Sebastian Roché · Mike Hough *Editors*

Minority Youth and Social Integration

The ISRD-3 Study in Europe and the US

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Editors
Sebastian Roché
National Centre of Scientific
Research (CNRS)
PACTE, Sciences-Po/Grenoble-Alpes
University
Grenoble, France

Mike Hough
School of Law, Birkbeck
University of London
London, UK

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This book draws on various sub-samples of the third International Self-Report Delinquency Study (ISRD), and the UPYC project in particular (Understanding and Preventing Youth Crime), to examine processes of integration of migrant and minority groups in developed industrialised societies. ISRD is a large-scale school-based survey of teenagers, involving research teams from around 35 countries. In this book, based on the UPYC project, our focus is on France, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States, though some chapters have included other European countries for comparative purposes.

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Contributors

Sandrine Astor Grenoble-Alpes University, CNRS, Science Po Grenoble, PACTE, ARIANE group, Grenoble, France

Claire Aussems University of Groningen/the Free University of Amesterdam/ Verwey-Jonker Institute, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

Dirk Enzmann Faculty of Law, Institute of Criminal Sciences, University of Hamburg, Hamburg, Germany

Diego Farren Institute of Criminology, Universität Hamburg, Hamburg, Germany

Mike Hough Emeritus Professor, School of Law, Birkbeck, University of London, London, UK

Ilka Kammigan Helmut-Schmidt-University, Hamburg, Germany

Chris E. Marshall School of Criminology and Criminal Justice, University of Nebraska-Omaha, Omaha, NE, USA

Ineke Haen Marshall School of Criminology and Criminal Justice, Northeastern University, Boston, MA, USA

Susan McVie School of Law, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK

Kath Murray School of Law, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK

Sebastian Roché National Centre of Scientific Research (CNRS), PACTE, Sciences-Po/Grenoble-Alpes University, Grenoble, France

Guillaume Roux Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, University of Grenoble Alpes, CNRS, Sciences Po Grenoble, PACTE, Saint-Martin-d'Hères, France

Majone Steketee Verwey-Jonker Institute, Utrecht, The Netherlands

Erasmus School of Social and Behavioural Science, Erasmus University, Rotterdam, The Netherlands

Renske S. van der Gaag Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

About the Editors

Mike Hough is an emeritus professor at the School of Law, Birkbeck, University of London. He founded and directed the Institute for Criminal Policy Research (ICPR) until his retirement in 2016. His research interests include procedural justice theory, public perceptions of crime, crime measurement and crime trends, and sentencing. He was president of the British Society of Criminology from 2008 until 2011.

Sebastian Roché is research professor at the National Centre of Scientific Research (CNRS), Sciences-Po, Grenoble-Alpes University, France. He has published research in the field of juvenile crime and criminal justice, and comparative policing, police legitimacy, and notably with Dietrich Oberwittler *Police-citizen relations across the world* (Routledge). He is the European editor of *Policing and Society* and head of UPYC-France project.

About the Authors

Sandrine Astor is a research assistant in social science methodology. She supports academics in survey design, data analysis and monitoring of fieldwork in relation to the use of quantitative techniques and tools in social sciences. She is a member of the research group ARIANE (research project support) at Pacte research unit (Université Grenoble-Alpes, CNRS, Science Po Grenoble). She is the head of the fieldwork of the fifth wave of the European Values Study in France.

Claire Aussems is an independent methodologist who was employed at the University of Groningen, the Free University of Amsterdam and at the Verwey-Jonker Institute. She specialises in the analysis of quasi-experiments and structural equation modelling.

Dirk Enzmann is professor at the University of Hamburg, Faculty of Law, Institute of Criminal Sciences. He teaches criminology at the Faculty of Law and statistical methods at the Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences. He has been a member of the ISRD steering committee since 2005. His research interests include juvenile delinquency, social contexts of crime, analytical criminology and survey research methods.

Diego Farren is a researcher and PhD candidate at the Institute of Criminology at Universität Hamburg. He holds master's degrees in sociology from Universidad de Chile and from Universität zu Köln. From 2006 until 2010 he worked for the non-profit organisation Fundación Paz Ciudadana. His main area of interest is the explanation of criminal behaviour through empirical analyses.

Ilka Kammigan is a criminologist and currently works as a post-doctoral research assistant at the Helmut-Schmidt-University in Hamburg, where she teaches statistics. She was involved in the UPYC/ISRD3 project as part of the German team at the University of Hamburg. Her research interests centre around theory testing and juvenile delinquency.

Susan McVie is professor of quantitative criminology at the School of Law, University of Edinburgh. She is director of the Understanding Inequalities project, co-director of the Edinburgh Study of Youth Transitions and Crime, and senior associate with the Administrative Data Research Centre for Scotland and the Scottish Centre for Crime and Justice Research. Her research includes crime trends and patterns, youth crime, juvenile justice, violence, homicide, knife crime, gangs, law enforcement and public health.

Chris E. Marshall is associate professor in the School of Criminology and Criminal Justice at the University of Nebraska at Omaha. He received his PhD in sociology from Iowa State University and, throughout his career, has been interested in theory construction, juvenile delinquency and quantitative methods. He has published in the areas of comparative criminology and cross-national methodology and has been working with the International Self-Report Delinquency Study for several years.

Ineke Haen Marshall is professor of sociology, criminology and criminal justice at Northeastern University, Boston, USA. She has published in the areas of comparative criminology, drug policy, criminal careers, minorities and crime, and cross-national methodology. She has been involved in the ISRD project from its inception and currently is the chair of the ISRD project.

Kath Murray is a research fellow at the University of Edinburgh. She has published research on stop and search in Scotland and is currently undertaking research on the devolution of railway policing in Scotland. Her research interests include the use of police powers, police legitimacy and accountability.

Guillaume Roux is a researcher at the Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, University of Grenoble Alpes, CNRS, Science Po Grenoble, PACTE. His research interests include racialisation, police-minorities relations, experience of discriminations and politicisation in poor urban suburbs, as well as methodology and epistemology. He is leading a research on the historical construction of antagonistic relations with the police and mobilisations in the French *banlieues.*

Majone Steketee is chairman of the board of directors of the Verwey-Jonker Institute (the Netherlands), which conducts scientific research on social issues. She is an expert in the fields of youth (care), violence in dependent relationships and mental health and has been involved in international studies of youth crime and intergenerational transfer of domestic violence. She is professor at the Department of Psychology, Education and Child Studies of the Social Faculty of the Erasmus University in Rotterdam.

Renske van der Gaag is a PhD researcher at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam. She co-ordinated the third wave of the International Self-Report Delinquency study in the Netherlands. Her research examines individual, family, school, neighbourhood and country influences to better understand differences in offending behaviour between migrant and non-migrant children across countries.

Chapter 1
Introduction: How Relations to Institutions Shape Youth Integration—Ethno-Religious Minorities, National Contexts and Social Cohesion

Sebastian Roché and Mike Hough

Social cohesion depends on a variety of societal mechanisms, whether material or symbolic, that make individuals feel attached to one another. Ultimately, cohesion can only occur if inhabitants of any geographical space believe that they are bound together or, at least, can coexist peacefully despite their differences. The socialisation of children certainly plays a role in shaping their views of society, their norms and value and their social identity (as part of an ethnic-religious group). Given the importance of institutions in modern and complex societies, cohesion also requires a shared sense that overarching norms, the political authorities that hold power and related street-level bureaucrats are supported, trusted and legitimate, or, at least, not rejected. Migration as a demographic factor and as a political reality, with the ethnic cleavages that in general can be consequent on migration, has a great importance, and more information is needed about how European and US societies actually face and suffer or benefit from these realities. The discussion about the place of Muslims, more intense in Europe than in the USA, has fuelled this debate even more after the terrorist attacks that have struck many European countries. Even before this, however, international organisations such as UNESCO and the OECD had expressed their concerns back in the mid-1990s about the effects of globalisation upon social cohesion (Green, Preston, & Janmaat, 2006).

Lack of cohesion may show itself in societal polarisation, group avoidance (with phenomena such as the 'white flight' and school segregation) or increases in crime. For young people, the mechanisms of cohesion operate at the interactional level in small groups of friends or during encounters with adults, as well as at the symbolic

S. Roché (✉)
National Centre of Scientific Research (CNRS), PACTE, Sciences-Po/Grenoble-Alpes University, Grenoble, France
e-mail: sebastian.roche@sciencespo-grenoble.fr

M. Hough
Emeritus Professor, School of Law, Birkbeck, University of London, London, UK
e-mail: M.hough@bbk.ac.uk

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level with the formation of moral values and the drawing of boundaries between larger groups (defined, e.g. by nationality, ethnicity and religious affiliation) in the public sphere. Cohesion is also dependent on socio-economic stratification and the geographic concentration of disadvantage. Finally, organisations that have responsibilities for social nurturing and enforcing rules, such as school, police and courts, have the power to influence and sometimes shape interactions as they variously can require attendance, demand compliance with orders and impose sanctions. They might also have effects on the formation of group identities and values: young people can discover who they are and what their status in society is, based on experiences at school and with the police. A cohesive society, one could assume, is one of shared morality and low crime, where interpersonal bonding operates across social, ethnic and religious groups and where organisations that discharge public functions are not resented but contribute to a peaceful and orderly way of life. Are certain societies more able than others to reaching such goals? Are the determinants of cohesion identical across nations?

This book aims at studying cohesion in a comparative manner. Its empirical foundation is an international research project, *Understanding and Preventing Youth Crime (UPYC)*, focusing on France, Germany, the Netherlands, the UK and the USA. UPYC is nested within a larger project, the International Self-Report Delinquency Study (ISRD), a large-scale international survey of schoolchildren in around 35 countries (Enzmann et al., 2018). There are still very few comparative surveys that can address issues of social cohesion, key ones being the World Values Survey and the European Social Survey. Most of them are focussed on the adult population. Conversely, comparative surveys of adolescents tend to be school-based and address educational issues. Perhaps the best known is the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA), a triennial international survey which aims to evaluate education systems worldwide by testing the skills and knowledge of 15-year-old students; and few have addressed questions of social cohesion, social disorder or crime. In the domain of juvenile criminology, publications tend to be international in the sense of being compilations of separate country-level studies, rather than genuine comparative work (but see Green et al., 2006 for a notable exception). Conversion to comparative research is a slow process, although a much needed one, given the diversity of nations and state forms in the EU and beyond. The UPYC/ISRD project provides an important empirical contribution to the existing academic discussion in several ways.

Firstly, the ISRD dataset allows us to use a multi-level approach, with a city or national context at the macro level, a local or meso-context (neighbourhood or school) and individual level behaviours and attitudes. The survey covers a wide range of topics, including experience as crime victims and whether these crimes are reported to the police, involvement in crime as perpetrators, exposure to family violence and attitudes to morality. The ISRD also sheds light on social identities (in particular religious and ethnic identities) across various national contexts and finds intriguing results in the sense that it is the exception and ‘not’ the rule that group identification or group belonging has comparable effects in all countries.

This 'negative' finding is important and highlights the need for understanding macro-contexts and how they impact individual level correlations. Comparing individuals and social groups across cities or countries is an important element for generalisation of theoretical assumptions: an average significant effect in a European sample might mask considerable variation between countries and between social groups in a given country.

Secondly, there is a diversity of ways in which adolescents are connected to society. Bonding operates through primary groups as family or friends but also through contacts with state-run or state-regulated organisations that have a duty to shape citizens, namely, schools and police. Those organisations both impose procedures and norms to individuals and provide a service to them. They even have an effect on primary groups, for example, when schools gather children of the same ethnic background with the consequence of increasing intragroup relations both among parents and children. We are not studying children in the political system, to paraphrase D. Easton, but rather children in the institutions and how the administration system affects their behaviours and ideas. Together with the nature and type of service distribution (more universalistic or more particularistic, see below), the perceptions and attitudes vis-à-vis school or police fall into the domains of study of the relations between young people and the state. Understanding the ways in which young people relate to their institutional environment is essential in a modern and post-industrial society where large organisations structure social life.

Thirdly, the manner in which all segments of a given society are policed and in which education is structured and distributed to those segments may be of critical importance for the study of cohesion and crime. Of particular importance is the orientation of the service: is it intended to be universalistic, treating all individuals (in our case, young people) in the same way irrespective of their socio-economic status or their ethnic group? Or is provision tailored specifically for different socio-economic or ethnic groups? Typically, policing or the provision of education may be evenly or unevenly distributed along those lines according to national principles or practices. A comparative approach is key to revealing the effect of such differences on children.

The overall methodology of ISRD3 and key findings can be found in Enzmann et al. (2018), and subsequent chapters in this book provides more specific methodological details. In brief, the survey was the third in a series that was originally built around modules of questions asking schoolchildren in the 7th–9th grades (aged 12–16) about their self-reported offending and experience of victimisation. While ISRD was designed to estimate the prevalence of offending and victimisation, it was also designed to enable testing of different criminological theories, particularly in the third sweep. Most participating countries sampled schools in two medium-sized or large cities, with samples designed to be representative of these cities (rather than the respective country). The survey was administered in school classrooms, using internet-based self-completion questionnaires wherever possible. The dataset for the third sweep of ISRD covered 27 countries at the time of writing, with a combined sample of 62,636.

The UPYC project was nested within ISRD3, covering France, Germany, the Netherlands, the UK and the USA. It was designed to examine issues of social cohesion and integration as they affected young migrants and other minority groups. Sample sizes were 1819 for France, 2957 for Germany, 1884 for the Netherlands, 2110 for the UK and 1920 for the USA (though data collection was still in progress in the USA at the time of writing.) The rationale for the choice of countries was partly pragmatic: there was a pre-existing network of researchers in these countries; and there was a funding programme, the Open Research Area (ORA) designed specifically to promote research collaboration between the five countries, from which we secured funding.

However, we also thought that any examination of issues of social cohesion and young people should start, at any rate, by examining relatively homogeneous countries facing recognisably similar problems of social integration. The five countries are all economically developed, industrialised and Western, and migration from developing countries, often in the global South, is a common trend. At the same time, there remain some important historical, social, cultural and political differences between the five. We thought that comparing and contrasting these countries would prove more useful, and generate more insights, than analysis across all 27 ISRD countries that between them cover an enormous range of social, economic and cultural features.

We should be clear about the limitations of ISRD and of UPYC as a project within it. Surveys are necessarily crude instruments that use multiple-choice questions to quantify often subtle concepts. Comparative surveys—especially when deployed in different countries—raise a further set of issues about conceptual equivalence across different languages and different cultures. Then there are forms of sampling error and non-sampling error which can limit the generalisability of survey findings. Finally, surveys usually provide a snapshot of the sampled population at a specific time—even if many of the questions they address are implicitly or explicitly about cause and effect: in survey analysis we search for correlations as an indication of causality—but we cannot in a single snapshot survey definitively test the direction of this causality. We can be certain that all these problems are present to some degree in UPYC/ISRD3, and we obviously do our best to contain them—and to remind the reader of their existence. Offsetting them, ISRD3 has some very significant strengths: a questionnaire which has been largely tried and tested; sizable samples, carefully drawn, in 35 countries; computer-assisted self-interviewing (CASI) wherever possible; and careful editing and checking of the final datasets. It seems likely that the problems we have listed will, in general, reduce the 'signal-to-noise' ratio in our findings, especially if different country samples are prone to different sorts of error, making findings opaque and hard to interpret. The strengths of ISRD3, on the other hand, should increase the 'signal-to-noise' ratio. We take comfort from the fact that the chapters in this books set out a remarkably clear and coherent set of findings—that we take as an indication that the survey's strengths far outweigh its weaknesses.

Key Comparative Findings: Crime and Attitudes Towards Morality and Norm-Shaping Institutions

The principal rationale for crime surveys—whether focussed on victimisation or self-reported offending—is to provide better indices of crime and crime-related behaviours. A recurrent finding in the three sweeps of the ISRD survey to date is the lack of accuracy of national data regarding juvenile crime and the lack of comparability of data from one criminal justice system to another. This is a serious impediment to the development of pan-European criminology and of course of world criminology if the geographical scope is broader. ISRD surveys cannot fully remedy these limitations, but at least for juvenile crime, it helps refining the diagnostic of variations in crime reporting to and recording by police.

There are many different types of crimes. They may be examined from the perpetrators' or the victims' perspectives. Rates of self-reported delinquency and risky behaviours among adolescents are presented in Figs. 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3 for the entire sample in the five UPYC countries. Among the variety of illegal acts, downloading is the most popular. It is more than three times higher than the next most prevalent crime: one-third of adolescents say they do this (Fig. 1.1). As regularly found in such surveys, theft without violence and fighting come second: opportunities and quarrels drive such behaviours. Assaults and complex thefts that require preparation are the least declared crimes. Alcohol and other drugs are used by adolescents (Fig. 1.2), but alcohol surpasses by far other substances, with a prevalence of 41% against 10% for cannabis, which is itself much more popular than LSD or heroin.



Fig. 1.1 Self-reported offending, prevalence, last year offending (five countries)



Fig. 1.2 Prevalence (lifetime consumption) of heroin/crack, ecstasy, LSD, speed, cannabis and alcohol in five countries



Fig. 1.3 Prevalence (last 30 days consumption) of use of alcohol/cannabis (categories: never/once or twice/ three or more times, five countries



Notes:
1. Prevalence rates are the percentages of respondents victimized at least once last year
2. Notification rates are the percentages of victims who notified the police on at least one occasion.
3. 95% confidence intervals plotted; weights used.

Fig. 1.4 Prevalence rates and rates of notification to police for three selected types of crime in five UPYC countries

And, the higher frequency of alcohol consumption (three times or more during the reference period) is much higher than cannabis (15% against 3%). Binge drinking is engaged in by a substantial share of young teenagers (15%). Clearly, given its association with violence, alcohol should be considered an important priority in terms of health and daily security.

Victimisation provides another perspective on crime prevalence. Among those covered by UPYC, cyberbullying now has the highest victimisation rate in all UPYC countries, followed by theft; crimes involving threat or use of physical violence remains the least frequent. Figure 1.4 shows prevalence rates—or the percentage of respondents victimised once or more in the last year—for robbery, assault and simple theft (without violence). There are variations between the five UPYC countries for some but not all crimes, with variation greatest for theft. Among Western countries, victimisation displays comparable levels of prevalence for robbery/assault: 4/3.8 in the USA, 4.4/4.8 in the UK, 4.7/5.2 in Germany, 4.9/4.3 in the Netherlands and 5,2/6,5 in France. France and Germany stand slightly above the average (4.6/4.9) for assaults. As expected, prevalence of theft is higher on average (26.2) and in each country: 32.6 in the USA, 19.1 in the UK, 32.3 in Germany, 25.5 in the Netherlands and 18.8 in France.

Figure 1.4 also shows that a very large proportion of victimisations go unreported to the police and therefore do not appear in statistics of crimes recorded by the police. Starting with the victims' perspective for the same selected crimes, UPYC highlights that young people do not report crime very often (to any adult

authority), and although such a rule applies everywhere, there are variations across countries. Around seven out of ten crimes—the vast majority, including robberies and assaults—will go unreported to the police. On average the reporting rate is 31% for robbery, 27% for assault and 25% for theft. Notification rates may be higher for a specific type of crime in a given country (e.g. robbery in France and to a lesser extent in the Netherlands), but on average for the three types of crime, they are comparable. This clear-cut contribution of UPYC needs to be highlighted.

Compared to adult surveys such as the ICVS, which display low reporting rates for crimes against the person, but higher rates for a range of property crimes, adolescents report a lower proportion of crimes to the police. That is a very obvious but critically important finding. It follows that it makes little sense to compare across countries police and judicial statistics of crimes concerning adults against those concerning young people. A second conclusion is about the determinants of these variations in reporting rates. We remain very largely ignorant of the sources of variation, which are large for several offences. Does this have to do with the perception of the police? Or with socio-economic characteristics or social inequalities across groups? Or other factors relating to a more general legitimacy of the state? Or with systematic differences between countries in the severity of particular crime types? Farren, Hough, Murray, and McVie (2018) in this volume found that reporting rates seemed unrelated to trust in the police, echoing findings from surveys of adult victimisation over many years that have shown that reporting rates tend to reflect—at least in part—instrumental self-interest (e.g. Hough & Mayhew, 1985). The fact that relationships with the the police are largely instrumental is of the essence when trying to analyse police citizen relations. And it is too often neglected from a theoretical point of view. But more research is obviously needed here.

Adopting the perpetrators' perspective, do we obtain a different picture? UPYC respondents who admitted committing crimes said that they were rarely subject to criminal investigation because their crime went undetected. The last year incidence question out of which the last year prevalence is constructed states, 'How often has this happened to you in the last 12 months?', and the reporting/notification to police incidence question is: 'How many of these incidents were reported to the police?'. Figure 1.5 shows that crime prevalence varies by country, but that overall, most countries have quite similar rates prevalence as measured by a general index of offending. However, the UK stands below the average and France clearly above it. Regarding the detection or contact rate, which is a measurement of how much police know about youth crime, it appears clearly that only a modest share of the total reaches the law enforcement authorities, on average 15.4%. A reporting rate being between 10 (the UK) and 25% (the Netherlands) does not allow police to have a comprehensive overview of youth crime. Germany (20.3) and the Netherlands police seem to be much more often aware of juvenile crimes than others (all between 9.6 and 10.3). That may be due to the city sizes that are sampled in each country or to social processes through which police are informed by citizens, and it is too early to draw a firm conclusion about policing performance here.

When comparing the ten cities nested in five countries, we end up with a complex picture of juvenile crime. Prevalence rates for different crimes vary across cit-



Notes:

1. 13 out of 14 self-reported offences included (all but illegally downloading).
2. Prevalence rates are the percentages of respondents who report committing at least one of these 13 offences in the previous year.
3. Rates of contact with the police are the percentages of respondents admitting offending who said that at least one of their offences had come to police attention.
4. 95% confidence intervals plotted; weights used.

Fig. 1.5 Index of self-reported 13 types of crime prevalence and crime coming to police attention (%) by country

ies, regardless of whether data on victimisation or self-reported offending are compared. This is despite the fact that all these cities have many similarities as Western industrialised conurbations. And regardless of whether victim or self-reported offending data are used, only a small proportion of youth crime reaches police attention. There are few hypotheses regarding these variations in rates of reporting or detection. On the more positive side regarding international knowledge production, such ISRD-related surveys have established a number of things with certainty: excepting the most serious of crimes, very few crimes of which juveniles are either victim or a perpetrator are detected by the criminal justice system. It follows that the main factors that regulate such behaviours have to be looked for outside the criminal justice system. Larger socio-economic and institutional factors must be taken into account in a comparative fashion, and criminologists have started to do so regarding the former more than the latter.

The cross-country differences in juvenile victimisation or offending are not well explained today. The same is true about variations in their detection by public authorities. They certainly should be a major focus of research in addition to the well-drafted causes that operate at meso-level (such as neighbourhood level) and at the individual level (e.g. via some psychological features such as impulsivity). The contributors to this book suggest many possible explanations and provide empirical

evidence of the importance of the structure and policies of some institutions, namely, schools and police. Their work suggests that the determinants both of crime and of reporting crime to authorities are worth investigating comparatively and that there are explanations in aspects of societal functioning that are related to the morality of adolescents (Wikström, 2010), the manner in which they are raised, the groups to which they belong (whether in terms of ethnic origin or migrant status).

Another meaningful lead is the institutional socialisation of young migrants in the host country by schools and by police through their day-to-day contact with agents of these two organisations. Taken together, these two aspects are illustrative of the integration of youth into society. Such is the path that this books starts to explore.

Integration of Society and Integration in Society

Integration has two main meanings: integration of society and integration in society. The first one refers to the whole society (or a whole social ensemble): it is said to be integrated when it can resist internal tensions or external shocks. In that sense, integration is a property of the totality (a society is more or less integrated). The second meaning denotes the relations that each individual has to the whole society. One is said to be (strongly) integrated when one is (strongly) tied to society, and the strength of the tie to it may result of multiple types of bonds. Here integration points at the relation between the parts and the whole. We might be tempted to infer that a society where individuals are closely tied to the whole is more integrated, and that may well be true, but still it remains conjecture. Perhaps a small shock experienced by a highly homogeneous and closely knit community may fracture it, while the same shock to a more diverse—and apparently more deformable—society would not. On the other hand, it seems likely that a diverse community experiences more tensions between its various parts. However, in this book, we shall not venture into a study of cohesion as a structural feature of the whole but rather focus on individuals in relation to society.

If we agree that integration in society has to do with the fact that its various parts are bundled together, we should also concur with the possibility that there are different *types* of bonds (such as shared common values or mutually beneficial interactions). It should be added that integration may be a consequence of coercion or of voluntary adherence to a society which reflects the relationship between power holder and citizens (that relates to types of political regime or inequality of rights of groups in society). Of course, bonding operates at different levels (e.g. between individuals, at the school level or at national level). In the study of the process of bonding, we should pay special attention to the forging of attachment by families and schools and the guardianship of norms by the police (and to a lesser degree, in the case of young people, the courts).

Integration in society does not solely refer to the process through which foreigners enter a host country and connect to it. In his study of suicide, didn't Durkheim

take into consideration several dimensions of that connection to society, including gender, age and occupation? However, today the word integration is mostly used in reference to minorities, persons with a migration background and migrants themselves. Without offsetting the role of socio-economic conditions, the importance of the hypothesis of 'importation' of cultural models by persons that have a migrant background should not be underestimated (Chap. 4).

The focus of this volume is thus on young people in relation to their migration history or minority status. It is important to bear in mind that the two notions are not synonyms. Very few black people in the USA are migrants, and most have a very distant 'migrant background'—if that is an adequate way of characterising enslavement—dating back centuries. And Maghreb people in France and African Caribbeans and Asians in the UK are now increasingly descendants of migrants—the third or even fourth generation. In addition, many migrants are persons who are travelling from one country to another within the European Union, from Poland to Germany or Spain to France, for example. These migrants may find integration much less problematic than those from countries beyond the EU, especially when the latter have a distinctive cultural heritage (such as religion). In these cases, there are indications that their migrant background is associated with less attachment to the host society and its institutions (Van Bergen, Feddes, Doosje, & Pels, 2015). Many factors may explain this: the lack of social capital (due to low parental education), lower language skills, a smaller social network connecting them to the host society and limited knowledge of the mainstream culture. However, since it is clear that there are variations from country to country, for example, in attitudes towards the police among the minority (Bradford & Jackson, 2017; Roché & Oberwittler, 2018), it seems that institutional and policy level factors must be keyed in such as school structure and policing policies. The UPYC data will be used here to test these hypotheses.

As we work with individual data about youth attitudes, we are able to assess their subjective attachment to society in terms of their values and connect the latter to their demographic characteristics (and, e.g. their migration status or their belonging to a minority group). Moreover, we are in a position to compare youth across Western societies.

Societal Integration in Society and Migration Backgrounds: Morality and Socio-Economic Determinants of Offending

The analysis of the UPYC dataset confirms the existence of challenges for the integration of young people with a migrant background, both in terms of adherence to moral norms that prohibit the use of violence and in socio-economic terms such as deprivation of neighbourhood or poor family supervision that constitute risk factors. It also finds national variations; hence, it would be as erroneous to neglect those challenges as it would be to assume that they are inevitable.

There obviously is a diversity of types of emotional and intellectual attachment to a society, for example, one may be 'proud' to be a national of a country and feel that others in the same nation may be trusted or adhere to 'shared values'. Morality refers to the latter type. Morality is about what is accepted and what is not, in a given society. And, at individual level, it is about the feelings of individuals vis-à-vis doing 'wrong' things: without shame, morality would not be a guide to individual behaviour.

Chapter 2 by Ineke Marshall and Chris Marshall studies the five countries, comparing variations in levels of moral condemnation of various forms of crime and misbehaviour (such as hitting someone intending to hurt them and robbery). Thus students in the USA and Germany expressed the highest levels of condemnation of robbery, while French and Dutch students were least condemnatory, with the UK in the middle. A similar ranking of countries emerged for physical violence. In addition, the authors find least heterogeneity in the judgement of students in the USA and Germany and greatest variation in France and the Netherlands; again the UK lies in the middle. These results indicate a strong moral consensus, or shared moral norms, in the USA and Germany and more variation in France and the Netherlands. In sum, Germany and the US children are more clearly opposed to violence, and there is agreement about this moral stance, while French and Dutch pupils are less averse to violence in aggregate but also more variable in their opinions.

Estimates of the degree of wrongdoing associated with serious crimes have great analytical value. Indeed, these crimes are those that are most central to morality: they attract the greatest condemnation and therefore are the most common ground on which human interaction may be developed. It appears very clearly that parents are at the core of morality in all countries for children at the age of junior high school and that they surpass by far other possible moral agencies such as teachers or friends. This finding, combined with differences found across countries, points to the need to do further research on differential parental attachment in Western and non-Western countries.

If there is no shared sense of wrongdoing across social groups, then this will work against the moral integration of society. Ineke Marshall and Chris Marshall have studied the relationships between moral judgements and migration status and religious affiliation. They show that migration status and religion play a role in some countries regarding moral condemnation of violent behaviours. Focusing on the core items involving use of violence, and using an 'index of wrongness' (highest when condemnation is higher), native-born pupils (ratio value, 44) clearly condemn robbery much more than first-generation migrants, children born abroad (ratio value, 20). The fact that second-generation migrants sit in between the two groups suggest a socialisation process and progressive incorporation of morality in the country. The notion that the first generation displays the least shame in front of their parents may in part explain difficulties that their families experience in effectively supervising their behaviour. Or, it may reflect the fact that children are exposed to more family violence, as Dirk Enzman and Ilka Kammigan explain: the differences that they found in prevalence rates of parental punishment between juveniles with and without migration background are substantial (Germany, 15.4 vs. 10.7%; the

Netherlands, 23.9 vs. 16.9%; the UK, 17.4 vs. 10.6%). The effect of migration background is reduced in some countries (France and the Netherlands) when taking living conditions into account, yet significant differences between migrant and non-migrant families remain (see Chap. 4). Role models are not as violence free in families with a recent migration background. And since school is less important than family socialisation regarding the sense of shame about violence, this explains that school effects on deviance and morality are modest (see below). In addition, in two of the four EU countries, Muslim students seem more likely to condone violence: in the three 'hitting with intent to hurt' scenarios, they appear to report slightly lower levels of shame and Christians the highest.

Most of the statistical effect in the overall sample on differences in shame comes from the Netherlands and the UK. It would require additional work to decide how religion combines with social status or group position in explaining that finding. The data do not suggest that migration status or religion have a major effect on morality. However, as no single other variable seem to have a massive effect, those two variables need not to be discarded. Unveiling the specificity of Muslims in Europe when it comes to values and relations to the wider society is not unique to the UPYC project as the works of Ruud Koopmans on adults (2015) and of Oberwitter and Roché on adolescents (2018) have found. Still, such a disparity in morality may be a cause of phenomena of social separatisms if families would prefer social environment that share their core principles, as indicated by extant research (on social homophilia in networking, McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001). This is another avenue for further research.

Majone Steketee and Claire Aussems have tested the predictive effects of adolescents' bonds—with parents, teachers, schools and friends—on involvement in offending, as measured by an index of self-reported crime (committed last year) in nine countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the UK, the USA). Clearly, having a migrant background (first and second generations, the latter representing three quarters of the total) is a predictor of the propensity to commit crimes. The analysis found some support for bonding theory, but the protective effect of bonding with parents, teachers, the school or friends is not strong and is inconsistent across countries. The relationship between migrant status and offending was better explained by a mix of other mediating factors. Firstly, contextual factors are at play such as living in a disorderly neighbourhood and attending a school with higher levels of disorders. Secondly, their families tend to exercise less robust supervision. Thirdly, peer effects also prove important: differential association with delinquent friends is a significant predictor of crime. Those lower levels of favourable contextual factors and family control probably explain lower self-control, which contributes to offending. This is a very classic set of criminogenic variables, well established in the literature. Overall, the researchers find very little empirical support for the role of social bonds as they are measured by subjective assessments on juvenile delinquency. The classic set of variables linking migration background to risk factors appear robust in most countries, the least being school disorganisation (a finding consistent with Chap. 3). How bonds and classic risk variables could be combined with morality to explain differences in offending across nations appears to be a natural follow-up study.

Integration: Schooling and Policing of Minorities and Majority Groups

Integration of youth with a migrant background is related to socio-economic as well as to morality-based determinants which can all be said to belong to a 'societal domain'. However, integration is also dependent on how institutions work and therefore on processes or policies that are adopted in order to design or regulate organisations or to direct them towards achieving specific aims. Based on the UPYC dataset, we may compare organisational designs and policies across countries and start shedding light on their effects. Schools and police forces are the two main institutions which are discussed, and both may impact integration into society.

Schools and police are institutional instruments that are serve indispensable functions for all modern states, without which their survival would be threatened. Stable states need loyal and law-abiding citizens, and this is achieved through socialisation, discipline and sanctions. A school system imposes itself on families and children: education is compulsory until a given age (often 16 in Western nations), school discipline is mandatory, and its violation may result into sanctions; substance of education is based on standards decided by national or local bodies—and often includes modules about citizenship for newcomers (see Joppke, 2008). In addition, a school system is structured into a series of processes that vary across countries: some adopt a tracking system (allocated pupils to different streams according to ability) and others a more universal approach; and some are (almost) entirely public, while others can rely heavily on the private sector. Police systems also impose norms, of a legal nature, on citizens. Police agents may control citizens, including young people, and have the power to force compliance (although not all police forces are inclined in a similar way to do that) with their orders. On the streets, their agents are those that lay down the law. Of course, police are not schools and reciprocally. Schools have an objective of personal development and skills learning, which is clearly not in the remit of police. Police have a duty to sanction law-breaking, which is not based on any capacity development process.

Together, schools and police are instruments of social integration. And, criminologists know that school failure and behaviours such as school absenteeism are related to delinquent behaviours, whatever the direction of the causality may be. It is hard to conceive of integration into modern and complex societies without reference to policing and schooling. If children are to belong to a larger society beyond their primary groups, their attachment to it will involve relations to those organisations that shape the nature of what is shared. It is therefore essential to better understand how children are linked to schools and police systems and also to the 'street-level bureaucrats' who work in such systems (Lipsky, 1980). They have contact with teachers and police officers. They develop attachments to, or reject, these organisations and their agents.

Integration and Schools

Schools are usually expected to create a commonality of values across social divides and to produce civic attitudes and attachment to the nation and the political society. One dimension of this is shaping law-abiding citizens and preventing crime. However, that is possible only if children are attached to the school both as an institution and as a set of persons.

A school system might perform such a task more or less aptly according to its structure and its functioning principles. There are many reasons why the school system might promote or hamper integration in society. In fact, a school system has a variety of features: it may be more or less homogenous nationally (more in case of a nationally regulated system), public or private, tracked or untracked (with or without an early selection of children into vocational schools) and more or less segregated (ethnically, religiously or socio-economically) at school or classroom level, with strong or weaker interpersonal links between pupils and their teachers.

School effects may be direct or indirect. They may be direct since each adolescent has a relationship with teachers and is more or less successful at school and obedient to school rules (complying with what is expected). Positive links may result in more attachment to school and less delinquent behaviour (Hoffmann, Erickson, & Spence, 2013). Similarly, the development of patriotic attitudes is dependent to some extent on the structure of the school system (Janmaat & Mons, 2011). In addition, the school system may have an indirect effect since it shapes the peer environment, and peers are proven to be key for predicting crime (Junger-Tas et al., 2012). It is established that schools may be highly segregated even in the context of a public regulated education system (Felouzis, Liot, & Perroton, 2005) and that most friends are formed in the neighbourhood and at school (Ennett & Bauman, 1993). Not so surprisingly, 'imposed peer environment' has an influence on crime and delinquency (Müller, Hofmann, Fleischli, & Studer, 2015).

Two chapters address the matter of schooling and integration of majority and minority pupils. One addresses the issue of tracked versus untracked school systems and their effect on delinquency, and the other investigates the determinants of attachment to schools.

Renske van der Gaag and Majone Steketee have explored an important aspect of the school systems in eight countries[1] in Chap. 6: its comprehensive (Finland, France, the UK and the USA) versus stratified nature (Austria, Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland). In stratified systems, children are subject to an early-selection process and are assigned to schools. Class and school-level effects may well impact their delinquent behaviours through four mechanisms: orderly/disorderly school environment, school and teacher bonding, motivational influences and peer influences. Crime is measured using an index of all types of self-reported crimes. Although France was an exception, on average, pupils in comprehensive

[1] They supplemented the UPYC sample with respondents from Austria, Finland and Switzerland to provide a better comparison of tracked and untracked systems.

systems reported significantly lower offending levels than those in stratified systems, controlling for a number of variables. For lower tracks pupils, the chances of offending are almost 8% higher compared than those in comprehensive systems. It should be noticed that the degree of disorder of a school has no effect on their behaviours, showing that what matters most are human relations with peers and teachers.

In line with previous studies that suggest that the negative effects of stratified school systems are amplified for migrants (Crul, 2013; Entorf & Lauk, 2008), Renske van der Gaag and Majone Steketee find that being a migrant in a lower track increases the probability of offending. On average, children with a migrant background have a slightly higher chance of offending (+2%) and so do all students in a lower track (+5%). When children with a migrant background also are in a lower track, an additional risk is found (+3%). Overall, their analysis shows three things. Firstly, in countries with a tracking system, differences in offending between native and migrant students are largest in lower tracks. Secondly, again in countries with a tracking system, the crime propensity of students is more affected by tracking if they have a migrant background than if not (though Germany is an exception in that respect). Finally, differences between adolescents with and without a migration background are not found in countries with a comprehensive system.

Schools are at the forefront of integration: they constitute an interface between the small primary groups with which young people identify and the larger society. Often, schools are tasked with turning adolescents into citizens. For schools to be able to produce loyal citizens, they must be in a position to build a positive relationship with adolescents before they enter the public sphere. To what extent can schools build trust among young people, a precondition for any message to be positively received? And which types of schools in which countries are more effective in doing so for which children? The main focus of Chap. 5 by Sebastian Roché and Sandrine Astor is religion, both religious denomination and religiosity in the five UPYC countries. The focus on religion rather than migration background has some advantages and limitations. The limitations are associated with the loss of focus on likely differences between first-, second- and third-generation migrants. The former allows us to consider the largest religious minority (Muslim) and compare it to agnosticism and to Christianity: it is therefore a proxy of the cultural distance with host society which is of value for testing the perpetuation of a sense of collective identity irrespective of the date of arrival of the young person's family into the country.

In order to investigate the relationship between religion and school attachment, a school-level measurement has been created: 'school concentration'. If education systems may be categorised in tracked versus comprehensive (Chap. 6), they can also be observed from the perspective of ethnic or religious concentration (Chap. 5). A comprehensive system may well be segregated at school or classroom level. Here, the authors consider school-level concentration (not classroom level). Minority concentration at school varies very much across countries, even between nations that have comparable proportions of minority: the Netherlands avoids high concentration, while France allows it, to take two extreme cases. This suggests that governments have diverse policies when it comes to school composition.

On average, religiously unaffiliated youth are slightly less attached to their school than the Christian group. However, in France and in the UK, there is a 9–10 points difference, while there is none in Germany and the Netherlands. When compared to unaffiliated youth, Muslims have a lower attachment to their school; but there is no difference between unaffiliated pupils and Christians. When it comes to religiosity, children who attribute importance to their religion display higher school attachment than those with low religious attachment. This explains why the highest levels of attachment are found among Christians for whom religion is important. In more detail, the effect of religiosity for Muslims on school attachment varies by country. In Germany, the Netherlands and the USA, the most devout Muslims are more attached to their schools than the least devout. It is not observed in France, and the contrary is true in the UK.

For the four EU countries taken as a whole, minority religion concentration at school has a small negative effect on attachment. When considering denominations, decreased attachment is found only for majority children who become less attached to their school: the more the presence of the minority, the less the majority feels attached to their school. Sebastian Roché and Sandrine Astor call this a 'relegation' effect. It is observed in France, Germany and the Netherlands, but not in the UK. Finally, the minority Muslim group is not impacted by concentration, except in the UK, where it erodes attachment to school. It will be a surprise for the proponents of the thesis of resentment fuelled by segregation that there is no evidence of a large effect of minority concentration on school detachment for young Muslims. However, previous studies bearing on the perceptions of injustice by pupils across ethnic groups have shown that it is intensified by more ethnic mixing and then modestly improved by increasing proportionate representation of the majority group (Hagan, Shedd, & Payne, 2005; Paterson, 1997). Those scholars call it the 'ordeal of integration', and comparable and equally complex mechanisms might operate regarding school attachment.

Integration and Police

Moral integration does not necessarily coincide with social integration. Moral integration into a society is inseparable from a state of mind where one tends to agree with the core values, which equates to preparing oneself to comply with basic requirement such as discarding the use of violence or the appropriation of other people's belongings. What may be the role of the police in terms of influencing the preparedness to comply with the law? In Chap. 7, Diego Farren, Mike Hough, Kath Murray and Susan McVie use an innovation in the third wave of the ISRD project: a short questionnaire module was devised to measure key concepts associated with procedural justice theory, and this was implemented in 26 of the 27 ISRD countries. It was supplemented in the UK with further questions on experience of police stop and search—allowing comparison to be made within the UK between Scotland and England that relate to social justice theories.

The authors test whether teenagers' trust in the police and their perceptions of police legitimacy influenced preparedness to commit crime. It could be argued that this constitutes a test of the moral authority of the police: the amount of trust and legitimacy conferred by the public on police might be translated into people's internalised norms about crime being 'wrong'. In other words, this chapter explores the central hypothesis of procedural justice theory, that the police can engender compliance with the law, and commitment to the rule of law, not only through instrumental strategies—of deterrence through the threat of punishment—but equally importantly through normative mechanisms. It also touches upon distributive justice. Based on the premises that 'the distributions of benefits and burdens resulting from them fundamentally affect people's lives',[2] distributive justice concerns a socially just allocation by government of benefits and burden (here, police stops) and perceived distributive justice, a notion later used by psychologists.

Empirically speaking, the authors measured preparedness to cheat and to steal using responses to two vignettes that set out tempting criminal opportunities. Preparedness to offend was associated with a combination of low trust in police and low ratings of police legitimacy (which varied across the ISRD sample country to country). And, in England and Scotland, being stopped by police proves an important additional factor to negative attitudes towards the police, an effect reinforced when the contact was assessed by young people as disrespectful. The unfair distribution of a service matters, proving that distributive justice is an essential component of trust.

As other studies have shown for adults, in the 26-country ISRD sample, on average, the legitimacy that young people confer on the police is shaped to a significant degree by their trust in the police. In order to better understand the relative effects of some dimensions of trust in police vis-à-vis others, the authors have compared various dimensions of trust in the five UPYC countries. It emerges that belief in the procedural fairness of the police—that they treat people fairly and respectfully—is a stronger predictor of perceived legitimacy, than both beliefs in distributive fairness and in police competence. In aggregate, the various beliefs that measure trust in the police have a clear predictive impact on preparedness to offend, largely mediated through perceptions of legitimacy—as procedural justice theory would predict.

However, the extent to which procedural justice theory is universally verified remains uncertain. Evidence suggest that it is not the case beyond Western countries. While 20 of the 26 countries in the analysis yielded findings consistent with the theory, six did not: in Armenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cape Verde, India, Indonesia and Kosovo, the effect of trust and perceived legitimacy on intention to offend is non-significant. It is striking that none of these are developed, industrialised Western countries. Similar findings have also been reported among the adult population (e.g. Bradford and Jackson, 2017; Sato, 2017, Tankebe, 2008).

While it is interesting to look at relations with the police and compliance with social and legal rules from the perspective of young people's attitudes (such as

[2] Lamont, J., & Favor, Ch. (2017) Distributive justice. In *The Stanford encyclopedia of phylosophy*. Retrieved January 18, 2018, from https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justice-distributive/.

levels of trust and perceptions of legitimacy), it is of equal value to analyse the effects of their living conditions (measured through neighbourhood effects) and of their social identity (both religious and ethnic), as well as their combination. Religion is a strong source of identity (see Chap. 5 by Roché and Astor) in all UPYC country for the Muslim group as can be assessed, based on the subjective importance given to their denomination compared to other main faith in Europe. In Chap. 8, Guillaume Roux shows that the more that Muslims feel attached to their religion, the more likely they are to judge the police as unfair in France, Germany and the Netherlands (in the UK, a similar direction in the correlation is found, though it is not significant). Since ethnicity and religious denomination are very much intertwined in the five UPYC countries where the largest minority religion is Islam and where most of the members of that group are originally non-EU members, religious effects seem to be mediated by other variables. In any case, neighbourhood effects have even more importance.

Guillame Roux has constructed a scale to measure neighbourhood disorganisation, drawing on items about pupils' perceptions of the frequency of various problems in their area. These neighbourhoods are places where ethnic and religious minorities are overrepresented and account for 38–39% of the resident youth population, which underlines the manner in which geography and social identities are intertwined. He finds a clear relationship between living in a disrupted neighbourhood and lack of distributive justice i.e. the uneven distribution of burdens by police (that he calls perceived police unfairness). The correlation is at its strongest in France. France and the UK samples have a high proportion of pupils from highly disrupted neighbourhoods relative to Germany and the Netherlands. Having in mind that Muslim youth are prominently from a low SES background, it may explain why the mean level of perceived police unfairness is at its highest in France (20%) and in the UK (15%) and lower in Germany and the Netherlands (8% in both cases).

The importance of minority status regarding policing is further explored by Diego Farren and Mike Hough in a final chapter about policing. They focus on the five UPYC countries, and treat England and Scotland as two distinct nations in the empirical analysis. They confirm that migrant status in EU countries predicts low trust and legitimacy in the police, which in turn predicts increased probabilities of violent offending (measured by self-reported offending). However, this finding holds only for second-generation migrants: first-generation migrants were found to differ little from native-born pupils. This is an important finding, indicating that the integration process is one that happens over a period of time—and over generations—and that it can start off well and end less successfully. This is not to deny that for some migrant groups, problems of integration may start with the migrating generation and continue thereafter for subsequent generations. In other words, so-called cultural barriers can be in existence from the point of migration, and religion and ethnicity can both be a resource or a hindrance depending on the receiving context, be it at the neighbourhood or state level. Fleischmann and Phalet (2017) have shown that this is a more acute issue for Muslim migrants.

Compared against the native-born majority (white) pupils, membership of the groups of non-white second-generation migrants and non-white native-born pupils

predicts low ratings of the police and involvement in violent offending. (Since in the USA, the main divide is between black and white youth, it is not surprising that migrant status does not emerge as a key division when it comes to attitudes vis-à-vis police.) And in these—quite complex—set of relationships, it is clear that there are significant mediating variables that explain the relationships between migrant/minority status, orientation to the police and involvement in violent offending. Living in disorderly neighbourhoods with limited collective efficacy in conditions of deprivation are causally implicated—together with minority or migrant status in themselves—a theme that also emerged clearly in previous chapters. Again, these findings are important.

The New Frontier of Comparative Studies: How National Context, Institutions and Policies Affect Cohesion and Crime

We know that countries have different political models, some being built on migration as a foundational myth, while others have only been recently facing more diversity, especially in large cities. Even the countries that have a multicultural history are torn apart along such debate, as can be seen after the election of Donald Trump in the USA. Other governments openly express doubts about the multicultural model as in the UK or with the insistence on integration or assimilation in France or Germany. Countries once synonyms of tolerance like the Netherlands are facing similar contentious debates. It is not known if the political models brandished in the face of the public by government play a role and to which extent.

To us it seems that success or failure in incorporating and integrating minority groups is more likely to be determined by demographic factors associated with migration, by culture and by structural or socio-economic factors that can result in concentration of inequalities. Strong symbolic statements may have *some* declaratory power, but they say little about the real processes of integration. One of the clear implications of findings in this book is that minority and minority often diverge in their judgements on acceptability of violence and in use of violence on children by parents (in both cases higher for groups with a migrant background) and that many—but again not all—migrant and minority groups face structural pressures arising from lack of financial and educational resources, as well as discrimination that relegate them to the most disadvantaged neighbourhoods; and as a consequence, their teenage children are disproportionately at risk of involvement in crime and conflict with the police. We shall return to this point below.

The reality of day-to-day interactions at the local level with agents of those kind of institutions that build what people have in common (language, values, related imagined identities) is worth exploring with surveys that cover various meso- and macro-contexts. And, when it comes to youth, school and police are two such organisations. We are in need of an overall approach of the multiplicity of youth relations to organisations which are not limited to one of them but inclusive of the most critical ones (e.g. school and police). The role of such organisations and related

state policies needs to be at the top of research agenda given the prominent role of government in development of societies and settlement or aggravation of social tensions as well as inequalities. This volume provides important insights, confirmation of key findings as well as new explorations into comparing the determinants of crime and cohesion.

Firstly, and very importantly, we find strong country differences, be it within UPYC countries or beyond them using the larger data set inclusive of the ISRD 27 countries (see Chaps. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9). That is not a discovery: other studies record national disparities, and we intuitively know about such country-based differences. Still, explaining variations between countries is a process which is in its nascent phase. Given the fact that many correlates of crimes are well established at the individual level, it is of utmost scientific relevance to understand how factors combine in different cultural and political contexts. And much remains to be done here. Regarding policy recommendations, since there not only are differences across countries in levels of observed phenomena (e.g. crime rates or police trust proportions) but also in the correlations between variables (e.g. between migration status and morality or crime or religiosity and trust in schools), better understanding of the macro-context is necessary. Understanding the effects of the national meta-organisations produced, the state building processes and their consequences on social life are the new frontier for criminology.

Secondly, the integration into society of young people from minority groups and those with migrant backgrounds is a delicate process in EU countries, and we find many signs of the lack thereof (in Chaps. 2, 3, and 4). A shared sense of wrongdoing is necessary to a moral integration in society, and family socialisation probably combined to neighbourhood influence plays an important role there. And it appears that native-born pupils clearly reject much more often interpersonal violence than first-generation migrants, while, in two of the four EU countries, it is Muslim pupils who appear to report slightly lower levels of shame about being violent and Christians the highest (see Chap. 2). In addition, parental violence in Europe is more frequently observed in families with a migration history (see Chap. 4). At the same time, socio-economic disadvantage creates clear mediating factors driving them to juvenile crime (see Chap. 3). Ethnicity and religion are neither the sole nor the primary determinant of morality or crime; still they need to be studied comparatively since they may provide social identity to some groups in society and therefore contribute or hamper integration. Any honest explanation necessarily is multifaceted: ethnicity, religion and socio-economic conditions are intertwined (see Chaps. 3, 4, 5, and 9) in different ways in the various cities of participating countries in2 the UPYC project. We have tried to determine whether religion and religiosity were factors of integration (i.e. that strengthen attachment to school) or of disintegration (as drawing lines between groups and creating a distance with school especially in the case of minority religions). Empirically, the two realities have been observed (see Chap. 5). The integrative power of individuals' religion and religiosity seems to be best understood in relation to the social and political framework in which it takes place. Rather than invariant sociological laws, context-based regularities seem to be found.

Thirdly, state institutions and policies have a series of effects on minority integration (see Chaps. 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9). Those policies may relate to the neighbourhood composition, to school system, to school segregation and to policing policies in terms of stop and search and more generally in terms of how police handles relations with citizen. National policies implemented locally or local policies may cause difficulty but also effectively address the problem of integration of minority groups. It is easier for minority children to identify with the 'local society' or the 'local forms of state' role as in the case of schools, as opposed to the national society or state. The importance of the relationships with street-level bureaucrats (of which teachers are a type) is well known (Lipsky, 1980), as is the role of local integration (Koopmans, 2015). And school attachment and commitment have been one of the hypotheses for understanding adolescents' behaviours (Hirschi, 1969, and followers). School-level effects deserve as much attention as other meso-level geographies such as the neighbourhood or the city. And so do relations with police.

Echoing classic studies of the last century, we find that disadvantaged neighbourhoods matter (see Chaps. 3, 8, and 9). Where structural pressures create concentrations of minority and migrant groups in these areas, the result is less cohesion and more hardship and disruption in the integration process. Countries whose governments pay insufficient attention to these problems, and invest insufficient resources to address them, are seriously jeopardising social cohesion now and in the future. Urban policies and housing allocation policies provide the backdrop of such geographic determinants of integration—or its absence. Despite the welfare state tradition and policies in EU countries, the composition of the population in places where children are brought up has a strong and consistent effect upon them: they resent police more when they live in an underprivileged place. Population composition is a key determinant of relations between police and young people. The variations in the degree to which minority youth are concentrated in deprived neighbourhoods might be an important variable to take into account when designing public policy.

Overall, studies of the effects of school structure in this volume concern the principles on which schoolchildren are enrolled into a type of school (comprehensive or tracked) and the consequences of the processes of assignment to a geographic location (possibly leading to segregation). To start with, countries where schools systems are comprehensive are more able to support the integration of pupils with migrant backgrounds than countries with tracked ones that rely on early-selection processes. Pupils with migrant backgrounds in comprehensive schools have lower rates of offending than those in tracked schools, with offending rates comparable to native-born pupils. This can be taken as an indication of their adoption of shared norms (see Chap. 6). Finally, when school-level concentration of the minority is higher, the majority is less attached to school, while the minority remains largely unaffected by the greater concentration (see Chap. 5). In general, minority youth do not seem to be alienated from school by the composition policy (we have not yet tested the effect of that variable on school success or failure). Paradoxically, even in adverse conditions where segregation is high and disorders frequently observed, schools might play a lesser role in alienating minorities from public institutions, and likely the nation, than the police.

Interactions with the police and attitudes towards them have manifest effects on preparedness to commit crimes—with the implication that the moral standing of the police in young people's eyes influences their engagement in criminal behaviour (see Chaps. 7 and 9). The same variables are predictors of the level of trust in police, which also prove important for gaining legitimacy. It is a fact that the use of stop and search by police is directly related to government policies that either give directions or regulate the use of that power. The distribution of stop and search is the result of a government policy, and as such it varies by country and within one country according to which is the incumbent party or leader. Police officers' individual actions are directly related to politics and policies. This is obvious when comparing rates of stop across countries for adults (FRA, 2010), and this volume confirms that it is also the case for adolescents. And since rates may also vary dramatically over short periods of time, as it has been the case in Scotland recently, media and parliamentary pressure as of mid-2015 led to a fall in the number of searches in Scotland.

These observations take us back to the importance of social justice. Distributive justice is of particular significance in both policing and education. Some governments have publicly identified the problem in policing and asked for equality (as the UK), while others have not (as France). Identifying and correcting for differential treatment of different particular groups is clearly important. In the context of policing young people, accounting for exposure to stops has been shown to narrow the racial gap in terms of attitudes to the police (Hagan et al., 2005). When inequalities arise in policing or at school, the principles of justice are violated, and should individuals perceive of it, it follows that they have negative assessment of the institutions and less commitment to the law. The two main dimensions of injustice are lack of distributive justice and lack of procedural justice. Regarding distributive justice, we have observed how being enrolled in a non-universalistic school system (a tracked system, see Chap. 6) and being frequently targeted by the police (see Chap. 7) have proven detrimental to social integration of migrants. And, we have seen that perceived police distributive injustice (see Chap. 8) and perceived procedural injustice (see Chaps. 7 and 9) on the part of the police have negative effects on attitudes to the police and propensity to crime. Theoretically, it should be stressed that institutional trust, grounded both in procedural and distributive justice, is of great importance for the cohesion of society—even if several other factors are also at play.

Finally, we have highlighted average correlations between variables for a set of countries. Still, national variations were always present when studying school-related variables or individual characteristics of the youth respondents such as ethnicity or religion. And so too is it the case when it comes to attitudes to the police. National variations in the associations between variables should be accounted for by any theory that proclaims universal validity. While chapters in this book provide good support for procedural justice theory in our *industrialised, developed Western* countries that make up the UPYC sample, there appear to be geographic limitations in its applicability, with developing countries showing an absence of the usual statistical relationships (cf. Chap. 7). There are less-developed countries than developing

ones in the world, and most of the world population does not share the same Western culture and political culture. Moreover, other studies also question the universality of the trust/legitimacy/compliance relationships (see Bradford & Jackson, 2017; Oberwittler & Roché, 2018; Sato, 2017, for empirical and theoretical perspectives). This should alert us to the risk of ethnocentrism in the field of policing studies.

The historical and cultural framing of legitimacy needs to be properly taken into account in further studies since Westerners live under a very peculiar type of regime. In liberal democracies legitimacy was vested into the 'sovereign people' and therefore trust made a key determinant of the relation between the people and the incumbent ruler as codified by political philosophers such as John Locke and Thomas Hobbes, while Jean-Jacques Rousseau insisted on participation of citizens. The fact that leaders—and those that act in their names—need to be trusted, that citizen have a right to express their views on public matters (the emergence of the 'public sphere' to use Habermas' (1991) term) and that these things constitute a pillar for their exercise of power is both a geographically and temporally situated invention that gave birth to one sort of legitimacy. The intellectual influence of the enlightenment on our regional understanding of legitimacy, which translated into decades of revolutions and changes in Europe and was characterised as no less than the 'invention of democracy' (Bernstein & Winock, 2002), should not be taken for granted in all parts of the world. Studies of legitimacy should broaden their search for the sources of legitimacy and cohesion that can account for findings observed in a wider range of political, economic and cultural settings.

Comparative research on adolescents and crime offers a possibility of studying how government influences cohesion of society and integration in society, allowing to discern what processes and practices may benefit the whole national community and its constituent parts. The study of institutions, organisations and related policies needs to be taken further in order to understand the causes behind the already well-established individual or meso-level causes of crimes. With some adaptations, given both its international nature and its local implementation at city level, the ISRD may be used in that perspective in the future in order to reach new grounds.

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Part I
Morality, Bonding and Families as Sources of Social Cohesion

Chapter 2
Shame and Wrong: Is There a Common Morality Among Young People in France, the UK, the Netherlands, Germany, and the USA?

Ineke Haen Marshall and Chris E. Marshall

Introduction

It is commonly believed that shared ideas about what is good and bad, right or wrong, worthy or unworthy will bind the members of society together and create a cohesive and vibrant society (Hitlin & Vaisey, 2013). In today's globalized world, the growing flow of people across borders has created societies that are less homogeneous, more culturally diverse, more fragmented, and less socially integrated. Increasingly we see that politicians blame "moral decay" or "moral decline" for such social ills as crime, drug addiction, and whatever else ails society. This manifests itself most clearly in the Western world, with the flows of migrants from the Global South to the North, introducing large numbers of migrants and refugees from societies with different cultural, ethnic, religious, or political norms and values. In countries like Germany, France, the Netherlands, and to a lesser degree the UK and the USA, Muslim immigrants in particular are viewed as representing different moral codes. We see it as an important task for social scientists to challenge or confirm taken-for-granted assumptions about differences between migrant youth and their native counterparts, using objective, data-driven analyses. It is one of the goals of the current chapter to empirically describe differences in the values and norms of native-born children and their migrant counterparts in France, Germany, the Netherlands, the UK, and the USA.

In many countries in Europe, much political and public discourse about morality focuses on refugees and migrants versus native-born and on Muslims versus

I. H. Marshall (✉)
School of Criminology and Criminal Justice, Northeastern University, Boston, MA, USA
e-mail: i.marshall@northeastern.edu

C. E. Marshall
School of Criminology and Criminal Justice, University of Nebraska-Omaha, Omaha, NE, USA
e-mail: cmarshall@unomaha.edu

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Christians. However, within a larger cross-national context, the story is much more complex. The interrelationships between migrant status, religion, ethnicity and race, and minority status are contingent on the national context (Marshall, 1997). For example, in the USA, where the dominant immigrant group is Latino, historically the most important determinant of minority status is race (i.e., African-American or Black), not immigrant. Yet, darker-skinned Latino immigrants are also considered "people of color" and thus considered minorities.[1] In the USA, Black Americans are overrepresented in official violent crime statistics, as both offenders and victims, and most of the most violent neighborhoods in the inner cities are largely inhabited by Blacks. In federal and state prisons, both Blacks and Latinos are overrepresented (Alexander, 2010). Public and political discussion in the USA often claims that Latino immigrants from the South are a criminal threat.[2] The Muslim population in the USA is very small, without being a visible presence in arrest statistics or prisons, but nonetheless eyed with weary suspicion as potential terrorists. In France, on the other hand, 90% of Muslim adolescents are French, born in France, and therefore not recent immigrants but rather part of an underprivileged minority group. In the USA, *race* is of profound importance, while this is less so in France, the UK, Germany, and the Netherlands. For more details, see Chap. 2. Space limitations prevent a more detailed discussion of the overlap between migrant status, religion, and minority status in the USA, the UK, France, Germany, and the Netherlands, but suffice it to say that this relationship is complex and nation contingent. Consistent with the emphasis in the current political debate, this chapter focuses on migrant status and religion, without explicit consideration of the potentially confounding effects of race or minority status.

Aside from aiming to describe the normative differences between native-born and migrant children in these five Western countries, we also want to explore the level of agreement among French, German, Dutch, British, and American pupils (Sewell, 1992) about the wrongness or shamefulness of particular behaviors. At first glance, one would expect such differences to be very small; after all, all five countries represent clearly the Western cultural realm. However, as those who have traveled from the Netherlands to Belgium or from the UK to the USA undoubtedly have experienced, even countries that seem to be quite similar on their surface may have deeply different "cultural structures" (Sewell, 1992). A case in point is a comparative study of American and French workers about the articulation of race and class divides across national contexts. French workers, compared to Americans, downplay material success in their definition of worth (of others), defining "what they view as France's distinctiveness and sacred values (e.g. solidarity) against Americans' perceived cold-bloodedness" (Lamont, 2006). Such value differences

[1] Minority group is defined as a group of people who, because of their physical or cultural characteristics, are singled out from the others in the society in which they live for differential and unequal treatment, and who therefore regard themselves as objects of collective discrimination (Wirth 1945). Minorities are also relatively powerless compared to the majority groups.

[2] For evidence to the contrary, see recent research Sampson (2008) and Martinez, Stowell, and Iwama (2016).

between seemingly similar countries are also highlighted by the World Values Survey, which for many years has questioned population samples across the globe, asking about aspirations, beliefs, ideals, and opinions about moral issues (Esmer & Pettersson, 2007). On the WVS website, there is a prominent cultural map of the world, grouping countries along the dimensions of secular/rational vs. traditional values on the one hand and self-expression vs. survival values on the other hand (http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs). On this map, France is grouped as belonging to "Catholic Europe," the Netherlands and Germany to "Protestant Europe," and the UK and the USA as belonging to "English-speaking" countries, depending on where they are located on the secular/rational and self-expression axis. Although grouped into these different clusters, all five countries are located on the self-expression and secular/rational quarter of the map, reflecting strong common cultural traits, thus clearly distant and differentiated from India, China, and Venezuela who cluster in the traditional/survival value region of the cultural map. The ISRD3 data (used in this chapter) allow us to analyze such very dissimilar countries, and we have already found some striking contrasts (e.g., in the use of parental physical force or social desirability in answering questions, see Enzmann et al. (2018). On the other hand, as we show in this chapter, much is to be gained by taking a closer look at countries that seem to have a common (i.e., Western) cultural and social context in order to gain a better understanding of the correlates and characteristics of morality. In this chapter, we test the hypothesis that adolescents' morality as well as the role of parents, school, religion, and friends as correlates of morality will be rather similar in France, Germany, the UK, the Netherlands, and the USA, with likely somewhat larger differences between the USA and the other four countries.

To anticipate our findings, our main conclusions are as follows. First, we find indeed broadly similar patterns and correlates of morality across the samples from France, the UK, Germany, the Netherlands, and the USA, with comparable relative rankings of perceived wrongness and sense of shame. Second, the initially observed differences in morality between native-born adolescents, first- and second-generation immigrants, Christian, Muslim, and agnostic/atheist adolescents disappear or are of small magnitude in the statistically controlled analysis, suggesting that the role of migrant status and religion is not clear and must be understood in the particular national context.

Conceptual Framework

Figure 2.1 below provides a schematic overview of the conceptual framework used in this chapter. Let us start with morality, the chapter's anchoring concept, on the far right-hand side of the figure. Following the literature (Clay-Warner, 2014; Harkness & Hitlin, 2014; Jennings, Mitchell, & Hannah, 2015), we distinguish two dimensions in morality: (1) *cognitive* (i.e., knowledge and recognition of "wrongness") and (2) *emotional* (i.e., the moral emotion of shame).



Fig. 2.1 Conceptual framework for analysis of samples from France, the UK, Germany, the Netherlands, and the USA

What we refer to as the normative domain covers a wide range of related concepts. All societies have a wide range of social norms, from how to greet a stranger, how to dress, how to take care of one's family, and to how to please one's god. Norms tell us what is required and what is unacceptable in our lives and actions (Covaleskie, 2013). Not all of these norms are of equal importance. For example, *social conventions* are specific rules about how to eat, dress, greet, or drive. *Legal rules* refer to prescriptions and proscriptions that are embodied in the legal code, varying from statutes against murder, theft, or tax evasion to anti-corruption legislation and prohibition of human trafficking. *Values* refer to individual or collective goals such as wealth, happiness, independence, and "the American Dream." *Moral rules* ("morality") refer to normative evaluations of good and bad, right or wrong, and worthy or unworthy evaluations of right or wrong. *Religious beliefs* and *norms* are moral codes linked to supernatural powers. As will become clear later in the chapter, our measures include a combination of legal rules, moral codes, and social conventions.

A large body of philosophical writings on morality interpret "moral" and "morality" as *normative* concepts that describe what it is to live up to *universal* standards of right and wrong, grounded in justice, fairness, and harm (Hitlin & Vaisey, 2013). Another approach—the one we take here—views morality to be whatever a person or group takes it to be, beliefs about right or wrong that vary between persons and groups and that may be *empirically* assessed (Hitlin & Vaisey, 2013). "Morality" is both a social and an individual phenomenon and may be studied at the macro (country or regional) level of analysis, as well as at the micro (individual level); in this chapter we do both. An important dimension of analyzing morality is to understand *what gets classified as immoral*. That is, specifically what kinds of behaviors are considered right (pro-social) or wrong (antisocial) in society. A related issue is the

degree to which members of a society share *agreement* (*consensus*) over the moral and legal codes. A lack of agreement over the content of the rules may signal a lack of social integration and cohesion. This chapter focuses on the beliefs of schoolchildren about selected legal rules, values, and moral codes which are, for purposes of simplification, referred to in this chapter as "morality." We attempt to measure not only the *intensity* or *strength* of moral condemnation of a selected number of antisocial behaviors (the eight-item pro-social values scale discussed below) but also the *level of agreement* (or diversity of opinions) about the "wrongness" of these behaviors among youth in different countries.

Morality involves not only the cognitive dimension (knowledge of wrongness of particular behaviors) but also the emotional dimensions of shame and guilt. Both shame and guilt are self-evaluative, self-conscious moral emotions (Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Tangney, Stuewig, & Martinez, 2014; see also Svensson, Weerman, Pauwels, Bruinsma, & Bernasco, 2013). *Guilt* focuses on the *behavior*: one feels bad because the act violates the internalized norms and values. *Shame*, on the other hand, is an evaluation of the self as a bad *person*. Shame is central to the formation of a conscience, and shame is one way society shapes the behaviors of its members (Covaleskie, 2013). Shame and conscience are shaped by the educative, socializing forces in society. A large part of children's moral socialization is the ability to pass judgment on the worth of their actions—which includes a properly formed sense of shame. In a strongly cohesive group or society, violation of norms causes shame.[3] It is through *internalization* of moral norms that shame is produced[4] (see also Covaleskie, 2013). Groups and societies differ in the nature and importance of shame and shaming. It may be argued that societies whose members have low levels of internalization of moral norms are less socially integrated and cohesive than societies whose members have truly internalized moral codes. In this chapter, we measure the internalization of moral norms by the intensity (or level) of anticipated shame produced by three hypothetical cases of moral violations (Wikström's shaming questions—see below). We explore whether there are cross-national differences in the average level of anticipated shame reported in response to hypothetical situations presented to pupils in France, Germany, the UK, the Netherlands, and the USA.

[3] Covaleskie writes "Knowledge of a set of norms is the first step in moral development, but it is a long way from the final step…If I know the norms, but they are not yet *my* norms, I might conform to them for all sorts of non-moral reasons—because I want the praise,… or to avoid punishment for violations…However, when society's norms become internalized, become *mine*, then something different happens…Shame is a sign that rules have become norms for us, we feel embarrassment or guilt or humiliation upon breaking rules of conventions, but we can only feel shame if we violate norms of a certain sort, moral norms that we have come to see as our own" (Covaleskie 2013).

[4] The significance of shame for explaining the propensity to engage in crime has been explored by several theoretical frameworks.

Who Teaches Morality: Family, Schools, Religion, and Friends?

In the middle section of Fig. 2.1, we list the four institutions which likely play a role in the moral socialization of youth: religion, family, friends, and school. Learning what is considered acceptable and proper is part of the socialization of children and youth and therefore the primary responsibility of the family (parents), followed by the schools (teachers). We tend to assume, quite reasonably, that family and schools represent the pro-social values (moral codes) of society. The success with which these two institutions (family and schools) are able to transfer the moral codes of society depends—among other things—on the quality of parenting and teaching and the attachment of youth to parents and teachers (Hirschi, 1969; Thornberry, 1987; Catalano & Hawkins, 1996).

The role of religion is a lot more complex. Atheist or agnostic individuals of course often have a strong sense of morality. Still, in the view of many, religion writ large (i.e., Christianity, Judaism, Buddhism, or Islamism) has traditionally provided the moral compass of society and continues to shape understandings of acceptable and "good" or "bad" behavior in particular contexts. Religious messages about morality are conveyed through "…public discourse, public institutions, legal codes, social norms, and family structures and gender roles" (Bader & Finke, 2010) not only in religious nations but also in secular nations who still incorporate some remnants of that religious cultural heritage. Secularization notwithstanding, the UK, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the USA are still viewed as primarily Christian countries, presumably sharing broadly similar values. Although in these countries, a sizable proportion of young people consider themselves explicitly atheist, or agnostic, the historical national religious context still may influence the moral values of individuals, even those who are atheist or secular. In France, the Netherlands, Germany, and the UK, many of the "newcomers" are of the Islamic rather than Christian faith, which—at least in the view of some—suggests a lower level of cultural integration in mainstream Western Christian society (Enzmann et al., 2018).

A related, but distinct, concept is the importance of religion in a person's daily life, which is defined as *religiosity*. Psychologists refer to this as piousness or devotion, and sociologists consider church membership, church attendance, doctrinal knowledge, and actively practicing the faith (Holdcroft, 2006) as measures of religiosity. Religiosity may be viewed as a measure of the internalization of religious norms. As a macro-level characteristic, religiosity represents the degree to which religion influences society and intersects with other areas of public life; it is the relative importance of spiritual beliefs over other domains. In this chapter, we include measures of religious affiliation (Christianity, Islam, unaffiliated), as well as importance of religion in one's life (religiosity).

Unlike the impact of family, religion, and school–which are all assumed to represent pro-social or "moral" values—the role of friends is more ambiguous. There is no doubt that friends begin to displace the impact of family and school once children enter adolescence. Friends are very important social influences on the attitudes and behaviors of youth, perhaps more so than parents or school during adolescence. The question is, however, whether this means a move in the direction of less "morality,"

and the answer is that it all depends on the kinds of friends. The best predictor of antisocial behavior (drug use, drinking, or delinquency) is the behavior of one's friends. Since adolescents appear to act and believe as their friends do, we would expect their views of their friends' morality and values should resemble their own. We include a measure of importance of friends' opinion in our analysis.

Last, but not least, the arrival of immigrants and refugees is often equated with a decline in shared moral values, since newcomers are believed to have different worldviews, beliefs, and conceptions of right and wrong than the host country. Western European countries in particular have invested considerable resources and thought in developing policies of assimilation, integration, or acculturation. Incorporating this premise, the conceptual model (Fig. 2.1 left-hand side) includes migrant status as a factor that may influence levels of consensus about legal and moral rules and social conventions. Be it noted that we do not test the effects of migration *through* parents, school, friends, or religion (i.e., mediating effects) but the effects of migration net of the role of parents, school, friends, or religion.

Methodology

The overall methodology of ISRD3 is covered elsewhere in this book and also in Enzmann et al. (2018). In brief, the survey was the third in a series that was originally built around modules of questions asking schoolchildren in the 7th–9th grades (aged 12–16) about their self-reported offending and experience of victimization. While ISRD3 was designed to estimate the prevalence of offending and victimization, it was also designed to enable testing of different criminological theories, particularly in the third sweep. Most participating countries sampled schools in two medium-sized or large cities, with samples designed to be representative of these cities (rather than the respective county). The survey was administered in school classrooms, using Internet-based self-completion questionnaires wherever possible. The dataset for the third sweep of ISRD covered 27 countries at the time of writing, with a combined sample of 62,636. UPYC is a subproject of ISRD3, with a maximum effective sample size of 10,169.

The current analysis is based on a near-final dataset. Additional cases are expected to be included in the US dataset, though the data for the four European countries will be updated only if errors in data editing and processing come to light (see Enzmann et al., 2018).

Dependent Variables: Pro-social Values and Level of Shame

We measure two dimensions of morality: cognitive ("level of wrongness") and emotional "(level of shaming") (see Fig. 2.1), using items adapted from Wikstrom and Butterworth (2006). (See Appendix; Fig. 2.5 shows what is commonly referred to as

Table 2.1 Reliability measures (Cronbach's alpha) for morality indices

	Pro-social index	Level of shame index
Overall	0.829	0.883
USA	0.840	0.877
The Netherlands	0.843	0.898
France	0.833	0.869
UK	0.838	0.897
Germany	0.783	0.871

the "pro-social values" scale, and Fig. 2.6 shows the questions to measure *shaming*.) Note that our measure of shame is the *anticipation* of shame, the positive or negative reactions based on past experiences in interpersonal relationships (Elster, 2007). We constructed two simple indices—a Pro-Social Index and a Level of Shame Index—by summing the scores of the eight pro-social items and the nine shame items. Then, we converted these two raw indices to individual POMP scores to place both on a common scale (0–100).[5] The overall reliability for the Pro-Social Index was 0.829, that of the Level of Shame Index was 0.883. The overall and by-country reliability is provided in Table 2.1. It is reassuring to see that the reliability of both indexes are quite high and comparable between the five countries. We used these two indices for our multivariate analysis.

Independent and Control Variables

Parents' influence measured by: "I would feel very bad disappointing my parents." Four response categories, ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree.

Friends' influence measured by: "How important is it to you what your friend or group of friends think about you?" Six response categories, ranging from totally unimportant to very important.

Teacher's influence measured by: "How important is it to you how your favorite teacher thinks about you?" Six response categories, ranging from totally unimportant to very important.

Importance of religion measured by: "How important to you (personally) is religion in your everyday life?" Six response categories, ranging from totally unimportant to very important.

Religious affiliation measured by three categories: Christian (Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox), Islam (Sunni or Shi'ite), or unaffiliated. Because of problems of interpretation, we exclude the very heterogeneous category of "other" (e.g., Buddhist, Hindu, Judaism).

[5] The general formula for individual POMP scores is $\text{POMP Score} = \frac{100 * (X - \text{Minimum})}{(\text{Maximum} - \text{Minimum})}$ (Cohen, Cohen, Aiken, & West, 1999; Enzmann, 2017).

Migrant status has three categories: (1) native-born, with both parents as well as the child born in this country; (2) second-generation immigrant, with at least one of the parents born abroad; and (3) first-generation immigrant, where the child was born abroad.

We include gender and grade (7*th*, 8*th*, or 9*th*) in our analysis. Grade is used in the ISRD3 project as a proxy for age (see Marshall and Enzmann, 2012).

Description of Sample[6]

Table 2.2 provides the frequency distributions for gender, grade, migrant status, and religion for the full sample (n = 10,169) as well as a breakdown by country. The majority is native-born (n = 5494; 54%), about one-third is considered second generation (n = 3630; 36%), and about one in ten of the students are classified as first-generation immigrant (n = 1040; 10%). The five countries differ significantly with respect to the proportion of immigrants in the sample. For example, 64% of the sample in the UK is native born, contrasted to the USA at 41%. The proportion of first-generation immigrants is roughly comparable across the five countries (lowest 8% in the Netherlands, highest 14% in the USA), but there is more cross-national variation in the proportion of second-generation immigrants. The US (46%) and German (41%) samples rank highest, followed by the Netherlands (36%), France (30%), and the UK (24%). It should be noted that countries with a longer history of immigration have third-generation immigrant children, which do not necessarily belong to the majority. For purposes of our analysis, it is useful that our sample has sufficient immigrant students to allow a testing of our conceptual model.

Almost a fifth of the total sample identifies as Muslim (n = 1924; 19%), which is not surprising in view of the large proportion of (first and second generation)

Table 2.2 Religious affiliation and religious diversity by country

	% Christian		% Muslim		% No religion		Religious diversity	
	Country (%)	Sample (%)	Country (%)	Sample (%)	Country (%)	Sample (%)	Country	Sample
USA	78	73	1	3	16	22	4	7
UK	71	33	4	22	21	43	5	4
Germany	69	49	6	22	25	27	5	4
France	63	35	8	28	28	35	6	4
Netherlands	51	24	6	14	42	59	6	5
Total		43		19		36		4

[6] Please note that this section describes the sample used for this chapter only, a sample which is somewhat smaller because we only used students who identified themselves as unaffiliated, Islamic, or Christian.

Table 2.3 Reliability measures—Cronbach's alpha—for factor analysis-derived scales

	Pro-social dimension		Level of shame dimension	
	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 1	Factor 2
Overall	0.816	0.644	0.877	0.781
USA	0.814	0.679	0.871	0.770
The Netherlands	0.842	0.598	0.890	0.841
France	0.811	0.670	0.874	0.725
UK	0.815	0.664	0.889	0.789
Germany	0.773	0.610	0.857	0.773

immigrants in the sample. A little less than half of respondents were Christian (n = 4479; 44%), closely followed by those who claim no religious affiliation (n = 3766; 37%). The country with the largest percentage of Christian respondents is the USA (75%), while the country with the smallest percentage is the Netherlands (25%). France has the largest percentage of Islamic respondents (29%), while the USA has the smallest percentage (3%). This latter low figure is likely explained by the fact that the majority of immigrants in the USA are from Latin American (primarily Christian) countries. Less than 13% of the US sample indicated that religion is "very unimportant" in their daily life, compared to 22% in Germany, 26% in France, 34% in the UK, and 41% in the Netherlands.

Important to emphasize here is that the ISRD samples should not be considered to be representative of entire countries or even the sampled cities (see Enzmann et al., 2018). Table 2.3 provides a breakdown of religious affiliation by country and for the total sample. The US sample is closely aligned with its country's percentage of Christians (72.6% for the sample; 78.3% for the country). However, for the UK, Germany, France, and the Netherlands, Christians are underrepresented in the ISRD3 samples, while Muslims are strongly overrepresented, perhaps due to the fact that the ISRD3 samples were drawn from large cities. We examined the diversity of our five samples in terms of a well-known measure, the Pew Research Center's *Religious Diversity Index* (RDI). The calculation of the RDI is not complicated (see Pew Research Center, 2014), and it provides a diversity gauge that is useful. We calculated the RDI for the five samples (right-hand column of Table 2.3), and we find that the Pew RDI for the country subsamples are quite well in-line with the five countries.

Findings

Cross-National Measurement Equivalence: Is Morality Measured in the Same Way Across the Five Samples?

The cross-cultural equivalence of measures is an important issue in comparative analysis (Warwick & Osherson, 1973; Vandenberg & Lance, 2000). That is, do the measures tap into the same meaning when used in France, the USA, and Germany?

In order to examine the psychometric properties of both indexes and their comparability across samples, we conducted exploratory factor analysis on the pro-social items and the level of shame items. The results are theoretically interesting. The analysis showed two-factor loadings in the pro-social items (see Table 2.3). The first factor included making an ethnic insult, vandalism, burglary, hitting with intent to hurt, and extortion/robbery. The second dimension includes lying or disobeying, illegally downloading, and shoplifting a small item. This finding suggests that dimension 1 reflects behaviors that are violations of legal rules, while dimension 2 includes rather minor routine violations (illegal downloading, shoplifting a small item) or a social convention (disobeying authority or parents). In later analysis, we find this distinction quite helpful. Table 2.4 displays the reliability measures for the factor analysis both overall and by country. Factor 1 is robust, factor 2 is weaker, and our analysis suggests that, in order to make factor 2 usable, we would have had to drop an item leaving us with only two items for factor 2. Factor loadings for the five countries were quite comparable suggesting that the pro-social scales perform in comparable manner across the five countries.

Also quite interesting are the results of the factor analysis of the level of shame items (see Table 2.4) with two strong factors with good reliability results. The first factor included the items which use one's best friend and the teacher as reference points. The second factor includes the items using parents as the reference point. As was the case for the pro-social values scales, the factor analysis met the basic qualifications for good factors: the two factors had overall alpha of 0.877 and 0.781, respectively. The item loadings (not shown here) were, once again, quite comparable among the five countries. Our analysis of the psychometric properties of the Pro-Social Values Index and the Level of Shame Index reassures us that the two indices operate quite comparably across the five countries

Differences in Pro-social Values

For the macro-level analysis, we have created a simple ratio constructed from the four response categories for each of the items: Very Wrong, Wrong, A Little Wrong, and Not Wrong at All. The constructed ratio combined Very Wrong and Wrong for the numerator of the ratio and A Little Wrong and Not Wrong at All for the denominator of the ratio. High values indicate that a larger proportion of the children in the country consider a behavior "very wrong or wrong" compared to those children who responded to the question as "a bit wrong" or "not wrong at all"; a low ratio indicates that the balance of perceived "wrongness" tilts in the direction of "little or no wrongness." Ratios below one indicate that a larger proportion of pupils in the sample perceives the behavior as Little Wrong or Not Wrong at All.

Figure 2.2 displays the wrongness ratio by eight different behaviors and country. Overall, extortion/robbery (35.0) gets the highest level of condemnation, followed by burglary (25.7). Both of these behaviors represent rather common examples of street crime. A close third is ethnic and racial insults (23.2), which is not a criminal

Table 2.4 Frequency distributions by country and for the full sample

		f	Percent *f* (%)		*f*	Percent *f* (%)		*f*	Percent *f* (%)		*f*	Percent *f* (%)
France	Male	844	48	Grade 7	528	30	Native	1063	60	Christianity	636	36
	Female	904	52	Grade 8	620	35	Second generation	530	30	Islam	509	29
				Grade 9	617	35	First generation	170	10	Unaffiliated	620	35
Germany	Male	1423	50	Grade 7	946	33	Native	1419	50	Christianity	1416	50
	Female	1409	50	Grade 8	871	31	Second generation	1162	41	Islam	647	23
				Grade 9	1019	36	First generation	254	9	Unaffiliated	773	27
The Netherlands	Male	939	52	Grade 7	641	36	Native	997	55	Christianity	447	25
	Female	860	48	Grade 8	556	31	Second generation	650	36	Islam	264	15
				Grade 9	602	33	First generation	152	8	Unaffiliated	1088	60
UK	Male	1100	54	Grade 7	810	40	Native	1304	64	Christianity	680	34
	Female	926	46	Grade 8	650	32	Second generation	484	24	Islam	457	23
				Grade 9	569	28	First generation	239	12	Unaffiliated	892	44

		f	Percent *f* (%)		*f*	Percent *f* (%)		*f*	Percent *f* (%)		*f*	Percent *f* (%)
USA	Male	821	47	Grade 7	579	33	Native	711	41	Christianity	1300	75
	Female	919	53	Grade 8	476	27	Second generation	804	46	Islam	47	3
				Grade 9	685	39	First generation	225	13	Unaffiliated	393	23
	Male	5127	51	Grade 7	3504	34	Native	5494	54	Christianity	4479	44
	Female	5018	49	Grade 8	3173	31	Second generation	3630	36	Islam	1924	19
				Grade 9	3492	34	First generation	1040	10	Unaffiliated	3766	37
Full sample	France	1765	17									
	Germany	2836	28									
	Netherlands	1799	18									
	UK	2018	20									
	USA	1740	17									



Fig. 2.2 Pro-social behavior ratios by behavior and country (higher ratios reflect higher condemnation of behaviors)

offense across all countries. Vandalizing property (15.6) ranks higher in average perceived wrongness than hitting with intent to hurt (12.0). Shoplifting something small like a candy bar—a minor infraction—is viewed as not very wrong (2.5). The wrongness ratios for lying or disobeying adults are very low in all five countries (1.9). There is only one item, illegal downloading of music or films, where the balance tilts to the side of Little Wrong or Not Wrong at All (0.7). These results are consistent with the results of the factor analysis discussed above, where we basically identified two dimensions in the eight-item Pro-Social Index. The first factor (based on ethnic insult, vandalism, burglary, hitting with intent to hurt, and extortion/robbery) is the same item that receives a fair degree of condemnation in the samples as illustrated by the wrongness ratios. The three items scoring the lowest (lying or disobeying, illegally downloading, and shoplifting a small item) are those identified as constituting the second dimension.

Although there is a general agreement among the five country samples about the relative wrongness of the eight behaviors, there are several interesting differences between the five countries. Focusing on the five most condemned items, Germany and the USA have the highest wrongness ratios. The Netherlands, on the other hand, consistently scores lowest on these five items. France and the UK occupy intermediate positions. The differences between countries with regard to the three least serious items (lying or disobeying adults, illegal downloading, and shoplifting a small item) are hard to interpret since the values of the ratios are very small. Keeping this warning in mind, it is noteworthy that the US sample scores highest on lying or disobeying adults and illegal downloading.

As we discussed in the introduction, a lack of agreement over the content of the rules may signal a lack of social integration and cohesion. Thus, in addition to measuring the *intensity* or *strength* of moral condemnation of a selected number of antisocial behaviors (the eight-item pro-social values scale discussed above), we

also consider the *level of agreement* (or diversity of opinions) about the "wrongness" of these behaviors among adolescents in different countries. To gauge the level of value consensus within each country, Table 2.5 presents the coefficients of relative variation (CRV) of pro-social values for the five samples. Higher scores reflect higher levels of disagreement. The scores do not tell anything about the moral condemnation of the behavior as such but rather whether children share the same views. For example, with regard to disobeying adults, there is more agreement within the US sample (38.4) than in the other four countries. With regard to ethnic or racial insults, the Netherlands (28.7) shows a higher degree of variation in the responses than, for example, Germany (15.1). There is more agreement among German and US children about vandalizing property (20.6 and 20.5) than among Dutch or French youngsters (30.4 and 29.8). The illegal downloading of music is a rather contested item: pupils in France (111.1) and the Netherlands (108.5) show very high levels of difference of opinion about this item, while children in the US sample appear to have a much higher level of agreement (56.1). Table 2.5 shows that there *are* some significant differences between the countries with regard to the level of agreement about pro-social values. With a few exceptions, the French and Dutch samples seem to present a less homogeneous picture than the US and German samples.

Table 2.6 displays the wrongness ratio by the eight items of the pro-social index and *religious affiliation* for the total sample. Focusing on the five most serious items (factor 1), Christians shows the highest level of wrongness for extortion (42.5), hitting (13.9), burglary (31.6), and vandalism (18.3, but an exception is ethnic insults (26.7), where Islamic pupils scores higher (30.5). Conversely, Muslims score lowest on the four remaining serious items: extortion (23.8), hitting (9.3), burglary (19.7), and vandalizing (11.9). Unaffiliated pupils occupy the intermediate position on extortion (35.9), hitting (11.7), burglary (23.8), and vandalism (15.3). With regard to the least serious items (factor 2), Islamic pupils on average see disobeying adults as more wrong (3.5) than their Christian (1.9) or unaffiliated (1.4) counterparts. The unaffiliated pupils score lowest on the items of illegal downloading and shoplifting.

Figure 2.3 displays the wrongness ratios by migration status. It makes sense again to distinguish between the more serious items (factor 1) and the less serious items (factor 2). Native-born pupils show the highest wrongness ratio for extortion, hitting, burglary, and vandalism, followed by second-generation pupils, with first-generation immigrants having the lowest wrongness ratio for all five behaviors. However, second-generation immigrants exhibit the strongest condemnation of ethnic and racial insults, more so than their native counterparts, or first-generation adolescents.

With regard to the three least seriously condemned items, there is a reverse pattern. Although we do not want to make too much of this, since all the ratios are of small magnitude, the level of condemnation (for illegal downloading, shoplifting small items, and disobeying authority) appears lower among those who have spent most time in the country and highest among the newcomers (first-generation immigrants).

Table 2.5 Coefficients of relative variation (CRV) of pro-social values (POMP) by country

	f	Shoplifting?	Lie, disobey adults?	Illegal download films, music?	Use weapon, force to get money?	Ethnic, racial insult?	Break in and steal	Vandalize property?	Hit intending to hurt?
France	1765	57.7	46.6	111.1	18.9	18.9	23.2	29.8	28.6
Germany	2836	40.3	48.8	72.2	13.6	15.1	15.4	20.6	20.8
The Netherlands	1799	46.0	46.9	108.5	22.0	28.7	24.3	30.4	29.6
UK	2029	40.0	44.9	75.3	17.1	19.2	21.1	22.3	28.0
USA	1740	39.9	38.4	56.1	13.9	16.9	16.3	20.5	24.5
Grand Total	10,169	44.5	45.7	82.2	17.0	19.9	20.0	24.7	26.0

Table 2.6 Pro-social behavior ratios by behavior and religious affiliation

	f	Illegal download films, music? Wrong-to-not wrong ratio	Lie, disobey adults? Wrong-to-not wrong ratio	Shoplifting? Wrong-to-not wrong ratio	Hit intending to hurt? Wrong-to-not wrong ratio	Vandalize property? Wrong-to-not wrong ratio	Ethnic, racial insult? Wrong-to-not wrong ratio	Break in and steal? Wrong-to-not wrong ratio	Use weapon, force to get money? Wrong-to-not wrong ratio
Christianity	4479	0.8	1.9	2.6	13.9	18.3	26.7	31.6	42.5
Islam	1924	0.7	3.5	3.2	9.3	11.9	30.5	19.7	23.8
Unaffiliated	3766	0.5	1.4	2.0	11.7	15.3	18.1	23.8	35.9
Grand total	10,169	0.7	1.9	2.5	12.0	15.6	23.2	25.7	35.0



Fig. 2.3 Ratio of wrong-to-not-wrong by migrant status (higher ratios reflect higher condemnation)

Differences in Level of Shame

We use a simple ratio constructed from the three response categories for each of the items: Yes, Very Much; Yes, A Little; and No, Not At All (see Appendix Fig. 2.6). Yes, Very Much is used as the numerator and combined Yes, A Little and No, Not At All as the denominator. This distinguishes those most shamed from those feeling just a little bit of shame or none at all. There are three hypothetical scenarios, involving shoplifting, physically hurting another person, and arrest, being found out by a friend, teacher, or parent.

Figure 2.4 displays the sense of anticipated shame ratio for the five country samples, as well as for the total sample. The greatest sense of shame across the entire sample is felt with respect to parents, regardless of the action—shoplifting, hitting, or arrest. This is consistent with the results of the factor analysis, which distinguished two dimensions: one with regard to parents (factor 1) and one with regard to friends and teachers (factor 2). The shame ratios vis-a-vis *parents* are the three highest among the nine scenarios (arrest scenario 8.37; shoplifting scenario 6.58; hitting scenario 3.85). Teacher's opinion is clearly less significant than friends' opinion in the six remaining scenarios (arrest 2.12 vs. 1.40; shoplifting scenario 1.18–0.57; hitting scenario 1.49–0.83). The *arrest* scenario seems to produce the greatest level of shame overall, with lower and more mixed results for the shoplifting and hitting to hurt scenarios.



Fig. 2.4 Sense of shame ratio with respect to teachers, friends, and parents by type of behavior and country (higher ratios reflect higher anticipated sense of shame)

Generally speaking these results hold *within* the country subsets too, although there is some variation between the countries. In the USA the sense of shame vis-à-vis parents is the greatest—compared to the UK, France, Germany, and the Netherlands—especially for shoplifting (9.39) and arrest (14.86), but it is also relatively high (9.39), though second to the Netherlands (5.33), for hitting. Interestingly, the Netherlands' respondents have higher level of shame for hitting vis-à-vis friends (1.30) as compared to the remaining for counties, while for shoplifting and arrest, the Netherlands falls back in the mix.

What may we say about the degree of *within-country* variation in levels of shame? Table 2.7 presents the coefficients of relative variation (CRV) of Level of Shame Index for the five countries. Higher scores reflect higher levels of disagreement. The scenarios with the parents as reference group tend to elicit the most homogeneous responses among youth in the five countries. Generally, the French sample shows the higher levels of diversity in their responses on the Level of Shame Index, and the US sample tends to have the lowest CRVs on most Level of Shame Index items.

There are some interesting differences across religious affiliation categories, but it is hard to see a clear pattern (results not shown). Those who claim no religious affiliation report the lowest levels of shame in the three shoplifting scenarios, as well as in the arrest scenarios. For the three hitting with intent to hurt scenarios, it is the Islamic pupils who appear to report slightly lower levels of shame. The Christian children report the highest levels of shame in the three arrest scenarios and in two out of the three hitting with intent to hurt scenarios.

Table 2.8 displays the sense of shame ratio by immigration status. The second generation's respondents had higher levels of shame for arrest than first generation or native born vis-à-vis friend (1.37 vs. 1.45 and 1.40), teacher (2.02 vs. 2.34 and 1.95), or parent (9.95 vs. 6.73 and 7.89). Perhaps the imprint of the law (and arrest as it manifestation) is strong as the respondents become completely assimilated in the new home country. The first generation has, in many of the scenarios, the *least* shame (except for friends in terms of shoplifting and assault) of the three immigration categories.

Results from Multivariate Analysis

In the preceding section, we presented a description of measures of morality, across the five countries, with particular focus on variations based on immigration status (native, second, or first generation) or religion (Christian, Islam, unaffiliated). We saw broad levels of similarity across countries, with some between-country variations and with small differences associated with migrant status and religion. In this part, we present the results of a multivariate analysis, in order to see if the variables included in our conceptual model (Fig. 2.2) operate in similar fashion across the five samples. We conducted OLS regression on the Pro-Social Index (Table 2.9) and the Level of Shame Index (Table 2.10). We included migrant status, religion,

Table 2.7 Coefficients of relative variation (CRV) sense of shame responses (POMP) scores by country

	f	Shame if friend knows shoplift	Shame if teacher knows shoplift	Shame if parents know shoplift	Shame if friend knows hit to hurt	Shame if teacher knows hit to hurt	Shame if parents know hit to hurt	Shame if friend knows arrested	Shame if teacher knows arrested	Shame if parents know arrested
France	1765	95.1	62.8	27.3	82.3	61.3	38.4	73.7	58.3	23.0
Germany	2836	62.3	47.0	23.2	66.8	49.9	34.1	48.1	41.2	21.9
The Netherlands	1799	70.9	58.7	28.5	54.3	50.3	31.0	56.7	51.6	28.0
UK	2029	71.2	53.5	27.9	70.2	52.7	38.2	56.8	46.2	26.9
US	1740	69.3	45.6	22.5	62.6	44.1	31.7	44.1	37.0	19.4
Grand Total	10,169	72.1	52.9	25.8	67.1	51.5	34.7	55.1	46.5	23.9

Table 2.8 Sense of shame ratio with respect to teachers, friends, and parents by type of behavior and immigration status (higher ratios reflect higher anticipated sense of shame)

	f	Shame if friend knows shoplift much to little/none ratio	Shame if teacher knows shoplift much to little/none ratio	Shame if parents know shoplift much to little/none ratio	Shame if friend knows assault much to little/none ratio	Shame if teacher knows assault much to little/none ratio	Shame if parents know assault much to little/none ratio	Shame if friend knows arrest much to little/none ratio	Shame if teacher knows arrest much to little/none ratio	Shame if parents know arrest much to little/none ratio
Native Born	5494	0.6	1.1	6.0	1.0	1.6	4.1	1.4	2.0	7.9
Second Generation Migrant	3630	0.6	1.2	8.0	0.7	1.4	3.7	1.5	2.3	9.9
First Generation Migrant	1040	0.6	1.2	5.7	0.7	1.3	3.3	1.4	1.9	6.7
Grand Total	10,164	0.6	1.2	6.6	0.8	1.5	3.9	1.4	2.1	8.4

Table 2.9 Regression of pro-social index on selected variables by country

	USA			The Netherlands			France			UK			Germany		
	B	SE	Beta	*B*	SE	Beta	*B*	SE	Beta	*B*	SE	Beta	*B*	SE	Beta
(Constant)	**64.541**	1.961		**60.827**	2.375		**62.552**	2.193		**63.104**	1.914		**68.473**	1.510	
Male (female is reference)	−1.129	0.645	−0.043	**−3.000**	0.763	−0.104	**−2.055**	0.716	−0.074	**−1.674**	0.653	−0.059	**−2.871**	0.470	−0.121
9th grade (7th grade is reference)	**−4.511**	0.760	−0.169	**−5.904**	0.921	−0.196	**−6.252**	0.883	−0.218	**−4.408**	0.798	−0.140	**−4.783**	0.558	−0.195
8th grade (7th grade is reference)	**−1.876**	0.811	−0.065	**−2.378**	0.944	−0.076	**−3.935**	0.897	−0.135	**−2.473**	0.768	−0.082	**−3.678**	0.585	−0.142
Christian (unaffiliated reference)	−1.373	0.913	−0.046	−0.613	1.195	−0.018	0.308	0.944	0.011	−0.656	0.918	−0.022	−0.243	0.625	−0.010
Islam (unaffiliated reference)	−2.065	2.165	−0.025	1.136	1.639	0.028	0.359	1.511	0.011	2.249	1.408	0.065	1.013	0.936	0.035
Religious importance	**1.620**	0.242	0.198	**1.038**	0.327	0.128	0.519	0.314	0.069	**1.015**	0.263	0.138	**0.876**	0.195	0.124
Feel badly disappointing parents?	**2.393**	0.305	0.192	**1.824**	0.419	0.117	**2.457**	0.346	0.186	**2.767**	0.325	0.200	**2.380**	0.255	0.189
Friend's thinking important?	0.012	0.252	0.001	0.004	0.323	0.000	−0.380	0.294	−0.034	−0.443	0.271	−0.040	0.248	0.208	0.024
Teacher's thinking important?	**1.700**	0.223	0.195	**2.102**	0.277	0.210	**1.951**	0.227	0.230	**1.713**	0.214	0.196	**0.815**	0.167	0.100
First generation (native is reference)	−1.864	1.023	−0.048	−1.908	1.611	−0.034	−0.407	1.345	−0.008	0.422	1.145	0.009	−1.539	0.906	−0.036
Second generation (native is reference)	**−1.373**	0.687	−0.052	−1.547	1.015	−0.051	−0.419	0.892	−0.014	**−2.095**	0.964	−0.063	**−1.234**	0.561	−0.051
R^2	0.171			0.148			0.173			0.160			0.142		
Adjusted R^2	0.165			0.141			0.166			0.154	0.138				
F ratio	26.885			19.894			25.164			28.169			34.305		
F ratio sig.	0.000			0.000			0.000			0.000			0.000		

Note: The emphasized regression coefficients in bold are significant at $p < 0.05$

Table 2.10 Regression of level of shame index on selected variables by country

	US			The Netherlands			France			UK			Germany		
	B	SE	Beta	B	SE	Beta	B	SE	Beta	B	SE	Beta	B	SE	Beta
(Constant)	**43.529**	3.109		**51.129**	3.833		**38.381**	3.766		**43.929**	3.209		**50.961**	2.637	
Male (female is reference)	**−3.104**	1.023	−0.074	**−8.823**	1.238	−0.180	**−5.348**	1.213	−0.108	**−6.443**	1.102	−0.133	**−7.224**	0.823	−0.169
9th grade (7th grade is reference)	**−5.987**	1.202	−0.140	**−10.307**	1.493	−0.201	**−9.572**	1.502	−0.189	**−6.776**	1.342	−0.126	**−7.173**	0.981	−0.162
8th grade (7th grade is reference)	**−2.941**	1.285	−0.064	**−4.236**	1.533	−0.080	**−5.875**	1.520	−0.114	**−2.781**	1.297	−0.053	**−4.041**	1.027	−0.087
Christian (unaffiliated reference)	1.192	1.448	0.025	−0.931	1.942	−0.016	2.816	1.610	0.056	−1.893	1.544	−0.037	1.276	1.095	0.030
Islam (unaffiliated reference)	−0.676	3.430	−0.005	**−5.460**	2.665	−0.078	−2.185	2.575	−0.039	**−6.301**	2.368	−0.106	−2.850	1.628	−0.055
Religious Importance	**1.062**	0.382	0.081	0.537	0.531	0.039	−0.185	0.535	−0.014	0.759	0.443	0.060	−0.082	0.342	−0.0O6
Feel badly disappointing parents?	**3.745**	0.482	0.188	**2.420**	0.679	0.092	**3.750**	0.588	0.159	**4.589**	0.544	0.195	**3.904**	0.449	0.173
Friend's thinking important?	**1.781**	0.403	0.110	**1.818**	0.522	0.091	**1.242**	0.502	0.062	**1.188**	0.452	0.062	**1.719**	0.362	0.095
Teacher's thinking important?	**3.357**	0.355	0.240	**4.440**	0.452	0.262	**4.701**	0.384	0.315	**3.557**	0.360	0.237	**3.209**	0.293	0.219
First generation (native is reference)	−2.780	1.621	−0.044	**−5.767**	2.625	−0.061	−2.020	2.310	−0.023	1.532	1.930	0.020	**−3.956**	1.576	−0.052
Second generation (native is reference)	**−2.450**	1.089	−0.058	**−3.559**	1.646	−0.069	1.266	1.514	0.023	−1.094	1.623	−0.019	**−3.482**	0.986	−0.080
R^2	0.193			0.210			0.230			0.188			0.184		
Adjusted R^2	0.187			0.203			0.224			0.183			0.180		
F ratio	31.125			30.657			36.333			34.361			46.495		
F ratio sig.	0.000			0.000			0.000			0.000			0.000		

Note: The emphasized regression coefficients in bold are significant at $p < 0.05$

importance of religion, importance of teachers, importance of parents, and importance of friends, with gender and grade as control variables. We make within-country and between-country comparisons of the magnitude of the standardized beta to determine if these variables are of equal importance across pupils from France, the UK, Germany, the Netherlands, and France.

Table 2.9 presents the regression results for perceived wrongness (pro-social values) as the dependent variable. The model performs adequately in all five countries: in the USA the model explains about 17% of the variance in the Pro-Social Index; in Germany 14% of the variance is accounted for. The models were significant in all five samples but this is an artifact of the large sample sizes. Important to note is that all predictors (including those that are not statistically significant) trend in the theoretically expected direction.

Both *grade* (as a proxy for age) and *gender* have an effect in the expected direction in all five countries (with the exception of gender in the USA where $p = 0.08$, beta −0.043). In all five samples, the magnitude of the beta is largest for the 9th grade (ranging between −0.140 for the UK and −0.218 for France), with smaller effects for the 8th grade. Males tend to score lower on the Pro-Social Index than females (ranging between Germany −0.121, compared to −0.059 UK, and −0.043 for the USA). *Importance of parents* and *importance of teachers* were significant at minimally $p < 0.05$ for all five country models, while *importance of friends* fails to reach significance in all samples. Thus, youth who are worried about disappointing their parents or who care about what their teacher thinks tend to score significantly higher on the Pro-Social Values Index than their counterparts who do not care so much about that. There is a varying *relative* influence of parents and teachers across the countries, though. In the USA and UK, parents and teachers have a roughly equal influence on the Pro-Social Index, while in the Netherlands and France, the teacher's influence trumps that of the parents. In Germany, on the other hand, the parent is the more important influence. *Religious importance* was significant in the expected positive direction for the USA (0.198), the UK (0.138), Germany (0.124), and the Netherlands (0.128). The French data also suggest that more religious pupils are somewhat more likely to morally condemn items on the Pro-Social Values Index, although the beta (0.07) is significant only at $p < 0.10$.

Contrary to expectations, *type of religion* is not relevant in any of the five countries. That is, compared to those who claim no religion (unaffiliated), neither Muslim nor Christian pupils score higher on the Pro-Social Values Index. Also contrary to a common belief, *first-generation* adolescents in USA, the UK, Germany, the Netherlands, and France do not show lower levels of support for pro-social values than their native counterparts. In the USA, the UK, and Germany, *second-generation* adolescents are slightly more likely to score lower on the Pro-Social Values Index; this variable was significant—barely—in a negative direction in these three countries, with beta values in the area of −0.050. Unlike the results presented in the bivariate analysis, the multivariate-controlled findings suggest that the apparent minor effects of religion and migrant status largely are washed out.

Table 2.10 presents the regression results for the anticipated shaming dimension of morality as a dependent variable. The model for the Level of Shame Index performs a

little bit better than the Pro-Social Index for all of the countries: the highest R^2 in the USA suggests that the model's included variables explain about 23% of the variance; the model did least well in Germany with only 18% of the variance accounted by the included variables. Again, all predictors (including those that are not statistically significant) trend in the theoretically expected direction.

The results for the Level of Shame Index are quite comparable to those based on the Pro-Social Values Index, with two notable exceptions: religiosity (not significant) and the importance of friends (now significant). The role of *gender* is stronger and more consistent, significant at $p < 0.05$ in all five countries, with the highest effect in the Netherlands (beta = −0.180), closely followed by Germany (beta = −0.169). The smallest impact of gender was in the USA (beta = −0.07). Much like the Pro-Social Index's results, older respondents have the greatest downward influence upon the Level of Shame Index (the betas for the 9th grade are all more negative than those for the 8th grade) in all five countries.

Importance of parents, *importance of teachers*, and *importance of friends* all are significant at minimally $p < 0 = 0.081$) where children who consider religion more important in their daily lives tend to report a somewhat higher level of shame when responding to the hypothetical scenarios. Controlled analysis provides some weak evidence for a relationship between *type of religion* and anticipated shame: in the Netherlands and the UK, Muslims tend to report lower levels of shame in response to the hypothetical scenarios (−0.078 and −0.106) than pupils who are agnostic or atheist (unaffiliated). Results for Christianity (compared to unaffiliated) are not significant in any of the five countries.

The picture with regard to *migrant status* is not as easy to summarize. In both France and the UK, first- and second-generation immigrant adolescents are neither more nor less likely to feel shame compared to their native-born counterparts. In Germany and the Netherlands, on the other hand, native-born pupils tend to express higher levels of shame than both first- and second-generation immigrants. The magnitude of these effects are rather modest however [the Netherlands (−0.061 and −0.069); Germany (−0.052 and −0.080)]. In the USA, second-generation immigrants are slightly less likely to report feeling shame compared to native-born youth (beta = -0.06); the beta for first-generation immigrants (−0.044) trends in the expected negative direction.

Summary and Conclusions

Criminologists tend to be interested in morality because it is viewed as an explanatory factor or correlate of delinquency and crime (Braithwaite, 1989; Rebellon, Piquero, Piquero, & Tibbetts, 2010; Wikström, 2010; Messner, 2012; Svensson, Pauwels, & Weerman, 2017). Not so in this chapter, where we analyzed morality as a *dependent variable* measured by survey responses of some

10,000 children in the UK, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the USA. Before summarizing our results, we must acknowledge the limits imposed by the operationalization of "morality" in the ISRD3 project. Morality is a complex, abstract, and multidimensional concept which may not easily be captured in a series of survey questions such as the ones we used. Still, we find it reassuring that the Pro-Social Values Index and the Shame Index, originally used by Wikström and colleagues, provide results that are largely consistent with theoretical expectation (construct validity). The reliability and factor analyses showed cross-national measurement equivalence of both indices. The Pro-Social Values Index is two-dimensional, with factor 1 reflecting more serious items (burglary, robbery, vandalism, hitting, and ethnic insult) and factor 2 capturing the nonserious items (illegal downloading, disobeying parents, shoplifting small item). The Shame Index is also two-dimensional, split between importance of parents' opinion (factor 1) and role of teachers and friends (factor 2). These dimensions proved to be conceptually meaningful and greatly facilitated the comparative analysis of the five samples. Furthermore, we have tried to capture the *cognitive* dimension of morality through the Pro-Social Values Index and the *emotional* dimension through the Shame Index. Our substantive findings for both indices are rather comparable, suggesting that both scales (which are moderately correlated $r = 0.046$) do tap the basic underlying dimension of morality.

We find broadly similar patterns of morality across these five countries. Similarity of relative rankings of wrongness and levels of shame across countries suggest value consensus and normative integration across these five countries. The highest levels of perceived wrongness were associated with violation of clear legal rules (robbery/extortion and burglary). Relatively strong condemnation was also expressed for ethnic insults. Vandalism and hitting with intent to hurt were viewed as wrong, albeit less so than robbery, burglary, or ethnic insults. The disapproval of shoplifting, disobeying authority, and illegal downloading was very low among all samples. Pupils across all samples expressed the highest levels of anticipated shame in scenarios where their behavior (shoplifting, hitting, or arrest) was witnessed by parents, with teachers in the second place. Friends' disapproval in the hypothetical scenarios placed a distant third in determining the level of shame experienced. Getting arrested produced the highest levels of shame in all samples. It should be noted that not all five countries exhibit the same level of normative integration (measured through the coefficient of relative variation): France and the Netherlands rank at the lower end, and the US sample reflects a higher level of agreement on moral and legal rules.

The conceptual model (Fig. 2.2) finds partial support across the samples in *all* five countries. Girls and younger children show higher levels of morality, as do children who value the opinions of parents and teachers. As expected, the role of friends is less clear-cut: friends' opinions are only of modest importance for the Shame Index (not at all for the Pro-Social Values Index). Children with more religiosity tend to score higher on the Pro-Social Values Index, but religiosity is not

relevant for the Shame Index, with the exception of the USA where a small effect exists. This is puzzling, since religion is linked to expressing remorse and shame and being forgiven.

Once we control for gender, grade, and importance of teachers, parents, friends, and religiosity, the effects of *religion* on morality largely disappear (see Table 2.3 for bivariate association). This is not surprising, since religion influences gender roles, bonding to school, selection of peers, and relations to parents. The only significant finding with regard to religious affiliation is that in the Netherlands and the UK, Muslim pupils report lower levels of shame (compared to unaffiliated pupils). In future research, we need to further explore this lack of correlation. It may be an artifact of our analysis: the use of unaffiliated (no religion) as reference group, the gross classification of all religions into only Muslim and Christian (eliminating the heterogeneous category of "other"), or possible interaction between faith and religiosity.

Under controlled conditions, *migrant status* is not related to the Pro-Social Values Index for any of the five samples; the analysis for the Shame Index shows varying outcomes for the five countries. These findings suggest that the effect of migrant status requires specification by country (see also Marshall, 1997). There is no doubt that the umbrella term "migrant" is too simplistic to capture the complex reality of what it means to be a migrant. In the USA, the recent migrant population is primarily Latino, quite different from the situation in France, Germany, the UK, and the Netherlands, with migrants primarily from North Africa and Eastern Europe. Unlike Western European countries, migrants in the USA enter a deeply racially divided society, with a weak social safety net. Furthermore, we tend to limit the definition of "migrant" to the first and second generation only, assuming that earlier generations have been truly integrated in mainstream society. However, many Turkish, North African, and Indian immigrants in Western Europe continue to be considered a minority group, even after they have become naturalized citizens. They remain visibly different, relatively powerless, and subject to the forces of discrimination and prejudice. We would argue that it is their structurally disadvantaged position, as well as their presumed different values and moral sense, which demands additional analysis and targeted policy interventions.

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Appendix

6.1) How wrong you think is it for someone of your age to do the following?

Tick one box for each line

	very wrong	wrong	a little wrong	not wrong at all
Lie, disobey or talk back to adults such as parents and teachers.	❑	❑	❑	❑
Knowingly insult someone because of his/her religion, skin colour,or ethnic background.	❑	❑	❑	❑
Purposely damage or destroy property that does not belong to you.	❑	❑	❑	❑
Illegally download films or music from the internet.	❑	❑	❑	❑
Steal something small like a chocolate bar from a shop.	❑	❑	❑	❑
Break into a building to steal something.	❑	❑	❑	❑
Hit someone with the idea of hurting that person.	❑	❑	❑	❑
Use a weapon or force to get money or things from other people.	❑	❑	❑	❑

Fig. 2.5 ISRD3 questionnaire items measuring pro-social values

6.2) Imagine you were caught shoplifting, would you feel ashamed if ...

	no, not at all	yes, a little	yes, very much
a) your ***best friend*** found out about it	❑	❑	❑
b) your ***teacher*** found out about it	❑	❑	❑
c) your ***parents*** found out about it	❑	❑	❑

6.3) Imagine you were caught physically hurting another person, would you feel ashamed if ...

	no, not at all	yes, a little	yes, very much
a) your ***best friend*** found out about it	❑	❑	❑
b) your ***teacher*** found out about it	❑	❑	❑
c) your ***parents*** found out about it	❑	❑	❑

6.4) Imagine you were arrested by the police for committing a crime, would you feel ashamed if ...

	no, not at all	yes, a little	yes, very much
a) your ***best friend*** found out about it	❑	❑	❑
b) your ***teacher*** found out about it	❑	❑	❑
c) your ***parents*** found out about it	❑	❑	❑

Fig. 2.6 ISRD3 questionnaire items measuring shame

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Chapter 3
‘Less Social Bonding, More Problems?’: An International Perspective on the Behaviour of (Migrant) Youth

Majone Steketee and Claire Aussems

Introduction

There are several signs that many young people with a migrant background feel less attachment to their social environment and institutions (Pels, 2008; Van Bergen, Feddes, Doosje, & Pels, 2015). This marginalized position is often seen as a possible explanation for their over-representation in problem behaviours such as crime, drug use or school dropouts (Junger-Tas, Steketee & Moll, 2008; Junger-Tas et al., 2010). Migrant families live more often in disadvantaged residential areas because of their high levels of unemployment and economic deprivation. Neighbourhoods with poor living standards, poverty and population instability suffer from high crime levels. Residential turnover weakens social bonds and social control in these districts (De Winter, Horjus, & van Dijken, 2009; Shaw & McKay, 1942). According to social bonding or control theory (Hirschi, 1969), weakened social bonds are considered the main cause of criminal behaviour.

Another important issue is that the host society also has an influence on the limited bonding of young migrants. Because of the negative attitude of citizens towards refugees in Europe, juveniles with a migrant background lack a sense of belonging in all aspects of society: in the public domain, in education (Pels, 2008; Van Bergen et al., 2015), in leisure time and in employability (Klooster, Kocak, & Day, 2016).

M. Steketee (✉)
Verwey-Jonker Institute, Utrecht, The Netherlands

Erasmus School of Social and Behavioural Science, Erasmus University, Rotterdam, The Netherlands
e-mail: MSteketee@verwey-jonker.nl

C. Aussems
University of Groningen/the Free University of Amesterdam/Verwey-Jonker Institute, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

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Young people with a migrant background have a strong and widely shared sense of exclusion: they feel themselves to be seen not as an individual, but only as a member of a migrant or religious group (Huijnk, Gijsberts, Andriessen, & Dagevos, 2015). At the same time, they sometimes feel more connected to their own ethnic group, but also with (transnational) movements elsewhere, such as political movements in their parents' country of origin. In this chapter we examine whether there is a difference in how young people with a migrant background are connected with school, friends, neighbourhood or parents compared to native youth. Is there less bonding of young people with a migration background and if so, what factors such as poverty, discrimination and lifestyle of young people play a role? Are there differences in these processes between European countries?

Theories About Bonding and Deviant Behaviour

When it comes to bonding, Hirschi's (1969) social bonding theory is one of the best known. Social bonding theory explains why young people do *not* get involved in criminal activity, in contrast to many other theories of crime. The explanation it offers lies in the quality and strength of social bonds. The more that young people are engaged in their social environment and aware of the relevant social norms and rules, the less they are likely to engage in criminal activities. Hirschi states that delinquent behaviour is a result of weak or missing links with the community. Social cohesion consists of four dimensions. First, the bonds with significant others such as parents, teachers, family and friends; second, the connection of the personal goals of students with the normative system of the country where they live; third, the involvement of young people in social activities; and finally, the belief in the social and normative values and norms in society. The assumption is that the lower scores on these four dimensions, the more likely it is that younger will commit an offence. Hirschi suggests that the stronger the bond with the parents, the teacher or the school, the more that young people are inclined to adopt their values. As a result, they will exhibit socially accepted behaviour. To avoid the disapproval of significant adults, they will tend to avoid risky behaviours such as truancy that are precursors to delinquency. These young people are positively rewarded for their behaviour, which makes the bond stronger. Hirschi also states that such young people will choose friends who behave in similar ways and that these friendships will protect them from riskier friendships.

This last point shows a weakness in his theory: Hirschi underestimated the influence of the peer group in facilitating deviant behaviour (Junger-Tas & Hean Marshall, 2012). Several studies have shown that the group of friends and how young people spend their leisure time have a great influence on delinquency (Steketee, 2012). A further criticism is that children grow up in varying social conditions in which not all parents have the same parenting skills (Kornhauser, 1978: Sampson & Laub, 1993). The reality is that, particularly in the disadvantaged neighbourhoods of large cities, large groups of children grow up in environments

that do not support the bonding process. Such areas are characterized by disorder, illegality and criminality, where problem families face addiction, poverty, unemployment and psychiatric disorders (Van Dijken, Stams, & De Winter, 2016). These neighbourhoods cannot transmit shared norms and values because they are unable to exercise social control over the young people who live in there (Junger-Tas & Hean Marshall, 2012).

In this chapter we are interested in the role of migrant youth and bonding. Hirschi (1969) claims that his theory applies to young people from different ethnic groups, gender and socioeconomic class: 'there is no reason to believe that the causes of crime among negroes are different from those among whites' (p. 79). In the Netherlands, several scientists (Bovenkerk, 1994; Van Gemert, 1998) believe that social bonding theory is too 'white' an approach to juvenile delinquency. Young people belonging to ethnic minorities have other social bonds such as coffee houses and mosques, which can lead to less bonding with the host society and therefore put them at risk of criminal behaviour.

In contrast, several studies confirm the applicability of social bonding theory to a range of ethnic groups (e.g. Junger & Marshall, 1997; Junger-Tas, 2001; Özbay & Özcan, 2006). Research among high school students in Turkey shows that this theory can also explain delinquent behaviour among young Turks (Özbay & Özcan, 2006). An association has also been found between weak social bonding and delinquency among Dutch youth of Antillean, Moroccan, Dutch, Surinamese and Turkish origin (Junger-Tas & Steketee, 2009). This finding is not specific to the Netherlands. The results of the ISRD-2 study, in which 30 countries participated, show that a good relationship with (one of) the parents, school, neighbourhood and friends has a protective effect on juvenile delinquency and that there is no difference between native and immigrant youth (Steketee, van der Gaag, & Wolthuis, 2016).

In the present study, we shall examine whether there is a difference in the bonding of young migrants with their family, school, teacher, friend and neighbourhood compared with people who have been born within the country. And do differences in bonding explain the over-representation of migrant youth in problem behaviour as delinquency, substance use and truancy?

In relation to various ethnic minorities, there are specific factors that may have an adverse effect on the bonding to society. These factors may include relative lack of social capital because of lower parental education, lack of language skills, social network, information and poor knowledge of the mainstream culture (Pels & Distelbrink, 2000). Young people with a migrant background more frequently grow up in large deprived urban neighbourhoods, where they often come into contact with crime, vandalism, delinquent friends or gangs. Cramped housing and limited financial resources mean that these young people often spend much time on the streets and are less often involved in organized activities such as sports clubs (Junger-Tas & Steketee, 2009; Pels, 2008). So migrant youth are more exposed to risk factors, such as having delinquent friends, growing up in a disorganized neighbourhood and spending more time in unsupervised public places, that are related to problematic behaviour.

The negative attitudes of the host community towards migrants in recent years is a growing problem for young people, which leads to an ambivalent social orientation (Pels & De Haan, 2003; Pels & Gruijter, 2005). They experience a 'wall of mistrust', which can lead them to rejecting the norms and standards of the host community, eventually turning into reality the negative expectations made of them (see also Harris, 1995). They can also engage experienced social injustice to legitimize their troublesome or criminal behaviour. The normal phenomenon of adolescent resistance to the established order will be strengthened by the experience of humiliation. Another mechanism is that if young immigrants feel that they are treated as different, they will respond with pride by defending their cultural integrity (Stepick & Stepick, 2002). Young migrants also have the opportunity to maintain transnational ties with their homeland. In response to these forces and opportunities, they maintain multiple identities, sometimes identifying with their homeland culture and at other times with the country they are living in. The question is what difference these multiple identities may make for civic engagement. The level integration into society is often mentioned by scholars as an important factor that influences the feeling of belonging to a society. Peguero et al. (2014) suggest that adolescents' school bond seems to diminish or decline as the children of immigrants assimilate.

Another important issue that has become increasingly salient is the religious background of young people. Young people with a Muslim or Jewish religion feel that they are not welcome because of the anti-Semitism or anti-Muslim attitudes of the majority population (Van Wonderen & van. Kapel, 2017; Van Wonderen & Wagenaar, 2016; Tierolf, van. Kapel, & Hermens, 2015). It is clear that many young Turks and Moroccans derive their identity primarily from their religion—for their cultural background—and themselves have become more aware in recent years of their Muslim identity (see Entzinger & Dourleijn, 2008). Within social bonding theory, religious conviction plays no direct role in creating bonds with the community. Including religiosity within the model does not appear to have an impact in predicting violent behaviour (Cretacci, 2003; Junger-Tas, 2001). Families where many conflicts occur, little supervision and poor communication, turn out to be less traditional in their beliefs. All this ensures that young people spend more time on the streets and more often delinquent behaviour (Junger-Tas, 2001). So in this chapter, we will also examine the moderating effect of being religious, the level of integration and whether migrant status impedes bonding with family, teacher or friends and increases risks of delinquent behaviour.

The research questions that we shall address in this chapter are:

- Do young migrants differ from others in bonding with their family, school, teachers, friends and neighbourhood?
- Do differences in bonding explain the over-representation of migrant youth in problem behaviour as delinquency, substance use and truancy?
- Are there cross-national differences in bonding of young migrants and its relationship with problematic behaviour?
- Are there specific factors such as young migrants' level of integration, their marginalized position, religion or living circumstances that have an effect on their bonding or delinquency?

Research Methods

The data are drawn from a subsample of the ISRD3 survey covering nine countries: the Netherlands, Germany, the UK, the USA, France, Austria, Switzerland, Belgium and Denmark. Although other chapters in this book focus mainly on the first five of these countries, we have incorporated another four into the analyses to enable cross-country comparison of migrants with similar origins. The UK and America have distinctively different migration patterns from other countries in the sample, the former being unique in having a large minority population of South Asian origin and the latter having migrants with Latin American origins. By contrast, migrants' backgrounds in Austria, Switzerland, Belgium and Denmark are similar to those in Germany, the Netherlands and France.

Data Collection and Sample

Data used in this analysis were collected during the third wave of the International Self Report Delinquency Study (ISRD-3) administered between 2013 and 2016 to 7, 8, and 9th grade students. The subsample with nine countries includes 26,383 students. Of these, 11% are first-generation migrants (born outside the country) and 30% are second-generation (born in the country, but parents born elsewhere). The remainder, almost 60%, are defined in this chapter as native. Most countries used a city-based sampling design based on proportionate-to-size sampling in two larger cities of the country. Researchers in Switzerland and Austria collected a national sample, but oversampled in the larger cities to meet the city-based requirements. Because most migrant families live in metropolitan areas, the number of migrant students is quite high compared to other studies. The USA has the largest number of migrant students (59%) and Denmark the lowest (28%). Three quarters of the migrant subsample are second-generation migrants and a quarter first-generation (Table 3.1).

Table 3.1 The number of migrant and native students for the nine countries

	N	Native (%)	First generation (%)	Second generation (%)
Austria	6.485	70	20	20
Belgium	3.484	60	14	27
Denmark	1.669	72	6	22
France	1.814	60	10	30
Germany	2.955	49	10	41
The Netherlands	1.884	54	9	37
Switzerland	4.069	51	13	35
UK	2.108	63	13	24
USA	1.915	41	13	46
Total	26.383	59	11	30

Description of Measures

Outcome Variable

We use a 'categorized versatility' score as a measure of delinquent behaviour. The survey asked students if they had ever or in the last 12 months committed any of the 12 offences. These ranged from minor offences such as shoplifting, group fights and vandalism to more serious crimes such as burglary and robbery. The categories in the versatility score were 'no offence,' 'one offence,' 'two offences' and 'three or more offences'—where all offences were committed in the last year.

Other *outcome variables* were binge drinking (five or more glasses on one occasion the last), use of marijuana last month and truancy last year.

Control Variables

Three control variables that were associated with offending in previous studies were included in the analysis: gender, grade, openness or willingness to answer honestly.

Migrant background was based on the country of birth of both parents and the student. A student was considered native-born if both parents had been born in the current country of residence and considered to have a migrant background if either one or both parents were foreign-born.

Mediating Factors

Family bonding was measured by a scale derived from four questions relating to emotional support from parents, feeling bad about disappointing parents, attachment to father and attachment to mother ($M = 4.41$, SD = 0.68, $\alpha = 0.69$).

School bonding was measured by a scale derived from four questions asking for the degree of agreement with these statements: 'If I had to move, I would miss my school'; 'Most mornings I like going to school'; 'I like my school'; and 'Our classes are interesting' ($M = 2.87$, SD = 0.70, $\alpha = 0.79$).

Teacher bonding was measured by a scale derived from two questions: 'If you had to move to another city, how much would you miss your favourite teacher?' and 'How important is it to you how your favourite teacher thinks about you?' ($M = 3.58$, SD = 1.36, $\alpha = 0.73$).

Bonding with friends was measured by the question: 'If you had to move to another city, how much would you miss your friend or group of friends?' ($M = 5.44$, SD = 0.89).

Moderating Variables

Identity was measured by a country-specific[1] question: To which of the following groups do you belong? We constructed a dichotomous variable measuring majority/minority status. Respondents were assigned majority status if they said they were white or European or specified their nationality (e.g. Dutch). All other respondents were categorized as having minority status.

Religion was measured by two questions: 'What is your religion or to which religious community do you belong?' and 'How important to you (personally) is religion in your everyday life?'

Level of integration was measured by two questions: 'What language do you most often speak at home?' and 'How many of your friends have at least one parent of foreign origin?'

Deprivation was measured by two questions: 'How well-off is your family, compared to others?' and 'If you compare yourself with other people of your age: do you have more, the same or less money (pocket money + presents + own earnings, etc.) to spend?'

Hate crime victim was measured by the question asking if the following had happened: 'Someone threatened you with violence or committed physical violence against you because of your religion, the language you speak, the colour of your skin, your social or ethnic background or for similar reasons?'

Analysis

We performed structural equation modelling in Stata 14 (StataCorp, 2015) to estimate direct and indirect effects of minority status on the outcome variables. First, we estimated separate models using bonding variables and other risk factors as mediating variables across all countries. Second, the same models were estimated for each country separately to explore if there were country differences. The latter models were estimated using multi-group SEM. In this procedure the intercept and regression coefficients were freely estimated for each country.

As the distribution of the outcome variables was skewed, a logarithmic transformation was used to approximate to a normal distribution. In all models we controlled for the impact of gender, grade and openness (the degree to which respondents were prepared to answer sensitive questions honestly). All figures contain standardized regression coefficients to enhance comparability between the impact of all variables. In this section we present graphically the results for the outcome variable versatility, which is the outcome of most interest. We present findings first across the whole sample, and then for individual countries. The results for the other out-

[1] The question was asked in different ways in different countries, because of conventions or legal restrictions in asking about ethnicity. For example, the French questionnaire asked, 'A quel espace géographique te sens-tu appartenir?'

come variables (use of marijuana, binge drinking and truancy) will briefly be described in the text; these results are aggregated across countries.

Findings

In this section we shall present our main findings. Section "Bonding as a Mediating Factor Between Migrant Status and Versatility" summarizes findings on bonding as a mediating factor between migrant status and delinquency. Section "Bonding as a Mediating Factor in the Relationship Between Migrant Status and Problem Behaviour" then presents a similar analysis on bonding as a mediating factor between migrant status and other forms of problem behaviour of juveniles. Section "Cultural Identity and Feelings of Belonging as Moderators in the Relationship Between Migrant and Versatility" examines how cultural identity and feelings of belonging act as moderators in the relationship between migrant status and delinquency. To anticipate our findings, there is some evidence for bonding theory, but it is actually quite weak. Because of this weak pattern of findings, we explore in Section "Risk Factors as Mediating Factors in the Relationship Between Migrant Status and Problem Behaviour" alternative explanations—examining a range of other risk factors—for the relationships observed between migrant status and self-reported offending.

Bonding as a Mediating Factor Between Migrant Status and Versatility

Figure 3.1 presents a model of the relationship between migrant status, versatility and mediating bonding variables (X^2 (6, n = 20,526) =6612.447 (p = 0.000), RMSEA = 0.232, CFI = 0.430). The figure shows that there is a direct relationship between migrant status and versatility (0.036) and that there is a mediating effect of bonding in this relationship. Migrants have lower levels of bonding with their family (−0.032), school (−0.044) and friends (−0.092). Their bonding with teachers, on the other hand, is stronger than for native youth (0.034). School bonding (−0.185), family bonding (−0.153) and bonding with the teacher (−0.035) have a positive influence, decreasing the chance that juveniles will commit more than one crime. Bonding with friends (0.057) on the other hand is a risk factor. Although there is a significant relationship, the mediating effect is not very large.

Mediation Models for Individual Countries

The mediation model for bonding was also estimated for the nine separate countries. What stands out is that none of the relationships between migrant status and the various bonding factors were significant for the USA and France. For the UK,



Fig. 3.1 Structural equation model of the relation between migrant and versatility and various aspects of bonding as mediators. *Notes*: Standardized solution; $N = 20{,}526$; nonsignificant coefficients. All coefficients are statistically significant

only the relationship between migrant status and school bonding was significant. For Belgium only the negative relationship between migrant and friends bonding was significant. Family bonding and school bonding were negatively related to versatility in all countries. We also found a positive association between friends bonding and versatility in all countries, except for the UK and the USA. Only in Austria and France a significant negative relation was found between teacher bonding and versatility.

Bonding as a Mediating Factor in the Relationship Between Migrant Status and Problem Behaviour

We also estimated models with outcome variables binge drinking, marijuana use and truancy. Obviously the relationship between migrant youngsters and the bonding variables in these models is very similar to the model of versatility. Therefore, we only briefly present the results of the relationship between the direct predictors of the outcomes (bonding variables and migrant) and the outcomes themselves. First, the model using binge drinking as outcome was estimated (X^2 (6, n = 14,733) =4680.03 (p = 0.000), RMSEA = 0.230, CFI = 0.387). School bonding (−0.130), family bonding (−0.082) and teacher bonding (−0.064) all have a negative relationship with binge drinking; for these cases higher bonding is associated with

less binge drinking. However, higher levels of bonding with friends (0.074) is related to more binge drinking. Migrants show lower levels of binge drinking than native juveniles (−0.045).

Second, a model was estimated that included marijuana use as outcome variable (X^2 (6, n = 20,526) =6612.45 (p = 0.000), RMSEA = 0.232, CFI = 0.380). The results of the model estimation are very comparable to the earlier findings. Higher school bonding, family bonding and teacher bonding all reduce marijuana use. Bonding with friends is a risk factor, with stronger bonding related to more marijuana use (0.015). The direct relationship between migrants and marijuana use is positive, meaning that migrants tend to use more often marijuana (0.038).

Third, the truancy outcome variable was included in the model (X^2 (6, n = 20,526) =6612.447 (p = 0.000), RMSEA = 0.232, CFI = 0.349). Similar to the previous models, higher school bonding (−0.174), family bonding (−0.115) and teacher bonding (−0.017) are associated with lower levels of truancy. Strong bonding with friends, however, is related to higher truancy (0.018). Migrants show more truancy than native adolescents (0.046).

Cultural Identity and Feelings of Belonging as Moderators in the Relationship Between Migrant and Versatility

Within Hirschi's theory, the definition of bonding is limited to the actual bonding of juveniles to their family, school or teacher. Research among migrant population shows that migrant youth quite often have stronger bonds with their country of origin than with the host country (WRR, 2007; SCP, 2015). The definition of bonding of migrant youth is more linked to identity and feelings of acceptation. In research into migrants' identity, bonding is often quantified through measures of identification with their host country and country of origin; this is measured either by the extent to which they feel connected to the host country and country of origin (e.g. 'I feel totally Dutch' or 'I feel more Dutch than Turk/Moroccan'). Identification refers to the extent to which an individual identifies itself with the social system of the country and the extent to which this system gives him or her the sense of belonging (Entzinger & Dourleijn, 2008). Identification and bonding refer to items such as the feeling of being accepted within the country, experienced discrimination or other forms of exclusion, attitudes to Dutch society and ethnicity of social contacts. Therefore, we have tested where ethnic identity acts as a moderator on the relationship between migrant background and delinquent behaviour. The question on ethnic identity was not asked in all countries, and in our sample Austria, Germany, Belgium and Denmark did not do so, leaving us with a sample of 11,734 drawn from France, the UK, the USA, the Netherlands and Switzerland. Fifty-two percent of pupils with migrant status defined themselves as belonging to the majority; of non-migrant (native-born) pupils, 5% were third-generation migrants who defined themselves as belonging to an ethnic minority.

Ethnic identity did not have any moderating effect either on the relationship between migrant status and bonding or migrant status and delinquency. Similarly we found no moderating effects of religious affiliation on the relationships between migrant status and bonding, on the one hand, and delinquency on the other.

Risk Factors as Mediating Factors in the Relationship Between Migrant Status and Problem Behaviour

The findings presented so far show that bonding theory can explain the over-representation of migrant youth in deviant behaviour such as delinquency or substance use or truancy better than the concept of identity. However, our findings do not amount to *strong* evidence for bonding theory. This section examines whether other risk factors are more powerful mediators in explaining the relationships between migrant status and delinquency. The ISRD3 dataset has an extensive range of measures that address risk factors, and the ones that we have used in this part of our analysis are summarized in Appendix. These are:

- Self-control
- Neighbourhood disorganization
- School disorganization
- Having delinquent friends
- Parental supervision
  - Parental supervision scale
  - Parental knowledge
  - Child disclosure scale

Risk Factors as Mediating Factor in the Relationship Between Migrant Status and Versatility (Delinquency)

Figure 3.2 summarizes a structural equation model that shows off the relationship between migrants and versatility, where other risk factors are included as mediating variables (X^2 (6, n = 25,179) = 37873.71 (p = 0.000), RMSEA = 0.268, CFI = 0.282). There is no direct relationship between migrant youth and versatility. As the results show, migrant youth are associated with less self-control (−0.051), less parental supervision (−0.065) and less parental knowledge (−0.042). Furthermore, they are related to higher levels of neighbourhood disorganization (0.134) and school disorganization (0.073) and have more often delinquent friends (0.076). The results also show that self-control, parental supervision, parental knowledge and child disclosure are negatively related to the number of different crimes committed by juveniles. Neighbourhood disorganization, school disorganization and having



Fig. 3.2 Structural equation model of the relation between migrant and versatility and other risk factors as mediators (standardized solution; $N = 25{,}179$; nonsignificant coefficients are displayed in red boxes)

delinquent friends are all positive predictors of versatility; higher levels of these risk factors increase the number of committed crimes. The results show that for the sample in aggregate, the relationship between migrant and versatility is totally mediated by the risk factors included in the model.

The Mediation Model for Individual Countries

Investigating the previous model for separate countries, we found that there are no significant relationships between migrant and all mediating risk variables for the UK and the USA (see Table 3.2). For Denmark only the relation between migrant and neighbourhood disorganization was significant. For Austria and the Netherlands, all relations between migrant and the mediators were significant, except for child disclosure. Taking into account the mediators in the model, only for Belgium there was a negative direct relation between migrant and versatility. In all countries self-control and having delinquent friends were significantly related to versatility (see Table 3.3). Also parental knowledge was significantly negatively related to versatility in all countries, except for the UK. All mediating risk variables were significantly

Table 3.2 Significant regression coefficients for the relationship between migrant status and risk factors, for each country

	Self-control	Neighbourhood disorganization	Parental supervision	Parental knowledge	Child disclosure	School disorganization	Delinquent friends
Austria	X	X	x	x		X	X
Netherlands	X	X	x	x		X	X
Switzerland	X	X	x	x	x		X
Germany	X	X	x		x	X	X
Belgium	X	X	x	x			X
France		X				X	X
Denmark		X					
UK							
USA							

Table 3.3 Significant regression coefficients for the relationship between risk factors and versatility, for each country

	Self-control	Neighbourhood disorganization	Parental supervision	Parental knowledge	Child disclosure	School disorganization	Delinquent friends
Switzerland	X	X	x	x		X	x
USA	X	X	x	x	x		x
Austria	X	X		x	x		x
UK	X	X	x		x		x
Belgium	X			x	x		x
France	X			x		X	x
Netherlands	X			x			x
Denmark	X			x			x
Germany	X			x			x

related to versatility for Switzerland, except for child disclosure. The same holds for the USA; all mediating risk factors are associated with versatility, except for school disorganization.

So we can conclude that most of the risk or protective factors like self-control, parental control and delinquent friends are of influence on delinquent behaviour for the different countries. And for most countries, there is a difference between migrant and non-migrant youth, in that the former are more at risk and less protected—with the exception of the UK, Denmark and the USA. For Denmark the only risk factor for migrant youth is disorganized neighbourhood.

Risk Factors as Mediating Factor in the Relationship Between Migrant Status and Other Problem Behaviour

Again, the same model was estimated for outcome variables of binge drinking, marijuana use and truancy. First, the model for binge drinking was estimated (X^2 (21, n = 17,707) = 26412.48 (p = 0.000), RMSEA = 0.266, CFI = 0.246). Higher levels of self-control (−0.195), parental supervision (−0.011), parental knowledge (−0.118), child disclosure (−0.054) and school disorganization (−0.027) are negatively related to binge drinking on alcohol. Neighbourhood disorganization (0.018) and having delinquent friends (0.213) are associated with increased frequency of binge drinking. However, migrant adolescents binge-drink less frequently than native adolescents (−0.091).

When marijuana was included in the model as the outcome variable, there were comparable results (X^2 (21, n = 25,179) = 37873.71 (p = 0.000), RMSEA = 0.268, CFI = 0.225). Self-control (−0.059), parental supervision (−0.024) and parental knowledge (−0.097) are negatively related to the outcome; when the values of these predictive variables increase, marijuana use of juveniles decreases. Higher levels of neighbourhood disorganization (0.078), school disorganization (0.026) and having delinquent friends (0.234) are positively correlated with more frequent marijuana use. There is no direct relationship between having a migrant background and use of marijuana.

Third, a model as outcome was estimated with truancy as the dependent variable (X^2 (21, n = 25,179) = 37873.71 (p = 0.000), RMSEA = 0.268, CFI = 0.211). As in the previous models, self-control, parental supervision (−0.011), parental knowledge (−0.118) and child disclosure (−0.054) are negatively related to truancy. On the other hand, neighbourhood disorganization (0.087), school disorganization (0.041) and having delinquent friends (0.169) are associated with higher levels of truancy. Juveniles with a migrant background show more truancy than juveniles with a native background (0.020).

Conclusion and Discussion

Our first main conclusion is that there is a significant relationship between migrant youth and several measures of deviant behaviour: delinquency, marijuana use and truancy. Only binge drinking is more common among native-born pupils. The differences in problematic behaviour between pupils with a migrant background and others can in part be explained by differences in bonding. Migrant pupils had lower bonding with their family, their school and friends. On the other hand, the bond with the teacher was stronger than for native-born youth. Bonding with the school and teacher has a protective effect; it reduces delinquent behaviour among migrant juveniles. Bonding with friends is for migrants a risk factor. This is consistent with the bonding theory. What is not consistent is that bonding with parents is also a risk factor for migrant youth. The explanation for this inconsistency could be that cultural differences between the family and the host country could confront children with more barriers and challenges such as other cultural norms, discrepancies between familial and societal expectations and increased chances of parent-child conflict due to differential acculturation rates between children and their parents (Marsiglia, Nagoshi, Parsai, Booth, & Castro, 2014; Schwartz & Unger, 2010). This could lead to loss of protective parental influences associated with their heritage culture.

Although there is a significant relationship between bonding and delinquency among migrant juveniles, the effect is weak and there are also variations between countries. So bonding theory can only partly explain the over-representation of migrant youth in problem behaviour as delinquency, substance use and truancy.

From research among migrant youth, we know that there are specific factors such as level of integration, the marginalized position of the migrant youth, religion or the living circumstances that have an effect on bonding and delinquency. The interrelationship of ethnic and national identity and their role in the psychological well-being of immigrants can best be understood as an interaction between the attitudes and characteristics of migrants and the responses of the receiving society. This interaction is moderated by the particular circumstances of the migrant group. The strengths of ethnic and national identity vary depending on the support for ethnic maintenance and the pressure for assimilation (Sabatier & Berry, 2008). In this study, however, we have not found any empirical support for this assumption. Specific factors such as being a victim of hate crime because of the skin colour, the level of integration, being religious and social marginalization have no effect on the relation with bonding or on the relationship between migrant status and delinquency. So the cultural background of migrants, like religion or level of integration, cannot explain the relationship with deviant behaviour. Also, the mixed identity of juveniles doesn't explain the deviant behaviour of migrants.

Perhaps the key finding of this analysis is that the strongest explanations for the over-representation of migrant youth in problem behaviour are to be found in the difficult circumstances, of their upbringing and the low social economic status of their parents, who tend to be unemployed or in low-paid jobs. Those with migrant backgrounds have consequent disadvantages to cope with: they are likely to attend

a school with a high degree of disorganization; to live in a neighbourhood that has a high degree of disorganization; to have more delinquent friends; to have less self-control; and to experience less parental control and less parental involvement in their activities. Any statistical significance of the direct relationship between migrants and versatility disappears when these risk and protective factors are put into the model. The risk factors explain the relationship between migrant youth and delinquent behaviour better than models with bonding that take into account specific factors associated with migrant status such as identity or level of integration.

The lack of parental control and parental knowledge can be a result of the lack of knowledge of the parents of cultural norms in the host country and insufficient language skills. This means that they are less able to exercise control of their children in terms of lifestyle, what they do in their spare time or the friends they have. The lifestyle of juveniles is an important risk factor. Young people's personal moral norms and their ability to exercise self-control may be important, but the circumstances of their daily lives also have a large effect on delinquent behaviour (Wikström, 2010).

A limitation of the research is that we were unable to refine our analysis to take account of different countries of origin of migrants. We know from ISRD-2 that migrant youth with an Asian background are quite comparable in their behaviour to native-born youth. Another important conclusion from ISRD-2 was that migrants from Western Europe were more delinquent than those from non-Western countries. The fact that 52% of migrant students say they belong to a majority group (e.g. white or European) may mean that these are Western Europeans whose culture is not so different from their host country. So further research should be done that takes into account migrants' country of origin. It could be possible that issues such as identity, religion, level of integration, being a victim of hate crime do matter for migrants from visible ethnic minorities, who may be confronted more often with racism and discrimination. This could also be an explanation for country differences for the mediating effect of risk and protective factor for migrant youth.

The key policy lesson of this study is that if we don't take more care of the most vulnerable children with migrant backgrounds, who live in deprived neighbourhoods and are exposed to multiple risk factors, we can be fairly certain that they will end up over-represented in police statistics and over-represented in the criminal justice process. We should be much more aware of the ways in which we guide these new migrant families into our society, and we should make better provision for migrant families to reduce the risks of crime and delinquency facing migrant children.

Appendix

Self-control was measured by nine items from the self-control scale (Grasmick, Title, & Arneklev, 1993) ($M = 2.79$, SD = 0.64, $\alpha = 0.84$). We used three subscales: impulsivity, risk tacking and self-centeredness. In the analyses we combined these three subscales to one variable self-control.

Neighbourhood disorganization was measured by a scale with five items: There is a lot of crime in my neighbourhood, drug selling in my neighbourhood, fighting in my neighbourhood, empty and abandoned buildings in my neighbourhood and graffiti in my neighbourhood, with for answering options from fully agree to fully disagree ($M = 1.45$, SD = 0.66, $\alpha = 0.87$).

School disorganization was measured by four questions: 'There is a lot of stealing in my school'; 'There is a lot of fighting in my school'; 'Many things are broken or vandalized in my school'; and 'There is a lot of drug use in my school.' There are four answering categories from I fully agree until I fully disagree ($M = 1.89$, SD = 0.68, $\alpha = 0.74$).

Closely related to lifestyle/leisure is whether or not the youth has friends involved in deviant or illegal behaviour. Admitting to having delinquent friend is often an alternative way of asking about one's own involvement in delinquency. Research has shown that self-reported delinquency of friends is strongly related with a youth's delinquent involvement (Warr, 2002). *Delinquent friends* is a five-item scale asking about the number of friends one has that are involved in drug use, shoplifting, burglary, extortion or assault ($M = 0.78$, SD = 1.15, $\alpha = 0.68$).

We also have looked at *parental supervision.* Recent developments in the literature suggest the importance of distinguishing between different dimensions of parental supervision. There is research that indicates that measures of parental supervision should be able to distinguish between parental knowledge, parental solicitation and child disclosure. If child disclosure is not controlled, detected links between parental supervision and crime can be spurious and dependent on unmeasured variation in child's own behaviour. This conceptual redevelopment was originally published by Swedish researchers Kerr and Stattin (2000). Recently, the basic idea has been corroborated by Eaton, Krueger, Johnson, McGue, and Iacono (2009). Therefore, we now introduce a new parental control scale, which basically consists of three subscales: parental knowledge scale (three items) ($M = 4.23$, SD = 0.85, $\alpha = 0.80$), child disclosure scale (five items) ($M = 3.57$, SD = 0.80, $\alpha = 0.63$) and a parental supervision scale (four items) ($M = 3.81$, SD = 1.02, $\alpha = 0.85$).

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Chapter 4
Parental Violence, Deprivation and Migrant Background

Dirk Enzmann and Ilka Kammigan

Introduction

For many children the first violence they experience is physical punishment by their parents. However, societies and social groups within societies are differentially affected by parental violence. Although we can observe a long-term decline of the acceptance of violence as a means of education, in some societies, social groups or families, violence as a means of education is a comparatively persistent phenomenon. Perhaps this is due to self-enforcing processes of its negative consequences, a cycle of violence that propagates into the next generation (for critical reviews of the evidence, see Thornberry, Knight, & Lovegrove, 2012; Widom, Czaja, & DuMont, 2015).

This chapter tries not to add further evidence to the questions whether and how parental violence is linked with delinquent behaviour of juveniles or other negative developmental outcomes. After reviewing existing evidence on the negative long-term effects of parental violence and reasons for its change over time, the focus is on the prevalence and predictors of parental violence itself. Using data for the many countries surveyed so far in the ISRD3 project, first we investigate the cross-national distribution of parental violence and explore whether differences in prevalence can be explained by macro-level differences in poverty and deprivation. Secondly, focusing on the five countries of the UPYC project, we investigate differences in the prevalence of parental physical punishment and physical abuse between families with and without a recent migration background and test the competing importation and deprivation hypotheses about the origins of violence.

D. Enzmann (✉)
Faculty of Law, Institute of Criminal Sciences, University of Hamburg, Hamburg, Germany
e-mail: dirk.enzmann@uni-hamburg.de

I. Kammigan
Helmut-Schmidt-University, Hamburg, Germany
e-mail: ilka.kammigan@uni-hamburg.de

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Long-Term Effects of Parental Violence and Global Changes Over Time

Among other factors, early socialization experiences in the family are responsible for delinquent and criminal behaviour in later years—either directly or indirectly as mediators or causes of the causes. Many criminological theories agree on this (even if they differ in basic assumptions), regardless of whether they focus on the individual level (e.g. Hirschi, 1969), the macro level (e.g. Messner & Rosenfeld, 1998) and on the immediate situational mechanism (e.g. Wikström, 2010) or whether they subscribe to the risk factor paradigm (Farrington, 2000). Research has shown that next to family functioning and parental attachment, a coercive parenting style, especially the use of physical violence as a means of punishment, has lasting negative effects on developmental outcomes in several respects (Fang et al., 2012; Ferguson, 2013; Gilbert et al., 2009; Malinosky-Rummell & Hansen, 1993) such as cognitive functioning (Kendall-Tackett & Eckenrode, 1996), conflict competence and attitudes towards violence (Enzmann & Wetzels, 2001), emotional stability and interpersonal behaviour (Malinosky-Rummell & Hansen, 1993), health, emotional well-being and risk behaviour (Aquilino & Supple, 2001; Widom, Dumont, & Czaja, 2007) and economic well-being (Currie & Widom, 2010), as well as antisocial and criminal behaviour (Fang & Corso, 2007; Nix et al., 1999; Widom & Maxfield, 2001). A recent meta-analysis of 111 studies (Gershoff & Grogan-Kaylor, 2016) on the effects of physical parental punishment (spanking) and the more severe form of physical abuse (often an escalation of corporal punishment) found negative effects of physical punishment for 13 of 17 different outcome groups (mean effect size $d = 0.33$, 95%-$CI = 0.29$–0.38). In a subgroup of 10 studies where measures of the less and the more severe parental violence were available, the average effect size of physical punishment reached two-thirds of the average effect size of physical abuse—showing that although physical abuse has stronger effects, even socially accepted "spanking" can produce substantial negative outcomes.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, physical punishment of children, students and apprentices in family and education was still widely accepted in developed Western societies. Although at first sight parental violence seems to be a relatively persistent phenomenon, until now one can observe a steady decline in the acceptability of violence in education. A decreasing tolerance for child maltreatment resulted in the first legislation to abolish parental corporal punishment in Sweden in 1979 (Janson, Langberg, & Svensson, 2010; Gilbert et al., 2009). By 2017, 53 states had followed this example.[1] In many countries this trend resulted in the criminalisation of violence as tool of education in schools and in the family (Gershoff, 2008). The legislation has been accompanied by increasing social disapproval of the actual use of physical punishment (Bussmann, Erthal, & Schroth, 2009). However, growing sensitivity to negative long-term effects of physical punishment and increasing responsiveness to child maltreatment are likely to increase

[1] For updates, see http://www.endcorporalpunishment.org/.

the number of cases reported to protection agencies, which makes it difficult to document evidence of an actual decrease of parental violence and child maltreatment (Gilbert et al., 2012).

This decline of the acceptance (and use) of physical parental punishment is embedded in a general decrease of violence in Europe and beyond, over several centuries (Eisner, 2014; Pinker, 2011). Likely macro-level reasons for this tendency are the development of states claiming a monopoly on the use of violence (Elias, 1978), the evolution of criminal justice institutions for punishment and the regulation of conflicts (Eisner, Murray, Ribeaud, Averdijk, & van Gelder, 2017), increasing literacy in the general population, an improvement of standards of living and an "expansion of the circle of empathy" (Pinker, 2011).

Theoretically Expected Relationships Between Parental Violence, Deprivation and Migrant Background

If better education and improvements in standards of living can explain the decrease of the acceptance and use of violence, one should expect higher levels of parental violence in countries with lower values of the Human Development Index (HDI), which is a modern measure of poverty. The HDI is an aggregate measure of indicators measuring life expectancy, education and per capita income.[2] In this chapter, data from the 27 countries surveyed in the ISRD3 project will be used to describe differences of the prevalence of parental violence across countries and to investigate whether these differences correlate with poverty on the country level as measured by the HDI.

The main theories explaining the relationship between poverty and dysfunctional or violent parenting at the individual level are stress theories, culture of poverty theories and poor environment theories (La Placa & Corlyon, 2016). Poverty may put individuals under severe stress, impairing their capacity to react to and cope adequately with their children's needs (Elder, Van Nguyen, & Caspi, 1985; Peireira, Negrão, Soares, & Mesman, 2015). According to culture of poverty theories, attitudes, behaviour patterns and lifestyles of poor people differ from the more affluent and better educated and are transmitted between generations, thereby causing persistence of poverty (La Placa & Corlyon, 2016; see also Harding & Hepburn, 2014). Finally, poor environment theories posit that parents' parenting styles and informal resources are negatively influenced by their neighbourhoods, either through contagion or collective socialization, especially if neighbourhoods are homogeneous with respect to poverty and social status (Leventhal & Brooks-Gunn, 2003). Elliott et al. (2006) found that neighbourhood disadvantage and parenting interact such that good parenting practices will protect their children from negative neighbourhood effects, which will not happen in families with dysfunctional parenting styles.

[2] Data have been published by the United Nations Development Programme (2015).

Additionally, poor neighbourhoods offer few informal resources that can support parents and children in need. Also, families and children living in poor neighbourhoods run an increased risk of being excluded from contact with the more affluent.

Below it will become apparent that as well as poverty and deprivation, the migration background of families also has to be taken into account. There are two reasons to assume that the prevalence of parental violence is higher among young people with a migration background: Firstly, their parents will in many cases have moved from countries in which parental violence is more prevalent. This *importation hypothesis* assumes a different culture of parenting and/or a continuation of the cycle of violence that was already under way in countries of origin. Secondly, according to the *deprivation hypothesis*, migrants often experience more adverse living conditions in their host country than the domestic population. Additionally, migrants often choose or are forced to live together in neighbourhoods characterized by poor housing conditions, incivilities and an accumulation of social problems, often segregated from other neighbourhoods. Using individual level data for the five UPYC countries, we investigate which of these hypotheses are supported by the data.

Methods

The overall methodology of ISRD3 is covered in this book's introduction and also in Enzmann et al. (2018). In brief, the survey was the third in a series that was originally built around modules of questions asking schoolchildren in the 7th to 9th grades (aged 12–16) about their self-reported offending and experience of victimization. While ISRD was intended to estimate the prevalence of offending and victimization, it was also designed to enable testing of different criminological theories, particularly in the third sweep. Most participating countries sampled schools in two medium-sized or large cities, with samples designed to be representative of these cities (rather than the respective country). The survey was administered in school classrooms, using Internet-based self-completion questionnaires wherever possible. The dataset for the third sweep of ISRD covered 27 countries at the time of writing. The survey sampled school classes of grade 7–9 students (age between 12 and 16) in 86 cities or regions, with a valid sample size of 60,913. Note that the data are representative only for students in the cities and regions surveyed, not the countries.

Whilst the first part of the analysis focusses on the full dataset of 27 countries that was available at the time of writing, the second part involves an in-depth examination of five countries: France, Germany, the Netherlands, the USA and the UK. These countries were the focus of a subproject of ISRD3, "Understanding and Preventing Youth Crime" (UPYC), supported by the national funding councils of the countries involved.

The ISRD3 study included two measures of parental violence derived from items 9 and 11 of the short form of the revised conflict tactics scales (Straus & Douglas,

2004). The first question, measuring *physical punishment*, probed incidents involving hitting, slapping and shoving.[3] This measured less severe forms of parental violence, sometimes called "corporal punishment", including "spanking" (Gershoff, 2010, p. 33f.). The answers allow the creation of measures of life-time prevalence, last year prevalence and last year incidence (frequency). The second question, measuring *physical abuse*, probed incidents involving hitting with an object, punching, kicking or beating up the child.[4] This is the more severe form of parental violence sometimes termed "parental maltreatment" (Enzmann et al., 2018). Note that both questions included the prompt that the respondent should include cases where the parent committed such acts as a punishment for something the child had done. Responses to both questions enabled the construction of measures of life-time prevalence, last year prevalence and last year incidence (frequency).

Parental Violence and Deprivation at the Macro Level

Figures 4.1 and 4.2 present findings on the country differences of the percentage of students who report that a parent has used parental violence over the last year (last year prevalence rate), either in the form of physical punishment or of physical abuse.[5] The countries are grouped into seven clusters: (1) Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland), (2) Western Europe (Austria, Belgium, Germany, Switzerland, the UK), (3) Southern Europe (France, Italy, Portugal), (4) Post-Socialist Eastern Europe (Armenia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania, Slovak Republic, Ukraine), (5) the Balkans (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Republic of the Kosovo, Serbia), (6) other non-European countries (Cape Verde, India,[6] Indonesia, Venezuela) and (7) the USA. The sequence of countries follows first the rank order of the average prevalence rates per cluster and second—within the clusters—the rank order of country-level prevalence rates.

[3] The questionnaire item reads: "Has your mother or father (or your stepmother or stepfather) ever hit, slapped or shoved you? (Include also times when this was punishment for something you had done.) Has this ever happened to you? [If yes] How often has this happened to you in the last 12 months?"

[4] The label is based on the definition of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention report (Leeb, Paulozzi, Melanson, Simon, & Arias, 2008, p. 14; see also Gilbert et al., 2009, p. 69). The questionnaire item reads: "Has your mother or father (or your stepmother or stepfather) ever hit you with an object, punched or kicked you forcefully or beat you up? (Include also times when this was punishment for something you had done.) Has this ever happened to you? [If yes] How often has this happened to you in the last 12 months?"

[5] All analyses in this chapter use weighted data and robust standard errors, taking the clustering of students into school classes into account. If the error bars of two 95% confidence intervals (*CI*) overlap by not more than half of the average arm length, the difference of point estimates (such as reporting rates) can be considered to be statistically significant at $p < 0.05$ (see Cumming & Finch, 2005). However, this holds only for single comparisons, not for multiple comparisons and not for correlated data such as matched data or repeated measures.

[6] Grade 9 students only.



Fig. 4.1 Last year prevalence rates of parental physical punishment across countries

The overall last year prevalence rate of parental punishment is 19.6% (95%-*CI* 19.0–20.2), ranging from 3.5% in Denmark to 39.2% in the Czech Republic. The rates of physical abuse are clearly lower with 5.2% (95%-*CI* 4.9–5.4) total, ranging from 0.4% in Denmark to 11.2% in the USA (the apparently larger 95%-*CI*s in Fig. 4.2 are mainly due to a different scaling of the *x*-axis). The data show substantial differences between countries and country clusters: parental violence is least prevalent in the Nordic countries (physical punishment, 8.1% (95%-*CI* 7.0–9.4); physical abuse, 1.6% (95%-*CI* 1.2–2.1)) and most prevalent in the USA (physical punishment, 23.9% (95%-*CI* 20.4–27.8); physical abuse, 11.2% (95%-*CI* 9.0–13.8)) and in the other non-European country cluster (physical punishment, 22.3% (95%-*CI* 20.8–23.8); physical abuse, 10.1% (95%-*CI* 9.2–11.1)).

We decided to focus on last year prevalence rates instead of life-time prevalence rates because the predictor variables used to explain parental violence refer to the current situation of respondents (see below). However, it is important to note that life-time prevalence rates are about 40% higher: The total life-time prevalence rate of parental punishment is 27.6% (95%-*CI* 27.0–28.3%) ranging from 13.9%



Fig. 4.2 Last year prevalence rates of parental physical abuse across countries

(95%-*CI* 12.2–15.8) in Denmark to 48.9% (95%-*CI* 47.0–50.9) in the Czech Republic, whereas the total life-time prevalence rate of physical abuse is 7.5% (95%-*CI* 7.2–7.9) ranging from 1.7% (95%-*CI* 1.1–2.6) in the Republic of the Kosovo to 15.1% (95%-*CI* 13.7–16.7) in Venezuela. This corresponds to the observation that the rate of children experiencing parental violence decreases with age. According to a national survey of parenting in Ireland, for the 10–14 age group, the prevalence rates are already under half the rates of younger children (Halpenny, Nixon, & Watson, 2009).

The link between parental physical punishment and more serious physical abuse can be seen in Fig. 4.3. There is a relatively strong country-level correlation between the prevalence of parental physical punishment and more serious physical abuse (Pearson's $r = 0.59$, $p = 0.001$, $n = 27$). Denmark emerges as the country with the lowest level of parental physical punishment and abuse, whereas the USA, Indonesia



Fig. 4.3 Country-level association between parental physical abuse and physical punishment

and the Czech Republic are the countries with the highest level. It is noteworthy that Denmark belongs to the countries that have prohibited parental corporal punishment by law (in 1997), whereas the USA, Indonesia and the Czech Republic still allow parents to use physical punishment. The countries below the red horizontal and left of the red vertical line represent countries below the median of *both* prevalence rates.

While the correlation between physical punishment and physical abuse suggests that they share common causes, it leaves open the question whether they are causally related, for example, in the sense that "spanking" can ran out of hand and transform to physical abuse if parents feel that milder forms of physical punishment are ineffective. There is the argument that parents using milder forms of physical punishment and those committing more severe forms are fundamentally different persons (Baumrind, Larzelere, & Cowan, 2002). Others argue that there is a curvilinear relationship between the severity of physical punishment and its effectiveness (similar to dose-effect relationships encountered in medical treatment), while milder



Fig. 4.4 Country-level association between human development index and physical abuse

forms of parental violence are assumed to have positive outcomes, the outcomes of more severe forms are expected to be negative (see Larzelere, Gunnoe, Roberts, & Ferguson, 2017 and counterarguments by Holden, Grogan-Kaylor, Durrant, & Gershoff, 2017). A meta-analysis of studies in which "spanking" and "physical abuse" have been studied in the same samples shows that both have similar effects on a range of outcomes, although the effects of physical abuse are stronger (Gershoff & Grogan-Kaylor, 2016).

The data suggest that cultural acceptance of the use of physical force by parents to discipline their children varies across the globe. If the deprivation hypothesis is correct, we should expect that not only at an individual level but also at the country level, poverty is related to the prevalence of physical punishment and physical abuse. To explore this hypothesis, we use the HDI as a modern measure of poverty (Sen & Anand, 1994; United Nations Development Programme, 2015). Figure 4.4 shows that—at the country level—the average prevalence of parental physical abuse is not systematically correlated with the HDI; Spearman's rank correlation is not significant ($\rho = -0.20$; $p = 0.344$). A closer look at the scatterplot shows two groups

Table 4.1 Logistic multilevel model to predict last year physical abuse by migration status and HDI

	Odds ratio	Std. err.	*z*	*p*	95%-CI
Fixed effects					
Migrant background (base: native)					
Second-gen. migr.	1.66	0.184	4.54	<0.001	1.33–2.06
First-gen. migr.	2.19	0.287	5.99	<0.001	1.69–2.83
HDI	0.54	0.133	–2.51	0.012	0.33–0.87
Random effects					
Variance (country)	0.314	0.173			0.107–0.922
Variance (class)	0.190	0.034			0.135–0.269

Notes: 25 countries, 3403 school classes, n = 59,447; robust standard errors; HDI centred and standardized by 2 standard deviations

of countries and two outliers: a group of non-European countries with a low HDI and high prevalence rates of physical abuse (Indonesia, India, Cape Verde and India), the group of European countries with higher HDI and medium prevalence rates of physical abuse, the USA with high HDI and a very high level of physical abuse and Denmark with high HDI and a very low level of physical abuse.

A closer look reveals that the countries are not homogeneous regarding the cultural background of the population. Especially in the Western European cluster, there are large groups of ethnic minorities with a migration background from countries with a lower HDI. Additionally, in the USA social minority status is ascribed along racial characteristics and by a long history of racial segregation. A logistic multilevel model that predicts juveniles' individual experience of parental physical abuse from their migration background ("native-born" vs. second- or first-generation migrants) together with HDI on the country level shows that the highest level of physical abuse was experienced by first-generation migrants, followed by second-generation migrants, and the lowest levels by native-born students (that included third-generation migrants) (Table 4.1).[7]

Compared to native-born students, the number of students experiencing physical abuse among the first-generation migrants predicted from the model is 4.2% points higher, whereas among second-generation migrants, it is "only" 2.4% points higher, an indication that may suggest that over time, the parenting style slowly adapts to the parenting style among natives in the country. Additionally, after statistically controlling for migration status, the effect of HDI is substantial and statistically significant: if the HDI increases by 2 standard deviations, the odds of becoming a victim of parental physical abuse is almost halved. Expressed in percentages, on average the predicted percentage of physical abuse is about 2.6% points lower if the HDI increases by 2 standard deviations. Thus, only after statistically controlling for the higher proportions of juveniles with a migration background in the more

[7] The values of HDI are centred at the total mean and standardized by two standard deviations in order to make the size of the odds ratio compatible to the effects of the dichotomous dummy variables of migration status (see Gelman, 2008).

Table 4.2 Logistic multilevel model to predict last year physical abuse in the US sample

	Odds ratio	Std. err.	*t*	*p*	95%-CI
Ethnicity (base: white)					
Black	4.03	2.25	2.50	0.014	1.34–12.14
Asian	3.31	2.11	1.87	0.063	0.94–11.68
Hispanic white	3.75	1.75	2.83	0.005	1.49–9.43
Hispanic non-white	3.32	2.14	1.86	0.065	0.93–11.89
Other	4.12	2.43	2.40	0.018	1.28–13.25
Migrant background (base: native)					
Second-gen. migrants	0.75	0.27	–0.79	0.430	0.36–1.54
First-gen. migrants	0.53	0.21	–1.60	0.113	0.24–1.16
City (base: east)					
South	2.12	0.67	2.39	0.018	1.14–3.95
Midwest	1.68	0.38	2.29	0.024	1.07–2.63

Notes: n = 1883 in 129 school classes; robust standard errors

developed countries, the expected negative relationship between poverty (human development) and parental physical abuse becomes visible.

However, the rather high level of parental physical abuse in the USA despite the high HDI in this country is still unexplained. Accordingly, we took a closer look at the US data in order to explore possible reasons for its deviant position with regard to physical abuse (see Table 4.2). The results of a logistic regression model to predict parental physical abuse by ethnicity, migrant background and the city of the respondents show that in the USA migrant background is *not* associated with an increased victimization risk. Instead, self-reported ethnic identity, i.e. not being non-Hispanic white,[8] appears to be an important risk factor. Translating the effects into estimated percentages of parental physical abuse shows that all students who identify themselves as anything other than "white" are at an increased risk: whereas the percentage of victims is 4.4% among white (non-Hispanic) students (95%-*CI* 1.2–7.6), the rates are significantly higher in the other groups—15.6% among black (95%-*CI* 7.0–24.1), 14.6% among white Hispanics (95%-*CI* 9.1–20.1) and 15.8% in the "other" group (95%-*CI* 6.0–25.7). The rate for the "white" group of students (4.4%) is similar to the reported rates for the Western European cluster. The higher rates among black and Hispanic students are consistent with US research and theory on higher levels of intergenerational violence and use of physical force (Fontes, 2002; Dakil, Cox, Lin, & Flores, 2011; see also Anderson, 1999). At the same time, results show that there are significant differences between the three US cities from which the students are sampled.

[8] The US questionnaire asked about racial and ethnic identification as follows: "Do you think of yourself as (1) White (not Spanish/Hispanic/Latino), (2) Black or African American, (3) American Indian or Alaska Native, (4) Asian, (5) Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander, (6) White Spanish/Hispanic/Latino, (7) Non-White Spanish/Hispanic/Latino or (8) Other?" This is consistent with common use by the US census. Note that in the current analysis, white Spanish students are treated as distinct from those students who identified themselves as simply "white".

The other extreme shown in Fig. 4.4 are students from the Danish city: here the prevalence rate of parental physical abuse is clearly the lowest. A likely explanation is the comparatively long history of abolition by law of corporal punishment in the Nordic countries. Starting in 1979 in Sweden and since then spreading over Europe and beyond, physical punishment by parents (and others) is banned by law in a growing number of countries (Gershoff & Bitensky, 2007; Commissioner for Human Rights, 2008; Global Initiative to End All Corporal Punishment of Children, 2009; Council of Europe, 2015). In Denmark parental physical punishment has been prohibited by law since 1997, but one can assume that similar to the development in Sweden, the acceptance of parental violence has already declined before the enactment of the law, which further reinforces the declining use of parental violence.

Effects of Migrant Background and Deprivation on Parental Violence

The higher prevalence rates of parental violence (physical abuse) among families or juveniles with migration background in the 25 countries investigated might be explained either by a culture of violence (or a cycle of violence), i.e. by a higher acceptance of violence as a means of education in the countries of origins (the importation hypothesis) or by the adverse living conditions many migrants face in their host countries (the deprivation hypothesis).

Using data of the five UPYC countries (France, Germany, the Netherlands, the UK and the USA), we explored both hypotheses by estimating two models to predict parental physical punishment and parental physical abuse: (1) a reduced model containing the status of migration background as a single predictor and (2) a full model additionally containing indicators of deprivation and parental stress. A non-significant effect of migrant background in the reduced model or a decrease of a significant effect (in model 1) to a non-significant effect of migrant background when adding deprivation or stressor variables (in model 2) would be an empirical argument against the importation hypothesis, while significant effects of deprivation or parental stress indicators would strengthen the deprivation hypothesis.

The ISRD3 dataset enables exploration of the effects of five indicators of deprivation and parental stress: (1) parent in receipt of unemployment or social welfare benefits, (2) relative deprivation of the family, [9] (3) a single-parent household,[10] (4)

[9] Question "How well off is your family, compared to others" with seven response categories ranging from "much worse off" to "much better off". For the analyses the values have been centred and divided by two standard deviations to make the exponentiated regression coefficients (odds ratios) compatible to coefficients of dichotomous variables (Gelman, 2008).

[10] Because the models predict parental violence, only data of respondents living in two (step)parent or single-parent families were analysed.

Table 4.3 Effects of migrant background on last year physical punishment before and after controlling for deprivation and stressors

	France		Germany		Netherlands		UK		USA	
Model	Odds ratio	*z*	Odds ratio	*z*	Odds ratio	*z*	Odds ratio	*z*	Odds ratio	*z*
Reduced	1.50***	3.19	1.61**	3.03	1.72***	3.71	1.67	1.88	1.25	0.97
Full	1.26	1.77	1.53*	2.55	1.57**	3.12	1.79*	2.12	1.40	1.47
Difference	1.19**	3.00	1.05	1.44	1.10*	2.24	0.93*	–2.27	0.89	–1.58

Notes: Odds ratios of reduced model rescaled; control variables: unemployment/recipient of welfare benefits, relative deprivation, one parent family, alcohol or drug use of parents, neighbourhood incivilities; sample sizes see Table 4.5; robust standard errors; $^{*}p \leq 0.05$, $^{**}p \leq 0.01$, $^{***}p \leq 0.001$

at least one parent having a problem with alcohol or drugs and (5) the level of neighbourhood incivilities.[11]

Table 4.3 compares the effects (odds ratios) of migrant background on parental punishment in the reduced and full model per country. In France, Germany and the Netherlands, significantly more juveniles with a migration background than native juveniles experience parental punishment.[12] This difference is not significant in the UK (cities in England and Scotland) and the USA. In France and the Netherlands, the direct effect of migrant background is significantly reduced if adding indicators of deprivation or parental stress to the model (see the row termed "difference" in Table 4.3),[13] whereas in the UK, the effect increases significantly. The reduction in France and the Netherlands shows that a part of the differences in parental physical punishment between juveniles with and without migration background can be attributed to adverse living conditions (in France the difference is no longer significant in the full model), whereas in the UK, the difference becomes only visible after statistically controlling for the indicators of deprivation or parental stress.

[11] Neighbourhood incivilities is an item mean score of five 4-point Likert items probing the existence of incivilities in the neighbourhood ("lot of crime", "lot of drug selling", "lot of fighting", "lot of empty and abandoned buildings", "lot of graffiti"); see ISRD3 Working Group (2013). The scores have been centred and divided by two standard deviations to make the exponentiated regression coefficients (odds ratios) compatible to coefficients of dichotomous variables (Gelman, 2008).

[12] Strictly speaking, the proportion of victimized to non-victimized students is significantly higher among juveniles with a migration background as compared to native juveniles. Note that the odds ratios of the reduced model are rescaled to make them compatible to the odds ratios of the full model by using the KHB approach (Kohler, Karlson, & Holm, 2011)—this solves the problem of comparing regression coefficients of hierarchically nested nonlinear models (Mood, 2010).

[13] The effect of the reduced model is the rescaled total effect of the predictor of interest (here: migrant background), the effect of the full model is its direct effect or the effect unconfounded by the variables added to the model, and the difference between rescaled total and direct effect is the indirect effect of the predictor of interest or a measure of confounding by the variables added. The difference itself is not confounded by rescaling as it would be when simply comparing coefficients of hierarchically nested nonlinear probability models (see Karlson, Holm, & Breen, 2010; Mood, 2010). Note that the odds ratio in the row "difference" is the exponentiated difference of the regression coefficients of the restricted and the full model, not the difference of their corresponding odds ratios.

Table 4.4 Effects of migrant background on last year physical abuse before and after controlling for deprivation and stressors

	France		Germany		Netherlands		UK		USA	
Model	Odds ratio	*z*	Odds ratio	*z*	Odds ratio	*z*	Odds ratio	*z*	Odds ratio	*z*
Reduced	2.27***	3.36	3.18***	3.70	5.47***	6.57	2.33*	2.05	1.93*	2.20
Full	1.73*	2.20	3.02***	3.33	4.77***	5.50	2.43*	2.14	2.49**	2.92
Difference	1.31***	3.69	1.06	1.15	1.15*	2.48	0.96	–1.15	0.78*	–2.47

Notes: Odds ratios of reduced model rescaled; control variables: unemployment/recipient of welfare benefits, relative deprivation, one parent family, alcohol or drug use of parents, neighbourhood incivilities; sample sizes see Table 4.5; robust standard errors; $*p \leq 0.05$, $**p \leq 0.01$, $***p \leq 0.001$

Table 4.5 Predicting last year physical abuse by migrant background and deprivation/stressors

	France	Germany	Netherlands	UK	USA
Migrant background	1.73* (2.20)	3.02*** (3.33)	4.77*** (5.50)	2.43* (2.14)	2.49** (2.92)
Unempl./ welfare benef.	1.02 (0.06)	1.48 (1.04)	1.40 (1.05)	1.09 (0.24)	1.56 (0.89)
Relative deprivation	1.72* (2.21)	0.78 (–0.79)	2.01** (3.25)	1.03 (0.13)	0.84 (–0.63)
Single-parent family	1.04 (0.17)	1.29 (0.74)	1.19 (0.63)	1.86 (1.50)	1.99 (1.67)
Parent alcohol/ drug use	2.88** (2.81)	3.22*** (3.70)	1.81 (0.92)	1.86 (1.34)	7.42*** (4.79)
Neighbourhood incivilities	2.28*** (4.06)	1.50 (1.42)	1.89* (3.14)	1.50 (1.46)	0.64 (–1.19)
n	1581	2728	1789	1816	1685
McFadden Pseudo R^2	0.083	0.059	0.119	0.041	0.118

Notes: Coefficients: odds ratios; *t* statistics in parentheses; robust standard errors; $*p \leq 0.05$, $**p \leq 0.01$, $***p \leq 0.001$

Overall, even if the significant odds ratios appear to be small, the differences in prevalence rates of parental punishment between juveniles with and without migration background as estimated from the full model are substantial (Germany, 15.4 vs. 10.7%; Netherlands, 23.9 vs. 16.9%; UK, 17.4 vs. 10.6%).

Table 4.4 shows the comparison (odds ratios) of migrant background on physical abuse in the reduced and full model per country. Regarding the more severe form of parental violence, the differences between migrant and nonmigrant families are much larger and remain significant (or even become significantly larger as in the USA) if variables of adverse living conditions are added to the model. Only in France and (to a smaller degree) in the Netherlands, the effect of migrant background is significantly reduced in the full model. As to the two hypotheses, the results cannot be used as an argument against the importation hypothesis because even if the effect of migrant background is reduced in France and the Netherlands by taking the living conditions into account, there still remain significant differences between migrant and nonmigrant families. In all countries the prevalence

rates as predicted from the full model are substantially higher among juveniles with a migration background (France, 7.0 vs. 4.3%; Germany, 5.8 vs. 2.0%; Netherlands, 9.5 vs. 2.2%; UK, 5.5 vs. 2.4%; USA, 13.5 vs. 6.5%).

Although in all five countries adverse living conditions are significantly related to the prevalence of physical abuse, the countries differ according to which factor is the most important (see Table 4.5). In none of the countries, receiving unemployment or social welfare benefits is significantly related to physical abuse, and single-parent families do not differ significantly from families with two (step)parents as to the risk of juveniles of becoming a victim of physical abuse.[14] In France and in the Netherlands, relative deprivation is related significantly positive to parental physical abuse but not in the other three countries. The strongest effects can be observed as to parental alcohol or drug problems: especially in the USA, but also in Germany and France, this is an important predictor of physical abuse (not in the Netherlands and the UK).

An interesting finding is the observation that in France and in the Netherlands, families living in neighbourhoods that are characterized by more signs of incivilities show a significantly higher risk of parental physical abuse (this not only applies to migrant families): comparing families in neighbourhoods with a measure of incivilities one standard deviation above the average to those one standard deviation below the average, we find prevalence rates (as estimated from the full model) of 6.5 vs. 3.0% in France and 6.6 vs. 3.7% in the Netherlands.

To further illustrate the effect of adverse living conditions, we can use the full model to estimate the percentage of juveniles experiencing physical abuse independently from migration status under two assumptions: (1) juveniles living in families experiencing financial deprivation (plus one standard deviation), living in neighbourhoods with incivility scores one standard deviation above the average and the parent having a problem with alcohol or drugs vs. (2) juveniles living in families experiencing no financial deprivation (minus one standard deviation) , living in neighbourhoods with incivilities scores one standard deviation below the average and the parents having no problem with alcohol or drugs. Keeping the percentage of juveniles with a migration background at the average, the estimated prevalence rates in groups (1) vs. (2) are France 8.2 vs. 2.2%, Germany 5.3 vs. 3.6%, the Netherlands 10.2 vs. 2.6%, the UK 6.5 vs. 2.4% and the USA 11.5 vs. 10.9%. This shows that overall deprivation or parental stress has the strongest effects in the Netherlands and France, strong effects in the UK, less strong effects in Germany and (with the exception of problems of parents with alcohol or drugs) no effects in the USA.[15]

The latter corresponds to the observation that including the variables of adverse living conditions into the model in the USA, differences between migrant and

[14] Note, however, that the results reported in this section may not be extrapolated to the risks of children because we are only considering physical abuse in the last year. The life-time prevalence of physical abuse in these five countries is about 30% higher: France 8.1 vs. 5.6%, Germany 6.1 vs. 4.2%, the Netherlands 8.3 v. 5.3%, the UK 5.2 vs. 3.6% and the USA 14.6 vs. 11.2%.

[15] Again, one should note that this may not be extrapolated to the situation of children because here we only consider physical abuse experienced in the last year.

nonmigrant families become more pronounced (see Table 4.4). Also note that in the USA, the effect of migrant background is no longer significant if additionally we include ethnicity as a predictor into the model (see Table 4.2). One can speculate whether migrants in the USA encounter a different situation than in Western Europe such that they experience less deprivation than non-white natives.

Conclusions

Using data from 27 ISRD3 countries, we have shown that the use of parental physical violence of any sort is clearly widespread and that about 20% of pupils experienced parental physical punishment in the last year (28% during their lifetime) and more than 5% were the victim of more serious physical abuse during the last year (7.5% during their lifetime)—the latter would constitute criminal offences in many countries. There is considerable variation in the prevalence of parental use of violence across countries, with very high rates in the USA, Indonesia and the Czech Republic and very low rates in Denmark. It is unlikely that the high rates in the USA are simply a result of a higher sensitivity to the issue of parental violence. If differential sensitivity were an issue for comparing parental violence between countries, we would expect estimates being "too high" in countries that already have criminalized corporal punishment such as Denmark or Finland, not in the USA.

There is some indication that parental violence is a function of poverty (measured by the HDI) at the country level. However, the analyses suggest that this becomes only visible when controlling for the effect of migrant background, which appears to be a significant risk factor for parental physical abuse. A notable exception to this is the USA, with its relatively high level of physical abuse despite a high level of HDI, but where ethnic minority status (rather than migrant status) is related to higher levels of self-reported physical abuse by parents.[16]

A closer analysis of survey data of the five UPYC countries lends support to both the importation and the deprivation hypothesis of parental use of violence. After taking into account deprivation and parental stressors, in all countries the models significantly predict substantially higher rates of parental physical abuse for pupils with a migration background. However, it would be wrong to interpret this as an indication for the importance of the specific culture of the migrant groups: it is important to note that the ethnic (and most probably cultural) background of the migrants differs between the five countries. Whereas in the USA most migrants originate from Latin-American cultures of Central and South America (80.7%), the majority (53.7%) of the French migrant families have a background in Arabic (northern African) cultures. In the three other European countries, migrants are more diverse: in Germany, the most important migrant groups originate from Turkey

[16] Elliott and Urquiza (2006) have made a strong argument that the issue of the role of ethnicity and culture in sexual and physical abuse in the USA is complex and in need of additional study. This is also true for other national contexts.

(31.9%), countries of the former Soviet Union (13.3%) and former Yugoslavia (9.4%); the largest migrant groups in the Netherlands originate from Suriname (19.8%), Morocco (13.3%) and Turkey (9.4%); and in the UK sample, the three most significant regions of origin are Pakistan (34.5%), Bangladesh and India (17.9%) and (more recently) Poland (4.7%). Apart from the fact that most migrants come from rural, more traditional places and from poorer regions, the cultural background of all these groups differs in many ways, and this is most likely also true for attitudes about physical punishment of children. Perhaps, a cycle of violence (that may be due to coping with poverty in the originating countries) may be an alternative to a cultural explanation.

The countries differ according to which of the deprivation and parental stress variables are the most important: in France and the Netherlands, relative financial deprivation of the family and the level of neighbourhood incivilities are important predictors (in France additionally problems of parents with alcohol or drugs), whereas in Germany and the USA, only parents' problems with alcohol and drugs contribute significantly to higher rates of parental physical abuse. In the UK none of the measures of deprivation or parental stress show a significant effect. Instead, controlling for effects of these variables increases the visible effect of migrant background (as in the USA). A possible explanation is the overall better living conditions of families with migration background compared to native borns. For example, in the cities of the UK and especially in the USA, parents with alcohol and drugs problems are significantly and substantially less prevalent in migrant families.[17] In the UK even the average financial deprivation is less pronounced in families of migrants. In contrast, in the French and the Dutch cities of the UPYC samples, significantly more juveniles with a migration background are living in single-parent families and in neighbourhoods characterized by more incivilities. Although the latter applies to migrant families in Germany as well, here significantly more young people with a migration background are living in families with two parents.

The positive effect of neighbourhood incivilities on the prevalence of parental physical abuse in France and the Netherlands is remarkable. In these countries the overall effects of deprivation and parental stress are highest, and the prevalence rates of parental physical abuse among juveniles with migration background are comparatively high. One can speculate whether this is due to more homogeneous neighbourhoods of segregated migrants in these countries. Obviously, the relationship between structural disadvantage, the segregation of ethnic groups into neighbourhoods with low collective efficacy (of which neighbourhood incivilities is but one indicator) and dysfunctional violent parenting styles deserves more research efforts (e.g. Lobo-Antunes & Ahlin, 2014; Ma & Grogan-Kaylor, 2017). Nevertheless, the growing sensitivity to the problem of violence in education, the many scholarly efforts to understand its causes and mechanisms and the increasing number of countries that prohibit corporal punishment of children are promising and reason for optimism.

[17] In this context we remind the reader that the UPYC samples are only representative for selected cities in the five countries, not for the countries as such.

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Part II
Institutions and Social Cohesion: The Role of Policing Styles and Schools

Chapter 5
Religion and Attitudes Towards State Organizations: The Case of Schools. A Comparison Across Five Countries

Sebastian Roché and Sandrine Astor

Introduction

This chapter explores the links between religion and school attitudes among adolescents in five countries. Socialization of children into a superordinate group (the nation state) is undertaken, in part, through schools that equip them with skills, instill values and impose rules and sanctions (compulsory attendance, behavioural standards). Attachment or detachment vis-à-vis school may be critical in the socialization of children and their integration into the larger society. We will use survey data based on the UPYC dataset and the ISDR3 questionnaire to explore the determinants of attitudes vis-à-vis schools of junior high school students.

Individuals develop a sense of belonging and identity to a variety of groups. Among these, several play a prominent role: family, ethnicity, religion and the state, to name just a few. The role of ethnicity and religion usually is of importance in explaining societal cleavages (Alba & Foner, 2015) and violence (Lim, Metzler, & Bar-Yam, 2007). What is at stake here is the role of civil society bonds: do they strengthen positive intergroup relations, and, at the same time, do those intra-group bonds also act as a bridge to or a separation from other groups (Putnam, 2007)? Within that line of thinking, sociologists have studied intergroup relations and related attitudes, for example, between individuals that belong to distinct faith or ethnic groups (Koopmans, 2004).

S. Roché (✉)
National Centre of Scientific Research (CNRS), PACTE, Sciences-Po/Grenoble-Alpes University, Grenoble, France
e-mail: sebastian.roche@sciencespo-grenoble.fr

S. Astor
Grenoble-Alpes University, CNRS, Science Po Grenoble, PACTE, ARIANE group, Grenoble, France
e-mail: sandrine.astor@umrpacte.fr

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Another angle concerns the relations between young citizens and the state and more specifically between them and public bureaucracies. Relations to public organizations charged with social integration, either by detection of crime and sanction (police, judiciary) or by providing education and skills (schools), are an important part of relations to the state and may be influenced by the strength of belonging to social groups. Do strong intra-group bonds strengthen or weaken identification with the state and its bureaucracies? The formation of attitudes towards the police has attracted attention, and it has been found that adolescents' ethnicity, faith and religiosity shape them in some countries more than in others, especially those with a history of rioting (Roché, Schwarzenbach, Oberwittler, & De Maillard, 2017). However, there are few studies of attitudes towards school or school sense of belonging (Willms, 2003), sometimes called orientation towards school, or school attitudes (Jessor, Van Den Bos, Vanderryn, Costa, & Turbin, 1995; Stern, 2012), and even less so in relation to youth identity and attitudes towards school (however, see Johnson, Crosnoe, & Elder, 2001).

School is a key mechanism for socialization of adolescents into the mainstream society: while school integration is correlated with school performance and a lesser propensity to commit crime (for early theories of attachment, see Hirschi, 1969), school is also expected to foster the integration into broader society and the formation of citizenship (Whiteley, 2005; Print & Lange, 2012). For these reasons, the relationships of children with their school are a critical element to consider. Regarding group identity and school, most extant work focusses on ethnicity and discrimination (Brinbaum & Primon, 2013) or on religiosity and academic achievement (Jeynes, 1999; Byfield, 2008; McKune & Hoffmann, 2009). By contrast, this chapter focuses on ties to schools and is of exploratory nature as there are few comparative works on school attachment in large Western cities. We endeavour to determine the place of religion among the factors of attachment and examine whether it is stable across countries. In a context where religion has become a very contentious issue, particularly in Europe, the chapter intends to test the possibility that attachment to school might be hampered by group identities and in particular religious ones.

This study observes the effect of religion on affective attachment to school across distinct national contexts (France, Germany, the Netherlands, the UK and the US). Two competing explanations are considered: on the one hand, one might consider religion (and religiosity) as a factor of integration for all denominations and in consequence a factor that strengthens attachment to school; on the other hand, religion might be understood as drawing lines between groups, and the subjective attachment to one's religion might create a distance with schools, especially in the case of minority religions and in the context of public schools.

The chapter starts by introducing our research question and setting it in the context of existing research. This first part ends with a clearly defined set of hypotheses and corresponding set of measures (in particular an index of attachment to school, and religious denomination, religiosity, degree to which minority religions are concentrated in schools). The second part of the chapter presents findings and consists,

firstly, of a presentation of bivariate effects of independent variables on school attitude across the five countries and, secondly, an attempt to measure the effects of both individual-level and meso-level variables (the latter being school status and minority religion concentration). The aim here is to see how religion (as a personal character and as a spatialized and concentrated group) may or may not influence attachment to school. Finally, we will conclude by discussing our findings and their limitations.

Research Question: Religious Diversity and Integration Through School

The education system is expected to promote societal cohesion. It is tasked with producing citizens that are loyal to the political system and identify with the political community, promoting common values (and in some cases tolerance), equipping the children with hard and soft skills so that they will find a place on the labour market. However, it is unlikely that the education system will achieve such goals if there is no attachment to school on the adolescents' part. Hence, we see school attachment as an important dimension of experience of one's society, the determinants of which need to be carefully studied. The relationship to school may be influenced by a diversity of factors, and in particular by gender, age and social stratification as measured by parents' socio-economic status. In addition, it may be conditional on children's social identity, and in particular on their religious group (in line with the group position theory, Weitzer & Tuch, 2006).

The effect of increased diversity in the population on social cohesion has been regularly discussed in the political and the scientific arenas. While most of the literature on population composition and the role of contacts is focused on in-group out-group relations, for example with studies about the determinants of tolerance vis-à-vis out-groups, here we are concerned about attachment of those various groups to institutions which for the most part are public institutions that contribute to the cohesion of overall society. While some assert the benefits of more homogeneity, others underscore the benefits of diversity on trust or "collective mindedness" (most prominently, Putnam's (2007) work, with many other publications since then). Academic findings are split on this issue, and to our knowledge, the school-level composition has not yet been studied. Religious effects can be hypothesized to vary across countries both because of institutional arrangements (in particular school status, private schools being of denominational nature) and public policies towards minority integration.

Religion is a complex notion that can refer, among other things, to an organization (a church), a faith (a denomination), a set of beliefs (a belief system), a degree of subjective importance or attachment (religiosity) and also a community of persons (a group). We will measure the effect of religion in two ways. Firstly, at individual level as a set of beliefs (self-declared affiliation to a religious denomination

or no affiliation) and a more or less acute intensity of religiosity (more or less importance given to one's religion or absence of religion). And secondly as a context variable in order to test whether diversity jeopardizes the integrative function of schools, with school composition reinforcing the fractionalization of contemporary societies.

Studies may be of micro nature (individual-level data) or macro nature (aggregated level, most often at the national level). At the macro level, recent studies show that worldviews tend to vary substantially internationally with many of the most secular countries being located in Europe (Hackett, Stonawski, Grim, & Skirbekk, 2015) and that national context matters (Stack & Kposowa, 2006). Even among Western nations, the share of denominations varies as well as levels of religiosity, and, in addition, some are very much secularized while others are not. For example, in our sample, the USA appear much more religious than Europe (see below). The importance of the division between atheism or agnosticism and religious worldview in individuals has been studied in the domain of crime. It remains a very contentious issue (see Zuckerman, 2009, for a discussion of stereotypes regarding agnostics and their propensity to violence).

Religion is not only a matter of faith but of a faith in context. Majority and minority religion need to be distinguished, as minority groups frequently occupy lower socio-economic positions and are relegated to neighbourhoods with concentrated disadvantage (an interpretation which has also been used regarding ethnicity by group position theory). When children define themselves as member of the majority denomination and display a high religiosity, that may help them to adhere to school and to integrate into mainstream society. The reverse could be true for minority religion. In the UPYC survey, the majority religion is Christianity. Lack of affiliation or agnosticism may be, in some cases such as the Netherlands, even more prevalent than Christianity. The largest minority religion is always Islam.

In general, at the micro level, there had been few studies about youth and religion in Europe until the issue of Islam surfaced. Since then it has been found that religiosity is much higher for Muslim youth (Kashyap & Lewis, 2013) and that it may have a strong effect on youth perception of some public institutions as the police, with a large divide between atheists and religious Muslims (in France but not in Germany, Roché et al., 2017). However, the effect of pupils' worldviews on school attachment has not attracted a lot of attention.

One can hypothesize that the ethnic composition of the population is an important factor: where there is a large minority group, attachment to the broader society may decrease, and tensions may be more likely to occur with the majority group. However, the various segments of the national population are not evenly distributed across a country. Rural and urban places, and poor and rich locations, may be populated very distinctly. Studying at the local level, one is able to better define an environment which is relevant for understanding children's experience of their society. Neighbourhoods have for a long time attracted attention in many topics and in criminology and remain very important to consider. However, schools are places where children spend a large amount of time and where they interact abundantly with other

children and adults. They deserve to be taken into account (Willms, 2003; Johnson et al., 2001). The ethnic composition of schools has been a major issue in itself in some countries, as in France where sociologists have been able to prove the existence of ghetto schools (Felouzis, Liot, & Perroton, 2005) or the UK with the worries expressed by the Social Integration Commission (Taylor, 2015). It has been shown that religious climate within the school plays a role in the social development of adolescents (Barrett, Jennifer, Chandra, & Frank Kenneth, 2007) and that school segregation increases religiosity (Van Der Bracht, D'hondt, Van Houtte, Bart Van De, & Stevens, 2016). School composition might therefore be an interesting meso level for observing the effects of religious concentration on school attachment.

Of course, school composition is not the only factor that may explain attachment to school, and others need to be controlled for. In particular, schools are also places were children will have to perform well enough to pursue their academic path, and performance at school is probably an important element of adherence to school, but the UPYC dataset does not include any objective measures of academic attainment.

Hypotheses and Measurements

We are testing hypotheses about the role of religion. Firstly, we assume three effects in relation to religion: (a) religious minority members will tend to have a lower attachment to school than the majority group since the latter's school experience will match their family culture and they will be able to have a more positive experience at school; (b) religiosity will influence attachment to school since religiosity is an indication of engagement with social norms and thus may inhibit some forms of crime or disorderly activities (for a discussion, see Grasmick, Kinsey, & Cochran, 1991); and (c) finally, minority religious concentration in schools will strengthen a feeling of rejection at school in minority groups and in the majority group. Members of minority religions will experience a sense of isolation. The majority group members will feel downgraded when more isolated from their fellow group members and if the population has a higher proportion of minority members. Both majority and minority group members will feel that they are relegated away from mainstream society.

Our hypotheses can be summarized as follows:

H1: Denomination will influence attachment to school: belonging to the majority denomination will mean higher attachment.
H2: High religiosity will strengthen attachment to school.
H3: Religious concentration at school will both strengthen minority and majority rejection of schools.

There are several possible measures of attachment to school. We retain an index of affective school attachment based on factor analysis,[1] consisting of the individual factor score on the first axis. The analysis is based on three variables ("Most mornings I like going to my school", "I like my school", "Our classes are interesting", each of them offering a four-position scale from "I fully agree" to "I fully disagree".).[2] The continuous construct ranges from low to high attachment and is then recoded. Our independent variables are: the religious denomination or absence of affiliation (as stated by the participant: no affiliation, Christian, Muslim, with other denominations and non-responses excluded); the subjective religiosity (importance of religion in daily life, in a six-point scale recoded into four categories); and the minority religious concentration (a construct based on the proportion of Muslims in each school; see below). Having the SES in models is important since the minority religion members often belong to lower SES categories. Measuring SES is always challenging in self-reported surveys of adolescents and even more in comparative surveys. We have devised a strategy that combines the SES of parents based on the employment status of the father and the mother (employed vs not employed) and a subjective assessment by adolescents of their family wellbeing and a subjective assessment of the pocket money that the respondent is given, relative to peers.[3] The SES construct is calculated based on an MCA and consists of a first axis score (a continuous construct recoded from low to high SES). In addition, we dispose of two other control variables: gender and age. Finally, we will take into account two school-level variables. The school status (private or public) may increase school attachment both for practical reasons (private school has more resource) and for moral reasons (children with a religious faith may find it more comfortable to work in a denominational school while agnostics or atheist may prefer a public school). The concentration of the minority religion at school is a score that is calculated for each school. It is computed as the proportion of Muslims in the school that they attend to compared to the average observed in all schools surveyed in the four EU countries (non-responses are excluded as well as the "other" minority religions which have very few members; and the US sample is excluded, having virtually no Muslim pupils). The score value is 1 when the school has equal representation of Muslims to the four country schools average, lower than 1 when the school counts less minority religion members (underrepresentation) and higher than 1 is the opposite case (overrepresentation of the minority group).

[1] Factor analysis is a technique for analysing categorical data, similar to principal component analysis. The first axis identified by the factor analysis accounts for most of the variance of the selected variables.

[2] For users of the ISRD dataset: the variable names are schbond2, schbond3 and schbond4.

[3] For users of the ISRD dataset: the variable names are workfath, workmoth, deprfam and deprsel.

Descriptive Bivariate Findings: School Attachment and Religion in Five Countries

The key issue in this chapter is the role of school in the socialization process. If children build a strong link to school and teachers, it is expected that both student and society will benefit from it. We now describe school attachment (both school affective attachment and absenteeism) across all five UPYC participating countries and present bivariate effects on attachment of religious variables (worldview and denomination, religiosity and denomination concentration at school level) and school status (private or public) for the five countries. Different national school systems both in terms of organization and of curricula might engender distinct levels of attachments on average (as observed with PISA data, but with indicators that do not correspond to the ISRD ones, Willms, 2003), which might in addition also vary between the religious minority and the rest of the population.

School attitudes are assumed to reflect a construct that can be measured by a scale, and they vary by country. On average levels in European countries are much lower than in the USA (54% against 65%). Still, there is great diversity in Europe, and France (47%) and Germany (51%) are situated well below the UK and the Netherlands (59–60%). The respective positions of the countries are not exactly in line with previous research, as the PISA index of sense of belonging puts Germany and the UK in front of the Netherlands and the USA, before France (Willms, 2003, p. 20). But again, indicators used are not consistent across the two surveys, and in any case, the UPYC sample is a not a nationally representative one. A common point however is that France is at the bottom of the league table—perhaps reflecting criticisms of its education system, for example, by journalist Peter Gumbel (2006), who argued that it was characterized by a culture of "negativity" and "humiliation" (Fig. 5.1).



Fig. 5.1 School attachment index recoded in quartiles (% "positive attachment" = belonging to quartiles 3 and 4), five countries



Fig. 5.2 Worldview (religious or secular affiliation) and denomination (Christian or Muslim) in five countries

Regarding worldview and religiosity, the UPYC study tends to confirms previous survey findings for both the adult and youth populations: Europe is a very secularized world region, and Western Muslims are much more committed to their religion than those from other religious denominations (Koopmans, 2004). Figure 5.2 shows the main religious denominations across the five countries, combining Protestant and Catholic Christians, on the one hand, and Shia and Sunni Muslims on the other. Other religions amount to a very small percentage of the sample and cannot be described in detail. Figure 5.2 shows that American teenagers substantially more often endorse a religious denomination (78%) than Europeans (60%). Those without religious affiliations (agnostics or atheists) formed the largest group across the four European countries in aggregate, at 40%. They were a majority in the Netherlands (60%) and a large minority in the UK and France (respectively, 43 and 35%). The high proportion of atheists and agnostics in the Netherlands could reflect peculiarities of the cities that were sampled, given that France is regularly assessed as one of the most secular countries[4] together with central European former communist states. The proportion of teenagers in our sample that declare themselves Muslims, the second largest religion, varies between 15% (Netherlands) and 29% (France). Such percentages do not reflect national averages, but rather those of very urbanized areas where Muslims tend to live.

Despite large variations between countries in the distribution of beliefs, a common feature across the five countries is that Muslims attribute much higher levels of importance to their religion in their daily lives than Christians (Fig. 5.3, the original six-point scale has been recoded into three categories.) About 80% of Muslims find

[4] For a recent example, see a census-representative survey of 11,282 people across the EU and 1052 people in the USA conducted in December 2016 by Dalia Research. Non-religious adults accounted for 58% of the French population, 54% in the UK and 40% in Germany. https://daliaresearch.com/religion-in-the-eu-young-germans-more-religious-than-old/ (Accessed on 22 July, 2017).



Fig. 5.3 "How important is religion in your daily life", five countries

their religion important, compared to a third of Christians. However, in the USA both Christians and Muslims find religion more often important than in European countries. Unsurprisingly, those with no religious affiliation attach very little importance to religion ("unimportant") in their lives—only 3% do so on average across the five countries (ALL), with the US figure highest at 10%. When unaffiliated teenagers *do* attach some importance ("mixed") to religion (15 in France–30% in the USA), this probably reflects family tradition and social importance of religion in the country.

Religious Concentration

Religious belief and the importance attached to religion is not necessarily equally distributed across urban space, nor is this likely within educational systems, as social groups are rarely if ever evenly distributed across schools. Given that Muslim families belong to the lower end of the socio-economic spectrum and knowing that socio-economic status has an effect on the educational strategies of families as well as limiting their choice of residence within city boundaries, an uneven concentration can be expected in all countries in the sample. Our focus here is on determining to what extent the concentration may vary across the four European countries (the USA being excluded because of the very low proportion of Muslims in our American sample).

Figure 5.4a presents the median and mean of the minority religion population size in each country and the spread of concentration across individual schools. The reference population is the average Muslim student population of our sample in the four countries. The median for each country is shown by the white bar, with the median for all four countries being 14%. The mean is shown by the figure in each bar. Concentration is highest in France, where 50% of schools have a concentration



Fig. 5.4 (**a**) School-level concentration of Muslim students (% belonging to a school) (median = white bar). (**b**) Cumulative percentage of students of Muslim denomination in each school of the four EU countries (dash bar = even distribution, on the left less than average, on the right more than average)

higher than 24%). The mean concentration is highest in France ($M = 36\%$), and the UK ($M = 29\%$) has the highest average proportion of Muslims. France stands out as the country with the highest concentration (up to almost 70% for some schools compared to 40% in Germany).

With this methodology, each student receives the concentration value of his school. Figure 5.4b displays the index computed on that basis: it is a cumulative

distribution of students in each country. The school concentration index shows two extreme cases: the Netherlands and France. In the Netherlands, 90% of Muslim students are in schools where the Muslim student concentration is lower than the average (the vertical dash line in Figure 5.4b) for the four countries. In France, only about half of them (50%) are in a comparable environment.

Findings: The Effects of Denomination and Religiosity on School Attachment in Five Countries

We now aim at testing the bivariate correlations between religion and of school attachment. For the sake of simplification, the school attachment measure has been recoded into quartiles of the whole sample. The school attachment scores in Figs. 5.5 and 5.6 show the percentage of respondents in the upper two quartiles. The subjective importance of youth belief has been recoded into two categories (low, high), including respondents who are unaffiliated—and who largely distance themselves from religion (cf. Section "Descriptive Bivariate Findings: School Attachment and Religion in Five Countries").

The three groups showing strongest attachment are Christians and unaffiliated youth in the USA and Christians in the UK (all at 66%) (Fig. 5.5). The groups showing weakest attachment are French Christians (48%), French pupils with no religious



Fig. 5.5 School attachment (% in upper two quartiles) by religious affiliation, five countries



Fig. 5.6 School attachment (% in upper two quartiles) according to religiosity (triangle = high/circle = low) in five countries (unaffiliated respondents excluded)

affiliation (38%) and the very small minority of Muslims in the USA (44%)—a surprising finding given their higher socio-economic status in that country. Muslims' attachment to school is very similar across European countries (51–57%).

Comparison of the two groups (Christians and Muslims) within each country shows a varied picture (Fig. 5.5): unaffiliated youth have slightly less positive attitudes to school than Christians in France and the UK, but the reverse is the case in the Netherlands, Germany and the USA. Christians have higher attachment than others in the UK, the USA and the Netherlands, but do not differ from other groups in Germany or France. In addition, Muslims have less positive attachment than Christians in the Netherlands, the UK and the USA but not in France or Germany. Thus the level of school attachment among different faith group varies both in absolute and relative terms from country to country. This suggests that other unobserved mechanisms drive positive attachment to school.

The effect of religiosity on school attachment varies by denomination and country and therefore needs to be examined in some details. Figure 5.6 breaks down levels of attachment by religious affiliation, which is further subdivided into levels of importance that religion has for respondents—which is used here as a measure of religiosity. (Those with no affiliation are excluded.) In the four European countries, the highest levels of attachment are found among Christians for whom religion is important. Regarding their religion as important is associated with a small increase in school attachment in the Netherlands (+3 percentage points), in Germany (+5,5) and in the UK (+7); and in France those Christians who regard their religion as important score 17 percentage points higher on school attachment than those for whom religion is not important. A comparable but smaller positive effect is also found in the USA (+3 percentage points). For Muslims, religiosity prompts more school attachment in two countries (Germany +7, UK +8), but there is no such effect in France, and it is reversed in the Netherlands (−10 percentage points).

These findings show that generalizations cannot easily be made about the impact on school attachment of religious affiliation and religiosity, as these effects vary according to the country. This, in itself, is an interesting finding which would require further elaboration. We might say that in Europe:

- There is a small negative effect on school attachment of having no religious affiliation in France and the UK.
- Muslim affiliation is associated with lower school attachment than Christian affiliation in the Netherlands and the UK.
- High religiosity for Christians is associated with higher school attachment in all five countries.
- High religiosity for Muslims is correlated with higher school attachment in Germany and the UK.

This exploratory work on teenagers' individual-level characteristics has not found large effects but has identified a variety of small—but statistically significant—effects. It is striking that no general rule can be observed that would be valid across all countries, indicating that religious variables do not have an intrinsic and universal effect.

Findings: Structural Effects at School Levels

We will now consider possible structural effects: the legal status of schools and the concentration of religious minorities. Regarding religious concentration, we focus on the four European countries only, since the Muslim population is not large enough in the USA. Schools' legal status is important: some school are private, selecting their intake and charging fees to parents, who obviously need to have the means to pay these; and many of these private schools are religious foundations. Other schools are public and among them some are less selective in their intake; and of these some are explicitly opposed to giving space to religion at least in selected countries (Smyth, Lyons, & Darmody, 2013).

School Status

Each country has a specific education system which can have several structural features: more or less centralized, for example, but also more or less privatized. While some countries have turned their backs almost totally on private schools (the Netherlands, which disables the variable of school status for that country), others combine the two types of structures. In the remaining four countries, the private institutions tend to belong to a Christian education subsystem but with some sort of state approval (contract or agreements between school and the state and a weak coordination system under the auspices of religious authorities). Even in states



Fig. 5.7 Percentage of pupils attending private school in four EU countries and the USA



Fig. 5.8 School positive attachment according to religious denomination and school status, (attachment index recoded in quartiles; (% "positive attachment" = belonging to two highest quartiles) (USA excluded)

known for their stark secularism such as France, the private system plays a large role. The percentage of students that belong to the private system in our sample, shown in Fig. 5.7, is also dependent on participation rates in the survey, decided largely by headmasters, and in England none of them participated. Although we have both types of status represented in Scotland, the total UK sample heavily underrepresents students in the private sector (3%), far less than we find in Germany (12%) or France (26%).

Figure 5.8 shows clearly that school attachment varies both by schools' legal status and by adolescents' religious affiliation. There are indications of interactions, whereby Muslim adolescents in private schools score ten percentage points higher on school attachment than those that are in public ones. By contrast unaffiliated pupils in private schools score eight percentage points lower than their peers in public schools. Christian youth attitudes towards school are not affected by the status of the school. It seems that for the most religious adolescents (minority religion children) or the least religious (unaffiliated ones), but not for those with moderate religiosity (belonging to the majority religion), the legal status of school is of significance in shaping their attachment to school.

Table 5.1 Correlation (Pearson's R) between concentration of Muslim pupils and attachment to school for Muslims and Non-Muslim subpopulations

		Correlation
FR	– Muslims	ns
	– Other	0.07 $p < 0.05$
	– All	0.10 $p < 0.001$
GR	– Muslims	ns
	– Other	−0.15 $p < 0.001$
	– All	−0,09 $p < 0.001$
NL	– Muslims	ns
	– Other	−0.10 $p < 0.001$
	– All	−0.10 $p < 0.001$
UK	– Muslims	−0.14 $p < 0.01$
	– Other	ns
	– All	ns
Four countries	– Muslims	ns
	– Other	−0.05 $p < 0.001$
	– All	0.03 $p < 0.01$

Note: 'Non-Muslims" are Christians and those without religious affiliation. Those affiliated to small religious groups, totally 2% of the sample, have been excluded

Minority Religion Concentration at School

Minority religion concentration is measured at school level, based on the Muslim population of students, as described above in Section "Descriptive Bivariate Findings: School Attachment and Religion in Five Countries". We have excluded from the analysis the very small religious groups and dichotomized the population as Muslim versus "others". The prevalence of Muslim pupils varies across the four European countries as shown above in Fig. 5.4a.

Examining bivariate effects, for the four countries taken as a whole (see Table 5.1, last line), minority religion concentration at school has a small effect only for majority children who become less attached to their school: the more the representation of the minority, the less the majority feels attached to their school. There is a small but statistically significant effect.

However, the average correlation masks the fact that concentration has divergent effects across countries. Regarding attachment to school at national level in the four countries separately, the effect of concentration is, again, mostly found in the majority population (France, Germany, the Netherlands) with the UK being an exception. However, the direction of the effect varies from country to country. In France, minority religion concentration has a small significant *positive* effect on attachment to school in the majority population ($R = 0.07$). School experience with religious concentration does not lead to detachment from school, on the contrary, as if school attitudes benefit from diversity. In Germany ($R = -0.15$) and in the Netherlands ($R = -0.10$), studying in a school with a higher concentration of adolescents of Muslim faith tends to decrease attachment to school of majority adoles-

cents. In the UK, concentration does not erode attachment to school for the majority adolescents, but only for the Muslim group ($R = -0.14$).

In sum, we end up with a complex picture. Firstly, there seems to be a "relegation effect" which is largely confined to the majority population: when the concentration of minority religion student increases, the remaining majority students tend to feel marginalized and therefore less attached to their school (Germany, the Netherlands). However, there is no such effect for the majority in the UK, and the opposite effect is found in France. Secondly, Muslim pupils are usually not impacted by religious concentration (France, Germany and the Netherlands). They are indifferent to concentration, with the exception of the UK where concentration leads to lower attachment to school, and it constitutes the only case of relegation effect on school attachment for the minority group. In sum the most consistent finding is that, in three countries (Germany, the UK and the Netherlands), a higher Muslim concentration decreases attachement of the majority pupils to their school.

Findings: A Multivariate and Multilevel Approach

Given the role of several individual and contextual variables in former studies, a multivariate and multilevel approach was undertaken. Space limitations and our objective of comparing countries drive us to present the general model for the four countries and variations of the overall model rather than opting for a detailed description of each case study. The full model results for each country are documented in the appendix (see Appendix 1, Table 5.2).

Regression models are presented for the four European countries only. We have included two types of individual variables in the model: socioeconomic (gender, age, parents' SES) and religious (religious affiliation and religiosity) (Model 1). Then, the structural variables are inserted (school legal status, and concentration) (Model 2). And in Model 3, possible differences for subgroups are tested.

For the four European countries (cf. Appendix 1), the empty model (i.e. without individual variables) indicates that there are variations at the school level that are not accounted for by individual-level variables: thus, it makes empirical sense to explore structural effects. In Model 1, we introduce the individual variables. In order to isolate the relevance of the denomination and religiosity for the attachment to school, it is necessary to exclude other influences which might explain it (parents' SES, gender, age). We see that school attachment is significantly determined by gender (with young males displaying a lower attachment, $b = 0.10$), age (with older schoolboys and schoolgirls expressing less attachment, $b = 0.19$) and SES of parents (with high SES children feeling more bound to their school, $b = 0.04$). Finally, when compared to unaffiliated youth, Muslims have a lower attachment to their school ($b = 0.10$), which is not found for Christians. When it comes to religiosity, compared to low religious attachment, children who attribute importance to their religion display higher school attachment (from $b = 0.14$ to.30 when religiosity is highest).

Model 2 considers the two structural variables. Here, the school status has no effect, while the religious minority concentration at school has a small significant effect: more concentration decreases attachment ($b = 0.06$). Finally, Model 3 indicates that the two subpopulations, Muslim and Christians, do not differ when compared to unaffiliated children. The effect of school concentration is identical (slopes coefficients are not significant, indicating no intergroup difference).

However, the model is made up of four combined national datasets (see Appendix 2, Tables 5.3, 5.4, 5.5, and 5.6). When studying the same model run for each country, we observe a number of differences. At the individual level, SES is significant in Germany and the UK but is significant neither in France nor in the Netherlands. Other variables' (gender and age) effects are stable across countries. Regarding religious affiliations, negative coefficients are found for Muslims (as in the aggregated dataset), which are not significant at the $p < 0.05$ level suggesting that sample size at national level is not sufficient for reaching significance. A higher religiosity is always a predictor of more attachment to school, except in the Netherlands. The school-level variables rarely have a significant role: school status is important in the UK only ($b = 0.45$), while concentration makes a difference in Germany only. Again, sample size at national level might not be sufficient for reaching significance.

In summary, the findings regarding the determinants of school attachment suggest that (1) socio-economic factors tend to have the most stable effects throughout countries, although all four countries are not always strictly aligned; male gender, older age and low parental SES tend to diminish attachment to school; (2) regarding the religious variables, a Muslim denomination denotes a slightly lesser attachment to school, and religiosity has a bonding role for Christians and Muslims; (3) structural variables (school status, minority concentration) have a limited overall explanatory power, which may be due to the opposed variations of their effects in religious groups across countries (as we have seen with bivariate findings at Section "Findings: Structural Effects at School Levels"), in two countries minority concentration tends to decrease school attachment of the majority group, but in another it tends to increase it, and in the last one had no effect). In the aggregated dataset, all included variables (individual and contextual) account only for a small part of the variance.

Discussion and Conclusion: The Limited Effect of Religious Variables on School Attachment

In this chapter, we aimed at understanding if religious diversity could negatively impact attachment to the school, as a core institution for socialization within a political entity. Since institutional support and trust is based on effective and fair functioning of institutions among adults, it would make sense that the perception that young people have of school is of utmost importance to understand their national socialization, cleavage and conflict formation in society. The focus on schools is

important due to their function in society (children acquire the skills necessary for work and social integration) but also due to their local dimension. Children are part of a society based on their local contacts with family, peers and other social groups but also based on contacts with state (owned or approved) bureaucracies such as police and schools. It is at the local level where religious minority members and their host society—since most of them have a migrant background—interact. National policies implemented locally or local policies may cause difficulty but also effectively address the problem of integration of minority groups. It is easier for minority children to identify with the local society or the "local state", as in the case of schools, as opposed to the national society, especially in the case of religious minorities evolving in a secular state. The importance of the relationships with street-level bureaucrats (of which teachers are a type) is well known (Lipsky, 1980), as is the role of local integration (Koopmans, 2004). And school attachment and commitment have been one of the hypotheses for understanding adolescents' behaviour (Hirschi, 1969 and followers). School-level effects deserve as much attention as other meso-level geographies such as the neighbourhood or the city.

Empirically, individual- and school-level determinants of attachment to school have been investigated in four EU countries (France, Germany, the Netherlands, the UK). The importance of religious socialization in adolescents on a number of issues related to crime, social or political integration is discussed and on selected aspects well established. However, few studies have compared worldviews (religious versus secular), belonging to a denomination and the subjective importance attributed to one's religion (religiosity) of youth combined to meso-level variables. We found a large proportion of students having minority religious status (i.e. non-agnostic, non-Christian), the largest minority religion being Islam (22% in EU countries samples, 3% in the US sample). Young Muslims attach far more importance to their faith than others. The population of school-age Muslims is neither evenly distributed in countries (on average in our sample 29% in France and 15% in the Netherlands) nor in schools. At school level, two countries stand out: France and the UK have a great diversity in minority religion concentration, ranging from very low levels to very high levels, a situation not found in the Netherlands and Germany. In the two latter countries, the distribution of young Muslims in the school system is more homogeneous. This could lead to very distinct and religiously driven appreciations of school.

Overall, we did not find a strong effect either of the denomination or of religiosity on school attachment. Denomination and religiosity play a limited role in explaining school attitude. In the four-country aggregated sample, belonging to the minority religion erodes attachment but does not cause a notable and significant detachment from school. Religiosity tends to moderately increase attachment to school. In multivariate and multilevel models for the four EU countries, taking into account the school population composition, we find that when concentration of minority is highest, the attachment to school slightly decreases. School context matters, but attachment is not systematically higher when student attend schools with

proportionately more students of their own denomination. This result contradicts other conclusions where similarity is good for attachment (Johnson et al., 2001, p. 335) - partially since our findings vary per country. What is consistent though is that the school effects are small. Previous studies on pupils bearing on another aspect of their perceptions, injustice of police and courts, across ethnic groups have shown that segregation measured at the school level has complex and non-linear effects. Perceived injustice is intensified by more ethnic mixing and then modestly diminished by increasing proportionate representation of the majority group (Hagan, Shedd, & Payne, 2005; Paterson, 1997). Comparable mechanisms might operate regarding school attachment.

The weak effect of denomination and religiosity, as well as that of minority concentration, is an important finding. Even in countries like France and the UK where ethnicity, a variable interlinked with denomination, is a predictor of more distrust and tensions with the police, such a mechanism does not appear to be strong regarding schools. Despite public tensions about the place of religion at school, and in the public sphere more broadly, even in countries where wearing a veil is a controversial public issue, young people seem to have links to school that are not primarily religion-based and not even heavily affected by minority religion concentration at school level. This is surprising in the sense that one could expect much more resentment, especially among the minority, and a feeling of alienation leading to a rejection of school. We need to underscore that attachment is not a measure of school achievement and that the two are not identical. Still, it is a positive news regarding the role of school in the integration process, an organization that does not provoke or crystallize rejection from children, whatever their social identities. The fact that attachment is not strongly fractured along ethnic or religious lines suggests that the school is an entry point of considerable interest for intervention.

There are a number of limitation and unanswered questions however. Firstly, there are important variations in school average attachment across countries (France getting the worst score and the Netherlands the best), for which we have not provided an explanation. Secondly, we have observed systematic national variations in the correlations between variables. That signifies an effect of the "national context" on associations found at the individual level. However, we have not provided a comprehension key for these differences (e.g. why would young UK Muslim resent being in religiously concentrated school, but Germany Muslim not feel the same? Or why would young French majority children feel more bound to their school when the school population is composed of more Muslim schoolmates, but the opposite is the case in the Netherlands?). The identification of such national context effects should prompt more research on what exactly in the national context is the cause of such variations. Only an improved survey design with that question in focus might help making progress for using the ISRD as a comparative instrument in the future.

Appendix 1

Table 5.2 Multilevel linear regression models explaining attachment to school for the 4 European countries

	Null model			Model 1 (level-1 predictors) (random intercept)			Model 2 (level-1 + level-2 predictors) (random intercept)			Model 3 (level-1 + level-2 predictors) (random intercept and slopes)		
	[a]	Std. Err.		[a]	Std. Err.		[a]	Std. Err.		[a]	Std. Err.	
L1—respondents (students)												
Gender (ref: female)				−0.10	0.018	***	−0.10	0.018	***	−0.10	0.018	***
Age (ref: <14 years old)				−0.19	0.019	***	−0.19	0.019	***	−0.19	0.019	***
Socio-economic status (low to high)[b]				0.04	0.009	***	0.04	0.009	***	0.04	0.009	***
Denomination (ref: unaffiliated)												
Christ.				−0.02	0.026		−0.02	0.026		−0.02	0.026	
Islam				−0.10	0.035	**	−0.08	0.035	*	−0.07	0.037	*
Religious attachment (ref: very unimportant)												
Very important				0.30	0.038	***	0.31	0.038	***	0.31	0.038	***
Quite or a bit important				0.25	0.030	***	0.25	0.030	***	0.25	0.030	***
Quite or a bit unimportant				0.14	0.025	***	0.14	0.025	***	0.14	0.025	***
L2—schools												
School type (ref: public)							−0.05	0.065		−0.06	0.065	
School level concentration index (low to high)[b]							−0.06	0.019	**	−0.06	0.020	**
Constant	−0.03	0.020		0.00	0.029		0.01	0.030		0.00	0.030	

Random-effects variance components												
Level 2 (schools)												
Intercept	0.06	0.008	***	0.05	0.007	***	0.05	0.007	***	0.05	0.007	***
Christ. slope										0.00	0.000	
Islam slope										0.01	0.008	
Level 1 (students)	0.63	0.010	***	0.61	0.010	***	0.61	0.010	***	0.61	0.010	***
Intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) in empty model	8.2%											
Log likelihood	−9870.3			−9739.7			−9735.4			−9733.4		
L1 var. reduction				3.1%	(vs empty model)		3.1%	(vs empty model)		0.3%	(vs model 2)	
L2 var. reduction				6.7%	(vs empty model)		11.9%	(vs empty model)		1.6%	(vs model 2)	
Log likelihood ratio test				261.18***	(vs empty model)		269.78***	(vs empty model)		4.02	(vs model 2)	
Number of observations	8214											
Number of groups	176											

[a]Unstandardized coefficients
[b]Standardized (mean = 0, SD = 1)
Schools with <10 respondents excluded
*$p < 0.05$, **$p < 0.01$, ***$p < 0.001$

Appendix 2

Table 5.3 Multilevel linear regression models explaining attachment to school for France

	Null model			Model 1 (level-1 predictors) (random intercept)			Model 2 (level-1 + level-2 predictors) (random intercept)			Model 3 (level-1 + level-2 predictors) (random intercept and slopes)		
	[a]	Std. Err.		[a]	Std. Err.		[a]	Std. Err.		[a]	Std. Err.	
L1—respondents (students)												
Gender (ref: female)				−0.23	0.042	***	−0.23	0.018	***	−0.23	0.042	***
Age (ref: <14 years old)				−0.16	0.044	***	−0.16	0.044	***	−0.16	0.044	***
Socio-economic status (low to high)				0.02	0.020		0.02	0.021		0.02	0.021	
Denomination (ref: unaffiliated)												
Christ.				0.06	0.060		0.05	0.061		0.05	0.061	
Islam				−0.14	0.088		−0.17	0.092		−0.17	0.094	
Religious attachment (ref: very unimportant)												
Very important				0.47	0.096	***	0.45	0.096	***	0.45	0.096	***
Quite or a bit important				0.35	0.075	***	0.35	0.075	***	0.35	0.075	***
Quite or a bit unimportant				0.17	0.061	**	0.17	0.061	**	0.17	0.061	**
L2—schools												
School type (ref: public)							0.07	0.086		0.06	0.085	
School level concentration index (low to high)							0.05	0.031		0.05	0.031	
Constant	−0.24	0.037	***	−0.27	0.064	***	−0.29	0.067	***	−0.29	0.066	***

Random-effects variance components												
Level 2 (schools)												
Intercept	0.04	0.013	**	0.03	0.011	*	0.02	0.010	*	0.02	0.010	*
Christ. slope										0.00	0.000	
Islam slope										0.01	0.018	
Level 1 (students)	0.78	0.027	***	0.74	0.026	***	0.74	0.026	***	0.74	0.026	***
Intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) in empty model	4.5%											
Log likelihood	−2236.4			−2187.7			−2186.5			−2186.3		
L1 var. reduction				5.1%	(vs empty model)		5.1%	(vs empty model)		0.2%	(vs model 2)	
L2 var. reduction				28.3%	(vs empty model)		35.6%	(vs empty model)		4.8%	(vs model 2)	
Log likelihood ratio test				97.45***	(vs empty model)		99.79***	(vs empty model)				
							2.34	(vs model 1)		0.47	(vs model 2)	
Number of observations	1713											
Number of groups	43											

[a]Unstandardized coefficients
Schools with <10 respondents excluded
*$p < 0.05$, **$p < 0.01$, ***$p < 0.001$

Table 5.4 Multilevel linear regression models explaining attachment to school for Germany

	Null model			Model 1 (level-1 predictors) (random intercept)			Model 2 (level-1 + level-2 predictors) (random intercept)			Model 3 (level-1 + level-2 predictors) (random intercept and slopes)		
	[a]	Std. Err.		[a]	Std. Err.		[a]	Std. Err.		[a]	Std. Err.	
L1—respondents (students)												
Gender (ref: female)				−0.08	0.028	**	−0.08	0.028	**	−0.08	0.028	**
Age (ref: <14 years old)				−0.18	0.030	***	−0.18	0.030	***	−0.18	0.030	***
Socio-economic status (low to high)				0.03	0.014	*	0.03	0.014	*	0.03	0.014	*
Denomination (ref: unaffiliated)												
Christ.				−0.05	0.041		−0.05	0.041		−0.05	0.041	
Islam				−0.06	0.055		−0.03	0.055		−0.04	0.058	
Religious attachment (ref: very unimportant)												
Very important				0.27	0.062	***	0.29	0.062	***	0.29	0.062	***
Quite or a bit important				0.25	0.051	***	0.26	0.051	***	0.26	0.051	***
Quite or a bit unimportant				0.16	0.042	***	0.16	0.042	***	0.16	0.042	***
L2—schools												
School type (ref: public)							−0.11	0.088		−0.12	0.088	
School level concentration index (low to high)							−0.11	0.032	***	−0.12	0.032	***
Constant	−0.01	0.028		0.01	0.047		0.02	0.046		0.0176463	0.046	

Random-effects variance components												
Level 2 (schools)												
Intercept	0.04	0.009	***	0.04	0.009	***	0.03	0.008	***	0.03	0.008	***
Christ. slope										0.00	0.000	
Islam slope										0.01	0.015	
Level 1 (students)	0.55	0.015	***	0.53	0.015	***	0.53	0.015	***	0.53	0.015	***
Intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) in empty model	6.7%											
Log likelihood	−3156.0			−3113.7			−3108.0			−3107.4		
L1 var. reduction				3.0%	(vs empty model)		3.0%	(vs empty model)		0.3%	(vs model 2)	
L2 var. reduction				3.7%	(vs empty model)		25.6%	(vs empty model)		5.6%	(vs model 2)	
Log likelihood ratio test				84.51***	(vs empty model)		96.02***	(vs empty model)				
							11.51**	(vs model 1)		1.16	(vs model 2)	
Number of observations	2775											
Number of groups	70											

[a]Unstandardized coefficients
Schools with <10 respondents excluded
*$p < 0.05$, **$p < 0.01$, ***$p < 0.001$

Table 5.5 Multilevel linear regression models explaining attachment to school for Netherlands

	Null model			Model 1 (level-1 predictors) (random intercept)			Model 2 (level-1 + level-2 predictors) (random intercept)			Model 3 (level-1 + level-2 predictors) (random intercept and slopes)		
	[a]	Std. Err.		[a]	Std. Err.		[a]	Std. Err.		[a]	Std. Err.	
L1—respondents (students)												
Gender (ref: female)				−0.14	0.035	***	−0.14	0.035	***	−0.14	0.035	***
Age (ref: <14 years old)				−0.22	0.038	***	−0.22	0.038	***	−0.22	0.038	***
Socio-economic status (low to high)				0.02	0.017		0.02	0.017		0.02	0.017	
Denomination (ref: unaffiliated)												
Christ.				0.00	0.053		0.00	0.053		0.00	0.053	
Islam				−0.11	0.068		−0.11	0.069		−0.10	0.072	
Religious attachment (ref: very unimportant)												
Very important				0.09	0.080		0.10	0.080		0.10	0.080	
Quite or a bit important				0.10	0.057		0.10	0.057		0.10	0.057	
Quite or a bit unimportant				0.05	0.048		0.05	0.048		0.05	0.048	
L2—schools												
School type (ref: public)							0.00	(omitted)		0.00	(omitted)	
School level concentration index (low to high)							−0.07	0.070		−0.08	0.071	
Constant	0.08	0.049		0.24	0.056	***	0.21	0.061	***	0.21	0.061	***

Random-effects variance components												
Level 2 (schools)												
Intercept	0.05	0.017	**	0.04	0.013	**	0.03	0.012	**	0.03	0.012	**
Christ. slope										0.00	0.000	
Islam slope										0.01	0.010	
Level 1 (students)	0.53	0.018	***	0.51	0.017	***	0.51	0.017	***	0.51	0.017	***
Intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) in empty model	9.4%											
Log likelihood	−1976.9			−1948.6			−1948.1			−1947.9		
L1 var. reduction				2.7%	(vs empty model)		2.7%	(vs empty model)		0.1%	(vs model 2)	
L2 var. reduction				33.2%	(vs empty model)		37.7%	(vs empty model)		0.7%	(vs model 2)	
Log likelihood ratio test				56.52***	(vs empty model)		57.56***	(vs empty model)				
							1.04	(vs model 1)		0.48	(vs model 2)	
Number of observations	1777											
Number of groups	28											

[a]Unstandardized coefficients
Schools with <10 respondents excluded
*$p < 0.05$, **$p < 0.01$, ***$p < 0.001$

Table 5.6 Multilevel linear regression models explaining attachment to school for UK

	Null model			Model 1 (level-1 predictors) (random intercept)			Model 2 (level-1 + level-2 predictors) (random intercept)			Model 3 (level-1 + level-2 predictors) (random intercept and slopes)		
	[a]	Std. Err.		[a]	Std. Err.		[a]	Std. Err.		[a]	Std. Err.	
L1—respondents (students)												
Gender (ref: female)				0.03	0.038		0.03	0.038		0.03	0.038	
Age (ref: <14 years old)				−0.21	0.041	***	−0.23	0.041	***	−0.23	0.041	***
Socio-economic status (low to high)				0.08	0.020	***	0.07	0.020	***	0.07	0.020	***
Denomination (ref: unaffiliated)												
Christ.				−0.06	0.057		−0.06	0.056		−0.06	0.056	
Islam				−0.09	0.077		−0.04	0.081		−0.04	0.081	
Religious attachment (ref: very unimportant)												
Very important				0.42	0.078	***	0.42	0.078	***	0.42	0.078	***
Quite or a bit important				0.30	0.061	***	0.31	0.061	***	0.20	0.061	***
Quite or a bit unimportant				0.19	0.058	**	0.20	0.058	***	0.20	0.058	***
L2—schools												
School type (ref: public)							0.45	0.120	***	0.45	0.120	***
School level concentration index (low to high)							−0.05	0.027		−0.05	0.027	
Constant	0.07	0.035		0.01	0.056		−0.02	0.053		−0.02	0.053	
Random-effects variance components												
Level 2 (schools)												
Intercept	0.03	0.011	*	0.03	0.011	*	0.01	0.006	*	0.01	0.007	*
Christ. slope										0.00	0.000	

Islam slope										0.00	0.011	
Level 1 (students)	0.70	0.023	***	0.67	0.022	***	0.66	0.021	***	0.66	0.021	***
Intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) in empty model	3.9%											
Log likelihood	−2431.4			−2388.5			−2380.1			−2380.1		
L1 var. reduction				4.3%	(vs empty model)		4.5%	(vs empty model)		0.0%	(vs model 2)	
L2 var. reduction				3.4%	(vs empty model)		49.5%	(vs empty model)		1.3%	(vs model 2)	
Log likelihood ratio test				85.82***	(vs empty model)		102.52***	(vs empty model)				
							16.70***	(vs model 1)		0	(vs model 2)	
Number of observations	1949											
Number of groups	35											

[a]Unstandardized coefficients
Schools with <10 respondents excluded
*$p < 0.05$, **$p < 0.01$, ***$p < 0.001$

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Chapter 6
Direct and Indirect Influences of School System on Youth Delinquent Offending Among Migrant and Native-Born Students in Eight Countries

Renske S. van der Gaag and Majone Steketee

Introduction

Schools are an important gateway to better prospects for children from disadvantaged backgrounds. In countries with a stratified school system, children are selected into different educational tracks according to their abilities, in some countries, as early as age 10 or 11 (OECD, 2013). This process is also referred to as tracking, streaming or ability grouping (Hanushek & Wößmann, 2006). Tracks substantially determine progress to future education and career opportunities. By contrast, in countries with comprehensive school system, all students follow education together, and no selection takes place before age 15 or 16. Proponents of tracking assert that more homogeneous classes allow education in a pace appropriate to all students and that tracking as such offers a more efficient way to organise education (see Ansalone, 2003; Hanushek & Wößmann, 2006). Students in higher tracks indeed seem to benefit from education in academic tracks.

However, research also demonstrates that tracking could reinforce social inequality as students from lower socioeconomic backgrounds and children of immigrants are more likely to be enrolled in lower tracks (Hanushek & Wößmann, 2006; Pfeffer, 2015; Van de Werfhorst & Mijs, 2010) and this influence of background becomes stronger in school systems with selection at an earlier age (Brunello & Checchi, 2007). In many countries, migrant students are particularly overrepresented in lower (vocational) tracks, even after accounting for socioeconomic background and prior

R. S. van der Gaag (✉)
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
e-mail: r.s.vander.gaag@vu.nl

M. Steketee
Verwey-Jonker Institute, Utrecht, The Netherlands

Erasmus School of Social and Behavioural Science, Erasmus University, Rotterdam, The Netherlands
e-mail: MSteketee@verwey-jonker.nl

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performance, as a result of parents' unfamiliarity with the school system and poor language skills (Borgna & Contini, 2014; OECD, 2015). Possible negative consequences of tracking may therefore affect this group even more than native-born youths.

Besides social inequality, several studies have associated lower tracks in stratified school systems with more delinquent behaviour and misconduct (Müller & Hofmann, 2016; Savolainen, Hughes, Hurtig, Ebeling, & Taanila, 2013; Van Houtte & Stevens, 2008). Selection is one distinctive feature of stratified systems that could potentially link tracking and negative social development, such as delinquent development. Stratified systems select students into different tracks based on ability but inherently also on motivation and other background characteristics, and lower tracks tend to have a higher share of unmotivated students with behaviour problems (Savolainen et al., 2013). This selection process could thus shape the social environment that students are exposed to at the class and school level and as such affect social processes and social development of students in specific tracks (Eccles & Roeser, 2011). Additionally, early selection could impact on student's motivation and feelings about school, for instance, due to experiences of failure after being selected into lower tracks (Van Houtte, 2016). Simultaneously, several studies suggest that the possible negative influences of the stratified school system could be magnified for migrant, but not for native students (Crul, 2013; Entorf & Lauk, 2008).

As far as we know, however, few prior studies have considered possible influences of school systems for migrant and nonmigrant students in terms of delinquent development. Various studies showed a differential effect of different school systems for different migrant backgrounds in terms of educational outcomes (see Dronkers, Van Der Velden, & Dunne, 2012). The few studies that examined the influence of school system on delinquent behaviour mainly focused on differences between school systems (e.g. Egli, Lucia, & Berchtold, 2012; Van Houtte & Stevens, 2008; Wiatrowski, Hansell, Massey, & Wilson, 1982) or differential effects on subgroups within lower tracks (e.g. boys versus girls, see Savolainen et al., 2013).

In this chapter, we use data from the third wave of the International Self-Report Delinquency study (ISRD3) to examine to what extent comprehensive and stratified school systems differ in their direct and indirect influence on self-reported delinquent behaviour in migrant and native-born students. The central research question in this chapter is: To what extent do school systems directly or indirectly influence self-reported delinquent offending in migrant and nonmigrant students? We expect the influence of school system on self-reported delinquent behaviour to be mediated through four mechanisms, namely, school environment, levels of school and teacher bonding, motivational influences and peer influences. Our analysis includes eight countries, four countries with a more comprehensive school systems (Finland, France, the UK and the USA) and four with a more stratified school system (Austria, Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland) (OECD, 2013).

Background

The School Environment in Different School Systems

Selection is an important mechanism in stratified school systems, and selection, whether positive or negative, inevitably affects the school environment. Students in higher tracks are generally from more advantaged backgrounds and have higher academic engagement, while lower-track students tend to come from more disadvantaged backgrounds, tend to be less motivated and tend to show more problem and disruptive behaviour (Berends, 1995; Crosnoe, 2002; Eccles & Roeser, 2011). As social disorganisation theory contends that crime levels vary with the capacity of a community to control its members' behaviour (Sampson & Groves, 1989; Shaw & McKay, 1942), the clustering of students inherent in tracking is likely to lead to higher levels of disorganisation in lower tracks, accompanied by higher levels of offending among the student population, and the opposite would be true for higher tracks.

Several studies showed that the social composition of the student population could indeed affect school culture and the levels of disorganisation experienced at schools. Rumberger and Palardy (2005) demonstrated that the average school socioeconomic status had as much impact on student achievement as student's own socioeconomic background, and this effect was similar for students from advantaged and disadvantaged backgrounds. Lower teacher expectations, a less challenging curriculum and student's feelings of safety at schools best explained this difference between high and low SES schools. Gottfredson, Gottfredson, Payne, and Gottfredson (2005) found a more direct association between the social composition of student populations and levels of school disorganisation. Their study suggested that schools with a larger proportion of socially disadvantaged students, in terms of proportion minority students and poverty, were more likely to experience higher levels of school disorder.

The social composition of a student body does not necessarily have to be related to tracking. In a comprehensive school system, a similar geographically induced selection may occur resulting in an accumulation of social disadvantage in schools in marginalised areas (Borgna & Contini, 2014). However, tracking could lead to higher and lower SES schools or classes enforced by deliberately imposed institutional structures, and, as such, it is important to be aware of the advantages and disadvantages of certain structures. Nevertheless, tracking could just as well help schools in stratified school systems to better anticipate various levels of school disorganisation and take adequate measures to prevent higher levels of school disorganisation, which may be more difficult in comprehensive systems or mixed tracks where students of all backgrounds come together.

Bonding to School and Youth Delinquent Development

Besides school environment, tracking may influence student's attitudes towards school and as such impact on bonding. Academic performance is regarded highly in western societies. Selection into lower vocational tracks has been related to experiences of failure, status loss, lower self-esteem and with anti-school attitudes and lower levels of bonding to school and teachers (Berends, 1995; Ireson & Hallam, 2009; Müller & Hofmann, 2016; Van Houtte & Stevens, 2008). According to social bonding theory, bonding is important in the prevention of delinquent development as socially conforming behaviour is developed through the strength of one's social bonds to social institutions, such as family and school, resulting from the (pro) social norms and expectations communicated through these bonds (Hirschi, 1969). Several studies have demonstrated that higher levels of bonding to school and teachers promote socially conforming behaviour and as such prevent delinquent behaviour and misconduct (Demanet & Van Houtte, 2012; Henry, Knight, & Thornberry, 2012; Payne, 2008; Stewart, 2003). Bonding may even be more important for students at higher risk of delinquent development, such as students from socially disadvantaged backgrounds (Ford & Schroeder, 2010). Hence, lower levels of bonding to school in lower-track students may lead to less acceptance of prosocial norms communicated by school and teachers and as such result in higher levels of nonconforming behaviour, such as delinquent offending.

Nevertheless, when it comes to social bonding, there is also evidence in favour of stratified school systems over comprehensive school systems. Vieluf, Hochweber, Klieme, and Kunter (2015) found that comprehensive schools promoted better teacher bonding for high achievers and students from better socioeconomic backgrounds, whereas in stratified systems the quality of the relationship between students and teachers was found to be higher in schools with a more socially disadvantaged student population. As school and teacher bonding are highly correlated (Allen, Kern, Vella-Brodrick, Hattie, & Waters, 2016) and bonding as such was shown to be associated with more socially conforming behaviour, tracked school systems could also promote prosocial behaviour in lower-track students. This would be more in line with research that finds no evidence for negative effect of tracking in terms of delinquent behaviour (Wiatrowski et al., 1982) or even a protective effect by lowering probability of certain types of delinquent offending as compared to being in higher tracks (Egli et al., 2012).

Selection and Motivational Influences

The selection process in tracked systems could impact on the motivation of children in lower tracks and possibly lower perceived achievement or future aspirations in these tracks as compared to higher tracks and comprehensive or mixed systems. Likely mechanisms are feelings of failure at being placed in a lower track, and the blocking of access to future educational opportunities, and associated reduced

aspirations. In this chapter, rather than perceived achievement, we specifically look at *relative* perceived achievement as compared to other classmates. Prior research suggests that better performance at school is associated with less delinquent behaviour over time (Hoffmann, Erickson, & Spence, 2013). In this regard, tracking could protect against delinquent behaviour as differences in achievement may be smaller in similar ability groups than in mixed or comprehensive groups. Relative perceived achievement is therefore likely to be higher in students in lower tracks than in lower ability students following education among higher ability peers.

The School Environment, School Bonding and Peer Influences

The school environment influences peer interactions and relations. Ennett and Bauman (1993) showed that 95% of all friendships are formed at school. Although times have changed since, with the introduction of internet and social media offering alternative modes for developing friendships, school is still an important setting for young people to find friends and interact with peers. The school environment is relevant as not only self-selected peers but also the "institutionally imposed peer environment" have been found to influence anti-social and delinquent behaviours (Müller, Hofmann, Fleischli, & Studer, 2016). The accumulation of social disadvantage in lower tracks could mean that students that may already be more at risk of delinquent behaviour are placed among peers at higher risk (Crosnoe, 2002; Gamoran & Berends, 1987), while research also shows that students in lower tracks are more vulnerable to peer influences (Crosnoe, 2002). Tracking denies lower-track students' opportunities for interaction with students from other backgrounds or with other (more positive) school-related attitudes and values. Moreover, lower levels of bonding are associated with interaction with delinquent peers and nonconforming behaviours, such as truancy and delinquent behaviour (Henry et al., 2012).

Different School Systems and Migrant Students

Research is inconclusive about the influence of different school systems for migrant students. In terms of educational outcomes, several studies suggest that comprehensive school systems improve outcomes and decrease inequality for migrant students (Griga & Hadjar, 2014; OECD, 2015). This favourable influence of comprehensive schooling over systems with early selection is that students with a migrant background have more time to acquire necessary language and learning skills to proceed to higher education than in systems with early selection (Crul, 2013). Besides skills, the comprehensive system also provides migrant students with more time and opportunities for interaction with students who have already acquired these skills and have other educational and occupational aspirations (Entorf & Lauk, 2008; Wiatrowski et al., 1982). Stratified school systems have been shown to exacerbate

negative influences for migrant and not for native students (Crul, 2013; Entorf & Lauk, 2008).

Other studies are less unequivocal about the quality of comprehensive over stratified school systems for migrant students in terms of educational outcomes. Using PISA math scores, Dronkers and de Heus (2012) do not find any significant differences between school systems for students with a migrant background. Crosnoe (2009) shows that students with a migrant background may not necessarily be better off in comprehensive schools. Students with a low socioeconomic background made less progress and showed more psychosocial problems as the share of students from better socioeconomic backgrounds increased, and this finding was even stronger for students with a minority background (e.g. African American or Latino).

Model and Hypotheses

Based on the theoretical reflection in the previous paragraphs, we created the following model and formulated several hypotheses to test in the analysis. We expect the influence of school system to be mediated through four different types of mediators: school environment, bonding, motivational influences and peer influences. In stratified school systems, those with mixed tracks are most similar to the comprehensive system, and we therefore do not expect any differences between these two types. The largest differences are likely to arise between the lower and higher tracks within the stratified system and between high and low tracks and the comprehensive system or mixed tracks (Fig. 6.1).



Fig. 6.1 Mediation model of the influence of school system on self-reported delinquent offending

Based on this model and our interest in possible differential influences for native and migrant children, we formulated the following hypotheses: H1, migrant students are overrepresented in lower tracks and underrepresented in higher tracks; H2, students in lower tracks report higher prevalence of last year offending than students in the comprehensive school system and mixed and higher tracks; migrant students report higher prevalence of last year offending than native-born students across levels; H3, stratified school systems differ in their influence on self-reported delinquent behaviour from comprehensive school systems, and this influence is mediated through the school environment, bonding, motivational influences and peer influences. We expected higher levels of school disorganisation, lower future aspirations and negative peer influences to increase and bonding and perceived achievement to decrease the probability of self-reported offending in lower-track students (H3A) and expect the opposite dynamics for higher-track students (H3B); H4, the influence of different tracks and mediators differs for migrant and native-born students.

Methods

Selection of Countries and Related School Systems

Only two out of the five UPYC countries have a stratified school system (Germany and the Netherlands), and in Germany the degree of stratification varies by region. Therefore, more countries with comprehensive and stratified school systems were included to improve the analysis. We decided to focus primarily on Western European, Scandinavian and Anglo-Saxon countries as these countries are more similar in terms of GDP, wealth and welfare structure. PISA 2012 horizontal stratification indices were used to identify countries with different school systems (PISA, 2012). These indices rank countries based on the age of selection and the number of different programmes available for students at age 15. Another important precondition for selection was participation of a specific country in ISRD3 as well as a clear indication of different school levels in the ISRD3 data for countries with a tracked school system. Based on these criteria, Finland, France, the UK and the USA were identified as countries with (more) comprehensive school systems and Austria, Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland as countries with more stratified school systems.

Data Collection and Sample

Data used in this analysis were collected during the third wave of the International Self-Report Delinquency survey (ISRD3) administered between 2013 and 2016 to seventh, eighth and ninth grade students. The subsample with eight countries includes 23,446 students, 8041 in countries with comprehensive and 15,405 in countries with stratified school systems. About 3% of the students had at least one missing observation and were omitted from the analysis ($N = 701$).

Table 6.1 Distribution of students across different educational tracks by countries

	Total	Low/vocational	Mix	High/academic	Total
	N	%	%	%	%
Austria	6347	34	37	29	100
Germany	2866	5	43	52	100
Netherlands	1851	62	17	21	100
Switzerland	3951	27	36	37	100
Total	15,015	30	35	35	100

Half of the sample is male (49%) and about two in five have a migrant background (40%; 11% first and 29% second generation). Table 6.1 shows the distribution across tracks in the ISRD3 for countries with a stratified school system.

A multistage sampling procedure with school classes as primary unit was used. Most countries used a city-based sampling design based on proportionate-to-size sampling in two larger cities of the country. Researchers in Switzerland and Austria collected a national sample but oversampled in the larger cities to meet the city-based requirements. Data were collected through standardised online or paper-and-pencil questionnaires in the classroom setting.

School response rates varied for most countries between 19% and 96%, with high response rates for Switzerland (75%) and Finland (96%) and low rates for the USA (<10%), the UK and the Netherlands (both 19%). Student response rates were generally high, ranging from 80% to 92% for most countries.

Measures

The core of the ISRD-3 questionnaire included question modules that had been previously translated, tested and used in the second wave of ISRD (Junger-Tas et al., 2012). For modules that were not part of ISRD2, validated translated scales were used whenever available. For the stratified school system, we classified lower vocational tracks, higher academic tracks and mixed tracks (Dronkers et al., 2012). Scales were calculated using POMP scores (proportion of maximum possible) ranging from 0 to 1 and were mean centred. As tracking was considered at the class-level, school disorganisation was also calculated and mean centred at the class-level. Table 6.2 summarises the measures used in this analysis.

Method of Analysis

We conducted mediation analysis[1] and tested significance of the indirect effect with a bootstrap test as adjudicated by Zhao, Lynch, and Chen (2010) and Preacher and Hayes (2004). School level was treated as a categorical variable with comprehensive

[1] *Total effect = direct effect + indirect effect,* or: $c = c' + a \times b$.

Table 6.2 Description of measures

	Variable	Item	Coding	Mean/SD/Chrohnbach's alpha
Dependent variable	Last year total offending	Have you ever in your life engaged in one of the following activities, if yes, how often last year? Offences: Graffiti, vandalism, shoplifting, burglary, car theft, theft from car, extortion, theft, group fight, assault, drug dealing	0 = never in life or not last year 1 = yes for one or more offences last year	
Control	Gender		0 = female; 1 = male	
	Grade	–	Grade 7, 8 or 9	
	Openness	Imagine you had used cannabis (cannabis/marijuana/hash), do you think that you would have said so in this questionnaire?	0 = already admitted, definitely yes; 1 = probably yes/no, definitely no	
	Country		Dummies	
Migrant background		Birthplace father Birthplace mother	0 = native (both parents native) 1 = migrant background (at least one parent foreign-born)	
School system		–	1 = comprehensive 2 = low vocational track 3 = mixed or general track 4 = high academic track	
Mediating variables	School disorganisation	(a) There is a lot of stealing in my school (b) There is a lot of fighting in my school (c) Many things are broken or vandalised in my school (d) There is a lot of drug use in my school	1 = fully agree; 2 = somewhat agree; 3 = somewhat disagree; 4 = fully disagree	$M = 0.29$, SD = 0.23; $\alpha = 0.75$
	School bonding	(a) If I had to move I would miss my school (b) Most mornings I like going to school (c) I like my school (d) Our classes are interesting	1 = fully agree; 2 = somewhat agree; 3 = somewhat disagree; 4 = fully disagree	$M = 0.62$, SD = 0.24; $\alpha = 0.80$

Table 6.2 (continued)

	Variable	Item	Coding	Mean/SD/Chrohnbach's alpha
	Teacher bonding	(a) If you had to move to another city, how much would you miss your favourite teacher?	1 = not at all; 2 = not much; 3 = only a bit; 4 = somewhat; 5 = quite a lot; 6 = very much	$M = 0.50$, SD = 0.27; $\alpha = 0.74$
		(b) How important is it to you how your favourite teacher thinks about you?	1 = totally unimportant; 2 = quite unimportant; 3 = a bit unimportant; 4 = a bit important; 5 = quite important; 6 = very important	
	Future aspirations	What do you think you will do when you finish compulsory school? (a) Continue schooling to prepare for higher education (b) Attend a school where I can learn a trade (c) Start apprenticeship (d) Look for a job (e) Other (f) Don't know yet	0 = don't know yet, other, look for a job, start apprenticeship (c–f) 1 = enrol in follow-up education (a/b)	$M = 0.67$, SD = 0.47
	Perceived performance	How well do you do at school?	7 = probably one of the best in my class(es); 6 = well above average; 5 = above average; 4 = average; 3 = below average; 2 = well below average; 1 = probably one of the worst in my class(es)	$M = 0.62$, SD = 0.47 (reversed, so higher indicates higher perceived achievement)
	Truancy	Have you ever stayed away from school for at least a whole day without a proper reason in the last 12 months?	0 = no 1 = yes	$M = 0.18$, SD = 0.39
	Delinquent friends	How many friends do you know who have done any of the following? (a) Soft or hard drug use; (b) Shoplifting; (c) Burglary; (d) Extortion; (e) Assault	0 = none 1 = yes to one or more	$M = 0.44$, SD = 0.50

system as reference category. Estimated effects therefore indicated *relative* direct, indirect and total influence of tracks in stratified sytems as compared to the comprehensive system (Hayes & Preacher, 2014). The influence of migrant background was addressed in a moderation analysis with an interaction term between migrant status and school level. As an article by Mood (2010) showed that logistic regression could lead to erroneous conclusions in mediation analysis, we used linear probability modelling (LPM), that is, linear regression (OLS) with a binary dependent variable and robust errors. LPM avoids the problem of unobserved variance which means that estimates can be compared across models (Ibid). Although LPM has been associated with some problems, e.g. predicted probabilities smaller than zero or larger than one and less efficient estimates, awareness of these issues and the large dataset used in this study were adequate to reduce the impact of these problems. Potential endogeneity was addressed by controlling for important confounders (Antonakis, Bendahan, Jacquart, & Lalive, 2010). Stata 14.2 SE modules 'sem' and 'gsem' were used to run mediation analyses.

Results

Results of the analysis are presented in four subsections. First, we examine the distribution of migrant and native students across tracks (Section "Distribution of Native and Migrant Students in the Stratified System"). Second, we describe differences in last year offending between school systems in general and between native and migrant students within systems (Section "Last Year Offending in Different School Systems and Tracks"). Third, we test direct and indirect influences described in Section "Background" (Section "Direct and Indirect Effects of the School System and Mediating Factors"). Finally, we compare effects for migrant and native students (Section "Relative Direct and Indirect Effects of School System for Native and Migrant Students").

Distribution of Native and Migrant Students in the Stratified System

Different studies have shown that migrant students are overrepresented in the lower tracks in stratified school systems. Although countries differ, a clear pattern emerges (Table 6.3): In the Netherlands, Germany and Switzerland, students with a migrant background are overrepresented in lower tracks. In the Netherlands, 70% of the participating migrant students are enrolled in lower tracks. Although overrepresentation of migrant students in lower tracks is not as evident in Austria, migrant students are still underrepresented in higher tracks. This unequal distribution across tracks between native and migrant students is statistically significant for all countries, which means that hypothesis 1 is accepted (H1).

Table 6.3 Distribution of native and migrant students across school tracks in different countries with stratified system (N = 15,015)

		Low	Mix	High	Total	
		%	%	%	%	Pearson Chi^2
Austria	Native	33	35	32	100	
	Migrant	36	41	23	100	$\chi^2(2) = 48.12$, $p = 0.000$
Germany	Native	2	36	62	100	
	Migrant	7	51	43	100	$\chi^2(2) = 121.53$, $p = 0.000$
The Netherlands	Native	56	17	27	100	
	Migrant	69	16	15	100	$\chi^2(2) = 43.35$, $p = 0.000$
Switzerland	Native	19	43	38	100	
	Migrant	36	29	35	100	$\chi^2(2) = 144.65$, $p = 0.000$

Table 6.4 Total last year offending between systems and across tracks

		N	Prevalence total last year offending (%)[a]	Sign. different from comprehensive system[b]
Comprehensive		7730	25.8	N/A
Stratified		15.015	26.0	No
Stratified	Low	4518	30.0	Yes
	Mix	5313	25.7	No
	High	5184	22.8	Yes
Total		22.745	25.9	

[a]*Different tracks*: Pearson χ^2 (3) = 64.50, $p = 0.000$
[b]*Separate tracks versus comprehensive system*: Tukey-Kramer test studentised range critical value (0.05, 4, 22.741) = 3.63

Last Year Offending in Different School Systems and Tracks

At first sight, no differences in self-reported total last year offending appear when comparing comprehensive and stratified school systems (resp. 25.8% versus 26.0%, $\chi^2(1) = 0.177$, $p = 0.67$). However, a different picture arises when considering different tracks within the stratified system. While the prevalence of total last year offending is comparable for the comprehensive system and mixed tracks in the stratified system, students in both lower and higher tracks significantly differ in self-reported last year offending from students in the comprehensive system (Table 6.4). Students in lower tracks report significantly higher levels of last year offending and students in higher tracks significantly lower levels.

In most countries with stratified school system, self-reported last year total offending significantly differs between migrant and native students, whereas no differences are visible in countries with a comprehensive school system (Fig. 6.2). Two-sample t-tests for all countries confirm this finding, with no significant differences between native and migrant students for countries with comprehensive systems and significant differences for three of four countries with stratified systems—Germany being the exception. Comparing school systems in general,



Fig. 6.2 Total last year offending for native and migrant students across eight countries

students with a migrant background report significantly higher prevalence of total last year offending behaviour across all tracks than native students, whereas no significant differences are visible for the comprehensive system (Fig. 6.3). Differences in offending are largest in lower tracks (9% between migrant and native) and smallest in mixed and higher tracks (resp. 4% and 6%).

Direct and Indirect Effects of the School System and Mediating Factors

The full model with all mediators and control variables also shows a consistent difference in effects between stratified and comprehensive school systems (Table 6.5). Stratified systems significantly increase self-reported offending behaviour compared to comprehensive systems while controlling for gender, grade, openness and country (positive relative direct effect). This effect is larger for lower tracks, increasing chances of offending behaviour in students by almost 8%, than for mixed and higher-track students, both about 5% increase. Differences in effect between lower tracks and other tracks in the stratified system are significant.[2]

[2] Low-High: Wald $\chi^2(1) = 10.22$, $p = 0.001$; Low-Mix: Wald $\chi^2(1) = 9.28$, $p = 0.002$.



Fig. 6.3 Total last year offending for native and migrant students across tracks

For higher-track students, school environment, bonding, motivation and peers fully mediate negative effects of school system and have a protective influence regarding offending behaviour. For lower and mixed tracks, the effect of school system is only partly mediated. These tracks still substantially increase the probability of offending, even after mediation (significant relative total effect).

A non-significant indirect effect does not reveal any information about underlying dynamics. Lack of significance could indicate lack of effect overall or mediators nullifying one anothers' effect. Teacher bonding is the only mediator that does not have any indirect influence on self-reported offending whatsoever, not compared to comprehensive systems and not across tracks (Table 6.6). All other mediators show often small but significant influences for either one or more tracks, both compared to the comprehensive school system and between tracks. Peer influences, school bonding and motivation have the largest influence on offending behaviour. The direction of most influences is comparable across tracks. However, protective influences are regularly larger for higher than for lower tracks. By contrast, the influence of mediators that increase probability of offending is generally larger for lower tracks than for higher tracks.

Table 6.5 Relative direct, indirect and total school-level effect based on full model (N = 22,745; bootstrap reps = 1000)[a,b]

	Direct			Indirect			Total		
	b	Bootstr. SE	Bias-corrected 95% CI	*b*	Bootstr. SE	Bias-corrected 95% CI	*b*	Bootstr. SE	Bias-corrected 95% CI
Compreh.	ref.			ref.			ref.		
Stratified	0.054***	(0.011)	(0.034–0.075)	−0.018***	(0.005)	(−0.027 to −0.008)	0.036**	(0.012)	(0.015–0.061)
Low	0.076***	(0.013)	(0.050–0.098)	−0.010	(0.006)	(−0.022–0.003)	0.066***	(0.014)	(0.038–0.092)
Mix	0.048***	(0.012)	(0.025–0.071)	−0.006	(0.006)	(−0.017–0.006)	0.042**	(0.013)	(0.015–0.065)
High	0.047***	(0.012)	(0.025–0.071)	−0.039***	(0.005)	(−0.049 to −0.028)	0.009	(0.013)	(−0.016–0.034)

**$p < 0.01$; ***$p < 0.001$

[a]Model with all mediators and controlled for gender, grade, openness and country (see Appendix)

[b]SRMR = 0.047 (<0.05 = good fit); coefficient of determination = 0.455. Due to robust analysis, sem could not provide other goodness-of-fit measures for model fit

Table 6.6 Relative indirect influence of tracks in stratified system through different mediators ($N = 22{,}745$; ref. = comprehensive system)

Mediator	Low			Mix			High		
	b	Bootstr. SE	Bias-corrected 95% CI	*b*	Bootstr. SE	Bias-corrected 95% CI	*b*	Bootstr. SE	Bias-corrected 95% CI
School environment									
School disorganisation	0.000*	(0.000)	(−0.000–0.001)	0.004***	(0.001)	(0.002–0.007)	−0.003***	(0.001)	(−0.005 to −0.001)
Bonding[a]									
School bonding	−0.005**	(0.001)	(−0.007 to −0.002)	−0.000	(0.001)	(−0.002–0.003)	−0.011***	(0.002)	(−0.014 to −0.008)
Motivation									
Perc. Achievement	−0.002**	(0.001)	(−0.003 to −0.001)	−0.002***	(0.001)	(−0.004 to −0.001)	−0.003***	(0.001)	(−0.004 to −0.001)
Future aspirations	0.010**	(0.003)	(0.004–0.016)	0.008**	(0.003)	(0.003–0.013)	0.004**	(0.001)	(0.002–0.007)
Peer influences									
Truancy	−0.010***	(0.002)	(−0.014 to −0.006)	−0.012***	(0.002)	(−0.016 to −0.008)	−0.013***	(0.002)	(−0.016 to −0.009)
Delinquent peers	−0.003	(0.004)	(−0.011–0.004)	−0.003	(0.004)	(−0.010–0.004)	−0.013***	(0.004)	(−0.021 to −0.006)

*$p < 0.05$; **$p < 0.01$; ***$p < 0.001$

[a]Teacher bonding was omitted from the table as no significant influences were detected

Lower and higher tracks significantly differ in their effect for school bonding,[3] future aspirations[4] and interaction with delinquent peers.[5] Compared to the comprehensive system, school bonding protects against offending behaviour for lower and higher tracks but has a larger effect for higher-track students. Effects of school bonding are comparable for mixed tracks and the comprehensive system. As expected, perceived achievement similarly protects students across all tracks more than the comprehensive system. Future aspirations, on the other hand, increase the probability of offending, but this effect is largest for lower tracks, possibly because options for future education are relatively clear and restricted at an early age. However, students in stratified systems are better protected against negative peer influences in terms of truancy and for higher tracks also against interaction with delinquent peers. Unexpectedly, school environment has no significant effect for lower tracks and only a small opposing influence, increasing the probability of offending for mixed tracks and decreasing this probability for higher tracks. Although separate effects are small, combined school environment, bonding, motivation and peers do capture influences interacting at the school level regarding offending behaviour.

Relative Direct and Indirect Effects of School System for Native and Migrant Students

Direct and indirect influences of school system change substantially when including migrant background in the analysis (Table 6.7). Compared to comprehensive systems, stratified systems still increase the probability of offending, but this effect is similar across tracks. School environment, bonding, motivation and peers now fully mediate negative influences of school system on offending across all tracks, not only for higher tracks as in the previous model. Nevertheless, higher-track students are still significantly better protected than lower- and mixed-track students as shown by the indirect effects.[6] Although not significantly different from the comprehensive system, overall being in a higher track slightly protects against offending, whereas enrolment in lower or mixed track appears to increase offending.

Tracks differently influence migrant and native students (Table 6.7). Whereas no difference exists in effects for migrant and native students in higher and mixed tracks, lower-track enrolment increases the probability of self-reported offending for migrant students by 3%,[7] on top of the influence of migrant background (+2%)

[3] Wald $\chi^2(1) = 35.80$, $p = 0.000$.

[4] Wald $\chi 2(1) = 9.66$, $p = 0.002$.

[5] Low-high: Wald $\chi 2(1) = 11.79$, $p = 0.001$; mix-high: Wald $\chi 2(1) = 15.49$, $p = 0.000$.

[6] Low-high: Wald $\chi^2(1) = 17.23$, $p = 0.000$; mix-high: Wald $\chi^2(1) = 41.03$, $p = 0.000$.

[7] Direct effect low × migrant.

Table 6.7 Influence of school system and migrant background ($N = 22{,}745$)[a,b]

	Direct				Indirect				Total			
	b	Robust SE	min95	max95	*b*	Robust SE	min95	max95	*b*	Robust SE	min95	max95
Compreh.	ref.				ref.				ref.			
Low	0.050***	(0.014)	0.022	0.078	−0.029***	(0.007)	−0.043	−0.015	0.021	(0.015)	(−0.008	0.051)
Mix	0.044***	(0.013)	0.019	0.069	−0.020**	(0.006)	−0.032	−0.008	0.024	(0.014)	(−0.002	0.051)
High	0.039**	(0.012)	0.015	0.063	−0.051***	(0.006)	−0.062	−0.039	−0.011	(0.013)	(−0.038	0.015)
Native	ref.				ref.				ref.			
Low × migrant	0.034*	(0.016)	0.004	0.065	0.037***	(0.007)	0.023	0.051	0.071***	(0.017)	(0.038	0.105)
Mix × migrant	−0.009	(0.015)	−0.038	0.019	0.028***	(0.007)	0.015	0.042	0.019	(0.016)	(−0.012	0.051)
High × migrant	0.002	(0.015)	−0.027	0.031	0.032***	(0.007)	0.018	0.045	0.034*	(0.016)	(0.002	0.065)

*$p < 0.05$; **$p < 0.01$; ***$p < 0.001$

[a]Full model with all mediators and controlling for gender, grade, openness, country and migrant background (see Appendix)

[b]Gsem better handled the complexity of this analysis than the sem-command. Gsem, however, does not provide any goodness-of-fit indicators. AIC and BIC indicators showed that this model represented a significant improvement over models without migrant background or only migrant background and no moderation

and lower-track enrolment (+5%).[8] School environment, bonding, motivation and peers appear to protect native students against offending as illustrated by a negative indirect effect, lowering the probability of offending with 2% and 3% for lower and mixed tracks and even 5% for higher tracks. However, for migrant students protective influences are inhibited partially for higher tracks and even reversed to risks for lower and mixed tracks.[9] Overall, the analysis shows a relatively strong relationship between enrolment in lower tracks and self-reported life-time offending for migrant students, increasing the probability by 9% as compared to similar students in the comprehensive system.[10]

The separate mediating influences of school environment, bonding, motivation and peers on the probability of offending are small (Table 6.8). Most interesting is the extent to which having a migrant background (*migrant* in Table 6.8) alters the influence of the main mediating effect (*general* in Table 6.8). The largest moderating effect of migrant background are found for school bonding and peer influences. The influence of delinquent peers appears to be rather large for students with a migrant background across all tracks. Nevertheless, this influence is still larger for lower-track than for higher-track migrant students. Overall migrant students in higher tracks are still protected against the influence of delinquent peers, while in lower tracks delinquent peers increase the risk of offending among migrant students.

Discussion and Conclusion

In this chapter, we have examined the influence of comprehensive and stratified school systems on self-reported offending behaviour for migrant and native-born students. Stratified systems select students into different tracks according to ability, in some countries as early as age 10 or 11. In the comprehensive system, by contrast, all students follow education together, and no selection takes place before the age of 15 or 16. Tracks in stratified systems substantially determine future education and career opportunities. The central question in this chapter was the extent to which school systems directly or indirectly influence self-reported youth delinquent offending in migrant and nonmigrant students. We explored four different mechanisms derived from academic literature through which selection in tracks could potentially influence offending behaviour, namely, school environment, bonding, motivation and peers.

In line with previous research, we found an unequal distribution of migrant and native students across tracks in all countries with a stratified school system (H1). The unequal distribution is most visible in the Netherlands and Germany where

[8] Low-mix: Wald $\chi^2(1) = 7.11$, $p = 0.008$; low-high: Wald $\chi^2(1) = 3.82$, $p = 0.051$ (not significant).

[9] High: Indirect high + indirect high × migrant = −0.051 + 0.032 = −0.019 (= − 2%); low: −0.029 + 0.037 = 0.008 (+1%); mix: −0.020 + 0.028 = 0.008 (+1%).

[10] Total low + total low × migrant = 9%.

Table 6.8 Relative indirect effect of tracks in general and moderation effects for migrant students ($N = 22{,}745$; ref.general = comprehensive; ref. migrant = native)

		Low			Mix			High		
Mediator		*b*	Robust SE	95% CI	*b*	Robust SE	95% CI	*b*	Robust SE	95% CI
School environment										
School disorg.	General	−0.001*	(0.000)	(−0.002 to −0.000)	0.002**	(0.001)	(0.001–0.004)	−0.003**	(0.001)	(−0.005 to −0.001)
	Migrant	0.002*	(0.001)	(0.000–0.003)	0.001*	(0.001)	(0.000–0.003)	−0.000	(0.000)	(−0.001–0.000)
Bonding[a]										
School bonding	General	−0.008***	(0.002)	(−0.011 to −0.005)	−0.001	(0.001)	(−0.004–0.001)	−0.014***	(0.002)	(−0.017 to −0.011)
	Migrant	0.006***	(0.002)	(0.003–0.010)	0.002	(0.002)	(−0.001–0.006)	0.009***	(0.002)	(0.005–0.012)
Motivation										
Perc. achievement	General	−0.002**	(0.001)	(−0.003 to −0.000)	−0.002**	(0.001)	(−0.004 to −0.001)	−0.003***	(0.001)	(−0.005 to −0.002)
	Migrant	−0.000	(0.001)	(−0.002–0.002)	−0.000	(0.001)	(−0.002–0.001)	0.002*	(0.001)	(0.000–0.004)
Future aspirations	General	0.012***	(0.003)	(0.005–0.019)	0.009***	(0.003)	(0.004–0.015)	0.005***	(0.001)	(0.002–0.008)
	Migrant	−0.002**	(0.001)	(−0.004 to −0.001)	−0.001*	(0.001)	(−0.002 to −0.000)	−0.000	(0.000)	(−0.001–0.000)
Peer influences										
Truancy	General	−0.015***	(0.002)	(−0.020 to −0.011)	−0.016***	(0.002)	(−0.020 to −0.012)	−0.016***	(0.002)	(−0.019 to −0.012)
	Migrant	0.007**	(0.003)	(0.002–0.012)	0.005*	(0.002)	(0.000–0.010)	0.004	(0.002)	(−0.001–0.009)
Delinquent peers	General	−0.015**	(0.004)	(−0.023 to −0.006)	−0.012**	(0.004)	(−0.020 to −0.004)	−0.019***	(0.004)	(−0.027 to −0.011)
	Migrant	0.024***	(0.005)	(0.014–0.034)	0.022***	(0.005)	(0.012–0.031)	0.017***	(0.005)	(0.008–0.027)

*$p < 0.05$; **$p < 0.01$; ***$p < 0.001$

[a]Teacher bonding was omitted from the table as no significant influences were detected

migrant students are overrepresented in lower and underrepresented in higher tracks, but this unequal distribution is also present in Switzerland and Austria—but to a lesser degree. Based on these findings, early selection in stratified school systems appears to reinforce inequality between migrant and native students. Nevertheless, differences in distribution across countries with stratified school systems suggest that other factors may be of influence as well, such as the composition of migrant populations in different countries.

Besides unequal distribution, our analysis also shows a clear difference in offending behaviour for migrant and native students between school systems and tracks (H2). In all countries with a stratified school system except Germany, self-reported offending is significantly higher for migrant than for native students, whereas no significant differences exist for countries with a comprehensive school system. Lower-track students in stratified systems, both native and migrant, more often report offending than higher-track students. However, differences in self-reported offending between native and migrant students are largest in lower tracks but also significant in mixed and higher tracks.

Based on different theories, we developed a mediation model to examine both direct and indirect effects of tracking (H3). Our analysis shows that, while controlling for gender, grade, honesty and country differences, stratified school systems generally increase the probability of offending compared to comprehensive school systems; this influence is largest for lower tracks in the stratified system. Only for higher-track students, the four mechanisms derived from theory—school environment, bonding, motivation and peer influences—fully mediate adverse influences of stratified systems on offending behaviour; for students in lower and mixed tracks, negative influences are only partially mediated through these mechanisms, which suggests that being enrolled in lower or mixed tracks in itself also increases the probability of offending. This finding indicates that students comparable in terms of perceived school disorganisation, bonding, motivation and exposure to specific peer influences are better protected against developing offending behaviour in higher tracks than in mixed and lower tracks. These findings about the effect of school system on offending contradict previous research by Wiatrowski et al. (1982) and Egli et al. (2012). An explanation could be that our study focused on eight different countries, whereas both other studies were single-country studies.

The picture changes substantially when considering a possible moderating influence of migrant background (H4). Our analysis clearly shows that migrant students are more affected by tracking than native students. Particularly, lower-track enrolment substantially increases the probability of total last year offending for migrant students. While mediating mechanisms school environment, bonding, motivation and peer influences reduce adverse influences of stratified school systems on offending for native students, having a migrant background completely abrogates these protective influences for students that are otherwise comparable in terms of school environment, bonding, motivation and peer influences. Most of the disparity in mediating effects between native and migrant students results from the relatively large influence of delinquent friends on migrant students. Besides school environment—the influence of delinquent friends is largest for migrant students in lower

tracks and smallest for those in higher-track students—delinquent friends could also reflect a neighbourhood effect: In many countries, children with a migrant background are more likely to live in disadvantaged areas and as such may have more interaction with delinquent friends. Nevertheless, a substantial part of the negative influence of tracking for migrant students on offending, particularly in lower tracks, could not be explained by school environment, bonding, motivation and peers. This finding suggests that tracking as such and the early selection inherent to tracking could have a more adverse effect on offending for migrant students. In the comprehensive system, no such effect is visible.

Of course, this study has some limitations. First, the cross-sectional character of the study does not allow any causal claims. We are aware of discussions about causality in academic literature and did not aim to *test* causal claims, but our analysis does provide evidence for a relatively strong relationship between school system in general and lower-track enrolment in particular and offending in migrant students. Second, although comprehensive school systems appear to better facilitate migrant students than stratified systems, possible segregating influences may still operate along other lines, such as race or ethnicity, rather than migrant status, for instance, by clustering students of these backgrounds in marginalised schools with little resources to provide good education (Borgna & Contini, 2014). Regardless of possible segregation in comprehensive systems, our analysis about the adverse effects of tracking of offending in migrant students still stands.

Overall, comprehensive school systems appear to better protect migrant students against offending behaviour than stratified systems. Particularly enrolment in lower tracks in stratified systems magnifies adverse influences on offending for migrant students. This represents a fundamental problem as students with a migrant background are generally overrepresented in these lower tracks. The differential influence of school system and tracking for migrant and native students is in line with previous educational research (Crul, 2013; Dronkers et al., 2012). Early selection in stratified systems does not allow students with a migrant background sufficient time to acquire the necessary language and learning skills to proceed to higher education. Once in lower tracks, opportunities for future education are limited, and migrant students are overly exposed to risk influences that raise the probability of offending, while our analysis also shows that influences protecting native students do not protect migrant students as well. Postponing selection could enable these students to strengthen their position in education. When language and learning skills are a problem, extra support could enable these students to reach their full potential and prevent future inequality.

Appendix

1. Relative direct, indirect and total school-level effect—full model (see Table 6.5)

	Unstandardised coefficient	Bootstrapped standard error	Standardised coefficient
Total last year offending			
School disorganisation	0.078***	(0.023)	0.023***
School bonding	−0.196***	(0.013)	−0.105***
Teacher bonding	−0.009	(0.012)	−0.005
Perc. achievement	−0.095***	(0.013)	−0.046***
Future aspiration	−0.020**	(0.006)	−0.021**
Truancy	0.168***	(0.009)	0.148***
Delinquent friends	0.269***	(0.006)	0.305***
Comprehensive	(ref.)		
Low	0.076***	(0.013)	0.069***
Mix	0.048***	(0.012)	0.046***
High	0.047***	(0.012)	0.045***
Constant	0.104***	(0.012)	
School disorganisation			
Comprehensive	(ref.)		
Low	0.005	(0.003)	0.014
Mix	0.053***	(0.003)	0.174***
High	−0.038***	(0.003)	−0.123***
Constant	−0.016***	(0.003)	
School bonding			
Comprehensive	(ref.)		
Low	0.023**	(0.007)	0.039**
Mix	0.000	(0.007)	0.000
High	0.055***	(0.006)	0.099***
Constant	0.001	(0.006)	
Teacher bonding			
Comprehensive	(ref.)		
Low	0.004	(0.008)	0.006
Mix	0.015*	(0.007)	0.024*
High	0.030***	(0.007)	0.046***
Constant	0.001	(0.007)	
Perc. Achievement			
Comprehensive	(ref.)		
Low	0.020**	(0.006)	0.037**
Mix	0.025***	(0.006)	0.049***
High	0.028***	(0.006)	0.055***
Constant	−0.033***	(0.006)	

(continued)

	Unstandardised coefficient	Bootstrapped standard error	Standardised coefficient
Future aspiration			
Comprehensive	(ref.)		
Low	−0.498***	(0.014)	−0.424***
Mix	−0.398***	(0.013)	−0.359***
High	−0.213***	(0.012)	−0.191***
Constant	0.837***	(0.010)	
Truancy			
Comprehensive	(ref.)		
Low	−0.058***	(0.011)	−0.060***
Mix	−0.073***	(0.011)	−0.079***
High	−0.076***	(0.011)	−0.083***
Constant	0.227***	(0.009)	
Delinquent friends			
Comprehensive	(ref.)		
Low	−0.013	(0.014)	−0.01
Mix	−0.011	(0.014)	−0.01
High	−0.049***	(0.014)	−0.042***
Constant	0.625***	(0.012)	
var(e.totlyp)	0.151***	(0.001)	
var(e.schdocls)	0.013***	(0.000)	
var(e.schbopc)	0.053***	(0.001)	
var(e.teabopc)	0.071***	(0.001)	
var(e.achievpc)	0.045***	(0.000)	
var(e.aftsch2)	0.195***	(0.001)	
var(e.truancyp)	0.143***	(0.002)	
var(e.delfrndp)	0.227***	(0.001)	
N	22,745		
SRMR	0.047	(<0.05 = good fit)	
Coefficient of determination	0.455		

Note: sem controlled for gender, grade, openness, country

2. Influence of school system and migrant background—full model (see Table 6.7)

	Unstandardised coefficient	Robust SE	min95	max95
Total last year offending				
School disorganisation	0.066**	(0.023)	(0.020	0.111)
School bonding	−0.194***	(0.013)	(−0.220	−0.167)
Teacher bonding	−0.011	(0.011)	(−0.033	0.010)
Perc. Achievement	−0.094***	(0.013)	(−0.120	−0.068)
Future aspiration	−0.022***	(0.006)	(−0.034	−0.010)
Truancy	0.166***	(0.008)	(0.150	0.182)

(continued)

	Unstandardised coefficient	Robust SE	min95	max95
Delinquent friends	0.268***	(0.006)	(0.257	0.280)
Comprehensive	(ref.)			
Low	0.050***	(0.014)	(0.022	0.078)
Mix	0.044***	(0.013)	(0.019	0.069)
High	0.039**	(0.012)	(0.015	0.063)
Native	(ref.)			
Migrant	0.017	(0.010)	(−0.002	0.036)
Native	(ref.)			
Low × migrant	0.034*	(0.016)	(0.004	0.065)
Mix × migrant	−0.009	(0.015)	(−0.038	0.019)
High × migrant	0.002	(0.015)	(0.027	0.031)
Constant	0.124***	(0.012)	(0.101	0.147)
School disorganisation				
Comprehensive	(ref.)			
Low	−0.017***	(0.004)	(−0.024	−0.010)
Mix	0.037***	(0.003)	(0.030	0.043)
High	−0.043***	(0.003)	(−0.049	−0.036)
Native	(ref.)			
Migrant	0.020***	(0.003)	(0.014	0.026)
Native	(ref.)			
Low × migrant	0.027***	(0.004)	(0.018	0.036)
Mix × migrant	0.022***	(0.004)	(0.013	0.030)
High × migrant	−0.002	(0.004)	(−0.010	0.006)
Constant	−0.048***	(0.003)	(−0.053	−0.043)
School bonding				
Comprehensive	(ref.)			
Low	0.041***	(0.008)	(0.025	0.056)
Mix	0.007	(0.007)	(0.006	0.021)
High	0.073***	(0.007)	(0.060	0.086)
Native	0	(.)	(0.000	0.000)
Migrant	0.004	(0.006)	(−0.008	0.015)
Native	(ref.)			
Low × migrant	−0.032***	(0.009)	(−0.051	−0.014)
Mix × migrant	−0.012	(0.009)	(−0.029	0.005)
High × migrant	−0.044***	(0.009)	(−0.061	−0.027)
Constant	0.055***	(0.006)	(0.043	0.066)
Teacher bonding				
Comprehensive	(ref.)			
Low	−0.005	(0.009)	(−0.023	0.013)
Mix	0.001	(0.008)	(−0.015	0.017)
High	0.036***	(0.008)	(0.020	0.052)
Native	(ref.)			
Migrant	0.024***	(0.007)	(0.011	0.038)
Native	(ref.)			

(continued)

	Unstandardised coefficient	Robust SE	min95	max95
Low × migrant	0.002	(0.011)	(−0.019	0.023)
Mix × migrant	0.018	(0.010)	(−0.002	0.038)
High × migrant	−0.031**	(0.010)	(−0.051	−0.011)
Constant	0.045***	(0.007)	(0.031	0.059)
Perc. Achievement				
Comprehensive	(ref.)			
Low	0.020**	(0.007)	(0.006	0.035)
Mix	0.024***	(0.007)	(0.011	0.037)
High	0.036***	(0.007)	(0.023	0.049)
Native	(ref.)			
Migrant	0.001	(0.005)	(−0.009	0.012)
Native	(ref.)			
Low × migrant	0.000	(0.008)	(−0.016	0.017)
Mix × migrant	0.003	(0.008)	(−0.013	0.019)
High × migrant	−0.021**	(0.008)	(−0.037	−0.006)
Constant	−0.023***	(0.006)	(−0.034	−0.012)
Future aspiration				
Comprehensive	(ref.)			
Low	−0.562***	(0.015)	(−0.591	−0.532)
Mix	−0.435***	(0.014)	(−0.461	−0.408)
High	−0.228***	(0.013)	(−0.254	−0.202)
Native	(ref.)			
Migrant	0.023*	(0.010)	(0.003	0.044)
Native	(ref.)			
Low × migrant	0.103***	(0.018)	(0.067	0.139)
Mix × migrant	0.060***	(0.017)	(0.027	0.093)
High × migrant	0.015	(0.016)	(−0.015	0.045)
Constant	0.794***	(0.011)	(0.772	0.815)
Truancy				
Comprehensive	(ref.)			
Low	−0.092***	(0.012)	(−0.117	−0.068)
Mix	−0.097***	(0.011)	(−0.118	−0.075)
High	−0.094***	(0.011)	(−0.115	−0.072)
Native	(ref.)			
Migrant	0.028**	(0.011)	(0.007	0.050)
Native	(ref.)			
Low × migrant	0.042**	(0.016)	(0.011	0.074)
Mix × migrant	0.029*	(0.014)	(0.001	0.058)
High × migrant	0.024	(0.015)	(−0.006	0.053)
Constant	0.174***	(0.010)	(0.155	0.193)
Delinquent friends				
Comprehensive	(ref.)			
Low	−0.055***	(0.017)	(−0.087	−0.022)
Mix	−0.045**	(0.015)	(−0.075	−0.015)

(continued)

	Unstandardised coefficient	Robust SE	min95	max95
High	−0.072***	(0.015)	(−0.101	−0.042)
Native	(ref.)			
Migrant	−0.02	(0.012)	(−0.043	0.003)
Native	(ref.)			
Low × migrant	0.090***	(0.019)	(0.053	0.127)
Mix × migrant	0.081***	(0.018)	(0.046	0.116)
High × migrant	0.064***	(0.018)	(0.028	0.100)
Constant	0.518***	(0.013)	(0.492	0.543)
var(e.totlyp)	0.150***	(0.001)	(0.148	0.153)
var(e.schdocls)	0.013***	(0.000)	(0.013	0.013)
var(e.schbopc)	0.053***	(0.000)	(0.052	0.054)
var(e.teabopc)	0.071***	(0.001)	(0.070	0.072)
var(e.achievpc)	0.045***	(0.000)	(0.044	0.046)
var(e.aftsch2)	0.194***	(0.001)	(0.191	0.196)
var.(e.truancyp)	0.143***	(0.002)	(0.140	0.146)
var.(e.delfrndp)	0.227***	(0.001)	(0.225	0.229)
N	22,745			
LL	−30,478,965			
df	159			
AIC	61,275,93			
BIC	62,553,035			

Note: gsem controlled for gender, grade, openness, country and migrant background

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Chapter 7
Trust in the Police and Police Legitimacy Through the Eyes of Teenagers

Diego Farren, Mike Hough, Kath Murray, and Susan McVie

Introduction

Procedural justice theory has made a substantial contribution to our understanding of policing (Hough, Jackson, & Bradford, 2013; Hough, Jackson, Bradford, Myhill, & Quinton, 2010; Tyler, 1990, 2004, 2006, 2011), but research and theorizing have focussed almost exclusively on policing adults (some exceptions are Fagan & Tyler, 2005; Hinds, 2007, 2009; Murphy, 2015; Oberwittler & Roché, 2018; Reisig & Lloyd, 2009). Those in late adolescence and early adulthood are, however, a critically important age group for policing and constitute a key "customer group". Crucially, it is during this period that young people undergo what is probably the most relevant phases of legal socialization in terms of developing their attitudes and orientations towards the police (Fagan & Tyler, 2005; Piquero, Fagan, Mulvey, Steinberg, & Odgers, 2005). We also know that offending careers generally start in the early teens (Jennings, Loeber, Pardini, Piquero, & Farrington, 2016, p. 7). Because of this, in the third wave of the ISRD project, a small amount of questionnaire space was devoted to the procedural justice theory (see Box 7.1). Also taking into account criticism of proactive stop and search policies (or stop-and-frisk in American English) in the United Kingdom (Murray, 2014; Scott, 2015; StopWatch, 2017) and the impact on teenagers (Flacks, 2017; Reid Howie Associates, 2002), an additional set of questions on stop and search encounters was included in the England and Scotland questionnaire (see Box 7.2).

D. Farren (✉)
Institute of Criminology, University of Hamburg, Hamburg, Germany

M. Hough
Emeritus Professor, School of Law, Birkbeck, University of London, London, UK
e-mail: M.hough@bbk.ac.uk

K. Murray · S. McVie
School of Law, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK
e-mail: s.mcvie@ed.ac.uk

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Using data from the ISRD3 project, this chapter helps to fill the gap in the analysis of procedural justice on adolescents. The chapter, like the rest of the book, focusses on the five countries that formed a sub-study of the overall ISRD3 project: UPYC (Understanding and Preventing Youth Crime). These are France, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States.[1] However, for some analyses, we use the full ISRD3 dataset for reasons explained below.

Procedural justice theory is a general theory about power, authority and compliance, but—as in this chapter—its focus is often specifically on the police and their relationships with the public. We follow the version of the procedural justice theory as conceptualized by Jackson and colleagues (Hough et al., 2013; Jackson et al., 2011), according to which the key tenets of procedural justice theory, as they apply to policing, are about the relationships that hold between[2]:

- The quality of police treatment of people (procedural fairness)
- Public trust in the police (trust)
- People's perceptions of police legitimacy (legitimacy)
- Their consequent preparedness to comply and cooperate with the police and comply with the law (compliance/cooperation)

Procedural fairness is the main dimension of trust in the police that predicts police legitimacy and, through legitimacy, also shapes levels of compliance. In other words, the manner in which police approach citizens is the factor that most shapes their trust in the police and perceptions of legitimacy—and those who confer legitimacy on the police are more likely than others to comply with the law and cooperate with police and legal authorities.

This chapter sets out to test the validity of this version of procedural justice theory as a framework for analysing teenagers' attitudes to the police, the law and lawbreaking. The results are divided into three sections. The section headed "Validity of the Procedural Justice Theory for Young People" examines the relationships between trust in the police, people's perceptions of police legitimacy and intention to offend (as a proxy for compliance) amongst all those countries participating in the ISRD3 project that included the procedural justice module.[3] The aim is to test the "invariance thesis" (Wolfe, Nix, Kaminski, & Rojek, 2016), that is, whether the

[1] Most of the chapters in this book focus on the five UPYC countries, counting the United Kingdom as a single country. In this chapter we have treated England and Scotland as different countries, for reasons explained below.

[2] Conceptualizations of what legitimacy actually means vary widely amongst studies (Bottoms & Tankebe, 2012; Hough, 2013; Hough et al., 2014, 2017; Jackson & Bradford, 2010; Jackson & Gau, 2016; Johnson et al., 2014; Reisig, Bratton, & Gertz, 2007; Tankebe, Reisig, & Wang, 2016; Tyler, 2003; Tyler & Jackson, 2013) with some even including forms of trust (like procedural justice) as dimensions of legitimacy (Gau, 2011, 2015; Gau et al., 2012; Murphy, 2015; Reisig et al., 2007; Tankebe, 2013; Tankebe et al., 2016). Hough, Jackson &Bradford (2010, p. 333) clearly differentiate between trust and legitimacy by stating that "[t]rust is believing that the police have the right intentions and are competent to do what they are tasked to do; legitimacy is recognizing and justifying police power and authority" (see also Jackson & Gau, 2016).

[3] At the time of writing this chapter, data on the procedural justice module was available for 27 countries, counting England and Scotland as two separate countries. The final number is expected to be around 35.

relationships between trust, legitimacy and cooperation are consistent across countries. Although this book's focus is on the countries that formed the UPYC study, the nature of the invariance hypothesis prompted us to broaden the dataset in this section of the chapter and include data for all available ISRD3 participating countries. It is hypothesized that the relationship between trust and legitimacy observed amongst adults by cross-national studies (Hough et al., 2013; Hough, Jackson, & Bradford, 2014, 2017) will also hold for teenagers.

In the section headed "Effect of Dimensions of Trust on Legitimacy Amongst the 6 UPYC Countries" we test the theoretical validity of the relationships proposed amongst the dimensions of trust and legitimacy and cooperation. Jackson and colleagues (Hough et al., 2013; Jackson et al., 2011) define trust and legitimacy as having three dimensions each. The dimensions of trust are trust in procedural fairness, trust in police effectiveness, and trust in distributive fairness. The dimensions of legitimacy are the perceptions of having an obligation to obey the police, moral alignment with the police, and views about corruption or lawfulness. Probably the most important thesis amongst procedural justice theories is that procedural fairness is the main predictor of legitimacy, even more important than instrumental motives like outcome favourability, distributive justice or police competence (Tyler, 1990, 2003; Tyler & Huo, 2002). This relates to one of the more robust findings emerging from comparative empirical tests of procedural justice theory with adults[4]—that amongst the dimensions of trust in the police, procedural fairness has the strongest effect on legitimacy (Bradford, 2014; Hough et al., 2013, 2014, 2017; Jackson et al., 2012; Jackson, Hough, Bradford, & Kuha, 2015). Using the UPYC dataset, the section headed "Effect of Dimensions of Trust on Legitimacy Amongst the 6 UPYC Countries" examines whether these results can be replicated for teenagers.

The section headed "The Impact of Stop-and-Search on Trust and Legitimacy in England and Scotland" contributes to literature on the impact of police-initiated contact on perceptions of police legitimacy (Bradford, 2017; Bradford, Jackson, & Stanko, 2009; Delsol & Shiner, 2006, 2015; Flacks, 2017; Gau & Brunson, 2010; Hough, 2013; Maillard, Hunold, Roché, & Oberwittler, 2018; Murray & Harkin, 2017; Sharp & Atherton, 2007; Tyler & Fagan, 2012). Focusing on the potentially asymmetrical effects of police contact (Skogan, 2006), it is hypothesized that contact with the police has a negative effect on legitimacy, that experiences of procedural *un*fairness especially damage perceptions of legitimacy, and that good experiences have either a small positive effect or no effect at all. Note that the analysis in this section draws only from the UK dataset.

The UK findings form an important part of the procedural justice jigsaw, as they demonstrate that in at least two jurisdictions, actual experience of the police works as a powerful shaper of attitudes from an early age. To explain, England and Scotland have followed markedly different policies on stop and search over the last decade. In Scotland, the tactic has been used more intensively, compared to England, principally on a non-statutory basis (that is, where in theory at least, the search is carried out with consent) and overwhelmingly on teenagers (Lennon & Murray,

[4]Whilst this relationship is found in Western European and North American countries, there are exceptions, especially in developing countries and the Global South (Bradford et al., 2014; Jackson et al., 2014; Tankebe, 2009a).

2016; Murray, 2014, 2015). Prompted by intense media and parliamentary pressure, a series of major policy and legislative reforms introduced from around mid-2015 onward[5] led to a steady fall in the number of recorded searches in Scotland. However, ISRD3 fieldwork had been completed prior to this policy shift, providing us with a neat natural experiment allowing us to compare the impact on young people's perceptions of the police that resulted from different levels and styles of use of stop and search. England by contrast became more cautious about its use earlier than Scotland, following decades of sustained criticism (Lennon & Murray, 2016).

Methods

The overall methodology of ISRD3 is covered in this book's introduction and also in Enzmann et al. (2018). In brief, the survey was the third in a series that was originally built around modules of questions asking schoolchildren in the 7th–9th grades (aged 12–16) about their self-reported offending and experience of victimization. Whilst ISRD was intended to estimate the prevalence of offending and victimization, it was also designed to enable testing of different criminological theories, particularly in the third sweep. Most participating countries sampled schools in two medium-sized or large cities, with samples designed to be representative of these cities (rather than the respective country). The survey was administered in school classrooms, using internet-based self-completion questionnaires wherever possible. The dataset for the third sweep of ISRD covered 28 countries at the time of writing, (counting England and Scotland as two countries) with a combined sample of 62,636.

Table 7.1 lists the participating countries and shows which countries included the Procedural Justice module, broken down by grade. Amongst these, only one (Austria) did not include the procedural justice module for any grade. In most other countries, the procedural justice module was only included for 9th grade students. Note that to keep the samples within countries as similar as possible, we only use 9th grade data when analysing groups of countries, whilst for UK-only analysis, we use 8th and 9th grade data.

The Procedural Justice (PJ) Module

The main variables used here are those included in the procedural justice module (see Box 7.1). These questions aimed to operationalize the two main concepts of procedural justice theory as conceptualized by Jackson and colleagues (Hough et al., 2013; Jackson et al., 2011): trust and perceived legitimacy.[6] Both concepts have three dimen-

[5] The Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2016 put stop and search on a statutory basis and introduced a requirement for a code of practice.

[6] They were adapted from the "trust in justice" module of the 2010 European Social Survey (cf. Jackson et al., 2011). Constraints of space in the questionnaire limited the number of items that we could include.

Table 7.1 Countries and grades including the procedural justice module[a]

	Grade		
Country	7	8	9
Armenia	X	X	X
Austria			
Belgium			X
Bosnia and Herzegovina	X	X	X
Cape Verde			X
Croatia	X	X	X
Czech Republic			X
Denmark	X	X	X
England		X	X
Estonia	X	X	X
Finland			X
France	X	X	X
Germany			X
India			X
Indonesia			X
Italy			X
Kosovo	X	X	X
Lithuania			X
Macedonia			X
Netherlands			X
Portugal			X
Republic of Serbia			X
Scotland		X	X
Slovakia			X
Switzerland			X
Ukraine	X	X	X
United States			X
Venezuela			X
Total	8	10	27

[a]Note that in some countries, other grades were purposefully included in the sample; and sometimes fieldwork errors mean that some respondents completed the procedural justice module when they were in grades that were not meant to complete the module. The converse may also be true, i.e. there are some respondents belonging to grades that were supposed to complete the procedural justice module who did not have the opportunity to do so. The table shows the planned strategy, ignoring these errors

sions. The dimensions of trust are trust in distributive fairness (10.1), trust in police effectiveness (10.2) and trust in procedural fairness (the only dimension of trust measured by more than one item, i.e. 10.3–10.5). The dimensions of perceived legitimacy are obligation to obey (10.6), moral alignment (the only dimension of legitimacy measured by more than one item, i.e. 10.7a–c) and lawfulness (10.8). In the analyses that follow, the values of two variables (i.e. 10.1 and 10.8) have been inverted so that higher values always reflect the positive end of the relevant dimensions.

Box 7.1 The PJ Module

The following questions ask what you think about the police. Normally, such questions are meant for adults, and probably you have never thought about this before. But we feel that young people like you also have an opinion and can also answer questions like this.

10.1) When victims report crimes to the police, do you think the police treat people of different races, different ethnic groups, or of foreign origin equally?
[0,"equally"; 1,"some worse"]

10.2) If a violent crime or a burglary happened near where you live and the police were called, how quickly do you think they would arrive at the scene?
[0,"extremely slowly"; 10,"extremely quickly"]

10.3) Would you say the police generally treat young people with respect?
[1,"(almost) never"; 2,"sometimes"; 3,"often"; 4,"(almost) always"]

10.4) How often, would you say, the police make fair decisions when dealing with young people?
[1,"(almost) never"; 2,"sometimes"; 3,"often"; 4,"(almost) always"]

10.5) How often would you say the police explain their decisions and actions to young people?
[1,"(almost) never"; 2,"sometimes"; 3,"often"; 4,"(almost) always"]

10.6) How you think about your duty towards the police? To what extent is it your duty to do what the police tell you, even if you don't understand or agree with the reasons?
[0,"not at all my duty"; 10,"completely my duty"]

10.7) To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements about the police?
[1,"disagree strongly"; 2,"disagree"; 3,"neither/nor"; 4,"agree"; 5,"agree strongly"]

(a) The police generally have the same sense of right and wrong as I do.
(b) The police generally understand young people's values.
(c) I generally support how the police usually act.

10.8) Do you think the police take bribes, and if yes, how often?
[0, "never"; 10, "always"]

The Stop and Search (S&S) Module

As part of the ISRD3 project, national teams had the option to include additional country-specific modules. In the United Kingdom, an additional module asked students about their experience of being stopped by the police, as shown in in Box 7.2.

Box 7.2 The S&S Module

The following questions are about being stopped and searched by a police officer.

This means that an officer stopped you in the street or another public place and asked you to show them what was in your pockets or bag. Please don't report occasions where you were just stopped and asked questions.

12.1) Have you ever been stopped and searched by a police officer?
[0, "No"; 1, "Yes"]

12.2) How often have you been stopped and searched by a police officer in the last 12 months?
[1, "Once"; 2,"Twice"; 3,"3–5 times"; 4,"6 or more times"; 5,"I have not been stopped in the last 12 months"]

Now, thinking of the most recent time you were stopped and searched by a police officer, please answer the following questions.

12.3) When did this happen?
[1,"Within the last week"; 2,"Within the last month"; 3,"Within the last 6 months"; 4,"Within the last 12 months"]

12.4) Please describe the behaviour of the police officer(s) who stopped and searched you
[1,"Not at all"; 2,"A bit"; 3,"Quite"; 4,"Very"]

(a) He/she was polite and respectful.
(b) He/she was professional.
(c) He/she was fair.

12.5) Did the police officer(s) do the following things:
[0,"No"; 1,"Yes"]

(a) Ask you if you were happy to be searched?
(b) Explain the reason for why you were being stopped and searched?
(c) Give you a written explanation for why you were stopped and searched?

12.6) Did you understand the reason for being searched by the police on this occasion?
[0,"No"; 1,"Yes"]

(continued)

12.7) Did you give your agreement to be searched by the police on this occasion?
[0,"No"; 1,"Yes"]
12.8) Which of the following things was the police officer looking for? Please tick all that apply (a. Drugs; b. Alcohol; c. Weapons; d. Stolen property; e. Firearms; f. Fireworks; g. Something else (please specify); h. I don't know)
[0,"No"; 1,"Yes"]
12.9) Did the police officer find anything when you were stopped and searched?
[0,"No"; 1,"Yes"]
12.10) How did you feel after being stopped and searched?
[1,"Not at all"; 2,"A bit"; 3,"Quite"; 4,"Very"]

(a) I felt embarrassed.
(b) I felt worried or scared.
(c) I felt annoyed.
(d) It made me feel safer on the streets.

12.11) Did you tell your parents that you had been stopped and searched?
[0,"No"; 1,"Yes"]
12.12) Was there anything that could have been done to improve your experience of being stopped and searched? [String variable]

Scales Measuring Trust and Legitimacy

In this chapter we generally use a scale measuring trust in the police that combines dimensions of perceived procedural fairness, perceived distributive fairness and perceived effectiveness. Similarly, we have generally used a scale measuring perceived legitimacy that combines the three dimensions of the construct: moral alignment, moral obligation to obey and lawfulness. However, in section "Effect of Dimensions of Trust on Legitimacy Amongst the 6 UPYC Countries" of our findings, using the six UPYC countries to examine in detail the relationships between trust and perceived legitimacy, we sometimes disaggregate the dimensions of each concept, using scales or single item measures for each dimension. We make it clear in the text when measures of these sub-dimensions are used.

The scales used to measure the two overarching concepts of trust and legitimacy should be regarded as formative measures. However, in the structural equaltion model in section "Effect of Dimensions of Trust on Legitimacy Amongst the 6

UPYC Countries", the scales measuring trust in procedural fairness and moral alignment should be regarded as reflective measures.[7] All constructed scales are row mean scales.[8]

Control Variables

Models controlling for the effect of other variables include age, gender, self-control[9] (see Wolfe, 2011), migration and family status. Age is a continuous variable, gender is a dummy (with 1 for males and 0 for females), migration status is a dummy (with 1 for migrants and 0 for natives) and family status is a dummy (with 1 for living with both biological parents and 0 for everything else). Models based on either the whole ISRD3 or UPYC datasets also include country fixed effects, whilst the analyses using UK data include city and grade dummies.

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[7] Formative and reflective measures differ with respect to the assumed direction of causality between measures and constructs (for a good summary, see Jarvis, MacKenzie, & Podsakoff, 2003). Reflective measures assume that respondents' orientation towards the underlying construct determines the answers they give to the questionnaire, so that the different items are taken as interchangeable and high correlations between them are expected. By contrast, formative measures assume that the answers given to the items in the questionnaire form the underlying construct. In this case the items cease to be interchangeable and low correlations may be expected. For a more extended discussion regarding the use of formative and reflective measures within the procedural justice framework (see Jackson et al., 2015; Bradford et al., 2017).

[8] To deal with the fact that variables included in the construction of a given formative measure may have different number of answer categories (see Box 7.1), all individual items are standardized into percentage of maximum possible (POMP) before creating the scales (see Cohen, Cohen, Aiken, & West, 1999). The logic behind POMP values is explained best through an example. If a variable has four answer categories, then in the transformed POMP variable the first answer category would be converted into zero, the second one into 33.3, the third one into 66.6 and the fourth one into 100. When forming a row mean scale out of two variables, again with four answer categories each, then someone answering both questions with value four would become a POMP value of 100 in the scale, and someone giving for both questions the value one would get the POMP value zero. Someone answering one of these questions with two and the other with three would get a POMP value of (33.3 + 66.6)/2, i.e. about 50.

The construction of the general formative measures of trust and legitimacy needs further explanation. To keep the weight of the dimensions the same in the construction of the general trust and legitimacy scales, first the average value of the dimensions with more than one item is estimated (i.e. procedural fairness in the case of trust and moral alignment in the case of legitimacy) and then an average scale is estimated using the raw items (transformed into POMP values) for dimensions represented by only one question and the previously estimated scales for the dimensions with more than one item in the questionnaire. In this way each dimension gets the same weight in the final scales.

[9] Self-control is included in this chapter as a simple row mean scale, i.e. as a formative measure, in all models including controls. The self-control scale is included in the ISRD3 official dataset under the "selfc" name.

Measures of Compliance

We decided to use a measure of *intention* to offend as a proxy for compliance, rather than self-reported offending. This was partly because we wanted to pre-empt the criticism that past contact with the police may be an endogenous predictor of self-reported crime (in other words, past contact with the police may be the result of self-reported crime, not the predictor of it). Note however that we have argued the case for using self-report measures of offending as dependent variables elsewhere in a more detailed examination of stop and search in the United Kingdom and that we use a self-reported crime scale in another chapter in this book (Farren & Hough, 2018). We think that both types of measure are defensible when testing procedural justice hypotheses.

Two questions are included as measures of compliance that ask about preparedness to offend.[10] Both are part of vignette questions in which the respondent must imagine a fictitious situation. The first situation is described as follows:

Imagine *You own a 2-year-old smartphone. You convince a classmate that this old model is great, and you do not say that there is a new model that is much better and cheaper. You are able to sell your classmate your old smartphone for a price that allows you to buy yourself the brand new model.*

The preparedness to offend question that follows this vignette is stated like this:

9.2) Can you imagine actually doing this?
[1, "Not at all"; 2,"Probably not"; 3,"Undecided"; 4,"Probably yes"; 5,"Yes, definitely"]

The second fictitious situation is described next:

Imagine *In a big store you see something which you always wanted but couldn't afford (e.g. expensive trainers, T-shirt, CD or perfume). You take it home without paying.*

The preparedness to offend question in this case is stated as follows:

9.4) Can you imagine actually doing this if it you were certain of not getting caught?
[1, "Not at all"; 2,"Probably not"; 3,"Undecided"; 4,"Probably yes"; 5,"Yes, definitely"]

The preparedness to offend construct is a formative measure created by averaging the POMP values of both items.[11]

[10] It is of course very unlikely that the police would be involved if such behaviour in school came to light, though at least in UK law, it would constitute the offence of fraud by false representation under section "Methods" of the 2006 Fraud Act.

[11] In the structural equation model in section "Effect of Dimensions of Trust on Legitimacy Amongst the 6 UPYC Countries", intention to offend is a reflective measure.

Statistical Analyses

Whilst many previous studies rely on structural equation models to test the validity of the procedural justice theory, we opted to use different statistical models to increase the robustness of the results. The main analyses included belong either to the family of regression models or to structural equation models. All regression models are linear and were estimated using Stata 14. The structural equation models in section "Effect of Dimensions of Trust on Legitimacy Amongst the 6 UPYC Countries" is generalized (i.e. model categorical variables with non-linear regressions) and was estimated using Mplus 7. Finally all bivariate analyses of independence were run in SPSS.

Weights are applied only for descriptive analyses. For all multivariate models, standard errors are clustered at the level of classes.

Results

Validity of the Procedural Justice Theory for Young People

In this section we check whether the relationship between trust and legitimacy posited by procedural justice theory is found for adolescents in the same way as for adults, drawing on the full ISRD3 dataset.

Figures 7.1 and 7.2 show, respectively, the mean trust and legitimacy POMP values for all countries participating in the ISRD3 survey that included the procedural justice module. The dots show where each country mean falls, and the lateral bars on either side of the dots indicate the sampling error of each estimate. The figures give a rough idea of the rank order of trust and legitimacy across the ISRD3 sample, although it is likely that there is limited measurement equivalence between countries, reflecting imprecision in language translation and conceptual differences, and the rank order should not be over-interpreted. Most European countries have higher legitimacy values than elsewhere, but the same is not true for trust.

Figure 7.3 shows that the predictive effect of trust on legitimacy is, as expected, strongly significant in all countries. The effects can be interpreted in terms of standard deviations, e.g. the mean effect for all countries is 0.43 (the dotted line in the graph). This means that—other things being equal—for all countries together, an increase of one standard deviation of trust increases legitimacy on average by 0.43 standard deviations. A score of zero would indicate a lack of relationship. For the countries included, most coefficient estimates lie between 0.3 and 0.6.

Table 7.2 presents a mediation analysis that shows that in most countries trust in the police is predictive of preparedness to offend; but that perceived police legitimacy is an important mediating factor. Preparedness to offend is the main dependent variable. The first column shows the predictive effect of trust on legitimacy for each country (i.e. the same values as in Fig. 7.3). The second column shows the



Notes: N = 18,289. Coefficients with 95% confidence intervals plotted, estimated through one single regression including country fixed effects and using cluster standard errors at the level of classes. The dotted line reflects the average level of trust amongst all countries estimated using the same regression but without country fixed effects. Both regressions include weights. Trust is a row mean scale including three dimensions: trust in police effectiveness, trust in distributive fairness and trust in procedur al fairness (see the section *Scales Measuring Trust and Legitimacy* for more information)

Fig. 7.1 Mean trust POMP values amongst all ISRD3 countries

effect of trust on intention to offend without controlling for legitimacy, i.e. the total effect of trust for each country. The third column shows the effect of trust on intention to offend when controlling for legitimacy, i.e. the direct effect, whilst the fourth column shows the effect of legitimacy on intention to offend from this same model. Finally the fifth column shows the proportion of the effect of trust on intention to offend that is mediated through legitimacy and includes values only for the countries presenting a significant total effect of trust.

The effect of trust on legitimacy is significant in all 27 countries included in the analysis. Eighteen countries present a significant total effect of trust on intention to offend, but only seven show a significant direct effect. In other words, in most countries the effect of trust on intention to offend is strongly mediated through legitimacy. For all countries with a significant direct effect, this is negative, as hypothesized. The last column in the table shows that only in four countries the mediated effect is less than 50% and that the average mediation effect amongst the countries with valid values is 66%. Finally 20 of the 27 countries have a significant negative value for the effect of legitimacy on intention to offend.



Notes: N = 18,178. Coefficients with 95% confidence intervals plotted, estimated through one single regression including country fixed effects and using cluster standard errors at the level of classes. The dotted line reflects the average level of legitimacy amongst all countries estimated using the same regression but without country fixed effects. Both regressions include weights. Legitimacy is a row mean scale including three dimensions: moral alignment, obligation to obey and perceptions of lawfulness (see the section "Scales Measuring Trust and Legitimacy" for more information)

Fig. 7.2 Mean legitimacy POMP values amongst all ISRD3 countries

The model estimated with trust and legitimacy included (columns 3 and 4 from Table 7.2) shows that in only one country (Republic of Serbia) there is a significant effect from trust but not from legitimacy. In all countries with a significant legitimacy and trust value, legitimacy is stronger than trust—with the exception of Serbia. Amongst countries with a significant effect of legitimacy, this lies between approximately 0.1 and 0.3 standard deviations.

Ideally we would have expected the total effect of trust on intention to offend to be significant and completely mediated through legitimacy for all countries and also for the effect of legitimacy to be significant in all countries. Differences between countries may reflect genuine differences in cultural orientations to authority; equally, however, they may be due to the omission of relevant variables (also at the level of country) or differences in response style and other survey-related errors. This is something that future studies should look at.

The results presented in this section provide clear support for some of the central hypotheses of procedural justice theory just as other studies have shown for adults, the legitimacy that young people confer on the police is shaped to a significant degree by their trust in the police and that in most countries, young people with a stronger sense of police legitimacy appear less willing to break the law.



Notes: N = 17,733. Coefficients with 95% confidence intervals plotted, estimated through one single regression including interactions between country dummies and trust. The model also controls for gender, age, migration, family type, self-control and country fixed effects and includes cluster standard errors at the level of classes. The dotted line reflects the average effect of trust on legitimacy amongst all countries estimated using the same regression but without interactions. No weights were included. Trust and legitimacy are row mean scales, each consisting of three dimensions (see the section "Scales Measuring Trust and Legitimacy" for more information)

Fig. 7.3 Effect of trust on legitimacy amongst all ISRD3 countries (*z*-values)

Effect of Dimensions of Trust on Legitimacy Amongst the Six UPYC Countries

So far, this analysis has not disaggregated the variation dimensions of trust (trust in procedural fairness, in distributive fairness and in effectiveness); rather, we have combined all three dimensions into a single scale, creating a generalized measure of trust. In this section we move to a more detailed examination of the different dimensions of trust and the ways that they shape young people's perceptions of legitimacy. This analysis focusses on the six countries in the UPYC sub-study of ISRD3. One of the central tenets of procedural justice theory is that trust in procedural fairness is the principle "driver" of perceptions of the legitimacy of legal authorities such as the police (Tyler, 1990, 2003; Tyler & Huo, 2002). Empirical studies have generally shown that trust in procedural fairness is a more important precursor of legitimacy than trust in fair outcomes, trust in distributive fairness and trust in competence (Bradford, 2014; Hough et al., 2013, 2014, 2017; Jackson et al., 2012, 2015). Similar findings emerge for young people.

Figure 7.4 shows that in all six UPYC countries, the predictive effect of trust in procedural fairness on legitimacy is stronger than the other dimensions of trust. The

Table 7.2 Mediation analysis

	DV: Legitimacy	DV: Intention	DV: Intention		Percentage (%)
	IV: Trust	IV: Trust	IV: Trust	IV: Legitimacy	Mediated
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Armenia	0.62***	−0.06	−0.08	0.01	–
Belgium	0.41***	−0.14***	−0.04	−0.25***	73
Bosnia & H.	0.55***	−0.02	0.00	−0.06	–
Cape Verde	0.34***	0.03	0.03	−0.03	–
Croatia	0.50***	−0.08+	0.04	−0.25***	100
Czech Rep.	0.44***	−0.15***	−0.07*	−0.17***	51
Denmark	0.39***	−0.12**	−0.01	−0.28***	93
England	0.59***	−0.18*	−0.08	−0.17*	55
Estonia	0.35***	−0.10***	−0.05+	−0.14***	46
Finland	0.38***	−0.17***	−0.04	−0.31***	75
France	0.53***	−0.25***	−0.06	−0.34***	75
Germany	0.40***	−0.18***	−0.10*	−0.19***	44
India	0.27***	0.03	0.03	−0.01	–
Indonesia	0.57***	0.06	0.02	0.05	–
Italy	0.40***	−0.19***	−0.08**	−0.26***	56
Kosovo	0.33***	0.01	0.03	−0.08	–
Lithuania	0.49***	−0.07*	−0.00	−0.15***	100
Macedonia	0.46***	−0.07	−0.01	−0.14***	–
Netherlands	0.42***	−0.13***	−0.03	−0.23***	76
Portugal	0.52***	−0.07**	0.01	−0.16***	100
Rep. Serbia	0.49***	−0.18***	−0.16***	−0.05	11
Scotland	0.46***	−0.09*	−0.04	−0.12**	56
Slovakia	0.39***	−0.14***	−0.09*	−0.14**	36
Switzerland	0.36***	−0.14***	−0.07*	−0.19***	49
Ukraine	0.56***	−0.03	0.03	−0.11*	–
United States	0.40***	−0.17***	−0.04	−0.30***	76
Venezuela	0.41***	−0.01	0.01	−0.06+	–
r2	0.35	0.18	0.20		

Notes: N = 17,698; *DV* dependent variable, *IV* independent variable; effects estimated through single regressions including interactions between the predictor showed and country dummies; z-standardized coefficients; all models include gender, age, self-control, migration, family structure and country fixed effects; standard errors clustered at class level (not shown for visual ease); ***$p < 0.001$, **$p < 0.01$, *$p < 0.05$, +$p < 0.1$

average effect amongst all six countries of trust in procedural fairness on legitimacy is 0.46 standard deviations, compared to 0.25 and 0.26 for distributive fairness and police effectiveness, respectively.[12]

[12] These estimates are not shown and come from the same regressions as in Fig. 7.4 but without country interactions.



Notes: N = 3,267. Coefficients with 95% confidence intervals plotted, estimated through three regressions (one for each dimension of trust) including interactions between country dummies and the respective dimension of trust. All models control for gender, age, migration, family structure, self-control and country fixed effects and include cluster standard errors at the level of classes

Fig. 7.4 Effect of procedural fairness, distributive fairness and police effectiveness on perceived legitimacy

Going a step further, Fig. 7.5 looks at the complete procedural justice model, including intention to offend as the dependent variable, and keeping all dimensions of trust and legitimacy separated. Amongst the trust dimensions, trust in procedural fairness is the strongest predictor for all dimensions of legitimacy. Moral alignment is also significantly predicted by distributive fairness but not by police effectiveness. The opposite is true for obligation to obey: this dimension is also significantly predicted by police effectiveness but is unaffected by distributive fairness. Amongst the dimensions of legitimacy, obligation to obey is the strongest predictor of intention to offend.

Of all the dimensions of trust, only distributive fairness has a direct effect on intention to offend. Nevertheless all dimensions of trust have significant indirect and total effects on intention to offend (see Table 7.3). In other words, the complete effect of trust in police effectiveness and procedural fairness is mediated through the legitimacy dimensions. Procedural fairness has the strongest indirect effect on intention to offend (−0.11 standard deviations) and taking its direct effect into account, the strongest total effect (−0.13 standard deviations) of all the trust and legitimacy dimensions, besides duty to obey. The effect of procedural fairness is mediated through all dimensions of legitimacy, distributive fairness is mediated only through lawfulness, and moral alignment and trust in police effectiveness is completely mediated through obligation to obey.



Notes: N = 3,534; structural equation modelling with categorical indicators (Mplus 7); standardized coefficients (StdYX); measurement models not shown for visual ease; all dependent variables in structural part are regressed on to gender, age, self-control, migration, traditional family and country fixed effects; standard errors clustered at class level; obligation to obey and moral alignment also allowed to covary (0.112***); chi-square 393, df 87, $p < 0.0001$, CFI 0.978, TLI 0.953, RMSEA 0.032 (90% CI 0.028, 0.035); ***$p < 0.001$ **$p < 0.01$ *$p < 0.05$ +$p < 0.1$

Fig. 7.5 Complete procedural justice model

Table 7.3 Effects of trust dimensions on intention to offend, broken down into direct, indirect (through legitimacy) and total effects

	Total direct	*Legitimacy* (indirect effects)				Total
		Obligation to obey	Lawfulness	Moral alignment	Total indirect	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Trust						
Police effectiveness	−0.03	−0.03***	−0.00	0.00	−0.03***	−0.06**
Distributive fairness	−0.07*	−0.00	−0.01***	−0.02*	−0.04***	−0.11***
Procedural fairness	−0.02	−0.05***	−0.02***	−0.04*	−0.11***	−0.13***

Notes: Effects from model presented in Fig. 7.5; standardized coefficients (StdYX); ***$p < 0.001$, **$p < 0.01$, *$p < 0.05$

The Impact of Stop and Search on Trust and Legitimacy in England and Scotland

The analysis in this section summarizes findings reported more fully by Murray et al. (unpublished) on the effects of stop and search on trust and legitimacy in England and Scotland. Note that in the last decade, recorded stop and search rates in Scotland have outstripped those in England and Wales (around seven times over by, 2012/2013) (Lennon & Murray, 2016). In particular, the use of stop and search in Scotland has impacted disproportionately on teenagers, with the number of searches recorded on a 16-years-old exceeding the resident population of 16-years-old in some areas (Murray, 2014). Prompted by major policy and legislative reform, recorded search rates in Scotland fell steadily from mid-2015. Note, however, that the UPYC fieldwork (and questionnaire time frame) coincided with periods of high search activity in Scotland.

Consistent with police recorded data, the UPYC sub-study found sharp differences in the prevalence of stop and search between England and Scotland. In Scotland, just over a fifth (22%) of respondents said that they had been stopped and searched at least once by the police, around three times higher than the prevalence rate in England, at 7%. Looking at the four cities in the study, Fig. 7.6 shows significant differences within the two jurisdictions, with a higher prevalence in Glasgow (24%) followed by Edinburgh (19%), Sheffield (11%) and Birmingham (5%).

Differences in prevalence between England and Scotland are more pronounced when broken down by school grade. For example, in Scotland a third of respondents in Grade 9 (Secondary 4) said that they had been searched, around four times the equivalent rate in England (8%).

Given the differences in prevalence between the two jurisdictions, it is striking that trust in procedural fairness amongst older respondents was lower in Scotland than in England on two measures (explaining decisions and treating young people with respect). For instance a quarter (25%) of respondents in Scotland said that officers "almost never" explain their decisions, compared to 19% in England, whilst a fifth (19%) of respondents in Scotland stated that the police "almost never" treat young people with respect, compared to 14% in England.



Fig. 7.6 Lifetime prevalence of stop and search amongst 12–16 years old in Glasgow, Edinburgh, Sheffield and Birmingham (%)

Table 7.4 Stops by the police last year and experienced procedural fairness on trust and legitimacy: England and Scotland

	Trust	Trust	Legitimacy	Legitimacy
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Stopped last year	−0.34***		−0.42***	
Police behaved polite and respectful (reference: not stopped last year)				
Not at all		−0.63***		−0.84***
A bit		−0.37*		−0.39***
Quite		0.02		−0.38+
Very		−0.14		0.17
r^2	0.09	0.09	0.39	0.41

Note: $N = 1042$; dependent variables are z-standardized; all models include gender, age, migration, traditional family, self-control and city and grade fixed effects; models (3) and (4) also control for trust; standard errors clustered at class level (not shown for visual ease); ***$p < 0.001$, **$p < 0.01$, *$p < 0.05$, +$p < 0.1$

Drawing on respondent's experience of police contact in England and Scotland, below we test the asymmetry hypothesis, which predicts that poor or badly handled contacts with the police have a strong negative impact on legitimacy, whilst positive experiences have either no impact at all or only a marginal positive impact (Bradford et al., 2009; Skogan, 2006). Table 7.4 looks at the effect of being stopped by the police (in the last year) and the effect of police conduct (whether the officer was polite and respectful) on trust in the police and police legitimacy.

Consistent with the asymmetry hypothesis, the results in Table 7.4 show that the experience of being stopped has a strong negative effect on trust and legitimacy (at −0.34 and −0.42 standard deviations, respectively). The results also support the asymmetry thesis when taking into account officer conduct during the last contact (based on whether police were polite and respectful).[13] Table 7.4 shows that when the police are "not at all" polite and respectful, the negative impact on trust and legitimacy is strongest (at −0.63 and −0.84, respectively). The impact on trust and legitimacy is also negative when police are "a bit" polite and respectful (at −0.37 and −0.39, respectively). However, when the police are "quite" or "very" polite and respectful, the effect on trust is non-significant; whilst police behaviour that is "quite" polite and respectful has a significant, albeit marginal negative effect on legitimacy. The coefficient for legitimacy is positive when the police are "very" polite and respectful; however, this effect is not significant.

[13] The stop and search module includes two more questions about the experienced procedural fairness in the last contact with police (i.e. whether the police officers were professional and whether they were fair, see question 12.4 in Box 7.2). The results are qualitatively the same with the other two items measuring procedural fairness (results not shown and available upon request).

Conclusions

Using the ISRD3 dataset, this chapter has tested several hypotheses generated by procedural justice theory. Overall, the findings show that young teenagers' attitudes towards the police have a similar dynamic to that established for adults. Trust in the police—which can be broken down into different forms of trust—engenders a sense of police legitimacy that is associated with a sense of *moral alignment, lawfulness* and *obligation to obey*; and teenagers who confer legitimacy on the police appear less willing to break the law. These findings appear to be robust across different countries—although the levels of trust and perceived legitimacy expressed by teenagers vary from country to country and the effects on intention to offend are not significant in all countries.

In several developing countries (i.e. Armenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cape Verde, India, Indonesia and Kosovo), the effect of legitimacy and trust on intention to offend was not statistically significant. We cannot at this stage say whether or not this reflects limits to the applicability of procedural justice theory. It is certainly plausible that in those countries where policing institutions are fragile (e.g. with endemic underfunding and corruption), rather different dynamics exist between trust, legitimacy and compliance. There may also be cultural differences in orientations to authority. Equally, however, some of the non-findings may be a function of limited sample sizes, survey errors and fieldwork problems. Studies dealing in detail with developing countries are rather scarce (Bradford, Huq, Jackson, & Roberts, 2014; Jackson, Asif, Bradford, & Zakar, 2014; Johnson, Maguire, & Kuhns, 2014; Reisig & Lloyd, 2009; Reisig, Tankebe, & Meško, 2012, 2014; Tankebe, 2008, 2009a, 2009b), whilst further analysis of cross-national surveys is needed to better explain general cultural differences, as well as other cross-cultural differences associated with, for example, survey answering styles or other survey-related errors (for an overview, see Harkness, Vijver, & Mohler, 2003; Harkness et al., 2010).

Cross-national datasets like ISRD3 provide the starting point for explaining differences in effects between countries.[14] Future research should dig into these differences, probably using multilevel models to include variables describing relevant contexts like school, neighbourhood, city and/or country (for a useful summary of factors related to perceptions of procedural justice in some of these contexts, see Weitzer (2010). For good examples of multilevel analyses including different data sources see Gau, Corsaro, Stewart, & Brunson, 2012; Röder & Mühlau, 2011, 2012). Further insights might also be drawn from procedural justice literature that looks at different cultural groups within countries, for instance, between ethnic groups (see, e.g. the chapters by Roux (2018), and by Farren and Hough (2018) in this volume and work by Bradford and colleagues (Bradford, 2014, 2015; Bradford, Hohl, Jackson, & MacQueen, 2015; Bradford & Jackson, 2017; Bradford, Jackson, & Hough, 2017)).

[14] The research project "Police and Adolescents in Multiethnic Societies" or POLIS is also a good example dealing with adolescents from Germany and France (see Oberwittler & Roché, 2013).

On the positive side, the finding that trust predicts legitimacy as expected, across 28 very varied countries, suggests that the dynamics by which authority is legitimated through the construction of trust could well be a cultural universal. Regardless of levels of economic development or types of political structure, legitimacy flows from trust, and the key means by which authorities can build trust is to be found in principles of procedural justice: treating people respectfully and politely, listening to what they have to say, and explaining reasons for decisions.

Looking at the UK sample, the analysis confirms that the quality of contact with the police is an important determinant of trust, and through trust, a determinant of legitimacy. As with adults, the experience of being stopped and searched can shape attitudes significantly, and as with adults, police contact that is judged to be procedurally unfair erodes trust markedly, whilst fair treatment has only a marginally positive effect. This demonstration that the "asymmetry effect" is as powerful for teenagers as for adults carries important policy implications, implying that heavy-handed policing of teenagers can lay solid foundations for years of hostility towards the police.

We should be clear about the limitations of this analysis. The tidiness of a quantitative dataset, especially when it is derived from an international survey, can mask the complex processes by which it was constructed. There are variations between countries in the precise methodology (such as sampling and fieldwork procedure); there are issues relating to translation and even more complicated issues to do with lack of conceptual equivalence across countries and cultures. These problems—which undoubtedly exist within ISRD3—probably serve to increase the ratio between "noise" and "signal" in interpreting the findings. In other words, they are more likely to mask significant findings and less likely to lead us to false conclusions.[15] We therefore draw some comfort from the clarity of the findings that we have presented here.

A different sort of criticism is that our data comprise a large number of highly inter correlated variables and that we have arbitrarily assigned these to measure different constructs, enabling us to point to the way in which scores on one construct can predict scores on another. There are two responses to this: first, the different measures that we have used are the result of quite extensive confirmatory factor analysis, albeit on different datasets (e.g. Jackson et al., 2011); and second, the relationships that we have found closely match the pre specified hypotheses that we wanted to examine.

Perhaps a more serious shortcoming is that snap shot surveys of this sort are poor at identifying causal order. We have argued that procedurally unfair treatment damages trust, which erodes legitimacy and increases propensity to break the law. The same data could support a reversed causal sequence: that teenagers who are inclined to break the law confer low legitimacy on the police (for example to avoid the cogni-

[15] As wisely stated by Kohn in his influential presidential address at the American Sociological Association 30 years ago (Kohn, 1987, p. 720): "when one finds cross-national similarities despite differences in research design, even despite defects in some of the studies, it is unlikely that the similar findings were actually produced by the methodological differences".

tive dissonance that they would otherwise experience) and are disinclined to trust the police. And when faced with defiant and uncooperative teenagers of this sort, the police may well dispense rougher justice than normal. This argument needs to be taken seriously. One response is that more experimental or quasi-experimental research should be added to the existing one (Jackson, 2015; Janssen, Müller, & Greifeneder, 2011; Mazerolle, Antrobus, Bennett, & Tyler, 2013; Murphy, Mazerolle, & Bennett, 2014; Paternoster, Brame, Bachman, & Sherman, 1997; Stroessner & Heuer, 1996; Tyler, Sherman, Strang, Barnes, & Woods, 2007), to nail down the evidence about causal ordering. We suspect that sensitively conducted research is likely to find a complex and dynamic interaction between propensity to offend and the quality of policing. Hard policing may amplify teenagers' likelihood to break the law; but their offending and associated behaviour may also prompt tough police responses. However, we would point to our—important—findings about the differences between levels of stop and search in England and Scotland and the demonstrable damage that intensive use of this tactic causes to trust in the police and police legitimacy.

The significant point for policy is that if the police make the wrong choices when responding to defiant and disrespectful teenagers, they may construct a "hard power trap" for themselves. We have argued elsewhere (Hough, 2013; Hough et al., 2017) that police officers can find themselves trapped in adversarial styles of policing. Once relationships between police and community have become, for whatever reason, abrasive and adversarial, the former are likely to have only limited room for manoeuvre in recovering a policing style grounded on principles of procedural justice.

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Chapter 8
Perception of Police Unfairness Amongst Stigmatized Groups: The Impact of Ethnicity, Islamic Affiliation and Neighbourhood

Guillaume Roux

Introduction

This chapter deals with perceived police unfairness amongst young members of stigmatized groups in four Western European countries (France, Germany, the UK and the Netherlands).[1] Following several studies (see Roché & Roux, 2017), perceived police unfairness (also called procedural injustice) is seen as a specific dimension of attitudes towards the police (*ATP*) rather than an explanatory factor for ATP.[2] In line with an emerging field of ATP studies focusing on the way group belonging (and more specifically identification) affects ATP, we deal with the relationship between perceived police unfairness and three sources of group belonging: ethnicity (belonging to those ethnic minorities who are generally profiled by the police), Islamic affiliation (being a Muslim) and neighbourhood, i.e. coming from deprived and disrupted urban neighbourhoods which are largely stigmatized in Western European countries.

In this chapter, group belonging designates the two facets of group identity, i.e. internal identification (group consciousness from the inside) and external categorization from the outside (being perceived as *different* by others; Jenkins, 1994). Amongst the three sources of group identification under scrutiny, only ethnicity has been a central focus of ATP studies, and this is mostly in the USA (and in the UK to

[1] The author is grateful to the book editors for their useful comments and thanks especially Mike Hough for our regular exchanges.

[2] Hence, in reviewing the literature, we consider as relevant all ATP studies, whatever the specific dimension or dependent variable under scrutiny (be it trust in the police, police legitimacy, etc.). This is based on the statement that the variables related to ATP are not fundamentally different when one considers one dimension or construct or another.

G. Roux (✉)
Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, University of Grenoble Alpes, CNRS, Sciences Po Grenoble, PACTE, Saint-Martin-d'Hères, France
e-mail: guillaume.roux@umrpacte.fr

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a lesser extent): Van Craen and Skogan (2015) state that we still know little about the relationships between ethnicity and migrant origin and ATP in most European countries. Since then, new studies have been published, notably in Belgium, France, Germany and Nordic countries, even if there is no well-established research tradition. There has been even less of a focus on neighbourhood (although it is increasingly examined, this is not in the context of group belonging) and above all Islamic affiliation (but see Roché, Schwarzenbach, & Oberwittler, 2017). In view of this, the present chapter is largely exploratory: its central purpose is to *describe* the relationships between the three sources of group identity and with perceived police unfairness, all well as with a limited number of other variables, in four European countries.

Besides this key descriptive dimension, we shall make a first step towards an explanatory model. Firstly, the effects of the three sources of group identification on ATP shall be compared "all things being equal": in Western European countries, ethnicity, Islamic affiliation and belonging to certain neighbourhoods are interrelated, their respective effect on ATP needing to be disentangled. Furthermore, different socio-economic characteristics must be taken into account, so as to ensure that we can draw conclusions about belonging to a stigmatized group per se (which is not the case if a variable reflects composition effects). Secondly, we shall consider two key categories of (potential) mediating variables between sources of group belonging and perceived police unfairness. Contact with the police is a key variable as it is related to stigmatized group belonging in different ways (and in particular through police profiling). Besides, attitudes towards discrimination are potentially key as they both have to do with belonging to a stigmatized group on the one hand and attitudes towards the police on the other hand.

Ethnicity, Islamic Affiliation and Neighbourhood as Sources of Group Belonging Affecting ATP

Ethnicity has been recognized as one of the main predictors for ATP[3] (for a review: Peck, 2015; Roché & Roux, 2017 for France; see Bradford, Jackson, & Hough, 2017). Members of ethnic minorities are more likely to have negative attitudes towards the police, a finding that may be largely accounted for by personal experience of the police. Indeed, those from ethnic minorities tend to have more contacts with the police—especially police-initiated contacts[4]—and experience more nega-

[3] Many cited studies are from the USA, as ATP studies were mainly developed in this country (also note that many of the statements and causal mechanisms in the US ATP studies are supposed to hold in different contexts as well). In parallel, we seek to mobilize European studies (in particular from the four selected countries). Each time a work *is not* from the USA, the national context shall be specified.

[4] As compared to citizen-initiated contacts with the police, police-initiated contacts have a more negative impact on ATP.

tive encounters (discussed in more detail below in the section on police contacts). Although this has mainly been interpreted as an individual variable (personal encounters), it also has to do with the way ethnic minorities were categorized by the police (through ethnic profiling) and society as a whole. Different authors underline the collective dimension of ethnic minorities' experience with the police, which is embedded in historical conflicts with the police (Escobar, 1999; Smith, 1991) and the broader history of ethnic relations. Several studies show that the ATP of ethnic minorities have to do with ethnic identification: according to Smith (1991, p. 14 for the UK) "Black antagonism to the police is part of the assertion of a group identity" (see also Millings, 2013 for the UK and Roux & Roché, 2016 for France). On the whole and whatever the mechanisms at play, ethnic antagonisms are well documented as far as judgments about the police are concerned, with however a number of exceptions. Indeed in the UK, survey research showed no association between ethnicity and ATP (police legitimacy) when relevant controls are in place (Jackson et al., 2012). And in a large-scale international comparative study, Bradford et al. (2017) found that in most countries, "association between ethnic minority status and police legitimacy disappeared" with all controls in place (but in these studies, perceived police unfairness was not the dependent variable, and ethnicity was defined based on self-categorization as ethnic minority).

In parallel to ethnic conflicts, the recent history of Western European countries has been characterized by tensions and divisions over Islam and related issues. The so-called second- and third-generation migrants with an "Islamic background" were at the centre of debates (Van der Brug & Van Spanje, 2009) referring to "conflicts of values". Furthermore, the issue of Islamic radicalization, terrorism and the "war on terror" may have increased the stigmatization of Muslims in Western societies (in Germany, the Netherlands and the UK: Vermeulen, 2014), value conflicts remaining a central focus of attention. As for Muslims, if as a general rule, Islamic identification tends to decline over generations (at the European level: Van Tubergen & Sindradttir, 2011), some authors conclude that it remains vivid if not revivified for some young Muslims (for Europe and the West: Voas & Fleischmann, 2012).

It remains unclear whether these elements have something to do with the police and the way they are viewed by Muslims in Western societies. In the field of terrorism studies, it was argued that some policy programmes aimed at fighting terrorism and the radicalization of Muslims—whose implementation relies on the police—led to singling out Muslim minorities as inherently suspect (for the UK: Heath-Kelly, 2013). From this perspective, police suspicion expressed in stops and frisks is the more tangible experience of the categorization of Muslims as "informal suspects" (on these "risk-based" stops and frisks: Lennon, 2015). Although the literature remains limited (as noted by Jarvis & Lister, 2013), several studies show that many Muslims have negative feelings about antiterrorism programmes, which they tend to perceive as stigmatizing. According to Mythen (2012), these feelings feed the sense of a stigmatized "we", i.e. Islamic identification. Judgments about antiterrorism programmes and their consequences may thus directly impact Muslims' perception of the police (Awan, 2012). There nevertheless remain some doubts about the nature of this relationship. Some authors actually suggest that the "logic of suspicion"

creates some divisions amongst Muslims themselves (in the UK, Hargreaves, 2014). Some Muslims may then support antiterrorism programmes and consequently offer support to the police, in contrast to others who feel stigmatized by society at large. Results for France showed that before the 2015 terror attacks, Muslims had more negative ATP than others, the effect of Islamic affiliation being particularly strong in the case of judgments about police racism and discrimination (Roché, 2016, p. 158). The policy programmes and public discourses following the attack may have increased this gap.

As for neighbourhood, it has been shown to affect ATP in many ways (according notably to sociodemographic composition, the prevalence of petty crime and local cultures of legal cynicism), its effect being currently compared to the one of ethnic identity (Schafer, Huebner, & Bynum, 2003). Neighbourhood effects on ATP have often been shown to be large and, in some cases, fully accounting for the relationship between ethnicity and ATP (Cao, Frank, & Cullen, 1996). On the whole, residents of poor, disrupted urban neighbourhoods are more likely to see the police as unfair. In a French study, belonging to a poor suburban area was significantly associated with perceived police unfairness (even after controls: Roché & Roux, 2017). The effect of ethnicity remained and was actually amplified in the poor suburban neighbourhoods (an interaction effect, a finding that contradicts Weitzer's (2000) study in the USA).

ATP studies have not generally considered neighbourhood as a source of group belonging and stigmatization. However, membership of the poorest and most disrupted urban neighbourhoods has been shown to be stigmatizing not only in the USA but also in Europe (in a comparative perspective: Germes, Schirmel, Brailich, Glaszei, & Pütz, 2010; Neal, Bennett, Cochrane, & Mohan, 2013). Membership of a stigmatized neighbourhood is a potential source of group identification, especially for young people, as well as for members of ethnic minorities (in the UK: Slater & Anderson, 2012; for France: Kirkness, 2014; in Germany: Eksner, 2013; in the Netherlands: Van Gent & Jaffe, 2017). In the light of ATP, this is directly relevant as antagonism to the police and the local history of police-population conflicts were shown to be a central dimension of neighbourhood identities in disrupted zones (for France: Roux & Roché, 2016; in the UK: Millings, 2013; in the USA: Sclofsky, 2016). Some young people from ethnic minorities in the French *banlieues* feel themselves to be targeted by the police not because of their ethnicity but rather because of the neighbourhood where they live (Lapeyronnie, 2008).

Islamic affiliation, ethnicity and neighbourhood, as sources of collective identification, are thus expected to shape perceptions of police unfairness. Young people from ethnic minorities as well as those living in the most disrupted neighbourhoods should be more likely to see the police as unfair. This may also be the case for Muslims, although there is more uncertainty about this and about the mechanisms at play. Furthermore, the interplay between ethnicity, Islamic affiliation and neighbourhood in shaping ATP remains to be tested. These three variables may be interconnected, ethnic minorities being overrepresented in the most disrupted neighbourhoods and Muslims being often members of these minorities. We shall then show how they relate to each other and whether or not each variable has an

independent predictive relationship with ATP. In examining the impact of Muslim identity, we shall test whether the strength of attachment to Islam (measured by an item on perceived importance of religion) makes any difference.

Contacts with the Police and Attitudes Towards Discriminations as Mediating Factors

As far as the relationship between the three sources of group belonging and perceived police unfairness is concerned, two types of mediating variables are expected to be key, namely, contacts with the police and attitudes about discrimination.

Members of ethnic minorities experience disproportionate contacts with the police, especially stops and frisks or ID checks, both in the USA and in European countries (Bradford, 2017 for the UK; for France: Jobard & Lévy, 2011; in Germany: Gauthier, 2016; in the Netherlands: Van der Leun & Van Der Woude, 2011; for these results holding in French urban disrupted neighbourhoods: Roché, 2016). They also tend to experience more hostile contacts than those from ethnic majorities (Hagan, Shedd, & Payne, 2005). As the effect of police contacts on ratings about the police is generally negative (especially for members of ethnic minorities: Schuck & Rosenbaum, 2005), contact was a logical candidate for explaining the links between ethnicity and ATP. Although it does not fully account for this link, it has been shown to be part of the explanation (Schafer et al., 2003; Weitzer & Tuch, 2004).

Levels of police contact have also been shown to vary by type of neighbourhood. Police forces tend to have a heavier presence in poor disrupted urban neighbourhoods than elsewhere, so that residents in these areas are more heavily policed (Hagan et al., 2005) and experience more contacts with the police (notably stops and frisks). Furthermore, the police have been shown to be more likely to use force and be less respectful in such areas (Terrill & Reisig, 2003; for France: Roché, 2016, p. 106).

As for Islamic affiliation, the targeting of Muslims by counterterrorism programmes, and their stigmatization in society as a whole, may lead to more police contacts. On the other hand, whereas police profiling relies on the visibility of group belonging, Islamic affiliation per se is often invisible. Whether young Muslims experience more contacts with the police than their non-Muslim counterparts thus remains an open question.

Attitudes to discrimination would be a logical mediating variable between belonging to a stigmatized group and ATP. For ethnic minorities, the feeling that one's group is discriminated against in society at large has been shown to result in negative views of its institutions, which tend to be seen as participating in or at least accepting if not legitimizing this discrimination (Van Craen, 2013; Van Craen & Skogan, 2015). This holds generally for trust in public institutions and specifically for trust in the police (Bradford et al., 2017 for a large-scale international comparison). In this study, it is expected to hold for members of other stigmatized groups as

well. As for general attitudes to discrimination, we shall consider their moral disapproval, as our data do not allow for measuring the feeling that one's group is discriminated in society at large. The relationship between the three sources of group belonging and perceived police unfairness is thus expected to be mediated by the moral disapproval of discrimination. This follows from the idea that the strength of this disapproval has to do with a general "sensitivity toward discrimination", which would be itself related to the feeling that one's group is discriminated against, and the perceived salience of this fact. A more specific indicator of attitudes towards discrimination shall also be considered, namely, the feeling that the police treats some groups worse than others. Here, the effect on ATP is a more direct one.[5] In some studies, the perceived existence of police profiling was part of the explanation for the link between ethnicity and ATP (Tyler & Wakslak, 2004).

Methods

UPYC (understanding and preventing youth crime) is an international self-report survey on school children experiences of crime and victimization (France, Germany, the Netherlands, the USA and the UK), which is part of ISRD-3 (the International Self-Report Delinquency study).[6] ISRD is a city-based survey (two or more large cities per country) targeting children aged 12–16 years (European grades 7–9).[7] The ISRD-3 core questionnaire and national modules were administered in classrooms mainly between 2014 and 2015. The sampling unit is school class: the survey was administered to classes of pupils. All or most secondary schools in the selected cities were included in the sample frame. For each country, a sample of classes was randomly drawn based on school size and grade, aimed at being representative of school pupils in the selected zones (using a computer programme designed by the German ISRD team). Questionnaires were administered in classrooms, this mostly online (for about 70% of the interviewees); paper and pencil questionnaires were used where there was no other solution.

For this study, US pupils were excluded from the UPYC sample, given the very small number of interviewees in our US sample identifying themselves as Muslims. The total sample for the four remaining countries is 8770. Some pupils have been excluded from the sample ($N = 8291$), for reasons explained below. Weighted data (correcting for sociodemographic variables) were used for descriptive statistics and unweighted data for multivariate analysis.

Dutch, German, French and English versions of the questionnaire can be found at www.northeastern.edu/isrd . Perceived police unfairness, our dependent variable, is measured by an additive scale based on three items: "police make fair decisions",

[5] Whether this variable is different from the independent variable itself is seen as an empirical issue (see the section Methods, data and variables).

[6] See https://web.northeastern.edu/isrd/upyc/.

[7] See http://www.icpr.org.uk/media/42198/uk_technical_report_upyc_5.7.16.pdf.

"police explain decisions", and "police treat youth with respect" ((almost) never/sometimes/often/(almost) always). All three items were shown to be central components of the police fairness[8] dimension. Correlation between these items ranges between 0.54 and 0.58, with a Cronbach's alpha score of 0.78. It should be noted that these questions were asked only to grade 9 students, except in France and the UK.[9]

The measurement of ethnicity is based on the country of birth of the pupils and that of their father and mother. It is our view that the meaning of ethnicity—its very relevance and "efficiency" as a social construct—is context-dependent. Here, the context is the one of police-citizen relations. From this point of view, the relevant fact is that the police tend to consider some citizens as suspect due to their *perceived* origin or ethnic background. Based on the country of birth, we thus use a proxy aimed at measuring pupils' belonging to a category which would be considered as "ethnically suspect". In other words, country of birth is a proxy for a *phenotype* which is likely to be profiled by the police.

Pupils perceived as having an African origin, as well as black pupils in general, would be considered as "ethnically suspect" in the four countries studied, this being also true, in France and Germany at least, for Turkish people. In the UK, people from South Asia—i.e. mainly from Bangladesh, India and Pakistan—tend to be seen as "ethnically suspect".[10] In terms of national or geographical background, this leads us to define pupils as being from an ethnic minority if they or at least one of their parents originated from any African country; from South Asia (Bangladesh, India and Pakistan); from specific islands where the majority population is black, such as the French overseas territories; and from Turkey. Pupils who are not sure about their ethnic origin (i.e. gave an answer categorized as Don't know, No answer or Ambiguous to questions measuring origin) have been excluded from the sample. Twenty-eight percent of pupils belong to an ethnic minority as defined here. The remainder of the sample has been defined as belonging to the ethnic majority of their country of residence. It should be stressed that the ethnicity variable has been constructed pragmatically, to be the closest approximation to the construct that we wish to measure. As the survey does not record grandparents' country of birth, we are only dealing with first- and second-generation migrants who would (a) generally be regarded as from an ethnic minority and (b) be included in groups that tend to be policed more heavily than others. It should be recognized that a few pupils categorized as being from the ethnic majority will actually be from ethnic minorities, but with a migration background in the distant past.

[8] Other chapters in this book have used the same or similar scales using these three items. Chapters 7 and 9 have labelled the scales as "trust in procedural fairness" or "procedural justice".

[9] To maximize sample sizes, pupils who were not asked these questions were kept in the survey sample (when the analysis is not about procedural fairness). *N* thus decreases when the analysis deals with perceived police fairness. And again, to maximize sample sizes, all pupils who were asked the questions about police fairness are included in the analysis.

[10] In France, Germany and the Netherlands, where this is not necessarily true, pupils of South Asian origin only represent a small minority of the ethnic minority pupils.

The disruptiveness of pupils' neighbourhoods is measured by an additive scale comprising five items (perceived level of …. crime/drug selling/abandoned buildings/graffiti/fighting). The variable is a proxy for living in the poor, disrupted suburban areas. What matters here is thus the distinction between these very specific neighbourhoods and all other spaces (and not the degree of neighbourhood disruptiveness per se, which would be of interest from a different angle). As a consequence, the additive scale was dichotomized: pupils living in the most disrupted neighbourhoods (16%) are distinguished from all others. We rely on the fact that pupils' subjective evaluation bears a reasonable relationship to the actual characteristics of their neighbourhood (see the discussion about the limits of this strategy).

The Muslim variable identifies pupils who state Islam to be their religion. A supplementary question measuring religious attachment was recoded into three categories: religion considered as "very important"/"quite important"/"not important or only a bit".[11]

Other variables in the analysis included:

- Number of contacts with the police after having committed an offence last year
- Disapproval of discrimination (discriminations in general judged more or less right or wrong)
- Perceived distributive justice (police treat some groups less well)
- Socio-economic control variables: age, gender and employment/income status of family

It must be noted that the survey does not allow to measure contacts with the police per se (except for some countries): the available measurement is about offence-related contacts (last year).[12] Although we are aware that this is not a proxy for contacts with the police per se, we consider it a relevant mediating variable, as those experiencing offence-related contacts are more likely to hold negative attitudes towards the police.

The research strategy is as follows: we start by presenting descriptive statistics about the way ethnicity, Islamic affiliation, neighbourhood and perceived police unfairness are interrelated.[13] We then test the effect of the three sources of group belonging on ATP "all thing being equal", taking into account socio-economic factors as control variables (linear regression analysis, ordinary least squares).

In a second step, we consider contacts with the police and attitudes towards discrimination as mediating variables. Here again, the relationships between the three sources of group belonging and these variables shall be explored in a descriptive

[11] Note that there are no noticeable differences between Muslim members of the racial minorities and Muslim members of the racial majority as far as the perceived importance of religion is concerned (using the question recoded in three categories).

[12] Pupils were asked whether they committed an offence from a list in the questionnaire (having stolen something, beaten someone, sent drug, etc.) and then whether they had contact with the police because of that.

[13] With very few exceptions, when we report the mean differences in means, it can be assumed that these differences which we comment are statistically significant (at least at the 0.05 level). When they are not, this is clearly mentioned.

way. The effect of the mediating variables shall then be tested, including all factors altogether in a single regression model. Finally, the effect of national differences (country of residence) will be tested with all controls in place.

The Connections Between Ethnicity, Place and Islamic Affiliation and How They Affect Perceived Police Unfairness

Interrelationships Between Ethnicity, Islamic Affiliation and Neighbourhood

This section explores the relationships between ethnic minority belonging, living in a disrupted neighbourhood and Islamic affiliation amongst the pupils sampled in of the four selected countries. Concerning Islamic affiliation, we will see whether considering religious attachment does make a difference (e.g. is the relation between Islamic affiliation and neighbourhood stronger for those Muslims who feel very attached to their religion?). The proportion of pupils from ethnic minorities (Fig. 8.1) is largest in France (34%) and smallest in the Netherlands (19%). Germany (27%) and the UK (31%) hold intermediate positions. More than one-third (34%) of pupils are Muslims in France and one-fourth or more in the UK (28%) and Germany (25%), against a bit more than one-tenth in the Netherlands (13%). Pupils from the most disrupted neighbourhoods represent almost a quarter of the sample in France (23%) and the UK (24%), against only 16% and 10% in the Netherlands and Germany.



Fig. 8.1 Proportion of ethnic minorities, Muslims and disrupted neighbourhoods [*N* = 2266 (ethnicity), 1987 (religion) and 1364 (neighbourhood)] in each country (%) [Representative sample of pupils in two or more large cities in each country]



Fig. 8.2 Proportion of ethnic minorities and Muslims according to neighbourhood (%). *N* (base) = 8014 (ethnicity) and 7757 (religion)

Figure 8.2 shows that the proportion of ethnic minorities is higher in the most disrupted neighbourhoods than in other areas, although the difference is a moderate one (Cramer's $V = 0.12$): in these neighbourhoods, 39% of pupils are from ethnic minorities, against only 25% in other neighbourhoods. Living in a disrupted neighbourhood is also associated with Islamic affiliation, the relationship again being moderate although slightly stronger (Cramer's $V = 0.15$): 38% of pupils from the most disrupted neighbourhoods are Muslims, as opposed to only 22% in other parts of the cities.

In the areas selected for the French sample, the majority of pupils living in the most disrupted neighbourhoods (52%) are from ethnic minorities. The proportion of ethnic minorities from these neighbourhoods is lower in Germany (39%), in the UK (34%) and in the Netherlands (31%; results not presented). The position of France is thus quite specific in that the country shows one of the highest proportions of very disrupted neighbourhoods (see above), as well as the highest proportion of ethnic minorities in these areas. If one considers that perceived police unfairness tends to be greatest amongst ethnic minority pupils from these disrupted neighbourhoods, France is likely to have high overall rates of perceived police unfairness. By contrast, there are comparatively few disrupted neighbourhoods in the Dutch sample and a comparatively small proportion of ethnic minorities in them.

By comparison, the relationship between being Muslim and ethnic status is very strong (Cronbach's alpha = 0.68): most pupils from ethnic minorities (as defined) are Muslims (72%), compared to only 6% of pupils from ethnic majorities (Fig. 8.3). Conversely, the majority of Muslims (82%) are from the ethnic minorities. This confirms the need to take into account both variables in an explanatory model: due to the strength of their association, the apparent effect of ethnicity may simply be a function of Islamic affiliation or vice versa. As for national differences, most ethnic minority pupils are Muslims in the UK (78%), France (76%) and Germany (69%) and a smaller majority in the Netherlands (57%).



Fig. 8.3 Proportion of Muslims by ethnicity (%). $N = 8251$

As far as the consequences of Islamic affiliation are concerned, religious attachment matters. It gives information about group belonging from the point of view of identification or subjective attachment to the group. The majority of Muslims (53%) consider their religion as "very important", and 27% say it is "quite important". Muslims living in the most disrupted neighbourhoods are slightly more likely to judge their religion as "very important" (58%) than those living in other areas (52%).

Group Belonging and Perceived Police Unfairness

Fourteen percent of the total sample score very high (point 7 of our seven-point scale) on perceived police unfairness. Figure 8.4 shows large variations between countries (14% of the total sample rating unfairness as high); perceived police unfairness is at its highest level in France (20%) followed by the UK (15%), as opposed to Germany and the Netherlands (8% in each case). Although this can only be part of the story, the contrast between France and the Netherlands is consistent with what we said above about the proportion of (strongly) disrupted areas in each country and the proportion of ethnic minority members in these areas.

Figure 8.5 shows the relationship between perceived police unfairness and ethnicity, Islamic affiliation and neighbourhood. Differences are clear: perceived police unfairness rises from 12% both for non-Muslims (Cramer's $V = 0.13$) and for ethnic majority pupils (Cramer's $V = 0.13$) to 21 and 20% for Muslim pupils and those from ethnic minorities. The difference is even greater for neighbourhood (Cramer's



Fig. 8.4 Proportion of pupils judging the police as unfair (Highest position of a seven-point scale of perceived police unfairness) in each country (%). *N* (base) = 4077



Fig. 8.5 Perceived police unfairness according to ethnic belonging (minority/majority), Islamic affiliation (Muslims/non-Muslims) and neighbourhood (disrupted or not) (%). *N* (base) = 4076 (ethnicity), 4079 (religion) and 4018 (neighbourhood)



Fig. 8.6 Proportion of Muslims judging the police as unfair according to religious attachment (%). $N = 997$

$V = 0.17$): living in the most disrupted neighbourhoods more than doubles perceived police unfairness (from 11 to 26%). On the whole, perceived police unfairness is greatest amongst pupils living in these disadvantaged areas.

These clear differences in perceived police unfairness according to ethnicity and Islamic affiliation hold for France, Germany and the Netherlands (differences are between 9 and 12 points for ethnicity and 9–11 points for religion). In the UK, ethnicity and Islamic affiliation make no noticeable difference (one- or two-point difference only). The difference in perceived police unfairness according to neighbourhood holds for all countries (12- or 13-point difference in the UK, the Netherlands and Germany, France showing the highest gap with 17-point difference). As for Muslims, Fig. 8.6 shows that Muslims who feel the more attached to their religion are clearly more likely to see the police as unfair (24%, against 15% and 16% for the two other groups).

Looking at country differences, Muslims who feel the least attached to their religion ("a bit" or "not important") compared to those the most attached (24%) are the least likely to judge the police as unfair in France (11% against 30%), Germany (13% against 16%) and the Netherlands (11% against 29%). This is not the case in the UK, where 33% of the least attached to their religion see the police as unfair, against only 17% of the most attached to Islam.

Table 8.1 summarizes all these relationships between group belonging and perceived police unfairness "all things being equal" (i.e. using linear regression analysis to disentangle the relationships between the predictor variables and to control for variations in key demographic variables). Concerning Islam, a distinction is made between Muslims according to religious attachment. Model 1 shows the effect of the variables measuring group belonging by themselves. Model 2 includes controls

Table 8.1 Effect of ethnicity, Islamic affiliation and neighbourhood on perceived police unfairness (linear regression analysis)

	1		2	
Model	Bêta	Sig.	Bêta	Sig.
Constant		0.00		0.00
Ethnic minorities	−0.05	0.01	−0.05	0.01
Muslims: Religion not or a little important[a]	−0.00	0.93	0.00	0.97
Muslims: Religion quite important[a]	0.00	0.92	0.00	0.83
Muslims: Religion very important[a]	−0.02	0.27	−0.02	0.43
Disrupted neighbourhoods	0.18	0.00	0.18	0.00
Age			0.02	0.28
Gender			0.01	0.55
Father unemployed			0.03	0.07
Mother unemployed			0.00	0.99
Family live on welfare			0.03	0.14
R^2	*0.04*		*0.04*	
N	*3955*		*3890*	

Models 1 and 2: VIF max. = 1.7 (ethnic minorities) and 1.5 (Muslims: religion very important) (all other VIF are between 1 and 1.2)
[a]Reference category = non-Muslims

for sociodemographic variables (age, gender, parental work status and source of family income).

Model 1 shows that "all things being equal" (i.e. with no control variables in the model, but each of the three variables controlled for each other) ethnicity and neighbourhood significantly predict perceived police unfairness (at 0.01 and 0.00): ethnic minorities and especially those living in the most disrupted neighbourhoods are more likely than others to see the police as unfair. On the other hand, belonging to a Muslim group, regardless of strength of religious attachment, does not significantly predict perceived police unfairness.

Model 2 adds control variables to check whether the apparent relationships between perceived police unfairness and ethnicity, religious affiliation or neighbourhood could simply be an artefact of the demographic composition of the sample. Ethnicity and neighbourhood both remain predictive of perceived unfairness (this at the same significant level). None of the control variables show a significant effect, even if age approaches statistical significance ($p = 0.07$). As a consequence of the limited number of variables in the model, R^2 is low (note that our purpose is not as much to explain the variance than testing the effect of a few specific variables for which we still know few).

Exploring the Effect of Mediating Factors: Contacts with the Police and Attitudes Towards Discrimination

As discussed in the Introduction, contact with the police and attitudes towards discrimination present themselves as the "usual suspects" to serve as mediating variables that could explain the relationships between perceived police unfairness and ethnicity, Islamic affiliation and neighbourhood. As contacts in general, contacts occurring after having committed an offence—the only available variable—may contribute to explain differences in perceived police unfairness according to group belonging, those experiencing contacts being more likely to judge the police as unfair.

Group Belonging, Frequency of Contacts with the Police and Attitudes Towards Discrimination

On the whole, the vast majority of pupils (94%) had no offence-related contact with the police over the past year. Five percent had one or two offence-related contacts, 1% having experienced three contacts or more. Figure 8.7 shows differences between countries; the difference between France and the UK is not significant, but the larger differences between these countries and Germany and the Netherlands are significant at 0.00.

Figure 8.8 shows the frequency of offence-related contacts (last year) by ethnicity, Islamic affiliation and neighbourhood. The type of neighbourhood makes a clear



Fig. 8.7 Percentage of pupils having offence-related contact(s) with the police (last year) by country. *N* (base) = 8066



Fig. 8.8 Proportion of pupils experiencing offence-related contact with the police (last year) according to neighbourhood, ethnicity and Muslim belonging (%). *N* (base) = 8066 (ethnicity), 8065 (religion) and 7924 (neighbourhood)

difference: pupils living in the most disrupted neighbourhoods experienced far more offence-related contacts (11%) than those living in other neighbourhoods (5%, sig. at 0.00), 4% of them having experienced three contacts or more. Pupils from ethnic minorities experienced roughly the same frequency of offence-related contacts as others (5% against 6% for the ethnic majority). Note that if studies in different countries show that ethnic minorities generally—but not invariably—experience more contacts with the police, this does not necessarily hold for offence-related contacts (furthermore, the UPYC survey is not about national populations as a whole but about young teenagers living in urban areas). Muslims experienced slightly less offence-related contacts with the police to non-Muslims (4% versus 6%).

Pupils from ethnic minorities experienced more offence-related contacts with the police than others in France (four-point difference), which is not the case in other countries (this could reflect either rate of offences or police activity). Differences in police contacts according to neighbourhood are very clear in all countries at the exception of the UK (+3% points difference only for those living in disrupted neighbourhoods; results not presented), with youth experiencing 9–12 points more contacts in the most disrupted neighbourhoods than in other areas.

If one now considers different Muslim categories according to religious attachment (Fig. 8.9), one sees that all groups experienced roughly the same proportion of contacts (4% or 5%).

Most pupils (82%) clearly disapprove of discrimination, declaring that it is “very wrong”. Figure 8.10 shows that the strongest disapproval of discrimination is slightly more widespread amongst Muslims and ethnic minorities than others. Those Muslims who feel least attached to Islam are slightly less likely to judge discrimination as “very wrong” (83%) than more strongly attached Muslims (90%; results not presented).



Fig. 8.9 Muslims' offence-related contacts with the police (last year) according to religious importance. $N = 1900$



Fig. 8.10 Proportion of pupils judging discriminations more or less wrong amongst Muslims (vs. non-Muslim), ethnic minorities (vs. majority) and disrupted neighbourhoods (vs. all others) (%). $N = 8173$ (religion), 8173 (ethnicity) and 7988 (neighbourhood). (Whole sample: discriminations not wrong or a little = 4%; wrong = 14%; very wrong = 82%)



Fig. 8.11 "Police treat some groups worse" (%) by ethnicity, Islamic religion and neighbourhood. $N = 4104$ (ethnicity), 4104 (religion) and 4038 (neighbourhood)

As far as neighbourhood is concerned, pupils from the most disrupted neighbourhoods are *less* likely to consider discrimination as very wrong" (73%) than those from elsewhere (84%), though this is largely due to the greater tolerance of discrimination by the ethnic majority in these areas.

Only about a third of the sample (35%) agreed that the police "treat some groups worse" than others, the proportion thinking this was lowest in France (31%) and highest in the UK (39%). Figure 8.11 shows considerable variations between groups on this variable: Muslims, those from disrupted neighbourhoods and those from ethnic minorities all were more likely to agree than others. Amongst Muslims, those with weak religious attachment were more likely to agree that the police discriminate (49%) than those with stronger attachment (39% for those who think that Islam is "quite important", and 41% for the most attached to their religion).

There are national differences in the gap in perceptions about police discrimination between ethnic minority pupils and others. Minority pupils in the Netherlands were 27 percentage points more likely to say the police treated some groups worse; the gap in Germany and France was 17 and 12 percentage points and 6 percentage points only in the UK.

Frequency of Contacts and Attitudes Towards Discriminations as Mediating Variable

Table 8.2 shows the mediating effect of attitudes towards discriminations and contact with the police, using linear regression analysis (least squares method; model 1 is a reminder for model 2 in Table 8.1). Model 2 shows that taking into account all

Table 8.2 Effect of ethnicity, Islamic affiliation and neighbourhood on perceived police unfairness when controlled for mediating variables (linear regression analysis, least squared method)

	1		2		3	
Model	Bêta	Sig.	Bêta	Sig.	Bêta	Sig.
Constant		0.00		0.00		0.00
Ethnic minorities	−0.05	0.01	−0.04	0.04	−0.04	0.05
Muslims: Religion not or a little important	0.00	0.97	0.01	0.73	0.00	0.87
Muslims: Religion quite important	0.00	0.83	0.01	0.67	0.00	0.81
Muslims: Religion very important	−0.02	0.43	0.03	0.15	−0.01	0.49
Disrupted neighbourhood	0.18	0.00	0.14	0.00	0.13	0.00
Age	0.02	0.28	0.01	0.42	0.07	0.00
Gender	0.01	0.55	0.03	0.09	0.02	0.11
Father unemployed	0.03	0.07	0.03	0.04	0.03	0.07
Mother unemployed	0.00	0.99	0.01	0.76	0.01	0.71
Family live on welfare	0.03	0.14	0.02	0.27	0.02	0.28
Offence-related contact with the police			0.07	0.00	0.08	0.00
Moral disapproval of discrimination			0.09	0.00	0.10	0.00
Police treats some groups worse			0.20	0.00	0.21	0.00
France[a]					0.23	0.00
The Netherlands[a]					0.05	0.01
UK[a]					0.13	0.00
R^2	*0.04*		*0.10*		*0.12*	
N	*3890*		*3835*		*3835*	

Models 1 and 2: VIF max. = 1.7 (ethnic minorities) and 1.5 (Muslims: religion very important) (all other VIF are between 1 and 1.2)
Model 3: VIF max. = 2.1 (France); all other VIF are between 1 and 1.7 (for ethnicity and the UK)
[a]Reference category = Germany

individual variables, all three mediating factors significantly affect perceived police unfairness: offence-related contacts with the police, disapproval of discriminations and beliefs about police discriminations all predict beliefs in police unfairness (this at $p = 0.00$). Perceived police discriminations show the greatest effect by far (beta = 0.20)—unsurprisingly given that it involves a judgment about another dimension of police fairness. Moral disapproval of discriminations shows a slightly greater effect than offence-related police contact (beta = 0.09 versus 0.07). Of the control variables, having an unemployed father now is a significant predictor (at 0.04).

As for the three sources of group belonging, ethnicity and neighbourhood remain significant when the mediating variables are included in the analysis. Out of the three variables, disrupted neighbourhood membership (significant at 0.00) remains the strongest factor by far but slightly decreases (its effect exceeding contact with the police as well as moral disapproval of discrimination). The effects of minority ethnicity remain a modest one and slightly decrease. In other words, the mediating factors do only partly account for the relationships between both ethnicity and neighbourhood and perceived police unfairness.

Model 3 shows that the individual variables in the model do not fully account for country differences as regards perceived police unfairness: with all controls in place, pupils living in the Netherlands and most of all the UK and France are significantly more likely to judge the police as unfair than those living in Germany (sig. at 0.01 or 0.00). The effects are huge for the UK and France (beta = 0.13 and 0.23 versus only 0.05 for the Netherlands), living in France showing the greatest effect on perceived police unfairness of all variables in the model with perceived police discriminations. As a result, R^2 increases from 0.10 in model 1 to 0.12 in model 2.

Although these models do not allow control for contacts with the police per se, this was possible in the case of France. Based on a country-specific question, a police-initiated contact variable was created, as research show that it is the type of contact which fosters perceived police unfairness. This additive scale includes indicators measuring the number of ID checks (in the street or in public transports), contacts as a crime author[14] and because the police gave a specific order (asked to do or not do something) during the previous year.[15] The scale was dichotomized (no contacts/one contact or more). When regression is based on the French sample only, *p* value for ethnic belonging in model 2 is 0.07 and 0.10 with police-initiated contacts in the model (i.e. significant at 0.05 with a single-ended test).[16] Without the Muslim variables in the model,[17] ethnic belonging becomes significant at 0.02 (this controlling for police-initiated contacts). Thus, for France at least, the effect of ethnicity, although modest, seems rather robust as it is not fully accounted for the selected relevant mediating factors, including police contacts per se.

Discussion

This chapter aimed to explore the relationships between ethnicity, Islamic affiliation and neighbourhood as sources of belonging to a stigmatized group on the one hand and perceived police unfairness on the other hand—a subject for which there are still few studies, especially in Western European countries. Even fewer focus on young people. The first aim was to describe the interrelationships between these three sources of group belonging and to show how each affects ATP per se. In the four selected countries, Islamic affiliation and ethnic minority membership (as defined here) are closely related, a large majority of pupils from ethnic minorities being Muslims. This confirms the need to consider both variables altogether, at least

[14] As this is redundant with offence-related contacts, the latest were removed from the subsequent regression models.

[15] Ten percent of pupils had at least one contact with the police during previous year.

[16] In the tested models, police-initiated contacts are significant at 0.02. Interestingly, the effect of moral disapproval of discriminations substantially decreases when controlled for police-initiated contacts (from 0.00 to 0.05; now significant at 0.05 only in all tested models).

[17] Excluding the variable seems reasonable as it is not significant and as Islamic affiliation and minority ethnic belonging are closely related.

in countries whose migrants largely come from Islamic countries. Furthermore, Muslims as well as ethnic minority members are overrepresented in the most disrupted neighbourhoods.

From a descriptive point of view, the three sources of group belonging are clearly related to perceived police unfairness (maximum perceived police unfairness near than doubles or more in a stigmatized group as compared to its non-stigmatized counterpart). Taking the variables altogether and controlling for socio-economic factors, pupils coming from the most disrupted neighbourhoods, whatever their religion or ethnicity, are the most likely by far to see the police as unfair. Nevertheless, belonging to an ethnic minority continues to predict perceived police unfairness, which is not the case for Islamic affiliation (regardless of strength of religious attachment). This is in line with qualitative studies which show that as far as minorities' relations with the police are concerned, ethnic as well as territorial (neighbourhood) sources of identification prevail (rather than religious or national ones; Millings, 2013).

The relationship between perceived police unfairness and both ethnicity and neighbourhood remains when offence-related contacts with the police and attitudes towards discriminations are taken into account. But the effect of both variables slightly decreases, which means that the presumed mediating factors do well play at such (in line with results for Belgium by Van Craen, 2013; Van Craen & Skogan, 2015).

In ATP studies, living in a stigmatized neighbourhood has seldom been considered as a source of group belonging. In line with many studies outside the field of ATP (Kirkness, 2014; Slater & Anderson, 2012; Slater & Hannigan, 2015), we posit that for some individuals, belonging to a stigmatized neighbourhood generates a sense of group belonging (if not always an "identity"). Police have the symbolic power of sending messages to groups about who they are (Loader, 1997) and creating a sense of belonging. Qualitative studies showed that in defining what it means to be a member of a poor urban neighbourhood, individuals from urban disrupted neighbourhoods—and especially ethnic minority members—currently refer to the treatment they receive from the police (Sclofsky, 2016; Millings, 2013 for the UK; Roux & Roché, 2016 for France). The police are often perceived through a sense of ethnic but also territorial belonging (an ethno-territorial or spatio-racial identity, the most disrupted neighbourhoods being themselves racialized or "ethnicized"; Neal et al., 2013).

Contrary to some results for the USA as well as for Europe (Bradford et al., 2017), but in line with other European research including more controls than the present study, we do not find neighbourhood characteristics as they were measured to account fully for the relationship between ethnicity and ATP. But it must be stressed that we are dealing with perceived police unfairness, while other studies focus on police legitimacy (using different controls and dealing with different countries may be also an issue). Maybe more importantly, not all studies use the same measurement for ethnic belonging. In European studies, ethnicity is not always conceptualized nor measured in relational terms or in an interactionist, context-dependent perspective, i.e. in relation to the specific issue of the research, as was the

case here (considering third- generation migrants may also make a difference). Interestingly, Bradford et al. (2017) do find some relations between ethnic belonging and ATP when they go from a general and non-context-dependent definition of who belongs to ethnic minorities to the consideration of specific ethnic minority groups and their position or history in a given society (this with all controls in place: when ethnicity effect seems to be absent, this is due to the contrasted relation of different minority groups to the police cancelling each other out).

As for national differences—and bearing in mind that the samples comprise cities and are not nationally representative—France singles itself out in various ways. The French sample has the highest proportion of ethnic and Muslim minorities. It also has the highest proportion of pupils from very disrupted neighbourhoods with the UK. On the contrary, the Netherlands and to a lesser extent Germany score low on the three variables. Furthermore, the relation between belonging to a disrupted neighbourhood and perceived police unfairness is maximum in France. This partly explains why the mean level of perceived police unfairness is at its highest in France (high also in the UK) and comparatively low in Germany and the Netherlands. The UK also singles itself out in other respects. Indeed, it is the only country where ethnicity and Islamic affiliation make quite no difference as far as perceived police unfairness is concerned (considering here descriptive statistics). This may be partly due to differences amongst South Asian groups as for antagonist relations to the police (as Pakistanis and Bangladeshis tend to have antagonist relations, this is not the case for Indians). Nevertheless, the statement still holds when considering only non-South Asian minorities.

Multivariate analysis shows that the differences as regards perceived police unfairness between France and the UK (mainly) as well as the Netherlands on the one hand and Germany on the other hand are not only due to composition effects.[18] Indeed, the likelihood of judging the police as unfair "all things being equal" is significantly higher in France, the UK and the Netherlands as compared to Germany. Differences in policing styles in each country (Hough, 2013)—in general or as far as members of stigmatized groups are concerned—may account for these results, something which we were not able to test. This is in line with Oberwittler and Roché (2013): based on a French-German survey, they found "a clear difference between French and German cities in all dimensions of police-adolescents relationships", negative ATP and experiences with the police being clearly higher in France. By contrast to France, the German police was shown to have a "nonconfrontational style" when dealing with ethnic minorities.

This study has several limitations. For ethnicity as well as neighbourhood, our data do not allow measures of the subjective dimension of group belonging. This includes both identification (attachment to the group) and the feeling that one's group is stigmatized (with or without attachment to it). In the future, drawing precise measures should allow to make stronger arguments about the relation of group belonging to ATP. This would notably mean measuring precise feelings of discrimi-

[18] As for the comparison between the Netherlands and Germany as regards perceived police unfairness, the difference only appears in the multivariate models.

nation—personal or for one's group, by the police or in general, due to ethnicity or neighbourhood belonging (see Weitzer & Tuch, 2004 for different measurements of police misconduct; Van Craen & Skogan, 2015 for feelings of discriminations by the police and in general). Not being able to take into account contacts with the police per se (i.e. not only after having committed an offence) is another clear limitation. Nevertheless, complementary analysis allowed to establish that for France at least, control for police-initiated contacts does not cancel the effect of neighbourhood nor ethnic belonging.

Explaining the effect of living in a disrupted neighbourhood is another challenge for future research. In line with the idea that police targeting is driven by police's perception of an "ecological contamination" (Werthman & Piliavin, 1967; Terrill & Reisig, 2003), Weitzer and Tuch (2004) interpret the effect of living in high-crime neighbourhoods as the one of the police "cast[ing] a wide net of suspicion" on inhabitants of these zones (p. 322). In this view, a central issue is *how the police as an institution is seen as targeting some groups defined by neighbourhood and singling them out*. This means that *police targeting* is not limited to racial profiling nor to the behaviour of police officers as individuals (Hallsworth, 2006; Rose, 2002). Exploring the perceptions of police's objectives as regards a given neighbourhood and its population thus becomes an issue for ATP studies (see Schafer et al., *op. cit.*, for items related to the perception of community policing).

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Chapter 9
Teenagers' Perceptions of Legitimacy and Preparedness to Break the Law: The Impact of Migrant and Ethnic Minority Status

Diego Farren and Mike Hough

Introduction

This chapter takes as its main conceptual frameworks the version of procedural justice (PJ) theory developed by Jackson and colleagues (e.g. Hough, Jackson, & Bradford, 2013; Jackson et al., 2011)[1] and the group position thesis (Blumer, 1958; Bobo, 1999; Weitzer & Tuch, 2006). It draws on the third International Self-Report Delinquency Study (ISRD3) to examine how teenagers with a migrant background differ from those who are native-born in levels of trust in the police, the legitimacy they confer on the police and their self-reported involvement in violent crime. We examine the interrelationships between migrant status, ethnicity and social integration and their relative impact on orientations to the police and involvement in violence. The analysis is restricted to six countries which form a sub-project of ISRD3, 'Understanding and Preventing Youth Crime (UPYC)', supported by the national funding councils of the countries involved.[2] These were France, Germany, the Netherlands, the UK (treating England and Scotland separately) and the USA.

[1] PJ theory has been theorized in many flavours. We follow the perspective of Jackson and colleagues (Hough et al., 2013; Jackson et al., 2011) according to which the main elements of PJ theory are trust, legitimacy and compliance. Trust is shaped by three dimensions: perceptions of procedural fairness, distributive fairness and police effectiveness. Legitimacy is also shaped by three dimensions: obligation to obey, moral alignment and lawfulness.

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D. Farren (✉)
Institute of Criminology, University of Hamburg, Hamburg, Germany

M. Hough
Emeritus Professor, School of Law, Birkbeck, University of London, London, UK
e-mail: M.hough@bbk.ac.uk

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All six countries have industrialized, developed economies, and majorities of the population in all six are white.

To anticipate our findings, we show that:

- In aggregate, migrants are more critical of the police and, possibly as a result, show higher likelihoods of involvement in violent offending.
- Migrant pupils' relative distrust of the police, low scores on legitimacy and greater involvement in violence are very largely a function of individual deprivation and the sorts of neighbourhood in which they live.
- Even after controlling for structural disadvantage conditions, differences in attitudes to the police remain between visible ethnic minorities and the white majority.
- We interpret this last result as the reflection of a history of discrimination on the part of the majority and consequent conflict that often emerges between majority and minority ethnic groups.

PJ Theory and Differences Between Social Groups

In understanding how relationships can go wrong between state authorities and minority groups, we have argued elsewhere (e.g. Bradford, Jackson, & Hough, 2018; Hough, 2013) that procedural justice theory provides a useful explanatory framework. The concepts and their measurement are set out in more detail elsewhere in this book (Farren, Hough, Murray, & McVie, 2018). In essence, procedural justice theory provides a normative rather than instrumental account of people's commitment to obeying the law (Bottoms, 2002; Tyler, 1990, 2011a). Its basic principle is that people make judgements about the legitimacy of those authorities that regulate their behaviour and will comply with those authorities that they regard as legitimate—feeling a moral, or normative, obligation to do so. Procedural justice theory suggests that the quality of treatment that people receive at the hands of the police and other authorities will be a core determinant of levels of compliance (e.g. Tyler, 2006, 2011a, 2011b). When authority is seen to be fair, respectful, responsive and accountable, it will be seen as legitimate and will tend to secure compliance.

PJ theory centres on how people experience interactions with authority. So when comparing groups of people within a society, differences in attitudes towards the police should largely reflect differences in the treatment received during those interactions. The obvious question to ask is why different social groups receive different treatment by the police. One possible reason is to be found in practices of racial profiling, which have been documented in the USA and in Europe (e.g. Goris, Jobard, & Lévy, 2009; Miller, 2007; Oberwittler & Roché, 2018; Rice, Reitzel, & Piquero, 2005; Tyler & Wakslak, 2004; Weitzer & Tuch, 2002). If, because of the way they look, members of a minority group are stopped or searched or arrested by the police more often, and experience less procedural fairness during police contacts, they are likely to evaluate the police more negatively.

A different argument is that members of minority groups experience more (and maybe more negative) police control because they tend to live in more disadvantaged conditions. Regardless of their ethnic composition, more crime is committed in disadvantaged neighbourhoods (Krivo & Peterson, 1996). As a result it is expected that citizens living in those areas will have more police-initiated contact and that in these contacts the police are more likely to adopt a proactive, or assertive, policing style.[3] Studies have found that police practices vary across different types of neighbourhoods and that when controlling for this, differences between groups are reduced or even disappear (e.g. Bradford et al., 2018; Sampson & Bartusch, 1998; Weitzer, 1999, 2010; Weitzer & Tuch, 1999, 2006).

In addition to personal experiences, what happens to others during their interactions with the police may also influence attitudes. These vicarious experiences—formed through observation or narratives (including those in the media) —may apply differently to different ethnic groups. For example, Weitzer and Tuch (2006) show that ethnic minorities in the USA are much more likely to hear stories about police mistreatment than white people. Rosenbaum, Schuck, Costello, Hawkins, and Ring (2005) show that African Americans more frequently hear about bad police experiences from friends and family, and white citizens from the media—and that vicarious experiences relayed by family are more damaging than media reports. Vicarious experiences may also alter the way in which individuals perceive police contact: Warren (2011) shows that vicarious experiences are amongst the strongest predictors of perceptions of police disrespect during contacts.

The Role of Social Identity in PJ Theory

The dynamics described by PJ theory, and differences observed between groups, can be understood through the concept of social identity. It is important to differentiate between identification with the superordinate group that the police represent and with one or more subordinate-level groups. Tyler and Blader (2003) deal mainly with the identification with the superordinate group in their group engagement model. According to their 'social identity mediation hypothesis' (Tyler & Blader, 2000, 2003, p. 353; see also Blader & Tyler, 2009), the way that agents of any superordinate group of powerholders treat people subject to their authority affects the latter's sense of self and of group membership—and thereby, their willingness to cooperate and comply with that authority.

Identification with the superordinate-level group has been tested empirically. For example, Bradford, Hohl, Jackson, and MacQueen (2015) use a randomized field trial in Scotland to compare the effect of the procedural fairness experienced during

[3] Hüttermann (2003) shows that police officers may adapt their policing style to the situation and identifies two styles: a symbolic one, which is concerned mainly with delivering a protective presence, and the 'street corner' one, which represents a more interventionist policing style. It can be expected that policing in more disadvantaged neighbourhoods will be more often of the second kind.

police vehicle stops on perceptions of legitimacy, identity with the Scottish community and likelihood of future traffic offending (compliance). They conclude that social identity is a more important mediator between procedural fairness and compliance than legitimacy.

In another study, Bradford, Murphy, and Jackson (2014) use a representative two-wave panel survey of Australians to show that social identity mediates the association between procedural fairness and legitimacy. They argue that the behaviour of the officer provides information to the individual about their social standing and levels of inclusion within the group that the officer symbolizes. Negative treatment by the police will communicate exclusion, and this will encourage recipients to invest more in relationships which provide a sense of inclusion.

This last argument is important because it opens the door for the analysis of the identification with not only the dominant social group but also with other subordinate-level groups. Oliveira and Murphy (2015) show that identification with the subordinate group may also have an effect on attitudes to the police, although identification with the superordinate group is still more important. Also Gerber, González, Carvacho, Jiménez-Moya, and Jackson (in press) show that amongst indigenous people in Chile the level of identification with their indigenous group moderates the relation between their perceptions of procedural fairness and legitimacy.

It is also of relevance whether the PJ theory applies in the same way for members of different social groups. For example, Bradford et al. (2014) show that procedural fairness is a more important predictor of identity with superordinate group amongst those who felt less included in this group. Bradford (2014) also used data from a survey of ethnic minorities in London to show that amongst those individuals who see themselves as non-UK citizens, social identity is the main mediator between police behaviour and compliance, while amongst those who regard themselves as UK citizens, the most important mediator is legitimacy.

PJ as an Indicator of Group Conflict

The role that identification with subordinate-level groups may have on attitudes to the police can be further theorized using social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and the group position model (Blumer, 1958; Bobo, 1999; Weitzer & Tuch, 2006). According to social identity theory, in order to make sense of the environment, individuals need to categorize people (including themselves) in terms of 'us' (or 'in-group') and 'them' (or 'out-group'). Membership of a given group comes with an emotional attachment to it and the sharing of some systems of beliefs. This means that members of the same social group will tend to be similarly orientated (or share a discourse or values) in their perception of members of out-groups.[4]

[4] Attitudes amongst members of the same social group will vary less (i.e. will be more determined by their group membership) the more the individuals identify with that group and the stronger the group conflict (Tajfel & Turner, 1979).

In multi-ethnic societies one important criterion for categorizing people is ethnicity. Members of specific ethnic minority groups that identify with this category will tend to share some opinions about others. Attitudes towards ethnicity can also be understood in terms of social identity. According to the group position model, prejudice is rooted in a collective sense of group position and this sense functions along two axes (Bobo, 1999, p. 454). The vertical axis represents hierarchy in the form of groups occupying unequal positions in a social order and the interests attached to those positions. The horizontal axis represents the inclusion-exclusion dimensions of identity and is the socioemotional aspect of this model. Racial attitudes are formed through the relations between groups along their positioning on these two axes and the consequential perceptions of threats and advantages. Perceptions of threat relate to the fear of the dominant group of losing privileges or resources to competing ethnic minorities, while the perceptions of advantages describe the belief of ethnic minorities that their interest may be enhanced by challenging the prevailing order (Weitzer & Tuch, 2006, p. 8). These perceptions help explain the actual practices of criminal justice institutions and group perceptions of these institutions.

According to Weitzer and Tuch (2006), the arguments outlined above also applies—at least in the USA—to the relationship between groups and social institutions. Through the lens of the dominant group, social institutions (like the criminal justice system) serve their interests so that there is a natural affinity between them and the police. In this respect the 'power-threat' thesis by Blalock (1967) states that coercive crime control exercised by the authorities benefits, in aggregate, the dominant group. The author argues that the extent of crime control experienced by minorities will be related to the perceived threat they pose to the dominant groups. The important points here are, first, that policing is not blind to ethnic differences—both through the eyes of the police and also through the eyes of the relevant minority groups—and second that the police generally serves the interests of the dominant group.

Weitzer and Tuch (2006, p. 12) argue that, for their part, minority groups will tend to see the police as contributing to their subordination through the use of both legal and extra legal methods—and consequently perceptions of unjust treatment by the police become also important indicators of group conflict. As stated by Bayley and Mendelsohn (1969, p. 141), minorities project upon the police their accumulated frustration with their deprivation and the unequal treatment that they regard as favouring the dominant group.

The group position model complements PJ theory well, because it focuses on a different level of analysis. PJ theory focuses on the individual or micro level, while the group position thesis concentrates on the meso level of relations between groups. We believe that differences in attitudes to the police between social groups are, at least in part, an indicator of group conflict. So by including a group position perspective, we do not limit our interpretation of differences in perceptions of legitimacy to individual experiences with the police. The comparison of attitudes towards the police amongst different social groups serves here as a barometer of the state of ethnic conflict in different European countries and in the USA.

The Aims of This Chapter

In this chapter we try to explain dissimilarities in attitudes towards the police and the resulting differences in the likelihood of reporting violent offences between native and migrant adolescents, relying on PJ theory and the group position model. We do this in three steps. First we test whether attitudes towards the police and self-reported violent offences differ between natives and those with migrant backgrounds. Extrapolating from previous studies, including those examining ethnic groups which do not have a recent migration background (e.g. Bradford et al., 2018; Bradford & Jackson, 2017; Oliveira & Murphy, 2015; Weitzer & Tuch, 2006), we expect those with migrant backgrounds to differ in their attitudes to the police and in their levels of self-reported violent offences.

Hypothesis 1 Overall, and relative to the native-born population, pupils with migrant backgrounds express less trust in the police, rate the police as having less legitimacy and score higher on self-reported violence.

As a second step we look at the mediation effect of the position of individuals in the social structure. Previous studies have shown that individual and collective characteristics of disadvantage can largely explain differences in attitudes towards the police. For example, Sampson and Bartusch (1998) show that differences in satisfaction with the police between whites and African Americans disappear when controlling for neighbourhood disadvantage. Bradford et al. (2018) also show that differences in perceptions of legitimacy between ethnic majority and minority disappear when controlling for a series of variables related to social integration. We thus expect that differences between migrants and natives in attitudes to the police will disappear or heavily reduce when controlling for aspects of position in the social structure.

Hypothesis 2 Differences between those with migrant backgrounds and natives in attitudes to the police and of levels of self-reported violent offences can be largely explained by the mediating effect of economic and social disadvantage.

Thirdly, we try to expand our understanding of migrant status and attitudes towards the police, using the group position perspective. We expect to find differences in attitudes to the police between migration groups, even after controlling for integration, depending on their ethnicity. We categorize respondents into six groups on the basis of their ethnicity (white/minority) and their migrant status (first-generation migrant/second-generation migrant/native). Ethnic groups that have been historically most discriminated and that have been the longest in the host country[5]

[5] Time since immigration is important according to social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), because an individual's behaviour will be more or less determined by their group membership depending on the intensity of their identification with the group. We do not have a measure of intensity of identification so we make the assumption that the identification with the group (and its conflicts with other groups) increases with time, especially when there is a history of rejection from the superordinate group.

are expected to be especially critical about the police, and the white native majority is expected to have the most positive opinion about the police.[6]

Hypothesis 3 Differences between social groups in attitudes to the police remain—even after controlling for disadvantage—and can be interpreted in terms of group conflict.

Methods

The overall methodology of ISRD3 is described by Enzmann et al. (2018). In brief, the survey was the third in a series that was originally built around questions asking schoolchildren in the 7th–9th grades (aged 12–16) about their self-reported offending and experience of victimization. While ISRD3 was designed to estimate the prevalence of offending and victimization, it also enabled testing of different criminological theories. Most participating countries sampled schools in two medium-sized or large cities, with samples designed to be representative of these cities (rather than the respective county). The survey was administered in school classrooms, using Internet-based self-completion questionnaires wherever possible. The dataset for the third sweep of ISRD covered 28 countries at the time of writing (counting England and Scotland as two countries), with a combined sample of 62,636. The UPYC project formed a sub-project of ISRD3. The UPYC research team thought that in-depth comparisons between these six broadly similar developed Western industrialized countries would be a useful counterbalance to the necessarily more broad-brush comparisons that the full ISRD3 dataset permitted. Not all grades in the UPYC sample answered the questions about procedural justice. The sample used here includes only the 8th and 9th grade respondents answering the PJ module (Table 9.1).

Measuring Migration Status

Table 9.2 shows the distribution of the migration categories amongst the UPYC countries, and the Appendix provides further details. We constructed the migrant status variable from questions asking pupils about their own country of birth and that of their parents. Those born outside of their current country of residence are treated

[6] Weitzer (2010) argues that a valid analysis of group conflicts should differentiate between the ethnic minorities of particular relevance in a given country. So, for example, in the USA, blacks and Hispanic are relevant groups, but with different migration histories, and should be kept separated in the analysis. Probably in Germany Turks would be an important ethnic minority to separate from others. Because of data limitations and to keep groups the same within countries, we simply differentiate amongst migrants between visible ethnic minorities and other minorities. We also include time since migration in terms of migration generation.

Table 9.1 Sample size amongst countries and grades

Country	8th grade	9th grade	Total
USA	0	705	705
Netherlands	0	530	530
France	564	576	1140
England	218	223	441
Scotland	328	306	634
Germany	0	919	919
Total	1110	3259	4369

Notes: Cases having missing values in at least one of the variables used in the analyses have been dropped

Table 9.2 Distribution of migrant population by country

	Native		Migrants			
			2nd generation		1st generation	
	Freq.	Perc.	Freq.	Perc.	Freq.	Perc.
USA	271	38	329	47	105	15
Netherlands	327	62	167	32	36	7
France	713	63	329	29	98	9
England	227	51	159	36	55	12
Scotland	478	75	85	13	71	11
Germany	434	47	384	42	101	11
Total	2450	56	1453	33	466	11

as first generation migrants if at least one of their parents was also born abroad; those born in their current country of residence but with at least one parent born abroad are treated as second-generation migrants. For the whole dataset used in this analysis almost half the students are migrants—reflecting the nature of the cities where the survey was conducted—but only about 11% are first-generation migrants.

Measuring Ethnic Minority Status

The ethnic minority variable is constructed mainly from responses to a question asking pupils what ethnic group they felt they belonged to. Researchers in each country specified the response options, which were usually the main ethnic groups in that country. Research teams were free not to include the ethnicity question and amongst the UPYC countries the German team opted out. (The analysis here measures ethnic status for German pupils only for those with migrant status as discussed in the Appendix). We recoded this question into a dichotomous variable in which respondents were assigned minority or majority status. As our main interest was in the policing of *visible* ethnic minorities, we designed the variable to differentiate

Table 9.3 Ethnic minority distribution by country and migration status

	Non-white						White					
	1st gen.		2nd gen.		Natives		1st gen.		2nd gen.		Natives	
	Freq.	Perc.	Freq.	Perc.	Freq.	Perc.	Freq.	Perc.	Freq.	Perc.	Freq.	Perc.
USA	54	8	157	22	59	8	51	7	172	24	212	30
Netherlands	27	5	126	24	8	2	9	2	41	8	319	60
France	68	6	235	21	22	2	30	3	94	8	691	61
England	45	10	138	31	47	11	10	2	21	5	180	41
Scotland	40	6	51	8	13	2	31	5	34	5	465	73
Germany	46	5	217	24	–	–	55	6	167	18	434	47
Total	280	6	924	21	149	3	186	4	529	12	2301	53

between those who most people—and especially the police—would regard as white and others. Inevitably this involved some fairly arbitrary decisions about classification, as different people, and different groups, and people in different countries, will have varying concepts of what it is to be 'white'. The Appendix gives details, and Table 9.3 presents the distribution of the final ethnic minority variable by country and migration status.

Self-Reported Crime

The analysis relies on a scale combining three self-report items asking about engagement in violence:

> How often *in the last 12 months* have you …
> … carried a weapon, such as a stick, knife, gun, or chain?
> … taken part in a group fight in a football stadium, on the street or other public place?
> … beaten someone up or hurt someone with stick or knife so badly that the person was injured?

The scale reflects the prevalence of reporting at least one violent offence in the last 12 months. Table 9.4 shows the prevalence for each of the three items by country and also the general prevalence of committing at least one violent crime.

Measuring Procedural Justice Concepts

The procedural justice model tested in this chapter has been discussed more fully elsewhere in this book (Farren et al., 2018). Here we rely on formative measures of trust and legitimacy. These are row mean scales weighting for the dimensions included. In other words, the dimensions with more than one item are averaged before the final scales are constructed. The dimensions of trust are trust in police

Table 9.4 Prevalence of self-reported violence items by country

	Carry weapon	Group fight	Assault	General prev.
USA	9.13	5.12	2.41	12.91
Netherlands	8.11	13.40	1.32	17.74
France	10.88	14.20	1.50	20.09
England	5.03	8.03	2.05	11.79
Scotland	5.56	6.37	2.39	9.94
Germany	10.23	5.02	2.29	13.60
Total	8.76	8.94	1.98	14.97

effectiveness, trust in distribution fairness and trust in procedural fairness. The dimensions of legitimacy are duty to obey, moral alignment and perception of lawfulness. The general trust $\left(\bar{x} = 53.36\right)$ and legitimacy $\left(\bar{x} = 62.44\right)$ variables have been rescaled into percentage of maximum possible (POMP; see Cohen, Cohen, Aiken, & West, 1999 and Farren et al., 2018) with minimum and maximum values of 0 and 100, respectively.

Controls

All models control for gender, age and family structure. Analyses of countries sampling more than one grade also include a grade 9 dummy, and models using the complete UPYC dataset also include country fixed effects. Family structure is a dummy variable differentiating between those living with both biological parents and the rest.

Measures of Social and Economic Integration

The models presented below compare the effects of the relevant predictors with and without controlling for various measures of social and economic integration. These were deprivation, bad neighbourhood, collective (in)efficacy and having mostly migrant friends. Deprivation is a dummy variable created from two questions, with values from 5 to 7 scoring as deprived:

- 1.14) How well-off is your family, compared to others? (1 much better off; 2 better off; 3 somewhat better off; 4 the same; 5 somewhat worse off; 6 worse off; 7 much worse off)
- 1.15) If you compare yourself with other people of your age: do you have more, the same, or less money (pocket money + presents + own earnings, etc.) to spend? (1 much more; 2 more; 3 somewhat more; 4 the same; 5 somewhat less; 6 less; 7 much less)

Bad neighbourhood (alpha = 0.88) and collective (in)efficacy (alpha = 0.83) are row mean variables transformed into POMP values with minimum and maximum values of 0 and 1, respectively. The questions included for these two scales have the same answer categories (1 fully agree; 2 somewhat agree; 3 somewhat disagree; 4 fully disagree) and are:

Bad neighbourhood:

- There is a lot of crime in my neighbourhood.
- There is a lot of drug selling in my neighbourhood.
- There is a lot of fighting in my neighbourhood.
- There are a lot of empty and abandoned buildings in my neighbourhood.
- There is a lot of graffiti in my neighbourhood.

Collective (in)efficacy[7]:

- Many of my neighbours know me.
- People in my neighbourhood often do things together.
- People around here are willing to help their neighbours.
- This is a close-knit neighbourhood.
- People in this neighbourhood can be trusted.
- People in this neighbourhood generally get along well with each other.

Having mostly migrant friends is measured through the following question:

- 5.5) How many of your friends have at least one parent of foreign origin? (1 None at all; 2 A few; 3 Many of them; 4 All of them)

This item is also transformed into a dummy variable with a score of 1 meaning that many or all of their friends have at least one migrant parent.

Statistical Analyses

All main models are linear path analyses which allow us to decompose the effects of interest into direct, indirect and total effects. All models were run using Stata 14 and include clustered standard errors at the level of classes. All dependent variables in models (i.e. trust, legitimacy and last year prevalence of violent offences) are scaled between 0 and 100 (trust and legitimacy are rescaled into POMP values, and the offences variable are transformed into a dummy with 0 and 100 as possible values), and all independent variables have been scaled to lie between 0 and 1. This allows us to interpret our estimated coefficients in terms of the average percentage point differences between groups (in the case of dummies) or between those scoring the lowest and the highest in a given scale.

[7] Note that the values of the answer categories for this scale have been inverted.

Findings

Results are presented in three sections. The first section presents the basic relationships between migrant status, attitudes to the police and involvement in violence. The second section shows how these relationships are attenuated when control variables are included in the analysis, and the final section introduces ethnicity as a further explanatory factor.

Section 1: Predictive Effects of Migration Status on Assessments of Police and Self-Reported Violence

Table 9.5 presents, country by country, the predictive effects of migrant status, relative to the rest of the population, on trust in the police, ratings of police legitimacy and self-report involvement in violence. For the sample in aggregate—the last row of the table—there is a (highly statistically significant) relationship between migrant status and distrust in the police. Other things being equal, migrants score on average 4.1% points less on the trust scale than others. Taking the average value of trust in the sample into account $\left(\bar{x} = 53.36\right)$, this is equivalent to a relative effect of 4.1/53.4 = 7.7%. Migrant status has both a direct predictive effect on legitimacy and an indirect effect, mediated through trust. Holding other things equal, migrants score on average 3.6% points less in the legitimacy scale (which represents a percentage effect of 3.6/62.4 = 5.7%), and 47% of this effect is mediated through trust (i.e. indirect effect divided by total effect or 1.7/3.6 = 0.47). Finally, migrant status

Table 9.5 Effects of migration on ratings of the police and self-reported violence, by country

		Legitimacy			Violence			
	Trust	Direct	Indirect	Total	Direct	Indirect	Total	R^2
USA	−0.27	−2.51*	−0.09	−2.61+	−3.23	0.42	−2.80	0.09
Netherlands	−9.53***	−3.04	−3.58***	−6.62**	−2.96	5.57***	2.61	0.11
France	−6.71***	−1.75	−2.91***	−4.66***	1.40	2.88***	4.28*	0.12
England	−6.06**	−1.58	−2.59*	−4.17	1.25	1.46	2.71	0.13
Scotland	4.88**	−1.01	2.20**	1.19	−0.92	−0.99	−1.91	0.09
Germany	−5.13**	−2.08*	−1.85**	−3.92**	−3.54	2.27**	−1.27	0.09
All	−4.13***	−1.89**	−1.66***	−3.55***	−1.02	1.85***	0.83	0.10

Notes: Effects are percentage point differences between migrants and natives (the reference category); regressions for each country are estimated independently; all models control for age, gender and traditional family; a grade 9 dummy is included in samples with 8th grade also sampled; the sample in aggregate ('All') also includes country fixed effects; all models estimated with cluster standard errors at the level of classes; standard errors omitted for ease of presentation; ***$p < 0.001$, **$p < 0.01$, *$p < 0.05$, +$p < 0.1$

has a (statistically significant) indirect effect on self-report violence. Migrants have on average a 0.8% point higher violent crime prevalence (although the total is not significant, this represents a percentage change of 0.8/15 = 5.5%) than the rest of the population, and all the positive effect is mediated through procedural justice variables.

Overall, therefore, the analysis confirms the procedural justice hypotheses that (a) people who distrust the police confer low legitimacy on them and (b) such people are more prone to involvement in offending.

The first six rows of the table show that this same pattern of relationships exists in most, but not all, of our countries. In all countries except the USA, there is a relationship between migrant status and distrust of the police; and in all these countries, there is an indirect relationship between migrant status and legitimacy (mediated through trust). In all these countries but Scotland, the effects point in the expected direction, i.e. migration status reduces trust and legitimacy. In Scotland migrants trust the police more and have higher perceptions of legitimacy. In three countries (Netherlands, France and Germany) and also in the sample in aggregate, there is an indirect relationship between migrant status and self-report violence (mediated through the procedural justice variables). The lack of expected relationships in the USA and the atypically positive relationships between migrant status and trust and legitimacy in Scotland are noteworthy, however.

Section 2: Explaining Migrants' Orientation to the Police and Violent Offending

Figure 9.1 shows how the predictive relationships described in the previous section attenuate when various control variables are added. The left-hand graphic (a) corresponds to the estimates for the sample in aggregate as shown in the last row of Table 9.5 above. Where any of the variables (trust, legitimacy and self-reported offending) lie to the left of the vertical midline (marked 0), this indicates a negative relationship; and where they fall to the right, the relationship is positive. The 'arms' spreading out from each symbol indicate the sampling error (95% confidence intervals) associated with the estimate of the regression coefficient: provided that neither arm crosses the vertical midline, the predictive relationship is statistically significant.

The right-hand graphic (b) shows the effects of adding in variables measuring economic (deprivation and quality of the neighbourhood) and social (collective efficacy and having mostly migrant family friends) integration. What this shows is that almost all of the predictive relationships between migration status and both ratings of the police and self-reported violence are 'washed out' by the addition of controls. This can be interpreted as showing that there is nothing intrinsic to migrant



Notes: Effects are percentage point differences between migrants and natives (the reference category); coefficients with 95% confidence intervals plotted; regressions for each country are estimated independently; all models control for age, gender and traditional family; France, England, Scotland and All include a grade 9 dummy; All also includes country fixed effects; models with 'controls added' also control for deprivation, neighbourhood quality, collective efficacy and migration status of family friends; all models include cluster standard errors at the level of classes

Fig. 9.1 Selected effects of migration without and with controls for mode of integration

status that explains either orientation to the police or involvement in violent offending. Rather, these relationships are a function of the quality of neighbourhoods that migrant pupils tend to live, the 'collective efficacy' of these neighbourhoods and pupils' levels of perceived deprivation.

Table 9.6 shows coefficients for the models presented graphically in Fig. 9.1 for the whole sample ('All'), first in Panel A without controls (as in the bottom row of Table 9.5 and in graphic A of Fig. 9.1) and then in Panel B (and graphic B) with the control variables added. When controlling for economic and social wellbeing, the effects of interest become statistically and practically irrelevant. It can also be seen that the predictive effects on police ratings and on self-reported offending of living in a rough neighbourhood and in one with low collective efficiency are very large. On average and keeping other things constant, people scoring the highest and the lowest in the neighbourhood scale differ in trust and legitimacy by 17.5% and 18% points respectively. Also people scoring 'worst' in the neighbourhood scale (ceteris paribus) have on average 27% points higher probability of reporting a violent offence compared to those scoring 'best'.

Table 9.6 Effects of migration on ratings of the police and self-reported violence (total sample), with controls

	Trust	Legitimacy			Violence		
		Direct	Indirect	Total	Direct	Indirect	Total
Panel A. Baseline estimates (R^2 = 0.10)							
Migrant	−4.13***	−1.89**	−1.66***	−3.55***	−1.02	1.85***	0.83
Panel B. Controls added (R^2 = 0.20)							
Migrant	−1.31	−0.79	−0.48	−1.27+	−2.13+	0.54*	−1.59
Deprivation	−1.66*	1.45**	−0.61*	0.84	−0.69	−0.00	−0.69
Bad neighbourhood	−17.46***	−11.5	−6.44***	−17.96***	19.52***	7.52***	27.04***
Collective (in) efficacy	−9.60***	−5.44***	−3.54***	−8.98***	−1.59	3.88***	2.29
Migrant family friends	−5.08***	−1.74**	−1.87***	−3.62***	1.03	1.73***	2.76+

Notes: Coefficients represent percentage point differences; both regressions control for gender, age and traditional family and include grade 9 and country fixed effects; standard errors are clustered at the class level and omitted for ease of presentation; reference category for migrant is native ***$p < .001$; **$p < .01$; *$p < .05$; +$p < .1$

Section 3: Disentangling Migrant and Minority Ethnic Status

The final part of our analysis sheds some light on the—inevitably complex—relationships between migrant status, broken down by migrant generation, and ethnic status, using a simple white/non-white measure. We have compared the following five important sub groups to the majority white native-born population in our sample (n = 2301; 53%), controlling for demographic factors and levels of social integration:

- First-generation migrants from minority (non-white) ethnic groups (n = 280; 6%)
- Second-generation migrants from minority (non-white) ethnic groups (n = 924; 21%)
- Native-born pupils from minority (non-white) ethnic groups (n = 149; 3%)
- First-generation migrants from majority (white) group (n = 186; 4%)
- Second-generation migrants from majority (white) groups (n = 529; 12%)

Table 9.7 shows for the aggregate data how these five groups vary in their orientation to the police and in their involvement in violent offending, relative to the native-born majority (white) pupils—who serve as the 'reference category' in the analysis. Figure 9.2 highlights the most relevant differences in Table 9.7. The findings are strikingly clear. Membership of two groups predicts low ratings of the police and involvement in violent offending: non-white second-generation migrants and non-white native-born pupils. It is notable that first-generation migrants who are non-white do not differ in trust and legitimacy from white native-born pupils, and they even report less violent crime.

Table 9.7 Relationships between trust, perceived legitimacy and self-reported violence, broken down by minority and migration status (total sample)

		Legitimacy			Violence		
	Trust	Direct	Indirect	Total	Direct	Indirect	Total
Panel A. Minority status							
First-generation minority	−0.31	−1.59	−0.12	−1.71	−6.94***	0.53	−6.42**
Second-generation minority	−4.88***	−1.15	−1.79***	−2.94***	−0.48	1.50***	1.02
Native minority	−7.69***	−2.85*	−2.82***	−5.67***	−1.10	2.66***	1.56
First-generation majority	2.10	−1.88	0.77	−1.11	−3.50	0.02	−3.48
Second-generation majority	0.89	−0.29	0.33	0.03	−2.43	−0.13	−2.56
Panel B. Integration controls							
Deprivation	−1.74*	1.46**	−0.64*	0.82	−0.56	0.01	−0.56
Bad neighbourhood	−16.65***	−11.33***	−6.12***	−17.45***	19.54***	7.22***	26.76***
Collective (in)efficacy	−9.97***	−5.44***	−3.66***	−9.10***	−1.35	3.94***	2.60
Migrant family friends	−4.76***	−1.64**	−1.75***	−3.39***	1.11	1.61***	2.72+

Notes: Coefficients represent percentage point differences; both regressions control for gender, age and traditional family and includes a grade 9 and country fixed effects; standard errors are clustered at the class level and omitted for ease of presentation; reference category for migrant is native ***$p < .001$; **$p < .01$; *$p < .05$; +$p < .1$



Notes: Coefficients with 95% confidence intervals plotted; effects represent percentage point differences with respect to the native majority (the reference group); the model controls for gender, age, family structure and grade and country fixed effects and for integration variables (deprivation, neighbourhood quality, collective efficacy, migration status of family friends); standard errors are clustered at class level.

Fig. 9.2 Effect of minority and migration status on selected PJ variables

Figure 9.3 breaks down the results showed in Fig. 9.2 by country. The most stable results across countries are:

- White migrants do not differ in their attitude towards the police compared to white natives
- Second generation non-white migrants generally have more negative attitudes to the police than the native white majority[8]
- Native minorities have the most negative attitudes to the police in all countries where the question about ethnicity asked explicitly about membership of a visible ethnic minority group (see Appendix).

The clear implication of these findings is that it is not migration status but ethnic status—and in particular, status as a visible ethnic minority—that is a significant determinant of pupils' orientation to the police and, we would argue, their consequent involvement in offending.

[8] With two exceptions: in the USA this is not the case and in Scotland the direction of this effect is reversed.



Notes: Coefficients with 95% confidence intervals plotted; effects represent percentage point differences with respect to the native majority (the reference group); each country model estimated independently; all models control for gender, age and family structure and for integration variables (deprivation, neighbourhood quality, collective efficacy, migration status of family friends); France, England and Scotland include a grade 9 dummy, standard errors are clustered at class level.

Fig. 9.3 Effect of minority and migration status on selected PJ variables and violence

Discussion and Conclusions

The results presented here show that migrants have more negative perceptions of police procedural fairness, confer less legitimacy on the police and, on self-report measures, have a higher likelihood of involvement in violence (Hypothesis 1). This association disappears almost entirely when controlling for economic and social characteristics of levels of incorporation into the host country (Hypothesis 2). The predictive influence of migration background on perceptions of legitimacy seems to be spurious, and the key factors that are actually responsible for this association are migrants' lower economic wellbeing and their location in deprived neighbourhoods with lower social capital.

Looking closer into migration, we subdivided migration categories into white and minority ethnic sub groups, and re-evaluated the previous findings. It turns out that minority ethnic status is a much more important determinant of perceptions of legitimacy than migration background. Even controlling for economic and cultural integration, visible ethnic minorities have more negative ratings of police procedural fairness (Hypothesis 3). We interpret this result as reflecting historical and current conflicts between ethnic groups and the resultant difficulties in the integration of

minorities related to migration policies and the differential opportunities given to members of different ethnic groups (see Alexander, 2001). We believe that the way in which new immigrants get integrated into the host country has an impact on the relations between the institutions representing the dominant social group and the incomers. One clear implication of our findings is that the countries analysed here have had only limited success in integrating ethnic minorities.

Two groups have notably more negative views of the police than others: second-generation migrants from ethnic minorities and native-born pupils from ethnic minorities. First-generation migrants—whether from ethnic minorities or white—do not differ from the native white majority in their orientation to the police. One possible explanation for this phenomenon can be given by the 'frame of reference' through which migrants evaluate their new host country (Röder & Mühlau, 2012). One would expect those with migrant backgrounds to keep the norms, values and institutions of their country of origin as a frame of reference and to evaluate the institutions in the new host country in comparison to their reference. According to this perspective, migrants coming to Western Europe from developing countries with more limited economic opportunities and higher levels of crime and corruption will tend to identify strongly with, and possibly even idealize, their new host country and adopt its norms and values (see also Bradford & Jackson, 2017). What happens to subsequent generations depends on whether the promise of the new country is realized, and on how well second- and third-generation migrants are socially and economically integrated and how fair they judge the treatment to be that they receive from the authorities. If and when migrant groups become disillusioned with the treatment they receive from host communities, this could reduce the legitimacy they confer on the country's norms and values and on its institutions of social control. This would open up obvious pathways into involvement with crime.

Inevitably there are qualifications to these findings. Our measure of ethnicity is crude, and probably misclassifies some of our sample. In an ideal world, our measure of migration history would also be more sensitive. Unlike the other three countries, the USA and the UK have significant populations of 'native minorities'; and the USA has a very specific history of forced migration—if that adequately describes the enslavement of Africans in the seventeenth, eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. So our generalizations across UPYC countries must be tentative. There are also more general limitations to ISRD data, discussed in Enzmann et al. (2018) and in Farren et al. (2018). However we take some comfort from the internal consistency of our analysis and the fact that it echoes other recent findings (e.g. Bradford et al., 2018).

Our reading of the results presented here relates to historical events. From a group position perspective, these discourses of rejection towards the 'others' are a reflection of group conflicts and especially of the reactions of the dominant group to perceptions of threat from migrants. Visible ethnic minorities have historically had a much more difficult process of integration than white migrants, and this is reflected in their attitudes to the police. The greater the differences between migrant groups and the white majority, the more radical the perception of threat held by the dominant majority and the stronger the antagonism between groups. As a result, visible

ethnic minorities are more at risk of exclusion than white migrants and may also experience higher levels of hostility in the treatment offered by social institutions like the police.

On a more theoretical level, we believe that by complementing PJ theory with a group conflict perspective—as we have done here—we address two related criticism about empirical social science in general and about the analysis of PJ in particular. The first is the artificial binary distinction between cultural and structural explanatory factors (Gans, 2012). The sense of group position is a normative construct and as such cannot be reduced to a purely objective description of positions in the social structure. It has a collective dimension of culturally shared ideas that emerge from historical experience and the current social, political and economic status of its group members. This historical socio emotional aspect of the sense of group position implies that even when controlling for variables measuring the position in the social structure, differences in opinion about the police may still be found between social groups. These differences may reflect differences in values and other aspects closer related to the culture, which are only partly dependent on the position of individuals in the social structure.

Related to this criticism, we also address Roché and Oberwittler's (2018) critique of PJ studies, that they neglect macro-level conditions and societal cleavages. By centring our analysis in the differences between social groups, we bring the meso level of social groups into the analysis. Although ideally we would include measures of values and 'worldviews' of the social groups, the inclusion of fixed effects still points to explanatory arguments related to the level of groups and their interaction and is a good starting point. Future studies may complement this by including softer measures of the elements of the 'culture' of each social group that play a role in the conflicts between them (good examples of the analysis of structure and culture through the combination of quantitative and qualitative methods are Kubrin & Weitzer, 2003 and Weitzer & Tuch, 2006). Moreover, by also comparing these group interactions between different countries, we bring the macro level of analysis back—though there remains a great deal of scope for macro-level explanations that account for country differences.

The policy implications of our findings are both obvious and challenging. At the start of the process of integration into their host country, migrant groups, especially from visible ethnic minorities, show little difference to the majority population in attitudes to authority. Over generations, attitudes to authority amongst visible ethnic minorities tend to diverge and tend to become more negative. Where this happens, it appears to be a function very largely of economic deprivation and of the impact of the consequent challenges of living in areas of deprivation; the process can be compounded by self-identification as belonging to a minority group that is subject to discrimination and disproportionate deprivation. Not all visible ethnic minority groups are subject to this process, but many are. It is critically important that governments of developed industrialized countries do more to ensure that migrant groups are more effectively protected from this dynamic of progressive marginalization.

Appendix: Variables Measuring Migrant and Ethnic Minority Status

The variables used to measure migrant and ethnic minority status reflect choices we made to achieve the 'least worst' measures, bearing in mind that the place of birth is only a proxy for migrant status and that the question on minority ethnic status was asked in different ways in different countries. (Variations in the question on ethnicity were unavoidable, given variations across countries both in the ethical norms about questions on ethnicity and in substantive differences in the ethnic compositions of each country's population.)

Migrant Status

The migration variable relies mainly on items asking about the country of birth of the pupil and parents. If at least one parent was born outside the survey country, the pupil is classified as a migrant.[9] We further distinguish between first- and second-generation migrants: first-generation migrants are those who were (a) born abroad and (b) had at least one parent born abroad. Other pupils with one or more parents born abroad are second-generation migrants.

A small proportion of those we define as having migrant status will be misclassified—such as those from families with multi-generation histories of working abroad, for example, on military service. There is also a case for defining pupils as having a migrant background if their *grandparents* migrated—but the necessary data were not collected.

Ethnic Minority Status

The ethnic minority variable is constructed mainly from Question 10 in the questionnaire, which was tailored to each country's needs. Table 9.8 shows question wording in the UPYC countries.

Information about parents' country of birth was also used to fine-tune Question 10 or to decide whether to define a case as minority or not when the answer given to Question 10 was inconclusive. In this second step in the construction of the minority variable, only cases initially defined as majority could be redefined as minority.[10] The general rule is as follows: anyone who has been classified as majority (or has

[9] In the cases of England and Scotland, people being born in any region of the UK are considered natives.

[10] There are some exceptions to this rule. Cases not categorized at all or with no valid answer in Question 10 could become majority after checking the information about the place of birth of the parents.

Table 9.8 Ethnic minority questions

USA	Q	Do you think of yourself as:
	A	1 White (not Spanish/Hispanic/Latino); 2 Black or African American; 3 American Indian or Alaska native; 4 Asian; 5 Native Hawaiian or other Pacific islander; 6 White Spanish/Hispanic/Latino; 7 Non-white Spanish/Hispanic/Latino; 8 Others (write in)
Netherlands	Q	Which (ethnic) group do you belong to? [Tot welke (etnische) groep behoor jij?]
	A	1 Dutchman [1 Nederlander]; 2 Moroccan [2 Marokkaans]; 3 Turkish [3 Turks]; 4 Surinamese [4 Surinaams]; 5 Antillean [5 Antiliaans]; 6 None of the above mentioned, namely: [6 Geen van de hierboven genoemde, namelijk:]
France	Q	Which geographical space do you feel you belong to? [A Quel espace géographique te Sens-tu appartenir?]
	A	1 I feel European [1 je me sens Européen(ne)]; 2 I feel African [2 je me sens Africain(ne)]; 3 I feel Asian [3 je me sens Asiatique]; 4 I feel South American [4 je me sens Américain(e) du Sud]; 5 I feel North American (e.g. USA, Canada, Mexico) [5 je me sens Américain(e) du Nord (par exemple, Etats-Unis, Canada, Mexique)]; 6 I feel the Middle East [6 je me sens du Moyen-orient]; 7 I feel from Russia [7 je me sens de Russie]; 8 I feel besides (please specify): [8 je me sens d'ailleurs (merci de préciser):]
England	Q	What is your ethnic group?
	A	1 White; 2 Mixed/multiple ethnic groups; 3 Asian/Asian British; 4 Black/African/Caribbean/Black British; 5 None of the above, but (write in):
Scotland	Q	What is your ethnic group?
	A	1 White; 2 Mixed or multiple ethnic groups; 3 Asian, Asian Scottish, or Asian British; 4 African; 5 Caribbean or Black; 6 White Spanish/Hispanic/Latino; 7 None of the above, but (write in):

Notes: *Q* question, *A* answer categories. The German questionnaire did not include this question

Table 9.9 Categories assigned as minority or majority in the different countries

Country	Majority	Minority
USA	White; Hispanic white; native islander	American; Indian; Asian; black; Caribbean; Hispanic non-white
Netherlands	Dutch	Moroccan; Turkish; Surinamese; Antillean
France	European; South American; North American; Russian	African; Asian; Middle East
England	White	Asian; black; mixed
Scotland	White	African; Asian; Caribbean; mixed

not been classified) and has at least one parent being born in a 'minority country', becomes a minority himself. The rules to define someone as minority or majority are presented in Table 9.9.

The ethnic minority variable is intended to differentiate between white and non-white respondents in order to look at racial aspects of migration (e.g. racial profiling). For this reason, countries having a majority non-white population are declared as 'minority countries'. The countries found in the answers about parents' birth country that were defined as 'minority countries', are:

- **Arab Africa:** Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia
- **Middle East:** Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kurdistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, United Arab Emirates
- **Asia:** Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Cambodia, China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, Kashmir, Korea, Laos, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand, Vietnam
- **Africa:** Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Congo, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mayotte, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Togo, Zambia, Zimbabwe
- **Caribbean:** Bahamas, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, Suriname
- **French colonies:** French Overseas Territories, Guadalupe, French Guiana, Martinique, Reunion, Mayotte
- **Dutch colonies:** Netherlands Antilles, Aruba, Bonaire, Curacao

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