

S O R P O N G P E O U

PEACE
AND
SECURITY
IN THE
ASIA-PACIFIC

THEORY AND PRACTICE



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Sorpong Peou

PRAEGER SECURITY INTERNATIONAL



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To My Dearest Family and Teachers

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Preface and Acknowledgments

This book is about peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region and seeks to determine whether any particular theoretical perspective in Peace and Security Studies (which includes realist security studies, liberal and socialist security studies, peace and human security studies, constructivist security studies, feminist security studies, and nontraditional security studies) has now emerged as the clear winner in the struggle for hegemony. If none has, it may be wise for us to aim at building innovative theories based on the strengths of existing theories. Security as a concept is known to be essentially contested and has become increasingly contestable. This critical challenge has the advantage of opening space for debate, but this book will make the case that, in the end, eclecticism offers the most promising perspective for the emerging policy agenda of building a regional security community during the 21st century. Based on numerous theoretical insights and evidences, this book contends that regional pluralistic security communities can be built to enhance regional, inter-regional, regime, and human security without allowing national security to be sacrificed on the altar of theoretical fantasy. In the conclusions, this book advances a theoretical perspective: democratic realist institutionalism.

My goal for writing this book is quite modest: to review critically major theoretical perspectives relevant to Peace and Security Studies with the aim of stimulating further debate among academics and policymakers. Space limits preclude a comprehensive review of the academic literature and require that references be held to a minimum, however.

I would like to thank specific individuals for various reasons. My gratitude first goes to the Department of Political Science at Simon Fraser University, where I had the privilege of spending half of my sabbatical in 2005 and where I enjoyed the support of Professor Tsuyoshi Kawasaki, who deserves my special gratitude. Other colleagues who provided me with valuable feedback include Alice Ba, James Gomez, James Farrer, Carolina Hernandez, Andy Knight, Richard Stubbs, and Carlyle Thayer. I also would like to thank my students (especially Waheeb Al-Eryani, Tor Erik Nyberg, Chawanis Chawanawong, Imai Akemi, Lorentzen Kathryn Kristine, and Redwood Melissa Paa) for their assistance, and William Wood for helping me edit the manuscript. My most special thanks go to my family—especially my wife, Chola, and my two wonderful daughters, Sophia and Josephine—for their unfailing love and support. I dedicate this book to them and to all my dearest teachers, especially David Dewitt, Paul Evans, Bernard Frolic, and William Moul, who shaped my intellectual thinking when I was their student.

I must stress, however, that I alone take full responsibility for any errors of fact or judgment that may still be evident in this book.

Sorpong Peou
Tokyo, Japan

Abbreviations

ABAC	APEC Business Advisory Council
ABM	Anti-Ballistic Missile
ADB	Asian Development Bank
AEC	ASEAN Economic Community
AFAS	ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services
AFTA	ASEAN Free Trade Area
AIPO	ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Organization
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
APT	ASEAN Plus Three
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASEANAPOL	Meeting of the Chiefs of National Police of the ASEAN Countries
CAPWIP	Centre for Asia-Pacific Women in Politics
CBMs	Confidence-Building Measures
CEA	China Economic Area
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CPP	Cambodian People's Party
CSBMs	Confidence- and Security-Building Measures
CSCAP	Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific
CSCE	Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe
CTBT	Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
CWC	Chemical Weapons Convention

DAWN	Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era
DCs	Developed Countries
DOVE	De-activating Our Violent Establishment
EEC	European Economic Community
ESCAP	Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UN)
EU	European Union
FUNCINPEC	National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia
GABRIELA	General Assembly Binding Women for Reform, Integrity, Equality, Leadership, and Action
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GRIT	Graduated and Reciprocated Initiatives in Tension Reduction
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICJ	International Court of Justice
ICTY	International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
IDs	Infectious Diseases
IMB	The International Chamber of Commerce's International Maritime Bureau
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IPR	Institute of Pacific Relations
JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency
LDCs	Less-Developed Countries
LDP	Liberal Democratic Party (Japan)
MILF	Moro Islamic Liberation Front
MNDAA	Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army
MRC	Mekong River Commission
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NEAC	Northeast Asian Community
NEAU	Northeast Asian Union
NGOs	Non-government Organizations
NIEO	New International Economic Order
NLF	National Liberation Front (Vietnam)
NMD	National Missile Defense
NOD	Non-offensive Defense
NPCSD	North Pacific Co-operative Security Dialogue
NPT	Non-proliferation Treaty
OSCE	The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

PAFTAD	Pacific Trade and Development Conference
PBEC	Pacific Basin Economic Council
PECC	Pacific Economic Cooperation Council
PLA	People's Liberation Army (China)
R & R	Rest and Recreation
SLORC	State Law and Order Restoration Council (Myanmar)
SOC	State of Cambodia
STIs	Sexually Transmitted Infections
TAC	Treaty of Amity and Cooperation for Southeast Asia
TB	Tuberculosis
TIMT	Tokyo International Military Tribunal
TMD	Theater Missile Defense
TOC	Transnational Organized Crime
UMNO	United Malays National Organization
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNTAC	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
US	United States of America
UWSA	United Wa State Army
WGs	Working Groups
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WRL	War Registers League

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Introduction

The end of the Cold War saw a dramatic reduction in the likelihood of global nuclear war, but threats to peace and security at various levels became increasingly evident (Dewitt, Haglund, and Kirton 1993) and, for some, sources of security threat have since increased. Peace and Security Studies as an academic field is thus alive and well and still demands our attention; however, theorists continue to disagree on how to study security, and their struggles for theoretical hegemony have intensified.

This book is about peace and security in the Asia-Pacific: it critically reviews various perspectives on peace and security in the region and seeks to determine whether any of them has now emerged as the winner in the struggle for hegemony. If none has, it may be wise for us to aim at building innovative theories based on the strengths of existing theories. As shall be discussed in this introduction, the study of peace and security is not only about the actual use or threat of force and the prevention of war, but also about the causes, consequences, and control of insecurity said to be rooted in various sources of threat to humans, their values, their agencies, and their environment, as well as about possible cures. Security as a concept is essentially contested and has become increasingly contestable. This conceptual challenge has the advantage of opening space for debate, but this book will make the case that, in the end, theoretical eclecticism offers the most promising perspective for the emerging policy agenda of building a regional security community during the 21st century.

SOME BACKGROUND IN PEACE AND SECURITY STUDIES

The study of security covers strategic studies (Brodie 1949; Gray 1982), which can be traced back to Karl von Clausewitz of Prussia, Kautilya of ancient India, Thucydides of ancient Greece, and even Sun Tzu of ancient China. Strategic studies has been recognized as being broader than military science, but narrower than security studies, which covers “everything that bears on the safety of a polity” that is “potentially boundless” (Betts 1997: 9). Military science is primarily concerned with military statecraft and is more related to the conduct of war than its causes and consequences. As the study of “how technology, organization, and tactics combine to win battles,” it has traditionally been an area in which military personnel specialize.

Strategic studies, which emerged out of debates over the definition of security, is the study of “how political ends and military means interact under social, economic, and other constraints” (ibid.: 9). Clausewitz, for instance, provided insight into the relation between war and politics, which dominated the security literature during the Cold War through its emphasis on military statecraft and the primacy of military security.

Force is central to strategic studies, which covers a variety of topics and concepts, including arms races, nuclear proliferation, defense, deterrence, arms control, and disarmament. Strategic studies “is concerned with the darker side of human nature, in that it examines the way in which military power is used by governments in pursuit of their interests” (Garnett 1975: 3). For Barry Buzan (1987), the two most crucial variables in strategic studies are political structure and military technology. International anarchy makes strategy relevant to the security affairs of sovereign states seen as primarily responsible for their own survival.

Strategic studies also deals with the question of how to prevent war. About 2,300 years before Clausewitz, Sun Tzu wrote *The Art of War*, in which he put down his thoughts regarding the avoidance of war through the gaining of strategic advantage. For him, war was the result of political failure (Sun 1988). Although he has often been regarded as a strategist who glorified warfare, Clausewitz insisted that war should be waged only when absolutely necessary and justifiable. The post-World War II American strategic thinker Bernard Brodie, often regarded as the Clausewitz of his day, not only advised the military establishment on how to win wars, but also made the following famous statement in 1946: “Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them” (cited in Howard 1992: 110). The work of military strategists concerned with nuclear deterrence is thus often misleadingly labeled, mainly because it is not only about how to fight wars, but also about how to prevent them (Howard 1992).

Contemporary security studies, which covers strategic studies, also owes an intellectual debt to the study of international relations (IR).

According to Ken Booth (2005: 2), “[t]he study of security has always been a central concern in the academic discipline of international relations.” Bill McSweeney (1999) also points out that security remains the central problem of IR. The history of IR can be traced through to the influential works of classical strategic thinkers, the 17th-century emergence of the Westphalian system, and, with increased intensity, World Wars I and II (Terriff *et al.* 1999: 11). According to Edward Kolodziej (2005: 48–76), Thucydides, Thomas Hobbes, and Clausewitz laid the classical realist foundations of security studies. Niccolò Machiavelli was also an important early influence with his idea of a permanent and professional army (Gilbert 1986). Gwyn Prins (1998: 785–86) argues that “[t]he single pivot around which most debates in security studies have turned for a generation has been what Robert Keohane calls ‘Classical Realism.’” A leading political realist, Kenneth Waltz (1988: 624–25), notes that “[r]ealist theory, old and new alike, draws attention to the crucial role of military technology and strategy among the forces that fix the fate of states and their systems.” Another leading realist, Stephen Walt (1991: 212), writes: “The main focus of security studies is easy to identify. . . : it is the phenomenon of war. Security studies assumes that conflict between states is always a possibility and that the use of military force has far-reaching effects on states and societies.” In his view, “security studies may be defined as *the study of the threat, use, and control of military force*” [italics original] and much of the literature fits “comfortably within the familiar realist paradigm.” Steve Smith (2005: 31) also comments that neo-classical works “constitute a powerful reworking of realist security studies.” Ken Booth (2005: 2, 3) further contends that “[t]he subject of security studies as it developed in the orthodox form during the Cold War was constructed in the image of political realism” and “out of political realism.” Political realists do not necessarily glorify war: they, in fact, study war in order to help prevent it from breaking out.

All theoretical perspectives on security still agree that “the starting point for the field is *insecurity*” (Terriff *et al.* 1999: 11). Insecurity still means different things to different people, however. Realists define insecurity “primarily as being vulnerable to being seriously harmed by others’ deliberate use of force” and security as “the nation’s freedom from rule by ‘others’ who are not part of it” (Terriff *et al.* 1999: 39, 43). National security remains the primary goal of states operating under international anarchy, because security threats remain permanent in international politics (Keohane and Nye 1985: 238). Realists would agree with Kenneth Waltz (1959: 416) that “[s]tatesmen and military leaders are responsible for the security of their states,” but not for humanity.

In recent decades, there has been a shift from the study of strategy to that of security (Keith and Williams 1997), as more and more scholars have sought to expand or broaden our understanding of insecurity by going beyond the intellectual boundaries found in realist security studies. Even

Stephen Walt (1991: 229) points out that the 1980s saw “a partial convergence between the sub-fields of security studies, peace research, and international political economy” and states that “the end of the Cold War will reinforce this trend by removing some of the substantive divisions between these fields.” Walt seems to recognize a broader agenda for security studies that includes the role of domestic politics, peace research, the study of security regimes, the power of ideas, and the relationship between economics and security. Security theorists examine actors to determine not only how and why they use or threaten to use violence, but also how and why they choose strategies that transform hostility into cooperation, eschew force or violence, and offer peaceful solutions to their conflicts. Edward Kolodziej (2005: 25) wisely contends that “to limit our search [and research] to war and violence as a scholar or analyst in security is not enough.” He includes the following theoretical perspectives: realism, neo-realism, liberal institutionalism, economic liberalism, Marxism, behavioralism, and constructivism. More perspectives on peace and security can still be included.

Theoretical perspectives that fit nicely within liberal and socialist security studies include neo-liberal institutionalism, domestic politics, commercial liberalism, democratic liberalism, and socialism. Unlike political realism, which tends to assume that state leaders are sometimes capable of acting foolishly, these non-realist perspectives are rationalist in that they tend to treat political actors, or some of them, as perfectly rational or regard either liberal or socialist actors as capable of cooperative behavior. Some realists resist inclusion of rationalist perspectives such as neo-liberal institutionalism (Mearsheimer 1998), but as Joseph Grieco (1988: 486) puts it, “[t]he major challenge to realism has been . . . liberal institutionalism.” A leading neo-liberal institutionalist, Robert Keohane (1993: 271) defends the point that “[i]nstitutionalist thinking has focused its critical fire on realism.” He and Lisa Martin (1998: 389) further claim that “the logic of institutionalist theory is directly applicable to security problems as realists define them” and that their theory “will ‘gradually invade’ the study of security issues.” Modern socialism (which stems from revolutionary thinkers and practitioners such as Karl Marx, Vladimir Lenin, Joseph Stalin, and Mao Zedong) poses a direct challenge to realism. It is an ideology predicting economic class interest-based warfare within and across national boundaries. Lenin’s theory of imperialism sought to abolish capitalism and build a communist state in Russia after the 1917 revolution. Mao did the same in China, where he predicted the eventual arrival of an “eternal peace” among communist states.

With the Cold War over, peace studies as an academic field is also said to have become increasingly relevant in security studies. Pacifism or idealism remains a force to be contended with and has in fact reentered the field in the form of “neo-idealism” (Kegley 1988). Laurence Freedman (1998: 53) notes that the shift of targets from “strategic” to “security” studies

“reflected the revival of the idealist tradition and notions of multilateral cooperation, thereby serving to delegitimize force as a primary tool of statecraft.” Peace research has been integrated into security studies (Haftendorn 1991; Terriff *et al.* 1999) and continues to provide an alternative approach to questions of war and peace. According to David Dunn (1999: 67, 68), “peace research exists as a legitimate approach to the study of war and peace in the 1980s.” The U.N. *Agenda for Peace* (1992) (focusing on peace-keeping, peacemaking, peace-building, and preventive diplomacy) and subsequent academic works could be observed through the lens of Quincy Wright’s 1942 peace program (Beck 1996). Some scholarly works on human security also fit nicely within peace studies.

The end of the Cold War also witnessed the development of other theoretical perspectives on security (critical of both realism and rationalism), which have since paid growing attention to the continuing power of historic, national, ethnic, and religious rivalries. The new security challenges have questioned whether the existing international institutions that have developed since the end of World War II (such as the United Nations) remain relevant (Dewitt, Haglund, and Kirton 1993). This development gave rise especially to constructivist security studies that includes knowledge-based perspectives, such as (neo-) functionalism, culturalism, social constructivism, post-Marxism, and postmodernism. The study of regional integration found in (neo-) functionalism “has always been a response to a security problem” (McSweeney 1999: 6) and regionalist perspectives have posed a direct challenge to realist security studies. Andrew Linklater (1998: 15) also notes the recent trend in security studies: “All such approaches—critical-theoretical, postmodern, feminist and liberal—have defined their identity through a series of challenges to realism.”

Another theoretical challenger to realist and liberal as well as socialist security studies is known as feminist security studies, which can be regarded as part of critical security studies. According to Anne Tickner (1995: 190), a leading feminist, “women have seldom been recognized by the security literature, yet women have been writing about security since at least the beginning of the [20th] century.” Feminists had long experienced difficulties getting accepted as part of security studies. In the late 1980s, however, various feminist perspectives on security began to draw attention from students in the field and “have proliferated in the post-Cold War era” (True 2001: 231). Valerie Hudson and Andrea M. den Boer (2005: 264) further contend that the relationship between national security and the status and situation of women remains under-examined and that “[w]omen’s issues, so long ignored in security studies, could well become a central focus of security scholars in the twenty-first century.”

Last, but not least, other scholars have in recent years broadened the concept of security to include a variety of nontraditional threats to survival. Threats know no borders and cannot be effectively contained by military

means. Transnational organized crime (including *jihadi* terrorism, piracy, and illicit trafficking), economic and environmental security, transnational migration, demographic changes, and health pandemics—these are new items on the nontraditional security agenda. Some scholars have resisted attempts to broaden the concept of security to include non-military sources of insecurity (Walt 1991: 213). Some, for instance, argue that environmental degradation does not threaten security (Deudney 1990: 463).

Whether one chooses to include or exclude nontraditional security issues is thus a matter of theoretical preference. The fact remains, however: nontraditional security as a new component of Security Studies has been established and has now become a growth industry. *Jihadi* terrorism as a form of transnational crime in particular has grabbed the attention of policymakers and scholars alike. According to Andrew Silke (2008: 28), “the five years since 9/11 have probably seen more books published on terrorism than appeared in the previous 50 years. Currently, one new book on terrorism is being published every six hours.”

Peace and Security Studies should always remain open to alternative theoretical perspectives critical of political realism. If this academic field was initially concerned with the question of war and political realism served as the intellectual pioneer, other theoretical approaches should be included as long as they directly challenge this dominant paradigm.

Our ultimate objective should not simply be to reject political realism, but to see if any of its challengers can do better. The big question is: has any perspective on peace and security now emerged as the hegemon in the recent struggle for theoretical hegemony in Peace and Security Studies? If none has, then it may be wise for us to aim at building innovative theories based on the strengths of existing theories. We now turn to the Asia-Pacific to see how and why it may help us answer the question.

CONTEMPORARY PEACE AND SECURITY STUDIES IN ASIA-PACIFIC

Peace and Security Studies has now become more region-specific. Based on Ken Booth’s observation that the academic field “divorced from area studies is largely thinking in a void,” both Joseph Nye and Sean Lynn-Jones (1988: 23) wisely contend that “[s]cholars in the field should seek greater expertise in the politics of particular regions.” Since the end of the Cold War, attention has also shifted from Europe and America toward the Asia-Pacific. This book thus provides a critical review of the various theoretical perspectives on peace and security in the region with a view demonstrating that this field of study has become increasingly region-specific.

The Asia-Pacific refers to a group of states that has been variously referred to as Asia-Pacific, Pacific Rim, and Asia and the Pacific. The Asia-Pacific as the

regional focus of this study is broader than East Asia, which includes only the Asian states in Northeast and Southeast Asia. Northeast Asia includes China, Japan, North and South Korea, Taiwan, and Russia, while Southeast Asia includes Cambodia, Myanmar (Burma), Brunei, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Timor-Leste (formerly known as East Timor), and Vietnam. In addition to East Asia, the Asia-Pacific includes Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States.

Recent trends appear to indicate that the Asia-Pacific will become the center of attention in the 21st century. First, the region is likely to become one of the most important in the world. Whether the 21st century remains “American” or becomes “Pacific” is a matter of debate, but we can still argue in defense of the broader “Asia-Pacific century.” The security role of the United States and the ascent of China to superpower status are likely to be a central focus of Peace and Security Studies. We cannot fully understand regional security by simply looking at what states do in Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia, or East Asia as a whole. What happens in the region often depends on the activities of great powers inside and outside East Asia. The security literature pays close attention to relations among powerful states, especially China, Japan, Russia, and the United States; these states are also directly involved as members of a regional security regime, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). One may contend that the United States “is not an East Asian state” because “it is external to the region,” but the same argument concedes that security development in this region could not “go forward without U.S. participation” and that “many of the East Asian states trust the United States more than they trust each other” (Buzan and Wæver 2003: 176).

The Asia-Pacific has also become a place where “so many of the leading winds of global strategic change are concentrated, not the least of which being the evolving power relationship between the United States and China” (Ayson and Ball 2006: xxii), and has become more important in security terms since the end of the Cold War. The region also offers a hard case for critical security studies (Dalby 2007).

Second, the Asia-Pacific has also enriched the field of Peace and Security Studies. Before and during the Cold War, the global rivalry between the two superpowers—the United States and the Soviet Union—rendered the (Euro-centric) Transatlantic the most important region in the world. Studies on East-Asian security at the time were empirically rich, but were not theoretically well informed. They lacked methodological sophistication, largely based on the “rational-actor” or ahistorical model that ignored organizational, psychological, and domestic factors. Much of what was written on Southeast Asia during the 1960s was also “permeated with implicit realist assumptions regarding the nature of the international system”; however, this work “seldom referred directly to the work of international relations theorists” (Huxley 1996: 231). But the main security events in the Asia-Pacific helped promote security studies and enrich the field. The Golden

Age of Security Studies emerged after the Korean War (1950–1953): the war “confirmed the militarization of the East-West conflict” and “strategy became big business” (Betts 1997: 13). The war also helped establish the new rules of the Cold War game (Jervis 1980). The U.S. war in Vietnam and U.S.–Soviet détente also called into question the utility of military force and emphasized the role of domestic politics and economic issues.

Third, the Asia-Pacific now enjoys a healthy growth of theoretical diversity. Muthiah Alagappa (1998a: 10–11) is correct when contending that “Asia can be said to be more broadly representative of the world than either North America or Western Europe” and that “[t]he study of Asian security can provide insights applicable to many other countries and regions.” This book thus provides a critical review of the competing theoretical perspectives on peace and security in the Asia-Pacific based on the various intellectual traditions, defined as sets of theories evolving over long periods of time but still being subscribed to by scholars, thus reflecting both continuity and the possibility of revision and refinement.

At present, the Asia-Pacific still provides rich empirical ground for political realism. There has been no shortage of realist scholars painting a grim picture of the region. East Asia once proved to be a region where wars of conquest continued unabated, and the end of the Cold War has not silenced the political realists, either, especially those who still see *realpolitik* at work in the arms races within the region.

A growing number of security scholars have studied the Asia-Pacific and come away dissatisfied with traditional realist pessimism, however. During the first half of the 1990s, they took comfort from the “peace dividend” and the growth of regional institutions. Some of those with optimistic views advocate the concept of collective security and can be labeled as realist institutionalists because of their emphasis on the role of great powers in the maintenance of international peace and security. A number of scholars began to take interest in entertaining the possibility of a Concert of Asia (made up of four great powers, namely, China, Japan, Russia, and the United States); however, they still differed on how such a regional security arrangement would eventually be established. On the ideal end of collective security is the old vision for international peace and security, with the U.N. Security Council (still dominated by five permanent members) standing at the pinnacle of power bestowed with the privilege of ensuring collective action against any state aggression.

In recent decades, neo-liberal institutionalists, political domesticists, and commercial and democratic liberals have also been paying attention to the security challenges in the Asia-Pacific. Neo-liberal institutionalists paint a rosy picture of security relations among states that have both experienced growing economic interdependence and engaged in institution-building. Those who focus on domestic politics tend to argue that domestic politics remains the key to understanding security. Commercial liberals have reason

for optimism because of economic interdependence and liberalization among states. Based on the post-Cold War process of democratic development in East-Asian countries such as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Indonesia, democratic liberals still pin their hopes for peace and security on further democratization in China and Russia.

Socialist perspectives have experienced major setbacks, especially since the Soviet disintegration in the early 1990s, but some have not lost hope that they will someday see a world not afflicted by capitalist war. East Asia has the largest number of states in the world that officially cling to socialism: China, North Korea, Laos, and Vietnam. Maoist insurgencies still cause trouble in states such as India, the Philippines, and Thailand. In short, socialists do not see the “end of history” after the so-called triumph of liberal democracy and still regard capitalism as an economic system that exacerbates security problems.

Scholars from other theoretical traditions have also focused their attention on the problem of peace and security in the Asia-Pacific. Peace- and people-centered, constructivist, and feminist perspectives have penetrated Peace and Security Studies.

In the Asia-Pacific, the number of scholars focusing on peace studies continues to expand. Although they have acknowledged that interstate war has been receding after the Cold War, they still consider armed conflicts among and within states worthy of their research agenda. They have also studied nonviolent methods for peace and security, such as international peacekeeping and peace-building (including international criminal justice, democratic institution building, and economic reconstruction). Peace teachings (both religious and secular) and the peace movements in the region also maintain a long tradition (Hunter 2006).

Other perspectives on peace and security have now made inroads into the Asia-Pacific. Within constructivist security studies, new perspectives have also emerged to challenge realism. Functionalism and its offspring (such as neo-functionalism and neo-neo-functionalism) have made a comeback. Policy-makers and scholars alike have shown more interest in the process of regional integration through trade and institution building. Culturalists tend to place emphasis on cultural norms and values as the key independent variable explaining regional cooperation in East Asia. Social constructivists have given further attention to the process of socialization and the strategy of engagement. Some scholars, including those of Asian descent (to be discussed later), have questioned Euro-centric theories of security, especially rationalist ones. For instance, they ask us to add ideational variables based on Asia’s diverse experiences, instead of European and American experiences (Alagappa 1998 a & b); to “rethink security” in East Asia (Suh *et al.* 2004); and to “reassess security cooperation” in the Asia-Pacific (Acharya and Goh 2007).

In the Asia-Pacific, feminists have now paid growing attention to the role of women in militaries and national politics, as well as in peace education

and other peace activities. They have studied the role of women in revolutions, such as those in China and Vietnam, the problem of militarization and prostitution in East Asia, the U.S. military bases located in military allies such as Japan and South Korea, and the protests staged by locals against the U.S. military presence in the region.

Nontraditional security studies has now received more attention in the Asia-Pacific, which continues to witness a growth of perspectives on various types of transnational organized crime, economic and environmental problems, population growth, transitional migration, and pandemics (Emmers, Caballero-Anthony, and Acharya 2006; Tan and Boutin 2001). Since September 11, 2001, as noted, the study of terrorism has been a growing industry. Scholars have also paid growing attention to other types of transnational crime (such as piracy and drug trafficking) and recognized economic and environmental problems as threats to security. States in East Asia gave birth to the formal concept of comprehensive security, which emphasizes economic and environmental security. Some scholars have now considered population and health issues to be sources of insecurity.

There exist a growing number of theoretical perspectives on security, although it must be pointed out that it is often difficult to label scholars in the field. Some consider themselves realists, but others question whether they are (Legro and Moravcsik 1999). Gideon Rose (1991), for instance, considers Fareed Zakaria a “neo-classical realist,” but Stephen Walt (1998: 37) calls him an “offensive realist.” Perhaps more than any other theory, postmodernism is quite complex and confusing to many scholars. Some proponents of the theory do not even make the term explicit.

Still, it may be wise to classify various theoretical traditions as follows: realist security studies, liberal and socialist security studies, peace and human security studies, constructivist security studies, feminist security studies, and nontraditional security studies. Together they fall under one broad umbrella: Peace and Security Studies.

Each theoretical perspective is judged on the basis of how well it can answer four basic questions: What is being secured? Different theoretical perspectives focus on different referent objects for security, including states, political regimes, societies, social groups, and individuals. What is being secured against? Sources of threat to security can be military, political, economic, social, or other. Who provides for security? Providers of security include states and international and non-governmental organizations. How is security provided and by what means?

This book rests on several standards of judgment. It evaluates how well security theorists answer the four questions about security. What states or non-state actors actually do (and why they do it and whether they succeed in their endeavors) matters more than what theorists think. Robert Cox (whose theory will be discussed later) may be right in stating that “[t]heory is always *for* someone and *for* some purpose,” but a valid theory must not

only be based on normative commitment alone but also have explanatory and predictive power with strong empirical support. Still, this book does not aim to reject any theoretical perspective, but rather to identify the weaknesses in all theoretical perspectives so that their proponents might wish to lower their expectations and possibly modify and further perfect them. This book also seeks to determine whether any perspective has now emerged as the “hegemon” in the struggle for theoretical supremacy in Peace and Security Studies. If none has, then it may be wise for us to aim at building innovative theories based on the strengths of several existing theories. Any theory-building efforts must rest on the wisdom that no theory is either completely false or completely true and that each theory should always be subject to modification, revision, and refinement based on normative commitment as well as empirical observation. Most importantly, this book establishes another standard of judgment: a good or effective theory must also be to show how security can be provided in a more comprehensive sense—national, international, regime, societal, and human. Sources of threat to security are both military and nonmilitary, and non-military sources have multiplied. An effective theory is thus one that can help us overcome them in a systematic fashion.

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Part I

Realist Security Studies

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Classical and Neo-Classical Realism

This chapter reviews classical and neo-classical realist perspectives on security in the Asia-Pacific. Classical realism still has some influence on security thinking in the region, but recent writings tend to favor neo-classical realism because of their emphasis on relative power, domestic politics, and decision makers' perceptions. Neo-classical realists tend to stress the rise of Japan and China, the dynamics of domestic politics, and political elites' perceptions. In general, they regard unipolar or hegemonic systems as more prone to international stability, peace, and security than multipolar ones. American neo-classical realists also tend to view regional security as dependent on American supremacy over the region; however, some have also incorporated theoretical insights from liberalism and constructivism.

CLASSICAL AND NEO-CLASSICAL REALISM IN A NUTSHELL

Classical realism is believed to have been influenced by Machiavelli, a figure much like Henry Kissinger or Tony Lake, of the Florentine Republic, who wrote *The Arts of War*. Classical realism tends to define power in objective terms. State leaders are driven by the ambition to maximize power with the aim of ensuring their own security. Niccolò Machiavelli (1469–1527) is known for his intellectual influence on classical realism based on the common belief in the selfish nature of humans. E. H. Carr (1939: 63) characterizes Machiavelli as “the first important political realist” who revolted against utopianism. Machiavelli’s work is focused on how the

prince can sustain his government. The interstate system is anarchical (no single state dominates the world), but it remains less important than human nature as an independent variable explaining princes' warlike behavior. Princes seek war, despite all the dangers, in order to augment their glory.

A military thinker who laid the foundations for a permanent and professional army, Machiavelli is known for saying "it is much safer to be feared than to be loved." To be safe and secure, princes must be like "lions" and "foxes" and must command generals with unlimited authority as in the Roman tradition. They must reject the widespread Renaissance belief that they would always remain helpless toys in Fortuna's hands and must do all they can to make themselves as strong and powerful as possible; thus, they must expand and conquer. The goal of the professional army is this: a complete defeat of the enemy in wars that should be "short and sharp" rather than long or protracted (Gilbert 1986: 24). Machiavelli drew lessons from ancient Rome: he "wanted Rome's battalions and legions and cohorts" (Boesche 2003: 37) that once gained glory, thus preferred glorious imperialism to balances of power, and believed that republics with permanent and professional armies were best for imperial expansion and the best guarantee of survival against both domestic and external enemies.

Hans Morgenthau (1985) is considered the modern founder of the scientific approach to classical realism. The nation-state may one day fade, because globalization may eventually render it "no longer valid" and "obsolete." To him, the state (not the prince) remains the primary actor in international politics and the referent point for security. The sources of threat are of a political and military nature rooted in human nature, which "has not changed since the classical philosophies of China, India, and Greece endeavored to discover [the law of politics]" (Morgenthau 1985: 4). As the result of such human nature, the world remains insecure: state leaders are driven by an innate desire to dominate others. History shows that states continuously prepare for and engage in organized violence or war. The type of power on which national security rests has the following characteristics: secure geographical boundaries, large territorial size, self-sufficiency in natural and industrial resources, and a solid technological base on which rests a strong military capability. Moral codes may influence individuals, but they do not make states moral agents. One of the principles of realism is that there are no universal moral standards on which states can agree. Effective balance-of-power systems are multipolar. Multipolarity invites caution from state leaders: numerous poles create a higher degree of uncertainty, making it more difficult for them to take decisive action.

International stability based on balance-of-power politics alone remains precarious. The systems "are essentially unstable" (Morgenthau 1985: 89). When a state becomes powerful and pursues imperialist policies,

other states either yield or seek to balance it, “or war decides the issue.” Struggles among states end only when a “world state” exists. A world state “is indispensable for the survival of that world”; however, it “is unattainable under the moral, social, and political conditions prevailing in the world of our times” (*ibid.*: 361). For now, peace can only be attained through accommodation with diplomacy as the main political instrument.

Neo-classical realism can be traced back to the work of the Greek war historian Thucydides. Colin Gray, who considers himself a neo-classical realist, makes the following observation about Thucydides: “It is not at all obvious that eighty years of careful scholarship in the twentieth century, from the aftermath of the First World War to the present day, have produced guidance on the causes of war noticeably superior to that offered by Thucydides” (Gray 1999: 162). Thucydides provides one of the most enduring realist statements on relative power as the key variable in the study of war: “the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must” (Thucydides 1972: 402). The real cause of the Peloponnesian War (431–415 B.C.) was “the growth of the power of Athens and the fear which this caused in Sparta.” The growth of their own military power led the Athenian leaders to see their city-state as superior to other city-states in Greece and to seek hegemony as the way to guarantee its security.

Neo-classical realists do not argue that human nature is irrelevant. Gray (1999: 175), who argues that “Clausewitz [still] rules” and that “the future is the past,” writes: “I fight, therefore I am human.” In his view, “we humans are so gripped by some of the less attractive features of our nature as to be obliged to function according to a notion of prudence that has to include a willingness to fight” (*ibid.*: 181). Overall, however, neo-classical realists have become less concerned with human nature as the main source of political ambitions and military aggression than classical realists, but more attuned to the impact of relative material power, domestic politics, and state leaders’ perceptions.

Neo-mercantile realists think about national wealth and international economic competition based on the idea of developing and commercializing new technologies, manufacturing products, and exporting them. In the words of Stephen Krasner (1983: 320–21), “national security can be defined to include not only the core objectives (territorial integrity and political independence) but a number of other values as well, some of which are economic.” The state is thus encouraged to play an economic role.

As their economic and military power grows, states become expansionist. Nazli Choucri and Robert North (1975: 1) put it forcefully: “a growing state tends to expand its activities and interests outward—colliding with the spheres of influence of other states—and finds itself embroiled in international conflicts, crises and wars. . . . The more a state grows, and thus the greater its capabilities, the more likely it is to follow such a tendency.”

Robert Gilpin's political law of "uneven growth" of national power leads to a similar conclusion: as the power of a state increases, that state will be tempted to try "to change the international system in accordance with its particular set of interests" (Gilpin 1981: 94–95). Fareed Zakaria (1998: 19) makes a similar argument: "increased resources give rise to greater ambitions." Rising states seek to build large armies, entangle themselves in politics beyond their borders, and seek international influence.

Other neo-classical realists also see the dangers of revisionist powers. While great powers manage the international system and thus remain satisfied or pro-status quo and dissatisfied states attempt to free ride on the offensive efforts of others, revisionist states are generally predatory. Revisionist state leaders are assumed to lust for empire and seek to expand power by being on the bandwagon, coveting far more than what they possess, taking great risks, or pursuing reckless expansion (Schweller 1995: 278–81). Aaron Friedberg (1996b: 13) further reminds us of how rising or emerging powers "seek to change, and in some cases to overthrow, the status quo and to establish new arrangements that more accurately reflect their own conception of their place in the world."

In general, neo-classical realists remain skeptical about peaceful power transitions, primarily because of the fast-growing challenger's revisionism or the hegemonic power's preventive actions against revisionist states. State leaders do not wait until threats grow out of hand, but actively seek to reduce international uncertainties. According to Gideon Rose (1991: 152), "Instead of assuming that states seek security, neoclassical realists assume that states respond to the uncertainties of international anarchy by seeking to control and shape their external environment." State leaders seek to maximize international influence. Zakaria also makes this point clear: "states seek more than mere security: they seek influence over the international environment. And the more powerful they become, the more influence they seek" (Zakaria 1998: 185). The interstate system thus remains inherently unstable and prone to war.

Neo-classical realists add two key intervening variables to classical realism: domestic politics and state leaders' perceptions. Relative material power alone does not explain states' foreign policy behavior. States are not treated as the "black boxes" that some realists assume they are. "Statesmen, not states," argues Zakaria (1998: 42), "are the primary actors in international affairs." Zakaria (1998: 38) argues that "statesmen encounter not only pressures from the international system but also constraints that are the consequence of state structure, chiefly the degree to which national power can be converted into state power." Domestic politics remain important to neo-classical realists, not because they see political actors competing with each other for power within their national boundaries, but because state leaders seek to protect or promote their national interests by mobilizing domestic support for their initiatives. According to Thomas Christenson

(1996: 11), state leaders cannot implement their foreign policy decisions through their state's military capabilities alone; they also use national power defined as their ability "to mobilize their nation's human and material resources behind security policy initiatives." For William Wohlforth (1999: 40), states cannot behave aggressively if constrained by domestic burdens like welfare costs and consumer culture.

According to neo-classical realism, perceptions of relative power also matter. The distribution of power can also be miscalculated or misperceived. William Wohlforth (1995: 39) notes that "if they [realists] wish to account for specific episodes of change [such as the end of the Cold War], they must take a perceptual approach to power." Fareed Zakaria also takes perception into account: "statesmen will expand the nation's political interests abroad when they perceive a relative increase in state power, not national power" (Zakaria 1998: 35, 38, and 42). States behave according to leaders' perceived realities of objective power. Political leaders do not operate in the same way under the same objective conditions, as classical realists tend to believe. Some state leaders are pro-status quo or defensive, while others are offensive or revisionist, but they do their best to serve their state's interests (Christenson and Snyder 1990).

Neo-classical realists tend to regard rising states as prone to revisionism or expansionism but advocate unipolarity or hegemony. In their view, international institutions are incapable of maintaining peace. Hegemonic stability theory is particularly relevant. Robert Gilpin (1997: 15), for instance, makes this preference clear: "In a highly interdependent world economy, economic relations among the great and even the small powers help provide both the glue holding the international community together and the friction driving nations apart." Regime formation depends on a hegemon both willing and able to enforce rules. Regimes weaken when their hegemons decline (Gilpin 1987: 345). Wohlforth (1999: 9) views unipolarity as durable and peaceful, especially "when one state's capabilities are too great to be counterbalanced" or when the preponderant power remains undisputed. Schweller (1995: 281) also argues that the international system remains stable when the pro-status quo states (likened to "the kings of the jungle") "are far more powerful than revisionist states."

PERSPECTIVES ON THE RISE OF ASIAN POWERS

Some Asian strategists are regarded as Machiavelli's children. Richard Samuels (2003), for example, examines Japanese policy elites who were eager to work toward placing their state among the great powers. They were ambitious to the extent that they sought to establish parity with the rest of the world by striving to eliminate the "unequal treaties" imposed on them by the West, by thriving to become a "first-class" nation, and by being determined to "catch up" and surpass the West (Samuels 2003: 12).

But before Machiavelli and Morgenthau, Kautilya (the key advisor to the Indian king Chandragupta Maurya [c. 317–293 B.C.]) and Sun Tzu advised state leaders and military strategists to secure themselves and their states. Kautilya's work on war and diplomacy reveals his wish to see his king become a world conqueror, his distrust of moral pleas when faced with a superior force, his approval of secret agents willing to kill enemy leaders and sow discord among them, his view of women as a weapon of war, and his belief in the spread of disinformation and the use of religion and superstition to demoralize enemy troops and to bolster the morale of his own (Boeshe 2003). Sun's work, which describes states in the “Warring States” period (453–221 B.C.), perhaps the bloodiest era in Chinese history, also attacks moral reasoning and advises leaders, faced with armed and dangerous neighbors, to take action that would help them to survive in an era where warfare became an instrument of power politics (McGreal 1996: 30–33).

Sun was a classical realist in that he placed strong emphasis on human nature, material power, and cost-benefit calculations. Like Machiavelli and Hobbes, Sun believed that human beings are naturally wicked. For him, “war is a natural aspect of the political and social environment of man . . . an expected, if unwelcome, mark of human behavior” (McGreal 1996: 32). Human beings disregard morality; human nature must be controlled by force. When asked if he could turn two platoons of concubines into troops, he demonstrated a simple logic of power; he divided them into different units, commanded by the king's two favorites. When the “troops” giggled instead of following his commands, he ordered the two “officers” beheaded on the spot. The next most senior concubines were put in their places, and the “troops” now flawlessly obeyed Sun's commands.

Sun Tzu's tactics include his advice to state leaders that they should assess their power as accurately as possible (Sun 1988). Power can be defined in material terms. When it came to preparing future battles, military leaders were prohibited from using superstitious rituals of prediction. They also had to be prudent by not trusting the intentions of other state leaders and had to pay attention to their capabilities (especially military ones, such as the strength of the opponent and the number of troops). State and military leaders would be wise not to assume that other states will not attack them and should thus prepare for war. They are also urged to show an ability to calculate the costs and benefits of alternative courses of action and to pay attention to the consumption of economic resources in warfare. For instance, Sun urges generals and leaders to ask such questions as: “Whose troops are stronger? Whose officers and soldiers are the better trained? Whose system of rewards and punishments is clearer?” and adds that this “is how you can know who will win” (*ibid.*: 46).

Sun Tzu did not advise leaders to wage war at all costs, however. In his words, “those who win every battle are not really skillful—those who render others’ armies helpless without fighting are the best of all” (Sun 1988: 67). This includes his warning against any siege of cities unless it is “done as a last resort” (ibid.: 20). If possible, non-military means (such as intimidation, spying, deception, and the disruption of enemies’ military alliances) should be pursued. Based on experiences from the “Warring States” period, he concluded that disrupting or splitting the military alliances of enemy states was the most cost-effective way to win a struggle for power. For example, spying on enemies helps leaders gain strategic advantage: “only a brilliant ruler or a wise general who can use the highly intelligent for espionage is sure of great success. This is essential for military operations, and the armies depend on this in their actions” (ibid.: 172). Although he did not want leaders to wage war at all costs, he wanted to see them win by using any available means, including nonmilitary tactics. Unlike Machiavelli (but like Kautilya), he “did not care a whit for glory and fame,” but just “wanted to win at all costs and to keep casualties—on both sides—to a minimum” (Boesche 2003: 37).

Sun Tzu’s strategic thinking remains influential in China today. Some Chinese military officers have proposed a strategy of “unrestricted war” as the way to stand up to the United States because China’s military power would not be enough to take on U.S. military power. Two Chinese colonels, for instance, wrote a book arguing that, “Unrestricted War is a war that surpasses all boundaries and restrictions. . . . It takes nonmilitary forms and military forms and creates a war on many fronts. It is a war of the future” (Pomfret 1999). According to Pomfret (1999), the Chinese strategy of unrestricted war is a marriage between Sun Tzu’s *Art of War* and modern military technology, as well as economic globalization. This strategy is based on the idea that weak states like China must not comply with the rules set by the West and must adopt their rules to ensure military victory. It is thus possible to combine terrorism, drug trafficking, environmental degradation, and computer virus propaganda with Sun Tzu’s *Art of War*.

Sun Tzu has also had an intellectual influence on Western writers. Robert Kaplan, who wrote *Warrior Politics* (2003), for instance, draws on the wisdom of past strategic thinkers such as Sun (and others like Machiavelli) and makes the case that we live in a world of unstable states and face an uncertain future. For Kaplan, Sun helps state leaders to avoid war by thinking strategically. To ensure peace and security, states must avoid bloodshed by concentrating their own efforts on gaining strategic advantage through tactics that include deception, spying, and intelligence gathering.

Some neo-classical realists see potential conflict in the Asia-Pacific because they regard multipolarity as prone to war: “Europe’s past could be Asia’s future” (Friedberg 1996a: 5). “Asia . . . will probably contain a group of big powers (including China, India, Russia, and Japan, with the United

States playing a role from across the Pacific) as well as several somewhat less powerful, but still potentially quite capable actors" (ibid.: 11). The international system today is "unipolar," and "is likely to remain so for some time to come" (Friedberg 2000, 2005), but it will likely become dangerously multipolar.

In the late 1970s, neo-classical realists tended to regard the fast rise of Japan as a potential problem in regional or world affairs. In the late 1980s, the United States was viewed as being on the decline, whereas Japan was then regarded as being on the road to great power status in pursuit of a *Pax Nipponica*. Neo-mercantile realists remain cautious: Japan has not turned itself into a military great power. Its aims are regarded as advancing its technoeconomic position through relative gains in technological prowess (Heginbotham and Samuels 1998). Elements of this grand strategy remain "consistent with its nineteenth-century strategy, when Japan's survival depended on the rapid acquisition of foreign technology and the modernization of its industrial base" (ibid.: 173). The only difference is that 19th-century Japan built its economic base for the purposes of improving its military power. In contrast, modern Japan has sought to strengthen its technological, industrial, and economic position in the world.

The Japanese tended to compete with other major industrial powers and to deepen economic ties with less industrialized states. Toward other major industrialized states, such as the United States and those in Europe, Japan became sensitive to the distribution of relative economic gains and remained reluctant to integrate its economy reciprocally with them, viewing them as threats to its economic security. Japan bandwagoned with the United States militarily, but balanced it economically. Economic rivalries among major industrialized states tended to perpetuate a state of "technoeconomic security dilemmas" closely associated with the logic of "technoeconomic competition."

Richard Samuels further noted recently that Japanese revisionists have sought to transform Japan into a normal great power with a grand strategy based on both the military threats from China and North Korea and the old ambitions of their forebears. According to Samuels (2007: 190), Japan pledged its support for the U.S. global strategy: "Japanese leaders have long referred to the archipelago as 'America's unsinkable aircraft carrier,' but the shared ambitions for this expeditionary platform are bolder than ever now that Japan's revisionist leaders have signed on to a global partnership." Moreover, Japan has now modernized and expanded the Japan Coast Guard's "power projection capabilities" and its "ability to project influence" (Samuels 2007/2008: 85).

More recently, however, neo-classical realists have shifted their focus to the rise of China as a hegemon with new political ambitions. They tend to liken this Asian power to Thucydidean Athens, imperial Germany, and the Soviet Union, thus regarding it as a potential superpower threat to the

United States. The Chinese elite's political ambitions and their sensitivity to the growth of their country's power have led some scholars to portray China as a "revisionist power," as opposed to the status quo powers like the United States. China is generally treated as a fast-growing power that is becoming "dissatisfied with the existing traditional hierarchy of prestige in the diplomatic area" and "may want to demonstrate that it is not a second rank nation in the region" (Kim 1997: 167). Christensen (2002) views it as a "conditionally or potentially revisionist" power.

Other neo-classical realists also believe that China is trying to become a hegemonic power capable of challenging the United States. According to Aaron Friedberg (1996a: 18), "China is both the single biggest factor and the single largest question mark in the Asian geopolitical equation . . ." and "the struggle for mastery in Asia" continues because China wants to displace the United States as the preponderant power in the region, even though the United States is unwilling to abandon its present dominant position (Friedberg 2000). More recently, Friedberg (2007: 39) writes: China "is fast acquiring military capabilities that will allow it to contest America's long-standing preponderance in the Western Pacific." He then adds that "[i]n East Asia and beyond, Beijing is working assiduously to enhance its own influence, while at the same time seeking quietly to weaken that of the United States." Paul Dibb (2006) further argues that with its material power continuing to grow, China poses a more durable and substantial threat to U.S. world supremacy than does terrorism.

By and large, neo-classical realists do not believe material power alone drives state behavior. National economic culture matters as well. According to Robert Gilpin (2003: 299), Japan and the United States remain "uneasy trading partners," primarily because their "modes of capitalism" are "inherently incompatible." The two national economies are fundamentally different and thus prone to competition and conflict: the United States has what Gilpin calls "managerial capitalism," whereas Japanese capitalism is one characterized as "collective capitalism." Managerial capitalism is based on the realities of corporate power and strong commitments to individual consumers. Collective capitalism in Japan has been based on the tripartite alliance of government bureaucracies, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), and big business. The Japanese subordinate their pursuit of economic efficiency to social equality and fairness, with the aim of preserving their national unity, independence, and uniqueness.

Domestic politics has also been seen by neo-classical realists as having an impact on Chinese leaders' ambitions. According to Christensen (1996: 6), for instance, "Mao in 1958 . . . decided to mobilize [China] . . . around long-term strategies designed to respond to . . . shifts [in the balance of power]." He adds that, "The manipulation or extension of short-term conflict with the other nation, while not desirable on straightforward international or domestic grounds, became useful in gaining and maintaining

public support for the core of grand strategy.” The end of the Cold War has provided more evidence that Chinese elites continue to pursue the path of state power by relying on the need to mobilize popular support for their grand strategy. The Communist Party relies on nationalism as an important element of its political legitimacy, often manipulating Chinese public resentment toward past Japanese imperialism in order to do so.

Domestic perceptions have also prevented Chinese leaders from getting soft on Taiwan and Japan. Christensen (2001) demonstrates that China has two major security concerns that defy defensive logic and power balancing: the political geography of the Taiwan issue and eroding norms of Japanese self-restraint. For instance, he devotes his analytical attention to the Sino-Taiwanese rivalry, which threatens to escalate into an interstate war. China is not a status quo power in that it does not accept a *de facto* territorial condition associated with Taiwan’s stance on its political independence. If Taiwan acquired defensive weapons, Chinese leaders would perceive them to be of an offensive nature capable of legitimizing the territorial status quo or of reasserting Chiang Kai-shek’s irredentist designs on China. Chinese political leaders might find it justifiable to take action against a recalcitrant Taiwan. They are driven by “[t]he need to preserve national integrity, to prevent domestic chaos in China, and, most of all, to preserve the reign of the CPP, which could easily be threatened by a blow to its reputation as a defender of national sovereignty” (ibid.: 59). Moreover, to the Chinese, Japan has the potential to become a great military power with old aggressive intentions. This fear is rooted in their perception of Japanese military capabilities in the sense that Chinese leaders have more historical reason to distrust Japan than the United States.

Evidence somewhat validates the neo-classical realist interpretation of the region. As its economic power has grown, China has also sought to expand its military power. It has pursued a multifaceted military modernization program by increasing defense spending, expanding missile force, and augmenting naval capabilities. Moreover, the Chinese elites still consider the United States as their principal or most dangerous potential adversary (Flanagan and Marti 2003: 4–5, 19). Between 2000 and 2008, China acquired some 20 major surface destroyers and frigates and at least 31 submarines, seeking to project its military power. In March 2009, Beijing announced that it would increase its defense budget by 15% (to \$70 billion), and then its defense minister made it clear that his country would not remain the world’s only major power without an aircraft carrier. China plans to build between four and six aircraft carriers, commissioning the first by 2015 (Bitzinger 2009). Beijing no longer hides its long-term ambitions of becoming a great sea power as was evident during the 60th anniversary of its People’s Liberation Army Navy when ships and aircraft from China and 14 other states took part in the April 2009 show of force in the East China Sea.

Critics of neo-classical realism still question whether Japan and China have such ambitions. Postclassical realists call into the question the argument that Japan is bound to challenge American hegemony. According to Tsuyoshi Kawasaki (2001: 231), Japan is a rational actor and continues to maintain its Cold War alliance with the United States. During the Cold War period, “Japan did not have a strong incentive to change its defensive security posture into an offensive one.” The country remains content with the status quo (rather than becoming revisionist as neo-classical realists have suggested), having opted for “a defensive posture to maintain its currently secure position” (ibid.: 228) and has pursued a “security-seeking mission” (ibid.: 231). In fact, Japan still spends little on defense (less than 0.9% of its GDP). Avery Goldstein (2003a: 63) further contends that “China [is] not eagerly pursuing imperialist glory” and stresses that it “lacks any obvious ambition or reason to indulge a thirst for international expansion, let alone domination.” Political leaders in Beijing have now sought to reverse the reputation their country acquired in 1995–1996 “as an irredentist, revisionist, rising power, into the reputation China was cultivating in 1997–1998 as a paragon of international responsibility” (ibid.: 73). More specifically, China does not have Nazi Germany’s grand ideology of racial superiority and has no need for *lebensraum* to conquer its neighbors, nor does it have a universal ideology such as the Soviet Union once embraced.

PERSPECTIVES ON HEGEMONIC STABILITY IN ASIA-PACIFIC

Neo-classical realists put little faith in the power of regional organizations or institution-building efforts to effect significant change. According to Michael Leifer (1996: 57), these efforts can only make modest contributions to a “viable balance of power” and can only work within the context of a “prior existence of a stable balance of power.” One example is the perfunctory nature of the ASEAN High Council provided for in the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, a regional mechanism for peaceful settlement of disputes among the members, which “has not yet been put into effect” (Leifer, 1989: 150). The regional mechanism “has never been constituted.” Rather, national interest still reigns supreme in the region, and regional machinery “is distinguished by the primacy of the national foreign ministries”—a “primacy” that “reflects the national government’s determination to prevent centrist tendencies from developing in the form of cooperative institutions with more than a minimal service function” (ibid.: 142).

International institutions may prove able to cope with some uncertainties, but will never overcome the perennial “problem of power,” especially when powerful states are bent on disrupting the status quo. Multilateral undertakings, such as the ARF, are viewed as analogous to that of “Hebrew slaves in Egypt who were obliged to make bricks without straw” (Leifer 1996: 59). Multilateralism may help mitigate state behavior, but it will not

transform the anarchic system. Leifer (*ibid.*: 53) considers the security forum to be “a highly imperfect instrument” that “has not reduced military competition in the form of regional arms procurements.” The transparency promoted by the forum is a double-edged sword: while it encourages states’ openness to one another, providing reassurance that they have no aggressive ambitions, transparency can also cause alarm by making military capabilities known to other states. In a world without common government, goes the argument, the ARF “suffers inevitably from intrinsic defects.” At the heart of the ARF is its failure to address the problem of power. Seen in this empirical light, “the prerequisite for a successful ARF may well be the prior existence of a stable balance of power” (*ibid.*: 57).

Seeing the ARF as a “building on sand,” Robyn Lim further contends that this security framework “is likely to dig a hole.” China adopted a strategy of “divide and rule” by keeping ASEAN “in disarray” and could use the ARF to isolate the United States and its supporters. China’s “long-term strategy is likely to deter the United States from maintaining a balance of power in East Asia by raising the costs of conflict” (Lim 1998: 127). China’s political ambitions and its lack of respect for the interests and rights of other states in the region must thus be kept in check.

Some neo-classical realists, however, acknowledge the recent development of regional institutions in the context of military and economic power. Kenneth Pyle (1997), for instance, contends that the U.S.–Japan security alliance rests on the link between the United States’ military power and Japan’s economic power, a bilateral link that provides regional stability for economic cooperation. Donald Hellmann (1997) further concludes that the free trade-oriented Asia-Pacific economic order would not be possible without the full-scale participation and leadership of the United States as the center of the regional trading system. American leadership within the Asia-Pacific is still measured in terms of its dominant currency, technological innovation, and military strength.

But other neo-classical realists see potential insecurity in the region because American hegemony has eroded. Within APEC, the United States has shown little interest in providing leadership and has in fact pursued its interests. Meanwhile, the United States “shifted to a much more aggressive policy toward Japan” whereas Japan is “less willing now to follow American leadership” and instead puts “much greater emphasis on national priorities” and focuses “more attention on the creation of an integrated East Asian regional economy under Japanese leadership” (Gilpin 1997: 23). However, neither Japan nor China has exercised hegemony over the region. Japan has not emerged as the regional leader in the eyes of others and is unlikely to play an effective leadership role. Nor is China likely to emerge as the leader of the region. Critical of optimistic accounts of the Chinese economy being the second or third largest in the world and capable of surpassing the U.S. economy, Gilpin argues that China is unlikely to become

the leading economic power in the region in the foreseeable future. Chinese exports consist of such low-tech products as toys, low-end consumer electronics, textiles, and footwear. Chinese factories remain noncompetitive, as half of them are state-owned. China remains one of the world's poorest countries in overall GNP terms. It faces growing social problems, such as problematic inequalities among different regions, between winning and losing industries, and between rural and urban dwellers.

American neo-classical realists still favor the maintenance of U.S. pre-ponderance of power. Regional peace and stability rests on the inability of Russia, China, or Japan to transform the world's unipolar system into a bipolar or multipolar world. The United States needs to maintain its military capacity in the region and to keep its military alliances in good repair. Japan, not China, is still America's ally. Due to the historically based mistrust between China and Japan, as well as between China and Taiwan, Washington should maintain its military capabilities and should even develop the Theatre Missile Defense (TMD) system, but without Japanese collaboration so that it does not provoke China.

There is no consensus among scholars on whether China or the United States is likely to start a major war. Steve Chan (2004) contends that a rising China is more likely to be peaceful by seeking accommodation with the United States, but the latter is more likely to start a preventive war before the balance of power becomes unfavorable to its interests and values. But others contend that China also has a history of behaving as great empires, including Russia and the United States, have throughout history. According to Warren Cohen (2007), the Chinese Empire resulted from the ruthless extension of power that conquered lands and drove away, killed, and assimilated their inhabitants. In his words, "in the creation of their empire, the Chinese were no less arrogant, no less ruthless, than the Europeans, Japanese, or Americans in the creation of theirs" (ibid.: 683). China today is the product of thousands of years of expansion until it came under challenge from European powers and Japan. It remains unclear whether a hegemonic Chinese power will start a war against the United States, but history still validates neo-classical realism in that power transitions between great powers can create military tensions.

Moreover, neo-classical realism has been refined by both historical and current events in the Asia-Pacific and ideological as well as identity-based tensions, all of which make its proponents sound more like liberals and constructivists. Schweller (1992), for instance, argues domestic structure matters. Throughout history, declining democratic leaders tend to form counter balancing military alliances against rising authoritarian powers; however, declining democracies tend to seek accommodation with rising democratic states, instead of waging preventive wars against them. Friedberg (2007: 42) also writes: "closer links among the region's democracies [such as Australia, India, Japan, and the United States] are both desirable

and feasible.” The tensions between China and Taiwan also challenge the traditional deterrence and security dilemma/spiral models in strategic studies. Christensen (2002: 13, 14, and 17) believes Washington should adopt a “pro-democracy assurance strategy” without defending Taiwan’s quest for independence from China. Washington should adopt a “moderate” strategy that would allow it to help maintain its alliances and at the same time pressure China into a position that will not push the United States out of the region. Some neo-classical realists (Friedberg 2005) have now become more eclectic in their analytical thinking.

Offensive and Defensive Realism

Offensive realism parts company from (neo-) classical realism on the assumption that the anarchic international system strongly shapes state security behavior. Unlike neo-classical and offensive realism, defensive realism views state behavior in a more benign light. According to defensive realism, states are more concerned about defending their security than about maximizing power. State behavior is defensive in nature: they balance against powers that threaten them rather than relentlessly seek to maximize power in an offensive fashion. While some defensive realists stress the benign nature of international anarchy and put less emphasis on human nature and domestic society, others take into account the role of political leaders' intentions, ideology, and other non-material factors, as neo-classical realists do. Nonetheless, neo-classical realism views states as relentlessly searching for power amid international uncertainties, whereas defensive realism treats their behavior as defensive: states become aggressive only when threatened. According to defensive realists, the Asia-Pacific seems to be moving toward stability, either within a bipolar balance-of-power system (if either China or Japan achieves parity with the United States), or through a balance-of-threat system.

OFFENSIVE VS. DEFENSIVE REALISM IN A NUTSHELL

Offensive realism views international politics as dangerously unstable and prone to a great-power war. States behave selfishly; they pursue political

independence and defend their national interests. They are generally treated as “black boxes” or “billiard balls” that exist in a world of anarchy and need to ensure their security by maximizing power. For John Mearsheimer (2001b: 55), “a state’s effective power is ultimately a function of its military forces and how they compare with the military forces of rival states.”

Dangers are primarily rooted in international anarchy and power structure, rather than in human nature. “Structural factors such as anarchy and the distribution of power . . . are what matter most for explaining international politics” (Mearsheimer 2001b: 10). Anarchy does not allow states to relax or lapse into a (false) sense of security. States, especially great powers, cannot afford to trust each other, because they each possess offensive military capability and can never be sure about each other’s intentions. Because of anarchy, states’ intentions cannot be presumed to be benign. They “are disposed to think offensively toward other states even though their ultimate objective is simply to survive. In short, great powers have aggressive intentions” (ibid.: 34).

Mearsheimer places emphasis on systemic dynamics (rather than on human nature, perceptions, or domestic politics). In his words, “status quo powers are rarely found in world politics, because the international system creates powerful incentives for states to look for opportunities to gain power at the expense of rivals, and to take advantage of those situations when the benefits outweigh the costs. A state’s ultimate goal is to be the hegemon in the system” (Mearsheimer 2001b: 21). They are “power maximizers” in the sense that they “maximize their relative power” within the international system. There is no end to how much power states want. Great powers in particular “do not practice self-denial when they have the wherewithal to shift the balance of power in their favor, and that the appetite for power does not decline once states of have a lot of it” (ibid.: 168–69). Offensive realists thus expect states to expand their power at the expense of others, but they do not necessarily believe that states must pursue power recklessly. Eric Labs, for instance, observes that, “Successful expanders learn from past mistakes and they try to go about expanding in a manner that draws the least attention of other great powers” (Labs 1997: 13). Offensive realists thus reject any non-confrontational strategy for achieving national security. Mearsheimer rejects both bandwagoning and appeasement. Appeasement is a “fanciful” and “dangerous” strategy, since it allows the balance of power to shift in favor of the aggressor.

Great powers tend to think that being hegemonic (capable of dominating all other states in the international system) is the best guarantee for their own national security. To ensure security, they seek to achieve hegemony now, because this strategy would do away with any future power deficit. States want to eliminate any future uncertainties in international politics. As such, they tend to be revisionist, “primed for offense,” and will not stop pursuing power until “hegemony is achieved.” Mearsheimer puts it bluntly: “it is better to be Godzilla than Bambi” (Mearsheimer 2005: 48).

Offensive realists tend to emphasize the calculation of costs and benefits, nuclear parity, and structural bipolarity. Peace or the absence of war is possible when the “costs and risks of going to war are high” and “the benefits of going to war are low” (Mearsheimer 2001b: 10). Mearsheimer adds that, “In the nuclear age great powers must have a nuclear deterrent that can survive a nuclear strike against it, as well as formidable conventional forces. . . . The balance of conventional forces would be largely irrelevant if a nuclear hegemon were to emerge” (*ibid.*: 5). His type of realism is structural to the extent that nuclear weapons can effectively dampen hyper-nationalism (no need for nationalist appeals as state security depends on nuclear weapons rather than on popular support). Whether or not there is peace or war also depends on the number of poles in the international system. States seek to either “balance” or “buckpass,” but do not generally “bandwagon.” According to offensive realists, bipolarity is thus preferable to balanced multipolarity, which is preferable to fractious and unbalanced multipolarity.

Defensive realism is a more moderate perspective than the other realist ones discussed so far, and it belongs to two different intellectual political traditions pioneered by Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778). For Hobbes, war remains the source of violent threat to security in the condition of anarchy. Human nature remains important. Hobbes admired Thucydides’ insights into human motivation (fear, honor, and self-interest). Human beings are basically rational egoists who seek to satisfy their passions. All men are equal, but equality leads to fear (diffidence), which causes competition among them for needs and desires as well as rivalry. Rulers thus pursue “power after power”—a pursuit that ceases only in death. As a result, rulers seek to balance each other’s threat. As Hobbes (1951 [1651]: 183) puts it, “as to the strength of body, the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest either by secret mechanism, or by confederacy with others, that are in the same danger with himself.” This implies that individuals ensure their security by joining others to balance the strongest.

For defensive realists, sources of threat to security can be found in war at three levels: human nature, relative power, and international anarchy. According to Kenneth Waltz (1959: 16), “War results from selfishness, from misdirected aggressive impulses, from stupidity.” Driven by selfish goals, men behave badly. But human ambitions are not the dominant cause of war. Nor does Waltz locate the main source of war in domestic politics. There is no guarantee that the world would become peaceful if states were “good.” Moreover, possession of material power, not states’ intentions, is a major source of threat to state security. Power is defined in terms of capability: population and territorial size, resource endowment, military strength, political stability, and competence. Third, the state of insecurity results from the fact that “in a condition of anarchy, relative gain is more important than absolute gain” (*ibid.*: 198).

Unlike neo-classical realists who see the merits of unipolarity, defensive realists distrust hegemony and put their faith in balance-of-power systems. No matter how benevolent they think they are, hegemons “end up being less, not more, secure.” Hegemony always “contains the seeds of its own destruction” (Layne 2002: 237). To be secure, states seek to balance the overwhelming power in the system. Throughout history they have engaged in balance-of-power politics—a predictable pattern. Waltz wrote: “Balance-of-power theory leads one to expect that states, if they are free to do so, will flock to the weaker side. The stronger, not the weaker side, threaten them” (Waltz 1995: 72). Thus, “overwhelming power repels and leads others to try to balance against it” (Waltz 1991: 669).

For Kenneth Waltz and some other defensive realists, bipolarity and nuclear weapons make the international system stable. Achieving perpetual peace in the system is not possible, but systemic stability defined in terms of the absence of system-wide war is. Bipolarity is the most peace-conducive structural factor, as it reduces uncertainty better than multipolarity. Moreover, Waltz welcomes incremental nuclear proliferation. He reasons that “nuclear weapons are . . . a tremendous force for peace,” based on the logic that “the probability of major war among states having nuclear weapons approaches zero” (Waltz 1990: 731, 740). Nuclear weapons prevent war because they make it difficult for states to make miscalculations.

Other defensive realists add insights similar to those of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who regarded humans as born free and their nature as neither bad (disposed to violence) nor good, neither selfish nor selfless. Man is basically “a gentle animal,” whose social relations are neither warlike nor cooperative. Man has only simple wants, few fears, and compassion for the suffering of others. However, human nature is corrupted by social institutions. Domestic politics determines whether the international system is stable. Corrupt states cause war to break out: the rich trick the poor into accepting a legal equality of rights in property that secure their unbalanced superiority in possessions and influence. Armed with the power of the state, they pursue their interests at home and abroad. Growing numbers of humans lead to scarcity, origin of property, possession, rivalry, pride, hatred, and jealousies. This leads to individualism and familism, and *amour propre* (jealous status) rather than *amour de soi* (respect for oneself). War thus breaks out because of “land, money, and glory.” The state would be the ultimate liberator by destroying social ties and freeing the individual from loyalty to anything except the state. The democratic state represents the “General Will” seen as pursuing no whims or private interests that would lead the state into possibly frequent wars. Rousseau’s famous “stag-hunt” analogy remains highly relevant. Like Hobbes, he viewed anarchy as driving states to behave defensively in search of security (Hoffman 1965), but believed that power balancing alone would produce no peace.

International isolation helps reduce the dangers of interdependence. Non-provocative defenses also assuage conflicts caused by fear of preemptive attack and deter attacks.

Other defensive realist works have fit more nicely with Rousseau's framework. They do not regard human nature as something that cannot be overcome by domestic factors. Liberal democracy, for instance, can help dampen international aggression and war. For van Evera (1990/91: 9), "the domestic orders of most European states have changed in ways that make renewed aggression unlikely." Walt (1995: 229) also notes that "the extraordinary absence of warfare between democratic or republican regimes suggest that their *domestic* orders help reduce conflicts between them as well."

Under anarchy states feel insecure, even though they are often quite secure. van Evera (1998: 92–93) contends that "States are seldom as insecure as they think they are . . . [the] exaggeration of insecurity, and the belligerent conduct it fosters, are prime courses of national insecurity and war." He notes that "a chief source of insecurity in Europe since medieval times has been [the] false belief that security was scarce."

Because of their search for security, states tend to balance against perceived threats. "Balancing" is still more common than "bandwagoning." According to Walt (1995: 213–4), states balance against perceived threats rather than the threat of material power: "Although power is an important factor in [states'] calculations, it is not the only one." He contends that "[rather] than allying in response to power alone, it is more accurate to say that states will ally with or against the most threatening power."

As to how states can achieve security, these defensive realists offer several insights. For example, states should be aware of geographical factors. If their national borders coincide with oceans, lakes, mountains, wide rivers, dense jungles, trackless deserts, or other natural barriers that impede offensive movement and enable them to defend themselves using natural advantages, they should feel more secure. They should also adopt strategic independence instead of strategic preponderance. Moreover, states should not exaggerate their insecurity or the strength of offense, because offensive dominance is quite rare. The low death rate of modern great powers testifies to this reality. Defensive realists think states possessing nuclear weapons that do not seek to alter the status quo help them gain the advantage of overwhelming defensive military power. If offense dominance becomes dangerous, states seek to control it. States "should adopt defensive military postures and seek arms control agreements to limit offensive forces." They "should also maintain defensive alliances" (van Evera 1998: 90).

In short, defensive realism remains distinct from offensive realism in that the former seeks to explain states' pursuit of security with power as the means, whereas the latter regards power as the end in itself. Some defensive realists prefer to minimize human nature, perception, and domestic politics in favor of an emphasis on international anarchy. Others have shifted their

analytical attention to domestic and perceptual factors believed to have real effects on state security behavior. States—interested in neither glory nor power—maximize security by responding to perceived threats.

OFFENSIVE REALIST PERSPECTIVES ON ASIA-PACIFIC SECURITY

Offensive realists have generally agreed with classical or neo-classical realists regarding the Asia-Pacific in that they all pay analytical attention to the rising power of Japan and China.

Mearsheimer (2001a) in particular claims that his offensive realism can explain hegemonic-power politics in the Asia-Pacific. From 1868 to 1945, for instance, Japan expanded its power, and its successes resulted from the weakness of both Russia and China. From 1917 to 1991, the Soviet Union behaved the same way. More recently, he has paid special attention to the growing power of China as the greatest potential threat to the Asia-Pacific, especially U.S. national security. Northeast Asia is characterized as a balance-of-power system, which will evolve in one of two different directions.

The first possible scenario is that China, if it fails to perpetuate its economic growth, will not emerge as the new hegemon in East Asia. If that happens, the United States will not see the need to maintain its troops in Japan and Korea; as a consequence, Japan will remain the wealthiest power in the region. The regional security system will become multipolar and balanced—among China, Russia, and Japan—if Japan acquires nuclear weapons and builds up its conventional forces.

The second possible scenario is that China will become the regional hegemon, creating an unbalanced multipolar region. China is more likely the potential hegemon. Japan is physically isolated from mainland Asia and will not find it easy to secure a foothold on the Asian continent as it did between 1895 and 1945, because China and Korea are no longer as weak as they once were. The Japanese economy, with a GNP of \$4.09 trillion U.S. dollars, is currently about three times as large as the Chinese economy, but Japan has a smaller population, which makes it almost impossible for the country to have an army as powerful as that of China. Even with spectacular economic growth, Russia would still face the population problem. Only China therefore will have the potential to become the hegemon in Northeast Asia. Population and economic growth are the most important factors. If its economy continues to grow at the average rate experienced since the 1980s, China will likely “become wealthier than Japan and even wealthier than the United States” (Mearsheimer 2001b: 397). If China reaches the level of per capita GNP that South Korea has now, China will have a GNP of \$10.66 trillion, which would become far bigger than that of Japan (\$4.09 trillion) or even the United States (\$7.9 trillion). If China’s per capita GNP reaches half of Japan’s, its GNP would rise to \$20.04 trillion. If that happens, Northeast Asia would become a multipolar but unbalanced

and dangerous system, with China threatening to dominate the region. One of the basic points stressed in Mearsheimer's theory is that, as a regional hegemon, "China, like all previous potential hegemons, would be strongly inclined to become a real hegemon" and would have a considerable "appetite for power" (ibid.: 400).

For Mearsheimer, the second potentiality seems to be more likely and more dangerous in the long run. He thus comes up with a pessimistic prediction: the rise of China will not be peaceful and will eventually transform the region into an unbalanced multipolar system. As a hegemon, China would threaten the United States as no former hegemon—such as Wilhelmine Germany, Imperial Japan, Nazi Germany, or the Soviet Union—has ever done. As a giant Hong Kong, China would have four times as much latent power as the United States, become a "more formidable superpower," and make it difficult for the United States to stop it from becoming a global competitor. China is likely to attempt to challenge the United States and push it out of East Asia. The United States would then return to the region (if it had already withdrawn its troops), or maintain its troops in the region, because it would want to ensure that China would not become "a global peer competitor." The United States has no history of tolerating peer competitors and "will seek to contain China and ultimately weaken it to the point where it is no longer capable of dominating Asia" (Mearsheimer 2005: 48).

Offensive realists generally expect interstate rivalries in the Asia-Pacific to become increasingly intense in the 21st century. Mearsheimer (2001b: 5), for instance, predicts that "[t]he result would be an intense security competition between China and its rivals, with the ever-present danger of great-power war hanging over them."

Like other political realists, offensive realists disregard regional institution building in Asia or engagement policies, which are usually regarded as having a modest impact on power. As Mearsheimer puts it, "Engagement policies and the like would not dull China's appetite for power, which would be considerable" (Mearsheimer 2001b: 400). He further advises against counting too much on the peaceful rise of a trading, democratic Chinese state as a powerful force for regional peace. As he puts it, "Whether China is democratic and deeply enmeshed in the global economy or autocratic and autarkic will have little effect on its behavior." He then offers the key reason as to why this remains the case: "democracies care about security as much as non-democracies do, and hegemony is the best way for any state to guarantee its own survival" (ibid.: 4).

Peace in Northeast Asia would be guaranteed only if the United States "would encircle China to try to keep it from expanding" (Mearsheimer 2001b: 400). This strategy remains possible, largely because "China is still far away from having enough latent power to make a run at regional hegemony, so it is not too late for the United States to reverse course and do what it can to slow China's rise" (Mearsheimer 2001a: 60).

Offensive realism seems to have some empirical support. This type of realist work can be traced back to the structural evolution from the Chinese world order to the rise of Japan, to the age of imperialism, and recently to some struggles for regional supremacy. With the end of the China-centered tributary system (which existed for thousands of years), some believe, the nation-state system in East Asia “exhibited intrasystemic variations consonant with the tenets of neo-realism, particularly with the balance of power” (Zhao 1997: 11). States that followed the Chinese hierarchical world order sought to maximize power. Without China as a “world empire” or an “Asian empire” and without rivals for many centuries, Japan rose and subsequently sought to increase its military power and to dominate Taiwan and Korea. Just before the end of the 19th century, Japan emerged as Asia’s first industrialized state with a strong military power, and it attempted to revise the status quo by asserting its dominance in the entire region. Japan waged two wars: one against China in 1894, the other against Russia in 1904. This marked the beginning of Japanese imperialism, with “an undisputed position among the foremost powers in East Asia” (*ibid.*: 56). Japan continued its empire-making efforts from the mid-1930s to the early 1940s, engaging in the diplomacy of imperialism aimed at creating the “Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere.” This imperial policy came to an end only after the United States defeated Japan in World War II, but it can be argued that Japan continues to seek to increase its power. China’s military ambitions, as noted, also seem to validate offensive realism.

Mearsheimer’s offensive realism, however, has some weaknesses. It sheds no light on why the United States has not withdrawn its 100,000 troops from Northeast Asia. More than a decade has passed since the end of the Cold War, but U.S. troops still remain in the region, even though China “is still far away from having enough latent power to make a run at regional hegemony.” The United States has not behaved according to the realist logic of Mearsheimer (2001a: 57), because Washington “has been committed to engaging China rather than containing it.” Perhaps no country in the world has done more than the United States to make China as prosperous as it is today. Neither has Japan actively sought to maximize power by becoming a regional hegemon as it once did, even though it has the capacity to build nuclear weapons.

Other published works also seem to suggest that the China threat to the United States is based less on China’s military or material power but more on its “soft power.” Joshua Kurlantzick (2007), for instance, contends that China has launched a “charm offensive” and is likely to become a global power, perhaps the first nation since the Soviet Union to rival the United States in terms of competing to expand international influence. China is no match for the United States in military terms. As Kurlantzick (2007: x) puts it: “though Beijing is rapidly modernizing its armed forces, China’s army and nascent navy cannot yet match the mighty American

armed forces: the People's Liberation Army still relies too heavily on conscripts, wastes time studying useless political doctrine, and spends less than \$80 billion a year on its military, in contrast to America's more than \$400 billion." China has used its soft power to expand its influence by joining multilateral institutions, providing support to international peacekeeping, promoting economic growth in Southeast Asia, Africa, and Latin America, and avoiding any interference in the domestic affairs of other states. More notably, "China's lack of political openness and its state-centered model of development are strengthening unstable authoritarian regimes from Sudan to Burma to Uzbekistan" (*ibid.*: xii).

If this is the way China is seen to behave, it raises two questions. The first question is whether China pursues an offensive or defensive strategy. One can make the case that Chinese behavior is of a defensive one, because the United States remains an offensive power seeking to extend its domination over other states in the Asia-Pacific. According to Stephen Cohen (2008), for instance, Washington has pursued a "winner-take-all approach" to Russia since the end of the Cold War. American leaders regard themselves as having the right to oversee Moscow's post-communist political and economic development, and to break strategic treaties with the latter, such as the Clinton administration's policy toward NATO's eastward expansion. Another example is the George W. Bush administration's unilateral withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and its decision to grant NATO membership to states geographically close to Russia. Like Russia feeling the pressure of NATO expansion, China may feel the same.

All these contradictions beg the question of whether great powers like the United States and China are always offense-oriented in that they relentlessly seek to maximize power. Glenn Snyder (2002: 161), for instance, brings up this point: "Mearsheimer's offensive realist states are not on the offensive all the time. Occasionally they are faced with having to deter and contain a rival that seeks to gain power at their expense."

The second question relates to the extent to which material power matters. If China poses a threat to the United States, it seems that ideology also matters. Although Mearsheimer tends to measure power in material terms, he notes the impact of non-material factors. In his words, "Constructive engagement is predicated on the liberal belief that if China could be made both democratic and prosperous, it would become a status quo power and not engage in security competition with the United States." He criticizes the United States for ignoring "signals from the anarchic world," because "American political culture is deeply liberal and correspondingly hostile to realist ideas" (Mearsheimer 2001a: 61). It thus seems that the China threat to the United States is not primarily of a military or material nature but of an ideological and political one. We are left wondering why this might be the case. If the United States has both engaged China because of its liberal culture and helped the latter to grow strong economically, one wonders if

China would do the same when it becomes a liberal democracy. If this is the case, ideology matters quite a bit; authoritarian states are more likely than liberal ones to behave aggressively; liberalism makes it more likely for states that adopt it to engage with one another rather than to struggle for hegemonic power in mortal combat.

DEFENSIVE REALIST PERSPECTIVES ON ASIA-PACIFIC

Defensive realists share the view that states in the Asia-Pacific have struggled to gain and maintain their national independence, as well as to preserve the regional status quo. Japanese aggression during the 1930s, the ambition to create the East-Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, and China's role in the Korean War, for instance, were not driven by the desire for world or regional domination, but by the need to ensure national security. As one defensive realist puts it, "Japan's expansion in the 1930s and early 1940s and China's intervention in the Korean War are classic cases of how security-driven policies and fears of adversaries' future intentions can provoke conflict" (Taliaferro 2000/01: 147).

During and after the Cold War, defensive realists contend that China and Japan engaged in the security politics of balancing the U.S. threats. As Avery Goldstein (2003: 122b) puts it, "Under Mao Zedong's leadership, [China's] Cold War was distinctively realist, sometimes to the point of caricature." Other defensive realists had also predicted that Japan would one day rise as a great power and would balance more powerful Western states to ensure its national security. Both Friedman and LeBard (1991: 403), for instance, even predicted another major war between the United States and Japan: "The struggle between Japan and the United States, punctuated by truces, friendships, and brutality, will shape the Pacific for generations. It will be the endless game about which the philosophers have written, the game of nations—the war of all against all." Others see the possibility of a "political partnership" between Japan and China (Wang 1994).

Kenneth Waltz (1997: 915–16) also writes: "Some of the weaker states in the system will . . . act to restore a balance and thus move the system back to bi- or multipolarity. China and Japan are doing so now." With high economic growth rates and growth of its military budgets, China will emerge as a great power mindful of the U.S. desire for the preservation of the balance of power in the region through its military presence. The United States continues its policy of containment aimed at China by maintaining its alliances with Japan and South Korea. The Americans aspire to "freeze historical development by working to keep the world unipolar," but this "aspiration . . . is doomed" (Waltz 2000: 36), because the "effort to maintain dominance stimulates some countries to work to overcome it" (*ibid.*: 37). This sounds more like offensive realism, but Waltz does not endorse a strategy of power maximization.

Defensive realists see the downside of neo-classical and offensive realist strategy and thus call on the United States to abandon the strategy of off-shore balancing or that of strategic preponderance, no matter how benign it may be. Defensive realists in general regard any overreaching attempts by the United States to maximize power in the Asia-Pacific as inviting counter-hegemonic strategic measures from North Korea, China, Japan, and Russia. China in particular has its pride and military power and may pursue hegemonic ambitions or intend to become a world-class Pacific power in the 21st century, but the Chinese pursuit of power within the international system is of a defensive nature. Waltz's optimism that the United States would be wise to reduce its military presence in East Asia is based on the analysis that doing so would lessen China's fears and its drive to counterbalance. An upgraded alliance between the United States and Japan "would be a risky and provocative strategy" and "would provide tangible evidence of hostile U.S. intentions to those in the PRC who already contend that Washington is intent on adopting a confrontational policy toward China" (Waltz 2000: 14). A China-containment policy could also become a self-fulfilling prophecy where "a concerned China lashed out at its superpower adversary, thereby becoming the 'aggressor' that the containment policy was to prevent" (Carpenter 1998: 2).

Non-hegemonic prescriptions for peace are also based on the assumption that states in the region would seek to balance American power if the United States continues to play the role of a hegemon. Almost all governments in Asia, including U.S. allies like Japan and South Korea, showed a lack of interest in joining forces with Washington whenever the latter appeared to act more aggressively. This counter-hegemonic behavior became manifest when two U.S. aircraft carriers were dispatched to the region the moment tensions between China and Taiwan grew in late 1995 and early 1996: "Virtually all East Asian governments made a concerted effort to distance their policies from that of the United States" (Carpenter 1998: 13).

Defensive realists in general see dangers in the pursuit of hegemony and the virtues of strategic independence. Christopher Layne took his cues from Waltz when arguing that states always balance power, that the unipolar world is an illusion, and that the post-Cold War international system is bound to become multipolar. Japan's Meiji policy was a strategy to transform itself into a power of equal status with the Western powers. More can be said about China, which "too, has reacted adversely to America's post-Cold War preeminence" (Layne 1995: 161). He cited the work of a China scholar that "Chinese analysts reacted with great alarm to President George Bush's 'New World Order' proclamations, and maintained that this was a ruse for extending U.S. hegemony throughout the globe" (*ibid.*: 161). True to the logic of Waltzian defensive realism, Layne further warns that "a strategy of preponderance will fail" because other states like China and Russia

will rise “to erode the hegemon’s preeminence” (*ibid.*: 159). Layne (2006) further predicts the “coming end of the United States’ unipolar moment.”

Layne is said to be the first American scholar to advance the concept of “strategic independence” based on the argument the United States remains the most secure power in the world and does not need to fear other great powers that view it as a distant power. As he puts it: “Strategic independence is . . . a more realistic policy than the strategy of pre-ponderance.” The United States would make a military commitment to helping others “only if other states failed to balance effectively against a rising Eurasian hegemon.” It does not mean, however, “an isolationist policy that rules out the use of American power abroad” (Layne 1995: 175). If the United States were to adopt the policy of strategic independence, Japan should be encouraged to acquire “great power, including nuclear, military capabilities” (Layne 1996b: 73). Offshore balancing challenges the strategy of preponderance or primacy based on “burden-shifting, not burden sharing” by letting other states provide their own security; it is a strategy of restraint that can reduce the U.S. threat to other states’ security. In his own words, “Relinquishing America’s hegemonic role in East Asia would materially reduce the likelihood of a military collision between the United States and China” (Layne 2002: 246). Layne (2006: 40, 41) maintains that the United States can enjoy security without remaining an extra-regional hegemon by adopting “an offshore balancing strategy based on multipolarity and military and ideological self-restraint.” In a similar vein, Ted Galen Carpenter (1998) regards “strategic independence” as the best alternative for the United States to promote peace in the Asia-Pacific region.

For other defense realists, there is now reason for optimism. China and the United States have established a bipolar balance of power (Ross 1999, 2006a&b). China is a land power. In Ross’s view (1999: 84), “China dominates mainland Southeast Asia.” This dominance arose from the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Indochina in 1975; Thailand’s subsequent shifting policy from its alignment with the United States toward China, especially in the 1980s; Indochina’s closer relations toward China in the 1990s; and Myanmar as a Chinese protectorate since World War II. Thus, “by 1991 China had achieved dominance over mainland East Asia.” Moreover, “by the mid-1990s Beijing and Seoul had developed close strategic ties” because they “share considerable concern for Japanese military potential” and because South Korea is prepared for possible U.S. reconsideration of its eventual withdrawal from Northeast Asia (*ibid.*: 85), moving closer to China and farther from the United States (Ross 2006a: 210; 2006b: 371, 380–83). China is a rising great power; arguing otherwise will “not only obscure the reality that China is already a great power in bipolar structure, but also the understanding that China can destabilize only by challenging U.S. maritime supremacy” (*ibid.*: 92). For Ross, “China is the only country

that could conceivably challenge U.S. maritime power" (*ibid.*: 94), but it is unlikely to become revisionist or pose a superpower challenge to U.S. security because China has long and multiple inland borders to protect from foreign countries, and this will put constraints on its ability to expand its maritime capabilities (Ross 2006a). For its part, the United States as the most formidable global power remains the dominant maritime power in the Asia-Pacific. Despite the fact that the United States lost its military bases in Thailand (1975), pulled its troops out of Indochina (1975), and removed its military bases in the Philippines (1991), "these losses did not weaken either absolute or relative U.S. naval power" (Ross 1999: 85). In fact, "the U.S. navy dominates Southeast Asia" and "the combination of U.S. bases in Japan and superior U.S. air capabilities ensures U.S. dominance of the Northeast Asian naval theater" (*ibid.*: 86).

These two dominant powers "will be strategic competitors engaged in a traditional great power struggle for security and influence." In this sense, "the similarities between the dynamics of the Cold War U.S.-Soviet relationship and the emerging U.S.-China relationship are striking" (Ross 1999: 96). Nevertheless, the bipolar structure between China and the United States is likely to be stable because the region's geography provides a defensive rather than an offensive advantage. China is a defensive power with massive retaliatory capabilities and the United States "will remain inferior to China regarding ground-force activities on mainland East Asia" (*ibid.*: 109). The United States' defensive advantage lies in both China's inferiority in the maritime theatres and its inability to catch up with the U.S. air and naval capabilities. The Asia-Pacific is, therefore, likely to become peaceful: "each power has a defensive advantage in its own theatre" and "each resists an equivalent escalatory response to the other's military acquisitions" (*ibid.*: 109). In short, China is not a revisionist power, and together the two great powers are pro-status quo and thus likely to develop a more relaxed and stable great-power relationship.

To a large extent, defensive realists have a certain theoretical advantage over offensive realists in that the former can explain states' security policies in defensive terms. One could thus make the case that China's security policies may have resulted from American hegemony—the main source of military threat to China's national security. North Korea's nuclear program may have been driven by insecurity rather than by its ambition to drive the United States out of Northeast Asia (Sigal 1998).

Defensive realist predictions of state behavior may still prove illusive. Defensive realists predicted that Japan would balance the U.S. power and might even join a military alliance with China, but Japan has so far failed to do so and instead continues to balance the rise of Chinese power (Ross 2006b: 387–89). As noted earlier, China's ambitions of becoming a

great sea power have also become increasingly evident. Defensive realists still have no effective way of proving neo-classical realists wrong.

Some defensive realists still regard rising states as behaving defensively, but add other non-material variables. Avery Goldstein *et al.* (2005), for instance, reject the offensive realist argument about China's offensive strategy and further contend that mutual perceptions of hostility are deeply rooted in historical conflicts. China embraced balance-of-power logic only until 1996, but has since abandoned this strategy in favor of what Goldstein terms a "neo-Bismarckian" grand strategy based on a more active embrace of multilateralism and self-restraint. China no longer balances U.S. power but instead cultivates bilateral partnerships with the world's major states, namely, the United States, states in Europe, and Japan. Such bilateral "strategic partnerships" differ from military alliances that other defensive realists expect to see (Goldstein 2003: 77–83). Tang Shiping argues that China under Mao Zedong was an offensive realist state, but China has since become a defensive realist state because the new leadership's appreciation of the security dilemma has fostered security policy moderation (Tang 2008). States are capable of learning.

Defensive realism has also become increasingly liberal. Even Kenneth Waltz (1991: 670) still suggests that democracy also matters, stating that "on external as well as on internal grounds, I hope that more countries will become democratic" as if to admit that states' internal characters may also influence international anarchy. Christopher Layne (2002: 241) has softened his conception of power when acknowledging "the enormous cultural clash" between Islamic fundamentalism and U.S. liberal ideology. Fareed Zakaria (1995: 481) raises a relevant question: "One wonders if [some] defensive realists believe that if the diseases were cured—the military bureaucracies, mythmakers, and cartels abolished—states would pursue enlightened self-interests that would never trigger balancing collations, and the result would thus be a perpetual peace."

3

Realist Institutionalism

The realist concept of national security has been challenged by scholars and policymakers who have long sought to promote an alternative arrangement based on the concept of collective security, which “entails the imposition of diplomatic, economic and military sanctions against international outlaws” (Thakur 2006: 32). Power remains fundamental to the concept of collective security, though, because it cannot be completely eliminated (Kupchan and Kupchan 1998: 406). Interstate disputes and hostilities will never disappear and sources of friction among states cannot be removed forever. Power balancing among great powers may continue, albeit at a manageable level. According to proponents of collective security, the preponderance of power in collective security is superior to military balancing under anarchy.

Nevertheless, the Asia-Pacific provides little empirical support for the different perspectives on regional collective security. The Asian concert of power that some scholars expected to see after the Cold War has not happened. The Korean War (1950–1953) provides the best example of collective security in action during the Cold War, but it remains the only case of collective security being implemented in the region. Moreover, the collective action taken by the United Nations still does not provide a strong case for collective security, and even economic sanctions do not seem to have had the intended effects.

REALIST INSTITUTIONALISM IN A NUTSHELL

Collective security downgrades the realist logic of power balancing and ranges from what Robert Jervis (1985) calls a concert of power defined as a “nascent collective security system” (where the great powers of the day act in concert) to the ideal form of collective security, which rests on the idea that power is not exercised by the strongest power in the system in the form of hegemony, but by a community of states.

The oldest concert of power—the hard end of the collective-security spectrum—can be traced back to the early 19th century, after Napoleon’s defeat in 1815. The Concert of Europe emerged, and it remains the only classic example of how the major powers—Austria, Great Britain, France, Prussia, and Russia—managed their relations in a concert.

Concerts of power rest on the premise that war among great powers is the most serious source of threat to state and regional security and also that great powers are capable of providing collective goods, especially international security (Kupchan and Kupchan 1991: 120, 140). Great powers can play a crucial role in security management: their shared objective is to ensure that war among them will not break out in a post-hegemonic period. In the 19th century, they also dictated to less powerful states. They also served as norm creators and defenders, especially during tough times.

Scholars observe factors that contribute to the viability of the system. The major powers within a specific concert are assumed to be capable of joint efforts, based on several assumptions. First, the rationale for concerted action still recognizes realist ideas: the great powers must share a common fear of both anarchy and national revolutions believed to induce war. According to Robert Jervis (1985: 65), “this fear produced more of a common basis of understanding than is usual in international politics.” The great powers in Europe also developed “unusually close bonds” during the war against the hegemon and after defeating it (which produces a slight degree of altruism). They must share a common belief that the defeated hegemon is not a normal state, is ineradicably aggressive, and still poses a danger to them in the future (*ibid.*: 60–61).

Second and still somewhat similar to realism, the major powers as winners of a hegemonic war are highly sensitive to the costs of war—so much so that they are not prepared to wage another war “unless their most vital interests are at stake” (Jervis 1985: 61, 65). For them to achieve cooperation, they must also be aware of the advantages of cooperation. Moreover, they would not worry too much about the costs of others’ ability to exploit them if the costs decrease and lower the level of their vulnerabilities to the problem of exploitation, but all must be aware of decreased gains from it.

Third, concert members do not balance any enemy state’s military threat to their members’ security, nor do they seek to eliminate the perennial problem of power among the members altogether. Rather, concerts aim at

managing the problem of power among great powers in the international system in such a way that makes it possible for them to coordinate their relations and even to settle disputes among themselves.

Fourth, cooperation among the major powers within a concert increases when the level of transparency and timely warning increases. Transparency mitigates the security dilemma. A relatively high level of communication among the major powers increases the level of transparency and “reduces—although it does not eliminate—misunderstandings that can cause a breakdown.” This helps increase their “confidence that others are not planning to exploit them” (Jervis 1985: 74). Both inspection and verification—even in the absence of formal agreements—are essential.

Fifth, the great powers in a concert must operate in a highly informal way. Efforts at building formal arrangements are often viewed as problematic. A race toward demilitarization can be successful even when no formal negotiations take place or without any formal agreement. There are no binding commitments; decisions are made on the basis of informal consensus that allows for flexibility and effectiveness. Moreover, there are no collective enforcement mechanisms, since it is the nature of concerts to be informal and consensus-based; all this would allow the major powers to exercise self-restraint.

Last but not least, ideology also matters. Proponents of concerts view mutually hostile ideologies as an obstacle to power management among great powers, but see a shared ideology as a pillar for confederation. A common liberal ideology is seen as a factor that ties the great powers together (Kibbe *et al.* 2001: 366). Other scholars contend that ideological agreement among major powers is essential to modern concert-building efforts: namely, states must give “liberal democracy and economic development first priority” (Rosecrance 1992).

In their most fundamental ways, global and regional concerts remain power-based. As Arthur Stein puts it, “The goal of this informal structure [concert] would not be to replace the [U.N.] Security Council.” He further argues that the concert would “provide a more effective, conducive venue in which the Great Powers could reach decisions, which could then be enacted by the Security Council” (Stein 2001: 2).

While concert members balance under informal consensus, states operating in the most ideal type of collective security balance under formal rule, namely, international law. Collective security in its most ideal form was first enshrined in Article 16 of the League of Nations, but can be traced to Alexandre Dumas’ *Three Musketeers*, which first enunciated this principle: “one for all, and all for one.” Proponents of collective security continue to view nation-states as the main referent object for security. After World War I, U.S. President Woodrow Wilson, an advocate for collective security, made this distinction clear when he expressed his contempt for collective

defense advocated by realists who prefer military alliances as the best system for peace: “The day we left behind us was a day of alliances. It was a day of balances of power. It was a day of ‘every nation takes care of itself or make a partnership with some other nation or group of nations to hold the peace of the world steady or to dominate the weaker portions of the world’” (cited in Claude 1962: 81). Collective security is not a balance of power among states as realists suggest, but a community of power. Collective security is not organized rivalries, but “an organized common peace.” States are assumed to share a *common* interest in international peace and security rather than *separate* interests, but proponents of this perspective tend to believe that collective security ultimately helps moderate strategic competition and enhance national and international security.

Power occupies a central place in collective security. Claude (1962: 6) notes that “the problem of power is here to stay; it is, realistically, not a problem to be eliminated but a problem to be managed.” Power is managed through formal institutions, which operate differently from military alliances associated with the concept of balance of power. Collective security is referred to as balancing against aggression under the condition of preponderance under the collective leadership of the U.N. Security Council, dominated by the five great powers since World War II ended.

Collective security as a framework for collective action is based on several assumptions. First, this perspective remains state-centric; however, states as members of the collective-security community are said to behave differently from those that exist in international anarchy. All states within the international community are eligible for universal membership. According to Claude (1962: 110), collective security “purports to provide security *for* all states, *by* the action of all states, *against* all states which might challenge the existing order by the arbitrary unleashing of their power.” States thus remain the referent object for collective security.

The second assumption addresses the questions of what is being secured against and who provides for security. Collective security assumes that some states within the U.N. system may violate the norm of world peace according to international law, although most have renounced wars of conquest. The source of threat comes from war resulting from the aggression of some states that fail to abide by international law.

The issue of agency associated with the question of who is designated to take enforcement action is relevant here. According to the U.N. Charter, the Security Council remains the main organizer of collective security action. It is important to note, however, that collective security can also be achieved within a much more limited area, namely, within regions. As Marina Finkelstein and Lawrence Finkelstein (cited in Miller 2001: 172) put it, “The essential point, the touchstone, is universality of membership

for the region involved and the obligations that the members have assumed toward each other in the preservation of peace in their own area against threats emanating from within their area.” Regional collective security is a smaller version of global collective security, but it is not the same as regional collective defense. Regional organizations may take collective action, but they must receive authorization from the Security Council. In any event, all national forces must be under U.N. command.

The third assumption is that member states are bound by a universal obligation to support collective enforcement action against aggression. There is “a legally binding and codified commitment on the part of all members to respond to aggression whenever and wherever it might occur” (Kupchan and Kupchan 1991: 119). When a state behaves aggressively, it will face collective punishment from other states who are members of the United Nations. Claude (1962: 357) also writes: “Collective security assumes the lonely aggressor; the violator of the world’s peace may be allowed an accomplice or two, but in principle the evil-doer is supposed to find himself virtually isolated in confrontation with the massive forces of the international *posse comitatus* [force of the country].”

Members of this community are states presumed to behave as a “great mass” whose behavior is morally driven by a “positive commitment to the value of world peace” (ibid.: 250), rather than that of narrow-minded national security. Collective obligation is assumed to trump national interests. Claude (1962: 255) states how collective security actually works: “whoever commits aggression is everybody’s enemy; whoever resists aggression is everybody’s friend. Membership in a collective security system involves alliance with nobody in particular and with everybody in general.”

Fourth, collective security is said to work because states are rational members of an international society. Potential aggressors know they would face threats from the preponderant community of states, whereas potential victims can rest assured that the security system is reliable. Collective security allows for the application of coercive means—military and/or non-military—as methods to be collectively undertaken by the members. Military punitive actions rest on the belief that states are capable of pooling in their resources to form an overwhelming military power. Advocates of collective security thus do not totally ignore the realities of power in the international system, but emphasize that balancing against aggression is more effective than balancing under anarchy. The rationale is that “when it works, it confronts aggressors with preponderant as opposed to merely actual force” (Kupchan and Kupchan 1998: 399).

Moreover, economic sanction are measures that still rest on coercive power—the power “to coerce target governments into particular avenues of response” (Hufbauer *et al.* 1990: 10) falling short of the use of military force. Within the framework of collective security, the U.N. Security

Council has the legal mandate to impose economic sanctions to be carried by U.N. members in accordance with the provisions of Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. This coercive method for security rests on the rationale that target governments would be persuaded to change their policies when realizing that the issues at stake are not worth the price or that they would be overthrown by the revolt of their people who want better governments. Economic sanctions work when, for instance, there is a correlation between decline in aggregate gross national product (GNP) over time and concessions made by the target governments (Pape 1997).

A CONCERT OF POWER IN ASIA-PACIFIC

Several advocates who have studied this region have since the mid-1990s turned their attention to the idea of a multilateral Concert of Asia. One common concern they share is that we may be witnessing the emergence of a multipolar region dominated by four major powers: the United States, China, Russia, and Japan—and that a better way to promote national and international security is to build a regional concert.

There are now several proponents of an Asian concert. Amitav Acharya (1999) contends that evidence shows that these states have shown more interest in an organized concert to ensure regional stability as multilateral mechanisms such as the ARF came under criticism. “There was already a pattern of unusually frequent bilateral summits between these powers at around this time” (*ibid.*: 84). Great-power relationships between the four major players improved. China might find it useful if its leaders could see a concert of four powers as an instrument for enhancing its international status and for reducing its fear that smaller powers in the region will use multilateralism to gang up on it. The other three major players seem to have become more receptive to the idea of a concert. As Acharya confidently puts it, “The U.S. has supported ad hoc concert-based solutions to specific regional security issues. Japan advocates a concert-like consultative mechanism. Russia will be interested in any and all of these ideas if invited to participate” (*ibid.*: 98). Douglas Stuart (1997) also appears upbeat about trends toward a concert in the Asia-Pacific. It is possible for China, Japan, Russia, and the United States to engage in “delicate diplomacy” that would help establish a regional concert.

There are several reasons why a Concert of Asia could develop, some of which are realist. Susan Shirk (1997) sees the possibility of a regional concert among the four great powers in the Asia-Pacific based on their shared perception of threat from North Korea. As she puts it, “The effort to prevent North Korea from withdrawing from the Non-Proliferation Treaty and becoming a nuclear threat created a new concert-like pattern of consensus building among the four Asia-Pacific powers along with South Korea” (*ibid.*: 262). She relies on evidence found in the U.S. initiative taken in 1991

to persuade Japan not to establish diplomatic ties with North Korea unless the latter scrapped its nuclear program. During 1993 and 1994, the major powers worked toward a joint approach to North Korea, prompting their foreign ministers, prime ministers, and presidents to visit each other's capitals. In Shirk's view, "the United States no longer serves as the hub among this group of five countries. Negotiations are conducted directly between all the parties, not just with the United States" (*ibid.*: 263).

One of the three pillars of an Asian Concert-like system rests on what Douglas Stuart calls "containment." The region has not experienced the kind of threat that members of the European Concert system did (such as France's hegemonic ambitions in the previous 150 years): no hegemonic power in this region has been defeated. Russia may be playing the role of a defeated empire, but it would not pose the kind of threat that post-Napoleon France would. "Russia does not fit the bill as a candidate for containment in Asia" (Stuart 1997: 234), but neither does China. In his words: "Even Beijing's very troubling behavior toward Taiwan does not prove that the PRC has hegemonic ambitions" (*ibid.*). More can be said about North Korea, which is diplomatically isolated and economically in trouble. There are two major trends that must be contained, namely, nuclear proliferation and the inclination to use force. With the strategy of reconciliation in place, major powers can stand united on the need to put pressure on China in order to help contain the spread of nuclear weapons to a country like North Korea. They can also send a clear message to Beijing that any policy of military intimidation or confrontation to achieve political ends is unacceptable.

Other scholars have also searched for common interests and values that the major powers could use to manage their relations. Evan Feigenbaum (2001) adds two factors: a common threat from global terrorism and a shared value in humanitarian intervention. China, Japan, and the United States could act on a bilateral or trilateral basis to expand the scope of law enforcement cooperation to counter terrorism, a challenge all three states share. Feigenbaum believed the United States should open a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Legal Attaché Office in Beijing. The three Asia-Pacific powers should also consider humanitarian relief as an activity that could further promote coordination of their relations. They should institutionalize dialogue on peacemaking and peacekeeping needs. None of them should be concerned about subordinating their contributions to U.N. oversight, because they are still under the auspices of the U.N. Security Council, of which both the United States and China are permanent members. Japan should also decide to strengthen its peacekeeping role. Together, the three powers should be able to institutionalize their trilateral cooperation in the areas of food deliveries and medical relief: China has extensive experience in relief work in North Korea and in managing natural disasters; Japan has gained the experience of handling the Tokaimura nuclear incident; the United States has accumulated experience in providing international

humanitarian relief. This prescription for trilateral cooperation rests on the assumption that external sources of conflict divide the three powers, and “it is the many sources of internal sources of violence that seem most likely to cause political breakdown in the future” (Feigenbaum 2001: 128).

Another factor that makes a Concert of Asia possible is that its proponents believe that it is possible for states in the Asia-Pacific to develop informal ties. Acharya (1999) thinks that the vision of an Asian Concert fits the Asia-Pacific well, since it does not require formal institutionalization. Richard Rosecrance also argues that countries like Australia can play the informal role of a “trois” as a way to help China and the United States cement their bilateral ties, as Austria did in the Concert of Europe when it played a role in cementing the Anglo-Russian relationship (Rosecrance 2006a: 368).

Proponents of an Asian Concert further believe that the great powers in the region have now agreed on the capitalist ideology of economic development, which can be accepted as “the primary element of an ideological consensus, ahead of liberal democracy,” although “[s]uch an understanding will not be easily attainable” (Acharya 1999: 86). Like Acharya, Douglas Stuart (1997) welcomes a joint commitment by these major powers as a movement toward capitalistic economic development.

However, Stuart broadens this ideological consensus to include other factors that help him formulate the concept of “reconciliation” as one of the three pillars upon which a concert rests. This would include bringing China into the international system by means of incorporating it into institutions that “foster habits of dialogue.” The strategy would also include “‘positive conditionality’ designed to manipulate Beijing’s interest in international status and expanded trading opportunities, as well as China’s need for outside sources of capital, expertise, technology, and natural resources” (ibid.: 238–39). China could thus be incorporated into major institutions of the world economic system.

The third pillar is based on two values: “mutual interest in the avoidance of a major war and a shared stake in economic prosperity” (Stuart 1997: 242). The major players in the region have had a “pervasive fear of war” that led to their agreement on the U.N. register of Conventional Arms in 1992 and new procedures to avoid naval incidents in the region. “Beijing remains acutely aware of the risk of going too far” and would not want to see its neighbors “form an anti-Chinese coalition” (ibid.: 243).

If Stuart is far more upbeat about the prospects of a concert than Acharya and Shirk, his optimism also comes from an assessment of the future possibility of shared liberal values among the major powers in the Asia-Pacific. He foresees a trend toward cosmopolitan liberalism. According to Stuart (1997: 243–44), “Asian governments will face growing pressures for domestic political reform.” This optimistic view is based on the post-Cold War trend in which “important reforms have taken place in key Asian countries, including Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand. Even

in China, there are signs of glacial progress in the areas of human rights and legal protections.”

There is no historical proof that concerts are common in international politics or that the ones that existed lasted for long. Robert Jervis (1985: 78) notes the rarity of concerts. There have been only three possible cases of concerts in world history: 1815–53, 1919–20, and 1945–46—and the latter two may not be legitimate examples. The Concert of Europe began to slide into rivalry after only eight years and finally collapsed in 1853 after Russia’s ambitions in the Balkans ushered in a war with Turkey.

To this day, there has been no concert of power in the Asia-Pacific. Even the six-party talk on North Korea’s nuclear proliferation has not given rise to a regional concert in any shape or form. Henry Kissinger (2009b: 8) notes that the great powers “have been unable to galvanize themselves into action.” Although they regard a concert among the great powers as an important force of regional stability and security, those who envision a Concert of Asia also recognize various challenges. Susan Shirk (1997: 268) still sees at least two possible obstacles to regional concert building. The first is the realist suspicion that “China might be a revisionist power, aiming to revive its empire after two hundred years of weakness and humiliation.” The second is a lack of ideological consensus among the great powers. According to Acharya, the European model of concert may prove to be inadequate for several reasons. First, the Asia-Pacific’s major powers have not emerged together from an anti-hegemonic war. Second, weaker states would find such a concert unacceptable. States in Southeast Asia fear an arrangement that would allow the great powers to dictate to them. ASEAN has continued to press for a “relationship among equals—a true partnership” (Acharya 1999: 86). Third, some states in the region are not pro-status quo. Serious territorial disputes among them persist and thus make it difficult for states having overlapping claims to agree on the idea of a concert. Fourth, the four major players still fail to regard each other as equally qualified for great-power status. China prefers to consider the United States as the only potential partner in a concert that excludes both Japan and Russia. In spite of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Agreement, China and Russia are far from becoming friendly enough to regard each other as members of a concert. According to Acharya (*ibid.*: 87), “China’s leaders and strategic thinkers are known to envisage an even more select group—China and the United States—as the guardians of regional order.” The United States has been less willing to consider China as its political peer, whereas China still proves unwilling to uphold the standards of the world economy and appears to have been moving away from liberal economic reforms in recent years. Fifth, states do not share a set of values and interests that are strong enough to bring them closer to each other as a concert. Human rights have, for instance, become a source of friction between China and the United States. States in the region have also adopted different political systems.

Overall, the concert-of-power approach still does not seriously challenge political realism discussed earlier. The global war on terrorism, as shall be discussed later, has hardly diluted realism, which treats this source of threat as an interlude between strategic rivalries among great powers, or one that may even deepen their existing conflicts. Even the Concert of Europe operated on the realist logic of power balancing; between the Congress of Vienna (1815) and World War II, Britain played a key role as a balancer restraining rising German power on the continent and Russian power in the east. After the Crimean War ended the Concert in 1854, bids for hegemony continued, culminating in the struggle among the great powers that led to World War II (Kolodziej 2005: 134). Feigenbaum (2001: 31) often sounds more like a realist than a proponent of concerts: “Chinese leaders have conducted their own foreign policy largely on the basis of the same calculations of balance of power and relative national advantage that drove the behavior of other majors during the Cold War.” Acharya (1999: 93) acknowledges that a concert is “a managed balance-of-power system rather than a security community in which states forsake war and power competition.” Will great democratic powers be able to build a concert of Asia?

COLLECTIVE SECURITY IN ASIA-PACIFIC

Asian history shows that collective security as a strategy has failed repeatedly. The post-World War I challenge from East Asia came from Japanese aggression in the early 1930s. Although a member of the League of Nations, Japan attacked Manchuria in 1931 and occupied the capital city of Mukden. In April 1932, the Japanese renamed Manchuria a new independent state and, by then, had launched an attack on China proper at Shanghai. Referring to Article 11 of the League’s Covenant, China appealed to the institution for collective action. Because the League was based on a veto principle, Japan managed to obstruct the Council’s attempts to secure a cease-fire and a Japanese withdrawal. When condemned by the Lytton Commission and the Assembly, Japan withdrew from the League. It was also problematic that this system of collective security was Euro-centric, as it developed after World War I, thus allowing the leading members of the League to treat East Asia as a region marginal to their interests.

One of the two classic examples of collective security action since World War II took place in Northeast Asia with the war in Korea (the other being the U.N. action after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in the early 1990s). Ramesh Thakur (2006: 33) argues that “[t]he closest that the U.N. has come to engaging in collective enforcement action was in Korea in 1950.” On 25 June, more than 90,000 North Korean troops crossed the 38th parallel to invade South Korea. It looked as though collective security was working for the first time. General Assembly Resolution 376 of 7 October 1950 recommended that “all appropriate steps be taken to ensure conditions of

stability throughout Korea.” Twenty-two of the sixty U.N. members offered military contingents, although only sixteen were considered to have usable quality and strength.

In reality, however, the U.N. military operation in Korea does not fit nicely into the description of collective security. Inis Claude accurately characterizes the U.N. role in the Korean War as “the collective legitimization of collective defense,” rather than “as the initiation and management of a collective security operation.” In his analysis, the United States “conceived the plan as a device whereby it might invoke the moral support of the United Nations for such resorts to force as it might find it necessary and desirable in the course of its cold war struggles” (Claude 1971: 269). Indeed, the United States and its military allies played the dominant role in the war. The Soviet Union took no part in the process of adopting a U.N. resolution on North Korea (known as the Uniting for Peace resolution adopted in November 1950 by the General Assembly).

On the battlefield, the United States also took command. The U.N. Secretary-General’s wish to place the collective security force under U.N. command and control was rejected when Washington decided to lead and dominate the multinational force (White 2002: 154–55). The United States contributed around 50% of the so-called coalition ground units, 86% of the naval forces, and 93% of the air force—almost two-thirds of the U.N. force. The sixteen participants included three permanent members (the United States, France, and Great Britain—leading NATO alliance members); six middle powers (Australia, Belgium, Canada, the Netherlands, Greece, and Turkey—either NATO allies or Western states); and seven small powers (Colombia, Ethiopia, Luxembourg, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, and the Union of South Africa). NATO members collectively intervened, but “[n]inety percent of all fighting forces were American and South Korean” (Joffe 1992: 38).

Washington’s security interests became clear after China’s full entry into the war on 3 November 1950 and lasted until 24 January 1951 (in defense of North Korea), attacking the so-called U.N. forces. The United States then developed a proposal to establish a Pacific Ocean Pact that would include Australia, Japan, Indonesia, New Zealand, and the Philippines. The proposal for this Pacific offshore island chain pact was based on the need to enhance U.S. security interests in Northeast Asia (Umetsu 1996). According to Lynn Miller (2001: 18), “many concluded that the United States . . . acted less as an agent of the U.N. than it had made the U.N. the agent of its foreign policy.”

More notably, the U.S.-led U.N. forces did not resolve the Korean War. They in fact widened the war when they crossed into North Korea and provoked a massive military intervention from China. The “U.N.” forces achieved their objective in restoring the pre-war status quo, but have to this day failed to resolve the security problem on the Korean Peninsula: the two

Koreas remain technically at war and still threaten each other. North Korea (considered to be the world's largest artillery force) still keeps about 8,500 pieces of field artillery and 5,100 rockets directed at South Korea. Today, the Korean Peninsula also remains the world's last remnant of the Cold War.

Collective security has failed to prevent not only North Korea from invading South Korea in 1950, but also China from invading Tibet in 1950, North Vietnam from attacking South Vietnam in the 1960s, Vietnam from invading Cambodia in 1978, and China from launching a military attack on the Vietnamese border in 1979. These examples of aggression show that states in the region often took aggressive unilateral actions against their neighbors, rendering collective security operationally ineffective as a multilateral deterrent. ASEAN member states have from early on professed to take collective action according to the U.N. Charter, particularly with reference to the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of member states. While ASEAN's security policy toward Indochina resembled regional collective security of a kind, its members did not achieve effective collective action. The Cambodia case in particular illustrates the realist point that states do not act according to the logic of collective security, due to their diverse interests and perceptions of threat. The primary concern of Indonesia and Malaysia was not Vietnamese aggression, but their shared perception of a threat from China. Only two ASEAN members, Singapore and Thailand, took the Vietnamese threat seriously, but their attempt to balance Vietnamese aggression went beyond the legal logic of external aggression. Geographical proximity seemed to make Thailand—a frontline state that shares its borders with both Cambodia and Laos—most sensitive to the Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Cambodia. Singapore also took a hard-line position, largely because it was anti-communist and was vulnerable to external aggression. Singapore's security policy aimed at balancing the Vietnamese aggression further reinforced its threats from two immediate neighbors. Singapore is geographically “sandwiched” between Indonesia and Malaysia, which took a more regionalist approach to the problem, recognizing Vietnam's legitimate security interests in Indochina. These two ASEAN states saw China as a long-term threat to Southeast Asia and Vietnam as a bulwark against Chinese expansionism. Their security vision clashed with that of Singapore and Thailand, which viewed Soviet-backed Vietnam as the main threat to regional peace and security.

The extent to which economic sanctions imposed on states in East Asia work remains a subject of debate, as scholars disagree on the utility of this security approach. For optimists, economic sanctions work better than military sanctions, especially when the two strategies are used simultaneously. They would, for instance, point to the sanctions imposed by the U.N. Security Council on the Dutch government still involved in Indonesia in the late 1940s. According to Kimberly Ann Elliott (1998: 62), the Dutch complied

with the demands of the U.N. Security Council's resolution (passed in January 1949) that it cease its military operations, release political prisoners, and facilitate the return to Jakarta of representatives of Indonesia. In May, the Dutch agreed to a timetable for Indonesian independence. Important in this process was the U.S. role in threatening the Netherlands, during its foreign minister's trip to Washington in late March 1949, with aid sanctions (suspending all Marshall Aid to the Netherlands East Indies).

For others, economic sanctions do not work at best and threaten security at worst. The case of U.S./U.N. vs. Netherlands over Indonesia was inconclusive. Pape (1997: 133) contends that, “[m]ilitary coercion by Indonesian nationalist forces was sufficient to account for the Dutch concessions.” The U.S. economic sanctions imposed on Japan in 1940 provoked Japan and led to the attack on Pearl Harbor. The U.S. economic sanctions against South Vietnam did not work, either. The U.S. decision to delay giving aid to the South Vietnamese government did not bring any real change. Change was possible only after Ngo Dinh Diem had been assassinated by a group of coup plotters, who had received explicit support from Washington. According to Pape (1998: 76), military actions are far more effective than economic coercion, which is viewed as illiberal in that it tends to inflict significant costs on the civilian populations of target states, rather than the leaders who make policy decisions. The international isolation of Cambodia and Vietnam during the 1980s through sanctions was not responsible for the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops so much as the new agreement among the permanent members of the Security Council after the collapse of the Soviet Union (Peou 1997b).

Recent evidence further suggests that the sanctions imposed on North Korea hardly worked. In 2006, the United Nations passed two resolutions condemning Pyongyang's launch of the Taepodong-2 missile test and an underground nuclear test, demanding that its nuclear program be scrapped and forbidding the country from additional nuclear tests or missile launchings. Nonetheless, Pyongyang chose to ignore U.N. demands. In April 2009, Pyongyang launched a satellite into orbit, despite warnings from the United Nations and other states (especially Japan, South Korea, and the United States). After that, the U.N. Security Council condemned the rocket launching and called for tightened economic sanctions against North Korea. Pyongyang responded by expelling U.N. inspectors from its nuclear facilities, quitting the six-party talks on denuclearization, and announcing that it had begun reprocessing thousands of spent nuclear fuel rods and would build nuclear weapons. In May 2009, North Korea conducted another nuclear test more powerful than the one in 2006, launched at least six short-range missiles in defiance of the United Nations, and abandoned the armistice signed in 1953. After the Security Council adopted a resolution banning arms shipments to and from North Korea in June 2009, Pyongyang launched more missiles in defiance of the resolution.

The international sanctions imposed on North Korea have thus far borne little fruit; they have, in fact, exacerbated tensions on the Korean peninsula. States in the region have not agreed on the need for sanctions against Pyongyang. After 2006, the United States and Japan maintained a hard line on North Korea, regarding it as a threat and pressing for tough economic sanctions against it. Japan enforced the sanctions by banning all imports and barring North Korean vessels from entering its ports, but this effort proved futile. Bilateral ties between Seoul and Tokyo experienced growing tensions rather than tighter cooperation. China and South Korea have not effectively enforced the economic sanctions. Seoul's position remains closer to that of China (Guoliang and Miller 2009: 164; Ross 2006b: 380–81). Beijing's policy of accommodation toward its North Korean ally (driven by concerns about the negative consequences of a destabilized regime in the latter) and Seoul's general reluctance to challenge Pyongyang head-on as well as its preference for national reconciliation have made it difficult for any U.N. sanctions to be effectively enforced.

The U.S. and European economic sanctions on international aid, trade, and investment to Myanmar have also proved ineffective or even counter-productive. Many states (from India to Indonesia to China) have done little to enforce the sanctions against Myanmar, despite its alleged human rights violations. Most states have, in fact, taken a more realistic approach toward the country's military junta and have either believed that economic sanctions would only make the generals more recalcitrant or preferred political stability to democracy. The military regime in Myanmar also could survive on minimal resources and still count on the divisions and support of other major states in Asia. Moreover, according to Stanley Weiss (2009: 4), "Not only have punitive sanctions and relentless public condemnation failed to moderate the regime's behavior, they have pushed the junta further away from the West and into Chinese arms." China still remains Myanmar's closest ally (Weatherbee 2008: 37, 49, 66, 76, 96, 279, and 285).

In short, collective security still fits with the power-based approach to security, but remains peripheral when it comes to its impact on the security policies of states in the Asia-Pacific. History still lends little empirical support to collective security. Since the end of World War I, this security arrangement has proved ineffective. According to Joseph Nye (2003: 169), "Collective security was a miserable failure in the 1930s, was put on ice during the Cold War, and then, like Lazarus, rose from the dead in the Persian Gulf in 1990. But it was only a minor miracle."

Part II

Liberal and Socialist Security Studies

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Neo-Liberal Institutionalism and Domestic Politics Perspectives

Scholars have now adopted neo-liberal institutionalism and domestic politics in their research on peace and security in the Asia-Pacific. Neo-liberal institutionalism has its intellectual roots in the work of Keohane and Joseph Nye (2000a: 20), who popularized the concept of “complex interdependence.” Political domesticists agree with the liberal perspective on economic interdependence to the extent that states are driven by the need for liberal reform and national prosperity, but disagree that states cooperate because of this causal variable alone. Concerning the Asia-Pacific, these two rationalist perspectives tend to paint a brighter picture of regional security than political realists. The promise of regional institutions or regime lies in their ability to bring states together as a group working cooperatively to advance their mutual interests and thus the cause of regional peace and security. While neo-liberal institutionalists count on economic interdependence and regional institutions to ensure or enhance regional peace and security, those who study the dynamics of domestic or bureaucratic politics count on positive or rationalist liberal forces within states. Both theoretical perspectives have their strengths and weaknesses.

NEO-LIBERAL INSTITUTIONALISM AND DOMESTIC POLITICS IN A NUTSHELL

Neo-liberal institutionalism has intellectual roots that can be traced back to the concept of complex interdependence, which arose in the 1970s.

Instead of assuming that states are egoistic actors that operate under conditions of international anarchy (as realists do), neo-liberal institutionalists assume that states also operate under conditions of complex interdependence, which mitigates state behavior.

Complex interdependence has at least three key characteristics in opposition to realism (Keohane and Nye 1985). The first is that scholars of this school lower the privileged position of the state, because they believe that states are no longer the only actors or the only communication channel. There exist other actors and associated channels, including government elites like bureaucrats (who have informal ties among themselves); non-government élites (whose communications are carried out face-to-face); and transnational organizations, such as the multinational corporations, banks, and civil society groups (who have their own channels). Formal and informal ties not under the full control of governments affect both domestic and interstate relations. Domestic groups can politicize issues and force domestic issues onto their states' international agendas. Transnational actors with global networks among individuals and non-governmental organizations also play key roles. These channels act as conduits that make governments more *sensitive* and *vulnerable* to one another.

The second characteristic is that there is no hierarchy of issues (as realists assume that military security remains the dominant goal of states). For neo-liberal institutionalists, states have a variety of policy goals and most of their nonmilitary issue areas are not always subordinated to military interests. Domestic groups can also formulate their own agendas that affect states' policy objectives. Issues that realists consider "low politics" (such as education, health, the environment, and commerce) can be just as important to governments, if not more so than military issues. The state's security imperatives can also be subject to its public's demand for welfare. In short, the state can be the vehicle for both warfare and welfare.

Third, complex interdependence has rendered the use or threat of military force less relevant and war more difficult to wage. The utility of force declines under complex interdependence and the recourse to force seems less likely, as other issues become more equal in importance. "Interstate use and threat of military force have virtually disappeared in certain areas of the world" (Keohane and Nye 2000: 116). Military force is also no longer the most appropriate strategy to achieve national security and other policy goals, including economic and ecological welfare.

Neo-liberal institutionalism is built on the liberal concept of complex interdependence in world politics, but its leading proponents remain ambivalent about its pacifying effects on states' security behavior. As Keohane and Nye (2000: 7) put it, "We are not suggesting that international conflict disappears when interdependence prevails. On the contrary, conflict will take new forms and may even increase. . . . We must therefore be cautious about the prospect that rising interdependence is creating a brave new

world of cooperation to replace the bad old world of international conflict.” Nor do they make a teleological argument that complex interdependence is the surest way toward a peaceful global future.

Concerning how states can achieve security, neo-liberal institutionalists contend that “realism . . . is better at telling us why we are in such trouble than how to get out of it” (Keohane 1989: 65). Neo-liberal institutionalists generally believe international institutions can help mitigate states’ conflict-prone behavior and promote cooperation among them by breaking out of the realist conceptual box. International anarchy (lack of centralized authority) exists; however, international institutions matter more significantly than realists are prepared to accept.

Power remains important in neo-liberal institutional thinking, but states as rational actors can act to mitigate it. Proponents of this liberal school do not naively “assume that [interdependence’s] consequences would automatically be benign in other respects” (Keohane and Nye 2000: 270). Their point is that interdependence is far from making power obsolete. They agree with political realists that hegemony may be crucial to the process of institution building, but it is unnecessary for regime maintenance, largely because institutions can also take on lives of their own.

Hegemony “does matter,” but “its decline is more decisive than its ascendance for regime formation in this world arena” (Crone 1993: 501). Hegemonic powers may become more willing to form international or regional regimes with lesser powers when they are in decline. On the one hand, “subordinate actors may desire to provide a multilateral framework that keeps a large actor in the system but also constrains its exercise of unilateral power.” On the other hand, “the super-ordinate actor may wish to use its size to preserve bargaining power that is perceived to be eroding.” Crone adds that, “This line of argument suggests that regimes may form as hegemonic deflation opens political space that was previously closed to dependent actors and preserves some advantage for super-ordinate ones, but that engagement will be wary and cautious on both sides” (*ibid.*: 505).

Power remains important in interdependence, but the power to lead must be shared to ensure that leading states’ shared interests are served in the context of “multiple leadership” (Keohane and Nye 2000: 202, 294). Liberals reject the concepts of hegemonic, unilateral, and collective leadership. Hegemony rests on coercion and lacks legitimacy. Unilateral leadership may be based on good examples and the leading state may take initiatives that it considers benign, but other states may not see it this way. Collective leadership (such as the type found in the concept of collective security within the U.N. system) has not worked well and is insufficient for policy coordination. “Multiple” leadership means one government takes the lead in one issue, but must be prepared to be “a follower on another” (*ibid.*: 203).

Neo-liberal institutionalists emphasize the importance of states’ shared or mutual interests and the positive impact of international institutions or

regimes on state behavior. States are egoistic actors as political realists see it, but can still achieve a superior outcome by pursuing long-term interests, not just short-term ones. While realists place emphasis on states' pursuit of relative gains, neo-liberal institutionalists tend to think that even rival states are more concerned about the material welfare of their own populations and can thus place greater value on absolute gains.

Backed by institutional arrangements, payoff structures can be altered, the strategies of reciprocity to promote cooperation can be made effective, and the scope can be lengthened. Rational states value future payoffs relative to current payoffs, when institutions help expand time horizons and enable them to perceive that their relationships will continue for an indefinite period of time through reiteration. Institutions motivate their members to "reinforce practices of reciprocity, which provide incentives for governments to keep their own commitments to ensure that others do so as well" (Keohane 1998: 86). International security regimes in particular are based on "principles, rules, and norms that permit nations to be restrained in their behavior in the belief that others will reciprocate" (Jervis 1983: 173).

Timelines can be further lengthened through the reliable information about states' policy actions and promptness of feedback that institutions can provide. Useful information (or intelligence) helps states understand each other's intentions and reduce uncertainties in an anarchic world. International institutions can alleviate fears of cheating and unequal gains from cooperation through the exchange of valuable information. "Institutions can facilitate cooperation by helping to settle distributional conflicts and by assuring states that gains are eventually divided over time, for example, by disclosing information about the military expenditures and capacities of alliance members" (Keohane and Martin 1998: 390–91). This logic "is directly applicable to security problems as realists define them" (ibid.: 389).

International institutions still rely on rule enforcement, but the best form of enforcement is voluntary self-enforcement. Liberal institutionalists reject centralized enforcement of rules and stress the importance of information sharing and reciprocity. Institutions help monitor compliance with commitments. As they deal with a series of issues over a period of time and under similar rules, member states learn to be honest and to preserve their reputations. Although they are rational egoists, states care about how others judge or evaluate their performances, largely because they are particularly sensitive to their long-term interests. If they are considered trustworthy, for example, they are more likely to be accepted in cooperative arrangements for future benefits. Even great powers may feel constrained by rules derived from their mutual interests and may respond by acting unilaterally or attempting to destroy institutions; however, they are still constrained by decision-making procedures and rules.

Neo-liberal institutionalists acknowledge some intervening variables as well, such as institutional membership size and domestic politics. Institutions

with a small number of like-minded members are more effective than institutions with more members (Keohane 1998: 91). Agreements can also be reached when a government can persuade its partners that it is both willing and able to implement them at home. “Successful international negotiations may therefore require changes in domestic institutions” (ibid.: 86). For example, the United States’ trade partners that have “fast-track” authority on trade have some assurance that the U.S. Congress will refrain from adding new positions to trade agreements as a condition for their ratification. Without this “fast-track” authority, the United States cannot promise to abide by negotiated terms, and this may rob agreements of credibility (ibid.).

Although neo-liberal institutionalism takes domestic politics into account, it remains largely state-centric. Critical of the theory being so closely joined at the hip to realism, some scholars emphasize the impact of domestic politics on states’ foreign policy decisions. Fareed Zakaria (1995: 462) makes the following observation: “political scientists are shifting their attention to the internal sources of foreign policy . . . the domestic politics of states are the key to understanding world events.”

Perspectives on domestic politics tend to be based on rationalism rather than culturalism or constructivism and initially include Graham Allison (1971) whose *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* sheds light on the crisis based on a rational actor theory that pays attention to individuals and groups such as national bureaucrats and military officials. Other scholars borrow insights from Robert Gilpin who suggests that there are two domestic groups within states: economic nationalists and liberal reformers (Stubbs 2000). Economic nationalists stress the need for state intervention in the economy. They view the world as highly competitive and prone to conflict, and therefore advocate for policies that protect nascent import-substitution industries and give emerging export industries a comparative advantage. Liberal reformers stress the role of markets as the most productive force of organizing economic relations. They prefer deregulation, privatization, and free-trade arrangements, which help states exploit mutual gains from joining the global economy. If the balance of domestic power shifts in favor of liberal reformers, states engage in the process of economic institution building. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita (2000) further seeks to explain states’ foreign policy behavior largely driven by decision makers’ domestic concerns or dynamics and the problem of war by examining their preferences and constraints—both domestic and international.

Proponents of this rationalist approach offer different reasons for conflict and cooperation among states. Some scholars stress that regime insecurity tends to create “conditions for cooperation, producing a diversionary peace instead of war” (Fravel 2005: 49). Others prefer to focus on different types of domestic actors. Etel Solingen (2003), for instance, pays attention to the role of different sub-national actors. Within nation-states, there are three ideal types of coalitions for key actors to shape states’ policy behavior, which

can lead to the creation or breakdown of regional institutions. The first is known as “internationalizing.” Internationalizing coalitions advocate openness to international markets, capital, investments, institutions, and liberal values. Members of such coalitions include the beneficiaries of internationalization (such as mobile capital, export-intensive sectors, and firms); highly skilled labor employed in competitive industries; analysts and professionals oriented toward a system based on the global economy and knowledge/technology; consumers of imported products; farm workers and small land-owners who want high prices for their agricultural exports; ethnic and religious groups who want greater international openness; and bureaucrats (working for independent central banks, finance ministries, and export-processing zones) whose tasks are to promote liberal reform. Internationalizing coalitions are the least military-oriented; they seek to avoid investing in the military security associated with overblown defense budgets that increase government and payment deficits, raise the cost of capital, and reduce savings and productive investment. They seek to avoid regional instability that may thwart foreign investment and to promote regional stability.

The second type of coalition is called “backlash.” Members of such coalitions resist the process of internationalization. They include import-competing firms and banks closely tied to the state, state-owned enterprises, unskilled blue-collar and white-collar workers, state bureaucracies rendered obsolete by reform, segments of the military and related industries, as well as nationalist, social, and religious movements that find material and normative dimensions of internationalization threatening to their own interests and values. Such coalitions justify the protection of state-owned enterprises under the cloak of national security. Their grand strategy is inward-looking, resisting pressure for economic liberalization and any intrusions on sovereignty, and targeting internationalizing coalitions at home and abroad. They tend to see ongoing regional instability or insecurity and thus resist any attempts to downsize military allocations and weapon complexes, erode statist privileges, or devalue nationalist and confessional mythmaking as a political currency.

The third type is termed “hybrid.” Such coalitions have diverse constituencies and are more difficult to identify. Their composition is much less clear cut than either internationalizing or backlash coalitions and “can bring together otherwise strange bedfellows.” They are more unwieldy than the other types and “are also bound to be significantly more afflicted with distributional conflicts” (Solingen 2003: 62).

Regional peace or security thus depends heavily on whether any of these three types of coalitions dominates politics within states in a region. Dyads of strong internationalizing coalitions are expected to build more cooperative and peaceful regional orders (zones of stable peace), whereas dyads of backlash or mixed backlash coalitions are expected to create zones of conflict. Internationalizing coalitions are generally reluctant to defect

through militarized strategies or to exacerbate territorial or ethno-religious disputes, largely because any armed conflict or extensive military buildups could threaten or disrupt domestic and regional peace and security.

Scholars who study domestic politics find it beneficial to promote international cooperation through transaction cost reduction, but view dense institutionalization as less necessary than neo-liberal institutionalists do. International cooperation does not depend on any provision for economic integration, largely because “the underlying logic of cooperation is global access, subordinating varying forms of regional arrangements to that logic” (Solingen 2003: 66). States cooperate with one another, not so much because of the size and content of their dyadic exchanges (such as trade and investments) or the level of economic interdependence. But most importantly, they cooperate because they desire regional stability and a peaceful environment that can attract foreign investment and because ruling coalitions desire to enter the world capitalist economy for markets, foreign assistance, raw materials, technology, capital, and political support (*ibid.*: 79).

NEO-LIBERAL INSTITUTIONALIST PERSPECTIVES ON SECURITY IN ASIA-PACIFIC

The extent to which neo-liberal institutionalism can shed light on peace and stability through regional cooperation in the Asia-Pacific is hard to assess, but its proponents have made the claim that it has now become more relevant than realism. Donald Crone, for instance, argues that peace appears to correlate with the presence of international institutions. Multi-lateral cooperation within ASEAN and the Pacific was seen as the primary means for achieving economic security in the 21st century. Crone questions whether hegemony matters much in the reorganization of the political economy. The formation of regimes, such as APEC, began in periods of change in the structure of international power: “Now, with the U.S. predominance in serious question, there is a movement to institutionalize . . . economic diplomacy in the form . . . of APEC” (Crone 1993: 501).

Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye in particular make the case that the growth of complex interdependence and institutionalization in the Asia-Pacific will lead to regional peace and security. Their study, for instance, shows why bilateral relations between Japan and the United States before and after World War II were different. Early in the 19th century, their interdependence was very low: “They were hardly aware of each other’s existence and had no regular means of contact” (Keohane and Nye 2000a: 238). By 1900, they became socially and economically sensitive to each other. Before World War II, however, the overall level of military interdependence between them was still asymmetrical and their economic interdependence was low. As a result, Japan sought in the 1920s to build a strong navy in order to make itself less vulnerable to the United States by evading the constraints imposed

by the Washington Naval Agreements. Also, “Japanese dependence on U.S. supplies of oil and scrap iron made Japan both sensitive and vulnerable to U.S. economic policies, and the United States sought to exploit this vulnerability” (*ibid.*: 239). Japan responded to the U.S. embargoes by attacking Pearl Harbor in 1941.

After World War II, Japanese-U.S. relations became more cooperative. Japan became part of the U.S.-centered security community, and economic interdependence between them increased dramatically. Although Japan was initially sensitive and vulnerable to the United States, “by the late 1980s economic interdependence had somewhat become more symmetrical” (Keohane and Nye 2000a: 239). Their military interdependence increased as well, and U.S.-Japan relations “were [also] highly linked to a variety of other networks and international institutions, constituting quite thick globalism” (*ibid.*: 240). According to Keohane and Nye, as economic and military interdependence between Japan and the United States grew deeper, and as their global networks and institutionalization became “thicker,” their expanded relations more cooperative. In fact, they argue that U.S.-Japan “military interdependence” helped to mitigate the frictions that arose in the bilateral trade relations of the 1990s.

Neo-liberal institutionalists would agree with game theorists that states in the region have had little reason to break from military cooperation—their “incentives to defect militarily by using military force have declined with the concentration of elites on goals of economic development and political stability” (Kahler 1995: 28). They noted growing institutionalization after the Cold War. Some regional institutions, such as ASEAN, are based on formal contractual agreements, while others, such as PECC and APEC, are not. Nevertheless, these institutions “have facilitated communication.” Moreover, “the information and analysis flow among the countries of the region has increased considerably, and transaction costs have been reduced. Economic interlinkages within the region have also grown rapidly, and functional cooperation in various forms has expanded substantially” (Harris 1993a: 289).

One of the strengths in neo-liberal institutionalism, when put in the Asia-Pacific context, is that it has some empirical support. The Asia-Pacific now looks more like a region of international regimes that have grown out of states’ acknowledgement of shared interests in economic development, prosperity, and peace. There exist at least three prominent regional institutions or regimes: ASEAN, APEC, and the ARF. In Southeast Asia, ASEAN has been judged a successful regional institution in the developing world. As the Cold War began to thaw in 1989, states in the Asia-Pacific further sought to institutionalize their economic cooperation by creating APEC as an economic regime whose members had embraced a long walk toward trade freedom. The APEC states’ combined total GDP accounted for \$12.3 trillion in 1992 and rose to \$18 trillion 1999, about 43.87% of global trade. Some liberal scholars have argued in defense of states’ economic interests in building international institutions. Then in 1994 came the

ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF): the most ambitious multilateral attempt by states in the region to date in their joint effort to build a regime capable of reducing security uncertainties in the newly emerging multipolar region. The ARF now has 27 members who agreed to manage their security affairs through the process of dialogue in three major steps: confidence-building measures (CBMs), preventive diplomacy, and conflict resolution.

Neo-liberal institutionalism further helps explain the formation of regional security regimes. Tsuyoshi Kawasaki (2006), for instance, characterizes the ARF as a “soft international institution” that fits nicely with the Assurance Game: states have sought to overcome their collective-action problem by establishing a regional institution with the aim of exchanging information in order to build mutual confidence. States’ concerns over sovereignty remain stronger than for those belonging to “hard” institutions, which are rule-based and closed. Convention- and voluntary-based as well as decentralized, the ARF resulted from states encountering the emerging uncertainty inherent in the post-Cold War policy direction of the United States, China, and Japan.

These states have sought to promote international cooperation through maintaining the regional status quo by agreeing on the need for unilateral action and the principle of “diffused reciprocity” (based on the expectation that states’ unilateral policy measures can be reciprocated by other states without *quid pro quos*) as opposed to “specific reciprocity” (which requires that states adjust their policies to benefit others on a *quid-pro-quo* basis). The status quo means preventing the United States from strategic disengagement, deterring China from intimidating others, encouraging Japan to continue self-restraint, and ensuring that everybody will benefit from growing, deepening interdependence. The ARF is regarded as “an effective solution” to the region’s collective-action problem (Kawasaki 2006).

In spite of this supportive evidence, neo-liberal institutionalism has come under considerable criticism. International regimes are not necessarily built upon existing high levels of economic interdependence among states in a particular region. At the time of its formation, ASEAN’s members were not economically interdependent. Moreover, much of intra-ASEAN trade has also been of a bilateral nature, especially between Singapore and two other major states (Indonesia and Malaysia). Bilateral trade among the member states remains so small that it would be difficult to for anyone to prove that economic interdependence within Southeast Asia was the main reason ASEAN was formed. Meanwhile, Canada and the United States were enjoying the world’s largest bilateral trade flow, but did not reach a formal free trade agreement until the late 1980s. It thus remains unclear when or at what level economic interdependence leads to the formation of international regimes.

In spite of the growing economic interdependence among the major powers (particularly China, Japan, and the United States), it remains unclear whether a security regime exists. Both China and the United States no doubt

share common economic interests. David Shambaugh (2009) contends that the interdependence that binds China and the United States together is inescapable. Their bilateral trade grew from \$2.5 billion in 1979 to over \$400 billion in 2008. The United States has become China's largest trading partner, and China (having amassed \$585 billion in U.S. Treasury bonds by September 2008) has become the United States' largest creditor. Almost all the Fortune 500 American companies do business in China, investing more than \$50 billion in more than 50,000 Chinese enterprises. In addition to economic and financial interdependence, the two states have deepened their social and cultural interdependence. Unlike 30 years ago, when no Chinese students studied in American universities, the late 2000s saw 67,000 Chinese students study in the United States, and 11,000 American students on Chinese campuses. Alan Collins (2008), however, concludes that a bilateral security regime between the two powers has not yet formed because they still pursue short-term self-interests, as each is still worried that the other may try to take advantage of its cooperation. Economic interdependence between China and Japan has deepened, but their nationalisms still prevent them from forming a bilateral security regime. Instead of working together to promote free trade in the region, the two states continue to compete with each other, especially for political influence over Southeast Asia (Ahn 2004: 28–31).

Another challenge to neo-liberal institutionalism comes from the lack of consensus on whether there is a causal relationship between interdependence and institutional strength. Intra-regional trade in East Asia has grown rapidly, reaching nearly 50% of its total trade in 1995 and 55% in the late 2000s—higher than that of North America (whose intra-regional trade accounted for only 40% of total trade in the mid-1990s and only 44% in the late 2000s). East Asia's intra-regional direct investment also accounted for 53.6% of its overseas direct investment in the mid-1990s. However, the regional institutions in East Asia are still quite weak—definitely much weaker than those in the Western world.

Other critics further contend that Asia-Pacific institutions are not governed by formal or binding rules. APEC is characterized as a “proto-institution” or a “meta-regime” not based on formal rules and decision-making procedures. This helps explain its institutional weaknesses. According to Carsten Otto (2000: 62), “APEC lacks most of the static criteria of a regime since it does not generate a set of rules with which a specific issue area can be regulated cooperatively.” The regional economic regime is not even equipped “to resolve its free-riding problems” and “cannot impose sanctions let alone binding decision-making procedures upon its members.” The ASEAN members of APEC still resist any efforts at “institution building that might give binding effect to its decisions” (Weatherbee 2008: 210). The “ARF has not moved forward beyond a ‘talk shop,’” either (*ibid.*: 161). In comparative terms, the Euro-Atlantic region witnesses greater multilateralism, elaboration, and formalization in NATO and OSCE than the Asia-Pacific. Even the U.S.-Japan

security alliance is not based on formal rules that the United States and Japan can rely on to disclose information regarding each other's future goals.

Members of regional institutions like ASEAN, APEC, and the ARF have continued to enhance their individual military capabilities (partly because of unresolved territorial disputes). States often do not share a common perception of external threat to their security or a strong sense of security interdependence (Duffield 2003). Sheldon Simon (2007: 132) argues that the regional security institutions, such as ASEAN and the ARF, remain weak, because none of them has proved "willing to tackle the core security issues affecting the region." Eul-Soo Pang (2007: 12, 24) similarly observes that the ARF "has not been able to reduce tensions and conflicts among the members" and regional institutions "have not produced security regimes and institutions to guarantee enduring peace and stability for East Asia." Unabated tensions between North Korea and other ARF members, as well as between Myanmar and other states, are good examples. The ARF has yet to achieve confidence-building measures among its members, not to mention preventive diplomacy or conflict resolution. Security interests often undermine economic policy commitments. In the case of APEC, for instance, the Bush administration subordinated "economic complexities to military priorities" (Pempel 2008: 571).

It is thus far from clear that any Asia-Pacific institution has helped its members overcome the security dilemma as realists tend to see happen in international politics. Political realists can also claim that the distribution of power among states still matters a great deal and that states find it more difficult to cooperate when faced with no common threat to their security. Even Axelrod and Keohane (1985: 226) admit that "there is no common government [in world politics] to enforce rules, and by standards of domestic society, international institutions are weak." Keohane and Martin (1998: 395) also concede that "[t]his necessity of institutions does not mean that they are always valuable, much less that they operate without respect to power and interests, constitute a panacea for violent conflict, or always reduce the likelihood of war." It is thus unclear whether any type of international institutions can have a significant effect on state behavior independent of power distribution. As shall be discussed next, domestic politics also seem to matter when we try to assess the impacts of regional institutions on state security behavior in the region.

DOMESTIC POLITICS PERSPECTIVES ON SECURITY IN ASIA-PACIFIC

The Asia-Pacific region provides scholars of domestic politics with some empirical ammunition to challenge both the realist assumption that military alliances are temporary due to external factors and state-centric neo-liberal institutionalism.

Some domesticist perspectives contend that realism has failed to explain the continuity or durability of military alliance politics amid system changes. For instance, they observe that the end of the Cold War did not bring an end to the U.S.-Japan security alliance centered on the San Francisco system established by the September 1951 peace treaty and the politico-economic arrangements that surround it. According to Kent Calder (2004: 136), the entire structure “has proved remarkably durable.” Even hegemonic stability theory, which stresses the continuing pre-eminence of American power, cannot account for this persistence. To make sense of institutional durability, one must dig “deeper into domestic systems of key nations.” American and Japanese elite interests have been complementary . . . reinforced by rising transpacific capital flows, to cover heavy U.S. trade deficits” (*ibid.*: 153).

Other scholars have paid attention to the negative security impact of domestic politics on regional institution building. Japan, for instance, has proved unable to play an effective regional leadership role in building or maintaining international institutions. According to William Grimes (2003: 353), Japan’s institutionalized inertia helps explains why Japan has been unable to provide a leadership role to ensure regional stability in East Asia. The Japanese state’s inertial tendencies can be understood in terms of its lack of “a coordinated and effective response to the actual or potential challenges of its international situation.” Even in the domestic economic area, there is no effective coordination among the government ministries. Within the Prime Minister’s Office, the five top-level aides on important international and economic matters have engaged in “turf battles” defending their respective bureaucracies. The Office could not even impose control over line ministries. Although Japan could play a decisive role in dealing with international economic crises, its domestic problems have even contributed to emergencies such as the Asian Economic Crisis in 1997.

In the security field, domestic turf battles are also said to keep the military in a low profile. Informal institutions, particularly the Yoshida Doctrine (confirmed in several formal institutions, such as the anti-war Constitution), determined Japan’s post-war policies marked by strong anti-communism as well as resistance to military buildup. Although Japan has become the world’s second highest defense spender, the basic consensus against militarization within the country has been institutionalized to the extent that any change has been incremental. The Japanese Defense Agency remained an agency lacking ministry status. Japan would need a “nearly superhuman effort” to make any change to this status quo. As a result, Japan “has not . . . taken on an explicit role as hegemon or leader” (Grimes 2003: 370).

Others further contend that domestic politics can also help make sense of institution building in the Asia-Pacific, depending on the type of domestic forces. Richard Stubbs (2000), for instance, has taken into account domestic balances of power between economic nationalists and liberal reformers within the major ASEAN states of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines,

and Thailand. Between 1967 and 1991, economic cooperation between these states was virtually non-existent. When the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) was adopted in 1992, the leaders of these states were pro-reform and prevailed over the nationalists who had led the way in the early 1980s. The domestic balance-of-power shift occurred at a time when these states faced a series of recessions and booms that affected their economies: the economic crisis of 1985–86 and the flood of foreign capital into ASEAN states from the late 1980s onward. Because of their political triumph over economic nationalists within the decision-making circles of these ASEAN states, the pro-reform state leaders who enjoyed a significant portion of domestic constituencies rededicated themselves in 1995 to an accelerated implementation of the AFTA agreement.

Coalitional analysis further helps explain regional security or insecurity. Domestic political forces conceived and nurtured ASEAN during and after the Cold War (Solingen 1999). The regional organization emerged when pivotal leaders in Southeast Asia forged supportive internationalist coalitions at home that favored domestic and regional political and economic stability and global integration. Solingen's domestic-coalition perspective further explains why ASEAN developed a pattern of dialogue and accommodation and renounced the use of force through their Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC). The cluster of internationalizing coalitions within states made it possible for them to become more domestically stable and secure, and capable of withstanding crises, such as the Asian crisis in 1997. As long as these coalitions have a strategy to promote regional cooperation that can prevail over backlash coalitions, patterns of institutional cooperation among the member states remain durable and, on the whole, wedded to internationalizing groups and constituencies. The logic can also be applied to the major regional institutions in the Asia-Pacific. Solingen, however, argues that the Korean War and the wars between Cambodia and Vietnam in the late 1970s resulted from backlash clusters. In the early 1950s, for instance, the backlash leadership in North Korea under Kim Il Sung “read war opportunities too favorably, miscalculating the resolve of neighboring and extra-regional actors anathematized by their policies” (Solingen 2003: 70). States that have strong domestic backlash coalitions, such as China and Vietnam, tend to be cautious about international or regional institutions, such as APEC and the ARF.

Others also see some type of a backlash coalition in the United States dominated by conservative realists under the second Bush Administration, which pursued a policy driven by excessive militarization. This coalition included the pro-defense industry and security hawks, anti-tax ideologues, social conservatives, and “values voters.” They were concerned about international constraints on American power, placed their faith in strategic power and moral resolve, and pursued unilateralism at the expense of Asian multilateralism (Pempel 2008).

Other scholars emphasize the relationship between bureaucratic politics and security. For Chien-pin Li (1997), for instance, the external sources of threat found in the region were not a major determinant of military expenditures in a number of Asian states from 1983 to 1993. Military corruption and subsidized defense industries were in fact the main determinants that drove up the military budgets. However, this “bureaucratic irrationality” was balanced by “economic rationality” in that the defense budgets generally correlated with the economic resources available.

Still others who have studied wars in the Asia-Pacific have found that decision makers’ preferences (shaped by domestic politics) matter. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita’s domestic concerns theory helps explain the war between Japan and the United States during World War II and the American War in Vietnam. The Japanese decision to attack Pearl Harbor in 1941 shows that Tokyo rejected a deterrence strategy and reveals that the attack did not result from the best choice Japanese leaders had but from the Japanese belief that the attack was their best strategic choice under the constraints they faced at the time, even though the decision might lead to bad consequences. Constraints included the fact that Japan did not have enough domestic resources. In the Vietnam War, as another example, U.S. presidents Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon had to adopt policies in response to the angry American public. To retain their presidencies, the two presidents adopted new strategies aimed not only to win the war in Vietnam but also to blunt domestic opposition to the war by reducing the number of American soldiers being killed and wounded in combat (Bueno de Mesquita 2000: 243–45). In contrast, communist North Vietnam faced no such domestic opposition to the war, despite the fact that a greater number of North Vietnamese died.

Perspectives on domestic politics have their merit. Even contemporary realists, particularly neo-classical and some defensive realists, have acknowledged the importance of domestic politics in state security policies. During and after the Cold War, the academic literature on domestic politics in East Asia sheds light not only on the question of war and peace among states but also the challenge of regime insecurity, which has been a genuine security concern for many political leaders.

Nevertheless, any overemphasis on domestic politics as the main factor determining institution formation or maintenance runs the risk of unduly deemphasizing system pressures. While many scholars overemphasize domestic politics as the main factor determining institution formation or maintenance, they still acknowledge that national power and system pressures do matter. Kent Calder admits that American preeminence played a key role in the Japan-U.S. alliance. As he puts it: “In its apparent dependence on American power and affluence for viability, the [San Francisco] System is also potentially consistent with realist formulations, assuming that its configuration reflects U.S. interests” (Calder 2004: 152–53). William

Grimes (2003) further contends that security policy change is possible, but only in an incremental fashion and under extreme circumstances when the state could suppress even important domestic interests. Although Japanese institutions remain inadequate, making it hard for Japan to respond effectively to change, “international pressures are slowly forcing Japan to change its way of making and implementing policy,” including in the military area (*ibid.*: 375). One of the systemic pressures that will drive Japan’s security policy is the economic rise of China. In Grimes’ words, “Japanese officials must . . . worry about antagonizing the United States, their most likely ally should China become belligerent” (*ibid.*: 369). As China continues to rise, its growing power will force Japan to depend on the United States. According to Grimes, “[if] the alliance weakens . . . Japan will need to be prepared to expand its war-fighting, intelligence, and crisis-management capabilities” (*ibid.*: 372). This shows that the military alliance structure still drives or shapes Japan’s security policy directions.

Scholars who only regard domestic/bureaucratic politics as the key variable to help explain state security behavior at times sound more like neo-classical realists. T. J. Pempel (2008), for instance, seems to worry about the declining role of the United States in East Asia because of the Bush administration’s policy of over-militarization. One question remains: has the liberal Obama administration been less inclined toward militarism? The U.S. role in both Pakistan and Afghanistan in March and April 2009 shows it has not; President Obama sent more U.S. troops to Afghanistan and pressed Pakistan’s military to take on the Taliban forces.

Because domestic politics alone do not exclusively determine state security behavior, this perspective has had difficulty explaining and predicting patterns thereof. If regime insecurity induces cooperative behavior, why do insecure regimes like those in North Korea and Cambodia under the leadership of Pol Pot (1975–78) tend to be belligerent? Also according to M. Taylor Fravel, “[i]ncreased regime insecurity . . . does not necessarily reduce a state’s ability to project power, especially against a weaker neighbor” (Wolf and Fravel 2006: 202). States still respond to external threats. In Vietnam, pro-reform leaders were on the rise in the late 1980s, but the reform process coincided with the receding power of Vietnam’s former patron, the Soviet Union. Before joining ASEAN in 1997, the military junta in Myanmar could also be classified as backlash, because it enjoyed “an absolute monopoly in defining the state security agenda” (Maung Maung Than 1998: 392) driven by nationalism and the need for self-reliance. As a result, the military government has invested in military security with overblown defense budgets. While domestic politics matters, “the realist approach to security through military strength has not been neglected” (*ibid.*: 405). Myanmar was a country under siege from Western powers and sought to deal with this external threat by joining ASEAN as a way to gain some regime legitimacy. Domestic politics alone do

not determine Japan's security policy, either: Tokyo, for instance, turned the Self-Defense Agency into a full-fledged ministry of defense in January 2007, as the perceived military threat of China and North Korea became more evident. In short, domestic politics can have an impact on state security behavior, but any impact must also be placed in the context of the changing international security environment.

Commercial and Democratic Liberalism

Two other theoretical perspectives that belong to the liberal tradition and take into account the role of domestic politics are commercial liberalism and democratic liberalism. These two perspectives are long-standing challengers to realism (because of their emphasis on the prospects for peace based on shared interests among trading and democratic states, respectively). Scholars have also adopted commercial liberalism and democratic liberalism to demonstrate that states in the Asia-Pacific are more likely to experience peace and security if they trade with one another and if they become democratic. This chapter shows that spectacular economic growth in the Asia-Pacific, particularly in Japan since the 1960s and in China since the 1980s, has made room for commercial liberalism, while recent democratization in East-Asian states further lends support to democratic liberalism. The case can be made that states that share the ideology of liberal democracy have not gone to war with each other and that ongoing tensions at the interstate level tend to be between democratic and non-democratic states, such as China and Taiwan, China and the United States/Japan, or North and South Korea. By the end of the 2000s, however, these two liberal perspectives had not yet reached universal acceptance. Realism remains relevant, in part because some liberal democracies in the region continue to harbor mutual suspicions of each other's intentions.

COMMERCIAL AND DEMOCRATIC LIBERALISM IN A NUTSHELL

Commercial liberals tend to make the case that trade has become a strong force for international security. Commercial liberalism is initially rooted in *The Wealth of Nations* by Adam Smith (1723–90), published in 1776. In his view, humans are not power hungry or bent on the unchecked pursuit of unequal accumulation of wealth. According to him, both manufacturing and commerce introduce order and good government and thus ensure the liberty and security of individuals. Nations develop an identical interest in commerce and trade, which diminishes the hunger for war. Other early commercial liberal thinkers also include David Ricardo (1772–1823), John Stuart Mill (1806–73), and others like Richard Cobden, who observed what they consider to be the pacifying effects of free-market capitalism. E. H. Carr (1939) thus notes that the heart of this liberal economic theory lies in its doctrine of harmony of interests derived from the belief that the economic division of labor among nations, each with its special task, would contribute to the welfare of humanity.

For economic liberals, free trade is seen to have pacifying effects on state security behavior. According to Mill (1909: 582), “it is commerce which is rapidly rendering war obsolete, by strengthening and multiplying the personal interests which are in natural opposition to it.” Richard Cobden believed that free markets advocate and promote international peace through free trade, unite states, and help them to reduce military spending (which is seen as a drain on the economy) (Stringham 2004). States’ desire for wealth and prosperity dampens their nationalist ambitions, fosters cosmopolitanism, and makes war among them unthinkable. One year before the outbreak of World War I, Norman Angell (1913: 329) published his work contending that “the world has passed out of that stage of development in which it is possible for one civilized group to advance its well-being by the military domination of another.” A world characterized by financial interdependence makes trade among states, not territorial conquest, the only means to accumulate wealth.

Commercial liberalism came under fire before World War II (Ripsman and Blanchard 1996/97), but regained credibility toward the end of the Cold War. Contemporary commercial liberals include Richard Rosecrance (1986, 1999) and Carl Kaysen (1998). Growing economic costs, contact, and communication are said to pacify trading states. Rosecrance created a typology of states in international politics: territorial, trading, and virtual. Territorial or military states still pose a threat to security in that they tend to expand their territory by way of conquest. Traditional territorial and military states (in the 16th and 17th centuries) pursued power through the acquisition of military capabilities and land to expand production and power. War was the primary source of threat to security as long as land remained the major source of production and power. By the mid-19th

century, however, the territorial and military pole in international relations had given way to the trading pole. Commercial liberalism's belief in the pacifying effects of unsubsidized and unrestricted free trade challenges the realist-oriented form of mercantilism and its "beggar-thy-neighbor" tendencies. International free trade removes protective barriers to international commerce (including domestic groups that are likely to support war, reduce free-trading interests that limit aggression, or generate support for the state in order to build war machines) (McDonald 2004).

Successful trading states produce tangible goods, but they subsequently become virtual states. Virtual states expand high-level service industries at home, but lodge most of their production outside their borders. There has been steady progress toward virtual-state relationships and hence international peace (seen as imminently profitable) and security in the 21st century, although interstate war has not become obsolete. Still, peaceful competition among trading and virtual states has intensified, while war among them has become less and less likely (Rosecrance 1999: 82).

Rising powers can benefit from peaceful development through international trade and no longer need territorial control of other nations. Advanced states find it increasingly costly to wage war and "can do better through internal economic development sustained by a worldwide market for their goods and services than by trying to conquer and assimilate large tracts of land" (Rosecrance 1986: 24–25). While democracies are less inclined to go to war against each other (from the liberal democratic viewpoint), "[w]hat the world needs are open domestic societies that are ready to receive foreign information and argument about their national priorities" (Rosecrance 1999: 77). Trading and virtual states that establish commercially open relations entail no new form of aggressive imperialism, because their mutual dependence forms the kind of economic bond that "will help ease security concerns" (*ibid.*: 18).

Other commercial liberals make similar claims that war does not pay. Although wars among industrialized states still occurred after the Industrial Revolution, the costs of war are said to have significantly begun to outweigh the benefits. Modern wars have become potentially costly. As Kaysen (1998: 452) puts it: "Industrialization multiplied both the scale and cost of war; industrial wars involved the whole nation, not the typically small fraction of population and output drawn into earlier wars." States are unified and thus do not turn territorial gains into effective control. Conquerors also face costly resistance from people in conquered states. Leaders and people in welfare-oriented states have also de-legitimized wars. All these make territorial gains from industrial wars smaller than their costs.

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, democratic liberals (known as neo-Kantianists) also began to challenge realism's emphasis on systemic factors in security politics. They consider realism to be inadequate for explaining war and peace. Political realists are wrong to think that physical distance

keeps democracies from waging war against each other. Michael Doyle further contends that balance-of-power systems are not the best guarantee for peace and security. As he puts it, the balance of power, “even at its best,” is “a poor form of international order to rely upon for international security.” He adds: “It may have ensured the survival of the Great Powers and somewhat reduced the number of wars, but it did so at the cost of a large investment in arms, the destruction of small powers, and a series of devastating Great Power wars” (Doyle 1997: 93).

Domestic norms and institutions together with commercial ties gave rise to democratic liberalism, which can be traced back to the work of Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), who famously advanced the concept of “perpetual peace” (as opposed to mere truce). The Kantian thesis is based on a global free market and a shared commitment by liberal states to the “categorical imperative,” defined as “a universal law that all rational beings can make and act upon for themselves as free, self-determining agents whose actions are morally good. . . . It enjoins us to ‘act autonomously and respect the right and obligation of everyone else to do the same’” (Tesón 1992: 63).

Democratic liberalism also downplays other liberal perspectives, including neo-liberal institutionalism, domestic politics, and commercial liberalism (Russett 1996: 84–90). International institutions are important, but their mitigating effects on state behavior are more by-products of peace than causes. Wealth alone does not ensure peace, either. Democratic liberals regard free trade alone as insufficient for the maintenance of international peace and security. Kant, for instance, did not argue that commerce serves no purpose for peace, but he warned of “a dangerous money power,” because rulers’ existing inclinations to war can be enhanced by wealth (Kant 1949: 433). Trade frictions between or among industrialized states (as neo-mercantile realists assert) prove that economic interdependence and high levels of international trade alone may not prevent states from waging war. Some democratic liberals would further mention Lenin’s theory of imperialism (to be discussed later) as justification for their objection to the “wealth-makes-peace” proposition.

Liberal democracy provides a major source of security at both domestic and international levels. The ultimate aim of liberal states goes beyond their own security to include the protection and promotion of individual rights; they emphasize wealth and prosperity—the welfare of the individual. Internationally, democracies co-exist in peace. Citizens in liberal democracies respect one another’s right to political independence. The principle of “mutual respect” is fundamental to citizens who value liberty. War can be waged only with the consent of the citizens who have “a great hesitation in embarking on so dangerous an enterprise” (Doyle 1997: 282).

World federalism based on the union of republican states provides the way out of war among states, but Kant rejected the idea of a world state because republican states remain egoistic. In his view, a world state can

become despotic. Kantians support the idea of “defensive alliances” against the threat of non-republics; in other words, the right of republics to maintain a military balance of power against non-republican states. They defend the right for liberal states to make war when they believe they are injured by the actions of non-democratic states, when legal proceedings fail to satisfy their grievances, when they experience threats.

Whether only liberal democracies develop peaceful relations or whether they are generally more pacific than states with other regime types is debatable. The “separate-peace” proposition states that liberal democracies behave peacefully toward states of their own type. Only liberal democracies can achieve peaceful accommodation among themselves. Transparency prevents them from launching pre-emptive strikes against each other. When experiencing a conflict of national interests, republics or liberal democracies tend to resolve their differences peacefully. Kant thus predicted the emergence of a “pacific union” only among republics. According to some contemporary Kantians, constitutionally secure liberal states have yet to engage in war with one another. They have republican constitutions, market economies, legal equality for citizens, and representative governments based on a separation of powers. But they have waged wars against non-liberal states and may be even more war-prone than the latter. Liberal states have invaded weak non-liberal states (for example, in colonial wars and more recently U.S. intervention in Third World states) more often than non-liberal powers. There are at least three major reasons why liberal democratic states may go to war against non-liberal states. First, liberal states believe that non-liberal states do not have the right to be free from foreign intervention, as they do not provide their citizens with domestic justice. When faced with major wars, liberal states also tend to fight on the same side. Second, they tend to regard non-liberal states as potential aggressors, because they are aggressive against their own citizens. Liberal states distrust powerful non-liberal states and are less inclined to reach compromises with them in security issues, such as arms control. Third, liberal leaders can also stir things up with non-liberal states to enhance their political legitimacy or to get elected. Other democratic liberals, however, have revised the “separate peace” proposition by contending that liberal democratic states also tend to be prone to peace with non-liberal states as well (MacMillan 2003), because they either rarely initiate violence or tend to have a lower propensity to initiate armed conflict.

COMMERCIAL LIBERAL PERSPECTIVES ON SECURITY IN ASIA-PACIFIC

Commercial liberals defend the case for “geopolitical optimism” based on the assumption that the common interest states in the region share can

overcome the legacies of past conflicts and restrain other realist factors, such as competition for power (Richardson 1994/95). Since the end of World War II, states in the region, particularly Japan, have pursued peaceful development through international trade.

Commercial liberals generally argue that more and more states now engage in trade relations because war no longer pays and trade benefits everyone involved. Alan Milward, for instance, studied Japan's past military aggression and demonstrates that this aggressive military policy proves to have been costly in the long run. He found that the initial "seizure of the southern areas in the first year of warfare did . . . correct certain raw material deficiencies in the Japanese economy" Milward (1977: 165), but Japan experienced serious economic problems afterward; it could not maintain the Co-Prosperity Sphere it had built. According to Keiichi Tsunekawa (2005: 126), Japan became a "commercial state" pursuing bilateral free trade arrangements with other countries. Japan's policy resisted any idea of an exclusionary economic bloc within East Asia.

The idea of Japan as a trading state can be traced back to the 1950s, when Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida sought to woo China away from the Soviet bloc, based on the optimistic belief that Chinese prosperity would make Beijing friendly to Japan and the United States. Early in the 1960s, Japan emerged as China's largest trading partner. In 1979, Japan became the first non-communist state to provide assistance to China and was the first country to resume foreign aid after the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989. According to Green and Self (1996: 36), "Japanese business leaders, scholars and diplomats were confident that over time the principles of commercial liberalism would triumph as trade and investment transformed China into a cooperative partner in developing a new Asia."

Unlike the United States and the Soviet Union, which spent enormous amounts of money on military defense during the Cold War, Japan devoted 99% of its resources to civilian production (Rosecrance 1986: 155). As "the symbolic leader of the new trading world" (*ibid.*: 228), Japan succeeded in getting what it wanted—such as raw materials and oil—through international trade rather than through military force, which had failed miserably in the 1930s. It accepted its dependence on what the rest of the world could provide and no longer saw the need to conquer others for such materials. Japan chose to procure necessary markets and raw materials through international commerce rather than through military expansion with the aim of achieving economic self-sufficiency (*ibid.*: 139).

Galia Press-Barnathan (2006: 271–74) further argues in defense of commercial liberalism using the cases of Japan, Indonesia, and the Philippines to show that these former enemies succeeded in promoting peaceful relations through economic cooperation. Japan had colonized the two Southeast Asian states until the end of World War II, but signed a peace

treaty with Manila in 1956 and with Jakarta in 1958. The three states have since seen direct economic benefits from each other.

Commercial liberals praise states that have recently adopted the policy of economic liberalization to promote export-oriented trade relations and foreign investment across borders. A key factor in the growth of intra-regional trade lies in what economists call “prisoner’s delight,” as opposed to “prisoner’s dilemma.” The “prisoner’s delight game” is based on the optimistic assumption that states respond to each other’s liberalization by unilaterally opening their borders to trade, also known as “unilateral trade liberalization.” States have observed their neighbors’ policy behavior and seen the benefits of this non-discriminatory policy because it helps states enhance their economic performance (Drysdale and Garnaut 1994).

The idea of peaceful relations among trading states within the Asia-Pacific has received considerable attention from state leaders. ASEAN states adopted export-oriented economic policies, which attracted foreign investors from Japan and Western states, and have sought to promote free trade. China and states in Southeast Asia agreed in 2005 to form a China-ASEAN free trade area, with a combined market of 1.7 billion people, which could raise ASEAN exports to China by 48% (\$13 billion) and Chinese exports to ASEAN by 55% (\$11 billion). China has now become Australia’s biggest trading partner. South Korea has also signed a free trade agreement with ASEAN set to take effect in June 2007. More recently, Japan has also pursued the idea of free trade with the regional group. Meanwhile, the United States and Singapore continue to maintain the lowest tariff rates on earth; their bilateral trade volume stood annually at \$40 billion in the early 2000s (Pang 2007: 2).

Because of growing economic, political, and military relationships, even great powers have deepened their mutual dependence, which has encouraged them to help each other. Relations between Japan and the United States are likely to remain peaceful. Rosecrance (1986: 208) argues that “both have greatly benefited from an open international economy in the past fifty years. Each will cooperate with the other to maintain and strengthen that openness.” The “common economic interests” that unite them “are stronger than any security uncertainties” and, therefore, “China’s role . . . does not determine either Japan’s or America’s foreign policy.”

Commercial liberals have reason for optimism concerning peaceful relations between China and other countries in the region. In Rosecrance’s view (1999: 172), “China is unlikely to revive past territorial demands” because of its commercial interests. Singapore, Hong Kong and, to a lesser extent, Taiwan have become virtual entities because their production facilities are based in other states. The best example of a virtual state is Hong Kong because it has located its production facilities in southern China and has expanded high-level services at home.

The rise of China as a great power is also unlikely to disrupt Sino-U.S. and Sino-Japanese relations. China has now become a “production plant

for the world, but [its] industries would only attain completeness when mated to research, development, design, marketing, and financing provided by other nations,” such as the United States and Japan (Rosecrance 1999: 171, 172). More recently, other writers made a positive prediction about the growing density of commercial linkages between China and the United States, especially after the former joined the World Trade Organization in 2001 (Hormats, Economy, and Nealer: 2001; Chen and Wolf Jr. 2001). China began to prosper as foreign investments flowed in: from \$250 billion in 2000 to \$1 trillion in 2007. As a trading state, “China is especially sensitive to the advantages of intensive growth and will not wish to disrupt essential economic arrangements that have been crucial to [its] success” (Rosecrance 2006b: 35).

Commercial liberals have continued to defend their optimism about interdependence even after the global financial downturn began in 2008. Shambaugh (2009: 6) writes about relations between China and the United States with a note of optimism: “The two countries have certainly had their share of crises and misunderstandings over the past 30 years (and continue to have differences in several policy areas), but each one was defused without deteriorating into conflict.” Also according to Shambaugh and Wright (2009: 6), relations between the two powers have improved: “Chinese attitudes toward the U.S. have grown noticeably warmer in recent years and, like other Asian nations polled, Chinese respondents surprisingly held consistently positive attitudes toward U.S. influence in Asia.” Interdependence between the two states seems to have contributed to peace. In spite of the recent economic downturn, the Asia-Pacific has not returned to the 1930s level of protectionism, which contributed to the outbreak of World War II.

Commercial liberalism is far from perfect, however. Whether trading or virtual states can completely transcend realism forever remains to be seen. Critics point out that economic interdependence in Europe was higher a century ago than in the Asia-Pacific today, but European states still went to war in 1914 (Rowe 2005). Likewise, high levels of economic interdependence between the United States and Japan during the 1930s did not keep them from waging war against each other.

There is still no academic consensus on the correlation between economic interdependence and peaceful co-existence among trading states in the Asia-Pacific (Taylor and Luckham 2006: 151). While some believe that economic interdependence promotes peace, others challenge this thesis (Simandjuntak 1990; Tan 1990; Trofimenko 1989). Even leading commercial liberals cannot be sure that relations among great powers engaged in commerce will stay peaceful. Rosecrance (2006b: 35), for instance, concedes that, “No one can be certain that relations among Great Powers will be peaceful ones over the long term,” because “states sometimes engage in war for insufficient reasons, neglecting the ties that bind nations together”

and also because “[s]hort-term motives take precedence over long-term maximization.”

A commercial-liberal pathway to security remains important, but Ming Wan (2003: 304) does “not dispute that economic ties alone cannot stop a war if governments are determined to fight.” States “have not abandoned national security. Realists dominate decision making in all the countries cited here, and all share the realist ambition to enrich the nation and strengthen national security” (*ibid.*: 298).

Furthermore, states that adopt commercial liberalism do not always stay anti-militaristic. When Richard Cobden advanced his theory, he was critical of British militarism and imperialism but admired the United States for spending less on military defense and even urged Britain to follow the U.S. model (Stringham 2004: 107, 108, and 114). But the U.S. model did not last. As noted elsewhere in this book, the United States has now spent more on defense than all the countries in the world combined. Japanese realism toward China and North Korea may not contradict Rosecrance’s understanding of dualism in international politics—namely, trading or virtual states pursue a relative gains strategy toward non-trading and non-virtual states, but an absolute gains strategy toward trading and virtual states—but it does highlight the fact that states that trade do not necessarily overcome the perception of mutual fear.

Since the mid-1990s, Japan’s post-Cold War view of China moved “from commercial liberalism to reluctant realism” (Green and Self 1996). Although there is strong consensus among Japanese elites that good Sino-Japanese relations must be maintained, they began to think that Japan must be prepared for scenarios other than trade. This shift came after China’s nuclear weapons tests, Chinese military threats against Taiwan, and Chinese nationalism, as well as controversial territorial claims. After Chinese President Jiang Zemin’s disastrous visit to Tokyo in December 1998, the new Japanese view of China was solidified: “In the space of only a few years, Japan’s fundamental thinking on China shifted from a faith in economic interdependence to a reluctant realism” (Green 2001: 78). Although Japan has not cut off all aid and investment or adopted policies to retard China’s economic growth, Japanese leaders have become more suspicious of China’s motives, began to doubt their own ability to affect change in China, and have established “multilateral and bilateral security networks to balance, and even contain, Chinese influence” (*ibid.*: 79). The fact that 90% of the new-generation Japanese politicians pushed for constitutional revision allowing Japan to play a more active international role further suggests that Japan is moving toward realism in its attempts to promote a national identity, and its efforts to press states in Southeast Asia, Central Asia, and Russia to “broaden cooperation beyond economic areas to include a more explicit security and political agenda” (*ibid.*: 273). As noted earlier, defensive realists believe Japan has since the mid-1990s sought to balance China (Ross 2006b: 387–89).

As the major states in the Asia-Pacific pursue free trade, they also tend to engage in geo-strategic competition. China and the United States have used free trade as an instrument to develop their security visions for the region by making concessions to build security relationships with lesser states. In 2001, for instance, the United States signed a trade agreement with Vietnam (historically suspicious of China) and is now the latter's largest export market. Their defense ties have since grown warmer. As Roger Cohen (2009: 9) notes, "In recent weeks, Vietnamese generals and Defense Ministry officials were whisked out to the U.S.S. *John C. Stern* aircraft carrier in the South China Sea for a tour that was a big hit."

As economic interdependence in East Asia increases and prosperity persists, defense spending and competitive arms processes also appear to increase as well. The economies of China and Taiwan have become increasingly interdependent, but preparations for war on both sides continue. China has deployed more than 1,000 missiles along its Taiwan Strait coast. Taiwan has responded to the threat by buying and developing advanced weapons. As China and Japan increased their bilateral trade, they also expanded their military capabilities. China has increased its defense spending over the past 15 years. In 2008, China was expected to spend \$61 billion on defense (a nearly 18% increase from 2007), but the actual figure may have been much higher. Early in 2009, the Government of China (2009: 2) published a paper on national defense that outlines worrisome aspects of intervention by the United States in the region. According to the Chinese report, "The U.S. has increased its strategic attention to and input in the Asia-Pacific region, further consolidating its military alliances, adjusting its military deployment and enhancing its military capabilities." The report particularly highlights U.S. arms sales to Taiwan (including the Pentagon's announcement in October 2008 that it was selling \$6.5 billion of weaponry to Taiwan) and regards these sales as "causing serious harm to Sino-U.S. relations as well as peace and stability across the Taiwan Straits." Meanwhile, although China has become Australia's new best friend, it is far from clear that the two trading partners can now trust each other enough to ignore military security (Wines 2009: 4).

Economic prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region through the so-called East-Asian economic miracle has so far allowed more states to increase their national defense expenditures, which are regarded by some as "a new Asian arms race" (Taylor and Luckham 2006: 139). Scholars like Michael Klare (1993) and Shannon Selin (1994: 3) see a correlation between increased economic resources and increased defense spending. Recent evidence provided by Robert Hartfiel and Brian Job (2007: 1) still reveals that levels of defense spending in East Asia continue to rise. Since the end of the Cold War, Jing-dong Yuan (2007: 178–82) further notes, several indicators suggest "significant growth in armament" in the region. According to Ward and Hoff (2007: 172), therefore, "[t]here are many reasons to

promote a peaceful world, but there is little evidence that increasing trade is one of them.” States that trade do not necessarily stop arming themselves.

Power remains relevant to the logic of commercial liberalism, which still has some realist backup. Rosecrance still maintains a realist point: while relations between China and the United States will likely remain peaceful because of their economic and security ties, China’s aggression would be checked in any event by neighboring states, who “would present barriers to extensive expansion.” He predicts that, “Even if the United States were not a major power guarantor of the existing settlement” other major powers like Japan, a unified Korea, India, and Russia “would make Chinese external expansion difficult if not impossible” (Rosecrance 2006b: 35). Commercial liberals emphasizing the virtue of interdependence still regard dependable security relationships among great powers as essential to peaceful relations among states. For Rosecrance, “economies cannot perform unless there is some form of political coherence among great states, supervising and protecting the market.” He adds: “If such protection exists, the twenty-first century will be the first epoch in history to offer the prospect of peaceful transformation and enduring global stability” (Rosecrance 1999: 211).

States in the Asia-Pacific have signed free trade agreements, but their pursuit of wealth and welfare still depends on the stability that rests on the security guarantees provided by the United States (Pang 2007: 24; Press-Barnathan 2006: 275). Dale Copeland (1998: 499) specifically points out that U.S. hegemony “has allowed Japan to flourish since 1945” and predicts that “one can imagine the fears that would arise in Tokyo should the United States ever reduce its naval and military presence in the Far East.” He goes on to predict that “Japan would be compelled to try to defend its raw material supply routes, setting off a spiral of hostility with regional great powers like China, India, Russia, and perhaps the United States itself.”

DEMOCRATIC LIBERAL PERSPECTIVES ON SECURITY IN ASIA-PACIFIC

Democratic liberalism is increasingly considered to be relevant to the Asia-Pacific. Scholars have relied on Kantian insights informing the democratic peace thesis to prove their optimistic views of future security development in the region. Richard Betts (1993/94); Winston Lord (1989); Mike Mochizuki and Michael O’Hanton (1998); Barrett McCormick (2000); and Edward Friedman (2000a&b) are among the democratic liberals. However, their optimism does not extend to the belief that the region is likely to become peaceful any time soon, because some states like China may not become democratic in the near future.

Democratic liberals who have studied the Asia-Pacific agree that the region is not secure yet: many states are not yet democratic and are thus

prone to external aggression. They still see a possibility of war between non-democratic and democratic states, notably between China and Taiwan (Wang 2002), China and Japan, as well as North and South Korea. Non-democratic states, such as China and North Korea, enjoy only limited forms of political legitimacy (mainly based on an authoritarian ideology) and have thus tended to resort to nationalism. Authoritarian states operate on the basis of hierarchy, secrecy, and repression and “are likely to perceive the outside world as hostile and threatening and are likely to encourage their citizens to hold similar views” (McCormick 2000: 325). However, some democratic liberals do not argue that authoritarianism automatically leads to war or conflict, while democracy preserves peace. What they say is that, as McCormick (2000: 325) puts it, “[a]uthoritarianism does not make conflict between China and the United States inevitable, but it does significantly increase its likelihood.”

Friedman views China’s anti-Japanese nationalism and its Sino-centric chauvinism as powerful hindrances to genuine China-Japan reconciliation. China’s new nationalism “has a vengeful, militaristic edge” (Friedman 2000a: 112). The absence of democracy has contributed to China’s misunderstandings of Tokyo, made “Chinese patriots” blind to their past hegemonic ambitions, perpetuating Japan’s security dilemma. China’s non-democratic nationalism has also been unattractive to the Taiwanese, and it “may not swiftly abate,” “will intensify pressures to isolate Taiwan internationally,” and “will use military force and economic destabilization to shake the support of the people of Taiwan from their government” (ibid.: 123).

But democratic liberals have observed peaceful relations among democratic states in the Asia-Pacific. Edward Friedman, for instance, cites examples of how democratic states in the Asia-Pacific have achieved genuine reconciliation, based on trust, transparency, and cooperation. As democracies, South Korea and Japan have done this. “A democratic South Korea, which suffered longer and far more from Japan’s imperial militarism than China did, has reconciled with Japan and agreed to put the past behind and built together a better future” (Friedman 2000a: 113). Friedman was well aware of the continuing difficulties between Korea and Japan, but thinks that “Seoul and Tokyo could still devise democratic ways of resolving issues in textbook disputes as authoritarian China cannot” (ibid.: 113).

Democratic liberals thus tend to predict that a democratic China will no longer perpetuate war-prone division between itself and others, such as Japan and Taiwan. A democratic China would promote debate that could enable Chinese patriots to pay “attention to millennia of Chinese wars of incorporation and expansion” (Friedman 2000a: 109) and could even help them understand others better, because of “the complexities of openness and transparency” (ibid.: 113).

Some proponents of the democratic peace argue for a democratic defensive alliance, but suggest that balancing Chinese power would be

irresponsible. Mochizuki and O'Hanlon (1998) present a democratic vision for the U.S.-Japan security alliance. They see little merit in multilateral regimes, such as the ARF, which "are better at preserving a widely endorsed status quo than at solving fundamental disputes between countries" (ibid.: 131). According to Mochizuki and O'Hanlon, the two military allies should promote greater balance and military burden-sharing and greater mutuality in crisis decision-making terms. Japan should not become as militarily powerful as the United States, but should be willing to engage in sea operations aimed at enforcing sanctions and freedom of navigation, as well as in shallow-water minesweeping. Japan should also deploy modestly sized units for land operations. The U.S.-Japan alliance should also provide humanitarian relief and peace operations. This security agenda should be based on "democratic principles" and "shared political values," not on traditional, national-interest grounds, because of Japan's "strong currents of pacifism and idealism" (ibid.: 128).

The U.S.-Japan alliance should be driven not only by Japanese pacifism, but also by the need to turn itself into a regional collective-security organization (perhaps a zone of democratic peace). Mochizuki and O'Hanlon thus envision a region where China is not threatened by a military alliance and will instead become democratic.

Edward Friedman (2000b: 250), however, rejects the strategy of political or military domination or containment, which he thinks "is bad policy advice" and "will make an iffy situation far shakier," but prefers the strategy of "engagement with quiet vigilance" that would allow democratic states in the region to engage fully with China, to adopt a long-term commitment, and to expect nasty bumps along the way. China and other undemocratic states in the region need to be democratized, but the task of building democracy belongs to their peoples, including "outraged people in China" (ibid.: 248), not to outsiders who cannot change the political regime of this country (Friedman 2000a: 124). Democratic transition should not be pushed to the point where it will lead to chaos at home. Evidence shows that Chinese people and leaders now seek to promote the rule of law in their "lawless state" (Friedman 2000b: 231).

The best strategy is one aimed at dispersing nasty tensions between China and Japan and at promoting "a world of mutual benefit" (Friedman 2000b: 250). Friedman stresses "policies of economic benefit, of building pacts of peace, and on the detoxification of Japan-China relations" (ibid.: 251). He sees the value/virtue of multilateral institutions, such as ASEAN and the ARF, which "may hold a promise of peace in the Asia-Pacific region" because "membership in certain multilateral bodies might provide mutual benefit and deter war" (ibid.: 230). Washington would have to "reconsider" its approach to human rights, which focuses on individual political rights, and would need to adopt "a responsible third world approach to human rights" (ibid.: 238). For others, Washington should also

serve as the role model of a responsible great power that they want China to become (Kim 2000).

Overall, democratic liberals seem to believe that they are on the right side of history progressing toward the democratic peace. Fukuyama (1989) declares the end of history, namely, the ideological struggles between democracy and other forms of government are over. Even some realist-inclined scholars believe that democratic values have a pacifying effect on state behavior (Betts 1993/94). While urging the United States to re-establish Japanese armed forces as a joint balance against the rise of Chinese neo-fascism bent on establishing hegemony in Asia, Bernstein and Munro (1997: 204) argue that “the single most important change, one that would, almost at a stroke, eliminate the sharpest areas of conflict between China and the United States, would be for China to follow the global trend toward democracy.”

Another source of strength in democratic liberalism is that democracies seem better than non-democracies at maintaining cooperation. Only the bilateral democratic alliances between the United States and Japan, the United States and South Korea, and the United States and Australia have survived the Cold War (Blackwill and Dibb 2000). For its part, the United States continues to strengthen its democratic alliances. In July 2001, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld met with Australian leaders to discuss security issues. Although an Asian version of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was not proposed, the meeting appeared to be an attempt to create an alliance among democracies in the region. Washington also courted India as the world’s most populated democracy (Vajpayee 2000: 10; Mann 2000: 16), although Australia has been the United States’ faithful alliance partner (Baker and Paal 2000; Green and Twining 2008). It thus seems that democracies continue to behave as democratic liberals expect. David Shambaugh, Thomas Wright, and others further point out that the United States still commands strong respect in the region and that its regional reputation remains far more robust than that of China. China’s authoritarian system has not enabled it to march ahead of the United States, and democracies in the region still regard China with suspicion. Large majorities in major democratic states (74% in Japan, 74% in South Korea, 70% in the United States, and 47% in Indonesia), for instance, “indicated that China could become a military threat to their country” (Shambaugh and Wright 2009: 6). Surveys by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs also showed that only 10% of Japanese, 21% of South Koreans, and 20% of Indonesians said they would be comfortable with China as Asia’s future leader. In contrast, 69% of Chinese, 75% of Indonesians, 76% of South Koreans, and 79% of Japanese believed that American influence in the region had increased during the past decade (cited in Pei 2009: 35, 36).

There are challenges to the democratic peace thesis, however. First, critics argue that the practice of cooperation norms is not limited to liberal

democracies. Other types of states have also espoused such norms, because wars are a costly way of resolving conflicts, and such norms are a mere reflection on a general state interest in avoiding war (Farber and Gowa 1996). ASEAN states, for example, have promoted regional peace and security, although most of them are not democratic. Indonesia under President Suharto, where the military played a dominant role and intervened in the decision-making process, rejected aggressive foreign policies (Dassel 1997).

Second, democratization may generate tensions and conflict among states. Charles Morrison observes that political liberalization in East-Asian states created difficult new challenges for regional security. In Morrison's (1990: 118) words, "the new freedoms work to further politicize trade issues, a phenomenon already familiar in U.S.-Japan and U.S.-Western European settings. Over time, this may have a corrosive effect on public attitudes which will spill over into other areas, including security relations." Harry Harding (1997: 176) also asserts that "[d]emocratization, especially in immature countries, can permit expression of nationalism that authoritarian regimes once suppressed, and such activity may not lead to peaceful foreign policies." David Bachman (2000: 195-96) predicts that "the process of democratic transition may make Chinese nationalism even more inflammatory." Also according to Barrett McCormick (2000: 306), democracy is not a "magic bullet." There are limits to what democracy can do for peace or stability, and this form of government "would not instantly eliminate Chinese nationalism or anti-American attitudes," although it "offers a better chance of overcoming these problems than dictatorship."

Third, the Asia-Pacific experience shows that democracies do not automatically achieve cooperation on every major issue. For instance, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe proposed the idea of an "Asian Arc of Democracy" (as part of the Arc of Prosperity and Freedom whose members would include Australia, India, Japan, and the United States), but the idea collapsed quickly when Australia did not go along and decided to launch the first "strategic dialogue" with non-democratic China. The United States and Japan have not collaborated at all times, either. Japan, for instance, initially lent a helping hand to the U.S. war in Iraq, but ended its mission there in 2007 and subsequently concluded its Iraq-Kuwait air cargo shuttle. Japan has been pressing for a more independent and equal security partnership with the United States.

Fourth, there are historical cases of "near misses," and balances of power among democracies still exist (Layne 1996a). In East Asia, Japan and South Korea have become democratic, but their bilateral ties remain far from ideal, as South Korea remains prepared for a possible war against Japan. There are signs indicating the two Asian democracies' continuing rivalry and threats of force (Emmerson 1996: 40), such as their ongoing disputes over Takeshima/Tokdo Island. The tensions between Japan and

Taiwan over another set of disputed islands (known as Senkaku in Japanese and Diaoyutai in Chinese) have grown intense.

Fifth, democratic liberals do not ignore the importance of material power, either. Michael Doyle (1996: 28), for instance, concedes that still power matters among democracies: “independent and more substantial . . . Japanese defense establishments pose problems for liberal cooperation. Military dependence on the United States has been one of additional bonds helpful in transforming a liberal peace into a liberal alliance.”

Inspite of their imperfect relations, liberal democracies have a better record than authoritarian states in terms of promoting mutual peace and security. U.S. alliances with Japan and South Korea remain durable, despite some doubt about their future. The U.S.-Japan alliance continues to allow alliance symbols, such as the nuclear umbrella and common democratic values, to “stand as a surrogate for alliance value,” and to keep the alliance “stronger than apart” (Samuels and Schoff 2009). Japan has balanced China (Ross 2006b: 387–89), but the U.S. “relationship with Japan is becoming stronger and stronger” (2006a: 208). Also, any argument that South Korea is moving closer to China and is likely to become hostile to the United States remains unconvincing. Seoul’s warmer ties with China may be based more on both tactical reasoning regarding North Korea than on their political values and its quest for Chinese support for reunification with North Korea. As such, bilateral cooperation between Seoul and Beijing may never grow close enough to break the U.S.-South Korea alliance, as long as China remains authoritarian and as long as the United States remains a powerful democracy.

Socialist Utopianism and Realism

Realists regard socialism as irrelevant to security studies and liberals quickly pronounced socialism dead after the Cold War, but socialist critics maintain that their perspectives have become even more relevant than ever to security matters in the current age of globalization. For socialists, liberal democracy does not mark the end of history, but only serves as another historical step toward socialism. Leading socialist theorists, most notably Karl Marx, and practitioners such as Vladimir Lenin of the Soviet Union and Mao Zedong of China contributed their thoughts to modern strategic thinking. The global vision for a socialist world order may have grown dim after the Cold War with Soviet disintegration; however, socialists still place their hopes on global capitalism's worsening problems. They have continued or renewed their academic attacks on global capitalism, particularly American imperialism. Fred Halliday (1999: 2), a scholar who has chosen to rely on Marxism's "great insights" rather than its "great illusions," argues that liberal triumphalism is premature. For him (and others), "the agenda of the revolutions of modern history is still very much with us" and any "picture of the contemporary world . . . that ignores this unfinished agenda is not only incomplete, but fundamentally distorted" (*ibid.*: 3). In Asia-Pacific today, perhaps more than any other region in the world, socialist perspectives on peace and security (especially on revolution and war) have survived the Cold War. China, Laos, North Korea, and Vietnam still officially embrace Marxism-Leninism. This chapter thus re-examines

Marxist, Leninist, Maoist, and dependency/world-system perspectives by taking a critical look at what they tell us about peace and security in the region, both in the past and into the future.

SOCIALIST UTOPIANISM AND REALISM IN A NUTSHELL

Socialism—based on the visions of Marxists, modern world systems, and dependency theorists in general—ascended during the Cold War in a fight for recognition as a dominant security paradigm (Kolodziej 2005: 221). The founder of modern socialism was Karl Marx (1818–83) who provided intellectual roots for contemporary critiques of realism and liberalism and laid a foundation for Leninism and Maoism.

Karl Marx's ultimate referent object for security is the human race as a whole. He advocated a type of idealism or utopianism committed to the advancement of human welfare, although his most immediate concern was focused on the proletarian class in industrialized states. Proletarian workers as the subordinate class within capitalist societies live insecurely; they are alienated, estranged, and exploited.

Capitalist exploitation is regarded as a form of unjust violence. Exploitation is characterized by the domestic nature of surplus value (profits, rent, interest, and so on). The economically powerful classes deny the less powerful ones their fair share of the economic surplus. Capitalism (an economic system associated with private property, a free and competitive market, and employment created by private or non-state employees interested in producing goods for profit) is viewed as the structural source of violence, because it gives rise to oppression, imperialism, and war. Morgenthau (1985: 36) writes: “For Marx and his followers, capitalism is at the root of international discord and war.” Seeking to create surplus value as part of capital accumulation, capitalist states can not be expected to co-exist peacefully. They will eventually encounter the problem of falling profit rates and recurring economic crises. Domestic under-consumption (which gives rise to surplus capital, rather than surplus value) and other factors will lead to economic crises, imperialism, and war among capitalist states.

Marx envisioned a world made up of communist societies as the new basis of a global or world security order, going beyond commercial and democratic liberalism. Like Kant, he took note of liberal tendencies toward peace, but he also notes that the liberal era is not the end of history. Free trade is not the endgame for peace, although it can be the policy that serves to hasten the time of a socialist revolution. Socialist revolution was viewed as the driving force of history. The next epoch in world history takes place when the liberal democratic era moves toward a socialist one, when the capitalist state withers away and ushers in the socialist state under the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat, and finally a communist or classless society emerges. For

Marxists, this does not seem to be an impossible mission because capitalists will eventually become their own “gravediggers.”

Whether Marx and his associate Friedrich Engels regarded violence and war as compulsory and essential to ending the bourgeois oppression (as those in the radical school think) inefficient as a means or instrumental remains a subject of scholarly debate. But the instrumental school appears most persuasive. Marx and Engels initially counted on interstate war as a force that would unleash revolutionary war, but later relied less on force and more on social power. Marx rejected the idea of a regular or standing army to defend the socialist state, but advocated the need for militia—a citizen’s volunteer army or the armed working class. For Marx and Engels, force is a means, not an end: “Force will be the midwife of revolution in those countries which have not advanced from the point of democratic processes, a fact which may force the proletariat to take sword in hand” (Cohen-Almagor 1991: 2).

Based on Marx’s vision for peace, Vladimir Lenin (1870–1924) built a theory of imperialism defined as the highest stage of capitalism where monopolies dominate the capitalist system and finance capital is established. The year 1900 marked the imperialist stage of capitalism, and Lenin regarded the outbreak of World War I as the empirical base for this explanation. The war did not result from the political struggle for world hegemony among the great powers, as realists see it. Imperialism was the main cause, deeply rooted in the capitalist states’ struggle for raw materials and markets under conditions of failing profits and their competition for access to overseas markets and colonies in other regions. The war also marked “the last stages of a global struggle between finance capital and a potentially unified proletariat” (Kolodziej 2005: 214). There was thus a clear “link between capitalism and war”—“one of the firmest postulates of Marxist analysis, expressed in its classic form in Lenin’s immensely influential pamphlet *Imperialism*” (Gamble 1999: 136).

But Lenin’s most celebrated work is based on the political necessity of a “vanguard communist party”—the Socialist Leviathan—capable of overcoming the bourgeois Leviathan. When left to itself, the working class would conform to bourgeois ideology. What was needed was a political organization to articulate the common interests of workers. A group of dedicated cadres (made up of intellectual officers responsible for training military units) would need to be formed. They would be professional revolutionaries and devote full time to the revolutionary work of a communist party, but would remain under the tight control of the party.

Lenin saw the possibility of “simultaneous revolution” in both capitalist and colonized states (and this runs contrary to the strategy of his successor, Joseph Stalin, who believed that socialism “in one country” was possible). The rationale behind Lenin’s strategy was that if there was a revolution in colonies alone, the imperialists could send their troops to crush it.

But if there was a revolution in the metropole only, troops from the colonies could be deployed to suppress the metropolitan revolution. The time would come when imperialist states, driven by uneven economic development among them, would fight each other. Consequently, they would be weakened enough to allow the communist party to launch a revolutionary war. Therefore, Lenin was no pacifist: he regarded war as a force that “helped to destroy the ‘most barbaric despotism in Europe’” (Cohen-Almagor 1991: 15). He initially had opposed the use of force for achieving revolutionary objectives, but later “affirmed not only the use of violence but also . . . terroristic activities” (*ibid.*: 8). According to Shy and Collier (1986: 827), “Lenin follows Marx in his insistence on the need to ‘break up,’ ‘smash,’ or ‘crush’ the ‘bourgeois state machine,’ with an organization created by the ‘people armed.’” He opposed all national-capitalist wars but supported all wars of liberation against world capitalism.

The Leninist theory of imperialism influenced socialists, including dependency theorists who either lived in the South (made up of least and less developing countries, LDCs) or who have studied LDCs; they thought that states in the North (made up of developed countries, DCs) enriched themselves at the expense of those in the South. But it was Stalin’s idea of “socialism in one country” that influenced revolutionary nationalism in the South. Although dependency theory was first based on Latin American experiences, scholars in other regions, such as B. N. Ghosh of Malaysia (2001), have adopted this theoretical perspective.

Although neither dependency nor world systems perspectives (to be discussed later) directly address the question of war and peace, they see conflict between the North and the South. Dependency theorists expect workers and other social actors (such as peasants, students, and even religious institutions) in the South to form alliances fighting for political rights, for local control of the national economy, and for more equal distribution of wealth. Some theorists believe in the need for class struggles against both local and international bourgeoisie. Others have called for more justice in international economic relations by pushing for structural reform in favor of a New International Economic Order (NIEO). Still others, such as Samir Amin (1977), have called for total disengagement from the world capitalist system through the policy of self-reliance. According to Ghosh (2001: 9), all dependency theorists agree that “development of LDCs is not possible unless and until the tie with the central capitalism is snapped. Socialism is regarded as the best alternative for having rapid economic development with social justice and equity.”

World systems theory, as represented mostly by Immanuel Wallerstein (2000) and Christopher Chase-Dunn’s works (1981), further poses a direct challenge to political realism. Capitalism has a reproductive logic in that this mode of production keeps producing the competitive interstate system,

whose units are prone to rivalry and war. Great powers in the core (whose regions had strong central governments with large mercenary armies) engaged in World Wars I and II as well as the Cold War, because of their competition over the right to exploit the periphery (whose regions lacked strong central governments that relied on coercive labor and whose economies depended on the exports of raw materials to the core).

These socialist theorists pride themselves on taking a more holistic approach to international relations by subsuming political realism and others through their rejection of ahistoricism and their commitment to trans-historical logics that bring state-centric theories under the rubric of the world capitalist system that emerged in the 16th century and continues today. The world economic order consists of a hierarchical form that is far from anarchical, in that competitive states are not equal (Chase-Dunn 1981: 32). The realist interstate system exists as “the political side of capitalism,” but “its survival is dependent on the operation of the institutions which are associated with the capital-accumulation process” (*ibid.*: 19).

Capitalism explains balance-of-power systems in a way different from political realism. A world empire is difficult to establish, because of inter-imperial rivalry that reproduces balance-of-power politics within the capitalist core and caused war among core states (hegemonic versus challenging) or empires, which seek to prevent anyone among them from becoming the world hegemon. Hegemonic powers, which advocate free trade, also engage in imperialism. The hegemonic state within the core would expand into parts of the periphery (turning them into non-industrial, primary product-producing colonies), when and if they are unable to compete with other rising core capitalists (McGowan and Kordan 1981).

Past capitalist hegemons were “strong enough to define the rules of the game and to see that they are followed almost all of the time” (Wallerstein 1996: 98). They used force and bribery to strengthen their position and relied on “ideological persuasion” as “a key element in persuading the populations of the hegemonic power[s] to pay the price of military supremacy.” They also persuaded “the cadres and populations of the allied countries to consider the pluses of an alliance far greater than its minuses.” They strived “even to create doubts among the victims of the system as to the acceptability of their complaints. Successive hegemonic powers have been increasingly successful in this ideological task” (*ibid.*: 100–01).

World-systems theory further contends that capitalist states in the semi-periphery are those used by capitalist states in the core to serve as the political buffer (between core and periphery) to thwart any aspirations in the periphery to rebel against the world capitalist system. Semi-peripheral states are still exploited (by those in the core); however, they also exploit those in the periphery. As part of the capitalist world system, individual states in the periphery can still develop their economies by adopting the

core's free-market capitalism (based on private enterprise and an entrepreneurial culture), but they cannot make the critical transition to socialism. Because the capitalist world system became truly global early in the 20th century, the road to socialism is only possible at the global level.

The world today is likely to experience more insecurity because the hegemon that still underpins the world capitalist system is not going to last. The world economy became stagnant in the 1970s, faced debt crises and the emergence of the East Asian tigers in the 1980s, and headed toward a final downturn in the 1990s. Capitalist states continue to lose legitimacy, and this legitimacy erosion leads to the increase of "day-by-day violence" in the world capitalist system. Anti-statism continues to rise. According to Wallerstein, "people everywhere are taking back from the states the role of providing for their own security. . . . The more they do so, the more there is chaotic violence . . . the more the states find themselves unable to handle the situation." This results in people's disinvestment in the state and "further weakens the ability of the states to limit the spiral [of chaotic violence]." The state has become less able to help the capitalists tame the "dangerous classes" and "accumulate capital" (Wallerstein 2000: 23, 24). The political struggle between the capitalist and socialist camps during this transition will become enormous. The outcome remains uncertain: it depends upon who can mobilize whom and who can provide the better analysis of "what is going on and what the real historical alternatives that we collectively face" are (*ibid.*: 26). Violence in the capitalist system will most likely increase rather than decrease, and "there will be great confusion" (*ibid.*: 25). For world-systems theorists, anti-systemic social movements can still take defensive action and aim to make the world relatively democratic and egalitarian.

MAO ZEDONG'S PERSPECTIVE ON PERMANENT PEACE

Marx's and Lenin's ideas had a great impact on revolutionaries in East Asia. Mao Zedong became the best-known Asian revolutionary, who declared in 1949 that "China has stood up [on its own feet]." His theory of revolutionary war still inspires other revolutionaries today, especially those in India, Nepal, and the Philippines.

Mao rejected the realist idea of a permanent possibility of war among states as well as the commercial optimism about peace among capitalist states, but he believed that the second epoch of imperialist wars waged by capitalist states would end one day. This epoch of "warlike life of humanity" had begun only a few thousand years earlier, with the development of production and the appearance of social divisions. World War I was unprecedented in history, but World War II was also "without precedent in all history and [brought] us close to the final war." For Mao, World War II "resulted from the development of the general crisis of world capitalism,

a crisis that is compelling the capitalist countries to enter into a new war, and above all the fascist countries to embark on new military adventures.” Believing that “this war will not result in the salvation of capitalism but in its collapse,” he predicted that the new war would become “bigger and more cruel than that of twenty years ago, inevitably involving all nations and dragging on for a very long time.” But he also predicted that the world was “near to permanent peace” (Schram 1969: 392). This historical event would give revolutionary movements and states the opportunity to rise and “to oppose all counter-revolutionary wars, thus giving this war as a whole the character of a war for permanent peace” (*ibid.*: 392).

Ultimately, Mao envisioned a new world order without war rooted in capitalist exploitation, after the defeat of fascism and capitalism—one with “eternal peace.” He wrote: “Throughout all eternity our sons and grandsons will never know war again.” This type of peace will occur when man “will never again desire war,” when “[n]either armies, nor warships, nor poison gas will then be needed.” Eternal peace is evident throughout “the third epoch in the history of humanity, the epoch of peaceful life during which there will never be war” (Schram 1969: 391–93).

More in keeping with Machiavelli and Lenin than Marx, Mao believed the justified use of violence. Before 1949, he had defended the “politics of human bloodshed” and viewed violence as a way to preserve oneself and destroy the enemy. He advocated the “theory of the omnipotence of revolutionary war” and did not rule out any use of force to destroy the enemies of socialism, be they capitalist or reactionary. As early as 1938, he declared war to be the way to build socialism: “As advocates of the abolition of war, we do not desire war; but war can only be abolished through war—in order to get rid of the gun, we must first grasp it in hand” (Schram 1969: 291). For Mao, “All power grows out of the barrel of a gun” (*ibid.*: 290).

Mao also departed from Marx in that he combined politics, time, and space to develop the military doctrine of revolutionary war (known as the doctrine of “people’s war”) based on the idea that it is not weapons but people who can defeat the enemy. Basically, he “built a new doctrine of revolution around the tactics and techniques of waging a peasant-based guerrilla war” (Shy and Collier 1986: 839). There are several elements to “people’s war” and Mao’s military strategy known as “active defense.” Guerrilla warfare depends on popular support, the mobilization of which becomes a political rather than a military task. This gave rise to his strategy known as “protracted struggle,” waged by the people’s army (made up of the mass-based militia, field armies, and local forces) or the Red Army of Workers and Peasants, which would demonstrate its strategic advantage over the enemy’s technically superior forces. In the event of war, the entire society could be mobilized. Regarding time, he warned against the strategy for quick military victory. On space, he warned against holding territory, which “could be suicidal for guerrilla forces.” For him, “operating in vast

and difficult terrain, better known to [revolutionary forces] than to their enemy . . . could entice, mislead, and wear them down, creating chances for damaging surprise attacks" (ibid.: 839). Cities and installations could be abandoned and the enemy forces drawn deep into China's hinterland, where they could be harassed, worn down, and defeated. These elements were part of Mao's "laws of revolutionary war" (ibid.: 841).

Mao further advocated the strategy of self-reliance (through one's strength and efforts) and adopted a foreign policy to "defeat all Chinese and foreign reactionaries" (Halliday 1999: 277). The declaration that "China stood up" refers to the throwing off of foreign imperialism and exploitation (Schram 1969: 167–68). During the Cultural Revolution, all economic activity was also brought under state control, as a new generation of revolutionary ideologues or the youthful Red Guard, loyal to Mao, violently sought to create "the new Communist man" or the "new Chinese man." Unlike the Soviets, who appealed for "peaceful coexistence" with the capitalist enemy, he advocated "permanent revolution" throughout the world with the aim to smash the stronghold of capitalism. He advocated the idea of spreading a "prairie fire" of revolution to liberate the Third World from Western imperialism.

The extent to which socialism in general can shed light on the question of war and peace is hard to determine. But revolutionary wars against capitalist regimes and states during and after the Cold War are a historical fact. Moreover, recent trends in world politics may still validate socialism. Marx himself never advocated revolutionary action in pre-capitalist stages. When their planned economic systems failed to increase productivity, socialist leaders in China, Laos, and Vietnam turned to capitalism as a new ideology of development, or market socialism. Upon Mao's death in 1976, Deng Xiaoping quickly instituted economic reform, turning China's coastal provinces into free economic zones open to foreign investment and capitalist principles. In 1986, the Vietnamese Communist Party also inaugurated an economic reform program known as *doi moi* (renovation) aimed at stimulating rapid economic growth. Once these states become capitalistic, the next logical step would involve a series of class struggles to bring about true socialism, followed by the eventual creation of a communist society. The disintegration of the Soviet Union and its allies also opened a new window of opportunity for neo-classical Marxist thinkers. Most recently, the Asian financial crisis that began in 1997 and the global financial crisis that began in 2008 must have given Marxists more reason to hope for the final transition from monopoly capitalism to state monopoly capitalism and eventually to socialism and communism.

Although socialism remains critical of realism, as well as commercial and democratic liberalism, it remains to be seen whether the socialist vision of a peaceful world will ever become fulfilled. Modern Marxists often succumbed to nationalism. Mao, Ho Chi Minh, and Pol Pot followed in

Lenin's and Stalin's ideological footsteps and all turned out to be more nationalist than internationalist. Although China initially leaned toward the Soviet Union, its security policy was more strategic than ideological. Mao's nationalism was evident from the start. Following his death, Chinese nationalism roared back to life. The Vietnamese communist movement under French rule fought a war of national liberation and called for social justice, but Vietnamese communists showed little allegiance to either the Soviet or Chinese communists (Duiker 1995: 104). Ethnic nationalism was one of the major factors that caused the Soviet state to split into 15 republics, whose rivalries with each other and with Russia continue today. The new socialist man has so far proved quite hollow.

Whenever Marxists had the chance to run the state, they soon conformed to the logic of statism. Lenin fell into the trap of realist thinking that "we are living not merely in a state, but in a system of states" (cited in Halliday 1999: 312). The Soviet state abandoned the Marxist call for the establishment of a militia. The offensive became entrenched in Soviet military thinking. In 1946, the Red Army was transformed into the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union. After Mao, China abandoned the military doctrine of "people's army," revised it to suit high-tech conditions, developed a new military doctrine for modern warfare, and built professional armed forces (including a modern navy). This led to the decline of "people's war" and especially of the militia's role in warfare, largely because of recent advances in military technology. As Ellis Joffe (1987: 571) puts it, "As an operational guide to fighting and force building, Maoist doctrine has not been developed by China's post-Mao leaders; it has been almost completely abandoned." The People's Liberal Army has grown more nationalist: it withdrew from the class-based politics of the Cultural Revolution and has made a transition from a revolutionary army defending the Communist Party to a national army defending against China's external enemies; it also focuses more of its attention on irredentist as well as long-standing geo-strategic claims (Flanagan and Marti 2003: 5, 8, and 9).

Some contemporary socialist thinkers even acknowledge the perennial problem of political power regardless of who wields it or where it is exercised. Gabriel Kolko (1997: 6), for instance, wrote of the Vietnamese socialists: "all too many Vietnamese Communists were no different from people in successful parties everywhere: their overriding concern was power." Because of his anti-hegemonic stance, Kolko's perspective also seems sympathetic to both the system of checks and balances at the domestic level and the realist system of power balancing at the international level. He believes that concentration of power within the Communist Party's Politburo alone could remove "any check on both its abuse and . . . its ignorance." Internationally, he thinks that unchecked power is also dangerous: "I have always deplored the hegemonic pretensions of the Soviet Union, China, the U.S., and all nations that aspire to dominate others" (*ibid.*: 12, 13).

Socialist states have in fact been no less prone to politicking, imperialism, and war than capitalist ones. China and the Soviet Union struggled for leadership of world communism during much of the Cold War, ended up in a “socialist” war in 1968 and have disputed over ownership of minor river islands for years. Mao once condemned Soviet “revisionism” for flirting with the United States—the world’s archcapitalist state—but later joined the latter against the Soviet Union. It is debatable whether Mao’s behavior fits with either offensive or defensive realism (Tang 2008; Feng 2005). During the early 1970s, the Cambodian and Vietnamese revolutionary movements fought together against the pro-U.S. regimes and American imperialism. But soon after their hard-won victories, they turned against each other. Another example of a bloody war between two socialist states was one that broke out along the Chinese-Vietnamese border in 1979.

Socialism still confronts another thorny question: Is capitalism bound to cause imperialist war? Japanese imperialism led to a series of wars, but it was clear that Japan had never reached the stage of monopoly capitalism. Moreover, the Marxist assumption that imperialism is driven by monopoly capitalism overlooks the fact that the Cold War was deeply rooted in the ideological conflict between the capitalist states represented by the United States and the socialist states led by the Soviet Union—not between capitalist states, as Leninists envisioned. Some Marxists acknowledge the absence of war between capitalist states during the Cold War period, but contend that American hegemony suppressed the natural conflicts between them and predicted that the end to the Cold War would drive capitalist states back into mutual competition leading to the defense of their national capitalists’ competing interests. The Cold War did end in the early 1990s; however, this resulted from the implosion of the Soviet Union (not of the United States), and it has not confirmed the prediction. Some think that three economic poles led by the United States, Europe, and Japan will create a new tension, but the tension that exists “hardly matches the regional blocs of the 1930s.” No signs of capitalist war are on the horizon. Gamble (1999: 137) argues that, “although the Cold War has now ended and the Soviet Union has been dismantled, there is no sign that the conflicts over trade and investment between the United States and Japan, or between the United States and the EU, which undoubtedly exist, will be resolved by force.” In his view, “the global economy is by no means free of military conflicts which continue to involve several of the leading capitalist states, but there have been no signs of military clashes between these themselves.” The global economic crisis that began in 2008 saw some international coordination among the major capitalist states, despite new fears of protectionism. At this point in time, there is no strong evidence of prospects for war among them, either, although political realists always tend to think that future prospects for war between China and the United States remain real.

DEPENDENCY THEORY AND SECURITY IN ASIA-PACIFIC

By and large, the dependency/world-systems perspectives on Asian security provide powerful critiques of realism and liberalism based on the argument that states do not operate on the basis of political independence and economic interdependence. The greatest sources of insecurity lie in national dependence at the world and regional levels as well as state repression at the domestic level.

Dependency theorists have something to say about security in the Asia-Pacific. Hegemony, as Bruce Cumings (1987: 49) puts it, is an international system of economic hierarchy, within which the hegemon in the capitalist center demarcates a grand area to which other peripheral states orient their economic and political policies, such as free trade, open systems, and liberal democracy. Hegemony is a system of hierarchical economic and political relations, but it can exist at the regional level. The United States was the hegemon. The economic and political systems of states in East Asia, such as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, were reshaped according to U.S. policy preferences. Washington initially even showed interest in the development of authoritarian states that conformed to its strategic interests.

More recent evidence suggests that the U.S.-dominated world economic system succeeded in incorporating some key states in East Asia into the semi-periphery. China, Hong Kong, Russia, South Korea, and Taiwan, for instance, have exported manufactured goods to the industrialized countries in the core. This international economic pattern sheds light on the United States' strategic interest in creating a type of political buffer between core and periphery in its policy attempt to prevent poor states from rebelling against domination by the industrialized states in the North.

Dependency theorists have made the case that the integration of national economies into the world capitalist system has led to political oppression against groups from the popular sector. American hegemony created not only a system of dependency, but also a repressive state system that excluded labor, exploited women, maintained low expenditures on social welfare, and militarized society (Cumings 1987: 74, 81). Capitalist states represented the interest of the capitalist class, if not individual capitalists. South Korea and Taiwan, for instance, are said to have operated relatively autonomously from their dominant classes; however, these states cannot transcend the collective interest of the capitalist class—both domestic and international (Koo 1987), although they have achieved high rates of economic growth. Hagen Koo argues that the capitalist class was the creature of the state in South Korea and Taiwan, but later grew strong enough to challenge the state. As a result, major economic policy decisions could no longer ignore the class power of big business, which compelled the state to play “an active role in suppressing labor movements through the corporatist control of labor unions” (Koo 1987: 177).

Dependency theorists pay particular attention to the growing insecurity of labor. Frederic Deyo (1987) contends that capitalist development maintained low labor costs and that the efforts to contain labor costs led to the political exclusion of organized labor. For Stephen Haggard and Tun-jen Cheng (1987), the state in South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore formed alliances with business that weakened or eliminated organized leftist, populist, or independent labor groupings. Peter Evans (1987) argues that the power of foreign capital brought negative effects on states in East Asia. Transnational penetration led to growing inequality. Although foreign investment led to economic growth and exhibited lower levels of inequality than those in Latin America, the East Asian experience still lent support to dependency thinking when the issue of inequality was raised (Evans 1987).

Concerning East Asia today, dependency theorists still defend the need for ending ties with the world capitalist system. Ghosh (2001), for instance, expands the concept of dependency to include academic, cultural, financial, market, consumption-based, bio-, environmental, military, and policy dependency. The educational systems of LDCs depend on the Western education system; their ways of life and their value systems have become completely dependent on those of the Western world. LDCs depend on capital inflows, direct foreign investment, and loans from the West. They have to submit to the power of the Western markets. LDCs also experience a “brain drain” problem, as they lose manpower and skilled workers to the developed world. Consumers in LDCs have developed tastes, preferences, and consumption patterns that depend on those of the DCs. Bio-dependency means that LDCs depend on the Western system for medical research, human pathology, medicines, and treatment processes. LDCs are made to depend on the West’s evaluation and solution of their pollution problems. LDCs depend on the West for the supply of arms and ammunition. LDCs have come under the West’s direct and indirect interference in their domestic affairs and depend on the latter for their performance evaluation with regard to international credentials as borrowers and foreign-aid recipients.

Such dependency creates conflict between DCs and the LDCs because of the growing economic disparities between them. According to Ghosh (2001), “the line of conflict would be sharper between DCs and LDCs and the conflict would be fundamentally sharpened by the economic disparities between these two groups of countries, arising mainly out of the new international economic disorders.” As a result, militarism in LDCs will rise and their growing economic power will lead them to challenge the developed world. The DCs will then respond by imposing “many restrictions to curb the rising militarism and economic power of LDCs. This will induce the LDCs to be far more united, retaliatory and reactionary by forgetting their cultural differences which may find expression at the macro-levels.” The clash will, in the short term, be “the clash of economic determinism,” which

“is likely to be very decisive.” In the long run, the DCs, afflicted with deindustrialization and decaying economic power, “will be like Samsons with their locks shorn in the battle of politico-economic supremacy.” Backed by their growing national economies, the South will emerge as the more dominant forces in the global scenario (*ibid.*: 165).

The implications of dependency theory for security in the Asia-Pacific are thus evident. The political struggles—between those who wish to retain the privileges of the unequal world capitalist system and those who prepare to fight to create a new economic system that will be more democratic and egalitarian—continue. The region is likely to become increasingly insecure, because most states in it are LDCs dependent on DCs like the United States. The DCs will face growing crises, prove unable to deal with the growth of chaotic violence, and grow weaker as their legitimacy declines. Accordingly, North Korea should not be expected to bow to the West’s demand for disarmament; China will become a powerful economy that can lead other LDCs into battle against the DCs, and Indonesia will also stand united with other LDCs in their combat for political supremacy. The LDCs will eventually win out and dominate the region, but only after a period of intense conflict.

Dependency theories have some real strength. Capitalism still produces inequality among peoples and countries and remains a possible source of long-term insecurity within capitalist states and for states in the periphery. The issues of long-term economic stagnation, growing inequality, deepening dependency rather than interdependence, and the weakening of the state seem powerful because they perpetuate unrest against capitalism. Historical evidence also shows that the war of national liberation has evicted Western imperialist powers. For example, the Indonesians threw out the Dutch; the Vietnamese did the same to the French and Americans.

Dependency theory perspectives still reveal real shortcomings, however. Have people living in socialist states not integrated into the world capitalist system enjoyed better economic development and security? Those living under socialist regimes (such as North Korea) that reject capitalism have suffered far more extensively than those living in states that have joined the world capitalist system. This theoretical perspective cannot explain why states in East Asia (such as Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and, more recently, China) have developed after they joined the world capitalist system. These capitalist states enjoyed unprecedented economic growth (however precarious it may be), especially when compared to countries in Latin America (Stubbs 2005: 1). Developing countries (such as China and India) have now become major exporters in the world capitalist economy, but their companies have become major players challenging the incumbents in the developed world that used to dominate the world economy. According to Roger Cohen (2008), the world is turned upside down because the Newly Acquisitive Nations’ power keeps growing.

Even if the current world capitalist order does not last forever, as dependency and world-systems theorists believe it will not, it remains unclear how exactly LDCs will one day stand united against the DCs and how anti-systemic movements will be mobilized to challenge and dominate the core. Not all movements are anti-systemic or progressive. If LDCs remain underdeveloped because of the world capitalist system, how can they ever hope to grow strong enough or be united around this strategy? If LDCs can be developed when they join the world capitalist system and also benefit from it, why should they rebel against world capitalism?

Realism can still shed light on competitive state behavior. As noted earlier, there is no substantial evidence to make the case that states' competitive behavior within the international system has its structural roots in the capitalist world system. Before the 16th century, for instance, city-states (such as Athens and Sparta) and empires (Roman and others) competed for domination, despite the fact that they were not capitalistic or part of any capitalist world system at the time.

We should still give these socialist perspectives the benefit of a doubt by keeping a close eye on how things in the Asia-Pacific will turn out over the next few decades. For now, we can assume that the world capitalist system will always remain unstable, but at the same time we have no strong reason to predict that capitalist democratic states are likely to turn their relations into worldwide military conflicts.

Part III

Peace and Human Security Studies

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International Pacifism

Traditionally, the main preoccupation of scholars in *peace studies* has been the outbreak of interstate war. Peace researchers have sought to understand the causes and consequences of war and solutions to this most pressing problem. In doing so, they have laid an intellectual foundation for academic research critical of realism. In the Asia-Pacific, perspectives in *peace studies* remain largely focused on the problem of interstate and intrastate war. As a result, some advocates continue to work in the areas of arms control, disarmament, and international peacekeeping. Although they have acknowledged that interstate war has been receding since the end of the Cold War, some still consider armed conflicts among and within states worthy of their research agenda. Others have focused on nonviolent activities, most notably international law, including international criminal justice. Evidence shows that these perspectives on security still have limitations because major actors, especially powerful states, remain committed to the statist concept of military security.

INTERNATIONAL PACIFISM IN A NUTSHELL

Peace researchers tend to focus on peace through peaceful means. The concept of negative peace was first coined by Johan Galtung (1969, 1975) whose work caused debate even among peace researchers. More recently, peace researchers define *negative peace* (as opposed to *positive peace*,

discussed in the next chapter) in ways similar to that of Galtung: the absence of direct physical violence. Kenneth Boulding (1978: 3) defines negative peace as “the absence of stable turmoil, tension, conflict, and war” and positive peace as a “condition of good management, orderly resolution of conflict, harmony associated with mature relationships, gentleness, and love.” This section focuses only on methods by which negative peace can be promoted, including arms control and disarmament, international peace-keeping, and international law.

Soon after World War II, the World Federalist Movement came into existence and after that sought to build a world federal government (Wooley 1988), in which world peace based on the international rule of law will prevail. World federalists reject the realist view that “if you want peace, prepare for war” and cite the realist thesis that an arms race creates a “security dilemma” (Jervis 1978). In their view, “those who live by the sword shall die by the sword” (Kegley 1988: 191). Arms races lead to war because they diminish national security and cause military imbalances. To escape the security dilemma, states should beat swords into plowshares.

However, the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union that had its origin in the late 1940s pushed the “world federation” agenda into the background. Advocates of peace later paid attention to a newly emerging concept—common security—advanced by the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues (1982) under the chairmanship of Olof Palme, whose report stresses that no state can ensure its own security at the expense of another’s. It argues instead that, *“A doctrine of common security must replace the present expedient of deterrence through armaments. International peace must rest on a commitment to joint survival rather than a threat of mutual destruction”* (ibid.: 139, italics original).

Proponents of common security did not seek to abolish military force immediately but to temper it with the process of diplomatic reassurance. Deterrence is still relevant but must be balanced by the need for states to reassure one another of non-offensive intentions, if they were to adopt the strategy of “non-provocative defense” (NPD). National armed forces still exist for defensive purposes and do not operate in a way that leads to offensive action. Common security thus seeks to avoid exacerbating mutual suspicions, tensions, and hostilities among states without making them vulnerable to attack. The goal is to avoid the security dilemma.

Ultimately, common security necessitates real policy steps toward nuclear and conventional arms control and disarmament. The relationship between arms control/disarmament and international peace goes back as far as the late 19th century, when Czar Nicholas II and pacifist elements in the idealist camp pressured for the Hague Conference of 1899, where the process of arms reduction was placed on the agenda for international discussion. After World War I, the League of Nations picked up this theme

again, “making disarmament one of the featured aspects of its quest for peace and security” (Claude 1971: 294). This was followed by other disarmament efforts, most notably the Washington Conference of 1921–22, the London Naval Conference of 1930, and the Disarmament Conference at Geneva in 1932. The U.N. Charter also identified disarmament as one of its concerns, although the degree of emphasis is less forceful relative to the League’s Covenant. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, advocates further called for a unilateral disarmament known as “Graduated and Reciprocated Initiatives in Tension Reduction” (Osgood 1981).

Interest in disarmament has continued since the end of the Cold War (Schell 2000), and proponents of arms control and disarmament remain upbeat about the prospect for an unarmed world. Since the end of the Cold War, members of the United Nations have signed several major arms conventions, such as the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1993, and extended the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) indefinitely in 1995. The idea of disarmament has also expanded to include regulation of weapons and the banning of certain types of weapons, such as land mines and cluster bombs. In December 1997, 122 states signed the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and Their Destruction (known as the Ottawa Treaty). On 30 May 2008, 111 states adopted a treaty to set an eight-year deadline to eliminate stockpiles of cluster bombs. Some argue that the full abolition of chemical weapons is now in sight, thus proving the realists of 1919 wrong, and that the world can prove the realist advocates of nuclear weapons wrong as well (Carroll 2008).

Other internationalists have also sought to promote global governance considered to be distinct from world government. For the Commission on Global Governance (1995), a world government is “accommodating to power, more hospitable to hegemonic ambition, and more reinforcing of the roles of states and governments rather than the rights of people” (Commission on Global Governance 1995: xvi). Global governance is “the sum of the many ways” that various actors—states, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), citizens’ movements, the mass media, multinational corporations, and the global capital markets—manage their common affairs. Diverse interests can be accommodated; cooperative action can be taken. Compliance with international rules can be enforced through formal and informal institutions established by people to serve their diverse interests.

In the 1990s, world federalists and proponents of global governance further supported international and intrastate peacekeeping. The United Nations defines *peacekeeping* as “an operation involving military personnel, but without enforcement powers, undertaken by the United Nations to help maintain or restore international peace and security in areas of conflict” (U.N. 1990: 4). It aims to end violent conflict and promote conflict resolution. Peacekeeping operations are based on adversaries’ consent

rather than U.N. coercion; peacekeepers are lightly armed for the sole purpose of self-defense. As a third party, they must operate on the principles of neutrality and impartiality. Their activities include observing border violations, acting as a buffer between hostile forces, monitoring cease-fires and troop withdrawal, ensuring disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of armed forces, and providing security during election times (Goulding 1993).

World federalists and advocates of global governance also support international law, viewing it as having the legal power to limit or abolish war and/or armed politics. International law has in fact evolved over the centuries, from the laws of war (rooted in the Western tradition of “just war doctrine” based on the *Jus Ad Bellum* or laws of war and the *Jus in Bello* or laws in the conduct of war) to human rights and humanitarian law (Gutman 1999 *et al*). The *Jus Ad Bellum* contains three basic criteria based on a general anti-war presumption: competent authority (a proper sovereign) to order the war for public purpose; a just cause (such as self-defense or the protection of rights by offensive war with a reasonable prospect for victory); and right intention (which must be pure in that it does not promote aggrandizement). The *Jus in Bello* lays down two limitations on the conduct of war: the principles of proportion (military means must be proportionate to political and military ends) and discrimination (no direct, intentional attack on noncombatant and nonmilitary targets).

Proponents of international law have lent further support to the promotion of international criminal justice institutions. Military and political leaders were brought to justice after World War II and tried for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and crimes against peace, but the concept of peace at the time was of an international nature. Even though the International Law Commission worked on a Draft Code of Offenses against the Peace and Security of Mankind, approved by the General Assembly in 1954, it was not until the Cold War was over that the international community began to build a close link between violations of international humanitarian law and international as well as domestic peace.

Proponents of international law reject political settlements that favor negative peace or satisfy the demands of *realpolitik* at the expense of justice. M. Cherif Bassiouni (1999: 796) contends that “the vast tragedies of the 20th century are . . . due to the absence of a permanent system of international criminal justice.” Only an effective legal system can help deter or lessen the scope of international violence and crime by holding individual perpetrators (including high-level decision makers) accountable in order to prevent them from *de facto* and even *de jure* impunity.

International criminal justice has been viewed primarily as an effort to promote negative (and positive) peace. Criminal justice is viewed as a legal method for both conflict termination and prevention, as it forces oppressors

to stop engaging in violence. War can be ended and peace restored when criminal leaders are arrested, convicted, sentenced, and jailed (Akhavan: 2001). This type of justice “will contribute to the reduction of social harm and to the preservation or restoration and maintenance of peace” (Bassiouni 1999: 808). It enhances national, international, and human security through “an integrated peace-building and reconstruction process” designed “to restore peace and stability, respect for the rule of law, and reconciliation” (Kerr 2001: 129), or as “an essential element of peace-building” (Popovski 2000: 407). The idea of “peace through justice” rests on the conviction that impunity has not prevented human rights violations from recurring (Goldstone 1995).

International criminal justice helps prevent the outbreak of violent or armed conflict in several ways. First, the cycle of revenge can be broken (Bass 2000: 310). Without any recourse to justice, victims of violence may take matters into their own hands. Criminal justice can help mitigate this security problem. Payam Akhavan contends that, “A post-conflict culture of justice . . . makes moral credibility a valuable political asset for victim groups, rendering vengeance less tempting and more costly” (Akhavan: 2001: 7). Second, criminal justice promotes reconciliation. Criminal prosecution of individual leaders is the process of individualizing guilt and can help defuse simmering animosities and mistrust among formerly warring communities. Third, “for many [proponents of justice], deterrence is the most important justification [for pursuing criminal justice], and the most important goal” (Wippman 1999/2000: 474). In pre-conflict situations, political leaders may be discouraged or prevented from making decisions that foment ethnic hatred and violence. Peace comes when dictators and torturers are excluded from positions of political power and influence, democratic leaders come to power through peaceful means such as free and fair elections, and refugees can return to rebuild their lives. Criminal justice also contributes to democracy building, because “the continuing legacy of impunity proved a serious impediment to democratization” (Roht-Arriaza 1999: 484).

Fourth, even if the pursuit of international criminal justice produces no immediate results, it still provides an important learning process that could introduce new judicial norms to help locals establish legal institutions, based on a new culture that rejects violence. A new moral force can be established through “unconscious inhibiting against crime” or “a condition of habitual lawfulness” within society (Akhavan 2001: 12). Political leaders’ calculations are important, but society can help constrain them through “the progressive entrenchment of a more moral self-conception [that] can occur among a wider public, which could stiffen resistance to the blandishments of a leader seeking to exploit ethnic enmity and thereby reduce the prospect of renewed violence after a conflict” (*ibid.*: 13).

More specifically, peace advocates view with optimism that ad hoc international criminal tribunals can prosecute, indict, and incarcerate

criminals and “have significantly contributed to peace building in postwar societies” (Akhavan 2001: 9). Peace advocates have been particularly active in promoting the International Criminal Court (ICC) because of the perceived weaknesses of national criminal justice and ad hoc criminal tribunals. More specifically, they have supported the ratification of the Rome Statute that established the ICC on 17 July 1998. The ICC, which came into being on 1 July 2002, is supposed to execute justice against individuals accused of three “core crimes”—war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity—but has no jurisdiction over the crime of state aggression.

In short, international pacifism has evolved from the idea of disarmament and arms control to peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peace-building, from the post war vision of world federalism to global governance. Peace-building includes a variety of methods that promote international and human security, and these methods include the disarming of warring factions, the demobilization and rehabilitation of former combatants, and the pursuit of international criminal justice against criminals (Knight 2003). Neo-Kantian or liberal cosmopolitan scholars have also criticized the liberal concept of democracy in a national context and observed ongoing shifts from national to international institutions, such as the European Court of Human Rights, the United Nations, and the ICC. They contend that globalization not only undermines the nation-state, but also calls into question the notion of national territory or boundaries. Since the end of the Cold War, internationalists have also revived the argument that regional organizations can help the United Nations make the U.N. Charter more operational (Knight 1996).

ARMS CONTROL, DISARMAMENT, AND PEACEKEEPING IN ASIA-PACIFIC

The concept of common security and the experience of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), a major agreement aimed at providing Europe with peace and security between the East and the West, led some state leaders in the Asia-Pacific to consider adopting this security thinking. New Zealand and Australia in particular were attracted to the anti-nuclear message of common security, and the Soviet Union also made a proposal for a new security structure in the Asia-Pacific. In 1986, for instance, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev proposed a “Pacific Ocean conference along [the lines of] the Helsinki [CSCE] conference.” This proposal revealed his “new thinking” on security, which aimed to promote economic cooperation, arms control, and confidence-building measures. Academic writings on common security in the Asia-Pacific also emerged (Clement 1989; Wiseman 1992).

The rationale behind this new security thinking was that the security dilemma that perpetuated the arms race between the two superpowers

during the Cold War could be resolved by appealing to their common interests. New thinking continued to evolve in a direction that departed from realism. In 1990, Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans called for the construction of “a future Asian security architecture involving a wholly new institutional process that might be capable of evolving in Asia just as in Europe, as a framework for addressing and resolving security problems” (Dewitt 1994: 5). Scholars also contend that common security provides a solution to the security dilemma problem driven by “both strategic uncertainty and a rapid military build-up” (Kerr *et al.* 1995: 251).

But to this day the approach to common security has proved to be inappropriate or unattractive in the East-Asian context. Hee Kwon Park notes that the CSCE was a process that took place in the East-West politico-military context; the two sides had totally different and largely competing philosophies. In the Asia-Pacific region, the nature and sources of insecurity are different. While the CSCE was adopted on the basis of “common interests” in viewing their “security problems” as their “common concern,” Asian states lack this necessary basis for common security (Park 1993). Religious and cultural diversity in Asia would make it difficult for states in the region to agree on human-rights issues, seen by some CSCE members as one of the core issues of common security. Also, the CSCE does not cover the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction—an area that should be dealt with in Asia. Other critics argue that the concept of common security cannot be applied because states in this region do not share a common perception of threat, but face a multiplicity of security concerns. They also found the idea of arms control unacceptable because power balances, geopolitics, and cultural values in East Asia were regarded as different from those of Europe. In Europe, the Cold War bipolar framework characterized by two military blocs (NATO and the Warsaw Pact) with more or less symmetrical force structures made arms reduction trade-offs and other security arrangements possible; such is not the case in East Asia. States in the Asia-Pacific then entertained the concept of cooperative security, but they still conform to the realist logic of power balancing (Weatherbee 2008: 20, 128).

Scholars have also provided prescriptions for policy action to deal with military buildups. While Klare (1993) considers the absence of regional arms control talks and the lack of security negotiations to be worrisome, other scholars have demonstrated a higher degree of optimism. Confidence-building measures have been deemed necessary, through the promotion of greater transparency among states with regard to arms acquisitions (such as a Regional Arms Registry) (Chalmers 1996a&b, 1999). Such measures can promote better mutual understanding among states, but some believe they must involve informal rather than formal arrangements and must aim at building confidence rather than reducing weapons (Fee 1988: 240).

Concerning traditional arms control and disarmament, scholars working for the promotion of peace in the region focus on military defense

trends, arms acquisition patterns, military modernization programs, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Some peace scholars pay considerable attention to recent military development, seeing the emergence of an arms race in the region. Michael Klare (1993), for instance, advances a provocative thesis that the next great arms race is likely to take place in East Asia. Despite the end of the Cold War, states in the region “are engaged in accelerating arms races with significant implications for regional and international security” (*ibid.*: 136). Others who work within the peace studies tradition have also acknowledged this worrisome trend in East Asia. Desmond Ball similarly argues that defense expenditure in East Asia between the mid-1980s and the mid-1990s increased at an unprecedented rate (Ball 1996). The trend continues unabated.

Others are more optimistic about the possibility of arms control and disarmament. Wu Yun, for instance, contends that China has since 1954 been consistent in opposing an arms race as well as genuinely advocating disarmament. Zhou Enlai stated at the Geneva Indo-China conference in 1954 that “we believe that the arms race must be halted, universal disarmament be carried out . . . atomic and hydrogen weapons and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) be prohibited for the interests of peace” (Wu 1996: 578). China’s attitudes toward disarmament and arms control also began to change in the late 1970s. In 1978, China participated in the first U.N. special session on disarmament. In 1979, it joined the U.N. Disarmament Commission. In 1980, it joined the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva. In 1981, it made it clear it was opposed to nuclear monopoly but did not advocate the policy of nuclear proliferation. In 1982, it participated in the second U.N. session on disarmament. In 1983, China appointed an ambassador for disarmament. Early in 1984, it joined the International Atomic Energy Agency (established in 1957 to reduce the threat of war by promoting cooperation among states with the aim of developing atomic energy for peaceful purposes). In 1985, it declared that it would reconsider its earlier opposition to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) previously seen as helping to maintain the two superpowers’ nuclear monopoly. All this evidence shows “China’s growing interest in and increasing willingness to take more responsibility in the arms control and disarmament process” (Wu 1996: 582). Things began to change in the 1990s (Guoliang and Miller 2009). China’s nuclear policies were finalized when it finally ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1992 and approved its indefinite extension. It also supported the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) negotiations that started in 1994, supported the indefinite extension of the NPT, signed the CTBT in 1996, ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in 1997, joined the Nuclear Supplier Group in 2004, applied for membership in the Missile Technology Control Regime, and has established consultation with other institutions.

Compared with other nuclear powers, China's recent efforts in the international nonproliferation regimes have been positive: it "always exercised maximum restraint in conducting nuclear tests and conducted the least number of nuclear tests" (Wu 1996: 583). China respects other countries' decisions to create nuclear-free zones, has agreed that it will not first use or threaten to use nuclear weapons, and supports verification based on the principle of equal participation and acceptance. China is now a supporter of non-proliferation: it "has been taking appropriate steps to adjust its national laws and policies so as to be compatible with international obligations" (Guoliang and Miller 2009: 166).

Gary Klintworth (2000: 84) similarly contends that "China has moved from a position of disinterest and opposition in the fifties and sixties to a strong commitment to arms control and non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction by the 1990s." In his view, China made this policy shift because it wanted a safer world, one "with a reduced risk of tension and conflict so that it can restrain its defense budget and concentrate scarce resources on domestic economic reform, reconstruction and modernization" (*ibid.*: 85). China shares with the United States the same security values, seeks to avoid the threat of sanctions as well as the accusation of being a rogue state, and desires to get along with the United States.

Malcolm Chalmers further argues that Southeast Asia has come to recognize that transparency measures have a positive role to play in the process of regional security dialogue. States in the region value the importance of openness, which "can make an important contribution to a more cooperative security culture" (Chalmers 1996b: 82). Others argue that transparency with respect to numbers and types of missiles and ships is not as effective as transparency with respect to intentions, anxieties, and conceptions of military sufficiency (Dewitt and Bow 1996). They do not reject the calls for regular dialogue among states as such, but insist that any such dialogue must be based on more formal proliferation-management of arrangements, which can heighten awareness, trust, and confidence. This means states must learn to accept more intrusive measures. States must provide clear markers for what they consider defense sufficiency, must articulate these markers in both doctrinal and operational terms, and must link arms acquisitions and deployments to this schema.

Overall, disarmament efforts in the post-Cold War era have proved to be positive. Certain middle-power countries, most notably Australia and Canada, have taken the lead on new international diplomacy efforts. Australia advocated the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), seeking to place an international ban on chemical weapons. Canada made efforts to construct an international treaty on anti-personnel land mines. A growing number of politicians in nuclear states now favor the idea of a world without nuclear weapons. Since the time of U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower, every American president has proclaimed the objective of freeing the

world from nuclear weapons. In the 1980s, even U.S. President Ronald Reagan and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev sought to champion the idea of abolishing nuclear weapons. Other American leaders, such as 2008 presidential candidates John McCain and Barack Obama, have also endorsed the idea of eventual nuclear disarmament. As president, Obama remains committed to the idea. Even leading former U.S. politicians like Henry Kissinger (2009a), George Schultz, William Perry, and Sam Nunn—known for their realist views—have endorsed the idea.

Perspectives on arms control and disarmament still have several weaknesses, however. First, it remains clear, as Muthiah Alagappa (1998b: 637) notes, that “cooperative security will be just one key component of the national security strategies of Asian states and, more importantly, that it “will supplement rather than supplant national capabilities and alliances”—perhaps in the realist sense.

Second, arms control measures do not necessarily undermine political realism. Defensively motivated states seeking to enhance non-offensive defense (NOD) do not adopt a security strategy in defiance of defensive realism. While arguing that arms races can escalate to war, Charles Kegley (1988: 191) agrees that peace is “based on a balanced distribution of military capabilities.” Malcolm Chalmers (1996b: 95) also acknowledges that military confidence-building measures “do not replace the continuing role of the balance of power in deterring aggression.” Even if all the nuclear warheads could be cut to 1,000 or even 500 on each side, realism would not be undermined: the balance of nuclear power/terror between the United States and Russia would remain largely unchanged.

Third, arms control and disarmament still lack empirical support. The Asia-Pacific remains heavily armed. States stay committed to force modernization and seem unready for arms control, not to mention disarmament. Although China preaches the message of disarmament, it has not taken drastic steps toward reaching this goal. It tested its first full-range Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) in 1980 and a potential Multiple Independently targetable Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV) in 1981 and successfully fired an SLBM (Sea-Launched Ballistic Missile) in 1982. China’s record of arms control remains dismal. Paul Bracken (2000) coined the term “second nuclear age” to show that states in the region acquired ballistic missiles as well as WMDs and target their neighbors as well as U.S. military presence. As noted earlier, North Korea has tested ballistic missiles and conducted nuclear tests. It is uncertain whether Pyongyang will ever give up its nuclear ambitions. Victor Cha (2003: 483) argues that nuclear proliferation in Asia is now over-determined, that rollback is unlikely, and that “the nonproliferation community’s focus on security factors may in fact be detrimental to stability because it fails to acknowledge the security factors that drove proliferation in the first place.” There are no region-wide arms control mechanisms in the Asia-Pacific. As of

2008, only bilateral arrangements exist, but they “are largely confidence-building measures” (Yuan 2007: 193).

States in the Asia-Pacific have shown little courage to adopt idealism in a genuine way. The United States—from the day of Eisenhower to the last day of George W. Bush in early 2009—has never taken concrete steps to abolish nuclear weapons. At one point, the Bush Administration demanded that North Korea “surrender any and all fissile material as a prelude to any discussion” (Pempel 2008: 565). Henry Kissinger’s change of heart does not go far enough; his proposal is based on his rejection of unilateral disarmament. In his words, “The program sketched here is not a program for unilateral disarmament. So long as other countries build and improve their nuclear weapons arsenals, deterrence of their use needs to be part of Western strategy” (Kissinger 2009a: 6). While President Obama stays committed to keeping North Korea non-nuclear, his administration does not make it easy for Pyongyang to disarm. In February 2009, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton followed in the footsteps of President George W. Bush by stating that, “If North Korea abides by the obligations it has already entered into and verifiably and completely eliminates its nuclear program, then there will be a reciprocal certainty from the United States” (cited in Ahn and Liem 2009: 7). Meanwhile, the United States and South Korea continue to increase defense spending. While Washington has now committed \$10 billion to base construction in South Korea, the latter “has [also] begun to increase its military budget annually by 10 percent under its \$665 billion Defense Reform 2020 Initiative” (*ibid.*: 7). Washington’s rejection of its own unilateral disarmament and its stern demand that other states, such as North Korea, first disarm are mutually incompatible and still reaffirm political realism.

Even if states agree to abolish nuclear weapons, this does not necessarily undermine realism, either. Even if the United States agreed to dismantle its nuclear weapons, huge stockpiles of conventional arms remain. According to Mikhail Gorbachev (2008: 6), some of the newest types of conventional weapons are “so devastating as to be comparable to weapons of mass destruction.” Moreover, “the lion’s share of those stockpiles would be in the hands of one country—the United States, giving it an overwhelming advantage.” The United States also has more than 700 officially recognized military bases “from Europe to the most remote corner of the world” and produces “half of the world’s military hardware.” As noted by Hartfiel and Job (2007), defense spending in East Asia continues to rise: states continue to build externally oriented weapons systems by acquiring potentially destabilizing weapons systems such as fighter aircrafts, surface ships, submarines, and missiles of all types, which could fuel competitive arms processes. (See also International Institute for Strategic Studies 2008).

Powerful states may also manipulate non-proliferation as a way to maintain their positions within the international system by accusing other

states of seeking nuclear weapons and thus intensify hostilities. After North Korea launched its missiles and conducted its second nuclear test in May 2009, Pyongyang correctly claimed that its last nuclear test was the world's 2,054th and that the permanent members of the Security Council were responsible for 99.99% of the total nuclear tests. The United States has also made official accusations of North Korea's and Iran's efforts to build nuclear weapons, and yet has sought to maintain itself as the world's only hegemonic power, now armed with an annual defense budget larger than the combined defense budget of all other states in the world.

Fourth, disarmament and arms control agreements remain breakable. States that have signed arms control agreements can renege on them, and unilateralism remains a policy option for states. The United States, for instance, revised arms-control treaties with the Soviet Union by tearing up the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, by declaring its intentions to build National Missile Defense (NMD)/Theater Missile Defense (TMD), and by retreating from other nuclear treaties, such as the NPT, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), and six years of talks on a biological weapons ban. In 2008, the Bush Administration also signed a bilateral treaty with India to help develop nuclear programs in the latter, which has refused to sign the NPT and CTBT. While great nuclear powers such as the United States can rewrite the rules of nonproliferation, non-nuclear states have rebelled by seeking to build nuclear weapons. (Iraq joined the NPT in 1969, but then ignored it. A member of NPT, Iran has been accused of breaking the rules.) North Korea joined the NPT in 1985, but withdrew from it in 2003 and was accused of breaking the rules when it conducted nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009.

Fifth, major states may be taking steps toward ridding the world of nuclear weapons, but they also seem to be moving to outdo their potential enemies in a different direction. China, Russia, and the United States in particular have been developing cyberstrategy (both defensive and offensive) and building cyberweapons in preparation for cyberwarfare. These innovations would allow the United States in the future to surreptitiously enter a computer server in China and Russia. According to some observers, "American intelligence agencies could activate malicious code that is secretly embedded on computer chips when they are manufactured, enabling the United States to take command of any enemy's computers by remote control over the Internet" (Sanger, Markoff, and Shanker 2009: 5). This still looks more like Clausewitz's strategic understanding of war as politics by other means.

International peacekeeping has its own limits. There exists a growing consensus among state leaders in the Asia-Pacific that U.N. peacekeeping missions have done more good than harm, despite their shortcomings. States in the region have formally approved peacekeeping missions under

U.N. command and control. Japan even adopted a peacekeeping law in 1992, as it participated in its first involvement with a U.N. peacekeeping force in Cambodia (United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia, UNTAC) (Ishizuka 2005).

But the literature on peacekeeping in Cambodia reveals considerable disagreement on why the mission did not work according to plan. All acknowledge that the Khmer Rouge faction was responsible for most of the cease-fire violations and did not abide by its agreement, especially after it pulled out of the electoral process. The State of Cambodia (SOC) led by Prime Minister Hun Sen was second to the Khmer Rouge when the number of cease-fire violations was assessed. Some scholars explain the Cambodian factions' non-compliant behavior in the context of Cambodian cultural tradition, which did not facilitate political compromise. For others, the Khmer Rouge was the main spoiler: it was never committed to the peace process in the first place. Michael Wesley (1995) argues that the Khmer Rouge had a history of relying on Maoist tactics, such as political mobilization, guerrilla warfare, and waiting to exhaust their adversaries and destabilize the enemy regimes. Another perspective, based on a typology of spoilers in the peace process, sheds light on variation in behavior. According to Stedman (1997), the Khmer Rouge was the "total spoiler" of the peace process, whereas the SOC was the "greedy spoiler."

Still others argue that we cannot understand variation in spoiler behavior unless we understand the varying degrees of vulnerability or insecurity the adversaries faced. Rather than addressing the Khmer Rouge's security needs, UNTAC made it more insecure by relying increasingly on the SOC's state structure. UNTAC did not deploy its troops in full strength until one year after the peace agreement had been signed, and after the disarmament had begun. This eroded UNTAC's legitimacy and created a security dilemma, which made it difficult for the four armed factions to cooperate with the United Nations on disarmament (Peou 1997a).

More recently the literature on international peacekeeping in the region has shifted toward East Timor (now called Timor-Leste). The humanitarian intervention led by Australia in this land preceded peacekeeping, but recent studies show that East-Asian states became more actively involved after much pressure from the international community and after being asked by Indonesia (Ichihara 2009).

Academic literature on peacekeeping still lends support to the security-based argument. Other case studies looking at arms management in the process further validate the thesis that in weak or collapsed states failed disarmament is associated with poor guarantees of security for the former armed adversaries (Adekanye 1997). Barbara Walter (2002) makes a strong case that the greatest problem that armed adversaries encounter when trying to comply with peace deals is not one of negotiating and reaching peace agreements, but, most importantly, one of implementing them, because of

their concern about post-treaty security under the distribution of power and conditions of extreme risk. This security-based argument still validates the basic thesis regarding the failure of UNTAC disarmament efforts. Although UNTAC played a vital role in confidence building, its peacekeepers proved unable to provide those under threat with effective security guarantees (Peou 1997b). The U.N. role in peacekeeping is unlikely to become any more effective as long as the United Nations lacks command of a standby army ready to take action.

All this helps explain why the major armed conflicts within Southeast-Asian states are unlikely to end any time soon. The armed insurgencies in both the southern Philippines and southern Thailand continue. Although the two ASEAN states have adopted democracy, they remain dominated by the military and security forces that have relied on violent means in dealing with minorities. The Catholic majority in the Philippines and the Buddhist majority in Thailand are unlikely to invite the U.N. to intervene in the armed conflicts. For their part, the Muslim minorities will not end their armed struggles, as long as they think that their security is at stake.

In short, evidence from the Asia-Pacific shows resistance to any grand idea of turning world federalism into a reality. States in the region have so far proved either unwilling or unable to disarm themselves unilaterally. The regional arms control and disarmament regime, if it exists, remains extremely weak. States' willingness or ability to intervene in the security affairs of war-torn states also remains limited. They remain unprepared to either let the United Nations have a permanent peacekeeping force or develop its own regional peacekeeping force.

SECURITY THROUGH INTERNATIONAL LAW IN ASIA-PACIFIC

As a matter of principle, states in ASEAN and the ARF, for instance, have officially agreed to take into account the principles in the U.N. Charter when seeking to establish guidelines and mechanisms to settle their disputes peacefully. In their 1971 Southeast-Asian Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone Treaty (ZOPFAN), the ASEAN states agreed to settle their disputes through peaceful means, such as negotiation, mediation, inquiry, and conciliation, and to refer their disputes to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) should they fail to reach any peaceful settlement.

Nevertheless, few states in East Asia have relied on the ICJ to settle their territorial disputes. In the 1990s, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore were involved in two bilateral territorial disputes: between Malaysia and Singapore over Pedra Branca in 1994 and between Malaysia and Indonesia over Sipadan and Ligitan Islands in 1997. They submitted their territorial disputes to the ICJ, expressing their willingness to accept its rule. In the Sipadan-Ligitan case, the two disputants agreed to refer to the ICJ in 2003; Malaysia won. In 2008, the ICJ also ruled in favor of Singapore.

The overall trend is far from ideal, however. The role of international law in the settlement of territorial disputes in East Asia has faced many constraints (Foot 2003). Indonesia now seems reluctant to rely on international adjudication or arbitration. Its dispute with Malaysia over the Ambalat block area of the Sulawesi Sea remains unresolved, and Indonesia even prepares to defend the area with military power (Weatherbee 2008: 142). The 2008 and 2009 territorial dispute in areas surrounding an ancient temple between Cambodia and Thailand has not been brought to the ICJ, which made a ruling in 1962 in favor of Cambodia regarding the ownership of the temple. Territorial disputes over the South China Sea have also resurged in recent years (*ibid.*: 142), despite an agreement on joint development. China claims to have jurisdiction over the whole sea, which stretches 2,000 kilometers from its coast to those of the Philippines and Malaysia and close to Indonesia's gas fields. Competing claims by other states have often drawn rebukes from Beijing. The Philippines prompted a protest from China when the former reasserted sovereignty over disputed islands in the South China Sea in March 2009. Malaysia and Vietnam also provoked a fierce response from China when the two ASEAN states lodged a joint submission to the U.N. Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) in May 2009. Vietnam, for instance, reasserted its "indisputable sovereignty" over the disputed Paracel and Spratly Islands, arguing that China's claims had no "legal, historical or factual basis" and that they considered them "null and void." Beijing then alleged that the joint submission "seriously infringed China's sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction in the South China Sea" and requested that the CLCS not consider the joint submission.

The ongoing disputes between Japan and South Korea over Takeshima/Tokdo Island remain unresolved. The captain of the 5,000-ton *Hwan*, the South Korean Coast Guard's largest patrol boat, reportedly said the following: "If the Japanese try to take this island from us, we will fight to the end. . . . If we run out of firepower, we will ram our ship against the intruders" (Sang-Hun 2008: 1). The tensions between Japan and Taiwan over other disputed islands (known as Senkaku in Japanese and Diaoyutai in Chinese) have also grown intense in recent years.

Evidence further shows that only a few states in the Asia-Pacific have pursued security through international criminal justice. To be sure, the Tokyo International Military Tribunal (TIMT) left some positive legacy; the Tokyo Trials took place from May 1946 to November 1948 and met some of its objectives. Seven defendants received a death sentence, while others received jail sentences ranging from seven years to life. The trials were not based on the principle of collective guilt. This demonstrates that the Tokyo trials helped reduce the tensions between the victors and the vanquished because the judicial process prevented any quest for vengeance. Together with the Nuremberg Trials, the TIMT also helped give rise to an international human rights regime, beginning with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights

adopted in 1948 and the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide approved by the U.N. General Assembly in the same year. Evidence, however, reveals that only a small number of war criminals were punished, while Emperor Hirohito received immunity. Moreover, the Tokyo Trials were political in nature; they still represented the victors' justice. War criminals who were nationals of the leading states that pushed for justice (such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union), for instance, went unpunished.

This does not mean that East Asia has no tradition of justice. Even in *The Art of War*, Sun Tzu "laid down the limits of what was permissible in war: the need to avoid excessive violence and a ban on the complete destruction of enemies" (Moghalu 2006: 4).

Overall, however, East Asians have been ambivalent regarding international justice. Although Asian states were among the coalition of more than 60 "like-minded" states said to have driven the ICC negotiating process, they have been relatively inactive before and after the Rome Conference in 1998. East-Asian states have been slow in signing or ratifying the ICC Statute. By mid-2008, only four states in East Asia (Cambodia, Timor-Leste, Japan, and South Korea) had ratified the Treaty, compared to half of the African states and nearly all European states (Peou 2008b).

The international pursuit of criminal justice in Timor-Leste and Cambodia remains largely elusive. In the case of Timor-Leste, Indonesia, which invaded East Timor in 1975 and then annexed the territory, remains opposed to the establishment of an international criminal tribunal to prosecute its military leaders and instead established the Ad Hoc Human Rights Court on East Timor, which has not been recognized by the United Nations. Generals Suharto (president of Indonesia from 1968 to 1998) and Wiranto have so far escaped justice. The Indonesian military still has considerable influence over justice and thus limits progress on human security. In Cambodia, some great powers have also stood in the way of criminal justice. When the government leaders of Cambodia sent a letter to the United Nations in 1997 asking it for legal action against Khmer Rouge leaders, China (a member of the U.N. Security Council) opposed it.

The linkage between criminal justice and security remains weak. War crime tribunals, according to Michael Reisman (1998: 46, 49), have a limited utility "for stopping wars and making peace." He adds that "the belief in war crimes tribunals as a 'magic-bullet' technique for deterring and stopping wars and making peace is unfounded." Even proponents of justice do not make a strong case for security. Rachel Kerr (2001: 128) argues that the establishment of the ICTY (the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia) "did not stop the war, and did not deter further crimes during the last two years of the war." In the case of Cambodia, criminal justice did not end the war; rather the end of the war in 1998 after a series of formal and informal amnesties made it possible for the United Nations to

pursue international criminal justice. The same can be said about the leaders of Timor-Leste, who resist the pursuit of justice for fear it will derail the peace process with Indonesia (Peou 2008b).

International legal deterrence of political crime has also proven ineffective. According to Garry Jonathan Bass (2000: 291), “it is far from clear that war crimes tribunals have much of a deterrent effect, either in the near or long term.” Neither the Nuremberg nor the Tokyo trials had an obvious deterrent effect after the 1940s, whether in the Soviet Union under Stalin, China under Mao Zedong, Ethiopia under Mengistu Haile Mariam, Uganda under Idi Amin Dada Oumee, Cambodia under Pol Pot, Indonesia under Suharto, and states in Latin America under various leaders. As Kingsley Chiedu Moghalu (2006: 178) notes: “using international war crimes trials as a frontline approach to preventing or deterring genocide is a failing policy.”

Undue expectations of what international criminal justice can do may also lead to disillusionment. Yves Beigbeder (2005: 234) states frankly that, “The ICC supporters should not entertain excessive or unrealistic expectations. The Court will not solve all the problems of the world nor eradicate ‘evil’: no more than the ICJ [International Court of Justice].” He goes on to concede that the Court “will not prevent war, maintain peace or suppress internal or external armed conflicts . . . cannot be expected to achieve reconciliation among divided countries or between countries long at war . . . cannot act as a Truth and Reconciliation Commission . . . will not replace able and willing national justice. All it can do is to reinforce national criminal law and justice.” The extent to which criminal justice helps reinforce national criminal justice remains unclear, particularly if its institutions are not built or strengthened. It is also far from evident that the aggressive pursuit of international criminal justice helps ensure democratic transition and consolidation. Ruth Wedgwood, for instance, argues that “the architects of institutions must pay some attention to history, and democratic transitions in this century have generally occurred in circumstances that did not permit the criminal trial of outgoing leaders”; criminal justice could even prevent dictators from leaving “power voluntarily” (Wedgwood 1999: 95). Jack Snyder and Leslie Vinjamuri (2003/04: 43) forcefully argue that “[t]rials do little to deter further violence and are not highly correlated with the consolidation of peaceful democracy.”

The Southeast-Asian experience further shows that the pursuit of criminal justice has not led to democratic consolidation in Cambodia, either. Leading members of the current Cambodian government were former Khmer Rouge elements and feared that the Khmer Rouge trials might adversely affect their future security. As a result, they have sought to personalize and consolidate power rather than to democratize it (Peou 2007). In contrast, the severe limits of criminal justice in Indonesia have not prevented the country from becoming democratic.

This is not to suggest that international criminal justice always proves harmful to the process of peace and democracy building. Evidence indicates

that criminal trials are more likely to achieve positive results when criminal leaders or ruthless dictators first lose power or weaken to the point where they are no longer capable of defending themselves or renewing or escalating armed conflict. More importantly, peace through democracy may prove more durable when it is achieved through peaceful negotiation and reconciliation and when more attention is devoted to democratic and legal institution building. Again Snyder and Vinjamuri (2003/04: 43) raise a very important point when arguing that “[a]mnisties or other minimal efforts to address the problem of past abuses have often been the basis for durable peaceful settlements.” They then add that “external pressure and assistance should be targeted on future-oriented tasks such as human rights training of police and military personnel, improved human rights monitoring of field operations, reform of military finances and military justice, and punishment of new abuses once the reforms are in place” (*ibid.*: 44). This point addresses the root of the problem: namely, that unless state institutions become democratic and stable, no amount of effort to deter criminal violence is likely to succeed. Many cases of genocide show that this crime is committed when regime insecurity grows intense or when they perceive threats to their personal or regime survival (Kuperman 2004; Peou: 1997b).

International humanitarian law may even become a new source of war-making. During the 1990s, this international law was regarded by its advocates as universal. A transnational “common culture” of human rights and humanitarianism then began to take hold. Political activists sought to rely on law as a peaceful method to abolish armed politics, but ended up endorsing the use of force for humanitarian purposes and even agreeing to let their humanitarian work be integrated into military interventions or accepting the militarization of their humanitarian work. Moreover, it remains difficult to expect international criminal tribunals and the ICC to function on the basis of impartial and universal justice (Foley 2008). They are still subject to the U.N. Security Council, whose permanent members can exercise their veto power to ensure their collective privileges or pursue their national interests.

In short, peace and human security through international criminal justice remains elusive. The key to the debate regarding the virtue of criminal justice lies not only on whether this method can promote international and human security, but also on the question of how to achieve peace and security first so that justice institutions can be built and strengthened. Legalism is more likely to succeed if states first become democratic and can form regional zones of peace among themselves. Most war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocides have been committed in non-democratic states, such as Cambodia under Pol Pot. Democracies may also commit these crimes during wartimes abroad, especially in other non-democratic states, but they are most unlikely to “carry out atrocities at home” (Bass 2000: 321).

Neo-Idealist Internationalism

Positive peace is another important peace-based perspective on security. It is generally defined as the absence of nonphysical violence, and is a source of insecurity defined in terms of political, social, and economic inequality. Galtung (1975a) advanced the concept of positive peace as the absence of “structural violence,” thereby going beyond negative peace (the absence of direct physical violence). Academic literature shows that the goal of peace-building has recently shifted from achieving negative peace to attaining positive peace and human security. More recently, neo-idealistic internationalism also places emphasis on peace and security through democracy, human rights, and economic development. The new concept of human security can also be considered part of this approach. In the Asia-Pacific, arguments about the need for the promotion of positive peace and socioeconomic security as well as human security have been made. A few countries in the region, most notably Japan and Thailand, have now officially adopted the concept of human security as part of their foreign policy agendas. However, they tend to define positive peace and human security in socioeconomic rather than political terms. Socioeconomic equity has up to now received far more policy attention than political equality. This approach still has its limitations, however.

NEO-IDEALIST INTERNATIONALISM IN A NUTSHELL

To advance their theory, proponents of neo-idealistic internationalism point to the U.N. Charter covering the need to defend and protect human

rights and to expanded definitions of peace made by the U.N. General Assembly in 1949, 1991, and 1996; they also support the Assembly's 1991 resolution asserting that "peace is not merely the absence of war, but that interdependence and cooperation to foster human rights, social and economic development, disarmament, protection of the environment and ecosystems and the improvement of the quality of life for all are indispensable elements for the establishment of peaceful societies" (White 2002: 49).

Proponents of universal human rights have acknowledged that the respect thereof can also help ensure negative and positive peace. David Barash (1991), for instance, points out that the denial of human rights could lead to a humanitarian war. Humanitarian intervention may still rely on the use of military force justified on moral grounds, but respect for human rights should be promoted as an end in itself, regardless of whether it can prevent or promote war, since it helps promote positive peace.

Positive peace has been associated with respect for human rights defined in political and socioeconomic terms. Peace writers, such as Richard Falk (1999b), focus their attention on basic decencies, participatory rights, basic human needs, and security rights. In their view, basic decencies include legal rights to protection from the acts or threats of genocide, arbitrary arrest, detention, and execution. Participatory rights allow people to take part in processes such as those that allow people to select their representatives, to choose their own jobs, to determine places of residence, and so on. Basic human needs include the rights to food, housing, health, and education. Security rights ensure national, human, and ecological survival.

Some reject free market neo-liberalism, which they view as having replaced the social democratic version of the compassionate state, based on respect for human rights. Some of them see the possibility of a global parliament whose elected delegates would represent individuals and society rather than states. This parliament could adopt legislation to protect the environment, control or eliminate weapons, safeguard human rights, and so on, and would be more credible and authoritative than such incumbent "watchdogs" as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the International Labor Organization, which currently make efforts to hold states accountable by exposing their failures to comply with international law.

Other peace advocates view socioeconomic inequality as posing a threat to positive peace. For Johan Galtung, socioeconomic inequalities between the rich and poor "were in and by themselves . . . unnecessary evils in their own rights" (Galtung 1975b). Some writers define peace as a state of satisfaction in socioeconomic terms. A source of threat to such peace comes from poverty and disparities between the rich and poor within and between states, more specifically those in the North and South. For some, humanity is threatened by dehumanization in that the process of oppression distorts the vocation of becoming human more fully. Oppressors are those who love themselves but exploit and fail to recognize others as human.

OXFAM, an NGO, also sees a link between world poverty and both structural as well as overt violence (Watkins 1995). Poverty denies human rights and results in the waste of human potential on a large scale. Disparities occur between those who have wealth, skills, and opportunities and those who have nothing or have few. Such disparities between the “haves” and “have-nots” deepen instability.

Proponents of socioeconomic justice also offer prescriptions for positive peace through proposals envisioning a more egalitarian world based on social justice, equal opportunities, and equity. Some stress the importance of human rights education. Others reject revolution and advocate dialogue by emphasizing love, humility, faith in people, and hope as part of the struggle for freedom. Education must take the form of dialogue rather than the narration characteristic of traditional, hierarchical learning through the teacher’s one-way provision of knowledge. Love, humility, faith in people, and hope promote dialogue, which in turn builds trust among people (Freire 1970). For OXFAM, poverty must be tackled by transforming attitudes, policies, and institutions. Actors who can achieve this end include political leaders, who are urged to sacrifice short-term political expediency in exchange for gains through long-term human development aimed at redistribution of wealth and opportunities. Community-based groups (made up of peasants, women, indigenous and ethnic minorities, trade unions, and NGOs) are among the agents of transformation. OXFAM places emphasis on human potential for developing alternatives other than various forms of intervention, such as reduction in arms sales, humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, mine clearing and a ban on anti-personnel mines, and international criminal justice. Positive peace requires socioeconomic equity (through nondiscrimination against women and minorities, as well as the management of markets), and sustainable development.

Environmental degradation has also long been regarded by peace researchers and activists as a growing threat to positive peace and human security. The strategies for environmental protection that peace researchers and activists have advanced include a land ethic that goes beyond good intentions, rejects arguments based on economic self-interest and values, and involves an intellectual and emotional process aimed at changing attitudes. The “land ethic” enlarges the boundaries of a community to include soils, waters, plants, and animals (Leopold 1981).

Positive peace may also be subsumed under the broad or human development-based approach to human security. The U.N. Development Program (UNDP), several states, and scholars belonging to this camp broaden the concept of human security to include socioeconomic underdevelopment. The UNDP (1994) recognizes a link between democracy and human development in economic terms, or between democracy and economic equity. Peoples may have achieved some degree of political freedom, but in many

cases their economic freedom remains unrealized. According to the 1994 UNDP report, “many now believe that democracy has not delivered. During the 1990s, income inequality and poverty rose sharply in Central Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), sometimes at unprecedented rates.” The report adds that “despite more widespread democracy, the number of poor people in Sub-Saharan Africa continued to increase” (UNDP 1994: 4).

From this perspective, human security is more than achieving electoral democracy; it also means freedom from economic constraints (such as starvation and poverty). Advocates of this method predominantly include those who work at the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and who believe in the power of market-based solutions to political problems, such as violent societal conflict. The report submitted to the United Nations by the Commission on Human Security (2003) (chaired by Sadako Ogata and Amartya Sen) further conforms to this approach:

The aim of human security is to protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfillment. Human security means protecting fundamental freedom—freedoms that are the essence of life. It means protecting people from critical (severe) and pervasive (widespread) threats and situations. It means using processes that build on people’s strengths and aspirations. It means creating political, social, environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that together give people the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity (ibid.: 4).

The comprehensive approach receives further elaboration when both Sadako Ogata and Johan Cels (2003: 274) state that, “This means protecting vital freedoms laid down in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other Human rights instruments,” seen as “fundamental to human existence and development.” This people-centered approach to human security differs from the narrow approach advocated by the liberal government of Canada (led by the then-foreign minister Lloyd Axworthy) and led by the Human Security Center (first based at the University of British Columbia and now based at Simon Fraser University).

DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN ASIA-PACIFIC

In the 1990s, perspectives on peace-building in the Asia-Pacific emerged. Initially, attention was devoted to promoting the innovative concept of cooperative security within the region. In September 1990, Canada’s Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark, offered some innovative thoughts on the possibility of building a North Pacific Co-operative Security Dialogue (NPCSD). This initiative was based upon the principles of

common interests and common values rather than exclusive national ones, and a common pursuit of peace and prosperity through cooperation. While military security remains essential, it can no longer retain its exclusive place in the concept of cooperative security. Other nonmilitary issues—sustainable development, the absence of poverty, human rights, and democracy—are as important to security as defense concerns.

Although it looks similar to common security at first glance, cooperative security as a concept is more flexible in terms of its emphasis on a step-by-step process and is more comprehensive in terms of outlook. While the common security framework tends to be rule-based, cooperative security fundamentally recognizes the importance of consensus and consultation, and favors multilateral gradualism.

Initially, the approach failed to find much favor among other states. The NPCSD initiative received some support from both the Soviet Union and Mongolia, both of which claimed, inaccurately, that it was an extension of their regional security proposals. Australia and New Zealand lent support to the idea, but viewed it as being too geographically narrow, since it excluded South Pacific states. Neither the United States nor Japan saw much utility in it. ASEAN did not initially welcome it, because the NPCSD was seen as an out-of-region initiative. The Canadian initiative “was not acceptable to the majority of the countries concerned,” including the United States during the first Bush Administration in the early 1990s, which was still committed to bilateral defense alliances in East Asia (Benwang 1992).

Cooperative security gained acceptance from several other states that had initially introduced different ideas about building a new security framework for the region. The concept was defined, subsequently redefined, and widely accepted; the states involved agreed on a broad conceptual framework based on a set of norms, principles, and decision-making procedures, with the aim of reducing regional tensions and ultimately resolving them. It rests on the basic assumption that states possess diverse cultural identities and interests, but that they have the potential to cooperate on the basis of self-interest. In a world of economic interdependence, national policies could no longer be adopted and implemented independently.

The multi-dimensional Canadian concept of cooperative security dialogue differs from the realist concept of hegemonic stability. The emphasis on multilateral consultation and cooperation, rather than hegemonic imposition, allows for flexibility and compromise. In other words, the concept stresses the importance of developing a “habit of dialogue” for the purpose of reaching consensus among member states. Canada did not initially seek to establish new international institutions, nor did it advocate transplanting Western mechanisms into the North Pacific. A security dialogue was simply viewed as a regional or sub-regional multilateral exercise that would engage a relatively small number of states in a consultative, exploratory, and

informal process. According to David Dewitt (1994: 7), cooperative security “recognizes the value of existing bilateral and balance-of-power arrangements in contributing to regional security and for retaining them.” More recently, the Canadian government sought to promote human security by sponsoring the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), which stresses the “responsibility to protect,” which includes the responsibility to rebuild.

The extent to which democratic ideals and human rights promote human security has been given consideration in the Asia-Pacific is difficult to assess, but this approach to human security has been taken more seriously in countries in the West. Within the ARF and APEC, only a handful of states have shown real interest in democratic and human rights as part of human security. According to Paul Evans (2009: 79), “[t]he impact of human security on intellectual and policy circles in East Asia is still growing, but remains limited.” Over the past decade, few ASEAN leaders have formally articulated the concept of human security, which emphasizes a need to intervene in states’ domestic affairs in order to promote democracy defined in terms of citizens’ political participation. Only Japan, South Korea, and Thailand have shown any interest in human security issues.

Overall, ASEAN members have yet to break formally the traditional rule of noninterference. According to Evans (2008), “human security is not a mainstream or influential part of security discourse or governmental behavior in Asia.” The ASEAN Declaration adopted in 1967 states that the member states “are determined to ensure their stability and security from external interference in any form or manifestation in order to preserve their national identities in accordance with the ideals and aspirations of their peoples.” The 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation further indicates the “[right] of every state to lead its national existence free from external interference, subversion and coercion” and the principle of “[non-]interference in the internal affairs of one another.” This is arguably the most important principle that guides the behavior of the member states. The ASEAN policy of “constructive engagement” between 1992 and 1997 with Burma has not changed the principle of non-interference. Burma’s poor human rights record did not deter ASEAN from admitting it into the fold in 1997.

Other leading regional institutions in the Asia-Pacific, notably APEC and the ARF, have not acted in any serious collective way to promote democratic and human rights that would violate states’ traditional sovereign rights. Lawrence Woods (1995: 153), for instance, takes note of “an expedient, hypocritical gap where ethics need not apply.” In his view, regional thinking today “is indicative of a trend, which sees human rights issues allegedly addressed through the back door.” Amitav Acharya (2001) further argues that the Asian concept of human security is more compatible with comprehensive security, which addresses the need to promote state/regime security in the context of economic survival, domestic stability, and regime

security, not in the context of social justice and human emancipation. This state-centric approach to security is what most East-Asian states have sought to do, namely, resisting any attempts to do away with the principle of noninterference.

Nevertheless, democracy and human rights promotion within states in Southeast Asia has received growing academic attention in recent years with Cambodia and Timor-Leste providing case studies for scholars. There are at least three main propositions in existing literature concerning the effects of international assistance on post-conflict societies. The “harmful effects” proposition can be inferred from reading influential work advanced by some well-established scholars. Of particular relevance is the early work by Ben Kiernan (1993), who contended that the U.N. intervention would seriously harm the political and economic development of Cambodia. From a political economy perspective, the former armed factions continued to battle for political supremacy, perpetuating the country’s tragic history of strife and violence. Cambodia seems unlikely to get on the right track toward peace. Some scholars speculate that as the country “slides back toward the past,” its “future is grim and uncertain,” because it might relapse into another genocidal war (Mehmet 1997). The second proposition, advanced by scholars like Pierre Lizée (2001), asserts that international assistance can have only temporary effects on recipient states. He regards the lack of capitalistic development as the crucial variable that explains factional self-aggrandizement and the politics of exclusion.

Representative of the “limited effects” perspective are the publications that take stock of recent political development in Cambodia between the UNTAC period and several years after. Grant Curtis, for example, recognizes that the U.N. mission played a key role in repatriating 370,000 Cambodian refugees, in ensuring a neutral political environment for the conduction of a national election, and in promoting some liberal values, such as human rights, a free press, and multiparty democracy. UNTAC’s success, however, was limited by the mission’s failure “to bring peace to Cambodia” (Curtis 1998: 150). Curtis further examines trends in external assistance, the types of technical assistance, its effectiveness and impact, and Cambodia’s absorptive capacity. He points to weaknesses inherent in the donor community’s policies to Cambodia. Donors did not rely on Cambodia’s institutional structures and could not commit to making international aid coordination effective. During the UNTAC period, donors chose their sectoral priorities, projects, and programs and established their implementation mechanisms and structures (*ibid.*: 74).

Other scholars, such as Roland Paris (2004), also recognize the limits of democracy building in Cambodia and criticize the neo-liberal agenda that has pushed the process of liberalization in the forms of democratization and marketization without first building institutions. They see democratization

and marketization as competitive, destabilizing, and thus having limits. In the late 1990s, Cambodia had not become more stable because of democratization. By this time, Hun Sen had “undermined his political opponents and consolidated his near-absolute powers . . .” (Paris 2004: 89). In fact, “the country became *more* stable in the late 1990s as Hun Sen increasingly backed away from his earlier democratic commitments” (*ibid.*: 90). This is a fair argument, but Cambodian history also shows that authoritarian rule is not the best system of government, either, when assessed in terms of promoting and maintaining political legitimacy or regime stability.

More recently, Sorpong Peou (2007) advanced a theoretical perspective called complex realist institutionalism to argue that one hindrance to the process of democratic consolidation is that the system of checks and balances has not become sufficiently institutionalized. The ruling party led by Prime Minister Hun Sen has consolidated political power at the expense of the opposition. The efforts of the international donor community to build peace have not been successful when measured in terms of transforming Cambodia into a stable democracy, which requires a high level of institutionalization at three levels: state, political, and civil society. This does not mean that the country is likely to return to a state of warfare; however, the stability remains fragile and the international donor community also remains more concerned about political stability than democracy. Even some democratic donors still pursue their realist agendas.

SECURITY THROUGH DEVELOPMENT IN ASIA-PACIFIC

Scholars have paid significant attention to the development-based approach supported by the experiences of states in East Asia. The literature on human security has focused on the role of Japan and other states in Southeast Asia because of their tendency to define human security in terms of meeting basic human needs.

According to scholars who have studied Japan’s security policy, Japanese governments have endorsed the UNDP concept of human security. Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi advocated the concept during a speech at the U.N. National Assembly in October 1995. The speech did not reject the concept of national security, but stressed the need to promote the well-being of “Earth’s citizens.” For the prime minister, human security meant freedom from poverty, disease, ignorance, oppression, and violence. In 1997, Murayama’s successor, Hashimoto Ryutaro, reiterated Japan’s commitment to human security, with an emphasis on environmental and developmental issues. It was the Asian financial crisis in 1997 that popularized the concept of human security. Hashimoto’s successor, Obuchi Keizo, formally adopted the concept as part of his foreign policy. In 1997, the prime minister declared the 21st century for Asia to be “a century of peace and prosperity built on

human dignity.” In December 1998, Obuchi announced the establishment of the U.N. Trust Fund for Human Security, and Japan has since contributed \$203 million between 1999 and 2002. Early in the 2000s, Tokyo also made a commitment to turning the 21st century into a “human-centered century.” In 2000, the Japanese government hosted an International Symposium on Human Security in Tokyo with Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen and the former U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees Sadako Ogata (a Japanese citizen) as key speakers; then, in January 2001, it sponsored the Commission on Human Security, co-chaired by these two speakers. The Japanese government further lent policy support to the then-U.N. Secretary-General’s Commission on Human Security, established in 2001.

Scholars have noted the distinct nature of the human security concept that Japan and other Asian states have adopted. According to Bert Edström (2003: 220), “the Japanese version of this concept identified it with developmental—in some cases even environmental—policies.” According to S. Neil MacFarlane and Yuen Foong Khong (2006), the Japanese version of human security has roots in Japan’s embrace of sustainable human development in the early 1990s. Overall, Japan stressed the need to empower people and to help them to protect themselves from a broad array of threats to their security, such as unemployment, disease, lack of education, and inadequate health care. According to Takashi Inoguchi, Japan’s approach to human security “centers on humanitarian aid for refugees, children, and victims of food shortages in economically struggling nations; emergency aid for nations hit by disasters; and grants-in-aid for low-income countries” (Edström 2003: 220). Japan’s development-based approach differs from that of other Western countries in that it reveals its “discomfort with the seemingly internationalist thrust of the evolving discourse on human security” and its “unhappiness . . . exacerbated by the emerging consensus of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty on ‘the Responsibility to Protect’ [sponsored by Canada]” (MacFarlane and Khong 2006: 159). On conceptual matters, there was some real tension between the protection-based or narrow approach to human security advocated by Western states like Canada and the development-based or broad approach advocated by state leaders, most notably Japan.

The concept of human security based on the UNDP and the Japanese initiatives tends to generate a lot of academic interest in East Asia. Scholars in the region, especially those of Asian descent, tend to argue that human security must be defined in a multi-layered fashion. They do not disregard the concept of national security, but see human security as complementary to it. Many forcefully argue that the developmentalist concept of human security is more compatible with that of ASEAN countries, which tend to adopt, build, and maintain a functioning market economy and formulate national policies aimed at reducing poverty as instruments to enhance

regime legitimacy. Up until 1997, the success of poverty reduction proved remarkable. However, the financial and economic crises of 1997 rolled back much of what the ASEAN states had accomplished in the previous decades.

Leaders remain preoccupied with meeting their citizens' basic needs. ASEAN countries have embarked on creating social safety-net programs that are of a socioeconomic nature, including food security, social funds, health and education, employment programs (Indonesia), and training for the unemployed (Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand). A growing number of scholars in East Asia tend to embrace the development-based approach to human security, arguing that governments have a role to play, but add that other actors, including international organizations (such as ASEAN and the ARF) and non-state actors (civil society) should play more active roles. They have called for economic and social reforms to reduce poverty, to create new jobs, and to improve health care for the poor.

The extent to which the concept of human security has become important in the security policy agendas of states in the Asia-Pacific is a matter of debate. Academic literature, however, reveals an uncomfortable truth about the rhetoric and reality of this new security agenda. The security politics of human security further reveal that states in the region pay lip service to the security of people and resist any idea that challenges the concept of national security. Even Japan has adopted the concept of human security with the aim of ensuring its political independence from the United States.

This perspective on human security seems most relevant in East Asia, as states in the region advocate the "development-based" method of promoting the well-being of individuals; however, the concept of human security has not yet brought down the national barriers between states in the region and those in the rest of the world. The main regional organizations, such as ASEAN and the ARF, have refused to put human security issues that would compromise their members' sovereignty on their security policy agendas. Thus, political realists still have good reason to maintain their skepticism about recent perspectives on human security. Regional organizations, most notably the ARF, have not seriously implemented the human security agenda. Some scholars have noted that the Forum, as the only security regime in the region, should play this role, but it has yet to act. Simon Tay (2001: 131, 132) makes this remark: "Who is in charge of human security? Not the ARF." He reminds us that "[t]he present practices of the ARF do not take up human security issues in a strong and a concerted manner."

One problem with the development-based approach to human security is that it has a broad emotional appeal, but has not gained a clear momentum in the policy arena. Roland Paris (2001) is among the most powerful critics of this broad approach. Most proponents agree on a wide range of threats to human life, but because it is so inclusive, policymakers do not

have a clear idea of how to proceed. It is unlikely that the different actors interested or involved in human security activities can enhance their collaboration far beyond what they have already done (Peou 2009a).

As shall be discussed later in constructivist security studies, critical theorists have also questioned the liberal peace thesis based on Western ideas or values, such as democratization, marketization, and criminalization of violence. They do not reject the concept of human security because it lacks any theoretical underpinnings, but generally suspect that the concept remains state-centric or is just another form of discourse that aims to promote the liberal hegemonic agenda, and thus propose that we take into account local cultural and socio economic conditions. Most states in East Asia also reject the liberal concept of human security because of their concerns about Western imperialism in the form of intervention in their domestic affairs (Acharya 2001b) and prefer to focus instead on the concept of nontraditional security (to be discussed later). Let us now turn to peace teachings and peace activism that are most evident in the Asia-Pacific, to see whether Asian cultural ideas are better than Western ones and adequate as methods for realizing peace and security.

Peace Education and Peaceful Activism

This chapter discusses the works of ancient Asian thinkers and covers peace movements in the Asia-Pacific. Although they apparently owe intellectual debts to the early activism of Westerners, contemporary peace movements in the region also grew out of the experience in India, when Mohandas Gandhi's movement emerged to challenge British colonial rule and, more prominently, out of the experience in Indochina, when the United States became involved in the Vietnam War during the 1960s. Peace movements continue to exist today, such as those in Japan and South Korea.

Whether the building of positive peace and the promotion of human security have been successful remains to be seen. Evidence is still being collected and the jury is still out. Proponents may cite successes in the politics of nonviolence, such as Filipinos forcing the United States to close its military bases and the continuation of Japanese pacifism, but it is difficult to measure their decisive impact on states' security policies. Advocates of peace have been ignored by the public, subject to political repression, and even divided among themselves. Many still lack the necessary resources to carry out their activities effectively.

PEACE EDUCATION AND ACTIVISM IN A NUTSHELL

The modern politics of peace through nonviolence can be traced to the activism of Gandhi (1869–1948) who condemned structural violence but

rejected direct or revolutionary violence as the strategy to abolish it. It may be helpful to point out that although Gandhi led a nonviolent resistance to British colonial rule in India, his supreme aim was to achieve the liberation of the individual human being. He regarded racism as a form of injustice based on “error” rooted in illusion (such as the illusion of white superiority and Indian inferiority). He considered colonialism a form of imperialist exploitation and sought self-rule for India in the form of complete national independence from British colonial rule. Like socialists, he condemned industrialism (the product of capitalism) as evil, regarding it as a system that enslaved workers and turned the masses into “machine-minders.”

Gandhi (1980) considered all men to be brothers and viewed his foes as participants in the joint search for a just society that would benefit both sides. Peace is achieved through mutual understanding among opponents. In his words, “Three fourths of all the miseries and misunderstandings in the world will disappear, if we step into the shoes of our adversaries and understand their viewpoint” (Ambler 1990: 204). Each individual has the responsibility to provide humanity with security by taking no more than what he needs. A person taking anything more than what is necessary is considered morally irresponsible or is “guilty of theft.”

More particularly, Gandhi rejected the realist idea that the ends justify the means. *Satyagraha*—meaning “adherence to truth,” “commitment to truth,” or “truth-force”—emerged as his basic strategy for the political struggle against unjust laws and colonial rule. If one faces hostile opponents, one must be loyal to truth and remain nonviolent. During the Salt March in 1930, for instance, practitioners of *Satyagraha* remained true to their faith in nonviolence, as they silently marched until struck down; none raised an arm in self-protection (Dalton 1993).

Gandhi’s most famous contribution to the teachings of nonviolence is known as *civil disobedience*, challenging the state and the British colonial power, based on the religious concept of *Ahimsa*—“the Way of Non-violence” closely associated with Jainism (one of India’s oldest religions, which stresses the vow of non-injury and requires respect for all living forms). This does not mean submission to the will of evildoers. *Ahimsa* simply means one individual can peacefully act in defiance of an unjust empire. In 1930, Gandhi launched a new campaign based on the idea of “individual” disobedience instead of “mass” disobedience.

Acts of civil disobedience included nonviolent protest (such as marches, pilgrimages, picketing, vigils, public meetings, issuing and distributing protest literature, and humorous pranks), non-cooperation with colonial rulers (through withdrawal from civil service, courts, government schools, and legislative councils), striking (through praying and fasting, which can disrupt traffic, mail service, and factories), and political and economic boycotts. Gandhi refused to kill or pay anyone to kill others, including the enemy, for any causes he was fighting for. He once said, “I would die for the

cause, but there is no cause I'm prepared to kill for." The atomic bombs dropped on Japan at the end of World War II convinced him that the future of our planet required that we look to the East for solutions, because the West represented a future of decadence, materialism, and conflict and had forfeited its ability to lead the human race.

Gandhi pinned his hopes on independence from colonial rule, self-sufficiency, and participatory democracy. He rejected revolution as a violent means to abolish capitalism and preferred societal rehabilitation based on nonviolence-based communism. He sought not to build the state, which he regarded as "violence in a concentrated form," but to establish the *sarvodaya* society. He regarded this society as stateless and classless, one of small autonomous and self-governing communities, whose mutual links are non-hierarchical, whose rule is based on moral rather than political or legal authority, whose principle of economic equality is based on distribution according to needs but respect for freedom of the individual, and whose activities are dedicated to "the raising up and the welfare of all."

Another major perspective on peace focuses on the cultural aspect of war and the possibility of peace through cultural exchange. The term *militarism* implies the glorification of war, military force, and violence through such communicative means as war films, novels, magazines, war games, toys, and sports (Gibson 1990). Israeli music was popular in Arab countries, and music may help enemies learn to enjoy and respect one another and can contribute to friendship, which can in turn create limits to hostility and help find a way to peace (Friedman 1990). Nonviolence also includes *civilian-based defense*, a strategy that seeks to train civilians to stop foreign occupation forces by making their society ungovernable and economically unproductive. This defensive strategy would also make other countries feel less threatened. For others, such defense could prevent arms races by allaying fears among states and could create a path toward peace (Sharp and Jenkins 1990).

In short, the ways of nonviolence rest on the assumptions that insecurity is rooted in war as well as oppressive social institutions and practices, and that these sources of insecurity can be overcome by nonviolent and non-offensive means.

Another method is through the actions of the peace movement, whose earlier activities placed almost exclusive emphasis on the pacifist role of people protesting against militarism and war. There are two basic types of peace movements: religious and secular. Resistance to war occurred during the early Christian period, and peace movements are said to have their origin in the United States and Europe. The first secular groups were established in 1815 after the Napoleonic War ended, when the idea of a "workers, strike against war" was first heard. The New York Peace Society and the Massachusetts Peace Society were formed. The modern U.S. peace movement emerged in the late 19th century and was later replaced by the contemporary peace movement in the 20th century (Young 1987).

Actors in various peace movements come from different ideological persuasions and traditions, including religious pacifism, secular pacifism, anarcho-pacifism, radical pacifism, unilateral nuclear pacifism, liberal internationalism, feminism, socialist internationalism, anti-war socialism, anti-conscription activism, conscientious objectionism, the transnational anti-war New Left of the 1960s, and the ecologically inspired movements of the 1970s and 1980s. One of the most interesting aspects of peace movements is that they have also become global or transnational over time. They may have their historical and intellectual roots in Europe and the United States, but they have spread to other countries, where peace activists peacefully fought for independence (such as India) and rejected militarism; some were inspired by the atomic bomb survivors in Japan.

Part of the problem with peace movements is that it is difficult to define what peace means, although they all tend to be against war. In the late 19th century, peace activists reacted against imperialism and arms races. After 1914, they reacted to World War I, regarding it as a mistake, strengthened by revisionist historians attacking official explanations of the war that tended to unilaterally blame Germany. In the 1930s, in addition to their reactions against the rise of fascist power in Western Europe and totalitarianism in the Soviet Union, peace workers crusaded against war. In the United States, peace movements worked to eliminate the causes of war and war itself. After World War II, they staged protests against the atomic bomb, leading to the creation of a committee in the United States known as "Non-Violent Action Against Nuclear Weapons" (NVA). Peace movements within colonies also began to emerge, with Gandhi providing much inspiration against colonialism. In the late 1970s, peace movements protested nuclear weapons and the arms races that depended on huge military budgets and consumed resources that could be used to meet basic human needs, such as education, health care, and housing. In the 1980s, peace advocates continued to protest nuclear weapons. They argued that the principles laid out in the concept of common security should serve as a guide in the pursuit of world peace, and they believed that this security framework would enable peace movements "to present a series of principles to guide U.S. peace movement thinking and action in the years ahead" (Solo 1988; Solo *et al.* 1990). Moreover, international peace activists emphasized the need to serve as *human shields* rather than rely on national *missile shields*.

After the late 1980s and into the 1990s, the new peace movement began to engage actively in turning human security into a collective issue: namely, "these new protests are neither peace nor disarmament movements, but a *movement for human security*" (Hegedus 1987). They not only rejected "the arms race as a means to defend the West against the Soviet menace," but also turned to "the democratic process" and served as

“a vehicle for democratic protest” (ibid.: 203). The new peace movement also sought to redefine security by opening a debate on the issue of security in the public arena. Security came to be redefined in civilian terms. The new peace strategy is to create “a balance of civilian forces” rather than a balance of military forces, by “assuring the security of civilians” and “the capacity of civil society to regain control over its future.” That is, “the civilian-oriented problem-solving process promotes the security of civil societies in the world and their capacity to control their destiny everywhere in the world” (ibid.: 203). Civilian emancipation is thus the ultimate aim of human security; its strategy differs from earlier protests (such as mass demonstrations), but is dominated by a multitude of actions: civil disobedience, non-cooperation, or radical nonviolence. The new praxis of civilian emancipation rested on the need to tackle concrete problems, such as poverty and famine in the Third World and freedom in former socialist states.

PEACE THROUGH EDUCATION IN ASIA-PACIFIC

Nonviolence is a strategy for peaceful change developed by Gandhi, but other pacifists in the Asia-Pacific have contributed their educationalist perspectives to peace studies. Long before Gandhi, Christians—before, during, and after the Reformation—developed a tradition of pacifism. Peace research in the United States has a long tradition (Rank 2006). Among the best-known Christian pacifist groups are the Quakers. In 1838, the Quakers founded the New England Non-Resistance Society and engaged in active but nonviolent opposition to war and preparations for war. Also in the United States, the first peace studies program was established in 1948, but such programs did not grow in large numbers until the late 1960s and early 1970s (during the U.S. involvement in the war in Vietnam and the Civil Rights Movement led by Martin Luther King Jr., inspired by his Christian faith as well as Gandhi). King led a nonviolent struggle against racism and helped promote civil rights. His method emphasized the Christian ethics of love and forgiveness towards those who suppressed African Americans.

The writings of East Asian thinkers are less known to students in peace studies. This field of research and teaching still has a limited influence. Japan is perhaps the first country in the region to witness the post-World War II development of peace studies, such as the Peace Research Group set up in 1964, the Peace Studies Association of Japan founded in 1973, and the introduction of university courses in peace studies at a university in 1976. After that, peace studies in Japan expanded. A survey conducted in 2005, for instance, shows that 42 Japanese universities now offered courses in peace studies. In addition, ten peace research institutes have been established (Yamane 2006: 87). Peace studies have recently penetrated China.

The first course in peace studies began in 2003 at Nanjing University. In 2005, the university established an academic discipline (Hunter 2006: 2; Cheng 2006: 200).

East-Asian philosophical thinking on nonviolence, however, can be traced back to the works of Lao Tse of ancient China in the sixth century B.C. (Wing-tsit 1973), Confucius (551–479 B.C.), and Mo-tzu (468–401 B.C.), all of whom left their marks on the Chinese nonviolence tradition. Taoism “offers a meaningful, meditative/analogical alternative to global security thinking” (Pettman 2005a: 59) and prefers *wu-wei*, known as active pacifism based on “sacral spontaneity” rather than political deliberation or military strategy. Pettman writes: “the Taoist classics conclude that war is never a preferred activity, and that when there is an alternative, we should take it. As the *Tao te ching* concludes with the following: ‘Show me a man of violence that came to a good end, and I will take him for my teacher’” (ibid.: 80).

The founder of Taoism and author of the *Tao De* (or *Tê*) *Ching* (or the *Classic of the Way and of Power*), Lao Tse (1963) rejected force as a strategy for peace and advocated the “Tao” or “Way.” The “Way” points to peaceful images of water or wind. Although soft and yielding, they can prevail over “hard” substances, such as rocks and iron. Lao wrote: “There is nothing softer and weaker than water, and yet there is nothing better for attacking hard and strong things.” He added that, “For this reason, there is no substitute for it. All the world knows that the weak overcomes the strong and the soft overcomes the hard.” Therefore, love can overcome weapons, which are instruments of evil and cannot be used by good rulers: “deep love helps one to win the case of attack and to be firm in the case of defense” (Lao 1997).

Taoism further opposes material strength as the source of peace and security or victory. As an early Taoist classic (Cleary 1990) composed over 2,000 years ago puts it: “Having extensive territory and a large population is not enough to constitute strength. Having strong armor and sharp weapons is not enough to win victory. Having high walls and deep moats is not enough to ensure security” (ibid.: 53). The text further states that, “A small country that actually practices culture and virtue reigns; a large country that is militaristic perishes.” Ultimately, “an army doomed to defeat is one that fights first and then seeks to win” (ibid.: 53–54).

Ultimate strength comes from justice and the respect leaders gain from the people. “What makes warriors strong is readiness to fight to the death. What makes people ready to fight to the death is justice. . . . When awesome dignity and justice are both exercised, this is called supreme strength” (ibid.: 57). Taoism stresses the need for enhancing authority, rather than accumulating power: “When leaders are worthy of respect, the people are willing to work for them. When their virtue is worthy of admiration, their authority can be established” (ibid.: 58). Knowing the Way helps provide security by establishing this type of authority: “When armies lose the Way,

they are weak; when they attain the Way, they are strong.” When generals lose the Way, they become inept; when attaining the Way, they become skillful. When attaining the Way, nations survive; when losing the Way, they perish (ibid.: 51).

The Way views victory in a nonviolent form. Being formless in confrontation with one’s opponents is the way to victory. Being calm in the face of opponents can also neutralize their formal or frontal assaults. According to the Way, “Only the formless are invulnerable. Sages hide in inscrutability, so their feelings cannot be observed. They operate in formlessness, so their lines cannot be crossed” (ibid.: 56). Being formless in military operations also means that “the war chariots are not launched, the horses are not saddled, the drums do not thunder, and the banners are not unfurled. Arrows are not shot and swords do not taste blood . . .” (ibid.: 51).

Offensive war is condemned and war can be abolished, for the simple reason that war costs more than it is worth. While the right to self-defense against attack is still recognized and perhaps justified, the *Tao De Ching* stipulates the following: “He who by Tao purposes to help a ruler of men will oppose all conquest by force of arms” (Waley 1958: 180). Peace apparently prevails when people or nations do not seek worldly dominion. Justice is regarded as the pillar of peace deeply rooted in desirelessness. The Taoist tradition views “many desires” as having adverse “affects [on] their sense of justice” (Cleary 1990: 68). The way to peace is to ensure happiness without excessive possessiveness: “you may be so rich as to own the world and so elevated as to rule the world, but you will be still pathetic” (ibid.: 85).

The optimism of Taoist pacifism lies in its founders’ conviction that human nature is basically good and can be nurtured; it is not nasty or wicked as Hobbes, Machiavelli, and Sun Tzu all assumed: “Human nature is generally such that it likes tranquility and dislikes anxiety; it likes leisure and dislikes toil” (Cleary 1990: 86). Even if human nature is corrupted by desires, it can still be transformed: “Human nature is developed by profound serenity and lightness; virtue is developed by harmonious joy and open selflessness” (ibid.: 79). All nations can thus be embraced, their national customs can be unified, all peoples can be included as if uniting a single family, and their judgments can also come together. People can become benevolent if only they love all creatures and do not hate humanity.

Mo-tzu also presented an anti-realist challenge to offensive war under any circumstances. The ethic of love that he embraced was believed to serve as a universal human virtue that can be practiced by everyone: “Those who love others will be loved in return. Do good to others and others will do good to you . . . What is hard about that?” His doctrine of universal love can be applied at the state level: one should “feel toward all people under heaven exactly as one feels toward one’s own people, regard other States exactly as one regards one’s own State” (Waley 1958: 76). This doctrine of love allows for self-defense, as it gives special attention to the arts of fortification.

Although one may love others equally, it does not follow that one can be loved equally by them. Still, war must be condemned and abolished.

Confucius also rejected the use of violence and war. Although he advocated the need to promote respect for tradition and authority, the Chinese sage contended that the value of benevolence and obedience is less important than peace, which he describes as the ultimate goal of human beings. Like Taoists, he and his followers believed that human nature is basically good. He is also known for embracing the Golden Rule: “Treat your subordinates as you would like to be treated by your superiors.” Also like Taoists, his teachings emphasize the need to abolish human desires: “If only you yourself were desireless they would not steal even if you paid them to” (Waley 1958: 89). This Chinese tradition stresses the necessity of military defense, but makes it clear that war should be waged only for a righteous cause and that accommodation as a strategy is preferred to defensive and expansive ones.

The Buddhist teachings of Zen master Thich Nhat Hanh (2005), a Vietnamese monk who led the Buddhist delegation in the Paris Peace Talks during the Vietnam War in the early 1970s, also present a message of peace through nonviolence. Hanh is fully aware that human life is not free from suffering or insecurity rooted in violence against individuals and other forms of violence, such as poverty, hunger, illiteracy, and diseases. Security in general means peace defined as freedom from *suffering* caused by war, violence, oppression, and exploitation.

Thich Nhat Hanh presents an alternative to violence as the way to achieve peace. Through nonviolence, peace can be achieved without one side claiming victory over the other. Reconciliation is the key concept. As he put it: “Reconciliation is to understand both sides and describe the suffering being endured by the other side, and then to the other side and describe the suffering being endured by the first side” (Hanh 2005: 73). Such reconciliation helps promote peace. Understanding the other side comes from the knowledge that we are creatures of social conditions. A pirate, for instance, is capable of inflicting suffering on others because he was born in a certain environment that would make anyone behave the same way if born in that environment. In Hanh’s words (*ibid.*: 65–66), “If I had been born in the village of the pirate and raised in the same conditions as he was, I am now a pirate. There is a great likelihood that I would become a pirate. I cannot condemn myself so easily.”

Nonviolence can also be carried out by people who are “not bound to any doctrine, theory, or ideology, even Buddhist teachings” (Hanh 2005: 90). Compassionate dialogue for peace is possible when people are open to each other’s insights and experiences, when they do not “impose their views on others,” when they respect the right of others to be different and to choose what to believe and how to decide,” when they renounce fanaticism and narrowness” (*ibid.*: 92, 93).

Positive peace can also be achieved when war can be prevented. In Hanh's words (1987: 101), "Preventing war is much better than protesting against the war. Protesting the war is too late"; peace activists "are determined not to kill and not to let others kill." Moreover, when war is prevented, peace will leave more money to erase poverty, hunger, illiteracy, and diseases from our world. We thus ought to be responsible for others by not accumulating wealth so as to deprive others.

Johan Galtung (2006: 15) asks how these religious traditions can find their ways into peace studies, but some scholars who have studied wars in East Asia are convinced that Asian pacifism has a positive effect on societies and state behavior. Some scholars acknowledge the influence of Confucianism on China's strategic thinking. Iain Johnston (1995: 66) notes that "war is inauspicious and to be avoided; the enemy is not necessarily demonized—it can be encultured and pacified . . . not exterminated or annihilated. . . ." He points out that, "When violence is used by the state to deal with external security threats, it is generally applied defensively and is limited in nature. This reflects a view that violence is not particularly efficacious in eliminating threats or producing security." Allen Whiting also shows this in his study of the Chinese civil war, the Korean War, the Sino-Indian War, and the Sino-Vietnamese War (Whiting 2001). Chinese President Hu Jintao is also said to have promoted official slogans with Confucian overtones, such as "Harmonious Society."

Other scholars regard the Confucian state as a provider of human security. According to Robert Bedeski, Confucianism provided a vital link between human security and the ancient Chinese state: individuals (as parents and children but not as autonomous individuals) enjoyed personal security. In his words: "[t]he traditional Chinese state was a remarkable political construction and provided human security to hundreds of millions over multiple centuries" (Bedeski 2007: 77).

Evidence remains inconclusive. Confucianism can hardly be given credit for the prevention of war among states in Northeast Asia. Chinese realism has often emerged to challenge Chinese pacifism. Chinese realists became convinced that pacifists were wrong-headed when the home of Confucianism, the small State of Lu, was invaded and destroyed in 249 B.C. As one Chinese realist put it, "the most the benevolent man can do is to be benevolent to others; he cannot cause others to be benevolent to him. The most the moral man can do is to exercise his love upon other people; he cannot make other people love one another" (Waley 1958: 79).

None of these religious teachings has effectively pacified domestic or interstate war in East Asia. Buddhism has proved unable to pacify domestic and interstate wars in Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. Some Zen Buddhist leaders were militarists in their teachings in times of war. Japanese Zen leaders, for instance, supported war efforts before and during World War II (Victoria 1997), and violence has become "the chosen path" for many people in India (Giridharadas 2008).

In short, there is no guarantee that nonviolence alone can always be effective. Gandhian pacifism may have helped India gain political independence from Britain, but it still raises more questions than answers. Would it have been possible if Britain had not been a liberal democracy and had not suffered from World War II? Why did nonviolence fail to prevent India from splitting into two states (India and Pakistan), and Pakistan from splitting into two states (Pakistan and Bangladesh)? In Tibet, the Buddhist nonviolent movement (led by the Dalai Lama and his monks) to gain autonomy from China has yet to achieve its political objective. The Dalai Lama's teachings on nonviolence have increasingly fallen on deaf ears, because a new generation of Tibetans has begun to regard them as unrealistic. Nonviolence practiced by Buddhist monks in Myanmar was also violently suppressed, for instance, when the junta ordered a series of brutal crackdowns in 2007.

PEACE ACTIVISM IN ASIA-PACIFIC

The East-Asian teachings of nonviolence are also said to have contributed to peace movements in the Asia-Pacific. Within the region, peace moments staged protests against imperialism, war, and political violence. Before World War II, peace movements in Japan had already emerged, first in the 1920s, when a small number of Japanese intellectuals advocated pacifism and foreign policy for peace. Due to little public support and the 1925 Maintenance of the Public Order Act, which restrained the freedom of speech and social movements, the peace movement remained quite weak or fragile and later was shattered by the rise of the militarist regime.

After World War II, peace movements re-emerged, most notably in Japan. The atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki (which turned the two cities into ruins and killed approximately 200,000 inhabitants by the end of October 1945) marked a profound change within Japanese society, as they brought unprecedented miseries to local people. Japan adopted a "peace constitution," which contains the famous Article 9 stating that "the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes." After the war, the press code was imposed by the Occupation General Headquarters in September 1945 (which prohibited any reports on the destruction caused by the bombings). The exhaustion experienced by the Japanese also made it difficult for the newly emerging peace movements to become well organized. It was not until the so-called Bikini Nuclear Incident (when the crew of a Japanese fishing vessel was radiated by a hydrogen bomb test conducted by U.S. forces at Bikini Atoll in 1954) that the brutality of nuclear weapons was officially made known to the public. As a consequence, the Suginami Appeal initiated by housewives unaffiliated with socialism or communism urged actions against nuclear weapons with the aim of preserving life and the happiness of humankind.

The Suginami Appeal succeeded in internationalizing Japanese peace movements. In the 1960s, Japanese peace movements staged protests against the Japan-U.S. security treaty. Peace activism continued to grow in the 1970s, as Japanese activists sought to mobilize support for actions against nuclear weapons. The Joint World Conference against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs was held in 1977. Grass-roots peace movements arose after that, armed with the campaign to expose the casualties of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and to make new documentary films for peace activities. The campaign brought together housewives, students, retired individuals, and workers who had no affiliations with either the socialist or communist groups in the country. They saw nuclear weapons as “absolute evils,” not just relative ones, and insisted on a total abolition of nuclear weapons under all circumstances.

The peace campaign intensified after the following events: the U.S. bombing of North Vietnam and U.S. President Johnson’s order to lay land mines at Da Nang, and his plan to increase U.S. troops in Vietnam. The U.S. involvement in Vietnam, beginning in 1955 with the establishment of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam known as ARVN and then leading to the sending of American troops (80,000 in 1965 and about 543,000 in 1969), gave rise to peace movements in several countries, particularly the United States and South Vietnam. In 1963, the War Registers League (WRL) organized the first demonstration against the war, and those who took part included priests, nuns, Communist party functionaries, Trotskyites, socialists, anarchists, religious pacifists, and conservative Republicans. The first antiwar coalition was the Fifth Avenue Peace Parade Committee. Millions of students demonstrated on hundreds of campuses. Students and faculty members organized what was known as “teach-ins” in early 1965, where they discussed their concerns about the war. Many people also stayed home from work to demonstrate their opposition to the war.

In the late 1960s, anti-war groups in the United States resorted to such tactics as draft card burnings, visible protest, refusing to fight, and confronting any type of war-mongering (Cooney and Michalowski 1990). By 1969, demonstrations against the Vietnam War had grown in intensity, culminating in students from all over the United States marching to Washington, D.C.C, in support of the “Mobilization Against the War.” Over 40,000 were said to have taken part in a “March Against Death” from Arlington National Cemetery to the White House, where the names of those killed in Vietnam were placed on placards carried by protesters. Those who participated in the protests against the war included radicals, liberals, socialists, Marxists, civil rights advocates, pacifists, and revisionists. A large number of new peace organizations—notably SANE, the Council for a Livable World, the World Without War Council, the Center for War/Peace studies, the Fund for Peace and its project centers, and the Campaign to Stop Funding the War—were also organized and continued after the war. This was a time

when anti-war activists from different theoretical and ideological backgrounds stood united in defending peace.

From 1965 to 1975, Vietnamese Buddhists led by the Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam also protested against the war. Studies on peace movements in Vietnam point to the sources of insecurity associated with imperialism, war, civil strife, and injustice, which had plagued the country since the end of the 19th century, and culminated in the war. The growing unpopularity of the South Vietnamese government led by President Ngo Dinh Diem ignited the peace movements in 1963. The regime was viewed as a foreign puppet, a military dictatorship dominated by Catholics, who reduced Buddhism (which made up three-quarters of the population) to the status of an association rather than a religion. The Vietnamese Buddhists sought to achieve negative peace. They demanded an end to the Catholic suppression of Buddhists, protested against the war, and sought to remove the U.S. troops from the country. The Buddhists carried out protests between 1963 and 1966 and “emerged as a potent political force and the only significant non-communist opposition in South Vietnam from 1963 to 1966” (De Benedetti 1990: 4).

Vietnamese Buddhists were neither liberal capitalists nor communists. They were critical of capitalism and even Western-style democracy, which were seen as unsuitable to Vietnam. Some Buddhist monks, such as Thich Nhat Hanh, contend that capitalism gives rise to competition and aggression, as well as “a ruinous arms race that further deprives the poor of their share of the world’s resources” (De Benedetti 1990: 14). They protested against hunger, condemning “full shelves in Western grocery stores” and stressing that starvation “in the Third World constitutes a form of violence” (Topmiller 2002: 13). Beginning in 1963, uprisings called for peace and nonviolence, speaking out against imperialism. Buddhist activism was based on the policy of neutrality in order to provide the Vietnamese masses with freedom from foreign domination and interference and to achieve peace through the eradication of poverty and injustice while bringing compassion and succor to them.

During the Cold War period, especially the period from 1963 to 1966, members of peace movements in South Vietnam were united by their common beliefs in nonviolence and empathy, which were treated as “a way of life that respects the rights of every living creature” (Topmiller 2002: 10). Self-sacrifices were for the good of saving others. The concept of self-immolation was fundamental to the Buddhist campaign against oppression and war in the mid-1960s, because it was viewed as representing “the highest manifestation of the Buddhist concept of nonviolence, given that the person committing the act chooses to harm himself or herself rather than harm another human being” (ibid.: 133).

After the Cold War, peace movements within East Asia continued, and they still carry out nonviolent protests against war and violence. As part of

the global Nonviolent Peaceforce, the brainchild of U.S. peace activist David Hartsough and others (who were inspired by the teachings of Gandhi and King), the Japan Group (led by Professor Akihiko Kimijima of Hokai Gakuen University) operated on the basis of Article 9 in the Japanese Constitution. Its pacifism of “non-action,” with slogans, such as “Do not take part in wars fought by the United States” and “Do not dispatch the Self-Defense Forces overseas,” has now been replaced by “active pacifism.” Members are also committed to staying on the side of people whose lives are in danger, to recording and publicizing human rights violations, and to mediating peace between hostile forces. In addition, they have worked alongside U.N. peacekeepers and plan to become actively involved in reforming social and economic infrastructures to help eradicate poverty and fight discrimination.

The Gandhian and Buddhist politics of nonviolence have also influenced peace activists in Myanmar. Aung San Suu Kyi (1995), influenced by Gandhi’s ideas and Buddhism, has led a democracy movement based on nonviolence. Her idea of “freedom from fear” is based on her political vision to transform Myanmar into a humanitarian democratic society based on the absence of direct violence as well as the development of democracy and human rights. This approach is not based on any scientific truth, but on the Buddhist teachings of truth said to be quite similar to those of Gandhi. Her notion of freedom from fear rests on the assumption that fear corrupts people. “It is not power that corrupts but fear. Fear of losing power corrupts those who wield it and fear of the scourge of power corrupts those who are subject to it” (*ibid.*: 180). To achieve freedom from fear, citizens must overcome their fear of power (such as arrest and detention) and struggle for democracy without resorting to violence. Charity, compassion, and loving kindness stand among the principal means of encouraging dialogue with the junta.

Overall, however, contemporary peace movements still seem to have made no lasting impact on violence and war. They did not put an end to the arms races after 1900, 1930, and 1945, nor could they prevent the emergence of totalitarianism in the 1930s. They did not disarm the fascist regimes or prevent the U.S. dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In Japan voters have demonstrated against Japan’s security policies toward the United States, such as the bilateral security alliance, the U.S. role in the Vietnam War, and the Japanese involvement in the Gulf War, but they have not been consistent in making their views effective at the ballot box. Their anti-war protests have so far presented no serious challenges to the incumbent government seeking reelection.

There are several good reasons why this may be the case. First, peace movements are often subject to repressive violence. During the Vietnam War, Buddhist peace activists in South Vietnam found themselves in an increasingly helpless situation and began a series of self-immolations that resulted in a decline of public support. According to Topmiller (2002: 68),

“the Buddhist hierarchy failed to end the fighting because they spoke for a powerless citizenry, while those arrayed against them held political, military and financial control backed by the United States.” South Vietnam and the United States treated Vietnamese Buddhist activists with suspicion, seeing them as communists who must be destroyed. The South Vietnamese government under the premiership of Nguyen Cao Ky led a successful campaign against Buddhist peace activists, who either were destroyed or went underground. During the 1930s, the Japanese government executed scores of leading peace activists. With Japanese nationalism on the rise again, leading peace activists may face growing challenges. On 17 April 2007, for instance, Iccho Itoh, Mayor of Nagasaki and vice-president of ‘Mayors For Peace’ (seeking support from mayors around the world to ban nuclear weapons by the year 2020), was gunned down.

Second, peace movements often have competing or incompatible interests. The Unified Buddhist Church in South Vietnam disintegrated into factionalism, as some members took a pro-government position, while others promoted a coalition government and peace talks between the governments of North and South Vietnam. Their differences “operated on different levels influenced by age, education, region, family background, rank in the religious hierarchy and attitudes towards authority” (Topmiller 2002: 7). Although the policy of neutrality was upheld, it contributed to the weakening of the peace movement, as it pleased neither North nor South Vietnam. In fact, it created even more confusion, as the policy defied the “American logic of one is either with us or against us” (ibid.: 14). There was also fierce disagreement among leftists: war-resistance socialists were anti-conscriptionists and anti-militarists, whereas communist militarists (especially after the Russian revolution led by Lenin) advocated violent revolution and war. During the Cold War, some major peace movements in Japan also found themselves unable to work together. For instance, *Gensui-kyo* inspired by “anti-imperialism” (operating on the ideological basis of anti-U.S. communism and associated with the Communist party) did not effectively cooperate with *Gensui-kin* inspired by “radical pacifism” (operating on the basis of anti-militarism associated with the socialists).

Third, peace movements may sometimes even encourage violence and war. Hanh (2005: 81), for instance, notes the following: “The peace movement can write very good protest letters, but they are not yet able to write a love letter. . . . If we are not peaceful, then we cannot contribute to the peace movement.” The American Civil War, for instance, resulted in part from peace-driven efforts to abolish slavery. The growing anti-war movement in the United States may have signaled to the North Vietnamese that the morale of the Americans was low and may have helped them conclude that they would be able to defeat the South within two years (Taylor 1999: 63).

Fourth, pacifism has often been subject to reinterpretation also depending on unpredictable changes in the international environment. Peace

advocates, including post-World War II Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida, have maintained that Article 9 prohibits Japan from possessing any military forces. After the Cold War emerged in the late 1940s, however, the United States and Japan changed their security policies from those “of demilitarization and democratization to those of remilitarization and regimenting Japan into the so-called Free Camp” (Kurino and Katsuya 1990: 126). In recent years, Japanese politicians, especially conservative ones, have further sought to reinterpret the pacifist Constitution in a way that would allow Japan to enjoy the right of collective self-defense in response to North Korea’s acquisition of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles.

Part IV

Constructivist Security Studies

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Functionalism and Neo-Functionalism

Following the end of World War II, functionalists began to challenge political realism by stressing the importance of functional effects on international or regional politics. Unlike other rationalist perspectives, they advocate learning without taking interests as given and unproblematic. McSweeney (1999: 136) notes that “[i]nterests are problematized in neo-functionalism in the sense that it conceives of collective actors coming to the school of interaction to learn and relearn—upgrade in the jargon—what the sectoral or national interest is, rather than assuming it is as a given in the matter of neorealism.” Both functionalism and neo-functionalism see a possible movement from nationalism to supranationalism. While functionalists tend to emphasize the importance of knowledge that results in the economic spillover into the political arena, neo-functionalists tend to stress the necessity of political initiatives; decision makers must engage in the process of regional integration and community building. In the Asia-Pacific, scholars observe that regional cooperation across national borders has increased and that there is evidence of increasing regional coherence. But the Asia-Pacific has produced only weak regional communities.

FUNCTIONALISM AND NEO-FUNCTIONALISM IN A NUTSHELL

While it is debatable whether functionalism and neo-functionalism should be placed under the umbrella of constructivist security studies, there

is reason for their inclusion. In recent years, Ernst Haas (a pioneer in neo-functionalism) and Peter Haas called themselves “pragmatic constructivists” (Haas and Haas 2002). Moreover, these perspectives can be said to be knowledge-based and thus, in a sense, constructivist. Michael Haas (1989) also applied neo-functionalism and Karl Deutsch’s notion of cultural affinity (known as “we-feeling”) to his study on regional cooperation and integration in East Asia.

Functionalism and neo-functionalism emphasize nonviolence for collective action in dealing with international problems, such as competitive nationalism. They tend to envision a world made up of regions that is different from the realist world. Functionalists reject the idea of a world state which they regard as too oppressive or a world federal organization which they see as too loose; they further go beyond the theory of economic interdependence, which makes states so sensitive and vulnerable to one another that unilateral actions become unwise or even threaten national survival.

Functionalists have dealt with the question of peace and security in a material and nonmaterial way. Traditional or competitive nationalism after World War II was a growing concern for them, for they regarded it as a cause of war and a threat to peace. War remains the main source of threat to national security, but functionalists have found states less suitable to the task of ensuring security. States are competitive and prone to waging war. Specialized international agencies (such as the World Food Program, World Health Program, United Nations Development Program, and International Labor Organization), on the other hand, can satisfy social security needs through providing material and technical resources in specific areas. Such agencies work most effectively when their technical experts rely exclusively on their specialized knowledge without engaging in controversial aspects of governmental conduct. They carry out non-political tasks promoting international cooperation because they can learn to avoid or transcend politics by not working for their national governments. Welfare is seen as separable from power and can transgress politics or eventually transcend power.

Specialized agencies act with the consent of member states willing and continuously able to surrender parts of their sovereignty over time, but the process of sovereignty transfer takes place “through a function” instead of a formula and in the form of “a sharing of sovereignty” (Mitrany 1966: 31). This process of regional integration goes through multiple stages. Technical and economic cooperation in such areas as communication and transportation constitutes the first stage. Next is the need for functional coordination between or among specialized agencies, where it is possible for international cooperation to be institutionalized. Functional activities in the social and economic arenas are directed at solving practical issues shared only by agencies with common interests. Functional integration takes place through the process of “natural selection” that binds “together those interests which are common, where they are common, and to the extent to which they are common”

(*ibid.*: 69). Once they have joined a specialized agency, all member states operate on the principle of equality and mutual benefit; the new system “offers even to the weakest of countries the assurances of non-domination and of an equality of opportunity in the working benefits of any functional activity” (*ibid.*: 205). The final stage of regional integration involves the establishment of a supranational entity over time based on the gradual surrender of national sovereignty and a shift of loyalty from national to supranational.

This functionalist process is based on both voluntarism and pragmatism. Even the transfer of political authority from states to international functional organs should be “inconspicuous and partial” (Mitrany 1966: 66) and should “not offend the sentiment of nationality or the pride of sovereignty” (*ibid.*: 205). This process is based on the principle of state consent, allowing actors to pick and choose the agencies they wish to join and to develop their functional loyalties over time. Because the system is flexible or voluntary, it makes it easy for states to join or leave specialized agencies at will.

Functionalists thus reject any military, legalistic, or constitutionalist/federalist measures to bring nation states together, but advocate the establishment of specialized international agencies capable of providing services to peoples in need. Functionalist perspectives are based on the premise that international peace and cooperation are possible when functional activities are allowed to take their course without any structural (rule-based) constraints. They place their hopes on the process leading toward economic and political integration, counting first on specialized international agencies, as opposed to balance-of-power or collective security systems, and then on the initial process of functional cooperation leading to political supranationalism. Learning also can help people think in non-national or regional terms and reorient their thinking in ways that will lead to the performance of tasks for the benefit of all members.

Neo-functionalists argue, however, that functional activities alone will not produce supranationalism. Ernst Haas’ work departed not only from realism (especially its balance-of-power theory and its insistence that change is impossible) and idealism (based on the idea of peace through international justice) but also from functionalism. He emphasized regional rather than global integration and focused on institution building based on political initiatives (such as the establishment of the European Economic Community [EEC] and Euratom in January 1958). Neo-functionalists are considered federal functionalists because they stress political and legal institutions. Economic integration is a step toward supranationalism, but this process triggers political dynamics that deepen economic ties in need of further political integration. Neo-functionalists view political cooperation as the starting point by which economic integration can take place, whereas functionalists see the process in reverse.

There are at least two broad developments that can be observed when we track down the process of regional integration: regional community

formation and political amalgamation (Puchala 1970). A regional community forms when peoples of different states learn to trust one another and build mutual confidence, characterized by a declining number of disputes. If people enjoy better mutual understanding and attachment, they have fewer conflicts. An economic community is measured by such yardsticks as the increase of exchanges in goods and services and the disappearance of communications barriers. Growth in trade volumes over time shows that peoples have increasingly accepted each other's exports and view themselves as economic partners. A regional community begins with some kind of collective commitment on the part of its members to widening the market for producers (by removing barriers to trade) and to undertaking common economic policies leading to a customs union.

Unlike neo-liberal institutionalists, who stress the importance of economic interdependence and institution building, neo-functionalists are far more ambitious in that they see the possibility of states transcending nationalism through a shift of loyalty toward supranational organizations based on both the rule of law and the principle of majoritarian decision making. Once regional institutions are established, national elites will engage in the process of socialization. This attenuates their loyalty to the nation-state and deepens their interest in the process of supranational institution building.

Moreover, neo-functionalists stress the important role of consensual knowledge that helps state leaders discover their common interests. Scientific knowledge in particular can influence policy decision making. In Ernst Haas' words, "scientific knowledge will create a consensual basis for the recognition of new cause-effect links which had not been recognized before" (Haas 1975: 858–59). Also, according to Peter Haas (1992a&b), operating in an environment with growing uncertainties, policymakers are assumed to rely increasingly on technical experts for information and advice.

One neo-functionalism assumption is that state leaders are decision makers pursuing neither military security as realists assume, nor material wealth as liberals assume. States pursue policies in response to new knowledge. Policy decisions are made on the basis of what they know, but state leaders often do not know what to do in unfamiliar circumstances. Today's global problems have multiplied and area issues are becoming more closely interlinked and complex, thus limiting leaders' knowledge and requiring that they seek scientific information and advice to help guide their policy decisions. They do not always do as they should, however, and only when confronted with a crisis will they pursue new scientific knowledge to help them "overcome institutional inertia and habit to spur them to seek help from an epistemic community" (Haas 1992b: 14). This perspective also assumes that actors can become "perpetual learners."

An epistemic community is made up of experts, specialists, and scientists. Its members need not be natural scientists and may consist of social scientists or individual experts from any discipline or profession who have

sufficient bases of scientific or social knowledge respected and recognized by members of their communities or society at large. Ernst Haas defines epistemic communities in this way: they “are composed of professionals (usually recruited from several disciplines) who share a commitment to a common causal model and a common set of political values” (Haas 1990: 41). Such communities are similarly defined by Peter Haas (1992b: 3) as “network[s] of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area.”

Proponents of epistemic communities do not argue that experts must hold correct, objective, or universal worldviews (*epistemes*). In fact, groups of experts that form epistemic communities may be small in size and have worldviews that may not be shared by other groups or individuals within their society. While their consensual knowledge can have political and social influence on collective policymaking, experts “do not necessarily generate truth” (Haas 1992: 23). Still, the validity of epistemic communities’ scientific claims is possible only if they can reach consensus on ways in which problems can be resolved. If “scientific evidence is ambiguous and the experts themselves are split into contending factions, issues have tended to be resolved less on their technical merits than on their political ones” (ibid.: 11). According to both Adler and Haas (1992: 385), “[w]hen an epistemic community loses its consensus, its authority is diminished and decision-makers tend to pay less attention to its advice.”

Another assumption is that for such communities to have epistemic influence on the policy-making environment, they must gain access to political power. In some areas, such communities can frame and shape policy agendas. Epistemic communities are thus believed to have policy influence over governments because of their powerful knowledge, independent intellectual thinking, and access to power. Epistemic communities serve as “channels through which new ideas circulate from society to government as well as from country to country” (Haas 1992: 27). Members of such communities seek to make links between the efforts of national actors and state policies. They work with bureaucrats, but do not merely serve as policy entrepreneurs. They have causal beliefs and normative commitments to certain social goals, playing the role of advocates influencing specific policies through direct contact with top political leaders. During such social interactions, experts seek to present their worldviews to government officials who are supposedly susceptible to persuasion and good ideas and who “learn through the evolution of consensual knowledge” (ibid.: 30).

THE LIMITS OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN ASIA-PACIFIC

Functionalism and neo-functionalism have made intellectual inroads into the Asia-Pacific, although Ernst Haas considers this process Euro-centric,

and therefore neither universal nor applicable to other regions. Despite this opinion, during the 1970s, the Asia-Pacific region began to conform to a form of functionalism. After the mid-1980s, optimism about regional integration through economic cooperation became increasingly evident when Japan adopted a strategy toward building a regional economy in response to growing trade protectionism in the United States and Western Europe, the appreciation of the yen, and increasing costs of domestic production. Asian regionalism and regional integration began to grow economic roots. Scholars began to pay attention to growing levels of regionalization in the areas of trade, foreign investment, and production, which were seen as positive forces for regional integration.

Functionalists place emphasis on the role of specialized regional institutions as an important factor in the process of regional integration. International organizations such as the U.N. Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) were created to take initiatives on environmental protection. ESCAP created an Environmental Coordinating Unit in 1978 and started in 1985 to host the Ministerial Conference on Environment and Development, seen as “a milestone in Asian environmental cooperation.” The year 1991 saw the first Environment Congress for Asia and the Pacific. Banks played a primary role in the Asia-Pacific’s financial integration. Established in 1966, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) was the first regional institution in the financial sector and has now entertained the idea of creating a regional currency. Factors for economic integration have received growing attention, especially from economists and those who work for specialized institutions such as the ADB.

For functionalists, technical cooperation has had political spillover effects. One particular example given is the China Economic Area (CEA, including the mainland, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macao). Economic integration between China and Taiwan is probably the most integrated economy in the world. In the early 1980s, Taiwanese businesspeople knew nothing about investment in China, but they subsequently became a major source of foreign investment in the mainland by the end of the 1990s, behind only Hong Kong, the United States, and Japan. Integration between China and Taiwan seemed inevitable, since the two economies have become increasingly complementary to each other. In 1990, their economic and trade exchanges spilled over into other areas, such as culture (pop music, movies, novels, etc.), news media, tourism, and political openness. They sought a solution to repatriate immigrants illegally entering Taiwan, establishing more political institutions. President Lee Teng-hui, for instance, invited all political parties to send their representatives to help form the National Unification Council and enacted the National Unification Guidelines. China also established the Association for Relations across the Taiwan Strait. Rounds of negotiation began.

Neo-functionalism appears to explain institution building in the Asia-Pacific better than functionalism. Asian states have shown more willingness

to participate in international organizations: about 40 regional organizations with predominantly Asian membership have existed. Most were formed after 1960, and about half were formed after 1965. Michael Haas (1989: 11) points out that “during the 1960s, Asia saw such organizations increase at a faster rate than any other region in the world.” He goes so far as to make the claim that “Asian regional cooperation in some ways fulfills the goal of transnational integration more fully than does European regional cooperation, where motives have long taken precedence over community building” (ibid.: 287).

Michael Haas (1989: 148) regarded ASEAN as “the most impressive regional organization in Asia.” Although ASEAN abandoned its pan-Asian spirit from 1978 to 1988 (following the Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Cambodia until 1989), the regional group’s notable accomplishments include “peaceful methods to resolve conflicts.” The process of ASEAN integration began with the *de facto* Indonesian leadership of President Suharto, who developed a “good-neighbor” policy toward the region after he came to power. The ASEAN leaders then managed to build “political solidarity” on a variety of issues, recognizing the primacy of economics over politics, willing to handle their disputes through bilateral mechanisms in order “to ensure continued progress at economic cooperation” (ibid.: 19). Moreover, ASEAN’s political initiatives spilled over into other areas of regional cooperation (such as education), as well as a joint regional effort against transnational crimes and the growth of institutions such as the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Organizations (AIPO) and the Meeting of the Chiefs of National Police of the ASEAN countries (ASEANAPOL).

More recently, other scholars have adopted perspectives more closely associated with neo-functionalism, recognizing the limits of market-driven, informal integration, stressing the role of state policy and knowledge, and turning to the need for further institutionalization at the regional level. Scholars have looked at how policies among states converged and resulted in close cooperation among them. Some have developed the belief that a federation of states in Northeast Asia remains a possibility, where nation-states in the region cease to have a role or enter a state of suspended animation. Michio Morishima (2000), for instance, envisions a Northeast Asian Union (NEAU) coming out of a Northeast Asian Community (NEAC), similar to the way the European Economic Community (EEC) was transformed into the European Union (EU). Just as the EU would one day become the United States of Europe (USE), so also the NEAU would eventually emerge. As he forcefully puts it: “The era of nation states will have come to an end, and we will have embarked on an era of a much larger state, what would perhaps be called a United States of Northeast Asia” (ibid.: 144). He predicts, contrary to realist predictions, that states in Northeast Asia will become integrated into a regional federation: “Unity among the countries . . . would be realized. Unity would bring them peace, and they would become stronger

by helping each other" (*ibid.*: 163). Because the Japanese and Chinese economies, as well as those of other East-Asian states, have become increasingly complementary and dependent on each other, some economists make the case for broader regional integration. Since the early 2000s, the ASEAN vision for regional integration has expanded to include China, Japan, and South Korea in the form of "ASEAN Plus Three" (APT) (Hund 2003).

Neo-functionalists can also take heart from the fact that the ASEAN leaders have taken concrete steps toward building a regional community. ASEAN launched several economic integration initiatives, most notably the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), the ASEAN Investment Area (AIA), and the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services (AFAS). The ASEAN Economic Ministers institutionalized a High-Level Task Force (HLTF), which recommended the creation of a more effective dispute settlement mechanism (DSM), in addition to the adoption of the Protocol on Dispute Settlement Mechanism in 1996. On 7 October 2003, the ASEAN states agreed to establish an ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) by 2015. In 2008, the finance ministers from 13 Asian states met in Spain in an apparent joint search for a way to establish a common currency (an Asian Euro), and they agreed to create a pool of \$80 billion that could be used by those that need to protect their currencies. In 2009, they again agreed to commit \$120 billion to assist those member states facing financial challenges associated with the global economic downturn that began in 2008.

While functionalism and neo-functionalism have much to say about prospects for peace and security in East Asia, problems remain. There is no general consensus that the region is moving clearly in a functionalist or neo-functionalist direction. Regarding APEC, John Ravenhill (2002: 185) observes "[t]he unwillingness of APEC members to pool sovereignty made for a particularly weak set of rules, a Secretariat that was confined to secretarial activities, ineffective procedures for monitoring, and no mechanism for resolving disputes among member states." The regional institutions in the Asia-Pacific have "no supranational teeth" (Hund 2002). Major states, most notably China and Japan, still have competing visions for a future regional community. China wants to turn the ASEAN Plus Three into a regional community, but Japan wants to include other democracies, such as Australia, India, and New Zealand.

Even ASEAN still does not fit as a version of regional supranationalism: it remains "an association of sovereign states that have sacrificed no sovereignty for the collective good" (Weatherbee 2008: 304). In fact, "intra-ASEAN economic integration is [still] exceeded by the centrifugal pull of integration into the extraregional and globalized economies" (*ibid.*: 303). ASEAN is more institutionalized than APEC but still has no supranational body capable of settling disputes among member states. In 2004, ASEAN adopted the Protocol on

Enhanced Dispute Settlement Mechanism, but it remains to be seen whether this regional organization will be able to carry out its role effectively. The ASEAN Charter adopted in November 2007 seeks to institutionalize their cooperation, but it only states that appropriate settlement mechanisms for disputes among states shall be established and that any failure to reach a resolution will be referred to the ASEAN Summit. ASEAN, for instance, has proved unable to resolve the Cambodian-Thai dispute over the ancient temple Preah Vihear, around which thousands of troops from both sides were deployed. Thailand accused Cambodia of employing diplomatic guerrilla tactics to redraw their 800 kilometer joint border. The armed clash between the two states in 2008 left one Thai and three Cambodian soldiers dead and several others wounded. In 2009, they exchanged fire again, leaving two Thai soldiers dead and twelve wounded.

Even supranational institutions dealing with monetary and environmental issues remain non-existent. Edward Lincoln (2004: 195, 228) contends that "there is little evidence that any of the countries in the region would be willing to sacrifice control over their domestic monetary policies for the sake of reducing or eliminating fluctuations among their currencies." China and Japan continue to compete for regional currency leadership. Although Japan committed \$38.4 billion to the Chiang Mai Initiative in 2009 and China committed the same amount, they still disagreed on who should make the largest contribution, and each thought it should be the one to shoulder the greater responsibility. Both states have also sought to broaden the regional use of their own national currency. Although its policy efforts to turn its national currency into the regional one have over the past 20 years proved futile, Japan has never stopped trying. In 2009, for instance, Tokyo offered 6 trillion yen in loans (in addition to its commitment to the Chiang Mai Initiative) to financially stricken Asian countries in an attempt to push the yen over the Chinese yuan in Asia. China has used its currency to settle trade transactions with states in Southeast Asia and is reported to have considered setting up a common currency for the Asian region (Takano 2009). The term *environmental regionalism* has now been coined, but there has been no serious relinquishment of national sovereignty over environmental issues (Campbell 2005: 230).

Scholars have attributed the lack of integration to governments' rivalry and self-interest and argue that Asian politicians have done little to foster regionalism. Economic disparities among the states in this region remain wide: from Singapore's per-capita income of \$27,490 to Indonesia's \$1,280 and Cambodia's \$380. Regional integration may even cause these national disparities to widen. States continue to promote trade relations, but none wants to experience trade deficits. Japan has refused to open its agricultural markets to Asian trading partners and even imposed higher duties against exports from China, a highly competitive exporting state. According to some scholars (Aggarwal and Koo 2005: 207), even a Northeast Asian Free

Trade Agreement (not to mention regional integration) is unlikely due to “strong relative gains concerns” unless a Sino-Japanese alliance emerges. The process of institutionalization advocated by state leaders in the region also tends to be driven by the need of each major state to balance each other’s influence (Hund 2003).

Realists can still claim in rebuttal that there will be no Asian Maastricht in Southeast Asia, at least in the 2010s. Evidence shows that “many ordinary Southeast Asians are becoming more contemptuous of their fellow ASEAN members.” Japan “remains unconvinced about regionalism and the majority of ordinary Asians remain wary of stronger ties with their neighbors” (Kurlantzick 2001: 20). In addition, those states that have become more active in promoting Asian regionalism may have reasons other than their newly acquired knowledge of how to cooperate. Once a reluctant regionalist, China’s recent embrace of regionalism seems to have been highly motivated by the growing anti-U.S. sentiment of state leaders in the region (Pempel 2008: 573). Moreover, the process of regional economic integration in East Asia has been driven first by Japan’s rising economic power and subsequently by China’s growing economic power, but this process is still limited by Chinese nationalism today (Ahn 2004).

Regional integration still depends on democratic values states share. As John Gerard Ruggie and others (2005: 279) note, “under conditions of democracy and pluralistic interest representation, national governments will find themselves increasingly entangled in regional pressures and end up resolving their conflicts of interest by conceding a wide scope, and devolving more authority, to the regional organizations they have created.” The ASEAN principle of consensus has made it difficult for the member states, both democratic and non-democratic, to proceed with their collective vision for regional integration. Non-democratic states such as Myanmar and Vietnam, for instance, oppose the idea of a human rights commission. Although the commission was included in the ASEAN Charter adopted in 2007, it is unlikely to function effectively. The Chinese and Taiwanese economies are the most highly integrated in the world, but the Taiwanese show no sign of willingness to accept unification with China. Taiwan has clearly developed its own political identity. Chinese consciousness in Taiwan has weakened dramatically, while Taiwanese consciousness has grown strong since the early 1990s (after the process of democratization began in the late 1980s). The unification of these two Chinese states is thus more likely if China becomes a democracy.

The EU experience further suggests that regional integration is possible when its members are not only democratic, but also have two dominant democratic powers to provide regional leadership. According to Robert Gilpin (2000: 198), “The alliance between Germany and France has been crucial in propelling the movement toward European unity.” This point,

however, goes to show that regional integration may need democratic leadership. If there is a degree of regional integration in East Asia without any progress toward supranationalism, it may also have to do with the growing economic power of China but without its attractive democratic leadership. The Asia-Pacific has not seen joint regional leadership as the EU has; both China and Japan remain rivals.

THE ROLE OF EPISTEMIC COMMUNITIES IN ASIA-PACIFIC

Networks of academics and research institutes are said to play a crucial role in the process of institution building in the Asia-Pacific. Some scholars trace the process of networking among transnational actors as far back as the early 20th century. Ravenhill (1988) refers to the Pan-Pacific Union founded in 1917. After the death of the Union, other non-governmental groups emerged; some, such as the Pacific Science Association, remain active. The Pacific Trade and Development Conference (PAFTAD), the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC), and the Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC) are among the earlier institutions with long histories. The emergence of PAFTAD and PBEC in the mid-1960s had direct links to the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR), which came into existence in 1925 but ceased to exist in 1960. (During World War II, as many as thirteen national delegations consisting of academics, business people, labor leaders, former government officials, and active diplomats attended regular IPR conferences.)

Some scholars believe that we cannot fully understand recent regional economic cooperation without taking into account the intellectual role played by the aforementioned non-governmental actors (Harris 1995a: 268) and their capacity to promote international cooperation in the region. After being formally launched in 1968, for instance, PAFTAD sought to create a regional network for academics, predominantly economists, from around the world to help states coordinate and harmonize their economic policies. Although its intellectual agenda recognized the importance of intellectual diversity, it came under the influence of neo-liberal economic theory, especially trade liberalization. PBEC also emerged as an association of corporate executives seeking to promote the spirit of free enterprise and the role of market forces in economic development. PECC came into existence in 1980, as PAFTAD and PBEC sought to bring together representatives of the academic, business, and government sectors acting in their private capacities. Its role was to promote greater economic cooperation through consultation and the coordination of information in order to solve economic problems, reduce friction, and promote awareness of the growing interdependence of national economies. Academics not only conduct research, but also act as “intermediaries” or “brokers” who engage in projects aimed at providing findings, making them available to the policy community, and providing leverage on policy development and implementation

(Higgott 1992: 114). These actors are “sources of ideas, expertise, and historical memory and test-beds for cooperation” and “can have a significant influence on Track 1 (government institutions)” (Morrison 2004: 561–62).

Other regional epistemic communities have also played a crucial role in promoting security integration. Regional security institutions, such as the ARF, should be understood in the context of intellectual history. The Forum has two main tracks, one dominated by state leaders and the other by non-governmental groups involving academics, journalists, politicians, and government officials (usually from ministries of foreign affairs and sometimes from ministries of defense) attending dialogues in “unofficial” and “private” capacities. Dialogue channels include annual and bi-annual meetings, multiple-meeting workshops, and conference series. According to Brian Job (2003: 241), intellectuals, academics, and officials have over the past several decades formed a community that has been central to the building of economic and security structures in the Asia-Pacific and stresses that their “impact has been ideational.” Together they are known as members of regional epistemic communities (part of second-track diplomacy aimed at spreading security knowledge in the region).

First convened in 1994, the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) is perhaps the best-known regional security-related epistemic community regarded as “the most ambitious proposal to date for a regularized, focused, and inclusive non-governmental process on Pacific security matters” (Evans 1994: 125). This epistemic community’s role in second-track diplomacy was intended to link non-governmental organizations dealing with security questions and to help influence regional security dialogue among states in the Asia-Pacific (Kerr 1994; Evans 1994).

The impact of non-governmental institutions on policy communities remains open to debate, however (Morrison 2004). We still know little about the extent to which the learning process or cognitive change makes a significant difference. On security, it is far from clear that the national CSCAP of each country has become powerful enough to achieve its objectives. First, “the CSCAPs . . . have serious financial problems” (Simon 2002: 174) because they are voluntary organizations that must support themselves. Even the CSCAPs in wealthy countries, such as the one in the United States, face funding problems. Those unable to support their work have had to rely on government subsidies, which could neutralize their commitment to independent thinking.

Second, if CSCAP members have close ties with their own governments (especially in socialist states such as China, Laos, North Korea, and Vietnam) their activities may not generate innovative ideas and might even become pro-status quo or pro-government. For instance, all Working Groups (WGs), which in December 2004 were transformed into Study Groups (SGs), had members who were government officials, despite the fact that they were involved in private capacities. Even some non-government

members dismissed new ideas on the grounds that governments would not take them seriously. Third, security experts who had personal differences or engage in institutional rivalries with CSCAP members, such as those in Southeast Asian states, were excluded from discussions. CSCAP members themselves may become so comfortable with one another that they may be less inclined to innovative thinking. In the case of South Korea's CSCAP, a small group dominated and stifled the academic community. Fourth, "there is no guarantee of continuity," either (*ibid.*: 174): national delegations attending CSCAP meetings depend on funding, availability and their specific interests, which may be more different than similar.

Fifth, the work of CSCAP shows no deep impact on government policies. The Transnational Crime WG used to avoid raising sensitive issues that touch on states' domestic affairs. The Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBM) WG failed to convince ARF member states to establish a regional arms register. Only the U.N. Conventional Arms Register exists. The CSBM WG proved unable to provide a forum where nuclear energy users could talk to each other, and national navies in the region do not seem to have engaged in any confidence and security building. Simon Tay (2002: 181) approvingly cites Sam Bateman who argues that "[i]f regional navies engage in confidence—and security-building activities, they might be working themselves out of a job—and that they are not going to do." The Maritime Cooperation WG also found itself unable to get great powers committed to new maritime regulations. Washington remained concerned with freedom of navigation, whereas China was concerned with international involvement in territorial disputes over the South China Sea. According to Simon (2002: 190–91, 194), "the kind of maritime cooperation envisioned by the Maritime Cooperation WG [was] virtually non-existent in the Asia-Pacific. Even with respect to something as basic as search and rescue, there are no established multilateral procedures." Naval spending in the region has surged (largely due to perceived regional threats). As noted before, China continues to strengthen its naval forces and territorial disputes in the South China Sea show no real signs of settlement. The Study Groups that replaced the WGs have yet to prove they can now overcome past shortcomings.

Moreover, CSCAP has not dealt with internal security on a consistent basis and has not successfully addressed military buildups because of states' mutual suspicions. Simon (2002) contends that realist policies will persist despite CSCAP's efforts. Such multilateral institutions were only designed "to ameliorate the hard edges of security realism" through the diplomatic process of assurance and reassurance (*ibid.*: 171). Members of the epistemic community also acknowledge the limits of their role. Brian Job sees a positive role played by norm entrepreneurs in advancing security multilateralism in the Asia Pacific, but then regards the accomplishments as the product of other factors (both ideational and structural) and observes that defense spending in East Asia continues to rise as states continue to build

externally oriented weapons systems (Hartfiel and Job 2007). According to Ball and Taylor (2006: 283), the epistemic community has yet to persuade ARF members to give up the principle of non-interference in their domestic affairs and to give serious consideration to “the complex, consequential and potentially intrusive issues of arms control . . . and conflict resolution.” Job (2003: 275) shifts his attention to the role of civil society in shaping the future of Asia-Pacific security, but as noted elsewhere, this is unlikely to make a difference until more and more states become democratic and allow civil society actors to play a greater role.

Culturalism and Social Constructivism

Culturalism and social constructivism are two other knowledge-based perspectives relevant to Asia-Pacific security studies. Culturalism has gained some currency because its proponents tend to argue that regional integration depends very much on states' common cultural traditions. To be sure, culture matters, but it is not destiny, nor has it prevented states in the region from preparing for war against each other. Whether states in the Asia-Pacific will soon become a regional community based on their common cultural values or whether they will become a security community remains to be seen. China and other states with Confucian traditions have enjoyed growing trade relations, but they have so far failed to integrate themselves into a regional community. Arguing that we live in a world of our own making, some social constructivists are united by their questioning of realist and liberal assumptions. There is a variety of constructivist perspectives, including those who believe that state behavior can only be explained in cultural-historical terms and those who see potential in the process of security community building through socialization. Even ASEAN is not a regional security community; the key factors that make it a security community are still lacking.

CULTURALISM AND SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIVISM IN A NUTSHELL

The most controversial form of culturalism is one advanced most notably by Samuel Huntington (1996). For him, the presence of a common

cultural identity has become the main driving force for interstate cooperation, but different civilizations among states have become the main source of security concern. Anarchy still matters, but it does not drive states to behave competitively based on the clash of national interests.

Cultural identities, based on civilizations, are a key referent object of security. For Huntington, a civilization is “the broadest cultural entity . . . the biggest ‘we’ within which we feel culturally at home as distinguished from all the other ‘them’ out there” (Huntington 1996: 43). Peoples in various regions belong to eight different cultural or civilization identities (with common objective elements, such as language, history, religion, customs, institutions, and subjective self-identification) that clash with each other: Western, Orthodox, Chinese, Japanese, Muslim, Hindu, Latin American, and African. There is no such thing as a “world community” or “universal civilization,” and there will never be. The world will continue to contain different civilizations. Because cultural values are relative, they cannot be treated as universal, and cultures will not converge into one world culture or civilization, but will rather clash with each other.

Unlike realists, who contend that nation-states are in conflict (due to human nature, nationalism, and international anarchy), Huntington claims that civilizations are most likely to become the dominant source of future global conflict. Sources of conflict among states in different regions of the world in the coming decades will no longer be primarily among princes or nations as they once were, ideological (as evident in World War II when communism, fascism-Nazism, and liberal democracy clashed and throughout the Cold War period when communism clashed with liberal capitalism), or even economic. Differences in material power and struggles for military, economic, and institutional power will still be relevant, but differences in cultural values and beliefs are likely to become the dominant source of conflict. In the post-Cold War world, conflicts between different civilizations will become more pervasive, more dangerous, more frequent, more prone to escalation, more sustained, and even likely to lead to global wars.

A global inter-civilizational war is still improbable although not impossible. According to Huntington (1996: 321), “clashes of civilizations are the greatest threat to world peace.” The “fault lines” between civilizations now matter more significantly. He likens the clashes of civilizations to “tribal conflict on a global scale” (*ibid.*: 207). If there is a new world war, it is more likely to be one fought between civilizations, rather than between states pursuing material interests. States belonging to different civilizations will compete with each other by attempting to acquire wealth, technology, skills, machines, and weapons that are regarded as modern.

States that belong to the same civilization, however, are more likely to cooperate or even integrate themselves into a regional community, because “publics and statesmen are less likely to see threats emerging from people

they feel they understand and can trust because of shared language, religion, values, institutions, and culture" (Huntington 1996: 34). Military alliances are likely to be formed on the basis of common civilizations and are more likely to be in conflict with states belonging to different civilizations. Huntington, however, does not argue that states that share the same civilization have never experienced conflicts. Throughout history, Muslims, Christians, and Hindus fought among themselves; however, intra-civilizational conflicts tend to be less dangerous, less prone to escalation, and less likely to expand than inter-civilizational ones.

Huntington thus offers a prescription for future security policy actions. In the short term, he argues, states in the same civilization must promote greater cooperation and unity, seek to incorporate civilizations that are close to theirs, limit the expansion of other civilizations' military strength, exploit other civilizations' differences and conflicts, ensure moderation in their own conflicts, and maintain military superiority. In the long term, Huntington's clash-of-civilization thesis points to the need for identifying elements of commonality between different civilizations, and, as such, states in different civilizations must work to prevent inter-civilization wars. He does not, therefore, advocate a grand strategy for any civilization to impose its cultural values (such as the Western civilization based on liberal democracy) on any other civilizations.

For social constructivists, national security remains the key concept defined in social terms. Threats of war are real and do occur, but are socially constructed rather than natural or inherent in the structural condition of anarchy. Social constructivists do not deny the reality of relative material power among states, but they do contend that differences in material power can be a source of threat only when states regard each other as rivals or foes. Material capabilities alone are insufficient in explaining national interests or shaping perceptions of insecurity. Security dilemmas are not driven by nature or anarchy, but are based on competitive identities, interactions, and practices.

Security is what states make of it, following the logic that "anarchy is what states make of it" (Wendt 1992). According to Wendt, "[a]n anarchy of friends differs from one of enemies, one of self-help from one of collective security, and these are all constituted by structures of shared knowledge" (Wendt 1999: 423). Social constructivists believe in the power of ideas, principles, norms and identity, and the possibility of normative and identity change. Norms—defined by some as "collective expectations about proper behavior for a given identity"—can "define identities or prescribe or proscribe [regulate] behavior for already constituted identities" (Jepperson *et al.* 1996: 54).

Social constructivists stress the role of agency, including norm entrepreneurs. Cultural norms can guide state behavior, but are still subject to change. According to Wendt (2001: 1025), "As actors become socialized to norms, they make them part of their identity, and that identity in turn creates a collective interest in norms as ends in themselves. The result is internalized

self-restraint: actors follow norms not because it is in their self-interest, but because it is the right thing to do in their society.”

Other social constructivists stress the importance of cultural change. Some regard social progress in terms of “cognitive evolution” (Adler 1997: 342–43) and argue that peace can be socially constructed through learning. Others argue that *realpolitik* ideology and practice ought to be changeable when state agents engage in counter-*realpolitik* socialization. Persuasion and social influence can elicit pro-social behavior, and because actors are “social status maximizers,” they care about their social status, honor, and prestige. Social influence can promote pro-social behavior when it involves social rewards (which can be acquired psychologically from such things as backpatting) and sanctions or punishments (rooted in psychological anxiety from opprobrium). Membership size matters not as much as rationalists think: “More may be better. Status backpatting and opprobrium effects are likely to be stronger when the ‘audience’ or reference group is larger” (Johnston 2001: 512). Power asymmetries exist, but can also be “mediated” by democratic norms shared among equals (emphasizing persuasion, compromise, and the non-use of force) and democratic decision-making rules that “enable the community in the first place” (Risse-Kappen 1996: 397).

Social constructivists regard identity change from enmity to amity as possible. There are Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian cultures of anarchy in which states can exist, but states can get out of the Hobbesian culture and move toward first the Lockean and then the Kantian. In Hobbesian cultures, states treat one another as enemies whose ultimate goals are identical: self-survival or national security; they exist in the “state of nature,” in which the “war of all against all” applies; they follow the logic of “kill or be killed.” States are accustomed to thinking that war is “natural,” that power is what they aim to maximize, and that self-help is what international politics is all about. To survive, states must help themselves by way of balancing the threatening “others.”

States in Lockean cultures enjoy a more relaxed view of security; they regard each other as rivals. War is no longer considered “natural,” but something manageable. Two basic norms—self-help and mutual help—underpin Lockean anarchy. States recognize each other’s rights to sovereignty, which is viewed as “an intrinsic property of the state” and “an institution” that should not be taken away from each other (Wendt 1999: 280). By and large, states are status quo-oriented. Military power is still important and balancing behavior still exists as states remain self-interested individuals. But they also take into account additional mechanisms for national security. The concept of collective security based on international law is the key to understanding state behavior. Lockean societies are imperfect; states are still expected to use force, although they “do so within ‘let and let live’ limits” (ibid.: 281). The number of wars remains limited, wars of conquest have become rare, and the number of state deaths has been low.

States in Kantian cultures are more mature than their Lockean counterparts. International anarchy still exists, but states no longer regard one another as rivals. Their collective identity is defined in terms of friendship, which differs from alliance in Hobbesian terms, and is not simply built on a Leviathan but on “shared knowledge of each other’s peaceful intentions and behavior” (Wendt 1999: 299). Under Kantian anarchy, states see one another as true “friends” or real “team players” whose collective norms—namely, non-violence and altruism—guide their mutual relations. Conflicts among them can still arise; however, when they do, states resort not to violence or war (now considered illegitimate), but to peaceful methods of dispute settlement, including negotiation, arbitration, and adjudication. When threatened by an outside third party, states in Kantian cultures are expected to fight as a team. The durability of their friendships is greater than that of threat-specific military alliances found in Hobbesian cultures.

Enemy states in Kantian cultures can be socialized into becoming members of a “security community” defined as a “social structure . . . composed of shared knowledge in which states trust one another to resolve disputes without war” (*ibid.*: 418). Social constructivists thus tend to believe that the key to building “conditions of peace” is to construct security communities (Adler 2001; Adler and Barnett 1998) whose Kantian members develop dependable expectations for peaceful change. States need not be democratic as long as they learn to exercise self-restraint—“the ultimate basis for collective identity and friendship . . . rooted fundamentally not in acts of cooperation . . . but in respecting each other’s difference” (Wendt 1999: 360). They may retain a certain military capacity, but do not engage in war preparations, as realists assume.

CULTURALIST PERSPECTIVES ON SECURITY IN ASIA-PACIFIC

Foremost among culturalists is arguably Samuel Huntington who saw a coming clash between East and West. Asians will challenge Westerners because they believe that they have commonalities among themselves, that their economic development will surpass that of the latter, that their success is a product of their cultural superiority to the West, and that their cultural values are more universal than Western ones. “The mounting self-confidence of East Asia has given rise to an emerging Asian universalism comparable to that which has been characteristic of the West” (Huntington 1996: 109).

The degree of the Asian threat to the West, especially the United States, varies over time and from country to country. Huntington initially regarded Japan as posing a greater security threat because of its growing economic power. Cultural differences between the United States and Japan, for instance, exacerbated their economic conflicts. In the 1980s, the Japanese had achieved great economic growth, seen the decline of American economic and social systems, and become “convinced that the sources of their

success must lie within their own culture.” Japan began to distance itself from the United States and sought to identify itself with a general Asian culture. Americans had “more difficulty understanding Japanese thinking and behavior and more difficulty communicating with Japanese than they [had] with any other people” (Huntington 2001: 140). As a “lone” and “swing” state, Japan is free to conduct its foreign affairs and may align with China when and if the latter rises to be the region’s dominant power, and if the United States loses its dominant position within the international system.

Huntington (1996: 313–16) became less concerned about the threat of Japan and paid more attention to the most potentially dangerous conflict between the United States (the world’s only superpower) and China (the pre-eminent power in Asia). He envisioned the possibility of a region in which China would seek to dominate East Asia and threaten regional stability in the 21st century. A war would begin with China after Taiwan acknowledges Beijing’s suzerainty and after the United States has pulled its troops out of South Korea (following reunification with the North) and reduced its military presence in Japan. China would then want to control the South China Sea, which would lead to war with Vietnam. With a Vietnamese appeal for American assistance, the United States would intervene. China would send its army into Hanoi and occupy much of Vietnam. China would count on American reluctance to get involved in another Vietnam War. Nuclear standoffs between the two great powers would occur. Japan would soon abandon its neutrality and bandwagon with China against the United States. Muslim states (none of which is a self-declared nuclear power, except perhaps Pakistan) would acquire nuclear weapons and join China. China would score initial victories in East Asia but would frighten Russia, which would then move in an anti-China direction. The United States, its allies in Europe, Russia, and India would subsequently become “engaged in a truly global struggle against China, Japan, and most of Islam” (*ibid.*: 315). After much devastation, the center of power would shift from the North to the South (contrary to what happened in the past, when global power shifted from the East to the West). Countries relatively less devastated by the war, such as India and Indonesia (which would have abstained from the war), would be the beneficiaries and would then emerge as new great powers.

Huntington thus argued that Western states should avoid war with those in East Asia by not arrogantly imposing their cultural values on the latter. Cultural imperialism will not succeed; the Asian states that do not share Western liberal democratic values will react with resentment and hostility. What this means is that the United States should not intervene in any intra-civilizational conflicts, such as one between China and Taiwan or China and Vietnam, so that it can avoid a major inter-civilizational clash with China. Liberal democracy will not save the United States and Japan

from adopting a more confrontational policy in the future, either. To this extent, Huntington seeks to avoid inter-civilizational rather than prevent intra-civilizational conflict. Meanwhile, Western states should seek to limit the expansion of the military strength of Confucian states in Asia (as well as Islamic states), moderate the reduction of Western military capabilities, and even maintain military superiority in East and Southwest Asia.

Some in East Asia appear to have been inspired by Huntington's work. Recognized as "an Asian Toynbee," the "Max Weber of the new Confucian ethnic," and a first-rate essayist who launched an intellectual attack on universal civilization, Kishore Mahbubani (2001) in particular defends cultural relativism and contends that moral truths vary from culture to culture. While he agrees with Huntington on the importance of civilization as the main variable explaining international security in the post-Cold War period, the two seem to stress the issue of fear in opposite ways. Mahbubani tends to paint a grim picture of non-Western (especially Asian) states' fears of the cultural threat posed by the West; Asians fear Westerners' aggressive policy of promoting democratic and human rights worldwide, especially in their region. These policies have often aggravated turbulence in Asian societies and produced irrational consequences.

Both Huntington and Mahbubani (2001: 75, 79) call for "dialogue" among different cultures to find "some credible middle ground" leading to "the process of mental emancipation" based on the principle of "live and let live." "The future will be marked by a two-way street in the flow of ideas, values and people" (*ibid.*: 111). And "while Western ideas and best practices have found their way into the minds of all men, the hearts and souls of other civilizations remain intact. There are deep reservoirs of spiritual and cultural strength which have not been affected by the Western veneer that has been spread over many other societies" (*ibid.*: 112). Western societies would then continue to be transformed by good minds from other cultures and witness a cosmopolitan community, where a new international civilization based on the integration of the best from all streams of mankind emerges (*ibid.*: 115).

David Kang has also sought to challenge realism by contending that states with cultural similarities like Japan, the Koreas, and Vietnam are likely to bandwagon with China. This perspective rests on the assumption that the preponderant state in the international system does not need to fight lesser or smaller states, because the latter may decide that it is futile to balance against the preponderant state and that it will be more beneficial to jump on the preponderant state's bandwagon. Kang sees East Asia as prone to becoming stable because a hierarchic system is emerging in the region, with China recognized as the preponderant state. He uses Asian history from 1300 to 1900, as well as contemporary examples to prove that a Sino-centric regional system provides stability. States in the region have not balanced China's growing power. Even Japan "has no intention of

challenging China for the central position in Asian politics,” but “has a view that accepts China as big and central” (Kang 2003: 177). Although Japan has the material capability to transform itself into a “normal” great power, it has not yet done so. Examples of how states have deferred to China also include Korea and Vietnam. The Koreans and Vietnamese accept China’s central position, even though they should be the most fearful of China due to past invasions of their countries.

There are still several weaknesses in these culturalist perspectives on security, however. First, it is questionable whether most states in East Asia would defer to China, because they do not belong to one civilization. China (based on Confucianism), Indonesia (Islam), and Japan (with its own culture), if Huntington is correct, are three separate civilizations. Moreover, some scholars who have studied China’s strategic culture do not believe that China can become pacific. Based on a case examining China’s Ming period (1368–1644), Alastair Iain Johnston (1995) challenges the conventional wisdom that its traditional strategic thought is uniquely anti-militaristic. He contends that “cultural realism” shows the persistence of *realpolitik* in China’s strategic culture, which has become more dominant and has a nontrivial effect on strategic choice, primarily because of its emphasis on the use of force as the best way of eliminating security threats. This preference is also tempered by an explicit sensitivity to one’s relative capacity to act against the enemy. Chinese leaders tend to act in a more offensive, coercive manner when the capacity of the enemy to threaten their national security is low and when their capacity to mobilize military resources is high. In contrast, Japan is said to have developed a distinct national culture of anti-militarism (Berger 1998), but there is no historical reason to believe Japan would be willing to defer to China, having defeated the latter in 1895 and waged war against it again from the early 1930s to 1945.

Second, culture alone cannot explain why states in the region are unlikely to bandwagon with China, as they did in the past when most of them were still weak. When it grew powerful as a state in the late 19th century, Japan rose against China. Culture also cannot explain why the United States has maintained bilateral security alliances with Japan and South Korea, while the two Asian allies, belonging to civilizations that have more similarities than differences, remain mutually suspicious, and have not formed a bilateral alliance (though they are American allies). If culture is the key determinant, we should have now seen the gradual emergence of a Sino-centric strategic military alliance made up of China, Taiwan, Vietnam, and Singapore after the Cold War. China has so far been unable to establish such a military alliance.

Third, cultures are also changeable and therefore indeterminate. If China’s *parabellum* paradigm is indeed cultural and hence historically contingent, it can always be transformed—albeit slowly. According to Johnston (1995: 1),

“[i]f strategic culture does change, it does so slowly, lagging behind changes in ‘objective’ conditions.” Berger also acknowledges that cultures “can and do change, but usually they do so in an evolutionary fashion. Dramatic change only occurs when the type of behavior that a culture produces no longer meets its basic needs” (Berger 1998: 329).

Fourth, China and Taiwan may share similar cultural values and traditions, but their political cultures have grown divergent (Chao 2003). The gradual integration of the two economies does not close the widening gap of their political differences or the minds of the two peoples. According to Chao, “the mood for unification on Taiwan’s side of the Strait has dropped a gigantic 50% in the past decade,” whereas “[t]he number of Taiwanese with a negative perception toward bilateral relations has tripled” and “the percentage of those who would identify themselves as ‘Taiwanese’ has ballooned from less than 20% to close to 50%” (ibid.: 289). The shared identity between the two peoples has become less evident, as they “are . . . detached from each other” (ibid.: 291) and have divergent identities, as well as different strategies for economic development. The Taiwanese belong to multiethnic groups with Chinese and Japanese colonial experiences, have grown accustomed to a Western style based on liberalism, and have difficulty with a type of bargaining style based on China’s “culture of neo-collective nationalism” in which collectivism and nationalism are equally valued but different from the Western experience. Taiwanese people start with more negotiable issues at the exclusion of tough political disagreements, whereas Chinese want to do things differently. Now a democracy, Taiwan not only differs with China on issues related to sovereignty and representation, but also has developed different interpretations of democratic and human rights. The Taiwanese have adopted Western-style democratic values and experienced a growth of full-fledged civil society based on the liberal concept of individualism, whereas China has a legacy of socialist ideology. After a regime transition in the late 1980s, their political cultures “have been growing increasingly discordant” (ibid.: 284).

Fifth, culturalists still subscribe to essentialism. Mahbubani (2001: 61), for instance, concedes that people cannot be bound by moral principles. In his words, “Power proves to be a great aphrodisiac. Both politicians and journalists have equal difficulty resisting the temptations that flow their way.” He cites Lord Acton’s famous axiom: “power corrupts. The absolute power of the Western journalist in the Third World corrupts absolutely” (ibid.: 162). Moreover, “soft power” (such as culture and ideology) still depends on “hard power” (such as economic, technological, and military capabilities). Huntington notes that “[s]oft power is power only when it rests on a foundation of hard power. Increases in hard economic and military power produce enhanced self-confidence, arrogance, and belief in the superiority of one’s own culture or soft power compared to those of other

peoples and greatly increases its attractiveness to other peoples" (Huntington 1996: 92). Hard power thus remains the key variable.

SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIVIST PERSPECTIVES ON ASIA-PACIFIC

Social constructivists studying the Asia-Pacific also go beyond realism and liberalism. They have sought to rely on cultural factors in their attempts to shed light on the national security problems that persist in the Asia-Pacific after the Cold War. Alexander Wendt (1998: 418), for instance, asks why "500 British nuclear weapons are less threatening to the United States than 5 North Korean nuclear weapons." This question is a challenge to political realism, whose explanation (based primarily on material factors) becomes indefensible when the military power of North Korea—regarded as a far greater threat to U.S. national security than Britain—is known to be far inferior to that of Britain.

Constructivists do not necessarily share other progressive views of human affairs, such as commercial and democratic liberalisms. Thomas Berger, for instance, refers to the "clash of nationalism" on the Korean Peninsula and in the Straits of Taiwan and the negative "impact of historical memory" on the relationships between Korea and Japan, which have not promoted closer bilateral ties despite their shared perception of a common threat during the Cold War and from North Korea, as well as between the United States and Japan (Berger 2003: 402–03). Berger cites examples of volatile relations between the two industrialized states and liberal democracies in Northeast Asia, namely, Japan and South Korea. States have also engaged in military alliances, but in ways that differ from realist predictions. The roots of conflict among states result from non-material factors found in historical legacies (past animosities and current suspicions), frustrated nationalism, distinct conceptions of national identity, and differing understandings of the national mission in foreign affairs. Racial and ethnic hatreds have also contributed to instability in the region (Berger 2000).

Thomas Berger (1998), Peter Katzenstein, and Nobuo Okawara (1993) also devote considerable attention to the domestic structure of Japan and the role of norms and ideas in politics, which help explain why states in the Asia-Pacific do not behave like those in Europe. Japan's domestic political structures matter because they have made it virtually impossible for the military establishment, which had enjoyed a powerful role until the end of World War II, to re-emerge and dominate the political decision-making process. The Japanese system of government consists of various institutional procedures that circumscribe military professionals' access to the centers of political power. Civilian control over the military establishment remains tight. There is also a strong bias against any military interpretation of security matters. The military system as a whole remains institutionally

underdeveloped; it lacks mobilization plans, a military court system, emergency legislation, a civil defense system, and rules for engaging the enemy. Japanese public attitudes toward security matters have further reinforced a culture of antimilitarism; they prefer passive stances over active ones. The overwhelming majority of Japanese does not feel threatened by Russia, favoring instead peaceful diplomacy, and a low-key consensus approach, and does not think very highly of the military establishment. Japanese pacifism defined in terms of support for minimal defense remains in line with the government's interpretation of the meaning of Article 9 of the Constitution, which the Japanese public has so far refused to amend.

Social constructivists regard socialization as capable of transforming cultural behavior (Johnston and Evans 1999; Ba 2006). Johnston tested the effect of socialization on state behavior using the ARF as his focus of analysis. Member states have developed "habits of cooperation" either through persuasive arguments that institutions matter or through social backpatting. One of the best examples of how states' interests changed through participation in the ARF social framework is China. According to Johnston, before joining the ARF China had not been aware of "what its interests were on many regional security issues, having never had to do the research on things such as transparency, military observers, CBMs, and preventive diplomacy" and was highly skeptical of such multilateral mechanisms (Johnston 2003). Its deep *realpolitik* assumptions provided the main ideological force. But the ARF consensus rule attracted China, which joined the Forum in 1994. Since then "there has [sic] been some noticeable changes in the discourse" (ibid.: 127). After the mid-1990s, Chinese officials involved in ARF activities began to articulate non-*realpolitik* concepts within the framework of multilateralism, such as common security and mutual security (a win-win rather than zero-sum game). Chinese officials learned to accept certain things, such as the Western concept of common security, of which they had previously been skeptical. Moreover, there have been increasing levels of Chinese "comfort" with the ARF's more institutionalized features and intrusive agenda over time" (ibid.: 134). The Chinese position—on preventive diplomacy, on its sovereignty claims over all the South China Sea islands, and on the need for intrusive CBMs—has become more positive. David Shambaugh (2004/05: 77) further argues that Chinese elites have participated in multilateral institutions, and that this shift had less to do with its "charm offensive" but more to do with their evolving desire to comply with international norms.

Overall, according to social constructivists, this policy progress resulted from Chinese officials' socialization within the ARF framework, which turned them into proto-multilateralists. China has not received any exogenous side payments or threats. It has not made a deceptive effort to exploit other states' cooperation, received new information, and become concerned

with its short-term reputation (as neo-liberal institutionalists would suggest). Nor has it used the ARF to constrain the United States (as political realists tend to think). Alice Ba even questions whether powerful states matter much when it comes to making the process of socialization work. In her view, ASEAN as a group of small powers have proved effective in socializing China through a persuasion strategy based on a deliberative/interactive rather than didactic/unidirectional process (Ba 2006).

Amitav Acharya (2001a) further points out that ASEAN had by the early 1990s already emerged as a “nascent security community” ASEAN’s reliance on norms for collective action and its identity-building initiatives gave rise to security-community building in the region. The ASEAN norms are both legal-rational (non-use of force, non-interference, regional autonomy, and avoidance of military pacts) and socio-cultural (consultations and consensus and a preference for informality over legalistic mechanisms). ASEAN member states’ behaviors were generally norm-consistent. The statist norms of non-interference and non-use of force in the “ASEAN Way” have been practiced and found their way into the creation of the ARF.

Acharya’s constructivist thinking shows that peaceful interaction remains his key variable, but this process does not occur in an ideological vacuum. Liberal ideology also matters in shaping ASEAN collective identity. Once built, collective identity may be durable, even in the absence of a shared threat. This helps explain why he anticipates the day when *realpolitik* will be buried for good. ASEAN sought “to use multilateralism to moderate and maintain a stable balance of power” and saw “multilateralism not as a substitute for U.S. military supremacy and its bilateral alliances, but as a necessary complement to the latter” (Acharya 2001a: 182). Multilateral dialogues were regarded as a strategy that could supplement a balance-of-power approach. In the short term, multilateralism “may help shape the balance of power by providing norms of restraint and avenues of confidence building among the major powers.” In the long term, “it may even enable states to transcend the balance of power approach” (ibid.: 184).

Nevertheless, constructivism remains inadequate as a coherent theoretical approach. First, this approach tends to exaggerate the positive process of normative change and ignores the potential for normative reversal. In the Asia-Pacific, there is insufficient evidence that the process of policy change based on new positive norms has effectively turned “bad apples” (such as some ARF members like North Korea and Myanmar) into good ones. China and ASEAN signed a Declaration of Conduct in 2002 with the aim of resolving their disputes through friendly consultations, negotiations, self-restraint, and joint exploration, but they have never conducted any joint exploration. The ARF norms associated with preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution have not led to an end of minority conflicts in the southern Philippines or southern Thailand, either. The cultural norm of informal consensus has not been widely practiced in Asia, nor is it unique to this

region. As noted earlier, the Concert of Europe also practiced this norm, but then later ceased to exist, especially when the Concert collapsed.

Moreover, if cultural norms are subject to change, there is nothing to prevent good norms from turning into bad ones, either. Japan, for instance, has slowly reversed its culture of anti-militarism. On 9 January 2007, its Defense Agency (subordinated to the Cabinet Office) was finally upgraded to a full-fledged ministry of defense. Thomas Berger's writings further reveal that structural factors matter far more significantly than history and culture alone. When faced with an aggressor, he predicts, Japan would first seek to appease its aggression, but would then look to the United States if this policy failed. In the back of the Japanese mind, the United States remains the final source of assurance. Japanese antimilitarism is thus not a *fait accompli*; it does not rest on the absolute guarantee that it will never degenerate. In his words, antimilitarism is likely to erode "if the United States allows the Cold War alliance structures to decay" (Berger 1998: 210). Japan would then be compelled to consider a dramatic expansion of its military capabilities, including the acquisition of nuclear weapons.

Second, constructivism tends to overestimate the positive power of socialization. If ASEAN states have since the early 1990s formed a nascent security community, the question is: does this mean they are no longer prepared for war against each other and are now ready to respond collectively to extra-regional threats? The Cambodian-Thai armed clashes near Preah Vihear Temple in 2008 and 2009 in particular would appear to contradict the expectation that the two ASEAN states became members of a security community. After the border clashes, Cambodia decided to increase its defense spending. This does not constitute a war, but neither does it make ASEAN a regional security community. Moreover, few of the ASEAN members, if any, have proved willing to lend diplomatic, political, and military support to another fellow member in the event of a Chinese threat to its interests, such as offshore exploration. The regional group has yet to present a united stand against such a Chinese threat (Weatherbee 2008: 127). Moreover, the unconditional strategies of economic engagement on the Korean Peninsula and across the Taiwan Strait have so far produced few tangible results (Kahler and Kastner 2006). As a democracy that can easily come under domestic attack when its policies produce no immediate payoffs, South Korea finds it difficult to sustain its strategy to transform North Korea, which can effectively adopt countermeasures like "fencing off" the benefits of economic integration (*ibid.*: 538).

Third, constructivism tends to underestimate material power. The "ASEAN Way" has some obvious limits. For instance, Carolina Hernandez (2000: 116) acknowledges that states in Southeast Asia have historically relied on "the U.S. military presence as a positive factor for regional stability." The thesis that small powers can persuade great powers like China to

play a cooperative role sheds some light on interstate relations in the Asia-Pacific, but its limits are also evident. It is still far from clear why ASEAN as a group of small and middle powers should be able to persuade China to adopt the policy of cooperation, when it is unable to persuade two of its members—Cambodia and Thailand—to avoid turning their border disputes into armed clashes. Ba (2006) also does not tell us how exactly the ASEAN Way of socialization can lead states in the region to build a stable regional security community. There are no doubt positive developments in Sino-ASEAN relations, but Ba remains rather cautious. In her words, “conclusions about the future of Sino-ASEAN at this stage can be only tentative” and territorial issues “may be non-negotiable” (*ibid.*: 175). Ba (2003) also seems to suggest that the regional institutions are simply an instrument through which China might exert its regional leadership. Studies on multilateralism in Chinese foreign policy further show the limits of socialization with military and security officials. The number of officials who internalized new norms of multilateralism remains small, confined only to civilians within China’s Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation and Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They have also struggled with other key ministries that champion strong protectionism and advocate the policy need to strengthen China’s military capabilities (Wang 2000; Shambaugh 1999/2000). It is worth adding that the People’s Liberation Army in particular seems to have embraced conservative nationalism, “seeking a gradual consolidation of . . . comprehensive national power” (Flanagan and Marti 2003: 9). Within the military establishment, liberal institutionalist voices advocating multilateralism and peaceful resolution of disputes can still be heard, but “conservative nationalism is the dominant paradigm” (*ibid.*: 9).

Post-Marxism and Postmodernism

Two other important knowledge-based theoretical perspectives on security are post-Marxism and postmodernism. Both are also more radical than social constructivism because of their “common ancestry in the Hegelian-Marxist tradition” (Wyn Jones 2001: 5). Post-Marxism can be traced back to the works by the founding fathers of the Frankfurt School and the Italian neo-Marxist Antonio Gramsci. Postmodernists question realist pessimism and liberal as well as socialist optimism. Scholars have applied these two theoretical perspectives to the Asia-Pacific. Post-Marxists take cultural knowledge into account but identify it as an ideology advanced by political and economic elites to maintain their hegemonic domination over less powerful states and social classes. They advocate the politics of emancipation through critical social movement against hegemonic powers in the region. Postmodernism has also permeated the study of security in the region since the early 1990s. Like the other theoretical perspectives discussed so far, these two perspectives have their strengths and weaknesses.

POST-MARXISM AND POSTMODERNISM IN A NUTSHELL

Post-Marxism has deep intellectual roots in the Marxist tradition, as evident by its assertion that Karl Marx’s class analysis “obscured other forms of social exclusion and systematic harm” (Linklater 2001: 136). Emancipationists agree that the state is not the referent object of security, but they do not accept Marx’s proletariat as the only class in need of

protection or security. Anti-capitalist but still class-conscious, they make individual human beings their referent object of security. Ken Booth (1991: 319), for instance, argues against state-centrism in favor of “individual humans as the ultimate referent” and contends that scholars should focus their attention on “real people in real places” (Booth 1995: 123). According to Wyn Jones (1999: 115), “for Horkheimer—as for Booth—the individual is always the ultimate referent for critical theory.”

Emancipationists have adopted the concept of human security (Bakker and Gill 2003; Burke 2001, 2006; Linklater 2005; Thomas 2001). They do not deny the relevance of classes, the state or any other collectivities, but believe individual human beings—particularly the poor, the disadvantaged, the voiceless, the powerless, and the underrepresented—should be regarded as the ultimate referent in security analysis. They view women and other oppressed or subordinated groups (including workers, peasants, and minority groups) to be part of the referent object of security.

Sources of threat to human beings include war, exploitation, unemployment, and other unmet human needs. War is not the phenomenon that political realists see, but results from the neo-liberal disciplinarian hegemon ruled by elites and large capital seeking to police and extend neo-liberal globalization and to discipline those that resist the global pro-market process. Neo-liberal globalism prioritizes and privileges the security and rights of large capital and a minority of beneficiaries, such as elites, ruling classes, plutocrats, and members of the aristocracy. At the same time, it ignores the security for the largest majority of humankind (Bakker and Gill 2003).

New-generation emancipationists locate new sites of emancipatory potential. According to Ken Booth (1991: 319), “[e]mancipation is the freeing of people (as individuals and groups) from those physical and human constraints which stop them carrying out what they would freely choose to do.” He then adds that “[w]ar and the threat of war [are] those constraints, together with poverty, poor education, political oppression, and so on. Security and emancipation are two sides of the same coin.” For Caroline Thomas (2001: 162), “[e]mancipation from oppressive structures, be they global, national or local in origin and scope, is necessary for security.”

Emancipationists are skeptical of the capitalist state’s role in security as it remains a limited moral community—limited because it perpetuates social exclusion, injustice, insecurity, and violence between sovereign territorial states. Capitalist structures are dominated by national political and economic elites interested mainly in maintaining the structure of domination through coercive and ideological means.

International institutions that exist today do not promote social justice, either. Their neo-liberal agenda serves the “big-power management of the international system” and “takes the existing order as given, as something to be made to work more smoothly, not as something to be criticized and changed” (Cox 1992: 173). Institutions in any hegemonic order are useful

to the extent that they seek to stabilize the global economy while perpetuating global insecurity. There is a need to shift the problem of changing world order back from international institutions to national societies.

Emancipationists have a normative commitment to changing the existing unjust capitalist world order. Some envisage *a just world order* free of structural domination—a post-hegemonic multilateral world based on greater diffusion of power among states, greater social equity, protection of the biosphere, moderation, and nonviolence in dealing with conflict, and mutual recognition of different civilizations. Robert Cox (2000: 33), for instance, argues in defense of peaceful coexistence among civilizations through a plural world order based on mutual understanding that allows them to find “common ground as a basis for some degree of universality within a world of differences.” Other emancipationists like Andrew Linklater (1998) further propose a “practical project” for extending a “universal dialogue community” beyond the nation-state, a community that is universal but more sensitive to cultural diversity and based on greater material equality. He also advocates an “ideal security community” (Linklater 2005).

Emancipationists basically do not disregard all types of states, either. Robert Cox considers states in the Third World as potential candidates for a counter-hegemonic coalition capable of working to undermine the dominance of states in the metropole. The state can also become the regulator and legitimator, but its role has to be based on a radical reorientation of social values and a new concept of social economy. It must play the role that would prevent environmental degradation and seek to meet human needs, such as health, education, child and elder care, and conviviality (Cox 2000).

Emancipationists count on social actors as agents of change. For Gramsci, the working class must follow the “Modern Prince”—the Communist Party that can lead an alternative “intellectual moral bloc” in its mission to build an emancipated society. Neo-Gramscian theorists, however, downplay the traditional anti-systemic movements, such as workers’ parties and trade unions, and include other social actors, such as non-governmental organizations and new social movements (including environmental, feminist, peace, and “people power” movements, which are seen to be capable of exposing the contradictions within modern societies). Old and new social movements make up “the counter-hegemonic alliance of forces on the world scale” (Cox 1999: 13). Emancipationists do not “direct and instruct those movements with which they are aligned; instead, the relationship is reciprocal” (Wyn Jones 1999: 162). Only global civil society can serve as the key site for change in inter-subjectivity and for emancipation, but its effectiveness “depends on the degree of civic solidarity.”

The tasks of emancipation include providing a new vision of social economy, “re-educating societies toward a different mode of consumption and production” (Cox 2000: 35), and building a “global civil society” as a basis for a new world order (Cox 1999). The role of emancipationists

includes raising awareness that nothing is immutable, as well as denaturalizing what is regarded as natural. This involves the building of a new “historic bloc” that would serve as the agent of change. They also advocate “a war of position” through the slow and patient construction of social foundations by creating alternative institutions and intellectual resources.

Postmodernists generally reject any emancipatory mission to build a just world order based on common ground (as post-Marxists advocate) or universalism that does not celebrate cultural diversity. For some, states seek to secure their national identity (Campbell 1992); for others, humans remain the key referent object for security. The pursuit of national security renders people insecure: “national security is perhaps the easiest rationale available to any regime wishing to engage in internal repression or establish more effective curbs on democracy” (ibid.: 37). Walker argues for “a clearer sense of what it means to have security for *all people* rather than the national security that now renders everyone increasingly insecure” (ibid.: 6).

Sources of insecurity are multiple. They include not only military threats but also violence, repression, poverty, environmental degradation, technological disaster, and cultures of alienation, all rooted in modern state structures. Modernism is characterized by scientific knowledge, nationalism, universalism, and grand theory; yet it also belongs to a period that has witnessed endless barbarian acts. Scientific knowledge as power is exclusionary; it ignores identity issues related to ethics, race, gender, and sexuality. Modernism has produced totalizing ideologies such as nationalism, Nazism, Marxism, and Liberalism, which advocate universalism, absolute truth, and conformity. These ideologies facilitated the commitment of systematic near-genocidal atrocities. Jim George (1994: 159) contends that “the rationality of the Enlightenment . . . is always . . . the power and domination of (for instance) the Western imperialist, the Stalinist apparatchik, the Modernization Theorist, the Cold War technician and nuclear strategist, the (humanist) agent of power politics.” For Simon Dalby (1997: 20), the perpetuation of the modern order threatens security, which is “premised on the particular model of understanding international politics that has so often supported hegemonic policies.”

The sovereign modern state, which possesses a monopoly on the legitimate use of national force, cannot be counted on to provide for security. Robert Walker (1988: 121) notes that “the state itself, far from being the provider of security as in the conventional view, has in many ways been a primary source of insecurity.” State elites build national identities by identifying or constructing others as different and dangerous and therefore as threats (Campbell 1992). For Bradley Klein (1994: 38), “states rely upon violence to constitute themselves *as states*,” to protect borders, and to “impose differentiations between the internal and external.” From his perspective, “a critical account of war and military strategy requires analysis of the constitutive role of violence in the making of states that act strategically upon the world,”

involving “discourses of violence by which military practices are embedded and legitimated within the texture of modern life” (*ibid.*). Statism as a political ideology seeks to defend the modern norm of state sovereignty, which involves “strategic violence” regarded as “an ongoing process of defining state boundaries, excluding that which differs from its domains, and punishing those who would challenge it” (*ibid.*: 7). Similarly, Simon Dalby regards sovereign states as “the threat to people in need of security” or as “frequently the source of insecurity” (2007: 256, 259) and contends that “security forces are the greatest threat to the population that neorealist theory assumes they are protecting” (1997: 23).

Postmodernist optimism lies in the promise of postmodern states (Cooper 2002) or a postmodern world constructed by global social movements or the global multitude (a new proletariat or a “network body” made up of social groups capable of opposing war) (Hardt and Negri 2006: 90–91). Postmodern states differ from pre-modern ones, which are considered “failed” or chaotic, and from modern states, which are stable but remain dangerous to each other because they operate on the principles of empire and the supremacy of national interest. Postmodern states remain national, but are both post-industrial and de-territorialized; they also allow mutual interference in each other’s national affairs, reject the use of force for resolving national disputes, and ensure their security on the basis of transparency, mutual openness, interdependence, and mutual vulnerability. Global social movements (especially critical ones that are not nationalist, deeply reactionary, parochial, or subject to cooptation by elites) do not seek to seize state power or get involved in normal activism, but actively engage in the politics of protest against neo-liberalization, dissent, and resistance in order to make the exercise of state power less pernicious and to interrogate contemporary capitalism. These global social movements must “carry the seeds of new understandings of what it means to be secure . . .” and possess non-hegemonic knowledge that “grows out of the ongoing practices of people everywhere” (Walker 1988: 6, 7). Walker (1988: 89), for instance, argues that “dominant powers are never omnipotent; if they have to rely on force alone, then their strength is brittle, subject to fatigue and unexpected fracture.”

A just world peace—the opposite not only of war between states but also of global injustice—is possible. This peace results from demilitarization in security provisions based on compassion, caring, and celebration of diversity rather than fears of difference. For Walker, the peace “must be rooted in an equal respect for the claims of both diversity and unity” (Walker 1988: 5). The global justice movement also proclaims the new gospel that “another world is possible”—a world where a new diverse and potent global multitude armed with biopolitical power can defeat armies of empire and forge a democratic alternative, as old-style imperialism is no longer effective and global capitalism contains the seeds of self-destruction (Hardt and Negri 2006).

But there is no linear progress toward a just world peace, and there is always uncertainty. For Walker, “The real source of hope embodied in critical social movements does not . . . lie in any clear vision” (Walker 1988: 80). They “are now particularly important sources of insight into the nature and possibilities of a just world peace” (*ibid.*: 2). Critical social movements “may fail and fade away. Sometimes they are crushed. They struggle against powerful forces, yet they are a source of optimism” (*ibid.*: 80).

POST-MARXIST PERSPECTIVES ON SECURITY IN ASIA-PACIFIC

According to emancipationists working on security in the Asia-Pacific, the region has become increasingly fertile ground for their perspectives. People in the region have suffered from insecurity rooted in socio-economic inequalities and state oppression.

In spite of the spectacular economic growth in East Asia in recent decades, the gap has grown between urban and rural dwellers after the liberal reform process began, especially since the mid-1980 integration of the Chinese economy into the global economy. The globalization requirement for efficiency left as many as 140 million rural laborers without work for most of the year. The rise of individualism associated with neo-liberalization has also hurt the provision of health, education, and welfare services.

Emancipationists point to the financial crises that have affected millions of lives in East Asia. Market forces, especially financial markets, have a propensity for manias, panics, and crashes. As recently as the late 1990s, a financial crisis started in Thailand and then spread to other countries in the region. According to Stephen Gill (2000: 56), “This brought economic misery to the vast majority of the populations of these countries and caused large numbers of bankruptcies, especially among small businesses.” He refers to the economic crisis in Indonesia, where in the second half of 1998 “over half of the population . . . had barely enough money to obtain one meal a day.” Also according to Mark Beeson (2007: 64), “the East Asian crisis not only undermined the governments in Indonesia, Thailand, and South Korea, but also dramatically impacted general human security as unemployment and the cost of living rose in the affected countries.”

Emancipationists blame the global capitalist economy for national and human insecurity. Beeson, for instance, regards “the introduction of capitalist production structures and social relations into East Asia” as “a security threat of the first order.” The expanding global capitalist economy led to “the breakdown of older social orders and the downfall of the political elites that dominated them.” It also put the countries of East Asia “on the front line of the Cold War,” and allowed the United States to turn “a blind eye to the mercantilist, authoritarian, anti-democratic practices that frequently characterized the developmental states of the region for the decades after the war” (Beeson 2007: 59, 60). More recently, neo-liberalization in

line with the IMF orthodoxy directly caused the East Asian financial and economic crisis in the late 1990s.

Emancipationists also remain critical of regional institutions, because none of them is considered capable of altering the basic parameters of state-centric security and because of ongoing U.S. hegemonic politics. States such as South Korea and Indonesia have been subject to the rules of the economic game by international institutions dominated by Western capitalist states, particularly those who dominate the IMF. In the wake of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, for instance, Japan adopted a more anti-U.S., anti-IMF stance by supporting the regional idea of an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF), but failed because of a U.S. objection. The United States remains hegemonic, not only because of its military might, but also because of its domination over the global economy. The United States still has the advantage of ideological power compared to China, Japan, and Russia, which still have no universal cultural appeal. As Peter Van Ness (2002: 135–36) puts it, “In sustaining the U.S. role in East Asia, the propagation of human rights, democracy and other liberal values by the United States is therefore as important as the maintenance of its military bases.”

Emancipationists do not advocate the return to the ancient Sino-centric order, where peoples other than Chinese were regarded as barbarians, but rather envision a post-hegemonic order where power relations among states are more diffused, where countries like China and Japan can maintain their civilizations and still respect others’. Cox (1996) treats Japan as a “reluctant military power” and a “middle power” with no hegemonic ambitions because its civilization is not universal. He also counts on Japan as a state with the potential to play a leadership role in developing a counter-hegemonic vision of greater diffusion of power and acceptance of diversity based on equality among civilizations. Japan should thus adopt a foreign policy more independent from the United States (that is based on multilateralism through the U.N. system and with a more equal orientation to all parts of the world). Japan should also export capital to help moderate the unevenness of world development and should be ready to act as a lender and consumer of last resort for countries in the Third World.

Critical theorists also see new potential in the development of a multilateral region in the Asia-Pacific, where the dominance of Western or American culture has failed to produce a Golden Age of multilateralism. In East Asia, the Japanese people in particular can build an alternative culture concerned with global problems, such as ecology, the injustice and dangers to peace arising from unequal social development, and economic exploitation. Citizens’ movements (such as those led by women, farmers, and organized labor) may have little in common, but their consciousness may be aroused by their “disgust with LDP corruption” and “a suspicion of LDP readiness to adapt to

world-market influences, to be the transmission belt of globalizing capitalism" (Cox with Sinclair 1996: 267–68). China is said to have given up its sense of cultural superiority when it adhered to the principle of equality among nations and adopted the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual respect, and peaceful co-existence).

Emancipationists do not justify Asian authoritarianism, however. While they recognize the developmentalist state's role in promoting security through political emancipation by ensuring basic economic development, their position against undemocratic practices remains unchanged. They argue for reconciliation between state activism and progressive reforms in the political sphere at the national, regional, and transnational levels. At the domestic level, relations among state power, economic development, and security "may be no more emancipatory in the longer term than those espoused in the Anglo-American countries," and thus there should be no "excuses for the continuing suppression of internal dissent" (Beeson 2007: 70). Critical theorists have also paid attention to the politics of security sector reform by focusing on the role of armed forces and police. Studies on Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines view the role of political leaders (such as former President Suharto, former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammed, and former President Ferdinand Marcos) as shaping the security sectors of their respective states to the advantage of their political regimes. These scholars also recognize the difficulties that stand in the way of security sector reform, despite pressure from external actors (Beeson and Bellamy 2008).

For emancipationists, global capitalism faces growing opposition from different social forces in the Asia-Pacific. Within developing countries, counter-hegemonic social forces have now played a political role in undermining the ruling classes. Emancipationist theorists speculate that organized community movements in the Asia-Pacific may grow in strength. In Mexico, the Zapatistas in Chiapas started a guerrilla movement that helped revive civil society and forged transnational links that provide an element in a global counter-hegemonic movement. In Canada, anti-globalization social movements staged protests against APEC, which subordinated human rights to corporate interests in the country's foreign policy. Even within the United States, "the globalizing policies of the executive branch and big corporations and banks are contested by territorial protectionism in the Congress, the states, and a sector of domestic business and labor" (Cox 1993: 154). Citizens' movements in Indonesia constitute "the potential base for a new political authority to replace the corrupt and tyrannical shell of power that remains" (Cox 2000: 35).

New social movements led by the middle classes have also taken over old social movements led by workers, peasants, and students. They have

organized their activities around trans-class issues, such as the environment, nationalism, human rights, and socioeconomic justice. Social movements have brought hundreds of thousands of people onto the streets in countries across the Asia-Pacific, including the Philippines in 1986, South Korea in 1987, Burma in 1988, China in 1989, Thailand in 1992, and Indonesia in 1996. In Singapore and Malaysia, where there have not been massive street demonstrations, “elements of civil society have been struggling to influence the government in more indirect ways.” Furthermore, “various popular movements have challenged authoritarianism not only in different national settings, but also across historical, social, economic, political and cultural differences” (Callahan 1998: 153).

Post-Marxist perspectives make a significant contribution to Peace and Security Studies in that critical social movements help tame capitalist democracy and enhance social democracy. William Callahan, for instance, argues that social movements are not as powerful as the state or transnational capital, which remains hegemonic, but they are not powerless, either. He argues that “social movements have had notable successes; they have played important roles in both overthrowing authoritarian regimes and influencing specific public policy plans” (Callahan 1998: 169).

These perspectives still have their limits, however. Social movements show little ability to coordinate their activities or achieve their goals. First, post-Marxists think that various types of resistance to hegemonic power include progressive forces such as the labor movement and fundamentalist social forces (such as Islamic ones, including terrorists), but it is unclear how they can achieve collective action strong enough to undermine powerful interests. In East Asia, no global civil society exists. Some social movements still represent the business sector; others have been either created or co-opted by state authorities. Even academics have formed a tripartite forum that includes government and business elites.

Civil society actors still cannot overcome states’ traditional security policies, either, as ample evidence has shown. They remain steadfast in pushing for a greater role in security, but have so far shown little effectiveness. Like regional epistemic communities, they have proved unable to influence state bureaucrats and policymakers with a strong conservative mind-set, especially those in authoritarian states. Although they can sometimes make governments listen to them, NGOs “are usually allowed to exist only on sufferance” and many of them are not even independent enough to be critical of government policies and politicians (Maddock 1998: 244). Government leaders can easily suppress dissenting voices, especially when they become too critical. Julie Gilson (2007: 38–39) further notes that “the role of non-state actors has to date contributed little to the security debate in East Asia. Even in those areas where non-state actors are present, they are usually weak, narrowly focused or effectively co-opted into state

activities through the commonly adopted tract-two formula.” Moreover, “NGOs and other non-state groups themselves remain very localized or disparate and there is as yet no substantial regional NGO forum to lobby for access” (Gilson 2007: 38–39). Old and new movements against world capitalism seem to make little progress (Wallerstein 2002). As noted, some humanitarian NGOs even ended up advocating war.

Moreover, social movements often lack the necessary resources to accomplish their task of transforming the international system from below. According to Roland Maddock (1998: 244), “They lack conventional sources of power and depend on pricking the conscience of national and international actors to respond positively to their plights.” He adds that “[t]his may often occur, but ethical indignation is not usually a powerful and long lasting impetus for radical change in international politics” (*ibid.*: 244).

Second, some emancipationists bemoan the fact that no power in the world has since the end of the Cold War effectively countervailed American power, the way the Soviet Union once did. They still expect to see different types of resistance to American power, including interstate military alliances associated with traditional balance-of-power politics (Gill 2003: 218, 219). If this is the case, post-Marxism does not pose a serious challenge to political realism. We also have yet to witness effective resistance to U.S. power initiated by other liberal democracies, either. If emancipationists reject the thesis that the United States has been on the decline, then the reason may lie in the fact that the liberal hegemonic system appears to be quite resilient and popular resistance has its own limits. If the U.S. hegemon were to decline into oblivion, would there no longer be a world hegemon? Recent developments seem to suggest that China may one day emerge as the next hegemon, but has this Asian power adhered to the norms found in its Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence? History suggests that it has not; China and India—which agreed to adhere to these norms—went to war in 1962, and China later went to war with the Soviet Union (1968) and Vietnam (1979).

Third, it remains unclear whether a post-hegemonic world order can ever be built and sustained for a significant period of time, without reverting to anarchy when global capitalism is totally dismantled. Hegemonies in East Asia existed long before the introduction of capitalism into the region. China emerged as an imperial or hegemonic system after the state of Ch'in conquered all of the country in a short period of time (230–21 B.C.). The East-Asian experience also shows that the end of one hegemon always leads to anarchy, which then gives rise to a new hegemon. According to Barry Gills (1993: 200), “[h]egemony in East Asia, as elsewhere, has been exercised by a variety of peoples, classes, states, and empires wielding a variety of cultural and ideological tools. The overall world order has experienced alternation between unitary hegemony and competitive systems of states.” Unfortunately past competitive systems of states in East Asia tended to lead

to bloody interstate wars, rather than peace. Hegemonic decline could, therefore, open a new era subject to a volatile or chaotic regional order.

Moreover, it is not clear how far emancipationists are prepared to go in order to ensure security. If emancipation means freedom from all constraints, then states of any type stand in the way. However, human security may not be ensured if statelessness prevails. Mohamed Ayoob (1997: 127) raises an important point: "Emancipation, interpreted as the right of every ethnic group to self-determination, can turn out to be a recipe for grave disorder and anarchy as far as most Third World states are concerned." But if anti-globalization movements were to succeed, states would be likely to gain strength. If Asian authoritarianism proves unacceptable to emancipationists, how can Asian values be protected and also respected?

POSTMODERNIST PERSPECTIVES ON SECURITY IN ASIA-PACIFIC

The recent literature on peace and security in the Asia-Pacific includes postmodernist perspectives, which question all the other perspectives discussed so far, such as the realist discourse on national security. In the early 1990s, postmodernists began to analyze security in the region. David Campbell (1992), for instance, seeks to understand the United States' foreign and security policy toward the Soviet Union and Japan.

Critical of realists who tend to explain state security behavior by explaining the United States' reactions to the Soviet military threats, Campbell contends that the Cold War can only be understood through an examination of the way in which American elites sought to secure American identity by constructing the Soviet Union as a different and dangerous other. After the Cold War, the United States no longer identified the Soviet Union as a threat to American national identity and needed to find someone else. American elites then began to reconstruct Japan as a new different and dangerous other. The Japanese were reconstructed as treacherous, childlike, emotionally disturbed, mentally ill, unstable, fanatical, evil, and endowed with superhuman physical capacities. These representations were not based on any objective realities. For instance, the Japanese threat was based on the claim that the U.S. trade deficits resulted from Japan's unfair practices. But this characterization of Japan did not occur when the United States began to experience its trade deficit after 1970, and other states (such as Canada, Korea, and Taiwan) were not constructed as threats, even though the United States experienced trade deficits with them (Campbell 1992: 224–25).

Other postmodernist-inclined scholars depict national elites in the region with ambitions as problems rather than solutions to security problems. Bruce Cumings (1999), for instance, narrates the way in which U.S.

policymakers perceived, interpreted, and made policies toward states in East Asia, particularly Japan, Korea, and China. American leaders did not think objectively and were misled by their racism and arrogance. They characterized states in East Asia in all kinds of precarious ways. Japan was viewed as “like us” or “not like us.” In Cumings’ words, “The image of Japan in the West can turn on a dime. During World War I, Japan was the scheming jackal, enjoying a war boom and tripled exports; but in the 1920s, when it entered a period of economic stagnation and pursued free trade policies, it was lauded for its liberal institutions” (*ibid.*: 25). China was referred to in varying negative ways as the “sick man of Asia” and “Butchers in Beijing” (*ibid.*: 151). North Korea was depicted as a rogue state, a communist puppet regime, and an economic basket case. American policymakers characterized North Korea as a threat to Western security. Perhaps the most interesting aspect of Cumings’ reflection on the U.S. policies toward East Asia is his rejection of any truth claimed by members of the Western academic community studying this region. He accuses them of collusion with the “intelligence arms of the American state” (*ibid.*: 174) by producing information and distorting intellectual inquiry to serve the interests of elites.

Other postmodernists question the so-called triumph of liberalism in the region, noting hegemonic rivalries among liberal allies. The United States, for instance, has sought to maintain itself as a regional hegemon through pursuing economic policies toward global integration. The United States has pushed for integration via an aggressive trade policy universalizing unilateralism aimed at re-subordinating East Asia to its economic hegemony. It has sought to reinforce a set of global economic practices that would restore its hegemony over the regional economy by promoting such practices as “free trade” and “free markets” as better alternatives to other paths toward economic development, most notably Japanese or East-Asian statist developmentalism.

Still others have taken issue with the modernist discourse of security in East Asia. Simon Dalby challenges the statist argument that violent modern state-making is part of the evolution toward a peaceful order, arguing that cultural diversity, the presence of minorities, and the absence of a single mode of state-building make it difficult for state-building to avoid harsh repression. He asserts that “many of the cases of national insecurity [in East Asia] have had little to do with external territorial threats to state integrity” and that “‘domestic’ political violence” has been “a cause of numerous insecurities” (Dalby 2007: 248). The development of modern state, has not led to security in East Asia, either. The earlier versions of modern states adopted by a militarist Japan, for instance, led to disaster that “still resonates in the region” (*ibid.*: 254).

Some postmodernists reject the constructivist idea of regional communities based on European universalism’s imperialist style. As one scholar puts it, “In a post-colonial, post-cold war period . . . an imperialist-style enforcement

of ‘European’ standards upon the nation-states of Asia is both unacceptable and unlikely” (Narramore 1998: 254). Terry Narramore (*ibid.*: 254) writes: “the ‘taming’ of Asia’s difference through colonization—an ‘Orientalism’ which never really succeeded—is not a viable option.” Regional institutions like the ARF remain state-centric and would be unable “to deal with levels of difference beyond or below the state” (*ibid.*: 263), such as ethnic, cultural, and religious problems in Asian societies like Japan (Narramore 1997).

Postmodernists still remain dissatisfied with the post-Marxist or critical theory perspective on security, contending that it may not lead to human emancipation. In addition to the charge they lay against emancipationists, who still lend support to modern state-building (even if they reject capitalism), postmodernists such as Simon Dalby (2007: 260) regard them as still having “universal aspirations to security.”

Postmodernists see potential in social movements’ role in building alternative security frameworks within the Asia-Pacific, especially when governments remain short-sighted. Such movements have played an active nonviolent role in the process of demilitarization and denuclearization. In the 1980s, antinuclear and antimilitary movements formed vigorous transborder alliances among Third World peace movements, between First World and Third World peace movements, and between popular movements and governments throughout the region. They protested the U.S. military buildups and registered victories (such as New Zealand’s banning of visits by nuclear-armed and nuclear-powered warships, the disintegration of the Australia-New Zealand-United States alliance, and the creation of the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone). Governments would have to be won over by the strategy to isolate the United States and to coordinate a regional mass campaign against any Japanese remilitarization.

Transnational and transregional NGOs can also stage campaigns to resist and transform state policies. They can intervene in government policy debates, expand their influence over the way Japanese foreign aid is decided and delivered, and gain control over the aid process to ensure that its impact will be positive rather than negative. Other postmodernists envision a regional congress of NGOs counterbalancing powerful forces: regional elites, Japan, and the United States. Some see knowledge communities as not “passive, abject targets under the totalizing control of the state, and void of meaningful agency.” They “socially construct not only the Asia-Pacific and the ‘sovereign’ identities which make up that world, but also their own subjectivity as legitimate agents of security” (Tan 2007: 13, 22) and must not construct their region along state-centric lines against creative alternatives. Regional think tanks (such as the Asia Europe Foundation or ASEF) have taken steps to deal with Huntington’s clash-of-civilization thesis. The ASEF stresses the need for “unity in diversity” among various cultures based on respect for the equal dignity of all civilizations.

In short, postmodernists studying the Asia-Pacific tend to rely on the politics of knowledge, delegitimation, accountability, nonviolent resistance, and negotiation. Consistent with their understanding of history and identity politics, they expose any claims of absolute or universal truth. The alternative security framework is one not only free of colonial rule, but also based on peaceful reunification of states (such as North and South Korea) and on the rapid demilitarization and denuclearization of the region. Military doctrines that allow national militaries to dominate the state and society (such as those in North Korea and Myanmar) must also undergo discursive change (in the structure of power and knowledge) through dialogue and negotiation.

The argument in defense of the need for postmodern discourses and states has some appeal in the Asia-Pacific. History shows that war between and within pre-modern states in East Asia had occurred long before the emergence of the modern state system. Feudal states in ancient China in particular found themselves caught in warfare: the Warring States period (453–211 B.C.) is considered to be the bloodiest era in Chinese history. Imperialism also took place in the pre-modern era. According to one scholar, “Japanese believe that Japan participated in aggression because [it] had modernized, but the aggression occurred because [it] was premodern.” Such “premodern imperialism was far more brutal than the imperialism of Marx and Lenin” (Morishima 2000: 35). As noted elsewhere, modern states in the Asia-Pacific have also engaged in war.

With all the best intentions and optimistic notes found in postmodernist perspectives on security (which helps open space for critical and creative theorizing), their counter-hegemonic discourses alone are unlikely to produce the best intended results. A challenge for postmodernism is whether critical social movements alone have been as intellectually influential as they believe they should be, and whether or not they have now fully developed or made their appearance evident in world politics. Within the Asia-Pacific, as noted earlier, critical social movements still face enormous structural constraints.

More problematic with postmodernists is that they tend to engage in the politics of dissent, protest, and resistance without providing an agenda for concrete collective action, as if to suggest that the new global multitude or social movements increasingly share intellectual commonalities strong enough to help them transcend politics and flee from the tyranny of state sovereignty. Postmodernists also tend to engage in abstract philosophical arguments with little empirical grounding.

The call for a multicultural world sounds ideal, but still raises difficult questions. How will the world’s major civilizations—without making any effort to find some common ground—ever stop seeking to dominate each other? Postmodernist-inclined civilizations, if they exist, may find themselves unable to stop others from pursuing cultural imperialism. The proposal for dialogue alone is unlikely to get us very far as long as the strong are not interested in speaking with the weak on an equal basis. According to Steve

Smith (1997: 334), postmodernists “see history as a series of dominations replacing dominations.” Whether history is more likely to be transformed rather than repeated remains to be seen, but if this has been a recurring pattern of history (especially since the arrival of the Enlightenment project), it is difficult to put complete faith in the promise of a just world peace. The end of the Cold War led to a neo-liberal hegemonic world order—not a just world peace. The end of American neo-liberal hegemony may also give rise to Chinese illiberal or European “postmodern” hegemony. Some postmodernists even advocate “voluntary” imperialism, based on the idea that states can first join international financial institutions, then the global economy, and the “imperialism of neighbors,” based on the need for intervention in pre-modern states (Cooper 2002). This type of postmodern imperialism remains Euro-centric, however. Still, it seems plausible that cultural imperialism (modern or postmodern) is more likely to diminish when all states become democratic. Only in the Enlightenment notion of democracy can all nations find some common ground for peaceful co-existence. Cultural relativism may help mitigate clashes between Asian and Western cultural values, but this theoretical reasoning provides no hope for the future because of its pro-status quo tendency. Must Asian states remain undemocratic then?

Although it contends that the modern state cannot promote global security, postmodernism remains based on modernist/essentialist values such as democracy (versus authoritarianism), justice (versus injustice), and equality (versus hierarchy). According to Steve Smith (1997: 332), “even Foucault and Derrida have argued that they are trying to return to the original purpose of the Enlightenment, by which they mean focusing on how to use knowledge to improve the human condition. . . .” A communist world in fact remains the ultimate vision advanced by Hardt and Negri (2006).

More problematic is the fact that postmodernists not only bring back the Enlightenment project through the backdoor, but also overlook the realities of material factors in politics. If all forms of knowledge are inevitably tainted by self-interest, power, and the desire for privilege, we are still left in the classical-realist world and thus find it hard to offer any creative alternatives as material power still matters. Campbell’s focus on identity politics helps us understand how American elites constructed Japan as a different and dangerous other, a substitute for the Soviet Union, but he does not explain why American elites perceived the threat of a rising Japan when the Soviet threat disappeared. Evidently the American “construction” of Japan as a threat to U.S. security began to diminish in the late 1990s, as the Japanese economy continued to face difficulties and the United States was left as the only superpower in the world. As noted, when the Japanese economy was stagnant in the 1990s, Japan was lauded for its liberal institutions. If American elites construct China as a new, different, and dangerous other, it is because China has the potential to become a world hegemon.

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Part V

Feminist Security Studies

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13

Essentialist and Liberal Feminism

Political realism has come under attack from various feminists for its gender-blind emphasis on national security. For J. Ann Tickner (1992: 128), “genuine security requires not only the absence of war but also the elimination of unjust social relations, including unequal gender relations.” Security threats to individuals—both men and women (but especially women)—include war, rape, domestic violence, poverty, gender subordination, and ecological destruction. Security means freedom from violence against women in times of war as well as in times of peace (Mikanagi 2004: 97). If Valerie Hudson (2009: 71) is correct that more than 160 million women went missing in 2005 alone, it is important that we pay attention to the causes of this tragedy. Feminism, however, is a diverse movement based on many different theoretical traditions: essentialist, liberal, cultural or radical, socialist (Marxism, Leninism, and Maoism), postcolonial, and postmodern. Although it is sometimes difficult to classify feminist perspectives, some feminists appear to take essentialism seriously. Other studies tend to validate liberal feminism, which argues that women are capable of doing men’s jobs, including those in military forces. These two feminist perspectives, the focus of this chapter, have also been subject to growing criticism from other types of feminists, however.

ESSENTIALIST AND LIBERAL FEMINISM IN A NUTSHELL

According to essentialist feminists, it is biology that drives men to behave aggressively or to dominate others, especially women. Proponents

have engaged in biological theorizing about natural sexual inequality between women and men.

According to Sandra Lipsitz Bem (1993), biological essentialism has been advanced in sociobiology, prenatal hormone theory, Sigmund Freud's theory of sexual object choice, and women-centered feminism. Scientists in sociobiology ground their theories on empirically controlled research that led to the argument that men and women are biologically different. Sociobiologists such as William Hamilton and Edward O. Wilson advanced evolutionary perspectives on the origins of sexual difference and sexual inequality based on "selfish genes," but there are instances of altruism in the animal world. Their reasoning rests on the fact that males are sexually promiscuous, aggressive, and prone to rape and abandonment of mates and offspring (Bem 1993: 18). Prenatal hormone theory resulted from the works of biopsychologists that shed light on the different ways in which male and female bodies develop in the uterus. Male and female bodies develop sexual differentiation during a critical prenatal period, a fact which has given rise to a theory of hormonally induced brain organization.

Women-centered feminists further focus on the psychological differences between males and females and thus contend that women have a special virtue in that they possess the natural ability to transcend artificial polarities that men in the realist world tend to embrace. These feminists tend to blame not human nature, as classical realists do, but male nature, as associated with separation, dominance, and hierarchy. Women value interpersonal relationships and are inclined to build institutions based on such values as interconnectedness, mutual empowerment, and harmony. If women were to dominate the world we would be in much less danger of destroying both ourselves and the planet. We would have a radically different conception of everything from morality to science (Bem 1993: 128).

Essentialist feminists would endorse the biological argument made by both Randy Thornhill and Craig Palmer (2000) that there exists a natural bond between men and violence. They argue that rape occurs in all known cultures and continues to occur among humans, but rapists are mostly male, and victims of rape are mostly female. Men use violence when driven by sexual jealousy and when seeking to control a sexual and reproductive resource valuable to them. Males rape because females have not been selected to mate with just any male, whereas females have the evolved psychological mechanisms that allow them to discriminate among potential sex partners. Hudson (2009: 71) further notes that "[e]volutionary biologists tell us that human beings and chimpanzees are the only species in the animal kingdom in which male members bond together to commit acts of aggression against other members of the same species." She then goes on to remark that "research shows that natural selection has slowly but steadily rewarded certain types of men . . . who use physical force to get what they

want . . ." (ibid.: 71). These men are "descendants" of Genghis Khan willing to subordinate others to their interests.

These feminists adopt biological essentialism as a scientific perspective to study peace and security. Christine Sylvester (1987: 498) writes: "These feminists look for the foundations of a shared standpoint in the common womanly activities which patriarchy fears, as well as in women's biology." They think that "the essence of femininity lies in the womb." Some pacifist feminists are essentialist in that they insist that "women equal peace and men equal war" (Burguières 1990: 1). They create a biological dichotomy between men and women. Even if they are in civilian clothes, men are always on shaky ground and are barely able to control their reason. Their bodies determine their natural inclination toward aggression and sex. Being beastly, a "man accepts the discipline of battle because it also includes or promises predatory and sadistic sexuality" (Ruddick 2002: 201). Believers in the biological distinction between men and women tend to regard men as sexually excited by violence and inclined to become predators, rapists, sexual assaulters, and murderers. Men are thus most suitable to be soldiers.

Moreover, essentialist feminists regard men as "warriors"—the source of domination and aggression, the life taker—marching to war or ready to do battle (rooted in biology and remaining unchanged from childhood to adolescence). Men tend to engage in activities that test their physical strength and prove their physical and moral courage and are therefore involved in social activities directly linked to fighting or killing. As noted in Burguières (1990: 4), men are "competitive, greedy and prone to outbursts of rage and violence" and thus "the root cause of wars."

In contrast, women are regarded as "beautiful souls" full of succor and compassion (playing the role of life giver, caregiver, and home keeper) and are noncombatants. Women are the natural protectors of children because they give birth to them and have the natural responsibility of mothering. Unlike men, women are by nature pacifistic and can bring peace.

Some forms of liberal feminism share biological essentialism's basic assumption that women tend to be biologically more nurturing or less aggressive than men, but they for the most part still differ from the latter: they stress the need to promote equal rights between men and women in the context of liberal politics. Francis Fukuyama (1998) thinks that if more women are in positions of power, we can expect to witness a more peaceful world. Fukuyama (1998: 27) regards human attitudes toward violence as "rooted in biology." For him, "there is something to the contention of many feminists that phenomena like aggression, violence, war, and intense competition for dominance in a status hierarchy are more closely associated with men than women." Findings by biologists suggest that "there was virtually no disagreement in the hundreds of studies on the subject: . . . boys were more aggressive, both verbally and physically, in their dreams, words,

and actions than girls . . . the vast majority of crimes, particularly violent crimes, are committed by men" (ibid.: 31). There is thus a genetic basis for male and female difference. Men have historically been the main perpetrators of violence. Modern violence has precedents going back at least tens if not hundreds of thousands of years. It is hard to find evidence of matriarchal societies, where women dominate men.

Because of their fixed biological nature, men will continue to dominate politics and the realms of war. Efforts to change men by resocializing them to become feminine will have limits. In Fukuyama's words (1998: 28), "[w]hat is bred in the bone cannot be altered easily by changes in culture and ideology." His feminism goes beyond commercial and democratic liberalism by pointing out the extent to which this thesis tends to overemphasize the virtues of liberalism (based on the rule of law, respect for individual rights, and the commercial nature of democratic states). In his view, liberal democracy and modern capitalism will never eliminate men's desire to dominate a status hierarchy or their tendencies to act out aggressive fantasies toward one another. Their advent "does not eliminate that desire, but "opens up many more peaceful channels for satisfying it." Liberal democracy and modern capitalism are institutions that help promote peace and security because their advocates do not try to change human nature, which is biologically grounded, but only seek to constrain it through institutions, laws, and norms. This "does not always work, but it is better than living like animals" (ibid.: 36, 40). Liberal democracy and modern capitalism provide no eternal cure for human nature, but they tend to make states more feminine.

Other liberal feminists focus their analytical attention on the exclusion of women from political power. The main source of gender oppression comes from the social and legal exclusion of women from formal political power under legal constraints working against female interests. The slavery of colored people, the domestic tyranny by men, as well as female subordination through educational and legal means perpetuate male dominance within society (including sexual discrimination), meaning that women tend to receive lower salaries compared to those of men, live in greater poverty, and hold far fewer responsible jobs within state institutions.

To enhance security for women is to ensure that they also enjoy equal legal rights with men (such as the right to vote and to run for public office) and can enter the center of power. Their role in developmental projects should also be recognized. They also should get as much pay as men do. Women should also have equal rights to serve as policymakers and as soldiers to defend their countries. Believing that women are as good as men in combat and are thus entitled to full rights, liberal feminists further support the idea of recruiting women for the military (arguing that they would benefit from the wages, travel, and education that military life offers them).

Liberal feminists go beyond biological limits by stressing the need for women to demonstrate their toughness in traditional masculine behavior, as well as their natural ability to take aggressive action and to engage in the use or threat of force. They question any argument that women cannot perform jobs in combat as well as men can. Women are capable of serving in the military and doing men's jobs, and they deserve equal treatment as agents or protectors (rather than as victims in need of male protection). With their enhanced role as protectors, women would become citizen-defenders and warriors. They also can acquire the courage and skills fostered by battle and are just as capable as men to engage in combat. Viewed in this light, women can also contribute to national defense and security. As such, liberal feminists are not specifically critical of political realists, because women can become as realist as men.

The differences between those who subscribe to biological difference and those who stress the same biological competence remain, but the two feminist sides agree on the need to incorporate women into domestic and international politics, including the foreign and security arenas. According to Fukuyama (1998: 35), democratic politics seems to provide a way out of men's biologically driven aggressive tendencies. In his words, “[t]he core of the feminist agenda for international politics seems fundamentally correct: the violent and aggressive tendencies of men have to be confronted, not simply by redirecting them to external aggression but by containing those impulses through a web of norms, laws, agreements, contracts, and the like.” Liberal laws, institutions, and norms do not seek to transform human nature, but to constrain it. In his view, “more women need to be brought into the domain of international politics as leaders, officials, soldiers, and voters. Only by participating fully in global politics can women both defend their own interests and shift the underlying male agenda” (ibid.: 34).

ESSENTIALIST FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON ASIA-PACIFIC SECURITY

Recent studies seem to fit somewhat with essentialist feminism. Some scholars have paid attention to the imbalance of sex between males and females and explained how this kind of imbalance is likely to exacerbate insecurity in Asia. One of the most interesting findings is that unmarried young adult men (known as bare branches or *guang gun-er*—the term that the Chinese use to refer to adult offspring who are like empty fruit trees because they do not bear children) have played a role in exacerbating insecurity. When unmarried, young adults of the lowest socioeconomic classes with no prospects for having families of their own tend to be much more prone than married men to attempt to change their unfortunate situation through means of violence. In other words, highly uneven male-to-female ratios tend to trigger domestic and international violence.

This perspective seems to be based on the assumption that unmarried men who lack stable social bonds are less likely to be peaceful than married ones, whose wives can be assumed to have a pacifying effect on them. Scholars do not argue that the significant number of bare branches directly causes violence but say that it can have “an amplifying or aggravating effect.” They further illustrate the point using this natural metaphor: “the presence of dry, bare branches cannot cause fire in and of itself, but when the sparks begin to fly, those bare branches provide kindling sufficient to turn the sparks into a fire larger and more dangerous than otherwise” (Hudson and den Boer 2002: 16, 17).

Both Valerie Hudson and Andrea den Boer (2002) observe the problem of violence within societies, particularly China and India. Women have been subject to kidnapping and trafficking, because unmarried men are willing to pay to get their brides. Bare branches have also engaged in prostitution (involving millions of sex workers with HIV-risky behaviors) and could become a significant new HIV risk group. Surplus males are also prone to intrasocietal and intersocietal violence. As they (*ibid.*: 15) put it, “[t]he potential for intrasocietal violence is increased when society selects for bare branches, as certain Asian societies do. It is possible that this intrasocietal violence may have intersocietal consequences as well.”

Illustrative historical cases help provide some empirical support for this perspective. In the 19th century, for instance, China was plagued with a vast army of bare branches. The Nien rebellion, which began in 1851 and was quelled in 1868, broke out when predominantly bare-branch rebel groups openly attacked imperial troops and forts in the Huai-pei region, where the sex ratio was extremely high: an overall average of 129 men for every 100 women. Surplus males joined bandit gangs, which initially were looting to make a living but then started to organize themselves and ended up becoming a powerful armed force known as the “Nien Jun” seeking to overthrow the Qing Dynasty. The imperial government had to import foreign arms and modernize its army by adopting the Western ways of war (Hudson and den Boer 2004: 211). Martial religious brotherhoods were also prone to violence and posed “grave security problems for the central government” (Hudson and den Boer 2002: 24). In colonial Taiwan (a colony of Taiwan from the late 1960s to the late 1800s) also witnessed a large number of revolts (19 in the 18th century, 58 in the 19th century) and Hudson and den Boer (2004: 217) also observe that men found it difficult to find wives because women were far fewer.

Moreover, high sex-ratio societies tend to give rise to authoritarian political systems and possibly war between states. Prospects for a peaceful and democratic China remain grim. Due to the ever-increasing number of bare branches, the only solution to this growing problem is short term: reduce the surplus men’s numbers. Leaders in Beijing, however, will be

hard-pressed to address the potential of grave social instability and may become inclined to move in a more authoritarian direction (Hudson and den Boer 2004: 268). Moreover, China may in 20 years have close to 40 million bare branches and “ardently wish to see them give their lives in pursuit of a national interest” because the “alternative is to allow them to remain a threat to national interest, which may increasingly be seen as an untenable policy position by the government” (Hudson and den Boer 2002: 36–37). Sino-Taiwanese relations, for instance, have at times been tense and may become a military battleground in the future.

Whether Asian bare branches’ tendency to commit acts of violence is of a biological nature is debatable. Both Hudson and den Boer make it clear that the imbalance of boys and girls is also part of Asian culture. In China, for instance, parents tend to prefer boys to girls (because the status of women remains low) and many of them tend to rely on the new technology of ultrasound that helps them identify whether their fetuses are male or female and engage in the widespread practice of sex-selective abortion (female infanticide). For Chinese men, not having a wife is also considered a source of personal shame or anger. Bare branches tend to have low levels of education and low job skills, and they tend to be unemployed. It would be interesting to study societies where the imbalance of sex favors women.

Still one of essentialist feminism’s strengths is that even some liberal scholars have subscribed to this perspective. Fukuyama, for instance, notes that American women tend to be less supportive of war efforts than American men. They tend to show less support for defense spending and the use of force abroad. He cites differing degrees of support among American women and men for the U.S. involvement in different wars, such as those in Korea and Vietnam. In the event of a North Korean attack, men also tend to favor U.S. intervention more than women (Fukuyama 1998: 34–35). If more American women participate in politics, the United States will become less inclined to use military force against other countries. Fukuyama (1998: 35) contends that “increasing female political participation will probably make the United States and other democracies less inclined to use power around the world as freely as they have in the past.”

On the surface, the essentialist feminist perspectives on “beastly” men and male soldiers seem to have some empirical support. No one can effectively deny that most people who have served in armed forces are male. Reports from battlefields further suggest that male soldiers find injuring and killing sexually exciting. They have committed atrocities or acts of cruelty for sexual-aggressive gratification. The well-known example of Japanese soldiers’ exploitation of so-called “comfort women” during World War II lends support to the essentialist view that men are sexually violent.

But essentialist feminism has come under attack from Barbara Ehrenreich (1999); Katha Pollitt (1999); R. Brian Ferguson (1999); Lionel

Tiger (1999); Jane Jaquette (1999); Judy El-Bushra (2007); Sara Ruddick (2002); Lynne Segal (1999); Jean Bethke Elshtain (1985, 1987); and Christine Sylvester (1987). These feminist critics provide powerful reasoning and empirical evidence to show that men also hate war. Ruddick, for instance, contends not all men are prone to violence and war. In her words, “No doubt there are predatory [or] rapist men who welcome the opportunity to become soldiers. It is also clear that most men trained and licensed to kill may be at least temporarily intoxicated by injuring others.” However, “soldiers experience an unpredictable mix of courage, fear, rage, lust, cruelty, loyalty, love, tenderness, and exhaustion and are often shocked by the vengeful fantasies of civilians” (Ruddick 2002: 201, 202). She further contends that “[i]f men were so eager to be fighters, we would not need drafts, training in misogyny, and macho heroes, nor would we have to entice the morally sensitive with myths of patriotic duty and just cause” (*ibid.*: 152). Similar arguments are made elsewhere (Pollitt 1999: 124). Also according to Ehrenreich (1999: 118), “Throughout Western history, individual men have gone to near-suicidal lengths to avoid participating in wars. . . .”

From the experiences found in the Asia-Pacific, it is difficult to argue that all men, particularly male soldiers, are biologically prone to violence. Not all male soldiers are rapists and not all men reject pacifism. There are certainly shameful cases of rape within the U.S. military bases in Japan (such as those in Okinawa), but their number remains small when compared to the number of U.S. soldiers stationed there. A nurse who worked for the U.S. Army hospital during the Vietnam War, for instance, shared her personal war experience. In her words: “I learned that men can be gentle, tender, and loving with each other. I learned that men and women can work together with mutual respect and admiration” (cited in Turner 1998: 124). As noted earlier, countless men in the Asia-Pacific such as the ancient Chinese sages and other leading contemporary pacifists (Gandhi, Martin Luther King, Jr., and Thich Nhat Hanh) show that men are neither born to rape women nor bound to commit atrocities or wage war.

On the other hand, women are not necessarily more pacifistic than men, either (Ehrenreich 1999: 119–20; Pollitt 1999: 123; Ferguson 1999: 126; Jaquette (1999: 129). According to Ruddick (2002: 185), “women . . . have distinct reasons for rejecting war.” However, “[t]his does not mean that women are innately or inevitably peaceful.” Women can in fact be just as proud as men when it comes to fighting in war. Ruddick again makes a strong case for the fact that “[t]here is nothing in a woman’s genetic makeup or history that prevents her from firing a missile or spraying nerve gas over a sleeping village if she desires this or believes it to be her duty” (*ibid.*: 154). Women are not afraid of fighting in combat, nor are they morally superior to male warriors. Pacifistic women “are greatly outnumbered by the majority of their gender who do not enter into pacifist construals as a chosen identification; indeed women in overwhelming numbers

have supported their states' wars in the modern West" (Elshtain 1987: 140). Also according to El-Bushra (2007: 134–36), "women often support war, whether they are directly engaged in fighting or providing other types of inputs into war efforts."

The military role of women in the Asia-Pacific helps invalidate the essentialist thesis about their natural peacefulness. Critics point to the fact that the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations under the Reagan Administration, Jeanne Kirkpatrick, and U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in the second Bush Administration took hawkish positions in the conduct of foreign policies, and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher championed the war against Argentina over the Falklands. U.S. Secretary of State Madeline Albright supported the NATO war against Serbia during the 1999 Kosovo crisis. During World War II, the Soviet Union was said to have had between 800,000 and 1,000,000 women in its armed forces (eight percent of its military personnel). During the late 1940s, Chinese women were a visible presence in the Red Army (Turner 1998: 23).

There is also a long tradition of women warriors in Northeast Asia. Although Japan's early history hardly mentions women warriors, the two most famous ones were Tomoe Gozen (known for her outstanding horsemanship and her ability to stand as the "equal of any man" or the "equal of a thousand") and Hangaku Gozen (known for her strength and accuracy with the bow). After the 10th century, Japan was often at war, and women armed with *naginata* (polearms) became involved in the last defense of towns and castles. There are tales of warlords' wives leading soldiers in battle and the image of women fighters with *naginata* began to arise (Varley 1994: 103–05).

China also has a long history of female warriors engaged in military combat. Although Hua Mulan (a possibly fictional woman who dressed as a man and undertook masculine life-roles during the fourth to seventh century A.D.) remains China's most famous female warrior (Edwards 2008), Chinese history books by ancient chroniclers—from 1066 B.C. to 280 A.D.—describe women as rank-and-file soldiers or women fighters with active combat and defense duties. A large number of women were in rebel armies in Chinese dynasties. During the Shang Dynasty that lasted from 1766 to 1122 B.C., Queen Fu Hao served as the top general of King Wuding of Shang. According to Hudson and den Boer (2004: 134), "women, along with men, were warriors, and could lead military campaigns against invaders." During the Zhou Dynasty (1122–221 B.C.) there was a master swordswoman and military trainer. Lady Sinn (Xian fu-ren), a 6th-century woman warrior, fought against rebels in China, assisted the Chinese states in their southward expansion, and is said to be "deserving of a position among the ranks of major Southeast Asian women warriors" (Wade 2008: 5). During the Song Dynasty (960–1279), General Liang Hongyu was known as the "mighty drummer and Lady of the Nation's Peace" who led an all-female corps that fought the Khitan invaders during the Middle Ages. Qin

Liangyu (1574/84–1648) led her troops against enemy forces such as the Manchurians. She defeated rebels who attacked Chengdu, and the Imperial Court granted her the title of “Lady” and the position of Overall Administrator of Military Affairs and Commander-in-Chief of Sichuan Province. During the Ming Dynasty, female warriors included General Shen Yunying and General Gao Guiying of the peasant rebels. General Gao Guiying engaged in organizing and training an all-female fighting force complete with female officers and led a number of generals to the strategic location of Changde in Hunan. In 1644, the peasant rebels captured Beijing and ended the Ming administration, and Gao made her husband Emperor and later became Empress.

Until the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Chinese women had participated in military and rebel organizations. From 1644 to 1911 during the Qing Dynasty, there were Pirate Admiral Zheng Yi Sao and Wang Cong’er (Supreme Commander of the eight armies of the White Lotus Sect). Zheng Yi Sao (1775–1844) and her husband fought in the Tay Son rebellion in Annam (present-day Vietnam) and then returned to China with 200 ships under their command and expanded the fleet to 600 ships after they established the Cantonese Pirate Coalition. Wang Cong’er (1777–1798) led more than 40,000 followers against the imperial army and engaged in many battles, using guerrilla warfare tactics to discomfit government troops. In the 19th and early 20th centuries, Chinese women served as rebels in the Taiping army at all ranks, including high-ranking positions, took part in the Boxer Rebellion (1900), and the Red Spears Movement (Hudson and Den Boer 2004: 137). During the Taiping Rebellion (1851–64), the sister of Hong Xiuquan commanded 2,000 female soldiers.¹

During the first half of the 20th century, China still witnessed female warriors, such as Chen Lianshi (a guerrilla commander) and Feng Shuyan (a legendary markswoman and army officer). Known as “Old Woman with a Gun in Each Hand,” Chen joined the Communist Party and engaged in covert operations. Feng and her husband joined the anti-Japanese resistance army where she became an officer like her husband and fought side by side with him in battles. Another Chinese female warrior was Zhao-Hong Wenguo, known as the grandmother of the anti-Japanese resistance during the Sino-Japanese war. She fought on the Great Wall frontlines, was honored by Kuomintang leader General Jiang Jieshi with the title “Mother of the Guerrillas,” was made the Commander of the Anti-Communist Troops over three provinces after World War II, and led 20,000 troops in the war against Communist forces.²

¹For more on Chinese female warriors, see an author-unnamed article entitled “Chinese women in history—soldier, pirates, scholars, sages and rulers,” <http://www.colorq.org/articles.aspx?d=asianwoman&cx=chinhistory>, accessed on 2 July 2008.

²Ibid.

The wars in Vietnam further help dispel the feminist myth of women as beautiful souls marching for peace. In this country, there is an ancient saying: “When war comes, even women have to fight” (Turner 1998; Taylor 2003). In their work, both Karen Turner and Taylor describe women’s historic and heroic roles in combat that went back to the ancient past. The women who led the uprisings against imperial China included Sisters Trung Trac and Trung Nhi, who defeated the Chinese army in 40 A.D. In 248, Lady Trieu An led another struggle against China by perching on an elephant and leading men into battle (Taylor 1999: 12, 19; Turner 1998: 26–27). From 1945 to 1975, Vietnamese women—mothers, wives, daughters, and sisters—from the countryside in North and South Vietnam joined their male comrades-in-arms in wars against Japanese armed forces and the South Vietnamese regime and its French and American allies. Hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese women are said to have fought alongside the men during the victorious battle against the French colonialist forces at Dien Bien Phu. One million women took part in the anti-French resistance (Taylor 1999: 31). During the subsequent war with the United States, women numbered 2 million (Taylor 1999: 71), making up 30% of the National Liberation Front or Viet Cong cadres and 50% of the guerrilla fighters in the South, and they were no disorderly irregulars. According to Turner (1998: 35), at least 140,000 women in South Vietnam provided support to the North Vietnamese forces, serving as spies, propagandists, and crude weapons makers; about 60,000 took part in direct military engagements as Viet Cong soldiers. Nearly a million women became involved in activities protecting villages from the South’s armed forces. In North Vietnam alone, about 1.5 million women are estimated to have served in the regular army, the militia and local forces, and professional teams (*ibid.*: 20–21). The Vietnam Women’s Museum in Hanoi honors the war roles of women in Vietnam, North and South, portraying them as heroines playing a prominent role in the war.

In short, evidence does not lend support to essentialist feminism based on the assumption that women are essentially pacifistic and men are biologically prone to violence. In addition, by “essentializing women’s roles as wives, mothers and nurses,” this type of feminism is accused of discouraging “their inclusion as active decision makers in political arenas” (El-Bushra 2007: 131). We now turn to liberal feminism.

LIBERAL FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON SECURITY IN ASIA-PACIFIC

States in the Asia-Pacific, especially the United States and Vietnam, have witnessed the intellectual influence of liberal feminism. During the American war in Vietnam, almost 10,000 American women (and, as noted earlier, approximately 2 million Vietnamese women) fought there. During the Tet Offensive in 1968, for instance, American servicewomen were

often in the line of fire facing mortars and rockets and suffered as much as their male comrades. They were also awarded military medals, including the Purple Heart, the Bronze Star, and Commendation Medals.

Women soldiers, including those in countries under colonial rule where they were recruited by liberation movements, have developed skills and abilities comparable with those of men. Military successes would have been less likely without female participation in war. Vietnam's long-haired warriors, for instance, proved as capable of engaging in military combat as their male counterparts. They fought to liberate their country from foreign domination by training in the art of war. They learned how to perform military duties ranging from firing weapons, laying traps, serving as militia women, patrol guards, and intelligence agents, and acting as propagandists (involved in such activities as converting non-communists), recruiters, and helpers in the efforts to keep the supply lines open and flowing. Thousands of them "labored on the Ho Chi Minh Trail, widening, repairing, defending, aiding and caring for the male soldiers sent to the South" (Taylor 1999: 119–21; Turner 1998: 9–116). Vietnamese "women expressed vengeful threats and handled lethal weapons with competence. Vietnamese male soldiers knew full well that the same women who comforted the wounded and dying were also capable of handling an AK-47" (Turner 1998: 135).

The long-haired warriors in the Vietnamese revolutionary movement are said to have enjoyed military successes and thus helped determine the war's outcome. The defeat of the French at Dien Bien Phu in 1954, for instance, came after Vietnamese women had contributed half of the 260,000 laborers (Turner 1998: 31). As pointed out by Turner (*ibid.*: 93), "the presence of women affected the men who depended on their courage and skills to keep the huge human conveyor belt, the Ho Chi Minh Trail, moving smoothly." The Vietnamese female soldiers, in another instance, contributed to the military victory of North Vietnam in 1975, because the United States had underestimated their roles in military combat.

Women in Aceh (Indonesia), East Timor, Malaysia, and the Philippines are also said to have trained as soldiers and spies and learned to use weapons (Edwards 2008; Siapno 2008; Tan 2008; Clavé-çelik 2008). Female warriors of the Malaysian Communist Party, for instance, "suffered terrible injuries, ran, walked and carried the same heavy load as the men, and sometimes persevered when male comrades had given up." Moreover, they "were known to be far tougher, physically and mentally, than their male counterparts, taking far more easily to the physical and mental demands of a life on the run. When captured, they rarely cracked under pressure or torture" (Tan 2008: 12). In the Philippines, the Huk female insurgents fought the Japanese army during World War II and occupied "the full range of military roles"; "some . . . attained formidable, even fearsome reputations as aggressive fighters" (Lanzona 2008: 1). In the 19th century, Acehnese heroines

(such as Cut Nyak and Cut Meutia) continued the armed struggle of their dead husbands and even “exceeded them in passion and constancy” (Clavé-çelik 2008: 10). More recently, Acehnese women warriors engaged in the armed struggle against the Indonesian state, serving in various capacities as fighters, cooks, logisticians, fundraisers, nurses, propagandists, and part of the intelligence service (*ibid.*: 11).

Liberal feminists may be able to draw comfort from the fact that some progress in getting women the recognition and rights as equals with men they deserve has already been made. In Japan, for instance, feminist issues emerged as early as the 1870s. In the beginning of the Meiji period, calls were made to promote equal rights between men and women. Japanese feminists sought to ensure that women would also enjoy legal rights, such as voting and freedom of expression. Moreover, they demanded the right to choose contraception and abortion. The first feminist movement, known as the New Women’s Association, formed after World War I and was led by Raicho Hiratsuka in an effort to achieve political equality between men and women. The movement sought to abolish the Public Order and Police Law (which prohibited women from engaging in political activities), demanded legal protection for women against venereal disease, and pressed for women’s suffrage for the good of society. Their ultimate goal was not to create a society based on female domination, but one based on “respect for women as well as men” (Tozuka 1999: 155). The post-World War II period saw the emergence of feminist demands for equal rights in the concept of citizenship in the area of electoral politics. They saw legal barriers to their rights as discriminatory against them in public life. They were prohibited from attending political groups or joining political organizations. Husbands had the right to divorce their wives if infected with venereal disease, and the law was seen as unjust or biased against women.

From a liberal feminist perspective, recent works show that women in East Asia have made some progress in their fight for equal rights. In Japan, women have made inroads into the political arena in recent years. Work by Iwao (1993: 225) shows that Japanese women first became visibly active in the House of Councilors election in 1989, when the issue of a newly introduced consumption tax raised an immediate concern for women, 34% of whom were “very concerned about the elections,” representing a threefold increase compared with that three years earlier. As a result, 17 women were elected into the House of Councilors, compared to only six prior to that. Rose Lee and Cal Clark (2000) are among liberal feminist optimists who regard democratization in Asian countries such as Taiwan and South Korea as beneficial to women. In their study on Taiwan, for instance, they found that women moved from being tokens essentially beholden to some other leaders to being independent political actors in their own right. They regard democratization—with its contribution to the expansion of civil society independent from state control—as a tool for women’s emancipation in East Asia.

Liberal feminism has been subject to criticism from other feminists, however. While it has strong empirical support in terms of its commitment to promoting the military or security role played by women (such as those in China, Vietnam, and the United States), it does not appear to break from realism. The growing number of women in the U.S. military (approximately 200,000 or 15% of the total, with more than 1 million female veterans) has not made the country any less militaristic. Female soldiers “defend law and order, wear uniforms, or carry guns for a living” and “share with their Hobbesian forefather a self-reproducing discourse of fear, suspicion, anticipated violence, and force to check-mate force” (Elshtain 1985: 42).

Liberal feminism has also been criticized for ignoring institutional constraints embedded in cultural values. Women may have gained political power, but discrimination against them remains pervasive in East Asia. In spite of the fact that it has adopted liberal democracy, Japan still has the lowest percentage of women parliamentarians serving in the House of Representatives (lower house) of the Diet, when compared with other developed democracies. In South Korea, legal equality remains an illusion, which is typical of societies in East Asia. For critics, just because women have obtained legal rights to equality under the law does not mean that they have been emancipated from gender hierarchies. Liberal feminists who attempt to achieve equality with men may not necessarily succeed in creating a more just world, because by joining the male-dominated world, they will be unable to transform the status quo. Critics reject the idea of serving in the military, believing it to be masculinist and thus oppressive. Cultural feminists are not interested in achieving gender equality with men by becoming like them (Brock-Utne 1985: 22–32). They also find it insufficient to transform male-dominated, male-defined structures by incorporating women into national armed forces. Elshtain (1987: 244) writes: “I cling to no naïve liberal shibboleth that women if drafted in large numbers will transform the military and war fighting. I know the military will transform women.” Removing legal constraints on what women can do does not hide the fact that they are still subject to sex discrimination and violence (Brock-Utne 1985: 30; Katzenstein and Reppy 1999).

Socialist and Cultural Feminism

This chapter focuses on socialist and cultural feminist perspectives, both of which can be grouped together as radical feminism. Friedrich Engels attacked the idea of the family as “natural,” contending that family values are economically conditioned. He regarded the husband as the bourgeois of the family and the wife as the proletariat. The solution to this problem of male supremacy is to abolish private property (Bryson 2003: 59). The revolution that puts an end to capitalist liberalism terminates men’s rationale for the need to produce heirs of their wealth. Overall, classical Marxists are not directly concerned with gender. The experiences of women in communist and post-communist states show the limits of such radicalism in the promotion of security for women. Cultural feminists seek to create a new world based on mutually respectful and interdependent relationships that reject militarism, sexism, and environmental degradation—a world whose members have developed a sense of a self-sufficient socially, economically, and environmentally responsible global community. Cultural feminism is radical in its prescription for freedom from male hegemony (generally associated with traditional patriarchy), but it has also been subject to criticism.

SOCIALIST AND CULTURAL FEMINISM IN A NUTSHELL

Feminists following the Marxist-Leninist tradition blame capitalism and imperialism for the insecurity of women. Smaller and less industrialized

states leave their women unprotected and vulnerable to the more powerful capitalist states and their agents.

Exploitation is regarded as the root cause of oppression, to which women are subject. Women may work, but their labor constitutes what Karl Marx called the reserve army of labor (for workers who are unemployed or partially employed). They are employed in times of economic growth and become unemployed during lean times. Under patriarchal capitalism, women are exploited by both capitalists and men. Miles (1986: 145) views “*the use of structural or direct violence and coercion by which women are exploited and superexploited*” as inherent in production and labor relations. Women in capitalist-patriarchal states are not the owners of their own individual person; they are subject to rape and murder through sex preselection, female foeticide, and femicide.

Traditional military security further ignores the security of people, especially women and minorities. The sources of threat to women’s security include human trafficking. They are critical of states’ exclusive attention to national security by ignoring women who suffer from a lack of access to education, health care, and employment, as well as domestic violence, systematic rape, exploitation, and other forms of violence.

For these feminists, post-capitalist states still cannot put an end to women’s oppression. As men, revolutionary leaders—idealized as the founding fathers of the socialist states—considered “the independent mobilization and organization of women around the man-woman contradiction” as “the threat to the unity of the oppressed, the unity of united front, and as inherently counter-revolutionary (Miles 1986: 198). Both Lenin and Mao, regarded as socialist patriarchs, still subsumed the women’s movement under the general movement fighting against imperialism.

Socialist feminists seek to abolish the sexual divisions of labor and to create a new type of society, where men and women can share domestic responsibilities and productive work. Proletarian men and women need to engage in revolutionary activities. They choose not to cooperate with non-socialist feminists and accuse liberal feminists of being bourgeois. They aim to establish an independent power base, to maintain its identity, and to refuse to join male-dominated trade unions. These socialist feminists also join the international socialist attack on capitalist imperialism in order to promote women’s autonomy defined in terms of freedom from coercion regarding their bodies and lives. Women are urged to form autonomous organizations guided by their analysis, programs, and methods.

Socialist feminists’ ultimate objective is to establish a new society based on the principle of egalitarianism within the family context, in which the sexual division of labor is totally abolished; just as men can do “women’s work,” women can also do “men’s work.” The type of society they have in mind is one led by an “anarchist feminist movement,” which does not seek

to replace male dominance with female dominance but will as Miles puts it, “build up a non-hierarchical, non-centralized society where no elite lives on exploitation and dominance over others” (Miles 1986: 37).

Socialist feminists advocate grass-roots or community-based democracy as the way to fight against selfish individualism and exploitation and to promote human freedom, socialist cooperation, and equality in the interests of men and women. Once established, past socialist states provided no real answer to women’s oppression. According to Jan Jindy Pettman (2005), only social movements, especially those led by women, can play an emancipatory role. These feminists advocate the concept of security that promises to emancipate people from the various sources of insecurity by allowing everyone to theorize his or her own security. Security thus needs to be reconceptualized in a way that rejects the traditional practice of national security constructed by visible state elites by including the voices and narratives of “everyday women.”

Socialist feminists are deeply committed to a better future based on socialism. Herbert Marcuse, for instance, declares his own commitment to the idea of making a transition to a better society for all women and men. Women become secure only when they are free to “determine their own life, not as wife, not as mother, not as mistress, not as girlfriend, but as individual human beings” (Marcuse 2005: 156). Emancipated women are those who achieve full economic, political, and cultural equality with men.

The feminist movement must thus resist and revolt against “decaying capitalism” and its mode of production and establish new social institutions, and this must begin at home. They seek to undermine capitalist patriarchy and join anti-globalization movements centered on welfare for women and to promote female independence, both economic and psychological, viewing this value as having the power to transform the existing oppressive patriarchal structure. In developed societies, they encourage women to enter industrial production, to gain economic independence from men, and to promote collectivism as well as socialist cooperation among them to end poverty.

Among their strategies is the organization of international conferences among socialist women (such as the First and Second International Socialist Conferences in 1907 and 1910, where they endorsed resolutions condemning imperialist powers’ militarist tendencies). Another strategy involves attacking economic injustices, deeply rooted in the process of economic globalization and exploitation. Because of their heavy emphasis on women’s socioeconomic conditions, they also disagree with liberal feminists’ strategy to fight for equality of opportunity, attack business corporatism, especially privatization of national assets that promotes corporate interests, and work toward meeting human needs for women by improving the conditions of their reproductive labor.

For their part, cultural feminists reject the realist claim that in order to achieve security states must exploit those that are weak and should get as

much power as possible, but they share some assumptions made by peace advocates. They argue that the pursuit of national security in the context of negative peace is legitimate only if it is not excessive (such as spending too much on preparation for war) and dangerous, but add that human security requires the focus of attention on people's fundamental needs. The referent object of security includes families and individuals. Individuals who suffer from insecurity include women who face sexual discrimination, those who lack basic necessities of life, such as children who receive no education and live on the streets, millions who remain illiterate, the homeless, the hungry, and the like. Cultural feminism is generally concerned with the security of all people, especially but not only women.

Cultural feminists strongly reject essentialist feminism. They do not argue that women are more naturally peaceful than men because they are biologically fixed, but emphasize a difference between masculine and feminine thinking and regard both men and women as capable of either. Sara Ruddick (2002), for instance, regards mothers as having preservative love, but mothers are not by nature loving or pacific. Mothering is socially constructed rather than a fixed biological relationship. Mothers are not necessarily female either, because they can lead a variety of lives ranging from heterosexual, to homosexual, to celibate. Mothering is thus different from birth-giving and regarded as work responding to children's needs and demands. Maternal thinking is based on a maternal ideology whose strategy is to help develop communities.

For cultural feminists, threats to security include war (rooted in militarism and sexism), injustice (such as discrimination, especially against women), and environmental degradation. They regard war and structural violence as equally significant threats to human survival and decency. Structural violence is an indirect form of oppression found not only in the relationship between poor countries in the South and rich ones in the North, but also within each country as some people get richer at the expense of others. Sexual violence against women committed in the structure of male domination rather than by men individually—sexism—is cultural and physical; pornography, demeaning stereotypes, sexist jokes, denial of women's reproductive rights, sexual exploitation and violence (prostitution and rape), unfulfilled and degrading domestic labor, and the like are the sources of male oppression of women and feminized men.

Women are the victims of both exploitation and oppression associated with patriarchy, under which women (and children) at the bottom of a hierachal society are required to produce warriors (Brock-Utne 1985: 74). Patriarchy rests on sexism and enforces the "war system" as a competitive social order based on unequal relations between human beings and authoritarian values that require coercive force.

Cultural feminists urge women not to join the military or other male institutions. Women must use their own resources and should rely on each

other because men are unreliable in the struggle for women's liberation. Women must be in charge—the agent of change through cultural war. They “are enjoined to create separate communities to free themselves from the male surroundings and create a ‘space’ based on the values they embrace” (Elshtain 1985: 47). Women should thus acquire power so that they can govern their countries and help prevent them from going to war.

Others aim at transforming traditional norms that perpetuate masculine thinking into a world security system for all nations and all peoples. Cultural transformation begins with the need for personal and relational change. Cultural feminists advocate equality between men and women on the basis of an equitable distribution of time, wealth, and power between them (but not on the basis of equality on men's terms). As Brock-Utne (1985: 144) puts it: “We do not want to copy men's ways, because we do not see them as worth copying.” Women should not become like men but instead should develop their own logic. They should help men reject the military institution and learn to “think and feel like women” (Brock-Utne 1985: 148). They also believe that only women can help men clean up the mess rooted in violence that men have created.

Ultimately, cultural feminists support the idea of an alternative world without any means of violence—a world with political participation, economic equity, social justice, and ecological balance. Some advocate a shift toward a disarmed world where “national armed forces are gradually replaced by nonviolent civilian defense forces trained in passive resistance and nonthreatening defense postures” and “the demilitarization of the mind” (Reardon 1993: 156, 159). Education based on women's ways of knowing (rooted in connectedness, cooperation, and discussion), political action, and social movement are the steps needed to make significant “inner psychic changes” in human beings rather than to promote structural changes in a revolutionary way (putting old wines in new bottles), although there is no certain guarantee for linear progress toward a new world order. Feminists choose life, rely on nonviolence, and redefine power as empowerment. The politics of peace involves nurturing “maternal practices” as a “resource” for nonviolent activism or peacemaking (Ruddick 2002).

SOCIALIST FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON SECURITY IN ASIA-PACIFIC

Socialist feminists characterize women in East Asia's newly industrializing states as an oppressed class. Work on Thai women, for instance, describes them as “newly proletarianized groups” (Mills 1999). In the late 1960s and 1970s, these feminists condemned U.S. imperialism and militarism, partly because of its violence against women. Female Asian prostitutes have been seen as sexually exploited and violently abused because of

U.S. imperialism and militarism. Capitalist patriarchy, which created socio-economic inequalities and the sex industry, remains the target of blame.

Within Northeast Asia, research has focused on the exploitation of women in new industrializing states. In South Korea, for instance, Gills (1999) argues that sources of oppression include not only economic exploitation but also other psychological and social roots. She pays attention to the problem of excluding women in reproductive labor from formal and productive labor; such exclusion impoverishes women, especially in the rural sector. Rural women experienced what she calls “tripleexploitation.” In pre-capitalist Korea, known as Choson society (1392–1910), the sexual division of labor corresponded to that between the public sphere of production and the private sphere of reproduction. Patriarchy was maintained by the elites who sought to secure the class/cast system that subjected women to male authority. Women were confined to housework and socialized into accepting their reproductive roles. Women’s domestic work was not recognized as labor of social value (*ibid.*: 92–93).

The Korean state is said to have adopted the policy of national security at the expense of women in the rural areas by promoting the industrial sector. Its policies were made to promote the “core” urban economy and to drain away the surplus created in the agricultural sector in favor of industrialization. As a result, women in the agricultural sector are kept at the lowest rank within the hierarchical structure of patriarchy. The new capitalist strategy, for instance, deepened the underdevelopment of the Korean agricultural sector, prevented women from reaping material benefits, and alienated them from the means of production and decision-making processes (Gills 1999: 128).

Within Southeast Asia, work has been done on the role of women in countries like the Philippines, where the Women Workers Movement was founded in 1984 to protest labor conditions for women in free trade zones. The General Assembly Binding Women for Reform, Integrity, Equality, Leadership, and Action (GABRIELA) was also organized in response to various issues associated with “the International Monetary Fund and World Bank intervention, U.S. military and economic intervention, government land reform policies, government budget allocations, establishment of a nonalignment policy and a nuclear-free-zone provision for the Philippines” (Kwiatkowski and West 1997: 163).

Some socialist feminists in the Asia-Pacific aim to overthrow global capitalism by revolution. For instance, they see the need for a socialist feminist revolution in the United States, regarded as the most powerful state in the world, especially within the global market (Wong 1991: 292, 295). The goal of revolutionary movements is not only to turn their societies into communist or classless ones, but also to ensure that women would become equal with men in cultural and socioeconomic terms.

In China, women played a crucial revolutionary role in fighting imperialist powers. Mao Zedong recognized the role of women in their revolutionary efforts. At the beginning of the Long March in 1934–35, women's organizations were formed that provided for education and mobilized women into revolutionary activity. Large numbers of women were recruited into mass organizations, but their role in combat was not prominent. Beginning in the 1920s, efforts were made to ensure liberation of the peasantry, which included women. Capitalism, which gave rise to male supremacy, was viewed as the source of threat to women. After 1945, Mao made it an official policy to ensure women's equality, viewing the liberation of women as a natural measure of the general liberation. Women were encouraged to take part in labor and received child care and other sources of support aimed to ease their domestic responsibilities.

In other Asian societies, revolutionary movements also promised to liberate women from capitalist patriarchy. As noted earlier, Vietnamese women joined the revolutionary movement on the basis of communist ideology's promises to expel foreign imperialists and to end Confucianism's gender inequalities. From the beginning, for instance, the North Vietnamese Communist Party promised to liberate them from capitalist values, to ensure equality between men and women, to encourage them to participate in the revolutionary struggles, and to give them a place in the Party structure. The Communist Party of Thailand also pledged its adherence to "ten disciplinary principles" adopted from Mao's Three Main Rules of Discipline and Eight Points for Attention. The Party made this promise: "Women shall enjoy equal rights as men in the political, economic, cultural, educational and vocational fields; [and the party will] bring the role of women into full play in the revolutionary movement and production; promote fully welfare work among women and children, [and] ensure education and work for the youth" (Jeffrey 2002: 43). The Communist Party of the Philippines was also "formally committed to sexual equality" (Lanzona 2008: 1).

More recently, socialist feminists have moved in the direction of post-Marxist critical theory when studying the sources of insecurity befalling women in East Asia. They remain critical of capitalism in general and the East Asian "economic miracles" in particular. As the Japanese economy grew, the number of sex tours by Japanese men increased. Men from rich countries exploited women in poor ones. A global free-market economy impoverished women in poor Asian countries. According to Yayori Matsui (1996: x), globalization forced "people to join the race to the bottom. It is women who are most exploited and most oppressed at the poorer end of the Asian spectrum."

Economic globalization has led to an international labor migration of women who move from villages to urban areas and then to other countries where they face various forms of violence. Military globalization has also exposed women to the danger of military violence around U.S. military

bases in East Asia, such as those in Okinawa and South Korea. Militarization is said to have impoverished women in the Asia-Pacific because states in the region continue to increase military expenditure at the expense of women's personal security needs, because it has pushed them into poverty.

Other socialist feminists have expressed similar criticisms. Instead of providing women with the security they needed, the economic miracles ignored the realities of gendered oppression and violence in the families, sweatshops, and prostitution houses across the Asia-Pacific region. The economic miracles, based on free-market economics, performed by states in the region came at the expense of women who work as global assembly workers. They sell their cheap labor to local factories and export process zones as labor migrants who lack citizenship rights and face discrimination and superexploitation. As sex workers, they also provide their services to help contain the sexual aggression of U.S. military men based in foreign territories. Asian statism and Asianism limit the space for Asian feminism, and feminist critique is associated "with Western contamination and antinational persuasion" (Pettman 2005: 170).

These feminists search for alternatives to the capitalist politics of security. Their emancipatory projects aim to enable women in the Asia-Pacific to develop their strategies. Grassroots groups, such as Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era (DAWN) and the Centre for Asia-Pacific Women in Politics (CAPWIP), developed "a grassroots emancipatory ethic for women" in the region. These groups engaged in various emancipatory activities, such as efforts to stop domestic violence, to mobilize the masses on the streets, and to organize groups lobbying state and international bodies which aim to address their security problems. According to Katrina Lee-Koo (2007: 245), individual women, their groups, and NGOs continue to "make significant impacts upon the human security of 'everyday women' in the Asia-Pacific and consequently have much insight to share with the academic discipline of security studies."

Studies on socialist states such as the former Soviet Union, China, and Vietnam raise a troubling question about the security of women. After the revolutionary wars ended, women did not see their dreams come true. In the Soviet Union, for instance, they remained unskilled workers and even became more overburdened because of their domestic and professional duties (Hansson and Liden 1983). According to Stacy (1983: 2), "the union of socialism and anti-patriarchal politics amounts only to a short-lived marriage of convenience." Part of the problem with the marriage between Marxism and feminism was that Mao tended emphasize the need to liberate the peasantry and to favor men. He argued that "the whole feudal-patriarchal ideology and system is tottering with the growth of the Peasant's power" (Croll 1978: 189). Like Engels, he seemed to believe that the breakdown of the capitalist structure would lead to the breakdown of economic relations between landlords and peasants and between the sexes. Consequently, the

Chinese Communist Party (CCP) pushed for redistribution of land among poor peasants, who gained middle-class status and enjoyed firm relations with the CCP. But the overall situation of women remained unchanged because land was distributed to the head of the household and only widows could benefit from the policy of land redistribution. Chinese women received even more burdens when they joined the labor force; they worked outside the home as well as inside. As part of the labor force, they did not enjoy greater economic power because the political power to control the means of production still rested in the hands of men. The Cultural Revolution failed in its attempts to overcome “the basic obstacles to the development of stronger female participation,” because “it merely tried to override them with the necessarily temporary mobilizational force” (Johnson 1983: 187). Women did not enjoy the same status as men in the military sector. They were allowed to serve in the armed forces, but most soldiers were still men. Women were still encouraged to take responsibility at home or to provide economic support to the Red Army: “Women now were asked to mother and wife the military and society as a whole” (Stacey 1983: 152).

In Vietnam, women have not enjoyed the same level of personal security as men. During the war with the United States, female soldiers were told to hold off on marriage until the end of the war; for many, the war ended too late. Women then re-encountered the challenges they had before the revolution; they did not enjoy educational opportunities, faced domestic violence, and did not receive recognition for their contributions to the war of national liberation. They were recruited on the basis of gender-equality and became revolutionaries as noted earlier, but most of the top leaders were male (Taylor 2003: 32) and the contributions made by the long-haired warriors were largely forgotten. According to Taylor (*ibid.*: 129–30), Vietnamese women gained some recognition when the government built a military museum in Hanoi to honor their contributions to the war. However, she notes that “[i]n the most basic ways, the lot of the Vietnamese woman did not change” and that “little changed from the past, and happiness for women . . . was as far from reality as ever” (*ibid.*: 129, 130). More specifically, female revolutionaries who were uneducated and unskilled peasants and joined the National Liberation Front “remain in the background” (*ibid.*: 136). Their war time contributions “are diminished in the postwar era by a collective outpouring of pity for those who have lost the essence of womanhood” (Turner 1998: 183). Women’s economic and political rights have been neglected in postwar reconstruction plans, and many continue to feel powerless. They have been judged not by what they had contributed to the nation during the war but by their capacity to bear children. The patriarchal attitudes of the Communist Party of the Philippines also “prevented women from assuming a larger role in the rebellion. And many women guerrillas were forced to conform to traditional social roles inside the movement, doing much of the cooking, washing and housekeeping”

(Lanzona 2008: 1). Huk women were relegated to support roles; few of them advanced to positions of command and most were still expected to serve the sexual needs of their male leaders (*ibid.*: 4).

Socialist feminists question whether the Communist Party alone can create true socialism for both men and women. Although the revolutions in the Soviet Union, China, and Vietnam brought about changes, oppression against women continued. Because many inequalities in these socialist states existed, women did not achieve total emancipation.

It remains to be seen whether socialist feminism will achieve its objectives and whether the abolition of capitalism would enhance security for women. In market economies, women may not achieve the ideal level of equality in socialist-feminist terms, but they enjoy more opportunities for individual fulfillment, more autonomy in the struggle against traditional forms of oppression, and benefit from both “the open expression of dissatisfaction and increased divorce” and “pressures for more mutually beneficial and mutually satisfying relationships” (Parish and Farrer 2000: 270).

There are still other challenges to socialist feminism in the Asia-Pacific. Most states are anti-socialist. Singapore’s anti-Marxist policy, for instance, has to this day made it impossible for any grassroots organizations to radicalize the feminist agenda. Few NGOs have been willing to address the issue of domestic workers, especially after the state cracked down on the so-called Marxist Conspiracy allegedly staged by Catholic social workers and lay workers at the Geylang Catholic Center for Foreign Workers. Throughout the 1990s, even churches were so concerned about the linkage between Catholicism and the Marxist Conspiracy that they “were extremely careful in their public dealings with domestic workers” (Lyons 2005: 7).

CULTURAL FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON SECURITY IN ASIA-PACIFIC

Radical/cultural feminists writing on women in East Asia have examined the oppressive power of traditional cultures and their negative impact on women’s lives. They pay attention to direct, indirect, and structural forms of violence against women.

Direct violence includes the torture of women, domestic violence, marital rape, acquaintance rape, stranger rape, and other forms of sexual violence, such as incest, sexual harassment, sexual assault, and forced sexual initiation. During World War II, for instance, Asian women were used as “comfort women” and forced into sexual slavery in the Japanese army. Studies on women in the Philippines and Indonesia further show that they were also subject to “honor killings.” Sexual violence against women in Myanmar (Skidmore 2003); Cambodia (Surtees 2003); Indonesia (Idrus and Bennett 2003); and Malaysia (Foley 2003) has also been studied.

Indirect violence includes social exclusion, political surveillance, and the dramatic effects of terror sustained by the military and state apparatus. Women in East Asian countries such as Myanmar, Cambodia, Malaysia, and Aceh have been subject to this form of violence.

Structural violence includes the layers of disadvantage women experience because of their gender, age, socio-economic status, and ethnicity. In Myanmar, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) created “through direct and indirect violence, the conditions in which structural violence takes hold and flourishes.” Skidmore (2003) acknowledges that “[t]he Burmese military government does not perform unsafe abortions, nor does it mandate sterilization, condone prostitution, or approve of the rampant domestic violence in both cities and villages.” However, she points out that “through its systematic violation of the human rights of an entire nation, the military council sets the preconditions for the explosion in frequency and volume of systematic forms of violence. Such structural violence is experienced disproportionately by the most vulnerable sectors of society: women and children” (ibid.: 78). Women in other Asian societies have also been in a weak position in educational, occupational, and economic terms. According to Jill Astbury (2003: 162), “[w]omen’s exposure to poverty is critical in many of the South and Southeast Asian countries.”

Studies on patriarchal violence note the cultural construction of violence against women in Asian societies. They are critical of any perspectives based on the notion that economic development serves as the precondition for women’s security. According to two scholars, “[w]hile the structural determinants of gender based on violence often correlate with varying degrees of development, the cultural, religious and institutional factors that promote or condone violence against women can remain unchallenged despite progress in terms of economic development” (Bennett and Manderson 2003: 4). These studies on Asian women seek to expose “how cultural pre-occupations with honor, shame and the sexual purity of women are central in sustaining gender differentiation and gender inequality, simultaneously justifying violence against women and depending upon such violence to reinforce hegemonic systems of gender inequality” (Bennett and Manderson 2003: 9). Fears of shame also prevent women from resisting sexual violence. They would be blamed for their victimization and under social pressure to protect their family interests rather than to defend their own individual rights. Family honor comes before personal honor, and this requires that women “endure great personal suffering to avoid actions they believe will injure their families” (ibid.: 10). Women are treated as male property and subject to punishment if they fail to meet their husbands’ demands or to show their husbands’ superiority.

Works by cultural feminists on Asian lesbians also challenge the Asian notion of social harmony or the myth of social tolerance. A study on

Japanese lesbians provides a good example. Regardless of their sexual orientation, Japanese women are still discriminated against in their workplace. Lesbians are in a situation worse than heterosexual women and are said to “refrain from articulating the reality of their specific situations in an effort to accommodate conservative expectations” (Chalmers 2002: 82). The liberal concept of choice is restrained by the need to conform to dominant cultural values influenced by notions of paternalism, which seeks to represent lesbians’ lives as being in perpetual conflict with dominant family values.

For some feminists, Asian lesbians’ conditions will improve if the traditional notion of family values or hetero-normative society breaks down. In other words, their conditions will remain unchanged if they continue their “survival tactics” by remaining integrated to the traditional family system. The social or family structure, based on the traditional assumption of family life associated with heterosexual relations, must be transformed. The conception of “family” thus needs reformulation.

Other cultural feminists also blame patriarchal hegemony for the structured insecurity of women in East Asia or injustices against them. Women warriors in Aceh, Cambodia, Timor-Leste, and the Philippines have failed to achieve equality with their male counterparts. Most female combatants in the Timorese armed and police forces, for instance, were said to have never been promoted and not even allowed to speak or express their opinions without their male commanders’ presence (Siapno 2008: 7).

Asian cultures prove to be a major impediment to feminist attempts at improving the role of women. Confucian culture (such as in China and South Korea) is viewed as being favorable to men and biased against women, who are admonished to work at home. Confucianism gave rise to the patriarchal family structure in East Asian societies, providing an overarching framework that maintains a gender-based hierarchy assumed to promote peace and harmony in all facets of life. Neo-Confucianism subordinates women to their fathers when they are young, to their husbands in middle life, and to their sons when they become elderly. Women’s activities include taking care of children and their husbands. This means that women face gender discrimination as party leaders tend to recruit men for public office. As Chin (2004: 299) puts it, “A male-dominated political culture adds to women’s low political representation. Political parties’ biases against women lead to gender discrimination in various ways.” Buddhist culture has also been criticized for downplaying the role of women. If prostitution is treated as a form of violence against women in Thailand, for instance, blame is placed on Buddhism as the official state religion because it relegates Thai women to second-class citizens.

Cultural feminists also blame military culture for women’s insecurity. American military violence against women has been attributed to the U.S. military’s sexist attitudes and hyper-masculine culture. Young American

boys are raised in a culture that emphasizes masculine identity. Military training seeks to turn recruits into “men” (rather than women), to provide them with the knowledge of how to use weaponry, and to socialize them into thinking that they are warriors. In East Asia, radical feminists regard the military-base culture and its threat to human security as pervasive in Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines (Kirk and Francis 2000; Kirk and Okazawa-Rey 2004).

To overcome cultural obstacles to justice for women, a few possibilities have been raised. One way to overcome patriarchy would be to promote matrilocal marriage, which would allow couples to accept the fact that they do not need to have sons and that daughters would be able to do what sons can do. Another solution was to carry out family planning (a one-child policy), which would weaken patriarchy because people would come to realize that daughters are as important as sons (Johnson 1983: 197–99). Some cultural feminists count on other possibilities for social transformation. Anne-Marie Hilsdon’s work (2003) on marital choice and violence against women in the Philippines and Rebecca Foley’s work (2003) on the history of Malaysian women’s campaign against gender-based violence illustrate the point. Muslim women in the Philippines struggle against the secular ideologies of the Philippine state. “Maranao NGOs promote women’s rights to sexual freedom, work, education and politics by interpreting the Qur’an in feminist ways that reportedly differ from the Quranic interpretations in the Hadith, mostly undertaken by men.” However, the feminist movement in Maranao claimed that “they ‘cannot just be for Maranaos’ but need to represent all women” (Hilsdon 2003: 38). Muslim and Christian women should work together in coalition—in the form of an epistemic community—to reduce violence against women. In the case of Malaysian women, an attempt was to protect women from domestic violence by establishing shelters for battered women. But later feminists recognized that this was not enough. In 1999, a report recognized violence against women as rooted in “the subordinating position accorded to women in the family and in society. It is a manifestation of the patriarchal and unequal power relations between men and women” (Foley 2003: 137–38). Feminists saw the need to form the Joint Action Group in 1985 and to organize a campaign against violence directed at women, through the holding of workshops and calls for legal reforms to end this type of violence.

Cultural feminists have also sought to redefine security, exposing a core contradiction inherent in U.S. military policy and practice in East Asia. Research conducted by Gwen Kirk and Margo Okazawa-Rey, for instance, sheds light on the negative impacts of U.S. militarism on people in East Asia. The U.S. military bases in the region, particularly those in Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines, have threatened the security of women and girls in the forms of rape and violence. “Thousands of incidents of military violence have occurred around ports and U.S. bases in Okinawa,

Korea, and the Philippines.” Critics “believe that the violence against women is integral to U.S. military attitudes, training and culture” (Kirk and Okazawa-Rey 2004: 60). Women activists blame U.S. sexism and racism for such violence, but U.S. militarism alone is not to blame. East-Asian governments are also complicit in allowing such violence.

In several East-Asian countries, grassroots activism aims to protect women from military violence that occurs in and around military bases. Grassroots organizations have been established and have condemned military sexism and racism, documented military crimes against citizens, especially women and girls, established centers or support networks, provided direct services, broken silence on relevant issues through education and protest, lobbied and promoted alternative economic development, and pursued litigation. In South Korea, for instance, feminists, students, human rights organizations, and labor activists gathered to protest the 1992 murder of a woman who worked in a bar serving U.S. troops and founded the National Campaign for the Eradication of Crime by U.S. troops in Korea. My Sister’s Place, a project started by the Korean Presbyterian Church, established two centers for bar women in 1986. In Japan, after the rape of a 12-year-old girl in Okinawa in 1995, women in the prefecture founded an emergency center. Students started De-activating Our Violent Establishment (DOVE) to address military violent issues and to demystify romanticized attitudes toward U.S. troops.

One problem with cultural feminism is that it is often difficult for us to see a clear distinction between nature and culture. Birgit Brok-Utne (1985: 32), for instance, wrote: “the old matriarchies were peaceful, and as a sex, women have never institutionalized violence.” This form of cultural essentialism seems conceptually inconsistent with cultural feminism’s emphasis on cultural norms of violence against women. As noted earlier, women in East Asia have a history of being capable of violent action. Women do not always respond to external threats differently from men. When their national survival is at stake, women also tend to behave in the same way as men do. As noted in Turner (1998: 47), for instance, “When even the gentlest Vietnamese woman could be inspired to enter the male world of violence for her country and when she learned to do the job well, the war had become in reality a total people’s war.”

Whether cultural feminists’ radical vision for peace and security will materialize fully remains to be seen. They condemn war toys, redefine masculinity, attack the glorification of war and warriors, and criticize growing military budgets that reduce social programs and put burden on women. But as they wage war with masculinity, they “are not only at war with war but with one another, as well as being locked in combat with women not self-identified as feminists.” Other women make no such effort. Many Vietnamese women, for instance, joined the liberation movement and most “did not mount anti-war protests or attempt to influence

the government to stop the war" (Taylor 1999: 126). There seems to be no real correlation or causal relationship between the growth of feminism and the decline of militarism. One could argue that feminism as a social or intellectual movement has become far stronger in the United States than anywhere else in the Asia-Pacific, but the United States (whose annual military budgets now exceed U.S.\$ 500 billion) remains the most militarized state in the world.

Postcolonial and Postmodern Feminism

Postcolonial feminism contends that none of the above perspectives sufficiently takes into account the negative impact of centuries-old colonialism, neo-imperialism, and the ongoing process of globalization since colonial rule. Women around the world do not suffer from oppression to the same degree. Postmodern feminists have also been critical of the other feminist perspectives on security in that they do not share assumptions that women share the same universal identity or that all women have suffered from oppression in the same way. Postmodern feminists prefer to listen to the different voices of women without seeking to impose any particular worldview on them so as to prevent cultural universalism or imperialism and to promote a world based on cosmopolitan democracy. Because states in the Asia-Pacific have different historical experiences and most of those in East Asia experienced colonial rule until the end of World War II, postcolonial and postmodern feminisms seem most relevant in feminist security studies. Feminists of these two theoretical persuasions have paid close attention to the harmful impact of imperialism. Postcolonial feminists do not see Western cultural values as having the potential to ensure security for women. Postmodern feminists have sought to deconstruct the myth about the stabilizing force of militarism and imperialism and to provide women with opportunities to make their different voices heard.

POSTCOLONIAL AND POSTMODERN FEMINISM IN A NUTSHELL

Postcolonial feminism shares with socialist feminism the view that capitalist patriarchy is a system of oppression, but adds that racism, colonialism,

and imperialism are additional sources of interstate competition or war, and a threat to nonwhite people in particular, especially women in developed and underdeveloped countries.

Postcolonial feminists challenge the concept of national security and advocate the concept of human security focusing on the security of those who are hyper-feminized (especially women of color, workers, immigrants, minorities, and colonized people) and sacrifice the most for hyper-masculinized power politics (Agathangelou and Ling 2004). Postcolonial feminists question the epistemological position held by feminists who see middle-class white women as the basis for addressing women's universal conditions around the world. Knowledge production must take into account the experiences of women in non-Western worlds because nonwhite women (women of color or Third World women) have experienced oppression. Before colonial rule, they not only worked as housewives but also as laborers in the public sphere. Colonized societies were integrated into the world economy and their position declined: they became marginalized because colonial powers' treatment of their colonies' socioeconomic conditions tended to favor men's modes of production. Colonial and nationalist patriarchies conspired to subject them to the process of cultural, racial, and gendered colonization, depriving them of equal citizenship. A patriarchal, racist capitalism exploits them and makes them think that their work is secondary to that of their husbands—the family's male "breadwinners" (Mohanty 2003: 141–50).

Globalization is still regarded by postcolonial feminists as an ongoing process of centuries-old colonization that did not end when colonies gained their independence. Postcolonial globalization is an economic, political, and cultural process that exploits and oppresses women of color, as well as contaminates, degrades, and distorts local cultural values. The process remains dominated by countries in the North and is viewed as a *re-colonization* of the South that affects women in particular. Women engage in productive labor, but continue to be marginalized because Western techniques of production still favor men as heads of their households. Globalization has also resulted in backlashes in the Third World against Westernization or Western homogenization and in nationalism or fundamentalism that also favors men over women. As a result of such backlashes, movements led by religious fundamentalists have sought to control women.

Other postcolonial feminists whose work is built on social constructivism seek to combine hypermasculine Western capitalism-cum-colonialism (conducive to power politics and local patriarchy within the non-Western world) as a method to shed light on competition and conflict between states as well as the oppression of colored women. Hypermasculinity, according to L. M. H. Ling (2002), has a "cultural pathology" with its economic roots in capitalist development. It "reconstructs *social* subjects, spaces, and activities into *economic* agents that valorize a masculined, global competition associated with men, entrepreneurs, the upwardly-mobile, cities, and

industrialization.” The Westphalian system of competitive states was superimposed onto the “Other” (non-Western worlds) by the “Self” (West). As Ling puts it, “global security and instability [in international relations], though seemingly inconsequential at first, will sprout from and eventually crack the supposed bedrock of hypermasculinity” (*ibid.*: 21–22).

Postcolonial feminists reject Euro-centrism, adopt multi-cultural (or cross-cultural/trans-cultural) methods of investigation, and take anti-racist positions. Their works echo Andrea Smith’s critique of white-dominated feminist organizations that advocate state violence to ensure safety and liberation for women and other oppressed groups (Smith 2004). They thus do not seek to rely on white women in developed countries for leadership, nor do they regard the latter as an agent capable of liberating women of color. They do not even accept white women as their spokespersons. White women are generally regarded as part of the neo-colonial structure under the banner of globalization and may be unsympathetic toward the causes of women of color whose sources of threat come from neo-colonial states or capitalist systems in the North. White women have been accused of defending cultural hegemony and of racial supremacy or failure to acknowledge their racism or the different histories of nonwhite women. Women of color should not be over-generalized as “powerless” victims of oppression (Mohanty 2003: 23). Postcolonial feminists advocate the importance of indigenous knowledge based on women’s respective cultural values or specific histories and traditions. They engage in the process of deconstructing the myth of a universalized sisterhood or ahistorical universalist theories by documenting the lived experiences of women of color and in the fight against gender or sexist oppression based on their cultural means rather than on Western ones (Mohanty 1991, 2003).

Rather than celebrating the myth of global sisterhood, feminist activists should engage in actual struggles on the ground, such as advocating “emancipatory knowledge” (Mohanty 2003: 1), creating “pedagogies of dissent” (*ibid.*: 217), and building “feminist solidarity” (*ibid.*: 3). They seek to emancipate nonwhite women (and men of their nonwhite groups, as well as immigrants and minorities in developed countries) from violence. The global hegemony of Western knowledge reproducing Western hegemony must be exposed and undermined. Postcolonial feminists also advocate anti-colonial solidarity among colored women and possibly North-South solidarity, if white feminists no longer “study down” women of color or other oppressed peoples, stop being complicit with the neo-liberal project of global patriarchal capitalism that corporatizes universities, and rely on colored women’s experiences and perspectives on how to create a just society (*ibid.*: 172, 174, and 235–44).

Feminists should also engage in forming a grassroots movement capable of articulating gender oppression and opposing imperialism through mobilizing transitional coalitions that bridge colored women’s various

experiences in the form of global solidarity. Transnational coalitions capable of challenging elite power (such as the World Social Forum and the anti-racist, anti-capitalist Feminism Without Borders) must also be forged to emancipate the oppressed from sources of neo-liberal insecurity and to create a new world. Both cultural and material, such coalitions can protest against capitalist institutions like the World Economic Forum and form alternative capitalisms that allow men and women of color to benefit from the market, stress political accountability, and allow for multiple voices to be heard (Agathangelou and Ling 2004).

Postmodern feminists also criticize both essentialist feminists who exalt traditional feminine virtues (questioning the assumption that women are victims of war and contending that men are also war victims) and liberal feminists who seek to incorporate women into the capitalist structures of security. They agree with postcolonial feminists who shift their attention from Western thought and regard colonialism and imperialism as institutions that have created a capitalist system that oppresses women. They also “problematicize” various forms of feminism that tend to regard women around the world as a unitary actor. Even women of color do not share the same experience of violence or oppression, and there is no one-size-fits-all masculinity, either.

Postmodernist feminists do not believe that women around the world can share a universal sisterhood, reminding other feminists that women have different experiences of gender oppression based on their own specific social, cultural, economic, and political conditions. Collective identity among women, therefore, does not exist. Women are neither biologically peaceful as essentialists think nor as capable of being aggressive as men as liberal feminists think, nor are they always culturally controllable or economically exploitable in the same ways, as radical or socialist feminists lead us to believe. Women are different in terms of class, race, age, sexuality, physical ability, historical experiences, and personal subjectivities.

These feminists also pay attention to the role of women in security politics. During wartimes, non-pacifist women became civil cheerleaders, and home-front helpmates. Their war-supporting roles included their activities as spouses, factory workers, government officials, parents of soldiers, and soldiers (Enloe 1983, 1990). Women have also been active players in foreign and security policy calculations. They take part in official or diplomatic meetings and help build trust and confidence between adversarial state officials in negotiations (Enloe 1990).

The modern state cannot serve as the emancipator for women because it “coercively and authoritatively constitutes the social order in the interest of men as a gender” (cited in Jones 1996: 411). Unlike realism, which views the state as objective in defending the so-called national interest, postmodern feminism views it as “not autonomous of sex,” although it may appear autonomous from social class. To talk about national security as realists

do is to overlook women's structural insecurity rooted in masculine activities. Even within the liberal state, “[m]ale power is systematic” (cited in *ibid.*: 411). The modern state—which requires the existence of an external enemy for it to come into being—is not the provider of security and must thus be problematized.

Postmodernist feminists also pay attention to prostitution on states' military bases. Challenging realism, they argue that military alliances cannot be fully understood apart from the masculinist state's need to maintain the masculine military ideology. Cynthia Enloe notes that “[n]one of these institutions—multilateral alliances, bilateral alliances, foreign military assistance programmes—can achieve their militarizing objectives without controlling women for the sake of militarizing men” (Enloe 1988: 85). Militarism is only a culture subject to change, however. Militarization as a form of violence against women can be resisted because this process depends “on certain ideas about femininity and on the labor and emotions of women” (Enloe 2000: 293). Even militarists are not invincible, because they “seem to believe that if women cannot be controlled effectively, men's participation in the militarizing enterprise cannot be guaranteed” (*ibid.*: 294). Women are not as powerless as often thought, but are made powerless only to the extent that societies impose dominant ideologies of male potency to discipline them.

Postmodern feminists pay attention to the question of knowledge being partial, incomplete, and representative of particular interests. Postmodern feminists blame grand teleologies of historic winners and losers, narratives based on triumphalist accounts of victories, and absolutist moralisms seeking “a unifying experience that total war or perpetual peace alone promises” (Elshtain 1987: 256). They remain skeptical about any all-inclusive feminist agenda aimed at promoting solidarity among all women based on their natural sisterhood or their universal experience of oppression.

Postmodern feminists formulate no comprehensive or grand strategy to undermine the masculine status quo, as socialist or radical feminists do, because women do not share the same political identity and allegiance. These feminists criticize “standpoint” feminism that engages in developing a common “vision of the world opposed to and superior to dominant ways of thinking” (Tickner 1992: 16). For them, “there are no right answers and no generalized prescriptions to be made. ‘Women and war’ is too complex a topic in which to promote the politics of the sound bite” (El-Bushra 2007: 145). Because of context-specific experiences, particular struggles vary; however, “the most important point is that each struggle contributes to a global climate that nourishes equity and social justice” (Peterson and Runyan 1999: 238).

One of the multiple ‘strategies’ is to show that there is no foundation for absolute truth. They seek to deconstruct oppressive languages that are gender-biased and “denaturalize” such concepts as sovereignty, nationalism,

dependency, globalization, and security. Language is what shapes intellectual thinking on security and can cause men of good will to behave in ways that can lead to irrational and immoral results. For instance, technostategic language reflects and shapes nuclear strategy. This language not only helps its speakers to maintain a feeling of control over the weapons, but also enables them to escape from thinking of themselves as potential victims of nuclear war. Human suffering and death are thus ignored by its speakers, despite the fact that many of them are on the whole nice men, even with liberal inclinations. The techno-strategic language we are willing to learn “not only limit[s] what we can say but also invite[s] the transformation, the militarization, of our own thinking” (Cohn 1987: 24).

Postmodern feminist optimism is based on the reconstructive task of creating alternative visions that will bring a more just and peaceful world. One task involves deconstructing militarist or realist discourse. Alternative voices will not be heard until militarism loses some of its power. People can also create rich and alternative voices through conversations with one another, through which a more just and peaceful world can be invented. Other “recommendations” include efforts to decrease structural inequalities by challenging neoliberal globalization, to expose the excesses of corporate capitalism, to decry exclusivist politics, to strengthen legitimate institutions capable of controlling violence and minimizing illicit activities, to promote cosmopolitanism, and to recognize the need for global community building. Feminist activists must carry out their activities on the basis of “context-specific experiences” (El-Bushra 2007: 144).

Still postmodern feminists “recognize that there are no right answers and no generalized prescriptions to be made” (El-Bushra 2007: 145). They thus cannot predict the future. Nothing is ever certain or invincible, because everything is subject to deconstruction and reconstruction. Postmodern feminists have no specific blueprint for the future with which to embark on their mission to emancipate women and men from masculine hegemonies or gender-based social injustices. “Strategies” may be adopted but only if they are appropriate within specific contexts and only if they include un-gendering divisions of power, violence, labor, and resources. Different voices of women must be heard so as to prevent any intellectual hegemony.

POSTCOLONIAL FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON SECURITY IN ASIA-PACIFIC

Some postcolonial feminists who have studied the Asia-Pacific believe that both Western colonialism and imperialism and the traditional masculinist discourse in East Asia have reinforced each other and thus made it possible for states in the region to become mutually competitive and prone to militarism, war, and violent repression.

Postcolonial feminism seems to agree with cultural feminism to the extent that the traditional discourse is of a masculinist nature. Cultures in East Asia have their particular mix of Confucianism, Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, Taoism, Shinto, and so on. However, “one strain persists—the patriarchal family.” From this perspective, “[p]atriarchal family relations predominate in East Asia” (Ling 2000: 173).

Modernization has not erased this masculine culture, since capitalist development began as a national family enterprise. Ling calls it “hypermasculinity” that “protects the patriarchal elite.” “Hypermasculine development” (which “uses family as an instrument of policy and predicates national modernization on modernizing the household”—which means regulating women) driven by the classic triad of family, state, and economy continues to maintain women’s exploitation and subordinate role with the patriarchal system. All this is based on an Asian belief that promotes “sage man” politics: namely, “only a wise man with the proper moral credentials can lead the nation” (Ling 2000: 177).

Japan, Korea, and China are particularly regarded by feminists as the foremost examples of hyper-masculinized states in East Asia. Imperial Japan, for instance, emerged as East Asia’s first Warrior Prince based on the imperial brotherhood of Japanese colonialism and imperialism. Japanese elites embraced the Western Other, learned from the latter and the Confucian role of benevolent parent to Asian dependents, and then sought to build what came to be known as the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. The Japanese quest for empire left a total of 30 million (including 3.1 million Japanese) dead and resulted in the forceful use of 300,000 “comfort women” (between 80% and 90% of them from Korea). Japan’s “co-prosperity doctrine represents the first results of interstitial transformation and postcolonial learning between Confucian governance and Western imperialism” (Ling 2002: 186). It has been alleged that the Japanese quest also victimized 300,000 people (including 80,000 women), who were bayoneted, beheaded, or executed in Nanking and the killing of over 40,000 Chinese and Eurasians in Singapore for their anti-Japanese sentiment. South Korea and China have done the same in terms of hyper-masculinizing the state and hyper-feminizing society, particularly women. Postcolonial feminists would also point to the exploitation of women by the masculinized state in South Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong for relying on their unskilled and cheap labor. Usually young and inexperienced, female workers were subject to unfair treatment when they married, sought to unionize, or fought for social benefits.

According to Ling (2002), hyper-masculinized states in East Asia—having been influenced by Western imperialism and Confucian paternalism that resulted in the “hybridization” between these two forms of masculinity, which gave rise to hypermasculinity—have competed with the West and each other. The West styled itself as a “Valiant Prince,” but the East (Other)

conjured itself as the “Warrior Prince,” who avenged the former’s plunder of the world. Western colonizers were first hyper-masculinized states and treated Asian states as “feminine” (submissive), but then state elites in the East also learned to do the same or even to out-masculinize the West. According to Ling, “[c]olonialism blurs the correlation between masculinity or femininity and biology. In naturalizing power as masculine, colonizers feminize all Others.” Moreover, this colonialist discourse helped “colonized men seek to retrieve their manhood by out-masculinizing the colonizers” (Ling 2000: 179).

Within Southeast Asia, Filipino women’s insecurity in particular has been traced back to the time when the country was still under Spanish colonial and American colonial rule. According to one writer, “the Philippines provides one of the clearest examples of how a nation’s colonial past and neo-colonial present are imbricated in an immensely elaborate pattern, its layers intricately overlapping but not indistinguishable, in the lives of Filipino women today” (Aguilar 1987: 511). The Spanish imposed a landlord system, which created insufferable conditions of forced labor, land tenure, and unfair and excessive taxation that led to frequent uprisings. The American colonizers preserved and extended the landlord system and left a colonial legacy. Unemployment, inflation, malnutrition, and militarization permeated Filipino women’s everyday lives. To boost tourism for economic development, “all moral scruples have been completely forsaken in favor of foreign exchange that has attained for the ‘hospitality industry’ the title of the third biggest dollar-earner” (*ibid.*: 514). Prostitution flourished, taking place in luxury hotels. Women received the honorific title of “hospitality girls” and were considered “professionals.” Major global institutions such as the World Bank practiced neo-colonial policies by turning Filipino women into exploited and oppressed migrant workers by their foreign employers; those at home were no less oppressed, however.

Feminist writings on Thailand contend that Western powers treated Thai women as if they really cared about the latter’s plight. For instance, they were critical of polygamy evident throughout Thai society, viewing such practice as “uncivilized” or non-modern, but they were in fact seeking to dominate Thailand by making its culture appear to be barbarian. Leslie Ann Jeffrey, for instance, asserts that since the early 19th century polygamy in Thailand had been a subject of Western condemnation: “By targeting gender and sexual practices such as polygamy as representative of the essential barbarity of Siamese culture, the imperial powers also made gender and sexuality a key terrain of the power struggle between colonized and colonizing countries” (Jeffrey 2002: 8). Since the early 20th century, prostitution has emerged as a political issue that Thailand must deal with. Thai elites adopted policies and signed a number of international treaties to please Western powers by abolishing prostitution in order for Thailand to become part of the international society of civilized states.

Postcolonial feminists thus view Western colonial legacies as perpetuating the international division of labor resulting in class and gender struggles. They reject liberal feminism because it offers few options for women and other feminized subjects in postcolonial societies. Regarding the question of who can provide for security, postcolonial feminists reject the patriarchal family, the patriarchal state, and hyper-masculinized Western as well as world institutions. Liberal or capitalist electoral democracy will not succeed in promoting peaceful relations among states or protecting the oppressed as long as these institutions remain hyper-masculinized. They reject any claims by Western feminists that only their traditions can “save” their “sisters” in Asia. The introduction of liberal democracy into postcolonial East Asia has reinforced the patriarchal system.

These feminists thus expect organized masses to make a historic shift from obeisance to foreign dictates to one where they can assume command of the national purpose. Filipino women are expected to develop a collective will to resist and challenge “male hegemony, reconstituted through the mediation of interlocking ideologies spawned by capitalist restructuring on a global scale” (Aguilar 1987: 523).

Postcolonial feminists studying the Asia-Pacific have developed several strategies, although their general prescription for social action remains largely normative. Coalition building, for instance, can wean hypermasculinity from reactionary repulsions, desires, and fears and should primarily target global capital. Worldwide activism has now been directed against globalizing processes, such as free trade and sex tourism, and “must retain sensibility to local diversities” (Ling 2002: 229).

One major problem with postcolonial feminism is that its proponents tend to assume that women of color share the same understanding of oppression. Japanese women, for instance, “find it difficult to share the difficulties and discrimination they face, and they cannot express the experiences of oppression as women with a common voice” (Bunch 1996: 3). Other Asian women may see their housework in a rather positive light. In Japan, for instance, they are treated as “professionals” and enjoy great respect. Other feminists note different social identities among Asian women: elite women, middle-class women, and peasant women. Peasant women became prostitutes, whereas elite women “guide women who had strayed from their proper roles—particularly prostitute women—by re-linking them to their (newly reconstituted) traditions and customs” in rural villages (Jeffrey 2002: 51). In East Asia, women joined revolutions for diverse reasons, many of which had little to do with gender consciousness. In Vietnam, for instance, some joined the communist movement for ideological reasons; others joined because of job opportunities, a spirit of adventure, political pressure, or fear (Taylor 1999: 55–56). All this raises questions of whether global feminist solidarity is possible and why postcolonial feminists believe

global feminist solidarity is superior to other forms of solidarity. As shall be discussed in the next chapter, postmodern feminism is better at shedding light on these questions.

POSTMODERN FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON SECURITY IN ASIA-PACIFIC

Postmodern feminists tend to dispute any argument for world solidarity among women. For them, some women are more insecure than others. In the United States, for instance, women married to non-military men do not suffer as much as those married to soldiers serving in the armed forces because the military expects them to behave a certain way. Women have to serve their husbands' sexual needs any time and are expected to be tolerant of their husbands' extramarital actions. Wives who follow their husbands when they are deployed out of the country are often under pressure to work in order to supplement their husbands' incomes, but their jobs (such as sewing and laundry) require non-military or low-tech skills and offer them low wages.

Postmodern feminists studying East-Asia security also focus their attention on the sexual subjugation of some women in and around U.S. military bases in former and present U.S. allies such as Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, and Vietnam, and draw diverse experiences from different women. Scholars and researchers have sought to advance their understanding on the basis of prostituted women's oral histories and photographs (Sturdevant and Stolzfus 1992). These women served American soldiers' sexual needs, which kept them in military bases on foreign soils. They point to the plight of Japanese women under U.S. control after World War II, when U.S. military commanders "imposed a ban on prostitution when they arrived," but Japan reinstated the policy of forced prostitution to help meet "sex-starved" U.S. soldiers' needs. Korean, Thai, and Filipino prostitutes were also pressed into service. During the war in Vietnam, Asian women were trucked in to nurse U.S. soldiers around the country (Enloe 2000: 230).

Prostitution has become a necessary and integral part of U.S. military operations in East Asia. Asian military prostitutes have been regarded as "players" in alliance maintenance. As noted, after World War II, the Japanese government redesigned the new prostitution system to satisfy American soldiers (Enloe 2000: 85), thereby sexualizing the U.S. military alliances with some East-Asian states. Since the 1950s, prostitutes in South Korea serving American soldiers as sex providers number more than a million, and they were considered South Korea's "personal ambassadors" responsible for improving bilateral civil-military relations between the two military allies. Korean prostitutes were under pressure from their own government to accommodate the demand by the U.S. forces in Korea with the purpose of promoting nondiscriminatory behavior toward black GIs stationed in South Korea and strict VD [venereal disease] control (Moon 1997). During the

Clean-Up Campaign in the 1970s, Korean *kijich'on* prostitutes became integral to the efforts of the U.S. forces in South Korea and the Korean government to secure Washington's military commitment to South Korea. American military men are not the only actors to blame. Other men who may have different forms of masculinity have also been involved, including local governments, local and foreign business entrepreneurs, and local men who as husbands have done their part to contribute and maintain militarized prostitution around military bases. Prostituted women have been subject to regulation, subordination, and violence. They have been accused of spreading AIDS among U.S. servicemen, although they were not necessarily the source of the disease. They live in poverty, experience maldevelopment, and are raped by military men (Sturdevant and Stolzfus 1992). Cynthia Enloe notes that "*insofar as the expansion or retraction of any foreign power's overseas bases increases or decreases the demand for women's sexual availability to male soldiers or sailors, the Pentagon's changing Asian strategy is a 'woman's issue'*" (Enloe 1983: 38).

Asian women, including prostitutes, also have the power to countervail American imperialism supported by its military bases and militarized masculinity. They question whether the U.S. military command would have been able to send young American men off on long and often tedious sea voyages and ground basing without access to sexualized "Rest and Recreation" (R & R). They question whether "many American servicemen would be able to sustain their own identities of themselves as manly enough to act as soldiers" if there had been "no myths of Asian women's compliant sexuality." As Enloe puts it, "the entire R & R policy and its dependent industry only work if thousands of Asian women are willing and able to learn what American military men rely on to bolster their sense of masculinity." In her view, "bar owners, military commanders, and local finance-ministry bureaucrats depend on Asian women to be alert to the differences among masculinities" (Enloe 1992: 23, 25).

Korean *kijich'on* prostitutes staged noisy and disruptive protests challenging U.S. domination and forcing a direct response from Washington and Seoul in the form of the Clean-Up Campaign. These women "were not simply passive victims of others' political and economic ambitions. . . . Although powerless in many respects, *kijich'on* women did voice their own interests, when push comes to shove, through private complaints and public protests. The Camptown Clean-Up Campaign, which was intended to improve channels of communication and cooperation in camptown politics, became the cork that plugged up the possibility of public protest by *kijich'on* prostitutes" (Moon 1997: 128). They helped forge Korean public resentment against US domination over their lives and used the Clean-Up Campaign's repressive tactics to advance their self-interest.

Postmodern feminists reject any grand strategy to ensure security. Liberal democracy is not the answer to women's insecurity. Even female

soldiers in the U.S. military do not enjoy the kind of respect they deserve. Men in the military give inadequate recognition to women's contributions, because masculinity is the most important requirement of the military establishment. The middle class, representing modernity, has played a role in penalizing women. In Thailand, for instance, the middle class does not support feminist activists' calls to support demands by prostitutes for better working conditions, but instead blames them for national cultural decline.

Postmodern feminists generally seek to listen to women's different voices and individual aspirations, as well as to engage in the politics of anti-hegemonic resistance and protest. National culture is not the only site of anti-hegemonic resistance. International and transnational organizations that promote Western norms, such as the United Nations, need to be challenged. Western cultural superiority in the realm of masculine supremacy over women's bodies must be exposed by revealing the Western attempt to dominate states in the developing world. The Western standards of civilization being imposed on women in Asian societies, such as Thailand, must thus be rejected.

These feminists do not necessarily treat prostitution as a form of violence, as other feminists do. For instance, they accept the fact that Korean prostitutes view education as a way to improve their lives and want their government to treat them fairly as well as to protect them. The way to ensure their personal security is to decriminalize their profession. Individual choice requires that women's individual voices must be respected. Prostitution in some East-Asian societies has come to be seen as something of a positive trade. Thai feminists had initially worked alongside Western feminists in advocating the total abolition of prostitution because of their shared view that "male sexual violence against women" was everywhere. Later, Thai feminists changed their position on prostitution, viewing prostitutes not just as passive victims of male sexual violence but as "active agents within limited circumstances" (Jeffrey 2002: 122). They could earn more money from prostitution in cities than they normally would in traditional industries such as handicrafts, sewing, and hairdressing. Prostitutes have come to be depicted as "wage earners" whose "income from prostitution is also dedicated to the education of siblings and children and is seen as an investment in future laborers or even as a step into the middle class" (ibid.: 131). NGOs—particularly the Foundation for Women or Education Means Protection of Women Engaged in Recreation—working to empower prostitutes came to view them as worthy of legal protection. Some rural women "are now considered the head of the household and . . . have a greater share of the decision-making power" (ibid.: 132).

In short, none of the grand strategies based on the French civilizing mission, American liberal capitalism, or Marxism-Leninism can ever hope to provide the optimal and ultimate liberation of nations because "they cannot even explain or cater to the everyday aspirations of [women]"

(Huynh 2004: 19). Postmodern feminists thus seek not to liberate women from what other feminists consider a threat to their security, but to learn to listen to their different voices and to accept their individual wishes.

Postmodern feminism has some theoretical and empirical strength. As discussed earlier, women in the Asia-Pacific do not share the same identity or interest. This perspective provides a broad framework that gives room for all feminists to overcome their irreconcilable differences through mutual respect, as well as the understanding that any attempts to universalize women's experiences falsely overlooks the plurality of their identities and voices. The experiences of women in the Asia-Pacific provide an empirical ground that can be used to question the positivist or universalistic argument made by any feminists who claim that women share the same experience of gender-based oppression. Even within the same society or culture, women are far from united.

Unsurprisingly, postmodern feminists have come under attack from their fellow feminists who see them as being subversive to women's causes. They have been accused of having "served more to exhaust than invigorate radical theorizing" (Segal 1999: 181). They are also condemned for their "patriarchal" attempt to undermine women's collective identity and to prevent women from acting together as a political movement to achieve their causes. Worse, postmodern feminists are accused of promoting conservatism, which allows those who enjoy the benefits of modernity to discredit any radical movements for change. If they seek to undermine the intellectual power of dominant discourses in their attempt to lead them into disarray, they can still be accused of providing no answer to the question "What will their alternatives be?"

Also problematic is the fact that there is still insufficient evidence suggesting that anti-imperialist feminist movements in East Asia have undermined the U.S. military presence in the region. In Japan, for instance, the anti-U.S. military base sentiment since the 1995 rape of a 12-year-old girl in Okinawa gave rise to explosive anger among the citizens of Okinawa and powerful movements against U.S. bases. Despite the rising local demand for U.S. base removal with the aim to prevent future sexual crimes by U.S. soldiers, the "solution" offered by the two governments "was nominal." "Although they made the symbolic gesture of returning the Futenma Air Station, they also decided to construct an SBF [sea-based facility] off the coast of Nago city, thereby maintaining the scope and size of U.S. military deployment in Okinawa" (Mikanagi 2004: 102). It remains unclear whether the recent plan to move thousands of troops at the U.S. military bases from Japan to Guam had much to do with the protests against the U.S. military after the 1995 rape incident. Feminist groups have a history of working at cross-purposes (Enloe 2000: 298).

Part VI

Nontraditional Security Studies

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Transnational Organized Crime

Transnational organized crime (TOC) has now become multifaceted and cannot be situated within a single theoretical tradition in Peace and Security Studies. When scholars study TOC as a transnational source of insecurity, they focus on the role of non-state actors rather than that of sovereign states; transnational criminal groups are not subject to the rules and norms of state sovereignty and are not territorially or politically restricted. Transnational crime has now been regarded as a growing, potent source of insecurity in the Asia-Pacific and a growing number of published works provides an assessment of transnational security issues in the region (Simon 2001; Hernandez and Pattugalan 1999; Carpenter and Wienczek 1996), particularly transnational organized crime. This chapter first focuses on TOC and then proceeds to discuss transnational terrorism, maritime security, piracy, and drug trafficking. Transnational crime requires transnational solutions, and while some progress has been made much more needs to be done. The political will for interstate cooperation in the region remains weak.

TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME IN ASIA-PACIFIC

Transnational organized crime has “evolved [over the past decade] from what was regarded as essentially a domestic issue to be handled by law enforcement agencies to a transnational phenomenon” (McFarlane 2001: 198). Both “[t]ransnational crime and terrorism can no longer be written off as ‘boutique’ regional security issues. These issues have become central to security

and international policy concerns in the post-Cold War era, extending far beyond the scope of conventional law enforcement" (McFarlane 2001: 219). Government officials have expressed concerns about the rise of TOC in various forms, particularly terrorism, piracy, and drug and human trafficking.

Transnational criminal groups operate across national boundaries and exist in both developed and underdeveloped states in the Asia-Pacific region. Some are more hierarchically or formally structured than others. In Japan, the *yakuza*—the country's mafia—is the Japanese umbrella term for organized crime. It has some 86,000 gang members armed with heavy weapons, such as hand grenades and anti-personnel mines. Rival *yakuza* crime syndicates battle for supremacy and engage in illegal businesses (such as prostitution, drug trafficking, and extortion). Chinese criminal organizations may have also grown in numbers and influence. The Chinese "triads" (secret societies that have been transformed into criminal organizations) number around 50 in Hong Kong, with at least 80,000 members. Vietnamese crime gangs are made up of members from both Vietnam and overseas Vietnamese communities. In addition, TOC in the post-Stalin Soviet Union went unrecognized by Moscow due to preoccupation with the Cold War. When this declining superpower disintegrated in the late 1980s, Russia and the newly independent states proved unable to control their borders, which led to the growth of transnational crime. The number of criminal organizations in Russia alone grew fast—from approximately 3,000 in 1992 to 5,700 in 1994 and to about 8,000 in 1996. Many of these criminal groups are also said to have taken control of private banks and have engaged in illegal transnational networks in other countries.

The proliferation of TOC is driven not only by money but also political power. The literature includes work on the following types of crimes: terrorism, piracy, money laundering, illegal immigration, transnational prostitution, drug trafficking, and human trafficking. These crimes pose a threat to security at various levels, none of which can be explained by realists, due to their state-centric, military focus. For example, terrorists do not use armed forces to defeat national forces and conquer states; they use violence against civilians to achieve political purposes (Kydd and Walter 2006). According to Phil Williams (1998: 265), "TOCs pose threats to security at three levels: the individual, the nation-state, and the international system of states." Louise Shelley (1995) regards TOC as a threat that will undermine international, national, regime, and human security.

In the Asia-Pacific, transnational organized crime has become an issue that threatens security at many different levels: military, political, economic, societal, and environmental. At the military level, scholars have focused on transnational sources of threat to national security. Some acknowledge that TOC is not yet a threat to the nation-state, but warn that it may undermine the state in the 21st century. States have already become vulnerable to various types of TOCs, and some transnational criminal groups are so well organized

that they can use force to challenge or undermine states, especially when the latter lack law enforcement capacity. Transnational crime can neutralize the military security of states. The military and law enforcement authorities in some regimes, such as those in Russia and North Korea, have been used for criminal or nefarious purposes. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the criminal groups involved with the *nomenklatura* fragmented into predatory gangs active in extortion and mafia capitalism. In Cambodia, China, and Indonesia, members of military establishments have engaged in business activities that ultimately involved them in criminal operations. Organized criminal groups in Myanmar have ties to former state institutions.

Transnational crime threatens political regimes by eroding their legitimacy (Chalk 1998) through such threats as serious banking fraud and trading malpractice. Examples include the 1989 U.S. Savings and Loan case, the 1991 Japanese securities affair, the 1995 Singapore Barings Bank scandal, and the 1997 Hanbo business scandal in South Korea. Russian mafia groups have controlled as many as 70% of Russian banks and in most cases have used threats of violence to achieve their political goals. Wealthy groups bribe state officials—even judges—to help them carry out their criminal activities. In Japan, South Korea, China, Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines, ruling elites are said to have lost credibility due to corruption scandals, which also cause political or regime instability. According to John McFarlane (2001: 211–12), “There is little doubt that corruption, cronyism, and deals between some business corporations and organized crime contributed to the 1997 Asian financial crisis.”

Transnational criminal groups can also threaten societal and human security. Even if they have no power to undermine state authority, criminal activities often threaten human rights and, potentially, national and international security. If states become unstable and repressive, the likelihood of conflict between states is greater, as the democratic peace thesis would suggest.

Transnational crime has also been perceived as a threat to the environment itself. According to Louise Shelley (1995: 471), “because organized crime groups are oriented towards immediate profits, their activities (cultivating drugs on unsuitable soil, harvesting, and selling of protected species and illegally over-fishing sturgeon for the lucrative caviar trade) often lead to serious environmental damage.” Illegal logging in Cambodia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand, for instance, has had a significant impact on environmental security. Foreign companies have cleared native forests by fire, which has worsened smog and atmospheric pollution. These companies are often well protected because of their links to powerful elites, such as those in Cambodia, Indonesia, and Malaysia. Such fires have damaged the environment (as well as “caused deaths and illnesses among thousands of people in the region”) (McFarlane 2001: 216).

What the literature implies is that political realism and other traditional perspectives on security can no longer adequately address the question of what

constitutes security. With growing interdependence and the speed and ease of modern international communications, national borders have become increasingly penetrable. States are said to be less and less capable of controlling what comes into them, and world trade has expanded enormously. Global exports in 1970 totaled U.S. \$1.27 trillion, U.S. \$2.3 trillion in the 1980s, and U.S. \$3.3 trillion in 1990. By the mid-1990s, the volume had increased to U.S. \$4.3 trillion. The number of dry cargo containers rose to over eight million in 1994 from around six million in 1990 (Williams 1998: 251).

Other scholars further question the relevance of realism due to a shift in the role of national militaries from waging war to crime-fighting. Peter Andreas and Richard Price, for instance, see a growing gap between concepts of traditional security and the contemporary practice of security policy, because the number of violent geopolitical conflicts among advanced industrialized states has declined. Instead of defining their security interests in terms of war or war preparations, most of these states have now defined them in terms of crime-fighting. There exists a trend toward a militarization of policing and a domestication of soldiering, blurring the distinctions between war-fighting and crime-fighting. As Andreas and Price put it, “far from simply disappearing, the role of the advanced state’s externally oriented coercive apparatus has been shifting from warfighting to crimefighting functions” (Andreas and Price 2001: 35).

In the United States, the discourse on security is changing from external military threats to the threats of global terrorism, such as the smuggling of nuclear material and drug trafficking. There has been a change in the exercise of power in the war against such crimes. Initially designed to deter military invaders, military equipment and technologies have been converted to deter transnational law evaders like drug traffickers. Meanwhile, law enforcement organizations have also sought to promote military technology for their own purposes. Moreover, there has been more cooperation between the intelligence community, which was originally designed to deal with geopolitical rivalries, and the law enforcement community, which was designed to deal with domestic matters. The military has even expanded its role to include external and internal law enforcement tasks, such as drug control and humanitarian missions.

States in Southeast Asia began to securitize transnational crime in 1996–97, when ASEAN leaders added the issue to their security agenda. They regarded TOC to be a threat to security, the rule of law, and the social and moral fabrics of their societies. The ASEAN states institutionalized the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime and a Senior Officials’ Meeting on Transnational Crime, adopted joint actions such as the 1999 ASEAN Plan of Action to Combat Transnational Crime, and pledged to enhance their collective efforts and consolidate their cooperation (Emmers 2003). More plans of policy actions against TOC were adopted in the subsequent years.

Other analysts of TOC continue to regard states as the main actor in the provision of security, but see the necessity of international cooperation

among them and with non-state actors. According to McFarlane, “no state can defeat a criminal threat that is generated from outside its jurisdiction without developing sound working relations and cooperation with neighboring states and adopting international ‘best practices’” (McFarlane 2001: 219). Sovereign states must enhance cooperation if they want to defend or enhance their national or regime security, to ensure the security of their population and citizens, and to protect the security of their environment. States must therefore coordinate imaginative and constructive regional and international responses. States must enhance their cooperation in their war against transnational crime and mobilize other legitimate transnational organizations—banks, airlines, and freight transportation companies—to assist them in these efforts.

Various methods for dealing with transnational criminal groups include military, diplomatic, law enforcement, and intelligence cooperation among states, which must have appropriate resources, professional skills, regulatory regimes, highly developed criminal intelligence and analytical capabilities, and dynamic and modern criminal justice systems. Legalists further advocate close cooperation between the law enforcement community and legal organizations. They argue that the solution to this source of environmentally rooted insecurity is not to militarize it, but to establish the rule of law and strengthen law enforcement agencies. Most transnational criminal activities should be treated as falling within the realm of international and domestic law enforcement. Some propose that the International Criminal Court should also prosecute terrorists and drug traffickers. So far there has been no consensus on this proposal, because there is no single definition of terrorism acceptable to all and because the inclusion of other types of crimes (such as drug trafficking) would stretch the Court’s resources too thin.

There is little evidence that states in the Asia-Pacific have been very successful in combating TOC, and they have not effectively translated TOC into a common security concern. Ralf Emmers (2003) argues that states in ASEAN still consider TOC a criminal issue rather than a security issue. Transnational criminal groups have become more technically sophisticated and thus more difficult to deal with. Many political regimes remain corrupt, subject to economic consideration during the development of market economies and inter-agency rivalries within states, driven by economic nationalism and still sensitive to the issue of national sovereignty (McFarlane 2007: 234–35).

TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM IN ASIA-PACIFIC

Growth in global networks has increasingly nurtured transnational terrorism. According to Thomas Homer-Dixon (2002: 56), “[t]errorists and other malicious individuals can magnify their own disruptive power by exploiting these features of complex and interconnected networks.” These

groups have not only collaborated with one another and with localized terrorist organizations, but also with established cartels (such as organized narcotics traffickers and arms smugglers), who can penetrate national boundaries. For some, the Asia-Pacific has emerged as the region “most affected” by transnational terrorism and “fertile ground for the birth of numerous indigenous groups and the recipient of a substantial number of foreign terrorist groups” (Gunaratna 2003: xi). In Southeast Asia, regional terrorist networks have been established within states. Islamic organizations—particularly the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the Philippines, and Jemiah Islamiah (JI) with its over- and underground networks stretching from southern Thailand to Australia—have been penetrated by Al Qaeda. The alleged spiritual leader of JI, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, even praised bin Laden for his terror. Some scholars claim that Militant Islam has emerged in the Malay Archipelago or maritime Southeast Asia, characterizing this as a “second front” in the war against terrorism (Tan 2003). Two other Asian states, Pakistan and Uzbekistan, are considered to be “front-line” states in this conflict (Foot 2004). Other security experts, however, dispute these transnationalist views, contending that they ignore local dynamics because terrorist groups operate within states, are highly fragmented, and are not subordinated to extra-regional terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda (Fealy and Thayer 2008).

Transnational terrorism challenges the realist assumptions that states are unified actors in international politics and that the main source of threat to their national security is of a military nature presented by other states. Terrorist attacks on modern states have often been driven by a religious commitment by radical Islamists (non-state actors operating within and across states) to set up greater Islamic states through immediate *jihad* (holy war) aimed at seizing power. Contemporary terrorists have advocated the need to establish a “vanguard of the *umma*” (community of believers), by condemning ruling elites (who allowed modern societies to deviate from the teachings of Allah) as “apostates” of Islam (those considered guilty of deserting this religious faith), capturing state power and using it as a military base to wage war against the “distant enemies” of Islam until the entire world recognizes the sovereignty of Allah (Pavlova 2003: 33). Scholars have identified Jemiah Islamiah (JI), active in Southeast Asia, as seeking to form an Islamic state or a purist pan-Islamic nation (*Daulah Islamiah*)—a regional state that would include Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the southern Philippines, Singapore, and southern Thailand (Claridge 2003: 48; Noor 2003: 162). JI “attempted to overthrow the central governments in Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta and replace them with an Islamic state ruled by the *sharia* [the Islamic legal code]” (Tan 2003: 113).

Transnational terrorism also poses a threat to economic security and various private sectors, including trade and commerce (Claridge 2003). The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on

11 September 2001 were considered a threat to the economic security of the United States. The Bali bombings in Indonesia on 12 October 2002 badly hurt the country's economy. According to Stefan Eklöf Amirell (2006: 57), "a number of developments in the wake of the 9/11 attacks indicate that international terrorists have developed plans for an attack in the Straits of Malacca." Both rich and poor countries have thus suffered from terrorism, although wealthy countries may be particularly vulnerable. According to Homer-Dixon (2002: 52), "[f]ast-paced technological and economic innovations may deliver unrivalled prosperity, but they also render rich nations vulnerable to crippling, unanticipated attacks."

The academic literature further reveals that transnational terrorism is now posing a growing threat to societal and human security. Transnational terrorism not only threatens specific nation-states and political regimes, but also, at the level of ideas, the liberal democratic order and human civilization itself (Sahni 2003: 19). Transnational terrorists whose members use violence in a premeditated, politically motivated manner primarily target civilians or non-combatants as an attempt to influence an audience. Former U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry considers the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 (which killed almost 3,000 people) to be a "hatred to murder innocent civilians" and an "outrage against humanity" (Perry 2001: 31). In East Asia, the Bali bombings killed more than 200 people in Indonesia. A wave of terrorist attacks shook the region after that, including the August 2003 bombing of the Marriott Hotel in Jakarta and other smaller attacks across Indonesia and the Philippines. Some terrorism experts worry that "[h]ardening of government targets will cause a displacement of the threat to softer targets, making civilians more prone to terrorist attacks" (Gunaratna 2003: 150). In Japan, the cult group Aum Shinrikyo was involved in the development of chemical and biological agents. The threat of unconventional weapons, such as the cult's sarin attack on a Tokyo subway in March 1995, further shows that future terrorists will try to find ways to make use of them (Stern 1999).

Different perspectives offer different solutions to terrorism. Some realists do not consider terrorism to be transformative of the international system; others press for increased spending on defense, warn against complacency about one's international popularity or one's ability to enjoy international support, recommend that failed states be rebuilt (which can pose a national security problem), and recommend multilateral strategies to combat terrorism. Stephen Walt (2001/02) advocates a multilateral institutional approach that reduces the perceived U.S. threat to the rest of the world. Although some realists urge the United States to become more generous, their thinking remains non-liberal because they believe that multilateral institutions do not constrain great powers' behavior but help to diffuse responsibility for intervention (such as rebuilding failed states). They defend the case for devolution of regional security responsibility to states in

other regions or to regional organizations and a gradual reduction of U.S. forward military presence. Australia and the United States, for instance, have so far offered support to ASEAN states in counterterrorism efforts. The Philippine counterterrorism forces have received training and worked with the U.S. Special Operations Forces, the FBI, the CIA, and the Agency for International Development.

Non-realist scholars question whether draconian tactics based on military strength can appropriately deal with the threat of terrorism in the Asia-Pacific. The long-term solution to this problem is to deal with the fundamental causes of such militancy, which “cannot be addressed by the use of force” (Tan 2003: 134). Some believe that the private sector should serve as the “vanguard of the war on terrorism” and cooperate with the public sector. Terrorism thrives on illegal activities and transfers funds through conventional banking and business entities. Still others think that promoting international trade helps reduce terrorist activities, for trade coupled with foreign aid helps poor countries prosper. There is a relationship between terrorism and international economic isolation; states that sponsor or turn a blind eye to terrorists include North Korea, which does not belong to the World Trade Organization. Some press for more equitable economic development to address the problem of marginalization experienced by poor Muslims. They see such development as the solution, because fundamental grievances underlie armed Muslim rebellion in Southeast Asia.

Still others think that trade and economic development are insufficient and advocate instead the promotion of democracy as the strategy to combat transnational terrorism. The United States and states in ASEAN are seen to have adopted illiberal measures that have allowed the political elites to entrench their authoritarian governments and their regime interest in destroying their political opponents, whether they are terrorists or not. Liberals call for measures to promote democracy in terrorism-infested states. They see a clear link between transnational terrorism and political authoritarianism. They call on state leaders such as those in the United States to adopt democratization in countries with repressive regimes as a counterterrorism strategy in the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks. Democratic institutions enable peaceful reconciliation of grievances and provide channels for participation in policymaking. This strategy offers a powerful alternative that can help address the underlying political conditions that have fueled the rise of Islamic extremism.

Reformers also favor democracy promotion. Anwar Ibrahim (a Muslim, former deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, and now a member of parliament), for instance, argues that “Osama bin Laden and his protégés are the children of desperation; they come from countries where political struggle through peaceful means is futile. In many Muslim countries, political dissent

is simply illegal. . . . Of greatest urgency is the work to inculcate an intellectual temper and political orientation that promote democracy and openness" (Ibrahim 2001). According to Farish Noor (2003: 196), "[m]ilitant cells" or "terror networks" are not the root causes of transnational terrorism; the lack of democracy, human rights, rule of law, and transparency in the running of state affairs is. Antiterrorism measures include developing a voice of Islam "committed to universal and humanitarian principles" (a voice "that would criticize the abuse of power both at home and abroad") and a state that can "turn itself into a democracy, to show that Islam is indeed compatible with the values of a progressive, liberal and pluralist age."

Still others see the need to promote democracy inclusive of both activist and militant Islamist groups that reject calls to arms but have experienced frustration with the political and social status quo. The United States and its allies should do what they can to prevent these non-terrorist groups from becoming terrorists and should conduct a dialogue aimed at establishing "a discursive political space" that would bring them "into a mainstream discourse. . . . By fostering participation and a sense of ownership over the democratic process," they say, "such a strategy would also make it harder for the violent Islamist fringe to secure fresh recruits" (Wright-Neville 2004: 42, 43).

Some scholars argue that political opportunities and socioeconomic as well as cultural conditions in disaffected regions must improve first before we hope to see a reduction in Islamic radicalism (Rabasa 2003). From this perspective, an effective strategy for counterterrorism is to promote democracy, not only by encouraging participation in electoral processes, but also, more importantly, by improving civil liberties, such as freedom of expression, assembly, association, education, and cultural or religious values. In addition, governments should refrain from indiscriminate attacks, torture, searches, seizures, and infringements on due process. Liberal democracies appear to make "superior counter-terrorists" (Abraham 2007). The counterterrorism strategy to adopt democratic rule appears to be most effective, but only if it can also address various domestic challenges. This is where the work by Fealy and Thayer (2008) is most helpful because of its emphasis on local conditions and dynamics.

The academic literature on terrorism in Southeast Asia tends to lean toward the growing politics of social or religious identity. Some, such as Elina Noor (2003: 171–73), attribute this to the grievances that Muslims have experienced worldwide, particularly the Israeli-Palestinian issue. The sources of terrorism include the global spread of Western values, such as secular humanism and individual liberties, feminism rejecting "family values," fear of chaos, trauma, envy, despair, and humiliation (Stern 2002: 6). One way to reduce terrorist activity is to change mechanisms that have alienated and humiliated people. The United States should thus provide no support for any policy aimed at promoting Western liberal cultural values and should not

seek to dominate other civilizations, especially those in Muslim countries. Others give attention to Muslims' "fundamental grievances," deeply rooted religious identity, politico-social domination by other ethnic and religious groups, and historical humiliation, such as Thailand's previous policy of cultural assimilation and religious discrimination against Muslims, as well as socioeconomic disparities. The Moro rebellion in the Philippines, for instance, can be traced back to colonial history when Islamization of the country was halted by the Spaniards' arrival in 1565 and then by the U.S. takeover in 1898. After that the identity-driven situation worsened when Catholic settlers from the north arrived, turning the Moros into a minority in parts of their traditional homeland.

Overall, transnational terrorism remains a contested security issue in the Asia-Pacific. Weak regional responses to modern terrorism reveal that regional organizations remain unable to agree on the degree of terrorist threat to their security. According to Tan (2003: 131), "the failure of ASEAN, and of its associated multilateral forums such as the ASEAN Regional Forum, in dealing with a range of recent economic and security issues does not bode well for regional cooperation in the war against terrorism." There is as yet no effective coordination among ASEAN and ARF members to combat terrorism (Simon 2007: 127). Neither ASEAN nor the ARF has provided leadership in developing anti-terrorism strategy (McFarlane 2007: 222). One critical challenge is that the threat of terrorism is more local than transnational (Fealy and Thayer 2008).

Moreover, counterterrorism appears to have hardened state security interests. The Bush Administration declared war not only on the stateless terrorists, but also on states that harbor them. Japan intensified its efforts to give its military a more muscular role in international security. Antiterrorism provided a temporary opportunity for states to cooperate, but some (especially Russia and China) wasted no time in consolidating state power by taking repressive violent action against Muslim dissenters (in Xinjiang and Chechnya, for example). According to Dittmer (2002: 65), "The 'war' cannot . . . really be said to have initiated a new era in world politics, at least as perceived from East Asia."

In short, the war against terrorism in the Asia-Pacific has not been won. The East-Asian experiences still show that democratic rights and civil liberties may have helped reduce the threat of terrorism, but do not eliminate it. The bombings at the JW Marriott and Ritz-Carlton hotels in Indonesia in July 2009 show that new democracies' terror fight remains weak. One problem may have to do with the fact that Indonesia's anti-terror campaign has been institutionally ineffective in seeking to uproot religious groups that breed extremism. Radical clerics are still allowed to operate freely and extremists can still recruit and raise money for their causes. Indonesia is still learning how to strike a balance between anti-terrorism measures and its newfound democracy.

PIRACY AND DRUG AND HUMAN TRAFFICKING IN ASIA-PACIFIC

Other unconventional transnational sources of threat to security include maritime security, piracy, and illicit drug trafficking (Williams and Black 1994). Maritime security in particular commands growing attention, largely because the region is a “community of maritime nations” (most, excluding landlocked Laos, have significant maritime frontiers) that have “strong maritime interests” with “commercial and strategic significance.” These states depend heavily on unimpeded access to raw materials, markets, and investment opportunities. In their view, “maritime issues are at the forefront of current regional security concerns” (Paik and Bergin 2000: 177). (The recent spate of pirate hijackings off the coast of Somalia, for instance, has made piracy a growing security challenge. Warships from states around the world, including those of NATO, have now been engaged in anti-piracy operations there.)

Although piracy is not a new menace to security in East Asia (pirates have been active throughout history along the coast of China and in the seas off Southeast Asia), modern piracy has become more frequent, more sophisticated, and more violent. Some analysts have traced this transnational crime back to colonial eras. Before the arrival of colonial powers in East Asia, the relationship between piracy and seaborne trade was quite simple, but it became more complex when European colonial powers (Portugal, Spain, Holland, and Britain) used piracy “as a means to control seaborne trade and to expand their influence and domains” over the region (Xu 2006: 221–22, 238). Others observe a relationship between piracy and recent globalization (Ong-Webb 2006: xiv).

A large number of piratical attacks in the world today occur in the East and South China seas, including the vicinity of the Straits of Malacca (Abhyankar 2006: 7). Southeast Asia shares about 75% of all piracy incidents worldwide—an increase to 285 in 1999 from 107 in 1991. Modern pirates are “well-organized criminal gangs who plan their attacks carefully” and “are prepared [to act with force and to] kill or maim] in accomplishing their goal” (Campbell and Gunaratna 2003: 82). Some pirates still use swords or knives, while “others have turned to firebombs, pistols, automatic weapons, and rocket-propelled grenades” (*ibid.*: 80). Countries that have suffered from pirate attacks include Indonesia, which (with a record of 121 attacks in 2003) by itself accounts “for a quarter of the world’s reported attacks” (Ong-Webb 2006: xv).

Transnational pirates are said to pose a growing threat to national, economic, and individual security. According to Carpenter and Wiencek (1996: 79), “Piracy is more than a commercial nuisance that poses a limited risk to persons and property in the shipping industry. It entails larger costs. It is a strategic threat.” Some security analysts have sought to link maritime terrorism to piracy. They view pirate attacks in Southeast Asian

waters as continuing to “demonstrate significant vulnerabilities for terrorists to exploit maritime security” (Fort 2006: 24). Operating in a decentralized, highly networked modern organization, terrorists “have emulated pirates and staged surface attacks, both to send a political message and to accumulate general cargo.” They use fast boats to help them fire “at ships mostly with RPGs, LAWs and heavy machine-guns including .30 and .50 calibre guns” (Campbell and Gunaratna 2003: 79). Maritime targets include seaports, international cruise lines, and warships. In February 2000, for instance, the MILF attacked the vessel *Our Lady Mediatrix* in the Philippines, leaving 40 dead and 50 wounded. In 2000–01 and 2002, in other instances, al-Qaeda and its associate groups planned suicide attacks on U.S. and British warships in the Straits of Malacca and Gibraltar, respectively. According to two analysts, “In January of 2002, Singapore intelligence discovered sophisticated and detailed reconnaissance information of U.S. naval facilities and ships in the region gathered by Al Qaeda reconnaissance teams. Multiple simultaneous attacks had been planned for the following month” (Campbell and Gunaratna 2003: 77). Local insurgents in the Southern Philippines “have links to groups such as the JI and al-Qaeda.” The MILF and the ASG, for instance, “have been involved in violent acts that qualify as political piracy but border on maritime terrorism because of their indiscriminate use of violence against civilians” (Amirell 2006: 63).

Scholars have offered countermeasures that include state policies, ASEAN initiatives, and the role of private security companies. Individual states “have undertaken . . . unilateral and bilateral ventures against piracy” (Shie 2006: 178). Littoral states increased their individual patrols in 2001 after the shockingly high number of piratical attacks in the Straits of Malacca the year before. One of the most radical proposals was to create permanent ocean-peacekeeping fleets conducting multinational patrols in both national and international waters. ASEAN has treated piracy as a connection to terrorism and has introduced a plan of action (*ibid.*: 176–77). In February 2002, Jakarta dispatched six warships to the Straits and both Malaysia and the Philippines conducted a six-day joint naval exercise. In 2003, more joint anti-piracy drills were conducted. Japan became involved with Indonesia and the Philippines, and the United States offered intelligence and financial support. Since the mid-1990s, Japan has made efforts to play a leading role in combating piracy in Southeast Asia. Private military and security companies have also provided a variety of anti-piracy services (Liss 2006: 111–13). Others, however, argue that countermeasures directed at piracy prove ineffective if poor socioeconomic conditions persist. Mark Valencia (2006: 88), for instance, contends that pirates do not have the same objectives as terrorists, who operate on the basis of “generally political and religious ideology. . . . For pirates, the motivating factor is economics.”

Overall concerns about maritime security have become legitimate in that they point to the possibility of terrorists using piratical tactics to achieve their objectives. Still, evidence suggesting the link between terrorism and piracy remains tenuous. One analyst notes that “as far as hard evidence or even credible indications go, there is little to suggest that the threat [of piracy and terrorism] is imminent” (Amirell 2006: 63).

Some scholars observe that the means to combat piracy remain inadequate as attempts to discourage piracy have proved ineffective. The International Chamber of Commerce’s International Maritime Bureau (IMB) established the Regional Piracy Center in Malaysia, in 1992. But according to Carpenter and Wiencek (2006: 85), there are “jurisdictional gaps between law enforcement and military agencies.” With some exceptions, “the nations that have observed the new menace of piracy do not seem inclined to send naval forces either to escort threatened merchant ships or to establish anti-piracy patrols in areas of frequent incidents” (ibid.: 87).

Moreover, the academic literature on piracy as a security threat still reveals analytical limitations. Has the military role of national navies in the region now been transformed from the defense of national territorial waters to the prevention of transnational maritime crime? While there is evidence suggesting that this has been the recent trend, states in the region have yet to forsake their geo-strategic interests. The Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) has funded conferences attended by coast guard officials from ASEAN states, helped equip their boats deployed to combat pirates (and terrorists), and has even “taken another step toward ending its self-imposed ban on the export of arms and providing military aid to neighboring states” (Samuels 2007: 80). The Japan Coast Guard has now become a *de facto* fourth branch of the military. This fits nicely with U.S. efforts to build up the Regional Maritime Security Initiative for the Malacca Straits by incorporating other major states in East Asia, such as Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, and Singapore, into its strategic fold (Pang 2007: 19).

Worldwide networks of illicit drug trafficking are additional examples of rising transnational crime with security implications. Transnational crime collects about \$1.1 trillion per year, with illicit drug trafficking alone exceeding \$400 billion per year, accounting for about 8% of total international trade. One scholar sees a change from “Cold War geopolitics to post-Cold War geopolitics” (Griffith 1993–94).

Illicit drug trafficking, including heroin, cocaine, and other stimulant substances, such as amphetamines and methamphetamines, has emerged as a growing source of insecurity in the Asia-Pacific since the early 1990s (Friman 1991, 1996a&b). In Dupont’s view, “the illicit drug trade is emerging as a significant long-term security issue for the region” (Dupont 1999: 434). Some see a “vicious spiral” in which the illicit narcotics industry, violence, corruption, and other challenges to national and regime security

“feed on each other and grow” (Seccombe 1997: 292). Drug production can destabilize countries through large-scale violence, especially in places where ethnic groups make their living by cultivating illegal crops and producing illegal drugs. They use arms to defend themselves and hinder authorities from eradicating their products. In Myanmar, for example, armed insurgent groups involved in drug cultivation and production include the United Wa State Army (UWSA) and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA). Myanmar has been seriously affected by drug traffickers, who have challenged the country’s national sovereignty. According to one study, “[Myanmar]’s sovereignty arguably is as much under threat from the anti-state imperatives of criminal trafficking in heroin and ATS as it has been from ethnic separatists or insurgents” (Dupont 1999: 454–55). In other states, such as China, Laos, Vietnam, and Thailand, although “drug traffickers pose a less severe” threat, they are still a “significant threat to the state. Their activities and operations violate the sanctity of the region’s borders and weaken the authority of national governments, especially when carried with the connivance of officials responsible for security and customs.” Drug traffickers also challenge “East Asian states’ traditional monopoly of power and taxation” (*ibid.*).

The end of the Cold War has not reduced the security dynamics of the drug trade in East Asia. Drug trafficking can still hinder prospects of economic development and integration into the international community. Pressure on one government by another driven by the latter’s need to combat drug trafficking can still create tension between them. The trade in methamphetamines from South Korea, Taiwan, and China also challenges Japanese policymakers. Drug issues might even “emerge as the primary areas of dispute between the United States and Japan” (Friman 1991: 890).

Illicit drug trafficking can also threaten regime security. Drug trafficking distorts economic and development priorities, imposes enormous social and health costs, corrupts the political process, and weakens state capacity to govern. According to Dupont (1999: 447), “In virtually every country in the region, corrupt government officials and members of the security forces have been recruited by organized crime.”

Drug trafficking has become a growing threat to human security as well. While illicit crops and drugs threaten to reduce the standards of governance, they also have a negative effect on the quality of life. Myanmar, often cited as a leading country involved in drug trafficking, has witnessed related insurgency, corruption, and human rights violations. The number of drug addicts has risen in recent decades and the spread of drug use has posed a growing risk to human health. Even innocent civilians with no direct contact to illicit drug producers or traffickers have emerged as potential criminal targets of law-enforcement agencies within their countries and without.

Scholars have proposed ways to deal with this source of threat to national, regional, regime, and human security. In 1984, U.S. President

Ronald Reagan declared the “war on drugs.” A militarization of policing and a domestication of soldiering have evolved, thus blurring “traditional boundaries occurring in the post-Cold War era . . . between an internally oriented domestic police sphere and an externally oriented military sphere” (Andreas and Price 2001: 32). The “low politics of policing” has become “high politics” and “there is a growing fusion between the world of military affairs and the world of police affairs” (ibid.: 52). In Japan, anti-drug enforcement is also aimed at penalizing local drug users and transnational dealers (such as members of the *yakuza* and Korean criminal groups), using methods such as compulsory hospitalization, education campaigns, uncovering clandestine domestic laboratories and distributors, deportation of those running factories, and tough, long-term imprisonment.

Bilateral and multilateral cooperation in the war on drugs has become increasingly evident. In September 1989, for instance, U.S. President George Bush and Japanese Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki declared their “global partnership” on this front. Under U.S. pressure in the early 1990s, Japan also began to provide economic assistance to drug-exporting countries, especially those in Southeast Asia. Others argue for multilateral cooperation. Because East Asia has become a major drug market (encompassing not only Myanmar, Thailand, and Laos, but also China and Vietnam), they have called for a multilateral approach to boost international cooperation among states in the region. Unilateral and bilateral cooperation is still needed, but without substantial regional cooperation to ensure a more comprehensive and effective regional response (possibly in the ARF framework), the threat of illicit trafficking will become difficult to deal with. The ARF’s second-track forums, such as the CSCAP Working Group on Transnational Crime, were seen as a step in the right direction, but more direct involvement by states in the region is required (Dupont 1999: 455). ASEAN states have declared their goal to transform Southeast Asia into a drug-free region by 2015 and have formally sought to cooperate with other states (such as China) and international organizations (such as the U.N. Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention).

Using military means to combat the drug trade may encourage military invasion through “search and destroy” missions, however, critics view any militarization of the drug issue as further deterioration of the poor human rights situations in recipient or producer countries. State authorities have resorted to violence and abused human rights under pressure from donors to eradicate illicit crops or the production and exportation of illicit drugs. Some argue in favor of “harm minimization” and point out that the war on illicit drugs remains unrealistic; it treats drug users as criminals and addresses the problem militarily. States should instead treat drugs as a health problem. Alternatives to anti-drug prohibition and legal enforcement thus might include differentiation of various types of drugs, legalization of drug use, and controlled availability.

The extent to which illicit drug trafficking has now become a serious security issue is subject to disagreement. Dupont (1999) bemoans the fact there is little analysis of the drug trade in East Asia and its impact on regional security. Moreover, not all scholars and policymakers view drug trafficking as a serious threat to security. Friman (1996a), for instance, focuses his analysis on Japanese relations with South Korea, Taiwan, and China, and contends that “the drug trade has not emerged as a primary security threat for Japanese policymakers in the aftermath of the Cold War.”

In the Asia-Pacific, human trafficking has also been regarded as a non-traditional source of threat to humans trafficked for various illegal purposes, such as exploitative labor and sexual exploitation. According to the International Labor Organization, the number of people in forced labor as a result of trafficking is 1,360,000. Approximately 98% of those subject to sexual exploitation are women and girls. This transnational source of threat remains clandestine; states in East Asia still do not have comprehensive counter-trafficking measures to prevent victims from falling through the cracks and to ensure their need for protection. On the contrary, victims are often treated as illegal migrants considered to have broken the law (NTS-Asia Secretariat 2009: 5).

Economic and Environmental Security

The causal relationship between economics and security is nothing new (Friedberg 1991). In the Asia-Pacific, the concepts of economic and environmental security have in recent decades received growing attention from both scholars and policymakers, yet disagreement among them continues. For some observers, economic and environmental problems are viewed as sources of tension and conflict between and within states; for others, they provide new opportunities for international and transnational cooperation. To what extent have states in the region taken this transnational source of insecurity to heart? The literature on economic security shows that states and other actors have taken interest in the relationship between economics and security, but it has not been until recent years that scholars began to pay closer attention to the relationship between sustainable development and the need to secure the environment. The literature also reveals a high degree of pessimism with regard to the collaborative role of the state, international organizations, and non-state actors. Much of what has been written on the Asia-Pacific's economic and environmental security still lacks analytical rigor.

ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY IN A NUTSHELL

As a central component of comprehensive security, economic development can be traced back to the Great Depression in the 1930s. After World War II, the United States also adopted the Marshall Plan and established

the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (known as the World Bank). According to Christopher Rudolph (2003: 8), “changing ideas and interests specific to the postwar period provided the incentives to adopt a more comprehensive view of security. . . .” In the developing world, the process of decolonization is usually followed by the need to ensure economic growth.

More recently, the concept of economic security departs further from the earlier concept of economic vulnerability at the state level because it places emphasis on unwanted and dangerous spillovers from open borders and the risks of economic volatility. According to Miles Kahler (2004), globalization has undermined the realist notion of economic security defined in terms of states’ economic vulnerability to other states. A new form of economic insecurity is associated with risks posed by transnational networks of non-state actors producing undesirable economic and political outcomes at the national level (such as loss of jobs). Scholars have identified economic roots of domestic conflict associated with capitalist production and the system of market governance.

Some, such as Kahler (2004), argue that national institutions remain central to the provision of economic security under conditions of globalization, but add that other actors such as regional and global institutions can play a mutually complementary role. Helen Nasadurai (2004), for instance, adds that national, regional, and global institutions can function as mechanisms of governance for economic security. Still others stress the important role of civil society actors (Caballero-Anthony 2004).

Proponents of economic security now focus on the increasing need to ensure “sustainable development” combined with the long-term vision to improve the world population’s standard of living and to ensure long-term development associated with a healthy life style that supports the ecological system. The Brundtland Commission (led by Gro Harlem Brundtland and set up by the United Nations to examine the growing concern about the accelerating deterioration of the human environment and natural resources. Ross McCluney (1994: 16) also notes that “continued economic growth and development, as well as population growth, can take place in a manner that will bring the global population to an acceptable overall standard of living, without damaging the life support system so much that it prevents this from ever being attained.” Economic security understood in the environmental context means economic development must also be sustainable—it must not proceed at the expense of the environment.

Environmental security departs further from political realism that tends to focus on competition among states for nonrenewable resources such as minerals and petroleum. Focusing on the need to sustain depleting renewable resources (Elliott 2000; Myers 1989), proponents of environmental security have now identified this threat to security at various levels: environmental, national, international, and human.

For a very long time, human beings have sought to conquer nature, viewing it as a threat to their survival; however, proponents of environmental security have in recent decades sought to protect nature so that human existence can be preserved. In the 1970s, scholars began to pay attention to the impact of environmental problems on national security. The issue was picked up by a growing number of security analysts in the 1980s. By the end of the decade, scholars had redefined the conception of security to include environmental problems, which are now regarded as a source of threat to security on many levels. In the 1990s, securing the environment became more fundamental.

Environmental sources of threat include air and water pollution, solid wastes, soil erosion or land degradation, deforestation, climate change or global warming, and general resource depletion. Air pollution is emitted from mobile sources, such as motor vehicles (which emit carbon monoxide, total organic gases, and nitrous oxides, and stationary sources, such as factories, that generate sulfur oxides). Water pollution affects water sources and solid wastes are mainly garbage left disposed incorrectly due to the lack of dumpsites for urban consumers. Climate change results from the warming of the earth, due to the greenhouse effect. Greenhouse gases are like a blanket that keeps heat contained in the earth's atmosphere. Environmentalists argue that the over-accumulation of such gases since the industrial revolution in the 1800s has contributed to the warming of the earth, which may have a catastrophic effect on the global climate. They have sought to make climate change part of "high politics" (associated with realist security studies), arguing that it requires immediate policy attention and action.

Environmental problems as a transnational source of threat to national security remain compatible with realism to the extent that they can threaten national survival. Environmental "realism" foresees a world of chaos induced by environmental stress. John Orme (1998) argues that "at some point in the next century the international arena could return to a Hobbesian state of war." In his "The Coming Anarchy," Robert Kaplan (1994: 58) predicts that environmental degradation will become "the national-security issue of the early twenty-first century." Environmental crises can weaken states. Weakened or failed states are incapable of making effective decisions or sticking to international agreements. They become prone to ethnic conflicts, genocide, coups d'état, guerrilla attacks, gang warfare, and deprivation conflicts; they may become authoritarian, intolerant of opposition, militarized, give rise to extremism and terrorism, or be prone to launch military attacks against neighboring countries to divert attention from internal grievances. Thomas Homer-Dixon (1998: 532) warns that "[i]f a number of developing countries evolve in this direction, they could eventually threaten the military and economic interests of rich countries." Environmental scarcities "are already contributing to violent conflicts in many parts of the developing world and could threaten developed countries. These conflicts are probably the early signs of

an upsurge of violence in the coming decades that will be induced or aggravated by scarcity" (ibid.: 502).

More recently, Homer-Dixon's prediction has become even more alarming: "Climate stress may well represent a challenge to international security just as dangerous—and more intractable—than the arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War or the proliferation of nuclear weapons among rogue states today." He adds that "[e]vidence is fast accumulating that, within our children's lifetimes, severe droughts, storms and heat waves caused by climate change could rip apart societies from one side of the globe to the other" (Homer-Dixon 2007: 6).

Proponents of environmental security now regard depleting renewable resources such as fresh water and fish stocks as a direct cause of potentially violent conflicts. Not every renewable resource scarcity leads directly to interstate conflict, however. States have not often gone to war due to scarcities of renewable resources, but they are likely to fight over river water, "a critical resource for personal and national survival." Both "conflict and turmoil related to river water are more often internal than international" (Homer-Dixon 1998: 516). Overall, Homer-Dixon's approach appears to lean more heavily toward the environmental cause of social conflict or "acute conflict" in three different forms: scarcity conflict, group-identity conflict, and relative-deprivation conflict. Scarcity of renewable resources could cause deprivation conflicts and could produce large population movement/cross-border migration that can also cause group-identity conflicts. These interactive sources of environmental scarcity create two dangerous patterns: "resource capture" and "ecological marginalization."

Environmental degradation and resource scarcities also threaten regime and human security. Such environmental problems as deforestation, soil erosion, water depletion, air pollution, and rising sea levels will have a political and strategic impact because they may prompt mass migrations and incite group conflicts or domestic conflicts, as well as conflicts between states. Increased environmental scarcity leads to large out-migrations and decreased economic productivity, which weaken or fragment states. Failed or failing states are likely to experience civil wars and humanitarian crises. Environmental decline could not only indirectly cause domestic instability derived from social tensions, but also threaten human security as it brings harm to human health. Environmental degradation, for instance, has created new infectious diseases that threaten human life. Some proponents of environmental security, as noted by Porter (1995: 218), contend that "the increasing stresses on the earth's life-support systems and renewable resources have profound implications for human health and welfare that are at least as serious as traditional military threats." Moreover, climate change threatens not only to submerge some coastal regions or nations but also to create "climate refugees" who would pose a growing threat to political or regime legitimacy, social stability, and human life. (The International

Organization for Migration has now estimated that there could be as many as 200 million climate refugees by 2050.)

Recent works on economic and environmental security emphasize several approaches to dealing with this type of security threat. Before coming up with the idea of environmental management, ecologists had begun to talk about the need for a radical transformation of the way we think about the environment. They take a long-term perspective on the concept and implementation of ecological action and call for fundamental changes to the way we understand modern science and social, economic, and political structures. Scholars of the green camp also contend that there are limits to economic growth, prefer to develop more harmony between humans and nature (eco-centrism), and favor decentralization (decentralizing state, social, and economic structures).

The international approach to environmental security initially focused on environmental management. This has become more evident as international institutions (such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organization) have taken environmental issues into account. In *Our Common Future*, the World Commission on Environment and Development (1987), which popularized the concept of sustainable development, saw poverty and environmental destruction as two central dangers confronting humanity and recommended a fivefold increase in sustainable industrial production. Reliance on technology seems to be the prescription for environment security. Partnership between developed and developing countries has also been seen as essential to the promotion of future environmental security.

Others recommend institution building. Homer-Dixon contends that forces employed by states to defeat their enemies on the battlefield would be unable to handle difficult environmental challenges. Poor states in the developing world remain vulnerable to environmental scarcities because they lack effective social institutions and thus will be unable “to create markets and other institutions that promote adaptation” (Homer-Dixon 1998: 536).

ECONOMIC SECURITY IN ASIA-PACIFIC

State leaders and scholars in the region have long recognized the importance of the relationship between economics and security. The concept of comprehensive security is not based primarily on states’ military and defense capabilities as it views security as achievable in a comprehensive, multidimensional, and holistic manner. Although the concept of security in economic terms can be traced back to before World War II as noted earlier, Japan has been known as the first country in Asia to formulate the formal concept *Keizai anzen hōshō* based on a combination of economic and technological capabilities with a low-cost military component. After World War

II, Japan came under U.S. military protection and shifted much of its policy attention to economic development by assimilating itself into a U.S.-led international trade regime that tolerated its import barriers. Comprehensive security—initially coined in the 1970s and presented to Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira in 1980 and Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone in 1984—stresses economic prosperity, diplomacy, and politics at the domestic, bilateral, regional, and global levels rather than on the level of national military security alone.

Comprehensive security was shaped by major world events in the 1970s, when Japan perceived itself to be under economic threat. Early in the decade, the overseas supply of primary commodities was threatened as oil prices increased. The two oil shocks in the 1970s reminded the Japanese that the modern economy remained fragile. They then came to realize that their near-total dependence on imported energy resources made them increasingly vulnerable in a fragile situation. The growing fear of unavailability of natural resources from overseas, such as minerals and foodstuffs like soybeans, thus triggered the need for a more comprehensive concept of national security. By the mid-1970s, Japan's anxiety about the supply of overseas resources had grown more intense. As a result, “the advocacy of ‘Economic Security’ gained salience, making the first instance in which the use of the term ‘security’ won general acceptance” (Umemoto 1988: 32).

In the late 1970s, Japan remained dependent on U.S. protection, but then sought to share more responsibility by agreeing to bear the defense burden, which had been mostly borne by the United States. Meanwhile, Japan sought to acquire a defense capability that could help it deal with “limited and small-scale aggression” without external assistance. Moreover, it sought to diversify its overseas supply of natural resources, to promote conservation technology (such as the stockpiling of petroleum and strategic metals) and alter the country's domestic industrial structure with the aim of reducing resource consumption.

From the late 1970s to the 1980s, Japan realized that it needed to play a role that bolstered the free trade regime by opening up its own markets, assisting Western industrialized states in maintaining the international economic regime, and advocating multilateral policy coordination. This policy had to do with its perception of declining American hegemony and the rise of economic protectionism in various forms around the world.

ASEAN states also embraced the concept of comprehensive security, but differed in terms of policy outlook. While Japan tended to see national security in comprehensive terms from without, some of the ASEAN states were more inclined to see sources of insecurity within their national boundaries. The primary concern was more exclusively with regime security rather than international or regional security. This concept became the

official doctrine of several ASEAN states, to varying degrees, such as Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore. As part of the postcolonial nation-building process, comprehensive security concentrated on regime building, meaning the legitimization of governments through economic development, and the centralization of political power through state-institution building. Comprehensive security was best described by Suharto's notion of "national resilience" (*ketahanan nasional*) as enunciated in the mid-1960s and officially recognized in 1973, which included military and non-military issues such as economic development and social justice. According to Alagappa (1988: 62), "[t]he doctrine of national resilience does not address the international environment. While it seeks to make external aggression and infiltration difficult and costly, it does not seek to develop a national capability to influence the regional geo-strategic environment." Domestic vulnerabilities rooted in inter-ethnic rivalry, communist insurgencies, and growing disparities in income distribution were treated as potential sources of instability. Malaysia also viewed sources of threat in military, political, economic, and social terms, including communist insurgencies, as well as racial and religious extremism. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, comprehensive security and national resilience "crept into the Malaysian vocabulary" (ibid.: 67), although it never became a formal doctrine. From the 1960s to 1980s, Singapore adopted a comprehensive security policy based on the concept of "total defense," which has its origin in its post-independence defense philosophy that emphasized not only the importance of national identity and the need for defense against external attack, but also the threat of internal disunity, which gave rise to its concerns over subversion and communalism.

Even socialist states in East Asia seem to have adopted the concept of comprehensive security, emphasizing the role of economic development in their pursuit of national security. China's Four Modernizations, for instance, clearly stressed the need to modernize the agriculture sector first, followed by industry, science and technology, and military defense. In the late 1980s, other socialist states (the Soviet Union, later Russia, and Vietnam) were also moving toward the world economy by seeking to tap into the trade, investment, and technology of other advanced capitalist states.

Comprehensive security remains state-centric in that it stresses the state's role in enhancing national security. Japan definitely emphasizes national survival. This means comprehensive security gives the state the primary responsibility to promote security through non-military means. As one scholar puts it, "The adoption of a comprehensive concept of security allows Southeast Asian states to go beyond the traditional context of security. However, they remain rooted to the idea of the state as the security referent and prove willing to subordinate human rights to the exigencies of state security (that is, regime security)" (Kraft 1998: 117). Hadi Soesastro (1990: 20) notes that "the governments have been the initiator and promoter of economic globalization as they adopt policies aimed at integrating

their economies into the world economy, initially through export-oriented development.” States in ASEAN rejected the prescription of dependency theory by joining the forces of globalization and hoping to promote their regime security through economic development based on the strategy to make national economies competitive at the international level. State leaders expected to reap benefits that would help enhance their regimes’ abilities to cope with economic, social, and political challenges within their national boundaries. This approach emphasizes the role of the military in economic development and in the promotion of economic security.

As comprehensive security generally overlooks human rights, democracy, and the environment, leading scholars began to question whether this state-centric approach to economic security can be achieved by the developmentalist state or political elites at the expense of liberal values, such as human and democratic rights. In an era of globalization, comprehensive security cannot achieve its objectives. Even authoritarian regimes have become more vulnerable to global forces. One Southeast Asian scholar notes that “they have relinquished much of their responsibility for and moral authority to claiming the role of the guarantor of the country’s security” (Kraft 1998: 129).

Following the financial crisis in 1997, the nexus between economic security and economic growth was further challenged. Scholars began to pay less attention to the state-centric concept of comprehensive security by expanding it to include regime and human security. They observed the negative effects of globalization on a state’s capacity to govern. Potential economic insecurities forced states such as China to make institutional adjustments and to adopt new policy instruments (Zhengyi 2004).

Some scholars attack states for adopting and implementing policies that lack transparency and accountability. Economic development should ensure that security rests in the hands of good citizenship and the acceptance of market discipline. This means that countries must pursue sound transparency that instills market confidence, respects signals from markets, and gets economic fundamentals (characterized by good monetary and fiscal policy) right. Policymakers must keep the national economy open to the world market and promote good economic governance at home. Critics also perceive the need to adopt a regional approach to economic security by strengthening the role of regional organizations, such as ASEAN. States are encouraged to provide data about their financial systems and cooperate at the regional level by creating such mechanisms as regional surveillance to help monitor ongoing development in the financial systems within different member states. This can be achieved if civil society also plays a role in furthering good economic governance by building social capital and by promoting collective action through social recourses based on collective norms of trust and cooperation. Caballero-Anthony (2004b) makes the case for the ASEAN Peoples’ Assembly (established in 2000), which provides a

general framework for civil society organizations in the region to engage with states and non-state actors.

In short, the literature on economic security has clearly shifted its emphasis from the exclusive role of authoritarian states in ensuring economic growth to the need for enhancing social control or participatory democracy that allows access by market forces to work alongside state institutions based on the assumption that economic security can be achieved when they are partners. Markets are not rejected, but must be tamed by governments and civil society actors. A difficult question remains: How long and how far can states in the Asia-Pacific continue to pursue comprehensive security without pursuing traditional military strategies? Some scholars believe that the positive trend will continue. Stuart Harris (1993b: 27), for instance, states that "Japan will increase its political, but not necessarily its security, role in the region." If Japan serves as the exemplary state model, the notion that Japan will never pursue national security in military terms will become less clear. As noted earlier, Japan's commercial liberalism is giving way to realism. The concept of comprehensive security now includes coast guard cooperation with other states in Asia, such as those in Southeast Asia and India. Although coast guards still primarily enforce laws and engage in crime fighting, they have expanded their security role and appear to enjoy more fighting power than ever before. China's recent embrace of comprehensive security, which primarily includes economic security, has not excluded military modernization, either.

ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC

States in the Asia-Pacific have now taken the environmental source of insecurity more seriously than ever before. In the United States, the first Bush administration was the first to acknowledge this threat, when it incorporated the environment into the overall security framework. The Clinton administration further integrated the issue into the national security agenda. The Obama administration has also advocated environmental security as a matter of policy. Distinguished U.S. national-security elders, such as former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown and former National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, have declared climate change as one of the two most formidable national security challenges the United States faces today (the other being weapons of mass destruction). In East Asia, spectacular economic growth prompted state leaders to adopt the concept of comprehensive security, but has in recent years posed a new form of threat to environmental, national, regional, political, societal, and human security.

For some, the environment itself has now come under threat. The War in Vietnam, for instance, has long been an important case study of the U.S. military's first full-scale use of herbicides (containing harmful dioxin) in

warfare. Agent Orange was among the herbicides used to defoliate mangroves and forests in Vietnam (as well as to destroy crops and remove aerial cover and food supplies to the North Vietnamese forces). Between 1961 and 1971, it is estimated that about 15% to 16% of the land cover in former South Vietnam was directly sprayed (and between 2.1 and 4.8 million people were also directly subject to herbicides) (Palmer 2007: 173).

Scholars have also expressed concerns about a growing threat to biodiversity regarded as the foundation of environmental security. In his work on environmental security challenges, for instance, Homer-Dixon (1998) studied countries such as China, the quintessential example of environmental degradation. China's per capita availability of arable land in the interior parts of the country has declined rapidly and the quality of the land has been destroyed by deforestation, loss of topsoil, and salinization. Waters have been contaminated and are in increasingly short supply as wells have become exhausted. Biodiversity loss has become a serious security problem. Half of Asia's forests have been lost and some 75% of Southeast Asia's forests may disappear by the next century. The level of river pollution in Asia is now three times the world average.

Pollution is also regarded as a growing threat to human health. In 1997, the Asian Development Bank ranked Asia the world's most polluted and environmentally degraded region; it contains 13 of the world's 15 most polluted cities. China and the United States have produced nearly half of the world's total greenhouse gas emissions, but China (annually producing 6,200 megatons of carbon dioxide) overtook the United States in 2007 as the world's largest emitter of carbon dioxide. China is likely to produce such emissions as much as 60% more than the United States by 2050, if Chinese emissions continue at their current pace. Pollution now makes cancer the most widespread deadly disease in China. Research in Japan also shows climate change has since the turn of the 21st century caused a decline in agricultural products, increased the frequency of tidal waves, and led to a rising number of heat strokes. If global warming continues, typhoons will grow larger, causing greater disasters.

The extent to which environmental degradation (contributing to global warming and then leading to a projected rise in the sea level) will cause regional, national, and human insecurity remains a subject of speculation. Southeast Asia, for instance, is now vulnerable to the effects of global warming. Were sea levels to rise, thousands of hectares of coastal land would be flooded. Major cities, such as Bangkok and Jakarta, would "be like an oven" (Fuller 2009). Other towns and infrastructure are threatened by flooding; fishing and agriculture would wither, and some fresh water would turn salty. Overall, there has been a growing consensus within the scientific community that greenhouse gas emissions continue to rise at a speed that may be exceeding the worst-case scenarios.

Optimists count on state resilience as one variable that can head off this growing challenge. Carlyle Thayer (2007), for instance, views Vietnam as slated to become one country most affected by the rise of sea level, and asserts that this will put enormous strain on its political system. However, this challenge will not force the Vietnamese people to flee to other countries as they did in the past. He feels that future adverse weather conditions are unlikely to spark a large exodus (such as the boat people that engulfed Southeast Asia in the 1970s). Authoritarian, the Vietnamese state remains resilient in meeting new challenges and will become increasingly active in dealing with this nontraditional security issue through multilateral channels.

Environmental scarcity has also been regarded as a growing source of threat to security at different levels. Land scarcity has triggered socioeconomic instability rooted in deforestation and land degradation both of which have social consequences such as “shortfalls in food production and exacerbation of poverty, as well as conflict over land tenure and access to forest lands and, in some cases, unplanned movement of peoples within countries and across borders” (Elliott 2000: 169). In the Philippines, “deforestation, soil erosion, depletion of soil nutrients have increased poverty and helped drive peasants into the arms of the Communist New People’s Army insurgency” (Homer-Dixon 2007: 6). Land scarcities in China also have grown intense.

Competition over scarce water among states could affect national and regional security. Studies point to potential conflict over transboundary waters shared by states competing for water supply and hydropower. The Mekong Basin, for instance, has come to the attention of scholars due to potential security threats faced by China, Burma, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam that share the Mekong River. The hydro-politics among these states are viewed as having implications for the security of the riparian states.

In her study of hydro-politics, Evelyn Goh (2001) looks at how the recent development of water projects on the Mekong has become a source of tension not only among states in the region, but also within them. Economic and environmental vulnerabilities have also posed a threat to societal and human security because of the hydro projects that could endanger ecological systems and human communities.

Fishing disputes among states are no longer considered within the realm of “low politics.” States have used their navies to perform “peace-time” functions, such as patrolling and enforcing fishing regulations inside their territorial waters. The issue of fisheries in the South China Sea has become “a contentious issue which could lead to armed conflict among the claimants” (Coulter 1996: 373). Thailand’s ties with Burma and Malaysia have been subject to fishing disputes. Both Burma and Malaysia have become unhappy with Thai trawlers (which numbered 3,889, making Thailand the fifth largest trawling fleet in the world), at times engaging in violent confrontations at sea

that have resulted in casualties and strained relations between the states. As a result, Thailand has equipped its navy with more power-projection capabilities (Paik and Bergin 2000: 185).

Energy shortages have also raised security concerns at different levels. Industrial development in the region has pushed up energy demand. Population growth, economic growth, urbanization in coastal cities, and increased material consumption compel states in the region to search for energy supplies. Such demand will make them more prone to conflict among themselves. States bordering the maritime areas have shown more interest in maximizing economic growth and adequate supplies of energy rather than preserving their regional maritime environment. They have often been driven to claim areas with potential oil and natural gas reserves. There are “examples of environmental problems escalating to the point of triggering conflicts among states” (Clapp and Dauvergne 2003: 19). Some have even predicted that China’s quest for oil security is more likely to result in “oil wars” instead of cooperation (Lee 2005).

Scholars still see the need for a stable and secure maritime regime capable of enhancing maritime security and promoting cooperation among regional states. States have now sought collective solutions to their transnational problems. It is unlikely that states will resort to force on this issue, although power asymmetries among them exist. For instance, the Mekong River Commission (MRC) has established rules for water utilization. More needs to be done, however, including institutional capacity building based on the principle of inclusivity and clear institutional structures and processes. State leaders and donor agencies in the region have also taken some collective action to combat environmental pollution in Southeast Asia. In 2007, Tokyo pledged to give the ADB (which has financed coal projects) \$100 million earmarked for two funds dealing with climate change: the Asian Clean Energy Fund and the Investment Climate Facilitation Fund. Tokyo also promised to provide the bank with up to \$2 billion over the next five years with the aim of promoting environmentally friendly investment in the region. In 2008, the G-8 leaders met in Japan and pledged to halve global emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases from current levels by 2050.

Evidence shows that the level of regional cooperation among actors in the Asia-Pacific remains low. Lorraine Elliott observes the following reality: “despite the many thousands of words on paper—in conventions, protocols, declarations, communiqués, statements of principle, management programmes and action plans—and despite some local successes, environmental degradation continues to worsen” (Elliott 2000: 160). Even when it faced the haze problems in 1997–98 that spread to some of its member states such as Singapore, ASEAN did not act as effectively as it should have (Cotton 1999). States spout rhetoric about the need for collective responsibility but they have so far failed to make good on their policy commitment to regional

cooperation. Moreover, the U.S. environmental policy in Asia evidently remains self-regarding (Elliott 2004). It is far from clear that the level of recent cooperation in the Asia-Pacific is now high enough to address all environmental concerns. The 2008 G-8 Summit in Japan, for instance, was not reassuring to many environmentalists, as it left the matter to the U.N. framework. States in the developing world, such the Group of Five Nations or G-5 (China, India, Brazil, Mexico, and South Africa), which attended the G-8 Summit as dialogue partners, blamed the developed world for global warming, saw them as bearing primary responsibility for the problem, and called on them to set a mid-term target of reducing greenhouse emissions by between 25% and 40% by 2020 from the 1990 level. The summit produced no such mid-term objectives, however. The United States under the second Bush administration even questioned the urgency of the growing climate challenge, using the excuse that mandatory cuts in carbon dioxide would bankrupt the economy. Other industrialized states, such as Japan and Germany, are nowhere near reaching the planned target.

Other scholars have now taken a bottom-up approach, downplaying the state's role, because they think governments tend to ignore or resist evidence pointing to environmental degradation. Environmental policies thus need the support of local communities and NGOs and must facilitate an equitable sharing of rights to and responsibilities for resource and environmental management. Some see the merit of technological solutions (Sari 2003). Other actors involved in the process of building social capital include NGOs, churches, neighborhoods, trade unions, voluntary associations, and the family. These non-state actors are thought to be able to play a role in promoting transparency, accountability, and participatory processes based on rules and norms generating cooperation and governing corporate interests. Nevertheless, the extent to which they can play an effective role remains to be seen.

Environmental realism persists, however. Some scholars fear this non-traditional source of threat will lead to the militarization of environmental issues. Still others contend that environmental degradation and resource scarcities are not the primary source of war or violence (Porter 1995). Meanwhile, environmentalist hawks have also sought to tighten government control or coercion rather than support market incentives, thus strengthening the state rather than weakening it. States still continue to show little collaboration. Instead of agreeing on a clear commitment to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, the G-8 members, for instance, simply called on the G-5 to share the global goal of reaching the 2050 target. However, countries like China (and India) remain far from committed to the 2050 target and seem more concerned with maintaining their rapid economic growth than ensuring long-term environmental security. Asymmetrical power relations among states also appear to be a major obstacle to multilateral action in East Asia. According to Evelyn Goh (2001: 494),

“China’s relatively strong position within the Mekong Basin offers few incentives for it to play a cooperative role within such a regime.” In her words, “In this developing region, we can . . . expect that power politics will be played out chiefly in the economic realm” (*ibid.*: 483). One scholar describes the Chinese dam-building efforts as “trickle-down hegemony” because China “has by and large pursued its own interests without regard for how these actions will affect its downstream neighbors” (Lieberman 2005: 281). Meanwhile, the United States has sought to warm up its relations with downstream states, apparently in an attempt to challenge Chinese influence (Gale 2009: A2).

The Population Threat, Migration, and Pandemics

This chapter reviews the literature on nontraditional security associated with transnational migration, health, and population threats regarded as new challenges to security at the national, regional, regime, and human levels. Because they can result in regional wars, political instability, and social unrest, nontraditional sources of transnational security threats exist in both developed and developing countries. In the Asia-Pacific, these sources of threat have been studied. Associated with population issues, migration and health have now become additional security challenges to the region. Transnational migration remains a security challenge to states that still have porous borders. Moreover, states now regard certain diseases as a source of insecurity at different levels. The Asia-Pacific as a whole has become the largest region in the world by population. China alone has a population of more than 1.3 billion. Overall, these nontraditional security concerns have yet to diminish greatly the importance of political realism, as states continue to pay much of their attention to military security.

THE POPULATION THREAT IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC

As an emerging subfield in security studies, security demographics has recently drawn the attention of some scholars who envision the security implications of long-term demographic change. The security threat of Asia's sex ratios studied by Valerie Hudson and Andrea den Boer (2002), for

instance, contributes to this subfield, but there are other security implications in the literature covering demographic issues.

One of the challenges that scholars saw initially was the issue of population explosion regarded as a threat to security. Scholars observed the overall population growth in the past two centuries—from 980 million to 6.5 billion (2008) and regarded it as a nontraditional security issue. Some predicted that the world in 2025 may contain a total population of 8.5 billion people. Until 2025, however, around 95% of worldwide population growth will take place in the developing world, especially in Africa and Asia. The world's two largest populations live in Asia: China has a population of more than 1.3 billion people and could expand to 1.5 billion by 2025. In the 1990s, India already had a population of 1 billion and may overtake China to become the world's largest population by 2025. The Asia-Pacific region contains more than two-thirds of the world's total population. At the same time, demographic decline has in recent years been evident in most countries in the developed world. A number of countries in the Asia-Pacific have the world's worst demographics. Russia is estimated to lose approximately 700,000 people per year. If these trends continue, its population will drop to about 134 million by 2015. In the mid-2000s, Japan's fertility rate stood at around 1.3 births per woman, and the country is said to be on track to losing half of its population by 2105. Other predictions sound more alarming: the Japanese population will shrink to about 90 million from 127 million in 2008 and to about only 40 million by the end of the century. Other developed countries in the Asia-Pacific (most notably Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan) have done more poorly. The debate on whether overpopulation or population decline poses a greater threat to security continues.

Non-realist scholars have observed that demographic factors can alter the complex strategic balance between states and also emphasize the relationship between demographic-generated poverty and war and regard these as a growing threat to national security. The growing imbalance of demographic and economic growth between the world's industrial democracies and the developing world may lead to violent conflict between them. Observers would, for instance, point to the widening gap between rich industrial democracies and poor non-industrial countries, especially autocracies. Their findings sound alarming notes that industrial democracies have experienced demographic stagnation and are falling behind in population. As Nicholas Eberstadt (1991: 128) puts it, "Today's industrial democracies would almost all be 'little countries.'" He adds that "[i]n aggregate the population of today's industrial democracies would account for a progressively diminishing share of the world population." In his view, the demographic and economic rise of non-industrial, non-democratic countries could pose a growing threat to industrial democracies if the latter's share of global economic output were to decline. A very different world—a world filled with dangers and confusion—could emerge and would be "even more menacing

to the security prospects of the Western alliance than was the Cold War for the past generation" (*ibid.*: 129). More recently, however, Eberstadt (2004b) observes the coming decline of the great 20th century demographic boom in East Asia and the growth of population in the United States. This means that the United States is likely to enjoy relative strategic advantages from its population growth in the future (*ibid.*: 26).

Other scholars have also paid attention to the threat of demographic imbalances to regime, social, and human security. There is evidence that ethnic groups may develop fears of population decline: namely, that their race or culture will be overwhelmed by fast-growing groups. The state could even collapse when the balance of demographic power shifts in favor of one group at the expense of others. The state may also be unable to exercise power when controlled by a social group facing the rapid population growth of others. The erosion of state control over society may encourage ethnic passions that could lead to civil war. During the 1970s, for instance, Soviet leaders who were Russian worried about the nearly stagnant Russian population because the populations of the southern republics, especially Muslims, were growing so fast that they moved to protect their religion, ignored Russian language, and disliked Moscow's control.

In other Asian states, groups that are aging fast also become less productive in economic terms and require more health and social services. This could create inter-generational tension, with the younger population resentful of the tax burden of the older population. Countries such as Japan, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan (whose population decline persists) may be now considered coming under such threat in terms of economic security. The economy of Japan, for instance, is viewed as likely to become more depressed if its population continues to age quickly. As the number of the elderly grows, the state increases taxes on workers, who respond by working less; this response leads to economic stagnation, which further reduces economic opportunity. This is also bound to create social instability or inter-generational conflict, as the shrinking young workforce bears more and more of the socioeconomic burden. For Japan, economic security based on current living standards and economic output may come under threat unless the country can bring in up to 30 million immigrants by 2050.

The literature on security demographics offers various insights on how this type of security can be enhanced. Traditionalists have long held that demographic growth poses a threat to security and could be overcome by moral means. Concerned with population growth in the 19th century, Thomas Malthus urged "moral restraints" in the forms of deferred marriage and celibacy. He opposed contraceptives and abortion as strategies to curb population growth. This moral position remains relevant today. Nevertheless, states in the Asia-Pacific, including China, have also adopted more liberal positions on population growth. Contraceptives and abortion should be legalized. This strategy was in fact adopted by China in the late 1970s.

Proponents of this strategy urge governments to improve the safety and effectiveness of contraceptive and abortion technologies and methods. Those in the West who are concerned with growing domestic instability in developed countries reject postmodernism, which celebrates cultural relativism and multiculturalism. They argue that immigrants, such as those from Muslim countries, “have to agree to fit in” and “must accept the imperatives of assimilation” and that host governments must do what they can to encourage this process, such as promoting secular education and creating an assimilated Islamic middle class (Pfaff 2002: 7).

Still others believe that the way to deal with population explosions in the developing world is by helping poor countries become “trading states” (Teitelbaum 1992/93), economically developed, and politically democratic. Those who view threats as rooted in the rise of non-industrial, non-democratic countries also advocate pronatalist policies that would reverse the population stagnation in industrial democracies. In developed states, wealthy groups—generally whites—tend to confront a problem of stagnant or even negative population growth. They tend to be well educated and busy with their work. Women are less willing to bear children due to a number of factors including more effective methods of contraception and crowding in urban areas. Some suggest that industrial democracies would not be threatened by the economic and demographic rise of non-industrial countries that share and defend common political principles.

Scholars disagree on the extent to which population issues pose a threat to national, international, and human security. Marxists consider the issue to be inconsequential. World capitalism is viewed as the source of underdevelopment, which threatens peoples in the developing world. They believe that the “population will take care of itself” and that the world just needs to redistribute wealth. Wealthy states should transfer some of their wealth to developing countries and should take action to promote favorable terms of trade with the developing world, which presses for a “New International Economic Order.” China under Mao Zedong adopted the line of thinking that fast population growth was a “very good thing” and population problems resulted from “imperialism” or “hegemonism.” Others maintain the same optimism; they see benefits in population growth, which tends to promote human ingenuity and inventiveness. Julian Simon argues that “in the long run . . . per capita income is likely to be higher with a growing population than with a stationary one, both in more-developed and less-developed countries” (cited in Kennedy 1993: 31). A large population of productive workers helps promote economic growth. People are regarded as human capital, indispensable to economic development. Technology has an infinite capacity to produce new resources to meet human needs. We must look for alternative sources of energy, with hopes for breakthroughs in biotechnology. If there are a few creative people in every 100, it is better to have

100 million than 1 million. According to Jeff Jacoby (2008: 6), “fewer human beings would mean fewer mouths to feed. It would also mean fewer entrepreneurs, fewer pioneers, and fewer problem-solvers.”

Political realists still treat demographic development in strategic terms, however. In East Asia, state leaders continue to defend their national and regime security by repressing ethnic minorities who seek to carve out separate homelands, such as those in China, Russia, and Myanmar (as well as those in Bangladesh and Bhutan) (Hazarika 2001). Moreover, political elites who regard population growth as a new source of threat to their regime security tend to adopt the policy of resettlement. In Indonesia, for instance, state elites worried about a population surplus in Java (the country’s center of political power) and adopted a population resettlement solution. Their demographic engineering has been part of the Indonesian regime’s strategic and security policy to reduce the increasing possibility of social and political tensions, especially in areas surrounding Jakarta (Tirtosudarmo 2001). In China, state leaders also tend to encourage the Han majority to relocate to regions like Mongolia, Tibet, and Xinjiang province in an attempt to build a relatively homogeneous civilization, to strengthen their control over the border regions, and to prevent foreign encroachments (Banister 2001).

TRANSNATIONAL MIGRATION IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC

In the Asia-Pacific, transnational migration has long been viewed as a challenge to national security. Astri Suhrke (1993) considers population movements a “high politics” issue in Southeast Asia. During the early phase of population movements in this region, southward migrations began by settling at the periphery of established polities, where they eventually conquered state power. In the tenth century, the T’ai-speaking people moved down the river valleys from southern China and settled the periphery of the Khmer empire. They first accepted the political authority of the Khmer king and even served as his mercenaries, but later began to establish a fortified military garrison on the outer reaches of the empire and by the late 13th century began to push Khmer authority farther south. This development provides “a classic conquest through migration, where the security of the state—in the sense of the power of the king—is undermined by increasing pressures from new peoples settled on the periphery” (ibid.: 182). The Thai army subsequently threatened the Khmer state but not its society because its conquest did not seriously affect or displace the local people, following instead a strategy of accommodation aimed at accepting diverse cultures.

In other cases, cross-border migration posed a security threat to both state and society. The Vietnamese also moved southward, from the Red River delta in the north, beginning from 900 A.D., and conquered through settlement, military annexation, and expulsion, displacing other cultural

groups as they moved. The first victim of Vietnamese migration was the Champa kingdom, which disappeared from history in the late 15th century. The next victim was the Khmer, which the Vietnamese forced out of the Mekong Delta. The perceived threat of migration to national security remains in East Asia today. Southeast Asia alone has no less than 15,500 kilometers of land borders, but states' "national boundaries are merely symbolic of effective territorial sovereignty" (Tigno 2003: 42). States in the region have established official border-crossing points, but much of the cross-border traffic (which has become quite extensive, complex, and comprehensive) has not been officially monitored.

Undocumented migration has, particularly since the financial and economic crisis in 1997, become a threat to national security. National borders are porous, so it is difficult for state authorities to effectively monitor the movements of clandestine migrant workers. In 2002, 230,000 North Koreans (more than 1% of the country's population) were hiding in China on their way to other countries, such as South Korea, Japan, and Russia. The number of Chinese migrant workers in Russia is said to grow even larger. According to one study, perceptions of Chinese migration in the Russian Far East are negative. Chinese migrants were seen as a growing threat to Russian national security; they were "coming like a swelling tidal wave." Fears of Chinese takeover of the Russian Far East led some to perceive "imminent" military conflicts between China and Russia (Alexeev 2003). At the same time, China also has a history of relying on or encouraging migration as a way to strengthen its control over the border regions and to prevent foreign encroachment.

Transnational workers have also created potential conflicts between sending and receiving states. Although sending countries have benefited from remittances, which constitute one of the biggest sources of foreign revenue for them, they have come to experience a growing dependence on an overseas employment program. They can be at the mercy of the receiving countries, which may decide to send or deport migrant workers back to their home countries, thus leaving their economic security uncertain (Lusterio 2003: 74–5). Migrant workers have also been regarded as a threat to host countries. For example, Muslim migrants from the Philippines and Indonesia to Sabah, where the indigenous Christian Kadazan-Duzan community lives, created not only battle lines along communal lines, but also tensions between the state of Sabah and the federal government of Malaysia. These undocumented Muslim migrants were expected to support the Malay-Muslim UMNO Party dominant in Malaysian politics. The imbalance of demographic growth within wealthy states could also create social tension, as is prone to violence. Uneven demographic growth rates among ethnic groups have created social tensions. Groups with demographic stagnation may perceive threats from those experiencing fast-growing populations, which tend to nurture local nationalism.

Migration has recently been viewed increasingly as a threat to human security as migrants have been expelled from host countries and prevented from entering them again. Socioeconomic controls include depriving undocumented migrants of social rights (such as unemployment insurance, family allowances, public housing, public schools for children, and retirement benefits), limiting their access to certain social benefits, and reducing employment opportunities. Welfare controls include checking migrants' status and identity: they are often viewed as free riders on welfare.

Migrants have been blamed for socioeconomic problems in host countries. Undocumented, low-skilled migrant workers have been abused by their employers but may not be willing to report their mistreatment to the local authorities. They also tend to suffer from serious illnesses in silence until their condition becomes life-threatening, fearing that the authorities might find out about their illegal status. In South Korea, for instance, some 330,000 foreign workers, the majority of whom come from China and Southeast Asia, have given rise to unforeseen security problems; they have been victimized by delayed payment of wages and compensation, poor working conditions (such as long working hours), little job security, no compensation in the event of industrial accidents, no health insurance protection, sexual harassment by Korean employers, and even physical violence (Kim 2004). Meanwhile, "undocumented migrants constitute a threat to the well being and health of the receiving society" (Tigno 2003: 52).

Migration to cities is seen as another security challenge. Late in the 20th century, about 1.4 billion people lived in the urban areas in the developing world, but the number was expected to increase by 40% in 2000 and to around 57% in 2025, to about 4.1 billion. At the end of the 20th century, there were 20 cities with populations of 11 million or more, of which 17 were in the developing world. Some mega-cities in Latin America, Central America, and Asia have more than 20 million people. In 2034, the populations in Mexico City and Shanghai could expand to 39 million; Beijing would have 35 million. Such giant cities can intensify social insecurity, such as unemployment, inadequate or non-existent housing, sanitation, transportation, food distribution, and communication systems. The problem of unemployment and the potential for social unrest have grown. In the early 1990s, the labor force in developing countries numbered around 1.76 billion, but it is expected to rise above 3.1 billion by 2025. This means between 38 and 40 million jobs must be created every year.

Solutions to migration problems have been addressed at different levels. Authorities in Southeast Asia "call on the local population 'to be their eyes and ears.'" Army and police authorities have been mobilized to deal with this threat. Immigration policy has become militarized, as many governments seek to confront the immigration problem and increasingly rely on military and police forces. Others, such as South Korea, have tightened

their control over illegal workers, but have faced fierce resistance from foreign workers demanding guarantees of human rights. Knowing that they face critical labor shortages, the Korean government agreed to extend illegal migrants' visa status and offer pension benefits and partial health insurance to foreign workers. Some scholars further suggest that states harmonize their information systems and create new and better techniques to monitor illegal migration. Illegal recruitment regulations must be more strictly enforced. More severe sanctions against illicit brokers and recruitment agents must be imposed. States that send and receive migrants should also undertake cooperative efforts by developing a multilateral approach to migration issues. Regional organizations, such as APEC, ASEAN, and the ARF, should put migration problems on their agendas. Governments need to interface with civil society actors, which play a role in creating and sustaining networks as well as in encouraging greater efficiency, transparency, and accountability among corrupt bureaucrats engaging in human smuggling. For some, civil society has played a role in promoting the rights of transnational migrant workers. It remains to be seen whether states in the Asia-Pacific will regard this as a real threat to security.

PANDEMICS IN ASIA-PACIFIC

Migration has been regarded not only as a nontraditional source of insecurity but also as a factor in the global and regional spread of infectious diseases (IDs) and flu pandemics, which have now entered the lexicon of nontraditional security studies. Urbanized populations are said to be increasingly vulnerable to communicable diseases, which kill nearly 20 million people every year. Infectious diseases include malaria, tuberculosis, hepatitis C, mad cow disease, HIV/AIDS, SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome), and the avian flu. Tuberculosis kills about 3 million people annually; malaria, 2 million; and hepatitis, 1 million. In 2006, the AIDS virus had infected more than 1.2 million people in North America and about 39.6 million people worldwide. Other IDs are also said to have generated military conflict, diminished state capacity (eroded political legitimacy and weakened militaries), impeded economic development (causing massive economic losses), caused social disruption/unrest, and reduced life expectancy. As shall be discussed, some scholars believe that various epidemics and pandemics can have devastating effects on national regime, international, and human security.

The link between health epidemics and national, regime, and global security has now received growing attention. They have the potential to contribute to intra-state war. Andrew Price-Smith (2002: 121) argues that disease "magnif[ies] . . . both relative and absolute deprivation and . . . hasten[s] the erosion of state capacity in seriously affected societies. Thus,

infectious disease may in fact contribute to societal destabilization and to chronic low-intensity intrastate violence, and in extreme cases it may accelerate the processes that lead to state failure.” IDs may also cause conflict between social groups, or intra-elite violence within states. As Price-Smith (2002: 124) puts it, “the potential for intra-elite violence is increasingly probable and may carry grave political consequences, such as coups, the collapse of government, and planned genocides.”

Epidemic diseases may contribute to the outbreak of violent conflict within and between states in three possible ways (Peterson 2002/03). First, catastrophic IDs may alter the balance of power between competitive actors. The diminished size of a population may provide a greater incentive for some state or a social group unaffected by an ID to attempt military conquest. Second, ID outbreaks may prompt disputes among states because of their disagreement over appropriate policy responses. Immigration policy may be adopted to guard national borders with the aim of turning away those suspected of carrying HIV/AIDS. Other states may adopt different approaches. Third, IDs may have devastating consequences for states and societies in that they can produce domestic instability, civil war, or civil-military conflict; they may also spark inter-state war.

Proponents of this perspective view domestic instability as a cause of national insecurity. As Alleyne (1996: 159) puts it, “There is a growing realization that national security depends in great measure on domestic stability, which is in turn heavily influenced by human development—embracing economic, environmental, health, and political concerns.” For instance, HIV/AIDS has contributed to income declines when breadwinners become sick or die. National economies may suffer from various socioeconomic crises rooted in labor shortages, diminished productivity, and weakening educational, social, and political structures. A worldwide pandemic is estimated to cost the world economy around \$800 billion. This type of economic problem would not affect China’s national security as much as it would affect Russia because of the much larger Chinese population and the recent measures taken by Beijing. An HIV/AIDS epidemic in Russia will most likely cause severe economic problems, such as economic stagnation, as it will decimate the working-age population and reduce worker output.

States in the Asia-Pacific are reported to recognize the growing threat of AIDS to national security. In Russia, the annual infection rate within its police and armed forces has risen sharply, from about 0.1 cases per 100,000 soldiers in 1995 to nearly 40 per 100,000 in 2003. Young men (about 5,000 conscripts in 2002 and 2003) have been rejected for military service because of IDs that included HIV/AIDS (Garrett 2005b: 54). Russia’s military effectiveness will also be affected, thus undermining political stability. As Susan Peterson (2002/03: 66) puts it, “AIDS could further erode Russia’s ability to staff a conventional army and potentially lead Moscow to rely more on a deteriorating nuclear force to maintain its great

power status.” States with large military forces such as China (with its 2.5-million-strong People’s National Liberation Army) and India (1.33-million-strong defense forces) remain secretive about the impact of IDs. Some observers think that HIV/AIDS can weaken national protectors of stability and security, such as political leaders, civil servants, and professionals.

Flu pandemics can also threaten economic security. The Spanish flu (which lasted from March 1918 to June 1920) was first found in the United States, appeared in Sierra Leone and France, and spread to other parts of the world. The 1957 Asian influenza pushed down the U.S. GDP by 3.1% and Japan’s by 2.6%. SARS is also said to have impeded the economic growth of infected states. Mely Caballero-Anthony (2005: 476) argues that infectious diseases such as SARS should be framed as “a matter of national security.” The virus emerged in rural China and then spread to five countries within 24 hours and subsequently to 30 countries on six different continents in just a few months. Although it infected only 8,000 people, killing 10% of them, the virus “had a powerful negative psychological impact on the populations of many countries” (Osterholm 2005: 28).

SARS also had a negative impact on economic growth by slowing national exports. The tourism and travel sectors in several countries such as China, Japan, and Singapore were hit badly within a matter of months. The number of flights in the region went down by 45%. Japan Airline (JAL), for instance, saw its revenue slashed by about \$2 billion. Major economies also received other blows, such as a drop in domestic demand and pessimism over business prospects. Overall, SARS cost regional economies \$30–\$60 billion. The H1N1 (swine) flu, unknown before it broke out in Mexico in 2009, could also devastate countries in the region. A large outbreak would impact their national economies, both causing the world’s stock markets to teeter and fall precipitously and diminishing states’ military capacity for self-defense.

Infectious diseases may also alter the outcome of international conflict. HIV/AIDS, for instance, can contribute to victory for one side of a conflict and defeat for the other in three different ways: “the deliberate dissemination of biological agents; the targeting by conventional means of public health; and the unintentional impact of epidemic disease on military readiness” (Peterson (2002/03: 69). During war, enemies can use biological weapons to spread diseases that can pose a substantial and direct threat to national security. AIDS can erode states’ military readiness when their soldiers badly affected by the disease cannot perform their duties, when military blood supplies are tainted, and when military budgets are cut.

Furthermore, infectious diseases pose a threat to international security. The U.N. Security Council’s Resolution 1308 warned that HIV/AIDS could, if unchecked, pose a threat to world stability. Infectious diseases have been

viewed as a transnational threat to international security with the potential to create or exacerbate tensions between states. Influenza can bring down the global economy by reducing foreign trade and travel or tourism. In East Asia, the Vietnamese charged that the Chinese sold old and sickly birds in Vietnamese markets, but Chinese authorities responded by saying that they could not effectively monitor the ten tons of chickens daily smuggled into Vietnam along their porous 1,000 kilometer border (Garrett 2005a: 19). Most of the international peacekeepers deployed around the world still remain free of risk from HIV, but some have already contracted the virus. As a result, IDs such as the avian flu could have a negative impact on U.N. peace operations. Some experts predict that a major pandemic could threaten global security at any time (Osterholm 2005; Garrett 2005a&b).

Some scholars also argue that “infectious diseases are potentially the largest threat to human security lurking in the post-Cold War world” (Pirages 1995: 11). If not overcome, these new IDs have the potential to become explosive epidemics that could pose a greater threat than the Black Death in Europe. By the mid-2000s, 2.4 million people were said to have died from AIDS, which kills people in their productive years and leaves millions suffering from lack of parental care. In some Asian villages, only the elderly and AIDS orphans remain. Consequently, the young and the elderly have to cut corners in agricultural production by reverting to simplistic slash and burn techniques and simply gathering what is edible from the forest. The result is destruction of the natural environment and reduction of food production and threatened household food security (Hsu 2001: 5). It has sent shock waves around the world, washing over many countries in the Asia-Pacific, such as Russia, China, and those in Southeast Asia (Cambodia, Vietnam, Thailand, and Myanmar), claiming many human lives. In early 2000, more than 6.4 million people in Asia were estimated to have been infected with HIV/AIDS, many of whom used injection drugs. According to Garrett (2005b: 58), “Myanmar may be the greatest contributor of new types of HIV in the world.” In Russia, AIDS will reduce its population by 12–13 million within less than 25 years; by 2050, its population may be reduced by one-third, to about 95–100 million. China experienced an HIV/AIDS explosion: about 20 million Chinese are estimated to be HIV-positive by 2010. As noted, “bare branches” have contributed to this problem. They and sex workers may have a profound effect on the future of HIV spread in China (Tucker 2005).

Flu pandemics know no borders and can threaten human life. The Spanish flu killed between 50 and 100 million people worldwide in 18 months. A new strain of avian influenza (H5N1) appears to have all the earmarks of a disease that could infect “40 percent of the world’s human population” and kill “unimaginable numbers” (Garrett 2005a: 3). It is estimated that the 1957 Asian influenza killed approximately 2 million people.

The Hong Kong flu in 1968 killed 35,000 people in the United States and 700,000 around the world. The avian flu that first appeared in southern China in 1997 hit people in Hong Kong, killing 6 people (35% of those infected) and sickening 18 others. China, Vietnam, and Indonesia have been infected by this virus. This deadly epidemic is unprecedented in terms of scale and contagiousness, and can kill domestic animals and wildlife, as well as humans (Karesh and Cook 2005). As the population of China grows (now 1.3 billion) and prospers, more of its citizens could fall victim to the avian flu, whose viruses pass from aquatic to domestic birds and mammals. China raises 13 billion chickens every year and has increased the number of pigs from just 5.2 million in 1968 to 12.3 million in 2005, but still has low hygienic standards overall. In the United States, the flu has the potential to kill 20% of the population (60 million deaths) and cause 80 million illnesses (compared to some 675,000 Americans who perished from the Spanish flu in 1918–20 (about 6% of the population of about 105 million). According to one estimate, the avian flu could kill between 180 and 360 million people around the world, more than five times the number of HIV-related deaths (Garrett 2005a: 4).

This transnational threat to security has been spread by the exchange of people, goods, and services that ensured economic growth and prosperity; as such, there is a need for preventive measures and proper treatment. Observers do not advocate a policy of strict control over immigration and closing of national borders, as such policy efforts are no longer feasible in the current age of globalization. Moreover, many Asian people's movements have historic, cultural, and kinship links that could not be destroyed "despite centuries of wars, conflicts and political power shifts" (Hsu 2001: 8). In the era of globalization, methods to deal with HIV/AIDS should include measures that make tools for self-protection, such as condoms and STI treatment, available to both military personnel and civilians. These advocates also seek to promote good governance that prevents sexual exploitation, trafficking, and other forms of exploitation, as well as to strengthen and enhance collaborative efforts between international organizations and national governments in the areas of training, education, and research.

States, international organizations (such as the World Health Organization), health professional groups, and even the private sector have been urged to intensify their collaboration in the areas of research and international assistance to fight pandemic influenza. Antiviral supplies remain extremely limited and should be increased. Some experts have called for more research to develop and produce an H5N1 vaccine not only for citizens of developed countries, but also for the entire global population. State and international organizations would need to develop master operational blueprints for dealing with pandemics of any of the above IDs. They also urge the business community to play a major role in the planning process,

such as stockpiling raw materials and developing a model for how to revive the global economy if it were to be devastated by a disease outbreak.

Others have called for a holistic, bottom-up approach, stressing the need to understand that we live in “only one world” based on “only one health.” The top-down approach dominated by science must be tempered by the need for a broader and more democratic approach that requires a philosophical shift toward small- and medium-scale efforts at the local and regional levels (Karesh and Cook 2005: 50).

Overall, past pandemics such as the Spanish flu seem to have had no sustainable impact on states’ national security policies. Peterson (2002/03), for instance, argues that policy recommendations regarding longer-term threats to the health of American armed forces and to social, economic, and political stability in other regions are unlikely to garner public support. Public indifference remains an obstacle to be overcome.

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Conclusion: Toward a New Asia-Pacific Security Order

This book is about peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region and has so far sought to determine if any of the theoretical perspectives under critical review have emerged as the clear winner in the struggle for intellectual hegemony in Peace and Security Studies. If none has, then it may be wise for us to aim at building innovative theories based on the strengths of several existing theories. Based on an extensive critical review of various theoretical perspectives in light of practice and evidence, this book now proceeds to make several conclusions and offer a proposal that advances democratic realist institutionalism.

The first conclusion is that the theoretical perspectives under review agree on one thing: security is the key dependable variable and a value that all can cherish. David Baldwin (1997) is correct when suggesting that security as a concept is not in dispute, but the specifications about it are. Peace and Security Studies, with the potential to be boundless, have also become a rallying point: because it is much broader than strategic studies (closely associated with the realist study of the threat, use, and control of military force), it tends to be inclusive, increasingly interdisciplinary, and amorphous. If Security Studies is known as a sub-field of international relations (IR), it no longer seems clear that this is the case. Security is not only about the survival of states but also about the survival of non-state entities.

Different security theorists have now focused their attention on different referent objects of security, including states, political regimes, societies, and individuals. Many of them pay closer attention to various sources of

threat to security (military, political, economic, social, or other) and include various actors other than political and military leaders as providers of security. Security providers include states, international and non-governmental organizations, social movements or groups, and even individuals. The means and methods by which security can be provided have also become increasingly complex. Moreover, security theorists concentrate not only on conventional measures, such as defense and alliance, nuclear proliferation and deterrence, arms control and disarmament, but also on the need for trade and democracy promotion, institution and community building, raising gender equality, and transnational cooperation.

The second conclusion is drawn from the fact that the various perspectives on peace and security in the Asia-Pacific demonstrate that security as a key concept has become increasingly contestable partly because a growing number of scholars define the concept as socially constructed. Sources of threat to security at different levels are both military and nonmilitary, and nonmilitary sources of insecurity have arguably increased. Moreover, security theorists have increasingly disagreed with one another on how to answer the four basic questions raised in this book. Some theoretical perspectives, especially those in realist and liberal security studies, are state-centric because of their commitment to national and international security. Socialist perspectives are less state-centric because their ultimate vision is of a utopian nature—a world of classless societies that function in favor of humanity. The focus in peace and human security studies has also shifted away from national security to international, regime, societal, and human security, as it has in constructivist and feminist security studies. Perspectives on nontraditional security deal with the concept of security at various levels—national, international, regime, societal, and human—depending on scholars' personal or intellectual commitments. Dialogue among theorists remains quite difficult, and this reconfirms the remark by Terry Terriff *et al.* (1999: 169) that “different perspectives [are] unable to engage in a meaningful dialogue with each other.” It is thus best to leave Peace and Security Studies in separate components, but we should still hope that more productive dialogue among scholars in the field will be possible one day.

The third conclusion is that each theoretical tradition has its strengths and weaknesses. This conclusion rests on our criteria of judgment discussed in the introduction. It may be worth recalling what they are. Each theoretical perspective is relevant to the extent that it can answer the four questions about security. What states or non-state actors actually do matters more than what theorists think. A valid theory must not only be based on normative commitment alone but also have explanatory and predictive power with strong empirical support. Any theory-building efforts must rest on the wisdom that no theory is either completely false or completely true and that each theory should always be subject to modification, revision, and refinement based on normative commitment as well as empirical observation.

This book establishes another standard of judgment: a good theory must show how security can be provided in a more comprehensive sense—national, international, regime, societal, and human. Because sources of threat to peace and security have now multiplied, an effective theory must be one that can help us overcome most of them in a systematic fashion.

Based on these criteria of critical evaluation, each theoretical perspective on security can explain something important in a specific context. Some are more persuasive than others in light of practice and evidence, but none has emerged as the clear winner in the struggle for theoretical hegemony in Peace and Security Studies.

These standards of judgment reveal that realist perspectives still have some explanatory power and empirical support. Political realism remains relevant because its critics do not yet possess enough empirical ammunition to shoot it down. Nation-states are neither dead nor dying. Based on ample evidence presented so far, there is no reason for anyone to believe that states in the Asia-Pacific (or anywhere else in the world) will soon wither away and that counter-hegemonic politics will soon supplant balance-of-power politics. If sources of insecurity—military and nonmilitary; material and nonmaterial; or ideational, national, and transnational—have become more numerous than ever before, there is reason to suspect that states might grow stronger rather than weaker partly because porous borders or statelessness can become more of a problem than a boon. Transnational terrorism, for instance, has done its part to reinforce the security role of states. Even environmental and economic challenges, such as climate change and the economic and financial downturn that began in 2008, have so far led to calls for more government control and regulation.

Attempts at building regional institutions or communities have somewhat softened state sovereignty, but have not yet trumped it. The United Nations will not soon emerge as a world federal state based on international or world law fully capable of disarming our world or ending military buildups in the Asia-Pacific, and protecting states, regimes, societies, and humans without any great powers dominating the system or any power-balancing politics. Even some critical theorists now seem to become more realistic. Linklater (2005: 127), for instance, argues that his vision of an ideal security community does not assume “that the condition of permanent peace is ever likely to be achieved” and that “progress toward this end requires the support of states, especially the great powers.”

But political realism has not emerged as the decisive winner in the struggle for intellectual hegemony in Peace and Security Studies, either. This theoretical paradigm still does not offer the best hope for the promotion of national, regime, societal, and human security. If the constant possibility of war is a certain reality, then states are never truly secure. Moreover, states

in the Asia-Pacific have done more than what realists expect to see happen; they have both built more regional institutions, instead of more military alliances, and engaged in international trade, as commercial liberals advocate. States that do not engage in international trade, such as Myanmar and North Korea, face challenges to their national security and cannot ensure or enhance various types of security.

But neither neo-liberal institutionalism nor commercial liberalism can claim decisive intellectual victory in the struggle for theoretical hegemony. As states build regional institutions (such as ASEAN and APEC) to promote peace through trade and investment, they nonetheless keep their regional institutions weak and even subservient to their own interests. The ARF remains stuck in the first phase of confidence-building measures and has proven unable to mitigate the violence-prone behavior of members like Myanmar and North Korea. Although they favor free trade, states continue to build and strengthen their national defense systems.

Empirical evidence further suggests the limits of peace and human security studies in the Asia-Pacific. The search for peace and security without weapons remains elusive. Efforts at stemming nuclear proliferation, for instance, have been thwarted again and again. States' strict adherence to the traditional principle of sovereignty remains a major hindrance to the development of a regional peacekeeping force, the pursuit of international criminal justice, and other types of peace-building activities. Peace education (both religious and secular) and activism are not new to the region, but they remain insufficient on their own to ensure national, regional, regime, and human security. Few states in the region genuinely respect democracy and universal human rights or have sought to promote human security, which is regarded as a challenge to state sovereignty.

Socialist security studies and constructivist security studies (which include functionalist, neo-functionalist, culturalist, social constructivist, post-Marxist, and postmodern perspectives) have sought to challenge political realism, but none has won in the struggle for theoretical hegemony. Socialism is not dead, but there is no light at the end of the tunnel for its utopian vision for peace and security. The national liberation or revolutionary movements in East-Asian countries were deeply driven by nationalism, but once the revolutionaries gained power, the socialist states turned into realist ones. (Neo-) functionalism has some explanatory power, because states in the region have embraced the idea of regional integration, but this is more rhetoric than a reality. Social constructivism can explain some of the impact of ideational factors on state behavior, but its proponents tend to be overly optimistic about the positive impact of socialization and the bright prospects for peace and security through engagement and regional community building. Post-Marxist perspectives' counter-hegemonic struggles still prove ineffective, and there is no guarantee that a post-hegemonic

regional order can also last. Throughout Asia-Pacific history, hegemony and anarchy always take turns. Not a single state in this region can be seriously considered postmodern (willing and able to forfeit its national sovereignty), either. Even the United States is second to none in its jealous defense of state sovereignty. Some states are prepared to interfere in the domestic affairs of other states, but remain unprepared to let others interfere in theirs. Neither a just world order nor a just world peace is in sight.

Feminist perspectives have provided a useful link between gender and security, but the search for a link between masculinity and insecurity remains elusive. The growth of American feminist movements has not made the United States less militaristic; however, where feminist movements are weak (such as those in Japan), anti-militarism can be strong. The Asia-Pacific experiences show that women can be as realist as men. When their countries come under threat, Asian women are expected to fight. The best contributions to Peace and Security Studies feminists can thus make will be to help enhance the quality of democracy by promoting feminine values. If Reihan Salam (2009) is correct in predicting that the era of male dominance is coming to an end and if Hudson's point that "when both males and females make decisions together all participants are more satisfied with the outcome than when it is the product of all-male groups" (Hudson 2009: 71) is valid, the quality of democracy can be enhanced. Because states (not simply men or women) make war (Jaquette 1999) and regimes can be repressive, those that favor feminine values may score higher on peacefulness.

Proponents in nontraditional security studies in the Asia-Pacific have urged us to give further thought to the emergence of nonmilitary threats, ranging from transitional organized crime to economic and environmental security challenges, and to security problems associated with demographic trends, transnational migration, and pandemics. These are transnational sources of threat to national, international, regime, society, and human security. Unfortunately, perspectives on these nontraditional security issues tend to be descriptive, speculative, and strong on advocacy. In East Asia, nontraditional security studies also tend to privilege threats to the state (Emmers and Caballero-Anthony 2006: xiv), but levels of effective cooperation among states still remain low. Most states in the region also have limited institutional capacity to deal with emerging transnational threats on their own, and all states still staunchly defend their sovereignty.

There is no theoretical hegemon in Asia-Pacific Peace and Security Studies at the moment, but this book discovers that there is now a growing consensus that democracies prove to be more effective than other types of states, when it comes to the question of security enhancement. So far, the strongest candidate in the struggle for theoretical hegemony is arguably democratic liberalism. Even political realism has been "softened" by idealistic factors like democratic ideas. This book sheds additional light on the

fact that regional institutions based on collective or common security are more likely to enhance security and that peace education, peace movements, and epistemic communities are more likely to have a significant impact on behavior if states are democratic. Other perspectives belonging to other theoretical traditions—socialist, constructivist, and feminist—do not argue that liberal democracy is totally irrelevant to the question of peace and security, but only tend to contend that this type of democracy remains inadequate.

Evidence still lends strong support to the argument that liberal democracy tends to ensure and enhance peace and security at the national level. Military alliances between socialist states or between authoritarian and democratic states in the Asia-Pacific have proved to be either short-lived or elusive; however, the most durable security alliances—particularly the U.S.–Japan (50 years old in 2010), the U.S.–South Korea, and the U.S.–Australia—have been between or among democracies. Any thesis that South Korea and Taiwan have been moving away from the United States and are being integrated into China has as little empirical support as the prediction in the 1990s that Japan would one day move away from the United States and draw closer to China. Any view that authoritarian China has become Australia’s new best friend (because of their shared commercial interests) ignores the fact that the two states still do not trust each other and that their growing economic interdependence has not prevented them from increasingly arming themselves. Some evidence also seems to validate the proposition that democracies tend to initiate violence far less frequently than authoritarian ones (such as North Korea), though they tend to exacerbate existing tensions by taking aggressive actions (such as imposing economic sanctions) for defensive purposes.

Again, this does not mean that democratic liberalism now reigns supreme in Asia-Pacific Security Studies. Democracies do not always behave alike. If Japan and South Korea—both of which are stable democracies—are still prepared for war against each other and have not yet formed a genuine security community, scholars may need to study the ongoing challenges to their process of socialization. One of the questions that needs more careful research is why democracies in the European Union (EU) have been able to overcome their historical animosities, but some democracies in the Asia-Pacific have not. Democratic liberalism still cannot tell us how to get states in the Asia-Pacific completely out of the Hobbesian security order and build a stable regional security community.

Where should we go from here then? There are several answers to the question. First, scholars subscribing to each theoretical perspective should continue to modify and refine their arguments in light of new evidence. It is best for us not to become dogmatic in defense of our theoretical perspectives, for Peace and Security Studies should be first and foremost about reflecting on what we know and seeking to know what we do not know, based on new practices and evidence.

Second, no single theoretical perspective discussed so far seems able to ensure and enhance security in the way that meets the standards of judgment advanced in this book. Edward Kolodziej (2005: 318) is wise in making the suggestion that “rival schools should attempt to integrate the best of prevailing thought and practices to produce better models of security than presently exist to respond to the security needs of the world’s diverse and divided peoples.” To varying degrees, some theoretical paradigms under review are of an eclectic nature. Some scholars combine realism, liberalism, and constructivism, and some political realists have begun to do more or less the same. Analytic eclecticism appears to be more promising if theoretical paradigms (such as realism, liberalism, and constructivism) can be judiciously combined. The quest for theoretical purity in our complex world has proved to be elusive.

Third, recent regional trends appear to lend some support to “democratic realist institutionalism” (DRI)—a type of realism that takes both material and ideational factors into account (Peou 2009b). This proposed theory seems to meet more of the standards of judgment established in this book. Few of the scholars subscribing to analytic eclecticism offer clear theoretical propositions that can be subject to empirical testing, however. Democratic realist institutionalism thus formulates the testable proposition that pluralistic security community building is what democracies and their leaders make of it. This proposed theory is institutionalist in its assertion that democracies tend to operate on the institutional basis of checks and balances, at both national and international levels. Regional institutions matter, especially among stable democracies. Democratic realist institutionalism is thus based on democratic liberalism, but only insofar as the theory that democratic states are less likely to wage war against each other.

This proposed theoretical perspective is also based on realism to the extent that it recognizes the persistence of states, material power, and balance-of-power politics. Pluralistic security communities should not mean that their member states can free themselves completely from politics, nor should they mean that national political regimes and domestic politics do not matter at all. Democratic states may still pursue political independence from each other and engage in “soft-balancing”—military efforts that fall short of traditional alliances and arms races (Paul 2005). The best examples in living memory include the British balancing against the United States after World War II, the French under President de Gaulle counterbalancing the United States, and the EU’s security and defense policy aimed at enhancing military autonomy (Layne 2006; Waltz 2000). Japan now wants a more independent and equal partnership with the United States. Security communities should not, therefore, be expected to transcend the security dilemma or to eliminate the need for soft balance-of-power structures (because even stable democracies are still based on effective systems of institutional checks and balances), or to build a world without any weapons. In

short, DRI rests on conceptual interaction between ideas (the democratic balance of power) and material power (the material balance of power).

Democratic realist institutionalism further hypothesizes that democratic states are more likely than non-democratic ones to ensure and enhance national, international, regime, societal, and human security through pluralistic security community building. First, democratic states can ensure better national security than non-democratic ones. Buzan and Wæver make the case that states that coexist peacefully develop a generalized fear of “back to the future” (Buzan and Wæver 2003: 353), as well as “a strong shared view of the status quo, a shared culture and/or well-developed institutions.” In their view, “[d]emocracy may not be a necessary condition but, as suggested by the democracy and peace literature (and by the empirical cases to date), it is a huge asset” (Buzan and Wæver 2003: 173). This argument does not reject the virtues of democracy; it only underestimates them. It is quite possible that democracies are better than non-democracies at developing a generalized fear of “back to the future.” Democracies also tend to be pro-status quo because they enjoy more satisfaction with their positions than non-democracies in the international system (Rousseau *et al.* 1996; Kacowicz 1995; Brawley 1993). Rising democracies prove less likely to escalate war against leading democracies or less likely than non-democracies to become revisionist, and thus less likely to use force to challenge the status quo (Huth and Allee 2003).

Moreover, democracies tend to share cultural norms that are more conducive to peaceful relations among states than norms that are non-liberal. There is no strong evidence suggesting that traditional cultural norms embraced in East Asia (such as those discussed in Chapter 9) have not over the centuries prevented war. As discussed in Chapter 11, culturalist perspectives ignore the fact that states in the region that have shared the same culture have also gone to war against each other. Bilateral military tensions between China and Taiwan, between China and Vietnam, and between North and South Korea further reveal that states that share the same culture still prepare for war against each other. In contrast, democracies that share liberal norms have a far better record of peaceful coexistence.

Democracy is not only about competitive and free and fair elections but also about democratic norms and democratic elites willing to comply with the democratic rules of the political game. Peace between Israel (i.e., dominated by right-wing conservatives led by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu) and Palestine (controlled by Hamas, which was democratically elected but is driven by radical Islamism with an anti-democratic agenda) or between Israel and Lebanon (dominated by Hezbollah’s religious extremists), for instance, is unlikely to be achieved.

Democratic norms encourage mutual satisfaction and accommodation among states that share them. In addition to their ability to maintain their security alliances (such as those in the Asia-Pacific, as mentioned earlier),

democracies have throughout history tended to pose less of a direct military challenge to each other. Evidence reveals that rising democracies and declining democratic hegemons tend to be able to engineer a satisfactory accommodation between them. Lesser liberal states may engage in balance-of-power politics against liberal hegemons, but may be unprepared to wage all-out wars with the latter. Moreover, rising democracies have no long history of hard military balancing against declining liberal hegemons to the point where they engage in war with the latter. Declining democratic leaders tend to form counter-balancing military alliances against rising authoritarian powers, but tend to seek peaceful accommodation with rising democracies (instead of waging preventive wars against the latter) (Schweller 1992). Early in the 20th century, for instance, the United States surpassed Britain in terms of power, but the latter did not fight to restore its once-dominant position in the interstate system (*ibid.*: 40). The United States has also put pressure on Japan to enhance its defense role and seems to regard a rising India in a relatively positive light.

There is also no conclusive historical evidence suggesting that a rising power always poses a direct military challenge to the dominant democratic state within the international system. Germany, for instance, started World Wars I and II, but did not pose a direct military challenge to Britain, choosing instead to begin its attack on other smaller states before the war spread to major powers. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union did pose a direct challenge to the United States, but did not start a hot war against the latter, either. Instead of making a power transition by waging war, the Soviet leaders finally chose to make a “valuation” transition by moving toward capitalist democracy (Kolodziej 2005: 246, 251, and 252). Power transition theorists thus do not argue that rising states are bent on waging war against declining hegemons but point out that peace between them is possible when an accommodation satisfactory to both sides can be found (Kugler 2006). It also seems that democratic states can satisfy the needs of rising authoritarian states better than authoritarian states can accommodate each other's. In East Asia, even authoritarian states (such as Vietnam) and semi-democracies (such as Singapore) still prefer a democratic hegemon to an authoritarian one. Few states regard the United States as a real threat to regional security, and many “East Asian states trust the United States more than they trust each other” (Buzan and Wæver 2003: 176). The argument developed by Steve Chan (2004) that a rising China is more likely to seek accommodation with the United States helps validate the point being made here, because he (1992) also observes the impact of democracy on state security behavior.

Democracies (not dominated by few repressive institutions such as the military and police) also tend to be institution-richer than non-democracies. Non-democratic regimes that are dominated mainly by their militaries (such as those in North Korea and Myanmar) have no stable democratic

institutions and tend to show either hostility toward other states or unwillingness to cooperate with them effectively. Some states may be considered democratic, but their political regimes remain institutionally weak and unstable as long as they remain subject to military influence. The Philippines and Thailand are good examples. In contrast, stable democratic regimes are completely subject to civilian rule. Moreover, they are more likely to enhance national security only if they develop effective systems of checks and balances among state institutions run by democrats or liberal reformers—not dominated by chauvinistic nationalists—as well as between state and civil society institutions. As scholars of Asian domestic politics also note, states are likely to cooperate more effectively when balances of domestic power shift in favor of liberal reformers or internationalists or when nationalists or backlash coalitions are effectively kept at bay or at least in check. Moreover, liberal democratic hegemons tend to build international institutions. John Ikenberry (2008), for instance, shows that the United States did this after World War II and further contends that the Asia-Pacific is likely to remain stable and survive the rise of China if the United States as the world's liberal hegemon and its democratic allies continue to institutionalize, strengthen, and extend the global order.

Democratic realist institutionalism thus shares one common element with democratic realism as advanced by Charles Krauthammer (2004), which emphasizes the role of a democratic hegemon within the unipolar system. But DRI goes beyond democratic realism (stressing the idea of "strategic necessity") to emphasize powerful regional democracies' community-leadership role in the process of developing security communities through institution building at the regional and national levels.

Second, democracies can also effectively ensure and enhance international security without forfeiting their national sovereignty to either world federalism or a world state. Regional security communities need not be like the EU, which can become a super-state and has been often charged with a "democratic deficit" (associated with the alleged limits of political accountability or legitimacy within the Union). More importantly, DRI goes beyond traditional security community studies, which tend to focus on peaceful relations among member states but still expect them to share a common perception of threat toward states outside their regional communities. The DRI vision sees the long-term possibility of regional security communities forming complementary building blocks and ultimately contributing to the development of a pluralistic world security community. This vision thus challenges the realist and constructivist hope for the eventual arrival of a world state (Morgenthau 1985; Wendt 2003), which has been regarded as oppressive (especially by Kantian liberals and postmodernists).

Third, regime security is far greater in democracies than in authoritarian states. Although far from perfect, democratic regimes are likely to enjoy

more political legitimacy, which gives rise to greater political stability. One can counter-argue that non-democratic governments can last a long time. The Chinese imperial system, for instance, remained stable for centuries. However, its stability appears to have been precarious. Because the emperor stood at the top of the system, the problem of dynastic cycles was inevitable. Dynasties were created but then disintegrated. Dynastic decay rooted in rulers' moral defects was another problem. Dynasties were strong when emperors were of good moral character and decayed when emperors turned bad. Bad emperors did not necessarily result from immorality alone. Sloth and weakness of character created other problems leading to dynastic decay. Moreover, political instability rooted in the precariousness of China's imperial system resulted from emperors' overwork, inexperience, and petty duties. As the imperial leadership weakened, it generated factionalism and warlord politics (Moody 1988: 27–28).

One-party regimes like those in China and Vietnam are also fragile. The Chinese Communist Party has proved to be quite resilient, but it is unclear how long the regime will be able to maintain its political legitimacy, if the authoritarian system becomes overly corrupt, if the economic system deteriorates badly, and if no institutional reform is possible. The number of large street protests that turn violent in China, for instance, rose from 60,000 in 2003 to 90,000 in 2006 (Wong 2009: 1). The Vietnamese leadership also has since the end of the Cold War seen itself as being vulnerable to subversion by hostile outside forces working in collusion with domestic reactionaries (Thayer 2008). Lest we forget, the authoritarian Soviet state finally collapsed, which even leading members of the academic community had failed to see coming. Authoritarian political systems may be stable in the short term, but their long-term development remains precarious (Riggs 1993). Semi-democratic states may be more stable than fledgling democracies in the same region (Hassan 1996; Case 1996), but they are not as stable or institutionally mature as democracies elsewhere. Semi-democratic stability is evident in Malaysia and Singapore due to legitimacy based on economic liberalism. In contrast, the New Order regime of Indonesia fell apart, while other democracies (such as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan) have enjoyed legitimacy and prospered economically.

Democratic regimes can also perform well, economically. Blondel and Marsh make a strong case that "there is no manifest evidence that liberal democratic rule is directly and obviously detrimental to economic well-being [and] . . . economic performance has flourished under liberal democratic regimes in East and Southeast Asia." They add that "democracy can help economic growth, even if authoritarian rule can also do so" (Blondel and Marsh 1999: 356). This remains true in the case of the Philippines and Indonesia. Authoritarian regimes such as those in China and Vietnam have experienced higher economic growth rates, but political authoritarianism does not automatically lead to economic development. Authoritarianism

has evidently led to regime instability. African military dictatorships in particular have proved this to be the case.

Fourth, evidently democratic regimes tend to promote human security more effectively than authoritarian ones. Democracies are less likely to go to war against each other when compared with authoritarian states, which also proves that democracies can ensure human security better than authoritarian states. Within security communities, states are more likely to reduce spending on defense and hence are more likely to ensure the security of people, such as meeting their socioeconomic needs. It is also debatable whether democratization leads to war or violence (such as ethnic cleansing), but stable democracies do not perpetrate murderous ethnic cleansing (Levene, Bartow, and Mann 2006: 480, 487). When compared with dictatorship, democracy is also positively correlated with a lower number of hungry people. Amartya Sen (1999: 92) also discovered that “one of the remarkable facts in the terrible history of famines in the world is that no substantial famine has ever occurred in any country with a democratic form of government and a relatively free press.” These findings run contrary to the undeniable fact that the world’s worse famines have occurred under murderous totalitarian regimes, such as those under Mao Zedong and Pol Pot. Democracy can also enhance security for women and girls. According to both Thomas Zweifel and Patricio Navia (2000: 99), “[i]n 138 countries observed annually over the period 1950–90, democracies showed markedly lower infant mortality rates than dictatorship.” Although some scholars argue that only authoritarian regimes can govern high sex ratios (Hudson and den Boer 2004: 259), it is far from clear that authoritarian China has done a better job in terms of overcoming the threat of infanticide (especially female) than democratic India has. Crimes against women in India, such as kidnapping, trafficking, and rape, are still on the rise (*ibid.*: 241), but there is no reason to think that democracies will never become more successful than non-democracies in trying to deal with these threats.

Fifth, democracies are more likely to turn more of their attention to newly emerging nontraditional security threats. Democracies may still be subject to terrorism, but they are better than authoritarian states when it comes to dealing with this type of threat, especially when they respect political rights and civil liberties and respond to socio-economic needs. Democracies also tend to rely on the rule of law and are far less repressive than authoritarian states. Evidently, they appear to make “superior counter-terrorists” (Abraham 2007). Based on the rule of law, democracies can also respond more effectively to other nonmilitary sources of insecurity. Carlyle Thayer (2008), for instance, predicts that Vietnamese officials are more likely to understand better that the challenges to Vietnam’s national security will be transnational if they can bring the public security and military intelligence services under the rule of law.

The fact that democracy can help ensure and enhance national, international, regime, societal, and human security does not mean that this system of government is flawless or forever sustainable. Capitalist liberalism has now come under growing threat from other illiberal ideologies, such as neo-Keynesianism, justice globalism on the Left and reactionary national-populism and religious globalism on the Right (Steger 2009). This means that we should also pay closer attention to what radical scholars say about security because of their insightful warnings against the kind of unfair and unethical capitalism that perpetuates extreme exploitation and contributes to the ever-widening gap between rich and poor nations and individuals. However, we must also be wary of any radical call to abolish capitalism once and for all. The historical experience of the 20th century shows that neither states nor political regimes, neither elites nor ordinary people were secure under anti-liberal capitalist or socialist rule. The task of radical theorists within the socialist, constructivist, and feminist theoretical traditions is thus useful to the extent that they are both constructive in terms of their theoretical contributions to debates on the quality of democracy and realistic (without being too utopian in their dream of a just world order or a just world peace). For the next few decades, there seem to be no realistic alternatives to the current liberal world security order. Therefore, limited energy and resources are best spent on building and improving tried and tested democratic institutions rather than replacing them with untried ones.

Nothing in the 21st century is thus more urgent than the task of building, sustaining, and enhancing democracy. One of the most important strategies for security in the Asia-Pacific is not to stop China from becoming a superpower (still driven by nationalism whose goal is to establish hegemony in East Asia, if not in the world and if not to start a war against the United States) but to ensure that it will become a democracy—one that is not dominated by conservative nationalist or chauvinistic communist elites who can still appeal to the military and security forces capable of creating threats to security. No Asia-Pacific security community is likely to emerge if China becomes such an authoritarian hegemon because it is likely to defend non-democratic regimes and to keep the region from advancing toward democracy, even if other states (such as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan) remain democratic and even if Indonesia becomes a stable democracy. More urgently, capitalistic excesses must be trimmed to ensure more sustainable and more equitable economic development.

This does not mean that democratic states must use force to promote democracy in East Asia. The U.S. strategy to build democracy in Iraq and Afghanistan through the use of force, for instance, has so far proved to be costly and counterproductive (Peou 2009a). Any U.S. preventive war against China would only bring great destruction to both sides and would precipitate American decline. Samuel Huntington (as noted in Chapter 11)

may be correct in predicting that a major Sino-U.S. war would also lead to their decline and the emergence of lesser powers. The good news for the Asia-Pacific is that democratic states have been making a joint effort to forge a security alliance, with the United States taking the lead (Green and Twining 2008), but this is a healthy development as long as the regional alliance of democratic states is primarily for defensive purposes and as long as the democracies engage in the diplomacy of reassurance with authoritarian states, such as China and Russia. The Asia-Pacific has so far been blessed by the fact that an expansionist NATO-type military alliance has not existed. When too powerful, such liberal military alliances may become more threatening than reassuring to non-democratic states. Regional stability has benefited from the liberal alliances between the United States and other democracies, but these democratic alliances must avoid expanding themselves aggressively into something that could be regarded by Russia or China as posing a potent threat to their security. The 2008 war between Russia and Georgia, for instance, may have resulted more from NATO's aggressive eastward expansion than from the latter's domestic conflicts.

When not backed by brute force, political, legal, and economic liberalization can be beneficial to the process of sustaining security. One wise course of action is to ensure the process of democratization, criminalization of violence, and marketization within authoritarian states through institution building. Complex realist institutionalism helps shed some light on how this triple process may actually work (Peou 2007).

In sum, we still have a long way to go before we can become confident enough about how to build, maintain, and improve tried and tested institutions that sustain security communities and enhance their performance. All theoretical perspectives must thus be subject to modification, revision, and refinement in light of practice and evidence, and their proponents should avoid holding rigidly dogmatic views. One can never become too cowardly to listen to others, to engage with them even when agreement seems to be nowhere in sight, and possibly to draw on some of their wisdom. We would only become wiser if we could find more creative ways to develop pluralistic security communities that enhance regional, inter-regional, regime, and human security without allowing national security to be sacrificed on the altar of theoretical fantasy.

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