CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PRAGMATICS

JACOB L. MEY

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SECOND EDITION

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PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION

There are certain activities in our lives that seem to be endlessly repeating themselves: we witness an apparently endless construction of houses, office buildings, roads and highways, and other infrastructures; there is the preparation and consumption of foodstuffs; there is the daily maintenance of the quarters we live in; there are the recurrent activities governing our use of the markets, small and big; and so on and so forth.

Similarly, writing articles and essays may, for some people, seem to have the same repetitive and perhaps even monotonous character. Still, there is a difference. Writing (or for that matter, all communicative action) is always directed at a person or group of persons; even the most monologic self-expressing poetry always addresses somebody (even though, in extreme cases, the audience is restricted to the poet him-or herself). In addition, the repetitive character of, say, housework may prompt our easy-going consorts to protest against the making of beds or the cleaning of kitchens, with the motivation that 'beds have to be made again anyway, so why not just let them be', or: 'dust is going to happen, so why not just adjust ourselves to a lower than needy standard of cleanliness'. In contrast, activities having to do with communication (in particular, writing) do not only affect the author (the 'originator', or *auctor*, with an old-fashioned term), but also, and perhaps to an even higher degree, the 'end user': the recipient, in our case, the reader.

But, some reader might object, what has all this to do with the current (concise) encyclopedia of language and linguistics that I am looking at right now? The answer is that encyclopedias, like all works of letters, presuppose our cooperation as readers. In and through the act of reading, we align ourselves with the author whose text we are perusing and with whom we are cooperating. And even though encyclopedias may seem to embody just what the word means: an all-round *paideia* (which is the Greek word for 'upbringing'), to a cursory observer it may seem that such works only pretend to satisfy an individual's desire to know a factoid or two, or to delve a little deeper into a certain area of knowledge. What is often overlooked is the interactive feature that is built into the very essence of encyclopedic work, no matter how apparently passive in character on the part of the reader.

It is no secret that many encyclopedias have been the forerunners of revolutions, as I pointed out in the Preface to the first edition of this Concise Encyclopedia. And what I wrote back in 1998 is just as true today as it was then:

> The purpose of an Encyclopedia, according to the original (1750–1769) *encyclopédistes*, the French literates and philosophers Denis Diderot and Jean le Rond d'Alembert, is to enlighten the population in order to make them choose the right way of leading their lives, free from the encumbrances of false beliefs and authoritarian doctrines. This apparent innocent and worthy aim had much wider and more profound consequences for society than its proposers could ever have foreseen, as we now know, with the benefit of historical hindsight. Two hundred years after the American, the French, and countless other revolutions, the encyclopedia has become a standard household fixture, and it is hard to imagine, by looking at the impressive, often leather-bound volumes that adorn the bookshelves of better-off households around the planet, how the original ideals of democratizing enlightenment could have had such strong political, even revolutionary side effects. (Mey 1998:xxv)

By the double token of being iterative and revolutionary, encyclopedias, while pretending to codify the knowledge they conserve and propagate, also reflect the societal interaction that is at their base. And this is, finally, why encyclopedias have to be constantly updated and 're-cycled'.

The British author Patrick Leigh Fermor describes, in one of his erudite 'travelogues', how he, as a young man roaming across the old Hapsburg domain, always found solace in the encyclopedias he discovered in the libraries of the manors and castles to which influential friends had given him introductions. Thus, the traveler found himself "poring over *Meyers Konversationslexikon*" during his stay at a castle in Rumania, while trying to update his knowledge of Central European history (Hungarian and Transylvanian in particular; Leigh Fermor 2005: 101)—in more or less the same way that I, in an earlier period of my life and some twenty years later, helped by *Meyer*, familiarized myself with the beautiful railway stations and city halls that had once adorned cities like Metz and Strasbourg in what had been the (then) German *Reichsland* Elsass-Lothringen. I recall the historic *frisson* I experienced, due in part to the fact that many of those magnificent building had long since fallen prey to the combined forces of war and regressive architectural ideologies, posing as progressive notions.

The 'melancholy of art', *melanconia dell'arte*, that I perceived contrasted with the urgent need to move on with history, in the same way as it happened for the English author years ago, during a journey through a landscape that was in continuous flux, always on the brink of disappearing into the local and historical horizon, only experienced by 'being there', in real life or in the vicarious existence of an encyclopedia, and by moving ahead in an irreversible, and in a way perverse, penetration.

As far as pragmatics is concerned, such a journey provides us with an apt metaphor, both with regard to the landscape traveled and to the various intellectual landmarks and influences encountered there. It seems safe to say that the pragmatic landscape is not only in flux, but that its movements and tendencies have steadily accelerated their courses. Thus, from a humble beginning at the remote outposts of philosophy and linguistic semantics, pragmatics has developed into a vast realm where often conflicting theories and practices reign—just as it was the case for our Brit, traveling the always unruly and undefinable territories that at one time were loosely integrated components of the Austrian-Hungarian *kaiserliche und königliche* twin monarchy, the "*k.u.k. Doppelmonarchie*", from the years before the Great War. But also, just as it is not only interesting, but useful for us to learn about happenings in those parts in the twilight between the two world wars, and confront them with the situation as it has evolved and especially as it is present to our minds today, so too is it useful, nay necessary, for us to reflect on the developments of our discipline ever since the days of John L. Austin and his burgeoning speech act theory. And in this respect, the new (second, 2006) edition of the mother volume to the present work, the *Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics* along with its present, concise offshoot, seem to be timely undertakings.

If one were to ask what in particular has changed since those early times, the answer may be that pragmatics has become a 'discipline' in its own right, rather than a somewhat ill-defined by-product of other branches of language studies. The notorious 'wastebasket of semantics' comes to mind: an expression due to Yehoshua Bar-Hillel, who considered pragmatics more or less as uncharted territory, a bit like those Western expanses in America where a man still could do whatever he wanted to do and get away with it, as no rules or regulations had yet been invented to provide law-based security and establish rule-driven well-formedness. In contrast, we observe a trend towards what could be called a 'legalization' of pragmatics, starting in its earlier development and continuing until the present day. Even though it still is too early to speak of a unified scientific discipline (a term which may more properly be applied to other branches of linguistics, such as phonetics or syntax), there is no doubt that pragmatics, as a discipline, has come into its own.

It would be wrong, however, to consider the growth and deployment of pragmatics as a science uniquely as a 'breaking away' from older disciplines like semantics or syntax. Rather, the development that led to the rise of pragmatics started as a linguistics-internal movement (inspired by the philosophy of language of the Austinian type), whose ultimate endpoint could not be foreseen (and, as many will say, is still out of sight and reach). Whereas, on the one hand, certain developments in pragmatics may have been triggered by the descriptive aporias and insufficiencies involved in purely semantic or even syntactic ways of considering language, on the other it is equally true that many modern pragmaticists gathered their inspiration from outside the realm of linguistics proper.

The two streams in this development: an 'intralinguistic' one, dealing with descriptive and explanatory questions from a linguistics-internal point of view, and an 'extralinguistic' one, emphasizing the social character of the language user and the language used, while insisting on the use of language as a defining feature of pragmatics, often seemed to be on a collision course, yet at other times were able to negotiate a peaceful coexistence. In particular, when one looks at some of the recent developments in pragmatics (some of which the present encyclopedia has only just begun to chart), it becomes clear that the two streams, or tendencies, have much to tell one another. Not only does the 'purely' syntactic or semantic approach not suffice, when we are

dealing with typical pragmatic phenomena (such as the manipulative or rhetorical uses of language that ever since the Sophists have been the hallmark of a pragmatically oriented study of language); in addition, the internal contradictions that arose from the desire to create a unified matrix, valid for semantic as well as syntactic description (as, e.g., exemplified in 'Montague grammar') have led to the acceptance of what some have called a 'pragmatic intrusion' into semantics (cf., among others, Levinson 2000: 164 *et pass.*).

For many, the very idea that rules could be given for pragmatic use of language has from the beginning been a *non sequitur*: the creative use of language by the individual in a societal environment could only be circumscribed by the classical, individual-based methods of linguistics, not defined (Mey 2002: 183). Instead, pragmatics has from its very inception promoted the development of society-oriented approaches, that is, approaches that take their point of departure in what is or can be out there, in the social context surrounding us, and then intrapolate these realities and possibilities onto the actual situation in which the language user him- or herself is involved. Such approaches contrast starkly with the well-known efforts by theoretical linguists, traditional sociolinguists, and other social scientists to first define the 'said', and then try to figure out what the conditions are that make a particular utterance 'correct' or 'acceptable'.

In all these cases, there is a certain 'ecological' principle at work, by which users endeavor to maximize their results with minimal efforts, while respecting their linguistic and social environments. This 'ecological turn' has inspired such differing tendencies as, on the one hand, relevance theory, and by what has been called 'default semantics' on the other (cf. Jaszczolt 2005 and the article by that name in this volume). Similarly, we have been witness to the rise of 'optimality theory' in its various versions—this latter approach is still in its infancy and has not yet reached acceptance in most of the 'border territories' (even so, the present work does have an article outlining some notions and possible approaches, cf. the eponymous article presented in the body of this volume).

Other recent developments have resulted in psycholinguistic excursus (or should I say: 'excursions', to remain in the traveling metaphor?). Here, one finds a number of articles dealing with developmental aspects of pragmatics (the psycholinguistic view) or approaches that are oriented towards cognitive psychology (as in 'cognitive pragmatics'). More generally, the cognitive approach itself, originally considered as an extension of epistemic and psychological ways of looking at language use, has come into its own as well, leading to a whole flurry of writings on venerable notions such as metaphor and metonymy, not to forget the return to 'classical', speech act-based ideas—first of all the concept of the speech act itself and its conditions, injecting them with new interpretations of the time-honored Searlean and Austinian conditions and restrictive maxims, including further extended notions, such as that of 'flouting a maxim' (on which see the article of that name, this volume).

The idea that language belongs, not only to a particular culture or country, but also to the speakers themselves, has gained some momentum in the past decades. Thus, the understanding that not everything linguistic is accessible to everybody at all times, and neither to everybody in the same (legally sanctioned) fashion, has given rise to speculations about accessibility in language, and to what has been called 'territory of information'; see, e.g., the article on 'accessibility theory' in this volume, or the writings of Akio Kamio (1994, 1995, 1997) and recent work by John Heritage (2007). To express one's condolences, for instance (to take Heritage's example), presupposes that one has the correct 'stance' in regard to the 'condolee'. More generally, all speech acting on principle belongs to society, and is only derivatively made possible through the language user's active participation in that society—ideas that have been around ever since the eighties (see Mey 1985), and which have lately come to fruition in my theory of 'pragmatic acts' (on which see the article of that name in the current volume; compare also Mey 2008).

The idea that language use and linguistic activities in general (either in the phonetic, syntactic, semantic, or pragmatic realm) obey some kind of 'law of least effort' has been fruitfully mined not only by the protagonists of relevance theory, but also in a more general way by the defenders of optimal, rather than maximal, solutions to linguistic problems. What this means is that rather than abiding by some strict rules (like those that allow one to say 'yes' or 'no' to questions of grammaticality), the thought that an optimal solution often consists in accepting a certain deviation from strict standards has taken hold in the sciences of the human over the past decades.

Early on, the psychologists started to operate with a notion of 'prototype', meaning: a concept with fuzzy edges all around; and in pragmatics, the suggestion that conditions are more optimally construed as constraints on the environment than as production rules binding the individual user, has gained considerable popularity. While a fully fledged theory of 'optimality' is something that we will have to wait (and work) for (as I remarked above), we may observe, at the interfaces between pragmatics and the other linguistic areas, an ever growing trend towards voluntary collaboration, rather than towards unification under some stringent formal umbrella. Given the newness of such approaches, there are only a few articles in the present volume that reflect this

tendency; had there been more time, and had the selection process been less restricted (viz., practically to the original articles in the fourteen mother volumes of 2006), more current work might have been made available.

One issue still bothers the compiler of the present volume, as it did with regard to its 1998 predecessor. It is an issue familiar to all who have ever tried to produce a conspectus-type, work-oriented overview of some area of knowledge. The dilemma of choosing between an alphabetical sequencing of contributions versus an hierarchical, thematically-based division of the field has bothered dictionary and encyclopedia makers for as long as their works have been around. The great *encyclopédistes* of the 18th century, whom I quoted earlier, opted for a strict alphabetical order; while I am not privy to their motivations, I can imagine that ease of access must have been one of them.

One is reminded of the often occurring situation where an opportunistic, 'seniority'-based order wins out over a logical one for the simple reason that logics are not universal. Compare the nightmare of those medieval philosophers who tried to capture the whole world under one metaphysical hat; closer to home, one needs only to think of the familiar situation where keys and other important items become practically impossible to find because the owner (often identical with the original depositor) no longer is certain which logic has guided his or her movements while putting away the object in question. Most techniques of object (and knowledge) retrieval operate by a logic of local associations: where did I go first, where from there, and so on. The alphabet provides us with an easy to remember, neutral sequence where everything has its place in a mostly universally accepted order; and this logic is what I have decided to follow also in the present volume.

It has been said by the famous Dr. Samuel Johnson (whose doctoral dignity seems to have been more honorific than acquired by hard work) that "dictionaries are like watches: the worst is better than none and the best cannot be expected to go quite true" (in Mrs. Piozzi's *Anecdotes of the Late Samuel Johnson*). Applying this dictum to the present work and its generic characteristics, one could say that encyclopedias, despite their recognized usefulness, never will achieve the mandate that is inherent in their title, viz. to give a full conspectus of an entire discipline or area of knowledge, let alone of the human knowledge *in toto*.

But even a more modest effort, as represented by the present, concise work, may be useful in giving us the time of day in more than one sense: not just telling us what is going on, but discuss it (through the voices of the articles' authors) in an intelligent and accessible fashion. If this should happen in the case of the present work, its compiler may have escaped the common doom of all compilers, embodied in the universal tension between that which is attainable and that which should be attained. And with these reservations in mind, I want to give the book my best wishes on its way to the reading public, and say: *I liber* 'Book, go forth'! May your travel be as happy, and lead to as many interesting encounters, as was the case for the audacious young Englishman, whose peripeties inspired me while I was writing these lines.

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Jacob L. Mey
Austin, Texas
9 February 2009

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A

Accessibility Theory

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Natural discourse does not start from scratch. Speakers routinely integrate new information with contextual assumptions, roughly, information that they can take for granted, and so they need not assert it (Sperber and Wilson, 1986/1995). Referring to discourse entities, an inherent feature of human interactions, is no different. Although some discourse entities are (treated as) new (*a kiss* in [1]), most are (treated as) identifiable (e.g., *the review, Helen, her* in [1], and *her heart*, a first-mention, in [2]). Thus, part of the nonasserted material is information about discourse entities that the speaker would like the addressee to retrieve (for citations of SBC [Santa Barbara corpus], see Du Bois *et al.,* 2000, 2003. [. . .] = a short fragment deleted):

(1) LORI: when you were reading **the review**,
you talked about **the affair between**
   Helen and Paul, [. . .]
all that happened was,
LINDA: was **a kiss**. [. . .]
LORI: **He** kissed **her**, (SBC: 023).

(2) DORIS: they had an autopsy done on her.
And **her heart**,
was just hard, (SBC: 001).

Accessibility Theory (Ariel, 1985a, 1985b, 1988a, 1990, 2001), in effect a development of Sanford and Garrod (1981) and Givón (1983) (and see also Chafe, 1994), assumes a logically prior distinction between identifiable/Given entities (coded as definite) and nonidentifiable/Given entities (coded as indefinite). Identifiable entities are ones for which the addressee is assumed to be able to access mental representations (see Du Bois, 1980; Heim, 1982). Accessibility theory seeks to account for the selection and interpretation of all definite referring expressions. The theory does not assume (as fundamental) the first versus subsequent mention distinction, and provides one and the same account for expressions considered referential (e.g., proper names), often used for discourse first-mentions, as well as for expressions considered anaphoric (e.g., pronouns), often used for subsequent mentions (Ariel, 1990, 1994, 1996). It also does not view references to the speech situation (e.g., by deictics) as special (Ariel, 1998a). All definite referring expressions in all languages are analyzed as accessibility markers, as instructions to the addressee on how to access specific mental representations. In fact, the theory handles other types of Given materials as well, most notably whole propositions (see Ariel, 1985a, 1985b, 1988b).

Using a definite NP, the speaker signals to her addressee to access some mental representation based either on his encyclopedic knowledge, his awareness of the speech situation, or his discourse model of the interaction so far (Clark and Marshall, 1981). The definite referring expression also provides information about the intended entity, which the addressee is to rely on when zeroing in on the intended referent (e.g., *her* is a singular female). This is as far as the definiteness aspect takes us, but speakers can be even more helpful. Mental representations are not equally accessible to us at any given stage of the discourse. Some are highly activated, others are mildly activated, and yet others, although potentially identifiable, are not currently activated at all. Speakers refer to discourse entities at all activation levels. This is where accessibility theory plays a crucial role. It helps the addressee pick the correct mental representation by indicating to him the degree of accessibility with which the mental representation is currently entertained. The claim is that each referring expression specializes for a specific degree of mental accessibility, hence the term *accessibility markers* for referring expressions. On this view, addressees search mental representations not only based on the content of the referring expression, but also based on the degree of accessibility indicated by the speaker.

Since mental accessibility comes in a rich array of degrees, accessibility markers can be graded on a scale of accessibility marking, some indicating very low degrees of mental accessibility, others indicating various intermediate and high degrees of accessibility. The following partially grammaticized (see Ariel, 2001) accessibility marking scale, starting with very

low accessibility markers and ending with extremely high accessibility markers, has been proposed in Ariel (1990), but the list is not intended to be exhaustive:

(3) Full name + modifier > full name > long definite description > short definite description > last name > first name > distal demonstrative + modifier > proximate demonstrative + modifier > distal demonstrative + NP > proximate demonstrative + NP > distal demonstrative (-NP) > proximate demonstrative (-NP) > stressed pronouns + gesture > stressed pronoun > unstressed pronoun > cliticized pronoun > verbal person agreement markers > zero.

For example, *the affair between Helen and Paul* in (1) is a long definite description. The prediction is that it indicates a mental representation that is not as accessible as the shorter *the review* or *he*. Indeed, *the review* is what the interlocutors have been discussing. But the affair, as such, was not explicitly mentioned in the conversation, and in fact, according to Lori, it's not even clear that there was one. *He* (a pronoun) refers to the highly accessible Paul, who was just mentioned.

Now, the correlations between specific referring expressions and specific degrees of mental accessibility are not arbitrary. This is why (3) is virtually a universal. By and large, the accessibility marking scale is governed by three coding principles: informativity, rigidity, and attenuation. Informativity predicts that more informative expressions be used when the degree of accessibility is relatively low. It is only reasonable for the speaker to provide the addressee with more information if the mental representation is not (highly) activated, so he can better identify the intended entity from among the many he entertains at a low degree of accessibility. Rigidity predicts that a (more) uniquely referring expression (such as a proper name), rather than a relatively nonrigid expression (such as a pronoun), should be used when degree of accessibility is low (cf. *Helen*, *Paul* with *her*, *he* in [1]). Finally, attenuation predicts that greater phonological size (including the presence of stress) correlates with lower degrees of accessibility, whereas smaller phonological size correlates with higher degrees of accessibility (cf. definite descriptions vs. pronouns, and even more so with zero).

The three principles overlap to a large extent. Quite often, informative expressions are also relatively rigid and unattenuated. However, this is not invariably so. *The newspaper* and *United States of America* are as informative and rigid as *the paper* and *US(A)*, respectively, but they are not as attenuated. Accordingly, the lower accessibility markers are found in contexts where a lower degree of accessibility is the case (see Ariel, 2001, *inter alia*). Similarly, in languages with verbal person agreement, there is no difference in the informativity and rigidity between independent pronouns (e.g., Hebrew *ani*, 'I') and the corresponding agreement marker (+*ti* for past tense). But distributional patterns show that the independent pronoun (less attenuated) is used when the speaker is less accessible. Finally, for Western names, it's usually the case that first and last names are equally informative and attenuated, but they are not equally rigid. Last names tend to pick a referent more uniquely than first names (simply because there is a greater variety of last names). Accordingly, Ariel (1990: 45) correlates the two types of names with different textual positions, showing that anaphoric first names mostly find their antecedents within the same paragraph, but last names have three times as many cross-paragraph anaphoric relations. This points to the lower degree of accessibility indicated by last names.

Distance between a previous and a current mention of the entity (recency) is indeed one important factor determining degree of accessibility. Naturally, the longer the time elapsed between the previous and the current reference, the less activated the representation, so that relatively lower accessibility markers are called for. Note that the relationship between the antecedent and the anaphor, their Unity, is not simply measured in number of words (only), but rather, syntactic boundaries (e.g., the clause), textual boundaries (the paragraph, the episode), and pragmatic boundaries (units more vs. less cohesively linked to each other) define the closeness between a potential antecedent and its anaphor, dictating higher or lower accessibility markers depending on how 'distant' the two are from each other. When a discourse entity is inferred based on another, we similarly see differences according to how automatic/stereotypic the inference connecting the two is (cf. *her heart* in [2], which is easily inferred from *her*, given that humans have hearts, with *his sense of character values* based on *his* referring to *Mister Forster* – SBC: 023, where we don't automatically assume that people have a "sense of character values"). Empirical evidence for these Unity claims can be found in Clancy (1980), Sanford and Garrod (1981), Givón (1983), and Ariel (1985a and onward).

Unity features mostly pertain to anaphoric references. Referent salience is important for all types of reference, first-mention referential expressions included. Some discourse entities are inherently more salient: the speaker and addressee (vs. third persons), humans (especially vs. inanimates), and famous personalities (vs. anonymous people). Other discourse entities have a prominent *ad hoc* status, mostly

because they constitute discourse topics. The predictions are then that higher accessibility markers will serve these more salient discourse entities. Competition over the role of intended referent between potential mental representations may, however, lower the degree of accessibility of each, mainly of nontopics. It then calls for lower accessibility markers:

(4) MARY: What I have to do,
      is take off **the distributor wire**$_i$,
      and splice **it**$_i$ in with **the fuel pump
      wire**$_j$.
      Because **my** ... **fuel pump**$_j$ is now
      electric, (SBC: 007).

(5) In the reference, each author is referred to by
   name and initials. There is a single exception –
   to avoid the possibility of confusion, first
   names are always included for **David Payne,
   Doris Payne, John Payne, Judith Payne** and
   Thomas Payne (Dixon, 1994: xvi–xvii).

In (4), the more topical entity is coreferred to by *it*, the nontopic by an informative lexical NP (*my fuel pump*). In (5), presumably equally accessible entities are all referred to by lower accessibility markers (full names), because they compete with each other (initial + *Payne* is not rigid enough in this context).

It is important to remember, however, that accessibility theory makes claims about correlations between referring expressions and degree of accessibility, measured as a total concept, rather than by any one of its components (e.g., topic, distance, or competition). In other words, the prediction is that accessibility marker selection is determined by weighing together a whole complex of accessibility factors, which together determine what the degree of accessibility of a given discourse entity is at the current stage of the discourse (see Toole, 1996; Ariel, 1999). This is why, for example, even speakers are not invariably referred to by the highest accessibility markers (zero in Hebrew). Although the speaker is a highly salient discourse entity, if she's not topical or if it's competing with another antecedent, it may be referred to by an independent pronoun.

Finally, accessibility theory is universal (see Ariel, 1990: 4.2), although not all languages have exactly the same set of referring expressions, and even when these seem to be identical, they may rate differently for the three coding principles (informativity, rigidity, and attenuation, e.g., cf. English and Japanese pronouns). Provided they are comparable, all referring expressions are predicted to indicate the same relative, though not absolute, degrees of accessibility. Thus, in all languages zeroes indicate a higher degree of accessibility than pronouns, but not all languages allow cross-sentential zero anaphora. Accessibility theory applies to all genres/registers (see Ariel, in press). In fact, because accessibility related discourse patterns are so common in diverse registers and languages, we can account for various cross-linguistic grammaticization paths. For example, the recurrent creation of verbal person agreement markers for first/second persons, but not for third persons (via the cliticization of the high accessibility markers used for the very salient speaker and addressee; see Ariel, 1998b, 2000), as well as universal constraints on the use of resumptive pronouns (see Ariel, 1999). At the same time, accessibility constraints may be violated to create special pragmatic effects (e.g., *Jamie the old lady* (SBC: 002) is too low an accessibility marker, when used by Jamie's husband in her presence).

See also: Deixis and Anaphora: Pragmatic Approaches.

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Activity Theory

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Cultural-historical activity theory (CHAT) is a school of thought concerning itself with the relation and interaction between humans and their material and social environment. Originally a psychological tradition, it has been expanded into a more general, multidisciplinary approach, which is used (besides in psychology) in semiotics, anthropology, sociology, cognitive science, linguistics, and design research. Thus, it would be more suitable to call it a framework, an approach, or a research program. From another perspective, CHAT is one of the few research traditions in human sciences originating in the former Soviet Union that have been able to gain acceptance in the Western research.

Historical Background

Cultural-historical activity theory, CHAT, originated in attempts by psychologists, as early as the 1920s, to establish a new, Marxist-based approach to psychology. The foundation of Activity Theory was laid by L. S. Vygotsky during the 1920s and early 1930s. (*see* **Vygotskij, Lev Semenovich**.) His work was continued by A. N. Leont'ev and A. R. Lurija, who both developed his ideas further and began to use the term 'activity.' (A good historical review of that development can be found in Leont'ev, 1989.) For a Marxist psychologist, who favors a monistic explanation of human mental processes, the Cartesian mind-body dualism is unacceptable. Thus, the starting point of CHAT is that human thinking has both phylogenetically and ontogenetically emerged and developed in practical action and social interaction in the world; there is no separate mind that could be studied in isolation from these actions; significantly, the individual person is thus not a real unit of the analysis of mind. In any such analysis, the purposefulness of actions must be taken into account, and therefore it is necessary to include a minimal context that makes the actions meaningful for the acting subject. This context, typically a purposeful, social system of actions, is called an activity. Certain general principles within this framework include object orientation; mediation by culturally and historically formed artifacts (tools and signs);

hierarchical structure of activity; and zone of proximal development.

Object Orientation

The most central feature of CHAT is that activities are oriented towards a specific object and that different objects separate activities from each other. In this tradition, the concept of object is complex and loaded. Activities emerge when human needs find a way to be fulfilled in the world. The object here is the entity or state of the world, the transformation of which will hopefully produce the desired outcome. An object has, thus, a double existence: it exists in the world as the material to be transformed by artifactual means and cooperative actions, but also as a projection on to the future—the outcome of the actions. The object is not exactly given beforehand, but it unfolds and concretizes in the interactions with the material and the conditions. Being a constantly reproduced purpose of a collective activity that motivates and defines the horizon of possible goals and actions, the 'sharedness' of the object is present only in social relations across time and space, as well as embodied in terms of history. Locally, the sharedness of an object is a process of social construction with divergent views and creative uses of cultural and interactional resources. Activities are thus often multivoiced, and none of the existing perspectives on the object can be defined as right—such a definition can only be given within an activity.

Mediation

The notion of tool mediation is one of the central features of CHAT. Actions are mediated by culturally and historically constituted artifacts, an artifact being defined as something that has been manufactured by a human. Thus, our relation with the world is shaped not only by our personal developmental history and experiences from various interactions, but also by the history of the broader culture we are part of. The world has been concretized in the shape of tools, symbols, and signs that we use in our activities. The world does not appear to us *as such*, uncontaminated, but as a culturally and historically determined object of previous activities. Humans project both these earlier meanings and those that have arisen from the fulfillment of current needs on to their objects; at the same time, they envision the potential results to be achieved. (*see* **Cognitive Technology**.) Language is an essential part of this toolkit, a tool of tools. According to CHAT, all mediation has both a language side and a material character: symbols and signs, and tools and instruments are all integral

Figure 1 A model of the basic mediational structure. (S) subject, object (O), and medium (M) at the vertices of the triangle indicate the basic constraints of mind. The line S-O represents the 'natural,' (unmediated) functions; the line S-M-O represents the functions where interactions between subject and object are mediated by auxiliary means. St_n is the subject's state of knowledge at time n; O_{sm} is the object as represented via the medium; O_n, object at time n; St_{n+1}, emergent new state of the subject's knowledge at time n + 1 (Cole and Engeström, 1993: 5–7). Reprinted from Salomon (1993), *Distributed cognitions,* Figure 1.2, with permission from Cambridge University Press.

parts in the same mediation process. The basic mediational structure is depicted in **Figure 1.**

Thus the foundation of our actions is a continuous synthesis of two versions of the world: one directly given, the other culturally and historically mediated. Their synthesis enables us to plan our actions.

The Socio-Pragmatic Nature of the Sign

Activity Theory has paid much attention to semiotic mediation. Vygotsky's final work *Thought and Language* (1934) has contributed greatly to the understanding of human mental activity in socio-cultural terms, by assigning a crucial function to language as a psychological tool capable of mediating the development of the mind. Language as a tool calls for the use of artificial stimuli, that is, the use of culturally and historically construed sign systems. Signs serve to control the psyche and behavior of others and the Self, bringing to bear traces of social activities and social relations sedimented in language.

Vygotsky's socio-genetic approach to thought and language was developed originally in the research tradition of developmental psychology, aiming at understanding the child's mental growth. Later works of CHAT have continued with semiotic mediation and identity formation by focusing more on language use and utilizing notions such as the internal and external dialogicality of discourse. (*see* **Addressivity; Dialogism, Bakhtinian; Discourse, Foucauldian Approach; Discourse Processing.**) The interest is here in analyzing language from the viewpoint of sense-making, as it takes place within the contexts of the complex relationship between pragmatic activity and social processes. Sense-making is viewed as an active,

culturally mediated process within and with which the external world is translated into a conceivable world and organized into objects of activities. Social change of language is explored with the help of developmental trends of sense-making through which new elements of meaning come into our social interests without leaving old meanings untouched.

Overall Structure of Activities

According to Leont'ev (1978), activities have a three-level hierarchical structure. Besides the activity level, which is a particular system of actions, and the action level itself, there is a third level, the lowest one, of operations. Operations are former actions that have become automated during personal development, and which are triggered within actions by specific conditions in the situation. Whereas in actions, there are always planning, execution, and control phases, operations are much more condensed, rapid, and smooth. To become skilled in something is to develop a collection of related operations. Operations are not, however, like conditioned reflexes: if the conditions do not fit, the operations return back to the action level.

In the tradition of the founders of CHAT, new forms for depicting activity have been elaborated. The most influential attempt to model an activity is due to Engeström. In his *Learning by expanding*, he aimed at defining a historically and concretely constituted system that has a timespan and internal transformations of its own. The model is presented in **Figure 2**.

In **Figure 2**, the model of individual action in **Figure 1** has been complemented to depict the

Figure 2 A model of an activity system (based on Engeström, 1987). The initial mediational triangle of individual actions is expanded to cover the social and cooperative dimension of an activity by adding a community sharing the same object and two new mediational relationships: social-cultural ('rules') between the subject and the community, and power/organizing ('division of labor') between the community and the shared object. The model is systemic in the sense that all elements have a relation with each other, but only the three main mediations are shown for the sake of clarity.

collective activity system. The model looks at the activity from the point of view of one actor, the subject, but the fact that subjects are constituted in communities is indicated by the point in the model labeled 'community.' The relations between the subject and the community are mediated, on the one hand, by the groups' full collection of 'tools' (mediating artifacts) and, on the other hand, by 'rules' that specify acceptable interactions between members of the community, and 'division of labor,' the continuously negotiated distribution of tasks, powers, and responsibilities among the participants of the activity system (Cole and Engeström, 1993: 7).

In an activity, the relation between individual actions and the outcome of the whole activity becomes mediated and indirect. Leont'ev (1978) explained the relation between individual actions and collective activity using an example of primitive hunters who, in order to catch a game, separate into two groups: the catchers and bush-beaters, where the latter scare the game in order to make them move towards the former. Against the background of the motive of the hunt—to catch the game to get food and clothing material—the individual actions of the bush-beaters appear to be irrational unless they are put into the larger system of the hunting activity.

Zone of Proximal Development

Activity systems are socially and institutionally composed entities exhibiting internal conflicts which develop through transformations. The characteristic feature of CHAT is the focus on such changes; it studies cognition, including language, as a dynamic, culture-specific, and historically changing phenomenon constituting activity systems. In this context, the zone of proximal development (ZPD) has became Vygotsky's most widely referenced notion. It concerns children's learning processes, and refers to

> the distance between the actual developmental level as determined by independent problem solving and the level of potential development as determined through problem solving under adult guidance or in collaboration with more capable peers. (Vygotsky, 1978: 86)

Current activity theoretical studies extend from Vygotsky's dyadic pedagogical outline to potential horizons of different activities that will "mature tomorrow but are currently in an embryonic state." In the tradition of developmental work research, Vygotsky's ZPD indicates in outline the distance between present everyday actions and the historically new forms of the societal activity. In Engeström's model, contradictions in activity systems are "structural misfits within or between activities. The new

forms of activity can be collectively generated as a solution to the double bind potentially embedded in everyday actions." (Engeström, 1987: 174). Contradictions may not be apparent or obvious, and they often appear as problems and disruptions in the flow of ordinary activities. In CHAT, new challenges of scientific concepts are also actively reflected in the ongoing research. Researchers in the areas of cognition and language studies are participating in the current development of discourse-based concepts.

The International Community

An international CHAT research community has been emerging, beginning from the late 1970s. In the early 1980s, there was a series of Northern European CHAT conferences on education; the first international CHAT conference was held in 1986 in Berlin, where the International Society for Cultural Research and Activity Theory (ISCRAT) was founded. This acronym was also the name used for a series of conferences: in Lahti, Finland, 1990; in Moscow, 1995; in Aarhus, Denmark, 1998; and in Amsterdam, 2002. A couple of these conferences have had their proceedings published as a selection of papers (Engeström *et al.*, 1999; Chaiklin *et al.*, 1998). In 2002, ISCRAT has joined forces with the Society of Socio-Cultural Studies (SSCS), resulting in a new society called International Society for Cultural and Activity Research (ISCAR), whose first joint world conference was held in Seville, Spain, in 2005.

From 1994 on, the CHAT-oriented *Mind, Culture, and Activity. An International Journal* has been published by Lawrence Erlbaum.

See also: Addressivity; Cognitive Technology; Dialogism, Bakhtinian; Discourse, Foucauldian Approach; Discourse Processing; Marxist Theories of Language; Pragmatic Acts; Scaffolding in Classroom Discourse; Vygotskij, Lev Semenovich.

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Adaptability in Human-Computer Interaction

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Introduction

In this article, two main themes will be touched upon: first, I will discuss the general topic of humans' adaptation to computers as tools, and conversely, how the computer tool can be adapted to human needs; and second, a particular instance of this adaptive process, in which both humans become (more) literate on and through the computer and computers are becoming more 'human,' will be discussed under the label of 'computer literacy.' In both cases, emphasis will be placed on the cognitive aspects of the problems, as embodied in the metaphors that are current in this particular discourse.

Adaptation and Adaptability

Adaptation

Earlier views on the computer as a tool (e.g., in human problem solving) have concentrated on the problem of *adaptation*: who or which is going to adapt to whom or which? (For a discussion of 'adapt-ability' vs. 'adaptivity,' where the latter is defined as a unilateral coercion on the human to conform to the patterns of behavior imposed by the computer, the former captures the necessity of letting the human decide to which degree, and to what purpose adaptation should be practiced, cf. Mey, 1998.)

Even though such efforts have their rationales in the context of computer modeling as it is usually understood, they do not touch upon the basic problem of adaptation, seen as a dialectic process of integrating two independent but interacting systems, the human and the computer (Mey and Gorayska, 1994). The case is analogous to that of perception; here, neither the senses nor the objects can be said, by themselves and unilaterally, to produce a sensation (e.g., of seeing). Perception is always perception of something, and it is always a perception by and in somebody. In the psychologist James J. Gibson's words, it is a "circular act of adjustment" (Gibson, 1979): "The activity of perception is not caused, nor is it an act of pure will" (Reed, 1988: 200).

An adaptability approach to computing thus endeavors to integrate two systems:

1. the human user, and
2. the computer tool.

In human-computer interaction, the human neither unilaterally 'acts' upon the computer, nor does the computer unilaterally prescribe the human some restricted form of activity. Rather, each system adapts to the other; their functional qualities, taken together, are what makes the use of the computer as a tool possible. In Gibsonian terms, tool making and tool using are tantamount to looking for and exploiting "affordances" (Gibson, 1979). To see this, consider the way our adaptation to, and interaction with, computers is characterized by our use of metaphors (*see* **Metaphor: Psychological Aspects**).

Computers and Metaphors

Like every other human activity, the use of computers has generated its own set of metaphors. We do our word processing using a 'mouse,' 'scroll' files up and down, 'chase' information on the Internet, get 'lost' in cyberspace, or trapped in the 'mazes' of the 'web'; and even if we have no idea what we are doing where in cyberspace, it can always be called 'surfing.' It's as if we were hanging out on the corners of our computational space – what one could call, using a novel metaphor, our 'cyber-hood,' our computerized neighborhood.

Among the various metaphors that currently characterize the computer and its use by humans, that of 'tool' has been one of the most pervasive. Just as tools help us execute certain activities better and faster, so too has the computer been considered a tool for performing certain operations (such as bookkeeping, accounting, tallying, registering, archiving, and so on) in a better, more efficient, and especially faster way. Among the attributes of this tool that have attracted most attention are, naturally, the ease with which it 'falls into' the human hand and routine; by extension, the computer is not even thought of as a tool any longer: enter the invisible, or 'transparent' tool (as I have called it; Mey, 1988), to be preferred over other, more visible and obtrusive kinds of instruments. The computer that adapts itself to the human user becomes an extension of the human body; conversely, the adaptable human user will treat the computer not just as any old tool, but rather as a crutch, a 'scaffolding' (in Bruner's terminology; Bruner, 1983), or even as a prosthesis, as we will see below (*see* **Scaffolding in Classroom Discourse**).

A Case in Point: The Computer as Prosthesis

It has been well known, ever since the pioneering work of people like Carroll (1991), that the tool we use to perform a particular task not only assists us in doing what we have to do, but also changes our understanding of the task itself and of a host of other things related to the task. It may change the very nature of the task altogether. For instance, to cite a classical case, the vacuum cleaner was originally introduced to alleviate and lessen a housekeeper's boring chores. In the end, it has increased the workload and made the work itself even more boring, because now it had to be performed more often and to a greater degree of perfection. The tool changes the task, and vice versa, in a never-ending "spiral" (Salomon, 1993).

With regard to computers, the tool has frequently been likened to a prosthesis. In the context of our discussion, this has had some profound effects. A prosthesis, one could say, is simply an augmentation of a human capability (either replacing a lost faculty or extending an existing one). But if we scratch this seemingly innocent surface, a host of hidden assumptions and unexpected problems turn up. First, there is the question of the augmentation itself: how far should we go, or be allowed to go, in the enhancing of the human sensory faculties? Using super-powered lenses and telecameras, we can spy

upon the most intimate happenings in the lives of famous people like the late Princess Diana. But even though the majority of readers of the tabloid press would not be without their daily dose of lurid photo-journalism, everybody agrees in condemning the excesses of the paparazzi when their need for media coverage directly or indirectly harms the celebrities they are pursuing, as it happened in the case of Princess Diana's death. "They are going too far," we hear people say. But what exactly is 'going too far' in what essentially is an adaptation of human goals and values to the possibilities of the tool? And how do we decide what is an acceptable limit for this adaptivity? On the one hand, more knowledge is more power; on the other, 'curiosity killed the cat' (and did irreparable damage to some notable humans and their progeny as well, as the case of Adam and Eve amply illustrates).

The Fragmented Body

The tool metaphor of the computer as a prosthesis carries with it yet another drawback. Since prostheses typically target one particular human capacity for augmentation, we come to think of our capacities as individually 'enhanceable.' There are two aspects to this enhancing: one, we consider only the individual agent, without taking his or her larger societal context into account; and two, we enhance single faculties in the individual, without taking into account the fact that these capacities form a unit, a human whole.

As to the first aspect, the societal character of our capacities, consider the 'paradox of success' that Kaptelinin and Kuutti (1999) have drawn attention to: what succeeds in one context may, by its very success, be expected to be a failure in another, seemingly similar environment. Thus, the very fact that, say, a decision-making computer tool has proven successful in the United States may warn us against trying to introduce it into a Japanese surrounding, where decisions among humans are made in ways that are very different from what is common practice in the U.S. (Kaptelinin and Kuutti, 1999: 152).

The other aspect relates to a currently popular notion of human capacities as being 'modularly replaceable.' Just as we are seeing the beginnings of 'surgical engineering,' in which techniques of replacement have substituted for old-fashioned operation and healing procedures, so we are witness to a trend toward substituting and augmenting not only parts of the body itself (such as is done in heart or kidney transplantation), but entire mental functions. A reasoning chip implanted in our brain relieves us from the headaches of going through the motions of filling in the trivial parts of a mathematical proof or a chain of syllogisms. A chip may replace a person's worn-out or Alzheimer-affected memory capacities. In general, wetware can be replaced by more sturdy and robust electronic hardware, pre-wired to augment specific mental functions, and even tooled precisely to fit the needs of a particular individual. The potential for prosthetic innovations of this kind is virtually unlimited, up to the point where the whole person may end up being 'retooled' electronically (*see* **Cognitive Technology**).

The Effects of Adapting

Despite these problems, we are not exactly prepared to shut down our machines in the name of a return to basics, a kind of information-age Ludditism. We will have to live with the computer, even if our adaptation to it, as well as its role as an adaptive prosthesis, carries serious problems, generating side effects some of which were not intended. Here, it is useful to distinguish between primary and secondary effects. To take a well-known example, when Henry Ford wanted to put an automobile in everybody's front yard, the primary effect of this 'automotive revolution' was that people were able to travel farther and in ways not imagined before. But the secondary effects, not foreseen by Ford or anybody else at the time, included our adaptation to this new transportation device: our mind-set changed, the automobile becoming our premier status symbol, our 'escape on wheels,' for some even serving as an extra bedroom. In due course, these secondary effects (including the need to build more and more highways, in the process destroying entire rural and urban environments in the name of transportation, creating a new, 'suburban' life style for millions of people, and so on and so forth) were much more important than the simple primary effects in regard to our modes of transportation. The innovative tool re-creates that which it was only supposed to renew: the prosthetic tail wags the human dog.

Another problem with the prosthesis metaphor, when applied to the computer, is that of augmentation. The prosthetic tool, be it a crutch or a pair of binoculars, augments our motor or visual capacities. The notion of augmenting a human faculty presupposes the existence of something which is not augmented, or 'natural.' The trouble with humans, however, is that 'natural' behavior is a fiction; while we do have certain 'innate' functions (the faculty of speech, the ability to walk upright, and so on), these functions cannot be put to work 'naturally' unless we 'initialize' them, break them in socially and culturally. And in order to do this properly, we need tools. In particular, in any learning situation, we need what Bruner called a 'scaffolding': a total learning environment where

the learner is gradually introduced to the next higher level of competency, all the way relying on the availability of physical and mental 'crutches'. And the more we enhance our human, culturally bound and socially developed functions, the less we rely on those crutches as external prostheses; we internalize the tools by making them part of ourselves, adapting and incorporating them, as it were, to the point where they are both 'invisible' and indispensable.

As an illustration, I will discuss the case of the word processor, thus leading into the second part of this article, which deals with the problems involved in computer literacy.

Computer Literacy

The Word Processor

A word processor is basically a tool for enhanced writing. Starting from the early, primitive off- and online text editors (such as RUNOFF or EDDY), modern word processors (such as the latest editions of Microsoft Word or WordPerfect) are highly sophisticated devices that not only help you write, but actually strive to improve your writing – and not just physically or orthographically. Text editors, for instance, will tell you that a sentence is ill formed or too long, or that a particular concept has not been properly introduced yet.

Computerized functions such as these may facilitate the ways in which we produce texts; on the other hand, the texts we produce are in many ways rather different from those that originated in a noncomputerized environment. Here, I'm not talking only about the outer appearances of a document (by which a draft may look like a final version of an article, and be judged on that count), but rather about the ways we practice formulating our ideas.

For instance, if we know that what we write may be disseminated across an international network, or abstracted in a database that is used by people from different walks of life and contrasting ethnic and cultural backgrounds, we will try to express ourselves in some kind of 'basic conceptualese,' shunning the use of metaphors and idiomatic expressions, thus sacrificing style to retrievability of information. As Oracle's Kelly Wical observed, such automated indexing of documents "will encourage people to write plainly, without metaphors … that might confuse search engines. After all, everyone wants people to find what they have written" (Wical, 1996; see also Gorayska, Marsh and Mey, 1999: 105 *ff.*).

In the following, I will examine some of these effects, and inquire into their desirability and/or inevitability.

Why Computer Literacy?

If literacy (no matter how we interpret this term) has to do with people's capacities for handling 'letters' (Latin: *literae*), then one may ask: What's so special about the computer that we need to define a special concept called 'computer literacy'? After all, people have been using the notion of literacy for ages, and there has never been a need to define a special kind of literacy for a particular tool of writing, such as a chisel, brush, or pen. Whereas 'penmanship' has become a synonym of 'high literacy' (no longer necessarily exercised by means of a pen), nobody has ever felt the need to define 'typewriter literacy' in terms other than in number of words per minute: a good ('literate,' if you want) typist can do at least 100 words per minute without committing too many errors, whereas a beginner or 'illiterate' person only can do 30 or 40 and will have to use a lot of time correcting his or her mistakes. In other words, there must be a difference, but what is it?

Writer and Tool

What makes a difference is in the relationship of the writer to his or her instrument: chisel and hammer, stylus and wax, quill and parchment, pen and paper, keyboard and screen. This relationship has not always been simple and straightforward; in particular, it has been known to influence the very way people write. The ancient Greek scribes who performed their craft in stone didn't bother to drag all their utensils back to the beginning of the line they just had finished: instead, they let the new line begin where the old one had stopped, only one level lower; thus, the script called *boustrophedon* (literally: 'the way the [plowing] oxen turn') came into being, with lines alternating in their direction of writing/reading. The medieval monks who wrote on parchment often tried to 'recycle' this precious and hard-to-get material by erasing earlier scripts and overwrite the deleted text, a technique known by the name of *palimpsest*. (By an irony of history, in due course the deleted text often turned out to be more valuable than the overwritten one. Many of the sources for our editions of the classical authors are due to the monks' parsimonious writing techniques.)

Undoubtedly, the invention of wood (later lead) letter type contributed greatly to the dissemination of written literature; yet, the effects on the scribe were never a matter of reflection. Much later, when the typewriter got naturally to be used for the purposes of office work, personal letters and literary 'works of art' still had to be composed by hand, if they were to be of any value. Even in a more practically oriented domain such as that of journalism, it is a known fact that the formidable, in life chief editor

of the Vatican daily *Osservatore Romano*, forbade the use of typewriters in his offices as late as 1948. His journalists had to write all copy by hand and then give it to a typist or typesetter.

The interaction between writer and tool changed dramatically with the advent of the computer. Not only is this writing instrument more perfect than any of its predecessors, but in addition it possesses a great number of qualities enabling people to approach their writing tasks in a different way. Accordingly, 'computer literacy' can be defined as: knowing how to exploit the various new uses to which the 'computer interface' between humans and letters can be put. Let's consider some of these uses.

How (Not) to Use a Computer

Here, I will not discuss the more specialized functions that computer writing has inherited from earlier technologies, merely perfecting but not changing them: bookkeeping and accounting (cf., the use of so-called 'spread sheets'), tabulating, making concordances, automated correspondence, and other office work (e.g., the automatic reminders one gets from one's credit card company or the local utilities services). The truly revolutionary aspect of computer literacy is in the effect it has on the writing process itself, that which earlier was thought of by some as sacrosanct, immune to any kind of mechanical implementation.

One could say that a truly 'computer literate' person is one who composes his or her literary production directly on the computer, without any interference except from the interface itself. This is a bit like composing directly on the piano, except that the keyboard there normally does not retain what has been played on it. In contrast, the conserving function of the computer is precisely what enables writers to enter into a totally new relationship with their tool.

Earlier work, being dependent on the paper medium, had to be meticulously corrected in the text itself, often with great problems of legibility and understanding (scratching or crossing out, 'whiting out,' overwriting, writing in between the lines and in the margins, cutting and pasting, and so on, with multiple versions often canceling out one another, or at least making perhaps better original lines impossible to retrieve). However, the computer allows the text producer to maintain near-complete independence of the material side of writing.

Paper has always been said to be 'patient' in that it did not protest against whatever the author put down on it, suffering great works of art and utterly trivial composition alike to be entered on its impartial surface. In comparison, the patience that the computer exhibits is not just an inherent quality of the tool: it is transferred to, and located within, the computer 'literate' who knows that Pilate's age-old adage *Quod scripsi, scripsi,* "What I have written, I have written" (John, 19: 22) has been rendered null and void by this new medium. Here, it doesn't matter what is written, for everything can always be reformulated, corrected, transformed, and recycled at the touch of a keystroke or using a few specialized commands. In extreme cases, we even may see the computer generate near-automatic writing (in the sense of the surrealists), with fingers racing across the keyboard and authors failing to realize what's driving them on. Subsequently, the author who checks and goes over the results may often marvel at the 'inventions' that he or she has been guilty of producing, almost without being aware of the process by which they happened.

Perspectives and Dangers

I will conclude this entry by pointing to some of the perspectives that manifest themselves in a considered approach to the problem of adapting to/from the computer/human, especially as they appear in the context of computer literacy. In addition, I will say a few words about the possible dangers involved in the headlong embrace of new technologies (and their implied mental representations and ideologies) just because they are new. First, there is that age-old dilemma (going all the way back to Plato): Is the human just a kind of idealized entity coupled to a material reality ('a mental rider on a material beast of burden')? Or do we conceive of the union of the two in different ways, now that we have better metaphors to deal with these questions (especially the vexing problem of 'which is master': mind over matter or the other way around)?

Mind and Body   Conceiving of the computer as a prosthesis may seem to finally resolve that ancient dichotomy: the mind-body split. If anything in the mind can be reproduced on a computer, then we don't need the body at all. Or, vice versa, if the computerized body can take over all our mental functions, why then do we have to deal with a mind?

There are indeed tendencies afoot that seem to advocate this kind of thinking. Some years ago, a book by Andy Clark (1997, frontispiece) proudly announced, in its subtitle, the ability to "put brain, body, and world together again". However, this synthesis is performed strictly on the basis of a computer-as-prosthesis informed philosophy: one describes

the mental functions as (if need be, computerized) modules, united under a common ordering principle or joined loosely in some kind of mental republic, a 'society of mind' à la Minsky (1986), where the different mental functions, conceived of as semiindependent but jointly organized modules, cooperate to form an organized, governing whole.

In Clark's model, the emphasis is on the brain, not the mind, the latter being characterized as a "grab-bag of inner agencies." The "central executive in the brain – the real boss who organizes and integrates the activities" is said to be "gone." Also "[g]one is the neat boundary between the thinker (the bodiless intellectual engine), and the thinker's world." No wonder, then, that replacing this "comfortable image" puts us in front of a number of "puzzling (dare I say metaphysical?) questions" (Clark, 1997: 220–221). Leaving those questions aside in our context, let me briefly explore some possible practical consequences of this 'dementalization,' when seen as involving a decentralization of the individual's capacities.

Mind, Creativity, and Control   While the acquisition of computer literacy as a condition for employment does not create much of a difference as compared with earlier situations (except for the extra cost and training it involves), the use of the computer in creative contexts represents a true breakthrough in the relationship of humans to their work, especially as regards their ways of creative production and reproduction. The interesting question here is not what the computer does to our hands, but in what ways it affects our mental ability to shape and reshape, to work out a thought, and then abandon it (but not entirely!). It is also in how it allows us to come back to earlier thoughts and scraps of insights that were jotted down in the creative trance, as it were – perhaps recombining these *disiecta membra* with other pieces of thought, all available at the drop of a keystroke. This qualitative change of our relationship with our creative tools is the true computer revolution; it defines 'computer literacy' as being qualitatively different from earlier, more primitive, creative and cognitive technologies.

The imminent danger of the spread of computer literacy is, of course, that any Tom, Dick or Emma who can handle a keyboard may consider themselves to be geniuses of writing, thus offsetting the positive effect of increased literacy through this reduction of the computer tool to an instrument of and for the inane and mindless. More importantly though, the danger exists that users, because of the apparent naturalness of their relationship to the computer, start considering themselves as natural extensions of the machine, as human tools. Being 'wired' becomes thus

more than a facile metaphor: one has to be plugged into some network, both metaphorically and electronically, to be able to survive in today's 'wired' society. The wireless person just 'isn't there.'

To see this, consider the way most people are wired into the mass media of communication: their lives and thoughts are dictated by the media. Whoever doesn't plug into this immense network of 'infotainment' (information and entertainment), is 'out,' is an 'outsider,' in the strictest sense of the word; outside of the talk of the day at the workplace, outside of the discussions in the press, outside of the newscasts and television reports on current scandals and shootings. An 'insider,' on the other hand, does not (and cannot) realize to what extent the simple presence of thought and feelings, otherwise considered as 'naturally' arising within the mind, is due to his or her 'wiredness,' his or her connection to the networks. It takes the accidental 'black screen' (or some other temporary media deprivation) to make one fathom the depths of one's dependency, the extent of one's being 'hooked up' to the infotainment universe (and as a result, being 'hooked on,' not just 'wired into,' that universe).

'Big Brother' and the Mind's 'Holding Company'
A final issue is of a subtler, less technical, and for that reason all the more threatening, nature; it has to do with the nature of the mental prosthesis that the computer represents. The computer's special features (programs and functions that are distributed throughout the hardware rather than being encapsulated in neat, identifiable blocks of instructions, routines being divided into subroutines to be used independently and/or recursively, and so on) have led some of us to think of the brain as a similarly organized, distributed architecture (like Minsky's "society of mind," mentioned above). In particular, the currently popular 'connectionist' view of mental processing is based on this analogy; the prosthesis metaphor, if applied within this frame of thinking, transforms the individual mental features and functions into a set of independent, yet connected components (what Clark irreverently called a "grab-bag of inner agencies"; 1997: 221). The question is, and the problem remains, how to orchestrate all those brainy agencies into some kind of mental unit(y). For all practical purposes, one could replace the media outlets by some central instrument, have it wired directly into people's heads, and bingo, we're in business: the wired society becomes a frightening reality, with 'Big Brother' embodied in a central 'Holding Company,' a monster computer, controlling and directing our entire lives (cf. Big Brother and the Holding Company, 1968).

One frequently hears computer users employ expressions such as, "The computer is in a bad mood today" or "The computer doesn't want to co-operate"; one sees irritated users kick their machines, pound their keyboards, or scream at their screens, accusing these devices of lack of cooperation. Such expressions, when they are not caused by either the user's poor computer literacy, or by a particular hard-ware or software deficiency, may reflect either a lack of critical awareness of the computer's properties as an auxiliary tool, or a failure to distinguish between the respective roles of the partners in human-comput-er interaction and cooperation. The future of human computer interaction lies in the humanizing of the tool, not in the humans' becoming more tool-oriented and tool-like. And as to adaptation and adaptability, I repeat what I said earlier: the computer tail should never be allowed to wag the user dog.

See also: Activity Theory; Cognitive Technology; Literacy Practices in Sociocultural Perspective; Pragmatics of Reading; Vygotskij, Lev Semenovich.

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Addressivity

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'Addressivity' (*obrashchennost'*) is a term coined by the Russian scholar Mikhail Bakhtin as part of his critique of traditional linguistics. It figures as well in the thinking of Bakhtin's colleague, Valentin Voloshinov, and it is helpful in understanding the approach to language and the psyche taken by Lev Vygotsky (*see* **Voloshinov, Valentin Nikolaevich**; **Vygotskij, Lev Semenovich**).

Bakhtin's work on language is best understood as part of his more general project to rethink the basis of the humanities and social sciences. Initially trained as a literary scholar, Bakhtin sought to reconceive the nature of ethics, psychology, literature, and language in such a way that choice, unpredictability, and open time were properly acknowledged. His work is suffused with the sense that the study of culture cannot be a science in the hard sense, a view that sets

him apart not only from his Marxist contemporaries but also from numerous schools since the 17th century. Because Bakhtin believed that human thought takes place primarily in the form of inner speech, a new understanding of language proved essential to his larger project of humanizing the 'human sciences.'

Bakhtin reacted to the beginnings of formalist and structuralist linguistics, which he understood as methods of understanding human speech as an instantiation of rules. In this model, the linguist studies the rules, *langue*, and regards individual speech acts, *parole*, as entirely explicable in terms of the rules (*see* **Principles and Rules**). This model and its attendant assumptions seemed to Bakhtin to exclude not only all that we think of as pragmatics and the social aspects of language but also everything that is truly creative in any dialogue between real people. Bakhtin wanted to formulate an alternative model that treated language, thought, and action as capable of genuine 'surprisingness' (*see* **Conspicuity**).

To this end, Bakhtin distinguished between sentence and utterance. The sentence is a unit of language understood as structuralists do. It does not take place at any specific point in time, and so is repeatable; the same sentence may be spoken on different occasions. The utterance, by contrast, is a specific act of speech that someone says to someone else on a specific occasion, and its meaning depends in part on the occasion. Each occasion is different, and so utterances are never repeatable. The utterance is a historical event and is part of a dialogue. Sentences provide resources for an utterance, but the utterance requires more than the sentence. Linguistics properly conceived should deal with utterances as well as sentences, but so long as language is understood in terms of sentences, we should call the discipline that studies utterances 'metalinguistics.'

What utterances contain that sentences do not is addressivity. Utterances are constituted by the fact that they are part of a specific dialogic exchange. Addressivity denotes all those aspects of the utterance that make it dialogic in the deepest sense (*see* **Dialogism, Bakhtinian**). Sentences contain only the potential to mean something, but utterances actually do mean something. In Bakhtin's terms, sentences have meaning (in Russian, *znachenie*) in the sense of dictionary-and-grammar meaning, but utterances have *smysl* (roughly, sense, or meaning in a real context).

One cannot solve the problem of context by writing a grammar for it. Although one can say many general things about context, no grammar of context could ever fully specify it, because context is as various as human purposes, which are irreducible to a set of rules. No matter how many helpful rules one may devise, there will always be a 'surplus' (*izbytok*). Bakhtin uses the same term, 'surplus,' to describe that aspect of human beings that is left over after all conceivable causal explanations have been applied. One's true selfhood begins where all possible categories and causes have been exhausted. In selfhood, the 'surplus' constitutes our humanness, and in utterances it constitutes the manifestation of humanness in language.

Addressivity involves everything that takes the resources of speech – dictionary meanings, grammar, syntax, rules of context – and turns them into an utterance. In practice, Bakhtin's work involved specifying features of context that were left out by structural linguistics, and so it overlaps strongly with pragmatics. It would be possible to absorb many of Bakhtin's insights into pragmatics without accepting his view of humanness, indeterminism, and the surplus (*see* **Pragmatics: Overview**).

Consider, for instance, the telegraphic model of language in which a speaker, intending to convey a message, instantiates the rules of language to produce a sentence. In that model, the message is then sent out through a medium to a listener, who decodes the sentence and so recuperates the original meaning. Speaking is encoding, and listening is subsequent decoding. The first problem with this model, in Bakhtin's view, is that nothing in this description would change if the listener were asleep, absent, or entirely different. But in real exchanges, the listener does not passively decode. Understanding is an active process in which the listener not only decodes, but also imagines how the utterance is meant to affect him or her, how it responds to past and potential utterances, and how third parties might respond. With all these factors in mind, the listener prepares a response that is revised as the utterance is being heard. Understanding is personal, processual, and active. Because every speaker counts on understanding of an active sort, the listener shapes the utterance from the outset. Speakers formulate their utterances with a specific listener or kind of listener in mind. This anticipation of a listener, which in ordinary speech is often guided by responses we sense **as** we are speaking, alters the tone, choice of words, and style of each utterance as a work in process.

Except in the purely physiological sense, each utterance is a co-creation of speaker and listener. It is essentially joint property. Bakhtin offers a series of examples, drawn from Dostoevsky's novels, of utterances whose whole point and stylistic shape would be missed without considering addressivity. In 'the word with a loophole,' for instance, the speaker deliberately exaggerates a self-characterization so that, if the response is undesired, the utterance allows

him to pretend after the fact that it was parodic or unserious. The utterance builds into itself future utterances to more than one possible response.

Such utterances are not only common in daily speech, but also figure in our psyche. Because thought largely consists of inner dialogues, our minds are composed of the listeners that inhabit us – our parents or other figures whose responses count for us. We address them when we think, and so our very thought is shaped by imagined anticipated responses. We justify ourselves, or guide our thoughts by what significant internalized others might say. We grow and change as we absorb new listeners or learn to address old ones differently.

Within and without, we live dialogically. Addressivity, the dialogue of inner and outer speech, involves not only the 'second person' (the listener) but also what Bakhtin calls the 'third person.' In different studies, the term 'third person' has two distinct meanings, both of which are essential to addressivity. Sometimes the third person refers to all those who have already spoken about the topic in question. No one speaks about anything as if he or she were Adam, the first to break the silence of the universe. Every topic has been 'already spoken about' and the words referring to this topic implicitly 'remember' the earlier things said about it and the contexts in which they were said. It is as if words have glue attaching to them the evaluations and meanings of earlier speakers. Thus, when we speak, we implicitly take a stand in relation to those earlier speakers, and our words may be spoken as if with quotation marks, at a distance, with various tones indicating qualification. Some words come already 'overpopulated' with earlier utterances. Our speech therefore contains implicit elements of reported speech (direct or indirect discourse) in which the framing utterance takes a stance with respect to the framed one. Such effects may not be visible in the words when viewed as parts of a sentence, but they are nevertheless keenly sensed by speaker and listener. We are in dialogue with our predecessors, and addressivity refers to this historical aspect of utterances as well as to the present speaker-listener relationship. Whether we are considering the second or third person in addressivity, the utterance is shaped by others.

A second sense of 'third person' refers to what Bakhtin calls the 'superaddressee' (*nadadresat*). We never turn over our whole selves to a listener, because we cannot count on perfect understanding. Each utterance is partially constituted by the projection of an ideal listener, an invisibly present third person who would understand perfectly. We sometimes make the superaddressee visible when, in talking with one person, we gesture, as if to say, 'would you just listen to him!' But visible or invisible, the superaddressee is part of every utterance. The superaddressee may be personified as God or imagined as the voice of history, but strictly speaking it is a constitutive factor of the utterance itself. We implicitly address this perfect listener as well as the real one before us. The superaddressee also figures in our inner speech, where again it may be personified.

The idea of addressivity allows Bakhtin to analyze a series of utterances that may look linguistically or stylistically simple but that are in fact complex when we consider them as part of a dialogue. Imagine a conversation in which one speaker's voice has been omitted but its intense effects have left their mark on the other speaker's utterance: some speech is shaped as if that process had taken place, as if it were one part of a tense exchange. Such speech takes 'sidelong glances' at the other's potential answer and may almost seem to cringe in anticipation of a response. Utterances may be 'double-voiced,' so that they seem to emerge from two speech centers simultaneously, each commenting on the other and addressing themselves to a third party. In extreme cases, such utterances may bespeak psychological disturbance, as in Dostoevsky. But double-voicedness also appears in simple form in parody. A vast variety of discourses become visible when we consider them from the perspective of addressivity (*see* **Narrativity and Voice**).

In contrast to such movements as 'reader reception' theory, Bakhtin sees the listener's response as active, not just after an utterance is made, but also while it is being made. Bakhtin is attentive to the formulation of an utterance as a shifting process. An utterance may change in the course of being said – in response to others, to circumstances, or even to the sound of itself. We are ourselves one listener of our speech acts, impersonating potential others. Bakhtin regards a culture's forms of addressivity as constantly changing in response to circumstances and the creativity of individuals. Some typical forms of addressivity may coalesce into speech genres, and to learn a language involves learning those genres. Speech genres differ from language to language and change over time (*see* **Genre and Genre Analysis**).

For Bakhtin, the idea that utterances may change as they are being made suggests that addressivity presumes a speaker truly 'present' and ethically 'responsible' (literally 'answerable' in the original Russian) for what he says and a listener present and responsible for how he listens. As speakers and listeners, we choose and may be held accountable for our choices. Nothing is already made or entirely explicable in terms of pre-given codes or prior causes. Thus, the concept of addressivity is closely connected with Bakhtin's insistence that ethics can never be a mere instantiation of rules; each situation requires real

presence and judgment. In what we do as in what we say, we really accomplish something never done before. Or as Bakhtin liked to say, there is no 'alibi.' These broad implications of addressivity explain why its pragmatic aspects belong to Bakhtin's project of altering 'the human sciences.' He describes human beings as social to the core because even in our psyche we think by dialogue. Conversely, he describes society and language as possessing both surprisingness resulting from the creative aspects of each dialogue and ethical significance resulting from our answerability for each utterance with addressivity.

See also: Conspicuity; Genre and Genre Analysis; Narrativity and Voice; Pragmatics: Overview; Principles and Rules; Voloshinov, Valentin Nikolaevich; Vygotskij, Lev Semenovich.

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Anthropology and Pragmatics

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Introduction

To see how anthropology and pragmatics are interrelated, we may start with the following observation: pragmatics concerns, first and foremost, actions and events that necessarily take place in context as actual happenings, that is, sociohistorically contextualized unique happenings. Such happenings, however, may be seen as tokens of virtual regularities such as action types, event types, or even illocutionary types (*see* **Speech Acts**). Hence, pragmatics may be approached from two different points of departure, either the sociohistoric context or the decontextualized regularities. This condition has given rise to the two distinct scientific traditions dealing with 'what we do' (i.e., our praxis): either the social science of actions and events, such as sociology and anthropology, or the logico-linguistic science of propositionally

centered regularities of speech acts. Both of these trends originated in (neo)Kantian philosophy (see later); they may be characterized as the pragmatic and the semantic tradition, respectively. Note, however, that the term 'pragmatics' is, by historical accident, attached to a branch of the semantic tradition. This tradition includes analytic logic, linguistics, and parts of psychology, anthropology, and pragmatics (e.g., ethnoscience, cognitive linguistics, and the theories of speech acts, implicature, and relevance). In contrast, the pragmatic tradition includes the social sciences, sociology, anthropology, critical philosophy, and parts of contemporary pragmatics such as critical discourse analysis and social pragmatics. In the following sections, the genealogies of these two post-Kantian traditions are elucidated, illustrating how linguistic anthropology is related to pragmatics (*see* **Critical Applied Linguistics; Critical Discourse Analysis; Speech Acts; Implicature; Discourse, Foucauldian Approach; Pragmatics: Overview**).

The Semantic Tradition

Let us start with the semantic tradition, which harkens back to the critical philosophy of Kant (1724–1804), in which the problematic of 'language' and 'meaning' still lurked behind that of '(re)cognition' and 'judgment.' The return-to-Kant movement of the late 19th century included not only the neo-Kantians in the narrow sense, such as Charles Peirce (see below), but also Gottlob Frege (1848–1925), who launched predicate logic and thereby started to reduce the (neo)Kantian problematic of 'judgment' and 'value' to questions of logical language (*see* **Peirce, Charles Sanders; Frege, Friedrich Ludwig Gottlob**). In particular, the notion of judgment, especially that of 'synthetic' judgment, became eclipsed by the analytic *Satz* (sentence, proposition), which was split into *Kraft* (e.g., assertoric, imperative, interrogative force) and *Sinn* (propositional content); the latter, again, was subdivided into categories and subcategories that could be characterized in formal-linguistic fashion, such as subject, predicate, and so on. Thus was born modern logic (analytic philosophy), to be pursued by Bertrand Russell (1872–1970), Rudolf Carnap (1891–1970), John von Neumann (1903–1957), and others who studied formal-structurally encoded meanings outside the context of language use. Such studies, which later came to include work in Artificial Intelligence, became the main staple of 20th-century Anglophone philosophy. This analytic 'linguistic turn' (Rorty, 1967) was also taken by the linguists of that period, especially the formalists of the neo-Bloomfieldian and Copenhagen Schools. Like the logicians, they saw the essence of language,

as well as the essence of the science of language, in formal regularities (rules) and clear and distinct analysis, in a decontextualized environment. Eventually, the trends in logic and linguistics converged and gave rise to generative linguistics, led by Noam Chomsky (b. 1928), who learned neo-Bloomfieldian formalism from Zellig Harris (1909–1992) and logico-linguistic derivation from Carnap. Even granted that Carnap was an empiricist, like Charles Morris (see below) and Willard Quine (1908–2000), whereas Chomsky worked in a rationalist paradigm, these philosophers and linguists represented two sides of the same semantic tradition. Subsequently, with the success of what became known as the Chomskyan revolution, the dominance of the semantic tradition in linguistics and its subfields was confirmed in the 1960s.

Yet, this 'revolution' was just an evolution of an earlier condition. That is, in tandem with the advocates of 'unified science' such as Carnap and Morris, who tried to integrate all kinds of science on the basis of modern formal logic, using the method of modern physics, the neo-Bloomfieldians had elaborated and advanced a linguistic formalism that was meant to replace the humanistic, cosmographic concerns of philology and anthropological linguistics with the investigation into the formal regularities of language and mechanical analytic procedures. Doing this, they successfully turned linguistics into a model human science in the eyes of many. Thus, the semantic tradition evolved from logico-linguistics into the more empirical sciences of anthropology and cognitive psychology. As an instance, consider the mid-20th-century flourishing of ethnoscience, which was characterized by mechanical elicitation procedures, with anthropologists trying to identify the semantic categories of fauna, flora, kinship, color, etc., as emically apperceived by natives and etically described by 'universal' semantic categories. Eventually, ethnoscientific studies – such as those of color terms conducted by Berlin and Kay (1969), who were originally inspired by the Saussurean/Hjelmslevian formal-structural analysis – yielded to the more empirically oriented 'prototype' semantics developed by Eleanor Rosch and her school in the 1970s (cf., Blount, 1995). Similar empiricist orientations gained acceptance even in logic and linguistics; compare the rise of fuzzy logic (or, more generally, multivalued logic) and generative semantics. The three lines then converged to form cognitive linguistics, pursued by George Lakoff (b. 1941), Ronald Langacker (b. 1942), and their followers. Thus, the birth of an empirical semantic science, i.e., cognitive linguistics, which constitutes a branch of pragmatics today, has its origin in the Fregean analysis of decontextualized propositional content (*Sinn*), which gradually, yet increasingly, became accommodated to

the empirical contexts of referential cognition and language use (*Bedeutung*).

But the Fregean legacy includes more. Recall that Frege reduced judgment to sentence, consisting of not only propositional content, but also force. This notion came to the attention of John Austin (1911–1960), a phenomenologically minded translator of Frege's *œuvre* into English (compare Frege's notions of propositional content vs. force with Austin's notions of constative vs. performative and locution vs. per-/illocution) (*see* **Austin, John L.**; **Speech Acts and Grammar**). This move led to the emergence of what is often called modern pragmatics, as pursued by John Searle and his followers (formally, this trend can be captured by the expression F(p), where p and F stand for proposition and illocutionary force, respectively). Others, such as H. Paul Grice (cf. 'what is said' vs. 'what is meant') and the post- and neo-Griceans, followed suit (cf. the success of Daniel Sperber and Deirdre Wilson's theory of relevance) (*see* **Grice, Herbert Paul**; **Neo-Gricean Pragmatics**; **Relevance Theory**). Clearly, this post-Fregean trend also belongs to the semantic tradition and constitutes, with cognitive linguistics, its empirical development. Notwithstanding the label 'pragmatics' that is commonly attached to it, this trend is little more than a branch of empirical semantics, inasmuch as it attempts (as do cognitive linguistics and linguistic functionalism) to relate, if not reduce, the meanings encoded in language (i.e., in lexico-grammar: sentence, clause, phrase; words, clitics, and morphemes) to empirical matters such as function, language use, and understanding. This brand of pragmatics thus excludes such contextual phenomena as cannot be transparently related to propositional meanings or grammatical rules; that is, most human practices, which occur contingently and largely independently of linguistically encoded meanings (cf. Mey, 2001).

In this connection, the following three points are worth observing: (1) the grammarians called 'generative semanticists,' such as George Lakoff and James McCawley, found post-Austinean pragmatics useful; (2) Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson's (neo)-Gricean relevance theory remains a highly abstract account based on *a priori* assumptions (economy, eufunctionalism, cooperation, and logico-rationalistic computation), while remaining impervious to the contextual and historic contingencies that lie at the heart of matters pragmatic; and finally (3) the current popularity of trends such as relevance theory and cognitive linguistics may be in part due to their eclectic, quasi-pragmatic, and quasi-semantic character, in line with their emergence at the transitional point where contemporary pragmatics is moving from more semantically oriented theories (such as those of speech acts or generative semantics), which are primarily concerned with linguistically encoded meanings, toward more robustly pragmatic theories, such as social pragmatics and critical discourse analysis, which are primarily concerned with contingent actual happenings in a sociohistorical context (*see* **Speech Acts**; **Critical Discourse Analysis**; **Pragmatics: Overview**).

Thus far, we have seen how the two post-Fregean semantic trends have led to cognitive linguistics and pragmatics. In the following discussions, we follow the genealogy of a nonsemantic, yet truly pragmatic tradition, derived not from Frege, but from other neo-Kantians, such as Peirce, Franz Boas, and Max Weber, and ultimately going back to Kant himself.

The Social-Scientific Tradition of Pragmatics

The genuinely pragmatic tradition, often known as the social sciences, includes anthropology and sociology, the origin of which goes back to Bronislaw Malinowski (1884–1942), Weber (1864–1920), Georg Simmel (1858–1918), Emile Durkheim (1858–1917), Boas (1858–1942), Karl Marx (1818–1883), Alexander Humboldt (1769–1859), and ultimately the Enlightenment philosophers such as the Marquis de Condorcet (1743–1794), Voltaire (1694–1778), and perhaps even the earlier Giambattista Vico (1668–1744). However, the most important figure in the current discussion is Johann Herder (1744–1803), a student of Kant who critically accepted Kant's critical philosophy and, in doing this, launched a metacritique of the latter, especially of its claim to human (and even 'anthropological' – the term is Kant's own) universality. In Herder's view, such alleged universality is no more than an ideology, conditioned by the historic, geographic, and cultural (that is, contextual) factors peculiar to the Idealist philosopher Kant and his times, i.e., the modern era of the German (secularized Lutheran) Enlightenment. Note that the idea of metacritique was already contained in Kant's critical philosophy, which tried to show, at the transcendental (second-order, or meta-) level, the valid limits of all philosophizing, including its own. Herder in turn elaborated on this theme, attacking Kant's claim to universality by appealing to the cultural diversity of the empirical world(s). Since the validity of such a metacritique can be assessed only by actual investigations into the empirical world, Herder's move led to the birth of the modern social sciences, especially in Germany, as attested by the works of Marx, Boas, and Weber, in which various eras and cultures were methodically compared. In so doing, these authors interpretively identified the sociohistoric uniqueness and contingent conditions of particular cultures and periods and demonstrated the historic/cultural limits and relativity of modern western thought and its 'products'

(including the social sciences and their ethnocentric universalism). Such was the underlying theme of Boasian anthropology, to be described shortly, following a brief look at the development of the 'new' science of sociology.

In the 19th century, between Kant's and Durkheim's times, rapid modernization, urban immigration, and capital formation progressed in England, France, and then Germany, leading to the emergence of social problems such as dire poverty, overpopulation in urban environments, and terrifying labor conditions. As the masses came into being in cities, society became a visible entity, to be investigated through demographic, statistical, and analytical means by reformers in the spirit of Henri de Saint-Simon (1760–1825) and scholars such as Auguste Comte (1798–1857) and Durkheim himself, who created a science called 'social physics' (which later became sociology) to measure, analyze, and control (i.e., 'tame') the social problems. Henceforth, sociology would develop around the two axes of Weberian interpretive, historical sociology (see earlier) and Durkheimian functionalist or statistical macrosociology. However, in the Anglophone world, the latter axis was much stronger, compared to the European continent; this can be seen exemplified in the works of British structural functionalism (social anthropology) and in Talcott Parsons's (1902–1979) systemic sociology in the United States. Such was the contextual background of what came to be known, on the one hand, as the sociology of language, practiced by scholars such as Joshua Fishman, Charles Ferguson, and others (cf., Giglioli, 1972), and on the other as, Labovian sociolinguistics the latter squarely belonged to the mainstream Anglophone tradition of structural-functional sociology, giving preference to macrosocial facts and regularities over interpretations and microsocial, contingent happenings.

In conflict with the latter tradition, the sociologist Erving Goffman (1922–1982) paved the way for a minute descriptive analysis of the dynamics of discourse at the microsocial level, and thus helped to revive the interpretive sociology of Weber, Simmel, Edward Sapir (1884–1939), G. H. Mead (1863–1931), and the Chicago School of sociology, known for its ethnographic and symbolic-interactional approaches (cf. Blount, 1995). This revival, often called the 'hermeneutic turn,' came to put its mark on various social sciences, including cultural anthropology, where Clifford Geertz (1926–2006), in the mid-1970s, successfully criticized the semantic orientation of ethnoscience (see earlier) for its neglect of interpretation and context. Similarly, in sociology, the phenomenological movement developed in the wake of the German sociologist Alfred Schutz's (1899–1959) works represented a long-awaited renaissance in ethnomethodology, originally advanced by Harold Garfinkel (b. 1917), who tried to base the entirety of sociology on the microsocial phenomena of lived worlds, especially their everyday interpretations and dynamic contextualization. Yet, the positivist standard of formal rigor and the phobia of interpretive ambiguity in sociology were such that ethnomethodology quickly lost its contextual flexibility, critical reflexivity, and comprehensive scope, and underwent formalization and miniaturization, thus turning into an independent sociological practice, namely, conversation analysis. This school (often thought to be associated with pragmatics) subsequently incorporated some of Goffman's insights and ideas of post-Fregean pragmatics, as evidenced in Penelope Brown and Stephen Levinson's types of conversational activity and theories of polite behavior (considered as face-maximizing rational decision-making). These theories, due to their eclectic nature, enjoyed popular acclaim especially during the transitory phase when modern pragmatics moved from the semantic to the social-scientific tradition, i.e., in the late 1970s and early 1980s (*see* **Activity Theory; Face; Politeness**).

The preceding discussion outlines a general genealogy of the microsociological theories of pragmatics. Yet, as regards the crux of the social-scientific tradition, which can be said to lie in the exploration of the sociocultural mechanisms by which language contextually indexes power relations, authorities, and identities, it is missing in most of these theories. In contrast, there are Goffman's microsocial analyses of interaction ritual, frame, and symbolic self-presentation later incorporated into the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu's (1930–2002) macrosocial theory of 'reproduction through habitus,' the field of practice, and symbolic capital. In Britain's class-stratified society, Basil Bernstein (1924–2000) also struggled with this problematic, especially when it came to determining the role that language plays in formal education. These three figures thus anticipated the coming of a truly social-scientific kind of pragmatics, i.e., critical pragmatics, as pursued in the 1980s by social semioticians, by Norman Fairclough and his Lancaster School, and others, such as Mey (1985, 2001), whose works share more and more traits with the paradigm elaborated by the anthropological tradition (*see* **Codes, Elaborated and Restricted**).

Although the above-mentioned groups have distinct genealogies, networks, and theoretical foci, all of them are nonetheless actively engaged in the social critique of language in education, medicine, and other kinds of controlling social instances; they also share among them many sources of critical inspiration and much theoretical weaponry, including the works of Peirce, Boas, Sapir, Benjamin Whorf, Roman

Jakobson, Dell Hymes, and John Gumperz in North America (see later), as well as the traditions embodied in the writings of Malinowski, J. R. Firth, M. A. K. Halliday, Raymond Williams, E. P. Thompson, and Stuart Hall in Britain; Émile Benveniste, Roland Barthes, Louis Althusser, Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, and Gilles Deleuze in France; Marx, Weber, Theodor Adorno, Walter Benjamin, and Jürgen Habermas in Germany; Antonio Gramsci in Italy; and Mikhail Bakhtin and Valentin Voloshinov in the former Soviet Union. All of these traditions can be seen as unified from a social-scientific perspective, focusing on language use as discourse, i.e., language in social context, and seeing pragmatics, located at the core of language, as praxis, involving social conflicts, power struggles, and identity (re)formations (*see* **Austin, John L.; Foucault, Michel**). And, if pragmatics is worthless unless it is concerned with contextualized linguistic practice, that is, with what is done by peoples and individuals living in particular societies and particular times – i.e., not just with 'what is said' (linguistic meaning), but with 'what is done' in a contextually situated, sociohistorical practice – then a genuine pragmatics must be a social science of praxis, of actions and events in culture, society, and history. Such a pragmatics has been emerging since the 1980s; it erases the disciplinary division between linguistic anthropology and pragmatics and enables seeing classic, post-Austinean pragmatics as a transitory phenomenon in the historic drift moving from the semantic tradition, or the logico-linguistics of decontextualized regularities, toward the genuinely pragmatic social science of contextualized actions and events (*see* **Pragmatic Acts**).

In the following sections, we take a genealogical look at the North American 'cosmographic' school of linguistic anthropology, starting with Boas, in order to get a better idea of the social-scientific tradition, where, if the current drift continues, the future of pragmatics lies. We start out with Peirce, the neo-Kantian whose semiotic Pragmati(ci)sm was comprehensive enough to bridge the gap between the Fregean semantic and Boasian anthropological traditions, as witnessed by Jakobson's (1896–1982) synthesis of the two trends under the rubric of Peircean semiotics (*see* **Jakobson, Roman**).

Pragmatics, Pragmati(ci)sm, and the Social Semiotics of Praxis

As is well known, the term 'pragmatics' has come from a tradition that is located in between semantics and social science, namely, American Pragmati(ci)sm. In Charles Morris's (1901–1979) triadic formulation, we speak of syntax (form), semantics (meaning),

and pragmatics (context) – terms that are derived from the semiotic Pragmati(ci)sm of the neo-Kantian Peirce (1839–1914) and thus properly indicate the origin of pragmatics as being located in Kant's second *Critique*, or more generally, in the latter's critical philosophy.

Peirce, who shared much with other neo-Kantians (such as the phenomenologists), articulated what he called a semiotic 'phaneroscopy' (phenomenology), in which actions and events constitute the basis of knowledge, aesthetics, and historic evolution (teleology). Most importantly, actions and events are signs that point to objects in context, such as agents (stimuli) and experiencers. Therefore, the basic mode of signification is indexicality, which is based on the principle of contextual contiguity; the other empirically oriented mode of signification, iconicity, is based on the principle of contextual similarity between signs and their objects. In addition, there are empirically unmotivated, albeit contextually indexed and/or iconically signaled, kinds of signs, i.e., symbols; these comprise conventional ideas (ideologies) and denotational codes, as they are presupposed by the speech participants involved in actions and events. These three kinds of signs interact with one another to constitute the human cosmology, as it is anchored on the (inter)actions and events taking place at the *hic et nunc* of human activity.

Eventually, this cosmographic theory of signs was adopted by Jakobson, who, in his comprehensive theory of communication (cf., Jakobson, 1990; Lee, 1997), articulated the empirical, indexically anchored universal matrix of grammatical categories and distinctive features, envisioned as the systematic interlocking of symbolic (formal and semantic) *langue* and indexical (phonetic and pragmatic) *parole* (*see* **Jakobson, Roman**). The Jakobsonian legacy successfully integrated Peircean semiotics and Boasian linguistic anthropology; it has been the guiding thread of North American linguistic anthropology ever since, from Hymes's ethnography of speaking all the way to Michael Silverstein's social semiotics (cf. Blount, 1995). In the beginning, however, there was Boas, to whom we now turn.

The Genealogy of Linguistic Anthropology: The Boasian Cosmographic Tradition

We now try to reconstruct the cosmographic theories due to Boas, Sapir, and Whorf; these early 20th-century theories have become somewhat obscured by the hegemonic dominance of the semantic tradition in linguistics and anthropology, which gained strength in mid-20th century.

As already noted, like Peirce, Boas was a neo-Kantian who had come to understand the human mind in terms of the three processes of similarity, contiguity, and abstraction, in close resemblance with the Peircean triad of iconicity, indexicality, and symbolicity. Unlike Peirce, however, Boas was a social scientist who fought evolutionism and institutionalized racism. In these efforts, he undertook the task of showing the existence of grammatical structures in every known language, especially (Native) American languages, and used his findings to prove the universality of a symbolic "faculty of forming abstract ideas" (Blount, 1995: 26), common to all human beings. In the process, Boas moved on to empirical studies of diverse languages in a universal framework, including hypothetical universal grammar.

Boas came close to discovering the notion of the phoneme, which harkens back, via the German *Völkerpsychologen* such as Heymann Steinthal (1823–1899), to Wilhelm von Humboldt's (1767–1835) idea of *innere Sprachform* and, ultimately, to Kant's notion of 'the inner and formative power of life forms,' as he articulated it in his third *Critique*. Coming to the cultural, idiographic, or cosmographic sciences (in the sense of Alexander Humboldt) such as geography, anthropology, and linguistics, from a background in nomothetic sciences such as (psycho)physics and experimental psychology (cf., Stocking, 1996: 9–16), Boas was naturally impressed by the diversity of human phenomena he observed in culturally and historically situated contexts. He saw the two kinds of sciences as being connected via the faculty of categorical perception, i.e., the human capacity and tendency to impose categorical forms (such as sound patterns) on empirical substance or diverse unique (idiographic) phenomena (such as phones and sensations). In this, Boas anticipated 20th-century structuralism, phenomenology, and Gestalt psychology, and their practitioners, whose battle-cry against 19th-century positivists' preoccupation with sensations was precisely 'the primacy of (categorical) human (ap)perception.' Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, Boas (as did the later structuralists) maintained that linguistic perceptions were decisively conditioned by the unconscious structure of the mind; moreover, this unconscious structure could, no less importantly, be rigorously investigated using a set of techniques not uncritically adopted from the physical sciences, in what came to be called 'structural analysis' (cf., Boas, 1989: 72–77; Sapir, 1949: 166).

Boas understood categorical phonemic perception essentially as a linguistic, structurally and unconsciously conditioned distortion in the conscious perception of phonetic and pragmatic (i.e., empirical) phenomena. In his critique of logico-linguistic reason (of the kind earlier articulated by Herder and Max Müller (1823–1900), and later by Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951)), Boas made a critical empiricist departure from the Cartesian understanding of the mind, centered around the conscious reflection that rationalists considered to be the key to reality and verity. Boas stressed the value of empirical data (i.e., phonetic representations and unadulterated texts), gathered through fieldwork, as being critically important to his effort to show the relativistic plurality of cultures and the invalidity of the *a priori* armchair theories of Eurocentric universalism and rationalism, especially evolutionism (cf., Stocking, 1982: 195–233, 1996: 215–256).

Boas indeed was able to show that similar processes of rationalization underlay both evolutionist reasoning and what was called the primitive, 'savage mind' (cf., Lévi-Strauss, 1962), and hypothesized that such pragmatic processes of conscious rationalization (as opposed to universally valid, logico-semantic reason) were similar across diverse cultures, although their specific contents (which could be empirically investigated through the study of cultural myths and folklore, including modern sciences and philosophy) varied cross-culturally and showed distinct, so-called 'geniuses' of peoples. Thus, Boas, as Marx had done before him, understood theoretical reason and consciousness as a veil, or a mirror that produced distorted reflections of empirical phenomena such as cultural practices. For Boas, conscious behaviors distort and change these practices, which are otherwise unconsciously and habitually carried out and historically preserved. It is in this context that Boas underlined the methodological significance of linguistic structure, a largely unconscious phenomenon, which was assumed to provide a crucial key to the historical reconstruction of past practices (see Blount, 1995: 23–26; cf., Sapir, 1949: 432–433; Silverstein, 1979).

It may be useful to further unfold Boas's argument, in particular as it was later elaborated by Sapir (1949: 26–27, 156). First, both conscious and unconscious elements of the human mind are theorized as essentially reactive in relation to the sociohistorical practices (pragmatics) that are represented by, and give rise to, them. Yet, the agentive awareness (consciousness) of practices is limited, and when human agents act in accordance with such limited and distorted awareness, they precipitate the transformation of these very practices, and history starts unfolding (in Weberian terms, this is the dialectics between conscious ideology, such as Protestant ethic, and actual practice, such as capital formation and labor). On the other hand, the unconscious mind, which comprises linguistic structure, more transparently reflects human practices (at time t_0); but, since practices quickly change, along with consciousness, in a dialectic movement, the unconscious is left

behind (at time t_1), and the correspondence with synchronic practices (at t_1) becomes opaque, even though it remains more transparently related to the diachronically prior practices (at t_0). Therefore, both consciousness and the unconscious (where linguistic structure is mostly located) end up being only opaquely related to synchronic practices. Thus, for Boas and his followers, 'synchronic structure' is both synchronic (inasmuch as it is used 'here and now') and diachronic (inasmuch as it points to past practices). This synchrony is made up of both static and dynamic facets, the former (i.e., linguistic structure) relatively transparently pointing to the past and the latter being 'where the action is' (viz., pragmatics and phonetics); the Weberian dialectic interaction between the two, contingently creates the historic conditions for the structures and actions that are yet to come (*see* **Phonetics and Pragmatics**). Thus, the discovery of the phoneme (and of linguistic structure in general) was directly linked to the rebuttal of 19th-century neogrammarians' genetico-causal determinism (itself a further derivate of the Newtonian–Laplacean deterministic worldview), according to which the posterior condition is mechanically determined by the anterior, and faultlessly derivable from it. The discovery of synchrony (vs. achrony) also was instrumental in Saussure's discovery of the historic dialectics of *langue* and *parole*, as noted by the dialectician Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908–1961), who properly stressed the importance of the latter's discovery of *parole* (and, implicitly, of pragmatics).

No less important, given the opacity between structure and practice in the synchronic phase, is the following corollary: from the preceding premises, it deducibly follows that phonetic acts do not transparently match the phonemic categories they correspond to – a mismatch that provides part of the conditions 'distorting' phonemic apperceptions. Similarly, pragmatic acts (say, commands) do not uniquely match grammatical categories (say, the imperative mood, as becomes clear when we study the so-called indirect speech acts) (*see* **Pragmatic Acts**). In other words, the irreducibility of linguistic structure to pragmatics, a phenomenon that Chomsky sees as having its origin in the human innate faculty of reason, is shown to be deducible as a consequence of historical dialectics, generated by the very limits of consciousness or reason (cf., Sapir, 1949: 100–103). Further, just as phonetic phenomena are misperceived through our unconscious phonemic patterning (which escapes reason), pragmatic practices and referents are often incorrectly apperceived by the native mind due to an unconscious grammatical patterning (that is, due to the language-specific structural pattern found to exist in the morphosyntactic encoding of grammatical categories) (*see* **Speech Acts and Grammar**).

This is the crux of the argument that has come to be known as the linguistic relativity hypothesis (cf., Blount, 1995: 26–28; Cowan *et al.*, 1986: 455–477; Whorf, 1956: 134–159) (*see* **Sapir, Edward**; **Whorf, Benjamin Lee**).

Examining the linguistic relativity hypothesis requires us to undertake empirical studies of linguistic structures and practices across languages and cultures, which again necessitates the hypothetical construction of universal inventories of structurally significant sounds and grammatical categories (as these indeed were presented by Boas (1911)). Clearly, the typological works of Sapir (1921) and Whorf (1956: 87–101) – as well as Jakobson's (1990) theories of distinctive features and verbal categories, which may be marked 'overtly' or 'covertly' (Whorf, 1956: 87–101) in particular languages – were further elaborations of this non-Eurocentric 'universal grammar,' based on emically significant categories in the languages of the world, and suggesting the possible existence of a universal human reality underlying the particular worlds of diverse cultures (cf., Sapir, 1949: 160–166; Whorf, 1956: 147, 207–232).

The basic framework of the Boasian cosmographic tradition, as it was shared by Sapir and Whorf, became the context in which Sapir's twin notions of drift and psychological reality are to be understood. That is, in contradistinction to the neogrammarians' mechanical, genetico-causal 'blind change,' drift, vaguely and holistically perceived as *Sprachgefühl*, refers to historical structural changes caused by the dialectic interaction between structure, language use, nonlinguistic practice, and metalinguistic rationalization. Sapir, a social scientist, understood that ideal patterns (Sapir, 1921: 147; 1949: 23, 83–88, 533–543) in structure were necessarily realized not in their pure forms, but in contextualized and varied, i.e., idio-, dia-, and sociolectal, form-tokens. Some of these variations may become saliently social-indexical and directly involved in the social struggles for cultural hegemonies, as well as in processes of normative rationalizations. In such cases, the interaction between language and society often results in structural changes (cf., Blount, 1995: 513–550). Also, some of the variations may become privileged when language users feel they are being formally correct, that is, actualizing potential regularities implicitly suggested by the synchronic state of language. In such a case, the variations analogically deducible from the structure's dominant pattern may become part of the structure that will arise from the interaction between language and the *Sprachgefühl* of the language users (cf., Sapir, 1921: 147–191; Whorf, 1956: 134–159; Lucy, 1992). (Sapir hypothesized in addition that such analogies were drawn and actually

implemented because of unconscious human strivings for formal beauty; on this, see below.)

Sapir's (1949: 16, 33–60) 'psychological reality' may be similarly reconstructed in the following way. Sapir (1949: 433) started out from the Boasian thesis that linguistic consciousness was opaque to practices, partly because it was influenced by unconscious structural (sound) patterns. This implies, Sapir noted, that there is some transparent linkage between consciousness and 'inner forms' (the sound patterns). Of course, native language users cannot consciously articulate the structure of their language, but they can 'feel,' half- or sub-consciously, such inner forms, which are beyond the realm of phonetic behaviors directly perceived by outsiders of the linguistic community. In other words, native language users (insiders) 'click with' (Sapir, 1949: 48, 159) the linguistic structure at the intersection of their consciousness and unconscious, i.e., at the level of feelings. And such an inarticulate, yet immediately sensed *Sprachgefühl*, and with it, the unconscious structural patterns, are manifested even in overt linguistic behaviors such as the categorical apperceptions of sounds, actions, and referents (cf., Sapir, 1921: 55, 1949: 46–60, 150–159; Whorf, 1956: 134–159). These attested behaviors would remain unexplained if it were not for the phenomenological reality of the phoneme and other form-patterns in the unconscious. Moreover, Sapir noted that allophones of a phoneme often historically developed into different phonemes. In his view, this meant that phonemic inner forms often transparently correspond to the historically reconstructed phonetic (allophonic) behaviors of users in the past (cf., Cowan *et al.*, 1986: 67–106). In this way, the linguistic history of a community was discovered to be alive (phenomenologically, psychologically real, or 'organic') in the *Sprachgefühl* and innermost unconscious of the language users. The individual mind, in short, is communal and historical in its subconscious core. Hence, Sapir noted, there is no need to oppose the individual to the social (collective), to hypostatize a 'super-organic' collectivity existing independently of individuals, or to reify culture or language.

In Sapir's cosmographic theory, the psychological reality had other important implications for the cultural nature of the human mind. That is, unconscious, historical, and communal symbolic forms are ideologically projected onto the chaotic reality of discursive practices, precipitating the chaotic, rhapsodic, and romantic "flux of things into tangible forms, beautiful and sufficient to themselves" (Sapir, 1949: 348), as they are found in poetically structured discursive texts and rituals. In and by themselves, the symbolic forms constitute an artwork of classicism, often referred to as 'the poetry of grammar,' created by the human striving for an aesthetic totality, *un système où tout se tient* (compare the notion of drift, referred to previously) (cf., Sapir, 1949: 344; Cowan *et al.*, 1986: 455–477; also consider Jakobson's (1990) 'poetic function'). Thus, in Sapir's view, the very regularity of linguistic structure – a regularity necessary in order to operate with decontextualized denotational and cognitive significations – is constituted by our aesthetic, expressive, and ideological strivings for formal completeness. Cognition, aesthetics, emotion, history, society, and the individual are thus intertwined in Sapir's cosmographic theory.

Unfortunately, the inroads made during the 1940s and 1950s by the semantic tradition into the sciences of language almost altogether eclipsed Sapir's cosmographic science, except in the narrow circle of linguistic anthropologists. This process started with the neo-Bloomfieldians, to be followed by the ethnoscientists in anthropology, the Chomskyans in (psycho)linguistics, and the cognitive scientists of diverse obediences, who all operated in this tradition. Nevertheless, Sapir's students, such as Stanley Newman (1905–1984) and Mary Haas (1910–1996), successfully passed the torch to the next generation, whose representatives included John Gumperz and Dell Hymes, who succeeded in firmly integrating the Boasian and Peircean–Jakobsonian (semiotic) approaches (cf., Gumperz and Hymes, 1986). Subsequently, Hymes's theory of communication, called the 'ethnography of speaking,' gained momentum in the 1970s (cf., Bauman and Sherzer, 1974), a decade that saw the hermeneutic (i.e., interpretive, contextual, or (neo-)pragmatic) turn in the social sciences and Anglophone philosophy (as pointed out previously). This turn provided the historic conditions for a revival of the Boasian tradition in contemporary North American linguistic anthropology, locating language squarely at the intersection of history, ideology, and practice (see Blount, 1995; Brenneis and Macaulay, 1996; Duranti, 2001; Kroskrity, 2000; Lee, 1997; Lucy, 1992, 1993; Schieffelin *et al.*, 1998; Silverstein and Urban, 1996). Here, the historic, ideological, and pragmatic aspects of language, including not only grammar, but also (con)textualization, language change and variation, Bakhtinian voicing, standardization, rationalization, modernization, linguistic nationalism and imperialism, language purism, feminism and gender, literalism, and other cultural ideologies and practices, seen in their sociohistoric context, are cosmographically studied in a social-scientific framework. Their discovery of the (re)formations of group identities and

power relations and sociocultural conflicts as happening in, and being constituted by, language as the central element thus converges with the social drift of contemporary critical pragmatics.

See also: Activity Theory; Austin, John L.; Bakhtin, Mikhail Mikhailovich; Critical Applied Linguistics; Critical Discourse Analysis; Discourse, Foucauldian Approach; Foucault, Michel; Frege, Friedrich Ludwig Gottlob; Grice, Herbert Paul; Implicature; Jakobson, Roman; Neo-Gricean Pragmatics; Peirce, Charles Sanders; Phonetics and Pragmatics; Politeness; Pragmatic Acts; Pragmatics: Overview; Relevance Theory; Sapir, Edward; Speech Acts and Grammar; Speech Acts; Whorf, Benjamin Lee.

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Applying Pragmatics

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The term 'applying pragmatics' (AP) is coined in this entry in preference to 'applied pragmatics' to signal that AP is a dynamic, user-oriented activity. With a wide and evolving range of applications in the societal context, AP contrasts with the somewhat fossilized term 'applied linguistics', which is primarily associated with (foreign) language learning and teaching, although it does cover linguistic applications in other areas, such as speech pathology, translation, and lexicography. Applied pragmatics embraces practices rooted in a pragmatic perspective on language users, language use, and contexts of use, where the users and their complex of personal, social, cultural, and ideational contexts are seen as paramount. If pragmatics itself is a 'user-oriented science of language', AP is a problem-solving activity with an emphasis on using pragmatic knowledge critically, imaginatively, and constructively in the real-world context of the 'social struggle', rather than on

rehearsing the tenets of canonical pragmatic theory (Mey, 2001: 308–319).

The relevance of pragmatics for the wider social agenda at the micro- and macro-levels of operation can be attributed in part to a series of developmental and formative tendencies: a concerted reaction to the syntactic formalism of Chomskyan linguistics and the preoccupation with language as system, where the language user and contexts of language use are disenfranchised; a 'social-critical' impetus, fueled by the desire to create a socially sensitive practice of language, typified for instance by the work of Basil Bernstein and the critical distinction he drew between restricted and elaborated code; a unique perspective on language as action and speech act theory, initiated by the work of J. L. Austin and the work of 'ordinary language philosophers'; and a perspective on language as communication rather than on language as grammar, deriving from the ethnomethodological tradition (Mey, 1998: 716) (*see* **Codes, Elaborated and Restricted; Austin, John L.**).

Levels of Application: Micro- and Macro-processes

Applying pragmatics operates at both the micro- and macro-levels of communication, although this distinction is approximate and more of a labeling convenience, since the two levels interpenetrate and synergize. 'Micro-pragmatics' looks at the day-to-day context of communication between individuals and groups situated in their local contexts. At the same time, local practices need to be seen against the societal backgrounds and institutional settings in which they occur (i.e., 'macro-pragmatics'). Micro- and macro-pragmatics are points in a continuum, each linking to the other and each serving as the focus according to the aim of the enquiry. Verschueren (1999: 220–224) cites Goodwin's (1994) analysis of the Rodney King trials as a case in point. While being arrested for a traffic violation in Los Angeles, King, an African-American, was subjected to a violent beating by police officers – an event that was filmed by an amateur video photographer and later broadcast on public television to public outrage. The police officers were subsequently put on trial and later acquitted. This led to street riots in Los Angeles and a subsequent retrial. As a communicative event, the courtroom proceedings can only be properly understood in relation to the macro-setting created by the institutional and social contexts in which they took place and through which they were mediated: the particular structure and participant roles and the associated verbal processes typical of the (U.S.) courtroom and a legal/trial setting; the actual and perceived social status of African-Americans within American society, as embodied by King at the time and subsequently; and the role of community and civil rights leaders and their adoption of the King case as a heuristic to draw attention to racism and police brutality. Thus, transcriptions of the trial process can be initially approached as instances of face-to-face linguistic interaction in a courtroom setting, but as the tale unfolds, the total event and its wide-reaching implications can only be properly understood in terms of how (U.S.) legal institutions reflect, endorse, and perpetuate particular societal practices and values.

Domains of Application: Micro- and Macro-pragmatics

As a perspective rather than a component of a linguistic theory, pragmatics can purposefully be applied in the investigation of all instances of language use, whether at the level of the individual, the group, the institution, or society as a whole, and whether at the level of the sentence/utterance or in relation to extended discourse (Verschueren, 1999: 203; Mey, 1998: 728). With its focus on the sentence/utterance level of discourse, micro-pragmatics is concerned primarily with the local constraints of the immediate context, such as: deixis and the indexing of personal, temporal, and locative features; reference and the textually directive function of anaphora and cataphora; and word order and the sequencing/clustering of particles and their discourse function to modify illocutionary force, to facilitate the management of conversation, or to highlight salient parts in a stretch of discourse (*see* **Deixis and Anaphora: Pragmatic Approaches; Discourse Anaphora; Discourse Markers**). Yet, rooted as these linguistic features are in the immediate surroundings of an utterance, the link with the world becomes apparent as the focus shifts from the individual to the wider, institutionally and societally driven contexts in which humankind must necessarily operate. To quote Mey (2001: 177):

> The world in which people live is a coherent one, in which everything hangs together: none of its phenomena can be explained in isolation.

This is now the domain of macro-pragmatics. Institutional and institutionalized language practices figure prominently on the agenda (and often), where power asymmetries may arise as the result of gender difference, perceived social standing and social privilege, and (lack of) access to power. Typical research areas and domains of application include: medical discourse and the study of language use in doctor-patient interviews, psychoanalysis, and schizophrenic discourse; educational and pedagogical language practices, such as teacher-student interaction, language

acquisition and the development of pragmatic competence, the articulation of language policy in relation to minority language instruction, wording of the learning/teaching curriculum, and, more generally, the sets of attitudes and beliefs propagated through the 'hidden curriculum'; the language of the workplace and its impact on management-worker relations; the language of the media, especially advertising discourse; the language of politics, government, and ideology, viewed as a force for linguistic manipulation and the engineering of human minds; and intercultural and international communication and the (lack of) understanding of cultural and communicative diversity, where what is pragmatically appropriate in the given context is at issue. In short, macro-pragmatics considers language use in terms of the totality of contexts in which the unique, dynamic, human activity of verbal communication takes place. It takes its cues from a variety of other related disciplines, such as (linguistic) anthropology, sociology, ethnology, and linguistic science itself. (*see* **Institutional Talk; Media and Language: Overview; Intercultural Pragmatics and Communication; Social Aspects of Pragmatics; Language Politics**.)

Applying Pragmatics and the Language User

Applying pragmatics aims to develop an awareness of the crucial role that language plays in the construction of individual, group, and societal identities and the consequences of these 'constructed identities' for individual freedoms and the rights of individuals to participate fully in the communities of which they are a part. Exploration of the macro-context, in relation to which all language activity takes place, is the province of 'societal pragmatics', with its unique focus on the users of language and the prevailing conditions under which they use language. Applying pragmatics highlights problems of language use that arise in social contexts where the failure to communicate successfully may lead to social exclusion and disadvantage (*see* **Social Aspects of Pragmatics**).

The domain of education is often singled out as the main sphere of human activity in which social privilege and access to power are unevenly distributed. Education is mediated and perpetuated through language. Any departure from institutionally identified standards of linguistic behavior is stigmatized and faces sanction. Hence, talk of linguistic oppression may take place, as evidenced, for instance, by the opposition between 'low' and 'high' prestige dialects. The latter can be associated with the linguistic standards whose observance is dictated for wider use by a minority but dominant class of language user. This language oppression is nothing less than social control through language. The insights provided by AP enable us to develop an awareness of the insidious effects of language repression while calling for greater transparency in how society deals with the individual's linguistic behavior in the educational setting (Mey, 1998: 731–732) (*see* **Power and Pragmatics**).

Societal pragmatics is also concerned with other social contexts in which linguistic repression is at work and where individuals behave unwittingly, in a certain way, on account of an institutionalized power imbalance. Medical discourse and the instance of schizophrenic speech are a further case in point. Schizophrenic speech is associated with abnormal language. Such speech impoverishment represents a loss of humanness, because the 'nonlanguage' of the schizophrenic, as it is now defined, has become a symptom rather than a means of communication and thus a target for psychiatric manipulation and intervention. By raising questions about the nature of interactive norms in medical practice, AP can argue the need for informed intervention, where the relationships between humanness, language use, sanity, and institutional power are placed under public scrutiny.

Matters of linguistic diversity and endangered languages are also fertile territory for pragmatic intervention. Language attrition, language loss, and language death are all issues on the pragmatic agenda, where description is seen only as an initial step to corrective action rather than as an end in itself (*see* **Minorities and Language; Endangered Languages**). Notwithstanding controversies over the global, cultural, political, and historical impact of English on smaller indigenous languages, AP can raise public awareness, help collate data, monitor linguistic policies and practices, seek to influence policymakers, and offer practical and professional support to speech communities actively wishing to preserve their languages. For instance, the Linguistic Society of America records that active intervention in this manner, as opposed to mere description and documentation, has shown highly promising results. Its website records that:

> Language loss is [often] far more directly a consequence of intolerance for diversity [than an inevitable result of progress], particularly when practiced by the powerful against the weak.

Applying Pragmatics and the Social Struggle

Applying pragmatics is explicitly concerned with situating the concerns of societal pragmatics in terms of a broad social-political agenda; it is interventionist rather than descriptive in its primary aims. Applying pragmatics is all about doing pragmatics. As a case in

point, Mey (2001: 313–315) cites the success of the linguistic war against sexism and the now mostly abandoned use of generic pronoun *he* as a modest yet significant victory for nonsexist practice. Uprooting the hegemonic *he* is not just linguistic tinkering; it brings about a restructuring of stated social relationships, thereby facilitating gender equality (*see* **Gender and Language**).

Applying pragmatics shares common concerns with critical linguistics, whose aim is to expose the hidden relationships between social power and language use, against the backdrop of sociopolitical and cultural factors. Case studies include: political discourse, specifically the clichéd rhetoric of Britain's political parties; the language of labor disputes and their documentation in the media; the use of more critically aware pedagogies in (English) second-language teaching; and the characterization of social power as a given or natural phenomenon, legitimized through unquestioning acceptance by the public (*see* **Media and Language: Overview**).

Applying pragmatics has a crucial, empowering, and emancipatory role to play. It helps us understand the power of language to discriminate indiscriminately across a range of social contexts; it suggests an agenda for pragmatically informed intervention on behalf of the disenfranchised, underprivileged language user; and, last, it seeks to put language in the hands of the language user, wresting linguistic control from those who would undermine and deny the rights and freedoms of the individual (*see* **Pragmatics: Overview; Marxist Theories of Language**).

See also: Austin, John L.; Codes, Elaborated and Restricted; Context and Common Ground; Critical Discourse Analysis; Deixis and Anaphora: Pragmatic Approaches; Discourse Anaphora; Discourse Markers; Educational Linguistics; Endangered Languages; Gender and Language; Institutional Talk; Intercultural Pragmatics and Communication; Language Politics; Linguistic Anthropology; Marxist Theories of Language; Media and Language: Overview; Minorities and Language; Power and Pragmatics; Pragmatics: Overview; Social Aspects of Pragmatics.

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Austin was born on March 26, 1911 in Lancaster. After studying philosophy in Shrewsbury and Oxford, he became fellow of All Souls College (1933) and later professor in Magdalen College at Oxford University, where he remained until his premature death on February 8, 1960. Although he was 'White's Professor of Moral Philosophy,' Austin is especially known for his contribution to linguistic philosophy and for his very personal use of ordinary language philosophy,

which he applied to fundamental issues such as meaning, free will, knowledge, truth, and other minds.

Austin was averse to theory building; he was fascinated by the analytical method of lexicographers, which he used for the study of how words and phrases are used in statements about reality, in the expression of beliefs and intentions, and in all types of conventional talk. Good examples of his philosophical use of the lexicographical approach can be found in his *Philosophical papers* and in *Sense and sensibilia* (in the latter work the foundations of British logical positivism are subjected to thorough criticism).

Austin's lasting contribution to the philosophy of language and to linguistic theory (especially pragmatics) lies in having initiated what later (through the work of his student John Searle) was to become the theory of speech acts. The starting point was Austin's observation (dating back to the 1940s) that there are two essentially different types of utterances: utterances that say how things are (or say what is the matter), and utterances that, merely by being made, bring about something (a 'new reality'). Austin called the former type 'constative' utterances (*The book is on the table*), and the latter type 'performative' utterances (*I baptize you Charles*). Whereas constative utterances are (primarily) judged on their truth/falsity, performative utterances are judged on their felicity/infelicity: their (non)success depends not on what the world is like (precisely because they bring about a new fact), but on felicity conditions, such as: appropriate context, authority and sincerity of the speaker, and the existence of certain (cultural) conventions. This distinction, which is the starting point of the William James Lectures given at Harvard University in 1955 (on 'Words and Deeds'), posthumously published as *How to Do Things with Words*, was then questioned by Austin himself, and replaced, in the course of the lectures, with a larger view on types of utterances, coupled with (semantic-pragmatic) types of verbs and with types of communicative strategies and effects. The final distinction is then one between acts (it would be better to speak of features of linguistic acts, or of power potentials or forces of acts):

Austin speaks of locutionary act (act *of* saying something, with a particular sense and reference), illocutionary act (performing an act – such as warning or accusing – *in* saying something), and perlocutionary act (the act – such as frightening or offending the interlocutor – achieved *by* saying something). As different people may react differently (some are frightened when being warned, others not), the nexus between the perlocutionary force (as yielding an effect in the hearer) and the two other forces is of a non-conventional nature.

Austin did not organize these ideas into a systematic theory, nor did he live long enough to answer the objections soon made to the published version of his lectures, which shows the evolution in his approach of 'words and deeds' and ends with a number of open questions. Thus it was all the more important that Searle turned Austin's gradually revised approach into a comprehensive speech act theory.

See also: Pragmatics: Overview; Speech Acts.

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B

Bakhtin, Mikhail Mikhailovich

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Mikhail Mikhailovich Bakhtin was born in Orel, Russia, south of Moscow, on November 16, 1895. Coming of age in turbulent times, he attended Saint Petersburg University between 1916 and 1918, dividing his time between classics, literature, and philosophy, while maintaining a keen interest in language outside the classroom. During the 1920s Bakhtin came into contact with Voloshinov and Medvedev, two fellow intellectuals who shared his broad interests in language, politics, dialogue, and literature. Later known as the Bakhtin Circle, these young writers met regularly to discuss the philosophy of language until 1929, when Bakhtin was arrested, detained, and later exiled to Kustanai in 1930. After working as a book-keeper on a collective farm, Bakhtin traveled to Saransk in 1936 to accept a position at the Mordovia Pedagogical Institute, where he taught Russian and world literature until his retirement in 1961. In 1940, Bakhtin submitted his dissertation, *Rabelais and the history of realism,* to the Institute of World Literature in Moscow, for which he was awarded the lesser degree of Candidate of Philological Sciences in 1952, rather than the doctorate. Although Bakhtin was a humble scholar who received little public recognition during his lifetime, his ideas have had an enormous, global impact on the philosophy and sociology of language. Bakhtin died in Moscow, Russia, on March 7, 1975.

Bakhtin is best known for his work on dialogue, a concept he continued to develop over the course of his career. For Bakhtin, dialogue was the central reality of language, a position partly inspired by the Greek philosopher Socrates, who stressed the emergent nature of truth in dialogic exchanges between opposing parties. In Bakhtin's estimation, the most productive exchanges occur between parties that enter into a discussion with contrasting points of view, allowing for change and diversity in society. Bakhtin hinted at this position in his first major publication, *Problems of Dostoevsky's poetics* (1929), in which he praised Dostoevsky for writing 'polyphonic' novels that represent the many competing voices found in every society. Because these voices resonate with larger systems of thought, such political orientations or even scientific worldviews, Bakhtin maintained that ideology, or perspective, is pervasive in everyday language use.

The political implications of dialogue are greatly expanded in Bakhtin's later writings. In *The dialogic imagination* (1981), he identified two major trends on the ideological plane. One tendency is toward homogeneity, where 'centripetal' forces seek to centralize the perspectives, discourses, or linguistic varieties found in society, reducing diversity and the possibility of change. Taken to an extreme, this monologic tendency leads to the death of dialogue, a fearful possibility that Bakhtin personally experienced under Stalin's regime. Fortunately, other 'centrifugal' forces are at work, destabilizing meaning by promoting diversity within society, whether as competing discourses or contrasting linguistic varieties. Here Bakhtin offered one of his most important concepts, that of 'heteroglossia,' where these competing centripetal and centrifugal forces enter into ongoing conflict, potentially sustaining internal diversity within a speech community, as separate but intermingling genres, registers, sociolects, discourses, and ideologies. In *Rabelais and his world* (1965), Bakhtin offered the telling image of the medieval carnival, where unofficial discourses and genres flourished, subversively contesting the centripetal forces of official hegemony.

See also: Voloshinov, Valentin Nikolaevich.

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Bilingual Education

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Introduction

The term bilingual education has multiple meanings, with varying positive and negative associations, and a varied history. Take three cases. First, bilingual education is loosely used to refer to schools attended by bilingual children (e.g., Latinos and Latvians in U.S. schools, Greek and Gujarati children in U.K. schools). However, bilingualism is not fostered in such schools. Rather, the aim is to shift the child rapidly from the home, minority language to the dominant, majority language. Second, the term refers to children who are allowed to use their home language in the classroom for only a short period (e.g., one or two years) until they switch to the majority language (called transitional bilingual education). Third, bilingual education appears a more appropriate label for schools in which students learn through two languages in the classroom. For example, there are dual language schools in the United States that teach students through Spanish for one day and the next day through English. In Europe, there are elite bilingual programs (e.g., Luxembourg, Switzerland) in which children both learn, and learn through two or more prestigious languages (e.g., German, French, English).

Types of Bilingual Education

Given that bilingual education has multiple meanings, some clarity is possible by defining different types of bilingual education. Although Baker (2001) and Garcia (1997), respectively, define 10 and 14 different types of bilingual education, a threefold categorization is helpful.

1. 'Null' forms of bilingual education bring together bilingual children but with the aim of monolingualism in the majority language. Submersion education is the term used in academic writing for such education, but not by school systems that tend to use the term mainstreaming. Submersion education implies that the child (on immediate entry to school) only experiences the majority language. The child is thrown into a language at the deep end and are expected to sink or swim in the majority language from the first day.

2. 'Weak' forms of bilingual education allow children to use their home language for a temporary period until they can switch totally to the majority language (Carrasquillo and Rodriguez, 2002). Weak forms of bilingual education include structured immersion, withdrawal classes, various forms of sheltered English, transitional bilingual education, and mainstreaming with foreign language teaching. Second language and foreign language teaching in schools occasionally produces competent bilinguals. Generally, such teaching does not result in age-appropriate proficiency in the second or foreign language, nor reaches a level of language that enables learning of curriculum content to occur via that language. Sometimes, a subset of language abilities is developed for instrumental or practical reasons (e.g., travel, trade, cultural awareness).

3. 'Strong' forms of bilingual education aim for each child, irrespective of ability, to achieve bilingualism, biliteracy, and cultural pluralism. Such outcomes are gained mainly through students learning content (e.g., mathematics, social studies) through both languages. Strong forms of bilingual education include U.S. dual language schools, Heritage Language programs, Canadian Immersion, and the European Schools movement. Three of these strong forms of bilingual education will be discussed here, so as to define education that has bilingualism as an educational outcome rather than bilingual children as an input.

Immersion Bilingual Education

Immersion education typically has students from majority language backgrounds (e.g., English homes in Canada; Swedish homes in Finland) and teaches them through another majority or a minority language (e.g., French in Canada). However, there are many variations: first, the age at which a child commences the experience. This may be at the kindergarten or infant stage (early immersion), at 9 to 10 years old (delayed or middle immersion), or at secondary level (late or late-start immersion). Second, the amount of time spent in immersion. Total immersion usually commences with 100% immersion in the second language, reducing after 2 or 3 years to 80% per week for the next 3 or 4 years, finishing junior schooling with approximately 50% immersion in the second language per week. Partial immersion provides close to 50% immersion in the second language throughout infant and junior schooling.

Children in early immersion are usually allowed to use their home language for a year or more for classroom communication. There is no compulsion to speak the second (school) language in the playground or when eating lunch. The child's home language is valued and not disparaged. Such children also start immersion education with relatively homogeneous language skills. This not only simplifies the teacher's task, it also means that students' self-esteem and classroom motivation are not threatened because of some students being linguistically more advanced.

Heritage Language Bilingual Education

Heritage language bilingual education occurs when language minority children use their native, ethnic, home, or heritage language in the school as a medium of instruction and the goal is competence in two languages. Examples include education through, or more often partly through, the medium of Navajo or Spanish in the United States (Francis and Reyhner, 2002), or Basque in Spain (Gardner, 2000),

or aboriginal languages in Australia (Caldwell and Berthold, 1995). In China, since 1979 minority language education has been provided for over 20 minority groups, partly as a way of improving ethnic minority relationships with central government (Blachford, 1997). In the Canadian provinces of Manitoba, British Columbia, Saskatchewan, and Alberta, there are heritage language bilingual education programs. The heritage language is the medium of instruction for about 50% of the day (e.g., Ukrainian, Italian, German, Hebrew, Yiddish, Mandarin Chinese, Arabic, and Polish). Heritage language programs in the United States (see Krashen *et al.*, 1998) and elsewhere vary in structure and content and overlap with the 90:10 model of dual language education (see later). Some of the likely features are described here.

Most of the children come from language minority homes but may be joined by a small number of majority language children whose parents desire bilingualism in their children. Such parents will often have the choice of sending their children to mainstream schools or to heritage language programs. In most cases, the majority language will also be used in the curriculum, ranging from second language lessons to a varying proportion (e.g., 10% to 50%) of the curriculum being taught in the majority language. There is a tendency to teach mathematical, technological, and scientific studies through the majority language, and to use the majority language progressively more across the grades.

Where a minority language is used for a majority of classroom time (e.g., 80% to almost 100%), the justification is that children easily transfer ideas, concepts, skills and knowledge into the majority language. Having taught a child multiplication in Mohawkian, this mathematical concept does not have to be retaught in English. The **justification** given for such programs is also that a minority language is easily lost, a majority language is easily gained. Children tend to be surrounded by the majority language, especially in the teenage years. Thus, bilingualism is achieved by an initial concentration on the minority language at school.

Dual Language Bilingual Education

U.S. dual language (or two-way) bilingual education typically occurs when there is an approximate balance in numbers between language minority and language majority students in the same classroom. Whereas a 50:50 **language balance** often was advised, the majority language can become dominant (e.g., because of its higher prestige value), putting the aim of bilingualism and biliteracy at risk.

Both languages are used for instruction and learning, revealing that the aim is to produce students

who are bilingual, biliterate, and bicultural or multicultural (Lindholm-Leary, 2001). Dual language schools use a non-English language for at least 50% of curriculum time for up to six grades. In each period of instruction, only one language is used, such that students learn a new language mostly via content. Genesee and Gándara (1999) suggest that such schools enhance intergroup communication and cultural awareness. They produce children who, in terms of intergroup relations, are likely to be more tolerant and sensitive. "Contact between members of different groups leads to increased liking and respect for members of the outgroup, including presumably reductions in stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination" (Genesee and Gándara, 1999: 667).

Some teachers use both languages on different occasions with their students; others just use one language and may be paired and work together closely as a team. The school ethos also will be bilingual by classroom and corridor displays, curriculum resources, announcements, and extracurricular activity using both languages if possible.

A central idea in dual language bilingual schools is language separation and language boundaries. Language boundaries are established in terms of time, curriculum content and teaching. One frequent preference is for each language to be used on alternate days. Alternately, different lessons may use different languages with a regular change over to ensure both languages are used in all curricula areas. The division of time may be in half days, whole days, or alternate weeks. The essential element is the distribution of time to achieve bilingual and biliterate students. Often, a 50:50 balance in use of languages is attempted in early grades, although in some schools, the minority language is given more time (60% to 90% of the available time). In the later years of schooling, there is sometimes a preference for more emphasis on the majority language.

Bilingual Education and Politics

There is no deep understanding of bilingual education except through understanding the politics behind such education. There are varying philosophical and political origins to bilingual education that underpin different models of bilingual education. For example, bilingual education is best understood by reference to national variations (Cummins and Corson, 1998). The contrasting politics of Canada's two language solitudes and South Africa's management of social integration when retaining multilingualism, the ardor of language activists in the Basque Country and the more gentle revolution in Wales, the suppression of Breton in France, and the historical repression of Native American Indian languages in the United States illustrate that the history and politics of a nation shapes its approach to languages and bilingual education.

The contemporary politics of bilingual education relates to the education of immigrants (e.g., in the United States, the United Kingdom), the preservation of nationalism (e.g., the fate of Breton in France), the devolution of power to regions (e.g., Wales, Catalonia), language revitalization (e.g., Native American Indians, the Maori in New Zealand), internationalism (e.g., the European Schools Movement, bilingual education in Japan), and the emancipatory education of deaf people (e.g., through bilingual education in a sign language and a majority language – see Baker and Jones, 1998). The varying politics of immigrant assimilation and political integration, economic protectionism and global trade, institutionalized racism and equality of opportunity, and recent debates about peace and terrorism can make bilingual education as much about politics as about education. Bilingual education also has become associated with political debates about dominance and control by elites, questions about social order, and the perceived potential subversiveness of language minorities (Garcia, 2002; Tollefson, 2002).

In Macedonia (Tankersley, 2001), China (Zhou, 2001), the United States (Wiese and Garcia, 2001), and the South Pacific (Lotherington, 1998), bilingual education also can be positively located within attempts to effect social, cultural, economic, or political change, particularly in strengthening the weak, empowering the powerless, and invigorating those most susceptible. This is illustrated by Tankersley (2001). Contextualized within the recent ethnic conflict in the Balkans, she examines a Macedonian/Albanian dual language program. The program demonstrated success in aiding community rebuilding after the war and the growth of cross-ethnic friendships. The research shows the potential for bilingual education program to develop students' respect for different languages and cultures, and help to resolve ethnic conflict. However, because the Macedonian language was connected with greater power and prestige, obtaining an equal balance of languages in the classroom was complex.

The importance of a historical perspective on bilingual education as politics is provided by Wiese and Garcia (2001) through an analysis of the U.S. Bilingual Education Act from 1968 to the present. The changing U.S. ideologies in minority language civil liberties, equality of educational opportunity, assimilation, and multiculturalism become translated into legislation and tested in litigation. Most recently, the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 placed an

emphasis on accountability and testing. Whereas Title V authorizes programs for Native Indian, Native Hawaiian and Alaskan Native Education, Title III requires testing in English for most language minority students. All states are required to monitor the progress of some 3.68 million U.S. language minority students in meeting their English proficiency and academic objectives. The paradox is that the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 followed the September 11 terrorist attacks. In the aftermath of the attacks, politicians, the press, and the public lamented the lack of language and cultural skills in U.S. intelligence and defense. It also seems possible that peace and harmony between religions and regions would be aided by producing bilinguals who appreciate the diversity that is possibly intrinsic in bilingualism and biculturalism.

Research and analysis of Proposition 227 in California has led to it being one of the most profiled examples of power and politics governing bilingual education (Stritikus, 2001; Crawford, 2004). In effect, Proposition 227 aimed at outlawing bilingual education in California. Proposition 227 was passed in a public ballot by a margin of 61% to 39%. Analysis of the voting and subsequent surveys found that Latinos were clearly against the proposition but, nevertheless, bilingual education became virtually illegal.

The importance of bilingual education for minority language literacy development and biliteracy has become a major recent theme (e.g., Martin-Jones and Jones, 2000; Hornberger, 2003). Using contexts of classroom, home, and community, such literacy research tends to be less concerned with teaching and learning methodology and more focused on, for example, the relationship between asymmetrical power relations and literacy practices that reproduce social inequalities and competing discourses about what counts as literacy. Current biliteracy research suggests that language policies and practices in education are struggles over power and authority, equity and marginalization, legitimacy and social order, symbolic domination and identities, social categorization, and social hierarchicization. Any consideration about who should speak what language, how, when, and where is essentially about what counts as legitimate language and who has dominance and control. Hence, those in power who legitimate the current social order regulate access to linguistic norms and linguistic resources to preserve their power and position.

However cogent and coherent are the philosophical and pedagogic and foundations for bilingualism, biliteracy, and biculturalism, however strong are the educational arguments for bilingual education,

and however strong are the arguments for the preservation of vanishing languages in the world, it is the politics of power, status, assimilation, and social order that can refute bilingual education so swiftly. However, bilingual education is typically a necessary, and sometimes an essential condition for the preservation of language species in the world. Where there is a shortfall in minority language reproduction in the family, then language production at school is essential in education to retain or increase the number and density of minority language speakers. From preschool bilingual education to adult language learning (e.g., in Ulpanim), bilingual education has a possible contemporary function not only to educate but also for minority language transmission.

Language Revitalization through Bilingual Education

Bilingual education is sometimes a component of national or regional language planning that varyingly attempts to assimilate indigenous and immigrant minorities, or integrate newcomers or minority groups (e.g., U.S., U.K.). On other occasions, bilingual education is a major plank in language revitalization and language reversal (e.g., among Native American Indians, the Sámi in Scandinavia, and the Maori in New Zealand).

The growing interest in endangered and dying languages has recently provided a further raison d'être to bilingual education. The predicted demise of many or most of the world's languages has created a momentum for language planning (Littlebear, 1999; Nettle and Romaine, 2000; Skutnabb-Kangas, 2000; Spolsky, 2004). For a minority language to survive, it has to produce new speakers, mostly via family language transmission and the education system (including adult language learning). Language planners tend to believe that bilingual education is an important means of language maintenance, language revitalization and reversing language shift, for example, among Native American Indians (Bia and McCarty, 2002; Francis and Reyhner, 2002; House, 2002), Ecuadorians (King, 2001), and the Basques (Gardner, 2000). Language acquisition planning via bilingual education becomes essential for language revival but insufficient by itself.

Nevertheless, bilingual education cannot gain its rational solely from language restoration or maintenance. It requires research to demonstrate underlying educational advantages (e.g., raising student achievement, increasing employment opportunities). There is sometimes over-optimism among language planners about what can be expected from and delivered by bilingual education in revitalizing a language.

Although bilingual education has an important role in language reproduction, and without bilingual education a minority language may not be able to survive except through intense religious usage, bilingual education cannot deliver language maintenance by itself.

The Advantages of 'Strong' Forms of Bilingual Education

Support for bilingual education tends to circle around eight interacting advantages of bilingual education that are claimed for students. There also are societal benefits that already have been alluded to in the above discussion of politics and bilingual education and will be briefly mentioned later. This section concentrates on the individual advantages.

First, bilingual education typically enables both languages to reach higher levels of competency. This potentially enables children to engage in wider communication across generations, regions, and cultural groups (Cummins, 2000). Second, bilingual education ideally develops a broader enculturation, a more sensitive view of different creeds and cultures. Bilingual education will usually deepen an engagement with the cultures associated with the languages, fostering a sympathetic understanding of differences, and, at its best, avoids the tight compartmentalization of racism and stereotyping. Third, strong forms of bilingual education frequently leads to biliteracy (see Hornberger, 2003). Accessing literacy practices in two or more languages adds more functions to a language (e.g., using in employment), widening the choice of literature for enjoyment, giving more opportunities for understanding different perspectives and viewpoints, and leading to a deeper understanding of history and heritage, of traditions and territory (Tse, 2001).

Fourth, research on dual language schools, Canadian immersion education, and heritage language education suggest that curriculum achievement is increased through content learning occurring via dual language curriculum strategies (Cummins, 2000; Tse, 2001). This is returned to later in this article. Fifth, plentiful research suggests that children with two well-developed languages share cognitive benefits (Bialystok, 2001). Such thinking advantages include being more creative because of their dual language systems (Baker, 2001), being more sensitive in communication as they may be interpersonally aware, for example, when needing to codeswitch, and tend to be more introspective of their languages (metalinguistic advantages – see Bialystok, 2001). Sixth, children's self-esteem may be raised in bilingual education for minority language students (Cummins, 2000). The opposite is when a child's home language is replaced by the majority language. Then, the child

itself, the parents and relatives, and not least the child's community may appear as inadequate and disparaged by the school system. When the home language is used in school, then children may feel themselves, their home, family, and community to be accepted, thus maintaining or raising their self-esteem.

Seventh, bilingual education may aid the establishment of a more secure identity at a local, regional, and national level. Sharing Welsh, Maori, or Native American Indian identity may be enhanced by the heritage language and culture being celebrated and honored in the classroom. Developing a Korean-American, Bengali-British, or Greek-Australian identity can be much aided by strong forms of bilingual education, and challenged or even negated by weak forms. Eighth, in some regions (e.g., Catalonia, Scandinavia) there are economic advantages for having experienced bilingual (or trilingual) education. Being bilingual can be important to secure employment in many public services and particularly when there is a customer interface requiring switching effortlessly between two or more languages. To secure a job as a teacher, to work in the mass media, to work in local government and increasingly in the civil service in countries such as Canada, Wales, and the Basque Country, bilingualism has become important. Thus, bilingual education is increasingly seen as delivering relatively more marketable employees than monolingual education (Dutcher, 1995; Tse, 2001).

To this list may be added the potential societal, ethnic group, or community benefits of bilingual education (May, 2001; Peyton *et al*., 2001; Stroud, 2001; Tse, 2001) such as continuity of heritage, cultural vitality, empowered and informed citizenship, raising school and state achievement standards, social and economic inclusion, social relationships and networking, ethnic group self-determination, and distinctiveness. This is well illustrated by Feuerverger (2001) in an ethnography of a village (Neve Shalom/Wahat Al-Salam) in Israel, where Jews and Palestinians attempt to live together harmoniously and cooperatively, maintaining respect for the culture, identity, and languages of each group. This is partly attempted by two schools, an elementary school and the 'School for Peace,' which create bilingual Hebrew-Arabic bilinguals.

The Effectiveness of Bilingual Education

Research support for bilingual education is relatively robust (Baker, 2001) although there has been much political challenge to this in the United States (Crawford, 2004). Perhaps the strongest research support for bilingual education derives from

evaluations of immersion education, particularly from Canada since the 1960s (Johnstone, 2002). There is plentiful research from the United States since the 1960s (see Baker, 2001, for a review).

Evaluations of the effectiveness of dual language schools indicate relative success. One of the most wide-ranging evaluations of dual language schools is by Lindholm-Leary (2001). She analyzed teacher attributes, teacher talk, parental involvement and satisfaction, as well as student outcomes (using 4854 students) in different program types. These programs included Transitional Bilingual Education, English-Only, the 90:10 Dual Language Model, and the 50:50 Dual Language Model. The measured outcomes included Spanish and English language proficiency, academic achievement and attitudes of the students. Socioeconomic background and other student characteristics were taken into account in reporting results. Among a wealth of findings, Lindholm-Leary (2001) found that

- students who had 10% or 20% of their instruction in English scored as well on English proficiency as those in English-only programs and as well as those in 50:50 dual language (DL) programs;
- Spanish proficiency was higher in 90:10 than 50:50 (DL) programs. Students tended to develop higher levels of bilingual proficiency in the 90:10 than the 50:50 DL program;
- for Spanish-speaking students, no difference in English language proficiency was found between the 90:10 and 50:50 DL programs. However, DL students outperformed transitional bilingual education (TBE) students in English by the Grade 6;
- students in both the 90:10 and 50:50 DL programs were performing about 10 points higher in reading achievement than the Californian state average for English-speaking students educated in English-only programs;
- higher levels of bilingual proficiency were associated with higher levels of reading achievement;
- on Mathematics tests, DL students performed on average 10 points higher on Californian norms for English-speaking students educated only in English. There was a lack of difference in the scores of 90:10 and 50:50 DL students;
- DL students tended to reveal very positive attitudes toward their DL programs, teachers, classroom environment and the learning process.

Thomas and Collier's (2002) Final Report on their 1985 to 2001 database of 210,054 minority language students' academic achievement in eight different models of education indicates that: schooling in the home language has a much greater effect on achievement than socioeconomic status; late immigrants whose early education was in their home language outperformed early immigrants schooled in English only; enrichment (heritage language) 90:10 programs and dual language programs (50:50) were the most academically successful for English L2 students and had the lowest dropout rates; the strongest predictor of L2 student achievement is the amount of formal L1 schooling with the more L1 schooling, the higher the L2 achievement; the highest quality ESL content programs reduce about half of the total achievement gap between those in enrichment or dual language programs and those without any bilingual support.

However, the reasons why research finds bilingual education linked with higher achievement are neither simple nor straightforward (August and Hakuta, 1997). There is likely to be a complex equation between such academic success and factors such as the support of the home (e.g., in encouraging literacy development), the devotion and dedication of teachers in school, children feeling their minority language is accepted and their self-esteem thus supported, and the positive relationship between bilingual education and cognitive development. Laosa (2000) reveals that school characteristics such as the quality and ratio of teachers per student, the teacher's credentials, and fragmentation of instruction are potentially influential in student achievement. That is, particular models of bilingual education interact with a host of student, teacher, curriculum, and environmental variables in complex ways to influence student outcomes. It cannot be assumed that bilingual education, *per se*, results in higher attainment across the curriculum. There are many interacting variables that will underlie such success with no simple recipes for guaranteed success.

The English Language and Bilingual Education

The paradox of English in bilingual education is illustrated by the research of Valdés (2001). English language learning policies enacted in schools can deny access to the language and knowledge that would empower U.S. immigrant children. Valdés (2001) shows that, separately and cumulatively, there are complex interacting classroom factors that frequently work against a student's second language development, achievement, employment, citizen rights and opportunities, and self-esteem. Such factors include a lack of regular, purposeful, and developing interactions with native speakers, impoverished second language interactions with teachers on a staff-student ratio of over 1:30, passive learning and 'tight discipline' strategies, mixed language competence classes working to a low common denominator, subject matter kept simplistic as the second language

is insufficiently developed, and teachers' concerns with 'flawed language' forms rather than communication: "Placing blame is not simple. Structures of dominance in society interact with educational structures and educational ideologies as well as with teachers' expectations and with students' perspectives about options and opportunities" (Valdés, 2001: 4).

The 'English language dominance' dangers for bilingual education also are found in access to Information Communications Technology (ICT) for language minority students. ICT is often dominated by the English language. This relates to current debates about the place of the English language in bilingual education in the context of the internationalization of English and its growing worldwide prominence as a second language rather than a mother tongue (Graddol and Meinhof, 1999). In contrast, there are potential opportunities to support the future of minority languages in education through ICT such as e-books, machine translation, voice recognition, WebTV, international e-mailing, and text messaging (Skourtou, 2002).

The Limitations of Bilingual Education

Although bilingual education has an increasing number of international supporters, it is not without some political critics, especially in the United States – see Cummins (2000) for a review. This has been considered earlier. There also are limitations to the pedagogical view of bilingual education. Bilingual education is no absolute guarantee of effective schooling. It is ingenuous to imagine that employing two or more languages in the school curriculum automatically leads to a raising of achievement, more effective schooling, or a more child-centered education. In reality, the languages of the school are but part of an extensive matrix of variables that interact in complex ways to make schooling more or less effective. Among bilingual schools in every country, there is often a mixture of the outstanding and the ordinary, those in an upward spiral of enhancing their quality, and those that depend on past glories rather than current successes. The school effectiveness research movement has located many of the important factors that make such schools more or less effective (August and Hakuta, 1997). Bilingual education is only one ingredient among many.

Another limitation of the pedagogical perspective on bilingual education is the nature and use of language learned at school. Canadian research suggests that the language register of formal (e.g., immersion) education does not necessarily prepare children for language use outside the school (Cummins, 2000). The language of the curriculum is increasingly complex and specialized. The vernacular of the peer group and the lingo of the street is different. Canadian children from English-speaking homes who have been to immersion schools and learnt through the medium of French and English sometimes report difficulty in communicating appropriately with French speakers in local communities. Local French speakers can find such students' French too formal, awkward, or even inappropriate.

A further concern about bilingual education is that language learning may stop at the school gates. The minority language may be effectively transmitted and competently learned in the classroom. Once outside the school gates, children may switch into the majority language for reasons of status, acceptance by peers, and inclusiveness in peer relations (that is, the majority language is often the 'common denominator' language). Thus, the danger of bilingual education in a minority language is that the language becomes a language of school but not of play; a language of the content delivery of the curriculum but not of peer culture. Extending a minority language learnt at school to use in the community over the teenage and adulthood years is something that is difficult to engineer, difficult to plan, but nevertheless vital if that language is to live outside the school gates.

See also: Language Policy in Multinational Educational Contexts.

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Bilingualism

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What Is Bilingualism?

Bilingualism is a product of extensive language contact (i.e., contacts between people who speak different languages). There are many reasons for speakers of different languages to get into contact with one another. Some do so out of their own choosing, whereas others are forced by circumstances. Among the frequently cited factors that contribute to language contact are education, modern technology, economy, religion and culture, political or military acts, and natural disasters. One does not have to move to a different place to be in contact with people speaking a different language. There are plenty of opportunities for language contact in the same country, the same community, the same neighborhood, or even the same family.

However, although language contact is a necessary condition for bilingualism at the societal level, it does not automatically lead to bilingualism at the individual level. For example, Belgium, Canada, Finland, India, Luxembourg, Paraguay, and Singapore, to name but a few countries, are bi- or multilingual, but the degree or extent of bilingualism among the residents of these countries varies significantly. There are large numbers of bilingual or multilingual individuals in Luxembourg, Paraguay, and Singapore, but considerably fewer in the other officially bi- or multilingual countries. Mackey (1962) claims that there are actually fewer bilingual people in bilingual countries than there are in the so-called 'unilingual' ones, because the main concerns of bi- or multilingual states are often the maintenance and use of two or more languages in the same nation, rather than the promotion of bilingualism among their citizens. It is therefore important to distinguish bilingualism as a social or societal phenomenon from bilingualism as an individual phenomenon.

Who Is Bilingual?

People who are brought up in a society in which monolingualism and uniculturalism are promoted as the normal way of life often think that bilingualism is only for a few, 'special' people. In fact, one in three of the world's population routinely uses two or more languages for work, family life, and leisure. There are even more people who make irregular use of languages other than their native one; for example, many people have learned foreign languages at school and only occasionally use them for specific purposes. If we count these people as bilinguals, then monolingual speakers would be a tiny minority in the world today.

Yet the question of who is and who is not a bilingual is more difficult to answer than it first appears. Baker and Prys Jones (1998: 2) suggest that in defining a bilingual person, we may wish to consider the following questions:

- Should bilingualism be measured by how fluent people are in two languages?
- Should bilinguals be only those people who have equal competence in both languages?
- Is language proficiency the only criterion for assessing bilingualism, or should the use of two languages also be considered?
- Most people would define a bilingual as a person who can speak two languages. What about a person who can understand a second language perfectly but cannot speak it? What about a person who can speak a language but is not literate in it? What about an individual who cannot speak or understand speech in a second language but can read and write it? Should these categories of people be considered bilingual?
- Should self-perception and self-categorization be considered in defining who is bilingual?
- Are there different degrees of bilingualism that can vary over time and with circumstances? For instance, a person may learn a minority language as a child at home and then later acquire another, majority language in the community or at school. Over time, the second language may become the stronger or dominant language. If that person moves away from the neighborhood or area in which the minority language is spoken or loses contact with those who speak it, he or she may lose fluency in the minority language. Should bilingualism therefore be a relative term?

The word 'bilingual' primarily describes someone with the possession of two languages. It can, however, also be taken to include the many people in the world who have varying degrees of proficiency in and interchangeably use three, four or even more languages. In many countries of Africa and Asia, several languages coexist and large sections of the population speak three or more languages. Individual multilingualism in these countries is a fact of life. Many people speak one or more local or ethnic languages, as well as another indigenous language which has become the medium of communication between different ethnic

groups or speech communities. Such individuals may also speak a foreign language – such as English, French or Spanish – which has been introduced into the community during the process of colonization. This latter language is often the language of education, bureaucracy and privilege.

Multilingualism can also be the possession of individuals who do not live within a multilingual country or speech community. Families can be trilingual when the husband and wife each speak a different language as well as the common language of the place of residence. People with sufficient social and educational advantages can learn a second, third, or fourth language at school or university; at work; or in their leisure time. In many continental European countries, children learn two languages at school – such as English, German, or French – as well as being fluent in their home language – such as Danish, Dutch, or Luxembourgish.

It is important to recognize that a multilingual speaker uses different languages for different purposes and does not typically possess the same level or type of proficiency in each language. In Morocco, for instance, a native speaker of Berber may also be fluent in colloquial Moroccan Arabic but not literate in either of these languages. This Berber speaker will be educated in Modern Standard Arabic and use that language for writing and formal purposes. Classical Arabic is the language of the mosque, used for prayers and reading the Qur'an. Many Moroccans also have some knowledge of French, the former colonial language.

Theoretical Issues in Bilingualism Research

Chomsky (1986) defined three basic questions for modern linguistics:

i. What constitutes knowledge of language?
ii. How is knowledge of language acquired?
iii. How is knowledge of language put to use?

For bilingualism research, these questions can be rephrased to take in knowledge of more than one language (see also Cook, 1993):

i. What is the nature of language, or grammar, in the bilingual person's mind, and how do two systems of language knowledge coexist and interact?
ii. How is more than one grammatical system acquired, either simultaneously or sequentially? In what aspects does bilingual language acquisition differ from unilingual language acquisition?

iii. How is the knowledge of two or more languages used by the same speaker in bilingual speech production?

Taking the acquisition question first, earlier observers of bilingual children concentrated on documenting the stages of their language development. Volterra and Taeschner (1978), for example, proposed a three-stage model of early bilingual development. According to this model, the child initially possesses one lexical system composed of lexical items from both languages. In stage two, the child distinguishes two separate lexical codes but has one syntactic system at his or her disposal. Only when stage three is reached do the two linguistic codes become entirely separate. Volterra and Taeschner's model gave rise to what is now known as the 'unitary language system hypothesis.' In its strongest version, the hypothesis supposes that the bilingual child has one single language system that they use for processing both of their languages in the repertoire.

In the 1980s, the unitary language system hypothesis came under intense scrutiny; for instance, by Meisel (1989) and Genesee (1989). They argue that there is no conclusive evidence to support the existence of an initial undifferentiated language system, and they also point out certain methodological inconsistencies in the three-stage model. The phenomenon of language mixing, for instance, can be interpreted as a sign of two developing systems existing side by side, rather than as evidence of one fused system. Meisel's and Genesee's studies led to an alternative hypothesis, known as the 'separate development hypothesis' or 'independent development hypothesis.' More recently, researchers have investigated the possibility that different aspects of language (e.g., phonology, vocabulary, syntax, pragmatics) of the bilingual child's language systems may develop at different rates (e.g., Li and Zhu, 2001). Care needs to be taken in interpreting research evidence using children at different developmental stages.

Although the 'one-versus-two-systems' debate (i.e., whether bilingual children have an initially differentiated or undifferentiated linguistic system) continues to attract new empirical studies, a more interesting question has emerged regarding the nature of bilingual development. More specifically, is bilingual acquisition the same as monolingual acquisition? Theoretically, separate development is possible without there being any similarity with monolingual acquisition. Most researchers argue that bilingual children's language development is, by and large, the same as that of monolingual children. In very general terms, both bilingual and monolingual children go through an initial babbling stage, followed by the

one-word stage, the two-word stage, the multiword stage, and the multiclause stage. At the morphosyntactic level, a number of studies have reported similarities rather than differences between bilingual and monolingual acquisition. Garcia (1983), for example, compared the use of English morpheme categories by English monolingual children and bilingual children acquiring English and Spanish simultaneously and found no systematic difference at all. Pfaff and Savas (1988) found that their 4-year-old Turkish/German subject made the same errors in Turkish case marking as reported in the literature on monolingual Turkish children. Muller's (1990) study of two French/German children indicates that their use of subject–verb agreement and finite verb placement in both languages is virtually identical to that of comparable monolingual children. De Houwer (1990) found that her Dutch/English bilingual subject, Kate, used exactly the same word orders in Dutch as monolingual Dutch-speaking children, both in terms of types and in proportional use. Furthermore, De Houwer found in Kate parallels to monolingual children for both Dutch and English in a range of structures, such as nonfinite verb placement, preposed elements in affirmative sentences, clause types, sentence types, conjunctions, and question inversion.

Nevertheless, one needs to be careful in the kinds of conclusions one draws from such evidence. Similarities between bilingual and monolingual acquisition do not mean that the two languages a bilingual child is acquiring develop in the same way or at the same speed, or that the two languages a bilingual child is acquiring do not influence and interact with each other. Paradis and Genesee (1996), for example, found that although the 2–3-year-old French–English bilingual children they studied displayed patterns that characterize the performance of monolingual children acquiring these languages separately, and they acquired these patterns within the same age range as monolingual children, they used finite verb forms earlier in French than in English; used subject pronouns in French exclusively with finite verbs, but subject pronouns in English with both finite and nonfinite verbs, in accordance with the status of subject pronouns in French as clitics (or agreement markers) but full NPs in English; and placed verbal negatives after lexical verbs in French (e.g., 'n'aime pas') but before lexical verbs in English ('do not like'). Further evidence of cross-linguistic influence has been reported by Dopke (1992), for example, in her study of German–English bilingual children in Australia. These children tended to overgeneralize the VO word order of English to German, which instantiates both VO and OV word orders, depending on the clausal structure of the utterance. Dopke suggests

that children learning English and German simultaneously are prone to overgeneralize SVO word order in their German because the VO order is reinforced on the surface of both the German and the English input they hear.

Most of the studies that have examined cross-linguistic influences in bilingual acquisition focus on morphosyntactic features. One area that has hitherto been underexplored is the interface between phonetics and phonology in bilingual acquisition. Although most people seem to believe that the onset of speech in the case of bilingual children is more or less the same as for monolingual children, there are indications that bilingual children seem to develop differently from monolingual children in the following three aspects: the overall rate of occurrence of developmental speech errors, the types of speech errors and the quality of sounds (Zhu and Dodd, 2005). For example, studies on Cantonese/English (Holm and Dodd), Putonghua/Cantonese (So and Leung), Welsh/English (Ball *et al.*), Spanish/English (Yavas and Goldstein), and Punjabi/English (Stow and Pert) (also in Zhu and Dodd, 2006) bilingual children seem to indicate that bilingual children tend to make not only more speech errors but also different types of speech errors compared with monolingual children of the same age. These speech errors would be considered atypical if they had occurred in the speech of monolingual children. Moreover, although bilingual children seem to be able to acquire monolingual-like competence at the phonemic level, there are qualitative differences at the phonetic level in terms of production. For example, using instrumental analysis, Khattab (also in Zhu and Dodd, 2006) finds that although Arabic–English bilingual children have similar patterns of production and use of VOT, /l/, and /r/ in some respects to those of monolinguals from each language, they also show differences that are intricately related to age, input, and language context. These studies and others are reported in Zhu and Dodd (2005).

There is one area in which bilingual children clearly differ from monolingual children; namely, code-mixing. Studies show that bilingual children mix elements from both languages in the same utterance as soon as they can produce two-word utterances. Researchers generally agree that bilingual children's mixing is highly structured and grammatically constrained, although there is no consensus on the nature of the specific constraints that organize their mixing. Vihman (1985), who studied her own son Raivo, who acquired English and Estonian simultaneously, argued, for example, that the language mixing by bilingual children is qualitatively different from that of more mature bilinguals. She invoked as evidence for this claim the fact that young bilingual children

indicate a propensity to mix function words over contentives (e.g., nouns, verbs, adjectives) – a type of mixing that is rare in older bilingual mixing. However, Lanza's (1997) study, although finding similar patterns in the mixing produced by her two Norwegian–English bilingual subjects, argued that children's mixing is qualitatively the same as that of adults; their relatively greater degree of mixing of function words is evidence of what Lanza called 'dominance' of one language over another rather than of a substantial difference from bilingual adults' mixing. Both Vihman's and Lanza's, as well as other studies of children's mixing, show that bilingual children mix their languages in accordance with constraints that operate on adult mixing. The operation of constraints based on surface features of grammar, such as word order, is evident from the two-word/two-morpheme stage onward, and the operation of constraints based on abstract notions of grammatical knowledge is most evident in bilingual children once they demonstrate such knowledge overtly (e.g., verb tense and agreement markings), usually around two years and 6 months of age and older. As Genesee (2002) points out, these findings indicate that in addition to the linguistic competence needed to formulate correct monolingual strings, bilingual children have the added capacity to coordinate their two languages in accordance with the grammatical constraints of both languages during mixing. Although these studies provide further evidence for the separate development, or two-systems, argument, they also indicate that there are both quantitative and qualitative differences between bilingual acquisition and monolingual acquisition.

Another area of interest in acquisitional studies of bilingual children is the role of input and social context in the rate and order of language acquisition. Earlier assumptions were that the bilingual child would have half, or less, of the normal input in each of their two languages, compared with the monolingual child. More careful examinations of bilingual children show considerable variations in the quantity and quality of input, interactional styles of the parents, and environmental policies and attitudes toward bilingualism. On the basis of Harding and Riley's work (1986), Romaine (1995) distinguished six types of early-childhood bilingualism according to the native language of the parents, the language of the community at large, and the parents' strategy in speaking to the child.

Type 1: One person, one language.

- Parents: The parents have different native languages, with each having some degree of competence in the other's language.

- Community: The language of one of the parents is the dominant language of the community.
- Strategy: The parents each speak their own language to the child from birth.

Type 2: Nondominant Home Language/One Language, One Environment

- Parents: The parents have different native languages.
- Community: The language of one of the parents is the dominant language of the community.
- Strategy: Both parents speak the nondominant language to the child, who is fully exposed to the dominant language only when outside the home, and in particular in nursery school.

Type 3: Nondominant Home Language without Community Support

- Parents: The parents share the same native languages.
- Community: The dominant language is not that of the parents.
- Strategy: The parents speak their own language to the child.

Type 4: Double Nondominant Home Language without Community Support

- Parents: The parents have different native languages.
- Community: The dominant language is different from either of the parents.
- Strategy: The parents each speak their own language to the child from birth.

Type 5: Nonnative Parents

- Parents: The parents share the same native language.
- Community: The dominant language is the same as that of the parents.
- Strategy: One of the parents always addresses the child in a language that is not his or her native language.

Type 6: Mixed Languages

- Parents: The parents are bilingual.
- Community: Sectors of community may also be bilingual.
- Strategy: Parents code-switch and mix languages.

The three headings Romaine used to classify the six types of childhood bilingualism – the languages of the parents, the sociolinguistic situation of the community, and the discourse strategies of the parents and other immediate carers – are critical factors not only in the process of bilingual acquisition but also in

the final product of that process (i.e., the type of bilingual speaker it produces). Arguably, the six types of bilingual children would grow up as different types of bilinguals with different mental representations of the languages and different patterns of language behavior.

Research on the cognitive organization and representation of bilingual knowledge is inspired and influenced by the work of Weinreich. Focussing on the relationship between the linguistic sign (or signifier) and the semantic content (signified), Weinreich (1953) distinguished three types of bilinguals. In type A, the individual combines a signifier from each language with a separate unit of the signified. Weinreich called them 'coordinative' (later often called 'coordinate') bilinguals. In type B, the individual identifies two signifiers but regards them as a single compound, or composite, unit of signified; hence 'compound' bilinguals. Type C refers to people who learn a new language with the help of a previously acquired one. They are called 'subordinative' (or 'subordinate') bilinguals. Weinreich's examples were from English and Russian:

(A) 'book'   'kniga'
     | |
   /buk/   /kn'iga/

(B)   'book' = 'kn'iga'

        /\

   /buk/   /kn'iga/

(C) 'book'
      |
   /buk/
      |
   /kn'iga/

Weinreich's distinctions are often misinterpreted in the literature as referring to differences in the degree of proficiency in the languages, but in fact the relationship between language proficiency and cognitive organization of the bilingual individual, as conceptualized in Weinreich's model, is far from clear. Some 'subordinate' bilinguals demonstrate a very high level of proficiency in processing both languages, as evidenced in grammaticality and fluency of speech, and some 'coordinative' bilinguals show difficulties in processing two languages simultaneously (i.e., in code-switching or in 'foreign' word identification tasks). It must also be stressed that Weinreich's distinctions among bilingual individuals are distributed along a continuum from a subordinate or compound end to a coordinate end and can at the same time be more subordinate or compound for certain concepts

and more coordinate for others, depending on, among other things, the age and context of acquisition.

Weinreich's work influenced much of the psycholinguistic modelling of the bilingual lexicon. Potter *et al.* (1984) presented a reformulation of the manner in which bilingual lexical knowledge could be represented in the mind in terms of two competing models: the Concept Mediation Model and the Word Association model. In the Concept Mediation Model, words of both L1 and L2 are linked to amodal conceptual representations. In the Lexical Association Model, in contrast, words in a second language are understood through L1 lexical representations. As can be seen in **Figure 1**, the models are structurally equivalent to Weinreich's distinction between coordinative and subordinative bilingualism. At the same time, several researchers (e.g., Kolers and Gonzalez [1980] and Hummel [1986]) presented evidence for the so-called dual-store model, as represented in **Figure 2**. This latter model has also generated considerable research on the existence of the putative 'bilingual language switch' postulated to account for the bilingual's ability to switch between languages on the basis of environmental demands (e.g., MacNamara, 1967; MacNamara and Kushnir, 1971).

Subsequent studies found conflicting evidence in favor of different models. Some of the conflicting evidence could be explained by the fact that different types of bilingual speakers were used in the experiments in terms of proficiency level, age, and context of acquisition. It is possible that lexical mediation is associated with low levels of proficiency, and concept mediation with higher levels, especially for those who have become bilingual in later childhood or adulthood. Some researchers called for a developmental dimension in the modelling of bilingual knowledge. Kroll and Stewart (1994), for example, proposed the Revised Hierarchical Model, which represents concept mediation and word association not as different models but as alternative routes within the same model (see **Figure 3**).

An important distinctive feature of being bilingual is being able to make appropriate language choices. Bilingual speakers choose to use their different

Figure 1 Lexical association model.

Figure 2 Dual-store model.

Figure 3 Revised hierarchical model.

Figure 4 Adapted from Grosjean, 1982: 129.

languages depending on a variety of factors, including the type of person addressed (e.g., members of the family, schoolmates, colleagues, superiors, friends, shopkeepers, officials, transport personnel, neighbors), the subject matter of the conversation (e.g., family concerns, schoolwork, politics, entertainment), location or social setting (e.g., at home, in the street, in church, in the office, having lunch, attending a lecture, negotiating business deals), and relationship with the addressee (e.g., kin, neighbors, colleagues, superior/inferior, strangers). However, even more complex are the many cases in which a bilingual talks to another bilingual with the same linguistic background and changes from one language to another in the course of conversation. This is what is known as code-switching. **Figure 4** illustrates a decision-making process of the bilingual speaker in language choice and code-switching.

There is a widespread impression that bilingual speakers code-switch because they cannot express themselves adequately in one language. This may be true to some extent when a bilingual is momentarily lost for words in one of his or her languages. However, code-switching is an extremely common practice among bilinguals and takes many forms. A long narrative may be divided into different parts expressed in different languages, sentences may begin in one language and finish in another, and words and phrases from different languages may succeed each other. Linguists have devoted much attention to the study of code-switching. It has been demonstrated that code-switching involves skilled manipulation of overlapping sections of two or more grammars and

that there is virtually no instance of ungrammatical combination of two languages in code-switching, regardless of the bilingual ability of the speaker. Some suggest that code-switching is itself a discrete mode of speaking, emanating from a single code-switching grammar.

One important aspect of the code-switching grammar is that the two languages involved do not play the same role in sentence making. Typically, one language sets the grammatical framework, with the other providing certain items to fit into the framework. Code-switching therefore is not a simple combination of two sets of grammatical rules but grammatical integration of one language in another. Bilingual speakers of different proficiency levels in their two languages or speaking two typologically different languages can engage in code-switching and, indeed, vary it according to their needs. The possible existence of a code-switching grammar calls into question the traditional view of the bilingual as two monolinguals in one person (for further discussions, see Grosjean, 1985). One consequence of the 'two-in-one' perspective is that bilingual speakers are often compared to monolinguals in terms of their language proficiency.

For example, some researchers have suggested that bilingual children have smaller vocabularies and less-developed grammars than their monolingual peers, while their ability to exploit the similarities and differences in two sets of grammatical rules to accomplish rule-governed code-switching was not considered relevant. In some experimental psycholinguistic studies, tests are given without taking into account that bilingual speakers may have learned their two languages under different conditions for different purposes and that they only use them in different situations with different people. It is important to emphasize that bilingual speakers have a unique

linguistic and psychological profile; their two languages are constantly in different states of activation, and they are able to call on their linguistic knowledge and resources according to the context and adapt their behavior to the task at hand.

Bilingualism as a Sociopolitical Issue

Language choice is not a purely linguistic issue. In many countries of the world, much of the social identification of individuals, as well as of groups, is accomplished through language choice. By choosing one or another of the two or more languages in one's linguistic repertoire, a speaker reveals and defines his or her social relationships with other people. At a societal level, whole groups of people, and in fact, entire nations, can be identified by the language or languages they use. Language, together with culture, religion, and history, is a major component of national identity.

Multilingual countries are often thought to have certain problems that monolingual states do not. On the practical level, difficulties in communication within a country can act as an impediment to commerce and industry. More seriously, however, multilingualism is a problem for government. The process of governing requires communication both within the governing institutions and between the government and the people. This means that a language, or languages, must be selected as the language for use in governing. However, the selection of the 'official language' is not always easy, as it is not simply a pragmatic issue. For example, on pragmatic grounds, the best immediate choice for the language of government in a newly independent colony might be the old colonial language, as the colonial governing institutions and records are already in place in that language, and those nationals with the most government experience already know it. The old colonial language will not, however, be a good choice on nationalist grounds. For a people that has just acquired its own geographical territory, the language of the state that had denied it territorial control would not be a desirable candidate for a national symbol. Ireland has adopted a strategy in which both the national language, Irish, and the language of the deposed power, English, are declared as official; the colonial language is used for immediate, practical purposes, and the national language is promoted and developed. However, in many other multilingual countries that do not have a colonial past, such as China, deciding which language should be selected as the national language can sometimes lead to internal, ethnic conflicts.

Similarly, selecting a language for education in a multilingual country is often problematic. In some respects, the best strategy for language in education is to use the various ethnic languages. After all, these are the languages the children already speak, and school instruction can begin immediately without waiting until the children learn the official language. Some would argue, however, that this strategy could be damaging for nation-building efforts and disadvantage children by limiting their access to the wider world. It should be pointed out that there is no scientific evidence to show that multilingual countries are particularly disadvantaged, in socioeconomic terms, compared to monolingual ones. In fact, all the research that was carried out in the 1960s and 1970s on the relationship between the linguistic diversity and economic well-being of a nation came to the conclusion that a country can have any degree of language uniformity or fragmentation and still be underdeveloped, and a country whose entire population speaks the same language can be anywhere from very rich to very poor. It might be true, however, that linguistic uniformity and economic development reinforce each other; in other words, economic well-being promotes the reduction of linguistic diversity. It would be lopsided logic, though, to view multilingualism as the cause of the socioeconomic problems of a nation.

Multilingualism is an important resource at both the societal and personal levels. For a linguistically diverse country to maintain ethnic group languages alongside the national or official languages can prove an effective way to motivate individuals while unifying the nation. In addition, a multiethnic society is arguably a richer, more exciting, and more stimulating place to live in than a community with only one dominant ethnic group. For the multilingual speaker, the availability of various languages in the community repertoire serves as a useful interactional resource. Typically, multilingual societies tend to assign different roles to different languages; one language may be used in informal contexts with family and friends, while another for the more formal situations of work, education, and government. Imagine two friends who are both bilingual in the same 'home' and 'official' languages. Suppose that one of them also works for the local government and that her friend has some official business with her. Suppose further that the government employee has two pieces of advice to give to her friend: one based on her official status as a government representative, and one based on their mutual friendship. If the official advice is given in the 'government' language and the friendly advice in the 'home' language, there is little chance that there would be any misunderstanding about which advice was which. The friend would not take the advice given in the 'home' language as official.

There is a frequent debate in countries in which various languages coexist concerning which languages are a resource. The favored languages tend to be those that are both international and particularly valuable in international trade. A lower place is given in the status ranking to minority languages, which are small, regional, and of less perceived value in the international marketplace. For example, French has traditionally been the number one modern language in the British school curriculum, followed by German and Spanish, and then a choice between Italian, Modern Greek, and Portuguese. One may notice that all of these are European languages. Despite large numbers of mother-tongue Bengali, Cantonese, Gujarati, Hakka, Hindi, Punjabi, Turkish, and Urdu speakers in England, these languages occupy a very low position in the school curriculum. In the British National Curriculum, the languages Arabic, Bengali, Chinese (Cantonese or Mandarin), Gujarati, Modern Hebrew, Hindi, Japanese, Punjabi, Russian, Turkish, and Urdu are initially only allowed in secondary schools (for 11–18 year olds) if a major European language such as French is taught first (Milroy and Milroy, 1985).

Clearly, multilingualism as a national and personal resource requires careful planning, as would any other kind of resource. However, language planning has something that other kinds of economic planning do not usually have: language as its own unique cultural symbolic value. As has been discussed earlier, language is a major component of the identity of a nation and an individual. Often, strong emotions are evoked when talking about a certain language. Language planning is not simply a matter of standardizing or modernizing a corpus of linguistic materials, nor is it a reassignment of functions and status. It is also about power and influence. The dominance of some languages and the dominated status of other languages are partly understandable if we examine who hold positions of power and influence, who belong to elite groups that are in control of decision-making, and who are in subordinate groups, on whom decisions are implemented. It is more often than not the case that a given arrangement of languages benefits only those who have influence and privileges.

For the multilingual speaker, language choice is not only an effective means of communication but also an act of identity (Le Page and Tabouret-Keller, 1985). Every time we say something in one language when we might just as easily have said it in another, we are reconnecting with people, situations, and power configurations from our history of past interactions and imprinting on that history our attitudes toward the people and languages concerned. Through language choice, we maintain and change ethnic group boundaries and personal relationships and construct and define 'self' and 'other' within a broader political economy and historical context.

Changes in Attitudes Toward Bilingualism

From the early nineteenth century to about the 1960s, there was a widespread belief that bilingualism has a detrimental effect on a human beings' intellectual and spiritual growth. Stories of children who persisted in speaking two languages in school having had their mouths washed with soap and water or being beaten with a cane were not uncommon. The following is a quote from a professor at Cambridge University that illustrates the dominant belief of the time, even among academics and intellectuals:

> If it were possible for a child to live in two languages at once equally well, so much the worse. His intellectual and spiritual growth would not thereby be doubled, but halved. Unity of mind and character would have great difficulty in asserting itself in such circumstances. (Laurie, 1890: 15)

Professor Laurie's view represented a commonly held belief throughout the twentieth century that bilingualism disadvantages rather than advantages one's intellectual development. Early research on bilingualism and cognition tended to confirm this negative viewpoint, finding that monolinguals were superior to bilinguals on intelligence tests. One of the most widely cited studies was done by Saer (1923) who studied 1400 Welsh–English bilingual children between the ages of 7 and 14 years in five rural and two urban areas of Wales. A 10-point difference in IQ was found between the bilinguals and the monolingual English speakers from rural backgrounds. From this, Saer concluded that bilinguals were mentally confused and at a disadvantage in intelligence compared with monolinguals. It was further suggested, with a follow-up study of university students, that "the difference in mental ability as revealed by intelligence tests is of a permanent nature since it persists in students throughout their university career" (Saer, 1923: 53).

Controversies regarding the early versions of IQ tests and the definition and measurement of intelligence aside, there were a number of problems with Saer's study and its conclusions. First, it appeared to be only in the rural areas that the correlation between bilingualism and lower IQ held. In urban areas, monolinguals and bilinguals were

virtually the same; in fact, the average IQ for urban Welsh–English bilingual children in Saer's study was 100, whereas for monolingual, English-speaking children it was 99. The urban bilingual children had more contact with English both before beginning school and outside school hours than did the rural bilinguals. Thus, the depressed scores of the rural population were probably more a reflection of lack of opportunity and contexts to use English and were not necessarily indicative of any sociopsychological problems.

More important, however, is the issue of statistical inference in this and other studies of a similar type. Correlations do not allow us to infer cause-and-effect relationships, particularly when other variables – such as rural versus urban differences – may be mediating factors. Another major factor is the language in which such tests were administered, particularly tests of verbal intelligence. Many such studies measured bilinguals only in the second or nondominant language.

At around the same time that Saer conducted studies on bilinguals' intelligence, some well-known linguists expressed their doubts about bilingual speakers' linguistic competence. The following is Bloomfield's characterization of a Menomini Indian man in the United States, whom he believed to have 'deficient' knowledge of Menomini and English:

> White Thunder, a man around 40, speaks less English than Menomini, and that is a strong indictment, for his Menomini is atrocious. His vocabulary is small, his inflections are often barbarous, he constructs sentences of a few threadbare models. He may be said to speak no language tolerably. (Bloomfield, 1927: 395)

This is one of the early statements of a view that became fashionable in educational circles; namely, that it was possible for bilinguals not to acquire full competence in any of the languages they spoke. Such an individual was said to be 'semilingual.' These people were believed to have linguistic deficits in six areas of language (see Hansegard, 1975; Skutnabb-Kangas, 1981):

1. Size of vocabulary
2. Correctness of language
3. Unconscious processing of language
4. Language creation
5. Mastery of the functions of language
6. Meanings and imagery.

It is significant that the term 'semilingualism' emerged in connection with the study of language skills of people belonging to ethnic minority groups. Research that provided evidence in support of the notion of 'semilingualism' was conducted in Scandinavia and North America and was concerned with accounting for the educational outcomes of submersion programs in which minority children were taught through the medium of the majority language. However, these studies, similar to the ones conducted by Saer, had serious methodological flaws, and the conclusions reached by the researchers were misguided.

First, the educational tests used to measure language proficiencies and to differentiate between people were insensitive to the qualitative aspects of languages and to the great range of language competences. Language may be specific to a context; a person may be competent in some contexts but not in others. Second, bilingual children are still in the process of developing their languages. It is unfair to compare them to some idealized adults. Their language skills change over time. Third, the comparison with monolinguals is also unfair. It is important to distinguish whether bilinguals are 'naturally' qualitatively and quantitatively different from monolinguals in their use of the two languages (i.e., as a function of being bilingual). Fourth, if languages are relatively underdeveloped, the origins may not be in bilingualism per se but in the economic, political, and social conditions that evoke underdevelopment.

The disparaging and belittling overtone of the term 'semilingualism' itself invokes expectations of underachievement in the bilingual speaker. Thus, rather than highlighting the apparent 'deficits' of bilingual speakers, the more positive approach is to emphasize that when suitable conditions are provided, languages are easily capable of development beyond the 'semi' state.

One of the specific issues Bloomfield raised in his comments on the language behavior of members of the Menomini Indians in North America was the frequent mixing of their own language and English. It has been described as 'verbal salad,' not particularly appealing but nevertheless harmless, or 'garbage' that is definitively worthless and vulgar. Unfortunately, although switching and mixing of languages occurs in practically all bilingual communities and all bilingual speakers' speech, it is stigmatized as an illegitimate mode of communication, even sometimes by the bilingual speakers themselves. Haugen (1977: 97), for example, reports that a visitor from Norway made the following comment on the speech of the Norwegians in the United States: "Strictly speaking, it is no language whatever, but a gruesome mixture of Norwegian and English, and often one does not know whether to take it humorously or seriously." Gumperz (1982: 62–63) reports that some bilingual speakers who mixed languages regularly still believe such behavior was "bad manners" or a sign of "lack

of education or improper control of language." One of the Punjabi–English bilinguals Romaine interviewed said: "I'm guilty as well in the sense that we speak English more and more and then what happens is that when you speak your own language you get two or three English words in each sentence ... but I think that's 'wrong'" (Romaine, 1995: 294).

Attitudes do not, of course, remain constant over time. At a personal level, changes in attitudes may occur when there is some personal reward involved. Speakers of minority languages will be more motivated to maintain and use their languages if they prove to be useful in increasing their employability or social mobility. In some cases, certain jobs are reserved for bilingual speakers only. At the societal level, attitudes toward bilingualism change when the political ideology changes. In California and elsewhere in the southwestern United States, for instance, *pocho* and *calo* used to serve as pejorative terms for the Spanish of local Chicanos. With a rise in ethnic consciousness, however, these speech styles have become symbolic of Chicano ethnicity and are now increasingly used in contemporary Chicano literature. Since the 1960s, there has been a political movement, particularly in the United States, advocating language rights. In the United States, questions about language rights are widely discussed not only in college classrooms and language communities but also in government and federal legislatures.

Language rights have a history of being tested in U.S. courtrooms. From the early 1920s to the present, there has been a continuous debate in U.S. courts of law regarding the legal status of language minority rights. To gain short-term protection and a medium-term guarantee for minority languages, legal challenges have become an important part of the language rights movement. The legal battles concerned not just minority language vs. majority language contests, but also children vs. schools, parents vs. school boards, state vs. the federal authorities, and so on. Whereas minority language activists among the Basques in Spain and the Welsh in Britain have been taken to court by the central government for their actions, U.S. minority language activists have taken the central and regional government to court.

The language rights movement has received some support from organizations such as the United Nations, Unesco, the Council of Europe, and the European Union. Each of these four organizations has declared that minority language groups have the right to maintain their languages. In the European Union, a directive (77/486/E EC) stated that member states should promote the teaching of the mother tongue and the culture of the country of origin in the education of migrant workers' children. The kind of

rights, apart from language rights, that minority groups may claim include protection, membership of their ethnic group and separate existence, non-discrimination and equal treatment, education and information in their ethnic language, freedom to worship, freedom of belief freedom of movement, employment, peaceful assembly and association, political representation and involvement, and administrative autonomy.

However, real changes in attitudes toward bilingualism will not happen until people recognize or, better still, experience the advantages of being bilingual. Current research indicates that there are at least eight overlapping and interacting benefits for a bilingual person, encompassing communicative, cognitive and cultural advantages (adapted from Baker and Prys Jones, 1998: 6–8):

Communicative advantages
Relationships with parents: Where parents have differing first languages, the advantage of children becoming bilingual is that they will be able to communicate in each parent's preferred language. This may enable a subtler, finer texture of relationship with the parent. Alternatively they will be able to communicate with parents in one language and with their friends and within the community in a different language.
Extended family relationships: Being a bilingual allows someone to bridge the generations. When grandparents, uncles, aunts and other relatives in another region speak a language that is different from the local language, the monolingual may be unable to communicate with them. The bilingual has the chance to bridge that generation gap, build closer relationships with relatives extended family.
Community relationships: A bilingual has the chance to communicate with a wider variety of people than a monolingual. Bilingual children will be able to communicate in the wider community and with school and neighbourhood friends in different languages when necessary.
Transnational communication: One barrier between nations and ethnic groups tends to be language. Language is sometimes a barrier to communication and to creating friendly relationships of mutual respect. Bilinguals in the home, in the community and in society have the potential for lowering such barriers. Bilinguals can act as bridges within the nuclear and extended family, within the community and across societies.
Language sensitivity: Being able to move between two languages may lead to more sensitivity in Communication. Because bilinguals are constantly monitoring which language to use in different situations, they may be more attuned to the communicative needs of those with whom they talk. Research suggests that bilinguals may be more empathic towards listeners' needs in communication. When meeting those who do not speak their language particularly well, bilinguals may be more patient listeners than monolinguals.

Cultural advantages

Another advantage of being a bilingual is having two or more worlds of experience. Bilingualism provides the opportunity to experience two or more cultures. The monolingual may experience a variety of cultures; for example, from different neighbours and communities that use the same language but have different ways of life. The monolingual can also travel to neighbouring countries and experience other cultures as a passive onlooker. However, to penetrate different cultures requires the language of that culture. To participate and become involved in the core of a culture requires a knowledge of the language of that culture.

There are also potential economic advantages to being bilingual. A person with two languages may have a wider portfolio of jobs available. As economic trade barriers fall, as international relationships become closer, as unions and partnerships across nations become more widespread, all increasing number of jobs are likely to require a person to be bilingual or multilingual. jobs in multinational companies, jobs selling and exporting, and employment prospects generated by translational contact make the future of employment more versatile for bilinguals than monolinguals.

Cognitive advantages

More recent research has shown that bilinguals may have some advantages in thinking, ranging from creative thinking to faster, progress in early cognitive development and greater sensitivity in communication. For example, bilinguals may have two or more words for some cactus object and idea; sometimes corresponding words in different languages have different connotations. Bilinguals are able to extend the range of meanings, associations and images, and to think more flexibly and creatively. Therefore, a bilingual has the possibility of more awareness of language and more fluency, flexibility and elaboration in thinking than a monolingual.

It would be misleading to suggest that there is no disadvantage to bilingualism. Some problems, both social and individual, may be falsely attributed to bilingualism. For instance, when bilingual children exhibit language or personality problems, bilingualism is sometimes blamed. Problems of social unrest may unfairly be attributed to the presence of two or more languages in a community. However, the real possible disadvantages of bilingualism tend to be temporary. For example, bilingual families may be spending significantly more of their time and making much greater efforts to maintain two languages and bring up children bilingually. Some bilingual children may find it difficult to cope with the school curriculum in either language for a short period of time. However, the individual, cognitive, cultural, intellectual, and economic advantages bilingualism brings to a person make all the effort worthwhile.

A more complex problem associated with bilingualism is the question of identity of a bilingual. If a child has both a French and an English parent and speaks each language fluently, is he or she French, English, or Anglo-French? If a child speaks English and a minority language such as Welsh, is he or she Welsh, English, British, European, or what? It has to be said that for many bilingual people, identity is not a problem. Although speaking two languages, they are resolutely identified with one ethnic or cultural group. For example, many bilinguals in Wales see themselves as Welsh first, and possibly British next, but not English. Others, however, find identity a real, problematic issue. Some immigrants, for instance, desperately want to lose the identity of their native country and become assimilated and identified with the new home country, while some others want to develop a new identity and feel more comfortable with being culturally hyphenated, such as Chinese-American, Italian-Australian, Swedish/Finnish, or Anglo-French. Yet identity crises and conflicts are never static. Identities change and evolve over time, with varying experiences, interactions, and collaborations within and outside a language group.

Bilingualism is not a static and unitary phenomenon; it is shaped in different ways, and it changes depending on a variety of historical, cultural, political, economic, environmental, linguistic, psychological, and other factors. Our understanding of bilingual speakers' knowledge and skills will grow as research methodology is defined and refined and our attitudes toward bilingualism change to the positive.

See also: Bilingual Education; Bilingualism and Second Language Learning; Society and Language: Overview.

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Bilingualism and Second Language Learning

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Introduction

There is a widespread perception in monolingual societies, particularly in the United States, that bilingualism is a rare and exceptional occurrence in communication. By contrast, from a global perspective, bilingualism is a world-wide phenomenon. In fact, global communication is often carried out through a speaker's second, third, or even fourth language. According to David Crystal (1997) approximately two-thirds of the world's children grow up in a bilingual environment which, in turn, leads to adult bilingualism/multilingualism. However, childhood bilingualism is not the only reason for adult bilingualism. A host of different factors (such as marriage, religion, education, linguistic plurality of a particular

region, migration, jobs, government policies, urbanization, etc.) also lead to adult bilingualism. How, then, do humans become bilingual? Is adult second-language learning different from child-language learning? Is bilingual-language acquisition different from monolingual-language acquisition? Is early bilingualism different from late bilingualism? Does second language learning have adverse cognitive effects on children? And how are two (or more) languages represented in the brain? This article attempts to answer these and other questions concerning bilingual language learning and use.

Key Concepts

Before discussing language development among bilinguals, it is crucial to give an overview of key fundamental concepts concerning language development in children and adults. Also, it should be mentioned that the term 'second language learning' is used in a wider sense to include the learning of any additional language during a period ranging from childhood to adulthood. An additional language may be a language of the country or spoken outside the country (i.e. foreign language).

Acquisition vs. Learning

A child's process of learning languages is different from an adult's process. A child can learn any language relatively effortlessly, while the same task becomes rather challenging for adults. For this reason, some second language researchers (Krashen, 1985) distinguish between two types of mechanisms in language development: a subconscious process resulting in tacit knowledge of the language (i.e., 'language acquisition'), and a more conscious process (i.e., 'language learning'). While children go through the former process, adults undergo the latter in their quest to become bilingual.

The Critical Period Hypothesis and Its Biological Basis

In addition to degree of effort, it has been frequently observed that even very proficient bilinguals fall short of being perfect bilinguals. In spite of the complete mastery of syntax, their speech is marked by traces of the first language accent. Similarly, it is also shown that in spite of considerable effort and motivation, the ultimate attainment of some grammatical structures by adults is seldom achieved. To explain these and other differences in language acquisition and recovery from aphasia Lenneberg (1967) proposed the "critical period hypothesis," which is sensitive to age. This hypothesis claims that there is a period in the

maturation of human organism, lasting from two years to puberty, in which nearly effortless and complete language acquisition is possible. Afterwards, this hypothesis notes, language learning requires more effort and motivation, largely because of a loss of brain plasticity resulting in the completion of the lateralization of the language function in the left hemisphere. Recent research claims have additionally shown that there are different critical periods for different grammatical structures of language. Since the accent (phonetics and phonology) of a second language is the most difficult to attain, the critical period for phonetics and phonology (approximately from five to seven years) is earlier than that for morphology and syntax. See Johnson and Newport (1991) and Bhatia and Ritchie (1999) for details.

Access to Universal Grammar (UG)

Children are born to acquire human languages. Regardless of gender, race, ethnicity, or nationality, every normal child is capable at birth of acquiring any human language. In theoretical studies following from the Chomskyan mentalistic framework, this innate ability is termed the access to universal grammar (UG). In this case, a child has full access to universal grammar, whereas an adult has either limited or no access. These and other universal principles of grammatical structures and principles of learning largely lead a child's language development. The role of parental input then becomes to trigger an appropriate value for innately given or set parameters, specific to the language to which the child is exposed. One such parameter, called the 'head parameter,' describes how a child does not have to even learn the specific word order of his/her language, but only has to choose between already specified values – head-initial or head-final – based on the nature of the input language. Children begin to learn to set parametric values even from the one-word stage. A Japanese child learns to choose the head-final system, whereas an English-speaking child chooses the head-initial value. These principles are generally refereed to as a child's language acquisition device (LAD).

Input and Learning Environment: Natural vs. Unnatural Settings

Usually children become bilingual or multilingual in a natural way. A normal child can become a fluent bilingual by the age of five, for instance, without any formal training. In the process of acquiring a language, the role of input (motherese, etc.) or imitation is important but limited. Children do not learn a language by mindlessly imitating the input provided by mothers or caretakers. That is, while the role

of parental input cannot be ruled out, language acquisition studies show that neither motherese nor imitation plays a significant role in a child's language development. Instead, this burden is carried by the child himself/herself. Research on child-language acquisition reveals that the child learns the language by using the 'rule formulation strategy.' For instance, an English-speaking child learns on his/her own that by the addition of the inflection '-ed' to a verbal stem, one generates the corresponding past tense form of the verb. In this process, the child over-generalizes and produces utterances such as 'I go-ed' [go-PAST]. Even after being corrected [i.e. provided negative evidence] by the mother or caretaker that the child meant 'I went' [go.PAST], the child still does not reject the rule s/he has formulated in his or her mind and which s/he still produces in utterances such as 'I went-ed' [go.PAST-PAST]. The role of the adult is thus to prevent the child's grammar from overgeneralization. In other words, the child has an innate capacity to acquire languages in an environment which is termed a 'natural' environment, whereas, by contrast, adults and school-age children learn language in formal settings such as schools and colleges through a formal instructional method.

Defining and Measuring Bilingualism

What is bilingualism and who is bilingual? Defining and measuring bilingualism is a very complex task due to the number and types of input conditions, biological, socio-psychological, and other non-linguistic factors that can lead to a varying degree of bilingual competencies. In short, there is no widely-accepted definition or measures of bilinguals.

Instead, a rich range of scales, dichotomies, and categories are employed to characterize bilinguals. If a bilingual can understand but cannot speak a second language, such an individual is called a receptive bilingual, whereas a productive bilingual demonstrates a spoken proficiency in two languages. If the second language is acquired in a natural setting before the age of five that individual is termed an early bilingual, in contrast with a late bilingual who learns his second language after the age of five either in home or in schools. Labels such as fluent vs. non-fluent, functional vs. non-functional, balanced vs. unbalanced, primary vs. secondary, and partial vs. complete refer, either to a varying command in different types of language proficiency (e.g., spoken, listening, writing, etc.), or an asymmetrical relationship (dominance) between two languages. A compound vs. coordinate bilingual refers to the way two languages are processed in the brain. The list is by no means exhaustive. Other major distinctions such

as simultaneous vs. sequential are discussed in the next section. Similarly, bilingualism can be viewed from individual, societal (attitudes towards bilingualism), and political (i.e., government policies toward bilingualism) perspectives.

In general, a bilingual person demonstrates many complex attributes rarely seen in a monolingual person. For that reason, a bilingual is not equivalent to two monolinguals, but something entirely different. This working definition of bilingualism is offered by Bloomfield (1933), who claimed that a bilingual is one who has a native-like control of two languages, i.e., a balanced bilingual (see Grosjean 1982 or Edwards, 2004 for more details).

Patterns and Mechanisms in Bilinglual Language Development

Providing either a natural environment or inputs in monolingual/dominant language speech communities is not a challenging task. The same is also true for those societies where social and political systems are conducive to bilingualism. For instance, in India, where bilingualism is viewed as natural, approved by society, and further nurtured by government language policies, linguistic groups and communities do not need to take any special measures to assure that their children receive input from two languages. In sharp contrast, in societies where bilingualism is not valued or where the language of a minority is distinct, it becomes imperative for families to plan meaningful strategies to ensure the smooth exposure to the family language. One such strategy that families employ in this second setting, described by Bhatia and Ritchie (1999) as "discourse allocation," restricts the use of one language to one social agent or social setting and the other language to other social situations. The various manifestations of such strategies are the following: (a) one-parent/one-language (e.g., the child's mother speaks one language and, the child's father speaks the other. This strategy was employed by Leopold (1939–1949) in his classic study of bilingual language development of his daughter, Hildegard; (b) one-place/one-language (e.g. speaking one language in the kitchen and the other elsewhere); (c) a language/time approach; and (d) a topic-related approach. Although the discourse allocation approach is better than providing no input and thus raising a monolingual child, it leads to different patterns in bilingual language development than developing bilingualism in a natural setting. For instance, during the early stages of Hildegard's bilingualism, she developed a rule that fathers speak German and mothers speak in English.

Childhood Bilingualism

Other factors such as age and amount of exposure to the two languages also result in differences in the pattern of childhood bilingualism. The distinction between simultaneous and sequential bilinguals in research on bilingual language acquisition is based on age and the degree of exposure to two languages. When the child is exposed to two languages to more or less the same degree from birth onward, the pattern of language development is referred to as simultaneous, whereas sequential bilingualism describes the attainment of one language first and the second language later, preferably before the age of seven. Similarly, the term late bilingual is used for those sequential bilinguals who acquire their second language at a relatively younger age than adults learning a second language. Although there is unanimous agreement among researchers about the validity of the simultaneous and sequential bilinguals, there is no consensus among scholars about the exact line of demarcation between the two. See McLaughlin (1984) and De Houwer (1995) for either theoretical or methodological grounds.

One of the most intriguing aspects of the childhood bilingualism is how children learn to separate the two languages, particularly in a natural setting (i.e., a simultaneous bilingual) in initial stages. After all, when parents provide input, they do not tag or prime their input with a language identification label. Even if parents go to the absurd length of identifying the language of each word or sentence they use, these labels are semantically empty for children. Furthermore, bilingual parents unwittingly make the task of separating the two languages even harder for children because of their normal tendency to mix two languages. In short, a child is provided with three distinct types of linguistic inputs: two languages, each in an unmixed/pure form, and one with a mixture of two languages. Given this state of affairs, how does the child learn to separate the two languages in question? This task is not challenging for a monolingual child because only one language serves as a source of input. The two hypotheses which attempt to shed light on this question are the unitary system hypothesis and the dual system hypothesis.

According the unitary system hypothesis (Volterra and Taeschner, 1978), the child undergoes three stages before s/he is able to separate two input languages. During the first two stages, the child experiences confusion. During the first stage, s/he is unable to distinguish the two lexicons and grammars of the linguistic systems. At this stage, they have a single lexicon made up of items drawn from the lexicons of both languages. Hence, no translational equivalents or synonyms are found in their vocabulary. Volterra and Taeschner claim that their two bilingual subjects at the ages of 1 year 10 months and 1 year 6 months had a hybrid list of 137 words with no translational equivalents. During the second stage, the child slowly learns to separate the two lexicons, but is still unable to separate the grammatical systems. Cross-linguistic synonyms emerge, but the child applies the same set of syntactic rules to both languages. It is only during the third stage that the child becomes capable of separating the two sets of vocabularies and grammars. Findings of recent research reveal that the unitary system hypothesis cannot sustain the scrutiny of the succeeding research and the evidence motivating the three stages of bilingual language development is full of shortcomings and contradictions both on methodological and empirical grounds.

The dual system hypothesis states that bilingual children, based on their access to Universal Grammar and language specific parameter setting, have the capacity of separating the two grammars and lexical systems right from the beginning. A wide variety of cross-linguistic studies (e.g., different input conditions – one parent/one language and mixed input condition; and different word order types) lends support to this hypothesis. For instance, in a study devoted to the language development of a Hindi-English bilingual child, it is clear that at age 2, the child is capable of developing two distinct lexicons using a syllabification strategy. At the age of 1 year 7 months, two different word orders develop – SVO [subject-verb-object] for English and SOV for Hindi. For a more detailed treatment of the shortcomings of the unitary system hypothesis and the strengths of the dual system hypothesis, see Bhatia and Ritchie 1999: 591–614.

Another fascinating feature of bilingual speech is that, not only are bilinguals capable of keeping the two linguistic systems separate, but they often mix them either within a sentence or inter-sententially. This behavior is often termed 'code-mixing' or 'code-switching' in sociolinguistic literature. Depending upon the theoretical and empirical objectives of their research, some researchers do not distinguish between the two terms and use them interchangeably; for those researchers who distinguish between the two, the code-mixing refers to intra-sentential mixing while the term code-switching refers to the intersentential mixing in bilinguals. Both bilingual children as well as adults show this behavior. What explains this behavior of language mixing? Earlier research attempted to explain it in terms of the language deficiency hypothesis: it was claimed that bilinguals in general and children in particular have language gaps. As claimed by the unitary system hypothesis the lack

of synonyms compels them to mix the two lexical systems during stage I. Similarly, stage II yields the mixing of two language systems due to confusion. In other words, the lack of proficiency in either one language (i.e., the absence of balanced bilingualism) or both languages (i.e., semi-bilingualism) leads to mixing.

The language augmentation hypothesis is capable of offering deeper insights into the bilingual mixing behavior. As it has been shown earlier in the discussion of the dual system hypothesis, children do not go through the initial stages of treating the two linguistic systems as if they were one system, but begin to distinguish them immediately. The consideration of optimization leads bilinguals to mix language with an aim to get maximum mileage from the two linguistic systems at their disposal. An analogy drawn from the beverage industry further explains this point. The separation of juices (e.g., apple vs. orange juice) renders two distinct tastes. However, if one mixes the two juices, the result is a new taste, a distinct from the two pure juices. The same is true of bilingual language mixing. Research on the linguistic and socio-linguistic motivations for language mixing both in children and adults shows that such considerations as semantic domains and semantic complexity (an item less complex or salient in one language), stylistic effects, clarification, elaboration, relief strategy (i.e., a linguistic item is temporarily unavailable in one language), interlocutor's identification, discourse strategies of participants/topics, addressee's perceived linguistic capability and speaker's own linguistic ability, and other complex socio-psychological reasons, such as attitudes, societal values, and personality, prompt bilinguals to mix two languages. The list of motivations is by no means exhaustive (see Bhatia and Ritchie, 1996, for more details).

Adult Bilingualism: Second Language Learning

In contrast to sequential childhood bilingualism, adults who learn a second language after they have learned their mother tongue experience the learning of a second language as a laborious and conscious task. As pointed out earlier, unlike children who are able to universally and uniformly acquire native competency in their mother tongue, adults rarely achieve native-like competency in their second language. Depending on the level of their motivation and hard work, adults can learn a second language with varying degrees of competence. However, there comes a point during the second language learning that even the most talented learner cannot pass the stage of 'fossilization.' This stage is marked with second language errors which no amount of training can

correct. For these reasons, second language (L2) learning is viewed as fundamentally different from first language (L1) acquisition. The hypothesis which aims at accounting for these differences between the child and the adult language is termed the fundamental difference hypothesis.

In spite of the asymmetrical relation between L1 and L2 learning, one should not draw a conclusion that there is nothing in common between the two. What is common between L1 and L2 learners is that both undergo stages of language development. In other words, like L1 learners, in the process of grammar construction, L2 learners undergo stages of development: the intermediate stages of grammar development between the initial stage and the ultimate stage are termed interlanguage grammars. Take the case of the development of negation in English L1 and L2 learners. The grammar of negation in L2 learners of English shows the same stages of development as in L1 English learners – Stage I: the sentence-initial placement of negation; Stage II: preverbal placement of negation with no auxiliary verb; and Stage III: preverbal placement of negation with an appropriate auxiliary verb.

Native Language Influence and Dominance

An important way in which L2 learning is different from L1 learning is the influence of the mother tongue on second-language learning. The mother tongue or L1 plays an important role in the process of L2 acquisition. Research on grammatical errors of L2 shows that L2 learners transfer the grammatical rules – phonetic, phonological, morphological, and syntactic rules – of L1 to their second language. An English-speaking learner of Hindi has difficulties in hearing and producing a four-way contrast between Hindi aspiration and voicing contrast (i.e., unvoiced unaspirates, unvoiced aspirates, voiced unaspirates, and voiced aspirates).

It would be a gross simplification to claim that L2 learners transfer all grammatical features of L1 to L2. Adult learners possess a relatively higher level of logical and cognitive ability than do children; therefore, these qualities color their second language learning. For instance, English-speaking learners of Hindi will not translate <u>there</u> in these sentences:

1. There is a chair in the room
2. The chair is over there

in an identical way (i.e. by choosing the remote locative adverb in both cases). Similarly, it would be an oversimplification to claim that childhood bilingualism is free from the dominance relationship between the two languages. Not only does the mother tongue

influence second language acquisition in children, it also affects their school achievement.

Approaches to Second Language Learning

In adult language acquisition research, the term second language is used in a wider sense to include both the acquisition of a second language which may or may not be foreign to a country. However, in the context of language teaching the distinction between the two is made to highlight major differences in the learning aims, teaching methods, and the achievement levels to be attained.

A number of approaches have been developed to facilitate the learning of second/foreign languages. Some of the following are notable:

1. Grammar-translation method: Following the tradition of teaching classical languages such as Greek, Latin, and Sanskrit, this method places emphasis on memorization and rote learning. Learners memorize nominal and verbal paradigms of the second language and translate L1 into L2 or vice versa. Very little emphasis is placed on developing spoken proficiency in the foreign language, while reading and written comprehension receives overwhelming importance. This method is perhaps the oldest method of language teaching which dates back to the 19th century.
2. The direct method: Also known as oral or natural methods, it departs from the grammar-translation method in three important respects: one, memorization receives a back seat in the learning of the second language; two, special emphasis is placed on acquiring spoken and listening competencies; and three, the introduction of the target language is free from any reference to the native language of learners. Native language is never used as a tool to explain either grammar or other intricacies of the target language usage. This model attempts to simulate the native speaker environment of the target language. However, in actual practice there are severe constraints on replicating the natural setting of the native speaker's learning environment in an actual classroom setting.
3. The audio-lingual method is a byproduct of World War II during which the United States experienced an urgent need to quickly train its troops in foreign languages for overseas military operations. An emphasis is placed on spoken and listening competencies, rather than on written ones.
4. The structural method: In order to speed up the acquisition of foreign languages, insights of structural linguistics were applied to language teaching. This method exposes learners to different structural patterns and transformation drills.

Audio-lingual structural models assume that L2 is acquired through imitation. The discussion in the key concept section shows the limitation of this model. A number of other methods such as the natural approach and 'suggestopedia' have been proposed, but the fact remains that no method has a grip on the complexity involving learning a second language.

Bilingual Education: Additive vs. Subtractive Bilingualism

Teaching children a school language, particularly if the school language is different from the child's home language, is one of the major challenges for bilingual education programs. Bilingual education programs in America aim at minority students learning English. Such programs have attracted a great deal of controversy on the basis of their merit and outcome. While there is rapid growth of bilingual education programs in the United States, the aim of such programs is not always to introduce additive bilingualism which ensures the maintenance of the child mother tongue, while learning the school/dominant language. A large number of bilingual education programs in the United States aim at subtractive bilingualism. In other words, while they offer children a transition to learning the school/majority language, in that process they do not ensure the maintenance of the child's mother tongue.

In contrast, the language policies of bilingual nations such as India, Canada, and Switzerland are very conducive to the promotion of language rights for minority languages. The government of India, for instance, favors the advancement of linguistic diversity and pluralism by the introduction of the Three Language Formula, which calls for trilingualism in education. In addition to learning two national languages, Hindi and English, students are expected to learn a third language beyond their native tongue. For example, in northern India, students are expected to learn one of the four Dravidian languages (Tamil, Telugu, Kannada, and Malayalam) from southern India.

While bi- or multi-lingual education programs like India's do not view bilingualism in general and the maintenance of minority languages in particular as a threat to national integration, this is not the case with bilingual education in the United States. U.S. educational policies are not conducive to linguistic and cultural diversity.

A notable feature of the Canadian bilingual education program is termed the language immersion program. Introduced in the 1960s in Quebec, the program was introduced at the request of the English-speaking minority to provide their children

a high level of proficiency in schools in the dominant language of the region, French. Children were immersed in schools in the second language of students (i.e., French) in which children used their mother tongue to communicate with a bilingual teacher who would reply in French. This process leads children from what Cummins (1981) calls basic interpersonal communication skills (BICS) proficiency to cognitive-academic language proficiency (CALP) in the school language. BICS refers to the language proficiency level of students with restricted vocabulary and simpler syntax, whereas CALP requires a type of proficiency suitable for academic pursuits – a developed vocabulary and sufficiently complex syntax suited for abstract and analytical thinking. The success of the Canadian language immersion model continues to generate enthusiasm and controversy in bilingual education in the United States.

Socio-Psychological Factors

Successful language learning not only depends on teaching methods but also on learners' motivation, intelligence, opportunities, and other factors, such as their attitude toward the target language and culture. Keeping in mind the motivation and the learners' attitudes, there are two types of learners: instrumental and integrative learners. Instrumental learners, who learn a language for the purpose of gaining external rewards (monitory gains, good jobs, etc.), however, tend to be less successful learners than integrative learners, who have a positive attitude toward the culture of the target language. Psychological factors such as the affective filter (Krashen, 1985) either inhibit or promote the learning of a second language: negative influences such as anxiety, lack of self-confidence, and inadequate motivation can create serious obstacles to successful language learning. Due to a lack of self-esteem and a higher level of performance anxiety, minority children tend to raise the affective filter, which results in the reduction of comprehensible input. Consequently, it takes a toll on their progress in language acquisition. Similarly, since adults show more self-consciousness than children, they put themselves in a disadvantageous position in terms of language acquisition.

Effects of Bilingualism

Does bilingualism have an adverse linguistic and cognitive effect, particularly on children? Earlier research in the United States pointed out that exposing children to more than one language during their childhood leads them to semi-bilingualism and confusion. Crowding their brain with two or more languages, this research suggested, not only leads children to linguistic deficiency, both in competence and performance levels (semi-lingualism, stuttering, etc.), but also to a wide variety of cognitive and psychological impairments such as low intelligence, mental retardation, left-handedness, and even schizophrenia.

Research by Peal and Lambert (1962), however, put to rest such a negative view of bilingualism: their findings and the work of succeeding researchers provide ample evidence that these negative conclusions of earlier research were premature, misguided (biased toward immigrant communities), and unnecessarily pessimistic. Solid on methodological grounds, Peal and Lambert's study revealed a positive view of bilingualism, including the conclusion that bilingual children demonstrate more cognitive flexibility than monolinguals. Contrary to previous studies, bilinguals performed better than monolinguals in both verbal and non-verbal measures. The study, which was conducted in Montreal, was revolutionary in its own right, changing the face of research on bilingualism forever (see Hakuta, 1985: Chap. 2 for details). This study has been replicated in a number of countries confirming the positive effects of bilingualism.

Conclusions

A number of diverse and complex conditions and factors lead to life-long bilingualism. These factors – biological, social, psychological, and linguistic – account for a varied pattern amongst bilinguals, witnessed around the world. Thus, a bilingual is neither two monolinguals in the brain, nor are two bilinguals clones of each other. These complexities indicate why no theory of language learning and/or teaching is capable of explaining bilingual verbal behavior and the mechanisms leading to bilingual language development.

See also: Bilingualism; Bilingual Education; Second and Foreign Language Learning and Teaching.

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Bruner, Jerome Seymour

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Jerome Bruner is a pre-eminent, powerfully influential, and multiply pioneering psychologist whose studies have touched on language in many ways.

Born in New York City of nominally observant Jewish parents, he was blind for the first two years of life. His father, a watchmaker, died when he was 12, after which his family moved about, and he developed his interest in sailing. He attended Duke University (B.A., 1937), and went to Harvard for graduate study in psychology (Ph.D., 1941). He served in the U.S. Army Intelligence Corps in World War II, applying his knowledge of propaganda and public opinion. He then joined the Harvard faculty, doing experimental psychological research on the dependence of perception on motivation (the 'New Look' studies). He carried out an enormously influential series of studies on the acquisition of structured cognitive categories, involving the grouping of instances on the basis of values of defining attributes. He founded and directed the Center for Cognitive Studies in the 1960s, leading the way toward the field's mentally realistic engagement with information processing. He left Harvard for the Watts Professorship of Experimental Psychology, at Wolfson College, Oxford University, in 1972, personally sailing across the Atlantic to assume his new role, and then returning to the United States in 1979. He has subsequently taught at the New School for Social Research (New York City) and the New York University School of Law. His research interests progressed from cognitive to developmental and educational psychology, where his thinking has galvanized our understanding of pedagogical practice, and then on to cultural and narrative psychology, providing specimen studies exemplifying another novel and productive paradigm for human studies.

His abiding interest in language began with his work on wartime propaganda and public opinion, more or less by-passed his perceptual experiments, and continued with his analyses of conceptual categorization. Despite personal contacts with George A. Miller, Noam Chomsky, Roman Jakobson, and Roger Brown, he never became enamored of the structural properties of syntactic or phonological grammars. For instance, it was Brown who added a 65-page appendix to *A study of thinking*, indicating how attributes and categorizations are involved in speech and linguistic meaning.

He became interested in language development, as epitomizing a symbolic, in contrast to iconic or enactive, system of representation and cultural 'amplifier' of reflective, in contrast to sensory or motoric, capacities. From language as an instrument of thought, based on semantic representation, he went on to treat language development in terms of communicative (or pragmatic) function. This perspective allowed him to combine prior American pragmatic and generative influences, with Oxfordian 'ordinary language' work on Austinian illocutionary acts, as well as Tinbergen's ethology – in his delineation of the ontogenesis of speech acts. He went on to the formulation of

the Language Acquisition Support System, through which speakers became participants with particular linguistic communities or subcommunities. In this way, he could emphasize not only cultural influences, but also narrative structures and processes. He based his account of stories on Kenneth Burke's pentad (Agents, Actions, Goals, Instruments, Settings – plus Trouble!), as well as other structural accounts and hermeneutic modes of human intentionality. Narratives, thus conceived, have properties that allow construction of personal selves/identities, as well as human institutions (such as schools and legal systems), and provide for the dynamics of individual development/aging and or human history (the passing forward of culture).

His prolific career has provided contributions sufficient to suggest several approaches to the role of language in the human sciences, but reflects a general trend from the application of his original experimental psychology to his more recent anthropological/interpretive stance. He has managed to combine an engagement in current political, educational, and legal issues, as they have become crucial over the decades, with a principled perspective stemming from meaning-based psychological research and theory – which he has helped shape and vitalize. His

has not been a 'school of psycholinguistics,' but rather a schooling of psychological engagement in human language.

See also: Jakobson, Roman; Psycholinguistics: Overview.

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Bühler, Karl

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Karl Bühler (see **Figure 1**) was born in Germany (Meckesheim) in 1879 and, after gaining a doctorate in philosophy and medicine, started work as an assistant to Oswald Külpe, a psychologist in Würzburg. Later he worked as a professor of psychology in Dresden and Vienna (1922–1938), before having to emigrate to the United States in 1938, where he lived in Los Angeles from 1945 until his death in 1963.

In linguistics Bühler is most famous for his work on deixis and on language function, but he also published work on developmental psychology, language comprehension, and human cognition as well as on other linguistic phenomena such as phonology, syntax, morphology, and stylistics.

Bühler postulated four axioms for linguistics, which were concerned with (1) the organon model of language, (2) the sign status of language (by virtue of *abstract* features), (3) the field structure of

language (Bühler united von Humboldt's dichotomy of *ergon* and *energeia* and de Saussure's distinction between *langue* and *parole* in his *Vierfelderschema* of language as *Sprechhandlung*, *Sprachwerk*, *Sprechakt*, and *Sprachgebilde*), and (4) the fact that language is a system of two 'classes' (*Zweiklassensystem*), namely semantics and syntax. Of these four axioms, it was especially the organon model that was influential.

The Organon Model

In his *Organonmodell* Bühler took up Plato's proposal to explain language by virtue of the metaphor of language as a tool (Greek *órganon*) that serves distinct functions in society. He distinguished between three functions: *Darstellung* ('representation'), *Ausdruck* ('expression'), and *Appell* ('vocative', 'appellative'). In very simple terms, language may be used for the representation of things (*Dinge: Darstellung*), for the expression of the speaker's inner feelings/states (*Sender: Ausdruck*), and for influencing the hearer's behavior (*Empfänger: Appell*). The linguistic sign is hence functionally very complex: it is a

Figure 1 Karl Bühler. With permission of the Archiv der Universität Wien.

symbol by virtue of its representational function, a *symptom* (sign, index) by virtue of its dependence on the sender, and a ***signal*** by virtue of its appeal to the hearer. In a given instance, one of these functions may dominate the others: *Darstellung* dominates in scientific language, *Ausdruck* in poetic language, and *Appell* in military language, but this does not mean that the other functions are not present as well (Bühler speaks of *Dominanzphänomene*). Thus, an expression such as *es regnet* ('it's raining') denotes a meteorological event (*Darstellung*). But by uttering it with different intonations, the speaker can also express his/her feelings (*Ausdruck*) or appeal to someone not to forget to bring an umbrella (*Appell*) (1982: 46). Because of Bühler's occasionally imprecise style of writing, aspects of this model remain much-discussed in European linguistics. For instance, it is not clear to what extent means of *Ausdruck* are employed intentionally or subconsciously and to what extent they are conventionalized. Although some of his examples include conventional and intentional expressions, *Ausdruck* is defined by him as "freie oder gehemmte Entladung von Affekten" (1982: 352), i.e., the free or inhibited discharge of emotions, which seems to more or less *subconsciously* 'mirror' the speaker's mental state or personality traits (Auer, 1999: 33). From a strict viewpoint, this function thus does not concern linguistics (Konstantinidou, 1997: 36; cf. also Péter, 1984: 245; Stankiewicz, 1964: 239f.); however, Bühler's

expressive function has also been interpreted as referring to intentional linguistic communication.

The 'Field Theory' of Language

Bühler also developed his own contextual language theory, the *Zweifelderlehre* ('two-field theory'). Signs, he said, are not isolated entities but always occur in context, in a 'field' that can be deictic (*Zeigfeld*) or symbolic (*Symbolfeld*). As such, linguistic signs function as *Feldgeräte* ('field tools'). Representational symbols can be interpreted solely with the help of the *Symbolfeld*, but in order to assign meaning to utterances containing deictic signals (*Zeigwörter*), hearers need the extralinguistic context (the *Zeigfeld*). What is designated by expressions such as *here, there, I, you* changes according to the position of the speaker. Thus, it is the *I*, *now*, and *here* that establishes the deictic center (Bühler calls it the *Ich-jetzt-hier-Origo*). The matter is more complicated because there are several *modi* of pointing toward the context of utterance: *ad oculos* (reference to components of the current context), *anaphorisch* (reference to textual components), and *am Phantasma* (reference to fictional worlds).

Bühler's contribution to linguistics is enormous: apart from crucially influencing linguistic research (especially the Prague School) before World War II, his work has been of great importance in linguistics since the 'pragmatic turn' in the 1970s, although he failed to gain the deserved attention upon his emigration to the United States. His *Organonmodell* has been immensely significant in that it influenced the establishment of derived functional models from Roman Jakobson to Dell Hymes and M.A.K. Halliday. He is still being reinterpreted and analyzed within modern linguistics (e.g., Kubczak, 1984; Péter, 1984; Auer, 1999). Similarly, his comments on deixis, morphology, and metaphor have provided a stepping stone for modern approaches in these fields. His estate is currently being reorganized by the FDÖP (*Forschungsstelle und Dokumentationszentrum für österreichische Philosophie*).

See also: Halliday, Michael Alexander Kirkwood; Jakobson, Roman.

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C

Class Language

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The relationship between language and social class is a key theoretical and empirical issue in critical discourse studies, ethnography of communication, and sociolinguistic research. It has been a focal point for postwar and current policy in language planning, and language and literacy education. The central questions of a class analysis of language were stated in Mey's (1985) proposal for Marxian pragmatics: 'Whose language' counts? With what material and social consequences? For which communities and social groups? Central concerns are how language factors into the intergenerational reproduction of social and economic stratification, and how communities, families, schools, the media, and governments contribute to "linguistic inequality" (Hymes, 1996). Yet current research continues to table and debate contending definitions of language and social class as social and economic phenomena.

Marx viewed language as an intrinsic characteristic of human 'species being,' as a form of mental and material labor. The "language of real life," he argued, is "directly interwoven" with "material activity and... mental intercourse" (Marx and Engels, 1845/1970: 118). This "mental production" is "expressed in the language of politics, laws, morality, religion, metaphysics etc. of a people." 'Sense experience,' the work of the eye and ear, was the basis not only of science, but of communal and social life (Marx, 1844/1964: 160–166). At the same time, Marx's (Marx and Engels, 1845/1970: 37) classical definition of ideology as a 'camera obscura' established the centrality of language in the distortion and misrepresentation of social and economic reality in social class interests (*see* **Marxist Theories of Language**).

Marxist theory establishes three critical traditions in the analysis of language and class. These are: (1) the analysis of language as a form of class-based social action and consciousness; (2) the analysis of social class and linguistic variation; and (3) the analysis of language as the medium for power and control, ideology, and truth in specific linguistic and capital markets (*see* **Power and Pragmatics**).

Language as Social Action and Class Consciousness

The prototypical class analysis of language was undertaken by Voloshinov (1973) (*see* **Voloshinov, Valentin Nikolaevich**). Language was conceptualized as a marker of class consciousness and a medium of class struggle. According to models of heteroglossia and 'multivocality,' each utterance and text is a revoicing of previous historical speakers and writers. The ideological content and social functions of each speech act or speech genre bear their own material historical origins. That is, they are produced and reproduced by and through social and economic "conditions of production" (Fairclough, 1992). By this account, face-to-face language exchanges are instances of class conflict and ideological difference, where class-located social actors bring to bear distinctive material interests and discourse positions. The point of such analysis is to extend the notion of the situated speaking and writing subject, to a closer sociological and economic analysis of that positionality. Contemporary work in critical discourse analysis supplements class analysis with attention to the linguistic construction of gender, race, sexual preference, and other forms of social identity ideology, and position (e.g., Lemke, 1995).

If utterances and their use are indexical of ideology and social class consciousness, what might this mean for differing cultural groups, communities, and their historical practices? Following Vygotsky (*see* **Vygotskij, Lev Semenovich**), Luria (1982) argued that the cognitive uses of the 'tool' of language were mediated by one's social relations, cultural practices, and material conditions. In his studies of the Uzbeks, Luria made the claim that particular forms of cognition and consciousness, what Marx referred to as capacity for the "production of ideas," were linked to cultural practices and material conditions of tool use. The cognitive affordances of language and literacy are

mediated by material economic and social conditions, including class location and cultural history.

In contemporary literacy theory, Paulo Freire also argued for the direct links between language and social class consciousness. Freire's (1972) prototypical work was concerned with the effects of literacy education upon the language and consciousness of the indigenous population and peasantry of postwar Brazil. Bringing together Marxist dialectics with liberation theology, he argued that autocratic governments and education systems constituted "cultures of silence" where marginalized populations were educated in ways that misnamed and misrecognized the world. Freire's work views ideologically distorted language as a mode of class-based false consciousness.

For Freire, critique of class consciousness was achieved through an educational process of 'renaming' the world in ways that demystified power, consciousness, and life, a similar agenda to that of Mey (1985), Chouliaraki and Fairclough (2001) and other contemporary critical linguists. Current agendas for the teaching of 'critical literacy' and critical discourse analysis stand in this Marxist tradition, focusing on the demystification, critique, and reconstruction of ideological language (Luke, 2004).

Linguistic Variation and Social Class

A further concern in the analysis of language and social class is how language variation acts as a marker and instrument of social class, and of racial and other forms of social stratification. A principal concern of sociolinguists in the postwar period has been over the effects of the differential and inequitable spread of economic and social capital on the language minority, postcolonial, and economically marginal communities (Hymes, 1996) (see **Minority Languages: Oppression**). The postwar origins of language planning reflect the impact of colonization, decolonization, migration, and geopolitical conflict upon linguistic retention and stability. The flow of global, regional, and national capital visibly impacts upon language loss, use, and retention (Pennycook, 1998). In the postwar period, sociolinguistic and language planning research has engaged with the effects of the unequal spread and distribution of economic capital upon language loss. Yet attempts to theorize and empirically describe the complex reproductive relationships of language and social class have been debated and contested (see **Linguistic Decolonialization**).

The sociological and sociolinguistic research on U.K. children by Basil Bernstein and colleagues (e.g., Bernstein, 1975) took up this challenge. This work provided an account of the role of language in the institutional production of stratified levels of educational achievement. Bernstein's argument was that working class students spoke a "restricted code," characterized by embedded and literal meanings, limited command of deixis, and thresholds in technical complexity. Middle-class children, he argued, mastered an "elaborated code" which was fitted for educational success and mastery of academic and scientific discourses. These, he argued, were tied to particular forms of early childhood language socialization and family structure (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1992). Bernstein's work was the object of several decades of controversy. Labov's (2001) studies of urban African-American language registers and nonstandard dialects, and Heath's (1983) studies of early class-based language socialization made the case against models of linguistic deficit. Bernstein's model has been defended by systemic functional linguists, who argue that there are indeed elaborated technical registers and contents, specific language domains affiliated with power, some of which particular social classes make explicitly available in early language socialization and educational training (Hasan and Williams, 1996) (see **Codes, Elaborated and Restricted**).

As distinctive sociodemographic speech communities, particular social classes may indeed have different speech patterns, varying in lingua franca, register, dialect, accent, and practices of diglossia (see **Register: Overview**). These, further, are affiliated with class-based social ideologies and cultural practices (Fishman, 1991). Ethnographic studies have shown how these variations are made to count in local social networks and institutions (Milroy, 1987). But the social and cultural bases and material consequences of such differences remain localized and contentious. To move past descriptive claims requires a broader sociological theory of social class, of "linguistic markets" (Mey, 1985; Bourdieu, 1992), and of changing media and modes of production and information.

Language as Capital in Linguistic Markets

Classical sociological definitions of social class begin from conceptions of structural economic location and material position. They attempt to define position and power *vis-à-vis* dominant means of production. The tendency of Marxist models is to further affiliate social class with particular 'class consciousness,' of which language, its use and its expression, is a constitutive speech marker. Bourdieu's (1992) sociology began from a view that class position is at least in part structurally determined. But it is also embodied

by human subjects in their 'habitus,' the sum total of socially acquired dispositions.

By this account, the bodily performance of linguistic competence is an element of cultural capital. This capital and affiliated forms of embodied taste, style, and ideology, constitute a key marker of one's social class position and mobility. Linguistic capital is deployed in specific social fields, which constitute 'linguistic markets.' Each market, each institutional context, in turn has variable rules and conventions of exchange whereby linguistic competence and literate proficiency in specific languages is valued or not. There, language use – as class marker and tool – has exchange value and power only in relation to other forms of capital, including social capital (e.g., networks, institutional access), economic capital, formal institutional credentials, artifacts, and so forth.

This is a more complex view of the relationship of language and social class. Language matters, as a primary marker of class, gender, culture, training, education, networks, traditions, and ideological consciousness. Yet like post-structuralist theories of discourse, Bourdieu's model viewed language not just as an index or marker of class position, but as reflexively constituting position and identity, power, and categorical social status. In this way, how language marks class, capital, and power is sociologically contingent, rather than determined by the characteristics of linguistic code or class position per se, or the ostensive power of any given utterance, genre, or text (Luke, 1996). This contingency is dependent on the availability of other forms of capital, and the variable, historically shifting norms, rules, and conventions of particular social institutions, fields of knowledge, and linguistic markets (*see* **Discourse, Foucauldian Approach**).

Current Issues

One of the principal critiques of postwar sociolinguistics, ethnography of communication, and functional linguistics was that they lacked a sufficient analysis of power, capital, and conflict. Indeed, sociolinguistic models of 'social context,' 'context of situation,' and 'social network' are often based on structural functionalist models of society and culture. The study of language and social class requires the rigorous analysis of social and economic relations within and between speech communities. Current work on language and social class continues to examine how language represents class consciousness, how it is implicated in ongoing issues of class conflict and cohesion, and how its acquisition and use are central to intergenerational production of social stratification of material and discourse resources.

Language variation, diversity, change, and ideology can be systematically linked to social class. Linguistic performance in text and discourse production does indeed have both symbolic and material exchange value, particularly in service- and information-based economies. But this depends upon the complex local economic and institutional formations of particular speech communities. Bourdieu offered a stronger analytic frame for analyzing how language 'counts' in specific institutional, disciplinary, and knowledge fields, and everyday social contexts. He suggested that issues around 'whose language' counts, which classes have power, require a rigorous socioeconomic analysis. Particularly under conditions of late capitalism and globalization, these sociological and sociolinguistic contexts and conditions are under considerable historical transition and challenge.

As the medium of consciousness and labor, language is entailed in the production of ideology, material goods, and social relations. The move in globalized economies towards information- and discourse-based forms of labor raises a number of key challenges to linguistic and ethnographic studies. First, linguistic, semiotic, and discourse competence will have increased significance in productive labor and consumption, shifting social class relations to means of production. Second, social class location and membership is determined by relations to dominant modes of communication, semiosis, and information (Castells, 2000) as much as it might be defined in classical Marxist terms. Finally, the formation of social class identity, ideology, and speech community have become more complex. They are now strongly influenced by forces of mass culture, media, and globalized information flows.

One of the principal claims of post-structuralist and postmodern theory of the past decade has been a breakdown of essential relationships between discourse and social class as a primary analytic category. It is increasingly difficult to analyze social class formation without due consideration of the complexity of cultural, racial, gender, and religious identity and position. Any analysis of language and social class must engage with this complexity. But indeed, any contemporary analysis of class and intersecting categories must engage with the constitutive place of language, text, and discourse.

See also: Codes, Elaborated and Restricted; Critical Discourse Analysis; Discourse, Foucauldian Approach; Language Planning and Policy: Models; Linguistic Decolonialization; Marxist Theories of Language;

Minority Languages: Oppression; Power and Pragmatics; Voloshinov, Valentin Nikolaevich; Vygotskij, Lev Semenovich.

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Classroom Talk

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Much classroom activity takes the form of talk. In recent decades, studies of teacher and student spoken language in the classroom have been undertaken from a variety of perspectives in applied linguistics, education, ethnography, and ethnomethodology. In particular, the analyses of talk between the teacher and the students, as well as among students, seek to understand how the spoken language and the discourse of the classroom affect learning (including language learning) and the development of sociocultural affiliation and identity (e.g., Watson-Gegeo, 1997).

To a great extent, spoken language and face-to-face interaction constitute the foundational aspects of both teaching and learning at school. Although specialists in education and teaching first became interested in the impact of classroom discourse and interaction on students' learning and the development of cognitive skills in the 1930s and 1940s, since that time, research on classroom talk has moved forward in a number of directions. In the study of language and applied linguistics, classroom talk has been the subject of considerable exploration in discourse, conversation, and text analyses, as well as sociolinguistic and sociocultural features of interaction.

The linguistic features of classroom talk were studied intensively in the 1970s and 1980s, when the uses of language and forms of interaction at school became an important venue in discourse, pragmatic, and literacy studies. Many of the early discourse analyses focused on the linguistic features of talk, narrative structure, common speech acts, their sequences, and the contexts in which they occurred, as well as the flow of classroom speech (e.g., Sinclair and Coulthard, 1975; Stubbs, 1983). As a matter of course, these studies approached classroom talk as

occurrences of conversational discourse, without attempting to discern the effect of the language spoken in the classroom on student learning and the educational processes. The analyses of the discourse flow and the language of interaction revealed that classroom talk is highly structured and routinized.

Building on the discourse-analytic foundation, the influential work of such sociolinguists and cognitive linguists as Cazden (2001), Gumperz (1982, 1986), Edwards and Mercer (1987), and Edwards and Westgate (1994) employed a combination of methodological perspectives in their explorations of the spoken discourse, language, and the structure of interaction in schooling. In general terms, sociolinguistics takes into account the social contexts and the structure of interaction to determine how they shape the spoken language. Sociolinguistic research methods in the classroom are usually complemented by ethnographic and pragmatic perspectives. Taken together, the findings of these studies have brought to the foreground issues of power, socioeconomic class, culture, and the social construction of experience in the classroom. Many, if not most, of these investigations point to the common and frequent mismatches between the normative properties of the school language and the language used in students' families.

A number of important and congruent findings have emerged from the study of classroom discourse and spoken language. One prominent thread in research is that a large majority of classroom interactions occur between the teacher and the students, individually or in groups, although some student–student interactions also take place during group or collaborative activities. Investigations carried out in different locations and countries around the world have shown that in classroom interactions, teachers talk approximately 75% of the time, with the remainder divided among the students. This pattern of talk seems to be comparatively consistent and, on the whole, resistant to change, despite the calls for its modification or attempted educational reforms (e.g., van Lier, 1988, 1996; Dysthe, 1996; Nystrand, 1997).

Another strand that runs through practically all studies is that classroom talk includes a number of predictable and observable sequences. Much of the classroom spoken language centers around knowledge and information elicitation turns between the teacher and the students, cohesive topical stretches of talk, or exchanges motivated by instructional activity in the classroom. In general terms, teacher–student exchanges reflect the unequal and hierarchical relationship of their participants in teacher-fronted classrooms (Edwards and Westgate, 1994).

The typical conversational patterns in such dyadic exchanges proceed along the lines of what has become known as Initiation-Response-Feedback (IRF) (also called Initiation-Response-Evaluation or Question-Answer-Comment), e.g.:

> Teacher: So, why did Peter run to the village?
> Student: For a joke.
> Teacher: Right!

In such routine classroom sequences, the teacher initiates the interaction or asks a question, the student responds or answers the question, and the teacher takes the concluding turn that provides a commentary (e.g., *So, Peter was bored*) or an evaluation (e.g., *Good/Great answer*).

Spoken language in the classroom is fundamentally different from many other types of talk, such as conversations among peers, coworkers, or family members. Some researchers, such as, for example, Mehan (1979) and van Lier (1996), have pointed out that IRF interactions are, by their nature, artificial and constrained and, for this reason, they cannot be analyzed as ordinary conversational discourse that follows ordinary interactional conventions. In their view, the institutionalized structure of classroom talk is crucially distinct when the teacher nominates topics and speakers, and controls turn-taking and the amount of participant talk.

The decades of investigating talk in the classroom have also identified the social, cultural, and behavioral practices that predominate in classroom discourse. Numerous studies carried out in such locations as the United States, the United Kingdom, and Scandinavia have demonstrated that complex systems of sociocultural prescriptions and expectations that exist in the wider society are strongly reflected in the norms of speaking and behaving in the classroom. Influential works by, for example, Heath (1983) and Gee (1990), highlight the pervasive discontinuities between the middle-class linguistic and interactional practices widely adopted in schooling and those in children's homes. The disparities between the rigidly prescribed and traditional rules of the classroom talk extend to the learning, socialization, and literacy development of the children in racially and linguistically diverse schools. Examples of language and interaction mismatches abound (e.g., Scollon and Scollon, 1981; Brock *et al.*, 1998):

- Spanish-speaking students in the United States are not always familiar with the predominant norms of classroom behavior when students are expected to be quiet while the teacher or another student is speaking.
- Native American students often participate in class conversations collectively, but not individually, as is usually expected in U.S. and Canadian schools.

- Ethnic Chinese students in U.K. and Australian schools rarely speak during requisite classroom activities and strongly prefer to work alone instead of working in groups, where much conversation is required.

In all, a large number of sociolinguistic and ethnographic studies have shown conclusively that the practice of classroom talk and the rigid norms of interaction in schooling represent culturally bound contexts for learning. As an outcome, the learning and literacy development of racial and linguistic minority students can be constrained in the classrooms where the structure of talk and discourse follows sociocultural prescriptions different from those in the students' communities outside the school.

From a different vantage point, research in discourse and conversation analysis, as well as language acquisition, has also shown that classroom talk has numerous important learning, cognitive, and social functions. The most common of these include exposure to language and linguistic input in the form of, for example, direct instruction, questions and answers, orientations to topics, information elicitations, explanations, hypothesis-making, and using evidence. In the following example of a story-circle discussion, the teacher attempts to elicit more elaborate explanations and evidential support for the students' in effect accurate appraisal of the story events:

> Teacher: Ok, so Laura got a pretty new dress…. A very nice dress. She must have liked it. So, did she like it?
> Several students together: Noooooooo.
> Teacher: She didn't? Well, no, she didn't…. Eh, ok, … so how do we know that she didn't?
> Sam: She said … I … I don't need it … it … the new one. So, she didn't.
> Teacher: Good job, Sam, good thinking…. Laura **really** didn't need this dress? Ok, or maybe, she didn't like it? Can we tell? How can we tell?

In addition to guiding the students to support their conclusion by means of the information in the story, the teacher also uses relatively advanced syntactic constructions, such as *must have liked it* and a number of complex sentences with noun clauses and negation.

More recently, with the increased understanding of learners' cognitive and linguistic development, investigations of classroom talk have continued to gain importance in language teaching and education of second language and minority students. In many cases, discourse and conversation analyses of classroom talk have also shown that language uses and interactions in educational contexts play an important role in learner language and cognitive development (see, e.g., Edwards and Westgate, 1994; Dysthe, 1996; Seedhouse, 2004). For instance, the uses of lexical and grammatical features in classroom talk

have allowed researchers to assess the value of classroom language exposure and input in language learning and the growth of first and second language literacy skills.

Among other venues, for example, the uses of display and referential questions in classroom talk have been extensively researched. The purpose of display questions is to elicit information already known to the interaction participant, who asks the question to lead to the display of knowledge or familiarity with information, e.g., "What do we call this thing?" On the other hand, referential questions elicit information that is not known to the speaker, e.g., "Why did you and Mary put this picture before that one?" Studies of referential questions have shown that their educational uses lead to different classroom exchanges that result in significantly longer speech events, higher rates of lexically and syntactically complex responses, and greater opportunities for learner language use (e.g., Edwards and Mercer, 1987; van Lier, 1996).

In-depth investigations of classroom talk have undertaken to gain insight into a large number of sociocultural and linguistic properties of interaction, such as equal and unequal power relationships, some aspects of turn-taking, talk management, and the timing and length of speech events (e.g., Markee, 2000). From the perspective of conversation analysis, classroom interactions have provided a fertile ground for examinations of repair, correction, self-correction, discourse, and face-saving markers in equal and unequal power educational contexts.

At present, sociologists, educators, and linguists almost universally recognize that social and cultural institutions of schooling are inseparable from how language and discourse are employed to transmit knowledge and socialize learners (e.g., Watson-Gegeo, 1997; Cazden, 2001).

See also: Conversation Analysis; Identity and Language; Institutional Talk; Socialization.

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Code Switching

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In many bi- and multilingual communities around the world, speakers need to choose, often at an unconscious level, which language to use in their interactions with other members of the community. One of the choices that bilingual speakers often make is to code-switch: that is, speakers switch back and forth between languages (or varieties of the same language), sometimes within the same utterance (*see* **Bilingualism**).

The motivations for code switching have often been treated simply as lists of possible functions for code switching. For example, Appel and Muysken (1987) cite five such functions. First, code switching may serve a referential function by compensating for the speaker's lack of knowledge in one language, perhaps on a certain subject. Second, it may serve a directive function by including or excluding the listener. Third, code switching may have an expressive function by identifying the speaker as someone having a mixed cultural identity. Fourth, it may have a phatic function indicating a change in tone in the conversation. And fifth, it may serve a metalinguistic function when code switching is used to comment on the languages involved.

While such lists are useful places to start, and no one would deny that code switching can certainly serve these functions, these types of lists fail to answer the question of what motivates speakers to make the choices they do at a particular point in a conversation. This article reviews the major proposals that have been advanced regarding the following question: why do speakers choose to engage in code switching in the first place?

Code Switching as a Research Topic

The current interest in code switching can be dated to a 1972 study of language use in Hemnesberget, a small village in northern Norway, conducted by Jan Blom and John Gumperz and described in a volume on sociolinguistics edited by Gumperz and Hymes (1972). In Hemnesberget, two varieties of Norwegian are used: Ranamål, a local dialect, and Bokmål, the standard variety. However, speakers' decisions regarding which variety to use are by no means arbitrary or haphazard. In general, Ranamål, the local variety, is used in local activities and relationships, reflecting shared identities with the local culture. In contrast, Bokmål is used in official settings such as school, church, and the media, communicating an individual's dissociation from the local group, i.e., not stressing his or her local ties.

Blom and Gumperz distinguish between two main functions of code switching: situational and

metaphorical. In situational code switching, which seems to be similar to the notion of diglossia, the speaker's choice of language is constrained by factors external to her/his own motivations, for example, the status of the interlocutor, the setting of the conversation, or the topic of conversation. So, in Hemnesberget, Blom and Gumperz observed that when an outsider joins a group of locals engaged in a conversation, the locals will often switch from the local variety, Ranamål, to the standard variety, Bokmål. In a later work, Gumperz (1982) introduces the distinction between 'we' and 'they' codes, which further amplifies the kind of linguistic alternation that occurs in situational code switching. 'We' codes are associated with home and family, while 'they' codes are associated with public discourse. In contrast to situational code switching, speakers may engage in a more complex type of code switching to create a 'metaphoric' effect. In his 1982 book, Gumperz explains that this metaphoric effect is a way for speakers to communicate "information about how they intend their words to be understood" (1982: 61). The classic example of metaphorical code switching from the Blom and Gumperz 1972 article is from a conversation at the local community administration office, where two villagers switch from the standard variety of Norwegian, in which they had been discussing official business, to the local variety to discuss family and other private affairs.

The Blom and Gumperz study is important because it illustrates that code switching is a complex, skilled linguistic strategy used by bilinguals to convey important social meanings above and beyond the referential content of an utterance. However, this is not to say that the Blom and Gumperz article has not generated some criticism over the years. In addition to some overlap and lack of clarity in the definitions of situational versus metaphorical switching, this model of code switching implies a sharp boundary between the two types of switching. In fact, Myers-Scotton (1993: 55) argues that the metaphorical meaning of a switched utterance is derived from its situationally based meaning. In any case, it is fair to say that this Blom and Gumperz study sparked an interest in studying code switching data in terms of a dynamic, interactional model that focuses on individual choices rather than static factors related to an individual's social status (*see* **Social Class and Status**).

The Audience-Centered Approach to Code Switching

Using a social psychological theory of language use, Howard Giles and his associates have developed a model of interpersonal communication that considers how speakers change the way they speak according to their audience. Giles refers to this type of strategy as accommodation (*see* **Speech Accommodation Theory and Audience Design**). Within Giles's speech accommodation theory, speakers are motivated by their desire for approval *vis-à-vis* their desire to dissociate themselves from the hearer. These concerns are cognitively salient and are realized by speech convergence (similar styles of speaking) or divergence (different styles of speaking). In fact, Giles predicted from these assumptions that the greater the effort in converging, the more favorably the individual will be evaluated by the listener. Thus, convergence and divergence are linguistic strategies to either decrease or increase social distance between participants in a conversation.

Although the premises behind speech accommodation theory have not been rigorously tested using code switching data in any comprehensive way, it is not difficult to see how the model could be used to explain speakers' motivations for code switching. For example, to test the prediction regarding how listeners will evaluate a speaker based on the speaker's perceived effort at converging, Giles *et al*. (1973) conducted an experiment involving bilingual English Canadian students who were asked to rate their reactions to a set of taped descriptions of a simple harbor scene given by bilingual French Canadian students. Different versions of this description – reflecting different levels of linguistic convergence to monolingual English – were presented to the English Canadian raters. The results of this experiment supported the prediction that the greater the effort in converging, the more favorably the speaker would be perceived. More specifically, the most convergent bilingual French Canadian student was viewed as the most considerate and the most concerned about bridging the cultural gap between French and English Canadians.

Speech accommodation theory has been successfully applied mainly in the contexts of dialect or style switching. However, the theory and its predictions still await further testing on code switching in bilingual settings.

The Conversation Analytic Approach to Code Switching

Both the Gumperz and the Giles models of code switching attend to extralinguistic factors such as topic, setting, and participants as influencing speakers' linguistic choices in conversations. Peter Auer (1984) questioned these assumptions and specifically questioned the way 'situation' was defined. For Auer, situation was a not a static set of contextual features that constrain linguistic choices. Rather, situation was seen as a dynamic phenomenon, emerging from

the sequential nature of a conversational interaction. Using the terminology and the techniques of ethnomethodology and conversation analysis, Auer argued that the meaning behind code switching must be interpreted on the basis of the linguistic choices made by the participants themselves in the preceding and following turns in a conversation. In other words, for Auer, social meaning is constituted locally rather than at a societal level (*see* **Conversation Analysis**).

Studies that use the technique of conversation analysis typically assign no independent semantic value to either of the languages involved. Instead, the conversational meaning of code switching results from the mere juxtaposition of the two languages, which generates contextualization cues whereby participants signal various contextual presuppositions. Thus, this language switching has a value of its own, independent of the direction of code alternation.

Some have argued that an approach that focuses on the negotiation of meaning as locally constructed cannot generalize across interactions in order to build explanatory theories. However, Auer (1995) has identified several basic code switching patterns that correspond to identifiable meanings, such as participant-related alternations, which reflect language competence or preference on the part of the speaker, and discourse-related alternations, which signal, for example, topic change (among other functions). Nevertheless, most researchers still recognize that in multilingual communities, each language available in the community indexes specific social and interactional meanings, and listeners tend to attribute consistent interpretations to the particular language choices that speakers make (*see* **Pragmatic Indexing**).

The Marked Model: A Speaker-Centered Approach to Code Switching

One of the more richly developed models designed to explain the sociopragmatic motivations for code switching is Carol Myers-Scotton's markedness model, which developed out of her field research in East Africa. The central premise of the markedness model is that speakers are rational actors who make code selections in such a way as to minimize costs and maximize rewards; that is, speakers are concerned with optimizing the outcomes of an interaction in their own favor.

This notion of the speaker as a rational actor making certain decisions about code choice, albeit at a largely unconscious level, is also evident in speech accommodation theory as well as in Gumperz's approach to code switching. However, unlike these other models, which consign the primary motivation for code switching to the addressee or to some other factor external to the speaker (e.g., topic or social setting), the markedness model is primarily a speaker-centered approach to communication.

Markedness and Communicative Competence

Within the marked model, all code choices fall along a continuum, as more or less marked or unmarked. With respect to bilingual speech, the unmarked choice simply refers to the linguistic variety that is expected, given the societal norms for that interaction. In contrast, marked choices fall at the other end of this continuum; that is, they are in some sense unusual or unexpected for the particular social interaction.

Furthermore, all speakers possess what Myers-Scotton calls a markedness evaluator, or the capacity to evaluate linguistic choices in terms of markedness, as part of their innate communicative competence (*see* **Communicative Competence**). While the capacity to assign markedness readings to linguistic choices is innate, the markedness continuum is established through exposure to the range of linguistic options used in the community.

Explaining Speakers' Choices

All code choices can ultimately be explained in terms of speakers' motivations to optimize the outcomes of the interaction. Most choices that speakers make affirm the norms that are in place for the particular exchange. These are unmarked choices, and they are usually the safest choices to make. The particular code used by the speaker is important only insofar as the participants view its status as marked or unmarked for that type of interaction. Thus, in a multilingual setting such as Nairobi, Kenya, the unmarked choice for most business transactions between strangers is Swahili. However, if the participants discover during the course of their conversation that they are members of the Luyia ethnic group, they will often switch into Luyia to continue the conversation. Luyia, then, becomes the unmarked choice, given the ethnic identity of the participants. However, code switching between Swahili and English within the same turn, within the same sentence, and even within words is typically the unmarked choice for informal social gatherings between educated, middle-class peers in Nairobi. Hence, the markedness of linguistic choices must be evaluated in terms of the norms for a particular exchange; the unmarked setting may even change within a conversation.

In contrast to the relative safety of unmarked choices, marked choices carry with them some element of risk for someone who wishes to defy the norms. Importantly, the interpretation that a marked choice receives derives from its contrast with the

unmarked choice for that exchange. That is, the un-expectedness, the 'otherness' of a marked choice carries significant social meaning. Marked choices are typically used to redefine the relationship between the speaker and the addressee, often as an expression of the speaker's authority or power, to indicate anger, or to assert one's ethnic identity (*see* **Identity and Language; Power and Pragmatics**). All these strategies can be subsumed under a single general principle: speakers make marked choices to negotiate a change in the expected social distance between the participants, either increasing or decreasing it.

The Significance of the Markedness Model

Since its formulation, the markedness model has been successfully used to explain code switching between languages, between dialects and registers, and even between stylistic choices in literary contexts. The strength of the markedness model is its ability to explain not only unmarked choices, which other models do as well, but also its ability to explain marked choices. Furthermore, the markedness model addresses the universal aspects of communicative competence in terms of the cognitive abilities that use readings of markedness to assess speakers' intentions. For these reasons, the markedness model is a powerful tool not only for code switching research, but also for any examination of the ways in which speakers use language to achieve interactional goals.

See also: Bilingualism; Communicative Competence; Conversation Analysis; Identity and Language; Power and Pragmatics; Social Class and Status; Speech Accommodation Theory and Audience Design.

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Codes, Elaborated and Restricted

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Bernstein was among the first scholars to focus on the correlation between the scholastic success (or failure) of a learner and the social class he or she belonged to. A student living in a well-off family, having many cultural stimuli (books, newspapers, periodicals, films, etc.) is bound to develop a rich and fully articulated language (a so-called 'elaborate code'), whereas a student who belongs to a working-class family and is exposed to poor linguistic and cultural stimuli, develops a fragmented, poor, syntactically deficient language (called a 'restricted code' by Bernstein) (see Bernstein, 1971–1975).

Regarding the Chomskyan theory that language naturally develops in the brain, due to the interaction of biologically innate structures and the environment to which the child is exposed, it may be the case that the data to which the child is exposed are so poor and confused that it is easy to demonstrate that the innate learning program prevails over the environmental stimuli, Bernstein therefore emphasizes the predominant role played by the environment in shaping the learning process. Of course, the correlation between social class is not, strictly speaking, without exceptions, because much of the learning process depends on the lifestyle of the family under consideration. There are exceptional working-class families where parents, contrary to all expectations, have good knowledge of the language and place great importance on culture, but the norm is that, within working-class families, cultural stimuli are less predominant than in more well-off families.

The problem, for sociologists, is how to offset the disadvantages of the pupils belonging to working-class families and how pedagogues (and teachers) can counteract such deterministic effects in the case of these children.

A possible solution to the problem is to ensure that the school (or the class) becomes another miniature family and that the negative effects of the families are compensated for by the pedagogical action of the school. The school should, therefore, be a positive environment in which pupils are exposed to positive cultural and affective stimuli that help their personalities grow and come to maturity. In such a model of the school, teachers lose their primary function of being transmitters of notions (knowledge, in general) and are required to take the roles of educators or pedagogues who act as models and provisionally replace (at least within the boundaries of the school) the family by setting good examples for the students, and, in particular, exposing them to the positive aspects of culture, intended as knowledge that interacts with the individual to make him or her grow up intellectually and emotionally. To compensate for the negative effects of families, in which dialogue and conversation have died or are confined to adjacency pairs of questions/answers or orders/replies, teachers have to play the role of communicators and stimulate communication. It is, in my view, impossible for a student to make progress in his or her language (to develop a more articulated written or oral mode of expression) unless he or she understands the function of communication, which is that of transmitting knowledge, but also of enhancing the expressive as well as the interpersonal function. To communicate is not only to express propositions (concerning others), but also to express propositions concerning what we really are and feel, and, by so doing, to interact with others, creating an intersubjective dimension in which social life is possible (see Capone, 2003).

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Cognitive Pragmatics

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Introduction

Cognitive pragmatics is concerned with the mental processes involved in intentional communication. Typically, studies within this area focus on cognitive processes underlying the comprehension of a linguistic speech act and overlook linguistic production or extralinguistic communication.

As far as cognitive processes are concerned authors in this field are interested in both the inferential chains necessary to understand a communicator's intention starting from the utterance he proffered and the different mental representations underlying the comprehension of various communicative phenomena as cognitive processes. Thus, a theory in cognitive pragmatics aims to explain what mental processes a person actually engages in during a communicative interaction (*see* **Shared Knowledge**).

Relevance theory (Sperber and Wilson, 1986/1995) is usually identified as the principal theoretical framework in the area of cognitive pragmatics (*see* **Relevance Theory**). Nonetheless, in the last decade, other theories have been developed. These include a far-reaching theory of the cognitive processes underlying human communication, known as the Cognitive Pragmatics theory (Airenti *et al.*, 1993a, 1993b; Bara, 2005), and the Graded Salience Hypothesis (Giora, 2003), a theory which focuses

on mental inferences underlying the comprehension of literal vs. figurative language (*see* **Metaphor: Psychological Aspects; Accessibility Theory**).

Describing the cognitive processes involved in communicative interaction is interesting not only for the study of such processes as fixed states – an approach that takes into consideration exclusively the final stage in healthy adult subjects – but also for the consideration of how a given function develops from infancy, through childhood, and to adulthood, and how it eventually decays in subjects with brain injuries (Bara, 1995). Such an approach makes it possible to better comprehend, from a cognitive perspective, how pragmatic competence develops and what neurocognitive structures might cause deficits in people's performance if damaged.

A closely related topic is the identification of the cognitive components that contribute to the realization of a complete pragmatic competence. From this perspective, it is important to consider the role played by a person's Theory of Mind and by the Executive Function (see below) during a communicative interaction.

Cognitive Pragmatics Theory

Airenti *et al.* (1993a, 1993b) presented a theory of the cognitive processes underlying human communication aiming to provide a unified theoretical framework for the explanation of different communicative phenomena (Bara, 2005). The authors proposed that their theoretical analysis holds for both linguistic and extralinguistic communication, and thus introduced, with reference to the interlocutors, the terms 'actor' and 'partner' instead of the classical 'speaker' and 'hearer.' The theory assumes that the literal meaning of an utterance is necessary but not sufficient to the partner in order for him or her to reconstruct the meaning conveyed by the actor, and that in order to understand the actor's communicative intention, the partner has to recognize a 'behavior game' the actor is proposing for him (the partner) to play. The behavior game is a social structure mutually shared by the participants of the communicative interaction. Suppose, for example, that while you are working in your office, a colleague walks in and says: [1] *It's snowing outside*. Although the literal meaning of the utterance is completely clear, you probably are utterly bewildered about how to respond. Only if [1] is understood as an invitation not to go outside, a request to close the window, a proposal to go skiing next week-end (that is, only if, in some way, the reason or reasons for uttering the expression were evident), will you be able to make the necessary inferences and answer appropriately. The utterance, pure and simple, without a game to refer to, has in itself no communicative significance whatsoever. Thus, an utterance extrapolated from its context of reference has no communicative meaning and cannot have any communicative effect on the partner.

Starting from the assumption that the communicative meaning of an utterance is intrinsically linked to the context within which it is proffered, Bosco *et al.* (2004a) defined a taxonomy of six categories of context: Access, Space, Time, Discourse, Behavioral Move, and Status. Using contextual information, the partner can identify the behavior game bid by the speaker, which allows him to fully comprehend the actor communicative intention.

Following the tenets of the Cognitive Pragmatics theory, Bucciarelli *et al.* (2003) proposed that two cognitive factors affect comprehension of various kind of pragmatic phenomena: the 'inferential load' and the 'complexity of mental representations' underlying the comprehension of a communicative act.

Inferential Load: Simple and Complex Speech Acts

Searle (1975) claimed that in speech act comprehension, the literal interpretation of an utterance always has priority with respect to any other interpretations derived from it. According to Searle, understanding an indirect speech act, e.g., [2] *Would you mind passing me the salt?*, is harder than understanding a direct speech act, e.g., [3] *Please pass me the salt*, because it requires a longer inferential process.

Bara and Bucciarelli (1998) provided empirical evidence that, beginning at two-and-a-half years of age, children find direct speech acts such as [4] *Please sit down*, and conventional indirects such as [5] *Would you mind closing the door?* equally easy to comprehend. In a further study, Bucciarelli *et al.* (2003) found that starting at age two-and-a-half years, children find both direct and conventional indirect speech acts easier to understand than nonconventional indirect speech acts, such as the utterance [6] *Excuse me, I'm studying* when it is a request to a partner who is hammering in a nail to stop making noise.

Using the tenets of Cognitive Pragmatics theory, it is possible to abandon the distinction between direct and indirect speech acts and adopt a new one based on the difference between inferential processes involved in comprehending simple as against complex communicative acts (Bara and Bucciarelli, 1998). According to the theory, the partner's understanding of any kind of speech act depends on the comprehension of the behavioral game bid by the actor; an agent will interpret an interlocutor's utterance based on the grounds that are assumed to be shared. In this perspective, the partner's difficulty in understanding a

communicative act depends on the inferential chain necessary to refer the utterance to the game intended by the actor. Direct and conventional indirect speech acts make immediate reference to the game, and thus are defined as 'simple speech acts.' On the other hand, nonconventional indirect speech acts can be referred to as 'complex speech acts,' because they require a chain of inferential steps due to the fact that the specific behavior game of which they are a move is not immediately identifiable. For example, to understand [4] and [5], it is sufficient for the partner to refer to the 'Ask for Something' game. In order to understand [6], a more complex inferential process is necessary: the partner needs to share with the actor the belief that when a person is studying, he needs silence and that since hammering is noisy [6] is a request to stop it is noisy. Only then, the partner can attribute to the utterance the value of a move in the 'Ask for Something' game. Thus, if the problem is how to access the game, the distinction between direct and indirect speech acts is not relevant. It is the complexity of the inferential steps necessary to refer the utterance to the game bid by the actor that accounts for the difficulties in speech act comprehension.

This distinction applies not only to standard communicative acts such as direct, conventional indirect, and nonconventional indirect speech acts, but also to nonstandard ones (such as ironic and deceitful) ones (Bara *et al.*, 1999a). The same distinction between simple and complex standard, ironic, and deceitful communicative acts holds for extralinguistic communication acts as well (*see* **Irony**). That is, the distinction holds also when the actor communicates with the partner only through gestures (Bosco *et al.*, 2004b) (*see* **Gestures, Pragmatic Aspects**).

The inferential load underlying a communicative act may explain the difference in difficulty that exists in the comprehension of different communicative acts pertaining to the same pragmatic category, such as between simple and complex standard communicative acts. To explain the difference in difficulty that might occur among communicative acts pertaining to a different pragmatic category, such as between a direct communicative act and a deceitful communicative act, is necessary to consider the complexity of the mental representations involved in their comprehension.

Complexity of Mental Representations

Still within the framework of Cognitive Pragmatics theory and along with the same complexity of the inferential load involved, Bucciarelli *et al.* (2003) described an increasing difficulty in comprehending simple communicative acts of different sorts: simple standard, simple deceitful, and simple ironic communicative acts.

According to the theory, in standard communication, default rules of inference are used to understand another person's mental states; default rules are always valid unless their consequences are explicitly denied. Indeed, in standard communication, what the actor says is in line with his private beliefs. Direct, conventional indirect, and nonconventional indirect speech acts are all examples of standard communication. In terms of mental representations, to comprehend a standard communicative act, the partner has to simply refer the utterance proffered by the actor to the behavior game he bids.

On the other hand, nonstandard communication such as irony and deceit involves the comprehension of communicative acts *via* the blocking of default rules and the occurrence of more complex inferential processes that involve conflicts between the beliefs the actor has shared with the partner and the latter's private beliefs. In the comprehension of irony and deceit, the mental representations involved produce a difference between what the actor communicates and what he privately entertains. It follows that, along with the same complexity of the inferential load involved, standard communicative acts are easier to deal with than nonstandard pragmatic phenomena.

According to Bucciarelli *et al.* (2003), in the case of the comprehension of deceit, the partner has to recognize the difference between the mental states that are expressed and those the actor privately entertains. Consider for instance the following example: Mark and Ann share that the lecture they just attended was incredibly boring. Later Ann meets John and tells him that Mark and she attended a tedious lecture. In the afternoon also Mark meets John, who asks him about the lecture. Actually, Mark is annoyed with John because John did not go to the lecture and he does not want John to know that he feels he wasted the whole morning. Mark does not know that John has already met Ann, thus he answers: [7] *It was really interesting!* John can understand that Mark is trying to deceive him because he recognizes the difference between the mental state that Mark is expressing and the one that he truly and privately entertains.

A statement, instead, becomes ironic when, in addition to the awareness of this difference, the partner also recognizes that the mental states expressed contrast with the scenario that he shares with the actor. For example, some months later, during a chat with Mark, Ann asks: *Do you remember the lecture that we attended some months ago?* Mark answers: [8] *It was really interesting!* What makes this utterance ironic is the fact that both interlocutors share that

the lecture had actually been boring. Thus, the difference between irony and deceit lies not in the partner's awareness of the difference between the mental states that the actor expressed and those that he actually entertains, but in his awareness that he does or does not share this difference with the actor.

In the case of irony, the partner has to represent not only the discrepancy between the mental states that the actor expressed and those that he privately entertains, but also that such awareness is shared with the actor. This makes an ironic communicative act more difficult to comprehend than a deceitful one.

Bucciarelli *et al*. (2003) showed the existence of an increase in difficulty in the comprehension of simple standard communicative acts, simple deceits, and simple ironies with an experiment carried out on children from two-and-a-half to seven years of age. The authors also pointed out that the same children show a similar predicted gradation of difficulty in understanding the same pragmatic phenomena, both when these are expressed by linguistic speech acts and when these are expressed by communicative gestures. Regardless of the communicative channel used by the actor, linguistic or extralinguistic, children find simple standard speech acts easier to comprehend than simple deceits, which are, in turn, easier to comprehend than simple ironic communicative acts.

Finally, an overall consideration of the mentioned results makes it possible to conclude that all of the theoretical predictions (both derived from the Cognitive Pragmatics theory and grounded on a person's cognitive processes underlying the communicative comprehension) hold true for the same pragmatic phenomena whether expressed by linguistic speech acts or by gestures. These results seem to indicate that linguistic and extralinguistic communicative acts share the most relevant mental processes in each of the specific pragmatic phenomena investigated and suggest that pragmatic competence shares the same cognitive faculty – regardless of the input processed – be it linguistic or extralinguistic. It is possible to interpret such empirical evidence as being in favor of a unified theoretical framework of human communication in which linguistic and extralinguistic communication develop in parallel being different aspects of a unique communicative competence (see Bara and Tirassa, 1999; Bara, 2005) (*see* **Communicative Principle and Communication**).

Cognitive Pragmatics and Development

In this section, we shall examine the empirical evidence in favor of the existence of cognitive processes of increasing complexity that underlie different pragmatic phenomena. The developmental domain is particularly interesting for this aim because it makes it possible to observe errors in the comprehension of different kinds of pragmatics tasks that allow us to falsify our hypotheses regarding the complexity of the mental processes involved in specific phenomena. However, adult subjects possess a fully developed cognitive system and communicative competence, and thus they do not show any interesting errors in comprehending or producing different kinds of communicative acts; it is only possible to analyze their time of reaction in solving such tasks.

On the other hand, if inferential processes and mental representations of increasing complexity underlie the comprehension of various kind of pragmatic phenomena, then it is possible to explain why, during the development of children's communicative competence, some communicative acts are understood and produced before others are. For example, children initially only understand sincere communicative acts and only later on in their development do they start comprehending, for example, deceit and irony. Children's ability to deal with mental representations and inferential chains of increasing complexity develops with age, and this fact helps explain the development of their pragmatic competence.

From this perspective, the increasing capacity to construct and manipulate complex mental representations is involved in the emergence of preschoolers' and kindergarten student's capacity to deceive. A deceptive task could be made easier to comprehend by reducing the number of characters, episodes, and scenes involved in the task, and by including a deceptive context (Sullivan *et al*., 1994).

Likewise the ability to comprehend and produce different forms of ironies involves an increasing and sophisticated inferential ability. Lucariello and Mindolovich (1995) carried out a study on the ability of 6- and 8-year-old children to provide ironic endings to unfinished stories. The authors claimed that the recognition and the construction of (situational) ironic events involve the ability to manipulate the representations of events. These representations have to be critically viewed, and disassembled in order to create new, different, and ironic event structures. Also, different forms of irony behave in different ways, as the authors' experiments show. Their results show that older children construct more complex ironic derivations from the representational base than younger children do.

Just as it is possible to better understand the development of pragmatic competence by considering the cognitive processes involved in a specific communicative act, it also is possible to explain deficits in performance in cases of brain damage. The ability of children with closed head injury to solve pragmatic tasks is specifically impaired (for a review, see Bara *et al*., 1999b). These subjects performed worse than

did their normal peers in specific pragmatic tasks such as bridging the inferential gap between events in stereotypical social situations and tasks such as comprehending utterances that require inferential processes because of their use of idiomatic and figurative language (Dennis and Barnes, 1990).

Cognitive Pragmatics and Brain Damage

Neuropsychological diseases affect communicative performance in various ways, depending on which relevant cognitive subsystem is damaged. The information obtained by studying these abnormal processes provides us with an opportunity to better understand the architecture of the brain/mind and its relationship to pragmatic competence (Tirassa, 1999; Bara and Tirassa, 2000). Acquired brain damage impairs certain cognitive processes while leaving others unaffected. For example, it is well-documented in the literature that aphasic patients with left-brain damage have residual pragmatic competence despite their language impairment.

On the other hand, what different cerebral injuries have in common is a damaged capacity to deal with phenomena that require complex mental processes in order to be understood. In particular, if the tasks require more complex inferences, then this capacity seems to be more damaged than in other cases, as we will show later in this section. Results like these seem to confirm the assumption that different pragmatic phenomena require the activation of increasingly complex cognitive processes.

McDonald and Pearce (1996) found that traumatic brain injured patients (TBI) do not have difficulty in the comprehension of written sincere exchanges such as [9] Mark: *What a great football game!*; Wayne: *So you are glad I asked you?*, but they have several problems, compared to the normal control subjects, in comprehending ironic exchanges such as [10] Mark: *What a great football game!*; Wayne: *Sorry I made you come*. The authors gave the subjects the same experimental material in auditory form and found that the patients' performance did not improve. The authors concluded that TBI patients have difficulty in comprehending irony and that, even if the tone of voice usually facilitates the comprehension of ironic remarks, it is not sufficient on its own.

Furthermore, McDonald (1999) found that, surprisingly, TBI patients have no problem understanding written ironic utterances such as [11] Tom: *That's a big dog*; Monica: *Yes, it's a miniature poodle*. The author suggested that [11] might require a shorter inferential chain compared to [10] in order to be understood. Indeed, in comprehending [11], it is sufficient to understand what Monica answers as meaning that Tom's statement meant the opposite of what

it said. In [10], however, Wayne's response is not only a rejection of the original comment, but an allusion to Mark's actual reaction to the game. Thus, there were at least two necessary inferential steps in the comprehension process. Such findings are in line with the proposal that different kinds of irony may vary in their difficulty of being understood, according to the complexity of the required inferential load (Bara *et al.*, 1999a).

Particularly interesting from our perspective are studies that showed that the decay of pragmatic competence in closed head injured subjects (CHI) reflects the same type of development that is observed in normal children, i.e., the capacities acquired later in the development of the pragmatic ability are the most damaged. Using a linguistic experimental protocol, Bara *et al.* (1997) tested a group of CHI subjects and found that specific pragmatic tasks such as the comprehension of nonstandard communication, e.g., deceit and irony, are more difficult than tasks requiring only simple mental representations, such as the comprehension of standard communication involving only direct, conventional, and nonconventional indirect speech acts. In addition, the authors found no differences in patients' comprehension of direct and conventional indirect speech acts. The same results were observed in the performance of children aged 2 to 6 years old who were tested by the same experimental protocol (Bara and Bucciarelli, 1998). It should also be noted that Bara *et al.* (1997) presented two classical tests on false belief to CHI patients in order to measure their theory of mind, but did not find any significant difference with the control group of children who were not brain damaged. Thus, the patients' poor performance on pragmatic tasks cannot be ascribed to a deficit of the Theory of Mind; that is, their poor performance cannot be ascribed to an inability to understand another person's mental states.

Moreover, Bara *et al.* (2000) used a similar extralinguistic version of the same pragmatic experimental protocol and evaluated the comprehension of standard communication, i.e., simple and complex communicative acts, and nonstandard communication, i.e., deceit and irony. Such a protocol contains videotaped scenes wherein the pragmatic phenomena are presented using extralinguistic means, such as pointing or clapping. The subjects were firstly a group of children 2–6 years of age and secondly a group of Alzheimer's disease patients, and found that children show the same tendency in the development of extralinguistc competence that was observed by Bara and Bucciarelli (1998) in the linguistic domain. In addition, the authors observed a similar tendency toward decay in the Alzheimer's patients' extralinguistic competence: the nonstandard extralinguistic tasks

are understood less well than are the standard communicative tasks. Finally, the trend of decaying pragmatic competence in the Alzheimer patient group matched the results obtained by CHI patients, when tested according to the same extralinguistic protocol (Bara *et al.*, 2001). The CHI subjects were also given several neuropsychological tests, but no statistical correlation between the subjects' performance on the pragmatic protocol and their performance on these collateral neuropsychological tests was found. Thus, the patient's poor performance cannot be ascribed to a deficit in their executive functioning.

As already observed for the development of pragmatic linguistic and extralinguistic competence, the empirical data concerning brain damaged subjects seem to be in favor of the existence of a unified pragmatic competence which is independent of the input – whether it is linguistic or extralinguistic. That is, the comprehension of speech acts and extralinguistic communicative acts shares the most relevant mental processes when tested on different pragmatic phenomena, and the pragmatic competence seems to be independent of the expressive means used to realize it.

Cognitive Pragmatics and the Executive Function

While the literature provides empirical evidence that mental processes involved in various pragmatic tasks can be ordered according to increasing difficulty, as we have seen above, in order fully comprehend pragmatic competence from a cognitive perspective, we need to consider also a further factor affecting the human ability to communicate: the executive functions.

The Executive Function is a cognitive construct used to describe the goal-directed behaviors that are mediated by the frontal lobes. The Executive Function guides a person's actions and enables him to behave adaptively and flexibly; it includes cognitive capacities such as planning, inhibition of dominant responses, flexibility, and working memory.

Barnes and Dennis (2001) have shown that, in addition to a deficient inferential ability, also a reduction of working memory and metacognitive skills may be invoked to explain closed-head injured children's problems in comprehending stories. Working memory provides the necessary resources for computing inference in ongoing text comprehension; metacognitive skills are used when checking if, and when, an inference needs to be made. The authors tested children with severe to mild head injury on their ability to comprehend brief written stories, and found inferencing deficits in children with severe (but not with mild)

head injury; these children had problems linking their general knowledge to the particular wording of the text. In general, when the metacognitive demands and the pressure on working memory were reduced, children with severe head injuries did not show any deficiencies in inferencing compared to the development in normal children or their mildly head-injured peers. Working memory also plays a role in explaining the poor ability to comprehend written stories that is observed in children with hydrocephalus, a neuro-developmental disorder accompanied by increased pressure of the cerebrospinal fluid on the brain tissue. Children with hydrocephalus, when compared to the control group, show increasing difficulty drawing on information from an earlier read sentence when trying to understand a new sentence, the greater the distance between the two texts. Thus, while these children do not seem to have a fundamental problem in making inferences, their poor performance is mainly due to a deficit in their working memory (Barnes *et al.*, 2004).

As to the role of other executive functions, Channon and Watts (2003) examined the ability of CHI patients to comprehend brief vignettes involving pragmatic judgement and the relationship between this activity and some executive functions: working memory, inhibition, and the ability to organize and plan appropriate responses in a certain context. The authors found that only the ability to solve the inhibition task, which required the subjects to inhibit dominant words and generate words that completed sentences with nonsensical endings, correlates with the pragmatic comprehension task. No association was found with the other executive skills.

From a neuropsychological perspective, intact frontal lobes are critical to executive functioning, and because traumatic brain injury often results in damage to these areas, pragmatic deficits shown by these patients can be explained by a principal Executive Function impairment. From this perspective, the deficits in planning and monitoring of behavior that are usually observed in such patients seem to explain the difficulty these subjects have in adhering to the structure of conventional discourse (McDonald and Pearce, 1998).

To conclude, theoretical and empirical studies in the literature seem to suggest that in order to explain people's pragmatic competence, it is necessary to take into account the role played by at least three elements: mental processes, namely, the inferential load and the complexity of the mental representations; the Theory of Mind; and the Executive Function. Whereas the empirical studies mainly focus on the linguistic competence that is needed to realize various pragmatic tasks, the perspective should be widened to include

a methodical comparison with extralinguistic competence. In order to establish whether, or not, the cognitive components that make these two different means of communication are the same in both cases. Finally, a complete theory in the cognitive pragmatic domain should be able to explain not only adult normal subjects' ability to communicate, but also the development and the decay of this capacity in brain-damaged patients.

See also: Communicative Principle and Communication; Gestures, Pragmatic Aspects; Irony; Metaphor: Psychological Aspects; Pragmatics: Overview; Relevance Theory; Shared Knowledge; Speech Acts; Speech Acts, Literal and Nonliteral.

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Cognitive Technology

B Gorayska

Cognitive Technology (CT) as a Scholarly Discipline

The primary area of inquiry is Technological Cognition (TC), which examines what happens to humans when they augment themselves with technologies, either physically or cognitively, to amplify their natural capabilities. The aim of CT/TC is to formulate and to test theories of human cognitive processes that interact with technological artifacts and are partially formed by those interactions. As a fluid, symbiotic hybrid of the embodied mind and its tools, such a technologized cognition has epistemic effects: It affords an understanding and control of the external world that otherwise would not have been possible. As rational agents, humans develop and use tools to empower themselves in the *real* world which exists independently of them. This places CT/TC firmly in the realist tradition, in direct contrast with the assumptions of postmodernism: if the external world were merely a social construct, where reality is reduced to, and interpreted as, *text*, tool augmentation other than that related to natural language (e.g., metaphor) would be superfluous and CT/TC would lose its *raison d'être*. The belief that the human mind *is* molded by tools and open to scientific scrutiny also dissociates CT/TC from any theoretical framework that is essentially behaviorist in nature.

Methodology for Tool Design

Dialectic adaptation of the mind to the operations of its tools – a process that is often tool-coerced – leads to technological change. Increased technological sophistication forces us to make ethical choices. Of interest here is a search for design methods and practice capable of eliminating, before they even arise, any undesirable effects of tool use on users. The main question is "Which design methods and practice will result in tool-mind-world hybrids that optimally benefit humankind?" CT, understood as a methodology for design, is thus a process: an approach to design, not a product of such a design. We can design tools in accordance with CT principles, informed by the theoretical developments of TC, but those tools are not in themselves instances of CT.

The search for ethical factors in tool design means that studies undertaken within CT are primarily about people and not about the technologies that augment them. This distinguishes CT from investigations of the so-called human factors in designing human-centered systems that promote 'naturalness' in human-tool exchanges and aim at designing ergonomic, user-friendly tools, in order to fully accommodate the limits of human performance and fully exploit the advantages of the user (as it is practiced in areas such as Cognitive Ergonomics, Cognitive Engineering, and Engineering Psychology). What such practices do not overtly address is the question of who really stands to benefit. Nor do they explicitly consider that every tool is a prosthetic device (some mental functions become redundant), that the user/tool relation is of one-to-many (with the dangers of stress overload), that sophisticated tools can obscure dignity at work, that they separate people from their natural habitat or change their perception of their own competence. By contrast, CT aims to bring humane factors to bear on design. The tool-mind-world hybrids designed according to the principles of CT are intended to be essentially anthropocentric, i.e., they maximize human (user) benefits (see **Figure 1**).

Mind-Amplifying Tool

CT takes a broad view of technology. All artifacts are in some measure cognitive tools. We need to understand them in terms of their goals and computational constraints as well as in terms of the external physical and social environments that shape and afford cognition. Any technology that serves that purpose by providing a tool has implications for CT/TC.

Cognitive tools can be situated on a continuum of purposeful use between the extremes of raw material and the brain. They can be more or less externalized or detached from the brain or the body (cf. bionic prostheses incorporating direct brain implants with word processors vs. spades). The greater the detachment, the lower the brain-tool connectivity and alignment. The lower the connectivity, the lower the ability to attend to the feedback the brain receives at

Figure 1   Anthropocentric CT design versus traditional human-centered design.

the interface; consequently, the less the need for people to adapt to the tool. Within this continuum, we can distinguish between natural technologies and fabricated technologies.

Natural Technologies

Natural technologies are instances of mental *techné*, i.e., learned skills and mental competencies. Examples proposed within CT include a body image generator responsible for perceiving one's own body size, the cognitive processes within the prefrontal cortex responsible for our social competence, or the cognitive processes evolved in autism. Here also belong learned aspects of natural language (*see* **Whorf, Benjamin Lee**), narratives, mnemonic systems for improving memory, task-dedicated cognitive processes in logic and arithmetic, or metaphors in cultural heritage. The mind itself can be viewed as a complex, goal-driven toolkit of natural cognitive artifacts that bootstrap on what is hard-wired, in order to make available a much bigger set of such artifacts. The mind thus facilitates interactions with the environment through the organization and integration of perceptual data, memory, and goal-management.

Fabricated Technologies

While some fabricated technologies are tangible (pens, paper, computers, mechanical gadgets, telecommunication devices, medical equipment, or flight simulators are obvious examples), others are not, but nonetheless they affect our mental capabilities and competences: e.g., writing systems, narratives, artificial languages, and so on.

Cybernetic systems such as robots can become a scientist's cognitive tools if they are built to further scientific progress. They have been applied to understand how categorical perception works, how intelligence of natural systems is embodied, and to the question of whether there is a fundamental distinction between humans and machines. In artificial intelligence, computation has been employed to formulate and to test theories of intelligence or the nature of consciousness. In computational linguistics, automated grammars have aided linguists in their efforts to understand the workings of natural language.

Any systematized environment that constrains cognition results in cognitive change. Perhaps the best example is a prison system where people become habituated to its inherent operations; many are unable to function effectively upon release. Or, take an organizational merger: Its most challenging aspect is consolidating the diversity of employees' mental cultures.

Perspectives on Mind Change

The simplest form of cognitive change is learning, and many technologies are purposefully developed to this end. While people will adapt to any technology, the extent of their adaptation depends on the extent of the cognitive fit between the human mind and the augmenting technology. When some mental processes are taken over by technology, the relevant natural technologies augment, too. A subsequent absence of the tool may then render the acquired *techné* ineffective. (As an example, consider the impact of word processors on generating texts.) Such a technological augmentation is not permanent and can be unlearned.

Technological augmentation can also have lasting effects. Longitudinal studies in archaeology reveal that cognitive fluidity can be directly linked to tool use. Studies in primatology and developmental psychology show that language constructs, in particular storytelling, played a crucial role in handling the complexity of the social dynamics responsible for the evolution of the primate brain. Social and narrative intelligence requires a larger neocortex, hence a bigger brain size.

Can we predict *a priori* the long-term effects of a given technology on the human user? The difficulty of this question has been recognized with respect to language. The meaning of a linguistic symbol depends on how, and in which context, it is used (*see* **Context, Communicative; Wittgenstein, Ludwig Josef Johann**). Language becomes alive and unfolds its history via its interaction with people. Meanings transform across different epochs and different cultures as a result of interpreting and reinterpreting language. The context of its use, and the medium through which it is used, have a bearing on language itself. Consider the impact of the Internet and mobile phones (texting) on the art of conversation or the spelling of words. The same is true of any artifact. Internal structure of design and a form perceived at the interface are insufficient to derive the social and personal significance or the subsequent development of a piece of technology. The latter can only happen in the context in which it is used. In the absence of such context, there is no unique answer to the question "What is this artifact for?" Its affordances for action (the toolness of a tool) only become manifest when the mind comes in contact with it in some context.

To predict the consequences of tool use, it is necessary (though not sufficient) to understand the social, psychological, and cognitive mechanisms that create the need for technological augmentation. A theoretical framework with a potential for such investigations must necessarily deal with motives

and benefits, in other words, with *relevance*. Within CT, the Theory of Relevance, originally developed with respect to language use (*see* **Relevance Theory**), has been broadened to encompass all cognitive processes (symbolic and connectionist) involved in action planning and goal management. This extended framework can be invoked to explain the modularity of mind and remove a variety of difficulties experienced in the symbol-driven acquisition of natural technologies or the design of fabricated ones. It provides grounds for classifying a dedicated inferential comprehension module as an instance of natural CT. By recognizing a multitude of cognitive interfaces (e.g., between perception, consciousness, knowledge, motivation, emotion, action, natural/fabricated technologies, external situations), the extended framework can assist the exploration of (1) the extent to which the constraints on our mental life are biologically or technologically determined, and (2) how language *techné* interacts with other aspects of cognition, facilitating, ultimately, the choice between various proposals for developing a humanized linguistic technology. Even so, the big question, whether, and to what extent, technology can be humanized, remains an open question (*see* **Adaptability in Human-Computer Interaction**).

See also: Adaptability in Human-Computer Interaction; Relevance Theory; Whorf, Benjamin Lee; Wittgenstein, Ludwig Josef Johann.

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Comics, Pragmatic Aspects of

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A comic (plural: comics), also known as (a) comic strip(s), is a narrative form that combines written text (*see* **Text and Text Analysis**) and pictorial elements.

A comic consists of a series of interrelated picture/text combinations. Each single picture stands in direct relation to the preceding units; this sequential order constitutes a chain of reference. Comparable to other serial productions of mass media such as soap operas or book and film series, comics have a continuous cast of main characters. The fact that the reader is

familiar with the protagonists' background serves as another important point of reference.

Comics either appear as regular strips in printed media (comic strips), in comic magazines with contributions by various authors, or as comic books featuring a main character and his or her story or episodes.

Origins of the Comics

Although the historic roots of comics can be traced back to the 18th and 19th centuries, to political cartoons and illustrated narratives such as *Max und Moritz* (1865) by Wilhelm Busch, comics in their modern form are a relatively recent phenomenon. At the end of the 19th century, American newspapers included comic strips in their Sunday supplement to attract more readers. These humorous picture-stories, also known as 'the funnies' or comic strips, gave their name to a new genre (*see* **Genre and Genre Analysis**), the comics, which is not restricted to funny stories only.

Narrative Means: How Comics Tell a Story

Is there a language specific to comics? At first sight, expressions like 'zooom,' 'grrowr!' and 'splash!' are likely to be identified as typical expressions of comic-language. While such expressions are certainly characteristic of the medium, they do not touch its essence. Among the great variety of narrative means of the comic, the most important feature is the interdependence of the illustrations and written text. Both elements are bearers of meaning, but it is their **combination** that makes up the narrative.

While the narrative may have any imaginable content – there are adventure stories, political satire, family series, the classical Greek mythologies and the Bible retold, comics for children, so-called adult comics with erotic or pornographic components, etc. – what all comics have in common is the use of this specific means of telling a story.

A comic consists of minimally two picture–text units, called panels. Panels are usually square boxes containing an image and sometimes text, bounded by a thin frame line. These panels are to be read in sequential order, comparable to a normal text, and this sequential relation distinguishes a comic from a mere accumulation of pictures. This sequence distinguishes a comic from a cartoon, which consists of a single picture-frame only.

If a comic is to be read like a text, the author has to create coherence within the story. He achieves this by forming a 'chain of reference.' This chain of reference will enable the reader to recognize the different panels as narrative elements of the same story, comparable to the process of reading a text – the reader knows that the preceding words of a sentence are connected to the following words and will create a coherent narrative (*see* **Pragmatics of Reading**).

To illustrate this, let's imagine an episode with the world's most famous duck, Walt Disney's Donald Duck. A first panel might show Donald Duck sitting on a bench; the second one, Donald walking through a park; the last one, Donald in front of a house.

Theoretically, the reader could interpret this pictures as three separate pictures: 'Donald sits on a bench' / 'Donald takes a stroll in the park' / 'Donald stands in front of his/a house.'

But the reader knows, by means of identical reference, that every Donald appearing in the panels following the first panel is the same protagonist in the same story. That way, the reader can fill in the narrative gaps and verbalize this sequence of panels as 'Donald sat on a bench and walked home through a park.' As most readers will be familiar with the small suburban house that Donald lives in, the author can draw on this familiarity with Donald's surroundings as a further point of reference.

This system of reference is based on two *narrative strings*. One string refers to the space or environment where the action occurs, the other refers to the action itself.

In this way, once introduced, the environment 'park' remains valid until a new environment appears. The depiction of the park can be reduced to a single tree, a meadow, a flower – it may even disappear entirely, with no harm done to text comprehensibility, as the reader will still know the setting to be a park.

The other string deals with the *action*. Here, too, an element, mostly a living being such as Donald Duck in the example above, refers to its first introduction and can be reduced in various ways, e.g., to a silhouette, a hand, a hat floating on the water (as will happen to such an unlucky person as Donald). The separation between these two narrative strings, environment and action, is not absolute, though; an element of the environment can become bearer of an action, for instance, when a rock gives up its function as environment and falls down to block the road instead. Conversely, Donald's car can change function: when he parks it in front of his house and walks away, the car becomes part of the environment and is no longer an element of the action string.

In comics, a story can do without a description of the environment, but not without action. However, even though the description of action thus has priority over that of the environment, the latter has another, equally important function: it determines the rhythm of the narrative. An environment drawn in

every detail will slow down the narrative rhythm, since the reader is likely to spend more time contemplating the picture and to study all the details shown, whereas a picture stripped of all environmental details will speed up the pace of the narration (see below, Narrative Rhythm).

Playful Conventions: How to Read the Narrative Codes

Most readers of comics have been familiar with the genre since childhood, hence know to decipher the conventions of the codes specific to comics. There is no prescriptive list of given codes, comparable to punctuation in a written text, such as periods or commas. While certain conventions have been established, each author still has the freedom to disregard them, to play with them, and to invent new means of structuring a story – the only constraint being that the reader still must be able to grasp the meaning.

Common Narrative Codes in Comics

Arrangement of Panels   Panels are usually arranged in sequential order, to be read from left to right and top to bottom, according to the usual direction of reading of the Latin alphabet. Deviations are marked by numbers or by arrows indicating the new direction. Deviations of the ordinary sequential pattern are often used to express the rupture of the normal (i.e., linear) flow of narrated time and space, for example, to illustrate simultaneous action or a particular protagonist's train of thought, as in daydreaming. Panels may have subpanels. A large panel may take up an entire page in a comic book, or be divided into subpanels forming a whole; so-called split-panels are arranged to show the details of an action happening, comparable to slow motion in a film.

Panel Frame   The panel frame usually consists of a straight line forming a square frame. It indicates the boundaries of the image-text component. The form of the frame is included in the playful way that comics handle narrative conventions. The frame will become more than a mere designating line and start being a bearer of meaning, for instance, when a story within a story is being told. A flashback is marked by wavy or punctuated frame lines, zigzagging lines will express strong emotions or pain. Irrespective of its shape, the frame's function becomes clear within the entire context. Some authors will occasionally omit the frame altogether. By doing so, they strip the topic of its environmental context. Thus, they create a moment of concentration, the effect resembling a close-up in film. Because almost anything goes in this genre

(as long as the readers can construct meaning from the context), there are even authors that do without frames altogether.

Balloons   Balloons are another vital constitutive element of the comic's narrative codes. They contain words or thoughts attributed to figures in the panel, and indicate who is speaking or thinking. The basic form of the balloon is a round or square frame containing the text; it usually hovers above the speaker's head like a small cloud, a small tail pointing to the speaker's head.

Balloons containing speech are conventionally drawn with a continuous line; balloons containing thoughts replace the balloon-tail by a line of bubbles. Thought-balloons are mostly used for characters that cannot speak in real life, such as animals, e.g., Jim Davis' 'Garfield,' the cat. There are, of course, infinite variations on this theme: whispering is illustrated by an interrupted line; a zigzagging balloon-tail indicates a voice as heard over a telephone; a balloon in zigzag-shape shows the speaker to be very angry; little icicles hanging on the balloon's lower frame lines indicate words spoken in mood; a balloon wreathed in flowers shows the character's effort to sweet-talk someone.

Colored comics will add color to their balloons and thus enhance the emotional impact of the text spoken or thought. A green balloon will signify envy, a red one anger or pain. A black balloon may even be drawn to resemble a somber storm cloud looming above the character's head, showing his or her dark mood.

Several balloons in a panel, as in a dialog, are to be read according to the direction of reading. Balloons can also contain symbols such as a light bulb (inspiration), a heart (love), or a saw (emulating the sound of snoring).

Written Text

There are three main groups of written text in comics:

a. text within a balloon
b. text within the panel
c. text at the edge of, or between panels, so-called caption texts.

Text Within a Balloon   Written texts in comics not only transmit their message by the words themselves, but also through the typographical appearance of the lettering. The latter is especially the case for the first two kinds of text mentioned, (a) and (b).

One important feature of the balloon text is its size. Small letters in a relatively oversized balloon indicate a low voice or a whisper; big letters, almost bursting

out of their balloon, indicate a loud voice or scream. The size of the lettering thus compensates for the absence of sound in the comic medium.

Various kinds of typography can be used to characterize the speaker. Comic author Walt Kelly, for instance, does this with great artistic subtlety in his story 'Pogo' (cf. **Figure 1**). This example shows three types of balloons as well as three types of lettering. The tortoise shown in the first panel is communicating in thought-balloons, according to the convention that animals do not speak. The letters are written in the widely used conventional capitals.

The second panel contains the balloon with the monologue of the deacon, a stiff-upper-lip persona forced to do kitchen-chores ("me, an administrative advisor, put to work peeling knockwursts and other vegetables"). His speech is contained by an ornamental balloon-frame, resembling ancient parchments. The letters are written in an accordingly old-fashioned way, made to resemble Gothic type, using capital and small letters.

Note, in the third panel, how small the letters ' – sigh – ' appear in the balloon. The last panel introduces an even different type of balloon; it is drawn to resemble a small cloud emerging from the bag containing the sausages and it contains the word 'chomp!' (an expression that combines the verb and the sound – see the next section).

So, just like the form of the panel or the balloon, the form of the letters, too, can bear meaning. Words cried in anguish will appear shaky or fragmented; old-fashioned typography and ornamental lettering is used to evoke an atmosphere of once-upon-a-time.

Text Outside Balloons   Since comics cannot represent sound, they make it visible. This is achieved with the aid of sound-imitating or -describing words, also called onomatopoeia – the 'zooom,' 'grrowr!' and 'splash!' mentioned above. Whenever the text is not confined to the balloon, there are even fewer limits on the imagination of the author as to their typography. As in the balloon texts, big-sized lettering indicates loudness.

The source of the sound can be inferred from its position in the panel. 'Plitch,' a sound describing a dripping faucet, will appear near the surface that the water drop falls on. Some authors draw onomatopoeia with such expressiveness that these become pictures in themselves, e.g., a 'bouumm!' with exploding letters.

These expressions are often based on the imitation of sound, such as the just mentioned 'bouumm!' that

Figure 1   In Walt Kelly's 'Pogo,' the lettering is masterfully used to carry meaning. (Kelly, 1972: 120). Copyright 2000 OGPI.

evokes the sound of an explosion. Often, a verb is shortened into a descriptive form that describes the action, as in 'drip,' 'sob,' 'cracklerattlebash!' Not to forget the innumerable possibilities of combinations of both sound, verb, and description, as the above mentioned 'chomp!' or the sound of a starting racing car: 'vroummmroarr!'

Note that a loud cry can take on the quality of a sound word, drawn without a balloon ('yikes!!').

Caption Texts   Caption texts are explanatory texts located at the edge of the panel (or between panels), often in a small, square frame of their own. They comment on the progress of the story in the panel and give information that has not been conveyed by the panels. The function of the caption text is to link the panels, sum up or comment on the action, or provide any information the author wants to communicate to the reader. They frequently deal with time factors, e.g., they could read 'later,' 'meanwhile,' or 'ten years ago.'

Pictorial Signs

Apart from the narrative means of structuring a story listed above, comics dispose of a large variety of pictorial signs. These signs appear as illustrations of the action taking place in the panel; often they are used to show a protagonist's emotional state or his or her general condition. Such illustrations are often graphical translations of a figure of speech, such as 'having a broken heart' or 'if looks could kill' – the lovelorn protagonist will have a splintered heart hovering above his or her head in the first case, whereas small daggers will be drawn on their way from the protagonist's eyes towards his or her adversary in the latter.

Great effort, embarrassment, and alarm are universally shown by little drops of perspiration flying from the protagonist's head (as in sweating, due to physical exertion, or breaking out in cold sweat). Pain is depicted by stars appearing above the hurting part of his or her body; feeling dizzy, being drunk or knocked-out, by spirals around the head (cf. above about 'balloons': hearts, light bulbs, etc., within the balloon).

Apart from these mostly figurative illustrations, comics have developed a specific graphic feature to show movement. They are called 'speed lines' and refer to the slurring of vision to the eye when an object or person moves in fast motion. Speed lines will trail along a speeding object, telling the onlooker 'it was here just a second ago, but it moved over there within the blink of an eye.' Speed lines will show the course of the moving object; often, they are accompanied by small dust clouds to enhance the effect.

Doing without Sound and Motion: Narrative Rhythm

Every narrative is told in segments. An author will select which segments of a progression he or she will show or tell and leave gaps in between for the reader to fill in and make up a continuous narrative flow (see Narrative Means: How Comics Tell a Story, above). The pace of a narration is directly related to the number of panels; an event illustrated by many panels will naturally slow down the narrative rhythm, whereas inserting a caption reading 'two weeks later' above a panel speeds it up. The narrative rhythm is not related to the time narrated (*see* **Narrativity and Voice**).

Apart from the numbers of panels, the narrative rhythm can also be varied by other means: by drawing a detailed environment (usually in a panel that is comparatively larger than the others), or by zooming out into a wide angle, as is often used in films to mark a moment of introduction or contemplation at the beginning or ending of a film. These wide angle shots are, for instance, used as recurring features in Goscinny & Uderzo's 'Asterix the Gaul.' The story usually starts with a large introductory panel, a wide angle shot of the 'small village in Gaul,' depicting a pastoral idyll, and it ends invariably with a panoramic view of the villagers enjoying themselves at a big banquet under the starry sky (with the unmusical bard being tied to a tree in the foreground, in most of the cases).

Equally, comics will make use of the other possibilities of film language, as it is expressed in the way a camera shot is taken. One of the factors involved is distance. A panel can show a small human silhouette in the distance, in the vast landscape of a desert plain. Or it can show only a detail of that person's face e.g., a pair of frightened eyes, seen from very short distance. The close-up shot will let the reader be part of the protagonist's emotional state of mind, whereas the first example keeps the reader more at a distance.

Apart from distance, the virtual camera can choose a particular angle to convey the narrative's message. A character shown from below will appear as someone superior and in control, someone looked down upon will appear as just that. Clever authors even make use of the subjective camera, known from experimental films. Thus, in 'Asterix and the Normans' a teenage boy from the capital Lutetia is sent to a remote small village 'to become a man.' He gets caught by the fear-inspiring Normans, knocked over the head and falls unconscious. The Normans splash water on him and in the following panel we see what the frightened boy sees: A close-up of a row of awe-inspiring beards as seen from lying on the ground, all nasty smiles and helmets, looking very grim indeed.

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Communication: Semiotic Approaches

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The Rise of a Controversy

The topic at issue in this article shows several problematic aspects. In communication research, we are presently crossing a phase of intensive innovation, in which the paradigm and the role of the different disciplines are changing remarkably. For a long time, the leading role in this area was played by the *sciences du language*, in particular by semiotics and linguistics. Nowadays, this role is played by a complex epistemological interplay, where other human and social sciences – focusing on the organizational assets of communication context – as well as technological disciplines contribute to the study of real communicative events. Thanks to these contributions, it has become evident that real communicative events are not only influenced, but functionally governed by their actual context (enterprises, institutions, communities, and other social organizations …) and by the media, by which they are not only broadcasted, but also structured.

Moreover, even linguistic sciences, which are expected to explain the internal structure of a communicative event, are largely adopting a model of communication whose conceptual frame is no longer essentially semiotic, but rather pragmatic. The prevailing of a pragmatic paradigm seems to have strongly redimensioned the semiotic claim. More specifically, both major trends – Speech acts Theory and Relevance Theory (i.e., the ostensive inferential model of communication) – are proposing a vision of communication that does not focus on semiotic aspects.

While the former of these trends has developed its own model essentially ignoring the semiotic approach (Austin, 1962 and Searle, 1969), the latter has created a proper controversy, initiating a sort of campaign against the semiotic approach and its academic power.

At this point, it is useful to outline the ostensive-inferential model of Relevance Theory synthetically, in order to specify its criticism of the semiotic model of communication, and also what it justly presupposes a semiotic model to be. In fact, the ostensive-inferential model, whose roots are Paul Grice's and David Lewis' works (Sperber and Wilson, 1995/1986: 2) is introduced by means of those aspects that oppose it to the semiotic model (Sperber and Wilson, 1986: 6) "The semiotic approach to communication (as Peirce called it and we will call it ourselves), or the semiological approach (as Saussure and his followers called it), is a generalization of the code model of verbal communication to all forms of communication," and is thus to be abandoned, since it does not seem to explain the real functioning of communicative events: "The code model of verbal communication is only a hypothesis, with well-known merits and rather less well-known defects. [. . .] Its main defect, as we will shortly argue, is that it is descriptively inadequate: comprehension involves more than the decoding of a linguistic signal" (Sperber and Wilson, 1995/1986: 6). In other words, the semiotic approach appears to interpret communication as a process where a speaker constructs a message by coding a certain meaning by means of a linguistic system, and transfers it to a hearer who simply **decodes** it, thus retrieving its original meaning. The roles of the speaker and the hearer in a communicative event are thus reduced to coding and decoding respectively. The scholars of the ostensive-inferential approach to communication, relying on wide and unquestionable evidence, argue that the process of interpreting a message by the hearer is far more complex, and that the semiotic component represents a rather short stretch of the communicative process.

The semiotic component is neither necessary nor sufficient to explain the process of communication.

Firstly, it is not necessary because many messages do not make use of a linguistic system; very often, the communicator addresses the hearer not through words of a certain natural language, or through another semiotic system, but through traces by which the hearer is expected to be guided to infer the communicative intention of the message. Sperber and Wilson (1995/1986: 25) argued in fact that Grice's originality consisted in suggesting that the identification of the communicator's intentions is **sufficient** for the achievement of successful communication, and the mediation of a verbal code is not necessarily needed. The authors give an example (Sperber and Wilson, 1995/1986: 25–26) that shows how communication may succeed even without the help of the coding-decoding process. If Peter asks Mary: 'How are you feeling today?', Mary may answer by pulling a bottle of aspirin out of her bag and showing it to him. Although there is no code or convention that rules the interpretation of her behavior, this action can be taken as strong evidence that she wants to inform Peter that she does not feel well. In this sense, Mary and Peter can be said to have communicated, even if they have not made use of any verbal or nonverbal code.

The semiotic component is not even sufficient, even in the very usual cases where it is present. However large it may be, interpretation requires that various contextual aspects are involved in order to complete the information carried by the semiotic component: "Verbal communication is a complex form of communication. Linguistic coding and decoding is involved, but the linguistic meaning of an uttered sentence falls short of encoding what the speaker means: it merely helps the audience infer what she means" (Sperber and Wilson, 1995/1986: 27). Within this complex form of communication, the results of the decoding process are considered a piece of evidence from which the hearer, through a noncoded mechanism, can infer the speaker's intentions. In this sense, the semiotic component becomes subservient to the inferential process. Using the terminology of Relevance Theory, an enrichment of the linguistic form of the message is however indispensable to obtain the semantic and pragmatic interpretation of a message. This is crucial to distinguish between 'sentence' and 'utterance of a sentence.' According to these authors, generative grammars fail to consider that a certain sentence may appear in an enormous variety of utterances that, though sharing a 'core of meaning' (Sperber and Wilson, 1995/1986: 9) bound to the linguistic code, each includes a different nonlinguistic, context-bound meaning that can be neither predicted nor 'calculated' through a decoding process. Therefore, an inference process is required in order to grasp a complete representation of the communicator's intentions. To give just an example (adapted from Sperber and Wilson, 1995/1986: 11), a sentence like 'You're leaving' contains different levels of noncoded meaning: (1) an indexical (you) whose interpretation depends on the actual communicative event where the sentence is uttered; and (2) a set of possible interpretations: is the speaker informing the hearer that she is to leave? Is she making a guess? Or is she rather expressing disappointment because he is leaving?

Thus, the process of comprehension, through which the hearer reconstructs the communicator's intentions, is not a decoding process, but rather an inferential process. Whereas the decoding process "starts from a signal and results in the recovery of a message which is associated to the signal by an underlying code" (Sperber and Wilson, 1995/1986: 13), an inferential process starts from a set of premises and reaches a conclusion warranted by the premises themselves. Among possible interpretations of an utterance, the hearer chooses the most adequate to certain expectations of truthfulness, informativeness, and comprehensibility. The inferential process of comprehension is an essential component of communication, which is nonetheless often integrated by the employment of a code. A common code between the interlocutors turns out to be the most powerful, however not indispensable, tool for communicating.

Sperber and Wilson's critical remarks are generally convincing and acceptable, where they criticize the attempt to explain the interpretative process merely in terms of decoding. Less convincing is the more general criticism of all semiotic models of communication, accusing them of reducing communication to a coding and decoding process.

Saussurean 'Signification' as Keyword and Sign of Contradiction

Our thesis is that Sperber and Wilson's criticism, which is legitimate in relation to certain semiotic models, is unacceptable for others. Furthermore, in our opinion, their reductive vision of the function of the semiotic component within a communicative process is by no means convincing.

For both points, we should briefly reconsider some of the communication models more or less explicitly proposed by semioticians and linguists in the past century. It is almost compulsory to start by referring to Ferdinand de Saussure, with whom the beginning of modern linguistics in its structuralist phase is usually connected. His representation of the

Figure 1   Ferdinand de Saussure's model.

communication process seems to constitute a typical coding and decoding model, **Figure 1**.

Here the speaker, having in mind a particular *signifié*, correlates it to the corresponding 'signifiant' of her linguistic system (*langue*), which is perceived by the hearer who correlates it to the correspondent *signifié* of the same linguistic system. Nonetheless, Saussure's *Cours* is of a problematic nature; its real function is to bear witness to a deep and complex meditation rather than systematicly expounding a theory. Thus, beyond the approximate presentation of the discourse circle (*circuit de la parole*), the Saussurean text introduces the fundamental but problematic distinction between *signifié* – defined as a meaning carried by an element of a *langue* (a linguistic system) – and *signification* – a term denoting a notion that remains rather opaque in the Saussurean text. Its interpretation and the evaluation of its role in Saussure's doctrine is nevertheless crucial, and turned out to characterize the two main divergent trends that emerged within post-Saussurean structuralism. It is worth noticing that these two trends have developed considerably different attitudes toward communication in their theoretical elaboration. Relevant representatives of both trends being numerous, only those scholars who cover significant and universally acknowledged points of controversy will be mentioned here.

The Functionalist Reading

Let us consider Saussure's text. In a passage in chapter IV of the second part of the *Cours de linguistique générale* (1916/1995: 158–159), Saussure seems to employ the term *signification* as equivalent to *signifié*: *signification* seems to be nothing but the counterpart of the auditive image, "*un des aspects de la valeur linguistique*" or, better, the value of the conceptual component of the linguistic sign. Nonetheless, in the following passages, Saussure opposes *signification* to *signifié* throughout a series of interlinguistic confrontations (*mouton* vs. *sheep* and *mutton*, French plural vs. Sanskrit plural and dual, etc). So, without explicitly saying it, Saussure employs *signification* as opposed to *signifié*; interlinguistic comparisons between different language-bound *signifiés* are possible thanks to a conceptualization of reality that is formed

somehow independently of these *signifiés*. This distinction lets us guess the existence of a complex correlation between the two semantic dimensions (reasonably understood as interpretation), which goes from the *signifiés* obtained through the coding to the *significations*, which articulate the *parole* (the speaker's actual message). Without this conceptualization, evoked by the use of the term *signification*, such a comparison between different languages would be simply impossible (on this point, see Rigotti & Rocci, in press). *Signification*, thus, has to be interpreted as an inter- or translinguistic category independent of the linguistic code, however correlated to it. If we integrate this notion into the Saussurean *circuit de la parole*, we obtain a more comprehensive model of communication, where the correlation of *signifiant* and *signifié* is only a stretch of a more complex path, starting with the actual meaning intended by the speaker, and ending with the reconstruction of this meaning tentatively operated by the hearer.

The interpretation of the Saussurean text presupposed by this model is explicitly adopted by N. Troubezkoy in his *Grundzüge der Phonologie* (1939), where the *signifiés* are considered, at the level of *langue*, as abstract rules and conceptual schemes, which need to be related to the actual *significations* emerging from language use (see also Rigotti & Rocci, 2006: 5). On this point, M. Bréal (1844–1995: 552b) observes that, where we need to employ a certain word in communication, we 'forget' all possible meanings of that word except the one that corresponds to our thought ("*s'accorde avec notre pensée*"). Although the other meanings are still somehow present to our mind, we choose the one that corresponds to the meaning we want to express – i.e. to the *signification*. Here, the relation between *signifiant* and *signifié* is certainly not a coding-and-decoding one, since it is mediated by the speaker's choice to her communicative intention. The same approach to communication may be found in Karl Bühler's *Organonmodell*, as outlined in his *Sprachtheorie* (1934). Among the numerous pages of Bühler's text, which could be useful to elucidate his position on this issue, one passage seems particularly revealing (1934: 63), where Bühler argues that no code can ensure the correct interpretation of the word 'horse' as it is used in a text, where it can refer to a single entity or to the species of horses in general. The use within a text is not "*morphologisch erkennbar*," i.e., it cannot be decoded by means of morphological properties of the language, neither in Latin, a language that does not possess articles, nor in any (Indo European or other) article-provided languages. What allows us to correctly interpret the use of the word 'horse,' is a 'detective-attitude' towards the

context of the communicative event, which aims at evaluating what the speaker has in mind: "Man muss es detektivisch gleichsam dem Kontexte oder den Umständen der Sprechsituation entnehmen, ob der Sprecher das eine oder das andere im Auge hat und *meint*." Moreover, an author to whom Bühler is quite indebted, Philipp Wegener, had also stressed the interpretative aspect of communication 50 years previously. Wegener argues that the hearer has the complex task of understanding the speaker's action; for this purpose, he has to figure out what the 'goal' of the communicative action may be. Comprehension of verbal messages is achieved through 'inferences' (*Schlüsse*), which rely both on the meaning of the verbal signs and on the experience of reality. So, where experience is lacking, comprehension is impossible (Wegener, 1885–1991: 128). For instance, one could not understand a sentence such as 'a whistle of the train, and my brother was gone,' if one had no experience of a train setting off from a station.

If, speaking of a semiotic approach to communication, we refer to this research tradition in linguistics and semiotics, the criticism put forward by the scholars of Relevance Theory loses its bite: in fact, the process of communication is not referred to as a coding-decoding process within this trend. Rather, one should acknowledge that the process of communicative inference is constantly associated with the concept of interpretation.

Nor would the objection be acceptable that, in these models, inference only plays the subservient role of integrating the semiotic process. Here, it must be noticed that, if inference is acknowledged as a necessary integration of the semiotic component, it follows that the semiotic component itself is not considered sufficient for the accomplishment of the communicative event. Therefore, the inferential component becomes essential for communication. More specifically, in this first tradition, neither the speaker's coding nor the hearer's decoding hold the supremacy in the communicative process; the crucial moment is rather when it becomes clear what the speaker intended to communicate, and the hearer understands it. As Bühler claims, on the backdrop of a Husserlian philosophical vision, language always appeals to the speaker's knowledge of reality; and each time we understand the meaning of a communicative event, we deeply and unavoidably rely on a 'reality-driven selection' (*sachgesteuerte Selektion*, Bühler, 1934: 65), which constitutes the core of communication. Not by chance, a large part of Bühler's research is devoted to the study of the specific semantic mechanism of the 'indexicals' or 'deictics' (*Zeigwörter*). This term refers to linguistic units and structures whose meaning is reconstructed through the identification of an aspect

of the communicative situation (Bühler, 1934 see in particular p. 107).

Here, given the importance that Bühler attributes to reality in the process of communication, it becomes clear why he adopts a 'triadic' notion of the sign, which is rather innovative if we compare it to other structuralist models. In his *Organonmodell* (1934: 24), the sign is conceived as an 'instrument' for communicating; and communication is interpreted pragmatically, as an action accomplished by the speaker and the hearer. According to Bühler (1934: 52), communication must be viewed as a human 'action,' vitally bound to other meaningful human behaviors. Communication is related to other actions, and is an action in itself. In particular, Bühler distinguishes between *Sprechhandlung* (1934: 53), which is the human activity of communicating, i.e., the Saussurean *parole*, as opposite to *Sprachgebilde* (the *langue*, 1934: 57); moreover, with the notion of *Sprechakt* (1934: 62), he focuses on a single communicative action, and with *Sprachwerk* (1934: 53), he denotes the linguistic products resulting from a single human action of communicating.

Within the model, the sign is related to the speaker (*Sender*), the addressee (*Empfänger*) and the objects and states of affairs in reality (*Gegenstände und Sachverhalte*). The sign is bound to each dimension by a specific relation: with regard to the speaker, the sign is a 'symptom,' bound by a relation of 'expression' (*Ausdruck*); with regard to the addressee, the sign is a 'signal,' and stands in the relation of appeal (*Appel*); and, finally, with regard to the object, the sign is a 'symbol,' and stands in the relation of 'representation.' The following diagram, **Figure 2**, illustrates Bühler's model (1934: 28):

The distinction between code dimension and discourse dimension of semantics, implied by the Saussurean terms *signifié* and *signification*, is tackled and deepened by another linguist: E. Benveniste, who introduced the terms 'semiotic' and 'semantic' (Benveniste, 1966a). He underlines that the content dimension of code units is a semiotic one; while the content dimension of the same units, insofar as they are used within a discourse, is truly semantic (on this point, see also Rocci, 2003). Moreover, among the indexicals investigated by Bühler, he focuses on personal pronouns, by which the communicative act and its constituents are mirrored in specific linguistic structures (Benveniste, 1966b). The study of personal pronouns on both the diachronic and the synchronic axes brings Benveniste to single out the essential role that is played by subjectivity (*I* and *You*) in communication.

On the basis of the Saussurean notion of 'signification,' conceived as the actual, situation-bound

Figure 2   Karl Bühler's *Organonmodell.*

Figure 3   The model of communication within the functionalist reading.

meaning of the sign in the communicative process, and of Bühler's interpretation of the sign as an instrument for communicating, we could modify Saussure's diagram and build a model of communication that is shared in its fundamental aspects by all the authors within the research tradition we have examined so far, **Figure 3**.

Even in its visual diversity, the well-known model proposed by Roman Jakobson (Jakobson, 1960/ 1995) is, in many respects, reminiscent of Bühler's sign model. Being evidently influenced by Shannon

and Weaver's model, it brings to light the process of transmitting a message, thus offering a rather obvious metaphor of the communicative process, **Figure 4**.

Jakobson's model has two indubitable merits: firstly, it takes into account, and represents synthetically, a complex set of factors; secondly, it deepens many of the specific functions of the message in relation to each of these factors in the communication process. This Russian linguist treasures his former belonging to the significant experience of Russian formalism, by introducing the poetic function into his model, as an

CONTEXT

ADDRESSER   MESSAGE   ADDRESSEE

CONTACT

CODE

Figure 4   Roman Jakobson's model of the fundamental factors of communication.

REFERENTAL

EMOTIVE   POETIC   CONATIVE

PHATIC

METALINGUAL

Figure 5   Roman Jakobson's model of the textual functions.

autotelic orientation of the message towards itself, **Figure 5**.

The graphic representation of Jakobson's model appears to be richer than the sign scheme provided by Bühler. However, if we consider the model implicit in the theory of the latter, we have to recognize that Bühler's model is richer in important respects: indeed, in Jakobson's perspective, the pragmatic dimension is weakened; the essential role of inference in interpretation is ignored, as well as the relevance of context for interpretation. Another important aspect concerns the distinction between *signifié* and *significance*, reflecting the more general difference between language (*langue*) and speech (*parole*), which remains outside the graphic model outlined by Jakobson, even though it is adumbrated in some significant research (Jakobson, 1957).

Some Code-model Approaches

The precise definition of the Saussurean model represents a core issue for a large segment of semioticians of the past century. Indeed, besides the tradition we have tackled so far, another tradition of semiotic studies starts from a different interpretation of Saussure's *signification*. The second trend does not concentrate on the notion of *signification*, and therefore it does not focus on the textual and discursive dimension of the *parole*, whereas the point of view of the code (*langue*) is preferred. This position can be found not only in Hjemslev's *Prolegomena to a theory of language* (1961), but also in various scholars belonging to French structuralism – among which R. Barthes plays a paradigmatic role – and in Umberto Eco's first semiotic theory, expounded in his work *Trattato di semiotica generale* (1979).

It is worth noticing that it is quite difficult to infer a model of communication from these positions.

Barthes, for instance, stresses the interpretation of language as a system, whereby the individual performing a particular act of *parole* (a discourse) simply selects and actualizes one of the possible states of the system (Barthes, 1964). As the semantic dimension is exhaustively represented by the system of the *signifiés*, the meaning of communicative messages is not built by a speaker for an addressee, but it is rather one possible product the system can generate. The human subject is excluded from the communication process; communication itself, conceived as a communicative interaction between two human beings, i.e., as the junction of the communicative action of the speaker with the interpretative action of the addressee, fails to be considered at all. Umberto Eco (1979: 8) defined communication as "the passage of a signal (*not* necessarily a sign) from a source (through a transmitter, along a channel) to a destination." This definition is meant to include both cases of machine-to-machine passages of information (see also 1979: 32), and cases where the destination (and not necessarily the source) is a human being. In the latter case, communication involves the process of signification, "provided that the signal is not merely a stimulus but arouses an interpretive response in the addressee" (1979: 32). The process of signification is not conceived as a communicative action; the focus here is on the signification system, "an autonomous semiotic construct that has an abstract mode of existence independent of any possible communicative act it makes possible" (1979: 9). Thus, it is the system that guarantees communication, and the existence of the system does not presuppose the existence of actual communicative events. On the contrary, communication between human beings necessarily presupposes a signification system (thus excluding cases of nonverbal, ostensive communication). It must be observed that Eco explicitly discusses the problem of what the place of the human being, i.e., "the 'acting subject'" (1979: 314) within semiotics should be. He concludes that what is outside the signification system – its "material expressions" (1979: 317) might even be "tremendously important," but it is beyond the subject of semiotics. In fact, as Eco argues, the proper subject of signification is "nothing more than the continuously unaccomplished system of systems of signification that reflects back on itself," whereas individual material subjects only "obey, enrich, change and criticize" the signification system (1979: 315).

As emerges from our survey of some theories within the second trend of Saussurean semiotics, speaking of a proper 'model of communication' in relation to them turns out to be quite difficult. In fact, communication in itself is intrinsically ignored. What they hypothesize are the mysterious workings

of an autonomous semiotic program, which would auto-install and run on a great number of undifferentiated terminals, thus defining their individual or network sign production.

Charles Sanders Peirce

The model of communication of the first trend inspired by Saussurean semiotics, which we found in Bühler, and which is confirmed by recent pragmatic models, shows interesting analogies with another tradition, often considered as alternative to the Saussurean one: the semiotic model by Charles Sanders Peirce. As Bühler would do in the 1930s, Peirce had already proposed a triadic notion of sign at the end of the 19th century, **Figure 6**.

According to what Peirce wrote in 1897 (1897–1935–1958: 2.228), "A sign, or 'representamen' is something which stands to somebody for something in some respect or capacity. It addresses somebody, that is, creates in the mind of that person an equivalent sign, or perhaps a more developed sign. That sign which it creates I call the interpretant of the first sign." Although Peirce is often considered one of the founders of semiotics, it must not be forgotten that his contribution is particularly relevant from the logical and philosophical points of view. And his interest for semiotics concerns the cognitive rather than the communicative dimensions. Nonetheless, his contribution is also significant for semiotics and for a theory of communication. Concerning semiotics, we have to underline that Peirce's notion of sign includes 'symbols,' as well as 'indexes' (bound to the object through a real connection), and 'icons,' which remind of objects by reproducing their features. Semiotics turns out to include both verbal and nonverbal dimensions. Nevertheless we should also consider that, within Peirce's enormous scientific production, we find some significant cues for a significantly comprehensive communication model.

Firstly, the correlation of the sign with both subjectivities involved in communication is highlighted by the above-quoted definition, where the subject to whom the sign is addressed is explicitly mentioned

Figure 6 Charles Sanders Peirce's model of sign.

and the addresser is presupposed. On this point, M. Hansen (2002) argued that Peirce's approach implies an active involvement of the speaker and the addressee in the process of interpretation. In fact, the 'representamen' does not univocally imply a certain 'interpretant,' but it rather suggests several possible interpretations. Here, the interaction of the speaker and the addressee is necessary to evaluate the interpretation to be chosen: the context of interpretation is actively constructed by the interlocutors, on the basis of the experience of the knowledge community.

Secondly, we find in the Peircean text a truly pragmatic reading of the process of interpretation, as the 'final interpretant' of a sign is the 'habit change,' i.e., "a modification of a person tendencies toward action" (Peirce, 1897–1935–1958: 5.476; on this point, see also Rigotti & Rocci, 2001: 48).

Concluding Remarks

We might conclude by arguing that the criticism raised against the semiotic tradition by the scholars of Relevance Theory is only valid for those semiotic approaches which can be defined as code-driven, and depend on a reductive interpretation of Saussure. They conceive of the sign as a binary unit, and thus reduce communication to a coding and decoding process. The criticism does not hold for all those, indeed rather numerous, approaches (Peirce and the functionalist interpretation of the Saussurean *Cours*: Troubetzkoy, Bühler, Jakobson, Bally, Sechehaye, Karcevskij …), where a pragmatic (in the sense of the *Organonmodell* of language) and triadic representation of the sign allows one to understand communicative events in an adequately comprehensive perspective.

Our short survey of semiotic approaches to communication in the 20th century shows that not all of them can be considered as code-models, it also puts forward – this concerns in particular some authors like Peirce, Bühler, and Benveniste – the possibility and even the reasonableness of constructing a semio-pragmatic model of communication (Searle, 1969; Clark, 1996), concerning both the wording and the interpretation side, this latter being based on semiotic, metaphoric (Lakoff, 1980; Danesi, 2004) and inferential processing (Sperber and Wilson, 1995–1986); comprehending both verbal and nonverbal communication (Rocci, 2003), and including a theory of subjectivity as one of its relevant components (see Rigotti and Cigada, 2004). And the semiotic tradition of the 20th century could be shown to be helpful in this endeavor.

See also: Austin, John L.; Bühler, Karl; Context, Communicative; Grice, Herbert Paul; Jakobson, Roman; Peirce, Charles Sanders; Relevance Theory; Speech Acts.

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Communicative Competence

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The phrase 'communicative competence' was introduced by the North American linguist and anthropologist, Dell Hymes, in the late 1960s (Hymes, 1962/1968, 1971). He used it to reflect the following key positions on knowledge and use of language:

- The ability to use a language well involves knowing (either explicitly or implicitly) how to use language appropriately in any given context.
- The ability to speak and understand language is not based solely on grammatical knowledge.

- What counts as appropriate language varies according to context and may involve a range of modes – for example, speaking, writing, singing, whistling, drumming.
- Learning what counts as appropriate language occurs through a process of socialization into particular ways of using language through participation in particular communities.

Hymes's juxtaposition of the word 'communicative' with 'competence' stood in sharp contrast at the time with Noam Chomsky's influential use of the term 'linguistic competence,' which Chomsky used to refer to a native speaker's implicit knowledge of the grammatical rules governing her/his language (Chomsky, 1957, 1965). Such knowledge, Chomsky argued, enables speakers to create new and grammatically correct sentences and accounts for the fact that speakers are able to recognize grammatically incorrect as well as correct sentences such as, in English *She book the read*, or in Spanish *plaza yo a la voy* ('square I am going to'). While accepting the importance of grammatical knowledge, Hymes argued that in order to communicate effectively, speakers had to know not only what was grammatically correct/incorrect, but what was communicatively appropriate in any given context. A speaker therefore must possess more than just grammatical knowledge; for example, a multilingual speaker in a multilingual context knows which language to use in which context and users of a language where there are both formal and informal forms of address know when to use which, such as *vous* (formal) and *tu* (informal) in French. Hymes famously stated that a child who produced language without due regard for the social context would be a monster (1974b: 75).

The emphasis that Hymes placed on appropriateness according to context, in his use of the term competence, challenged Chomsky's view about what exactly counts as knowledge of a language – knowledge of conventions of use in addition to knowledge of grammatical rules. In addition, and more fundamentally, Hymes problematized the dichotomy advanced by Chomsky between 'competence' and 'performance' and the related claim about what the study of linguistics proper should be. Chomsky's interest was in the universal psycholinguistics of language, the human capacity for generating the syntactic rules of language. His interest in knowledge, captured in his use of 'competence,' was therefore at an ideal or abstract level rather than in any actual knowledge that any one speaker or group of speakers might possess. For Chomsky, the focus of linguistics as a discipline should be on understanding and describing the general and abstract principles that make the human capacity for language possible. In contrast, 'performance' or actual utterances – that is, what people actually say and hear with all the errors, false starts, unfinished sentences – could add little to an understanding of the principles underlying language use and was therefore not deemed to be a relevant focus of linguistic study.

Hymes acknowledged the value of the more abstract and idealized approach that Chomsky advocated, not least because such a universalistic approach challenged any theories of language based on genetic differences or notions of racial hierarchy (Hymes, 1971: 4). However, he argued that there were other important dimensions to the study of language that should not be so readily excluded from linguistics as a scientific field. Hymes's own interest in language was in large part driven by a concern for language questions arising in real life contexts, such as why children from economically advantaged and disadvantaged social backgrounds differ in the language they use. Chomsky's and Hymes's different aims for developing language theory are nowhere more clearly evident than in Hymes's comment on Chomsky's (1965: 3) now famous statement, on the purpose of linguistic theory: "Linguistic theory is concerned primarily with an ideal speaker-listener, in a completely homogenous speech-community, who knows its language perfectly...." Hymes (1971: 4) comments: "The theoretical notion of the ideal speaker-listener is unilluminating from the standpoint of the children we seek to understand and to help."

Hymes was highly critical of a theory that explicitly set out to ignore the impact of social context on how language is used and hence the competence/performance dichotomy set up by Chomsky (echoing in some ways the *langue* and *parole* distinction made by Saussure, 1916). At a specific level, his key reasons for challenging such a dichotomy can be summarized as follows (based on Hymes, 1962/1968; 1971; 1974b):

- The dichotomy itself is problematic. It presupposes that knowledge can be understood without reference to use, yet analyzing actual use of language is key to exploring underlying principles for such use. Hymes argued that "performance data" should be considered a legitimate focus for linguistic study both in its own right and as data that reflects knowledge underlying any performance.
- The dichotomy is built on a series of abstractions: ideal speaker-listener, homogenous speech-community, perfect knowledge of language.
- Chomsky's notion of speaker-listener does not acknowledge or account for the differences in

reception competence and production competence evident in many contexts, as in children from some social backgrounds understanding formal school language yet not producing it.

- What counts as knowledge of language is reduced to only one aspect of knowledge, namely grammatical knowledge, when there are clearly other aspects to knowledge of language that are important, such as when to use which language, or varieties of languages, and in which contexts.
- Within an approach that focuses on competence as idealized knowledge, it is the abstract system of language that becomes the focus rather than speakers'/groups of speakers' use of language.
- Given the focus on knowledge as a set of abstract rules underlying use, actual use is relegated to only a marginal position in the scientific study of language.

Hymes (1972a: 282) offers communicative competence as a more general and superordinate term to encompass the language capabilities of the individual that include both knowledge and use: "competence is dependent upon both (tacit) knowledge and (ability for) use."

While Hymes argued against the foundational dichotomy between competence and performance proposed by Chomsky, he was not dismissing the value of the distinction entirely. Hymes refers to communicative competence as "abilities in a broad sense" of how to use language, whereas performance is always a specific use of language that reflects some of that competence (2003: 321). Thus any specific performance may partially reflect the nature of the conventions governing an individual or a community's knowledge of language. In setting up a framework for developing an adequate theory of language, Hymes argued that both what is known (competence) and what is actually done (performance) must be taken into account. Such a framework involves exploring and accounting for the following:

1. Whether (and to what degree) something is formally possible
2. Whether (and to what degree) something is feasible
3. Whether (and to what degree) something is appropriate
4. Whether (and to what degree) something is in fact done, actually performed (Hymes 1972a: 284–286).

Questions 3 and 4 are central to the socially oriented approach to the study of language advocated by Hymes. In contrast to Chomsky and his claim to linguistics as a subfield of psychology and philosophy, Hymes seeks to claim a space for the study of language within "a science of social man" (Hymes, 1971: 6).

A Key Concept in an Emerging Sociolinguistic Tradition

Emphasis on the notion of communicative competence formed part of Dell Hymes's call for a new field of study, the ethnography of communication, sometimes called the ethnography of speaking (Hymes, 1962/1968; Gumperz and Hymes, 1972/1986). There are a number of concepts and categories presupposed by the notion of communicative competence, which continue to be highly influential in sociolinguistics and in many socially oriented approaches to study of language.

Sociocultural Context

Given the importance attached to knowledge of the social conventions governing language use, understanding the context of language use is considered to be central. Exploring such context, that is, the cultural, historical, and social practices associated with the language use of any particular group or community of people, involves detailed descriptions and classification of language use organized around the following key questions. What are the communicative events, and their components, in a community? What are the relationships among them? What capabilities and status do they have, in general and in particular cases? How do they work? (Hymes, 1974b: 25).

Ethnography of Communication

In order to explore how language is used in context, Hymes argued for an ethnographic approach to the study of communication or ways of speaking (Hymes, 1974a). This involves researchers setting out to systematically observe the activities of any given community, through immersing themselves in such activities and collecting a range of data, such as recordings, field notes, and documentation. In this methodology both 'etic' and 'emic' approaches are considered important and complementary; the etic approach refers to observation from the outside as it were, that is, the researcher seeks to observe in detail the communicative activities – or speech events – of participants in a community; the emic involves exploring such events, from the inside, to determine how participants make sense of and understand such events and interactions. Ethnographers emphasize the importance of emic accounts to any theory of language; for example, only an emic perspective would enable a researcher to understand that a clap

of thunder may in some cultural contexts be considered to be a communicative act (as in the case of the Ojibwa reported by Hymes, 1974b: 13), or that certain types of communication are permitted to men in some contexts while proscribed in others, such as the disciplining of children (as reported by Philipsen, 1975).

In an attempt to build a descriptive framework of how language is used in different contexts, Hymes, drawing on anthropologists such as Malinowski (1923, 1935), developed a series of categories to map out the relevant contextual aspects to language use, such as speech event and speech community.

Speech Event

This is a category (after Jakobson, 1960) that reflects the idea that all interaction is embedded in sociocultural contexts and is governed by conventions emerging from those contexts. Examples of speech events are interviews, buying and selling goods in a shop, sermons, lectures, and informal conversation. The speech event involves a number of core components identified by Hymes, which are signaled in his mnemonic device SPEAKING. [See **Table 1**].

Speech Community

While the term speech community was not coined by Hymes (the most notable earlier use being that of Bloomfield, 1933), Hymes's elaboration of the term certainly contributed to its prominence in sociolinguistic approaches to the study of language.

The acquisition of communicative competence takes place within speech communities: speech communities are constituted not just by a shared variety or language, but shared sets of norms and conventions about how those varieties can and should be used. Through everyday interaction with others in a speech community, a child learns how to use language appropriately, that is, according to the norms of any given speech community. Some events inevitably involve people from different speech communities, which may create tensions: as in for example school classrooms where participants share a common language but may not be members of the same speech community (Hymes, 1972c).

Diversity

Acknowledgement of diversity and variety between and across language use, in communities and individuals, is a basic position in Hymes's work and is a central tenet in sociolinguistics. Such diversity manifests itself in countless ways: the very existence of language varieties, both as languages and varieties within languages; the range of conventions

Table 1 SPEAKING – acronym invented by Dell Hymes (1972b) to specify relevant features of a speech event

S-settings and scenes	Setting refers to time, place, physical circumstances. Scene refers to the psychological or cultural definitions of the event: for example what 'counts' as a formal event varies from community to community.
P-participants	Who is involved, as either speaker/listener, audience.
E-ends	Ends can be defined in terms of goals and outcomes. Goals refer to what is expected to be achieved in any event: outcomes refers to what is actually achieved. Goals and outcomes exist at both community and individual participant level: for example, the conventional goal of a wedding ceremony may be marriage, however, individuals within that event may have other goals.
A-acts	Speech events involve a number and range of speech acts, particular types of utterances such as requests, commands, and greetings.
K-keys	The tone, manner, and spirit in which acts are done, for example, serious or playful. Specific keys may be signaled through verbal or/and non-verbal means.
I-instrumentalities	The particular language/language varieties used and the mode of communication (spoken, written).
N-norms	Norms of interaction refer to rules of speaking, who can say what, when, and how. Norms of interpretation refer to the conventions surrounding how any speech may be interpreted.
G-genres	Categories or types of language use, such as the sermon, the interview, or the editorial. May be the same as 'speech event' but may be a part of a speech event. For example, the sermon is a genre and may at the same time be a speech event (when performed conventionally in a church); a sermon may be a genre, however, that is invoked in another speech event, for example, at a party for humorous effect.

governing the use of such varieties in different contexts (such differences have been documented in relation, notably, to social class, ethnic group, gender); the different values attached to particular usages (for example, the values attached in different communities to such phenomena as silence, eloquence, and interruptions).

Privileging diversity as a universal of language shifts the emphasis away from any differential status attached to varieties, or the notion that difference signals deficiency in any way. All varieties are seen

as equally valid, although some are acknowledged to be more appropriate in particular contexts.

Appropriateness

This is a key presupposition to the notion of communicative competence and is a central notion in sociolinguistics. As discussed, communicative competence presupposes the following; that a language user's knowledge – competence – is more than just grammar-based; that knowledge of language requires knowledge of the appropriate social conventions governing what and how something can be said, to whom and in what contexts. Appropriateness thus involves both linguistic and cultural knowledge (Hymes, 1971: 14).

Within sociolinguistics, a focus on appropriateness of language use is said to indicate a descriptive (how language is used) rather than a prescriptive (how language should be used) approach to language diversity.

Socialization

People learn the rules of use through everyday interaction within speech communities. It is through such interaction that children acquire knowledge about appropriate language use, that is, communicative competence (Hymes, 1971: 10). Hymes indicates that socialization is not constituted by a rigid trajectory and suggests that both "a long and short range view of competency should be adopted" (1972a: 287). From his perspective, the short range view concerns innate capacities as they emerge in the first years of life, and the long range concerns continuing socialization through life. What this short/long range implies is that competence is not static. In some instances, quite drastic changes can be made to an individuals' competence; as when a child whose home language variety is significantly different from the school variety. Of course, as Hymes emphasizes, such extensions or shifts in competence are not necessarily straightforward; there are plenty of opportunities for misunderstanding to occur when receivers/listeners accustomed to the language varieties of one community engage in communication with those from another.

Communicative Competence in Other Domains

The notion of communicative competence has been highly influential in fields beyond linguistics, such as education, sociology, and psychology. In some instances the basic assumptions surrounding the term have been maintained, and in others extended or problematized.

Probably nowhere has the impact of the notion been more powerful than in the teaching of languages, including the teaching of English as a second or foreign language. Whereas the emphasis in language teaching had been on grammatical and syntactic accuracy, following the work of Hymes and others (Gumperz and Hymes, 1972/1986), there was a significant turn towards communicative language teaching: this shift involved the teaching and learning of language considered to be appropriate to specific situations, based on what speakers actually use, rather than what they are presumed to use (Paulston, 1992). Assessment of language learning has been influnced accordingly, with a focus on students' capacity to communicate, rather than the ability to produce grammatically correct sentences (Hall and Eggington, 2000). The extent to which this more situational approach to second and foreign language teaching prevails is a matter of debate, but the impact of communicative competence is widely acknowledged (Firth and Wagner, 1997).

The use of the term has also been extended and modulated in other domains. For example, Culler (1975) developed the influential notion of literary competence to describe readers' knowledge of the conventions required in order to interpret literary texts. Academic communicative competence has been used to refer to knowledge of the conventions governing the use of language in academic communication (Berkenkotter *et al.*, 1991). Both uses refer to knowledge of specific textual features, such as metaphor in the case of literary competence and argument in academic competence, as well as knowledge about what counts as specific text types or genres (academic, literary) in particular cultural contexts.

Other uses of 'communicative competence' have developed, alongside and in contradistinction to the Hymesian term. Habermas (1970) uses the term communicative competence more in line with Chomsky's linguistic competence, to the extent that he is interested in theorizing an ideal speech situation, rather than elaborating a sociolinguistic description of actual situations and utterances. In contrast, Bernstein's interest was in an elaboration of actual use of language, particularly within the context of schooling. However, he offered a critique of the way in which 'competence' models implied an exaggerated capacity of individual rational choice and control over language use, without due attention to "distribution of power and principles of control which selectively specialize modes of acquisition and realizations" (Bernstein, 1996: 56). The need to theorize power in relation to competence and language use is a key

strand in other studies re-examining the notion of communicative competence in more recent times.

Re-examining Communicative Competence

The work of Hymes is central in sociolinguistics as a field and continues to reverberate across socially oriented approaches to the study of language in a range of disciplines, including applied linguistics, education, communication studies, and social psychology. In recent times, there have also been significant re-examinations of communicative competence and related notions, as they have come to be used in sociolinguistics, from both critical and post structuralist approaches.

Re-examining Appropriateness

The notion of appropriateness is central to communicative competence and central to the field of sociolinguistics whose empirical goal has been to explore patterns of language use, according to the norms of any given community. However, the use of such a notion has been critiqued by some because it serves to emphasize norms and underplay differences within any given community or communicative context. Fairclough (1995), for example, like Bernstein mentioned above, argues that a model of language based on appropriateness assumes shared views among all users about what counts as appropriate, ignoring struggles and tensions in any given interaction; for example, tensions evident in interactions between institutional representatives and clients, men and women, or speakers from different cultural and linguistic backgrounds. Research in some socially oriented approaches to language, such as feminist linguistics and critical discourse analysis, has made visible the power dynamics in communicative events, within and across communities (Cameron, 1992; Wodak, 1992; Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999).

In the same vein, emphasis on a normative notion of communicative competence in second and foreign language teaching has been critiqued by theorists of second language acquisition. Norton (2000) states that although it is important for learners to understand the conventions of the target language, it is also important for them to explore "whose interests these rules serve" (2000: 15). She argues that any definition of communicative competence should include an acknowledgement of the importance of the right to speak (Bourdieu, 1977); such a right to speak, or be heard, is not granted to all speakers in all contexts. Thus for example, immigrants using a foreign language may find that, although familiar with the conventions governing a particular use of that language, they may not be granted the right to speak or be heard in some contexts.

Re-examining Speech Event and Speech Community

While Hymes always indicated that he used the word 'speech' to mean all types of communicative modes/channels, sociolinguistic research has tended to focus on the spoken word. In more recent times, explicit attention has been paid to other modes of communication, thus extending the use of core concepts. For example, those working within literacy studies have used existing terms to signal a specific focus, such as "writing event" (Basso, 1974), "literacy event" (Heath, 1983; Barton and Hamilton, 1998). Likewise, Swales (1990) has argued that the term discourse community is more useful than speech community, as a term for describing and accounting for practices around written texts. Some theorists have argued that the word 'speech' signals that language is considered more significant than other practices, or that language is somehow divorced from other social purposes and activities, and have argued that the notion of practice, including the notion of "community of practice" is more all encompassing and powerful (Eckert and McConnell-Ginet, 2003; see also discussion about ways in which 'practice' is used in Schultz and Hull, 2002).

A more fundamental challenge to the notion of speech community comes from theorists emphasizing the ways in which recent historical changes, notably globalization, powerfully influence the ways in which people engage in the world and disrupt traditional notions of community and community membership. Through a whole range of technological, social, and economic developments – shaping modes of labor, travel, and communication – individuals' relations to others are more diverse and fluid, less restricted by time and space. The extent to which speech community with any presumed identifiable boundaries continues to be a meaningful category of observation and analysis is debatable within the context of a rapidly changing world (Rampton, 1998; Collins, 2003).

Re-examining the Notion of Speaker

Just as the notion of speech community has been challenged, so too have prominent labels used to categorize individuals in relation to communities – such as social class, ethnicity, linguistic repertoire, and gender. Such terms, because they often denote fixed sets of attributes and capacities, have been recognized as problematic, particularly by post structuralist writers who stress that identity is always

in process. Indeed, the relationship between language and identity has established itself as a key area for research. Such work tends to challenge the idea that language use reflects categories of identity (I speak as I do because I am a working class woman) and emphasizes, rather, how individuals actively construct aspects of social and personal identity through their use of language in specific contexts (in speaking as I am, I am constructing and representing myself as a working class woman). While it is recognized that such constructions of identity are not free floating but are regulated by the specific contexts and interactions in which they occur (Cameron, 1997a), the fluidity of identity tends to be emphasized. In these approaches, the term 'performativity' rather than 'performance' is used, in order to signal how identity is enacted or performed through interaction (Cameron, 1997b; Butler, 1990/1999).

Re-examining Context

The work of Hymes placed the importance of context centrally within the concern of linguistics and advocated ethnography as the key organizing methodological tool with which to observe language use. However, there has been considerable debate about what constitutes context and how context should be conceptualized and explored. Two significant and quite distinct approaches to the study of context can be found in conversation analysis and critical discourse analysis: the former orients inwards as it were towards language, the latter orients outwards towards the social world. Conversation analysts argue that speakers construct and represent relevant aspects of context through their actual interaction and that these can be empirically observed (Schegloff, 1997). In contrast, critical discourse analysts (Fairclough, 1995) and feminist linguists (Cameron, 1992) have signaled the limitations to approaches that seek to understand context through empirical observation alone: there have been calls to draw on social, critical, and post structuralist theorists and philosophers such as Foucault, Habermas, Bourdieu, and Bakhtin, in order to explore the ways in which language use is related to ideology and power, and in order to explore how phenomena such as globalization are influencing communicative practices. Some of this work tends to explore language use through the lens of such theory and pays only minimal attention to examining contexts empirically (Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999), whereas others drawing on ethnographic traditions such as Hymes's, aim to establish an approach that draws on both empirical observation and specific aspects of social theory (Rampton, 1995; Lee, 1996; Maybin, 1999). Attempts have a been made to integrate levels of

analysis at the macro level of society with micro levels of actual utterances; Gee (1996) for example uses the terms big 'D' discourse to refer to the former and little 'd' discourse to refer to the latter; Fairclough (1992) has developed a three-layered framework to explore such relations, which he refers to as a textually oriented discourse analysis (TODA).

See also: Codes, Elaborated and Restricted; Communicative Language Teaching; Context, Communicative; Discourse, Foucauldian Approach; Habermas, Jürgen; Identity in Sociocultural Anthropology and Language; Identity: Second Language; Intercultural Pragmatics and Communication; Speech and Language Community.

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Communicative Language Teaching

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Communicative language teaching (CLT) is best understood within the broader historical spectrum of methods or approaches to language teaching. Seen from a 21st-century modernist perspective that views teaching as rather more science than art, the theoretical grounding for the epistemology of practice offered by CLT can be found in (1) the second- or foreign language acquisition research that began to flourish in the 1970s and (2) a long-standing functional view of language and language use as social behavior. The interpretation or implementation of practice in language teaching contexts around the world is, of course, yet another matter. A consideration of

these various influences highlights the major issues that confront CLT in the early decades of the 21st century.

Linguistic Theory and Classroom Practice

The essence of CLT is the engagement of learners in communication to allow them to develop their communicative competence. Use of the term 'communicative' in reference to language teaching refers to both the process and goals of learning. A central theoretical concept in CLT is *communicative competence*, a term introduced in the early 1970s into discussions of language (Habermas, 1970; Hymes, 1971) and second-language learning (Jakobovits, 1970; Savignon, 1971). Competence is defined as the expression, interpretation, and negotiation of meaning and looks to second-language acquisition research to account for its development (Savignon, 1972, 1983, 1997). The identification of learner communicative needs provides a basis for curriculum design. Descriptors sometimes used to refer to features of CLT include: process-oriented, task-based, and inductive (or discovery-oriented).

The elaboration of what has come to be known as CLT can be traced to concurrent developments in linguistic theory and language learning curriculum design, both in Europe and in North America. In Europe, the language needs of a rapidly increasing group of immigrants and guest workers, along with a rich British linguistic tradition that included social as well as linguistic context in the description of language behavior, led to the development of a syllabus for learners based on notional-functional concepts of language use. This notional-functional approach to curriculum design derived from neo-Firthian systemic or functional linguistics that views language as meaning potential and maintains the centrality of context of situation in understanding language systems and how they work (Firth, 1937; Halliday, 1978). With sponsorship from the Council of Europe, a Threshold Level of language ability was proposed for each of the languages of Europe in terms of what learners should be able to *do* with the language (van Ek, 1975). Functions were based on the assessment of learner needs and specified the end result or goals of an instructional program. The term 'communicative' was used to describe programs that followed a notional-functional syllabus based on needs assessment, and the language for specific purposes (LSP) movement was launched.

Concurrently, development within Europe focused on the process of classroom language learning. In Germany, against a backdrop of social democratic concerns for individual empowerment articulated in the writings of philosopher Jürgen Habermas (1970), language teaching methodologists took the lead in the development of classroom materials that encouraged learner choice (Candlin, 1978). A collection of exercise types for communicatively oriented English language teaching was used in teacher in-service courses and workshops to guide curriculum change. Exercises were designed to exploit the variety of social meanings contained within particular grammatical structures. A system of 'chains' encouraged teachers and learners to define their own learning path through a principled selection of relevant exercises (Piepho, 1974; Piepho and Bredella, 1976). Similar exploratory projects were also initiated by Candlin at his academic home, the University of Lancaster in England, and by Holec (1979) and his colleagues at the University of Nancy in France. Supplementary teacher resource materials promoting classroom CLT became increasingly popular (for example, see Maley and Duff, 1978). There was also a renewed interest in learner vocabulary building. The widespread promotion of audiolingual methodology with a focus on accuracy in terms of so-called native grammatical or syntactic form had resulted in the neglect of learner lexical resources (Coady and Huckin, 1997).

At about the same time, paradigm-challenging research on adult classroom second-language acquisition at the University of Illinois (Savignon, 1971, 1972) used the term 'communicative competence' to characterize the ability of classroom language learners to interact with other speakers and to make meaning, as distinguished from their ability to recite dialogues or to perform on discrete-point tests of grammatical knowledge. At a time when pattern practice and error avoidance were the rule in language teaching, this study of adult classroom acquisition of French looked at the effect of practice in the use of coping strategies as part of an instructional program. By encouraging learners to ask for information, to seek clarification, to use circumlocution and whatever other linguistic and non-linguistic resources they could muster to negotiate meaning, and to stick to the communicative task at hand, teachers were invariably leading learners to take risks, to speak in other than memorized patterns. Consistent with the process of language development that was being documented in first-language and untutored or 'natural' second-language acquisition research, the communicative activities offered learners an opportunity to focus on meaning as opposed to form. Achievement tests administered at the end of the 18-week introductory-level instructional period showed conclusively that learners who had engaged in communication in lieu of repeating laboratory

pattern drills performed with no less accuracy on discrete-point tests of grammatical structure. In fact, their communicative competence as measured in terms of fluency, comprehensibility, effort, and amount of communication in unrehearsed communicative tasks significantly surpassed that of learners who had had no such practice. Learner reactions to the test formats lent further support to the view that even beginners respond well to activities that let them focus on meaning as opposed to formal features.

A collection of role plays, games, and other communicative classroom activities was developed subsequently for inclusion in the adaptation of the French CREDIF materials, *Voix et Visages de la France*. The accompanying guide (Savignon, 1974) described the purpose of these activities as involving learners in the experience of communication. Teachers were encouraged to provide learners with the French equivalent of such expressions as 'What's the word for...?,' 'Please repeat,' and 'I don't understand,' expressions that would help them participate in the negotiation of meaning. Not unlike the efforts of Candlin and colleagues working in Europe, the focus was on classroom process and learner autonomy. The use of games, role plays, pair, and other small group activities gained acceptance and was subsequently recommended for inclusion in language teaching programs generally.

The coping strategies identified in the Savignon (1971, 1972) study became the basis for the subsequent identification by Canale and Swain (1980) of strategic competence in their three-component framework for communicative competence, along with grammatical competence and sociolinguistic competence. Grammatical competence represented sentence-level syntax, forms that remain the focus of Chomskyan theoretical linguistic inquiry and were a primary goal of both grammar-translation and audiolingual methodologies. Consistent with a view of language as social behavior, sociolinguistic competence represented a concern for the relevance or appropriateness of those forms in a particular social setting or context. There is now widespread recognition of the importance of these various dimensions of language use and of the need for learners to be involved in the actual experience of communication if they are to develop communicative competence.

Inclusion of sociolinguistic competence in the Canale and Swain framework reflected the challenge within American linguistic theory to the prevailing focus on syntactic features. Dell Hymes (1971) had reacted to Noam Chomsky's (1965) characterization of the linguistic competence of the "ideal native speaker" and had used the term 'communicative competence' to represent the use of language in social context and the observance of sociolinguistic norms of appropriateness. His concern with speech communities and the integration of language, communication, and culture was not unlike that of Firth and Halliday in the British linguistic tradition. Hymes's communicative competence may be seen as the equivalent of Halliday's meaning potential. Social interaction rather than the abstract psycholinguistic functioning of the human brain would become an identifying feature of CLT. Interpreting the significance of Hymes's perspective for language learners, some U.S. methodologists tended to focus on 'native speaker' cultural norms and the difficulty, if not impossibility, of representing these norms in a classroom of 'non-natives.' In light of this difficulty, the appropriateness of communicative competence as an instructional goal for classroom learners was questioned (Paulston, 1974).

CLT thus can be seen to derive from a multidisciplinary perspective that includes linguistics, anthropology, philosophy, sociology, psychology, and educational research. Its focus has been the elaboration and implementation of programs and methodologies that promote the development of functional language ability through learner participation in communicative events. Central to CLT is the understanding of language learning as both an educational and a political issue. Language teaching is inextricably tied to language policy. Viewed from a multicultural, intranational, and international perspective, diverse sociopolitical contexts mandate not only a diverse set of language learning goals but also a diverse set of teaching strategies. Program design and implementation depend on negotiation among policymakers, linguists, researchers, and teachers. The evaluation of program success requires a similar collaborative effort. The selection of methods and materials appropriate to both the goals and context of teaching begins with an analysis of socially defined language learner needs, as well as the styles of learning that prevail in a given educational setting (Berns, 1990).

Emergence of English as a Global Language

Along with a better understanding of the second-language acquisition process itself, the emergence of English as a global or international language has had a profound influence on language teaching, confronting language teacher education with new challenges worldwide. With specific reference to English, CLT recognizes that the norms followed by those in the 'inner circle' of English language users, to adopt the terminology proposed by Kachru (1992), may not be an appropriate goal for learners

(Pennycook, 2001; Savignon 2001, 2002). In a post-colonial, multicultural world where users of English in the outer and expanding circles outnumber those in the inner circle by a ratio of more than two to one, the use of such terms as 'native' or 'native-like' in the evaluation of communicative competence has become increasingly inappropriate.

Learners moreover have been found to differ markedly in their reactions to learning a language for communication. Although some may welcome apprenticeship in a new language, viewing it as an opportunity, others experience feelings of alienation and estrangement. Such phenomena may be individual or general to a community of learners. In Spanish-speaking Puerto Rico, for example, a long-standing general resentment of U.S. domination exerts a powerful negative influence on English language instruction. Not only learners but sometimes teachers also may consciously or subconsciously equate communicative English language learning with disloyalty to the history and culture of the island. Studying the rules of grammar and memorizing vocabulary lists is one thing. Using English for communication in other than stereotypical classroom exercises is quite another. Where they exist, such feelings are a strong deterrent to second- or foreign language use, even after 10 or more years of instruction.

With respect to the documentation of cross-varietal differences of English, research to date has focused most often on sentence-level lexical and syntactic features. Consequently, such attempts as the Educational Testing Service (ETS) Test of English for International Communication (TOEIC) to represent norms for a standard English for international communication reflect a primarily lexical and syntactic emphasis (Lowenberg, 1992). The hegemony of essentially Western conventions at the levels of discourse and genre is represented or challenged less easily. Differences in the way genres are constructed, interpreted, and used of course clearly extend beyond lexical and syntactic variation. Such differences are currently thought of as discursive in nature and are included in discourse competence, a fourth component of communicative competence identified by Canale (1983). Pressures for a 'democratization' of discursive practices have in some settings resulted in genre mixing and the creation of new genres. In professional communities, however, conformity to the practices of an established membership continues to serve an important gate-keeping function. The privilege of exploiting generic conventions becomes available only to those who enjoy a certain stature or visibility (Foucault, 1981; Fairclough, 1992; Bhatia, 1997).

Sociocultural Competence for a Dialogue of Cultures

Consistent with a view of language as social behavior, sociolinguistic competence is as we have seen integral to overall communicative competence. Second- or foreign language culture and its teaching have of course long been a concern of language teachers. Yet, if early research addressed the possibility of including some aspects of culture in a foreign language curriculum (for example, see Lado, 1957), recent discussion has underscored the strong links between language and culture and their relevance for teaching and curriculum design (Valdes, 1986; Byram, 1989; Damen, 1990; Kramsch, 1993). So mainstream now is the view of culture and language as inseparable that the term "sociocultural" has come to be substituted for the term "sociolinguistic" in representing the components of communicative competence (Byram, 1997; Savignon, 2002; Savignon and Sysoyev, 2002).

Interest in teaching culture along with language has led to the emergence of various integrative approaches. The Russian scholar Victoria Saphonova (1996:62) has introduced a sociocultural approach to teaching modern languages that she has described as "teaching for intercultural L2 communication in a spirit of peace and a dialogue of cultures." Given the dialogic nature of culture (Bakhtin, 1981), we cannot fully understand one culture in the absence of contact with other cultures. Thus, dialogue can be seen to be at the very core of culture, where culture is understood as a dialogical self-consciousness of every civilization.

The emergence of a focus on sociocultural competence can be seen in other European nations as well. The free flow of people and knowledge within the European Union has increased both the need and the opportunity for language learning and intercultural understanding. Brammerts (1996:121) described the creation of the International E-Mail Tandem Network, a project funded by the European Union that brings together universities from more than 10 countries to promote "autonomous, cooperative, and intercultural learning." The project is an extension of the tandem learning initiated in the 1970s in an effort to unite many states in a multicultural, multilingual Europe. Collaboration between entire classrooms of learners is a focus of ongoing research (Savignon and Roithmeier, 2003; Kinginger, 2004).

Interpretations of CLT

Although the term CLT may be recognized worldwide, theoretical understanding and interpretations of it vary widely. Some methodologists have suggested that CLT is an essentially Western concept,

inappropriate in other than Western contexts (Richards and Rogers, 2001; Rao, 2002). In addition, there are those who consider discussions of CLT to be passé (Bhatia, 2003; Kumaravadivelu, 2003; Savignon, 2003, 2004). Discouraged by the failure of both grammar-translation and audiolingual methods to prepare learners for the interpretation, expression, and negotiation of meaning and yet encouraged to adopt a variety of commercial materials and strategies increasingly labeled 'communicative,' many teachers and even teacher educators have been left confused or disillusioned. Substantive revision of teaching practice appropriate to a given context is ultimately of course the responsibility of classroom teachers. Yet, they cannot be expected to change their practices without considerable administrative and governmental support along with extensive guided experiential pre-service and in-service professional development.

Given the current widespread uncertainty as to just what are and are not essential features of CLT, a summary description would be incomplete without brief a mention of what CLT is *not*.

CLT is not concerned exclusively with face-to-face oral communication; principles of CLT apply equally to literacy. Whether written or oral, activities that involve readers and writers in the interpretation, expression, and negotiation of meaning are in and of themselves communicative. The goals of CLT depend on learner needs in a given context. Although group tasks have been found helpful in many contexts as a way or providing increased opportunity and motivation for communication, classroom group or pair work should not be considered an essential feature of CLT and may well be inappropriate in some settings. Finally, CLT does not exclude metalinguistic awareness or conscious knowledge of rules of syntax, discourse, and social appropriateness. However, knowing a rule is no substitute for using a rule. The creative use of interpretive and expressive skills in both reading and writing requires practice. CLT cannot be found in any one textbook or set of curricular materials inasmuch as strict adherence to a given text is not likely to be true to the process and goals of CLT. In keeping with the notion of context of situation, CLT is properly seen as an approach or theory of intercultural communicative competence to be used in developing materials and methods appropriate to a given context of learning. No less than the means and norms of communication they are designed to reflect, communicative teaching methods will continue to be explored and adapted.

Considerable resources, both human and monetary, are being deployed around the world to respond to the need for language teaching that is appropriate for the communicative needs of learners. In the literature on CLT, teacher education has not received adequate attention. What happens when teachers try to make changes in their teaching in accordance with various types of reform initiatives, whether top-down ministry of education policy directives or teacher-generated responses to social and technological change? Several recent reports of reform efforts in different nations provide a thought-provoking look at language teaching today as the collaborative and context-specific human activity that it is.

Redirection of English language education by Mombusho, the Japan Ministry of Education, includes the introduction of a communicative syllabus, the Japan Exchange and Teaching (JET) Program, and overseas in-service training for teachers. Previous encouragement to make classrooms more 'communicative' through the addition of 'communicative activities' led to the realization by Mombusho that teachers felt constrained by a structural syllabus that continued to control the introduction and sequence of grammatical features. With the introduction of a new national syllabus, structural controls were relaxed, and teachers found more freedom in the introduction of syntactic features. The theoretical rationale underlying the curriculum change in Japan includes both the well-known Canale and Swain (1980) model of communicative competence and the hypothetical classroom model of communicative competence, or the "inverted pyramid," proposed by Savignon (1983: 46).

Minoru Wada, senior advisor to Mombusho, described these efforts as "a landmark in the history of English education in Japan. For the first time it introduced into English education at both secondary school levels the concept of communicative competence. ... The basic goal of the revision was to prepare students to cope with the rapidly occurring changes toward a more global society" (Wada, 1994:1). Following the research model adapted by Kleinsasser (1993) to understand language teachers beliefs and practices, Sato (2002) reported on a year-long study of teachers of English in a private Japanese senior high school. Multiple data sources, including interviews, observations, surveys, and documents, offered insight into how EFL teachers learn to teach in this particular context. Among the major findings was the context-specific nature of teacher beliefs, which placed an emphasis on managing students, often to the exclusion of opportunities for English language learning.

Cheng (2002) has documented the influence of a new, more communicative English language test on the classroom teaching of English in Hong Kong,

a region that boasts a strong contingent of applied linguists and language teaching methodologists and has experienced considerable political and social transformation in recent years. In keeping with curricular redesign to reflect a more task-based model of learning, alternative public examinations were developed to measure learners' ability to make use of what they have learned, to solve problems, and to complete tasks. Cheng's ambitious multiyear study found the effect of washback of the new examination on classroom teaching to be limited. There was a change in classroom teaching at the content level, but not at the more important methodological level.

The case of such washback in Costa Rica, a small nation with a long democratic tradition of public education, offers a contrast with the Hong Kong study. Quesada-Inces (2001), a teacher educator with many years of experience, reported the findings of a multicase study that explored the relationship between teaching practice and the Bachillerato test of English, a national standardized reading comprehension test administered at the end of secondary school. Although teachers expressed strong interest in developing learner communicative ability in both written and spoken English, a reading comprehension test was seen to dominate classroom emphasis, particularly in the final two years of secondary school. The findings illustrate what Messick (1996) has called "negative washback," produced by construct under-representation and construct irrelevance. The Bachillerato test of English does not reflect the content of the curriculum, assessing skills less relevant than those that go unmeasured. The English testing situation in Costa Rica is not unlike that described by Shohamy (1998) in Israel where two parallel systems exist – one the official national educational policy and syllabus and the other reflected in the national tests of learner achievement.

English language teaching has also been a focus of curricular reform in both Taiwan and South Korea. Adopting a sociocultural perspective on language use and language learning as a prerequisite to pedagogical innovation, Wang (2002) noted the efforts that have been made to meet the demand for competent English language users in Taiwan. They include a change in college entrance examinations, a new curriculum with a goal of communicative competence, and the island-wide implementation of English education in the elementary schools. However, she noted that despite learner preference for a more communication-focused curriculum, grammar teaching continued to prevail and much more needed to be done to ensure quality classroom teaching and learning: "Further improvements can be stratified into three interrelated levels … teachers, school authorities, and the government. Each is essential to the success of the other efforts" (Wang, 2002: 145).

CLT in the 21st Century

In each of the studies sketched above, the research was both initiated and conducted by local educators in response to local issues. Although each is significant in its own right, together they can only suggest the dynamic and contextualized nature of language teaching in the world today. Nonetheless, the settings that have been documented constitute a valuable resource for understanding the current global status of CLT. Viewed in kaleidoscopic fashion, they appear as brilliant multilayered bits of glass, tumbling about to form different yet always intriguing configurations. From these data-rich records of language teaching reform in the early 21st century, three major themes emerge, suggestive of the road ahead:

1. The highly contextualized nature of CLT is underscored again and again. It would be inappropriate to speak of CLT as a teaching method in any sense of that term as it was used in the 20th century. Rather, CLT is an approach that understands language to be inseparable from individual identity and social behavior. Not only does language define a community but a community, in turn, also defines the forms and uses of language. The norms and goals appropriate for learners in a given setting, and the means for attaining these goals, are the concern of those directly involved.
2. Related both to the understanding of language as culture in motion and to the multilingual reality in which most of the world population finds itself is the futility of any definition of a 'native speaker,' a term that came to prominence in descriptive structural linguistics and was adopted by teaching methodologists to define an ideal for language learners.
3. Time and again, assessment seems to be the driving force behind curricular innovations. Increasing demands for accountability along with a positivistic stance that one cannot teach that which cannot be described and measured by a common yardstick continue to influence program content and goals. Irrespective of their own needs or interests, learners prepare for the tests they will be required to pass. High-stakes language tests often determine future access to education and opportunity.

See also: Communicative Competence; Habermas, Jürgen; Halliday, Michael Alexander Kirkwood; Language Teaching Traditions: Second Language; Second and Foreign Language Learning and Teaching.

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Communicative Principle and Communication

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Inferential Nature of Communication

The main characteristic of human communicative behavior is that its major part takes place between the explicitly expressed words. Most of the time, there is a significant difference between what we say and what we mean. In spite of this, we usually have no difficulty figuring out what the speaker tries to communicate implicitly. Why is this so? According to Grice, the decisive feature of pragmatic interpretation is its inferential nature (Grice, 1961). He argued that most aspects of utterance interpretation that traditionally are regarded as conventional, or semantic, should be treated as conversational, or pragmatic. This means that the hearer constructs and evaluates a hypothesis about the speaker's meaning. In this process she/he relies on the meaning of utterances, contextual and background assumptions, and general communicative principles that speakers are supposed to observe in normal circumstances. In the center of the Gricean approach are the so-called implicatures which are aspects of the speaker's meaning inferred on the basis of contextual assumptions of communication and principles.

Out of the three main elements of inferential intention-recognition: meaning of utterances, contextual and background assumptions, and principles of communication, the latter has generated most debate. Pragmaticians have been engaged in searching for communicative principles that govern communication. A principle is the formalized expression of the behavior of a system. It is not a statistical generalization but a causal, mechanical explanation, a general law. Models of communication, especially cognitive ones, have made serious efforts to identify the principles that govern different aspects of use and understanding of language.

Cooperative Principle

Grice regarded cooperation as the ruling element of verbal communicative interaction. He argued that utterances automatically create expectations that guide the hearer toward the speaker's meaning. He considered communication to be both rational and cooperative, and claimed that the inferential intention-recognition is governed by a cooperative principle and maxims of quality, quantity, relation,

and manner (truthfulness, informativeness, relevance and clarity), which speakers are expected to observe (Grice, 1961, 1989: 368–372). The interpretation that a hearer should choose is the one that best satisfies his/her expectations. Inferential communication can be considered successful when the communicator provides evidence of her/his intention to convey a certain thought, and the audience infers this intention from the evidence provided by the communicator.

Grice's inferential approach to communication has been so fundamental that all subsequent pragmatic theories have been influenced by it. Researchers have accepted and relied on the inferential nature of communication, but some have questioned the cooperative principle and maxims as the governing communicative principle of communication. Several critics of the Gricean view (e.g., Keenan, 1979; Traunmüller, 1991) expressed their skepticism about the universality of maxims, arguing that different cultures have different principles or maxims. According to Gumperz (1978), culturally colored interactional styles create culturally determined expectations and interpretive strategies and can lead to breakdowns in intercultural and interethnic communication. Others, such as Sperber and Wilson (1995), argued that cooperation is not essential to communication and suggested a reduction of Grice's maxims to a single principle of relevance. According to this view, a rational speaker will choose an utterance that will provide the hearer with a maximum number of contextual implications in a minimum processing effort. In recent years, two approaches have emerged as most influential in the debate about the communicative principle: the neo-Gricean view and the theory of relevance.

Neo-Gricean View

Neo-Gricean pragmatists such as Horn (1984) and Levinson (2000) retained the view that cooperation is essential to communication. Whether generalized or particularized, they argue, conversational implicature derives from the shared presumption that speaker and hearer are interacting rationally and cooperatively to reach a common goal. Although they kept the cooperative principle as a decisive factor of communication, they revised the maxims to account for a range of generalized implicatures, which Grice described as carried in all normal contexts and contrasted with more context-dependent particularized implicatures. In his book, Levinson addressed the problem of "generalized conversational implicatures (GCI)" as opposed to "particularized conversational implicatures (PCI)." He claimed that only the former are truly linguistic in that only they do not rely on "specific

contextual assumptions" (Levinson, 2000: 16). He emphasized that "... a theory of GCIs has to be supplemented with a theory of PCIs that will have at least as much, and possibly considerably more, importance to a general theory of communication. It is just to a linguistic theory that GCIs have an unparalleled import" (Levinson, 2000: 22). Levinson listed three principles that guide generalized conversational implicatures:

> Q-Principle:
> Speaker: Choose the maximally informative expression alternative (that still is true).
> Addressee: Assume that speaker has chosen the maximally informative expression alternative (that still is true).
> I-Principle:
> Speaker: Produce only as much linguistic information as necessary to satisfy the communicative purpose.
> Addressee: Enrich the given linguistic information, identify the most specific information relative to the communicative purpose.
> M-Principle (Modality/Manner/Markedness)
> Speaker: Communicate non-normal, non-stereotypical situations by expressions that contrast with those that you would choose for normal, stereotypical situations.
> Addressee: If something is communicated by expressions that contrast with those that would be used for normal, stereotypical meanings, then assume that the speaker wants to communicate a non-normal, non-stereotypical meaning.

Relevance Theory

Supporters of Relevance Theory share Grice's intuition that utterances raise expectations of relevance. However, they question several other aspects of his approach, including the need for a cooperative principle and maxims, the focus on pragmatic processes that contribute to implicatures rather than to explicit, truth-conditional content, the role of deliberate maxim violation in utterance interpretation, and the treatment of figurative utterances as deviations from a maxim or convention of truthfulness (Sperber and Wilson, 1995, 2004). Building on the central insights of Grice's contribution but advancing beyond him in significant ways, Sperber and Wilson (1995) argued that cooperation is not crucial for ostensive communication. However, it is fundamental for all speakers to form their contributions so that the audience will not only attend to them but will be able to infer the intended meaning without unjustifiable processing effort. This approach is grounded in a general view of human cognition according to which human cognitive processes are geared to achieving the greatest possible cognitive effect for the smallest possible processing effort. In order for individuals to achieve this, they must focus their attention on what seems to be

the most relevant information available to them. A feature of Sperber and Wilson's theory that is significantly different from Grice's is the idea that the processing of an utterance involves the construction of a context in which the effects of the utterance are evaluated. The context is not given, but is enriched in such a way that the processing of the utterance is facilitated (*See* **Relevance Theory**).

Sperber and Wilson believe that to communicate verbally is to claim an individual's attention: hence, to communicate is to imply that the information communicated is relevant. This fundamental idea, according to which communicated information comes with a guarantee of relevance, is the communicative principle of relevance. They argued that the principle of relevance is essential to explaining human communication because human cognition tends to be geared to the maximization of relevance (cognitive principle of relevance). According to relevance theory, utterances raise expectations of relevance not because speakers are expected to obey a cooperative principle and maxims or some other specifically communicative convention, but because the search for relevance is a basic feature of human cognition which communicators may utilize (Sperber and Wilson, 2004).

In their book, Sperber and Wilson (1995) demonstrated how these principles are enough on their own to account for the interaction of linguistic meaning and contextual factors in utterance interpretation. Their claim is that the expectations of relevance raised by an utterance are precise enough, and predictable enough, to guide the hearer toward the speaker's meaning. The aim is to explain in cognitively realistic terms what these expectations of relevance amount to and how they might contribute to an empirically plausible account of comprehension.

Criticism of the Principle of Relevance

Levinson (2000) criticized Relevance Theory (RT), while making the case that generalized conversational implicatures comprise a distinct domain within pragmatics. He relies on the Gricean distinction between generalized and particularized conversational implicature and claims that an approach such as RT (Sperber and Wilson, 1995), which does not give any theoretical weight to the distinction and uses the same communicative principle and comprehension procedure in the derivation of all conversational implicatures, cannot really give an adequate account of the nature of these generalized inferences. According to Levinson, RT does not allow for an intermediate level of generalized conversational implicatures in between 'literal meaning' (semantics) and once-off ('nonce') inferences.

Some researchers have described the relevance-theoretic approach to communication as psychological rather than sociological. Mey said that "relevance theory ... does not include, let alone focus on, the social dimensions of language" (2001: 89). Talbot (1994: 3525–3526) called relevance theory "an asocial model," pointing out that, within the RT framework, there is no way of discussing any divergence of assumptions according to class, gender, or ethnicity. In her response to this criticism, Sperber and Wilson (1997) argued that sociological aspects are not left out of RT because the theory considers human communication inferential, and it presupposes and exploits an awareness of self and others. Inferential communication is fundamentally social, not just because it is a form of interaction but also because it exploits and enlarges the scope of basic forms of social cognition.

Verbal communication usually conveys much more than is linguistically encoded. Pragmatic theories such as RT take an interest mainly in the enrichment of linguistic meaning, derivation of standard implicatures, and principles governing the process of communication. Sociolinguists are more interested in the ostensive or non-ostensive uses of the act of communication itself to convey claims and attitudes about the social relationship between the interlocutors. Sperber and Wilson accepted that RT largely ignored these issues. They emphasized, however, that this did not mean to deny their importance. They merely felt that, at that stage of the theory development, they could best contribute to the study of human communication by taking it at its most elementary level and abstracting away from these more complex aspects.

Another issue is that communication can hardly be restricted to what people intend to communicate. People usually communicate more than they intend and, according to Mey and Talbot, Sperber and Wilson's model rests on the exclusion of precisely this (Mey and Talbot, 1988: 746). In their rebuttal, Sperber and Wilson (1997) pointed out that the issue is not whether non-ostensive forms of information-transmission exist but whether they should be treated as communication. In RT, it is argued that unintentionally transmitted information is subject merely to general cognitive, rather than specifically communicative, constraints. Consequently, it falls under the first, or cognitive principle of relevance rather than the second, or communicative principle.

Communicative Principle

Mey (1993: 2001) introduced an inclusive term 'Communicative Principle' that basically comprises

both the Cooperative Principle and the Principle of Relevance. He argued as follows:

> People talk with the intention to communicate something to somebody; this is the foundation of all linguistic behavior. I call this the Communicative Principle; even though this principle is not mentioned in the pragmatics literature (at least not under this name – a variant, the 'Principle of Relevance', will be discussed later in this chapter), it is nevertheless the hidden condition for all human pragmatic activity, and the silently agreed-on premise of our investigation into such activity. (Mey, 2001: 68–69).

According to the Communicative Principle, intention, cooperation and relevance are all responsible for communication action in a concrete context.

Conclusion

In recent years pragmatics has been thriving both in the social and inferential paradigms.

However, only an integrated model that unifies the linguistic, cognitive, and social aspects of communication has considerable hope to be able to account for what is universal and what is culture-specific in human verbal interaction.

See also: Context and Common Ground; Context, Communicative; Cooperative Principle; Intercultural Pragmatics and Communication; Pragmatics: Overview; Relevance Theory.

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Communities of Practice

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The notion 'community of practice' was developed by Jean Lave and Etienne Wenger (Lave and Wenger, 1991; Wenger, 2000) as the basis of a social theory of learning. A community of practice is a collection of people who engage on an ongoing basis in some common endeavor: a bowling team, a book club, a friendship group, a crack house, a nuclear family, a church congregation. The construct was brought into sociolinguistics (Eckert and McConnell-Ginet, 1992a, 1992b) as a way of theorizing language and gender – most particularly, of responsibly connecting broad categories to on-the-ground social and linguistic practice.

The value of the notion to sociolinguistics and linguistic anthropology lies in the fact that it identifies a social grouping not in virtue of shared abstract characteristics (e.g., class, gender) or simple copresence (e.g., neighborhood, workplace), but in virtue of shared practice. In the course of regular joint activity, a community of practice develops ways of doing things, views, values, power relations, ways of talking. And the participants engage with these practices in virtue of their place in the community of practice, and of the place of the community of practice in the larger

social order. The community of practice is thus a rich locus for the study of situated language use, of language change, and of the very process of conventionalization that underlies both.

Two conditions of a community of practice are crucial in the conventionalization of meaning: shared experience over time and a commitment to shared understanding. A community of practice engages people in mutual sense making – about the enterprise they are engaged in, about their respective forms of participation in the enterprise, about their orientation to other communities of practice and to the world around them more generally. Whether this mutual sense making is consensual or conflictual, it is based in a commitment to mutual engagement, and to mutual understanding of that engagement. Participants in a community of practice collaborate in placing themselves as a group with respect to the world around them. This includes the common interpretation of other communities, and of their own practice with respect to those communities, and ultimately the development of a style – including a linguistic style – that embodies these interpretations. Time, meanwhile, allows for greater consistency in this endeavor – for more occasions for the repetition of circumstances, situations, and events. It provides opportunities for joint sense making, and it deepens participants' shared knowledge and sense of predictability. This not only allows meaning to be exercised, but it provides the conditions for setting down convention (Lewis, 1969).

The community of practice offers a different perspective from the traditional focus on the speech community as an explanatory context for linguistic heterogeneity. The speech community perspective views heterogeneity as based in a geographically defined population, and structured by broad and fundamental social categories, particularly class, gender, age, race, and ethnicity. The early survey studies in this tradition (Labov, 1966; Wolfram, 1969; Trudgill, 1974; Macaulay, 1977) provided the backbone of variation studies, mapping broad distributions across large urban communities. What these studies could not provide is the link between broad, abstract patterns and the meanings that speakers are constructing in the concrete situated speech that underlies them. The search for local explanations of linguistic variability has spurred a range of ethnographic studies over the years (Labov, 1963; Gal, 1979; Eckert, 2000), and in recent decades the ethnographic trend has intensified. A major challenge in such studies is to find local settings in which speakers engage the most intensely in making sense of their place in the wider social world, and in which they articulate their linguistic behavior with this sense. The construct 'community of practice' is a way of locating language use ethnographically so as to create an accountable link between local practice and membership in extralocal and broad categories. What makes a community of practice different from just any group of speakers (e.g., a bunch of kids found hanging out on the street, or a group of undergraduates assembled for an experiment) is not the selection of the speakers so much as the nature of the accountability for this selection. While every community of practice offers a window on the world, the value of this approach relies on the analyst's ability to seek out communities of practice that are particularly salient to the sociolinguistic question being addressed. It is this selection that makes the difference between particularism and a close-up study with far-reaching significance.

Explanation for broad patterns is to be found in speakers' experience, understanding, and linguistic development as they engage in life as members of important overarching categories. A white working-class Italian-American woman does not develop her ways of speaking directly from the larger categories 'working class,' 'Italian-American' and 'female,' but from her day-to-day experience as a person who combines those three (and other) memberships. Her experience will be articulated by her participation in activities and communities of practice that are particular to her place in the social order. It is in these communities of practice that she will develop an identity and the linguistic practices to articulate this identity. Thus communities of practice are fundamental loci for the experience of membership in broader social categories – one might say that it is the grounded locus of the *habitus* (Bourdieu, 1977).

Survey studies show us that working-class speakers lead in the adoption of local phonological change. While one can speculate about the motivations for this early adoption on the basis of general knowledge about class, the actual dynamics of social meaning can only be found through direct examination of working-class linguistic practice. Ethnographic work in suburban Detroit high schools (Eckert, 2000) sought to understand the salience of class in adolescents' day-to-day practice. The study uncovered an opposition between two large communities of practice, the jocks and the burnouts, that constitute class cultures in the context of the high school. The working-class culture of the burnouts and the middle-class culture of the jocks are specifically adolescent, and class consciousness and conflict takes the form of a highlighted social opposition in school and the maximization of resources in constructing this opposition. Linguistic variables, a prime resource, correlated significantly with participation in these communities of practice, rather than with parents'

social class. The jocks' and burnouts' contrasting orientation to such things as school, the urban area, relationships, and the future provided direct explanations for the burnouts' lead in the adoption of new local changes.

Another important aspect of the communities of practice approach is its focus on the fluidity of social space and the diversity of experience. The speech community perspective's focus on demographic categories implies a center and a periphery (Rampton, 1999). The focus on average behavior for categories suggests a 'typical' speaker, erasing the important activity of speakers at the borders of categories. This also produces a static view of the relation between the linguistic and the social, since change tends to come from the borders (Pratt, 1988). Studies of communities of practice, therefore, can capture the interaction between social and linguistic change. Qing Zhang, for example (Zhang, 2001), has captured the role of stylistic practice among the new Beijing 'yuppies' in the development of new dialect features, and Andrew Wong (Wong, 2005) has traced semantic change in the differential use of the term *tongzhi* 'comrade' between the activist and nonactivist gay communities. Mary Bucholtz's study (Bucholtz, 1996) of a group of girls who were fashioning themselves as geeks – a persona normally reserved for males – provided direct observation of girls pushing the envelope of gender in their daily linguistic practice.

A community of practice that is central to many of its participants' identity construction is an important locus for the setting down of joint history, allowing for the complex construction of linguistic styles. Such history also sets the stage for change. Emma Moore's study of teenage girls in northern England (Moore, 2003) traced the gradual split of a group of somewhat rebellious 'populars' as some of them emerged as the tougher 'townies' in their ninth year. In the process, the vernacular speech patterns of the townies intensified in opposition to those of their more conservative friends.

The enterprise of sociolinguistics (and linguistic anthropology) is to relate ways of speaking to ways of participating in the social world. This is not simply a question of discovering how linguistic form correlates with social structure or activity, but of how social meaning comes to be embedded in language. Meaning is made in the course of local social practice (McConnell-Ginet, 1989) and conventionalized on the basis of shared experience and understanding (Lewis, 1969). The importance of the community of practice lies in the recognition that identity is not fixed, that convention does not pre-exist use, and that language use is a continual process of learning.

The community of practice is a prime locus of this process of identity and linguistic construction.

Communities of practice emerge in response to common interest or position, and play an important role in forming their members' participation in, and orientation to, the world around them. It should be clear that the speech community and the community of practice approaches are both necessary and complementary, and that the value of each depends on having the right abstract categories and finding the communities of practice in which those categories are most salient. In other words, the best analytic process would involve feedback between the two approaches.

See also: Identity and Language; Interactional Sociolinguistics.

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Computer Literacy

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Introduction: Why Computer Literacy?

If literacy (no matter how we interpret this term) has to do with people's capacities for handling 'letters' (Latin: *literae*), then one may ask: What's so peculiar about the computer that we need to define a special concept called 'computer literacy'? After all, people have been using the notion of literacy for ages, and there has never been a need to define a special kind of literacy for a particular tool of writing, such as a chisel, or a brush, or a pen. 'Penmanship' has become a synonym of 'high literacy' (not necessarily exercised by means of a pen), but nobody has ever felt the need to define 'typewriter literacy' in other terms than in number of words per minute: a good ('literate', if you want) typist can do at least 100 wpm without committing too many errors, whereas a beginner or 'illiterate' person only can do 30 or 40, and will have to use a lot of time correcting her or his mistakes.

The difference that makes a difference

The relation of the writer to his or her instrument has of course always been a complicated one. Sometimes this relation has been known to influence the very way people write: the ancient Greek scribes who performed their art in stone didn't bother to drag all their utensils back to the beginning of the line they just had finished; instead, they let the new line begin where the old one had stopped, only one level lower, and thus the script called *boustrophedon* came into being (where the lines alternate in their direction of writing/reading).

Undoubtedly, the invention of wooden, later lead letter type contributed greatly to the dissemination of written literature; however, the effects on the scribe were never a matter of reflection. Later on, the typewriter got naturally to be used for the purposes of office work, while personal letters and literary 'works of art' had to be composed by hand, if they were to be of any value. Even in more practical domains, such as that of journalism, it is a known fact that the famous Count Dalle Torre, late chief editor of the Vatican daily *Osservatore Romano*, forbade the use of typewriters in his offices as late as 1948, so journalists had to write their copy by hand, and then give it to a typist or typesetter.

The interaction between writer and tool changed dramatically with the advent of the computer. Not only is this writing instrument more perfected than any of its predecessors, but in addition it possesses a great number of qualities enabling people to approach their writing tasks in a different way. Accordingly, 'computer literacy' can be defined as: knowing how to exploit the various new uses that the 'computer interface' between humans and letters can be put to. Let's consider some of these uses.

How to use (and not use) a computer

I will not mention the more specialized functions that computer writing has inherited from earlier technologies, merely perfecting, not changing them: bookkeeping and accounting (so-called 'spread sheets'), tabulating, making concordances, automated correspondence and other office work (e.g., the 'automatic reminders' one gets from one's credit card company or the local utilities services). The truly revolutionary aspect of computer literacy is in the effect it has on the writing process itself, that which earlier was thought of by some as taboo to any kind of mechanical implementation.

One could say that the truly 'computer literate' is a person who composes his or her literary production directly on the computer, without any interference except from the interface itself. This is a bit like composing directly on the piano, except that the keyboard there normally does not retain what has been played on it. In contrast, the conserving function of the computer is precisely what enables writers to enter into a totally new relationship with their tool. While earlier work, being dependent on the paper medium, had to be meticulously corrected 'in' the text itself, often with great problems of legibility and understanding (scratching or crossing out, 'whiting out', overwriting, writing in between the lines and in the margins, with multiple versions often canceling out one another, or at least making the perhaps better original lines impossible to retrieve), the computer allows the text producer to maintain near-compete independence.

Paper has always been said to be 'patient' in that it did not protest against whatever the author put down on it, suffering great works of art and utterly trivial composition alike to be entered on its impartial surface. In comparison, the patience that the computer exhibits is not only a matter of the tool: it is situated within the computer 'literate', who knows that Pilate's age-old adage *Quod scripsi, scripsi* 'What I have written, I have written' has been rendered null and void by this new medium. Here, it doesn't matter what is written, for everything can always be reformulated, corrected, transformed, and recycled, at the touch of a keystroke or using a few specialized commands. In extreme cases, we even may see the computer generate near-automatic writing (in the sense of the surrealists), with fingers racing across the keyboard and authors failing to realize what's turning them on. Subsequently, the author who checks and goes over the results may often marvel at the 'inventions' that he or she has been guilty of producing, almost without being aware of the process by which they happened.

Perspectives and dangers

While the acquisition of computer literacy as a condition for employment does not create much of a difference as compared with earlier situations (except for the extra cost and training it involves), the use of the computer in creative contexts represents a true breakthrough in the relationship of humans to their work, especially as regards their ways of creative production and reproduction. The interesting question here is not what the computer does to our *hands*, but in what ways it affects out *mental* ability to shape and reshape, to work out a thought, then abandon it (but not entirely!), and how it allows us to come back to earlier thoughts and scraps of insights that were jotted down in the creative trance, as it were – perhaps recombining these *disiecta membra* with other pieces of thought, all available at the drop of a keystroke. This qualitative change of our relationship with our creative tools is the true computer revolution and it defines 'computer literacy' as being qualitatively different from earlier, more primitive creative and cognitive technologies (*see* **Cognitive Technology**).

The dangers of the spread of computer literacy are, of course, that any Tom, Dick or Emma who can handle a keyboard may consider themselves to be geniuses of writing, thus offsetting the positive effect of increased literacy by this reduction of the computer tool to an instrument of the inane and mindless. More importantly, though, the danger exists that users, because of the apparent naturalness of their relationship to the computer, start considering themselves as natural extensions of the machine, as human tools.

One frequently hears computer users employ expressions such as: 'The computer is in a bad mood today' or: 'The computer doesn't want to cooperate'; one sees irritated users kick their machines, pound their keyboards, or scream at their screens, accusing them of lack of cooperation. Such expressions (when they are not caused by either the user's poor computer literacy, or by a particular hardware or software deficiency) may reflect either a lack of critical awareness of the computer's properties as an auxiliary tool, or a failure to distinguish between what is the respective role of the partners in human computer interaction and cooperation. As I have shown elsewhere (Gorayska & Mey 1996), the future of human computer interaction lies in the humanizing of the tool, not in the humans' becoming more tool-oriented and tool-like: the computer tail should never be allowed to wag the user dog.

See also: Cognitive Technology.

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Conspicuity

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It is normally assumed that for communication to work efficiently, we should avoid the multiplication of meanings. This is supported by Grice's description of the Maxim of Manner, according to which we have to "be perspicuous," and therefore, among other things, "avoid ambiguity" (Grice, 1975) (*see* **Grice, Herbert Paul; Maxims and Flouting**). However, in ordinary conversations, speakers often put much more into their utterances than is obvious from the surface of the sentence, and hearers generally take out much more than is presented to them on the surface. To understand this multiplication of meaning, another Maxim of Manner should be introduced, according to which we have to "be conspicuous" and therefore "relish ambiguity." This maxim subsumes two general pragmatic principles: "Make your conversation as interesting/witty/surprising as possible" and "Make your utterance/text as expressive as possible, but still accessible." It can be linked to two of Leech's principles of pragmatics, the Interest Principle, which is part of interpersonal rhetoric, and the Expressivity Principle, which is part of textual rhetoric. According to the Interest Principle, we prefer a conversation that is interesting, in the sense of having unpredictability or news value, to a conversation that is predictable (Leech, 1983: 156). It tells you to be witty. Conversations as mere exchanges of information can be boring, whereas conversations that force us to infer more from the utterances then we actually get on the surface are the ones that we love to engage in, provoke, and prolong. Meaning depends on the information people can take out of an utterance, rather than the information that is already in it. What counts is semantic depth on the one hand (the depth of conversational implicatures) (*see* **Implicature**) and the witty exploitation or creation of multiple meanings on the other. Leech's Expressivity Principle is "concerned with effectiveness in a broad sense which includes expressive and aesthetic aspects of communication, rather than simply with efficiency" (Leech, 1983: 68). Research therefore is needed to answer questions such as: How do people use polysemous words in their daily linguistic interaction? How do they become aware of the existence of multiple meanings? Do they use them to achieve certain rhetorical, communicational, and social effects? (see Nerlich and Chamizo Dominguez, 1999; Nerlich and Clarke, 2001) Normally, the injection with and extraction of a 'surplus' of meaning from utterances (based on established polysemies or on conversational implicatures, or a mixture of both) goes unnoticed, because this surplus is congruent with the surface forms that hint at it and with the context in which they are used. This normal contextual unfolding of that which is implicated (meant) by an utterance used in context, but not 'said,' has been studied in a Gricean framework, using notions such as conversational implicature and speaker meaning vs. sentence meaning (see Mey, 2001: 43). There are, however, also cases when the inherent multiplicity of meanings is itself brought to the surface, is exposed in our daily conversational interaction, when we challenge the 'principle of conventionality' through the introduction of incongruity and dissonance. Although Grice implied in his writings that implicatures are an everyday phenomenon, he stressed that ambiguity, irony, and so on are violations of the communicative norm. And yet, it is this 'violation', this 'flouting' of conversational maxims that makes conversations interesting, that makes people actually engage in and enjoy conversations.

See also: Cooperative Principle; Grice, Herbert Paul; Implicature; Maxims and Flouting; Neo-Gricean Pragmatics; Pragmatics: Overview; Relevance Theory.

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Constraint, Pragmatic

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Rules, processes, and representations in pragmatic theory can come with conditions, or restrictions. Such restrictions, or constraints, pertain to the scope of application of a rule, the spread of the process, or the well-formedness of a representation. They can be seen as external restrictions delimiting, for example, an application of a theory, or as an integral part of the theory (*see also* **Pragmatics: Overview** and **Metapragmatics**).

In optimality-theory pragmatics (e.g., Blutner, 2000; Blutner and Zeevat, 2003), constraints constitute an integral part of the theory (*see* **Pragmatics: Optimality Theory**). Because linguistic meaning underdetermines the proposition expressed, a pragmatic mechanism of completion of this meaning is proposed. It is conceived of as an optimization procedure, founded on the idea of the interaction of violable and ranked constraints. The selected, optimal proposition is the one that best satisfies the constraints. This selection is performed by the pragmatic system whose role is to interpret the semantic representation of a sentence in a given setting. This system is founded on the principles of rational communication worked out by Grice and subsequently by Horn (1984) and Levinson (1987, 2000) in the form of the Q-principles and I/R-principles (*see also* **Implicature; Grice, Herbert Paul; Neo-Gricean Pragmatics; Pragmatics and Semantics**). The I/R-principle compares different interpretations of an expression, while the Q-principle assesses the produced structure as compared with other unrealized possibilities: It blocks interpretations that would be more economically connected with alternative forms. Examples of interpretation constraints are STRENGTH (preference for informationally stronger readings), CONSISTENCY (preference for interpretations that do not conflict with the context), FAITH-INT (faithful interpretation, interpreting all that the speaker said). FAITH-INT precedes CONSISTENCY which precedes STRENGTH in the ranking (see Zeevat, 2000).

Another example of constraints that are constitutive of the theory is Segmented Discourse Representation Theory (SDRT) (e.g., Asher and Lascarides, 2003). In SDRT, rhetorical relations spell out constraints on discourse interpretation. The interpretation of discourse is founded on constraints on discourse coherence. For example, a relation between two propositions can be Narration, Explanation, or Elaboration.

Theory-external constraints can be exemplified by particular lexical items that provide certain restrictions on interpretation. For example, it has been observed by Grice that there are certain words that do not contribute to the truth-conditional content of an expression. Among such words are 'but,' 'moreover,' and 'therefore.' While Grice classified them as conventional implicatures, it was subsequently suggested (Blakemore, 1987) that they do not have conceptual content but instead are indicators of pragmatic inferences to be performed by the addressee. 'After all,' 'you see,' 'also,' and other such indicators also belong to this category:

> A: '*Oscar and Lucinda* is worth reading. After all, one of the best novelists wrote it.'

'After all' functions here as an indicator that the second sentence is to be taken as evidence for the claim made in the first. By Blakemore's account, such indicators contain procedural (rather than conceptual) meaning and they act as constraints on inference in communication. This approach to constraints on inference has been developed and plays a major role in relevance theory. Blakemore (1987) calls such indicators constraints on the relevance of a proposition. Moreover, it has since been observed (Wilson and Sperber, 1993) that there are also procedural items that constrain the proposition expressed, such as pronouns, as well as markers such as 'please' and 'let's' that constrain the process of inferring the propositional attitude of the speaker or the speech act. The scope of the category of such constraints, as well as the binary conceptual-procedural distinction, still remain a contentious matter (see, e.g., Blakemore, 2002; Lee, 2002) (*see* **Relevance Theory**).

See also: Grice, Herbert Paul; Implicature; Metapragmatics; Neo-Gricean Pragmatics; Pragmatics and Semantics; Pragmatics: Optimality Theory; Pragmatics: Overview; Relevance Theory.

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Context and Common Ground

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People talking to each other take much for granted. They assume a common language. They assume shared knowledge of such things as cultural facts, news stories, and local geography. If they know each other, they assume shared knowledge of earlier conversations and other joint experiences. And if they are talking face to face, they assume shared knowledge of the scene around them. 'Common ground' is the sum of the information that people assume they share. Although the notion is often treated informally, it has a formal definition that has been essential to the study of semantics, pragmatics, and other areas of language.

History

'Common knowledge' as a technical notion was introduced by David Lewis (1969) to account for how people coordinate with each other. Suppose A, B, and C agree to meet at city hall at noon. The three of them take it as common knowledge that they intend to go to city hall at noon if and only if: (1) all three believe that the agreement holds; (2) the agreement indicates to all of them that they believe the agreement holds; and (3) the agreement indicates to all of them that they intend to go to city hall at noon. In Lewis's terminology, the agreement is the 'basis' for A, B, and C's common knowledge that they intend to go to city hall at noon. Common knowledge is always a property of a community of people, even though the community may consist of just two people.

The notion of 'common ground' was introduced, in turn, by Robert Stalnaker (1978), based on Lewis's

common knowledge, to account for the way in which information accumulates in conversation:

> Roughly speaking, the presuppositions of a speaker are the propositions whose truth he takes for granted as part of the background of the conversation...Presuppositions are what is taken by the speaker to be the **common ground** of the participants in the conversation, what is treated as their **common knowledge** or **mutual knowledge** [p. 320, Stalnaker's emphases].

In this view, people in conversation take certain propositions to be common ground, and when they make assertions, they add to this common ground. When A tells B, *George arrived home yesterday*, A takes it as common ground with B who George is, what day it is, and where George lives. A uses the assertion to add to their common ground the proposition that George arrived home the day before. Common ground therefore also includes common (or mutual) beliefs, and common (or mutual) suppositions (Clark and Marshall, 1981; Clark, 1996).

Common ground is a reflexive, or self-referring, notion (Cohen, 1978). If A takes a proposition as common ground with B, then A takes the following statement to be true: A and B have information that the proposition is true **and that this entire statement is true**. (*This sentence has five words* is reflexive in the sense that **this sentence** refers to the sentence that contains it.) Because of the self-reference, people can, technically, draw an infinity of inferences from what they take to be common ground. Suppose A takes it that A and B mutually believe that George is home. A can infer that B believes that George is home, that B believes that A believes that George is home, that B believes that A believes that B believes that George is home, and so on *ad infinitum*. In practice, people never draw more than a few of these inferences. These iterated propositions

are therefore a derivative and incomplete representation of common ground. The reflexive notion is more basic (Lewis, 1969; Clark and Marshall, 1981; Clark, 1996).

Bases for Common Ground

In conversation and other joint activities, people have to assess and reassess their common ground, and to do that, they need the right bases. These bases fall into two main categories: community membership and personal experiences (Clark, 1996).

Communal Common Ground

Common ground is information that is common to a community of people. Some of these communities are built around shared practices or expertise, such as the communities of ophthalmologists, New Zealanders, or English speakers. Once A and B mutually establish that they are both ophthalmologists, New Zealanders, or English speakers, they can take as common ground everything that is taken for granted in these communities. Even if A and B mutually establish that A is a New Zealander and B is not, they can take as common ground everything an outsider would think an insider should know about New Zealand. Common ground based on community membership is called 'communal common ground.'

Everybody belongs to many communities at the same time. Some of these communities are nested (e.g., North Americans, Americans, Californians, San Franciscans, Nob Hill residents), and others are cross cutting (Californians, lawyers, football fans, Christians). Both nesting and cross-cutting communities lead to gradations in common ground. Any two Californians might readily presuppose common knowledge of the Golden Gate Bridge on San Francisco Bay, but only two San Franciscans would presuppose common knowledge of Crissy Field right next to it.

People have both direct and indirect ways of establishing which communities they jointly belong to. When people meet for the first time, they often begin by exchanging information about their occupations, residences, hobbies, and other identities. They display other communal identities indirectly – in their choice of language, dialect, and vocabulary; their choice of dress and accoutrements; and their age and gender. It is remarkable how many cultural identities people can infer as they talk and how useful these are in establishing communal common ground.

Personal Common Ground

The other main basis for common ground is joint experience. The joint experience may be perceptual.

When A and B look at a candle together, they can take their joint experience as a basis for certain mutual beliefs – that there is a candle between them, that it is green, that it smells of bayberry, that it is lit. Or the joint experience may be linguistic or communicative. When A tells B (on April 8), *George arrived home yesterday,* and once they mutually establish that B has understood A, the two of them can take it as common ground that George arrived home on April 7. Common ground that is based on joint perceptual or linguistic experiences between two people is called their 'personal common ground'. It often holds only for the two of them.

Conversations and other joint activities depend on the orderly accumulation of personal common ground. Suppose A and B are assembling a television stand together. To succeed, they need to establish as common ground what each is going to do next. Part of this they accomplish linguistically, in their spoken exchanges, as when A proposes, *Let's put on this piece next,* and B takes up the proposal, *Okay.* But other parts they accomplish perceptually, as when A hands B a board, screw, or screwdriver, or when A holds up a board and they examine it together. Most face-to-face conversations depend on a mix of linguistic and perceptual bases for the accumulation of personal common ground. Telephone conversations depend almost entirely on linguistic bases.

Language and Communal Common Ground

Communal common ground is fundamental to account for the conventions of language, what are termed the 'rules of language'. These include conventions of semantics, syntax, morphology, phonology, and pragmatics (Lewis, 1969).

Speakers ordinarily try to use words that their addressees will understand, and that requires a 'shared lexicon.' The problem is that every community has its own 'communal lexicon' (Clark, 1996). Once A and B jointly establish that they are both speakers of English, they may presuppose common knowledge of a general English-language lexicon. But because other communities are nested and cross cutting, so are the lexicons associated with them. There is a nesting of communities that speak English, North American English, New England English, and Bostonian. Although words such as *dog* and *in* are common to English in general, others are common only to one or another nested community; in Bostonian, for example, a *barnie* is a Harvard student. Indeed, every community (Californians, lawyers, football fans, ophthalmologists) has a specialized lexicon. The lexicon for lawyers includes *tort, mortmain,* and

ne exeat. The lexicon for ophthalmologists includes *tonometry*, *uveal*, and *amblyopia*. To use *barnie* or *mortmain* is to take as common ground a Bostonian or legal lexicon. Communal lexicons are sometimes called jargon, dialect, patois, idiom, parlance, nomenclature, slang, argot, lingo, cant, or vernacular; or they consist of regionalisms, colloquialisms, localisms, or technical terminology.

Speakers also try to use syntactic constructions, or rules, that they share with their addressees. For example, in English generally, it is conventional to mention place before time (*George is going to London tomorrow*); yet in Dutch, a closely related language, it is conventional to mention place and time in the reverse order (*Pim gaat morgen naar London*, 'Pim goes tomorrow to London'). The rules of syntax, however, vary by nested communities. It is conventional to say *He gave it me* in British English, but not in English generally. It is conventional to say *My car needs washed* in Western Pennsylvania English, but not in North American English. Many rules of syntax are tied to specific words in a communal lexicon, and these vary from one community to the next.

Speakers also try to use, or adapt to, the phonology of their cultural communities. Indeed, pronunciations vary enormously from one community to the next. The vowel in *can't*, for example, changes as one goes from British to North American English, from northern to southern dialects of American English, and even from one social group to another within a single school. Also, the same person may pronounce *singing* as 'singin' in an informal setting but as 'singing' in a classroom or a court of law.

Discourse and Personal Common Ground

Personal common ground is essential to the processes by which people converse. To *communicate* is, according to its Latin roots, to *make common* – to establish something as common ground. To succeed in conversation, people must design what they say (1) against the common ground they believe they already share with their interlocutors and (2) as a way of adding to that common ground (Stalnaker, 1978). Two consequences of trying to make something common are 'information structure' and 'grounding.' 'Information structure' is a property of utterances. When A tells B, *What the committee is after is somebody at the White House,* A uses the special construction to distinguish two types of information (Prince, 1978). With the Wh-cleft *What the committee is after,* A provides information that A assumes B is already thinking about. It is one type of 'given information.' In contrast, with the remainder of the utterance 'is somebody at the White House,' A provides information that A assumes B doesn't yet know. It is 'new information.' Given information is assumed to be inferable from A and B's current common ground, whereas new information is not. New information is, instead, what is to be **added** to common ground. The way people refer to an object in a discourse (e.g., the committee, somebody, of the White House) depends on whether they believe that the object is readily evoked, known but unused, inferable, or brand new in their common ground for that discourse (Prince, 1981).

'Grounding' is the process of trying to establish what is said as common ground (Clark and Schaefer, 1989; Clark and Brennan, 1991). When A speaks to B in conversation, it is ordinarily not enough for A simply to produce an utterance for B. The two of them try to establish as common ground that B has understood what A meant by it well enough for current purposes. In this process, B is expected to give A periodic evidence of the state of his or her understanding, and A is expected to look for and evaluate that evidence. One way B can signal understanding is with back-channel signals such as *uh-huh, yeah*, a head nod, or a smile. Another way is with the appropriate next contribution, as when B answers a question asked by A. But if B does not manage to attend to, hear, or understand A's utterance completely, the two of them will try to repair the problem. One way is illustrated here:

A (on telephone): Can I speak to Jim Johnstone, please?

B: Senior?

A: Yes.

B: Yes.

In turn 2, B asks A to clear up an ambiguous reference in A's question, and in turn 3, A does just that. Only then does B go on to answer A's question. Turns 2 and 3 are called a 'side sequence' (Jefferson, 1972). Grounding takes many other forms as well.

Common ground is central to accounts of language and language use. It is needed in accounting for the conventions, or rules, of language and to explain how people contribute to conversation and to other forms of discourse.

See also: Context, Communicative; Conversation Analysis; Pragmatic Presupposition.

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Context, Communicative

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Introduction

One of the central foci of research on language over the last several decades has been the relation between language and context. Work in linguistic anthropology, sociolinguistics, pragmatics, psycholinguistics, and philosophy of language has demonstrated a wide variety of ways in which language and verbally communicated information of various sorts are informed and even shaped by the social and interpersonal contexts in which speech occurs (see Duranti and Goodwin, 1992). Overlapping lines of research have also demonstrated various ways in which language **constitutes** context, including the social effects described in speech act theory (*see* **Speech Acts**), the formulation and attribution of beliefs in relevance theory (Grice, 1989; Levinson, 2000; Sperber and Wilson, 1995) (*see* **Relevance Theory**) and the 'creative use' of indexical terms such as pronouns, deictics, and other shifters (Silverstein, 1976) (*see* **Indexicality: Theory**). The focus on context, as both a constraining factor and a product of discourse, has led to increasingly fine-grained approaches to speech, since it is primarily in the formation of spoken or written utterances that language and context are articulated. The significance of these developments for linguistics lies in the increased precision with which linguistic systems, cognitive processes, and language use are co-articulated. For anthropology, it lies primarily in the fact that communicative practice is integral to social practice more generally. Language is a factor, if not a defining one, in most of social life, and ideas about language have had a basic impact on social theory for the last century.

Given the scope of these developments, it is unsurprising that there are various approaches to context corresponding to the disciplinary predilections of researchers. Speech act theory zeroed in on the relation between speech forms and circumstances as captured in felicity conditions and the doctrine of (illocutionary) force (Austin, 1962). Gricean approaches to conversation focus on inference and belief ascription under the assumption that speech is a cooperative engagement, subject to the maxims of quality, quantity, relation, and manner (Grice, 1989) (*see* **Maxims and Flouting**). Relevance theory shares a focus on inference as a central feature of speech, but dispenses with the Gricean cooperative principle (*see* **Cooperative Principle**), maxims, and the tasks of calculating and testing for implicatures (*see* **Implicature**). In their place, it proposes to explain inferential processes in terms of a single principle of relevance according to which logical, encyclopedic, and lexical information are combined. Speech act, implicature, and relevance theories are all closely associated with linguistics and have in common that they treat context as built up utterance by utterance in the course of speaking.

From a social perspective, ethnomethodology and conversation analysis have made major contributions to our understanding of language in interaction (*see* **Conversation Analysis**). Both assert that face-to-face interaction is the primordial context for human sociality (Schegloff, 1987: 208) and the most important locus of observation of language. While they may rely on the pragmatic and inferential processes studied by linguists, their focus is different.

Conversation analysis (CA) has emphasized the temporal and hence sequential organization of verbal exchange (Sacks *et al.*, 1974), the existence of procedural rules guiding turn taking in talk, the phenomenon of conversational repair, and the micro-analysis of actually occurring verbal interaction (*see* **Conversation Analysis**). Psycholinguists and cognitive linguists treat context as a matter of mutual knowledge and cognitive representation, hence as a basically mental construct.

The approaches mentioned so far have in common that they treat context as a radial structure whose center point is the spoken utterance. They share a commitment to methodological individualism, which prioritizes the individual over the collective and seeks to reduce social structures to individual behaviors. Starting from the perspective of the participant(s) in speech production, they derive context from relevance, mental representation (including attention focus and practical reason), and the momentary emergence of the speech situation. From this viewpoint, context is a local concomitant of talk and interaction, ephemeral and centered on the emergent process of speaking. Whether one places primary emphasis on actual language use as attested in the field or on constructed examples, the ultimate frame of reference and explanation is individual speech activities and the verbal interactions in which they occur.

From the opposite viewpoint, others have developed approaches to language and discourse in which context is neither local nor ephemeral, but global and durable, with greater social and historical scope than any localized act. There are several shifts here worth distinguishing. Whereas the first set of approaches is grounded in linguistics, psychology, and microsociology, the second is based in large-scale social theory and history. Utterance production is not assumed to be the generative center of context, as it is for individualist approaches. Rather, the explanatory frameworks are social and historical conditions that are prior to discourse production and place constraints on it. Standard linguistic description is a case in point, because it claims that individual uses of language depend for their intelligibility on linguistic systems (grammatical and semantic) that are logically prior to any act of speech. To the extent that such perspectives treat discourse production at all, the relevant units are either analytic abstractions (the idealized Speaker of linguistics) or collectivities (communities, classes, social networks, kinds of agent defined by gender, age, profession, residence, etc.). Similarly, the temporal frame of discourse production is not the momentary unfolding of utterances in what individualists call real time, but the conjunctural time of collective systems and historical processes.

Just as there are various local approaches to context, there are also diverse global ones. In a Foucaultian view, for example, if there can be said to be a basic context for language, it is neither interaction nor the individual strips of speech or text familiar to linguists. On the contrary, the frame of reference is 'discourse,' meaning large-scale formations of beliefs and categorizations pervaded by power relations and articulated in 'assemblages.' (*see* **Discourse, Foucauldian Approach; Power and Pragmatics**). Similarly, Bourdieu has argued that language forms and varieties should be analyzed relative to linguistic markets in which they bear various sorts of symbolic and cultural capital (Bourdieu, 1993). Both Foucault and Bourdieu take as their point of departure collective facts and set out views contradictory to methodological individualism (a predictable corollary of the structuralist orientation of both thinkers). Critical discourse analysis (CDA) offers another clear example (nicely reviewed in Blommaert and Bulcaen, 2000). In this approach, discourse is treated under three perspectives: as text endowed with linguistic form, as 'discursive practice' through which texts are produced, distributed, and consumed and as 'social practice' which has various ideological effects, including normativity and hegemony. CDA emphasizes power, exploitation, and inequality as the social conditions of language, tracing them through various contexts including political and economic discourse, racism, advertising and media, and institutional settings such as bureaucracies and education. Notice that, while these forces may be played out in individual speech events, the frame of reference is broader than, and logically prior to, any given event. Moreover, the focus on speakers' intentions as the source of meaning that is common to methodological individualist approaches is absent in all large-scale approaches (*see* **Critical Discourse Analysis**).

The linguistic, psychological, and microsociological approaches from which we started are largely complementary to the large-scale approaches just mentioned. The local settings of utterance and face-to-face interaction that are central to the first group are absent or at best marginal in the second. Conversely, the collective facts central to social definitions of context are marginal or simply ignored in individualist approaches. This polarization gives rise to overstatement and many missed opportunities for productive research. It becomes unclear how to articulate different levels of context analytically, or even whether such articulation is an appropriate aim. Given that discourse responds to context at multiple scales, and that any actual social setting can be characterized under either micro- or macro-perspectives, the two are inevitably pitted against one another.

In its strong forms, methodological individualism claims that the collective facts studied by sociologists and anthropologists are epiphenomena of individual actions, whereas a proponent of collectivism may claim with equal conviction that individual utterances and face-to-face interactions are the trivial precipitates of larger social forces. Thus, the dichotomies of scale underwrite contradictory claims about what is most basic to context.

While much of the literature bearing on context can be placed on one or the other of these extremes, linguistic anthropology has been the exception because it has attempted to integrate levels (*see* **Linguistic Anthropology**). One motivation for this is the empirical fact that speech practices are shaped by and help shape contexts at various levels. Another is the patent inadequacy of all bipolar accounts, which inevitably distort the relative significance of contextual features and produce a vacuum at one level or the other. As an interdisciplinary enterprise, linguistic anthropology has always straddled grammar and actual language use in socially and historically defined settings. The focus on speech requires detailed analysis of locally emergent facts both linguistic and ethnographic (hence 'micro'), while the focus on linguistic and social-cultural systems requires equally careful analysis of formal and functional regularities whose motivations lie far beyond individuals and their actions (hence 'macro'). Thus, the ethnography of speaking combined such descriptive units as the speech event, the community, and verbal repertoires in an attempt to bring the ethnographic setting of utterances to bear on their formal and functional properties. In recent decades, linguistic anthropologists examined the relation between language and political economy and what has come to be known as language ideologies, both of which combine phenomena from different scales (Silverstein, 1979; Schieffelin *et al.*, 1998). Any study of context that seeks to account for the formal specificity of utterance practices **and** their social embedding must reject familiar divisions between micro- and macrolevel phenomena.

Context is a theoretical concept, strictly based on relations. There is no 'context' that is not 'context of,' or 'context for.' How one treats it depends on how one construes other basic elements including language, discourse, utterance production and reception, social practice, and so on. It is by now widely recognized that much (if not all) of the meaning production that takes place through language depends fundamentally on context and further, that there is no single definition of how much or what sorts of context are required for language description. There is therefore no reason to expect that any single model or set of processes will be analytically sufficient for

all research (and good reason to be skeptical of universal claims). At the same time, it is clear that there are principles and kinds of relations that recurrently organize contexts. We are concerned here with both the semiotic specificity of discourse practices and their social and historical embedding. What are the units and levels of context one needs to distinguish in order to give a rigorous account of language as practice? What are the relations and processes that give rise to different contextual units and levels? How does one analyze actual contexts without falling into a morass of particulars?

My way into these questions is through two broad dimensions of context, which I will call emergence and embedding. The former designates aspects of discourse that arise from production and reception as ongoing processes. It pertains to verbally mediated activity, interaction, copresence, temporality, in short context as a phenomenal, social, and historical actuality. Embedding designates the relation between contextual aspects that pertain to the framing of discourse, its centering or groundedness in broader frameworks. So stated, there is an initial alignment of emergence with the highly local sphere of utterance production, on the one hand, and embedding with larger scale contexts on the other. This is the way the two are usually discussed in the literature on language. Emergence is associated with so-called real time utterance production and interaction, and embedding describes the locatedness of utterances in some broader context. However, emergence can easily be conceived at different temporal levels, as any historian knows, just as embedding applies within the most local fields of utterance production. To see this, let us turn to a more detailed look at each of the dimensions, starting with emergence.

Emergence

Context as a Sheer Situation

In an interesting discussion of the micro–macro problem from the viewpoint of conversation analysis, Schegloff (1987: 208) asserted that interaction, minimally involving two people, is the primordial site of sociality. This view is rooted in a significant history of thought about both sociality and interaction (Schutz, 1970a). The former term is seldom defined precisely, but in Schegloff's pithy claim, it stood for the human propensity to engage with others, with the invited inference that this propensity is a basic aspect of human society. The primordial importance accorded interaction can be traced to the phenomenological sociology of Alfred Schutz. Schutz set about to merge the social theory of Max Weber with the phenomenology of Edmund

Husserl (with a healthy dose of William James and Gestalt psychology). In his view, social subjects develop in a world of intersubjective relationships, in which others are given to them both as objects in space and as other selves (Schutz, 1970a: 163). They partake of a primitive reciprocity in the sense that each exists in relation with the other. They are parties to a mutual 'we,' each located in a world also occupied by the other. In interaction relationships (as opposed to relations among contemporaries or predecessors), the parties are copresent corporeally, which entails their being in the same place at the same time and in what phenomenologists call the 'natural attitude' (wide awake, in their senses, with access to common sense). For each party to interaction, the other's bodily gestures (including utterances) present themselves as expressions that project and make perceptible inner states of consciousness. In interaction, the other's body is primarily a field of expression presumed to be meaningful, not a mere object perceived (*see* **Gestures, Pragmatic Aspects**). As a corollary of copresence, the two are in the same temporal stream, and each can perceive the other's expressions as they emerge from moment to moment. The mutual copresence and reciprocal access of interactants takes the shape of a more exacting reciprocity: until further notice and for all practical purposes, each party can put himself in the shoes of the other, taking on, or at least entertaining, the other's perspective.

Goffman (1972) helped formulate a Schutzian view of context in his influential paper "The neglected situation" (*see* **Goffman, Erving**). Goffman critiqued the then widespread treatments of social context in terms of correlations between macrolevel sociological variables, such as gender, class, profession, and institutional roles. He argued that situations have their own properties that follow from the fact of copresence between two or more people. A situation is a space of mutual monitoring possibilities within which all copresent individuals have sensory access to one another with the naked senses. Hence, the following conditions apply:

1. There are at least two parties who cooccupy the same objective time (which Schutz [1970a: 165ff.] distinguished from inner time and the constituted experience of space-time), in which perceptions and expressive gestures unfold sequentially.
2. Each party to the situation is present in body, both perceivable and capable of perceiving the other.
3. The situation is a field of mutual monitoring possibilities, which entails the capacity of the co-occupants to notice and attend to each other.

These three conditions imply mutuality (we share this), cooccupancy of the same space-time (we are both here-now) and reciprocity (I perceive you and you perceive me). Notice that a situation is not a field of **actual** mutuality, reciprocity, and cooccupancy, but a field in which these are alive as **potentials**. (This is another factor reminiscent of phenomenology in the idea of the 'horizon'). It is minimally structured, logically prior to any utterance, and notably lacking any object beyond the copresent parties. From the perspective of language, the situation provides a sort of 'prior outside' into which speech and language are projected through utterance acts.

Given what we have said so far, all of dialogic speech could be described as situated insofar as it occurs in situations. The utterance *the curry is done* is situated, let's say, when produced by a cook in response to the question *when will dinner be ready?* Both question and response are situated in the perceptible, interactive relationship between the parties, and all three of the above conditions apply. But Goffman distinguished between "merely situated" and inherently situated factors. The former include linguistic and symbolic structures that are instantiated in utterances but do not really depend on the situation for their definition. In contrast, timing and delivery of utterances reflect the *in situ* mutual adjustments between interlocutors and are inherently situated. Goffman's situation, then, represents a layer of context that is prior to language, but with which we can distinguish between merely and inherently situated aspects of the speech stream. A great deal of research over the last decades has demonstrated the significance of this framework, and the ways in which speech transforms and adapts to situations. It has become an article of common sense that context is situated, whatever else it is.

Relevant Settings

The situation thus defined is insufficient to describe interaction because it lacks several basic features. Whereas any situation exists in time, it lacks such temporally grounded distinctions as early vs. late and middle vs. beginning or ending. The latter terms can only be applied to a course of activities in which there are act units and expectations. Furthermore, at the level of the situation each party is potentially aware of the presence of the other, but is not attending to the expressive meaning of the other's gestures. As a mere field of copresence (what Schutz [1970b] called a 'pure we relationship'), a situation has no meaningful structure: nothing in particular is going on or is especially relevant. If we layer onto the situation socially identifiable acts, expectations, mutual understanding among parties, and a framework of relevance, we arrive at a contextual unit closer to interaction and

considerably more structured. We will call this new unit the *setting* (Sacks, 1992: 521–522).

If a speaker says, *I am here to meet with Martin*, *this is a great party*, or *I'm asking you to help* (s)he has in each case **formulated** the setting in which the utterance occurs. In the language of CA, a formulation is a description, hence a categorization, as opposed to indexical expressions that invoke the setting, but do not formulate it since they lack descriptive content. In paradigm cases, the formulation applies reflexively to the very speech setting in which it occurs. What most concerns us at this point is that formulations are internal to interactive context, they display the participants' judgments of what is relevant and going on, and they illustrate the conversion of a mere situation into a social setting (Schegloff, 1987).

To introduce the concept of relevance is to transform fundamentally the idea of context. On the one hand, judgments of relevance always imply a theme or point of interest from which the relevance relation is established. On the other hand, this relation is rooted in actors' previous experiences, in light of which the interest arises (Schutz, 1970b: 5). A theme, like a focal point, implies a background or horizon against which it is distinguished and in relation to which it functions as a center point. This in turn implies that any context in which thematic relevance operates is a bilevel structure (usually described as foreground/background, or theme/horizon). The reference to the biographical history of the actors for whom something is thematic effectively expands the temporal scope of context from the vivid present of situated perception to a past remembered and sedimented through habitual experience. In short, as soon as we introduce relevance, context becomes a hierarchical structure connected to a nonlocal history.

In addition to the distinction between theme and horizon, Schutz (1970b) developed a three-way contrast between kinds of relevance, which he calls topical, interpretive, and motivational. The first centers on the object or matter to which actors turn their attention. The second has to do with which aspects of the object are relevant to the question at hand, and which parts of the actor's background knowledge are brought to bear on it. The third pertains to the actor's prospective purpose (which Schutz called "in order to motives") and the past conditions that give rise to that purpose (Schutz's "because motives"). The combined effect of these three sorts of relevance is to create a multistranded relevance system in the setting, encompassing both memory and anticipation. While Schutz's probing study makes further distinctions, these will suffice to underscore that interactive context, even at the relatively primitive level of the setting, is hierarchical along several dimensions, both local copresent and nonlocal.

Semiotic Field, Symbolic and Demonstrative

Although we introduced the function of formulation in order to clarify the difference between a situation and a setting, our framework is as yet impoverished from the perspective of language structure and semiotics. This is the next element we must introduce in order to approximate a notion of context adequate for linguistic description. We will do so by way of the theory developed by Karl Bühler (1990 [1934]), which had a profound impact on subsequent linguistic and semiotic approaches to context (particularly the ethnography of speaking, linguistic treatments of deixis and contemporary linguistic anthropology). Bühler distinguished two aspects of the context in which any sign is used: (i) the *Symbolfeld* 'symbolic field,' consisting of words, other signs, and the concepts they represent, and (ii) the *Zeigfeld* 'demonstrative field,' which is the immediate interpersonal setting in which an utterance is produced. These two elements combine in various ways in Bühler's treatment, for instance anaphora and "imaginary deixis," (*see* **Bühler, Karl; Deixis and Anaphora: Pragmatic Approaches**) and the resulting model of context is pervasively semiotic. It inherits all the features of settings as laid out above, but these are transformed by signs (symbolic, indexical, iconic), sign relations (syntactic, semantic, pragmatic), the presence of objects stood for, and various functions including individuated reference and directivity (purposive orientation of an interlocutor's attention by word and gesture).

Bühler summarized the *Zeigfeld* as "Here Now I," thus foregrounding its relation to the linguistic system(s) of the participants. These three terms are the prototypical deictics: they are referring expressions whose conventional meanings belong to the linguistic code, and yet, as indexicals, their reference on any occasion of use depends strictly on the context of utterance. Deixis is the single most obvious way in which context is embedded in the very categories of human languages. Recall that in Sacks' terms, deictics 'invoke' the setting, because they are indexicals, but do not 'formulate' it, because they lack descriptive content. Contrast *I am here* with *I am in the dining room of my home*. It has also become common in the literature to distinguish between referential indexicals, (e.g., deictics, pronouns, presentatives, certain temporal adverbs) and nonreferential or social indexicality (Silverstein, 1976). The latter would include such phenomena as regional or other recognized accents, stylistic registers, and honorifics (Agha, 1998; Errington, 1988) insofar as these

features of language signal aspects of utterance context without actually referring to or describing it. Contrast an utterance spoken with a heavy New England accent, which nonreferentially indexes the provenience of the speaker, with *I am from New England*, which states it. What is most relevant about indexicality for present purposes is the way that both referential and nonreferential varieties serve to articulate language as a general system with utterance context. The deictic categories of any language, and the combination of those categories into phrases, sentences, and utterances, reveal schematic templates for context.

The demonstrative field therefore converts the interactive setting into a field of signs. For Bühler, it includes gestures and other perceptible aspects of the participants, such as posture, pointing, directed gaze, and the sound of the speaker's voice, all of which orient the subjective attention focus of the participants. Like Goffman and the conversation analysts, Buhler assumes that the participants are in the "natural attitude": wide awake, oriented, each with a sense of his or her own body, synthesizing sensory data from vision, hearing, and touch in a system of coordinates whose origo is the here-now-I (Bühler 1990: 169ff.). Within this phenomenal setting, utterances, in both their symbolic and indexical dimensions, both reflect and transform context. They orient participants attention, thematize objects of reference, formulate, invoke, and construe the setting, operate on relevance systems, in short, they produce context.

The situation, setting, and demonstrative field are emergent in the sense that they unfold in time. This is one consequence of the fact that linguistic practice produces context in an ongoing fashion. It gives rise to duration, sequence, simultaneity, synchronization, and it forces us to include memory, anticipation, and teleology in our model of context. Time is central to the study of conversation and sequence is basic to turn-taking systems, anaphora, and thematic coherence, the interactive production of sentences (Goodwin and Goodwin, 1992), and the organization of a host of conversational structures. It is also at the root of the concept of adjacency in conversation analysis, the relation between contiguous units in talk.

Notice that emergence entails time but is different from it, since it describes the relation between various units of discourse production. When individuals co-engage in a setting, their perceptual fields are oriented by relevance and when they coparticipate in a demonstrative field, they are reoriented by signs. So too temporal relations are converted in the passage from situation to setting to demonstrative field. Diachrony is an existential condition of context at any level of analysis, but it denotes different processes according to the level. For example, the inner duration of

experience, the simultaneity of pure we relations, the production of utterances, the taking of turns at talk, the opening, middle, and closing of conversational units, and the prospective projection implied by intention and strategy are different diachronies. Emergence is everywhere in relation to structure, and to describe context as emergent implies that it is structured.

Embedding

The progression from situation to setting to demonstrative field is neither a temporal sequence nor a set of inclusion relations. It is a matter of logical ordering, from the relatively primitive level of the sphere of perceptual awareness through the semiotically entangled demonstrative field. The setting inherits features of copresence from the *situation*, transforming it by way of relevance relations and socially recognized units of action. The symbolic–demonstrative field inherits an interperspectival relevance system from the setting, but transforms it by means of multifunctional semiotic systems (most notably language). The model of context implicit in the demonstrative field is the minimal starting point for the study of discourse.

Whatever else is true about discourse context then, it entails bodies and perceptual fields, relevance systems, act types, and the expectations they engender, semiotic systems and the transformations they effect. As emphasized above, all of these contextual formations are emergent in that they involve duration, sequence, simultaneity and, in the more complex formations, memory and anticipation. In virtually all of ordinary communicative practice, the three levels combine and the distinctions between them are analytic: a setting is merely what is left when we analytically peel away the effects of semiosis; a situation is what remains when we bracket off relevance. Such analytic separation has the advantage of clarifying how discourse contexts hang together and fall apart, and how language and discourse differentially tie into the distinct orders of context. It should not suggest that the three lead separate lives, as it were: in the course of social life, there is no situation that is not tied into a setting and no setting that is cut loose from semiosis. This relation of ordered entailment and tying in we will describe as embedding.

To study context is to study embedding. If contextual formation X is embedded in Y, then the following statements are true:

i. Y entails X, but X does not entail Y;
ii. Y inherits certain properties from X but introduces other properties;

iii. Y transforms X, altering inherited properties and introducing new principles of organization (via rearrangement, reweighting, etc.);

iv. If any part of X becomes a thematic focus, either for participants or for analysts, then Y is the relevant horizon.

For example, a setting entails the possibility of mutual monitoring among participants, but a situation does not entail a relevance structure (i). The symbolic–demonstrative field inherits act units and relevance relations from the setting, but reconstitutes it via multifunctional semiosis (ii). The relevance system of a setting organizes how participants monitor one another in the situation, and the semiotic functions of the symbolic–demonstrative field transform relevance via thematization (iii). If a problem arises in mutual monitoring among copresent participants, then it is dealt with in light of the setting, which establishes the expectations and relevance requisite to identifying or rectifying the problem. Similarly, if a problem of (ir)relevance or failed expectations arises, then it is grasped and dealt with in the light of the ongoing symbolic–demonstrative field, which invokes, formulates, and provides the means to construe the setting (iv). The upshot of these remarks is that contextual embedding is never a mere add-on or external surround to features of discourse or interaction. At whatever level we examine it, context **is** embedding relations.

Research in linguistic anthropology over recent decades provides abundant and forceful evidence that embedding is not limited to the contextual levels so far adduced. No symbolic–demonstrative field exists in a social vacuum and however strong the impulse to generalize by way of rules, invariant structures, or procedures, contexts vary more radically than so far suggested, and on parameters not yet mentioned. This comes as no surprise to ethnographers, but it poses a real challenge to linguists because linguistic systems and practices articulate precisely and in detail with social phenomena beyond the reach of even the most sophisticated semiotics. How are we to explain the impact on context of such systematic phenomena as the difference between expert and novice practice in institutional settings (Cicourel, 2001), the role of ideology on discursive practice, the differential affects of national, ethnic, or class identities on discourse production, the values that attach to different ways of speaking, writing, or other mediated forms of discourse that do not assume the face-to-face situation at the heart of the demonstrative field? For example, it is clear that persons and objects in the demonstrative field have, for the participants, values of various kinds. They are good, bad, beautiful, ugly, mine, yours, costly or cheap, coveted or to be avoided, yet such values derive from social systems and experiences beyond the scope of the demonstrative field. In actual practice, as opposed to theory-driven proxies of practice, discourse circulates in contexts that are themselves embedded in social formations only partly explainable by discourse. In Bühler's demonstrative field, participants and objects are anonymous, the accidental occupants of semiotically defined positions and roles. Yet in ordinary discourse, actual persons, groups, objects, and settings are in play, and these are, for the most part, familiar and valued.

This is one of the most difficult problems in the study of context: in order to achieve a general account, we formulate schematic regularities, yet in order to actually engage in discourse, speakers and addressees must come to grips with emergent particulars. Semiotic accounts seek to overcome this difficulty by distinguishing types (generalities) from tokens (particular instances), or by combining structures (e.g., linguistic systems) with phenomenology (Bühler's solution). The problem with these approaches is that they treat actual practices as merely situated instantiations of general laws, which domesticates particularity by making it a mere instance of the general. At the same time, they preserve a radial definition of context, according to which the individual, utterance, or situation is the center point and all other factors are defined in relation to it. This is a productive solution to certain problems, such as the semantics of indexical reference, where the sign stands for its object in an aboutness relation. But what of an organizational context like a hospital, a university campus, or a courtroom? Most of the interactions that occur in these contexts are shaped in part by institutional frameworks, credentialing processes, and social divisions that exist before and beyond any demonstrative field, that may be nowhere signaled in the discourse, and yet shape the context and constrain participants' access to discourse. We need a way of analyzing contextual dimensions that are not radial to the utterance or the field of copresence, but that shape it significantly. Relegating such factors to the social setting is a convenient shorthand, but it fails to explain how they impinge on discourse. To require that they be relevant to the participants is to require that they be thematized, whereas much of the social formation impinging on discourse contexts is unnoticed. To label them background knowledge begs the question, since most individuals in institutional settings have fragmentary or systematically skewed knowledge of the forces that objectively shape the contexts in which they interact.

Social Field

We have said that when one contextual level or sphere is embedded within another, the embedding level inherits certain properties from the embedded one, that it transforms it, and that it serves as the operative horizon against which the embedded level is grasped. In these terms, we can say that any demonstrative field is embedded in one or more social fields. The term 'social field' as used here is adapted from practice sociology and designates a bounded space of positions and position takings, through which values circulate, in which agents have historical trajectories or careers, and in which they engage on various footings (e.g., competitive, collaborative, collusive, strategic). Thus defined, a social field is neither radial nor discourse-based, although discourse circulates in most fields, but there are interactive settings embedded in any social field. What is different about a social field is its scope (nonlocal), the way it is organized (nonradial), the character of the boundary (credentials and limited access as opposed to the gradual boundaries and relatively open access to demonstrative fields), and the values that circulate in it (e.g., economic, symbolic capital and power as opposed to meaning production through indexicality, reference, and description). Moreover, whereas participants in discourse production are traditionally conceived as individuals (hence interaction means intersubjective engagement), the agent positions in a social field can be occupied by collectivities (e.g., professional organizations, 'communities,' classes, departmental staff), whose interactions are typically mediated by writing, electronic media, and other instruments. Under this definition, a hospital, university, profession, academic discipline, a courtroom, a supermarket, an airport, a religious congregation, and a neighborhood are all social fields. This does not mean they are all equivalent or that any one of them may not itself be embedded. It does mean that these and other social formations provide critical embedding contexts that shape radial, interactively centered demonstrative fields.

The social field places constraints on who has access to the participant roles of Speaker (Spr), Addressee (Adr), overhearers (ratified and unratified), the sanction to participate in a capacity, the requirement to manage face in specific ways (Goffman, 1967), and so on (*see* **Face**). In the demonstrative field as such, there are no constraints on who can play what role in acts of reference, directing of joint attention, or semiotically proper indexicality. It suffices that the participants master the language and be in the natural attitude. But this is not true in a social field, in which access to different positions is constrained, the authority to speak in certain terms and to specific others is restricted, and the capacity to monitor another is a selective right or even a responsibility, not a mere existential condition.

In the kinds of organizational fields listed above, there are also many virtual counterpart relations, such as the correspondence between the patient and the X-ray image, the cash register number and the cashier, the evidence and the now-past actions that produced it, the paper and its author. These correspondences create networks of counterpart relations between objects in the immediate demonstrative field and ones that are absent (in other places or other times). Careful study of deictic practice shows that such counterpart relations play a formative role in how participants resolve indexical reference. The implication is that in order to understand simple indexical practices, we are forced to look beyond the immediate field of copresence, just as participants must do in order to get the point of utterances. In order to explain the actual functioning of the *Zeigfeld*, then, we are obliged to look beyond it to the social field. These are all embedding effects and the social field is unavoidable in any description of indexical practice.

Settings and demonstrative fields are designed so as to project them into further embeddings. Any relevance system ties its thematic focus into a history of other engagements with the object, a horizon of other related objects, a set of judgments regarding what is interpretationally relevant and what can be ignored. Hence, the setting is already rooted in a world beyond itself. Once we introduce semiosis, we have aboutness relations, and not all objects stood for are copresent in the situation. Furthermore, the symbolic categories themselves tie the sign and its object into other signs and objects *in absentia,* as Saussure put it.

Two rather different transformations take place in the embedding of a demonstrative field in a social one. The social field is made actual, we might say, localized, by its articulation via relevance, symbolization, and indexical invocation (all the better if it is explicitly formulated, although this is not necessary, as we have seen). This is a genuine transformation because the social field does not owe its structure or existence to the kind of radial, intentional structures into which it is recruited by signs (the world is not organized in the same way as the language that refers to it). The second mode of embedding is occupancy: the actor occupies a participant role, which occupies an agent position (Dr. Jones speaks as an expert performing a procedure). The copresent setting occupies a socially defined site (the relevance system and actions in progress are procedures in a medical

clinic). The referent-object occupies a socially defined position (the needed instrument in an ongoing procedure). Hence, the embedding social field provides a space of positions (including referent positions) and those positions are occupied or taken up by the various elements inherited from the embedded demonstrative field.

Embedding is a process in time, and a proper study of context at the level of social fields must attend to the temporal order of occupancies, including the careers of persons, objects, places, and actions in the time course of the organization. The social field has a history that transcends any particular occupancy. The clinic outlasts Dr. Jones, just as it outdistances the single office he occupies on such and such an occasion. Utterance-to-utterance temporality at the level of the demonstrative field is embedded, and hence transformed, in the broader history of the field.

Looking across the communicative practices embedded in one or more social fields, it becomes possible to ask which elements remain relatively invariant across embeddings, and which ones are subject to transformation. The distinctions between Spr, Adr, Object, the semiotic means of thematization, the omni-relevance of perception and the procedural organization of turn-taking (Schegloff, 1987) may remain constant, for instance, even if differentially realized and constrained in different fields. Such invariance contributes to the partial autonomy of the demonstrative field across embeddings. Inversely, certain features of social fields may function as relatively constant constraints or resources for any demonstrative field that emerges within their scope of embedding. To that degree, these factors contribute to what Bourdieu (1993) called the "heteronomy" of the embedded fields. Autonomous features of any field derive from the field's own organization, whereas heteronomous (nonautonomous) features derive from its embedding in some other field. Thus, we can ask of any discourse context: in what measure and in which features is it autonomous? It is standard in the literature on language to describe speech contexts as if they were highly autonomous, such as Bühler's generalized *Zeigfeld* or the hackneyed Speaker–Hearer dyad of linguistics. But this nomothetic bias toward autonomous schemas hides heteronomous effects that are systematic and consequential for a theory of context.

The participants in any process of discourse production are clearly a key part of the context, whether they engage as individuals or groups and whether we treat context in local or nonlocal terms. In the discussion so far, there is an implicit series of embeddings of participants, from the individual subject to intersubjective copresence (situation), to coengagement

(setting) to participant roles (demonstrative field) to agent positions (social fields). In a series of influential studies, Goffman (1963, 1981) brought attention to the differential kinds and degrees of involvement that parties to discourse sustain in social practice. He distinguished, for example, unfocused from focused interaction, the former pertaining to mere situations and the latter to settings in which the participants share a common attention focus and orientation (which he dubbed "encounters"). Given a focused interaction, the question arises as to the degree of intensity of involvement and the distribution of involvement among participants (over time). This in turn led Goffman to distinguish among contexts according to how they regulate involvement, the embodiment of that regulation in space and physical conduct, the penalties for inappropriate involvement (invasion, exclusion, drifting away, excess intensity), and the overall "tightness or looseness" of contexts (Goffman, 1963: 198–210). Although this entire discussion is rooted in the phenomenological sense of subjective engagement, it can be analogically projected to the level of social field and the agent positions they entail. Here, involvement has to do with modes of occupancy of positions, how tight or loose a field or a position is, the degree to which occupying one position precludes or requires engagement with other positions, the vectors of access or exclusion provided by given positions, the means of displaying or concealing involvement, the varieties of collusion or competition that are differentially built into sectors of the field. In short, the embedding of discourse production in social fields defines a space of involvement among agents.

Whereas most of Western language theory has posited a speaking subject endowed with free will and uncurtailed intentionality, social theory has long debated the extent to which social actors and actions are determined by social forces external to them. This has given rise to a host of concepts significant in the study of context, including structuration, subjection, ideological state apparatuses, and habitus (Bourdieu, 1977). Notwithstanding significant differences among them, these ideas have in common the basic observation that social actors, from subjects to collectivities, are not given by nature but are, in critical ways, produced by society. Such ideas turn individualism on its head by asserting that not only is the 'natural subject' not the starting point from which society is produced, but the subject is itself, already, a social production. The importance of this line of thought for a study of context lies in the challenge it poses to any theory of meaning production that starts with individual intentions and phenomenal situations in order to then derive context by addition of external

factors (a view pervasive in language sciences). From the vantage point of social fields, the corresponding question would be to what extent engagement in a field shapes the participants not only in their agent-based external engagements, as it were, but more pervasively in their habits, dispositions, and intentions. In other words, there is a tipping point at which context ceases to be conceivable as the layering of structure upon intersubjective copresence and becomes the very **production** of subjects and the condition of possibility for intersubjectivity. Our definition of embedding as entailment, partial inheritance, transformation, and the necessary horizon for any contextual factor foreshadowed this shift.

In practice theory, the idea of a field is intimately related to the notion of habitus. The former defines the space of positions and position takings and the latter defines the social conformation of agents who engage in the space. There are four principal sources of the idea of habitus, which will help clarify its meaning. First, the Aristotelian idea of hexis, which joins individual desire or disposition with the evaluative judgment of what is good. If these two are aligned, we might say, the person is disposed to act in ways that are good. A linguistic analog might be interactive hexis, as evidenced in the spontaneous desire that good speakers have to be cooperative interlocutors or to say the right thing at the right time. Second, the phenomenological idea of habit and habituation as developed in the writings of Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, and Schutz. The idea is that in the course of ordinary experience we habitually engage in certain ways, we tend to routinize and typify. Under various guises, the idea that Sprs use language in habituated, routine ways has been a staple in the study of language for the last half century or more (cf. phenomenologists, Sapir, Whorf, Garfinkel, conversation analysis, ethnography of speaking). The third source of habitus is the idea, made prominent by Mauss (1973), that human beings conduct themselves physically in culturally patterned, habituated ways. Mauss was concerned with such phenomena as walking gait, posture, ways of carrying oneself, the management of body space in social settings (like waiting in line), socially standardized gestures (whether actually conventional, like the thumbs up gesture, or not), standard ways of holding objects, such as tools, of covering or revealing parts of the body. Mauss' insight was that these myriad aspects of how social actors inhabit and act through their bodies are socially patterned. Notice that, while some of this is explicitly taught to children and sanctioned, such as proper modesty or table manners, other aspects are merely instilled by habit and the tendency of human groups to routinize. The linguistic analogue to this

would be utterance production as a corporeal activity, subject to habitual voice modulation, pacing, posture, degrees of involvement, and their embodiments.

The fourth source is the scholastic philosophical idea of habitus, meaning mental habits that regulate acts. This idea most decisively entered into practice theory through the writings of the art historian Erwin Panofsky, whose work Bourdieu translated and considered fundamental to his theory of practice. For our purposes, the most salient lines of argument in Panofsky (1976) were these:

1. In a given historical conjuncture, there exist underlying mental habits that guide people's cultural production in different spheres (such as philosophy and architecture in 12th–13th century Paris).
2. These habits are instilled through education.
3. They come to guide both how actors act and how they evaluate acts.
4. They are realized in works.

Thus stated, the habitus is a *modus operandi*, flexible enough to be realized in different works, every one of which is unique, and in different spheres of work, which may differ widely. From a language perspective, the habitus would involve discourse genres (Hanks, 1987; Briggs and Bauman, 1992), routine ways of speaking and interpreting speech, and the habits of mind implicit in standard ways of representing the world in language.

As used in practice theory, the term habitus bundles these four sources into a single idea. It therefore claims that there is a basic unity between the disposition to speak in certain ways, the evaluation of speech, the bodily habits enacted in speech production, and the mental habits instilled in speakers as social beings. What unifies this set of features is not logical necessity, but historical necessity. Habitus is individual, since it forms individual persons, and collective, since it is a social formation. It joins the body with the mind rather than asserting the division and priority of either one over the other, as is more typical in language studies long dominated by mentalism. Finally, it is an alternative vision of the speaking subject, openly contradictory of the traditional idea that speakers are freely intending persons whose inner mental states (propositional attitudes, intentions) are the source of discursive meaning.

The relation between habitus and field is subtle and far-reaching. On the one hand, the habitus is usually associated, in writings on practice, with the social provenance of the individual in terms of class, gender, ethnicity, and other macro-sociological divisions. It is inculcated in childhood, primarily in the domestic field and through more or less formal education. It is reinforced and reproduced in ordinary social life in

these spheres and also in labor practices, which exert particular influences (including agriculture among farmers, research, writing and teaching for an academic, painting for a painter and so on, driving for a cabby, etc.). Any form of ritual practice has a potentially strong impact on habitus, by dint of engaging the dispositions, evaluations, body and mental orientations of practitioners through the repeated doing of practice. The important point is that there is a dynamic (if not dialectical) relation between contextual embedding and the formation of the actors who engage contexts. Language and discourse are among the central modalities through which the dynamic is articulated.

How do participants enact their positions in the field so as to achieve their communicative goals? How do they decide on goals and plausible ways of achieving them? Which strategies and moves are permissible or effective in a given field, and which are ineffective or impermissible? The idea that speakers are strategic is widely accepted in discourse studies. Gumperz's (1992) work on discourse strategies effectively shows that with contextualization cues, speakers strategically position themselves and frame the interpretation of their utterances for their own ends. Grice's (1989) theory of implicature rests on a model of the speaker as one who pursues communicative ends through "implicitation," by deriving and conveying complex conversational meanings with underspecified statements, formulated so as to be expanded by inference. The speaker in an inferential language game must be strategic if only to properly attain such subtle and understated affects. Similarly, conversation analysis envisions the speaker in interaction as an active maker of context, one who masters the procedural system of turn taking, the conditional relevances of conversational moves, knows how to hold the floor, call for a repair, invite or block certain inferences. In general, the exemplary speaker talks on purpose and pursues practical ends by more or less effective means, in more or less locally defined contexts. To call this 'strategy' invites the assumption that it is elaborately thought out, which is sometimes true, but not always. Whether full-blown strategies or mundane purposive gambits, discourse strategies have a double relation to the field: they may be called forth by context or they may produce it anew. If context bears an unavoidable relation to the habitus of those who occupy it, it is also subject to the purposive projects and strategies they pursue.

Contextualization Processes

In the course of spelling out a minimal architecture for discourse context based on embedding and emergence, we have made reference to a number of processes. As we have emphasized, all of the units involved emerge in time, albeit at different levels, and embedding itself is a dynamic process. At this point I want to draw together and offer a preliminary summary of the processes through which context occurs. The first class of processes involves intentionality, in both senses of representation and purpose. Thus, when a speaker pays attention, thematizes, formulates, or invokes context, he or she converts it into a semiotic object in a standing-for relation. Similarly, when the speaker uses grammatical, intonational, or gestural means to cue his or her current footing and to contextualize the current utterance, semiotic relations are produced between the expressive stream and the context of its expression. In deictic usage, speakers construe context, signaling both the referent and the perspective under which it is individuated. Austinian performatives (Austin, 1962) rest partly on the intentionality that links the propositional content to the conventional act type, the locutionary act to the illocutionary (*see* **Speech Acts and Grammar**). The kinds of creative indexicality revealed by Friedrich (1979), Silverstein (1976), and others all involve the consequential use of signs to invoke contexts and thereby bring them about. Through intentionality, signs and expressions project their objects and thereby alter context. Inferential processes (interpretation, extrapolation, implicitation, contextual enrichment) also operate on expression forms in the light of contexts, with special importance given to relevance structures. All of these processes rely critically on the capacity of participants to produce and evaluate signs of context, and to do so on purpose. Strategy and improvisation are ways of exercising this capacity.

But we have also mentioned processes that are not subject to the intentionality of participants, at least not necessarily. This is a different class of phenomena. From situations to settings, demonstrative fields, and embedding social fields, we have said that objects, persons, and groups occupy positions in context. This occupancy is not a standing-for relation, and it may or may not be subject to the purposes of the actor. If a police officer calls to me on the street, I am interpolated into a position, whether or not I wish and whether or not I produce a sign of my position. When I go to the airport and pass through security, I occupy the position of a ticketed passenger to be inspected whether I wish to or not, just as I become a customer when I sit in a restaurant. Occupancy can be described as 'taking up a position' but it also designates 'finding oneself in' and 'being put in' a position. When persons or objects are referred to in discourse, they are thereby thrust into positions and the social relations that define them. The key point is that the positions and the process of occupying them

are social facts at least partly independent of the intentional states of the participants.

Another contextual process whose source is beyond the scope of intentional action is what might be called over-determination. The social field in which an interaction is embedded does not determine what participants do, or how context emerges. But it does make certain contextual configurations and actions more likely and predictable. It reinforces and calls for them the way the operating room calls for a certain engagement from the medical experts working in it, or the courtroom calls for specific forms of engagement on the part of its occupants. The acquired habitus of a practitioner of any profession is reinforced constantly by the settings, rights, responsibilities, and routine practices that make up the field. Along with the training that inculcates ways of seeing appropriate to the profession, these aspects of the field reproduce, sanction, and guide contexts and ways of occupying them. We will say that embedding over-determines context when habitus, field, built space, and sanctioned practice align to impose or induce specific features of context. Organizations, religious and missionary settings provide clear examples of this, but the effect is much more widespread.

Social fields also authorize and legitimate certain contexts and modes of engagement, but not others. A cashier has the authority to tell you how much you owe for a product, just as a doctor has the authority to classify your body states and a teacher is authorized to evaluate your work. This authority is enacted in intentional processes, but its source is the field, not the intentional states of individuals. We describe it as a process and not an attribute in order to foreground the dynamic whereby authority is conferred on certain contexts and agents in them. Legitimacy could also be conceived as an attribute of contexts and actions, but is more productively viewed as the process whereby they are aligned to the values of the field. In the same family of phenomena, Ide (2001) distinguished between volitional aspects of discourse production and nonvolitional 'discernments' of context. The latter designated the process whereby participants construe and align themselves to the field-based requirements of context, such as when they use Japanese honorifics unreflectively and automatically, out of a habitus-like sense of what is called for. Any of these processes may involve intentionality, but they illustrate the capacity of fields to exert a structuring influence apart from intentionality.

Conclusion

Discourse context cannot be formulated as a set of correlations between global, macrolevel social features and local, microlevel ones: correlation is far too crude for the kinds of articulation in play. It cannot be described as the reproduction of macrolevel types at the token level: speech is productive and inherently situated. It cannot be derived by sheer seat-of-the-pants creative expression guided by purely local intentions and relevance systems: we do not simply fabricate the contexts of our discourse whole cloth. In short, the social horizon of discourse production requires that we use a different vocabulary. Two key terms in this new lexicon are emergence and embedding, and together they define a space of contextualization more productive and realistic than any of the familiar divisions of scale. Embedding describes the relation that holds between situations, settings, demonstrative fields, social fields, and habitus. These have the status of analytically isolable levels in the overall architecture of context. For any level X embedded in Y, Y entails X, Y inherits features from X and adds others, Y transforms X on several distinguishable dimensions (temporality, participation, weighting of factors), and Y serves as the presumptive horizon of X, held ready for thematization and relevance relations. Embedding is more basic than correlation, instantiation, or reproduction, because it is the objective condition under which these occur.

Some features of context follow from the distinct logic of the level at which they arise, whereas others are imposed by embedding. The sheer copresence of the situation, the relevance of the setting, the semiosis of the demonstrative field, the constraints and resources of the social field, the bodily dispositions of the habitus – any of these may be relatively free from the structuring effects of the fields in which they are embedded. To the extent that this is so, the contextual level to which they belong is relatively autonomous. By contrast, to the extent that some process at a given level is determined by its embedding in another field, it is nonautonomous. The functions that make up the demonstrative field, for instance, are relatively autonomous, whereas those that count as mutual monitoring and relevance are not, because they depend on the field in which they are embedded. Similarly, the resolution of ordinary indexical reference is nonautonomous.

Emergence is a pervasive feature of context, which is dynamic along several trajectories at several levels. What we might call context time precipitates from the interaction between distinct temporalities at the levels of situation (body time), setting (act time), demonstrative field (time formulated and invoked with signs, themselves produced in time), social field time (careers, historical revaluation of positions, objects, and what is at stake), and

habitus time (embodied mental and physical habits, routinizations, alignments of disposition with evaluation). Just as time and participation are defined by copresence at the level of the situation, by cognitive engagement at the level of the setting and agent positions at the level of the field, so too other aspects of context emerge in different temporal streams. It is only in practice, especially communicative practice, that they are synchronized to one another. Context occurs when multiple temporal relations are articulated to one another in the emerging actuality of practice.

Behind the standard divisions of scale in context lies a more basic distinction between context-building processes that presuppose individual intentionality, and those that do not. The latter derive directly from the field in which communicative practice is embedded. Intentionality encompasses purposes (as in I intend [to] X) and aboutness relations (I am talking about X). For any student of language, it is doubtful whether the dispositions, mental habits, and embodiments of the habitus can replace intention as a motor for action, as Bourdieu suggested. It is difficult to imagine a theory of language or discourse context that exempted itself from aboutness relations or purposive action. Yet the habitus and the current state of the field cooperate on the intentional states of those that occupy them. They provide a ready-made universe of objects and agents, frames of reference, spaces and evaluative stances – the very stuff of context.

See also: Bühler, Karl; Conversation Analysis; Critical Discourse Analysis; Cultural and Social Dimension of Spoken Discourse; Discursive Practice Theory; Environment and Language; Indexicality: Theory; Linguistic Anthropology; Pragmatics: Overview; Social Aspects of Pragmatics.

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Conversation Analysis

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Introduction

What kinds of social organizations are used as resources when people communicate through talk in interaction? It is this question that conversation analysis attempts to answer. Conversation analysis (CA) studies the methods participants orient to when they organize social action through talk. It investigates rules and practices from an interactional perspective and studies them by examining recordings of real-life interactions.

Although conversation analytic research may be subsumed in typically linguistic disciplines such as pragmatics, discourse analysis, or (interactional) sociolinguistics, it started in American sociology. In particular, the sociologists Erving Goffman (*see* **Goffman, Erving**) and Harold Garfinkel prepared the ground in which CA arose – Goffman with his study of cultural rules and rituals in face-to-face interaction (Drew and Wootton, 1988), and Garfinkel with his investigations into the situated and normative character of shared understanding in everyday courses of action (Heritage, 1984). Enabled by the spread of recording techniques that opened new ways of inspecting interactional data, Harvey Sacks (†1975) and Emanuel Schegloff established a novel paradigm for researching the organization of human action in and through talk in interaction (Schegloff, 1968; Schegloff and Sacks, 1973; Sacks, 1992) (*see* **Telephone Talk; Sacks, Harvey**). Although the foundational work in CA focuses on talk in conversations, the framework has gradually been extended to research of other types of talk such as medical and clinical interaction, lessons, or news interviews. This is why the more general characterization 'talk in interaction' nowadays is often preferred over 'conversation.'

Studying Transcriptions of Recorded Talk

In conversation analysis, the investigation begins with making an audio and/or video recording of naturally occurring talk. These recordings are carefully transcribed according to specific conventions first developed by Gail Jefferson (see Jefferson, 2004). The *CA transcription notation* is designed for rendering details that contribute to the organization and intelligibility of talk. It helps to retain features of prosody and turn positioning in the transcription. Together with the original recording, the transcription enables researchers to examine the forms of language use that were available to the participants in the recorded interaction itself.

A CA transcription is still readable without considerable expert knowledge. The transcript does not represent speech production at the level of its mechanical reproducibility (the *etic* approach that is typical of phonetics). Rather, the transcription provides an empirically reliable approximation of the interpretative assemblies that participants in talk are working with (the *emic* approach). A transcription is the combined result of carefully listening to how and where utterances are produced and the interpretative work of the transcriber as a competent member of the culture under investigation.

Extract (1) exemplifies this way of transcribing talk. It documents a short episode – just 7 seconds – from a Dutch telephone conversation (the original text is followed by an English translation in italics):

Extract (1). Telephone call between brothers. Background information: Jan is calling his brother Ton from their Rhine barge. Their parents sail a barge as well. Ton is in the office of the shipping exchange. Caller Jan is inquiring whether their mother is also at the shipping exchange.

```
54 Jan:    mamah, (0.2) is die d'r ook?
           mama (.) is she there too?
```

55		0.4
56	Ton:	HÈ↑:h?
		huh?
57		(.)
58	Jan:	m̲ama:h
		mama
59		0.6
60	Ton:	w̲aa:r
		where
61		0.3
62	Jan:	is die d̲aa:r?
		is she there?
63		0.3
64	Ton:	↑hi̲e↑:r?
		here?
65		(.)
66	Jan:	j [ah
		yes
67	Ton:	[nEEj!
		nO!
68		(.)
69	Jan:	°oh:.°
70		0.6

In order to be able to read a transcription like this one, the reader has to know the conventions. Notice first that each speaker contribution – or *turn* – has a separate line. This indicates the turn's chronological position relative to its predecessor and its successor. Other notation conventions include:

- 0.6   The length of silences between and within turns is measured in tenths of seconds.
- (.)   A dot between brackets (.) indicates a short silence of less than 0.2 seconds.
- [In the case of simultaneous talk, the onset of the overlapping turn is located by a *left square bracket* in the overlapped turn.
- . , ?   A *period* indicates a falling final pitch contour, a *comma* a slightly rising pitch contour, and a *question mark* a strongly rising one.
- ↓ ↑   Vertical arrows provide information about local pitch movements within syllables or at the level of a single syllable. A *downward arrow* signals a falling tone movement, an *upward arrow* a rising one.
- wo̲rd   *Underlining* signals salient stress.
- wor:d   A *colon* renders a noticeable sound stretch.
- sto-   The *hyphen* is used as a cut-off marker.
- >faster<   This utterance part is produced with higher pace than the talk surrounding it.
- <slower>   The pace is relatively slower.
- LOud   *Capitals* indicate relative loudness.
- °soft°   The *degree sign* signals that an utterance part is produced more softly than the surrounding talk.
- ·h   Hearable inbreath.
- hh   Hearable aspiration.
- (guess)   The transcriber is uncertain about the utterance part between parentheses.

Even the transcription of a brief episode such as the one documented in extract (1) already displays very basic features of talk in interaction. Note, for a start, how short turns may be. If the reader was expecting utterances in turns at talk to consist of complete, well-structured sentences, he will be surprised to find out how little the participants need to achieve meaningful verbal interaction. How do they do this? This question will be answered by looking at two levels of the organization of talk that are central in conversation analytic research: turn taking and sequence organization. The interaction in extract (1) shows that the participants know where and how to change the roles of speaker and listener. How they manage this is the subject of the section about the organization of turn taking. Second, the talk in this fragment is an interactionally coherent exchange of communicative actions. The episode starts with a question and it ends with the answer to that question (see lines 54 and 67, respectively). How are we able to recognize this kind of interactional order in a series of utterances? How is it achieved? This question is answered at the level of sequence organization, that is, the way in which participants coordinate actions in series of turns in order to effectuate interactional projects.

Turn Design and the Organization of Turn Taking

A remarkable feature of the interaction in extract (1) is that speaker change is coordinated smoothly. Both interruptions (or other kinds of simultaneous talk) and gaps are relatively rare. In a seminal paper first published in 1974, Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson formulate these observations in more technical, organizational terms; the participants display an orientation to minimization of overlap, while at the same time, they also orient to minimization of gap. Sacks and his colleagues account for this fine organizational balance by a description of the systematics that conversationalists orient to when they coordinate the organization of turn taking.

The basic organizational problem that participants have to solve each turn anew is to determine when the speaker will complete the current turn. The recipient

is not only figuring out what the turn is about and what the speaker is doing with it, he also has to be alert for the moment it might become his turn to speak. Recipients anticipate such organizationally relevant moments by building expectations as to what the utterance underway is going to look like. Turns are produced linearly in real time, but in the course of a turn's production, a recipient can make an informed guess about the structure of the whole unit by inspecting – in its environment of use – the part that is already there. The turn so far provides cues as to how the unit underway is constructed and when it will possibly be complete.

The building stones of turns are turn constructional units (TCUs). Each turn is built with at least one *turn constructional unit*. The design of a TCU may vary. A TCU can be built as a one-word unit, such as the turns with no more than the words *here, yes,* or *no* in extract (1). Other TCUs have a syntactically more elaborate design, such as the interrogative clause '*is she there too.*' Depending on the unit type the speaker is recognizably using for the construction of a TCU, the recipient will make different predictions as to when the ongoing turn may be complete.

The more complex the unit type is, the more faceted the projection of completeness. Compare the extract below. Angela begins a TCU with a particular type of subordinate clause (*(but) if you get them back*, line 321). This makes the unit underway analyzable as the first part of a compound TCU with an [*if . . . , then . . .*] structure. The turn will not be complete until the speaker has finished the *then*-part that is projected by the *if*-part:

Extract (2). Telephone call between two 17-year old Californian girls. Angela has just complained that Corey's friend has not returned three of her CDs.

```
321. Angela: →   ·hhh (but) if you could get them
322.             back, (.) that be great.
323.             0.2
324. Corey:      °'kay.°
```

Note that the recipient does not begin to speak when the speaker has finished the part with the *if*-clause. Even the short silence after it is not used as an opportunity for speakership transference. The recipient observably orients to the preceding clause as a preliminary component of a compound TCU with a two-part structure. It foreshows a continuation with a structurally specifiable type of second part as its final component. Only after the subsequent main clause implementing this latter part has reached completion, does the recipient take over (cf. Lerner, 1991, 1996).

Recipients may locate possible completeness on the basis of the interplay of syntactic and prosodic information. Whereas the TCU's construction type 'nominates' a place in an ongoing TCU as a syntactically plausible point of completeness, prosody can 'second' the nomination (Schegloff, 1998). For example, a speaker can stretch or reduce the vocalization of the intended last syllable of the turn, or mark it with a noticeable tone movement such as the falling pitch movement in the last word of Angela's turn in extract (2). **Figure 1** makes the intonation contour of this TCU graphically visible with the help of *Praat,* a program for the phonetic analysis of speech.

Figure 1 Prosodic analysis of the TCU in lines 321–322 of extract (2).

The lower half of the graph shows the fundamental frequency – an acoustic correlate of pitch – of Angela's TCU in Hertz. Note that the last two words of the TCU move toward a final pitch level that is noticeably lower than the base level of the preliminary component.

Construction type and prosody are not the only dimensions within which participants negotiate turn rights, however. The issue of whether an utterance is possibly complete strongly depends on pragmatic factors, most notably on how the ongoing turn is related to its immediate interactional context (*see* **Context, Communicative**). Single words such as *mama, where?, here?, yes,* or *no,* for example, can only function as meaningful independent interactional moves when uttered in a context that lends them this type of intelligibility.

Each utterance provides an ensemble of various types of cues that together project a *possible completion point* of an ongoing TCU. The first possible completion point of a TCU is the place where turn taking becomes an interactionally relevant issue. The participants of talk in interaction negotiate speaker transition around such *transition relevance places*. Conversationalists use specific techniques to allocate next turn. If current speaker selects another participant as next speaker before her turn has arrived at its first possible completion point (other selection), the selected party has both the right and the obligation to begin the next turn at this point. If no other speaker is selected, another participant may self-select as next speaker. If none of these options is used, current speaker may continue. The system then applies again as soon as current speaker arrives at the next possible completion point (Sacks *et al.*, 1974).

A TCU can function as an interactional move in its own right, and because of this, it may fill a turn slot on its own. On the other hand, turns may consist of more than one TCU (multi-unit turns). However, unless special provisions are made to maintain speaking rights over a longer stretch of talk – as is the case with, e.g., story telling (cf. Sacks, 1974) – each next possible completion point of a subsequent TCU is treated as a place where speaker transition is an organizationally relevant, negotiable issue.

Thus, the organization of turn taking is accounted for by describing it as a set of constructional practices that enable the co-participants to determine the place at which speaker transition becomes relevant and to then deal with that issue according to a structured set of interactional options. This way of modeling the organization of talk is characteristic for the CA approach. The methods that members orient to are described as formally and as generally as is necessary to account for the fact that people succeed in managing turn taking in an orderly way, innumerable times a day, in all kind of situations. At the same time, the description has to explain how participants are able to shape and recognize each time anew the particular context in which the rules for allocating next turn apply. CA thus studies the organization of talk as situated, socially organized sets of practices. It describes the methods members use for organizing talk as interactional structures that both shape the context in which they operate and enable its orderly, interactionally coordinated progression.

The general model sketched in the initial paper about turn taking has been developed further and refined in work on systematic practices of overlap positioning and overlap resolution (Jefferson, 1986; Schegloff, 2000a), collaborative turn construction through anticipatory completion of compound turns (Lerner, 1991, 1996), and the role of gaze, gesture, and body positioning (Goodwin, 1981) (*see* **Gestures, Pragmatic Aspects**).

The general characterization of the systematics of turn taking has appeared to be very robust across languages. Depending on the structural features of specific languages, however, the linguistic practices deployed to project possible completion points of TCUs may vary. The structure of English, for example, allows for early projectability of the design of TCUs. Its strict Subject-Verb-Object (SVO) word order in full clauses, for example, enforces early positioning of predicates. Function markers such as question words, imperatives, conjunctions, or quote attributions occur in sentence-initial position, just as the inversion of subject and auxiliary in yes/no interrogatives enables early recognizability. A language such as Japanese, on the other hand, is said to have an SOV- or OSV-type of word order, an agglutinative morphology, and a preference for postpositioning over prepositioning of markers of syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic functions. These properties result in a predicate-final design of clauses in TCUs. Consequently, the construction of TCUs may display a delayed projectability of possible completeness. On the other hand, Japanese has the option of explicit markers of possible completeness such as final verb suffixes or final particles (cf. Tanaka, 1999). The differences in language structure lead to partially different sets of grammatical practices that are deployed for the interactional organization of turn taking. The general principles of turn construction and completion projection are nonetheless the same.

Sequence Organization

We now turn to the question of how an exchange like the one in extract (1) is easily understood as

a coherent episode. It is not just the linear temporal order of turns that accounts for our understanding. The series of turns has a structure. Some turns belong more together than others. The ways conversationalists link turns to other turns as coherent series of interrelated communicative actions is called sequence organization. A *sequence* is an ordered series of turns through which participants accomplish and coordinate an interactional activity.

A question followed by an answer is an example of a sequence. Other examples are a request and the decision that is made about it, an informative and its receipt, and a criticism and the reply to it. All these different types of two-part sequences are instances of a very tight type of sequence organization: the *adjacency pair* (cf. Schegloff, 1968; Schegloff and Sacks, 1973). When a recipient of a turn at talk hears the speaker's utterance as the first part of a particular type of adjacency pair, the appropriate thing to do next is to deliver an utterance that may count as the second part of the same pair. For example, the appropriate reaction to a question is to answer it. The question is treated as the first pair part of a question/answer pair; the answer is its second part. Requests, invitations, offers, proposals, informatives, complaints, or accusations establish similar expectations with respect to a continuation with a fitting type of second pair part in the next turn (*see* **Speech Acts**).

Extract (3) documents several instances of question/answer pairs. The first one starts in line 33. The son asks his mother a question, and at the first possible completion point of his turn, the mother takes over to answer it.

Extract (3). Telephone call between a mother and her son. Background information: The mother has called her son from the family's Rhine barge. The son is in a boarding school for bargee children.

33 son:	nou↓: >waar zitteh jullie< nouw.
	well where are you *plural* *now.*
	0.2
34 mother:	i:: >Amsterdam.<
	i::(n) Amsterdam.
35	0.3
36 son:	waar moe(we) almal heen.
	where all do (we) have to go to.
	0.3
37 mother:	è↑:h?
	huh?
	(.)
38 son:	waar moewe heen
	where do we have to go to
39 mother:	naar Luik.
	to Liège.
	0.2

40 son:	naar Lui:k?
	to Liège?
41 mother:	jah.
	yes.

When the mother treats the utterance in line 33 as the first part of a particular type of adjacency pair, she is dealing with it as a specific type of social organization. She does not just hear an interrogative sentence that, under felicitous conditions, may count as a separate speech act; she hears it as an utterance that proposes her engagement in an interactional course of action. When an utterance is analyzable as the first pair part of a particular type of adjacency pair, it locally establishes a normative expectation toward what its recipient should do in next turn. The first part makes the delivery of a fitting second part *conditionally relevant*. That is, its recipient is expected to deliver the second part in his next turn. If it is absent, this is noticeable and accountable (cf. Schegloff, 1968; Heritage, 1984). The obligation to deliver the second pair part as soon as possible in next turn may be suspended, however. Compare, for instance, the mother's response to her son's next question in extract (3) ('*where all do (we) have to go to*'). '*Huh?*' is not an answer. Instead of answering the question, the mother initiates *repair* (cf. Schegloff *et al.*, 1977; Schegloff, 1992, 2000b). She signals that she is having a problem with prior turn. The son's subsequent, slightly modified repetition of his question apparently solves the problem, because the mother is able to answer now ('*to Liège*'). Unlike the first question/answer sequence in this episode, the answer is not delivered in next turn. A short repair sequence is inserted between question and answer. Schematically, this can be rendered as shown in **Figure 2**.

An *insertion sequence* like the repair sequence in lines 37–38 locally suspends the interactional expectation to deliver the second pair part in the turn following the one with the first part. The intervening interaction shows that the participants nevertheless are still oriented to the relevance of the second pair part. The repair sequence is recognizably supportive of the felicitous development of the base sequence in which it is embedded. The delivery of the answer

Figure 2 Sequential structure of the interaction in lines 36–39 of extract (3).

is still pending. The urgency to answer is only temporarily postponed. Note that the questioner even renews the actuality of getting an answer by redoing his question in the repair itself, thereby creating another opportunity to hold on to the preference for next-positioning of first and second pair parts. And, by the way, note also that the inserted repair sequence is again structured by principles of adjacency pair organization!

Conditional relevance is also the key for understanding the structure of extract (1). We are able to understand the interaction in extract (1) as an orderly, methodically achieved sequential course of action on the basis of the adjacency pair structure. For the reader's convenience, the fragment is repeated below:

Extract (1). Telephone call between brothers.

54	Jan:	mamah, (0.2) is die d'r ook?
		mama (.) is she there too?
55		0.4
56	Ton:	HÈ↑:h?
		huh?
57		(.)
58	Jan:	mama:h
		mama
59		0.6
60	Ton:	waa:r
		where
61		0.3
62	Jan:	is die daa:r?
		is she there?
63		0.3
64	Ton:	↑hie↑:r?
		here?
65		(.)
66	Jan:	j [ah
		yes
67	Ton:	[nEEj!
		nO!
68		(.)
69	Jan:	°oh:.°
70		0.6

The question in line 54 urges its recipient to deliver an answer as soon as possible. Its delivery is, nonetheless, suspended three times by the initiation of repair from the part of the intended answerer (lines 56, 60, and 64). Each next repair initiation builds upon the result of the former one, until the recipient of the question finally is able to answer it in line 67. The sequential organization of this episode can be schematized as shown in **Figure 3**.

The interaction in extract (1) is tied together by the way the utterance in the first turn is sequentially related to the one seven turns later. The question in line 54 makes an answer conditionally relevant, and

position 1: 1st pair part (Jan's question in line 54)
  R$_{a1}$: Ton initiates repair (line 56)
  R$_{a2}$: Jan repairs (line 58)
    R$_{b1}$: Ton initiates repair (line 60)
    R$_{b2}$: Jan repairs (line 62)
      R$_{c1}$: Ton initiates repair (line 66)
      R$_{c2}$: Jan repairs (line 66)
position 2: 2nd pair part (Ton's answer in line 67)
position 3: sequence closing third (the answer receipt in line 69)

Figure 3 Sequential structure of the interaction in lines 54–69 of extract (1).

as long as this answer is not given, the participants work collaboratively toward an occasion in which it can be delivered. All intervening actions are recognizably designed as subsidiary to the task still pending. They should enable the recipient of the question to answer it, and as such, they account for the answer's postponement in each subsequent turn.

The interactions in extracts (1) and (3) clearly illustrate that the practices through which conversationalists make sense of turns at talk are based upon *sequential reasoning*. A turn such as '*in Amsterdam*' in extract (3) can only be interpreted within the context of the question it is answering. The expression is not just a place formulation. As a place formulation, it is answering the question where the family's Rhine barge is at the time of asking. The structure of the TCU as a lone standing prepositional phrase even signals the kind of action it is designed to accomplish in its environment of use. The combination of the turn's position and the composition of the TCU together signal answerhood. It informs the recipient about how the turn should be related to its local sequential context. The identification of this relation is part and parcel of determining what a speaker is saying and doing. Interpretative reasoning goes by lines of sequential organization.

Utterances in turns at talk accomplish actions that are part of social activities which are sequentially organized and have sequential implications for the participants. In this section we have only looked at one type of sequence organization – the adjacency pair structure – and the way it can be expanded by sequence insertion. Central to this perspective is the insight that utterances do not just simply count as isolated 'actions.' Participants in talk in interaction orient to them as moves in contextually situated social arrangements. Participants in talk in interaction do not attribute meaning to utterances by simply applying rules that are independent from and external to the interaction. They make sense of utterances in turns at talk by situated, sequential reasoning.

Conversation Analytic Methodology

Conversation analytic methodology is based upon the already discussed assumption that the sense-making devices that participants in talk in interaction orient to can be understood as forms of situated, interactional reasoning (cf. Heritage, 1984; ten Have, 1999). This kind of contextual reasoning can only be investigated from *within* the interaction. The central requirement of CA methodology – convergence between the analyst's perspective and the perspective of the participants – attempts to achieve this. The analyst has to make plausible that his or her results are indeed a description of the methods that the participants themselves orient to.

The Data

In order to avoid problems with respect to the ecological validity of data, naturally occurring interactions are strongly preferred. They are recorded and transcribed according to the conventions discussed earlier. The transcriptions are used to generate initial ideas about how people communicate in talk in interaction. These ideas are worked out by looking at other instances of the same phenomenon. As a result, the description is gradually broadened and cyclically refined by falsifying or validating evidence. Additionally, transcripts allow the researcher to make her data available to the scientific community. The data are retrievable for the audience. Other students are enabled to redo and to check the analysis.

Analyzing Data

Conversation analytic methodology is strongly data driven. There are two kinds of studies. In a *single case analysis*, the researcher develops an analysis of the interaction in a single episode with respect to some interesting or relevant aspect. In a *collection study*, the analyst generalizes the results of a cumulative series of single case analyses with respect to a specific aspect. All cases are compared with respect to some feature by describing how, and the degrees to which they are the same, similar, or different.

Single case analyses serve purposes such as generating ideas that have to be grounded in a collection study, testing and applying the results of collection studies, or exploring the interplay of constellations of practices in episodes of talk in interaction. Collection studies have two phases (cf. Heritage, 1995). In the first phase, the analyst describes regularities with respect to some particular aspect of the data and develops a description of a candidate pattern by going from case to case in a corpus of transcripts. The description of phenomena is both formal and situated. A description is formal when it is formulated at a level of generality that allows for a characterization of the recognizability of a device across contexts. A description is situated when the context is specified. We can discern distinct levels of description: the level of turn design – practices of turn construction or 'packaging' – and the description of the kind of social action that is implemented by practices of turn construction at a sequential level.

In a second phase, the analyst attempts to meet the requirement of convergence between the participants' and the analyst's perspective, and has to prove that the participants observably orient to the candidate pattern. A keystone procedure to do this is deviant case analysis (cf. Schegloff, 1968); the analyst examines cases where some departure from the described pattern can be observed. Examination of deviant cases either results in a modification of the theory developed so far, or it can be shown that a boundary case eventually provides some kind of second-order validation of the basic pattern. The latter is frequently the case with conversational repair. Conversationalists frequently undo departures from the patterns used. Such cases convey how and to what extent the participants are oriented to the principle that the analyst tries to establish as a pattern. Remember, for instance, how departures from the principle of conditional relevance in extracts (1) and (3) eventually confirmed a participant orientation to that very same device. The participants maintain the rule of having to provide a fitting second pair part by solving the troubles they encounter in trying to obey to the rule. Usually, phases 1 and 2 are repeated recursively. The ideal is to achieve an exhaustive description that accounts for all instances of the phenomenon in question in the corpus.

Quantification may play a role in determining the distribution of the observed pattern. Quantitative processing of the data, however, is subsidiary to qualitative exploration of the phenomenon in phase 1 and to qualitative validation of the candidate description in phase 2. Distributions that confirm a hypothesis primarily establish regularities. The researcher still has to provide qualitative evidence that the participants observably orient to such a pattern as a normative interactional rule. If the analyst is able to demonstrate that conversationalists orient themselves by the principle in question and to give a plausible account of how they do this, this accounts for the regularities.

The next section gives a short demonstration of a conversation analytic way of working. A single case will be discussed in order to explain how it confirms a general pattern. The case analysis describes an aspect of sequence organization that is called preference organization. In this case, the preference of agreeing over disagreeing assessments will be looked at. The analysis shows that the orderly packaging of

systematic sequential alternatives allows for inferences that are part of the interpretative procedures participants use to make sense of talk.

Preference Organization

The excerpt below is taken from a telephone conversation between spouses. The wife has called her husband late at night in his restaurant bar. The episode starts with the husband introducing a new topic. He tells how business is doing tonight. This report is concluded with a summary assessment: '*so u:h it's much better tonight than expected*' (lines 41–42). When his wife parsimoniously confirms this evaluation by only saying *yes*, the husband is not content with this response. It is challenged almost immediately ('*so what?*,' line 46):

Extract (4). Telephone conversation between spouses. Background information: In the preceding episode, Ans has blamed her husband for failing to answering the phone earlier that evening.

```
27            [ 3.2
28            [((cutlery sounds in background))
29 Bert:      nou e:::::h 't is (nog eh) lekker druk.
              well u:::::h it's (still uh) pretty busy.
30            0.6
31 Ans:       m:.
32            0.5
33            'k hoor 't jah
              So I hear uh huh
34            0.5
35 Bert:      °↑jah:°
              yes
36            1.2
37            °éen twee drieh° (0.6) nou drie
              one two three (0.6) well three
38            (garnetborde) en twee drie vier zit-(.)
              (plate services) and two three four sit-
39            vijf zes: zitt'n 'r nog.
              five six still sitting there.
40            2.5
41            dus e:h dat valt
              so u:h it's
42            vana:vond reuze mee
              tonight much better than expected
43            (.)
44 Ans: →     ·thHH j:Ah. hhh
              yes.
45            0.2
46 Bert: →    wat dan:?
              so what?
47            0.7
48 Ans:       *nou ja:h e:hh*
              well yes u:hh
```

In the aftermath of this exchange, a short dispute develops between the spouses. The wife's initial

reaction is rather resistant. Yet when her husband keeps pushing her, she finally bursts out in an angry, reproaching tirade (lines 59–70):

Extract (5). 22 seconds later in the same episode (including a long, awkward silence).

```
58 Ans:       je:zus
              jesus
59            ik moet elk woor:d >wat ik zeg<
              I have to every word that I say
60            moet ik verantwoordeh
              I have to account for
61            moet ik vier keer uitLEGgehH
              I have to explain four times
62            (.)
63 Bert:      nee dat hoeft niet.
              no you don't have to.
64            1.3
65 Bert:      dat hoe[:-
              you don't-
66 Ans: →          [ALS IK zeg JA: van nou
                   if I say yes like well
67            >met ander woordeh< da's dan
              in other words that's
68            PRIma eh dan=ehm· ·hHh
              fine then uh then uhm ·hhh
69            0.4
70 Bert:      ↑neeh dat hoe:ft ↓nie:t,h
              no you don't have to,
```

The wife does the kind of metatalk we all know from our own quarrels. Acting as a competent lay linguist, she formulates explicitly what she meant with her response: '*if I say yes, (...) in other words, that's fine (...)*.' In her version, the husband has misunderstood her completely. When reacting with *yes*, she was giving an agreeing, even approving response. The question is, however, whether the husband indeed did misunderstand her. Did he have any conversational evidence for an alternative interpretation when he threw doubt upon his wife's response?

In order to be able to answer this question, we have to go back to the sequence that occasioned the dispute. The utterance '*so u:h it's much better tonight than expected*' (lines 41–42) is an assessment. It is an interactional property of *first assessments* that when its recipient is also knowledgeable about the evaluated object, a second assessment is expected from the part of that party. *Second assessments* have the property that they find their measure in the assessment they are responding to. Second assessments are never neutral; they either agree or disagree with the first one. Disagreeing assessments are more delicate actions than agreeing assessments. Participants in talk in interaction treat a disagreeing second assessment usually as a less preferred type of next action than its agreeing alternative. They are

nonequivalent alternatives. Agreement is preferred and unmarked; disagreement is dispreferred and marked. Preferred second pair parts are delivered without delay and formulated in a frank, concise mode. Dispreferred seconds, on the other hand, are frequently delayed, mitigated, hesitantly produced, hidden away, put or accounted for in a roundabout way (Pomerantz, 1984; Schegloff, 1995).

The ranking of sequential alternatives with respect to their relative degree of preference is called *preference organization*. The preference for agreement is just one type of preference organization. A related type of preference organization is the preference for project success. It accounts for the preference for second pair parts of adjacency pairs that bring about the result targeted in the interactional project that is initiated with a first pair part, e.g., getting an answer to a question, accepting an invitation, granting a request, affiliating with a complaint, etc. Participants' orientations to preference organization is a major source for *sequence expansion* of adjacency pairs (Schegloff, 1995). Participants may probe and try to preempt the likeliness of a dispreferred second pair part in a *presequence* (Schegloff, 1980). They may initiate repair on first pair parts in *insertion sequences* in order to provide an opportunity to adjust the preference structure of the preceding first pair part, or to at least delay the delivery of a dispreferred second pair part. And they may try to revise or to accommodate a preceding dispreferred second pair part in various types of *post-expansion* (Schegloff, 1995) – as in the kind of post-expansion that can be observed in extracts (4–5). The relational implications of types of interactional alignment and disalignment that are governed by preference organization are also investigated from the perspective how participants negotiate *epistemic rights* (Heritage and Raymond, 2005; Stivers, 2005). For example, a co-participant may claim or give evidence for primary epistemic authority by the way he responds to a first assessment, although the response itself has a kind of secondness because it is done in a sequentially second position.

The notion of preference does not refer to psychological dispositions. It is a description of interactionally observable orientations of participants. Preference organization provides the participants with a subtle and powerful apparatus for making interpretative inferences. In extract (4), the husband uses it as a resource when he challenges his wife's response. In a context in which an agreeing second assessment is preferred, his wife avoids taking a stance. When she reacts with '*yes*,' she merely acknowledges her husband's statement '*so u:h it's much better tonight than expected*.' She does not affiliate with her husband, but responds in an evasive manner instead. Her husband's reaction attends to precisely this aspect of her response. He challenges a weakly agreeing response in a sequential environment in which another alternative is more preferred. So, despite his wife's subsequent (re-)formulation of the meaning of *yes* as simply agreeing, the man nevertheless has good reasons to hear her response as a sign of reservation or even foreboding disagreement. From a sequential perspective, the response is not just acknowledging prior speaker's assessment. Saying *yes* in this context is rather deployed as a device to avoid agreeing. As a contextually specifiable selection of another alternative than the preferred one, it legitimizes the interpretation that is subsequently challenged by the husband.

The analysis of the origins of the argument in extract (4) demonstrates several aspects of the conversation analytic approach. First, it introduces another aspect of sequence organization: preference organization. Second, it shows one more time how the meaning of utterances is constituted along lines of sequential reasoning. An utterance in a turn at talk is not just what it says, but what it does in a particular sequential context. Third, the analysis illustrates that the methods by which participants make sense of their talk may be (re-)specified and (re-)negotiated in the course of the interaction. Finally, the discussion demonstrates some aspects of CA methodology discussed in the former section. The knowledge that first assessments invite a second assessment from its recipient stems from a collection study (Pomerantz, 1984). The interaction in extract (4) seems to contradict this pattern. Instead of continuing with a second assessment, the recipient responds with only an acknowledgement token. However, when this observation is combined with insight into the ways how preference organization operates, the interaction can be explained in terms of the very same mechanism. The analysis of a deviant case eventually provides a kind of second-order validation of the theory developed so far.

Extensions and Applications

The basic theoretical, analytical, and methodological framework of CA has been developed further into various domains and directions. Studies in the area of interaction and grammar explore the relationship between language structure, linguistic practices, and the organization of turn taking and of sequences in talk in interaction (Ochs *et al.*, 1996; Selting and Couper-Kuhlen, 2001; Ford *et al.*, 2002; Couper-Kuhlen and Ford, 2004).

The work of Charles Goodwin has given a major impetus to the study of the multimodal and embodied character of the organization of human action in talk in interaction – not only the role of gaze, gesture, and

body positioning, but also the use of tools and other features of the setting (Goodwin, 2000; see also the workplace studies in Heath and Luff, 2000). Goodwin (2003) provides a collection of CA studies of the ways in which people with one or another form of language impairment use various types of sequential and situational reasoning in ordinary communicative situations (*see* **Institutional Talk; Family Speak**).

Talk in institutional, professional, or work settings is also studied by describing how it is constrained or modified in comparison to conversational interaction (Drew and Heritage, 1992). The research in this area has frequently the shape of studying genres or activity types in a specific domain, e.g., the news interview (Clayman and Heritage, 2002), judicial interaction (Atkinson and Drew, 1979), emergency calls (Whalen and Zimmermann, 1990), meetings (Boden, 1994), telling good and bad news in clinical settings (Maynard, 2003), and gossip (Bergmann, 1993). The research here is sometimes called applied CA (see ten Have, 1999) (*see* **Institutional Talk**).

Wootton (1997) is an example of a CA study in the area of early language acquisition. The study of foreign language use in talk in interaction focuses on the organization of repair (see Schegloff, 2000b; Gardner and Wagner, 2004).

A primarily British group of social psychologists approaches typically psychological topics such as attitude, identity, and cognition from an interactional perspective, using CA as a central theoretical and methodological framework (Te Molder and Potter, 2004).

Journals that regularly publish CA papers are *Research on Language and Social Interaction, Discourse Studies, Human Studies, Journal of Pragmatics, Language in Society, Pragmatics,* and *Text.* Important centers of CA research are UCLA (Schegloff, Heritage, Clayman), UCSB (Lerner, Raymond), the University of Wisconsin (Maynard, Ford), the University of York (Drew, Local, Wootton), the University of Helsinki (Sorjonen), the University of Southern Denmark the Graduate School of Language and Communication (Wagner, Hougaard), the University of Bielefeld (Bergmann), and the Max Planck Institute Nijmegen, Language and Cognition Group (Stivers).

Discussion lists with CA-oriented discussion are the Language-use list, the Ethno-Hotline, the German *Gesprächsanalyse*-list, or the Danish MOVIN-list. The Ethno/CA News website of Paul ten Have announces conferences, publications, and other news.

See also: Context, Communicative; Family Speak; Gestures, Pragmatic Aspects; Goffman, Erving; Institutional Talk; Sacks, Harvey; Speech Acts; Telephone Talk.

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Conversational Agents: Synthetic

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Embodied conversational agents (ECAs) are virtual humans (often life-size) who are capable of carrying on conversations with real humans. These virtual humans may serve many functions, both practical and theoretical. In the practical vein, they may act as the interface to a computer so that instead of choosing commands on a menu, one can carry on a conversation.

Figure 1 shows an ECA named REA who acts as the interface to a database of houses in the Boston area. Rather than having to type in search terms, users can tell REA what kind of property they are looking for, and REA will nod, reflect, and then find appropriate properties and describe them using a combination of descriptive hand gestures, head movements and spoken language.

ECAs can also serve as autonomously acting characters in video games. **Figure 2** shows an ECA that plays the role of a village leader that reacts to the soldier character played by the user. In this instance, the system is designed to teach Arabic in such a way that soldiers going into an unfamiliar culture learn appropriate body language as well as the necessary foreign words and phrases.

ECAs also allow linguists to model human linguistic behavior and to evaluate competing theories of

Figure 1 REA, the virtual realtor. Copyright MIT Media Lab.

Figure 2 The Tactical Language Training system: embodied conversational agents as autonomous game characters. Copyright by University of Southern California.

language use by observing them in action. **Figure 3** shows an ECA that gives directions by speaking, gesturing, and tracing a route on a map. This system has allowed researchers to discover the role of nonverbal behaviors, such as eye gaze and head nods, in grounding, or the establishment of information as shared between two participants.

In all of these cases, the embodied conversational agents are modeled on human face-to-face conversation and therefore get their meaning across by employing not just text (as do regular computers with a mouse, keyboard, and screen) but also spoken speech with intonation, hand gesture, head movements, and facial expressions. Embodied conversational agents are defined by the following:

- The ability to recognize and respond to verbal and nonverbal input
- The ability to generate verbal and nonverbal output

Figure 3 MACK, the Multimodal Autonomous Conversational Kiosk. Copyright MIT Media Lab.

- The ability to deal with conversational functions, such as turn-taking, feedback, and repair mechanisms
- The ability to give signals that indicate the state of the conversation as well as to contribute new content to the discourse.

ECAs are inherently multidisciplinary endeavors, and they have piqued the interest of researchers in a number of different fields, from computer science (and its subfields of computer graphics, artificial intelligence, natural language processing, and human–computer interaction) to linguistics, psychology, and education. However, researchers have found themselves either relying on theories of human–human interaction and language use set forth by others or elaborating their own theories of these behaviors as a way of ensuring that their interfaces share the conversational skills of human users. Thus, for example, Lester *et al*.'s (2000) cosmo character refers to the objects in his environment using pronouns, descriptions, and/or pointing gestures according to a complex algorithm based on the linguistic theory of referential ambiguity. Wang *et al*.'s (2005) pedagogical agent and Walker *et al*.'s (1997) virtual actor both rely on Brown and Levinson's (1987) theory of politeness and language use. Cassell *et al*.'s (2000) Sam virtual child character supports children's development of literacy skills through modeling the use of nondeictic referring expressions, spatial locatives and temporal adverbs according to theories of children's acquisition. Poggi and Pelachaud (2000) base the facial expressions of their ECA on Austin's (1962) theory of performatives.

In the following sections, I outline some of the linguistic issues that are evoked by ECAs and how these translate into conversational skills that allow humans to communicate with ECAs.

Sample Interaction with an ECA

REA is an ECA whose domain of expertise is real estate; she has access to a database of available properties for sale in Boston. She can display pictures of those properties and of their various rooms, and she can point out and discuss their salient features. **Figure 4** is an excerpt from an actual interaction.

Conversational Properties

In addition to demonstrating the use of several conversational modalities, such as speech, hand gestures, and head movements, REA is engaging in some very subtle human-like behavior that demonstrates four properties of face-to-face conversation: (1) the distinction between conversational behaviors (e.g., eyebrow raises) and conversational functions (e.g., turn-taking), (2) the importance of timing among conversational behaviors (and the increasing cotemporality or synchrony among conversational participants), (3) the distinction between interactional and propositional functions of conversation, and (4) the planning of how to convey a concept with maximal efficiency. Each of these properties is described next with reference to REA and Mike's conversation.

Distinction between Function and Behavior

In order to allow humans and computers to converse successfully, one cannot hard-code conversational behaviors into the system. That is, for example, it does not work to tell the ECA to nod at the user

Mike approaches the projection screen. REA is currently turned side on and is gazing idly about. As Mike moves within range of the two cameras mounted above the screen, REA turns to face him and says:
REA> Hello. How can I help you?
MIKE> I'm looking to buy a place near MIT.
REA nods, indicating that she is following.
REA> I have a house to show you.
A picture of a house appears on-screen behind REA who blinks and looks at the house and then at Mike.
REA> It's in Somerville.
MIKE> Tell me about it.
REA briefly looks up and away while she plans what to say
REA> It's big.
REA makes an expansive gesture with her hands.
Mike brings his hands up as if he is about to speak and so REA does not continue; instead waiting for him to speak.
MIKE> Tell me more about it
REA> Sure thing. It has a nice garden.
REA sketches a curved gesture with her hands indicating that the garden extends along two sides of the house
MIKE> How far is it?
REA> It is five minutes to the Porter Square T station.
*REA makes it clear that it is five minutes **on foot** from the T station by making a walking gesture with her fingers*
MIKE> How big is the house?
REA> It has four bedrooms, three bathrooms. . .
And the house tour continues.

Figure 4   Conversation with REA.

every time the user speaks because the ECA may not be able to nod if the head is already engaged in looking around the room. Instead, sometimes the ECA will want to signal that it is following by making agreement noises such as "uh huh." Instead of hard-coding, the emphasis has to be on identifying the high level structural elements that make up a conversation. These elements are then described in terms of their role or function in the exchange. Typical discourse functions include conversation invitation, turn-taking, providing feedback, contrast and emphasis, and breaking away. Then, one can establish mappings between functions and behaviors. **Table 1** illustrates typical conversational functions and behaviors.

   This is especially important for ECAs because particular behaviors, such as the raising of the eyebrows, can be employed in a variety of circumstances to produce different communicative effects, and the same communicative function may be realized through different sets of behaviors. The form we give to a particular discourse function depends on, among other things, current availability of modalities such as the face and the hands, type of conversation, cultural patterns, and personal style. Although such discourse functions have formed the object of many studies, particularly in the fields of ethnomethodology and conversational analysis, until the first ECAs, these observations had not been merged into one understanding of the interaction between

Table 1 Examples of conversational functions and their behavior realization

Communicative functions	Communicative behavior
Initiation and termination	
React to new person	Short glance at other
Break away from conversation	Glance around
Farewell	Look at other, head nod, wave
Turn-taking	
Give turn	Look, raise eyebrows (followed by silence)
Want turn	Raise hands into gesture space
Take turn	Glance away, start talking
Feedback	
Request feedback	Look at other, raise eyebrows
Give feedback	Look at other, nod head

From Cassell and Vilhjalmsson (1999).

different linguistic and nonverbal devices and the functions that they play in conversation.

   The REA ECA generates speech, gesture, and facial expressions based on the current conversational state, the conversational function she is trying to convey, and the availability of her hands, head, and face to engage in the desired behavior. For example, when the user first approaches REA ('user present' state), she signals her openness to engage in conversation by looking at the user, smiling, and/or tossing her head. Once again, this approach comes directly from the conversational analysis literature on human–human conversation (Cassell, 2000). **Table 2** summarizes Rea's current interactional output behaviors.

Importance of Timing

Behaviors that achieve a joint communicative goal occur in synchrony, and we assume that behaviors that cooccur carry meaning together. That is, the meaning of a nod is determined by where it occurs in an utterance, all the way down to the 200-millisecond scale (consider the difference between "you did a [great job]" (square brackets indicate the temporal extent of the nod) and "you did a [. . .] great job"). Thus, in the dialogue shown in **Figure 4**, REA says "it is five minutes from the Porter Square T station" at exactly the same time as she performs a walking gesture. If it occurred in another context, the same gesture could mean something quite different; if it occurred during silence, it could indicate Rea's desire to take the turn. Although it has long been known that the most effortful part of a gesture cooccurs with the part of an utterance that receives prosodic stress (Kendon, 1972), it was not until researchers needed to generate gestures along with speech in an ECA that it was discovered that

Table 2 Output functions

State	Output function	Behaviors
User present	Open interaction	Look at user, smile, toss head
	Attend	Face user
	End of interaction	Turn away
	Greet	Wave, say ''hello''
Rea speaking	Give turn	Relax hands, look at user, raise eyebrows
	Signoff	Wave, say ''bye''
User speaking	Give feedback	Nod head, paraverbal (''hmm'')
	Want turn	Look at user, raise hands
	Take Turn	Look at user, raise hands to begin gesturing, speak

it is the 'rhematic' (Halliday, 1967) or new contribution part of an utterance that receives the gesture.

One of the striking features of timing in conversation is the fact that during the course of a conversation, participants increasingly synchronize their behaviors to one another. Entrainment ensures that conversation will proceed efficiently (one of the functions that Brennan and Hulteen (1995) suggest are needed for more robust speech interfaces). REA cannot yet entrain her nonverbal behaviors to those of the listener. Human users, however, very quickly entrain to her, and begin to nod and turn their heads in synchrony with her within one or two conversational turns.

Division between Propositional and Interactional Functions

Some of the things that people say to one another move the conversation forward, whereas others simply regulate the conversational process. Propositional information corresponds to the content and includes meaningful speech as well as hand gestures that represent something. Interactional information regulates the conversational process and includes a range of nonverbal behaviors (quick head nods to indicate that one is following, or bringing one's hands to one's lap and turning to the listener to indicate that one is giving up the turn) as well as sociocentric speech ("huh?" and "do go on"). Both functions may be fulfilled by either verbal or nonverbal means. Thus, in the dialogue in **Figure 4**, Rea's nonverbal behaviors sometimes contribute propositions to the discourse, such as the gesture that indicates that the house in question is 5 minutes on foot from the T stop, and they sometimes regulate the interaction, such as the head nod that indicates that REA has understood Mike's utterance. For the most part, before the advent of ECAs, computational linguistics and work on dialogue systems concentrated on the prepositional functions of language. Adding a body to dialogue systems, however, brought home the need for the 'phatic communion' (Malinowski, 1923) or social aspects of conversational interaction between humans and machines.

Communicating Concepts with Maximal Efficiency

In e-mail, all of our communication goals must be translated into text (with the occasional emoticon). In face-to-face conversation, on the other hand, humans use every means at their disposal to communicate what they want to say. They use gestures to indicate things that may be difficult to represent in speech, and they depend on the ability to simultaneously use speech and gesture in order to communicate quickly. In this sense, face-to-face conversation allows us to be maximally efficient. In the dialogue reproduced in **Figure 4**, REA takes advantage of the hands' ability to represent spatial relations among objects and places by using her hands to indicate the shape of the garden (sketching a curved gesture around an imaginary house) while her speech gives a positive assessment of it ("It has a nice garden"). However, in order to produce this description, the ECA needs to know something about the representational properties of speech and gesture, something about how to merge simultaneous descriptions in two modalities, and something about what her listener does and does not already know about the house in question. These needs result in a new kind of computational architecture in which the planning of what the hands do and the planning of what language will do must be tightly coupled, and both must be linked to an information state module that keeps in mind the communicative goals and respective knowledge of both parties, as in **Figure 5** (Kopp *et al.*, 2005).

Research Issues

The field of ECAs is still in its infancy. Although ECAs are far more capable of engaging in human-like face-to-face conversation than they were even 10 years ago, nobody would yet mistake them for humans. In fact, the development of ECAs has allowed researchers to uncover a host of behaviors

Figure 5 Multimodal microplanning.

that we take for granted, but that must be accounted for in a complete simulation of human communication. One large strand of current research on ECAs deals with the effect of emotion on verbal and nonverbal behavior in conversation (Andre *et al.*, 2000; Bui *et al.*, 2004; Chi *et al.*, 2000; Gratch and Marsella, 2004). Another examines personality and cultural differences and how these can be represented in ECAs (Loyall *et al.*, 2004; Trappl and Petta, 1997). Yet a higher-order concern is the social roles occupied by ECAs (Prendinger and Ishizuka, 2001), etiquette (Bickmore, 2004), and relationship building (Cassell and Bickmore, 2002). Finally, several researchers are constructing frameworks for evaluating the effects of ECAs on human–computer interaction (Ruttkay and Pelachaud, 2004). This issue is a thorny one. In this article we have spoken of ECAs as both practical and theoretical constructs, and yet the jury is still out on exactly how practical they are as interfaces to computing power. Nevertheless, ECAs have allowed us to analyze human behavior by synthesizing it in a way that previous tools did not allow.

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Conversational Analytic Approaches to Culture

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Introduction

Conversation analysis (hereafter CA) is an approach to the study of social interaction which emerged in the 1960s in the work of Harvey Sacks, Emanuel Schegloff, and Gail Jefferson. Early work in CA drew upon the sociologies of Goffman and Garfinkel but quickly took on a distinctive set of methods and analytic questions specifically adapted to its chosen subject matter – the organization of talk-in-interaction (see Heritage, 1984). Today CA is practiced within a vibrant, international community of researchers distributed across a range of fields including sociology and anthropology, linguistics, psychology, and communication studies. CA is not associated with a specific theoretical construct of culture. However, the findings of various studies within CA are suggestive of an approach to culture and society as these are typically understood in the social scientific literature.

CA Methods

What distinguishes CA most clearly from other approaches is its methodology. CA research is based upon recordings (audio or audio-video) of human interaction (see Sacks, 1984 for the rationale). Analysis proceeds by unmotivated observation: that is, without looking for anything in particular (e.g., deictic particles, honorifics, talk about politics) the researcher attempts to isolate possible practices (relatively stable ways of performing actions). CA relies on unmotivated observation for the basic reason that – in working with conversational materials – it is not possible to adequately describe what one is looking for in advance of finding a set of instances (Schegloff, 1996a, 1997). Indeed, premature attempts to describe the phenomenon in the terms of some specialized vocabulary (e.g., linguistic, anthropological, sociological) often serve to obscure the very thing that is being investigated. A central point here is that a given practice need not be, and in fact rarely is, uniquely realized in a single form, i.e., there is no one-to-one mapping between forms and functions/practices. (This raises issues about the usefulness of traditional linguistic description in CA studies.) Take, for instance, other-initiated repair (Schegloff *et al.*, 1997 *see* **Conversation Analysis**). In English conversation, a wide range of formal devices may be used to initiate repair of a previous speaker's turn. These include 'open class' repair initiators such as 'huh?' (Drew, 1997); wh-words such as 'what?,' 'who?,' 'where?'; partial repeats, often with stress placed on

the specific target of the repair initiator (e.g., '**You** opened it?'); and 'You mean X?' formulations, as well as combinations of wh-word and partial repeat. So the initiation of repair is accomplished by a range of different formal devices (often engendering alternate trajectories of action). At the same time, the formal devices used for initiating repair of a prior speaker's turn may also be used in quite other ways. 'Huh?,' for example, also occurs as a tag while partial repeats may be used to confirm what another has just said. The absence of a one-to-one mapping thus goes both ways. The consequences of such a situation are various. As already noted, in terms of method it requires that analysis proceed not by searching out forms but instead practices, which, at the outset of the analysis, remain by necessity partially described. A more basic consequence has to do with placement: if a given form may serve as the vehicle for a number of different actions, how do participants in conversation figure out – overwhelmingly correctly – which action is being done with a given form? In an early paper Schegloff and Sacks (1973) described this in terms of a 'placement problem' and noted that a form such as 'we::ll:' can be understood, by participants and analysts alike, as a 'possible preclosing' on the basis of its placement at the recognizable end of talk on a topic. In the same paper they went on to formulate a powerful analytic question which summarizes the conversation analytic understanding of the relation between form, placement, and action – 'why that now?' The question, which has become the *sine qua non* of conversation analytic research, also points to the importance of working back and forth between the particular instance – and its embedding in some specific course of action – and the larger collection of which it is apart since the 'that' is definable only in terms of such a dynamical relation (see Schegloff, 1998).

Once a practice is identified, it is collected. The resulting collection then serves as the basis of an analysis. The advantage of working with a collection – is that it allows for the identification of 'deviant' cases – instances in which the practice does not (for whatever reason) follow its normal course – a 'deviance' to which participants themselves orient. Such deviant cases frequently reveal participants' own orientations to the various contingencies involved in the execution of that practice – orientations which are typically unobservable in cases which conform to normative expectations and which are therefore literally unremarkable. In the context of an examination of practices for referring to persons, for instance, a collection of instances allows the analyst to distinguish cases in which just reference is being done from those in which something in addition to this

is being accomplished (for instance, in cases where a locally subsequent form is used in a locally initial position, e.g., a spouse returns home from work and is met immediately with 'What did she say?'; see Schegloff, 1996b).

Collections allow, then, for the identification and description of practices of human interaction. A good deal of CA work is concerned to document and describe such practices – to add, as Goffman said, "another animal to the zoo." But there is also a more basic issue at stake in conversation analytic research. CA aims to understand the mechanics which underlie and organize the wide range of practices which have been described. To this end, conversation analysts have introduced a number of important conceptual tools for understanding this underlying mechanics of interaction – for instance, the concepts of conditional relevance and preference (see Schegloff, 1968; Pomerantz, 1984). However, work in this area is still in its infancy. Thus, we have very good descriptions of how, on the one hand, person reference is done in conversation and how, on the other, place reference is done, but, at this point, very little sense of the ways in which both might be organized in relation to a more basic system of reference in conversation (though see Schegloff, 2000).

Implications for Concepts of Culture and Society

In his early work on conversational and other materials, Sacks developed an approach which eventually came to be known as 'membership categorization analysis' (MCA). MCA had clear links to the work done by ethnoscientists as well as ethnomethodological researches which examined the logic of categorization as manifested in people's ordinary activities including conversation. In his well-known paper 'On the analyzability of stories by children,' Sacks (1974) examined a line from a child's story, 'the baby cried, the mommy picked it up,' and attempted to explicate how it was that a listener knew intuitively that it was the **baby's** mother (rather than some other 'mother') who picked the baby up. This he explained in terms of category-bound activities and rules for application (hearers' and viewers' maxims). MCA is essentially an examination of ordinary, vernacular logic and, as such, is quite clearly about 'culture.' Schegloff (2002) explains:

> Sacks had proposed that a core element of vernacular culture was composed of common-sense 'knowledge' about members of the society and others organized by reference to types or categories of person, categories which were themselves organized into collections

of categories – such as [male, female], [Protestant, Catholic, Jew], [adult, child], [cat people, dog people], [Libra, Sagittarius, Leo], and so forth. Such collections were empirical objects; the grouping of categories into collections might be the case or not the case for some culture. The way I just exemplified the point was 'correct,' at least for American society and culture; it would have been for this culture incorrect to have proposed as a collection of categories [male, female, Sagittarius]; Sagittarius does not belong to that collection.

In the development of CA, MCA was superseded by the methods described above although its findings were to some extent incorporated into the analysis of sequence organization – specifically the analysis of person and place reference (see Schegloff, 1996b). Early work in MCA along with more recent developments in CA hold out the possibility of research into the culturally specific categorization techniques associated with different languages and cultures (see Schegloff, 2002).

'Culture' and Conversational Practices – The Possibility of Comparative Research

On one of the relatively few occasions that Sacks discussed 'culture' in his lectures he defined it as a 'system for generating recognizable actions.' This characterization fits well with methods and research agenda described above and points to the possibility of comparative studies. It suggests, that is, that cultures differ in terms of the actions (or practices) which they generate as recognizable. Most of the work in CA has examined English conversation and a question arises as to the extent to which the findings are generalizable to other languages, other cultures, or even contexts within the same culture.

'A simplest systematics for the organization of turn-taking for conversation' (Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson, 1947) was a massively important paper within the development of CA. Not only did this paper provide one of the first systematic applications of CA methodology, it also described a very wide range of practices having to do the with the construction of turns at talk, the distribution of opportunities to speak, and the basic properties of sequence organization and recipient design. A somewhat implicit claim of the paper was that the basics of the system described should account not just for English conversation but for conversation in general – regardless of language, culture, social situation, or whatever. Conversational turn taking, it was claimed, is locally managed, by and for the participants on a turn-by-turn basis. In that sense, conversation differs from 'speech exchange systems' in which turn taking is pre-allocated. Some anthropologists had advanced alternate descriptions of turn taking in the cultures they had studied. Riesman (1974), for instance, described Antiguan creole conversations as 'contrapuntal,' even 'anarchic' and participants as having "no sense of interruption." One of the great benefits of CA methodology is that it allows such claims to be tested empirically on actual conversational materials. Sidnell's (2001) examination of turn taking in Caribbean creole conversations attempted to do just this and showed that Riesman's claims are not supported by the data. On the contrary, the basic features of the system which organizes opportunities to speak in Caribbean creole conversations do not differ significantly from those described by Sacks *et al.* for American English. Such research suggests that conversational turn taking is not subject to a great deal of crosscultural variation (and, of course, there are a number of evolutionary reasons why this might be the case – see Goody, 1995).

While a good deal of conversational organization is not subject to cultural variation, there are also many practices which are specific to a group (defined in terms of culture or language). Stivers, for instance, in examining African-American English data, has found an apparently distinctive way of expressing agreement (and alignment) which involves making the same assertion or assessment as a previous speaker but using a completely different set of lexical items and idiomatic phrases to do so. In recent work, Levinson (2002) has examined practices for referring to persons in data from Rossell. He finds that although the system is basically the same as that described for English (in terms of the underlying preferences for recognition and minimization), it is 'inflected' by local taboos that disallow the use of names to refer to certain classes of relatives. The interactional problem created by such taboos is solved by the use of eyebrow flashes as well as gaze and manual points which 'count as' inexplicit references and therefore as taboo-compliant behavior.

Social Organization and Culture as an Organization of Conversational Practices

In addition to the comparative type of research described above, a number of ethnographers have used CA to describe a social group (or culture) as an organization of conversational practices. Marjorie Goodwin's (1990) pioneering work on African-American children, for instance, analyzed the ways in which their social groups were built out of and realized within a set of practices of speaking. She found, for instance, that social groups were organized through the issuing and receipt of directives as well as the production of requests. More recently. Charles Goodwin (1994) has examined a range of professional settings (such as legal and archeological) in

terms of the conversational practices which constitute their practical work.

CA eschews top-down theorizing and it is, perhaps, for this reason that a CA approach to culture has not been either a priority or an outcome of research to date. However, conversation analytic work is strongly suggestive of an approach to culture and other topics of traditional social-scientific inquiry. If such notions are to be a part of conversation analytic research they will need to be grounded in the conversational materials which constitute the empirical base of this approach.

See also: Conversation Analysis.

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Cooperative Principle

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The Principle Itself

In his William James Lectures at Harvard University in 1967, H. Paul Grice posited a general set of rules contributors to ordinary conversation were generally expected to follow. He named it the Cooperative Principle (CP), and formulated it as follows:

Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged (Grice, 1989: 26).

At first glance, the Cooperative Principle may appear an idealistic representation of actual human communication. After all, as Grice himself has learned from his detractors, many believe "...even in the talk-exchanges of civilized people browbeating disputation and conversational sharp practices are far too common to be offenses against the fundamental

dictates of conversational practice." Further, even if one discounts the tone of an exchange, "much of our talk exchange is too haphazard to be directed toward an end cooperative or otherwise" (Grice, 1989: 369).

However, Grice never intended his use of the word 'cooperation' to indicate an ideal view of communication. Rather, Grice was trying to describe how it happens that – despite the haphazard or even agonistic nature of much ordinary human communication – most discourse participants are quite capable of making themselves understood and capable of understanding most others in the course of their daily business.

What Counts as Cooperation?

Grice invites us to consider the following, quite unextraordinary exchange:

> A: I am out of petrol.
> B: There is a garage round the corner (Grice, 1989: 32).

Assuming A immediately proceeds to the garage, secures the petrol, and refills his car, we may describe B's contribution as having been successful. By what rational process of thought was A so quickly able to come to the conclusion that the garage to which B refers would fulfill his need for petrol? Why did B's utterance work? Grice's answer: because A and B adhere to the Cooperative Principle of Discourse.

It is not hard to imagine that two friends sharing a ride would want to help each other through a minor crisis; thus, 'cooperation' in this scenario seems quite apt.

But imagine the exchange went this way instead:

> A: I am out of petrol.
> B: (sarcastically) How nice that you pay such close attention to important details.

In this second scenario, not only does B refuse to assist A in solving the problem, he uses the occasion to add to A's conundrum an assault upon his character. Assuming A feels the sting, again B's contribution has been successful. So how and why in this case has B's contribution worked? How can such a sour response as B's callous retort be considered 'cooperative'? Again, Grice's Cooperative Principle proves a useful answer. The explanation requires closer inspection of the strictness with which Grice uses the term.

The Cooperative Principle and the Maxims of Cooperative Discourse

Grice explicates his Cooperative Principle of Discourse in 'Logic and Conversation,' the paper originally presented at Harvard University in 1967, later printed in Cole and Morgan (1975), and reprinted in a slightly revised version in Grice's *Studies in the Way of Words* (1989). We cite from his final version as we assume this is the one he considered most complete. In the essay, Grice is careful to limit use of the CP for describing only talk exchanges that exhibit the following three specific characteristics:

1. The participants have some common immediate aim.
2. The contributions of the participants [are] dovetailed, mutually dependent.
3. There is some sort of understanding (often tacit) that, other things being equal, the transactions should continue in appropriate style unless both parties are agreeable that it should terminate (Grice, 1989: 29).

Though he is careful to limit the CP's application to talk exchanges that exhibit these particular cooperative characteristics, this list should not be read as an admission of great limitation. For Grice finds that most talk exchanges **do** follow the CP because most talk exchanges do, in fact, exhibit the **cooperative** characteristics he outlines:

> Our talk exchanges … are characteristically, to some degree at least, cooperative efforts; and each participant recognizes in them, to some extent, a common purpose or set of purposes, or at least a mutually accepted direction (Grice, 1989: 26).

Grice identified the Cooperative Principle as a 'super principle' or a 'supreme principle' (1989: 368–369) that he generalized from four conversational 'maxims' he claimed discourse participants ordinarily follow. With a nod to Kant, Grice identifies the maxims as:

1. Quantity (give as much information as is required, and no more than is required)
2. Quality (do not say what is false or that for which you lack adequate evidence)
3. Relation (be relevant)
4. Manner (be clear, be orderly, and avoid ambiguity) (1989: 28).

Clear fulfillment of these maxims may be demonstrated in the following exchange:

> A: Do you know where I can buy some petrol?
> B: You can buy petrol at the garage right around the corner.

Let us assume that B is sincere and knowledgeable, and A finds the garage right away based upon B's advice. It is the case then that B's response to A's question follows the maxims completely, giving exactly the right amount of information (quantity),

information for which B has the required evidence (quality), information that is directly connected to A's question (relevance), and information given in a fashion effectively and efficiently understood (manner).

But Grice knew that people do not always follows these maxims as they communicate. (What dull business conversation would be if they did!) Rather, interlocutors can fail to fulfill the maxims in a variety of ways, some mundane, some inadvertent, but others lead to what most consider the most powerful aspect of Grice's CP: conversational 'implicature.'

Failures to Fulfill Maxims and Implicature

Grice describes four ways in which maxims may go unfulfilled in ordinary conversation. The first three ways are fairly straight forward. One might **violate** or infringe a maxim. This infringement is often done with the intention of misleading; for example, one might say, 'Patricia was with a man last night' as a way of making Patricia's routine dinner out with her husband seem clandestine. One might **opt out**, making it clear that one refuses to cooperate in a conversation for some reason; for example, one may be legally bound not to provide information one has. Or, one might encounter a **clash** of maxims, facing the choice of violating one maxim or another. For example, one may not be able to give all of the information required (quantity) because one does not have adequate evidence for the information (quality).

Most interesting is the final possibility for the nonfulfillment of a maxim: **flouting** or **exploiting** a maxim for the purpose of implicating information (implicature). This case is the one in which even an apparently uncooperative response illustrates discursive or linguistic cooperation. Recall the examples with which this article was introduced.

> A: I am out of petrol.
> B: There is a garage round the corner.

In this instance, we may claim, that B – at first blush – appears to break the maxim of relation. For what does a garage have to do with petrol? Since drivers are aware that garages sell petrol, it is not long before A realizes that B has not broken the maxim of relation at all; it is, in fact, instantaneous. B's point is directly relevant. B is being cooperative in both the colloquial sense and the specialized sense Grice applies to the term. Grice's Cooperative Principle makes sense of the speed with which A is able to process the usefulness of B's contribution. A assumes B is following the maxims and would thus not mention the garage unless it had petrol.

In the next scenario, however, the exchange, and thus the rational process by which A makes sense of B's contribution, is markedly different:

> A: I am out of petrol.
> B: (sarcastically) How nice that you pay such close attention to important details.

In this instance, B flouts the maxim of quality by stating as true something for which he has specific and immediate evidence is untrue. One likely implication of B's remark is that A is an idiot for not paying attention to such an important detail as having enough petrol in the car. If A feels the sting of B's remark, A and B have exhibited discursive cooperation that resulted in an implicature directed to A from B (*see* **Maxims and Flouting**).

While one example hardly illustrates so many cases, Grice works out a number of possible forms of implicature: irony, metaphor, meiosis (understatement), hyperbole, social censure, deliberate ambiguity, and deliberate obscurity (for example, if one is trying to keep a secret from the children). In all of these cases, maxims are broken and the breaks result in specific information implied to and understood by the receiver of the utterance.

The power of the conversational maxims to describe rational processes by which speakers and hearers make sense of each other's utterances have energized many scholars of language and conversation across many fields. But, as the introduction to this article makes clear, the Cooperative Principle has not been free from serious critique.

Major Critiques of the Cooperative Principle

Problems with the Term 'Cooperation'

Despite the care with which he used the term "cooperation," Grice is regularly accused of promulgating a theory that assumes too friendly a spirit of communicative interaction among people. This charge is most commonly made in work outside of Grice's own field of linguistic philosophy. In effect, these detractors claim Grice is just too nice.

For example, Tannen (1986) claims that Grice's maxims of cooperative discourse can't apply to "real conversations" because in conversation "we wouldn't want to simply blurt out what we mean, because we're judging the needs for involvement and independence" (1986: 34–45). Tannen assumes that Grice's maxims are prescriptions that conversations must follow strictly in order to be considered cooperative. Cameron (1985) makes a similar case, taking issue with Grice's application of the term 'cooperation' to all discourse.

Cameron is quite correct in her claim that – at least in the colloquial sense of the term – assumptions regarding the appropriateness of 'cooperative' behavior have dogged women for centuries. But Cameron demonstrates a reductive view of Grice's use of the term 'cooperation' when she describes Grice's CP as an 'inflexible' and 'unproductive' apparatus that provides yet another way for both 'chauvinists and feminists' to believe that 'whereas men compete in competition, women use co-operative strategies' (1985: 40–41). Grice's version of cooperation is more flexible and less dogmatic than these critics assume.

Others have gone so far as to claim Grice **advocated** cooperation among conversational participants, believing Grice prescribed cooperation as the most effective way of engaging in meaningful communication with others.

Cooper (1982), interested in applying Grice to theories of written composition, claims that Grice advocates cooperation because

> what enables conversation to proceed is an underlying assumption that we as conversants have purposes for conversing and that we recognize that these purposes are more likely to be fulfilled if we cooperate (1982: 112).

The notion that discourse participants cooperate with each other and that they do so out of a mutual benevolence is a misreading of Grice's position on cooperative discourse; but it is one that persists.

Grice himself acknowledged the difficulty some have had interpreting his use of 'cooperation.' As a final chapter to his 1989 book, Grice wrote a 'Retrospective Epilogue' in which he considered criticism his theories had engendered. It has already been related that here Grice acknowledged that his theory suffers from a perceived naïveté. To combat the criticism, Grice adds useful information about what counts as cooperative in discourse. First, he reminds readers of the sort of utterances he seeks to elucidate: voluntary talk exchanges that require some form of "collaboration in achieving exchange of information or the institution of decisions." And, he points out that within exchanges intended to produce information or determine decisions, cooperation "may coexist with a high degree of reserve, hostility, and chicanery and with a high degree of diversity in the motivations underlying quite meager common objectives" (Grice, 1989: 369). Even as adversarial an exchange as a hostile courtroom cross-examination would at least simulate adherence to the CP.

To further explain the sort of cooperation to which Grice refers, it might help to borrow a term from classical rhetoric. The ancient Greeks used the term 'Nomos' to indicate cultural practices that defined a group of people. Two closely related connotations of the term are useful for the present discussion: (1) 'the mores" of a given collective (Ostwald, 1969: 33); and, (2) customs "which are generally observed by those among whom they prevail" (1969: 36). Nomos is not necessarily an explicit, prescribed set of conventions, but rather a set of conventions that are brought into existence by the very fact that people ordinarily follow them, perhaps without even realizing they are following a set of conventions. When American youths visit Europe, the locals can spot them in an instant by their footwear; but, in the United States, sneakers are simply what young people ordinarily wear.

Nomos applied to conversation, then, is a set of conventions, or rules (or maxims) for talk according to which a group of people ordinarily makes meaning. In the maxims, Grice believes he has found universal conventions that all people may regularly follow in their meaning-making talk exchanges. In order for such a set of conventions to function, a certain degree of at least tacit assent to those conventions is necessary. Thus, the term 'cooperation' is quite apt.

The crucial subtlety of Grice's theory is this: interlocutors do not necessarily cooperate with each other; they cooperate with a set of conventions that allows each interlocutor to produce approximate enough meanings for communication to work. This form of cooperation is not necessarily benevolent at all; even the bitterest of verbal fights require linguistic cooperation to work.

The aim for Gricean conversation analysis – and thus the CP and the maxims – is not to advocate benevolent cooperation, but to prove the rationality of conversation. "…observance [of the maxims] promotes and their violation [except in the case of implicature] dispromotes conversational rationality" (Grice, 1989: 370).

Although many have claimed Grice's writing on the CP is ambiguous and is on occasion inconsistent with terminology, this should not be said of Grice's measured use of the term 'cooperation.'

Precise readings of Grice's writing on cooperation demonstrate that he rarely, if ever, describes interlocutors as **being** cooperative. Rather, he claims that interlocutors' contributions to conversation **are cooperative.** The contributions are uttered in cooperation with a set of conventions for producing meaning. In this sense, we might think of a pair of interlocutors as each operating according to the dictates of a set of conventions (the maxims) and thus they are 'co/operators': two operators of discourse operating at once.

Consider also, Grice's use of the term 'dovetailed' in describing the state of cooperative contributions to conversation (1989: 29). Dovetailed elements are placed within very close proximity to each other, maintaining the integrity of each separate element, but creating a stronger whole. Utterances remain utterances, but conversations take flight, implicating new meaning for hearers and speakers.

Problems with the Maxims: The Haphazardness of Communication and the Specificity of Maxims

The second major critique of the Cooperative Principle has been a topic of spirited discussion among linguistic philosophers since Grice first proposed it. Grice himself identifies the problem as resulting from the thought that communication is simply too "haphazard" to be described accurately as having a cooperative end. Some forms of communication are not appropriately described by the CP. For example, as Grice puts it, "Chitchat goes nowhere, unless making the time pass is a journey" (1989: 369).

Grice suggests the problem is two-fold. First, he agrees with critics that the maxims appear less "coordinate" than he would prefer. The maxim of quality appears in some ways more definitive of information than the other maxims. And, the maxims are not independent enough: relevance, as will be shown, has been often regarded as containing the essence of the other maxims. Second, Grice's selection of cooperation as the "supreme Conversational Principle" underpinning the rationalizing operations of implicature remains, to say the least, not generally accepted (1989: 371).

In his 'Conversational maxims and rationality' Kasher (1976), claims that cooperation is not a principle that accounts for all information conveyed by implicature because cooperation may be "contrary to [a speaker's] interest" (1976: 241). Kasher offers the following example: Man A. is asked by Man B. "Who is going to marry your sister?" Man A., who knows the proper name of the intended, replies, "A peacock dealer." Man A.'s reply, Kasher points out, does not satisfy the demands of full cooperation, and the CP, claims Kasher, cannot account for a situation in which there is no cooperation. As an alternative explanation for the operation of conversational implicature, Kasher poses the "Rationalization Principle," which stems from the idea that Relevance (one of Grice's maxims) is the only necessary element to explain a talk exchange. In a later work, Kasher renames his principle "the principle of rational coordination," which states: "Given a desired basic purpose, the ideal speaker chooses that linguistic action which, he believes, most effectively and at least cost attains that purpose" (Kasher, 1977). Kasher's well

known critique thus began what has become 'Relevance Theory,' which is at its base a refinement of Grice's earlier work (*see* **Relevance Theory**). (See below for references to other work on Relevance.)

Though in his final work he admitted some misgivings and offered minor refinements of his maxims of cooperative discourse, Grice, up until his death in 1988, defended his selection of the Cooperative Principle as the 'supreme principle.'

Scholarship Influenced by the Cooperative Principle

Though critiques of the CP remain unresolved – and perhaps they always will be – there is nevertheless no denying that Grice's CP has had a dramatic influence on discourse studies across disciplines. The CP can probably not be considered definitive, but there is no denying it has proven quite generative.

Because Grice's Cooperative Principle has such cross-disciplinary appeal, any survey of work influenced by it is almost certainly incomplete. The sketch here is intended to acquaint the reader with some applications of major importance and to give readers a richer understanding of the depth and breadth of the influence Grice has had. (For more citations and commentary on work influenced by Grice's CP, see Lindblom, 2001.)

Grammar

Grammarians frequently view literal or sentence meaning as more important than any individual's intended meaning in making an utterance. Thus Chomsky, for example, has critiqued Grice's CP for being unprincipled (1975: 112) and has complained that Grice's approach to language study is behaviorist due to his focus on utterer's intention (Suppes, 1986: 121). Other grammarians influenced by Chomsky have used similar logic to critique the CP as too concerned with context.

Suppes, whose essay is an excellent synthesis of grammar studies using Grice, argues that these grammarians assume an even more closely rule-bound language governance, making their claims essentialist. Further, he argues, that Grice's CP is useful precisely because it is so context dependent. Chomsky's positivism is not an issue in a Gricean analysis because Grice's work "bring[s] out the importance of context" (Suppes, 1986: 124).

Neo-Gricean Pragmatics

Grice's influence is most apparent in a branch of linguistic study that has become known among some as Neo-Gricean pragmatics. Scholars in this

field have greatly revised Grice's maxims of cooperative discourse in a variety of interesting ways, but they have maintained the basic direction of Grice's work, especially in regard to the concept of conversational implicature. Huang (1991) usefully surveys a great deal of scholarship from well known scholars in this area, including Atlas, Levinson, Sperber and Wilson, Leech, and Horn (*see* **Neo-Gricean Pragmatics**).

As mentioned previously, Kasher developed a specific focus on one of Grice's maxims, thus establishing the field of Relevance Theory. Sperber and Wilson have also generated an important Relevance Theory, theirs influenced by Fodor's theory of cognitive modularity. According to Huang, Sperber and Wilson believe "one is always maximizing the informational value of contextual stimuli to interpret the utterance in a way which is most consistent with the Principle of Relevance" (Huang, 1991: 303). Along with texts by Kasher and Sperber and Wilson, important developments in Relevance Theory may also be found in Grandy and Warner (1986) and Tsohatzidis (1994).

More recently, a special issue of *Journal of Pragmatics* has focused exclusively on Gricean themes in pragmatic analysis. Although he resists the notion of a school of 'Neo-Gricean' approaches, the journal editor has nevertheless gathered a collection of papers that illustrates that Grice's CP and maxims are ideas that "shook the world of language study in the past century, and continue to move and inspire today's research" (Mey, 2002: 911). The special issue includes essays focused on social roles in Japan, maxim confluence among multi-lingual code-switchers, academic writing, and other current approaches to Gricean pragmatics.

The CP is not only applicable across cultures, it is also possible to use Gricean analysis to examine a 'theme' in discourse. For example, much interesting work is underway in the pragmatics of humor (for example, Attardo, 2003).

Politeness Theory

Politeness theorists use Grice's CP specifically to examine the ways in which maxims are exploited to indicate some special status of the hearer. For example, a lawyer would answer a judge, "Yes, your honor." The 'your honor' breaks the maxims of quantity – as surely the judge is aware of her title – but including the words 'your honor' implies the speaker's understanding that the judge holds a greater position of authority.

For a valuable survey of Politeness Theories, see Fraser (1990). In this piece Fraser examines politeness theories posited by Lakoff and by Leech, and he explains that both of these theories rely heavily on Grice's CP, though Lakoff reduces the maxims by two and Leech increases the number by six. The most influential Politeness Theory was developed by Brown and Levinson (1987).

Brown and Levinson's work is primarily influenced by Goffman, but they also claim "Grice's theory of conversational implicature and the framework of the maxims that give rise to such implicatures is essentially correct" (1987: 3). Goffman's influence may be seen in Brown and Levinson's concentration on the concept of 'face wants.' Their politeness theory examines the ways in which speakers and hearers use conversational implicature to fulfill the 'face wants' of higher-status participants in conversation. Like the CP itself, Politeness Theory is certainly not free from critique, but it has resulted in fascinating analysis and has generated much spirited debate (*see* **Face**; **Politeness**).

Question Processing

Several works in the area of question processing have developed from Grice's Cooperative Principle. Questions and questioning patterns can result in implicatures regarding politeness, status, and authority, and they operate according to conventions that many have build upon Grice's maxims. Singer provides a useful assessment of the study of question processing in all of its stages: question encoding, question categories, selection of answering strategies, memory search, comparison, and response (1990: 261). He identifies 'response' as the category for which Grice's CP is the most powerful.

Most interesting in 'response' is Lehnert's theory of secondary questions. According to Singer, "If asked 'Are there oil wells in Manitoba?' a simple 'no' would appear rather blunt. Instead, in keeping with Grice's 'maxim of quantity' and Lehnert's theory of secondary questions, it is more appropriate to hypothesize the next logical question and answer, 'There are a few, but there is not much oil east of Saskatchewan.'" (Singer, 1990: 273).

Gender Studies

Though above we single out some scholarship in gender studies for applying superficial accounts of the CP, there is excellent scholarship in the field that has used Grice's CP and maxims to examine behavioral and status differences between women and men. Brown, using the Politeness Theory she developed with Levinson, has used Grice to examine the sociopolitical situations of women in non-Western cultures (1990). Rundquist and Michell have looked at men's and women's use of conversational strategies in western culture.

Rundquist uses Grice to confront the "popular belief that women's speech is more indirect than men's" (1992: 431). She finds that men more frequently than women flout maxims to implicate information. Some of the purposes she identifies for which men tend to implicate information include to "give direction to their children," to "put themselves down as well as to tease others," "to be humorous," "to show themselves off to their best advantage in conversation," and perhaps most significantly for a study of gender, "to avoid direct confrontation" (Rundquist, 1992: 447). Michell (1984) questions if women often flout maxims to implicate information. She determines that women are far more likely to simply lie to protect themselves from verbal and physical abuse in a misogynist culture. For example, imagine a woman missed a meeting because she had painful menstrual cramps and because she had an important report to finish. This woman would be far more likely to claim she missed the meeting because of the report, leaving out the mention of cramps, even if the report was not even close to being the primary reason for her absence; her omission is an opting out, not an implicature (Michell, 1984: 376).

Teacher Research and Pedagogy

Studies in teacher research have approached Grice's Cooperative Principle for two important purposes: (1) to examine the discourse of the classroom situation; and (2) to establish effective pedagogical strategies.

Three valuable works serving the first purpose may be found in Edwards and Mercer (1987), Kleifgen (1990), and McCarthy (1987). The first two works focus closely on the ways in which the educational scenario highlights the need for listeners to fill in propositions implicated by speakers. Edwards and Mercer examine the ways in which children become more and more proficient in these skills through their educational training. Kleifgen suggests that teachers should look for the points in classroom discourse when students begin to predict the outcomes of teachers' questions so quickly that it is clear the students are ready to move on to a higher level of difficulty.

McCarthy's essay – probably the finest treatment of the CP from a pedagogy scholar – traces the development of a college student as he writes for his composition, cell biology, and poetry classes. Examining both the student's written assignments and the teachers' detailed responses to them, McCarthy uses Grice's CP to determine what is required for this student to cooperate as a writer in each class and whether or not he was successful. In McCarthy's judgment, the student was successful as a student because he was able to determine "what counted as 'cooperation'" in each of his classes (1987: 249). Thus, McCarthy uses the CP in a flexible, context specific manner consistent with Grice's own descriptions of it.

Other scholars with an interest in writing instruction have used Grice for productive ends. Though they are too likely to read Grice's CP as describing a benevolent, cooperative relationship between writer and reader, Cooper (1982; 1984) and Lovejoy (1987) have used the CP to positive effect in college writing classes. Lovejoy's very practical revising template using the maxims is especially useful for college students learning to write more sophisticated texts.

Professors of literature have also found Grice's CP of use in articulating abstract themes from literature. Pratt's (1977) work is probably the best known, but for a fascinating reading of Beckett's *Waiting for Godot* using Gricean analysis, see Gautam and Sharma (1986).

Conclusion

A cross-disciplinary examination of how Grice's Cooperative Principle has been put into practice clearly indicates that the CP has had tremendous appeal and influence. It is precisely the CP's flexibility and context-dependent nature that makes it of such broad value. However, that same flexibility and context-dependence has also generated a fair number of critiques that cite lack of specificity and a too-relativistic application to discourse. Thus, it seems, the CP's strength is also its weakness. Certainly a great diversity of scholars have found the Cooperative Principle of Discourse and its attendant Maxims of Conversational Cooperation useful as analytical tools toward a variety of ends. It is doubtful, however, that the notion of 'cooperation' among discourse participants will ever be universally accepted.

See also: Maxims and Flouting; Neo-Gricean Pragmatics; Politeness; Relevance Theory.

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Critical Applied Linguistics

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Doing Applied Linguistics Critically

Although the term 'critical applied linguistics' is relatively recent (see Pennycook, 2001), it draws on a far longer history of critical work in related domains, work that can be traced back at least to the early part of the 20th century. In this first section, however, I will present critical applied linguistics in its contemporary forms by providing a brief summary of interlocking domains of applied linguistic work that operate under an explicit critical label, including critical discourse analysis, critical literacy, critical pedagogy, or critical language testing, as well as both areas that have developed a critical focus without using the label, such as critical approaches to translation or language policy, and those that have used alternative critical banners, such as feminism, antiracism, and so on (**Table 1**). By and large, this work can be characterized as dealing with applied linguistic concerns (broadly defined) from a perspective that is always mindful of the interrelated concerns (adapting Janks, 2000) of dominion (the contingent and contextual effects of power), disparity (inequality and the need for access), difference (engaging with diversity), and desire (understanding how identity and agency are related). Thus, in their discussion of critical literacy, Luke and Freebody suggest that "although critical literacy does not stand for a unitary approach,

Table 1 Domains of critical applied linguistics

Domains	Key works/authors	Orientation
Critical applied linguistics	Pennycook A (2001). *Critical applied linguistics: a critical introduction*. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum	''Critical applied linguistics . . . is more than just a critical dimension added on to applied linguistics: It involves a constant skepticism, a constant questioning of the normative assumptions of applied linguistics. It demands a restive problematization of the givens of applied linguistics, and presents a way of doing applied linguistics that seeks to connect it to questions of gender, class, sexuality, race, ethnicity, culture, identity, politics, ideology and discourse'' (Pennycook, 2001: 10)
Critical discourse analysis	Fairclough N (1995). *Critical discourse analysis*. London: Longman.	CDA ''aims to systematically explore often opaque relationships of causality and determination between (a) discursive practices, events and texts, and (b) wider social and cultural structures, relations and processes; to investigate how such practices, events and texts arise out of and are ideologically shaped by relations of power and struggles over power'' Fairclough (1995: 132).
Critical literacy	Muspratt S, Luke S A & Freebody P (eds.) (1997). *Constructing critical literacies: teaching and learning textual practice*. St Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin Clark R & Ivanic R (1997). *The politics of writing*. London: Routledge	CL ''marks out a coalition of educational interests committed to engaging with the possibilities that the technologies of writing and other modes of inscription offer for social change, cultural diversity, economic equity, and political enfranchisement'' (Luke and Freebody, 1997: 1).
Critical language awareness	Fairclough N (ed.) (1992). *Critical language awareness* London: Longman.	''People cannot be effective citizens in a democratic society if their education cuts them off from critical consciousness of key elements within their physical or social environment. If we are committed to education establishing resources for citizenship, critical awareness of the language practices of one's speech community is an entitlement'' (Fairclough, 1992: 6).
Critical approaches to translation	Venuti L (1997). *The scandals of translation: towards an ethics of difference*. London: Routledge.	''To shake the regime of English, a translator must be strategic both in selecting foreign texts and in developing discourses to translate them. Foreign texts can be chosen to redress patterns of unequal cultural exchange and to restore foreign literatures excluded by the standard dialect, by literary canons, or by ethnic stereotypes'' (Venuti, 1997: 10–11)
Critical approaches to language policy	Phillipson R (1992). *Linguistic imperialism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.	Phillipson's work ''places English squarely in the center of the fundamental sociopolitical processes of imperialism, neo-colonialism, and global economic restructuring'' (Tollefson, 2000: 13).
	Ricento (ed.) *Ideology, politics and language policies: focus on English*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. 9–24.	Language policy and planning ''must deal with issues of language behavior and identity, and so must be responsive to developments in discourse analysis, ethnography, and critical social theory'' (Ricento, 2000: 22–23).
Critical sociolinguistics	Williams G (1992). *Sociolinguistics: a sociological critique*. London: Routledge. Wodak R (1996). *Disorders of discourse*. London: Longman.	''Discourse sociolinguistics, like critical linguistics . . . aims at de-mystifying . . . disorders [in discourse] . . . in the two domains of discourse, in actual language use in institutions and in the intersection of institution and everyday life. In both cases, we will also pose the question of possible changes'' (Wodak, 1996: 3).
Critical approaches to second language education	Canagarajah S (1999). *Resisting linguistic imperialism in English teaching*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.	''It is important to understand the extent to which classroom resistance may play a significant role in larger transformations in the social sphere'' (Canagarajah, 1999: 196).
	Norton B (2000). *Identity and language learning: gender, ethnicity and educational change*. Harlow: Longman/Pearson.	We need a ''concept of the language learner as having a complex social identity that must be understood with reference to large and frequently inequitable social structures which are reproduced in day-to-day social interactions'' (Norton Peirce, 1995: 579).
Critical pedagogy and second language education	Morgan B (1998). *The ESL classroom: teaching, critical practice and community development*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.	''ESL teachers, through both their responses and their silence, define what is appropriate and what might be possible in a new country'' (Morgan, 1998: 20).

Table 1 Continued

Domains	Key works/authors	Orientation
	Norton B & Toohey K (eds.) (2004). *Critical pedagogies and language learning.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.	''Advocates of critical approaches to second language teaching are interested in relationships between language learning and social change'' (Norton and Toohey, 2004: 1).
Critical English for academic purposes	Benesch S (2001). *Critical English for academic purposes: theory, politics, and practice.* Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.	''The overarching goal of critical EAP is to help students perform well in their academic courses while encouraging them to question and shape the education they are being offered'' (Benesch, 2001: xvii)
Critical bilingualism	Walsh C (1991). *Pedagogy and the struggle for voice: issues of language, power, and schooling for Puerto Ricans.* Toronto: OISE Press.	CB implies ''the ability to not just speak two languages, but to be conscious of the sociocultural, political, and ideological contexts in which the languages (and therefore the speakers) are positioned and function, and the multiple meanings that are fostered in each'' (Walsh, 1991: 127)
Critical multiculturalism	Kubota R (2004). 'Critical multiculturalism and second language education.' In Norton B & Toohey K (eds.) *Critical pedagogies and language learning.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 30–52.	CM ''critically examines how inequality and injustice are produced and perpetuated in relation to power and privilege'' (Kubota, 2004: 37) exploring ''a critical understanding of culture'' (Kubota, 2004: 38), and involving all students ''in critical inquiry into how taken-for-granted knowledge, such as history, geography, and lives of other people, is produced, legitimated, and contested in power struggles'' (Kubota, 2004: 40).
Critical classroom discourse analysis	Kumaravadivelu B (1999). 'Critical classroom discourse analysis.' *TESOL Quarterly 33(3)*, 453–484.	CCDA draws on critical ethnography as a research tool, has ''a transformative function'' and ''seeks to play a reflective role, enabling practitioners to reflect on and cope with sociocultural and sociopolitical structures that directly or indirectly shape the character and content of classroom discourse'' (Kumaravadivelu, 1999: 473).
Critical language testing	Shohamy E (2001). *The power of tests: a critical perspective on the uses of language tests.* London: Longman.	CLT ''implies the need to develop critical strategies to examine the uses and consequences of tests, to monitor their power, minimize their detrimental force, reveal the misuses, and empower the test takers'' (Shohamy, 2001: 131).

it marks out a coalition of educational interests committed to engaging with the possibilities that the technologies of writing and other modes of inscription offer for social change, cultural diversity, economic equity, and political enfranchisement" (Luke and Freebody, 1997: 1).

Probably the best known work has been in the related areas of critical discourse analysis (CDA) and critical literacy, which share a concern to understand texts and practices of reading and writing in relationship to questions of power, equity, diversity, and change. Whether as a mode of research (analyses of texts or of literacy contexts) or as a mode of pedagogy (developing abilities to engage in critical text analysis), these approaches to textual analysis are concerned with relations among texts, discourses, ideologies, and the wider social and political order. Norman Fairclough, whose approach to CDA has achieved considerable popularity, explains that critical discourse analysis "aims to systematically explore often opaque relationships of causality and determination between (a) discursive practices, events and texts, and (b) wider social and cultural structures, relations and processes; to

investigate how such practices, events and texts arise out of and are ideologically shaped by relations of power and struggles over power" (Fairclough, 1995: 132). CDA and critical literacy have also been combined under the rubric of critical language awareness, since the aim of this work is to "empower learners by providing them with a critical analytical framework to help them reflect on their own language experiences and practices and on the language practices of others in the institutions of which they are a part and in the wider society within which they live" (Clark and Ivanic, 1997: 217).

A textual domain that has received much less attention is critical work in translation studies (a minority focus within applied linguistics itself). And yet, it is clear that a focus on dominion, disparity, difference, and desire underpins various forms of work, from studies of how particular translations can clearly be read as ideological formations (see Hatim and Mason, 1997) to studies of the role translation has played within different historical formations, from colonialism to globalization. Indeed, Venuti's approach to translation takes the position that to "shake the regime of English,

a translator must be strategic both in selecting foreign texts and in developing discourses to translate them. Foreign texts can be chosen to redress patterns of unequal cultural exchange and to restore foreign literatures excluded by the standard dialect, by literary canons, or by ethnic stereotypes" (Ventui, 1997: 10–11). Such work surely needs to be included within critical applied linguistics since it is based on an antihegemonic stance, locates itself within a view of language politics, makes an ethics of difference central, and tries, in its practice, to move toward change.

Also focusing on the global hegemony of English and the need to promote diversity is critical work in language policy and planning. While much work in language policy has been remarkable for its political quietism, debates around the global spread of English and the destruction of the world's linguistic diversity have developed a clearer critical agenda. Central here has been Phillipson's (1992) accusation of (English) linguistic imperialism, and his argument that English has been spread for the economic and political advantage of the core English-speaking nations. As Tollefson (2000) explains, Phillipson's work differs markedly from mainstream sociolinguistic work focusing on the global spread of English since he "focuses on the unequal distribution of benefits from the spread of English." Rather than viewing the spread of English in positive terms and focusing on descriptions of varieties of English, Phillipson's work "places English squarely in the center of the fundamental sociopolitical processes of imperialism, neocolonialism, and global economic restructuring" (Tollefson, 2000: 13). These concerns have then been allied with accusations of linguistic genocide and the need for linguistic human rights to protect the global diversity of languages (Skutnabb-Kangas, 2000). While these arguments have raised considerable debate, especially in relation to the need to understand how the global position of English is resisted and appropriated (Canagarajah, 1999; Pennycook, 2001), the focus on the politics of language and an agenda for change clearly provide a significant critical dimension to any understanding of the dominance of English and continued linguistic diversity.

Sociolinguistics more generally has also been taken to task for lacking a critical dimension, Mey calling for a "critical sociolinguistics" that can "establish a connection between people's place in the societal hierarchy, and the linguistic and other kinds of oppression that they are subjected to at different levels" (Mey, 1985: 342). While sociolinguistics would appear to have the tools to deal with questions of language and power, the argument here is that ways in which power operates in relation to class,

gender, or race have not received adequate attention or a focus on possibilities of intervention. Some of these challenges have been taken up in work on language use in workplace settings, which aims not just to describe inequitable practices but also to change them. Wodak's study of hospital encounters, for example, looks not only at the ways in which "doctors exercise power over their patients" (Wodak, 1996: 170) but also at ways of intervening in this relationship. Other work in this domain has looked at language use in a range of institutional settings – language and the law, language in medical settings, language and education – to reveal how the complex relations between institutional power and the larger social context create inequitable but potentially changeable relations through language.

Critical approaches to language education – sometimes under the rubric of critical pedagogy – have had fairly wide coverage. As Norton and Toohey explain, "advocates of critical approaches to second language teaching are interested in relationships between language learning and social change" (Norton and Toohey, 2004: 1). As with the related domains of critical literacy and discourse analysis, critical approaches to language education can be viewed as both a critical research enterprise and as a domain of practice. Significant research in the first category would include work such as Canagarajah's critical ethnographies of 'periphery' students' and teachers' forms of resistance to English and English teaching methods: "it is important to understand the extent to which classroom resistance may play a significant role in larger transformations in the social sphere" (Canagarajah, 1999: 96); and Bonny Norton's work on ways in which gender, power and identity are interlinked in the process of language learning (Norton, 2000). Morgan (1998) and many others (see Norton and Toohey, 2004; Pennycook, 1999), meanwhile, look more directly at how forms of critical pedagogy in second language classrooms may bring about change.

Interrelated fields of research and practice have also emerged here, including Benesch's *Critical English for academic purposes*, which "assumes that current conditions should be interrogated in the interests of greater equity and democratic participation in and out of educational institutions" (Benesch, 2001: 64); Walsh's notion of critical bilingualism, which she explains as "the ability to not just speak two languages, but to be conscious of the sociocultural, political, and ideological contexts in which the languages (and therefore the speakers) are positioned and function, and the multiple meanings that are fostered in each"(Walsh, 1991: 127); Kubota's argument for critical multiculturalism, which

"critically examines how inequality and injustice are produced and perpetuated in relation to power and privilege" (Kubota, 2004: 37) by focusing directly on issues of racism – on "collective, rather than individual, oppression" (Kubota, 2004: 37) – by problematizing, rather than presupposing difference, exploring "a critical understanding of culture" (Kubota, 2004: 38), and involving all students "in critical inquiry into how taken-for-granted knowledge, such as history, geography, and lives of other people, is produced, legitimated, and contested in power struggles" (Kubota, 2004: 40); and Kumaravadivelu's critical classroom discourse analysis, which, drawing on critical ethnography as a research tool, has "a transformative function" and "seeks to play a reflective role, enabling practitioners to reflect on and cope with sociocultural and sociopolitical structures that directly or indirectly shape the character and content of classroom discourse" (Kumaravadivelu, 1999: 473).

The related domain of language testing has also taken a critical turn in recent years. In Spolsky's history of the development of the TOEFL exam, it is clear from the outset that "testing has been exploited also as a method of control and power – as a way to select, to motivate, to punish." So-called objective tests, he points out, by virtue of their claims to scientific backing and impartiality, are "even more brutally effective in exercising this authority" (Spolsky, 1995: 1). These concerns have been pursued furthest by Shohamy in her notion of critical language testing (CLT) which "implies the need to develop critical strategies to examine the uses and consequences of tests, to monitor their power, minimize their detrimental force, reveal the misuses, and empower the test takers" (Shohamy, 2001: 131). Shohamy's proposal for critical language testing clearly matches many of the principles that define other areas of critical applied linguistics: her argument is that language testing is always political, that we need to become increasingly aware of the effects and uses of tests, and that we need to link preferred visions of society with an ethical demand for transformative practice in our own work as (critical) applied linguists. Doing applied linguistics critically, then, implies an interest in the workings of power, a concern with issues of inequitable access to and through domains of language, consideration of the effects of social and cultural difference, and attention to the ways in which people are located, understand themselves, and have opportunities to change.

The Critical in Applied Linguistics

The emergence of these various critical projects has been met with mixed responses. For some, critical applied linguistics is little more than a critique of other orientations to applied linguistics; thus, Davies provides the following definition: "a judgmental approach by some applied linguists to 'normal' applied linguistics on the grounds that it is not concerned with the transformation of society" (Davies, 1999: 145). Yet it is clear from the previous section that critical applied linguistics is not so much a critique of 'normal' applied linguistics (though it certainly may engage in such critiques) but is rather a different, alternative, or even transgressive way of doing applied linguistics. A central concern in discussing critical applied linguistics, then, is what is actually meant by the term 'critical.' One position would argue that all good academic work is by nature critical, entailing an open mind, a degree of skepticism, and an ability to keep a form of academic distance from the objects of inquiry. From this point of view, it is crucial to avoid bringing one's own judgments into any form of academic inquiry. Thus, Widdowson, for example, in arguing for a "critical, not a hypocritical, applied linguistics to take us into the future" (Widdowson, 2001: 16), is concerned that by taking an *a priori* critical stance, critical applied linguistics may impose its own views on the objects of inquiry, taking inappropriate stances on the social world rather than maintaining a critical distance. For Widdowson, it is impossible **as an applied linguist** (though not necessarily as an individual) to choose between different ethical and political concerns, and thus critical applied linguistics hypocritically fails to maintain a critical distance.

An alternative position, however, turns the tables on Widdowson's dichotomy, suggesting that it is mainstream applied linguistics that is hypocritical by dint of its inability or unwillingness to grapple adequately with the social, political, and ethical concerns that inevitably come to bear on any applied linguistic context. By making claims to deal with real world issues to do with language, but by failing to engage with questions of power, inequality, racism, sexism, or homophobia in relation to discourse analysis, translation, language learning, literacy, or language in the workplace, mainstream applied linguistics might therefore be described as espousing a form of liberal ostrichism (Pennycook, 2001) in its relativistic refusal to engage with the social, political, ethical, and epistemological concerns of an inequitable world, and the tendency for applied linguists to bury their heads deep in the sand and eschew engagement with the broader context of applied linguistic work. This second sense of the critical, to which Widdowson objects, is one which draws on a long history of critical theory, and takes as its starting point the analysis of power and inequality in the social world.

From this point of view, academic responsibility requires more than critical distance; rather, it demands that we attempt to address social, cultural, and political concerns head on, with an explicit political agenda.

If a strong case can thus be made for the unavoidability of political engagement, the concern nevertheless remains that critical applied linguistic research may be blinkered by its political normativity. Indeed, it may be argued that much of critical applied linguistics operates with a normative, leftist political agenda and a conservative applied linguistic epistemology. That is to say, it follows a modernist emancipatory framework (Pennycook, 2001), bringing together a static politics based on various forms of neo-Marxian analyses of inequality and emancipation, with an equally static applied linguistic epistemology. In addition to a political focus on inequality, then, critical applied linguistics also needs a form of problematizing practice. From this point of view, critical applied linguistics is not only about relating micro-relations of applied linguistics to macro-relations of social and political power; nor is it only concerned with relating such questions to a prior critical analysis of inequality. A problematizing practice, by contrast, suggests a need to develop both a critical political stance and a critical epistemological stance, so that both inform each other, leaving neither the political nor the applied linguistic as static. From this point of view, then, critical applied linguistics maintains both a consistent focus on issues of dominion, disparity, difference, and desire while at the same time maintaining a constant skepticism toward cherished concepts such as language, grammar, power, man, woman, class, race, ethnicity, nation, identity, awareness, and emancipation. Remaining aware of the diverse contexts in which it may hope to be applicable, this transgressive applied linguistics remains wary lest the very terms and concepts of any critical project at the same time inflict damage on the communities it is aiming to assist. This form of critical applied linguistics is far more than the addition of a critical/political dimension to applied linguistics; rather it opens up a whole new array of questions and concerns about language, identity, sexuality, ethics, and difference.

Applied Linguistics and the Critical

Elder suggests that "the very existence of a transgressive critical applied linguistics which attacks the foundations and goals of applied linguistics is perhaps a sign that applied linguistics is a discipline which has come of age" (Elder, 2004: 430). The emergence of critical applied linguistics, however, has broader implications for applied linguistics than mere maturity. By drawing on a far more extensive range of external domains than is often the case with applied linguistics, critical applied linguistics not only opens up the intellectual framework to many diverse influences, but also makes old debates over linguistics applied versus applied linguistics (for example, Widdowson, 2001) little more than a red herring. As Rajagopalan suggests, we may now start to view applied linguistics as a "*trans*disciplinary field of inquiry," which means "traversing (and, if it comes to the push, *trans*gressing) conventional disciplinary boundaries in order to develop a brand new research agenda which, while freely drawing on a wide variety of disciplines, would obstinately seek to remain subaltern to none" (Rajagopalan, 2004: 410). Thus, by taking not only a broad view on knowledge but also a political view on knowledge, critical applied linguistics transcends a conception of applied linguistics as a fixed discipline, or even of applied linguistics as a domain of interdisciplinary work, and opens the doors to a diversity of epistemological influences. While Davies may lament such a position as being "dismissive totally of the attempt since the 1950s to develop a coherent applied linguistics" (Davies, 1999: 141), critical applied linguistics will always be concerned about the interests behind such constructions of coherence.

Critical applied linguistics in fact plays a crucial role in opening the narrowly defined domains of a coherent applied linguistics to a range of different theoretical positions. It is responsive not so much to shifts in mainstream linguistic and applied linguistic theory, but rather to the linguistic, somatic, and performative turns elsewhere in the social sciences. To the extent that applied linguistics remains partially dependent on linguistics, it has been hampered by the inability of linguistics to deal with the linguistic turn in the social sciences. Thus applied linguistics has been desperately slow to address such concerns. It is only recently, as Canagarajah puts it, that we have started to "redefine our understanding of the human subject. We have borrowed constructs from disciplines as diverse as philosophy, rhetoric, literary criticism, and the social sciences. We have adopted different theoretical positions ranging across feminist scholarship, language socialization studies, Bakhtinian semiotics, and Foucauldian poststructuralism. These schools have helped us understand identities as multiple, conflictual, negotiated and evolving. We have traveled far from the traditional assumption in language studies that identities are static, unitary, discrete, and given" (Canagarajah, 2004: 117). Understandings of the role of discourse in constituting the subject, of the subject as multiple and conflictual, of the need for a reflexivity in knowledge

production, are slowly starting to emerge in applied linguistics, led by work in critical applied linguistics.

At the same time that the linguistic turn has swept across the social sciences, there has also been a somatic turn, a turn towards the body. For some, the somatic turn runs counter to the perceived logocentrism of the linguistic turn, though others suggest it is more of a redressing of this imbalance so that we can see that the social order is both textual and corporeal. For Bourdieu, the somatic turn has been part of an attempt to understand how dispositions are written onto our bodies, how cultural capital is not something we pull on and take off but is deeply bound up with how we act. "The sense of acceptability which orients linguistic practices is inscribed in the most deep-rooted of bodily dispositions; it is the whole body which responds by its posture, but also by its inner reactions or, more specifically, the articulatory ones, to the tension of the market. Language is a body technique, and specifically linguistic, especially phonetic, competence is a dimension of bodily hexis in which one's whole relation to the social world, and one's whole socially informed relation to the world, are expressed" (Bourdieu, 1991: 86). Applied linguistic orientations to the body have to date generally been limited to versions of nonverbal communication, but again, as critical applied linguistics opens up this orientation to understanding the relation between the social order, language, and the body, it is starting to push more mainstream work in new directions.

Finally, the growing interest in identity across other fields of inquiry is increasingly affecting (critical) applied linguistics (see, for example, Norton, 2000). At the forefront of this focus on identity is the performative turn, and the crucial insight that identities are **per**formed rather than **pre**formed. Central to this move toward the performative has been Butler's argument that "gender proves to be performative – that is, constituting the identity it is purported to be. In this sense, gender is always a doing, though not a doing by a subject who might be said to preexist the deed" (Butler, 1990: 25). These arguments have been most influential in queer studies, where the questioning of categories of sexual and gender identity has allowed a framing of sexuality that goes beyond lesbian and gay identification and instead embraces the broader category of queer (Nelson, 1999). Cameron points out that such a position has serious implications for sociolinguistics and studies of language and gender, since "sociolinguistics traditionally assumes that people talk the way they do because of who they (already) are," whereas a performative approach to identity "suggests that people are who they are because of

(among other things) the way they talk" (Cameron, 1997: 49). The question for language and gender studies (or any other focus on language and identity), then, is not how men and women talk differently, as if males and females preexisted their language use as given categories of identity, but rather how to do gender with words. This does not mean that we do not constantly perform gendered identities through language but rather that we constitute through language the identity it is purported to be. It is in the performance that we make the difference. Again, cutting edge work in critical applied linguistics is starting to open up applied linguistics to such perspectives.

This view suggests, then, that a transgressive, critical applied linguistics has become far more than a political add-on to mainstream applied linguistics. It has now, by contrast, become the gateway through which new theories and ways of thinking about applied linguistics are entering and changing the discipline. A newly emergent approach to critical applied linguistics has superseded the static politics and epistemologies of the modernist emancipatory framework, and started to take on board the implications of the linguistic, somatic, and performative turns, with major implications for applied linguistics more broadly. It accepts that we have to confront the crisis of realist representation in Western academic life and the need for reflexivity in knowledge production, that we need to understand the role of discourse in constituting the subject, and that the subject is multiple and conflictual. At the same time it acknowledges that the logocentric idealism of an overemphasis on discourse overlooks the ways in which the social order is not only about language, textuality, and semiosis but is also corporeal, spatial, temporal, institutional, conflictual, and marked by sexual, racial, and other differences. The somatic turn allows applied linguistics to readdress the embodiment of difference, while the performative turn suggests that identities are formed in the linguistic and embodied performance rather than pregiven. This in turn provides the ground for considering languages themselves from an antifoundationalist perspective, whereby language use is an act of identity that calls that language into being. These are the concerns of an exciting new era of transgressive applied linguistics.

See also: Discourse, Foucauldian Approach; Discrimination and Language; Discursive Practice Theory; Education in a Multilingual Society; Educational Linguistics; Endangered Languages; Gender and Language; Gender and Political Discourse; Identity and Language; Identity: Second Language; Language Education for Endangered Languages; Language Planning and Policy: Models; Language Politics; Law and Language: Overview; Linguistic Rights;

Literacy Practices in Sociocultural Perspective; Pragmatics: Overview; Politics of Teaching; Power and Pragmatics; Pragmatics: Linguistic Imperialism; Queer Talk; Reading and Multiliteracy; Second and Foreign Language Learning and Teaching.

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Critical Discourse Analysis

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Introduction

Critical discourse analysis is founded on the insight that text and talk play a key role in maintaining and legitimating inequality, injustice, and oppression in society. It employs discourse analysis to show how this is done, and it seeks to spread awareness of this aspect of language use in society, and to argue explicitly for change on the basis of its findings.

Critical discourse analysis is not associated with a specific school of linguistics or discourse analysis. Many have followed Fairclough (1989) in drawing primarily on the systemic-functional linguistics of Halliday (1989). According to Halliday, the resources of language simultaneously fulfill three major functions: the **ideational** function of constructing representations of the world; the **interpersonal** function of constituting social interactions; and the **textual** function of creating cohesively structured texts and communicative events. This suits the purposes of critical discourse analysis, which engages both with the way language is used to construct and disseminate discourses – ideologically specific representations of some aspect of the world – and with the way language is used to enact hegemonic genres – specific ways of using language to achieve purposes of social domination. Fairclough (1993: 134; 2000: 14, see also van Leeuwen, 2005) added styles – uses of language to construct and enact social identities.

But many critical discourse analysts use other methods, including, for instance, argumentation strategies (e.g., Wodak and Matouschek, 1993), narrative analysis (see e.g., Mumby, 1993), forms of conversation analysis that go beyond the constraints stipulated by proponents such as Schlegoff (1997) and link conversational data to their wider social context (e.g., Ehrlich, 1998), and more. While Fairclough and others (e.g., van Leeuwen, 1996) have adapted and elaborated systemic-functional linguistics for purposes of critical discourse analysis, van Dijk (e.g., 1993a) and others have demonstrated that a much wider range of methods can usefully be applied in critical discourse analysis, arguing for a multidisciplinary approach which "chooses and elaborates theories, methods and empirical work as a function of their relevance for the realization of socio-political goals" (1993a: 252). The methodological diversity of critical discourse analysis is well demonstrated in the pages of *Discourse and Society*, which has been the key journal for critical discourse analysis over the past 17 years.

Critical discourse analysts engage not only with a range of discourse analytical paradigms, but also with critical social theory. In more recent work social theory may even dominate over discourse analysis. Fairclough in particular has consistently explored ways of grounding critical discourse analysis in critical social theory (see Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1997). Strongly influenced by Marx and Gramsci, Fairclough's work also engages with Foucault, Bourdieu, Habermas, Harvey, and Giddens, to mention just a few names. But, again, there is no theoretical orthodoxy in critical discourse analysis. With regard to the key concept of **ideology**, for instance, van Dijk (1993a: 258; 1998), sees 'ideologies' as the 'worldviews' that constitute 'social cognition': "schematically organized complexes of representations and attitudes with regard to certain aspects of the social world, e.g., the schema (...) whites have about blacks, which may feature a category 'appearance'," while Fairclough has a more Marxist view of ideology in which ideologies are "constructions of practices from particular perspectives (...) which iron out the contradictions, dilemmas and antagonisms of practices in ways which accord with the interests and projects of domination" (Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1997: 26). But this has not led to divisions within critical discourse analysis. What unites critical discourse analysis is neither methodology nor theoretical orthodoxy, but a common goal: the critique of the hegemonic discourses and genres that effect inequalities, injustices, and oppression in contemporary society.

The issues critical discourse analysts have explored over the past 20 years have also varied widely. A great deal of work, particularly by Wodak (e.g., Wodak *et al.*, 1990; Wodak and Matouschek, 1993) and van Dijk (e.g., 1991, 1993b) and their associates has focused on racism and antisemitism, and more recently also on immigration and asylum (e.g., Van Leeuwen and Wodak, 1999). The discourses of neoliberalism and their role in the neocapitalist policies and practices of governments, the business world, and other institutions have become another important focus (e.g., Fairclough, 1993, Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1997, Fairclough, 2000). But the pages of *Discourse and Society* and collections such as Toolan (2002) show that critical discourse analysts have addressed many other issues as well, including gender, education, doctor-patient communication, war and terrorism, and welfare and unemployment, to mention

just a few. The data used by critical discourse analysts also vary. Although there has been a tendency to focus on speeches by politicians, parliamentary debates, and media reports and editorials, critical discourse analysts have also analyzed school textbooks, advertisements, the books of management gurus, transcripts of doctor-patient and workplace meeting interactions, and much more. And as a glance at the contents of *Discourse and Society* will demonstrate, this work has increasingly come from all corners of the world.

Critical Linguistics

The immediate forerunner of critical discourse analysis was critical linguistics, a movement that started at the University of East Anglia in the mid–1970s (Fowler *et al.*, 1979; Hodge and Kress, 1993). Halliday's systemic-functional linguistics provided the fundamental insight that made it possible to move linguistic analysis beyond formal description and use it as basis for social critique (1989: 101):

> Grammar goes beyond formal rules of correctness. It is a means of representing patterns of experience (...) It enable human beings to build a mental picture of reality, to make sense of their experience of what goes on around them and inside them.

Critical linguists added two further steps. The first was inspired by Marx. The "patterns of experience" Halliday refers to, they argued, are not necessarily neutral. They are patterned the way they are to suit the needs and interests of those who use them both to understand and to enact their reality, and if such interests include domination, they are ideological. The second was inspired by Whorf. If different languages can encode different "patterns of experience" (and different ideologies), they argued, so can different uses of one and the same language. In a study that has rightly become a classic, Tony Trew (1979: 106–107) described how, when the Harare police, in what was in 1975 still Rhodesia, fired into a crowd of unarmed people and shot thirteen of them The *Rhodesia Herald* wrote: "A political clash has led to death and injury," while the *Tanzanian Daily News* wrote, "Rhodesia's white suprematist police (...) opened fire and killed thirteen unarmed Africans." Analyzing texts of this kind, Trew demonstrated that political views are not only encoded through different vocabularies (of the well-known freedom fighter versus terrorist type) but also through different grammatical structures, here for instance through the coding of the same event as either a noun ('death') or a verb ('kill') that, for its grammatical completion,

requires an active subject ('police') and an object ('Africans'), so that both the perpetrators and the victims must be referred to explicitly. Another key example of what critical linguists have called "ideological transformations" is passive agent deletion: if the Tanzanian version were to be passivized ("Thirteen unarmed Africans were killed…") it would no longer be necessary to name the police as the agent of the killing.

With work of this kind, critical linguists took the fundamental step of interpreting grammatical categories as potential traces of ideological mystification, and broke with a tradition in which different ways of saying the same thing were seen as mere stylistic variants, or as conventional and meaningless indicators of group membership categories such as class, professional role, and so on. Without their work, critical discourse analysis would not have been possible.

Critical Discourse Analysis

Critical discourse analysis started in the mid–1980s as a new direction in the work of Fairclough, van Dijk, Wodak, and others. As a movement it began in 1992, at a meeting in Amsterdam with presentations by van Dijk, Fairclough, Wodak, Kress, and van Leeuwen, which were later published as a special issue of *Discourse and Society* (*4, 2,*1993). The group gradually expanded and continued to meet annually from 1992 onward. Another early collection of influential papers was published a few years later (Caldas-Coulthard and Coulthard, 1996). Since then critical discourse analysis, now usually referred to as CDA, has been a fast growing and increasingly interdisciplinary movement. A first large-scale international conference was held in 2004 in Valencia. Two new journals started in the same year, *Critical Discourse Studies* and the *Journal of Language and Politics*.

Critical discourse analysis moved beyond critical linguistics in a number of ways. The first has already been mentioned: the attempt to ground critical discourse analysis in critical social theory and to articulate the relation between discourses and the social practices in which they are embedded. By the early 1990s, discourse had also become a key term in postmodern philosophy and cultural studies, and critical discourse analysis explicitly distanced itself from the dominant tendency in these fields to reduce the social to discourse, and discourse only. Concepts such as marketization (Fairclough, 1993) could incorporate both changing practices (the market practices that are now introduced in many institutions, including

universities) and the changing discourses that played a key role in this process by proposing and legitimating changes, training people in new practices, requiring them to learn new ways of talking and writing, and so on. As universities had to learn to compete with each other for students, treat students as customers, and so on, their discourses were also marketized. Job advertisements, for instance, changed from traditional forms such as "Applications are invited for a lectureship in the Department of English Literature ... " to forms such as "The Department of Law is a thriving department committed to excellence in teaching and research ... ," to accommodate the new emphasis on and entrepreneurial ethos and self promotion. Fairclough stressed the interdiscursivity of such genres. The old continues alongside the new, certainly for as long as the new practices still cause tension and have not stabilized.

Critical discourse analysis also moved beyond critical linguistics in adopting a much more fully interdisciplinary approach, studying not only texts and transcripts of talk, but also their contexts, whether by historical or ethnographic methods. Wodak's 'discourse-historical approach' set the example here, increasingly involving collaborations between discourse analysts, on the one hand, and historians, political scientists, anthropologists, and sociologists on the other hand, as well as stimulating reflection on interdisciplinarity itself (e.g., Weiss and Wodak, 2003).

Critical discourse analysis has also moved beyond language, taking on board that discourses are often multimodally realized, not only through text and talk, but also through other modes of communication such as images. Kress and van Leeuwen (1996) developed methods of visual analysis that were strongly inspired by Halliday's systemic-functional linguistics and demonstrated how these methods could be used for purposes of critical discourse analysis. To mention an example, van Leeuwen (2000) shows how 'visual racism' is realized not just by the most obvious racist stereotypes, but also through subtler methods. The members of some social groups, for instance, are never personalized, never depicted as individuals with unique characteristics. They are represented *en groupe*, often in highly similar or identical poses. This can then create a 'they are all the same' or 'you can't tell them apart' effect. Again, the members of some social groups are consistently depicted in 'long shot', which, literally and figuratively, 'distances' them from the viewer.

Overall, then, critical discourse analysis has moved towards more explicit dialogue between social theory and practice, richer contextualization, greater interdisciplinarity and greater attention to the multimodality of discourse.

Critiques

Critical discourse analysis is no longer of interest only to linguists. The work published in journals such as *Critical Discourse Studies* and the *Journal of Language and Politics* shows that social scientists from a range of different fields are actively engaging with critical discourse analysis. By contrast, CDA has received some strong-worded critiques from within linguistics. These have often been included in collections of CDA papers (e.g., Toolan, 2002) and in the prescribed reading lists of university courses in linguistics departments, thus encouraging a certain suspicion of critical discourse analysis, especially in contexts where linguistics is taught and practiced as a neutral scientific enterprise.

In one of the most widely quoted critiques, Widdowson (1995, 1996) argues that it is the business of discourse analysis to describe formal patterns 'above the sentence' and that critical discourse analysts confuse discourse analysis with textual interpretation. In a similar vein Stubbs (1997) calls the analyses of critical discourse analysts 'textual commentaries.' Like Widdowson, Stubbs mainly targets Fairclough, conveniently ignoring the wide range of critical discourse work published over the years in *Discourse and Society* and elsewhere. The text analysed in Fairclough (1989), which are often pedagogical examples to demonstrate methods of analysis in what is essentially a textbook, are, according to Stubbs, "fragmentary" and "insufficient" because they do not constitute a representative sample and do not involve the kind of large scale quantitative work in which many linguists are now engaged.

Most of all, however, these critiques take offense at the explicit social and political goals of critical discourse analysis. Widdowson, for instance, argues that texts are differently interpreted by different readers and that critical discourse analysts unfairly privilege their own interpretations. From the point of view of critical discourse analysis (see e.g., Fairclough, 1996), traditional sociolinguistic and stylistic approaches to the study of language in social life may have succeeded in describing patterns of language use and patterns of language change, but they have not explained them. They have treated them as more or less meaningless conventions and autonomous evolutionary processes. Critical discourse analysts are seeking to explain why texts are the way they are, and why they change the way they do, and following Halliday, they look for the answers to these questions in the social, economical, and political world.

Critical discourse analysts are aware that their own work, too, is driven by social, economical, and political motives, but they argue that this applies to all

academic work. Social divisions of labor have traditionally ensured that scientists and other academics do not have to confront the conditions that make the continuation of their work possible and the place it has in the wider scheme of things. Critical discourse analysts at least make their position explicit and feel they do not need to apologize for the critical stance of their work; on the contrary, by contributing to debates on issues that are of crucial importance to society, they continue the tradition of reasoned debate that has been fundamental to democratic societies since antiquity, feeling that their work as scholars entails greater social responsibilities than providing facts for others to interpret and use.

See also: Critical Applied Linguistics; Discourse, Foucauldian Approach; Discrimination and Language; Discursive Practice Theory; Media, Politics and Discourse Interactions; Politics and Language: Overview; Power and Pragmatics.

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Cultural and Social Dimension of Spoken Discourse

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'Spoken discourse' is a fancy name for the sort of language we live with in the course of ordinary life, the source from which we all acquire not only language itself but, indeed, major aspects of our social and cultural worlds. It is largely through spoken interaction with others that we learn not only what sorts of social identities there are, and how to recognize them, but in fact how to construct and present ourselves as persons. Insofar as most meaningful social action is accomplished in large part discursively, it is also through speech that we carry out much of the business of our lives.

Within linguistics, the study of discourse is frequently distinguished from other structural inquiries simply by the size and scope of the units of analysis. When one looks at linguistic entities larger than sentences, takes into consideration the organization of textual fragments, or begins to encompass turns at talk across different speakers, tools that were useful in analyzing sounds, words and their parts, or clauses become insufficient. It is in the choice of larger bodies of language, too, that the communicative traditions of specific social and cultural communities become immediately and unavoidably relevant. For what warrants selecting some particular fragment of speech as a unit in the first place? What gives it coherence and separates it from other surrounding talk?

Cultural considerations are always at work in such judgments. What makes a stretch of talk into a complete 'conversation' or 'mathematics lesson' or 'curing ceremony' or 'farewell'? Local criteria for what constitutes 'talk' in the first place can vary widely. From the beginning of anthropological attention to speech, theorists have grappled with differing notions of what is *real* talk – often highly specialized genres like prayer ('talk with God'), or denunciation and declamation in ritual or highly public settings – versus what is simply 'small talk' (gossip, a casual conversation, a greeting on the path), or not even 'talk' at all (perhaps a gesture, the babbling of an infant, the calls of animals, or the voice of the wind – for some communities real communication, if by nonhuman interactants, whereas for others even true discourse with intentional, albeit not volitional, participants).

Equally variable, then, are the sorts of participants spoken discourse admits. Discourse requires interlocutors, and these come in different flavors, not all equally endowed with voices or privileges to use them.

(In some communicative traditions, 'children are to be seen and not heard'; in others, wisdom comes 'out of the mouths of babes.') Different genders, castes, classes, ages, and ethnic identities may be differentially voiced or devoiced, and the resulting discourses will be differentially marked by what have been called 'participation frames': matrices of interlocutors, with different sorts of rights and obligations for speaking, differential access to the speech of others, and different sorts of statuses – whether recognized, ratified, authoritative, or the reverse – and stances (authoritative, indifferent, oppositional, etc.) in relation to the resulting talk.

The provenance of every piece of discourse is thus some social occasion for talk, and the textual sediment of the discourse will therefore always carry traces of its sociocultural (and political and historical) origins: why people had the linguistic interchange, and what happened (to them, between them, for them) when they did. An incidental but important consequence for research on spoken discourse is thus ethical: the identities and purposes of interlocutors may require careful treatment in any empirical description or analysis, since unlike canonical sentences, rarely are discursive fragments generated in the (relatively) neutral social and political climate of elicitation or introspection.

The social character of spoken discourse is also clear in the texture of speech itself. (Aspects of the spoken medium, incidentally, have analogues in other linguistic modalities, such as sign, a topic beyond the scope of this article.) By definition we think of the medium as verbalization – spoken words – but other sorts of signals are routinely involved. Spoken discourse routinely includes vocal sounds other than phonation, voice qualities, nonspeech vocalizations (e.g., sighs, laughs, grunts), and other noises, which may have local and partly conventionalized import (a finger snap, a clap, a stomp, a slap, even a slammed door, a tapping pencil, or a spoon on a glass). Moreover, gestures and in general motions and attitudes of the body – themselves subject to cultural shaping (think of a nod, a bow, a wink, or a shrug) and to ideological shading ('it's not polite to point') – may form a central part of interaction, coordinating the discourse itself or complementing other signaling modalities. The popular idea that one can tell where people are from or who they are by watching them interact – whether true or not – confirms how folk linguistics understands that discursive *styles* are cultural products.

Discourse is intrinsically four-dimensional, unfolding in both space and time in a way that defies

the often linear idealizations of linguistic analysis at the clause level. Discourse is also typically both polyphonic and polyvocal, combining multiple voices sometimes simultaneously and sometimes in orchestrated and partially overlapping sequences. Both aspects of spoken discourse are complicated by the sociocultural matrix in which it is produced.

Because it always unfolds in space and typically involves multiple participants, discourse can be structured in part by how interactants are arranged: how they stand or sit with respect to one another, how they are distributed in the physical environment, how they orient themselves to one another, and what sort of access (visual and aural, if not tactile and olfactory as well) they have both to other interactants and to other entities in the surrounding environment. Cultural structuring of space is thus the fundamental grounding of the resulting talk.

More insistent still is temporal structure in discourse, which always emerges as sequences of smaller linguistic units. When there are multiple interlocutors, units can overlap, be truncated, or abort prematurely. Sequences can stop and restart or can embed themselves within one another. There can be gaps, long or short. Generally time is the platform for speech, so that interlocutors can play with rhythm, synchrony, and asynchrony. Differences in temporal styles, then, can also emerge, distinguishing cultures, event or activity types, and individuals, often with value judgments and cultural stereotypes attached ('fast talkers' do not simply talk fast).

The four-dimensionality of spoken discourse merges most directly with its sociocultural underpinnings in the turn-taking system. Because there can be competition for discursive resources – the 'floor' (or its avoidance, through reticence or silence); the topic, the story line, or the punch line; authority and responsibility (and their ducking or shirking) – speaking is always a matter of politics, though the power involved may be microscopic and subtle. Who gets turns, who takes turns, and who is denied turns – and how these turns are shaped – are thus always matters of social import. Society also defines who (and what) can be addressed, who can hear, and who must not. Accordingly, there are miniature social and political structures implicit in different systems of turn allocation (contrast a courtroom or a barroom with a classroom or a locker room).

Structures of participation in spoken discourse have a further sociopolitical dimension, in that interlocutors never interact in a biographical vacuum. Their identities and personal histories, to a greater or lesser extent, public and shared between interactants, shape their talk as well as talk directed to them or around them. Some discourse theory concentrates on the mutual building of 'common ground,' or shared knowledge, between interactants in talk, but discourse begins with most shared belief already in place, legislated by prior experience (centrally including prior discourse). The sometimes covert sociopolitical structure also gives rise to 'recipient design': the fact, noted long ago by Bakhtin, that discursive 'moves' – turns at talk – are specifically tailored, in the moment, both to the purposes at hand and to the specific social personae present. Not only 'semantic' content but everything from syntax and lexicon to accent and eye gaze is part of the 'design' of talk in relation to its socially constituted targets.

There are processing consequences of the sociocultural embedding of discourse, also a product of temporality overlain by participation structures. For some theorists (Clark (1996), for example), the hallmark of talk is that it is a prototypical joint and collaborative activity that requires coordination of various kinds between interlocutors. It cannot be done alone, and to talk at all requires participants to find ways to coordinate, often without knowing exactly what is going to happen next. Both cognitive skills – the ability to infer meaning and intention, for example – and cultural routines (various 'scripts' that allow cultural experts to anticipate what will or should come next) may be involved in producing such coordination. Nonetheless, a hallmark of spoken discourse is that it is ordinarily neither preplanned nor (except in limited ways) editable, and thus it requires interlocutors to stay on their communicative toes. It is perhaps the extemporaneous quality of much spoken discourse that makes it, in Bakhtin's (1986) terms, a primary genre, a source of raw material that other sorts of language draw upon.

Spoken discourse is usually also employed for other cultural purposes: it is part of activity. Since multiple things can be happening within a single turn (Goodwin, 1981), 'parsing' discourse is not strictly a structural matter but rather requires both interlocutors and analysts to calibrate a wider context of activity and participation with the specific internal dynamics of an utterance. Such parsing is 'online' – immediate to the context and concurrent with anything else that may be going on – so that the indexical links between whatever is happening and forms of talk (the ways that speech indicates what is happening and that action partly determines the accompanying talk) are constantly in a process of revision and update. Discursive interlocutors can start off 'doing' one thing and end up accomplishing another, with multiple other 'speech acts' flitting in between.

The fact that spoken discourse ordinarily takes place 'face-to-face' also has social consequences.

Some of these stem simply from the physical presence of interactants, equipped with all their bodily trappings and sensibilities. For example, physical co-presence means that corporal expressions of a cultural milieu are immediately available for discursive exploitation and incorporation. Smell and touch can be invoked as much as sound or sight, and the orientation and disposition of bodies in interaction is usually significant for discourse, signaling aspects of participation (or exclusion) and commitment to the discursive task at hand, and is sometimes itself socially regimented (the seating arrangements at a *fono*, or a dinner table). Copresence means, too, that the *absence* or withholding of explicit signals may also be communicative; silence may do social work within conversation, as can avoidance of eye contact and physical distance and withdrawal.

Similarly, speech occurs in a wider physical environment, mapped and rendered significant by cultural treatment. (Recall Goffman's (1981) example of the outrageous hat that served as direct referent to the anaphoric 'it' in 'I don't like it.') Not only may physical objects have cultural significance for discourse to feed on (the colored and significantly textured patches of ground in an archeology dig, for example), but so may the environment be populated with otherwise invisible 'cultural entities' (the space where a historical figure's house once stood, for example, serving as an invisible mnemonic sign for the person himself).

Finally, consider the cultural wrappings around both the digital and analogue signaling channels in spoken discourse. Words and morphemes in the stream of speech are of course subject to the familiar sociocultural and historical fashioning that produces any linguistic code. Additionally, culturally specific emblems – gestural holophrases – conventionally complement or substitute for speech, and these clearly differ from one speech tradition to the next. (Think of the different significance across the world of gestures with different raised fingers, for example.) Conventions of form as well as meaning apply (a 'thumbs up' gesture is not the same with any other finger or with the thumb placed slightly at an angle). Beyond the hands, there are nods, shrugs, and a variety of other conventionalized bodily signs that punctuate and modulate the ordinary linguistic channel.

However, many analogue signaling devices characterize spoken discourse, and these, too, may be subject to cultural shaping.

Discourse depends – minimally for successful reference – on indexical links between discursive elements and contextual entities. *Pointing* is a device for indexically picking out a referent in the neighborhood (variously scaled and constructed) of interlocutors, and similar semiotic processes are involved in what Clark (2003) called *placing* – manipulating or moving entities in the environment as a way of incorporating something into discourse. Cultural convention often conditions how one is to point; e.g., in many Australian languages (and probably elsewhere), referents – even imaginary ones – are carefully located in space with respect to cardinal directions or other cultural standards. Analogue indexical devices are also typically ideologically charged. There may be socially polite and impolite ways to point or to handle things – for example, to pass them from one person to another. Speech that involves such gestures inherits properties from its component communicative acts. It also draws upon cultural conventions when, for example, the formation of 'iconic' gestures draws on local standards of 'similarity.'

A further analogue signaling device prominent in spoken discourse is gaze. Where interlocutors look can show both a speaker's bid for an addressee's attention and the other's acquiescence, although here, too, cultural factors may alter both expectations (as when people 'avert their eyes' or 'cannot meet your gaze'). Gaze can also be used to signal withdrawn or withheld attention. There are often accompanying ideologies (the admonition 'Don't stare!' or the detective's assessment of a 'shifty look.')

Facial expression more generally modulates the effects of speech: imagine an ironic smile accompanying rebuke or insult, or an angry look on top of an overpolite request. In sign languages, indeed, the face is one of the major 'phonological' articulators. In the verbal medium, of course, the most obvious counterpart is the voice, the final analogue signaling device to be mentioned.

Some speech communities conventionalize affect and emotion with ways of using the voice, and local theory may speak informally of, say, an 'angry voice' or relate a certain named voice quality ('whispered' or 'hoarse') to a particular communicative intent or to certain sorts of social identities ('falsetto' voice among Maya women, or 'question intonation' as a gender stereotype). The existence of such distinguishable speech symptoms also makes possible deliberate imitation or representation. 'Voicing' a protagonist by using his or her words and also his or her voice or bodily attitudes is the stock-in-trade of discursive virtuosi, among the most characteristic and versatile of cultural experts.

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D

Default Semantics

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It is hardly contestable that the interpretation of the speaker's utterance by the addressee is frequently driven by the salience of some of the possible interpretations. This salience can be caused by a greater frequency of a certain meaning or by its simplicity, but ultimately it rests on knowledge of social and cultural conventions or the cognitive principles that govern our thinking. Default Semantics concerns such cognitive defaults.

Before laying out the principles of Default Semantics, it is necessary to situate the default-based views in the research on the semantics/pragmatics interface. According to the traditional view, in addition to lexical and syntactic ambiguities, there are also semantic ambiguities such as that between the wide and narrow scope of negation in (1), represented in (1a) and (1b) respectively. 'KoF' stands for 'present king of France'.

(1)   The present king of France is not bald.
(1a) $\neg\exists x \, (KoF(x) \, \& \, \forall y \, (KoF(y) \supset y = x) \, \& \, Bald \, (x))$
(1b) $\exists x \, (KoF(x) \, \& \, \forall y \, (KoF(y) \supset y = x) \, \& \, \neg Bald \, (x))$

The ambiguity position, held by Russell, among others, has been successfully refuted. Instead, it has been proposed that such differences in meaning belong to what is implicated rather than what is said (Grice, 1975) (*see* **Grice, Herbert Paul**), and subsequently that semantics can be underspecified as to some aspects of meaning and require pragmatic intrusion in order to arrive at the full propositional representation of the utterance (see, e.g., Carston, 1988, 2002) (*see* **Pragmatics and Semantics**). It is now usual to talk about the *underdetermination* of sense and *underspecification* of the logical form. According to some post-Griceans, such differences in meaning can be explained through default interpretations. The level of defaults has been conceived of in a variety of ways: as belonging (i) to semantics (as in Discourse Representation Theory, Kamp and Reyle, 1993, and

its offshoots, such as Segmented Discourse Representation Theory, Asher and Lascarides, 2003) (ii) to pragmatics (Bach, 1994); or (iii) to fully fledged social and cultural conventions, called presumptive meanings or generalized conversational implicatures (Levinson, 2000). All of these default-based approaches advocate some degree of semantic underdetermination, understood as conceptual gaps in the output of lexicon and grammar. In other words, the logical form, which is the output of the grammatical processing of a sentence, does not provide the totality of meaning of the proposition expressed by the speaker.

While this statement is certainly true, and while it also seems to be true that some pragmatic contribution is often required in order to get the correct truth conditions of the utterance, it does not mean that such an underspecified or underdetermined representation need be distinguished as an epistemologically real level in utterance processing. In Default Semantics, there is no semantic ambiguity, but there is no underspecification either. The logical form as the output of syntactic processing interacts with the information coming from the property of mental states of *having an object*, *being about* something, called their *intentionality*. So, if we ask where meaning comes from, we can point to two sources of meaning: (i) compositionality of the sentence meaning and (ii) intentionality of the mental state that underlies the sentence. Both are equally basic and equally important, and hence it would be incorrect to consider any information coming from intentionality as an additional, pragmatic level of utterance processing. They both belong to semantics. In dynamic approaches to meaning, such as Discourse Representation Theory, such a level of representation, called in Default Semantics an *intentionality-compositionality merger*, has been successfully implemented and seems to be more in the spirit of dynamic meaning than postulating any unnecessary underspecifications or ambiguities (see Jaszczolt, 1999a, 1999b, 2000).

Default Semantics is governed by three main principles: the Parsimony of Levels (PoL), Degrees of Intentions (DI), and the Primary Intention (PI):

PoL: Levels of senses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity.

DI: Intentions in communication come in various degrees: they can be stronger or weaker.

PI: The primary role of intention in communication is to secure the referent of the speaker's utterance.

In PoL, the principle of parsimony with respect to the proposed levels of meaning is taken further than in other post-Gricean approaches. Instead of discerning an underspecified logical form and pragmatic intrusion, both sources of meaning are treated on an equal footing and both contribute to a common level of representation (the intentionality-compositionality merger). DI and PI principles specify how intentionality contributes to the meaning representation. In agreement with the phenomenological tradition (Husserl, 1900–1901), we have defined intentionality as the property of beliefs, thoughts, doubts, etc., of being about an object. It is compatible with the definition of intentionality that this aboutness can be stronger or weaker. For example, a definite description 'the best Italian painter' can correspond to a thought about a particular individual, e.g., Michelangelo (and be used *referentially*); to a thought about a particular individual who does not correctly match the description, e.g., Picasso (i.e., there is a referential mistake); or finally to a thought about whoever happens to undergo the description (and be used *descriptively*). In the first case, intentionality is in the strongest form: as a property of the mental state, it reaches, so to speak, a real object. In the middle case, it is weaker: a real object is intended, but there is no such object corresponding to that description, and hence it reaches a mental construct that is a composite of the real person and an incorrect description. In the final case, the intentionality is dispersed and does not reach an object.

Now, intentional mental states need vehicles of meaning, and language is one such vehicle. As a result, linguistic expressions share the property of intentionality, and hence we can talk about intentionality of utterances as well as intentionality of thoughts. On the level of utterances, this intending is realized as *intentions in communication*. Three types of such intentions are distinguished in Default Semantics: an intention to communicate certain content, to inform about certain content, and to refer to objects, states, events, and processes. In accordance with the DI and PI principles, information from the degree of intentionality of the mental state (or the strength of intending, informativeness of an utterance) merges with the information from compositionality and produces the complete propositional representation that conforms to PoL. So, Default Semantics offers a more economical alternative to the approaches founded on underspecified semantics in that it implements Occam's razor (the methodological principle of not multiplying beings beyond necessity) 'one level up.' Semantic representation structures of Discourse Representation Theory have been implemented as formalizations for such intentionality-compositionality mergers (Jaszczolt, 1999b, 2000, 2006).

The DI and PI principles, in recognizing degrees and strengths of intentions, explain how default interpretations can arise. In the case of definite descriptions such as 'the best Italian painter,' the hearer normally assumes that the speaker utters the description with a referential intention and that the description is used correctly. This assumption is further corroborated by the assumed intentionality of the speaker's belief: the intentionality is strongest when a particular, identifiable individual has been intended. By force of the properties of vehicles of thought discussed in this article, the stronger the intentionality, the stronger the speaker's intentions. In the case of definite descriptions, the stronger the intentionality, the stronger the referential intention. In the case of definite descriptions, there are three degrees of intentionality corresponding to the three readings distinguished previously: (i) the strongest, referential; (ii) the intermediate, referential with a referential mistake; and (iii) the weakest, attributive. The strongest intentionality corresponds to the default reading. This default reading arises instantly, as a compositionality-intentionality merger. Only if addressees have evidence from their knowledge base or from the context that this default is not the case does the default interpretation *fail to arise*. This procedure is an improvement on other default-based approaches where defaults have to be *canceled* or *overridden*. Cancellation of defaults is a costly process and should not be postulated lightly: if there is no evidence of such cancellation, it is better to do without it and assume a more economical model of utterance processing.

Similarly, cognitive defaults can be discerned for belief and other propositional attitude reports. Sentence (2a) can give rise to a report, as in (2b).

(2a) The best Italian painter painted this picture.
(2b) Mary believes that the best Italian painter painted this picture.

Using the representation of the Discourse Representation Theory (Kamp and Reyle, 1993; Reyle, 1993),

Figure 1 A combined DRS for the three readings of (2b).

we can represent the possible readings of (2) as in **Figure 1** (Jaszczolt, 1999b: 287):

The discourse referent *y* is enclosed by a box drawn with a broken line, which signals that *y* can belong to any of the three remaining boxes. If it belongs to the outermost box, the reading is *de re* (about a particular individual, say, Michelangelo). Placed in the middle box, it signals that Mary has a *de re* belief but is referentially mistaken, thinking, for example, of Picasso. Placing *y* in the innermost box corresponds to a belief about whoever undergoes the description, i.e., a belief in a proposition (*de dicto*) rather than about a particular individual. Analogously to the case of definite descriptions where referential use was the default, the *de re* reading of a belief report comes out as a default, because it corresponds to the strongest intentions and the strongest intentionality. So, **Figure 1** comprises three possible representations (three possible compositionality-intentionality mergers).

In addition to definite descriptions in extensional and in propositional attitude contexts, the mechanism of the principles of Default Semantics has been applied to a variety of language expressions and constructions, including proper names (Jaszczolt, 1999b), presuppositional expressions (Jaszczolt, 2002a, 2002b), expressions of temporality and modality, and tentatively to numerals and sentential connectives (Jaszczolt, 2005a, 2005b). Naturally, the PI principle will not always be relevant. The referential intention will not always be present, and even when it is, it may not pertain to the assessment of the default or nondefault status of various readings. For example, in an assessment of the default meaning of *will* from among the epistemic necessity *will* in (3), dispositional necessity *will* in (4), and a marker of future tense in (5), it is the intention to inform the addressee about a certain content that is graded from the strongest to the weakest:

(3) Mary will be in the opera now.

(4) Mary will sometimes go to the opera in her tracksuit.

(5) Mary will go to the opera tomorrow night.

The Default-Semantic account of *will* also demonstrates that modal and temporal senses of *will* are traceable to one, overarching modal concept (akin to the sentential operator of *acceptability* in Grice, 2001). And since *will* is modal, it follows that the assignment of defaults has to be reversed as compared with the examples previously discussed: the weakest intentionality corresponds to the default sense of *will*, and this, predictably, turns out to be the regular future marker in (5) (for a formal account, see Jaszczolt, 2006).

Not all default interpretations are reducible to cognitive defaults. For example, the interpretation of possessives, as in (6), is dependent on the addressee's background knowledge and the context, rather than on the properties of mental states.

(6) Peter's book is about a glass church.

Similarly, inferences to a stereotype ('female nurse'), such as in (7), are not the case of the strength of intending but rather stem from the acquaintance with social and cultural practices.

(7) They employed a nurse to look after the patient.

Such default interpretations belong to the category of social and cultural defaults and are not always of central interest to semantic theory.

The phenomenon of negative-raising, i.e., the tendency for negation on the main clause to be interpreted as negation on the subordinate clause, is not an obvious cognitive default, but here we must be cautious. Neg-raising unpredictably applies to some relevant verbs but not to others, as (8) and (9) demonstrate.

(8) I don't think he is dishonest. (communicates, defeasibly: 'I think he is not dishonest.')

(9) I don't hope he will win. (does not communicate: 'I hope he will not win.')

The important question at this point is to ask about the scope of applicability of the theory. The question of the scope of applicability can be taken in the narrow and in the wide sense. In the narrow sense, we ask which default interpretations can be regarded as cognitive defaults, traceable to the properties of mental states. Cognitive defaults are rather widespread. In addition to the examples already mentioned, numerals seem to default to the 'exactly' meaning, rather

than being underdetermined between 'at least,' 'at most,' and 'exactly,' or having an 'at least' semantics. The enrichment of some sentential connectives such as *if* (to 'if and only if') and *or* (to exclusive *or*) can possibly also be traced to the strength of the informative intention and intentionality. This proposal concerning connectives and numerals is still highly programmatic and in need of further research. It is signaled here in order to shed some light on possible applications of cognitive defaults. In the wide sense, Default Semantics also comprises social and cultural defaults simply by assigning them an epistemological status that has nothing to do with the compositionality-intentionality merger.

To sum up: Default Semantics postulates a level of utterance interpretation called a compositionality-intentionality merger and thereby significantly decreases the role of underspecification in semantic theory. It distinguishes cognitive defaults and intention-based degrees of departures from these defaults, triggered by the addressee's knowledge base and the context. The theory also acknowledges the existence of social and cultural defaults whose source lies beyond semantics proper.

See also: Grice, Herbert Paul; Implicature; Neo-Gricean Pragmatics; Pragmatics and Semantics; Semantics-Pragmatics Boundary.

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Deixis and Anaphora: Pragmatic Approaches

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'Deixis' is generally understood to be the encoding of the spatiotemporal context and subjective experience of the encoder in an utterance. Terms such as *I, here,* *now*, and *this* – the so-called 'pure deictic terms' – are heavily context dependent and represent a kind of cognitive center of orientation for the speaker. What, for instance is *here* for me, may be *there* for you. Clearly such terms pose problems in terms of both reference and meaning, and standard accounts have attempted to find a middle ground between

lexical and pragmatic meaning (see Green, 1995). The difference between 'anaphora' and deixis is fairly straightforward again in standard accounts (see Jarvella and Klein, 1982), but an increasing pragmatic emphasis has made the distinction between the two less easy to define. In standard accounts, anaphora is seen as much more of an intralinguistic or intrasentential element. Consider the following sentences:

> That man is very tall. He must have trouble buying clothes.

The deictic expression *that man* must be given a pragmatic interpretation, while the pronoun *he* is said to 'refer back' to the foregoing element. But as we shall see, the issue is not so simple.

Anaphora is generally understood to be the process whereby a linguistic element is interpreted derivatively from a foregoing unit – its 'antecedent.' Although it covers a range of expressions that the speaker may use in referring and picking out the intended referent, research has focused almost exclusively on pronominal referring expressions in discourse, for example:

> Fred came into the room. He sat down.

The theory of anaphora deals with the relationship between *he*, *Fred*, and the objects that these elements describe or pick out. The most problematic and interesting of anaphoric phenomena are those that are crosssentential or discourse based. In the taxonomy of Hankamer and Sag (1977), the antecedent is not considered to be crucial, and where it is not explicitly stated, the process is known as 'pragmatically controlled anaphora.' However, this is not central to the kind of pragmatic approaches that have recently been explored and indeed is close to what Halliday and Hasan (1986) and Brown and Yule (1983) would call 'exophoric' reference.

Pragmatic approaches to anaphora are part of a larger set of (sometimes conflicting) theories that Breheny (2002) calls 'nondynamic.' Within these non-dynamic approaches there are two subsections: 'linguistic' and 'pragmatic' approaches, the latter including what has come to be known as (following Cooper, 1979) 'E-type approaches'. A nondynamic linguistic approach to the above example would stipulate that the pronoun in the second sentence is bound to the noun phrase in the first. However, one can still promote a 'linguistic' approach without the idea of crosssentential binding. In this approach, the pronoun serves as a proxy for a definite description and would therefore easily be accommodated within Hankamer and Sag's model. The relationship between antecedent and pronoun is not so much syntactic as paradigmatic; the pronoun deputizes for the noun phrase. Linguistic approaches nevertheless agree that some linguistic rule enables the description to be recovered, whether due to semantic or syntactic considerations (Heim, 1990; Neale, 1990) (*see* **Semantics-Pragmatics Boundary**).

Pragmatic approaches stress the absence of any generalized linguistic rule that would account for the recovery and interpretation of descriptions in anaphoric contexts. Rather, any principles about the process of recovery must be inferred from more general principles about discourse organization and context (*see* **Principles and Rules**). Consider the following example from Breheny (2002):

> A man who walked in the park whistled.

Putting aside for the moment whether this is an appropriate sentence for analysis (that is, whether it is pragmatically plausible), two problems are evident here. The first is the problem of uniqueness, a particular difficulty when the antecedent is an indefinite (*a man*). In the model of Evans (1977) there must necessarily be only one man walking in the park; in other words, *a man* cannot be a disguised plural, giving rise to an 'attributive' (after Donnellan, 1978) reading of the phrase *a man who*. What linguistic rule tells us that this is so? The past tense of the verb *whistled* leads us away from any notions of generality as they tend to occur in timeless present contexts (*A man walking in the park whistles*). However, this by no means counts as a linguistic rule and is more readily interpreted through pragmatic means.

Another problem arises with contradictions. Again, consider the following from Breheny (2002):

> A: Last night I met a Cabinet minister.
> B: She was not a Cabinet minister.

Here, B does not ascribe to the description the property that A thinks it has. The pragmatic approach would have to rely on the notion of 'implicit content' to interpret this exchange. The proposition expressed by A cannot depend on the actual state of the referent. Clearly, pragmatic approaches can neatly sidestep both the uniqueness and contradiction problems, but they do so at a cost. The way the utterances are interpreted does not seem to rely upon any generalized notions of either discourse organization or contextualization. Rather, there is at most a general assumption about implicit communication, and we have no way of predicting which interpretation is correct or at least the most salient. As Breheny notes, this has led many to look further for some kind of **linguistic** rule; but there is no reason to suppose that because pragmatic rules are difficult to locate there must be a more formal linguistic answer (*see* **Constraint, Pragmatic**).

Where a pronoun is apparently bound to an indefinite expression without restriction, certain difficulties

arise, as in the following example (the so-called 'donkey anaphora'):

Every farmer who owns a donkey beats it.

The problem for nonpragmatic accounts of anaphora here is that the indefinite (with its *wh*-clause) bound to the pronoun (*every farmer who owns a donkey*) is a quantificational noun phrase that actually has the pronoun in its scope.

Pronouns with definites as antecedents would appear to offer less of a challenge to pragmatic approaches, as in the earlier-cited example of *Fred came into the room. He sat down.* The traditional approach is to regard the pronoun as 'coreferring' to the name *Fred*, thus tying the pronoun variable to the noun phrase constant. But this makes the pronominal reference purely intralinguistic (as an element of 'cohesion') and wholly dependent upon its antecedent. A more pragmatic approach would be to see the pronoun as referring in a different way to that which *Fred* refers to. Just how different and in what way is difficult to specify, but certainly this approach makes pronominal reference of this kind very similar to deictic or exophoric reference; the line between deixis and anaphora is blurred. A problem with the traditional approach, which we might call the 'binding' or 'cohesive' approach, is that in indefinite contexts, what appears to be a straightforward binding of a quantificational expression and a variable (pronoun) does not represent a rule that can be generalized to a meaningful degree. In crosssentential examples such as *I had ten marbles but dropped them. I found nine. It had rolled under the sofa,* because the pronoun is not properly bound to its antecedent, there is no plausible interpretation. However, in the following example from Breheny, *Every boy left school early. He went to the beach,* the pronoun seems to convert the universal quantifier into an existential one.

There is a considerable body of work devoted to promoting pragmatic approaches to anaphoric interpretations (*see* **Pragmatic Presupposition**). In general these works share the view that anaphoric reference is interpreted by means of a range of inferential strategies. This is essentially a neo-Gricean approach, as evident in the work, particularly, of Huang (1994), who employs Gricean principles proposed by Levinson (1987) (*see* **Grice, Herbert Paul**; **Neo-Gricean Pragmatics**).

Much of the debate hinges on the very nature of pronouns and their contexts. Pronouns do not contain what is traditionally thought of as 'descriptive material,' and yet they are used to refer precisely to that material. This has led quite naturally to theories of anaphoric behavior broadly deemed 'substitutional.' Perhaps the most radical attack on these approaches was presented by Jones (1995), who declared the phenomenon of anaphora and its attendant substitution theories a 'hoax.' For Jones, reference is not an intrinsic property of particular language units and therefore not a property that some units have more than others. Broadly pragmatic, Jones's theory sees reference as a contextualized communicative action expressed in and through the properties of an utterance as a whole. Since, for Jones, what is referred to by speakers is outside and beyond the means used to refer to it, there is no possibility of any linguistic constraints on reference. Such a radical view represents the ultimate pragmatic position, but most theorists have been content with a compromise, whereby linguistic elements routinely prompt a number of interpretive strategies. However, such a compromise is rarely satisfactory and often results in a weakened pragmatics, wherein what appears to be a contextual rule is in fact no more than a linguistic one, dressed up in the language of Gricean or neo-Gricean pragmatics (*see* **Metapragmatics**).

Furthermore, there seems to be evidence that anaphoric pronouns are not merely interpreted in a pragmatic fug of inferencing, but are, after all, subject to certain constraints. Jones's view therefore throws too much onto context and pragmatics; after all, if there were no constraints or intralinguistic rules, we would not be able to make the right kinds of inferences (*see* **Context, Communicative**; **Constraint, Pragmatic**).

As Heim states:

...there are data which seem to point to the existence of tighter and somehow more 'syntactic' limitations on the range of reading that actually emerge (p. 165).

Deixis is much more easily subsumed under a pragmatic theory. Traditional accounts make a distinction between the indexical and symbolic meanings of deictic terms. The symbolic meaning of a deictic term might be said to be its semantic aspect, while the indexical meaning is its pragmatic aspect. For example, the expression *here* might be said to have a symbolic aspect roughly glossed as proximity to the speaker, while the indexical aspect would be the precise location to which *here* was referring. The terms 'indexical' and 'symbolic,' then, have much in common with the Fregean concepts of 'reference' and 'sense' (*see* **Frege, Friedrich Ludwig Gottlob**). But the semantic aspect is so vague in certain contexts that many have felt that it cannot really be said to have any bearing on interpretation. Nunberg (1993) in particular has shown that, just as the indexical meanings of deictic terms change according to the

contexts in which they occur, so too do the symbolic meanings (*see* **Indexicality: Theory**). This breaking down of traditional binarism has had important implications for pragmatic theory. Emphasis has shifted from the meaning and reference of terms in possible contexts to consideration of the cognitive methods that addressees employ in the interpretation of utterances. Pragmatic approaches have in general attempted to blur the line between deixis and anaphora, but the tendency to see one element (deixis) as essentially exophoric and the other (anaphora) as intralinguistic remains.

See also: Constraint, Pragmatic; Context, Communicative; Frege, Friedrich Ludwig Gottlob; Grice, Herbert Paul; Indexicality: Theory; Metapragmatics; Neo-Gricean Pragmatics; Pragmatic Presupposition; Principles and Rules; Semantics-Pragmatics Boundary.

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Dialogism, Bakhtinian

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'Dialogism' (along with 'prosaics') is one of two commonly used cover terms to describe the main theories of the Russian scholar Mikhail Bakhtin (1895–1975) about language, literature, culture, and the psyche. The theories also occur in the works of Bakhtin's colleagues and disciples, Valentin Voloshinov and Pavel Medvedev, who tried to reconcile them with Marxism, which Bakhtin did not do (*see* **Bakhtin, Mikhail Mikhailovich; Voloshinov, Valentin Nikolaevich**).

Dialogism describes an approach to culture in terms of dialogue, but Bakhtin used the term 'dialogue' to mean different things over the course of his long career. The term was central to his early study of Dostoevsky, *Problems of Dostoevsky's poetics* (1929), whose fifth chapter outlines a general theory of language in terms of dialogue. During the 1930s, Bakhtin developed his theory of language and applied it to his study of literary genres. He praised the novel as the most dialogic, and therefore the most realistic, literary genre. In the 1960s and 1970s, he extended some brief comments in his earlier works to suggest a dialogic approach to culture as a whole.

Because Bakhtin's usage of the term constantly changed, inconsistencies, sometimes amounting to flat contradictions, appear in his own writings and in those of his followers and explicators. 'Dialogic' in one sense may be opposed to monologic, but in another sense it may not allow for the existence of the monologic. Among Bakhtin's explicators, dialogue is often confused with Hegelian or Marxist dialectics, despite Bakhtin's explicit and vehement contrast of

the two concepts. It is therefore worthwhile to distinguish which sense of 'dialogue' one has in mind. Among the many that appear in Bakhtin's works, three principal usages stand out most clearly.

1. 'Dialogue' in the first sense describes a general approach to language. Bakhtin contended that linguists have been mistaken in taking the sentence as the fundamental unit of language. To mean anything, and be part of language as it actually exists, a sentence must be transformed into an utterance, which is a part of a specific dialogue. Language is a matter of people speaking to each other on specific occasions for specific purposes, and many features of language will be overlooked if one focuses on the sentence. To be sure, linguists, when necessary, "smuggle into" their analyses of sentences some features of 'dialogue,' but they do not fully understand 'dialogue' or take it as their point of departure.

In this use of the term, all utterances are, by definition, dialogic. Sentences, so to speak, hang in the air; they have the potential to become parts of a dialogue if they are 'embodied.' A particular person must say the sentence to someone for a particular reason at a given moment. If that person should use the same sentence (such as, *What time is it?*) on a different occasion, its meaning will be different. Sentences are repeatable, but utterances in dialogue are not, because each moment and each dialogic exchange differs from every other. Another way Bakhtin expresses this point is saying that utterances, unlike sentences, possess 'addressivity'; they must be addressed to someone in order to exist as utterances at all, and this act of addressing shapes them from the outset (*see* **Addressivity**).

Speakers do not first formulate sentences and then utter them, and listeners do not just happen to hear them and passively decode them. The dialogic exchange does not resemble the delivery of a letter by post or the encoding and decoding of a message in Morse code. Rather, the listener actively shapes the utterance from the beginning. The speaker takes into account the listener's status, knowledge, beliefs, and values; anticipates possible responses; and shapes his or her utterance accordingly. If the listener is present and begins to react visibly to the utterance (which may be much longer than a single sentence) while it is being uttered, the speaker may shift its tone, style, and choice of words as he speaks. In a real sense, then, the speaker and listener are co-creators of the utterance during each dialogue. The utterance belongs to the speaker alone only in a purely physiological sense.

Similarly, every dialogue is about something, and whatever it is about has been discussed before. The topic is 'already spoken about' and words sometimes seem to carry with them the earlier contexts of their usage. At times, the word may be dense with remembered contexts, and the utterance has to weave its way among earlier uses, agreeing with some, parrying others, indicating ambivalent relations to many more. Thus, the dialogic aspect of utterances pertains not only to the present exchange in which they take part but also to the orientation of speakers and listeners to earlier dialogues on the same topic. Each dialogue is in dialogue with its predecessors.

Bakhtin understood the psyche to be largely linguistic in nature, by which he meant that we think in terms of dialogues. We address others silently, and the others who figure most prominently in our inner dialogues, the ones we address most often and whose imagined responses count the most, in large part define who we are. Moreover, some expressions prominent in our culture may exist within us as simply authoritative words that we hold at a reverential distance and do not question, whereas other ways of speaking are more or less appropriated by us until they become our own. We make ourselves by gradually choosing among the meaning-laden ways of speaking given by our culture.

Each dialogic exchange is unique, but dialogues fit into patterns. It would be impossible to define all the presuppositions about meaning, fact, and purpose that enter into every speech exchange, and so we use templates, or what Bakhtin calls 'speech genres,' to get started. Each speech genre, whether it defines the purchase of a railway ticket, the psychological novel, or the exchange in a psychoanalytic session, pertains to a specific kind of dialogue, which speaker and listener (or writer and reader) may modify in the course of using it. Any given language – say, English or Russian – contains not only grammar, syntax, and vocabulary, but also, if we conceive of language dialogically, a set of speech genres. Those genres differ from language to language, and so people who know a language from study in school may still find themselves misunderstood or uncomprehending because they do not know that language's speech genres. Genres change over time. They alter according to the pressure of many individual dialogues and so represent essentially cultural transitions. They are a drive belt from experience to language. Moreover, individual words may carry with them the 'aura' of the context in which they are typically used. What is often described as a word's 'connotation' is in fact the trace of a speech genre (*see* **Genre and Genre Analysis**).

2. 'Dialogue' in the second sense refers to a specific type of dialogue (in the first sense). In the second sense of the term, not all utterances are dialogic; some are 'monologic.' A monologic utterance is directly

oriented towards its topic and purpose. Although the words it uses may be shown to carry the traces of earlier dialogues, those traces do not constitute part of the utterance's 'task.' If heard, they would interfere with it. The speaker wants only one speech center, his own, to be heard and attended to. By contrast, we may (in the simplest case) cite someone else's words – the person before one or some generally known quotation – with an ironic intonation. In that case, the speaker has taken another's utterance and given a new semantic direction to it. The utterance's task depends on the listener hearing two speech centers, that of the original utterance and that of the present speaker. When an utterance depends on our sensing two speech centers in interaction, we have a 'double-voiced word,' and each double-voiced word is dialogic in the second sense. That is, within a single utterance, an entire dialogue resounds (*see* **Irony; Narrativity and Voice**).

Double-voiced words are immensely various. They are of course present in each case of reported speech, of covert or overt citation, and of stylization or parody. But they are much more widespread and various than that. An utterance may, so to speak, glance over its shoulder at a possible response and incorporate an ironic answer to that response. To understand such an utterance, we must see its double-voicedness. Double-voiced words figure in the psyche as well, and they complicate our inner speech (*see* **Reported Speech: Pragmatic Aspects**).

Drawing on Dostoevsky's novels, Bakhtin offers a catalogue of double-voiced words and mentions a number of them that occur in daily life. Each of these would be misunderstood if analyzed solely in terms of traditional linguistics, because their defining characteristic is the presence of two speech centers. Sometimes a cited word may even seem to overwhelm the citing one and bend it to its own purpose. Various forms of mental pathology may involve the activity of internalized hostile double-voicedness. An antipathetic other mocks our inner voice as we think.

In Bakhtin's view, the realist novel makes the most extensive use of dialogue in the second sense. Novels dialogize whole world views, as they are represented by the particular ways of speaking of given professions, generations, subcultures, and many other groups. Bakhtin calls the many different, value-laden ways of speaking in a given language 'languages of heteroglossia.' Novels dialogize heteroglossia, and so force the differing parts of a culture to confront each other. An apparently straightforward passage of novelistic prose may in fact contain complex implicit dialogues. Though spoken in the third person, the passage may in fact paraphrase what a given character would say in her own distinct language; that paraphrase may be implicitly subjected to an authorial commentary. Or we may hear how those words would sound to another character not present and so detect dialogues that might happen. If these characters' ways of speaking also reflect different languages of heteroglossia, then whole world views may be brought into interaction. Prior to Bakhtin, such effects, though sensed, could only be described by the catch-all term 'irony.' The concept of dialogue thus allowed Bakhtin to demonstrate the complex art behind novelistic prose and one reason that novels seem to offer both subtle social commentary and an especially rich sense of the individual psyche (*see* **Literary Pragmatics; Pragmatics of Reading**).

3. 'Dialogue' in the third sense refers to a world view. If we imagine that what happens in an especially rich dialogue characterizes the world as a whole, we may understand life itself dialogically. To live means to engage in dialogue, and all cultural activity is a giant symposium. In the richest dialogues, the interaction of speakers may lead to insights that neither had before, and so dialogue may be genuinely creative. It manifests 'surprisingness' (*see* **Conspicuity**). That is, it is one source of the world's indeterminism. Bakhtin thus used dialogue as an image of why a deterministic view of life is mistaken and why free choice is real. Dialogue therefore became part of his lifelong agenda to demonstrate the meaningfulness of ethical responsibility (literally, 'answerability' in Russian). If the world were simply the execution of ready-made causal chains, it would contain no freedom and so no responsibility. It would be a dead thing. But dialogue belies this view of the world and allows us to see that nothing in it is final or already given. Because it allows for the genuinely new and surprising, dialogue makes the present moment matter. In one rather vague passage, Bakhtin states that there is even a kind of truth that is essentially dialogic. Such truth cannot be paraphrased as a single, monologic utterance. The Socratic dialogues partially represent this sense of truth and it is fully present in Dostoevsky. Numerous critics have pointed out that this third concept of dialogue relates closely to Bakhtin's theology, to the dialogue between God and man, and perhaps, to the dialogue among the persons of the Trinity. This interpretation may be rejected by one who still accepts Bakhtin's account of dialogue in the first sense and second sense.

See also: Addressivity; Bakhtin, Mikhail Mikhailovich; Conspicuity; Genre and Genre Analysis; Irony; Literary Pragmatics; Narrativity and Voice; Pragmatics of Reading; Voloshinov, Valentin Nikolaevich.

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Discourse Anaphora

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Introduction

Discourse anaphora is a means of managing the memory representation of the discourse being constructed by the speech participants on the basis of a cotext as well as a relevant context (for further details of this view, see Cornish, 1999, 2003; but *see also* **Deixis and Anaphora: Pragmatic Approaches** in the present volume, for somewhat different perspectives). Where discourse is concerned, it is clear that not all referents will have been introduced via an explicit textual antecedent; it is also possible for them to be evoked 'obliquely' in terms of an association or a (stereotypical) inference of some kind (see especially example (1), which follows).

This article takes what might be termed a 'discourse–cognitive' view of anaphoric reference, rather than a textual–syntactic one. The use and interpretation of nonbound anaphors – that is, anaphoric expressions whose interpretation is not determined primarily by features of the clause in which they occur – require not only a relevant cotext as well as context, but also, crucially, a psychologically salient representation of the discourse evoked via what in previous work I have called the antecedent-trigger (an utterance token, gesture, or percept). See the section titled 'The Antecedent-Trigger' for a discussion of this term.

Some Useful Concepts and Distinctions in the Study of Indexical Reference: 'Anaphora,' 'Deixis,' and 'Textual/Discourse Deixis'

Let us start by drawing the more fundamental distinction between the dimensions of *text* and of *discourse* (*see* **Understanding Spoken Discourse**). Very briefly, *text* refers to the ongoing physical, perceptible trace

of the discourse partners' communicative or expressive activity. This includes not only the verbal content of an utterance, but also prosody, pausing, semiotically significant gestures (nonverbal signals), and of course punctuation, layout, and other graphic devices in the written form of language (*see* **Text and Text Analysis**). The addressee or the reader exploits these textual features in order to infer the *discourse* being coconstructed by the participants. *Discourse* in this sense refers to the hierarchically structured product of the constantly evolving sequence of utterance, illocutionary, propositional, and indexical acts jointly performed by the discourse partners (see, for an illustration, representation (7) of the discourse corresponding to text (5)). This product is, of course, partly determined by the context invoked (*see* **Text World Theory** for a similar conception of discourse).

Discourse anaphora, then, constitutes a procedure (realized via the *text*) for the recall of some item of information previously placed in discourse memory and already bearing a minimal level of attention activation. It is essentially a procedure for the orientation of the interlocutor's attention, which has as essential function the *maintenance* of the high level of activation that characterizes a discourse representation already assumed to be the subject of an attention focus by the interlocutor at the point of utterance. It is not only the anaphoric expression that is used (typically, a third-person pronoun) that realizes (discourse) anaphora, but also the clause in which it occurs as a whole. This predicational context acts as a kind of 'pointer,' orienting the addressee toward the part of the discourse representation already cognitively activated and which will make it possible to extend in terms of an appropriate coherence relation (see Kleiber, 1994: Ch. 3).

(1) [*Fragment of dialogue in film*:]*Woman*: "Why didn't you write to me?" *Man*: "I did . . ., started to, but I always tore '*em* up." (Extract from the film *Summer Holiday*. Figure (5.5) from Cornish F (1999). *Anaphora, Discourse and Understanding. Evidence from English and French*. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 157. By permission of Oxford University Press (URL www.oup.com). Also reprinted as example (6d), p. 204 from Cornish (2005) by permission of John Benjamins Publishing Company.)

In (1), an instance of indirect anaphora, it is the illocutionary point of the woman's initial question, which bears on the nonexistence of a letter or letters that she had expected the man to write to her, together with the lexical–semantic structure of

the verbal predicate *write* (in the sense "engage in correspondence"), that provides an interpretation for the unstressed pronoun '*em* in the third conjunct of the man's reply. The example clearly shows the extent to which inferences based on existing discourse representations, lexical, and general knowledge are mobilized in the operation of discourse anaphora, which clearly does not require the copresence of an explicit textual antecedent, under the traditional cotextual account of anaphora, in order to exist (see also Blackwell, 2003, in connection with a study of Spanish conversations and spoken narratives, and Ziv, 1996).

Here is an example involving different possible continuations of the antecedent-trigger predication in terms of distinct anaphoric predications:

(2) Jason$_i$ witnessed a terrible accident$_j$ yesterday$_k$ at the Dunton crossroads$_l$. *He$_i$* was very shaken/*It$_j$* resulted in two deaths/#*It$_k$* was dull and overcast/?#*It$_l$*/*The place$_l$* is a known danger-spot.

Note: Subscripted letters indicate identity or otherwise of the intended referents of the expressions so marked. In (2), the first two argument referents introduced ('Jason' and 'the terrible accident Jason witnessed the day before the utterance of (2)') may be naturally continued via unaccented pronouns – but not the scenic referent 'the day before utterance time,' nor (or at least, not as easily as with the first two entity referents evoked) 'the Dunton crossroads,' which is expressed by an adjunct and which serves as a locative frame of reference for the situation evoked as a whole (see also the point made in regard to certain natural Spanish conversational data by Blackwell, 2003: 118, 122–3). The slashes here are meant to indicate alternative continuations of the initial sentence. The crosshatch preceding an example is intended to signal that, as a potential utterance, it is unnatural in the context at hand. Example (2) is intended to be discourse-initial, and not part of an earlier, ongoing discourse.

Deixis, on the other hand (*see* **Deixis and Anaphora: Pragmatic Approaches**), is a procedure that relies on the utterance context to redirect the interlocutor's attention toward something associated with this context (hence that is potentially familiar to him or her), but to which she or he is assumed not already to be attending. As Kleiber and other pragma-semanticists have observed, *deixis* causes a break in the continuity of the discourse at the point where the deictic procedure is used, so that in effect the interlocutor is invited to 'step out' of this discourse context to grasp a new referent in terms of the current situation of utterance – or, alternatively, another

aspect of a same referent, which has already been focused upon. So deixis serves to introduce a new referent into the discourse, on the basis of certain features of the context of utterance.

Now, *textual* as well as *discourse deixis* provide a transition between the notions of deixis and anaphora, because they consist in using the deictic procedure to point to part of a pre- or postexisting textual or memory representation, but which is not necessarily highly activated. The interlocutor will therefore need to exert a certain cognitive effort in order to retrieve it. This interpretative effort will involve constructing an 'entity,' on the basis of the discourse representation in question, in order for it to be the subject of a predication, an anchor for the introduction of new information. Where there is a difference in topic-worthiness between the representation introduced by a trigger and the intended referent, the *discourse-deictic* and not *anaphoric* procedure must be used, as in (3), an attested utterance:

(3) [*End of the words of welcome uttered by the director of the Language Centre, at the start of a conference, University of Edinburgh, 19 September 1991*] "… We intend to record the guest speakers, so *these* will be available to participants at the end of the Conference …." (Example (20) in Cornish, 2005: 212.) (Permission to reprint granted by John Benjamins Publishing Company.)

In order to access the referent targeted via the proximal demonstrative pronoun *these* (namely, 'the recordings of the guest speakers' papers'), the hearer will have to draw an inference of the type: "If the guest speakers' papers are recorded at time t_0, then at time t_n $(t_n > t_0)$, there will be recordings of these papers." Unlike the indirect referent in (1) and the first two more 'direct' ones in (2), here the implicit referent has not attained the status of a potential *topic* (*see* **Thetic-Categorial Distinction** and **Topic and Comment**) by the time the initial clause is processed, for it is 'the guest speakers' that enjoys this status at this point. So it is predictable that the elaborative *so*-clause that immediately follows will continue to be about these entities. The demonstrative pronoun *these* in (3) directs the hearer's attention toward a referent that she or he must create on the basis of the representation introduced via the initial conjunct, as well as in terms of his or her knowledge of the world. So it is an instance of *discourse deixis* rather than of *anaphora*. Indeed, the (anaphoric) personal pronoun *they* in its place would have maintained the situation evoked via the initial conjunct, resulting in the retrieval of the only salient topic-worthy entity within it,

'the guest speakers' – an interpretation leading to quite severe incoherence here.

Three Essential Ingredients of the Operation of Discourse Anaphora: 'Antecedent-Trigger,' 'Antecedent,' and 'Anaphor'

The Antecedent-Trigger

This is not necessarily an explicit, textual expression (a phrase of some kind). It may also be a percept or a nonverbal signal (see Cornish, 1996, 1999: ch. 4). In (1) it is the illocutionary point of the woman's initial question, in conjunction with the use of the verb *write* that triggers the discourse representation in terms of which the pronoun *'em* refers, whereas in (2) it is the use of the descriptive noun phrases *Jason, a terrible accident,* and *the Dunton crossroads*. The broader notion of 'antecedent-trigger,' in relation to the traditional, canonical textual 'antecedent' of normative written prose, which is required to be morphosyntactically and semantically parallel to the anaphor, is useful in that it enables us to include both exophora and indirect anaphora (see example (1)) within the purview of anaphora *per se* – of which both these phenomena are instances (see also Cornish, 1999: 41–3).

The Antecedent

This is a psychologically salient discourse representation in terms of which the anaphor refers or denotes. As this characterization suggests, it is a unit of *discourse*, not of *text* (see the distinction drawn earlier) and may be constructed via direct interpretation of the cotext in terms of a relevant context or in terms of the context alone in conjunction with relevant aspects of mutual knowledge, or in terms of inferences from either of these. See, as an example, the informal description of the antecedent of the unstressed pronoun *'em* in (1): 'the set of unfinished, torn and unsent letters which the man had begun writing to the woman.' See also Dahl and Hellman (1995), Langacker (1996), van Hoek (1997), and Cornish (1999: 44–7). A given antecedent-trigger may give rise to several distinct 'antecedents' (in this sense), as a function of the possible drawing of inferences, of what is predicated of the former's referent, or of the functioning of the type of anaphor chosen to target it. Sample (4a, b) provide examples, where the antecedent-trigger *one of the new Toyota models* in the first sentence of (4a) gives rise to different 'antecedents' targeted by the pronouns *they,* the *it* in the second anaphoric continuation, and *one*; whereas the entire initial sentence acts as antecedent-trigger

for the antecedents created via the anaphors *that* and the *it* in the final anaphoric continuation in this example:

> (4a) John bought one of the new Toyota models yesterday. *They* are really snazzy cars/ *It* is standing outside his front door/ Mary bought *one* too/At least, *that*'s what he told me/*It* took only half an hour to complete.
>
> (4b) "The grouse season begins today, and *they*'re being shot in large numbers" (*Today Programme*, BBC Radio 4, 10.12.04)

The Anaphor

This is a referentially dependent indexical expression. The relation is not exclusively between antecedent-trigger and anaphor (except in the case of metalinguistic occurrences, as in this example: A: *Psephism was much in vogue in those times*. B: *What does **that** mean?*: but these in any case, as Lyons (1977) points out, are instances of *textual deixis*). First, then, the anaphor refers, not to its antecedent(-trigger), but in terms of whatever its antecedent(-trigger) refers to (see Lyons, 1977, vol. 2: 660). Second, the discourse referent evoked via the antecedent-trigger is not necessarily the same at the point of retrieval via the anaphor as it was at the point of introduction: minimally, what will have been predicated of the referent concerned within the antecedent-trigger predication (and potentially within subsequent predications) will have altered that referent's representation – perhaps even radically. Third, it is not simply the anaphor on its own that retrieves the (updated) discourse referent at the point where it occurs in the cotext, but the anaphoric (or 'host') predication as a whole: compare the anaphoric continuations in examples (2) and (4a) in particular in this respect. So what is predicated of the referent of the anaphor acts as a filter, ruling out theoretically possible referents or denotata, and as a pointer, targeting and selecting a salient discourse representation that is compatible with what is predicated of the anaphor's referent (see also Yule, 1981; Dahl and Hellman, 1995).

As we shall see in analyzing text (5) in the next section, there is a variety of types of anaphor – zero forms; ordinary pronouns; demonstrative pronouns; reduced proper names; demonstrative, definite, and possessive full NPs; ellipses of various kinds; and so on – which each have distinct indexical properties. As such, they each function to establish different kinds of discourse anaphoric structures and are each sensitive to specific types of discourse context and function. See Cornish (1999: 51–68) for some discussion. On the use of demonstratives in narrative discourse, see in particular Himmelmann's (1996) typological study.

The Text – as Well as Discourse – Sensitivity of Discourse Anaphora

The text we are going to analyze for illustration is taken from a British newspaper, *The Guardian* (1 July 1998, p. 3), reproduced under (5) (for convenience in the analysis that follows, the paragraphs are each numbered in the left-hand margin).

> (5) ***Monet waterlilies set £20m record***
> *Luke Harding*
>
> 1. *A painting of the most famous garden in the history of art last night sold for £19,801,500, shattering all records for a work by Claude Monet.*
>
> 2. *Two frenzied telephone bidders pushed the price for Monet's Waterlily Pond and Path by Water to almost £20 million at Sotheby's, suggesting that good times are back again for the fickle art market.*
>
> 3. *The price, reached after six minutes of bidding, comfortably shatters the previous £13 million record for a painting by the artist. Waterlily Pond is now the most expensive Impressionist work sold by a European auction house since 1990. Sotheby's had estimated the sale price more modestly at £4–£6 million.*
>
> 4. *The oil painting, executed in 1900, was acquired by a private British collector in 1954 and has not been shown in public since then.*
>
> 5. *The identity of the buyer is a mystery. "We are still totting up the figures for the total auction," a jubilant Sotheby's spokeswoman said last night. "It's been a very very good night."*
>
> 6. *Monet was passionate about flowers and intrigued by landscape architecture. In 1893 he purchased a plot of land which adjoined the rural house in Giverny, near Paris, where he had moved 10 years earlier. A small stream ran through the plot, and Monet turned the garden into a horticultural paradise.*
>
> 7. *Monet worked tirelessly during the summer months, producing 12 pictures in 1899 and six in 1900. The oil sold last night shows the left section of his water garden, with the Japanese-style footbridge and path gently curving through patches of purple irises and tall grass.*
>
> 8. *"It took me some time to understand my waterlilies," Monet said in a conversation with the author Marc Elder in 1924. "All of a sudden I had the revelation of how enchanting my pond was. Since then I have had hardly any other subject." Waterlily Pond and Path by the Water is now the 11th most expensive ever painting sold at auction. Its sale price is easily eclipsed, though, by another work completed just nine years earlier – Portrait du Dr. Gachet – by a then little-known artist, Vincent Van Gogh, which went for $82,500,000 (£55 million) in 1900.*

9. *Last night's sale follows a gradual recovery in the art market – unlike the overheated boom of the late 1980s, where it was focused in just one or two areas. Recent sales of Impressionist and Old Master works have been encouraging – despite allegations that many of Van Gogh's best-known works are fakes* (Example (8) in Cornish, 1998: 30–31). (Permission to reprint granted by *Guardian Newspapers* and *Cahiers de Grammaire*.)

In this text, there are several 'topic chains' (see Cornish, 1998, 2003 for further details). A topic chain is a sequence of mainly anaphoric (referentially dependent) expressions within a text that retrieve the same referent, which is thus the subject of several predications for a segment of the text. This referent may have been introduced explicitly via a *referentially autonomous* expression, such as a full proper name, an indefinite NP, or a full definite NP. This is the 'head' of the chain, the anaphoric expressions retrieving its referent then being the 'links.' We will adopt Dik's (1997: 218) definition of topic chains (what he calls 'anaphorical chains') in recognizing three theoretical discourse-functional positions within them: (1) the head of the chain, which introduces the topic referent into the discourse; (2) a second-link position (only exploited in 'macro'-topic chains), whose function is to 'reconfirm' the installation of the topic referent in question – that is, it has an essentially addressee-oriented function; and (3) a third position, which may be multiply filled, consisting of purely anaphoric retrievals of the topic referent whose function is to maintain the high-attention focus now accorded (or assumed to be so accorded) to that referent by the addressor. By the third link, then, the referent retrieved is taken as enjoying full topic status in the discourse.

The four most important topic chains in text (5) are the following: (1) the one dealing with the article's overall topic, the painting by Monet which had just been sold by auction for a record price; (2) the one bearing on the price fetched by the sale; (3) the one having to do with the artist himself; and finally (4) the one dealing with the plot of land that he had bought at Giverny in 1893, of which the stream that flowed through it served as a model for his painting. These chains are made up of the following successions of expressions:

1. *A painting of the most famous garden in the history of art … Monet's Waterlily Pond and Path by Water …. Waterlily Pond … The oil painting … ø … The oil sold last night … Waterlily Pond and Path by the* (sic) *Water … Its …* ;
2. *£19,801,500 … the price for Monet's Waterlily Pond and Path by Water … The price … the sale price …. Its sale price …* ;
3. *Claude Monet … Monet … the artist … Monet … ø … he … he … Monet … Monet … ø … his … Monet;*
4. *A plot of land which adjoined the rural house in Giverny, near Paris, where he had moved 10 years earlier … the plot … the garden … his water garden ….*

Let us represent these four topic chains schematically, using the abbreviations 'R-A' for 'referentially autonomous expression' and 'R-NA' for 'referentially nonautonomous expression,' as follows ('H' = 'Head of chain,' 'L2' = 'Link-2,' and 'L3' = 'Link-3'):

(6) *Schematic representation of the four topic chains in (5)*
- **Topic Chain 1**: H: R-A; L2: R-A; L3: R-NA, R-NA, R-NA, R-NA, R-A, R-NA.
  ('the painting by Monet')
- **Topic Chain 2**: H: R-A; L2 : R-A; L3: R-NA, R-NA, R-NA.
  ('the sale price reached by the painting')
- **Topic Chain 3**: H: R-A; L2: Ø; L3: R-NA, R-NA, R-NA, R-NA, R-NA, R-NA, R-NA, R-NA, R-NA, R-NA.
  ('Claude Monet')
- **Topic Chain 4**: H: R-A; L2: Ø; L3: R-NA, R-NA, R-NA.
  ('Monet's garden')
  (Item (9) in Cornish, 1998: 32, slightly adapted.)
  (Permission to reprint granted by *Cahiers de Grammaire*.)

This representation points up the fact that referentially autonomous and anaphoric expressions do not occur indiscriminately in any position within a chain. For apart from the autonomous expression that occurs in fifth position within the link L3 in chain 1 (*Waterlily Pond and Path by* (sic) *Water*), autonomous referring expressions always occur in the central positions within chains (positions H and L2); whereas anaphoric expressions appear only within link-position L3. See Ariel (1996) on the distinction between referentially autonomous and nonautonomous indexical expressions (particularly as far as the distinction between full and reduced proper nouns is concerned).

Interestingly, it is precisely in the two topic chains that are intuitively the most central to text (5) as a whole (namely, chains 1 and 2) that we find link L2 realized by an autonomous expression. The other two chains (3 and 4), where this same link is by hypothesis unfilled, evoke referents that are subsidiary within this discourse in relation to the referents developed by chains 1 and 2: the article deals, after all, with the particular work by Monet as well as with the record

price it fetched in auction, rather than with the artist or his garden as such. Furthermore, the representation in (7) (following) of the discourse structure associated with (5) shows that although chains 1 and 2 are set up within central discourse segments (paragraphs 1–3, 5, 8b, and 9), chains 3 and 4 are restricted to background, subsidiary segments (the segments corresponding to paragraphs 4 and 6–8a). So it is not surprising that the last two topics should not have required an L2 link for their installation within the discourse.

Let us look now at the relationship between the occurrence of an expression realizing a given link in a chain and the discourse function of the unit in which it occurs, in terms of the structure of the discourse as a whole. Schema (7) represents the structure of text (5) as discourse (indentations indicate subsidiary segments):

(7) *Discourse structure corresponding to text (5)*

1. [Para 1: **Introduction of the global discourse topic,** the painting by Monet and its record price reached at an auction in London]
2. [Para 2: **Continuation** of the sequence of events surrounding 1]
3. [Para 3: **Development on the record price** reached by the sale of the work]
    4. [Para 4: **Background segment** on the history of the painting, from its inception to the present]
5. [Para 5: **Return pop to the central topic.** Introduction of two local topics (not developed in the remainder of the text): the buyer's identity, and the calculation of the total price of the sale]
    6. [Para 6: **Flashback** to the subject matter of the painting and its origin: the purchase by Monet of a plot of land near his country house in Giverny – the inspiration behind the work. No reference to the painting as such]
    7. [Para 7: **Development of this background topic:** what the painting shows of the garden]
    8a. [1st half of Para 8: **Continuation of the topic of Monet's inspiration drawn from his garden at Giverny**]
8b. [2nd half of Para 8: **Return to the central topic of the record price of the painting** and comparison with the astronomical price reached by another painting of the same period]
9. [Para 9. **Conclusion: Extrapolation to the art market in general** – the recovery of the art sale market precipitated by this auction. No reference to Monet's painting]
(Item (10) in Cornish, 1998: 34)
(Permission to reprint granted by *Cahiers de Grammaire*.)

The structure of the first two of the four topic chains in (5) in this respect is as follows. The title of the article already sets up the global theme, the sale of Monet's painting *Waterlily Pond and Path by Water* and the record price it fetched. In the introductory paragraph, this dual aspect of the global theme is made explicit in a complex sentence. As an introductory sentence-paragraph, it has a 'thetic' character, where the information it presents to the reader is entirely new (*see* **Thetic-Categorial Distinction**).

The second paragraph is an elaboration of the situation established by the first, dealing more specifically with the price of this sale at auction; but it also serves to *identify* the painting by Monet, which is the topic of the first paragraph. This cannot be an instance of *cataphora*, where the antecedent-trigger follows the 'cataphor,' for all that, given the referentially autonomous character of *both* nominal expressions used here (full indefinite NP and full proper name); so the referential dependency of anaphor on 'antecedent-trigger' does not obtain – that is, we have *coreference* without *anaphora* in the strict sense here. The use of two indexically strong (referentially autonomous) expressions at this point – *Monet's Waterlily Pond and Path by Water* and *the price for Monet's Waterlily Pond and Path by Water* – is no doubt motivated by the concern to promote their referents to global topics within the article, following their brief introduction in the initial paragraph.

The third paragraph continues this theme of the price fetched by the sale of the painting. Note that the two references to the dual global topics of the article are made via lexically explicit NPs (a reduced proper name for the painting (*Waterlily Pond*) and a definite, also reduced, NP for its price (*the price*)), and not via pronouns. (The fact that these are reduced NPs means that they are not referentially autonomous, but are potentially anaphoric, like pronouns.) See Geluykens (1994) on the question of anaphoric 'repairs' in spoken interactions, where the speaker mis-assesses their addressee's current attention state, and uses a reduced indexical form type (a pronoun of some kind), which she or he immediately corrects to a fuller form (a definite or demonstrative NP or a proper name). There are two reasons behind the use of *the price* as subject of the initial sentence of this third segment of the discourse: first, this reference is followed immediately by a nonrestrictive relative clause in apposition, a position from which unaccented pronouns (here *it*) are excluded (this is also the case with the lexical NP *the oil painting* in paragraph 4); and second, the repetition of the definite article and of the lexical head of the complex NP, which were used in the previous paragraph to 'topicalize' the referent at issue, signals at the start of this new segment that it will continue to be about it. In other words, the referent in question, though topical, is nonetheless reevoked at the very beginning of a *new* discourse segment and no longer within the one in which it

was originally topicalized. See Fox (1987) in this respect, who argued that repeated proper nouns in English spoken and written texts may have this function, and also Blackwell (2003) in relation to her spoken Spanish data.

Similarly, the use of a proper noun, albeit reduced (*Waterlily Pond*), at the point in this segment where this reference occurs, is made necessary by the evident need to distinguish this referent from the other central referent, which has already been evoked in this paragraph ('the painting's sale price'), but which enjoys an advantage over it in terms of topic-worthiness at the point where the reference is made. The pronoun *it* used in its place would certainly have retrieved this latter referent, and not 'the painting' as such. This fits in well with what is stated by Levinson's (1995) "M-principle" (see also Huang, 2000: 208), to the effect that the use by a speaker of a phonologically and lexically more substantial expression where a more attenuated one could have been used in its place is normally intended and interpreted as *not* meaning the same as if the more unmarked expression had been used (*see* **Deixis and Anaphora: Pragmatic Approaches** for further details of this account).

As for the two references to these two macrotopics throughout paragraph 4, where the focus switches to background considerations relating to the central theme, the first is made via a definite lexical NP (*The oil painting*, in initial subject position of the segment) and the second by means of a null form, the ellipsed subject of the second conjunct of the clause, which realizes this segment. The motivation behind the use of the former expression type at the beginning of this segment is exactly the same as that of its counterpart *the price* in the same position at the start of the previous paragraph. Because it is followed by a nonrestrictive relative, a pronoun could not have occurred in its place; but even if one could, it would be excluded for reasons of anaphoric ambiguity: for the pronoun *it* here – leaving aside what is predicated of the referent of this expression in this context – would have retrieved the referent 'the sale price' evoked by the immediately preceding clause.

Paragraph 7, which falls together with paragraphs 6 and the first half of 8 in a background discourse segment, includes a reference to the painting, a reference that reevokes at the same time the event of the sale on June 30 (*the oil sold last night*). Once again, we have to do here with a definite (elliptical) NP; and just as in the previous cases, the reason for it is the existence of comparable referents that are in competition in terms of topichood. The first half of paragraph 8 (8a) continues the theme of the subject

of the painting ('Monet's garden'), a theme that is abruptly interrupted in the middle of this paragraph by the opening of a segment returning to the macrotopic of the record sale price reached by this painting at auction at Sotheby's.

Now, it is precisely by means of a full proper name that this transition to a segment dealing with the circumstances of the sale of the painting is carried out. As such, we can hypothesize that it corresponds to what Dik calls a *resumed topic*. It is this particular marked discourse function realized via this referentially autonomous expression that motivates its exceptional filling of the 'anaphoric' L3 link in this macrotopical chain (recall the structure of Chain 1 given in schema (6) earlier). Once its topic status has been reestablished within this new segment – which does not correspond this time to the start of a new paragraph in terms of textualization (see the *text/discourse* distinction mentioned earlier in the second section) – the next (anaphoric) reference may be realized by means of an unaccented pronoun: in this case, by the pronoun contained in the possessive determiner *Its*.

Conclusion

As we have seen in connection with text (5) in particular, the occurrence of different types of nonautonomous, potentially anaphoric expressions in a text is in large part determined by the discourse function of the unit of discourse corresponding to the textual segment in which that expression appears, as well as by its position within that segment. In the case of written newspaper articles of the kind seen in (5) at least, it is clear that initial position within a unit is reserved for lexically based NPs (reduced proper nouns and definite NPs, as well as demonstrative ones), whatever the degree of topicality and accessibility their intended referent may enjoy at that point; unaccented pronouns and of course null pronouns are virtually excluded from such positions, because they serve to mark the continuity of the attention focus established prior to their occurrence. We have also seen how the copresence of competing referents in the immediately prior cotext may favor the use of an indexically stronger form type than a pronoun or a null anaphor in order to avoid unintended anaphoric continuities.

Discourse anaphors, in sum, are sensitive to the hierarchical structure of the discourse that may be assigned to a given text, in conjunction with an appropriate context, and their choice by a speaker or writer is clearly a function of his or her ongoing assessment of the conditions under which their addressee or reader will be operating at the point of use. In the case of discourse anaphors, it is clear, in Dahl and Hellman's (1995: 84) colorful words, that

their 'antecedents' "aren't just sitting there, waiting to be referred to, but rather ha[ve] to be created by some kind of operation": this is a reflex of the fact that anaphora operates within the dynamic, ongoing construction of *discourse*, rather than exclusively in terms of the more static dimension of *text*.

See also: Deixis and Anaphora: Pragmatic Approaches; Text and Text Analysis; Text World Theory; Thetic-Categorial Distinction; Topic and Comment; Understanding Spoken Discourse.

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Discourse Markers

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Discourse markers can be defined as those elements, such as *you know, I mean, well, oh, m, you see, look, listen,* that have a distinct prosodic entity, tend not to have a specific semantic meaning, and contribute to scaffold the pragmatic coherence of interaction (*see* **Scaffolding in Classroom Discourse**). Broadly speaking, discourse markers have often been described by their absence of traditional linguistic properties, since neither their use nor their meaning seem to resemble any of the traditional linguistic categories. In fact, these elements have been typically discarded from rigorous linguistic studies, and in different languages have been assigned the general vague name of 'particelle' (Italian), 'fillers' (English), or 'muletillas' (Spanish) – both the English and the Spanish terms evidence these markers' function of 'filling' or 'supporting' discourse. In some sociolinguistic domains, discourse markers were marginalized because they were traditionally attributed to

incompetent and incoherent speakers of a language (Watts, 1989).

Schenkein (1972) and Jefferson (1978) were among the first that became convinced of the need to study these vague elements that seem to distort syntax and have a multiplicity of undefined meanings. As an instance, consider how Dik (1989: 45) characterized these elements as 'extra-clausal constituents'; their role in natural language was described as follows: "*any natural language text can be exhaustively divided into clauses and extra-clausal constituents . . . which are neither clauses nor part of clauses.*" In other words, discourse markers, for this author, belong to the realm of spoken language and need to be studied only with reference to the parameters of spoken language.

In the 1980s and early 1990s, some authors studied the general presence of discourse markers in several languages, with no special reference to any grammatical or syntactic model. Thus, for instance, Vicher and Sankoff (1989) described discourse markers in contemporary French; Bazzanella (1990) did the same for contemporary Italian, and Fraser Gupta (1992) for Singapore colloquial English. Other studies delved into the use of a specific discourse marker in a language, giving a full description of its different functions; cf., for example, Tognini-Bonelli (1993) on 'actually' in British English.

Since then, several authors have tried to name, classify, and describe the nature and function of these seemingly 'elusive' elements. In my opinion, there are three main approaches to the study of discourse markers: the conversational, the grammatico-syntactic, and the discourse-cognitive.

The conversational approach concentrates on the role of discourse markers in the structure of conversation. For example, Schegloff (1984), who called them "continuers," stated that they are used by the speaker to show the listener that his/her speech forms a coherent whole in progress. In the same vein, Schiffrin (1987: 31) provides the following definition: "markers are sequentially dependent elements that bracket units of talk." Both authors (along with others) agreed on the essentially spoken nature of these elements; from their studies, one is led to conclude that discourse markers are better analyzed from an interactional than from an ideational perspective (following Halliday's (1994) macrofunctions of language) (*see* **Systemic Theory**). In fact, Schiffrin (1985: 281) pointed out that: "discourse markers . . . help speakers express interactional alignments toward each other and enact conversational moves"; elsewhere she stated (Schiffrin, 1987) that the presence of discourse markers in a conversation helps the mechanics of turn-taking, the organization of speech

acts, the structuring of discourse ideas, the interactive structure of participants, and the presentation of information.

The second model corresponds to the grammatico-syntactic approach to discourse markers. Among others, Knott and Dale (1994: 45) described discourse markers as a "reasonably homogeneous group" that tends to be formed by "*simple* linguistic expressions [their italics] . . . that have become simplified because they correspond to constructs that are in continual use when we process text." In their description of the elements that can function as 'cue phrases' (the authors' term for discourse markers), they enumerate coordinators, subordinators, conjunct adverbs, and phrases that take sentential complements (e.g., 'it follows that,' 'it may seem that'). Also following this approach, in a comprehensive account of discourse markers, Fraser (1999: 938) explored the characteristics of these elements; discourse markers "impose a relationship between some aspect of the discourse segment they are a part of, call it S2, and some aspect of a prior discourse segment, call it S1." In other words, this author identified discourse markers with the elements that signal a two-place relationship between adjacent discourse segments, e.g., *therefore, however, and,* etc., and discards other elements that he calls "commentary pragmatic markers" (e.g., *frankly*), 'focus particles' (e.g., *even*), 'pause markers' (e.g., *hum, well*), and interjections (e.g., *oh*). In my view, commentary pragmatic markers, and especially the latter two categories (pause markers and interjections) are the most outstanding and most frequently encountered in speech, because they are responsible for the scaffolding of interactional meaning in conversation. In fact, Fraser (1999: 943) considered that the three basic features of discourse markers are the following: they "do not constitute a separate syntactic category," their meaning is "procedural not conceptual" (1999: 944) and, "every individual discourse marker has a specific, core meaning" (1999: 945). This view somehow contradicts Schiffrin's (1987: 314) argument that not all markers have meanings; Fraser specifically mentioned the markers *oh* and *well* which, incidentally, are very common in English.

This apparent contradiction derives, in my opinion, from the fact that both the conversational and the grammatical-syntactic approach present a static view of discourse markers. By *static*, I mean that these approaches try to apply traditional linguistic parameters to a phenomenon that evades classical labeling and analysis. In my view, there are several issues to consider in this respect: first, it is not possible to discard from this category all the elements that

serve to scaffold interaction in conversation and only accept those that fulfill certain syntactic parameters (as Fraser does), and second, it is not possible to say that some of these elements have meanings and others do not (as Schiffrin suggests).

To describe the phenomenon of discourse markers, I propose what I call a discourse-cognitive approach: discourse markers are elements that fill the discoursal and cognitive slots that spoken language needs in order to weave the net of interaction. This dynamic approach is geared to the description of the discourse and the cognitive status of the markers (Romero Trillo, 1994, 2001), but does not limit them to a closed-class repertoire. The approach intends to account for the two main issues at stake: the issue of a 'core meaning' for each marker, and the nature of an 'accepted' repertoire of discourse markers in each language. As to the first, the question of the core meaning poses many problems, since each element may appear in such a multiplicity of functional contexts, and with such a varied array of meanings, that it is very difficult to assign a core meaning, especially in the case of pause markers and interjections. Second, with regard to the elaboration of an accepted repertoire, it is my belief that what we find in discourse is not just a series of discourse markers; rather, we are dealing with discourse slots (functions), where any element – provided it fulfills several conditions related to context and prosody – can function as a discourse marker. In other words, the phenomenon of discourse markers shows that spoken interaction needs to have a pragmatic skeleton, consisting of such discourse slots, that holds the communicative force of the interaction together. The slots are filled by elements that may vary according to regional, ideolectal, or sociolinguistic features within one and the same language.

Due to this multiplicity of conditions that determine the choice of an element (multiplicity of functions and multiplicity of elements realizing each function), the challenge is to find a principled method of selection and a corresponding analysis of this phenomenon. In other words, how can we decide about the appropriateness of the meaning of an element in a specific discourse slot? What are the contextual interactions between the discourse marker and the slot in which it occurs?

When one looks at the elements that function as discourse markers, it becomes immediately clear that there are elements whose meaning is clear: *you know, I see*; alongside with them, we find other elements whose meaning it is difficult to trace: *mhm, aha*. This inclusion of discourse markers that have no apparent meaning or grammatical characterization, but play a role in the cognitive structure of interactants, has led

me to develop the notion of 'discourse grammaticalization' (Romero Trillo, 2001). According to this view, discourse markers are elements that have undergone a process of discourse grammaticalization and have included in their semantic/grammatical meaning a pragmatic dimension that has interactional purposes. In other words, a grammaticalized marker becomes a homonym in a particular synchronic system that, when realizing a discourse function, constrains the relevance of the proposition it introduces, as Hopper and Traugott (1993) have suggested.

Based on the work on grammaticalization by Heine *et al.* (1991) and Hopper and Traugott (1993), I have classified discourse markers as follows (Romero Trillo, 2001):

- Acategorial items such as: *yeah, yep, m, mhm, etc.*
- Lexical items such as: *listen, well, good, fine, etc.*
- Lexical composites such as: *I mean, you know, the thing is, oh my God.*

The discourse grammaticalization approach to discourse markers – an approach shared by other scholars such as Aijmer (2002) – addresses the question of the versatility of meanings and the nontransparent nature of these elements that may not have a unique pragmatic meaning.

The problem now is: how can we account for the alternative options that we have, for example, for showing feedback in a certain situation in a particular language? Clearly, several elements (*I see, I know, yes, yeap, m, mhm, aha, etc., . . .*) could realize such a function. The only possible way out of this quandary is by appealing to the notion of appropriateness, defined as "the possibility to choose the most adequate element in the realization of a certain function in a specific context" (Romero Trillo, 2001: 531). By using the notion of appropriateness, I emphasize that the use of a particular form in discourse is not dependent on any kind of grammatical assessment (as a matter of fact, many discourse markers do not belong to any particular grammatical category, as I mentioned above), but on the frequency with which it appears in a significant corpus-based language sample (representing a native speaker's linguistic competence).

Appropriateness is based on the assumption that there are no preestablished rules that determine the correct or incorrect use of a given element as a discourse marker, but that speakers will rely on the regularities of certain parameters that are considered adequate to a given linguistic situation. These parameters are not only linguistic but also extralinguistic, such as social class, context of the situation, age of the speakers, etc. (*see* **Class Language**; **Context, Communicative**).

Another interesting feature of discourse markers is their autonomy in the development of a second language. In other words, teachers and learners of a language tend to concentrate on the acquisition of the grammatical and lexical elements that enable communication, but tend to disregard the study and development of the pragmatic weight that discourse markers add to language learning. In fact, several studies show that the pragmatic component of language learning that is formed by cognitive, affective, and linguistic elements (discourse markers) is difficult to reproduce in the nonnative language teaching class (Romero Trillo, 2002). This is the reason why nonnative speakers suffer from what I call 'pragmatic fossilization,' as it is especially evidenced in the use of discourse markers (Romero Trillo, 1997, 2002); that is to say, the evolution of the learners' interlanguage does not include a development in the use of discourse markers similar to the native-language speakers as to frequency and diversity. In my study of the evolution of discourse markers, I made the general distinction between 'operative markers' (those dealing with managing concepts or tools), and 'involvement markers' (those dealing with social rapport). This comparative study showed that there is a similarity in the use of operative and involvement markers at an early age in native and nonnative children. However, with learners' increasing age, involvement markers become difficult to acquire for nonnatives, a fact that leads to a pragmatic fossilization in their use of such markers (i.e., nonnative speakers tend to use the markers that they acquired when they were children). This fossilization is more evident when the native and the target language realize a certain function with divergent translational equivalent markers (see Romero Trillo (1997) on the use of attention-getting markers in Spanish and English). In fact, the fossilization of discourse markers reveals the shortcomings of learning a foreign language in a nonnatural environment, especially as to the use of the elements that contribute to the pragmatics of interaction.

See also: Class Language; Context, Communicative; Scaffolding in Classroom Discourse; Systemic Theory.

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Discourse Processing

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In our daily lives, we are often asked to comprehend language in units larger than the single sentence. For example, when we follow instructions for how to set the clock on our VCR, we need to develop our understanding of the situation over the course of several sentences (e.g., "Wait until you see the red light flashing. Then, hold down the 'Time' button and..."). When we have a conversation, the meaning of a particular utterance may be based on our understanding of previous utterances (e.g., the meaning of 'him' in the sentence "Ask him where the briefcase is" depends on our understanding of the referent's previous mention). When we read or listen to stories, the narrative is built up across many sentences, paragraphs, and typically chapters. The preceding examples of language use are examples of discourse, and discourse processing is the processing involved in building meaning across several sentences or utterances. Although research on discourse processing has grown to encompass work done in a range of fields (e.g., linguistics and education), the focus of this article will be research that has grown out of the field of psycholinguistics. We begin by discussing the research paradigms most widely used to explore issues in discourse processing. Then, we outline several of the major theories of discourse processing. We conclude by reviewing several domains in which discourse processing has been explored.

Methods of Studying Discourse Processing

Over the past several decades, discourse-processing research has focused on the comprehension mechanisms that operate while readers comprehend a text or listeners understand a conversation – as it unfolds. The methods used in this pursuit have been a mixture of both on-line and off-line measures. On-line measures are often timing-based measures designed to assess the moment-by-moment operation of the language comprehension system. Off-line measures are typically based on responses such as paraphrases and answers to comprehension questions; such measures are not necessarily intended to directly tap the moment-by-moment operation of the comprehension system.

On-Line Paradigms

There are two major methodological paradigms that are based principally on on-line measures: the inconsistency detection paradigm and the probe response paradigm. These paradigms use reading times, lexical decision times, and naming times (among other measures) as primary dependent measures.

Inconsistency Detection The inconsistency detection paradigm was introduced by O'Brien and Albrecht (1992). Participants are asked to read a passage such as the following:

> Jane woke up on Thursday morning in a panic. Her rent check was due the next day, but there was no money in her bank account. When she walked into the kitchen, she remembered that she hadn't yet deposited the large refund check that she had gotten from the IRS. After getting dressed, **she grabbed the check and drove to the beach.**

The narrative begins with a sentence or two designed to introduce a fact about (or a goal for) the main character. In this case, Jane needs to get some money into her bank account. At the end of the narrative, there is a critical sentence (or clause) that conflicts with information presented earlier in the passage. In the example narrative, the bold clause at the end of the passage is the critical one: if Jane needed to get the check to the bank, readers should find it strange that she took the check to the beach. If readers notice this inconsistency, they should have difficulty understanding the critical sentence. The comprehension difficulty slows the readers down, such that they read the critical sentence more slowly than a version of the same sentence that is consistent with the information presented at the beginning of the narrative (e.g., "After getting dressed, she grabbed the check and drove to the bank").

The inconsistency detection paradigm has been used to explore several issues in discourse processing. For example, the paradigm provides a means of assessing what information readers remember as they work their way through a narrative. If their reading times slow down for a sentence that is inconsistent with information provided earlier in the narrative, their slowed reading times suggest that they remember the previously presented information. The inconsistency detection paradigm has also been used to investigate how readers draw inferences during discourse processing. Sometimes the inconsistent information is inconsistent only with implicit rather than explicit information.

Probe Response The second major paradigm that has been used in studies of discourse processing is

the probe response task. Participants are asked to listen to or read passages such as the example presented above, and at some point during the passage the participants are presented with a probe word (i.e., a word that may or may not be related to the theme of the narrative). For example, at the end of the 'rent check' passage presented above, participants might see the probe word 'bank.' In one version of the probe response methodology, participants are asked to make a lexical decision on the probe word. That is, they are asked to judge whether the probe is a real word or not ('nust' is an example of a nonword). If the concept named by the probe word (bank) is currently active in the comprehender's representation, they should respond to the probe word faster than they would respond to a probe word that is unrelated to the narrative (e.g., 'bird' is a word that is unrelated to the 'Jane' passage). If the concept named by the probe word is not currently active, it should not be responded to faster than an unrelated probe word. Other versions of the probe response paradigm use naming tasks as the primary dependent measure (i.e., participants are shown a probe word and required to pronounce aloud the word as rapidly as possible).

The probe response methodology has been used to study a wide range of topics in discourse processing. Variants of this task have been employed to assess when comprehenders draw inferences while processing narratives, the nature of the inferences drawn, the way that certain elements of a discourse remain active in memory (or not) as more of the discourse is processed, how comprehenders keep track of the characteristics and goals of the protagonists in a discourse narrative, and many other issues.

Off-Line Methods

Several kinds of off-line measures have been employed to understand the comprehension of discourse. Paraphrase tasks, in which participants are asked to paraphrase what they have heard or read, have been used to study what comprehenders remember about various aspects of a discourse (e.g., how much of the surface form do they remember? how many of the details do they remember?) and what inferences they have drawn. Another off-line measure that has been used is the question-answering task. Participants' answers to comprehension questions are used to assess the representations that comprehenders generated for a discourse. Think-aloud paradigms, in which participants are asked to think aloud about their developing understanding of a discourse, have been used to explore the comprehension strategies employed as comprehenders work their way through a discourse. Whereas there is some question about the extent to which these off-line measures provide a true reflection of the processing mechanisms that operate during, rather than after, comprehension, measures such as those listed above provide valuable information about the representations that are constructed from a discourse.

The Three-Pronged Approach

Arthur C. Graesser and colleagues (see Graesser *et al*., 1997) have advocated a three-pronged approach to the study of discourse processing. This approach is a combination of on-line and off-line measures. The three prongs of this approach are (1) developing hypotheses from theories of discourse processing, (2) employing off-line measures to obtain a detailed understanding of the strategies used during discourse processing, including an understanding of the inferences drawn and constructs and elements best remembered, and (3) on-line measures to determine how these inferences and strategies are employed by the comprehension system to build a representation of the discourse in real time.

Theoretical Approaches to Discourse Processing

Several theories of discourse processing have been proposed over the past two decades. These theories differ in the cognitive mechanisms that are evoked to explain how discourse is understood, but they agree on several issues:

1. Comprehension of a discourse leads to a mental representation of that discourse.
2. Comprehenders routinely update their mental representations. Updating involves the integration of new information into their existing representation of the discourse.
3. Comprehenders draw at least some inferences during the comprehension of discourse. These inferences help to maintain discourse coherence at both global and local levels.
4. Some of the information from the discourse remains highly active in memory (i.e., in the foreground of the discourse), whereas other information is less active in memory (i.e., in the background of the discourse). Whether a given element is in the foreground or the background of the discourse depends on the current focus of the discourse.
5. The comprehension of a discourse can be affected by a number of variables, such as the genre of the discourse being processed and the comprehender's goals for understanding the discourse.

These themes of discourse-processing research have been integrated into and explained by a number of individual theories.

Construction-Integration Model The construction-integration model was proposed by Kintsch (1988). This model proposes that discourse is comprehended in two iterative stages. In the construction stage, the incoming text base, which is a representation of the content of the discourse but not of the actual words and phrases in the text) enters working memory; in working memory, the text base retrieves potentially relevant information from long-term memory. This stage of processing can be described as ballistic: it happens quickly and automatically. During the integration stage, the comprehension system begins to integrate the new information with the previously existing model of the discourse. The integration stage is comparatively slow and resource consuming, as the comprehension system pares down the information activated in the construction stage and integrates only the information that is most relevant to the present situation into the model of the discourse. The resulting representation is called a 'situation model.'

Structure-Building Framework The structure-building framework was outlined by Gernsbacher (1990). The theory proposes that discourse comprehension proceeds by building mental representations of the information presented in the discourse, with the initial process in building a structure called 'laying a foundation.' The foundation of the structure is based around the characters and events initially presented in the discourse. When new information is presented, it can either be mapped to the existing structure (i.e., it is attached to the existing structure), or it can prompt the comprehension system to shift to a new structure (i.e., the comprehender lays the foundation for a new structure). Finally, some information in the structure can be enhanced, made more available for further processing, whereas other information can be suppressed, made temporarily unavailable for further processing.

Event-Indexing Model The event-indexing model was discussed in Zwaan *et al.* (1995). It proposes that comprehenders continually monitor the discourse model to maintain coherence on five dimensions: protagonist (who is involved in the events being described?), time (at what time is the event taking place?), space (what are the spatial relations between the characters, objects, and events being described?), causality (are the events in the discourse causally related to each other?), and intentionality (is the

incoming information relevant to the protagonist's goals and intentions?). Shifts on any one of those dimensions (e.g., if the discourse indicates some temporal delay between one event and the next) are typically associated with some processing cost as comprehenders update their representation. The largest processing costs tend to be associated with discontinuities on the time and protagonist dimensions.

Memory-Based Approach Myers and O'Brien (1998) described the memory-based approach to discourse processing. Whereas other models might posit the operation of 'active' processing mechanisms (in the sense that these mechanisms actively retrieve information when building a representation of the discourse), the memory-based approach is built on passive mechanisms of memory retrieval. The memory-based approach is based on Hintzman's (1986) MINERVA, and its 'resonance' process of memory retrieval. On this view, incoming information resonates both with the existing model of the discourse and with information in long-term memory. Information from memory is used to interpret the incoming sentence to the extent that it resonates with the new information.

For a more detailed review of these and other models of discourse processing, the reader is directed to Britton and Graesser (1996).

Theoretical and Empirical Issues

The final section of this article reviews a set of findings that bear on those aspects of discourse processing that have been most widely studied.

Integrating Sentences into a Coherent Discourse

One of the most basic questions in discourse-processing research is how comprehenders connect a series of utterances or sentences into a coherent whole. This issue can be separated into a series of smaller questions. First, how does the comprehender know that a series of utterances or sentences are intended to be interpreted as a connected discourse? There are several linguistic cues that signal the coherence of a discourse. David A. Robertson and colleagues asked comprehenders to process a series of sentences such as "The family rode together in a car" (Robertson *et al.*, 2000). When the series of sentences began with the definite article, comprehenders tended to interpret the series of sentences as part of a connected discourse. On the other hand, when the same sentences were presented with the indefinite article, comprehenders tended to interpret the sentences as being unrelated to each other. Thus, cues as subtle as the articles that are used in subsequent sentences

indicate whether those sentences should be interpreted as related or not. Connectives such as *because*, *however*, *meanwhile*, and others play a similar role. For example, in the sentences "The mother was preparing food for the party. Meanwhile, the grandparents were loading the mini-van," although the focus of the two sentences is different, the connective *meanwhile* indicates to comprehenders that both sentences should be interpreted as part of the same discourse model.

Once comprehenders have begun to integrate a series of sentences into their mental representation of a discourse, they must continue to process each subsequent sentence. There are several strategies tha might be used. Comprehenders might connect each incoming sentence to the most recently encountered sentence. In doing so, the comprehender is attempting to maintain local coherence (see, e.g., McKoon and Ratcliff, 1992) in their discourse model. On the other hand, comprehenders may attempt to maintain global coherence in their discourse model (see, e.g., Graesser *et al.*, 1994; Singer *et al.*, 1994). That is, comprehenders might connect each incoming sentence by virtue of the overarching themes of the discourse (e.g., the goals of the protagonist).

In general, comprehenders attempt to maintain both local and global coherence. Experiments using the inconsistency detection paradigm discussed above demonstrate the guidance afforded by global coherence. For example, if a narrative begins by presenting a goal for Jane (she needs to get money into her bank account), and several sentences later, the comprehender is told that Jane is going to the beach without meeting her goal, comprehension will typically slow down. The slowed comprehension suggests that the overarching goal – a component of global coherence – affects processing individual sentences (see, e.g., Albrecht and O'Brien, 1993). Additionally, it is clear that comprehenders attempt to maintain local coherence from sentence to sentence (see, e.g., McKoon and Ratcliff, 1992). If a given discourse has too little local coherence, it will be viewed as altogether incoherent.

Comprehenders pay attention to several elements of the discourse in attempting to maintain coherence. Chief among them are space (where are the events taking place?), time (when are the events taking place?), the protagonists being described, causality (is there a causal relationship between the events being described?), and the goals of the characters (Zwaan *et al.*, 1995). An incoming sentence can potentially violate coherence on these (or other) dimensions. The more dimensions that are violated by the incoming sentence, the more difficult that sentence will be to understand and to integrate into the existing representation of the discourse.

There is a considerable amount of evidence in support of the claim that these dimensions are important for maintaining the coherence of a discourse. Space has been shown to be important in several ways. First, when two objects are described as being in different locations, focusing the discourse on one of those objects makes the other less accessible to the comprehender (see, e.g., Glenberg *et al.*, 1987). Second, in studies in which participants study the layout of a building before reading a narrative about events that take place in that building, reading times are sensitive to the relative distances between the rooms in the building. Sentences that describe a character moving between adjacent rooms of the building are read more quickly than those that describe a character moving between nonadjacent rooms (see, e.g., Morrow *et al.*, 1987).

Time is less well studied than space (i.e., the spatial dimension) but has an equally strong effect on language processing. Zwaan (1996) asked participants to read passages which contained a shift in temporal perspective. The time shift was either small ("A moment later…") or large ("A day later…"). Comprehenders took more time to read sentences with a large temporal shift than to read sentences with a small temporal shift. Subsequent experiments have provided more support for claims about the importance of the temporal dimension (Rinck *et al.*, 2001).

The remaining elements outlined above – protagonist, causality, and intentionality – have received less attention than space or time. The research that does exist on these topics is generally supportive of the claim that shifts on any of these dimensions can lead to processing difficulty. A more detailed understanding of how each of these dimensions works, and how the dimensions are used together during discourse comprehension, is needed.

Generating Inferences during Discourse Processing

To achieve successful comprehension, the comprehender must often fill in details that are not explicitly presented in the discourse. That is, the comprehender must generate inferences about the events being described in order to maintain a coherent representation of the discourse. For example, when they encounter a pair of sentences such as "It was very cold that winter morning. Joe slipped on the sidewalk," comprehenders need to draw the inference that there may have been snow or ice on the sidewalk in order to integrate the two statements into a coherent discourse model. The processes through which inferences are generated have been explored extensively over the past two decades.

One of the major research questions about inference generation during discourse processing has centered upon the issue of when inferences are generated and when they are not. According to the minimalist position (McKoon and Ratcliff, 1992), comprehenders mostly attempt to maintain local coherence when they process a discourse. The only inferences that are routinely generated by comprehenders are those that are required to maintain local coherence (such as the inference that there was ice on the sidewalk from the example in the previous paragraph). Comprehenders are capable of drawing more global inferences from discourse, but these inferences are only drawn under certain circumstances (e.g., when the comprehender is attempting to process the discourse more deeply than usual). In contrast, the promiscuous position maintains that comprehenders routinely generate a wide range of inferences from the discourse, including those that are not strictly necessary to ensure local coherence. These inferences include inferences about the goals of the characters, the emotional state of the characters, the cause-and-effect relationship between events in the discourse, the intent of the writer in conveying particular pieces of information, and so on.

A compromise between these extreme positions is the constructivist position. The constructivist position holds that comprehenders routinely draw inferences that meet their goals as comprehenders, inferences that maintain the coherence of the discourse, and inferences that explain why different events in the discourse are taking place. On this view, comprehenders may appear to behave in accord with the minimalist position under certain conditions and in accord with the promiscuous generation position under other conditions, depending on the nature of the discourse and the goals they have in comprehending that discourse. For example, if the comprehender is attempting to skim the discourse in an effort to quickly glean information, they may draw few inferences (in keeping with the minimalist position). On the other hand, if individuals are reading a discourse for enjoyment (say, if they are reading a detective novel) or if they are trying to learn about a new field of study, they may read the discourse more carefully and draw a wider range of inferences.

Another topic of import with regard to inference generation during discourse processing is the mechanism(s) through which the inferences are drawn. It is undoubtedly the case that many kinds of inferences (especially those relating to the local coherence of the discourse) are drawn by combining information from the incoming discourse with 'world knowledge' retrieved from long-term memory. For instance, when we read that it is cold outside, we can infer that it is probably wintertime. When we read that the character in the discourse has slipped on the sidewalk, the knowledge that snow and ice can be on the sidewalk during the winter is retrieved from memory, supporting the inference that the snow or ice has caused the character to fall. This sort of inference generation can be explained via the mechanisms of many of the theories outlined earlier. For example, the construction-integration model proposes that inference generation is supported by the rapid, automatic retrieval of world knowledge during the construction stage of comprehension. On the other hand, much less is known about how more global inferences (e.g., inferences about the goals of the characters, the purpose of the author in writing the discourse, and the theme of the discourse) are generated. It seems likely that world knowledge of the sort described above contributes to the generation of these global inferences. Additionally, metalinguistic knowledge about different genres of discourse (e.g., that newspapers are supposed to be balanced and factual, that detective stories should build suspense) may also help the comprehender to draw inferences about the purpose and structure of the discourse.

Determining Reference in Discourse Processing

When discourses are produced, they do not repeatedly use the same word to refer to a particular object or person. A character may be introduced as 'Jane,' and in the next sentence be referred to as 'she,' and later in the discourse be referred to as 'the woman with the brown hair.' In order to maintain the coherence of the discourse, the comprehender must realize that 'Jane,' 'she,' and 'the woman with the brown hair' all refer to the same person.

The most well-studied case of reference in discourse processing is the comprehension of anaphoric reference, or reference to a person or object that has previously been mentioned (as in the above example). One factor that influences the comprehension of anaphoric references is the nature of the information currently active in memory (and foregrounded in the discourse). If there is one female character currently in the foreground of the model (Jane), then pronouns such as 'she' will be mapped onto Jane. If there is more than one female character in the foreground of the model, the pronoun will be mapped to the one whose representation is most active. In some cases, further knowledge is needed in order to determine the referent of an anaphor. When Jane is referred to as 'the woman with brown hair,' the comprehender needs to know that Jane has brown hair in order to easily understand the reference as intended.

The choice of reference for an entity in the discourse depends largely on the circumstances in

which the entity is being mentioned. When a person or object is initially mentioned, it is usually marked with the article *a* or *an*, and the description provided is typically somewhat detailed. Subsequent references are less detailed, and may be made by pronouns or other 'shorthand' referring expressions. The more the entity has been mentioned in the discourse, the shorter the referring terms tend to be. The change in referring terms is related to the given/new distinction in language use. Information that is given (i.e., that is already established in the discourse) may be referred to in a shorthand manner because it is assumed that the comprehender already knows what is being talked about. Information that is new (i.e., information that is assumed to be unknown to the comprehender) is described in more detail to ensure that the comprehender has the relevant information to process subsequent discourse.

Conclusion

This article has presented a brief overview of the literature on discourse processing. We have discussed the overarching themes of this work, the major theories of discourse processing, and the subareas of discourse processing that have received the most attention in the literature. Nonetheless, our review has not done justice to the ways in which perspectives on discourse processing have been used in fields such as education, linguistics, communications, and communication disorders. Without a doubt, the field of discourse processing will continue to grow and flourish as researchers attempt to understand the complexity of the processing involved as comprehenders understand discourse.

See also: Discourse Anaphora; Discourse, Narrative and Pragmatic Development; Reference: Psycholinguistic Approach.

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Discourse, Foucauldian Approach

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> There exists today a problem which is not without importance for political practice: the problem of the status, of the conditions of existence, of functioning, of the institutionalizing of scientific discourses. That's what I have undertaken to analyze historically – by choosing the discourses which have, not the strongest epistemological structure (mathematics or physics), but the densest and most complex field of positivity (medicine, economics, the human sciences). (Foucault, 1978: 20)

> I am not just amusing myself by making the game more complicated for a few lively minds. I am trying to define in what way, to what extent, to what level discourses, and particularly scientific discourses, can be objects of a political practice, and in what system of dependency they can be in relation to it. (Foucault, 1978: 23)

This article looks at the relatively early works of Michel Foucault, especially *The order of things* (1970) and *The archæology of knowledge* (1972). These are the two major works that stem from a time when Foucault was critically interested in the concept of discourse and how it might be taken out of its hitherto (very broadly) 'linguistic' context and reconnected with his own discipline, which he called the history of systems of thought. The article is more or less confined, then, to that period of his thinking, though with some excursions into the so-called 'middle period' when Foucault's main concern centered more around the idea of power. By this later time, the concept of discourse had all but disappeared from the surface of Foucault's writings, to be displaced by the concept of apparatus (*dispositif*) and, at a later stage, by the idea of technologies of the self (cf. Hunter, 1991).

Among critical discourse theorists such as Foucault, the term 'discourse' refers not to language or social interaction as formal systems or as matters for empirical analysis but to relatively well-bounded areas of historically specific knowledge that determine what a human subject can possibly be or become at a given time. That is, it is deeply connected with what might be called the politics of the self and identity, and with exceptions, it is almost impossible to find this use of the term in other – largely Anglo-American – approaches to discourse. (One exception is, of course, the approach called New Historicism, and Foucault himself makes acknowledgment of this in his preface to *The use of pleasure* [1986].) If our prior conceptions of discourse have been mainly linguistic or quasisociological ones, to understand Foucault's approach, we may now have to completely rethink the idea. We may even need to be prepared to think of it as a totally different concept in a totally different field that just happens to have the same name as something we already know and take for granted as discourse analysts. (Though, for a recuperation of Foucault into linguistically based forms of discourse analysis, see Fairclough [1989].)

According to this approach, in any given historical period we can write, speak, or think about a given social object, practice, or positioning – madness, for example, or gender – only in certain specific ways and not others. (On madness, see Foucault (1967), and on gender, see Sawicki (1991).) The overall point is that discursive categories such as, say, 'schizophrenic' or 'homosexual,' are historically distinct ways of thinking about ourselves and others. They cannot be presumed to have existed 'essentially' throughout time and space.

'A discourse' would then be whatever constrains – but also enables – writing, speaking, and thinking within such definite historical limits, and we must deliberately refer to 'a discourse' or 'discourses' in the count-noun form, for even though Foucault frequently uses the mass noun 'discourse,' he is typically keen to point out that this is something of a theoretician's shorthand, a way of signaling some common and general properties of particular discourses. Historically specific discourses (e.g., medicine and protopsychology in the nineteenth century) are quite distinct from one another as well as from earlier and later forms of 'themselves' that may or may not have the same names.

However, these discourses can also overlap and intersect as they change historically, such as those discourses on life, labor, and language we call biomedicine, economics, and linguistics. Foucault tried to trace these complex comings together and departures in *The order of things* (1970). Sometimes he treats the discourses separately; at other times he looks at their contribution to the possibility of each period having an overall view of the world (which he calls the Western episteme). For example, he finds that, in the 16th century, the 'table' of the human sciences had no concepts of life and labor at all. Nor was language thought of as a signifying system or 'medium': it was simply there as "one of the figurations of the world" (1970: 56), a naturally useable substance like air or water. Moreover – and this may be difficult for contemporary readers to appreciate – there was no concept of 'man' or 'humanity' at this time. In fact, Foucault argues that what we now call 'humanity' had no way of conceptualizing its separateness until the 19th century. 'Man,' in this

account, is barely a couple of centuries old. Before this, there were different connections and separations to be made.

We should note here that *The order of things* is clearly dependent, in many respects, on Martin Heidegger's deep suspicions concerning the historical fragility of the concept of 'man' – though Foucault's work makes no direct acknowledgment to any such source. This may be because Heidegger's own dating of 'man' has the concept arrive much earlier than does Foucault's (for details, see Heidegger, 1997).

To take an example from before the centrality of the idea of 'man,' the discipline called 'natural history' in the 17th and 18th centuries was purely descriptive and taxonomic. It dealt with tables of types; in this case, tables of life-forms. Natural historians merely collected, described, and tabulated species and types; they never tried to form overall theories of life in general (as did, e.g., Darwin in the 19th century). Such forms of thought simply were not available, and the same was true of the discourse concerning labor in these earlier times. The discipline then known as the 'analysis of wealth' merely tried to examine forms of exchange and trade, as though what we would now think of as humanly produced ('man-made') commodities were 'natural' things to be bought and sold. There was also, at this time, a discourse that dealt with language called 'general grammar.' Just as natural history collected and tabulated species, and the analysis of wealth categorized forms of exchange, however, so did general grammar seem happy to separate language into, for example, nouns and verbs and to create taxonomies of their types.

By the early 19th century, however, these three discourses had become much more distinct. They had become separate sciences: early biology (whose major figure is Cuvier), early economics (Ricardo), and philological linguistics (Bopp). As the period known as the Enlightenment (Rabinow, 1987: 32–50) – and particularly Kant's analysis of the limits or finiteness of what knowledge could achieve – began to have its belated effect beyond philosophy proper, these separate discourses appeared to have a previously unforeseen object in common: 'man' as both the one who was able to 'know' and, simultaneously, as the area or object to which knowledge should primarily be applied. (Again, this version of 'man' in Foucault is highly dependent on Heidegger's [1997] analysis of the emergence of 'man' as *subjectum* in/as the earliest moments of modernity.) It only then became possible to say, think, or write that man lives, man labors, and man speaks. This makes possible the field of the human sciences as Foucault knew it in his day, so that there emerged new objects requiring new

analyses, with distinct discourses covering each of the three areas: psychology (human life), sociology/economics (human labor), and literature and myth (human signification, as it were, 'man' to 'man').

Then, in the 20th century, structuralism announces the supposed 'death of man,' the idea that this seemingly old, but actually quite recent, conception of man is a fiction and has always been 'really' absent, and that what we strangely confine to the category of 'humanity' is a highly delimited conception of being. With respect to 'life,' psychology is (we hear) replaced by psychoanalysis, which assumes that a uniform structure known as 'the unconscious' inhabits each of us in more or less identical ways. (The unmarked figure is Lacan.) As for 'labor,' ethnology now replaces general sociology/economics, and structural conditions situate human societies as mere responses (albeit differentiated) to universal conditions and needs (Lévi-Strauss, perhaps?). In the case of 'language,' structural linguistics looks for universals beneath the specific, local, and unique bits of language that are actually written and spoken (Chomsky?). At this point, contemporary discourses (including, we might add, the discourses on discourse itself) are put in their historical position. They are pluralized so that they no longer seem to have unique access to fundamental truths. Truth becomes a function of what can be said, written, or thought, and Foucault's (1981: 6) poststructuralist project becomes one of exposing the historical specificity – the sheer fact that things could have been otherwise – of what we seemed to know during Foucault's own 'today' (i.e., c. 1970) with such certainty.

Our more immediate question is, after all, what does Foucault mean by 'discourse'? After working on what he called the discourses of life, labor, and language in *The order of things*, Foucault (1972) immediately began to try to theorize the concept of discourse as such in his next book, *The archæology of knowledge*. This is perhaps Foucault's most difficult work. *The order of things* is complex enough as it is, but to trying to read a complicated theoretical reflection on it (which is what *The archæology of knowledge* is) in the absence of *The order of things* is a near impossibility. Still, *The archæology of knowledge* is the main work in which Foucault tries to spell out what he means by 'discourse.' The best way to deal with Foucault's approach to discourse, however, is to work carefully through *The order of things* (despite its seemingly arcane history of the human sciences) and then to read *The archæology of knowledge* for a more theoretical formulation of Foucault's rethinking of this topic.

Because the type of 'discourse theory' to which Foucault contributed is less well known in

English-speaking circles than are formal and empirical approaches, a brief historical preamble is in order. Pre-Foucauldian critical discourse theory originated in continental, largely French, philosophical traditions. It had its most cogent application in relation to the history of ideas rather than to the analysis of either formal language systems or social structures. O'Sullivan *et al.* (1983: 72–73) argue that it began with structuralism itself and its opposition to those "inherited habits of thought and analysis" which assumed that social and cultural 'objects' existed in the 'real world' ready to be seized or (as one said in those days) 'adequated.' The structuralists, particularly the early Roland Barthes, tried to show that, on the contrary, these objects exist only "as *products*, not *sources*, of … signification." But this position on discourse – which still differs from Foucault's in that it attaches discourse primarily to signification – did not mean that 'anything goes.' Because 'objects' are said to be 'discursively produced,' this does not imply that we can make the world into anything we want simply by speaking, writing, or thinking in a certain way (Macdonell, 1986). Instead, structuralist and semiotic approaches to discourse were intended as critiques of individualism and idealism. According to this position, what we can imagine (let alone put into practice) is both permitted and constrained by the structurally available discursive possibilities at our disposal.

Foucault, however, argues that both formal and empirical approaches to discourse have tended to work on the side of the enunciation (*énonciation*) of discourse. By 'enunciation,' he means the techniques, the structures, the forms of know-how by which people are able to produce and recognize utterances. Such a narrow focus can include only the surface of language use, the ways and means by which concepts and meanings are spoken or written. In place of this emphasis, Foucault (1972) proposes to look at discourses (again in the plural) – historically specific bodies of knowledge – at the level of the enounced (*énoncé*) or, as his translators have it, the 'statement.' This change of emphasis moves discourse away from being simply a technical accomplishment (linguistic or interactional) on the part of preexisting subjects and redirects it toward the questions: What can possibly be said? And what can possibly be thought? Ergo: What can a subject be?

Referring back to his historical analyses in *The order of things*, Foucault (1972: 80) considers his failure there to specify the terms 'discourse' and 'statement' (*énoncé*):

> Instead of gradually reducing the rather fluctuating meaning of the word 'discourse,' I believe that I have in fact added to its meanings: treating it sometimes as the general domain of all statements, sometimes as an individualizable group of statements, and sometimes as a regulated practice that accounts for a certain number of statements; and have I not allowed this same word 'discourse,' which should have served as a boundary around the term 'statement,' to vary as I shifted my analysis or its point of application, as the statement itself faded from view? (Foucault, 1972: 80)

To clear up this confusion, Foucault asks whether we could think of the statement as a unit of (a) discourse, just as the sentence is a unit of (a) language. If so, it is then necessary to ask what kind of unit it is. For example, would it be exactly the same as a proposition, a sentence, or a speech act? Let us take these in order.

First, a statement cannot be the same as a proposition. The proposition is the basic unit of logical analysis: a declarative utterance describing an actual state of affairs, or else a 'truism.' Taking Foucault's (1972: 81) own example, the propositions "No one heard" and "It is true that no one heard" have identical propositional 'contents' – to all intents and purposes they are the same proposition. But they may constitute two different statements. We can see this by asking what they state in particular circumstances. If each were to occur as the first line of a novel, for example, Foucault (1972: 81) continues, they could provide the scene-setting for quite different kinds of narrative. The first – "No one heard" – could be "an observation made either by the author, or by a character," whereas the second "can only be in a group of statements constituting an interior monologue, a silent discussion with oneself, or a fragment of dialogue, a group of questions or answers".

According to this theory, Foucault's first criterion for a statement is that it should be responsive to what Pêcheux (1975) calls 'functioning.' Propositional content, at least in traditional logic, is thought to remain constant across different local usages. But unlike propositions, statements – as components of discursive formations – have to be thought of primarily as functional units. They do things, bring about pragmatic effects, rather than merely 'represent' states of affairs.

Second, Foucault argues, a statement is not the same as a sentence, at least as far as we can tell. Truncated 'sentences' – such as 'Absolutely!' – can, it is true, carry the force of statements. They can do things and create pragmatic effects, but this objection is trivial. Even formalist approaches acknowledge that such truncations can count as sentences. In fact, the sentence (according to any of the various schools of linguistics) is itself very difficult to define, and so we will never be in a position to decide clearly one

way or another about the correspondence (or lack of it) between sentences and Foucault's statements. However, there is some relatively firm ground, for it is possible to say that certain word groupings that are clearly not sentences do carry the force of statements. Foucault's (1972: 82) example is the paradigm of the Latin verb *amare* – *amo*, *amas*, *amat* ... – which schoolchildren once had to recite in class. Obviously, and perhaps even by definition, this is not a sentence, for it lists the forms that can 'fill slots' (verb positions) in actual Latin sentences. Yet it is still a statement, a "statement of the different personal inflections of the ... verb." Thus, classificatory schemata, tables, maps, and taxonomies, though rarely expressed as sentences, can be statements. The periodic table of the elements is a statement, and so is a price schedule or a timetable.

More importantly, these examples show clearly how groups of statements (where 'groups of statements' is approximately equal to 'discourses') act to both constrain and enable what we can know. Statements, that is, cannot be characterized by their syntactic or grammatical forms. Expressions that do not use verbal language can be statements: "a graph, a growth curve, an age pyramid, a distribution cloud" (1972: 82). The important thing (and this is Foucault's second criterion for a statement) is that statements should be component parts of knowledge systems ('systems of thought').

Third, a statement cannot be the same as a speech act. Austin (1975) argued that speech acts (e.g., saying "I do" during a wedding ceremony – a performative utterance that accomplishes an event in and by its very saying), to be successful, must meet certain 'felicity conditions.' Not all instances of "I do" will count: it must be said in front of someone who is vested with the authority to conduct marriages, the two parties must consent, and so on. It is true that both Austin's speech acts and Foucault's statements can be said to 'accomplish' events and create effects, but equivalences between (some) speech acts and (some) statements are merely coincidental.

Can we say, for instance, that there is equivalence between "I promise" when it is said as a proposal of marriage within the discourse of medieval romance and "I promise" when it is said as an agreement to meet for lunch? Perhaps these are equivalent speech acts (strictly, they are both 'commissives'), but each is a different statement. The two statements occur in totally different social 'technologies' and historically formed discursive practices. Each, if successful, produces distinct kinds of human subjects: lovers and lunchers; each, again if successful, (re)creates and maintains political institutions as different as love and lunch. Hence the third criterion for

a statement is that it should be part of a technique or techniques for the production of human subjects and institutions.

Returning to Foucault's initial question about whether statements are perhaps 'units' of discourses, we can see that the answer is a qualified 'no.' A statement is not strictly a unit at all in the way that the proposition, the sentence, and the speech act may be. Instead, it is a "function that operates vertically in relation to these various units, and which enables one to say of a series of signs whether or not they are present in it" (Foucault, 1972: 86). It is "not itself a unit, but a function that cuts across a domain of structures and possible unities, and which reveals them, with concrete contents, in time and space" (1972: 87). Statements can therefore be understood not as fixed components, but only via the rules that govern their functioning. However, these rules are not like, for example, grammatical rules: They have to do with historically variable bodies of knowledge, they are the rules for what it is possible to know. Hence, they are not susceptible to (nor can they help us arrive at) a general theory of language.

Statements and the rules that govern them are not purely linguistic (indeed, we have seen that they can be completely nonlinguistic), nor are they purely material, but in fact, they connect these two domains. To analyze or describe discursive rules, in Foucault's sense, we must always turn to specific historical conditions – to the piecemeal, the local, and the contingent. Events, no matter how specific, cannot happen just anyhow. They must happen according to certain constraints, rules, or conditions of possibility. These restrictions mean that discourses always function in relation to power relations in Foucault's rather idiosyncratic sense of the term. Because power is crucial to any understanding of Foucault's theory of discourse, we must consider it here briefly, if prematurely.

For Foucault, 'power' is very different from traditional sociopolitical conceptions of it. Discourse is not a mere effect or end-product of preexisting Power (with a capital 'P'). Nor is power 'owned' by some privileged person or group and exercised "simply as an obligation or a prohibition on those who 'do not have it'" (Foucault, 1977: 27). Power, for Foucault, is not just the ruthless domination of the weaker by the stronger (to paraphrase Nietzsche); in fact, it is not to be 'had' at all.

> Power is everywhere; not because it embraces everything but because it comes from everywhere .... Power comes from below; that is there is no binary and all-encompassing opposition between ruler and ruled at the root of power relations, and serving as a general matrix – no such duality extending from the top down and reacting on more and more limited groups to the

very depths of the social body. One must suppose rather that the manifold relations of force that take shape and come into play in the machinery of production, in families, limited groups and institutions, are the basis for wide-ranging effects of cleavage that run through the social body as a whole. (Foucault, 1979: 93–94)

Eco (1986: 244), however, argues that this radical rethinking of power by Foucault does not mean that it has no possible connections with language. Instead, Foucault's

image of power closely recalls the idea of the system that linguists call *the given language*. The given language is, true, coercive (it forbids me to say "I are him," under pain of being incomprehensible), but its coercion doesn't derive from an individual decision, or from some center that sends out rules in all directions: It is a social product, it originates as a constrictive apparatus precisely through general assent . . . . I'm not sure we can say that a given language is a device of power . . . but it is surely a model of power. (Emphasis added)

So, as an illustration of how far we have come now from formalist conceptions of discourse as language, we can now see that the linguistic system (the *langue*) itself, far from being the source of discourse, is just one instance of power where power is considered as a set of relations of force. Because these relations are local and historically contingent, they cannot be 'predicted' by a general theory. Only particular investigations – what the early Foucault calls 'archæological' investigations, investigations of a specific 'archive' – can specify them.

Returning to the level of the statement: statements are best approached not individually, but in terms of the organizations or archives of which they form a part. Hence, what can be said or not said about something is neither absolutely fixed (because it varies historically) nor open to the whims of the moment. For

the archive . . . determines that all these things said do not accumulate endlessly in an amorphous mass, nor are they inscribed in an unbroken linearity, nor do they disappear at the mercy of chance external accidents; but they are grouped together in distinct figures, composed together in accordance with multiple relations, maintained or blurred in accordance with specific regularities. (1972: 128)

Even though it can (by chance perhaps?) take a linguistic form, the statement is a sociohistorical function rather than a strictly linguistic one. Yet because statements can still be located in talk and texts, we can work from collections of statements to their organizing archives. This archaeological method shows that social histories of thought, knowledge, and power are both unique and specific as well as having general properties. Foucault (1981) called

this method of tracing the systematic (archival) properties of unique and local affairs 'eventalization.' It is no accident, then, that he refers to the archive as "the very root of the statement-*event*" (1972: 129; emphasis added).

However, Foucault's idea of the discursive archive does not simply replace concepts like 'system,' 'structure,' '*langue*,' and so on. Rather, analyses of an archive as a condition of 'stating,' as a relatively stable system of functioning (at specific places and times), must be taken together with analyses of its historical flux, of "the general system of the formation and transformation of statements" (1972: 130). 'Archive' is a much more mobile and fluid term than the relatively fixed concept of 'episteme' (1970). The concept of an archive "deprives us of our continuities" (1972: 131) and establishes the fact that human subjects and historical events are not firm and discrete (id)entities but are fragmented and changing sites across which the flows of power move – and sites that, in turn, themselves move the flows of power. The archive, more radically, "establishes that we are difference, that our reason is the difference of discourses, our history the history of difference, our selves the difference of masks" (1972: 131). Hence, in another work of self-commentary, Foucault (1978) argues for three radical modifications of our (then?) current conception of discourse.

Instead of thinking of discourse (in the singular) as a global 'language' pertaining to a global history, so that everything (even silence) refers back to a hidden 'meaning' that the historian or philosopher must find and interpret, Foucault argues that discourses (in the plural) are "limited practical domains" (1978: 16) that have their own "rules of formation" and "conditions of existence" (1978: 16). There is no meta-discourse, or higher discourse, that grounds specific discourses.

Instead of thinking that a totally free and unlimited human subject merely 'uses' the techniques of discourse to express itself, that is, to construct meanings from prelinguistic 'cognitions,' Foucault argues that the historian of ideas can find, as part and parcel of a discourse, "the operations exercised by different 'discoursing' subjects" (1978: 16). This is just one constituent of discourse analysis (as history of ideas). It gives no priority or privilege to the human subject, although it by no means, as in severe versions of structuralism, 'deletes' the subject (Althusser, 1976). In fact, in his later work, Foucault went on to give detailed attention to those discursive operations he called the techniques of the self and described what he was doing as the history of the human soul.

Instead of thinking that history once had a definite origin so deeply buried in the past that we have lost

touch with it, so that we must now remember it afresh as the 'real' starting point and purpose of humanity's 'being in the world,' Foucault suggests that history itself – the medium in which we are condemned to have our being – is differentiated and fragmented into particular discourses, and that each fragment (each discourse) has a temporal threshold, a process of coming-into-being, and an equally complex process of disappearance that can be analyzed and described.

For any Foucauldian approach, discourse then turns out to be more important than mere linguistic or social structure (or, indeed, their combinatory possibilities). It is intimately connected with the necessary historicity and finitude of our being in the world and the (perhaps paradoxical) fragility of that condition. It has, ultimately, to do with what we can know in any particular eventual circumstance – and how that knowing makes us what we are as historically located subjects. To make a travesty of a long-forgotten beer commercial: It refreshes the parts of our being that other discourse theories cannot reach.

Acknowledgments

See also: Constraint, Pragmatic; Power and Pragmatics; Pragmatics: Overview; Principles and Rules; Speech Acts; Speech Acts and Grammar.

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Discourse, Narrative and Pragmatic Development

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Discourse, Narrative, and Pragmatics

In linguistics, the term 'discourse' refers to a structural unit larger than the sentence. Of the many definitions for it in a standard dictionary, linguistics picks out length and coherence as criterial. Discourse involves more than one sentence, and the sentences must be contingent. Just as every string of words is not a sentence, not every sequence of utterances is considered a 'text.' For discourse, there are requirements of relevance in form and especially in meaning. Texts can be created by more than one participant, as in conversation or in various

forms of monologue, most notably narrative and exposition.

The study of discourse is generally considered the province of pragmatics in that it involves the uses of sentences (the products of a syntax), when people attempt to communicate information. Analogous to 'syntactic competence,' learners must also develop 'communicative competence' (Hymes, 1972), where utterances are judged less in terms of form than with respect to how well they meet the requirements of various speech situations. However, to the extent that there are formal dependencies across sentences, for example, relationships of coreference or structural mappings governing ellipsis, the study of discourse may fall under syntax; and the description of degrees of relevance or coherence between sentences places it within various semantic frameworks. (Poetry, a specialized form of discourse, exploits sound patterns as well to create links between successive lines, but those phenomena are only rarely treated within phonology.)

Research on the acquisition of pragmatics in first language learning focuses on four major aspects of communicative competence.

1. Developing 'speech acts,' or the communicative functions of sentences in conversation. For example, using utterances to report events, make statements (or declarations) about the world, request information or action, or prohibit action (Dore, 1975; Searle, 1969).
2. Emerging 'conversational skills' in face-to-face verbal interaction. These include knowing when and how to take a turn in conversation; how to initiate, elaborate, or terminate a topic; and how to respond to a speaker in keeping with the pragmatic constraints set by the preceding utterance (e.g., direct question forms demand answers; indirect questions [*can you pass the salt?*] demand actions). They also include skills in detecting the presence and source of any breakdown in communication and knowing how to repair such breakdowns (Garvey, 1984; McTear, 1985).
3. Adjusting one's language to fit the social context of the conversation in keeping with cultural conventions and social roles. These involve issues of politeness, formality, and the age or status of one's listener in what have been called 'styles' or 'registers' of speech.
4. Taking an extended turn to tell a story ('narration'), explain an event, give directions on how to make something or how to get somewhere, or persuade one's listener in an argument ('exposition'). These are referred to as different 'genres' of extended discourse and require the organization of utterances into coherent and cohesive messages.

Early Pragmatics Development

A useful framework for understanding early pragmatics development derives from the theory of speech acts (Austin, 1962; Searle, 1969). According to Austin, speaking was 'doing things with words.' All sentences are speech acts, but the clearest illustration is the performance of those acts that can only be done with words, like promising or marrying. For example, the sentence *I now pronounce you husband and wife* is not a description of an event, but its utterance is the event. The marriage pact is not made until those words are spoken by a qualified person in the context of a wedding ceremony. In Austin's view, sentences have three components: intended function, 'illocutionary force'; form, 'locution'; and effect on the listener, or 'perlocution.'

By moving speech into the sphere of action, Speech Act theory points to nonverbal behaviors as precursors to speaking. Using the framework of Speech Acts, Bates *et al*. (1975) identified three phases in the earliest pragmatic development of children: the perlocutionary, illocutionary, and locutionary phases. For example, while stretching for something out of reach, an infant might make an involuntary effort noise. If the noise alerted a helpful adult to the child's activity, and she or he handed the object to the child, one could say that the child's behavior had an effect, but not that the child intended to communicate. The act would be perlocutionary, but not illocutionary. A slightly older child might look intently at the adult and grab for a toy in the adult's hand. Bates and her colleagues would have ascribed intention to the action with the intent look that accompanied it and called it illocutionary. The final locutionary phase begins when the child has the intention to communicate and uses words to do so (whether or not the perlocution, or effect, is the same as the one intended).

In this vein, Dore (1975) reported on a child in the one-word stage, who used intonation to change the illocutionary force of a single locution: 'mama' with a falling contour to name her, a rising contour to make a question, and an abrupt rise-fall to call her. As their linguistic repertory grows, children can move from 'protoimperatives' or 'protodeclaratives' to actual imperatives and assertions, and eventually to the whole range of functions that words make possible: requesting, prohibiting, greeting, cursing, promising, labeling, etc.

Conversation as Discourse

Among the pragmatic functions toddlers master toward the end of the second year, such as answering, repeating, and requesting, those that elicit further speech are key. When children can both speak and

elicit speech, they have the basic tools for creating discourse through conversation. Conversations in turn have sets of rules to be mastered.

Grice (1975) and Sacks *et al.* (1974) have described such sets of rules based on observations of successful and unsuccessful conversations. The most basic principles are (1) to take turns and (2) to be 'cooperative.' Grice defined cooperation in terms of four 'maxims,' the Maxims of Quantity, Quality, Relevance, and Manner. When it is a person's turn in conversation, his or her contribution should provide neither too much nor too little information, and it should be relevant, clear, and true.

The first of these behaviors to show development is 'turn-taking.' In many cultures, mothers will treat their infants and toddlers as conversational partners well before the children are capable of effective turn-taking. One may respond to the child's smiles and burps as well as his vocalizations, thus modeling responses in a turn-taking rhythm and extending periods of 'joint attention' with the child. Following another's gaze and establishing joint attention about an object appear to be themselves important precursors to conversation. Research shows that time spent in joint attention at six to eight months predicts later language measures (Mundy and Gomes, 1998). Indeed, periods of joint attention are the necessary context for conversation. Over the second year, children move from responding to others' vocalizations with actions to responding mostly with other vocalizations, i.e., conversing.

A second key to promoting conversation is learning to be relevant. The second speaker must make his or her responses share the first speaker's topic and add new information to it. As novice conversationalists, children depend heavily on assistance (or 'scaffolding') from their conversational partner. In general, children have been shown to respond more to questions than nonquestions, and the questions help by directing the nature of the response. Caregivers encourage children's contingent responses by asking questions and doing what Kaye and Charney (1980) called 'turnabouts,' turns that first respond to the child's prior utterance and then request further response. Still, the ability to give contingent responses, despite mothers' scaffolding of children's efforts, is slow to develop.

Preschool conversations between toddlers are tentative at best when neither party can reliably be relevant. Even in adult-child dialogue, 2-year-old children's responses tend to be mainly noncontingent. In a longitudinal study of dialogues between two young girls between the ages of four and six, McTear (1985) traced the emergence of greater and greater thematic continuity in their conversation as utterances came to serve the dual role of responding to a preceding utterance, as well as providing for further talk. However, Dorval and Eckerman (1984) showed that second graders (8-year-olds) were nearly as likely to give noncontingent responses as contingent ones, with significant improvement not seen until fifth grade (age 11 or so).

Skill at conversational exchanges also involves being aware of when a turn is not successful. Efforts at repairing misunderstood turns are seen before age three (Garvey, 1984). The youngest children tend to simply repeat their failed messages, while children older than three are more likely to revise their messages (Tomasello *et al.*, 1984). 3- to 4-year-old children respond appropriately to a variety of requests for clarification from the caregiver, including those that request simply a repetition of an element of the child's utterance, a confirmation of what was heard, or further specification of an element in the child's message (Garvey, 1984). However, use of such clarification requests by the child herself to repair her own understanding is still inconsistent in the preschool years. In a variety of communication tasks, preschoolers often fail to question ambiguous information and do not themselves provide maximally informative messages (Garvey, 1984).

Finally, preschool children are also learning how to change their style, or register, of speech according to the needs and desires of their interlocutor. Politeness forms begin to emerge in 2-year-olds (Ervin-Tripp, 1977), who have demonstrated that they know to change the degree of directness of their requests when prompted to say it "even more nicely." 4-year-olds have also shown that they speak differently to a 2-year-old than to another 4-year-old or an adult, making some of the accommodations associated with motherese for the younger children (Hoff-Ginsberg and Kreuger, 1991). Where different dialects are involved, observers have recorded instances of code switching among 3- and 4-year-olds; the children used a more formal, mainstream dialect with adults, but more dialect features when addressing peers (Wyatt, 1991).

In the preschool years, children take many steps toward learning to produce discourse. In the context of conversation, they gradually move from observations and comments on ongoing activity to discussions of absent people and things involved in past or future events. That is, face-to-face conversation provides the option of using the nonlinguistic context to support the interpretation of what is being said. When the speaker cannot rely on the hearers having had the same experiences to help them understand the message, the speech must be more independent of the speaking context, or 'decontextualized.' It must

be more explicit and will typically require more complexity in syntax and cohesion (Tannen, 1982). Early moves to decontextualized speech in a conversational setting retain the potential benefit of interaction – questions and answers back and forth that help the speaker know what the hearer did not understand and to progressively refine her meaning. Thus, conversation provides both the motivation and the medium for children to take longer and longer solo turns.

From Conversation to Longer Texts, Narrative, and Expository

Longer turns in the context of scaffolded conversations with a mature speaker lead children toward their first narrative and expository texts. Narratives are essentially connected passages relating past events (Labov and Waletsky, 1967). Even among adults, they can commonly be 'co-constructed' in conversation with contributions from two or more participants, but a classic narrative is a self-contained production by one speaker (or writer).

Expository texts share many characteristics of narratives. They, too, are extended turns of decontextualized speech or writing, but their primary purpose is to convey information. There is no requirement that explanations relate events, although they often incorporate narrative passages. Different genres of exposition are more or less structured depending on their purposes and the amount of information that they need to package. A narrative or exposition must be structured to both impart information and govern the flow of the information. Through various linguistic forms, they distinguish what is background from what is highlighted, and what is given from what is new (Hickmann, 2003; Berman and Slobin, 1994).

Mature narratives present not only 'what happened' but further engage the listener in giving a perspective on the motivations and consequences of the events related. Using the same words and structures available for individual sentences, stories construct a 'hierarchical framework' for the whole text. For example, articles in English (*a* and *the*) identify definite versus nondefinite noun phrases within the sentence, but also function across sentences by signaling what is given (what has come before) from what is being currently introduced. Languages without articles, like Chinese, recruit other forms, e.g., word-order shifts, to perform the same functions (Hickmann, 2003). In both languages, such linguistic devices are 'multifunctional,' having one function within the sentence and at the same time another function in the discourse.

In addition, stories set up implicit expectations on the part of the narrator and also the characters in them. Such expectations derive both from world knowledge, of the usual sequence of events, and from the particular circumstances of their setting in a given story. The economical expression of the different levels of perspective and expectation represented by the characters, distinct from those of the narrator, requires the integration of sophisticated cultural, linguistic, and cognitive skills by the speaker. The 5-year-old, often considered in command of his syntactic system, is still very much a novice in creating sustained discourse. Many of the elements of successful narration and exposition are still developing as children move into adolescence (Hickmann, 2003: 324).

Relatively little research has been done on children's engagement with expository texts, although they clearly play an important part in their developing understanding of the world. The majority of children's school texts outside of 'language arts' are exposition and there is perhaps reason to include it more in early education.

Narrative Development

Much more attention has been given to narrative in research and in early schooling. Labov (Labov and Waletsky, 1967) and later Bruner (1986) argued that narratives are a fundamental way in which humans encode and make sense of their experiences. It is a daunting task to understand and describe the many strands of development involved in the process of narration, but much progress has been made since Labov (Labov and Waletsky, 1967; Labov, 1972) brought the attention of linguists to naturally occurring narratives in people's everyday lives and sought to apply the basic techniques of structural linguistic analysis to narrative functions. Just a few years later, Halliday and Hasan's (1976) seminal work paved the way for focused study of microstructures, or the specific links creating cohesion across sentences.

The distinction between 'cohesion' and 'coherence' in narrative is generally framed in terms of the contrast between linear or 'local' versus hierarchical or 'global' discourse organization. So, "linguistic cohesion" is seen for the most part in adjacent clauses, while "thematic coherence" pertains more to macrostructures at the global level of plot organizations. By studying narratives from different languages and cultures, studies can use the contrast of stories made both within and across groups, finding elements subject to individual differences, and finding candidates for discourse universals in the commonalities of macro- and microstructures across cultures.

Looking at development across time of the ways discourse functions are mapped onto forms in the

stories of different age groups in different language communities, researchers have picked out a general progression of which functions are successfully encoded at what age. One can also see how different languages make encoding one or another function more or less difficult to achieve. For example, in English the presence of an early acquired inflectional morpheme for progressive aspect (*-ing*) encourages early marking of events as ongoing. In contrast, children learning German (German, Standard) or Hebrew, which both lack a similar inflection for aspect, do not have a comparable signal of the distinction and thus may be later in recognizing the need to recruit available forms for it, like adverbs (Berman and Slobin, 1994: 34).

Another area of important development in narratives involves the child's Theory of Mind (ToM). Bruner (1986) made the distinction between the "landscape of action" (i.e. the events that took place) and the "landscape of consciousness" (i.e., the protagonists' reactions, intentions, and interpretations of the events). The ability to understand and express the landscape of consciousness involves a child's growing awareness of and ability to reason about the mental states of other people (Astington, 1993) as well as the child's mastery of the language forms that refer to mental states, especially noun clause complements, e.g., "thinks <u>that something is true</u>," "does not believe <u>what he sees</u>" (de Villiers and de Villiers, 2000). Such clauses permit the expression of two propositions with different truth values in one sentence; for example, a false clause can be embedded in a true clause so that the narrator can express something about the character distinct from his own thoughts.

Research Frameworks for Narrative Development

Several comprehensive studies of narrative development have ensued in the last three decades. Some focused on the macrostructure of the event sequences in the form of 'story grammars': e.g., Labov himself (Labov and Waletsky,1967; Labov, 1972), Mandler (1978), Stein (1982), Applebee (1978), McCabe and Peterson (1991). Others focused on the microstructure, and still others treated the relationships between micro- and macrostructure (Berman and Slobin, 1994; Hickmann, 2003).

Berman and Slobin (1994) merits particular attention in both the breadth and depth of their study, reported comprehensively in a 1994 volume, and in the host of studies their project has spawned. These 'frog stories,' like the pear stories (Chafe, 1980), the bear story (Snow *et al.*, 1995), the cat and horse

stories (Hickmann, 2003), and many others, use a single set of stimulus pictures presented to different populations under the same conditions. For example, Mayer's frog stories, especially *Frog, where are you?* (1969) have been told by adults and children of different ages, speaking languages of different typologies, with different language handicaps (Downs syndrome, deafness, Williams syndrome), different linguality (bi- and trilingual), and so forth.

Developing Narrative Coherence

Models of plot structure (or 'story grammars') provide the frame for describing and analyzing children's growth in coherence. Labov's influential schema (Labov and Waletsky, 1967) is one of the first to define the minimal characteristics of a well-formed story. It should have an onset, an unfolding, and a resolution (roughly, a beginning, middle, and end). In a later formulation (Labov, 1972), the onset of a fully formed narrative has an abstract, a brief statement of what the story is about, and it also provides an orientation or setting, the 'who, where, and when.' The unfolding is the obligatory nucleus of the story and consists of one or a series of complicating actions, which lead to a high point and then the resolution or result. At the end of the story, the narrator provides a coda, a short passage that indicates that the story is over and may bridge back to the conversation in which the story was embedded. In this schema, the strictly 'narrative' clauses recall the temporally ordered experience being recounted; the 'free' clauses or 'evaluative' elements have no fixed position in the text but occur throughout, and together give the motivation or commentary to the story. Evaluative statements convey the narrators' personal involvement in the story through expressing their own or the characters' desires, intentions, thoughts, or opinions – Bruner's 'landscape of consciousness.' Evaluation is found in 'free' clauses or can be embedded in the fixed narrative clauses in the form, for example, of intensifiers, similes, hypotheticals, etc., which go beyond a simple direct telling of what actually happened.

Stein's model (1982) was similar to Labov's but focused more attention on the unfolding components of the story. In her story grammar, after a 'setting,' there are 'episodes,' each with an 'initiating event' and an 'internal response,' which motivate an 'attempt' leading to a 'consequence' and resulting in a 'reaction.' One aspect of growth in children's stories, then, occurs in their progressively more complete episode structure. (See also Mandler, 1978; McCabe and Peterson, 1991; Trabasso and Rodkin, 1994; Berman and Slobin, 1994: Part IIa.)

Some authors have highlighted different schema for stories in various cultures and subcultures

(Gee, 1989). Still, a basic sequence for the development of children's ability to tell a story from a set of pictures, like those reported in Applebee, 1978, or Berman and Slobin, 1994, is more or less as follows:

1. 3- to 4-year-olds only occasionally provide minimal narrative sequences (two or three dynamic events related in a temporal chain), but more often respond to the request to "look at the pictures … and then tell a story" with picture descriptions which treat each scene as an isolated event. Applebee (1978) elaborated further on pre-narrative development, characterizing children's most primitive stories as 'heaps,' lists of unrelated referents and events.
2. In a second phase, children organize 'chains' of events ordered in time. These tend to focus on the most salient pictures, rather than the events that advance the story.
3. Next, a 'causal structure' emerges (Trabasso and Rodkin, 1994). Early causal relationships generally begin by relating local or adjacent events and only later become more global.
4. At an intermediate level, children may manage one or two well-formed 'episodes,' but they are not able to sustain the organization throughout. Among the many stories analyzed by Peterson and McCabe (1991), one frequently seen category includes those that end at the high point, (i.e., do not manage to bring the story to a resolution).
5. The most mature stage projects a causal structure over the whole story, where events relate to an initial goal and attempts to reach the goal. The outcome is coordinated with respect to the goal and includes evaluative commentary, all organized in what Berman and Slobin (1994), following Guiora, called an 'action-structure' that communicates beyond its content through its organization the hierarchy of importance within the story.

Support for these stages also comes from studies of children's comprehension of and judgments about texts. Esperet (cited in Hickmann, 2003), for example, presented children with four types of candidate texts: (1) unconnected sentences; (2) event scripts, with a temporal order but no episodic structure; (3) incomplete stories; and (4) complete stories. Consistent with the findings from production studies, the 5- to 7-year-olds could differentiate true stories from unconnected sentences, but only the older children, the 9- to 11-year-olds showed sensitivity to the difference between complete and incomplete stories and scripts.

Well-formedness also appears to affect children's processing of stories. When subjects are presented with 'canonical' stories and stories where different narrative units are deleted or displaced, even 5-year-olds will show better recall for the canonical stories, and generally will repair anomalous stories in retelling by making them more compatible with their canonical versions (Mandler, 1978).

Developing Narrative Cohesion

The most influential framework underlying discussions of development in this area derives from Halliday and Hasan's *Cohesion in English* (1976). They described (and proposed coding for) the microstructure of a text, the 'semantic links' between elements across sentences. Halliday and Hasan presented a comprehensive taxonomy for five types of cohesion – Reference, Substitution, Ellipsis, Conjunction, and Lexical. They listed over a dozen subtypes for each, and in their coding indicated the direction, distance (number of intervening sentences) between the cohesive element and its source, and whether the link was direct or 'mediated,' i.e. linked to its source through another cohesive element that is also linked to the same source. Most links are considered to be 'anaphoric,' referring to an element in the preceding text, but can also be 'cataphoric,' referring to an element in text that follows. Reference that can be determined only from the situation outside the text is 'exophoric,' as opposed to textual or 'endophoric' links.

In general, as children get older, one sees fewer instances of deixis and exophoric references, and more connectivity within the text. The most crucial ties concern those that maintain 'reference' to the entities in the stories and those that locate the events in 'space' and 'time.' For tracking shifts in spatial location, one element is established as an 'anchor,' and then subsequent actions take place in some relation to the anchor. For time, the story sets a tense for the 'event time,' and then moves back and forth on a time line between the event time and the 'utterance time' (Hickmann, 2003).

The key principle is that the text, whether narrative or expository, must establish its own reference points in a way that does not presuppose prior knowledge of them. Once they are established, reference to them must be maintained consistently, until new elements are introduced and become available for 'presupposition' by subsequent elements. Managing presupposition is a task that requires both linguistic knowledge of the particular forms used in a given language and conceptual awareness of the knowledge state of the listener. For example, in English, use of the definite article *the* or a personal pronoun (*she*, *it*, *they*) presupposes an antecedent. To use them in a 'first mention' without an antecedent is anomalous or immature. But once an entity has been mentioned,

it becomes anomalous not to use the presupposing forms. Ex. _John returned from a trip. He brought news of his travels_, not *he brought news of a trip. Younger children will generally use these forms in relation to their own knowledge base. In telling a narrative, though, the knowledge of the hearer is almost always different from that of the speaker, so the narrator must suppress his or her own reference points and maintain the ties from the listener's point of view – or in some cases, from the character's.

A fundamental error for young narrators is to use a presupposing form for first mention and indeed we see that 4- and 5-year-olds give appropriate 'newness marking' of first mentions at or below chance levels, whereas by nine or ten years old, they reach near adult levels (92%, Hickmann, 2003: 196). Note that young Chinese speakers have the same task of marking newness, but their language does this with word order, whether the element comes before or after the verb. Since word order has so many other functions linguistically, the task of marking newness is even more complicated for those learning Chinese.

Similarly, for 'maintaining reference' in English, one option is to use a zero form (ellipsis), e.g., 'He went up the rock and 0 called for the frog.' The choice of the null subject requires both discourse knowledge of when it is appropriate and syntactic knowledge of how to conjoin verb phrases. Berman and Slobin (1994: 181) reported that nearly all of the English preschoolers used null subjects in their stories, but not for discourse purposes. Unlike subject ellipsis among older narrators, the preschoolers used them either ungrammatically or conversationally, in response to questions their listeners used to prompt them to continue. Here, the obstacle appeared to be that the younger children had not completely mastered the conditions on phrasal conjunction ('he went and 0 called').

Cohesion is also enhanced by communicating a clear temporal order. Early stories tend to give no indication of the relative timing of events. By kindergarten, half of the children give adverbial sequencers like 'then,' 'and then,' or 'next.' By second grade or so, more children begin to use adverbial time clauses and create complex relationships between events (Pearson and Ciolli, 2004). (See also Berman and Slobin, 1994, for a description of the emergence of temporal links in the frog stories.)

Developing the Evaluative Function

Stories must have coherence and cohesion to be interpretable, but they must develop evaluative elements to be meaningful. Actions make the most sense when we know the actors' motivation and intentions, and stories are more engaging when they relate the actors' emotions and desires and the narrator's reactions. The narrator must paint the 'landscape of consciousness' for the listener.

The earliest references to mental states in young children's narratives talk about the simple emotions or desires of the characters – happiness, sadness, fear, and anger in the case of emotion, and what they want or like in the case of desires. However, such expressions of mental state are still rather rare in the narratives of 5-year-olds although children at this age have a fairly well developed Theory of Mind (Astington, 1993). Between 5 and 9 years of age, children begin to incorporate more and more of the landscape of consciousness into their stories. More complex emotions like surprise, guilt, or jealousy, and references to the characters' cognitive states (what they believe, know, or are thinking about) begin to emerge (Berman and Slobin, 1994; Pearson and Ciolli, 2004).

Relation to Emerging Literacy

The relationship between Theory of Mind and discourse appears to be reciprocal. In order to tell an authentic story, rich with the internal reactions and cognitions of the characters, the child must have a conceptual understanding of mental states, a well-developed Theory of Mind. Similarly, a mature communicative competence requires the child to be able to judge the communicative intentions and desires of their interlocutors as well as infer their state of knowledge or ignorance about the topic of discourse. At the same time, the rich narratives that are told or read to children, and their active participation in back and forth conversation about them, provide developing children with some of the best evidence from which to build a Theory of Mind (Nelson, 1996).

Indeed, the pragmatic frameworks which guide the interaction of speakers in communicative situations build, with each new element of mastery, the tools to take the child to the next step, continually closer to adult norms for discourse. Many aspects of children's oral language predict their later skill with written discourse through the middle school years (Tabors _et al._, 2001).

See also: Bruner, Jerome Seymour; Communicative Competence; Conversation Analysis; Discourse Anaphora; Evolution of Pragmatics; Genre and Genre Analysis; Metapragmatics; Neo-Gricean Pragmatics; Register: Overview; Relevance Theory; Sacks, Harvey; Speech Acts, Classification and Definition; Speech Acts, Literal and Non-literal; Syntax-Pragmatics Interface: Overview; Tannen, Deborah.

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Discrimination and Language

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Various forms of linguistic discrimination throughout the world result from unique local circumstances. This article concentrates on linguistic perspectives, which intersect with historical, political, economic, educational, and other social influences that determine the stratification of dominant-to-subordinate groups everywhere. Those who hold political power tend to be linguistically dominant, and those who lack political clout are often linguistically subordinate. In some countries these sociopolitical linguistic circumstances become confused with popular conceptions of proper and improper uses of language (see Zentella, 1997).

Linguists from various backgrounds working in communities around the world have either directly or indirectly exposed forms of linguistic discrimination. Einar Haugen proved to be an exceptional pioneer regarding matters of linguistic discrimination derived from studies of bilingualism and its consequences. His article 'The stigmata of bilingualism' (Haugen, 1972) overtly recognizes that people who are fluent in two languages or who have partial competence in a second language speak with relative prestige based upon their fluency and the corresponding stature of those languages depending upon immediate circumstances.

Ferguson (1959) identified linguistic boundaries that coincided with related real or potential forms of language discrimination when he formulated the concept of diglossia, that is, where high and low forms of a language coexist with established linguistic functions regarding literacy, religion, education, etc. The 'High' (H) form is used for formal, religious, and scholarly purposes, while the 'Low' (L) form represents the colloquial vernacular that reflects many significant linguistic differences from the H form. He noted diglossia in Arabic, Greek, Swiss-German, and Haitian Creole, observing that the H form always had a strong formal literary tradition and that H was never acquired as a native dialect, but was always introduced through formal education.

Although Ferguson goes to great pains to restrict the concept of diglossia to H and L forms within a language, Fishman *et al.* (1971) found this concept to be so compelling that they extended it to include bilingual communities, such as those described by Haugen (1972). Linguistic purists often insist that diglossia must adhere to Ferguson's (1959) original monolingual depiction, albeit with explicit accounts of the H and L forms. Others may be attracted to Cooper *et al.*'s (1971) extended definition, which has been applied to socially stratified bilingual communities in which H is aligned with the dominant language and L is associated with the subordinate language. Such a distinction has proved useful to bilingual scholars who seek to make clear differences between countries such as Canada, with two official languages that coexist in law, and the United States, where speakers of languages other than English confront greater linguistic disadvantages.

Thus far our orientation toward discrimination has focused on linguistic prejudice against people who are engaged in face-to-face (or telephonic) conversation, but there are other interpretations of linguistic discrimination that are more socially favorable when viewed in terms of those who are concerned with upholding linguistic standards. In this sense the Académie Française may be thought of as engaged in linguistic discrimination, in this instance, to ensure the purity and longevity of Standard French. While evidence of linguistic prescriptivism is abundant, another interpretation of linguistic discrimination can be found in the pioneering work of Brown and Gilman (1960), who observed that formal and informal uses of *tu* and *vous* in French resulted from a keen sense of social awareness about relations among individuals within the French speech community. Use of *tu* and *vous* was not only influenced by linguistic constraints, appropriate usage required the ability to discriminate between those who are peers of comparable or lower social standing, and interlocutors who are more senior and therefore deemed worthy of the more formal *vous*. Deferential kinship terms of reference require similar capacities to discriminate between those who are elder or younger among speakers of Chinese, Japanese, and Korean, among others. In Paris or Tokyo the native speaker of the local dominant language must discriminate between those who are deemed worthy of linguistic honorifics and those whose social standing is subordinate to that of the speaker.

Fastidious scholars have taken care to specify the forms of linguistic discrimination that can be gleaned from their research. One of the most illuminating accounts of research that helped dispel racial stereotypes about language can be found in Labov's groundbreaking essay 'The logic of nonstandard English' (Labov, 1972a). Labov (1972b) also used studies of American minority languages and dialects as the foundation for developing rigorous quantitative interdisciplinary studies of linguistic variation; he used conversational evidence as well as

speech that is strictly controlled under experimental conditions.

In the wake of the U.S. Civil War and ensuing racial strife that has lingered since the emancipation of American slaves, many unflattering and uninformed linguistic stereotypes and misconceptions about the intelligence of African-Americans has flourished and helped to perpetuate anti-black racism in America. Labov *et al.* (1968) built extensively upon Labov's major study of the social stratification of English in New York City (Labov, 1966). With support from programs intended to advance racial equality, Labov began the massive task of documenting the linguistic details of Puerto Rican and African-American English in New York City, and in so doing he challenged and debunked many of the prevailing myths about low intelligence among African Americans and those who have not learned English natively.

Many groups have experienced discrimination, but linguistic discrimination can be associated with individuals as well as groups. This article is devoted more broadly to groups of people who share voice qualities that belie their membership within one or more groups, that is, based on race, sex, sexual orientation, age, education, region, religion, ethnicity, class, etc. Goffman (1959) eloquently described the multiplicity of these groupings as they apply to individuals in their daily lives, as well as the various settings and situations in which individuals from one or more groups find themselves at any given moment.

Linguistic prejudice and discrimination frequently grow in postcolonial contexts that give rise to the birth of pidgin and creole languages (see Pennycook, 1998; Hymes, 1971; Romaine, 1988). Pidgins are born when two groups of speakers are in contact and draw upon features of their mother tongue and the unfamiliar language of their interlocutor. As such, a pidgin has no native speakers. However, once children acquire a pidgin language natively, it is transformed into a Creole. Throughout history most pidgins and the Creoles they gave birth to resulted from human conquests, where those who were enslaved and/or colonized came to speak nonstandard versions of foreign tongues that were spoken by more powerful colonizers or slave traders.

Linguistic stratification born of slavery, colonization, or other forms of human subjugation yields social conditions that repeatedly give rise to strong senses of linguistic superiority or inferiority that will vary greatly from one situation to another. For example, Trudgill (1982) observes 'covert prestige' associated with working-class speech in England, which at first blush may seem counterintuitive, however, the language of the popular masses will hold considerable esteem to those who preserve it and nurture it through their daily language usage.

India represents a postcolonial nation where colonialism has left indelible linguistic impressions to the point that English still serves as a lingua franca throughout the country, while India's native languages are more strongly associated with diverse groups from different regions. This linguistic hierarchy may be replicated in other colonial contexts to which Indians migrated, such as South Africa (Mesthrie, 1992).

Changing political circumstances that transformed Europe when the former Soviet Union disbanded resulted in linguistic discrimination of a different kind. Reisigl and Wodak (2001) and Wodak and van Dijk (2000) observe profound linguistic opinions and overt anti-Semitism in the writing of journalists as western European nations absorbed growing populations of citizens from other eastern European countries. Indeed, the linguistic plight of immigrants in various communities frequently trigger negative reactions from locals who dislike the speech of foreigners. These linguistic opinions are relative and often exist within a nation, typically with clear knowledge of regions where speech is distinctive. In this way, a double-edged object may be forged, of linguistic adoration (among insiders) and potential linguistic ridicule (from outsiders).

Very often government language policies can exacerbate linguistic conflict or social coherence. Switzerland is well known for linguistic egalitarianism because of having four official languages, whereas official language movements that are highly nationalistic may, perhaps inadvertently, foster social conditions for intolerance against those who lack fluency in dominant linguistic norms.

While these observations are devoted centrally to linguistic matters that are clarified by linguistic research, anthropologists, educators, sociologists, psychologists, and many others confirm that linguistic discrimination intersects with other dimensions of social strife that accentuate linguistic behavior as a sign of inclusivity or exclusivity.

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Discursive Practice Theory

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Introduction

Practice theories try to account simultaneously for the ways that human action is constrained by the social-cultural order ('structure') as well as for human agency, which reproduces and/or transforms 'structure.' Key figures in the formulation of practice theory in the social sciences include Pierre Bourdieu (1977), Anthony Giddens (1979), and Michel de Certeau (1984), promising a way out of the enduring dichotomies between individual and totality, structure and agency, and activity and system.

Distinctive Features of Practice Theory in Linguistic Research

Two features distinguish practice theory as it has been developed in linguistic theory. First, in addition to the work of Bourdieu and Giddens, the work of Soviet psychology (especially the Vygotskian school of activity theory) (*see* **Activity Theory; Vygotskij, Lev Semenovich**) and Peircean semiotics has been particularly significant. Second, what structure might mean, and thus the tools needed to go beyond a structuralist theoretical model, varies more from work to work than in other disciplines; linguists often grapple with the influence of social structure (the area focused on by practice-based accounts in most other disciplines), but sometimes they must also deal with the effects of grammatical structure or cognitive structure. In addition, they sometimes revisit ideas about the intersection of all three, for example in considering how language structures perceptions of the social world (especially in debates about the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis). Discursive practice theory often attempts to transcend the dichotomy between an objective view of language as a system unto itself (Saussure), and a subjective view, emphasizing the transitory creations of speaking subjects (phenomenological approaches). Also relevant are attempts to challenge dichotomies of type/token, form/use, synchrony/diachrony, and production/reception.

Practice theories challenge the view of social behavior as fundamentally ordered by rules and norms, which is evident in many formal and certain sociolinguistic approaches to language by focusing instead on the interplay of relatively stable schematic aspects of social life, and emergent, unformalizable ones. Instead of focusing on grammar, or even on the conventionalized, automatic correspondence between linguistic forms and context, a practice approach characterizes speech as a form of action, and language as fully interpenetrated by other modes of human engagement with the world (Hanks, 1996: 229–230). Practice theory thus effectively decenters language from its privileged place in linguistics.

In addition, while the unit of speech in formalist linguistic models is typically taken to be the isolable sentence of the individual speaker, in a practice approach it is the socially defined relation between agents and the social field that 'produces' speech forms (Hanks, 1996: 229–230). In this way, it rejects the attempt to reduce language use to conceptual models or individual psychology.

Two Examples of the Impact of Practice Theory in Linguistic Analysis

Genre Analysis

Genres are key units of description for the analysis of communicative practice. They are units greater than an utterance, but less than a language, and they are enduring conventions used to perceive the world and act on it (Hanks, 1996: 242). Earlier studies focused on structural definitions, trying to resolve which features constituted a sufficient or adequate basis for defining a genre (see Briggs and Bauman, 1992 for a review). Later studies, influenced by the ethnography of speaking and ethnoscience, investigated more locally relevant classifications but continued to use a taxonomic approach to classifying genre. Though Mikhail Bakhtin also used this approach, he also 'challenged the notion that genres are static, stylistically homogeneous, and nonoverlapping units,' and he introduced the need for considering the linguistic aspects of genres in terms of their ideologically mediated connections with social groups (Briggs and Bauman, 1992: 145). Hanks (1987) synthesized Bakhtin's 'sociological poetics' and Pierre Bourdieu's theory of practice, each of which he sees as inadequate on their own, to develop a notion of genre as an orienting framework for the production and reception of discourse. In his work, genres are not conceived of as unitary wholes, as in formalist approaches, but as schemes and strategies, focal elements which actors use variously and which never become fixed in structure. Hanks's (1987, 1996) analysis of texts produced in early colonial Maya society in Mexico shows how novel genres were being produced at a time when social conventions of all kinds were contested. The focus on historical materials, however, forced him to extrapolate about conditions of production and reception when his own theory of practice would ultimately require a fuller account (see also Hanks's (1990) detailed account of the relationship between deictics in Yucatec, which retheorized reference as a form of social practice).

Bauman and Briggs's perspectives on genre emerged from an interest in creating more space for analysis of verbal artistry with the notion of perfor-

mance, which had some affinities with the notion of practice. A focus on performance also shifted attention away from the formal patterning and symbolic content of texts to the emergence of verbal art in social interactions between performers and audiences (Bauman and Briggs, 1990: 59–60). However, as they noted, a focus on performance could also risk simply broadening the focus of analysis without transforming it. They signaled a shift in focus from product to process and from structures to agency by focusing on entextualization, decontextualization, and contextualization instead of text and context (see also Silverstein and Urban, 1996). This focus emphasizes the intertexuality of genre, emphasizing the ways that interpretation of discourse is shaped by being linked with a genre. Crucially, however, not everyone has the power to engage in these processes: "by invoking a particular genre, producers of discourse assert . . . that they possess the authority needed to decontextualize discourse that bears these historical and social connections and to recontextualize it in the current discursive setting" (Briggs and Bauman, 1992: 148). These approaches both highlighted that genres cannot be understood in terms of form and function alone; analysis required addressing questions of political economy, ideology, and power, though the significance of ideology was better elaborated in Briggs and Bauman's work.

Studies of Language and Gender   In social theory, theories of practice have tended to focus more broadly on class relations, bureaucratic structures, or culture (Ortner, 1996). In sociolinguistics and linguistic anthropology, however, one of the key sites for the elaboration of practice theory has been in studies of language, gender, and sexuality. Feminist theorists challenge biologically or culturally reductive accounts of gender by pointing out that gender is not something one has but something one does. A variety of metaphors have arisen to capture this idea: gender as activity (Goodwin, 1990), performance (Hall, 1999), accomplishment (West and Fenstermaker, 1993), or practice (Eckert and McConnell-Ginet, 1992). Fine-grained sociolinguistic analysis seems to be particularly useful for demonstrating the way gender is done in everyday practices. Marjorie Harness Goodwin drew on Vygotskian psychology to argue that activities, rather than cultures, individuals, or gender, should be the basic unit of analysis for the study of interactive phenomena. Goodwin examined the different social structures created by African-American boys and girls in a range of speech and play activities. In some activities she found girls and boys building systematically different social organizations and gender identities, while in others

she found them building similar ones. Her focus on activities suggested that behavior is not the implementation of social scripts or cognitive schemata, but rather the (re)construction of each event anew as it unfolds. The focus on activities thus usefully replaces essentializing analytic categories. Nonetheless, like some phenomenological accounts, it also seems to accord speakers a lot of agency and tends to focus on gender as constructed in individuals vs. institutions, in a way which perhaps betrays the psychological origins of activity theory. Goodwin's focus on activities also left her work vulnerable to a critique more widely made of practice theory: that the move beyond the focus on the contingency and locality of practices towards an account of how these practices articulate with larger social systems is endlessly deferred (Connell, 1987; McElhinny, 2003; Smith, 1999).

The work of Penny Eckert and Sally McConnell-Ginet kept a macrosociological picture more clearly in focus, in part because their model was meant to challenge a structuralist-functionalist paradigm widely used in variationist sociolinguistics that places class at the center of analysis. Language has often been seen in this tradition as a passive marker of the speaker's place in the socioeconomic hierarchy (Eckert and McConnell-Ginet, 1992: 468). Eckert and McConnell-Ginet replaced a functionalist definition of community with the concept of community of practice. A community of practice "is an aggregate of people who come together around mutual engagement in an endeavor. Ways of doing things, ways of talking, beliefs, values, power relations – in short practices – emerge in the course of this mutual endeavor" (1992: 464). They argued that discussions of gender and other aspects of identity "all draw on reifications that emerge from and constitute conventional maps of social reality. These reifications structure perceptions and constrain (but do not completely determine) practice, and each is produced (often reproduced . . .) through the experience of those perceptions and constraints in day-to-day life" (Eckert and McConnell-Ginet, 1995: 470). Eckert (2000) applied this concept to a study of a Detroit high school; Ehrlich (1997) applied it to studies of gender in second-language learning classrooms. A community of practice identifies a somewhat larger analytic domain than does activity, and it thus serves as a mediating region between local and global analysis. The notion of community of practice stops short, however, of social-theoretical analysis of large-scale inequalities (for some critical evaluations of the strengths and limits of the concept see Holmes and Meyerhoff, 1991).

Judith Butler's (1990) argument that gender works as a performative, constituting the very act that it performs, built on the definition of performative utterances in Austin (1962) and Searle's (1969) work on speech act theory. Her argument that there is no prediscursive event, that even our understanding of biology is discursively produced, placed significant emphasis on what analysis of discourse might reveal about how speakers manipulate feminine and masculine ideologies. The utility of the concept of performativity for ethnographic and sociolinguistic work is currently debated, as is the contribution Butler's work made to practice theory (Hall, 1999; Livia and Hall, 1997; McIlvenny, 2002; McElhinny, 2003). Sometimes her work was seen as granting speakers too much agency (Cameron, 1997), but she had also been critiqued for failing to grant actors enough agency (Hall, 1999).

Conclusions

The critiques of Butler's work are representative of the way practice theory has generally been received. While practice theory emerged out of the conviction that it is possible to mediate between the opposed shortcomings of subjectivism and objectivism, the theoretical responses to this apparent antinomy are invariably met with the critique that they fail to transcend this dilemma. Bourdieu's work had been especially susceptible to this critique (Schatzki, 1997; King, 2000). King argued persuasively that Bourdieu's formulation of habitus, defined as enduring social knowledge in the form of unreflective habits and commonsense perceptions, slipped back into the objectivism it attempted to refute since the dispositions that comprise habitus are directly derived from individuals' socioeconomic or structural positions. Many sociolinguistic accounts which rely extensively on Bourdieu have yet to engage with this critique. Another strain of practice theory inspired by Ludwig Wittgenstein, Gilbert Ryle, and Martin Heidegger had called into question the possibility and relevance of theorizing practice in the first place (Stern, 2003: 187). These influences have, as yet, been less well-developed in linguistic theory, though see Duranti (1997) and Sidnell (2003). While this approach to practice theory may rightly caution against a re-theorizing of practice, it also points to the inherently precarious position that practice theory occupies. 'Practice' approaches attempt to offer a rigorous theory of society and to maintain an orientation that closely attends to the details of local organizations of activity. While this makes it useful in its promise to resolve analytic tensions, it also means that practice theory, perhaps appropriately enough, remains inchoate. For this reason some scholars have suggested that the insights of practice theory might be better understood as a project or method than a theory.

See also: Activity Theory; Austin, John L.; Bakhtin, Mikhail Mikhailovich; Communities of Practice; Context, Communicative; Conversation Analysis; Gender and Language; Genre and Genre Analysis; Interactional Sociolinguistics; Marxist Theories of Language; Speech Acts; Vygotskij, Lev Semenovich.

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Education in a Multilingual Society

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Introduction

Societal multilingualism can be conceptualized in relation to two broad dimensions:

- The proportion of citizens who are fluent in two or more languages
- The degree to which languages other than the dominant language are used for purposes of social interaction within the society.

Thus, the degree to which any society is multilingual varies in relation to how many of its citizens are fluent in multiple languages and use these languages for a variety of functions in a range of social contexts. By implication, few societies can be characterized as completely monolingual in the sense that virtually every society includes individuals who use their multiple language abilities in a variety of social contexts. There is no simple cut-off point above which a society can be characterized as 'multilingual' and below which it is 'monolingual'; rather, societal multilingualism represents a continuum that is, in principle, quantifiable according to the variables outlined above.

In an era of globalization with unprecedented human mobility and social exchange, processes of language learning (and language loss) are apparent in societies around the world. Government policies attempt to influence these processes by supporting the teaching of certain languages in schools and, in some cases, by actively discouraging the maintenance of other languages, usually the languages of subordinated groups within the society (Skutnabb-Kangas, 2000).

The complexity of global multilingualism, and the challenges of language planning, can be appreciated in relation to the fact that that there are an estimated 5000 languages spoken in the world's 200 or so sovereign states and about two-thirds of all children in the world grow up in a bilingual or multilingual environment (Crystal, 1997). To illustrate, approximately half of the school populations in the Canadian cities of Toronto and Vancouver come from non-English-speaking home backgrounds. Similar linguistic diversity as a result of immigration and population mobility characterize many cities in Europe, the United States, and Australia. Other countries around the world have always been highly multilingual since their inception as nation states (e.g., India, Singapore, South Africa, Switzerland, etc.).

In the following sections, categorizations of educational provision in multilingual societies are outlined, and some of the major sociopolitical and psychoeducational issues that characterize this provision are discussed.

Categorizing Education in Multilingual Societies

The most obvious initial categorization of education in multilingual societies is whether instruction is conducted through one language exclusively or through two or more languages. Although bilingual and trilingual programs have been increasing throughout the world, partly as a result of many positive evaluations of these programs (see below), the bulk of educational provision in multilingual societies is monolingual in nature. The relative merits of monolingual versus bilingual programs will be considered in relation to the research evidence after reviewing the many complex manifestations of bilingual and multilingual education.

A variety of typologies have been proposed for categorizing multilingual education. Perhaps the best known of these is Mackey's (1970) typology that distinguishes 90 different potential varieties depending on the intersection of home language(s), curricular organization of languages, and language(s) of the community and country, as well as the regional and international status of the various languages.

A less complex categorization was proposed by Cummins and Corson (1997). They distinguished five broad types based on the sociolinguistic characteristics of the languages used in the program and the population groups the program is intended to

serve. Four of these program types are intended primarily for minority or subordinated group students while the fifth is intended for majority or dominant group students. These categories are not rigid, and some programs can be located in more than one category as a result of the fact that the same program serves several different groups of students.

Type I programs involve the use of indigenous languages as media of instruction and are aimed primarily at helping students of indigenous heritage acquire or consolidate their knowledge of the language. Examples include Quecha/Spanish bilingual programs in South America (Hornberger, 1988), Maori bilingual and immersion programs in New Zealand (Bishop and Glynn, 1999) and the a variety of Native language bilingual programs in the United States (McCarty, 1997). The indigenous group has usually been conquered or colonized at some time in the past, and the bilingual programs are typically aimed at revitalization of languages whose survival is threatened.

Type II bilingual programs involve the use of a national language together with a higher status or more dominant language. The national languages involved in these programs typically have long-term status in the society and often some degree of official recognition. The primary target group of Type II programs are speakers of the national language, and the program goals typically include the development of bilingual and biliteracy skills among students and reinforcement of the status of the language in the society. Examples include programs that use various African languages together with English in several African countries (e.g., Nigeria and South Africa), Gaelic in Ireland and Scotland, Welsh in Wales, Basque and Catalan in Spain, and French outside of Quebec in Canada (Baker and Prys Jones, 1997).

Type III programs involve immigrant languages that are the languages of relatively recent immigrants to a host country. Many of the bilingual programs in countries such as the United States, The Netherlands, Australia, and Sweden fall into this category. Most of these are transitional programs designed to facilitate students' overall academic progress. In some situations, Type II and Type III programs merge into one another, as in the case of some Spanish-English bilingual programs in the United States that may serve both long-term Spanish-speaking groups as well as more recent immigrant groups.

Type IV programs use manual sign languages to serve children who are deaf or hard-of-hearing. Bilingual/bicultural programs for deaf children are a relatively recent phenomenon. Scandinavian countries pioneered bilingual/bicultural programs for deaf students (Mahshie, 1995) and North American programs involving American Sign Language (ASL) followed in the early 1990s (Gibson *et al.*, 1997).

Type V programs may involve either a national language or a language of wider communication and are intended for dominant or majority group students. The primary goal is to develop bilingual and biliteracy skills among these students. Examples of Type V programs include French immersion programs in Canada (Swain, 1997) and dual language programs in the United States (Thomas and Collier, 2002). Dual language programs in the United States also fall into the categories of Type II or Type III since they serve both linguistic minority students and English L1 students with the goal of promoting bilingualism and biliteracy for both groups. The European Schools model that involves instruction in up to four languages at various points in the students' school career also qualifies as Type V (Beardsmore, 1993). Many Type II programs involving instruction through a national language can also be classified as Type V because they serve students whose L1 is the majority or dominant language as well as native speakers of the national language.

Debates and Research on Bilingual Programs

Various rationales are typically offered for implementing monolingual education in multilingual contexts. These include justifications related to educational effectiveness, ideological imperatives, and administrative/financial expediency. For example, in Western countries with significant immigrant and/or minority populations (e.g., the United States) intense debates have raged with respect to the educational effectiveness of bilingual education. Those who champion monolingual education in the dominant language argue that maximum instructional exposure to that language will result in better overall school achievement. This argument is frequently paired with the ideological justification that education should actively promote the assimilation of minority students rather than encourage them to maintain their L1 and allegiance to their home cultures. Bilingual education in these contexts is also frequently characterized as costly and administratively cumbersome.

Debates in post-colonial contexts have covered similar ground, albeit with some differences. The educational effectiveness argument for monolingual education in the higher status language of wider communication is frequently fueled by parents' perception that this is the language of power and upward mobility. Ideological considerations that lead some governments to support monolingual education include the fact that in highly multilingual countries the former colonial language is viewed as 'neutral' and thus no favoritism is shown to competing national languages. Finally, the cost and administrative

burden of developing curricula and educating teachers to teach in multiple languages are frequently viewed as prohibitive for recently independent and often impoverished nations. As a consequence, it is often seen as more administratively feasible to teach through the colonial language than to explore multilingual instructional options.

Although the arguments for monolingual education have been persuasive to many policy-makers and parents in both developed and developing countries, accumulating research evidence paints a very different picture. Evaluations in many countries have demonstrated that well-implemented bilingual and trilingual programs succeed in developing fluency and literacy in a minority language at no cost to the development of academic skills in the majority or dominant language (Spolsky, 1986; Williams, 1996; Cenoz and Genesee, 1998; Cummins, 2000; Baker, 2001; Thomas and Collier, 2002). Furthermore, although there may be increased start-up costs involved in any new program, bilingual and trilingual programs are not intrinsically more costly to operate than monolingual programs. The fact that students in bilingual programs experience no adverse academic consequences despite less instructional time through the dominant language has been attributed to the demonstrated transfer of concepts and skills across languages (e.g., phonological awareness, concepts in content areas such as science and mathematics, reading and learning strategies, etc.) (see Baker, 2001 for a review).

In summary, considerable research supports the feasibility of bilingual and multilingual programs both from the perspective of cost and overall educational effectiveness. However, effective implementation is much more likely when the ideological conditions in the wider society are favorable. In the absence of such favorable ideological conditions, educators committed to the bilingual program must work collaboratively to create a microcosm within the school where students' bilingual and bicultural identities are affirmed (Freeman, 1998).

See also: Bilingual Education; Bilingualism and Second Language Learning; Languages of Wider Communication; Linguistic Decolonialization; Minority Languages: Oppression.

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Educational Linguistics

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The Emergence of Educational Linguistics

By all accounts, educational linguistics as a defined
area of study began in the 1970s with the work of
Bernard Spolsky, who first put forth the term in a 1972
conference paper and later produced the seminal in-
troductory monograph on the topic in 1978. He origi-
nally envisioned educational linguistics as a sub-field
of linguistics, much like educational psychology and
educational sociology are subfields of their disciplines
proper, that would specifically address the broad
range of issues related to language and education.

   He positioned his educational linguistics in relation
to applied linguistics, which, he noted, encompassed a
broader territory of practical language issues. Educa-
tional linguistics has, indeed, continued to develop
in tandem with applied linguistics, which has come
a long way since the middle of the 20th century
(Markee, 1990; van Lier, 1994). There is less than
total agreement as to what the relationship between
the two is, however. Some scholars, for example,
identify themselves as linguists who are applied lin-
guists who are educational linguists (e.g., van Lier
1997: 95), whereas others, pointing to its unique
objectives and goals, distinguish educational linguis-
tics as a field unto its own (e.g., Christie, 1994: 97;
Hornberger, 2001: 5). What is clear, however, as
Hornberger (2001: 19) points out, is that educational
linguistics has developed a unique niche in that its
"starting point is always the practice of education and
the focus is squarely on (the role of) language (in)
learning and teaching." It is in filling this niche that
educational linguistics has found its place in a variety
of contexts around the world.

Three Schools

Internationally, educational linguistics seems to have
taken shape in three major ways, or in what might be
considered loosely the British, the Australian, and the
American schools. Each is distinctive in a number of
ways.

   The British School may be the most closely coupled
with general linguistics as seen in the efforts to make
linguistics a foundational area of teacher training
(Brumfit, 1997; Stubbs, 1986), as well as attempts
to create curricula based on linguistic principles
(Carter, 1990, cited in Christie, 1994: 96). At the

same time, British educational linguistics cannot be
said simply to be the marriage of linguistics with
education. On the one hand, there has not been uni-
versal agreement as to how linguistics should relate to
education, leaving much to be done on this front by
both linguists and educators (Hudson, 2004). On the
other hand, following the lead of an applied linguis-
tics that synthesizes multiple disciplinary approaches,
British educational linguists also draw on a wide
constellation of research tools beyond those offered
by linguistics alone (Brumfit, 1996; see, for example,
Creese, 2003).

   Australian educational linguistics stands out for
its clear connection to systemic functional linguistics,
in particular. Here, systemic functional linguistics, in
which language is viewed as a social semiotic that is
part and parcel of creating and interpreting social
context, is brought together with other social sciences
in order to study language use in educational practice
as a socially situated process (Christie, 1994; Martin,
1998). A central focus of the Australian School has
been the teaching and learning of genre in literacy for
professional and academic purposes (e.g., Christie
and Martin, 1997). It also is worth pointing out the
loose connection between the British and the Austra-
lian schools because of Halliday's influence on both
the beginnings of British educational linguistics and
the growth and development of educational linguis-
tics in Australia (see Halliday *et al*., 1964, for an early
influential work; see also Hudson, 2002).

   The American School is characterized by its diver-
sity of topics and conceptual underpinnings. Aspects
of general linguistics are brought together regularly
with the research tools of other social sciences, most
often anthropology, psychology, and sociology, to
investigate the totality of issues related to language
acquisition, language use, and sociolinguistic context
in formal and informal education (Hornberger,
2001). In addition to Spolsky, Hymes has been an
influential figure in American educational linguistics,
especially in the early days, and his perspective on
sociolinguistics (e.g., Hymes, 1974) has been drawn
on in a great deal of research under the rubric of
educational linguistics, especially in the United States.

   It should be noted, of course, that the British,
Australian, and U.S. contexts are not the only sites
where educational linguistics has emerged. The prin-
ciples of educational linguistics have been put to use
in a variety of settings; for example, Pakir (1994)
describes the use of educational linguistics to exam-
ine the role of multilingualism and cross-cultural
communication for education in Singapore; and in
Argentina, Suardiaz and Domínguez (1987) take an

educational linguistics perspective in considering the role of the native language in elementary education, as both instrument and object of the educational process and as means of evaluating that process. The importance of educational linguistics for other contexts also can be seen in the establishment of training programs in various parts of the world, which will be discussed later.

Taking Stock of the Field

Despite the clearly identifiable (albeit nonexclusive) trends in what we call the three schools of educational linguistics, there is much common ground and activity. Educational linguistics is characterized by certain core features that, by and large, all approaches to educational linguistics share. In particular, we highlight the tendency toward transdisciplinarity that, although latent in Spolsky's formulation, is increasingly gaining prominence. We then pause to reflect on academic and professional developments including the establishment of degree programs and the publication of core texts.

Defining Characteristics

Fundamentally, as Hornberger (2001) shows, educational linguistics can be characterized as a field with a dynamic relationship to a range of disciplines which takes a problem-oriented approach to issues focused squarely on language in or around education, yielding analytical scope with depth on these issues. Accordingly, educational linguistics has a broad scope and a narrow focus.

The interface of linguistics with other disciplines has always been a core feature of educational linguistics. As Spolsky remarks, it "start[s] with a specific problem and then looks to linguistics and other relevant disciplines for their contribution to its solution" (1978: 2). Its scope, he continues, "is the intersection of linguistics and related language sciences with formal and informal education" (1978: 2). The potential set of problems to be examined is, of course, unquestionably vast, as are the possible combinations of research tools that could be used to investigate them. This does not mean, however, that educational linguistics is adrift in an ocean of research prospects. Rather, as a field, it is "pluri-centric, multi-method, and multi-level" (Kjolseth, 1978, in reference to Sociology of Language). That is to say, there are, as several other entries in this encyclopedia indicate, multiple core issues at the heart of educational linguistics, which demand different sets of research methods. Thus, a broad scope is achieved through the range of work done under the auspices of the field and

depth is accomplished through intricate investigations by individuals with expertise in specific areas. Each educational linguist approaches research in different ways, some focusing on micro-level issues, some on macro-level issues, and others on the connections between them. The result is a holistic, or transdisciplinary, understanding of the interplay among individuals, language, society, and education.

From Interdisciplinary to Transdisciplinary

Educational linguistics came of age in a dynamic moment in intellectual activity, particularly in the area of language study which also saw the birth of Fishman's sociology of language (Fishman, 1968, 1972) and Hymes's ethnography of communication (Hymes, 1972; see Joseph, 2002, and Murray, 1998, for discussions on the history of [socio]linguistics). It is not surprising, then – given this climate that eschewed disciplinary boundaries in favor of the holistic study of specific issues – that educational linguistics emerged as problem-oriented and interdisciplinary. Spolsky suggested that linguistics, although central to the study of language-related issues, must be synthesized in a complementary manner with the approaches of other disciplines in order to comprehend fully any specific problem (viz. issue or theme) related to language and education (1978: 2–3). It is here that the seeds of transdisciplinarity in educational linguistics were first planted.

Writing on the subject of applied linguistics more broadly, Halliday (2001: 176) stated:

> I say 'transdisciplinary' rather than 'inter-' or 'multidisciplinary' because the latter terms seem to me to imply that one still retains the disciplines as the locus of intellectual activity, while building bridges between them, or assembling them into a collection; whereas the real alternative is to supercede them, creating new forms of activity which are thematic rather than disciplinary in their orientation.

Halliday remarks that activities in applied linguistics "involve more than the content of any one discipline: at the very least, they involve psychology, sociology, and linguistics" (2001: 176) and he offers foreign language teaching as an example. In his call for a transdisciplinary applied linguistics, he notes that the aim should be not simply to create an amalgam of intellectual activity made up of a collection of features from a variety of disciplines but to go further and synthesize what each relevant discipline has to offer on a particular issue. By doing this, the focus becomes theme-based. A theme, he explains, "is defined not by content but by aspect, perspective or point of view" (Halliday, 2001: 176). In this way, Halliday suggests, the focus of intellectual activity

would not be on building bridges across disciplinary content areas but, rather, on synthesizing specific research tools (which are often, although not always, disciplinary-based) to investigate a particular theme or issue. It is a fine distinction but an important one.

The starting point is at the core of the difference between inter-/multidisciplinarity and transdisciplinarity. In inter-/multidisciplinary inquiry, the research begins with what is knowable from the point of view of specific disciplines and how, by building bridges across them, a researcher can achieve a more vibrant picture than one would be able to view from the vantage point of a single discipline alone. In a transdisciplinary orientation, research begins with a theme – an aspect (a specific issue, concern, problem) of a specific situation – and then uses the resources at one's disposal to investigate that theme. This, to use Halliday's words, removes the locus of intellectual activity from the disciplines, thereby superseding them to place the locus of intellectual activity around the theme itself. The transdisciplinary researcher is like a painter who creates a multidimensional picture of a particular theme by using the spectrum of research tools on her or his palette.

Following Spolsky's characterization of educational linguistics as problem-oriented, it is easy to see how it is best considered transdisciplinary. Problem-oriented is similar in spirit to theme-based in Halliday's formulation of transdisciplinarity. In each case, the idea is that a researcher not simply takes disciplinary knowledge and applies it to a situation. In educational linguistics, a researcher begins with a problem, issue or theme, related to language and education and then synthesizes the research tools in her/his intellectual repertoire to investigate or explore it. The work of educational linguistics, then, is carried out in and across a variety of academic departments (anthropology, area studies, education, English, foreign languages, linguistics, psychology, sociology, etc.) depending on the theme. This is, incidentally, how the pioneering anthropological linguist Edward Sapir envisioned that *all* research in linguistics should take place (Anderson, 1985: 219–221). In this way, educational linguistics follows in a tradition of linguistics broadly conceived. The Australian School has long taken this approach, characterizing educational linguistics as a transdiscipline (Martin, 1993: 141).

The theme-based nature of a transdisciplinary educational linguistics also serves to highlight another crucial element of this field – research/practice reflexivity. Research in educational linguistics is not done for the sake of knowledge alone but, rather, with the aim of addressing a particular aspect of a practical concern to formal and/or informal language education. Thus, the aim of research is to impact on practice. This is a two-way street, however. What is done in the practice of formal and/or informal education often serves as the impetus for research. In this way, themes to be investigated are not generated exclusively in the mind of a researcher but from the researcher's contact with practice. In educational linguistics research and practice feed off of as well as inform each other (Freeman, 1994; Myers, 1994; Pica, 1994).

From its beginnings, the field of educational linguistics has been concerned with the study of all the factors that influence language use as it relates to education. The objective has always been the creation of a thorough and articulated body of knowledge about these factors, and relationships among them, for the purpose of advancing educational issues ranging from language acquisition to language planning. Clearly, no single paradigm or discipline could suffice for such an endeavor and, consequently, educational linguistics is likely to continue to evolve as a transdisciplinary field, bound not by a disciplinary base but by its single focus.

Professional Activities

Since the founding in the early 1970s of the first two doctoral programs in educational linguistics at the University of New Mexico, by Spolsky, and at the University of Pennsylvania, by Hymes and Wolfson (Hornberger 2001), a number of academic training programs specifically in educational linguistics have grown around the world. Doctoral programs with a concentration in educational linguistics have been established at Arizona State University, Stanford University, the University of Manchester, the University of Newcastle upon Tyne, and the University of Warwick. Master's level training in educational linguistics has been created at Lancaster University, Srinakharin Wirot University, and the University of Colorado, Boulder. Coursework in educational linguistics is offered at universities in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Saudi Arabia, the United States, and probably elsewhere as well. In addition, the University of Groningen hosts the Educational Linguistics Research Group and the Monterey Institute of International Studies offers master's degrees in TESOL and TEFL through its Graduate School of Language and Educational Linguistics. Educational linguistics is clearly becoming firmly institutionalized (see Relevant websites).

Intellectual activity in educational linguistics also has been strong since the early 1970s. The first foundational book, alluded to earlier, was Spolsky's (1978) *Educational linguistics: an introduction* followed by Stubbs's (1986) *Educational linguistics*.

Developments continued in the 1990s when educational linguistics was a featured topic of the Georgetown University Round Table on Languages and Linguistics (Alatis, 1994) as well as the subject of other conference presentations (e.g., Brumfit, 1996; van Lier, 1999). The *Concise encyclopedia of educational linguistics*, an impressive summary of work in the field, edited by Spolsky, was released in 1999. Most recently, Kluwer Academic Publishers inaugurated its *Educational linguistics* book series with van Lier as general editor. Although there is as yet no professional organization or peer-reviewed journal devoted to educational linguistics, the student-managed *Working Papers in Educational Linguistics* (www.wpel.net) has continuously published work since 1984. Individual educational linguists have published and presented their work in a variety of venues since the beginning and they continue to have a strong presence in linguistics and related social sciences.

Future Directions

Lamentably, as Gee reminds us, "linguistics has had much less impact on education, and teachers know much less about language and linguistics, than the current state of our knowledge about language in education, or the current dilemmas of our schools, would seem to merit" (2001: 647). After depicting how differing theories of language arising from functional and generativist linguistics, respectively, play a role in major educational debates (such as that around whole language vs. phonics instruction), Gee goes on to exemplify some of what we do know about language in education, including the role of overt focus on language in helping children acquire new forms of academic language, the need for teachers to understand the diverse linguistic and cultural resources children bring to their classrooms, and the ways in which language form and meaning are interactionally worked out in moment to moment classroom interaction. He argues, then, as other educational linguists have before him, that we need to do a better job of putting what we know in linguistics into practice in schools.

As pressure builds on the educational systems of the world to serve the needs of increasingly diverse multilingual populations and at a time when multilingualism and multiliteracy are clearly becoming socially and economically advantageous, the need to understand relationships between language and education is particularly acute. The more the complexity of the relationships between language and education is recognized, the more complex research must become, in turn. Transdisciplinary work is likely to be more important than ever before. Although educational linguistics as a field has tended in this direction since the beginning, there is much to be done to build a truly unified and coherent body of knowledge. Although all educational linguists seem to share the common goal of fostering education that is linguistically appropriate and socially responsible, there is little strategic dialogue on how to realize this goal on a grand scale. As a whole, then, educational linguistics seems to lack a clear course. If educational linguistics is to emerge as an articulated transdiscipline that encompasses all issues in language and education, it is time to seek out the connections and relationships among all the individual and societal topics that are studied at micro-, meso-, and macro-levels. Recent trends in ecological research are promising in this regard.

Although ecological approaches are not new to the social sciences, they have recently gained prominence in educational linguistics. Van Lier (1999), for example, emphasized the importance of integrated multidimensional inquiry over the decontextualized study of discrete variables when trying to understand matters related to language and education, which are all socially situated. In this vein, an ecological approach is increasingly used in the study of all facets of educational linguistics, from individual-level language acquisition to classroom pedagogy to language policy. For instance, Leather and van Dam's (2003) *Ecology of language acquisition*, the first text released in Kluwer's *Educational linguistics* series, features a collection of articles that consider the complex contextual factors that influence language acquisition. In addition, Hornberger's (2003) *Continua of biliteracy: an ecological framework for educational policy, research, and practice in multilingual settings*, also an edited volume, highlights the value of synthesizing multiple levels of analysis in order to fathom the intricacies of constructing, implementing, and evaluating educational programs for bi-/multilingualism. Although these books reflect different perspectives on ecology, they share the understanding that the processes involved in any aspect of language and education cannot be effectively studied in isolation. It is in this sense that ecology is likely to play a central role in the future of educational linguistics.

Consistent with the early core characteristics of the field, these ecological approaches in educational linguistics are problem-oriented and interdisciplinary. At the same time, the theme-focused holism in these approaches moves the field more firmly toward transdisciplinarity, making a strength of drawing on multiple disciplines to create a holistic portrait of (the role of) language (in) teaching and learning. In all, educational linguistics, as it has done throughout its short history, is certain to remain grounded in its core principles while adapting to fit the needs of research and practice in an ever-changing multilingual world.

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E-mail, Internet, Chatroom Talk: Pragmatics

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Scope and Purpose

The notion of the Internet comprises several elements: the ensemble of technical possibilities resulting from computers being linked to each other in computer networks; the types of communicative situations and types of language used in those situations; the body total of its users; and the sum of all Net communities using language. All of these elements define situations of language use. In addition, the Internet comprises all websites, which may be linked to all kinds of use situations. This article will deal exclusively with uses that situations such as chats, e-mail, and lists have in common. All of these genres essentially involve the use of language in an interactive, human-to-human way.

The following discussion will only deal with interactive Internet genres. Just as in written and spoken language, there are great differences between these genres; the following discussion will try to identify aspects of language that apply to all such genres, even if to varying degrees, in the same way that we can make useful generalizing statements about written and spoken language as basic medial varieties. The following discussion will include technical details of the Internet only to the extent that such details are needed to account for specific uses of language on the Internet. The discussion presupposes a basic knowledge of the Internet and its resources.

Research Background

The rise of the Internet as a medium for communication has, next to its societal, economic, and political consequences, arguably had the most significant effect on language. Although the rise of the Internet has variously been compared, as to its nature and its effects, to the rise of mass literacy in the 'Gutenberg revolution,' the new cultural technology represented by Internet communication has received surprisingly little attention from linguistics. On the one hand, Crystal (2001: viii) points to the eminently "linguistic character" of the "Internet revolution," which he characterizes as a "linguistic revolution" (Crystal, 2001: viii); on the other hand, there is a remarkable reluctance on the part of linguists to engage in the subject to any major extent, when it comes to taking a perspective on the language of the Internet vis-à-vis the other medial varieties of language (such as has been done with respect to the differences between the spoken and written medial varieties of language). In fact, the common theme of all research on the subject is to point out how this lack of research interest is in stark contrast to the role of the Internet itself.

Several factors may be cited as possible motivation for this unexpected reticence on the part of the linguists. The use of language on the Internet occurs in the most technically-oriented among all of the media and, as such, is removed from what linguists tend to perceive as the domain of 'natural' language occurrence, given that the study of natural language is supposed to provide a window to humankind. The Internet's high degree of technological sophistication is felt as too much of an intervening, disturbing factor. Another factor may be the nature of the medium itself: given the fast technological development of the Internet, statements about communication on the Internet tend to become obsolete at a rate much faster than in any other field of language studies, in fact faster than in any other area of scientific investigation.

The relative volatility of the object of study is another reason why research on language in the Internet has been less well represented in traditional publication channels, which take a relatively long time for publication. This, in turn, has prevented the field from becoming an established and reputable field early on. It has also not been helpful that

most of the research on computer-mediated communication (CMC) has occurred on the fringes of many other disciplinary traditions, often making it difficult to locate previous work on the topic. In addition, much, if not most, of the early work has seen the light of day in student papers and M.A. theses, available, befittingly, through the Internet. All this made for a distinct – and in fact embarrassing – lack of genuine linguistic interest in language on the Internet.

During the first stages of research on the Internet, there was a lot of speculative popular comment, practical interest in the technicalities of the Internet, and cultural criticism, most of which bordered on linguistics, and in fact pointed up the need for an empirically based linguistic study. Beginning from the earliest stages of the Internet, there continues to be a strong interest in practical etiquette, which includes matters linguistic, but is arguably just as interesting in its own right as a field for (socio-) linguistic research. While the social sciences showed an early strong interest (which also was of relevance to linguistics; cf. Wallace, 1999; Döring, 2003), the first major representatives of genuinely linguistic research are found in the studies by Herring (1996), Weingarten (1997) and Beißwenger (2000). The most recent – and in fact the first – monograph on linguistic aspects in the narrower sense is Crystal (2001). This work reflects the fast pace of the development of the Internet in that the research quoted is represented to a great extent by contributions to on-line journals (e-journals), which have a much faster rate of publication than do the traditional channels. The well-established *Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication* is supplemented by a website called *language@internet*, devoted specifically to research on language and language use on the Internet.

Finally and most significantly, empirical work on language in the Internet has up to now shown a severe bias towards a few world languages, with English and German the subjects of, by far, the most empirical studies. As this fact has definitely resulted in a skewed view of the subject, it should be clearly stated at the outset that whatever is said in the following reflects this present stage of scant empirical research – shortcomings of a kind and a degree that are unusual in other fields of linguistics. There is a very urgent need for studying other, typologically and culturally different, languages, as such languages are increasingly making an appearance on the Internet.

Languages on the Internet

Before discussing linguistic aspects of language on the Internet, it is in order to address the issue of languages on the Internet. While it is obviously very difficult, for a number of reasons, to give any figures even approaching reliability (language of home pages? language of chats, of newsgroups, listservs, e-mail? an average of all these? frequency of use?), it is generally agreed that at the moment of writing, English is (still) the dominant language in the Internet, certainly as far as the language of homepages and the languages of browsers are concerned. There appears to be a consensus that, as of now, the figure for English stands at between 70 and 80%, with Spanish as the current runner-up. Even so, the rate of change in favor of other languages is enormous.

While English clearly has a major advantage as the language of the technology of the Internet – all terms for technology and communicational procedures being in English – there are countervailing tendencies. Above all, the number of Internet users whose first language is not English has risen dramatically; it is now estimated to be in the area of two-thirds of all Internet users. The issue here is to what extent these users are using which language in communicating with whom. Again, English is bound to have a major advantage for communicating with speakers of other non-English languages, both because the technology and terminology are English and because of the difficulties of introducing other writing systems. Still, there is a distinct and (even within the space of only a few years) fast increase in the number of other languages being used on the web, with Chinese as a potential frontrunner in the foreseeable future. Other factors that have to be taken into account are the global cultural and political reactions against English and English-speaking countries, along with the globalization process itself, inasmuch as English and the Internet represent important vehicles as well as symptoms of this process.

While further aspects of linguistic change will variously be taken up in the following sections, it is clear that on the level of language alone, the new medium is having a major impact on the ecology of language (*see* **Adaptability in Human-Computer Interaction**). The trend towards the use of English as a lingua franca on a hitherto unprecedented scale will be counterbalanced, with effects difficult to predict, by a slowing down, if not a reversal of the universal trend towards language loss, especially of minority languages (*see* **Minorities and Language**). What at the moment looks like a clear dominance of English on the Internet with the concomitant political, social, and cultural effects of language convergence will within a relatively short period transform into a major effect of preservation of language diversity, with the Internet offering a sanctuary for otherwise doomed languages and providing them with an important tool for

the preservation of their identity, something no other medium could offer. It is difficult to predict, however, if all types of languages will be affected to the same extent and in the same way. Given the novelty of the situation and the fast rate of change of usage conditions, including the technical facilities, it is hard to predict if the effects will include a global diglossia, involving English or other world languages, or what the scenario of language distribution on the Internet and other linguistic media will be.

Language in the Technical Medium

Of all three language media, the Internet is the one that is the most highly technically, nonnaturally constrained. It is therefore to be expected that to a considerable extent, the specific shape of language on the Internet will be a consequence of these constraints. While a radical technological determinism is not advocated by anyone, it is equally clear that the language of the Internet, for all its internal diversity, is shaped by the technological conditions in the same way that spoken and written language are. Here, it may be useful to work with a three-tiered layering of basic constraining factors: just as the differences in the physical, pragmatic, and communicative situation or setting of the two traditional language media make for differences in the social, psychological, and emotional conditions and perceptions of the situation, and, as a consequence, trigger different choices from the repertoire of structurally possible forms, so, too, the specific technical and physical conditions of Internet communication will result in specific constellations, comprising

- the physical setting
- the communicative situations and situations of use that are based on this setting, along with the situations as they are perceived psychologically, socially, and emotionally, and the concomitant pragmatic conditions
- the choices made from the repertoire of available linguistic forms, these choices in turn providing access to the perception of the communicative situations.

This three-tiered framework provides a broad grid for the new options and choices on all levels of linguistic analysis: from new genres to the systematic choice of the individual items.

Since every discussion of the place of language in the new medium makes reference, in a variety of ways, to the physical conditions and the communicative situation on the Internet as explanatory dimensions for the specifics of language use, it seems appropriate to briefly discuss these constraints first.

Next to the outstandingly 'technical' character of the medium itself, including its one-to-many and one-to-one, as well as all kinds of combined situations, the immense speed of communication and the sheer quantitative possibilities of data transfer, the most important physical conditions determining the Internet setting are absence of physical copresence and various forms of shifted temporal copresence. Chat situations and instant messaging, as well as MUDs and MOOs (see below), come as close as possible to temporal copresence (either synchronous or asynchronous), whereas in other forms, such as e-mail, we have a presumption of temporal proximity (in replying and reacting) that varies to degrees; in contrast, listservs and newsgroups have a lesser expectation of their entries being followed up.

The lack of physical copresence has consequences of various kinds. Physical distance has been thought, on the one hand, to be prone to translate as emotional distance, making communication on the Internet appear less apt for subjective and personal communication. On the other hand, the intervening technology, together with, e.g., the option of assuming anonymous nicknames in chatrooms, provides a protective wall, allowing one to take more risks in communicating, at the same time that it reduces the need for strict self-control. This permissive character of the Internet in turn provides for more personal freedom than does spoken, face-to-face communication. These perceptions of the communicative situation have immediate consequences for the linguistic behavior of individuals, and are reflected by it.

This lack of control and monitoring has led to what, from a normative point of view, may appear as a relaxation of linguistic decorum and in general, more liberal attitudes towards norms, linguistic and social. In addition, the inability to control the other communicants provides more freedom and room for creativity, more room for playfulness, but also defines new constraints. It is not the case that there are no norms. Rather, Net communities on all levels develop norms that stand in a complex relationship of difference and distance to the norms in other social situations. The language used reflects this perception of the communicative situation as a virtual, shared communicative place (or even a 'stage') with newly evolving norms on several levels.

In fact, one of the major gratifications of Internet use, be it in chats or virtual play rooms such as MUDs (Multi-User Domains) and MOOs (Multi-Object-Oriented Multi-User Domains), is the sense of theatricality or even drama that is conveyed by the specific virtual universe of discourse and its complex relationship to the real world – not unlike, one might even argue, to what happens in literature. It is

this theatrical character of the Internet that goes a long way towards accounting for the playfulness, the creativity of language, and in fact the humor typical of much Internet language, which is also the hotbed of the specific linguistic developments on the Internet. (Further, pragmatic implications of this characteristic with respect to speech acts will be discussed below).

Substituting Nonlinguistic Contextual Information

The linguistic issue that has figured most prominently in the discussions of language in the Internet is its character as a medium situated in between, and having affinities to, both spoken and written language. Already in the earliest linguistic analyses of Internet language, the issue most focused on was the presence of elements (especially in the language of chats) that are typical for spoken language. Such forms have to be seen under two angles: as elements conveying playfulness and creativity, and as elements substituting for the nonverbal context; at the same time, these elements carry the germs of potential linguistic changes. Among these elements are: ideograms (called 'emoticons'), expressing emotion in a way that is iconic for the respective facial expression; the liberal use of expressive abbreviations (such as 'rotfl,' 'rolling on the floor laughing'); and onomatopoetic expressions (or sound words) like 'ahhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh'. The list also includes all kinds of phonetic spellings (e.g., 'paske' for French 'parce que').

Orthography, too, may be an expressive vehicle; it is used in many ways, such as variation on capitalization (for emphasis) and use of lower case where (as for German substantives) upper case is standard. Punctuation and spelling deviations are also used in very creative ways.

Typical for chatrooms are, furthermore, activities termed 'emoting,' or action descriptions such as 'looks.' Typing '/me looks bewildered' will appear on the screen as 'X looks bewildered.'

The above list awaits further empirical study across typologically different languages, since different languages appear to make use of typologically different structures. A salient feature of German Internet language are the so-called 'roots,' 'action words,' or 'inflectives' as in *knuddel* ('cuddle'), which even can be intensified to *megazurueckknuddel* ('mega cuddle to you too'). These forms are formally infinitives and are therefore not inflected. This type of verbalization performs the respective motions (or emotions) and has to be seen in the context of the 'theatrical' character of the Internet universe of discourse.

Most of the forms quoted here have developed into markers of registers belonging to the Internet language of the languages under discussion (*see* **Register: Overview**). Their frequency of occurrence correlates with the perceived formality of the type of interaction, even within subtypes of individual genres, such as different types of chat scenarios (e.g., moderated vs. nonmoderated). The use and mastery of these items have developed into indexes of speech community membership, with some Internet genres, like MOOs and chats, having developed very elaborate and strictly enforced social conventions. There is, on the Net, an acute perception of community membership as manifested by the correct use of these items.

Apart from their creativity in the specific communicative situation of the Internet, these novel items (especially the typically oral ones) have to be seen in the light of the language's particular character as medium. The most salient characteristic from the point of view of pragmatics and context is a property often referred to as 'lean': the Internet is characterized as a 'lean medium,' referring to the fact that in this medium, there is no 'rich' contextual information available of the extralinguistic kind. (The issue is similar to that discussed in earlier sociolinguistic debates under the label of 'deficit' vs. 'difference'.) Even so, the validity of the lean medium hypothesis has been questioned by people who claim that the screen provides a variety of graphic means to make up for the lack of extralinguistic contextual information; among these are the emoticons and other devices referred to above. Other ways to signal identity comprise (linguistic and other) features, such as personal formatting and the choice of nicknames, to compensate for the types of information not available in the Internet language, as compared to the spoken and written media.

The fact remains, however, that more attention is focused on the individual graphic and linguistic item chosen: the individual item and variant is perceived as carrying a higher functional and informational load. After all, with respect to perception and processing, the Internet language's visual input has a specific addressee and its shape cannot be changed at will: once received, it has much less of an ephemeral character than does the acoustic input of spoken language. In addition, it has been observed that the Internet medium, in comparison with the two traditional media, is much more conducive to metalinguistic comment and as such, much more self-reflexive; this observation holds both in terms of reflection on, and meta-discussion of, issues of language use proper, as well as for the pragmatic and social rules that govern language behavior (arguably another consequence of

the medium's high technological sophistication). Thus, the technical nature of the medium changes the language itself, both as to content and use.

As for empirical research on the language of the Internet itself, one of the glaring deficits in this area concerns the lack of a cross-linguistic investigation of the features and forms discussed above. Even a superficial survey of extant work reveals that the forms used in a given language or culture are not only technically specified, but vary in accordance with typological conditions, with specific national cultural histories, and with the varying situations of contact. The use of uninflected forms in French appears to be very rare, whereas it is very frequent in German: in a strongly inflected language such as German, absence of inflection is marked and carries information. This condition would in turn explain the paucity of these forms in English, with empirically testable claims following from this hypothesis. As for the English of the Internet, this is characterized by its well-known proliferation of abbreviations, a phenomenon that fits in well with the language's established structural tendency of abbreviation and morphological reduction generally. It is instructive to observe the dominance of English as it appears even in the transfer of English-based abbreviations to other languages (among these not least German), as observed in the use of abbreviations and acronyms, such as 'rotfl'('rolling on the floor laughing') even in German chats, 'cu' (for 'see you') or in French chats; (cf. Haase, 2003; for work on Italian, cf. Orletti, 2004).

In cultural terms, the high frequency of acronyms in English may go back to the culture's long-established tradition of using shorthand in telecommunication. On the other hand, the typical German use of uninflected expression may well represent a borrowing from English-language cartoons and comic strips, whereas the French preference for the 'plus' and 'minus' signs ('+,' '−') may reflect the prestigious position of mathematics in the history and the educational system of that country. There is thus a wide-open field for the crosslinguistic study of technical-based universal, cultural, and typological factors determining the language-specific make-up of 'Netspeak' in Crystal's (2001) terms.

The Status of Internet Language as a Medium: Between Written and Oral, or How?

Apart from the forms directly supposed to act as substitutions for contextually given information in spoken language, there is another group of forms that are characterized by their preferred occurrence in spoken language. Here, we find all kinds of ellipses

and deletions (both of subject and auxiliary, as in 'been here today?'), particles, deletions, and interjections as well as paratactic style and colloquialisms. Together with the first group of forms (treated above under the heading of 'lean' medium), they contribute to what has been discussed as the typical 'oral' flavor of much of Internet language, especially as it is used in chat.

The two groups have given rise to a debate that basically replicates and extends the familiar issue of orality vs. literality. The discussion has increasingly focused on the question of whether the language of the Internet is a new variety of language medium in its own right, on a par with varieties such as the spoken and written medium, or whether it is simply an extension of written language, since it is typed on a keyboard, but of course including spoken elements to varying degrees. To deal properly with this matter, an essential distinction must be made between the medium of the physical input and output on the one hand, and on the other, the technicalities of the transmission process, which result in the properties discussed above. In particular, the way the language is dealt with through the media of writing and reading, in production and reception respectively, has led researchers to characterize Internet language as 'typewritten conversation': a language that is oral conceptually, but medially written. The notion of conceptual is taken here as referring to a prototypical association of the communicative situation and a set of perceptions of situation and register; the theoretical question of whether there are just two, or perhaps three conceptual language media, each prototypically associated with a language medium, will have to be decided empirically. To settle this issue, further empirical research on other languages, as well as on what does NOT occur in Internet language, will be needed.

Pragmatics

The issue of conceptually new media, broached in the previous section, is related to another issue, *viz.* the question to what extent the new Internet genres are simply medial translations of older genres belonging to the traditional language medium. Genres are conventionalized packages, containing as their ingredients communicative purpose, communicative situation, and language register; most of these are tied to one specific language medium (*see* **Genre and Genre Analysis; Register: Overview**). While it is clear that one significant aspect of language change affected by the Internet is the rise of new genres, this shift is more obvious in some cases than it is in others. MUDs and MOOs, new groups and listservs are clear cases of

new genres in a new language medium; among the unclear cases, the most debated is that of chat.

At issue is the question to what extent spoken conversation is able to preserve its identity in the context of Internet chat. The most obvious common feature for both normal conversation and Internet chat is that of turn taking (*see* **Conversation Analysis**). Even so, we observe features of the chat that militate against a simple transposition of conversation from one medium to another: for instance, the notion of a turn is defined rather differently in the Internet medium, given its technical constraints on length, which has led to the invention of turn-splitting techniques. Also, the notion of the speaker itself is spread out over two contexts: the actual typing and editing context, and the context in which the message appears on the screen of the other communicant. Moreover, the mechanisms for next speaker selection are entirely different in the two media. Further important differences have to do with the notion of topicality, due to the nonadjacent character of corresponding moves, and in general with interactional coherence, which is a very different notion here than the one we are familiar with from spoken conversation with its narrow constraints. Thus, establishing coherence requires much more work on the Internet than it does in spoken conversation; an important aspect of that special effort is the need to furnish a lot of explicit communicative meta-information on the linguistic surface of the chat, making it in fact appear more autonomous, relying less on shared interactionally focused information than is the case for written language. Given these differences, it is an open question whether the media constraints of the Internet allow us to refer to the chat as typed conversation.

Parallel effects of the technical and communicative conditions on Internet language use can be observed on several other levels. An important consequence of the absence of direct monitoring is, in speech act terms, an increased uncertainty about the uptake of speech acts (*see* **Speech Acts**). On the one hand, this feature of the communicative situation tends to minimize the danger of loss of face (*see* **Face**), and thus helps explain the socially more forgiving character of the Internet. On the other hand, it also accounts for a higher degree of interactional uncertainty, especially when it comes to interactionally focused actions and referents. As a consequence, the usual conversational maxims are relaxed, or have to be adapted to the specific communicative situation; in particular, given the specific nature of turn-taking and topic management, the notions of relevance and quantity cannot be the same as in spoken conversation (*see* **Maxims and Flouting**; **Relevance Theory**).

Another consequence of the relative uncertainty of interactional focusing is the fact that much more referential effort has to be undertaken in terms of the intensional content of expressions; thus, there tends to be less pronominal reference and more reference by full lexemes. This is particularly obvious when the referents are located in topically coherent, but spatially nonadjacent turns. We see the same phenomenon occurring in hypertext: hypertextual organization cannot rely on a sequential reading in any predetermined order. As a consequence, the modular character of hyper- (or in general: meta-) text enforces a much more explicit, self-contained, and autonomous reference, just as do the Internet genres themselves, and much as does written language. It is obvious that the essentially different social obligations incurred by Internet users have given rise to a substantial number of books on Internet 'netiquette,' testifying to the fact that notions of correctness and appropriateness, analogous to those familiar from written and spoken standard varieties and registers, are in the process of formation (*see* **Register: Overview**).

Varieties and Communities

Another issue on the borderline between linguistics and sociolinguistics that has surfaced in more recent studies on language on the Internet is the role of varieties. Early work was dominated by the idea that written English was to be the standard on the Internet; standard English operated as a vehicle of globalization, to the disadvantage of other languages, and contributed to an ever more progressive leveling of other languages and dialects. Studies of Internet language, apart from occasional references to non-standard forms as marks of orality, were mainly focused on standard languages. While there is still little work being done on the systematic use of non-standard varieties and dialects on the Internet, it is apparent that there are differences between languages, to the extent that some languages allow their users to exploit such varieties and dialects for purposes of maintaining a local identity; for instance, a language like German appears to be much better represented by its dialects on the web than are others, like French. There is, however, far too little data available on this question, and, as already pointed out, the situation is changing very fast, to the quantitative disadvantage of the world's languages.

Recent work (Androutsopoulos and Ziegler, 2003) has not only moved the discussion away from unreflected, folklore-linguistic doomsday predictions of further language decay on the Internet, to a serious analysis of nonstandard forms by studying actually

occurring, nonstandard language, but it has also taken the debates a step further, in the direction of interpreting the changes in terms of code-switching, of interactional processes, and of language-community networks. As an instance, we may consider the situation on the Indian subcontinent, where core membership in an Internet network is associated with Hindi. In another context, chatters on a German local dialect channel select graphic representations of nonstandard spoken forms and nonstandard grammatical features to establish and confirm their respective membership on several levels of Internet communities.

While much research has been devoted to the nature and the internal structure of Net communities on the part of the social sciences, few studies have been done along the lines of a microlinguistic, interactionalist analysis, showing the micro-structure of the group symbolic use of linguistic forms and variants. Such work would describe local variants of global processes, in which ever larger networks of users develop shibboleths to manifest their status as network members, and ultimately as Internet users. In terms of language variety, what emerges here is a special, medially defined linguistic register. The specific varietal architecture of a language determines the extent to which varieties can assume these functions: nonobservance of spelling rules in a language like French, where the standard variety exerts very high normative pressure, carries much higher information value, and thus more symbolic force, than is, for instance, the case in German.

Language Change

Just as the advent of writing and mass literacy had a major impact on language and languages on several levels, new technical and communicational options are expected to evolve new genres, adapted to the new, sooner or later to be conventionalized communicative situations, with new rules for floor use and altered linguistic norms in terms of register and style. The development of such new genres, registers, and individual expressions, along with the attribution of additional functions to the old forms can generally be seen as an evolutionary process in which users adapt language to the new technical and communicative conditions and functions (*see* **Adaptability in Human-Computer Interaction**). As the network studies referred to above demonstrate, a core mechanism in this process is that of speakers negotiating, in a cooperative process, markers and symbols of language communities on several levels of networks; such markers and symbols then translate into register markers (*see* **Register: Overview**).

Above, I have discussed the impact of these processes on the ecology of language(s); in addition, there are several other important lines of research dealing with the effects of the Internet on language. Thus, one of the major future research questions will be to what extent the new registers, inasmuch as they represent the new genres linguistically, will show a convergence of register features and markers. Given the advanced technological sophistication of the new language medium, it could be hypothesized that the registers would be more similar across languages than written registers traditionally have been, even taking into account the existence and influence of typological borders. It will also be interesting to see, given the great differences between cultures when it comes to notions of politeness, if any such convergence will extend to floor behavior in terms of pragmatic constraints and politeness rules, and in particular whether one may expect to see modifications of the cooperative principle. The more technical linguistic evidence regarding typological and cultural convergence vs. difference, to the scant extent that it exists at the time of writing, is inconclusive and does not offer support for either position, whether the discussions are couched in linguistic terms or in terms of cultural theory.

There can be no doubt that the Internet, its terminology, and at least some of its formal linguistic apparatus has, in addition to creating a certain spill-over effect onto the other language media, in particular furthered the influence of English. Technical terminology and the language used in communicative institutions such as 'chat' or 'e-mail' have entered the language at large: compare the use of the 'at' sign (@), domain names (.com, .gov., new lexical formations like 'dotcoms'), terms like 'flaming' or 'spam,' or the new word formations starting with 'e-,' such as 'e-mail,' 'e-government,' and so on. While these new forms certainly represent elements of language change, they are mostly confined to a rather local level, and do not change the overall, let alone the typological character of a language. But they do represent language change under another perspective: language contact. From this point of view, the Internet accelerates a trend that has long been observed for English in contact with other, local languages: the rise of contact varieties. It is to be expected that this tendency will pick up even more speed in the future. It will be interesting to see if the language contact mechanisms observed for spoken contact varieties apply in the same way in the communicative conditions of the Internet.

Since the Internet provides the fastest ever channel of social diffusion, and linguistic change on the broader, societal level is dependent on this kind of

contact, the Internet may well accelerate other, ongoing changes on this more general level of societal change. In particular, with respect to the distribution of the language media over its various domains, the new language medium has effected something like a redistribution of the societal functions with respect to the language medium in which they are carried out. Not that written language is directly threatened as to its function and place of functioning: what has happened is that the spectrum of societal functions and types of communication is now being *shared* between three, rather than two, language media. In practical terms, this change means that there is an increase in genres and registers, amounting to an increase in internal differentiation of the repertoire to be learned and taught.

With regard to research on language change and its methodology, the Internet provides some unique opportunities. Thanks to its easy access to 'texts' (technically available as logs on the web), as elements of written-ness in a medium perceived as one of conceptual orality, the Internet provides a rare window of opportunity for monitoring the micro-mechanisms of this evolutionary process, including the social negotiation that takes place along with it, and traces the diffusion of that process through linguistic and social contexts until the language has changed.

See also: Adaptability in Human-Computer Interaction; Conversation Analysis; Genre and Genre Analysis; Maxims and Flouting; Minorities and Language; Register: Overview; Relevance Theory; Speech Acts.

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Emancipatory Linguistics

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The term Emancipatory Linguistics may be used to refer to a trans-disciplinary research field paying attention to topics traditionally viewed as a peripheral or completely outside the purview of mainstream orthodox linguistics. The very objective of this research field is to provide insightful contributions to a socially oriented study of language and discourse activities that would be closely attentive to political underpinnings and implications of linguistic enquiry. This means that since emancipatory linguistics is a term that covers a multitude of rather different approaches, across different disciplines in Language Studies (Discourse Analysis, Sociolinguistics, Socio-pragmatics, Applied Linguistics, Anthropological Linguistics), its distinctiveness lies in its commitment to construct a comprehensive theory of discursive processes that will provide the basis for political action and emancipatory social change, i.e. for an effective practice of intervention and a relevant concern in linguistic education. Its principal challenge lies in showing how language shapes and is shaped by micro- and macro-political processes, both inextricable and mutually informing language use.

By contrast with a well-established tradition in theoretical and descriptive linguistics, this issue takes language and language users in their concrete sense, rather than in their generic or abstract sense (the Chomskyan "ideal speaker-listener in a completely homogeneous speech-community" (Chomsky, 1965: 3)). As a result, it adopts a critical perspective on linguistic theoretical models that obscure the heterogeneity of the real conditions of the communicative use of language and the relations of language use to the (re)production of the struggle between social forces at the level of private and public interactions. Such critical perspective also devotes serious attention to the social nexus

of scientific practices and assumptions. This article first deals with key analytical concepts that drive research in this field, contrasting them with the epistemological bedrock that informs more conventional research. Secondly, some directions in future research agenda are considered.

Verbal Interaction: From Equality and Cooperation Between Autonomous Subjects to Inequalities, Opaqueness and Irreducible Tensions Between Social Actors

Within the broader framework of a sociolinguistic model for communicative interaction, the introduction of the socio-interactionist perspective of construction/reproduction of social reality through language has made that traditional sociolinguistic categories, such as social identity (gender, age, social class) and ethnicity are no longer understood as abstract a priori categories which have a deterministic effect on the interactional process; rather, they are understood as dynamic, contextual aspects which are ongoing and locally (re)produced, and particularly related to social power, i.e. hierarchized structures of social relations that are constitutive of communication and will circumscribe the possibilities of action available to interactants.

Consequently, instead of the transparency and neutrality of language as an instrument for mediating meaning, presupposed in conventional linguistic models of ideal verbal communication such as the transparent and neutral negotiation between social partners (Grice, Goffman), and in the specific case of democratic deliberation, between enlightened peers (Habermas), what one has is gradual shades of opaqueness and strategic ambiguity of actions mediated by various kinds of cross-cutting sets of social structures which embed and embody social clashes of a cultural, ideological and political nature. This anti-idealist conception of verbal interaction does not characterize misunderstanding and incomprehension as a deviation from the ideal of openness, honesty and clarity, but rather as a norm, since the notions of cooperation, openness and sharing are of an ideological nature, probably originating in Western white society.

In fact, a central claim of this research is that since such tensions and inequalities in verbal communication are symptomatic of and conducive to tensions and inequalities in the broader social reality, there is no necessary and self-evident connection between communicative and social order. Closely linked to such idea of an interdependent non deterministic relationship between micro- and macro-contextual order is the idea of linguistic ideologies as a dialectical mediation link between verbal activities and social structures.

Linguistic Ideologies and Indexicality

Drawing upon but moving beyond the traditional socio-ethnolinguistic concept of context in human language behavior, attention is paid to the very assumption that interpretation is socio-historically situated and ideologically biased. Although the term ideology has a spectrum of competing understandings, this perspective emphasizes the ideological as inherently indexical and plural phenomena that is infused with semiotic processes mediating social life. Recent studies of discourse in institutional settings and in the public arena have explored both the empirical and the theoretical contributions that opens up for an investigation of the mechanisms through which language ideologies index the intersection of different sociopolitical interests.

In the words of Silverstein, through indexicality "signs point to a presupposed context in which they occur (i.e., have occurred) or to an entailed potential context in which they occur (i.e., will have occurred)" (1992: 315), metapragmatically mediated by linguistic ideology, i.e. social and experiential rooted conceptions and evaluations of the relationship between language and cognition, language and power, language and legitimacy, formal and functional devices. Attention to linguistic ideologies and indexicality as embodied and embedded in discourse processes problematizes the oppositions created by the traditional linguistic studies such as those between ideology and science, and between ideology and theory.

Future Research Agenda

With respect to the goal of critical intervention, future research in emancipatory linguistics will discuss traditional reductionist explanatory notions, such as the notion of history and the notion of social structure. Moving beyond the Marxist tradition, such research will interpellate in a more comprehensive way, the complex hierarchical and cross-cutting sets of mechanisms and rationales that drive the micro- and macro-contextual order.

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Endangered Languages

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Language Endangerment

Although it is somewhat difficult to count languages and to measure linguistic diversity with exact precision, there are an estimated 6800 languages spoken in the world today. While there is some question as to exactly how many languages will be lost over the course of this century – ranging from a low of 25% to a high of 90% – there is widespread agreement that language loss is occurring at an unprecedented rate. Most recent studies have concluded that at least 50% of the world's languages are losing speakers and that by the end of this century, a full 90% of the world's languages will disappear entirely, replaced by more widely used (national and/or global) languages. This situation is generally referred to as language endangerment, a term used broadly for languages which are threatened with absolute loss; a language is considered lost when it has no speakers. Language endangerment is sometimes called language attrition or language death, but 'death' is avoided out of sensitivity to the population whose language has been lost. Language attrition and moribundity – when children cease learning a language – are now taking place with exceptionally rapid speed. Hundreds of languages are currently endangered and there are few parts of the world where some form of language decline is not occurring. While language attrition is not in and of itself a new phenomenon, the rate of decline in linguistic diversity appears to be unique to this era, and is perhaps rivaled only by the kind of language loss which took place in conjunction with the agricultural revolution of approximately 10 000 years ago. One consequence is that a significant number of communities are facing the loss of a language which historically and traditionally has been foundational to their sense of identity. In some instances communities are reacting with efforts to revitalize the local language, while in others they lack the resources, time, or motivation to do so.

Linguists are particularly concerned with the loss of indigenous, or local, languages, as opposed to immigrant languages. For the latter, the language may give way in the new territory to an already established (national or dominant) language, but a robust speaker community continues/thrives in the homeland of the immigrants. (This is the situation of most immigrant languages in the United States, for example; for the most part, second-generation immigrants speak and use English in their daily lives, but their ancestral language is maintained in their original homeland. English, in contrast, is an immigrant language to North America; for a range of historical, socio-economic, and political reasons, it has largely ousted Native American local languages.) It is the loss of such local languages which is of concern to linguists, as their loss means an absolute kind of disappearance of the language. Thus, by and large, the term 'language endangerment' refers to the attrition and potential loss of local languages. A language is considered endangered when it is used by fewer speakers and when it is used in fewer situations or domains.

Language endangerment typically involves language contact situations, with two (or more) languages in use, where one language (Language A) replaces another (Language B). Prototypically, Language A is being adopted by speakers of Language B and so Language A replaces Language B in the sense that decreasing numbers of speakers of Language B use it, until ultimately there are no speakers of Language B at all. This is referred to as language shift, a term which refers specifically to such changes in patterns of language use, whereby speakers abandon the language of their parents in favor of another language. In the scenario outlined here, Language A can most neutrally be referred to as a language of wider communication; it tends to be a language which holds social prestige, serves official and governmental functions, and is used in education. It is often a regional or national lingua franca, i.e., the language which groups speaking different languages use to communicate with one another. It is also called, less neutrally, the

dominant language, the majority language, or even the killer language. 'Dominant language' is to be avoided as it implies a deliberation on the part of the speakers of that language to dominate others; in some instances this is in fact the case, as when language policies intentionally restrict use of a local language. But in other situations the influence of the language of wider communication is more indirectly and subtly attained, through prestige and social pressures. Similarly, a number of labels are used to refer to Language B, such as minority language, indigenous language, mother tongue, or heritage language. The term 'local language' is more neutral and captures the fact that language use is tied to a particular geography, and that a speaker community generally sees the need or desire to use this language within a given region. The respective terms 'majority' and 'minority' for Languages A and B are not always accurate; speakers of Language B may be numerically greater but in a disadvantaged social or economic position which makes the use of the language of wider communication attractive. The term 'heritage language' can be confusing, as it is often used to refer to the language of one's ancestors, regardless of how many generations have passed since anyone spoke the language. It does not necessarily refer to a local or indigenous language, and can also refer to the ancestral languages of immigrants, even when they have not been spoken for generations.

Predications of language loss stem from several considerations, which center around a combination of critical factors in language vitality, including the number and generations of speakers, their geographic distribution and relative isolation, and recognition of ongoing rapid language shift. First, there is a very uneven distribution between languages and speakers, with just a handful of languages spoken by a very large percentage of the global population. According to current counts, approximately half the world's population speaks one of just 20 languages, and eight languages (Mandarin [Mandarin Chinese], Spanish, English, Bengali, Hindi, Portuguese, Russian, and Japanese) surpass all others with over 100 million speakers. Arabic could perhaps be added to this list: the sum total of all speakers of some form of Arabic makes it the fifth largest language, with over 200 million speakers. Not all varieties of Arabic are mutually intelligible, however, and so the differences between them are more language-like than dialect-like. Yet given the total number of people who speak some variety of Arabic, it should be included in the list of major world languages. The situation is markedly different for most of the world's languages. Some 96% of all languages are spoken by just 4% of the population, and one-fourth of the total number of languages have fewer than 1000 speakers. More than half of all languages have fewer than 10 000 speakers. Although the total number of speakers is not the sole indicator of language vitality, it is certainly a very important one. A very large majority of the world's population speaks just a very few languages. More to the point is the fact that we are witnessing rapid language shift, with a small set of major or global languages gaining in terms of numbers of speakers at the expense of a vast majority of the world's languages.

Finally, it is important to note that the geographic distribution of languages is also very uneven, with the largest numbers of languages spoken in Africa and Asia, and much smaller numbers elsewhere, such as in North and South America and the Pacific. Europe has a very few languages, both in terms of raw numbers and of percentage relative to the whole. This distribution is summarized in **Table 1**.

Distribution by continent or region is only part of the story. Language density, or the number of languages per unit area, varies greatly. Papua New Guinea stands out with 820 languages; with its relatively small territory, it has the highest language density of any country in the world. In all of North America, fewer than 200 indigenous languages remain, although there were certainly hundreds of distinct languages several centuries ago. Today, only a handful of these (such as Cree, Dakota, Ojibwa, Navajo) have a hope of survival, and even their longevity is doubtful. The case of Cree is illustrative. As of the 1998 Canadian census, there was a total of 87 555 speakers of all varieties of Cree. These speakers are not monolingual, however, and they show low literacy rates in Cree (only 5–10%) but high literacy rates in a second language, usually English (75–100%). Such figures are indicative of significant language shift. The figures for Dakota are even more alarming, with fewer than 27 000 speakers in North America as a whole, and only 31 monolingual speakers (as of 1990). Basic descriptions

Table 1 Geographic distribution of languages

	Total living languages	Percentage
The Americas	1013	15%
Africa	2058	30%
Europe	230	3%
Asia	2197	32%
The Pacific	1311	19%
Total	6809	

Source: Grimes (2000).

of Dakota speech patterns note that in some communities the children and young adults do not speak Dakota or at least prefer to speak English. Again, these are all signs of ongoing and advanced language shift, leading toward language extinction.

As this may suggest, in only a very few cases is language loss due to the loss of the speaker population itself. Instead, the primary cause for language loss is language shift, when speakers cease to speak their own native tongue, the local language, in favor of the language of what is usually, politically and/or economically, the dominant culture. Such shift from the local to the language of wider communication can occur over several generations, or even as quickly as over the course of a single generation. In many cases the oldest generation – the grandparent group – speaks the local language as their first and primary language and has limited or nonfluent knowledge of the external language of communication; in some instances they may even have no knowledge at all of the language of wider communication. In contrast, the middle generation has some knowledge but primarily uses the language of wider communication, and the youngest generation has little to no knowledge of the local language, using at best a few words or phrases, such as greetings. In cases of rapid language shift, however, these changes occur across a single generation.

Levels of Language Endangerment

Implicit to the study of language endangerment is the notion that a relatively vital language can change to a state of endangerment at some point, usually when children cease learning the language. In studying language endangerment, it is important to assess degrees of vitality versus endangerment. That said, because a large number of factors enter into each situation, it can be difficult to rank levels of endangerment. Therefore, different linguists have proposed a variety of scales, with differing numbers of stages of endangerment and different labels for each level. There is, however, widespread agreement on the ends of the scale: safe languages and extinct languages. Generally, languages are categorized with respect to endangerment on a scale of six levels: safe, at risk, disappearing, moribund, nearly extinct and extinct.

Safe: A language is considered safe when all generations use the language in all or nearly all domains. It has a large speaker base relative to others spoken in the same region and, therefore, typically functions as the language of government, education, and commerce. Many safe languages enjoy official status

within nation-states, and as such tend to be held in higher prestige than other languages.

At Risk: A language is at risk when it is vital (being learned and used by people of all different age groups) without any observable pattern of a shrinking speaker base, but lacks some of the properties of a safe language: for example, it is spoken in a limited number of domains or has a smaller number of speakers than other languages in the same region.

Disappearing: A language is disappearing when there is an observable shift towards another language in the communities where it is spoken. With an overall decreasing proportion of intergenerational transfer, the speaker base shrinks because it is not being replenished. Disappearing languages are consequently used in a more restricted set of domains, and a language of wider communication begins to replace it in a greater percentage of homes.

Moribund: A moribund language is one that is not being transmitted to children.

Nearly Extinct: A language can be considered nearly extinct when only a handful of speakers of the oldest generation remain.

Extinct: An extinct language is one with no remaining speakers.

It should be noted that sometimes an intermediate stage between 'safe' and 'at risk' is recognized, 'safe but small,' determined by languages which are otherwise safe and stable but have a relatively small speaker base. The last three levels of language endangerment given here – moribund, nearly extinct, and extinct – are characterized by a lack of intergenerational transmission; disappearing languages are characterized by a downward trend.

Many linguists would argue that any language which is not at the safe level is endangered. Furthermore, there does not appear to be a direct correlation between the level of endangerment and the anticipated rate of language attrition: some communities shift language usage more slowly, and others more quickly. That said, language endangerment is currently a pressing concern for the linguistic community precisely because rapid attrition is occurring at a global level. In addition, the kinds of documentation and revitalization efforts needed are directly related to the level of endangerment. The closer a language is to extinction, the greater the urgency to act before fluent speakers are gone. Except in cases of sudden attrition (e.g., when a language is abruptly lost through natural catastrophe or warfare; see the next section), endangered language situations tend to be characterized by speakers of differing proficiency levels. Languages ranked at any level below safe

tend to have communities which include individuals who are semispeakers, i.e., not fully fluent speakers, lacking native proficiency; the ratio of semispeakers to fluent speakers varies among communities and with endangerment levels. Such semispeakers show varying degrees of fluency, ranging from strong or nearly fluent speakers, through reasonably fluent semispeakers and weak semispeakers who are less fluent, to those with even more limited speaking competence. In assessing language vitality, it is thus important to take into consideration the proficiency and knowledge of the speakers of the language. Even in the case of extinct languages, there may be cause to move quickly, as there may still be 'rememberers' of the language who have some recollection of its use or may have some experience with it. Sometimes communities opt to resurrect (or 'resuscitate') extinct languages; rememberers can play a critical role in these efforts. Here too there is a range of proficiency: in some cases such rememberers have memorized entire texts without understanding their meaning, while the knowledge of others is restricted to only a few words or phrases. Rememberers can play an important role in language revitalization and documentation efforts, but they are static and do not represent living language.

What Is Lost?

There are a number of reasons to be concerned about language attrition. Language is a key part of each person's identity and is an essential component of a group's cultural and social heritage. Local communities who have lost their language speak about it as a deeply personal loss which is accompanied by a loss of a sense of self. Speakers whose languages are not endangered are also aware of the importance of language as a marker of identity and pay great attention to differences in dialects and speech patterns. Thus perhaps one of the most compelling reasons to be concerned about language endangerment is that the speakers who lost this part of their heritage deeply regret it and grieve over it. For this reason, so many different communities around the world are currently engaged in language revitalization efforts. Some of those groups whose languages are extinct are now attempting to resurrect them from whatever records have survived, including missionary descriptions, grammars, and sometimes oral recordings.

Loss of language also means a loss of intellectual wealth. From the linguistic standpoint, as we lose languages, we lose linguistic diversity. A great many of the world's broad array of endangered languages are understudied; what little knowledge we have indicates that many are structurally very different from the languages spoken by the majority of the global population (e.g., Mandarin, English, Spanish, and so on). The languages with the most speakers, cited in **Table 1**, represent a very small portion of the world's languages typologically and genetically. Thus language loss means a decline in sources about the range of human language and its limitations. For the linguistic community, one of the challenges of language endangerment is to record and describe as many languages as possible while they are still spoken, so that we do not lose this wealth of human knowledge without record. Language loss should also be considered from the broader scientific perspective. Language encodes the range of human experience and knowledge; its disappearance entails the loss of the skills, information, beliefs, and ideas of a people. Often this involves specific knowledge about plants and their medicinal uses. It also includes historical knowledge; preliterate societies record their histories in their oral traditions, including stories, legends, and songs which tell the history of their people, settlements, battles, and so on. Language is more than a repository for religious and spiritual beliefs; in many societies the language itself is sacred and cannot be separated from religious beliefs and practices.

Taxonomy of Endangerment Situations

Language change and loss are naturally occurring processes which have been in place as long as language itself. Every language is constantly changing over time, and eventually evolves into one or more related but different languages; for example, the modern Romance languages (Spanish, Italian, French, and so on) are related to Latin, which is no longer used as a spoken language except for religious purposes. This kind of language 'loss' is a natural and ongoing process. Linguists are more concerned, however, with the absolute loss of language, which occurs when a language disappears entirely, without descendant languages. This kind of loss comes about in several different ways. Sometimes an entire speaker community passes away due to warfare, genocide, or disease. More frequently, however, language loss is the result of language shift, when speakers cease to speak their own native (local) tongue in favor of the language of what is usually the dominant culture, dominant politically and/or economically. The time frame for such shift varies across situations; it can take place over several generations, or much more quickly. One typical pattern is that the oldest generation, the grandparents, speaks the local language as their first and primary language, the middle generation has some knowledge but uses the dominant language primarily, and the youngest generation has little or no

knowledge of the heritage language, and may at most know a few words or phrases. In cases of rapid language shift, however, these changes occur across a single generation, with the parent generation speaking the local language but their children, for whatever reasons, speaking a different one.

There are a number of ways to categorize language endangerment situations. One useful taxonomy takes into account the relative rate of attrition together with its causes. This taxonomy recognizes four different categories of attrition: sudden, radical, gradual, and top to bottom.

Sudden attrition refers to language loss which occurs abruptly because of the sudden loss of its speakers due to disease, war, natural disasters, and so on. Relatively few cases of sudden attrition have been documented, although it most probably occurred more frequently during periods of colonization, when certain indigenous groups are known to have been annihilated due to disease. In modern times, civil strife, ethnic and religious clashes, and the spread of some diseases, such as HIV, increase the chances of sudden attrition occurring in certain areas of the world.

Radical attrition is similar to sudden attrition in the sense that it comes about due to political circumstances which cause speakers to stop using their language. Such circumstances include repression and/or genocide, often occurring where groups are singled out for ethnic cleansing. (Under colonization and later, apartheid in South Africa, for example, Khoisan speakers abandoned their ethnic identity and so too their languages in order to avoid repressive measures which included genocide.) Such language shift is thus a means of self-defense or even self-preservation for speakers for whom identification with their ethnic group may lead to persecution. In these circumstances people are likely to cease speaking their heritage language abruptly.

Cases of gradual attrition are more prevalent in the world today. Gradual attrition is the relatively slow loss of a language due to language shift away from the local language to a language of wider communication. In some cases the language of wider communication is a regionally dominant language, and in others a national lingua franca. Gradual attrition often involves transitional bilingualism: as the speaker population is in the process of shift, certain groups primarily speak the local language and others the language of wider communication. Thus it is here that the clearest gradations in intergenerational transmission are to be found. Because this type of attrition is gradual, speaker communities may be unaware that it is in progress, until it is quite advanced and the local language is seriously endangered.

Bottom-to-top attrition refers to the loss of the local languages in most domains with the exception of religious and ritual practices. Languages at this level are in an advanced stage of attrition. The local language is preserved only in those contexts where its use is seen to be the most critical. This tends to be those types of context where ritualized or sacred texts are critical, and the population may view the specific language of these as sacred in and of itself. Such ritualized or ceremonial texts are often memorized. Because these tend to be very prestigious but restricted domains for a community, it can be difficult to assess the actual vitality of the language in question. In less advanced instances of bottom-to-top attrition, the language is still used spontaneously in the settings to which it has been assigned by members of the local community. In extreme cases, the only remaining knowledge of a local language may be memorized portions of a ceremony. There are reports of communities which have retained the memorized rituals in the local language for many generations but have lost all comprehension of them.

Assessing Language Vitality

The factors involved in assessing language endangerment or vitality are complex. Language vitality is usually ranked in scalar terms on the basis of a combination of factors, in particular on numbers and generations of speakers. On one end of the scale are extinct languages which are no longer spoken at all, and on the other end are viable languages in no current threat of endangerment. In between these two extremes, a number of stages can be recognized. A healthy language with strong vitality is used with a variety of functions and in a range of settings, usually called domains. The most vital languages are used in all settings, formal and informal, official and in the home. In cases of language attrition, the local language is used in increasingly fewer domains with fewer functions as attrition progresses. Simply put, an important diagnostic in assessing vitality is the range of uses of a particular language.

Although it is often thought that the absolute number of speakers of a language is the key factor in language vitality, experts agree that in fact it is intergenerational transmission which is critical in determining it. In order for a language to be healthy, it needs to be used by future generations. When children cease learning and speaking a language, it is already endangered, even if there still exists a significant number of speakers. Intergenerational transmission does not in and of itself guarantee the safety of a language, however, as a complex set of factors are involved. These all pertain to questions of who uses

the language, how, and when. In 2003 UNESCO's Ad Hoc Expert Group on Endangered Languages established a core set of nine criteria to be used in determining language endangerment:

1. Intergenerational transmission
2. Absolute number of speakers
3. Proportion of speakers within the total population
4. Trends in existing language domains
5. Response to new domains and media
6. Materials for language education and literacy
7. Governmental and institutional attitudes and policies, including official status and use
8. Community members' attitudes toward their own language
9. Amount and quality of documentation.

These nine factors are key in assessing language vitality. Variables (1)–(3) involve the distribution of speakers of the language, relative to the total number of the ethnic population as well as to generational stratification, and in absolute terms as well. Variables (4) and (5) are concerned with domains of language use; (7) and (8) with attitudes at the local and national level; and (6) and (9) are related to the kinds of material available for the language, including both pedagogical and reference materials as well as linguistic documentation. Strictly speaking, the level of linguistic documentation relates to language endangerment only insofar as ample documentation can aid language revitalization or resurrection efforts; the act of documenting a language does not directly affect its vitality.

Intergenerational Transmission

Intergenerational transmission is the single most important factor in determining a language's viability. In order for a language to remain healthy, it must be spoken by children, as they are the representatives and predecessors of future generations of speakers. For this reason, intergenerational transmission is the single most critical factor in a language's ongoing vitality. At the same time, rates of intergenerational transmission may vary between villages or speaker communities and it cannot be assumed to be uniform across a speaker population. There can be variation within a single village: it is often the case that in one family the children do not learn to speak the local language but in another they do. As this accurately suggests, overall language vitality may be uneven, higher in some communities and lower in others. A thorough analysis of language vitality requires attention to such regional variation in addition to the generational variation in transmission and use. A 10-way distinction in terms of transmission and

use is proposed by Krauss (1997) to enable a more detailed means of assessing variation in speaking patterns across generations:

a. The language is spoken by all generations, including all, or nearly all, of the children.
a-. The language is learned by all or most children.
b. The language is spoken by all adults, parental age and up, but learned by few or no children.
b-. The language is spoken by adults in their 30 s and older but not by younger parents.
c. The language is spoken only by middle-aged adults and older, in their 40 s and up.
c-. All speakers are in their 50 s and older.
-d. All speakers are in their 60 s and older.
d. All speakers are in their 70 s and older.
d-. All speakers are in their 70 s and older, and there are fewer than 10 of them.
e. The language is extinct, with no speakers.

As this scale suggests, it is important to make distinctions across age-groups within a single generation as well as across generations. Some might argue that a language is already in danger at stage (a-), when some of the children are not learning it. At stage (b), there is a greater level of danger, and so on; if the language is to survive at this stage, efforts need to be made at revitalization, or for reversing language shift. This scale may appear overly detailed; it is clear that a language is already on the way to extinction when it has reached stage (b). Yet at times it is needed. First, it can be quite useful in assessing the relative vitality not only of different languages, but at times more importantly, of various speaker communities. Inuktitut, for example, can be rated at level (a) in Greenland, where there are fluent speakers of all generations. (There are other factors which enter into its vitality in Greenland, such as official language status and use in education.) In some other Inuktitut-speaking communities, however, children are not learning the language and it is on the path to extinction. This is the case in specific communities in Canada and Alaska, although the children are acquiring it in other communities. This example further underscores the fact that evaluating the overall status of a language can be difficult, as it may vary from community to community. Second, if community members decide to revitalize their language, it is important to have an accurate understanding of the ages and numbers of fluent speakers who can assist in the revitalization effort.

Absolute Numbers of Speakers

Absolute population size alone is not a definitive indicator of language vitality. Each individual

community is embedded in a set of circumstances that affect language use, so that even a small isolated rural community which has little contact with speakers of other languages and in which all members, of all generations, learn and use the local language, cannot reasonably be called endangered. That said, as a general rule, the more speakers, the more likely the community will be able to resist language shift. Put differently, small communities are at greater risk, because they can more easily disappear due to any one of a number of natural or man-made catastrophes. Furthermore, a small community can more easily be assimilated to a large community, and is likely to have fewer resources to resist external pressures. Yet small size alone does not condemn a language to extinction, because the nexus of relevant factors may actually favor language use. A case in point is Icelandic. It is spoken as the first language by a relatively small group of people (approximately 300 000), but it is the national language of the country of Iceland, has a long-standing literary history, and is a language of education. Icelanders have a strong sense of pride in their cultural and linguistic heritage and teach Icelandic to their children as their first language. It is hard to characterize it as being in any way endangered. By the same token, a relatively large speaker community does not guarantee language vitality. Navajo, an Athapascan language spoken in North America, provides an example. Although there are currently approximately 178 000 speakers (2000 census), there is ample evidence of advanced language shift. In 1968, a full 90% of first-grade children spoke Navajo as their first and primary language; by 1990 this figure had dropped to 30%. Despite the relatively large speaker base, it is doubtful that future generations will speak Navajo unless measures are undertaken to assure its continuance.

Proportion of Speakers within the Total Population

The ratio of speakers of the local language with respect to the total population of the local community is an important diagnostic in evaluating language vitality. For safe languages, all of the population speaks the language. In contrast, for extinct languages, none of the population does. In between these two extremes, languages can range from unsafe, with early language shift, where nearly all of the population still uses them, to severely endangered, where only a small percentage do. The larger the percentage speaking and using the language in an active way, on a daily basis, the more likely the language is to maintain its vitality.

In addition to the ratio of speakers of the local language to the number of people who would claim that local language as ancestral, it is useful to compare how the local language speakers are embedded in a larger social and cultural context. Often local communities are in a minority position with regard to a national culture, represented by speakers of a language of wider communication. The narrower the gap, the stronger the position of the local language.

Trends in Existing Language Domains

A vital language continues to be used in existing domains, while in contrast an endangered language is used in fewer domains. The differences in usage can be placed on a continuum, with safe languages used in all domains for all purposes. Next are situations of what is called diglossia, or the use of different varieties in different contexts. Here a language of wider communication, usually a regional or national language, is the one used in official domains, such as government, education, and other public offices and institutions. The local language, in contrast, is also used in public domains, including not only traditional (local) places of worship or other religious institutions, but elsewhere as well. Typically, the local language is used in the home and informal domains, and the language of wider communication in official domains, and both can be used in public domains. Older members of the community may use only the local language. Next on the continuum is what the UNESCO Ad Hoc Group of Experts terms dwindling domains, when use of the language of wider communication spreads at the expense of the local language. The critical change here is that the local language is used less frequently in the home and is not transmitted to children. This state is further characterized by bilingualism in both the parent and grandparent generations; the children tend to be semispeakers but may be bilingual if the local language is spoken in the home. As this description suggests, at this point there is advanced language shift; the language is endangered and could be ranked as disappearing or even moribund. There are two final stages in this continuum which precede extinction: limited or formal domains is one, and highly limited domains the other. The former is characterized by use of the local language at festivals and ceremonies, in particular when the older generation is present (and therefore using the language). Often the use of the local language is itself tied to the rituals of these occasions and to an extent may be formulaic in usage. UNESCO also includes use of the language in the home in this category when such use is limited to the grandparent generation. The next stage, highly limited domains, represents even greater restriction

in use of the local language. It is used only by a very small number of people on very particular occasions, and its use is often ceremonial.

As is clear from this description, the range of domains in which a language is used can be correlated to the generational distribution of speakers and their levels of proficiency. Use in all domains requires fluent speakers of all ages. Loss of intergenerational transmission, by its very definition, is indicative of a restriction in domains, as it signals that the language is not spoken in the home setting with children.

Response to New Domains and Media

Vital, safe languages are not only used in existing domains, but a measure of their strength is the extent to which their use is extended to new domains. These are created as society and conditions change, and an important measure of a language's vitality is the extent to which it evolves with the people who speak it. The general pattern, worldwide, is for the language of wider communication to be used in emerging domains, including formal education and media of all kinds. The question of language use in the media is critical. The media helps spread language use and fosters its growth and/or maintenance. Moreover, use of a language in media is an important indication of that language's prestige and the kind of support it receives from the larger (dominant) culture, the allocation of resources, and so on. Finally, the media represents prestige and affluence, and the language used in the media is associated with both of these.

Education is a key domain for language use. By its very nature, education promotes the language of instruction and fosters its use. Many local languages are not used in schools; in places where they are, they are more likely to be taught as a secondary subject and not used as languages of instruction. For a language to be truly vital, not only must it be taught in the schools, but it also must be used to teach other subjects.

Materials for Language Education and Literacy

Most linguists and local community members agree that education and literacy in the local language are necessary to maintain vitality, or to revitalize a language threatened with endangerment. Some local communities reject this notion, wanting to preserve their oral traditions and to rely solely on them. There is, however, a cost to this decision, as it limits the domains in which the language can be used. Regardless, most regard literacy as essential for local languages. Yet more than half of all languages have no written form, and so a writing system needs to be developed for them in order to use them in education and literacy programs. Basic pedagogical and reference materials are needed, including textbooks, dictionaries and usable descriptive grammars. Such materials are readily available for languages of wider communication, but not for the majority of local languages. In addition, reading material is needed for literacy as well.

The existence and use of such materials is another diagnostic for assessing language vitality. UNESCO uses a scale of six levels in this assessment; each of these levels correlates with ever-decreasing vitality. At one end, safe and stable languages have an established orthography with a written tradition that includes a full range of written materials; the language is used in official domains such as government and education. At the next level, the materials exist and are used by children in the school, at least in terms of developing local language literacy, but the written language is not used in the government or administration. At the third level, children are exposed to written materials in the schools; they may play a role in education but print media, such as newspapers, journals, magazines, do not use the written form of the language. At the next level, although written materials exist, they are not used in education. Only some community members use them, while for others, their existence may have symbolic value. At the fifth level, the community has knowledge of a writing system and some written materials exist. Finally, at the other end of the community, there is no orthography and the language has no written form.

The singular importance of literacy, as presented by the UNESCO Ad Hoc Group of Experts, is not one which would be embraced by all linguists and by all community activists. It represents a practical view of the role of writing and literacy in the modern world in which local languages compete to survive.

Governmental and Institutional Attitudes and Policies

National and regional governmental policies, laws, and attitudes all play a critical role in the fate of local languages. Policies can be viewed as supportive, fostering the use and development of local languages. They can be benign, not explicitly supportive but also not disadvantageous to local languages. Governmental policies can also be explicitly hostile toward local languages and can actively discourage their use.

There is a direct relation between national-level policies and the attitudes of speakers of the language of wider communication. Positive policies at the national level tend to reflect the overall attitudes of the population toward local languages. One aspect

of this is attitudes toward bi- or multilingualism. While some nation-states (such as Canada, Nigeria, or Switzerland) are multilingual, with multiple national and/or official languages, others (such as the United States) are unequivocally monolingual at a national level with regard to language and education policy, as such policies are intended to promote the use of one and only one official language (English, in this case). Because the use of local languages almost always entails at least bilingualism to some degree, so that community members can function at local, regional, and national levels, these languages suffer in countries which are dogmatically monolingual.

National-level attitudes can influence local attitudes. Language is closely associated with the people who speak it; negative attitudes toward a specific language translate into negative thoughts and beliefs about the speakers and their culture, social norms, and heritage. Such negative views can further influence the views community members have of their language. They may perceive it as backward, useless, underdeveloped, and so on, or they may see it as an impediment to advancement in a larger society which does not value their specific local language. Needless to say, such attitudes have an adverse effect on language use and foster language attrition. The role of community members' attitudes toward their own local language cannot be overstated. Where there is a strong sense of pride in the language, it is more likely to be used and less likely to move into an endangerment situation. In cases where language attrition has begun, the chances of reversing language shift are considerably greater if the people have positive attitudes toward the local language. In the absence of these, a revitalization program must begin by fostering community support.

Causes of Language Shift

The precise causes of language shift are specific to each individual endangerment situation, yet several key factors often come into play. These include urbanization, globalization, and what have been called social dislocation and cultural dislocation. Often the causes of language shift center around imbalances in prestige and power between the local language and culture on the one hand, and the language of wider communication and dominant culture(s) on the other. The imbalance, or unequal levels of power, often means that members of the local community are socially disadvantaged in a number of ways with respect to the majority population. In concrete terms, this frequently means that members of the local community are relatively powerless politically, and are less educated and less wealthy, in many cases living

in poverty, and with less access to technology and modern conveniences, than the majority population. One common result is that this socially disadvantaged position becomes associated with, or even equated with, the local language and culture, and so knowledge of the local language is seen as an impediment to social and economic advancement. Socio-economic improvement is thus perceived as tied to knowledge of the language of wider communication, as is renunciation of the local language and culture; for this reason, the situation has been called social dislocation. Social dislocation stemming from lack of prestige and power is one of the most powerful motivating factors in language shift.

Related to social dislocation is what has been called cultural dislocation, which comes about as a result of modernization and globalization. These two related forces bring people from different cultures, speaking different languages, together in a variety of settings, from informal to official, including religious and educational settings. This often results in the culture of the minority giving way to that of the majority. At an extreme, globalization is feared to lead to cultural homogenization. The loss of cultural distinctions supports a loss of linguistic distinctions, since the culture is embedded in the language.

Urbanization is another key cause of language shift and is itself related to cultural and social dislocation. Urbanization brings people from different regions and cultures into the same living and working spaces. They are necessarily required to communicate with one another and so turn to an established lingua franca or language of wider communication. It is not surprising that we find the highest levels of language retention in rural areas; in general, the more isolated a community, the more likely it is to maintain use of the local language. Urbanization has the opposite effect: by bringing people into contact, it facilitates language shift.

Globalization puts even greater pressure on local languages and can be a major factor in language shift. One of the results of globalization is the emergence of at least one global language of wider communication. A global language is a particular type of language of wider communication, and in some instances may supplant the national language in this role. The global nature of trade and commerce has in recent decades put increasing pressure on the need for an international lingua franca, a position currently held by English. Whereas historically it was important for key figures in world politics to be able to communicate, it is now critical that a large number of people in all walks of manufacturing and business communicate with one another, increasing the need for a global language. Some local communities thus see

the knowledge of a global language as necessary for socio-economic advancement. In cases where knowledge of a national or regional language is also important, and in fact may be the only language of education, the need to know the global language can supplant the need or desire to know the local language.

Thus in the modern world, multilingualism generally involves knowledge of one or more national languages and, increasingly, of the global language. This represents a change in traditional patterns, when speakers knew a number of local languages. The shift stems from a combination of factors including education, social prestige, and socio-economics. One factor which has led to diminished local-level multilingualism is the current importance of the national language in terms of access to education, higher-paying jobs, the media, and social advancement. The national language provides a language of wider communication which makes knowledge of multiple local languages less necessary. A key characteristic of language endangerment is that use of the local language is limited, not only regionally but also functionally. In some cases, it is used only in the home, while in others, it is used in the village but not for communication with people living outside of the immediate community, and so on. Thus, the uses of the local language have become increasingly limited, with the net result that it is increasingly important for speakers to learn not only a language of wider communication but also, in many instances, a global language.

Strengthening Language Vitality

A number of steps can be taken to strengthen language vitality and reverse language shift. These require action and commitment on the part of community members and at the level of national government alike. Such steps include instituting educational programs which teach and promote use of the local language, and establishing national language policies which make these possible and which support linguistic diversity. An often critical part of such programs is the development of literacy in the local language. In most cases, pedagogical materials need to be developed and teachers need to be trained; in cases of advanced attrition, they will need to be taught the language itself, in addition to language pedagogy.

As this implies, levels of extinction and degrees of fluency (especially among semispeakers) are of great relevance to language revitalization efforts. Disappearing languages often have fluent speakers of many ages who can be enlisted in the work of revitalization. For moribund or nearly extinct languages,

this is considerably less likely, and the importance of semispeakers to the ultimate success of the process grows considerably. An extinct language may still have rememberers who, although they have no active speaking ability, may know individual words or phrases, such as greetings. So even in cases of extinction there may be a variety of levels of lingering knowledge.

See also: Identity and Language; Language Maintenance and Shift; Minorities and Language.

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Environment and Language

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Introduction

The notion of environment, like that of language, is a complex one, and there are a number of views on the most appropriate approach to this topic. The title of this article suggests that they can be treated as independent entities and correlated to one another. Moreover, it suggests that language is central, and that the environment surrounds this center. This implies that that the principal task of the investigator is to look for significant correlations between the two. The correlational approach contrasts with the view that languages are integrated with their environment and that correlations therefore are not of central concern.

Whenever the coverage of a discipline such as linguistics is extended, problems of definition arise. I comment here on the notion of 'environment of language' first and turn to attempts to define 'language' in the next section.

Environment of language has been characterized differently by different writers. Sapir (1912: 227) distinguishes between physical and social environment but cautions that:

> The mere existence, for instance, of a certain type of animal in the physical environment of a people does not suffice to give rise to a linguistic symbol referring to it. It is necessary that the animal be known by the members of the group in common and that they have some interest, however slight, in it before the language of the community is called upon to make reference to this particular element of the physical environment. In other

words, so far as language is concerned, all environmental influence reduces at last analysis to the influence of social environment.

One such social influence that has received much attention in recent years is how different social roles of men and women are reflected in gender-specific language and discriminatory language use. Similarly, a number of ecofeminists have argued that man-made language is a root cause not only of social discrimination but also of unhealthy environmental attitudes.

Perhaps the best-known characterization of the environment of language is given by Haugen (1972: 325), who pointed out that the search for an appropriate definition of 'environment' might lead one's thoughts first to the referential world to which language provides an index. However, this is the environment not of the language but of its lexicon and grammar. The true environment of a language is the society that uses it as one of its codes.

Haugen further limits his investigation to the linguistic environment of language (i.e., the users, the relation to other languages, and the agencies concerned with the form and use and attitudes, but not their relationship to the natural environment). Haugen's ideas reflect his experience of Norway, with its competition in colonial days between Danish and Norwegian, and in independent Norway between three competing proposals for a national language. He was furthermore influenced by his experience of migrant languages in the United States, and his observations of language in modern nation states are repeated in many of the pre-1990 writings on this topic (e.g., the contributors to Enninger and Haynes [1984]).

In more recent years, the notion of environment of language has been widened considerably. Fill (1993)

includes parameters such as age and gender into the ecology of language and, in the wake of the growing awareness of a worldwide environmental crisis, the relationship between language and the natural environment has become a focus of research interest. The question of whether environmental problems are in part a consequence of a growing mismatch between the contours of language and the contours of the natural environment has been asked by Mühlhäusler (1983), Trampe (1990), Halliday (1992), and Fill (1993).

There are four logically possible relationships between languages and their environment, all of which have been the subject from time to time of different schools of linguistics: the independency hypothesis (Chomsky, cognitive linguistics), language is constructed by the world (Marr), the world is constructed by language (structuralism and poststructuralism), and language is interconnected with the world – it both constructs and is constructed by it (ecolinguistics).

In the emerging discipline of ecolinguistics (Fill, 1998; Mühlhäusler, 2003), all of these relationships are considered, though the importance of the independency view of language has been greatly reduced.

Linguists continue to differ on the kinds of relationships they regard as most important and on what aspects of the world are perceived as most influential. Regarding relationships, the majority of writers on language and environment continue to emphasize the central role of competition (Haugen, 1972; Mufwene, 2001). The experience of competition between the nation states of Europe seems to be the metaphorical basis for this emphasis, but in numerous traditional societies, small languages have coexisted with larger ones without any danger of them being lost. Ecolinguists such as Fill (1993) note that competition is far less important in nature than commonly believed, and that more than 80 percent of all interactions between natural species are either beneficial or neutral.

The aspects of the world deemed most important by linguists are social factors – contact with other languages and varieties as well as the metalinguistic beliefs and practices prevailing in a language community. The interaction between languages and their natural correlates have remained subsidiary to this, partly because earlier attempts to explore the nature of language with reference to their environments have been fairly crude. The notion that language and environment adapt to one another is recent, and as yet not fully developed, but progress has been made in the study of the relationship between linguistic diversity and the diversity of natural life forms (Nettle, 1999), between conservation, biology and language conservation (Mühlhäusler, 2003; Harmon, 2002; Maffi, 2001), and between language development and environmental conditions (Mühlhäusler, 1996).

Metaphors and Definitions of Language

The primary purpose of definitions is to create a research tool. The question of a suitable definition of language needs to be distinguished from the question of its ontology – the actual nature of language. Haugen's notion of a 'language ecology,' in which languages interacted with other languages and their environment, was not conceived as a claim about the essential nature of language, and he made it clear that this was not a suggestion that languages are organisms. Language ecology for a long time remained a useful metaphor that helped answer questions such as the disappearance of minor European languages and the causes of language conflict.

Those who use the notion of language ecology metaphorically have held varying views on the nature of language, ranging from that a mental organ to that of a social semiotic. However, ecolinguists, similar to integrational linguists, question the independency view of language and claim that, as language is inextricably linked to wider ecology, its ontology is that of an ecological phenomenon (Finke, 2002; Mühlhäusler, 2003).

Themes in Language and Environment

There are numerous approaches to the relationship between language and environment (surveyed in Mühlhäusler, 2003). I restrict the discussion here to those that start at the linguistic end (i.e., studies focused on the properties of words, grammar, and discourse).

Properties of Words

A focus of many present-day writers is the proliferation of neologisms that have emerged in the wake of growing awareness of the global environmental crisis: Most of the new terms are the result of terminology planning rather than spontaneous innovation, an example being the INFOTERRA Thesaurus (1997). Most of the new terminology originates in English, is highly technical, and consequently abounds in abstract nouns, multiword formation, and words of Latin and Greek origin. The appropriateness of such formations in environmental discourse has been questioned by numerous writers (summarized in Harré *et al.*, 1999), who point out the dangers of substituting greenspeak for environmental action. They have also drawn attention to the trend to introduce deliberately misleading terms to

deflect public attention of problematic practices. Examples of the latter category are 'land reclamation' for wetland drainage, 'sustainable agriculture' for agriculture aimed at sustainability, 'vegetation manipulation' for clear felling, and 'game management' for hunting of wild animals.

Critical ecolinguistics, pioneered by Halliday in 1992, exposes the growthism (portraying growth as semantically unmarked and positive: bigger is better), classism, and speciesism (privileging the human perspective: man is the master of creation) of Western languages, and there are now numerous studies on these trends (see Fill and Mühlhäusler, 2001). The dominance of inappropriate English expressions in the environmental domain is spread through translation. European Union legislation, for instance, requires intertranslatable environmental terminology, and the new member states model their terms on existing English expressions. The resulting process can be characterized as semantic colonization. Conversely, environmental concepts from traditional languages spoken in nonindustrial societies rarely find their way into the green terminology that has developed in English and other world languages over the last decades.

Properties of Grammatical Constructions

Studies beyond the level of green lexicon are rare. Halliday's (1992) suggestion that grammars are the fossilized memory of experience has prompted a number of writers to explore how radically different grammars (e.g., ergative vs. nominative-accusative) reflect fundamentally different attitudes to the relationship between humans and nature. They point out, for instance, that ergative languages, or languages in which cause–effect relationships are difficult to encode, reduce the disposition of their speakers to change their environment. Noun classification systems differentially emphasize or deemphasize the solidarity of humans with other life-forms, as does the inclusion or exclusion of animals in the same gender class as humans.

An extensive list of environmentally problematic grammatical practices in modern European languages is given by Chawla (1991). These practices include passive constructions in environmental texts, which suppress the actor or human agency in environmental degradation, and nominalizations, which reduce processes to abstract objects, as in 'water condenses' becoming 'condensation occurs.'

Properties of Texts and Discourses

The Whorfian idea of linguistic determinism suggests that language structure predisposes language users to develop specific attitudes and actions. It fails to account for the observation that within one and the same language, very different discourses about environmental matters can be produced. For instance, different language is used by developers and environmentalists to describe the same landscape. These differences involve lexical choice as well as the differential use of pronouns. Thus, 'we' can refer to either 'humans and nature' or 'developers and clients.' Similar differences between conservationists' and seal hunters' discourses have been described by Martin (1986). When examining discourses from a narrative perspective, it is found that groups with opposing views on environmental issues typically use the same narrative structures, the difference being the choice of who are the heroes and who are the villains (see Harré et al., 1999). Very different perceptions of the environment are created by the economic, moral, and scientific macro discourses. These discourses often raise conflicting perceptions, particularly on issues such as the need to reduce overpopulation of animals to prevent destruction of their habitat. Irving (2002) describes the cyclical discourses about the koalas of Kangaroo Island. These animals, which enjoy a charismatic status on the Australian mainland, were introduced to the island in the 1920s, where they multiplied to plague proportions. Scientific arguments for the cull or reduction of the koalas have been repeatedly put forward and rejected on moral and economic grounds, and the matter remains unresolved. Another domain in which scientific discourses clash with economic and moral discourses is ecotourism (Mühlhäusler and Peace, 2001).

Environmental Metaphor

Because environmental awareness is of recent origin in Western societies, environmentalist language not only developed numerous new terms but also developed a number of metaphors. Such metaphors have been the focus of several studies (Harré et al., 1999; Döring, 2002; Mühlhäusler, 2003). Environmental metaphors can be analyzed as cultural core metaphors (e.g., our environment is the book written by God, a larder, or a machine), rhetorical devices that help reconcile conflicting discourses (one buys products that do not cost the earth), heuristic devices (the 'sink' metaphor has been employed to explore the possibility of reducing global warming through heat sinks and carbon sinks), and rhetorical devices to justify environmental policies such as population control (lifeboat earth, spaceship earth).

Those concerned with the effect of key metaphors on environmental perceptions and actions note that the different players in the environmental debate live

by a range of different metaphors. This makes both local and global agreement on environmental action very difficult.

Critiquing environmental metaphors is a key concern of many ecolinguists. Ecofeminists have pointed out that the metaphors of male explorers such as 'virgin territory' or 'penetrating the interior' are essentially rape metaphors. Similarly, managerial, corporate metaphors such as 'environmental management system,' 'environmental auditing,' 'environmental performance evaluation,' or 'environmental objectives' have received much criticism, as has the metaphor of reification, the portrayal of situated processes as timeless, bounded objects.

Ongoing Dichotomies

In what has been said thus far, the notions of language and environment have been seen as distinct. This view contrasts with the ecological or biocultural approach (Maffi, 2001), which replaces the dualistic view of the relationship between language and the environment with a more complex holistic notion that nature and culture, language and environment are inextricably linked and that the diversity of linguistic and cultural perspectives is a key factor in biological diversity and environmental health. It has been proposed (Harré *et al.*, 1999; Maffi, 2001) that the fit between traditional languages and their natural environment was brought about by the necessity of languages to match the diverse environments in which they are spoken. This leads to the conclusion that the loss of linguistic diversity is a key factor in the loss of biological diversity.

Just as natural ecologies are seen as structures and are defined by functional interconnections between their inhabitants and their habitats, linguistic diversity is seen as similarly structured, with small languages being important for the viability of larger ones and vice versa. Haugen's metaphor of a competitive marketplace has been replaced by a metaphor of protective layers (Mühlhäusler, 1998). In a layered language ecology, the smallest local vernaculars are sheltered from neighboring vernaculars by intercommunity Pidgins, regional Pidgins, and larger lingua francas. The layer metaphor seeks to explain why small vernaculars have become very vulnerable when intercommunity languages are replaced by a single, large, national language.

Applications and Prospects

Any linguistics that increases the number of parameters it considers provides for a larger number of applications and explanations. The language and environment approach has begun to be applied to language planning, and Liddicoat and Bryant (2000: 305) suggest that "where planning does not consider ecology the result is typically environmental damage, in language as much as in other areas."

Increasingly, language planners consider the social and natural environments of their activities, and in particular the question of whether the introduction of new practices (e.g., literacy or Information Technology), into the environment of indigenous traditional languages might have an adverse effect on their viability. The suggestion that misleading labeling can lead to environmental degradation has been applied to environmental education and signage and has led, for instance, to the renaming of small Australian land animals (previously referred to as rats) with names that remove the perceived undesirability that 'rat' suggests. Examples include Djoorri for the common rock-rat, Palyoora for the plains rat, Tooaranna for the broad-toothed rat, and Rakali for the water-rat (Braithwaite *et al.*, 1995).

Critical environmental linguists have proposed a number of changes in product labeling (e.g., more careful use of the descriptor 'natural' in the United Kingdom) and in the wording of environmental impact assessments. Interestingly, in Wales there is now a requirement of a linguistic impact statement. Critical reassessment of the term 'natural' is also encountered in the debate about causes of so-called natural disasters such as landslides, floods, or droughts, which often turn out to have been triggered by human activity. The idea of languages having an environment or being part of the ecology has produced significant development in the areas of literacy education (e.g., Barton, 1992) and L2 education. Language learning is now seen to take place in a classroom environment or wider social environments that affect its success.

As yet, most writings on language and education have been of a theoretical or critical nature rather than empirical, and the findings that have been made in recent years have been slow in reaching wider public awareness and policy making. Organizations such as Terralingua (http://www.terralingua.org), or events such as the 2004 World Expo of Language and Cultures in Barcelona, may help to popularize the ideas addressed here. The establishment of a new publication focused on an ecological approach to language planning (*Current Issues in Language Planning*) should promote new departures in language planning practices.

See also: Halliday, Michael Alexander Kirkwood; Language Planning and Policy: Models; Linguistic Decolonialization; Sapir, Edward.

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Evolution of Pragmatics

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Introduction

Imagine you are walking through a forest. You approach a clearing in the middle of which you notice three tall sticks standing in the ground. Are they young saplings? No, as you get closer you notice that each stick has been stripped of its bark, that one end of each has been sharpened, and that all three have been forcibly embedded into the ground. This is no natural occurrence; someone has put the sticks there deliberately. You begin to wonder. The sticks are arranged in a straight line each about a meter apart, but the two outer ones are angled inwards, so it's unlikely they're intended as a fence. They are not hidden, so it

is unlikely that someone has left them there to collect later. Since they have been put there deliberately, however, they must have been put there for a reason: why?

This is the kind of question we humans ask a lot. We strive to interpret the actions or behavior of others in terms of the reasons or intentions that might have led them to act or behave in the way they did. In the above scenario, our natural disposition is to try and work out (infer) the intentions behind the action of placing the sticks where they were. Despite the absence of the person who placed the sticks in the ground, you can't help wondering what he or she might have meant by putting them there.

Pragmatists have noticed that this disposition also comes into play when the behavior in question is linguistic. After all, there is much more to understanding the full message that a speaker is trying to convey than simply knowing the meaning of the words themselves. Consider example (1) below:

(1) Jack: Are you going to Bill's party?
    Lily: Bill doesn't like linguists.

The words Lily utters in response to Jack's question have stable, context-independent meaning: linguistic meaning. Jack knows the linguistic meaning of Lily's utterance because he can speak English. The study of this level of meaning is linguistic semantics. But what about the full message Lily intends to convey with her reply – her 'speaker meaning'? This message need not be closely tied to the words she utters at all; it is context-dependent as opposed to context-independent. If I tell you that Lily is a linguist, and that Jack knows this, then the message she intends to convey might be that she will not be going to Bill's party. This level of meaning – what speakers, as opposed to words mean – is the domain of pragmatics.

Of course, pragmatics is many things to many people: there are close to 400 entries in this concise encyclopedia and a quick flick through them reveals modern pragmatics to be made up of a wide range of subdisciplines. There's conversational analysis, the pragmatics of gesture and gender, literary pragmatics and historical pragmatics to name only a few. Indeed, one way of looking at the evolution of pragmatics would be to interpret it as concerning the development of the discipline of pragmatics and to trace its historical development from the writings of Charles Morris and, in the case of English pragmatics, the literature in ordinary language philosophy at Oxford in the 1940s and 1950s (Austin, 1962; Grice, 1989).

The sense of the word 'evolution' used in the title of this essay, however, is the biological one. So for talk of the evolution of pragmatics to make any sense at all, we need to adopt a view of pragmatics that somehow ties it in with biology, and more generally with the 'natural' world. One way to do so is to adopt a cognitive viewpoint and regard pragmatics as – ultimately at least – a branch of cognitive science or psychology. Such a view owes a lot to the work of Noam Chomsky (2000), who advocates a similar, 'naturalistic' view of language. Construed in this way, pragmatics is not just an academic enterprise, it is:

> a capacity of mind . . . a system for interpreting a particular phenomenon in the world, namely human ostensive communicative behavior. (Carston, 2002: 4)

This essay, then, concerns itself with how the capacity of mind that is pragmatics evolved. It is not an essay about the evolution of language. The human pragmatic capacity is implicated in the interpretation of all kinds of human communicative behavior: true, that behavior may well – and perhaps most often does – consist in uttering a string of words (accompanied perhaps by a nonverbal behavior such as a gesture or a facial expression), but it could just as easily consist in planting some sticks deliberately into the ground.

The section 'The Pragmatic Capacity' looks briefly at how human communication works, and articulates what the human pragmatic capacity is. This section involves an exploration of what identifies human behavior as 'ostensive' and 'communicative' (the kind of behavior the capacity has evolved to interpret). It also looks at the foundational cognitive machinery the capacity appears to be built upon. The section 'Metarepresentation and Evolution' examines some of the broader questions an evolutionary account needs to address. To what extent is the evolution of this foundational machinery bound up with the evolution of communication? What circumstances might have led to the evolution of such mechanisms, and how did they become a specialized pragmatic capacity? Bearing the answers to these questions in mind, the section 'The Evolution of Pragmatics' presents one version – in the form of a step-by-step account – of the evolution of pragmatics. This progression is based on a 'myth' originally offered in Grice (1982) but in what follows is independently endorsed by research into the evolution of human cognition.

The Pragmatic Capacity

Ostensive Behavior

Whichever of the subdisciplines of pragmatics you choose to focus on, there is a good chance it will owe at least something to the work of H. Paul Grice. Grice (1989) was a philosopher who wrote

some highly influential papers and delivered the William James Lectures – called 'Logic and Conversation' – in 1967, out of which modern pragmatics developed.

Part of Grice's legacy is that our view of how humans communicate has changed completely. According to the traditional 'code model' of communication – which dates back to Aristotle – a communicator's thoughts are translated into a signal by the use of a code (in this case, language), and translated back from the signal by an audience into the original message. Post Grice, human communication has come to be regarded as an intelligent, intention-driven, inferential activity. Rather than simply being a process of coding and decoding, human communication is achieved by a speaker giving evidence of an intention to inform the hearer of something, and the hearer inferring a conclusion from this evidence.

Consider the following example. If a colleague catches your eye at a meeting and looks in a deliberate manner towards the door (perhaps accompanied by a mimed yawn), then you might infer that your colleague is bored and wants to leave. But this communication is not achieved by coding and decoding. Rather, what the behavior made clear was the fact that your colleague had an intention to inform you of something: communication was achieved by your inferring what this was, rather than decoding your colleague's actions.

Of course, to adopt this view of communication is not to deny the role of coding and decoding in the special case of linguistic communication. In order for Jack to derive Lily's intended meaning in (1), he does indeed need to know the linguistic meaning of the sentence that Lily utters. Crucially, however, he only needs to know it because it provides him with a clue to the speaker meaning that she intends to convey. Her utterance makes clear that she intends to communicate something to him, and he has to infer what the content of this intention is.

There have been various proposals as to how this inference is made. A common story (initially proposed by Grice) has it that Jack begins from the presumption that Lily is being cooperative in her response (perhaps by following a 'cooperative principle' and 'maxims'), or 'relevant' in some sense of the word (see **Relevance Theory** – Sperber and Wilson, 1986/1995). Jack uses this presumption to construct the best available hypotheses about Lily's intended meaning. Since Jack has asked her a question, he obviously expects an answer, and Lily would be being neither cooperative nor relevant if her only intention was to communicate to Jack that Bill doesn't like linguists. Jack knows, however, that Lily is a linguist, and based on the presumption

that Lily is cooperating (or that she believes it is relevant to tell him that Bill doesn't like linguists), Jack can infer that Lily's intention is to communicate that she will not be going to Bill's party. Whatever story you decide to tell, as well as possessing the requisite semantic competence, in order to interpret speaker meaning, hearers must possess something more, and use this information to work out what was meant.

This 'something more' involves a range of factors. Since it involves inferring the intentions of others, it presupposes an awareness that other people have intentions in the first place. This observation is not a trivial one: other people's intentions and mental states generally are not objects to be perceived in the world in the same way as are their faces or bodies; they are 'out there,' but they are invisible. Equally, it presupposes the existence of mechanisms by which these hypotheses about the intentions of others can be represented: a 'framework,' if you like, on which representations of the thoughts and intentions of others can be hung. Finally, it presupposes the existence of standards or expectations about proper communicative behavior according to which hearers form the best hypothesis about a speaker's intended meaning.

On the last of these points, I will have little to say; not because the existence of such standards or expectations is not linked to the evolution of pragmatics, but because the attempt here is to tell a much more general story. Suffice to say, humans are rational beings, and successful communication (in general) proceeds along rational lines according to such standards or expectations. In what follows, I will be interested in the extent to which human communication involves the expression and attribution of intentions (and what kinds of intentions are expressed and attributed), and the mechanisms that underlie our ability to do this.

So, what kinds of intentions are involved? A first suggestion might be that all that is required for an act to be 'ostensive' or 'communicative' is that the agent of the act has an intention to impart some information to an audience. A moment's reflection, however, reveals that having this intention is not enough. If I intend to inform you that I want a particular book for my birthday, I might decide to leave a magazine casually open at the page where I have ringed a review of the book in question with a pen. Notice that in this scenario, I don't want you to know that leaving the magazine for you is my intention: I leave the magazine looking as if it has fallen open at this page naturally.

Many people (including Grice) see a sense in which this kind of example is problematic; those who do see the problem as residing in the fact that there is

something covert about the way I have behaved. Indeed, there is a sense in which the kind of transfer of information in this example doesn't even count as 'communication,' which – after all – we feel to be a joint activity. In any case, even if we do regard this situation as an instance of communication, it is certainly not the kind of communication that is reliant in any way on the expression and attribution of intentions. It can't be, since you are unaware I have an intention to inform you of anything. In this example, my behavior is not 'ostensive.'

For an act or behavior to count as ostensive, we need another intention. This one is the 'higher-order' intention that the intention to impart some information be revealed. So in the above example, I would not only need to intend to inform you that I would like the book for my birthday, but also intend you to **realize** that this is my intention. I could achieve this higher-order intention in a variety of different ways. One way would be to make it obvious to you that I have left the magazine open deliberately: I might leave it out in a highly prominent position – perhaps open on your desk; another would be to write 'Birthday present please!' next to the circle I have drawn around the review; still another would be to point out to you the fact that I have circled the review as you enter the room. In keeping with the terminology adopted by Carston in the above quote, I call behavior with this kind of higher-level intention 'ostensive communicative behavior.'

Returning to the example in my opening paragraph, one reason that the three sticks deliberately stuck in the ground attract your attention so is that they may be evidence to you that someone has the higher-order intention that you realize that they have a basic intention to impart some information to you. Having recognized the higher-level intention, you are naturally predisposed to try and infer what this basic intention is.

Theory of Mind

The capacity to infer this kind of complex intention is closely related to – perhaps even a part of – the human ability to attribute mental states in general, including beliefs, intentions, and desires: the ability widely known as 'mind-reading' or 'theory of mind' (Baron-Cohen, 1995). Imagine two people running past you quickly down a road, one behind the other: A, the person behind, is gesticulating angrily; B, the person in front, is looking over his shoulder with a certain expression of fear. Rather than viewing their motion as you might view the random motion of two billiard balls – one apparently 'following' the other around a billiard table – it is an automatic

response to interpret their behavior in terms of the mental states that underlie it. At a basic level, you would perceive their actions in terms of their goals and desires; in terms of the person behind – A – wanting to catch the second – B, or B's desire to escape.

However, as well as these basic concepts, you would also attribute to A and B more complex mental states (Leslie, 1994). So, for example, it might be clear to you that A **believes** that B has done something wrong (the complex mental state underlying A's goal), and that B believes that A **intends** to catch him (the complex mental state underlying B's desire to get away). Notice that the kind of beliefs you attribute may well be incompatible with the beliefs you yourself hold: you have no problem attributing to A the belief that B has stolen his wallet, even though you know that B has not (because, for example, you have A's wallet in your pocket).

Since the ability underlying theory of mind is recursive, our own and others' mental states can be represented in a multilayered way, to a number of different levels. Watching the chase, you have no problem entertaining the thought that B believes that A believes that he has done something wrong, or even that A believes that B believes that A believes that he has done something wrong (or even, for that matter, that B believes that A believes that B believes that A believes that he has done something wrong, etc.). The mind-reading ability – and, therefore, the pragmatic capacity – is underpinned by a more general ability that humans have to represent other representations, or, to use another current piece of terminology, to 'metarepresent.' The pragmatic capacity is built upon this ability.

The kind of representations humans might metarepresent can be either public ones – such as the linguistic utterance in example (2), or mental – such as the thought in example (3). The pragmatic capacity must at the very least involve the ability to entertain and manipulate metarepresentations as complex as the one(s) in (3) (where the metarepresentation is the emboldened part):

(2) Lily said **that Bill doesn't like linguists**.

(3) Lily intends **me to realize that she intends to inform me that she isn't going to Bill's party**.

Developmental psychologists have designed experiments to discover at what age this ability emerges in humans (by about four years old), and have shown that it is subject to pathological breakdown. Autistic individuals, for example, typically fail tests in which they have to explicitly attribute to others beliefs incompatible with their own, and this inability is

generally taken to be evidence that they lack full-blown theory of mind (Leslie and Happé, 1989; Happé, 1994. While some autistic individuals acquire language, the condition is typified by an inability to communicate anywhere near 'normally': those who **do** understand words find it hugely problematic, sometimes impossible, to understand what speakers mean by them.

Metarepresentation and Evolution

Over recent years, there has been a tremendous amount of research into the human mind and the evolution of human cognition. In particular, people have questioned the long-held view that humans are endowed with general, all-purpose cognitive abilities, which they bring to bear on any cognitive task set before them. Philosophers of mind (Fodor, 1983) have argued that the mind (or part of it) is modular: that it is an organized system of individual, highly specialized mechanisms. The existence of conditions such as autism lends support to this proposal. Cognitive scientists and evolutionary psychologists argue that these domain-specific mechanisms have evolved as adaptations to deal with specific challenges in the ancestral hominid environment (Hirschfeld and Gelman, 1994). The mind, viewed in this way, is an 'adaptive toolbox.'

We are now in a position to begin asking evolutionary questions, such as those I posed in the introduction. Indeed, since the pragmatic capacity is some kind of specialized metarepresentational ability, we can be more specific in the kind of questions we ask. Before we look at possible scenarios in the evolution of the pragmatic capacity, we need to look at the evolution of the metarepresentational ability.

All nonhuman animals with cognitive capacities possess the ability to represent, but the ability to entertain representations of representations – and representations of representations of representations, etc., – appears to be as unique to humans as the ability to use echolocation is unique to bats (Sperber, 2000b: 117). Indeed it has even been suggested that the sophistication of the human metarepresentational ability underlies our ability to be aware of our own thoughts, and is therefore implicated in one of the biggest mysteries of all: human consciousness.

A striking feature of much of this work is that while there is disagreement on the factors that may have led to the evolution of such an ability, there is broad agreement at least that it could have evolved – or at least begun to evolve – independently of communication. One view (Cosmides and Tooby, 2000) proposes that the ability to 'detach' ourselves – mentally, at least – from the here-and-now, and

entertain a representation of a situation as something other than a true belief about the world, would have improved our adeptness in reacting and responding to local aspects of the environment. This ability would have enabled humans to adapt to the environment spontaneously – for example, by making plans – rather than having to adapt (as does the rest of the animal kingdom) on an evolutionary time-scale. Such improvisational skills would have proved highly adaptive.

Another view – The Machiavellian Intelligence Hypothesis (Byrne and Whiten, 1988) – suggests that as well as the task of interacting with the natural environment, a particular challenge for humans (and, indeed, primates generally) was the task of dealing with the complexity of social interaction. In the human case, it is proposed that this challenge led to a kind of 'Cognitive Arms Race,' within which human cognitive abilities spiraled – mainly in order to help individuals compete with their conspecifics and perhaps outmaneuver them. The ability to interpret behavior in terms of the motives behind it would have given an individual strong predictive powers, and it would have been adaptive to become more and more adept at working out the thoughts and feelings of others (Humphrey, 1984).

A recent paper (Tomasello *et al.*, in press), points out that as well as evolving the ability to compete and deceive, humans also evolved the ability to collaborate and cooperate. This unique human disposition to share intentions – in which a metarepresentational ability is also implicated – may form the foundations upon which much human interaction (and possibly human culture) is built.

Of course, sensing how someone else is feeling does not necessarily require complex metarepresentational abilities. Well before full-blown human theory of mind develops, a young infant can sense the emotional state of its carer. Indeed, a great deal of the way humans sense the emotional states of others is done in other – nonintentional – ways. Consider the automatic way in which we interpret facial expressions, or the way panic spreads through a crowd. The cries that alert others to danger in this situation may not be uttered with intentions, and are on the whole not understood by attributing intentions. Presumably at some early stage in our evolution, this was how we were able to sense whether or not people were friendly or a threat, or whether a situation was safe or dangerous.

Before the evolution of metarepresentation, our ancestors were 'ignorant of an inner explanation for their own behavior' (Humphrey, 1984: 49). But once they were selected, rudimentary metarepresentational abilities could have spiraled and spiraled

until they eventually led to the evolution of the kind of complex mechanisms that underlie full-blown theory of mind. Tooby and Cosmides (1995: xvii) put it like this:

> Unobservable entities . . . are 'visible' to natural selection . . . Over innumerable generations, the evolutionary process selected for modules . . . that could successfully isolate, out of the welter of observable phenomena, exactly those outward and visible signs in behavior that reliably signaled inward and invisible mental states.

At a crucial evolutionary stage, then, humans somehow became aware that they were living not just in a world populated by other faces and instinctive cries, but a world populated by other minds.

There is little evidence so far that nonhuman animals possess mind-reading abilities to anything like the degree of sophistication found in humans (Premack and Premack, 1983; Hauser, 1996) and hence recognize that their signals **mean** anything. In many ways, this lack of evidence could be seen as presenting problems for an evolutionary account of, for example, theory of mind (Plotkin, 1997). Our common ancestor with the chimpanzee (who lived about 7 million years ago) may have possessed imitative capacities, and these may have been refined into metarepresentational abilities along the hominid line since then, but there is scant evidence among modern-day chimpanzees that they possess anything other than the most rudimentary metarepresentational abilities. The communicative skills of chimps are very basic; indeed, even the more sophisticated nonhuman animal communication systems work along entirely different lines to human communication.

Consider vervet monkeys: when a vervet sees a predator, it emits a specific alarm call that alerts other monkeys in the group: a loud barking call for leopards; a short, double-syllable cough for eagles; and a 'chutter' sound for snakes (Cheney and Seyfarth, 1981). However, on hearing a vervet monkey produce an alarm call, a vervet need not presume that the calling vervet is being cooperative or relevant in order to work out precisely what it means. Vervet monkeys don't mislead, and they don't answer questions indirectly. Communication is achieved without either the sending or receiving animal consciously recognizing that the signal means anything. Indeed, studies suggest that the vervet has very little control over the production of the call itself; it is more as if vervets exploit a reliable correlation between hearing an alarm call and there being a predator in the vicinity rather than that there is any 'meeting-of-minds.' What we need to show is why, and how, human communication evolved along such radically different lines.

The Evolution of Pragmatics

To recap: the human pragmatic capacity is "a system for interpreting . . . human ostensive communicative behavior." Ostensive behavior is behavior that reveals a certain complex type of intention, and so the pragmatic capacity is a system that makes the recognition and attribution of such intentions possible. In other words, it is a specialized version of the human ability to attribute mental states.

To what extent would it need to be a specialized version of this ability? There are a number of issues to bear in mind. First, the types of 'meaning' that a speaker can convey by producing an utterance are generally much more complex than the types of intention normally attributed to someone in order to explain their observed behavior. Second (and related to the first), we often attribute intentions to others by observing the effects of their actions, deciding which of those effects they might have desired, and attributing to them the intention to achieve those desired effects: the 'chase' between A and B is a good example. However, a speaker will achieve very few effects by producing an utterance unless she is first understood, so the normal procedures for recognizing the intentions behind ordinary noncommunicative actions won't work: the hearer can't first observe the effect of an utterance and then infer what it meant.

Thirdly, in order to understand intentional communication – as opposed to ordinary noncommunicative behavior – it is necessary to be able to attribute several layers of metarepresentations; yet young children below the age of four – the same children who (as do autistic subjects) fail standard theory of mind tests – master verbal communication quickly and effortlessly well before this age. Based on these and other arguments, Sperber and Wilson (2002) propose that the theory of mind inferences central to the interpretive process are performed by a domain-specific 'comprehension' mechanism or module. This comprehension module is an evolved sub-module of the theory of mind module: another part of the human 'adaptive toolbox.'

Consider the following scenarios, which are intended to be seen as taking place over many, many generations. Imagine a tribe of our hominid ancestors. When these ancestors are tired, they involuntarily yawn. To other hominids, a yawn reliably correlates with tiredness in the same way that, say, black clouds correlate with rain (or – though there are differences – the vervet alarm call correlates with the presence of a predator). Crucially, though, a metarepresentational ability is already evolving along the hominid line: perhaps to help better exploit the

environment; perhaps to facilitate more complex social interaction. Our ancestors already have rudimentary metarepresentational abilities, and the evolution of the pragmatic capacity should be seen against the backdrop of this independently-evolving metarepresentational prowess.

In the first scenario, one member of the tribe – call him Jack – is able to fake a yawn. Another member – call her Lily – recognizes the voluntary, unspontaneous nature of Jack's yawn. At this stage, the fact that Lily recognizes that Jack has faked the behavior may lead her to come to the conclusion that he is not tired. Jack is producing a normally involuntary behavior voluntarily and could, after all, be trying to deceive her.

Now, let's move to scenario two. In this scenario, we imagine that not only does Lily recognize that Jack has faked a yawn, but also that Jack intends Lily to recognize his behavior as such. Jack and Lily can already metarepresent in a rudimentary way: the metarepresentational ability, recall, is evolving independently. He is 'aware' of his intention, and is metarepresenting its content – as in (4) – and she is entertaining the metarepresentation in (5) below:

(4) I intend **that Lily recognizes my intention to fake this yawn.**

(5) Jack intends **that I recognize that he intends to fake a yawn.**

The possibility of deception – a plausible interpretation in the previous stage – is no longer the only possibility. Of course, Lily is still likely to be in something of a quandary. Jack is not only apparently faking a yawn, but also doing so overtly. It does not seem unreasonable to suggest that one way Lily might proceed is to presume that Jack is pretending or being playful. By the time such a conclusion is arrived at by Lily, we have reached a third scenario.

Consider now a fourth scenario. Lily has come to suppose not that Jack is playing a game, but rather that Jack is trying to get Lily to believe (or at least accept) that he is, in fact, tired. That is, that Jack's intention in producing the normally involuntary behavior voluntarily is to communicate the very same thing the involuntary behavior normally conveys. By this stage, of course, Lily may wonder precisely why Jack should choose to use a faked yawn to communicate tiredness as opposed to an involuntary one. There may be various reasons; one reason may be that Jack's voluntary production might only be intended to indicate some, as opposed to all, of the features associated with an involuntary yawn. Perhaps Jack is tired, but not so tired as to yawn involuntarily; perhaps he is feeling drowsy because he feels

unwell. Recall the example described in the section 'The Pragmatic Capacity,' where a faked yawn is used to communicate boredom. Whatever he intends to inform Lily, he is – at this stage – entertaining the metarepresentation in (6):

(6) I intend **Lily to realize that I intend to inform her that** …

And Lily, if she recognizes his intention, is entertaining the metarepresentation in (7):

(7) Jack intends **that I realize that he intends to inform me that** …

By the time we have reached this scenario, Jack's behavior is 'ostensive' in the sense defined earlier, and Lily has engaged in the kind of pragmatic inference modern-day humans employ. If such a system of communication can be shown to have been advantageous, we can imagine that the cognitive abilities necessary to engage in such communication would have been selected for.

What might the advantages be? Why should already-evolving metarepresentational abilities be recruited – or 'exapted' (Gould, 1980) – for use in communication? The main advantage is that it is the intention behind the behavior, rather than the behavior itself, which plays the main role in Lily's successful understanding of Jack. Communicators have reached a stage where the ostensive behavior need have nothing more than a very tenuous connection with the message a communicator intends to convey, so long as the communicator thinks the audience can infer it. In short, hominids have gone from only being able to communicate by exploiting 'natural' correlations and being able to communicate only a limited number of things, to also being able to communicate non-naturally, employing systems of representations, and being able to communicate virtually anything at all.

Of course, communication along these lines would at first have been slow and effort-consuming. The limitless possibilities such a system would have opened up, though, would have given humans an enormous advantage that presumably came to outweigh the costs. If we imagine scenarios such as these taking place generation after generation, and consider them against the back-drop of the developing metarepresentational ability, we have a plausible account of how ostensive communicative behavior and – moreover – the specialized cognitive mechanisms required to interpret such behavior could have evolved. Over evolutionary time, slow, conscious reasoning processes would have come to be replaced by 'fast and frugal heuristics' (Gigerenzer and Todd, 1999) which made this kind of pragmatic inference automatic. In

modern humans, they are carried out by a dedicated submodule of theory of mind: the pragmatic capacity.

Now Jack is walking through a forest. As he approaches a clearing, he hears an animal cry. In the middle of the clearing, he sees a large rodent disappearing slowly into a wide pool of quicksand. He becomes tense. His tribe uses this route frequently, and even if he shouts at the top of his voice, he knows they will not be able to hear him from here. He thinks. He has to go on, but he must warn his people. If he places a log in front of the quicksand, there is a chance that some people will walk around the log and hence successfully avoid the quicksand. Many, however, will simply presume that the log has fallen naturally and step straight over it into danger. He thinks again. He walks over to a small tree and cuts off three long, thin branches. He strips off the bark and starts to sharpen them.

See also: Grice, Herbert Paul; Implicature; Neo-Gricean Pragmatics; Pragmatics: Overview; Relevance Theory.

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F

Face

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Background

A search for 'face' in the on-line *Oxford English dictionary* (OED) yields pages on this polysemic entry. It also illuminates the cultural and psychological dimensions of the construct that lies at the heart of a well-known model of linguistic politeness expounded by Brown and Levinson in their seminal work *Politeness: some universals in language usage* (1978, 1987) (*see* **Politeness**). The Western character of their (positive and negative) face derives from an Anglo-Saxon understanding of the rational individual who seeks to protect himself or herself, and others, from Face-Threatening Acts (FTAs). In spite of its claim to universality, the politeness model that stems from this characterization of face is also, inevitably, culture-biased (*see* **Intercultural Pragmatics and Communication**).

In reaction to this, a critical reappraisal of Brown and Levinson's notion of face has engaged scholars beyond the Anglophone world, who have brought to their analyses insights from psychology, philosophy, and anthropology. In particular, critique from Asian linguists has now grown into a consistent contrastive body of research, which has expanded to include perspectives from Southern Europe (e.g., Turkey, Greece, Spain, Italy), South America (e.g., Ecuador, Argentina), and South Africa, thus widening considerably the cultural spread of the debate.

If it is thanks to two British anthropologists (Brown and Levinson) that linguistic politeness rose to become the subject of ongoing scholarly debate, it is too easily forgotten that it was an American sociologist who gave us the powerful account of 'face' that stands at the heart of it. Not a universal account, however; in fact, Erving Goffman's 'face' is American in many of its facets, and yet an original contribution to the modern study of the social and psychological relevance of this arguably universal construct to politeness research and human interaction (*see* **Goffman, Erving**).

Face as a philosophical construct boasts a history that dates to ancient civilizations. For example, the Náhuatl people who inhabited Central America would use the expression 'face-heart' (Spanish *rostro-corazón*) to define personhood. In their understanding, "face seems to refer to the physiognomy of the self while the heart is the dynamic aspect of self" (Jiménez Cataño, 1993: 72) (my translation). In modern times, among the more defining influences on Goffman's early work and his conceptualization of face are Chinese and American Indian sources and the work of the French sociologist Émile Durkheim.

'Face' According to Goffman

Even though Goffman was primarily concerned with uncovering the rules governing social interaction, his treatment of 'face' leads the reader to believe that he saw it as the hub of interpersonal dynamics; in fact, for Goffman 'face-saving' was shorthand for 'the traffic rules of social interactions' (1967:12). His concept of face, unlike Brown and Levinson's later understanding of it, seeks to accommodate both strategic and social indexing behaviors and is best apprehended in the context of social order as ritual. Equilibrium is maintained by interactants making choices informed by moral rules. In turn, the social morality underpinning Goffman's order consists of values such as pride, honor, dignity, consideration, tact and poise, perceptiveness and feelings, all of which the self expresses through face. Within the wider social order, face maintenance is a condition rather than the objective of interaction.

Émile Durkheim, the French thinker, saw social action as symbolic ritual enacted through positive and negative rites, hence Goffman's definition of the person as a "ritual object," a "deity," and "his own priest" (1967: 55). However, Durkheim also envisaged solidarity as the glue of the social order. Solidarity between actors would aim for the fulfillment of obligations toward others as a condition for the maintenance of equilibrium. Goffman's interactant is certainly more individualistic, but avoids the egocentrism of Brown and Levinson's

idealized agent. Ultimately, for Goffman as for Durkheim, organizational order comes before the safeguard of the individual self, which can be asked to sacrifice his or her face (with the ensuing embarrassment) for the gain of society (1967: 112).

In 1944, the *American Anthropologist* published Hsien Chin Hu's seminal account of the Chinese concept of 'face.' A decade later, Goffman acknowledged his debt to Hu in his discussion of a Western version of 'face.' Goffman's social psychological definition of face is that of 'the positive social value a person effectively claims for himself by the line others assume he has taken during a particular contact' where a "line" is the interactants' self and others' evaluation (1967: 23). Self-respect and considerateness are safeguards for one's own and others' face in social encounters. These social values underline the interdependent character of Goffman's actor whose face he considers sacred (1967: 19). Face maintenance requires a ritual order, that is 'acts through whose symbolic component the actor shows how worthy he is of respect or how worthy he feels others are of it' (Goffman, 1967: 19). For Goffman, the contemporary and still enduring Anglo-Saxon values of independence and privacy have swung the balance from a Durkheimian collective self to a self-aware, more individualistic self.

Goffman's 'face-work' consists of defensive (saving one's own face) and protective (saving others' face) practices exercised simultaneously, another indication of the social value that he attached to face. "Avoidance" rituals, "corrective" processes, and the "aggressive use of face-work" are also discussed by Goffman in some detail alongside the tacit cooperation that makes face-work possible. Brown and Levinson's model seems to have given preeminence to the first three practices, thus emphasizing the self-defensive, negative posture of their ideal agent.

For Goffman, "tact," "reciprocal self-denial," and "negative bargaining" (favoring one's counterpart) signal the degree of social awareness and concern for others, possibly motivated by self-preservation, which interactants would display as a "ritually delicate object" (1967: 31). In spite of later developments in politeness research that somewhat obscured the originality of Goffman's face, his notion remains a primary object of interest for scholars engaged in the situated study of interpersonal behavior in general and of 'polite behavior' in particular.

Brown and Levinson's 'Face' and Its Critics

Brown and Levinson's positive and negative face is a cognitive, abstract, culture-dependent construct attributable to a rational agent; it makes extensive use of Durkheim's negative (avoidance) rituals. The dualistic notion of face and the emphasis on negative face and the notion of 'imposition' have attracted extensive criticism in subsequent Chinese and Japanese studies of politeness, as well as among other non Anglo-American scholars. Although Brown and Levinson acknowledge Durkheim as their source for negative and positive rites, their understanding of the sociologist's original concepts is substantively altered in their model; their ideal rational actor is busy protecting own and others' face, rather than giving, enhancing, or maintaining face. Emotions, when accounted for, are also means of face-protection.

Such a reductionist perspective has progressively laid bare the need for a sociopsychological and affective construct of face that resonates again with Goffman's original motivation for the study of interaction as being "not about the individual and his psychology, but rather the syntactical relations among the acts of *different persons mutually present to one another*" (1967: 2) (italics added).

It is Brown and Levinson's negative face (and negative politeness) that have been singled out for intensive scrutiny on grounds of cultural relativity. Further, their outline of positive and negative face as mutually exclusive in interaction has been challenged by empirical research that indicates, instead, the coexistence of many face wants calling on simultaneous positive and negative face-work. Similarly, the assumptions that only one type of face can be threatened at any given time and that Face Threatening Acts (FTAs) can be analyzed out of context are highly problematic.

The crosscultural validity of Brown and Levinson's model has buckled under the criticism of suffering from British 'cultural bias' (Baxter, 1984). Research in linguistic politeness in the 1990s indicated a split between cultures where face is a key explanatory construct in interpersonal behavior and those where other values such as discernment, deference, and respect play a more important role. Face and face-work will operate differently in socially stratified cultures (e.g. Japan and Mexico, where normative politeness is dominant) compared to status-based cultures (such as China and Korea), where normative and strategic (volitional) politeness coexist. Where status is allegedly less marked in interpersonal interaction and normative politeness is less in evidence (e.g., Northern Europe and North America), the concern for face remains nevertheless relevant, even if expressed in a more understated way.

The consolidation of psychology research on the social self and social identity has opened up new contexts of relevance for the dynamics of face and face-work, calling on a modified model of face

and politeness that breaks free from the straitjacket of cognitivist psychology. Another exciting development is the emergence of indigenous psychologies from Asia and Africa which, instead of testing Western formulations, may develop their own analytical models and constructs to make true crosscultural comparison possible.

Future of Face Research

For all the criticism of ethnocentrism that their model has generated, Brown and Levinson's work can boast an unmatched and continuing level of interest within the field of linguistic politeness research. Twenty years on, new insights from social and cultural psychology point in the direction of a culture-situated, dynamic understanding of face that gives consideration to other factors such as personal values, one's own self-concept, self-identity in various groupings, role expectations, and normative constraints (Earley, 1997: 95–97). After years of established disciplinary research in politeness, especially in anthropology and linguistics, face is becoming a privileged topic for interdisciplinary research. In addition, its cultural sensitivity calls for more international collaborative research if its sociocultural and philosophical roots are to be uncovered for further comparative analysis.

On a more abstract level, one could imagine face as a bridging concept between interpersonal interaction and social order in the sense that face, at the micro-level of verbal and nonverbal behavior, encapsulates and dynamically displays the manifestations of (macro-level) cultural values. Situated discourse would thus become the epistemological locus where observation and interpretation of face and face-work take place as within their most expressive environment. Alongside psychologists, anthropologists, and sociologists, in future social theorists may be called upon to explore a powerful construct that thus far has occupied but not yet exhausted the endeavors of most politeness scholars.

See also: Goffman, Erving; Intercultural Pragmatics and Communication; Politeness; Politeness Strategies as Linguistic Variables; Pragmatics: Overview.

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Family Speak

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To work on family speak is to be interested in language as it is used in the private space. Family interactions have special features that make them a particularly revealing object of research. As in any interaction, power relationships exist, especially between parents and children (*see* **Power and Pragmatics**) But the intimacy that prevails in a family setting is unique: no other context presents so great a degree of proximity between participants or so great a volume of shared references owing to a common past (*see* **Shared Knowledge**). The intimacy of the family context affects discourse in three ways: (1) informality, since family speak is the most informal discourse there is, (2) the major role played by implicit understanding due to shared references, and (3) the particularly high number of metapragmatic or metadiscursive comments (especially in exchanges with children), since the home is a privileged venue for pragmatic learning (*see* **Language Socialization; Metapragmatics**).

Work on family discourse allows us to reconsider some important issues in pragmatics, namely:

1. The socialization of children. The family is the matrix of socialization and of the constitution of

identity. As a result, family interactions offer an ideal means for observing processes involved in the acquisition of pragmatic competencies and the transmission of social and cultural values. Various strategies related to these processes have been studied, notably the use of control acts (particularly well documented), topic management, and metapragmatic comments. Narrative and explanatory talk have also been the object of interesting studies (*see* **Narrativity and Voice**). Several of the works listed were conducted from a cross-cultural perspective and highlight the differences observed from one linguistic community to another (*see* **Scaffolding in Classroom Discourse; Pragmatics: Overview**).

2. Politeness. In canonical models of politeness (notably Brown and Levinson, 1987), face-threatening acts (FTAs) are classified based on how directly or indirectly they are carried out, and the greatest politeness is associated with the greatest degree of indirection. It appears, however, that nagging, insults, complaints, and other FTAs occur frequently in family conversations, often in a direct form, without causing a deterioration in the family climate. These acts are not perceived as crude. In family speak, therefore, the direct nature of the act does not indicate impoliteness, and facework is done differently. By documenting how FTAs occur in the context of intimacy, works on family speak therefore help relativize the scope of norms that some consider universal in terms of politeness (*see* **Politeness; Face**).

See also: Face; Language Socialization; Metapragmatics; Narrativity and Voice; Politeness; Power and Pragmatics; Pragmatics: Overview; Scaffolding in Classroom Discourse; Shared Knowledge.

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Charles J. Fillmore received his Ph.D. in Linguistics at the University of Michigan in 1961. After spending ten years at Ohio State and one year at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford, he transferred to the Linguistics Department at Berkeley. He was elected Fellow of the American Association of Arts and Sciences in 1984 and was President of the Linguistic Society of America in 1990.

Fillmore's work centers around interconnected foci of research. The major focus is the interface of syntax and semantics, concentrated on the analysis of English and Japanese with an emphasis on the semantics, in the broadest sense, of individual expressions. Fillmore has successfully applied this type of analysis to several types of discourse, focusing especially upon the deictic potential of individual expressions; for example, he has made use of literary discourse as a means of explaining the perspective exploited especially by modern literary discourse, such as indirect free style. His analysis of semantics and syntax was later elaborated upon in a systematic way in the form of 'construction grammar,' the integrated description of the semantics and syntax of subsentential units.

Fillmore's work has had a major impact on semantic and syntactic analysis by arguing for a separate level of analysis for 'case roles' such as agent, patient, and locative, in an effort to account for the semantics of sentences and the semantic interdependencies, manifested syntactically, between constituents, much in the vein of valency theory. Although there are regular correspondences with syntactic functions of phrases like subjects and objects, such as that between syntactic subjects and agents, these case roles have to be set up as a logically separate layer of semantic intuition and, consequently, of linguistic description,

since in other cases, and in variant typological scenarios, the only argument for the association of case roles with syntactic function is based upon statistical tendencies of various strengths.

Fillmore's work constitutes a significant contribution not only in terms of linguistic theory, but also to the linguistic description of English and Japanese. The application to a major corpus of English (based on the British National Corpus, amongst other materials) of his descriptive approach is at the center of a major corpus-based lexicographic project ('Frame Net') with the aim of a semantic-syntactic description of the lexical units of English. These lexical units are conceived of as triple layers of information: a semantic case (such as agent), a grammatical function (such as subject), and a phrase type (such as NP). The semantics of a lexical unit, in particular each individual sense of a polysemous unit, is conceived of as based on a semantic frame with a script-like inferential structure associated with types of situations, objects, or events. Any target so characterized is also characterized by dependents that are part of this frame. The core elements of a particular frame uniquely specify the particular sense of a lexical unit. Meaning differences between different senses of polysemous items are reflected in different kinds of syntactic realizations of the elements of the frame defining the whole lexical unit. The aim is to ultimately provide an on-line-accessible database that contains all the semantic-syntactic information a native speaker possesses of a lexical unit.

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Formulaic Language

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Introduction

"a vast proportion of verbal behavior ... consists of recurrent patterns, of linguistic routines" (Hymes, 1962/1968: 126).

"our language does not expect us to build everything starting with lumber, nails, and blueprint, but provides us with an incredibly large number of prefabs" (Bolinger, 1976: 1).

Formulaic Language and Novel Language

It is universally recognized by linguists that human language is unique in its expressive potential because it enables us to produce and comprehend utterances that we have never encountered before. Most research into linguistic form has therefore tended to focus on the mechanisms by which that flexibility operates. However, evidence from psycho- and sociolinguistics, and in recent years also from corpus linguistics, indicates that there is a mismatch between the potential that human language has for novelty and the much smaller set of patterns that are actually found in our everyday linguistic behavior. As Pawley and Syder (1983) point out, there are things that the theoretical models indicate we **can** do, but which don't seem to be done as often as they might be.

Of course, it is no surprise that languages make possible the expression of ideas that no one has ever yet needed to express. The cutting edge of human creativity is the capacity to capture a new idea and convey it to others, and unless language can facilitate that, cultural, technological and philosophical development will be greatly hampered. What is less clear is why messages that **are** often needed should also eschew the full creative potential of language. For although language makes it possible for us to express an idea in many different ways, native speakers of any given language know that there are certain preferred formulations of it. Pawley & Syder (1983) point out, for instance, that in English we say that the time is 'six forty' or 'twenty to (or before) seven,' not 'a third to

(or before) seven' or 'seven minus twenty.' This is a matter of convention, not any grammatical or semantic restriction, and languages vary in their practices. In French, 'six forty' is expressed as *sept heures moins vingt* ('seven o'clock minus twenty'), while in German, *halb sieben* ('half seven') means 'half past six,' that is, half an hour before seven.

A Preliminary Definition of Formulaic Language

As with many complex phenomena, a complete definition of formulaic language is difficult to capture until a great deal is understood about it. A fuller exploration of the definition and identification of formulaic language is provided later. For now, it will suffice to say that, for most researchers, the term 'formulaic language' refers to two or more words which may or may not be adjacent and which have a particular mutual affinity that gives them a joint grammatical, semantic, pragmatic, or textual effect greater than the sum of the parts. For instance, the word string *in order to* conveys a relationship between two actions without it being clear how the three constituent words contribute to expressing that relationship. The word string *get away with you* means 'don't be ridiculous,' which is not a literal interpretation of the words. The word string *happy birthday* is a strongly favored routine for expressing good wishes, even though, by analogy with Christmas greetings, *merry birthday* ought also to be possible.

Even these few examples already highlight a number of issues that must be continually addressed when researching formulaic language. Firstly, it is clear to even a casual observer that most, if not all, formulaic word strings derive from novel constructions. This raises the question of how we are to decide precisely when a configuration should be considered formulaic rather than novel. Is *have a nice day* a formula or not? It certainly seems to have pragmatic connotations over and above its composite parts, yet if someone were to create, as novel, a grammatical sentence to wish someone a pleasant time from now until nightfall, it could well come out in precisely these words. A second, related issue is how much linguistic knowledge we should attribute to users. In the expression *if I were you*, the verb form is a subjunctive. Many people now do not use the subjunctive after *if*, but still use this expression. Are they exceptionally applying knowledge that they do in fact have, or do they have a way of producing the expression without needing to understand why – or indeed perhaps without even noticing that – the verb takes a form they could not generate using their own linguistic system? Thirdly, what is the relationship between units of processing and words on the page? The vagaries of English writing are legion: we write *into* as one word but *out*

of as two, for instance. Is *in order to* really *inorderto?* What would the implications be for viewing *take heed* as *takeheed*, since we can say *due heed was taken* and *took heed* as well? The point is not whether answers can be proffered, for they certainly can, but that any given answer reflects certain assumptions and priorities in linguistic modeling. When the questions are asked, it is these assumptions and priorities that are under examination.

The Focus of Research into Formulaic Language

Researchers of formulaic language are interested in questions such as: Why do conventionalized forms exist and persist? What determines which forms become conventionalized? What prevents or permits the replacement of one conventionalized form by another? How does the deliberate choice of a less conventionalized formulation impact on the way the message is perceived? How do children balance learning to be idiomatic with learning the underlying linguistic system that predicts so many under-used alternatives? Why do post-childhood foreign-language learners find it so difficult to identify the conventionalized nativelike form from among the many equally grammatical alternatives? What is it about common conventional word strings that makes them peculiarly resistant to the effects of aphasia?

As answers to these questions have emerged, it has become clear that the relationship between formulaic language and the language system as a whole has the potential to inform many applied linguistic endeavors, including language teaching, machine translation, author identification and profiling, artificial speech aids, linguistic rehabilitation, and perhaps even the early diagnosis of degenerative brain conditions.

Why Formulaic Language Exists

Processing Shortcuts

Psycholinguistic evidence strongly suggests that we operate under tight processing restrictions when handling linguistic material. If this is so, then our tendency to use formulaic language might be the result of expediency – that is, it makes processing shortcuts possible. Conceptualizing a 'processing shortcut' is highly contingent on how one models psycholinguistic knowledge. However, most psycholinguists would agree that the pressure point relates to assembly rather than storage. In other words, the brain seems very able to accommodate as many lexical units as we want to store, but we are very easily thrown off course when formulating an utterance, if we try to do too many things at once.

Quite why humans should experience difficulties in composing language online is unclear, but it is probably linked to our limited working-memory capacity. In one approach to psycholinguistic modeling, formulaic language is conceived of as a solution to this constraint. It bundles a grammatical configuration of several words into a single lexical unit that can be understood or retrieved without any grammatical processing. In fact, this proposal is seriously compromised, in its extreme form, by the fact that virtually no word strings are immune from some sort of grammatical fine-tuning. In its weak form, however, the model proposes that grammatical interventions are kept to a minimum, to the benefit of processing parsimony. That is, even if it is necessary to insert the subject, verb ending, and object into *do* SOMEONE *a favor,* a saving is still made over having to retrieve each word and ending separately and combining them from scratch.

Not all psycholinguistic models, however, easily accommodate the notions of 'units' and 'assembly.' Neurologically inspired models aim to identify the processes by which pathways of neural activity are established, maintained, and used. In such models it makes no sense to speak of a word string being 'stored.' Rather, a formulaic word string is conceptualized in terms of a fast processing pathway. Just as a pianist who practices a difficult sequence of notes will, by virtue of that repetition, find it easier to play in future, so it is reasoned that if you become used to producing the articulatory movements that result in a particular routine expression, then this pathway will be strengthened, until it becomes not only fast and reliable but also rather difficult to interrupt, modify or, if it should go wrong, put back on track without starting from the beginning again. Different approaches to psycholinguistic modeling make different predictions, and so are a useful focus for investigations. By testing the predictions of each model, their relative plausibility can be evaluated.

What Formulaic Language Is Used For

Promotion of Self

There are as many different proposals about the purpose of formulaic language as there are domains in which it is found. Under one or another name, it has been independently described across a wide range of areas of linguistic research, beginning, many centuries ago, with observations in the clinical domain, and most recently blossoming as a major focus of attention in second language acquisition and teaching. In between, attention has been paid to it by researchers working on child language acquisition, sociolinguistics, literary style, phraseology, grammar, discourse, and psycholinguistics. Yet in each domain the purpose of formulaic language is differently conceived, so that a somewhat confusing picture emerges. Wray (2002) proposes that the explanation for the differences is that formulaic language is a generic strategic solution to a recurrent challenge for us as humans: how to promote our own interests.

The rationale for this proposal resides in the way that humans use language to manipulate others. Manipulation entails persuading another person to think, feel, or act in some way that you desire. Selecting linguistic material that enables you as a speaker to fluently express your message and enables your hearer(s) to easily decode it supports this self-promotional goal. For instance, commands in the army are given in a consistent, prespecified form, not only so that they will be instantly recognized, but also so that they will be acted upon as a reflex, rather than queried or challenged.

It is important to note that, in this context, it is not just the local meaning of utterances that the speaker wants the hearer to understand with ease, but also their meaning within the surrounding discourse and the pragmatic, social, and cultural context. Also, the speaker's intentions may be altruistic at one level, such as when a teacher formulates the explanation of a concept in a way that will help the students understand it. But at a deeper level even such altruism is driven by the speaker's desire to create a particular kind of outcome that is beneficial for him or herself. Teachers want to be good at their jobs and want to avoid having to explain the same things many times. The workman who shouts a warning to a passing pedestrian certainly wants to save him or her from danger but also does not want to be responsible for injuring someone.

The following sections examine some of the various functions of formulaic language that have been chronicled in the research literature. The proposed underlying agenda of self-promotion is just a hypothesis, and it is for future researchers to establish whether it stands up to scrutiny in each of the contexts in which formulaic language is believed to operate.

A Badge of Identity

Most native speakers can think of expressions that they have picked up from someone else. Sociolinguists have long recognized that humans use language as a tool for expressing their identity relative to other speakers. When we speak, we select particular turns of phrase that we perceive to be associated with certain values, styles, and groups. We are sensitive, too, to the choices that others make. Our linguistic choices

can be both conscious and subconscious and are part of a more general desire to behave like those with whom we most closely identify, or who embody our aspirations.

Social Bonding

Closely allied with the expression of identity is the selection of particular turns of phrase to achieve specific purposes in a (micro-)culturally acceptable way. For instance, in some kinds of Christian discourse, expressions like *praise the Lord* are used simultaneously as disjuncts conveying the speaker's stance towards the associated proposition(s) and as strong markers of the perceived shared values of hearer and speaker. At the macro-cultural level, native speakers within their broad speech community share certain knowledge about nativelike ways of expressing ideas – knowledge that nonnative speakers may not be party to. Becoming accepted into an adoptive speech community entails demonstrating this insider knowledge, though various dynamics relating to both the infiltrator and the host community may place obstacles in the way of a full match with native speaker knowledge.

Other kinds of social bonding also use formulaic language. For example, in Britain elaborate exchanges often take place during a simple sales transaction, with every stage accompanied by routine, largely unconscious, expressions of gratitude. Such behavior is evidently necessary to create and maintain the locally desired level of social ambience, for its absence can be interpreted as rudeness.

Memorization as an Aide-Memoire

One subtype of formulaic language consists of deliberately or inadvertently memorized material, including rhymes, prayers, speeches, songs, and so on. The deliberate memorization of texts is often associated with the need to recall the fine detail of the text correctly, not just its message or general form. It would be inappropriate, for instance, to remember only the gist of a Keats poem, so that one had to paraphrase it rather than recite it, for poetry is defined as much by the precise configuration of the form as by the meaning. Some texts, such as liturgical and legal rituals, have a performative status that can be nullified if the form is altered. Other texts must be recalled correctly because they are the key to other information. For example, it is important not to confuse which months have which numbers of days in the chant *Thirty days hath September* and not to reverse the order of the words in *Richard of York gave battle in vain* (used for remembering the colors of the rainbow), otherwise the very purpose of learning the text is defeated.

The mnemonic function of formulaic language matches well the psycholinguistic notion that a formulaic word string is retrieved as a single unit, or in some automatic way. The less processing that goes on, the lower the chances of making alternative choices that undermine the integrity of the whole.

But formulaicity really comes into its own where a balance is sustained between prefabricated text and creativity. This is in evidence in oral literary traditions, where the recitation of lengthy epic poems is achieved by the strategic use of repeated text patterns to express recurrent ideas. These provide a reliable structure for a unique performance event, in which the detail of the formulation is a one-off creative variation on a traditional oral text. Key research into formulaicity in oral performance was carried out by Parry (e.g., 1930) and Lord (1960) who compared traditional Slavic poetry performances to Homer's epics. But it has also been identified in many other cultures including Anglo-Saxon, Maori, and Tibetan. Closer to home, parents retelling well-known fairy stories display something similar. Each extemporization is unique, yet fully recognizable as a version of the original. Its form is constrained both by the plot itself and by traditional, thus more or less compulsory, turns of phrase (e.g., *I'll huff and I'll puff and I'll blow your house down; Mirror, mirror on the wall, who is the fairest of them all?; Who's been sleeping in my bed?*).

Fluency Under Pressure

Public extemporization, described in the last section, must count as a high-stakes activity that can put the performer under a lot of pressure. It seems entirely plausible that one function of repeated material in traditional narratives, as also the chorus in folk songs, is to provide the performer with processing space to remember and formulate the next part of the text. Formulaic patterns also support other kinds of fluent performance, such as auctions and sports commentaries (Kuiper, 1996). Here, as in epic poetry, familiar words and grammatical patterns aid not only the performer but also the audience. The performer can use well-rehearsed strings to relieve the pressure on productive fluency, confident that this material will come out effortlessly and without thought. Meanwhile, the audience, recognizing that a formulaic string has begun, can bypass full decoding and use the recurrent material as a means of locating and isolating what is new.

Support for First Language Acquisition

The relationship between formulaicity and language learning is complex. In first language acquisition

children are known to use memorized expressions, containing grammatical constructions that are precocious relative to their current level of linguistic knowledge. However, commentators often downplay this practice relative to the acquisition of single words and grammatical rules. The reason is that while formulaic language certainly plays a social and interactional role for most children, it is unclear to what extent the early holistic learning of word strings makes any contribution to the slower, more methodical learning of the language as a system of rule-governed unit combinations. Memorized strings do seem to be broken down and reused to some extent. However, the fact that children often 'unlearn' memorized irregular forms like *went* – only to have to relearn them later – has led many researchers to regard the breaking down of formulaic material as too patchy to be a major feature of language acquisition, leaving the role of the formulas something of a puzzle.

On the other hand, since a common feature of formulaic material, both in adult and child usage, is irregularity, it is somewhat to the child's advantage **not** to be too precipitous about harvesting from a useful whole what might turn out to be rather less useful parts. In line with Peters' (1983) notion of 'segmentation,' Wray (2002) has proposed that children and adults alike take a parsimonious approach to breaking down memorized word strings. This **needs only analysis** (Wray, 2002: 130–132) enables word strings to be associated with their holistic meaning until there is direct evidence for the possibility of variation in a particular locus, when the string will be loosened in just that place, to accommodate the variation. In this way, the idiom *by and large*, which never changes, is never broken down, because there is never any input that challenges its immutable form-meaning association. As a result, neither children nor adults inform their knowledge of the word *large* by referring to its occurrence in that idiom, any more than the meaning of *king* would be informed by its apparent occurrence in *barking*. In contrast, a word string such as *pull SOMEONE'S leg*, which displays limited variation, will establish a balance of fixedness to flexibility that accommodates the novel subject and possessor, along with appropriate verb morphology, but retains as fixed the occurrence of *pull* and *leg*. Needs only analysis, Wray argues, accounts for the conservation of irregularity in idioms and other formulaic word strings, and, being motivated predominantly by evidence in input rather than logical potential, also explains the relative rarity of many grammatically acceptable formulations for which another formulation already exists with the same meaning.

Help and Hindrance in Second Language Acquisition

In second language acquisition, new parameters result in new patterns (see Wray, 2002: Chaps. 9–11 for a detailed review). While young children seem to acquire a second language in a manner somewhat similar to their first (and with similar success), even at kindergarten age any differences in the uses to which the language is put (and in how the child perceives it as a communicative tool) seem to affect the pattern of acquisition. As children grow older, new psychological and social constraints appear to precipitate variations in learning style and outcome, as Wong Fillmore (1979) notably found in her study of five Hispanic children in California.

By adulthood, two broad tendencies can be observed. Naturalistic learners favor approximations of large chunks gleaned from input, which may remain permanently inaccurate in form, especially if they are effective in communication. Taught learners appear to undervalue phrasal input, focusing on smaller units in order to gain a sense of control in their expression and comprehension. By the time such learners are of higher intermediate level, they characteristically display grammatically logical but often nonnativelike choices. That is, they have missed out on the acquisition of 'idiomaticity.' The challenge of how to improve nativelike idiomaticity in intermediate and advanced learners is a focus of considerable research, but no easy answers have yet materialized. An irony of attempts to promote idiomaticity through the teaching of common nativelike expressions is that an excessive use of them can render a learner's output a somewhat meaningless concatenation of phrases, disguising other aspects of his or her linguistic knowledge. As a result, the puzzle of how to teach nativelike language is matched by the puzzle of how to test it in relation to other abilities.

A Residual Lifeline

It has been known for centuries that certain kinds of common expressions, such as greetings and curses, along with memorized rhymes, prayers, and songs, often survive when a stroke or other injury disrupts a person's linguistic abilities. In addition, individuals may produce one or more recurrent phrases peculiar to them and/or repetitive phonological strings with no apparent meaning. Psycholinguists are interested in establishing the properties shared by these resilient items, in order to shed light on linguistic processing in general. Meanwhile, clinicians and speech therapists focus on how someone with command of such a limited inventory of expressions can often succeed in conveying a great many messages, using intonation,

tone of voice, and voice quality to modify or cancel the customary meaning.

Recognizing Formulaic Language

Researchers of formulaic language are currently challenged by two major practical difficulties: how to define it and how to identify it in spoken and written text. These are inevitably intertwined, for you cannot find something that remains undefined, nor define it without having examples of it. Wray (2002: Chaps. 2 and 3) explores the issues in detail, showing that many definitions confuse form, function, and meaning, while others are too exclusive or inclusive to be useful.

Frequency

One approach is to define formulaicity as a function of frequency. In this view, word strings that are often heard and said gain processing privileges born of the repetition. The increasing ease of processing reinforces their preferential selection from among the options for expressing that message. Meanwhile, their frequency is what makes them sound familiar and nativelike, so that our desire to sound like those around us encourages us to continue selecting them for social reasons. The advantage for researchers of a definition based on frequency is that it facilitates reliable identification. One can set the parameters of an automatic corpus search and extract as formulaic all the material that reaches that threshold.

There are difficulties with this approach, however. Firstly with a very few exceptions – mostly idiom adverbials and adjectives like *by and large, spick and span,* and *lock, stock, and barrel* – formulae are not invariable in form and are often not contiguous either. This complicates the searching, and while wild cards can assist in the accommodation of certain kinds of variation, the setting of the search parameters remains a significant determinant of what is included and excluded in the output and how much manual sorting is subsequently required. A second problem is where to draw the line between two formulas and two variations of one. For instance, what is the relationship between *thank you, thank you very much,* and *thank you very much indeed*? In practice a contingency decision is taken. But by the time readers survey the results of a study, such decisions are often long forgotten, risking the proliferation of beliefs about absolute answers rather than definition-dependent ones.

A third problem is that frequency is not determined from a consistent baseline, but rather as a function of how often a message needs to be conveyed. When we find that *good morning* is more frequent in a corpus than *long live the King* this does not tell us

that the former is 'more' formulaic, only that people more often wish each other good morning than they wish the king a long life. Frequency searches therefore need to be able to measure how often a particular formulation is used to express its message. The formulaicity of *good morning* arguably owes more to its preferential use over alternatives like *good day* and *how do you do* than to its absolute frequency. Indeed, it might well be found that, opportunity for opportunity, *long live the King* is more predictable than *good morning*.

Form

Aligning formulaicity with grammatical irregularity offers an easy but rather narrow route to definition and identification. In more inclusive approaches, the cline of fixedness makes form-based definitions difficult to pin down. One strategy has been to make a feature of the variability itself, and place linguistic configurations along a continuum from fully immutable to fully flexible. Although many have favored this approach, it is difficult to avoid a descriptive taxonomy with no explanatory or predictive powers. Since there is evidently a dynamism about form, including the diachronic shift from flexible to inflexible (fossilized), this seems a pity. Nevertheless, it is clear that form cannot be ignored. Capturing the nature and extent of the variability has also been attempted, and entails the recognition of 'frames' composed partly of lexical material and partly of abstract categories representing closed or open class choices, e.g., NP_1 *take + TENSE* NP_2 *to task*. Many frames become predominantly abstract, once the potential for adjectives, intensifiers, and so on is allowed for, raising new theoretical questions about just how different such frames are from traditional linguistic descriptions.

Phonological form has attracted some attention, since fluency is associated with elision, weak forms, etc., and phrases with nonliteral meanings can be expressed within a single tone unit more easily than can their literal equivalents. However, it has proved difficult to find a resilient correspondence between pronunciation and formulaicity.

Finally, in form-based accounts, the status of standard collocations remains unclear. A word may preferentially combine with particular partners without being prohibited from pairing with others. The customary pairings are unquestionably idiomatic, but often do not have other features of formulaicity.

Meaning

Some linguists regard as formulaic only expressions with a holistic meaning that cannot be derived from the individual words. A useful test of this is to swap

an individual word with a near synonym, to see if this destroys some feature of the meaning. The results can be very informative: the *large intestine* is not the same as the *big intestine* nor the *big toe* as the *large toe*. However, it is easy to cross into instances where the alternative is not really a synonym. In *by and large* the word *large* does not, and never did, relate to size, and this is why *by and big* sounds impossible.

Holistic-level semantics is, however, not a sufficiently broad definer of formulaicity. Even if the definition is extended to cover the pragmatics of the whole, as with expressions like *have a nice day*, difficulties arise. The expression *great to see you again* will, for example, fall outside of the definition, being neither opaque nor endued with a strong pragmatic tone. A second difficulty is that there is no cleardividing line between what is and is not opaque. Several dynamics interact here, including the survival in a formula of an outmoded word (e.g., *curry favor*) and the use of metaphor (e.g., *straight from the horse's mouth*). Just as with morphology and etymology in word formation, what is opaque for one person may be transparent for another. It follows that any attempt to define formulaic language in relation to meaning cannot ignore the knowledge of the individual. Yet drawing on the individual's intuition and judgment as the basis for defining and identifying formulaic language runs into its own serious problems.

All in all, it remains difficult to characterise formulaic language in purely semantic terms, and, again, it is part of the researcher's job to formulate theory that can explain why this should be so.

Future Directions

Research into formulaic language draws together the theoretical and the practical. In applied spheres it is possible to by-pass theory, but understanding how formulaic language fits into the bigger picture remains important. So far, the modeling of formulaic language has been psycholinguistically inspired, but the role of psycholinguistic models in informing linguistic theory has always been debated. The point of contact must be the definition of the lexical unit, on the one hand, and of the word and morpheme, on the other. Cross-linguistic research already questions the viability of the 'word' as a linguistic category (e.g., Dixon and Aikhenvald, 2002), and research on formulaic language suggests that words are not the largest units being manipulated by the grammar. While some theoretical linguists maintain that idiomaticity falls outside the domain of formal linguistic description, there is undoubtedly scope for theory to address more directly the question of what formulaic language is and how it arises.

See also: Communicative Language Teaching; Discourse Processing; Second and Foreign Language Learning and Teaching.

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Michel Foucault (true name Paul, born on October 15, 1926, in Poitiers, France) was a French philosopher, psychologist, and psychopathologist. He graduated from the École Normale Supérieure de Paris in 1952. From 1954 to 1958 he taught French at the University of Uppsala in Sweden, and from 1958–1959 at the University of Warsaw, Poland, where he established the Center of French Culture. Foucault spent the following year in Hamburg, returned to France in 1960, and became the head of the Department of Philosophy at the University of Clermont-Ferrard. In 1969, he was given a professor title and was promoted to the Head of the History of Systems of Thought at the Collège de France. Foucault died on June 25, 1984.

Foucault's ideas developed in three periods marked by the issue of his major books.

The first period, represented by *Madness and civilization* (Foucault's doctoral dissertation) is inspired by the fact that madness, though originally inspired divinely, was considered a mental illness and thus simultaneously repressed in the Western societies. He also claimed that madness contrasted to sanity, and the repercussion caused by this distinction is a troublesome and scalding conception dating back to the Age of Reason.

In the second period of his development, Foucault issued *L'Ordre du discours*, which is a seminal study of the natural sciences, linguistics, economics, and social thought of the 18th and 19th centuries. Greatly inspired by Nietzsche's claim about the death of God, Foucault declares the death of Man – a discursive formation of the advances in sciences in the last 150 years.

During the last period (from 1975), Foucault examined the effects of power on the individuals and society, and demonstrated how historical inquiry are combined with philosophical questions about subjectivity, knowledge, and power. He showed how sexuality can be put into discourse and argued that simple liberation from power is impossible. Subjectivity, he claims, can be viewed through one's sexuality. In the immense three-volume study entitled *Histoire de la sexualite* (the first two volumes were issued during his lifetime; the third one is unfinished) he gives an insight into the understanding of sexuality through centuries, and how Western Societies perceived themselves as sexual beings.

Foucault juxtaposes the 'history of ideas' with the 'archeology of science.' In the 'speaking' of language, he sees the replication of discourses of power; what constitutes us as human speakers is social power, hegemony, and ideology. He claims that the history of thought, of knowledge, of philosophy, of literature seems to be seeking and discovering discontinuities. Foucault considers all knowledge arbitrary, including notions of truth, in order to keep power structures relevant and functioning. In this view, he rejects the linear model of history and suggests analyses of discourse, its relative rules in various moments of history, and sees any form of writing or expressing oneself as the way of abandoning of disruptions in favor of stable structures. Moreover, he sees discourse not as a document, but as a monument.

Foucault was not only philosopher, lecturer, and writer, but also participated in the political actions; he actively helped the Solidarność [Solidarity] party in Poland in 1980 and engaged in the movements against discrimination of the disabled, homosexual, and marginal social groups. His thoughts, taken over in the 1990s by the queer theory, became the source of the revival of the feminist, gay, and lesbian studies.

See also: Critical Discourse Analysis; Discourse, Foucauldian Approach; Linguistic Decolonialization; Queer Talk.

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Frege, Friedrich Ludwig Gottlob

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Frege was born on November 8, 1848, in Wismar, Germany. He studied mathematics at Jena, then at Göttingen, where he obtained his doctoral degree in 1873. He became Privatdozent at the University of Jena, where he taught mathematics. In 1879 he became extraordinary professor and in 1896 honorary professor. He stayed in Jena until he retired in 1918. He died on July 26, 1925, in Bad Kleinen. Frege's main field of research was mathematics and the philosophy of mathematics, but his lasting contributions are in the field of formal logic and philosophy of language. During his lifetime Frege, who was an introvert and had a very small audience, exerted little influence, but his ideas were diffused by Rudolf Carnap, Bertrand Russell, and Ludwig Wittgenstein. Because of the development of semantic theory and the growing impact of formal logic on linguistic theorizing, his work occupies a central position within contemporary semantic and linguistic theory, epistemology, and philosophical logic.

Frege's work can be seen as the (unfulfilled) realization of his logicist program, which consisted in reducing arithmetic to logic, i.e., in defining arithmetical concepts in terms of logical concepts and in developing a strictly formalist-logical system for arithmetic statements and procedures. His *Begriffsschrift* (1879) was the first important step in the realization of the program. Frege modernized propositional and predicate logic, and provided a notational system for expressing all types of relationships between propositions, and offered a formalization of first order predicate calculus. In his following book, *Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik* (1884), Frege provided a not-yet formalized elaboration of logicism. The main idea developed in this work is that numbers can be defined as classes of equivalent classes (hence the *a priori* truth of '2 + 3 = 5'). Frege then embarked upon the exhaustive formalization of his program, trying to reduce arithmetic to logic within an axiomatic system. This was the ultimate goal of his *Grundgesetze der Arithmetik*, the first volume of which appeared in 1893 and the second in 1903. But at the time the second volume was published, Frege had already been faced with a paradox in his logical system (the paradox was pointed out to him by Russell), and in spite of his efforts, Frege eventually had to recognize the unrealizability of his reductionist program.

In the process of working out his program, Frege had felt the need to explicate the underlying philosophical views. This required a systematic reflection on notions such as truth, meaning, thought, concept, object, identity, function, and argument. Whereas the 'semantic theory' contained in Frege's *Begriffsschrift* was a poor one, he succeeded in articulating a comprehensive theory of meaning and reference in three articles published in the early 1890s: 'Funktion und Begriff' (1891), 'Über Begriff und Gegenstand' (1892), and 'Über Sinn und Bedeutung' (1892). Although the three articles were, in Frege's view, an informal study (oriented toward aspects of linguistic expression) meant to clarify the aims of logic (the study of laws and properties of thought), they belong to the foundations of modern philosophical logic. Frege himself continued to refer to these articles when, later in his life, he wrote three studies on thought and thought operations ('Der Gedanke,' 'Die Verneinung,' and 'Gedankengefüge,' published between 1918 and 1923). It is important to stress that Frege never referred to his logico-semantic views as constituting a 'philosophy of language' (in fact, as a logician he had a deep mistrust of natural language): whatever he wrote on meaning, reference, assertion, and on linguistic aspects of concepts and judgments was intended to be a less technical exposition of his work in the philosophy of mathematics and in formal logic.

Frege's theory of meaning (and reference) is basically the outgrowth of his reflections on the construction of a notational system for expressing relationships between objects and properties (for Frege's reductionist and very Platonicist ontology only objects and concepts are needed). Objects are expressed by names; as objects, Frege recognizes individuals, classes and truth values. Properties correspond to concepts, expressed by predicative words (*Begriffswörter*, or short: predicates). Predicates are instantiated by individuals (when these are subsumed under a predicate: *Socrates is human*), or are included in a more general predicate (subordination of a predicate under another predicate: *Humans are mortal*). Thoughts (*Gedanken*) are the result of a combination of (object-)names and predicates; they are expressed in sentences, which have a truth value. Predicates are treated as functions to which arguments are linked: a predicative 'function' leaves open one or more places that can be taken in by 'arguments', the variable semantic and syntactic terms filling in the open spots: *speaking* (x), *murdering* (x, y) as semantico-syntactic frames for propositions such as *Brutus is speaking* and *Brutus murdered Caesar*. So Frege treats basic propositional structure in terms of function and argument(s); he was very critical of the traditional analysis into subject and predicate, as it makes no distinction between subsumption and subordination. For the description of the structure of

propositions involving operations on the basic function-argument frame, still other expressions are needed, such as 'propositional connectives' and 'quantifiers' (also dealt with by Frege). Frege was aware that apart from assertive propositions or statements there are other types of sentences: commands, wishes, exclamations, etc. He excluded these from his logical investigations, and in fact seems not to have taken much interest in what he called the *Kraft* ('force') of linguistic expressions.

As a logician, Frege stuck to the principle of the part-whole correlation, applying it to the analysis of propositions (in direct relation to their truth value); later, this principle was called the 'compositionality' principle. The principle is used to account for the fact (1) that the truth value of a proposition results from what its component parts stand for; (2) that the (semantic) content of a proposition results from the combined contents of its component parts; (3) that we can construct new propositions out of (significant) parts of formerly uttered propositions.

The crown jewel of Frege's 'philosophy of language' (essentially a logical semantic theory, with a syntactic component later developed by Carnap as 'logical syntax') is his theory of *Sinn* and *Bedeutung*. The terms have been most often translated into English as 'meaning' resp. 'reference' (but also as 'sense' resp. 'meaning'); however, *Sinn* is not strictly (lexical) 'meaning' and *Bedeutung* is not only 'reference' (i.e., a relation) but also 'referent' (i.e., an object: the *Bedeutung* of a proper name is, in Frege's view, the object denotated, and the *Bedeutung* of a proposition is its truth value) and even 'importance' (Frege's semantic theory has an axiological ring to it, since he also speaks about 'value'). The distinction – which Frege applied to proper names, to (uniquely referring) descriptions, and to (simple/complex) sentences (conditional sentences; indirect speech) – serves to set off (a) the objective idea corresponding to the way an object is presented to us [= *Sinn*] as distinct from all kinds of subjective representations [= *Vorstellungen*] that we can associate with an object; and (b) the object (a referent, class of referents, a truth value) in which the reference achieves its realization [= *Bedeutung*]. Identity statements (such as *The morning star is the evening star*) precisely are cognitively (scientifically) important, because through them we learn that two expressions giving a different presentation of an object refer to the same thing (in this case, the two expressions or names *the morning star* and *the evening star* 'coincide' in the same object, namely, the planet Venus). Of the same object various ways of presentation can be given (like 'Marcus Tullius' and 'Cicero' or of Napoleon: 'the winner of the battle at Austerlitz' and 'the emperor defeated at Waterloo'); the same *Sinn* or way of presentation can, at different moments, correspond to different objects ('the president of the United States'). Although problems remain with the distinction (e.g., what is the *Sinn* of a proper name? How can one make a clear-cut distinction between objective ideas and subjective representations about objects?), Frege's theory of *Sinn* and *Bedeutung* has been of crucial importance for the later study of meaning and reference (specifically for the analysis of proper names and descriptions) and for the logical analysis of sentences. Frege's logic (and reductionist ontology) also inspired later work in logical syntax and semantics as applied to the analysis of truth and to the construction of an ontology.

See also: Constraint, Pragmatic; Default Semantics; Pragmatics: Optimality Theory; Pragmatics and Semantics; Reference: Semiotic Theory; Wittgenstein, Ludwig Josef Johann.

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Freire, Paulo

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One of the most influential educational thinkers of the 20th century, Paulo Freire became a powerful symbol of the relationship between education and social change, particularly in the Third World. Freire was born on September 19, 1921, in the city of Recife in northeast Brazil, where he grew up in poverty. He succeeded in entering a private high school with a scholarship and became sensitive at an early age of the discrepancies in power and wealth between Brazil's social classes.

Freire entered the University of Recife Law School in 1943 but decided that he should devote himself to education instead. He became the director of education at SESI (Social Service of Industry), a government agency responsible for improving the living standards of workers. He received his Ph.D. in 1959 from the University of Recife with the dissertation 'Present day education in Brazil.' During the 1960s, he became involved in movements for popular education, focusing on adult literacy in rural communities and, in 1963, became the director of the National Literacy Program.

Since at the time literacy was a prerequisite for voter registration, Freire's activities were considered overtly political and, by many in the ruling elite, subversive. In 1964, a military coup ousted President Goulart, and Freire was arrested and held for 70 days on charges of treason. What followed were 16 years of exile. During that time, Freire worked at the Chilean Institute for Agrarian Reform until he took a post at Harvard for a year (1969–1970) and then moved on to Geneva, where he became the educational director of the World Congress of Churches, traveling the world to promote literacy programs and develop further his ideas on education and literacy that he had described in his *Pedagogy of the oppressed* (1972).

A passionate Christian and a Marxist, Freire saw education both as a tool by which ruling classes subdue the masses and as a way of resisting that very oppression. Freire attacked the 'banking' system of education, where the student is viewed as an empty receptacle to be filled with facts, and instead advocated a dialogic or problem-posing approach to teaching, where education is made meaningful because it is related to the real lives and experiences of the learners. The purpose of this style of teaching and learning is to empower learners by making them aware of their own capacity to transform the world. This process, known as conscientization, has been associated with Freire's philosophy of education, although he himself thought the term was often misused.

In 1980, Freire returned to Brazil and began teaching at the Catholic University of São Paulo and the State University of Campinas. He also continued to be involved in adult and mass education programs. In 1986 Freire received the UNESCO Prize for Peace Education, and in 1988 he was appointed minister of education for the city of São Paulo. Paulo Freire died on May 2, 1997, at the age of 75. His work continues to exert a profound influence on educational thought and practice to this day.

See also: Critical Applied Linguistics; Educational Linguistics; Institutional Talk; Language Education: Language Awareness; Marxist Theories of Language; Minority Languages: Oppression; Participatory Research and Advocacy; Politics of Teaching.

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Gender and Language

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The field of language and gender is multidisciplinary
in scope. Practitioners can be found not only in
linguistics and gender studies but right across the hu-
manities and social sciences, including in anthropol-
ogy, cultural studies, education, literary studies,
social psychology, and sociology. The point of contact
is feminist interest in language and, in that sense, there
is always some form of political agenda and engage-
ment. After thirty years, the accumulated research is
now wide-ranging. Explicitly feminist in focus are
explorations of gender positioning, in representations
in media broadcasting and print, and in interaction in
the media and other institutions. To give an indication
of the range of coverage, a few examples are: exam-
inations of the dynamics of classrooms privileging
boys (e.g., Swann, 1992); case studies of women
in public life (e.g., Walsh, 2001); the wisdom and
efficacy, or otherwise, of institutional guidelines on
non-sexist language use (Cameron, 1998a); sexism in
press coverage, e.g., victim-blaming in rape reporting
(Clark, 1998), and the reinforcement of normative
gender positions in reporting on a sexual harassment
conviction (Talbot, 1997); the rhetoric of physically
abusive husbands and the disenfranchisement of their
wives (Adams *et al.,* 1995). Less explicitly feminist,
but nevertheless coming from a feminist standpoint
are studies of the minutiae of conversational interac-
tion between close friends in same-sex groups (e.g.,
Coates, 1996), a study of bilingual youth culture
(Pujolar, 2000), and many and varied storytelling
analyses: of accounts of pregnancy (Freed, 1996), so-
cialization of children at family dinnertables (e.g.,
Ochs and Taylor, 1992), lesbian coming-out stories
(Wood, 1999), among many others. *The handbook
of language and gender* is a detailed overview of the
field, providing a full and indicative representation
of its diversity and depth (Holmes and Meyerhoff,
2003).

Since the early 1990s, two prominent issues in
language and gender have been: a sustained critique
of 'gender differences' as the research agenda and a
need for firmer theoretical grounding. The sections
that follow address both of them in turn.

Querying the 'Gender Differences' Agenda

There is a well-known claim that men and women
use interactional styles associated with power and
solidarity, respectively (*see* **Power and Pragmatics**).
The existence of distinct female and male interaction-
al styles has now gained widespread acceptance, to
the extent that they have entered popular 'common
sense' (cf., e.g., Talbot, 2003). There is a considerable
weight of evidence to support this view, including
research on politeness (e.g., Holmes, 1995) and on
physical alignment and eye contact in conversations
(e.g., Tannen, 1990). In a detailed study of compli-
ments and compliment responses, for example, Janet
Holmes has found New Zealand women using com-
pliments a great deal more than men do, with compli-
ments between women being used to consolidate
solidarity between the giver of the compliment and
the recipient. Holmes found that men, on the other
hand, tend to find compliments threatening and may
use mock insults and sparring to cement friendships
instead. The overall picture is one of polarization; of
men's talk as power based and competitive, women's
talk as solidarity-based and cooperative.

According to the 'difference' framework, gendered
language patterns are a consequence of distinct fe-
male and male subcultures. In this view, women and
men behave differently because they are segregated in
childhood. Boys, who tend to play in large groups
with hierarchical social structure, learn to value sta-
tus and become power-focused; whereas girls, who
tend to play in small groups of 'best friends,' learn
to value intimacy and become solidarity-focused.
In the process, children acquire different gender-
appropriate behavior. They enter adult heterosexual
relationships with differing expectations about friend-
ly interaction and consequently encounter problems
of miscommunication (e.g., Tannen, 1991). These
miscommunication problems have been presented
as analogous to cross-cultural miscommunication.

There are many detailed critiques of the 'difference' framework (e.g., Cameron, 1995; Crawford, 1995; Freed, 1992; Talbot, 1998; Troemel-Ploetz, 1991; Uchida, 1992). The foremost concerns are the erasure of power and a tendency to overgeneralize, brought about by disregard for contextual considerations other than gender. Sex segregation in childhood is greatly exaggerated (Thorne, 1993). Claims about miscommunication among adults disregard issues of conflict over rights and obligations in times of social change (Cameron, 1998b). 'Gender differences'-based research on language depends on untenable dichotomies; critics have argued for far more nuanced understandings of power and solidarity, and indeed gender, and query the continued usefulness of the whole line of inquiry. The question: 'how does the language of women and men differ?' is no longer considered an appropriate starting point for research into gendered patterns of behavior seeking to further a feminist understanding of patriarchal social relations and sexual inequality. It is a question that assumes its answer lies with, precisely, differences. In short, the search for 'gender differences' has become an impoverished framework that flattens out the enormous range, variation, and richness of inter-action between women and men, boys and girls.

Beyond 'Difference': The Poststructuralist Turn

In an article reflecting on the history of the field, Barrie Thorne points to a skewed emphasis on the micropolitics of face-to-face interaction – at the expense of the social structures and processes in which all face-to-face interaction is embedded – and accounts for it in terms of a 'strategy of deliberate one-sidedness' advocated by Erving Goffman (1983) (*see* **Goffman, Erving**). This analytic move generated a rich body of work on gender in everyday interaction but also, Thorne argues, generated a rift between theory and analysis (Thorne, 2001). Since the early 1990s, attempts to resolve this rift have drawn on critical theory, particularly poststructuralist theories of discourse and identity. A conceptualization of identity as flux is notable in recent research, strongly influenced by poststructuralism and paralleling developments in related fields (e.g., *see* **Critical Discourse Analysis**).

A poststructuralist position on discourse and identity provides an alternative to the polarized conceptualization of gender identity. While the 'gender difference' approach operates with a static conception of distinct male and female identities, developed and fixed in childhood, in a poststructuralist account identity is much more fluid. Feminist criticism from this perspective takes language as the site of the cultural production of gender (e.g., Weedon, 1997). In this view, gender identities are not pre-given, but constructed in discourse; individuals take up positions in their enactments of discourse practices. This view serves to caution against making *a priori* assumptions about gender identity, such as by implicitly setting up a masculine-feminine dichotomy as the starting point (by determining to look for 'differences' in the behavior of women and men). It also serves as a corrective to assumptions of homogeneity in the social identities and relationships of women and men. Research influenced by poststructuralism examines not gender difference but the construction of gender identities. This approach to language and gender is grounded in the assumption that subjectivity is constituted in discourse. In discourse, individuals are positioned as social subjects who are gendered in specific ways.

Careful avoidance of bipolar categories of gender, and the comparative approach that goes with them, is a characteristic of recent research. Some analysts are explicit in their grounding in feminist theory (e.g., contributors to Hall and Bucholtz, 1995; Bucholtz *et al.*, 1999) and directly or indirectly interrogate categories such as masculine, feminine, heterosexual, white, middle-class, etc. 'Exceptional speakers' (the title of Kira Hall's contribution to the *Handbook of language and gender*) are increasingly studied on their own terms, rather than as exceptions to an over-rigid model that is unable to accommodate them. Such cases of 'footnote deviance' (Holmes and Meyerhoff, 2003: 354) include the 'tomboys' and 'sissies' that a 'two-cultures' account cannot accommodate adequately, and the African-American women whose verbal behavior awkwardly refuses to fit the pattern for a 'feminine' interactional style based on middle-class white Americans. This attention to liminal users of language has produced new areas of interest within the field of language and gender, e.g., an emerging field centering on 'the sexual and gender deviance of previous generations' (ibid.), which its practitioners have given the name 'queer linguistics' (*see* **Queer Talk**). A related point is that there are parallels between developments in the study of gender and of ethnicity, where the converse is taking place. A shift in focus to gendered subjectivity has generated increasing attention to masculinities. Just as whiteness is receiving critical attention, rather than occupying an invisible position as the 'non-ethnic' norm, so masculinities are being examined as constructed identities. Language and gender has seen significant expansion to encompass sexual orientation, ethnicity, and multilingualism, and, to some extent, class, involving analyses of spoken, written, and signed gendered identities (*see* **Intercultural Pragmatics and Communication**).

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Gender and Political Discourse

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Little research has been done on the topic of gender and political discourse, although this issue may show us the extent to which a gendered division of power holds worldwide. (The recent work done by Walsh 2001 is noteworthy in this field.) While highly revealing of the key role that language and other styles of communication play in the political arena, investigations of gender and politics also shows how social closure occurs, hindering access and skewing the representation of certain genders, classes, and social groups in this area.

This article will deal primarily with issues of institutional politics, particularly parliamentary, legislative, and government politics, and not with issues of everyday politics. The very lack of women in government and parliaments explains in part the lack of research done on gender and political discourse (in Peterson and Sisson Runyan, 1993, conclusive figures from all continents around the world can be found. Also see Wodak, 2003). In fact, most countries that acknowledge the objective of promoting equality between women and men do not have parity governments, and only in a very few exceptional cases do women even comprise 40% of parliament. The fact that women's social position is not as strong as men's, despite progress made in certain areas of the world, has been linked to masculinist hegemony, which in turn is connected to social class and ethnic differences in different ways in different places. Masculinist hegemony is diffuse since, as Walsh (2001: 17) indicates "it is embedded in impersonal discursive practices and institutional structures that are historically associated with men." Indeed, when statistics are broken down by gender in the areas of education, health, economic participation, or wages, women as a group are still at a disadvantage. The fact that women's social position remains weak, although to varying degrees in different countries around the world, explains why women encounter resistance and difficulties in joining the political sphere and other prestigious areas of society such as business or academia. In the legitimization of this social weakness, several factors seem to play a significant role, like religion (Balaghi, 1994), culture (Graumann-Ubale, 1996), or historical reasons (Dudink, 2004).

Because our societies perceive a process of evolution and modernization leading women's presence to increase daily throughout the world, their greater presence in the Western sphere, considered to be more 'evolved' ('civilized'), is considered a given. Nevertheless, these assumptions are not always justified and mask some important aspects of the issue. For instance, while the female participation rate in northern European countries stands out as an exception (Gomard, 2001), other countries considered to be less Western or civilized, such as Costa Rica and Rwanda, apply the quota system.

Seemingly, only where strong women's movements conjugate certain political clout with the defence of women's social position and interests can political change increase women's numbers in politics. Thus, the political earthquake hitting Rwanda or Northern Ireland has uniquely placed women's movements actively participating in the peace negotiations and making noteworthy contributions to national reconciliation. These women have subsequently stood for public office in elections in order to change policies. Analogously, the processes of political decentralization in Spain and recently also in the United Kingdom, have enabled the conditioning of women politicians in regional parliaments and governments, and in regional governments (thereby enabling the recent constitution of a parity national government in Spain with women who have demonstrable experience in government).

Such examples seem to indicate that barriers encountered by women are so frequent and substantial that the process is sometimes not gradual (as it seems to have been in Scandinavia). At times, the political rules are modified, opening the way for women only after deep change altering the political equilibrium, or even only after strong social upheavals. But the figures are overwhelming and leave little room for optimism. The results of deep changes in the political rules, if they do suffice, are not always positive. Developments in the so-called Eastern European countries illustrate how political change can lead to lower female participation (Hungry, Poland, Rumania, and Russia are clear examples. See Peterson and Sisson Runyan, 1993: 54ff.; see also Matland, 2003). Seemingly therefore, only where strong women's movements conjugate certain political clout with the defense of women's social position and interests can political change increase women's numbers in politics.

This article reveals how language barriers (i.e., difficulty in attaining an education and socialization generating an acceptable communicative style for intervening in the social arena), and cultural barriers (i.e., difficulty in fully participating in traditionally male-oriented fraternal networks within political organizations), are rooted, but also reinforce structural barriers (particularly, the unequal distribution of women and men in the public sphere of politics; differences in women's socialization that do not prepare them to overcome cultural and linguistic barriers, etc.).

In order to show these links, the first section of this article analyses the issue of gendered communicative styles, the difficulties they present for women, and what women contribute by modifying traditional patterns. Section two demonstrates how perceptions of gendered communicative styles affect the way women involved in politics are represented and evaluated. Finally, section three examines the role played by the current discursive order in reproducing gender inequality and how language barriers are linked to other cultural and structural barriers.

The Discursive Order: Is There a Feminine Style in the Political Arena?

Several of the authors who have worked on this issue have used 'communities of practice' as their starting

point to suggest that the political domain constitutes a discursive order characterized by certain ways of speaking and evaluations about their appropriacy that are traditionally associated with males. That is, professional politicians are seen as an "aggregate of people who, united by a common enterprise, develop and share ways of doing things, ways of talking, beliefs, and values, -in short practices" (Eckert and McConnell-Ginet, 1999: 186). The fact that this community of practice has traditionally been made up of males explains why such ways of speaking and values have taken shape as dominant and why everything departing from this practice and these values is appraised as unsuitable or unacceptable. While no specific communicational style is demanded of men in the political arena, women do not seem to have an appropriate one available. This inequality in demands leads to a process of exclusion, making it difficult for women to gain access to important resources and positions in the organization. This situation is an example of social closure (social domination).

This exclusion may, in turn, give rise to a situation in which access to these high-level resources and positions is achieved by means of adaptation to the dominant styles and forms. Within research on language and gender, certain linguistic choices have been identified as masculine in style: being more assertive in one's expression and exercising of power (which includes highlighting rather than concealing responsibility for decisions or actions), and being direct and confrontational with adversaries in political debates. These traits, which are not necessarily found among all males, appear most clearly in two specific spheres in the political arena: in parliamentary debates and in the creation and maintaining of fraternal or peer networks, both within political organizations (parties and unions), and in informal interaction between members of the same or of different parties. Ties are made and negotiations take place outside a formal context through these networks, making them as important in politics as they are in other areas.

These masculine stereotyped forms are increasingly rejected by women. Thus, within the British Labour Party, for instance, Harriet Harman has criticized what she terms the "militaristic" and "macho" language of the laddish coterie who surround Blair, claiming that talk of "big guns," "big hitters," and "big beasts" is not how women refer to one another (the Guardian, 9 March 1999; also see Walsh's analyses, 2001: 100ff.). However, these discursive practices are highly effective in building fraternal networks in political parties.

Researchers have also attempted to define the traits characterizing a feminine style. Authors such as Blankenship and Robson (1995), using a study of a corpus of political discourse in the United States between 1990 and 1994, have identified the following five traits: basing political judgments on concrete, lived experience; valuing inclusivity and relational nature of being; conceptualizing the power of public office as a capacity 'to get things done' and to empower others; approaching policy formation holistically; moving women's issues to the forefront of the public arena.

At least the first three of these five traits have been considered paradigmatic examples of how women tend to tackle communication in other public spaces, such as business. However, as with all characterizations of feminine styles, we can never be sure whether these styles actually appear in women's discourse or whether they are rather a perception or a representation of women in social positions of responsibility, based on and shaped by gender stereotypes (Martín Rojo and Gómez Esteban, 2002, 2004).

Lastly, we cannot overlook the different ways in which women devoted to politics act. In fact, Walsh (2001: 11) identified three models explaining these differences. First is the accommodation model, required by a male-oriented cultural context, in which women adapt to dominant practices both in their management of conflict and in their expression of authority. Nevertheless, adapting to molds and forms traditionally considered typical of male politicians often leads women politicians to be seen as strange specimens, behaving as would be expected of a leader, but not of a woman (Margaret Thatcher is a paradigmatic example). The fact that women to whom this categorization is attributed are seen as exceptions does not contribute to promoting the feminization of the political sphere.

The second model is what Walsh terms the critical difference model, which could be characterized as the search for cooperation instead of adopting an aggressive, confrontational style. Here, there is a risk of being perceived as weak and ineffectual, or to put it bluntly, as poor professionals having arrived where they are thanks to the paternalism of males who have given them an undeserved place due to quota policies (this phenomenon could be seen as similar to what occurs in leadership positions in the sphere of labor, cited by authors such as Holmes, 1995; Tannen, 1996; Martín Rojo and Gómez Esteban, 2002, 2004). As indicated by Deborah Cameron (1992: 76), regardless of how this style is judged, adopting it contributes to rectifying the traditional dichotomy between private and public spheres and the unequal distribution of women and men in these spheres. It could be expected, however, that with the gradual feminizing of the public sphere, adopting this style would contribute to transforming the rules and values that govern it.

The third model is what Walsh calls the performative model and consists of women switching between the other two models depending on the communicative situation and other factors. Although this model is perhaps the most widely followed (see Romaniuk, 2004 for similar conclusions), it remains invisible. As stated in Fairclough's (1989: 182ff.) analysis, although Margaret Thatcher herself used a hybrid style, carefully conjugating selected features associated with middle-class femininity and 'authoritative expressive elements' used by men politicians, the masculine model was insistently attributed to her (she was described as 'the best man in the cabinet'). Her model was even resorted to in order to masculinize and discredit the work of other women (Walsh cites the case of Margaret Beckett when competing for Labour leadership in 1994 (Walsh, 2001: 72–73).

This frequent alternating of styles does not depend so much on a rational choice made by these women but is rather a reflection of the tension they experience, leading them to use different options. Examples such as the new President of the Parliament of Andalusia, who declared her will to exercise her power "not to follow in the footsteps of men, but to open new paths on which womens' footsteps may be seen..." are still few and far between. In addition, as Wodak (2003) points out, female MPs in EU parliament display a wide range of identity constructions, and gender can be overridden through national and ideological affiliation.

Furthermore, while serving as an avenue for women to develop their own style of leadership, stressing the differences between the masculine and feminine forms of exercising power also involves risks. Emphasizing some aspects of what has been defined as specifically feminine leadership, or defending its virtues, may in fact serve only to further stereotype and marginalize women in leadership and politics. It is also paradoxical that this marginalization comes at a time when certain cracks can already be seen in the towering edifice of the two-sex and two-gender system. (Given that people are now more aware of the fact that gender differences are socially constructed, distinctions between the genders have weakened and a host of different ways to be a women or a man are expressed more freely.) (Freed, 2003). And what is even more highly suspicious is the vulgarized version of the positive view of differences in academic circles that is so prevalently found in the media, the self-help industry, and books on popular psychology. *Cosmopolitan* has made en effort to tie these different ways of speaking with the presence of certain hormones or the different constitution of our brains. Through dichotomies and oversimplification, these media relentlessly stress that women and men shop, think, speak and behave differently.

Beyond any doubt, in the current discursive order of politics, we find that the requirements are somewhat flexible and open for men (if male politicians adopt a nonconfrontational style, this behavior would not be necessarily interpreted as a sign of weakness), but restrictive for women who are also harshly criticized and often excluded from a sphere where dominant practices have been imposed throughout history. We therefore find ourselves up against an example of domination and exclusion that is reproduced and bolstered by discursive practices. From this perspective, at least three areas stand out for their importance: parliamentary debate, government tasks, and peer relations in nonformal contexts. The first area is linked to the adversarial style, the second to how power is expressed and managed, and the third to building one's own identity and one's own group identity.

As indicated by other authors (Puwar, 1997; Sreberny-Mohamadi and Ross, 1996; Walsh, 2001), women find a confrontational style, ranging beyond parliamentary debate, to be alienating and inhibiting. As Sedgemore (1995: 54) indicated, in parliament, when differences are small, they must be magnified and when they do not exist at all, they must be fabricated.

However, cultural differences can be observed in how this confrontation is managed. In the British parliament, for instance, both the parliamentary procedure and the physical layout itself stimulate confrontation (Sedgemore, 1995: 54). Legal interventions are allowed in debate where one speaker gives way to another so that he or she can make remarks that tie in with the line of argument. These legal interventions are not permitted in other parliaments. But illegal interventions, highly effective in increasing the aggressive tone of the debate, are found in all parliaments. When made on a group basis, these interventions consist of interjections, stomping, noise, and all types of comments demonstrating support or disapproval of the speaker, while on an individual basis, illegal interventions usually consist of comments such as 'that's a lie' or 'resign.' In this light, Shaw's figures (2000) illustrate that legal or illegal interruptions in parliamentary debates are often made by men. By not availing themselves of these interventions, women therefore limit their access to the floor and thus relinquish their power in the debates.

In the second area, government tasks, the way is gradually being paved for new styles of leadership incorporating more cooperative and less assertive

traits that afford greater scope for interpersonal relationships. Yet these innovations come up against resistance even when advocated by men. (As compared with his predecessor's brusque, pushy, severe style, Spanish prime minister Rodríguez Zapatero has been dubbed 'Bambi' by the opposition for his conciliatory style). This resistance is even greater when it comes to women, since their practices, based on an ideology that understands power as a resource to transform society and not to dominate others, are not considered to be chosen rationally but rather considered to be a sign of inherent weakness. In her campaign within the British Labour party, Beckett's reluctance, for instance, to speculate on potential situations in which she would push the nuclear button were not understood as a political position in itself, i.e., the rejection of a populist discourse on security, or support for nuclear disarmament. Instead, they were understood as a sign of weakness invalidating her as a candidate.

Lastly, in the third area, peer relations, the role played by practices traditionally associated with masculine forms is interesting to observe. Especially interesting is the role they play in informal contexts (coffee breaks, mealtimes, parties, Christmas dinners, nights out), where relationships become less formal, power relationships are less manifest, and more stable networks emerge. Organizations and political parities are built on these types of relationships. Paradoxically, obstacles are also presented for women in participating in this type of situation, especially in highly masculinized sectors. It is important to draw attention to the social implications of this marginalization of women in male peer networks, since at the higher levels of organizations real power resides in these groups. Because networks like these are the basis for choosing the candidates called upon to represent the people in elections, these relationships play a key role in either promoting or thwarting women's inclusion.

Reducing political relationships to 'gentlemen's clubs,' 'big guns,' or 'political babes' excludes those who explore new, more democratic types of political systems. Therefore, analyzing the barriers to women in politics better enables us to show the potential results of women's equalitarian participation in politics that could, in turn, open up the possibility of new ideological positions. It has, for instance, been noted that women's role in peace negotiations after various conflicts in Northern Ireland, Rwanda, or Israel-Palestine has opened up forms of reconciliation that are not based on excluding any of the parties. Also, the awareness of being in a position of weakness in politics can lead to a less assertive style and the seeking of consensus in decision-making and exercising power. Moreover, women's involvement in grassroots movements is bringing about new brands of politics that are closer to people's everyday life experience and needs. This less elitist style, more adapted to voters' specific situations, means that politics becomes much more democratic. Romaniuk (2004) also shows the emergence of a new communication ideology that values private forms of communication in the public sphere. It has also been indicated that women are less susceptible to corruption (according to Johon Mathiason, former Director of the UN Division for the Advancement of Women), perhaps because of their exclusion from the fraternal networks where so many things are negotiated outside the regulatory sphere of the political arena. Lastly, women's role in changing the political agenda seems noticeable, although it is done from NGOs, since in certain countries, consensus has been reached between women of different political parties to address issues such as abuse of women, or to respond to some of the claims of the women's movement's.

The Social Representation of Female Politicians

What we have seen thus far shows how the style adopted by women in positions of power in government or parliament is sometimes not as important as how these styles are perceived and represented. Several authors have studied how representations reproduce gender stereotypes and traditional dichotomies separating the public and private spheres.

The media play an important role in reproducing and disseminating dominant representations of women involved in politics (Ross and Sreby-Mohammadi, 1997). One of the main reasons, in addition to the deep rooting of traditional visions indicated by Walsh, is that most of those who own or control the media are men who assume that the ideal reader will also be male.

Due to the strong impact of gender inequalities in the distribution of social spaces, women's presence in the public sphere is still viewed as exceptional. Thus, as Fowler (1991) indicated, male presence undoubtedly overshadows female presence in the British press, which reaffirms women's underrepresentation in the public sphere (King, 1992: 133), feeding the lack of female models. The few articles which are devoted to women reproduce traditional stereotypes, that is, these articles include references to women's family ties (husbands, fathers, children, etc.) or provide information on their marital status, thereby reaffirming their image as dependent (on the will or actions of others). These articles often also include observations and value judgments regarding their physical aspect (for instance in the campaign for Labour

Party leadership "where Blair was a youthful 40-something, Beckett was post-menopausal" (*Daily Express*, 24 June 1994). Adjectives used to describe women usually place the emphasis on their physical and emotional qualities and nearly never on their professional or moral worth. And when the adjectives do evaluate their moral worth, they usually refer to traditionally imposed traits (fidelity, resignation, care for others) or traditionally disdained traits (domineering, masculine in style, wielding of 'female weapons'). (Mcdonald, 1995: 50, points to double moral standards in social spaces.)

Therefore, when women's action as high-level politicians is represented in the media, we find they are considered tokens, that is, as symbols of their gender rather than as individuals. For example, when a minister is criticized for her actions, her entire gender's suitability for government is called into question, while a man's incompetence only calls into question his own incapacity and never that of his entire gender.

Thus, as Kanter points out, when women are seen as token they are subject to three perceptual tendencies: greater visibility, contrast or comparison, and assimilation (1977: 130ff.). Greater visibility, contrast, and comparison can be observed in the scrutinizing and criticism of women's action in government. Walsh (2001) has studied how women's actions within the Labour Party, the Blair government ('Blair's babes'), and the Welsh and Scottish parliaments are continuously compared and benchmarked against male ways of speaking and values. Women in government are the marked gender (Tannen, 1996). As a result, their behavior is observed and judged for its suitability. If their performance is judged to be negative, then the whole gender is discredited. Suffice it to cite how Welsh Agriculture Secretary Christine Gwyther was treated in the media for being vegetarian.

This discredit leads on to the third tendency – assimilation. Women in the public sphere are seen as more masculine than in the domestic sphere. Thus, those women who do not convey an empty image of power are perceived as macho. This is not a positive representation, however, since they are seen not as women, but as rejected specimens. They are the iron ladies, the women who wear the trousers, pseudo-men (for research on virilization and exclusion suffered by these women in the public sphere see Martín Rojo and Gómez Estaban, 2002).

The observation of these perceptual tendencies leads us to reason that the women who do not take part in this dichotomized distribution of public and private spheres are the ones who pose the greatest contradictions and tensions in the media. Page's

analysis (2003) of the representation of leading barrister and wife of the then British prime minister Cherie Booth Blair in the British press shows these contradictions. The stereotypically passive representation of Cherie Blair might be seen as securing her husband's political status against the potentially destabilizing influence of her representation as a powerful professional in the public domain, thereby reinforcing gendered norms (Page, 2003: 570). What has yet to be studied is the impact of her representation as a professional on other working women. Here, Page's analysis seems to show that while her professional worth is not questioned, she is considered to be an exception.

Barriers Constituting a Glass Ceiling and Potential Action

Language barriers hamper women's access to politics both on an institutional and an everyday level in both parties and organizations. We must not overlook female illiteracy rates, higher than those of men throughout the world. While women have not yet been socialized to compete in the political arena, what is relevant is how in the current order of discourse the dominant practices and values deprive them of the tools they need to make a way for themselves.

We have already seen the dilemmas faced by women in politics as well as the dominant social representations in the media. While no specific communicational style is demanded of men in institutional politics (except some stylistic preferences for expressing conflict and opposition in debates and for exercising power), women politicians do not seem to have an appropriate style available to them. This inequality in requirements gives rise to a situation where both maintaining their traditional features and assuming traditional masculine traits leave women looking out of place in politics. As a result, men's prevalent position in organizations is not threatened, but rather effectively reproduced and therefore bolstered.

In addition, while stressing the differences between the masculine and feminine forms of exercising power provides an avenue for women to develop their own style of leadership, it also conceals other restrictions they face at entry and the thwarting of new ideological positions and ways of doing politics.

Changing this situation requires changing discourse's social order so that it is open to other types of participation. Carbó (2003) studies one outstanding example of the changes required, the Zapatist commander Esther's intervention in the Mexican Parliament, the first by a nonparliamentarian, indigenous woman. Yet, we know that the order of

discourse cannot be modified unless other orders are. In fact, it is no coincidence that women have attained socialization in less competitive areas, like politics in regional parliaments and local institutions, because less power is wielded there (i.e., the autonomous governments in Spain and the United Kingdom) or in situations where overcoming crises has required innovative solutions.

Language barriers are inextricably tied to other barriers, particularly cultural ones, favoring particular practices and ways of doing politics. This link explains why women MPs in Britain were not even able to change the evening sessions in the British Parliament to make their work and home lives compatible. Their attempt was seen as a break with tradition, and the same holds true for their rejection of the dominant aggressive, masculine style.

Both cultural and language barriers invariably lead us to structural barriers, to the unequal distribution of social spheres, and to the relegating of women outside the most prized public sphere. Social changes are threatening this order but have not yet changed it. More deeply rooted and seemingly more difficult to change is the strong link traditionally established between power and masculinity. Gender stereotypes are still shaping role stereotypes in the political arena. As a result of the association of power and masculinity, when women reach high positions, they can be regarded as deviant examples or virilized women (Golda Meïr and Margaret Thatcher are outstanding examples). This association between genders and roles promotes essentialist discourses attributing specific worth and possibilities. As a result, we see that the political arena is a gendered social space.

As long as women's numbers in politics are low, it will be difficult to see that the problems we face as women (abuse, less research on diseases affecting women, lower salaries, difficulties in attending to both work and children, etc.) are problems of society as a whole. In democracy, justice must be for the entire population. Women's greater presence in politics would help to bring these issues to the fore and would encourage solutions attenuating social exclusion and injustice.

See also: Critical Discourse Analysis; Gender and Language.

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Genre and Genre Analysis

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Genre in Literary Studies

When, in the 18th century, English commentators wished to follow their classical predecessors, Plato and Aristotle, in distinguishing among types of artistic production, they borrowed the word *genre*, 'kind,' from French. The term was initially applied to literary texts, which had also been the concern of the classical commentators. All literary genres were considered to be recognizable by their adherence to conventions of form, content, and use of language. For example, Aristotle, in Chapter 6 of the *Poetics*, defined and described epic, lyrical, and dramatic poetry by identifying their constituent parts. Of tragic drama, he wrote (quoted in Dorsch, 1965: 39):

> Necessarily . . . every tragedy has six constituents, which will determine its quality. They are plot, character, diction, thought, spectacle, and song. Of these, two represent the media in which the action is represented, one involves the manner of representation, and three are connected with the objects of the representation; beyond them nothing further is required.

In a similar vein, but over 2000 years later, the Romantic essayist William Hazlitt began his *Lectures on the English Poets* (1818 [1910]: 1) by focusing on the content, form, and phonological features of poetry:

> In treating of poetry, I shall speak first of the subject-matter of it, next the forms of expression to which it gives birth, and afterwards of its connection with harmony and sound.

According to classical Greek literary theory, the distinction among lyric, epic, and dramatic poetry was found in their different use of narrative voice: In lyric poetry, only the narrator's voice was heard; in epic, the narrator spoke alongside the characters; and in dramatic poetry, only the characters' voices were heard. Despite a longstanding tendency among neoclassical commentators to treat genres as discrete and stable, writers inevitably mixed them; for instance, Shakespeare mixed prosaic comedy and tragic verse by following the murder of Duncan with the comic porter's scene in *Macbeth*, and in *Hamlet* (Act II, Scene ii), he parodied the critics of his time through Polonius's pedantic distinctions among the genres of 'tragedy, comedy, history, pastoral, pastoral-comical, historical-pastoral, tragical-historical, tragical-comical-historical-pastoral' and so on.

By Hazlitt's time, the proliferation of new genres, such as the novel, and the Romantic critic's preference for the unique and original over the generic and conventional led to the gradual decline of the importance of the concept of genre in literary studies. As a result, in literary studies and in other esthetic fields, such as art and film criticism, to describe something as a 'genre piece' was to stigmatize it, a process some writers and critics have been at pains to challenge (e.g., Braudy, 1985):

> No part of the film experience has been cited more consistently as a barrier to serious critical interest than the existence of forms and conventions, whether in such details as the stereotyped character, the familiar setting, and the happy ending, or in those films that share common characteristics – Westerns, musicals, detective films, horror films, escape films, spy films – in short, what have been called *genre* films. Genre films especially

are criticized because they seem to appeal to a preexisting audience, whereas the film 'classic' creates its own special audience through the unique power of the film-making artist's personal creative sensibility.

In the 20th century, certain critics began to rehabilitate the concept of genre in literary studies. Rather than conceiving of genre as a fixed, absolute set of conventions, however, modern critics see genre as a dynamic set of conventions that are related to changing social institutions and purposes. Structuralist critics redefine genre as a set of expectations that a reader acquires from his or her reading. These expectations may be fulfilled or frustrated in any further act of reading, each one of which reshapes one's generic expectations. The literary critic's role, therefore, is not to state the formulas to which literary texts must adhere, but, at least in part, to expose the expectations that account for particular esthetic responses. The structuralist critic also tends to favor those works of literature that set out to challenge prevailing expectations through parody or denial, as Eichenbaum (1925; cited in Scholes, 1974: 88) noted:

> In the evolution of each genre there are times when its use for entirely serious or elevated objectives degenerates and produces a comic or parodic form. The same phenomenon has happened to the epic poem, the adventure novel, the biographical novel, etc.

Eichenbaum argued that the genre is 'regenerated' through the playful subversion of conventions that enable the creation of new forms.

Genre in Language Studies

Structuralist critics view literature as a self-contained system with its own codes and conventions. In contrast, another major figure, Mikhail Bakhtin, related literary language to the wider and hitherto neglected system of codes and expectations governing discourse in general. In 'The Problem of Speech Genres,' Bakhtin (1952–1953 [1986]: 60) wrote:

> Each separate utterance is individual, of course, but each sphere in which language is used develops its own *relatively stable types* of these utterances. These we may call *speech genres* ... Special emphasis should be put on the extreme *heterogeneity* of speech genres (oral and written). In fact, the category of speech genres should include short rejoinders of daily dialogue (and these are extremely varied depending on the subject matter, situation, and participants), everyday narration, writing (in all its various forms), the brief standard military command, the elaborate and detailed order, the fairly variegated repertoire of business documents (for the most part standard), and the diverse world of commentary (in the broad sense of the word: social, political). [italics in original].

In language studies, in the decades following Bakhtin, the term 'genre' has been appropriated by linguists who wish to explore nonliterary spoken and written discourse in which expectations of conventional use of text structure, lexis, and syntax are likely to be satisfied; for example, academic research articles, letters of application for employment, recipes, and so-called 'service encounters' in which customers interact with shopkeepers in order to purchase goods. Despite common interests, there is considerable divergence in why and how these linguists use the term 'genre' and undertake genre analysis.

Genre in Systemic-Functional Linguistics

Systemic-functional linguists employ genre as part of their project to relate language use to its social context, in particular, 'the context of culture.' Interest in genre arose out of a growing sense of the inadequacy of the concept of 'register' to account for the contextual aspects of text. Register analysis assumes that textual features can be predicted because texts vary conventionally in relation to three 'situational variables'; namely, 'field' (subject matter), 'tenor' (relationship between participants in the interaction), and 'mode' (whether the text is written or spoken). These situational variables did not deal with *why* the text might have been written or spoken. The realization that a text might be shaped and so categorized in relation to its communicative purpose led to a resurgence of interest in a text's genre; that is, how a text relates systematically to its context of culture.

For example, the register of entries in travel guidebooks might vary according to the writer's relationship with the intended readership (a formal relationship with erudite connoisseurs of, say, art history and architecture, or an informal relationship with student backpackers); the subject matter covered by the entries (fields such as food, wine, history, architecture, beaches, night clubs, and various types of accommodation); and the mode (usually written but possibly with some appeal to spoken discourse in the less formal realizations). None of these situational variables takes into consideration *why* tourist guidebooks come to be written; in other words, their context of culture. Analysis of the genre of travel guidebooks would consider the cultural phenomenon of tourism: the fact that different types of people choose to travel as a leisure pursuit in which they gaze at certain things (landscape, certain buildings), eat certain kinds of food, and indulge in particular leisure pursuits (swimming, clubbing, visiting galleries, shopping for souvenirs) before moving on. A consideration of the genre of a text helps account

for its content, as well as its form: A generic text is one in which conventional characteristics have developed out of an evolving set of cultural imperatives.

Systemic-functional linguists begin to analyze the genre of a text by assuming that its overall purpose is met through a sequence of stages, each of which achieves an intermediate purpose. The analyst seeks, through observation of a number of related communicative events, first to identify these stages and then to decide which are optional and which are obligatory, as well as their possible chronological order. Ideally, the analyst then arrives at the "generic structure potential" (Halliday and Hasan, 1989: 63–69) of a set of communicative events. Hasan recorded a number of 'service encounters' at a grocery, which yielded several apparently obligatory elements that she termed sale request, sale compliance, sale purchase, and purchase closure. These obligatory moves were sometimes combined with several optional elements. Hasan's notion of generic structure potential involved a considerable level of detail. The elements were not only shown to be compulsory or optional but they were also put in predictable sequences and recursive elements were identified.

Though fewer of her successors dared to be quite so detailed in their formulation of generic structure potential, Hasan's work was followed, for example, by Ventola's (1987) crosscultural comparison of Finnish and Australian English talk in a post office and gift shop and by McCarthy's (2000) discussion of talk in a hairdresser's salon and during driving lessons. McCarthy's study was particularly concerned with the interplay between the relatively predictable 'transactional talk' (which, in a hairdresser's salon, included 'arrival and checking in for appointment.' 'discussion of how the client's hair is to be cut,' and 'payment/closure at desk') and the less predictable 'interactional talk,' such as evaluative comments on the smell of the shampoo, the shape of the protective gown, or casual conversation about the hairdresser's life and recent experiences. McCarthy argued that, though it is less predictable, the interactional talk is as important as the transactional, because it is the former type of talk that manages the client–customer relationship.

Unpredictability is an issue for genre analysis, and it is fair to say that much genre analysis favors conventional situations. Kress (1985: 19) went so far as to argue that most situations are conventional and, therefore, produce texts that can be characterized as 'generic':

> The social occasions of which texts are a part have a fundamentally important effect on texts. The characteristic features and structures of those situations, the purposes of the participants, the goals of the participants all have their effects on the form of the texts which are constructed in those situations. The situations are always conventional. That is, the occasions on which we interact, the social relations which we contract, are conventionalized and structured, more or less thoroughly, depending on the kind of situation it is. They range from entirely formulaic and ritualized occasions, such as royal weddings, sporting encounters, committee meetings, to family rituals such as breakfast or barbecues or fights over who is to do the dishes. Other, probably fewer occasions are less ritualized, less formulaic; casual conversations may be an example.

Despite Kress's skepticism about casual conversation, McCarthy's (2000) discussion of interactional talk and Eggins and Slade's (1997) exploration of casual conversation suggested that casual talk is at least partly amenable to genre analysis. Eggins and Slade (1997: 229) identified, for example, different types of narrative that populate everyday talk, and they proposed a generic structure for gossip. They made the following observation:

> Storytelling is very common in casual conversation. It provides conversationalists with a resource for assessing and confirming affiliations with others.

Like McCarthy, Eggins and Slade viewed interactional speech genres as crucial in establishing, negotiating, and maintaining group identity. Through stories that illustrate and dramatize cultural values, conversational participants manage in-group membership.

Ultimately, what distinguishes the systemic-functional genre analyst is his or her focus on the text (spoken or written) as the source of evidence for generic classifications. The procedure is an iterative one: The analyst gathers together examples of the genre, looks at their structure, and breaks each example down into purpose-driven stages. Because each stage has a different purpose, the assumption is that each stage will be differently realized linguistically. The analyst, therefore, seeks to describe the 'realization patterns' of each stage of the generic text. The presence of distinctive patterns reinforces or challenges the analyst's intuition that the texts are generically related. Critics argue that the procedure is circular: If the analyst finds an example that does challenge his or her intuition, the model is simply adapted to accommodate the awkward text. Thus, the model is never 'proven wrong.' However, advocates of this type of genre analysis would counter that the circularity of the process is inevitable; describing the potential structure of a genre entails an ongoing series of refinements, because the nature of a genre changes as society's demands evolve (e.g., Halliday and Martin, 1993). The way that society

shapes genres is the focus of the approach taken by North American school of analysts known as the 'New Rhetoricians.'

Genre in 'the New Rhetoric'

The evolving nature of genres is a preoccupation for at least some of the American genre analysts known as the 'New Rhetoricians' (cf., Freedman and Medway, 1994). The focus of the New Rhetoric is "centered not on the substance or the form of discourse but on the action it is used to accomplish" (Miller, 1984: 151). This school of genre analysts, therefore, situates genres in a thick ethnographic description of the communities that give rise to them, whether these communities are tax accounting firms (Devitt, 1991), bank offices (Smart, 1993), or scientific researchers (Bazerman, 1988; Myers, 1990).

For example, Bazerman (1988) looked at the gradual evolution of the experimental article in science and accounted for its changing form and structure in the evolving character and activities of the academic communities that have increasingly come to communicate through research papers. Thus, the experimental article grew out of the broadening of the scientific community in the age of Newton and of the substitution of the replicable experiment for the public demonstration. As experiments became more sophisticated and costly, replicability in principle replaced replication in practice; meanwhile, the success of the physical sciences gave their preferred forms of communication a prestige that was borrowed by other disciplines such as psychology and the social sciences. In those disciplines that are less obviously amenable to empirical research, the formal elements of the research article have a persuasive as much as a practical function. The moral of the New Rhetoricians' work on genre is that it is a negotiable 'social fact,' rather than an invariable set of conventions, as for example, in Bazerman (1988: 8):

> Formal definitions, expected features, institutional force, impact, and understandings of the genre vary through time, place, and situation. That variation is an important part of the story. Each new text produced within a genre reinforces or remolds some aspect of the genre; each reading of a text reshapes the social understanding. The genre does not exist apart from its history, and that history continues with each new text invoking the genre.

Although New Rhetoricians are concerned that students understand the history and changing nature of genres, they are less inclined to offer formulaic descriptors of specific generic texts. In this, they differ both from the systemic functionalists and from those who come to genre analysis from applied linguistics, and specifically English for Specific Purposes (ESP).

Genre in Applied Linguistics

Applied linguists' analyses of genre share something of the approaches of both the systemic-functionalist school and the New Rhetoricians. Like the latter, they favor ethnographic descriptions of the 'discourse communities' who use genres to achieve social actions (cf., the notion of a 'rhetorical community' proposed by Miller, 1994). It is the needs of the discourse communities that are linked to the formal qualities of generic texts, usually described as a sequence of 'moves' that recall the generic structure potential of the systemic functionalists.

One of the best-known accounts of genre in this tradition is Swales' (1981, 1990) account of research article introductions in the sciences and social sciences. He refined his model into a three-move sequence, the overall function of which within the academic community is to 'create a research space.' This goal is accomplished by 'establishing a territory' (for example, by making a topic generalization and surveying the literature); 'establishing a niche' (for example, by questioning past research or adding to its scope); and 'occupying the niche' (for example, by previewing one's own research). Within the research community, the research article introduction is used rhetorically to align oneself with or against a research tradition and to frame stronger and weaker claims to knowledge. Further work along these lines has been published on business correspondence (Bhatia, 1993), quantity surveying reports (Marshall, 1987), and economics discourse (Dudley-Evans and Henderson, 1990).

Where systemic functionalists rely initially on the genre analyst's intuitions to break down a text into purposive stages, focusing mainly on multiple examples of the text type and looking for realizational patterns that justify the intuitive categorizations, the applied linguist checks his or her stages or moves against evidence garnered from the discourse community, through observation and interview.

Changing Conceptions of the Discourse Community

The 'discourse community' concept was based on the sociolinguistic notion of the speech community, whereby similarities in speech could be accounted for by the speakers' living in a community defined by geographical space, social class, gender, ethnicity, and so on. In a discourse community, the members may be dispersed widely and of different social classes, genders, and ethnicities, but they are linked by a common set of communicative purposes; for example, they might need to write research articles

for international refereed journals, or they might need to write business letters, such as letters of application for a job. For Swales (1990), discourse communities have six identifying characteristics:

1. A discourse community has a broadly agreed set of common public goals.
2. A discourse community has mechanisms of inter-communication among its members.
3. A discourse community uses its participatory mechanisms primarily to provide information and feedback.
4. A discourse community uses and hence possesses one or more genres in the communicative further-ance of its aims.
5. In addition to owning genres, a discourse commu-nity has acquired some specific lexis.
6. A discourse community has a threshold level of members with a suitable degree of relevant content and discoursal expertise.

The influence on Swales' work of academic genres is clearly discernible here. A group of physicists or biologists, say, would have a set of research goals, journals, and conferences with which to give infor-mation and feedback. The group would have several genres at its disposal (research articles, reports to funding agencies, conference papers, populariza-tions), and its members would have relevant exper-tise (they would all likely be educated to degree level and beyond). However, more recent work has addressed the restrictive and static nature of this ten-tative description of the discourse community. It is difficult to fit diffuse discourse communities into Swales's model: What is the discourse community that produces and reads, say, a tabloid newspaper, or even a popular science article in a magazine like *New Scientist?* In those examples, writers and readers seem to have different levels of expertise. Junk mail seems to be a genre, but it is difficult to characterize the discourse community that produces or consumes it. Several attempts have been made to redefine the discourse community. Consider Barton's (1994: 57) definition:

> A discourse community is a group of people who have texts and practices in common, whether it is a group of academics or the readers of teenage magazines. In fact, discourse community can refer to several overlapping groups of people: It can refer to the people a text is aimed at; it can be the people who read a text; or it can refer to the people who participate in a set of discourse practices both by reading and writing.

In this definition, Barton brought out the different orientations each individual has to the discourse com-munity to which he or she belongs. We can imagine

a novice language teacher joining a teachers associa-tion and attending conferences and receiving its news-letter. After a while she might lose interest, stop attending conferences, and throw out the newsletter when it comes through her letterbox. Later, however, she might begin to undertake a further educational qualification. She might start attending conferences again, read the newsletter, and even contribute some articles based on her further study. She might then be invited to serve on a committee of the association and contribute to the making of policy and the organiza-tion of association events. In short, over time, the individual's status in the community shifts – it may be marginal or it may be central. A central member will have more say over the ethos of the community and will have more resources at his or her disposal for communication than a marginal member. If we sup-pose that this fictional teacher is typical of members of a discourse community, then we can begin to re-think discourse communities as large, fuzzy, porous, dynamic groupings, rather than as a static set of qualified individuals. Presumably, too, our imaginary teacher has other interests, domestic and public, that simultaneously involve her in different discourse communities to different degrees.

In addition, Barton pointed out that not all dis-course communities have the participatory structure of, say, a teachers association. Magazines geared to teenagers will have a less participatory structure than newsletters produced by teachers' associations. Few of the readers will ever become writers for the magazine, and the readership will by its nature be transient and renewed, as people get older and move on. Even so, publications like this usually have a participatory mechanism, such as a letters page, where at least some of the readers can articulate their opinions or share their problems and thus con-stitute a visible community of which the reader is invited to feel part.

Bex (1996) adopted and adapted another concept from sociolinguistics in his redefinition of discourse communities: that of loosely knit and closely knit social networks (cf., Milroy, 1987). In her work on dialect preservation and change, Milroy observed that, when members of a speech community interact with each other regularly in their public and private lives (i.e., if they work and socialize together), then the community can be characterized as 'close-knit' and dialect is maintained. When people commute to work, interact with different people when they social-ize, and have a number of links with 'outsiders,' then they are loosely tied to their speech community, and so dialect tends not to be preserved. Bex argued that this process has a parallel in discourse commu-nities. The teacher who is an active member of an

association, both reading and writing articles for the association newsletter and regularly attending conferences and leading workshops, will be closely tied to this discourse community and will have internalized more fully its generic codes and conventions than a loosely tied teacher who sometimes reads the newsletter. Readers of a magazine for teenagers would generally not move much beyond a loose affiliation with a fairly disparate community. The nature of the discourse community and the nature of the individual's involvement with it, then, are both variable. Bex (1996: 66–67) emphasized the dynamic nature of discourse communities:

> What I am proposing then is a complex interrelationship between social discourses, discourse communities, text production, and text reception. The model I have in mind is entirely dynamic. Individuals either produce, or produce interpretations of, texts according to the norms of the discourse community and the functions which the text is intended to serve within that discourse community. These are then verified by the group as meaningful, or challenged and refined. Such groups may develop highly characteristic modes of expression that remain internal to the group. However, these modes of expression are always situated historically, in that they develop from earlier 'ways of saying,' and socially, in that they interact with and take on (some) of the meanings of the larger social groups of which they are part.

Bex used this dynamic model of the discourse community to account for the generic conventions of a variety of texts, from academic texts to advertising to junk mail to literature. Such a dynamic model of the discourse community allows genre analysts to move away from the notion of genre as being confined to ritualistic sequences of speech or writing uttered to perform predictable actions by a specific group of qualified people.

More recent work on genre in applied linguistics continues to address the concept of the discourse community in academia and highlights the danger of thinking of even close-knit discourse communities, such as those of academic disciplines, as being homogeneous, harmonious groupings of individuals. Hyland (2000: 11) observed the following:

> Communities are frequently pluralities of practices and beliefs which accommodate disagreement and allow subgroups and individuals to innovate within the margins of its practices in ways that do not weaken its ability to engage in common actions. Seeing disciplines as cultures helps to account for what and how issues can be discussed and for the understandings which are the basis for cooperative action and knowledge-creation.

Given the social nature of academic discourse, it is possible to look at some of its features in terms of how the social relations within the academic communities are negotiated. Myers (1989), for example, showed how pragmatic conventions of politeness are negotiated, even within scientific writing.

Summary

As the above discussion shows, conceptions of genre – literary and nonliterary – vary according to the interests of the analysts. Literary theorists are concerned with the categorization of literary texts and how their conventions are elegantly maintained or wittily subverted. Linguists are concerned with the relation of texts to context and focus in particular on the predictability or unpredictability of elements of the text. As a result, some analysts have focused on the descriptions of highly predictable, ritual, transactional texts, many of which seem banal in nature, such as recipes (Eggins, 1994) or reprint requests (Swales, 1990). More recently, there has been a greater attempt to identify generic patterns in less predictable interactional texts, such as casual conversation (Coupland, 2000; Eggins and Slade, 1997). In the systemic-functionalist tradition (e.g., Halliday and Hasan, 1989), the analyst collects comparable texts and attempts to find in them predictable, goal-oriented elements that are characterized by similar realizational patterns. The New Rhetoricians collect comparable texts and set them in a rich ethnographic context that attempts to account for the engagement of the individual text with the dynamic history of the genre to which it belongs. The applied linguists, whose concern is less to explain and more to teach generic conventions to novices, take from both of the other approaches and identify predictable 'moves' in generic texts while explaining their function with reference to the communicative purposes of the discourse community.

The concept of the community and its communicative needs has been central to recent conceptions of genre in linguistics. Even here, the notion of the discourse community has rapidly evolved from that of a static group of experts with clearly defined goals. The discourse community is now perceived as a diffuse group of individuals with different levels of expertise and changing social relations, whose communicative needs more or less coincide at different points of time. The logical extension of this line of thought is to consider how individuals understand genres. Chilton and Schäffner (2002: 20) wrote

> Participants in a linguistic interaction conceive of the interaction as being of a certain kind, as proceeding according to certain patterns of linguistic interaction that they have conceptualized in memory, and in which they may be more or less skilled. The conceptualization and its deployment in the ongoing activity define that

activity: There is no genre form independent of the participants' conceptions and preconceptions.

There is truth in this assertion, or systemic functionalists, New Rhetoricians, and applied linguists could not begin to group together those texts that they believe belong to the same genre and begin their analysis. However, genre analysis can be conducted with reference to the individual's knowledge and expectations, the structure of the discourse communities in which he or she is situated, and the more-or-less conventional texts produced to serve those communities' communicative purposes.

See also: Bakhtin, Mikhail Mikhailovich; Communities of Practice; Genres in Political Discourse; Halliday, Michael Alexander Kirkwood; Speech and Language Community; Text and Text Analysis.

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Genres in Political Discourse

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A 'genre' is a more or less stabilized and habitual linguistic way of acting and interacting, characterized by a distinctive linguistic form or structure, associated with specific communicative purposes, and with particular social or institutional contexts (Swales, 1990; Bhatia, 1993). For instance, giving a speech, conducting an interview, and having a debate are all types of political genre. The category of 'genre' is related to what some scholars call 'text type' (de Beaugrande and Dressler, 1981), and to 'activity type' (Levinson, 1979). Analysis of the linguistic forms of genres sometimes focuses on 'generic structures' (Halliday and Hasan, 1989), the overall organizational pattern that distinguishes one genre from another, seen in terms of particular elements (or 'stages') occurring in a particular order – for instance, news reports in the press characteristically consist of a headline, plus a lead paragraph that summarizes the story, plus a variable number of 'satellite' paragraphs that fill out details. Bell and van Leeuwen (1994: 124–177) analyze "adversarial political interviews" in this way. Other more cognitively oriented research analyzes the characteristic topical structures of genres in terms of macrostructures and macrotopics (van Dijk, 1980). Genres also have distinctive features of linguistic form at other levels of analysis. For instance, the organization of 'turn-taking' (the distribution of turns at talking between participants) in political interviews is different from that in doctor-patient consultations (Heritage and Greatbatch, 1991). And there are genre differences in intertextuality – the way one text is connected with others – for example, scientific articles and political reports in newspapers represent the words of others in different ways (de Beaugrande and Dressler, 1981).

Pragmatic research on genre focuses on the importance of contextual cues in the way people interpret texts. One approach is in terms of prototype theory (Rosch, 1973), which helps to explain why texts that differ in their linguistic structure from central instances of a particular genre may nevertheless be interpreted as instances of that genre on the basis of contextual cues – for instance, an article written by a scientist on the basis of scientific research in a scientific journal is likely to be interpreted as a scientific report, even if it differs linguistically quite markedly from most scientific reports (Paltridge, 1995).

Genre can be seen as one of three main analytical categories in discourse analysis: a genre is a way of (inter)acting, a 'discourse' is a way of representing particular aspects of the world (e.g., there are liberal, conservative, and social democratic discourses in the field of politics, which represent matters such as social welfare differently), and a 'style' is a way of being, an identity (e.g., there are different leadership styles in politics, such as the styles of British Prime Ministers Winston Churchill, Margaret Thatcher, and Tony Blair). Genres are best distinguished at the level of social practices that are relatively stable and durable over time, and particular concrete events, such as an actual political speech or interview, can be analyzed in terms of which genres and combinations of genres they draw upon. Much actual political text and talk is hybrid with respect to genres, i.e., combines different genres together (Fairclough, 1995a,b; Lauerbach, 2004).

An account of specifically political genres faces the difficulty that the field of politics is not unambiguously delimited but is socially constructed, and open to different competing constructions. The feminist slogan of the 1960s and 1970s, 'the personal is political,' is one indication of the difficulties here. Are we to assume a clear separation between the personal and domestic as elements of 'private' life, on the one hand, and politics as an element of 'public' life, on the other? Are gender relations in the household a form of political relation, or do political relations only obtain between the parties and factions of parliamentary politics? What about extraparliamentary movements and campaigns, such as those of environmental groups or protests against the policies of the World Trade Organization – are they a part of politics? Is there a clear distinction between politics and government, or politics and media, given that government is so much the target and focus of politics, and that so much of even parliamentary politics is now mediated through the press, television, and even the Internet? And are we to regard talk of the politics of organizations (such as businesses and universities) as merely a metaphorical appropriation of the term, or see the field of politics as including the many different types of organization as well as 'national' politics? What about local politics, international politics, and what is increasingly referred to as 'global' politics? How one defines and delimits politics is itself a political choice, and it determines how one delimits the genres of politics.

Here is a relatively broad view of politics, one that focuses on the political sphere as a distinct and partially institutionalized area of social life, and therefore excludes household politics and the politics of particular organizations, such as schools or workplaces.

The political sphere, for purposes of this article, is that dimension of social life in which different social groups act in pursuance of their particular interests, needs, aspirations, and values. Political interaction between different social groups has both a cooperative character in that there is a search for a *modus vivendi* and a conflictual character in that there is a struggle for power (Chilton and Schäffner, 2002). They may do so at different scales (locally, regionally, nationally, and internationally), although it is the national scale that has received most attention in political theory and analysis, problematically, given the current growth of international political entities. Politics in this sense includes the political system (parliament, political parties, elections, structures of political communication, etc.), but also includes 'grassroots' or 'social movement' politics, and the 'mediatized politics' of the printed and broadcast media (Fairclough, 1995a). These are analytically distinguishable but overlap considerably in concrete events. The political sphere can be seen as the sphere that connects the state and the lifeworld (or 'civil society'), and one dimension of its internal heterogeneity is that it ranges from stabilized and institutionalized structures to unstable, fluctuating, emergent political tendencies and initiatives. Settled practices and vested interests precariously coexist with movements in and pressures from the lifeworld, and what counts as political (open to action in pursuance of alternative policies) shifts as areas of social life are politicized and depoliticized, brought into and taken out of the sphere of politics (Muntigl, 2002).

In accordance with this view of politics, political genres will be taken to include genres associated with the political system (e.g., parliamentary debate, political manifestos and programs, parliamentary or party conference speeches by political leaders, policy documents), mediatized political genres (e.g., political news reports, political interviews, political 'chat shows,' party political broadcasts, political advertising in the press and on billboards), the political public sphere (e.g., public meetings, campaign literature of social movements, political forums, and focus groups). The range of genres is thus extensive, and this list of examples is by no means exhaustive. Most of the literature has tended to focus on particular genres (political interviews and parliamentary debates have, for instance, received considerable attention), but there are arguments for also attending, particularly in the case of more institutionalized areas of politics, to 'chains' or 'networks' of genres that constitute the discourse dimension of political systems, the discourse 'technologies' so to speak of institutionalized politics. Thus, in the area of political communication there are systematic connections between, for instance, policy documents or major political speeches, press releases and news conferences, and reports in the media, and there are regular and predictable transformations in language as material is moved along such a chain of genres (Fairclough, 2003).

This article focuses on linguistic research on political genres (including linguistic, pragmatic, sociolinguistic, discourse, and conversation analysis), but it is important to acknowledge that various disciplines contribute to analysis of political genres, including political science and media studies. Very limited reference is made here to this broader body of research (Dryzek, 1990; Corner, 1995; Livingstone and Lunt, 1994), but research on political discourse in general and political genres in particular is most productively conceived as interdisciplinary analysis in which language and discourse analysts can make a specific contribution to political, cultural, and media research, while at the same time enriching themselves theoretically and methodologically through dialogue with other disciplines (Fairclough, 2000).

This article focuses on four genres associated with the political system, mediatized politics, and the political public sphere: political interviews, political speeches, policy documents, and public sphere dialogues.

Political Interviews

Political interviews have attracted considerable research interest as the genre that has been most potent in the way television has transformed the character of politics in the past 50 years. The history of broadcast interviews (Bell and van Leeuwen, 1994) shows a shift from deferential journalists putting tentative questions to distant and sometimes impatient politicians, to a situation in which journalists confidently and sometimes aggressively quiz or try to corner politicians (on behalf of the public as they commonly claim), while politicians have become accomplished television performers and even media personalities. The boundary between politics and media has radically shifted, and politics now has a thoroughly mediatized character.

One body of research on political interviews has adopted the method of 'conversation analysis' (Heritage and Greatbach, 1991; Clayman and Heritage, 2002). Conversation analysis focused initially on everyday conversation but increasingly has turned its attention to institutional talk in, for instance, doctor-patient interactions and news interviews, treating these as adaptations of everyday conversation to fit specific institutional purposes that reduce the diversity of features characteristic of

the latter, and develop the normal conversational activities that are retained in specialized ways. For instance, features of 'turn-taking' (organizing the distribution and alternation of participants' turns at talking), which are a pervasive characteristic of conversation, are retained but in a distinctive form. Types of turn are distributed according to the institutional role of participants, most obviously in that it is only interviewers (IR) that ask questions, and interviewees (IE) that provide answers. IR questions are commonly preceded by statements that are standardly treated by IE as 'prefaces' to questions in that they do not respond to such statements but wait for a question before responding. There are features of the design of news interview talk which (a) achieve the 'task' that participants have to produce talk for an 'overhearing' news audience, talk that is addressed to an audience rather than addressed by IR and IE to each other (which would position the audience as 'eavesdroppers' on a conversation), and (b) meet the constraint that interviewers should "maintain a stance of formal neutrality towards interviewee statements and positions" (Heritage and Greatbatch, 1991: 106). For instance, 'response tokens' (such as 'yes,' 'oh,' 'really,' 'mm hm'), which are regularly produced in everyday conversation by co-participants in the course of an extended turn by one participant, are not produced by IR in the course of extended answers by IE, and, in withholding them, IR 'declines' the role of primary addressee in favor of the news audience. And IR questions that might be taken to be 'hostile' and therefore in breach of IR neutrality are generally not treated as expressing IR's opinion but are merely designed to solicit IE's viewpoint. Participants in news interviews overwhelmingly comply with such interactional norms.

Although conversation analysts emphasize that the norms of political interview are socially constructed and subject to social change, they have tended to understate the diversity and variability of contemporary forms of political interview. I see this as a problem of levels, as I indicated earlier. Conversation analysts have described a genre of political interview that has been perhaps the dominant genre, one with a normative power in terms of what interviewers and interviewees tend to recognize as what they should do, one that has achieved a certain stability and durability at the level of the social practices of politics, which can constitute a powerful point of reference in actual political interviews but is not instantiated in any simple way within them. Actual events, actual text, and talk are more diverse and hybrid with respect to genres. One response to this is to distinguish different types and styles of political interview (Bell and van Leeuwen, 1994), but clear-cut typologies are

difficult to arrive at. Another approach is to recognize that although there is a measure of stabilization of types and styles (including the personal styles of leading broadcast journalists), political interviews as events are performances that variably, and more or less innovatively, draw upon and combine genres which have a certain stability and uniformity at the level of social practices (Fairclough, 1995a,b; Lauerbach, 2004).

Bell and van Leeuwen (1994) analyze one particular type of political interview, the 'adversarial' political interview, in terms of its generic structure, seeing it as made up of the following 'stages': (a) greeting, (b) soliciting opinion, (c) checking, (d) challenging, (e) entrapment, and (f) release. The interview begins on a cooperative note, with the interviewer as host greeting the interviewee as guest. The interviewer then asks an 'open' question giving the interviewee the chance to state his views in the way that he wants to ('soliciting opinion'). The shift from cooperation to contest begins with 'checking,' in which the interviewer prepares the ground for challenges by checking facts and figures. The interviewer then moves onto the offensive by confronting the interviewee with statements that contradict or weaken the latter's position ('challenging'). 'Entrapment' is a sort of verbal checkmate, a statement with which an interviewee can neither agree nor disagree without damaging his or her position. The final stage is 'release,' a return to cooperation, in which the interviewer asks a question (often dealing with future prospects or aims) that the interviewee is allowed to answer without challenge. Some of these stages may be absent from adversarial interviews – the interviewer may move straight into challenges after the greeting – and the central stages occur recursively (e.g., there may be several sequences of challenge and entrapment). Although the whole of such an interview consists of a series of questions and answers, the interviewer's questions vary in their linguistic form and in their illocutionary force in different stages of the interview. Their analysis thus moves toward forms of pragmatic analysis, which are more fully developed in other research (e.g., Fetzer, 2002), in which the focus is on the relationship between what is said and what is meant, and on such specific issues as directness and indirectness, politeness and impoliteness, and presupposition.

Fairclough (1995b) is an analysis of a political panel interview in the course of an election campaign between a television journalist and representatives of the three main British political parties. The focus is on genre hybridity, on the slippage between conventional political interview of the type described by Heritage and Greatbatch (1991), everyday

conversation, and an entertainment genre that at points approximates a comedy routine. Such genre hybrids are a general characteristic of mass media and a specific characteristic of mediatized political genres. They are a facet of the fluid and shifting character of the political sphere, that is, of its shifting relations with other spheres, including those of the media and of everyday life (the 'lifeworld'). Another example is political 'chat shows,' in which politicians engage in 'chat,' – conversational language specialized for purposes of entertainment – rather as film stars or pop idols do (Livingstone and Lunt, 1994; Fairclough, 1995a).

Political Speeches

I referred at the beginning of this article to the common view of the 'generic structure' of genres – particular elements occurring in a particular order. I also defined a 'genre' as a more or less stabilized and habitual linguistic way of acting and interacting. These 'elements' are characteristically themselves actions – so that a genre is a way of (inter)acting, which is composed of constituent actions. However, the assumption that these constituent actions are necessarily strictly ordered is not sustainable. They are in highly ritualized genres (e.g., the official opening of a new parliamentary session), but this is not a defining feature of genres as such. For instance, Graham, Keenan, and Dowd (2004) analyze historical continuities in 'call to arms' speeches from Pope Urban II (1095) to George Bush (2001). They identify four 'generic features' of such speeches: (1) an appeal to a legitimate power source that is external to the orator, and which is presented as inherently good (e.g., God, or the nation), (2) an appeal to the historical importance of the culture in which the discourse is situated, (3) the construction of a thoroughly evil Other (e.g., terrorism), and (4) an appeal for unification behind the legitimating external power source. The authors analyzed some 120 of such speeches, and the particular realization, including the particular ordering of these generic elements, is predictably variable.

A different approach to analysis of political speeches is based on 'functional pragmatics,' which aims at reconstructing the 'deep' actional structure of texts through analysis of their textual 'surface.' Sauer (2002) analyzes one of a series of commemorative speeches (British Prime Minister John Major's speech) given by senior politicians on the 50th anniversary of the allied victory in World War II. One focus of his analysis is the 'importation' of textual elements into this primarily epideictic address (eulogy), which gives it a heterogeneous character, including a mixture of genres. Specifically, these are

elements of Conservative Party neoliberal ideology that introduce the genre of party political speech. Sauer (p. 131) also notes a 'populist' element that enters through "the classical rhetorical technique of contrasting sublimity with popular expressions" (e.g., "We are, as it were, still rubbing our eyes after 1989 wondering if it can be real"), a characteristic I also identified in Tony Blair's speech on the occasion of Princess Diana's death (Fairclough, 2000). Such 'conversationalization' of political language is pervasive in contemporary politics.

Muntigl (2002) focuses on the innovative political work that is done in major political speeches, specifically the 'politicization' of certain issues in the sense of constituting them as issues for political debate, and the 'depoliticization' of others. He analyzes a speech by the European Commissioner responsible for employment, industrial relations, and social affairs, Commissioner Flynn, in which employment policy at a European Union (EU) level is opened up as a political issue (politicized), but, at the same time, is depoliticized by projecting the particular policies adopted by the EU as the only possible ones, ruling out alternatives. Muntigl's analysis includes the generic structure of the speech, and semantic and grammatical analysis of how particular social groups and their policy positions are positioned in relation to each other. I adopted a similar approach to a major policy speech of Tony Blair on the "new international community" at the time of the Kosovo war (Fairclough, 2000), showing how the speech constituted 'the international community' as a new and only apparently inclusive actor in international affairs and especially military interventions in the affairs of sovereign states, which could be interpreted in Muntigl's terms as the simultaneous politicization of interventions on claimed 'humanitarian' grounds and their depoliticization through excluding alternatives to the particular policies proposed. In both cases, one can see an important element of the action of such policy speeches in terms of space: 'carving' out a new EU space for employment policy interventions, and a new 'global' space for military interventions on the part of a largely self-appointed 'international community' (in effect, the United States and its allies). In discourse analytical terms, this political genre contributes to the emergence and hegemony of new discourses.

Policy Documents

Discussed here briefly is work on the genesis of policy documents within the EU (Wodak, 2000), which draws attention to a complex collective and negotiated process of production associated with this genre (as also with other political genres, such as political news reports). Successive drafts of the

policy document were debated and altered in the EU Competitiveness Advisory group, which consists of representatives of the employers and the trade unions, as well as some politicians and bureaucrats. This analysis locates this one genre as an element in a chain or network of genres (including committee meetings, expert opinions, documents of the EU Commission) and points to relations of recontextualization between such genres, and to the characteristic transformations that take place as elements are moved from one genre (e.g., committee discussion) to another (e.g., the policy document). One aspect of these relations of recontextualization is their 'filtering' effect: things that can be said in a meeting cannot be directly recontextualized in a policy document.

Public Sphere Dialogues

My fourth example illustrates most clearly the potential of interdisciplinary research on political genres. The foundational work of the social theorists Jürgen Habermas and Hannah Arendt on the public sphere has made it clear that the question of the public sphere is centrally the question of what forms of dialogue are available for public deliberation. Their work has been developed by Dryzek's studies of 'deliberative democracy'; the final chapter of Dryzek (2000) can be interpreted as a normative discussion of the genre of public sphere deliberation or dialogue. None of these theorists is a linguist, so what they say about public sphere dialogue is merely schematic from a linguistic point of view. However, their work can be 'operationalized' in the analysis of actual dialogues in a way that fruitfully combines social theory and analysis of discourse and genre.

The 'critical' analysis of discourse has often focused on negative critique – a critique of the dominant forms (including genres) of discourse. However, part of the objective of critical analysis is also 'positive' critique – the normative specification of alternatives, not in a purely hypothetical way, but on the basis of forms that actually exist, if often in a marginalized way. In the case of public sphere dialogue, one can specify normative generic conditions on the basis of (to give the familiar term an ironic twist) 'best practice,' and evaluate actual dialogues in terms of these normative conditions (Fairclough, 1999). On the basis of the theoretical work on the public sphere discussed earlier, the following characteristics of good public sphere dialogue can be specified:

- Regulation: maximally open to diverse discourses and voices, interaction jointly managed by all participants

- Emergence: new individual, collective (as members of groups) and universal (as citizens, and human beings) identities can emerge
- Action: as Arendt (1998: 200) puts it, "power is actualised where word and deed have not parted company" – good public sphere dialogue leads to action, has effects on the world

Although these characteristics are formulated in an abstract way, their presence or absence in dialogue can be measured in more precise analytical terms – for instance, with respect to the first characteristic, the form of management of interaction can be specified in terms of features of turn-taking. The third characteristic points to the question of how public sphere dialogue is positioned in genre chains or networks, and it indicates that particular institutionalized regimes of governance have a partly discourse character – specifically, in this case, the existence (or nonexistence) of systematic procedures for feeding public dialogue and deliberation into policy-making processes can be seen as partly a matter of the existence of established relations of recontextualization between the genre of public sphere dialogue and the genres of policy making.

Conclusion

A vast amount has been written on political genres, including traditional and more modern forms of rhetorical analysis of especially political speeches. This article has drawn selectively from more recent research. I highlight two characteristics of political genres that have been relatively neglected but are crucial if genre and discourse analysts are to make an effective contribution to political research.

The first is the fluid and shifting character of political genres, their hybrid character, and their openness to new forms of hybridity. Politics is in a sense a 'space between,' a social sphere that, on the one hand merges into the structures of the state and the market, and, on the other, connects with the more open and diverse sphere of the 'lifeworld,' everyday life. Relations between politics and business, media, leisure, and so forth fluctuate as part of processes of social change. For instance, there is a common view that the 'official' politics of the political system has become moribund as states have begun to function more as facilitators for the emergent 'global' form of 'hypercapitalism' – real policy options have ceased to exist, old differences in political ideologies have become meaningless – and one can see the increasingly mediatized character of politics, its increasing focus on leaders who are effective television personalities, its preoccupation with image at the expense of political 'message,' as discourse facets of what are arguably structural changes.

The second is the interconnection of political genres, the relations that are contracted between them in genre chains or networks, the relations of recontextualization that obtain between them, and the linguistic transformations entailed when, for example, material from committee meetings is recontextualized in policy documents. This focus accords with the partly institutionalized character of politics as political system, including pressures to incorporate the public sphere (e.g., the contemporary integration of 'focus groups' into the political apparatus) and 'lifeworld' politics (e.g., various originally activist NGOs, which have become institutionalized). The political sphere is germane to the constitution of 'regimes of governance' on different scales ('global,' macroregional, e.g., the EU, national, and local), which regulate (with varying degrees of success) social interactions, relations, and identities. And such regimes of government have a partly discourse character, which is best captured by seeing them as distinctive networks of genres. Especially in the context of increasing 'globalization,' in which such regulation operates with extreme rapidity across vast distances of social space and across scales, networks of political genres are an inherent part of regimes of government.

See also: Activity Theory; Conversation Analysis; Critical Applied Linguistics; Critical Discourse Analysis; Genre and Genre Analysis; Media, Politics and Discourse Interactions; Power and Pragmatics; Rhetorical Tropes in Political Discourse.

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Gesture and Communication

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As a field of study, gesture has become energized in recent years. There is now an organization (International Society for Gesture Studies) and a journal (*GESTURE*, founding editors Adam Kendon and Cornelia Müller). In preparing this article, I have aimed to balance the empirical basics of gestures with a theoretical perspective from which to regard gestures and see what insights they bring to an understanding of the nature of language.

The word 'gesture' covers a multiplicity of communicative movements, primarily but not always of the hands and arms. Often, gestures are assumed to comprise a channel distinct from speech, but careful investigation challenges this traditional view. Gestures and language are best thought of as a single system, larger than either language or gesture as traditionally assumed. It will be useful to begin our survey by drawing distinctions among different actions, all of which might be termed 'gesture.'

Kendon's Continuum

Adam Kendon once distinguished gestures of different kinds along a continuum that I named 'Kendon's Continuum,' in his honor (McNeill, 1992). The gestures we are mostly concerned with are the 'gesticulations.' See McNeill (1992) for details.

'Gesticulation' is motion that embodies a meaning relatable to the accompanying speech. Gesticulation is by far the most frequent type of gesture in daily use and it covers many variants and usages. It is made chiefly with the arms and hands but is not restricted to these body parts – the head can take over as a kind of third hand if the anatomical hands are immobilized or otherwise engaged, and the legs and feet too can move in a gesture mode. In a large sample of gestures, Shuichi Nobe (2002) found that the stroke phase of the gesticulation is synchronous with the coexpressive speech about 90% of the time (gesture phases are defined below). When strokes are asynchronous, they slightly precede the speech to which they link semantically, usually because of brief hesitations, and the time gap is small. Gesticulations rarely if ever follow their coexpressive speech (Kendon, 1972). There is no basis for the assertion that strokes occur during hesitations. Such a view has attainted urban legend status, but it is based on a misrepresentation of the original study by Brian Butterworth and Geoffrey Beattie (Butterworth and Beattie, 1978).

They reported that the rate of gesture occurrence was higher during speech pauses than phonations. However, far more gestures occur during phonation than pauses, so the 90% figure is the result (Nobe also did not replicate their higher gesture rate during pauses, possibly because of different communicative situations: Nobe was looking at narrations, while Butterworth and Beattie had analyzed college tutorials, where gestures during pauses are likely to have had 'turn suppression' functions not prominent in narrations). The expression 'coexpressive speech and gesture' is explained below. Other controversies have revolved around the issue of whether gesticulations are communicative – 'made for the listener' – or beneficial primarily for speech production – 'made for the speaker' (cf. Krauss *et al.*, 2000; Alibali *et al.*, 2000). Gesticulations combine both universal and language-specific features. Speakers of every language studied thus far (and this is a sizable list: in our lab alone, English, Japanese, Mandarin [Mandarin Chinese], Korean, Spanish, French, German [Standard German], Italian, Turkish, Georgian, Russian, American Sign Language, Taiwanese Sign Language, and a few African languages) produce them, and the gesticulations for the same events in a cartoon stimulus show clear similarities across these languages. Yet there are also striking differences which are traceable to characteristics of the languages the gestures are cooccurring with, in particular whether the language is, in Leonard Talmy's typology (Talmy, 2000), S-type or V-type (see McNeill and Duncan, 2000). Gesture space is oriented in terms of absolute compass direction by speakers of Guugu Yimithirr (Guguyimidjir) (an Aboriginal language with obligatory absolute orientation in its verb morphology) and also by speakers of Tzotzil (a Mayan language that lacks the lexical precision of directional reference as seen in Guugu Yimithirr [Guguyimidjir], but whose mode of living promotes exact spatial orientation, which is then embodied in gestures; see Haviland, 2000).

'Speech-framed gestures' are part of the sentence itself. The term is from Karl-Erik McCullough. Such gestures occupy a slot in a sentence, e.g., 'Sylvester went [gesture of an object flying out laterally],' where the gesture completes the sentence structure. These gestures time differently from gesticulations – they occupy a gap that fills a grammatical slot, rather than synchronizing with speech that is coexpressive.

'Emblems' are conventionalized signs, such as thumbs up or the ring (first finger and thumb tips touching, other fingers extended) for 'OK,' and others less polite. Kendon prefers the term 'quotable gesture,' referring to a potential for a more or less

complete verbal translation – 'OK' translating into terms of approbation, for example. Emblems or quotable gestures are culturally specific, have standard forms and significances, and vary from place to place. Kendon (1995) has for some years studied the gesture culture of Naples, a locale with an exceptionally rich repertoire of quotable gestures (cf. de Jorio, an early 19th-century figure, in Kendon, 2000). These gestures are meaningful without speech, although they also occur with speech. They function like illocutionary force markers, rather than propositions, the mode of gesticulation, and the timing when they occur with speech, being quite different. A single Neapolitan emblem for 'insistent query' (the 'purse' or *mano a borsa*: prototypically, the hand palm up, the fingers and thumb loosely bunched together at the top, and rocking up and down) was observed in one case stretching over several utterances and then continuing into the next speaker's turn, still demanding clarification. This gesture is not employed in North America (a similar-looking gesture is used to mean that something is 'precisely so'), which illustrates the cross-cultural variation of the emblem. Emblems can blend both sequentially and simultaneously with gestures of other kinds. Many emblems have deep historical roots, far outlasting the spoken languages with which they occur. Some go back to Roman times (Morris *et al.*, 1979), including the infamous 'finger,' beloved of the American road – it would have been understood by Julius Caesar. Most emblems have iconic or metaphoric components. The contact of the thumb and forefinger in the 'OK' sign captures the idea of precision. But the emblem is also specified by a convention pairing the form of the gesture to the approbation meaning. The fixity of the emblem is the evidence of this. Putting the *second* finger in contact with the thumb is still precision but no longer is the 'OK' sign of approbation.

'Pantomime' is dumb-show, a gesture or sequence of gestures conveying a narrative line, with a story to tell, produced without speech. And at the other extreme of the continuum, 'signs' are lexical words in a sign language such as ASL. Sign languages have their own linguistic structures, including grammatical patterns, stores of words, morphological patterns, etc. The linguistic code of ASL is quite unlike that of English. Sign languages have evolved without the requirement of being coordinated with speech. In fact, hearing signers find producing speech and signs simultaneously to be disruptive to both. For an authoritative description, see Liddell (2003).

As one moves along Kendon's continuum, two kinds of reciprocal changes occur. First, the degree to which speech is an obligatory accompaniment of gesture *decreases* from gesticulation to signs. Second, the degree to which a gesture shows the properties of a language *increases*. Gesticulations are obligatorily accompanied by speech but have properties unlike language. Speech-framed gestures are also obligatorily performed with speech, but relate to speech in a different manner – sequentially rather than concurrently, and in a specific linguistic role. Signs are obligatorily *not* accompanied by speech and have the essential properties of a language. Clearly, therefore, gesticulations (but not the other points along Kendon's continuum) combine properties – gesture with language – that are unalike, and this combination occupies one communicative instant. A combination of unalikes, at the same time, is a key psycholinguistic fact and a framework for an imagery–language dialectic. The remainder of this article focuses on gesticulations. If no ambiguity results, from here on I shall use the simpler term 'gesture.'

Traditions of gesture study not summarized in this article because of length are gestures of the theater (Fischer-Lichte, 1992), histories of gesture studies (Bremmer and Roodenburg, 1991), 'neurogestures' (McNeill, 2005), gestures in human–computer interface design (Kita *et al.*, 1998), methods of gesture transcription and measurement (Quek *et al.*, 1999), and the gestures of children (Bates and Dick, 2002), including home signs (Goldin-Meadow, 2003).

The Iconic, Metaphoric, Deictic, Beat Quartet

These categories or, as I will later say, dimensions are inspired by the semiotic categories of C. S. Peirce. Elena Levy and I proposed a classification scheme with four categories: iconic, metaphoric, deictic, and beat. All are gesticulations or speech-framed gestures on Kendon's continuum.

Iconic: Such gestures present images of concrete entities and/or actions. For example, appearing to grasp and bend back something while saying "and he bends it way back." The gesture, as a referential symbol, functions via its formal and structural resemblance to event or objects.

Metaphoric: Gestures are not limited to depictions of concrete events. They can also picture abstract content, in effect imagining the non-imageable. In a metaphoric gesture, an abstract meaning is presented as if it had form and/or occupied space. For example, a speaker appears to be holding an object, as if presenting it, yet the meaning is not presenting a concrete object but an idea or memory or some other abstract 'object' (for examples, see McNeill, 1992; Cienki, 1998). This is a gestural version of the conduit metaphor that appears in expressions such as 'he packed a lot into that lecture,' where the lecture is presented as

a container and the message as its contents (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980). Recent work on metaphoric gestures has greatly expanded the subject. Müller (2004) developed a new theory of metaphor as a dynamic process (whereby 'sleeping' metaphors are 'awakened' in context) in which metaphoric gestures play an essential part. Parrill and Sweetser (forthcoming) develops a new theoretical account based on 'mental spaces blending theory.' Metaphoric gestures often indicate that the accompanying speech is meta rather than object level – for example, saying "the next scene of the cartoon" and making a conduit cup of meaning gesture (iconic gestures, in contrast, favor the object level).

Deictic: The prototypical deictic gesture is an extended index finger, but almost any extensible body part or held object can be used. Indeed, some cultures prescribe deixis with the lips (Enfield, 2001). Deixis entails locating entities and actions in space *vis-à-vis* a reference point, which Karl Bühler called the 'origo' (Bühler, 1982; Haviland, 2000). Much of the pointing we see in adult conversation and storytelling is not pointing at physically present objects or locations but is abstract pointing, which Bühler referred to as "deixis at phantasma." The emergence of abstract pointing is a milestone in children's development. In striking contrast to concrete pointing, which appears before the first birthday and is one of the initiating events of language acquisition, abstract pointing is not much in evidence before the age of 12 and is one of the concluding events (McNeill, 1992).

Beats: Such gestures are so called because the hand appears to be beating time. Other allusions to the musical analogy use the term 'baton' (Efron, 1941). As forms, beats are mere flicks of the hand(s) up and down or back and forth, zeroing in rhythmically on the prosodic peaks of speech. This rhythmicity has made beats seem purely speech related. However, they also have discourse functionality, signaling the temporal locus of something the speaker feels to be important with respect to the larger context. One can think of a beat as a gestural yellow highlighter.

With these four categories, Levy and I were able to classify nearly all gestures in the narrative materials we collected. Other researchers have proposed more finely subdivided categories.

Dimensions Rather than Kinds

I wish to claim, however, that none of these 'categories' is truly categorical. We should speak instead of *dimensions* and say: iconicity, metaphoricity, deixis, 'temporal highlighting' (for beats), social interactivity, or some other equally unmellifluous (but accurate) terms conveying dimensionality.

The essential clue that these are dimensions and not categories is that we often find iconicity, metaphoricity, deixis, and other features mixing in the same gesture. Beats often combine with pointing, and many iconic gestures are also deictic. We cannot put them into a hierarchy without saying which categories are dominant, and in general this is impossible. A practical result of dimensionalizing is improvement in gesture coding, because it is no longer necessary to make forced decisions to fit each gesture occurrence into a single box.

Tight Binding

The temporal binding of speech and gesture is almost impervious to forces trying to interrupt it. The very heterogeneity of the following observations shows the inviolability of the speech–gesture unit (see McNeill, 2005 for details).

Gesture synchrony and DAF: Delayed auditory feedback or DAF has a dramatic effect on the flow of speech, which slows down, becomes hesitant and is subject to drawling and metatheses (spoonerisms). Nonetheless, despite the interruptions, speech and gesture remain in synchrony.

Gesture inoculates against stuttering: Mayberry and Jaques (2000) made two noteworthy observations. First, the onset of a gesture stroke inoculates against the onset of stuttering. Second, if stuttering begins *during* a stroke, the speaker's hand freezes in midair and may fall to rest. In both observations, we see an incompatibility between the interruption of speech in stuttering and the occurrence of the meaningful gestures.

Gestures of the blind: Congenitally blind speakers, who have never observed gestures, nonetheless do gesture and do so as frequently as sighted subjects, and gesture even when they know are talking to another blind person (Iverson and Goldin-Meadow, 1998). This is dramatic evidence of a speech – gesture bond.

Information exchange: Information received in a gesture may be recalled later as speech (not gesture) (Cassell *et al.*, 1999). Symmetrically, Kelly *et al.* (1999) observed subjects recalling information presented in speech as having been gestural.

Gestures and fluency: Speech and gesture become complex or simple in tandem, even to the point of jointly disappearing (the gesture disappears along with speech, rather than replacing it).

To sum up binding, speech and synchronous coexpressive gestures form a tightly bound unit, capable of resisting outside forces attempting to separate them, such as DAF, stuttering, lack of visual experience of gesture, and loss of fluency. Speech and gesture also spontaneously exchange information in memory,

so that when something is recalled the speaker cannot tell the original format. Tight binding clearly fosters an imagery–language dialectic by creating unbreakable psycholinguistic units within which it can take place.

Gesture Anatomy

The anatomy in question is temporal, an anatomy of 'phases.' The gesture illustrated in **Figure 1** includes all phases except a final, retraction phase, which did not occur in this case because a new gesture followed immediately. The speaker had been given a comic book to read and was retelling the story to a listener from memory. The transcription, by S. Duncan, is as follows: "so he gets a / hold of a big [oak tree / and <u>he</u> **bends it way ba<u>ck</u>**]." Notation: / denotes a silent pause; [the onset of motion; underlining a hold; boldface the stroke;] the end of motion.

Unfolding in Time and Its Meaning

As this example illustrates, gestures pass through a series of phases, each with its own position and function in the gesture. The phases enable us to peer into performance dynamics. Kendon (1980) differentiated among what he termed "gesture units," "gesture phrases," and "gesture phases."

A gesture unit is the interval between successive rests of the limbs. In the example, the gesture unit included not only the interval from 'oak' to 'back,' but also further speech and later gestures not shown.

A gesture phrase is what we intuitively call a 'gesture' and it in turn consists of up to five gesture phases, in sequence:

- Preparation (optional): The limb moves away from a rest position into the gesture space, where it can begin the stroke. The onset of preparation shows the moment at which the visuospatial content of the gesture starts to take form in the cognitive experience of the speaker. 'Oak tree and' coincided with the preparation phase in the illustration, and it is noteworthy that the preparation commenced with the first mention of the object in the preceding clause – as the idea was introduced, so the next image flicked on to become a gesture.
- Stroke (obligatory in the sense that, without a stroke, a gesture is not said to occur): The stroke is the gesture phase with meaning; it is also the phase with effort, in the dance notation sense of focused energy. In the example above, the stroke was the bending back, the hand in a grip around something thick, timed with the coexpressive 'bends it way ba<u>ck</u>.'

Figure 1 Gesture phases in the 'and he bends it way back' gesture. The insert is a frame counter (1 frame = 1/30 s.). The total elapsed time is about 1.5 s. Panel 1: Prepreparation position. Hand is shown just prior to lifting off from the armrest. Panel 2: A Prestroke hold occurs while saying 'he' – the hand waiting for 'bends.' This figure depicts the hand at the start position of the stroke (ready to pull down and to the rear). The preparation interval was slightly less than 1 s. Panel 3: Middle of stroke – 'way.' The hand has closed around the 'oak tree' and is moving downward and to the rear. Note how the speaker's own position in space defines the location of the oak tree and the direction of the bending-back movement – the gesture framed according to a 'first-person' or 'character' viewpoint. Panel 4: End of stroke and beginning of the poststroke hold in the middle of 'back.' Hand is at its farthest point to the rear. After the poststroke hold, the hand immediately launched into a new gesture.

- Retraction (optional): The hands return to rest (not always the same position as at the start). There may not be a retraction phase if the speaker immediately moves into a new stroke, as was the case in the illustration.

In addition, Sotaro Kita (pers. comm.) identified:

- Pre- and poststroke hold phases (optional): Temporary cessations of motion either before or after the stroke motion; in the example a prestroke hold occurred during 'he' and a poststroke hold during the second half of 'back'; holds ensure that the meaningful part of the gesture – the stroke – remains semantically active during the coexpressive speech. Holds suggest that the stroke and the coexpressive speech comprises an idea unit created in advance, from the start of the preparation phase.

The gesture phases are organized around the stroke. This is the 'object' being presented. It is prepared for, withheld if need be until the coexpressive speech is ready, and held again until all linked speech is over. The full span of phases, from the beginning of preparation to the end of retraction, describes the lifetime of a particular gesture and its linked idea unit.

Coexpressiveness and Synchrony

Gesticulations (but not other points along Kendon's continuum) have the property that strokes synchronize with coexpressive speech. This section explains this concept. An example is illustrated in **Figure 2**. The speaker was describing a cartoon episode in which one character tries to reach another

Figure 2 Synchronous, coexpressive gesture with 'up thróugh.' Accent indicates a stressed vowel.

character by climbing up a drainpipe on the inside. The speaker is saying "and he tries going **up thróugh** it this time," with the gesture occurring during the boldfaced portion (the illustration captures the moment at which the speaker is saying the vowel of 'through'). Coexpressively with 'up' her hand rose upward, and coexpressively with 'through' her fingers spread outward to create an interior space. The upward movement and opening of the hand took place simultaneously, and both were synchronized with 'up through,' the linguistic package that carries the same meanings. The effect is a uniquely gestural way of packaging meaning – something like 'rising hollowness,' which does not exist as a semantic package of English at all. The gesture and the linguistic construction synchronize as a whole, not component by component. Thus, speech and gesture synchronize at the point where they are coexpressive and this, not the components, is the unit that aligns them.

Growth Points and Context

Synchronous combinations of such unlike modes of cognition – visuospatial-actional gesture synchronized with analytic-combinatoric speech – may be operative psycholinguistic units, termed 'growth points' or GPs (McNeill and Duncan, 2000). One way to think of a GP is as imagery that is categorized linguistically, an image with a foot in the door of language. A GP is inferred from the totality of communicative events, with special focus on speech–gesture synchrony and coexpressivity. It is called a growth point because it is meant to be the initial form of a thinking-for-speaking unit out of which a dynamic process of utterance and thought organization emerges.

The Psychological Predicate Regarding the GP as a psychological predicate (a term from Vygotsky, 1986 – not always a grammatical predicate) suggests a mechanism of GP formation in which differentiation of a focus from a background plays an essential part.

The concept of a psychological predicate illuminates the theoretical link between the GP and the context of speaking. Defining a psychological predicate requires reference to the context; this is because the psychological predicate and its context are mutually defining. The psychological predicate (1) marks a significant departure in the immediate context, and (2) implies this context as a background. We have in this relationship the seeds for a model of real-time utterance generation and coherent text formation.

First, when gestures and speech synchronize they jointly form the contrast underlying a psychological

predicate. Second, the form of the gesture embodies the content that makes this differentiation meaningful. These correspondences can be demonstrated by exploiting a quirk in the cartoon stimulus that we have employed, in which Sylvester attempts to reach Tweety by climbing a drainpipe conveniently running up the side of the building from street level to the floor where Tweety is perched; he does this twice – first on the outside of the pipe, then on the inside. If a speaker recalls both attempts and in the correct outside-inside order, the gesture–speech combination relating to the second attempt includes a focus on interiority; this is the differentiating element. If a speaker misses the outside attempt but does recall the inside attempt, or recalls them in reverse order, interiority does not now contrast with exteriority, and the gestures with such recall do not include it as a particular feature. These results have been reported by Susan Duncan at workshops; I summarize them, with illustrations, in McNeill, 2005.

Contexts and Catchments

The context of differentiation is an empirically approachable concept via gestures that organize themselves into 'catchments.' A catchment is recognized when one or more gesture features recur in at least two (not necessarily consecutive) gestures. The logic is that a discourse theme will produce gestures with recurring features. These gesture features can be detected. Then, working backwards, the recurring features offer clues to the cohesive linkages in the text with which they co-occur. A catchment is a kind of thread of visuospatial imagery that runs through a discourse to reveal the larger discourse units that emerge out of otherwise separate parts. The recurring features can include hand use (right hand, left hand, two hands similarly deployed, two hands differently deployed), space, orientation, trajectory, hand shape and position, and others, although these are the most common.

By discovering the catchments created by a given speaker, we can see what this speaker is combining into larger discourse units – what meanings are being regarded as similar or related and grouped together, and what meanings are being put into different catchments or are being isolated, and thus are being seen by the speaker as having distinct or less related meanings.

Viv's Catchments   I shall use one speaker's recounting of an episode from the cartoon stimulus to demonstrate catchments and how they can be used to imply something of the dynamic process of utterance formation.

The episode involves a bowling ball, and follows directly the ascent inside the drainpipe described earlier. Tweety, seeing Sylvester, fetches a bowling ball and drops it into the top of the pipe; the ball and Sylvester meet in the middle; Sylvester shoots out of the bottom of the pipe, the bowling ball now inside him; he rolls, bowling ball style, down an inclined street and into a bowling alley; after a significant pause, there is the sound of pins being knocked over.

Viv's gesture performance reveals three catchments, recognizable from hand use and hand shape/position:

C1. The first catchment involves one-handed gestures, and accompanies descriptions of Sylvester's solo motion, first up the pipe, then out of it with the bowling ball inside him. Thus, C1 ties together references to Sylvester as a solo force.

C2. The second catchment involves two-handed symmetrical gestures that group descriptions where the bowling ball is the antagonist, the dominant force. Sylvester becomes what he eats, a kind of living bowling ball, and the symmetrical gestures accompany the descriptions where the bowling ball asserts this power.

C3. The third catchment involves two-handed asymmetrical gestures and groups items in which the bowling ball and Sylvester mutually approach each other in the pipe. Here, in contrast to the symmetric set, Sylvester and the bowling ball are equals differing only in their direction of motion.

With these catchments, we can analyze the real-time origins of the utterance and gesture in the accompanying example, in a way that incorporates context as a fundamental component. The illustrated example is in the symmetrical C2, which shows that one of the factors comprising its field of oppositions was the various guises in which the bowling ball appeared in its role of an antagonist. That is, the idea unit was not only dropping the bowling ball but the bowling ball as a force in its own right. We can write the meaning of the psychological predicate as 'Antagonistic Force: Bowling Ball Downward.' This was the context and contrast. Thus, 'it down' (see **Figure 3**), unlikely though it may seem as a unit from a grammatical point of view, was the cognitive core of the utterance – the 'it' indexing the bowling ball, and the 'down' indexing the significant contrast itself in the field of oppositions. And the verb 'drops,' therefore, was *excluded* from this GP; it referred to something Tweety did, not what the bowling ball, as a force, did.

Viv's gesture in **Figure 3** was made with two symmetrical hands – the palms loosely cupped and facing downward as if placed on top of a large spherical object, and the hands moved down during the

Figure 3 Downward stroke with '**it do**wn.'

linguistic segments 'it down.' The inferred GP is this image of downward movement plus the linguistic content of 'it' (i.e., the bowling ball) and the path particle 'down.' The stroke *excluded* the verb, 'drops.' The full utterance was "Tweety runs and gets a big bowling ba[ll and drops **it do**wn the drainpipe #]."

The exclusion of 'drops' was not an accident. First, the preparation phase of the 'it down' gesture had two features that skip the verb. Preparation began at the first mention of the bowling ball in the preceding clause (again, preparation for the next gesture began with the object was first mentioned). This shows that the bowling ball was part of the discourse focus at that moment. And, second, preparation continued right *through* the verb, suggesting that the verb was irrelevant to this focus. Further, a brief prestroke hold seems to have preceded 'it down' (although coding varies), which, if present, targeted the stroke to 'it down.' Finally, a poststroke hold lasted exactly as long as it took to complete the spoken articulation of 'down,' which preserved the synchrony of the gesture and the word. So the stroke fully and exactly timed with just two words, 'it down,' and excluded a third, 'drops.' The rest of the utterance can be explained by 'unpacking' this GP via a construction (in this case, the caused motion construction, which provided the verb 'drops' as well as the ground element, 'the drainpipe'; cf. McNeill and Duncan, 2000).

Social Context

Lev Vygotsky, in his argument against Jean Piaget, famously asserted that everything appears in a child's development twice: first on the social plane, later on the psychological (Vygotsky, 1986). The concept of a social-to-psychological transition can be applied to gestures as well. Gestures imply a social other. If one denies access to a listener, the frequency of gesture declines (Alibali *et al.*, 2000). Increasing the number of listeners changes the shape of the gesture space

Figure 4 Gestural mimicry. First panel is a gesture by the speaker to the right; second panel is mimicry by the speaker to the left.

Figure 5 Gesture mimicry synchronized with the other's speech.

and this in turn changes the direction of gestures depicting movements of characters in the story (Özyürek, 2000).

I shall conclude with examples of the social sharing of gestures. The research from which they are drawn is not yet published, but the phenomenon of social sharing or resonance through gesture is significant.

Mimicry and Two-Bodied Gestures Gestural mimicry occurs when one conversational partner, within a short time, reproduces the gesture of the other partner; the effect is often to cement a kind of social solidarity and is accordingly seen commonly between close friends. The example in **Figure 4** from research by Irene Kimbara shows the woman on the left reproducing the gesture just performed by her friend on the right.

A different kind of shared gesture is also possible between strangers. **Figures 5** and **6** are from Nobuhiro Furuyama (2002), who studied the gestures of learners as they were instructed in a new motor task (origami). In each illustration, the learner is seated at the left (two different training sessions). In the

Figure 6 Gesture appropriation synchronized with the person's own speech.

Figure 5 example, the learner mimics the gesture of her tutor. The mimicry occurred without speech by the learner, but her *gesture* synchronized with the *tutor's speech*. As the tutor said "[pull down] the corner," the learner performed the gesture during the bracketed portion. The **Figure 6** example, in contrast, shows the learner appropriating the tutor's *gesture* by combining it with her *speech*. The learner is saying "[you bend this down?]," and during the bracketed speech moved her hand to the tutor's hand, and then moved her hand downward and away (the illustration shows the start of the gesture). As Furuyama observes, the tutor had turned in his chair so that the same left–right gesture space was before him and the learner, a maneuver that might have invited her to enter his gesture space. It is striking that any taboo against strangers coming into physical contact was overridden while the hands were in a symbolic mode.

Examples of these kinds address what can be called collectively the 'social resonance' of gesture. Janet Bavelas has long been interested in this phenomenon. Bavelas *et al.* (2000) demonstrated resonance not from the viewpoint of shared feelings, the more traditional approach, but as joint cognition and storytelling; gestural repetition seems to act as grounding and in general conveys mutual understanding.

Acknowledgments

See also: Deixis and Anaphora: Pragmatic Approaches; Discourse Anaphora; Discourse Processing; Gesture: Sociocultural Analysis; Gestures, Pragmatic Aspects; Metaphor: Psychological Aspects; Metapragmatics; Narrativity and Voice; Sign Languages: Discourse and Pragmatics; Sign Language: Overview; Word and Image; Sign Languages: Semiotic Approaches.

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Gesture: Sociocultural Analysis

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Gesture is Integrated with Utterance

When people come together to interact, they can exploit everything at hand (as we might say) to communicate with one another. They position their bodies in relation to both interlocutors and other copresent people; they manipulate objects in the surround; they orient their senses towards one another; they talk; they look; they listen; and they gesture – they move their bodies (and sometimes other entities as well) as part of interaction. Although this short article concentrates on gestures, mostly those performed with the hands, that form part of spoken utterances, much of what it describes could be extended to a wider range of 'gestural expression,' whether or not linked directly to speech, and including a variety of body parts (head, eyes, face, torso) and corporal techniques.

The keenest observers of human communicative capacities have always been interested in gesture. Consider the expressive postures of clay or stone figurines from Palenque to Phnom Penh, or the fingers, hands, arms, faces, and bodies of human figures depicted on vases, walls, textiles, shields, masks, and canvases from Auckland to Greenland, or captured in snapshots and sketches from New York to New Guinea. Quintilian, the 1st-century Roman rhetorician, offered a treatise on how to use gesture artfully as part of oratorical persuasion. Grand speculative programs in the 18th and 19th centuries – programs which continue in perhaps less ambitious and explicit forms to the present day – found in gesture evidence for presumed universals in thought and language. Conversely, explorations of human diversity – especially in the 20th century – also found in gesture a fertile empirical ground to demonstrate divergence and cultural specificity. Important here was the rise of iconic recording technologies which allowed observers to reduce fleeting gestural performances to representation which could be indefinitely replayed and scrutinized for analysis. There is a related tension, in both pretheoretical and analytic fascinations with gesture, between nature and culture: between speech-accompanying gesticulation cast as 'pantomime,' 'protolanguage,' or 'natural pidgin' somehow grounded in presumed panhuman iconicity and expressivity, vs.

the unpredictable culturally specific repertoire of gestures that clearly must be conventionally learned, used, and understood, and that remain opaque to non-natives. (Some Los Angeles natives perform an L-shaped hand on their foreheads to mean 'loser,' i.e., to indicate that some third person is a poor excuse for a human being – a gestural convention perhaps no less exotic that the Neapolitan 'hunger' or 'poor' gesture performed with a slapping motion toward the hip – see Kendon, 1992. The 'loser' gesture exists as an animated emoticon on at least one Internet instant messenger service.)

Contrasting bodily movements with other aspects of the utterances of which they form part, the expressive virtues of gesture both complement and differ from those of the digital, segmentable, and structurally contrastive elements of spoken language. Since it uses as an expressive medium the very body that is involved in human action in the first place, gesture can model action both directly and analogically. Even highly stylized pantomimes can illustrate aspects of action not verbally expressed, nor indeed easily expressible: complex configurations of objects and actors, perspectives, details of mechanics and effort in action. Contrasting with the linear flow of speech units, gesture unfolds in four dimensions, and easily combines multiple simultaneous signing vehicles (gaze, facial expression, posture, as well as hands and other extremities) in a miniature and multifunctional orchestra of expression. Utilizing space as well as time, gesture has a dimensionality, a potential persistence, and a spatial immediacy in the context of utterance not similarly available to sound. For example, a gesture can be held across a chain of utterances, thus providing a diagrammatic vehicle to anchor talk; or it can incorporate into a scene spatial elements – such as direction, distance, size, or shape – which receive no corresponding verbal expression.

Nonetheless, gesture and speech characteristically occur together, combining with still other expressive resources to coordinate interlocutors in the communicative process, and often with precise temporal and semantic coordination. Emblems – the culturally specific, learned gestural forms, with usually quite specific conventional readings, like an 'OK hand' or a locally defined obscene gestural imprecation – can cooccur with speech or, perhaps more often, simply replace it, even in the midst of conversational turns. They are thus a kind of language surrogate. Other sorts of gesture, however, seem to be inextricably linked to simultaneous speech. Researchers have repeatedly observed, for example, that depictive or representative iconic gestures – which seem to present images reminiscent of entities or events also receiving verbal mention – appear synchronized with, or

temporally just antecedent to, apparently associated words, or 'lexical affiliates' as they are called. 'Formless' gestures, dubbed 'batons' or 'beats,' seem instead to track speech rhythm, falling at once on stressed syllables and points of presumed speaker emphasis. Furthermore, deictic gestures allow interlocutors to indicate referents spatially (although sometimes in virtual space), and thus provide a (sometimes seemingly indispensable) complement to roughly simultaneous spoken referential expressions, such as *this* or *that*.

Theorists adopt sometimes diametrically opposite positions, however, about the differences between gesture and speech as communicative resources. Some think gesture 'leaks,' betraying a speaker's true feelings and thoughts, perhaps in opposition to more treacherous (because more conscious?) words which may try to conceal them. Or they may see gestures as largely involuntary somatic twitches, simply reflecting the speaker's (or the mind's) struggle to externalize inchoate inner images as a linear sequence of verbal elements. This article will largely ignore the putative 'inner' processes that underlie gestural production, to concentrate instead on the semiotic and functional properties of gestures. We take for granted the communicative potential of gesture in the process of utterance, and its connections with social and cultural formations more generally. For just as gesture is integrated with utterance, tying words directly to a spatiotemporal context, it is also part of wider cultural routines of the body, susceptible both to the stylization and persistence of custom – patterns of gesture have evidently remained largely intact in Naples for several centuries, much longer, no doubt, than patterns of speech – and to the ideological productions of culture to which we turn at the end of the article.

Meanings and Interactions

Gestures function like other signs, verbal or otherwise. To expand on a gestural typology already alluded to, a commonly cited Peircean trichotomy can be applied to gestures. Conventionalized – thus symbolic, in the Peircean sense – emblems, with specifiable 'citation' forms (thus, in Kendon's terms, 'quotable' – 'and then she did **this** [quoting the gesture]') and holophrastic as well as lexemelike meanings, except for their manual modality resemble certain spoken expressions. The conventionality can be seen partly in specific criteria of well-formedness (the circle of the 'OK hand' is made with the thumb and the index finger, with the others extended slightly upwards, not with just any fingers, and presumably not with other orientations of the hand, orientations which in other cultural settings can

produce very different meanings). Conventionality is also evidenced by the families of use to which such culturally specific gestures are put. Indeed, emblems are in both form and function much like interjections, or 'response cries' (Goffman, 1976), which also may depart from the phonotactic canons of a language and which inhabit a characteristic expressive realm – often, for example, indexing various kinds of disapproval or designed for interpersonal social control – but which remain highly culture specific nonetheless.

There are symbolic and conventional aspects not just to a society's repertoire of emblems but to nonce gestures as well. Hand shape in gesture, for example, is sometimes highly specific: how one points, with what digits or other body parts, and what sorts of thing one can refer to with a specific sort of pointing gesture, are matters carefully (and symbolically) regimented in many cultural contexts. In Tepoztlan, Mexico (Foster, 1948), one used different hand shapes to show the height of a table, a donkey, or a child, and using the wrong sort of hand remains a potential insult throughout Latin America. Recent investigation proposes that even in spontaneous gesticulation different hand shapes come in 'families' with highly schematic shared meanings: 'precision' or 'offering,' for example, associated with the 'precision grip' (the touching thumb and index figure of the 'OK hand') or 'open palm' hands, or 'individuation' associated with a lone extended finger. Presumably, however natural the explanations for such groupings may seem, cultural tradition and transmission must be centrally involved in propagating such families of form.

Gestures are also heavily iconic, depicting aspects of objects and actions by selectively mirroring or diagraming shapes, movements, and configurations of entities or events that provide the vehicles for gestural interpretation. A Guugu Yimithirr man, for example, describes how his boat capsized in a storm. He gesturally evokes the rolling motion as the boat was picked up by the wind and tossed on its side (**Figure 1**), saying "like **this**." Resemblance is, of course, a feeble principle for interpreting a sign, and interlocutors must always infer what aspects of a demonstration they are to attend to – one reason that words and gestures frequently complement one another semiotically, or that gesticulation uninformed by the accompanying words may remain obscure, until the soundtrack (or the subtitles) are turned back on. Because gestures iconically – if schematically – demonstrate actions and depict objects, they can also incorporate varying perspectives or viewpoints on such action, often more directly than can syntactic and lexical devices which imply voice or valence. A gesturing hand can represent now an object, now

Figure 1 First shipwreck gesture.

a tool for operating on it, now an actor manipulating it, and now an observer of the scene. Gesture can also suggest granularity or resolution (for example, in gestures accompanying directions or instructions), as well as specifics of the configuration and shapes of objects – a principle exploited in sign language nominal classifiers, and used to advantage in spontaneous gesticulation as well. A hand holding even an imaginary object adjusts itself to its shape and weight.

Finally, gestures indexically project the contexts of their occurrence. The rhythmic gesticulations called beats, mentioned above, are almost pure indexes, tracking the speech stream much in the way a conductor tracks a score, and additionally parsing it into significant segments. Even the most wooden of gesturers – from Englishmen to presidential candidates – seem to punctuate their syllables gesturally. However, the observed synchrony between gestures in general and their apparently affiliated words is itself an indexical trace of the temporal unfolding of an utterance. A pointing movement, another classic indexical sign, may pick out a perceptually available referent, but it may also create an invisible one in thin air, leaving it available for later resumption by gestural (or spoken) anaphor. Clark (2003) describes a range of object manipulations, which he calls 'placing,' to achieve referential ends parallel to those of 'pointing.' Crucially, gestures of 'placing' depend for their success on the structure of space – and of particular culturally significant spaces (from store counter tops or queues, in Western society, to the hearth or the notorious witchcraft cave in, for example, indigenous Mexico).

Pointing gestures are of particular interest because they combine all the Peircean modalities and additionally require careful conceptual coordination between interlocutors to convey their meanings.

Figure 2 Double pointing gesture.

Consider the case of Rosa, in **Figure 2**, who makes a complex double pointing gesture, when she reaches the climax of a story about an elderly woman who opened the downstairs door of her house to some threatening men. Afraid, she wanted to escape out the same door, but could not because she had left the upstairs door to the house itself unlocked. In Friulian, Rosa narrates the older woman's dilemma in the present and in the first person: "*Nopos la vie parze che o ai lepuarte viarte* [I cannot leave because I have the door open]." She performs the double pointing gesture in two stages: her left hand reaches out with the fingers extended loosely to the right when she says "I cannot leave"; then her right hand – which has accompanied the other in the move to the right – forms a pointing hand and points up to her left as she says "the door open." The gesture invokes diagrammatically the configuration of the house (an outside door to stairs which lead up to the main dwelling) which Rosa's audience knows well. It indexes the relevant locations in that conjured space. Rosa uses conventional index finger pointing to signal the unlocked door, and a looser pointing hand to show the blocked escape route. And, interactionally, the double point captures perfectly the protagonist's dilemma: a choice between two impossibilities.

Directional indexicality also infects gestures otherwise based on quite different semiotic principles. A gestural imprecation, for example, can be performed in a specific direction, indexing at once its target and its author. A depiction can combine the

Figure 3 Second shipwreck gesture.

representation of a referent's size with an indexical indication of its position. In the shipwreck example mentioned above, the gesture not only illustrates the boat's rolling motion but also indexes the cardinal direction in which the boat flipped over, given prevailing storm winds. Contrast **Figure 1**, where the speaker has north to his right, and shows the boat flipping in front of him, i.e., to the west, with another performance of the same story where the narrator is facing north, and depicts the boat flip with a very different motion, but in the same direction (see **Figure 3**). Indeed, the shipwreck gesture illustrates a perhaps unexpected sort of gestural convention, since it is a norm for speakers of Guugu Yimithirr (and in other communicative traditions, too) that gestures depicting motion, real or hypothetical, remain faithful to cardinal orientation (Haviland, 1993).

Though most research has concentrated on gestural 'meaning,' gestures (along with attitudes of the body more generally) are clearly central in coordinating (inter)action. The preconditions of face-to-face communication involve positioning bodies to allow, restrict, or prevent mutual access. Moreover, states of

talk can be restructured and reorganized in part by the talk itself, and in part by reorientations of interlocutors brought about by gesture, shifts in gaze, and adjustments of posture. Theories of the ontogenesis of gesture often link children's manipulation of objects as the source for later gestural 'ritualization.' Pointing, for example, appears to grow out of grasping and reaching. Even in adults, handling objects, moving them, and directing attention to them and to the spaces around them seem to give rise to gestural routines which, in turn, can become routinized or 'grammaticalized' through the course of an interaction. Gesture is thus embedded in bodily techniques, themselves notoriously shaped by cultural practices.

Ideologies of Gesture

Like other cultural practices, gesture when it rises to explicit consciousness inspires metatheory and ideology. The most astute early students of gesture, from de Jorio to Efron, comment with skepticism on theories which purport to link the proclivity to gesture, or gestural exuberance, to aspects of personality or temperament, if not to gentility and good breeding, or even to race and national character. The fact that such links have been advanced, nonetheless, suggests something about a an ethnotheory of the communicative economy which gesture and speech jointly inhabit. The fact that some populations – ranging from Warlpiri women in mourning, who must not blurt out certain tabooed words (Kendon, 1988), to members of monastic orders who abjure the worldliness of words – voluntarily substitute elaborated, conventionalized systems of gesture for speech, is a kind of reversal of the common injunction on children in other societies not to point or impolitely overuse their hands in talk.

Arguments about the communicative virtues of gesture seem always to involve subtle and perhaps contradictory ideological stances: Roman orators (like modern-day politicians) hoped to become more persuasive through calculated use of gestures; but pop psychologists argue that 'body language' is truer – precisely because deeper and less susceptible to conscious manipulation – than words. Some theories find gestures peculiarly appropriate to situations where words fail – over great distance, or in situations of too much (or too little) noise; others find virtue in their surreptitious and silent potentialities (as in the case of the Cuna lip point [Sherzer, 1972], which can be a vehicle for clandestine criticism or mockery). Finally, the analytical debates about whether gesture is a speaker's or a hearer's phenomenon (i.e., whether

it is, in the psychologists' parlance, 'communicative') reflect pernicious dichotomies that surround such culturally specific notions as volition and intention, individual vs. community, or knowledge/mind vs. practice/body.

See also: Gesture and Communication; Gestures, Pragmatic Aspects; Sign Language: Overview; Sign Languages: Semiotic Approaches; Word and Image.

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Gestures: Pragmatic Aspects

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(Hand-) gestures play many diverse roles in human life and do many different jobs in social interaction. Gesture – simple emblems like the thumbs-up sign as much as ongoing gesticulation that accompanies talk – is a most flexible resource that is utilized in a multitude of cultural practices, ranging from legal proceedings to work in mines to the making of music and intimate moments of talk, and it is always in play when people collaborate with their hands on common tasks. The practices of gesture are heterogeneous and difficult to subsume under a common denominator, other than that the activity involves communicative action of the hands. The view adopted here is focused by the question how gesture serves persons – *embodied actors* – who are acting in the world together, within specific ecological and cultural settings, and together making sense of it; gesture is conceived as a mode (or set of modes) of bodily action by which the world is structured, known and understood, not in the first place as a system of signs or a mode of expression.

Gesture serves human activities, including conversation, in a number of different capacities that can be conceived as *alignment-types*: ways of aligning people, gesturing hands, and the situated world within which they interact. Alignment types are distinguishable on the basis of the framework of participant orientation within which gestures are perceived and understood, i.e., in terms of their alignment and coordination with gaze, speech, action, and the setting or landscape within which the interaction takes place. Six alignment types are distinguished here, leaving open the possibility that there are others:

1. hand gestures can aid in the structuring and making sense of the **world-at-hand** (i.e. the world **within** reach of the hand);
2. they can serve for orientation within and understanding of the **world-within-sight** (but **beyond** reach of the hands);
3. gestures can represent or **depict** the world in its absence, within the 'gesture space' (McNeill, 1992) that is created by the participants' orientation to the gesturing hands;
4. hand gestures, often in combination with other bodily action, can **embody communicative action** and discourse structure;
5. they can **mediate and regulate transactions**; and
6. they can construe content that is conveyed by the verbal utterance that they accompany (**ceiving/ ception**).

In the following, the features of each alignment type are described, and gestural practices that are characteristic of it are discussed. The last section of the article delineates aspects of the coordination of gesture and speech.

Making Sense of the World at Hand

A great deal of inconspicuous gesturing occurs while people and their hands are actively engaged with the world at hand. Gestures arise as a byproduct of and in the service of practical action, disclosing features of the immediate scene, or otherwise involving the touching, feeling, grasping, and handling of whatever is at hand, and maybe the making of something from it. Gestural practices that are coupled with the world at hand are often excluded from the study of gesture, which is treated as movement in the air by empty hands. However, wherever cooperation involves the handling or making of things (including the making of graphic marks on paper), one finds manifold indexical, iconic, and symbolic actions of the fingers and hands, and often these are entirely indispensable, given the type of activity underway and the communication tasks that it raises for the practitioners (Ochs, Gonzales *et al.*, 1996).

Among the 'jobs' that gestures do in the world-at-hand are: to structure the participants' perception of objects; to disclose intrinsic, invisible features and affordances of things; to analyze, abstract, and exhibit action; and to 'mark up' the setting. Gestures can arise as minimal modulations of instrumental acts, performed for the benefit of the coparticipants, e.g., in the context of demonstrations.

Genres of gestural practice found within the world-at-hand include, among others:

Tracing: An index finger, set of fingers, or hand is moved along a surface, thereby drawing a line, but also gathering tactile information, in order to discover (feel), disclose, and broadcast undisclosed features of objects or to inscribe real or imaginary marks on surfaces (e.g. to suggest possible features and fields of action). Goodwin writes:

> A quite general class of cognitive practices consists of methods used to divide a domain of scrutiny into a figure and a ground, so that elements relevant to the activity of the moment stand out. ... Through these practices structures of relevance in the material environment can be made prominent (Goodwin, 1994).

Exploratory procedures (see Gibson, 1962): These are patterned actions by which hands systematically explore intrinsic object properties (texture, volume,

consistency, temperature, brittleness) and affordances (what can be done with objects). While these actions serve the information-gathering needs of the actor, they are easily enhanced so as to disclose, i.e., make visible and broadcast, the qualities that are discovered through them. Demonstrative haptic or tactile explorations provide for shared understandings of the material features and functional characteristics of the things that require our attention.

Highlighting action and its accessories: Practical actions or their stages are elaborated through formal operation such as exaggeration, repetition, and segmentation, to disclose their logic, components, and characteristics to coparticipants. Gesturalization serves as a method for the self-explication of manual action. Minimal modifications – e.g., the repetition or exaggeration of a component act – can serve to draw attention to stages or accessories of the activity.

When the participants employ artifact-based representation practices (e.g., writing, diagramming, doodling) in addition to speaking and gesture, as is common in many lines of work, gesture can become aligned and enmeshed with them (Streeck and Kallmeyer, 2001), which can result in hybrid symbolic acts (e.g., symbolic gestures committed to paper, a line drawn on paper to emphasize a currently spoken word); situated, ephemeral graphic artifacts such as doodles and/or the acts of making them thus take on social-symbolic functions. Gesture is also indispensable as a medium for the interpretation of professional diagrammatic representations: architectural and engineering blueprints, for example, are enhanced by gestures showing motion, changes over time, or the dimension of height that the flat diagram lacks.

What distinguishes this entire variety of gesture uses from other basic varieties is their alignment within the material, perceptual, and cognitive ecology of the situation: they are perceived and understood by reference to their contiguity with objects and instrumental acts. In other words, the participants' visual attention encompasses gestures and things, and these elaborate one another. Gesture directs the recipient's attention, an effect that is also achieved by the placing of objects in the recipient's line of regard. Gesturing about and arranging objects are activities that serve epistemic functions and often go hand in hand (Kirsh, 1995).

Revealing the World within Sight

A different framework of person-gesture-world alignment is realized when the gesture orients the participants to the visible world beyond the reach of the hands. This is the prototypical realm of pointing: an extended index finger or hand (or another array of body parts whose constellation can be seen as a vector) enables the participants to coordinate their orientation so that they jointly focus their gaze on a distant object, feature, or location. Pointing is only one type of orienting behavior, however; posture, gaze direction, and head orientation can serve similar purposes, as can the placing of an object in the interlocutor's line of regard (Clark, 2003). And pointing is not universally executed with an extended index finger (Wilkins, 2003); other varieties include lip-pointing (Sherzer, 1972) and pointing by gaze and movements of the head. Within a given repertoire, there may also be pragmatically motivated alternatives such as pointing by index finger – to individuate an object among other objects – and pointing with the open hand – to select an object as an exemplar of a kind (Kendon and Versante, 2003). Handshape and motion patterns can also serve to **characterize** the focal object, i.e., to shape the recipient's perception of it. Gestures made in this mode serve spatial orientation as well as the sharing of sights: once a shared visual focus is established, what is seen together can then be structured by gesture; motions of the fingers and hands project lines, vectors, points, etc., onto seen scenes, indicating **how** what is visible should be regarded. The visual field – i.e., the culturally structured landscape within sight – is thus augmented and made intelligible by layers of cognitive-manual actions and forms.

Depiction by Hand

The third alignment type of hand gestures is brought about when interaction participants turn away from the world and focus attention inside their interactional huddle, and, by their bodily orientation and positioning in space, mark off the space between them as territory of their interaction. The interaction space becomes the stage for hand gestures when attention is, however fleetingly, focused on the speaker's gesticulating hand(s) (Streeck, 1993). This happens whenever gesture is employed as a representation device, to depict aspects of the talked-about world, whether concrete or abstract, real or imagined. When gesture is used to depict or represent, for example in the context of narrative, recipient attention is solicited for the gesturing hands. This is done, for example, by including deictic expressions in the talk, some of which, for example deictic adverbs (Spanish *asi*, German *so*), seem to be primarily designed for this task. In the context of depiction, gesture is a foregrounded activity. Descriptive (depicting) gestures represent worlds in collaboration with speech, and they are understood by reference to what is **known** about the world, not what is seen at the moment.

While the category 'iconic gestures' is a familiar one, the actual study of gestural depiction is in its

infancy (but see Müller, 1996; Kendon, 2004). The most detailed accounts describe iconic devices in sign languages of the deaf (Mandel, 1977), which however operate under different conditions and carry different representational loads; they function in part by virtue of their paradigmatic relations to other signs within large, conventionalized repertoires. Practices by which worlds are depicted on the gesture stage include the placing of imaginary objects on the stage; diagramming relations between them; enacting practical action schemata; sculpting volumes; and drawing outlines, among others. Some of these representational practices may be derived from other cultural practices (e.g., from drawing in sand). Most important, because most readily available to the hands, are acts of virtual grasping and handling, by which objects and instruments are evoked.

When complex imagery is assembled over time, as is the case when complex objects or events are described, the two hands often complement one another: one may 'hold' and classify the object, the other supply additional characterizations or arguments (Enfield, 2004). Repertoires of routinized and sometimes specialized methods of gestural depiction are part of the tacit communicative skills required by various professions, including designers and engineers.

Gestural depiction does not work by virtue of the hands producing shapes that **resemble** real-world phenomena, but rather because in a given context an action of the hand can be seen as **characterizing** a phenomenon or experience, and much as any phenomenon can be characterized by a multitude of words, it can be characterized by a multitude of gestures. Often, although essential to the success of the communication, the representational load of a gesture is minimal, because it is embedded within rich linguistic descriptions, and all it must do is to evoke a single feature for the practical purposes of the activity at hand (Arnheim, 1969).

Embodying Speech and Communicative Action

Another alignment type and functional genre of hand gestures that is common in the context of conversation, but also occurs interwoven with gestures of other alignment types, is the use of the hands in the embodiment of communicative action. This includes gesturing by which the communicative act performed (question, proposal, imploring, and so on); aspects of the pragmatic and syntagmatic structure of the unfolding utterance; and coherence relations between successive or separate utterance parts are shown or foreshadowed. A minimal version of this mode of gesturing are beats, i.e. hand movements characterized less by a distinct handshape or form than by repetitiveness and emphatic synchronization with the rhythm of speech, and signifying not so much by form as by changes in form which cue the beginning of a new speech unit. The pragmatic mode of gesticulation also includes pronominal referential gestures: pointing-like motions, often made by the thumb, which individuate and refer figuratively within the universe of discourse, marking acts of reference to nonpresent people, locations, or points in time. And it includes the display of the stance that the person takes towards an utterance or the content expressed. Pragmatic gesture encompasses all actions of the hands (and a variety of other body parts, notably the face, head, and shoulders) by which aspects of the communicative interaction are displayed. The category also includes recipient actions, such as head gestures of affirmation and negation or rejection that are known throughout human societies. Speech act gestures (gestures that embody illocutionary force) often possess metaphorical quality: they figure aspects of the processes of speaking and communicating as handlings of physical objects or as conduit (McNeill, 1992) (*see* **Speech Acts and Grammar**).

The characteristic alignment of pragmatic gesturing is its occurrence at the periphery of the interaction space: such gestures are commonly executed outside the line of sight of the speaker and at the periphery of the visual range of the addressee. They are rarely subjected to the speaker's visual control. While this is the unmarked way in which communication is embodied, occasionally pragmatic gestures are made salient by being performed in the segment of the interaction space that is usually reserved for gestural depiction. Generally during conversation, the embodiment of speech and communicative action and process by hand gestures is a background process. But pragmatic gesturing is also the most ubiquitous, irrepressible, and perhaps indispensable variety of gesture, contributing greatly to the precision timing and entrainment that are characteristic of so much conversational interaction. Many societies have conventionalized at least some pragmatic gestures; some, such as that of southern Italy (Kendon, 1995), have evolved large repertoires (de Jorio, 2000 (1852)). Yet we also find immense individual variation in pragmatic gesturing; individuals tend to evolve habitual personal styles of gesticulation, and these idiosyncrasies are most obvious in pragmatic gesticulation.

Ordering and Enabling Transactions

Gesticulation in the pragmatic mode overlaps to a large extent with another usage variety; possible differences in alignment, however, suggest that it be

treated as its own kind. This is gesticulation, that is also occupied with the communicative process, but at the same time addresses other interaction participants whose actions it is intended to regulate. This mode of gesturing can involve touching the other (Efron, 1972 (1942)), thereby eliciting attention or allocating a turn, soliciting response or attempting to silence it, and directing the attention of others to one another, among many other interactive and social-organization functions that these gestures serve. Many gestures blend the display of communicative action with the regulation of the behavior of others, and the distinction between these two modes is of only limited analytic value: at one end of the polarity, gestures are aligned with what the speaker is presently doing, and convey something about it; at the other end, they are performed in attempts to structure the actions of other participants. Often a gesture is aligned in both ways at the same time, or the two functions are realized at different points within the same gestural action.

Interactive or transactional gestures have enabled the development of codified, specialized gesture codes by which complex transactions such as vehicular traffic (the gestures of traffic cops), legal proceedings (as in medieval codes of law), or the making of music (through the gestures of conductors) are ordered or accomplished.

'Ceiving'

The last mode of gesturing included here is not usually treated as a distinct mode, but rather as the paradigmatic form of all gesturing other than pointing; however, it is easily distinguished in terms of the way it is aligned with the interaction participants' lines of regard as well as the current state and progress of talk. This is a mode of gesturing that is adequately described as 'thinking by hand': it involves the speaker's hands producing schemata in terms of which utterance content or narrated experience is construed. This mode is usually lumped together with gestural depiction (under the label 'iconic gesture'); however, although 'ceiving' or 'ception' is usually a component or means of gestural depiction (as well as of pragmatic gesticulation), it also occurs on its own, within an alignment framework that is different from both gestural depiction and pragmatic gesticulation. The 'pure' variety of ception is realized whenever speakers, **without attending to the process,** use their hands to give form to – i.e. construe – content. Often this is done via a simple or complex schema of grasping – by means of a prehensile posture (Napier, 1980), which is why this author labels it 'ceiving' or 'ception' (from Lat. *cap-*, take; a pattern thus formed is called a 'cept'). Ception is a bodily form of conceiving,

i.e., of conceptually structuring content to be articulated in speech: this content-to-be-made-sense-of is **grasped** by an abstract prehensile action (the grasp occurring 'in the air').

The notions of ceiving/ception and cept that are introduced here are predicated upon a view of thinking as an activity not of the mind or brain but of the entire person, involving the body and its cultural skills in relevant ways, and of grasping by hand and other modes of handling objects as primary human forms of exploring, recognizing, and understanding the world, activities which provide numerous models after which linguistic concepts are formed, including the concept 'concept' itself, which depicts the process of making-sense-of (conceiving) as 'taking-hold-of-together,' i.e., as action by the hands. In ception, thinking-for-speaking draws upon the intelligence and world-knowledge of the hands. In contrast to depiction, during which the speaker **controls** the activity of the hands, during ception the speaker is **dependent on** his or her body to 'come up with' an appropriate cept: the process of speaking becomes dependent upon embodied knowledge. Thus, when we observe speakers forming cepts while speaking, we witness the very process of embodied thought. Cepts, of course, are also formed and used during acts of depiction, in which case they depict phenomena in terms of ways of grasping or handling them. And many pragmatic gestures – metaphorical ones – are ceivings and articulate the process of communication as a handling of things (*see* **Pragmatic Acts**).

The extent to which speakers rely on 'pure' ceiving (i.e. ceptional acticvity of the hands performed outside the realm of conscious awareness and without specific depictive aims) to aid them in the formulating of talk and the making of sense appears to vary greatly. When the activity occurs, however, it is easily recognized: it involves the speaker orienting to the interlocutor, not to the gesture (ceiving is a background process), and performing largely haptic motions whose gestalt often coincides with subsequently uttered concepts. When interlocutors see the speaker actively searching for a concept (i.e., a word), they may volunteer one that fits the cept that the speaker has presented. In other words, listeners have privileged access to the speaker's gestured cepts (which is *not* the case during depiction).

Pragmatic Function and Placement of Gestures

Word searches demonstrate the importance that the relative ordering of gesture and speech has for the process of intersubjective understanding: during

ception, manually performed cepts usually precede verbally articulated concepts. The hands are given an opportunity to find the first form that makes sense. Interlocutors are thereby afforded previews of concepts, enabling them to build understanding incrementally. Within the context of the other alignment frameworks, relative ordering of gesture and talk is organized differently and meets different tasks. When gesture is engaged with the world-at-hand, talk is often subservient to and made to fit the manual-visual procedures by which the scene is illuminated and its perception shaped. Pointing is coordinated with specific classes of linguistic expressions (deictics and demonstratives) (*see* **Deixis and Anaphora: Pragmatic Approaches**). During depiction special linguistic expressions and gaze direction are used to direct the recipient's visual attention to the gesture; gaze, talk, and gesture are orchestrated with great precision to render multimodal representations of worlds beyond the interaction space. Embodiments of communicative action, in contrast, and many other-directed, interactive, or transactional gestures are background processes, perceived peripherally (by listeners) or kinesthetically (by speakers), and providing an ongoing interactional framing and footing of the talk that occupies the focus of attention. Very important for the functions of pragmatic and interactional gestures, on the other hand, is their exact placement within the turns and sequences of interaction within which they occur (*see* **Conversation Analysis**). Gestures made just prior to or during the initiation of an utterance can foreshadow the speech act for which the turn is taken; ongoing gesticulation in mid-turn can mark the continuing relevance of the speech act frame of the turn, or the performance of a series of such acts, for example during extended turns at talk; and gestures made during or after utterance completion can indicate the kind of response that is sought for it, or the stance that the speaker takes with respect to what is conveyed (as is the case with shrugs, which are common during utterance completion).

All gesturing of the hands is co-orchestrated with speech prosody: gesture units coincide with prosodic units, and gesture strokes are coordinated with prosodic stress. In some specialized varieties (the gestures of rappers and conductors, for example), but also sometimes during ordinary conversation, gestural motions appear to map out the movement of the voice, thereby visualizing acoustic phenomena. To some extent, this coordination is a by-product of the self-synchrony of the human body: muscular actions of the limbs synchronize with muscular action of the vocal apparatus. At times, however, the hand's dancing to the vocal beat is a more deliberate practice of revealing the ongoing organization of speech,

offering the recipient hand-packaged 'chunks' of talk by providing coherence via rhythmically placed iterations of a gestural act.

See also: Conversation Analysis; Deixis and Anaphora: Pragmatic Approaches; Gesture: Sociocultural Analysis; Gesture and Communication; Pragmatic Acts; Sign Language: Overview; Speech Acts and Grammar.

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Goffman, Erving

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Erving Goffman ranks among the most celebrated sociologists in the world of the second half of the 20th century. His work ranged from urban anthropology to sociolinguistics, ethnology of communication, and microsociology with the study of social interaction. In spite of this diversity and his own refusal to subscribe to any particular trend, he is generally placed in the symbolic interactionist paradigm of sociological thought (School of Chicago).

Erving Goffman was born in 1922 in Manville (Alberta, Canada) of Ukrainian Jewish parents and spent his childhood in the Ukrainian Jewish community of Dauphin, near Winnipeg. He began studies in chemistry at the University of Manitoba in Winnipeg and worked at the National Film Board, in charge of propaganda documentaries, led by John Grierson. In 1945 he received a degree in sociology at the University of Toronto, following the teaching of the anthropologist Ray Birdwhistell, who taught that gestures, just as with institutions and social facts, are accountable of sociological analysis. After he got his M.A. in 1949 at the University of Chicago, with Everett Hughes, he was appointed research assistant at the University of Edinburgh, where he met Tom Burns, one of the leaders of British sociology. He spent more than 2 years (1949–1951) in one of the Shetland islands to gather material, based on the observation of conversational interactions, for his PhD thesis which he submitted in 1953 under the supervison of Lloyd Warner at the University of Chicago. From 1954 until 1957, he was a visiting scientist at two psychiatric hospitals, the National Institute of Mental Health in Bethesda, Maryland, and St. Elizabeth Hospital in Washington, D.C. From this experience he published *Asylum* (1961).

From 1958 to 1968, he held teaching positions at the University of California, Berkeley: visiting assistant, assistant professor, and eventually professor of sociology. From 1968 to 1982, he was offered the prestigious chair Benjamin Franklin of Anthropology and Psychology at the University of Pennsylvania. In 1981, he was elected President of the American Sociological Association. He died of cancer in November 1982 in Philadelphia.

Goffman was a part of the linguistic turn of the 1950s and 1960s, making significant contributions to linguistics by undertaking formal study of talk and developing the notions of public, self, face, demeanor, structures of attention and information, ritual, footing, and frame. His work is characterized by the interplay of concrete data and theoretical development and by the use of the metaphors of theater and stage management to draw attention to the manipulative and the moral aspects of social life.

From the time he wrote his dissertation (1953), Goffman was concerned with face-to-face interaction, and he implemented it in a formal linguistic way in his last works, *Frame analysis* (1974), *Forms of Talk* (1981), and the paper 'Felicity's condition' (1983a). Through the notions of response, footing, and frame, Goffman strengthened the connection between discourse analysis and conversation analysis. Opting for microanalysis as a method of study, he accounted for the ways in which the situatedness of speech contributes to the form and meaning of utterances, and he analyzed the procedures employed by people in their face-to-face dealings with one another. With his notion of footing, Goffman analyzed the structure of communication in social encounters. He made analytic distinctions by assigning different kinds of participant roles to hearers (the participation framework), either adressee, overhearer, or eavesdroppers, and to speakers (the production format), either animator, author, or principal. It is linguistics that provided the cues and markers to determine such footings. Levinson (1988) developed this topic in proposing a set of universal participant categories based on grammatical grounds.

It should be mentioned that when Goffman was at Berkeley, he worked on telephonic conversations with Garfinkel and Sacks while visiting them in 1963 at the Center for the Scientific Study of Suicide in Los Angeles. However, Goffman's views diverged from conversation analysis on several issues. He found it unnecessary to incorporate recorded data in his work and to analyze detailed actual interactional events. While conversation analysts use turn-taking organization, adjacency pair, and the organization of repair to deal with interaction, Goffman promoted the notion of face both as an account for action and as the motivating basis for the ritual organization of interaction. Finally, for Goffman, talk was not transparent, and conversation relied heavily on presuppositions and not on the sole turn-taking system claimed by conversation analysts.

It must be added that Goffman was an authentic stylist and that his books, noticed as early as 1959 with the publication of *Presentation of self in everyday life*, continue to be widely read outside of the restricted field of sociology. His writings, available in many languages, include eight books, three collections of essays, and at least 28 essays. His last book, *Forms of talk* (1981), was nominated for a National Book Critics Circle award in 1981.

See also: Conversation Analysis; Face; Gender and Language; Gestures, Pragmatic Aspects; Sacks, Harvey.

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Grice, Herbert Paul

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(Herbert) Paul Grice was born on March 15, 1913 in Birmingham, England, into the family of Herbert and Mabel (née Felton) Grice. His father was a successful businessman who manufactured small metal items. Herbert Paul was educated at Bristol Clifton College and at Corpus Christi College at Oxford University. While in college, Grice combined the study of classics with philosophy and later became a lecturer in philosophy at St. John's College, where he was elected a fellow in 1939. During World War II, Grice served his country in the Navy, first in the North Atlantic, then from 1942 in Navy Intelligence at the Admiralty. After his military service, Grice returned to Oxford's St. John's College. At the end of 1967 he left for the University of California at Berkeley, where he taught and conducted research, obtaining full professorship in 1975. In 1980 Grice retired from his university position, but remained active in pursuing his linguistic and philosophical investigations.

Paul Grice is generally known for his two most influential papers, 'Meaning,' published in 1957,

and 'Logic and Conversation,' published in 1975. In 'Meaning', he distinguishes between two types of meaning: (1) the 'natural' or 'observable' meaning and (2) the 'nonnatural' meaning, that is, the idiosyncratic meaning of a particular communicator. In 'Logic and Conversation,' Grice argues that in order to communicate people need to cooperate while exchanging verbal information and proposes the 'cooperative principle'; "Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted direction or purpose of the talk exchange in which you are engaged" (Grice, 1975: 45).

The Gricean cooperative principle is subdivided into context-related maxims. According to the maxim of quantity, one should provide the listener with just the needed amount of information. The maxim of quality states that one should produce only texts that one believes to be true. One needs also to be relevant while communicating with others; and last but not least, one should communicate in a particular manner, that is, express oneself verbally in a clear way. Grice is probably best known for presenting an idea of 'conversational implicature' in terms of this theory. For example, let us suppose that A informs B, "I'm cold," and B replies, "Here is a blanket." B's reply, by offering the blanket, is a proper response to A's conversationally implicated request to B to do something about A's being cold.

Grice is also regarded as the father of 'intention-based semantics,' in which the phrase 'timeless meaning' (i.e., conventional meaning) is of fundamental importance. As Gaukner explains, "That a certain form has a timeless meaning is normally necessary if a speaker is to reasonably expect that an utterance of that form of words will produce the intended effect" (2004). Grice's works helped establish pragmatics as the study of meaning embedded within its context. His impact is felt in many branches of contemporary linguistics, including the study of communicational grammars of discourses, conversational analysis, and even axiology.

See also: Conversation Analysis; Implicature; Pragmatic Presupposition; Pragmatics: Overview.

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Gustave Guillaume was born December 16, 1883. His early education remains obscure, but in 1914 he became a student of Antoine Meillet (1866–1936) at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes in Paris, at Meillet's invitation. In 1919 he published *Le problème de l'article et sa solution dans la langue française* (awarded the Prix Volney), the first extensive examination of article function; articles are actualizers, which when added to an underlying noun, or noun in tongue (i.e., *langue*), create a surface noun phrase, or noun in discourse ((discourse) replaces Saussure's term 'parole').

In 1929 he published *Temps et verbe. Théorie des aspects, des modes et des temps*, in which he presented verbal systems as cognitive systems having successive developmental stages, which can be detected by complexity of form and surface usage. Language is no longer seen as static, but as an activity, the creation of discourse. In 1931 he became vice-president of the Société Linguistique de Paris, and in 1934 its president.

Subsequent to the death of Meillet, he was appointed lecturer at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes in

1938, and taught there until his death in February, 1960. The classes had a regular clientele, some of whom attended year after year. During these 22 years, he further developed the view that a language is a cognitive structure, in which content is primary, and morphosyntax, since its only role is to make the content perceivable, is secondary. His Law of Coherence states that a content system (e.g., nominal number) is fully coherent, so that irregular plurals (e.g., mice, teeth) are just as regular in their cognitive content as other plurals. His Law of Simple Sufficiency states that the morphosyntax easily tolerates irregularity; it only has to be regular enough to reflect sufficiently the coherence of the content system that it marks. He also developed his views on the act of language, the cognitive activity of the speaker in creating discourse, a study to which he gave the name of 'psychomechanics,' since it deals with mental mechanisms.

Towards the end of his life, he published one book and some 20 articles, gathered into a posthumous volume (1964). In his last decades his ideas began to be disseminated by others, notably Moignet, Stefanini, Molho, in France, and Roch Valin in Canada. On his death he left his papers, including the draft text of every lecture given during the 22 years at the Hautes Etudes, to Valin, who subsequently founded the Fonds Gustave Guillaume at Laval University in Quebec City as a research center in psychomechanics. By 2000, 16 volumes of the lectures had undergone joint publication in Canada and in France, with another 19 still to come. A volume of important excerpts has also appeared (1973); it was translated into English (1984), and then into half a dozen other languages. In 2003 an important manuscript that he had completed just before his death was published: *Prolégomènes à la linguistique structurale 1. Essais et mémoires de Gustave Guillaume*, a profound and coherent presentation of his linguistic thought, with a second volume in 2004, which also contains notes for two further volumes that he had planned. There are further volumes to come, and the fact that the value of these is undiminished after almost fifty years is an indication that Guillaume was a most original penetrating thinker, as recognized by his faithful audience at the Hautes Etudes (many of whom had distinguished careers of their own).

See also: Linguistic Anthropology.

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http://www.fl.ulaval.ca/fgg/ – Fonds Gustave Guillaume, Université Laval.

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Habermas, Jürgen

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Jürgen Habermas is one of the foremost social theorists and political philosophers of postwar Germany. He was born in Düsseldorf on June 18, 1929, and grew up in the town of Gummersbach. In the autumn of 1944, at the age of 15, he was sent to the front to serve as an assistant in the sickbay. He returned home in February 1945, three months before the final collapse of the Third Reich. Finishing his secondary school in the following years, he learned to appreciate the 'bourgeois constitutional state' as a historic achievement. He went to the University of Göttingen in 1949, spent a short period studying in Zürich and moved to Bonn in 1950, where he studied philosophy, history, psychology, German literature, and economics with Erich Rothacker and Oskar Becker. In a newspaper article published in 1953, he exposed Heidegger's association with Nazism. After obtaining his Ph.D. in 1954, he worked as a journalist. He married Ute Wesselhoeft in 1955; they had a son and two daughters. In 1956, Habermas became a research assistant to Theodor Adorno at the Institute for Social Research in Frankfurt, which was led by Adorno and Max Horkheimer. Thus involved with the Frankfurt school of philosophy, he developed a neo-marxist critical theory of society, which emphasized the importance for democracy of a public debate that is undistorted by financial and administrative powers. Because of a conflict with Horkheimer, he resigned in 1959 and managed to get a scholarship to finish the thesis for his second doctorate (Habilitation), which he obtained in 1961 under the supervision of Wolfgang Abendroth (*Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit*, 1962). At the recommendation of Hans-Georg Gadamer, Habermas was appointed professor of philosophy at Heidelberg in 1961. Taking sides with Adorno in the so-called 'Positivismusstreit,' he argued against Popper's critical rationalism that a critical social theory differs essentially from natural science. He stayed at Heidelberg until 1964, when he had the opportunity to become professor of philosophy and sociology at the University of Frankfurt. In the following period, he further established himself as a leading intellectual, whose views were influential, though not uncontroversial, in the student protest movement of the late 1960s. In this period he also traveled to the United States, where he held various visiting positions.

Habermas left the university in 1971 to become co-director, with Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker, of the 'Max Planck Institute for research of the life conditions of the scientific-technical world' at Starnberg. During this period, he initiated a research program that he has been pursuing for the rest of his career, and which centers around communicative action. In 1981, he published his magnum opus, the 2-volume *The theory of communicative action* (Habermas, 1981). In 1983 he returned to the University of Frankfurt, where he once again became professor of philosophy. This period was marked by his vigorous defense of the emancipatory potential of modernist thought against the attacks by postmodernist, deconstructivist thinkers (*The philosophical discourse of modernity*, Habermas, 1985), and by the elaboration of his theory of communicative action in the field of ethics (*Justification and application: remarks on discourse ethics*, Habermas, 1991) and philosophy of law (*Between facts and norms: contributions to a discourse theory of law and democracy*, Habermas, 1992). After his retirement in 1994, he continued to write influentially on a number of political and cultural issues, such as the social implications of developments in biomedical science, and the political consequences of terrorism.

From a linguistic perspective, Habermas's main accomplishment was his attempt to put insights gained from the study of everyday linguistic practice at the heart of a theory of rational action and of society at large. Drawing on the work of Bühler, Austin, and Searle, he used a typology of speech acts to characterize the kind of rationality which underlies communicative action, and which he viewed as a potential for emancipation. He started from a distinction between success-oriented action and consent-oriented action. The former is exemplified both by

instrumental actions using nomological knowledge of nature, and by strategic actions aimed at achieving coordination between rational agents. By contrast, consent-oriented action consists of a cooperative attempt to reach agreement about the interpretation of the situation that confronts the participants in communication, and about the best plans for action in that situation. When individuals engage in this kind of communicative action, there are three types of speech acts involved: constative, regulative, and expressive speech acts. Every speech act, regardless of type, is related to three sorts of validity claims, which can be accepted or rejected by the hearer. Thus, the hearer can reject a speech act for not being right with respect to norms (for example, an order can be unacceptable in a certain context), for not being truthful (when there is doubt about the intentions of the speaker), or for not being acceptable with respect to truth (for example, when the speaker assumes certain conditions to be fulfilled which in fact are not) (*Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns*, Habermas, 1981, I: 369–452).

See also: Austin, John L.; Bühler, Karl; Speech Acts.

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M. A. K. Halliday was born in Leeds, UK. His father was Wilfrid J. Halliday, a teacher of English and Latin at Pudsey Grammar School and co-editor of the northern counties volume of the *Survey of English dialects* (1962). He was educated at Rugby School (1938–1942), then studied Chinese, as part of his military service, at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London (1942–1943). After enlisting with the British Army in 1944, he worked with Military Intelligence in India, then returned to SOAS in 1945 as an instructor in Chinese in the military service courses. In 1947 he enrolled in the University of Peking and also taught English there; in 1948 he took his external London B.A. in Chinese. His postgraduate work for the University of London started at Peking University and continued at Lingnan University (Canton). But after his return to London in 1950, he transferred to Cambridge University, where he undertook a dissertation on the 14th-century Mandarin 'Secret History of the Mongols' under the supervision of J. R. Firth of the University of London. He became Assistant Lecturer in the Department of Chinese at Cambridge (1954) and received his Ph.D. in 1955. In 1958 he gave up his Cambridge position to take the post of Lecturer in the Department of English Language and General Linguistics, University of Edinburgh, and became Reader there in 1960. This period saw the development of his 'scale-and-category grammar,' whose principles are set out in his 1961 publication. In 1963 he moved to University College, London, as Director of the Communication Research Centre. There he was subsequently appointed Professor and founding Chair of the Department of General Linguistics (1965) and Director of the Nuffield/Schools Council Programme in Linguistics and English Teaching (1964–1970). In the latter period, the scale-and-category grammar gave way to its successor, 'systemic-functional grammar.' Halliday resigned his chair in 1971, and until 1975 undertook temporary positions at various universities (Brown, Nairobi, Illinois, Essex) and at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences (Stanford). In 1976 he took up the position of Professor and founding Chair in the Department of Linguistics at the University of Sydney, NSW, where he remained until retirement in 1988. Subsequently he has held temporary positions at universities in Singapore, China, Japan, and the UK. He has received honorary degrees from universities in Australia, Canada, China, France, Great Britain, Greece, and India. He continues to reside in the Sydney area.

The scale-and-category grammar had its origins in the work of J. R. Firth, particularly his 'system-structure' theory. Halliday's scale-and-category model had a division of language into three strata: the intermediate level of grammar and lexis (together, 'form'); the upper level of context, which relates form to the situations of its use; and the lower level of substance in which language is encoded as sounds or written symbols. The grammar has four primary categories: unit, structure, class, and system. The units of inclusiveness—sentence, clause, group, word, and morpheme—are arranged on a scale of rank, on the principle that each higher unit includes one or more instances of the next lower unit. Each unit has its own distinctive structure potential, consisting of an inventory of structural elements. Each structural element is realized by a unit at the next lower rank, unless a 'rank shift' occurs: when the element consists of some unit at the same rank as, or higher rank than, its own unit. Particular units are also classified on the basis of their syntax (distribution in the next higher unit) and morphology (their distinctive structure potential). Classes and sub-classes are arranged on a scale of delicacy, from the most general classes to the most specific. System represents the paradigmatic relationship within sets of features at increasing degrees of delicacy. The scale of exponence arranges structural elements and the units they consist of successively in top-to-bottom description.

Systemic-functional grammar is a natural development of scale-and-category grammar. Whereas in scale-and-category system is one of four primary categories, in the later development it is the sole primary category. System represents paradigmatic choice at all levels and at all ranks. Choice in one system may imply a further systematic choice of terms; the logical dependency of one system on another is a network, which in principle is elaborated synoptically to comprise in a single network all paradigmatic choices at each stratum of a single language. The relation between the paradigmatic and the syntagmatic components of the grammar is handled by realization rules, which take as input combinations of choices within the network and produce strings of structural elements as output within units at whatever rank.

Function in systemic-functional grammar is understood in two senses. The primary or 'meta'-functions divide the general meaning of discourse into three parts: ideational meaning, itself split into experiential meaning (i.e., propositional) and logical meaning, then interpersonal, and finally textual. These functional divisions permeate the grammar from top

to bottom. Any whole utterance or any single form may have propositional content and logical structuring and also implications for social intercourse, and at the same time possess important text-forming features. The second meaning of function is as a term for the elements of structure within units, e.g., subject within clause, or modifier within group.

Systemic-functional grammar has been extended into a number of other important language-related disciplines, such as clinical research and practice, discourse studies, educational theory, and natural language computation. Within the latter it has led to the development of the Nigel grammar component of the Penman text generation system.

See also: Critical Applied Linguistics; Educational Linguistics.

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Hill, Jane

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Jane Hassler Hill was born in Berkeley, California on October 27, 1939. After taking her first course in linguistic anthropology at Reed College, Hill's fate as a scholar was sealed. Stirring a lifelong passion for language, Hill later continued her studies at UC Berkeley, where she completed a B.A. in anthropology in 1960, winning the prestigious departmental prize on graduation. For her graduate training, Hill traveled to UCLA, where she studied with William Bright and Harry Hoijer, two respected linguists in the Americanist tradition. There she completed an M.A. in linguistics in 1962, followed by a Ph.D. in anthropology in 1966. Hill is best known for her cutting-edge research in linguistic anthropology, encompassing everything from language contact and prehistory to worldview, racism, and language obsolescence. Hill is also a respected descriptive linguist.

Over the course of her career, Hill has contributed widely to Uto-Aztecan linguistics, starting with her dissertation on the Cupeño language of southern California. Following in the tradition pioneered by Franz Boas and Edward Sapir (*see* **Sapir, Edward**), Hill's work with several elderly Cupeño speakers led to the first definitive grammar of this virtually undocumented language, a study she followed with a series of articles on stress, lexicalization, clause structure, and verb classes. Decades before, one of Alfred Louis Kroeber's students, Paul-Louis Fay, had conducted preliminary fieldwork on Cupeño, allowing Hill to compare Fay's notes with her own, and leading to a lifelong interest in language obsolescence. Hill has also published on issues of prehistory, contact, honorifics, and color terminology in the Uto-Aztecan language family.

Hill's longstanding interest in contact and attrition culminated with the publication of *Speaking Mexicano* in 1986, a work she coauthored with her husband, Kenneth Hill. Set in the Malinche Volcano region of central Mexico, among Mexicano speakers, a language that descends from classical Nahuatl, the book focuses on the structural effects of contact with Spanish. Over the centuries, Mexicano absorbed a number of features from Spanish, including nouns, verb roots, grammatical affixes, and syntactic templates. Though many Mexicano speakers

are bilingual, the community as a whole has opted not to shift to Spanish across-the-board, owing to a pervasive ideology that attributes distance to Spanish and intimacy to Mexicano. Instead, the speakers of Mexicano have collapsed the opposition between the two languages in many settings, a situation that Hill and Hill describe as 'syncretism' rather than mere mixing. Once juxtaposed, speakers can either highlight or suppress the ideological overtones of the two speech forms, claiming the power, for instance, associated with Spanish or, alternatively, creating a subtle parody of the Spanish-speaking world. Ironically, a new ideology of purism, which places a strong preference on classical Nahuatl, now threatens what survives of the language today, with its strong Spanish influence.

Jane Hill has earned a reputation as one of the most distinguished scholars currently working in the tradition of linguistic anthropology. After a stint at Wayne State University, Hill accepted a position at the University of Arizona in 1983, where she currently holds the title of Regent's Professor. Hill also served a term as President of the American Anthropological Association in 1998–1999. In 2004, Hill was awarded the prestigious Viking Fund Medal, in recognition of her outstanding record of service and scholarly research in linguistic anthropology.

See also: Sapir, Edward.

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Historical Pragmatics

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Introduction

Historical pragmatics is a field of study that lies at the intersection of historical linguistics and pragmatics. It has established itself as an active field of inquiry since the mid-1990s as a result of a broadening of both historical linguistics, which started to replace a view of language as a coherent and homogeneous system by a more corpus-driven approach, focusing on genre-specific conventions and the internal variability of older stages of language, and a simultaneous broadening of pragmatics, which started to accept an increasingly wide range of data, including also

written data. As a consequence, historical pragmatics defines itself as the study of pragmatic aspects in the history of specific languages. The field is also called historical discourse analysis or historical dialogue analysis (e.g., Brinton, 2001; Jucker *et al.*, 1999). The choice of terms may sometimes imply a specific perspective, but often they are used interchangeably.

Data

Spoken interaction from the past is not directly available for inspection, but this is no longer seen as problematic for historical pragmatics for several reasons. Instances of recorded spoken language abound in historical data. Court records, for example, contain verbatim accounts of the words spoken during the course of legal proceedings in a law court. Plays consist almost entirely of fictional accounts of spoken language. Early scientific textbooks are often written in the form of fictional interactions between a master and a student. Narrative fiction may contain long stretches of reported discourse. And language teaching textbooks often provide model conversations, e.g., for the merchant traveling to a foreign country.

In all instances, the reliability of these data is an issue. Court proceedings were presumably formal and thus not typical of everyday language. Prescriptive models in language textbooks and representations of conversations in drama or fictional narratives cannot be taken as accurate renderings of the spoken language of any particular period. Therefore, on the one hand, these historical records of spoken language may give us an approximation of the real spoken language in different historical and sociocultural contexts; on the other hand, these instances warrant a pragmatic analysis in their own right. Thus, we may analyze the use of discourse markers in a play by Shakespeare, not because we believe that this is a particularly good approximation to how discourse markers were used in spoken conversations of Shakespeare's time, but because we are directly interested in how Shakespeare used discourse markers in his plays. (*see* **Discourse Markers**).

In addition, Koch and Oesterreicher (1985), in a widely adopted model, have argued for a need to distinguish between the realization of language in a particular medium, and the way language is realized on a scale ranging from the language of immediacy to the language of distance. As to the first, language may be realized either in the phonic code or in the graphic code. But this dichotomy has to be distinguished from the scale formed between instances of the language of immediacy, which is more typically (but not exclusively) realized in the phonic code, and the language of distance, which is more typically (but not exclusively) realized in the written code. While no historical language realized in the phonic code is still available, there is sufficient data on the language of immediacy, as for instance in diaries or in personal correspondence.

Moreover, even written texts that lack any connection to the spoken language and that are manifestations of the language of distance are always produced in a communicative context by writers who want to communicate with their readers, and as communicative events they are amenable to pragmatic analyses.

Topics in Historical Pragmatics

Several distinct subfields of historical pragmatics can be distinguished. The first approach, which has been called 'pragmaphilology' by Jacobs and Jucker (1995), studies pragmatic aspects of historical texts in their sociocultural context of communication. Such studies are not new, except for their more explicit reliance on recently developed descriptive tools from the fields of pragmatics and discourse analysis. These may range from ethnographic descriptions of communicative events to the various forms of politeness attested in historical data and to discourse analytical investigations. They also include an approach that may be termed 'literary historical pragmatics.' Fitzmaurice (2002), for instance, provides a pragmatic reading of familiar letters in 17th- and 18th-century England which takes into account intended and unintended meanings implied and inferred by writer and audience. Sell (2000) deals with literary texts of the past. He argues that literary activity should be seen as communication in a strongly interactive sense, as it is affected by the different situationalities of sender and receiver. In the case of literature, sender and receiver are often separated not only in place but also in time. In this case, the literary critic, or the historical pragmaticist, has the task of mediating between the situationalities.

The second approach, diachronic pragmatics, studies the historical development of pragmatic elements, such as discourse markers or speech acts, or it studies the pragmatic causes of language change. To the extent that different stages in the history of a language are compared, historical pragmatics is a kind of contrastive analysis. As in any contrastive study, it is important to specify the *tertium comparationis*, i.e., the element that remains constant when different diachronic stages are compared. It has become standard to distinguish between 'diachronic form-to-function mapping' and 'diachronic function-to-form mapping'

(see Jacobs and Jucker, 1995: 13). An example of the former are discourse markers or pragmatic markers, which are typically marginal forms with little or no propositional meaning that occur outside the syntactic structure and which function on the interactional or pragmatic level. Brinton (1996) examines a variety of such markers in Old English and in Middle English. In this case, linguistic forms that stay relatively stable are taken as a starting point, and their different functions at different stages of their diachronic development are traced.

If, on the other hand, a linguistic function, such as the expression of politeness, is taken as starting point, the term *diachronic function-to-form mapping* is used. In this case, the different realizations of this function in the course of time are studied. Arnovick (1999), for instance, traces the histories of a number of speech acts, such as promises, curses, blessings, greetings, and entire speech events, such as flyting and sounding, which she collectively calls *illocutionary biographies*. Jucker and Taavitsainen (2000) argue that histories of individual speech acts have to be situated within a multidimensional pragmatic space in which the speech act can be contrasted with neighboring speech acts.

Often, however, the distinction between these two perspectives is not easy, because in the course of time a particular linguistic element may change both its form and its function. And in some cases the object of investigation is not a particular form or a particular function but a more comprehensive system of interconnected entities, as in the case of address term systems (see Taavitsainen and Jucker, 2003). Many languages distinguish between a more polite and a more intimate personal pronoun of address, such as French *vous* and *tu* or Early Modern English *you* and *thou*. Some languages have more than just two such pronouns of address (e.g., German at some stage of its development, see Listen, 1999). Such systems undergo multivaried developments at different levels. Busse (2002) investigates the morpho-syntactic variability of the second person pronouns in the plays by William Shakespeare and seeks to identify the factors that influence the choice of *you* versus *thou* and *ye* versus *you*.

The cover term *diachronic pragmatics* is also used for approaches that study the pragmatic causes of language change. Traugott and Dasher (2002), for instance, argue on the basis of extensive corpus data from English and Japanese that there are predictable paths of semantic change because such changes are pragmatically motivated, that is to say they are bound up with mechanisms called *invited inferencing* and *subjectification*.

Recent Advances

To date, a disproportionate amount of research in historical pragmatics is devoted to the history of English, but important work has been carried out in several other and less-well researched languages. Xing (2004), for instance, investigates the pragmatic factors affecting the development of a specific focus particle in Mandarin Chinese. Lunde (2004) examines reporting strategies in medieval East Slavic hagiography and homiletics, and Collins's (2001) study is devoted to the distribution of reporting strategies in a corpus of medieval Russian texts.

The papers published by Bax (2003) testify to the importance of rituals in language change in diverse language situations, ranging from ancient Indo-European religious poetry (Vedic hymns) to ritual politeness in early modern Dutch letter writing and ritual aspects of contemporary mass sports events. The language of the mass media has also received increasing attention from historical pragmaticists, for instance in the papers published by Ungerer (2000) and by Herring (2003), which provide an historical view on mass media communication, and thus show that historical pragmatic analyses can also be applied to changes in progress.

See also: Discourse, Foucauldian Approach; Discourse Markers; Literary Pragmatics; Media: Pragmatics; Politeness; History of Pragmatics; Pragmatics: Overview; Speech Acts.

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History of Pragmatics

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Pragmatics, the study of sign use and sign users in situations, is usually considered to be a fairly recent addition to the language sciences (*see* **Pragmatics: Overview**). The term *pragmatics* is generally said to date back to the work of the American semiotician and behaviorist Charles Morris and his distinction of the three parts of semiotics: *syntactics*, *semantics*, and *pragmatics*. The foundations for pragmatics as a linguistic discipline are regarded as having been laid by ordinary language philosophers and speech-act theorists such as Ludwig Wittgenstein, John L. Austin, John R. Searle, and H. Paul Grice (*see* **Austin, John L., Grice, Herbert Paul, Wittgenstein, Ludwig Josef Johann**).

By adopting this new approach to language, studied as a kind of human action, philosophers and linguists hoped to overcome an overly narrow study of language as a closed system to be analyzed in itself and for itself, as advocated in structuralist traditions of linguistics after Ferdinand de Saussure and Noam Chomsky. Since the 1970s, pragmatics has become the focus of interest not only in mainstream linguistics, but also in communication studies, discourse analysis (including applied studies in the schoolroom or courtroom), conversation analysis, in psychology, the social sciences, artificial intelligence, and in the study of language and cognition. The study of language has therefore gradually widened its scope during the last half of the 20th century, from the *sign* to the use of signs in social situations, and from the *sentence* to the use of utterances in context.

Half a century after widening the scope of linguistics in this way, it has, however, become clear that a wider pragmatic perspective on language, social interaction, and mind had, in fact, already existed

well before Austin made it popular in the 20th century (Nerlich and Clarke, 1996, 2000, where more references can be found) (*see* **Pragmatic Acts**).

This history of pragmatics will concentrate on uncovering the roots of the *different approaches to pragmatics* that one can distinguish in Europe and America: (1) the Anglo-Saxon approach which emerged from *ordinary language philosophy* with Wittgenstein, Austin, and Searle, and which has dominated the field, and which (2) developed concurrently with, but independent of, the school of *British contextualism and functionalism*; (3) the French approach, which is based on the *theory of enunciation* elaborated by Émile Benveniste; (4) the German approach (associated with the *critical theory movement* around Jürgen Habermas and Karl Otto Apel), which wants to study pragmatics as part of a general theory of (communicative) action (*see* **Habermas, Jürgen**).

These European traditions of pragmatic thinking were affiliated in various ways with the development of *pragmatism* as a new philosophy that emerged in the United States in the latter part of the 19th century, and which made the three-way split between syntactics, semantics, and pragmatics popular in linguistics, philosophy, and semiotics.

All approaches, the two Anglo-Saxon ones, the French one, the German one, and the American one, have their deeper roots in Antiquity, that is, in *rhetoric*. They are also all based, to various degrees, on Immanuel Kant's philosophy of the 'active (transcendental) subject' and on John Locke's philosophy of the 'semiotic act.'

These pragmatic modes of thought can be studied as *historical traditions*, but they can also be analyzed as *theoretical frameworks* that cluster around certain pragmatic key words:

1. Anglo-Saxon: speech act, meaning, use; meaning, intention, context, function
2. German: agenthood of (transcendental) subject, dialogue, pronouns
3. French: subjectivity, markers of subjectivity, indexicals
4. American: meaning as action, the triadic sign relation.

These four traditions should not be regarded as monolithic, unchanging, and exclusive. Since the 1970s, many approaches have developed that deal with language in use, such as, to mention just a few, the social pragmatics developed by Jacob Mey (Mey, 2001), also called *language in use* theory, the systemic-functional approach to language developed by Michael A. K. Halliday (Halliday, 1978) (*see* **Halliday, Michael Alexander Kirkwood**), the various types of (critical) discourse analysis (see Mey, 1979,

1985; Beaugrande, 1996), and more recently the pragmatic and critical approach to metaphor analysis one could call the theory of *metaphor in use*.

Sources of Antagonism and Inspiration

It is generally assumed that language was studied as an *organism* in the 19th century and as a *system* in the 20th. This does not seem to leave much room for the study of language in use or in context or the study of the relationship between language and action. However, looking at disciplines adjacent to linguistics, such as various kinds of philosophy, psychology, sociology, and semiotics, one can discover that the roots of pragmatic thinking go back as far as the 19th and early 20th centuries. Inasmuch as these disciplines influenced the fringes of official linguistics, they also triggered pragmatic insights in linguistic thinking itself, especially in its reflection on meaning.

Those linguists who were interested in the meaning and use of language and not only, like the majority of their historical-comparative colleagues, in sound change, turned to an older source of pragmatic inspiration: rhetoric. Since antiquity, and since the Middle Ages as part of the trivium (rhetoric, grammar, logic), rhetoric had been part and parcel of language studies. However, in their efforts to constitute linguistics as an autonomous science, historical-comparative linguists had focused almost exclusively on the study of grammar, detaching it from the study of language in discourse (rhetoric) and from logic. By contrast, in their study of meaning and discourse, linguists and philosophers not working in the mainstream of historical-comparative linguistics made use of some of the concepts inherited from rhetoric (as for example the figures of speech, the situation of discourse, the interaction between speaker and hearer, and the tripartition of grammar, logic, and rhetoric itself, which is at the root of many semiotic triads).

Among those who redefined and criticized the use of the concept of organism as a metaphor for the study of language, many also rejected an older philosophical theorem, namely that language represents thought (or ideas) and that only language that represents thoughts or the world is worthy of philosophical inquiry, as Aristotle had claimed in *De Interpretatione*, 17a, 1–5 (see Whitaker, 1996).

For pragmatic thinkers of all times, by contrast, language is not only there to represent true or false states of affairs, but it is used to influence others in specific ways, to communicate with others, to act upon others, and to make them act in certain ways, in other words, to change the world. This is why Austin later rejected the philosophy of language developed by those logical positivists who paid lip

service to pragmatics, but still only studied statements as mapping onto states of affairs and the understanding of statements as the understanding of truth conditions. For some of the early pragmaticians, as well as for the later ones, language was also not simply a system of conventional signs for the representation of thoughts. They reflected instead on the motivation underlying the signs' sound-structure and meaning, on the 'naturalness' of language, as one would say now, and on the sources of that motivation in the speakers and the speech situation, in the uses they make of signs in situations.

Early Pragmatic Insights

In Germany, the representational theory of language was undermined in the tradition of Kant, whose theory of the active organizing powers of the mind gave the impetus for a philosophy of language based on the mental acts of the speaker/hearer, especially in the works of Johann Severin Vater, August Ferdinand Bernhardi, and Wilhelm von Humboldt, published during the first two decades of the 19th century. These thinkers gradually replaced the philosophical study of the subject-object relation by a linguistic study of the subject-subject relation, and, in doing so, they developed a dialogical approach to language. The following quote from Vater's work, in which he develops a pragmatic conception of the sign (influenced by Locke's semiotics and Johann Heinrich Lambert's philosophy of language), will demonstrate this tradition, which ends with Humboldt's study of dialogue (for more information on the Kantian tradition, see Perconti (1999).

> One can define these concepts [the sign, etc.] from the following points of view: (1) the one who signifies, (2) the one for whom one signifies, (3) the purpose of the signification, (4) the success, the reciprocation of this purpose, (5) the sign, as the means, and (6) that which is signified (Vater, 1801: 137; all translations are Nerlich's).

Compare with Humboldt:

> It is particularly relevant to language that duality has a much more important role in it than anywhere else. All speech is based on interlocution (*Wechselrede*), in which the speaker always posits the addressee as the one person opposite him, even when there are more people around. [...] To divide humanity into two classes, the natives and the enemies, is the basis of all primitive social bonding (Humboldt, 1963 [1827]: 137–138).

During the second half of the 19th century, the German pragmatic tradition focused even more on the role of the hearer and on language understanding in situation, possibly under the influence of the hermeneutical tradition (from Friedrich Schleiermacher to Wilhelm Dilthey).

In England, the representational theory of language was overthrown in the writings of the Scottish school of common sense philosophy, in particular the work of Thomas Reid. Reid remarked that Aristotle had been right to observe that

> besides that kind of speech called a *proposition*, which is always either true or false, there are other kinds which are neither true nor false, such as a prayer or a wish; to which we may add, a question, a command, a promise, a contract, and many others (Reid, 1872, vol. II: 692).

However, according to Reid, Aristotle had been wrong in relegating the study of these speech acts other than the proposition to rhetoric (or to the domain of what is now called the pragmatic 'wastebasket' (see Mey, 2001: 12–15):

> The expression of a question, of a command, or of a promise, is as capable of being analyzed as a proposition is; but we do not find that this has been attempted; we have not so much as given them a name different from the operations which they express (Reid, 1872, vol. I: 245).

Reid therefore developed a philosophical theory of meaning and a theory of speech acts that could accommodate these types of sentences. He stressed that, unlike statements, these other sentences are fundamentally 'social operations,' because their success necessarily depends on their uptake by others. Reid's views on language spread widely, from Scotland to England, mainly Cambridge, to the United States, and to France.

Whereas Reid had mainly focused on speech acts as social acts and thus contributed to speech-act theory *avant la lettre*, the philosopher and elocution teacher Benjamin Humphrey Smart developed a contextualist theory of meaning as his contribution to a general theory of signs and to early pragmatics. In his *Outline of sematology: or an essay towards establishing a new theory of grammar, logic, and rhetoric* (Smart, 1831), Smart took up Locke's threefold division of knowledge into (1) *physicology*, or the study of nature, (2) *practology*, or the study of human action, and (3) *sematology*, the study of the use of signs for our knowledge, or, in short, the doctrine of signs (Smart, 1831: 1–2). His study deals with signs "which the mind invents and uses to carry on a train of reasoning independently of actual existences" (Smart, 1831: 2). For Smart, sematology (as later semiotics for Morris, and going back to the medieval trivium) had three parts: grammar, logic, and rhetoric. In all three parts, Smart makes it clear that signs do not *mean* ideas, they are *used* to mean something in *context*.

He quotes the following passage from the work of the Scottish common sense philosopher Dugald Stewart, a follower of Reid:

> our words, when examined separately, are often as completely insignificant as the letters of which they are composed; deriving their meaning solely from the connection, or relation, in which they stand to others (Stewart, 1854–1860, V: 154–155).

Smart was widely read, although it seems more by thinkers working outside linguistics proper, such as Charles Darwin. The term Smart used for his philosophy of language in context, *sematology*, was later used idiosyncratically by the German psychologist Karl Bühler, but Smart's theory of signs as part of his epistemology was also continued, to some extent, by those working in the tradition of 'significs' (see more on significs below).

Locke and the opposition to Locke were also important in France. Etienne Bonnot de Condillac and the Ideologues had based their philosophy of language in part on Locke's representationalism and empiricism, and saw in language a system of signs for the representation of ideas and sensations. After the French Revolution, in which the Ideologues had been involved, and during the French Restoration, their sensualist (and therefore quasi-materialist) philosophy of language was attacked by French philosophers and psychologists of the eclectic school, such as Victor Cousin, Théodore Jouffroy, and also Maine de Biran, who drew on ideas taken from Kant's philosophy of the active spirit, as well as from the common sense philosophers in Scotland and England, such as Reid. Based on their theories and Reid's conception of social acts, Adolphe Garnier formulated, about 1850, a theory of speech acts (orders and promises, for example) which highlighted the social aspects of speech acts, that is, both the interaction between (the intention of) the speaker and (the understanding by) the hearer, and the interlocutors' social position in the context of discourse. However, Garnier's speech-act theory went almost unnoticed. It was only at the beginning of the 20th century that the legal philosopher Adolf Reinach formulated a similar, but much more elaborate, theory of speech acts, or what Reinach called, with Reid, *social acts*, based, in part, on Edmund Husserl's phenomenology. For Reinach, speech acts, such as commands, can only exist *qua* command insofar as they are not divided up into a statement or *constatation* and its performance. They are both part of *the social act* (Reinach, 1913: 708; Engl. transl. 1983: 20), similar to what Jacob Mey (Mey, 2001: 206–235) later called *pragmatic acts* (*see* **Speech Acts**; **Pragmatic Acts**).

The Development of Pragmatics between 1850 and 1930

Gradually, Cousin's philosophy was replaced in France by Hippolyte Taine's rationalist and positivistic psychology. In Germany, too, psychology, especially Friedrich Herbart's mathematical psychology, became more important than philosophy for the advancement of the study of the nature of language. Herbart himself proposed that language could only be understood in the context of human action in general; a view repeated (without direct reference to Herbart, but totally in his spirit) by William Dwight Whitney in the United States (who also stressed the social dimension of language as an institution), by Johan Nicolai Madvig in Denmark (who stressed the role of context and developed a theory of meaning as use), and by Philipp Wegener in Germany who studied not only language in context but also what he called the *dialogic speech-act*, and what H. P. Grice was later to call *conversational implicatures* (*see* **Implicature, Grice, Herbert Paul**). Wegener analyzed, for example, (elliptical) 'statements' that function as commands:

> In the word-sentence 'my boots', the pure word-image does not trigger the representation of the facts that (1) somebody orders an action; (2) what that action is; (3) who should execute the action. All this can only be inferred from the situation and the gestures. The word-image only evokes the representation of a definite thing that the speaker has in mind as an object (Wegener, 1921: 9–10).

Heymann Steinthal, another follower of Humboldt and Herbart, and one of the most famous psychologists of language in the 19th century (read and criticized by Madvig, Whitney, Wegener, and many others), did not directly contribute to a pragmatic theory of language, but, inspired by Steinthal's work and the Russian linguist Aleksandr A. Potebnya, developed an original theory of language and meaning based on the concept of psychological activity. (For the Russian tradition, especially Voloshinov and Bakhtin, see Nerlich (2000). *See also* **Voloshinov, Valentin Nikolaevich; Bakhtin, Mikhail Mikhailovich.**)

In France, Taine's call *back to Condillac*, and his semiotic theory of signs, was heard by the linguist Michel Bréal who abhorred the widely used metaphor according to which words or meanings 'live and die' like biological organisms. Instead, he argued that

> Our forefathers of the school of Condillac, those ideologists who for 50 years served as target to a certain school of criticism, were less far from the truth when they said, in simple and honest fashion, that words are signs. [...] *Words are signs*: they have no more existence

than the signals of the semaphore, or than the dots and dashes of Morse's telegraphy (Bréal, 1964 [1900]: 249, italics ours).

However, Bréal did not only study language as a system of signs, but also as the expression of the speaking subject, who uses language to express emotions, beliefs, wishes, and demands, that is, to accomplish speech acts. He also analyzed the traces left in speech of the speaker using language, as for example the function of markers such as *nevertheless*, *hopefully*, etc. Furthermore, like Reid and others, Bréal criticized what Austin later called the *descriptive fallacy* in linguistic thinking. Compare:

Language is not only made to say: 'the sun shines on the countryside', 'the rivers flow into the sea'. Beyond that, language serves mainly to give expression to desires, demands, to be the expression of the will. It is this *subjective* side of language that should be studied more [...] (Bréal, 1877: 361–362).

The topic of the subjectivity in language was taken up by the French counterpart to Anglo-Saxon speech-act theory, viz., the theory of enunciation, as elaborated by Charles Bally, Gustave Guillaume, and Émile Benveniste (*see* **Bühler, Karl**) and amalgamated with a theory of speech acts in the work of Oscar Ducrot. These French linguists also studied what they called the actualization of language (*la langue*) in speech (*la parole*) through what Roman Jakobson, for example, called *shifters*, and Bally called *indicators*.

But Bréal not only initiated a study of subjectivity and indexicality in language, but also promoted a functionalist approach to language. Quite early on in his career, while actually introducing German historical-comparative linguistics to France, Bréal began to criticize its organicism and its way of studying linguistic forms without taking into account their function. For Bréal, as for other 'functionalists' of that time (such as Wegener), function was the primary force of language change. Forms do not change in sound or meaning all by themselves, but because they are used with a specific function by the language user in discourse and in a certain situation. Other French functionalists were the psychologists Frédéric Paulhan and Henri Delacroix, and the linguist and medical doctor Eugène Bernard Leroy. Paulhan, in particular, established an explicit theory of speech acts in the context of a theory of linguistic functions that is directly comparable to that developed by Karl Bühler in Germany (more on Bühler below). Using an example that has become commonplace in pragmatic writing, he points out that:

[I]n order to understand the words 'it's raining', it suffices that, consciously or half-consciously, I take my umbrella with me when I want to go out. If I act in this way, I can really say that I have understood the words 'it's raining', even though I might not have associated them with any images that they represent (Paulhan, 1886: 47).

The German functionalists and speech-act theorists *avant la lettre* at the turn of the 19th to the 20th century, especially Anton Marty and Bühler, were influenced by rationalist linguists such as Whitney, Madvig, Wegener, and Bréal on the one hand, but also, on the other, by new developments in psychology, such as the descriptive psychology developed by Franz Brentano, by the psychology of Gestalt, by phenomenological psychology, as well as by developments in social behaviorism.

Bühler (who was also a great admirer of Wegener) was working in the context of the Würzburg school of psychology, and he knew the work of Marty and Edmund Husserl well. He established the most elaborate theory of pragmatics in Germany (Bühler, 1934), of which his 'organon model' was the central part. In this model, he places the linguistic sign in its context of use, bringing into the model the speaker and hearer (forgotten in the semiotic triangle popularized by Charles K. Ogden and Ivor A. Richards) and the reference to 'things' (forgotten in Ferdinand de Saussure's famous speech circuit). The organon model, depicted by a triangle overlaid upon a circle, shows that every sign is at one and the same time a symptom (indicator, index) by virtue of its dependence on the sender (whose internal state it expresses), a signal by virtue of its appeal to the recipient (whose behavior it controls), and a symbol by virtue of its assignment to the objects and states of affairs (to which it refers). And so, every sentence is at one and the same time *expression*, *appeal*, and *representation*. These are also the three main functions of language and sign use.

This functional and semiotic theory of language was further elaborated by linguists, such as Erwin Koschmieder and Alfons Nehring, as well as by philosophers, such as Karl-Otto Apel and Jürgen Habermas (*see* **Habermas, Jürgen**). Koschmieder, also influenced by Husserl, developed one of the first theories of performatives in Germany, a theory which can be directly compared to that which was being developed on the other side of the English Channel by Austin.

As early as 1929, Koschmieder had hinted at some puzzling syntactic phenomena of tense and aspect which would lead him to postulate a new "case of coincidence" (Koschmieder, 1965 [1945]: 26–27). He discussed the Hebrew equivalent of the sentence *I hereby bless him*, and pointed out that in such examples the action arises in the very utterance, that is to

say: action and utterance coincide. He also used the example (later made famous through Austin): *Hiermit eröffne ich die Versammlung* ('I hereby open the meeting', i.e., 'I declare the meeting to be opened'), and he pointed out that *Hiermit schreibe ich einen Brief* ('I am hereby writing a letter') is impossible.

A Cambridge psychologist, George Frederick Stout, working toward the end of the 19th century, was also influenced by Brentano, as well as by Herbart and by Kant. From Kant, he took the insight into the active organizing powers of the individual in understanding the world and applied it to the individual using language. Stout was opposed to English associationism as proposed for example by Alexander Bain (Bain, 1855) and John Stuart Mill, and put forward a contextualist theory of language that incorporated some principles reminding one of the later Gestalt school of psychology. He was especially interested in the context-sensitivity of the notions of subject and predicate, thereby implicitly challenging linguistic analysis in terms of logic alone. He thus contributed to the development of ordinary language philosophy in Cambridge.

The psychological work of Paulhan and Stout was appreciated by the English philosopher and philanthropist Lady Victoria Welby, whose work on "meaning" (which she called *significs*) started an English and a Dutch school of pragmatics (named 'significa'), in which not only was context important, but language use and the whole speech event (including the speaker's intention and the hearer's interpretation) were taken into account (see Schmitz, 1990).

The English school of contextualism (Sir Alan Henderson Gardiner, Bronisław Malinowski, John Rupert Firth) was partly based on the work of Welby (just as later also was Ogden and Richards' work, who, too, can be counted among the functionalists) on the one hand, and on the work of Wegener (which was much less metaphysical and more 'pragmatic' than Welby's) on the other. Gardiner wanted to analyze "acts of speech," Firth whole "speech events," and Malinowski wanted to study meaning as action. In his famous supplement (on meaning in primitive languages) to Ogden and Richard's book *The meaning of meaning*, Malinowski claimed that language is "a mode of action," especially of cooperation between people (Malinowski, 1923: 315).

The meaning of meaning also contained an extract of Peirce's work on semiotics as a direct result of Lady Welby's influence. In the early years of the 20th century, Lady Welby had corresponded with the father of pragmatism and semiotics, the American philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce. Peirce had inherited the term *pragmatisch* from Kant (in the latter's distinction between *practical* reason, that is, of the 'pure kind,' and

pragmatic reason, that is, of the 'empirical' kind), and he knew the semiotic literature of the past well, from the Medieval philosopher Peter of Spain to Locke, Reid, and Welby. His counterpart, the pragmatist psychologist William James, by contrast, derived the term *pragmatism* from the Greek *prágma*, meaning 'practice', 'action'. And, whereas Peirce's *pragmaticism* (a term Peirce introduced to set his theory off against James's) became part of his semiotics, as a general theory of signs and of meaning, James's *pragmatism* became part of a morally based psychology and theory of truth (*see* **Peirce, Charles Sanders; Morris, Charles**).

Inspired in part by some principles of pragmatism, but also by Ogden and Richards' theory of signs and symbols, as well as by developments in logical positivism and behaviorism, the American Charles Morris is well-known for his tripartition of semiotics into *semantics*, as the study of the relationship between words and the world, *syntactics*, as the study of the relationship between words and words, and *pragmatics*, as the study of the relationship between words and their users (Morris, 1938). He made this the basis for a behavioristic type of semiotics.

The problem of 'meaning,' so important to Lady Welby and the pragmatists, became the focus of philosophical thinking worldwide. This was especially the case in England where, from the turn of the 19th century until the mid-20th century, it was leading up to the 'linguistic' and then 'pragmatic' turns in the philosophy of language. Initially, philosophers, such as the Oxford philosopher and classical scholar Austin, used linguistic analysis to find philosophical clarity; later, linguists used philosophical methods, such as those advocated by Austin, to study wider aspects of language. Here one can trace a line of thought leading from Gottlob Frege to Russell and the early Ludwig Wittgenstein (Wittgenstein I), to the later Wittgenstein (Wittgenstein II), Gilbert P. Ryle, Peter F. Strawson, Austin, H. Paul Grice, and finally to John Searle. Searle had written his Oxford D.Phil. thesis under Austin and Strawson on Frege's notion of sense and reference, and his concept of 'illocutionary force,' so central to pragmatics, can be traced back to Frege.

Pragmatism, Semiotics, and Speech Act Theory

As we have seen, many psychologists, philosophers, and linguists shared what Malinowski once called a "pragmatic *Weltanschauung*" (Malinowski, 1923: 328) at the turn of the 19th into the 20th century. They all regarded language as a mode of action and interaction. This conception was not unknown to Austin, who had read Gardiner, Morris,

Peirce, and others. However, it seems that Austin neither wished to be associated with the contextualist-functionalist pragmatics developed on his doorstep (Nerlich, 1996), nor with the pragmatist, behaviorist, and semiotic pragmatics developed on the other side of the Atlantic by Morris, nor with the formal type of pragmatics developed by ideal language philosophers such as Rudolf Carnap. Austin also did not accept Morris's tripartition of semiotics into syntactics, semantics, and pragmatics; as he pointed out in 1940:

> Now the reason why I cannot say 'the cat is on the mat and I don't believe it' is not that it offends against syntactics in the sense of being in some way "self-contradictory." What prevents me saying it, is rather some semantic convention (implicit, of course), about *the way we use words in situations* (Austin, 1963 [1940]: 10; italics ours).

And,

> the supposed "ideal" language ... is in many ways a most inadequate model of an actual language: its careful separation of syntactics from semantics, its list of explicitly formulated rules and conventions, and its careful delimitation of their spheres of operation – are all misleading. An actual language has few, if any explicit conventions, no sharp limits to the spheres of operation of rules, no rigid separation of what is syntactical and what semantical. (Austin, 1963 [1940]: 13).

It is astonishing to see that Austin does not use the term *pragmatics* in this context, as he implicitly argues for an integration of syntactics and semantics into pragmatics, being the study of the use of words or signs in the situation of a speech act.

Conclusion

Before Austin, the foundations for pragmatics had been laid by thinkers who stressed that:

- Signs are not only used for the expression of thought, but have various other functions.
- Signs have not only an intellectual but also an affective function.
- Sign use has basically three functions: representation, expression, and appeal.
- Signs can only be understood in the context of the situation in which they are used.
- Speaking is a goal-directed action.
- Signs are instruments used in the act of speech, and their use has practical effects and consequences.
- Signs are mainly used to influence others.
- Signs only function in dialogue and conversation; the reciprocity between speaker and hearer is important.

- Signs are used for the coordination of human behavior.
- Some signs are indexically linked to reality and the language users.

Rather late in the development of pragmatics are these ideas:

- Certain speech acts are self-referential.
- In saying something we are doing something.

See also: Austin, John L.; Bakhtin, Mikhail Mikhailovich; Frege, Friedrich Ludwig Gottlob; Grice, Herbert Paul; Peirce, Charles Sanders; Pragmatic Acts; Pragmatics: Overview; Rhetoric: History; Speech Acts; Voloshinov, Valentin Nikolaevich.

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Humor in Language

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There are many spoken and written varieties of humor, from puns to novels, but characteristic techniques recur in all forms of verbal humor, namely production of incongruity based on linguistic constructions or on the events described. Such incongruity can be represented as a clash between opposed semantic scripts. Thus, in the classic one-liner:

> A panhandler came up to me today and said he hadn't had a bite in weeks, so I bit him.

The phrase "had a bite" belongs structurally to the build-up, while functioning as the script-switch trigger, that is, the unit around which the joke's dual meaning revolves. The script in force in the build-up, namely a panhandler seeking a handout from a passer-by, vanishes in the punchline, where a previously backgrounded script takes hold, in which the victimized passer-by becomes the attacker, while the panhandler becomes the victim. Recognition of the sudden script switch releases psychic energy as laughter, according to Freud (1960), Bateson (1953), and others.

In everyday talk we find both spontaneous conversational joking (puns, banter, wordplay), personal anecdotes, and canned jokes (either narrative or nonnarrative, as in riddle jokes). Conversational joking can be spontaneous or formulaic. Recurrent conversational situations call for formulaic witticisms like "Born in a barn?" to someone who leaves a door open, and typical joking strategies like hyperbole: "I had about a thousand books to return" and irony: "I love it when it sleets." These utterances generate humor through the speaker's pretense in evoking one script while believing another – often modeled theoretically as a violation of some conversational maxim or the principle of relevance. (*see* **Maxims and Flouting**.) There are humorous sayings such as, "It's like déjà vu

all over again"; allusions like "Though William shake his spear, Anne hath a way"; proverbial similes like "Colder than a well-digger's ass"; leave-taking formulas like "See you in the funny papers"; and so on.

A description of the syntax and semantics of jokes as in Raskin (1985) requires to be extended, in order to include a consideration of their interpersonal and social dimensions in real-life contexts (Attardo, 1994, 1997; Attardo and Raskin, 1991). Discourse analysis has begun to elucidate the performance aspects of joke and anecdote telling (Sacks, 1974; Norrick, 2001), and to explore how conversationalists create and respond to humor in interaction, in casual talk among friends (Norrick, 1993) and family members (Everts, 2003), as well as in institutional settings (Holmes, 2000). (*see* **Critical Discourse Analysis; Institutional Talk**.) We must view joke telling, punning, and teasing in relation to contextualization cues, gender, power, solidarity, and social distance, as well as principles of politeness and cooperation in order to understand how verbal humor can express aggression, yet still build rapport. Joking allows participants to signal their respective affiliations and to align themselves with respect to them. Humor provides a socially acceptable vent for strong emotions toward other people and groups. Some individuals joke with almost everyone; some people kid each other whenever they meet, developing customary joking relationships in which teasing and joking are habitual and competitive. Moreover, conversational humor often revolves around inside jokes – jokes only group members have the shared background knowledge to understand (*see* **Shared Knowledge; Irony; Politeness**).

See also: Critical Discourse Analysis; Humor: Stylistic Approaches; Institutional Talk; Irony; Maxims and Flouting; Politeness; Shared Knowledge.

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Humor: Stylistic Approaches

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Much work in stylistics has demonstrated a sustained and thoroughgoing interest in the connections between patterns of style and aspects of verbal humor. This interest stems in part from stylistics' general concern with text analysis and from its preoccupation with developing analytic models to help explain the ways texts function as discourse. Stylisticians are, however, also interested in humorous discourse as it intersects with the wider study of verbal play and creativity in language. This particular approach is embodied in Nash's seminal study (Nash, 1985), which draws upon a large range of texts, penned by the author himself, to illustrate the full spectrum of types of verbal humor. A further dimension of the stylistic analysis of humor, which works in parallel with the focus on the connections between textual patterns and the humor impulse, is its interest in the differences between humorous discourse and so-called 'ordinary' discourse. The concern here is therefore with exploring how the 'nonroutine' communication that is humorous discourse makes for a useful tool for exploring contrastively the more commonplace patterns of everyday social interaction (Simpson, 1998: 35).

An axiom that underpins most stylistic research on humor runs as follows: for a text to be humorous, it must exhibit (at least) some sort of stylistic **incongruity**. Importantly, the incongruity may operate at any level of language or discourse; that is, at any point on a linguistic continuum that extends from lexicogrammar right up to dialogue and discourse. Puns and related forms of verbal play illustrate well the type of incongruity that is situated at the 'grammatical' end of the continuum. The incongruity in puns occurs when some feature of linguistic structure simultaneously combines two unrelated meanings, thereby allowing a 'double meaning' to be located in what is in effect a chance connection between two elements of language. **Lexical** puns, for instance, are activated by a clash between polysemous lexical items such as homophones and homonyms, as in Groucho Marx's quip "We only shot two bucks, but that's all the money we had" (see further Simpson, 2003: 16–29).

Situated toward the opposite end of the continuum, some incongruities may be grounded in mismatches between text and discourse context, and this type of humor-inducing strategy has received fullest explication in stylistic research on drama dialogue. Stylisticians have been especially interested in oppositions between characters' speech strategies and the discourse context (within the play) in which these strategies are framed. Similarly, stylisticians have reached interesting conclusions about the humor mechanism by crossreferencing the way fictional characters interact on the stage with the way they might be expected to interact should they inhabit the 'real' interactive world of playwright and audience/reader. Indeed, this tradition of research has yielded many insightful studies of the Theatre of the Absurd, where rich comparisons can be drawn between the discourse world **inside** the play and the discourse world **outside** the play (see Burton, 1980; Short, 1989; Simpson, 2000; Herman, 1996). By way of illustration, consider the following short scene from N. F. Simpson's absurdist play *One Way Pendulum*, where a courtroom has been hastily assembled inside a domestic living room to facilitate Mr. Groomkirby's 'swearing in' ceremony:

> The Usher enters followed by Mr. Groomkirby, whom he directs into the witness box. Mr. Groomkirby takes the oath.
> Mr. Groomkirby: (*holding up a copy of* Uncle Tom's Cabin).
> I swear, by Harriet Beecher Stowe, that the evidence I shall give shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
> Judge: You understand, do you, that you are now on oath?
> Mr. Groomkirby: I do, m'lord (Simpson, 1960: 60).

Whereas a courtroom is an institutionally designated location that deals exclusively with legal proceedings, it manifestly cannot be set up *ad hoc* in a domestic living room. Moreover, there are established procedures for ritualized activities such as the swearing-in of witnesses, and shared assumptions between participants about the way these routines are conducted form part of the communicative context of a 'real' courtroom. Clearly, the 'swearing in' ceremony here violates the pragmatic preconditions that govern the ritual, and so the communicative competence that organizes everyday interaction for the reader/viewer of the play acts as a frame for interpreting the incongruity of the displayed interaction at the character level on stage.

The principle of incongruity as a humor-inducing technique can be extended, beyond its core sense as a stylistic twist in a pattern of language, to cover situations where there is a mismatch between what someone says and what they mean. This extended pragmatic sense equates roughly with the concept

of **irony**. Many forms of irony are situated in a discursive opposition between what is asserted and what is meant, as embodied in an utterance such as 'You're a fine friend!' when said to someone who has just let you down. The irony here is located in a departure from Grice's maxim of 'truth' (which dictates that your interactive contribution must be true), although not all irony is explicable within the Gricean model. For example, another conceptual framework, arising from work in Relevance Theory, sees irony as 'echoic mention'; that is, as a type of usage where the utterance echoes other utterances and forms of discourse. This is apparent in an exchange such as the following

> A: I'm really fed up with this washing up.
> B: *You're fed up!* Who do you think's been doing it all week?

where the proposition about being fed up is used in a 'straight' way by the first speaker, but in an ironic, echoic way by the second (see Sperber and Wilson, 1981).

Irony, in both of the senses identified above, features especially prominently in stylistic research on parody and satire – two forms of verbal humor whose central stylistic incongruities are arguably built upon different kinds irony. The principle of echoic mention is absolutely central to parody's capacity to function as what Nash terms 'a discourse of allusion' (Nash, 1985: 100). Parody can take any particular anterior text as its model, although more general characteristics of other genres of discourse can also be brought into play. Once echoed, the stimulus text becomes part of a new discourse context so it no longer has the illocutionary force it once had in its original context, and that is what often engenders parody's ironic humor.

Satire has an aggressive element which is not necessarily present in parody. How this translates into stylistic terms is that satirical discourse, as well as having an echoic element, requires a further kind of ironic twist or distortion, of the more 'Gricean kind,' in its textual design. This additional distortion means that while parodies can remain affectionate to their source, satire can never be so. To illustrate, consider this famous passage from Jonathan Swift's satirical pamphlet *A Modest Proposal*:

> I shall now therefore humbly propose my own thoughts, which I hope will not be liable to the least objection. I have been assured by a very knowing American of my acquaintance in London, that a young healthy child well nursed is at a year old a most delicious, nourishing, and wholesome food, whether stewed, roasted, baked, or boiled; and I make no doubt that it will equally serve in a fricassee or a ragout (Swift, 1986 [1729]: 2175–2176).

The 'echoic irony' in Swift's text derives from its mimicking of the genre of the early eighteenth century pamphlet, and more narrowly the proliferation of pamphlets offering economic solutions to what was then perceived as the 'Irish problem.' However, the passage also contains an ironic distortion that marks it out as satire. This distortion comes through the startling sequence where the persona proposes to alleviate the burden of overpopulation and starvation in Ireland by eating that country's children. This twist marks an abrupt shift from a framework embodying what is morally acceptable to a framework of abnormality and obscenity.

An important rider needs to be attached to the 'incongruity-based' stylistic work on humor sketched thus far, which is, to put it bluntly, that not all incongruities are funny. Indeed, the type of humor response that a single textual stimulus attracts can vary enormously from recipient to recipient and from context to context. The variability of the humor response has not escaped the attention of stylisticians, and more recent work in stylistic humorology has sought to address both sides, the stimulus and the response side, of the humor event. One model that has come to prominence in this respect is the *General Theory of Verbal Humor* (GTVH) (see Attardo 1997, 2001 for useful compact expositions of the model). A key postulate of the GTVH is that the incongruity element in a humorous text is bounded by a preceding 'setup phase,' which establishes a neutral context for the incongruity, and a 'resolution phase,' which describes the knowledge resources employed by the humor processor to resolve the incongruity. The GTVH thus marks a shift away from an entirely text-centered description of humor toward one that accords equal weight to both textual and cognitive mechanisms of humor processing.

A useful literary-stylistic application of the GTVH is Attardo (2002), which is an exploration of the techniques of verbal humor used in Oscar Wilde's *Lord Arthur Savile's Crime*. Of a number of extensions to the theoretical model, Attardo develops a mechanism for exploring the humor of longer texts– the GTVH traditionally concerns itself with short jokes and quips – part of which involves differentiating between 'punch lines' and 'jab lines.' In multiple joke-bearing texts, the punch line is a humorous instance at the end of a text, while the jab line is a humor instance anywhere else in a text (Attardo, 2002: 235).

Another area where stylistic investigation has sought to move beyond textual description to consider the sociopragmatic features of humor is Simpson's study of satirical discourse (Simpson, 2003). Simpson seeks to isolate the inferencing mechanisms that text

processors need to use in order for a text to become satire. Especially important is the mechanism that allows a text's claim to 'sincerity' to be rescinded – a mechanism that is normally pressed into service on encountering ironic distortions like those sketched earlier. Translated to Swift's satirical text quoted above, the distortion at the textual level results, probably for most readers, in the sincerity condition being rescinded at the pragmatic level, the perlocutionary consequence of which is that the text is read as satire and not as a 'straight' or serious proposal.

Contemporary stylistic approaches to verbal humor will continue to develop models of analysis where descriptions of text are paralleled with descriptions of the text's impact, both social and cognitive, on its readers. One area that is yet to receive adequate scholarly scrutiny is to do with the intersection between humor and other stylistic devices. For instance, while a technique such as literary **foregrounding** relies on an incongruity in its textual design, there remains no adequate account of why some, but not all, foregrounded patterns in a text are funny. The same principal applies to figurative language, where the question again arises as to why, for example, some novel metaphors and metonymies are humorous and some are not. These questions will no doubt be addressed by stylisticians as ever more sophisticated methods of dealing with humorous language present themselves.

See also: Grice, Herbert Paul; Humor in Language; Irony; Irony: Stylistic Approaches; Maxims and Flouting; Relevance Theory.

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Iconicity

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Iconicity is the idea that a formal property in a sign corresponds through similarity to a property of its referent. The idea was entertained and then rejected by Plato in the *Cratylus*. Plato's conclusion was restated by Saussure as "*l'arbitraire du signe*" and has been a mainstay of all versions of structuralism, including notably generative grammar (cf. Hockett, 1960; Chomsky, 1969). Most standard textbooks dismiss the topic with examples of individual words: *whale* is a small word for a large animal; *microorganism* is a large word for a small one; QED. The relationship between form and meaning is considerably more interesting than this once we analyze complex signs and sign systems using the notion of diagrammatic iconicity introduced by Peirce (1932), or indeed, Saussure's closely related notion of motivation. A diagram is an attenuated icon if the relationship among its parts in some way approximates the relationship among the elements to which these parts refer. Standard examples of the apparent diagrammatic iconicity of language then include the universal principle of isomorphism, which as a cognitive principle is largely responsible for the operation of grammatical analogy (i.e., "One form should correspond to one concept"). This can be thought of as the iconicity of paradigms. Other standard examples that correspond more to Saussure's motivation include the semantic compositionality of *dix-neuf* and other compounds; Behaghel's first law ("physical closeness corresponds to conceptual closeness"; cf. Bolinger, 1975; Bybee, 1985; Haiman, 1985); several apparently universal ordering principles, such as the order of clauses in a narrative (*I came, I saw, I conquered*; cf. Jakobson, 1965) or in conditional constructions (protasis precedes apodosis; cf. Greenberg, 1966) corresponds to the conceptual or real-time order of the states to which the propositions refer; and the various uses of repetition and reduplication (cf. Moravcsik, 1978), such as XX typically means plurality, distributivity, iterativity, or emphasis

of whatever is denoted by X. This type of motivation can be thought of as the iconicity of syntagms.

It is now widely recognized that systematic correspondences do exist between linguistic diagrams and extralinguistic reality, but the nature of these correspondences is often debated. Following Zipf (1935), it is now acknowledged that a principle of least effort is involved in the creation of linguistic structures, such that familiar, frequently mentioned and unsurprising concepts tend to be given reduced expression. We talk about cars and TV rather than automobiles and television, and there is no language known in which the words for *man* and *woman*—for all the inexhaustible fascination, mystery, and complexity of their referents—are seven-dollar words. It even seems that we consciously control the contrast between fuller and more reduced expressions of the same phonetic strings, depending on whether they are formulaic or novel (Van Lancker and Canter, 1981; Van Lancker, Canter, and Terbeek, 1981), or on whether they are to be interpreted as common nouns or anaphors (Haiman, 2003).

In some cases, the relationship between the reduction (and opacity) of a form and its predictability can be scalar, with different points along a linguistic continuum corresponding with different points along a conceptual continuum, exactly in accordance with an elaboration of Zipf's principle. A striking example is a correlation discovered and defined by Givon (1985) that seems to have considerable cross-linguistic validity: the length and complexity of an anaphoric expression will tend to covary with the remoteness in discourse of its antecedent, all the way from a full noun phrase down to zero. Givon considered this to be an iconic covariation, although the Zipfian motivation for the pattern is apparent.

Challenges to the principle of iconicity today take two forms. The first approach consists in demonstrating that many examples of iconicity in the literature (including possibly all variations on the markedness principle that "more form corresponds to more meaning") can be reduced, like Givon's principle, to economically motivated reductions, the basic principle being to give lesser expression to what is familiar or

predictable. For example, the third-person singular of verbal and nominal paradigms is frequently zero. It could be that this is an icon of the third person as "the absent one" (cf. Benveniste, 1946), but it could be an economically motivated reduction of the most frequently occurring case. Iconicity would then be purely incidental, an epiphenomenal consequence of another drive.

The second approach consists of acknowledging the possible importance of iconicity in primitive signaling between speakers who share no common conventions—perhaps speakers of different languages, perhaps primitive speakers of the first human languages (cf. Grice, 1989: 358, whose insistence that "every artificial or non-iconic system is founded upon an antecedent iconic system" is an expression of this view)—but then emphasizing that through conventionalization iconicity will be very rapidly lost. First come charades and onomatopoeia (indeed, common sense makes us ask what other means there might possibly be at speakers' disposal), but, once speakers share a common culture, all the conventional features of normal grammar will rapidly appear in their communication, sometimes within a matter of minutes (cf. Bloom, 1979). Although it may seem like no more than common sense that speakers will find it easier to store and process icons than symbols (Givon, 1985), there is little solid evidence that has been adduced in support of this contention. In fact, Benveniste (in linguistics) and Berger and Luckmann (in culture) have recognized that people tend to accept whatever they are familiar with as perfectly natural and to reject all alternatives as alien and barbaric (cf. Anderson, 1990). Motivation, in this view, derives entirely from conventions that are "always already there." In a way, the argument from convention is related to the argument from least effort because much of the opacity of conventions results from streamlining. But this argument is one that should make the analyst even more skeptical about the possibility of encountering iconicity in any recorded language. If iconicity can be lost within 15 or 20 minutes in a contrived encounter, then what are the chances we will encounter it in languages that have been spoken for any longer than this time? To survive at all, it must be constantly recreated.

To counter such reasonable skepticism, it is necessary to demonstrate that iconicity is an independent and currently productive drive in the genesis of linguistic structures. The constant operation of analogy and the rarity of perfect synonymy may be taken as evidence for the psychological reality of isomorphism or the iconicity of paradigms ("one form corresponds to one meaning"). The iconicity of syntagms is a different matter.

The best evidence for the psychological reality of motivation is the fact that where there are competing structures with roughly the same meaning, speakers will tend to select the form that corresponds to the specific meaning they prefer on the basis of motivation. Stock examples are the contrasts between *hair* (mass noun) and *hair-s* (count noun) or between *kill* and *cause to die* (cf. Wierzbicka, 1980, 1985). But it could be argued that the choice between preexisting structures is not the same as the creation of novel ones and thus provides at best pale evidence for the reality of motivation.

It may seem that the tension between iconic and economic or Zipfian motivation may be a straightforward one that reflects the competition noted by Passy (1890) and von der Gabelentz (1891) between the drive for clarity, on the one hand, and the drive for ease, on the other. Cases such as Givon's topic accessibility hierarchy and the motivation for the reduced expression of anaphors in general indicate that often the same formal contrasts may have one interpretation here and another one there.

Another example explicitly dealt with by Haiman (1985) is the contrast between light and heavy versions of the reflexive in a number of unrelated languages, including English. Given that there exists a conceptual contrast between introverted actions that people typically perform on themselves (verbs of grooming, dressing, and change of posture) and extraverted actions that they more typically do unto others, the Zipfian principle of economic motivation predicts that the light form of the reflexive is used where the verb is introverted, whereas the heavy form is used where the verb is extraverted. This is borne out in English and in almost all the languages where the light/heavy distinction for reflexives exists:

> I shaved.
> I kicked myself.

But there is another conceptual contrast that the same morphological distinction expresses. Light reflexives are typically middles or impersonal passives, that is, one-participant activities (cf. Langacker and Munro, 1975; Haiman, 1976). Heavy reflexives never function as impersonal passives because the heavy reflexive morpheme (typically a separate nominal expression) marks a second participant. Thus, the contrast between the next two sentences.

> I got up.
> I got myself up.

The strong sense of reflexives such as *I got myself up* in English is of a divided or alienated self. In this particular sentence, the subject denotes the will, the

object the flesh. In languages that form their impersonal passives via a reflexive construction, such as Russian, the contrast is:

> videt-sja
> see-3.SING.REFL
> 's/he is seen, is visible'

> videt   sebja
> see-3.SING self
> 's/he sees him/herself' (as in a mirror)

The sense of a divided self is, admittedly, weak in textbook cases of reflexivization involving mirrors (person vs. image of person), but recurs with overwhelming frequency in natural discourse, which is filled with descriptions of people who force themselves to do things they do not want to do, pat themselves on the back, feel proud of or sorry for themselves, hate themselves for their weakness, and so forth (cf. Haiman, 1998: Chap. 5, and the references cited there). Exactly the same formal contrast (light/heavy reflexives) can be iconically or economically motivated.

The light reflexive participates in another contrast, between intransitive and transitive verbs that involve a change of state. In those cases in which the verb root for related transitives and intransitives is the same, there are a number of possible means of expressing the contrast via derivational affixation (see **Table 1**). Sometimes one language will make the intransitive the basic form, while another language makes the transitive the basic form for the same verb. Thus in English, the verb *bear* (a child) is basically transitive, and the intransitive is the derived passive *be born*. In Turkish, the verb 'be born' is basic *dog-*, and the verb 'bear' is the derived causative *dog-dur-*. But the contrast is not an entirely random one. Zipfian considerations of economy lead us to expect that typically verbs that are generally performed on others will have the bare stem in the transitive and a derived mediopassive in the intransitive, whereas verbs that are conceived of as spontaneous actions will more typically occur in the unmarked form in the intransitive, with a derived causative for the transitive. This is what Haspelmath (1993) found to be the case in a survey of 31 verbs in 21 languages – some complex derived expression (the anticausative) is favored for the intransitives formed from verbs such as *break*,

where it is more probable that an outside force brings about the event. Conversely, actions such as *freeze*, which typically occur without an outside instigator, can be made transitive by the addition of some causative. So, the contrast is exactly parallel to that between introverted and extroverted reflexives, and is a function of purely economic principles: reduced expression is given to the predictable.

The presence of iconicity can most clearly be demonstrated when it comes into conflict with economy and trumps it. Such cases are well known and leave no room for ambiguity. The most striking examples come from the expression of symmetry. Haiman (1985) showed that in Hua (Yagaria), the expression of reciprocity, a symmetrical relationship, cannot be given by a reciprocal pronoun (there are none) nor by straightforward sentential coordination because the structure S1 + S2, as in many Papuan languages, exhibits a morphological asymmetry between the first (medial) and the second (final) clause. The medial verb occurs with two verbal desinences M (medial) and A (anticipatory), which agree with the subject of S1 and S2, respectively, whereas the final verb occurs with a totally distinct F (final) desinence, which agrees with the subject of S2 alone. The morphological asymmetry of the verbal desinences (verb of S1 = V + M + A; verb of S2 = V + F) reinforces the syntactic asymmetry of order, so that a coordinate sentence such as S1 ['Max hit Harry'] S2 ['Harry hit Max'] can mean only something like 'Max hit Harry and thereupon/therefore Harry hit Max'. The problem of reciprocal symmetry is solved in Hua by making the second verb also into a medial verb whose M desinence agrees with the subject of S2 and whose A desinence agrees with the subject of S1. The whole coordinate construction, which models a closed ring, is treated as a nominalization that occurs with a light final verb that agrees with the subject of S1 + the subject of S2.

> ebgi-ga-na   ebgi-ga-na ha'e
> hit-3.SING.M-3.SING.A   hit-3.SING.M-3.SING.A
>   do.3DL.F
> 'they hit each other'

where DU indicates Dual. There is a more economically motivated way of saying this, which consists of stripping both the medial verbs of their personal desinences and nominalizing the verb stems by affixing the glottal stop:

> ebgi-'   ebgi-' ha'e
> hit-NOM.   hit-NOM. do.3.DL
> 'they hit each other'

The latter does justice to both iconicity and economy, but the first satisfies iconic imperatives alone.

Table 1 Affixation and transitivity

Intransitive	Transitive
Bare stem	Bare stem + causative
Bare stem + reflexive passive	Bare stem

In the same way that we need to distinguish iconic from economic motivation, we have to separate iconically motivated symmetry of this sort from other cases that seem to be motivated by yet other drives. The drive for symmetry without iconic motivation is abundantly attested in a number of Southeast Asian and Oceanic languages. There is an enormous literature on this topic, some of which is summarized in Fox (1988). A particularly striking (if modest) example from English, first noted by Alan Cruttenden, is the phenomenon of radio announcements of tied scores, for example, *Sussex 2, Essex 2*. From the point of view of information structure, both scores are new information and should be read with the same intonation as *Sussex 2, Essex 3*. Yet they are not, with the paradoxical result that listeners hearing only *Sussex 2...* can turn off the radio because they already know the score. It is probable that announcers seeing the symmetrical segmental structure XY ZY before them assign it a (cognitively inappropriate but esthetically motivated) noniconic symmetrical intonation XyZy.

Because the results of an iconic imperative are constantly being eroded by other drives, and compromised in any event by the natural limitations of the one-dimensional auditory medium of language, cases in which it is nevertheless apparent are heuristically useful. A routinely exploited heuristic consequence of the principle of isomorphism is that recurrent cross-linguistic identity of form between two or more grammatical constructions must be a reflection of a perhaps unsuspected semantic commonalty; for example, such a commonalty is exhibited by protasis clauses in conditional sentences and sentential topics, whose semantic identity is now widely recognized (cf. Podlesskaya, 1992). A parallel heuristic consequence of the principle of motivation is that when a given construction recurrently exhibits formal symmetry, this formal symmetry is a reflection of possibly unsuspected conceptual symmetry; such a pattern is exhibited by the protasis and apodosis clauses of counterfactual conditional sentences, and a plausible semantic account for this symmetry has been offered by Haiman and Kuteva (2003).

Given that iconicity is widespread in human languages and given that the forces of conventionalization immediately attack and destroy iconicity, the central problem is accounting for the fact that it nevertheless endures. For this to be so, it is not enough to suggest that iconicity was the original state of some conjectured proto-language. Rather, iconicity must be constantly created. Although it has been optimistically proposed that there are cognitive motives for iconicity, no evidence has ever been presented that iconic forms are easier to store or to access than symbolic ones. This suggests that an essentially esthetic impulse (perhaps simply the impulse to reproduce a given structure) is responsible for the creation of iconic forms (cf. Haiman, to appear).

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Identity and Language

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This article considers what identities are, how they depend on language, how that dependency may have come about, and how linguistics and affiliated disciplines have gone about analyzing it. Secondly, it examines how the very way in which we identify and conceive of languages is bound up with identity, usually that of a nation.

What Is Identity?

Your identity is, very simply, who you are. It has two basic aspects: your name, which serves first of all to single you out from others (the deictic function), and then that deeper, intangible something that constitutes who you *really* are, which we might think of as the *meaning* of your name (the semantic function). Names are obviously pieces of language, but less obvious is the role played by the language you speak, and how you speak it, in constructing that other, deeper aspect of your identity, both for yourself and others.

Imagine a group of strangers at a bus stop. The bus they are waiting for drives past without stopping, and the following remarks ensue:

A: Well fuck me.
B: I say, wasn't that the 23?
C: I'm like not believing this.

Picture in your mind what A, B, and C look like. You can probably say something about how they are dressed, their background, what they do, what they are like, and whether you would like them or not.

It is extraordinary how much we are able to infer from what are, after all, a few squiggles on a page. We have an instinctive capacity to construct the identity of a whole person in our minds based on minimal input, and it is most effective when the squiggles represent something the person said.

Self-identity has long been given a privileged role in identity research. But the identities we construct for ourselves and others are not different in kind, only in the status we accord them. The gap between the identity of an individual and of a group – a nation or town, race or ethnicity, gender or sexual orientation, religion or sect, school or club, company or profession, or the most nebulous of all, a social class – is most like a true difference of kind. Group identities seem more abstract than individual ones, in the sense that 'Brazilianness' doesn't exist separately from the Brazilians who possess it, except as an abstract concept. Yet combinations of such abstractions are what our individual identities are made of, and group identity frequently finds its most concrete manifestation in a single, symbolic individual. The group identities we partake in nurture our individual sense of who we are, but can also smother it.

Bourdieu, discussing regional and ethnic identities, made an important point that applies to many other types of identity as well: although they essentialize what are actually arbitrary divisions among peoples, and in this sense are not 'real,' the fact that, once established, they exist as mental representations makes them every bit as real as if they were grounded in anything 'natural.'

> One can understand the particular form of struggle over classifications that is constituted by the struggle over the definition of 'regional' or 'ethnic' identity only if one

transcends the opposition [...] between representation and reality, and only if one includes in reality the representation of reality, or, more precisely, the struggle over representations [...].

Struggles over ethnic or regional identity – in other words, over the properties (stigmata or emblems) linked with the *origin* through the *place* of origin and its associated durable marks, such as accent – are a particular case of the different struggles over classifications, struggles over the monopoly of the power to make people see and believe, to get them to know and recognize, to impose the legitimate definition of the divisions of the social world and, thereby, to *make and unmake groups* (Bourdieu, 1991: 221).

The role played by names, labels, and other linguistic forms of classification-*cum*-text in the making and unmaking of groups along the lines Bourdieu described is why identity is ultimately inseparable from language.

Identity and the Functions of Language

Dunbar (1996) located the origin of language in the needs of higher primates to form social alliances in order to deal with challenges in their environment, including threats from powerful members of their own species. He believes that the essential functions of language for evolutionary purposes were phatic ones, with gossip – language of purely social content exchanged for social purposes – being the equivalent of the grooming that primates use to form and maintain social bonds. The move from physical to linguistic grooming is attributed by Dunbar to increasing group size. Early humans "must have faced a terrible dilemma: on the one hand there was the relentless ecological pressure to increase group size, while on the other time-budgeting placed a severe upper limit on the size of groups they could maintain" (Dunbar, 1996: 77). Language made it possible to increase group size without losing social cohesion or the time needed to gather and hunt food. Because language can be directed at several people simultaneously, the rate of grooming is increased manifold.

Dunbar notes, "Being able to assess the reliability of a prospective ally becomes all-important in the eternal battle of wits" (Dunbar, 1996: 78–79). On the one hand, language serves the purposes of the individual who is seeking to make an alliance: "It allows you to say a great deal about yourself, your likes and dislikes, the kind of person you are; it also allows you to convey in numerous subtle ways something about your reliability as an ally or friend" (Dunbar, 1996: 78). It also serves the person being courted as a prospective ally: "Subtle clues provided by what you say about yourself – perhaps even how

you say it – may be very important in enabling individuals to assess your desirability as a friend. We get to know the sort of people who say certain kinds of things, recognizing them as the sort of people we warm to – or run a mile from" (Dunbar, 1996: 79). He concludes, "Language thus seems ideally suited in various ways to being a cheap and ultra-efficient form of grooming. [...L]anguage evolved to allow us to gossip" (Dunbar, 1996: 79).

If we think about language from this perspective, its primary purpose is no longer necessarily restricted to one of the two traditionally ascribed to it, communication (by a speaker having an intention and wishing to transmit it to listeners) and representation (of the universe, as analyzed into the logical categories that languages are thought to contain). Before either of these, and in many regards enveloping them both, language exists, in this reversed perspective, for the purpose of *reading the speaker.*

Sociolinguistic inquiry into identity and language is concerned with how people read each other, in two senses. First, how the meanings of utterances are interpreted, not just following idealized word senses and rules of syntax as recorded in dictionaries and grammars, but in the context of who is addressing whom in what situation. Secondly, how speakers themselves are read, in the sense of the social and personal identities their listeners construct for them based on what they say and how they say it (a complex process, because most speakers' output is already shaped in part by how they have read their listeners). Every day each of us repeatedly undertakes this process of constructing our reading of people we encounter, in person, on the telephone, on the radio or the screen, or in writing, including on the Internet, based on their language – what they say and how they say it.

Targeting Identity in the Analysis of Language

Modern linguistics has moved slowly but steadily toward embracing the identity function as central to language. The impediment has been the dominance of the traditional outlook, which takes representation alone to be essential, with even communication relegated to a secondary place. This outlook was never the only one available, however, and when early 20th-century linguists such as Jespersen and Sapir came to investigate how language functions to define and regulate the role of the individual within the social unit at the same time that it helps to constitute that unit, they were not without predecessors. It was just that mainstream linguistics as it had developed within the 19th century was not inclined to see such questions as falling within its purview.

An overview of the development of such inquiry within linguistics and adjacent fields can be found in Joseph (2004), from which some key moments will be excerpted here. The first is Labov (1963), a study of the English dialect of Martha's Vineyard, an island off the coast of Massachusetts, where the diphthongs in words such as *right* and *house* are pronounced as [əy] and [əw] rather than [ay] and [aw]. This feature is not found in the dialects of the mainlanders who 'summer' on Martha's Vineyard, and with whom the Vineyarders (year-round residents) have a complex relationship of dependency and resentment. "It is apparent that the immediate meaning of this phonetic feature is 'Vineyarder.' When a man says [rəyt] or [həws], he is unconsciously establishing the fact that he belongs to the island: that he is one of the natives to whom the island really belongs" (Labov, 1963: 307). This is very much the sort of analysis of the effect of linguistic identity on language form that would characterize work in the 1990s and since, though it was sidelined in the mid-1960s by the statistical charting of variation and change.

In the meantime, one particular identity focus – gender – led the way in directing attention to the reading of identity in language. Lakoff (1973) argued that, in both structure and use, languages mark an inferior social role for women and bind them to it. Gender politics is incorporated directly into the pronoun systems of English and many other languages, through the use of the masculine as the 'unmarked' gender (as in 'Everyone take his seat'). Lakoff points to features that occur more frequently in women's than in men's English, such as tag questions, hedges, intensifiers, and pause markers, which as marks of insecurity and of the role women are expected to occupy are fundamental to maintaining the status quo in gender politics.

As the notion of separate men's and women's language was accepted, the more general notion of the language–identity link was let in through the back door, leaving the way open for the study of group identities of all sorts beyond those national and ethnic ones traditionally associated with language difference. This was a challenge to a sociolinguistics that had been fixated on class differences. By the mid-1980s this shift was underway in the work of, for example, Gumperz (1982), Edwards (1985), and Le Page and Tabouret-Keller (1985), though it was really in the 1990s that it would come to occupy the mainstream of work in sociolinguistics and linguistic anthropology. (For a small but representational sample of studies see, on the sociological end, Fishman (1999); on the anthropological, Schieffelin *et al.* (1998); and in discourse analysis, Wodak *et al.* (1999).)

This work also received significant input from social psychology, where one approach in particular needs to be singled out: Social Identity Theory, developed in the early 1970s by Tajfel. In the years following his death in 1982, it came to be the single most influential model for analyzing linguistic identity. Tajfel (1978: 63) defined social identity as "that part of an individual's self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership." Within this simple definition are embedded at least five positions that in their time were quite revolutionary: that social identity pertains to an individual rather than to a social group; that it is a matter of *self-concept*, rather than of social categories into which one simply falls; that the fact of *membership* is the essential thing, rather than anything having to do with the nature of the group itself; that an individual's own knowledge of the membership, and the particular value they attach to it – completely 'subjective' factors – are what count; and that emotional significance is not some trivial side effect of the identity belonging but an integral part of it.

Beyond this, Social Identity Theory marked a break with other approaches in the fact that it was not concerned with analyses grounded in a notion of 'power,' but simply in the relative hierarchizations that people seem instinctively to impose on ourselves, most particularly in our status as members of 'in-groups' and 'out-groups,' which would come into even greater prominence in the 'Self-Categorization Theory' that developed as an extension of the original model, notably in the work of Tajfel's collaborator Turner (see Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Turner *et al.*, 1987; Turner, 1991).

Partly under the influence of such work, sociolinguists were beginning to reorient their own object of investigation. Milroy (1980) reported data from studies she conducted in Belfast showing that the 'social class' of an individual did not appear to be the key variable allowing one to make predictions about which forms of particular linguistic variables the person would use. Rather, the key variable was the nature of the person's 'social network,' a concept borrowed from sociology that Milroy defined as "the informal social relationships contracted by an individual" (Milroy, 1980: 174). Where close-knit localized network structures existed, there was a strong tendency to maintain nonstandard vernacular forms of speech – a tendency difficult to explain in a model such as Labov's, based on a scale of 'class' belonging where following norms of standard usage marked one as higher on the hierarchy and entitled to benefits that most people desire. Labov's early work on Martha's

Vineyard had suggested that the answer lay in identity, specifically in the value of belonging to a group who, although not highly placed in socioeconomic terms, could nevertheless claim something valuable for themselves (in the Martha's Vineyard case, authenticity). Milroy's book provided statistical backing for such an explanation.

Although the inner workings of the social network depend somewhat on the amount of personal contact, the essential thing is that its members share *norms*. As attention turned to understanding the nature of these norms, two much publicized views had an impact. Fish (1980) had devised the concept of the 'interpretative community' to account for the norms of reading whereby people evaluate different readings of the same text as either valid or absurd. An interpretative community is a group sharing such a set of norms; its members may never come into direct physical contact with one another, yet share norms spread by the educational system, books, or the media. Soon after, Anderson (1991, first published in 1983) proposed a new understanding of the 'nation' as an 'imagined community,' whose members, like that of the interpretative community, will never all meet one another let alone have the sort of regular intercourse that creates a 'network.' What binds them together is the shared belief in the membership in the community.

Notably with the work of Eckert, sociolinguistic investigation of groups ideologically bound to one another shifted from statistically based examination of social networks to more interpretative examination of 'communities of practice,' defined as "an aggregate of people who come together around mutual engagement in an endeavor" (Eckert and McConnell-Ginet, 1992: 464). In the course of this endeavor there emerge shared beliefs, norms, and ideologies, including, though not limited to, linguistic and communicative behavior. The advantage of the community-of-practice concept is its openness – any aggregate of people can be held to constitute one, so long as the analyst can point convincingly to behavior that implies shared norms or, better still, elicit expression of the underlying ideologies from members of the community. This line of research is thus continuous with another one that has focused more directly on the normative beliefs or ideologies by which national and other group identities are maintained. Some early work along these lines was published in Wodak (1989) and Joseph and Taylor (1990), and subsequently a great deal more has appeared, e.g., in Verschueren (1999), Blommaert (1999), and Kroskrity (2000).

Other features of recent work on language and identity include the view that identity is something constructed rather than essential and performed rather than possessed – features that the term *identity* itself tends to mask, suggesting as it does something singular, objective, and reified. Each of us performs a repertoire of identities that are constantly shifting, and that we negotiate and renegotiate according to the circumstances.

Coconstructing National Identity and Language

As mentioned at the outset, it is not simply the case that identity is built upon language. The reverse is also true. One of the first obstacles to be overcome in establishing a national identity is the nonexistence of a national language. The 'nation–state myth' – that basic view of the world as consisting naturally of nation–states – is bound up with an assumption that national languages are a primordial reality. Whatever difficulty we might have in determining the borderlines of who 'the Germans' are, whether the German-born children of Turkish immigrants are German for instance, or whether certain Alsatians are French or German, the German language is going to figure significantly in the equation. Hitler attempted to justify his initial invasions of neighboring countries on the grounds that these German-speaking peoples were inherently part of the German nation; and, as Hutton (1999) has shown, his policies of oppression and ultimately extermination of the Jews were underpinned by the argument that, although their language, Yiddish, was a form of German, their lack of a nation gave them the perverse racial peculiarity of not being able to have a 'mother tongue.' They therefore did not belong to the German body politic but were seen as a parasite within it.

But whether Bohemian, Alsatian, and Yiddish dialects were part of 'the German language' were not facts given in advance, nor even ones that a linguist could establish scientifically. The 'German language,' like every national language, is a cultural construct. It dates from the 16th century and is generally credited to Luther, who, in translating the Bible, strove to create a form of German that might unite the many dialect groups across what until the late 19th century was a patchwork of small and large states, linguistically very diverse. (This story is itself a part of the cultural construct, and although not false, it is considerably oversimplified – in order to shape up as a proper 'hero' myth, it ignores or marginalizes the work of many other individuals and broader cultural changes.) The prototype of the modern national language was Italian, which may seem surprising, given that Italy did not become a political nation until 1860, with full unification coming in 1870, just a year before that of Germany. Or perhaps not so surprising – the political divisions of the Italian

peninsula may have been precisely what motivated the creation of cultural unity through linguistic means.

In the Romance-speaking world during the thousand years from the fall of the Roman Empire to the Renaissance, 'language' meant Latin, used for all official and written purposes, though what people spoke in nonofficial contexts was a local dialect, historically related to Latin though significantly different from village to village. There was, then, no 'Italian language.' That concept and its realization are credited – heroically, and again only semimythically – to Dante, author of the *Divina Commedia.* Dante's treatise *De vulgari eloquentia* (c. 1306), not published until 1529, lays out the process by which he claimed to discover, not invent, the national language of a nation that would take five and a half centuries to emerge politically. To the modern reader this all seems a fiction, a pretense of discovery in what will actually be Dante's invention of an illustrious vernacular – which will in turn camouflage how much of it is actually based on his native Tuscan. But Dante's *volgare illustre* became the template on which other modern European standard languages were modeled.

Once the national languages existed, however, their invention was promptly forgotten. The people for whom they represented national unity inevitably came to imagine that the language had always been there, and that such dialectal difference that existed within it was the product of recent fragmentation, when in fact it had preceded the unification by which the national language was forged. In the words of one prominent historian:

> National languages [. . .] are the opposite of what nationalist mythology supposes them to be, namely the primordial foundations of national culture and the matrices of the national mind. They are usually attempts to devise a standardized idiom out of a multiplicity of actually spoken idioms, which are downgraded to dialects [. . .]. (Hobsbawm, 1990: 51)

By the early 19th century this 'nationalist mythology' would lead to strong Romantic theorizations of national political identity being grounded in a primordial sharing of language. One of the strongest expressions was that of Fichte:

> The first, original, and truly natural boundaries of states are beyond doubt their internal boundaries. Those who speak the same language are joined to each other by a multitude of invisible bonds by nature herself, long before any human art begins; they understand each other and have the power of continuing to make themselves understood more and more clearly; they belong together and are by nature one and an inseparable whole. (Fichte, 1968 [1808]: 190–191)

Fichte was writing to rouse the 'German nation' to repel the advance of Napoleon. He was successful in doing so. However, in 1870 the shoe was on the other foot, when the Franco-Prussian War led to the German annexation of Alsace, a German-speaking province that had been part of France for more than two centuries and whose population was mainly loyal to France, despite their linguistic difference. This provoked a sharp turn away from the Fichtean view on the part of French linguists such as Renan (1882), who formulated a new view of national identity as based not on any primordially determining characteristic such as language, but on a shared will to be part of the same nation, together with shared memories.

The nation, in other words, exists in the *minds* of the people who make it up. This is the conception that Anderson (1991: 6) would return to in defining the nation as "an imagined political community." The 'legacy of memories' Renan pointed to would dominate future philosophical and academic attempts to analyze national identity. The other element, the collective 'will' of the people, would, however, have the deepest political impact, starting with the redrawing of the map of Europe at Versailles in 1919. It has continued to be the assumed basis for the legitimacy of the political nation up to the present time.

Billig, a colleague and collaborator of Tajfel, has explored how the "continual acts of imagination" on which the nation depends for its existence are reproduced (Billig, 1995: 70), sometimes through purposeful deployment of national symbols, but mostly through daily habits of which we are dimly aware at best. Examples include the national flag hanging in front of the post office and the national symbols on the coins and banknotes we use each day. Billig introduced the term *banal nationalism* to cover the ideological habits that enable the established nations of the West to be reproduced. In Billig's view "an identity is to be found in the embodied habits of social life" (Billig, 1995: 8), including language. Smith (e.g., 1998, Chapter 8) has emphasized how much of the effort of nationalism construction is aimed at reaching back to the past in the interest of 'ethno-symbolism,' and this can be seen particularly in the strong investment made by modern cultures in maintaining the 'standard language,' by which is meant a form resistant to change, hence harking backward. Hobsbawm placed great stress on the fact that enthusiasm for linguistic nationalism has historically been a phenomenon of the *lower middle class.*

> The classes which stood or fell by the official use of the written vernacular were the socially modest but educated middle strata, which included those who

acquired lower middle-class status precisely by virtue of occupying non-manual jobs that required schooling. (Hobsbawm, 1998: 117)

These are also the people who become the mainstay of nationalism – not just by active flag-waving on symbolic occasions, but daily in the banal ways pointed to by Billig, including their use of 'proper language' and their insistence on its norms, for instance in conversation with their own children. Hobsbawm has suggested that, in Victorian times, the pattern was established whereby the lower middle classes (artisans, shopkeepers, and clerks) enacted their national belonging by showing themselves to be "the most 'respectable' sons and daughters of the fatherland" (Billig, 1998: 122). In other words, although their real identity was that of a social class, they masked it for themselves and others in a nationalistic guise. The mask was double-sided: in their obsession with 'speaking properly' as a mark of respectability, they were contributing to the linguistic construction of their nation.

At the start of this article, I wrote that identities are, first and foremost, names, and that the work of identity construction consists of supplying meaning for the name. In the case of national identity, language has traditionally been a key ingredient in this process for at least five reasons:

1. Groups of people who occupy contiguous territory and see themselves as having common interests tend to develop, over long stretches of time, ways of speaking that are distinctive to them, marking them out from groups who either are not geographically adjacent to them or else are perceived as having different, probably rival, interests. In other words, language does tend to mark out the social features on which national belonging will come to be based – but it is only a tendency, because it also happens very frequently that the same way of speaking is shared by people with very different interests (religious ones, for instance), and that markedly different ways of speaking exist among a group of people who nonetheless see themselves as part of the same nation.
2. The ideology of national unity has favored a view that nations are real because those within them share a deep cultural unity, and this has coexisted with a widespread – indeed, nearly universal – belief that deep cultural unity is the product of a shared language. This is what Fichte meant by the 'invisible bonds' by which nature has joined those who speak the same language. Again, as with (1), it cannot be more than a tendency, because it is not the case that people who identify themselves as belonging to the same culture or nation think

identically. Yet language is central to the *habitus* (an ancient term revived by Bourdieu): the fact that we spend our formative years attending long and hard to the task of learning words and their meanings from those around us results in our acquiring tastes, habits, and ways of thinking from them that will endure into adult life. The language does not somehow transmit culture and identity to its speakers – rather, the language is the *text* through the constant interaction with which older speakers transmit culture and identities (local and personal as well as national, ethnic, and religious) to the young. (In many cases the young will want an identity of their own and will attain it first of all by resisting the imposition of culture upon them by their elders.)

3. In addition to being the text of cultural transmission, the language is the principal medium in which texts of national identity in the more usual sense will be constructed. It is not the only such medium, nor the only powerful one, as Billig's exposition of 'banal nationalism' has shown. But the particular concepts that constitute a national identity correspond to words in the national language, embodied in 'sacred texts' of the nation such as a constitution or key works of the national literature, including the national anthem.
4. As universal education is adopted throughout the nation, inculcating standards of 'correct' language assumes a central role. Overtly, this is from a perceived duty to maintain the culture. However, as Hobsbawm has shown, such is the force of the language-culture-nation-class nexus that, especially for the upwardly mobile members of the lower middle class, being a 'proper' citizen and member of the community is inseparable from using 'proper' language.
5. Insofar as nations are not the historical essences they purport to be, but are constructs that inevitably involve a certain amount of arbitrary and even capricious divisions and classifications, when a nation wants to control who can live in it, vote in it, and enjoy state benefits, language can appear to be the most obvious test for deciding whether particular individuals belong to the nation or not. Most nations no longer have laws based on racial classification – which are rarely easy to apply in any case – yet many do require cultural qualifications to be met, which are likely to include language either overtly or indirectly.

Each of these factors has reinforced the others in giving the national language the force of a cultural–historical 'ethno-symbolic' myth as suggested by Smith (see earlier discussion). Within each, too, there

is a contradiction or a caveat that has periodically pendulum-swung to prominence, such that the loss of belief in the national language and all it stands for is always potentially there and is bound to come to the fore at least periodically. The question that is unanswerable for now is whether national languages, together with the nations to which they are attached, represent a historical phase that is now on a course of decline heading for eventual disappearance, to be replaced with 'glocalization' – a term that has been coined to denote the combination of globalization with the resurgence of local, subnational sites of belonging – or whether they are an invention that has proven too useful for human social organization to be given up.

See also: Communities of Practice; Identity in Sociocultural Anthropology and Language; Identity: Second Language; Interactional Sociolinguistics; Language Attitudes; Language Politics; Linguistic Habitus; Multiculturalism and Language; Native Speaker; Social Class and Status.

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Identity in Sociocultural Anthropology and Language

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Reflections of Identity in Language Use

The main focus of studies of language and identity in sociocultural anthropology (LISA) is on the interplay between global cultural categories ('census identities' such as gender, race, class, or others that may be culturally salient, such as kinship identities), and how these identities are constructed, performed, or challenged locally in speech events through linguistic forms. One of the distinguishing characteristics of the LISA approach is that rather than taking census and other identity categories as pre-given, it investigates how these categories are made relevant by and for language users. It is important to understand that LISA research does not lose sight of the larger picture; it attempts to discover how speakers' ideologies about census identities shape, and are shaped by, interaction. Identity as viewed in this tradition is therefore emergent but constrained: identities are created and re-created when speakers are actually talking to each other, but the way these identities emerge is contingent on the speakers' sociocultural discourses and ideologies.

Identities are named 'relationships' in cultural ideologies and interactions; identity categories such as census identities are a shorthand for identifying – and thinking about – the many ways that a person relates to others in the community. For example, by referring to gender or drawing on a gender identity in interaction, a person calls up a bundle of culturally-shared relationships to other people in their culture. A man may call up solidarity with another man through cultural ideologies of masculinity that identify men as a class of people who share certain social traits. In this sense, identities are 'imaginary' (cf. Anderson, 1991 on imagined communities and nationalism) or 'figured worlds' (Holland *et al.*, 1998). Because identities are relational, a person has no single fixed identity, only identities constructed and contextualized in interaction (and to the extent that an identity is psychologically real, it is based on the self's conception of its place in psychologically idealized models of interaction). LISA studies investigate the tension between ideologies of identity categories and their emergence in interaction through language and other communicative modes. LISA does not study the motivation of speakers to join identity categories, but it does show how such categories are reproduced in ideologies and cultural discourses through talk.

We might suppose that the most straightforward way of claiming an identity is to speak the language of that identity: one is Tongan when one speaks Tongan, Uzbekh when one speaks Uzbekh, etc. But this view is destabilized when speakers are multilingual (which seems to be the larger portion of the world's population). Does a Black-American-Heterosexual-Woman become Dominican when she uses Dominican Spanish, or an Australian when she uses Australian English? By investigating just these kinds of situations (Bailey, 2001) LISA researchers have shown that the 'language-equals-identity' model is too simple to represent actual interaction. This research challenges the notion that languages are single, invariant entities, and has shown that a language is full of many different voices: registers, styles, varieties, and even other languages. At the same time, LISA analyses incorporate speakers' own ideologies of language. For although we might objectively observe that language use is never pure, the subjective ideologies of language users is often quite different. Language users' understandings of "how language is supposed to be" affect the way they use it: they bias performance in certain directions, as sociolinguistic variationists have been able to measure.

The terms most used for such a mixed view of language in LISA are heteroglossia and polyphony, from the work of Russian literary theorist Mikhail Bakhtin. Bakhtin (1981) argued that words (and by extension other linguistic forms) carry the 'voices' of previous uses, into current contexts of use. That is, words have meanings beyond pure denotation and carry the residue of earlier situations of use. Heteroglossia, as Bakhtin uses the term, refers to the tension between the pure official language and more vernacular forms of language existing in a language community and used in a single text. Polyphony refers the use of different languages or varieties that meet on an equal footing (cf. Morris, 1994: 248–249). Bakhtin's focus was the novel, but LISA researchers have shown that heteroglossia and polyphony obtain in everyday conversation, and these properties of language help people to create identities in interaction. This view destabilizes both the simplistic view of 'a language,' and the assumption that by using a particular linguistic feature (e.g., word, pronunciation, or syntactic construction), one can perform an identity connected with a culturally-relevant population that is thought to use that linguistic feature.

Meanings that rely on the current or previous context, or both, are known as indexical meanings. All languages have such indexical meanings as part

of their grammar. In English, the meanings of words such as *I* and *you* are associated with actual people only in the moment of speaking. Thai pronouns indicate not only speaker and addressee, but also their relative ages and genders (Simpson, 1997). Most indexical meanings – whether in a grammar or not – relate to the aspect of context that provides information about the speaker's identity. A linguistic feature indexes an identity because someone of that same culturally-relevant identity category has used it before, or has been represented as using it before (e.g., in media). Speakers rarely assert **directly** that they are, for example, a woman, or white, or Bosnian (although they do at times, and these moments are all the more interesting for their rarity). Rather, speakers more often rely on the processes of indexicality to create their identities.

Theorizing indexical meaning as it relates to identity has been the focus of much of the work of Michael Silverstein (1976, 1996) and Elinor Ochs (1992, 1993), who have made a number of important distinctions among indexical meanings that are crucial for understanding how identity and language are theorized. The first distinction is between direct and indirect indexicality (Ochs, 1992). Direct indexicality is a meaning relationship that holds directly between language and the stance, act, activity, or identity indexed. For example, in English, using certain syntactic forms such as imperatives will generally directly index a relationship of power. The imperative is associated with the context of a speaker who has the power to force the addressee to perform the action stated in the imperative. Indirect indexicality arises when the social relationship (in this case, power) is further indexed to an identity category, such as masculinity. Thus we might notice that men use more imperatives than women, or there might exist (as in the United States) a cultural discourse such that men are supposed to be more authoritative than women. When this supposed connection is discovered, we might be tempted to say that imperatives index masculinity; however, it would be more accurate to say that imperatives indirectly index masculinity because they directly index power, and power is in turn associated with masculinity.

An illustration of this process can be seen in the American English address term *dude* (Kiesling, 2004). *Dude* is used most frequently by young white men, and indexes a stance of casual solidarity: a friendly, but crucially not intimate, relationship with the addressee. This stance of casual solidarity is a stance habitually taken more by young white American men than other identity groups. *Dude* thus indirectly indexes young, white, masculinity as well.

Such descriptions of indexicality are abstract, however, and do not take into account the actual context of speaking, such as the speech event and the identities of the speakers determined through other perceptual modes, such as vision. One of the most difficult aspects of indexicality is that indexes not only call up the previous contexts in which a linguistic feature has been used, but what previous context they call up can be influenced by the current context. Indexical meanings thus interact with the context of speaking, such that the (assumed or 'pre-existing') identity of the speaker can affect the indexicality of a form even as that form is seen as performing an identity. For example, in the United States, often when a women uses an imperative, a particular kind of authority – motherhood – is indexed: when a woman tells a friend (particularly a man) to "put on your coat," the response is often sarcastically, "Yes, mother." In this example, the use of an imperative directly indexes a stance of authority. In the dominant American cultural discourses of femininity, authority is indexed only in the context of motherhood, so this feminine role is indirectly indexed and available for comment by the addressee of the imperative. Such a response is not made when the speaker is known to be a man (unless the addressee wishes to refigure the speaker as a woman for some reason, in which case the layers of indexicality begin to become thick and tangled). One might argue that the content of the imperative is what indexes motherhood: mothers order their children to do things for the children's own good, especially putting on coats. This argument only points out just how specific indexicality can be, however, as a single phrase can call up the stereotypical class of people known in the United States as 'mothers.' In addition, we might observe that imperatives used by women are more often than not used with such 'motherly' content. In any case, note how even such a brief, unremarkable use of language leads to an intricate web of identity indexes. Such are the minute, commonplace, but complex indexical meanings that rely on and recreate identity discourses and ideologies.

These indexicalities are thus both sensitive to and indexical of social context and the other possible relevant identities being performed in a particular instance of talk-in-interaction. Bonnie McElhinny's (1994) study of police officers in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, is particularly relevant in this light. She showed that when the identity of being a police officer is salient in an interaction, such a speaker tends to use less affect in her or his speech. This lack of affect indexes a distant, emotionless stance, a stance that is not indexical of femininity in Pittsburgh. However, the

women officers told McElhinny that they did not feel less feminine in these situations, because gender is less relevant as an interactional identity; in such interactions they think of themselves primarily as police officers. As women have joined men on the police force, the affectless and emotionless stance has thus come to index not so much masculinity, but 'police officer.'

Further complicating the connections between linguistic form and identity is the fact that indexes are always potentially creative as well as presupposing (Silverstein, 1976). That is, an index can be used to change what is in play in the context (creative) rather than simply respond to the already mutually understood context (presupposing). The classic example of such context-changing uses is that observed by Blom and Gumperz (1972) in Hemnesberget, Norway. In Hemnesberget at that time there was a diglossic situation in which the linguistic variety of Norwegian known as Bokmål was the official language of government and commerce, while Ranamål was the local variety (dialect) more typically used for intimate settings. Blom and Gumperz described an instance in which an inhabitant goes to the community office for official business and interacts with another local inhabitant with whom he is friends. The official business is conducted in Bokmål (indexing in a presupposing manner the situation), but when the official business is finished, the customer switches to Ranamål to indicate he wishes to have a less formal conversation about local matters. This switch from Bokmål to Ranamål is a creative index, because it changes the context from formal to informal, rather than responding to an external cue such as a change of setting or the arrival of a new participant.

While this distinction between creative and presupposing indexicality is important and useful to begin with, LISA researchers have more recently emphasized the fact that indexes always have both a creative and a presupposing aspect. Sidnell (2003), for example, described how language is used to create a male space in a Guyanese rum shop. While this setting is understood by the Guyanese to be a male space, it is nonetheless often populated by women for various reasons. Sidnell analyzed a stretch of talk-in-interaction in which one of the men drinking in the rum shop designs "his talk…to preserve the observable gender exclusivity of the activity" (2003: 338). That is, the way his talk is designed makes the space a male one even when he is addressing a woman in it, and thereby helps to recreate the 'male-only' context, in effect (creatively) peripheralizing women who are present.

A final complication comes from the 'level' of knowledge that speakers use in interpreting indexical meaning. While most indexical meanings are not overtly discussed by speakers, some linguistic features nevertheless become the focus of social discussion and overt knowledge. For example, Americans have become aware of, and can articulate, the masculine indexicality of *dude* (they are aware of its use on this societal level), but have much more trouble explaining what it means in terms of local stances. Morford (1997) analyzed the use of second-person pronouns in French in this light. She showed that on one level of indexicality, the use of *tu* and *vous* in French indexes a relationship between two speakers based on a reciprocal vs. asymmetric use of the forms. However, Morford found that French speakers have a knowledge about (for example) what kinds of families have asymmetric use between parents and children, and that some speakers make conscious choices about whether to use *tu* or *vous* with other speakers. Most importantly, these choices have to do with the interplay between this metapragmatic awareness and the kinds of identities that speakers wish to create. Morford cites one particularly vivid example of a teacher who explains that he constructs status as a teacher in part through his asymmetric use of second person address with the support staff of the school.

Performance of Identity in Mediated Social Practice

While the distinctions made above are important, individual indexical forms such as 'pronoun' or 'accent' are idealizations of meanings that are tangled in a messy, changing, and locally contestable web of meaning. That is, there are complex meaning relationships not just between a linguistic form and a specific social identity, but that there are also connections of meaning among different kinds of identities, and different social entities and categories such as institutions and census groups. LISA researchers do not search for psychological representations of such links, but rather they investigate the manner in which such connections are created and used in interaction. In fact, these connections need not be present in any individual's psyche before a speech event; it is by participating in the event itself that speakers bring indexicalities and identities about, because they are needed for speakers to 'make sense' of the talk. In this way, LISA is similar to critical discourse analysis (*see* **Critical Discourse Analysis**) in arguing that the interpretations that speakers make of the ongoing talk based on 'background knowledge' or conversational principles (*see* **Pragmatics: Overview**) are not

used in a value-free way but are a resource for doing identity in interaction.

One of the most significant bodies of work along these lines is Jane Hill's (1993, 1995, 1998) work on what she calls "mock Spanish." (*see* **Hill, Jane**). In this work, the process of indirect indexicality and the ideological structuring of background knowledge come together to reproduce racist discourses that are covert even for those using them. Hill took as her starting point the nonce borrowing of Spanish (or forms that resemble Spanish) by Anglos, such as *Hasta la vista*, *baby*, popularized by actor and politician Arnold Schwarzenegger in the film *Terminator*. Hill showed that these forms of Spanish are used strategically by speakers to create an ironic speaker stance with respect to stereotypically Hispanic (Latino) identity, stances that are often demeaning to this identity category (e.g., lazy, disorderly, given to rudeness), in effect distancing the self from such identities by gently parodying their principal index, Spanish language forms.

A similar process is at work in a conversation I analyzed between two white American fraternity men (Kiesling, 2001). The two men in that conversation discuss the roster of the fraternity's intramural basketball team. Embedded in this discussion is a short exchange in which each boasts about his basketball ability. At strategic points in both parts of this speech event, the interactants use linguistic features of African American Vernacular English (AAVE) to index their boasting stance, as well as a stance of basketball expertise. The crucial point is that the men are not trying to 'be black,' but they are drawing on an association of 'blackness' with basketball and boasting. In other words, when performing 'basketball player' it helps to perform 'black' as well. A similar point was made by Bucholtz (1999), who showed that AAVE features are used in a fight narrative told by a white male high school student in California to represent a tough stance. Other articles appearing in the same journal issue as Bucholtz's made similar points and represent an important body of work for LISA understandings of language and identity.

Issues of race and racism in language, and gender and sexism in language have therefore been central in LISA research. Over the past decade, Susan Gal and Judith Irvine (Gal and Irvine, 1995; Irvine, 2001) have developed an influential set of concepts for understanding how speakers' ideologies of language are involved in the social production of indexicals of identity categories. Their view recognized three semiotic effects of ideology as a factor in indexicality: iconicization, recursivity, and erasure. Iconicization is the ideological endowing of a linguistic feature with and characteristic that is taken to be like some essence of a recognizable identity or type of person. In the example from Hill above, mock Spanish is understood to be iconic of some inherent characteristic, laziness or disorderliness, of Spanish speakers. Recursivity is the manner in which ideologies are represented in parallel recurring form with respect to multiple levels of social organization. In the example above, stereotyped differences between black and white men in the United States (the stereotyped black characteristics of athletic prowess and fighting ability) become the basis for negotiating differences between fraternity brothers, both of whom are white. In effect this use recursively reproduces the black-white identity distinctions in interactions with only white male speakers. Finally, erasure is the effective simplification of both formal and sociological complexities of experience, and can render all but a single term of a schematic dichotomization invisible to speakers. In all of the above examples, the Anglo white language style is invisible as a specifically alternative register, while the Spanish and AAVE are marked and highly salient; the white Anglo vernacular register is erased and re-enforced as normative by such uses, rendering its social peripheralizing power less visible.

Studying Identity through Language and Contextualized Language Variation

Up to this point, we have generally focused on language and identity as performed when speakers use languages or varieties they recognize as different. But the processes of indexicality, and the tendencies toward iconization, recursivity, and erasure are at work even when a single variety is being used, not only when varieties (or languages) are mixed. As sociolinguistic variationists continually remind us, language is inherently variable in both grammar and use (Guy, 1996); such variability is a valuable resource for speakers in identity work. Several researchers have been incorporating insights from LISA studies into the search for how this variability is used by speakers to create social meaning.

Penelope Eckert (2000, 2002) is the most prominent of these researchers and has done the most to move this new perspective of meaning in variation forward. She advocates understanding variation as a resource for creating personal styles and "stylistic practice as a process of *bricolage*, in which ways of being are transformed through the strategic reuse of meaningful resources." (2002: 5) In her ethnographic analysis of sociolinguistic variation in a Detroit-area high school, she showed how vowel variants vary alternately with other aspects of social

practice and style, such as 'cruising' (driving around a particular route with friends without a destination) and wearing wide pants cuffs. She showed that while the variables she analyzed have general meanings throughout the school (e.g., whether they are associated with the urban rather than suburban areas of Detroit), they are used in specific clustered ways to create personal styles by individuals.

Students of Eckert's are moving this view of variation and identity forward considerably. Sarah Benor (2001) investigated how the language of Orthodox Jews differs depending on their background and orientation to integrate into the Orthodox community. Her work is significant in two respects. First, it showed that identity is not just about the outward practices and styles of speakers, but that the internal orientations and ideologies of speakers can influence their use of language, and that the relationship between these orientations and language use are not necessarily linear. Second, she showed that adults, as they become integrated socially and ideologically into a new community with a different way of speaking (even if that new way is based on the rate of use of a linguistic variant), can change their speech to the new way of speaking. This finding suggests that speakers have much more control over how they speak than is often assumed. Benor's work showed further the Eckertian view that most variables provide general meaning resources that acquire specific meanings in local contexts, since each analyzes essentially the same linguistic form, but show how its indexicality changes depending on the community and the individual speaker's style.

I have been working with a more atomistic view than Eckert's, but one that is consistent with her perspective. This view focuses on the performance of stances in interaction rather than personal styles. We can understand Eckert's personal styles to be repertoires of stances; the variables used habitually by speakers to create these styles are primarily concerned with creating stances – relationships of the moment. In an analysis of the -ing variable used in a college all-male fraternity in the United States (Kiesling, 1998), I showed that the men who speak with a high rate of the 'standard' velar variant [-ŋ] in meetings are more likely than those whose rate is lower to be taking a stance at that point highlighting their structural power in the fraternity (through age or office-holding). These men also use grammatical forms that help them take an epistemic stance of certainty. Men who use the nonstandard coronal articulation [-n] in meetings tend to take a stance that highlights their connections to the aggregate of men (solidarity) or their ability to work hard for the fraternity. They also tend to use more profanity

and other nonstandard features, such as double negatives and *ain't*. The point is that these differing rates of the variable shows the fraternity men to be taking particular stances at various points in specific interactions; it is not just that each man is from a certain class or ethnic background and uniformly reflects that in speech production. Moreover, one can explain why – in the context of the situation, the man's personality, and cultural discourses and ideologies of masculinity, for example – he would take such a stance. This focus on stance moves us further toward an explanation of why speakers use the forms they do, and how these forms mean in interaction.

Such an interactionally local understanding of the indexicality of linguistic forms does not entail that wider cultural discourses, in this case norms of gender, are not also being indexed. In fact, we see here how the meanings of variation also exhibit the property of recursivity: the kinds of stances that the men take, sorting themselves out relationally, are all stances that index masculinity in their culture as well. In other words, they are able to 'be men' of one or another sort – not more or less male – while they are using **either** variant, because the dominant cultural discourses of masculinity include approved types that are both structurally or intellectually powerful (the standard users) and that are friendly or physically powerful (the nonstandard users). These cultural discourses are being recursively played out in the momentary stances the men take in the meetings.

In terms of method, in all of these directions of research, we find a curious marriage between the quantitative, objective, paradigm of variationist linguistics and the qualitative, subjectively-focused view of culture and interaction from sociocultural anthropology. One of the crucial ways that anthropology has informed the study of language and identity is in fact a focus on the speaker's interpretive frameworks, to which we turn now.

Ethnographic Investigation of People's Interpretive Frameworks

One of the strengths of LISA studies is the in-depth investigation of the speakers' interpretive frameworks – how speakers themselves respond to language as reflective or constitutive of identity. This metapragmatic awareness, and its relationship to other indexicalities, is an important area of research in LISA. Silverstein (2001) proposed a classification that specifies under what kinds of conditions, and how, a linguistic form is likely to be accessible to metapragmatic awareness. While there is not space

to explain these principles here, Silverstein's work suggested that certain types of linguistic forms are more accessible resources for speakers to use to connect with identities.

Holland and Skinner (1987) took another approach, and argued that identities be understood as organized in the cultural models that speakers hold for the world. Such models are more specific than ideologies; they are in essence normative narratives of life trajectories or domains to which actual people are compared, especially in language. Holland and Skinner used the cultural model concept to understand how women at a southern U.S. college semantically organize the language they use to describe men.

Such interpretations of the relationship between language and identity are beginning to be articulated with traditional dialectological questions about how language relates to place. Johnstone (2004a, 2004b) suggested that a speaker's emplacement – that is, being culturally connected to place – is not simply another census identity, but one that is discursively negotiated like others. Speakers who live in the same geographical space take different orientations to it as a culturally meaningful place, and local dialect forms may function in various ways in everyday talk, in self-conscious performances, and in metalinguistic talk about the dialect, to index these orientations. The use of dialect forms to index orientation to place may help determine which forms are preserved and which are lost over time. This work indicates that even such taken-for-granted categories as place are ideologically organized by speakers, and that this ideological organization can affect the way speakers use language, and its meaning in terms of identities.

Language and Identity over Time

Future research in LISA is likely to focus on further understanding the ways in which indexicality works to create identities in interaction, from a number of perspectives. For one, the question of awareness is still a very open one, in which even what counts as awareness is not entirely clear. One can imagine a typology of awareness that can then be matched with Silverstein's accessibility hierarchy. Awareness may also be promoted by the media as well as face-to-face communication, and it is not clear the ways in which these modes of mediation differ for the creation of identity categories and indexicalities. Finally, the ways in which the use of these indexicalities construct and re-create identity categories, and especially relations of dominance among them, will continue to be a puzzle for some time.

See also: Anthropology and Pragmatics; Bakhtin, Mikhail Mikhailovich; Class Language; Critical Discourse Analysis; Discourse, Foucauldian Approach; Identity and Language; Indexicality: Theory; Linguistic Anthropology; Linguistic Decolonialization; Media and Language: Overview; Politics and Language: Overview; Pragmatics: Overview; Spoken Discourse: Types; Understanding Spoken Discourse.

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Identity: Second Language

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Interest in second language identity in the field of applied linguistics is best understood in the context of a shift in the field from a predominantly psycholinguistic approach to second language acquisition (SLA) to include a greater focus on sociological and anthropological dimensions of second language learning, particularly with reference to sociocultural, poststructural, and critical theory. Researchers of second language identity have been interested not only in linguistic input and output in SLA, but in the relationship between the language learner and the larger social world. In particular, these researchers have examined the diverse social, historical, and cultural contexts in which language learning takes place and how learners negotiate and sometimes resist the diverse positions those contexts offer them.

Many researchers interested in second language identity are also interested in the extent to which relations of power within classrooms and communities promote or constrain the process of language learning. It is argued that the extent to which a learner speaks or is silent or writes, reads, or resists has much to do with the extent to which the learner is valued in any given institution or community. In this regard, social processes marked by inequities of gender, race, class, ethnicity, and sexual orientation may serve to position learners in ways that silence and exclude. At the same time, however, learners may resist marginalization through both covert and overt acts of resistance. What is of central interest to researchers of second language identity is that the very articulation of power, identity, and resistance is expressed in and through language. Language is thus more than a system of signs; it is social practice in which experiences are organized and identities negotiated.

After tracing the genesis of work in second language identity from the 1970s to the present day, this chapter outlines some of the major theoretical

influences on second language identity research. It then examines four trajectories of research that have much promise for the future: identity and investment, identity and imagined communities, identity categories and educational change, and identity and literacy.

The Historical Context

In the 1970s and 1980s, applied linguistics scholars interested in second language identity tended to draw distinctions between social identity and cultural identity. While 'social identity' was seen to reference the relationship between the individual language learner and the larger social world, as mediated through institutions such as families, schools, workplaces, social services, and law courts (e.g., Gumperz, 1982), 'cultural identity' referenced the relationship between an individual and members of a particular ethnic group (such as Mexican and Japanese) who share a common history, a common language, and similar ways of understanding the world (e.g., Valdes, 1986). In my own earlier work (Norton Peirce, 1995), I initially examined identity as a social construct as opposed to a cultural construct because I debated whether theories of cultural identity could do justice to the heterogeneity within the groups encountered and the dynamic and changing nature of identity observed in my research. As Atkinson (1999) has noted, past theories of cultural identity tended to essentialize and reify identities in problematic ways. In more recent years, however, the difference between social and cultural identity is seen to be theoretically more fluid, and the intersections between social and cultural identities are considered more significant than their differences. In this more recent second language research, identity is seen as socioculturally constructed, and scholars draw on both institutional and community practices to understand the conditions under which language learners speak, read, and write the target language.

A brief review of some of the articles published in the special issue of the *TESOL Quarterly* on Language and Identity exemplifies the increasingly interdisciplinary approach to second language identity research characteristic of the 1990s. I argued at the time that while the contributors framed their notions of identity in different terms, the similarities between the conceptions of identity were more marked than their differences (Norton, 1997). Thus Morgan (1997), for example, who was particularly interested in *social* identity, nevertheless explored the relationship between intonation and identity with reference to the dominant *cultural* practices of a particular group of Chinese immigrants in Canada. He did not,

however, reify these cultural practices, but sought to understand them in relation to the dynamics of ethnicity and gender. Schecter and Bayley (1997), who were particularly interested in *cultural* identity, nevertheless sought to understand their research with reference to larger *social* debates over the terms of Latino participation in American society, suggesting that social relations of class are important in understanding the relationship between language and identity. Duff and Uchida (1997), indeed, collapsed the distinctions between the social and the cultural by arguing for a sociocultural theory of identity in which identities and beliefs are co-constructed, negotiated, and transformed on a regular basis through language.

The diverse research covered in the 1997 *TESOL Quarterly* special issue, as well as special issues of *Linguistics and Education*, edited by Martin-Jones and Heller (1996), and *Language and Education*, edited by Sarangi and Baynham (1996), anticipated the wide range of research on second language identity characteristic of the early years of the 21st century. A number of monographs on the topic have appeared in catalogs and conferences (Day, 2002; Kanno, 2003; Miller, 2003; Norton, 2000; and Toohey, 2000); a growing body of research, common themes of which are discussed below, have been published in a wide variety of journals including *The Modern Language Journal* (Potowski, 2004), *TESOL Quarterly* (Lam, 2000; Maguire and Graves, 2001), and *Journal of Second Language Writing* (Hyland, 2002; Ramanathan and Atkinson, 1999); and there has been the establishment in 2002 of the award-winning *Journal of Language, Identity, and Education*, edited by Tom Ricento and Terrence Wiley, which has already published an exciting array of research on second language identity.

Current research on second language identity conceives of identity as dynamic, contradictory, and constantly changing across time and place. Indeed, a recurring theme throughout much of the research is that of 'transition.' Many of the participants in research projects on second language identity are undergoing significant changes in their lives, whether moving from one country to another (Kanno, 2003) or from one institution to the next (Harklau, 2000). Such transitions can be productive for language learning, providing learners with enhanced skills at negotiating bilingual identities; other transitions can be more problematic, as learners struggle to accommodate changing expectations in different institutional contexts. In such changing sets of circumstances, identities that might be seen as contradictory may in fact be constructed within contexts that are themselves sites of struggle (Cummins, 2000).

Theoretical Influences

A broad range of theorists have been influential in shaping current research on second language identity, most notable of whom are Bakhtin (1981, 1963/1984), Bourdieu (1977, 1979/1984), Weedon, and Lave and Wenger (1991). All of these theorists, while working within diverse disciplinary frameworks, are centrally concerned with both institutional and community practices that have an impact on learning.

Mikhail Bakhtin (1981, 1963/1984) takes the position that language needs to be investigated not as a set of idealized forms independent of their speakers or their speaking, but rather as situated utterances in which speakers, in dialogue with others, struggle to create meanings. For Bakhtin, the notion of the individual speaker is a fiction, as he sees all speakers constructing their utterances jointly on the basis of their interaction with listeners in both historical and contemporary, and both actual and assumed, communities. In this view, the appropriation of the words of others is a complex and conflictual process in which words are not neutral but express particular predispositions and value systems (*see* **Bakhtin, Mikhail Mikhailovich**).

Pierre Bourdieu (1977, 1979/1984), a contemporary French sociologist, focuses on the often unequal relationships between interlocutors and the importance of power in structuring speech. He suggests that the value ascribed to speech cannot be understood apart from the person who speaks and that the person who speaks cannot be understood apart from larger networks of social relationships. In this view, when a person speaks, the speaker wishes not only to be understood, but to be believed, obeyed, and respected. However, the speaker's ability to command the attention of the listener is unequally distributed because of the symbolic power relations between them. To redress the inequities between what Bourdieu calls 'legitimate' and 'illegitimate' speakers, he argues that an expanded definition of competence should include the "right to speech" or "the power to impose reception" (1977: 648).

The work of Christine Weedon, like that of Bakhtin and Bourdieu, is centrally concerned with the conditions under which people speak, within both institutional and community contexts. Like other poststructuralist theorists who inform her work, Weedon foregrounds the central role of language in her analysis of the relationship between the individual and the social, arguing that language not only defines institutional practices, but also serves to construct our sense of ourselves and our "subjectivity" (Weedon, 1987: 21). Weedon notes that the terms *subject* and *subjectivity* signify a different conception of the individual than that associated with humanist conceptions of the individual dominant in Western philosophy. While humanist conceptions of the individual presuppose that every person has an essential, unique, fixed, and coherent 'core,' poststructuralism depicts the individual (i.e., the subject) as diverse, contradictory, dynamic, and changing over historical time and social space.

A shift from seeing learners as individual language producers to seeing them as members of social and historically constituted communities is of much interest to anthropologists Jean Lave and Etienne Wenger. Lave and Wenger (1991) argue that what they call "situated learning" is an integral and inseparable part of social practice, as newcomers are mentored into the performance of community practices (*see* **Communities of Practice**). Their notion "legitimate peripheral participation" represents their view that communities are composed of participants who differentially engage with the practices of their community and that conditions vary with regard to ease of access to expertise, to opportunities for practice, to consequences for error in practice, and so on. From this perspective, then, educational research might focus not so much on assessing individual 'uptake' of particular knowledge or skills, but on the social structures in particular communities and on the variety of positionings available for learners to occupy in those communities.

Rather than seeing language learning as a gradual individual process of internalizing a neutral set of rules, structures, and vocabulary of a standard language, the work of Bakhtin, Bourdieu, Weedon, and Lave and Wenger offers applied linguists ways to think differently about language learning. Such theory suggests that second language learners need to struggle to appropriate the voices of others; they need to learn to command the attention of their listeners; they need to negotiate language as a system and as a social practice; and they need to understand the practices of the communities with which they interact. Drawing on such theory, becoming a 'good' language learner is seen to be a much more complicated process than earlier research had suggested (Norton and Toohey, 2001).

Research Trajectories

Research on second language identity has taken a number of interesting directions that hold much promise. The four trajectories I wish to examine address research on identity and investment, identity and imagined communities, identity categories and educational change, and identity and literacy.

Identity and Investment

In my research with immigrant women in Canada (Norton, 2000; Norton Peirce, 1995), I observed that

existing theories of motivation in the field of SLA were not consistent with the findings from my research. Most theories at the time assumed motivation was a character trait of the individual language learner and that learners who failed to learn the target language were not sufficiently committed to the learning process. Such theories did not do justice to the identities and experiences of the language learners in my research. For this reason, I made the case that the notion of 'investment' might help to extend notions of motivation in the field of SLA. The notion of investment, inspired by the work of Bourdieu, signals the socially and historically constructed relationship of learners to the target language and their often ambivalent desire to learn and practice it. If learners 'invest' in the target language, they do so with the understanding that they will acquire a wider range of symbolic and material resources, which will in turn increase the value of their cultural capital. Unlike notions of instrumental motivation, which conceive of the language learner as having a unitary, fixed, and ahistorical 'personality,' the notion of investment conceives of the language learner as having a complex identity, changing across time and space, and reproduced in social interaction. An investment in the target language is best understood as an investment in the learner's own identity.

The notion of investment has sparked considerable interest in the field of applied linguistics (see Pittaway, 2004). McKay and Wong (1996), for example, have drawn on this concept to explain the English language development of four Mandarin-speaking students in Grades 7 and 8 in a California school. They note that the needs, desires, and negotiations of students are not simply distractions or deviations from an ideal language learning situation; on the contrary, they must be regarded as constituting "the very fabric of students' lives and as determining their investment in learning the target language" (McKay and Wong, 1996: 603). Angelil-Carter (1997) found the concept useful in understanding the language development of an English language learner in South Africa, noting how the student's investment in prior discourses impacted on his acquisition of written academic discourses. Skilton-Sylvester (2002), drawing on her research with four Cambodian women in adult ESL classes in the United States, has argued that traditional views of adult motivation and participation are limited because they do not address the complex lives of adult learners or their investment in learning English. Her findings suggest that an understanding of a woman's domestic and professional identities is necessary to explain the investment in particular adult ESL programs. Potowski (2004) uses the notion of investment to explain students' use of Spanish in a dual Spanish/English immersion program in the United States. She notes that no matter how well-run a language program is, unless a learner's investment in the target language is consistent with the goals of the program, target language growth may not meet expectations. Potowski makes the case that the notion of investment makes an important contribution not only to the study of SLA, but to research on heritage language maintenance.

Identity and Imagined Communities

An extension of interest in identity and investment concerns the imagined communities that language learners aspire to when they learn a new language. In Norton (2001), I drew on my research with two adult immigrant language learners to argue that while the learners were initially actively engaged in classroom practices, the realm of their desired community extended beyond the four walls of the classroom. This imagined community was not accessible to their respective teachers, who, unwittingly, alienated the two language learners who then withdrew from the language classroom. The work of Lave and Wenger (1991) and Wenger (1998) helped me to make sense of this data. In many second language classrooms, all of the members of the classroom community, apart from the teacher, are newcomers to a set of language practices and to a community that includes those language practices in its activities. The question that arises then is what community practices do these learners seek to learn? What, indeed, constitutes 'the community' for them?

For many language learners, the community is one of the imagination – a desired community that offers possibilities for an enhanced range of identity options in the future. The community may also be, to some extent, a reconstruction of past communities and historically constituted relationships. In essence, an imagined community assumes an imagined identity, and a learner's investment in the target language must be understood within this context. Learners have different investments in particular members of the target language community, and the people in whom learners have the greatest investment may be the very people who represent or provide access to the imagined community of a given learner. Of particular interest to the language educator is the extent to which such investments are productive for learner engagement in both the classroom and the wider target language community. Such questions have been taken up more extensively in a coedited special issue of the *Journal of Language, Identity, and Education* on Imagined Communities and Educational Possibilities (Kanno and Norton, 2003) in which Adrian Blackledge, Diane Dagenais, Farah Kamal, Yasuko Kanno, Bonny Norton, Aneta Pavlenko, and Sandra Silberstein

explore the imagined communities of specific groups of learners in Canada, Japan, Pakistan, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

Identity Categories and Educational Change

While much research on second language identity explores the multiple and intersecting dimensions of learners' identities, there is a growing body of research that seeks to investigate the ways in which particular relations of race, gender, class, and sexual orientation may have an impact on the language learning process (Norton and Toohey, 2004). Innovative research that addresses these issues does not regard such identity categories as variables, but rather as sets of relationships that are socially and historically constructed within particular relations of power. Ibrahim's (1999) research with a group of French-speaking continental African students in a Franco-Ontarian High School in Canada explores the impact on language learning of 'becoming black.' He argues that the students' linguistic styles, and in particular their use of Black Stylized English, was a direct outcome of being imagined and constructed as Black by hegemonic discourses and groups. From a slightly different perspective, Taylor's (2004) research in an anti-discrimination camp in Toronto, Canada, argues for the need to understand language learning through the lens of what she calls *racialized gender*. The stories of Hue, a Vietnamese girl, and Khatra, a Somali girl, are particularly powerful in this regard, supporting the view held by Kubota (2004) that a color-blind conception of multiculturalism does not do justice to the challenges faced by language learners of diverse races and ethnicities.

Similarly, the work of scholars such as Ehrlich (1997) and Pavlenko (2004) is particularly insightful with regard to intersections of gender and language learning. Their conception of gender, which extends beyond female-male divides, is understood to be a system of social relationships and discursive practices that may lead to systemic inequality among particular groups of learners, including women, minorities, elderly, and disabled. Pavlenko, for example, argues for the need to understand the intersections between gender and other forms of oppression, noting that both girls and boys who are silenced in the language classroom are more likely those from the working class. In a similar spirit, Nelson (2004) explores the extent to which sexual orientation might be an important identity category in the second language classroom. Of central interest is the way in which a teacher can create a supportive environment for learners who might be gay, lesbian, or transgendered. Interest in identity categories and language learning is gaining momentum. A special issue of the *TESOL Quarterly* on Gender and Language Education, edited in 2004 by Kathy Davis and Ellen Skilton-Sylvester as well as an edited volume *Gender and English Language Learners* (Norton and Pavlenko, 2004) are available.

Identity and Literacy

Researchers of second language identity have become interested not only in the conditions under which language learners speak, but in the extent to which identities and investments structure their engagement with *texts*. There is growing recognition that when a second language learner reads or writes a text, both the comprehension and construction of the text is mediated by the learner's investment in the activity and the learner's sociocultural identity. By way of example, Norton Peirce and Stein (1995) demonstrate how the meaning of a South African reading comprehension text shifted when the social conditions under which it was read changed. They argue that the changing social occasions created different kinds of investments on the part of the students, and as the students' identities shifted from compliance to resistance, so did their interpretation of the text. Student resistance is also a theme in Canagarajah's (2004) literacy research with Tamil students in Sri Lanka and African American students in the United States, in which he demonstrates how students learning a second language or dialect sometimes engage in clandestine literacy activities to resist unfavorable identities imposed on them.

Much emerging research on literacy and second language identity also addresses the impact of literacy practices on relationships beyond the classroom. Lam (2000), for example, studied the Internet correspondence of a Chinese immigrant teenager in the United States who entered into transnational communication with a group of peers. She demonstrates how this experience of what she calls *textual identity* related to the student's developing identity in the use of English. The research of Kramsch and Thorne (2002) indicates, however, that not all transnational Internet communication leads to positive identity outcomes. In their study of the synchronous and asynchronous communication between American learners of French in the United States and French learners of English in France, they found that students had little understanding of the larger cultural framework within which each party was operating, leading to problematic digital exchanges. Ramanathan and Atkinson (1999), indeed, make the case that there is much need for cross-cultural writing research to better inform both teachers and students of the sociocultural knowledge of student writers from diverse regions of the world.

Scholars such as Luke (2004), Kress (1993), and Ivanič (1997) have influenced much research on the relationship between literacy and second language identity. While Luke's work has focused on the contribution of critical literacy to second language education and Kress's on the conception of text as a socially and historically constituted genre, Ivanič has explored the notion of writer identity, making the case that writers' identities are constructed in the possibilities for self-hood available in the sociocultural contexts of writing. Ivanič's distinctions between the "autobiographical self," the "discoursal self," and the "authorial self" have been useful in writing research with both young second language learners (Maguire and Graves, 2001) and college-level students (Hyland, 2002; Starfield, 2002).

Conclusion

Research on second language identity has struck a chord in the field of applied linguistics, opening up multiple avenues for research on every aspect of the field. While this chapter has focused on the identity of the second language learner, there is now increasing interest in the identity of the second language teacher (Johnston, 2002; Lin, 2004), the second language teacher educator (Goldstein, 2003; Pennycook, 2004), and the second language researcher (Hawkins, 2004; Leung *et al.*, 2004). If we take seriously the argument that the identity of the second language learner is not a personality variable but a socially and historically constructed relationship to both institutional and community practices, then it follows that teachers, researchers, administrators, testers, and policy makers are all implicated in the range of identities available to the second language learner. There is every indication that the interest in second language identity will grow in momentum, enriching existing trajectories of research and forging new, exciting directions.

See also: Critical Applied Linguistics; Identity and Language; Identity in Sociocultural Anthropology and Language; Language Education: Language Awareness; Language Teaching Traditions: Second Language; Language Policy in Multinational Educational Contexts; Language Politics; Language Socialization; Multiculturalism and Language; Politics of Teaching; Power and Pragmatics.

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Implicature

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The Basic Notions

The term '*implicature*' goes back to the philosopher Paul Grice, as laid down in his seminal article 'Logic and Conversation' (Grice, 1989), which is the published version of a part of his William James lectures held in 1967 at Harvard University (*see* **Grice, Herbert Paul**). In Grice's approach, both 'what is implicated' and 'what is said' are part of speaker meaning. 'What is said' is that part of meaning that is determined by truth-conditional semantics, while 'what is implicated' is that part of meaning that cannot be captured by truth conditions and therefore belongs to pragmatics. Several types of implicature are distinguished. **Figure 1** shows the Gricean typology of speaker meaning (cf. Levinson, 1983: 131).

The most widely accepted type of implicature is the *conversational implicature*. According to Grice, it comes in two ways, generalized conversational implicature (GCI) and particularized conversational implicature (PCI). The following example from Levinson (2000: 16–17) illustrates this distinction:

Context, 1 Speaker A: What time is it?
            Speaker B: Some of the guests are already
                       leaving.
            PCI: 'It must be late.'
            GCI: 'Not all of the guests are already
                  leaving.'
Context, 2 Speaker A: Where's John?
            Speaker B: Some of the guests are already
                       leaving.
            PCI: 'Perhaps John has already left.'
            GCI: 'Not all of the guests are already
                  leaving.'

Because the implicature ('. . . not all . . .') triggered by *some* arises in both contexts, it is relatively context-independent. Relative context-independence is the most prominent property of GCIs. In addition, GCIs are normally, or even consistently, associated with certain linguistic forms. For example, if someone utters *Peter is meeting a woman this evening* it is, because of the indefinite article, standardly implicated that the woman is not his wife, close relative, etc. (cf. Grice, 1989: 37; Hawkins, 1991). In contrast to GCIs, PCIs are highly context-dependent, and they are not consistently associated with any linguistic form.

The distinction between conversational implicatures and *conventional implicatures* draws on the observation that in coordinations like *Anna is rich but she is happy*, the truth conditions are just the truth conditions of the coordination *Anna is rich and she is happy*, with the exception of the contrastive meaning of *but*. This meaning is not truth-functional, and it is not context-dependent either; hence, there is some motivation for assuming the category of conventional implicature.

Note that there may be further types of implicature, e.g., implicatures of politeness or style that are neither conventional nor conversational (cf. Leech, 1983; Brown and Levinson, 1987).

Conversational implicatures come about by the *exploitation* (apparent flouting) or *observation* of the *cooperative principle* (CP) and a set of maxims (Grice, 1989) (*see* **Cooperative Principle; Maxims and Flouting**):

Cooperative Principle
Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged.

Maxim of Quantity
1. Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of exchange).
2. Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.

Maxim of Quality
Try to make your contribution one that is true.
1. Do not say what you believe to be false.
2. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.

Maxim of Relevance
Be relevant.

Maxim of Manner
Be perspicuous.
1. Avoid obscurity of expression.
2. Avoid ambiguity.
3. Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity).
4. Be orderly.

These maxims and submaxims are conceived as rules of rational behavior, not as ethical norms. They figure prominently in the derivation of an implicature.

Figure 1 Gricean typology of speaker meaning.

The basic idea of such a derivation is best illustrated with a simple dialogue. Imagine that I ask my colleague *Is Markus there?* and she answers *There is a pink Porsche behind the library building*. Understood literally, such an answer does not make any sense. However, as I assume that my colleague is cooperative, and remembering that Markus drives a pink Porsche, I can figure out that Markus is in the library. In working out this information, I have made use of the assumption that my colleague's answer has been relevant with regard to my question. Thus, conversational implicatures display the property of *calculability*. A general scheme for the working out of a conversational implicature is given by Grice (1989: 30–31):

> A man who, by (in, when) saying (or making as if to say) that *p* has implicated that *q*, may be said to have conversationally implicated that *q*, provided that (1) he is to be presumed to be observing the conversational maxims, or at least the Cooperative Principle; (2) the supposition that he is aware that, or thinks that, *q* is required in order to make his saying or making as if to say *p* (or doing so in *those* terms) consistent with this presumption; and (3) the speaker thinks (and would expect the hearer to think that the speaker thinks) that it is within the competence of the hearer to work out, or grasp intuitively, that the supposition in (2) is required.

Table 1 lists some of the most typical cases covered by the CP and the maxims. Examples for each case are given below the table. For further classical examples, see Grice (1989) and Levinson (1983). In what follows, '+>' stands for 'implicates conversationally':

(1) War is war. +> 'There is nothing one can do about it.'

(2) Some men were drunk. +> 'Not all of them were drunk.'

(3a) He is a fine friend. +> 'He is not a fine friend.'
(3b) You are the cream in my coffee. +> 'You are my best friend.'

(4) There is life on Mars. +> 'Speaker believes that there is life on Mars.'

Table 1 Typical cases of implicature

Maxims	Exploitation	Observation
Quantity	Tautology (1)	Scalar implicature (2)
Quality	Irony, metaphor, sarcasm (3)	Belief implicature in assertions (4)
Relevance	Implicatures due to thematic switch (5)	Bridging (6)
Manner	Implicatures due to obscurity, etc. (7)	Conjunction buttressing (8)

(5) Speaker A: I'm out of petrol.
Speaker B: There is a garage round the corner.
+> 'The garage is open.'

(6) Speaker A: Look, that old spinster over there!
Speaker B: Nice weather today, isn't it? +> 'No comment.'

(7) She produced a series of noises that resembled "Sì, mi chiamano Mimì". +> 'Her singing was a complete disaster.'

(8) Anna went to the shop and bought jeans. +> 'She bought the jeans in the shop.'

For further illustration of the exploitation/observation dichotomy, look at (1) and (8). As to (1), tautological utterances are always true, which amounts to their being fundamentally uninformative. There is no situation where a speaker wants to tell someone that something is identical with itself. Thus, it seems that the utterer of (1) has violated the first maxim of Quality. Gricean reasoning then leads the hearer to the insight that this violation was only apparent (cf. Autenrieth, 1997). In (8), we have a simple conjunction of two sentences. If the meaning of *and* were to be the same as the meaning of the logical operator, it could not be explained that there is an additional meaning 'and then.' Grice's view is that we may identify the semantic meaning of *and* with the pure connecting operation known from logic as long as we are able to derive the additional meaning from the maxims. The observation of the fourth maxim of Manner, "Be orderly!", will do this job (cf. Posner, 1980). Both observation and exploitation are in line with the general pattern for working out an implicature.

Besides the property of calculability, conversational implicatures display the properties of variability and cancellability. *Variability* means that there are contexts where the speaker utters the same utterance, but the respective implicature does not arise. Thus, the implicature is dependent on the specific context in which it arises. (This does not exclude the notion of relative context-independency in the case of GCIs.) *Cancellability* (or defeasibility) means that it is possible to withdraw an implicature within the situation of utterance without any contradiction. For example, it is possible to utter *Some men were drunk, indeed all*. Reversely, conversational implicatures should be *reinforceable*, as Sadock (1978) proposed. Thus, it is possible to conjoin the content of an implicature with the utterance that triggers that implicature, as in *Some of the girls were reading books but not all*.

Conventional implicatures are neither calculable, nor variable, nor cancellable. However, they are said to be detachable, i.e., if the elements that trigger them are replaced, the respective implicature does not arise.

By contrast, conversational implicatures are *non-detachable*, i.e., if there is an expression X′ that shares meaning with expression X that triggers the implicature, the same implicature should arise. For example, if *She is very beautiful* gives rise to an ironical implicature, then *She is a real beauty* should have the same effect (Sadock, 1978: 287). (An obvious exception to this are Manner implicatures.)

For further illustration, consider focus particles like *even*. An utterance such as *Even JOHN drives a Porsche* has the same truth conditions as the corresponding utterance without the focus particle, i.e., *John drives a Porsche*. The additional meaning of the type 'John is the least likely to drive a Porsche,' being related to a contextually given set of other individuals (e.g., Gustav, Bettina, Markus...), may be considered as a conventional implicature (cf. König, 1991), because this meaning appears to be neither truth-conditional nor context-dependent. Moreover, if *even* is replaced by another focus particle, the respective implicature is not triggered. However, if the conventional implicature is bound to the specific lexical item *even*, and for this reason is detachable, then the implicature seems to be part of the literal meaning of this lexical item. Therefore, it is difficult to distinguish between conventional implicatures on the one hand and entailments (belonging to the 'what is said') on the other hand. For this and other reasons, some researchers do not accept that there is a category of conventional implicature (cf. Bach, 1999; for a logical approach, see Potts, 2005).

Beyond Grice

The reception of the Gricean framework has been largely dominated by the wish to develop a more systematic architecture of maxims. Moreover, the Cooperative Principle has been on trial, as other aspects (e.g., logical, anthropological, cognitive, etc.) became more attractive. The prevailing tendency has been to reduce the set of maxims proposed by Grice. Three major reductive approaches have been developed: (a) the tri-heuristic approach by Levinson (2000), (b) the dual principle approach by Horn (1984), and (c) the monoprincipled approach by Sperber and Wilson (1995) and Carston (2002). These approaches are outlined in the following sections. It should be mentioned, however, that there are other important approaches that elaborate on the Gricean framework, e.g., Gazdar (1979) or Atlas (2005), as well as radical criticisms such as Davis (1998). For useful surveys, see Levinson (1983: Ch. 3) and Rolf (1994).

Presumptive Meanings: Levinson's Theory of Generalized Conversational Implicature

Levinson develops his revision of Grice's maxims from three heuristics that follow from the anthropological need to overcome the "fundamental bottleneck in the efficiency of human communication, occasioned no doubt by absolute physiological constraints on the articulators" (Levinson, 2000: 28). Accordingly, Grice's rationalistic CP plays no role. The heuristics are (Levinson, 2000: 31–33):

> *Levinson's Heuristics*
> Heuristic 1: What isn't said, isn't.
> Heuristic 2: What is simply described, is stereotypically exemplified.
> Heuristic 3: What's said in an abnormal way, isn't normal; or Marked message indicates marked situation.

Heuristics 1 corresponds to Levinson's Q-principle (see maxim of Quantity 1 in Grice's framework), Heuristics 2 to Levinson's I-principle (Grice's maxim of Quantity 2), and Heuristics 3 to Levinson's M-principle (Grice's maxim of Manner 1 and 3). These three principles are said to derive GCIs. For the correspondences to Grice, and a typical example, see **Table 2**.

Where inconsistent implicatures arise, they are "systematically resolved by an ordered set of priorities" (Levinson, 2000: 39), among them $Q > M > I$, where '$>$' is understood as 'defeats inconsistency.' Levinson (2000: 153–164) gives some examples for $Q > I$, $Q > M$, and $M > I$. An example for $Q > M$ is

Table 2 Correspondences between Levinson's Heuristics and Principles, and Grice's Maxims

Heuristics	Principles	Grice's Maxims	Example
Heuristic 1	Q-Principle	Quantity, 1	Q-Implicature: (a) Some colleagues were drunk. $+>$ 'Not all of them were drunk.' (scalar implicature) (b) The doctor believes that the patient will not recover. $+>$ 'The doctor may or may not know that the patient will not recover.' (clausal implicature)
Heuristic 2	I-Principle	Quantity, 2	I-Implicature: Anna turned the switch and the motor started. $+>$ 'Anna turned the switch and then/therefore the motor started.' (conjunction buttressing)
Heuristic 3	M-Principle	Manner, 1 and 3	M-Implicature: Bill caused the car to stop. (vs. Bill stopped the car.) $+>$ 'He did this indirectly, not in the normal way, e.g., by use of the emergency brake.' (periphrasis)

It's not unlikely that Giant Stride will win the Derby, and indeed I think it is likely. Here, as Levinson (2000: 160) points out, the first conjunct gives rise to the M-based implicature 'less than fully likely,' because of the double negative *not unlikely*, while the second conjunct triggers the Q-based implicature 'it is possible it is likely,' because of the use of *think*, which does not entail the complement clause. In this case, the Q-implicature of the second conjunct defeats the M-implicature of the first. (However, as Traugott, 2004: 11 observes, *indeed* may serve as a M-implicature cancelling device.)

The Q-principle is defined as follows (Levinson, 2000: 76):

> *Q-principle*
> **Speaker's maxim:** Do not provide a statement that is informationally weaker than your knowledge of the world allows, unless providing an informationally stronger statement would contravene the I-principle. Specifically, select the informationally strongest paradigmatic alternate that is consistent with the facts.
> **Recipient's corollary:** Take it that the speaker made the strongest statement consistent with what he knows, and therefore that:
>   a. if the speaker asserts $A(W)$, where A is a sentence frame and W an informationally weaker expression than S, and the contrastive expressions $<S, W>$ form a Horn scale (in the prototype case such that $A(S)$ entails $A(W)$), then one can infer that the speaker knows that the stronger statement $A(S)$ (with S substituted for W) would be false [...]
>   b. if the speaker asserted $A(W)$ and $A(W)$ fails to entail an embedded sentence Q, which a stronger statement $A(S)$ would entail, and $\{S, W\}$ form a contrast set, then one can infer that the speaker does not know whether Q obtains or not (i.e., $\{P(Q), P \sim (Q)\}$ read as 'it is epistemically possible that Q and epistemically possible that not-Q'

The I-Principle mentioned in the Speaker's maxim requires that a speaker should not be more informative than necessary (see below). Wherever it is possible, the speaker should build on stereotypical assumptions. In the Recipient's corollary, two cases are distinguished, namely scalar implicature, involving Horn scales (named after Laurence Horn, see the next section) and clausal implicature, involving contrast sets.

In the case of *scalar implicatures*, we need a *Horn scale*: given a scale $<q, p>$ with p as an informationally weak and q as an informationally strong element, the assertion of p implicates the negation of q. In such cases, the speaker is supposed to be as informative as possible, thus observing the Q-principle (or the maxim of Quantity). Therefore, the speaker could not say more than he actually did, and this means

that the stronger statement does not hold. A classical example is the utterance p = *Some colleagues were drunk* implicating q = 'Not all of them were drunk'. In the case of *clausal implicatures*, we need *contrast sets*. Let {know, believe} be a contrast set. Then p = *The doctor believes that the patient will not recover* implicates q_1 = 'The doctor may or may not know that the patient will not recover' (Levinson, 2000: 110). The crucial point is that clausal implicatures indicate epistemic uncertainty about the truth of the embedded sentence. Note that, because <know, believe> also form a Horn scale, there is a scalar implicature as well: in this case p implicates q_2 = 'The doctor does not know that the patient will not recover.'

Well-known Horn scales include the quantifiers <all, most, many, some>, connectives <and, or>, modals <necessarily, possibly>, <must, should, may>, adverbs <always, often, sometimes>, degree adjectives <hot, warm>, and verbs <know, believe>, <love, like>. Contrast sets include verbal doublets like {know, believe}, {realize, think}, {reveal, claim}, {predict, foresee}, and others (cf. Levinson, 2000: 111).

Now consider the I-principle (Levinson, 2000: 114–115):

> *I-Principle*
> **Speaker's maxim:** the maxim of Minimization. 'Say as little as necessary'; that is, produce the minimal linguistic information sufficient to achieve your communicational ends (bearing Q in mind).
> **Recipient's corollary:** the Enrichment Rule. Amplify the informational content of the speaker's utterance by finding the most *specific* interpretation, up to what you judge to be the speaker's m-intended [= meaning-intended] point, unless the speaker has broken the maxim of Minimization by using a marked or prolix expression.
>
> Specifically:
>   a. Assume the richest temporal, causal and referential connections between described situations or events, consistent with what is taken for granted.
>   b. Assume that stereotypical relations obtain between referents or events, unless this is inconsistent with (a).
>   c. Avoid interpretations that multiply entities referred to (assume referential parsimony); specifically, prefer coreferential readings of reduced NPs (pronouns and zeros).
>   d. Assume the existence or actuality of what a sentence is about (if that is consistent with what is taken for granted).

This principle is said to cover a whole range of implicatures: conditional perfection (9), conjunction buttressing (10), bridging (11), inference to stereotype (12), negative strengthening (13), NEG-raising (14), preferred local coreference (15), the mirror

maxim (16), specialization of spatial terms (17), and possessive interpretations (18) (cf. Levinson, 2000: 117–118).

(9) If you mow the lawn, I'll give you five dollars. +> 'If you don't mow the lawn, I will not give you five dollars.'

(10) Bettina wrote an encyclopedia and sold the rights to Elsevier. +> 'Bettina wrote an encyclopedia and then sold the rights to Elsevier.'

(11) Gustav unpacked the picnic. The beer was warm. +> 'The beer was part of the picnic.'

(12) Markus said 'Hello' to the secretary and then he smiled. +> 'Markus said "Hello" to the female secretary and then Markus smiled.'

(13) I don't like Alice. +> 'I positively dislike Alice.'

(14) I don't think he is reliable. +> 'I think he is not reliable.'

(15) John came in and he sat down. +> 'John$_i$ came in and he$_i$ sat down.'

(16) Harry and Sue bought a piano. +> 'They bought it together, not one each.'

(17) The nail is in the wood. +> 'The nail is buried in the wood.'

(18) Wendy's children +> 'those to whom she is parent'; Wendy's house +> 'the one she lives in'; 'Wendy's responsibility' +> the one falling on her; Wendy's theory +> 'the one she originated'

The M-principle is defined as follows (Levinson, 2000: 136–137):

M-principle

Speaker's maxim: Indicate an abnormal, nonstereotypical situation by using marked expressions that contrast with those you would use to describe the corresponding normal, stereotypical situation.

Recipient's corollary: What is said in an abnormal way indicates an abnormal situation, or marked messages indicate marked situations, specifically:

Where *S* has said p, containing a marked expression *M*, and there is an unmarked alternate expression *U*, with the same denotation *D*, which the speaker might have employed in the same sentence-frame instead, then where *U* would have I-implicated the stereotypical or more specific subset *d* of *D*, the marked expression *M* will implicate the complement of the denotation *d*, namely $\bar{d}$ of *D*.

The M-principle is supposed to cover a range of cases, among them lexical doublets (19) and rival word formations (20), nominal compounds (21), litotes (22), certain genitive (23) and zero morph

constructions (24), periphrasis (25), and repetition (26) (cf. Levinson, 2000: 138–153).

(19) She was reading a tome [vs. book]. +> 'She was reading some massive, weighty volume.'

(20) Ich nehme den Flieger [vs. das Flugzeug]. (= I take the plane [vs. the airplane]) +> 'Fliegen ist nichts Besonderes für mich.' (= 'Flying is quite normal for me.')

(21) This is a box for matches (vs. matchbox). +> 'This is a (nonprototypical) box specially made for containing matches.'

(22) It took a not inconsiderable effort. +> 'It took a close-to-considerable effort.'

(23) the picture of the child (vs. the child's picture) +> 'the picture depicts the child'

(24) She went to the school/the church/the university (vs. to school, to church, to university, etc.) +> 'She went to the place but not necessarily to do the associated stereotypical activity.'

(25) Bill caused the car to stop. (vs. Bill stopped the car.) +> 'He did this indirectly, not in the normal way (e.g., by using the emergency brake).'

(26) He went to bed and slept and slept. +> 'He slept longer than usual.'

Note that only the first ('Avoid obscurity of expression') and the third ('Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity)') submaxims of the Gricean maxims of Manner survive in Levinson's M-principle. Levinson views the second submaxim ('Avoid ambiguity') in connection with 'generality narrowing', which is subsumed under the Q-principle (Levinson, 2000: 135). The fourth submaxim ('Be orderly') is not needed any more, because the notorious cases of 'conjunction buttressing' fall under the I-principle in Levinson's framework. Moreover, Levinson (2000: 135) notes the general cognitive status of this general semiotic principle of linearization, and he questions its status as a maxim.

It seems that many of the cases in (19)–(26) may be explained in terms of the Q- or I-principle; in other cases, it is not at all clear that we have the same denotation, as required in the Recipient's corollary of the M-principle, thus throwing into doubt whether a separate M-principle is really needed. By comparison, Horn's (1984) approach (sketched in the next section) has no separate maxim/principle of Manner. For further discussion, see Meibauer (1997) and Traugott (2004).

Obviously, the maxim of Quality and the maxim of Relevance are not maxims that figure in the derivation of GCIs. The only comment on the

maxim of Quality Levinson gives is that this maxim "plays only a background role" in the derivation of GCIs; maybe he has the sincerity conditions for assertive acts in mind (Levinson, 2000: 74). Note that Grice (1989: 34) needed the maxim of Quality to derive the implicatures in the cases of irony, metaphor, and sarcasm (*see* **Irony**). In contrast, Levinson argues that irony and sarcasm are cases of PCIs (Levinson, 2000: 386, Fn. 2), a claim that seems somewhat premature at least when considering cases of conventional irony and sarcasm. The maxim of Relevance is a maxim that, according to Levinson (2000: 74), derives only PCIs. However, this maxim seems to play a role when it comes to disambiguation and 'ellipsis unpacking' (Levinson, 2000: 174, 183) (*see* **Relevance Theory**).

In addition to the revision of the Gricean maxims just outlined, Levinson sketches a radical revision of the widely accepted Gricean view of the interaction of grammar and pragmatics according to which in language production, conversational implicatures are supposed to operate on, and follow the semantic representation of, the said (Levinson, 2000: 173). Levinson finds this view basically wrong:

> Grice's account makes implicature dependent on a prior determination of 'the said.' The said in turn depends on disambiguation, indexical resolution, reference fixing, not to mention ellipsis unpacking and generality narrowing. But each of these processes, which are prerequisites to determining the proposition expressed, may themselves depend crucially on processes that look undistinguishable from implicatures. Thus, what is said seems both to determine and to be determined by implicature. Let us call this *Grice's circle*. (Levinson, 2000: 186)

According to Levinson, there are at least five phenomena that show the influence of GCIs on sentence meaning (Levinson, 2000: 172–187). First, GCIs (of the scalar type) are involved in the disambiguation of ambiguous constructions like *some cats and dogs*, for only the bracketing *[[some cats] and dogs]*, with the appropriate implicature 'some but not all cats, and dogs in general,' is appropriate in the sentence *He's an indiscriminate dog-lover; he likes some cats and dogs*. Second, the resolution of indexicals is dependent on the calculation of GCIs, e.g., *The meeting is on Thursday.* $+>$ 'not tomorrow' (when tomorrow is Thursday). Third, reference identification often requires GCIs, e.g., *John came in and the man sat down.* $+>$ 'The man was not identical to John.' Fourth, in ellipsis unpacking, as in simple dialogues like *Who came? – John <came>*, the missing information is constructed on the basis of Relevance and I-Implicature. Finally, there is the case of

generality narrowing, e.g., if someone utters *I've eaten breakfast* $+>$ 'I've eaten breakfast [this morning]' where the Q-principle is activated.

In order to resolve the dilemma of Grice's circle, i.e., to account for 'pragmatic intrusion,' Levinson proposes an alternative model (Levinson, 2000: 188). This model contains three pragmatic components, namely Indexical Pragmatics, Gricean Pragmatics 1, and Gricean Pragmatics 2, and two semantic components, namely Compositional Semantics and Semantic Interpretation (model-theoretic interpretation). The output of Compositional Semantics and Indexical Pragmatics is input for Gricean Pragmatics 1. The output of Gricean Pragmatics 1 is input for Semantic Interpretation, and its output ('sentence meaning, proposition expressed') is input for Gricean Pragmatics 2, whose output is 'speaker meaning, proposition meant by the speaker.'

Whereas Indexical Pragmatics and Gricean Pragmatics 1 are presemantic pragmatic components, Gricean Pragmatics 2 is a postsemantic pragmatic component. It seems that Gricean Pragmatics 2 deals with PCIs ('indirection, irony and tropes, etc.,') whereas Gricean Pragmatics 1 deals with GCIs ('disambiguation, fixing reference, generality-narrowing, etc.'). At the heart of Levinson's approach is his analysis of GCIs, precisely because it is here that arguments for this new model of the semantics-pragmatics interaction may be found.

Division of Pragmatic Labor: Horn's Q- and R-Principles

Central to Horn's approach to implicature is the insight that implicatures have to do with "regulating the economy of linguistic information" (Horn, 2004: 13). In contrast to Levinson, Horn (1984) assumes only two principles, the Q-principle and the R-principle:

> **Q-principle**
> Make your contribution sufficient: Say as much as you can (given R).
> (Lower-bounding principle, inducing upper-bounding implicatures)
> **R-principle**
> Make your contribution necessary: Say no more than you must (given Q).
> (Upper-bounding principle, inducing lower-bounding implicatures)

The Q-principle collects the Gricean maxims of Quantity 1 as well as Manner 1 and 2, while the R-Principle collects Quantity 2, Relation, and Manner 3 and 4. The maxim of Quality is considered as unreducible, as truthfulness is a precondition for satisfying the other maxims (Horn, 2004: 7).

The Q-principle aims at the maximization of content. It is a guarantee for the hearer that the content is

sufficient. The hearer infers from the speaker's failure to use a more informative or briefer form that the speaker was not in a position to do so. Scalar implicatures are a case in point. The R-principle aims at the minimization of expression, and consequently, the minimization of the speaker's effort. According to Horn, this principle holds for all indirect speech acts.

The following table, which is adapted from Horn (2004: 10), shows how the Q-principle works in the case of scalar implicatures (**Table 3**). The two-sided reading is the default case.

According to Horn, the conflict between the Q-principle and the R-principle may be resolved, as expressed by the following principle (Horn, 1984: 22):

> **The Division of Pragmatic Labor**
> The use of a marked (relatively complex and/or prolix) expression when a corresponding unmarked (simpler, less 'effortful') alternative expression is available tends to be interpreted as conveying a marked message (one which the unmarked alternative would not or could not have conveyed).

Levinson (1987: 73) argues that Horn mixes up two things here that properly should be distinguished, namely minimization of content on the one hand, and minimization of expression on the other. According to Levinson, splitting up the maxims of Manner in the way Horn does is mistaken, because the Manner maxims are fundamentally dependent on form, and thus related to minimization of expression.

Following Horn's original work, much research has been done on Horn scales, e.g., by Hirschberg (1991), Fretheim (1992), Matsumoto (1995), Sauerland (2004), van Rooy (2004). In this connection, three further areas of research deserve to be singled out.

First, as shown in Horn (1989: Ch. 4), there is the phenomenon of *metalinguistic negation*. For example, when uttering *It's not warm, it's hot!* the first part of the utterance gives rise to the scalar implicature 'It is not hot,' but this implicature is obviously denied in the second part of the utterance. Typically, utterances of this type have a humorous, ironical, or sarcastic flair (cf. Chapman, 1996 for an overview

and Carston, 1996 and Iwata, 1998 for an echo-theoretic interpretation).

Second, there is some discussion about the exact status of the Horn scales in the lexicon, e.g., how are elements selected for scales, how is the ordering of the elements achieved, etc. An influential approach is the one by Hirschberg (1991), who argues that there exist, in addition to lexical scales, scales that are induced pragmatically or on the basis of real-world knowledge. For example, when speaker A asks *Did you get Paul Newman's autograph?* and speaker B answers *I got Joanne Woodward's*, implicating 'not Paul Newman's,' we are dealing with a salient scale of autograph prestige <Newman, Woodward>. Consequently, Hirschberg (1991: 42) denies that there is any principled distinction between GCIs and PCIs.

Third, the economical aspect of Horn's reduction of the Gricean apparatus has recently become very attractive within *Bidirectional Optimality Theory* (cf. Blutner, 2004). This theory assumes that sentences are semantically underspecified, and therefore are in need of enrichment. A function *Gen* is assumed that determines for each common ground the set of possible enrichments. Bidirectional (i.e., taking the perspective of speaker *and* hearer) Optimality Theory then stipulates that a form-meaning pair is optimal if and only if it is taken from the set defined by *Gen*, and that there is no other pair that better fulfills the requirements of the Q- and I-principle. For an application and further discussion, see Krifka (2002) (*see* **Pragmatics: Optimality Theory**).

Relevance Theory: Carston's Underdeterminacy Thesis

Relevance theory is a cognitive theory of meaning whose major claims are that semantic meaning is the result of linguistic decoding processes, whereas pragmatic meaning is the result of inferential processes constrained by one single principle, the *Principle of Relevance*, originally proposed in Sperber and Wilson (1995) (*see* **Relevance Theory**). However, the connection to the Gricean maxim of Relevance is rather weak, as can be seen from the following definitions

Table 3 Application of the Q-Principle to scalar implicatures

Statements	Lower bound, one-sided (what is said)	Upper bound, two-sided (what is implicated qua Q)
a. Pat has three children	'... at least three ...'	'... exactly three ...'
b. You ate some of the cake	'... some if not all ...'	'... some but not all ...'
c. It's possible she'll win	'... at least possible ...'	'... possible but not certain ...'
d. He's a knave or a fool	'... and perhaps both ...'	'... but not both'
e. It's warm	'... at least warm ...'	'... but not hot'

(Carston, 2002; for other versions, see Wilson and Sperber, 2004):

> *First (Cognitive) Principle of Relevance*
> Human cognition is geared towards the maximization of relevance (that is, to the achievement of as many contextual (cognitive) effects as possible for as little processing effort as possible).
> *Second (Communicative) Principle of Relevance*
> Every act of ostensive communication (e.g., an utterance) communicates a presumption of its own optimal relevance.

Carston (2002) questions the standard division of labor between semantics and pragmatics and argues that pragmatics contributes much more to the construction of explicit meaning ('what is said') than generally assumed. Her overall aim is to establish relevance theory as a theory of cognitive pragmatics. The relevance theoretic approach is, according to Carston, "to be characterized as a sub-personal-level explanatory account of a specific performance mechanism conducted at the level of representations-and-procedures" (Carston, 2002: 11).

Carston's *underdeterminacy thesis* says that linguistic meaning generally underdetermines what is said. Pragmatic inferences are not only necessary to determine implicatures, but also to fix the proposition directly expressed by an utterance. This discrepancy between the meaning encoded in linguistic expressions and the proposition expressed by the utterance of these expressions ('what is said') is illustrated by various cases (over and above the well-known cases of ambiguities and indexical resolution): missing constituents (27), unspecified scope of elements (28), underspecifity or weakness of encoded conceptual content (29), overspecifity or narrowness of encoded conceptual content (30):

(27a) [Where is the book?] On the top shelf.
      (= 'The book is on the top shelf.')
(27b) Paracetamol is better. [than what?]
(27c) This fruit is green. [which part of the fruit?]

(28a) She didn't butter the toast in the bathroom with a knife. [different stress changes the information structure]
(28b) There's nothing on TV tonight. [nothing that is interesting for you]

(29) I'm tired. [predicate is too weak]

(30) Her face is oblong. [predicate is too narrow]

In all these cases, additional inferential steps are necessary to understand what the speaker intends to say.

Since linguistically encoded meanings are necessarily incomplete, pragmatics makes an essential contribution not only to the construction of *implicit meaning* but also to the construction of *explicit meaning*. In the spirit of Relevance Theory, Carston proposes a three-level model of semantic and pragmatic interpretation of linguistic expressions.

The first step involves semantic decoding of linguistic expressions. The output of the semantic decoding is an impoverished, nonpropositional semantic representation, which Carston calls logical form. It can be described as a "structured string of concepts with certain logical and causal properties" (Carston, 2002: 57) containing slots indicating where certain contextual values must be supplied. Hence, the output of the semantic decoding device is an incomplete template or scheme, open to a range of compatible propositions.

In the second step of interpretation, the hearer reconstructs the proposition intended by the speaker through pragmatic inference. Thus, pragmatic inference bridges the gap between what is linguistically expressed (incomplete conceptual schemata/logical form) and what is said (full propositional representations). For example, when a speaker utters the subsentential expression *on the top shelf* in a given context of utterance, the hearer is supposed to reconstruct the missing constituents to yield the intended proposition 'The marmalade is on the top shelf'. The pragmatic interpretation device is constrained by the First (Cognitive) Principle of Relevance, as proposed by Sperber and Wilson (1995).

Finally, there has to be a third step of interpretation, in which the hearer determines implicatures, i.e., 'what is meant.' Thus, Carston assumes that pragmatic inference is necessary for the second and third step of interpretation. In this cognitive approach, the bulk of utterance interpretation has to be done by pragmatic inference.

The pragmatic device of interpretation relies not only on linguistic information but also on additional information gained from context, perception, and world knowledge. Here, Carston essentially refers to Searle's theory of mind, especially his notion of *Background* (cf. Searle, 1980). Utterances are interpreted against a set of more or less manifest background assumptions and practices. Consider, for instance, the following five sentences: (a) *Jane opened the window*, (b) *Jane opened her book on page 56*, (c) *Jane opened the wall*, (d) *Jane opened her mouth*, (e) *The doctor opened her mouth*. Carston assumes that the encoded meaning of the English verb *open* does not vary in all five examples, although *open* receives quite different interpretations, depending on a set of background assumptions about different practices of opening. The Background is construed as a set of weakly manifest assumptions and practices in an

individual's cognitive environment. Since the Background always supplies additional meaning to the interpretation of an utterance, the proposition expressed by an utterance cannot be fully determined by the meaning of its parts and the mode of their combination. Consequently, the principle of semantic compositionality (*see* **Frege, Friedrich Ludwig Gottlob**) does not hold for the proposition expressed, but only for the underdetermined logical form (i.e., the first step of interpretation).

As does Levinson (2000), Carston, too, argues that Grice does not account for the fact that 'what is said' is not independent from pragmatic input. However, Carston and Levinson differ in their approaches to the question of how the pragmatic intrusion problem needs to be dealt with. As shown above, Levinson develops a pragmatic subtheory of GCIs, dealing only with the pragmatic processes involved in the elaboration of 'what is said'. By contrast, Carston favors a unitary account of all pragmatic processes, irrespective of whether they contribute to the 'what is said' or to different implicated assumptions (corresponding to Levinson's PCIs).

Carston's (2002: 377) use of the terms *explicature* and *implicature*, essentially based on Sperber and Wilson's (1995: 182) distinction between explicit and implicit assumptions/propositions, is spelled out in the following way (cf. Carston, 1988):

> **Explicature**
> An ostensively communicated assumption that is inferentially developed from one of the incomplete conceptual representations (logical forms) encoded by the utterance.
> **Implicature**
> An ostensively communicated assumption that is not an explicature; that is, a communicated assumption which is derived solely via processes of pragmatic inference.

The difference between explicatures and implicatures lies essentially in the way they are supplied: explicatures are developments of the logical form that they contain as a proper subpart, whereas implicatures are derived purely inferentially. In regard to these two kinds of pragmatic enrichment, the cognitive approach Carston promotes motivates the distinction between 'communicated assumptions' and the 'inferential steps' leading to them. Carston argues that explicatures are construed by means of interpretative hypotheses rather than by (generalized) implicatures.

Consider the example: *John came in and he sat down*. The preferred interpretation for the personal pronoun *he* in the second sentence is the coreferential one. Following Levinson, this interpretation results from an I-implicature. Carston argues that this implicature must be a proposition like '*He* refers to whomever *John* refers to', "a propositional form representing a hypothesis about reference assignment" (Carston, 2002: 151). She rejects the idea of reference assignment being an implicature and rather identifies it as an interpretative hypothesis like 'John came in and he, John, sat down,' which is derived online and only confirmed if it meets the expectation of relevance. Carston claims that this strategy is able to resolve the dilemma of Grice's circle, for the simple reason that interpretation processes can be effected simultaneously.

Finally, the cognitive approach leads Carston to reject *conventional implicatures*; these are subsumed under the procedural elements. Relevance Theory distinguishes between concepts as constituents of mental representations, and procedures that constrain pragmatic inferences. Conventional implicatures conveyed by expressions such as *moreover* and *therefore* do not contribute to the conceptual part of the utterance, but point the hearer to the kind of pragmatic processes she is supposed to perform (cf. Blakemore, 2002).

Bach (1994), who tries to defend the Gricean notion of 'what is said,' criticizes the notion of explicature and proposes instead the term *impliciture* (cf. also Bach, 2001). Implicitures are either *expansions* of 'what is said,' as in *You are not going to die [from this little wound]* or *completions*, as in *Steel isn't strong enough [for what?]*. In these cases, "the resulting proposition is not identical to the proposition expressed explicitly, since part of it does not correspond too any elements of the uttered sentence"; hence Bach considers it "inaccurate to call the resulting proposition the explicit content of an utterance or an explicature" (Bach, 1994: 273).

Carston views Relevance Theory as a cognitive theory of utterance understanding that aims at the subpersonal level, where processes are fast and automatic. Thus, it should be clear that this theoretical goal differs from that pursued by Grice (cf. Saul, 2002). It must be noted, however, that arguments from psycholinguistic research are called for in order to constrain the theory.

First, it may be asked how children acquire implicatures and what roles maxims, principles, and the like play in this process. There are studies on the acquisition of irony and metaphor by Winner (1988) as well as studies on the role of Gricean principles in lexical acquisition (cf. Clark E V, 1993, 2004). More recently, studies have been done on the acquisition of scalar implicatures, in particular dealing with the hypothesis that small children are "more logical" than older children and adults, in that they more readily accept the "some, perhaps all" – reading of the quantifier *some* (cf. Noveck, 2001; Papafragou and Musolino, 2003).

Second, there is some evidence that hearers do not first compute the literal meaning, then the nonliteral or indirect meaning, but that they arrive at the nonliteral/indirect meaning earlier or in a parallel fashion (cf. Shapiro and Murphy, 1993; Récanati, 1995; Gibbs, 2002; Giora, 2003). It is obvious that experimental research is very important for implicature and explicature theory (cf. Wilson and Sperber, 2004: 623–628).

Quality Reconsidered

In the development of neo-Gricean approaches to implicature such as Horn's and Levinson's, the Gricean maxim of Quality has been neglected (*see* **Neo-Gricean Pragmatics**). Thus, genuine pragmatic matters such as metaphor, irony, sarcasm, lying, etc. have become largely unattractive for some implicature theorists, although metaphor had been featured as a cardinal case of maxim exploitation already early on (cf. Levinson, 1983: 147–162). Relevance Theory, on the other hand, which takes a stand on Grice as well as on neo-Gricean approaches, has developed an independent theory of irony; moreover, Carston (2002: Ch. 5), analyzes metaphors as instances of *ad hoc*-concept construction. In neither of these approaches, however, does the maxim of Quality play any role (*see* **Metaphor: Psychological Aspects**).

First, consider *irony*. If a speaker A utters *X is a fine friend*, referring to a person who has betrayed a secret of A's to a business rival, then the first maxim of Quality is flouted (Grice, 1989: 34). Because it is obvious that A does not believe what he says, the hearer reconstructs a related proposition, i.e., the opposite of p. The ironical implicature qualifies for the status of an implicature, because it is calculable, context-dependent, and cancellable. Note that this substitutional analysis is in contrast to the additive nature of other types of implicature. However, this approach has been criticized for several reasons: (i) The analysis cannot account for ironical questions, requests and understatements, (ii) it cannot explain the distinction between irony and metaphor, because the latter is also explained with regard to the first maxim of Quality, and (iii), it is not fine-grained enough, because it does not follow from 'He is not a fine friend' that he is not a friend at all.

The Gricean approach to irony has been most prominently attacked by relevance theorists (Sperber and Wilson, 1981; Wilson and Sperber, 1992; Sperber and Wilson, 1998). Following Sperber and Wilson, ironical utterances have four main properties: (i) They are mentioned, not used, (ii) they are **echoic** in nature, (iii) the ironical interpretation is an implicature that

is derived through recognition of the echoic character of the utterance (Sperber and Wilson, 1981: 309), (iv) the ironical speaker displays a dissociative attitude towards the proposition uttered. Take the utterance *What lovely weather!* as an example. When uttered during a downpour, the speaker cannot mean the opposite, because this would be uninformative. Instead, he wants to convey that it was absurd to assume that the weather would be nice. Thus, the ironical utterance is a case of echoic mention of a previously entertained proposition. Types of echo include sarcastic repetition (31), attributed thoughts (32), norms (33) and standard expectations (34) (cf. Sperber and Wilson, 1998):

> (31) A: I'll be ready at five at the latest.
> B: Sure, you'll be ready at five.

> (32) A: I'll be ready at five at the latest.
> B: You mean at five tomorrow?

> (33) A: I'll be ready at five at the latest.
> B: You are so punctual.

> (34) A: I'll be ready at five at the latest.
> B: It's a great virtue to be on time!

Thus, the echo theory of irony does not imply that there is always an original utterance that is exactly reproduced. The echo theory is constrained in that most utterances cannot be interpreted as echoes, and echoic interpretations must contribute to the relevance of an utterance.

Several objections to this theory may be made (cf. Sperber and Wilson, 1998): (i) The notion of an echo is far too vague; it does not make sense to look for an echo in cases of conventional irony, e.g., when somebody utters *Boy, is it hot!* when it is icy cold. (ii) Because not every echoic mention is ironical, echoic mention is not sufficient to explain ironical interpretation. (iii) It is not clear why the substitution of the opposite should not be a starting point in the search for the dissociative attitude of the speaker towards the proposition. (iv) Relevance Theory cannot explain why hearers often fail to grasp the relevance of an ironical utterance.

Second, consider *metaphor*. For Carston (2002), metaphors are cases of *ad hoc* concept construction. *Ad hoc* concepts are those concepts "that are constructed pragmatically by a hearer in the process of utterance comprehension" (Carston, 2002: 322). Typical instances of *ad hoc* concepts come about via narrowing or broadening. *Narrowing* may be illustrated by utterances like *Ann is happy*, where the concept associated with *happy* in a particular context is much narrower than the encoded concept. The case of *broadening* is exemplified by utterances like *There is a rectangle of lawn at the back*, where it

is very unlikely that the encoded concept of *rectangle* is communicated. Both processes are cases of constructing an *ad hoc* concept that contributes to the explicature.

If metaphors are *ad hoc* concepts, then they are part of the explicature as well. Thus, in *Mary is a bulldozer*, the logical form of *bulldozer* is associated with an *ad hoc* concept **BULLDOZER*** differing from the concept **BULLDOZER** usually encoded by this word. In this approach, metaphor isn't an implicature any more, as Grice (1989) and Levinson (1983) would have it, but an explicature.

Recall that for Horn (1984), the maxim of Quality was unreducible. Since then, its domain of application has considerably shrunk. However, it still seems to play a role when it comes to the analysis of lying, deception, insincerity, and – maybe – irony (cf. Wilson and Sperber, 2002; Meibauer, 2005). In Levinson's (2000) approach, matters of irony, etc., are dealt with in the component called Gricean Pragmatics 2. Maybe it is there that the maxim of Quality will have a comeback. It is clear that some version of the maxim plays also a role in the definition of success conditions for assertive illocutions (*see* **Irony**).

Implicature and the Grammar/Pragmatics Interface

As has become clear from the sketch presented here of Levinson's and Carston's frameworks, pragmatic inferencing is powerful enough to influence semantic representations (*see* **Semantics-Pragmatics Boundary**). However, when it comes to pinpoint the exact relations of implicatures to illocutions on the one hand, and sentence types on the other, there still are many open questions.

First, consider implicatures *vis-à-vis* illocutions. Even if both are associated with an individual speech act, these notions refer to different entities: an additional proposition, in the case of implicature, vs. a type of act such as a promise, assertion, request etc., in the case of illocution.

An important connection between illocutions and implicatures is usually seen as obtaining in the case of *indirect speech acts* (*see* **Speech Acts; Pragmatic Acts**). According to Searle (1975), a reconstructive process that leads the hearer from the secondary illocutionary point (the 'literal' illocution) to the primary illocutionary point (the intended illocution) is similar to the scheme of reasoning that Grice proposed for conversational implicatures; step 2 of his sample derivation even includes principles of conversational cooperation (compare also the speech act schema proposed by Bach and Harnish, 1979). Accordingly, indirect speech acts have sometimes been analyzed as

implicatures, for example the question *Can you close the window?*, meant as a request to close the window, a case that is related to the R-Principle as proposed by Horn (1989, 2004).

A case in point is the *rhetorical question*. Whereas Meibauer (1986) analyzes them as indirect speech acts, i.e., interrogative sentences types associated with assertive force and polar propositional content, Romero and Han (2004) analyze negative *yes/no* questions like *Doesn't John drink?* as connected with a positive epistemic implicature such as 'The speaker believes or at least expects that John drinks.' It is not clear at first sight whether such analyses are compatible; in any case, as Dascal (1994) has shown, the notions of implicature and speech act are independently motivated, and should not be confused. Thus, the question of their interrelation requires further research.

Second, consider implicatures vis-à-vis sentence types. It is widely accepted that there is a systematic connection between sentence types such as declarative, interrogative, and imperative, etc., and illocutions such as assertion, question, and request, etc.; moreover, in some approaches the existence of an intermediate category 'sentence mood' is assumed (cf. Sadock and Zwicky, 1985; Harnish, 1994; Reis, 1999; Sadock, 2004; Zanuttini and Portner, 2003). However, while it is conceivable that sentence types determine a certain illocutionary potential, the analogical notion of an 'implicature potential' has never been proposed, probably because of the authors' concentration on lexical elements that give rise to GCIs.

However, there are several observations showing that such a concept is not totally mistaken. Consider the following examples:

(35) Who is the professor of linguistics at
Tübingen? +> Someone is the professor of
linguistics at Tübingen.

(36) [I gave the encyclopedia to Bettina.] You gave
the encyclopedia to WHOM?

(37) Visit Markus and you'll get new ideas! +> If
you visit Markus then you'll get new ideas.

(38a) This is good. +> This is not excellent.
(38b) Is this good? *+> Is this not excellent?

In (35), we have the case of an existential implicature that is typically bound to *wh*-interrogatives, but shows the properties of variability and cancellability. (Its classification as an existential presupposition, cf. Levinson, 1983: 184, has been abandoned, because it does not survive the negation test.) Example (36) illustrates the echo-*wh*-question. As Reis (1991) has persuasively argued on the basis of German data, these sentence types are neither 'echo-*wh*-interrogatives' nor *wh*-interrogatives. Instead, these utterances

are regular instances of any sentence type, and their interrogative force is explained as a conversational implicature triggered by the *wh*-element (see also Reis, 1999). Another example showing that implicatures are sensitive to sentence types is the conditional imperative in (37) (cf. Davies, 1986; Clark, 1993). Finally, if elements that trigger scalar implicatures are in the scope of a question operator, the respective implicature may be blocked, as shown in (38) (the asterisk * denotes a blocked or unallowed implicature). In summary, then, there is evidence of a systematic interaction between implicatures and sentence types. The question is, then, how and where to account for this interaction.

A detailed analysis of the sentence type-implicature relation is developed in Portner and Zanuttini (2000). They concentrate on negated *wh*-interrogatives and exclamatives in Paduan, a northern Italian dialect spoken in the city of Padua:

(39a) Parcossa *no* ve-to anca ti!? (*wh*-interrogative)
Why NEG go-s.cl also you
'Why aren't you going as well!?'

(39b) Cossa *no* ghe dise-lo! (*wh*-exclamative)
what NEG him say-s.cl
'What things he's telling him!'

The point is that the NEG-element has no negative force. In principle, there are two strategies for analyzing examples like (39): First, as a special type of negation, nonpropositional, expletive, or modal in character. The second strategy, as proposed in Meibauer (1990) on the basis of German data, is to assume regular negation, and to derive the modal effect from pragmatic principles. Portner and Zanuttini (2000), drawing on the latter approach, assume that exclamatives are factive. The negation particle *no* triggers a conventional implicature, which says that the lowest element from a set of alternative elements (that are possible in a contextually given scale) is true. In cases like (39a), there is an expectedness scale {less expected < more expected}, in cases like (39b), there is an unexpectedness scale {more expected < less expected}. The scales are dependent on the respective sentence type. While it is not clear (i) whether exclamatives constitute a separate sentence type at all (cf. d'Avis, 2001), (ii) why the implicatures are of the conventional type, and (iii) how the relevant scales are obtained from the context, it should be clear that such an approach paves the way for a more empirical research on the interplay of sentences types and implicatures.

Conclusions

On the basis of the foregoing sketch of three major approaches to implicature theory, we may state some of the prevailing tendencies. To begin with, there is a striving to understand implicatures in terms of economy. This is true for Levinson's insight that implicatures help to overcome "the slowness of articulation," as becomes clear from his slogan "inference is cheap, articulation expensive" (Levinson, 2000: 29), as well as for Horn's appeal to the principle of least effort and Sperber and Wilson's view on optimal relevance. Lately, recent developments in Optimality Theory have shown attempts to integrate the interplay of maxims into their frameworks.

Second, there is a tendency to reject the classic dual distinction between 'what is said' on the one hand, and 'what is implicated' on the other. Instead, a three-level approach to meaning is favored, cf. the distinction in Levinson (2000: 21–27) between sentence meaning, utterance type meaning, and speaker meaning, or Carston's three-level model of utterance interpretation. However, there is considerable terminological confusion here, as the diagram in Levinson (2000: 195) impressively shows; confusion that has to do with the still unsolved problem of finding demarcation lines or fixing the interfaces between 'what is said' and 'what is meant.' Further discussion of the question of level architecture can be found in Récanati (2004).

Obviously, the second tendency is connected with the widely accepted view that some sort of underdeterminacy thesis is correct, and that there are presemantic pragmatic processes that are input for model-theoretic interpretation (cf. Levinson, 2000: 188), or are necessary to fix full propositional representations (cf. Carston, 2002).

As has become clear, there are still many problems to solve: the status of the maxims of Relevance and Manner, the distinction between GCI and PCI, the status of conventional implicatures, the interaction of implicatures with illocutions and sentence types, to name only a few. Besides, the role that implicatures play in many areas, such as those of language acquisition and language change, awaits much further research.

See also: Cooperative Principle; Grice, Herbert Paul; Irony; Maxims and Flouting; Neo-Gricean Pragmatics; Pragmatic Acts; Pragmatics: Optimality Theory; Relevance Theory; Semantics-Pragmatics Boundary; Speech Acts.

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Indexicality: Theory

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Indexicality in Peirce's Categories and Sign Typology

'Indexicality' is a feature of the 'index,' one of three types of signs identified by Charles S. Peirce, the other two being the 'icon' and 'symbol.'

According to Peirce, a sign is something that stands for something else, in some respect. It creates in the mind of the interpreter an equivalent sign, or perhaps a more developed sign, that is, an interpretant (2.228 – As is common in Peircean scholarship, quotes and citations will be identified by volume and paragraph number from Peirce [1931–1958]).

That the sign stands for something in some respect means that it does not refer to the object in its entirety (dynamic object), but only to a part of it (immediate object). Furthermore, a sign subsists for Peirce according to the category of 'thirdness,' that is, it presupposes a triadic relation between itself, the object, and the interpretant thought, which is itself a sign. And given that it mediates between the interpretant sign and the object, the sign always plays the role of third party.

The icon is characterized by a relation of similarity between the sign and its object.

The symbol is a sign "in consequence of a habit (which term I use as including a natural disposition)" (4.531). The symbol is never pure but contains varying degrees of indexicality and iconicity; similarly,

as much as a sign may be characterized as an index or icon, it will always maintain the features of symbolicity: a sign to subsist as such always requires the mediation of an interpretant and recourse to a convention.

The index is a sign that signifies its object by a relation of contiguity, causality, or by some other physical and mechanical connection. This relation also depends on a *habitus* or convention: e.g., the relation between hearing a knock at the door and someone on the other side who wants to enter. Convention relates the knocking to the knocker, but contiguity/causality predominates to the point that we are surprised if we open the door and nobody enters. Types of index include: (1) 'symptoms,' medical, psychological, natural, or social phenomena (actual contiguity + actual causality; (2) 'clues,' natural phenomena, attitudes, and inclinations (presumed contiguity + nonactual causality); (3) 'traces,' physical or mental (nonactual contiguity + presumed causality). "An 'index,'" says Peirce, "is a sign which would, at once, lose the character which makes it a sign if its object were removed, but would not lose that character if there were no interpretant" (2.304).

Signs subsist in the dialectic between symbolicity, indexicality, and iconicity. The symbol is never pure but contains varying degrees of indexicality and iconicity; similarly, a sign that is prevalently indexical or iconic maintains the characteristics of symbolicity – it requires the mediation of an interpretant sign and recourse to a convention.

Symbolicity refers to the sign's conventional character, the relation of constriction by convention between a sign and its object established on the basis of a code, a law. To say it with Peirce: "I define a Symbol as a sign which is determined by its dynamic object only in the sense that it will be so interpreted. It thus depends either upon a convention, a habit, or a natural disposition of its interpretant, or of the field of its interpretant (that of which the interpretant is a determination)" (letter from Peirce to Welby, 12 October 1904, in Hardwick, 1977: 33).

Indexicality refers to the compulsory character of the sign, to the relation of cause and effect, of necessary contiguity between sign and object: "I define an Index as a sign determined by its dynamic object by virtue of being in a real relation to it" (Hardwick, 1977: 33). The index requires mediation by an interpretant sign and recourse to a convention. But in the case of the index, unlike symbols, the interpretant does not decide on the object. On the contrary, the relation between sign and object preexists with respect to interpretation, it is an objective relation and in fact conditions interpretation. The sign and that which it stands for are given together independently of the interpretant. Nonetheless, this independence does not exclude the necessity of recourse to a convention to organize the relation between sign and object as a sign relation.

Indexicality belongs to the category of 'secondness,' one of Peirce's three categories, the other two being 'firstness' and 'thirdness.'

- Firstness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, positively and without reference to anything else.
- Secondness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, with respect to a second but regardless of any third.
- Thirdness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, in bringing a second and third into relation to each other (8.329).

Firstness (in-itselfness, originality), secondness (over-againstness, obsistence) and thirdness (in-betweenness, transuasion) are universal categories. Peirce's categories help to explain logicocognitive processes and therefore at once the formation of signs. Analyzed in terms of Peirce's typology of signs, firstness coincides with the sphere of iconicity. Something that presents itself as firstness, presence, 'suchness,' pure quality is characterized by the relation of similarity (1.356–1.358). Analyzed in terms of Peirce's typology of signs, thirdness coincides with the sphere of symbolicity. Together with the other two categories, thirdness guides and stimulates inquiry and therefore has a heuristic value. The inferential relation between premises and conclusion is based forever on mediation, that is, on thirdness.

Secondness is the category according to which something is considered relatively to or over against something else. It involves binarity, a relation of opposition or reaction. From the viewpoint of signs, secondness is connected with indexicality. The icon, which is governed by firstness, presents itself as an original sign, the symbol, which is governed by thirdness, as a transuasional sign, while the index, which is governed by secondness, is an obsistent sign (2.89–2.92).

Any sign may be taken as something in itself, or in relation to something else (its object), or as a go-between (mediating between object and interpretant). On the basis of this threefold consideration, Peirce establishes the following correspondences between his trichotomy of the categories (all his trichotomies contain thirdness insofar as they are trichotomies) and three other important trichotomies in his semiotic system: firstness: qualisign, icon, rheme; secondness: sinsign, index, dicisign (or dicent sign); thirdness: legisign, symbol, argument (2.243). Symbolicity is the sign dimension that shares most in thirdness, because it is characterized by mediation (or in-betweenness),

iconicity by firstness or immediacy (or in-itselfness), and indexicality by secondness (or over-againstness). The category of secondness, together with firstness and thirdness are the omnipresent categories of mind, sign, and reality (2.84–2.94).

On the level of the typology of signs, firstness, secondness, and thirdness correspond to iconicity, indexicality, and symbolicity; on the level of logic, they correspond to abduction, deduction, and induction; and on the level of ontology, to agapism, anancism, and tychism.

From the viewpoint of logic, inference regulated by secondness and indexicality corresponds to deduction (while inference regulated by firstness and iconicity corresponds to abduction, and inference regulated by thirdness and symbolicity corresponds to induction). In fact, in the case of an 'obsistent argument' or deduction, the conclusion is compelled to acknowledge that the facts stated in the premises, whether in one or both, could not be if the fact stated in the conclusion were not there (2.96).

Indexicality and Logic

From the viewpoint of ontology, of universal being, secondness, and in sign typology, indexicality is present in the law of 'anancasm' or necessity. According to Peirce, this necessity regulates the evolutionary development of the universe together with 'agapasm' (creative love, which corresponds to firstness) and 'tychasm' (causality, which corresponds to thirdness) (6.287–6.317).

To indexicality and respectively secondness or obsistence, a binary category, there corresponds a relation of relative alterity in which the terms of the relation depend on each other. Effective alterity, the possibility of something being-on-its-own-account, absolutely, *per se*, autonomously, presents itself as firstness, or orience, or originality, according to which something "**is what it is without reference to anything else** within it or without it, regardless of all force and of all reason" (2.85). An effective relation of alterity is not possible in terms of binarity, indexicality, secondness, obsistence. Relations of alterity are not possible in a system regulated exclusively by secondness, therefore, binarity, where an element exists only on the condition that it refer to another element and would not exist should this other element be negated. "Take, for example, a husband and wife. Here there is nothing but a real twoness; but it constitutes a reaction, in the sense that the husband makes the wife a wife in fact (not merely in some comparing thought); while the wife makes the husband a husband" (2.84).

In the succession deduction–induction–abduction, the degree of alterity increases. Says Peirce:

"Abduction is the process of forming an explanatory hypothesis. It is the only logical operation which introduces any new idea; for induction does nothing but determine a value, and deduction merely evolves the necessary consequences of a pure hypothesis. Deduction proves that something **must** be; induction shows that something **actually is** operative; abduction merely suggests that something **may be**" (5.172). Abduction is the inferential process by which the rule that explains the fact is hypothesized through a relation of similarity (iconic relation) to that fact. This rule that acts as the general premise may be taken from a field of discourse that is close to or distant from that to which the fact belongs, or it may be invented *ex novo*. If the conclusion is confirmed, it retroacts on the rule and convalidates it (ab- or retro-duction). Such a retroactive procedure makes abductive inference risky, exposing it to the possibility of error; at the same time, if the hypothesis is correct, the abduction is innovative, inventive, and sometimes even surprising.

Peirce connected indexicality and deduction:

An Obsistent Argument, or **Deduction**, is an argument representing facts in the Premiss, such that when we come to represent them in a Diagram we find ourselves compelled to represent the fact stated in the Conclusion; so that the conclusion is drawn to recognize that, quite independently of whether it be recognized or not, the facts stated in the premises are such as could not be if the fact stated in the conclusion were not there; that is to say, the Conclusion is drawn in acknowledgment that the facts stated in the Premiss constitute an Index of the fact which it is thus compelled to acnowledge (2.96).

Indexicality and Dialogicality

In inference, the relation between the premises and conclusion may be considered in terms of dialogue between 'interpreted signs' and 'interpretant signs' (Ponzio, 1990: 49–61). The degree of dialogicality and alterity is low in induction – where the relation between premises and conclusion is determined by habit and is of the symbolic type – and in deduction – where the conclusion is a necessary derivation from the premises in a relation of the indexical type. To be precise, the degree of dialogicality in the relation between interpreted (premises) and interpretant (conclusion) (an indexical relation) is minimal in deduction: once the premises are accepted the conclusion is compulsory. Induction (where the relation between premises and conclusion is symbolic) is also characterized by unilinear inferential processes: identity and repetition dominate, but the relation between premises and conclusion is no longer compulsory. Instead, in abduction the relation between the

argumentative parts is dialogic in a substantial sense. The relation between premises and conclusion is predominantly iconic, therefore a relation of reciprocal autonomy. Consequently, abductive inference can generate sign processes at high levels of dialogicality and otherness, therefore responses that are risky, inventive, and creative with a minimal margin for convention or symbolicity and mechanical necessity or indexicality.

An approach to indexicality in terms of dialogue has its source in a theoretical framework that may be identified as Peircean-Bakhtinian (from the Russian philosopher Mikhail Bakhtin; *see* **Bakhtin, Mikhail Mikhailovich**), and its basis in the distinction between 'formal dialogicality' (which refers to the fact that a text is enacted or represented in the 'form of a dialogue') and 'substantial dialogicality' (which concerns the 'degree of dialogicality' in a given text, whether formally a dialogue or not). These two concepts of dialogicality do not necessarily coincide: a formal dialogue does not necessarily imply substantial dialogue, while the latter does not necessarily take the form of a dialogue. Signs and arguments are formally dialogical as the result of a dialogue between interpreteds and interpretants, according to varying degrees of dialogicality. From a semiotic perspective, the relationship between interpreteds and interpretants results in signs which – on a scale ranging from a maximum degree of monologism to a maximum degree of dialogism, otherness, and creativity – may be (prevalently) indexical, or symbolic, or iconic; from the perspective of logic, the relationship between interpreteds (premise) and interpretants (conclusion) results in arguments or inferences and is of the deductive, inductive or abductive type. The varying balance in indexicality, symbolicity, and iconicity in any given sign situation, whether formally a dialogue or not, involves variations in the degree of otherness and dialogicality regulating the relationship between the interpreted (premise) and interpretant (conclusion) of an argument: therefore, argumentative value may also be measured in terms of the degree of substantial dialogicality (Ponzio, 1990: 215–232).

Theory of Indexicality in a Peircean Semiotic Framework

Peirce's recognition of the need for the index may be connected with his interest in Duns Scotus's realism and the notion of *haecceitas* (thisness), which indicates the single thing in contrast to universality, i.e., the reality of actuality or secondness: "hic and nunc," Peirce observes, "is the phrase perpetually in the mouth of Duns Scotus" (*CP* 1.459). "The index has the being of present experience" (4.447) of *hic* and *nunc*. An index "is a sign which refers to the Object it denotes by virtue of being really affected by that Object" (*CP* 2.248), where the word "really" resonates to Scotus's doctrine of *realitas et realitas* (Sebeok, 2001: 87). To demonstrate the centrality of indexicality in Peircean semiotics, Thomas A. Sebeok (2001) observed that Peirce contended that no matter of fact can be stated without the use of a sign serving as an index, because 'designators' compose one of the main classes of indexes and because designation is "absolutely indispensable both to communication and to thought. No assertion has any meaning unless there is some designation to show whether the universe of reality or what universe of fiction is referred to" (8.368). Indexes "whose relation to their objects consists in a correspondence in fact … direct the attention to their objects by blind compulsion" (1.558). Deictics of various kinds, including tenses, that offer the most clear examples of indexicality.

Indexicality, iconicity, and symbolicity are three complementary rather than antagonistic categories. Peirce returned repeatedly to his sign typology. By 1906, he had classified 66 different types of signs. However, the most important in all his reflections on signs was a trichotomy formulated in relation to his original typology and presented in an article of 1867, 'On a new list of categories' (1.545–1.559). With this trichotomy, Peirce identified three types of signs: icons, indexes, and symbols. Sebeok evidenced that all three are present in nonhuman semiosis as well (for a synthesis of the comparison between the human world and the world of other animals relatively to this typology, see Sebeok, 2001). From the perspective of sign types, there is no difference between human and nonhuman semiosis. In the light of Sebeok's research, it is now clear that icons, indexes, and symbols are present both in languages (which are human) and in nonlanguages.

As Sebeok observes, elaborating on Peirce's typology, not signs but sign aspects are the object of classification. The hybrid character of the sign should now be obvious with respect to its distinction into symbol, index, and icon. The Peircean conception of the relation between symbol, icon, and index has very often been misunderstood. In fact, these terms were thought to denote three clearly distinguished and different types of sign, each with characteristics so specific as to exclude the other two. Now we know that signs that are exclusively symbols, icons, or indexes do not exist in the real world. Furthermore (and what most interests us here) in Peirce's theory, the symbol is a mere abstraction. It is never conceived as existing as a pure symbol but is always more or less mixed with iconicity and indexicality, or to say it with Peirce, it is always more or less 'degenerate.'

This denotation implies that more than being signs in their own right, the icon and index represent different levels in 'degeneracy of the symbol.' The symbol is not purely a symbol but almost always takes the characteristics of either the icon or index. The symbol may be represented iconically as a body in a state of unstable equilibrium, in which the stabilizing symbolic force is counteracted by iconic and indexical forces. But this image establishes a relation of contrast between symbol, index, and icon, when in fact they are not separate or distinct, nor are they in a relation of opposition.

Otherwise, with respect to the symbol, we would have signs that are purely icons or purely indexes and not simultaneously symbols; or symbols with no traces of iconicity or indexicality. Perhaps the image that best accounts for the relation of the symbol to the index and icon is that of a filigreed transparency with uneven traces of iconicity and indexicality, as opposed to pure transparency.

Indexicality is at the core of the symbol, given that the symbol depends on the interpretant as a result of its relation to the object. This relationship is what makes a sign a symbol. This result means that transuasion, which characterizes the symbol as a transuasional sign, is considered in its obsistent aspect (2.92), and that the index is an obsistent sign. On the other hand, insofar as it is determined by the instances of what it denotes and being a general type of law, the symbol entails indexicality. In the sign considered as a symbol, identity hinges upon the alterity of the sign, which is determined by mediation of the interpretant, so that, insofar as it is a symbol, "a sign is something by knowing which we know something more" (8.332). However, this expansion is so because the sign is not only a symbol, or better, the very fact of being a symbol involves iconicity and indexicality given that thirdness, the mode of existence of the symbol, presupposes firstness and secondness or originality and obsistence, which correspond respectively to the icon and index.

From the viewpoint of its relation to the object, the sign is a symbol insofar as it involves the mediation of an interpretant; from the viewpoint of its relation to the interpretant, the sign-symbol is an Argument. This statement is true if the sign-symbol distinctly represents the interpretant that it determines as its Conclusion through a proposition that forms its Premise, or more generally, its premises (2.95). Depending on the type of sign relation established in the argument between premises and conclusion, three kinds of arguments are possible: Deduction, Induction, and Abduction. Though differentiated, all three belong to the sphere of the symbolic and are of the transuasional order.

Peirce used the term 'Transuasional logic' to indicate the doctrine of the general conditions of determination of the interpretant (the conclusion) through propositions acting as premises (2.93). But three types of arguments are possible because they do not belong to the sphere of the symbolic alone. This means that not only the category of Transuasion comes into play but also that of Originality and Obsistence (2.84–2.96). In Peirce, the term Symbol indicates the genuine Sign obtained by abstracting from the two levels of 'degeneracy' of the sign. These are: the minor level – that of the Index; and the major level – that of the Icon. In the Symbol or genuine Sign, signification depends on the relation to the interpretant, whereas in the Index and Icon the capacity to signify is relatively autonomous with respect to the relation to the interpretant (2.92).

By virtue of the relation between icon, index, and symbol – a relation neither of autonomy and indifference nor of opposition, but rather of reciprocal implication – the sign is at once identical to itself and other.

The relation of implication changes in balance depending on whether the iconic, symbolic, or indexical aspect dominates, which is determined by the type of semiosis in course. All signs are symbols to the extent that they signify through mediation of an interpretant, but precisely because of such mediation they are not symbols alone.

In Peirce's semiotics, symbols, indexes, and icons overlap in such a way that if the symbol were purely symbolic, the relation between premises and the conclusion in the argument would paradoxically be indexical and not symbolic, and would not, in fact, give rise to a transuasive argument or induction. The latter presupposes a hypothesis resulting from a preceding abduction that implies iconicity (2.96). Let us suppose that the relation between premises and conclusion is purely analytical and is wholly contained within the symbolic universe, the conventional/arbitrary, the Law; in other words, let us suppose that the relation between the symbol and interpretant is of mere identity. In this case, the relation between premises and conclusion is deductive and as a constrictive argument, it is endowed with the character of indexicality.

Mutual complicity between symbol, icon, and index should now be obvious. These three different shades of the sign are in turn implied in the cognitive process. This implication means that they are at once categories of logic and semiotics (Ponzio, 1990: 197–214).

Indexical Types of Verbal and Nonverbal Signs and Signals

The main types of indexical signs include: (1) symptoms, (2) clues, and (3) traces. Let us consider them in detail.

In the case of the symptom, the relation of the interpretant to the interpreted is of contiguity and causality: blotchy skin (interpreted), liver disease (interpretant); smoke (interpreted), fire (interpretant).

In the case of the clue, the relation of the interpretant to the interpreted is of causality (but not given in present time), on the basis of a presumed relation of contiguity: a cloudy sky as a sign that it will rain; a bloodstain on a glove as a clue that the owner is the assassin.

In the case of the trace, the relation of the interpretant to the interpreted is of contiguity (not given in present time) on the basis of a presumed relation of causality: a footstep is interpreted as the trace of a man or animal; a phobia as the trace of a certain event.

Symptoms, clues, and traces are not produced as the repetition of a pre-established interpretant of identification: they are not the result of a coding process, nor are they endowed with communicative intentionality (otherwise they would be signals: smoke used to signal one's presence or to transmit messages; footsteps left expressly by a person to signal his or her trajectory). However, these signs are interpretable because of their typicality, that is, they are already known, they have already been seen, and they repeat certain distinctive features. A preliminary moment of identification or recognition is also necessary: a footstep repeats certain distinctive features that characterize it as the imprint left by an animal, a man's or woman's shoe, a bare foot; if left by an animal, it may be characteristic of a horse (whether shod or not), a deer, etc. Similarly, a certain somatic fact appears as a symptom insofar as it repeats characteristics that identify it as that particular symptom and that link it to pathological state; in the same way, clouds mean rain if they are identified as that certain type of cloud that carries rain.

Thus traces, symptoms, and clues, too, have an identification interpretant that is determined on the basis of one's own experience or of others, and is established on the basis of a given tradition or social practice.

Similarly to signals, the relation between interpreted and interpretant is fixed on the basis of a law: in fact, handbooks are available for identification of given types of symptoms or clues or traces on the basis of specific distinctive features. A handbook of medical symptomatology or hunting are two such examples. By consulting handbooks as though they were signal codes or language dictionaries, specific traces, symptoms, or clues may be decoded even when one has no previous direct experience of them.

In some cases, symptoms, clues, or traces are produced intentionally and are predetermined by the identification interpretant in the course of their very production. In such cases, they function as signals, even if masked as symptoms, clues, or traces. An actor who recites rage or fear, a person who pretends to be moved, feigns illness, leaves footprints on the ground so as to be followed (e.g., to set a trap), or to divert the pursuer, intentionally produces symptoms, clues, and traces according to distinctive features foreseen by the identification interpretant. Therefore, contrary to what the interpreter believes, the latter does not come into play exclusively when such features are being decoded (Ponzio, 1990: 44–36).

In signals disguised as symptoms, clues, or traces, the success of pretence depends on the fact that these signs remain distinct from signals, that is, they appear to be uncoded and devoid of an identification interpretant produced intentionally by a sender: they must not seem characterized by the identification interpretant 'at the source,' but only when they are actually being read and decoded. Thus, those cases in which symptoms, clues, and traces are signals highlight the distinction between such signs and signals as well as the distinction between the latter and verbal signs in their signal dimension rather than generally invalidating this distinction, that is, between the signs in question and signals.

Besides acting as signals, verbal signs, when such aspects as those mentioned in the preceding paragraph come into play, may also function as symptoms, clues, or traces: without speaker or writer intention, a piece of discourse, whether written or oral, may be read as indicating a specific social status or place of origin, it may betray impatience or uneasiness, foresee a certain development in the relation between interlocutors, indicate that the person speaking is in a hurry to conclude the conversation, etc. We qualify verbal signs that are symptoms, clues and traces as paraverbal signs.

Therefore, verbal signs have dual signality: as far as they are intentional, they are also signals, and as far as they are unintentional, they may also be symptoms, clues, and traces. Dual signality in verbal signs becomes triple when unintentionality is recited, calculated, or feigned, that is, when that which seems to be a symptom, clue, or trace in the verbal sign is, in reality, a disguised signal.

Indexicality in Verbal Language

Indexicality is discussed by Peirce to solve the problem of the connection between verbal language and referents in the real world. Verbal language is characterized by conventionality and 'diagrammatization.' Diagrammatization makes verbal language a 'sort of algebra'; consequently, it seems to be a sphere apart, separate from its objects. But thanks to indexicality, that is, to an association of contiguity, verbal language is not reducible to an algebric system.

Indexicality enables language to pass from the level of diagrammatization to the level of application of its diagrams.

The relation between the phonia *book*, the object *book*, and the graphia *book* is 'conventional': however, traces of indexicality are also present, owing to the relation of contiguity established between phonia and object, and phonia and graphia. In this case, contiguity would seem to be established 'by convention.' But once this convention has been learned, it is a bond and continues to subsist thanks to the fact that the name and the object or the phonia and the graphia of the same word are given in a relation of continuity (Ponzio, 1990: 37–43).

Jakobson studies the indexical factor in verbal language in 'Shifters, verbal categories and the Russian verb' (1971 [1957]). The indexical function in verbal signs is carried out by a special class of grammatical units he calls 'shifters.' As characterized by Jakobson, shifters are 'symbol-indexes' because their dominant aspect is given in the combination of indexicality with conventionality (*see* **Jakobson, Roman**).

An example of shifters is the personal pronoun. On one hand, *I* is conventional because we can only know what it means if we know the convention on the basis of which we interpret it as referring to its object under some aspect (a person considered under the aspect of speaking subject) and therefore as situated on the same interpretive trajectory as *ego*, *je* and *moi*, *ich*, *io*, etc. From this point of view, the sign *I* is a symbol. On the other hand, in order to refer to its object, that is, to the speaker, it must be in an 'existential relationship' with it. Therefore, *I* is also an index. The personal pronouns *I* and *you* may be interpreted as referring **alternatively to the same object**, according to whether it carries out the function of 'speaking subject' or 'subject spoken to.' This multiplicity is possible on the basis of a convention and at once on the basis of the fact of functioning as an index in the literal sense of a pointing finger.

Indexicality plays a fundamental role in verbal language. As Sebeok observed (1991: 128–143), Peirce highly valued the function of shifters owing to the connection between verbal language and its referents. Designations – exemplified by the various types of deixis, including verbal tenses – said Peirce:

> ... are absolutely indispensable both to communication and to thought. No assertion has any meaning unless there is some designation to show whether the universe of reality or what universe of fiction is referred to. (8.368, note 23)

Two texts by Peirce on 'indexicality' in verbal language seem particularly significant, a paper of 1892 and another of 1893 (respectively in the third and fourth volumes of *Collected papers*). Peirce considers the problem of indexicality as part of his quest to solve the problem of how verbal language, characterized by diagrammatization, which makes it like algebra, is able to connect up with its referents. This connection is only possible, says Peirce, thanks to indexicality, that is to say, association of contiguity:

> It is not the language alone, with its mere associations of similarity, but the language taken in connection with the auditor's own experiential associations of contiguity which determines for him what house is meant. It is requisite then, in order to show what we are talking or writing about, to put the hearer's or reader's mind into real, active connection with the concatenation of experience or of fiction with which we are dealing, and, further to draw his attention to, and identify, a certain number of particular points in such concatenation. (3.419)

The function of indexicality is to make language pass from the level of diagrammatization to the level of application of its diagrams. The recurrent distinction between subjects and predicates of propositions, implies the distinction, says Peirce, between the indicative part of discourse and what it affirms, questions, or commands about it.

Indicatives assert nothing (2.291). They only serve to draw attention to something, and if compared to verbs, they would be considered as imperatives, such as *be careful*, *look there*. Words like *this* or *that* "have a direct, forceful action upon the nervous system, and compel the hearer to look about him," says Peirce, "and so they, more than ordinary words, contribute towards indicating what the speech is about." Concerning the term 'pronouns' used for such words as *this* or *that*, Peirce observes that nouns would be more appropriately designated as "pro-demonstratives" (3.419), as substitutes of indicators, that is deictics.

Terms like *this* or *that* are indexes with the function of drawing attention to what one means no differently from the expression *attention!* or similar cries. Terms like *this* or *that* refer to other words in written discourse; in this case, their function is no different from the relative pronouns *who* or *which*, etc., nor from use of the letters of the alphabet to indicate the issue in question in a text (naturally on the understanding that similar letters stand for the same thing). These terms continue to function as indexes that "de-algebrize" language (2.287).

"A possessive pronoun," said Peirce, "is an index in two senses": in the sense that it indicates the possessor, and in the sense that it denotes the thing possessed.

Peirce attributed the character of indexicality to indefinite pronouns such as *any*, *every*, *all*, *none*, *whoever*, etc., which he called 'universal selectives';

and to indefinite pronouns like *some*, *something*, *somebody*, which he called 'particular selectives.'

Furthermore, adverbs of place and time, etc., must also be taken into consideration in relation to indexicality, together with such expressions as *the first*, *the last*, *the seventh*, *the first part*, etc., and prepositions and prepositional phrases such as *above*, *below*, *to the right of*, *to the left of*, etc. (2.289–2.290).

Peirce also observes that while terms that carry out an iconic function in discourse – similarity, quality, etc. – may be described, those, instead, with the function of index escape description.

Given that it is the ultimate condition of semiosis and communication, indexicality may be considered as the extreme limit of semiotic description.

See also: Deixis and Anaphora: Pragmatic Approaches; Discourse Anaphora; Discourse Markers; Iconicity; Peirce, Charles Sanders; Pragmatic Indexing; Reference: Psycholinguistic Approach.

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Institutional Talk

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Institutional talk has been analyzed extensively by conversational analysts. Drew and Heritage (1992: 3–4) define it in the following way: "the institutionality of an interaction is not determined by its setting. Rather, interaction is institutional insofar as participants' institutional or professional identities are somehow made relevant to the work activities in which they are engaged." By disembedding talk from its institutional setting, this view misses the real point about institutional language: the fact that it is situated (Gumperz, 1982) (*see* **Context, Communicative**).

Institutional talk is embedded in power relations, and in order to understand what is really at stake, these relations have to be made explicit. Fairclough (1989) draws attention to the different meanings of the term 'power.' We can think of physical power, as of one person over another. However, institutional power is usually enacted by consent. Power can be seen as both a product and a process by which the members of an institution organize their activities. For Foucault (1980: 98), power is exercised through a "net-like organisation," in which individuals are participants both as its "consenting target" and as the "elements of its articulation." This means that the subaltern positions in an institution (for example, patients in hospitals) contribute in certain ways to unequal power relations, by accepting as the natural order of things that doctors in "standard medical interviews" should have interactional control over the distribution of turns at talking, the selection and change of topics, and what kind of questions are answered (Fairclough, 1992: 138–139) (*see* **Power and Pragmatics; Discourse, Foucauldian Approach**).

As Mey notes, "the case of the medical interview is an outstanding instance of the institutionalized discourses in which the value of the individual's linguistic expression is measured strictly by the place he or she has in the institution. Only utterances which meet the criteria of the official discourse are allowed..." (Mey, 2001: 301).

Institutional talk is often gendered (Graddol and Swann, 1989). In the following example in my study of doctor–patient communication in Brazil, a doctor manipulates a woman into breastfeeding her baby, against her argument that she has to go to work (**Table 1**) (Magalhães, 2000: 159–163).

The doctor's male authority is manifested in an absolute interactional control, in terms of the topic and the turns at talking. In terms of the topic, he controls entirely what is talked about, commanding the mother, with verbal and nonverbal arguments (for example, by hitting his desk), to go back to breastfeeding.

Table 1 Example of institutional talk in doctor–communication

Summary of the woman's arguments	Summary of the doctor's arguments
She has to go to work. Work demands involvement, making it difficult to go on breastfeeding. She is weak, and her milk does not feed the baby properly. So the baby is hungry	Breastfeeding must be applied in all cases. The doctor does not discuss the woman's particular case. In fact, he does not even explain why the baby has to be breastfed. He counters her argument that her milk does not feed the baby properly by saying that it does

The doctor furthermore controls turn-taking by overlapping speech, as when the woman notes that when she breastfeeds, the baby is still hungry. Overall in this example, we see how institutional talk is embedded in power relations by means of the interactional control exercised by those in power (*see also* **Gender and Language**).

See also: Context, Communicative; Discourse, Foucauldian Approach; Gender and Language; Power and Pragmatics.

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Interactional Sociolinguistics

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'Interactional sociolinguistics' (IS) can be described as the application of interpretive methods of discourse analysis to gain detailed insights into the many communicative issues that arise in today's social environments, by means of systematic investigation of how speakers and listeners involved in such issues talk about them in the conduct of their affairs. This description is couched in general terms and includes a minimum of technical terminology, but it builds on premises that need to be spelled out in more detail. For instance, the notion of 'discourse' has become widely used in the general academic literature, with such expressions as the 'discourse(s)' of science, of mathematics, or of psychiatry. These terms often replace established categorizations for disciplines or specialist activities as a way of focusing on what practitioners do rather than relying on established nominal labels.

'Formal linguists' are concerned with the grammatical rules of specific languages and dialects and look at discourse as a string of utterances that can be reduced to the grammar and lexicon of constituent sentences and analyzed by established analytical procedures. 'Sociolinguists,' on the other hand, deal with the talk of individuals speaking as members of specific groups and engaging in context-bound encounters where, along with grammar and lexicon, social and cultural forces constrain both what can be said and how it can be said. It follows that to participate in an encounter requires both linguistic and social knowledge.

But how does language interact with the social? Earlier sociolinguistic investigations turned to the published ethnographic literature for social information. In today's complex and rapidly changing societies, however, established social science concepts such as class, gender, and ethnic group cannot account for the ever-increasing diversity of the social ecologies in which we live. Social knowledge is increasingly seen as constructed through interaction. Discursive practice, the argument goes, rests on interaction, requiring the active participation of speakers and listeners, who use knowledge of the entire semiotic situation – of which speaking is a part – along with their linguistic knowledge to understand what is intended at any one point.

Theoretical Roots

A main motivation for interactional linguistic research is the search for replicable qualitative methods

of sociolinguistic analysis that can provide insights into the inherent linguistic and cultural diversity that characterizes current communicative environments. These methods are also used to document the impact of the diverse environments on members' everyday lives without relying on traditional social science categorizations. It is by now evident that diversity can no longer be treated as primarily a matter of distinctions among bounded, locally homogeneous language/culture units. Regardless of where we live, diversity is all around us. A large and ever-growing number of empirical sociolinguistic studies testify to its extent and significance, even in areas and domains of activity traditionally considered to be monolingual and monocultural. Questions of diversity loom large in public debates and in the recent social science writings that have greatly transformed our current thinking about social and cultural phenomena. Yet so far most attempts to deal with the communicative import of diversity, particularly its role in everyday communication, continue to rely on essentialized, taken-for-granted notions of culture and group on the one hand and dialect, style, or speech variety on the other. Such attempts to explain what happens in talk in terms of extra-communicative notions, whose relationship to real-life discursive practices is highly questionable, are unlikely to yield replicable results.

The 1960s writings on 'ethnography of communication' (EC) in a sense laid the foundation for current IS research. In his well-known 1960s critique of post–World War II Whorfian studies, Hymes (1962) argued that the failure of current research to provide empirical validation of relations between linguistic and cultural variability may be a result of the fact that, contrary to the prevailing assumptions, variability is not just a matter of distinctions among community-wide, presumably homogeneous grammatical and semantic structures. As Hymes (1974) suggests, many aspects of language function, which at the time had received little attention, play a major and often crucial role. His early programmatic writings set out an initial program for comparative research on both structure and function. The main argument was that such analyses, if they are to be empirically viable, must focus on specific situations of speaking, defined as interactively constituted, culturally framed encounters and not attempt to explain talk as directly reflecting the norms, beliefs, and values of communities seen as a disembodied, hypothetically uniform whole (Gumperz and Hymes, 1964, 1972). Instead of relying on community-wide generalizations as the bases for comparison, Roman Jakobson's (1960) notion of the 'speech event' was adopted as an intermediate level of analysis. Events, on the one hand, constitute units of verbal interaction, where what is said is socially and culturally constrained, so that valid ethnographic information on what are relevant norms and constraints can more readily and verifiably be obtained by event level analysis than if one were to build on generalizations about the community-wide values. At the same time, events are made up of stretches of talk that are subject to linguistic analysis in their own terms.

The initial EC studies concentrated largely on named, bounded gatherings rather than unmarked everyday talk – public performances, ceremonies, magical rites, ritual practices, political oratory, and judicial proceedings of various kinds – such as can be found in societies throughout the world. Ethnographic research served to gather information on beliefs, values, and appropriateness norms as they applied to the event. Findings tended to be generalized by formulating 'rules of speaking,' which governed participation and conduct in the event and choice among available speech styles that made up the communities' linguistic repertoires (Bauman and Sherzer, 1989; Blount and Sanches, 1977; Sanches and Blount, 1975). Event-focused comparative investigations served to call attention to the analytical importance of situated talk and to the need for new data on inter- and intrasocietal variability of linguistic structures and language usage. Yet as Brown and Levinson (1978) demonstrated, structuralist usage rules can never be made precise enough to predict what people actually do with talk. Among other things, they fail to account for the many, often unforeseeable contingencies that govern everyday behavior, as was argued in Bourdieu's (1977, 1991) well-known critique of structuralism.

When detailed descriptions of situated performances became available, the notion of 'event' as the extralinguistically defined unit of language usage also turned out to be untenable. Anthropologist-folklorists concentrating on verbal performance discovered that, more often than not, events were not clearly bounded. Rather, the participants' definition of what the relevant context is 'emerged' in the course of the performance itself (Bauman, 1988; Bauman and Briggs, 1990; Hymes, 1981). In such cases, as Hanks puts it in a well-known article on genre: "The idea of objectivist rules is replaced by schemas and strategies, leading one to view genre as a set of focal and prototypical elements, which actors use variously and which never become fixed in a unitary structure" (1987: 681, quoted in Bauman and Briggs, 1992). That is to say, invocations of context are perhaps best seen as communicative strategies for conveying indexical information, and we do not need to confine event analysis to named entities.

Any string of utterances bounded by a detectable beginning and an ending that provide evidence for the outcome can be treated as an event.

Initial insights into the cognitive functioning of context invocation come from studies of 'code switching' (Auer, 1998), a term that is commonly used to refer to alternation among different languages or language varieties within the same community. Such alternations are found throughout the world, particularly in situations of rapid social change, and are frequently described via rules that specify the situational constraints governing language usage. In the old Roman Catholic Church service, for example, Latin was considered appropriate for prayer, while for sermons, the native language was to be employed. Yet if we examine switching as it enters into the discursive practices that constitute an event, it soon becomes apparent that the situation is more complex. As with the folk performances mentioned above, it is not the situation that determines language use; rather, it is the language or style, among other signs, which, when interpreted in relation to the ongoing talk, evokes a shift in contextual presuppositions. Code switching, in other words, functions as an metapragmatic signaling strategy that is employed indexically to suggest or evoke an 'envisionment' that yields the presuppositions in terms of which constituent messages are to be understood.

While both event evocations and code-switching function metapragmatically (Silverstein, 1976, 1993), they are 'phenomenologically distinct' (to use the current linguistic anthropologists' term). Event analysis yields general information or envisionments about what is expected in the event as a whole and what the likely outcomes are. Code switching, on the other hand, is signaled via shifts at the level of individually isolable grammatical forms. Such shifts can be seen as indexical 'contextualization cues,' which, when processed simultaneously with grammatical and lexical signs and nonlexicalized background knowledge, serve to construct the contextual ground for turn by turn, situated, sentence-level interpretation and thereby suggest how constituent messages should be understood (Gumperz, 1982). In other words, contextualization cues represent speakers' ways of providing information to interlocutors and audiences about how language is being used at any one point in the ongoing stream of talk. What sets them apart from lexicalized metadiscursive signs is that they include purely suprasegmental signs, such as stress, intonation, volume, rhythm, and so forth. Since no utterance can be pronounced without suprasegmental signs, contextualization cues are ever present in the talk. They provide direct evidence for the necessary role that indexicality plays in talk.

Contextualization strategies signal by cueing indirect inferences. Since in conversation we could not possibly express all the information that interlocutors must have to plan their own contributions and attune their talk to that of their interlocutors, it is easy to see the reason for this indirectness. But finally and perhaps most importantly, indirect (not overtly lexicalized) signaling mechanisms are for the most part culturally or subculturally specific. For example, prosody, rhythm, and phonetically marked locally specific features of pronunciation are among the principal means by which we identify where people are from and 'who' they are – that is, assess their social identity. In fact, we are socialized into society via indexical communication, and through indexical signs we indicate our 'stance' *vis-à-vis* what is happening (Ochs, 1996).

If we accept that (a) interpretation is always context dependent, and (b) that contextual presuppositions shaping interpretations are themselves subject to constant change in the course of an interaction, then we cannot expect to find the kind of one-to-one mappings of form to meanings that we associate with referential communication. Contextualization cues serve to retrieve the frames that channel the interpretive process by trimming the decision-making tree – that is, limiting the range of possible understandings.

In talking about the functioning of indexical signs in interpretation, it becomes necessary to distinguish between meaning in the linguists' sense of reference and 'situated inferences.' The latter are crucial in communicative practice. In everyday talk, situated inferences always take the form of assessment of what a speaker intends to convey by means of a message, and these are often quite different from propositional content. For example, if Giovanni and Paolo had just been talking, and I asked the former, "What did you do with Paolo?" he will not answer, "I made a statement" or "I performed a speech act." A more likely answer would be, "I asked him for a favor" or "I asked him if he was free this evening." Moreover, even if Giovanni had said, "I asked him a question," I would not take this as referring to grammatical or speech act categories but as rather as telling me what he wanted from Paolo. Communicative practices are forms of actions, and conversational inferences are made by human agents acting in the real world.

By arguing that all communication is intentional and based on inferences, we are in some ways building on Garfinkel's notion of interpretative procedures to look at the inferential aspects of speaking. But Garfinkel is not specific as to what he means by inferencing or by the 'method' by which members' interpretive processes can be retrieved, apart from

saying that we need to resort to background information on how and why a particular inference came about. How do we know what kinds of background knowledge are relevant at any one time? Is it enough simply to speak of 'extra-communicative background knowledge'? We must assume that information about contextual frames and how they interact with grammar and background knowledge is communicated in the course of discourse-level communication, where discoursing is treated as an intrinsically interactive process. It becomes necessary to clarify the specifics of what happens in the interaction as such, to assess what is intended.

Conversational analysts (Atkinson and Heritage, 1986) set out to implement Garfinkel's program. Their work has shown brilliantly what can be learned through detailed sequential analyses of speaking practices. Sequencing alone cannot by itself account for situated interpretation. Sequential ordering relies on just one of the many indexical processes that affect inferencing. Assessments of communicative intent, at any one point in an exchange, take the form of hypotheses that participants in an encounter can either confirm or reject in the course of an exchange. As conversational analysts point out, focus on members' procedures is a necessary analytical prime. The problem for IS then becomes not just to determine what is intended, but to also discover how interpretive assessments relate to the signaling processes through which they are negotiated.

How can we overcome the inherent ambiguity of inferential processes? In my own empirical field studies, I have worked out a set of procedures along the following lines. Relying on data from previously collected targeted ethnographic observations, the IS analyst begins with turn by turn scanning of the recorded materials at two levels of analysis: (a) content, and (b) grammatical form, prosody, and rhythmic organization to isolate event units. The units should be marked off from others in the recorded data by at least some thematic coherence and by detectable beginnings and ends. Lectures, ceremonies of various kinds, interviews – that is to say named units of the type normally studied by ethnographers of communication – exemplify one type of event. But event sequences can also be extracted from everyday conversations and other casual encounters. For instance, narrative sequences may alternate or come interspersed with more formal discussion, argument, banter, and the like. In performing this segmentation we seek to discover natural interactive sequences to provide empirical evidence either to confirm or disconfirm analysts' interpretations – evidence against which to test assumptions about what is intended elsewhere in the sequence. These event sequences

then form the base units for further analysis of conversational inferencing.

In phase two of the analysis, events are transcribed. The goal here is to prepare 'interactional texts' by setting down on paper all those perceptual cues – verbal and nonverbal, segmental and nonsegmental, prosodic, paralinguistic, and so on – shown by past and ongoing research to be demonstrably relied upon by speakers and listeners as part of the inferential process. This enables us not only to gain insights into situated understandings, but also isolate recurrent form–context relationships and show how they contribute to interpretation. These relationships can then be studied comparatively across events to yield more general hypotheses about members' contextualization practices.

In turning to conversational inference and its role in communicative practice, let me give some concrete examples to show how I view the process of understanding. Some time ago, while I was driving home from the office, my radio was tuned to a classical music station. At the end of the program the announcer, a replacement for the regular host who was returning the next day, signed off with the following words: "I've enjoyed being with **you** these last two weeks." I had not been listening very carefully, but the extra strong stress and volume on *you*, in a syntactic position where I would have expected an unaccented pronoun, caught my attention. It sounded as if the speaker was producing the second part of a formulaic exchange of compliments. But since there was no one else who could have spoken the first part (something like: "I enjoyed **being** with you") on the program, I inferred that by the way the host contextualized his talk, he was indirectly – without putting it "on record" – implicating (Grice, 1989) the first part, something like: "I hope you have enjoyed listening to me" (Gumperz, 1996). A second, somewhat more complex example comes from my analysis of the crossexamination transcript of the victim in a rape trial.

> Counsel: "You knew at the time that the defendant was interested in you, didn't you?"
> Victim: "He asked me how I'd been ... just stuff like that."

In both cases, I had to search my memory of past communicative experience to construct a likely scenario or narrative plot that might suggest possible interpretations. In example one, my initial hypothesis conflicted with what I knew from listening to the radio program. My search triggered a different, more plausible scenario. In the second example, I relied on what I knew about crossexaminations as adversarial trial proceedings, where the attorney

attempts to expose weaknesses in the defendant's testimony. But while these general facts tell us something about participants' motives in their choice of verbal strategy, we need to turn to what they actually said to understand what they intended to convey. By the words he chose, and by the way he contextualized his talk, the counsel raised the possibility that the defendant and the victim had a prior relationship. The victim's move, on the other hand, positioned as it is immediately after the attorney's question, implicates a different scenario, one where the two were merely casual acquaintances. In this way she sought to deny and in a sense ward off the questioner's potential attack on her testimony by suggesting another implicature.

I use the term 'activity' or 'envisionment' to refer to the above type of constructs. My claim is that all interpretation rests on such constructs. 'Activities' are an aspect of what Goffman (1974) calls 'frames' and are subject to constant change in the course of the exchange. That is, they do not apply to events as wholes; rather, they apply to each component move. I argue that, ultimately, all interpretation at the level of discursive practice relies on these constructs.

This view of understanding has some similarity to cognitive scientists' notions of 'scene,' but IS sees activities as evoking the actions of actors engaged in strategically formulating and positioning their moves to accomplish communicative ends in real-life encounters. In so doing, they rely on their presuppositions about mutual rights and obligations, as well as on ideologies of language and individuals' personalities, to get their message across. This implies that, in addition to meaning assessment in the established sense, there are always social relationships that are continuously negotiated and renegotiated by means of the same interpretive processes by which content is assessed.

It is useful to distinguish between two levels of inference in analyses of interpretive processes: (a) global inferences of what an exchange is about and what mutual rights and obligations apply, what topics can be brought up, and what is wanted by way of a reply, as well as what can be put in words and what is to be left implied; and (b) local inferences concerning what is intended with any one move and what is required by way of a response. In this way it becomes possible to account for changes in frame as a function of the sequential positioning of moves. Both levels of interpretation involve activities as cognitive constructs. The first is related to what Goffman calls 'framing,' while the second deals with something like the conversational analyst's 'preference organization.' While contextualization cues assist in retrieving the knowledge on which activity constructs are based,

they do not work in isolation. Interpretation always relies on cooccurring symbolic, lexical, and indexical signs. Signs such as prosodic contextualization cues, pausing, and others are usually produced and interpreted without conscious reflection and are therefore particularly useful in revealing frequently overlooked aspects of the interpretive process, which tend be highly sensitive to cultural variability.

Interactional sociolinguistics does not claim, of course, that the methods described here solve the problem of interpretive ambiguity. The aim is to find likely solutions that are plausible in that they show how component actions cohere in the light of an event as a whole, whether it is a three-part string of moves or a longer encounter. Inferential procedures are not like assessments of the truth or falsity of specific interpretations. The method resembles conversational analysts' ways of reconstructing the general procedures that conversationalists employ in formulating specific actions. However, it goes beyond conversational analysis in that the concern is with situated online interpretation. In studies of intercultural and interethnic communication, these methods have been useful in detecting systematic differences in interpretive practices affecting individuals' ability to create and maintain conversational involvement.

Ultimately, agreement on specific interpretations presupposes the ability to negotiate repairs and renegotiate misunderstandings, agree on how parts of an argument cohere, and follow thematic shifts and shifts in presuppositions – i.e., sharing indexical conventions. A basic issue is to show how these tasks are accomplished, and it is for this reason that IS puts so much stress on contextualization processes. Such metapragmatic activity is important for participation in everyday interaction. Without metapragmatic strategies, conversationalists do not learn and do not profit from their own misunderstandings. And this clearly has to do with verbal ability at the level of communicative practice, because it is on such practices that our ability to assess and evaluate the significance of what we perceive rests.

Let me present one more example to illustrate the multiplicity of inputs to the interpretative process. A young elementary school student, when asked to read, replied, "Ah ca-an't read." The teaching assistant thought he meant to say that he was not able to read. Examples like this have often been cited in the literature on classroom learning in support of assertions that African–American students have difficulty with literacy learning. But when we discussed this example with a group of African–American graduates, they pointed out that the expression carried contoured intonation, and given the expression's positioning after the teaching aid's question they

would interpret the student as saying, essentially, "I don't want to do it right now. I want company in reading." On the basis of experiences like these I became alerted to the fact that for those familiar with African–American conventions, the differences between 'contoured' and 'noncontoured' intonation may carry information.

Such uses of prosody are not only found in African-American speech. Consider the following example I recently heard in Cambridge from someone talking about his college, King's. "Fellows of King's are well known, to fellows of King's." The second phrase is set off from the first, and therefore foregrounded, by lowering of pitch and volume. This suggests that *well known* is restricted, so as to highlight the interpretation, and that the compliment phrase applies only to other fellows of King's, not to the public at large. Understanding, as structuralists have taught us always relies on selective perceptions based on our knowledge of oppositions, and this is true for indexicals as well as for symbolic relationships. All interpretive assessments are relational. They are made with reference to something else, not necessarily directly represented in talk. Nevertheless, as the examples show, assessment involves reasoning that is intrinsically dialogic, in the sense that positioning within an exchange is essential to communication.

Conclusion

Interactional sociolinguistics does not claim to present an integrated grand theory of language, culture, linguistic ideology, interaction, and communication. In view of the many radical transformations that mark much of the known world, such a theory would be premature. Rather, it draws upon an eclectic array of recent theories to find ways of uncovering the phenomenological grounding of communicative problems in today's social life to sharpen our understanding of the multiplicity of forces that underlie interpretation and thereby draw on what we have learned in recent years to prepare the ground for more productive theorizing.

See also: Code Switching; Conversation Analysis; Identity and Language.

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Intercultural Pragmatics and Communication

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Intercultural Pragmatics

In her book *The Opposite of Fate* the American writer of Chinese descent, Amy Tan (2003: 54), writes of a time when tragedy hit her life and when, as a result, she decided to quit the doctoral program in linguistics that she was pursuing at the time: "The doctorate, I decided, would be a worthless appendage. Besides (...), how was I bettering the world by teaching others to examine the intricacies of dead languages and the like?" Amy Tan's words echo these of the linguist Dell Hymes (1996: xii), who speaks of the fascination of modern linguistics with "aspects of language as an abstract formal device" and who sees as a more worthwhile and more timely goal "to think about language as part of life" (Hymes, 1996: x) and to develop a "linguistics that someone needs (...) – a linguistics that every student of human life should know, that one would like everyone to know (...), that should be part of general education" (Hymes, 1996: 220).

Intercultural pragmatics is a part of contemporary linguistics which is most concerned with "language as a part of life," indeed, with language as it affects millions of lives in the contemporary world, and which arguably every student of human life should know. It is a discipline that has developed in response to what Istvan Kecskes (2004), the editor of the new journal *Intercultural Pragmatics*, calls "the challenges of a new era."

These challenges of a new era involve, above all, interaction among people from different cultures. Pragmatics as a part of linguistics has always been concerned with interpersonal interaction – but (as will be discussed below) in the past it was often locked in a monolingual and monocultural framework, derived, essentially, from the English language and Anglo culture. In the contemporary world, however, a monolingual and monocultural perspective on language use is no longer tenable, and in fact has become glaringly irrelevant and obsolete.

In a recent book entitled *Becoming Intercultural*, the Korean-American scholar Young Yun Kim (2001: 1) writes: "Millions of people change homes each year, crossing cultural boundaries. Immigrants and refugees resettle in search of new lives (...) In this increasingly integrated world, cross-cultural adaptation is a central and defining theme." Cross-cultural adaptation is particularly relevant to immigrants and refugees, but the need for cross-cultural understanding extends further. In modern multiethnic societies, newcomers need to learn to communicate with those already there; and those already there need, for their part, to learn to communicate with the newcomers. In a world that has become a global village, even those living in their traditional homelands need to develop some cross-cultural understanding in order to be able to cope with the large world confronting them in a variety of ways.

Language has been defined, traditionally, as a tool for communication, and linguistics as the study of language. In practice, however, the dominant linguistic paradigm of the second half of the 20th century

had very little to do with human communication, and even less with problems of cross-cultural communication. In the last three decades, however, linguistics has 'greened' and the formalistic approaches of generative grammar have been supplemented, if not supplanted, by approaches more concerned with meaning, culture and people, than with formalisms.

The "pragmatic turn" (Mey, 2004) in linguistics is part of this 'greening.' But the paradigms of pragmatic research that at first came to the fore were derived largely from philosophical speculation based on English (especially in the works of Austin, Searle, and Grice) and did not reflect the mass phenomenon of interaction among people from different cultural backgrounds. As Kecskes writes in his editorial in the first issue of *Intercultural Pragmatics*, "We live in an age of globalization that is characterized by rapid changes in every field of life. This is resulting in a revision of theories and ideas in several branches of the humanities and sciences, including pragmatics. The existing paradigms cannot always accommodate new research. This is especially true for pragmatics, which is considered a perspective in language and communication rather than the study of a particular aspect of language" (Kecskes, 2004: 1).

Intercultural pragmatics studies, above all, problems arising in communication between people with different cultural backgrounds and different cultural expectations. A good example of such problems is provided by Amy Tan's account of the difficulties that her Chinese-American mother continually faced in her interactions with other Americans. As Amy Tan reports, "... some of my friends tell me they understand 50 percent of what my mother says. Some say they understand 80 to 90 percent. Some say they understand none of it, as if she were speaking pure Chinese. But to me, my mother's English is perfectly clear, perfectly natural. It's my mother tongue. Her language, as I hear it, is vivid, direct, full of observation and imagery. That was the language that helped shape the way I saw things, expressed things, made sense of the world." Amy Tan's mother's English was fluent, but its grammar was non-standard, and her way of speaking made it appear "fractured", "broken", "limited" – and her "limited" communicative competence made her also appear to be limited as a person. "I know this for a fact, because when I was growing up, my mother's 'limited' English limited my perception of her. I was ashamed of her English. I believed that her English reflected the quality of what she had to say. That is, because she expressed them imperfectly her thoughts were imperfect. And I had plenty of empirical evidence to support me: the fact that people in department stores, at banks, and at restaurants did not take her seriously, did not give her

good service, pretended not to understand her, or even acted as if they did not hear her."

Aware of the limitations of her communicative competence in English, Amy Tan's mother often got her daughter to speak to people on the phone pretending that she was her mother. For example, when Amy was fifteen, she had to call her mother's stockbroker in New York presenting herself as "Mrs. Tan."

> And my mother was standing in the back whispering loudly, 'Why he don't send me check, already two weeks late. So mad he lie to me, losing me money.' And then I said in perfect English, 'Yes, I'm getting rather concerned. You had agreed to send the check two weeks ago, but it hasn't arrived.' Then she began to talk more loudly. 'What he want, I come to New York tell him front of his boss, you cheating me?' And I was trying to calm her down, make her be quiet, while telling the stockbroker, 'I can't tolerate any more excuses. If I don't receive the check immediately, I am going to have to speak to your manager when I'm in New York next week.' And sure enough, the following week there we were in front of this astonished stockbroker, and I was sitting there red-faced and quiet, and my mother, the real Mrs. Tan, was shouting at his boss in her impeccable broken English.

What is at issue here is not just the grammatical incorrectness of the mother's English, but above all, her way of speaking – her loudness, her shouting, her emotional intensity, her "directness" (as Tan describes it), her inability to use understatement such as "I'm getting rather concerned."

Amy Tan's attitude to, and interpretation of, her mother's difficulties is in itself instructive, as it reflects aspects of the confusion and theoretical insecurity that have until recently plagued the field of intercultural pragmatics, and to some extent still do. On the one hand, the vignettes offered in Amy Tan's book clearly show differences between Chinese communicative norms and expectations and the Anglo-American ones, and throw light on cultural misunderstandings related to those differences. On the other hand, Tan, like many linguists of her generation, is clearly frightened of stereotyping, and she prefers to deny the reality, or at least describability, of cultural differences such as those between Chinese and American culture, professing instead her faith in human universals. And yet her own experience, conveyed with great talent in her books, clearly reflects the reality of those differences, and the urgent need for them to be described and widely understood – especially in countries where people of different cultural backgrounds have to live together. Thus, at times Tan's observations and intuitions as a writer come into conflict with the ideologies that can perhaps be traced to her linguistic education in the 1970s.

In the 1970s, the pragmatic scene was largely dominated by the search for the universals of politeness and for the universal maxims of conversation. The widely accepted paradigms were those of Brown and Levinson's (1978) theory of politeness, which affirmed "pan-cultural interpretability of politeness phenomena" (Brown and Levinson, 1978: 288), and Grice's theory of conversation, which posited a number of universal conversational principles.

In 1978, Brown and Levinson set out "to describe and account for what is in the light of current theory a most remarkable phenomenon. This is the extraordinary parallelism in the linguistic minutiae of the utterances with which people choose to express themselves in quite unrelated languages and cultures" (Brown and Levinson, 1978: 60). A quarter of a century later, it is increasingly widely accepted that this "extraordinary parallelism" was largely an illusion due to that "light of current theory." What is seen as more remarkable today is the extent of cross-linguistic and cross-cultural differences in ways of speaking. Brown and Levinson (1978: 61) described it as their goal "to rebut the once-fashionable doctrine of cultural relativity in the field of interaction" and "to show that superficial diversities can emerge from underlying universal principles and are satisfactorily accounted for only in relation to them." Their major conclusion was that "interactional systematics are based largely on universal principles" (Brown and Levinson, 1978: 288). Today, it is increasingly accepted that those diversities in ways of speaking and interacting are not superficial at all and that they can be largely accounted for in terms of different cultural attitudes and values; and the "cultural relativity in the field of interaction" is increasingly seen as a reality and an important subject for investigation.

In 1983 this author presented, at a meeting of the Sydney Linguistic Circle, a paper entitled 'Different cultures, different languages, different speech acts: English vs. Polish' (Wierzbicka, 1985), which argued that the supposedly universal maxims and principles of politeness were in fact rooted in Anglo culture and which in time became the nucleus of her book *Cross-cultural Pragmatics* (Wierzbicka, 1991/2003). The paper argued, in particular, that the "freedom from imposition," which Brown and Levinson (1978: 66) saw as one of the most important guiding principles of human interaction, was in fact an Anglo cultural value, and that the avoidance of "flat imperative sentences," which Searle among many others attributed to the "ordinary conversational requirements of politeness," did not reflect "universal principles of politeness" but rather, expressed special concerns of modern Anglo culture. At the same time, some

other linguists, too, were raising their voices against the 'universals of politeness' approach to pragmatics and were arguing in defense of culture as a key factor determining ways of speaking, trying to link the language-specific ways of speaking with different cultural values. The scholars who in the inhospitable post-Gricean climate of the 1980s (or so) were opposing a facile universalism and pioneering intercultural (as against pancultural) pragmatics, included, among others, Ho-min Sohn, the author of "Intercultural communication and cognitive values" (1983); Tamar Katriel, the author of *Talking straight: Dugri speech in Israeli Sabra culture* (1986); Yoshiko Matsumoto, the author of 'Reexamination of the universality of face: politeness phenomena in Japanese' (1988); James Matisoff, the author of *Blessings, curses, hopes, and fears: psycho-ostensive expressions in Yiddish* (1979); Thomas Kochman, the author of *Black and white styles in conflict* (1981); and Sachiko Ide, the author of a study on the Japanese value of *wakimae* or 'discernment' (1989). In the 1990s, the broadly-based intercultural pragmatics grew further, bearing rich fruit in the works of authors such as Donal Carbaugh, the author of *Talking American* (1988); Cliff Goddard, the author of papers such as 'Cultural values and 'cultural scripts' of Malay' and 'Communicative style and cultural values – Cultural scripts of Malay' (1997, 2000); Jean Harkins, the author of *Bridging two worlds: Aboriginal English and cross-cultural understanding* (1994); Felix Ameka, the author of studies on Ghanaian conversational routines and the editor of a special issue of the *Journal of Pragmatics* on interjections (1992); Michael Clyne, the author of *Intercultural communication at work: Cultural values in discourse* (1994), and many others. Last but not least, an important role was played by two open-minded and cross-culturally alive journals: Jacob Mey's *Journal of Pragmatics* and Marcelo Dascal's *Pragmatics and Cognition*.

Outside linguistics, there were anthropologists who did not give in to the superficial and anti-cultural universalism of the time and who continued to focus on the language particulars and to probe the links between ways of speaking, ways of thinking, ways of feeling and ways of living. To mention just a few names and works, particularly important from a linguistic point of view: Catherine Lutz, the author of the classic book *Unnatural emotions: Everyday sentiments on a Micronesian atoll and their challenge to Western theory* (1988); Richard Shweder, the founder of cultural psychology and the author of *Thinking through cultures – Expeditions in cultural psychology* (1991); Dorothy Holland and Naomi Quinn, the editors of *Cultural models in language and thought* (1987); Roy D'Andrade and Claudia

Strauss, the authors of *Human motives and cultural models* (1992), and Claudia Strauss and Naomi Quinn (1997), the authors of *A cognitive theory of cultural meaning*. Here, too, two journals played an important role: *Ethos* and *Culture and Psychology*.

There were also some philosophers who started to question the universalist pragmatic theories of Grice, Griceans, and neo-Griceans from a philosophical as well as cross-linguistic point of view. In particular, Wayne Davis (1998) argued in a book-length critique that "the Gricean theory has been barren" and that "the illusion of understanding provided by the Gricean theory has only served to stifle inquiry" (Davis, 1998: 3). "The Gricean explanation of common implicatures" is, Davis argued, "undermined by the existence of nonuniversal implicature conventions" (Davis, 1998: 183). For example, Grice and his followers had claimed that the correct interpretation of a tautology like *War is war* could be calculated from some universal maxims of conversation. Davis pointed out that this claim is refuted by the observation that such tautologies receive different interpretations in different cultures, and he concluded: "The moral is clear. Generalized tautology implicatures (...) are not explained by Gricean Maxims" (Davis, 1998: 46). In a similar context, Davis (1998: 168) quoted and endorsed the present author's own observation that "from the outset, studies in speech acts have suffered from an astonishing ethnocentrism" (Wierzbicka, 1985: 145).

> Many of the criticisms I present have been known for some time. But the import and seriousness of the defects individually and collectively have not been widely appreciated, and the problems have had little impact on the general acceptance of Gricean theory. The best known critics of the Gricean theory have either expressed confidence that solutions would be found within the Gricean framework (...) or presented alternative theories with similar defects (Sperber and Wilson, 1986). (...) Only one author (Wierzbicka, 1987) has argued that the conception is fundamentally flawed. (Davis, 1998: 3)

From the historical, as well as theoretical, point of view, it is important to note that a powerful impulse for the rise of intercultural pragmatics in the last decade came from the growing field of studies focussed on cross-cultural (or intercultural) communication. When in her 1986 book *That's not what I meant!* Deborah Tannen stated that "the future of the earth depends on cross-cultural communication," she was expressing a perception which was growing, especially outside academic circles, but also increasingly within. At a time when every year millions of people crossed the borders, not only between countries but also between languages, and when more and more people of many different cultural backgrounds had to live together in modern multiethnic and multicultural societies, it was becoming increasingly evident to many scholars that research into differences between cultural norms associated with different languages was essential for peaceful co-existence, mutual tolerance, necessary understanding in the workplace and in other walks of life in the increasingly global and yet in many places increasingly diversified world. It was more and more frequently noted that the once popular assumption that the principles of politeness were essentially the same everywhere and could be described in terms of universal maxims such as those listed in Leech's *Principles of Pragmatics* (1983) flew in the face of reality as experienced by millions of ordinary people – refugees, immigrants, the children of immigrants, caught between their parents and the society at large, cross-cultural families and their children, and also by monolingual stay-at-homes who suddenly found themselves living in societies that were ethnically, culturally and linguistically diverse.

The tremendous practical importance of identifying, and describing, the culture-specific norms of politeness and, more generally, norms of interpersonal interaction has been increasingly recognized in the field of language teaching. In this field, too, the realization grew steadily over the last decade or so that 'Grice's Razor,' which extolled the economical virtues of concentrating on the supposed universality of the underlying principles and which cut off unnecessary culture-specific explanations, spelled out a disaster for the students' communicative competence and their ability to survive socially in the milieu of their other language. As Kramsch (1993: 8–9) put it in her book *Context and culture in language teaching*, "If (...) language is seen as social practice, culture becomes the very core of language teaching. Cultural awareness must then be viewed both as enabling language proficiency and as being the outcome of reflection on language proficiency. (...) Once we recognize that language use is indissociable from the creation and transmission of culture, we have to deal with a variety of cultures."

The present writer's long polemics against the 'universals of politeness' and 'universal principles of human conversation' was rooted in her own experience as a language migrant (to use a term introduced by Besemeres, 2002) – from Polish into English, especially academic English, and also, into Australian English (Wierzbicka, 1997). On a very small scale, her 1997 cross-cultural memoir illustrates a noteworthy aspect of intercultural pragmatics as it has evolved over the last decade or so: the new alliance between, on the one hand, linguistic pragmatics, based on 'hard' linguistic evidence and rigorous

linguistic analysis, and, on the other, the growing field of study focused on the 'soft' data of personal experience of cross-cultural and cross-linguistic living.

I will illustrate this alliance with three excerpts from that memoir, which deliberately takes a personal rather than objective perspective. As many recent writers on the subject have argued, such a personal perspective legitimizes the insistence with which proponents of intercultural pragmatics have been challenging, in the last decade or so, the earlier paradigms. Commenting on her life in Australia, to which she emigrated from Poland in 1972 (having married an Australian), the author wrote:

> I had to start learning new "cultural scripts" to live by, and in the process I became aware of the old "cultural scripts" which had governed my life hitherto. I also became aware, in the process, of the reality of "cultural scripts" and their importance to the way one lives one's life, to the image one projects, and even to one's personal identity.
>
> For example, when I was talking on the phone, from Australia, to my mother in Poland (15,000 km away), with my voice loud and excited, carrying much further than is customary in an Anglo conversation, my husband would signal to me: 'Don't shout!' For a long time, this perplexed and confused me: to me, this 'shouting' and this 'excitement' was an inherent part of my personality. Gradually, I came to realise that this very personality was in part culturally constituted. (Wierzbicka, 1997: 119)

The realization of the close links between one's ways of speaking, one's personality and one's cultural background raised for the author the question that countless other immigrants are constantly confronted with: to what extent was it desirable, or necessary, to adapt to one's new cultural context (changing oneself in the process)?

> Early in our life together, my husband objected to my too frequent – in his view – use of the expression *of course*. At first, this puzzled me, but eventually it dawned on me that using *of course* as broadly as its Polish counterpart *oczywiście* is normally used would imply that the interlocutor has overlooked something obvious. In the Polish 'confrontational' style of interaction such an implication is perfectly acceptable, and it is fully consistent with the use of such conversational particles such as, for example, *przecież* ('but obviously – can't you see?'). In mainstream Anglo culture, however, there is much more emphasis on 'tact', on avoiding direct clashes, and there are hardly any confrontational particles comparable with those mentioned above. *Of course* does exist, but even *of course* tends to be used more in agreement than in disagreement (e.g. 'Could you do X for me?' – 'Of course'). Years later, my bilingual daughter Mary told me that the Polish conversational expression *ależ oczywiście*: 'but-EMPHATIC of course' (which I would often replicate in English as 'but of course') struck her as

especially 'foreign' from an Anglo cultural point of view; and my close friend and collaborator Cliff Goddard pointed out, tongue in cheek, that my most common way of addressing him (in English) was 'But Cliff....'. (Wierzbicka, 1997: 119)

Thus, the author had to learn to avoid overusing not only "of course" but also many other expressions dictated by her Polish cultural scripts; and in her working life at an Anglo university, this restraint proved invaluable, indeed essential.

> I had to learn to 'calm down', to become less 'sharp' and less 'blunt', less 'excitable', less 'extreme' in my judgements, more 'tactful' in their expression. I had to learn the use of Anglo understatement (instead of more hyperbolic and more emphatic Polish ways of speaking). I had to avoid sounding 'dogmatic', 'argumentative', 'emotional'. (There were lapses, of course.) Like the Polish-American writer Eva Hoffman (1989), I had to learn the use of English expressions such as 'on the one hand..., on the other hand', 'well yes', 'well no', or 'that's true, but on the other hand'.
>
> Thus, I was learning new ways of speaking, new patterns of communication, new modes of social interaction. I was learning the Anglo rules of turn-taking ('let me finish!', 'I haven't finished yet!'). I was learning not to use the imperative ('Do X!') in my daily interaction with people and to replace it with a broad range of interrogative devices ('Would you do X?' 'Could you do X?' 'Would you mind doing X?' 'How about doing X?' 'Why don't you do X?' 'Why not do X?', and so on). (Wierzbicka, 1997: 119–120)

As these quotes make clear, for writers whose view of intercultural pragmatics was informed by their own personal experience, their knowledge of what was involved was not purely theoretical: above all, it was practical. They were convinced that the insistence on cultural differences was not only theoretically justified (because these differences were real) but also that acknowledging them, and above all, describing them, was vitally important for the practical purposes of intercultural communication and understanding; and in the case of immigrants, of daily living.

The 1991 edition of Wierzbicka's *Cross-cultural pragmatics* was an attempt to challenge the Gricean and Brown and Levinsonian paradigms, and to expose the anglocentric character of various supposedly universal maxims, principles and concepts (including the key concept of 'face,' which was the linchpin of Brown and Levinson's theory of politeness). Twelve years later, when the expanded second edition of the book was published, the tide had changed. Nonetheless, paradoxically, while the universalist pragmatic frameworks developed in the 1970s were gradually losing their appeal, the program of actually

describing the different ways of speaking and thinking linked with different cultures continued to encounter a great deal of resistance.

As the differences between cultures and subcultures were increasingly celebrated, there was also a growing suspicion of any generalizations as to what exactly these differences might be. Diversity was seen as beautiful but also as inherently elusive and indescribable. With the growing emphasis on diversity, the view gradually developed that diversity was everywhere, and that while those differences could and should be celebrated, they could not be described. Thus, in many quarters, there developed a great fear of the notion of culture (especially, a culture), and attempts to identify any differences between particular cultures came to be seen as static culturologies.

Those who promote intercultural pragmatics accept, of course, that cultures are not essences, that cultures are not monads, and that cultures have no fixed contours. But they refuse to conclude from this that cultures cannot be discussed, described, and compared at all. They point out that it would also be a conclusion denying the subjective experience of immigrants, and one going against their vital interests; and that to deny the validity of the notion of culture-specific discourse patterns (including Anglo discourse patterns) is to place the values of political correctness above the interests of socially disadvantaged individuals and groups. In particular, they argue that with the increasing domination of English in the world, both Anglos and non-Anglos need to learn about various Anglo cultural scripts, and that to try to describe these scripts, and to explain the values reflected in them, is not to indulge in stereotyping, but on the contrary, it is to help Anglos to overcome their inclination to stereotype immigrants as rude, while at the same time helping immigrants to better fit in, socially, and to improve their lives (cf., e.g., Wierzbicka, 2002a, 2002b).

In this context, it has become more and more clear that the key issue is that of the metalanguage in which different speech practices and norms can be usefully described and compared. At a time when the English language was commonly taken as a baseline for all comparisons, even those pragmaticists who were more interested in cross-linguistic variation than in supposed universals of politeness or a supposedly universal logic of conversation often assumed that English lexical categories provided legitimate analytical tools for such comparisons. In particular, it was widely assumed that English words such as 'request,' 'apology,' and 'compliment' could be relied on as such tools, and that one could study how requests, apologies, compliments and so on are realized in this or that language and culture (cf., e.g., Blum-Kulka

et al., 1989). The fact that many other languages do not have words corresponding in meaning to such English categories was either ignored or dismissed as unimportant.

Similarly, English folk-categories such as directness, formality, harmony or politeness were accepted uncritically as valid tools for intercultural pragmatics, as were also lexical categories of technical English such as 'face' (Brown and Levinson, 1978), 'relevance' (Sperber and Wilson, 1986) and so on. As discussed, for example, in Goddard (2004: 144), the ethnocentrism "inherent in choosing a descriptive metalanguage which is language-specific and culture-specific (…) necessarily imposes an 'outsider perspective'" on the language and culture described in such terms. At the same time, the alternative practice of using indigenous terms (e.g. *enryo*, *wa*, *omoiyari* in the case of Japanese) involved obvious translation problems in reverse.

The approach to intercultural pragmatics advocated and implemented in the so-called NSM approach seeks to solve the crucial problems of a suitable metalanguage for intercultural pragmatics by pointing to the existence of a shared lexical and grammatical core in all languages – a core which can be used as a culture-neutral and language-independent natural semantic meta-language (hence the term "NSM"). This approach has now identified, on an empirical basis, 60 or so universal semantic primes, whose English exponents are linked with simple words such as 'good' and 'bad,' 'someone' and 'something,' 'people,' or 'know,' 'think,' and 'want.' (For exponents in languages other than English, see Goddard and Wierzbicka (eds.), 2002). Relying on this empirically established set of primes, the proponents of the NSM approach to intercultural pragmatics have produced a large body of detailed, highly specific descriptions of culture-specific norms and practices, formulated neither in technical or semitechnical English terms such as 'formal' and 'informal' or 'direct' and 'indirect,' nor in terms of English folk categories such as 'apology,' 'compliment,' 'sarcasm,' 'understatement' and so on, but rather, in terms of simple words which have equivalents in all languages.

The identification of universal semantic primes that have lexical exponents in all languages has allowed NSM researchers to develop a theory of cultural scripts, where a cultural script is a hypothesis about culture-specific attitudes, assumptions and norms formulated in simple words and testable in consultation with native speakers and cultural insiders. This theory has now produced a large body of fine-grained culture-specific descriptors and cross-cultural comparisons. (See, e.g., Goddard 1997,

2000, 2004; Goddard and Wierzbicka (eds.), 2004, in press; Wierzbicka, 1991/2003, 1996, 2002b.)

The proponents of the cultural scripts approach to intercultural pragmatics argue that the use of such concepts can free researchers from what Goddard (2004) calls "terminological ethnocentrism" and give them a neutral, culture-independent metalanguage for describing different cultural norms. At the same time, the use of such concepts allows them to capture the native speaker's point of view, without distorting it through the application of descriptive tools rooted in the English language or Anglo academic culture.

On this point, the NSM-based approach to cross-cultural pragmatics differs radically from that characteristic of works like Blum-Kulka *et al.*'s (1989) *Cross-cultural pragmatics: Requests and apologies* or Kasper (and the subsequent work by Blum-Kulka and her colleagues). The proponents of the NSM approach argue that while the works in this tradition must be appreciated for their attention to cultural differences reflected in ways of speaking, they cannot escape the charge of terminological, and not only terminological, ethnocentrism. Given that words such as 'requests' and 'apologies' stand for conceptual artifacts of the English language, using them as analytical tools inevitably involves imposing an Anglo perspective on other languages and cultures. To describe ways of speaking across languages and cultures in terms of folk categories encoded in English is like describing English talk in terms of Japanese, Hebrew or Russian folk categories (e.g., the Japanese *wakimae*, cf. Ide, 1989, the Hebrew *dugri*, cf. Katriel, 1986, or the Russian *vran'e*, cf. Wierzbicka, 2002b); but of course nobody would wish to describe English in such terms.

As the present author (cf., e.g., Wierzbicka, 1991/2003) and colleagues have repeatedly argued, the conviction shared by so many semanticists and pragmaticists that it is all right to try to describe all languages through English terms untranslatable into the language of speakers whose ways of thinking those terms are supposed to explain and illuminate, shows the same Anglocentrism that the Gricean and post-Gricean maxims, principles, and conversational postulates once did. Such an anglocentrism is sometimes defended in the name of science. For example, Kay and Berlin in various publications defend the use of English words such as 'color' to analyze thought processes of speakers of languages that have no word like 'color' in the name of scientific discourse. Their opponents (including the present author) argue that English has no special status in describing the ways of thinking of speakers of languages other than English. Words such as 'good' and 'bad' or 'say,' 'think,' 'know' and 'want,' which, as evidence suggests, have morpholexical exponents in all languages, free the analysts from an Anglo perspective, while allowing them at the same time to retain a mini-lexicon of 60 or so English words as a practical lingua franca for articulating different culture-specific conventions, norms and values (and more generally, ways of thinking). For example, claims that in many societies people are guided in their ways of speaking by principles such as 'don't impose' or 'be relevant' depend on the English words 'impose' and 'relevant,' which have no equivalents in other languages. To say that speakers of those other languages are deeply concerned about some values which – as it happens – can only be formulated in English means to give English a privileged position in the humankind's mental world.

The theory of cultural scripts seeks to formulate norms, values and principles of language use in words which, unlike 'impose' or 'relevant,' have equivalents in all other languages, that is words that, it is argued, stand for universal human concepts. These universal words (or word-like elements) are the same words in which semantically encoded meanings are also explicated.

For other current approaches to intercultural pragmatics, see, in particular, the first issue (2004, 1) of the new journal *Intercultural Pragmatics*.

See also: Identity in Sociocultural Anthropology and Language; Identity: Second Language; Language Change and Cultural Change; Politeness.

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Internet and Language Education

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History of the Internet

Computer power is 8000 times less expensive than it was 30 years ago. If we had similar progress in automotive technology today, you could buy a Lexus for about $2. It would travel at the speed of sound and go about 600 miles on a thimble of gas (Wagschall, 1998).

In the space of scarcely a decade of widespread availability, the Internet has affected and even transformed many aspects of people's lives in the technologized world. To be sure, the basic structure of the Internet has existed since the 1960s, but it was not until the 1990s that it began to be used extensively by the general population, and not until the mid-1990s that schools started to use it for educational purposes (Keating and Hargitai, 1999).

Sometime around the early to mid-1990s was also the time that most educators started to receive e-mail service, either privately or through their institutions. The precise dates and degrees of availability vary widely from country to country and institution to institution, with countries such as Finland and the United States being early leaders, and universities and colleges having earlier and easier access than elementary or secondary schools. Most (if not all) educators have access to e-mail and to the Internet in industrialized countries, but also increasingly in the developing countries (see Warschauer, 2003). However, the degree, quality, and/or frequency of access still varies widely.

The Internet as Classroom

The Internet has made it possible for institutions to offer courses and entire degree programs online, so that in the words of enthusiasts, the 'two-by-four-by-six' constraints of classroom instruction have been broken. This phrase, first used by Tiffin and Rajasingham (1995: 87), reverberated around the online learning conferences of the late 1990s to indicate how the Internet had managed to supersede the *two* covers of the textbook, the *four* walls of the classroom, and the *six* daily hours of (high school) instruction.

The first years of the Internet boom led to enthusiastic activity in setting up online classes, courses, and programs. A large number of universities started planning to offer online or distance degree programs. In their 1997 guide to external degrees, Spille *et al.* (1997) listed 122 accredited universities in the United States that offered distance degrees.

In addition, several large consortia or 'virtual universities' sprang up in the United States, the three largest being California Virtual University (CVU), Western Governors University (WGU), and Southern Regional Electronic Campus (SREC). These were originally not universities offering actual courses or degrees, but they acted as brokerage institutions, with online catalogues, searchable databases, and multiple enrollment options. All had plans to establish corporate links and to offer information on corporate training providers. CVU was discontinued in 1999. WGU is now an accredited university and offers degrees in education, business, and information technology. However, its degrees are not universally recognized. SREC has now evolved into the SREB (Southern Regional Education Board) 'electronic campus,' in which a large number of southern colleges and universities in 15 states participate. Courses offered include some foreign language courses (about 30), but many of these are taught by videotape or audiotape, and are thus not truly online, i.e., Internet-based.

Other countries also have their online institutions or consortia, e.g., the Canadian Virtual University (CVU – not to be confused with the now-defunct California version) offers a rather extensive menu of foreign language courses. Similar to their U.S. counterparts, many of these are textbook plus video/audio-based, but some offer supplementary materials on the Internet. Other international institutions include the Erasmus Student Network in Europe, aimed at facilitating exchange programs and study abroad, CIEE (Council on International Educational Exchange), and many others.

When one looks at the actual mechanisms and materials that are used to offer 'online' language classes, one often finds that they operate with a traditional textbook, supplemented perhaps with a CD-ROM, video and/or audiotapes (all these purchased by the student, and sent by regular mail), with at times an online component. In other words, most 'online' courses are only in part online (and often minimally, or optionally). Thus, many courses are a mixture of traditional distance education practices (distributing materials by mail) and additional Internet and e-mail services. This may gradually shift toward more fully online technologies, as course management systems (CMS) become better (and more affordable) and as Internet technologies, such as voice over IP and streaming audio and video become more accessible.

Accessibility continues to be an important issue. While it is possible in most places now to get Internet access (if only in Internet Cafes, where an hour's access may be quite cheap by Western standards), in many countries access at home may be expensive, because even local calls may be charged per minute. Thus, a group of students in the United States communicating with a group of students in say, Japan, may encounter inequalities of access, not because of differences in equipment, but because of the cost of telephone bills. Massive expansion of broadband access (cable, DSL, etc.) will equalize access in many areas. However, there will remain vast areas of the globe, and numerous neighborhoods in even the most well-connected countries, where access continues to be difficult.

Online courses and programs receive mixed reviews. As mentioned above, initial enthusiasm was considerable, even though detractors have been equally vociferous. A scathing indictment was David Noble's *Digital diploma mills* (1998), which cited numerous ways in which online programs may shortchange students, cut corners, reduce the quality of education, and commercialize and commodify knowledge as merchandise bought and sold over the Internet.

The advantages and disadvantages of online learning are fairly predictable. Among the advantages are individualization, flexibility, and independence from time and space constraints (i.e., study when you want, where you want). Disadvantages include the lack of face-to-face interaction, technical problems, and dependence on self-motivation. Interestingly, instructor-student interaction, which one would expect to be less in online classes, is often reported to be in fact the opposite: students and instructors often report that they have in fact more and better interaction online than they would in the equivalent classroom setting (e.g., large undergraduate or high school classes,

where individual attention is minimal). A final logistical problem of online courses can be the administration of official tests and exams at a distance (e.g., how to prevent cheating and how to arrange for proctoring).

A crucial requirement (perhaps *the* most crucial requirement) of a successful online course or program is the development of a (virtual) community of learning, a social context. An online 'space' must be created that fosters a sense of belonging and that encourages (and requires) learners to communicate with one another. Simple steps along the way may be for all learners to post personal bios and photographs, the use of chat rooms where learners can get to know each other (in small groups) informally, and the design of collaborative activities and projects. Several online environments have been designed that encourage the development of such communities (e.g., Svensson, 2003), and clearly such three-dimensional, highly visual, and multimodal virtual landscapes can be attractive for certain groups of students. As mentioned above, CMS are constantly becoming more versatile, integrating graphics, audio, video, animation, interactive games and quizzes, and more. Of course, the need for such bells and whistles varies with the type of student: Some will always prefer a more no-nonsense information and debate-based approach driven by professional goals and requirements.

Research and Resources: The Internet as Tool

In language courses we rely on textbooks, dictionaries, and libraries; on exposure to the target language from a variety of sources; and of course on interaction with fellow students, teachers, and if possible other target-language speakers. What can the Internet offer to assist learners in their quest for language sources, resources, and guidance?

The Internet can serve as a useful tool for language learners, either in full online classes, or as supplements to regular classes (in so-called *hybrid* formats, which combine classes with online work) in these three ways: (1) information about languages and linguistics; (2) authentic language use and language samples; (3) opportunities for interaction. A fourth way, practice opportunities, will be discussed after these three, in the next section.

Information about Languages and Linguistics

Let's say you want to check the vowel chart of Quechua. Before the mid-1990s, you would try to find a source on your shelves or in the library, or perhaps order books via Interlibrary Loan, and so on. Now you type the words *Quechua vowel chart* into one of the major search engines, and within a few seconds you are looking at the vowel chart (the accuracy being dependent upon the original source).

To give another example, perhaps you are citing a research paper, but you are missing a particular detail such as a page number or the author's initials. Instead of searching in libraries or hunting through your files to find the original or your notes, you now might find the information through an Internet search in a fraction of the time and effort: someone, somewhere will probably have a reading list posted that has the information you need.

As these examples show, the researcher, student, and teacher of language can find an enormous amount of information about language and languages on the Internet, although the quality of that information will have to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. A number of websites and portals, such as Ethnologue, the Yamada Language Center, Bob Peckham's Famous French Links, the AATG links for German, among many others (see 'Relevant Websites'), attempt to guide the visitor to particular categories of information and services (such as specialized language fonts) and in some cases evaluate or comment on the sites listed. In addition, there are a number of online journals on CALL (Computer-Assisted Language Learning), many of them free of charge.

In sum, the student of linguistics and of any particular language can find an abundance of information on the Internet. Language teachers can use the Internet to design research projects for their students, as well as to incorporate authentic texts (including audio and video) in class. As Internet technology advances, it becomes easier to obtain on-the-spot transcripts of video fragments, to find ready-made lesson notes for news clips, or to compile a list of online activities in grammar, vocabulary, and so on.

Authentic Language Use and Language Samples

Most language teachers and students agree that using authentic materials is beneficial for a number of reasons, especially if this can be accompanied by carefully designed activities and lesson plans. Finding suitable authentic materials can be quite difficult and time-consuming, of course, and here the Internet once again has a plethora of resources available. In some cases, teaching materials such as transcripts and prototype activities (as mentioned above) are made available on websites, but in most cases the teacher or student must decide how to evaluate, interpret, and deal with the materials found. Once again, as in examples mentioned above, the quality, veracity, or representativeness of the authentic language samples must be evaluated by the user.

A host of other potential issues may affect the use of authentic language samples from the Internet. Let's say a teacher of Chinese wants to use a video clip from a news broadcast in Chinese in tomorrow's lesson. This video clip may be available now on a news website, but there is no guarantee that it will still be there tomorrow. Furthermore, relying in class on accessing a live website has its risks: the site may be down, the local server may be down or suddenly slow down to a crawl, and so on. Therefore, the teacher may have to download the clip to the hard drive, but perhaps this is not allowed because of copyright restrictions, or space restrictions, or special software may be required. To use the resources available on the Internet at short notice, a number of prerequisites may apply. It is neither automatic nor risk-free.

A different, but no less thorny issue relating to the abundance of authentic materials available on the Internet in written form is the ease of cutting and pasting material into essays and writing projects. The ease of access to quotes and academic sources makes unattributed use of quotes easy. As in other areas, however, the Internet offers some solutions to the problems it has itself created: there are a number of excellent websites and services available to not only spot plagiarisms but also to discuss ways of preventing and dealing with it in foreign language writing classes.

Opportunities for Interaction

As mentioned earlier, by the mid-1990s, most academic institutions had begun providing e-mail access for faculty, staff, and students. In addition, increasing numbers of people began to have e-mail access from their home, first by modem, then by cable, DSL, or other broadband connections. In some countries adult access to e-mail is as high as 90% (for example, in the United Kingdom, Australia, and The Netherlands, according to a 2002 Nielsen Ratings survey). Chat and instant messaging (IM) are less ubiquitous, yet in some countries (e.g., Brazil and Spain) more than 40% of adults were reported to use it. In addition, young adults in the United States now report that they hardly use e-mail anymore (except to communicate with parents and teachers Thorne, 2003); but use IM most of the time that they are online (which can literally be 24 hours a day in the United States where there are generally no time limits). Many young people routinely have several windows open in which they communicate with several friends separately and simultaneously, while also listening to music and claiming to be doing their homework. If this is true, and if the homework indeed gets done satisfactorily, then the Internet has truly brought multitasking to the younger generations, too.

The effect of various forms of online interaction in language learning have not yet been fully investigated, although a number of studies have been conducted. Lamy and Goodfellow (1999) compared asynchronous (e-mail or discussion list) and synchronous (chat) communication in an online French class, and they found that asynchronous communication was particularly well suited for language learning, because it allows for a combination of reflective and conversation-like language use. Thorne (2003) found that students required to participate in asynchronous online learning were relatively unmotivated until they discovered IM connections with their counterparts abroad; through IM they started getting to know them, and this also involved flirtatious and romantic encounters online. What it really means for online language learning remains unclear at this point. The slower, more monitored medium of e-mail and threaded discussion allows the learner to focus more on accurate and edited language use (Lamy and Goodfellow, 1999), whereas the more spontaneous medium of IM is generally quite tolerant of errors, but places a high premium on effective communication of interpersonal meanings. It will clearly take significant longitudinal research efforts to establish the learning potential of the various modes of Internet interaction.

Activities: The Internet as Tutor

Ever since the Internet became popular for language learning in the mid-1990s, enterprising teachers have been putting up language activities, quizzes, and games. During the first few years, most online activities were actually a step back (pedagogically speaking) from the sorts of things teachers had been doing with actual software (such as Hypercard) since the 1980s. Online activities tended to be fairly mechanical, often based on blank-filling or multiple choice, with little meaningful feedback. The design challenges were considerable, but the technologies were not versatile and only minimally interactive. New web design technologies and advances in speed of access, audio and video compression, and more powerful web browsers have resulted in a greater variety of online language practice opportunities. These now include listening comprehension based on audio and video clips, animated writing tutorials for Japanese and Chinese, drag-and-drop vocabulary and phrase matching, and many others. In addition, feedback may be individually tailored, so that the level of the activity is adjusted in accordance with

the responses of the student (e.g., Jim Cummins's 'e-lective' reading program).

In addition to activities designed for individual practice, the Internet also offers opportunities for collaborative work. Examples include the following:

- *WebQuests* – inquiry-oriented group projects (designed by Bernie Dodge of San Diego State University) that use Internet resources to investigate particular topics. Free websites exist (especially Dodge's original WebQuest page at SDSU) that facilitate the design of such projects as well as the sharing of results, e.g., in the form of final presentations.
- *Concordancing* – A concordance program searches texts or corpora of texts for certain words, word combinations, or phrases in context, making it an ideal tool for collaborative investigations of vocabulary, grammar, or idiom usage. Sample concordance and corpus websites exist for a number of languages; in addition, the major search engines can also be used as concordancers of sorts: Typing in a particular word or string will bring up many examples of the particular items in question, which can then be investigated by students in groups and reported on. A large set of links and resources, as well as pedagogical advice, can be found on the website of Michael Barlow.
- *Project Poster* – A nonprofit web-based service that allows students and classes to quickly put together some text and images in the form of a simple website that can then be used for class presentations.

There are many other resources available on the Internet that can be used for students working in groups to engage in project-based learning. As one further example, the University of Iowa has an excellent website for phonology and pronunciation in English and Spanish, with animated diagrams and video clips of articulation. Language learners can use this website (and many others on a variety of language topics) to investigate, discuss, and practice aspects of pronunciation.

Equality, Democracy, and the Internet

In various places above I have alluded to certain inequalities in access to and the use of technology in education. Such inequalities have generally been referred to as the "digital divide" (Warschauer, 2003). In the early days of technology use in education, there was a clear division between the traditional haves and have-nots in society in terms of hardware, software, and access. Thus, in the United States, affluent suburban schools were the first ones to get computers and Internet access, whereas inner city and rural

schools were left behind. There was a fear that poor schools and minorities would once again miss out on equal opportunities for learning with the new technologies. As a result, a strong push was made in the United States to ensure that the digital divide would be bridged. Special programs were set up to provide disadvantaged schools and areas with heavily discounted computers and connections. One such program, initiated during the Clinton-Gore administration, is E-Rate, which provides broadband connections and equipment to underserved districts and schools at discounts of up to 90%. In addition, many grant proposal requests encourage (or require) the inclusion of technology in educational project proposals, thus allowing grant recipients to beef up the technological infrastructure of their institutions.

In the early years the Internet was heavily English-dominated. It was hard to find websites in other languages, and in fact the technologies to use scripts other than Roman (non-alphabetic, or so called 'double-byte' scripts such as Japanese and Korean, or right-to-left scripts such as Arabic and Hebrew) were primitive. But a common standard, Unicode, has become widespread, and this technology enables the encoding of any writing system. A related issue has been the worry that the English-dominated Internet would contribute to the increasing marginalization (and extinction) of minority languages. However, as Warschauer shows, the variety of websites in languages other than English has increased significantly. In 1997, 81% of websites were written in English, but in 2000 this percentage had dropped to 68% (Warschauer, 2003: 96). In addition, many websites are bilingual or multilingual, and online translation tools, such as Babelfish, exist that can automatically translate a website into another language (imperfectly, but in most cases comprehensibly).

According to *Technology Counts* (2004), availability of computers and access to the Internet are now much improved in the United States, with just a few percentage points separating richer and poorer schools in terms of number of students per computer, and number of classrooms connected to the Internet.

Internationally, there are still vast discrepancies from country to country as well as from region to region within countries (this summary is based on data in *Technology Counts*, 2004). In Europe, Finland, Sweden, and Austria are among the leaders in school computer use, whereas France, Germany, and Italy have less access and connectivity. In Africa, many countries have few computers in schools, with South Africa and Egypt standing out as having respectively about 17.5% and 31% of schools equipped with computers. Asian countries also vary greatly

in terms of access. Both South Korea and Japan have made enormous efforts to get computers into every classroom. Poorer countries such as Mongolia, Vietnam, and Laos are much farther behind. A similar situation pertains in Latin America, with Chile ahead of all other countries, and the poorer countries such as Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru (as well as most Central American countries) lagging far behind.

However, these numbers, interesting though they may be, do not tell the whole story. Number of students per computer or number of classrooms connected to the Internet tells us little or nothing about the quality of their use in education. It goes without saying that technology can be used well or badly, efficiently or wastefully, productively or destructively, innovatively or mind-numbingly. And from this perspective, comparing the amount or even sophistication of technology across places and schools is of limited interest. Much more important is a comparison of what is done with the technology, and here reliable data are extremely hard to come by. Yet, there are numerous reports of vast differences in the pedagogical aspects of technology use between rich (middle-class, suburban) schools and poor (rural, inner-city, high-immigrant) schools. In the former you tend to see more open-ended applications, web and graphic design programs, and students engaged in creative projects. In the latter, you tend to see students working on so-called 'integrated learning systems' or a variety of basically 'drill-and-kill' CD-ROM programs, essentially lock-step language practice without much imagination or creativity involved. In the former, you tend to see more group work in an open classroom setting, in the latter it is more likely to be individual work in a computer lab or in a corner of the classroom. Thus, the digital divide may be perpetuated even if inequalities of equipment and connectivity are overcome, because of the lack of training of teachers and students with the technology and its creative use and because of a lack of upgrading of the curriculum.

There are a number of things that need to be done to overcome this second, far more insidious educational inequality. The first is teacher education. It has often been recommended that at least one-third of a technology budget should be spent on teacher professional preparation and inservice development. This recommendation is rarely if ever followed in practice. In most cases, once the equipment and software, and the building and wiring of labs are paid for, little money (if any) is left over for teacher training. The few workshops available (often offered by vendors) tend to be shallow and cursory, technology-oriented rather than pedagogy-oriented, and scarcely address the integration of technology into a meaningful and challenging curriculum. Even in CALL

conferences, a majority of presentations focus on new technologies and innovations, rather than on solid classroom practices.

Now that many countries (India, South Africa, Brazil, South Korea, Japan, and so on) are engaged in a major push to make computers available in every classroom, early signs are once again that the issue of integrating technology into the curriculum is largely ignored or at best neglected. Unless a consistent policy is established of putting teacher training and curriculum development *before* computer purchasing and infrastructure (in budgeting terms), these countries will find that, to quote Larry Cuban's conclusion from surveys in the famed Silicon Valley, computers are "oversold and underused" (not to say, "misused," too). The following quote from Phil Agre expresses the dilemma well:

> It is extraordinarily common for organizations to invest large sums in complex computers without any investment in training. Schools often invest their scarce resources in computers without any thought to the curriculum. In some cases, the responsible authorities are duped by claims that the systems are easy to use. In other cases, it is assumed that computers will pay for themselves by displacing staff, and therefore further investments in human capital seem like the opposite of that intention. In each case, what is neglected is what Kling (1992) calls the web of relationships around the computer. Computers are easy to see, but webs are not. (Agre, 1999)

Unless the issues of teacher preparation and curriculum development are addressed in an energetic fashion, inequalities in the innovative, equitable, and responsible use of technologies will persist regardless of how many work stations, applications, wires, or wireless networks schools are bombarded with.

Future

The future of technology in language education is like the opening paragraph of Dickens's *Tale of two cities*: "It was the best of times, it was the worst of times...." The trend can go in either direction, the crucial element being what is to come first: quality of pedagogy and curriculum or the latest, fastest, glitziest hardware, software, and connectivity? As an educator with a long-standing interest in technology, I can only sustain a belief in its beneficial effects if I think that it can improve the quality of the educational experience of our students. I can only defend this belief because I have kept this mantra firmly in mind over many years:

- Pedagogy first
- Curriculum second
- Computers third.

In the end, it is up to the teacher and the student to define the role of technology in learning. There are many exciting examples of good and creative work already available, and surely many more to come, especially if teachers and students demand them and actively participate in their development. At the same time, there are strong commercial and administrative forces that will always try to tug the development toward more mechanical, mass-produced, test-oriented functions. It is important to realize the dynamics of instruction both at the micro and the macro levels, so that effective action can be promoted.

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http://amsterdam.nettime.org – Amsterdam.

http://babel.uoregon.edu – Babel.

http://www.digitaldividenetwork.org/ – Digital Divide Network.

http://www.ethnologue.org – Ethnologue.

http://grow.aatg.org/index.html – American Association of Teachers of German.

Irony

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The term 'irony' is commonly used to describe both a linguistic phenomenon (verbal irony) and other phenomena including 'situational' irony (i.e., irony of facts and things dissociated from their linguistic expression; Shelley, 2001) such as a fire-station burning to the ground, various more-or-less philosophical ideas (Socratic irony, Romantic irony, Postmodern irony), and even a type of religious experience (Kierkegaard, 1966). While there may be connections between situational and verbal irony, it does not appear that literary and religious uses can be fruitfully explained in terms of linguistic irony. This treatment will be limited to verbal irony.

Other definitional problems include the purported distinction between irony and sarcasm. While some have argued that the two can be distinguished (for example, irony can be involuntary, while sarcasm cannot be so), others maintain that no clear boundary exists. A further problem is presented by the fact that in some varieties of English, the term *irony* is undergoing semantic change and is assuming the meaning

of an unpleasant surprise, while the semantic space previously occupied by *irony* is taken up by the term *sarcasm*.

The word *irony* goes back to the Greek *eironeía* (pretense, dissimulation) as does the history of its definition and analysis. Irony is seen as a trope (i.e., a figure of speech) in ancient rhetorics and this analysis has remained essentially unchallenged until recently. In the traditional definition irony is seen as saying something to mean the opposite of what is said. This definition is demonstrably incorrect, as a speaker may be ironical but not mean the opposite of what he/she says; cf. *It seems to be a little windy* (uttered in the middle of a violent storm), in which the speaker is saying less than what is meant. Similarly, overstatements and hyperbole may be ironical (Kreuz and Roberts, 1995).

A recent and fruitful restatement of the irony-as-trope theory has been presented by Paul Grice who sees irony as an implicature, i.e., as a deliberate flouting of one of the maxims of the principle of cooperation (*see* **Cooperative Principle; Grice, Herbert Paul; Implicature**). Relatedly, speech-act approaches to irony see it as an insincere speech act. Initially, Grice's approach saw irony as a violation of the maxim of quality (i.e., the statement of an untruth) but this claim has been refuted, as seen above. Broadening the definition to, for example, 'saying something while meaning something else,' runs the risk of obliterating the difference between irony and other forms of figurative or indirect speech. However, this loss of distinction may be a positive aspect of the definition, as has been recently argued (Kreuz, 2000, Attardo, 2002).

While the idea of 'oppositeness' in irony is problematic, approaches to irony as negation have been presented (Giora, 1995), who sees irony as 'indirect' (i.e., inexplicit; cf. Utsumi, 2000) negation; related ideas are that of contrast (Colston, 2002) and inappropriateness (Attardo, 2000).

A very influential approach to irony is the mention theory (Sperber and Wilson, 1981), which claims that an utterance is ironical if it is recognized as the echoic mention of another utterance by a more or less clearly identified other speaker(*see* **Use versus Mention**). Furthermore, the ironical statement must be critical of the echoed utterance (cf. Grice, 1989: 53–54). Similar theories based on the ideas of 'pretense' and 'reminder' have been presented as well. Criticism of the mention theory notes that not all irony seems to be interpretable as the echo of someone's words, or that if the definition of mention is allowed to encompass any possible mention it becomes vacuous (since any sentence is potentially the mention of another sentence). Furthermore, there exists an admittedly rarer, non-negative, praising irony, called *asteism*

(Fontanier, 1968: 150). An example of asteism might be a colleague describing Chomsky's *Aspects of the theory of syntax* as a 'moderately influential' book in linguistics. Other approaches to irony include the 'tinge' theory, which sees irony as blending the two meanings (the stated and the implied ones) with the effect of attenuating the ironical one (Colston, 1997).

All the theories of irony mentioned so far share the idea that the processing of irony is a two-step process in which one sense (usually assumed to be the literal meaning) of the utterance is accessed and then a second sense of the utterance is discovered (usually under contextual pressure). Thus, for example, in a Gricean account of irony as implicature, the hearer of an utterance such as *That was smart* (uttered as a description of clumsy behavior, such as spilling one's wine upon someone's clothing) will first process the utterance as meaning literally roughly 'This behavior was consonant with how smart people behave' and then will discard this interpretation in favor of the implicature that the speaker means that the behavior was *not* consonant with how smart people behave. This account has been challenged recently by 'direct access' theories.

The direct access theories claim that the hearer does not process the literal meaning of an ironical utterance first and only later accesses the figurative (ironical) meaning. Rather, they claim that the literal meaning is either not accessed at all or only later. Direct access interpretations of irony are squarely at odds with the traditional interpretation of irony as an implicature. Some results in psycholinguistics have been seen as supporting this view (Gibbs, 1994). The mention theory of irony was commonly interpreted as a direct access theory, but recent work (Yus, 2003) seems to indicate that it too can be interpreted as a two-step process. Other researchers (e.g., Dews and Winner, 1999) have presented contrasting views which support the two-step approach, although not always the claim that the literal meaning is processed first: claims that interpretations are accessed in order of saliency (Giora, 2003) or in parallel have been put forth.

Psycholinguistic studies of irony have focused on children's acquisition of irony (Winner, 1988), progressively lowering the age at which children understand irony to under ten years old; on the neurobiology of the processing of irony (McDonald, 2000), emphasizing the role of the right hemisphere alongside the left one (in which most language processing takes place); and on the order of activation of the various meanings in the ironical text. A significant issue is the degree and nature of the assumptions that the hearer and speaker must share for irony to be understood; this can be summed up as the 'theory of mind' that the speakers have.

In particular, irony involves metarepresentations (Bara *et al.*, 1997, Curcó, 2000).

Considerable attention has been paid to the optional markers of irony, i.e., primarily intonational and kinesic indications of the speaker's ironical intent. While several phonological and other features have been considered 'markers' of irony, it appears that none of these features is exclusively a marker of irony. Reviews of markers include phonological (e.g., intonation), graphic (e.g., italics, punctuation), morphological (e.g., quotatives), kinesic (e.g., winking), and contextual clues (Haiman, 1998).

Recently, the social and situational context of irony as well as its pragmatic ends have begun being investigated in sociolinguistics and discourse/conversation analysis as well as in psycholinguistics. Work on the social functions of irony has found a broad range of functions, including in- and out-group definition, evaluation, aggression, politeness, verbal play, and many others (e.g., Clift, 1999; Anolli *et al.*, 2002; Gibbs and Colston, 2002; Kotthoff, 2003). It is likely that this list may be open-ended.

The relationship between irony and humor remains underexplored, despite their obvious connections, although some studies are beginning to address the interplay of irony and other forms of implicature, such as indirectness, and metaphoricity. Finally, it is worth noting that dialogic approaches to language (e.g., Ducrot, 1984) see irony as a prime example of the co-presence of different 'voices' in the text (*see* **Literary Pragmatics**), in ways that avoid the technical problems highlighted in the mention theories.

See also: Implicature; Pragmatics: Overview; Relevance Theory; Speech Acts.

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Irony: Stylistic Approaches

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Most books or articles on the topic start with a warning that the concept of irony is elusive (Muecke, 1970) and that it takes many forms. Myers (1981: 410) said that "in irony we inherit both a device and a concept." Nash (1985) alerted us to the lack of consistency in usage even among literary critics. Although dictionaries offer definitions and exemplifications, they point to the complexity of the phenomenon rather than enlighten the reader. The word has both positive and negative connotations today, a mark of its complex history and range of functions in discourse. The word does not appear in the English language until the 16th century and is only commonly used by speakers from the early 18th century onwards. Clearly the phenomenon existed before it was named, even prior to the Greek word from which the English word derives. The word *eironeía* to describe the Greek philosopher Socrates's treatment of his conversational opponents is first recorded in Plato's *Republic*. Socratic irony today refers to a discourse strategy whereby the speaker pretends he or she is learning from an interlocutor whilst trying all the while to uncover the flaws in that person's argument (Nilsen and Nilsen, 2000).

Conveniently, a distinction is often made between situational irony and verbal irony. In the first we have an observer who notices a state of affairs or event which is in some way incongruous. The second is a rhetorical device. We have an ironist who produces a linguistic message whose meaning is other than the literal meaning, in many cases understood to be the opposite of the literal meaning conveyed. There is a discrepancy between the words and what the speaker means by these words, an opposition between the surface and the underlying meaning. This is also called traditional irony in most writings and is often attributed to Aristotle (Barbe, 1995).

An oppositional model of verbal irony holds that the speaker says the opposite of what he or she means. In this account, irony is unveiled by a process of substitution of lexical items or propositions. In the case of stable irony (Booth, 1974), where the intended meaning is fairly clear, as in "What a lovely day!" uttered on a day when the weather is anything but pleasant, meaning may be retrieved by word substitution (e.g., 'lovely' for 'awful'), an example of lexical-antonymy. Oppositeness is at the heart of Raskin's semantic theory of humor (STH) (Raskin, 1985) where he discussed oppositeness in terms of local antonymy, two opposite meanings arising from a particular discourse. At the propositional level, consider Myers's (1981: 411) example "I always wanted to spend the summer in Detroit," uttered by a speaker who does not want to spend the summer in Detroit. Here we have an example of negation at the propositional level. Some linguists argue that examples like the one above constitute an instance of criticism coupled with a complaint, also known as nonce irony. Common irony refers to expressions which have become stock phrases in a language, such as "that's a likely story!" (Barbe, 1995: 18–22).

When considering verbal irony, a number of assumptions need clarification. One often-debated issue is that of intentionality and sincerity of the ironist. Here the focus is on the production of an ironic text. This approach has been popular in stylistic analyses of literary texts, concerned with identifying devices employed by writers. The rhetorician Quintilian claimed that the ironist 'intends' to convey something which is other than what he or she says, thus effectively being insincere. Albeit not universally held, this view still finds many supporters today. Interestingly, the anti-intentionalist position is refuted on the basis that if the text can be read ironically, it is read "as if it were intended to be ironical" (Muecke, 1978: 364), highlighting the importance of the speech community's conventions of usage over the individual speaker's intentions. However, Gibbs *et al.* (1995) provided convincing evidence that intention is not necessary for irony to occur. They show that hearers are perfectly able to recognize the ironic meaning created by a sentence whilst knowing at the same time that the speaker's intention was not to convey irony. It is true that instances of dramatic irony rely on this, as is the case when readers of a book, or an audience at a play, know something that the characters themselves do not know. In the world of theatre, the *ingénu* who utters sincerely the words of the playwright is a good example of unintentional irony. The speaker is separate from the ironist, the animator of the utterance distinct from the author of the utterance (Goffman, 1979).

Haiman (1990: 188) explained that the distinction between sarcasm and irony is rooted in intention. Whilst sarcasm is intentional, it is not a necessary condition for irony. "To be ironic, a speaker need not be aware that his words are 'false' – it is sufficient that his interlocutors or his audience be aware of this." Sarcasm is often categorized as a form of irony and some researchers use the term interchangeably (Attardo *et al.*, 2003). However, for some, it is

a type of indirect criticism which is perhaps more personal and more blunt, and where the speaker's intentions to criticize are more obvious. Barbe (1995: 28) distinguished between the two by considering whose face is more threatened by the utterance. In the case of sarcasm she claims the speaker is compromising him- or herself, and thus a sarcastic comment constitutes a face-threatening act for the speaker.

As for the notion of double significance, and more precisely the clash between the literal and implied meaning, it is clear that the meanings are not necessarily in a relation of 'opposition' in the strict sense, as is often presumed. When making use of hyperbole it is possible to speak the truth whilst conveying an additional meaning. Myers's example of the comment "I love people who signal," uttered by a passenger after the driver attempts a left turn without signaling (Myers, 1977: 172), is a good case in point. Here the speaker is not saying she does not like people who signal, a negation of the declaration, neither is she being sincere about loving all people who signal. As well as exaggeration, understatement may be used ironically, effectively flouting Grice's maxim of quantity – which suggests that your contribution must be as informative as is required, but no more than is required, for the purposes of the current exchange (Levinson, 1983). The ironist is speaking the truth, but implies, by omitting to give as much information as is required, that there is a conversational implicature to be inferred by the hearer (see **Maxims and Flouting**). Ironical quotations and interjections do not fit into the traditional oppositional model of irony either.

Irony can make use of metaphors (see **Metaphor: Stylistic Approaches**). Overusing metaphors, placing unfitting metaphors, and juxtaposing unlikely metaphors are useful devices for the production of irony. In the case of explicit irony (as in a sentence starting with, for example, 'ironically' or 'isn't it ironic') the speaker brings to the recipient's attention an incongruous occurrence, communicating the nonverbal irony of fate. But in most instances of irony, which are implicit, inference is the key to uncovering the 'true' meaning. However, as with all instances of irony, interpretation is idiosyncratic and it is not certain that meaning will be recovered by the hearer. This has led many researchers to shift their focus away from the ironist to the recipient of the message (see **Irony**) (Kaufer, 1981; Giora, 1995; Giora and O'Fein, 1999a, 1999b).

Building on Sperber and Wilson's echoic interpretation model (Sperber and Wilson, 1981; Wilson and Sperber, 1992) and the pretense and theater models (Clark and Gerrig, 1984; Haiman, 1990), Clift (1999)

concluded that in naturally occurring conversations, irony is not necessarily located in the utterance itself, thus giving credence to the view that irony cannot reliably be identified on the basis of linguistic description alone. Irony emerges from dynamic conversational activity and is exploited by creative speakers as part of their turn-taking involvement. For Clift, irony may emerge from a flouting of a conversational expectation, a tension between 'slots' and the 'items' that fill them (Clift, 1999: 547). Irony in natural conversation serves an important discourse and social goal and is used in the management of interpersonal relationships (Norrick, 1993). It can be used to criticize whilst not losing face and at the same time minimize the threat to the face of the listener, thus adhering to rules of politeness. It can be used to display wit and solidarity and to affirm bonds between conversationalists too (affiliative vs. nonaffiliative purposes).

In pragmatics it is postulated that recognition of irony lies in the markers used to direct the recipient of the message to the right interpretation. Contextual clues can appear at all levels of language: word, clause, utterance, and discourse. In speech, pointers include kinesic (ranging from gestures to nods and smiles) and phonic (tone of voice, stress, pitch, etc.) markers. Another pointer to irony may come from the contribution being inappropriate in relation to the context or the cotext, even when on the surface the contribution seems relevant. Contradictory clauses are also a trigger. One indicator is the use of register clashes. During an informal conversation one might shift from an informal style to a formal style for ironic effect, for example, or insert phraseology which belongs to another field of discourse. An unusual collocation may alert the speaker (or reader) to the existence of an ambiguity. Jane Austen's opening sentence in *Pride and Prejudice*,

"It is a truth universally acknowledged that a single man in possession of a good fortune must be in want of a wife,"

combines overstatement ('universally,' 'must be') with a contradiction ('good fortune' / 'in want of') to indicate that the sentence must not be taken at face value. The choice of lexis points to an incongruity and alerts the reader to another intended meaning. Markers, however, are pointers and do not constitute irony *per se*.

Although verbal irony does not always imply a script opposition or negation of the literal message, it allows for a double perspective to be conveyed. This may explain why much irony falls into the realm of humor (see **Humor in Language**), as the perception of a contrast is at the heart of Incongruity Theories

and Surprise Theories (Goldstein and McGhee, 1972). Attardo (1994) placed the word 'irony' within the semantic field of humor, and claimed that irony and humor overlap significantly (Attardo, 2001). Others have argued that irony and humor share the same mechanisms (Giora, 1995). Irony is used to express an evaluative judgment, to convey an attitude about the interlocutor, an event, or more generally about some aspect of one's universe of belief (Martin, 1992) with the possible outcome that it can have the perlocutionary effect of being humorous, a desirable quality for most. For the recipient, satisfaction is gained from the process of decoding the multiple readings. In literature, techniques used by writers which signal that humor is present also enhance the reader's experience. Triezenberg (2004) explained that, for example, as a device, repetition with skillful variation is a potent humor enhancer. She also drew attention to the importance of cultural factors and shared background knowledge for ensuring that humor is decoded and fully appreciated. In order to achieve a "secret communion" (Leech and Short, 1981) between author and reader, a complex range of linguistic and nonlinguistic factors needs to be combined.

The general theory of verbal humor (*see* **Humor: Stylistic Approaches**) was developed to describe the conditions necessary for a short text to be considered humorous, and aims to provide an explanation of the cognitive processes involved in the processing of humorous texts (Attardo, 2001, 2002). From considering the structure of the joke, the theory has been extended to attempt to analyze humorous literary texts. Although some attest to its literary stylistics value, others argue that it is hitherto not adequate to account for the aesthetic qualities of literary writing (Triezenberg, 2004). Nevertheless, irony as well as humor is a linguistic resource which speakers and writers employ skillfully and acquire as part of their linguistic competence, and recognize in others' performance. No absolute agreement can ever be reached about incidences of irony and their interpretation, as usage as well as interpretations are rooted in the social and linguistic conventions of a particular speech community at a specific point in time. To the extent that any instance of language use can be analyzed using rigorous methods of linguistic and stylistic analysis, it is possible to say something about the mechanisms employed in the use of irony, even if the concept itself is constantly evolving.

See also: Humor in Language; Humor: Stylistic Approaches; Irony; Maxims and Flouting; Metaphor: Stylistic Approaches.

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Jakobson, Roman

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Roman Osipovich Jakobson (**Figure 1**), an American philologist and linguist of Russian Jewish descent, was born in Moscow. He moved to Prague in 1920 and to the United States during World War II. He graduated from Moscow University and participated in the Russian avant-garde movement in literature. When he moved to Prague, he pursued his doctorate at the University of Prague. From 1933 to 1939, he taught at the Massaryck University, Brno, but left Czechoslovakia following the Nazi occupation. He then traveled to Uppsala in Sweden, to Denmark, and to Norway before leaving for New York in 1941. He taught at the École Libre des Hautes Études, a French/Belgian university in exile, accommodated by the New School for Social Research in New York. He then taught at Columbia University (1943–1949) before becoming a professor at Harvard in 1949 and at MIT in 1957. In 1982, Jakobson died in Boston, Massachusetts.

He was a prolific author, and much of his work was dedicated to literary studies, but his role in the development of structural linguistics is also important. There have been many studies of his publications in English, in particular throughout the twentieth century, but significantly less of what he published in Russian has been examined. Most of these primary sources are now available for research.

In Moscow, Jakobson, along with the other young intellectuals, and G. O. Vinokur and P. Bogatyrev in particular, were involved in the creation of the Moscow Linguistic Circle, taking part in the debates that began to develop in the second half of the nineteenth century on Slavic philology, poetics, dialectology, and folklore in the Old Russian Empire. After the death of F. E. Korsh (1843–1915), Jakobson chaired the Moscow Linguistic Circle until his departure for Prague. Traditionally, F. F. Fortunatov's Moscow School advocated a formal, logical approach to language study. A somewhat different treatment of the same themes predominated in St. Petersburg, where the OPOIAZ – Society for the Study of Poetic Language – was created in 1916 (it ceased to exist in

1923). Jakobson was a member of OPOJAZ, along with V. Shklosky, I. Tynianov, and B. Eikhenbaum. In St. Petersburg, the 'Kazan' School of J. Baudouin de Courtenay (1845–1929) and his disciples predominated. Both the Moscow Linguistic Circle and OPOIAZ are usually referred to as the Russian Formalists. However, influential studies in language, linguistics, and literature were not limited to these two centers in the Old Russian Empire and the Soviet Union: the city of Kharkov, with its university, was fundamental, as was the legacy of O. O. Potebnia, with his disciples, in Moscow, St. Petersburg, and elsewhere, and the activities of the Historical-Philological Society (created in 1876).

After moving to Prague, Jakobson met Prince Nikolai Trubetzkoy (1890–1938) at a time when Prague was a hub of intellectual activity enabled by the intellectual climate fostered by T. G. Masaryk. Jakobson's main interests in the period continued to center on Slavic philology and literary studies. He was one of the founding members of the Prague Linguistic Circle, along with V. Mathesius (who was president until his death in 1945) and N. Trubetzkoy, S. Karchevskij, and J. Mukařovský, among others. The Prague and Copenhagen centers became known as schools of structural linguistics. The former benefited from the Jakobson's move to the United States, where he promoted the prague school.

The focus of Jakobson's writings during his Moscow and Prague periods is primarily aimed at literature, new art aesthetics, and philology (rather than linguistics), including Slavic philology, comparative philology, sound patterns and phonemics, literary language, the influence of folk literature on literature, folk songs, Futurism, aesthetics, poetics, versification, Russian and Slavonic culture and comparative mythology. It was after his arrival in the United States that Jakobson increased his output in phonology and, later, in linguistics, but he continued to describe himself as a Russian philologist.

There is still much research to be pursued on the evolution and sources of his ideas. For example, during the Moscow/Prague period, Jakobson wrote on literary themes and authors such as Trediakovsky (1915), Khlebnikov (1920, using his pen name

Figure 1 Roman Jakobson (1896–1982).

R. A. [Roman Aljagrov] and for his own poetry), Majakovskij (1931), Pushkin (1937), and Pasternak (1935).

Some of Jakobson's writings were dedicated to specific languages: Russian and its dialects, Czech, Bulgarian, and others. He also wrote on a number of linguists/philologists such as Durnovo (1926), Mathesius (1932), Shakhmatov (1920), and Peshkovskij (1933) (the latter two were disciples of O. O. Potebnia).

With P. Bogatyrev, he wrote on Slavic philology in Russia during the period of 1914–1921 (1922–1923). In the late 1920s, he produced two articles on phonetics and the phonological history of Slavonic languages. In 1931, he published a paper on the principles of historical phonology and entries on 'phoneme' and 'linguistics' for a Czech scientific dictionary in 1932 and 1935.

Jakobson was interested in identifying universals in languages, and he consequently disregarded relevant crucial differences. The idea of shared grammatical features as opposed to shared origin was part of his theory of universals. On the same basis, he postulated a development of the Slavonic verbal system (1932) based on a single stem. In 1936, he also published an article on the Russian/Slavonic case system based on the same idea. In 1938, he presented a paper on his theory of phonological affinities at the Fourth International Congress of Linguists in Copenhagen. In 1939, he wrote an article on the structure of phonemes. These pieces were the beginning of his work on phonology and linguistics.

In addition, in the 1920s and 1930s, Jakobson also had an interest in the sociology of language and national self-determination. These topics appeared in his papers in 1920–1921 and 1931. The latter year focuses on the proposed Eurasian linguistic union within the Eurasian ideological movement proposed by Russian émigrés in the 1920s and 1930s, characterized by an idiosyncratic linguistic and cultural approach.

His 1941 *Kindersprache, Aphasie und allgemeine Lautgesetze* (Jakobsen, 1971a: 328–401) has generated much research, as it suggests that there might be a universal order in the acquisition of speech sounds. His cooperation with N. Trubetskoy resulted in the furthering of the theory of distinctive features for the phonemes – the components of sounds. A phonetic feature distinguishes one phoneme from another (e.g., voiced/voiceless). The presupposition in this theory is that a set of features is applicable to distinguish phonological differences in all languages.

The concept of distinctive features, along with other concepts related to sound patterns, sound, and meaning, were expanded after Jakobson arrived in the United States. The Technical Report for the MIT Acoustics Laboratory, *Preliminaries to speech analysis* (1952) was jointly published with G. Fant and M. Halle. With Morris Halle, in 1956, in *Fundamentals of language*, the authors put forward the idea that a set of 12 binary oppositions, a bundle of 12 features, would be sufficient to give an account of all of the distinctions in all languages. The languages differ only in the manner that they combine these features. This contributed to the subsequent developments in phonological theory. For instance, A. Martinet outlined his views on Jakobson's phonology in his 'Substance phonique et traits distinctifs' (1957–1958).

Jakobson promoted the application of linguistics to literature. Some of the concepts that he used were those of iconicity, markedness, metaphor and metonymy, and communicative functions. He created a model of communicative functions based on the work of Karl Bühler and others. He argued that a shared code was not sufficient, but a context was essential in the communicative function. The components of communication are the addresser and the addressee and context, message, channel, and code. Therefore, depending on the focus of the component of communication, the functions are emotive (focuses on the addresser's attitude to his or her own message; e.g., interjections and emphatic speech), conative (focuses on the addressee; e.g., vocative), referential (refers to the context), phatic (refers to the contact/channel of communication between two speakers), metalinguistic (refers to the code itself, language about language; i.e., metalanguage), and poetic (refers to the additional component of a message apart from content). Each piece of discourse requires an analysis to identify which of the above functions predominate.

The seven volumes of Jakobson's *Selected writings* (1962–1984) offer an outline of the main areas of

Jakobson's many interests. The correspondence of Jakobson with Trubetskoi and others in the interwar period (Toman, 1994) offers interesting insights into both the circulation of ideas and the characters of the personalities.

Jakobson's acquaintance with Claude Lévi-Strauss has generated another strand of interaction and influence. The 1980 *Dialogues* with Krystyna Pomorska (his last wife) is another source. *The sound shape of language* with L. Waugh in 1986 represents another element in the history of Jakobson's thoughts. There are many publications on his life and works. Equally there is a great deal of comment about his works by Jakobson himself. Indeed, the accounts of intellectual histories in language sciences and the other areas that interested Jakobson are selective and have not been sufficiently researched. His eleven essays edited by K. Pomorska and S. Rudy (1985) *Verbal art, verbal sign, verbal time* are meant to be mainly an introduction to his works in poetics but also have relevance to his linguistic ideas.

See also: Bühler, Karl.

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Language Attitudes

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One grievous failing of Elizabeth's was her occasional pretty and picturesque use of dialect words – those terrible marks of the beast to the truly genteel.
Thomas Hardy (*The mayor of Casterbridge*, 1886)

It is impossible for an Englishman to open his mouth without making some other Englishman hate or despise him.
George Bernard Shaw (*Pygmalion*, 1912)

The operative class, whose massacre of their mother tongue, however inhuman, could excite no astonishment.
Thomas Hamilton (*Men and manners in America*, 1833)

Introduction

The most basic theme in modern social psychology is the importance of perception. We do not react to the world on the basis of sensory input but, rather, in terms of what we perceive that input to mean. This is the foundation of all our social constructions, of all our individual and group relationships, and it is a foundation that reflects – in ongoing fashion – our accumulated social knowledge. Perception is the filter through which sensory data are strained, and the establishment and maintenance of this filter is culturally specific and – within social groupings – individualized to a greater or lesser extent. For example, because every individual has accumulated a unique set of experiences, each set of perceptual spectacles is itself special to some extent. At the same time, there are many social perceptions that group members hold in common: at one level, we can think of these as stereotypes, at another as culture itself. At a group level, the most important feature has to do with the acceptance of shared understanding. In a great many instances, this is the only sort of understanding to which we have access, and we sometimes fall prey to the idea that **our** understanding is, in fact, the only sort possible. Nonetheless, we are aware

(occasionally, at least) of the relative nature of social knowledge when we realize that others do not sort out their world in quite the same way as we do.

Perceptions operate in societies, most of which are stratified in various ways and in which – to put things bluntly – power and status are often able to translate social difference into social deficiency. Because language is one of the traditionally important social markers, it is not surprising that the study of attitudes has a central position in the social psychology of language. Nor is it surprising that the results of this study shed some light on the generalities just mentioned. It is easy, for example, to demonstrate that great variation exists in terms of people's reactions to (or evaluations of) different accents and dialects. The question, of course, is what to make of this variation.

The Basis of Judgment

Social preferences and prejudices concerning language varieties are long-standing and of continuing potency. This is because views of language correspond to views of the social status of language users; in this sense, language (or dialect or accent) provides simple labels which evoke social stereotypes that go far beyond language itself.

We can begin here by observing that even dictionary definitions of dialect and accent help to sustain the view that nonstandard language is less correct language. The *Oxford English Dictionary* (*OED*), for example, notes that dialect may be considered as "one of the subordinate forms or varieties of a language arising from local peculiarities of vocabulary, pronunciation, and idiom." This definition is implicitly held by those for whom the term 'dialect' conjures up an image of some rustic, regional speech pattern; for such people, the 'standard' variety (see below) is not really a dialect at all; rather, they consider it as the 'correct' form from which all others diverge. On accent, the *OED* is not much better; it is, we find, a mode of utterance which 'consists mainly in a prevailing quality of tone, or in a peculiar

alteration of pitch, but may include mispronunciation of vowels or consonants, misplacing of stress, and misinflection of a sentence.'

But what is the basis for language attitudes and judgments? Three broad possibilities suggest themselves.

Intrinsic Difference

One possibility is that language attitudes reflect intrinsic differences across and within language varieties themselves. That is, the reason for variety A being evaluated so much more favorably than variety B is simply that A is a linguistically superior form. Although this is a view that has had considerable historical support, and while it remains common at a popular level in virtually all linguistically stratified societies, linguists have convincingly demonstrated that to see languages or dialects in terms of innate superiority or inferiority is to profoundly misunderstand the nature of human language itself:

> just as there is no linguistic reason for arguing that Gaelic is superior to Chinese, so no English dialect can be claimed to be linguistically superior or inferior to any other … There is no linguistic evidence whatsoever for suggesting that one dialect is more 'expressive' or 'logical' than any other, or for postulating that there are any 'primitive', 'inadequate' or 'debased' English dialects. (Trudgill, 1975: 26)

A very good demonstration of this was provided by William Labov (Labov, 1976). He studied Black English (in the United States), which makes an excellent test case for dialect validity since it had for so long been rejected by the white middle class, and since its speakers were victims of a prejudice that went well beyond language alone. If it could be shown that Black English was not some debased variety, this would go some way towards establishing linguistic integrity for all dialect varieties.

There were three strands to Labov's work. First, he justly criticized earlier studies which had elicited Black English from youngsters through interview techniques which were both unfamiliar and intimidating; these were hardly likely, he noted, to produce normal, conversational samples. Second, Labov reminded us of what casual observers had known for a very long time – the Black community is verbally rich and, like other 'oral' cultures worldwide, supports and rewards those who are particularly linguistically gifted. Third, and most important of all, Labov demonstrated the regular, rule-governed nature of Black English. Rules are of course an essential feature of language, and if it were possible to demonstrate formal grammatical regulation within Black English – not necessarily identical, of course, to regulation in other dialects – then charges of inaccuracy and

sloppiness would become groundless, and it could not be dismissed as some 'approximation' to 'proper' English.

As an example, here is one of the rules Labov described for Black English, a practice called 'copula deletion.' In a sentence such as *she the first one started us off*, the *is* is not present. Does this mean that the Black speaker who uttered it is unaware of this verb form? Well, consider another sentence taken from a Black corpus: *I was small then* – here, the past tense of the verb 'to be' appears. Why should it figure in this sentence but not in the former one? Labov's work revealed the regularity governing this linguistic behavior: in contexts in which the standard variety permits verbal contraction (e.g., *they are going* can become *they're going*), Black English allows deletion (e.g., *they are going* can become *they going*). We have, therefore, a rule – slightly different from the one obtaining in the standard, but no less logical. The regularity is further evidenced by the fact that, in contexts in which the standard does not allow contraction, there is no Black English deletion: *he's as nice as he say he's* is patently incorrect according to the rules of the standard variety, which outlaws contraction in the final position. In like fashion, it is incorrect to say *he's as nice as he says he* in Black English.

The import of this sort of work is clear: there are no substandard language varieties. There are standard dialects in many languages, and so it logically follows that all others must be nonstandard – but this latter term is not pejorative in any technical linguistic sense. A standard dialect is, roughly, that spoken by educated people, and it is the form usually found in writing. Its position derives from history and from the social standing of its speakers. If York instead of London had become the center of English power, for instance, then the traditional BBC newsreader would sound quite different, and schoolteachers would be promoting another form of 'correct' English in the classroom.

Aesthetic Difference

Another possibility might be that language varieties – although not to be seen (grammatically or 'logically') in terms of 'better' or 'worse' – do actually vary in their aesthetic qualities. Perhaps, then, more favorable attitudes might attach to those varieties that sound better, or more mellifluous, or more musical. Many years ago, for instance, standard English was defended as 'one of the most subtle and most beautiful of all expressions of the human spirit' (Chapman, 1932: 562) and, a little later, Henry Wyld, a linguist at the University of Liverpool, wrote:

> If it were possible to compare systematically every vowel sound in RS [Received Standard English – i.e., what we

now more usually call RP, Received Pronunciation] with the corresponding sound in a number of provincial and other dialects, assuming that the comparison could be made, as is only fair, between speakers who possessed equal qualities of voice, and the knowledge how to use it, I believe no unbiased listener would hesitate in preferring RS as the most pleasing and sonorous form, and the best suited to be the medium of poetry and oratory. (Wyld, 1934: 610)

I need hardly say that such sentiments were (and are still, of course) not restricted to those speaking in and for English. Can we put to the test, however, the belief that dialect A is more aesthetically pleasing than dialect B?

Recent studies have compared an 'inherent value' hypothesis here with an 'imposed norm' one. The former term suggests, as Wyld did, that aesthetic qualities are intrinsic, while the latter holds that they are attached or imposed by the listener, who, in hearing a standard (for instance), considers it mellifluous because of the status of its speakers. In one investigation, Welsh adults listened to European French, educated Canadian French and working-class Canadian French voices. Asked to rate the pleasantness and prestige of the voices, the judges – who were virtually ignorant of French – did not single out any of the three varieties. Earlier studies had shown, however, a clear aesthetic preference among French speakers for European French. In another experiment, British undergraduates who knew no Greek evaluated the aesthetic quality of two Greek dialects, the Athenian and the Cretan: the former is the prestige standard form, while the latter is a nonstandard variant of generally low status. As in the French study, no significant differences between the two dialects were found. If anything, there was a slight tendency for these British students to rate the Cretan variety as more pleasant and prestigious than the Athenian (Giles *et al.*, 1974, 1979).

The important element in these demonstrations is that the judges were unaware of the social connotations possessed by the different varieties in their own speech communities. The implication is that, if one removes (experimentally) the social stereotypes usually associated with given varieties, aesthetic judgments will not be made which favor the high-status standards. Anyone who watches a film or a play in which (for example) a woman dressed as a duchess speaks with a Cockney accent can appreciate the point here: someone in the audience who had an understanding of English, but not of more subtle intralinguistic variation and convention, would miss a great deal of the comedic effect. The norms here are imposed by those in the know, and the stereotypes which link beauty, or harshness, or

comedy to a particular set of sounds are unavailable to others. (None of this, I hasten to add, rules out purely individual preferences: I may think Italian is the most beautiful language, you may believe that Gaelic is unrivalled – but we can agree to differ on a matter of subjectivity.)

Social Perception

We now turn to a third possibility, which – because we have eliminated the first two – becomes the most likely: the variant evaluations found in the social laboratory and on the street reflect perceptions of the **speakers** of given varieties; any qualities – 'logical' or aesthetic – of the varieties themselves are, at best, of very secondary importance. Thus, listening to a given variety acts as a trigger or a stimulus that evokes attitudes (or prejudices, or stereotypes) about the community to which the speaker is thought to belong.

A general moral here seems to be this: when social stratification is associated with linguistic variation, the variety used by those with social clout will commonly be perceived as (grammatically, lexically, or phonologically) superior to nonstandard forms. There are two exceptions to this rule, and they occur at opposite ends of the status continuum. First, extremely high-status varieties may seem affected and generally over the top. Second, there is a 'covert prestige' possessed by working-class speech, with its positive associations of masculinity. Research has found that both working-class and middle-class males claimed to use nonstandard forms even when they did not customarily do so (Edwards, 1989; Trudgill, 1983). The actual use of such forms, by generally standard-speaking individuals, is most likely when the speaker wants to appear forceful, direct, and unambiguous. An example: a friend of mine, a middle-aged, upper-middle-class American university professor (male), was being pressed by colleagues (also male) on a departmental matter. Finally, he ended a rambling and inconclusive discussion – one that had unfolded according to the norms of standard, educated American English – by smiling broadly and saying, "Listen, boys, you **know** the' ain't no way I can do it." All-male social gatherings, as at least half the readers will know, often produce such examples.

Variation in Social Attitudes

If we reject linguistic and aesthetic arguments as the real underpinnings of variations in language (and speaker) evaluation, we have only cleared away some annoying underbrush. It is very useful to know that the basis for language evaluation rests upon

social convention, but we must make more detailed inquiries about the assessment of language varieties. We come then, to language attitudes *per se*.

While many regional or class dialects are perceived unfavorably, there is more than a simple dichotomy between good (standard) and bad (nonstandard). Urban speech patterns (such as, in Britain, those of Birmingham, Glasgow, and Liverpool) are generally seen as more unpleasant than are rural varieties (Devon English, for instance). Again, the basic explanation rests upon social connotation: for many, rural areas have a charm that is absent in heavily urbanized, industrialized centers. So rural dialects, although not as prestigious as the standard, may be viewed more favorably than urban varieties (which are often tied more closely to class differences, as well) (Wilkinson, 1965; Trudgill, 1975).

Wyld (above) hinted at an important problem in the comparison of language varieties. If I wish to find out which of two dialects is the more pleasant (for example), and if I therefore record a speaker of each and have the voices judged by listeners, to what can I reasonably attribute any differential ratings that may be found? Are they due to features of the dialects themselves? Might they not also be reactions to purely individual qualities of voice – tone, pitch, rhythm, pace, and so on? A way around this difficulty was devised in the 1960s by Wallace Lambert. In his 'matched guise' method, judges evaluate a tape-recorded speaker's personality after hearing him or her read the same passage in each of two or more languages, dialects, or accents. The fact that the speaker is, for all 'guises,' the same person is not revealed to the judges (who typically do not guess this). Any variations in the judges' ratings can then be considered as reflections of their stereotyped reactions to the different language varieties, since potentially confounding individual variables are of course constant across guises (see Lambert *et al.*, 1960; Edwards, 1989).

A large number of studies have shown that evaluations of different varieties vary in nonrandom ways. Thus, standard accents and dialects usually connote high status and competence; regional, 'ethnic,' and lower-class varieties are typically associated with greater speaker integrity and attractiveness. Ellen Bouchard Ryan and her colleagues (Ryan *et al.*, 1982, 1984) have attempted to summarize the many language attitude studies by providing an "organizational framework." They suggest that there are two determinants of language perceptions: standardization and vitality. The important point about the standard here is that it is a variety whose norms have been codified and have become associated with social dominance. Vitality refers to the number and importance of functions served, and is clearly bolstered by the status which standards possess; it can also be a feature, however, of nonstandard varieties, given sufficient numbers of speakers and community support. Furthermore, two particularly salient evaluational categories account for most of the variance: social status (which is more or less equivalent to competence) and solidarity (roughly combining integrity and attractiveness) (see Edwards, 1992).

These findings are interesting for several reasons, but the single most important factor is their stereotypical nature: people are evaluated in terms of characteristics that, in a broad-brush sort of way, reflect perceptions of the group to which they are seen to belong. The implication is obvious: **individuals** – with all their personal strengths and weaknesses – are viewed in stereotypical **group** terms. Studies have suggested that at school, in the workplace, in counselor–client relations, and so on, negative stereotypes can create problems. (It is also worth remembering here that stereotyping can operate in the opposite direction, too – those with the socially 'right' attributes may have their progress unfairly expedited.)

Difference, Deficit … and Solidarity

In the Classroom

More than three decades ago, John Gumperz and Eduardo Hernández-Chavez made the following observation: "Regardless of overtly expressed attitudes … teachers are quite likely to be influenced by what they perceive as deviant speech … thus potentially inhibiting the students' desire to learn" (Gumperz and Hernández-Chavez, 1972: 105). Obviously, like other members of society, teachers have language attitudes, and it is not surprising to find that, on the whole, they have downgraded nonstandard varieties and, by extension, the capabilities of their speakers. Trudgill (1975: 63) noted, for example, that teachers were not averse to telling (some of) their pupils that their speech was "wrong … bad … careless … sloppy … slovenly … vulgar … gibberish." A study conducted in Nova Scotia (Edwards and McKinnon, 1987: 335) found similar teacher attitudes: one said that poor children were unable to "articulate their thoughts"; another observed that "Blacks have a slang language all their own – they will not use proper English when the opportunity arises."

Teachers' points of view are, in one sense, merely a particular illustration of a much broader relationship between linguistic variation and social attitudes.

But in another sense, their beliefs are special – for the obvious reason that negative evaluations of children's speech styles may lead to real problems, in the classroom and beyond it. It is a cruel irony that socially disadvantaged children, who clearly struggle under all sorts of very real burdens, should be weighed down still more by evaluations of the inadequacies of their language – when these evaluations are typically based upon inaccurate assumptions. The negative reactions to their speech patterns do, however, reveal how hollow a purely academic sense of 'inaccurate assumptions' can be, in a world where attitudes can transform difference into deficit.

'At Home'

Given the strength and pervasiveness of language attitudes, there are strong tendencies for speakers of nonstandard varieties to accept, themselves, the evaluations of others (the so-called minority group reaction is an example here; see Lambert *et al.*, 1960). While the sense that one's own speech is not very 'good' may be a common phenomenon, it is nonetheless a disturbing one – as the description above of the educational arena makes clear. Thus, Halliday (1968: 165) noted that

> a speaker who is made ashamed of his own language habits suffers a basic injury as a human being; to make anyone . . . feel so ashamed is as indefensible as to make him feel ashamed of the colour of his skin.

Beyond the obvious recommendations for greater linguistic awareness and sensitivity, one might also ask just why low-status speech varieties continue to exist. If they are generally considered inferior, why wouldn't speakers try to eradicate them? Why wouldn't language or dialect shift be a more popular option? Nonstandard speakers are hardly without adequate models for language alteration, after all. Nowadays, more than ever before, the ubiquity of the broadcast media means that virtually all have at least a passive awareness of standard forms (and research has shown how easy it can be for this to be translated into a more active quantity) (Edwards, 1989). Indeed, many years ago it was predicted that a leveling of variant speech styles would be the inevitable consequence of the wired world. But it seems not to have happened.

We have to bear in mind here that the solidarity function of **any** common language is powerful; even a low-prestige variety can act as a bonding agent, reinforcing group identity (see the focused discussion in Ryan, 1979). Group identity and its (linguistic and other) markers are known quantities and, in that sense, 'safe'; on the other hand, attempts to alter speech styles may be risky. Failure may lead

to marginalization – a sense of not being a full member of any social group. Even success may prove too costly. A Mexican American who abandoned Spanish was labeled a *vendido* (Carranza and Ryan, 1975), a 'sell-out,' a defector to the other side. A French Canadian in analogous circumstances was a *vendu*. Cockney grandparents once told their grandchildren that, if they tried to speak in a 'la-di-da' accent, their mates would call them 'queer' (Bragg and Ellis, 1976). Whatever the current status of these well-known if somewhat dated cases, it is clear that the principle remains powerful. Finally here, nonstandard speakers may also refrain from attempting to alter their language patterns if the exercise is considered to be pointless – as it may be seen to be for those who are members of visible minority groups, for instance. If reactions to Black English are reflections of social evaluations of Black speakers, then learning and using some more standard form may be a waste of time. The social difficulties faced by Blacks occur largely because they are black, not because they do not use standard English (consider, for example, that there are many nonstandard-speaking Whites in comfortable circumstances).

Language Attitudes and Language Acquisition

One important aspect of attitude study has been its connection with the learning of second (and subsequent) languages. Positive attitudes, it is generally thought, are likely to facilitate second language acquisition, although it is realized that variations in the context and the perceived functions of the new medium are also important. Indeed, this has very much been the received wisdom, and there is a large literature on attitude and motivation in language learning. John Macnamara, however, appeared to take an opposing view, asserting that attitudes were of little importance in language learning (Macnamara, 1973). His argument is worthy of some attention here, since it leads to some finer-grained attention to language attitudes generally (see also Edwards, 1995).

Macnamara noted that necessity may overpower attitude – and this is clearly true. The adoption of English by the Irish, for instance, was a shift not generally accompanied by favorable attitudes; indeed, most historical changes in language use owe much more to socioeconomic and political pressures than they do to attitudes *per se*. But perhaps attitudes of a sort – instrumental attitudes – do play a part in language shift. A mid-19th-century Irishman may have hated English and what it represented, while still acknowledging the necessity and long-term

usefulness of the language. A pragmatic or 'instrumental' motivation need not imply the deeper, 'integrative' motives so dear to the hearts of teachers keen on introducing their charges to new languages **and** new cultures. Similarly, there may be a useful distinction here between positive and favorable attitude; to remain with the Irish example, we might say that the attitudes towards the learning of English were positive and instrumental, but not necessarily favorable or integrative. (It must be acknowledged, of course, that instrumental–integrative and positive–favorable distinctions may change or disappear as language shift develops.)

Macnamara went on to contend that pupils' language-learning attitudes at school were also relatively unimportant. Language in the classroom, he said, was typically an unreal and artificial business, with communication subordinated to narrow academic concerns that fail to engage children's interest. It is this situation, and not pupils' attitudes, that underlies the traditionally poor results of school language programs.

Now, it is undoubtedly true that a great failing in language classrooms has been the absence of realistic usage, but I do not think that this implies that attitudes are of small importance. The argument that the classroom is artificial is essentially a condemnation of approaches and practices, and does not of itself indicate that attitudes are trivial. In fact, attitudes may be of considerable importance precisely because of 'artificiality' – i.e., where a context is **not** perceived as pertinent to real life, or is **not** seen to be necessary, attitudes may make a real difference. The importance of favorable attitudes, then, may vary inversely with real linguistic necessity (Edwards, 2001).

Details and Directions

Within social psychology, 'attitude' is a disposition to react favorably or unfavorably, a disposition with three components: feelings (the affective element), thoughts (the cognitive element), and a resultant tendency to action (the behavioral element). One knows or believes something, has some emotional reaction to it, and then does something about it. Two points, however, should be made.

There is often considerable inconsistency between attitudes and actions. In a classic study, a Chinese couple (accompanied by the experimenter) toured the United States in the early 1930s. Visiting about 250 hotels and restaurants, they were refused service only once; however, when the investigator later wrote to the places visited, he found that more than 90% said they would not serve Chinese people (LaPiere, 1934). There are, of course, many possible

reasons for this finding: immediate self-interest, a desire to avoid embarrassment, a difference between reactions to an ethnic group abstraction and assessments in concrete instances, and so on. But the inconsistency remains.

The other point is that there is often confusion between attitude and belief – a confusion particularly noticeable within the language attitude literature. For example, the answer to a questionnaire item such as 'Is a knowledge of French important for your children, yes or no?' reflects a belief. To gauge attitude would require further probing into respondents' feelings about the expressed belief. It would clearly be incorrect to assume that the answer 'yes' implied a favorable attitude: the informant could grudgingly accept that French was important for career success, while loathing both the language and its culture.

More attention to these distinctions – apart from simply improving accuracy – might be salutary in terms of understanding why evaluations take the forms they do. Given that unfavorable reactions to nonstandard varieties have typically been discussed in terms of status or prestige differentials, for instance, it could be useful to confirm this, from the respondents' point of view, by asking them the bases for their evaluations. Such an exercise might be of special interest since – as has been mentioned above – nonstandard varieties elicit positive ratings along some dimensions. It is surely reasonable, after all, to gather as much information as we can from the actual participants in language studies, as well as imposing more purely theoretical interpretations upon their responses (Edwards, 1995).

Language attitude study should perhaps be prepared to expand its scope. Various methodologies have produced a sizable body of evidence bearing on social perceptions, stereotypes, and language attitudes. We can now predict with some confidence what sorts of reactions are likely when people hear varieties of (for instance) Black English, Newfoundland English, Cockney, Received Pronunciation, Boston English, and many others; we can also make predictions about those 'ethnic' varieties produced by nonnative speakers of English that show the influence of the first language. We understand, at a general level, how these reactions come about, via the linguistic 'triggering' already noted, and how they reflect a set of attitudes (or beliefs) – often of stereotypical nature – that listeners have of speakers. Investigators have not, however, gone very much beyond fairly gross explanations; that is, they have typically not related speech evaluations to particular speech attributes. Thus, although hundreds of experiments have revealed negative reactions towards Black English,

we have virtually no information relating specific linguistic attributes of that variety to such reactions – attributes that might include pronunciation patterns, particular grammatical constructions, or the use of dialect-specific lexical items (or, of course, any combination of these) (Edwards, 1999).

Some moves have already been made in this direction. For example, in 1982, Howard Giles and Ellen Bouchard Ryan issued a call for "more detailed linguistic and acoustic descriptions of the stimulus voices as well as examining the relative evaluative salience of these particulars for different types of listeners" (Giles and Ryan, 1982: 210). A related, although not so pointed, observation was made by Edwards, in calling for fuller probing of the reasons behind the evaluative decisions made by informants (Edwards, 1982; see also above). In general, though, social psychologists have done little in the way of isolating linguistic and acoustic variables and relating them to evaluative judgments. Such work has simply not been their métier.

It is in linguistic research that we find descriptions of features that characterize and differentiate language varieties. In recent years, a considerable amount of work has been done here; for example, linguists (including Laver and Trudgill, 1979 – in a book on social markers that remains a valuable reference) have pointed out such phenomena as:

1. the nasality habitually associated with some (RP, for example) but not all varieties of English;
2. the wide dialectal variations in consonant pronunciation: thus, RP speakers pronounce *lock* and *loch* more or less identically, with a final /k/, but (some) Scottish pronunciations involve final /x/. Another example: in British English, pronouncing the postvocalic /r/ in words like *cart* and *mar* is inversely related to social-class status, whereas in some varieties of American English (e.g., New York English) a positive correlation exists between /r/ pronunciation and status;
3. grammatical variation: copula deletion in American Black English, for example (as we have seen, above);
4. lexical differences: some English speakers *brew* their tea, some *mash* it, some let it *steep,* some let it *set,* and so on.

If, however, linguists have been the ones to describe such variation, they have either been relatively uninterested in its relation to variations in social evaluations, or have simply assumed that the more obvious and salient linguistic markers are the triggers for differentiated ratings. Like social psychologists, linguists too have generally stuck to their lasts – although a recent and most welcome collection (Milroy and Preston, 1999) deals explicitly with linkages between linguistic features and attitudes.

Conclusions

There are many important aspects of language attitudes and their ramifications that it has not been possible to attend to in this brief overview. One has to do with the relationship between language and gender. The 'covert prestige' briefly noted above, for instance, is essentially a male phenomenon – the positive connotations of nonstandard speech are not typically found among women; indeed, where middle-class male informants may report more nonstandard usage than is actually the case, female respondents overreport standard dialect usage. A large literature suggests, generally, that women are often more linguistically conservative than are men, that they produce 'politer' and more 'correct' speech, that there are significant gender differences in lexicon and function, and so on. All of these features are influenced by, and reflected in, language attitudes (see Coates, 1993 for a good overview).

Another important area with a burgeoning literature has to do with the accommodations made by speakers in different contexts and with different interlocutors. Linguistic accommodation can take many forms but, whether it operates at or below the level of conscious awareness, its fundamental feature is the modification of speech patterns to converge with, or diverge from, those of others. Accommodation can reflect individual concerns – wanting to sound more like the boss, or intentionally departing from the usage of someone you dislike – or group ones: you may wish to emphasize your 'in-group' membership, or to solidify an ethnic or class boundary. Once again, attitudes clearly underpin practices (for an overview here, see Giles and Coupland, 1991; Robinson and Giles, 2001).

What I have tried to deal with in this article is some of the central themes in the area, some of the scaffoldings on which other aspects rest. They include the following:

1. some basic definitional and terminological matters: it is always important to be clear about terms and meanings, and especially so when – in areas such as this – the terms have broad popular connotations as well as more narrowly academic ones;
2. the bases upon which linguistic judgments are made: most people still believe that intrinsic qualities of language varieties can reasonably underpin rankings of 'better' and 'worse.' The persistence of this belief is disappointing, to say the least, especially in educational circles;

3. the manner in which linguistic difference is typically translated into linguistic deficit: it is evident that, linguistic enlightenment notwithstanding, society continues to deal rather bluntly with variation – and, if most consider a difference to be a deficit, then it becomes one;

4. the ways in which linguistically stigmatized individuals and groups come to accept the judgments made of them by 'outsiders': this is an extension of the previous point, insofar as it is a potent reflection of the power of social pressure;

5. the reasons behind the persistence of low-prestige varieties: given the potency of social pressure and prejudice, it is interesting that group solidarity, on the one hand, and fear of personal marginalization, on the other, are sufficient to maintain stigmatized varieties;

6. the evaluative dimensions and categories that seem to be employed when ranking different language varieties: the regularity with which a few basic categories (such as 'competence,' 'integrity,' and 'reliability') appear across a very wide range of studies is one of the most robust features in language study;

7. language attitudes in contexts of learning and shift: questions of how, and to what extent, attitudes and motivations are important in situations of change – or potential change – throw light upon both the attitudes and the contexts;

8. the need for greater interdisciplinarity in what are sometimes called, hopefully, the 'language sciences': a common criticism of modern social psychology involves its allegedly disembodied character – further and deeper attention to language, and language attitudes, would at once redress academic oversight and inevitably abet interdisciplinary linkages that would, in turn, reduce decontextualization.

See also: Communities of Practice; Interactional Sociolinguistics; Minorities and Language; Multiculturalism and Language; Social Class and Status; Speech Accommodation Theory and Audience Design.

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Language Change and Cultural Change

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Human languages are inherently variable and dynamic, and their shifting shapes are constrained by diverse factors. Culture, defined as those human projects which endow the raw materials of our world – including the stuff of language – with meaning, must be among these. But to explore relationships between language change and cultural change requires appreciation of the immense complexity of cultural mediation, and linguistic analysis at a high level of detail and delicacy.

Several basic observations are required prior to developing this theme. First, 'languages' do not map isomorphically onto 'cultures.' From this obvious fact it is immediately clear that the relationship between language change and cultural change will not be straightforward. Mutually intelligible varieties of large regional and world languages are found among people involved in very diverse ways of life. Mutually intelligible varieties of Spanish are spoken by peasants in Mexico and philosophers in Madrid. Conversely, people who share very similar ways of life may speak several different languages. The Pueblo Indians of the southwest United States constitute a highly coherent and relatively homogeneous culture area, with a long history of contact and exchange among their communities, but speak at least five mutually unintelligible languages belonging to three different language families, plus one isolate. Local language ideologies work to minimize convergence among these languages (Kroskrity, 1993).

Second, resonances between language change and cultural change tend to be quite local. Linguists correctly greet global generalizations with profound suspicion. For instance, there is no universal correlation between the elaboration of sexism and gender-based discrimination in a society and the grammaticalization of gender in its language or languages. In an exceptionally careful study of this question, Chafe (2002) explored the relationship between gender roles and the grammar of gender in Northern Iroquoian. In several languages of the group, a set of masculine pronominals distinguishes singular and plural forms and subject and object case. A feminine gender pronominal has developed from an original 'nonspecific' pronoun, and in the nonsingular is not distinguished from neuter gender. Chafe argued that contrastive elaboration of masculine gender versus feminine gender pronominals, which occurred about a thousand years ago, is in resonance with the prominence given to males in many Northern Iroquoian cultural scenarios (although Northern Iroquoian societies are matrilineal). However, he noted that such male prominence is extremely common in human communities, yet most languages do not show the same kind of differential elaboration of gender marking. For this reason, he preferred to speak of a cultural 'motivation' for the pattern, rather than of a cultural 'cause.'

In the Northern Iroquoian example, the structure of the pronominal system is unlikely to be prior to, and motivating of, the prominence of male roles. Instead, male prominence motivated the elaboration of the masculine pronouns. The diverse developments of noun classification through plural marking in the Uto-Aztecan languages (Hill and Hill, 1997) provide another case of the cultural motivation of linguistic patterning, in this case a loss of elaboration. In Proto-Uto-Aztecan, reduplicated plurals marked a class of human nouns, as against other nouns pluralized with suffixes. In two descendant language groups, the O'odham or Upper Piman languages and Hopi, the marked class has been extended beyond human nouns to classify for 'protrusion' and 'intrusion.' In Tohono O'odham (a Uto-Aztecan language of Arizona), spoken in a community that observed patrilineal descent, lineage exogamy, and patrilocal residence, the marked plural class includes kinship terms for women and kin linked to ego by women, but not kinship terms for men. This resonates with local understandings, expressed in legends, that inmarrying women stand as marked outsiders to the patrilineal

kin group. In contrast, in Hopi, with matrilineal descent and matrilocal residence, the only marked plural kin terms are the words for 'bride, inmarrying woman' (an outsider from the point of view of the husband's matrilineage) and 'husband, inmarrying man' (an outsider from the point of view of the wife's matrilineage). That is, the metaphor of 'outsiderness' functions in the noun classification system in the kin terms of both languages, but is greatly restricted in Hopi, consistent with the understanding there that descent through females constitutes the core social unit, the matrilineage. It seems most unlikely that patterning in the pluralization of kin terms would shape social organization, but quite reasonable that understandings of social organization would motivate the use of marked versus unmarked plural forms.

The loss in English of the distinction, otherwise nearly universal in European languages, between a polite/distant and an intimate/solidary second-person pronoun provides another example of such culturally motivated language change. Most scholars believe that the English T-pronouns, the intimate/solidary second person forms *thou*, *thee*, *thy*, *thine* were lost in ordinary usage in the late 17th century in reaction to the linguistic practices of a dissident religious sect, the Society of Friends or Quakers. Friends, consistent with their belief in the equality of all human beings before God, refused to use the V-pronouns that signaled social distance and deference. This practice was scandalous in a society where a regard for hierarchy was hegemonic and the use of a T-pronoun could constitute insult or even illegal *lèse majesté* that might lead to imprisonment. Rather than risk being taken for a Quaker, other speakers displayed their commitment to hierarchy and propriety by generalizing the V-pronouns even to contexts that had hitherto called for the use of the T-form without any presupposition of insult or disrespect. Regardless of whether the role of Quaker innovation has been properly understood, it seems likely that cultural ambivalences and ambiguities about hierarchy in the emergence of modernity shaped the gradual loss of the T/V distinction in English, rather than that the loss of the T/V distinction motivated a reorganization of British social order.

Benjamin Whorf, often misunderstood as a linguistic determinist, outlined in his most significant paper (Whorf, 1956) a dialectical interaction between language change and cultural change that attempted to account for examples like those above. Silverstein (1976, 1979, 1996) has proposed a contemporary semiotic refinement of Whorf's ideas. He argues that general semiotic principles underlie the development of such resonances between language change and culture change. These principles produce a 'dialectic of indexicality' which drives analogical change. First, speakers project referential functions on to indexical functions and 'objectify' these. In the case of the English (and other European language) pronouns reviewed above, Silverstein suggests the following chain of analogies. The third-person pronouns exhibit apparent referential distinctions of number and gender, which are taken by speakers to refer properly to things in the world – although these 'things' achieve their 'naturalized' status, of course, precisely through linguistic practice and specifically through indexicality. But speakers come to see this indexical projection as 'reference.' By analogy, the social hierarchy distinctions of the T/V contrast in the second-person pronouns, which are technically indexical, can be taken by speakers to be referential as well. Thus to English speakers the social world came to be seen as consisting of individuals possessing an inherent property of meriting deference, parallel to inherent properties of gender, or of singularity versus plurality. Such analogical reasoning permits speakers to manage social anxieties (Inoue, 2004), by trying to bring usage rigidly into line with an understanding of the world that has precisely been projected from language in the first place. Such 'iconizing' (Gal and Irvine, 1995) projects do not always succeed in taking a language change to completion, but it is clear that the constant interplay of indexical orders (Silverstein, 1996), motivated by specific cultural anxieties and ambivalences that must be ever present in human communities, constitutes a powerful force for language change.

Among the kinds of change that can be driven by the 'dialectic of indexicality' is the formation and spread of styles and registers. An excellent example is the shift in American English in the stylistic features thought to be appropriate to the talk and text of ministers, political orators, and the like in their public roles. Cmiel (1990) has shown that an explicit ideology of egalitarianism emerging through the end of the 18th and the first half of the 19th centuries led to the development of the so-called middling style for elevated language. In the middling style ordinary vernacular words and short sentences came to be favored. This process of reshaping public language as an icon of the American egalitarian imaginary continues to develop. The grammar and lexicon of documents such as the Declaration of Independence and the U.S. Constitution strike many 21st-century Americans as forbiddingly elevated and elite. Even liturgical language has been simplified: new translations of the Christian Bible are in strikingly everyday language, and ministers of the gospel experiment with vernacular forms (as in the famous case of Cornell West, a minister and professor at Harvard University, who

recorded a compact disk of raps, a genre that originated in African-American street culture). Highly placed American politicians can use quite vulgar language, even in elevated public contexts, without facing censure – indeed, such language may bring approbation. It marks them not only as ordinary people with a commitment to egalitarianism, but as plain-speaking 'straight shooters.' It is perhaps not surprising that the tendency toward 'plain speech' in public forums has reached new heights (or depths) at precisely a period when increasing political-economic inequality has made many Americans anxious about the status of egalitarianism, a continuing ultimate value in U.S. society.

Language Change and Sociocultural Evolution

The work briefly reviewed above examines very fine-grained linguistic changes motivated by ideological processes in local speech communities. However, linkages between more general tendencies of language change and cultural change have often been proposed. Widely accepted through the early 20th century was the theory that human language exhibited a hierarchy of evolutionary grades, from 'primitive' to 'civilized,' that correlated with the grades of the theory of cultural evolution. While linguists today almost universally reject such ideas, evolutionary thinking continues to have a place in theories of the relationship between language change and culture change, and deserves brief attention.

Certain limited features of human languages may be loosely correlated with subsistence type and social complexity. These include plant and animal terminologies. For instance, Brown (1984) argued that the number of life-form terms for plants (*tree*, *bush*, *herb*, *grass*, *vine*, etc.) is correlated with increasing social complexity. Brown also suggested that cultivators have many more folk generic terms for plants than do hunter-gatherers, and also use more binomial species labels. While other studies have supported these results (e.g., Balée, 1994), they should be interpreted with caution. Balée has pointed out that the difference in the number of generics for plants between cultivators who speak Ka'apor (Urubú-Kaapor) and hunter-gatherers who speak Guajá, another Tupi-Guaraní language closely related to Ka'apor, is due partly to the fact that the Ka'apor simply have more uses for plants; they use implements made from plants to process other plants, and their sedentism permits an elaborate material culture. Furthermore, Hunn (2001) has pointed out that in Oaxaca, vernacular speakers of Spanish, an expanding world language, have far simpler repertoires of biosystematic terminology than do speakers of small local Zapotecan languages, in spite of the fact that Spanish has been spoken in the area for 500 years. Berlin and Kay (1969) held that elaboration of color terminologies was correlated with level of sociocultural evolution. But MacLaury (1991) showed in a study of Mayan-language speakers in Chiapas that the elaboration of color terminology could exhibit vast differences among speakers of a single language, and seemed to depend more on the specific life circumstances of individuals, especially on how much people were forced to engage with novelty, than on any broad correlation between language and sociocultural evolution. Thus terminological elaboration in the biosystematic and color lexicons appears to be largely correlated with the elaboration of attention and use, a matter that is not surprising in any way and that can be accounted for within Silverstein's model outlined above, without appeal to evolution theory.

The concept of natural selection, taken from Darwinian theory, has been invoked by modern linguists to account for the relationship between language change and cultural change. Hymes (1968) suggested that the current reduction of world linguistic diversity, caused by the expansion of 'world' languages at the expense of 'full' languages, results from a selective process in which world languages are better adapted to certain emerging communicative functions, and thus replace full languages. Croft (2000) and Mufwene (2001) have suggested that linguistic elements within inherently variable assemblages (which Mufwene has characterized as 'Lamarckian species') – phonetic realizations, construction types, semantic features, and the like – can be seen, like genetic alleles, as targets of natural selection. Cultural context, among other variables, yields selective pressures, and the relative frequency of particular realizations of linguistic elements will reflect these. The development of Haitian Creole (Haitian Creole French) from French has been treated within this model. During the early 'settler' period, when slaves lived intimately with their French masters on small landholdings, they acquired a version of vernacular French that, while it was a second language, was not greatly dissimilar from the French spoken by the native speakers from whom they learned it. The shift to plantation agriculture, however, swamped out these early second-language varieties of French. Increasingly large populations of newly imported African slaves had less and less access to French models. Themselves learning the language from other second-language speakers, they favored the least marked French constructions and constructions derived from African sources over the

varieties used by the earlier African settlers of Haiti. This process yielded the basilectal creole varieties attested in Haiti today. Thus, the context for selection that favored basilectal structures was a cultural system: plantation agriculture, with its huge slave work forces supervised by relatively few – and interactionally remote or absent – French-speaking overseers.

Advocates of the selectionist view have neglected the complex mediations between cultural and linguistic systems that must underlie the emergence of a system such as Haitian Creole, and that are treated in the semiotic theory of Silverstein and others cited above. Constraints on the acquisition of second-language features do not consist solely of the opportunity for learners to observe native-speaker models, and such opportunity is not determined in any simple way by mode of subsistence or labor organization. Instead, these opportunities and what learners make of them are mediated by ideological systems. For instance, in the Haitian Creole case European French speakers almost certainly found that the shift toward basilectal varieties was entirely consistent with their understanding of Africans as unintelligent and unable to master refined European speech. With such an understanding – a convenient one when the labor regime involved starving and torturing these Africans – the 'disorderly' grammar and 'impoverished' lexicon of the slaves would be merely natural, would invite no intervention, and might even be encouraged. Deviations from this 'iconization' would, in Gal and Irvine's (1995) terms, be 'erased,' and pass unnoticed or be dismissed as aberrant or suppressed as dangerous. At the same time, among Africans, basilectal varieties could become icons of their own world, symbols of resistance to and differentiation from their French-speaking oppressors. An approach restricted to the terms of the theory of natural selection does not invite investigation of the semiotic dynamic by which these ideological systems – which are well documented – resonated with the emerging basilectal structures.

The development of modern Mexicano in the state of Tlaxcala, Mexico shows clearly that simple demographic facts cannot account for language change in a contact system. Mexicano is the descendant of Tlaxcalan Nahuatl (Náhuatl Central), one of the Nahua (Aztecan) languages of the Uto-Aztecan family. Mexicano has incorporated very large amounts of Spanish loan vocabulary, across nearly every subcomponent of the lexicon from nouns for European cultural elements such as horses and chickens to discourse particles, prepositions, and derivational morphemes. The Mexicano case is the reverse of the Haitian Creole case: over a few hundred years,

immigration from Europe reduced Nahua-speaking communities to islands in a Spanish-speaking sea. However, the rate of incorporation of Spanish loan elements into Mexicano cannot be correlated directly with the ratio of Nahuatl speakers to Spanish speakers. Instead, it is closely linked to genre. Spanish loan words can convey an elevated or serious tone, and so large numbers of Spanish constructions appear even in the 16th century, at a time when Nahuatl speakers were emphatically the majority in central Mexico and very few people were bilingual, in such genres as the minutes of the proceedings of town councils and notarial records such as wills. Bilinguals today can adjust the frequency of Spanish versus Nahuatl roots even in spontaneous speech. They express thereby subtle variations in stance and attitude that are associated with diverse social positions, age cohorts, and genders within a larger ideological system that contrasts nativistic Nahuatl purism and the expression of community solidarity with an ideology that, by iconization, links Spanish to the power of its first-language speakers.

Language Spread and Language Shift

Cultural mediation appears to play a role in language spread and language shift. The archaeologists Colin Renfrew and Peter Bellwood (2002) hypothesized that large multibranched language families such as Indo-European or Niger-Congo-Kordofanian almost all descend from languages spoken by primary cultivators at the time of the initial domestication of animals and cultivated plants. In contrast, small language families such as Wakashan or North Caucasian are the residue of a more linguistically diverse pre-Neolithic epoch. Renfrew and Bellwood argued that the principal mechanism of language spread throughout most of human history was not the language shift that is so obvious in the history of the last 500 years, but the expansion and spread of populations of speakers of the languages ancestral to the large families. Since demographic factors favor the increase of populations of cultivators over populations of hunter-gatherers, Renfrew and Bellwood predicted that the languages of the latter will be found only in relic zones where the Neolithic expansions of cultivator populations did not reach.

One difficulty with this very general model is that there are attested cases of ancient language shift. For instance, two of the major language families of the Americas, Athabaskan and Algonquian, are spoken largely by hunter-gatherer populations which obviously expanded without shifting to cultivation. Some of the descendant languages (such as California Athabaskan, Denaina in southwest Alaska, and the

Algonquian descendant language Cree-Montagnais [Montagnais] in the Canadian subarctic) exhibit incongruent elements that must represent the influence of speakers of a substratum language who adopted the expanding Athabaskan or Algonquian variety (Kari, 1989; Golla, 2000). The Australian linguists Nicholas Evans and Patrick McConvell (Evans and McConvell, 1998; McConvell, 2001) have proposed that hunter-gatherers who survive climatic instability in continental interiors must be able to accomplish not only movements into uninhabited territories, but retreats into populated regions. The latter type of move requires the cultural capacity – Evans and McConvell call it 'charisma' – to incorporate populations thus encountered into the social, ritual, and linguistic systems of the retreating group. Such movements are attested by apparent substratum linguistic elements not only in the Americas, but in the Australian materials which Evans and McConvell originally investigated. Evans and McConvell's work suggests that a set of ideas about language must be as much a part of successful hunter-gatherer adaptations as is nature knowledge and technological capacity.

Nichols (1992) suggested that the likelihood of language shift is conditioned by human ecology. She proposed a distinction between linguistic 'accretion zones' (sometimes called 'residual zones') and linguistic 'spread zones.' The former tend to form in micro-environmentally complex coastal and montane zones, and are characterized by very large numbers of languages, large numbers of small language families, and high levels of multilingualism. Indigenous New Guinea, aboriginal California, and the Caucasus mountains are examples of accretion zones. Nichols argued that the languages of accretion zones are relatively stable and thus are likely to harbor archaic features. 'Spread zones' tend to form in continental interiors and are characterized by relatively small numbers of languages and language families, and the formation of lingua francas. Languages in spread zones are more likely to be innovative and fail to preserve archaic features. The Eurasian steppes, the Congo basin, and the North American subarctic are examples of spread zones. Language shift, to spreading languages, is much more likely in spread zones than in accretion zones. At the root of this distinction is probably the differential cultural adaptations of humans to the two different types of environment. In the intricate mesh of relatively stable micro-environments in accretion zones such as aboriginal California or the Caucasus, cultural systems that favor local differentiation and specialization, mediated by various forms of cultural exchange, tend to be associated with linguistic ideologies that favor multilingualism over language shift. Local ways of speaking become markers of privileged access to local resources, but speakers become multilingual to manage exchange relationships. In contrast, in spread zones a combination of relative environmental instability and large-scale homogeneity of human adaptive strategies may favor distribution of risk over large geographical regions. This is best accomplished on the linguistic side through the relative homogeneity of a spreading language. A dramatic example of this type is the spread of Shoshoni across the Great Basin of North America. Shoshoni language ideology favors inattention to dialect variation, this inattention being accompanied by an unusually high level of mobility of bands and family groups, and Shoshoni exhibits no clear linguistic isoglosses even though it is distributed over an extremely large area (Miller, 1970, 1971). It seems likely that this sociolinguistic picture is an old one in the community. However, language shift in accretion zones **is** attested, as with the language shift in California and coastal Alaska to California Athabaskan and Denaina respectively, with the superstratum Athabaskan communities being involved in an Evans and McConvell-type move into populated territory.

Hill (2000) proposed that different tendencies in the organization of language diversity between accretion zones and spread zones probably result from complex interactions between ecological adaptation, the social contexts of language acquisition, and language ideologies. When linguistic ideologies construct features of language as licensing access to resources, two directions in sociolinguistic stance by speakers are possible. The adoption of a 'localist' stance is exemplified by speakers of the Kokolo:di dialect of Tohono O'odham, who live in a relatively well-watered and productive region of the Sonoran desert. Their dialect is highly homogeneous and focused, and speakers are very resistant to, and self-conscious about, innovation. Speakers of the Gigimai dialect, on the other hand, who live in a region with sporadic and very low rainfall, exemplify a 'distributed' sociolinguistic stance. These speakers are relatively promiscuous adopters of all available linguistic resources. Hill suggested that localists understand their situation in relation to their language and their environment as entailing a statement like 'I have a rightful and primary claim on valuable and dependable local resources that are necessary to my well-being, and the way I speak verifies my claim.' In contrast, distributed speakers appear to believe that 'I have no rightful and primary claim on valuable and dependable local resources adequate to sustain my well-being. However, I might be able to add to my limited primary claims secondary claims on

a sufficient range of a distributed inventory of resources to sustain my well-being. The way I speak verifies these secondary claims.' Even in this case of the desert-dwelling Tohono O'odham, where historically water scarcity approached and sometimes passed limits on human survivability, the contrasting sociolinguistic stances are not strictly determined by environment, but by local cultural understandings of it and by a linguistic ideology that takes certain sociolinguistic stereotypes to license insider versus outsider status, and hence rights to resources. The Tohono O'odham do not live in the same desert that a biologist or a geologist might see, but construct 'landscapes,' culturalized environments in which resources become meaningful. Furthermore, unlike the desert-dwelling Western Shoshoni described by Miller (1970, 1971), the Tohono O'odham choose to notice dialect differences, construct these as sociolinguistic stereotypes, and use them to license rights. There are, however, ecological constraints that can rule out a localist stance. Localism, with its close adherence to relatively homogeneous ways of speaking, probably requires a period of focusing within childhood peer groups, and the local environment must provide enough in the way of relatively stable subsistence resources to permit the formation of such groups. Distributed-stance speakers of Tohono O'Odham report that water and food scarcity required their families to make frequent moves, precluding the formation of stable peer groups. Among these speakers, even siblings may speak quite differently from one another. Miller (1970, 1971) reported absence of child peer groups for the Western Shoshoni as well. Childhood peer groups, or lack thereof, are not the only dimension of social organization that may shape language spread and shift. James and Leslie Milroy (1985) showed for urban contexts that sociolinguistic 'focus,' the relative homogeneity and stability of dialects, is related to the structure of social networks, which is in turn related to local impacts of political-economic systems. Relatively dense and closed networks, where people have many different kinds of relationship with others that remain relatively stable, favor strong focusing. In contrast, open networks, in which people often form new relationships, some of these involving so-called 'weak ties' – social ties that mediate only very limited kinds of interaction, such as commercial transactions – seem to favor the rapid spread of innovation and relative heterogeneity and instability in local ways of speaking.

Esoterogeny and Exoterogeny

Thurston (1987, 1989, 1992), based on work in Melanesia, suggested that types of structural drift in language change may be associated with the localist and distributed stances outlined above. Very focused local varieties may undergo what Thurston called 'esoterogeny,' acquiring and conserving highly marked and unusual typological properties that are difficult to learn. In contrast, spreading languages are likely to be 'exoteric,' characterized at many loci of typological variation by relatively unmarked structures. An illustration of contrasting esoterogenic and exoterogenic processes of change can be drawn from the Uto-Aztecan languages. The ancestral Uto-Aztecan proto-language seems to have had at least a distinction between an unmarked nominative and a marked accusative case on nouns, and a set of argument-encoding clitics that distinguished nominative from accusative. The descendant Nahua languages, which have spread throughout central Mexico and into Central America as far south as El Salvador and Honduras and had millions of speakers (Náhuatl in Mexico still has at least one million speakers), retain only the latter feature and lack case marking on nouns. In contrast, Cupeño, spoken within the California accretion zone and perhaps the smallest Uto-Aztecan language, marks the accusative case on nouns and their modifiers, distinguishes nominative from accusative case in a set of pronominal prefixes, has added the additional elaboration of a set of person-number clitics that distinguish an ergative agent from an absolutive subject, and distinguishes the absolutive objects of imperative verbs from accusative-marked objects of verbs in nonimperative moods.

One of the most famous examples of esoterogeny is the Amazonian language isolate Pirahã (Múra-Pirahã), spoken by about 150 people. Everett (2004b), the major contemporary scholar of the language, has commented that "the combination of a small phoneme inventory, which provides minimal contrast, complex morphology, tone and a few other features unique to Pirahã make this language very unusual and extremely difficult to learn." The unusually small inventory of segments includes some otherwise unattested allophones, such as a bilabial trill allophone of /b/ and a double-flap allophone of /g/, in which the tongue tip first flaps on the alveolar ridge and then on the lower lip as the tongue actually comes out of the mouth. The stress rules of the language involve an unprecedentedly complex interaction between rightward alignment and four distinct syllable weights, which are shaped partly by the voicing of the onset consonant rather than the weight of the nucleus (there are no coda consonants). Such 'esoteric' features are almost certainly propped up by local ideologies that have made them meaningful as identity markers. This is the case with Pirahã. In contrast

with their close linguistic relatives, former speakers of Mura who now speak only Portuguese, and in spite of ample contact with Portuguese speakers over 200 years, the Pirahã are not bilingual, believing that speaking only their own language is essential to their identity as people who are 'straight' instead of 'crooked' (Everett, 2004a).

Culture and the Speed of Language Change

Historical linguists are very interested in the speed of language change, since methods of linguistic prehistory can retrieve deeper pasts when language change is slow. Thus, it would be useful to determine whether cultural factors can slow or accelerate language change. There is not time to treat this point in detail; a very useful discussion of factors that slow and accelerate cultural change itself can be found in Urban (2001). Therefore, I treat only two salient questions, the role of subsistence type and the role of media. In the case of subsistence type, it is often suggested that language change may be faster among hunter-gatherers than in more complex societies. However, the above discussion has insisted that susceptibility to innovation is mediated by much more complex factors. The distinction between accretion zones, where speakers tend to adopt localist stances, be relatively resistant to innovation, and display tendencies toward esoterogeny when they do innovate, versus spread zones, where speakers tend to adopt distributed stances and be relatively open to innovation which is likely to be exoteric, crosscuts the distributions of hunter-gatherers and cultivators. In accretion zones are found hunter-gatherers such as the Karuk of California, but also communities of small-scale horticulturalists such as those of highland New Guinea, and even literate state-level societies as in the Caucasus mountains. Spread-zone linguistic communities also include societies at every level of sociocultural evolution. Thus, no generalization about the speed of language change that refers simply to subsistence type or level of sociocultural complexity is likely to be useful.

Another argument frequently made about the interaction between sociocultural factors and rate of language change is the idea that the adoption of certain media will slow down or speed up the rate of innovation. In the case of writing, often suggested as a factor favoring conservatism, this is almost certainly wrong. This can be shown by the well-known contrast between two Germanic languages, Icelandic and English, both spoken in highly literate societies. Icelandic is a notorious case of conservatism, with today's speakers able to understand 800-year-old texts

with minimal assistance. In contrast, English of the same period is quite inaccessible to contemporary speakers, and must be studied as a foreign language, even though literacy has been quite widespread in England for nearly 500 years (Cressy, 1980). Recently developed media such as radio, television, and the Internet are often suggested as likely to favor accelerated innovation and the spread of languages spoken by early adopters of such media. The lesson of literacy, for which we have thousands of years of records in hundreds of languages, is that the interaction between media and language change is likely to be complexly mediated by ideology and by the details of local social organization and political economy.

Conclusion

The cases and controversies about the relationship between language change and cultural change reviewed above lead historical linguists to conclude that the two processes seem often to be connected. However, these connections seem to be irrevocably local and historical rather than general and evolutionary. Tendencies – such as the loose association between accretion zones, localist sociolinguistic stances, and esoterogeny versus spread zones, distributed sociolinguistic stances, and exoterogeny – can indeed be identified and are useful in pointing toward possibilities. But exceptions are common, and evolutionary accounts of local situations are likely to be unsatisfactory. Instead, the understanding of these relationships is a historical-linguistic project. Such a project requires detailed historicist untangling of the interaction between local cultural construal of resources, rights, and persons and the ways that local details of drift in language change are linked to these by language ideologies.

See also: Environment and Language; Indexicality: Theory; Language Maintenance and Shift; Media and Language: Overview.

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Language Education for Endangered Languages

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As local communities become more aware of the potentially imminent loss of their languages, they have begun to undertake measures to foster education in them. There is currently a wide range of programs which have been adopted to arrest language loss and to help children and adults take control of learning their language. These can loosely be divided into school-based and community-based programs.

School-Based Programs

When people think of education, they naturally think of school programs, and perhaps the majority of programs for endangered languages are based in schools. In many communities the school is seen as the primary vehicle for language education. Note that this is a radical shift from the way that children first learn their primary language, within the home and within a community of speakers. It is more reminiscent of the way that children typically learn foreign languages.

Total-Immersion Programs

Total-immersion programs work well when there is a sufficient speaker base to help insure their success. These programs tend to be multifaceted, with total-immersion language instruction in the schools reinforced by the sole use of the language in the home. Thus they are often most successful when fluent speakers can be found in all generations, as the source not only of teachers in the school, but also of parents who can speak the language in the home. A common goal of total-immersion programs is complete and fluent use of the target language in all domains. In a true total-immersion program, all of the school curriculum is taught in the endangered language and the language of wider communication is often taught as a secondary subject. Bi- or multilingualism is an ultimate goal, as in general, children enrolled in such programs ultimately need full use of both the endangered language and the language of wider communication.

The Language Nest Model

The language nest model is a particular type of immersion program. It was first used in the 1980s in New Zealand for the revitalization of the Maori language and is often referred to by its Maori name, Te Kōhanga Reo. It has subsequently also become closely associated with Hawaiian language revitalization, which built its program on the Te Kōhanga Reo model but uses the Hawaiian name, Pūnana Leo. The language nests were initially created in regions where the only group of people speaking the language was, by and large, the grandparent generation; the parents and children tend to be monolingual in the language of wider communication. The language nest model takes preschool children and places them in 'nests' where the endangered language is spoken. Parents are generally expected to make the commitment to learning the language and using it in the home to reinforce what is learned at school. Historically, as each lead class graduated and went on to a higher level, first in preschool, then elementary and secondary school, new nesting classes were created so that children ultimately received all of their education in the target language.

The creation of domains of language use outside of the schools has proven to be a challenge for language nest programs, in large part because the speaker base is primarily second-language speakers who do not attain full fluency in the endangered language.

Partial-Immersion Programs

For languages with relatively few remaining speakers or with a lower level of community commitment, it is often not realistic to implement a full-fledged immersion program. Partial-immersion programs exist in many schools, where the curriculum is taught primarily in the language of wider communication and the endangered language is taught in specially focused classes. There are two basic types of partial-immersion programs. In the one, the less common, some subjects are taught in the endangered language. Such subjects are typically the culture and/or history of the people. The benefits here are that learners acquire the language in culturally appropriate settings using the specific lexicon. Thus a Native American class on oral traditions or crafts could be conducted in the indigenous language. In the other, the endangered language is taught as a secondary subject. The advantages to this model are obvious: it requires a smaller commitment of time and resources. Moreover, children coming to these programs often do not know the endangered language, and so need to learn it from the beginning. The primary disadvantage is that the endangered language is allotted secondary status within the schools and is taught more as a foreign language than as a primary language. Thus it does not achieve the full range of uses of the language of wider communication and cannot supplant it. Although such programs may be designed with the ultimate goal of stable bilingualism, they rarely

achieve it, since they do not achieve full fluency in the endangered language.

Outside of the Schools

The dichotomy between school-based programs and others is somewhat artificial, as often two different types of programs are used in conjunction with each other. For example, many of the total-immersion school programs require the parents to learn the language and use it in the home to reinforce the work that is done in the schools. While school-based programs are almost exclusively built on Western models which require literacy in the endangered language, programs outside of the schools often dispense with literacy as too time-consuming and cumbersome for learning to communicate orally.

Community-Based Programs

Community-based programs are grassroots movements, stemming from and sustained by community leadership and commitment to language education. Such programs vary greatly in nature, but often have in common that they bring together a variety of community members for language practice. Maori communities in New Zealand organize weeklong or weekendlong immersion events for community members of all ages; people come together with the commitment to speak nothing but Maori for the time of the event. Other communities have established similar immersion events, or schedule regular meetings for language practice. These group meetings often link the practice of native crafts and traditions with language use. They have the advantage of offering options to adult learners who may not be able to attend regular classes. Beyond creating opportunities for language use and immersion, such programs organize language festivals, feature plays, songs, and poems, and actively promote the use of language in conjunction with traditional activities.

Some programs have made the decision to start teaching the endangered language to adults, not children. The rationale behind the decision is that it is the adults who will then use the language and teach it to the children, as is the norm for first-language acquisition. UNESCO, for example, advocates adult literacy first, with an emphasis on the acquisition of the practical skills needed for functioning in the modern workplace.

Master–Apprentice Program One very successful program for language groups with few remaining speakers is the master–apprentice program. Initiated in California in 1992 for teaching languages on the verge of extinction, its basic principles can be adopted to the teaching of endangered languages anywhere. The program matches an 'apprentice' learner with a 'master' of the language whose job is to teach the language by using it in everyday life. The program is based on the following principles: (1) the use of English is not permitted in interactions between master and apprentice; (2) the apprentice needs to be a full participant in determining the content of the program and assuring use of the target language; (3) oral, not written, language use is always primary in learning and communicating; (4) learning occurs not in the classroom, but in real-life situations, engaging in real-life activities (e.g., cooking, gardening, etc.); and (5) comprehension will come to the beginning language learner through the activity, in conjunction with nonverbal communication. These principles are designed to insure that language learning and instruction take place in an immersion setting that nearly replicates the 'natural' language-learning environment of children (as opposed to artificial classroom settings, for example).

Beyond the inherent incentive to learn and to teach one's language, in the Californian program a modest stipend is provided for up to 3 years of work between the master and the apprentice. After this period the graduate apprentices should be prepared to continue their education with the masters, but also to serve as teachers themselves.

Training before beginning the team work is critical. The language masters are primarily tribal elders who may not have actively used their language for many years, due to the very factors which have led to language attrition. In addition, they are not trained language teachers and many have never taught their language. Thus initial training sessions are designed to provide the opportunity for masters to become accustomed to speaking their languages again and to introduce the basic principles of language immersion instruction, such as building and practicing vocabulary, and enforcing the importance of repetition, review, and patience in language learning. Important components of the training include getting the participants used to nonverbal communication, teaching apprentices key phrases and questions in the target language, and some cross-cultural comparison of the different ways language is used in different cultures. Despite the many linguistic and cultural differences, there is a commonality of experience which makes it very useful for all teams, from beginning to advanced, to come together for this training.

By the end of the first year, apprentices should be able to ask and answer simple questions about themselves, describe pictures, use some culture-specific language (prayers, stories, etc.), and recite a short speech prepared with the help of the master.

This basic repertoire is expanded in the second year, with the goals of being able to speak in simple grammatical sentences, being able to carry on extended conversations, having increased comprehension, being able to converse on most topics, and being able to give short speeches. Finally, by the end of the third year of the program, the apprentices should be able to converse at length, use long (and presumably complicated) sentences, and develop plans for teaching the language. These goals are at once realistic and ambitious: language learning is a slow process, and the apprentice meets with the teacher only for 10 hours per week. One can predict that the learner's motivation will be very high in this program and will have a positive impact on learning. The results of the program vary among individual students depending on a range of factors, such as the overall time commitment, how much the apprentice is truly immersed in the language, and so on.

Potential Difficulties

Despite the many differences between these various educational models and the particularities of individual endangerment situations, they similarly face a number of potential difficulties. These include a lack of qualified teachers, as often speakers are elderly and untrained as teachers, while younger, trained teachers lack proficiency in the language. Lack of pedagogical materials and other basic resources (such as dictionaries) often hamper programs. At a more profound level, a lack of consensus about how the language is to be spoken and how it is to be written, with disagreements frequently centering around issues of orthography and codification, who has the right to teach it, have put an end to many potential programs.

Access to the media is often difficult to impossible for endangered languages.

Legislation at local and national levels can either aid or impede endangered-language education. Policies which promote multilingualism and allocate resources to support educational programs can have favorable effects, while more monolingual policies which require testing or use of a single national language can have a negative impact which is difficult for a local community to overcome.

See also: Endangered Languages; Identity: Second Language; Language Teaching Traditions: Second Language; Minority Languages: Oppression.

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Relevant Websites

http://portal.unesco.org

Language Education: Language Awareness

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The constitution of the Association for Language Awareness (ALA) defines LA as 'explicit knowledge about language and conscious perception and sensitivity in language learning, language teaching and language use.' Hence, LA has always extended into many areas, including translation (Bowker, 1999) and literature (Carter, 1999). Here we focus, first, on what is normally regarded as 'grassroots' and 'classroom' LA, centered on language learning

and teaching, and, second, on pertinent broader social and applied contexts of language use, social attitudes, etc., and on some of the implications of globalization.

LA is generally seen as emerging in the 1970s, in the writings of Halliday (1971), and with the recommendations of the Bullock Report (DES, 1975) in the United Kingdom, drawing attention to under-achievement in L2s in British schools. Some more enterprising teachers were soon independently establishing local projects to increase pupils' knowledge of languages and language. Cameron (1993) refers to three types of LA program at this time:

for pupils about to start L2 learning, for pupils in multilingual/multicultural classrooms, and as prelinguistics courses for pupils in higher classes. The National Council for Language in Education (NCLE) working parties (1978) and conferences (1981, 1985) brought valuable institutional support to these grassroots initiatives, and Hawkins (e.g., 1984) added an enduring theoretical framework, with proposals for LA as a 'bridge' between mother tongue L1 and L2 education, and between primary and secondary education, and also with broader social objectives, such as parenting. Further impetus came in 1989 with a British Association for Applied Linguistics Seminar on LA (an event organized to bring together language practitioners using the term for different purposes in a range of contexts), and in 1992 with the First International Conference on LA, at which the ALA and its journal *Language Awareness* were launched. ALA conferences have followed biennially at venues in the United Kingdom and overseas (to date, Canada, Ireland, Sweden, France, and Spain).

LA often has been identified with the United Kingdom, as above, but equivalent projects are increasingly found elsewhere. EU-funded projects involving networks across several countries have been particularly impressive – for example, the primary-school focused Evlang – 'l'éveil aux langues' project (Candelier, 1998). Labels used to translate LA have occasionally aroused debate, as they can carry subtle distinctions, even within a single context (e.g., Gnutzmann's [1997] list of German terms). Related English terms include *consciousness-raising* (CR) and *Knowledge about Language* (KAL). James (1996) proposes reserving CR for the identification of discrepancies between present knowledge and target knowledge, and employing LA for the metacognition of knowledge that one already possesses without previously realizing one had it. KAL has been employed in some U.K. government reports. Cameron (1993) points to the different origins of KAL and LA, and the confusion arising from assuming synonymy. These two terms in particular reflect the LA debate around the role of explicit learning and explicit knowledge in language learning.

LA is associated with discovery-focused pedagogy. Often, learners engage in small-scale investigations requiring reflection or talk about how languages work, how they are learnt, and how they themselves can best focus their own learning. Hence, the development of metalanguage (e.g., Jaworski *et al.*, 2004; Berry, 2005), awareness of strategies of learning and communication, critical evaluation of the process of language learning (e.g., Garrett and Shortall, 2002), and working toward more autonomy in learning and use (Little, 1997) also feature. Reflective approaches

are extended to language teacher education (e.g., Wright and Bolitho, 1993; Walsh, 2003), and also teacher development. Hence, projects bridging 'the space between' English and Modern Foreign Language teachers have involved the teachers sharing reflections on their different perspectives and experiences (Pomphrey and Moger, 1999; Turner and Turvey, 2002).

Benefits attributed to LA are viewed across five broad and overlapping dimensions: performance, cognitive, affective, social, and power (James and Garrett, 1991). The performance dimension concerns whether knowledge gained from greater awareness of language facilitates improved language use and learning. The cognitive dimension relates LA to an 'awareness of pattern, contrast, system, units, categories, rules of language' (Donmall, 1985: 7), and to the development of an 'analytic competence' that extends beyond language learning: a role Hawkins (1984) suggests might earlier have been fulfilled by learning Latin. The affective dimension is usually considered in terms of attitudes, motivation and curiosity accruing from LA. Hawkins's proposal for LA as a bridging subject to address poor achievement is directed as much at this dimension as the performance one. The social dimension is generally seen in terms of social harmonization in contexts of language diversity, and of building better relations between ethnic groups. The power dimension aims at increased sensitivity and empowerment to counter the manipulative and oppressive use of language, and to understand and counter language ideology. LA work with its prime focus on this dimension is usually referred to as Critical LA (Fairclough, 1999). It will be clear that the success or failure of LA work, in terms of both short-term and more enduring impacts, needs to be judged on these dimensions. We now turn to consider LA in the wider social context, where the last three dimensions in particular feature strongly.

Although some LA projects in schools aim at changing attitudes toward languages and their speakers, other work has studied the broader social backdrop of attitudes and stereotypes itself. Whereas some of this survey work has drawn its data from teachers and students (e.g., Garrett *et al.*, 2003, in Wales; Lochtman *et al.*, 2004, in Brussels), other work has studied the views of nonlinguists generally, arguing (*inter alia*) '. . . the undeniable importance it has in the language professional's interaction with the public' (Preston, 1996: 72). LA-relevant work also has focused on specific contemporary issues in which language and communication can play a crucial role, from designing teaching programs to counter physician-patient communication barriers in HIV/AIDS medical interviews (Singy and Guex, 1997), and

(to extend LA to communication and discourse awareness) understanding the communication complexities of HIV/AIDS campaigns (e.g., Perloff, 2001), to attitudinal studies of ageism in communication, and of 'good communication' between generations (e.g., Williams *et al.*, 2004).

Cameron (2000) has linked this general contemporary concern with 'good communication' with processes of globalization, which is increasingly referred to in other recent LA work. Some concerns itself with the increasing mobility of large numbers of people and the impact on language choice and use, the values attached to them, and social identities, whether they are tourists (Jaworski *et al.*, 2003), or recently immigrated communities (Yelenevskaya and Fialkova, 2003, in Israel) or their children who have grown up in the new community (Jørgensen and Quist, 2001, in Denmark), or people returning to visit locations of earlier family generations (Wray *et al.*, 2003, in Wales). Other work has explored the implications of the claim that, with the weakening of traditional social distinctions of class, sex, and age under globalization, traditional language situations and notions of standard language varieties have come under attack. Kristiansen (2001), for example, finds attitudinal evidence of a splitting in two of Standard Danish, with a standard emerging for the media that differs from that valued in the educational system. But globalization also is viewed in terms of the commodification of discourse, the increasing marketization in our lives and institutions, including education, and of how our increasingly knowledge-based societies impact not only on our jobs but also on our personal relationships and identities across the lifespan. LA has a challenging role to play in such globalization processes, to better prepare us for pursuing our social identities, and for resisting organizational incursions into our everyday lives. To this end, Fairclough (1999) has argued the importance of promoting educational programs in critical discourse awareness.

See also: Bilingualism and Second Language Learning; Discrimination and Language; Education in a Multilingual Society; Educational Linguistics; Language Attitudes; Language Policy in Multinational Educational Contexts; Language Teaching Traditions: Second Language; Migration and Language; Minorities and Language; Multiculturalism and Language; Second and Foreign Language Learning and Teaching.

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Language in Computer-Mediated Communication

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Before computers were networked, the terms 'language' and 'computer' only occurred together in describing programming code. In recent years, however, the Internet and related technologies have become popular and pervasive media for human communication. Since the late 1970s (e.g., Hiltz and Turoff, 1978), questions of how human language is used in these media have become important concerns for linguists, communication scholars, sociologists, and researchers from other disciplines. This article begins by describing the primary forms of computer-mediated communication (CMC), as well as the characteristics that differentiate these media from one another. It then addresses the primary issues that have dominated the discussions of computer-mediated language. A brief caveat is in order. The Internet changes so rapidly that the forms of CMC available, and the ways in they are used and by whom, evolve more quickly than print forms such as this article can accommodate. By the time this article reaches its readers, new forms may well have emerged.

Characteristics of Computer Language Media

In the simplest sense, CMC can be distinguished on the basis of whether it occurs in real-time (synchronous CMC) or whether there is a time delay between messages (asynchronous CMC). With synchronous forms, participants type messages that appear on others' screens as soon as they are sent. Readers reply instantly, leading to a rapid exchange of brief messages. Chat rooms, where multiple people gather on the basis of shared interests, are one form of synchronous CMC, as is instant messaging, which usually occurs between two people. Synchronous CMC is also found in richly visual graphical online games (including multi-player role-playing games in which people play together to achieve goals such as gaining treasure or slaying mythical monsters) and as an accompaniment to online versions of traditional games such as poker, dominoes, and backgammon. Multi-user domains, or MUDS, are textual online 'spaces' designed for functions as varied as role-playing, generalized socializing, and education. Like other synchronous forms of CMC, users of a MUD interact in real time if they are online simultaneously and are in the same 'room' or area of virtual space.

The most popular forms of CMC are asynchronous. Email, the electronic equivalent of letters, may be person-to-person, or may be group communication organized through mailing lists based on interest, family, friendship, work, or other ties. Websites are also asynchronous, with static information posted for readers. On weblogs (or 'blogs'), a writer or collective of writers posts comments on a daily or even hourly basis. Readers can often engage in discussion of those comments through hyperlinked sections that appear

as second pages. Webboards, bulletin boards, and newsgroups are asynchronous forms of topical discussion in which large groups of users may gather on their own time to read and leave messages. Though the distinction based on synchronicity is common, in practice the lines between the two may blur. If people are online simultaneously and checking often, email can function in a near synchronous manner. Short message services (SMS), also known as text messaging, send very brief messages through mobile phones in exchanges that can happen quickly enough to be considered synchronous or with enough lag between turns to render them asynchronous.

Computer-mediated language can also be characterized by a set of other features that can influence interaction. These characteristics have also proven helpful for thinking about how forms of CMC differ from one another and how they compare to other forms of language use such as face-to-face communication (the usual standard for comparison in CMC research), telephone calls, and traditional letters (see the discussion of oral and written language below). In contrast to most other media forms, CMC can be either one-to-one or one-to-many. Email, instant messaging, and SMS are usually directed at single users, while mailing lists, chat rooms, and discussion boards are usually written for a broad and often semi-anonymous audience. The ability for each Internet user to communicate one-to-many is an unprecedented transformation in the landscape of communication media, which have historically limited this capacity to a small number of influential mass media producers.

Forms of computer-mediated language media also vary in the degree of interactivity, or ability to respond to messages, that they offer. Email and instant messaging are highly interactive, as messages are generally meant to invoke responses (one-to-many email as occurs on mailing lists and with spam is an exception). Websites, on the other hand, may not offer any means for readers to respond to their contents. A single form, such as the weblog, may vary in the degree of interactivity it offers depending on whether the author includes the means for readers to leave comments or reply to those comments that are left.

In strong contrast to face-to-face interaction and to a lesser extent the telephone, computer-mediated language media seem to transcend space. There are many locations where Internet access is difficult or impossible, which affects which languages are common online (more on this below). However, so long as people are online, messages exchanged across continents are indistinguishable from those sent between rooms in the same building, both in form and speed of transmission. This can create a sense of being close to one another. Since sending messages via computer is generally less expensive than using long distance telephone (let alone travel), computer mediation can greatly increase the opportunities people have to use language with those far away.

By virtue of being electronic, computer-mediated language can be stored and replicated. Although forms of CMC vary in how ephemeral they may feel, most, if not all, are replicated as they are transmitted and stored on servers and backups. Most forms of CMC can be copied and sent on to others. Even messages sent person-to-person can be retrieved and replicated for other individuals or large audiences. This was the case when all email sent at the failed corporation Enron was posted to the World Wide Web as part of court proceedings. Chat and instant messaging seem to pass as soon as they occur, yet they can be logged. However, despite the inherent replicability and storage potential of computer-mediated language, storing and archiving examples of online language use has proven to be a difficult logistical challenge that has become a source of particular concern for librarians and information scientists. Computer-mediated language sites that are present one day may be gone or transformed the next.

Some forms of online language are more hypertextual than others. In hypertextual CMC, exemplified by websites, particular words or phrases on one page are linked to other pages with more information. Clicking on the hyperlink allows users to follow up on those bits that interest them most. In contrast to more linear forms of CMC such as chat, gaming, and instant messaging, in hypertextual CMC, information is connected through multiple possible relationships, giving readers the choice of what to pursue and allowing different readers of the same text potentially very different reading experiences. Email, which was once linear, has become more hypertextual as the ability to embed clickable links within messages has become common.

Finally, CMC media differ in richness (Daft and Lengel, 1984), or the extent to which nonverbal cues are apparent. In its early days, all forms of CMC were extremely lean, as all messages were restricted to the same monochrome font in the limited ASCII character set. The ability to format messages by varying fonts and colors and embedding images and sounds has made many forms of CMC, especially websites and graphic interfaces, richer. When CMC is lean, as it often is in more text-based forms, the reduction of physical appearance cues, along with the evidence of status and attractiveness they bear, can create a kind of invisibility or anonymity. Leanness

also positions language as the sole means of creating social context among interactants.

With this background, the article now turns to key issues that have dominated the research on computer-mediated language. These include the primacy of English versus other languages, comparisons between CMC and speech and writing, online playfulness, hostility, and the influence of gender on online language use. The essay concludes with a consideration of the influence online language use is likely to have on offline language.

Languages Used in Computer-Mediated Communication

Measuring the use of any particular language in online communication is challenging given the variety of forms of CMC and their varying accessibility. Efforts to ascertain language use have usually estimated the proportion of Internet users who speak a given language. English emerges as the most-used language on computer networks, although the proportion of English speakers relative to those who speak other languages on the Internet has fallen considerably since the late 1990s. The business Translate to Success has compiled data from varied surveys of Internet users to estimate that in 2004, 38.3% of Internet users spoke English. Chinese, Japanese, and Korean are also popular, constituting 11.2%, 10%, and 4.1%, respectively. The most common European languages are German (6.8%), Spanish (5.5%), Italian (3.9%), French (3.5%), Portuguese (3.1%), Russian (3%), and Dutch (2%). Only 1% of the world's Internet users speak Arabic. Fewer than 0.1% speak any African language. An effort to conduct a language census of weblogs (blogcensus.net) has resulted in the indexing of over two million blogs. More than half of these are in English, followed in dramatically smaller numbers by those in French, Portuguese, and Farsi (each of which occurred in between 10 000 and 90 000 blogs). Polish, German, Spanish, and Italian are the only other languages found in more than 10 000 blogs each.

That language use on the Internet maps so poorly onto language use in the global population reflects the wealth required to incorporate computer-technology into a populace, as well as historical and governmental constraints on the implementation of the technology in given cultures. Furthermore, in some nations, such as India, English may be the language used to access the Internet, even if it is not the primary language spoken by the majority of its citizens. The overrepresentation of languages used in wealthy countries, especially English, has often given rise to a sentiment that the Internet represents a further colonization of poor nations by those with greater wealth, particularly the United States.

The use of a given language on the Internet is also affected by the technology itself. Until recently, online writing was restricted to the ASCII character set, which is designed exclusively for the Latin alphabet. With the advent of Unicode, people can now write with other alphabets; however, this technology is neither available to nor used by all. The result has sometimes been considered a form of "typographical imperialism" (Herring and Danet, 2004) with potential social, political, economic, and linguistic consequences. For instance, Greece has seen recent controversy surrounding what is called Greeklish, an online version of written Greek in which the Latin alphabet is used to transliterate (Koutsogiannis and Mitsihopoulou, 2004). While some Greeks, particularly the young, view this as a means of participating in the global discourse of the Internet, others view it as a threat to the integrity and history of the Greek language.

Writing, Speaking, and Hybridity

Scholars striving to describe the linguistics of CMC have often done so by comparing online interaction to face-to-face communication and writing. Although in earlier work, the comparison presupposed an erroneous assumption that all computer-mediated language was the same, other scholars have limited their comparisons to particular forms of CMC. Biber (1986), Chafe (1982), and Mulkay (1985, 1986) are among those who have compared oral and written language. In general, scholars examining diverse forms of CMC in a number of languages (particularly English, French, Swedish, and Norwegian) have found that CMC resembles both written language and oral conversation (Baron, 2000; Baron and Ling, 2003; Baym, 1996; Danet, 1997; Ferrera *et al*., 1991; Hård af Segerstad, 2005; Herring, 2001; Ling, 2005). CMC is like writing in many ways. The text usually bears an address. Messages can be edited prior to transmission. The author and reader are usually geographically (and often temporally) separated, messages can often be read by anonymous readers who may not respond. It is not possible for interlocutors to overlap one another nor to interrupt. Context must be created through the prose so that messages are often explicit and complete. There is rarely an assumption of shared physical context. Messages are replicable and can be stored. Vocabulary, syntax, spelling, and the use of uncontracted forms may make online interaction more like writing than speech.

On the other hand, there are many ways in which online language better resembles speech. Messages

are generally related to prior ones, often through turn-taking, although disrupted turn adjacency and lack of feedback can render turn-taking challenging (Herring, 2001). Messages are based in a relationship between writer and reader. There is often a history of shared referents and speech conventions (e.g., Hymes, 1986). The audience is usually able to respond and often does so quickly, resulting in reformulations of original messages. Topics change rapidly. The discourse often feels ephemeral, and often is not stored by recipients despite the capacity for storage. Furthermore, online language can be marked by colloquial and nonstandard spellings that foreground phonetic qualities (e.g., 'gotta' instead of 'have to').

Ultimately, many scholars conclude that online language is an "interactive written register" (Ferrera *et al.*, 1991), hybrid (Danet, 1997), creole (Baron, 1998), or "uncooked linguistic stew" (Baron and Ling, 2003) that blends elements of written and oral language with features that are distinctive to this medium, or at least more common online than in any other language medium. Among the most commented upon features of online writing are the use of abbreviation (e.g., TTYL for 'talk to you later'), the use of asterisks as brackets to simulate underlines, and upper case lettering to indicate emphasis. A number of deletions have also been noted, including the deletion of subject pronouns (e.g., 'gotta go now'), vowels, and punctuation. In SMS, spaces may be deleted as well, and there may not be any adjectives or adverbs (Hård af Segerstad, 2005; Ling, 2005). Messages in instant messaging, chat, and SMS are considerably shorter than those in conversation, writing, or most other forms of CMC, and in some synchronous forms of CMC such as IM, utterances may be broken up across turns.

In addition to the variety of forms of CMC, the task of identifying distinguishing characteristics of CMC is further complicated by the fact that there are so many other factors that influence language use in any medium (Baron and Ling, 2003; Baym, 1995a; Herring, 2001). As Basso (1974) has noted, written language always depends on its cultural and social contexts, functions, and the relationship between writer and reader. Each of these factors is at play in determining the linguistic form of any single instance of computer-mediated language use. Furthermore, individuals have distinct personal styles. As seen below, gender also influences language style.

In group CMC contexts where many people hold discussion over long periods of time, group norms develop that influence language use. These may include distinctive words, such as 'whuggle,' a form of greeting documented by Cherny (1999) or 're,' a short form of 'hello again' used to greet for a second time in an Internet Relay Chat channel (Werry, 1996). In some cases, groups develop entire genres of language use distinctive or tailored to their forum, such as humorous lists of 'unasked questions' in a soap opera discussion (Baym, 1995b). Stylistic standards of formality and politeness also emerge over time within particular groups.

Playfulness in Computer-Mediated Language

Some of the distinctive linguistic features found in CMC can be attributed to a desire to save keystrokes, especially features such as deletions in synchronous interaction. However, many of the phenomena that occur in online language are better described as playful than time-saving. A number of scholars, most notably Danet (2001), have noted the playfulness of CMC. Danet (2001) argues that the play found on CMC, especially in synchronous CMC, can be traced to several influences. Interactivity and instant feedback can lead to a sense of immersion that may facilitate play. The lack of clear authorities and formal governing structure of online spaces can promote playfulness. The legacy of hacker culture with its love of wordplay, puns, irony, flippancy, and play with typography and spelling is also an influence as hackers were early adaptors of the Internet. Finally, the anonymity of many online spaces can be conducive to play since the enhanced role of language in creating an identity offers participants greater latitude than normal in presenting a self. For instance, many forms of online interaction require as a starting point that interactants choose a nickname or screen name by which they will be known.

Other reasons for the playfulness of CMC may be a desire for spontaneity or to increase the socioemotional appeal of messages in this nonverbally impoverished medium. Many of the 'errors' that make online interaction more like speech than writing can be understood as efforts to create a friendly, informal, conversational tone, which in turn gives rise to further playfulness. Following Bauman (1975), Baym (1995b) argues that online language often serves as a mode of performance that strives to entertain, to enhance the appeal of the discourse, to build identities for the performers, and to foster friendly relationships among interactants.

Among the most common forms of linguistic play in CMC are the aforementioned acronyms. Often-used acronyms including BTW (by the way), IMHO (in my humble opinion), and many others are compiled into online dictionaries posted on the Web. In particular, CMC contexts, people often develop unique playful acronyms such as PVGD, used in a soap opera discussion group to explain why the

children in the fictional town of Pine Valley aged so rapidly (the GD stands for 'glandular disorder'), or YMMV for 'your mileage may vary' offered when sharing personal experience in an online discussion group for pregnant women. Creative acronyms may be used to substitute for nonverbal expressions, as in LOL for 'laughing out loud.' Language play can also be seen in the development of new words in online contexts. Spam (unwanted barrages of messages), flaming (hostility), and blogging (writing online diaries) are examples of such words that have made it out of the Internet into wider discourse. Many have noted how common humor is in online contexts (e.g., Baym, 1995b; Myers, 1987).

Online Hostility

In contrast to theories that CMC fosters a playful affiliative environment, there has long been speculation that because of its potential anonymity, or reduction of nonverbal cues, CMC would foster the use of more hostile language, or flaming. Early research (e.g., Kiesler *et al*., 1984) argued that because the computer medium is lean, it creates an environment in which norms are suspended. As a consequence, there would be more swearing, insults, name calling, and expression of negative affect. This (error-filled) comment from a group discussion of the television show *Star Trek*, is a typical flame: "Will you stupid jerks get a real life. Everyone with half a brain or more know that a human and a Kligon can not mate. The Klingon mating procedure would kill any human (except one with a brain like you). Stay off the net stoopid!" In group interactions, such messages usually lead to what has become known as a flame war. Such flame wars follow a fairly predictable pattern in which the original flame is followed by an equally hostile retort. The hostilities escalate, drawing in more participants. Other participants then chime in urging the original participants to move the discussion off-list or to ignore the hostilities. Eventually people lose interest and the discussion dies out. Many sources on the Internet can be found describing this pattern and offering 'netiquette' tips to prevent flame wars. Flaming is also concern in person-to-person interactions online. Fearing flaming, some organizations now require that some forms of communication, such as evaluations and reprimands, be conducted face-to-face rather than online in order to prevent inappropriate hostility.

One explanation of flaming is the reduced "social presence" (Short *et al*., 1976) of other interactants given the leanness of the computer medium. Other scholars (Lea *et al*., 1992) have argued that flaming cannot be explained by the medium alone, since the amount of hostility varies tremendously across online contexts. They argue instead for a normative explanation, in which some groups create contexts that encourage more argumentative styles. Flaming has also been linked to masculinity, or "the chest-thumping display of online egos" (Myers, 1987: 241).

Despite the common sense that flaming is rampant in CMC, research suggests that it is perceived as more common than it actually is. Rice and Love (1987) found in their study of an organization's computer-mediated messages that although socioemotional expression was common, only 0.2% of the messages were antagonistic. Lea *et al*. (1992) theorize that flaming may seem more common than it is because single messages may be seen by so many people and because hostile messages are so memorable. In fact, people are considerably more likely to be nice than to flame in online contexts (e.g., Preece and Ghozati, 1998).

Gender

The speculation that flaming is associated with gender is indicative of a strong focus on gender that has characterized much of the linguistic work on CMC. Early CMC rhetoric often suggested that the elimination of the nonverbal cues to gender would result in the elimination of gender from language use, with optimistic consequences ranging from women's voices being granted more status to the elimination of gender as a meaningful cultural category. In some online contexts, gender becomes a subject for linguistic play. One much-studied MUD, Lambda MOO, offers participants nine gender options for their identity, each with its own set of pronouns (Danet, 2001). In addition to male, female, and neuter, people can choose to identify as: either, Spivak, splat, plural, egotistical, royal, or 2nd person. Third person descriptions of each of these options would be he, she, it, s/he, E, e*, they, I, we, you, and per, respectively.

However, research has consistently investigated whether the differences often noted in face-to-face conversation persist in CMC and whether gender can be identified from language style. Empirical findings are mixed, but do suggest modest gender differences. In discourse analytic studies of asynchronous discussions, Herring (2001) argues that men use an adversarial style, and women a supportive/attenuated style oriented toward affiliation. Although there is more overlap than difference in the messages written by men and women, Herring asserts that at the extremes, longer messages, strong assertions of opinions, and crude language are more likely to be written by men. One MUD described by Kendall (2002) describes the aggressive style of answering questions seen often within the group as MAS for

'Male Answer Syndrome.' Men are also more likely to open and close conversations. Sexist language has also been found in CMC (e.g., Gurak, 1997). Kendall (2002), for instance, describes how women outside the group are depicted as sexual objects. When someone mentions seeing a woman, for instance, a typical response is "did you spike 'er?" (Kendall, 2002: 85).

Messages written by women are more likely to be short and to include qualifications, justifications, apologies, and expressions of support (Herring, 2001). Evidence for a female affiliative style can also be seen in the finding that women's IM closings take twice as many turns and are nearly three times as long as male closings. Women are also nearly three times more likely to begin SMS interactions with openings (Baron and Ling, 2003).

However, while Savicki *et al.* (1997) found that groups in which there were more men used more factually oriented language and calls for action, less self-disclosure, and fewer attempts at tension prevention and reduction, they did not find any gender differences in expressions of opinion, apology, questions, or even flaming. Ling (2005) finds that women's SMS messages are longer, exhibit more complex structure, and are more like writing than men's. In their statistical analysis, Savicki *et al.* (1997) report that gender had only modest explanatory power in differentiating the language style of messages.

Gender is a factor not just in message style, but also in perception of message style, with impacts on response (or nonresponse) to those messages. Herring (1996) argues that men and women differ in their perception of aggressive messages. While men are more likely to see them as evidence of freedom of speech, candor, and healthy debate, women are more likely to see them as hostile and unconstructive.

The Effect of Computer-Mediated Language on Offline Language Use

CMC offers a hybrid, playful, and occasionally confrontational style of language that closely resembles language in other media, yet has some distinguishing characteristics. As is often the case when new language forms emerge, some develop concern that standard language is under threat. Newspaper articles have worried, for instance, that the brief exchanges of instant messaging will lead to an inability to conduct face-to-face conversations or that nonstandard spelling and punctuation will decimate grammar as we know it. Although there have been few if any studies directly addressing this phenomenon, the evidence from studies of computer-mediated language do not offer strong reasons for concern. CMC has

been shown to have depended on a variety of influences, including the technology, the purpose of the interaction, the norms of the group, the communication style of the speakers' social groups offline, and the idiosyncrasies of individuals. There is no consistent standardized 'Computer Mediated Language.'

Baron and Ling's (2003) analysis suggests there are actually far fewer such deviations from standard language forms than people would expect given the attention they are paid. Furthermore, only a few of the nonstandard features of language that do occur in CMC are due to inattention or lack of awareness of standards (Herring, 2001). Most are instead deliberate choices made as language users adapt to the technical and social contexts of their interactions. The evidence thus suggests that people are aware that different situations call for different language styles, and are unlikely to lose the ability to hold face-to-face conversations, spell, or use punctuation as a result of time spent online.

See also: E-mail, Internet, Chatroom Talk: Pragmatics.

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Language Maintenance and Shift

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On the whole, the extent of endangerment of the world's language diversity reflects the distribution of languages on our planet. The highest density of endangered languages seems to exist in the linguistically heterogeneous parts of the world. It happens that countries with very high numbers of languages are near the equator, such as Papua New Guinea, India, Brazil and Mexico, as well as the countries of central and western Africa.

An analysis of language endangerment globally shows that a crucial difference in language shift settings seems to be between contexts of globalization, nation-state contexts, and subnational contexts.

In a substantial part of the world, namely Australia, the Americas, Europe, and Japan, minority languages are increasingly under threat as they are replaced by the official languages of nation-states. However, this does not hold true for the vast majority of endangered languages spoken elsewhere, for example on the African continent. With about one-third of the world's languages, this continent is among the most linguistically rich areas on our planet.

Language maintenance activities emerge in quite different contexts and facets. Some French and Afrikaners feel a pressing need for such supportive measures even though their languages seem not to be immediately threatened by extinction. In contrast, speakers of endangered minority languages may refuse to get involved in activities that aim to maintain or revitalize the use of their ethnic tongue. Among linguists, the stances toward language maintenance also vary considerably. Some seem to want to work toward a maintenance of the world's linguistic diversity, which implies a challenge to either human evolution or a creationist design. On the other extreme, some linguists do not see it as their duty to get professionally involved in language maintenance activities. In the following account, language maintenance activities will be discussed with merely a pragmatic focus, i.e., the options and roles for speech communities, linguists, and international bodies such as the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).

Has there ever been a *Homo sapiens sapiens* proto-language, which, some 100 000 or 200 000 years ago, started the long process of diffusing into more than 100 000 languages, which have been reduced from that number to the approximately 6000 languages spoken today? Whatever possible scenario for language evolution one chooses to believe, it seems certain that our present language inventory is the remnant of a much richer pool. Furthermore, the shrinking of linguistic diversity seems to have picked up speed in the last few thousand years. This situation is of immediate concern to many linguists and numerous ethnolinguistic communities.

Terms like 'language death,' 'language murder,' 'language suicide,' and 'killer languages' evoke pictures in which languages themselves are alive or dead. Languages are portrayed by these terms either as suffering victims or as aggressive offenders, prior to any scholarly analysis. We should keep in mind that all spoken tongues are no more and no less than variations of human language. Groups of people may foster or give up an ethnic language, the latter having happened thousands of times. Communities and individuals who give up their ethnic language do not end up in total silence, unable to communicate

with anyone any longer. Such language shifters usually acquire 'modern' and more 'useful' languages. Language is one – some say the most important – asset of culture and identity. But cultures as well as identities change over time. Why then do some linguists seem to think that the status quo of language usage could and should be frozen?

While scholars would do well to refrain from sentimental statements on languages of other people, they may very well respect and assist in spreading the emotional attachment of the speakers themselves to their language. Minorities and their offspring very often experience the loss of their heritage languages as traumatic. For example, as First Nations people in Canada phrase it, without an ancestral language, people are no longer able to relate to their environment or to their spiritual world. Khwe in Namibia, Bretons in France, Ainu in Japan, Frisians in the Netherlands, Mohawks in Quebec, and many other ethnolinguistic minorities feel that way and want to maintain or regain their languages. With such communities, the question arises, what can be done and by whom?

The Intangible Cultural Heritage Unit of UNESCO has been working for more than 20 years with members of endangered language communities and linguists toward establishing an Endangered Language Section. These initiatives have resulted in the formulation of the documents 'Language Vitality and Endangerment' as well as 'Recommendations to the Director General' labeled 'Action Plans' in March 2003. I will highlight some of the key issues discussed in these documents.

It seems to me that there are basic differences in the types of language endangerment in different language contact settings. While we are quite familiar with the language endangerment situation in nation-state contexts, as found for example in the Americas, Australia, and Europe, we still know little about the other parts of the world. The greatest linguistic diversity still exists in Papua New Guinea and in Africa south of the Sahara. The threat to these languages differs from that in the previously mentioned parts of the world.

Ethnolinguistic minorities from nation-state contexts, such as the First Nations people in Canada or the Amazigh in Morocco, may benefit from examining the living experience and common practice of multilingualism in most sub-Saharan African communities. The latter, in turn, must learn about the experiences of minorities in nation-states because this will be their challenge in the near future. UNESCO is playing an important role by supporting African governments in establishing language policies that might help to allow for cultural and linguistic diversity within their nation-states.

The role of UNESCO in that process is threefold. UNESCO addresses governments on their educational and cultural policies within the frame of its 'Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity' of 2001. But UNESCO in addition requests the active involvement of linguists and speech communities to safeguard the still-existing linguistic diversity. Noriko Aikawa, director of the Intangible Heritage Section of UNESCO, stated in 2001: "UNESCO's future strategy on languages is to strengthen co-ordination between language research, policy and education programs. The results of research should be immediately incorporated into appropriate language policies, educational planning and pedagogical tools." (Aikawa, 2004: 35).

Languages Are Threatened in Different Settings

The scenarios in which the world's language diversity is threatened range from subnational settings to national contexts and finally to environments that are formed by processes associated with globalization. It is crucial, indeed, for the understanding of various aspects of language endangerment, to consider the specific contexts in which language shifts occur. In the following discussion, three different settings of language contact situations will be distinguished: the global context, the context of nation-states, and the subnational context.

Global Context

Looking at the dynamics by which languages gain speakers in the context of globalization, we find that only a few languages benefit from global merging, and these languages at present seem to be mainly English and Spanish. The international exchange of knowledge and world trade are conducted to an increasing degree in only a few world languages, and some scholars seem to expect that, given this tendency, a world culture, based on one common language, will finally emerge from these developments.

But up to now, we can state that languages have not been replaced in the context of globalization. The so-called world languages – increasingly English only – are acquired as additional and not as first languages. For example, the integration of the new European Union member states accelerates the spread of English as the European lingua franca. In the course of this process, French will further lose second language speakers, but at the same time, none of the European national languages, especially not French, will lose first language speakers to English ('After Babel,' 2004).

Nation-State Context

In the context of nation-states, governments obviously rely on the languages in which they run the countries. National majority languages are widely established and used in administration, politics, science, and education, as well as in media and literature. Such national languages may not be confined to single political-administrative territories; the same language may be in such a dominant position in several nation-states. National languages may also not cover an entire nation-state, as we see in Quebec. However, common to all these national languages is the criterion that they are instrumentalized by governments, and with that they receive official support and recognition within nation-states.

In the same context of nation-states, we often find minority languages, which are threatened and marginalized by the dominance of established national languages. Languages of this latter type are, for example, Japanese, Finnish, German (German, Standard), and Dutch. In their areas of domination they endanger minority languages such as Ainu, Saami, Sorbic, and Frisian, respectively. At the same time, various forms of English are threatening and replacing minority languages in quite a number of nation-states, such as the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand. Within north African states, national Arabic varieties are expanding – not only as a second language but also as a mother tongue – and replacing the ancestral languages of Amazigh communities.

Kiswahili (Swahili), in the Republic of Tanzania, and Setswana (Tswana), in the Republic of Botswana, are among the few African languages that are established as media of nationwide communication. Only these two sub-Saharan African languages have been described as threats to other languages in the context of the nation-state. Kiswahili threatens more than 130 other Tanzanian languages, while Setswana does the same to about 30 languages spoken in Botswana. Other African languages with a nationwide distribution, such as Kinyaruanda (Rwanda) and Kirundi (Rundi), do not threaten minority languages at all, because no minority languages exist within the national boundaries.

Subnational Contexts

Minority languages in many parts of the world, however, are threatened in subnational contexts. In sub-Saharan Africa, as just mentioned, very few African languages are established nationwide. On the national level, African governments predominantly use the imported languages of the former colonial powers, and these are the prevailing languages in national

administration, in secondary and higher education, in modern literature, etc. In most African countries, the knowledge of these imported languages is still – after 40 years of independence – confined to the educated elite in the urban centers. One indication that imported, formerly colonial languages have not developed into the languages of the masses is the fact that not a single African language has so far been replaced by French and English. The only exception on the African continent seems to be the language of the Guanche on the Canary Islands, who lost their Amazigh language to Spanish after their final defeat in 1496. If we consider Afrikaans as a European language, then of course quite a number of Khoisan languages have been replaced by that Indo-European language, which is spoken exclusively on the African continent.

For that reason, language displacement in sub-Saharan Africa occurs, in by far the most cases, in subnational contexts, i.e., minority languages are generally not replaced by established national majority languages. Language shift takes place in local contact situations and for quite different reasons. For example, speakers of a minority language may shift from their language to another due to the adoption of a different religious faith. Former hunter-gatherer communities may assimilate to pastoral societies not only in the mode of production but also by taking the language of the pastoralist. Thus, African minority languages are threatened and replaced by other African languages, languages which themselves are very often minor languages within the nation-state.

Ethnolinguistic minorities in sub-Saharan Africa generally live in complex language contact situations in which they are marginalized in subnational contexts and for various reasons. The processes that may lead to the extinction of their languages are very different from those that affect minority languages in the contexts of nation-states. In the latter context, minority languages are generally threatened because they are dominated by national majority languages. In sub-Saharan Africa, in contrast, most languages of ethnolinguistic minorities have survived until today precisely because their speakers have been and are being marginalized and neglected, in other words, excluded from national developments. Of course, this should not lead us to be cynical and to conclude that it may be better to let the people suffer in order to keep their languages alive, so to speak. With continued efforts and good fortune, the sub-Saharan African nations, too, will progress further, and nation-states there will become the dominant frames of reference for minorities and their cultures. Then, policies that respect and appreciate cultural and linguistic diversity as an asset rather than an obstacle

to national unity may help to foster the use of heritage languages among minority communities. This seems to be one of the most prominent fields for further activities for UNESCO and also for linguists.

Which Languages Are Endangered?

The evaluation of the state of vitality of any language is a challenging task, mainly because speech communities are complex and language use patterns within these communities are difficult to explore. In addition, poor infrastructure and rigid political conditions may not even allow for determining the number of actual speakers of a language.

In 2001, an Ad-hoc Expert Group on Endangered Languages was asked by the Intangible Cultural Heritage Unit of UNESCO to prepare a draft overview of the threat to the world's language diversity. From March 10 to 12, 2003, an International Expert Meeting on Endangered Languages was held at the UNESCO headquarters in Paris, and linguists and language planners, representatives of nongovernmental organizations, and members of endangered-language speech communities discussed the draft. Two documents, namely, 'Language Vitality and Endangerment' and recommendations to the director general (labeled 'Action Plans'), were formulated in March 2003.

In the first document, nine major factors are identified to assess the language situation of endangered languages (see **Table 1**).

Factors 1 through 6 focus on the assessment of a language's vitality and its state of endangerment. The single most important factor is the first one, which asks for the extent of language acquisition among the children within a community. It is obvious that a language without any young speakers is seriously threatened with extinction.

Factors 1 through 5 are meant to capture the dynamics of the processes of a given language shift situation. The proportion of speakers within

Table 1 Factors for assessing endangered languages[a]

Degree of endangerment
1. Intergenerational language transmission
2. Absolute number of speakers
3. Proportion of speakers within the total population
4. Loss of existing language domains
5. Response to new domains and media
6. Material for language education and literacy
7. Governmental and institutional language attitudes and policies, including official status and use
8. Speakers' attitudes towards their own language
Urgency of documentation
9. Amount and quality of documentation

[a]UNESCO, 2003.

a community (factor 3) reveals an important aspect of language vitality: is the minority language an essential indicator for being regarded as a member of the community or not? The Arggobba in Ethiopia, for example, strongly insist on and declare their ethnic identity and origin even though their language has disappeared and it is not known whether any speakers of Arggobba still exist among the more than 60 000 Arggobba.

Loss of domains (factor 4) for an ethnic tongue may be triggered by, for example, the introduction of formal education or by new job opportunities for members of minority groups. A change in religious affiliation can also result in a shift to another mother tongue, a language that is associated with the new religion (factor 5). For example, Hausa and Dyula (Jula) spread in west Africa along with Islam. An outstanding example of the correlation between language and religious affiliation is the community of the Jeri leatherworkers, who live among the Sienare Senofo in the northern part of the Ivory Coast. The members of the Jeri community abandon their own language and adopt two different languages as new mother tongues according to their religious affiliation: "Sienare with the non-Muslim, and Manding with the Muslim Jeri" (Kastenholz, 1998: 259).

Factor 6 relates to the stage of development of a given language ('Ausbau'). Is there a community orthography? Have they agreed on a common standard form for writing the language? Do teaching and learning materials for the language exist? Is literature, such as newsletters, stories, religious texts, and so forth, published in that language?

Factor 8 assesses the speakers' attitudes toward their ethnic language, and factor 7 deals with the government's policies toward that language. And finally, factor 9 attempts to evaluate the urgency for documentation by asking for the quantity and quality of existing analyzed language data.

For minority languages in national contexts, such as in Canada, New Zealand, and Morocco, it is obvious which of the languages have to be regarded as being endangered, i.e., the First Nations languages, Maori, and Amazigh, respectively. In other contexts, all these nine factors should be taken together in surveying the overall sociolinguistic situation of a language with respect to its degree of endangerment.

What Is Actually Lost When Languages Vanish?

The preamble to UNESCO's 'Language Vitality and Endangerment' document includes the following statement:

The extinction of each language results in the irrecoverable loss of unique cultural, historical, and ecological knowledge. Each language is a unique expression of the human experience of the world. Thus, the knowledge of any single language may be the key to answering fundamental questions of the future. Every time a language dies, we have less evidence for understanding patterns in the structure and function of human language, human prehistory, and the maintenance of the world's diverse ecosystems. Above all, speakers of these languages may experience the loss of their language as a loss of their original ethnic and cultural identity. (UNESCO, 2003: 2, with permission.)

Obviously, linguists need language data from as many languages as possible in order to reconstruct language history, set up typologies on aspects of structure, or understand concepts underlying languages. But above that, do endangered languages offer anything special to linguists?

In his article 'The endangered languages of Ethiopia: what's at stake for the linguists?' Hayward (1998) provides several examples of unusual structural phenomena that exist only in endangered Ethiopian languages. For example, an established typology of number systems had to be fundamentally revised because of linguistic forms found in Bayso (Baiso), an endangered language spoken in the southern part of Ethiopia.

The lexicon and categories of each language are based on and reflect a certain conceptualization of the world. The human population shares more and more perceptions of the world channeled through a rapidly spreading global culture. With that, concepts diverging from the global norms are rapidly fading and appear to be the most vulnerable assets of languages. The numeral systems, spatial orientation, and taxonomies are only some of the areas that are being homogenized in this process (Brenzinger, 2003).

As a final example, even the sounds of languages may no longer be heard, which is unquestionably an essential loss, maybe not only for linguists. The bilabial click, also referred to as the 'kiss click,' had been reported by the late Oswin Köhler (personal communication) to be extinct with the death of the last speaker of a Southern Khoesan language in the early 1970s. At the same time, Anthony Traill collected language data from !Xóõ, "the last of the Southern Bushmen languages that were once spoken throughout southern Africa" (Traill, 1985: 6). With these approximately 1000 speakers of variants of !Xóõ, a unique sound of human language, the kiss click, has survived until today.

In turning to the speakers themselves, we may ask: do they suffer from any loss when they abandon their heritage language?

Lee Cronk, an American social anthropologist, has studied the change in ethnicity and culture of a former hunter-gatherer people in Kenya. This community was formerly known as Yaaku, then Mukogodo, and today they belong to the Maasai society. The community lost the former Cushitic language and adopted the Maa language. The Mukogodo took over the pastoral mode of production and along with that the culture of the Maasai.

> Mukogodo [born around the 1930s] and before were born in rock shelters, grew up speaking Yaaku, and ate honey and wild game. Younger people were born in small houses, grew up speaking Maa, and drink milk and eat meat from goat, sheep, and cattle. In the past few decades, Mukogodo have also begun attending schools, getting jobs in and outside the Mukogodo area, and even traveling to Ulaya [Europe] itself. Change has been the norm for most humanity for the past century or more, and nowhere has it been faster or more dramatic than among the Mukogodo. (Cronk, 2004: 2, with permission.)

Maasai culture has spread over a wide area of east Africa, and several hunter-gatherer communities have lost their distinct identity and language in the "homogenizing force of Maasai society and culture" (Cronk, 2004: 143). Cronk captured an experience I had while working with a Yaaku elder in 1990:

> One day while conducting an interview with an elderly Mukogodo man about the old language [Yaaku], Brenzinger played back some Yaaku phrases that the man had spoken earlier into a tape recorder. At first, the man was delighted to hear the old language, even if it was coming from a box rather than from a person. Not really understanding the principle of the tape recorder, he tried engaging it in conversation, giving the customary cheery 'Eiuwuo!' response to the recorded greeting 'Aichee!' But soon it became obvious that the tape recorder did not really know how to carry on a conversation in Yaaku. The man first became frustrated, then very angry, and finally he began to weep. (Cronk, 2004: 83, with permission.)

In 1990, only a few elders remembered fragments of the old Yaaku language, and the emotional affection for the Yaaku language, as expressed in the above story, was not shared by other community members. The young members of the community were not interested in the language of their grandparents, whom they thought of as 'primitive' cave people, even though some of them were still alive. The community had adopted the Maasai lifestyle and values in sharing the high appreciation for cattle and Maasai customs such as female circumcision, the age-set system (in which groups of men go through initiation and other stages of life together), and marriage ceremonies.

Although the Mukogodo-Maasai decided to abandon their former language and culture, many other indigenous peoples insist that linguistic (and ethnic) identity is essential and enables them to respond to the everyday challenges in their lives. The deep-rooted emotional affection of many speakers for their language has been expressed very often. The following statement is by Christine Johnson, a Tohono O'odham elder, for the American Indian Language Development Institute in June 2002.

> I speak my favourite language
> because
> that's who I am.
> We teach our children our favourite language,
> because
> we want them to know who they are. (UNESCO, 2003: 1)

There are members of various globally dominant cultures who think that the worldwide spread of one language, of course their own (together with their culture, economy, and religion), would be for the benefit of all humankind. Obviously, not everyone agrees on that. However, one also has to respect the will of communities that decide to abandon their language and culture, as described with the former Yaaku, today's Mukogodo-Maasai.

What Could and Should Be Done?

What is the first priority when languages are threatened by extinction? Among scholars, there is hardly any argument: documentation, i.e., research on and collection of data from endangered languages, is the fundamental task for linguists working in this field.

Within ethnolinguistic communities discussions on the future of their ancestral languages are far more complex, and quite diverse opinions are expressed. Those speaking endangered languages often consider their own language as being backward and not functional for themselves and future generations. Other communities, however, experience threats to their languages as a crisis and commit themselves to language (re)vitalization activities, establishing environments, such as kindergartens, in which their languages are exclusively spoken in order to stabilize their mother languages among the young generation. An increasing number of ethnolinguistic minorities want more. Firstly, they demand control over the terms and conditions that govern the conduct of research; secondly, they claim rights on research outcomes and also want to have a say in how research results should be used and disseminated.

There is a minimal consensus among linguists on the overall importance of the preservation of

language data of endangered languages. However, reactions to demands for assistance by the speech communities with which linguists work may vary widely. Such requests relate mainly to four areas, which may be regarded as essential for safeguarding endangered languages.

Language Work

Many scholars working with ethnolinguistic minorities are willing to help develop practical orthographies that can be used by community members themselves. And some scholars assist communities in the production of reading, learning, and teaching materials.

Capacity Building

Capacity building in this context may refer to the training of local language workers in reading and writing their own languages, the production of reading materials, etc. More privileged settings further allow for the training of language teachers. The formation of local, academic research centers in which speakers of endangered languages are trained to study and document their own languages is possible with quite a few ethnolinguistic minorities. And an exceptional case for the African continent is the Royal Institute for the Amazigh Culture, in which professors and researchers have worked since October 17, 2001, in a national research institute at the University of Rabat to document and develop their own threatened mother tongue, Amazigh.

Language Policy

Language policy is a highly sensitive issue in well-established democracies and even more so in countries that are still struggling to find their way to good governance. Very few linguists are actively involved in the formulation of national language policies in countries of the first kind, and none I know of in those of the second.

In the educational sector, quite a number of linguists are engaged in implementing mother tongue education programs to safeguard ancestral languages. Mother tongue education has become more popular in most parts of the world over the past 15 years, and UNESCO has been instrumental in this development through its policy statements and related activities since 1953.

Looking at endangered languages, however, we find that in many Asian and African countries, so-called mother tongue education does not refer to the ancestral languages of ethnolinguistic minorities but to the use of local, provincial, and national dominant languages as the media of instruction. Less than 10% of the approximately 2000 African languages are currently employed as media of instruction in the educational sector, with not even a single endangered language among them. Mother tongue education in many cases further cements the position of languages that spread at the expense of endangered languages. As linguists, we are obliged to support any attempt to use African languages in formal education, but with that we may involuntarily help to threaten the languages of ethnolinguistic minorities, which are not included among the media of mother tongue education. There seems to be no way out of this dilemma.

Living Conditions

Dealing with the living conditions of communities is commonly not considered to be within the assignment of linguists. Nevertheless, linguists could help to overcome problems caused by economic poverty and lack of education. For example, national HIV/AIDS awareness programs do not generally consider the often-illiterate ethnolinguistic minorities. Materials produced for these marginalized communities require input from linguists because the concepts and contents need to be conveyed in a culturally meaningful way. Only then can these communities understand the challenge of HIV/AIDS and react to it appropriately.

Roles for Linguists and Speech Communities

Maintaining language diversity demands the involvement of linguists, language planners, and policy makers. Akira Yamamoto has been rightfully demanding for many years that 'research in endangered language communities must be reciprocal and collaborative' because only in working together with the communities are linguists able to contribute to the safeguarding of endangered languages.

Some scholars estimate that in the last 500 years at least half of the languages formerly spoken throughout the world have disappeared. They suggest that only 10% of the present day languages are safe, i.e., not threatened with extinction. To safeguard the vast number of endangered languages requires actions in quite a number of different areas, far more than the few mentioned above. The specific activities that can and should be carried out in a given research setting are determined by several factors. Each research context has its specific limitations and prospects, and these always depend heavily on communities' attitudes toward their own language and their perception of the research carried out on it. And yet, the professional and social competence of a researcher is crucial in determining what is actually possible in the collaboration between the scholar and the speech community.

Having a linguist who is a member of the community does not always keep other community members from doubting linguistic research being carried out on an endangered language. Ofelia Zepeda, a trained linguist who wrote her Ph.D. thesis on her mother tongue, describes the most critical challenges to her linguistic work, which came from her own people, the O'odham. The objections to her work came from two different angles. The few O'odham people who had received some linguistic training some years before her, instead of supporting her, created obstacles to her work.

> Interestingly it was this small group of skilled O'odham language teachers who looked at my publication critically and in their own way offered criticism. However, their criticism was often not constructive or friendly. While still other O'odham people, taking the conservative position, let me know that it was wrong to write the language and to publish it for wide dissemination. (Zepeda, 2004: 7)

Dr Zepeda published *A Papago grammar* in 1982, but the O'odham people have only now, after more than 20 years, started to acknowledge her academic and community work on her mother tongue.

Proficiency in nationally and internationally dominant languages will gain importance throughout the world and, for that reason, will continue to spread. This development does not necessarily require the sacrifice of other languages, i.e., mother tongues of ethnolinguistic minorities, because most societies have always been multilingual. However, speakers might decide to abandon a low-prestige ethnic tongue for the benefit of social mobility and career opportunities. Languages are either maintained or abandoned by their speakers. In these situations, ancestral languages can survive in the long run only if meaningful roles for them can be established in the lives of the community members. Ultimately, in order to maintain and perpetuate the world's language diversity, these speakers have to find good reasons for keeping their ancestral language alive in natural everyday communication with their offspring.

See also: Endangered Languages; Environment and Language; Identity and Language; Language Planning and Policy: Models.

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Language Planning and Policy: Models

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Just as with many new fields, there continues to be disagreement over the name of this one, variously called language policy (Nesiah, 1954; Sibayan, 1974), language treatment (Neustupný, 1970), language cultivation (Prague School, 1973), language engineering (Sibayan, 1974), language planning (Haugen, 1959), and language management (Jernudd, 2001). While the last five are more or less synonymous, referring to attempts by authorities to modify language behavior, the first can refer to the customary practices in choice of language items and variety in a speech community, or to a specific decision or set of decisions to modify those practices. To avoid confusion, we will use the terms as follows. The language policy of a speech community (an undefined term, ranging in size from a family through a nation-state to a multinational grouping) consists of the commonly agreed set of choices of language items – whether sounds or words or grammar – or language varieties – whether codes or dialects or named languages – and the beliefs or ideologies associated with those choices. It can be found in language practices and beliefs or in formal policy decisions such as laws, constitutions, or regulations. Language management, planning, engineering, cultivation, and treatment are actions taken by formal authorities such as governments or other agencies or people who believe that they have authority, such as parents, teachers, or academies, to modify the language choices made by those they claim to have under their control (Spolsky, 2004). Language management itself has three components: the development of explicit language plans and policies, their implementation (by rules or laws or resource allocation), and the evaluation of results and effects (cf. Rubin and Jernudd, 1979: 2–3).

Managing Bad and Good Language

Language policy makers and analysts apply the term policy and its synonyms to a wide variety of administrative levels ranging from international organizations (Van Els, 2001) to world regions (Extra and Gorter, 2001; Kaplan and Baldauf, 2003) to countries (Grenoble, 2003; Lo Bianco and Wickert, 2001), or to single educational institutions (Karyolemou, 2002). The term has been expanded to include what is referred to as 'grass roots language policy', that is, policy originating in or influenced by the affected members of the speech community (Hornberger, 1996). Cooper (1989) shows that it can usefully be applied to a family level.

The main principles of language policy become evident even at this simplest level. In any family, there is language policy, as shown by the normal choices of

language in the speech practices of the group, viz., which variety of language is addressed in practice to each member. For instance, baby talk (Ferguson, 1964) may be used with very young children, heritage languages (Cummins, 1983) with grandparents, or community languages (Smolicz and Secombe, 1985) with outsiders. In immigrant families, there is commonly a difference in language usage between adults, older children, and younger children. There are socially determined differences concerning who usually has the right to speak and what topics and forms of language are appropriate when the family gathers. In conversations between adult caretakers and children, there are commonly efforts to manage language choice, whether by encouraging the use of one variety or by attempting to discourage bad language. Definitions of what is bad language vary socially. It may consist of presumed mistakes in grammar or pronunciation, or the use of stigmatized forms or expressions such as cursing, obscenity, blasphemy, foreignisms, or inelegancies. Often beliefs or an ideology will be quite different from practice. Immigrant parents may think that their children should use either the heritage or the new language exclusively. Such beliefs may or may not lead to successful efforts at management.

The effort to avoid bad language and teach good language is carried outside the home into other institutions, particularly the school which takes a leading role in efforts to modify the language known and used by its pupils. Because of their central role in language socialization, school teachers are most comfortable, it seems, with a standardized variety of language, with clear statements on what is right and what is wrong. They commonly share the puristic belief, that there is a 'correct' variety of language, and, *contra* King Cnut, the key belief that language management is possible. They believe that they themselves use correct language: French teachers are sure they pronounce the *l* in *il vient* and Palestinian teachers are sure they teach in Modern Standard Arabic.

Correctness, however discovered or defined, is one common criterion for good language (Guitarte and Quintero, 1974). Another is the avoidance of obscenity, sometimes institutionalized in laws and regulations at the local and national government level. The United States has federal laws against obscenity, but standards and definitions are local (Harrison and Gilbert, 2000). Blasphemy, an obvious concern of religious institutions, is unlikely to be a matter of legislation in secular nations, but remains an issue in the many states with religiously dominated constitutions such as Pakistan. Seditious language, as opposed to actual sedition and violent language ('fighting words' in the laws of some southern U.S. states) is also criminalized in some nations.

A more recent criterion for good and bad language is 'political correctness', the avoidance of chauvinist or racist language. The campaign to avoid words or expressions that stigmatize racial or religious groups or that express prejudice based on gender (assigned or constructed) is about half a century old in the West. In the United States it has led to language management efforts especially by publishers and editors who try to ban gender-biased terminology and grammar (Pauwels, 1998).

A common criterion for language management, one that moves us closer to the realm associated with national language policy, is the avoidance of expressions and words considered foreign (Annamalai, 1989). One of the inevitable effects of culture and language contact, and it is difficult to distinguish the two, is a tendency to borrow foreign words along with the new concepts and artifacts that they label. In many situations, ideological opposition to foreign borrowings is nearly as strong as opposition to the use of foreign languages (Kroskrity, 1998). In Latin America from the conquest, there was puristic opposition to the use of 'americanismos', defined as words borrowed from native languages or locally coined, and a similar anti-foreign purism now calls for laws against borrowings from English (Rajagopalan, 2002). The idea of a pure uncontaminated language is widespread (Jernudd and Shapiro, 1989). Preventing linguistic corruption was and remains a key task of the French Academy. Most national language movements hold puristic beliefs, although the particular source of contamination (French in the Dutch-speaking portion of Belgium, Arabic in Turkish, Yiddish in Hebrew, Danish and now English in Icelandic) varies. Presumably, this represents a belief in the identifying and symbolic value of language. By admitting foreign elements, 'I may be weakening my national identity'.

Three important generalizations emerge from the discussion so far. One is the tension between pragmatic communicative goals (for instance, the caretaker aims to give the child the most efficient variety of language) and symbolic and social goals (identifying the speaker with a chosen social group). A second generalization relates to the linguistic and social levels on which policy can apply: linguistically, it can refer to a single sound or word (*ain't*) or to a labeled variety of language (jargon, English); socially, it can apply to a small social group such as a family or to a higher level such as a nation state or an international federation. A third generalization is that policy is manifested in practice, in beliefs or ideology, and in management activities, and while the three aspects are intertwined, they need not be consistent.

National Language Policies

Most analyses of language policy and management are concerned with formal, governmentally backed activities at the national or regional level aimed at controlling language knowledge and use within a country or region.

During the first phase of the study of language planning, Kloss (1969) proposed a useful distinction between what he called status planning, the determination of the status and functions of a language in a community (such as 'official' or 'national') and what he called corpus planning, the specification of the proper form a particular language should take (such as writing system or spelling or approved lexicon or grammar). Planning was considered an appropriate term in the 1960s, as one part of national development planning (Das Gupta and Ferguson, 1977).

Cooper (1989) added to these two the field of acquisition planning, the determination of which languages should be taught to those who do not speak them and how. While these three domains are conceptually distinct, in practice they overlap. Making a language variety official usually involves standardizing it, writing it down, and modernizing it. It also requires teaching it to citizens who do not know it. Foreign and domestic language policies are blended in situations like the status of French in Canada, the retention of colonial languages in Africa, and the status of trans-border languages in ethnic enclaves such as Swedish in Finland or French and Italian in Switzerland or French and German in Italy.

Corpus Planning and Management

Concern for the form of language may be discerned in the efforts of parents, teachers, and other caretakers to make sure that their charges speak clearly and use forms that are acceptable. It appears more fully developed and institutionalized in efforts to maintain the purity and correctness of sacred texts and in the educational systems that take on some responsibility for correctness. Indeed, language management agencies (Dominguez and López, 1995) are often part of a ministry of education.

More generally, in many countries, especially those where the issue of status is not salient, the largest share of language management is concerned with corpus policy, the prescription of the proper form a language should take, and the cultivation of a language to handle appropriate functions (Prague School, 1973). This can take a variety of forms. In many of the least developed countries and among some indigenous groups in developed countries, the

principal corpus activity is the adoption or adaptation of a script and the promotion of literacy among its speakers (Fishman, 1977).

Another frequent goal is language purification (Neustupný, 1989). Commonly this involves an attempt to return to a sometimes fictitious primal language, purging the modern language of loan words and expressions imported from other languages (Jernudd and Shapiro, 1989). Examples are the purging of Persian and the substitution of Sanskrit-based words in Hindi, and the reverse in Urdu (R. King, 2001). Similarly, the deletion of foreign influences in German during the Nazi years and the perpetual struggle of French against Franglish (Weinstein, 1989) are of the same order. Sometimes purification is more extensive. For instance, under Atatürk, a deliberate attempt was made to simplify and modernize Turkish (G. Lewis, 1999). Older linguistic forms borrowed from Ottoman Turkish, Persian, and Arabic were replaced with elements identified with a Turkic past, and the Perso-Arabic script was converted to a Roman one. Similarly, in China the development of Putonghua was accompanied by extensive modernization of vocabulary and morphology (Coulmas, 1991). In a similar vein, the attempt to create a pan-national standard Arabic and to diffuse it throughout the Middle East and North Africa, overlaying the sometimes mutually unintelligible country dialects, has required major innovation in the writing system, grammar, and lexicon of the language (Suleiman, 2003).

Sometimes corpus activity has been directed to the revival or rejuvenation of a language that historically had become fossilized or marginalized, for instance, the attempt to support the use of Quichua in the Ecuadorian Andes (K. King, 2000). Similar management may be found in the attempts to spread the use of Celtic languages in Ireland, Scotland, Wales, Cornwall, and Brittany. In the case of Cornish, extinct for nearly two centuries, and with only medieval texts available, the decision to revive the language required a major effort to rebuild the vocabulary.

Another example showing how corpus management fosters the status of marginalized languages is the use of institutional power to promote selected languages. For instance, the status of Hebrew was transformed from a sacred and literary language in the Jewish diaspora to the recognized language for everyday use in the Jewish community in Mandatory Palestine, a development which prepared for it for its role as the official language in Israel (Spolsky and Shohamy, 1999). Classical Arabic has been used to enhance religious identity among Muslims; in the Arabic speaking countries, it is usually listed alongside religion in the constitutional definition of

the state. After Indian independence, Sanskrit was listed in the Constitution as one of the official languages of India, was proposed as a medium for the transmission of news on the radio, and is now set as the medium of instruction in three universities. The new draft constitution of Iraq moves Kurdish close to equality with Arabic. An Official Maori Language Act in New Zealand provided official status for what was considered an endangered language. Official status is not enough – Ireland and New Zealand and Valencia were able to increase the numbers who have learned Irish and Maori and Catalan by adding resources for teaching the languages, but they have not so far been able to increase the number of people actually using the language.

The converse of the policy of promoting little-used languages is the deliberate removal or downgrading of languages. The systematic suppression of the use of Tibetan in China or Kurdish in Turkey or the autochthonous languages among the American North, Central, and South American Indians are clear examples. In the same vein, but less dramatic, are the efforts by the former Soviet states (Hogan-Brun and Ramoniene, 2003; Landau and Kellner-Heinkele, 2001) to replace Russian with their titular language. While most of this policy is directed at language use – in government, the press, the media, the educational system – it also includes changes in the language itself. These changes include the purging of Russian forms and vocabulary (added during the period of Stalinist Russification) from the titular language, a search for alternative cultural and historical roots – in the case of Muslim states emphasizing Turkic origins – and the creation of neologisms both to replace Russian borrowings and to modernize the traditional language (Grenoble, 2003). In most of these nations, shifts to roman scripts had begun even before independence, but then became more pervasive. In some of the former satellite Baltic and Eastern European states, the Russian language has been stripped of its dominant position in government and the educational system.

Status Management

The status of a language variety refers to the domains and extent of its use and to its associated rankings in society. More particularly, status management usually refers to the designation of languages as official for use in the public sector and in the educational system. Most scholarly analysis of language planning and policy is concerned with status, although, as Fishman (2000) points out, status and corpus are usually intertwined. The nature of status policy depends substantially on differences in the number and types of languages spoken in a country (Lambert, 1999).

Countries with a single dominant language face a different set of policy issues compared with linguistically dyadic or triadic countries – those with two or three relatively equal languages. Similarly, countries that are linguistic mosaics, that have a large number of significant languages, have different sets of problems from monolingual and dyadic or triadic language countries.

Ideologically Monolingual Countries

Few countries are truly linguistically homogeneous – Iceland is probably the closest (Vikor, 2001) – but many countries in Western Europe, the Americas, and Asia have perceived themselves as being essentially monolingual. In Europe, this is especially striking in the face of persistent multilingualism. The recently published *Encyclopedia of the Languages of Europe* (Price, 2000) listed some 300 historical and currently used languages in Europe. Several of the countries in East Asia, too, essentially see themselves as monolingual although each contains important language minorities. In these cases, there is generally what Fishman (1969) labeled a single Great Tradition, which is associated with a single language. Generally, these countries leave the interest in the selection and standardization of the national language to the field of historical linguistics, but for those with a more recent history, there are studies looking at the first congress proclaiming the language (Fishman, 1993) and of the struggle for standardization. In linguistically homogeneous countries (Fishman, 1966a), the principal focus of language policy has been on corpus management, the cultivation and purification of the national language (for instance, Pedersen, 2003), supplemented in some countries – notably France, Germany, and Japan – by efforts to export the national language abroad (language diffusion policy) (Cooper, 1982).

Within ideologically 'linguistically homogeneous' countries, language policies that relate to linguistic minorities depend in part on the kind of minority involved.

Ethno-Linguistic Regional Minorities Long-standing, geographically concentrated minorities with a recognized history and culture receive the bulk of attention in both governmental and educational language policy, as well as in academic analysis. Examples of such minorities are the Swedish-speaking minority in Finland, the Sami in Finland, Sweden, and Russia, and the Celtic language communities in Ireland, Great Britain, and France. The dominant paradigm in European status policy and in academic analysis is the protection of such linguistic minorities against the absorptive effects of the dominant national language.

A wide variety of country and language specific case studies is now available (Dorian, 1998; Fishman, 2002; Grenoble and Whaley, 1998; Hale, 1991; Krauss, 1991). Most of them exemplify this approach. The use of terms such as 'threatened', 'dying', 'endangered' languages and at the extreme, 'language death', and 'linguistic genocide' reflect the nature of such analyses. The intended effect of these terms is to characterize the aspirations of ethno-linguistic minorities in terms of group and individual rights. These rights are elaborated by law in many monolingual countries, as well as in covenants and resolutions enacted by international bodies: The European Charter for Minority or Regional Languages, a Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, The Oslo Recommendations regarding the Linguistic Rights of National Minorities, The Hague Recommendation Regarding the Education Rights of National Minorities, and the Universal Declaration of Linguistic Rights (Ferguson, 1968; May, 2001; Nic Shuibhne, 2001). For instance, the term 'other languages' of Europe is a product of an international organization, the European Union. It refers to "all languages apart from the eleven official languages that are ignored in public and official activities of the European Union (Extra and Gorter, 2001: 1)." In practical European Union policy, with its first principle of national sovereignty, the identification of a protected linguistic minority is reserved to the founder states, which have the option to exclude any variety they label as a dialect, as Sweden in 1995 decided that the Charter applied to Sami, Tormedal Finnish, Finnish, Romani Chib, and Yiddish, but not Skanian with 1.5 million speakers, and France prefers not to recognize Occitan.

The effect of official designation of a minority language, whether within a country or internationally, can be of substantial benefit to the group, expanding its claim to educational and governmental support. Consequently, there is constant pressure to expand the list, drawing the line further down the continuum from language to dialect or giving legal identity to different types of languages. For instance, the deaf community has sought recognition of sign languages as separate minority languages, but the European Union continues to resist this. Efforts have also been made in the United States to declare Black English a minority language, and thus subject to special protection. There has been a movement to imbed the concept of language rights in a larger framework, the promotion of multilingualism for the general population, autochthonous or immigrant (Skutnabb-Kangas, 2000).

Policies toward linguistic minorities differ according to their relative size, their degree of geographic concentration, their historical roots, their extra-country linkages, the strength of their ethnic identification, and the political activism of their leadership (Paulston, 1994). The features of official language policy that vary according to these characteristics are: (a) a language's role in the education system, in particular the class and school levels in which it is used, and whether it is taught as a subject or used as a medium of instruction; (b) its role in governmental affairs – the legislature, judiciary, administrative services, the military; (c) its role in the media, particularly that portion controlled by government; (d) the possibility of using it in access to governmental and commercial institutions, and (e) its use in the workplace.

In academic analyses of minority language policy, a number of constructs have been proposed to arrange language minorities along continua of relative vitality. A widely used scale is the Graded Intergenerational Disruption Scale (Fishman, 1991) based upon a language's presence in governmental affairs, education, adult use, and intergenerational transfer. The scale also purports to advise linguistic minorities on how to advance their status and how to promote the use of the language. It ranges from the most threatened eighth stage, where any effort needs to start with 're-assembling' the language from 'vestigial users . . . socially isolated old folks' and teaching it to adults, to the highest stage, where the language is used to some extent in 'higher level educational, occupational, governmental, and media efforts' but lacks the safety of political independence. In between, there are another half dozen levels, the most significant of which are probably the sixth ('intergenerational informal oracy'), the fifth ('institutional unsupported literacy') and the fourth ('use in official lower education'). In Fishman (2001), where various scholars are asked to comment on the scale, several raise questions about the ordering of the scale: for instance, there are many cases where institutionalized literacy teaching (commonly of a religiously sanctified language) continues even without much everyday oral use.

Fishman's scale was developed to account for the process that he labeled Reversing Language Shift, an attempt by supporters of a language to re-establish or establish its status. Also named 'language revival', the process of re-establishing natural intergenerational transmission (language revitalization) or vernacular use of a literary language (revernacularization) is most clearly exemplified by Hebrew.

The success of the Celtic revivals in various countries has depended on the extent to which they are backed by political power, as in Ireland where the Celtic language, Gaelic, has become a symbol of

nationhood, or in Wales, where a regional government has championed its use. However, even in countries and regions where there is strong governmental backing, only a minority of the population actually speaks the Celtic language. Other cases of revival involve territorial linguistic minorities.

Territorial Linguistic Minorities Territorial linguistic minorities also differ in the extent to which their speakers seek full political autonomy, as do the Tamils of Sri Lanka, and some of the Basques in Spain. For most groups, however, the goal is limited to the use of the minority language in governmental affairs and at various levels of the education system. For instance, in Spain in three constitutionally mandated autonomous regions, Basque, Catalan, and Galician languages are not only taught in schools, but public use of the language is actively promoted, and, because their speakers occupy their own political units within Spain, they can determine their own official language policy within their territory (Turell, 2001). By way of contrast, in France, the Basque-speaking sections bordering on Spain are not officially recognized as separate language groups, they do not comprise a separate political unit, and they cannot determine linguistic policies. In France, the promotion of the Basque language is left to voluntary initiatives. In a similar vein, the various Celtic languages represent different kinds of territorially specific language minorities with varying claims on governmental power – one result of autonomy for Wales and Scotland has been to boost the claims of Welsh and Scottish Gaelic. In New Zealand, the campaign for Maori language regeneration accompanied a series of legal claims before a Tribunal set up to remedy failures to carry out provisions of the 1840 Treaty of Waitangi, most of which sought financial reparations for lost land and hunting and fishing rights (Spolsky, 2003).

There are many other territorially-concentrated linguistic minorities elsewhere in Europe, such as the Frisians in the Netherlands who receive special treatment in support for their bilingual education but not in their dealings with government (Gorter, 2001). Special accommodation is also made for territorial linguistic enclaves whose residents are speakers of languages of neighboring countries. For instance the Swedes in the southwestern corner of Finland (Vikor, 2000), and the Germans in the contiguous border regions of Belgium (Aunger, 1993), Italy, and France are examples of transborder linguistic minorities, the former deriving recognition from historic political union and continuing territoriality.

There are a few long-established linguistic minorities that are not geographically concentrated and that typically receive less policy attention. Of these, the most notable are the Roma or Romani, who are scattered and peripheralized. In its negotiations with new candidates for membership, the European Union generally exerted considerable pressure to have these languages supported, following a principle of 'do what I say and not what I do' and not giving them the privilege accorded to foundation members of choosing which varieties to support. While the main goal of Chinese language policy has to do with developing the common language (Putonghua) and in simplifying the characters used for writing Chinese, the cultivation and preservation of minority languages has now been added as a goal (White, 1997). After most speakers of Yiddish in Europe have been killed or have emigrated, some European countries now recognize Yiddish as a minority language (Hult, 2004).

Paulston (2004) has proposed what she calls "extrinsic linguistic (or ethnic) minorities," groups such as the Russians in Baltic Republics who went from being majorities to minorities by legal measures or the moving of borders or grants of independence, but who continue to show strong language loyalty.

Aboriginals Like other territorially concentrated linguistic minorities within homogeneous states, culturally distinct autochthonous groups receive a great deal of attention both in language policy and in academic analyses. Often the languages of such groups are in a wide variety of stages of development. Hence, a primary focus of management is on alphabetization and the promotion of literacy and oracy. In most cases, the drive for language rights among aboriginal groups is tied to cultural revival and reinforcement. Linguistic groups whose members are still active speakers of their languages and who are territorially concentrated, such as the Samis in the Nordic countries (Jernsletten, 1993) and Russia, or the Quichua (K. King, 2000) in the Andean highlands of Peru, Bolivia, and Ecuador have greater success in achieving special treatment in language policy. More dispersed aboriginal groups such as the American Indians and the aboriginal tribes in Australia who are dispersed through a hundred different regions (Lo Bianco and Rhydwen, 2001), have an even greater difficulty in language maintenance – although the Navajo have had some success (McCarty, 2002; Spolsky, 2002). An exception are the Maoris in New Zealand who have had great success in cultural and linguistic revival through concentrated political agitation and through the use of Maori in Te Kohanga Reo, the preschool 'language nest' programs and the subsequent development of immersion education in

elementary schools (Benton and Benton, 2001). Autochthonous minorities, although commonly suffering from political and social and economic discrimination, at least can claim that they were there first. Autochthonous languages are obviously especially endangered, for they lack other territories where they are spoken.

Immigrants   Language policies are much less accommodating to the needs of immigrant groups. In fact, almost all of the international covenants supporting the rights of linguistic minorities apply only to citizens, arguing that immigrants chose to live in the country and so can reasonably be expected to make an effort to learn its language. In addition, the claim that the preservation of immigrant languages is required for maintenance of language diversity is a weak one, for their languages are usually spoken in the country from which they come. However, recently this distinction has been blurred (Hornberger, 1998). In the early years immediately after World War II during the first major flow of 'guest workers' into Europe, they were expected to go back to their home countries after a brief sojourn. Moreover, at that time, any service of their linguistic needs in education was supposed to be provided by their home countries. In addition, immigrant groups tended to be widely dispersed in cities and did not constitute a separate territorial unit. Over more recent decades, their numbers have grown immensely, particularly with Eastern Europeans migrating into Western Europe, citizens of former colonies moving to the metropolitan homeland, and a major wave of migrants from Islamic countries. As their numbers have grown, they have not tended to form separate territorial groups, although their concentration in urban areas, their numbers, and their growing political influence have come to require special educational and governmental accommodation. These may include the provision of instruction in the home language in primary schools, the translation of government documents and court proceedings into the home language, and, in some countries, support for instruction of new immigrants in the national language of the country. In spite of expressions of support for immigrants and their human rights, there has been a tendency to require proficiency in the official language for citizenship and in some cases for immigration.

The United States provides a clear example of this transformation. Over two centuries, massive waves of immigrants have been absorbed. Historically, they tended to be widely dispersed into a number of cities, where little islands would be created. Each group, however, was expected in time to merge into the general population, including the learning of English (Fishman, 1966b). After a period when immigration was restricted by legal quotas, the number of immigrants has increased rapidly. As a result, there are now 3 million children in the United States who speak at home a language other than English. They are referred to as Limited English Proficiency (LEP) children. Three-fourths of the LEP students are Hispanic, and instead of dispersing throughout the country they have become a major territorial language minority in Florida and the American southwest and West, particularly California. One result was the institution of language rights accorded territorial linguistic minorities elsewhere, including a highly institutionalized system of bilingual education in primary schools, and representation of Spanish in public life and the media (Roca, 2000). This development has given rise in some states to reverse pressure to enact legislation banning bilingual education and making English the only official language (Baron, 1990).

Dyadic or Triadic Societies

Countries that have two or three major recognized languages such as Canada, Belgium, Switzerland, Sri Lanka, and Cyprus, each with its own territory, have problems of language policy different from those facing ideologically homogeneous countries. In such countries, language management issues tend to pervade large sectors of the educational system and public life. As in linguistically homogeneous counties, some provision may be made for lesser language minorities, but the fabric of the state itself tends to be linguistically consociational involving only the primary languages. The preferred solution to any conflict is territorial: governmental and educational institutions are organized separately in the different language areas, and political power is carefully balanced between the linguistic units. An extreme example is Belgium, a country historically formed by uniting monolingual territories. After four governmental crises based on language issues between 1979 and 1990, the country was partitioned into different language regions: (a) areas that are exclusively monolingual in Dutch or French, (b) areas such as Brussels that are officially bilingual, and (c) areas that are monolingual but provide some minority language rights (Deprez and Du Plessis, 2000). Switzerland has a longer-established form of consociational linguistic territoriality, but restricts its implementation primarily to educational and governmental affairs; each of the 27 cantons is autonomous in language choice. Canada, too, was formed out of previous, distinct French and English territories. To maintain unity, it is formally bilingual, but French-speaking Quebec periodically attempts

to gain independence from the other, primarily Anglophone-speaking, provinces of Canada. A series of referenda for Quebec's independence has not gained a majority of votes in Quebec, defeated by negative votes from a combination of Anglophones, aborigines, and immigrant communities. However, in Quebec province itself, the use of French in all governmental affairs, education, and public displays is mandated (Bourhis, 2001). In Anglophone Canada, an innovative policy was introduced whose intent was to disarm the Quebec separatist drive. Schools for non-francophones require their students to enroll in immersion classes to make them proficient in French. This widely watched program has been only modestly successful.

In some countries, the relationship between the ethno-linguistic groups is so contentious that the country breaks apart, as in the former Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia (Bugarski, 2001). In post-independence Pakistan, two linguistically different sectors were separated by a thousand miles – a Bengali-speaking Eastern half and an Urdu-, Punjabi-, and Sindhi-speaking western half (Rahman, 2002). After a bitter war, the eastern sector became a separate country, Bangladesh. A two millennia-old conflict between Tamils and Sinhalese in Sri Lanka is in danger of partitioning the island into two countries, as is the conflict between the Greece- and Turkey-oriented halves of Cyprus. Sometimes in binary societies, one language group dominates the other as in the Sudan where the Arabic-speaking North dominates the lower multilingual, tribal-based south, or in Israel, officially bilingual in Hebrew and Arabic, where Arabic (though benefiting from more use in education than in many nominally Arab countries (Amara and Mar'i, 2002) is clearly dominated by Hebrew.

In dyadic nation states, then, the key management problem usually remains the resolution of competing demands for status between two languages with strong claims.

Mosaic Societies

Most countries are neither homogeneous nor dyadic nor triadic in composition. Indeed, the majority of countries in the world are made up of five or more important ethno-linguistic and territorially discrete segments. The problems of language policy, both corpus and status, in mosaic countries such as India, Indonesia, the Philippines, and most of the countries of Africa are immense and complex. Here, status and corpus are inexorably linked: a language's claim to official recognition is clearly bounded by its state of cultivation, for it is difficult to use an unwritten language in schools or an unmodernized language to teach science. In many of these countries, the overwhelming primary concern is corpus management, in particular the development of a written form of the languages, the promotion of literacy among the public, modernization by developing new terminology, the staging and duration of language instruction at the various levels of the educational system, and the preparation of teaching materials and teachers. Moreover, the solutions to status policy issues that are available in ideologically monolingual, dyadic, or triadic countries do not apply where there are many languages.

In mosaic societies, even the number of languages spoken in a country is often uncertain. Various counts have enumerated between 1000 and 2000 languages in Africa. In Nigeria alone, a variety of linguistic censuses have found 200 to 400 languages. At last count, there are 535 languages in India. In the late 19th century, Grierson counted a thousand. In all of these countries, the number of language varies immensely in part because the dividing line between languages and dialects is indistinct and political rather than linguistic.

Those who wish to develop language policy in such countries face a number of special challenges. In many of them, a single over-arching language was introduced by the former colonial power and is still used by a small elite. There were two major approaches to colonial language policy. France and Portugal (like Spain in Latin America) were consistently ruthless in requiring the metropolitan language for all government and for any education they supported. After its experience in India, Britain in other parts of the world followed what might be called a modified Oriental policy, providing initial education (at least the first two or three years and sometimes up to secondary school) in reasonably populous indigenous vernacular languages, at least those with a writing system. German and Belgian colonial policy similarly allowed a small place for vernacular languages. After the primary level, both approaches then accepted the centrality of the metropolitan language, but the British did encourage some continued cultivation of some indigenous varieties.

In the optimistic days after World War II, post-colonial political pressure was to dethrone the colonial language and nativize the choices of national languages. A number of African and Asian former colonies started to indigenize their schools. However, the initial pressure for abolishing the colonial tradition has had to be balanced against the tendency among indigenous elites in many former colonial countries to distinguish themselves by their command of the colonial language (Myers-Scotton, 1993), and increasing proportions of the population see the command of that language as the path to

upward mobility. Moreover, the exclusive choice of native languages sacrifices links to modernity and international communication. As a result, the use of ex-colonial languages lingers and may be growing. For instance, while the Indian constitution prescribes that English was to be abandoned as a national language within ten years, it still remains one of the official languages. Moreover, Indians of all social classes see the mastery of English as the avenue for upward mobility, and enrollment in English-medium private schools is growing (Dua, 1996). Similarly, in most former Francophone states in Africa, French remained the official language after independence, to be threatened most recently by globalizing English rather than by local national languages (Chumbow and Bobda, 2000).

The process of nativization, with its shift to indigenous languages, is handicapped by the number of those languages and their regional or tribal identification, with all of the status implications resulting from selection of one or a few languages and so favoring its speakers over others. Solutions adopted in a variety of countries include the creation of a fresh lingua franca, usually adopting a local dialect, often one close to the capital city, or adopting a regional language. The use of the new lingua franca is then promoted for use in the education system, in government, and in the media. One of the most striking examples is Bahasa Indonesia, developed out of Malay and now the national language (Dardjowidjojo, 1998). Malay was also the basis of Bahasa Malaysia, and the slight variant Bahasa Melayu developed in Malaysia and Brunei, but there are new pressures for English to be used there (Omar, 1998). Other cases are Tok Pisin, in Papua/New Guinea, Filipino, a variant of Tagalog, in the Philippines, and the adoption of Swahili in Tanzania and East Africa. It should be noted that in Malaysia, there has been a decision to move to English-medium instruction at all educational levels (Gill, 2002).

Many mosaic countries have chosen a language policy model which reflects one or another stage in the history of language policy in the former Soviet Union (E. Lewis, 1972). In the early Soviet period, the languages of the 15 principal language regions were declared to be of equal status. Each was declared the official language and taught in the schools in its own region. Every child had the right to be educated in his or her own language. Russian was to be *primus inter pares*. The decision to encourage and cultivate the vernaculars was based on the principle that it would be the fastest way to develop communism among illiterate peoples, and Grenoble (2003) notes that this policy did result in the rapid development of literacy. Under Stalin, with the pressure for central control, the status of the regional languages was downgraded and the spread of Russian was promoted.

India initially adopted the Soviet model. At Independence, the boundaries of the states were redrawn from the multilingual units they had been under British rule to more or less monolingual units, taking into account the major literary languages, as the political parties in the independence movement had urged. In the years immediately after independence, there was a great deal of concern in India about the balkanizing effect of this decision. To combat what were called 'fissiparous tendencies' Hindi – a Sanskritized form of Hindustani – was chosen to be the bridging national language. However, the states in southern India, whose languages belong to an entirely different family, strongly objected. As happens in many mosaic societies, the resulting compromise piled on languages in the educational system. The medium of instruction in the primary school was to be the local language, with various other languages added in secondary and higher education, serving as either media of instruction or as subjects of study. India's compromise was called the Three Language Formula – in primary school the local language would be used; in secondary school Hindi, English, and the regional language would be taught. In the Hindi area in the north, another regional or European language was to be substituted. As yet this policy has not been rigorously applied and, *de facto*, the local languages still seem dominant with English serving as the bridge language. While such compromises mitigate political difficulties in mosaic countries, the problem of governmental communication remains, particularly which languages can be used in governmental affairs. This usually requires the adoption of one or a few working languages, or allowing the use of many languages but providing a mechanism for interpretation and translation (Itagi and Singh, 2002).

The People's Republic of China essentially continued a 2000-year old tradition for Chinese languages by continuing the ideology that they were all dialects, united by their single writing system (Zhou, 2004). Language management then became a matter of finding a way to simplify the characters, supplement them with a more or less phonetic alphabet, and encourage a shift to Putonghua, the variety of Mandarin based on the Beijing dialect. For the non-Chinese languages, the initial policy was based on the Soviet model, with the development of literacy in and recognition of a manageable number of varieties, originally (as in the Soviet approach) selecting one dialect as the basis of standardization. There was, however, no effort to force them to accept the Chinese writing system, but rather acceptance of various traditional scripts or use of modified Roman or Cyrillic

alphabets. At one period, there was a strong effort to assimilate these groups, too, linguistically as well as culturally, but more recently, there is an acceptance of bilingual solutions for the larger languages (Zhou, 2003).

Most African nations are afflicted with the effect of the lack of congruence between imperially established and tribal or linguistic boundaries. They generally include many languages, many of which are spoken by large numbers in bordering states. In former French colonies, the position of French as language of government and advanced education is well established (Salhi, 2002), in spite of efforts in North Africa to establish the status of Arabic (Daoud, 2001). Portuguese, too, remains dominant in former Portuguese colonies, though in some countries Creoles are developing and becoming important (Vilela, 2002). In West Africa, Bamgbose (2000) complains, there are national language policies that do not reflect an understanding of local linguistic practices and that are seldom seriously implemented. Illiteracy rates are high; colonial language policies mainly remain in effect. In Botswana, Nyati-Ramahobo (2000) reports, the indigenous languages other than Setswana have been ignored or discouraged, and English is favored over it in government and education. Summarizing the current status in Africa, Batibo (2004) notes that only 2 countries (Egypt and Libya) have adopted indigenous languages as their official medium, 8 use an indigenous language alongside an ex-colonial language, 27 use an ex-colonial language with some symbolic secondary use of an indigenous language, and 18 have ex-colonial languages as the only official national language. In other words, 80% have failed in any efforts to establish indigenous languages as official languages. Two countries that use indigenous languages in the school system, Botswana and Tanzania, require its use by all students, whatever their mother tongue. Many are hopeful that the recognition of a number of indigenous languages in the South African constitution alongside English and Afrikaans will lead to multilingual policies (Kamwangamalu, 2000; Mesthrie, 2002), but studies are suggesting how slow the process is (Heugh, 2003).

This same problem of mosaic societies is not limited to single countries, but faces international organizations with sovereign states as members who must communicate in multilingual contexts. The Council of Europe, for instance, now has 45 member states. It has adopted French and English as its official languages of communication. The United Nations publishes its daily journal in English and French, but has six 'working languages' in which official statements may be made: Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian, and Spanish. If a delegation wants to communicate in another language, it must provide translators and interpreters. The European Union provides for translation and interpretation among the languages of all its members, requiring about 200 simultaneous translators for a single session if all possible language pairs are to be covered.

The issue of language policy in international organizations with their presumption of equality among the languages of member states illustrates the more general problem of the tension between status considerations in language choice and the need to make communication in multilingual contexts effective (Ammon, 2002; de Swaan, 1999; Van Els, 2001). The *de facto* primacy of English as the language of communication is not without its critics (Phillipson, 2003). Elsewhere, when the need for international communication is paramount, the trend is to use English as the common language. For instance, 85% of the citations in the world's scientific literature are published in English (Garfield and Alfred, 1990). While the multilingual capacity of the computer and the Internet has belied the prediction that only English would be used, the pressure for English appears to continue unabated. The growing predominance of English in international communication, of course, is a major handicap to speakers of other languages, and there are numerous attempts such as 'English as a Lingua Franca' or 'World English' to modify the language to make it more accessible to non-native speakers. The perennial attempts to foster the use of Esperanto serve the same purpose.

Foreign Language Teaching Policies

There is some overlap in language teaching policy between domestic and foreign languages. For instance, French is both a domestic and foreign language in Canada, as are French and English in many ex-colonial countries. However, in the main, foreign language policies are usually quite distinct from, and less developed and conflicted than, policies with respect to national language(s) and those of intra-country minorities. They also tend to be given less attention in scholarly analyses of language policy. In addition, such policies tend to be piecemeal rather than coordinated. Only a few overall national foreign language teaching policies have been adopted. The national plan for The Netherlands (van Els, 1992) is one of the few that were based upon surveys of adult use and national need. Australia's national policy statement (Lo Bianco, 1987) included policies with respect to indigenous peoples and immigrants as well as foreign languages. Comprehensive national policy in England was until recently either expressed as part of official

curricula for all instruction, or is addressed by non-governmental organizations (Moys, 1998), including a new policy document developed from the 2000 Nuffield Report (Department for Education and Skills, 2004). Foreign language policy normally relates only to the educational system, although France and Egypt try to limit the use of English outside the educational system. Within the education system, there are a number of common issues that foreign language policy must face (Bergentoft, 1994).

One basic decision concerns the proportionate role of foreign language instruction in the curriculum. In most mosaic countries, the promotion of multilingualism in intra-country languages and perhaps the colonial language leaves little time for foreign languages. The study of foreign languages is most fully developed in Western Europe, where statutory mandates usually require the study of one, and in most countries, two, foreign languages. It appears that the reason for a two-foreign-language policy is to ensure that languages other than English, which is almost always the first choice, are included. Language study may take up a substantial proportion of curricular time. In Sweden, for instance, language study may absorb 15% of total curricular time. In Luxembourg, where French, German, English, in addition to Luxemburgish, are required, the proportion of time taken up in language study is much higher.

Time spent on foreign language study is generally less in the English-speaking countries (Moys, 1998). In the United States, although some state governments which have authority over education do mandate the teaching of foreign languages, the decision on how much foreign language should be offered is usually left to individual districts and schools. All 50 states include the study of foreign languages in their secondary school curricula, although no state requires the study of foreign language in secondary school as a graduation requirement for all students, and only ten states require language study for college-bound students. Unlike other countries, in the United States students may start their language study in higher educational institutions. In 2002, there were 1.4 million students enrolled in foreign language classes in 780 colleges and universities. However, unlike other countries where students enroll in foreign language study in primary school and continue throughout secondary school, enrollments in the United States foreign language classes tend to start in secondary school or college, and drop on the average by half from one language course level to the next. In many countries there is an increasing tendency to start language study earlier and earlier in primary schools, but the practice is still uncommon in the United States. In England, where a decision was made to drop the requirement for foreign language study after the age of fourteen in comprehensive schools, and in the United States, where budgetary pressures became intense, the number of foreign language courses dropped precipitously.

Foreign language teaching policy specifies which languages are to be studied and in what order of priority. This choice is determined by government fiat in some countries. In many countries, however, school and student choices are primary. In England, and formerly in the United States, the traditional order of language selection for modern languages was French and then German. In the United States, Spanish has become the overall favorite, with French and German in steep decline. French, a language spoken in a country a short journey away, remains the favorite in England. In the other countries of Western Europe, the language chosen after English is likely to be German, followed by French and Spanish. In almost all non-English speaking countries that require foreign language study, the first language to be studied is English, selected by eighty per cent or more of the students, often starting in primary school (Bergentoft, 1994). In the United States, federal governmental support, provided during the Cold War for the teaching of Russian, now promotes the study of the languages of Asia and the Middle East at the higher education level; this support has been boosted since 9/11. Except for instruction specifically aimed at immigrants, Asian languages are seldom taught in countries outside of their home regions.

While some countries specify the method of teaching in language classrooms, in the main, the choice of style of classroom instruction is left to teachers, school districts, and textbook publishers. Indeed, the general trend is away from centralized control of language education to more localized and individual teacher decisions. There are, however, some general trends in the style of language teaching that are taking place in most countries. Particularly in Europe there has been a tendency toward the adoption of what is called communicative competence-oriented language instruction and the primacy of oracy over reading and writing skills. Moreover, the Council of Europe has been instrumental in bringing about a modernization and uniformity in language teaching in many countries. In the early 1990s, what was referred to as the Threshold Level (van Ek, 1975) was introduced by the Council of Europe. It provided specific communicative competence goals that students were expected to achieve. The Threshold Level has been adopted throughout Europe for the teaching of 20 languages, and more advanced levels have been described (Ek and Trim, 1991, 2001). The Council also

provided to its members a widely adopted series of guidelines for everything from teacher training, elementary school language instruction, and language education for vocational students. The European Union supported research throughout Europe on improvement of foreign language teaching and provided advice on general language instructional strategies to all of its member states (European Commission, 1997).

Much of the control of the nature of foreign language instruction lies with the adoption of uniform strategies for assessment. In this regard, once again the international organizations in Europe have been helpful. The Council of Europe developed a set of language assessment standards, the Common European Framework (Council of Europe, 2001) intended to promote a degree of uniformity among its members, with a goal of facilitating the growing practice of student exchanges (Scharer and North, 1992). These standards have been widely adopted throughout Europe and are influential elsewhere. In the United States the most important, indeed the only, national attempt to make uniform policy for foreign language instruction is the development of a set of standards for a substantial number of languages. Developed by a teachers' organization, the American Council on the Teaching of Foreign Languages, the ACTFL guidelines (American Council on the Teaching of Foreign Languages, 1986) has had a major effect on the modernizing of foreign language instruction throughout the United States.

In China, after the end of the Cultural Revolution and even more with the access to the World Trade Organization, there has been a centrally mandated increase in foreign language teaching, with an emphasis now on English (as opposed to an earlier emphasis on Russian) but with a wide choice of other languages. Methodology, too, is being revised, with a new concern for oral language and for humanistic approaches.

Conclusion

In summary, both the development and analysis of language policy have grown immensely in the past several decades. Earlier interest in corpus management has now been overshadowed by a surge of interest in status policy, particularly as it relates to the rights of territorial, regional, and aboriginal minorities. There has also been an increase of interest in language acquisition policy, but it still receives less attention and is almost entirely unrelated to the rest of language policy. However, anyone following the topic in the world's press can usually find two or three stories about language policy a day, and scholarly activity is fast expanding in order to keep up. It seems safe to predict that the study of language policy in general will continue to develop rapidly.

See also: Endangered Languages; Identity and Language; Language Education: Language Awareness; Language Maintenance and Shift; Language Policy in Multinational Educational Contexts; Linguistic Decolonialization; Minorities and Language; Politics and Language: Overview; Power and Pragmatics.

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Language Policy in Multinational Educational Contexts

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Global Distribution of Multilingualism

Bilingualism and multilingualism are a normal and unremarkable necessity of everyday life for the majority of the world's population. Linguists estimate that there are roughly 6800 languages in the world, but only about 200 nation-states. With more than 30 times as many languages as there are countries, bilingualism or multilingualism is present in practically every country in the world, whether it is officially recognized or not (Romaine, 1995). This means that in a broad sense multilingual educational contexts can be understood to encompass the educational practices of most countries in the world. The varied cultural and linguistic contexts existing in contemporary societies around the globe pose

complex challenges for policy makers in many areas. The centrality of language to education means that policies concerning choice of which language(s) to use as the medium of instruction are essential, even if the need is not always overtly acknowledged. In addition, the need for teaching of additional languages as subjects is widely recognized as schools have a critical role to play in providing the bi- and multilingual skills that have become increasingly necessary in the modern world. In this article the terms 'bilingualism' and 'multilingualism' will be used interchangeably to refer to the routine use of two or more languages in a community (*see* **Bilingualism**).

Despite the near-universal presence of more than one language in every country, the global distribution of linguistic diversity is strikingly uneven. Papua New Guinea alone contains 13.2% of the world's languages, but only 0.1% of the world's population and 0.4% of the world's land area. The overall ratio of languages to people is only about 1 to 5000. If this ratio were repeated in the United States, there would be 50 000 languages spoken there (Nettle and Romaine, 2000). Over 70% of all the world's languages are found in just 20 nation-states, among them some of the poorest countries in the world. They include Papua New Guinea (823), Indonesia (726), Nigeria (505), India (387), Mexico (295), Cameroon (279), Australia (235), the Democratic Republic of Congo (218), Brazil (192), United States (175), the Philippines (169), Malaysia (139), Tanzania (135), Vanuatu (109), Russia (100), Vietnam (93), Laos (82), Ivory Coast (77), Ghana (79), and Solomon Islands (69). These data come from the *Ethnologue*, a database compiled by SIL International.

Need for Language Policy and Planning

The pervasive presence of some degree of multilingualism indicates a universal need for language policy and planning in order to ensure that members of different language groups within a country or other administrative unit have access to and can participate in important societal institutions such as schools, government, and media (*see* **Language Planning and Policy: Models**). Schooling is one of the most critical sites for planning because education is the primary societal institution through which legitimation for the state's dominant language is sought. Formal education is often the first point of contact children have with the world outside their own community. Speakers of languages other than the official and national languages recognized for instructional purposes are often at a disadvantage. The poor school achievement of minority group

children due to discontinuities between home and school language is well documented (Corson, 1990; Tollefson, 1995).

The first sociolinguists to tackle questions of language policy and planning were concerned with the language problems of developing nations such as Malaysia and India (Fishman *et al.*, 1968). Many countries under former colonial rule designated the colonial language as their sole official language for education and government. Ivory Coast, for example, declared French as its official language. Some have in addition specified national languages which may be compulsory in education. Others such as Indonesia replaced the former colonial language with their own.

From the 1970s onward, scholars have been concerned with education in migration contexts, particularly in Europe, which has seen the rise of increasingly diverse populations in countries such as Portugal and Iceland, often cited as examples of monolingual nations. The illusion of linguistic homogeneity is belied by the existence of a number of minorities in both these places. Portugal has a population of about 10 000 speakers of Mirandese (Miranda do Douro) concentrated in small villages in the northeastern part of the country. Because both Portuguese and Mirandese are closely related Romance languages, Mirandese has been thought of as a dialect of Portuguese. However, in 1999 the Portuguese parliament recognized it as a regional minority language and has undertaken some steps to protect it. It is optionally taught in some local schools, and work on grammars and dictionaries is under way. Portugal also has large numbers of immigrants from its former colonies (Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, São Tomé and Principe, East Timor, and Brazil). There may be as many as a quarter of a million 'new' immigrants (many of them illegal) from eastern Europe, especially Ukraine and Russia. Immigrants now comprise about 5% of the population, one of the highest proportions in the European Union, up from less than 2% at the turn of the 21st century. Iceland too has witnessed an influx of immigrants from Asia, especially since the 1990s, in addition to those coming from European countries. Although only around 3% of the population is non-Icelandic in origin, as many as 40 different languages may be spoken in addition to Icelandic.

An even more recent area of concern has been the notion of language rights, as individual and collective rights of persons belonging to linguistic minorities have been increasingly acknowledged in international human rights law and encoded in various legal instruments (May, 2001; Skutnabb-Kangas and Phillipson, 1994).

Components of Language Policy

Spolsky (2004: 5) distinguished three components of language policy: language practices, language beliefs or ideology, and language planning. The notion of language practices concerns the choices members of a community make among the varieties available for use. Consider, for instance, the many Haitians or Cubans who have immigrated to cities such as Miami, who may use English to varying degrees in addition to Haitian Creole French or Spanish. Or consider Saami speakers in Norway, who may know Saami (an indigenous language of northern Norway, Sweden, and Finland), Norwegian, and English to varying degrees. Language beliefs include attitudes toward and beliefs about these varieties. Until recently attitudes toward Saami have been quite negative, among both Saami and non-Saami. Majority populations often show little enthusiasm for the languages of immigrant minorities either, even when the language concerned is a world language such as Spanish (as is the case in the United States) or Arabic (the language of many immigrants in France and the Netherlands). This is due to status differences between the majority and minority populations. Distinctive food, dress, song, etc. are often accepted and allowed to be part of the mainstream, but language much less so. The idea that linguistic rights need protection has never been part of American culture, and so they have not been seen as central to U.S. courts unless allied with more fundamental rights such as educational equity, etc. (Schiffman, 1996).

Language planning includes any efforts to modify practices or beliefs by means of some form of management or intervention. It usually takes the form of a set of planned and managed interventions supported and enforced by law and implemented by official government agencies. Many countries encode language policies of one sort or another in their constitutions, laws, or other official documents. UNESCO sponsors the MOST (Management of Social Transformations) Clearing House on Linguistic Rights, designed to provide information for legislators, decision makers, researchers, and other representatives of both governmental and nongovernmental organizations. The database provides an overview of the most important international legal instruments, major nongovernmental documents, and national constitutions containing provisions relating to language and the rights of linguistic minorities, and a bibliography on linguistic rights in international human rights law (see **Law and Language: Overview**). In conjunction with other sources of data (Skutnabb-Kangas, 2000: 297–311), this information can be used for further sociolinguistic analysis as well as for the development of multilingual policies.

The MOST database lists 163 constitutions containing some mention of language; 22 countries either have no constitution at all or have a constitution that contains no provisions relating to language. Perhaps the most common kind of provision is to declare a language or languages as official or co-official, or as a national language. Nevertheless, fewer than 4% of the world's languages have any kind of official status in the countries where they are spoken. The fact that most languages are unwritten, not recognized officially, restricted to local community and home functions, and spoken by very small groups of people reflects the balance of power in the global linguistic marketplace. Around 100 constitutions specify one or more official or national languages with special privileges of use. Seventy-eight mention a single official or national language. The constitution of France says that "the language of the Republic shall be French."

More than 20 countries have more than one official language. India, for instance, has 19 and South Africa has 11. The constitution of Vanuatu states that the national language is Bislama, and the official languages are Bislama, English, and French. The principal languages of education, however, are English and French. India's constitution codifies a variety of provisions protecting linguistic minorities, including the right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice, and freedom from discrimination on grounds of language. In addition to specifying Hindi as the official language, it grants rights to regional state languages and specifies which languages can be used for communication between states, and between states and the national government. Every state is supposed to endeavor to provide adequate facilities for instruction in the mother tongue at primary level to children belonging to linguistic minority groups, and there is a provision establishing a Special Officer for Linguistic Minorities. When a language is spoken by 30% or more of the population in any state or district, it is recognized as bilingual and the relevant minority language is placed on the same footing as the regional language for use by public authorities.

In practice, no country gives official status to every single language spoken within its territory. Where language policies exist, they inevitably privilege a limited set of languages. Even where explicit policies do not exist, governments have to operate in some language(s). This means that policy is implicit even if no specific mention is made of language. Here is where an examination of practice is essential. The presence of many languages other than English in industrialized countries such as the United States and Australia often comes as a surprise because these

countries have generally operated and seen themselves as largely monolingual English nations, despite the presence of a considerable number of indigenous and (im)migrant communities using other languages. The United States is a classic example of a country with no official language policy. The term 'benign neglect' is sometimes used to describe cases where a state has no codified policy specifying which languages are official. Nevertheless, when a multilingual country uses one or more languages exclusively in public schools, and in the administration of state services and activities, it is making a distinction based on language. In showing a preference for some language(s), whether designated as official or national or not, the state's decision benefits those for whom the chosen language(s) is a primary language, to the detriment or disadvantage of others who either have no or lower proficiency and are denied the benefit or privilege of using their own primary language. The only cases where immigrant and indigenous minorities receive equal treatment are in those countries where neither group is given any special status (Kymlicka and Patten, 2003).

The term 'de facto' ('by fact') is used for policies that operate covertly, implicitly, without necessarily having any official written support in legal documents. 'De jure' ('by law') policies are overt, explicit, officially and legally defined. Probably most majority languages dominate in many domains where they have only de facto and no legal status. English is the dominant de facto or official language in over 70 countries. French has official or co-official status in 29 countries. The majority of countries in the world operate either de facto or de jure as monolingual states in recognizing only one language for use in education. This does not always mean that no other languages are used in education, but rather that they do not have official status. Again one must look to practice in individual cases to assess the situation.

Language Policies in Nation-States

The nation-state is the most critical unit of analysis because it is the policies pursued within national boundaries that gives some languages (and their speakers) the status of majority and others that of minority language. The term 'minority' is ambiguous because it may have both numerical and social/political dimensions. It is generally a euphemism for nonelite or subordinate groups, whether they constitute a numerical majority or minority in relation to some other group that is politically and socially dominant. What is common to most minority languages from a sociopolitical perspective is the fact that their status is defined in relation to some

administrative unit, which in the modern world is generally the nation-state. Mandarin Chinese, with 900 million speakers, is spoken by more people than any other language in the world. In China, it has the status of majority language, but in many other countries such as Malaysia, it is a minority language. Catalan (Catalan-Valencian-Balear) is spoken by a minority of people within Spain, but by a majority in Catalonia, where it has official recognition. A minority language in a large country may be a majority language in a smaller country. Some languages, such as the signed languages used among deaf speakers, are minority languages in all contexts (see Minorities and Language).

The linguistic heterogeneity of many countries reflects the linguistic arbitrariness of shifting political boundaries that have encapsulated distinct ethnic groups or nationalities with their own languages. All nation-states, whatever their political ideology, have persecuted minorities in the past and many continue to do so today. Many indigenous people today such as the Welsh and the Basques find themselves living in nations that they had no say in creating and are controlled by groups who do not represent their interests and in some cases actively seek to exterminate them. More than 80% of the conflicts in the world today are between nation-states and minority peoples (Clay, 1990). The Chechens, for example, lost at least one-quarter and perhaps half of their population in transit when they were deported en masse to Kazakhstan and Siberia in 1944. In 1957 they were allowed to return to their ancestral territory. In the face of continued Chechen rebellion to Russian appropriation of their land, economic resources, and a continued denial of civil rights, in late 1992 Russia sent tanks and troops to the north Caucasus, ostensibly as peacekeepers in an ethnic dispute.

While not all states are actively seeking the eradication of minorities within their borders, they have pursued policies designed to assimilate minorities into the mainstream or dominant culture. It was not too long ago that minority children in places such Australia, the United States, Britain, and Scandinavia were subject to physical violence in school for speaking their home language. Often the education of these children entailed removing them from their parents and their own cultural group. The Statutes of Iona in Scotland, dating from 1609, are among the early instances of legislation in present day U.K. designed to promote linguistic and cultural assimilation. The statutes had the expressed purpose of separating Highland children from their native Gaelic culture and language and educating them in English in the Lowlands, where they would not only learn the dominant language, but would do so in an alien

cultural and linguistic environment where their own culture was seen as barbaric. The law required the chiefs to send their eldest child to the Lowlands to be educated until they could speak, read, and write English.

In North America native children were sent to boarding schools where their own languages were forbidden. In Canada, the federal government and churches entered into a formal partnership to run a residential school system for Indian and Inuit children as part of the assimilation policy of the Canadian government. Education in such church-run, government-funded residential schools was supposed to prepare children for life in white society by denying them their native identity. The residential school system was in operation for nearly 150 years. In some parts of Canada as many as five generations of children attended, and some communities were depopulated of children between the ages of 5 and 20. Such schooling produced a collective sense of shame about native languages and identities. It is not surprising that demands for some form of bilingual education emerge when a group feels it is being discriminated against on other grounds. In a study done of 46 linguistic minorities in 14 European countries, the clearest link to emerge between language and schooling is that a minority language which is not taught tends to decline (Allardt, 1979).

The borders of most countries are often linguistically diverse areas. Due to a variety of political and historical factors, bilinguals may be concentrated in particular geographic areas constituting regions where the use of a language other than the state language is normal. The northeastern corner of Italy shares a border with Slovenia to the east and Austria to the north. It contains a substantial population speaking either Slovenian, as well as Friulian (more closely related to Provençal than to standard Italian), or German (Standard German). Sauris is in effect a German linguistic island severed from the Austrian empire and incorporated into the Italian state. The region of Trentino-Alto Adige (Südtirol), governed by a special statute giving equal status to German (Standard German) and Italian, guarantees the right to education in the mother tongue for Germans in the province (from nursery to higher level). Italian is taught as a second language starting from the second year of the elementary cycle. Friulian is one of the largest minority languages of Italy, with over half a million speakers in the region of Friuli-Venezia-Giulia. A regional act of April 1993 provided funds for the promotion of Friulian in primary schools. Friulian is also used in some bilingual preschool education in the province of Udine. In the south and on the east coast, Greek and Albanian are spoken in some communities by descendants of refugees and mercenaries. Neither Greek nor Albanian has any official status, although the languages are taught in a small number of schools.

Although Article 6 of the Italian constitution is a clause pertaining to linguistic minorities which states that the republic protects linguistic minorities by special laws, there are discrepancies between policy and practice. Many minorities do not benefit from any special provisions. There are approximately one million speakers of Sardinian, which has no official recognition, despite the fact that Sardinia is an autonomous region governed by special statutes. Sardinian may be used in preprimary schools if needed to communicate with children. At the primary and secondary levels Sardinian has recently been introduced as a separate subject on an experimental basis.

In some countries decisions about language policy follow a 'personality' or 'territory' principle. In Switzerland territorial unilingualism exists under federal multilingualism in the country's four officially declared national languages: German, French, Italian, and Romansch. Of the 26 cantons, 22 are officially monolingual, with one of the four languages functioning as the dominant language in education. English is much preferred over the other official languages as a second language learned at school. Canada follows the personality principle for its two official languages, French and English, where sufficient numbers warrant. Quebec gives a universal right to French education, but the right to English education is limited to those with at least one parent educated in English.

Language Policy beyond the Nation-State

Many nation-states are similar to Italy in their incorporation of a number of groups with distinct languages, and their recognition of only one or a few languages for use within the education system and for other societal institutions. As the official language of Italy, Italian is also recognized beyond its national borders as an official language of the European Union (EU). Europe is perhaps unique in having such a large concentration of world languages within its borders as well as a sizable number of minority languages. From its beginning as the European Economic Community, the EU has accorded official status to each of the national languages of its member states. This means that relatively small national languages such as Danish, with roughly five million speakers, and Greek are, in principle, as official community languages on an equal footing with international languages such as French and English, a status they have nowhere else in the world. Outside the

EU and its own borders, Danish has a similar status only in the Nordic Parliament, and, like Greek, it is not spoken at international gatherings. As embodied in its linguistic policy, this has meant that equality of access to the EU's institutions should not be hindered by language. In 1990 the European Parliament adopted its so-called 'principle of complete multilingualism,' which it declared to be "consistent with the respect which is owed to the dignity of all languages which reflect and express the cultures of the different peoples who make up the European community." However, from the beginning not all languages have been equal; nor in the larger sense was or could multilingualism ever be 'complete.' This resolution was adopted due to pressure in support of granting Catalan some sort of official standing in the EU's operations.

The case of Catalan is indicative of the fact that many minority languages, both indigenous and non-indigenous, are not recognized either as official or as working languages, even though some of them have larger numbers of speakers than do the national languages. Thus, Catalan with its roughly six million speakers, despite having more speakers than Danish, was not an official language because the country in which it was officially recognized, Andorra, is not a member of the EU. In the member states where it is spoken, France, Spain and Italy, it does not have official status. While denying official status to some languages like Catalan, the regulations of the EU have continually been expanded to accommodate the entrance of new member states with their national languages. In 2004 the EU expanded from 15 countries with 11 official languages to 25 countries with 20 official languages.

The EU has undertaken legislation to defend the status of certain minority language communities within its borders in the form of the European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages (1992). Although it specifies no list of actual languages, the languages concerned must belong to the European cultural tradition (which excludes 'immigrant' languages), have a territorial base (which excludes languages such as Yiddish [Western Yiddish] and Romany [Romani], used over a wide geographic area), and be a separate language identifiable as such (which excludes local dialects of the official or majority languages). The terms of reference are deliberately vague in order to leave open to each member state how to define cultural heritage and territory. The charter provides a large number of different actions that state parties can take to protect and promote historical regional and minority languages, from which states must agree to undertake at least 35. However, each state is free to name the languages

which it accepts as being within the scope of the charter (Ó Riagáin, 1998). The U.K., for instance, ratified the treaty in March 2001, but did not include Manx and Cornish. Mercator Education maintains a database of information relating to the use of regional and minority languages in education.

Language planning on an even more limited regional basis clearly makes better sense for languages such as Saami, Basque, Catalan (Catalan-Valencian-Balear), and other languages cutting across national boundaries, but the EU has generally avoided taking any action which would interfere with national laws or policies concerning linguistic minorities. The result is that many languages are valued only beyond their national borders, while not being recognized for educational or other public purposes even within their own areas of concentration.

Language Policies at the International Level

The issue of language in education has been central to the mandate of UNESCO because one of its goals is to achieve universal quality primary education and a 50% increase in adult literacy by the year 2015. Established in 1945 as a special agency of the United Nations, the organization promotes international cooperation among its 190 member states and six associated members in the fields of education, science and culture. It aims to be a standard setter in forging international agreements on a variety of ethical issues. In 1953 UNESCO published an expert report on the use of vernacular languages in education, whose recommendations are still considered to be a central reference and have been widely referred to.

Nevertheless, UNESCO's (1935: 6) much-cited axiom "that the best medium for teaching is the mother tongue of the pupil" did not lead to any widespread adoption and development of vernacular languages as media of education. Despite some encouraging developments in some countries, in most parts of the world schooling is still virtually synonymous with learning a second language. Brenzinger (1998) estimated that fewer than 10% of African languages are included in bilingual education programs, with the result that more than 1000 African languages receive no consideration in the education sector. Skutnabb-Kangas (2000) maintained that education for minorities in many parts of the world still operates in ways that contradict best practices. She estimated that fewer than 10% of the world's languages are used in education.

In 2003 UNESCO published a new position paper on languages and education reflecting the changing global context for education in a multilingual world

(*see* **Education in a Multilingual Society**). The recommendations included choice of the language of instruction in multilingual contexts; the need to preserve the languages and the ethnic identities of small language groups; and the role of English as the lingua franca and the language of instruction in countries where it is not a native language. These concerns grew out of recognition of education as an important tool and reflection of cultural diversity in a rapidly changing world.

The changing character of multilingualism in the world today has manifested itself in at least two patterns. The first is that over the last few centuries in particular, some languages have shown a remarkable propensity to spread. Speakers of the 10 largest languages make up about half the world's population, and this figure is increasing. The 100 largest languages account for 90% of all people, with the remaining 6000-some confined to ten percent of the world's most marginalized peoples, who have generally been on the retreat for several hundred years (*see* **Endangered Languages**). European colonization of the New World created many such language spreads, and most of the largest European languages are also widely spoken outside Europe. Today an Indo-European language, either English, French, Spanish or Portuguese, is the dominant language and culture in every country in North, Central and South America (Nettle and Romaine, 2000).

A second noteworthy trend is increasing bilingualism in a metropolitan language, particularly English, which has become the language of the 'global village.' No one knows exactly how many people speak English as a first or second language, but some estimates for the former group are 375 million; for the latter group, some figures run as high as 1.5 billion (roughly a quarter of the world's population). As the world's economy has shifted from an industrial base to one based on exchange of information, the globalizing new world order is founded on communications technology, which underlies the linking of national economies. Hence the role of language and communication is destined to play a more critical role than ever before (*see* **Languages of Wider Communication**). Because the technology facilitating these developments originated largely in the English-speaking world, English is at the leading edge of global scientific and economic development. As much as 80% of the information stored in the world's computers is in English and 90% of the world's computers connected to the Internet are located in English-speaking countries. English is now the most widely used language in publication, with over 28% of the world's books printed in English and over 60 countries publishing books in English. English is also the language of international air traffic control and the basis for Seaspeak, used in international maritime communication. Crystal (1997) estimated that 85% of international organizations use English as one of their working languages, among them the United Nations and its subsidiary organs. French is the only real rival to English in this arena and it has been continually losing ground. Virtually all major corporations advertise their products in English. English is also the language of international popular culture for today's youth.

Most people in northern European countries such as the Netherlands, Germany, and the Scandinavian countries are becoming bilingual in English at an increasingly earlier age through schooling. Soon there will be few monolinguals among their school-age populations. English has rapidly become the first preferred foreign language study at school in the European Union, with nearly 90% of students studying it. French is almost always the second most widely taught language. The teaching of one or more foreign languages in primary school has also become more widespread.

Many countries have changed their educational practices regarding the teaching of foreign languages as a response to increasing demand for English. In Iceland, for instance, English has replaced Danish as the first foreign language taught in compulsory education (i.e., primary and lower secondary) in the new national curriculum. Danish is still taught as a compulsory second language to maintain and strengthen ties and cooperation with other Nordic countries. English instruction begins at age 10 (the fifth year of schooling) and is taught for 6 years, while Danish begins at age 12 and is taught for 4 years. During the last two years of lower secondary schooling students generally have the option of learning a third foreign language, usually German (Standard German), but Spanish and French in some cases. The national curriculum guidelines also prescribe a minimum number of hours per week of foreign language instruction. These are rather low: 16 hours per week in English over a 6 year period, 14 for Danish, and only 2 hours per week in the optional third foreign language. Foreign languages are generally not used as the medium of instruction.

In other parts of the world English has rapidly replaced other languages once widely taught as second languages. Under the Soviet regime Russian was imposed in schools throughout the former Soviet bloc. After disintegration of the Soviet Union, few countries besides Russia require students to learn it, with the result that the language is less and less used.

Meanwhile, a third trend is that immigration and migration have brought about increasing linguistic and cultural diversity in much of Europe as well as the United States and other parts of the globe (*see* **Migration and Language**). At the end of the 20th century one-third of the urban population in

Europe under the age of 35 was composed of ethnic minorities, the result of widespread migration in the 1950s and 1960s when Europe experienced an acute labor shortage. Around 10% of the school age population already has a culture and language different from that of the majority of the country in which they reside (Extra and Verhoeven, 1999). London has become an increasingly diverse city with as many as 200 languages spoken in its schools as a result of the influx of overseas migrants from the Caribbean and Asia. Similarly, Melbourne, once primarily a monolingual city, now has the largest concentration of Greek speakers in the world.

At the beginning of the 20th century one in eight persons in the United States was nonwhite; by the end of the century the proportion had increased to one in four. The white population also grew more slowly than any other group in the latter half of the 20th century. From 1980 to 2000 the Hispanic population in the United States doubled. The U.S. Census 2000 revealed that persons claiming Hispanic or Latino origin have replaced African-Americans as the largest ethnic minority group. A third of California's population belongs to this minority and nearly 40% of its population claims to speak a language other than English at home (Hobbs and Stoops, 2002). The United States is now the fifth largest Hispanic country in the world. Cities such as Miami and Los Angeles are now predominantly hispanophone, and Los Angeles has been Latinized by its continuing immigration from Mexico. In three states, California, New Mexico, and Hawaii, as well as the District of Columbia, minority populations constitute the majority.

Recognizing that issues of identity, power, and nationhood are closely linked to the use of specific languages in the classroom, UNESCO's (2003) position paper on education in multilingual contexts reaffirmed the value of mother tongues, but at the same time stressed the importance of balancing the need for local languages in learning and access to global languages through education. As far as mother tongue teaching is concerned, UNESCO advises that it should cover both teaching of and through this language for as long as possible. Learning through a language other than one's own presents a double burden. Not only must new knowledge be mastered, but another language as well. Many minorities may be disadvantaged to begin with, coming from at-risk populations such as new immigrants, refugees, etc.

Linguistic Human Rights

The UNESCO (2003) position paper also endorsed many of the recommendations that have come out of the debate about linguistic human rights, which has emerged as an important topic in the context of the education of linguistic minorities (Varennes, 1996; Paulston, 1997; Skutnabb-Kangas, 2000). The notion of linguistic human rights is an attempt to link the debate about language rights with the relatively well-defined international legal framework in existence for human rights. That is, the concept of human rights is invoked as a means of reaching consensus on the rights of linguistic minorities to ensure social justice. These include the rights of indigenous and minority groups to education in their own language, access to the language of the larger community and that of the national education system, and international languages (see King and Schielmann, 2004). Discussion of a universal declaration of linguistic rights is taking place under the auspices of UNESCO. Such legislation aims at guaranteeing at an individual level that everybody can identify with their mother tongue(s) and have this identification accepted and respected by others, and can learn the mother tongue(s) fully, orally (when physiologically possible) and in writing. In most cases, this requires that indigenous and minority children be educated through the medium of their mother tongue(s); that they can use the mother tongue(s) in official situations (including schools); that everybody whose mother tongue is not an official language in the country where they are resident can become bilingual (or multilingual, if they have more than one mother tongue) in the mother tongue(s) and (one of) the official language(s) (according to their own choice).

In practice, this is being achieved to some degree in some contexts, often by means of what has been called a 'three-language formula' or a '3 ± 1 language formula' in education (see **Education in a Multilingual Society**). In India a three-language policy means that children from non-Hindi-speaking areas study their regional language, in addition to Hindi, and English. Hindi speakers, on the other hand, study Hindi, English, and another language. In each state there is generally a large population who speak the dominant language of the neighboring state in addition to the dominant language of the state in which they reside. In Andhra Pradesh the dominant language is Telegu (Telugu), but many people speak Kannada, Marathi, and Tamil. Millions of Telegu speakers reside in the states of Karnataka, Orissa, Tamil Nadu and Maharashtra. Each state is multilingual and the linguistic majority in one state may be a minority in other states. Each state usually recognizes one official language and restricts the use of other languages to particular districts within the state. Critics of the policy contend that although it sounds fine in theory, in practice it has not been followed throughout the country.

In Luxembourg trilingualism in the national language, Luxembourgish or Lëtzebuergesch (Luxembourgeois), French, and German (spoken in the neighboring countries of Belgium, France, and Germany) is encoded in legislation which ensures that all citizens learn all three languages at school. Students begin with their everyday spoken language, Luxembourgish, in compulsory preschool education. German is added in the first year of primary education, and French from the second year of primary school onward. Over the years, however, and particularly in secondary education, French gets an ever-bigger share until it completely replaces German as the language of instruction. English is learned as a fourth compulsory language in secondary education and secondary technical education.

Kymlicka and Patten (2003: 7) claimed that one reason why there has been a general reluctance to view policies of official bilingualism as rights rather than as pragmatic accommodations is that public institutions in the most powerful Western nations, the U.K., the United States, France, and Germany, have been monolingual for a century or more with no significant movement toward challenging the hegemonic position of the majority language. Immigrants have not generally challenged the hegemony of these nations and have usually assimilated rapidly and none of these countries has faced the linguistic challenges of Belgium, Spain, Canada, or Switzerland. Language occupies a contested position when nation-states cannot ground their basis for a common identity on language, religion, or culture. Some still regard the concept of language rights as 'regressive' because they are seen as encouraging the persistence of ethnic differences, leading to conflict and divided loyalties. It is an unresolved question whether and when language shift can be required or expected in deliberative democracies (see **Language Maintenance and Shift**). Likewise, one can question whether it is legitimate for the state to insist that all children be schooled in the majority language of the state as the sole or main medium of instruction. National ethnic minorities have many more internationally and nationally coded rights than immigrants. The linguistic human rights movement has focused on securing a universal right to mother tongue primary education.

Typologies and Models of Multilingual Education

Bilingual education is not a modern phenomenon; it has existed in one form or another for at least 5000 years. Only recently, however, has it become an area of concern for policy makers. The term 'bilingual education' can mean different things in different contexts. If we take a commonsense approach and define it as a program where two languages are used equally as media of instruction, many so-called bilingual education programs would not count as such (see **Bilingual Education**). Moreover, the 'same' educational policy can lead to different outcomes, depending on differences in the input variables.

Typologies of bilingual education range from those which distinguish two basic types (Edwards, 1984) to Mackey's (1972) 90-cell typology. In her discussion of these many typologies each with somewhat different terminologies, Hornberger (1991) showed how the same terms are often confusingly used for different types of educational programs and conversely, different terms refer to the same type. So-called transitional bilingual education, for example, is also referred to as compensatory or assimilation bilingualism. Sometimes a distinction is made between immersion and submersion, and often the additional term 'structured immersion' is used for a program that has more in common with submersion than immersion. Like submersion, it is a program of monolingual majority language instruction for minority language speakers with little or no use of the pupils' first language. A so-called maintenance program does not necessarily foster maintenance. Sometimes the term refers to a program's goal, e.g., the maintenance of a minority language, while in other cases, it refers to the structure of a program, e.g., the curricular maintenance of a minority language as a medium of instruction.

Hornberger proposed her own framework, which distinguishes between bilingual education models and program types. Models are defined in terms of their goals with respect to language, culture and society, and program types in terms of characteristics relating to student population, teachers, and program structure. This led her to recognize three types of models, transitional, maintenance, and enrichment, each of which may be implemented via a wide range of program types. Like Hornberger, Skutnabb-Kangas (2000) recognized three general types: immersion, submersion, and maintenance. If the educational aim of a bilingual program is the enrichment of majority children, an immersion program is chosen and the children are taught through the medium of a second language. The type of program chosen will typically, though not always, have different consequences. In practice, the situation in individual countries is complex and often several different options are available for different kinds of children, depending on a variety of circumstances, varying from place to place.

Immersion

Immersion programs first began in Montreal in 1965 to teach French to English-speaking students. Although there are many variants of the model, in most cases the students come from the same home language background, and the curriculum typically involves two or more languages as the medium of instruction. One of these is usually the student's home language, and the other a second or foreign language, with at least 50% of the curriculum being taught through the second or foreign language. The Canadian model can be thought of as leading to 'additive bilingualism' because the aim is to produce a high level of proficiency in both languages. Results have shown that immersion students consistently display normal levels of academic development in their first language while acquiring high levels of proficiency in the second language (*see* **Bilingualism and Second Language Learning**). Full benefits of immersion emerge after about 5 or 6 years of continuous participation. Early immersion programs tend to achieve better results, but late immersion programs can also be successful (Johnson and Swain, 1997; Cenoz and Genesee, 1998).

After the success of the French immersion programs, similar immersion models of various types have become widely used around the world to promote indigenous and minority languages. Some programs are total immersion, such as the Hawaiian program, which uses Hawaiian as the language across the curriculum. English is introduced as a subject from the fifth grade (around age 10) for 1 hour a day. Most of the students attending are English speakers and are learning Hawaiian as a second language. The immersion model contrasts with more conventional language teaching as a subject for a limited number of hours with fewer opportunities for high levels of academic or informal engagement with the language in use. In immersion there may be little if any focus on language learning *per se* in the form of direct teaching of grammar and vocabulary. Language is acquired through the meaningful interaction required to learn academic content in various subjects. Other variants of the model may rely on bilingual immersion combined with a third language taught as a subject. In parts of the Basque country Basque and Spanish are used for instruction during primary education, and English is taught as a subject beginning in kindergarten.

In other cases, however, total immersion programs have been used as a tool to assimilate linguistic minorities into dominant languages. Minority children are put into majority language classes (with or without

some additional teaching of the second language). Some researchers have called such programs 'submersion' or 'subtractive bilingualism' since the second language gradually undermines proficiency in the first because the development of the child's first language is disrupted and incomplete. In the United States some children have received assimilationist treatment (with or without special instruction in English as a second language), while others have had the opportunity to participate in bilingual programs along with majority children who were being exposed to the first language of the minority group in an enrichment scheme. The types of programs offered to particular groups depend very much on the relationship between them and the government.

Transitional Bilingual Education

Bilingual education was given a legal footing in the United States by the Bilingual Education Act of 1968. Aimed at children with 'limited proficiency in English,' it provided funds for instruction in the mother tongue only as an aid to allow the children to proceed as rapidly as possible into ordinary mainstream classes in the majority language. From the beginning there was conflict over the degree of emphasis to be given to native language instruction. The model of bilingual education prescribed by the federal government, however, was opposed in its aim and principles to the kind of enrichment goals underlying Canadian immersion. Although it provided opportunities for schools to set up bilingual education programs, it did not place individual schools under any legal obligation to do so. Moreover, there was no intention or provision to maintain the students' home language. Instead of receiving equal instruction in both languages as they would in a maintenance program, the students would be given increasingly less instruction in their native language until they finally left the program.

Litigation brought to the courts on behalf of various groups of minority students led in some cases to court-mandated bilingual education programs. In Lau vs. Nichols a class action suit was brought against the San Francisco Unified School District by Chinese public school students in 1970. It was argued that no special programs were available to meet the linguistic needs of these students. As a consequence, they were prevented from deriving benefit from instruction in English and were not receiving equal treatment. The plaintiffs made their appeal not on linguistic grounds, but on the basis of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which states that "no person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color

or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subject to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance" (Teitelbaum and Hiller, 1977: 6). In their case against the school board, the plaintiffs requested a program of bilingual education. Although the case was lost, the Supreme Court overturned the decision of the federal district court in 1974. It concluded that "the Chinese-speaking minority receives fewer benefits than the English-speaking majority from respondents' school system which denies them a meaningful opportunity to participate in the educational program – all earmarks of discrimination banned by the regulations" (Teitelbaum and Hiller, 1977: 8). This was a landmark decision because it meant that for the first time in the United States the language rights of non-English speakers were recognized as a civil right. It was one of the few language cases ever to reach the Supreme Court, and its ruling made schools rather than parents or children responsible for remedying the children's limited knowledge of English.

In its decision the Supreme Court did not press for any specific remedy. It pointed out only two possibilities: namely, teaching English to the students or teaching them in Chinese. They requested only that the school board rectify the situation of inequality of educational opportunity. The remedy taken by the San Francisco school board was to set up a bilingual education program for Chinese, Filipino, and Spanish language groups, who made up over 80% of the students with little or no English. Teaching in English as a second language was offered to all other minority groups. The Lau decision led to other cases. It also encouraged expansion of the services and eligibility provided through the Bilingual Education Act, and many states passed bills mandating bilingual education. The Lau decision was also instrumental in setting up policy guidelines at the federal level that would allow the U.S. Office of Education to decide whether a school district was in compliance with the Civil Rights Act and the Lau case. A document referred to as the 'Lau Remedies' directed school boards to identify students with a primary or home language other than English and to assess their proficiency in English and the home language. Elementary school students were to be taught in their dominant language until they were able to benefit from instruction entirely in English. The U.S. Congress made the Lau decision an explicit part of the Equal Educational Opportunities Act (1974). Further mandates for bilingual instruction followed from lawsuits by Latino parents.

The sixth (and final) version of the Bilingual Education Act reauthorized by Congress in 1994 endorsed for the first time the goal of developing native language skills alongside its traditional focus on English language acquisition for limited-English-proficient children. Meanwhile, under the Clinton administration (1993–2001) two-way or dual immersion programs were promoted; these grew more than tenfold between 1987 and 2001. These were aimed at integrating majority and minority children in a program of content and literacy instruction in two languages.

In the late 1990s, however, the tables turned dramatically when a lawsuit was filed on behalf of Latino parents who claimed that state policies mandating Spanish instruction discriminated against their children (Carbajal *et al*. vs. Albuquerque Public Schools, 1999). This case attempted to portray bilingual education as a violation of civil rights rather than an entitlement. In California a conservative software millionaire named Ron Unz spearheaded a movement named English for the Children, portraying itself as a group committed to securing the right to instruction in English for immigrants. Under this proposal children with limited English proficiency were to be 'mainstreamed' as soon as possible into regular classrooms. After voters in three states (California in 1998, Arizona in 2000, and Massachusetts in 2002) voted against bilingual education, programs were dismantled, and have been under attack in others. This outcome meant that most of the bilingual education programs enrolling 43% of the English language learners in the United States would be replaced with intensive English immersion.

Ironically, one of the reasons why many people have viewed bilingual education so negatively is due to the fear that it aims to maintain languages, and by implication cultures, other than English. Even at the peak of their existence, bilingual programs reached only a minority of children for whom they could have been beneficial. Voters appeared to be largely ignorant of the rationale behind such programs as well as their aims and outcomes. Crawford's (2004) analysis suggested that the public had a mistaken view that bilingual education was a diversion from acquiring English rather than a means to that end. It was the idea of maintaining languages other than English which the public was against. While foreign language instruction in the world's major languages in mainstream schools has been seen as valuable, both economically and culturally, bilingual education for minority students has been equated with poverty and loyalties to nonmainstream culture which threaten the cohesiveness of the state. Voters were also misled by the use of the term 'English immersion,' which suggested an intensive English program tailored to the needs of children learning English.

In addition, various opponents of bilingual education have formed a powerful lobby backed by considerable sums of money. The English-only movement formed in 1983, operating under the name U.S. English, has been campaigning in favor of a constitutional amendment to make English the official language of the United States, and for similar legislation at state level. The organization also seeks to repeal laws mandating multilingual ballots and voting materials. Twenty-seven states have enacted some form of official legislation. The group has seen programs that accommodate immigrants in their native languages as a kind of 'linguistic welfare' system that lowers the incentive to learn English and restricts them to low-skilled, low-paying jobs.

In 2002 the Congress effectively repealed the Bilingual Education Act when it passed the 'No Child Left Behind Act.' References to bilingualism have been removed from various federal agencies to reflect the shift away from bilingual education to concentration on the acquisition of English. The Office of Bilingual and Minority Affairs at the U.S. Department of Education was renamed the Office of English Language Acquisition, Language Enhancement and Academic Achievement for Limited English Proficient Students. The National Clearing House for Bilingual Education has been renamed the National Clearing House for English Language Acquisition and Language Instruction Education Programs.

As in the case of immersion programs aimed at enrichment, research supports the pedagogic effectiveness of bilingual education programs. Students in bilingual programs have typically performed at least as well on English reading tests as students in all-English programs (Corson, 2001; Crawford, 2004). Much of the concern over acquisition of English masks the fear many middle-class whites have of losing their majority status. Although proponents of U.S. English attempt to legitimize the organization's existence as a way of breaking down supposed language barriers and facilitating minority access to the material and other benefits of mainstream America, the irony is that most ethnic minorities do not actually want a self-contained ethnic group where no English would be spoken. Nor, however, do they want to assimilate linguistically or culturally. A majority want to maintain their ethnicity and language while also being American. An unfounded fear of diversity itself and thinly disguised racism lies behind the backlash against bilingual education in the United States, and in Europe, where earlier policies of providing home language instruction to the children of migrant workers have been rescinded or drastically curtailed.

Despite propaganda from U.S. English to the contrary, there were actually 4.5 times as many non-English speakers recorded in the U.S. census when immigration reached its highest level than in the 1990 census. The assimilative forces that absorbed those immigrants and their languages are even more powerful today. Although the number of non-English speakers is increasing, so too is the rate of shift to English. Languages other than English are the ones under threat. Spanish is fast approaching a two-generation pattern of language shift rather than the three-generation model typical of immigrant groups in the past. Without the replenishing effects of continuing immigration, Spanish would scarcely be viable in the United States over the long term (Veltman, 1983, 1988).

Weak Linkages between Language Policy and Planning

Despite evidence of growing rather than decreasing diversity in many education systems, in some countries the trend has been toward not recognition of the need for policy and planning but the imposition of ever more centralized provision and greater intolerance of diversity. There are important differences between 'tolerance rights' and 'promotion rights.' Most democracies provide for freedom of government interference in private language use, but many are reluctant to make legal provision for promotion of languages in the public sector other than the dominant language(s).

In addition, weak linkages between policy and planning render many existing policies ineffective (Romaine, 2002). Many language policy statements are often reactive *ad hoc* declarations lacking a planning element. Eritrea's 1995 decision **not** to recognize an official language is a grand declaration with no linkage between policy and planning. Thus, President Isayas Afewerki (Brenzinger, 1998: 94):

> When we come to the question of language as a means of instruction in schools, our principle is that the child should use its mother tongue or a language chosen by its parents in the early years of its education, irrespective of the level of development of the language. Our policy is clear and we cannot enter into bargaining. Everyone is free to learn in the language he or she prefers, and no one is going to be coerced into using this or that 'official' language.

Policies cannot be implemented unless those with the duty to implement them are provided with the necessary resources. Policies cannot be effective unless they are tied to a plan for monitoring of compliance and application of sanctions where they are not implemented.

See also: Bilingual Education; Bilingualism and Second Language Learning; Bilingualism; Education in a Multilingual Society; Education in a Multilingual Society; Endangered Languages; Language Maintenance and Shift; Language Planning and Policy: Models; Languages of Wider Communication; Law and Language: Overview; Migration and Language; Minorities and Language.

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Language Politics

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Language politics (LPt) is actual political activity with respect to language and can be distinguished from *language policy* (LPc), i.e., the conception and planning of such activity; but both are, as a rule, closely intertwined (Spolsky, 2004; Ozolins, 1996). LPt's typical agents are state politicians, but they can be members of any polity (institution or community) – for example, a family, a religious community, a town, a nongovernmental organization, or an international organization. Objectives of LPt can vary greatly depending on interests and motives – e.g., 'purifying' one's own national language of foreign loans to shape it into a more adequate symbol of national identity, or spreading the language within the state or beyond in order to more efficiently exert power. LPt has to reckon with existing language rights and may result in new language rights (Paulston, 1997) (*see* **Linguistic Rights; Linguistic Decolonialization**).

Internal LPt regulates language within the polity, while *external* LPt aims beyond it. For the state, the former is part of interior politics, the latter of exterior politics. Internal LPt can be directed at language structure (*language corpus politics*, LCPt) or language status and function (*language status politics*, LSPt). Typical aims of LCPt are graphization (introducing or regulating script and orthography); standardization, including codification (selection and codification of norms of spelling, pronunciation, vocabulary, grammar, and style or texts); 'purification' (eliminating foreign loans); and modernization (developing modern terminology). Typical aims of LSPt are spreading the norm of a standard

variety and, in the case of multilingual communities, allocating languages to certain regions (McRae, 1975) or domains and functions – for example, official (Laitin, 1992), educational (medium or subject of teaching on various educational levels; Lo Bianco, 1987), religious (Landau and Kellner-Heinkele, 2001), the media, or the military (Ager, 1996; Schiffman, 1996). Politics of language promotion, language maintenance, or language revival can comprise LCPt, such as constructing or reconstructing vocabulary, as well as LSPt, such as encouraging use in the family or institutionalization in school (Ó Riagáin, 1997) (*see* **Applying Pragmatics**).

External LPt is mainly LSPt or, more specifically, *language spread politics*. Examples of global consequences occurred during colonialism (Phillipson, 1992) (*see* **Linguistic Imperialism**). Today virtually all the larger language communities, or their major states, endeavor to allocate their languages in international organizations (e.g., the Arab countries in the UN in 1973, France and Germany in the EU; Ammon, 2003, 2004) or in the school curricula of other countries (Ammon and Kleineidam, 1992, 1994; Ricento, 2001; Haarmann, 2005).

See also: Applying Pragmatics; Endangered Languages; Identity and Language; Language Maintenance and Shift; Language Planning and Policy: Models; Language Policy in Multinational Educational Contexts; Languages of Wider Communication; Linguistic Decolonialization; Linguistic Rights; Politics and Language: Overview; Pragmatics: Linguistic Imperialism.

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Language Socialization

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Introduction

Language socialization is the process whereby a child or other novice develops communicative competence through interactions with older and/or more experienced persons. Language socialization researchers seek to understand how novices learn to use language in the culturally specific ways that enable them to participate competently in the social life of a particular community. Another, equally important goal of language socialization research is to understand the broader sociocultural contexts within which this developmental process occurs, from local to global levels of analysis.

Origins

The language socialization research paradigm was initially formulated in the early 1980s by Elinor Ochs and Bambi Schieffelin (Ochs and Schieffelin, 1984; Schieffelin and Ochs, 1986a, 1986b). At that time, a significant body of research on language acquisition already existed, as did another on socialization (sometimes referred to as enculturation). But the two had developed quite separately from one another.

Language acquisition research, rooted in developmental psychology and psycholinguistics, tended to treat language acquisition as a rather self-contained individual developmental process, largely ignoring the sociocultural contexts within which it occurs; conclusions drawn from studies conducted in mainstream North American and European settings were assumed to be universally valid. Meanwhile socialization research, rooted in anthropology and sociology, was conducted in a variety of ethnographic settings worldwide, but gave little attention to the central role of language as the primary medium through which socialization occurs. Working in collaboration with researchers from several disciplinary backgrounds (including linguistic anthropology, developmental psychology, sociolinguistics, applied linguistics, and education), Schieffelin and Ochs sought to combine the strengths of both of these established bodies of research and to bridge the gap between them.

Axioms and Aims

As this synthetic approach suggests, a central assumption in language socialization research is that the acquisition of language is inseparable from the acquisition of other kinds of cultural knowledge and practices. This is perhaps nowhere more clearly seen than in interactions between young children and their

caregivers, which were the main focus of the earliest language socialization studies (Schieffelin and Ochs, 1986a, 1986b). As a young child is acquiring language, she or he is simultaneously developing a repertoire of social skills and a culturally specific world view. In learning how to use the language(s) of their community, children also learn how to think, how to comport themselves, even how to feel in particular situations and how to express (or otherwise manage) those feelings. As a developmental process, then, language acquisition is far more than a matter of learning to produce grammatically well-formed utterances. It is also a matter of learning how to use language in socially and pragmatically appropriate, locally intelligible ways, and as a means of engaging with others in culturally meaningful activities. Over the course of time, this makes it possible for the child to engage with others in an increasingly broad range of social contexts, and to assume increasingly complex roles and identities. (To varying degrees, these assumptions are shared by researchers in allied fields such as developmental psychology and developmental pragmatics; see Bloom [1998] and Bugental and Goodnow [1998] for useful overviews, and see Blum-Kulka and Snow [2002] for a recent collection of case studies.)

Language socialization research is thus concerned with the microgenesis of communicative competence (Schieffelin and Ochs, 1996), which comprises but also goes well beyond linguistic competence in the generativist sense. Communicative competence also comprises the practical knowledge, much of it prediscursive (if not preconscious), that one must have in order to use language as a social tool, to engage in talk as a social activity, and to coconstruct meaningful interactive contexts with others. Language socialization research is thus concerned with all of the knowledge, orientations, and practices that make it possible for an individual to function as – and, crucially, to be regarded by others as – a competent member of (or participant in) a particular community, however broadly or narrowly defined.

Examples of Key Insights and Areas of Investigation

Since the initial formulation of the language socialization research paradigm in the early 1980s, language socialization studies have been conducted in a broad range of settings worldwide. These studies have provided the empirical foundations for various kinds of comparative insights, which in turn have given rise to new theoretical developments and productive new areas of thematic focus as the paradigm has continued to develop.

Nonuniversality of Baby Talk

In their pioneering comparison of language socialization practices among members of three groups – white middle-class Americans, Kaluli (of Papua New Guinea), and Samoans – Ochs and Schieffelin (1984) found important culturally based differences in several areas. One such difference concerns baby talk – the simplified, stylized register that caregivers in some groups (e.g., white middle-class Americans) use with infants and young children. Previously, language acquisition researchers had assumed, based on studies conducted in mainstream North American and European contexts, that baby talk is universal (i.e., used by caregivers in all societies), and that this ostensibly accommodative way of speaking facilitates the child's acquisition of language. Ochs and Schieffelin found that not only do Samoans and Kaluli never use baby talk; they rarely address preverbal children at all, and do not treat them as conversational partners. Even so, young Kaluli and Samoan children are immersed in a richly verbal environment from the earliest days of their lives. Ochs and Schieffelin found that they acquire language at more or less the same age, and at the same developmental rate, as children in Western societies.

Differing Cultural Understandings of Human Development

Ochs and Schieffelin also found that the preverbal child's abilities and tendencies are conceptualized quite differently from one group to another, and that the professed goals of language socialization practices differ accordingly. The egalitarian Kaluli regard preverbal children as 'soft' and helpless, based on not just their lack of physical abilities, but also their inability to use language as a social tool, i.e., as a means of getting what they need or want from others (Schieffelin, 1990). For the Kaluli, a primary goal of socialization is to 'harden' children, which is largely a matter of helping them learn to use 'hard' (adult-like, socially effective) language. (From a Kaluli perspective, the use of baby talk would be antithetical to this goal.) Samoans, in contrast, regard preverbal infants as willful, defiant, and antisocial; among their foremost concerns is that children learn their place in hierarchical Samoan society, and that they learn to act and speak accordingly (Ochs, 1988). Age is an important dimension of social stratification in Samoa, so in this regard young children are near the bottom of the hierarchy. They must learn to adapt themselves to social situations, as they cannot expect their elders to accommodate them (such as by using deliberately simplified language). The first words attributed to children in these two

societies reflect these differing cultural conceptions of the nature of the child: Kaluli believe that a child's first meaningful utterances will be the words for *mother* and *breast*, while Samoans expect to hear a defiant *(Eat) shit!* (Ochs and Schieffelin, 1984).

Influence of Local Social Norms on Children's Acquisition and Production of Specific Linguistic Forms

Language socialization researchers have demonstrated that specific aspects of culture and social organization such as those just described can influence children's acquisition of language in quite specific ways at the level of linguistic form. A striking example is Platt's (1986) study of Samoan children's acquisition of the deictic verbs *sau* 'to come' and *'aumai* 'to bring/give.' Young children frequently hear both verbs used as imperatives in everyday contexts, and *sau* is the less semantically complex of the two. Based on this information alone, the expectation would be that children would begin using *sau* productively earlier than they would begin using *'aumai*. But as noted above, young Samoan children occupy a low position in an age-stratified social hierarchy. Very rarely is it appropriate for them to tell anyone to come – it is the prerogative of higher-status persons in Samoan society to remain stationary and to have lower-ranking persons come to them. Young children are expected and encouraged to appeal to higher-status persons to give them things (such as food), however. Thus the number of persons toward whom a young child can appropriately use the imperative *give* is far greater than the number of persons whom the child can tell or ask to *come*. Young children's much more frequent use of *'aumai* 'give' can be taken as evidence that they learn the social norms that organize and constrain the use of these two verbs at the same time as they learn the linguistic forms.

Differing Social Functions of Specific Verbal Practices across Cultures and Social Groups

Language socialization researchers have found that the same basic type of practice or activity may serve different functions in different communities, even in the same society. A good example is verbal teasing. Teasing may be used as a means of social control, i.e., to shame a child and thereby discourage him or her from engaging in a particular behavior (perhaps as an alternative to corporal punishment or some other form of coercive physical intervention, which may be dispreferred); to toughen the child by teaching him or her how to deal with others' affronts, and how to be self-assertive in return; or as a form of interactive play that provides a basis for a child and an adult to engage each other verbally without need

or expectation of exchanging substantive information (Schieffelin and Ochs, 1986b). Examples such as this reveal the potential of language socialization research to reveal both universal and culturally specific aspects of socialization practices, and of communicative practices more generally.

Delimiting Universals of Communicative Practice

Ways of dealing with unintelligibility provide another such example and may offer insight into a universal aspect of communicative practice. Schieffelin and Ochs (1996) propose a universal set of possible responses to unintelligibility, first making a distinction between speaker-rooted unintelligibility (in which the speaker perceives his or her own utterance to be unintelligible to an interlocutor) and addressee-rooted unintelligibility (in which the speaker perceives an interlocutor's utterance to be unintelligible). In each case, they assert, four basic responses are available to speakers everywhere. But in different communities, one response may be preferred over the other three; or two or three may be regarded as more or less equally valid options while another is strongly dispreferred. In the case of addressee-rooted unintelligibility, the four universal options are:

1. ignore unintelligibility;
2. display nonunderstanding;
3. verbally guess at what interlocutor might be saying;
4. negatively sanction interlocutor's unintelligibility (e.g., by teasing or shaming).

Schieffelin and Ochs observe that among Kaluli and Samoans, option #3 is least preferred – quite unlike in mainstream American society. Looking beyond these three groups, one might reasonably surmise that in East Asian societies such as Japan and Korea, where the social dynamics of honorification are pervasive and subtle, empathetic and intuitive styles of interaction are strongly preferred, and there is much concern with face (one's own as well as that of one's interlocutor), option #4 would be dispreferred in most situations; whereas #1, #2, and #3 would all be more preferred, but to differing degrees under different social circumstances (e.g., #3 is much more likely to be used in casual conversation with a peer than in a workplace exchange with one's supervisor).

Language Practices at Home and in School

Certain themes addressed in early language socialization research have been carried forward and taken in new directions in subsequent years. Heath's (1983) comparative study of language use in two working-class communities in the USA (one black, one white) and the implications for children's rates of success in school has had enduring influence. Heath's work

continues to inform recent studies that examine various kinds of continuities and disjunctures between children's home environments and the classroom. The dinner table conversations of white middle-class American families (Ochs *et al.*, 1989, 1992), for example, have been shown to foster specific types of problem-solving orientations and to encourage children to display skills that are expected and rewarded in the classroom. In other settings, cultural disjunctures between home and school lead to poor educational outcomes (Watson-Gegeo, 1992). Research on children from immigrant and other nonmainstream communities in the USA suggests that when classroom activities and modes of interaction draw on communicative practices and participant structures that are familiar to these children, their levels of participation and academic achievement improve significantly (Gutiérrez *et al.*, 2001). Heath's influence can also be traced to other recent studies that focus on the role of narrative in language socialization. Baquedano-López (2001), for example, examines how narrative practices serve as a resource for the socialization of a transnational Mexican identity in a Catholic parish in Los Angeles; and Capps and Ochs (1995) consider the central role that narratives of personal experience play in the discursive construction, and quite possibly the social reproduction, of agoraphobia.

The Development of Subjectivities

A central theme of virtually all language socialization studies is the development of locally intelligible subjectivities, or ways of being in the social world (Kulick and Schieffelin, 2004). This is clearly seen, for example, in Clancy's (1999) study of how affective states and verbal expressions of affect are negotiated between Japanese mothers and their young children; in Schieffelin's (1990) examination of how Kaluli mothers cultivate sibling relationships among their children such that elder sisters will 'feel sorry for,' and always be willing to give to, their younger brothers; and in Fader's (2001) study of how Hasidic Jews in New York City use literacy practices in socializing girls' gender and ethnic identities – also an important means by which symbolic boundaries separating the Hasidim from other groups (including other Jewish groups) are maintained. As these examples suggest, virtually all aspects of subjectivity, including affect, morality, and desires, are shaped in culturally specific ways – and in accordance with cultural preferences, by and large – through language socialization. But in an interesting and productive reorientation of this perspective, Kulick and Schieffelin (2004) urge language socialization researchers to consider 'bad subjects' – those individuals in every community who persistently display culturally dispreferred traits and/or engage in nonnormative, deviant behaviors. As Kulick and Schieffelin point out, "the focus on expected and predictable outcomes is a weakness if there is not also an examination of cases in which socialization doesn't occur, or where it occurs in ways that are not expected or desired" (Kulick and Schieffelin, 2004: 355). Language socialization research must account for reproduction as well as "why socializing messages to behave and feel in particular ways may also produce their own inversion" (Kulick and Schieffelin, 2004: 356).

Languages and Cultures in Contact

As noted previously, recent language socialization studies explore the ways in which locally situated interactions articulate with macro-level social processes, such as cultural revitalization movements and postcolonial nation-building. Many of these studies have been conducted in settings characterized by sustained contact between languages and cultures, such as occurs in postcolonial, creole, diasporic, urban, and border communities (Baquedano-López, 2001; Fader, 2001; Garrett, 2005; Kulick, 1992; Moore, 2004; Paugh, 2005). These studies investigate the ways in which language socialization processes unfold in linguistically and socioculturally heterogeneous settings characterized by bilingualism and multilingualism, code-switching, language shift, and other contact-induced linguistic and sociocultural phenomena. The coexistence of two or more codes within a particular community, whatever the sociohistorical circumstances that have brought them into contact, is rarely a neutral or unproblematic state of affairs. It tends to be a focal point of discursive elaboration and social conflict, with complex linkages to other, equally contested issues that play out on multiple levels, from the household to the state. As they are socialized to use language, children are also socialized into knowledge of these intimately related issues, and of preferred and dispreferred ways of dealing with them, from their earliest years.

Dynamics of Language Shift

In some contact settings, language socialization practices may be an important mechanism of language shift – a point made vividly by Kulick's (1992) study of rapid shift in a small village in Papua New Guinea. Building on Kulick's work – which shows that local cultural and ideological factors may be of greater importance in accounting for language shift than the macrosociological (e.g., political and economic) factors that are more commonly invoked – more recent studies have shown language shift to be a contingent, nonlinear phenomenon in which language

socialization practices play a crucial but often subtle mediating role. Paugh (in press) shows that young children in the Caribbean island of Dominica are encouraged by their parents and other adults to acquire English, which is contributing to language shift away from the local Afro-French creole. But in later years, as children spend increasing amounts of time interacting with peers beyond the supervision (and earshot) of adults, they increasingly use the creole in their play as a way of enacting adult roles and activities. Although ultimately it may not prevent language shift from running its course, at present such pretend play seems to provide older children with opportunities to develop some degree of proficiency in the creole. In his investigation of a quite similar situation in the Caribbean island of St. Lucia, Garrett (2005) examines code-specific genres as the basis for socialization activities in which adults encourage young children to be verbally self-assertive. Cursing, insulting, and other locally valued self-assertive ways of speaking conventionally require use of the historically stigmatized Afro-French creole language that many St. Lucian caregivers (much like their counterparts in Dominica) otherwise discourage children from using. The persistence of socialization routines in which adults playfully urge children to use the creole in self-assertive ways favors the maintenance of such code-specific genres, which in turn may be having a retarding or dampening effect on language shift.

The Persistence of Everyday Practices

These and other recent studies suggest that a language socialization approach can yield a more nuanced account of ongoing changes and shifts in local communicative practice than can larger-scale, quantitatively oriented studies that are less attentive to situated interactions (particularly those occurring at the critical juncture between generations). In a case where language shift is already quite far along, for example, a language socialization approach may reveal that culturally specific ways of using language persist in speakers' use of the 'new' code. In her study of a Navajo community, Field (2001) demonstrates that although today's bilingual caregivers often speak English to children, they continue to socialize traditional Navajo values of autonomy, self-determinacy, and respect through the use of a triadic participant structure in issuing directives. Based on this observation, Field (2001: 249–250) proposes that "certain aspects of language use may be more conservative, or more resistant to change, than code." She goes on to assert, "[I]t is exactly those aspects of a speech community's interaction that are tacitly taken for granted that are also the most basic, pervasive, and resistant to change. Furthermore, they are maintained through the most mundane routines and forms of everyday communicative practice – which also happen to be the preferred context for research on language socialization."

Essential Features of Language Socialization Research

In whatever setting a particular study is conducted, and whatever specific linguistic and sociocultural phenomena are the focus of the investigation, four key features are essential to language socialization research. These four features reflect the paradigm's interdisciplinary origins as well as its commitment to taking a maximally holistic perspective on the relationships among language, culture, and society.

1. **Longitudinal study design.** Language socialization researchers closely track developmental changes in individual subjects by periodically recording their participation in naturally occurring socialization interactions and activities over a developmentally significant span of time. In order for such tracking to be feasible, a language socialization study usually focuses on a relatively small number of children or novices – typically three to six, or a single small cohort (if the study is conducted in a school or other institutional setting). Qualitative depth of analysis is emphasized over quantitative breadth. Data in the form of naturalistic audio and/or audio-video recordings of the focal children or novices interacting with caregivers and other community members are collected at regular intervals (e.g., monthly), usually over the course of a year or more of sustained fieldwork. Some researchers revisit their field sites periodically over several years or even decades (e.g., Schieffelin, 1996) in order to keep up with individual and community development over longer spans of time.

2. **Field-based collection and analysis of a substantial corpus of naturalistic audio or audio-video data.** Regular, periodic data collection as described above gives rise to a large corpus of recordings; a year-long study typically yields 75–100 hours. A corpus of this size strikes a balance between ethnographic and longitudinal adequacy and practical manageability. But collection of the recordings is only a first step; in order for them to serve as a meaningful data set, the researcher must transcribe and annotate them while in the field. This is accomplished with the aid of local consultants, usually members of the community in which the research is being conducted (such as older relatives of the focal children). For language socialization researchers, this one-on-one collaboration with local consultants is indispensable. In addition to

assisting with the most basic aspects of transcription (such as clarifying specific words and phrases captured in the recordings), consultants can bring to the researcher's attention layers of meaning that would otherwise escape his or her notice or understanding. Collaborative transcription also provides ongoing opportunities for the researcher to benefit from consultants' native-speaker intuitions about the use of particular linguistic forms and variants, and their perspectives on many other aspects of local social life.

3. **A holistic, theoretically informed ethnographic perspective.** This is achieved in part through sustained fieldwork and a commitment to ethnographic methods (including participant observation), and in part through familiarity with current theoretical issues and debates concerning such methods. Both depth and breadth of ethnographic observation are important in language socialization research. In addition to tracking individuals over the course of time (as described above), the researcher must observe and record in a broad variety of contexts in order to understand how different social settings may influence those individuals' language usage and modes of participation. Doing so allows the researcher to observe and record a broad range of persons as well; in effect, tracking a particular focal subject across contexts provides access to an entire social network, and often to a broad cross-section of the community that includes fictive kin, peers, neighbors, etc. Although most recorded data are collected during everyday activities, the researcher must be attentive as well to exceptional events (i.e., those that occur rarely or unpredictably) and to periodic activities such as those associated with agricultural, political, and ritual cycles. The systematic collection of recorded data that is central to any language socialization study may be supplemented by surveys, interviews, elicitation sessions, or other methods, depending upon the kinds of data that are needed in order to address the study's central research questions. Whatever complementary methods are chosen, the researcher should have a thorough understanding of the theoretical issues in which they are based.

4. **Attention to both micro and macro levels of analysis, and to linkages between them.** This can be considered part of the ethnographic perspective outlined above, but is important enough to merit consideration in its own right. Language socialization research is not just a matter of producing detailed ethnographic accounts of individual developmental processes and the local contexts in which they occur. An overarching goal is to understand how such individual developmental processes relate to larger sociocultural and historical processes. As they analyze their recordings and other microethnographic data, language socialization researchers are constantly on the lookout for patterns and principles that may also be discernible at macro levels of analysis. Likewise, when they make macroethnographic observations, they consider various ways in which the patterns or principles identified may be writ small in their recorded data. Ultimately, the language socialization paradigm is comparative in perspective, recognizing that while some aspects of language socialization are universal, others vary considerably from one sociocultural setting (or historical period) to another. Attention to micro–macro connections is an important means by which researchers are able to distinguish between the universal and the culturally specific, and to consider the relationships between them.

In recent years, some researchers who have claimed to be doing language socialization research have largely if not completely ignored one or more of these four essential areas. (See Kulick and Schieffelin [2004] and Watson-Gegeo and Nielsen [2003] for recent comments on language socialization research design and methodology.) A short-term study that offers no longitudinal observations, a study based solely on questionnaires and interviews, or one that makes use of naturalistic recordings but is not ethnographic in any meaningful sense simply does not constitute language socialization research. (Such a study may yield interesting data and may contribute meaningfully to other research paradigms, of course.)

That said, the language socialization paradigm is sufficiently flexible to comprise a broad range of studies that place varying degrees of emphasis on the four features outlined above. Since the paradigm's initial formulation, certain trends have emerged in language socialization research that reflect broader trends in the social sciences. Most early language socialization studies were conducted in small-scale non-Western communities and focused primarily on microethnographic levels of analysis. These studies yielded classic ethnographic descriptions of these communities as well as fine-grained, strongly longitudinal accounts of how individual developmental processes unfold within them. More recent studies, many of them conducted in Western societies and in various kinds of socioculturally and sociolinguistically heterogeneous settings, have tended to emphasize the ways in which individuals and local communities are implicated in macro-level processes such as those associated with globalization phenomena, and the

ways in which everyday practices of individuals shape and are shaped by those processes (Garrett and Baquedano-López, 2002). Similarly, language socialization studies conducted by researchers of different disciplinary backgrounds show certain broad differences in orientation, such as whether they place greater emphasis on ethnographic topics and issues of social theory, or on grammatical development and the functions and distribution of specific linguistic forms and structures (Ochs and Schieffelin, 1995).

Language Socialization across the Lifespan

Language socialization is always a reciprocal, dialectical process in which the learner, regardless of age or level of experience, is much more than a passive recipient of input. The child or novice plays an active role in coconstructing every interaction in which she or he participates, however limited that participation might be; even a preverbal infant must be regarded as an emergent participant (de León, 1998), who, while being socialized himself or herself, is in various ways socializing others into such roles as mother, father, and elder sibling. Novices can often be observed to resist socialization, or to steer socializing interactions in new, sometimes unexpected directions. Older children may even assume the role of expert *vis-à-vis* their elders, as when a school-age child introduces his or her parents to a new technology (e.g., computers), or when adult immigrants with limited proficiency in the language of the host society rely on their bilingual children to assist them in dealing with persons and institutions outside the household.

Although the majority of studies conducted thus far have focused on young children, others, particularly in recent years, have focused on language socialization later in the life cycle: in middle childhood, adolescence, and adulthood. As this suggests, language socialization researchers consider socialization to be a lifelong process. Even those who study young children avoid treating child development as unilinear progression toward a static, monolithic adult status. Likewise, in studies of older children and adolescents, it is not assumed that they are gradually taking on pre-existing adult roles and identities; on the contrary, they can often be observed, particularly within their peer groups, to contest and renegotiate the tropes and discourses of identity (including gender and racial/ethnic stereotypes) that circulate among adults in their communities and in society at large.

Entry into adult status, however locally defined, is by no means the end of socialization. Adults continue to be socialized into new roles, statuses, identities, and practices, many of which involve new ways of using language. Adults may find it necessary or desirable to master new registers or styles associated with changes in their vocational or professional lives, or with new avocations or other activities that broaden their social horizons and involve participation in new communities of practice. Similarly, emigration, religious conversion, and other significant life changes may make it necessary or desirable for adults to master new codes and/or new discursive genres, which may involve either spoken or written forms of language (Schieffelin, 1996).

Reproduction and Continuity

For language socialization researchers, close analyses of individuals' participation in naturally occurring interactions are not ends in themselves, but provide empirical points of entry into larger issues of sociocultural reproduction and transformation. Among the most significant contributions of language socialization research is the insight that it yields into the everyday life of a community – the mundane activities and interactions in which ordinary individuals participate on a daily basis, constituting the warp and weft of social life. As linguistic anthropologists have long recognized, a community's norms, values, ideologies, patterns of social organization, and cultural preferences of various kinds are inscribed in – and to a great extent, constituted by – everyday communicative practices and social interactions. For language socialization researchers, this means that it is possible to investigate the ways in which everyday exchanges such as those between a young child and his or her primary caregiver relate to other domains of social structure and cultural meaning such as cosmological belief systems, kinship, and patterns of exchange and reciprocity.

The cultural knowledge that guides an individual's participation in mundane social interactions tends to be difficult for the anthropologist or other investigator to tap into because it is implicit, common-sense knowledge that is seldom reflected upon or articulated. But even adults or experts for whom it is second nature realize that it does not just come naturally to the child or novice. Virtually all socialization activities (even those that do not involve explicit teaching) are routinized to some degree, so as to provide the child or novice with opportunities to engage in more or less predictable, schematically structured interactions with caregivers, teachers, or other more experienced persons. Socialization activities are thus contexts in which the background knowledge that adults or experts draw upon during the course of everyday activities tends to be discursively formulated and explicitly articulated for the benefit of children or novices. To be

sure, the routinized, explicit qualities of socialization activities also make them a prime analytic focus for the investigator seeking to understand the underlying cultural principles that organize day-to-day social life in the community as a whole.

Transformation and Change

Language socialization research is not merely a matter of accounting for linguistic and cultural reproduction and continuity, however. Language socialization researchers recognize that everyday communicative practices are finely guided by preferences, orientations, and dispositions that are social in origin and culturally specific in nature. But at the same time, they are creatively and strategically deployed by individuals whose particular configurations of interests, intentions, and goals are uniquely their own. Language socialization research therefore highlights the open-ended, negotiated, sometimes contested nature of everyday life, and recognizes that the most ordinary activities may be sites of innovation and far-reaching change.

Languages themselves change over time, and language is a crucial medium through which virtually any aspect of culture may be contested, resisted, renegotiated, and ultimately transformed. Recognizing this, language socialization researchers regard both language and culture as fundamentally emergent, dynamic, open-ended domains that partake of all of the ebbs and flows of social life. A corollary of this is that any given language or culture greatly exceeds the capacities (cognitive, practical, and otherwise) of any individual speaker or social actor; every individual's access, therefore, is necessarily partial (Schieffelin, 1990). This partiality is contingent on specific configurations of social variables (gender, birth order, class, ethnicity, etc.) that in turn shape, and are shaped by, the individual's lived experiences. The variation among individuals that inevitably results – even among children in the same household, or students in the same classroom cohort – is a primordial source of social dynamics, which over the course of time give rise to innovation and change in language and culture alike.

Toward a Relational, Nonlinear Perspective on Human Development

Language socialization researchers therefore avoid conceptualizing human development as a matter of individuals acquiring pre-existent bodies of cultural knowledge, linguistic forms, etc., that are static and bounded. Rather, language and culture, and individuals' acquisition thereof, are conceptualized in relational terms, emphasizing their symbolically mediated, coconstructed, dynamically emergent qualities (Kramsch, 2002).

This is not to say that the heuristic value of established notions of system and structure are spurned in favor of a radical antiformalism. In practical terms, the processes with which language socialization research is centrally concerned can hardly be described and analyzed without reference to some such notions (e.g., grammar, code, speech community), nor without due regard for the demonstrable formal and structural properties that make them coherent units of analysis. The challenge is to avoid unduly reifying such systems and structures: to avoid treating them as self-contained, autonomous entities that somehow exist apart from the historically particular social worlds and lived experiences out of which they emerge, and by virtue of which they can be discerned, labeled, and posited as units of analysis in the first place. The grammar of a given language, for example, is better regarded as a **precipitate of** or **distillation** from the ongoing flow and flux of communicative practice (at a specific historical moment in the social lives of actual speakers) than as an abstract, timeless **basis for** or **prerequisite of** communicative practice (by hypothetical speakers within an idealized, homogeneous community).

Similar concerns inform language socialization researchers' nonteleological perspectives on the outcomes of socialization (Kramsch, 2002). Individual development is recognized to be variable, contingent, nonlinear, and ultimately open-ended. Differing degrees and types of developmental progress and multiple kinds of successful outcomes are recognized – even when the arena of investigation is a classroom or other institutional context in which the participants themselves differentiate success and failure in much starker terms.

The relational tensions that language socialization researchers seek to explore are well captured by Bourdieu's notion of 'habitus' (Bourdieu, 1977; Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992). Habitus can be defined as an integrated set of durable, embodied dispositions which predispose the individual to act and react in ways that are more or less specifiable, more or less predictable, but ultimately open-ended and underdetermined. Habitus is the emergent outcome of numerous densely intersecting factors – virtually all of them mediated and substantially influenced by culture – ranging from gender and class status to the particulars of individual life experience. An individual's habitus predisposes him or her to perceive, think, and act in semi-routinized ways, and to regard certain conditions in the world around him or her as normal. But habitus does not rigidly determine that

individual's behavior; it is open-ended, allowing for creativity, improvisation, and innovation.

A defining characteristic of habitus is that it is inculcated, i.e., socialized; the dispositions to which Bourdieu refers are said to be acquired largely through socialization, particularly during the early years of the lifespan. Bourdieu's work says very little about how socialization actually comes about, however. Language socialization research strives to fill this gap in our knowledge of human development by means of empirically grounded studies, and in so doing, to contribute to understandings of the multiplex relationships among language, society, and culture.

See also: Communicative Competence; Communities of Practice; Identity in Sociocultural Anthropology and Language; Language Change and Cultural Change; Linguistic Anthropology; Linguistic Habitus; Social Aspects of Pragmatics; Socialization; Speech and Language Community.

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Language Teaching Traditions: Second Language

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Introduction

Learning a language in addition to one's first, or native, language has its roots in prehistory, when tribes encountered other tribes whose language differed from their own and a need to communicate arose, perhaps to exchange goods, form alliances, or ask directions. With no written records on which to rely, we can only conjecture as to how that learning happened. However, it would not be unreasonable to assume that it occurred in much the same way as uninstructed (sometimes called 'informal' or 'natural') language acquisition happens today, given similar communicative needs. Instructed (or 'formal') second language learning, however, has a long and varied tradition that may or may not have been based on communicative necessity, depending on the particular historical context in which it occurred Traditions in language teaching reflect a mix of earlier, established techniques combined with innovative influences justified by contemporary ideas in philosophy, religion, and later, psychology, in addition to cultural norms and values. A fascinating aspect of language teaching is that particular themes continued to recur throughout its history, down to the present day.

The following overview of language teaching traditions traces their history from classical Greece and Rome to the 20th century. The perspective is Western European based on the role of Latin and, to a lesser extent, Greek in the curriculum. This is not to suggest that other, non-Western traditions do not contribute to our understanding of historical practice. For example, the oral tradition associated with non-Western educational approaches can provide important insights into second-language teaching and learning. Unfortunately, research on the teaching of second languages within and from the non-Western perspective – as opposed to the teaching of Western languages in the non-Western context – is an area that remains largely unexplored in academic research. Reagan (1996) provides a general overview of non-Western educational traditions, including the teaching of first, but not second, languages.

Early Greek Education

Greeks during the 6th century B.C. held two conflicting views of education in the schools of Athens and in those of Sparta. Although the Athenian model formed the basis for the Western tradition, it is nonetheless interesting to review the Spartan model to see which aspects were shared between the two.

Schools in Sparta

Sparta was a military state established in the 8th century B.C. The Spartan citizen lived for the welfare of the state, of which he was the property, and individuals had no importance apart from the state. Contact with foreigners was discouraged; in fact, free travel outside the state was prohibited. The aim of education was to develop character, not intellectual capacity, and thus to create obedient, courageous, disciplined citizens who were physically fit and loyal to the state. Girls received no formal education; they learned at home the ideals of the state and of homemaking. They also studied gymnastics to enhance physical fitness, essential for healthy reproduction. Boys became wards of the state at age 6 years, when they left their family homes and moved into military barracks in units of 64 peers. They would not live in a

home situation again until marriage at age 30 years. A state official, the *paidónomous*, supervised education, with the aid of assistants who conducted the actual training. At age 18 years, young men became cadets, at which time they began a 2-year period of training in military strategy and tactics, followed by a 10-year obligatory military conscription. On successful completion of service, men were granted full citizenship.

The Spartan curriculum consisted of extreme physical training, sports, and military drill, motivated by competitiveness and harsh discipline. Training in literature was limited to accounts of military heroism. Language teaching, first or second, was not part of the curriculum. In fact, the adjective 'laconic' derives from the geographical name Laconia, of which Sparta was capital, to describe the terseness of speech for which its citizens were famous.

Schools in Athens

In contrast to education in Sparta, the aim of education in wealthy and cultured Athens, victorious in the Persian War (479 B.C.), was to produce a well-balanced individual, intelligent and of strong moral character. Although the state supervised and regulated elementary education, it did not financially support it. Each school was independent and privately operated by a teacher. Education was not compulsory. On the other hand, a 2-year period of military training, *ephebía*, beginning at age 18, was mandatory. Only sons of free citizens were educated; girls received their education at home from their mothers. From ages 7 to 14, boys studied reading, writing, music, and gymnastics, with different teachers for each subject. Reading instruction began with learning the alphabet. Children sang an alphabet song and formed the letters with their bodies while the rest of the class guessed the letters and words.

All teachers were male, and each pupil was accompanied by a *paedagogós*, a male slave who served the mixed functions of nurse, chaperon, and tutor throughout the school day. The elementary school teacher was among the lowest-status occupations in Athens. Itinerant teachers provided instruction beyond the elementary school, offering curricula dependent on their interests and expertise: grammar, composition, rhetoric, literature, music, mathematics, astronomy, or physics. When military training became voluntary, it was replaced by higher education in philosophy, rhetoric, and science, offered through private academies.

Plato and the Academy

A military hero from an aristocratic and wealthy family, at age 20, Plato became a student of Socrates, studying with him for almost 8 years until he witnessed his teacher's trial and conviction in 399 B.C. Disillusioned with Athenian democracy, Plato left Athens, only to return in 387 B.C. and purchase a recreation grove dedicated to the god Academus, wherein he opened a school, the Academy. Plato charged no tuition, relying on the donations of wealthier students to support the enterprise. Both men and women were welcome to study at the Academy. However, only advanced students – those who had already studied geometry – were accepted. The teaching method was lecture-based, with some elements of Socratic dialogue. The curriculum included higher mathematics, astronomy, music, literature, law, history, and philosophy. Plato's epistemology (theory of the nature of knowledge) viewed knowledge as a recalling of ideas that are innate in the soul. He believed that man does not arrive at truth through the senses or by experience. Instead, he must turn inward, looking inside himself. In this way, he can arrive at innate truths through reason. 'Education,' literally 'to draw out of' derives from the idea and exist within learning is the recollection, or remembering, of what is already known and that exists within.

Plato's philosophy, translated into education theory, held that all children should be educated to the limits of their abilities, and that the state, rather than the family, should provide that education. The aim of education was to produce individuals (rulers, warriors, workers, and civil servants) who were oriented to their role in society and whose characters were disciplined to control their animal appetites; that is, to subordinate their senses to reason. Until ephebia at age 18 years, education was devoted to the study of mathematics, literature, poetry, and music. Plato recommended that elementary-level learning be as close to play as possible and that higher levels of learning develop students' critical thinking skills and their ability to use abstract reasoning.

Aristotle and the Lyceum

Aristotle became the most famous of Plato's students in the Academy. At age 41 years, he became tutor to Alexander, son of King Philip of Macedonia, who would later become known as Alexander the Great. At age 50 years, Aristotle returned to Athens and, following in the footsteps of his famous teacher, purchased property and opened a school. The property, dedicated to Apollo Lyceus, provided the name for the school, the Lyceum. The Lyceum became known for its work in natural sciences and was the site of the first zoo and botanical gardens in the Western world. Aristotle's keen observations of nature – honed over the years by examining samples of animal and vegetable life brought back from Alexander's conquests – became

the world's chief source of scientific knowledge for the next 1000 years. Aristotle's teaching style consisted of a morning walk through the gardens with his regular students, during which they exchanged and discussed ideas; his school became known as 'peripatetic,' or 'walking about.' After eating lunch with his students, Aristotle gave public lectures on politics, literature, and philosophy. The students organized themselves and performed the administrative duties of the Lyceum. All students were expected to engage in historical or scientific research, much of which formed the basis for Aristotle's propositions.

Like Plato, Aristotle believed that man is a rational animal: an animal because he possesses a body with physical needs and appetites, and rational because he has a soul. Unlike his teacher, who held that man is born with preformed ideas, Aristotle proposed that man is born devoid of knowledge, a *tabula rasa* ('blank slate') and that he formulates ideas as a result of contact with material objects. Whereas Plato would have defined learning as 'education,' learning for Aristotle was a matter of instruction ('to put into'): a process of putting knowledge into an empty, but receptive, mind.

The aim of education under Aristotle was to produce a good man; that is, to change a man who is not good by nature to one who controls his animal activities through reason. Both his intellectual and his physical abilities should be developed to their fullest potential. Women were viewed as inferior to men, and their proper functions, as wives and procreators, were fulfilled in the home through training in the domestic arts and gymnastics. Even among men, education was aristocratic; that is, limited to the sons of citizens. The curriculum was not to serve any vocational function, as such activities were the provenance of slaves. Reading, writing, mathematics, natural science, physical education, and humanities (rhetoric, grammar, poetry, politics, and philosophy) formed the curriculum. Because man learns from nature, by habit, and by reason, the teacher's function consisted of organizing the material in a logical manner. Repetitive drill was used to reinforce what was understood by reason, and correct habit formation was essential in the learning process.

The opposing ideas of Plato and Aristotle, in simplified terms of 'education' versus 'instruction,' or of innate knowledge as opposed to knowledge derived from experience, had a profound influence on Western education, including traditions of language teaching. Twenty-first century debates surrounding the extent to which language acquisition is a function of innate human faculties or a result of environmental factors continue to capture the attention of linguists and to influence teaching practice.

Roman Education

In the Roman Republic (508–146 B.C.), education took place at home. Mothers or older relatives tutored young children. Strict obedience was valued. Children were expected to acquire an elementary knowledge of reading and writing. Instruction, whether in literacy or in the trades and professions, was through apprenticeship; that is, through example and imitation. Education was largely vocational, not erudite.

The Roman conquest of Macedonia and Greece (201–146 B.C.) had a powerful influence on Roman society and education. The acquisition of the new territory brought thousands of well-educated Greeks to serve as slaves in Roman households, where they became the teachers of Roman youth. Greek language, culture, and philosophy, including principles of education, spread. The Greek language was so commonly used among educated people that one could address the Roman senate in Greek and be understood. The inclusion of jokes and plays on Greek words in Roman theater provides evidence that even lower classes of Roman society were familiar with the language. By the beginning of the 3rd century B.C., Greek was the language of prestige and culture among educated and upper–social class Romans, existing alongside Latin in a bilingual society.

Considered more practical in orientation than the Greeks, the Romans viewed education as a means to an end: It conferred prestige, but more important, it led to higher status and, thus, to better marriage prospects and more opportunities for advancement.

The system of formal education in Rome in the first century B.C. was divided into four levels. The first, or elementary, level, the *Ludus* (meaning 'game' or 'play'), enrolled children from ages 7 to 12. In it, the *magister* ('teacher') taught reading, writing, and arithmetic. Despite its name, the Ludus was infamous for its harsh discipline, and teaching was primarily by rote. Children depended on memory to learn. Elementary schools were open to children of all free families, boys and girls alike. In this sense, Roman education was more public than the Greek. (Girls' public education, however, ended at this level.) Romans debated the advantages of public versus private school for their children, and upper-class families employed private tutors for their children. The second level of formal schooling was the Grammar School, enrolling students ages 12 to 16. 'Grammar,' from the Greek *grámma* ('letter'), was the art or technique of writing, not the compendium of rules that the term implies today. The students who attended Grammar School did not typically come out of the Ludus. Rather, they were students who had been privately instructed at home for their elementary education.

Both Latin and Greek grammar schools were available, and students could attend one or the other, or both. It is important, from a language learning perspective, to remember that the grammar schools used Latin or Greek as both the content of the curriculum and the medium of instruction, in what we would consider today an immersion-type setting. Young people who attended them would have already been at least functionally competent in the language, having learned to understand, speak, and probably read it at home from a private tutor. The teacher, or 'grammarian,' taught grammar (composition) by means of literature, primarily through lecture. Lecture (literally, 'reading') consisted of the teacher's reading aloud of literary texts and providing comments. The texts provided both the content of the lesson and the form that students were to imitate. Students took notes and memorized lectures. From ages 16–20 years, students attended the School of Rhetoric, where they learned how to use language effectively through the continued study of grammar, argument, and speech (or oratory, literally 'pleading from the mouth'). The chief purpose of the school of rhetoric was to train students to be successful public speakers. The last and highest level of schooling was the University. Two universities were established in the early years of the Roman Empire: one in Athens and the other in Rhodes, both Greek-language institutions. In addition to higher learning, attending the university would have been a study abroad experience. Students who attended the university could be anywhere from 21 to 45 years old. The principal subject was philosophy, but other subjects included law, mathematics, medicine, architecture, and rhetoric. The well-educated Roman was bilingual in Latin and Greek.

Quintilian

One of the most well-known and influential educators in Rome was Quintilian (35–96 A.D.). After training in rhetoric and pursuing a career in law and politics, he was appointed the first state professorship of rhetoric in Rome. Quintilian authored the *Institutio Oratoria* ('Education of the Orator'), a 12-volume series that covered wide-ranging topics in education from preschool to advice for the practicing orator. His advice was that of a distinguished politician and orator regarding the education of boys from upper-class families who were destined to become future leaders. From that perspective, the primary objective of education was to train students to be effective and persuasive public speakers who would then be good public servants. Self-discipline, moral integrity, and social conscience were highly valued attributes. In an age that lacked print media, an esteemed man who could sway public opinion with his oratorical skills held incomparable value for the state. A command of spoken language in conjunction with a background in its literature, history, poetry, music, and philosophy was the mark of a well-educated citizen.

Many of Quintilian's educational principles would be recognized in modern guidelines for practice. Among other things, he advocated that curricular content must be appropriate to the child's ability level (a better predictor for success than age alone); individual differences, both intellectual and physical, among students must be taken into account, with aptitude being an important factor in determining success; a system of rewards to promote learning is more effective than one of punishment; learning cannot be forced, rather, interest, motivation, and persistence are better served through a pleasurable instructional experience; content should be relevant to contemporary situations, and activities should deal with the practical application of that knowledge; and public education is more beneficial than private for the development of social skills.

With regard to language learning in particular, Quintilian suggested that spelling should reflect pronunciation and that games should be used to encourage learning. He advocated the use of wooden blocks in the shape of letters as a way for young children to learn the alphabet and spelling. Above all, he maintained that earlier is better, especially where language is concerned. He recommended that children learn Greek first and Latin second, as the latter would be learned anyway in the context of daily life. Because he believed that learning derives from instruction, he warned that care must be taken to expose children only to excellent and accurate models of language use, both with regard to their caregivers and to the texts they read. Errors, once inscribed on the wax tablet that was the metaphor for the child's mind (Aristotle's *tabula rasa*), were considered difficult, if not impossible, to erase.

Latin Grammars

Aelius Donatus (4th century A.D.) and Caesariensis Priscianus (end of the 5th to the early 6th century A.D.) were Roman grammarians who wrote Latin grammars. Donatus's short grammar, *Ars minor*, was so widely used that any elementary grammar book became known as a 'donat.' It presented the parts of speech in a question and answer format ("What is a noun? A part of speech that signifies by its case a person or thing specifically or generally.") Examples from literature illustrated forms and correct usage. It also contained lists of commonly made errors (alongside the correct forms) and figures of speech. Donatus referred to students' errors as

'barbarisms,' and it is likely that many of them were incorrect spellings based on language they had learned only from dictation, in addition to influences from Vulgar Latin (i.e., the language commonly spoken by the people), which was quite different both from the classical, literary language that students learned in school and from non-Latin dialects. Priscian's grammar, *Institutiones grammaticae*, meant to follow the *Ars minor*, was an 18-book treatise on all aspects of Latin grammar, phonology, morphology, and syntax, filled with quotations from Latin authors. For many students, the examples from Priscian's grammar constituted their only exposure to Latin literature.

The curriculum that Rome had adopted from Greece, namely, grammar, rhetoric, dialectics, mathematics, astronomy, music, and philosophy, remained unchanged for centuries throughout Western Europe. It was a system of education founded on the study of language and designed for students who were already functionally proficient in the language – Greek or Latin – before they began to study it formally.

Education in the Medieval Age

When Germanic tribes invaded, fractured, and conquered the Roman Empire, many of them accepted the culture of Rome and Greece, including Christianity. As a consequence, the Roman church emerged as a dominant influence in Western Europe. The aim of education changed from the development of the educated citizen to the preparation of a man of God, in anticipation of the afterlife. The focus of education turned away from the practical affairs of the world, from sense experience, from physical education, and from external reality. Truth was viewed as absolute: it was not discovered through experimentation but delivered through faith, and it was found only within the Church. Because pupils were inclined toward evil, as a result of original sin, they had to be disciplined and undergo physical punishment to control their evil inclinations.

The spread of Christianity created a conflict between Christian theology and ancient philosophy in education. Liberal thinkers wanted to maintain what was beautiful from the ancient authors, preserving their culture in a Christian form. Theologians were ambivalent in their attitude toward Latin and Latin authors. On the one hand, the Bible and church services were in Latin, so all clergy needed to learn the language. On the other hand, Latin literature, which had served as the model and the method for language teaching, was pagan and a source of possible moral corruption. Because of this, the classical authors were no longer considered appropriate content, especially for young people. Scripture and the writings of the early Church fathers replaced them as models for learning Latin.

Three types of schools predominated during the Middle Ages: the catechetical school, the cathedral school, and the monastic school. Catechetical schools provided an elementary level of education consisting of fundamental doctrines of faith. They were designed for catechumens, that is, possible converts to Christianity, and they provided only what was essential in Latin; namely, the memorization of prayers and scripture passages. The monastic schools, in contrast, trained boys to become monks. They retained the Roman curriculum of the seven liberal arts, divided into the trivium – grammar, rhetoric, and dialectics, or logical argumentation – and the quadrivium – arithmetic, music, geometry, and astronomy. The cathedral schools prepared clergy and sought to provide advanced knowledge of scripture, doctrine, and ritual. This instruction was combined with the study of grammar, rhetoric, literature, geometry, history, and philosophy. Boys who did not intend to become either priests or monks but who wanted a general education attended either the cathedral or monastic schools, where they studied the liberal arts as 'externs.'

Monks were members of a religious order, or community, who vowed dedication to lives of chastity, obedience, poverty, farming, and teaching. These monks were workers, not contemplatives. The curriculum of the monastic schools, therefore, stressed practical skills. Latin, too, was learned for utilitarian purposes: reading and singing to participate fully in the ritual activities of the church, writing to copy manuscripts (but not necessarily to understand them), rhetoric to be able to teach and preach effectively, and arithmetic to calculate the dates of Easter.

An early church figure, Jerome (340–420 A.D.), having completed a classical education in Rome and then studied theology, asceticism, Hebrew, and scripture, translated the Bible from Hebrew and Greek into Latin. This was the first Latin bible, known as the Vulgate. It became the official version of scripture for eight centuries. Jerome also founded a monastery and a monastic school in Bethlehem. In a letter dated 403 A.D., he offered advice to a mother on how to raise her infant daughter, much of which can be traced to Quintilian. Jerome stressed the importance of good models and advocated early play with alphabet blocks. He warned against allowing errors to occur and suggested that to ensure accuracy from the very beginning, the mother should guide her daughter's hand as she wrote on a wax tablet or traced letters carved in a board, "so that her efforts confined within these limits may keep to the lines traced out for her and not stray outside of these" (Ulich, 1954: 165). Errors are to be strictly avoided,

as "An unused jar long retains the taste and smell of that with which it is first filled" (166). Jerome also advised that the girl learn both Greek and Latin from the very beginning to avoid a non-native-like accent: "For, if the tender lips are not from the first shaped to this, the tongue is spoiled by a foreign accent and its native speech debased by alien elements" (167). Finally, he suggested that the ideal solution would be to send the girl to a monastery.

Another early Church father, Augustine, in his *Confessions*, provided an account of his language-learning experience. He claimed that language developed out of a need to communicate and that he learned his native language by associating sounds and gestures with objects. He then collected these 'signs' and used them to convey his own meanings and desires. Augustine did not know Greek before he went to school and suffered because of it, causing him to hate the language: "The difficulty of learning a strange language did sprinkle as it were with gall all the pleasures of those fabulous narrations. For I understood not a word of it, yet they vehemently pressed me and with most cruel threats and punishments to make me understand it." He compared that experience to learning his first language, without fear or torment, but simply by listening to people talk to him and attempting to convey his own meanings, concluding that "a free curiosity hath more force in children's learning of languages, than a frightful enforcement can have" (147). By his own admission, Augustine loved classical Latin literature, but he criticized the amount of time and effort spent on it and particularly disliked grammar: "men care more to observe the rules of grammar than the laws of God" (149).

The Rise of Universities

Moslem influence during the 11th and 12th centuries, with access to Greek texts in translation, stimulated renewed interest in classical learning. Scholars traveled to Spain and southern Italy to peruse the tremendous libraries that the Arabs had built. In addition, the growth of cities provoked a need for professional training in law and medicine. The university had its informal beginnings where teachers and students came together to learn and debate, much as they had done in Plato's Academy. For their own protection from interference by secular or Church authorities, teachers and students found it necessary to incorporate themselves; hence, the term universitas studiorum ('collective of studies' or corporation). The University of Bologna was the earliest – established in 1088 – and specialized in law; the University of Salerno specialized in medicine, and the University of Paris specialized in the arts.

At the university, one could attain three levels of degrees: the bachelor of arts, the master's, and the doctor's (from the Latin *docere* 'to teach'). The bachelor of arts degree entitled one to continue for a higher degree. The master's and doctor's were earned through the defense of a thesis, demonstrating one's scholarship. The curriculum for the bachelor's degree remained the seven liberal arts. Because of a continued lack of books in the Medieval period, the method of instruction was still by lecture, delivered by either a master's or doctor's candidate who read something he had written and provided commentary. There was no minimum age for attending the university, and it was not unusual for students to be as young as 12 years old.

As in earlier times, a thorough knowledge of Latin was essential for the successful completion of studies at the bachelor's level and a prerequisite for more advanced study. By this point in time, however, Latin was no longer any student's first language. So, to ensure that students would acquire proficiency in Latin, not only for conducting research and writing but also as a means of spoken communication, students were required to use Latin as all times, in and out of class, even in the 'colleges' (student residences): "It has been decreed that the speaking of Latin shall be strictly observed in all the colleges and lodgings, not only by the simple students but also by the bachelors, according to the statutes, . . . on penalty of a certain fine to be imposed" (Seybolt, 1921: 72). Students were encouraged to report their peers who didn't speak Latin outside of class. In fact, some students were appointed language spies, called 'wolves,' who recorded the names of students who used the vernacular (their native language) instead of Latin. The students whose names appeared on the lists were summoned and fined.

For conventional and religious purposes during the Medieval Age, Latin remained the language of school even as it became further and further removed from students' linguistic reality outside the classroom. Students did not possess a functional command of Latin; it was a not used by the vast majority of people in the wider community. Latin was a foreign language. Most students did not use it readily and had to be forced to speak it.

Revival of Classical Studies

With the rediscovery of classical authors, there was a renewed enthusiasm for the *studia humanitatis*; that is, the classical Latin education including literature and history. The proponents of the new learning, the humanists, advocated more than just the correction of manuscripts: They proposed a revival of classical

learning and culture. They sought to institute Latin as the language of wider communication, much the way that English is used today. The school curriculum, then, continued to be devoted to the liberal arts, but with the insistence that texts of the ancient authors form the content of the curriculum. Students would, once again, learn language in conjunction with content, through exposure to excellent models, and not as a system of abstract rules. The most prominent educators of the day – Vittorino da Feltre, Guarino Guarini, Desiderius Erasmus – exhorted that learning should be pleasant, that harsh discipline was unnecessary and counterproductive, and that errors are artifacts of a developing grammatical system and not a sign of linguistic or moral decay. New attention was paid to the surroundings and comfort of the pupils, as evidenced by Vittorino da Feltre's delightful boarding school, the *Casa Giocosa* (the Playful House), where children learned Latin and Greek in an Italian countryside villa while enjoying fresh air, simply prepared food, and lots of physical exercise and outdoor games. Erasmus, the Dutch humanist, not one to mince words, put it boldly when he wrote in his treatise *On the right method of instruction*,

> I have no patience with the stupidity of the average teacher of grammar who wastes precious years in hammering rules into children's heads. For it is not by learning rules that we acquire the power of speaking a language, but by daily intercourse with those accustomed to express themselves with exactness and refinement, and by the copious reading of the best authors (Woodward, 1921: 163–164).

Rise of the Vernacular Languages

The humanists' best efforts notwithstanding, they failed in their quest to establish Latin as the universal language. A combination of economic, religious, political, and scientific developments worked against them. As nations formed across the European continent, national languages solidified national identities. Increasing criticism of the abusive power of the Catholic Church stigmatized the use of Latin by association. Although Latin prevailed for a while longer as the language of scholarship and international relationships, it began to lose ground as the vernacular languages grew increasingly powerful. Scientific discoveries began to be published in the vernacular. Galileo published his treatise on planetary movements in Italian, not Latin. The rise of a middle class of merchants and bankers legitimized the vernaculars as media of communication. Parents needed to be convinced of the value of having their children devote

so much time and effort to learning Latin. Perhaps the event that had the most significant effect on the language teaching was one of the greatest inventions of all time: the printing press, which allowed for the mass production of books. For the first time, students had easy and relatively inexpensive access to texts. They no longer needed to commit everything to memory or to laboriously copy reams of commentary and lecture notes. Moreover, it wasn't long before the Latin texts were readily available in translation, either interlinear or in side-by-side columns. Such innovation had the obvious effect of eliminating the need for students to struggle through the Latin text to understand its meaning. They could simply read it in their native language.

In addition to his condemnation of the excesses of the Catholic Church, Martin Luther was also a proponent of widespread literacy education. He advocated free elementary education for all children in Germany so that they would be able to read the Bible and thereby attain salvation. Philip Melanchthon functioned as Luther's mouthpiece for educational reform. On the basis of his observations in schools, Melanchthon proposed a three-level system. The plan remained basically humanist, with the innovation that children should first be taught (level 1) in the vernacular before proceeding to the Latin grammar school (level 2) and the conventional course of study, followed by the university (level 3). The rules and regulations that Melanchthon outlined, however, suggest anything but a golden age for learning: those for the university students prohibit a long list of weapons that students were not to bring to their classes, along with curfews for evenings in the pubs and recommendations to students on how to organize their time effectively.

In England, Sir Thomas Elyot authored the first book on education written and printed in English language, the *Boke named the Governour* (1531). While still advocating the learning of Latin, he argued that English could be used just as well as Latin for scholarly purposes. The Spanish scholar and humanist Juan Luis Vivès (1492–1540) held that language is a living entity, not a static one, and that its use defines its grammar. He proposed that Latin should also be treated as a living language and not simply in imitation of Cicero. Vivès also advocated the use of the vernacular in teaching boys, even though he wrote his treatise in Latin. However, Pietro Bembo (1470–1547), in Italy, not only urged the use of the vernacular but wrote in Italian to praise the Italian language. Bembo was instrumental in establishing as the literary standard the Florentine dialect found in the literary masterpieces by Dante, Petrarch, and Boccaccio.

The Jesuits

The Catholic Church responded to its critics by calling the Council of Trent (1555) to initiate reforms from within. Its program (the Counter Reformation) depended on the education of clergy and laity. Ignatius of Loyola (1491–1556) founded the Society of Jesus, the Jesuits, using a military model: Members would be soldiers who fought for the cause of religion. The Jesuit system of education, although criticized for its elitism, has enjoyed tremendous prestige and esteem since its founding in 1540. The graduate of a Jesuit school was expected to think clearly and logically, express himself eloquently and effectively in speech and in writing, and possess erudition. The *Ratio studiorum* ('Plan of Studies') was the Jesuits' exhaustive description of their educational model. Again, it was a liberal arts curriculum, based on and devoted to the study of Latin. In the lower grammar school, students spent almost 25 hours per week on the study of Latin. Ignatius himself advocated the learning of Latin through literary texts, with Latin as both the medium and the content of instruction. Students were admonished to use Latin at all times. The use of the vernacular was strictly limited, allowed only for the purpose of learning to deliver sermons in it when necessary. Extensive teacher training, rigorous organization, and a carefully prescribed curriculum were hallmarks of the Jesuit system. Despite a lengthy and highly supervised period of training, the least prestigious position was held by the teacher of grammar.

Toward the Modern Era

The esteem with which the Jesuit system was held provided impetus for the Protestants to design a educational system that could compete with it. In opposition to the elitist nature of the Jesuits, the educational reforms proposed by Johannes Comenius included public education for all, regardless of aptitude or intelligence: "a sieve, if you continually pour water through it, grows cleaner and cleaner, although it cannot retain liquid" (Comenius, 1657: 67). A renewed emphasis on observation, experimentation, and reasoning within the scientific paradigm of the day was realized in Comenius's curriculum by a focus on direct experience and learning through the senses. He advocated that pupils study things before words and that teachers organize materials into a natural order, by presenting ideas incrementally, beginning with the known and gradually introducing the unknown, and by recycling material at increasing levels of complexity throughout the curriculum (what he referred to as "the concentric method"). He was

also strongly in favor of repetition, explicit error correction, and accuracy from the very beginning: "the first attempt at imitation should be as accurate as possible, that not the smallest deviation form the model be made.... For whatever comes first is, as it were, the foundation of that which follows. If the foundation be firm, a solid edifice can be constructed upon it, but it be weak this is impossible" (Comenius, 1657: 199–200). Although his treatise, *The Great Didactic* (1657) contains many contradictory statements, Comenius's textbooks were his claim to international fame. His major contribution to education is his pioneering use of illustrations as an integral, not merely decorative, element in language textbooks. He, too, advocated elementary instruction in the vernacular school, followed by the Latin school.

Even the most ardent proponents of vernacular education, although advocating education for all, restricted it to the elementary level. Thus they ensured rudimentary vernacular literacy and religious education for the common people. Secondary schools (gymnasia, grammar schools, lycée, academies) were still based on the Latin model and remained the intellectual territory of the elite: boys from well-to-do families who could afford to sent them off to school to be trained in the liberal arts.

Vernacular education at the elementary level predominated in the 17th and 18th centuries, whereas the commonest type of secondary school remained the traditional Latin school. The 'naturalistic' movement in education reflected the major philosophical points of Romanticism and naturalism; namely, an emphasis on emotion as opposed to reason, an intense interest in nature and intuition, and the belief that the closer man remains to his natural state, the more authentic he is. Rousseau (1712–1778) authored a treatise on education in novel form, *Émile*, in which he proposed that man is by nature good, but becomes spoiled by the restraints of society and formal education. This position was in direct opposition to the notion that man is born evil and must be saved by God's grace. In line with his philosophical position, Rousseau recommended the elimination of schools altogether.

Émile, however, influenced the ideas of Johann Basedow (1723–1790) in Germany, who established an experimental laboratory school, the *Philanthropium*. His methodology abolished rote memorization, advocating instead the use of games and a natural, immersion-type approach to teach language, even Latin: "They [the youngsters] played the 'Command' game. You see, it is this way: first, they all stand in a row like soldiers, and Herr Wolke [the teacher] is the officer who commands in Latin, and they must do everything he orders. For instance, when he says

claudite oculos, they close their eyes tightly: or, *circumspicite*, they peer around in all directions" (Cole, 1965: 429–430) Basedow's curriculum emphasized the importance of the vernacular as the language of instruction and led, ultimately, to the elimination of the Latin grammar schools.

The Lesson of Tradition

When the connection between language and content was severed, Latin became a subject in the curriculum, like science or music, rather than its foundation. Moreover, as it no longer functioned as a means of communication – other than to read ancient texts that were readily available in translation – it served no utilitarian purpose and so could be abandoned for the sake of including more practical subjects in the curriculum. The learning of language for a practical purpose presupposes certain social and economic conditions; for example, international politics, evangelization, commerce, travel, and globalization. In the 20th century, 'living' modern languages replaced Latin in the curriculum, but interestingly, although the language changed, the teaching methodology did not. The legacy that the teaching of Latin left on the early–20th-century curriculum was one of a system of abstract grammatical rules and translation, despite centuries of reformers' advice to the contrary.

In an attempt to create successful classroom conditions for language learning, educators returned, perhaps unknowingly, to the last, most confident era of language teaching – the ideal method – in the tradition of Comenius and the Jesuits. Many methods were introduced: The Silent Way, Suggestopedia, Community Language Learning, and the Berlitz Method. Audiolingualism, a language teaching method popular in the United States in the 1960s, promised to produce competent second-language users through the use of pattern practice, with lots of repetition and absolute accuracy from the beginning. The presentation of language was so rigorously prescribed that learners were not allowed to make mistakes or form bad habits. Touted as a 'scientific' method–based partially on principles of behaviorism in psychology – it prompted schools to make huge investments in language learning laboratories, where students donned headphones, listening and repeating what they heard on tapes. Needless to say, the method did not produce the results it had promised. Unfortunately, it did produce a generation of learners who were convinced that they were incapable of learning language and a cadre of school administrators who were reluctant to invest in future language learning schemes.

The communicative language teaching movement that became popular in the 1970s emerged in opposition to the grammar translation practice of teaching Latin, behaviorist approaches, and any rigidly prescribed method. Proponents of the approach argue that learners acquire language through the interpretation, expression, and negotiation of meaning, rather than through the study of grammatical rules, translation, or mimicry. Others propose immersion education or content-based instruction to maintain the connection between language and content, in a way similar to the bilingual system in early Rome. Others seek to recover the humanist tradition and the centrality of literature in language teaching. Those who take a fully vocational approach suggest curricula designed to teach Language for Special Purposes. Rhetoric and argumentation have resurfaced in Language for Academic Purposes courses.

Consonant with a society that values scientific over humanistic endeavors, some applied linguists look for a scientific orientation to language learning. Such approaches place a renewed emphasis on providing learners with models, in the form of 'input.' Research continues to investigate the extent to which earlier is better, especially with regard to the acquisition of native-like pronunciation. Other linguists take a more philosophical approach and seek to discover universal truths about language and its acquisition, fueling the debate about whether language derives from innate faculties of the human mind or environmental factors.

Language teachers, having never heard of Quintilian, Jerome, or Vittorino da Feltre, readily embrace the role of affect in language learning to explain why it is important to create an environment that is conducive to learning. They consult language teaching manuals that suggest the use of concrete objects, body movements, and illustrations to convey meaning and to support language development. They include authentic texts in the curriculum to provide models of real language use, although the glossing of text may take the form of hyperlinked text, rather than interlinear translation.

Whether, when, and how to deal with learner's errors remains a concern, as well as how to focus learners' attention on form, without losing sight of meaning. How much and what kind of grammar instruction might enhance learning is still under discussion.

Language teaching tradition reveals that true innovations may be rare, but when confronted with the necessity of implementing instruction that leads to successful language learning, the voice of tradition still echoes in contemporary practice.

See also: Communicative Language Teaching; Languages for Specific Purposes.

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Languages for Specific Purposes

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Defining the Object

The object of study for the branch of applied linguistics that is covered by the heading 'Languages for Specific Purposes' is multi-faceted. The many facets are a consequence of the fact that this discipline looks at (in principle all) aspects of actual communication in specialized discursive domains. To say that discursive domains are specialized means that it is possible to become a specialist in the domain, through education, training, or experience. This definition covers primarily professional areas, but also nonprofessional areas like hobbies. The fact that not a focused part of the human linguistic competence, but the totality of aspects involved in communication in the described settings is the potential object of study, gives studies into the field a very wide range. However, two main poles may be isolated in the landscape of LSP research, around and between which different approaches and projects are located:

- One pole sees LSP as supplementary language skills that are applied when producing texts in specialized situational settings in order to realize specific purposes. The basic assumption is that language is generally used in the texts according to the ordinary rules known to all language users (Language for General Purposes, LGP), but the ways words are connected and the words are specialized. This approach is generally meant by the English term used to designate the object of study, viz., 'Language for Specific Purposes.' The concept centrally behind this term is closely connected to language teaching for professional purposes, where speakers of, e.g., English as a foreign or second language have to learn (additionally) how to use language in areas where they are going to work. In other words, scholars tending to this pole concentrate upon the specific linguistic differences between language used in different settings.

- The other pole is more closely connected to the concept of specialized meaning. The center of this pole is the concept meant by the German term *Fachsprache*, i.e., domain or subject specific language. This concept lays more weight upon the specialized meanings constituting a domain and upon the relations between these meanings and the linguistic choices conventionally made by the agents of the domain. In other words, the view of the scholars tending to this pole is more global,

they are rather looking at the language of a domain as a general reflex of the domain and the specialized meanings constituting the domain. This latter view is more discourse oriented in its approach to its object.

The two poles describe two original, fairly different approaches to this object: the first mentioned approach, concentrating upon text production in specialized situational settings, is connected to language teaching, especially to teaching a foreign or second language in connection with vocational training, university studies, etc. A major interest in this approach is to create knowledge about the specific needs to be covered in such specialized language classrooms, in order to make this kind of language teaching as efficient as possible. The study of domain specific language use comes in handy as a linguistic basis for such specialized courses. This kind of language teaching is mostly connected to learning English. For one thing, this occurrence is due to the fact that a number of countries with multiple national languages (often former British colonies like India or Malaysia) use or have until recently used English as a common language, for example, in administrative and judicial settings. Here, there is a strong need for specialized teaching. Secondly, the position English has especially in the scientific world as *the* lingua franca of international contacts and publications means that there is a strong everyday need among students and scholars from all over the world to acquire specific and specialized English language skills. Consequently, this approach has been followed mainly by scholars working in the field of teaching English to adults with specialized professional or academic needs. Due to the distribution of English in the world described above, the approach is not limited to Britain or the United States, but is widely spread in all parts of the world, although predominantly connected to the teaching of English.

The second mentioned approach, the one focusing more on the specialized meanings, has a different root. It grew out of a general interest in sociology and dialectology and was an extension of former studies of different population groups' ways of living through studies of their discourse. Thus, the original interest was wider in its scope. This study lead to an early interest in global models of communication in specialized settings, combining text internal and text external factors in the descriptions and focusing upon global explanations including and combining discoursal features, relevant knowledge, and social backgrounds rather than just finding specialized elements of the discourse. Germany and Austria were the two countries where this kind of study of specialized

discourse was first developed, but also the Scandinavian countries have a tradition for investigating specialized discourse from this perspective.

It is important to say that modern LSP research is normally not placed at any one of the two poles, but rather at some place on the continuum between them. And furthermore there is no 1:1 relation between countries and approaches. Just as an example, recent work by Bazerman (1995) and by Swales (1998) is highly discourse analytic in its approach and thus more broadly interested in global features of the specialized discourse.

Basic Distinctions: Relations between Communicators

In their essence, all approaches to the study of domain related discourse are sociological in their basic assumptions. This tenet is reflected in the fact that degree of specialization of a text and, connected to that, the relation between senders and receivers in a communicative situation concerning their respective levels of expertise is traditionally seen as a crucial factor when setting up models for describing specialized communication. The basic assumption lying behind such models is that the characteristics of the participants in the communication and the purposes pursued by them are main determiners of the way texts are written. Many different stratified classifications of the relevant communicative settings have been proposed. The following tripartite stratification gives a fairly good overall picture of the factors underlying the different proposals:

- Scientific discourse: This kind of specialized discourse is characterized by the fact that both senders and receivers are experts (expert–to–expert–communication). Texts show a high degree of abstraction and a considerable amount of often standardized terminology. These characteristics are seen as consequences of the purpose of communication in such settings, viz., to develop and refine the general knowledge of a domain. Furthermore, the high prestige connected to such discourse and its highly public character means that, apart from aspects of necessary precision, stylistic features play a very important role.
- Practically oriented discourse: Here, too, we find communication where both senders and receivers are experts (expert–to–expert–communication). But in this type of discourse, the experts are not working on developing or refining the general scientific knowledge of a domain. Instead, they are solving practical problems in their daily work and use communicative devices relevant for these purposes. As

an example, the difference between the two levels in the stratification is the difference between chemical scientists writing learned articles for scientific journals and chemical scientists working in the laboratory, running their experiments and collecting the data. In the first setting, the purpose is to textually present and develop new knowledge in the field in a public environment (scientific discourse); in the second setting, the purpose of the communication is to solve practical problems occurring in the daily work (practically oriented discourse). The second setting tends to be more informal and to show only the degree of, e.g., terminological specialization in its oral or written texts that is necessary for coping. Aspects of necessary precision play a major role here, although also in this stratum the sociological aspect of showing by way of the applied language that the communicative party belongs to the relevant peer group should not be neglected.

- Discourse of popular science and domain-oriented didactics: The sender-receiver relations are here always asymmetric (i.e., sender has a higher degree of relevant knowledge than the receiver(s)). Two prototypical cases are communication between experts and consumers (e.g., in manuals) and between experts and novices (e.g., in textbooks). The purpose of this kind of communication is to convey structured knowledge of the domain to receivers who lack this knowledge, but need it for (often) practical purposes. A third prototypical case is the communication of domain-specific knowledge in magazines for popular science. This kind of communication is slightly different from the two cases first mentioned,

as it is characterized by a very important element of entertainment, whereas, e.g., manuals and textbooks are more directed toward actually enhancing the receivers' knowledge in practically relevant areas. Although texts of all three prototypical kinds show lots of similarities due to the fact that sender-receiver relations are always asymmetric, they also show important differences, mainly due to the last-mentioned difference.

Traditional Approaches

In order to describe the very complex object of study, that is text from specialized domains in all their aspects, LSP linguistics has included a wide variety of disciplines and approaches from the general toolbox of linguists, see **Figure 1.**

In the following list, we outline some of the central approaches of LSP linguistics and relate them to the above model.

- Terminology and lexicography: A very central area of LSP linguistics and historically the first area of studies of special domain language to be developed in large scale is terminology. Traditionally, terminology has concentrated upon standardizing the use of words (lexis) and the denomination of concepts, in order to shape languages for specific purposes, so that they are optimal for scientific or professional communication. Recently, terminology has expanded toward other areas like organization, representation and handling of information and knowledge, thus contributing to the development of systems and

Figure 1 Linguistic disciplines with special importance for LSP linguistics.

databases for storing knowledge. Consequently, the interface between knowledge stored in words and knowledge stored in other semiotic systems is of major importance for modern terminological research. Especially technical domains have been the object of terminological studies. Another area connected to lexis and to the manageable representation of words and meanings from specialized discourse is lexicography. The main purpose of this branch of LSP linguistics is to create a sound basis for the production of specialist dictionaries that are highly functional for dictionary users. Consequently, research in this area concentrates on the user and his/her needs and the functions of dictionaries that may be deducted from such studies. Studies from this perspective have been performed in many domains, among them especially the areas of science, law, and administration, where there is a substantial need for translational tools. Finally, it is relevant to mention that research in these fields have treated in some detail the question of the importance of cultural context for the term systems of a domain. A general distinction is made between culture-dependent and culture-independent domains. A prototypical example of a culture-dependent domain is the domain of law. Term systems in this kind of domain are basically different across national cultures, as each nation has developed their own legal system. Consequently, legal terms from different cultures in principle do not mean the same (at least as long as no standardization has taken place). A prototypical example of a culture-independent domain is the field of electricity. In this domain, the degree of overlap between term systems from different national cultures is very much higher than in the culture-dependent domains.

• Intercultural analyses (genre analysis, register analysis, conversational analysis): The wish to develop LSP linguistics toward a more global description of discourse in specialized settings led directly to a focusing on the text as the central object of study. And in this connection, the concepts of genre and of registers have acquired paramount importance. This emphasis is due to the fact that both concepts as descriptive tools are highly oriented toward describing the influence of communicative purposes (genre) and situational settings (genre, register) on texts. Thus, to a large extent, the development of genre and register linguistics has been driven by the interest in developing descriptive tools for LSP research. Concrete studies have concentrated upon conventional characteristics of domain specific genres like research articles, legal judgments, statutes, company brochures, or scientific journals. Especially in a continental European context such studies have been performed as contrastive text and genre analyses

across different cultures, thus generating results with special relevance for translators of these specialized genres. Domains with special interest have been the areas of law, medicine, and areas of (technical) science. An area where much work was produced especially in the 1990s was the area of scientific communication, and the applied perspective was the intercultural. This stress was, to a large degree, due to the fact that in these years the development toward English as lingua franca in scientific contexts was speeded up decisively. This development made it especially interesting to investigate whether in scientific contexts the national culture or the (international) discipline is the most influential concerning textual and stylistic choices in text production. An intermediary position was defended by scholars, claiming that academic writing is not influenced by national styles as such, but that it is possible to isolate four different styles, connected to different scientific cultures. No decisive evidence has been found for any of the positions, but the discussion showed different influences at different textual levels. And recently the instruments developed for this type of intercultural pragmatic studies of texts are used also in projects investigating the influence of English textual conventions on texts from different domains (like business communication) originally written in other languages. The intercultural perspective is also relevant for oral communication and has especially been investigated using conversational analysis in a number of cases. The question of differences in ways of negotiating, of showing disagreement, or in solving problems in professional settings has attracted special interest. Finally, it is important to state, that the criterion 'culture-dependent vs. culture-independent domain' is hardly relevant in this perspective, as opposed to what we saw when looking at the perspectives of terminology and lexicography: Also genres from culture-independent domains may differ considerably across national cultures.

• Asymmetric communication: As mentioned above, asymmetric discourse (i.e., communicative situations in which sender and receiver have different levels of knowledge concerning the domain of the communication) is an important part of the object of study of LSP linguistics. And this part of the object has been intensely investigated over the last 20–30 years, applying especially research instruments from text and genre linguistics, pragmatics and cognitive science, but also some instruments from anthropology, like conversational analysis. Studies are geographically concentrated around Europe and North America. The reason could be that the problem of asymmetry in knowledge relations and consequently in (abusable) power relations has been a

central issue in the general discussion in these Western societies. Frequent objects of study have been doctor-patient communication, and communication in court and in other administrative settings, but also the area of technical writing (writing efficient technical documents). Research in this area has had a strong element of prescription, of not just registering characteristics of the object of study, but explicitly of contributing to better and more equal communication also in asymmetric settings.

- Studies of Business Communication: The way we have described the object of study of LSP linguistics until now, focus has been on communicative settings that are characterized mainly by their topic, by the object of communication. However, a specific branch of LSP linguistics defines its object of study more on the basis of situational elements and on the basis of the actions performed in specific texts, viz., the study of Business Communication. What makes this discourse domain specific is the fact that it is always tightly connected to the professional purposes of companies or organizations, including such areas as marketing and public relations. Typical objects of study are the internal and the external business communication within and between companies and the management of these communicative processes. In this connection, instruments from cultural science are often applied in order to describe differences and similarities between senders and receivers from different national or international cultures. And as multi-modality plays a major role in texts from these areas of communication, also the instruments from semiotics have been included and used for analyses within this sub discipline of LSP linguistics.

Recent Trends for the Development of the Discipline

In these years the recent trend in the discipline is that three areas are gradually coming into focus, thus supplementing or strengthening (some of) the perspectives and approaches already described above: cognition, semiotics, and the area of document design. The latter areas are already represented in the discipline as it looks today (cf. above), but it is likely that they will receive more attention in the future. Multi-modality is becoming a characteristic feature not only of texts from business communication, but also of texts from many other fields of specialized communication, as the importance of different media and the requirements concerning layout and entertainment are growing. So semiotics will become a necessary perspective when investigating such texts, too. And document design (connected,

among other things, to the area of technical writing) has also a good future in a world, in which the amount of information is immense and the time to be allocated for reading limited. The prescriptive tradition of technical writing, intending to judge the efficiency of texts and not just collect data about the text and its coming to life, will gradually gain more importance also in fields where it has not yet been introduced, like in the areas of legal and administrative communication. And finally, there is a growing interest within the field of terminology as well as within other subfields of the discipline to focus not only upon textual or linguistic issues, but to pay more attention to the cognitive activities underlying communication in specialized settings. The expansion requires the inclusion of more instruments from the area of empirical cognitive linguistics, but is just a consequential next step in a development already running. An interesting consequence of paying more attention to this subject is that it may shift focus from superindividual aspects of communication like conventions, group language, etc. (i.e., more sociologically oriented aspects) to individual aspects like personal knowledge resources, mental processes, and learning styles. Thus, where the two prospective trends mentioned first constitute merely a profiling of the discipline within the directions in which it has been developing for the last 20 years, this last mentioned shift of attention may lead to a major paradigm shift in the discipline.

See also: Applying Pragmatics; Education in a Multilingual Society; Genre and Genre Analysis; Institutional Talk.

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Languages of Wider Communication

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Languages used to facilitate cross-linguistic communication among speakers of different languages brought together by processes of migration, trade, or travel, stretch back to the beginnings of recorded history. Some had extensive reach – covering much of the world then tied together by existing trade routes, such as the Silk Road, a loose network that linked the Mediterranean and East Asia – such as Soghdian (a language still spoken in present-day Tajikistan), and, at a later date, Persian (Foltz, 2000). But no language down to the past century could claim large numbers of speakers across the globe. For instance, while Latin served as a lingua franca in Europe for centuries, it had effectively no presence throughout Asia and Africa. One of the hallmarks of the most recent stage of *globalization* has been that the development of such a world language has become for the first time a possibility, and that English appears to have already attained that status or to be well on the way to doing so. Perhaps because the phenomenon is so comparatively new, while languages serving large expanses that formerly made up large segments of the world market, such as Persian or Latin, have been around so long, terms such as *world language* and *international language* – even at times *language of wider communication* – have tended to be employed, if not exactly interchangeably, then without clear demarcation. In their precise meanings, a *world language* must by its nature encompass the entire globe, while a language can be said to be *international* if it serves clusters of nations. For its part, a *language of wider communication* signifies one that provides a mutually intelligible medium for speakers in multilingual societies.

World Language

A *world language* is not simply the most widely spoken language in the world, or the one that is the official language in the greatest number of nations. To merit such classification, a language must have achieved a position of global preeminence in another key respect: its existence must have become

a practical necessity to fill a wide range of functions brought to the fore by processes of globalization. The development of world language, then, does not represent the culmination of a linguistic process at all; it comes into being as the concomitant of larger historical trajectories, powerful forces that condition communication needs around the world. For most of the history of the world, there has been only the most remote contact between peoples in distant parts of the world. While a world market loosely existed from ancient times, the limitations of transportation and communication technology determined supranational regional zones as the largest effective units for which a lingua franca such as Persian, Arabic, or Chinese constituted a practical necessity. The need for a world language is not felt so long as communication is largely limited to bilateral relations between nations or take place in regional settings in which a particular international language such as Arabic or Spanish suits the purpose. World language requires a stage at which every point, or virtually every point, in the world is thrown into relation with every other, when global communications has become virtually instantaneous, and the trip from any place in the world to any other has been reduced to hours rather than weeks or months. It requires a structure of world trade that is truly multilateral – rather than one that transports goods and services within definite imperially defined channels only (as was the case during colonialism in Asia and Africa).

Such international relations throw together persons from many nations from diverse regions of the world into regular contact, and make ease of communication among them an economic imperative, requiring a recognized common linguistic medium, a world language (*see* **Intercultural Pragmatics and Communication**). Finding its basis primarily in the economic realm, world language also more and more penetrates technological, scientific, intellectual, political, and even the cultural realm, as the need for translation raises a barrier to the rapidity with which information is disseminated in the digital age. In such a case, the continued spread of a world language finds a strong impetus not only in political economy, as global trade represents an increasing share of the total, but through intellectual and cultural motives, too, as people around the globe are induced to learn it to further their wide-ranging objectives.

On the other hand, a world language need not be widely spoken in every nation of the world, nor must most people in the world speak it, any more than earlier regional lingua francas such as Latin in Europe or Persian along the routes of the Silk Road were universally understood in the supranational political geographies they served. Yet, at a minimum, it would

be reasonable to expect such a language to be widely spoken on every continent, to have an ever-growing number of speakers in every nation, and to have emerged as the single most important language of global commerce.

The world language would not necessarily have the most mother tongue speakers, a distinction that currently belongs to Chinese, with its 874 million speakers (Grimes, 1996). On the contrary, one of the salient characteristics of a world language, like that of a supranational lingua franca like Latin or Persian in an earlier epoch, is that the majority of its users would be non-mother tongue speakers, bilinguals for whom it represents a second language. For them, a world language serves global, as opposed to purely local, functions. It is an entry-point into global relations, and one that need not usurp or even threaten the entrenched uses of the other language(s) they speak.

Is English a World Language?

Most estimates place the total number of English speakers globally at between 500 million and 1 billion, the difference consisting mainly in how proficiency in the language is defined. The best indication of the status of English as a world language is provided by the number of people around the world who feel compelled to gain at least some knowledge of the language, irrespective of their level of ultimate attainment. For it is the motivation of hundreds of millions across the globe to learn English that gives the measure of the degree to which it has become the world language, there being no comparable phenomenon associated with any other language. The rise of English is also demonstrated by the increasing frequency with which it is being incorporated into school curricula (*see* **Language Policy in Multinational Educational Contexts**), not only in "second language contexts" (such as India and South Africa) where it serves as a *language of wider communication* on the national scale (see below), but even in foreign language contexts (including China and Europe), though this distinction is somewhat losing its usefulness for the description of English. The entrenchment of English in the school curriculum in diverse societies throughout the world will tend to produce a greater proportion of English users globally over time.

While the nature of a world language seems to preclude the need for more than one, the possibility cannot be ruled out that another language of equal, or even greater importance, could emerge, either joining or replacing English in its position of preeminence. As Graddol (2004) has argued, rapid shifts in demography together with a restructuring of linguistic

space by modern telecommunications may produce profound effects on language use by the middle of the 21st century, perhaps redefining how we think of languages (local, national, regional), and simultaneously transforming the notion of world language.

Development of World Language

There have been two primary paradigms employed to account for the linguistic effects of globalization that would give rise to a world language: modernization and linguistic imperialism. Modernization describes the spread of industrial production, technology, finance, and trade, the burgeoning of the middle class, and the birth of a consumer culture, among nations that were previously 'underdeveloped'. From this standpoint, the increasing use of a common language throughout the world simply represents the natural concomitant of the march of progress. In marked contrast, linguistic imperialism finds in the spread of certain languages to the exclusion of others the exercise of Western, ultimately imperialist, hegemony, the extension into the cultural and linguistic realm of the political and economic control that the 'Center' has exercised over the colonial and neocolonial 'periphery' for centuries. Both explanations take for granted that globalization, including the spread of English, represents an essentially Western-driven process, one of which the rest of the world catches up to or is incorporated into European/North American society, rather than a multi-polar process driven by no central hegemony. Brutt-Griffler (2002) shows, rather, the development of English into or toward the status of a world language to be considerably more complex, a process that includes numerous forces, economic, political, cultural, and intellectual, underlying globalization, combined with the active agency of its new speakers around the globe choosing to learn the language.

World Language and Language Contact

The development of a *world language* – as one spoken primarily by non-mother tongue speakers – should produce effects on the other languages of the world and on the world language itself. As a language of bilinguals, it is thrown into contact with languages throughout the world, leading to processes of language change. Certainly the spread of English has exerted an effect on other languages via language contact. This process ranges from the incorporation of English words into languages as diverse as German and Japanese, to the emergence of mixed varieties of other languages and English, for example, chiHarare, a mixture of Shona and English spoken in Zimbabwe.

At the same time, other languages have in turn exerted an influence on English. For English itself, entering a phase of the history of the language known as the World English phase, in which non-mother tongue speakers have proliferated until, as noted above, they now exceed the number of its mother tongue users, has produced highly noticeable changes. World English – the phase of the history of the language in which it functions as a world language (Brutt-Griffler, 2002) – has spawned *World Englishes*, often called non-native varieties of the language (Kachru, 1986) spoken in nations throughout Africa and Asia (see also World Englishes). It is contested whether there is any global standard of World English, and if so, what that standard might be. But it is clear that the growing number of speakers of new varieties of World Englishes increases their potential to exert a greater impact on international usage of the language.

Linguistic, Political, and Social Consequences of World Language

The implications of the development of a world language have been significant, ranging from concerns over its alleged connection to a loss of linguistic diversity, to questions of access to high-level proficiency in a language that often confers power and privilege to its speakers, to the use of such a language to transcend ethnic identity and traditional gender roles, to questions of the meaningfulness of the paradigm of nativeness within a language of primarily non-mother tongue users (*see* **Identity: Second Language**). Though all of these questions are important, none has received the attention that has been devoted to the fear that the global spread of English represents a causal factor in the endangerment of languages. Graddol (2004) notes, "Many believe English will become the world language to the exclusion of all others." It has been strongly suggested that in Africa, for instance, the spread of English "is leading to the top-down displacement of numerous other tongues" (Nettle and Romaine, 2000: 144), a contention that has been challenged by others (Mufwene, 2001, 2002). Indeed, if such were the case, we would expect to find gains in the number of native speakers of English in Africa proportionate to the loss of those of disappearing languages, something the statistics do not appear to support. Rather, as Brutt-Griffler (2002) has argued, the spread of English as a world language produces not monolingual English speakers but bilinguals (see also **Bilingualism and Second Language Learning**). Graddol (2004) remarks, "English will indeed play a crucial role in shaping the new world linguistic order, but its major impact will be in creating new generations of bilingual and multilingual speakers across the world."

As English is learned in many multilingual contexts at an earlier age and reinforced by exposure gained through various media, new and old (Berns and de Bot, 2004), the distinction between native and non-native speakers of the language may be increasingly blurred, as fluency in it may be used as an 'exit visa' from ethnic identity and traditional gender roles (Mazrui, 2004). The continued growth of English as a world language will prompt ever-greater concerns about access to the language for all members of society, and not simply for those who can afford to buy it, and about the economic and intellectual advantages knowledge of such a world language can confer.

International Language

Though the rapid growth of the world language over the last century has taken attention away from other *international languages*, a large number continue to play a vital role in the modern world, as they have for at least past millennia and will continue to do for the foreseeable future. International languages are most typically associated with the facilitating of international communication – a function that in past centuries Latin, Persian, Greek, Sanskrit, Turkish, and French all played – and the linking of diasporas across wide geographical expanses. In the modern world, however, particularly with the emergence of a world language, their primary role seems to be developing into the maintenance of supranational economic, cultural, and, within certain limitations, ethnic zones (set off by the use of, for example, Arabic, Swahili, Chinese, Spanish, Portuguese, or French). In some cases, such as Arabic or German, these represent a lack of correspondence between ethnolinguistic identity and national boundaries, as Arabs are dispersed over more than twenty nations on two continents and German is given official or special status in eight European nations. In other cases, such as French, its existence as an *international language* reflects a colonial legacy, in which most of the thirty-four nations in which French has a special status are former African or Caribbean colonies of France (see **Table 1**) – nations in which generally most people do not speak

French as a mother tongue. A variation of this imperial case is illustrated by languages such as Spanish, which though introduced into the Americas as an imperial language, is now the mother tongue of the majority of people in more than twenty nations in the Americas, which now dominate the Spanish-speaking world. And in yet other cases, such as Swahili, an international language may constitute the expression of emerging postcolonial nationalism that plays out in a supranational context – in this case East Africa. Though Swahili is not originally indigenous to the region and has not been the mother tongue of the vast majority of its peoples, it has at least begun to take on that function for increasing numbers. Another group of international languages, of which the largest is Chinese, are more nearly expressions of a diaspora.

The categories listed above need not be mutually exclusive. For instance, Portuguese is the official language in five African nations, though it is not for the most part the mother tongue of the majority of the peoples in those nations, and yet, like Spanish in the Americas, has become the mother tongue of the majority of the largest lusophone nation, Brazil. French itself, like German, is spoken in several European nations – as well as by a diaspora population in Canada. Russian has spread to neighboring countries partly as an imperial language learned as a second language by peoples incorporated into the Russian empire and partly via a large Russian-speaking diaspora in those nations. In other cases, like Kurdish, the language can be called international, as it crosses national borders, but only because the Kurds have been denied nationhood by the three more powerful states in whose territory their would-be homeland lies. This also brings out a significant distinction between *international* and *world*, because international is based on the original construction of the *national*, world is not.

Major International Languages: A Statistical Picture

The major international languages can be distinguished through an examination of some key statistics, such as those in **Tables 1** to **4**, which show the number of nations in which official status is accorded to particular languages (see **Table 1**), and which show the number of mother tongue speakers (see **Table 2**), total speakers (see **Table 3**), and second language speakers of selected languages (see **Table 4**). **Tables 5** through **7** provide proportions of print publications in different languages in the sciences (see **Table 5** and **Table 6**) and humanities (see **Table 7**) and **Table 8** shows the percentage of web pages on the Internet (see **Table 8**). Statistics by themselves can be

Table 1 Number of nations in which international languages are given some official status

1. English	63
2. French	34
3. Spanish	23
4. Arabic	23*
5. German	8
6. Portuguese	7

Ammon, 1994, p. 1726; *Crystal, 1997a, p. 359.

Table 2 Number of mother tongue speakers of 10 languages, in millions

1. Chinese	874
2. Hindi	366
3. Spanish	358
4. English	341
5. Bengali	207
6. Arabic	202*
7. Portuguese	176
8. Russian	167
9. German	100
10. French	77

World Almanac, 1999, p. 700; *Grimes, 1996.

Table 3 Total number of speakers of 11 languages, in millions

1. Chinese	1052
2. English	700+*
3. Hindi	487
4. Spanish	417
5. Russian	277
6. Bengali	211
7. Arabic	202
8. Portuguese	191
9. Indonesian	170
10. French	128
11. German	128

World Almanac, 1999, p. 700; *approximate lower estimate, Crystal, 1997b, p. 61.

Table 4 Numbers of second language speakers of 10 languages, in millions

1. English	300+*
2. Mandarin Chinese	188
3. Indonesian	140
4. Hindi	120
5. Russian	110
6. Spanish	59
7. French	51
8. Tagalog	40
9. Urdu	40
10. German	28

World Almanac, 1999, p. 700; *Crystal, 1997b, p. 54.

Table 6 Percentage of languages used in natural science publications, 1980 to 1996

	1980	1984	1988	1992	1996
English	74.6	77.1	80.5	87.2	90.7
Russian	10.8	9.2	6.9	3.9	2.1
Japanese	2.3	2.5	2.1	2.3	1.7
French	3.1	2.4	2.4	1.6	1.3
German	3.5	3.3	2.9	1.6	1.2

Ammon, 1998, p. 152.

Table 7 Percentage of languages used in humanities publications, 1978 to 1995

	1978	1982	1986	1990	1995
English	69.1	69.9	70.6	71.7	82.5
French	6.6	5.9	5.9	5.9	5.9
German	5.2	6.0	5.4	5.7	4.1
Spanish	3.6	3.6	4.0	3.8	2.2

Ammon, 1998, p. 167.

Table 8 Percentage of web pages by language in 2000

English	68.4
Japanese	5.9
German	5.8
Chinese	3.9
French	3.0
Spanish	2.4
Russian	1.9
Italian	1.6
Portuguese	1.4
Korean	1.3
Other	4.6

Jacques Maurais, 2003, p. 22.

revealing, but they only tell part of the story. For example, it is clear that English has no rival as an international language, strengthening its claim as the world language. French, sometimes said to be a challenger, or a "big language" (Graddol, 1997), clearly does not stand out as having the same importance on a global scale, as shown by its placement as a distant sixth as a language of publishing in Chemistry, the discipline for which the most accurate statistics are available (82.5% for English, 0.5% for French, see **Table 5**), or fourth and second. Respectively, in the natural sciences (90.7% to 1.3%, **Table 6**) and the humanities (82.5% to 5.9%, **Table 7**) as compiled by Ammon (1998). French also ranks only fifth in number of web pages (68.4% to 3.0%, **Table 8**). And while French is second to English in the number of nations in which it is an officially recognized language (63 to 34, **Table 1**), when we examine total numbers of second language users (**Table 4**), we find that French, with some 50 million estimated users, ranks not only behind English (300 million+), but also Chinese (188 million), Indonesian (140 million), Hindi (120 million), and Russian (110 million). While such numbers, however, give a very approximate measure of significance as a *language of wider communication* (see below), it does not necessarily reveal

much about a language's international significance. For instance, Indonesian and Hindi are mainly confined to the national borders of Indonesia and India, while French second language speakers lie mainly outside of that nation, as the number of nations in which French serves as an official medium (34) demonstrates, as compared to that of Indonesia and Hindi (1 in each case). Taking the statistics as a whole, however, we can conclude that French is an internationally significant language within the former French colonial world, but, as the statistics on scientific publishing demonstrate, it is not a language commonly chosen when the goal is to reach a world audience.

In the same manner, the contention that German represents a major international language as demonstrated by its official status in 8 nations (Ammon, 1994), placing it behind only English, French, Spanish, and Arabic, and ahead of Portuguese, looks quite different upon further analysis. Because all of those nations lie in a concentrated portion of Europe, and given estimates of only some 28 million second language speakers, it would be more accurate to describe German as a regionally important language in central Europe, of the same type, but not on the same scale, as Arabic (official in 22 nations and with more than twice the number of speakers).

The acceptance of a language as official also reflects neocolonialism in politics that may obscure both actual distributions of language users and their increasing importance globally. For example, while European languages are often official in former colonial settings, other languages do not receive similar endorsement. Thus, while German, though spoken by only 1.5% of the population of Belgium, has official status there, Turkish is not recognized as such in Germany, though its speakers make up 2.4% of the population, and though it is recognized as such in Bulgaria. There are some 15 million Turkish speakers outside of Turkey, not far behind the total of 17.5 million German speakers outside the main German-speaking nations of Germany and Austria.

Functions of International Languages

If we were to conceive the functions of an international language to include linking diasporas to mother countries, most of the world's larger languages could be said to be international in an age of increasing transnational migrations. International languages as such rather serve more institutional functions. They generally confer a sense of political affinity among groups of nations, whether, as in the case of Arab nations and Spanish-speaking American nations, as a sort of proto-nationalism, or, as in the case of France and Belgium and their

former colonies, something more along the lines of a sphere of influence with colonial or neocolonial overtones. They may also facilitate the creation of a common market, whether institutionalized or more informal, particularly but by no means exclusively in the area of cultural productions, such as the Spanish-language film and music industry in Latin America. International languages allow global telecommunications giants to beam information in television signals via satellite to large international audiences – as for instance the Arabic station Al-Jazeera. Finally, they facilitate educational ties between nations sharing a common language.

Impact of English as a World Language on the Functions and Usage of International Languages

While international languages retain their importance in linking language groups across national and continental boundaries, they seem to be losing importance where the goal is to communicate with a global audience. There is thus a pronounced trend toward English as the medium for the publication of scientific research (**Tables 5, 6,** and **7**). **Table 6** shows that of the articles indexed by *Chemical Abstracts* the percentage in English increased from 62.3% in 1978 to 82.5% in 1998, while the proportion in every other language except Chinese fell. The two languages that followed English in 1978 experienced particularly dramatic declines thereafter, Russian (19.5% to 3.1%) and German (5.0% to 1.6%), while French fell off from 2.4% to just 0.5%. Ammon's (1998) figures (**Table 7**) demonstrate the same trend the natural sciences as a whole. English shows similar dominance on the Internet (**Table 8**). In 2000, 68.4% of web pages were in English, with only Japanese (5.9%) and German (5.8%) registering more than 5%, followed by Chinese (3.9%), French (3.0%) and Spanish (2.4%) above the 2% level (Maurais, 2003).

Languages of Wider Communication

A language of wider communication, also known as a *lingua franca*, provides a mutually intelligible medium for speakers in multilingual societies, to some extent replicating on the intra-national scale the function of world (or international) language(s) on the global scale – although world and international languages are languages of wider communication in the broadest sense of the term. There are three major categories of languages of wider communication:

- international languages which may not be indigenous to the region, such as English, French, or Portuguese in Africa, or alternatively may be

indigenous, as in the case of Swahili in East Africa and Hausa in West Africa; English as a language of wider communication in Europe (Seidlhofer and Jenkins, 2003) represents something of an intermediate case, because English is indigenous to a portion of the region but not in continental Europe where it plays its specific role;

- languages of indigenous origin that have come to fill the role of national (or regional) languages, though they are not the mother tongues of the majority of the people, for example, Bahasa Indonesia (Indonesia), Tagalog (Philippines), or Hindi (parts of India);
- languages of local and recent origin that have arisen at least in part specifically to fill the function of a language of wider communication; often called *urban vernaculars*, they are mixed languages containing elements of local languages, and sometimes international languages such as English or French; Isicamtho (South Africa), chiHarare (Zimbabwe), and Town Bemba (Zambia) number among them.

When English or French functions in this capacity, it tends to be referred to as a *second language*, to signal that it provides many speakers of a given nation with a medium in which to communicate when confronted with nationals outside the speaker's language group. In such cases, the second language may or may not be given official status, but it is generally adopted for a wide range of societal functions: economic, political, and cultural. In the second case, the languages are always official, and are also designated as national, as they are held to embody the national aspirations of the people, as may also be the case with an international language such as Swahili that is indigenous to the region. In the case of *urban vernaculars*, they are seldom given institutional recognition of any kind, and in many cases have only begun to be distinguished as languages in their own right. In the highly fluid circumstances in which they arise, they may even become transformed into the mother tongues of at least a portion of their speakers and may also be making their way into the classroom (Childs, 1997).

When a language is spoken in only one or a few countries as a second language by many of its speakers, that constitutes evidence that it functions as a language of wider communication. Two such languages are Swahili, which according to some estimates has as few as 5 million mother tongue speakers and 30 million second language users, and Bahasa Indonesia, with some 17 to 30 million native speakers as compared to 140 million non-mother tongue users. Ten major languages of wider communication, with estimates of their number of second language speakers, are given in **Table 4**.

Functions of Languages of Wider Communication

Languages of wider communication (*lwc*) fill different functions, from the overtly political and institutional characteristic of top-down statist language planning agendas to bottom-up processes that may even go unnoticed by policymakers. When designated as official or national languages, *lwc*s can be used to promote nationalism in multi-ethnic societies, and may be associated with particular political forces or ideological aims – a role that may be as divisive as it is unifying. Hindi in India, for example, is widely associated with Hindu nationalism and viewed with suspicion, if not hostility, by large sections of the population. At the other extreme, the *lwc*s that have arisen in urban African contexts have been the spontaneous products of the mixtures within them of large numbers of speakers of various – and often closely related and mutually intelligible – languages. Closely connected, as Mufwene (2004) has pointed out, to the encroachment of urbanization on "the function of most indigenous languages as markers of ethnic identity," these languages may be used to deemphasize ethnic identity or to signal urban identity. Despite the latter connotation, or perhaps indeed because of it, such mixed languages, including South Africa's Isicamtho, chiHarare in Zimbabwe, Lingala in Congo, Town Bemba in Zambia, and Wolof in Senegal, appear to be spreading apace to rural areas, too. Because they are largely confined to non-elites, such *lwc*s, though probably the fastest-growing languages in many places, have so far received little, if any, official recognition.

See also: Bilingualism; Identity and Language; Identity: Second Language; Intercultural Pragmatics and Communication; Language Change and Cultural Change; Language Maintenance and Shift; Language Policy in Multinational Educational Contexts; Migration and Language; Minorities and Language; Multiculturalism and Language; Pragmatics: Linguistic Imperialism.

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Law and Language: Overview

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Introduction

Interest in legal language is not a modern phenomenon, although extensive research into it began to appear only in the latter part of the 20th century. Earlier comments on the language of law were exclusively critical of the style, vocabulary, and structure of legal texts, especially legislative language. We find the French philosopher Baron de Montesquieu in his *De l'Esprit des Lois* (1748) arguing for a simple legal language, to be understood by all readers in the same way, and furthermore to be understood by people even of mediocre understanding ("*mediocre entendement*"). The 19th century English utilitarian, Jeremy Bentham, also proposed that legislation should be written in a language understood by laypersons. "Clearness in respect of its language" was one of the seven properties, Bentham argued, "a body of law . . . must be possessed of."

These comments show that there was a problem felt by leading thinkers concerning the language of the law. Both Montesquieu and Bentham related to legislation, but their criticism may be equally directed to other legal documents. Furthermore, legal language and legal institutions have been the target of criticism in literature. Charles Dickens' description of the English Chancery Court in his novel *Bleak House* – the time it takes for the judges to decide a case, the language which no one understands, etc., – is well known.

In the early days of modern linguistics, before it had become an established discipline, we do find studies on the law and its language. Several members of the pre-World War II Prague Linguistic Circle addressed problems of legal language. The language of legislators was examined from a functional perspective, with the focus on the educational level of readers of legislative texts, which implies that many people who are affected by the law are not able to read the texts in which the law is written. Another facet of the work of Prague linguists was in the field of vocabulary; observations were made on the careful use of words in legal texts which have inexact meanings in everyday discourse.

Academic lawyers had also dealt with legal language, and published articles, and even textbooks on the drafting of legislation and other documents. These tend to be prescriptive from a lawyer's point of view, and are not outwardly critical of the structural complexities found in legal texts. An exception is the

seminal work of David Mellinkoff (Mellinkoff, 1963), *Language of the Law*. In his book, Mellinkoff, a lawyer, is highly critical of the obtuse language lawyers employ in their documents.

Fields of Research

This section introduces the various fields of research that have grown over the past 30 years or so. Reference will also be made to the various articles that appear in this encyclopedia that relate to current research into those fields of law and language.

Linguistic interest in the language of the law was perhaps initiated by David Crystal and Derek Davy in their book on *Investigating English style* (Crystal and Davy, 1969). In this work, the authors examine a number of registers of English, including the legal register. In the chapter on legal language, they deal with the language of contracts, pointing out the style of legal draftsmen who have developed an intricate and syntactically complex style, in order, on the one hand, to prevent misunderstanding, and on the other, to cover all what the clients want to say and not to depend on extrinsic evidence for the interpretation of the document. They draw attention especially to (1) the conditional structure of the legal sentence; (2) the placing of modifiers immediately adjacent to the phrase or word to be modified; (3) the use of non-finite clauses as postmodifiers; and (4) the lack of explicit connection between the sentences of a document with its accompanying repetition of lexical items and the accompanying sparing use of pronouns. Following Crystal and Davy's book came a spate of work on legal language, especially the language of legal documents. A great deal of this work has been in the fields of grammar, especially syntax, and lexis. Much of the research was produced by Scandinavian scholars (e.g., Gustafsson, 1975), and several of the papers in the special issue of *Text* (1984) were devoted to the language of legal documents deals directly with written legal language, while other articles have a bearing on this register.

In the United States, interest in the law and language came initially more from a sociological and anthropological than a linguistic perspective. One may also cite work on the language of Barotse jurisprudence, Yakan litigation, and Shawnee laws, among others. The type of doubletalk and gobbledygook used by government during the Vietnam War and especially during the Watergate affair also led to many researchers putting the focus on the language of administration and of law. Only in the early 1970s were sociolinguists introduced to this area of research. Brenda Danet's overview of language in the legal process, which appeared in the *Law and Society Review* in 1980, served as a stimulus to further and broader research in the areas of law and speech. Interest in oral communication in Western legal cultures grew, too, with the development of more efficient recording equipment, which allowed a more accurate record of spoken legal proceedings, thus allowing linguists and conversational analysts to tackle courtroom discourse. A conference was held in 1985 at Georgetown University on spoken legal discourse, e.g., witness questioning, depositions, jury instructions and interpretation; many of the papers presented were published by Levi and Graffam Walker (1990). Another research field in the area of law and spoken language addresses lawyer–layperson communication. This involves dialogue not only in the courtroom but also in the lawyer's office when the lawyer speaks to his/her client.

It can be seen that this distinction between written and spoken legal language is one that pervades research into legal language. Taxonomies of types of legal language have been set up. Within the mode of written legal language, not only are documents such as legislation and contracts examined, but also legal textbooks and law reports. Spoken legal language may be subcategorized into courtroom discourse and out-of-court discourse, and each of these subcategories may be further subdivided; see a description of genres in general.

Against the background of growing interest in spoken legal language, the study of written legal language may seem to have reached its peak in the 1980s; further work on legislative texts, on contracts, and on wills has been carried out not so much from a structural point of view, but more from a discourse and pragmatic perspective. Legal texts, especially written legal documents, have been analyzed as discourse. Moreover, pragmatics has been extended to speech in legal proceedings, for example the adjacency pair of question/answer in witness testimony, and formulaic language in texts such as the witness's oath. This type of spoken legal language has been, and is still being, extensively studied within a sociolinguistic framework, in which pragmatics has found an important niche. The reader is directed to the articles on legal pragmatics and on definitions and rules in legal language.

At the same time as these developments, another field opened up, a field that has emerged from time to time since Montesquieu and Bentham, but has not until recently attracted the attention of scholars in linguistics and sociolinguistics – the problem of the readability and comprehensibility not only of legal texts but, principally, of spoken legal discourse. The Charrows (1979) conducted a psycholinguistic study of jury instructions, pointing out the low level

of understanding of many jurors, who may have to make fateful decisions concerning matters they do not grasp. Many of the attempts to improve the style of legal documents, to make them comprehensible to the layperson, derive from work on language structure. This research and accompanying public agitation eventually led to the support by U.S. President Carter for plain language in legal documents that directly affect the public, e.g., insurance policies. Many legal firms, especially but not only in the English-speaking world, have adopted plain English in their document writing as company policy.

The right of silence of the accused, especially in the Anglo–American legal context, has been studied both in terms of its pragmatics, with attempts made to answer the question what the accused means by his or her silence during police investigation, and also in terms of comprehensibility, establishing it as a field of research associated with plain language. Not only has the Miranda warning (in the United States) been under scrutiny as far as comprehensibility is concerned, but in the wake of changes in the text setting out the accused's right of silence carried out in the United Kingdom, linguists have investigated whether the average suspect with a below-average IQ may understand what is being read out to him or her, and what s/he is reading.

Apart from suspects who may not understand what is being said to them by authoritative figures (e.g., police and lawyers), there are other disadvantaged groups who face a linguistic battle in the course of legal proceedings. Litigants and suspects who do not speak, or who have an inadequate knowledge of, the language used in the courts are in many jurisdictions entitled to an interpreter. The various problems arising from interpretation and the rights of the interpreter and the interpreted are discussed in, while other disadvantaged groups, for example aborigines in Australia, which has attracted much research recently, is dealt with in.

The employment of linguists as expert witnesses in the courtroom has grown over the last two decades or so. The expertise work requested tends to be in the field of voice and writing identification. Much of the research on language in the courtroom is now included in this field of studies. The associated field of intellectual property rights and their violation is an area of current research discussed in.

We also find groups of philosophers, linguists, and academic lawyers who examine law and language from a semiotic point of view. The Lithuanian–French semiotician Algirdas Julien Greimas wrote with linguist Eric Landowski a seminal work on legal discourse (1966), followed by further work from a Greimasian perspective by Bernard Jackson

(1984). Semiotic research into legal language has also appeared from a Peircian standpoint, and from the Italian analytical school of jurisprudence. A discussion of police/citizen encounters from a semiotic point of view is found in.

The development of legal language has been studied, especially within the European area. Despite a distinction that needs to be made between common law (Anglo–American) law countries and countries whose legal systems are what is termed continental, developed from the Justinian code to the Napoleonic code and beyond, the language of the law in both systems has much in common. This may be seen, too, in a comparative approach in non-European systems. Furthermore, studies have been carried out on the influence of the law on 'normal' language itself, as may be seen in.

There remain a number of less prominent areas in which research has been carried out on the law and language. For example, within the model of Roman Jakobson's functions of language, the poetic function of the language of the law has been examined in terms of rhythm, alliteration, parallel structures, and the extensive use of metaphor.

See also: Conversation Analysis; Formulaic Language; Legal Pragmatics; Silence.

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Legal Pragmatics

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A discussion of the intersection of two crucial domains of human activity, language and law, requires an interdisciplinary approach, which is the underlying assumption of this article and one of the main tenets of pragmatics, the study of language in use. The language of the law is not only notorious for its lexical and syntactic complexity, which has given rise to criticism (e.g., Mellinkoff, 1963; Danet, 1980, 1985; Lakoff, 1990), but it also has certain pragmatic peculiarities. The present study on legal pragmatics will provide a pragmaticist's account of legal issues rather than a lawyer's view of the linguistic problems he or she faces. Since the direction of fit is from language to law and not from law to language, the assumption is that the aim of legal pragmatics is to construct an interface between the two domains by searching for pragmatic peculiarities in the language of the law. Thus, this article will investigate the instantiations of selected pragmatic concepts in the language of the law. The starting point of my analysis consists of a few observations on the topic made by others before.

1. The turn-taking system used in court is similar to that of other institutional settings (e.g., classrooms or chaired meetings) in that it is more rigid and less flexible than the one operating in everyday face-to-face conversation (Levinson, 1983: 301).
2. The institutionalized character of the court is reflected in formulaic, if slightly archaic and stilted language (Lakoff, 1990: 94).
3. According to Danet (1985: 276), legal discourse is concerned with "the nature, functions and consequences of language use in negotiation of social order." Despite its formulaic character, legal language employs a wide range of registers. It can represent various styles, ranging from frozen through formal and consultative to casual.
4. Verbal interaction in court exemplifies various questioning strategies, which lend themselves to a pragmalinguistic analysis, since "courtroom discourse is unilateral in that barristers enjoy a one-sided topic control of discourse" (Luchjenbroers, 1997: 477). This control is a sign of power, a sociopragmatic concept discussed in the section 'Power vs. Solidarity' below.
5. Kurzon (1995) emphasized the role of silence in trial proceedings, and his more recent analysis (Kurzon, 2001) addressed the politeness of the judges. He claims that in formal language politeness may be taken for granted and is therefore automatically present (it may in fact be presupposed).

Pragmatic Concepts in the Language of the Law

The main issue addressed here is the extent to which the language of the law lends itself to a pragmatic analysis, e.g., whether typical pragmatic notions can be found in this type of discourse. My hypothesis is that the language of the law shares most of the pragmatic properties of colloquial language. These are presupposition, deixis, implicature, speech acts, and power vs. solidarity.

Presupposition

The notion comes in different guises, such as: semantic, pragmatic, and lexical presupposition, but the most widely recognized distinction runs along the semantics-pragmatics line. Thus, semantic presupposition is a relation between two propositions, such that the presupposing proposition can be denied, whereas the presupposed one is immune to negation, i.e., it is always true. Among the so-called presupposition triggers are a variety of lexical items and syntactic constructions, e.g., Levinson (1983: 181ff) lists more than 30 such items. Take factive verbs like 'regret,' which presuppose the truth of their complements, e.g., in

(1) I (don't) regret that it's raining.

Here the truth of the complement sentence (i.e., that it is raining) cannot be denied, regardless of

whether the verb in the main clause is negated or not. In contrast, pragmatic presupposition is a relation between two utterances whose truth/factuality is taken for granted in a given context due to the mutual knowledge of the speaker and the addressee(s). For instance, if I ask a secretary in my department 'Is the professor in?' the question would normally presuppose that there is only one professor in our immediate context, i.e., an instance of existential presupposition related to definite descriptions. However, in this case, both I and the secretary know that only one of the many professors in the department, viz. the boss, is referred to with the definite NP 'the professor,' rather than with 'Prof. Brown.'

As can be expected, questions with presuppositions permeate interrogations. Recall the proverbial:

(2) When are you going to stop beating your wife?

Commenting on such questions, Shuy (1998: 15) showed that they are particularly useful in the case of suspects whose guilt is uncertain. It turns out that questions with presuppositions intimidate the suspects who might think that the interrogators already know the facts that they do not.

In her analysis of the role of questions in Supreme Court trials, Luchjenbroers (1997: 482), following Danet (1980: 521ff), defined questions in terms of the degree of factuality of the potential answers, ranging from open-ended questions of 'high' fact value, through *wh*-questions, to restrictive 'yes/no' questions of 'low' fact value. Predictably, the counsel have least control over witness replies with the open-ended questions and maximal control with 'yes/no' questions. The latter are also called leading questions, where the interrogators provide the facts of a testimony and the witnesses either confirm or deny them. The counsel have control over the witness, since they do not only know the answer that they expect to hear, but also gear their questions accordingly. Thus, the answer to the counsel's leading question is presupposed as in the following examples of the most frequent forms which leading questions can take: declaratives, accusatory 'yes/no' questions, and alternative questions, cf. (3a), (3b), and (3c), respectively (notice the use of 'some' which, in contradistinction to 'any,' obviously presupposes the truth of the utterance):

(3a) You had some alcohol?
(3b) Did you have some alcohol?
(3c) Did you or didn't you have some alcohol?

(Luchjenbroers, 1997: 482).

Deixis

Another pragmatic concept of relevance here is deixis, which can be defined as the expression of spatiotemporal relations in language by means of 'indexicals' (pronouns and adverbs that indicate three transient notions: the participant roles, the place, and the time of the utterance, labeled person, place, time deixis, respectively), as in the classical example:

(4) I am here now.

This pragmatic spatiotemporal domain is relevant to an analysis of legal language, especially to court trial discourse, because there consecutive instances of deictic anchoring reflect the spatiotemporal relations between the actual event, its spoken testimony by the witness/defendant, its written records, and possibly its later reception by potential readers.

Since one of the purposes of a court examination is to determine the identity of various persons involved in a case, and the exact location and time of the event, all three major deictic categories are realized in what is called "factuality of persons, place and time," (Kryk-Kastovsky, 2002: 254ff). The category of person is grammaticalized in natural language by means of personal pronouns 'I,' 'you,' 'he/she' referring to the speaker, the addressee, and the third party, respectively. Consequently, personal pronouns used in court trial discourse should reflect the interpersonal relationships between different participants of the trial. Stygall (1994: 180) presented an insightful proposal that personal pronouns should be redistributed in two categories, placing the referent either in the trial world or in the abstract world of the legal universe. Thus, 'you' is ambiguous between two uses: it is deictic when it refers to the addressee(s) and nondeictic in its generic use. Singular pronouns like 'I,' 'he,' 'she' are obviously deictic, whereas 'it' can either be deictic (when it points to an entity), or nondeictic, i.e., when used as dummy subject. On the one hand, this observation contradicts the traditional view that while 'I' and 'you' are unambiguous in everyday discourse, the third person ('he'/'she'/'it')stands for the entities outside the discourse situation, and thus is often called 'a nonperson.' On the other hand, Stygall's stand correctly reflects one of the possible approaches to court trial discourse, i.e., that its structure consists of textual layers. In his study of old court trial records, Koch suggested three textual layers in which the dialogue going on in court can be embedded: legal framework of questioning, report of a statement, and a dialogue rendered as a quotation (Koch, 1999: 406ff).

In addition to the major deictic categories, scholars have also distinguished discourse, emotional, and social deixis. These can be labeled 'marginal deictic uses,' since as opposed to person, place, and time deixis, they are not obligatory occurrences

determined by the very nature of language, but are totally dependent on the speaker's choices. Thus, discourse deixis points to a (preceeding or following) portion of the text/discourse, emotional deixis employs demonstratives to mark a personal attitude towards a given entity, and social deixis concerns the use of forms of address as markers of social distance, cf. (5a), (5b), and (5c), respectively (court trial transcripts from Shuy, 1998, emphasis mine):

(5a) Q: What stuff did you tell him that's true?
    A: That I ain't did **that,** that I knew her for a long time.
(5b) A: Then when I got to school, **this** boy told me about what happened.
(5c) I have known **Ms. Lockhart** for about 2 years. Sometime I call her **Ms. Lillie.**
(Shuy, 1998: 164ff).

As we have seen, deixis is not only one of the major properties of spoken language (more than 90% of human utterances contain deictics), but for obvious reasons, it is even more pervasive in the language of the law.

Implicature

The Gricean idea of 'what is meant but not said' is undeniably relevant to the language of the law, where actual meanings have to be inferred from examinations, witness depositions, and other forms of judicial discourse. As Mey (1993: 99) stated, implicature is a regularity that cannot be captured in a simple syntactic or semantic rule, but by some conversational principle. One of the best-known examples of implicature comes from Levinson (1983: 97):

(6) A: Can you tell me the time?
    B: Well, the milkman has come.

where A has to infer the answer (e.g., that the milkman always comes around 6 A.M., hence the time has to be about 6 A.M.).

In the context of a court trial the process of inferencing and the resulting notion of implicature might constitute useful tools both for the interrogators in asking questions and for the interrogated in providing or evading answers. Atkinson and Drew (1979) analyzed court trial discourse in conversational-analytic terms and have shown that, in contradistinction to conversation, which is more loosely organized (the turns are not prelocated), court examination involves question-and-answer sequences. Since the turns in court trial discourse are prelocated in one direction only (i.e., from the interrogators to the interrogated), any pauses in the examination of witnesses or defendants have an inferentially implicative character, i.e., after the witnesses and defendants provide their

answers, the next turn reverts to counsel who self-select. Inferences also work on a more elusive, psychological side of the court trial discourse, since any utterance can be a basis for moral inferences made about the speaker by the hearer(s) (Atkinson and Drew, 1979: 68). Compare these observations to the role of perlocutions in everyday discourse as opposed to the perlocutions that occur in court trials and often carry moral and social obligations (Kryk-Kastovsky, 2002: 236ff).

Inferencing can also be employed to discover what Harris (1994, emphasis original) called ideological propositions in courtroom interaction, such as:

(7) This court is a **reasonable** court – trying to do **justice** to both sides in some disputes?

As Harris (1994: 161ff) rightly pointed out, the concepts of a court based on reason and exercising justice are ideological assumptions that underlie the judicial system by definition and are therefore often quoted by public figures as the basic principles securing the credibility of the legal system and political democracy in general. Therefore, by challenging the justness of the court, the statement starts an ideological dispute and thus implicates an oppositional view of reality. Finally, as demonstrated by Shuy (2004: 11ff), the counsel can use inferencing analysis (which involves the working out of implicatures) in order to solve ambiguities occurring in depositions or recorded data.

Speech Acts

Speech acts are utterances whereby by saying something the speaker performs certain acts, which are called performatives, as opposed to constatives, i.e., mere statements. The distinction was introduced by Austin (1962) and elaborated on by Searle (1969), who distinguished between five classes of performative utterances: representatives, directives, commissives, expressives, and declarations. In his later work, Searle (1975) emphasized the crucial role that performatives (especially declarations) play in legal language, whereas Danet gives priority to directives since "Within the facultative-regulative functions of law they are the most prominent in legislation that imposes obligations," (Danet, 1980: 458).

Speech acts are among the pragmatic concepts that most frequently occur in legal language, since according to Hencher, "[s]peech act theory and the law are made of much the same stuff. Pragmatic concepts such as authority, verifiability, and obligation are basic to both" (Hencher, 1980: 254). The crucial role of speech acts in the language of the law has also been shown in Jori (1994), Maley (1994), and Stygall (1994). Legal discourse is, by definition,

permeated with performatives used by the speakers to perform legal acts. This evidence has been demonstrated by Danet, who claims that representatives, which commit the speaker to the truth of a proposition, can express a strong or a weak commitment, e.g., actions of testifying or swearing vs. asserting or claiming, respectively. Since according to Austin law is a set of commands, even more important to the legal language are directives, future-oriented speech acts intended to change the current state of affairs by making someone to perform some action, e.g., subpoenas, jury instructions, or appeals. Commissives, as the name suggests, commit the speaker to a future action, which includes any kind of contract, whether a business contract, a marriage, or a will. Expressives are supposed to cover cases of the convicted persons, asked before the sentence is announced whether they have anything (personal) to say. This moment is when they have the last opportunity to apologize, excuse themselves, and deplore their crime. Finally, declarations produce a fit between the words and the world, a change that comes about because of the speaker's utterance, as in the classic

(8) I declare the meeting closed. (Danet, 1980: 458ff)

It must be noted, however, that the position of formulaic expressions in legal language goes far beyond single speech acts, like swearing in a witness, requesting information, or warning the suspect of his/her constitutional rights, as in the case of Miranda Rights:

1. The suspect has a right to remain silent and he need not answer any questions;
2. If he does answer questions, his answers can be used as evidence against him.
3. He has a right to consult with a lawyer and if he cannot afford hiring a lawyer, one will be provided for him without cost. (Shuy, 1998: 52)

These speech acts are also part of a larger speech event. Such an event can be analyzed not only in linguistic terms, but also in terms of nonverbal context (e.g., spatial positioning and alignment in the courtroom) that can provide information concerning the social organization of discourse (Philips, 1986). Moreover, the physical characteristics of the courtroom emanate the atmosphere of power exercised by the interrogators (Lakoff, 1990: 91ff; Maley, 1994: 32ff). And it is the notion of power that this article will now address.

Power vs. Solidarity

Power in the Courtroom The distinction between power vs. solidarity introduced by Brown and Gilman (1960), was later been taken up by various theories of politeness, especially by Brown and Levinson (1987). The interplay between power and solidarity is apparent in the context of the courtroom where the interrogators exercise their power on the interrogated. The asymmetrical relation was particularly acute in the past, e.g., in early modern England, when judges could use their power by verbally abusing the witnesses and the defendants. For instance, the infamous Judge Jeffreys addressed the interrogated with invectives like 'blockhead' or 'vile wretch' (Kryk-Kastovsky, 2002: 253). The change in the politeness system to the effect that both social inferiors and social superiors receive the polite forms of address has also had repercussions in the judicial jargon, so that nowadays the distance between the interrogators and the interrogated is much more subtle. While the obnoxious behavior of judges is no longer possible nowadays, some more innocuous ways of indicating the distance can be detected. On the extralinguistic side, it is the spatial organization of the courtroom that creates distance between the interrogators and the interrogated both due to the superior position of the judge (Lakoff, 1990: 87ff) and the role of the counsel who "reduce the witness to a function of a puppet" (Luchjenbroers, 1997: 480). On the linguistic side, the distinction between power and solidarity can be exemplified by the use of the appropriate forms of address and by the presence vs. absence of the legal jargon in the speech of the insiders and outsiders of the courtroom, respectively. Moreover, the power contrast can also be detected in the verbal behavior of men and women. As noticed by O'Barr (1982), who follows Lakoff (1975), women's speech is much more tentative and less convincing due to the use of hedges, (super)polite forms, tag questions, speaking in italics, empty adjectives, hypercorrect grammar and pronunciation, lack of a sense of humor, etc. On the basis of these characteristics, O'Barr makes the distinction between powerful vs. powerless speech and shows that although women use powerless speech more often than men, the two categories are not necessarily to be assigned to the two sexes, but rather they reflect the social position of the speaker (the less powerful the speaker's social position, the less powerful his/her language). The transcripts quoted by the author convincingly demonstrate that powerful language is much more effective in courtroom discourse than powerless language. Consider the following quotation from O'Barr (1982: 65ff), where the emphasized words and expressions are clear instances of powerless language (emphasis mine):

(9) Q: State whether or not, Mrs. A, you were
 acquainted with or knew the late Mrs. X.
 A: **Quite well.**
 Q: What was the nature of your acquaintance
 with her?
 A: **Well,** we were, **uh, very** close friends. **Uh,** she
 was even **sort of** like a mother to me.

As stated above, one of the manifestations of power and solidarity are forms of address, and this is what our discussion will now turn to.

Forms of Address Legal language as a conservative register has preserved many of the old address forms. Even in countries like the United States, where addressing others with first names is quite common, the language used in court is characterized by a high level of formality. Thus, the judge can be addressed as 'Your Honor,' 'The court,' or much less formally as 'Judge Smith' (although here some restrictions apply). In addressing the judge directly, the traditional formula 'May it please the court' is used. Lawyers are addressed and referred to as 'Counsel,' and members of the jury are addressed with the names of their social roles, e.g., 'Juror Number One' (depending on the assigned seat). Interestingly, the same formal register holds true for the interrogated, who are referred to as 'the witness' and 'the defendant' (Lakoff, 1990: 93). Although analogous situations hold in other languages with regard to referring to the participants of a court trial discourse, crosslinguistic variation applies to the ways a suspect/defendant/convict is referred to in the media. While in English, he is invariably referred to as 'Mr Brown,' in German the first and second name, without the honorific 'Herr,' are employed ('Harald Braun'), and in Polish merely the second name, again without the honorific, is used ('Kowalski'). It might be insightful to look into the (historical and sociocultural) reasons why loss of honorifics is the case in the two languages that have much more elaborate address systems than English. After all, German and Polish employ the T/V distinction (grammaticalized as *du/Sie* and *ty/Pan-i*, respectively), so that the use of honorifics is subject to strict sociopragmatic principles.

The Structure of Courtroom Discourse

In the following section, this article will examine to what extent courtroom discourse can be considered an approximation to everyday speech. As shown above, legal language contains all the major (socio)-pragmatic categories present in everyday communication. Therefore, it might be reasonable to assume that the parallel also holds on the discourse-analytic

level; in other words, that the organization of courtroom discourse does not markedly differ from everyday discourse.

Guidelines for Courtroom Discourse Participants

Intuitively, one of the major characteristics of court trial discourse should be its effectiveness in achieving discoursal goals. Such effective courtroom tactics can be found in trial practice manuals addressed to what O'Barr (1982) calls "legal tacticians." Just to quote a few selected speech characteristics recommended by the authors of such manuals:

1. Overly talkative witnesses are not persuasive.
2. Narrative answers are more persuasive than fragmented ones.
3. Exaggeration weakens a witness's testimony, etc.

As can be expected, lawyers are also given advice as to effective verbal behavior (O'Barr, 1982: 32ff):

1. Make effective use of variations in questions format to get the most favorable responses for your client. Interestingly, O'Barr notes that lawyers are often warned against asking questions to which they do not know the answers (i.e., they should resort to leading questions, cf. the section Presupposition above).
2. Another recommendation pertinent to this analysis is to vary the styles of questioning depending on the different kinds of witnesses (men vs. women, the elderly, children, etc.), a differentiation one might dub sociopragmatic, cf. the remarks on powerful vs. powerless speech in the section Power vs. Solidarity above.
3. Finally, a piece of advice that reminds a (text) linguist of a cohesion device, i.e., repetition is useful for emphasis, but it should be used with care.

With these guidelines in mind, let us now have a look at the main differences between two types of discourse of interest here, court examination and everyday conversation.

Court Examination vs. Conversation

At a first glance, court trial discourse looks analogous to any other discourse. However, Atkinson and Drew (1979) warn the non-initiates against hasty generalizations by showing to what extent court examinations can be compared to everyday interaction. First, if we consider the structural characteristics of conversation outlined by Sacks *et al.* (1974), i.e., turn-taking, turn allocation, transition-relevance places (TRPs), repairs, etc., predictably, everyday conversation is much more loosely organized than court trial discourse, so that in a conversation the

turns are (relatively) spontaneous and the number of participants may vary. Second, while in court the distribution of power relations is obvious, in everyday conversation any power relations between its participants are not demonstrated overtly due to the different social setting of this type of discourse, which would imply that the Politeness Principle is observed. Third, although questions and answers often occur in a conversation, they are not a norm, whereas the verbal exchange in a court examination consists solely of question-and-answer pairs (Atkinson and Drew, 1979: 61ff). Moreover, in court examinations turn order is fixed and so is the type of turn contributed by each speaker. As Stygall rightly pointed out, turns and TRPs are controlled by the interrogators, whereas repairs and self-repairs, instigated by the questioning process, come from the interrogated (1994: 117ff). Indeed, the relation between the representatives of the two social roles is asymmetric in that only the interrogators have the right to ask questions, and the turns of the interrogated necessarily constitute (preferably adequate) answers to these questions. In other words, the turns in court examination, unlike in a conversation, are pre-allocated, or to use the terminology of Sacks *et al.* (1974), only one party (the interrogators) self-selects.

A unique property that differentiates court trial discourse from everyday conversation is what is called 'legal metacomments' (Kryk-Kastovsky, 2002: 248ff). These comprise the interrogators' comments on whatever is going on in court and are an instantiation of the metacommunicative function of language. Legal metacomments easily lend themselves to a pragmatic analysis due to their peculiar characteristics, in a way comparable to discourse deixis in everyday conversation. Thus, legal metacomments either refer (anaphorically) to a portion of previous discourse, or (exophorically) to a situation outside the actual discourse situation, cf. (10) and (11), respectively. In (10), the metalinguistic use of the verb 'say' takes the utterance outside the actual situation-of-utterance and gives it a special discourse function (i.e., that of a leading question), whereas in (11) the question is commented on by the judge as leading the witness, i.e., its discourse function is also changed from a simple 'yes/no' question to a leading question:

(10) So you say you actually ran away on Friday night? (Johnson, 2004: 105)

(11) Q: All right. Now the car the man was driving, was it a brown, a brown 1972 Chevrolet Nova?
OPPOSITION LAWYER: Objection.
JUDGE: Sustained, leading the witness. (O'Barr, 1982: 142)

The Language of the Law – At the Crossroads of Sociopragmatics, Discourse Analysis, and Intercultural Communication

It follows from the discussion above that (legal) pragmatics does not suffice to explain the intricate interface of language and the law. One of the reasons is that the relation between the two disciplines cannot be reduced to a simple combination of a few pragmatic concepts that occur in courtroom discourse; it calls for a multidisciplinary approach. Apart from pragmatics proper, a broader approach is necessary. First, the relations between the participants of court trial discourse call for a sociopragmatic explanation in terms of power and solidarity and the role which these concepts play in polite behavior, in the use of forms of address, etc. Second, an analysis of the structure and organization of courtroom discourse should be conducted within the conversation-analytic and/or discourse-analytic frameworks to provide a comparison between the verbal exchanges in the courtroom and everyday conversation. Finally, on a more global level, a crosslinguistic and intercultural investigation might be in order to juxtapose the intricacies of the use of legal language in various cultural-linguistic communities. Not only would such as investigation reveal the differences between the Anglo-Saxon and European judicial systems, but also the various organizational peculiarities that result from these differences. Since in Great Britain and the United States the trial procedure is adversarial, whereas in most other countries it is inquisitorial, the following consequences ensue. In adversarial systems, the jury (consisting of lay persons) plays a crucial role in the trial proceedings. While the judge presides, the jury is presented the evidence from both the prosecution and the defense, and decides which side sounds more convincing. The inquisitorial trial procedure is much more rigid in that professional judges listen to the evidence presented by a state-appointed attorney and deliver a verdict. This style puts the defendant at a disadvantage, especially if his/her side is not fully represented. The markedly different roles played by professionals and laymen in both legal systems have serious repercussions for the entire organization of the trial procedures and the chances of the defendants (Lakoff, 1990: 86). Finally, it might also be useful to look at the organization of court trial discourse in countries outside Europe and North America and study different legal traditions, e.g., the court trial procedures in China deeply rooted in Chinese culture based on Confucianism, cf. e.g. Gao (2003).

See also: Law and Language: Overview; Power and Pragmatics.

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Linguistic Anthropology

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Linguistic anthropology is the study of language **in** culture and society. The field analyzes linguistic practices as culturally significant **actions** that constitute social life. The situated use of language is exemplary of the meaning-making process that shapes a social worlds saturated with contrasting values and contested interests, with opposed political positions and identities, with variable access to institutions, resources and power. Linguistic anthropology examines the role of social interaction – and the semiotic processes on which it relies – in making, mediating and authorizing those contrasts and differences. Aspects of context enter

into this process through linguistic form itself, as form signals speaker alignments and cultural presuppositions that are called into play during social interaction. Presuppositions invoked during interaction can draw on any cultural realm: categories of contrasting identities, folk ontologies, notions of truth, space, time, cosmological order, and morality. Such presuppositions are invariably linked to language ideologies, that is, culturally specific conceptions about language and its role in social life.

Recent research on language-in-context has resulted in new definitions of the field's fundamental concepts: 'language' 'metalanguage' 'discourse' 'context' 'event' and 'text.' Metalanguage is crucial because it makes possible the reflexivity that is a necessary feature of verbal interaction. Reflexivity has methodological as well as theoretical implications. Speakers' categories of speech, events and personae are reflexive in that they create frames of interpretation for social interaction and are not necessarily uniform within any group. They are indispensable starting points for empirical investigation of talk. Such categories provide perspectival views on interaction and contrast with the linguists' own perspectives and direct observations. Scholarly discourses and debates about language are of theoretical interest as well. Like the metadiscursive categories about language and interaction of ordinary speakers, expert debates also create frames of interpretation; they participate in cultural systems, and often legitimate relations of power.

In concert with some poststructuralist philosophies, yet in quite different ways, linguistic anthropology analyzes linguistic practices not only as the instruments of social life, but rather as the **ground** on which social and cultural conflicts are fought. A key issue has been the creation of cultural authority through communication. As a result, current research in linguistic anthropology has considerable significance in the study of political and economic formations, scientific and religious enterprises, as well as in the more traditional study of group boundaries and social identities. Contemporary linguistic anthropology provides the semiotic concepts necessary to understand how social institutions – including "language" and linguistic structure – are reproduced, authorized, and continually transformed.

Terms and Turfs

The label 'linguistic anthropology' was coined in the late 19th century by scholars at the American Bureau of Indian Affairs who collected folkloric material among native Americans. Its current use in the United States dates from the early 1960s, when 'linguistic anthropology' became a cover term for the study of language in social life and conversely for the study of social context in shaping linguistic structure and use. Two commitments have remained central to the field, and link it distinctively to anthropology: First, ethnography is its indispensable methodology, though augmented by elicitation, interview and audiovisual technologies. Second, linguistic form and function are studied within a cross-cultural, comparative framework, with attention to human universals along with historical, regional, and power-laden sociocultural differences.

A set of other hybrid labels emerged at roughly the same time, also proposing to study language in social, cultural and psychological terms. Scholars from a number of disciplines came together under labels such as: sociolinguistics (later split into interactional and variationist), ethnography of communication, linguistic stylistics, linguistic pragmatics, psycholinguistics, ethnomethodology, ethnolinguistics, conversation analysis, discourse analysis, interactional analysis, sociology of language, and anthropology of language, among others. Some of these terms became alternate designations within linguistic anthropology (e.g., ethnography of communication, interactional sociolinguistics), others have come to mark differences of emphasis (e.g., discourse analysis, pragmatics). Still others, like variationist sociolinguistics and conversation analysis, have developed characteristic methodologies, remaining closely aligned with their disciplines of origin – linguistics and sociology respectively.

The intellectual excitement and energy evidenced by the proliferation of terms, conferences, and edited volumes in the 1960s was an ironic response to the establishment of separate departments of linguistics in American universities in the post-WWII period. These departments provided institutional backing for the formalist study of language as an autonomous phenomenon, putting aside concerns with the contexts of language. They thereby indirectly re-invigorated such contextual questions in other institutional venues. Only psycholinguistics was directly spurred by generative grammar, which legitimated cognitive questions in the face of the reigning behaviorism. The new contextual fields were surely also encouraged by more funding for cybernetics and 'communication research,' which became policy sciences during the Cold War.

Within anthropology, the new labels joined the much older term 'anthropological linguistics,' which was closely tied to fieldwork-based typological research on native North America languages as established by Franz Boas in the early 20th century. Those who now adopt the label of anthropological

linguistics are oriented to linguistics departments, to descriptive work in the structuralist tradition or to historical reconstruction of language and verbal art in unwritten languages. Those identifying as linguistic anthropologists orient to anthropology departments and to language and speech as cultural practice. Many individual scholars are active in both kinds of research. Differences of emphasis notwithstanding, linguistic anthropology and anthropological linguistics have been used interchangeably as labels in textbooks and encyclopedias. The Boasian tradition gives linguistic anthropology significant institutional recognition, intellectual influence and prestige within the discipline of anthropology.

In the hybrid fields of the 1960s, practitioners held themselves accountable to different departmental audiences (linguistics, sociology, anthropology), resulting in different emphases and preferred topics. Collections of articles in the last few decades, however, have usually included scholars from several disciplines, all writing on a single theme. The roster of substantive topics has included: the linguistic marking of social relations and identities; conversational interaction and other speech genres; political processes mediated by speech such as decision-making and dispute settlement; language and nation; multilingualism, linguistic variation and multidialectalism; standardization and literacy; national language policy; narrative, performance, verbal art and ritual; the emergence, circulation and desuetude of languages, linguistic varieties, registers and styles; the acquisition of cultural competence through language; the relation of cognition to linguistic categories as coded in grammars and lexicons; the mechanisms of language change. The last half century has also brought new issues such as the globalization of languages and the effect of novel communicative technologies.

Roots and Shoots

Linguistic anthropology is often called an interdisciplinary field. But considered as an intellectual (rather than a departmental or institutional) endeavor it is rather a set of lineages or kinship lines that are read and invoked for inspiration and legitimation. As in all segmentary lineage organization, naming one's ancestors is also a means of forming alliances and oppositions in today's controversies. (What the field would analyze as the relation of narrated and narrative event.) This very brief recitation of family ties is not a history of linguistic anthropology but an overview of a usable past on which current practitioners rely.

The turn of the 20th century is the conventional starting point, especially the work of Franz Boas, Edward Sapir and their students. They collected textual materials to document peoples whose cultures were rapidly changing under brutal colonial pressure. These scholars were inspired by the previous century's German tradition that considered language as a historical guide to the customs and values of a group. Starting with Boas's studies of verbal art and folklore, poetics has played a continuing role, strengthened by contacts with parallel interests among Prague School linguists. Contact with avatars of European dialectology of the 19th and 20th centuries helped raise concerns about regional distributions of forms, definitions of languages, standardization, dialect boundaries and historical change. A francophone line of structuralist linguistics starting with Saussure, through Benveniste, is perhaps best characterized as the immediate source for the autonomous linguistics that has been linguistic anthropology's intellectual foil. In this respect, at least, American structuralists from Bloomfield to Harris to Chomsky have been the heirs of Saussure. For linguistic anthropology, by contrast, Saussure's project is significant as part of a broader understanding of sign phenomena.

The other sources of sign theory were the Americans C. S. Peirce and to a lesser extent the more behaviorist Charles Morris. The significance of Peirce's semiotics for linguistics was emphasized by Roman Jakobson, himself a central node in a kin network that connected American structuralism to Prague School functionalism and Russian formalism while also helping to bring the work of Bakhtin's decidedly anti-formalist Russian school of poetics and literary studies of the 1920s and 30s to international attention. Literary studies have repeatedly been 'captured' as relatives by linguistic anthropology, or vice versa, as in the mid-century dramatism of Kenneth Burke, the semiotic readings of Roland Barthes, or the writings of Raymond Williams and other neo-marxist critics. There were also the quasi-literary interests of Malinowski in language function and 'context of situation,' not taken up by British social anthropologists but rather by functional linguists and later in the century within anthropology by Gregory Bateson.

Philosophies of language have also been significant interlocutors for linguistic anthropology. Austin's ordinary language philosophy was particularly important as it side-stepped the Fregean concern with truth conditionality. This was followed by Searle and Grice on speech acts and implicatures, and in a different line by Wittgenstein on language games. A later and contrary branch of this lineage is represented by Hilary Putnam and Saul Kripke on the indexicality of reference. Finally, linguistic anthropology rightly claims important kin connections with phenomenologists such as Husserl who inspired sociologists

from Schutz, to Goffman to Garfinkel, though these doubtless also saw themselves as descendants of G. H. Mead, himself very likely a reader of Peirce.

Relying on all these sources, linguistic anthropology was consolidated in the 1960s through two intellectual strategies familiar from the history of science: The first was a bid to constitute an 'object' of analysis that had not before been the focus of research. Most broadly stated, this object was the process of face-to-face interaction. One can rephrase the argument this way: the primary datum for all the ethnographic and language-based disciplines is the contingent stream of eventful talk in everyday life, along with its concomitant non-verbal signaling systems. Each disciplinary enterprise abstracts from this in a principled manner. What is not within its focus becomes an obstacle to research and is bracketed or theoretically discounted. For instance, Saussure was quite explicit that a synchronic linguistics should (for the moment) ignore what he defined as 'external' though admittedly important facts, instead studying structural relationships of contrast and opposition he defined as 'internal' to language. In a parallel way, the sociocultural anthropology of the 1960s treated language as a vehicle for recounting cultural content, thereby excluding from study the situation in which the telling occurred.

This first project has had considerably success. Linguistic anthropology abstracted something new from that accessible stream of verbal activity, finding systematicity where others had found only noise: Goffman's "neglected situation;" "naturally occurring talk" and 'conversation' as defined by Schegloff and Sacks; the "speech event" and its functions, as defined by Jakobson; studies of performance genres by Hymes, Friedrich, Albert, and Ervin-Tripp; Barth's notion of interactions as boundaries; Austin and Searle's "speech acts," and the organization of "social meaning" that Gumperz and Labov found in linguistic variation and codeswitching. Goffman declared the relative analytical independence of an "interactional order" governed by a separate set of principles not directly related to larger social structures. There ensued a period of description, typologizing, and cross cultural comparison.

The second, more radical intellectual project was a double-edged critique, targeting both linguistics and social science as then constituted. Hymes's dictum was a classic performative, disguised as mere description: "... whereas the first half of the century was distinguished by a drive for the autonomy of language as an object of study and a focus upon description of structure, the second half was distinguished by a concern for the integration of language in sociocultural context ...." (1964: 11). This

project continues to inspire theory and research. It has produced detailed criticisms of mainstream linguistics, sociology and anthropology.

In the argument with generative linguistics, linguistic anthropology retained much of structuralist analysis, but rejected the asocial definition of language. What had been peripheralized became central in a series of changes in focus. Linguistic anthropology emphasized multilingual, stratified speech communities instead of the ideal hearer/speaker; performance instead of linguistic competence; linguistic repertoire and speech act instead of abstract grammar and sentence; speech acts and speech events instead of the disembodied sentence. As sources of evidence, contextually located and tape-recorded interaction replaced intuitions about grammaticality. Some of this dovetailed with European initiatives to study sentence level phenomena through their cohesion into larger units. In mainstream American linguistics, however, the subjects taken up by linguistic anthropology were relegated to subfields such as pragmatics and sociolinguistics.

In sociology, it was methods and epistemology that were attacked by language-centered approaches. Study of interaction highlighted the situatedness of all sociological descriptions, indeed the unavoidable role of the interviewer in shaping the answers that made up a sociological report. This insight about the 'reactivity' of measurement was recognized as important, but was so corrosive to sociological business-as-usual that it was isolated as the workings of a 'micro-order,' to be studied separately from the institutional, organizational and demographic issues that occupied the mainstream of sociology. Without theories of how micro and macro were linked, there was a continuing side-lining of language as subject matter, and the trivialization of interactional process as merely the enactment of patterns determined elsewhere, the faithful reflection of supposedly more powerful 'macro' forces.

The role of linguistic anthropology within anthropology was more complicated. The position of language was significantly transformed in the 1980s in two ways. First, through a redefinition of culture. Rather than a symbolic or cognitive phenomenon (the two previous approaches) culture came to be seen as a set of embodied practices within institutions; practices that, in certain conjunctures, could change the institutions themselves. 'Language' was often invoked as a powerful means of constructing reality. Ethnographies of speaking that analyzed race, gender, ethnic conflict or dispute settlement fit well into practice theories such as those inspired by Bourdieu, by Birmingham cultural studies, colonial studies and Gramscian notions. But even when

recognized as important, linguistic practice was rarely analyzed in any detail.

Simultaneously, a second enterprise was also launched, related to language but largely independent of linguistic anthropology. Under the influence of literary studies, anthropology mounted a reflexive critique of the poetics and rhetoric of anthropology's own prose genres, especially ethnographic monographs. Anthropologists joined continental theorists such as Foucault and Derrida in unpacking and undermining the idea of objective knowledge. Metadiscourse, texts, their materiality, their authorization, their ability to 'objectify' and devalue others, all took center stage in sociocultural anthropology. But these concerns were often separated from the classic ethnographic and comparative goals of the discipline. For linguistic anthropology, the poststructuralist philosophers' discussions of discourse, rhetoric and poetics as shapers of 'truth' and subjectivity rang familiar tunes – if in unfamiliar keys. As a result, they provoked spirited responses. This critical engagement was guided by the internal logic of linguistic anthropology itself during intensive discussions in the 1980s and 1990s. The debates with poststructuralism encouraged a synthesis within linguistic anthropology that was aimed at developing a processual, event-based, political economy of texts in social life, and a semiotic perspective on culture.

The overall project of linguistic anthropology remains the reshaping of linguistic theory from an interactionalist and culturalist perspective, and the revamping of anthropological investigations of meaning and action from the perspective of a semiotically grounded understanding of language, culture and social institutions. Within these broad aims, the last twenty years have brought substantial revisions in theoretical concepts.

Concepts and Controversies

The orienting concepts discussed here are not strictly separable; there are overlaps and echoes among them. Each section traces continuities with earlier formulations, discusses points of recent controversy and consensus, and then outlines briefly the implications of current approaches in linguistic anthropology for both linguistic and anthropological theory.

Indexicality, Metalanguage, Materiality

The multifunctionality of language was a pillar of 1960s linguistic anthropology. Jakobson (1960) enumerated emotive, poetic, metalinguistic, phatic and conative (action) functions. These operate simultaneously. Depending on the nature and goal of interaction, some are highlighted more than others. Yet

linguistic anthropologists observed that in many cultural contexts experts and laypeople alike privileged referentiality, believing that the naming of things in the world and predication about them was the pre-eminent role of language. Early linguistic anthropology proposed the category of 'social meaning' to designate what is communicated through a disparate set of formal linguistic devices in which picking out a referent is only secondarily involved, or absent altogether. These included Labovian phonological markers of class or regional identity, speech levels, grammatical alternates specific to males vs. females, avoidance registers, and codeswitching between languages and dialects.

The conceptual unity of these phenomena has been clarified through more concentrated attention to the non-referential, metalinguistic and poetic functions of language. This has been done through a foundational critique of structural linguistics, fortified by a culturalist reading of Peircean semiotics.

The structuralist tradition of grammatical analysis, no less than western common-sense, implicitly relies on the assumption of a stable referentiality for linguistic units. Saussure created a semiotics in which signs link a concept (signified) with a sound image (signifier) in systems of value-creating contrast. But he left unanalyzed the circumstances under which signs would be instantiated. His form of structuralism is able to explicate the workings of grammar as a system of oppositions, sequences and substitutions. But severing an abstract system of types (*langue*) from their tokens in contexts-of-use (*parole*) had serious limitations. Most importantly, it could not analyze what Jakobson called 'shifters:' linguistic phenomena whose referential value is not entirely fixed within an abstract system, but relies in part on features of the situation in which they are used. There is no type-level stability in the reference of 'I,' it varies with the instance of utterance, always identifying the speaker of the moment. More generally, not only reference but also the interpretations of speech acts, implicatures and presuppositions are necessarily linked to events of speech.

Thus, speech as social action is not adequately described as the 'putting to use' of a separately analyzed grammar. On the contrary, grammar is full of devices – deictics, tense, mood, evidentials – that gain their interpretation only in part from type-level contrasts, and in part as tokens of use in specific contexts. These phenomena make an autonomous grammar impossible in principle: to describe them fully one needs pragmatics. That is, the speech event in which they occur must be analyzed in ethnographic detail and systematically linked to linguistic form.

To do so, Jakobson drew on C. S. Peirce's triadic semiotic theory in which a sign is linked to an object

for an interpretant. Indexical signs, for Peirce, stand for their objects by virtue of a culturally noticed, real-world contiguity. In contrast to symbols, defined by Peirce as signs that stand for their objects by virtue of a general law, indexes simply point to their objects; they signal through a co-existence between the sign and the objects and speech events of its occurrence. In these terms, shifters are partially indexical, partially symbolic. As Silverstein (1976) argued, the linguistic phenomena earlier identified as having "social meaning" (e.g. phonological variants, codeswitches) are non-referential indexes, relying for their interpretation on their contiguity (indexicality) with contextual features of the speech event in which they occur. That is how a phonological variant can signal the social relations of the speakers in an event, their relation to the topic of talk and/or the nature of the event itself. Non-referential indexes can be placed on a continuum with shifters. Indeed, the philosophical work of Putnam and Kripke showed that any act of reference necessarily has an indexical component. Referential indexes (shifters) and non-referential indexes have two further significant properties. They need some metadiscursive frame in which to be interpreted (see next section). And they can be either presupposing or creative. If presupposing, then their use signals that some aspect of the context is taken for granted as existent; if creative/entailing, then the use of the form itself brings into social relevance (into apparent 'existence') the objects or categories with which the form is culturally associated.

By linking shifters and non-referential indexes, a Peircean analysis provides a conceptual unity to social indexicals and thus to what used to be called 'social meaning,' thereby clinching the case against an autonomous grammar. It also provides conceptual materials for an alternative theory of linguistic structure. Classic empirical studies of indexicals include Errington's work on speech levels in Java; Silverstein's re-analyses of Labovian phonologoical variables and of T/V pronoun usage in the history of English; Irvine on Wolof registers; Ochs on indexicals of gender and stance in language socialization; Duranti and Agha on honorifics; and Haviland on Australian avoidance register. Brown and Levinson handled politeness phenomena, which are also of this kind, with a decidedly different approach.

The presumption that referentiality and propositionality are the pre-eminent functions of language is part of an ancient western ideology. Not as old, but still powerful is the related idea that metalanguage and poetic forms are mere ornaments to reference. Because language has so often served as a model of culture, these widespread assumptions have implications for anthropological theory. For instance,

Lévi-Strauss borrowed from structural linguistics the idea of distinctive features; ethnoscience borrowed generative grammar's idea that there are rules of competence. Interpretive anthropology borrowed from philology the notion of text. In each of these otherwise different cases, it was the referential capacity of language that served as the model for culture. Culture, like grammar, was seen as organized symbolic content that could be extracted from the real-time social action and historical positioning in which it was created. This taken-for-granted move of decontextualization reproduced the Cartesian assumption of a chasm between world and word. Accordingly, approaches in anthropology that emphasized practice, political economy and materiality were assumed to be opposed to those concerned with meaning, representation and ideation.

In contrast, a linguistic anthropology that places indexicality and speech-as-action at the center of attention provides a different synergy with sociocultural anthropology. Propositionality, however significant, is recognized as a feature peculiar to language. It is least like the rest of culture. Instead, the indexical aspects of linguistic practices, as interpreted by metadiscourses, are among the best examples of cultural meaning-making. Indexical signs are not only linguistic; they are also gestural, visual and sartorial, among other modalities. They are not 'reflections' of some other, more (or less) important reality. Rather, they are constitutive of the real-time creation of social-material reality through interaction. Peircean semiotics, with its tripartite emphasis on the **object**, as mediated by the sign and interpretant, insists on the materiality of communication, and conversely on the semiotic organization of material practices.

Context and Contextualization

Speech events were a fundamental unit of early linguistic anthropology. Studies focused on their constituent features (e.g., speaker, hearer, topic), social functions and cross-cultural typologies (e.g., Gumperz and Hymes, 1972; Bauman and Sherzer, 1974). In the last few decades, the structural description of speech events has been transformed into a more flexible concern with the 'context' of discourse and performance, bringing several important changes in the understanding of context. Good overviews of these issues are offered by Bauman and Briggs (1990), and Duranti and Goodwin (1992). The notion of 'context' as a set of social, spatial and physical features surrounding talk was commonsensical but inadequate. It implied the possibility of infinite regress in the number of features; it neglected the perspective from which context was viewed; and it assumed a firm

divide between talk and context. The problem of infinite regress arose from the effort of the analyst to list exhaustively the factors that might affect the nature and form of the talk. In order to choose which of the many features are relevant, one must address the question of perspective. Features defined from the point of view of the analyst are useless for understanding social process; it is the selective attention by participants to aspects of the social surround that analysts ought to be describing.

Conversation analysts such as Schegloff, Sacks, Jefferson, Heritage, Charles and Marjorie Goodwin took as an axiom the importance of discerning what participants orient to on a moment-by-moment basis in the local management of sequential talk. Participants need not share perspective among themselves any more than they do with the analyst. They might well have to negotiate a definition of the situation. Context then becomes a joint accomplishment. Infinite regress is avoided because it is the participants who together signal when 'enough is enough,' or defeat each others' attempts to include more (or less) of the surround. Such signaling is not necessarily propositional speech, yet is certainly communicative. Talk itself signals the frames for its own interpretation, supplying the cues for what is to be taken as its own context. There is no firm divide between a strip of talk, its co-text (linguistic context) and its sociocultural context.

It is not context, then, that is of interest, but contextualization: how participants attend to on-going discourse, conveying their assessments, evaluations, presuppositions as well as predictions about the definition of the activity that is occurring, the event-specific roles of the participants, the intentions of speakers, the direction the activity is likely to take, as well as unexpected switches in all of these. This process relies on culture-specific folk theories about social actors, intentions, events and goals, while recreating those very categories in the process of communication. These theories are not necessarily shared. What Putnam observed about the lexicon is equally apt here: in any group there is likely to be a division of linguistic labor and of the expertise it requires. In addition to local knowledge, contextualization relies on the universal metacommunicative capacity of language, and on the universal ability of speakers to attend to and respond to metamessages about the relationship of talk to its surround.

The several concepts that have been crafted for the analysis of this metacommunicative process differ in certain respects, but bear a family resemblance. Lucy (1993) provides a good review of these. Bateson proposed 'framing' to denote metamessaging that signals some activity to be play or not-play. This is common even among many non-human animal

species. Chafe and Fillmore made linguistic use of this formulation. Goffman (1979) extended it with his notion of the footing or stance taken in an interaction, and the participant roles or role fragments – such as 'author' 'animator' 'principal' of an utterance – that are thereby evoked. Philips described participant structures, and Cicourel proposed the notion of schema for related phenomena. Gumperz (1982) introduced contextualization cues to name the many kinds of linguistic signals (e.g. prosody, codeswitching) from which one infers what kind of activity is in effect. Silverstein (1993) distinguished between metasemantics, by which speakers define the meanings of words, and metapragmatics. Metapragmatic discourse is explicit commentary or evaluation of language use (e.g. that some event was gossip). Metapragmatic function, by contrast, is implicit signaling to suggest which cultural frame or activity is in effect. Bakhtin (1981) and Voloshinov proposed literary analysis of reported speech and voicing as metacommunicative devices that present the perspective of one speaker on the speech of another. Bauman (1986) showed that performance is itself reflexive: the speaker assumes responsibility for speaking well, thereby drawing attention to the code and poetic forms through which speech genres are created and thus expectations about them are signaled.

A crucial aspect of framing or voicing is the possibility that frames can be embedded in other frames; they can be transposed and projected both forward and backward in time. Furthermore, speakers create interactional tropes, treating interlocutors and events 'as though they were someone/something else,' thereby achieving novel communicative and social effects. As part of such effects, voices can be reported in quotation or in various forms of indirect discourse. Social interaction is thus an endless lamination of narrated events and the narrative events within which the stories are told. For linguistics this implies a complexity in patterns of pronouns, tense, evidentials, discourse markers and anaphora that signal such embeddings of frames. These cannot be handled without theorizing indexical phenomena. For sociocultural anthropology the embedding of frames and their interpenetration during narratives and conversation allows analysts to understand processes such as the relationality of personhood and the fragmentation of selves, as well as subject formation, role-distance, and the cultural conceptualization of what counts as authenticity. It is a small example of the reality-constructing processes involved in reported speech that the speech reported need never have happened, or not in the way reported. Yet the report – culturally framed as, say, gossip, journalism, court testimony, or oracle – can have far-reaching consequences in shaping subsequent social relations.

Framing and the propositional content of talk always occur simultaneously. Metamessages allow the analyst to track participants' interactional moves in an encounter. These moves (the interactional text) include the open-ended set of acts that can be done with words: promises, teases, threats, and the unnamed, more general alignment or antagonism among speakers. These acts are accomplished in part by small observable behaviors such as sequencing, body position, and conversational repair. But they are just as importantly accomplished by the ways in which the names for objects and actions that are the subject matter of talk are selected from the many equally accurate denotational labels available. As Schegloff (1971) pointed out for the limited case of place-names, how one formulates a label is always relative to a particular event of talk, that is, indexical. Selection of a term that picks out a referent involves a delicate (and not always conscious or aware) negotiation of social relationships, assumptions about participants' levels and types of knowledge, hence their identities and social location. In turn, the use of one rather than another referring expression is creative/performative. The difference between 'dine' 'take a repast' 'chow down' or 'put on the old nosebag' is not only a matter of lexical register. Each claims a speaker identity, positions speakers with respect to each other, with respect to the event, the referent, and to the cultural discourses indexed by the labels selected. Framing and the indexicality of reference together accomplish contextualization: the moment-by-moment means through which interaction creates and transforms social relations.

Text and Entextualization

There is an irony in the effort of linguistic anthropology to discern how participants contextualize stretches of discourse. For scholars themselves spend most of their time ripping snippets of discourse out of context in order to translate, transcribe and analyze them. The process of decontextualization is a key (reflexive) step in social science methodology. Yet the examples of transposition, reporting the speech of others, and embedded frames discussed earlier show that decontextualization is just as familiar from everyday life. It is the flip side of contextualization. This is what Bakhtin evocatively characterized as our mouths being full of other people's words. It has been a focus of analysis in linguistic anthropology for the last two decades.

Close analysis of the process requires a distinction between 'text' and 'discourse.' 'Text' is any objectified unit of discourse that is lifted from its interactional setting. 'Entextualization' is the process of transforming a stretch of discourse into such a unit of text, undoing its indexical grounding by detaching it from its co-text and surroundings, yet taking some trace of its earlier context with it to another setting which is thereby changed and which reciprocally transforms the text itself. Certain formal properties can enhance the likelihood of entextualization. For instance, poetic features of cohesion, or genre conventions can signal a boundary to an interaction, therefore a chunking of text. But any stretch of discourse can enter into interdiscursive relations by which it seems to be recalled, repeated or echoed in further discourse. It can be picked out and seemingly frozen as text, to be involved in further intertextual relations that link it to previous and subsequent versions of text. Interdiscursive and intertextual links create the impression that text fragments 'circulate' across texts, events and among speakers.

The linguistic means of entextualization are the same metadiscursive signals that are essential for contextualization: devices of framing, cueing, metapragmatic discourses and functions. For the purposes of linguistic analysis, it is necessary to study the transformations that discourse undergoes as it is entextualized and then (re)contextualized. Footing or genre might change, as might indexical grounding (as signaled by changes in deictics of person, space and time). The function of the text might also change (e.g. from everyday act to ritualized tradition). New forms, functions and meanings may be emergent in the newly re-contextualized text. And there are questions of access, power and inequality involved in the social arrangements that constrain what sorts of persons and statuses can entextualize in what institutional settings. Processes widely analyzed under other names – translation, codeswitching, glossing, among others – are amenable to further scrutiny in these terms. Furthermore, by cultural definition, some texts are more or less accessible for de- and recontextualization.

The anthropological implications of this line of work extend in at least three directions. First, such analysis can reveal how the social magic of authority – political, legal, epistemic – is created in and across interactions. The relationship between narrated event and the story-telling event in which it occurs is a delicate nexus at which to 'calibrate' voicing through the projected relations of teller to tale, to audience, to source, and to previous and subsequent events and tellings (Silverstein, 1993). Through metapragmatic framing, speakers can construe the interactive event that is recounted as being distinct from the on-going event of talk (reportative calibration), or as the same event (reflexive calibration), or as emanating from some other epistemic realm such as

the sacred, the universal, or mythic (nomic calibration). Within specific institutional settings, these calibrations create different sorts of authority: claims to knowledge, or claims to (and the social effect of) speaking as/for the people, the ancestors, the gods, or the laws of science. Contests over the metapragmatic framing of sources for statements can create (and destroy) the authority of texts and hence the power of speakers. As Silverstein and Urban (1996) note, a significant part of politics is the struggle to entextualize authoritatively. Linguistic practices, then, are the very grounds of politics, not the medium, description or reflection of them. This includes the assignment of responsibility and blame, credibility and doubt. Hill and Irvine (1993) show that across widely different cultural settings, such attributions are managed through metapragmatic devices such as reported speech and the distribution of voices across participant roles.

Second, the processes of entextualization and links among texts (intertextuality) allow a deeper understanding of temporality, spatiality and social connectedness. Despite the undeniably linear, sequential ordering of speech, there is no single 'now' in interaction. Any utterance is weighted with the earlier source from which it can be heard to have originated, and the implicit future recounting in which it might participate. The interdiscursive links among interactional contexts can be extended and projected without temporal limit (Irvine, 1996). Even within a single narration there are often layered successions of retellings which, embedded in each other, can make traditionalization visible as a temporal process. Similarly, study of intertextuality can highlight systematic relations among events in spatial extension, inviting scholars to rethink the relation of face-to-face interaction and what used to be called 'larger social structures.' This will require further theorization of the various kinds of linkages between interactions. For instance, we need to know how circulation – a shorthand term for intertextual links, echoes, repetitions – has differential 'reach' across interactions that are distinguished according to their degrees and types of instutionalization, geographical range, political economic consequentiality, form of mediation as broadcast, print, or face-to-face talk. The phenomenon of translation (linguistic, cultural) deserves considerably more attention in these terms, as it too is a form of multiply layered intertextuality.

Finally, there are methodological implications of this perspective on text. Social science research always involves reflexive language. Jakobson remarked that there could be no linguistics without metalanguage, as scholars have to ask for glosses, acceptability judgments and paraphrases. The reactivity of fieldwork

became an issue for sociocultural anthropologists of the 1980s, (just as it had for sociologists in the 1960s) when they noted that fieldwork is 'dialogic.' It is not the positivistic observation of an object by a subject but an encounter between two subjects – the informant and the anthropologist – with different relevances, values, and different sets of ultimate audiences in mind. Much of the subsequent critical commentary focused on issues of objectification in ethnographic writing. Less attention was paid to the fieldwork encounter itself as dialogic and mutually objectifying. Like any interaction, fieldwork and interview are always susceptible to the confusion of mismatched or even incommensurable metapragmatic signals among interactants that Gumperz called 'cross-talk,' and that is made worse by power differentials. This is less a problem specific to anthropological research than an insight about the nature of human interaction. As Mannheim and Tedlock (1995) have remarked, the people anthropologists study have been 'objectifying' each other well before the arrival of the fieldworker. The task is to specify what kinds of objectification and incommensurability in metacommunication are operating, and how.

Language Ideologies

Language ideologies are cultural conceptions about language, its nature, structure and use, and about the place of communicative behavior in social life. Useful definitions and exemplary studies are presented in Woolard and Schieffelin (1994) and Schieffelin *et al*. (1998). Ideas about speech and language are common in all social groups and are as culturally diverse as linguistic practices themselves. In the linguistic anthropology of the 1960s the study of language attitudes and native models of politeness, language variation, honorifics and appropriateness were grist for cross-cultural typologies and comparisons. These research themes, along with others detailed below, are unified under the rubric of language ideology.

The term 'ideology,' though polysemous, most often evokes ideas connected to politics and power. Such concerns have a long pedigree in linguistic anthropology. Boas as public intellectual brought anthropological and linguistic evidence to bear against racist science and anti-immigration policies. Overtly political concerns about inequality and race were also present in the 1960s, for instance in the debates among Bernstein, Hymes, Gumperz, Kay and Labov on the existence, value, and consequences of 'restricted codes' in working class and Black speech. Current controversies that have strong political implications include the increasingly global hegemony of English, the linguistic mediation of inequality, the future

of endangered languages, and the stigmatization of multilingualism and of certain accents and dialects. What is different today is scholars' reflexive analysis of communicative processes in their own work and in large scale politics.

Language ideologies always include metapragmatics, that is, local suppositions about the relation of speech forms to speakers' identities and their social situations. But language ideologies are never only about language. They include whatever other conceptual systems are taken to be relevant to language by the speakers and institutions under study. In the analysis of language ideology, as in the study of metapragmatics, there is a split between those approaches privileging explicit, propositional content, and others that focus on implicit ideological patterns inscribed in linguistic, institutional, ritual and other material practices. Language ideologies are never unitary and so the study of ideology commits the theorist to a perspectival approach. As Woolard has emphasized, one must ask: whose ideology is at issue and in what practices and institutions is it sited. There are likely to be contradictions among ideologies. For instance, Bateson's notion of the double bind consists of two contradictory ideological (meta) messages, delivered in different modalities simultaneously. There is also likely to be contestation among ideologies evident at different social locations. Nor are ideologies likely to be shared within social groups in a world characterized by linguistic divisions of labor. In a single population, language ideologies inscribed in the practices of schooling can conflict with or override those evident in families, friendship networks or other institutions, raising questions about the relative authority of different ideologies.

Early discussions of 'linguistic ideology' emphasized the tendency of explicit ideological statements to rationalize and thereby distort linguistic practices. Boas and Bloomfield saw speakers' models of their own speech as obstacles to genuine linguistic analysis. More recently, scholars have noted that there is no access to linguistic materials except through the filter of metalinguistic assumptions – whether these are the assumptions of speakers and/or of analysts. Current use of the term 'language ideology' considers such filters not as regrettable distortions but as part of the perspectival nature of ideologies, their necessary partialness and partiality. This includes the perspective of linguists. Language ideologies are grounded in social position and experience, in moral and political stances. But they are not an automatic reflex of these. Rather, ideology mediates between social position and linguistic practice in diverse domains. Students of language socialization (Ochs and Schieffelin, 1994) have shown that children do not simply learn linguistic skills. Rather, local ideologies mediate between talk itself and assumptions about the proper relationship between childhood, talk and forms of mothering. Similarly, in the study of literacy, Collins finds that language ideologies add their own contributions as interpretive filters, defining who can be expected to read and write in what way and for what purpose, thereby contributing to the creation of many distinct forms of literacy. The linkage between linguistic practices and categories of identity is also mediated by language ideologies. How are maleness and femaleness indexed in speech? When such indexes appear in interaction, other dimensions of social life – such as the expression of desire, sexual activity, typified emotions, rank and social position – are entailed, in part on the basis of local cultural images of masculinity and femininity (Cameron and Kulick, 2003).

By viewing language ideology as an inescapably perspectival lens on social interaction, linguistic anthropology engages in debate with neo-Marxist lineages of ideology-critique. Some studies in linguistic anthropology have marshaled evidence from language use to challenge social theorists' proposals about the workings of symbolic domination and cultural hegemony. Other work has reconsidered influential formulations about ideology by Bourdieu, Foucault, Althusser, Žižek and others to reveal their unexamined assumptions about language and semiosis. Social theorists of ideology often and unreflectively rely on implicit linguistic models that, because they seem commonsensical or self-evident, help to make their theories more persuasive. Most generally, ideologies that present themselves as concerning language can work as displacements or coded stories about political, religious or scientific systems; ideologies that seem to be about religion, political theory, human subjectivity or science are often implicit entailments of language ideologies, or the precipitates of widespread linguistic practices. The term 'displacement' can be further analyzed here as a form of voicing. However, to recast a language debate as a coded dispute about religion, aesthetics, morality or politics is not, in itself, an explanation. Rather, the goal of analysis in studies of language ideology is to show **how** such a displacement works in semiotic terms, how it is instantiated in practices, and how it legitimates, justifies or mediates action in quite other areas of social life. Conversely, a particular definition of language may itself be made more credible by its connection to other, non-linguistic, sociopolitical concerns and especially to their supporting institutions.

Ethnolinguistic nationalism provides a familiar example. Over several centuries, European philosophical and political practice did the ideological work of making the connection between the cultural

categories of 'language' and 'nation' appear a necessary, natural and self-evident one, united as much in everyday political practice as in scholarly arguments. This occurred in part through the establishment of a science of language that defined a bounded and unified object of study ('language') as a natural entity, out there to be discovered. The ideologically constructed unity of language-and-culture in a populace was seen as the ultimate source of political authority: those who spoke one language constituted a 'people' whose united voice would replace the authority of imperial rule. By this logic, any group claiming to speak the same language could use that fact as proof of its nationhood and thus justification for a state of its own. A somewhat different example of authority through language ideology is the political theory of the 'public sphere' as guarantor of democratic politics. According to European notions of a public sphere, as dissected by Habermas, the worth of a speaker's argument is judged not by speakers' social status. Ideally, democratic citizens make anonymous contributions to policy debate and to critiques of the state. It is the form and rationality of their contributions, not their identities, that is supposed to guarantee the fairness of a democratic polity. From the perspective of this theory of democracy, it is evident that a model of ideal linguistic interaction underpins the semblance of impartiality and hence the legitimacy of democratic process (Gal and Woolard, 2001).

It is not only politics that is legitimated by images of language and social life. Bauman's study of Quakers and Keane's more recent report on Christian missionizing both suggest that the relations envisioned between speakers and listeners within these religious communities implied forms of interiority and intentionality that became models for various forms of Christian belief. Other forms of belief are also underwritten by understandings about language in social life. For instance, Shapin's historical account of 17th century science shows that polite conversation among gentlemen was the model that, when transferred to gentlemanly interaction at the Royal Society, created the credibility and assumed replicability of early scientific experimentation. In these examples, linguistic ideologies underpin social institutions, providing the supposedly self-evident background that authorizes new social forms.

Language ideologies are cultural frames. As such they have their own histories, which are instantiated and circulated in specific institutions and genres of speech and writing such as the etiquette book, instruction in oratory or realist novel. Another such genre in the west is linguistic philosophy. Its analyses are supposedly universal, yet very much rooted in the history of European cultural understandings about language. While the notion of 'intentionality' of the speaker is a key term in western philosophy of language, comparative study shows this to be but one historically specific version of an interiority-centered language ideology. As Duranti and Rosaldo have shown, in many social groups outside of Europe, inferences about speakers' intentionality are not decisive or indispensable in the interpretation of speech acts. Bauman and Briggs's study of the western philosophical tradition focuses mainly on Herder and Locke, tracing the historical conditions out of which emerged the regimentation of linguistic practices that would subsequently count as examples of 'folklore' on the one hand, and 'objective speech' on the other. Another such genre is linguistics analysis itself, especially as it has intersected with colonial projects. Historical studies show how language ideologies fit into fields of debate with which they are contemporaneous, and that concern other, diverse matters: the nature of human difference and inequality, competition among scholarly disciplines, or the competence and vision of a particular monarch's ruling group.

Differentiation: Registers, Communities, Variation and Change

Speech community, linguistic repertoire, variation, register and style are among the foundational concepts of linguistic anthropology. Adopted from earlier frameworks of research, they were redefined by the work of the 1960s. In the last twenty years they have been transformed once again in light of the notions of indexicality and metapragmatics/ideology. In any social group, images linking typical persons to typical activities and typical linguistic practices draw on culturally salient and elaborated principles of differentiation (e.g. presupposed notions of caste or occupation, folk theories of gender and personhood) that are often perceived by participants as necessary and inherent distinctions. These ideological principles – axes of differentiation – mediate between social and linguistic characteristics and orient the practices and relations of interactants. Speech communities and language communities are emergent effects built out of such axes of differentiation.

Linguistic variation often appears to speakers (and to analysts) as a reflection or diagram of social differentiation. A famous example is the finding by Labov and his students that phonological variables correlate with situational style and the socioeconomic status of speakers. The analytical task is to specify the ideological – or more precisely the semiotic – processes by which these correlations arise and become significant. Why and how do particular chunks of linguistic material coalesce into

recognizable and nameable ways of speaking (registers) that gain significance as signs of particular populations, activities, settings, and are heard as appropriate to certain events. Furthermore, how is it that in any interaction, the expected correlations can be subverted or transposed, thereby signaling quite unexpected messages?

The extension of a Peircean theory of signs has been productive in approaching these issues. Linguistic features that form co-occurring clusters or registers are indexical of (point to) categories of speakers who regularly use them, or to situations and activity types in which the features regularly occur. But not all real-world co-occurrences form indexical signals. The co-occurrences must be noticed and formulated within some cultural or ideological system. To make such linkages and render them meaningful for speakers often requires extensive discursive efforts and the effects of media circulation. Another means of establishing meaningful indexicalities is through ritual and institutionalization. When both the ways of speaking and the people or activities are typified, schematized and conceptually linked, the result is a system of registers that evokes a system of stereotypes. Formulations of referents in minute-to-minute interaction rely on these associations. Registers often include not only linguistic material but also other signaling systems such as clothing, demeanor and gesture. Linguistic-forms-in-use that are thus ideologized as distinctive and implicating distinctive kinds of people can always be resignified, further ideologized (or misrecognized) as emblematic of other social, political, or moral characteristics in what Silverstein has dubbed multiple orders of indexicality.

Another of Peirce's sign relations – iconicity – is key in differentiation, according to Irvine and Gal (2000). Peirce distinguished between indexes that point to their objects and icons that share the qualities of their objects, for some interpretant (e.g. a theory or ideology). In sociolinguistic differentiation, there is always a *set* of contrasting indexes pointing to contrasting objects in a relation that Peirce would call diagrammatic iconicity. Furthermore, the indexical links between linguistic signs and speakers, characteristics or events are understood not simply as a cooccurence but a sharing of quality. When an index is thus perceived as an icon, the resulting sign is a Peircean 'rheme.' Essentialization is in part constructed semiotically, through the perception that the sign and the object are iconically linked. A system of such contrasts, salient at one level or scale can be projected, in a fractally recursive manner, onto other scales of social and linguistic relation, either broader or narrower. This allows for the proliferation of the same or similar difference at greater and smaller scales. Social or linguistic aspects of the sociolinguistic scene that do not fit such systems of stereotypes are semiotically erased. That is, they are ignored, backgrounded and sometimes physically eliminated.

When a system of such indexical signals is the basis of social interaction, then participants can have fairly strong expectations about communication. Even if the participants do not share what is usually called a single language, they recognize the kinds of speech that signals different sorts of people and activities, and a speech community can be said to exist. Note the similarity to the Prague School's notion of *Sprechbund*. Since precolonial times, networks of exchange, commerce, travel and exploration have been creating speech communities that are diverse in social function, stability and extent. It is important to make an analytical distinction. Speech communities consist of people who can interpret each others pragmatic, indexical signals to varying degrees. Language communities are groups of people bearing loyalty to norms of denotational system. Usually the denotational form receives a name – English, Swahili, Taiap – and is imagined as bounded and separate from other comparable units. Language communities emerge as cultural system in the context of heterogeneous speech communities when difference in denotational practice is ideologized as significant. Thus contact and interaction – not isolation – produce distinct language communities.

Language communities, although always characterized by loyalty to code, are nevertheless culturally distinct. Sometimes a single person's speech is recognized as exemplary and aesthetically pleasing. In other cases the form of speech used in a certain setting or event (kiva, longhouse, oratory) is considered the model worthy of emulation. More common in the world today is the language community that is linked to a state system and oriented not to beauty but to standardized forms of correctness, monitored by language academies, school systems and grammar books. Named languages do not simply exist in the world. Through institutions they are constantly being made and reconstructed, their boundaries policed and defended. In the process of consolidation, standard languages often become gate-keeping devices in national labor markets, providing speakers who control them with increased access to jobs and other resources (Bourdieu, 1981). But the value of standard languages does not derive from such direct market activity; rather their market value depends on semiotic processes of differentiation.

Speakers who are incorporated into colonial empires through bureaucracy, trade, or conquest, but do not speak the language of the state, come to see their own linguistic practices through the eyes of

the powerful center. Therefore, they come to see themselves relationally, as peripheral. For such populations, the switch in perspective produces novel self-understandings as 'minority' 'local' or 'indigenous.' In states organized as democratic and multicultural, legitimating one's indigeneity or minority standing requires at least partial adoption of the state's standardizing ideology. Whatever their own ideologies about linguistic practice, such populations must often produce a denotational code different enough from others to count as a 'language' of their own. For many decades, such 'local' languages were the special province of anthropological linguists, whose descriptions deliberately erased – as inauthentic – the contact languages and multilingualism that tied indigenous speakers to their neighbors and colonial rulers. Part of the problem is that Euro-American linguists' notion of language as morpho-syntax-with-sound pattern is often at odds with local definitions that focus on lexical co-locations, place names, prosodical features and textual organization. These differences acquire increased significance when indigenous languages are considered endangered. The question of what merits documentation becomes a highly consequential matter, argued by scholars, by courts, and among members of the language community. As Hill and others have shown, whatever counts as linguistic knowledge in indigenous communities often endows its owner with authority and access to local resources. The position of Euro-American linguists as experts and arbiters in these matters is rife with moral contradictions that have been a focus of professional writing in recent years.

The exploration of metapragmatics and language ideology has produced new approaches to language change. Change is often the unintended consequence of people attending to linguistic structures through the prism of their own language ideologies, limited as these are by cognitive contraints on awareness and sociopolitical framings of what is significant. Increasing linguistic differentiation occurs through patterns of schismogenesis among interacting speakers, or conversely through simultaneous use of genetically different denotational codes in codeswitching (Heller, 1988). Codeswitching itself become the focus of loyalty, thereby producing a new language community. Other processes of differentiation result in language obsolescence, or contrariwise in language revival and the creation of 'heritage' languages for diasporic populations (Dorian, 1989). Also common is the commodification of language or linguistic practice for touristic purposes and the concomitant 'ethnicization' of local denotational codes when they co-exist with a standardized state language. In this process there are often structural changes in the local language that mark it as iconic of the group with which it is identified. Ideologies of 'modernity/ tradition' 'male/female,' 'purity/dirt,' and presuppositions about typified emotional states, notions of self, and quite local political issues, all can mediate between the socioeconomic situations of speakers and the forms of language change they experience (Gal and Irvine, 1995). Ideological framings of difference penetrate significantly into grammar.

A semiotic analysis of differentiation has implications for the study of processes beyond linguistic practices. The tendency for nationalisms to recursively evoke internal divisions of the populace into foreign-natives vs. native-natives is well explained by the semiotics of differentiation. In colonial and imperial circumstances, details of cultural practices have been interpreted as evidence of the relative 'humanness' of conquered populations in contrast to conquerors. Projections of this kind are not presupposing indexes of existing features, but creative (performative) acts that bring into interactional relevance the very iconic similarities they seem to be merely describing. In yet another form of differentiation, speakers adopt the Goffmanian 'figures' of others. That is, they take on, for varying periods of time, the registers, objects and activities seen as iconic of others in acts of Bakhtinian mimicry, quotation, parody and/or admiring emulation. By attending to the semiotics of differentiation linguists study the dynamics of heteroglossic social orders.

Language and Thought

Whether and how grammatical categories influence habitual thought and 'perceptions of reality' are among the oldest concerns of anthropological linguistics/linguistic anthropology. They were first raised for European science by colonial exploration and contact with languages whose grammatical structures seemed exotic in relation to the patterns familiar from study of geographically more proximate populations. In one way or another such differences worried Boas, Sapir, and Whorf, and well before them inspired Humboldt, Herder and Condillac. The issue has continued to draw scholarly interest throughout the 20th century.

If one were to consider the social power to be gained from the ability to define social 'reality' – as in Gramsci's cultural hegemony, Foucault's discourse, Bourdieu's doxa – then this set of questions would parallel those raised in the rest of linguistic anthropology. Characteristically, however, studies of linguistic relativity have taken a narrower view of linguistic practices, and have considered neither power nor a socially located and mediating ideology. Positing a more direct relation between language and thought, they have studied psychological and cognitive process-

es in themselves. There is currently a reversal in this trend, however, bringing studies of linguistic relativity closer to the issues of identity formation, politics, conflict and social differentiation that characterize the rest of linguistic anthropology. Recent work suggests that issues of translation, register and interaction will become as important in studies of linguistic relativity as they are increasingly becoming in other areas of linguistic anthropology. Two reviews provide excellent guides to the state of research and its disputed history: Hill and Mannheim (1992) and Gumperz and Levinson (1996). It will suffice here to note some areas of consensus among scholars, before taking up three contested issues to give a sense of the debates and the way terms such as language and thought have been redefined.

These matters are agreed: First, linguistic relativity (or the so-called Sapir-Whorf hypothesis) is not a hypothesis to be 'tested' but an axiom or starting point for research. Grammatical categories, to the extent that they are obligatory or habitual and relatively inaccessible to speakers' consciousness form a privileged location for reproducing cultural and social categories because they constrain the ontology taken for granted by speakers. There is no assumption about the coherence of entire 'world views' in this as in any other corners of anthropology. Second, although evidence of universals in human cognition has been thought to undermine a search for language-specific cognitive phenomena, all researchers acknowledge both. The interesting questions concern the relative strength, nature, sequence and role of universals vs. cultural-linguistic specificities and what those specificities might be. Third, it follows that Whorfian effects exist. This is hardly surprising given the discussions above about creative indexicality and projections. Finally, research priorities have shifted during the 20th century. Due in part to the Chomskyan 'rationalist' program in linguistics, the cognitive turn in psychology, and the empirical results of Berlin and Kay's (1969) research on color terminology, universals took center stage in the 1970s. Currently, there is a renewed interest in Whorfian effects from a number of different perspectives.

Turning now to contested issues, the first concerns the category 'grammar.' Whorf proposed that languages differ in the grammatical **analogies** they make. By handling substantively different lexicon within the same grammatical frame, they invite speakers to treat the otherwise different items in a similar way. Thus, English treats days, years and months not as cyclical events but with the same grammatical devices as ordinary object nouns. English speakers expect – by unconscious analogy – to count time in the same way as they count tables. They ask about the substance out of which days are made, on the analogy of wood as the substance out of which tables are made. Hence the objectification of time as a substance. Such analogies are unquestioned background assumptions. They become apparent to analysts if one analogy system is compared to another that provides different hidden parallels. Careful methodology is fundamental here: when two systems are compared, neither can be taken as the standard or metalanguage for the other.

Some theorists suggest that the privileging of morphosyntax and its effect on semantic categories is misplaced, in a world of multilingualism. Friedrich proposed instead that the tropic or 'poetic' aspects of language, inflected by ethnopoetics, will differ most across cultures. (This echoes cognitive linguists' claims that habitual metaphors structure thought.) Similarly, if the poetic form of narration changes during language shift, there is a loss of a distinct cultural pattern for organizing experience. Others counter that narrative organization signals merely a difference in the way that experience is packaged for the purpose of talk, and is not necessarily reflective of cognition. This formulation runs into trouble, however, if people must use obligatory linguistic categories to encode experience in order to plan for future recountings.

A second set of arguments starts from experimental or cognitive psychology and the presumptive priority of universal cognitive processes. For some, linguistic relativity is not an issue because they assume language and cognition to be isomorphic, with thought as 'inner speech.' Linguistic relativity is also irrelevant for domains assumed to be unmediated by language: physical, musical or craft skills that are thought to be coded in somatic schema. Theories about universals of thought derive also from the Kantian tradition that takes categories of time, space and cause as the fundamental grounds of human reasoning. For many domains, there are also likely to be universal constraints imposed by the nature of the domain itself, and the specialized anatomical and neurophysiological adaptations of humans to a concrete world: wavelength for color; gravity in the case of space. Even in the realm of language there might be universals of structure or lexical organization. What does linguistic specificity add to such universals? Levinson suggests that in the case of space and possibly many other domains, linguistic relativity is still powerfully involved. Universals substantially *underdetermine* the possibilities of conceptual solutions to describing spatial arrangements.

A third controversy takes up Hymes's early suggestion that there is a linguistic relativity of language use as much as of linguistic structure. Populations differ in the genres and events they recognize. Interpretations that participants derive from utterances are always dependent on sociocultural context. Thus, the fit between language and thought is mediated by habitual practice; social interaction

and cultural beliefs (ideologies) about the everyday world. For instance, deictics of space are found in all languages. Nevertheless, as Hanks (1996) argues, they encode culturally specific information, and they map social and experiential fields, not objective spaces. Thus, cultural schema of several kinds mediate between the use of a deictic term and its proper interpretation. Furthermore, these frames and schema are not always equally available to all speakers in a community. A linguistic division of labor is often evident, as is the consequent necessity to negotiate meanings between interactants. Clearly, this brings to the study of linguistic relativity questions of indexicality, entextualization and ideology. For the study of linguistic relativity the implications are significant: There might be as much variation between speakers in their access to alternate perspectives and theories as there is across 'cultures.' Furthermore, distinguishing between 'language' 'culture' and 'thought' is at best a rough methodological tactic. The object of investigation for linguistic anthropology, in current practice, is exactly 'culture' as a process that is simultaneously semiotic, interactional and linguistic.

See also: Indexicality: Theory; Interactional Sociolinguistics; Jakobson, Roman; Linguistic Decolonialization; Metapragmatics; Power and Pragmatics.

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Linguistic Decolonialization

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Linguistic decolonization describes both the actions taken in postcolonial contexts to undo the social, political, and cultural effects of the dominance of colonial languages and a philosophical challenge to the Western language ideologies that underpinned the colonial project and that have persisted in the postcolonial period. A wide view of 'colonization' includes not only the classic cases of Western expansionism but also 'internal colonialism' involving indigenous and minority populations within the nation-state (*see* **Minorities and Language**). We can speak of linguistic decolonization in a multitude of contexts, ranging from new state formation in Africa and Asia and the former republics of the Soviet Union to indigenous language planning in the Pacific, North and South America, to minority language movements in Western Europe. Given this vast scope, no pretense will be made here to cover all possible contexts and the vast literature in language planning and postcolonial studies; rather the aim is to outline some of the common features and challenges of documented processes of linguistic decolonization and what they have to say about language ideologies and policies in general (*see* **Linguistic Rights**).

Linguistic decolonization always takes place within a nationalist project: either as an element of new nation-building, or as an effort to legitimate languages and identities that were unrecognized or actively suppressed under colonialism. Linguistic decolonization projects have thus been preoccupied with redressing linguistic inequality and cultural oppression in the public sphere, particularly in education and in official/governmental life, by replacing all or part of the colonial language's public functions with one or more local, indigenous, or minority languages.

Projects of linguistic decolonization are thus profoundly shaped by dominant ideologies of language and nationalist ideologies about how language is related to cultural and political identities. These ideologies include the central premises that languages are 'natural' and clearly bounded entities that map onto equally natural human boundaries; that there is an essential or primordial link between a single language (conceived of as the 'mother tongue') and a single/unitary identity (either personal or collective).

A combination of social, ideological, and pragmatic issues complicate the process of linguistic decolonization and its goals of democratization and cultural legitimation for previously colonized groups. On the practical level, in postcolonial contexts it is rare that linguistic decolonizers have access to all the material and political resources needed to replace the status and functions of the colonial language in all domains. It is also the case that both local and global political economies of language are resistant to challenges to those powerful, former colonial languages. This is because those languages often still constitute social and political capital at the local level, where they can be used by local elites to legitimate their social positions.

Second, those languages (particularly English) have currency in new, global markets, motivating postcolonial social actors to embrace dominant language education in search of economic mobility despite the cultural value of schooling in the minority or indigenous language.

It is also the case that when minority or indigenous languages are 'developed' in the image of the colonial languages they replace, language planning efforts (normalization, officialization, standardization, codification) have the potential to create new forms of linguistic hierarchy. First of all, language planning policies may favor particular languages or dialects and thus their speakers. In some cases, those hierarchies are accepted by the population, to the benefit of particular speakers. In other cases, this political dimension of language policy ends up creating a permanent crisis of legitimacy that prevents postcolonial language planners from reaching any consensus. More generally, the introduction of minority or indigenous languages in the spheres of literacy and education inevitably creates a divide between 'good/pure' and 'bad/mixed' codes and validates new forms of expert linguistic knowledge owned by a minority.

With respect to linguistic purism in postcolonial contexts, two points can be made. First, it is an outcome of dominant ideologies of authoritative language (*see* **Power and Pragmatics**). Second, as a result of contact with the dominant language, both the form and use of the dominated language are inevitably 'mixed' and therefore stigmatized, once 'high' forms of that language are introduced. The issue of linguistic purism highlights the difficulty of resisting or challenging the single language/single identity premise of the nationalist project. At the political level, agents of linguistic decolonization are often forced to legitimate noncolonial languages in dominant terms because those terms are imposed by powerful gatekeepers. In addition, there is the question of the 'colonized mentality': the fact that the validity of dominant ideologies of language, including the denigration of nondominant languages, has often been internalized

by the general population. Postcolonial linguistic agents are often faced with a double-bind: if they use the colonial language, they are seen as traitors to their cultural/ethnic group; if they use the dominated language, their voice has a more limited power and reach (*see* **Pragmatics: Linguistic Imperialism**).

Truly radical linguistic decolonization projects would thus have to challenge the fundamental premises of dominant linguistic and cultural ideologies and practices. These radical forms of resistance involve the legitimation of plural or hybrid linguistic forms, practices, and identities, including the appropriation and reworking of colonial languages. This kind of linguistic decolonization is rare in the public sphere, although it can be seen in some indigenous education projects and is more noticeable in domains of artistic, creative linguistic practice.

See also: Minorities and Language; Power and Pragmatics; Pragmatics: Linguistic Imperialism.

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Linguistic Habitus

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Pierre Bourdieu's (1981) concept of habitus denotes a modality, which enables the individual to act routinely as well as creatively and innovatively.

Central to Bourdieu's theory is the attempt to describe the dynamic relationships between the structural conditions of an individual existence, the individual's activities as a product of socialization under these conditions and the open-ended yet strictly limited capacity of the individual for action. In the process of socialization (*see* **Socialization**), a system of permanent dispositions is created in the individual, including sensitivity as one prerequisite for

personal development. This system of dispositions and sensitivity is a necessary precondition for successful social activity.

Bourdieu emphasizes a circularity between 'structure,' 'habitus,' and 'practice.' Habitus functions as an awareness-matrix, an action-matrix, and a thought-matrix for the individual; however, it does not alone determine behavior. A habitus is acquired under a certain set of social conditions, which Bourdieu calls 'objective structures.' To these belong the existential requirements, which characterize and define a social class. A habitus therefore is generated and regenerated by the specific objective structures of a class, and at the same time define and redefine, generate and regenerate the lifestyle and practice of its members. Bourdieu describes this circularity as follows: habitus function as "structured structures, which are suitable to function and work as structuring structures" (Bourdieu, 1979: 167). Implicit in a habitus is a tendency toward self-stabilization – despite the fact that socialization is not completed until death. New experiences are integrated in a habitus that leads to its constantly changing form while remaining relatively stable.

The term 'linguistic habitus' thus refers to the set of dispositions in the field of language: to a person's notion of linguistic 'normality' and of 'good' language, to a society's notion of 'proper' ways of language behavior, of 'legitimate' language variations and practice. The term does not describe language as a means of communication in a narrow sense, but refers primarily to the symbolic relations and signs by which language becomes a medium of power. Gogolin (1994) defines the monolingual habitus, which is common to the classical European nation states as an example of a linguistic habitus. In the process of their foundation in the 18th and 19th century, the basic and deep-seated belief was created that monolingualism is the universal norm for an individual and for a society (cf. Hobsbawm, 1990). This idea was disseminated and traditionalized by institutions of the nation-state: jurisprudence, military forces, political, and administrative bodies. Probably most influential for the creation and dissemination of these fundamental elements of the concept of nation-state were the modern state school systems, which were established simultaneously to the foundation of the nation-state as such. Linguistic homogenization was the main motive for the development of public education systems. The establishment of one national language and of a monolingual national society was (and often still is) seen as essential for the success of the nation-state, especially at the economic level.

In reality, hardly any nation in the world ever had a monolingual population. In most countries – especially in the Australasian, Asian, and African world, but also in Europe – people speak more than one, often many languages (*see* **Bilingualism**). Despite this reality, the deep-seated belief in monolingualism as natural in a society governs individual and public opinions towards language and language practice. In the cases of European nation-states, this preference becomes obvious in connection with immigration. Roughly one-third of the people under the age of 35 years in the member states of the European Unity are migrants, speaking other languages than the national language(s) of the respective state (*see* **Migration and Language**). For example, in the year 2000, more than 350 languages were spoken by children in London schools. Nevertheless, the European state school systems act as if they had monolingual populations. The teaching is centered on the 'legitimate' language of the state or the area, that is to say the national language or the official language of the region. The other languages are rarely taught at schools; children stay illiterate in their second or third language they live in. Consequently, they are unable to develop their other languages towards the most elaborated state (*see* **Bilingual Education**). By these mechanisms, the hierarchy and power relations between languages become stabilized. Those who have no or less access to the legitimate language are at risk of being excluded from participation and equal success in a society.

The linguistic habitus is the governing mechanism of these processes. The notion of linguistic normality was traditionalized in history, despite multilingualism. There is no collective remembrance of these historical events; the fact that this notion once was created and implemented explicitly has disappeared from collective memory. According to Bourdieu's theory, a habitus functions the better, the less conscious its owner is about it.

A variation of the monolingual habitus seems to be at work in multilingual nation-states as well, due to the fact that there is usually one selected language of power. This choice may not be a national language. In colonial or postcolonial situations especially, the language of power very often is not a national language, which by constitution has legitimate status. Instead, it is the language, which guarantees survival and success in the linguistic market – mainly the language of the former colonists. Whereas in Europe, the standard national languages are usually considered the legitimate variant, in colonial situations symbolic power is linked to the languages of the former oppressors (cf. Goke-Pariola, 1993). The linguistic

habitus ensures the relative stability of these situations, and thus contributes to the durability of societies of marked disparities in power between different social groups.

See also: Bilingualism; Bilingual Education; Migration and Language; Socialization.

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Linguistic Rights

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Central Concepts

All the rights that individuals, groups, organizations, and states have in relation to languages (their own or others) are linguistic rights or language rights (LRs). Languages may similarly have rights. Strictly speaking, only binding rights (coded in laws or regulations of various kinds) count. In most cases, these also include a duty-holder who has to see to it that the rights can be enjoyed. A state or a regional authority can, for instance, have the duty to organize education through the medium of a certain language for certain individuals or groups in a specific place. In addition to rights proper, there are many nonbinding recommendations, declarations, and other nice intentions and wishes about LRs.

An individual in a specific country may have the right to use her or his mother tongue in various contexts, for instance in dealing with authorities, local, regional, or state-wide, orally or in writing or both; the authorities do not necessarily need to reply in the same language. The mother tongue is often for legal purposes defined in a strict way, as the first language that a person learned, and still speaks, and with which s/he identifies. A definition often used in situations where forced assimilation of indigenous peoples has made the older generation speak the dominant language to their children, is sometimes much less strict: a mother tongue, with LRs connected to it, is defined as a language which is, or has been, the first language of the individual her-/himself, or of (one of) the parents or grandparents.

Often, it depends on how many individuals there are in a country (area, region, municipality, etc.) whether individuals (speakers or signers) belonging to that group have any LRs; the group has to have a certain size. Two of the most important European LRs documents, from the Council of Europe, use group size as a criterion, but do not in any way define it: The European Charter on Regional or Minority Languages, and the Framework Convention on the Protection of National Minorities, both in force since 1998, use formulations such as "*in substantial numbers*" or "*pupils who so wish in a number considered sufficient*" or "*if the number of users of a regional or minority language justifies it.*" (See the latest news about these documents and their ratifications at the Council of Europe. The treaty numbers are 148 and 158).

If an individual can use the right to all mother tongue medium services anywhere in her or his country, we speak of a principle of personality. Usually, only members of large groups with excellent protection have this kind of right, which in most cases is restricted to the dominant language speakers in a country. Often, such speakers are not even aware of how precious these rights are, and how unusual it is to possess such rights for any of the world's linguistic minorities (or even some linguistic majorities: e.g., in several African countries, the old colonial languages still have more rights than the indigenous African languages have). If LRs are connected to a specific region, such as is the case in Switzerland, where German-speakers can use their language in official contexts only in certain cantons, while French, Italian, or Romansch-speakers can use their

respective languages only in certain other cantons (where German speakers do not have the right to use German), we speak of a principle of territoriality. That means in practice that if Italian-speaking Swiss parents want their children to be educated through the medium of Italian, they have to live in the only canton (Tessin) where this is a right.

Many international organizations and most states have language policies that spell out the official languages of the organization or state and, by implication, the LRs of the people, groups, and states dealing with, and working within, that entity. The United Nations has six official languages, the Council of Europe only two (English and French). The European Union has several times increased the number of its official languages, such that after its latest expansion, in May 2004, the Union now has 20 official languages; all official documents have to be made available in all of them. Many organizations also have working languages; their number may be more restricted. A number of states have only one official (or state) language; most have two or more (English is *an* official language in more than 70 states; see Skutnabb-Kangas, 2000). South Africa has 11 official languages, India 22. In addition, many states specify one or several national, additional, link, or national heritage languages in their constitutions; in most cases, these have fewer rights than the official languages have (see de Varennes, 1996).

Linguistic Human Rights (LHRs)

The very recent and still somewhat unclear concept of Linguistic Human Rights (LHRs) combines language rights (LRs) with human rights (HRs). LHRs are those (and only those) LRs which, first, are necessary to satisfy people's basic needs (including the need to live a dignified life), and which, second, therefore are so basic, so fundamental that no state (or individual or group) is supposed to violate them. Some basic rights prohibit discrimination on the basis of language (negative rights); others ensure equal treatment to language groups (positive rights). There are many LRs which are not LHRs. It would, for instance, be nice if everybody could, even in civil court cases, have a judge and witnesses who speak (or sign) this person's language, regardless of how few users the language has. Today, it is mostly in criminal cases only that one has a linguistic HUMAN right to be informed of the charge against oneself in a language one understands (i.e., not necessarily the mother tongue); in all other contexts, people may or may not have a LANGUAGE right, depending on the country and language; in the best cases, interpreters paid for by the state are used. Likewise, it would be nice if the following demands were to be met:

> All language communities are entitled to have at their disposal all the human and material resources necessary to ensure that their language is present to the extent they desire at all levels of education within their territory: properly trained teachers, appropriate teaching methods, textbooks, finance, buildings and equipment, traditional and innovative technology.

But such demands are completely unrealistic and cannot be considered part of LHRs. (They come from Article 25 of the 1996 Draft Universal Declaration of Linguistic Rights.) At this moment, only a few dozen language communities in the world have these kinds of rights; this has to be seen against the background of the fact that there are some 6500 to 7000 spoken languages (and perhaps an equal number of sign languages) in the world (see Ethnologue; see Skutnabb-Kangas, 2000, Chapter 1, for the unreliability of the statistics).

Two kinds of interest in LHRs can be distinguished. One is "the expressive interest in language as a marker of identity," the other an "instrumental interest in language as a means of communication" (Rubio-Marín, 2003: 56). The expressive (or noninstrumental) language rights "aim at ensuring a person's capacity to enjoy a secure linguistic environment in her/his mother tongue and a linguistic group's fair chance of cultural self-reproduction" (Rubio-Marín, 2003: 56). It is only these rights that Rubio-Marín calls "language rights in a strict sense" (Rubio-Marín, 2003: 56); in other words, these could be seen as LHRs. The instrumental language rights "aim at ensuring that language is not an obstacle to the effective enjoyment of rights with a linguistic dimension, to the meaningful participation in public institutions and democratic process, and to the enjoyment of social and economic opportunities that require linguistic skills" (Rubio-Marín, 2003: 56). So far, it is not at all clear what should and what should not be considered LHRs, witness the lively ongoing debates about the topic.

Language is one of the four most important human characteristics (among many others that are also listed in human rights instruments) on the basis of which discrimination is never allowed (the others are gender, 'race,' and religion). Still, language often disappears in the educational paragraphs of binding HRs instruments. One example: the paragraph on education (§ 26) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) does not refer to language at all. Educational linguistic human rights, especially the right to mother tongue medium education, are among the most important rights for any minority. Without them, a minority whose children attend school, usually cannot reproduce itself as a minority: it cannot integrate with the majority, but is forced to assimilate to it.

Binding educational clauses of human rights instruments have more opt-outs, modifications, alternatives, etc., than other Articles of such instruments have. One example is the UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities in 1992 (emphases added: '*obligating*' and positive measures in *italics*, '**opt-outs**' in **bold**):

A. States *shall protect* the existence and the national or ethnic, cultural, religious, and linguistic identity of minorities within their respective territories, and *shall encourage* conditions for the *promotion* of that identity.

B. States *shall adopt* **appropriate** legislative *and other* measures *to achieve those ends.*
. . .

4.3. States **should** take **appropriate** measures so that, **wherever possible**, persons belonging to minorities have **adequate** opportunities to learn their mother tongue **or** to have instruction in their mother tongue.

The Council of Europe's *Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities* and *The European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages*, both in force since 1998, also have many of these modifications, alternatives, and opt-outs. The Framework Convention's education Article reads as follows (emphasis added):

In areas inhabited by persons belonging to national minorities traditionally or in substantial numbers, **if there is sufficient demand**, the parties shall **endeavor** to ensure, **as far as possible** and **within the framework of their education systems**, that persons belonging to those minorities have **adequate** opportunities for being taught in the minority language **or** for receiving instruction in this language.

The opt-outs and alternatives ('claw-backs') in the *Charter* and the *Convention* permit reluctant states to meet the requirements in a minimalist way, something they can legitimize by claiming that a provision was not 'possible' or 'appropriate,' or that numbers were not 'sufficient' or did not 'justify' a provision, or that it 'allowed' the minority to organize teaching of their language as a subject, but at their own cost.

Without binding educational linguistic human rights, most minorities have to accept 'subtractive' education through the medium of a dominant/majority language. In subtractive language learning, a new (dominant/majority) language is learned at the cost of the mother tongue, which is displaced, leading to diglossia and often to the replacement of the mother tongue. Diglossia means a situation with functional differentiation of languages, e.g., one at home and in the neighborhood, another for use at school and with authorities.

Assimilationist, subtractive education of indigenous and minority children is genocidal; it fits two of the five definitions of genocide in the *UN International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide* (E793, 1948):

Article II(e): "forcibly transferring children of the group to another group," and

Article II(b): "*causing serious bodily or **mental** harm to members of the group*"(emphasis added; see Skutnabb-Kangas, 2000 for details).

The human rights system should protect people in the globalization process, rather than give market forces free range. Human rights, especially economic and social rights, are, according to human rights lawyer Katarina Tomasevski (1996: 104), supposed to act as *correctives to the free market*. She claims that "The purpose of international human rights law is . . . to overrule the law of supply and demand and remove pricetags from people and from necessities for their survival." These necessities for survival thus include not only basic food and housing (which would come under economic and social rights), but also basics for the sustenance of a dignified life, including basic civil, political, *and cultural* rights. It should, therefore, be in accordance with the spirit of human rights to grant people full linguistic human rights.

See also: Endangered Languages; Intercultural Pragmatics and Communication; Linguistic Decolonialization; Pragmatics: Linguistic Imperialism; Social Aspects of Pragmatics.

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Literacy Practices in Sociocultural Perspective

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Introduction

This article discusses some of the things meant or intended when researchers refer to 'literacy practices.' One meaning is that the researchers will treat literacy as an event in which the (arti)facts of inscription cannot be separated from persons, settings, and other communicative modalities. In addition to this descriptive aim, the term also usually signifies a theoretical ambition. Across multiple disciplines of social inquiry, reflecting the legacy of thinkers such as Sahlins, Williams, Foucault, Giddens, and Bourdieu, the term 'practice' has come to signify a range of theories and frameworks that grapple with the interplay of structure and construction, history and agency (Ortner, 1984). Although a literacy event may be as personal and fleeting as jotting down a list or glancing at an advertisement, literacy understood as the making or interpreting of inscriptions has a history of many millennia, and is closely associated with long-term and large-scale enterprises, such as cities and states, armies and schools, extensive markets and world religions. Relating the personal to the large-scale, the fleeting to the enduring, subject to structure, is thus a challenge confronting the study of literacy practices.

The term 'New Literacy Studies' (NLS) denotes a broad framework, drawing together various critical approaches within the field of literacy studies, consciously built upon the notion of literacy as a **practice**, rather than, say, a psychological skill or abstract social property. Within the NLS framework, literacy practices have been explicitly discussed as entailing a twofold research intention: (a) to build upon the notion of literacy as a communicative event, itself derived from the anthropological ethnographies of communication paradigm, but also (b) to push analysis beyond events to the ideological framing and institutional contextualizing that gives particular events their broader significance (Street, 1993). In this effort, NLS work has drawn particular inspiration from the ground-breaking research of Shirley Heath on literacy events, and it has used the anthropological notion of 'cultural model' to explore relations between consciousness and institutions. It has also, however, been informed by European and English traditions of critical discourse analysis, which call for the study of language as a social practice, an approach to language/society informed by Marxian analyses of ideology and hegemony and Foucault's arguments about discourse, knowledge, and power (Rogers, 2003).

In what follows, I first discuss work in the latter 'New Literacies' (NLS) framework, then indicate amplifications and framings suggested by sociocultural perspectives drawn from anthropology and linguistic anthropology (LA), arguing that the differing approaches only partly overlap. The article concludes by addressing contemporary literacy problems in the US and the complementary strengths and weaknesses of the two approaches (NLS and LA) in thinking about those problems as well as in providing frameworks for more general understandings of the phenomena of literacy and practice. It goes without saying, an article of this scope will unavoidably be schematic, citing only directly relevant work, leaving much that is worthwhile unmentioned and treating as settled much that deserves further argument.

Literacy Practices in the New Literacy Studies

As noted above, within the NLS approach, priority is given to studying literacy events, the situated doings that involve acts of reading, writing, or both. Highly influential early work was that of Heath (1983), who showed that in home, school, workplace, or church, what was a issue was not a binary contrast between literacy and orality, but rather the socially situated and culturally mediated events – whether reading a bedtime story or reading the mail, filling in a job application or composing a prayer for a church service. Participating in such events, people not only decoded or encoded text but were socialized into and enacted particular views of what reading or writing might be, who took what roles in such events, and how they were part of larger-purpose endeavors: bringing up children, going to school, getting and keeping a job, expressing faith. In calling attention to the fact that acts of inscription and interpretation were part of a more general communicative economy, Heath's studies were part of a more general inquiry, also undertaken by historians and literary scholars, into the relations between orality and literacy (see Gee, 1996, for one review).

With the breaching of boundaries between written text and spoken event, the question of context is sharply raised, or in a more specific analytic idiom, the issue of indexicality is posed. Shuman (1986), in an in-depth study of working-class girls' "fight stories," emphasized that the right or authority to provide an account (that is, to be or not be talking

behind someone's back, itself grounds for an altercation) depended on particularities of relationship and situation, not on the communicative modality of speaking or writing *per se*. Drawing upon work by Garfinkel and Sacks, she noted that "all utterances are indexical ... [that is,] all utterances have multiple possible meanings and any particular meaning is **an understanding of context** (Shuman, 1986: 119, emphasis added)." Arguing that the principle of indexicality extended to inscribed utterances, she argued that "The recognition of indexicality admits the possibility of multiple interpretations of text (Shuman, 1986: 120)." The theoretical recognition of indexicality, and the practical possibility of multiple interpretations of text, means that there can in principle be no strict line between text, context, and interpretation. The point is not simply that multiple interpretations are possible, which is true but uninteresting in itself. Rather, it is that which interpretations gain authority is a matter of social dynamics, involving actors and institution-based understandings, as well as inscriptions.

The second aspect of the NLS understanding of literacy practices is that practices necessarily involve a cognitive-ideological dimension – of cultural models and implicit theories regarding what counts as reading or writing. One of the more systematic treatments of literacy models, Bialostok (2002), analyzes interviews with a set of middle-class parents, arguing for a "white middle class model of reading," in which the reading of prose (fiction or non-fiction) in books is given near-exclusionary status. In Bialostok's analysis, the statements that interviewees make, such as "Reading is part of me" or "I can easily gorge down a novel a day," are expressions of metaphors which **indirectly index** a cultural model in which reading is a proxy for morality (Bialostok, 2002: 351). In this model, reading is recurrently talked about as a moral act of worthy consumption, and a series of interesting metaphors are attached to this textual consumption. Book reading is sustenance, it fills readers up; indeed, they can 'devour' or even 'binge' on books. Reading books is a fitting part of the good person: "Books fit in with my life," says one respondent; "Reading is something that's just part of me," says another (Bialostok, 2002: 356). The person who doesn't read (books) is often characterized as "missing a lot of things" (Bialostok, 2002: 357). Book reading produces economic well-being: "Books have enriched our children's lives" says one respondent. But its lack points to poverty: "It's just so sad when a child doesn't have any books or isn't read to. They have such impoverished lives," says another interviewee (Bialostok, 2002: 359). As Bialostok argues, this is not just a matter of variation in culturally specific

conception of reading, coherent and articulated through interlocking images, and anchored in the institution of the middle class family. It is also that this is the model or theory of reading promoted by the child-rearing professions of the contemporary US and, in particular, the school. It is a model that recognizes and gives legitimacy to certain class-associated literacy practices, while ignoring or derogating acts rooted in other systems of value (see also Heath (1983)).

An important point about positing what we might call an ideological level of models and implicit theories that are part of literacy practices is that, as with language ideologies more broadly, such conceptions and theories mediate between real-time micro-interactional events, and institutional orders, that is, perduring social classifications, organizational forms, and activity types. In his ethnography of literacy on the Pacific atoll of Nukulaelae (Tuvalu), Besnier (1995) shows that letter writing gains its full significance within a configuration linguistic, cultural, and social features that include Nukulaelae lexical and grammatical categories of affect, norms for face-to-face conversation, norms for gender-based emotional expression, and extensive labor out-migration. Most pertinent to our current theme, Besnier shows that the strong evangelical religion practiced on the island provides weekly enactments, through sermons, of gendered personhood and authority.

In Besnier's account, Nukulaelae sermons feature a blending of literate and oral resources: sermons are written beforehand, but preaching styles draw on other ritual genres as well as biblical passages. For many Nukulaelae, sermons are key events in which religious authority and a public search for truth is performed, displayed, and claimed. The sermon is part of a more general fundamentalist epistemology: " ... Scriptures are the ultimate arbiter of truth. If they abide by the authority of God and the Bible, humans can gain access to the unambiguous truth that is otherwise beyond their reach (Besnier, 1995: 141)." This pursuit of truth is done by individuals evoking and commenting upon the sacred scripture in written sermons: "[the composition and performance of which] centralize an individualistic sense of personhood and the search for the truth (Besnier, 1995: 138)." But the sermon is part of – that is, it reflects, expresses, and reproduces – an institutional hierarchy of gender and knowledge: though women as well as men may preach, only men can write a sermon.

That conceptions of reading or writing include assumptions about categories of person appropriate to a given activity is, of course, not surprising. The exclusion of women from Koranic or Talmudic scholarship is well known; enlightenment intellectuals

in Europe and Colonial North America assumed that Blacks, whether free or enslaved, were incapable of writing; and in pre-Revolutionary America, it was normative that the virtuous woman should read, but not "take up the pen," especially for public expression (Warner, 1990). Such ideological framing of literacy events, combining cultural classification (e.g., male/female, white/black) and institutional site (e.g., the school, the pulpit, the press), shows that concepts of literacy practice must extend beyond the observable event.

Literacy Practices in Sociocultural Perspective

The New Literacy Studies has been largely an undertaking of educators, anthropologists, and sociolinguists who have successfully critiqued earlier claims about literacy as a context-independent "technology of the intellect" and called into question many school-based and official definitions of literacy (Street, 1984; Gee, 1996). As a research program it has, however, been less successful in areas germane to a sociocultural perspective on literacy practices. These areas include the following: (a) registering the consequences of the artifactualization of language wrought by inscription and the technical-institutional distribution of such text-artifacts, (b) analyzing the ideological range that accompanies literacy endeavors in comparative, global perspective, and (c) attending to institutional and social structural influences on literacy practices outside contemporary Western states and school systems. I address each of these themes below.

Artifactualized Language

One undeniable aspect of inscription is that it turns language into a thing, it renders some element of language (words, syllables, phonemes) into an artifact, into marks made in some medium (clay, papyrus, paper, acetate). These artifacts can, in turn, become input for procedures of accumulation and distribution of varying scale. Despite the untenability of Jack Goody's general conception of literacy, one value of his extensive research is his emphasis on procedures of accumulation and distribution of text-artifacts as essential processes in the evolution of social complexity. In what is otherwise a critical assessment of Goody's 1986 monograph, *The logic of writing and the organization of society*, Collins and Blot (2003: 20) have written:

> A general virtue of *LWOS* is that it provides constant reminders of the semiotic dimensions of social complexity. An endless keeping of lists seems to accompany

social undertakings of any significant scale: censuses of population undertaken by states and lists of priest-officiants maintained by temples are prime examples. Bookkeeping emerged early as a primary function: if not *the* primary function of inscription in Mesopotamia, and it figured in subsequent temple, palace, and merchant economies in the Ancient Near East.

As if in complement to Goody's *The logic of writing and the organization of society*, Olson (1994) developed an extended inquiry into philosophies and practices of reading in the intellectual traditions of Western Europe. He argues that a written textual representation is important because as an artifactualizing of language, it suggests **a** model of language. This model inclines users to become (a) aware of the dimensions of language represented (say, letters or words) and (b) troubled by what is **not** represented, that is, by what is left unsaid. In Olson's account, an historical confluence of ideological, institutional, and technological developments in Western Europe results in a general model of reading-faithful-to-the-text, which arose out of medieval and early modern religious debates, was given substantive diffusion by the development of universities, printing and print-capitalism, and entered into debates in 16th- and 17th-century science about how to best read the *Book of nature*. As articulated by Francis Bacon and other early modern philosopher-scientists, the model of reading became part of a doctrine of truth based on precise records, in "unadorned style," in experimental and other natural scientific inquiry. This concern for realistic, replicable representations of the natural world, in turn, gave impetus to developments in various representational media which flourished in the 17th–19th centuries: portrait painting, map-making, and botanical drawing. These representation media themselves became print artifacts, mechanically reproduced, extensively distributed, and mediating far-flung engagements in a world being transformed by capitalism and colonialism.

What is often called 'the print revolution' was a central element in the production and distribution of artifactualized language. Historians of print (Eisenstein, 1968) have described the cultures of print emerging along with the new technology developed by Gutenberg in Germany in the 1450s, and they have described the very rapid spread of both production sites and book artifacts. As noted in Crosby's (1997) suggestive analysis of the role of measurement and representation in European science and technology: "By 1478 they were printing in London, Cracow, Budapest, Palermo, Valencia, and a number of cities in between. By the next century millions of books had been printed (Crosby, 1997: 231)."

The widespread diffusion of print artifacts, and especially books and newspapers, gave rise to new ways of viewing language, space, and time, encouraging, in turn, new ways of imagining both collectivities and individual nature. For Eisenstein, what she called "the uneven rise of reading publics" led to new forms of individual development. She argues that with the spread of books, lives became more procedure-bound as individuals and groups began "going by the book" (Eisenstein, 1968: 39). Such "going by the book" was a textual ethos and practice characterizing a "'middle class' secular puritan" ethos found in Protestant Europe and North America, in which domestic handbooks, marriage guides, and etiquette rule books were paramount in the conduct and judgment of lives. Eisenstein suggests that the new literate individualization also contributed to the envisioning of and identifying with new collectivities, in particular, the nation-state.

This line of argument has been influentially developed by Anderson (1991), who argues that wide dissemination of newspapers and novels provided textual materials for imagining new spatial and temporal orders, for which the language-codifying nation-state was both instrument and outcome. A more historically and culturally nuanced account of such processes is provided in Warner's (1990) analysis of letters, literacy, and political categories in late colonial and early national U.S. history. In his account, foundational concepts such as 'citizen' are linked to social divisions – such as those between men and women, whites and blacks – and to particular textual practices, such as collecting personal libraries, practicing journalism, and selling an 'American literature.'

We now live of course in an era not of ascendant nationalism but of globalization, wrought not by printing press but by computing machines and their communicative infrastructure. Space considerations do not permit much discussion, but there has been considerable interest, debate, and writing about this most recent development in the production and distribution of text-artifacts. We need not need enter the debates of whether the digital technologies are revolutionary newcomers, or merely new communicative modalities interacting with older modes, whether they herald an era of dystopian or utopian postliteracy (Warschauer, 1999). But we should note that with digital as with alphabetic literacy, artifactualized language provides ways of mediating communication, channeled through existing and emerging institutional forms, typically with official inducements for appropriate use and sanctions of inappropriate use, and typically also accompanied by an underground of subversive, wayward practices.

Sociocultural Practices of Language Use Associated with Inscription and Artifact Circulation

In the preceding section I focused upon the artifactualizing of language brought about by inscription, some of the major developments in the production and distribution of such artifactualized language, and some of the historical, institutional, and psychological developments associated with these communicative economies. These latter include the rise of states and general religions, the development of science, nationalism, and the rule- (or book-) bound self. It is ethnocentric and crudely techno-deterministic to argue, as some have, that the alphabet, *qua script*, causes modern science. I agree with Brandt (2001), however, that the many students of literacy practices have gone too far in denying a technical dimension to literacy, giving short shrift to technical–institutional interactions and political economic dynamics in the history of literacy.

This concern registered, it is also important to stress that there are always cultural variations in the way literate resources are taken up and put to use. Indeed, to its credit, the NLS framework has always stressed such variation. Given its concern to critique official, dominant understandings, it has not, however, brought out the playful, subversive uses of literacy; such transgressive uses often highlight the cultural shaping of literacy practice.

Burke's (1988) 'The uses of literacy in Early Modern Italy' gives a picture of literacy practices in a flourishing mercantile city state. Not surprisingly, we learn that in the 16th-century city state of Florence there was a robust notarial culture in which merchants kept extensive accounts and engaged in voluminous correspondence as they tracked expenditures and profits over far-flung trade networks. Also not surprisingly, we learn of secular, sacred, and patriarchal efforts at regulation: the Florentine state pioneered the use of written passes in order to regulate subjects' travel; the Church issued tickets that were collected at communion, part of a record book registering attendance and nonattendance; and literate Florentine males proposed what Burke calls a "rule of female illiteracy (Burke, 1988: 38)." This latter prohibition on who should read and write seems to have been caused by a familiar patriarchal plight: fear of wayward female sexuality, more particularly, that literate wives and daughters might get up to no good by trafficking in love letters. The state, for its part, feared unauthorized reading of its correspondence and pioneered the use of ciphers for encrypting correspondence. The Counter Reformation Church was troubled by both literacy and illiteracy. Literates

were problematic because they might read heretical works, such as those being busily produced and disseminated by Protestant printers to the north. Illiterates, on the other hand, were worrisome because they were fond of and susceptible to superstition and magic. And the illiterate majority of early modern Florence had access to **written** magic: spells, incantations, and medical cures that used alphabetic sequences (such as *abracadabra*), printed and otherwise inscribed on cards, amulets, and other objects, in order to evoke and control the supernatural.

There is a small but interesting body of research showing that in colonial and postcolonial settings, hybrid forms of spiritual practice involve non-Western peoples appropriating the idea of supernatural powers of sacred text. This is the case among the Mende of Sierra Leone, who make spells and talismans with fragments of Classical Arabic (Koranic) script (Bledsoe and Robey, 1993); it is also the case with the Gapun villagers of Papua New Guinea, who manipulate Biblical text in search of the material benefits promised by Cargo religion (Kulick and Stroud, 1993). Basso's (1990) description of an indigenous Apache writing system reports the case of Silas John, a mission-raised Apache who in early adulthood experienced visions in which God apparently imparted knowledge of 62 prayers and a system for writing them down. The writing system was novel in form, drawing upon both English orthography and Apache sand-painting designs. After his visions, Silas John became the prophet of a neotraditionalist religious movement, gathering a select band of twelve disciples, to whom he taught his system of writing. He and his followers then used the writing system to record prayers and other instructions for use in rituals. In short, Silas John drew upon the idea of the power of **divine writing**, creating a written code, knowledge of which was necessary to successful performance of ceremonies. A traditional practice of rites was continued, but only through the agency of new literates, readers who controlled access to the divine through their manipulation of esoteric script. A case strikingly similar to this one, and roughly contemporaneous, is that of the Aladura movement in colonial Nigeria during the 1920s. It also involved a prophet, Oshitelu, who also received prayers in a vision, along with a writing system for recording them. Oshitelu's writing system was distinct from English orthography, in which this prophet had also been schooled, and thus was accessible only to the specially trained (Probst, 1993).

In a recent study of practices of magical writing in Highland Ecuador, Wogan (2004) describes how the villagers of Salasaca attribute life-threatening power to acts of writing and erasure. Wogan argues that many practices of magical writing are a mirror-image of the Ecuadorian state's concern to record all indigenous peoples in its Civil Registry. In a campaign advertising the need to register new births, the slogan *Si el niño no está inscrito, es como si no existiera* ("If a child is not registered, it's as if he doesn't exist") is proclaimed on posters and television (Wogan, 2004: 52). Conversely, Salasacans attribute life-threatening power to placement of a name in the book of San Gonzalo, a local saint. Hence the mirror-image: if a child's name is not registered in one book, the Civil Registry, it is "as if" he or she does not exist; if a name of a person is placed in another book, that of San Gonzalo, that person is in mortal danger, until they have their name removed (which erasure eliminates the supernatural threat).

Ideologies of Language and Literacy

As should be apparent from the foregoing discussion of religious and magical literacy practices, the existence of text-artifacts and their use in specific local settings is often overlain with a strong evaluative dimension, that is, an ideological layering. The view that a letter, a word, or a name or a passage in a book gives access to supernatural beings and powers is a belief, an idea about language, and an element in a framework for relating practices with language artifacts to concerns at once worldly and otherworldly. The idea that some given language or form of language has special powers is widespread, and the so-called world religions are well-known for their linguistic orthodoxies. I will illustrate two cases. For Muslims, Classical Arabic is the only language in which the holy Koran may appropriately appear; for Roman Catholics, until recent decades, Latin was the only correct language for the liturgical service. Aspects of this religious belief in the divine nature of specific languages clearly recurs in the nationalist equation of "a (n artifactualized and print-disseminated) language and a people," an equation of essentialized language and political-cultural community, which has informed political struggles and education policy throughout the world (Anderson, 1991; Bauman and Briggs, 2003).

Sometimes the focus of ideological reasoning is not language *per se* but the particular script in which the divine is both evoked and represented. This is apparent in the Apache and Nigerian cases described by Basso and Probst. Such cases in turn reflect a more general state of affairs: that orthographies (systems of inscription) are never neutral phenomena. They are instead often the object of sharp controversy over the best (i.e., the most authentic or scientific) way to represent a given language. The varied conflicts and their constituencies, sites, and orthography-ideas are

discussed in research on language revitalization movements in Europe, South Asia, and the Americas (see, for example, the papers in Fenigson, 2003).

In a more abstract fashion, thinking about literacy has incorporated specific assumptions about orthographic development and social evolution. Goody and Olson, for example, put forth claims about an "alphabetic mind" as part of arguments about the supposed superiority of alphabetic over other writing systems. Such claims were quickly refuted by anthropologists and comparative psychologists (see Street, 1984, for a general review), but they reflect an old legacy in Enlightenment thinking about literacy and society. Rousseau, in his writing on the social contract, posited an equivalence between kinds of inscription and stages of society. The scheme went like this (see discussion in Collins and Blot, 2003: 166–167):

- Savagery (non-state societies) = Picture writing
- Barbarism (non-Western Asiatic states) = Hieroglyphic writing
- Civil Man (Western states and empires) = Alphabetic writing

This evolutionary hierarchy recapitulates other now-discredited hierarchies of culture, thought, and language, but with a focus on orthography rather than grammatical form.

In yet other cases, it is neither a given language or script that is central to the ideologizing of literacy practices, rather it is the encounter between a superposed world language/religion and local beliefs about both language and the supernatural, resulting in novel construals of uses of artifact-language. This is the situation reported by Kulick and Stroud (1993), in which Gapun villagers apply pre-existing theories of hidden meaning in language to their readings the Christian Bible, as they seek passages which will unlock the secrets of Cargo wealth. Such an encounter is also the object of Pulis' (1999) study of Rastafarian citing-up, a reading practice which emphasizes playing with the **sound** of scripture in order to tap meanings hidden by the literal or denotational meanings of the text. In some cases, the holy language can be used for other supernatural purposes, which are organized in accordance with local practices. In Bledsoe and Robey's discussion of Mende, ritual specialists substitute "Muslim magic" for indigenous magic and sorcery: "A *moriman* uses his command over Arabic writing, which is widely regarded as the literal word of God, to obtain God's assistance. He evokes a verse's power by writing it on paper, rolled into a tight wad and tied with string or inserted in a small amulet pouch (Bledsoe and Robey, 1993: 118)." Note in this case the condensation of talismanic power and artifactualized language: the verse, written in "the literal word[s] of God," is compacted into a tight wad and inserted into an amulet pouch.

A theme explicitly discussed in Wogan's work on magical writing is that occult uses of literacy are often in counterpoint to the official organization of literate practices in the service of state functions. For the Ecuadorian state, the practice of registering people and land is part and parcel of being a modern society. Salasacan magic writing is, of course, viewed as a premodern superstition, albeit one that shares a belief in the life-defining efficacy of writing in books. The general point here – that literacy practices are intertwined conceptions of modernity – has been widely discussed. An early and highly controversial claim by Goody was that (Western) literate traditions were causal forces in the creation of modern, democratic forms of government; this was echoed in Olson's early general statements about literacy and modern science. Their claims were effectively criticized, but as an ideological assumption, as separate from what we might call historical understanding, the equation of literacy with modernity in the West is widespread and pervasive (see Street, 1984; Collins and Blot, 2003: Chaps. 2 and 4, for critical discussions).

The pertinent question, of course, is what is meant by 'literacy' or 'modernity.' Some recent linguistic anthropological work provides a nuanced approach to the issues. In *Voices of modernity: language ideologies and the politics of inequality*, Bauman and Briggs (2003) discuss the way in which major philosophical works, developing a conception of modern versus traditional society, depended on a highly selective viewing of language. A case in point is provided by John Locke's essays on the foundations of knowledge and forms of government. In both kinds of essay, Locke treats language as a purely literal-referential communicative device, stripped of its interactional or contextual dimensions. (His view of language is thus like overly generalized conceptions of literacy, common enough in the 20th century, which equate an undifferentiated literacy with a singular modernity.) As Bauman and Briggs show, there are many intellectual traditions, ranging from Classical Empiricism through Antiquarianism, Folklore, and Boasian Anthropology, which have differently stipulated what is essential to 'language,' while giving priority to specific **entextualizations** of language, as part of their projects of establishing boundaries between the modern and the pre-modern.

Reporting from a very different part of the world, and treating a more modest historical scope, Schieffelin (2000) also grapples with the issue of literacy and modernity. In her article she analyzes how the Kaluli of highlands Papua New Guinea have responded to Christian missionary activity and the

variety of literacy practices attendant upon such activity. Analyzing missionary grammars (structural linguistic descriptions) and literacy primers, she shows how descriptive and prescriptive documents systematically skew the form of Kaluli language like importing Anglophone notions of literacy and encouraging reading and writing activities of a church-appropriate type. Kaluli literates, for their part, bring a local slant to interaction and interpretation. They read in groups, rather than in isolation, and they interpret written language as speech, in accordance with Kaluli beliefs about what is primary: talk rather than text. These local appropriations notwithstanding, Kaluli of the 1980s, after some 50 years of missionary activity, have adopted a modern ideology of authoritative truth: it resides **in the written text**. The blending of imported categories of description and practice with indigenous ones is part of a local modernity that Schieffelin deftly characterizes. But the Kaluli are nonetheless drawn into what she calls "colonial and missionary intrusions . . . premised on the principle of asymmetry: domination, control, and conversion . . ." (Schieffelin, 2000: 321).

One general lesson from this work is that in thinking about literacy ideologies and long-term developments, such as the emergence of modernity, it is wise to seek out variation in and dialogic exchanges between the so-called modern and non-modern. It is also important to be aware of the frequent connection between literacy practices and forms of power and authority, to which we now give our attention.

Institutions, Language, and Social Structure

Investigating ideologies of literacy and of language more generally can help in understanding literacy practices as doubly-articulated phenomena, that is, as enacted in events while also informed by ideological overlays. Efforts to understand the relation between empirical events and abstract entities such as models must, however, also attend to literacy institutions and their authority with respect to language, language use, and social differentiation. Religion and education are two well-known examples of such institutions.

As Goody (1986) and numerous others have noted, the spread of ancient civilizations, with their city states, extensive taxation, and conscript armies, typically also featured priestly castes and temple complexes, which were distinguished by their knowledge and control of an esoteric literacy dividing elites from masses. World religions are also famously "religions of the Book" and struggles to control the book – its script, language, or interpretation – are struggles through which knowledge becomes power and power knowledge.

Even in relatively modern times, the elite concern to regulate mass forms of literacy is evident. One of the first known national literacy campaigns, in 17th century Sweden, also featured national literacy tests. A country with high literacy rates and surprising gender equality in those rates, Sweden's literacy campaign featured household instruction and religious oversight: parish supervision and compulsory testing to ensure not just reading but orthodox, Protestant reading (Gee, 1996: 32–34). Besnier's close analysis of Nukulaelae church services brings out the way in which religious **institutions are enacted**, how categories of person, and knowledge, and text are combined in communicative events: e.g., the sermon. In such events, differences between the kinds of person are presumed, displayed, and thus reproduced: for example, between the Christian and un-Christian; and between men who write and women who read. A limiting case of sorts is suggested by dissenting, hybrid religious movements. The examples of Silas John and Oshitelu show that a prophet, his writing, and chosen readers, can mobilize charismatic authority, in claiming and performing divine access through scriptal practices, without substantive institutionalization of offices, personnel, or resources. An important point revealed in all these cases, as in those discussed by Schieffelin (2000) and Wogan (2004), is that something significant occurs with the locating of authority, truth and correctness **in text**. Epistemologies and ontologies shift as well as what we might call social technologies of language. Artifactualized language is subject to different dynamics of accumulation and distribution than non-artifactualized language, with different potentials for ideological articulation and institutional consolidation.

Ever since Socrates's voice was transmuted into Plato's writings, the school as well has been a paradigmatic literacy institution. Since the time of the Greek and Roman empires, the *schola* has been the primary site for drawing boundaries between the idealized uniformity and consistency of civilized language and the hybridizing variety of barbarian tongues. It is a familiar story that nationalism feeds upon and promulgates the standardizing of language, a political impulse toward centralization and control given great efficacy by the institutions and agents of the nation-state and the colonial regime, accompanied, to be sure, by local interpretations and reworkings (see Gee, 1996; and Street, 1984 and 1993, for discussion of general mechanisms and cases from national, colonial, and postcolonial settings). There is considerable historical and ethnographic work showing that schooled literacy is a particular institutional regulation of appropriate practices of reading and writing in correct forms of language, a mode of contemporary power which is also inextricably

connected to dynamics of subjectivity and identity formation (see Collins and Blot, 2003, Chaps. 4 and 5, for discussion and extensive bibliography).

That schooled literacy in the United States, for example, reflects and helps reproduce patterns of race and class inequality is both a familiar claim and the proverbial tough nut to crack. The undeniable persistence of racialized class inequality in literacy attainment has fueled an ongoing sense of a literacy crisis in late 20th and early 21st century America, yet neither side in the acrimonious reading wars of the last decade have much compelling evidence that their pedagogical proposals to improve school literacy achievement will do that, let alone lessen general economic inequalities. The current plight is well characterized in Rogers' (2003) ethnographic and critical discursive analysis of the panacea of family literacy, which focuses on one African-American family's multigenerational struggles with schools, Special Education referrals, and the damaged identities that result from literacy failure. Rogers, an ardent believer in the value of literacy and education, nonetheless writes:

> … research in New Literacy Studies has demonstrated that parents of working-class and minority children do value education and school and are involved with their children's education. I want to suggest that **it is precisely because of this belief and involvement that working-class and minority families' efforts are thwarted within the institution** (Rogers, 2003: 144, emphasis added).

One way of thinking about valuing education and encountering failure in school and the workplace, a way of moving beyond the current political opportunism of reading reform, is suggested by Brandt's (2001) historical analysis of literacy traditions and practices in 20th-century America. Drawing on Bourdieu's writings about social fields and her own historical material, Brandt argues for the concept of bold sponsors of literacy, providing more dynamic accounts of social institutions – of family, church, school, and the workplace – and their intertwined role in promoting and regulating literacy practices.

Taking Stock: New Literacy Studies, Linguistic Anthropology and Indexical Analysis

In the preceding I have discussed the New Literacy Studies' formulation of literacy practices and some of the empirical work developing this conception. Interwoven with and as complement to that discussion, I have drawn on research on the history and anthropology of literacy, seeing this especially as part of a general sociocultural perspective on literacy practices. I have emphasized the artifactualization of

language, uses of artifactualized language, especially in the domain of religion and the occult, the ideological articulations of such uses, and the significance of literacy institutions and their authority in order to discuss analytic and substantive issues relevant for understanding literacy practices understood as sociocultural phenomena. These are issues which are mentioned in various NLS works; indeed it is a truism of NLS work that literacy is ideological, but on my reading these issues are not given sufficient theoretical attention or empirical priority **in their inter-relation**.

One way of approaching this argument is to note, again, that most work on literacy practices posits a two-way relation: between events and models. Within linguistic anthropology, the subfield of anthropology that takes language analysis as central to a more general project of sociocultural inquiry, much work on language function and ideology has either been explicitly cast as practice (e.g., Hanks, 1996) or has developed via theory and analysis of indexicals (e.g., Ochs, 1996; Silverstein, 1985). On my reading, this work shares a fundamental assumption: that overcoming the dichotomy of the linguistic/social requires analysis of a three-way relation: between language **form** (system), language **use** (acts, events), and language **evaluation** (an ideological or reflexive aspect of social process and communicative conduct).

There is now a small but growing body of work which uses analysis of indexicality to investigate the sociocultural processes in which literacy practices are situated and to which they contribute. I have discussed this briefly above, with regard to Bialostok's work on models of reading and Shuman's discussion of talk–text interactions among working-class adolescents. Two general points may be made regarding this work and indexicality more generally. First, analysis of indexicals entails a commitment to systematic investigation of language–context relations, with healthy concern for interpretive complexities. Second, it requires as well an awareness that many language–context indexical relations are indirectly related to – they **indirectly index** – other sociocultural constructs and processes, which are themselves essential to the larger analysis. Briefly put, I think that indexical analysis offers a promising entrée to the interplay between microanalytic language use (events) and macroanalytic sociocultural constructs (including models). Let me turn to some examples. Silverstein (1996) is an influential discussion of the indexical underpinnings of language standardization in the contemporary USA, linking such standardization to general semiotic-economic processes, such as commodification, and ideologizing strategies, such as naturalization. More recent explorations of indexical dimensions of literacy and learning include

attention to long-term interactional development of student identities; the indexing of unspoken models of appropriate literacy; the interplay of heterogeneous voices, pedagogical innovation, and globalized discourses of learning; and the assembly of knowledge and identity in dispersed, digitally mediated work settings (see studies in Wortham and Rymes, 2002). Blommaert (2005) provides a series of illustrative cases and analyses of literacy practices within orders of indexicality – authoritative frames for reading and writing events – which organize postcolonial and diasporic encounters between Africans and Europeans. Collins and Slembrouck (2004) develop a related line of inquiry via a case study of the reading practices encountered in situations of dense, migration-based multilingualism.

Conclusion

I have concluded with a brief discussion of work using indexical analysis to investigate literacy practices because it shares with research in the NLS framework a concern to grasp the simultaneous, ongoing interplay between the microphenomena of everyday life and the macrophenomena of institutional orders, unequal resources, and accumulated power and authority. But the work on indexicality holds more closely to what I take to be an important insight from linguistic anthropology: that understanding communicative practices, in our case, literacy practices seen as total social facts, requires attention to language form, use, and evaluation. Such a three-way analytic can lead from situated communicative doings to longer-term structuring processes, while remaining attentive to cultural dynamics. I think the foregoing discussion of religion, magic and literacy practices illustrates some of the issues involved.

It must be borne in mind, however, that concern with literacy practices is not just an effort to better understand literacy, though it is that. The concept emerged along with the New Literacy Studies, which were themselves an effort to consolidate a critique against earlier models of literacy, in the academy and officialdom more generally, which privileged Western literate traditions and minds over other traditions and minds. In their concern to uncover and demonstrate the logics underlying mundane practices by the economically, politically, and culturally disfavored, NLS practitioners share with anthropologists a number of philosophical, analytical, and substantive concerns, and they share also, I would suggest, an ethical commitment to anthropology as cultural critique. In the urgency of their normative stance, they may focus overly much on legacy of the school in shaping literacy practices (an indictment in which

I would place myself in earlier textual manifestations), and in widening this focus, sociocultural perspectives are invaluable. But in their normative stance, NLS practitioners also remind academic anthropology that knowledge matters – in struggles as well as deliberations. Let this article be a contribution to and encouragement of continuing exchanges, on the common ground of literacy practices, between critical anthropology and new literacy studies.

See also: Indexicality: Theory; Reading and Multiliteracy; Sociolinguistics and Political Economy; Writing and Cognition.

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Literary Pragmatics

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The efforts to relate the study of literary texts to the science of language have mainly taken two directions. In an earlier, quantitative approach, the emphasis was on how to characterize a text, based on the occurrence of certain elements (substantives, adjectives, and so on). The methods employed were mainly statistic. Later approaches focused on the qualitative aspect: how to account for certain characteristics (grammatical constructions, literary tropes, etc.) thought to be specific for types of text or, more generally, how to characterize a stretch of text in relation to what used to be called 'extralinguistic' purposes: persuading, arguing, questioning, etc. – matters that used to be taken care of in the discipline called rhetoric.

When talking about literary pragmatics, it is important to realize that pragmatics was not developed from inside linguistics but, rather, originated in related fields, such as philosophy, sociology, and the theory of interaction. The linguists were initially alerted to pragmatics through the aporias that arose within their strictly limited field of view (*see* **Pragmatics: Overview**). Similarly, literary studies did not 'discover' pragmatics by themselves; the approaches to the study of texts as related to the human users were developed simultaneously by philosophers, literary theoreticians, and pragmaticists. The purpose of these endeavors was to make sense of the fact that language does not always obey the strictures of the grammarians; indeed, the linguistic structure of a text has, in many cases, very little to do with the effects of a text, with what it 'does,' or with how a text is produced and consumed by the users.

Applying the definition of pragmatics as "the study of the use of language in human communication, as determined by the conditions of society" (Mey, 2001: 6) to the case of literary communication, we may say that literary pragmatics is concerned with the user's role in the societal production and consumption of texts.

The Linguistics of Texts

Early approaches to literary pragmatics (what used to be called 'text linguistics') took their point of departure in certain concepts that had been developed in linguistics mainly in order to cope with the needs of grammatical description. A text was thought of as a hierarchically structured complex of sentences, just as the sentence itself was considered a hierarchically structured unit of 'phrases' (noun phrases, verb phrases, etc.). A 'text grammar' was proposed in

parallel to the sentential grammar developed by Chomsky and his school (see, e.g., van Dijk, 1972).

Later efforts were spurred on by the achievements of philosophers and pragmaticists such as Austin and Searle, who developed a theory of 'speech acts' – that is, utterances that did something in addition to being merely 'uttered': the 'illocutionary' vs. the simple 'locutionary' aspect (*see* **Speech Acts**).

The idea that utterances had a 'performative' and not just a 'constative' value (originally due to Austin, 1962) gave rise to a classification of speech acts into categories such as assertions, questions, orders, and apologies. Following on this, some suggested that we could look at a text as a gigantic 'macro-speech act' that had under it all sorts of individual acts, each expressed in some hierarchically ordered, linguistically recognizable form. This approach mostly failed, on several counts. First, it was not easy to explain what exactly the relationships were between the different acts making up the text. There was also the problem of the hierarchical constraints, which seemed unnatural, given the essentially linear, and often unpredictable, nature of textual 'speech acting.' However, the idea that sentences may be conjoined in deeper ways than just being strung together on the surface ('concatenated' in Chomskyan parlance) had taken hold. Similarly, the notion that language 'performed,' did something, led to the valuable discovery that certain sentences were 'doable' or 'speakable,' and others were not (Banfield, 1982).

Perhaps the most important insight into the nature of human language use as 'doing things with words' (Austin, 1962) was due, again, not to a linguist but to a philosopher, H. Paul Grice, who took the ideas developed by both Austin and Searle (1969) several steps further. In order to explain the regularity of human conversations and their mostly successful outcomes, Grice (1989: 26–31) postulated the principle of cooperation, stipulating that every person's contribution to a conversation should be commensurate to its purpose (including the aims and motives of the participants) (*see* **Cooperative Principle** and **Grice, Herbert Paul**). Grice further suggested four conversational maxims regulating our cooperative handling of conversational information: making it sufficient (the maxim of 'quantity'), true ('quality'), relevant ('relation'), and orderly ('manner'). Any infringement of these maxims should be interpreted (assuming the general idea of conversation as cooperation) as implying an additional meaning: Breaking ('flouting') a maxim imparts a message that although not explicitly mentioned, nevertheless is understood. Grice's famous example is that of a professor writing a recommendation for a student, consisting of a statement as to the student's attendance in class and his correct

English spelling – clearly irrelevant matters in the context – and thus implying that there must be a reason for the professor's unwillingness to cooperate, viz. that the student does not deserve a 'real' recommendation (Grice, 1989: 30) (*see* **Maxims and Flouting**).

Grice's notion of 'implicature,' as it is called, is of the utmost importance with regard to explaining how authors and readers go about 'cocreating' the literary work, as discussed later (*see* **Implicature**). It has often been remarked that the essence of art, visual or literary, is in the way we omit things, rather than saying them outright or representing them pictorially. When a queen utters that she is not amused, we understand perfectly well what she is, and we hide to escape her wrath. When God asks Cain, 'Where is Abel thy brother?' Cain realizes (since God of course knows exactly where Abel is and who killed him) that this implies the question, 'Why did you do this to your brother?' However, Cain refuses to cooperate in this conversation and tries to deny the implicature that he should have been 'his brother's keeper.' But in the next sentence, having 'answered' God's question with the pseudo-cooperative utterance 'I know not,' he shows that he indeed has gotten the implied message: 'Am I my brother's keeper?' (Gen. 4:9).

In the following sections, I briefly indicate the particular instances in which pragmatics meets with various linguistic and literary approaches, as they are dealt with in the remainder of this article.

The problems of text production and consumption are discussed first. Next, a brief discussion is provided of a concept that has gained increasing attention in the discussions during the past few decades: interactivity, understood as the active (specifically Gricean) collaboration between reader and author. Such a collaboration involves more than plain interaction, however: the relationship between the active partners is 'dialectic,' which means that neither the author nor the reader can claim exclusive possession of, or authority over, the text. Following this, I characterize this relationship as a 'cocreative' one: a text is not the exclusive work of the individual author but always presupposes the active collaboration of an audience, the readers. How this cocreation is orchestrated technically is the subject of the following sections, in which first some classical linguistic techniques of 'signposting' are discussed, and then the important pragmatic concept of 'voice' is introduced as that which brings the text to life. In particular, the 'point of view' embodied in the voice of a character helps us find our way through the textual maze; this 'vocalization' relies not only on signposting by means of linguistic devices but also on the techniques of cooperation and implicature (including flouting) that were

mentioned previously. When the proper conditions for use of these techniques are not met, we may experience a phenomenon that I have termed 'voice clashing': voices speaking out of order, either by an author's fiat or (more often) by authorial negligence. The final section wraps up the discussion by stressing the human engagement that is the necessary condition for successful text work.

Production and Consumption

The following is a common model of production and consumption in our society: a producer delivers a product to the market, and the consumer pays the market price, acquires the product, and starts consuming it. After the transaction is concluded, producer and consumer part ways, never to meet again unless in special cases (foreseen by the laws regulating trade in our society), such as inferior product quality or unsatisfactory handling of the financial aspects of the purchase. This relationship is purely linear and unidirectional; the deal, once consummated, cannot be reversed (barring special cases such as return or repossession of the product).

One may be tempted to apply this simple model to the production and consumption of literary works: The author is the producer of some literary text, whereas the reader is a consumer who happens to be 'in the market' for a particular literary product. Once the book is bought, the reader is free to do whatever he or she wants to do with it: take it home and place it on the shelf in the living room, possibly read it, or maybe even throw it in the trash – or at somebody, literally or metaphorically.

In reality, things happen not quite like that. Buying a book is not like acquiring a piece of kitchenware or furniture. One does not just bring a book back from the bookstore: one takes home an author, inviting him or her into the privacy of one's quarters. The author, on the other hand, does not just make a living, producing reams of printed paper (granted, there are those that do), but has a message for the reader as a person. This is, eventually, why books are bought and sold: not because they are indispensable for our material existence, but because they represent a personal communication from an author to a potential readership – a communication that, in order to be successful, will have to follow certain rules.

Authors and Readers

The process of writing has been likened to a technique of seduction: a writer takes the readers by their hands, separates them from the drudgery of everyday life, and introduces them to a new world, of which the writer is the creator and main 'authority' (Mey, 1994:

162, 2000: 109). The readers will have to accept this seductive move and follow the author into the labyrinth of the latter's choice in order to participate properly in the literary exercise. The readers take the narrative relay out of the hands of the author: 'The author is dead, long live the reader,' to vary Barthes (1977).

Marie-Laure Ryan (2001) envisioned this reader participation along a twofold dimension: that of interactivity (in which the reader manipulates the text) and that of immersion (where the reader seamlessly identifies him- or herself with the text). In immersion mode, the reader is not just a spectator on the virtual scene: The 'role of the reader' is that of an "active participant in the process of creating the fictional space" (Mey, 1994: 155). As discussed later, the immersed reader is a 'voice' in the text; he or she is not only 'present at the creation' of the text but also to some extent its 'creator' (Barthes, 1977).

In literary texts in particular, the success of the story depends not only on the author but also to a high degree on the reader. In the process of creating the text, the reader is created anew, reborn in the text's image. This interactivity does not just happen on the level of the text: it involves a deeper layer, that of the self. What is created is not only the fictional space but also the reader in it, 'lector in fabula.' 'This book changed my life' is therefore not just a trite expression we employ to register an exceptional reading experience; such changes happen whenever we consume texts (including nonliterary genres, such as scientific and commercial prose, legal texts, etc., and 'texts' in a wider understanding of the term – theatrical and movie productions, the visual arts, and so on; Mey, 1994: 155). Updating our view on texts, we may even include here the virtual realities of the computerized world and its texts, as discussed by authors such as Gorayska and Mey (1996), Ryan (2001), and others.

Text Dialectics

A dialectic situation of interaction occurs when the interacting parties influence each other in such a way that the outcome of what one party does is determining for the other's ability to operate.

In language use, the pragmatics of interaction determines the game, whose very name is dialectics. When speaking or writing, we are always engaged in some communication (informing our partner about some event, apologizing for inflicted injuries or insults, promising services, telling a story, etc.). In this activity, we crucially depend on the other's presence and cooperation not only for the legitimacy of our speech acts but also for their very viability. Conversely, our interactors depend crucially on who we think they are

and on whether they think of us as good partners in interaction. (After all, one can only tell a story properly to listeners whose interests one shares or imagines one does). The way we see ourselves and our partners, and how they see themselves and us, is essential to this dialectic process. The following section details how such representations come about and are managed.

Cocreativity

Pragmatically speaking, a text is the result of what Bakhtin (1994: 107) called "the meeting of two subjects." The life of the text "always develops *on the boundary between two consciousnesses, two subjects*" (Bakhtin, 1994: 106; italics in original) the two consciousnesses being the author's and the reader's. The author is by definition conscious of his or her role in creating the world of letters, the 'fictional space,' mentioned previously. However, the reader's consciousness is just as essential in cocreating this fictional universe. For Bakhtin, the reader is the (co-)creator of the text: It is in the dialogue between author and reader that the text, as a dialectic creation, emerges (*see* **Bakhtin, Mikhail Mikhailovich**).

How do author and reader, these two 'consciousnesses,' navigate the fictional space? For a reader, it is not enough to identify with the author passively; the reader must consciously adopt the cocreator role, as it is assigned by the textual dialectics. Conversely, the author must consciously alert the reader to the signposts and other 'indexes' placed in the fictional space to enable the navigation process.

In some older novels, mainly those written in the 18th and 19th centuries, the author often appears on the scene in person, apostrophizing the reader and telling him or her what to do, what to feel, what not to object to, which 'disbeliefs to willfully suspend,' and so on. The 19th-century British writer Anthony Trollope was a master of this 'persuasion-cum-connivance,' as when he told the readership that he was unable to expatiate more on certain characters of his story: the publisher, a Mr Longman, would not allow him a fourth volume, so he had to finish the third and last of the Barchester novels at page 477 – and, well, since we are already at page 396 . . . ("Oh, that Mr Longman would allow me a fourth!" Trollope, 1857/1994: 306). The curious and eagerly co-creative reader hurries to the last page of the novel to find that its number is indeed '477,' just as the author had predicted. We cannot exclude the possibility that the reader may feel a bit taken in: the cocreative is morphing into the gullible.

Cases such as these are the exception, and readers will normally do no more than smile at discovering their complicity in what is commonly understood as an authorial prank. In other cases, the cocreativity that is needed to make the cocreative enterprise succeed, although less obvious, is (perhaps for that reason) considerably more effective. Notorious instances of successful 'reader deception' are found in the Argentine writer Julio Cortázar's work, as in the novella 'Historia con migalas' ('A story of spiders'; 1985). Here, the author consciously leads the reader down a 'garden path' of narration, along which the two female protagonists by default are assumed to be a male–female couple. Only in the story's very last sentence do they literally remove their morphological protection, along with their seductive veils (see Mey, 1992; the trick is pulled off successfully only in the Spanish original).

In the Cortázar story, reader seduction (involving the cocreation of a manipulated consciousness) is achieved without the reader's awareness – a typical requirement of certain literary genres, such as the joke or, as in this case, the garden path story. In other (more normal?) cases, readers are guided through the fictional labyrinth by certain indications as to where the narrative 'thread' is leading them, which readerly pitfalls they have to avoid, where to proceed with caution or alternatively with boldness, and so on.

Signposting

In the Cortázar story, the reader is led astray by the (mis)use of linguistic means. It is as if the author had changed or removed the usual road signs – a technique one could call 'deceptive signposting.' The question is what are these signposting techniques, and how are they normally used to bring coherence to a text when no garden paths or jokes are involved?

First, we have the time-honored concepts of 'deixis,' such as when articles and (personal) pronouns are employed to 'point to' a particular character. In particular, in anaphora, the relative pronoun is used to 'point back' (or, in cataphora, 'forward') to a character or object that is already mentioned, or is going to be mentioned, in the story. The common concept covering these phenomena is called '(phoric) reference' (*see* **Deixis and Anaphora: Pragmatic Approaches**).

In addition, we have means to indicate the time and place relations that are of importance in order to establish and promote the flow of the story. Time adverbs such as 'today' and place adverbs such as 'abroad' tell us when, and where, the story is taking place. Also, we have sentence adverbs that give a particular flavor to a larger stretch of discourse, sometimes even an entire paragraph (e.g., 'regularly,' 'unfortunately,' and 'clearly,' especially when placed sentence-initially).

As was the case in the Cortázar story, much of the correct understanding of a story is imparted through the use of gender-marked items, such as 'she' vs. 'he,'

or by exploiting the difference between a male and a female form of, for example, an adjective. The latter technique is not always applicable in English; in the Cortázar case, the 'dénouement' comes when the unsuspecting reader finally is confronted with an unequivocal, female adjectival form: *desnudas* 'naked' (a Spanish fem. plur. since it refers to women; in the English translation, this point gets lost and the garden path leads nowhere).

In addition to these linguistic techniques, pragmatics offers the reader a great help. There is Gricean implicature, mentioned previously; furthermore, the author has at his or her disposal various ways of representing speech or thought, either by directly quoting a character's utterance (literally putting words in his or her mouth) or by indirectly reproducing what the character is thinking to him- or herself in 'free indirect discourse,' as in the following quote from Jane Austen (1810/1947: 191): "And now – what had she done or what had she omitted to do, to merit such a change?" Here, 'she' (Catherine, the novel's heroine) is musing about her sudden change in fate (owing to the fact that, unbeknownst to her, the father of her lover has discovered that she is no rich prospect after all); however, we are never told explicitly who this 'she' is: being competent, cocreative readers, we will know.

Characters are given 'voices' that we clearly and distinctly perceive as the characters' and theirs alone. This notion (including the phenomenon of vocalization) is discussed next.

The Voices of the Text

Vocalization

'Vocalization' is a powerful way of creating and maintaining the fictional space with the willing help and indispensable assistance from the readership, and of 'orchestrating' the dialectics of cocreativity between author and reader. Taken by itself, the term may be translated as 'giving a voice,' 'making vocal' (or 'heard,' depending on the perspective). In the context of literary pragmatics, vocalization means 'giving a voice to a character in the story' – in other words, making the character speak.

We are more or less familiar with the phenomenon from the simple fact of narrative dialogue. Whenever a conversation is included in the story, we hear the voices of the characters discussing current events or other matters of interest, such as how many kinds of love there are (compare Kitty and Anna's conversation in Tolstoy's *Anna Karenina*; 1889/1962: 155), or the advantages of married life as opposed to the single gentleman officer's existence, as enthusiastically described by General Serpuchovskoy to Vronsky – how he got his hands freed when marriage lifted the 'fardeau' of everyday worries onto his shoulders (Tolstoy, 1889/ 1962: 350). In situations such as these, the attribution of voices is done in a straightforward manner, more or less as it happens in a play: the lines are put into the mouths of the characters, given voice through the unique assignment of a familiar role name, and are often preceded by what is called a 'parenthetical,' such as 'he said,' 'she laughed,' and 'he cried'.

Voice and Focus

Vocalization is an intricate process, inasmuch as it not only gives voice to a character in the strict sense of speaking one's part, but also affords information about the character's perspective or point of view. What the voice indicates is not just the character as such (by naming the person) but also the viewpoint from which the character sees the other characters, and indeed the world. In this wider sense, voices range over the entire fictional space they create: "Utterances belong to their speakers (or writers) only in the least interesting, purely physiological sense; but as successful communication, they always belong to (at least) two people, the speaker and his or her listener" (Morson and Emerson, 1990: 129).

Vocalization always implies 'focalization,' a focusing on the characters' placement in the literary universe (Mey, 2000: 148). In Bal's (1985: 100) words, focalization is "the relation between the elements presented and the vision through which they are presented." This vision and these relations are not open to direct inspection by the reader's naked eye in as much as they are necessarily mediated through the voice of the author; consequently, they may have trouble being focalized properly.

The Pragmatics of Voice

In the absence of obvious signposts, such as names and parentheticals attached to the 'physiological utterance' (especially when we are dealing with an unspoken thought or an 'unspeakable sentence'), we may be unsure whose voice we are hearing. This is where pragmatics comes to the rescue.

In order to be speakable, a sentence, Banfield (1982) noted, must have a 'speaking subject" – not just a sentential subject, but one authoring the utterance that is placed in a context in which certain utterances are speakable by certain persons. Successful vocalization at the author end is matched by the reader's successful revocalizing: the reader cocreates the part of the fictional universe in which the utterance is spoken and attributes the voices univocally to the focalizing characters, including the speaking subject.

When Voices Clash

Voices may sound in harmony, or they may clash. A voice that is not in accordance with what we, as readers, know about the speaking character will jar, not sound right; we do not feel it is the voice of the character (but perhaps the voice of the intrusive narrator trying to disguise him- or herself as a character or even, as in the case of Trollope, as the author). Other clashes are often referred to as 'poetic license,' such as when animals are attributed vocalizations that are not in keeping with their animal status. In *Anna Karenina*, we encounter quoted thoughts ascribed to the bird-dog Laska, who is irritated at Levin and his brother because they keep chatting while the birds fly by, one after the other, without the hunters so much as bothering to point their guns at them: '"Look how they have time to make conversation – she thought – And the birds are coming . . . . In fact, here comes one. They're going to bungle it . . ." Laska thought' (Tolstoy 1889/1962: 185).

In other cases, the reader is confused, such as when voices speak 'out of order,' having access to material that is strictly not accessible to the characters, given their background, or even false (Mey, 2000: Chap. 6). Such 'clashes' may even be caused intentionally, for example, in order to obtain a comic effect by letting characters adopt modes of speech that are not commensurate with the speech proper to the events or characters (such as when a director purposefully introduces modern colloquialisms and slang into a Shakespearian play).

Conclusion: The Role of Pragmatics

The user has been the guideline in our reflections on the ways readers and authors participate in the common endeavor of creating a literary text. The dialogue we engage in as authors and readers is a dialogue of users; the 'dialectics of dialogue' has been invoked to explain the users' cocreative roles, as authors and readers, in establishing the textual object (e.g., a story).

However, dialogue does not happen in a vacuum; it is

> a dialogue of social forces perceived not only in their static coexistence, but also as a dialogue of different times, epochs and days, a dialogue that is forever dying, living, being born: Coexistence and becoming are fused into an indissoluble, concrete *multi-speeched* [italics added] unity. (Bakhtin, 1992: 365)

The voices of the text are anchored in the plurality of discourse, in a 'multispeeched' mode; this multi-vocality represents the dialectic relations between different societal forces (*see* **Discourse, Foucauldian**

Approach). If it is true that texts only come into existence as human texts through an actual engagement by a human user (as already stated by Roman Ingarden in 1931), then a pragmatic view of text, particularly literary text, is anchored in this user engagement. Conversely, the user is engaged only insofar as he or she is able to follow, and recreate, the text supplied by the author. Among the voices of the text, the reader, too, has one; this vocalization is subject to the same societal conditions that surround the author. The textual dialogue thus presupposes a wider context than that provided by the actual text. As we have seen, pragmatics offers a view on this wider, social context and explains how it interacts with author, texts, and readers.

See also: Bakhtin, Mikhail Mikhailovich; Cooperative Principle; Deixis and Anaphora: Pragmatic Approaches; Discourse, Foucauldian Approach; Grice, Herbert Paul; Implicature; Maxims and Flouting; Pragmatics: Overview; Speech Acts.

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Literary Theory and Stylistics

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Stylistics and literary theory would appear to coincide neatly in a concern for the language of the given object, literature. In one model, stylistics can be seen as a hyponym to the superordinate theory of literature, that aspect of theory that explicitly deals with locating and describing the particular language of literature. Yet stylistics is often marginalized as a literary-critical approach and has not enjoyed an easy relationship with many of the dominant trends in literary theory. Indeed, the term *stylistics* has suggested to some critics a rather marginal activity having to do with the niceties of an author's style; but it clearly is much more than that. In a broad historical context, stylistics has its roots in the *elocutio* of Aristotelian rhetorical studies. Crucially surviving from the rhetorical tradition, *elocutio* dealt with the appropriateness of the expression and the relevance of its stylistic choices. Thus, it is a focus on the language of the expression in a particular way to do with *how* the text means, rather than *what* it means. Here are the roots not only of stylistics, but also of formalist and structuralist analyses of the 20th century. Literary theory, in contrast, is a broad area of investigation covering linguistic, social, cultural, political, economic, hermeneutic, empirical, and psychological issues surrounding the production and consumption of literary texts.

Before the 20th century, the notion of style was a secondary product of the analysis of grammar and rhetoric. In the 20th century, it developed from *elocutio* to encompass almost anything to do with an explicit focus on the 'language' of the (normally literary) text; that is, its particular and manifest phonological, lexical, and grammatical features. Stylistics arose partly because of the need in literary criticism to work with a set of agreed-upon and defined terms for the analysis and description of a particular kind of language, the language of literature. Such a language would not be wholly derived from the study of rhetoric (though it would take from it where it felt it was necessary) but would be built upon modern linguistic analysis. Stylistics in the main has concentrated on literary texts (despite the offshoot and somewhat tautologous sounding 'literary stylistics'), although the concept of style extends beyond the literary. With its focus on the language of the text, largely (but not exclusively) treated in a synchronic manner, stylistics has obvious affinities with a certain kind of literary criticism, particularly what came to be known as 'practical' criticism. This critical approach, growing out of the work of I. A. Richards in the 1920s, focused on the mechanics of the text, its immanent language features, and gave the pedagogy of English literature an enormous boost by freeing it from the contextual constraints of history and biography and treating the text on its own terms. It was thus an important precursor of Anglo-American New Criticism. The text's 'terms' were linguistic, both in detail and in use as metaphor. Stylistics is not to be confused with the New Criticism of the 1950s and 1960s, but it does share some methodological axioms, and the two approaches overlap in the 1960s.

Modern stylistic analysis really began with the work of Charles Bally (1909) and Leo Spitzer (1948) in the first half of the 20th century. Bally's *stylistique* saw literary texts as examples of particular language use, and his work prefigures later conceptions of register and mode (particularly in the work of M. A. K. Halliday and David Crystal). Bally was a pupil of Ferdinand de Saussure. Spitzer, however, saw 'style' as not so much a particular form of linguistic 'character' but as a manifestation of social or historical 'expression.' Spitzer's work is essentially the cultural interpretation of style, and he suggests another important line of stylistic investigation (be it literary or nonliterary). His work highlights an ongoing tension in

stylistics between formal description of linguistic features and broader cultural, psychological, or historical or interpretative aspects of the text.

Put simply, the goal of stylistics is to describe the linguistic features of the object of analysis in such a way as to demonstrate their "functional significance for the interpretation of the text" (Wales, 2001: 438). Its relationship to literary theory is a complex one. In the 1960s, linguistics became the focus both of a certain movement in literary theory and of critical approaches that grew out of the close-reading methods of I. A. Richards and others. The way in which linguistics was used by literary theory and stylistics, however, was radically different. Stylistics in its anglicized form has tended to eschew the philosophical complexities and self-reflexive obsessions of literary theory and to use the practical methods of linguistics wherever it sees them as being relevant to a particular reading. Linguistic theory and practice is very much the handmaiden of stylistics, which eclectically draws on what are deemed appropriate terminology and discourse. The dominant linguistic theory throughout the 1960s and 1970s was undoubtedly that of Noam Chomksy and his followers, yet strikingly, stylistics almost ignored his work during this time. The Chomskyan influence is seen particularly acutely in the work of Ohmann (1964) and Levin (1962). Here, style is seen as a transformational option selected from a core form. Despite the central notion of 'transformations,' which could easily be related to notions of style (and is presented convincingly by Ohmann and Levin), Chomsky's work was seen as too abstract for the text-driven concerns of the stylistician.

Stylistics found a more sympathetic grammar in the work of M. A. K. Halliday, whose systemic grammar allowed stylisticians to link grammatical description with literary effect in a way that was more transparent than in the Chomskyan paradigm. Halliday's functional approach (Halliday called it *systemic-functional*) again uses the notion of language *choices,* but sees them determined by the uses or functions which they are seen to serve. Language is thus socially constituted and meaning cannot be formulated in isolation (in opposition to the formalist approach). Literary stylisticians approved of this view because it allowed the notion of literary 'style' to be part of a larger, sociolinguistic network. In the 1970s and 1980s, stylistics drew on a number of different methodologies and approaches, most notably the Hallidayan functional model, feminism, pragmatics, and discourse analysis, these approaches being dominant and extremely influential. Indeed the most obvious and striking development in stylistics in the last 20 years has been its recognition of the notion of 'discourse' – although this was not especially new

and had a precursor in Crystal and Davy (1969). There are some parallels in literary theory in that following the radical movements of structuralism and deconstruction in the 1960s and 1970s, a more historicist approach began to be seen. This was not simply an opposition to the formalisms of, for instance, deconstructive methodologies, for the New Historicism often incorporated deconstructive practice (particularly in the work of Stephen Greenblatt). Rather, it was a widening of the linguistic context and a breaking down of barriers between literary and nonliterary writing.

Perhaps the most pervasive influence on stylistic analysis in recent years, then, has been that of discourse analysis, and there are again parallels with developments in literary theory. Discourse analysis can signal many things, from the most text-centered description of language fragments to broad, Foucaultdian speculations about power and language. Literary theory has drawn more on the work of Foucault than almost any other theorist of 'discourse,' and yet Anglo-American stylisticians remain suspicious of his writing and treat it with a degree of scepticism. What unites the Foucauldian approach with those such as the Hallidayan, however, is a belief in the contextual nature of language and a focus on language 'beyond the sentence.' Further, there is a belief, not always made manifest, that the (discourse) stylistician should be looking at 'real' language; that is 'naturally occurring' discourse. Of course, literature provides us with a ready-made supply of 'real' discourse, although many discourse analysts reject this corpus, insisting that it is 'deviant' language. However, the approach has been fruitful in the field of stylistics. Ronald Carter's seminal collection of stylistics essays *Language and Literature* (1982) was followed by the volume *Language, Discourse and Literature: An Introductory Reader in Discourse Stylistics* (1989). The shift in focus is clearly registered in essay topics: the first volume is dominated by grammatical considerations, despite the inclusion of Deirdre Burton's influential 'Through glass darkly: through dark glasses' (a politico-stylistic analysis of Sylvia Plath's *The Bell Jar*). The latter volume draws heavily on developments in pragmatics and discourse analysis, including applications of Politeness Theory, Speech Act Theory, and Gricean pragmatics.

If we take discourse analysis in its broadest sense, then it is possible to also view stylistics, "as simply the variety of discourse analysis dealing with literary discourse" (Leech, 1983: 151). This may not lead anywhere, and rather sets stylistics adrift from other movements in linguistics. Stylisticians have tended to draw eclectically from developments in discourse

analysis (as they had done from other developments in linguistics) and the related field of pragmatics. Speech Act Theory, Politeness Theory, and Critical Discourse Analysis are now the staples of stylistic approaches. Speech Act Theory has also been adopted by literary theorists with some success, though Derrida's interpretation is quite different from Searle's. Fairclough's Critical Discourse Analysis (1989) has been extremely influential in encouraging a more politically orientated approach to stylistics. Used primarily in the analysis of media texts, it has proven fruitful in some aspects of literary analysis, reflecting the challenge (or threat) posed by the spread of media and cultural studies over traditional 'English' courses. Critical Discourse Analysis in a literary context is exemplified in the work of David Birch (1989), Sara Mills (1997) and Michael Toolan (1996), among others. It has its roots in Hallidayan systemic-functional linguistics (although Hodge and Kress 1993, successfully employ a Chomskyan model for analysis) and is particularly concerned with the linguistic encoding of ideology in texts. Its main object is most naturally the language of the media, of institutions, and of government; but again, stylisticians are able to examine the ideologies evident in representations of these elements as well as taking the broader view of literature as an encoder of ideology. The integrationalist approach of Michael Toolan is influenced by the work of Roy Harris (1984 and *passim*) and rejects many of the fundamental tenets of Western linguistics while promoting a holistic view of language function. Fundamentally exciting and iconoclastic, its effect has yet to be fully registered in literary discourse analysis.

Literary theory in the second half of the 20th century was initially driven not by Chomsky or Halliday or Richards or F. R. Leavis, or even Spitzer or W. K. Wimsatt, but by the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure, whose *Cours de Linguistique Generale* (1917) exercised a profound influence on continental and Anglo-American literary criticism (and indeed criticism of other arts). Translations and reprints of the work increased dramatically through the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, as the *Cours* became the *sine qua non* of literary criticism. But the way in which Saussure was adopted by literary critics and cultural theorists was vastly different from the way that, say, Halliday, was adopted by the stylisticians. Saussure offered no grammatical method and only the broadest semantic theory, and so was not adopted 'practically' in the same way. What he offered literary critics and theorists was a way of conceiving meaning relations, and he did so by positing a number of crucial, and by now extremely familiar, ideas:

(i) The distinction between *la langue* and *la parole*
(ii) The essential arbitrariness of the linguistic *sign*
(iii) The arbitrary and conventional nature of the *sign*
(iv) The distinction between the *signifier* and the *signified*
(v) Language is binary and contrastive.

These five observations together revolutionized literary and cultural criticism and were thoroughly used and abused throughout the middle and latter part of the 20th century. Aberrant readings and deliberate misreadings of Saussure pushed literary theory into an extreme self-reflexive period in the 1970s. At first, Saussure's work was felt most keenly in literary structuralism, where content was bracketed off and structure became central. The literary text was seen to function like a sentence – a massive grammatical construction. Individual words (or signs) were mere fillers for essential structural functions and a sign's meaning was a result of its relation to other signs (in particular one in which it stood in binary relation to) and based on an arbitrary relation between the 'acoustic sound-image' (the signifier) and the concept associated with it (the signified). Thus, at a stroke issues of a text's 'meaning' were reduced to that of a text's structure. This fact coupled with misreadings of Saussure and extreme versions of the theory of the arbitrariness of the sign (*contra* Saussure), took criticism away from the delicate consideration of a text's aesthetic value and toward a consideration of literary practice as *sign*.

This is only one half of the story, however, for another version of structuralism took the notion of binary and contrastive relations and utilized it to produce close and immensely detailed analyses of the meaning relations in individual texts (Riffaterre, 1966). Indeed, Riffaterre's work, particularly the essay on Baudelaire's *Les Chats*, became a model for a certain kind of structural-linguistic analysis. In this important work, many of the present-day issues and difficulties to do with the location and description of style are evident. Riffaterre draws on the Russian formalist school in his notion of literature as some form of stylistic defamiliarization, but he attacks the structuralism of Roman Jakobson and Claude Levi-Strauss for its undiscriminating location of features (which may or may not have stylistic significance). Riffaterre further is concerned with the effects of the language upon its audience.

In the early 1970s, debates about the relationship between linguistic analysis and 'traditional' literary criticism raged, particularly in the United Kingdom. The most famous of these was the Fowler-Bateson debate (1971) (see Simpson, 2004 for a reprint of this argument). Roger Fowler took it as axiomatic

that language analysis was at the heart of literary criticism, while F. W. Bateson, a literary critic, suggested that literature possessed an 'ineradicable subjective core' which was simply not amenable to linguistic analysis. Essentially, this was a claim for the unique status of literary language and a swipe at so-called 'objective' methods of analysis. But for a decade in the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s, the linguistic critics held sway, and the two approaches to linguistic theory and practice outlined above came together in a peculiarly anglicized form. The work of Fowler drew on both the continental Saussurean tradition and the more pragmatic (not in the linguistic sense) and eclectic stylistic Anglo-American tradition. In works such as *Linguistics and the Novel* (Fowler, 1977) *and Linguistic Criticism* (Fowler, 1986), one will find the work of Halliday, Chomsky, and Saussure linked with the practical consideration and analysis of a range of largely canonical literary texts. Traditional areas of investigation were given a new look, with some new terminology. In Fowler's work, we find analyses of 'mind style,' of paradigmatic and syntagmatic relations, and of free indirect discourse – standard areas for later stylistic analysis. Fowler's work drew on structuralist methodologies, if somewhat eclectically, but typically avoided Barthesian excesses.

In theory, stylistics offers common ground for those perennially separate groups of literature and language specialists; but the two domains have developed from such different origins that the relationship is never clear. In 1960, Roman Jakobson famously stated that "a linguist deaf to the poetic function of language and a literary scholar indifferent to linguistic problems and unconversant with linguistic methods are equally flagrant anachronisms" (1960: 377). One could extend David Lodge's statement that "the novelist's medium is language: whatever he does, *qua* novelist, he does in and through language" (Lodge, 1966: ix) to literature as a whole. Literature is fundamentally language, and the linguist is interested in language. This language can be conceived of as fundamentally different from 'ordinary' language, or as different only to the extent that it contains a greater concentration of features already present in other forms of language. But whether the difference is seen as one of degree or one of kind, the object of analysis is still language. What could be simpler? Even with the arrival, or rather discovery, of Saussure by literary theorists, the relation between linguistics and literature was not made clearer. This is partly because linguists in the 20th century, following Humboldt and more recently Chomsky, tended to view language as an abstract system, whereas the principal domain of the literary critic was in the textual features of the text as artifact. Stylistics thus continues to see the text as the object of study, but instead of seeing it as part of a system, sees it more simply as a site where language is organized, and proceeds to utilize the methods of descriptive linguistics for a more focused and less subjective analysis of those textual features. For the stylistician, then, the text is both data (as a linguist) and artifact (as literary critic). This assumption of the literary artifact (and acceptance of it) has led to the stylistician's domain object being largely simply the literary canon. Literary stylistics does not engage much in debates about the canon (on the whole) – it accepts it as its object of study and analysis. This is because it is not a coherent theory of literature as such, but a collection of possible methodologies. As noted, stylistics often borrows from whatever methodology is prevalent in mainstream linguistics. Traffic the other way – stylistics influencing mainstream linguistics – is almost unheard of. The influence of Saussure brought literary criticism and linguistics both to treat the text synchronically (that is, without regard to time). Stylistics is still a predominantly synchronic approach which has found no parallel to the historicist developments in literary theory that have dominated since the late 1970s.

An important development in the broad field of linguistics in the late 20th and early 21st centuries is that of 'cognitive linguistics.' Cognitive Linguistics (as part of a broader 'cognitive science') is most notably associated with the work of Giles Fauconnier, George Lakoff, Ronald Langacker, Mark Turner, and Eve Sweetser, among others. Much is made of the supposed *antiobjectivist* stance of the cognitivists, where language, thought, and conceptualization are seen to be *embodied*. Embodied experience is expressed through metaphors (hence the cognitivists' obsession with this trope), and knowledge is constituted through and by what are known as *conceptual metaphors*.

Cognitive stylistics naturally takes its lead from cognitive psychology and linguistics, having a number of key assumptions. The first is to do with the 'embodied mind,' an attempt to heal the Cartesian split between mind and body. Mental activity is 'embodied,' in that physical and cultural functioning is interwoven and finds outlets in our use of metaphors and other tropes. Humans are said to conceptualize abstract concepts in concrete terms, where modes of reasoning are grounded in our physical being. Metaphors such as 'success is up' are said to demonstrate this. However, it is too easy to take this as a given, or simple cognitive disposition. Eve Sweetser has shown that such movements from the concrete to the abstract develop over a period of time.

The movement, for instance, from the following two meanings of 'see':

(i) I see the cat
(ii) I see what you mean.

shows a cognitive development in terms of historical semantic change. In its most enlightening form, particularly in the work of Sweetser, it can throw light on the development of semantic change and thus has a diachronic as well as synchronic aspect. There are some within the discipline who wish to replace the term 'stylistics' with the term 'cognitive poetics,' but, in my view, this is a dangerous move. The strength of the eclectic approach offered by stylistics is also its weakness: its restless search for new applications and new theories to galvanize the movement can also be seen as the capricious appropriation of others' work. The cognitive poetics 'revolution' shows the discipline of stylistics at its best and at its worst – sifting through the mass of theories and applications for the most appropriate for stylistic analysis and producing genuine interdisciplinary analyses or misappropriating theories and rushing too quickly to apply them to texts.

Catherine Emmott's (1997) work has made important contributions to our understanding of certain procedures of text-mapping, drawing on recent cognitive and discourse theories. Emmott avoids the pitfalls of what might be called the 'new' affective stylistics by resisting the temptation to speculate further upon the aesthetic considerations of the text. Cognitive poetics (sometimes given the term 'cognitive stylistics') has an uneasy relationship with literary theory, and indeed with traditional stylistics. We might, for instance, define 'literariness' in terms of "cognitive events triggered in the mind by linguistic stimuli" (Pilkington, 2000: 189). But how are we to locate and define those 'cognitive events' except by the description and analysis of the 'linguistic stimuli'? It is not clear how this is different from saying that the text produces a certain effect because of its relevant linguistic features. Traditional literary concerns reappear with a new metalanguage. The focus, as in other cognitive approaches, is, then, on how the text works (or how readers work the text) rather than what the texts means. The work of Stockwell (2002) and Semino and Culpeper (2002) outlines the major concerns of the 'new' stylistics and is usefully read alongside the more traditional stylistic work of Paul Simpson (2004). Jonathan Culler's (1975) notion of 'literary competence' is the main precursor here (in a literary-critical context), but there are also links to the earlier work of Stanley Fish (1970) and Wolfgang Iser (1978). The 'human mind' is the focus of critical attention; but the human mind is a troubling, elusive thing whose functions and very being have to be inferred from human actions and processes. The principal difficulty is that as the analyses of individual texts proceed, the focus on the workings of the 'human mind' is diminished. Typically, as readings become more engaged with the manifest features of the literary text, claims about the 'cognitive' aspect of the analysis are more difficult to sustain.

An alternative to the cognitivists' approach is presented in the work of David Miall (e.g., Miall and Kuiken, 1994 and passim) and others. Miall's work draws on the work of Samuel Taylor Coleridge and grows out of the theories of both Coleridge and the 20th century formalist Victor Shklovsky. Other influences include the Dutch discourse analyst Teun van Dijk. Miall's claim is that the literary text is a universe "whose laws are distinctive" (1994: 2), echoing a more traditional view of the literary artifact. Although he on occasions assumes a crude notion of what constitutes 'ordinary language,' he makes some important observations regarding the nature of the literary text. Most cognitive approaches describe a 'resource-limited' system in which cognitive structures economize comprehension by deleting irrelevant propositions, inferring relevant propositions and building macropropositions. But Miall suggests that literary texts reverse the economizing effects of schemata and other supposed cognitive features. Thus, Miall finds cognitive approaches inadequate and unable to account for the richness of literary language. At a stroke, he rejects a dominant approach and brings to the fore a traditional view of the literary artifact.

Closely allied to the burgeoning cognitive stylistics movement is the development of empirical stylistic analyses from the late 1980s. Empirical stylistics also draws on and is influenced by the growing field of corpus-based linguistic studies. It faces many of the same difficulties faced by the affective stylistics of Stanley Fish developed in the 1970s and the *Rezeptionsästhetik* of Hans Robert Jauss of the same time. Do we account for general dispositions of an ideal reader, or do we try to account for the readings of individuals? In all cases, what is the role of stylistic analysis? In such cases, the common assumption is that nothing is 'there' in the text until a reader construes it – a seemingly trivial point which nevertheless has potentially devastating consequences for a discipline based on the close analysis of manifest linguistic features. Studies such as Steen's (1994) into readers' processing of metaphor rely on conventional interpretation of informants' responses and the sifting and evaluation of data. The corpus of literary texts is already there, as it were, as given.

After the tremendous developments and upheavals in literary theory from the 1960s to the beginning of

the1980s, criticism settled to a period of prolonged historicism, whether politicized or not. The dominant strains have been in historicized analysis, postcolonial and feminist (and postfeminist) work, including psychoanalytical approaches. To be sure, criticism could not sustain its relentless self-questioning forever, and there has been a certain amount of retreat from critical neuroses and a reassessment of earlier critical and literary issues – even such hoary old-timers as authorial intention. Certainly, literary theory turned away from the kinds of linguistic concerns that had been fundamental to its development in the 1960s through to the 1980s and focused more on extending and challenging the canon and on forging closer relationships with historical methodologies. In some ways, language-study (in its broadest sense) has rarely been further from the domain of 'mainstream' literary criticism; and theoretical inputs and influences from mainstream linguistics (or out the mainstream) are rare.

In stylistics, many of its traditional concerns are still being explored, despite the proclamations of the cognitive stylisticians. In journals, one will still find work on free indirect discourse, on 'mind style,' on metaphor and metonymy, on speech acts and pragmatics, on feminist stylistics, and on transitivity. This is partly due to the fact that a certain kind of stylistics (particularly evident in British universities) is essentially a pedagogical tool, and many of these topics and approaches are still the core of stylistics and 'literary linguistics' courses both in Europe and in the United States.

Stylistics in Europe has tended to engage with the interface of linguistic and literary theory more readily than the dominant British model (which is largely conservative in its eclecticism). European work – especially from The Netherlands, Germany, and Spain – has embraced movements both in linguistics and literary theory to produce challenging and often exciting readings of texts. European stylistics has tended to incorporate issues in philosophy, both 'continental' and 'traditional,' in its approaches and analyses much more readily than its more conservative counterpart. Here we are likely to find Derrida, Wittgenstein, Russell, Said, Gadamer, Kripke, and Spivak rubbing shoulders with Halliday, Chomsky, and Leech and Leavis, Greenblatt and Harris. Stylistics and literary theory are closely related in this eclectic tradition. This is partly due to a tendency in Europe to embrace European philosophy more readily than in Great Britain and the United States and a desire to integrate the empirical and the philosophical. Thus, the 'great four' of critical theory (and related fields) who so dominated and influenced cultural analysis in the 1960s, 1970s, and

1980s – Jacques Derrida, Roland Barthes, Jacques Lacan, and Michel Foucault – were assimilated into European cultural theory readily. Coupled with a tradition of stylistic analysis (as in the work of Teun Van Dijk), this philosophical and cultural assimilation gave rise (and to a certain extent still does) fertile cross-disciplinary literary analysis.

See also: Critical Discourse Analysis; Relevance Theory; Stylistics.

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Lying, Honesty, and Promising

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Promising and asserting are both speech acts, and as such they are regulated by practical norms as well as linguistic norms (e.g., norms of etiquette). Here we shall be concerned with the **moral** norms that govern these speech acts.

Informational Theories

Many philosophers take the view that the morality of an act – its rightness or wrongness – is a function of the harms and benefits this act brings to the agent and to others. These philosophers also hold that the main way promises and assertions affect the interests of human beings is when they serve as sources of information. So, they conclude, both promises and assertions are morally significant principally because, and in so far as, they purport to offer information. Let's call this the 'informational' view of the morality of promise and assertion. On this view, morality censures an unfulfilled promise or a false assertion because these deeds can harm others by giving them false information.

We are all obliged to take due care not to lead others to form false beliefs, at least where this might be harmful to them (Scanlon, 1998: 300). This obligation means that we must not set out to deceive people by making them insincere promises or telling them things that we know to be false. But it also means that we mustn't change our minds about what we promised we were going to do (without good reason) or make an assertion without adequate evidence. Someone who accepts a promise standardly forms the expectation that the promisor will perform, and they may rely on this expectation to their detriment. Someone who believes an assertion is similarly exposed, if this assertion turns out to be false. I'll deal with informational theories of promising first and then move onto assertion.

Information theorists of promissory obligation fall into two categories. First, there are those (sometimes called 'expectation theorists') who argue that we are all under an obligation not to mislead others about how we shall behave in the future and that this obligation is why we ought not to make them promises that we do not fulfill (Scanlon, 1998: Chap. 7; Thomson, 1990: Chap. 12). Second, there are those who argue that we are obliged to fulfill our promises only where there is an up and running practice of

fulfilling one's promises: prior to this, there is no promissory obligation. For such 'practice theorists,' promissory obligation is conventional (Hume, 1978: Book III, Part II, Section V; Anscombe, 1981; Prichard, 1968).

Practice theories differ from expectation theories in their account of how the obligation to keep a promise arises from our interest in having correct information about how other people are going to behave. According to the practice theorist, we can create expectations of performance in our audience by uttering words like "I promise" only where there is an actual practice of making such utterances true, i.e., where people have come to feel some obligation to make them true. So one can't explain the moral significance of this utterance simply by reference to the expectations it creates. Still the practice theorist agrees with the expectation theorist that we are obliged to maintain the practice of promise-making where it exists, because this practice serves our information interest and thereby aids the coordination of behavior.

Turning now to assertion, there is much controversy among philosophers of language about the extent to which language in general, and assertion in particular, involve social convention. For example, Davidson maintains that "there is no known, agreed upon, publicly recognizable convention for making assertions" (Davidson, 1984: 270), and he thinks the same is true of promising. On the other hand Fried urges that the promisor has "intentionally invoked a convention whose function it is to give grounds – moral grounds – for another to expect the promised performance" and "to abuse that confidence is like . . . lying: the abuse of a shared social institution that is intended to invoke the bonds of trust" (Fried, 1980: 16). Thus, there is a division among information theorists of the morality of assertion parallel to that between expectation and practice theorists of promissory obligation.

It has long been debated whether there is any morally significant difference between lying to someone and deceiving them in a more oblique fashion (e.g., by way of false implicatures, deliberate ambiguity, or by leaving misleading evidence around, etc.). And this debate reflects a genuine ambivalence in our everyday attitudes. Where we feel entitled to deceive others – for the sake of their health for instance – many of us are still inclined to go to the trouble of trying to avoid telling a direct lie. On the other hand, where such deception is wrong, the wrong is seldom thought to be mitigated just because a direct lie was avoided.

There is a tradition of thought, however, according to which lying is always wrong, but we are sometimes permitted to deceive in other ways (Aquinas, 1966: II-II 110 a3; MacIntyre, 1995: 309–318). But many contemporary writers have expressed doubts about whether the manner of the deception could by itself make a serious moral difference (Sidgwick, 1981: 354–355; Williams, 2002: 100–110). An expectation theorist who maintains that the wrong of lying is only the wrong of deception will share these doubts (Scanlon, 1998: 320). On the other hand, a practice theorist of the morality of assertion may allow that, in addition to any harm he does to the person he deceives, the liar is abusing and thereby undermining a valuable social practice (Kant, 1991: 612), namely the use of language to convey information.

Noninformational Theories

Until now, we have been assuming that what makes an act, including a speech act, wrong is, some harm that it does to those it wrongs in the end. There are many moral theorists who reject this assumption, and it is open to them to propound noninformational theories of what is wrong with a lie or a broken promise. Rather than attempt a comprehensive classification of noninformational theories, I shall consider one such theory of promising and one such theory of lying, both taken from Kant.

Take promising. Kant locates the moral significance of promising not in the information interests it serves but rather in the fact that it grants the promisee a certain moral authority over the promisor: it entitles the promisee to require the promisor to perform and thus deprives the promisor of a certain moral freedom (Kant, 1996: 57–61). If I promise you a lift home, I am obliged to give you a lift unless you release me from this promise. This line of thought was central to classical theories of promissory obligation (Hobbes, 1991: Chap. 2) and has found an echo in some contemporary writing (Hart, 1967: 60). For these authors, a breach of promise wrongs the promisee, whether or not it also harms them by inducing false expectations in them, because it flouts the moral authority that the promisee has acquired over the promisor.

On this view, informational theories miss what is distinctive about promising. There are many ways of influencing people's expectations and of co-ordinating your behavior with others (Raz, 1977: 215–216). For example, one can predict that one will do something or even express a sincere intention to do something, while making it clear that one is not promising. To promise to do it is to express the intention to undertake an obligation to do it (Searle, 1969: 60), an obligation that mere expressions of intention or predictions do not bring down on the speaker, however firm or confident they may be. If

I predict, on excellent evidence, that I shall be going in your direction because the police will be towing my car in that direction, I have not committed myself to making it true that I shall be going in your direction when that prediction threatens to be falsified.

Turning now to lying, Kant makes a firm distinction between wrong one does in deceiving someone and the wrong one does by lying (Kant, 1996: 182–184). One can lie without deceiving (e.g., when one knows one won't be believed) and one can deceive without lying. On deceiving someone you may wrong them but, according to Kant, when you lie, the person you wrong is yourself. The liar violates a duty to himself (though this violation need not involve harming himself). On explaining the nature of this wrong, Kant follows thinkers like Aquinas in attributing a natural teleology to speech:

> communication of one's thoughts to someone through words that yet (intentionally) contain the contrary of what the speaker thinks on the subject is an end that is directly opposed to the natural purposiveness of the speaker's capacity to communicate his thoughts (Kant, 1996: 182).

In lying, one violates a duty to oneself by abusing one's own faculties, by using oneself "as a mere means (a speaking machine)" (Kant, 1996: 183). It may be possible to capture Kant's basic idea here without reference to natural teleology or duties to self if we adopt a certain view of assertion.

One can distinguish two currently influential theories of assertion. In the first, inspired by Grice, asserting that p is a matter of uttering something with the intention of thereby getting your audience to believe that p, by means of their recognition of that very intention (Grice, 1989). If something like this statement is correct, the moral significance of an utterance *qua* assertion must lie solely in the effect it is trying to achieve, i.e., in the effect that the assertion has on the beliefs of others. In the second view of assertion, asserting that p is more like promising that p. In promising, someone intentionally undertakes an obligation to perform: undertaking such obligations is what promising consists in. Similarly to assert a certain proposition is, on this view, to intentionally undertake an obligation to ensure that one asserts only what is true (Dummett, 1973: 299–302) and, perhaps, to defend one's assertions as true, should they be challenged (Brandom, 1983). Putting oneself under such obligations is what assertion consists of.

Once the second view is in play, we can say what is wrong about lying without making reference to the effect that the lie has on others. A liar is in the wrong not because he is wronging someone but because he knows that he is taking on obligations he cannot discharge. In this way, lying differs from deception that wrongs the deceived when it harms their interests in some way. Deception is an offence against others while lying is an offence against truth. Provided morality is not solely concerned with harm, this offence may be counted as a moral wrong.

See also: Speech Acts; Pragmatic Acts.

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Marxist Theories of Language

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The hinges of a Marxist consideration concern the links binding the language to the structure of society, to models of material praxis, and to forms of ideology. An evaluation of the relationship between Marxism and the sciences of language coincides with the overall judgment expressed by many scholars on the historical experience of the so-called 'real socialism': the questions on the agenda are relevant and unavoidable, but the answers given are, on the whole, misleading or disappointing. The questions posed by Marxism as an interpretive methodology of social relationships may be worded as follows: which linguistic arguments prove that 'man is the sum of social relationships?' How are the different systems of beliefs, socially shared knowledge, cultural values, and rules of a human community continuously rebuilt in his language? How do the ideal–typical needs for mutual understanding and the real contingencies of differentiation and social struggle weave together in the language? These queries question all the symbolic articulations connected with the difference between manual labor and intellectual work.

Looking for a 'True' Marxism in Linguistics

What is the meaning of 'being a Marxist in linguistics?' First of all, it must be stressed that from a methodological point of view, it is not a question of applying Marxism to linguistics (Ponzio, 1989), as such an approach carries the idea of a 'will of power,' which is not acceptable for cultural practices guided by the paradigm of the search for a historical, consensual truth. Any attempt at a mere external application legitimates a defense mechanism aiming at protecting the autonomy of language science against the obtrusiveness of ideological knowledge. To adhere to a Marxist theory of the language does not mean to draw the proposals of a linguistic explanation from the dogmas of social philosophy, but to identify a route of interpenetration between the problems posed by linguistic practice (or reflection) and the possibilities of an unbiased analysis of the same at a social level, just like the one Marx carried out to explain how the capitalist economy of his time worked.

Classics' Indications

The hypothesis of a direct accessibility between Marxism and language sciences may seem surprising when one considers that the assertions concerning language are poor and fragmentary in the classical literature of Marxism. Some passages from the *German ideology* are extremely enlightening, especially those where Marx and Engels (1970) explain that language originated from the need for relationships with others, and is the matter that from the beginning 'contaminates' the spirituality of a 'real, practical conscience,' which is typical of man. Other noteworthy references can be found in the section about *Nature's dialectic*; here Engels develops Darwin's theme of the ape's humanization processes and suggests the existence of a strict connection between language and work. Of course, from an early date (Lafargue, 1894), scholars' attention was attracted by the possibility of identifying a class-prejudiced characterization both in the use of language and in the process of its historical evolution (*see* **Class Language**). This assumption does not justify in the least the absurd contraposition of a 'socialist' or 'revolutionary linguistics' to a 'capitalist' or 'reactionary one,' which would necessarily occur if Marxist theoretical and ideological principles were schematically applied in a scientific investigation of linguistic problems.

Scylla and Charybdis in Marxist Linguistics

A subtle plot of historical and political conditions led Joseph V. Stalin to denounce the fact that Mikolai J. Marr (the recognized spokesman of Marxist theory in linguistics until then) had incurred such an aberration in his doctrine, as he had reconciled his own monogenetic (or Japhetic) hypothesis of language with assertions about its superstructural and class-prejudiced nature. The great normalizer of the Soviet State often intervened in the linguists' debate published

in *Pravda* (summer 1950), and – as an expert on Marxism, not on glottology – he presumed to outline the correct picture of a Marxist interpretation for linguistic questions. Stalin's position – which seems to be supported by common sense and is consistent with the scientific programs of Saussure's structuralism and Durkheim's sociology – turns out to be fundamentally incorrect both in its method and in substance, although it is absolutely justified by virtue of a certain sociolinguistic policy. As a matter of fact, on the one hand, the pretension to solve a scientific debate by a substantial appeal to authority appears unacceptable; on the other hand, the rebuttal of Marr's thesis is carried out with the help of trivializing arguments. However, from the point of view of the history of thought, Stalin's intervention is an affirmation and, at the same time, a denial of a Marxist theory on language. It is an affirmation because it demonstrates *de facto* that any theoretical language elaboration is bound by reasons of social and political practice. Language sciences, too, obey precise constraints deriving from the development of human relationships and draw inspiration from the ideological climate in which a society lives. Actually Stalin's concern to preserve languages conceals the 'sovietization' process imposed on the different nationalities gathered in the former USSR, and aims at defusing social conflicts. But Stalin's position patently clashes with that dimension of Marxist theory, so it necessarily adheres to a 'critical linguistics,' that is to say, a linguistics that tries to unveil the dominant mechanisms operating in communicative practices (*see* **Critical Discourse Analysis**). For a number of reasons, Stalin could not adopt such a view, and in order to avoid the problems that Marr had reasonably posed but incorrectly solved (Borbé, 1974), he takes refuge in an attitude of denial: as a language system has its own autonomous organization and is an instrument of national identification, language is not a superstructure and does not have a class character, so Marrism is not the equivalent of Marxism in linguistics. Stalin's position is not only mistaken, as he commits the 'minimalist error' (Mey, 1978) of considering language as a mere by-product of the cultural life of a nation, but it is also responsible for putting an end to the debate on the potential of Marxism in linguistics, through its own mystification (Marcellesi and Gardin, 1974).

Language Sciences and Critique of Ideologies

If we escape both monsters of Marrism and Stalinism, are there other implemented models of interpenetration or mutual control between the social theory of Marxism and linguistic questions?

'Bakhtin's Circle'

In fact, an authentically Marxist position in the language sciences is worked out in the postrevolution decade in Russia by the so-called 'Leningrad School.' Michail M. Bakhtin (*see* **Bakhtin, Mikhail Mikhailovich**), Valentin N. Voloshinov (*see* **Voloshinov, Valentin Nikolaevich**), and Pavel N. Medvedev tried to develop a semiotic theory of culture based on Marxist principles. Their conceptual pattern set three interpretative routes: decoding psychic processes both historically and socially; exploring the polyphonic dialogics intrinsic in a language; identifying the sociological constraints of a literary text. The Marxist relevance criterion of such an approach is the criticism of the forms of ideology and the way ideology works. In Voloshinov's opinion (1973), a Marxist conception of the problems posed by language philosophy is warranted by the need to explore the sign nature of ideological phenomena. As a result, the study of the ideologies embodied in the ethical, religious, juridical, political, and literary institutions of a society must be based on an explanation of the principles regulating their constitutive elements: i.e., signs. The identification of the ideological sphere with semiotics enables us to explain the formation of an individual conscience as a socio-ideological phenomenon; one must therefore imagine an unseizable dialectic interaction between the mind's working and the activation of sign-ideological systems (*see* **Dialogism, Bakhtinian**). The specifically psychological aspects of such an explanatory route were developed by Lev S. Vygotsky (*see* **Vygotskij, Lev Semenovich**); his theory advocated that superior psychic processes (memory, language, will, etc.) are interiorizations of social interactions mediated by signs. To explain the connection between language and ideology, Voloshinov resorted to a metaprocedural strategy: he showed which ideologies are carried by linguists. Two macrotrends are therefore identified in the study of language, which appear as epistemological constants and are still in force: individualist subjectivism (from Humboldt to Croce and Vossler) and abstract objectivism (which was exemplarily represented by Saussure). Voloshinov demonstrated that the Marxist point of view calls for an analysis of the socioideological material 'molded' by verbal interaction in order to rebut both the unsubstantiality of individual creativity in linguistic expression and the narrow-mindedness of a superindividual system of rules escaping the manifold pressures of language usage.

Social Cognition and Linguistic Praxis

The debate interrupted by Stalin and the programs started by the 'Leningrad School' were reconsidered

in the 1960s both by Soviet scholars who were interested in giving a historical and materialist direction to semiotic structuralism (Reznikov, 1964) and by other scholars working in the field of social criticism in the capitalist West (Cornforth, 1967). An interesting bridge between these two perspectives had been sketched in Italy by Antonio Gramsci's brilliant intuitions and was later consolidated in Poland by Adam Schaff (1967). The need for a 'Marxist linguistics' was set by the Polish philosopher in the sphere of a knowledge theory beyond the opposite extremes of mechanistic materialism and subjective idealism. According to Schaff, a Marxist theory emphasizes the role of mediating procedure that language plays between what is subjective and objective, mental and social, biological and cultural. This theory acts as a central support for a conception of man as the being who is responsible for the creation of his own cognitive and relational models. Even if some differences can be found from the point of view of inner logic as well as on the level of phylogenetic and ontogenetic acquisition, the process of 'thinking–speaking' is substantially unitary, as cognition is an effect of social praxis and communicative relations are full of cognitive contents. This dialectic unity enables us to reject both the reflex theory suggested by a naïve materialism and the theory of significant systems autonomy, proposed by some updated versions of idealism. Furthermore, Schaff's Marxist language theory aims at being immediately employed in the practical questions weighing on the decision-making ability of a human person as an actor and a maker of his or her social world. On this subject, Schaff also considers a social categorization process that emphasizes the connection between ideology and language, that is, 'thinking–speaking by stereotypes.' The resort to stereotype and to prejudice gives emphasis to the fact that as the relationship between the individual mind and reality is mediated by the sphere of meanings, the workings of the mind itself are influenced by historical and social conditionings. Stereotypes reveal the real control that social groups have over the contents and processes of individual thought. Schaff's pragmatic point of view allowed him to give stereotypes of the sociointegrative and defense functions that make the workings of the mind compatible with the political structure of society. Similar conclusions are drawn by all those currents of sociolinguistics and pragmalinguistics that wonder about the connections between the conscience of sociality carried by the language and the limits of what the historical conditions of praxis allow human subjects to mean when they are diversified by factors such as age, sex, culture, class, degree of social control, etc. Some theories within 'social linguistics' are marked by an implicit adhesion to a Marxian inspiration, such as 'praxematics,' coming from Lafont's school or Mey's pragmatic approach. Lafont (1978) works out a linguistics focused on the 'praxeme': this is an instrument for the production of sense in speech and, at the same time, a unit of analysis in the relation between the language user and the practical social conditions that make it possible for the uses of linguistic varieties to clash. In outlining the basic question '*Whose language*?,' Mey (1985) makes a constant, critical comparison between the categories obtainable from analysis of industrial society (such as production, oppression, and manipulation) and the instruments of linguistic analysis. According to Mey, the Marxian inspiration in sociolinguistics lies in the need for a theory that can explain the intricate relationship between language as a sociocultural product and the forms of the overall reproduction of a society. The solution he proposes entrusts pragmatics, as the theory of linguistic use, with the task of explaining the various 'wording' possibilities connected with the clashing nature of groups, with different approaches to knowledge and with different power distributions.

Sign Systems and Social Reproduction

The principles of historical–dialectical materialism imply that language is interpreted by abstractions that are in turn determined by the sum of practices regulating man's 'organic exchange' with nature, bearing in mind the often distorted representations imposed by the historical limits within which man is obliged to live his social relationships (Erckenbrecht, 1973). The Marxist idea of language aims at specifying the features of the production of sense carried out by man in the present circumstances of his history and, therefore, at identifying the role of sign systems within the process of 'social reproduction' as a whole. This category indicates the totality of techniques and procedures through which human groups perpetuate their presence in the world. In this perspective, Ferruccio Rossi-Landi's tentatively investigated connection between language and work is justified (1983). At first sight, Rossi-Landi seems to exaggerate when he applies the Marxian labor theory of value to the field of language and to other nonverbal forms of human communication. Indeed, the most important thing is the epistemological and methodological indication of the need for passing from the surface level of exchange and/or the sign market to the underlying level of social labor that is implicit in cultural signification and communication processes. This change of focus makes it possible to criticize the dichotomy traditionally accepted by linguists (out of common sense) between the 'system' and 'use' of the language, both in its classical version of Saussure's

opposition between 'langue' and 'parole,' and in its neoclassical version of Chomsky's opposition between 'competence' and 'performance.' The adherence to these two categories enables linguists to exorcize the fetish of an explanatory autonomy, by confining the pertinence of Marxism to the illustration of the social function of a language. By the contrast, in Rossi-Landi's view, those abstractions are useful only if they are rooted in the ground of 'common speaking,' which defines historically the linguistic *a priori* of the human being. The philosophical methodology of 'common speaking,' which was later generalized in a semiotic methodology of 'common semiosis' by Rossi-Landi, achieves the Marxist theory target of unveiling the ideological consistency of the 'logosphere' and clarifies the mediating role that sign systems play between the economic basis and the super structures of society.

What Shall We Do?

The Marxist perspective, however narrow it may appear, binds those who study linguistic problems to historical–dialectical materialism and obliges them to consider the connections between linguistic theory and the theory of praxis as being relevant. This double bond results in the urgent need to explore the linguistic signs' ideological texture. But for the linguist, the adherence to such an explanatory route entails the commitment to carry out his own language investigations according to an emancipatory project concerning the potentials of human beings. To be a Marxist in linguistics means to adopt an intrinsically debunking perspective of the relationships of social control that are formed and/or expressed in the language. Of course, it is not necessary to be a Marxist to work out a critical and emancipatory linguistics, but the opposite is true: it is necessary to take a critical attitude to be authentically Marxist in linguistics. Marxism aims at putting a sort of 'metasemiotics,' meant as a critical theory of ideologies, at the basis of the language sciences. This perspective is shared by those (such as the late Pierre Bourdiese) who try to use Marxian categories (class, commodity, labor, surplus value, alienation) in the analysis of the relations of linguistic reproduction in society, and by those who take only a critical stance from Marxism, thinking that this is enough to perfect the technical solutions provided by linguistic knowledge. Both 'revolutionaries' and 'reformers' share the same desire to look for a small red petal in the white cup of reflexation on language.

See also: Bakhtin, Mikhail Mikhailovich; Class Language; Critical Discourse Analysis; Dialogism, Bakhtinian; Pragmatics: Overview; Voloshinov, Valentin Nikolaevich; Vygotskij, Lev Semenovich.

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Maxims and Flouting

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Maxims and *flouting* are two closely interrelated terms central to the Oxford language philosopher H. Paul Grice's famous theory of the Cooperative Principle, which first emerged in the William James lectures that Grice delivered at Harvard University in 1967 (*see* **Cooperative Principle; Grice, Herbert Paul.**) Grice's project was to try to reduce the number of meanings for lexical items ("Grice's razor" [Davis, 1998: 20]), and he did this by postulating a new, separate type of non-semantic meaning that he called *implicature*, a type of meaning that is not semantically coded but arises in conversational context (*see* **Implicature**).

The generation of implicature is crucially connected to the workings of an overall *Cooperative Principle* and a set of conversational *maxims*.

The Cooperative Principle

Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged (Grice, 1989).

The Maxims

Quantity

1. Make your contribution as informative as is required.
2. Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.

Quality

1. Do not say what you believe to be false.
2. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.

Relation

1. Be relevant.

Manner

1. Avoid obscurity of expression.
2. Avoid ambiguity.
3. Be brief.
4. Be orderly.

These maxims may either be observed or breached, and in both cases implicatures may arise. The maxims can be contravened in a number of different ways, but crucial importance was allotted to the *blatant*, *intentional* contravention of one (or more of the) maxim(s), or *flouting*. On spotting such a blatant breach, the hearer – who will always retain his or her belief that the speaker is being cooperative – will immediately begin a search for an additional or alternative meaning for the utterance, one that *observes* the maxim(s) in question and thus follows the Cooperative Principle. The result of such a search is the implicature. Consider the following example:

A: Are you going to Anna's party?
B: Well, Anna's got this new boyfriend now.

B's reply here clearly breaches Grice's maxim of Relation (the only truly relevant answers to A's question would be *yes* or *no*). According to the theory, spotting this breach would set off a reasoning process in A, along the following lines:

1. B has said that *Anna's got this new boyfriend now.*
2. This utterance breaches the maxim of Relation.
3. I have, nevertheless, no reason to believe that B does not intend to observe the Cooperative Principle and the maxims.
4. B could not be doing this unless what he really wanted to convey was something different from what he literally says.
5. On the basis of the available context (e.g., that B really liked Anna's old boyfriend), what B really wanted to convey was, *no* (*I am not going to Anna's party*) (a *relevant* reply, i.e., one that is not in breach of the maxim of Relation).

Note how this example illustrates the context-dependency of implicatures. If the context assumed in 5 were *B really* disliked *Anna's old boyfriend*, the interpretation (implicature) would be the opposite, namely, *yes* (*I am going to Anna's party*). (*see* **Context, Communicative.**)

What Is a Maxim?

The concept of maxim is a crucial notion within the theory of the Cooperative Principle. Grice's own characterization of the entity is many-faceted. First of all, he was unambiguous on the point that the maxims are descriptive rather than prescriptive. Our rational nature, according to Grice, leads to the observable situation that the maxims are observed (more often than not). That is, he never meant that the maxims *should always* be observed, one of several common

misunderstandings which has marred the field of Gricean pragmatics since its beginning (Thomas, 1995: 56).

Another noteworthy aspect of Grice's characterization of his maxims is that just because they are seen to have a basis in human rationality, they are not therefore to be considered innate. Furthermore, he was also attracted to the idea of maxims as *general interactional principles* governing both non-verbal and verbal behavior. Finally, the proposed set of maxims was seen as *expandable*: "There are, of course, all sorts of other maxims (aesthetic, social, or moral in character), such as 'Be polite,' that are also normally observed by participants in talk exchanges, and these may also generate . . . implicatures" (Grice, 1989: 28).

In the post-Gricean literature, there are roughly three main approaches to maxims. The first tries to tighten the association between the maxims and human rationality. The main representative of this approach, Asa Kasher, does this by postulating principles of rationality from which Grice's maxims are seen to derive (Kasher, 1976). The second, more influential approach, alienates itself most strongly from Grice's original formulation: here, the maxims are redefined as innate, linguistic rules that are always observed and that will produce the same implicatures irrespective of context (e.g., Atlas and Levinson, 1981; Horn, 1984). This formalist, cognitivist approach, in its quest to 'purge' the Gricean scheme, often ends up reducing the number of proposed maxims, a trend that culminated in the theory of relevance proposed by Sperber and Wilson in 1986, in which all the maxims were collapsed into one, cognitive, Principle of Relevance. This is in stark contrast to a completely opposite trend, found in the third approach to maxims, the social pragmatics approach. Geoffrey Leech (1983), adopting Grice's view of maxims as learned entities, ends up adding a large number of maxims to Grice's scheme.

The main drawback of the formalist, cognitivist approach is clear: they see maxims as rules that are in principle always followed, and hence this kind of theory cannot account for that which is observed when some such entity as a maxim is *breached* (e.g., flouted), namely, the emergence of a layer of underlying meaning (implicature). Support for this observation has come from a perhaps unusual angle: research in Artificial Intelligence has shown that, in order for computers to communicate efficiently with human beings, they need to observe all the Gricean maxims at all times. If they do not, the human communicator will invariably read more into the computer's utterance than the devisers of the program intended (Bernsen *et al.,* 1996).

The main criticism of the social pragmatic approach has revolved around their uncritical, *ad hoc* proliferation of maxims (see, e.g., Brown and Levinson, 1987). A weakness of *all* approaches, including the social pragmatics approach, is the widespread belief that there must be an ultimate, fixed set of universal maxims where each can be classified and labeled individually. This despite the fact that the universality of maxims was drawn strongly into question as early as the mid-1970s, in Elinor Keenan's (1976) famous study of a Malagasy community, in which the influence of an informativity maxim (Quantity) was shown to be absent in certain speech situations. Unfortunately, rather than drawing attention to the eclectic sociocultural reality of Gricean maxims and other such entities, Keenan's work was applauded as a refutation of Grice's claims by those who believe that universality is the only valid stamp of approval for maxims.

The varied appearance of maxims around the world makes likely the hypothesis that one cannot ever hope to be able to enumerate and label every single maxim – the list of entities that can be flouted to produce implicature is probably open-ended. This, of course, calls for a detailed and succinct definition of the notion, to stand guard at the door, controlling which new maxims get in. A simple solution would be to adopt a functional definition such as that proposed by François Récanati (1987: 133), to the effect that a maxim is an entity that can be flouted to produce implicature (see also Levinson's 'general principle' [1983: 132]). The success of such a definition would, however, depend on whether or not one has reached a satisfactory understanding of the notion of *flouting*.

Flouting: Past, Present, and Future

As was noted in the first section of this article, flouting is the blatant breach of one of the maxims. Because all hearers embody faith in the speaker's inherent intention to be cooperative (i.e., to observe the maxims [at some level]), a seeming breach will trigger a reasoning process whereby the hearer will try to come up with a meaning for the utterance that *turns it into* an act of observing the given maxim(s) (an implicature).

There are several problems with this model. First of all, it is unlikely that it is the hearer's belief in the speaker's cooperativity that is the reason behind the former's quest to retrieve an implicature. This is especially the case if one chooses to include politeness maxims into the scheme: if a politeness maxim is breached, the implicature is hardly ever more polite than the act itself (consider, e.g., the act of turning away when one should have greeted somebody, in

order to implicate, for instance, that one considers that person to have done something despicable). Another serious problem is that the reasoning process the hearer is supposed to go through is psychologically implausible. And finally, the end product of this process, the implicature, is presented as an entity that is easily circumscribed (a fully fledged proposition), whereas real life might prove to be far less ordered, with several half-formed, semi-verbalized hypotheses as outcome.

Despite these problems, which are clearly in need of serious attention, there has been a curious neglect of the notion of flouting in post-Gricean theory-building. The interest from empirical researchers has, by contrast, been tremendous. The notion is used as an analytical tool in a large array of studies in a multitude of extra-pragmatic and semi-pragmatic fields such as, e.g., literary criticism (e.g., Bollobás, 1981), humor studies (e.g., Attardo, 1990), or gender studies (Rundquist, 1992). Such widespread application clearly confirms the theoretical value of the notion. However, as very few have felt the need to make any significant amendments to the theory (apart from the occasional addition of a 'new maxim'), the problems remain.

In the theoretical literature, it is mainly the strong focus on observance (largely because of a reluctance to deal with the troublesome notion of context) that has obscured the need to deal with the notion of flouting. The discussion above related the formalist approach with their definition of maxims as context-independent rules that are always to be observed. Another trend manifests itself by interpreting every observed breach of a maxim not as a breach, but as the observance of an invented, 'opposite' maxim (e.g., a breach of Be brief would be seen as an observation of 'Be wordy') (see, e.g., Joshi, 1982).

A particularly serious form of neglect is, of course, outright rejection, as in Sperber and Wilson's highly influential, and heavily criticized, Relevance Theory (1995). (*see* **Relevance Theory.**) Maxims, as envisaged by Grice, are afforded no place in a theory of indirectness, and the notion of flouting leading to implicature is replaced by the idea that implicature should be arrived at by a continued search for relevance, when the literal interpretation yields none. The problem for Relevance Theory is, of course, empirical evidence such as that mentioned in the previous section (Bernsen *et al.,* 1996), which shows without a shadow of a doubt that maxims (or something like them) *are* involved and that breaching them *does* have the effect of stimulating the interpretation of indirect meaning. In addition, there are interesting indications that Grice may have stumbled on to something that is in reality part of an even larger scheme than he

envisaged. In experimental social psychology, it has long been noted that 'unusual events' are sociocognitive triggers for a search for an 'explanation' (the 'expectancy principle' [Weiner, 1985: 81]). The breach of a maxim, being the departure from a norm, is also in this sense an 'unusual event,' and the search for an implicature has much in common with the description of the search for an 'explanation.' If this connection is viable, it holds great promise for the further development of Grice's model of flouting.

Conclusion

All in all, Grice himself offered merely 20 or so pages on the topic of maxims and flouting. Subsequent research offers much food for thought, but no viable theory has emerged that exploits the full potential of Grice's eminent point of departure. This does not mean that it is an impossible task to arrive at such a theory, but it would probably require a considerable reorientation of focus, possibly toward the sociocultural significance of both maxims and flouting.

See also: Cooperative Principle; Discourse, Foucauldian Approach; Grice, Herbert Paul; Implicature; Intercultural Pragmatics and Communication; Irony; Neo-Gricean Pragmatics; Relevance Theory.

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Media and Language: Overview

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The mass media are generally considered to include the press, radio, and television; the Internet, although not strictly a medium, is also increasingly included. News and current affairs articles and programs, documentaries, sports news and broadcasts, radio phone-ins, advertisements, reality television, quiz shows, soap operas, websites, and so on help to organize the ways we understand our society and culture. They are often the only way we have of understanding other societies and cultures. The media's influence on everyday life is usually taken for granted. They supply accounts of reality and construct particular forms of knowledge and pleasure: they inform and educate, they sell products, they tell stories, they entertain, they connect us with others, they help form our identities, they influence trends and mobilize opinion, they circumscribe our experience in what has become a media-saturated environment.

Linguists and others working in language and communication have always been interested in the language of the media. Bell (1995: 23) gives four reasons for this: the ready availability and accessibility of media texts as sources of language data; the importance of media for evidence of language use and language attitudes in a speech community; the use the media themselves make of language; and the way the media reflect culture, politics and social life. Not surprisingly, other researchers from a range of disciplines and fields such as media studies and journalism, communication, cultural studies, sociology, education, and psychology have also been interested in how the media shape these understandings.

In these fields, media are studied not just through their texts but also through the wider cultural contexts associated with industrial production processes, and through the effects they have on their audiences (for example, Watson, 1998; Curran and Gurevitch, 2000). While texts are at the center of any concern related to language and the media, the analysis and critique of production processes and audience effects are often valuable as well. This article will discuss a variety of approaches to media analysis and outline briefly some of the recent debates about the media to emphasize the usefulness of the range of critical resources that have been applied to media texts and media language.

Approaches to Media Language Analysis

Media texts have been analyzed both quantitatively and qualitatively. Early work, especially in the United States, concentrated on content analysis. Content analysis focuses on the message and assumes that its content can be broken down into units of meaning that can be counted in a process that is designed to be objective and replicable. Much of this early work looked at the content of American newspapers, especially on subject matter categories like politics, crime, and sports. Towards the end of the 1930s, Harold Lasswell, who was interested in the relationship between propaganda and public opinion in the 'new' mass medium of radio, used content analysis to investigate political values. During World War II, the U.S. government, through the Experimental Division for the Study of War-Time Communications under Lasswell, conducted the 'World attention survey' through a content analysis of major newspapers, which was designed to investigate newspaper coverage of foreign affairs. Others investigated the propaganda output

from various organizations and individuals, focusing on aspects like the 'values' expressed in political speeches or the 'tone' of the headlines. Essentially, the origins of this approach developed in the study of the content of newspapers, but then evolved to be used as a way of evaluating political messages, especially Nazi and Soviet propaganda messages during World War II and the Cold War.

Much of this research was quantitative, relying on coding aspects of content into a number of discrete categories and counting their frequency. Later content analyses applied a similar methodology to television, but just about every type of media communication has been studied. Modern content analysis is still used for news content or detecting political bias, but it has also been used to investigate topics like gender representation in advertisements, violence in children's television programs, and representations of minority groups (for example, the work of the Glasgow Media Group in the United Kingdom on the news; and the research by George Gerbner and his associates in the United States on the Cultural Indicators project).

The first edition of the *Encyclopedia of language and linguistics* included an article on media language as part of the communicative process and outlined a different and more theoretically based tradition in the study of media language. It started with semiotics to demonstrate the need to think of media language as part of a sign system or as a process of communication with complex social and cultural influences affecting the way in which media texts are produced and understood. The article reviewed the major approaches to the study of media language, such as critical linguistics, noting its approach to ideology and power in the representation of social reality, and its agenda in unmasking the seemingly objective nature of news reports; semiotics, especially as a way of decoding both verbal and visual aspects in advertisements; and discourse analysis, again primarily of news texts, but also phone-ins, interviews, and disc jockey monologues, with an emphasis on pragmatics, speech acts, and turn-taking. It noted a shift in emphasis away from textual analysis alone towards a more audience-focused approach.

Other overviews published more recently have outlined the research trajectories in language in the media through the work of individual linguists, especially with respect to the growing influence of Critical Discourse Analysis. Bell's (1995) overview maps out the approaches made in the study of media language and discourse from, first, Critical Linguistics and then Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). He notes the growing importance of CDA and its sociopolitical concern to reveal inequalities of power as a standard approach to media texts, outlining the contributions

of Fowler through his development of Critical Linguistics to apply functional grammar to news texts; of van Dijk's using text linguistics to develop discourse analysis to apply to news story structure; of Fairclough's bringing social theory, especially the work of Foucault, to discourse analysis, and to his contribution, along with that of van Dijk, to the development of Critical Discourse Analysis with its explicit sociopolitical stance. Bell's own work links text analysis of news stories to media production processes and the role of the audience. Critical discourse analysts are interested in both details of the text itself and the broader social, political, and cultural functions of media discourse to determine other layers of meaning. Much of their work to date has been on the analysis of factual genres like news rather than fiction or advertising.

CDA has become an important approach for studying media texts, especially in European linguistics and discourse studies.

However, to argue uniformity in the CDA approach could be misleading. The use of the individuals' contributions to structure overviews of the field is instructive here. CDA is not a holistic approach, using a single theory or even a single methodology. Its foundations are derived from classical rhetoric, pragmatics, text linguistics, sociolinguistics, and applied linguistics and reflect the growing interdisciplinarity in research between the humanities and the social sciences. Ideology and power underpin applications of CDA to issues relating to gender, class, and ethnicity and also to more general discussions about media discourses relating to politics or the economy (*see* **Media, Politics and Discourse Interactions**). However, depending on the discipline background of the researcher, the methodologies may differ, with both large empirical studies found as well as small, focused qualitative case studies. Weiss and Wodak's (2003) volume covers some of the research practices under the umbrella of CDA, and their introduction outlines some of the critiques and debates that have evolved with it.

The dominant paradigms of media language research have tended to produce critical evaluations of the power of the media to influence and even to subordinate their audiences. As indicated above, much of the work on media language, especially in critical linguistics and critical discourse analysis, has been undertaken on the news and is concerned with uncovering its underlying ideologies. In particular, this work targets for special attention social problems like discrimination and prejudice (for example, van Dijk's 1991 work on racism). The studies undertaken in CDA are designed with an emancipatory purpose; that is, they have a sociopolitical agenda intended

to shed light on issues of power and domination. Thus, it should not be surprising to see so much CDA focused on the news.

News is not considered as some neutral image of the real world but as a product of news gathering and news making. In other words, news is the end result of a number of processes, including organizational policies and preferences that set the news agenda and selection and judgments about relative importance and significance. It is thus a representational discourse made by converting the raw data from a variety of sources, including eyewitness accounts, interviews, and media releases, into stories within the context of technical constraints like production deadlines, and in accordance with the news values of the time (*see* **Newspeak**). News values, or the set of criteria used to determine newsworthiness and hence whether or not an item is likely to appear as news, act as a filtering mechanism or gate-keeping device for what is reported.

The study of the news has always been at the forefront of media discourse research. The constructedness and selectivity of the news and its concentration on negative events, together with its connection to powerful institutions and commercial market imperatives, have proved compelling for language researchers, especially those who are interested in critical approaches to ideology, and have stimulated investigations into story content, underlying values, and structure, as well as studies of representations of specific issues and groups. However, media language has been studied at other levels beyond journalistic practices, media production processes, and textual analysis.

The traditional distinction between news and entertainment has transferred into analytic approaches, with linguists and discourse analysts using conventional, language-focused, empirical methods on news texts, especially on news content, news values, and ideals of objectivity. This has left theorists from other fields like sociology, cultural studies, and women's studies to supply much of the insight into the entertainment side of media output. It is from these traditions that studies about consumption, popular taste, the politics of the everyday, and notions of pleasure and resistance have been undertaken.

A major contribution here has been insights from reception studies into reading practices and how readers or audiences negotiate meaning and respond to various media texts such as soap operas and women's magazines, as well as news programs. These are questions that usually lie outside traditional language or discourse analysis. Audience research has been the mainstay of media and cultural studies research for some years now as researchers endeavor to find out how audiences make sense of media texts.

Reception studies have focused on specific genres to see how different social groups (based on age, class, ethnicity, or gender) or subcultures interpret texts in different ways. Hermes (1995), for example, in her analysis of women's magazines, draws heavily on responses from women who describe the pleasure they derive from reading what is often considered a devalued genre. Fewer studies have undertaken detailed linguistic analysis to relate textual features to audience interpretation. Richardson's work (1998) on economic reporting in television news is an exception here, as she links an analysis of media discourse on the economy with an analysis of the reception of that discourse.

Studying texts with images and sounds has presented challenges to conventional discourse analysis, which has valued modes of language through speech and/or writing over visual images or music. The mass media produce multimodal texts, that is, texts that draw from language, pictures, or other graphic elements and sounds in various combinations. Considerations of the multimodal nature of media texts are difficult to incorporate in language-based media analysis. Two examples of work on multimodality in the media, linked to linguistics, are Kress and van Leeuwen's work on text layouts (1998, 2001) and Cook's work (2001) on advertisements.

Kress and van Leeuwen have pointed out how the multimodality of the media needs to be taken into account when analyzing discourse. Their (1998) semiotic analysis of newspaper front page layouts shows how conventions related to the positioning of headlines, blocks of text, and photographs produce meaning and coherence; how visual cues (size, color, contrast) produce hierarchies of meaning; and how frames like lines and spaces produce separations or connections. They emphasize the importance of layout analysis in the critical study of newspaper language. The nature of advertising also means that analysts need to take account of pictorial and musical modes, even in advertisements where language predominates. Cook (2001) stresses the links between language in advertising with the other modes and urges analysts to understand the interconnections they make with each other to construct meaning. In spite of the difficulties in trying capture such multimodality, concentrating on language and ignoring the other modes is to miss much of the potential for meaning of contemporary media texts.

Current Issues

The Impact of New Media

Researchers and other commentators have continued to be interested in media language and have expanded

the field to include newer forms of media, mainly through attention to computer-mediated communication (CMC) (*see* **Language in Computer-Mediated Communication**). The development of global, digital, networked communication systems and their infrastructure in the latter part of the 20th century has captured the public imagination in terms of the seemingly limitless potential to provide access to information and to facilitate interaction with others. This has been greeted with either utopian predictions of a better informed and more democratic society with greater facilities to connect and interact with others through the creation of virtual communities, or a darker view of information overload, unregulated content, personal isolation, and even loss of ability to interact face-to-face, and a 'digital divide' between those with access and those without.

New on-line technologies have transformed news through the capacity to accumulate unlimited multimodal information in a single text and to permit different routes of access and different levels of interaction. On-line news departs from the constraints of space and time associated with print and broadcast news and instead organizes vast amounts of information content as self-supporting layers with hypertext links (Lewis, 2003). In addition, various new forms of news have emerged with webcasts, web logs, news groups, and news alert services that provide constant access to news and embedded information.

Research on language use in computer-based media is struggling to keep pace with rapid technological innovations. The impact of the Internet and related technologies on language has been discussed (often negatively) in terms of language change and effects on literacy. Crystal's (2001) linguistic perspective offers evidence of the emergence of distinctive language varieties developing in Internet-related forms of communication, including e-mail, chat groups, virtual worlds (imaginary environments for text interactions), and the World Wide Web. In each, he notes adaptations in graphology, grammar, semantics, and discourse to suit the characteristics of the technology and its uses. Rather than forecasting the demise of the written form or, more dramatically, the death of languages as the result of the impact of new technologies, Crystal argues that the Internet is providing creative possibilities and enrichment opportunities for its users.

Work related to language in the new media has included studies on topics like web pages and hypertext links, e-mail discussion lists, and Internet video conferencing, and studies on themes like multilingualism in chat sites, the dominance (or not) of English in the new media, the extent of democracy, and the division between the information-rich and information-poor (for a range of studies, see Pemberton and

Shurville, 2000; Herring, 1996; Jenkins and Thorburn, 2003; Aitchison and Lewis, 2003). Language research has focused primarily on computer-mediated communication via the Internet, its relationship to face-to-face communication, and its relative anonymity, as well as textual aspects like special language features and idiosyncratic codes of conduct and etiquette (or 'netiquette'). E-mail users and Internet chat users have developed spelling shortcuts like letter homophones or acronyms as a kind of coded shorthand to speed up typing (by saving keystrokes), and even special symbols created originally from ASCII characters ('emoticons' like smiley faces) to add emotional content. These shortcuts and symbols also help to differentiate regular users from newcomers. The so-called 'netspeak' or 'netlingo' has spread beyond CMC, with similar shortcuts and symbols adopted by mobile telephone users for text messaging, and CMC jargon like 'flaming' and 'spamming' becoming more widely used and understood.

Internet communication channels like chatrooms, bulletin boards, newsgroups, complex hyperlinked websites, and electronic games need to be thought of differently from traditional media texts (*see* **Language in Computer-Mediated Communication**). Such texts are characterized by their interactivity but also by their intertextuality, as they draw on other texts and play with established conventions of form and representation (Buckingham, 2000). In addition, many new media forms with their built-in potential for interactivity make the traditional distinction between author and reader (or producer and audience) less important, as texts are cooperatively produced and meanings are created, challenged, and changed. While it may be compelling to foreground the benefits of intertextuality and interactivity in contemporary media texts, especially in terms of creativity and innovation, many texts produced in new media are just refashioned conventional texts whose interactivity is based on limited choice and pathways.

Revisiting Traditional Media

The more traditional media continue to generate research interest with new insights. Changes to the language of the media have been noted, such as growing tendencies for a more casual, conversational style with an increasing use of colloquial vocabulary and vernacular idiom by journalists and interviewers; a greater emphasis on celebrity; stress on the personal; and a marked trend to the short, sharp, sound bite designed to be pithy and provocative, especially when edited into news reports.

In debates about declining journalistic standards, the news media across a range of countries increasingly have been criticized for not separating news from

entertainment, for personalizing and sensationalizing stories, and for focusing on 'softer' or 'lighter' stories rather than concentrating on more serious issues in a process termed 'tabloidization' (for international perspectives on tabloidization, see Sparks and Tulloch, 2000). Mass-market magazine content also has become more sensationalized with a growing emphasis on celebrity coverage, gossip, scandal, and intrigue. Franklin (1997: 4) has criticized both print and broadcast journalism, commenting that "the trivial has triumphed over the weighty; the intimate relationships of celebrities from soap operas, the world of sport or the royal family are judged more 'newsworthy' than the reporting of significant issues and events of international importance."

While news and public affairs remain an important part of media output, a significant portion of television output is devoted more directly to entertainment through soap operas, dramas, talk shows, reality television, quiz shows, sports, and lifestyle programming. It is likely that the increasing global trend of the media supplying more and more of these shows is underpinning the tendency for the news to become more conversationalized and more 'tabloid,' as it too comes under market pressure to entertain and to connect more closely with ordinary values and practices.

Research has continued as well on a range of variously disenfranchised groups, including women, children, the aged, ethnic minorities, and disabled groups, and on moral panics, not just in the traditional sense of 'muggings' and escalating urban violence (Hall *et al.,* 1978) but in a more diverse sense that includes media coverage of issues related to pornography, pedophilia, health risks, and medical negligence. Research also has been conducted into media's role in language development and literacy.

These new and continuing directions in research are contributing to the growing critique of the media and how they operate. Contemporary media language is changing, especially under the influence of globalizing technologies and changes to the media industries that are affecting the way our social world is presented to us. As global media corporations operate beyond the symbolic spheres of national influences and cultures, we are seeing increasingly globalized programming and convergent technologies, but whether this will translate into a homogenized culture with a global language is not at all certain. It is more likely that improvements in technology will give us more choice about where we get our information from and how we entertain ourselves.

What is evident within the study of language in the media is a continuing trend away from just text-based and/or purely linguistic approaches, not only in order to take account of factors surrounding media texts like the production processes, the characteristics of the medium, and the circumstances of audience reception but also to look at the nature of media language itself as it changes in relation to changing industry, social pressures, and emerging technologies.

See also: Critical Discourse Analysis; Genre and Genre Analysis; Language in Computer-Mediated Communication; Media, Politics and Discourse Interactions; Media: Pragmatics; Newspeak; Speech Acts; Text and Text Analysis.

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Media, Politics and Discourse Interactions

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Media texts are frequently being used as corpora in linguistic analysis, treating politics- and policy-related questions such as social inclusion and exclusion, stereotypes, and constructions of national or ethnic identities (Wodak and Busch, 2004). For instance, over 40% of the papers published in the journal *Discourse & Society* are based on media texts (Garrett and Bell, 1998: 6). There are different reasons for this: given their public nature, media texts are easily available and accessible, offering even a historic dimension through archives. Media texts can be assumed to have an impact as they address and reach multipliers or a more general large public. It can be assumed that they receive attention by their audiences, as their reception is voluntary. Media texts, as other texts in the public domain, provide discursive and linguistic resources that can be seen as authoritative voice (Bourdieu, 1982). Although also in media studies news is one of the most widely studied media forms, the connection between

media and politics has not been sufficiently investigated (Fiske, 1987: 281), and no coherent theory that integrates media theories, political theory, and social change has been developed so far.

The first part of this article discusses the correlations between media and politics. The historical perspective on developments in Western Europe shows a change of paradigms that becomes visible in the media order, in conceptions of the public sphere, and in media theory more generally. The second part focuses on approaches to the analysis of political discourse in the media. Given that the political field and the media field both undergo a process of rapid change, a flexible framework is needed, which is not based on fixed categories such as ownership or media genre and which establishes close connection between media texts and contexts of production and reception. The article therefore foregrounds approaches developed within critical discourse analysis (CDA).

Media, Politics, and the Public Sphere

The post-World War II media order in Western Europe was characterized by a strong public

service broadcasting sector that aimed at reinforcing a unified national public sphere and was therefore protected by broadcasting monopolies. While print media were differentiated according to ideological, class, regional, and language criteria and therefore reached only segments of the national public sphere, the public broadcasting service addressed the nation as a whole. The public service saw itself as a kind of classroom for the nation, which it served, represented and constituted. National broadcasting could create "a sense of unity – and of corresponding boundaries around the nation," "turn previously exclusive social events into mass experiences," and "link the national public into the private lives of citizens" (Morley, 2000: 107). Within the public service the state language was seen as a means of strengthening national identities. In the case of multilingual states, such as Switzerland or Belgium, this led to the creation of parallel systems in the respective languages within the national broadcasting order. Imagining the audience as a national community and structuring communication in a unidirectional paternalistic top-down manner also determined language practices that emphasized the cultivation of a 'pure' standard language. This became apparent not only in language practices excluding 'deviant' accents, but also in ideologically loaded metalinguistic discourses.

Early mainstream theories in media sociology were based on the political philosophy of Enlightenment and viewed the individual as an actor in fulfilling the social contract that grounds civil society. The ideal of media as the fourth realm, as an autonomous controlling institution, which faces the legislative, the executive, and the judiciary, presupposes that there is a relationship of autonomy and distance between the media and the political sector. Such approaches to media and politics tend to conceive media as an omnipotent manipulatory force or to relativize the power of media with respect to politics. In both, communication is conceived as a linear process, in which the transfer of meaning from the sender to the receiver is the central concern. Such approaches fail to locate media, individual actors, and audiences within conflicting fields of interest and power relationships, which are in turn constitutive for the formulation of subject positions (Mattelart, 1999: 94).

Habermas's discourse-based concept of the public sphere defines public sphere as the mediating institution between society and the state. Media fulfill a dual role; on the one hand they are a commodity depending on the rules of the media and the advertising market; on the other they structure social relationships. In the first phase of the constitution of bourgeois nation states, media contributed to the development of the public sphere, whereas in a later phase – because of commercialization and the intimate linkage between the state and the economy – they contributed to its erosion. Habermas's model, originally published in 1962, was based on the assumption of a single unified (national) public sphere. Critics of Habermas's model were formulated by feminist studies (e.g., Young, 1987) and later also by scholars addressing the question of minority exclusion (e.g., Morley, 2000; Husband, 2001) or language as a factor of such exclusion (Busch, 2004). Habermas (1990) himself revised his model and conceded that he had neglected the existence of counter discourses, counter publics, and counter cultures. Drawing upon Foucault's notion of discourse, he recognized that the exclusion of the 'other' is a constitutive element in the formation of the public sphere and that the formation of dominant discourses is based on mechanisms of exclusion. Nevertheless, suppressed discourses can have a transformative impact on dominant discourses.

Struggle of Discourses

In the 1960s and 1970s, various processes of differentiation transformed the media landscape. All over Europe, media became a central topic on the political agenda. The state monopoly on broadcasting as well as the commercial media trusts that gained power in the concentration process were criticized for excluding a range of social groups and deviant political positions. In other words, social movements claimed an adequate representation within the national media systems. To achieve this aim, social movements largely had to rely on their own media such as posters, leaflets, and alternative print media to express alternative or counter opinions in public.

At the same time, public service broadcasting differentiated its programs according to different styles and tastes. Alongside the nationwide programs, specific regional programs gained in importance. On the political level, regionalization in the media corresponded to a revalorization of regional autonomy and of regional languages. The idea of cultural homogeneity conceived as masculine, white, and monolingual lost in impact, as counter discourses challenged the dominant views and hegemonic social relations.

The main challenge for the public service media stemmed from the pressure of private media enterprises. It was the opposition of public versus private that dominated media policies and finally led to the abolishment of broadcasting monopolies in Western Europe. So-called liberalization first only concerned radio, which had abandoned its function as the leading medium to television already in the 1960s. In commercial media, the information aspect became subordinated to the entertainment component.

Technology-driven media theories, which prioritize aspects of form and format over aspects of content, attribute to the medium as such the leading role in shaping and transmitting a message. This approach became popular with McLuhan's succinct formula "the medium is the message," which marks a break from concepts that ascribe a preeminent power in influencing public opinion to media, both in an educational and in a manipulative way. It neglects, however, the question of how technological developments are appropriated socially and culturally. Discourse-oriented approaches to society and politics as developed by Habermas, Foucault, or Bourdieu have a strong impact on media studies and theories. This shift of perspective emphasizes social relations and cultural factors and allows revealing hegemonies and power relationships. In this sense, media can be seen as sites of discourse struggles.

Fragmentation and Reconfiguration of Media Spaces

In the 1990s, the process of decentering the national public sphere gained in momentum. The availability of satellite and cable TV and later of the Internet has led to a further fragmentation of media audiences, a reconfiguration of media spaces and an increasing multidirectionality of communication flows. Two distinctive developments characterize the new kinds of transnational broadcasting spaces and new transnational configurations of culture: the emergence of global broadcasting regions which link populations of neighboring countries on the basis of proximity, common cultural heritage, language, or ethnic identity, and the creation of new diasporic broadcasting spaces, which gather into a single audience different national communities scattered across the world (Robins, 1997: 15–16). In the broadcasting sector, the media landscape becomes complex and manifold. In addition to the traditional national public service emerge not only the global players, but also a range of local media that themselves tend to have various translocal and transborder connections. While commercial interests are constructing a transnational space as a by-product of their primarily economic motives, nonprofit ventures seek to empower local communities, marginalized populations, and civic activists.

Media formats and genres developed by public service media change in nature. Genres and text categories that used to be separated are blurred, new genres appear (e.g., infotainment, edutainment, reality soaps). Political discourse is not confined to the information genre, but also has its impact in the entertainment sector.

This development in the media field corresponds to a decentering of the nation–state at the political level. Under the pressure of an increasingly globalized economy, the state gradually loses its central role as an organizing principle in society and delegates former core competencies, on the one hand, to institutions and expert committees on a supra-state level, and on the other, to a substate level of regions and communes as well as private bodies or NGOs ('non-governmental organizations'; see Castells, 2003). Neoliberal discourses are replacing the former vision of the welfare state. The deregulation of the media system and the weakening of state influence on the media order potentially provide the media with more space for acting in their own right.

In the current debate on the desideratum of a European public sphere, it becomes obvious that the nation state with its public arena is not withering away yet. At the same time, shortcomings already inherent to the notion of a national public sphere – exclusions and fragmentations – are becoming more accentuated. Husband (2001) draws attention to the necessity of reflecting on possible interfaces between parallel and mutually exclusive public spheres in order to guarantee some social coherence. Whereas political discourse could easily be tied to (national) discourse communities within the nation state paradigm, it seems to be becoming more multilayered now.

Approaches to the Analysis of Political Discourse in the Media

In the academic field, certain assumptions that were taken for granted within the nation–state paradigm are increasingly submitted to revision. In retrospective, media are acknowledged a central role in the formation of the modern nation–state as well as in the standardization and homogenization of national languages. Present media developments seem to also allow more space, however, for nonstandard linguistic practices, for multilinguality and multivoicedness (Busch, 2004).

The present trend in approaches to media texts can be characterized in both disciplines, in media studies as well as in linguistics, by a focus away from text-internal readings, where readers are theorized as decoders of fixed meanings, to more dynamic models, where meanings are negotiated by actively participating readers. Consequently, there is a stronger emphasis on processes of transformation of discourses, on recontextualization, and on intertextuality. Nevertheless, studies that focus on production-related transformations are still scarce. Although since Stuart Hall's (1980) influential model of decoding and encoding, the reader is attributed an active role in the constitution of meanings, studies that combine

the moment of the media text and its reception are not very common.

Rapid changes within the media system and within the political order demand an analytical framework for the study of political discourse in the media that is flexible and sufficiently open. Critical discourse analysis (CDA) provides such a framework, as it combines in an interdisciplinary approach close textual analysis with the analysis of the larger social context as well as with routines of textual production and reception. CDA foregrounds a dual focus in the approach to political discourse in the media: the detailed analysis of communicative events and the order of discourses, i.e., to locate these communicative events "within the fields of social practice and in relation to the social and cultural forces which shape and transform those fields" (Fairclough, 1998: 143). This involves the analysis of texts, of discursive practices of text production, distribution, and consumption, and the analysis of social and cultural practices that frame discourse practices and texts (Fairclough, 1998: 144).

The Field of Politics and of the Media

To capture how the political and the media domain are articulated and how media discourses and political discourses are interlinked, it is useful to draw upon the notion of different fields that characterize modern society as developed by Pierre Bourdieu (1982). According to Bourdieu, the separate fields of the economy, the state, the legal system, the arts, politics or the media, etc. are each marked by their own particular form of institutionalization and by their own social and discursive practices. The political field has undergone significant changes that led to an increasing specialization and professionalization of the involved actors. Political discourse manifests itself among others in parliamentary debates, political meetings, party conferences, and public debates. A certain amount of political discourse is designed from the outset to be reported and represented in the media. This is, for example, the case for parliamentary speeches in which politicians often do not only address the assembly but also a larger general public, as they anticipate mediatization. Referring to the field of politics, Bourdieu suggests that political discourse is doubly determined, on the one hand internally within the field of professional politics and on the other externally, i.e., in relation to the people politicians represent as well as in relation to other fields, the media field being one of them.

The field of journalism and the field of the media are determined by power relations and competition between different media, which become visible through certain indicators such as the market share, the value on the advertising market, the symbolic capital of prestigious journalists. The importance of the media field in relation to other fields, such as the field of politics, is that it holds a sort of monopoly on the means of production and on large-scale distribution of information. Political discourse and action are subjected to the principle of selection exerted by journalists and the media within the logic of the journalistic field, which is in turn dominated by market competition (Bourdieu, 1996: 45ff). In order to escape possible censorship that results from the selection process in media production, political actors develop strategies of presenting their concerns in forms that are likely to become media events or stories with news value. Political actors adapt their agenda and style to the requirements of media presence (e.g., short statements, studied gestures, hairstyle) and of media formats (live debates, talk shows).

Both fields, the political and the journalistic, have in common that they are directly under the influence of the sanctions of the market and of plebiscite. According to Bourdieu (1996: 92), the linkage between the two fields amplifies the tendencies of the agents involved in the political field to act according to pressures exerted by the expectations of a mass public and reduces the autonomy of the political field. In the media field, competition between different media enterprises has become more accentuated in the past few years. Since the fall of the state monopolies, the public service broadcasting cultures have also changed significantly. Even genres that used to be relatively stable such as the national news programs on television have experienced fundamental transformations. For instance, there seems to be an acceleration of pace, a compression of time, in which live-broadcast is given priority over in-depth investigation, and short and diversified news items are combined into a more or less connected rapid succession of news flashes.

From the perspective of CDA, the relationship between the field of politics and the field of media can be understood and analyzed as a chain of recontextualizations. Writing or speaking about any social practice is already an act of recontextualization (Caldas-Coulthard, 2003: 276). Recontextualization can involve suppression and filtering of meaning potentials, but it can also result in expanding meaning potentials by adding or elaborating upon the an earlier version of the text (Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999). Van Leeuwen and Wodak (1999: 96) suggest that transformations due to the recontextualization of political discourse include deletion, rearrangement (e.g., changing the order of propositions, altering emphasis), substitution (through linguistic means such as nominalization, metaphor,

metonymy, synecdoche, personalization), and addition (adding new elements to the representation of social practices). In this sense, recontextualization can in turn have a transformative effect on a particular practice or create a new practice.

Linking the fields of politics and media, recontextualization takes place in two directions: media recontextualize political discourse (e.g., speeches) and politicians recontextualize political discourse derived from media (e.g., quoting media as public opinion, as the voice of the common man in the street).

In the process of recontextualization, discourses may also be transposed to a more legitimate context (e.g., from an informal context to the more formal of parliamentary speech) and thus gain in power and status. Legitimation of a text can also be gained through reference to authority, reification, moral evaluation, or through reference to "true stories from real life." Authority can be gained through reference to law, a person with recognized authority, or an institution. On the other hand, laws in democratic societies often emerge from chains of political discourses in which media have their place (Wodak, 2000).

Analyzing Media Texts

With the rapid and dramatic changes in the media sector, obvious categorizations of media with regards to their area of dissemination (national, local, international, etc.), ownership structures (public service, private), or orientation (information, entertainment, education) are becoming more and more difficult. The formerly propagated separation between information and entertainment/edification can hardly be maintained as new genre names such as infotainment or reality soap suggest. Political discourse does not only appear in news or other information programs, but also in formats formerly reserved to other fields such as talk shows. Pinning down the language of news programs or the language of political media discourse becomes more and more impossible. The following part of this article therefore presents elements for an open and flexible framework for the analysis of (political) discourse in media.

Imagining the Audience

Who is the addressee and how is the relationship with the audience structured? These are central questions in the analysis of media texts. It is in fact the structuring of the producer–audience relationship and the ways in which audiences and their expectations concerning texts are imagined that determine how a text is shaped. Genres and text categories depend on this aspect. The notion of the target audience, which encompasses a spatial (local, regional, national, global) and/or a social (social status, income, age, gender) dimension is based on rigid and reified audience categories. Research on media coverage and definitions of target audiences are instruments of marketing research and correspond to criteria established by the advertising industry. Ang (1991) demonstrates that this approach is based on a discursive construct of audience that is unable to grasp the actual relationship between media and audiences and to conceive communication processes. She distinguishes between two main orientations: audience-as-public and audience-as-market. The first is generally associated with the public service media sector in which the addressee is seen as a citizen (of a state); the relationship with the audience is paternal and aims at transmitting values, habits, and tastes. It is linked to the so-called transmission model of communication, in which the transmission of a message and the ordered transfer of meaning is the intended consequence of the communication process.

The second configuration of audience is associated with the private commercial media sector. Audiences are addressed as consumers in a double sense: as consumers of the media product and as potential consumers of the products advertised in the programs. In the attention model of communication (McQuail, 1987), communication is considered successful as soon as attention is actually raised in audiences. The transfer of meaning plays a secondary role. The scoop, the extraordinary, and the scandal gain in importance as means of awakening attention.

In the alternative media sector, the conception of the audience is determined by the idea of an active public that participates in social action and media production. The aim is to overcome the division between producers and audiences, to move closer to a situation in which the Other is able to represent itself, in which the heterogeneity of "authentic informants" is not reduced (Atton, 2002: 9). Alternative or third-sector media are consequently closer to the ideal of representing the multivoicedness of society in all three dimensions, which Bakhtin (Todorov, 1984: 56) has described: heterology (*raznorečie*), i.e., the diversity of discourses, heteroglossia (*raznojazyčnie*), i.e., the diversity of language(s), and heterophony (*raznoglosie*), i.e., the diversity of individual voices.

These different basic orientations in conceiving the producer–audience relationship result in preferences for particular media formats (e.g., authoritative information-centered programs, infotainment programs, and dialogic forms such as phone-in programs) and a choice of particular linguistic practices. They also determine the way in which discourses

are being shaped, reproduced and transformed. It has, for example, been observed that the public service sector, at least in some segments of its program, is becoming more market-oriented and that formats and genres developed in a certain sector are taken up – sometimes in a transformed way – by others.

Modalities and Meanings

Media communication is inherently multimodal communication: this means that language in written and spoken form is one of several modes available for expressing a potential of meanings. For instance, in print media lay-out and image are available in addition to the written word; in radio, language is present in its spoken form, alongside music and different sounds; in television all the aforementioned modes can be drawn upon in a context in which the moving image holds a central position. Similarly, in computer-mediated communication, a wide range of modes is available. "A multimodal approach assumes that the message is 'spread across' all the modes of communication. If this is so, then each mode is a partial bearer of the overall meaning of the message. All modes, speech and writing included, are then seen as always partial bearers of meaning only. This is a fundamental challenge to hitherto current notions of 'language' as a full means of making meaning" (Kress, 2002: 6).

How these modes interact is not only a question of technical availability, but rather a question of social appropriation and convention, as Kress and van Leeuwen (2001) point out in their multimodal social semiotic theory. The interplay between the different modes has undergone substantial changes in media history. Writing was considered in many cultural environments as the central mode for the transfer of canonical knowledge and authoritative discourse. This practice of the predominance of the written text influenced radio production so that practically all radio texts in the early days of the medium were produced first in written form and then read in the radio broadcast. Even in television for some time, news broadcasts were read without a transmission of the image of the speaker, as it was considered that the moving image could distract attention. Linguistic practices and text genres from established media exerted and exert a considerable influence on new media and vice versa. Gradually with television, the image has moved into a central position. This has an impact also on political discourse, where appearances and the visible *mise-en-scène* of political events is becoming more important and must be considered as part of the political discourse. Live broadcasts of TV debates between representatives of different political orientations have for instance become central events in elections. Computer-mediated communication (e.g., Internet, e-mail) as well as other forms of new communication media (e.g., mobile phone news services) are increasingly present in the political field. The conversationalization of (political) discourse in the media (Fairclough, 1995: 9–10) has already gained in momentum with the image and television; possibly the new media will contribute to accelerating this development.

Text and Context

Media production is regulated by institutional routines, and media reception by everyday practices and arrangements, both depending on available resources. The production of media texts can be seen as a series of transformations, a chain of communicative events that link sources in the public domain to the private domain of media reception (Fairclough, 1995: 48–49).

Media production also encompasses the collection and selection of raw material. At each stage in media production, earlier versions of the text are transformed and recontextualized in ways that correspond to the priorities and goals of the current stage. In a multimodal context, different modes can become separated; for example, images can be subtitled with other texts or associated with other contexts.

During the production process, journalists can revert to different kinds of source material: political speeches, interviews, items already preprocessed by news agencies, press releases, archives, other media texts, etc. Current transformations in media production can be characterized on the one hand by an increasing specialization of journalists on narrower fields of reporting (specialization on topics, geographical areas, etc.) and on the other hand by a decreasing labor division between technical and journalistic parts of production. The journalist is not only responsible for the text, but also for the lay-out, the selection of images and even parts of the technical production. Replacing the typesetter, the reader and/or the sound technician, the journalist becomes the designer of a multimodal text. At the same time, because of the economic imperative of reducing the fixed costs in media enterprises, the amount of genuine journalistic investigation decreases in favor of ready-made products such as news agency material and preproduced elements and formats. Journalistic work is becoming more and more a matter of selection than of investigation and news production. This process is encouraged by an oligopolistic owner structure and practices of cross-referencing between different media. In relation to political discourse, this means that certain topics

can make sometimes even unexpected media careers and become dominant in certain media areas (Siegert, 2003).

Another aspect frequently referred to in the context of media and political discourse is the acceleration of the rhythm of news production, especially with the rise of electronic media, which has in turn an accelerating influence the political agenda. That the political field responds to rhythms of urgencies was already raised by Platon, who drew attention to the differences between the actors in the *agora*, the public space, the political arena and philosophers who obey other rhythms. No doubt political and media agendas and discourses influence each other in multiple ways. Whereas earlier theories assumed a predominance of politics over the media or vice versa, contemporary approaches foreground interdependencies and interactions between the political and the media fields.

See also: Dialogism, Bakhtinian; Discourse, Foucauldian Approach; Habermas, Jürgen; Linguistic Habitus; Media and Language: Overview; Media: Pragmatics; Society and Language: Overview.

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Media: Pragmatics

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Today, many, if not most, people in the world live in societies that can be described as 'mediatized societies.' A mediatized society is one in which the meaning processes, or discourses, provided by the communication media play an increasing, even overwhelming, role in the way society is economically, politically, and culturally organized, affecting the way we as individuals and groups think about everything and thus what we do in all contexts of life.

The mediatized society affects us in whatever social roles we have to fill in everyday life. As citizens, we are concerned about the organization and power relations of society; as consumers, we have to take care of our material, intellectual, and wider cultural needs; and as human beings, we have to organize our private lives as individuals, couples, or families on a daily, weekly, and yearly basis.

In all these respects, we are surrounded and affected by the sea of discursive meanings produced by the media. It is therefore mandatory for the understanding of modern society to understand the complex social meaning processes that have media at their core. This requires a 'pragmatics of media' that explores media discourses in their situational and social contexts.

Approaches to the Study of Media Discourses

It has gradually become accepted, at least in principle, that in order to understand the workings of the mediatized society it is necessary to adopt a holistic perspective of the media, according to which it is necessary to not just analyze the media texts but also to consider the production and reception processes involved in media texts, as well as the macro-social context, as interdependent objects of empirical analysis. For a number of years, these processes were conceptualized theoretically in semiotic terms as a signifying process, along the lines laid down by the so-called 'encoding/decoding' model of mass communication (Hall, 1980) (**Figure 1**).

This model implies that any study of a media genre or of the media coverage of real-world events must research, in addition to the textual aspects, the production and reception stages around the text. The model serves to remind analysts that in analyzing a text, they are dealing not with a fixed structure of meaning, but with a volatile phenomenon resulting from the signifying codes of both the producers and the recipients of the text. Crucially, these codes need not be identical; indeed, since the codes at the disposal of any individual consist of a unique assemblage of the meanings assimilated during that person's life history, the codes of producers and receivers are in principle nonidentical. Consequently, one should expect to find multiple meanings resulting from different individuals' reading of a news bulletin, an advertisement, or a TV reality show.

On the other hand, people also belong to interpretive communities (constituted by such factors as class, ethnicity, gender, age, profession, location, etc.) in which meanings are shared to a large extent (Schrøder, 1994). Therefore, a purely textual analysis of a media text can still be justified, as long as the analytical findings are offered cautiously as potential meanings, or made on behalf of a specific interpretive community whose sign universe makes these meanings plausible.

In recent years, the term 'discourse analysis' has gained general acceptance as the way to characterize the theoretical and methodological framework, often holistic, within which analyses of media language and communication are carried out in the interdisciplinary field of media studies, cultural studies, and communication studies. For a general introduction to the most prominent distinctive approaches to discourse analysis in the social sciences and the humanities, see Jørgensen and Phillips (2002).

First-Generation Discourse Analysis: 'Critical Linguistics'

Critical linguistics developed in the 1970s as an influential school of early discourse analysis because it was able to demonstrate the close relationship between the detailed linguistic choices and the production of ideology in media texts (especially news) and, by implication, to explain how media ideology contributed to the reproduction of a social order characterized by inequality and oppression (Fowler *et al.*, 1979).

Critical linguistics adheres to an early version of linguistic constructionism, according to which the words of our language function as a conventionalized mental grid through which we perceive reality. Words constitute the reality that they designate, and when newspapers inform about social states and events they inevitably construct those very states and events.

Going one step further, critical linguistics claims that also the syntactic choices made in a text have a constraining effect on the construction of social reality. The most important of such syntactic–ideological processes are those of passivization and nominalization.

Figure 1 The encoding/decoding model. Reproduced from Hall S (1980). 'Encoding/decoding' In Hall S, Hobson D, Lowe A & Willis P (eds.) *Culture, media, language.* London: Hutchinson.

This should not be taken to mean that the verbal choices in news reports can be made by journalists at will. As mentioned previously, the formation of public opinion through the media in capitalist societies is controlled by those with economic and social power over the mass media, who will see to it that social affairs are represented in such a manner as to not jeopardize their interests and privileges. Consequently, there is a power dimension in all public communication, an ideological thrust that by its sheer omnipresence in the aggregate media landscape manages to establish the current social arrangements as natural and inevitable and to discredit alternative perspectives as being contrary to common sense.

It is the task of critical linguists to expose the ideology conveyed by the media, to demonstrate that news reports of social affairs are indeed constructed and that they systematically portray a state of affairs that is not in the best interest of the majority of the population.

It is thus the goal of detailed linguistic analysis to demonstrate how various seemingly innocent linguistic features in a text convey ideological meanings that reproduce existing unequal power relations. Through linguistic analysis of the news text, the critical linguist is able to expose "warped versions of reality" (Fowler, 1985: 68).

Drawing on Halliday's (1978) theory of functional grammar and social semiotic, innumerable publications by the core group of critical linguists through the late 1970s and the 1980s have described the specific linguistic features that "will probably repay close examination" (Fowler, 1985: 68; see Fowler *et al.*, 1979; Hodge and Kress, 1988). The 'checklist' presented in Fowler (1985) includes the following:

1. Lexical processes: Under this heading, critical linguists examine the way a text uses different lexical fields through the choice of vocabulary (including metaphors) from specific areas of experience, such as scientific vocabulary in a cosmetics ad or management jargon in a political text.

2. Transitivity designates the textual construction of reality through the description of participants and processes, as reflected in the nouns and verbs of the text. As Fowler (1985: 70) states, "Different choices of transitivity structure will add up to different worldviews."

3. Syntactic transformations: Critical linguists believe that certain syntactic transformations of sentences, particularly those labeled 'passivization' and 'nominalization,' are ideologically problematic because they may make agency invisible and thereby obscure who did what to whom or significantly change the relative prominence of the participants.

4. Modality: Under this heading, analysts search for the different linguistic features (e.g., modal verbs and adverbs) through which speakers and writers may express their attitudes toward the events depicted by the sentences in which they occur.

5. Speech acts and turn-taking: Analysts should consider for each sentence or utterance what speech act it appears to perform and how it may build positions of power in the situation in which it is written or spoken. The analyst may also produce interesting insights about the power aspect of interpersonal interaction by examining the turn-taking patterns of different kinds of dialogic and discussion-oriented TV programs: who can speak when and about what, who can open up new topics, etc.

6. Implicature: This linguistic feature is best explained as the meaning that can be found by 'reading between the lines.' There is more to meaning than what is said, and an essential part of the meaning communicated through language is inferred by the speakers from the situational and social context.

7. Address and personal reference: Under this heading, the analyst may consider how different stylistic choices can be seen as addressing some readers rather than others (such as a Latinate vocabulary addressing the educated), how naming conventions affect the degree of formality, and how personal pronouns (*you* used with simultaneous individual and mass appeal in ads, and *we* used to include or exclude listeners from the group the speaker belongs to) may affect interpersonal relationships.

This checklist of potentially ideology-bearing features developed by 'critical linguistics' has found its way into many later forms of qualitative textual analysis of the media, including the approaches to discourse analysis discussed later.

It is not evident, however, that they are all equally useful for the production of insights about the media's signifying processes. For instance, transitivity analysis requires an immensely time-consuming scrutiny of textual details, and even when a kind of ideological pattern does emerge from the analysis (see the case analyzed in Fowler, 1985), it is usually a fairly predictable one that even a cursory glance at the text would have discovered. Therefore, especially for students with little linguistic training, transitivity analysis is usually not worth the effort.

Regarding the 'syntactic transformations' of nominalization and passivization, it is doubtful whether the claims of their mystifying effects are really warranted. In most cases, they appear to be based on erroneous assumptions about the 'nonrecoverability' of the transformed or deleted linguistic items (Trew, 1979). It seems to be equally probable that on the basis of their overall knowledge of the world, their familiarity with the media agenda and yesterday's news reports, and their general communicative competence, average newsreaders will have no difficulty in reconstructing who did what to whom, despite the agent having been deleted from the sentence through a passive construction. Interestingly, an empirical study of readers' reception of newspaper articles previously analyzed by Trew found that the syntactically constructed ideology of the articles did not determine the readers' views of the events reported. Their views depended on their identities and life histories as much as on an ideological effect attributable to the news language (Sigman and Fry, 1985).

Critical Discourse Analysis of the Media

Although clearly intellectually rooted in critical linguistics, critical discourse analysis (CDA), as developed by Norman Fairclough and others since the late 1980s, represents a significant theoretical and methodological advance toward the interdisciplinary study of media discourse (Fairclough, 1995, 2003; van Dijk, 2001; Wodak and Reisigl, 2001). Rather than concerning itself just with the media's textual reproduction of ideology, CDA sets up a comprehensive theoretical framework that relates textual features systematically to the situations in which those texts are produced and consumed and to the larger social processes of the society in question.

This theoretical framework is often described through a model of three embedded boxes (**Figure 2**), each of which represents a dimension of analysis (Fairclough, 1995: 59).

'Texts' stand at the core of the model and are explored through the same forms of linguistic analysis that are used by critical linguistics, with the purpose of illuminating the way the text represents social reality and the way it portrays the identities and relations of the participants in the textual universe.

The second dimension of analysis deals with 'discourse practices' – that is, the processes through which the media text is produced in media institutions and consumed, or 'decoded,' by the audiences and users in the context of everyday life. The discourse practices are seen as mediators between texts and macrolevel 'sociocultural practices,' which constitute the third dimension of analysis. On this level, the phenomena brought to light by the other two dimensions are viewed in relation to the macrosocial processes that characterize the societal 'order of discourse' at a given point in time (*see* **Discourse, Foucauldian Approach**).

CDA, in contrast to critical linguistics, is founded on an acute awareness of the ambivalent role of media discourses in the social formation. Inscribing his model into the current debates about 'structure' versus 'agency' (Beck *et al.*, 1994; Giddens, 1984),

Figure 2 Dimensions of analysis in CDA. Reproduced with permission from Fairclough (1995).

Fairclough placed his approach within a social constructionist theory of society according to which media discourses are constituted by social practices and also are constitutive of such practices.

This means that, on the one hand, mainstream media discourses are constrained, by the economic and political frameworks within which they operate, to produce versions of reality that are on the whole supportive of the existing social order. On the other hand, the fact that the existing social order is not monolithic but characterized by diversity and ideological struggle means that the faithful representation of this very reality must also be characterized by diversity and struggle, and the outcome of such representational struggles is by no means certain to always favor the power elites. The end result of the media's discursive practices in a given area is therefore often uneasily balanced between social reproduction and social change, between convention and innovation.

For example, the macrosocial phenomenon that Fairclough terms the 'conversationalization' of public discourse in the media (i.e., the increasing occurrence of informal speech forms and colloquial expressions in television news and documentary programs) can be seen as sometimes working to support ideologically hegemonic forces because it may trivialize and simplify complex social relationships. However, conversationalization may also serve as a generator of cultural democratization because it may make complex issues easier to understand: "The communicative style of broadcasting lies at the intersection of … democratizing, legitimizing, and marketing pressures, and its ambivalence follows from that" (Fairclough, 1995: 149).

'Intertextuality' is a key analytical concept in CDA designating a principle of textual construction and recognition encompassing several distinct processes. It is meant to cover the basic fact that any text is indebted to innumerable previous source texts and will itself potentially become a source for an infinite number of future texts. Intertextuality also includes the way a text may stylistically echo one or more well-established genres, or particular well-known texts (e.g., when a TV commercial echoes the Western genre or a specific Western film), as well as the way a text may use specific recognizable passages from other texts (e.g., when a U.S. presidential hopeful inserts into his speech a passage from the Declaration of Independence or the Bible, or when news stories rely on direct or indirect quotations of a politician's statements).

Finally, the intertextual perspective means that the analyst should search for the way the particular text may draw on different 'orders of discourse.' This is a term that Fairclough borrowed from Foucault and that he defined as "a structured configuration of genres and discourses … associated with a given social domain" (Fairclough, 1998: 145) with clear implications for the regime of knowledge and power that rules within the particular domain. In the case of political discourse in the media, one may find that the conventional political order of discourse is intermingled with scientific and technological orders of discourse, the order of discourse of grassroots politics, the everyday order of discourse, etc. to create a new hybrid superordinate order of discourse that may herald innovative processes in the political domain.

The main limitation of CDA, which in no way invalidates its achievement as a stimulating theoretical framework for media analysis, is the lack of empirical consideration of the middle level of analysis, the discourse practices. Fairclough deliberately excludes this aspect from his own analyses, stating that "my emphasis will be upon linguistic analysis of texts.…I am not concerned … with direct analysis of production or consumption of texts" (Fairclough, 1995: 62). It is nevertheless a limitation that becomes acute if the analyst wants to discuss the sociocultural implications for audiences of the meanings found through textual analysis. Very few researchers have undertaken a fully holistic, empirical study of media discourses examining the text-mediated communicative circuit between senders and recipients. Among the exceptions are Swales and Rogers's (1995) study of corporate mission statements and the studies of the news circuit by Gavin (1998) and Deacon *et al.* (1999).

Conversation Analysis and Discursive Psychology

A third important discourse analytical approach has been developed mainly by scholars in the field of discursive psychology (Potter and Wetherell, 1987). Among its heterogeneous ancestry, there is no doubt that the ethnomethodology/conversation analysis complex has had the most formative influence on the approach with regard to the actual procedures of analysis. It is the analytical aim of conversation analysis to explore the situational micromechanics of verbal interaction, illuminating among other things the speakers' management of turn-taking processes through adjacency pairs, the role played by silences and interruptions in the flow of interaction, the way speakers manage topic development and topic change, mechanisms for 'opening up closings,' and so on (for general introductions to conversation analysis, see Nofsinger (1991) or Have (1999)).

Like conversation analysis, discursive psychology takes its point of departure in the situational context

in which language is used. However, it does so in order to explore how the micromechanics of verbal interaction affect wider cultural, political, and social processes, for instance, in the analysis of nationalism in institutional and everyday settings (Billig, 1995, chap. 5), and in order to reconceptualize the study within psychology and social psychology of topics such as attitudes, memory, and attribution (Potter and Wetherell, 1987).

The study of the mass media is not central to discourse psychology proper. However, it is clear that the approach has a lot to offer theoretically and analytically in this respect as the electronic media become increasingly dominated by programs that borrow from or replicate the verbal interaction of everyday life and as the digital interactive media open up enticing prospects of virtual communities based on verbal exchange (Hutchby, 2001) (*see* **Cognitive Technology**).

Briefly characterized, discourse psychology analyzes talk in everyday situations because it is in interpersonal encounters that an important part of social reality is constructed, as speakers position themselves and each other in situational roles according to their individual and social interests. Discourse psychology is particularly concerned with the way speakers engage in fact construction – that is, the way they attempt to establish their accounts, or 'versions,' of social events as true and factual and to undermine the factuality and truth of the versions of their interlocutors – a focus that is particularly appropriate to investigate many television news interviews and studio debate programs (Potter, 1996).

When they produce their accounts of social events, staking a claim for their version, participants are drawing on meaning resources based on interpretive repertoires, a kind of 'framework of understanding' (Potter and Wetherell, 1996: 89):

> By interpretative repertoires we mean broadly discernible clusters of terms, descriptions, and figures of speech often assembled around metaphors or vivid images. In more structuralist language we can talk of these things as systems of signification and as the building blocks used for manufacturing versions of actions, self, and social structures in talk.

In a study of the discursive construction of politics in Danish media, Phillips and Schrøder (2004) found that the media made sense of the political through six different interpretative repertoires for understanding politics in a wide sense, ranging from the parliamentary arena, through the subpolitical arena of grassroots activism, to the life–political arena of political consumption in daily life: 1. 'parliament-at-work,' offering a positive perspective on capable and active politicians; 2. 'the dirty underside of the party game,' in which politicians are seen as scheming and manipulative; 3. 'populism,' pitching sensible citizens against distant, ignorant, and arrogant politicians representing 'the system'; 4. 'grassroots activism,' in which citizens can make a difference by joining forces around single issues; 5. 'everyday politics,' where the negotiation of individual responsibility for social issues results in small-scale political action; and 6. 'politics as a meta-phenomenon,' an interpretive repertoire that constructs an outside evaluative and reflective perspective on the mechanics and limits of political institutions and agents.

The important point about such repertoires is that they are not mutually exclusive but may coexist in a particular media discourse about politics, serving different rhetorical purposes in different situational circumstances. Also, they should be seen not just as contributing to the formation of citizens' personal 'attitudes' about politics but also as generative meaning practices, which result in different conceptualizations of the possibilities and limits of political action.

As already mentioned, discourse psychology takes no particular interest in the media. However, Potter's comprehensive analysis of the situational construction of facticity is full of examples from media discourses, as he demonstrates how speakers in news programs take great pains verbally to demonstrate that they do not 'have an axe to grind,' to voluntarily confess to having a stake in some state of affairs in order to create an impression of honesty and trustworthiness despite their stake, to claim that "facts show that …" something is the case, to bolster credibility by adducing the testimony of sources whose identity may be difficult to establish (e.g., when news reports draw on so-called 'community sources' for their reporting of city gang warfare), and so on.

The most interesting and systematic work on media discourses from a situational perspective of dynamic interpersonal negotiation, however, has come from scholars who view themselves as conversation analysts rather than discourse psychologists (Clayman and Heritage, 2002; Greatbatch, 1998; Heritage and Greatbatch, 1991). One growing body of work has analyzed the most interactive genre of news production, the news interview (*see* **Conversation Analysis**).

In such studies, there is not much interest in the possible ideological meanings of the sequence of utterances. Attention is focused on the interactive dynamics of the interview exchanges as their turn-taking patterns are compared with those of ordinary everyday conversation in order to illuminate the specific constraints and options that govern the

situational production of such interviews within the framework of public service broadcasting.

Noting that news interviews deviate systematically from ordinary conversation in replacing the latter's question–answer–receipt pattern with a question–answer–question sequence, Heritage (1985) explained this difference by the fact that news interviews are produced for an overhearing audience. By avoiding the evaluation inherent in the third-turn 'receipt'–response characteristic of normal conversation, the interviewer declines the role of evaluating answer recipient while maintaining the neutral role of answer elicitor.

The importance of the overhearing audience also manifests itself in the frequent occurrence of so-called 'formulating' utterances, in which an interviewer (by saying to the interviewee, "So you're suggesting that ...") may make explicit the potentially controversial implications of a politician's answer while merely appearing to rephrase what the interviewee just said. Formulations may thus also serve an important function within the institutional framework of public service broadcasting, which requires journalists to maintain impartiality and balance in the coverage of controversial matters.

A completely different type of TV interaction for an overhearing audience is analyzed by Crow (1986), who explores the conversational pragmatics of a U.S. phone-in program in which a sexologist host gives advice about sexual problems, a genre that falls between private interpersonal talk and talk explicitly designed for an overhearing audience. Montgomery (1986) offers an excellent example of the analysis of broadcast monologue as he demonstrates how radio DJ talk, in contrast to third-person-based radio news monologue, operates on the axis between first and second person pronominal address. The DJ constructs an imagined community with his or her listeners in a simulated half-dialogue in which he or she does not display the slightest sign of awkwardness that his or her initiating speech acts (e.g., greetings and questions) are not responded to by anybody. Scannell (1991) presented a diverse range of studies on different types of conversational interaction in the broadcast media.

Analyzing the Visual Aspects of Media Discourse

The visual aspects of modern media discourses have presented a difficult challenge for analysts of mediated meaning processes for many years. It is characteristic of discourse analytical approaches that they are almost exclusively focused on media language, whereas the visual dimensions of news reports in print and electronic media are at best given secondary attention.

This situation exists despite the fact that it has long since become conventional wisdom for media research that the media landscape is increasingly dominated by still and moving pictures, which carry a substantial part of the total meaning communicated in newspapers and magazines, on television, and in the new media.

When visual analysis of media pictures is attempted, the analytical tools always derive from the same two sources: Roland Barthes's operationalization of the linguistic concepts of denotation and connotation for the analysis of images, especially photographs, and semiotician Charles S. Peirce's concepts of iconic, indexical, and symbolic signs (for a detailed analysis of news photographs, see Hall (1973) and Fiske (1990).

Barthes (1964) suggested that we distinguish between two orders of meaning in a photograph: the denotative level, which carries the innocent, factual meanings available to any observer irrespective of cultural background, and the connotative level, which carries the visual meanings that a specific culture assigns to the denotative message.

Barthes's original example presented an advertisement that denotatively pictures a string shopping bag in which one can see some onions, a green pepper, a can of tomato sauce, and two packets of pasta; the colors are yellow and green on a red background. In the French context of Barthes's analysis, this visual message acquires the cultural meaning (connotation) of 'Italianicity,' and as a selling proposition the ad offers not just a number of unrelated products but the whole atmosphere associated with Italian cuisine. In similar fashion, other ads may offer visually based connotations such as sexuality, family happiness, scientific progress, and historical authenticity. According to Barthes, these connotative meanings will appear to the consumer as naturally given, not as ideological constructs, because they are 'grafted' onto the underlying, innocent denotative meaning. In this way, advertisers and other message senders may use connotations to convey taken-for-granted meanings that are shared within a culture without making these (ideological) meanings available for critical scrutiny.

The analytical terms borrowed from Peircean semiotics have to do with the relations between signs and the real-world objects to which they refer (Peirce, 1985). Whereas a 'symbol' is a sign whose connection with its object is purely a matter of convention (the linguistic 'word' being the obvious example), an 'icon' is a sign that is related to its referent through

similarity; thus, a photograph in a news article or in an advertisement is an iconic sign of the real-world phenomenon it represents. An 'index' is a sign that signifies by existential or physical connection with its object, such as when a product advertised in a magazine ad is made visually contiguous to the paraphernalia of a desirable lifestyle, whose qualities may thereby become associated with the product.

It should be stressed that the three Peircean concepts are not to be thought of as three different kinds of sign but, rather, as three dimensions that are inherent properties of all signs in relation to their referents. A media picture of the White House is thus simultaneously an iconic representation of a particular building located in Washington, DC; an indexical representation of the government of the United States since it houses and thereby stands for its primary executive officer; and a symbolic representation of the connotative values conventionally associated with the United States and its president, be they those of the coercive global policeman or the home of freedom and democracy.

It is especially the indexical/metonymical aspects of visual signs that may carry powerful ideological implications because they seem to establish a natural connection between the sign and its referent, between the 'part' that is selected by the photographer or editor for visual representation in the news photo and the 'whole' scene that the photo supposedly represents. Thus, a metonymic photograph of a single violent incident may convey a wrong impression of a demonstration that was otherwise peaceful and orderly (*see* **Pragmatic Indexing**).

These semiotic tools have proved to be of considerable heuristic value for the analysis of media images, but it must be acknowledged that they have been unable to provide insights beyond the commonsensical. Moreover, the distinction between denotation and connotation is theoretically dubious because it is impossible within the terms of the theory to define precisely the threshold between noncultural and culturally invested meaning on which the distinction relies (Eco, 1968). Some attempts have been made in recent years to change these theoretical terms by drawing on a cognitive approach to visual perception, according to which there is no fundamental difference between the perceptual processes of making sense of real-world and pictorial visual stimuli. The first-order visual media meanings are naturally perceived by the visual sense and then enter into a process of cultural investment and interpretation according to conventionalized signifying processes (Messaris, 1997).

The challenge of developing an innovative approach to the analysis of visual discourse has been taken up by scholars who wish to take discourse analysis much further than merely extending its field of operation from linguistic to also include visual signs. They suggest that the modern media from school textbooks to the World Wide Web are increasingly producing texts that are multimodal, making use of a range of representational and communicational modes within the limits of one text (Kress and van Leeuwen, 2001).

The range of the different 'modes' of communication includes, in addition to verbal language, the visual (including graphic styles, spatial display, diagrams, pictures from line drawings, and still and moving photos), the gestural, sound, etc. and requires the building of a comprehensive 'discourse semiotic' in which all kinds of human semiosis are explored within the terms of one theoretical platform (Kress *et al.*, 1997: 258):

> Discourse analysis has, on the whole, focused on the linguistically realized text. In the multimodal approach the attempt is to understand all the representational modes which are in play in the text, in the same degree of detail and with the same methodological precision as discourse analysis is able to do with linguistic text.

The overall theoretical framework of Kress and van Leeuwen's visual discourse semiotics is strongly akin to Fairclough's three-dimensional model, whereas the analytical practice is inspired eclectically by theoretical and analytical work in linguistics, visual semiotics, film theory, art criticism, as well as numerous predecessors in the various fields of media research, especially the analysis of advertising (Cook, 1992; Myers, 1994; Williamson, 1978).

At this stage, however, it is not evident that the multimodal approach represents the kind of genuine innovation of the analysis of visual media discourses claimed by the authors. First, irrespective of the authors' protestations to the contrary, with its indebtedness to Halliday's (1978) theory of social semiotics, the approach is based on and to some extent biased toward a linguistic conceptualization of the other modes of representation. Moreover, both some of its theoretical ground pillars and some of the analytical insights balance somewhat uneasily between the postulatory and the commonsensical, and the analytical conclusions sometimes lapse into a simplistic view of the transfer of ideology from verbal–visual text to reader.

Toward a Pragmatics of Media

This article has argued that a holistic theoretical perspective is necessary to understand the way the media communicate with citizens and consumers living in a mediatized world. One consequence of the adoption of a holistic, discourse–analytical perspective on the

media is that in addition to focusing the analytical spotlight on the textual meaning processes in the media, the analyst is also invited to explore the discursive practices through which media texts are produced and received, as well as the larger sociocultural framework within which these processes take place. This requires the analyst to supplement traditional forms of critical analysis of media texts with ethnography-inspired interview-based fieldwork of, for instance, journalistic production routines and audience reception processes.

Such discourse–ethnographic work produces new textual objects of analysis in the form of qualitative interviews with media producers and audience members about the meaning processes they engage in around the media product (Lindlof, 1995). Clearly, this research agenda is no less imbued with theoretical and methodological hazards than that of traditional media language analysis, which may explain the reluctance of media discourse analysts to embark on the kind of ethnographic fieldwork that they readily acknowledge is necessary. However, the payoff in terms of explanatory power is evident in those few instances in which scholars have faced the holistic challenge and brought together insights from production, textual, and reception studies of mediated communication (Deacon *et al.*, 1999).

See also: Cognitive Technology; Communication: Semiotic Approaches; Conversation Analysis; Critical Discourse Analysis; E-mail, Internet, Chatroom Talk: Pragmatics; Halliday, Michael Alexander Kirkwood; Media and Language: Overview; Media, Politics and Discourse Interactions; Peirce, Charles Sanders; Pragmatic Indexing; Telephone Talk; Word and Image.

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Medical Communication: Professional-Lay

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The Information Society and the Changing Status of Experts

Fifty years ago, authorities were generally more clearly defined in society than they are today. Teachers, doctors, and lawyers had undisputed expert status and as such they were highly respected and their authority was rarely questioned by the average citizen. Academic training was the exception rather than the rule and a much larger number of people were employed within the agricultural sector or within other manual sectors following a very limited period of schooling. Being practical, skillful, and able to manage were important values, whereas intellectualism, theoretical discussions, and criticism of society were not the order of the day. To a large degree, knowledge was still passed on from your elders and gained by experience. Although not academically trained, most people (men) were skilled in something often through some form of apprenticeship and areas of expertise were generally acknowledged.

Gradually, this has changed. In the 1960s, academics started challenging the authorities and their status as omniscient. They demanded the right to have a say (not only within their own fields) and this demand required information. From the 1960s on, the number of people receiving academic training has exploded. Jobs that just a few decades ago required very little schooling cannot be had without years at college. Written material is distributed like never before, the various media provide a constant stream of information and the advent of the computer and the Internet in particular has catapulted us into the era of the information society. Many citizens and consumers today consider information their right in a democratic society, but there is also another side to the coin. Apart from the self-assured, critical, and challenging citizen, there are still many people who find it difficult to digest even fairly simple texts and who are not used to asserting themselves publicly. This group of people is at a disadvantage in the self-service information society. Authorities have been able to lower their level of personal service and have become used to handing out brochures and referring people to web pages. Furthermore, within some areas the reason for publishing huge amounts of information is not a true desire to convey information but, rather, a way to limit responsibility. That is why, for example, patient package leaflets contain long lists of extremely unlikely side effects, a measure that prevents the medical company from being taken to court on a 'should-have-told' basis.

The New Roles of Medical Experts

Society is now at a stage at which it is possible to obtain information about almost anything within a very short period of time. This has changed the way in which experts and authorities are perceived. Now that there is easy access to so much information it has become possible, and quite common, to criticize and challenge the views and decisions of experts. Within the field of medicine this has led to new roles for medical professionals and the entire medical industry (it should be noted that the contents of this section first and foremost apply to the industrialized world).

To a large degree, the medical profession is still highly respected and much authority still surrounds the health-care practitioner. Nevertheless, many patients do not accept a diagnosis as readily as they used to, they seek second opinions, read up on the matter themselves, and suggest alternatives, etc. Once they are convinced the diagnosis is right they do not always accept the treatment proposed by the doctor; they may challenge his/her views by means of the latest research available on the Internet and they may seek alternative treatment. Patients want access to their files to check what is going on. The medical industry is being met with claims of openness and information about the medicine they produce. Patients want to know about possible side effects (and to have them graded statistically) in order to decide whether to take the medicine prescribed or not. Medical experts no longer just diagnose and prescribe; they are expected to be willing and able to inform and discuss with the patient to a degree never seen before. Generally speaking, patients are more literate than ever and used to seeking and digesting new information. But even the most well-educated part of populations do, however, not possess the background knowledge of a medical expert and are linguistically speaking not part of the discourse community of medical experts. There is no doubt that patients who are used to digesting complex texts will often benefit from the information they obtain. However, many people do not possess this ability and this is problematic, because in today's society they are expected to. In earlier days, the doctor assumed complete responsibility; on the one hand, this meant that the patient was left to the mercy or competence of the individual doctor; on the other hand, it meant that the patient could leave things in the hands of fate and the doctor and did not have to carry the burden of having to be informed and being able to make informed decisions. But in the 21st century, authorities expect people to understand the technical and semitechnical language of doctors, various health

campaigns on prevention and warning signals, the contents of patient package inserts (also in connection with the increasing amount of medicine sold over the counter, i.e., without any consultation), a number of informative brochures on specific ailments, their own medical files, and so on. This may be quite feasible to part of the population, but is likely to be problematic to many people.

What Is Medical Language?

Medical language is traditionally regarded as the language used by medical experts when communicating in an expert-to-expert context. It is the language of the 'specialist,' often defined as a special language as opposed to general language used by the general public in everyday situations:

> Special languages are semi-autonomous, complex semiotic systems based on and derived from general language: their use presupposes special education and is restricted to communication among specialists in the same or closely related fields. Sager *et al.* (1980: 69)

Those who master medical language have been encultured or socialized into the language. The student of medicine automatically becomes a student of medical language when attending university to become a health-care practitioner. Thus, apart from acquiring knowledge about the medical field, s/he learns to communicate with peers using the linguistic tools appropriate in the medical context. It is a process in which books, medical journals, traineeships at hospitals, conversations with lecturers, fellow-students, doctors, etc. contribute to a gradual buildup of a specialist, medical language. When the student graduates, s/he not only possesses thorough *knowledge* of the medical field, s/he also masters the *language* of the medical discourse community.

Characteristics of Medical Language

The most obvious characteristic of medical language is its extensive use of words related to the subject matter – also referred to as 'medical jargon.' Apart from the medical jargon, medical communicators also favor a passive and impersonal style that focuses on objective, measurable phenomena rather than concrete actions. This style is attained through the use of heavy noun phrases (with nominalized actions), passive clauses, and a preference for third-person pronouns rather than first personal pronouns.

The medical jargon and the passive and impersonal style allow experts to provide precise and condensed information for other experts who are trained to perceive and consequently talk about the physical world in a rational, objective, and measurable way.

An example could be the pharmacist describing the attributes of a medicinal product in the so-called product summary – which is an official document from the pharmaceutical company that provides approving authorities with information about a particular product in order for them to authorize the marketing of the product. It gives health-care practitioners detailed information about a medicinal product as in the following extract:

> The antidepressant, antiobsessive-compulsive and anti-bulimic actions of fluoxetine are presumed to be linked to its inhibition of CNS neuronal uptake of serotonin. Studies at clinically relevant doses in man have demonstrated that fluoxetine blocks the uptake of serotonin into human platelets. Studies in animals also suggest that fluoxetine is a much more potent uptake inhibitor of serotonin than of norepinephrine. (http://pharma-help.com)

This example is used within a medical discourse community that is 'pure,' in the sense that the community is composed of equals or near-equals in knowledge and professional role (pharmacist to doctor). However, medical genres and medical discourse are not necessarily restricted to that of experts talking to experts. As patients, consumers, and members of society in general, nonspecialists momentarily enter the medical discourse community – not as producers but as *consumers* of medical texts such as patient package inserts for medicinal products, social marketing leaflets explaining the dangers of smoking, or when consulting GPs or pharmacists. Therefore, medical language is not restricted to the discourse community of experts but can also be found in communities in which the addresser is a professional and the addressee is a layperson.

The need for medical information accessible to people outside the professional medical domain has brought about a significant change in the premises of medical communication. The traditional symmetrical communication between equals (e.g., pharmacist to doctor) has been challenged by the demand for *asymmetrical* communication between experts and laypeople (e.g., doctors to consumers). This demand calls for recognition of a medical language at *different levels of abstraction*. If both communicators are specialists, the highest level of abstraction (i.e., 'traditional' medical language) is the obvious choice. If the communication is asymmetrical (professional-lay), the medical subject matter has to be adjusted to the knowledge of laypeople. In practice, this means that texts, which originate from an expert discourse community but serve as the basis for a consumer-oriented version, need to be 'translated' to become meaningful to nonexpert readers.

What Is Professional-Lay Medical Language?

This section deals with written communication though many features apply to oral communication as well.

Target Group

In 1859, Kierkegaard wrote about the following situations in which experts, or people who know more than others, want to convey their knowledge to other people:

> If I am to succeed in guiding another human being towards a certain goal, I have to find the place where he is and start right there [...]. In order to help somebody, I certainly have to understand more than he does, but first and foremost understand what he understands. (our translation of Kierkegaard, 1869, in Becker Jensen, 2001: 18)

Kierkegaard tells us that if you do not have this understanding it is no help that you are more knowledgeable than your target group, and he adds that:

> All true helpfulness begins with humbleness towards the person I seek to help, and this is why I have to understand that helping is not wanting to rule, but to serve. If I cannot do this, I cannot help anybody (our translation of Kierkegaard, 1869, in Becker Jensen, 2001: 18).

Kierkegaard points out two important maxims that are still valid for expert-to-layman communication: It is the level of the target group which should determine the level and style of the text, not the writer's level – otherwise the extra knowledge of the expert becomes useless to the reader. The writer must be humble and possessed of a true desire to be of assistance, i.e., should not be preoccupied with his own status and authority.

The target group in expert-to-layperson communication is often potentially the entire population and must therefore be characterized as very broad indeed, which is why the visualization of a target group may well be a very substantial problem to the writer. The expert writer is in danger of overestimating his audience because of his own extensive knowledge and may be afraid of sounding patronizing if too much is explained. An expert writer may also feel that very simple language questions his status as expert – after all, expert language signifies expertise and authority to many. All things considered, if there is a true desire to make a text understandable to all laypeople and not just half of them the safe way is to use the lowest common denominator as a yardstick. If there is a well-defined target group, the lowest common denominator within that group should be used.

Kierkegaard's two maxims should be kept in mind at an overall level, whereas the following may be of assistance at a more specific level when writing for laypeople.

Characteristics of Professional-Lay Medical Language

Incomprehensible Medical Jargon Perhaps the most defining feature of medical – or expert – language is the use of expert terms unknown to most people. For example, we may see the use of 'therapeutic indications,' 'contra-indications,' and 'interactions' in the headlines of an insert. These terms should be replaced by lay terms when possible or should be paraphrased. It should be noted that most medical jargon has Latin or Greek roots, but that the extent to which Latin medical terms have been incorporated in everyday language varies greatly from country to country. French and English have, for instance, been more receptive to Latin than German and Scandinavian languages.

False Friends False friends within an expert-to-lay context are words and expressions that are used both in everyday situations and in special contexts but in which the meaning of the words differs depending on the context in which the words are used. For example, the expression 'to administer' is the formal use of giving someone a drug. However, the expression is also used in a more informal sense in business or legal settings but with a totally different meaning. It may be very confusing to the reader if he knows the word well from other contexts but cannot make sense of it in the context in question. The use of such terms should therefore be avoided.

Inconsistent Use of Synonyms Generally, medical language is characterized by sparse use of synonyms but, when they occur, perhaps especially in expert-to-lay texts in which semiexpert terms or lay terms are used, too, the reader who does not possess the expert knowledge needed to judge whether the terms are synonyms or not may become confused when confronted with two or three different terms for the same thing. This is, for example, the case when 'lactation' and 'breastfeeding' are used interchangeably. Stylistic variation should be avoided if there is a risk of sacrificing understanding.

Long or Complicated Words or Expressions Traditionally medical expert language often makes use of officialese. Strictly speaking, this has nothing to do with medical jargon or with the advantages of expert language such as brevity and precision, rather the opposite. Still medical texts are often characterized by unnecessarily long or complicated words and expressions which make the text more difficult to digest. These superfluous words or blown up expressions should be removed and replaced with more simple ones.

Long and Complicated Sentences These are often a direct consequence of situations in which long and complicated words and expressions coupled with a too complex sentence structure result in lengthy, inflated sentences. Such sentences should be reduced by omitting superfluous words and expressions and can in many cases be split up into two or three shorter sentences.

Passive and Impersonal Style In expert communication, it is often not particularly relevant to know who the 'actor' is. Thus, instead of using the active voice, medical experts rely on a passive style making use of the passive voice and nominalization. In the passive voice, the person performing the action is deleted. This strategy may be quite useful in texts in which the actor is either unknown or simply not important, but in cases in which the patient needs to know that *s/he* is to perform some kind of action (e.g., in connection with a patient package leaflet) it is important to use the active style. The passive style makes the text impersonal and it forces the reader to take extra mental steps as s/he converts the passive sentence into an active one in order to work out "who is doing what." For example, an impersonal expression such as "X should not be taken during the first 3 months of pregnancy" should be replaced by a more active expression "you should not take X during the first 3 months of pregnancy." Passive sentences should be turned into active voice and undue nominalizations should be avoided in favor of the more direct verbal form.

Too Much Information in One Sentence Contrary to sentences containing superfluous words, these sentences are complex because they contain too much *relevant* information. For example, "This includes previously untreated patients and patients who have previously responded to treatment with X, but whose condition has recurred." Apart from listing too much relevant information, the sentence is also complex because it is packed with heavy noun phrases. Very often, sentences become rather long and complex because the writer adds extra information to the noun by means of pre- and postmodifiers. The result is heavy noun phrases, which – when unpacked – would constitute sentences in their own right. To non-experts, these sentences can be very difficult to unpack correctly. Such sentences should be edited by splitting them up into two or three shorter sentences.

Remnants from Translation Many medical experts are used to reading and discussing in English although it is not their native language. Modern non-English medical language is often very influenced by English lexis and even syntax. This may be a problem to non-English speaking laypeople.

Presuppositions A text that to an expert has a logical structure may not be logical to a layperson. If the writer relies on presumed (but nonexisting) background knowledge of the reader, the reader may be unable to follow the thoughts of the writer and may think that he jumps to conclusions.

Evidently, it is not realistic to completely avoid all of the above expert features. But the reason why expert language may be difficult to laypeople is the fact that these features tend to appear together in a sentence. Several studies show that they make the text less accessible to the general reader (see, e.g., Killingsworth and Gilbertson, 1992; Killingsworth and Steffens, 1989).

Length There are of course different conventions for the length of a text, but lay texts should never be longer than strictly necessary.

Print Size Information on medicine is often provided in far too small print that may discourage readers even before they have started. The print size should be reader-friendly.

Order of Information The order of information should be as logical as possible. Usually a sound strategy is to place the most important information in the beginning of the text.

Headings Well-placed, informative, and precise headings help weak readers navigate through a text. Headings should be written in clear and understandable terms and should not be too long.

Pictograms For instructional texts, pictograms may be a good solution, but the pictures or symbols should in no way be open to interpretation. This is more difficult than it sounds – a picture of a glass of water may to one reader mean that a pill should be dissolved in a glass of water, whereas to another it indicates that a glass of water should be drunk after swallowing the pill.

Conclusion

In spite of this attempt to describe the 'ideal' characteristics of professional-lay medical communication, professional-lay communication is still in its infancy and the discourse conventions are not in place.

Professional-lay discourse in the medical context may best be described as a 'pseudo' discourse for the time being, in which professionals – with varying success – try to adapt their medical language to a mixed audience (potentially the entire population) whose knowledge of the subject matter and the discourse conventions of the medical field is very restricted. What we experience is a semiprofessional discourse that attempts to merge the qualities of traditional medical language with the discourse conventions of 'plain English' style guides. One could speculate about the reasons for the lack of successful professional-lay communication. No doubt many of the problems can be attributed to the enculturation of health-care practitioners into the medical domain through language that means that the *discourse* and *practice* of medicine are difficult to separate. More specifically, it has the following consequences:

- Medical experts generally lack the ability to downgrade their special language in order to accommodate a target group of nonexperts. The medical experts are experts within medicine, not within plain English communication.
- Medical experts feel less inclined to adopt a fully professional-lay discourse, as it may question their status as experts – after all, expert language signifies expertise and authority to many. They may even feel that talking medicine at a lower level of abstraction demystifies their profession and results in status loss.
- Finally, medical experts resist the professional-lay discourse for ideological reasons. Because of their scientific schooling, medical experts may regard professional-lay discourse a language for *mediation*, inappropriate for talking about medicine because the required simplification in professional-lay discourse (which promotes a personal, subjective, action-oriented style) does not meet the demands for precision, conciseness, objectification, and passivity, which is the paradigm of medical science.

Thus, instead of developing a professional-lay medical discourse, which enables experts to explain medical concepts at a lower level of abstraction, the experts resort to their habitual way of communicating (i.e., the language into which they have been socialized when acquiring their expert knowledge) in spite of the fact that their expert language is difficult to understand for 'outsiders' and therefore hampers the readability and usability of consumer-oriented medical documents.

And so, today, we face a situation in which, in spite of the fact that the medical community produces numerous documents for patients (package inserts, health leaflets, information letters prior to hospitalization, etc.), the professional-lay discourse has not

been fully developed (and embraced) by the medical discourse community. Therefore, the discourse remains a hybrid between traditional medical language and consumer-oriented plain English.

See also: Languages for Specific Purposes; Socialization.

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Metaphor: Philosophical Theories

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Metaphor and Philosophy

Rather than simply interpreting particular metaphorical expressions, philosophers of language investigate questions such as whether metaphors mean what they do in virtue of semantic content, or whether pragmatic features of expression use and context determine the meaning of metaphors. Answering such questions requires addressing fundamental issues in language and communication such as issues about the limits of literal meaning and the semantic-pragmatic distinction.

Defining Metaphor

Metaphor theorists disagree about which class of expressions constitutes the proper object of an analysis of metaphor. While most metaphor theorists favor live metaphors (metaphors that invite a multitude of interpretations), others such as George Lakoff and Mark Johnson (1980) focus on dead metaphors (metaphors with a relatively fixed meaning) and their role in structuring cognition. At the same time, some metaphor theorists adopt broader definitions while others work with narrower definitions of metaphor.

Metaphor, in its broadest sense (metaphor$_1$), includes most if not all figurative language such that the principle contrast is between metaphorical and literal language. Narrower definitions take metaphor to be only one among many other non-literal tropes. A second type of metaphor (metaphor$_2$), distinct from other non-literal tropes such as irony, metonymy, and synecdoche, is what makes us think of one thing *as* another. Since the very possibility of giving a unified account of metaphor$_1$ is remote, articulating an account of metaphor$_2$ is a more appropriate goal. However, a demarcation problem remains a challenge for any treatment of metaphor$_2$: it must be worked out what it means to say that metaphor$_2$ makes us think of one thing as another in such a way that the difference between metaphor and other non-literal tropes is illuminated.

Delineating Metaphor

The class of metaphorical expressions can be delineated by form or by function. The paradigmatic form of metaphors is the subject-predicate form *S is P.* Metaphorical expressions of this kind are the focus of, for example, John R. Searle's (1993) account of metaphor. According to Searle, a speaker utters an expression of the form *S is P* (*Juliet is the sun*) in order to convey an intended proposition (that Juliet is radiant) of the form *S is R.*

Other accounts of metaphor delineate the class of metaphorical expressions according to a specific understanding of metaphor's function to make us think of one thing as another. For example, the comparison view of metaphor is the view that metaphor functions by comparing two things (Juliet and the sun). Delineating metaphor according to this function assimilates simile to the class of metaphors.

The clear disadvantage of constructing an account of metaphor around any particular form, even paradigmatic forms, is that doing so leaves unexplained other expression forms that have a plausible claim to metaphoricity. Extended metaphors that run the length of a poem and noun-function metaphors of the form *The B of A* (*The countless gold of a merry heart*) are not easily captured by the form *S is P*. Since diverse forms can carry out the same function, functional definitions of metaphor do better at capturing non-paradigmatic forms. Functional definitions explain why we use metaphor (e.g., to compare) in a way that form alone cannot.

The Metaphorical and the Literal

Almost every metaphor theorist accepts the Deviance Thesis: metaphor is essentially nonstandard and deviates either semantically or pragmatically from ordinary literal language. The Deviance Thesis is reflected in the persistent, but challenged (Cohen, 1976), view that metaphors are either literally false or conceptually incongruous.

Deviance and Value

Historically, the deviance of metaphor has been tied to the question of the value of metaphor. Although Cicero (*De Oratore*), Quintilian (*Institutio Oratoria*), and rhetoricians celebrated the deviance of metaphor and its embellishment of language, philosophers John Locke (*Essay concerning human understanding*) and Thomas Hobbes (*Leviathan*) condemned the use of metaphor in philosophical inquiry. If the best chance at arriving at and communicating truth is afforded only by unambiguous literal language use, metaphor's deviance from the literal is therefore suspect. Jean-Jacques Rousseau (*Essay on the origin of languages*) and Friedrich Nietzsche (*On truth and falsity in their ultramoral sense*) attempted to undercut this criticism by arguing that all language is fundamentally metaphorical and championed metaphor's creative function. For a short history of philosophical thought about metaphor, see Johnson (1981) and Kittay (1987).

Deviance: Semantic or Pragmatic?

The cognitive value of metaphor is now generally conceded and metaphor's deviance is considered separately from its value. Contemporary accounts of metaphor characterize its deviance either as a violation of semantic rules or as a violation of pragmatic constraints. Various semantic theories can describe the semantic deviance of metaphor; for example, it can be described as a violation of selection restrictions or as a violation of standard meaning lines between possible worlds.

Samuel R. Levin (1977) describes construal mechanisms for assigning interpretations to anomalous or deviant sentences, including the metaphors of ordinary language use and conversation. Metaphors are semantically deviant because they fall outside the class of sentences generated by normal operation of the rules of grammar. According to the metaphor *The stone died,* to be a stone in the metaphoric sense (to be a dunce) is to be similar in characteristics to a stone in the literal sense. The noun *stone* has semantic markers that might include (((Object) (Physical)) (Nonliving) (Mineral)), and the verb *die* has semantic markers that may include ((Process) ((Result) ((Cease to be) (Living)))). The verb has selection restrictions ((Human) or (Animal) or (Plant)), and it is these restrictions that are violated in *The stone died*. Construal rules that sanction the transfer of the feature (Human) to the semantic markers of *stone,* for example, allow us to derive the interpretation that the dunce died.

Jaakko Hintikka and Gabriel Sandu (1990) characterize the semantic deviance of metaphor according to possible world semantics. On this view, meanings are functions from possible worlds to classes of individuals. We can visualize this function by imagining that a notional meaning line connects the individuals, in their respective possible worlds, picked out by the function. Metaphoric meaning is a function that draws nonstandard or deviant meaning lines: they differ from literal meaning lines in that they rely exceptionally heavily in some specific respect on either qualitative or functional similarity. In *The stone died,* the speaker draws the meaning lines of *stone* on the basis of qualitative hardness and immovability.

Pragmatic accounts of metaphor are motivated by the observation that the very same expression (for example, *A storm is gathering*) can be interpreted literally in one context (said of a dark and windy sky) and yet be intended and interpreted metaphorically in another context (said of an anticipated faculty meeting). A full explanation of metaphor, then, must look beyond merely the expression itself to the context of the utterance. H. Paul Grice's theory of conversational implicature provides a pragmatic account of the deviance of metaphor. Conversational implicatures, including metaphor, arise when what is said violates conversational maxims. Grice (1975) says that metaphor violates the conversational maxim of saying only what is true, while Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson (1986) argue that it violates the principle of saying only what is relevant. In either case, it is noticing that what is said deviates from these maxims and principles that prompts the hearer to search for an interpretation of the utterance (*Juliet is the sun*) such that the speaker is contributing something true or relevant to the conversation (that Juliet chases away darkness).

Joseph Stern (2000) presents a dual challenge to the Deviance Thesis: unlike Levin, Stern argues that metaphor is not grammatically deviant and, in contrast to Gricean pragmatic accounts, that it is not necessary to first notice that what is said is deviant. Stern suggests that metaphor is a linguistic type representable in the grammar by the operator *Mthat*[Φ]. Like indexicals and demonstratives, metaphors have both a character and a content. The character, or meaning, of a metaphor is the linguistic function from context to content expressions; the content of a metaphor is the propositional content determined by the character (i.e., the interpretation of the metaphorical expression). For example, in an analysis of *Juliet is the sun,* in which the predicate is the metaphorical component, the character of the metaphor picks out the content of {*Mthat*['*is the sun*']}, that is, properties (nourishing, chasing away darkness, etc.) that are associated with the sun.

Stern argues that metaphor is not pragmatically deviant in the way suggested by implicature theorists, insofar as what is conveyed by a metaphor is not inferentially derived against a background of conversational maxims. Instead, the rules of grammar simultaneously make available metaphorical and literal interpretations. Stern and others (Glucksberg and Keysar, 1993; Récanati, 1995) cite evidence that the metaphorical interpretation of the sentence is processed in parallel with, and not serially to, the literal interpretation. It is not necessary to recognize first that what is said violates pragmatic constraints.

Theories of Metaphor

Conditions of Adequacy

Theories of metaphor are successful to the extent that they fulfill certain conditions of adequacy. For example, the proposal that metaphorical expressions are ambiguous fails, because it cannot explain how the meaning of the metaphorical expression depends on the literal meaning of the words used. Unlike ambiguous expressions (example, *bank*), the meaning of the words on one (literal) interpretation stay 'active' and guide the other (metaphorical) interpretation. Other desiderata include explanations of the expressive power and catachretic function of metaphor to remedy gaps in the vocabulary by using words in new ways. Accounts should make sense of the ubiquity of metaphor and explain why some metaphors fail. The more controversial features of metaphor, such as its apparent falsity and nonparaphrasability, must either be accounted for or be explained away. For further discussion of these and other conditions of adequacy, see Nogales (1999).

Aristotle

Aristotle defines metaphor as the transference of a name from genus to species, from species to genus, from species to species, or by analogy. In his influential treatment of metaphor (found in *Poetics* and in *Rhetoric*) we find the seeds of substitution, analogy, and simile theories of metaphor. Under Quintilian's substitution theory of metaphor, a new decorative name is transferred to an object in substitution for its usual plain name, though for merely rhetorical effect. Analogy theories of metaphor have been of particular interest to those interested in the predictive nature of scientific models (Hesse, 1966; Gentner, 1982). Because Aristotle thinks that the function of both simile and metaphor trades on comparison and noticing pre-existing similarities, he is also credited as an early proponent of the view that metaphor is a kind of simile. The elliptical simile theory of metaphor specifies that metaphors such as *Time is a child at play* are ellipses of corresponding similes (*Time is like a child at play*). Lynne Tirrell (1991) argues that not all metaphors have corresponding similes, such as metaphors of the form *A is Ψ* (*The moon is envious*). Therefore, although metaphor theorists continue to be tempted to explain metaphor in terms of simile (Fogelin, 1988), elliptical simile theories of metaphor apparently cannot serve as general theories of metaphor.

Interaction Theories of Metaphor

Interaction theories of metaphor have a prominent place among contemporary semantic theories of metaphor. Introduced by I. A. Richards (1936) and Max Black (1962), this kind of theory proposes that instead of simply re-naming or comparing objects, two concepts or systems of associated commonplaces are simultaneously 'interactive.' In *my love is a rose*, the source (also called 'vehicle' or 'focus') *rose* projects an isomorphic set of connotations or believed commonplaces (such as fragility) upon the topic (also called 'tenor') *my love*. Eva Feder Kittay (1987) articulates this interaction in terms of semantic field theory. In this theory, the meaning of a term is a function of its relation (of affinity or contrast) to the other terms in its semantic or conceptual field. For example, the meaning of *midwife* is a function of its semantic field structured according to relations among the agent (midwife), her patient (the mother), and the result (the child). For Socrates's metaphor of teachers as midwives, interactive projection consists of restructuring the relations among the terms in topic field (*teacher*) analogously to those in the source field (*midwife*). Reconceiving the topic in this manner permits the special and controversial creativity of metaphor: metaphor goes beyond exploiting existing

similarities to create new similarities or perspectives on the world (perspectival theory of metaphor). Metaphor makes us think of one thing as another because its function is to create a perspective from which we gain an understanding of that which is metaphorically portrayed.

Davidson and Metaphorical Meaning

Donald Davidson (1978) gives what is perhaps the most influential objection to any semantic treatment of metaphor. According to Davidson, the fundamental error of all semantic accounts of metaphor is to read the contents of the thoughts provoked by the metaphor into the content of the expression itself. Davidson denies that the concept of metaphorical meaning is required to explain how metaphor achieves its effect. Sharply distinguishing between what words mean and what words are used to do, Davidson argues that it is the meaning of words that is supposed to explain what can be done with words (and not, for example, the effects achieved by metaphor that explain the meaning of the metaphorical expression). It is because literal meaning and truth conditions, but not metaphorical meaning, can be assigned to sentences apart from particular contexts of use that only literal meaning has genuine explanatory power. If there is no metaphorical meaning, then theories of metaphor can tell us about the effects metaphors have on us, but they do not provide a method for decoding a special content conveyed by the metaphorical expression. See Leddy (1983) and Farrell (1987) for criticisms of Davidson's view, and Crosthwaite (1985) for a defense of Davidson's account.

See also: Grice, Herbert Paul; Implicature; Irony; Maxims and Flouting; Metaphors and Conceptual Blending; Metaphor: Psychological Aspects; Metaphor: Stylistic Approaches; Metaphors in Political Discourse; Metonymy; Pragmatics and Semantics; Relevance Theory; Semantics-Pragmatics Boundary.

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Metaphor: Psychological Aspects

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The psychological study of metaphor has had a major impact on the interdisciplinary understanding of language and thought. Thirty years ago, the topic of metaphor was mostly seen as peripheral to the major focus of research in both linguistics and psychology, because metaphor was primarily viewed as a poetic device that is not representative of how people ordinarily speak or think. But in conjunction with the emergence of cognitive linguistics in the 1970s and 1980s, psychological research has demonstrated that metaphor is ubiquitous in discourse, can often be easily understood and produced in appropriate social and linguistic contexts, and perhaps most importantly, is both a type of language use and a fundamental scheme of thought. This entry describes the empirical evidence relevant for, and the theories building on, these claims.

The Ubiquity of Metaphor in Language

Metaphor has traditionally been viewed as a distortion of both thought and language, because it involves the transfer of a name to some object to which that name does not properly belong. Speakers and writers presumably use metaphor as an ornamental feature for poetic and rhetorical purposes (e.g., to say what is difficult to state literally, to express meaning in a vivid manner), rather than to impart fundamental concepts. In each case of metaphorical language, a person aims to present some underlying analogy or similarity in the form of a condensed or elliptical simile. Thus, a metaphor of the 'A is B' form indirectly implies the speaker's intended literal meaning "A is like B in certain respects." For instance, the metaphor 'The car beetles along the road' describes the movement of the car as being like the movement of a beetle. Under this traditional view, metaphor should be infrequent in language, especially in scientific discourse, and people should have more cognitive difficulty when uttering and understanding metaphors than they do when using the equivalent literal speech.

Psychological research has shown, however, that metaphor is a major part of both spoken and written language. Various studies have attempted to quantify the frequency of metaphor use in a variety of contexts. One detailed study examined the use of metaphor in transcripts of psychotherapeutic interviews, in various essays, and in the 1960 Kennedy-Nixon presidential debates and found that people used 1.80 novel and 4.08 frozen metaphors per minute of discourse (Pollio *et al.,* 1977). If one assumes that people engage in conversation for as little as 2 hours per day, a person would utter 4.7 million novel and 21.4 million frozen metaphors over a 60-year life span! A different analysis of the metaphors produced in television debates and news commentary programs showed that speakers use one unique metaphor for every 25 words (Graesser *et al.,* 1989). These, admittedly crude, analyses clearly demonstrate that metaphor is not the special privilege of a few gifted speakers, but is ubiquitous throughout both written and spoken discourse.

However, a closer look at everyday language suggests that these empirical attempts to 'count' instances of metaphor vastly underestimate the pervasiveness of metaphor in people's ordinary speech. Typical frequency counts of metaphor do not include analysis of conventional speech that is motivated by metaphoric modes of thought. Consider the following mundane expressions that people often use in talking about verbal arguments (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980).

> Your claims are indefensible.
> I've never won an argument with him.
> I demolished his argument.
> He attacked every weak point in my argument.
>
> His criticisms were right on target.
> He shot down all of my arguments.

At first glance, none of these expressions appear to be very metaphoric, at least in the same way that an utterances such as 'The sun is the eye of heaven' might be. Yet, a closer look reveals the systematic metaphoric structuring whereby people think of arguments in terms of wars. We can actually win or lose arguments. We see the person we are arguing with as an opponent. We attack his positions, and we defend our own. We plan and use strategies. We might find certain positions undefensible, requiring us to take new lines of attack. Each of these things do not simply reflect the way we talk about arguments: we actually argue as if we were in a war. Our understanding of argument as war is active and widespread, but this concept is so deeply entrenched in our ordinary conceptual system that we tend to miss its metaphorical character.

Cognitive linguistic research has suggested that there are perhaps hundreds of conceptual metaphors, such as ARGUMENTS ARE WARS, that structure our everyday experience, and that they are found in a wide variety of conceptual domains (Gibbs and Steen, 1999; Kövecses, 2002; Lakoff and

Johnson, 1999). Linguistic analyses do not typically quantify the number of verbal metaphors, and the conceptual metaphors underlying them, that may be present in any one sample of speech or text. But one psychological study of the narratives women produced when describing their experiences recovering from cancer showed that conventional metaphoric language was employed more than 6 times per minute, and that only 22 conceptual metaphors underlay the vastly different metaphoric expressions these women produced, especially in their talk of emotion (Gibbs and Franks, 2002). Conceptual metaphors seem to be ubiquitous in the ways people talk of their experiences. One question that has generated a great deal of debate within psychology is whether these instances of conventional metaphor necessarily reflect anything about the metaphorical nature of many abstract concepts.

Metaphor Understanding: The Standard View

The traditional belief that metaphor is deviant suggests that metaphors should be more difficult to interpret than literal speech. The most famous proposal along this line comes from H. Paul Grice's theory of conversational implicature (Grice, 1989) (also see Grice, H. Paul (1913–1988); *see* **Implicature**). Grice argued that the inferences needed to understand nonliteral meaning are derived from certain general principles or maxims of conversation that participants in talk-exchange are mutually expected to observe (Grice, 1989) (*see* **Maxims and Flouting**). Among these are expectations that speakers are to be informative, truthful, relevant, and clear in what they say. When an utterance appears to violate any of these maxims, as in the case of metaphor, listeners are expected to derive an appropriate 'conversational implicature' about what the speaker intended to communicate in context, given the assumption that he or she is trying to be cooperative (*see* **Cooperative Principle**).

Grice (1989) more specifically suggested what has become known as the 'standard pragmatic model' for understanding indirect and nonliteral meanings, including metaphor. In this view, understanding metaphor is accomplished in a series of steps: (1) analyze the literal meaning of an entire expression, (2) compare this literal meaning to the context, (3) if the literal meaning is appropriate, then stop, otherwise (4) derive an alternative meaning that makes the speaker's/writer's utterance sensible in the context, given the cooperative principle. This rational account suggests, then, that metaphors are understood as conversational implicatures and should take additional time to comprehend over that needed to interpret literal speech that is appropriate to the context.

Psychological Tests of the Standard View

How accurate is the standard view as a psychological theory of metaphor understanding? First, the results of many reading-time experiments in psycholinguistics show that people do not always require additional mental effort to comprehend many kinds of figurative utterances, as compared with so-called literal speech (Gibbs, 1994, 2002). Listeners/readers often take no longer to understand the figurative interpretations of metaphor (e.g., 'billboards are warts on the landscape'), metonymy (e.g., 'The ham sandwich left without paying') (*see* **Metonymy**), sarcasm (e.g., 'You are a fine friend'), idioms (e.g., 'John popped the question to Mary'), proverbs (e.g., 'The early bird catches the worm'), and indirect speech acts (e.g., 'Would you mind lending me five dollars?' *see* **Speech Acts, Literal and Nonliteral**) than to understand equivalent literal expressions, particularly if these are seen in realistic linguistic and social contexts. Appropriate contextual information provides a pragmatic framework for people to understand metaphoric utterances without any recognition that these utterances violate conversational norms. In fact, psychological studies have specifically shown that people do not need to find a defective literal meaning before searching for a nonliteral meaning. For example, people apprehend the metaphoric meanings of simple comparison statements (e.g., 'surgeons are butchers') even when the literal meanings of these statements fit perfectly with the context (Glucksberg *et al.*, 1982). Even without a defective literal meaning to trigger a search for an alternative meaning, metaphor can be automatically interpreted.

These experimental findings from psycholinguistics are damaging to the general assumption that people understand metaphor as violations of conversational maxims. Similar psychological mechanisms appear to drive the understanding of both literal and metaphoric speech, at least insofar as early cognitive processes are concerned. Everyone agrees that people may sometimes take a good deal of time to process novel poetic metaphors, for example. Studies have shown, in fact, that conventional, or familiar, metaphors can be understood more quickly than novel expressions (Katz and Ferretti, 2001). Yet the additional time needed to understand novel metaphors is not necessarily due to a preliminary stage during which the literal meaning for an entire utterance is first analyzed and then rejected. Listeners may take longer to understand a novel expression, such as 'The night sky was filled with molten silver,' because of the difficulty

in integrating the figurative meaning with the context, and not because listeners are first analyzing and then rejecting the expression's literal meaning (Schraw, 1995).

Many psychologists have gone on to argue that even if metaphor does not necessarily demand extra cognitive effort to understand, people may still analyze literal, conventional, or salient, aspects of word meaning during immediate metaphor comprehension (Blasko and Connine, 1993; Giora, 2001). Some studies, which measure the meanings activated during each part of the moment-by-moment process of linguistic understanding, suggest that comprehending familiar and novel metaphors engages different linguistic processes. Analysis of literal word meaning still precedes metaphorical meaning during novel metaphor understanding, with both types of meaning arising in parallel during familiar metaphor processing. Other studies that assessed people's speeded judgments about the sensibility of different word strings at different moments find no difference in the comprehension speed for literal and figurative strings (McElree and Nordlie, 1999). This lack of time-course differences is inconsistent with the claim that metaphoric interpretations are computed after a literal meaning has been analyzed, and suggest that literal and metaphoric interpretations are computed in parallel.

Although these research findings imply that metaphor processing is not secondary to literal understanding, psycholinguists are, again, careful to note that people may be biased toward initially interpreting the literal, or salient, meanings of metaphoric statements in cases of novel metaphor (Giora, 2001). Yet others argue that even if some linguistic meanings (e.g., literal or metaphoric) are created sooner during metaphor processing, these findings do not imply that entirely different mental processes operate to produce these different meanings (Gibbs, 2002). Different kinds of meaning may arise from a single linguistic process. The fact that scholars label one kind of meaning 'literal' and another 'metaphoric doesn't necessarily indicate that different processes operate (such as a literal processing mode and a metaphoric processing mode) as people access these meanings (either in a serial or parallel manner).

More recent theories of figurative language understanding, which are more general than metaphor theories *per se*, suggest that people may initially access a word's interpretation that can be compatible with both its literal and metaphoric meanings (Frisson and Pickering, 2001). Over time, however, people use context to home in on the word's appropriate metaphoric meaning, where the homing-in process is faster when the preceding context is strong, and slower when the preceding context is neutral. In this way, context does not operate to distinguish between different literal and metaphoric meanings, as assumed by most theories (such as in the standard model), but functions to change an underspecified, or highly general meaning, into a contextually appropriate, specific interpretation which may be metaphorical.

A different theory embraces the notion of 'constraint satisfaction' to provide a comprehensive model of the different sources of information that constrain metaphor understanding (Katz and Ferretti, 2001). Under this view, understanding a metaphoric utterance requires people to consider different linguistic (e.g., people's familiarity with words and phrases) and nonlinguistic (e.g., related to specific context) information that best fits together to make sense of what a speaker or writer is saying. These different sources of information are probabilistically evaluated, and combined to offer a most likely 'winning' meaning for a metaphor. A constraint satisfaction model may have the flexibility to account for a wide variety of metaphor processing data that seems to differ depending on the familiarity or conventionality of the expression, the context in which it is encountered, and the speaker's/writer's likely intentions in using metaphorical language.

In summary, there has been a great deal of psychological research devoted to the general question of whether metaphorical language requires additional cognitive effort to understand, compared to non-metaphorical speech. The findings of these widely varying studies strongly imply that metaphors are not deviant and do not necessarily take more time to understand, but that more subtle factors, such as the familiarity of the expression and the context in which it is used, can shape the time-course of metaphor understanding. Many studies now situate metaphor understanding within a more comprehensive view of linguistic processing that does not posit specialized mechanisms for interpreting metaphors, even if these expressions often convey distinctive kinds of meanings (Kintsch and Bowles, 2002), and which specifically relies on cognitive mechanisms, such as suppression, that are employed widely in all aspects of language processing (Gernsbacher and Robertson, 1999).

Psychological Models of Metaphor Understanding

A great deal of research has been devoted to the specific processes involved in understanding metaphorical meaning, beyond the general question of whether metaphors are more difficult to comprehend than literal speech. These studies have explicitly examined the ways that the A, or target, and B,

or vehicle, terms interact to produce metaphorical meaning. A long-standing assumption in many academic fields is that we understand metaphors by recognizing the ways that topic and vehicle terms are similar. Thus, in understanding the metaphor 'Juliet is the sun,' listeners are presumed to figure out the properties of both Juliet and the sun that are similar.

But psychological studies indicate that metaphor comprehension does not demand that the topic and vehicle terms share properties or associations (Camac and Glucksberg, 1984). This finding is supported by many studies showing that metaphors have directional meaning. If metaphorical meaning arises from the overlap of the semantic features of topic and vehicle, expressions such as 'The surgeon is a butcher' and 'The butcher is a surgeon' should have similar metaphoric meanings. But this is clearly not the case. The similarity that arises from the comparison of a topic and vehicle does not produce metaphorical meaning. Instead, similarity is created as an emergent property of understanding metaphor. Thus, many psychological studies have demonstrated that novel features emerge from metaphor comprehension that are not salient in one's separate understanding of the topic or vehicle (Gineste *et al.,* 2000). This idea is consistent with the popular, but somewhat vague, interactionist theory of metaphor (Black, 1979), which argues that the presence of the topic stimulates a listener to select one of the vehicle's properties so as to construct a 'parallel implication complex' that may induce changes in one's understanding of both the topic and vehicle. In general, psychological studies provide strong evidence supporting the idea that metaphor cannot be reduced to rule-governed extensions or variations of the topic's and vehicle's literal meanings.

Psychologists disagree, however, about the cognitive mechanisms involved in feature emergence during metaphor understanding. The two main proposals state that metaphorical mappings between concepts from dissimilar domains can be accomplished by either comparison or categorization processes. Traditional comparison theories posit that metaphor understanding demands a mapping of low-salient features from the source domain with high-salient features of the target domain (Miller, 1979). But understanding many metaphors, such as 'Men are wolves,' seems to involve the activation of semantic features that are not typically associated with either the source or target domain until after the metaphor has been understood (Ortony, 1979). Gentner's 'structure-mapping' theory of analogy and metaphor avoids this problem by suggesting that people begin processing a metaphor by first aligning the representations of the source and target domain concepts

(see Gentner *et al.,* 2001). Once these two domains are aligned, further inferences are directionally projected from the source to the target domain. Finally, new inferences arise within the target domain, reflecting relational, and not just feature-specific, aspects of the metaphor comprehension processes. Experimental evidence in support of this comparison view shows, for instance, that people infer relational, but not feature-specific, meanings when interpreting metaphors (Gentner *et al.,* 2001). For instance, when people read 'Plant stems are drinking straws,' they infer that both plants and straws convey liquid to nourish living things, and not just that both plants and straws are long and thin (i.e., object commonalities). Other research indicated that metaphors that express relational information (e.g., 'Plant stems are drinking straws') are viewed as being far more apt than those that only map object features ('Her arms were like twin swans').

An alternative view claims that metaphors are better understood via categorization processes, as class-inclusion, rather than comparison, statements (Glucksberg, 2001). For example, the statement 'Yeltsin was a walking time bomb' asserts that the former Russian President was a member of a category that is best exemplified by time bombs. Of course, time bombs can belong to several other categories, such as the weapons used by terrorists. But in the context of talking about people, time bombs best exemplify the abstract category of 'things that explode at some unpredictable time in the future and cause a lot of damage.' In this way, metaphors reflect '*ad hoc*' categories and refer at two levels: the concrete level (i.e., an explosive device) and a superordinate level (i.e., the properties of time bombs).

One implication of the class-inclusion model is that it suggests that the topics and vehicles, or target and source domains, in metaphors play different but interactive roles in metaphor comprehension. For example, the word 'snake' evokes different meanings in the phrases 'my lawyer is a snake' and 'the road was a snake.' In this way, metaphor topics provide dimensions for attribution, while vehicles provide properties to be attributed to the topic. Psychological evidence supporting this position showed that in a reading-time study, presenting people first with a topic term that is highly constrained reduces the time needed for the subsequent processing of a metaphorical statement, in contrast to when people are first presented with a less-constrained topic (Glucksberg, 2001). Furthermore, presenting people with an unambiguous vehicle primes subsequent metaphor comprehension, in contrast to what happens when they are presented with an ambiguous vehicle term. This pattern of data illustrates how the level of constraint

is an important feature of metaphor topics, while the degree of ambiguity is an important characteristic of metaphor vehicles. Comparison models of metaphor understanding are unable to explain the importance of constraint and ambiguity, because they assume that metaphor comprehension always begins with an exhaustive extraction of the properties associated with both topics and vehicles. Having advance knowledge about either the topic or vehicle should presumably, then, prime metaphor processing. However, the categorization view correctly predicts that only advanced knowledge about highly constrained topics and unambiguous vehicles facilitates metaphor comprehension, a finding that is most consistent with the claim that metaphor understanding involves creating a new, *ad hoc* category and not merely comparing one's knowledge about topic and vehicle domains.

A proposal titled the 'career of metaphor' combines aspects of both the comparison and categorization views (Gentner and Bowdle, 2001). This theory claims that there is a shift in the mode of mappings from comparison to categorization processes as metaphors become conventionalized. For instance, novel metaphors such as 'Science is a glacier' involve base terms, such as 'glacier,' with a literal source (i.e., 'a large body of ice spreading outward over a land surface'), but no relational metaphoric sense (i.e., 'anything that progresses slowly but steadily'). People comprehend novel metaphors as comparisons in which the target concept (e.g., 'science') must be structurally aligned with the literal base concept (e.g., 'glacier'). In some instances, the comparison process may lead to the induction of a novel metaphor category. On the other hand, conventional metaphors can be understood either by comparison or categorization processes. For example, the metaphor 'A gene is a blueprint' has two closely related senses (e.g., 'a blue and white photographic print detailing an architect's plans' and 'anything that provides a plan'). The relations between these two senses make the conventional base term polysemous (i.e., semantically related literal and metaphoric meanings). As such, conventional metaphors may be understood by matching the target concept with the literal base concept (a comparison process) or by viewing the target concept as a member of the superordinate metaphoric category named by the base term (a categorization process).

Metaphor in Thought

Most of the psychological research on metaphor has focused on how it is used and understood within language, and has assumed that metaphorical meaning is created *de novo*, and does not reflect preexisting aspects of how people ordinarily conceptualize ideas and events in terms of pervasive metaphorical schemes. But in the past 20 years, various linguists, philosophers, and psychologists have embraced the alternative possibility that metaphor is fundamental to language, thought, and experience. Cognitive linguists, for instance, claim that metaphor is not merely a figure of speech, but is a specific mental and neural mapping that influences a good deal of how people think, reason, and imagine in everyday life (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999). Evidence supporting this claim comes from linguistic research on the historical evolution of what words and expressions mean, the systematicity of conventional expressions within and across languages, novel extensions of conventional metaphors, studies on polysemous word meaning, and nonverbal behaviors such as gesture (Gibbs, 1994; Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, 1999).

However, psychologists have been critical of much of this work and its possible implications for theories about conceptual structure and metaphor understanding. First, most of the evidence for metaphorical thought, or conceptual metaphor, comes from purely linguistic analyses, and psychologists have expressed deep skepticism about these claims on both methodological and theoretical grounds, especially with regard to linguists' heavy reliance on their own linguistic intuitions (Murphy, 1996). Second, some psychologists argue that conceptual metaphor theory is unfalsifiable if the only data in its favor is the systematic grouping of metaphors linked by a common theme (Vervaeke and Kennedy, 1996). Consider again the conceptual metaphor ARGUMENT IS WAR (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980), which presumably motivates conventional expressions such as 'He attacked my argument' and 'He defended his position.' Cognitive linguistic research suggests that any expression about argument that does not fit the WAR theme is usually seen as evidence for another theme, such as WEIGHING, TESTING, or COMPARING. This implies that no linguistic statement can be brought forward as evidence against the ARGUMENT IS WAR metaphor, which makes the basic tenet of conceptual metaphor theory impossible to falsify. Finally, some psychologists argue that many conventional expressions viewed as metaphorical by cognitive linguists are really not metaphorical at all, but are treated by ordinary speakers/listeners as literal speech (Glucksberg, 2001). Simple expressions like 'He was depressed' are entirely literal, and may not be motivated by a conceptual metaphor such as SAD IS DOWN, because they only reflect something about the polysemous nature of meaning (e.g., 'depression' can be used to talk about either physical depression or emotional depression).

Psychological Studies on Conceptual Metaphor

Despite the skeptical reaction of some psychologists to the idea of metaphorical thought, or conceptual metaphor, there is a great deal of psychological evidence supporting the claim that many aspects of people's abstract concepts and reasoning processes are shaped by enduring conceptual metaphor. Studies show, for instance, that conceptual metaphors influence the ways people conceive of various abstract domains, such as emotions, minds, politics, advertising, scientific theories, the self, morality, learning, and problem-solving (Gibbs, 1994; see Steen and Gibbs, forthcoming, for reviews). Most of these studies demonstrate that providing people with a particular metaphorical construal of some domain (e.g., that EMOTIONS ARE CONTAINERS) can facilitate the way they learn new information, solve problems, and make decisions, if the newly encountered material has a similar metaphorical structure. At the same time, whereas switching from one conceptual metaphor to another may require more cognitive effort in some situations (Langston, 2002), people typically have multiple metaphorical ways of conceiving of most abstract ideas (e.g., THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS, THEORIES ARE FABRIC (Gibbs, 1994). This multiplicity of metaphorical schemes provides another source of evidence for the idea that a good deal of ordinary thought is shaped by metaphor.

Even if people seem able to think metaphorically about various domains, many psychologists and especially many psycholinguists are skeptical about whether conceptual metaphors are normally recruited during people's ordinary comprehension of language (Glucksberg, 2001). These critics find it difficult to believe that conceptual metaphors play much of a role in how people interpret verbal metaphors such as 'Surgeons are butchers' or 'Lawyers are snakes.' To a large extent, the debate over conceptual metaphor settles into two camps: those scholars studying novel metaphors and those studying conventional language that may reflect different conceptual metaphors (e.g., 'He attacked my argument' for ARGUMENTS ARE WARS, 'Our relationship hit a dead end street' for LIFE IS A JOURNEY, and so on). Thus, different approaches to the psychology of metaphor understanding are oriented toward different types of metaphorical language. A likely possibility is that conceptual metaphor may have a strong influence on some aspects of verbal metaphor use, but not on others.

In fact, there is a large body of evidence from psychological studies, employing different methods, that clearly demonstrates that (a) people conceptualize certain topics via metaphor, (b) conceptual metaphors assist people in tacitly understanding why metaphorical words and expressions mean what they do, and (c) people access conceptual metaphors during their immediate, online production and comprehension of conventional and novel metaphors. This work includes studies investigating people's mental imagery for conventional metaphors, as in idioms and proverbs (Gibbs and O'Brien, 1990), people's context-sensitive judgments about the figurative meanings of idioms in context (Nayak and Gibbs, 1990), people's immediate processing of idioms (Gibbs *et al.,* 1997), people's responses to questions about metaphorical expressions about time (Boroditsky and Ramscar, 2002; Gentner *et al.,* 2002), readers' understanding of metaphorical time expressions (McGlone and Harding, 1998), and studies looking at the embodied foundation for conventional metaphoric language (Gibbs *et al.,* 2004).

To briefly give a few examples from these psycholinguistic experiments, studies show that people have a complex metaphorical understanding of many abstract domains, which partially motivates everyday reasoning and language use. For instance, people conceive of the domain of emotions metaphorically, based partly on their embodied experiences of emotions, such that they tacitly know that phrases like 'blow your stack' and 'flip your lid' are motivated by the conceptual metaphor of ANGER IS HEATED FLUID IN A CONTAINER. This metaphorical understanding of anger influences people's judgments about the degree to which someone experiences anger and about the best use of different metaphorical phrases in context (Nayak and Gibbs, 1990). At the same time, people's tacit knowledge of conceptual metaphors constrains the specific mental images they can form for verbal metaphors, and the specific meanings they believe these metaphors express (e.g., that 'blow your stack' means to get very angry while the person is feeling internal pressure, and the expression of the anger is unintentional and forceful) (Gibbs and O'Brien, 1990). In fact, many conventional phrases and idioms, long thought to be dead metaphors, retain much of their metaphorical meaning precisely because they continue to be linked to enduring conceptual metaphors. Finally, priming studies suggest that reading a conventional metaphorical phrase, such as 'John blew his stack,' quickly accesses the conceptual metaphor (ANGER IS HEATED FLUID IN A CONTAINER) that partly motivates why this expression has the particular metaphorical meaning it conveys (Gibbs *et al.*, 1997). Reading another expression with roughly similar metaphoric meaning, such as 'John bit her head off,' activates a different conceptual metaphor (ANGER IS ANIMAL BEHAVIOR), giving rise to the creation of these metaphorical expressions.

The debate over the role that metaphorical thought may play in a psychological theory of verbal metaphor use will likely continue. Once more, it seems inevitable that several of the different approaches to metaphor within linguistics and psychology will become part of a more comprehensive theory of metaphor. Yet it is already evident that the traditional views of metaphor as deviant, ornamental aspects of language and thought no longer are tenable and that psychological studies have provided excellent reasons to believe that metaphor is a fundamental part of the ways people speak and think.

See also: Cognitive Pragmatics; Cooperative Principle; Grice, Herbert Paul; Implicature; Maxims and Flouting; Metaphor: Philosophical Theories; Metaphor: Stylistic Approaches; Metaphors in Political Discourse; Metaphors and Conceptual Blending.

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Metaphor: Stylistic Approaches

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Introduction

Stylistic approaches to metaphor used to take metaphor as one of the most important rhetorical figures of speech that could characterize a particular style. A representative illustration is provided in the classic textbook *Style in fiction*; the authors, Leech and Short (1981: 79), offered a checklist for stylistic features: metaphor is included in the section on tropes, together with metonymy, synecdoche, and other figures of speech defined by 'strange meaning' or 'semantic deviation.' In contrast, schemes, the other main group of rhetorical figures of speech, are defined by repetition of form, or 'structural parallelism,' such as chiasmus and rhyme. According to Leech and Short, schemes and tropes together constitute one of the four dimensions of style, the other three dimensions involving features of vocabulary, grammar, and text (still called cohesion and context). This stylistic angle on metaphor, representative of most mainstream positions, hence distinguished metaphor from ordinary meaning and its linguistic basis (vocabulary, grammar, and text) and treated it as a separate class of phenomena requiring special treatment.

Since the publication of *Style in fiction*, however, the perception of the relation between metaphor, style, and language has dramatically changed. Metaphor – once regarded as the rhetorical figure par excellence, being parasitic on ordinary or literal meaning, deviant, dangerous, and misleading – is now seen as one of the foundations of all language, and its use, being constitutive of meaning, is seen as normal, grounded in experience, and offering guidance to linguistic expression. The presence of metaphor as such is not necessarily indicative of any particular style, as it used to be. Instead, it is part of common, everyday language, as is attested by the many metaphorical forms (words, phrases, morphemes, and even grammatical constructions) that are entirely conventional. The publication that has been pivotal in this change of perspective, Lakoff and Johnson's *Metaphors we live by* (1980) (cf. Lakoff and Johnson, 1999), provides a wealth of examples of the ubiquity of metaphor in language, including conventional talk of *love* as 'a journey,' *argument* as 'war,' *theories* as 'buildings,' *understanding* as 'seeing,' and *life* as 'a gambling game.'

The new view holds that metaphor may still be exploited for rhetorical purposes. However, the present-day stylistician has to analyze the specifics of this exploitation against the background of the more general patterns of metaphor pervading language and its use. This means that classic studies of metaphor in literary style, such as David Lodge's *The modes of modern writing* (Lodge, 1977), are not invalidated by the new approach, since they also include the stylistic use of conventional metaphor, but their theoretical and empirical suggestions do require more extensive investigation of the relation between metaphor in style and metaphor in all language use (Steen and Gibbs, 2004). That is the direction taken by many recent stylistic approaches to metaphor. What has remained unchanged between the traditional and the contemporary views of metaphor is the awareness of metaphor's cognitive import. Aristotle, Giambattista Vico, Percy Bysshe Shelley, Friedrich Nietzsche, I. A. Richards, Max Black, and Paul Ricoeur, to name but a few of the numerous metaphor theorists over time, have all pointed to the conceptual or cognitive basis of metaphor: metaphor draws attention to similarities or correspondences between entities or domains that are fundamentally distinct. This happens in everyday talk of sports in terms of war, or lust in terms of hunger. But it also motivates the more spectacular or subtle stylistic exploitations of metaphor, as in Aristotle's discussion of Homer's comparison between old age and wheat stubble (see Mahon, 1999).

A concomitant constancy between old and new theories of metaphor is the derived attention to its social, affective, and aesthetic import as the corollary of its conceptual structure. When people are compared to lions or to mice, they are compared to animals with a higher or lower status, and this has the accompanying social effect of praising or criticizing them. In addition, when this happens perversely, it can produce irony and humor, and perhaps some admiration for the aesthetic wit of the usage, depending on the occasion and the perception of the producer's rhetorical intentions. But perfectly ordinary metaphorical expressions, such as *time is money*, also have social and affective implications, which are part and parcel of the stylistic effect of a metaphor. The mechanisms of these effects have been studied by experimental psycholinguists (e.g., Gibbs, 1994) and by conversational analysts and applied linguists (Cameron and Low, 1999). Stylistic approaches, however, are typically more focused on the functional analysis of metaphor, effects on cognition being left to the behavioral sciences.

Definition

Metaphor as a feature of style is a subclass of all metaphor in language and its use. The stylistic definition consequently has to distinguish metaphor as a stylistic device from metaphor as a more general linguistic mechanism. The stylistic definition hence approaches metaphor as one typical characteristic of a particular language variety that is relatively individual or idiosyncratic, such as the style of an individual work or author, or more generally, language user. For instance, the metaphors of politicians such as Tony Blair or George W. Bush are important ingredients of their style. But metaphor may also be characteristic of broader patterns of usage across groups of language users, including, for instance, sports reporters or songwriters. Such encompassing language varieties, or registers, are typically based in more general classes of usage that transcend individual styles. However, those manifestations of metaphor will also be considered as having a stylistic interest because of their typical role in clearly identifiable registers and genres.

As suggested previously, the difference with traditional stylistic approaches is that metaphor today is not just taken as a rhetorical device that should be opposed to ordinary vocabulary, grammar, and texture. Instead, the use of metaphor in those nonrhetorical provinces of language may also have a stylistic function. Thus, when a language user has a preference for one set of metaphors over another, both of which are completely conventional parts of the language, the preference may still be seen as a feature of that language user's style, regardless whether it is glaringly prominent or revealed only by careful scrutiny or even statistical analysis.

The new, so-called cognitive-linguistic approach to metaphor launched by Lakoff and Johnson (1980, 1999) defined metaphor as a mapping between two semantic domains. Such crossdomain mappings can motivate varying numbers of systematically related linguistic expressions of a metaphorical kind. For instance, 'love' can be metaphorically conceptualized as a natural force, and we can hence say that somebody was *swept off his feet* or *bowled over* by another person. Such conventional metaphorical expressions are part and parcel of everyday language, and they have overt stylistic implications when they are used relatively deliberately as metaphors, or when new aspects of the mapping are exploited for discursive purposes. An example may be provided by rock singer Neil Young's lines "You are like a hurricane, there's foam in your eyes, and I'm getting blown away." But less prominent patterns of usage would be equally relevant, as when people consistently use one set of metaphors for marriage as opposed to other possible sets, either in conversations or in psychotherapy (Gibbs, 1994).

The cognitive-linguistic approach to metaphor has been developed in various ways (cf. Gibbs and Steen, 1999; Dirven and Pörings, 2002), with one line of theorizing, called 'conceptual integration theory' or 'blending theory,' offering a competing model that utilizes more than two conceptual domains or spaces (Fauconnier and Turner, 2002; cf. Grady *et al.*, 1999). The cognitive-linguistic approach has also given rise to alternative models, in particular in psycholinguistics (Glucksberg, 2001). These alternative models define metaphor in different ways, mainly questioning the basic assumption that crossdomain mappings are understood by means of some form of comparison (Giora, 2001; cf. Croft and Cruse, 2004). It should also be noted that the cognitive-linguistic definition of metaphor as a crossdomain mapping in conceptual structure allows for the possibility that not all metaphor in thought is expressed by metaphor in language. Crossdomain mappings in thought may also be realized by similes, analogies, extended metaphors, megametaphors, allegories, and parables, to mention just the most well-known alternatives (Steen and Gibbs, 2004). Therefore, stylistic approaches to metaphor have to be explicit about their preference for either the linguistic, formal definition of metaphor, which takes metaphor as one specific rhetorical figure, or the more general, cognitive definition, which takes metaphor as a figure of thought, which in turn includes a whole range of rhetorical figures and even text forms.

The advantage of adopting the more encompassing definition is its capacity for contrasting the stylistic functions of these various rhetorical forms. Thus, when a crossdomain mapping is expressed as a metaphor, it may slow down or even prevent the activation of a comparative interpretation strategy, whereas its expression as a simile may facilitate such a strategy (see Gentner and Bowdle, 2001). This, in turn, may decrease or increase the recognition and hence the experienced prominence of a metaphor in style.

There is yet another complication with the definition of metaphor. It would be incorrect to suggest that all linguists (and stylisticians) have embraced the cognitive-linguistic definition of metaphor that also includes all conventionalized metaphorical meaning. For instance, Jackendoff (2002), the most important representative of the generative-grammatical approach to semantics, believed that this went too far, and abided by the more restricted definition of metaphor as the relatively deliberate rhetorical figure. This means that, in effect, that there are currently three definitions of metaphor in style:

1. The restricted rhetorical definition of metaphor as active or deliberate metaphor.
2. The broader cognitive-linguistic definition, which focuses on metaphor as a specific linguistic form, whether it is active and deliberate.
3. The most encompassing, cognitive, definition, which defines metaphor as a crossdomain mapping in conceptualization that may be realized by various rhetorical figures, of which linguistic metaphor is one that has to be contrasted with simile, analogy, and so on.

History

The cognitive-linguistic approach emphasizes the cognitive and systematic nature of metaphor and therefore highlights its ubiquity and conventionality. This is an encompassing, linguistic approach, which does not take metaphor as just a stylistic device in the rhetorical sense of the term. To many scholars, the cognitive-linguistic approach has replaced older views of metaphor, which used to limit metaphor to the rhetorical phenomenon – that is, to those metaphors that are active – thereby drawing attention to their deviance as well as to the probability that they are deliberate. The cognitive-linguistic view argues in particular that it has taken over from the conceptualization prevailing in the 1960s, of metaphor as necessarily involving grammatical deviance, research showing that many metaphorical expressions in language are not deviant but rather are the norm.

Similarly, not all metaphors uncovered by the cognitive-linguistic approach require pragmatic inferencing, as was argued in the 1970s by John Searle and H. P. Grice, but may be understood with reference to conventionalized semantic mappings. The best overview of these different positions is still provided by Ortony (1993).

Another series of issues that has been important in the history of metaphor is the debate over the questions of whether metaphor is a matter of substituting a metaphorical expression for another, presumably literal one; whether it is a matter of comparison between unlike phenomena; or whether it is a matter of interaction between two distinct ideas (for an overview, see, e.g., Gibbs (1994)). Modern developments in cognitive linguistics have come to take a liberal view of the notion of correspondences in metaphor as a cross-domain mapping. This now includes both pre-existing and perceived similarity between phenomena (comparison), and interaction between conceptual structures (interaction), as is, for instance, summarized by Kövecses (2002) in his cognitive-linguistic introduction to the field. This broader view of metaphor in cognitive linguistics goes back as far as the classic position of Aristotle, who also saw metaphor as based in correspondences. At the same time, the new view re-establishes contact with the widespread structuralist views of metaphor as based in similarity, versus metonymy as based in contiguity (cf. Barcelona, 2000; Dirven and Pörings, 2002; Panther and Radden, 1999). It has led to new questions about the analysis of many metaphorical expressions. For instance, do we see time **as** money (metaphor) or do we see time **via** or **through** money (metonymy)?

A third historical issue has to do with the terminology for metaphor analysis. Cognitive linguistics and other cognitive scientific approaches of metaphor have introduced the distinction between 'source' and 'target' domains, whereby the source domain includes the knowledge of the metaphorically used concepts and words and the target domain includes the knowledge of the nonmetaphorically used concepts and words. These terms are now in competition with the traditional terminology, which calls the source domain the 'vehicle' and the target domain the 'tenor.' Yet another tradition talks about the source domain vocabulary as the metaphor 'focus,' and the target domain vocabulary is regarded as the 'frame.' Thus, in an expression such as *Time is money*, 'time' is called the tenor or a term from the target domain and 'money' is called the vehicle or a term from the source domain; 'money' is the focus, whereas 'time is . . .' is called the frame. It is not clear which terminological tradition will prevail.

Classes of Metaphor

Metaphor can exhibit many different linguistic forms. Most attention has been paid to metaphorically used words, with some attention being paid to the various word classes, such as nouns, verbs, and adjectives (e.g., Goatly, 1997; Steen, 2002; Cameron, 2003). However, metaphor is also important for the study of phraseology, exhibiting connections with idiom and with the revitalization of allegedly dead metaphor (Naciscione, 2001), and systemic-functional grammarians have performed extensive study of grammatical metaphor and its stylistic and discursive functions (Simon-Vandenbergen *et al.*, 2003).

Metaphor can also play a role in all kinds of meaning. For instance, study has been made of common source and target domains, which are typically (but certainly not exclusively) concrete and abstract, respectively. Kövecses (2002) listed as common source domains the human body, animals, machines and tools, buildings and construction, plants, games and sports, and so on; he listed as common target domains concepts such as life, time, death, emotions, thought, society, and so on. The study of the metaphorical conceptualization and expression of emotions, in particular, has been rather detailed and advanced (Kövecses, 2000). Particular combinations of source and target domains lead to well-known classes of metaphor, such as personification, concretization, or abstraction. One very specific class of metaphor involves the crossing of sensory modalities, producing synesthesia: we conventionally talk of *loud colors* and *dark sounds,* among many other possibilities.

The functions of metaphor in discourse are also various. Ernest Rutherford's model of the atom in terms of the solar system has a descriptive and explanatory function in science, as well as a didactic function in education. Psychologists have employed various metaphorical models of the mind, ranging from steam engines to computers. But highly conventional metaphors may also function as topic management devices in conversation. And highly innovative metaphors may function as the acme of artistic pleasure (for one list of functions of metaphor, see Goatly (1997)).

Further classification of metaphors in style is possible by considering their combination with other rhetorical figures. Oxymoron and paradox often require metaphorical interpretation to resolve their logical contradiction, as in *sweet sorrow.* Hyperbole and litotes often combine with metaphor to enlarge or diminish the object of comparison, as when a boxer is called 'Hurricane' or 'Raging Bull.' This leads to a consideration of the possibility of the laudatory as opposed to the critical use of these scales of comparison, involving the addition of irony, sarcasm, and humor. Consider W. H. Auden's phrase of 'committing a social science,' a metaphorical phrase that turns social science into a crime. Similar combinations are possible of metaphor with schemes of form, involving parallelism and deviation in sound and grammar, as often happens in newspaper headlines or nicknames (think of tennis player Pete Sampras, who was called 'Pistol Pete').

Application

Metaphorical Utterances

Metaphor in style has a wide range of manifestations, including, to begin with, its striking use in specific utterances. Famous metaphorical quotations may illustrate this phenomenon, from the Bible's *The Lord is my shepherd* through Karl Marx's view of religion as *the opium of the masses*, to George W. Bush's repeated use of *the axis of evil* to refer to Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. Specific metaphors may also be conventionalized parts of the language in the form of sayings, such as *Time is money* or *How time flies*. In discourse, these may be used in their regular form to conventional effect, or they may be exploited for special purposes, as when Bob Dylan writes "Time is a jet plane, it moves too fast." When used in their regular form, metaphors often serve in conversations as topic management devices, signaling that one topic is being terminated and the conversation is moving on to another.

Some sayings are not metaphorical by their linguistic structure alone; strictly speaking, rather, they turn metaphorical only when they are applied to specific situations, such as when *Blind blames the ditch* is used for an accident without any blind people or ditches. Idiomatic expressions other than sayings may also be based on metaphor, and they may also be given specific twists, in what Anita Naciscione has called 'instantial stylistic use.' Here is her example with *the course of true love never did run smooth*, from D. H. Lawrence's story *Mr Noon*:

> The course of true love is said never to run true. But never did the course of any love run so jagged as that of Joanna and Mr. Noon. The wonder is, it ever got there at all. And yet, perhaps, a jagged, twisty, waterfally, harassed stream is the most fascinating to follow [Naciscione, 2001: 74].

Another stylistic exploitation of specific metaphors involves allusion and intertextuality. A well-known example involves the title of William Faulkner's novel *The sound and the fury,* which harks back to Shakespeare's *Macbeth*:

> Life's but a walking shadow, a poor player
> That struts and frets his hour upon the stage
> And then is heard no more. It is a tale

Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury,
Signifying nothing [Act 5, scene 5, lines 19–28].

Faulkner's allusion to these lines in the title of his novel is immediately relevant to the interpretation of the first part of the novel, which presents a story told by a mentally retarded man. Shakespeare's famous metaphor is one version of a series of metonymically related metaphors that are all highly conventional, including *life is a play*, *life is a player*, and *life is a stage*. Consider Shakespeare's contemporary, Sir Walter Raleigh:

What is our life? A play of passion,
Our mirth the musicke of division,
Our mothers wombs the tyring houses be,
Where we are drest for this short Comedy,
Heaven the Judicious sharpe specatator is,
That sits and markes still who doth act amisse,
Our graves that hide us from the searching Sun,
Are like drawne curtaynes when the play is done,
Thus march we playing to our latest rest,
Onely we dye in earnest, that's no Jest [Raleigh, *What is our life* (1612)].

The metaphor underlying Raleigh's poem is metonymically related to the more famous one produced by Shakespeare, and both may be seen as variations on a conventional theme in the Renaissance. This points to a cultural basis of metaphorical themes and their conventional and stylistically charged expression.

The complicated relation between conventional metaphor from previous periods and present-day allusion and intertextuality may be demonstrated with reference to the 20th-century song by Elvis Presley, *Are you lonesome tonight?* There is a parlando part in the song that begins "Someone said that life is a stage," and then continues by telling a sad love story that is divided into acts, and ends with an empty stage. The question arises whether Elvis has picked up on Raleigh, or Shakespeare, or on some other, intermediary source; or whether *life is a stage* has become part of the folklore of the English-language speech community. That this is not an isolated coincidence is shown by the possibility of a comparable relation between Shakespeare's famous *Juliet is the sun* and the following line from a hit song by British rock band, The Cream: "you're the sun, and as you shine on me, I feel free."

Even more complex possibilities for intertextual stylistic play are suggested by potential allusions to the cognitive-linguistic or metaphorological literature. Thus, Julian Barnes, in his novel *Metroland,* had a chapter called 'Sex is travel,' which comes suspiciously close to LOVE IS A JOURNEY, the favorite example from Lakoff and Johnson's *Metaphors we live by*, which was published in the same year, 1980. The content of Barnes's chapter, however, reveals that this idea can also be interpreted as metonymic rather than metaphoric, in that sex is not similar to a journey but requires travel to the beloved.

Another, similarly innovative stylistic exploitation of a metaphor familiar from the theoretical literature is offered by Michel Faber, in his fantasy/science-fiction novel *Under the skin*. One of the characters utters the following words: "A butcher has to be a bit of a surgeon you know." This is a deliberate perversion of the directionality of a metaphor that has received a lot of attention, *this surgeon is a butcher*. However, its perversion is extremely functional in the situational context of the novel, in which people are treated like cattle and are fed and slaughtered for future consumption by a group of aliens – alien butchers of humans having indeed to be something like surgeons.

These phenomena can all be seen as forms of uptake of a specific metaphor by another language user. This may also occur in more direct and reciprocal forms of discourse, such as ongoing conversations. Interlocutors may take up metaphors on the spot, as it were, for purposes of acceptance or rejection, extension, and development, and for sincere, as opposed to perverse, exploitation. Cameron (2003), for instance, shows how students can immediately repeat and extend metaphors offered by teachers during oral expositions in classrooms.

Metaphorical Patterns

Moving away from the stylistic importance of metaphor for specific utterances, there are also more general patterns of metaphorical style, which may relate to the style of an individual language user. A number of examples may be given from the domain of literature (see Steen and Gibbs, 2004). For instance, Elena Semino has shown how the metaphorical aspects of the mind styles of two fictional characters, Bromden in Ken Kesey's *One flew over the cuckoo's nest* and Clegg in John Fowles's *The collector,* display different properties: Bromden's language uses conventional metaphor in creative ways, whereas Clegg's metaphorical language contains many idiosyncratic metaphors. Another area would be the style of a fictional narrator, such as the narrator of George Orwell's *Nineteen eighty-four*, studied by Anne-Marie Simon-Vandenbergen; the narrator uses animal, physical force, and liquid metaphors to express the lack of consciousness and liberty in a totalitarian world. Metaphorical style may also pertain to the language use of an entire work, as has been shown by Don Freeman for a number of Shakespearian plays. This suggests that the personal style of the complete works of individual authors may display

specific patterns of metaphorical usage, as may be the case for heavily metaphorical writers such as Salman Rushdie, as opposed to authors who are clearly much less metaphorical, such as Ernest Hemingway. It will be self-evident that such patterns may also be found in the language of nonliterary writers or speakers, such as famous philosophers or politicians (e.g., Jäkel, 1997; Charteris-Black, 2004), but these have received much less attention.

Style can also be regarded as the language typically used for a particular class of discourse, as opposed to an individual's imprint on the structures of their language use. One of the most famous cases involving metaphor is the one of metaphysical lyrical poetry, which is characterized by the use of daring metaphorical conceits. These are identified by their combination of a specific form, in that they are often presented as analogies or even full-blown arguments, with a particular content, which seems to force the difference between the two domains on the reader more than their fragile and often strained similarity. Here is an example from John Donne, in his poem to Mr Rowland Woodward:

> Like one who'in her third widowhood doth professe
> Her selfe a Nunne, tyed to retirednesse,
> So'affects my Muse, now, a chaste fallownesse [Donne, *To Mr Rowland Woodward* (~1635)].

It should be noted how some stylisticians might actually object to calling these lines a metaphor, since they have the form of an analogy that may also be classified as an extended nonliteral comparison. However, the presence of an underlying cross-domain mapping cannot be contested, so that these lines do count as metaphorical in the conceptual sense of the word.

A similarly famous case is constituted by imagist poetry, wherein almost arbitrary external resemblance between entities motivates metaphorical projection from source to target domain. One of the most famous examples is the following poem by Ezra Pound:

> The apparition of these faces in the crowd:
> Petals on a wet, black bough [Pound, *In a station of the metro* (1913)].

Here, too, questions may arise about the rhetorical classification of the form as a metaphor; however, its conceptual status as a cross-domain mapping is again beyond doubt.

There are also subgenres of the novel that contain characteristically specific manifestations of metaphor in their style. Hardboiled detectives, for instance, typically contain a macho private investigator who revels in producing roughshod analogies portraying women, or more generally their view of emotional situations. Philip Kerr's *Berlin noir* trilogy provides a goldmine of metaphors, such as in the following example:

> Impatient of her, I snatched her knickers down, pulling her onto the bed, where I prised her sleek, tanned thighs apart like an excited scholar opening a priceless book. For quite a while I pored over the text, turning the pages with my fingers and feasting my eyes on what I had never dreamed of possessing [Kerr, *Berlin noir* (1994)].

More generally, David Lodge, following a suggestion made by Roman Jakobson, argued that novels are characterized by the use of simile whereas poetry displays a preference for metaphor (Lodge, 1977).

Poetry and novels are just two genres that display specific patterns of use of particular classes of metaphor. Jakobson and Lodge have postulated many more relationships, and a beginning has been made with the study of the variation of metaphor across registers and domains of discourse. For instance, Kurt Feyaerts has edited a collection of articles on the relation between metaphor and the Bible (Feyaerts, 2003), Lakoff and Johnson's latest work surveys the role of metaphor in philosophy (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999), Reuven Tsur (1987) and Gerard Steen (1994) have addressed the position of metaphor in literature (cf. Steen and Gibbs, 2004), and Lynne Cameron (2003) has examined the use of metaphor in classroom discourse at primary-school age. In the collection on metaphor and thought by Ortony (1993), there is a special section on metaphor in education and another section on metaphor in science, with contributions from Thomas Kuhn and Richard Boyd, among others. Andrew Goatly (1997) has made a beginning with describing some of these relations in stylistic detail, including the distribution of diverging metaphor forms across conversations, news reports, popular science, magazine advertisements, novels, and lyric poems.

Finally, the broadest scope for a stylistic approach to metaphor may define 'style' as the overall impression of a particular language, in contrast with another language. Thus, British English and American English have different patterns of metaphorical usage, one striking feature involving the combination between metaphor and hyperbole in American English (cf. Kövecses, 2004), as may be demonstrated with reference to the frequent exaggerated use in American English of verbs such as *die* and *kill* for many mundane actions, including the light and computers. Different languages can also utilize source domains for particular target domains in very different ways. Variation of metaphor within and between languages is turning into a new area of interest for linguists and stylisticians alike (Kövecses, 2004).

See also: Metaphors and Conceptual Blending; Metaphor: Philosophical Theories; Metaphor: Psychological Aspects; Metaphors in Political Discourse; Metonymy; Psycholinguistics: Overview.

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Metaphors and Conceptual Blending

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(1) The truth is *clear*.

(2) He was *blinded* by love.

(3) His writing is *opaque*.

(4) I *see* what you mean.

'Metaphor' was defined by Aristotle (*Poetics* XXI, 1457b) as "... giving the thing a name belonging to something else, the transference being ... on the grounds of analogy." More succinctly, Quintilian (VIII, VI, 1) defined metaphor as "the artistic alteration of a word or phrase from its proper meaning to another." Traditionally, then, metaphor is defined as a 'trope,' a nonstandard meaning used for its literary effect. On this view, any cognitive significance attributed to metaphorical phenomena is of a negative character. Hobbes (*Leviathan*), for example, argued that metaphors are "... *ignes fatui*; and reasoning upon them is wandering amongst innumerable absurdities ...."

In contrast to the view of metaphor as a literary curiosity, cognitive semanticists such as Lakoff and Johnson (1980), Sweetser (1990), and Turner (1991) have argued that metaphor is a pervasive phenomenon in everyday language and, moreover, that it represents the output of a cognitive process by which we understand one domain in terms of another. Cognitive linguists define metaphor as reference to one domain with vocabulary more commonly associated with another domain. Thus construed, metaphoric language is the manifestation of conceptual structure organized by a 'crossdomain mapping': a systematic set of correspondences between two domains, or conceptual categories, that results from importing frames or cognitive models from one domain to another.

Conceptual Metaphor Theory

In 'conceptual metaphor theory,' metaphorical expressions are the linguistic manifestation of underlying conceptual knowledge. Whereas traditional approaches have tended to consider metaphorical uses of words and phrases on a case-by-case basis, cognitive linguists have pointed to patterns in the metaphorical uses of word meanings. For example, in (1) through (4) we see a number of examples that employ words whose literal meaning concerns the domain of vision, used metaphorically to characterize the domain of understanding. In such cases, the real topic of discussion (e.g., understanding) is known as the 'topic' or 'target' domain, while the domain characteristically associated with the vocabulary (e.g., seeing) is known as the 'vehicle' or 'source' domain.

In these and many such examples of this metaphoric mapping, the relationship between the domains is systematic: if seeing corresponds to understanding, then not seeing corresponds to not understanding, faulty vision corresponds to faulty understanding, and so forth. In conceptual metaphor theory, the systematic nature of the relationships between domains in the metaphor results from mapping cognitive models from one domain onto counterparts in the other. This results in a transfer of images and vocabulary from the source domain onto the target. Moreover, it also involves the projection of inferential structure so that inferences from the source domain can be translated into parallel inferences and counterparts in the target. For instance, in the SEEING domain, if someone is 'blinded' he will be unable to see. Analogously, in the KNOWING domain, if someone is 'blinded' he will be unable to apprehend certain sorts of information. For this reason, metaphor is considered a conceptual phenomenon, rather than merely a lexical one.

Viewing metaphorical language as a manifestation of the conceptual system explains why the correspondences between elements and relations in the two domains of a metaphor are systematic rather than random. Cognitive linguists argue that the systematicity in the usage of source and target domain terminology derives from the fact that some of the logic of the source domain has been imported into the target in a way that maintains the mappings from one to the other. Consequently, there are parallels between the source and target domains, both in word meanings and in the inferences that one might draw from sentences that use those word meanings. Although the objective features of the two domains in a metaphor are often quite different, the two domains can be seen as sharing abstract similarities.

Analyses of conceptual metaphors are typically stated in terms of the domains that are associated by the metaphor. The domain of vision, for instance, is metaphorically linked with the domain of knowledge and understanding. Consequently, these utterances are said to be instances of the KNOWING IS SEEING metaphor. Alternatively, metaphors can be described in terms of the high-level mapping between the two domains, as in Seeing → Knowing (**Table 1**). The latter notation is especially useful when the analyst

Table 1 Example of domain mapping

Seeing		Knowing
Seer	→	Knower
Thing seen	→	Topic of understanding
Quality of vision	→	Quality of understanding
Visual ability	→	Intelligence

wants to outline the correspondences between the two domains.

Conceptual metaphors such as KNOWING IS SEE-ING make up a pervasive repertoire of patterns in language and thought. The many expressions we can remember or create that conform to the pattern have been taken as evidence that, just as the metaphoric meanings of many of these words are conventional, so too are the metaphoric mappings. Consequently, a lexical analysis of metaphor is not complete unless it refers to the underlying mapping patterns.

The idea that knowledge of metaphoric mappings constitutes part of the linguistic competence of the speaker is supported by the use of conceptual metaphors in novel, poetic language (Lakoff and Turner, 1989). For example, in *To the lighthouse*, one of Virginia Woolf's characters describes moments of insight as "illuminations, matches struck unexpectedly in the dark." Although many of the linguistic expressions in this excerpt are creative, the conceptual mappings conform to the pattern in the KNOWING IS SEEING metaphor. Just as a match affords the possibility of seeing one's surroundings for a brief period of time, a moment of insight allows one to understand something for a brief moment of time. The seer in the match scenario corresponds to the knower, and the quality of vision corresponds to the quality of understanding.

Higher-Level Mappings

In addition to KNOWING IS SEEING, cognitive linguists have identified a large number of conventionalized metaphors, such as DESIRE IS HUNGER (*sex-starved*, *sexual appetite*), HOPE IS LIGHT (*dim hopes*, *ray of hope*), or LOVE IS A JOURNEY (*we've come a long way together, their marriage is going off-track, we're just spinning our wheels*) (see Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, 1999). That is, there are many expressions about desire, hope, and love that systematically exploit vocabulary from the domains of hunger, light, and journeys, respectively. As noted earlier, the systematicity derives from the fact that the mappings between elements in the source and the target domains are typically constant from expression to expression, and that many source domain inferences map onto analogous target domain inferences.

Moreover, many conventionalized metaphors such as LOVE IS A JOURNEY can themselves be seen as instantiations of more general crossdomain mappings. LOVE IS A JOURNEY, along with A CAREER IS A JOURNEY and even LIFE IS A JOURNEY, are all instantiations of a more general mapping between long-term purposeful activities and progress along a path. Indeed, the latter is part of a very abstract mapping scheme known as the 'event structure metaphor' (Lakoff, 1993; Lakoff and Johnson, 1999). As outlined by Lakoff (1993), the event structure metaphor includes the mappings outlined as follows.

States	→	Locations
Changes	→	Movements
Causes	→	Forces
Actions	→	Intentional movements
Purposes	→	Destinations
Means	→	Paths
Problems	→	Impediments to motion

Particular metaphoric expressions such as *dead-end relationship* can thus be seen as motivated by metaphoric mappings at multiple levels of abstraction (LOVE IS A JOURNEY, LONG-TERM PURPOSEFUL ACTIVITIES ARE JOURNEYS, and the event structure metaphor).

Primary Metaphor and Experiential Grounding

One important claim in conceptual metaphor theory is that 'primary metaphors' are grounded in correlations in experience. For example, the metaphorical mapping between quantity and height (MORE IS UP) is thought to be motivated by correlations between the number of objects in a pile and its height, or the amount of liquid in a glass and the height of the fluid level. In traditional accounts dating back to Aristotle, metaphors were based on similarities between the two domains invoked in the metaphor. By contrast, Lakoff and Johnson (1980) highlighted the existence of a large number of metaphorical expressions, such as *big idea*, whose two domains have no inherent similarities, arguing instead that such metaphors are experientially motivated.

The experiential motivation of metaphors is consistent with the fact that the mapping between the domains and entities in a primary metaphor is directional. For instance, although the conceptual metaphor KNOWING IS SEEING allows us to utter an expression such as *I don't see what you're saying* to indicate the existence of a comprehension problem, it does not license *I don't understand your face* to indicate a problem with visual acuity. Directionality is thought to reflect the underlying cognitive operations in metaphor, in which an experientially basic source domain is exploited to reason about a more abstract

target domain. Indeed, many entrenched metaphors involve the use of a concrete source domain to discuss an abstract target. For example, importance is expressed in terms of size (as in *big idea* or *small problem*), similarity is construed as physical proximity (as in *close* versus *disparate* philosophical *positions*), and difficulties are discussed in terms of burdens (as in *heavy responsibilities*).

Primary metaphors originate in *primary scenes* in which critical aspects of the source and target domains cooccur with one another. For example, the KNOWING IS SEEING metaphor is thought to be motivated by contexts in which visual experience brings about understanding. In fact, corpus research shows that child-directed speech contains many utterances in which both the perceptual and the cognitive meaning of *see* are simultaneously present as in (5) (Johnson, 1999).

(5) Oh, I see what you wanted.

In fact, children produce many such utterances themselves, prompting the suggestion that the meaning of words such as *see* evidences 'conflation,' as the word refers simultaneously to the visual and the cognitive experience. Learning the metaphorical meaning is not a matter of generalizing from a concrete meaning to an abstract one, but rather requires 'deconflation,' in which the child gradually dissociates and distinguishes between the two domains in the metaphor (Johnson, 1999).

Primary metaphors such as KNOWING IS SEEING are directly grounded in experience, while other metaphors are only indirectly grounded. For example, the THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS metaphor is supported by examples like (6) to (8) from Grady (1997), in which theories are discussed with verbiage that might appropriately be applied to buildings.

(6) You have failed to buttress your arguments with sufficient facts.

(7) Recent discoveries have shaken the theory to its foundations.

(8) Their theory collapsed under the weight of scrutiny.

However, it is unlikely that many people have correlated experiences of theories and buildings. Moreover, many experientially basic aspects of our concepts of buildings are not exploited in this metaphor, as in (9) and (10) (Grady and Johnson, 2002).

(9) This theory has no windows.

(10) I examined the walls of his theory.

Instances in which source domain language (in this case pertaining to buildings) has no target domain interpretation reveal 'metaphorical gaps.' Primary metaphors, however, do not evidence these gaps, as virtually any word that is meaningful in the source domain can be metaphorically interpreted in the target domain (Grady, 1999). Consequently, Grady (1997) suggested that the THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS mappings that underlie (6) through (8) arose from a combination of two primary metaphors: ORGANIZATION IS PHYSICAL STRUCTURE and PERSISTING IS REMAINING ERECT. Unlike the proposed mapping between theories and buildings, experiential grounding of a mapping between persistence and remaining upright is quite plausible (Grady, 1999).

Conceptual Blending Theory

Much of the linguistic data accounted for by conceptual metaphor theory can also be analyzed in terms of 'conceptual blending theory' (Fauconnier and Turner, 2002). An elaboration of 'mental space theory' (described later), the conceptual blending framework (also known as 'conceptual integration' and 'blending theory') assumes many of the same claims as conceptual metaphor theory, such as the idea that metaphor is a conceptual as well as a linguistic phenomenon and that it involves the systematic projection of language, imagery, and inferential structure between domains. However, in contrast to the emphasis on conventional metaphors in conceptual metaphor theory, conceptual blending theory is intended to capture spontaneous, online processes that can yield short-lived and novel conceptualizations. Furthermore, blending theory reveals connections between the cognitive underpinnings of metaphor and a variety of other linguistic phenomena handled by mental space theory.

Mental Space Theory

Mental space theory (Fauconnier, 1994) is a theory of referential structure, a level of conceptual organization between the situation being described and the linguistic structures that describe it (Langacker, 1993). Although motivated by linguistic data, mental spaces are not specifically linguistic in nature and reflect the operation of more general cognitive processes. In this framework, words do not refer directly to entities in the world. Rather, linguistic cues prompt speakers to set up elements in a referential structure that may or may not refer to objects in the world. Created to solve semantic problems created by referential opacity and indirect reference, mental spaces can be thought of as temporary containers for relevant information about a particular domain.

A mental space contains a partial representation of the entities and relations of a particular scenario as perceived, imagined, remembered, or otherwise understood by a speaker. This representation typically includes elements to represent each of the discourse entities, and simple frames to represent the relationships that exist between them. Mental space theory deals with many philosophical problems of meaning by employing multiple spaces to represent a single sentence. Although different spaces can contain disparate information about the same elements, each individual space is internally coherent, and together they function to represent all of the relevant information. In contrast to traditional approaches to meaning construction, the bulk of the cognitive work involves tracking the mappings between spaces rather than the derivation of a logical representation of sentence meaning.

(11) Orlando Bloom is the new James Bond.

(12) Iraq is the new Vietnam, as protests return to the airwaves.

(13) The new James Bond wears jewelry everywhere he goes.

In the context of a newspaper article about the signing of British actor Orlando Bloom to play the character James Bond in an upcoming spy movie, example (11) prompts the construction of two mental spaces, one for reality and one for the movie. Element *a* represents Orlando Bloom in the reality space, while element *a'* represents James Bond in the movie space. An 'identity' mapping between *a* and *a'* represents the fact that in this context *a* and *a'* are the same person, even though Orlando Bloom the actor may not share all of his character James Bond's qualities.

Reality		*Movie*
a	→	a'
Bloom (a)		Bond (a')

In the context of an article about the increasing involvement of musicians in antiwar protests, (12) prompts the construction of two mental spaces: one for 2004 and one for 1970. Element *w* represents the American war with Iraq in the 2004 space, whereas element *w'* represents the American war with North Vietnam in the 1970 space. The link between these two elements is not identity, but rather **analogy.** Similarly, there is an analogy link between the contextually evoked protests in the 1970 space (*p'*) and the explicitly evoked protests in the 2004 space (*p*).

2004		*1970*
w	→	w'
p	→	p'
Location (w, Iraq)		Location (w', Vietnam)

Once elements in different mental spaces are linked by a mapping, it is possible to refer to an element in one space by using language more appropriate for the other space. For example, one might utter (13) to convey Orlando Bloom's penchant for wearing necklaces. As in (11), (13) would involve the construction of two mental spaces: one for reality and one for the movie. Element *b* stands for Bloom in reality space, whereas *b'* stands for Bond in movie space, and (given that wearing jewelry is unlikely for the very macho James Bond character) the predicate wears-jewelry pertains to *b* and not *b'*. Thus, in (13), the speaker refers to *b* (Bloom), only indirectly by naming its counterpart *b'* (Bond). In mental space theory, the possibility of using a term from one space to refer to a linked element in another domain is known as the 'access principle.'

Reality		*Movie*
b	→	b'
Bloom (b)		Bond (b')
Wears-Jewelry (b)		

The access principle is in fact central to the account of metaphor in mental space theory.

(14) Paris is the heart of France.

(15) The heart of France is under attack.

On Fauconnier's (1994) account, a metaphor such as (14) is handled by setting up two mental spaces: one for the source domain (anatomy) and one for the target (geography).

Anatomy		*Geography*
Heart	→	Paris
Body	→	France

The *heart* is linked to *Paris*, and the *body* is linked to *France* by analogy mappings. Once these spaces are linked, one can refer to Paris as *the heart of France*, as in (15). Moreover, as in conceptual metaphor theory, cognitive models that detail the importance of the heart to sustaining the body are cognitively accessible to the target domain and can be mapped onto target space counterparts.

Conceptual Blending and Metaphor

Fauconnier and Turner (1998) suggested that metaphoric mappings were one manifestation of a more general integration process that crucially involved the construction of blended mental spaces. 'Blended spaces' are mental spaces that are built up online to incorporate information from different frames, as well as local contextual information. Central to conceptual blending theory is the notion of the 'conceptual integration network,' an array of mental spaces

in which the processes of conceptual blending unfold (Fauconnier and Turner, 1998). These networks consist of two or more input spaces structured by information from discrete cognitive domains, a generic space that contains structure common to the inputs, and a blended space that contains selected aspects of structure from each input space along with any emergent structure that arises in the course of comprehension. Blending involves the establishment of partial mappings between cognitive models in different spaces in the network and the projection of conceptual structure from space to space.

One motivation for blending theory is the observation that metaphoric expressions often have implications that do not appear to originate in either the source or the target domain. For example, although neither butchers nor surgeons are customarily considered incompetent, a surgeon metaphorically described by his or her colleagues as a *butcher* does not have a good reputation. In blending theory, appreciating this metaphor involves establishing mappings between elements and relations in the source input of butchery and the target input of surgery. As in conceptual metaphor theory, there is a mapping between surgeon and butcher, patient and dead animal, as well as scalpel and cleaver.

However, blending theory also posits the construction of a blended space in which structures from each of these inputs can be integrated. In this example, the blended space inherits the goals of the surgeon and the means and manner of the butcher (Grady *et al.*, 1999). The inference that the surgeon is incompetent arises when these structures are integrated to create a hypothetical agent with both characteristics. Behavior that is perfectly appropriate for a butcher whose goal is to slaughter an animal is appalling for the surgeon operating on a live human being. **Table 2** shows the conceptual integration network for *That surgeon is a butcher.* The fact that the inference of incompetence does not originate in the source domain of butchery is further suggested by the existence of other metaphoric uses of *butcher* – such as describing a military official as *the butcher of Srebrenica* – that recruit structure and imagery from the butchery domain but do not connote incompetence. Differences in the implications of the butcher metaphor in the domains of medicine and the military highlight the need for an account of their underlying conceptual origin.

Blending can also be used to explain how the target domain influences the meaning of metaphoric expressions. For example, the metaphoric idiom *digging your own grave* is used to imply that someone is unwittingly contributing to their own failure. While this metaphor depends on conventional metaphoric mappings between death and failure, the meaning of

Table 2 Example of conceptual integration network

Surgeon Input space	Blended Space	Butcher Input space	Generic Space
Surgeon	S/B	Butcher	Agent
Patient	P/A	Animal	Patient
Scalpel	S/C	Cleaver	Cutting instrument
Goal: Heal patient	*Goal:* Heal patient	*Goal:* Kill animal	
Means: Precise cuts	*Means:* Slashing cuts	*Means:* Slashing cuts	
	Emergent inference: Incompetent (S/B)		

the metaphor in the target domain does not seem to result from a straightforward projection from the source domain of grave digging. If the target domain concerns a case where one's ill-advised stock purchases lead to financial ruin, the digger maps onto the purchaser, the digging maps onto the purchasing, and the digger's death maps onto the purchaser's financial ruin. However, note that in the realistic domain of grave-digging, there is no causal relationship between digging and the grave-digger's death. The blended space thus invokes its imagery from the source input space but obtains its causal structure from the target input (Coulson, 2001; Fauconnier and Turner, 2002).

Furthermore, unlike metaphor theory, which attempts to explain generalizations in metaphoric expressions via the conceptual mappings that motivate them, conceptual blending theory attempts to explain meaning construction operations that underlie particular metaphoric expressions. Consequently, blending theory can address the meaning construction in metaphoric expressions that do not employ conventionalized mapping schemes. For example, the italicized portion of this excerpt from an interview with philosopher Daniel Dennet involves a metaphorical blend: "There's not a thing that's magical about a computer. *One of the most brilliant things about a computer is that there's nothing up its sleeve*" (*Edge 94,* November 19, 2001). The input domains here are *computers* and *magicians,* and the blend involves a hybrid model in which the computer is a magician. However, the connection between these two domains arises purely from the cotext of this example, as there is no conventional COMPUTERS ARE MAGICIANS mapping in English.

Blending also can be used to explain how a number of different kinds of mappings can be combined to

explain the meaning of a particular example such as (16) (from Grady *et al.*, 1999).

> (16) With Trent Lott as the Senate Majority Leader, and Gingrich at the helm in the House, the list to the Right could destabilize the entire Ship of State.

This example involves an elaboration of the conventional Nation-as-Ship metaphor, in which the Nation's policies correspond to the ship's course, leadership corresponds to steering the ship, and policy failures correspond to deviations from the ship's course. The Nation-as-Ship metaphor is itself structured by the more abstract event structure metaphor. The source input is the domain of Ships, which projects an image of a ship on the water, as well as the concept of the helm, to the blended space. The target input is the domain of American politics, which projects particular elements, including the (Republican) politicians Trent Lott and Newt Gingrich, to the blend, where they are integrated with the sailing scenario.

Example (16) describes the ship listing to the right. However, in the realistic domain of ships, neither the presence of one individual (Trent Lott) nor the beliefs of the helmsman are likely to cause the ship to list. The logic of this metaphoric utterance comes not from the source input but rather the target input in which the Senate Majority Leader and the Speaker of the House can affect national policies and the overall political orientation of government. Furthermore, the standard association between conservatism and the right as against liberalism and the left is clearly not based on the ship model, as it is frequently encountered in other contexts. However, because the scenario in the blend involves spatial motion, the literal notion of rightward movement is integrated with the other structure in the blend to yield a cognitive model of a ship piloted by Newt Gingrich that lists to the right.

Consequently, Fauconnier and Turner (2002) proposed that metaphoric utterances are mentally represented in networks of mental spaces known as 'integration networks.' As noted earlier, conceptual integration networks are comprised of four mental spaces. The source and target domain each structure one input space; the generic space represents abstract commonalities in the inputs; and the blended space inherits structure from its inputs as well as containing emergent structure of its own. Rather than emphasizing the extent to which metaphorical utterances instantiate entrenched mappings between source and target domains, conceptual integration networks only represent those cognitive models that are particularly relevant to the mapping supported by the utterance. While mappings in the integration network require knowledge of conceptual metaphors, such as KNOWING IS SEEING, blending theory is best suited for representing the joint influence of input domains and the origin of emergent inferences in particular metaphoric utterances.

Metaphor, Conceptual Blending, and Linguistic Theory

In part because of its origin in mental space theory, conceptual blending theory suggests that the meaning construction operations that underlie metaphoric meanings are but a subset of those involved in other sorts of indirect reference. By treating all sorts of mappings as formally identical, it is possible to understand the transfer of structure in metaphor as being fundamentally similar to the transfer of structure in nonmetaphorical instances. Thus, regardless of whether or not the information being combined originates in different domains, the integrative operations can be understood as requiring the construction of mappings between partial structures that originate in different mental spaces.

This formal identity allows for the unification of the treatment of metaphor – which principally recruits analogy mappings – with the treatment of 'counterfactuals' and 'conditionals,' conceptual blends that often recruit identity mappings. A number of researchers working within the framework of conceptual blending have addressed its implications for counterfactuals (e.g., Coulson, 2000; Fauconnier, 1997; Oakley, 1998). Similarly, the formal treatment of all sorts of mappings is useful in explaining the variety of complex combinations coded for by modified noun phrases. For example, blending theory has been used to explore issues of noun modification in seemingly simple cases like *red pencil* (Sweetser, 2000), more exotic cases like *land yacht* and *dolphin-safe tuna* (Turner and Fauconnier, 1995), and privative constructions such as *alleged affair* and *fake gun* (Coulson and Fauconnier, 1996).

The most obvious application of conceptual metaphor and blending theory, however, is in lexical semantics, or the study of word meaning. The pervasiveness of metaphoric meanings suggests that metaphoric extension is a major factor in the emergence of new senses, and thus plays an important role in 'polysemy'. Polysemy is the phenomenon in which a single word form has many related senses, as in *cut paper*, *cut the budget*, and *cut corners*. Because most words have an array of interrelated senses, metaphor and blending can be used to explain how these different senses can be seen as extensions and elaborations that arise as a function of different contextual circumstances.

Another productive process for creating word senses is 'metonymy,' in which words are used to refer to concepts closely related to their more customary referents (*see* **Metonymy**). For example, in (17), *Shakespeare* refers not to the man, but to the plays authored by the man. Similarly, in (18), *the White House* refers not to the building but to the people who work in the building.

(17) Kenneth loves Shakespeare.

(18) The White House never admits an error.

The interaction of metaphor and metonymy has recently emerged as a major focus of research in cognitive linguistics (see, e.g., Dirven and Poerings, 2003).

Accounts of both metaphor and metonymy are important for the study of how meanings change over time (Sweetser, 1990; Traugott and Dasher, 2001). Conceptual metaphor theory can identify conventional mapping schemes, such as the event structure metaphor, to describe patterns of semantic change, and the experiential grounding of primary metaphors might help explain why some patterns are more pervasive than others. Moreover, conceptual blending theory, with its capacity to describe the integration of general knowledge and contextual circumstances, might be used to address historical, social, and psychological causes of semantic change.

See also: Metonymy; Metaphor: Philosophical Theories; Metaphor: Psychological Aspects; Metaphor: Stylistic Approaches; Metaphors in Political Discourse.

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Metaphors in Political Discourse

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Everyone knows that politicians use language in ways designed to persuade, and perhaps deceive, and some people would include 'metaphors' as examples of political rhetoric. It is important to be clear what is understood by the term 'metaphor.' In the first part of this article we outline the traditional understanding and then the contemporary cognitive theory of metaphor. In the second part we apply the latter to examples of political discourse, specifically discourse about political institutions, showing how a scientific understanding of metaphor can yield insights into what humans are doing when they reason about politics.

The Classical Tradition

Greek and Roman thinkers were well aware that language was integral with politics and public life in general and studied it under the rubric of 'rhetoric.' Their writings on the subject to some extent seek to explain metaphor (among many other rhetorical devices) as a phenomenon of human communicative behavior, but they were far more concerned with evaluating the persuasive or esthetic effects of metaphors with a view to advising public speakers.

Aristotle, however, has a theoretical framework. He defines metaphor as 'the application of a word that belongs to another thing' (Aristotle, 1995: 21) and discerns different types of such application. For Aristotle, then, metaphor is about the use of words, not about the nature of thought. Moreover, Aristotle thought of metaphor as something exceptional. In *Rhetoric* he is above all concerned with the emotive effects caused by metaphor and by the 'correct' choice of metaphors. He regards metaphor as special to certain forms of writing and speaking and to certain talented individuals. These ideas, repeated by classical writers such as Cicero and Quintilian, are implausible in the light of modern research on metaphor. Aristotle does note the role of metaphor in the expressing of new ideas, but others concentrated on functions such as being brief, and avoiding obscenity and eulogistic embellishment. In fact, the tendency is to reduce the prominence of metaphor and to handle it with a fair degree of suspicion.

This stance is inherited and magnified by the early modern philosopher and pivotal political theorist Thomas Hobbes (cf. Chilton, 1996). Here is Hobbes on metaphor: "Metaphors, and senseless and ambiguous words, are like *ignes fatui*; and reasoning upon them, is wandering amongst innumerable absurdities; and their end, contention, and sedition, or contempt" (*Leviathan*, chapter 5, pp. 116–7, original emphasis). In this passage it becomes clear that for Hobbes metaphor may actually be a kind of threat to the political status quo. This should at least alert us to the possibility that metaphors play a very important role in political life.

The Cognitive Theory of Metaphor

In the 1980s linguists realized that metaphor was not simply a matter of transferring a word from its 'proper' referent to some other referent, nor a special use of language confined to the literary or oratorical domains (cf. Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, 1999). The following points are essential for any serious investigation of 'metaphor in political discourse.'

First, metaphor is a cognitive, not a linguistic phenomenon. The human mind has various forms of organized knowledge. These may be innate or partly innate and elaborated by culture-relative experience. Let us call these 'domains.' Metaphor is then defined as a mapping from a source domain of this type to a target domain. The evidence suggests that many source domains tend to be based in physical, especially spatial, experience and be stored in the mind as what are often referred to as 'image schemas.' What the metaphorical mapping does is transfer structure from the source domain to a less well-specified domain.

Second, it is apparent that such metaphorical mappings account for the meanings of many ordinary words in a language as well as idiomatic expressions. Metaphors are therefore not confined to special genres. However, in political discourse, as in other types of discourse, particular words and idioms will obviously

be relevant, so particular metaphors will be also. We will see that certain image schemas are an important source of political concepts, e.g., the source–path–goal schema and the container schema. An important point to be made here is that metaphors are actually an instrument for reasoning, contrary to what was asserted by Hobbes. They provide a means by which the human mind can make inferences, for if metaphors map structure from a source domain to a target domain, inferences that can be done in the source domain can (potentially) be done in the target domain.

Another methodological consideration concerns the etymology of political vocabulary. In English and some other languages many words for political phenomena derive from Latin or Greek words with different meanings. Meaning change in general is often metaphorical in the sense defined here. In the case of political words the metaphors involved can be of interest because they give some indication of how the human conceptual system operates over historical time in this domain of human life.

Finally, two caveats are in order. First, this article refers primarily to metaphor in political discourse in English. Second, it refers to the Western political tradition. Whether the points made can be generalized is a question for further research.

Metaphor and Politics

Political behavior involves using language as a form of political action and as a form of reflection on (metarepresentation of) political behavior. The two are not of course entirely separate but in what follows we shall focus on the second. What, then, are the political concepts that have a metaphorical basis?

If we make the assumption that political behavior involves both cooperation and competition, we can ask how metaphor is involved in the conceptualizing of this duo. It is clear that the relevant concepts will concern differentiation of various sorts and the relations among the parts. Relations of power will be especially significant.

The basic vocabulary of hierarchy and precedence is derived metaphorically from spatial concepts. Two of the fundamental image schemas are the front–back schema and the up–down schema, based on human anatomy, perception and cognition.

The front-back schema gives us metaphorical mappings for precedence (the word itself being etymologically metaphorical [*Latin prae-cedere go in front of*] and related to physical ordering of individuals in procession). This is why we speak of an individual or group coming **before**, in **front** of, **ahead** of, in the **vanguard**, etc., while others **come behind**, **fall behind**, **follow**, etc. It will be noticed that these expressions

contain mappings from additional image schemas. One of these is the path schema, which reflects experience of human movement. Front–back combined with path gives us the powerful concept of **leadership** and **followers**. In certain political discourses, such concepts are applied to whole groups (ethnic groups, states, regions) in expressions such as '**backward** nations'; indeed the concept of **progress** itself is etymologically derived (*Latin pro-gressus a forward move*) from the spatial front–back and path schemas. In persuasive political discourse, orators frequently claim that their country is, or urge that it should be, **moving forward**. In fact, this schema appears to be indispensable for the meanings associated with one important strand of political discourse, namely reference to policy and future planning. Politicians and their bureaucrats thus frequently speak and write of **looking toward the future**, **taking rapid steps**, **moving on**, coming **to a crossroads**, **going in the right direction**, and so on.

In the up–down schema, **up** maps onto good, strong and powerful. Thus superior individuals or groups are not only better in some normative sense, but also possess power **over** others. These expressions are embedded in the language and enter into systematic semantic relations. Thus if someone is **over** or **above** you, you are **beneath** or **below** them; you will be **subordinate, inferior**, and they may **stoop, condescend**, and so on. This network is the basis for further concepts: a group may **rise up**, or cause an **uprising**, and an established authority may **decline, fall**, or **collapse**. The basic image schema of standing upright is important to the rather complex development of the concepts evoked by words such as 'estate' and 'state.'

Concepts of control and power are lexically encoded by way of the spatial up–down image schema. This can be seen from the constructions into which the relevant lexical items enter in English and other languages. For example, it is systematically the case that we say power **over**, control **over**, authority **over**, charge **over**, responsibility **over**, and so forth, rather than some other preposition. One of the key concepts of Western political philosophy from the early modern period onward is **sovereignty**. The history of this word, like that of the term 'state,' is complex, but what should be noted here is that it is also metaphorically derived according to the up–down schema: *sovereign* < late Latin *superanus* < Latin *super* ('on top of,' 'over').

The conceptualization of discrete groups of individuals, in many cases in discrete geographical regions, is probably a crucial component of political thinking and action. The form of such concepts is provided by the basic container image schema, which has many politically significant ramifications. The container schema captures human experience of 'inside,'

'outside' and the intermediate boundary. On the linguistic evidence, it is apparently recruited by the conceptual system to understand, reason about, and communicate about social groups. In reality collections of objects and individuals need not have determinate bounds. The container image schema, however, imposes them. Presumably it coincides with what may or may not be a basic schema, that of self and other. It is this schema that makes it possible to draw inferences such as: if A is not **in** the group, then he is **outside** it; in order to **enter** the group A must cross a boundary. As Chilton (1996) and Chilton and Lakoff (1995) argued, the container schema is fundamental to the concept and discourse of security, as well as to the modern concept of the state and the international system, where countries and regions are conceptualized as container-like entities. Two combinations with other image schemas are worth noting here. In combination with the center–periphery schema, we have political concepts of **central authority** and **remote** or **peripheral regions**. In combination with the path schema, we have what appear to be emotionally charged concepts of invasion, incursion, and the infringement of national boundaries.

In the Western political tradition certain metaphors with cultural (rather than image-schematic) sources for the state have recurred, as Peil (1983) has shown: the body politic, the ship of state, buildings, machines. The first three can be regarded as linked to the container schema, and the body schema involves basic as well as cultural knowledge. All provide rich possibilities for political inferences in the sense outlined earlier.

The body-politic metaphor is particularly entrenched. It permits the mapping of structured knowledge about the body (and its ills) onto the political domain. If the polity has a **head**, it also has its lesser parts that serve it. If the polity is a body, then it may have **disease**, which may be due to an invasive element, e.g., a **parasite**. It follows that it needs a **physician** to **cure** it, who may prescribe a **cure** such as a **purge**. As is well known, this train of thought was developed and manipulated in Nazi thinking and propaganda. Peil's other metaphors provide inferential potential that will be more or less familiar to readers. If the state is a **ship**, it may need a strong **captain** to **steer** it though **rough seas**; if it is a building it will need strong **foundations**, a **roof** to protect it, and **pillars** to hold it up; if it is a **machine**, then there are **levers** of power, the machinery has **checks** and **balances**, and it may be more or less **efficient**, or may go **out of control**.

Such examples suggest that the cognitive theory of metaphor provides a means of investigating the intricate conceptual networks that underlie discourse about political institutions. They also suggest that core features of political theory, at least in its traditional Western forms, make use of metaphors derived from a small set of image schemas. But these are hypotheses for future research.

See also: Metaphors and Conceptual Blending; Metaphor: Philosophical Theories; Metaphor: Psychological Aspects; Metaphor: Stylistic Approaches.

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Metapragmatics

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There are at least three senses in which it is possible to speak of metapragmatics. The first, the most general and potentially generic one, refers to the theoretical debate on pragmatics and its central concerns, its epistemological foundations, and the definition *metá* of its relevant object and scope. Metapragmatics in this sense concerns itself with the criteria of pertinence of the discipline, not to state which is the 'best' pragmatics, but to verify the consistency of the basic assumptions, the definitions of the questions to be asked, and the methods to be adopted.

The second, narrower sense, highlights the conditions that make speakers' use of language possible and effective. The task of metapragmatics in this sense is, above all, to make those conditions explicit. This kind of metapragmatics, which can be related to the problem of the universals of human communication, is transcendental in a Kantian sense inasmuch it deals with the constitutive elements of human knowledge.

The third sense is less ambitious than the other two. It is concerned with the investigation of that area of the speakers' competence that reflects judgments of appropriateness on one's own and other people's communicative behavior. In this sense, metapragmatics deals with the 'know-how' regarding the control and planning of, as well as feedback on, the ongoing interaction.

The metapragmatic level is not just *one* of the metalinguistic levels: on the contrary, it is different from them, as the knowledge it refers to concerns not 'the ability to say' but 'the ability to do' (and the ability to say what one does). The metapragmatic level represents the interface between the linguistic and the extralinguistic: it enables the language user to relate language and world, by checking the adequacy of utterances with regard to actual contexts. The knowledge it incorporates leaves traces on the surface of discourse.

The different meanings of the term 'metapragmatics,' with their corresponding different objects of study, have an etymological justification, as they can be linked to the different meanings of the prepositon *metá* in Classical Greek: not only 'above' but also 'beyond.' After all, the term 'metaphysics' is based on a misunderstanding: the volumes by Aristotle entitled *Metaphysics* did not transcend and justify his earlier writings on physics but, simply, because of a chance arrangement, 'came after' the ones on physics.

The paradox of metapragmatics, and also its potential oxymoron, is that it 'comes after', though reflecting on, a knowledge that 'comes before' any theory.

Metapragmatics 1: The Need for Metatheoretical Reflections

Pragmatics has definitely come a long way. From being a 'wastebasket,' to use Bar-Hillel's (1971) well-known metaphor, it has become an accredited discipline with an international association, crowded conferences, textbooks, and a monthly journal. Pragmatics is undogmatic, tolerant, and does not demand acts of faith. The reverse side of this tendentially ecumenical hospitality, however, is the heterogeneity of the theoretical proposals it brings together – something that makes it all the more necessary that the theoretical standpoints and the argumentative strategies be clarified. Nevertheless, an agreement both on an (albeit minimal) definition of the field of pertinence and on the assumption of the ideological and theoretical commitments this definition entails is necessary. To achieve this goal, a metatheoretical awareness is needed. So far, these reflections have mainly been practiced on boundary issues (disciplinary and academic), especially with regard to the often disputed borders of pragmatics with semantics and sociolinguistics. Beyond defining goals – something that was appropriate in the first stages of its development – metatheoretical reflections have a right to autonomy. Clearly, any choice regarding the object of study of pragmatics, its domain and, as a consequence, the choice of the most effective descriptive categories and methods, entails a commitment to a metapragmatic view; this commitment and view, however, are most often neither foregrounded nor even made explicit. At times they are simply missing. Nevertheless, such a concern for the epistemological implications of what researchers assume pragmatics is about, is not only legitimate but also necessary, as pragmatic investigation goes beyond the boundaries of linguistics and overlaps with semiotics. Its object is not language, speech, grammar, but human communication (clearly, all these terms ask for metatheoretical definitions). Its subjects are not speakers, but people making (different types of) interactional choices; the study of the latter requires an integrated conceptual framework.

Last but not least, no justification is needed for speaking about meta*pragmatics*; rather, one should ask why one does not commonly speak about metaphonology, metasyntax, metasemantics, and so on.

Wittgenstein (1953) highlighted the constitutional fallacy of any metadiscourse that claims to be foundational, but that is actually just one more linguistic game among many others. Even so, games that consist of asking oneself where the game one is playing comes from, where it leads to, whether its rules have any sense, or if they ought to be changed, are games worth playing. Metapragmatic epistemological reflection is not necessarily transcendental. One way to escape the foundational regression consists in reflecting on how pragmatics speaks about itself, on how it represents itself, on its wording, on its key words, on its predominant metaphors. Much work is needed here. First of all, one has to avoid the risk of new forms of hypostasis (see Borutti, 1984), brought about by certain, apparently harmless, metalinguistic uses. For instance, the use of a definite noun phrase can be idealizing: the risk of an idealization exists whenever one refers to 'the speaker,' who could end up by being an hyperuranian subject, or a lunar *effet-sujet*. Hence, the obvious need for a solid empirical and context-sensitive 'anchorage.'

As noted, pragmatics is tolerant; some would even call it loose. Yet, if one looks at the literature labeled pragmatic, one is struck by the frequency of such words as 'rules,' 'maxims,' 'principles.' From the available data, one tries to infer rules and principles. One could even imagine a (superego-like) need for normalization; a need that is clearly understandable if one considers the messy nature of the object and the need to define analytical instruments with which to infer generalizable results. On the one hand, it is a fact that pragmatic mistakes are much more compromising than grammatical ones: there is nothing worse for an interactant than the *pragmatica sanctio* whereby his/her syntactically and semantically well-structured utterance is inappropriate, ineffective, unhappy, inadequate to his/her wishes and aims. On the other hand, 'normativeness' assumes that what is regulated, i.e., the basic units to which rules and regulations apply, is not controversial. But, once again, this is a matter of metatheoretical choice (see Mey, 2001: 176ff.; Verschueren, 2003).

Metapragmatics 2: On the Possibility Conditions of Action and Interaction

Communication

The second type of research that can be labeled 'metapragmatic' studies the possibility and felicity conditions of communication. Whereas in other research areas, such as text linguistics, there have been attempts to define the constitutive rules – what makes a text a text, the *quidditas*, rather than the *qualitas* of the text, identified in coherence – in pragmatics attention has mostly been given to regulative rules or principles: how to cooperate, be kind, polite, etc. In this regulative sense, traditional rhetoric, as it lists and correlates locutionary and perlocutionary strategies, is a distinguished and sophisticated precedent. One limit of rhetoric is that it ignores the action level of language, defined by Austin as the illocutionary level of a speech act, which can be taken to represent the basic unit of analysis both in conversation analysis and in pragmatic linguistics.

Normativeness, as noted, presupposes that what is normalized is clear. Nevertheless, the following questions remain open. What is constitutive of an action? What is constitutive of an interaction? What must necessarily, not optionally, hold for an action of a certain kind to be performed? What units of action are constitutive of a given interaction?

In this type of metapragmatics, for instance in research on dialogue-constitutive universals, to use Habermas's (1971) label, the metaphysical risk is particularly tangible. The same risk is encountered in the presumed identification of universal speech acts, particularly if they are transferred onto syntactic units and inflectional moods (the illocutionary acts of statements, questions, and commands as unproblematically reflecting the indicative, interrogative and imperative moods (*see* **Speech Acts and Grammar**)). The problem of identifying basic acts – whether universal or not, and whether or not associated with specific syntactic forms – is related to the problem of the conventions underlying the performance of an act. In its turn, this problem is linked with the problem of consensus: what is the consensus that allows us to define the interactional sequence *X* as *Y*? Is there a pragmatic common core allowing a cross-cultural comparison of communicative behaviors and, if so, what does it consist of?

Here, a wide and by no means uncontroversial area of research opens up. Shared metapragmatic knowledge concerns knowledge of culture-bound and group-bound action frames. Members of a given community, in a given phase of its history, are able to produce and recognize types of linguistic action, and assign, prospectively or retrospectively, an utterance 'token' to a 'type' of action, by describing *X* as *Y*. Behind this possibility of performance and recognition of linguistic action one can imagine, in a Kantian fashion, several conditions:

a. *Conditions of 'thinkability,'* i.e., conditions underlying the possibility of thinking types of actions. These conditions are registered in the lexicon, for instance, as speech act names or illocutionary force indicating devices; they deal with the 'what is,'

the essence. The most famous attempt to define constitutive rules of speech acts was made by Searle (1969) (*see* **Speech Acts**). Such attempts can be related to research in Artificial Intelligence (AI) and cognitive psychology, in particular on action frames and on how global patterns are inscribed in the speakers' memory. The major difficulty met by this kind of investigation derives from the fact that there is not just one way to perform an action; neither is there a one-to-one relationship between linguistic form and action type: in short, there is no correspondence between sentence types and utterance types.

b. *Conditions of feasibility*, i.e., conditions regarding the system of aims and expectations within which the action is performed; they deal with the 'how to do,' the procedure. This kind of knowledge concerns the existence and functioning of intersubjectively recognizable strategies by which people match different kinds of action to different actual contexts. The Gricean maxims form an example of proposals made in this area, which can be related to praxeology, inasmuch as they deal with effective acting. However, further research – including cross-cultural work on politeness – has underlined that Grice's maxims are strongly ethnocentric; so, they must be reconsidered, maybe even discarded as possible candidates for the role of pragmatic universals (*see* **Maxims and Flouting**).

c. *Conditions of recognizability*. These conditions deal with questions such as 'where did you get this from,' 'what made you say this,' and so on, hence with interpretability. This question is related to the study of the different kinds of linguistic and paralinguistic means and markers (lexical, but also morphosyntactic, textual, prosodic, kinesic) available in different languages. Their conventional nature is not given once and for all, but changes over time and space. They narrow down the range of possible reasonable interpretations, on the part of the interpreters, of their partners' communicative behaviors, in abductive processes, by trial and error, through which the assignment of signification is negotiated. Obviously, the more shared knowledge the interactants have, and know they have, the more often they will leave out the intermediate steps in their dialogues, which, as a result, will be mutually understandable by them, but not by an external observer.

From a logical point of view, the three types of conditions are arranged in a hierarchically descending sequence, while from a methodological point of view this sequence is reversed. From a 'practical' point of view, i.e., from the point of view of what is really happening in human interaction, these conditions come together, because the social actors rely and act on the three kinds of conditions simultaneously. The main problem is that of relating these three types of conditions to the conventional intersubjective practices of everyday interaction where cognitive structures and sociopsychological constraints interact. The difficulties brought about by Searle's constitutive rules, and the rules' inadequacy as micro-models of linguistic action and communicative behavior have been highlighted by Kreckel (1981) (*see* **Principles and Rules**).

Empirical-Conceptual Approach

The term 'metapragmatics' has been applied in comparative lexical research, particularly as it has centered on verbs defining linguistic actions, i.e., on speech act verbs (*see* **Speech Acts, Classification and Definition**). Such an approach, defined as 'empirical-conceptual,' starts from the assumption that an investigation of the lexical structure, of the semantics of verbs used to describe speech acts, throws light onto the nature of linguistic action (Verschueren, 1985). Such research has the advantage of bringing the often abstract reflections of classical speech act theory closer to the ways in which linguistic actions are described in individual languages. Now, given that the lexicon forms an interface between pragmatics and grammar, and that the study of the lexicon thus represents an important empirical 'anchorage,' it is still also true that mere lexical research is inherently inadequate for the analysis of interactive dynamics. It is indeed necessary, if actual interaction is not to become irrelevant, to correlate the investigation of the typologies of the verbs that people use to describe linguistic actions with the investigation of what people seem to know 'in real time,' 'live,' about the use of their own language in context. The study of the types of linguistic items (among them lexical items) must be linked to the study of the types of their underlying contextual features and criteria of appropriateness.

It also is important to clarify the level of abstraction at which one is working, so that pragmatic metalanguage is not at the same time both the *definiens* and the *definiendum*: the interiorized conceptualization of the linguist as a native speaker of a particular language should not predetermine his/her selection of the relevant features of a speech act in relation to a (presumably universal) common core.

This type of metapragmatic research has the merit of positing a methodological connection between speech act taxonomy and folk taxonomies. It is well known that languages, those powerful instruments of conceptualization, segment the external world and natural phenomena in different ways, from the color spectrum onward – a much-quoted example both in favor of, and against, the so-called Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. Unlike colors, though, linguistic actions

do not exist *in natura*; they do not come before language use, nor are they separable from it. Regardless of the power of the means we are able to mobilize, a privileged extraterritorial theoretical standpoint from which to look at linguistic actions does not exist.

Metapragmatics 3: The Management of Discourse

Common Knowledge and Reflexivity

The two distinctive features here are the reference to common knowledge – both shared knowledge and folk theories – and reflexivity. Significantly, they coincide with the most resistant barriers that separate artificial intelligence from the human intellect: common sense (a notion which is epistemological, not ideological, as pointed out by Parret, 1983) and reflexivity, i.e., the human intellect's capability and transcendental possibility of thinking (and speaking) about its own thinking (*see* **Reflexivity**).

Reflexivity is also one of the most distinctive features of natural languages, marking them off from other semiotic systems precisely by this capacity of describing themselves. The complex issue of reflexivity, seen as merging with indexicality and encompassing all metapragmatic activities, has been investigated from an anthropological, cross-cultural viewpoint by Lucy (ed.) (1993). From a more restricted, linguistic viewpoint, an aspect of reflexivity can be found in the possibility that speakers have of communicating on the communication they are engaged in, by defining it and by confirming or modifying the definitions given by themselves and by their partners. Such 'editing,' along with self- or other-initiated repairs, is rooted in metapragmatic reflexivity; so are reformulations, evaluations, metadiscursive comments, and requests for explanations through which mutual understanding is negotiated. In texts and discourse, there are classes of markers – e.g., Gumperz's (1982) 'contextualization cues' – and metacommunicative utterances whose role it is to ensure dialogue management in terms of communicative effectiveness.

When tackling a speech sequence, not only can one describe it, give it a name, but one also can judge whether it is appropriate to the situation. One can understand whether one has chosen – among adequate communicative options – the one that best fits the context; if this is not the case, one can retrace one's steps and correct oneself. One can, in an overall communicative strategy, negotiate the degree of directness, explicitness, or politeness as one goes along. One can decide whether one has said the right thing at the right time in the right way, or whether one has made a tactless remark. If the utterance was too elliptical or cryptic, ironical, or digressive in relation to a conversational topic (hence requiring adventurous inferential steps), one can ask for explanations and redefine the context and its presuppositions, thereby reshuffling the assignment of rights and duties among the partners.

All such skills are not predicated on clumsy beginners (the 'model readers,' in the sense of Eco (1979), of many textbooks and grammars) but on social actors and 'competent readers' (see Mey, 2000) who use their communicative know-how, not with awe but with pleasure. At the other end of the scale of metapragmatic awareness are gaffes and jokes. This shared metapragmatic awareness is not only linguistic but also semiotic, encyclopedic, and constitutionally intertextual. It refers to a knowledge that concerns not only language as social (culturally and historically determined) behavior but also our 'being in the world.' The problem of metapragmatic appropriateness, being close to the problem of style, lies in that dialectic relationship between expectation and surprise that is peculiar to the communicative exchange. Regarding to a given system of expectations, there will be more or less marked choices. A choice is all the more significant when it is less foreseeable (see Arndt and Janney, 1987): the more it eludes ceremony and routine, the more it communicates. In this sense, the literary text is highly informative in its nonredundancy (see Lotman, 1977). Once one is engaged in a routine, and has chosen a communicative register, the most remarkable and revealing choice will be the unexpected one, the sudden change in the linguistic, intonational, and proxemic register.

Monitoring

A considerable part of metapragmatics as discourse management can be ascribed to monitoring, to definitions of the situation furnished by the interactants as they go along. Ethnomethodologists call these definitions 'glosses,' specifying that these are not an exception but the rule in spontaneous verbal interaction. Interaction management includes a control on discourse which refers to the conditions of feasibility and interpretability mentioned in 'Metapragmatics 2' above. This monitoring can be found at a macro-level, e.g., in the allocation of conversational rights, in the kind of sequence and the thematic development of turns, or at a micro-level, in the explicit focusing of speech on speech and on its micro-organization (e.g., utterances like 'What I mean is . . . ,' or, in written texts, the heading of a paragraph). Every utterance that not only performs some kind of action but also describes it, venturing a description of 'what is happening' (which it is up to the hearer to validate), plays

a monitoring role. Pragmatics started as the analysis of ritual performative utterances which do what they say and say what they do. A metapragmatic paradox is that, in everyday speech, if I want to do something, I must not say I am going to do it. In order to 'state,' for instance, I must not say 'I state that.' If I do, it means I am doing something else. In order to perform an action, I must avoid naming it. In discourse, however, there can be a syntactic and temporal displacement between an action and its description. This is what happens in the metacommunicative acts that describe a speech sequence from an illocutionary point of view (e.g., 'This was a promise, an order, a simple statement,' etc.). Because this kind of description is an important means of orienting the interaction processing, the metacommunicative acts can be referred to as 'speech control': they offer a labeling of preceding actions (anaphorically) or subsequent ones (cataphorically), and they focus on the simultaneous presence in discourse of linearity (a preceding sequence *X* can be classified as *Y*) and a depth (the speaker is both the involved participant and the observer of him/herself and of the interaction). Discourse has both a sequential and a hierarchical organization **Discourse, Foucauldian Approach**. Finally, it is worth noting that metaillocutionary qualification is often also metatextual and cohesive (e.g., 'That was a question'), but not *vice versa*.

From a (not only) terminological point of view, 'metapragmatic' is a hyperonym in relation both to 'metatextual' (comprising those mechanisms which enable one to signpost one's way through the text, e.g., textual deixis) and to 'metaillocutionary' (comprising those mechanisms that make explicit the kind of illocutionary act, e.g., as metacommunicative acts). Finally, if 'metacommunication' is meant as something more limited and more precise than as defined by Watzlawick *et al.* (1967), for instance, if one takes it as qualifying a global communicative modality (e.g., 'I was only joking'), then it falls within the range of metapragmatics.

Applying Metapragmatics

Conflicts have their origins in different definitions of the same situation. As Watzlawick *et al.* state, "The ability to metacommunicate appropriately is not only the *conditio sine qua non* of successful communication, but is intimately linked with the enormous problem of the awareness of self and others" (1967: 53).

Like philosophy and anthropology, metapragmatics has 'therapeutic' potential. At any level, both theoretical and everyday, whenever a social group or a speaker look critically at themselves, maybe making corrections, adjustments or clarifying comments on

their discourse, the dangerous identification between Self and *the* point of view is broken, and the road opens up to the legitimization of other points of view. The 'meta-' determines that space in which the other's perspective can be accepted. Moreover, metapragmatic awareness enables the speaker not to adhere to the established sociocommunicative roles and routines so closely as to be totally absorbed by them. Metapragmatics specializes in the control of the argumentative conditions and strategies, lending itself easily to becoming a critical instrument of fundamental importance in digging up and highlighting the underlying presuppositions as well as the different kinds of the unsaid. It is clearly helpful in, for example, first language acquisition (see, among others, Gombert, 1993; Bernicot and Laval, 1996) and second language learning, in the cross-cultural comparison of the ways in which a linguistic and social group represents and recognizes itself (see, among others, Blum-Kulka, 1992), in the analysis and discussion of any, more or less openly authoritarian and unidirectional, discourse (see, among others, Jacquemet, 1992). Metapragmatic competence is potentially subversive, such as when it enables the hearer to verify that the preparatory conditions of appropriateness of a speech act are fulfilled (as an example, imagine a patient saying 'Why are you doing this?' to his/her doctor).

Metapragmatic knowledge is a crucial step toward an ecology of communication.

Conclusions

The possible meanings of metapragmatics mentioned at the outset are not mutually exclusive; on the contrary, they can be related to, and even be integrated with, each other. For example, if one chooses to stress metapragmatics in sense 3 (see 'Metapragmatics 3') rather than in senses 1 or 2, this is a theoretical choice (see 'Metapragmatics 1'). One can even claim that the only non-transcendental way of legitimizing metapragmatics (relevant for sense 1) is one that records and analyzes specific communicative practices in socially and historically determined contexts. Its not being indifferent to individual languages is a major requirement for a non-metaphysical metapragmatics. Another requirement is that of not being indifferent to the ways in which people express their knowledge, e.g., by feedback on and adjustments to, what they are doing communicatively, thus building up the interpretation which is the result of the cross-inferential work on the part of all the participants involved. A systematic account of this knowledge is a difficult interdisciplinary enterprise, which cannot be merely introspective. While pragmatics has experienced, there is the risk of replacing a metaphysics of

introspection with a metaphysics of empirical data, in an excessive fragmentation of the research work and its findings that leaves no room for any significant generalization.

One possible theoretical choice and one that in the present, extremely varied and lively state of the debate, can only be a partial choice, consists in denying the existence of any clear-cut division between 'scientific' metapragmatic knowledge and the metapragmatic knowledge of the users of a language, and instead, assuming there exists a *continuum*, at a smaller or greater distance from the object, viz.: the use of the language.

The basic assumption which is relevant to the first sense of metapragmatics as metatheoretical reflection, could then be to hold that in pragmatics, there are different degrees of explicitness in, but no differences in nature between, folk and scientific theories. The metapragmatic paradox is that the traditional metatheoretical top-down control is valid only if it is kept down to earth.

High-sounding transcendencies are replaced by inevitably partial analyses of what is constitutive of the communicative practices in which one is involved, of the ways in which awareness of self and of others comes out, not just in order to speak about the world, but to change it, and oneself, through discourse. The program of metapragmatics (its Manifesto) might be the (meta-)pragmatic sentence that Socrates (had he not been forced by the tyrants to drink the hemlock) would have added to his motto 'I know I don't know': 'I don't know enough that I do know.'

See also: Conversation Analysis; Deixis and Anaphora: Pragmatic Approaches; Discourse Anaphora; Grice, Herbert Paul; Habermas, Jürgen; Literary Pragmatics; Mitigation; Neo-Gricean Pragmatics; Politeness; Pragmatic Presupposition; Pragmatics: Overview; Speech Acts.

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Metonymy

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Metonymy: History and Terminology

Metonymy has been studied for at least 2000 years by rhetoricians, for 200 years by historical semanticists, and for about two decades by cognitive linguists. More recently, metonymy has come to be recognized as a fundamental cognitive and linguistic phenomenon alongside metaphor that manifests itself in the lexicon as well as in grammar (Panther and Radden, 1999; Barcelona, 2000; Nerlich and Clarke, 2001; Dirven and Pörings, 2002; Panther and Thornburg, 2003; Steen, 2004).

The earliest definition of metonymy can be found in the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, written before 82 A.D.:

> *Denominatio* est, quae ab *rebus propinquis et finitimis* trahit orationem, qua possit intellegi res, quae non suo vocabula sit appellata.
>
> *Denominatio* [i.e., 'metonymy'] is a trope that takes its expression from *near and close things* and by which we can comprehend a thing that is not denominated by its proper word. (Koch, 1999: 140–141)

A classic example of the rhetorical use of metonymy is 'The pen is mightier than the sword.' In 1980 the cognitive linguists Lakoff and Johnson (1980) introduced the concept of conventional or conceptual metonymy alongside the concept of conceptual metaphor. They argued that metaphor and metonymy are not just rhetorical devices, but pervade our talking, thinking and acting in the world. According to this new view, a conventional metonymy is a metonymy that is commonly used in everyday language in a culture to give structure to some portion of that culture's conceptual system. Metonymies can be based on many cognitive and culturally based conceptual relationships. To give only two examples (there are more later in this article): in 'Napoleon lost at Waterloo,' metonymy is based on the controller-controlled relationship; in 'The kettle is boiling,' metonymy is based on the container-contents relationship. One of the more recent definitions of metonymy, rooted in this new view of metaphor and metonymy, is the following:

> Metonymy is a cognitive process in which one conceptual entity, the vehicle, provides mental access to another conceptual entity, the target, within the same idealized cognitive model. (Radden and Kövecses, 1999: 21)

Here the 'near and close things' referred to in the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* have been replaced by Lakoff's 'idealized cognitive models.' Other researchers work with the terminology of domains, schemas, or frames instead.

In between the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* and the more recent publications, research into metonymy picked up ideas from traditional rhetoric (metonymy was part of the tropical triad of metaphor, metonymy, and synecdoche or else of the quadruple of metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, and irony), from associationist psychology (it inherited the distinction between contiguity and similarity as defining the difference between metonymy and metaphor), from Saussurian linguistics (it inherited the distinction between syntagmatic and paradigmatic relations, which Jakobson (1956) used to distinguish between metaphor and metonymy), from interactionist approaches to metaphor (Black, 1979) (it inherited the distinction between tenor and vehicle), and from Gestalt psychology (it inherited the distinction between figure and ground). This last influence has come to the fore in recent years through Langacker's work and has been successfully integrated into various frame-based analyses of metonymy.

An example of this type of analysis can be found in Panther and Radden (1999). They study the following metonym:

(1) The first violin has the flu.

> The concept 'the first violin' is part of a knowledge structure that it evokes. As a musical instrument, a violin is immediately associated with the violinist as the player of that instrument. Moreover, the first violinist is defined as a member of a larger group of musicians, the symphony orchestra. Among the musicians of the orchestra, the first violinist is the most outstanding member. Finally, our knowledge of orchestras includes, among other things, the notion of music and its representation in scores. The predication *has the flu* as well as the attribute *first* trigger a non-literal interpretation of the noun phrase *the first violin*. Thus, the metonymic reading in [1] involves a shift from the instrument to the musician as the most readily available element in the frame. Through this metonymic shift, the reference point ('the first violin') is backgrounded and the desired target ('the first violinist') is foregrounded. (Panther and Radden, 1999: 9)

This analysis draws on Langacker's (cognitive) distinction between reference-point and target (1993: 3). For Langacker, metonymy is a reference-point phenomenon in that "the entity that is normally designated by a metonymic expression serves as a reference point affording mental access to the desired target,

i.e. the entity actually being referred to" (Langacker, 1987: 385–386).

The distinction between reference-point and target can be compared to those made in pragmatics between what is said and what is meant, what is said and what is referred to, what is said and what is only implied, and between the conventional meaning/referent and the intended meaning/referent of the words used. This brings us to the question: Is metonymy a conceptual/cognitive or a referential/pragmatic phenomenon? Or both?

Metonymy: From Cognition to Social Interaction

At present, there are two camps in the cognitive linguistic community: those who see metonymy essentially as a referential and/or pragmatic phenomenon and those who see it essentially as a conceptual and cognitive one (Nunberg, 1978; Feyaerts, 1997: 74–76). For Seto, for example, metonymy "is a referential transfer phenomenon based on the spatio-temporal contiguity as conceived by the speaker between an entity and another in the (real) world" (Seto, 1999: 91). At the other end of the spectrum we find Kövesces and Radden's (1998) work, in which metonymy is radically defined as a conceptual phenomenon. Lakoff and Turner (1989: 103) were rather more cautious when they wrote that metonymy "is used primarily for reference: via metonymy, one can refer to one entity in a schema by referring to another entity in the same schema."

More recently, Warren has made the distinction between referential metonymy and propositional metonymy, in which the former is based on reference-based relations, such as between cause and effect or container and content, the latter on antecedent-consequent relations (or if-then relations). An example of referential metonymy is: "*The bathtub* is running over. [That which is in the tub, i.e., the *water*]" (Warren, 1999: 127). An example of propositional metonymy is: "It won't happen while I still *breathe*. [If he breathes, then he lives]" (p. 129). Warren defines referential metonymy in the following way:

> For anything to qualify as a referential metonym, the following applies:
>   (i) it should have a referent,
>   (ii) the intended referent is not explicitly mentioned but its retrieval depends on inference,
>   (iii) inference is made possible because there is some connection between the mentioned referent (the trigger) and the implied referent (the target) deemed so well known that in the context in question the former will automatically suggest the latter. (Warren, 1999: 123)

For Warren, "the actual meaning-construction of metonyms depends on successful referent-identification. We cannot be certain that we have worked out the correct metonymic extension, unless we believe we know what the referent is" (Warren, 1992: 68). It seems that our ability to create and understand metonyms is grounded in our ability to infer the referential intentions of others in linguistic interaction (see Burling, 1999).

Metaphor and Metonymy

From this point of view, one can argue that metonymy is a pragmatic strategy used by speakers to convey to hearers something new about something already well known. This distinguishes it from metaphor, which can be regarded as a pragmatic strategy used by speakers to convey to hearers something new that cannot easily be said or understood otherwise or to give an old concept a novel, witty, or amusing package. Using metaphors, speakers tell you more than what they actually say; using metonyms they tell you more while saying less. From the point of view of the hearer, metaphor is a strategy used to extract new information from old words, whereas metonymy is a strategy used to extract more information from fewer words. Metaphor is a conceptual and semantic simulation device, whereas metonymy is a conceptual and syntactic abbreviation device. Both are pragmatically grounded and exploit cognitive mapping processes.

An example of the use of a metaphoric strategy would be the child who points to an oil spill on the road and says:

(14) "Look: A dead rainbow!" (Todd and Clarke, 1999)

An example of the use of a metonymic strategy would be the German passenger who, in 1997, looked down from a plane approaching Heathrow and said to his wife, when pointing to a cow:

(15) "Look: BSE!"

In the first case, the mother has to *create* a relation between the oil spill shimmering in many colours and a rainbow, a rainbow that seems to have been reduced to a sad puddle. In the second case the wife can *exploit* a given relation between cows and the potentially deadly disease they might carry (BSE, Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy, or 'mad cow disease'). Here the relation is not created but presupposed (Bredin, 1984: 57). In the case of metonymy, the hearer has to find the target item and interpret it by retrieving a relation between it and the trigger. As conceptual metonymic relations (such as cause-effect, part-whole, container-content)

are cognitively well entrenched, the interpretation of metonymy is less demanding than the interpretation of a metaphor, where the possible links between what is said and what is meant are relatively open-ended (Warren, 1992: 99).

Whereas our ability to leap through mental spaces and establish unexpected but enlightening links between features of these spaces underlies metaphor, our ability to access an entire state, situation or object from the mention of some part is the hallmark of metonymic thinking (Warren, 1999: 122).

Both metaphor and metonymy can lead to semantic change and polysemy. In the case of metonymic sense extension, the pathways we use seem to be cognitively entrenched and rooted in patterns of human action and experiences of handling objects. Many linguists have tried to establish typologies of these 'pathways' of metonymic sense extension (Nerlich *et al.*, 1999), but one example will suffice here. In 1981, Norrick distinguished the following types of metonymy and correlated them with 18 metonymic principles. This typology includes the part-whole relationship often called synecdoche (on the metonymy and synecdoche, see Nerlich and Clarke, 1999; Seto, 1999, 2003).

  I. Cause – effect
    1. Cause – effect
    2. Producer – product
    3. Natural source – natural product
    4. Instrument – product

 II. Acts and major participants
    1. Object – act
    2. Instrument – act
    3. Agent – act
    4. Agent – instrument

III. Part – whole
    1. Part – whole
    2. Act – complex act
    3. Central factor – institution

IV. Container – content
    1. Container – content
    2. Locality – occupant
    3. Costume – wearer

 V. Experience – convention
    1. Experience – convention
    2. Manifestation – definition

VI. Possessor – possession
    1. Possessor – possession
    2. Office holder – office

This use of well-established conceptual pathways makes metonymy quite different from metaphor.

As a result of the use of a metaphor, salient features of words and objects are blended across semantic and conceptual space. Metaphor binds distant conceptual domains together and creates conceptual networks. As a result of the use of a metonym, a word absorbs salient features inside a referential or conceptual space or, to put it differently, it spreads out over conceptual space(s). Whereas metaphor creates new meaning and possibly new conceptual structures, metonymy incorporates free-floating meaning, steals meaning from related concepts and conceptual domains, and thereby changes or strengthens given conceptual structures.

Synchronically, metonymies are created by exploiting contiguous relations inside a conceptual/referential domain. This can have a rhetorical effect, as in "Look, BSE!" or else be the result of pragmatic constraints on cost-effective communication (as in 'The appendix has just passed out'). Diachronically, metonymies can spread serially (which can lead to synchronic polysemies, such as *panel* which can mean either 'flat distinct section of a larger surface, such as that in a door' or 'a group of people as a team' or 'list of jurors,' etc., similar to *board*) from, say, *board* to table to food (as in *bed and board*) to the people who sit around the table, etc. This chaining follows 'natural' relations, quite often based on immediate proximity between objects and people in space. As interlocutors do not cross distant conceptual boundaries, they tend not to exploit and create the wide conceptual networks on which metaphorical expressions are based.

Conclusion

The definition of metonymy inside cognitive linguistics is still fluid and this article could only provide a glimpse into some aspects of research. It did not deal with metonymy and salience (Paradis, 2004), metonymy and qualia, the interaction between metaphor and metonymy, and the universality of conceptual metonymies (see Panther and Thornburg, 2003).

See also: Metaphors and Conceptual Blending; Metaphor: Philosophical Theories; Metaphor: Psychological Aspects; Metaphor: Stylistic Approaches; Rhetoric: History; Rhetoric: Semiotic Approaches.

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Migration and Language

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Introduction: Migration, Language Diversification, and Contact

Migration – that is, the permanent or temporary movement of people from one geographical area to another – has been a constant of human history since earliest times and has shaped the areal distribution of languages and the history of linguistic groups.

Language diversification and spread as a consequence of migration underpins the histories of large language families, such as Indo-European, Sino-Tibetan, Austronesian, and Afro-Asiatic. The geographical dispersion of languages belonging to these families is the result of large-scale prehistoric migrations, reflecting both military invasions and agricultural expansion. Language diversification through people movement and the subsequent communicative isolation of the migrating group is depicted in the classic *Stammbaum* or family tree model of language change: each split in the diagram reflects a situation where people occupying a geographical area divided, and one group settled in a new, nonadjacent territory.

Migration movements not only support language diversification through geographical dispersion, but also create the conditions for inter-group contact and linguistic convergence, that is, structural borrowing and the leveling of marked distinctions between dialects and languages (*Sprachbund* phenomena and koinéization/dialect leveling). Contact between different linguistic groups also leads to the formation of new forms of speech: trade jargons and other contact languages (pidgin/creoles, mixed languages, second language varieties) have emerged as a direct result of human mobility.

Migration movements are particularly prevalent in times of accelerated social, political, and economic change (e.g., demographic growth, technological innovation, political conflict and persecution, economic deprivation and poverty). Wars, industrialization, colonialism, and the subsequent emergence of a global capitalist world market have all led to high rates of national and transnational migration, and have shaped states and societies across the world (Castle and Miller, 1998).

Dialect Leveling and Dialect Formation

Whereas traditional dialectologists often evoked an idealized 'linguistics of isolation and immobility' (Chambers, 2002: 117) – epitomized in the construct of the 'non-mobile, older, rural male' (NORM; cf. Chambers and Trudgill, 1998) as the ideal informant – modern dialectologists and sociolinguists have shifted their attention to the systematic study of the linguistic consequences of geographical mobility. High levels of rural-to-urban migration have not only contributed to the gradual decline of traditional rural dialects (dialect loss), but new composite dialects have crystallized rapidly in urban environments. London, for example, has always been characterized by high levels of in-migration and linguistic mixing. In the 16th century the emerging London norm was significantly shaped by the influx of large numbers of northerners into the city. Some northern dialect forms, such as, e.g., the northern third person plural marker *–(e)s* (*know(e)s* vs. southern *–th*, *knoweth*), were incorporated into the emerging norm of London English (and subsequently into standard English; Nevalainen, 2000).

The development of planned urban communities in areas targeted for industrial expansion in the 1960s and 1970s, the so-called new towns, offered linguists an opportunity to study processes of dialect mixing and leveling in real time. Kerswill and Williams (1992; also Kerswill, 1996) compared the speech of children in Milton Keynes, a new (1969) urban development near London, with that of their parents who had moved to the town from elsewhere in the southeast, and also northern England and overseas. They found that the children's dialect lacked regional distinctiveness, and differed both from their parents' dialects and from the local dialects spoken in the nearby areas. Children used various linguistic strategies in their creation of the new dialect: they avoided strong regional forms used by their parents, developed phonetically intermediate forms, which mediated between the various dialect inputs, and generally preferred forms that were similar to the non-localized, RP-like southeastern norm.

Dialect leveling also played a major role in colonial settlements. In South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand relatively homogenous colonial dialects developed on the basis of the diverse input dialects of the migrating settlers (Trudgill, 1986; Chambers, 2003: 65ff.).

In multilingual countries (e.g., South Africa, Switzerland) urbanization also led to the formation of multilingual cities (in other countries this development is a consequence of transnational migration): Xhosa, the language of many rural-to-urban migrants in South Africa, is now a major language in Cape Town (next to Afrikaans and English), and French and Italian are competing with Swiss-German in Basel, a historically German-speaking town (Lüdi, 1995).

Whereas traditional dialectological and sociolinguistic studies stipulated that their subjects should be locals (or have arrived in the area before the age of

seven, i.e., at an age when they could still master the phonological complexities of the dialect), Chambers (2002) argued for the need to include non-local residents into modern dialect surveys. He introduced migration as an independent variable using the Regionality Index (RI), which identifies the migration history of informants on the basis of the following indicators: place of birth of informant, place of birth of parents, area where respondent grew up, and area of residence. The RI is similar to the 'combined birth-country criterion,' i.e., birth country of person as well as parents, which is used in transnational migration research (cf. Extra and Gorter, 2001).

Bilingualism, Language Shift, and Maintenance

In some cases migrating people have imposed their language(s) on the indigenous population: the southward migration of Bantu-speaking groups (starting around 1000 B.C.) led to the absorption or displacement of indigenous hunter-gatherer communities; the Roman Empire spread its language through warfare and conquest; European colonial settlements transformed the political and linguistic landscapes in Africa, the Americas, and Asia. In-migration of powerful groups can thus contribute to the creation of indigenous minority groups and/or language shift. Less powerful migrant groups usually assimilate to the dominant language of the new society: the French Huguenots who arrived in South Africa in the 1680s adopted Dutch, the dominant language of the colony; in the 20th century Jewish migrants to the United States adopted English, in earlier migrations their ancestors had adopted Lithuanian and Polish (which they used alongside their ethnic language, Yiddish). Bilingualism and code-switching are frequently observed among second and third generation migrants, where they become markers of the migrants' hybrid, bi-cultural identities (cf., for example, Zentella's 1997 study of Spanish-English code-switching in El Barrio, a Puerto Rican neighborhood in NYC; cf. also Dabène and Moore, 1995; a classic article on migration and hybridity is Park, 1928).

Long-term language maintenance is rare among migrants who move as individuals or in small family groups, and intergenerational language shift – which is indicated by the co-existence of different mother tongues within a household – is usually completed within three generations (Nahirny and Fishman, 1965). Clyne (1991) has shown on the basis of his analysis of the Australian census information that the rate of shift differs across migrant language groups. Important variables, which support or delay language shift, are: settlement patterns (presence or absence of cohesive ethnic suburbs), endogamy, cultural distance from the host society, contact with the home country, and cultural values attached to language. Horvath (1985), in her study of vowel variation in Australian English, has illustrated how Italian and Greek migrants are gradually incorporated into the Australian English speech community: first-generation migrants form a peripheral group (she describes their English as 'accented' and 'ethnic broad'; basically, they use second-language varieties), second-generation migrants were full (usually bilingual) members of the host speech community.

Group migration tends to delay language shift. Long-term intergenerational language maintenance has been documented for the so-called *Sprachinseln* ('language islands' or language enclaves). These geographically-bound territories are typically located in rural areas and reflect the cohesive settlement patterns of the original migrants. Subsequent generations maintain their linguistic and cultural/religious distinctiveness from the surrounding host society. Well-known examples of linguistic enclaves are the German-speaking settlements in eastern and southeastern Europe that were formed as a consequence of migrations since the Middle Ages, and also the 18th century Amish settlements in North America. Language maintenance in these areas occurs in functional complementarity with the language(s) of the host society (cf. the papers in Berend and Mattheier, 1994). Community bilingualism, however, affects the structures of the heritage language, and heavy lexical and structural borrowing are commonly observed (cf. Louden on Pennsylvania Dutch in Berend and Mattheier, 1994).

Mass Migration and Language Formation

The forced mass migrations associated with slavery have led to the formation of stable contact languages in Africa, the Caribbean, and Asia. The plantation system created a catastrophic break in linguistic tradition: captured slaves not only spoke a variety of diverse native languages, but they also dramatically lost all contact with their homeland, did not share a lingua franca with the other slaves, and had only minimal access to the dominant colonial language of their masters (Sankoff, 1979). The pidgin/creole languages that emerged in these contexts supplanted the original languages of the slaves, and became the basis for the formation of new cultural and linguistic communities in the diaspora.

The situation was different in the case of indentured labor migrations that took place in the mid- to late 19th and early 20th centuries. Although work conditions were generally poor and laborers were often coerced into employment, it was, at least in principle, possible to

return home upon completion of the contract. Moreover, unlike slaves, indentured workers did not form "a pulverized mass of individuals from several tribes, but instead they were limited to men of a few nationalities, who found themselves together in a situation in which community life of a sort was possible" (Reinecke, 1969: 114). Conditions were thus generally favorable for language retention, and inter-dialect leveling has been described for the transplanted languages of indentured workers (Mesthrie, 1991 with regard to Bhojpuri in South Africa). At the same time workers acquired a knowledge of the language(s) of the host society. These second language acquisition processes contributed to the creation of new varieties of the dominant language, which replaced the workers' original mother tongues after several generations in the diaspora (cf. Mesthrie, 1992).

Structural similarities between pidgin/creole languages and the outcomes of second language acquisition in the context of mass labor migration have been explored systematically with regard to fossilized interlanguages such as, e.g., *Gastarbeiterdeutsch* ('guest workers' German'; cf. Clyne, 1968 for an early discussion), and also 'immigrant Swedish' (e.g., *Rinkeby* Swedish, as described by Kotsinas, 2001). Both varieties show grammatical reduction and phonological simplification akin to pidgin languages (cf. also Smart, 1990 for a description of pidgin Arabic used by Asian labor migrants in the Gulf states). However, a stable contact language did not emerge among second generation migrants in either Germany or Sweden. Instead, teenagers with a migrant background have been found to use a stylized pan-ethnic form of the local language that incorporates certain features (e.g., phonology, intonation) of their parents' second language. This pan-ethnic variety of the target language is seen as 'deficient' by native speakers, but serves as a symbolic badge of membership in the larger migrant community (on the ideological implications of popular debates about *Rinkeby* Swedish, see Stroud, 2004). A similar phenomenon has been described for Australia where such speech forms are colloquially referred to as *wog-speak* ('wog' can be used in a self-mocking sense by migrants to designate their bicultural identity; Warren, 1999; Clyne *et al.*, 2001). Under conditions of social segregation and intergroup conflict, such ethnolectal developments can lead to long-term processes of linguistic divergence and the development of oppositional linguistic (sub-)cultures.

Transnational Migration, Language, and Citizenship

Transnational migration has grown in volume and significance since 1945. High levels of in-migration have changed the demographic, economic, and social structures in many countries and have led to the formation of new ethno-linguistic minorities (cf. the papers in Extra and Gorter, 2001 and Extra and Verhoeven, 1998). Transnational migration is largely an urban phenomenon. Fraser Gupta (2000) uses the term 'cosmopolis' to describe multilingual urban settings that have been created by waves of migration, and where the individual's linguistic and cultural repertoires are characterized by a multiplicity of registers, languages, and cultural traditions (cf. also Castle and Miller, 1998 on the rise of 'global cities').

Many countries have recognized the necessity of introducing special language services for new arrivals, and education has been a key site for the implementation of migrants' linguistic rights. Policies that accept the cultural differences created by migration and grant minority linguistic and cultural rights to migrants have since the late 1970s been instituted in countries such as Australia, Canada, and Sweden. In Australia the Adult Migrant English Program (AMEP) offers up to 510 hours of ESL lessons to adult migrants, and special school-based programs exist for children. At the same time Australia's language policy aims to develop and maintain languages other than English within the school curriculum and also radio, TV, and print media. In Australia (also Canada and the United States) heritage language education, which focuses on developing appropriate teaching methods for second and third generation migrants, has developed into an important branch of second language pedagogy.

However, multilingual programs have come under attack in Australia (and elsewhere) since the mid-1990s: linguistic and cultural diversity are increasingly viewed as a threat to national homogeneity, and there has been a marked policy shift in favor of emphasizing the teaching of English. As a result bilingual programs and services have been reduced (a similar development has been observed in Sweden: see the articles by Boyd, Ozolins, and Clyne in Extra and Gorter, 2001; for the United States cf. Crawford, 2000). Assimilatory language policies see linguistic and cultural integration as a prerequisite for citizenship, and exclude the migrants' bicultural and bilingual identities from the public sphere.

Conclusion: Migrants as 'New' Ethnic Minorities

Today, migration is a central force in social transformation, international relations, and domestic policy in countries as diverse as Germany, Malawi, and Singapore. Chain migration (secondary migration of family members) and migrant's social networks,

which encourage and facilitate settlement in a new country, can lead to the formation of ethnic enclaves in societies with large migrant populations. The subsequent development of community networks and institutions (social clubs, churches, etc.) in the host society gradually transforms transitory migrant groups into permanent and relatively cohesive 'new' ethnic communities. Like 'historic' indigenous minorities, migrant minorities are usually vulnerable populations whose linguistic and cultural rights need to be addressed and protected by national language policies and planning.

See also: Bilingual Education; Bilingualism; Education in a Multilingual Society; Language Maintenance and Shift; Language Planning and Policy: Models; Linguistic Rights; Minorities and Language; Multiculturalism and Language.

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Relevant Website

http://www.immi.gov.au/amep/index.htm – Adult Migrant English Program in Australia.

Minorities and Language

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Introduction

The relationship between minorities and language is complicated. Historically, the problem of minorities is closely related to the development since the 16th century of the modern system of 'nation-states.' The process of state formation, still relevant today, leads to a differentiation between majorities and minorities. It is an inevitable consequence of policies aimed at national homogeneity and cohesion. A distinction has to be made between 'language minorities' and 'minority languages.' The former refers to the social group or community, and the latter to a specific category of languages. Sometimes terms such as 'lesser used,' 'heritage,' 'stateless,' and 'ethnic' language are used in place of 'minority language.' Minority languages are different from majority languages, which are also referred to as 'dominant,' 'national,' or 'state' languages.

There are between 6000 and 7000 different languages in a world of over six billion people. Of all those languages, just a few, such as English or Chinese, are spoken by hundreds of millions of speakers. Most languages are spoken by only a few thousand speakers, or sometimes just a handful of speakers. In fact, 96% of the world's languages are spoken by just 4% of the people. Most of the world's languages are spoken in a broad area on either side of the Equator, in Southeast Asia, India, Africa, and South America. Not all of the 'smaller' languages are minority languages, but most of them are. The theme of minority languages is closely related to 'endangered' or 'threatened' languages, an issue that received increasing attention after Krauss (1992) rang the alarm bell over the future of 90 percent of the world's languages.

Definitions

The concept of 'minority' is problematic from the point of view of several disciplines. What constitutes a minority depends on who defines a minority, and who the beneficiaries are of minority rights. Much work has been done in international law – in lengthy debates and in many forums – concerning minority protection. After World War II, the United Nations expressed a felt need for a clear definition of the concept 'minority.' In particular, the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities became an important agency.

Arriving at such a definition took many years, and proved to be a difficult task. Finally, UN Special Rapporteur Capotorti (1979: 7) defined a minority as "a group numerically smaller than the rest of the population of the State to which it belongs and possessing cultural, physical or historical characteristics, a religion or a language different from those of the rest of the population and show, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity, directed toward preserving their culture, traditions, religion or language."

Although later studies tried to improve on this definition, it still reflects the general understanding of 'minority' in international law (Pentassuglia, 2002: 72), and covers most minority situations (Thompson, 2001: 130). This definition combines 'objective' and 'subjective' approaches which are sometimes seen as contrasting. 'Objective' means that minorities are seen as given historical facts, in which group membership is given or involuntary. In a subjective approach, the free choice and will of the group members are decisive. However, up to the present day, the term 'minority' is not defined in the most important instruments of international law. The reason is that a definition has to serve certain ideological or political goals. Thus it can exclude certain minorities, and as a consequence some can profit from protective measures, where others cannot. In a more sociological sense, the term 'minority' may also be used to refer to less status and less power. In many studies, this usage is given preference over the commonsense understanding wherein 'minority' only refers to sheer numbers ('less than half' or 'a smaller number').

A basic distinction can be made between 'regional minority languages' and 'immigrant minority languages.' The first type are languages that are indigenous and territorial, minorities created during state formation or because of migration of population groups many centuries ago. The second type is the outcome of more recent international migration processes. Still, many examples can be given of how difficult it is to decide whether a language is a minority language or not (Hoffmann, 1991: 219–247). The difficulty in arriving at an acceptable definition lies in the diversity of situations in which minority languages exist.

In recent years, the definition in the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (1998) has gained wide acceptance. 'Regional or minority languages' means:

> Languages that are traditionally used within a given territory of a State by nationals of that State who form a group numerically smaller than the rest of the State's population; and different from the official language(s) of that State.

This definition shows the decisive role the nation-state plays in the determination of which language varieties obtain minority rights (and protection), and which do not. The status of a variety as either language or dialect depends primarily on political recognition by a state.

Membership and Numbers

Who belongs to a language minority, and who does not, is not always easy to establish. It does not seem to be possible to give criteria that are valid for all members of a particular group. It is clear that most members of a language minority have certain characteristics in common, but that does not have to be the case for all members. Fundamental criteria for belonging to a language minority are (1) self-categorization, (2) common ancestry, (3) distinctive linguistic, cultural, or historical traits, and (4) a form of social organization that places the language group in a minority position.

These four criteria do not have to be valid for all members of a group, but they do for a large part of them. Self-assignment is a fundamental criterion; categorization by others can also be important, but it is not decisive. Ancestry is usually mixed, and a criterion such as 'linguistic distance' can be extremely complex. A minority can be recognized by the government and obtain provisions or not. Moreover, it is possible to choose to become a member of a minority (by learning the language), or to leave the group (by no longer speaking the language).

Language minorities differ very much in size; there may be only a handful of speakers, or there may be millions. The number of individuals who speak a language seems a simple given, but it does not have to be (Fishman, 1991: 45–46).When drafting a list of minority languages, and the numbers of speakers, one runs inevitably into a lack of consensus on which varieties belong on the list as separate languages, and which may be sub-varieties (Ethnologue, 2004). Counting individuals as speakers is not a straightforward task because there are many different criteria. The most common is mother tongue (i.e., language acquired as a child), but also language competence (the language that someone is able to speak) and main language used (the most important daily means of communication) are considered as criteria. The size of a language minority can therefore differ, depending on whether the mother tongue speakers are counted, or the persons being able to speak a language are included. The speakers of language minorities are counted in different ways; one has to be careful when comparing the sizes of different minorities. All figures are usually estimates.

Analytic Frameworks

Many scholars have presented ideas, models, and theories designed to answer questions related to the conditions under which a shift from minority to majority language takes place, or when a minority language is maintained or revived. Here we can point briefly to a few models, but it is important to mention that a general theory of minority language development is still lacking. These frameworks analyze the relative strength of minorities and the measures necessary for their survival. Often in the past analysts failed to place sufficient emphasis on the social context. The central issue is people, not numbers.

A framework that has gained wide currency in the literature is the ethnolinguistic vitality model (Giles *et al.*, 1977). It is designed as an analytic tool to better assess the position of languages against each other, originally the position of French in Quebec relative to English. The key notion is 'vitality,' which is defined as, "that which makes a group likely to behave as a distinctive and active collective unity in intergroup situations" (Giles *et al.*, 1977: 308). The more vitality a group has, the greater its chances for survival as a distinctive linguistic community. There are three main sets of structural factors that influence the vitality of an ethnolinguistic group: status, demographic, and institutional. The status of a language is dependent upon historical, economic, social, and linguistic factors. Demographic factors have to do with the numbers and distribution of the speakers. Institutional factors concern the position of the language in various sectors of society, such as government, education, mass media, and religion. The stronger the language is on these structural factors, the higher is the ethnolinguistic vitality of the group speaking the language, and the greater are its chances for survival as a linguistic community.

The question can be raised whether an 'objective' account of the position of a (minority) language provided by an expert researcher or a language planner is perceived in the same way by the speakers of the language themselves. For that reason, a 'subjective vitality questionnaire' has been developed to measure the way speakers perceive the vitality of their own and other language groups (Bourhis *et al.*, 1981; Giles and Johnson, 1987).

In 1991, Fishman published his book *Reversing language shift* (RLS) in which he presents a set of ideas for analyzing the situation of (minority) languages around the world. The core of his ideas is formed by the GIDS (Graded Intergenerational Disruption Scale), a kind of scale similar to the one used to measure earthquakes. It establishes the extent

to which a language community has been disrupted in the modern world. It is a functional approach where the language is seen to be used for certain functions in society, and not for others. Many threats face minority language communities, and Fishman wants to offer a diagnostic framework in which language planners and language activists can base their strategies to repair the situation, and to prevent further harm from occurring. The GIDS consists of eight stages, from the first and lowest stage where the language community has been broken up and few speakers remain, to the last stage where the language has the highest functions in national media and government. The crucial point is that the family-neighborhood-community nexus has to be secured in order to make certain that a language is transmitted from one generation to the next. Only when that process of intergenerational language transmission is assured, will a language survive.

An innovative combination of the vitality and RLS perspectives is given by Grin (2003; Grin and Moring, 2002) who has constructed a model of language policy for minority languages. Central is a 'policy-to-outcome' path, and the end result is that the minority language is being used to enhance the vitality of the language. In this model three conditions are necessary to reach the goal of minority language use. The first is the *capacity* to use the minority language, in the sense of an adequate degree of linguistic competence, and education is essential for the capacity development of speakers. Second are *opportunities* to use the language, not only in private but also in public. The language policy of the state can play a crucial role in creating opportunities for public language use. Finally, there must be a *desire* to use the language; usually speakers are bilingual, and have a choice to use either the majority language or the minority language. Policy has to improve language attitudes. Together, these three conditions constitute a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for the outcome of language use to appear. This model of capacity, opportunity, and desire must be seen in a 'language ecology' paradigm that stresses the interrelationship between a language and its broader social context (Grin, 2003: 43–48).

See also: Endangered Languages; Language Planning and Policy: Models.

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Minority Languages: Oppression

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Throughout history, minority languages have been very frequently subjected to oppression and often extinction by state policies rooted in colonial and neocolonial traditions, which aim at linguistic and cultural homogeneity, and also by majority ethnic groups within national states in their efforts to culturally and linguistically dominate and oppress minority groups. In addition, many minority indigenous groups, together with their cultures and languages, have been completely wiped out by introduced epidemics. As part of ethnocentric 'civilizing' projects, which see indigenous languages and cultures as inferior and discriminate against native speakers for using their own languages, the work of traditional missionaries, until recent decades, has also frequently prohibited the use of indigenous languages. In 1981, the Tukano leader Álvaro Sampaio denounced at the Russell Tribunal in Holland that, in the Upper Rio Negro region of Amazonas, Brazil, many indigenous languages disappeared as a result of (mission) boarding schools, where the use of Portuguese was enforced and the use of indigenous languages was prohibited (Sampaio, 1981: 13). Some indigenous peoples, especially in urban settings, facing violent discrimination and, having become ashamed to speak their own languages, avoid teaching their children their language out of fear that they too will be discriminated and, thereby, have fewer chances of a better life.

Historical evidence shows that, when prestige has been conferred on a minority language, it has more chances of survival. The valuing of the Navajo language as a code language by the U.S. government in World War II led to an increase in its use at the time. James Crawford (1998), referring to endangered native languages in North America, outlined the acute loss of these languages; even in the case of languages which have large populations of speakers such as Navajo (148 530 in 1990, which accounts for 45% of all native American language speakers in the U.S.), the percentage of Navajo who speak only English is increasing. Crawford presented Census Bureau data to show that between 1980 and 1990, among school-age Navajo children living on the reservation, the number of monolingual English speakers more than doubled. Crawford stressed the need to examine the social and historical causes of 'language loss' and the failure on the part of many linguists, in an attempt to separate external and internal factors, to take proper account of the question. This author further demonstrated how the coercive assimilation policy, as practiced by the Bureau of Indian Affairs from the late 1880s until recent decades, has alienated many native people from their cultural roots. In contrast, from the 1980s several indigenous peoples have adopted policies which aim at promoting the use of their languages. Citing Krauss (1992), Crawford emphasized that the will to revive or maintain native languages must come from the speakers, who must feel a need to value their languages (*see* **Pragmatics: Linguistic Imperialism; Linguistic Decolonialization**).

After a long history of oppression, there have been some recent governmental initiatives such as the Native American Language Acts of 1990 and 1992 in the United States, aiming to promote the protection of indigenous languages with a grant program. A Universal Declaration of Linguistic Rights was drawn up at a meeting of institutions and nongovernment organizations that took place in Barcelona, Spain, in June 1996. It was asserted that invasion, colonization, occupation, and other instances of political, economic, or social subordination often involve the direct imposition of a foreign language, distorting the perception of the value of 'native' languages. This was the first time that the claim to be able to exercise freedom

of speech in the language of one's choosing was clearly stated. Some years later, at the 31st session of the UNESCO General Conference in Paris (November 2, 2001), the UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity was adopted as a legal statement that recognizes, for the first time, cultural diversity as a 'common heritage of humanity' and considers its safeguarding to be a concrete and ethical imperative, inseparable from the respect for human dignity. In 2001, the UNESCO published an atlas of endangered languages (Wurm, 2001) (*see* **Linguistic Rights**).

Crawford (1998) argued that, in defending the protection of minority languages, the most effective line of argument is an appeal to social justice. The loss of culture and language can, he stressed, destroy a sense of self-worth. Language death occurs to the dispossessed and the disempowered peoples who most need their cultural resources to survive under hegemonic pressures. The oppression of minority languages must be seen as part of a much more encompassing cultural and political oppression, in which any divergent political discourse is oppressed. Jacob Mey argued that an alternative strategy to brutal political repression by hegemonic powers is that "the hegemonic forces of the political majority may take their aim at disrupting the minority's possibilities of participating in the ongoing political discourse by eliminating the access for minority cultures to the exercise of their free speech rights in their own tongues" (1994: 154). The developing field of pragmatics (Mey, 2001) – the study of language from the perspective of its users, of the choices they make, the constraints they encounter in the use of language in social interaction, and the effects their use of language has on other participants in communication – provides an important tool for studying the oppression of minority languages. This and similar approaches stress the socially oriented thinking that sees language primarily as a means of communication between human users (*see* **Pragmatics: Overview; Social Aspects of Pragmatics**).

One of the pioneers in showing a concern about the oppression of minority languages is the anthropologist-linguist Edward Sapir (1884–1939) (*see* **Sapir, Edward**), trained by Franz Boas in the early 20th century. Being the only professionally trained linguist among Boas's students, Sapir showed a concern for the need to record endangered Amerindian languages before they were lost to humanity. In 1915, on the Berkeley anthropologist Alfred L. Kroeber's invitation, Sapir went to work in California with Ishi, the last speaker of Yahi, a Yana language, recording the language and culture (1917) (*see* **Anthropology and Pragmatics**).

Jay Powell of the University of British Columbia and Michael Krauss of the Alaska Native Language Center of the University of Alaska have carried out important research on language loss and participated in attempts to revitalize languages which have been oppressed, with varying degrees of success. Powell defended the symbolic significance of revitalizing indigenous languages; even when the language does not become fluently spoken again, the use of indigenous words or phrases can help give value and meaning to indigenous cultures and strengthen a sense of indigenous cultural identity. The philosopher Marcelo Dascal (2004) drew attention to the cognitive, emotive, cultural, social, and political functions of languages that, in addition to being tools of communication, carry traditions and cultures.

Among recent works, David Crystal (2000) examined the threat to minority languages and revealed a concern to retain the linguistic and cultural diversity in the world, estimated to comprise 6000 languages in the year 2000. Crystal defined language death, presenting reasons for his concern for the alarming rate of loss of languages (one language dying every two weeks) (2000: 19). He calculated that 4% of the world's 6 billion inhabitants speak 96% of the languages (2000: 14); for 51 languages a lone speaker survived, while 25% of languages had less than 1000 speakers. Crystal explored contributing factors, a major one being negative attitudes to a language, in government policy and local communities. He presented considerations as to how to redress the situation. From his argument of the value of languages, Crystal showed that the attribution of prestige to a threatened language and policies to promote the empowerment of its speakers, given better economic conditions, are favorable factors for its survival.

R. M. W. Dixon (1980) estimated in 1980 that in Australia around 25% of the original languages were extinct and 50% threatened with extinction. Anette Schmidt (1990), ten years later, estimated that 64% are extinct or have only a few elderly speakers, and that 28% are severely threatened. Of the 90 languages this author described as 'surviving,' 70 are classified as being threatened or severely endangered.

Andrew Dalby (2003) focused especially on the linguistic history of Europe and the processes by which minority languages are lost. Lenore Grenoble and Lindsay Whaley (1998) offered an overview of the issues involved in language loss, combining articles of authors of different backgrounds to provide sociological and economic as well as linguistic perspectives on language loss. After an overview of language endangerment, their book presents the situation confronting threatened languages, the issue of what can be lost as a language ceases to be spoken, and the linguistic processes involved.

Daniel Nettle and Suzanne Romaine (2000) related ecological and linguistic vitality, and examined

assumptions about why languages die and how some languages have become dominant; however, their approach has a predominantly ecological bias. Tove Skutnabb-Kangas (2000) examined how most indigenous and minority education contributes to linguistic genocide from a multidisciplinary perspective. This author combined different theoretical concerns such as linguistic human rights, minority and multilingual education, language ecology and threatened languages, the impact of linguistic imperialism and unequal power relations on ethnicity, linguistic and cultural competence, and identities. The book presents many empirical examples from around the globe.

Darcy Ribeiro estimated that between 1900 and 1957, 87 indigenous peoples with their languages and cultures had become extinct in Brazil (1979: 239). Aryon Rodrigues (1993) affirmed that there were about 1273 indigenous languages spoken in Brazil in 1500; here, the loss is of the order of 85% (1993). Bruna Franchetto estimated that, of the 180 languages spoken today in Brazil, the average number of speakers per language is less than 200 (2000: 84–88).

After centuries of oppression, with the rise of indigenous political movements, especially since the 1970s, there have been attempts to demand respect for cultural and linguistic plurality. Efforts have been made to revitalize languages seen as being on the way to extinction, and to revive languages that have become extinct. In the past two decades, constitutional amendments have been introduced in many national states that aim to recognize cultural and linguistic plurality parallel to movements of ethnic and linguistic resurgence. However, despite the very rapid growth of indigenous and minority ethnic group cultural and political movements, the revitalization of oppressed languages occurs in radically different ways across the globe. Rita Segato (1999: 162) observed that some voices, which celebrate the process of 'globalization' and do not interpret it as an exacerbation of imperialism, subscribe to the idea that only as a consequence of the internationalization of modern ideas about citizenship and human rights has it become possible for previously invisible peoples to emerge and today claim rights in the name of their identity. Segato proposed that this is only partly true, and pointed to the fact that we are dealing with an ambiguous and unstable process, capable on the one hand of affirming minorities' rights, but, on the other hand, homogenizing cultures, flattening their lexicons and values, so that they can enter the generalized dispute for resources (1999: 162–163).

In examining the oppression of minority languages and cultures, a dynamic concept of culture is necessary. Language and culture are dynamic and in constant change, embodying a set of meanings – beliefs, values, knowledge – in an ongoing process of construction, reconstruction, and transformation. Traditions are revitalized, reinvented, and lived through languages. However, many minority languages and cultures suffer violent oppression not only from strictly language-oriented policies (such as practiced in education), but also by the encroachment of national societies on the lands of indigenous peoples and as part of cultural and political domination.

See also: Anthropology and Pragmatics; Linguistic Rights; Pragmatics: Linguistic Imperialism; Pragmatics: Overview; Social Aspects of Pragmatics.

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Mitigation

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In everyday language, 'mitigation' as an action noun can refer both to the action of mitigating, and to the fact of being mitigated. The former sense foregrounds the process, the latter the result. In the technical use of the term, mitigation is an all-embracing category employed in pragmatics (*see* **Pragmatics: Overview**) to label the wide set of strategies by which speakers attenuate one or more aspects of their speech.

Many rhetorical figures, such as periphrasis, euphemism, litotes, understatement, meiosis, or reticence, can be subsumed under the label 'mitigation,' as they can all be viewed as saying less, while not necessarily meaning more. In mitigation, something which is somehow expected, is substituted, side-stepped, disguised, or simply deleted and left unsaid by the speaker, out of manners, cautiousness, or modesty: it is up to the hearer to reconstruct it inferentially.

The notion and the term were introduced in pragmatics by Fraser (1980) to refer to the linguistic devices by which speakers try to protect themselves against various kind of interactional risks. Fraser (1980) listed the following as typical mitigating devices in English: indirect acts and justification moves (especially for directives), passive and impersonal constructions where references to speaker and hearer are deleted, epistemic disclaimers (e.g., *If I'm not wrong*) and non-epistemic disclaimers (e.g., *I hate to do this, but…, If you wouldn't mind…*), parenthetical forms and modal adverbs reducing commitment to the proposition (e.g., *probably, possibly,* etc.), tag questions, hedges (e.g., *technically*) in

Lakoff's (1973) sense of the term. According to Fraser (1980), mitigation can be 'self-serving,' in which case it aims at avoiding possible unwelcome outcomes for the speaker, or 'altruistic,' in which case it aims at reducing negative effects for the hearer.

Historical Background

Both the term (*mitigatio*) and the notion itself are found in the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, a treatise from the second decade of the 1st century B.C., of uncertain authorship, usually attributed to Cicero. This manual transposes the Greek art of rhetoric into the practical Roman spirit; the author describes the effect of *deminutio* ('belittlement') and explains that it should be used, out of prudence, to avoid antagonism and antipathy in speaking (*Rhet. Her.*, IV, XXXVII, 50).

Mitigation has been used as a technical notion in linguistic pragmatics since the late 1970s, when a main concern in pragmatic research was to make the concept of illocutionary act (Austin, 1962) operational in the analysis of discourse.

From this period on, in the vast research field on politeness (a vastness that is well documented, among others, by Kasper, 1990; Watts *et al.*, 1992; DuFon *et al.*, 1994), some mitigation-related notions, if not the term, are overtly or covertly at work. Among these, the most influential model of politeness (*see* **Politeness**), that of Brown and Levinson (1987 [1978]), treats mitigation as a synonym of politeness (1987: 42). The 'face-saving view' of interaction (Fraser, 1990), based on Goffman's notion of 'face' (Goffman, 1967; for a reexamination, see the Focus-on Issue on 'Face' of the *Journal of Pragmatics,* 2003) (*see* **Goffman, Erving; Face**), has the idea of mitigation at its core: the strategies of both positive

politeness (related to social approval) and of negative politeness (related to privacy and autonomy) can be read as mitigating strategies. Subsequent research into politeness, which is more directly linked to mitigation, has focused on the devices that minimize the impact of a face-threatening act (FTA), especially requests. The 'maxims of politeness' put forward by Leech (1983: 132ff) in his model of discourse, in particular the 'Tact Maxim,' all have a bearing on mitigation as they are based on a general 'interpersonal rhetoric,' which mainly aims at avoiding disagreement and at fostering agreement between interlocutors (*see* **Maxims and Flouting**).

Significantly, the notion of mitigation becomes a widely recognized analytical tool when the epistemological orientation in pragmatics shifts from an introspective, philosophically oriented paradigm to an empirical one that is increasingly addressing real, non-constructed data, in *situated* contexts (in the sense assigned to the term by Mey, 2001: 219ff).

These two requirements (non-constructed data that are taken from, or are characteristic of, specific interactional contexts) are distinctive features of studies in which mitigation is used. In particular, Labov and Fanshel (1977), in their thorough analysis of a therapy session involving Rhoda, a girl suffering from anorexia, and her psychotherapist, introduce the concept of mitigation as opposed to that of 'aggravation' to designate two "basic interactive dimensions" (p. 84). Mitigation is rooted in "the subject's desire to mitigate or modify his [*sic*] expression to avoid creating offense" (1977: 84). In a pedagogical framework, Edmondson and House (1989), applying Edmondson's (1981) theoretical model, propose many moves that are conceptually related to mitigation inasmuch as they can be described as 'hearer-supportive.' Specifically, Edmondson (1981: 115ff) proposes three types of supportive moves, viz. grounders, expanders, and disarmers, which play mitigating functions. In a similar vein, Meyer-Hermann and Weingarten (1982) focus on psychotherapeutic conversation, whereas Langner (1994) takes his data from college classroom interaction. Both these works use an interesting notion of mitigation (German: *Abschwächung*) which is defined as a reduction of obligations for the interlocutors. Prince *et al.* (1982), based on a corpus of physician-physician dialogues, is a study of the linguistic means doctors use in order to be cautious and to weigh the degree of certainty of their utterances. Two main types of modifications are distinguished: 'approximators' (roughly corresponding to Lakoff's [1973] 'hedges') and 'shields,' i.e., expressions "conveying some markedness with respect to speaker's commitment" (Prince *et al.*, 1982: 86).

Among the works that do not only apply the concept but propose insights on its grounding and functioning, Holmes (1984) concentrates on strategies that attenuate or reinforce ('boost') illocutionary force. Moving on from Fraser (1980), Holmes (1984) treats mitigation as a particular case of attenuation, occurring when the predictable effects of a speech act (*see* **Speech Acts**) are negative. According to Holmes, attenuation devices affecting illocutionary force can be grouped into the following four categories: (1) prosodic devices (e.g., a falling-rising intonational contour, realizing the epistemic mode in English, decreased emphasis, lower voice, etc.); (2) syntactic devices (e.g., tag questions, impersonal constructions, double negatives in formal discourse, etc.); (3) lexical devices; and (4) discourse devices (e.g., digression indicators like *by the way*, which, as already observed by Brown and Levinson [1978: 174], reduce the relevance of the utterance they introduce). Lexical devices are further divided into: attenuating devices focusing on the speaker (for instance, parenthetical expressions such as *I gather, I guess, I suppose*); attenuating devices focusing on the hearer (e.g., *you know, if you don't mind, if you are sure that's OK*); and attenuating devices focusing on content or 'other.' This latter category includes attenuating mechanisms realized by epistemic adverbials such as *possibly* and *probably*, and adverbials displacing the responsibility for what is being said to other sources (e.g., *allegedly, reportedly, presumably*).

Blum-Kulka *et al.*'s (1989) study in the framework of a research project on cross-cultural speech act realization (CCSARP) is centered on the linguistic realizations of requests and apologies in various languages, with different degrees of conventionalization. As to requests, these lend themselves to mitigation more easily than do other speech acts because they are inherently invasive of the other's territory, being face-threatening acts (FTA) in Brown and Levinson's (1987 [1978]) terms (*see* **Face**). Conversely, apologies tend to be reinforced in order to be more effective. The authors draw a distinction between internal and external mitigation: the former occurs within the speech act, while the latter occurs outside it and corresponds to what in other frameworks (*see* **Conversation Analysis**) are called 'pre-sequences' or 'grounders.' As documented by Blum-Kulka *et al.*'s important collection of data, the category 'mitigation' proves to be useful for the interethnic comparison of different strategies of performance of speech acts in cross-cultural research (*see* **Intercultural Pragmatics and Communication**).

Theoretical Questions

Even from the brief overview above, it appears that diverse notions of mitigation, in different approaches and in varying terminology (from

'cajolers' to 'sweeteners,' from 'softeners' to 'disarmers,' from 'rounders' to 'shields,' etc.), all rely on some assumptions that can be summarized in the following points:

1. the notion of mitigation presupposes that an illocutionary act can be modified; in other words, illocutionary force can be seen as having degrees of strength (among others, Holmes, 1984; Sbisà, 2001);

2. such a modification calls into play an intensity factor that in many cases can be thought of as scalar;

3. the intensity factor itself can be modified in the direction of a weakening (resulting in what is called 'mitigation,' 'attenuation,' 'downgrading,' etc.) or in the direction of a strengthening (resulting in what is called 'reinforcement,' 'upgrading,' 'boosting,' etc.). Caffi (1990) proposes the superordinate category 'modulation' to refer to both directions of modification.

In the case of weakening, in particular mitigation, some questions arise; these may be grouped in three sets. The first set is relevant from a descriptive viewpoint and can be formulated as follows:

i. Leaving aside the important role played in mitigation by nonverbal means (in particular, proxemic and kinesic cues, such as smiles, gestures, postures, etc.), what are the kinds of mitigating devices that a natural language offers as resources for situated interaction? Are they mainly lexical, morphological, syntactic, or prosodic? Which combinations of different devices are more often attested in use? Is it possible to map types of mitigating strategies onto types of interaction? Is it possible to discover significant distributional constraints on mitigating devices and strategies used for performing different (macro-)types of illocutionary acts?

The second set of questions, at a higher level of abstraction, can be summed up as follows:

ii. What is it that is weakened by mitigators? In other words, what is the linguistic scope, whether lexicalized or not, that is affected by the mitigating operation? Is there a correlation between the abstract scope of the linguistic mitigating device and the inferrable effect with respect to the value assigned to a given interactional dimension? What modifications are a matter of degree and what a matter of type? How do different kinds of mitigating devices interact? With which results? It should be noted that these questions are not abstractly speculative but have a direct bearing on the analysis of data.

A third set of questions is theoretical in nature:

iii. What are the types of presuppositions or illocutionary felicity conditions that are influenced by attenuating modulations? (*see* **Pragmatic Presupposition**.) Is it possible to envisage significant connections between types of mitigation and different types of speech act felicity conditions?

Research still has to provide satisfactory answers to these questions, which need both an adequate theoretical framework and an adequate empirical grounding in different cultures/languages in different interactional contexts for different illocutionary acts. From a theoretical viewpoint, research conducted so far on various languages has shown that a systematic treatment of mitigation requires the integration of a speech act theoretical approach with other frameworks that take into account both the sequential dimension of discourse and the type of encounter in which mitigation is enacted.

The main question (which is far from being answered) regards the co-variance of variables involved in mitigating processes. From a methodological viewpoint, a first typological distinction needs to be made between form and function, between the formal means of the attenuating operation and its function in mitigation. As to form, research into various languages has shown that lexical and morphosyntactic mitigators are often employed in combination. While some mitigators are special to particular illocutions, so much so that they can be described not only as mitigating devices, but as illocutionary devices in their own right (e.g., *please* both functions as mitigator and indexes a speech act as a request), other mitigating devices can be called *passe-partout* mitigators (e.g., *a bit*, *a moment*), which are employed across a whole range of illocutions. As to function, the typologies of mitigators proposed by different authors converge in identifying, within the utterance, two abstract scopes to which the mitigating operation applies, i.e., proposition and illocution. Operating on the former, mitigation produces vagueness; operating on the latter it produces indirectness. A third scope can be added to these two, namely the deictic origin of the utterance (Bühler, 1934): the detachment of the utterance from its actual utterance source, as it happens in impersonal constructions, works, too, as a mitigating device (Haverkate, 1999). Deleting the source of the utterance and assigning it to other sources is a very frequent strategy by which speakers avoid taking responsibility for their speech acts.

As to the results of mitigation (in the second sense of the term, mentioned at the outset), they are at the same time calculable and uncertain. This holds not only in the general sense that perlocutionary acts and their perlocutionary effects, not being conventionally determined, cannot be foreseen, but also in the sense that mitigating operations may produce a margin of uncertainty, even with respect to the locutionary act, i.e., the intended act of reference and predication. In this respect, a syntactically negative structure, for instance a litotes (e.g. *John is not particularly bright*) can be described as a mitigation from a formal viewpoint (cf. Giora *et al.*, 2005); however, from a functional

viewpoint, it can be attenuating (similar in that to a 'true' minimization) or reinforcing (similar in that to an hyperbole), the latter function being the one assigned by classical rhetoric to this figure of speech. In addition, it is ultimately up to the hearer to work out not only the illocutionary force of the utterance, but also its propositional content (in speaker's opinion, is John too uptight for his role, a bit shy, or just dull?).

The conclusion is that the privileged object of analysis in the study of mitigation processes should be *form*, i.e., the linguistic expressions and structural patterns of discourse in a given (macro- and micro-)context. A pragmatic analysis of each of these forms, at different degrees of conventionality, will show the interplay of heterogeneous communicative dimensions.

Research Perspectives

Mitigation lies at the core of what can be called the rhetoric of everyday interaction. This rhetoric plays out against the background of our metapragmatic awareness (*see* **Metapragmatics**), i.e., our knowledge of what is appropriate to a given communicative situation. Mitigation is a relative concept: something is always mitigated with respect to something else. Within a repertoire of possible communicative choices which shape interactional styles in activity types, some choices will be preferred. For this reason, mitigation can only be defined contextually and co-textually within the global (and locally managed) system of the interactants' mutual expectations (*see* **Context, Communicative**). Hence, mitigation raises the issue of a complex system of knowledge, encompassing attitudinal and emotive factors: about the world, about the words, about ourselves, and about our interlocutors. It can only be dealt with satisfactorily when all these aspects (macro- and micro-sociocultural, linguistic, psychological, relational) and their interplay are considered.

As a concept that captures the rhetorical, indexical quality (*see* **Deixis and Anaphora: Pragmatic Approaches**) of our communicative behaviors, mitigation cannot be fully accounted for by an exact, abstract definition or strict classification: such techniques are only possible for decontextualized units. Precisely because of its rhetorical nature, ambivalence is its inherent quality: an antiphrastic tension, even a slight paradoxical current, runs through mitigation. After all, if someone mitigates, it means that there is something to be mitigated: where everything is (interactionally) 'safe,' there is no need of mitigation.

So far, mitigation has been a subtopic of the wide field of research in politeness and its dominating metaphor of 'face.' In Caffi (1999, 2001, 2008), an extended view of mitigation is put forward: mitigation is defined as a weakening of one or more heterogeneous interactional variables (e.g., commitment to the proposition, degree of (in)directness of the illocution, endorsement of a social role, emotive involvement, topical salience, etc.), which constitute the system of an encounter. The predominant currents in pragmatics have been sociologically oriented. In accordance with their emphasis on the cultural and social aspects of the construction and negotiation of meaning, the notion of mitigation as a type of strategic behavior in a goal-oriented activity has been foregrounded. What so far has remained in the background is the psychological side of this meaning-construction that can be summed up in the question: In a given encounter, what kind of person would I like to be taken as? What is the relationship between the use of different types of mitigation and speakers' constructions of the 'self,' i.e., their self-presentations beyond mere face-work? What is the impact of mitigated choices on the process of interlocutors' mutual attunement (Caffi, 2008). An integrated approach does not dismiss the sociological view, but emphasizes the need to take the personal, psychological, emotive dimension into account. The model speaker of pragmatics is, at present, a *face*. This 'face' should be seen as belonging to a *person*, viz., a complex speaking subject endowed with a metapragmatic awareness covering social as well as cognitive and emotive discursive competences. In mitigating processes, there seems to be another motivational factor, more basic than politeness, i.e., minimizing responsibility. By mitigating, a speaker can avoid running unnecessary risks. Once again, it becomes clear that 'saying is doing'; as a type of doing, saying presupposes rights, implies risks, triggers obligations, produces effects, and changes contexts. Far from being relegated to some kind of stylistic variation or assigned to some province of (classic or new) rhetoric, mitigation is directly linked to the optimization of the system triggered by an encounter; it smooths out the interactional processes by presenting the speaker as considerate, tactful, thoughtful, and empathetic, and thus makes the attainment of interactional goals easier. In conclusion, mitigation both presupposes and reaffirms the multidimensional character of actual discursive choices, and foregrounds our identities both as social actors and as interacting persons.

See also: Context, Communicative; Conversation Analysis; Deixis and Anaphora: Pragmatic Approaches; Face; Goffman, Erving; Metapragmatics; Politeness; Pragmatic Acts; Pragmatic Presupposition; Pragmatics: Overview; Speech Acts.

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Morphopragmatics

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Definition

Morphopragmatics is a subdiscipline integrating morphology and pragmatics. It describes grammatical morphological phenomena (within both word formation and inflection), capable of systematically contributing autonomous pragmatic meanings to discourse.

Morphopragmatics is definable as the set of general pragmatic meanings/effects obtained by morphological rules. The privileged objects of a morphopragmatic description are evaluative suffixes, such as diminutives, as in Portuguese *adeuz-inho,* Spanish *hasta lueg-ito* both 'good-bye-DIM,' augmentatives, as in Spanish *cabez-ota* 'big head'; Portuguese *animal-aço* 'huge animal,' elatives, as in Italian *fort-issimo,* 'very strong,' but also reduplicatives, as in Italian *(occhi) neri neri* 'very dark (eyes),' excessives, as in German *das Aller-schlecht-este* EXC-bad-SUPERL 'the very

worst,' and, within inflection, personal pronouns of address and Japanese honorifics.

The model fills in a gap concerning meanings not systematically dealt with by linguists, although influential in interactive discourse. Evaluative/alterative affixes, the major representatives of the central category investigated by the model, are characterized by semantic elusiveness, i.e., they exhibit no stable semantic value in terms of either denotations or connotations, and their meaning contributions to the speech event are better described within pragmatics, e.g., in terms of their dependence on speech situations, speech acts, attitudes of interactants. Due to lack of semantic stability, their meanings have been granted sporadic and impressionistic descriptions by morphologists. Pragmaticists, on the other hand, have overlooked morphopragmatic meanings as these are often overridden by the general pragmatic impact of the word meanings or, even, of the syntactic construction, which is perceived as more influential in terms of pragmatic constraints. For example, in a request such as *wouldn't you read this book-let* (a thick volume!) *for me?*, the diminutive *book-let* is pragmatically intended to downgrade the load of the request, but the *wouldn't*-construction is capable of the same effect and may darken the pragmatic contribution of the suffix *-let*. Morphopragmatics is intended to shed light on cases of exclusive relationships between morphology and pragmatics. It is a framework for describing cases of grammaticalized (i.e., morphologized) pragmatics, i.e., pragmatic effects produced by grammatical operations. The model marginalizes extra-grammatical phenomena, as in, for example, English reduplicatives (*teeny-weeny*) or slangy formations (*lanky* ← 'Lancashire'), although these obtain similar discursive effects because they belong to a heterogeneous group of word-forms admitting irregularities in their coining.

The Theory

The theory was pioneered by Wolfgang U. Dressler and Lavinia Merlini Barbarese in successive steps (Dressler and Merlini Barbarese 1986, 1987, 1991), and expanded into a fully fledged model in 1994. It started with the observation that some still productive elements, Italian interfixes such as *-ic-, -ol-.* and *-e/ar-*, placed before evaluative suffixes (as in *brutt-ar-ella* 'ugly-INT-DIM' 'not exactly nice'), retained some pragmatic effects as a remnant of their former status as suffixes, although, synchronically, they were semantically empty, i.e., denotationally meaningless. The investigation of such effects prompted the authors' interest toward the entire paradigm of evaluative suffixes. Predictably, meaningful suffixes also had a privileged and autonomous relationship with

pragmatics. It is in this area that morphopragmatic studies achieved their most fruitful results. Other applications are Dressler and Kiefer (1990) on German and Hungarian excessives, Kilani-Schoch and Dressler (1999) on French *-o* suffix, Crocco Galéas (1992) on Italian ethnics, Merlini Barbaresi (1999) on English *-y/ie* suffix, and more recently Cantero, 2003 on Spanish phenomena.

Morphopragmatics is parallel to other well-established subdisciplines, such as morphosemantics, lexical semantics of morphology, lexical pragmatics of morphology, and pragmatics of syntactic patterns and textual strategies, but it is to be carefully distinguished from them:

- Morphosemantics studies the semantic meanings of morphological rules, i.e., the regular denotational and connotational modifications obtained by derivational or inflectional rules. Within a morphosemantic investigation, pragmatic variables connected with speech situations become irrelevant. Reference to a pure denotational meaning of smallness added by a diminutive suffix, as in *room-ette*, belongs here.
- Lexical semantics of morphology deals with the denotational and connotational meanings of single, morphologically complex, words, as lexicalized *star-let*.
- Lexical pragmatics deals with the pragmatic meanings idiosyncratically conveyed by single complex words, such as lexicalized *bunn-y* 'rabbit,' selecting a child environment and obtaining a meaning of endearment.
- Syntactic patterns and textual strategies may convey pragmatic meanings of their own and interfere with those obtained by single constituents of the text.
- Morphopragmatics deals, instead, with pragmatic meanings that can be regularly obtained through the sole application of morphological rules, given certain sets of contextual conditions. The morphological operation may be totally responsible for the added utterance meanings, with the wordbase being either neutral (*dogg-y*) or contributory (*dear-ie*, Italian *piccol-ino* 'small-DIM') or even contrary (Italian *gross-ino* 'big-DIM') to the effect pursued.

The Tenets of the Theory

The theory relies on the assumption that pragmatic meanings are not completely derivable from semantic meanings with the help of general pragmatic principles; it favors the claim that a morphopragmatically relevant rule possesses some nonsemantic, autonomous pragmatic feature in its meaning description. In the case of Italian diminutives, for example,

the pragmatic effects they obtain cannot be derived from a semantic meaning [small] with its allosemes [unimportant] and [young]. They are based on an autonomous pragmatic feature [fictive], and on a derived, more specific character [nonserious]. Evidence of that is the fact that many of such pragmatic effects can also be obtained by augmentatives, which share with diminutives the pragmatic feature [fictive], but certainly not the semantic meaning [small]. In Italian, saying to somebody:

(1) mangi come un maial-ino
    you eat like a pig-DIM
    'you eat like a little piggy'

would not sound dissimilar from:

(2) mangi come un maial-one
    you eat like a pig-AUGM
    'you eat like some huge pig'

In both cases, the suffix is capable of hedging the critical remark, i.e., of downgrading the illocutionary force of the evaluative assertion, via a playful character added. Compare with a nonsuffixed version:

(3) Mangi come un maiale
    'you eat like a pig'

which is insulting and likely to cause an angry retort by the addressee.

The playful character, on the other hand, cannot be viewed as a stable connotation of the two suffixes, because, with a change of context (e.g., a sarcastic approach), the same suffixes may turn their meanings into aggravating unpleasantness. See:

(4) Italian: vuoi tener fuori le tue man-ine/one dai
        miei affari, per favore?
    will you keep out the your hand-DIM/AUG-PL
        from the my business-PL, please?
    'why don't you mind your own bloody business'

Fictiveness is conceptualized as a departure from conventionally accepted standards of meaning; it generates a frame of personalized values where such standards glide according to the speaker's evaluation. Fictiveness creates an area of fuzziness, which, in interactional discourse, needs explanations and allows negotiation, as in:

(5) Italian: il tuo articolo è un po' cort-ino
    the your article is a little short-DIM
    'your article is a bit short, I'm afraid'

A likely rebuttal could be:

(6) che intendi per cort-ino?
    what do you mean by short-DIM?

The use of the un-affixed base *corto* (as in *l'articolo è corto* 'the article is short'), by contrast, would

activate conventional standards and would not allow meaning negotiation; it might at most trigger a discussion on what is 'short' for an article, due to the meaning relativity of dimensional adjectives.

In Italian, but also in other languages, such as Spanish, Portuguese, German, English, Dutch, Polish, Russian, and others, a diminutive formation produces modifications that may be at the same time relevant for morphosemantics, i.e., denotational diminution and positive or negative connotations, and for morphopragmatics, i.e., fictiveness and its derived character [nonserious], capable of constraining the type of speech situations and of downgrading the strength of the illocutionary force of the entire utterance. So, in the Italian example above, the diminutive formation *un po' cort-ino* 'a bit short-DIM', besides conveying a meaning of semantic diminution, by virtue of its fictive and nonserious character, suits a case of non-official evaluation, indicates the speaker's lower responsibility in uttering it and obtains mitigation of the critical remark.

Morphopragmatic effects may even be independent of the denotative meaning of smallness and of connotational meanings of positivity (pleasantness, coziness, etc.), or negativity (meanness, meagerness), or emotionality (endearment, tenderness). Cases are conceivable in which none of these meanings is actually activated and still morphopragmatic effects obtain, as in:

(7) Italian: ho bisogno di una sua firm-etta qui, per
        favore
    I have need of a your signature-DIM here, please
    'well, now, could you just sign here, please?'

where the meaning [small] of the suffix in *firm-etta* is suspended and superseded by its feature [nonserious], which lowers the speaker's responsibility for the face-threatening directive speech act and obtains a downgrading of the deontic imposition of the request and of the requestee's liability in case of noncompliance.

A fictive character is recognizable also in other morphological rules, as, for example, in German and Hungarian excessives. From a semantic viewpoint, excessives are not different from superlatives: like these, they indicate the highest possible degree of a value along a scale, but excessives obtain a fictive upgrading of this extreme, which can be exploited, for example, in paradoxical or sarcastic hyperboles, as in:

(8) German: aber das Aller-schön-ste kommt erst
        jetzt
    but the EXC-beautiful-SUPERL comes only now
    'but the most beautiful of all is about to come up
        now'

where 'beautiful' is used sarcastically of something unpleasant.

The model also concerns morphopragmatics in inflection, as, for example, Japanese honorifics, particularly the suffix –*masu*, which indexes social and psychological distance in conversation. The honorific system is a matter of morphopragmatics because its sociopragmatic meaning is biuniquely expressed by such suffixes.

New, promising areas of morphopragmatic studies have recently opened up, for example in language acquisition (Dressler, 1997).

Factors Favoring Morphopragmatic Meanings

Child-centered speech situations and the emotionality involved, the ludic character of playfulness among intimates, familiarity and informality in general, sympathy and empathy, but also understatement, euphemism, false modesty, irony and sarcasm, are all factors favoring morphopragmatic meanings of diminutive formations and other morphological rules. In a child-centered speech situation, the feature [nonserious] is constitutive and triggers diminutive formations. Examples are:

(9) who's my lovely little girl-ie?

German: wer komm-erl-t denn da?
who come-DIM-s PART there
'who is that cute boy/girl is coming there?'

involving emotions and signaling intimate relations between mother and child. The other factors, such as irony, understatement, etc., are regulative. Compare:

(10) Italian: un tantino anziano per lei, no? (irony)
a bit-DIM old for her, no?
'a shade old for her, eh?'

(11) Italian: io facevo un ragionamento un po' divers-ino (understatement: downgrading speaker's responsibility; said by a student to a professor)
I made a reasoning a bit different-DIM
'I was approaching the matter slightly differently'

Emotive factors are not primarily connected with diminutive formations, as can be seen from the last

example. Constitutive and regulative factors combine in determining the application of the rule, which is also dependent on whether the utterance contains a suitable base for the suffix. Whatever the word chosen as a base ('landing site'), the effects clearly extend to the entire utterance.

See also: Irony; Linguistic Anthropology; Mitigation; Politeness; Pragmatics and Semantics; Semantics-Pragmatics Boundary; Syntax-Pragmatics Interface: Overview.

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Morris, Charles

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Charles William Morris was born in Denver, Colorado on May 23, 1901 and died in Gainesville, Florida, on January 15, 1979.

He studied at the University of Chicago, and received his Ph.D. in philosophy in 1925. His academic career included the jobs of instructor at the Rice Institute (1925–1931), Associate Professor (1931–1947) and lecturer (1948–1958) at the University of Chicago, and Research Professor at the University of Florida. He also taught at Harvard and at the University of Texas.

In 1934, Morris edited the collection of lectures *Mind, self, and society* by his former Professor George Herbert Mead.

Morris was interested in logical positivism, and in scientific empiricism as promoted by the Vienna Circle. He dealt in formal logic (along the line inaugurated by Rudolf Carnap), behavioral psychology, and language philosophy. He participated in the international congresses of the philosophy of science (Prague 1934, Paris 1935).

From the beginning of the 1930s, Morris gave the very first course in semiotics (so labeled). He assumed the existence of a close interdependence between science and semiotics. Consequently, in his first major work, *Foundations of a theory of signs* (1938), Morris claimed that science is "at once a language, a knowledge of objects, and a type of activity." The *Foundations* were originally intended as the first volume of an *International encyclopedia of unified science* (a project promoted by Neurath and Carnap). Following upon ideas due to Charles S. Peirce (whom he never met), Morris's basic contribution in this work is the tripartition of semiotics into syntactics, semantics, and pragmatics. This distinction was also adopted in linguistics. Pragmatics, as studied by contemporary linguistics, originates in Morris' idea of a branch of semiotics concerned with "the relations of signs to their interpreters."

His next major work was *Sign, language, and behavior* (1946), which developed along the same lines.

In 1964, he published *Signification and significs*; the basic idea thereof is that semiotics studies "what signs signify to certain persons, how signs are considered in a specific language, the origin, uses, and effects of specific signs."

Morris organized the 5th and 6th International Congress for the Unity of Science. He was Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and President of the Western Division of the American Philosophical Association (1936–1937).

In 1977, *Ars Semeiotica. International Journal of American Semiotics* was launched at the University of Colorado, under the patronage of Charles W. Morris.

See also: Communication: Semiotic Approaches; Peirce, Charles Sanders; Pragmatics: Overview.

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Multiculturalism and Language

J Edwards

Focusing upon linguistic and cultural contact means focusing upon group identity. It is this sense of 'groupness' – ethnic or national – and the recognition that both underpins and reflects it, that constitute the core of the discussion on multiculturalism, a discourse that is essentially sociopsychological and usually emotionally charged. This can be true from either side of group boundaries: linguistic and cultural continuity, for example, can be both a rallying point for members of a beleaguered minority and an irritant (or worse) for those fearful of social balkanization or fissiparous movements. Multiculturalism is an icon for some, an illusion for others. And language – particularly in its symbolic roles, as well as in those communicative ones that link past to present, that bear culture across generations – is in many instances the centerpiece of the multicultural thrust. During and after language shift, it is certainly possible to maintain cultural distinctiveness and the sense of border that is the heart of group definition. However, this is not a viewpoint likely to be endorsed by people who feel themselves at risk of assimilation, nor can it be denied that continuity of language use is a powerful cultural buttress.

The politics of identity – the skeleton, that is to say, which is fleshed out by cultural and linguistic differences, details, and demands – is of special current salience. Our age is one of transition, and transitions are often difficult and painful. In the territories of the former Soviet Union, in the increasing western European federalism, in the killing fields of Africa – but also in the struggles of indigenous peoples in North and South America, in the debates on multicultural accommodations in new-world 'receiving' societies (Canada, Australia, the United States) – we see contexts in flux, identities up for renegotiation, languages in contact or conflict, 'small' cultures attempting to resist larger ones, and so on. It is true that, in some cases, the 'ethnic' factor in conflict is something of a red herring. The Hutus and the Tutsis of Rwanda essentially share the same culture, religion, and language and, consequently, ethnic difference was not the real nub of the conflict that led to the massacres in 1994. In Africa, Asia, and elsewhere, colonialism planted many delayed-action devices, emphasizing and stiffening cultural difference. But even if ethnic or nationalist roots are not, in themselves, causal phenomena (in situations of group friction),

their very existence – the fact that they are *there*, the fact that dormant, or even unreal, traditions can be evoked and played upon, the fact that manipulated or selective history can be made to serve current ends – is of considerable importance. In some other cases, matters of language and culture are not only symbolic markers signaling deeper waters, but are more centrally implicated in intergroup conflict. It is not economic deprivation or lack of effective political representation in federal corridors that primarily fuels the sovereignty movement in Quebec – yet its power has come within a hair's breadth of breaking up the country.

Multiculturalism usually implies multilingualism and, at a *de facto* level, they exist in virtually all countries, in very few of which national and state borders are coterminous (see Connor, 1978). At a *de jure* level, languages are more often accommodated than are cultures. Still, despite a large number of languages and a small number of states – about 5000 and 200, respectively – only about a quarter of the world's polities recognize more than one language (and recognition itself rarely implies or reflects equivalent status; see Edwards, 1995).

Legislated attention to cultural diversity is rare, and Canada and Australia are virtually alone in having official multicultural policies. The Canadian approach is generally illustrative. Two years after the establishment of linguistic duality (with the Official Languages Act of 1969), a policy of multiculturalism was announced, and an Act was passed in 1988 – the aims were, from the first, to assist cultural groups to develop and to contribute to the larger society, and to help them learn either or both of the two official languages. Further elaboration (as found in the Act) stressed the preservation and enhancement of other languages – but this is supposed to coincide with the strengthening of English and French, too, the national commitment to which is reaffirmed. The Canadian policy demonstrates, then, the generalities employed when cultural maintenance or the continuity of non-official languages is under discussion (the Act talks of enhancing the Canadian 'multicultural heritage'), as opposed to the specificity attaching to the status of legally sanctioned varieties. Unsurprisingly, this package has been seen as rather an empty one; more pointedly, the feasibility of **multi**culturalism within a **bil**ingual framework and the depth, therefore, of real government commitment has been questioned. Of course, reactions to official multiculturalism range very widely, from the mistaken notion that it is a spur to ethnic separatism and an impediment to national unity (perhaps, indeed, to the emergence of some

eventual, nonhyphenated **Canadian** identity), to the naïve belief that it enshrines and reflects a general tolerance for diversity – evidence for the moral superiority of the Canadian 'mosaic' over the more southerly 'melting pot.'

But the Canadian policy, for all its generality and its possible interpretations, is more broadly significant as an example of political response to diversity. Liberal democracies are of course obliged by deepest principle to consider multicultural realities – but consideration does not imply uniformity of sensitivity or reaction. In the Canadian approach to multiculturalism, an apparent response at the level of the group, the collectivity, is arguably of such a general nature (and, one should add, is so weakly supported, financially and otherwise) that it represents only a tiny course adjustment to the more traditional liberal stance in which rights are seen to inhere in individuals, a stance broadly descriptive of contemporary Western society. So, to the reactions already mentioned, we can add two further interpretations of multicultural policy: it represents only politically opportunistic lip service to the idea of cultural maintenance (a view which could of course be **endorsed** by the cynical assimilationist); or, it is a genuine response to heterogeneity, but one that is unfortunately flawed in its framing and its application. It need hardly be said that these and other stances are not unique to the Canadian context.

The appropriate democratic response to cultural diversity is of course the underlying issue here. Should there be formal multicultural policies at all and, if so, should they enshrine some level of commitment to group rights? What level? And what groups? The literature on multiculturalism and its ramifications – pluralist accommodation, the negotiation of identity, the rights of minorities, the obligations of the liberal state, and so on – has only recently turned to such matters. The turn, however, has been significant, and there is now a concern for 'identity' that extends from literature, to the social and political sciences, to philosophy.

In his treatment of 'identity politics,' Taylor invokes the idea of 'recognition' and, more specifically, the politics of equal recognition as fundamental. But this can shade easily into a politics of group difference, in which the uniqueness of group identity is emphasized. It is this, of course, that adherents claim is at risk of being ignored or, worse, assimilated to some overarching majority (the "cardinal sin against the ideal of authenticity": Taylor, 1994: 38). So we arrive at an interesting juncture: the principle of universal equality is stressed but within that, as it were, arise demands for the recognition of distinctiveness. The demands of general respect, on the one hand, and of particularity, on the other, lead to difficulties:

> The reproach the first makes to the second is just that it violates the principle of nondiscrimination. The reproach the second makes to the first is that it negates identity by forcing people into a homogeneous mold that is untrue to them. (Taylor, 1994: 43)

Bearing in mind the traditional liberal sense that society ought to ensure individual equality but remain neutral as to the desired contents of lives, but aware of the concerns of cultural collectivities (especially, of course, those under threat from powerful neighbors), Taylor argues for a more 'hospitable' liberalism that departs somewhat from this traditional neutrality, for the idea that cultures should be given some means of self-defense, for at least an initial presumption of equal worth – for something, that is, between a cruel homogenization and an ethnocentric self-immurement.

Kymlicka (1995) has also addressed the matter, arguing that it is within the bounds of liberal democracy to provide groups with the means to ensure their cultural continuity – and, where these groups are specially disadvantaged, this may in turn require special attention, perhaps special rights. In this connection, he defends treatment differentiating between indigenous minorities and immigrant groups. Kymlicka (see also 1998) has concerned himself particularly with the Canadian context, suggesting that the multicultural policy is – or could be – an effective instrument. It is interesting (given what I have noted above) that he repeatedly points out that this policy, now to be understood as a vehicle for the provision of group rights, is, after all, no real threat to the *status quo*. Diversity will be subject to reasonable limits, and existing conceptions of rights, freedoms, and human dignity will not be overturned.

It is impossible to analyze here the rich detail of these sorts of arguments (or, indeed, to note the criticism they have elicited). But they are the ones we now need, since they confront the underpinnings of multiculturalism and may thus lead to useful generalities applicable across contexts. A great deal of the literature has, for too long, consisted of special pleading for one group or another, under the guise of a broad concern for pluralist accommodation. A more profound assessment of multiculturalism will necessarily involve its linguistic components, and that is why I have emphasized the former in this brief discussion. It is of course possible to attend to language *per se* without much concern for its cultural foundations. But an instrumental approach omits the essence of the matter here: the interweaving of language as a strand in the larger fabric, as part of a broad concern with identity and belonging.

See also: Identity and Language.

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N

Narrative: Sociolinguistic Research

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Labov and Waletzky, 1967

In the sociolinguistic quest to 'tap the vernacular', one of the richest sources of data comes from narratives of personal experience (Labov, 1972; Labov and Waletzky, 1967). As the narrator becomes immersed in the details of the narrative itself, he is "no longer free to monitor his own speech as he normally does in face to face interviews" (Labov, 1972: 355), hence mitigating the 'Observer's Paradox' (Labov, 1970: 32). Thus, this type of data provides a wealth of largely unmonitored speech amenable to analysis of variable lexical, phonetic, and morphosyntactic forms. However, these narratives of 'ordinary people' (Labov, 1997: 397) which are commonplace in sociolinguistic data, have a more intrinsic interest: the internal structure of the narrative itself. These funny, tragic, trivial tales may appear to be idiosyncratic to the individual narrator, but despite their disparity vis-à-vis content and style, similarities in linguistic structure and function abound.

In an attempt to uncover the underlying mechanisms at work in the course of telling and retelling narratives of personal experience, Labov and Waletzky (1967: 12) propose an analytical framework which isolates "the invariant structural units which are represented by a variety of superficial forms." In other words, the deep level structures which map onto surface-level variations. Although this framework is nearly 40 years old, it "continues to dominate the field," (Macaulay, 2002: 289) alongside more wide-ranging treatments of narrative (e.g., Prince, 1983; Linde, 1993). It has thus remained the bedrock for sociolinguistic narrative analysis over the last few decades.

Fundamental to this framework is (1) the clause as a grammatical unit, and (2) the semantic functions of these clauses. The individual clauses are grouped into sections which have different functions within the story. Labov (1972: 359–360) defines narrative as "one method of recapitulating past experience by matching a verbal sequence of clauses to the sequence of events which ... actually occurred" (see also Labov and Waletzky, 1967: 201). A minimal narrative contains "a sequence of two clauses which are temporally ordered" (Labov, 1972: 360–361), as in (1) and (2):

(1) and I took his nappy off
and as I took it off literally he pooped all over the cubicle!
(2) and then his mum and dad woke up
and Mel punched his dad

(All examples come from a large number of narratives collected at the University of York (Smith *et al.*, 2002–2004) by students enrolled in the course Variationist Narrative Analysis).

These chronologically ordered clauses, or **complicating actions** (Labov and Waletzky, 1967: 32) provide the **referential** function of the narrative, reporting 'a next event' in response to the potential question 'What happened [then]?' (Labov, 1997: 402). They provide the backbone of the story and are the 'most reportable event' (Labov, 1997: 404): without these, there is no narrative. (The complicating action is often terminated by a result or resolution, "the set of complicating actions that follow the most reportable event" (Labov, 1967: 414).

However, most narratives are not this minimal, and, significantly, one "which serves this [referential] function alone is abnormal: it may be considered an empty or pointless narrative" (Labov and Waletzky, 1967: 13). In addition to the question 'What happened next?', we also want to know 'What's the point?'. Labov refers to this as the **evaluative** function of the narrative.

Evaluation clauses in a narrative contain statements or words that tell the reader what to think about a person, place, thing, event, or entire experience. They are "the means used by the narrator to indicate the point of the narrative, its *raison d'être*: why it was told, and what the narrator is getting at" (Labov, 1972: 366). They give the story reportability and make it worth telling. These clauses can be highly

embedded within the narrative itself and can include evaluation of a third person as in (3).

(3) And so he said in future years he'd only shag actresses.

On the other hand, it can be a much more direct statement about the narrator's feelings, as in (4):

(4) They've just got absolutely no scruples about owt.

The circumscription of evaluation, both structurally and semantically, has proved to be the most problematic. Its defining qualities underwent substantial revision in Labov (1972) and Labov (1997).

Added to the referential and evaluative function of narrative are orientation, abstract, and coda.

The **orientation** section of a narrative contains statements that provide the setting or context of a narrative which "serve to orient the listener in respect to person, place, time, and behavioral situation" (Labov and Waletzky, 1967: 32), as in (5):

(5) and he used to drink Lowenbrau
    and he used to like ten pints every night
    and at the weekends he'd get so drunk he couldn't stand up.

The **abract** "is an initial clause that reports the entire sequence of events of the narrative" (Labov, 1997: 402) in summary form, as in (6):

(6) Last time I got pulled it were for drink driving.

In other cases, they are requests for an extended turn at talk, as in (7):

(7) So did you hear about the gas leak?

These often act as some type of advertisement in order to 'get the floor', as in (8):

(8) Right, I can tell you a birthday story and a half!

The *coda* is "a functional device for returning the verbal perspective to the present moment" (Labov and Waletzky, 1967: 39). These clauses often employ deixis, as in (9), or make the effects of the narrative applicable to the here and now, as in (10):

(9) Erm, and that was it. That was me getting arrested for fraud.
(10) So we live and learn and I shall never ever move a static caravan again.

These five major sections most often follow a linear structure: the story opens with the abstract, followed by some orientation clauses and then the complicating action, while the coda signals closure. Evaluation clauses are interspersed throughout this bounded unit.

In discourse level phenomena, "narrative is the prototype, perhaps the only example of a well-formed speech event with a beginning, a middle, and an end" (Labov, 1997: 396). Moreover, they have "a fairly regular structure that is largely independent of how they are embedded in surrounding talk" (Schiffren, 1994: 284). Although there are differences, both structurally and functionally, in how a narrative is realized, the study of a large body of narratives have demonstrated that this structure is fundamental to the majority of narratives of personal experience, it is the 'normal form' (Labov and Waletzky, 1967: 40).

Sociolinguistic Correlates

Although Labov and Waletzky's prime motivation in the 1967 paper was the narrative itself, one of the 'ultimate aims' was to "require close correlations of the narrator's social characteristics with the structure of their narratives" (Labov and Waletzky, 1967: 13). Since that time, a number of classic sociolinguistic categories have been examined against the backdrop of narrative: in particular class, gender, geography, age, and ethnicity.

Class

Labov (1997: 412) observes class differences in narrative: upper middle class speakers report on emotions, while lower class speakers "are sparing in their reporting of subjective feelings." Horvath (1987: 219) also finds differences in content: the majority of working class speakers' stories concern themselves and other family members; in middle class speakers' narratives, protagonists not personally known to them predominate.

Class differences may also exist not only in content, but in quantity, too. Macaulay's (1991: 139) study of Ayr in South West Scotland shows that working class speakers have on average a greater number of narratives both in number terms and as a proportion of the overall sociolinguistic interview than their middle class counterparts. This finding was replicated in his study of Glasgow speech (Macaulay, 2002: 298).

Gender

Labov and Waletzky make no explicit reference to gender differences in narrative, but it, too, may have an impact on content. Findings from Johnstone's (1990: 66) study of middle class whites in Fort Wayne, Indiana, suggests that men's narratives focus on their personal exploits and successes, whereas women underplay the 'protagonists' personal roles.' Holmes' (1997: 286) results from the Wellington Corpus of Spoken New Zealand English are similar:

"the women focus on relationships and people, affirm the importance of their family roles, family connections, and friendships. The men focus on work and sport, events, activities, and things, and affirm the importance of being in control, even when they don't achieve it."

Cheshire's (2000) research into the narratives of teenage friendship groups in Reading also finds gender stratification in how stories are co-narrated: in a nutshell, "for the boys, the telling was the more salient aspect of a narrative, whereas for the girls it was the tale" (Cheshire, 2000: 200).

Age

Labov (1972: 393–396) finds that the ability to narrate evolves with age. This is supported in subsequent research (e.g., Peterson and McCabe, 1983; Bamberg, 1897; Toolan, 1988). 'Leap frog' narratives are the most common among four year olds where the child jumps from event to event unsystematically. By six years old, the classic pattern established by Labov is more in evidence: temporal relationships have developed, but the referential function predominates, with little evaluative function evident (e.g., Peterson and McCabe, 1983), and a paucity of orientation clauses (e.g., Snow and Imbens-Bailey, 1997). In later years, there is a focus away from factual information to getting the point across, with an increasingly sophisticated use of evaluative devices with increasing age (e.g., Romaine, 1985; Kernan, 1977: 101).

Syntactic complexity increases with age from pre-adolescent to adult (Labov, 1972: 393), and remains stable in later years (Labov and Auger, 1993).

Ethnicity

Labov and Waletzky (1967: 38) state that their proposed framework "will achieve greater significance when materials from radically different cultures are studied in the same way." Indeed, whether their framework is culture specific or universal has been the subject of scrutiny (e.g., Tannen, 1981, 1982, 1984; Blum-Kulka, 1993; Tsitipis, 1988). Divergences from the 'expected' model appear from the very earliest years. Michaels (1981, 1984, 1985) shows that "children from different backgrounds come to school with different narrative strategies" (Michaels, 1981: 423). White children have as a framework 'topic-centered' narratives which have minimal assumption of shared background, full description of objects, explicit spatiotemporal grounding; black childrens' narratives are 'topic associating,' where the narrator presents "a series of implicitly associated personal anecdotes" (Michaels, 1981: 429). Ethnic differences are not restricted to children: Holmes (1997) finds in her New Zealand corpus that Maori speakers, in comparison to their Pakeha counterparts, leave parts of the narrative relatively inexplicit, including the evaluation section.

Geography

Johnstone (1990) suggests that there are regional differences in discourse style explicable in terms of different cultural contexts. In her analysis of Indiana narratives, she finds that the narrators use highly specific details, or 'extrathematic orientation' (Johnstone, 1990: 201) in orientation sections of narratives. She interprets this within the context in which the narratives take place: they must be culturally embedded, or 'anchored in the real, local world' (Johnstone, 1990: 210) in order for the narratives and narrators themselves to sustain, in Labov's (1997: 407) terms, credibility.

Linguistic Internal

The syntactic correlates of narrative structure are discussed in Labov and Waletzky (1967) and Labov (1972). Hopper (1979) and Hopper and Thompson (1980) also find that certain linguistic forms predominate in particular parts of the narrative: complicating action verbs are most usually punctual rather than iterative or durative and are usually perfective; stative predicates predominate in orientation; evaluation clauses are often irrealis, with use of modals, subjunctives, and negatives (see also Silva-Corvalán, 1983). These "predictable grammatical correlates not only for narrative type but also within narratives" (Fleishman, 1985: 852) are realized formally in some languages: for example, in Swahili, foregrounded clauses or complicating actions are marked with the prefix ka-, background with ki- (Hopper, 1979: 213). In other languages such as English, they derive from the discourse structure itself (Hopper, 1979) and are used as devices to signal levels of 'information relevance' (Fleischman, 1985: 852).

Variable morphosyntactic forms that cannot be explained at clause level may find interpretation within the broader discourse unit of the narrative. Schiffren (1981) finds hardly any use of the historic present in abstracts, codas, and evaluative clauses, and a minimal number in orientation. In contrast, almost one-third of complicating action clauses are in the historic present. The interpretation of these quantitative results relies on Labov and Waletzky's model: as verbs in complicating action clauses are temporally ordered, they are free from providing a reference time, thus marking for tense is redundant (see also Johnstone, 1987; Wolfson, 1979; Silva-Corvalan, 1983).

Despite some findings on differential behavior across a range of sociolinguistic and linguistic internal categories, the foundations of Labov and Waletzky's framework remain largely unchallenged. In the field of sociolinguistics, they continue to provide a solid foundation for research into narratives of personal experience.

See also: Conversation Analysis; Cultural and Social Dimension of Spoken Discourse; Discourse Markers; Discourse, Narrative and Pragmatic Development; Identity and Language; Narrativity and Voice; Social Class and Status; Sociolect/Social Class.

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Narrativity and Voice

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'Voice' concerns the question 'Who speaks?' (who tells the story in a narrative?) and presupposes a pragmatic view of language. Hence, the concept of voice implies that any narrative is uttered by someone. Usually, one speaks of narratives 'in the first person' when the voice refers to itself and 'in the third person' when it does not and the narrative appears to just flow (Bal, 1996). More rarely, narratives are told 'in the second person,' so that the first person is strongly implied but not mentioned. An intermediate form is 'free indirect discourse,' where the narrative espouses the idiosyncrasies of the character closely without using the first-person pronoun. Voice is the concept that, in the wake of Roland Barthes, killed the author while enabling critics to continue analyzing texts by positing a 'speaker' who allegedly uttered them. At the time, many were preoccupied with the French tradition, and I was myself interested in emending Gérard Genette's theory of narrative. At this time, I want to give some opacity to the perhaps too transparent veil of these alternative approaches, so that it helps to cast a somewhat amazed look at that key concept of voice. I will deprive the concept of its 'naturalness' and refrain from taking it for granted. Instead, I argue that 'voice' is an extremely artificial and skewed concept.

This reversal of what is 'normal' or 'natural' and what is *techne* or artifice accomplishes three things. It helps to suspend – but not give up – what seems 'normal' or even 'natural' in the equipment we have inherited from our training and from the traditions within which we work, including the concepts of voice and others we routinely work with and the methods learned and practiced. It suspends the certainties regarding the domains the humanities have accustomed all of us to consider **separately**: art, literature, film, and the ideas and images that run through philosophy and religious studies. Moreover, it questions the concept of voice as one borrowed from the domain of the **anthropomorphic imagination** and as deriving its apparent self-evidence from it.

Voice and Its History

The metaphor of 'voice' in literary studies came into use after the 1930s, in the wake of certain technological discoveries and developments. Neither of the two earliest modern publications considered narratological – the collection of Henry James's prefaces to *The art of the novel* from 1907 and E. M. Forster's *Aspects of the novel* from 1927 – uses the term. James uses a remarkably **visual** vocabulary, whereas Forster uses the term 'story-teller' (Forster, 1974: 22–23) to refer to the author of narrative literature. When he uses the term 'voice,' he is referring either to tone ('a tone of voice' (Forster, 1974: 86)), or to the literal, physical voice. For example, he writes: "... the story as a repository of a voice. It is the aspect of the novelist's work which asks to be read out loud." (Forster, 1974: 27) But, though he does not use the concept in the analytical sense of later narratologists and linguists, his phrasing tells of the transforming meaning of voice in a culture about to embark on a 'secondary orality,' as radio and sound film became common. He writes, with a tellingly enthusiast primitivism:

> What the story does do in this particular capacity [...] is to transform us from readers into listeners, to whom 'a' voice speaks, the voice of the **tribal** narrator, squatting in the middle of the **cave**, and saying one thing after another until the audience falls asleep among their offal and **bones** (Forster, 1974: 27, emphasis added).

The late 1920s and the 1930s would be the moment that the word 'voice' became replenished with sense and relevance in a culture that saw itself as modern. It is the moment that posed the problem of voice in the culture at large. Specifically, it was the moment, heavy with consequences, in the middle of the so-called modernist period, of the transition from silent to sound film (see Lastra, 2000).

Before that transition, the idea that images could have a voice was as utopian as it was exotic. The 'movement' of the image was already quite an impressive miracle, for which artists like Degas and photographers like Muybridge and Marey had prepared the public. To turn technological experiments into multimedia spectacles, pianos were put in the theater room. Sound was a luxury – decorative. It did not narrate. But one day, technology facilitated the transition that we now find so natural – from silent to sound film.

This was not a single transition. The particular moment I am interested in here is when sound began to transform from ornament to supplement, and before it became an integral element of the moving image. It is the moment when sound began to be 'added' to the image. The image was made first, and then sound was literally put together with it. The procedure of adding sound was jokingly called

'goat-glanding' (Armstrong, 1998). A generation later, the true wonderment of the procedure, its technological spectacularity soon forgotten, was evoked nostalgically in fictional form in the film *Singin' in the Rain* by Stanley Donen and Gene Kelly (1952; see Armstrong, 1998). This film can serve here as a theoretical object and contribute to an understanding of the full impact of the concept of 'voice,' which is not taken into account when it is used for narrative analysis.

In this film, play-acting without words, the 'original' or 'natural' form of the moving image is represented in all its fantastic splendor when Debbie Reynolds acts as an acoustic prosthesis to the 'mute' actress whose voice wouldn't 'pass.' Whereas Reynolds ends up achieving final victory, the class-bound censorship of her counterpart's voice exceeds the hilarious humor of the set-up of doubling and splicing between body and voice. It also puts the finger on what may well be called 'the politics of voice,' which would link this 'classism' to Forster's primitivism. In line with Schmid's narratological concept, we could speak here of 'voice-interference.'

'Goat-glanding' opened the possibility of a new engagement between language and image. This new engagement turned cinema into the third art. Neither literature nor visual art nor a simple combination of the two, cinema was a fundamentally different art where language and image were inextricably intertwined, along with other media such as music and space. From that position, cinema was able to cast doubt on the essentialism that sought to separate the media and consequently house them in separate disciplines.

In this culture, cinema had the role of cultural model that we are only now beginning to grant it, in its break with the idea of 'pure' media and its accession to the mass public, which accorded the masses the status of both consumer and **judge** of art. But this cultural situation also generated a crisis. I contend that the concept of 'narrative voice' is an instrument of the **repression** in that crisis and the crisis of authorial authority that it entailed.

This cultural crisis, which knocked absolute authority out of the hands of expertise, is also the crisis of the authority of the author. Barthes and Foucault drew only philosophical consequences from the technological change, and that, quite late, when they proposed the ideas of the dispersion (Foucault, 1979) and death (Barthes, 1986 [1968]) of the author. The moment of crisis had, in fact, already happened several decades before. The trigger was the cinema, recently furnished with a voice.

The metaphor of voice as technological would, for example, direct attention to the production of the 'diegetic chronotope' – the timespace in which the plot is set – as the domain of the effect of the real. Far from possessing an authority that goes without saying, narrative voice seen as 'addition' distracts attention from the total lack of authority of, to recall the example, Debbie Reynolds' character, in order to implement the diegetic fiction as the frame of viewing the work as a whole. That fiction draws the story into a chronotopological hole, from which, in general and with the exception of postmodern experimentation, it will not reemerge.

In this respect, again, the literalized revelation in the raising of the curtain in *Singin' in the Rain*, with its explicitly added voice, can serve as model. The identity of the woman 'who speaks' shows itself in a *mise-en-scène*, which is also a theoretical *mise-en-abîme* of the question, 'Who speaks?' Here, the *mise-en-scène* 'explains' why, in the history of cinema, the artificial character, the nonidentity, the 'added' quality of the voice, has been 'forgotten' so easily, so fast, and perhaps, so desperately.

In the cinema of former days, this technology had had its own materiality: sound, music, tools, and machines. But a new cognitive understanding also underlay that very materiality whose conception it had made possible because thinkable. That understanding is anchored in the sciences of the time. It concerned not the overestimation but rather the fundamental deficit of the body, so that it was seen as being in constant need of supplementation by means of prostheses, one of which was the voice. The concept of voice, disembodied, made technical, thus makes its appearance as a tool for analysis, as if to over-compensate for the anxiety triggered by a generalized sense of the body's defective state. A body part pried loose of its body.

In view of the fiction that proclaims the disincarnation of narration, one must take a position in the debate that subtends such an attitude towards voice. On the one hand, the concept of narrative voice is constructed on the presupposition of spatial distance. By not matching the images in any obvious way, the voice seems to lose its body. This loss brings it into the present of reading, where it partakes of the strong perceptual and affective experience. This, in turn, reincarnates the voice. But, on the other hand, in the very attempt to incarnate it, to give it body – for example, by marking its gender, age, and other social positions – the voice is deindividualized by the analyst who uses the term 'voice.'

Faced with these cases, where the concept of voice is artistically theorized as meaningful after all, it is necessary to 'work through,' put under erasure, those aspects of the metaphor of voice that distort and censure the analysis.

Images of Authorship

Among the aspects of the metaphor of voice that might have informed its creation and that remain its primary motor, is, first of all, the notion of the 'subject' as the owner or site of the narrative voice. This incites the analyst to privilege voice over other aspects of the fabric of the narrative text that contribute equally strongly to the production of its meaning. Most obvious of all is the example of the 'image.' The text is not reducible to the ensemble of words that constitute it. The image is an element in all narratives. The narrative voice entertains a relationship with the visual fabric that permeates the text, but this is not a systematic relation of mastery.

The narrative voice does not 'create' or produce all the images rendered in the text; many preexist the voice's description of them. 'Voice' is a term invented to eliminate authorship as the prime preoccupation of literary studies, yet to let it in again through the back door. Wayne Booth published a book in 1961 called *The rhetoric of fiction.* As the title indicates, two elements of what constitutes the field or object 'literature' in the common understanding orient it away from the author's primacy: 'rhetoric' and 'fiction.' The one indicates that whoever 'speaks' the words in the text does not speak straightforwardly in a direct, reliable, constative mode of language use, but may be caught in acts of seduction, deviation, figuration, or outright lying. Hence, the second element, 'fiction,' which takes literature away not only from the author but also from the world within and for which she writes. Appealing to a mode of reading still most adequately defined as 'the willing suspension of disbelief,' fiction takes the substance, content, or reality of the literary work out of the hands of the author. The latter can wash her hands of everything that shocks, disturbs, annoys, or dangerously entices the reader. The latter, as the definition has it, is responsible for willingly giving up on the author's epistemic answerability.

Booth's book introduced a term – the 'implied author' – that from that moment on was so widely used that it became a cliché. The term is deceptively straightforward. It suggests that the biographical author has a textual delegate behind which she can hide, a guarantee of discretion and cultural politeness morphed into a methodological *de jure* argument. But the concept *de facto* operated the switch, not really from author to text but from author as speaker of the text to reader who construes an image of that person. The reading, the concept promised, would give all information, relevant and desired, about who 'spoke' the narrative. Any questions beyond who wrote the book were indiscreet and redundant.

Inscribed within the text by a 'hand' she could manipulate at will, the author could be read off the page, and it befell to the reader to compose the image of the author from the data gleaned during the reading.

The 'implied author' offered a bonus that the author as corpse did not, and that became too attractive to turn down. In a quite literal double sense, it **authorized** the interpretation one wished to put forward without taking responsibility for it. The phenomenological edge of the concept wore off. What was left was the authority of the constative statements that speaking of – but simultaneously **for** – the implied author afforded. Judgments based on the idiosyncrasies of individual readings could be presented with the aura of having detected what the author, willy-nilly, 'meant to say.' Meaning thus collapsed into intention, as it had before Booth came along.

Meanwhile, a mere seven years later and in a totally different vein, Roland Barthes had put the author to death, given birth to the reader, and conjured up a phantom author rather comparable to Booth's. The author whose death he hyperbolically declared was the masculinist, individualist bossy one of classical narrative and its obedient theorists. Instead, between the lines of his murderous prose, he proposed a figure without identity or voice, an impersonal 'scriptor.'

Neither Booth, who displaces the author into the realm of interpretation, nor Barthes, who attempts to disembody the author, eradicates this figure. It appears as if the author cannot be entirely dispensed with. For the moment, it seems preferable to just bracket 'him' and look at the results of these rhetorical moves.

Once the author is bracketed and reemerges on the reader's side of things, the first major problem that this move leaves hanging is the question of 'who speaks' the words on the page if it isn't the actual author. The first step, further away from the now rhetorically built author, was the concept of 'narrator.' This addition was necessary because a single narrative, by definition attributed to a single implied author, can easily have many narrators. Also, a narrative 'in the first person' sometimes speaks with the voice of the younger self, and then with the one of the disabused older fellow who decides to write down the life story.

In search of reliable concepts, yet intent upon conceptualizing agency 'beyond' the author, literary studies reformulated the question of 'who speaks' as the question of 'voice.' The word 'voice' is naturalized, a near-catachresis, to account for the fact that a story doesn't come out of the blue, and that someone is responsible for it. As such, it seems indispensable

to circumscribe the subject of the text. But when we use words like 'responsible,' we enter the domain of the ethical.

Related to this responsibility is yet another aspect of voice – as metaphor of textual subjectivity. This metaphor is also the starting point of a search, of the 'whodunit' kind, the quest for the identity of the unknown criminal. This question indicates that words and images matter, that they 'act,' as speech-act theory teaches us. Where acts are performed, someone is accountable; the entire social and legal system works on that premise. No wonder the disciplines that comprise the humanities also take for granted the importance of that fundamental question.

The question 'Who speaks?' interrogates the nature of the verb 'to speak.' This question implies two questions about meaning. The first concerns the construction of meaning. 'What does this mean?' and 'What does she mean (to say)?' are two different conceptions of meaning that the metaphors of authorship conflate, namely signification – the production and processing of publicly accessible meaning – and intention – that inevitable urge to identify meaning with the mind of the genius-artist who put that meaning out. The former has no bearing on authorship; the latter does. Conflating them, then, begs the question of meaning.

The second question implied in the 'Who' question concerns agency. 'What are the consequences?' is perhaps the best way of phrasing it. This question raises two others: on the one hand, that of the effectivity measurable only in terms of reception, in other words, what does the work 'do' to its readers or viewers?, and on the other hand, the social relevance of the work, that is, 'What does it do to the public domain in which it functions?' These two questions, I hasten to add, must be asked in the positive but also in the negative form. What meanings and critical possibilities are repressed when we use a concept of the 'who?' kind, such as narrative voice? In other words, what is the metaphorical status and import of the analysis structured on the basis of 'voice?' In anticipation of my conclusions, this need to ask the question 'who?' negatively – which is rarely done – makes it impossible to dismiss the personification implied by the question.

Conceptions of the Artistic Text

A second cluster of features imported by the metaphor of voice concerns not the subject of the work but the conception of art that underlies it. The privilege mostly unreflectively accorded to narrative voice easily entails an extreme 'mimeticism,' an assumed and endorsed, albeit disavowed, seamless match between social relations and literature, a match that is literature and art's very mission to question. The relevance of literary narrative resides, precisely, in its refusal to obey the pressure of realism as *trompe-l'œil*. The question of 'who speaks?' can only escape that *trompe-l'œil* if its other, the question of 'who doesn't speak?', is systematically carried on its back, like a parasite. The question of which character, in what social position, does **not** have access to speech, is, on the one hand, one of voice, but on the other, one that undermines the belief in and obedience to the text as 'account.' As Gayatri Spivak remarked in a brief but forceful analysis of the case of Friday in Defoe's *Robinson Crusoe*, (1975 [1719]) – later revisited by Coetzee's *Foe* (1986) – Friday's tongue has been cut (1999: 186–187). In Coetzee's postmodern version, his tongue has been cut literally, hence, physically. This mutilation can, in and of itself, serve as a theoretical object. It stages an almost naïvely literalizing perspective on Defoe's story in a rewriting that is disabused of realism.

The addictive attachment to realism is rooted in the need to protect the aspect of the metaphor of voice that most badly needs scrutiny, namely authority. Authority is both obliterated and protected – and abducted by a criticism that nevertheless derives its authority from it. As I mentioned above, the presence of authority in humanistic studies allows the authorization of interpretation to be naturalized. The concept of voice, hence of narrator, is part of that authorizing impulse. As a phantom presence, the author continues to lurk in the wings as long as the major analytical concepts partake of the author's anthropomorphic shape. The attribution of intention that this concept of narrator facilitates is a weapon in the service of subordinating the reader. The latter, brainwashed by education to interiorize the taboo on exercising her function of 'second person,' is too easily submissive to the intention that clothes the text as long as it is conceived as the unquestioned product of voice. But, I contend, 'below' or 'behind' the thematic of narratorial sincerity, authenticity, and competence lies an alleged and naturalized unity of cultural memory in which those features are given the status of virtues.

Responsibility, in other words, does not equal authority. Both the scriptor and the reader are responsible for their acts of meaning-making, all the more so because they cannot appeal to and hide behind authority. Nor does subjectivity equal agency; one can exist as a subject and still be deprived of agency. Conversely, agency cannot take advantage of the problematization of unity to disavow responsibility. Here lies the importance of a disbelief that undermines realism. Against the desire for authority that informs

the addiction to mimeticism, and before a different kind of entanglement between reader and work becomes possible, a disentanglement of responsibilities is necessary.

Nor can voice claim 'origin,' that other doxic cultural obsession. Origin implies generativity, and that perspective must be kept in its limited place. If words and images 'come from' somewhere, it is from the culture that the work and its readers share, at least partially. They are picked up like graffiti and litter from the roads we walk along throughout our lives. They end up in works of art and literature. Then we hasten to narrow their provenance to the single speaker we call 'voice.' Mikhail Bakhtin insisted long ago on cultural polyphony, and many scholars have followed suit (*see* **Dialogism, Bakhtinian**). Against this craving for and self-evident alleging of origin, I suggest that voice insists too exclusively on illocution, that aspect of speech – and by extension, of all cultural utterances – that indicates the speaker's intent. In the process, it privileges the speaker, writer, or maker of images. Thus, the concept lends itself to subordinating and easily obscuring perlocution, the utterance's **effect**, and thereby disempowers the listener, reader, or viewer. We need to suspend **time**, in the sense of sequence, as narrative's defining principle, if only because of its obsession with the idea of origin. Together, then, the aspects of voice discussed so far – subjectivity, mimeticism, its grounding in authority, and origin – have in common a tendency to restrict narrative analysis to the inscription of time as foundation of narrativity. This remains important. The concept of 'voice' must remain functional, albeit 'under erasure.' But this temporality is located inside the chronotope that constitutes all narrative works.

See also: Dialogism, Bakhtinian; Discourse, Foucauldian Approach; Literary Pragmatics; Pragmatics of Reading; Rhetoric: Semiotic Approaches.

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Native Speaker

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Although the rise of the idea of a (naïve) native speaker can be, as pointed out by Dasgupta (1998), traced as far back as the antiurbanist impulse released by German Romanticism of the 19th century, the use of the expression *native speaker* became prevalent in modern linguistics, particularly since the Chomskyan intervention in linguistics, which in perhaps its least appreciated aspect brings metropolitan linguistics back home to the West after a rather long detour to various peripheries and colonies. Although some would argue that Chomsky's ideal native speaker does not look very different from the native speaker of those who hold a more prescriptivist position, he takes the theoretical view that we are all native speakers of the steady state grammar we develop on the basis of innately specified language capacity.

Scholars concerned with what Chomsky calls E-language are, of course, preoccupied with the question: of which language? This, as Muysken (1998) points out, is not a straightforward matter for the internal language/external language (IL/EL) mapping is more often than not asymmetrical (cf. Hindi and Urdu in South Asia, which arguably represent the same IL, and Patois, Dialect, and Quechua in South America, which presumably manifest different IL's). Nor is the relationship between language competence and language use a straightforward one, for the former seems to crucially depend on the latter, as can be clearly seen in language attrition (cf. Seliger and Vago, 1991). These considerations of asymmetrical mapping and use bring social parameters and sociolinguists into the picture. A further complication is added by the so-called indigenized varieties of some European languages, particularly English (for obvious reasons behind its international spread). The debates regarding the status of these varieties, at least some of which are demonstrably fully rule-governed linguistic systems, have made it increasingly clear that both ownership and multilingualism must be taken into account in providing a more viable characterization of the notion of *native speaker*.

Earlier accounts of the notion of native speaker, such as the ones collected in Paikeday (1985) and Coulmas (1981), try to come to terms with some of the complications summarized above. However, with only a couple of exceptions, they do so with what must be seen as a monolingual/monocultural bias, remarkably clearly spelled out by Crystal (1985) and Quine (1985), and with almost no awareness of questions thrown up by the existence of varieties such as Indian and Singaporean English. The old monolingualist characterization of the concept of native speaker – as mother tongue or first language – may no longer be sufficient (cf. Pattanayak, 1981 and Harris and McGhee, 1992; among others). Token homage to multilingualism or minor adjustments to such a characterization can't solve the problem, because they tend to take a simplistic view of multilingualism.

The functionally determined distribution of the use of particular languages and the concomitant acquisition and competence in them in multilingual societies makes such accounts inadequate because neither the proficiency nor the competence of a multilingual speaker can be described in simple, additive terms – a bilingual speaker is not a simple, additive union of two monolingual speakers. The existence of indigenized varieties of English (and some other European languages) makes these accounts look even worse. It is one thing to de-emphasize or question the role of introspection in linguistics, as many of the contributors to both Paikeday (1985) and Coulmas (1981) do, but quite another to come to terms with what Coulmas (1981: 1) calls "the common reference point" for all of linguistics. Although the question of the relationship between use and the acquisition and sustenance of competence needs to be researched more thoroughly than it has been, no harm is done if the expression *native speaker* is understood as *native speaker/user*, as no one will deny that to become and to remain a native speaker of a language one must use it.

The question, as Kandiah (1998: 90) puts it, is not whether the native speaker/user exists – Paikeday's dismissal of the concept is much too cavalier – but "what we mean when we say that people know, use and view a language in a manner that allows them to see themselves as and to be recognized and accepted as native speakers/users of it." "To be recognized as" and "to be accepted as" add the dimension of ownership or proprietorship to an already complex set of parameters that must be taken into account in defining the native speaker/user. In other words, the native speaker/user is not dead, as the title of Paikeday's book suggests, but has simply been somewhat prematurely buried by some. Kandiah (1998) rightly insists that the fact that large numbers of ordinary people consciously or unconsciously assume the notion *native speaker/user* in their interactions guarantees that it captures something real. Although it is instructive to deconstruct certain construals of *native speaker/user*, not much is to be gained by discarding the concept completely.

Even if the assumption that one is naturally proficient in one's mother tongue is rejected, Paikeday's suggestion that we use "proficient user of a specified language" instead of *native speaker/user* is not productive because we need to know how to measure proficiency and who determines the norms against which such measuring will take place.

As the considerations that preoccupy most of the contributors to Paikeday (1985) – for example, mother tongue, the age at which acquisition of the language in question began, and the order of acquisition – are rendered irrelevant by the functionally distributed use of and competence in several languages in multilingual societies' the only way to avoid being sidetracked by them is to attempt a characterization grounded squarely in the reality and psycholinguistics of multilingualism. Singh (1994) offers the sort of characterization I believe is needed: "Grammatically speaking, a native speaker of a language is a person who has relatively stable and consistent grammaticality judgements, which he shares with some other speakers, regarding structures alleged to be from his language." A native speaker/user is, in other words, a speaker/user whose well-formed judgments on utterances said to be from her language are shared by her community. Only a definition of this sort can, it seems, preserve the innocent grain of truth in structuralist and generativist conceptions of the native speaker and acknowledge the considerations Kandiah rightly brings to our attention. It also exposes the oxymoronic nature of labels such as *non-native varieties of X* by making it clear that whereas one can legitimately say that native speakers of Texan English are not native speakers of Heartland Canadian English, one cannot legitimately say that native speakers of Texan English are not native speakers of English (because they do not speak Standard British or Standard Midwestern American English).

Although some of the questions thrown up by the emergence of varieties of English such as Indian and Singapore English are very important for characterizing the notion of a native speaker/user, the debates regarding the status of such varieties unfortunately tend to be almost journalistic. Consider the easily understood matter of lexical innovation and morphology, for example. The preoccupation with pedagogy and an almost complete neglect of grammar in the contemporary sense reduce most discussions of lexical innovation in such varieties to journalistic reports on exotica. It is true that Indian English, for example, has words that are peculiarly its own, but all varieties of English have words that are peculiarly their own. Although the delight of discovering words that are unknown in other, particularly standard, varieties of English is understandable, the

unfortunate conclusions that are drawn from such excursions into exotica are unwarranted and seem to stem from a lack understanding of the morphology of Indian English. It is important to look carefully at the morphologically complex words in Indian English and other such varieties. Morphologically complex innovations result from an interaction between requirements of the material landscape and what grammar permits, and here these varieties do not offer much that is radically different.

The fact that *goonda* 'gangster' or *lathi* 'stick' exist only in Indian English is no more interesting than the fact that *tuque* 'a knitted cap resembling a long stocking' exists only in Canadian English. These would be notable if the peculiarity of the lexicon of Indian English could be attributed to a distinct and peculiar morphology. Such an attribution, however, seems unwarranted. Like the peculiarity of the lexica of all other varieties of English, the peculiarity of Indian English seems limited to simplexes. Hosali (1998) intended her example of *lathi-charge* 'an attack with *lathis*' to show a distinctive morphological pattern in Indian English. She notes that the distinctive feature of this morphologically complex item is "the use of a *lathi* or 'a long heavy stick made of bamboo and bound with iron.'" This explanation shows, contrary to her own suggestion, that the item is not a result of substratum-influenced morphology or of an unlicensed extension of English rules of word formation, but reflects the fact that the simplex *lathi* is a word of Indian English, a fact which is of no particular relevance to the morphology of that language. Other complex words also suggest that no such substratum influence or illegal extension is involved in the morphology of Indian English. There is, as I argue in Singh (2002), little in Indian English morphology that cannot be seen as a natural extension of patterns or rules of word-formation used or exploited in other 'native' varieties of English. Indian English certainly has simple and complex words that don't exist in these other varieties, but each one of those has simple and complex words that don't exist in the other varieties. Morphologically complex words in Indian English are, in other words, fully licensed by word-formation rules of English morphology. *Batch-mate* exists in Indian English because *class-mate* and *room-mate* exist in all varieties of English; *collectorate* exists because *directorate* exists throughout the English-speaking world.

Comparable illustrations from syntax and phonology are easy to find, but perhaps it is sufficient to point out here that there are no structural features at any level of grammatical description that characterize all non-native varieties of English to the exclusion of all native varieties. Given that most linguists

who have made serious efforts to find such features acknowledge that there aren't any (cf. Trudgill, 1995), we are fully justified in concluding that the dichotomy native variety/non-native variety cannot be structurally or grammatically sustained. And if it indeed cannot be sustained, speakers of at least the varieties that can be shown to have their own norms, such as Indian English and Singapore English, must be classified as native speakers of English by virtue of the fact that they are native speakers of their respective varieties – the fact that they are not native speakers of some other variety is irrelevant. This is, of course, consistent with the definition in Singh (1994). Although we fully recognize the importance of acceptance, recognition, and ownership, the definition itself does not have anything to say directly about them, because, as I have argued extensively, these are clearly politico-economic matters, better discussed and negotiated elsewhere (see Lele, 2005). It is perhaps counter-usage, but, fortunately, no more so than the definitions of *democracy* in English dictionaries, for example, which define it not in terms what it actually is but in terms of what it could potentially be. It can, hopefully, be used to persuade those who insist on using technical expressions somewhat arbitrarily that they should refrain from doing so.

It is at least mildly ironic that whereas the asocial tradition of linguistic or grammatical inquiry sees and characterizes the speakers of the sorts of varieties mentioned above as native speakers of these varieties, the allegedly socially responsible tradition of sociolinguistics is responsible for creating the expression *non-native variety*. The former honors its commitment to treat all viable, rule-governed systems of linguistic communication at par, but the latter seems more than willing to sacrifice the grain of innocence contained in the impulse released more than a century ago. It is the sociolinguist's intervention that adds to the understandable pedagogical dichotomy *native/non-native speaker* the unlicensed dichotomy *native/non-native variety*. Why some native speakers of English want to treat some other native speakers of English as non-native speakers is an important question, the answer to which is to be found in the political economy of the contemporary world, though sociolinguists are welcome to try to answer it. Why some English-speaking sociolinguists also want to do that is perhaps an even more important question, at least for theorizing about language and society. And in what is perhaps the final irony, the only sustainable interpretation of 'non-native variety' may well be the interpretation 'not of the land' or 'still retaining its otherness' – that is why the structuralist argument that Indian English, for example, is just as self-contained a system as RP English, for example, sounds like a threat to speakers of other Indian languages in India.

That it also sounds like a threat to speakers of RP English is easy to explain – such a status is seen as a demand for a share in the cultural and political power wielded by the native speakers of English in the inner circle inhabited by RP English speakers. This interpretation is, at any rate, not the one that the creators of the expression *non-native variety* and the promoters of a demonstrably unwarranted use of *non-native speaker* in scientific discourse have in mind. It is not available to them because the non-nativeness they see in or want to confer on varieties such as Indian English and Singaporean English resides in their view, as they make repeatedly clear, in the Indianness or Singaporeanness of these varieties. It can be invoked only by those who, like Dasgupta (1993), believe that the non-nativeness of these varieties (from an indigenous perspective) resides instead in their Englishness.

See also: Multiculturalism and Language.

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Natural Language Interfaces

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Communicating More Effectively with Computers

As technology has progressed to the point where computing hardware is at its most affordable, one can readily argue that the limiting factor in the usability of computers is the usability of the interface. At the onset of interactive computing, the ability to manipulate the data and programs resident on a computer was restricted to individuals able to master the very rigid syntax and vocabulary of command line interfaces. Consider the following scenario:

> Given a file of data containing test results, calculate the relevant statistics about each person and display and save a table of results in sorted order based on average.

A command line to complete this task might look like the following:

> stats < data.txt | sort –k 3,3n > results.txt ; lpr results.txt

where *stats* is the program for calculating statistics, *data.txt* is the input file, and *results.txt* will be the output file.

Alternatively, if one wanted to produce some type of graph or bar chart, the sort command would have to be replaced with the name of the appropriate program and another complicated set of flags and arguments (such as *–k 3,3n*) would likely need to be specified to produce the proper behavior.

An advance in interface usability is the now ubiquitous graphical user interface (GUI). The GUI primarily relies on the point-and-click control of a mouse to select files, data in files, and programs. With a GUI, the sample problem might be handled by completion of the following tasks:

- Select the desired program (*stats*) based on location of its associated icon.
- Select the run action from a hierarchical set of menus.
- Specify the input file *data.txt* in a dialog box.
- Reorder the displayed output by clicking on the appropriate column header once or twice.
- Select the 'save as' action to store the results into *results.txt*.
- Select the print menu action and perhaps click on a few more buttons and options to generate the desired output.

With a GUI, the graph or bar chart would likely require other menu selections within the same program. Although the GUI has made interaction with computers more accessible to a greater number of people, it restricts users to a 'select and use' mode of communication and problem solving, requires users to maintain a specialized cognitive model of selection ('when do I left-click' vs. 'when do I right-click'), and requires users to have special knowledge about the location and organization of menus and icons that may vary from application to application and machine to machine.

Now consider the following alternative – a natural language interface (NLI) that might allow the user to specify the necessary actions for our sample scenario as follows:

> "I need stats run for the skills tests. Please sort them by average and display and save them into a file."

No specialized knowledge about communication is required by the user. The specification could just as easily have been provided to a human assistant. A NLI can allow people to use all the communicative power of language they already possess rather than

be forced into an unnatural and limiting mode of communication such as a GUI.

This article provides an overview of the utility of various areas of study in natural language processing (NLP) for constructing effective NLIs to computer applications. After discussing technical challenges in constructing NLIs, this article describes approaches to meeting these challenges and concludes with a discussion of representative NLIs that illustrate past, present, and future trends in NLI research and development.

NLI Complexity and Limitations

NLIs are subject to most if not all of the technical challenges studied by researchers investigating fundamental problems in natural language understanding at both the utterance and discourse level. However, since NLIs are grounded within the specific domain of a computer application, the required breadth of linguistic coverage is not as large as it could be, but usually it is broad enough to lead to potential complications such as the ones discussed next.

Contextual Subtlety of Meaning and Ambiguity

Consider a NLI to an in-car navigational system that helps provide directions to the driver of an automobile. Suppose the user says, "I need to get to the airport quickly." Suppose also that the driver is somewhere in the vicinity of New York City, where there are three major airports. Without confirmation, the system could begin directing the driver to the wrong airport. An appropriate follow-up response could be, "Which airport, LaGuardia, JFK, or Newark?"

Assuming that the referential ambiguity of *the airport* is resolved, the interpretation of *quickly* is not clear-cut either. Some possible parameters that the navigational application might require in order to produce a proper response include the following:

- Exactly how quick? The possibly quickest route might also have a higher risk for traffic delays.
- The reason for getting there quickly. There is a major difference in going to the airport to catch a flight and going to the airport to pick someone up. In many applications, it is important for the system to understand the underlying user goals.

Now consider a slight variation of the same situation, in which the NLI is to a telephone-based travel assistant and the user is now looking for suggestions that involve public transportation, such as subways, buses, and taxis.

"I want to get to the airport quickly and cheaply."

Depending on the relative constraints of time and money, various suggestions are possible. The interface must be capable of engaging the user in extended dialog that takes context and domain knowledge into account in order to properly advise the user.

Diversity of Expression

Consider the following paraphrases of "I want to get to the airport quickly":

> What's a [fast|quick|short] route to the airport?
> How do I get to the airport as [fast|quickly] as possible?
> Can you tell me a [fast|quick|short] route to the airport?
> It would be nice to get to the airport quickly.

All these statements are reasonable within the context of a conversation between two people. Unfortunately, not all of them are likely to be reasonable for a NLI. Due to resource constraints in the development process, designers of NLIs invariably must take steps to constrain the allowed language. Common strategies include the following:

1. Constrain syntax and vocabulary of system responses to the allowed forms of input. Users will tend to adopt the language forms they perceive the system to be using.
2. Structure responses to constrain user input choices. This presumes that users will attempt to be cooperative. Compare the following two choices for the initial system statement for a NLI for a travel assistant:

   "What are your travel plans?"
   "Tell me your destination city."

   The second response naturally constrains the set of maximally cooperative user responses.
3. Provide feedback that enables users to track the progress of the interaction to ensure that proper understanding is occurring. Consider the following sample:

   System: Tell me your destination city
   User: Nashville.
   System: Your destination is Asheville. Tell me your departure city
   User: No, I said Nashville.
   System: Correction, your destination is Nashville. Tell me your departure city.

Without feedback, the system error might not be detected until several statements later. Note that the previous example would occur in a speech-based interface rather than a typing interface. However, a NLI that uses typed text for input

tends to allow a wider range of syntax and vocabulary as well as encourages users to communicate via longer responses. Techniques for handling these issues associated with typed input are discussed later when a description of the Why2-Atlas physics tutor is provided.

To summarize, NLIs enable much greater expressiveness for users than GUIs, but steps must be taken to constrain the level of expressiveness so that the NLI is technically feasible. The next section examines key development principles of NLIs and presents a generic architecture for a NLI that will form the basis of our discussion of actual NLIs.

NLI Design Principles

In this section, some key principles for NLI development are discussed. Examples are drawn from the author's experience in developing a system called the Circuit Fix-It Shop (Smith, 1995).

Principle 1: Acquire data on language use for the application domain. It is absolutely crucial to collect data on language use for the problem domain for which the NLI is being constructed. The most common sources of data are samples of human–human conversation and the use of Wizard-of-Oz (WOZ) simulations of human–computer interaction. In a pure WOZ simulation (Fraser and Gilbert, 1991), the user is led to believe that he or she is interacting with an actual computer system, but in reality a human is processing the user's input and controlling the prototype system responses. WOZ simulations tend to require extra time initially to develop, but they can potentially provide more accurate data on what users may actually attempt with a real NLI.

Principle 2: Develop semantic representations for the meaning of user input that are consistent with the semantic representation used in the application domain. Consider the following two utterances and possible meaning representations:

"The switch is not on."
 assertion (switch, position, on, false).
"The switch is off."
 assertion (switch, position, off, true).

The utterances have the same meaning but their basic representation looks different. This can be further compounded if we consider 'up' and 'down' to be synonyms for 'on' and 'off' in this domain. A decision must be made about the form of canonical representations and consistently used. This is, of course, easier to achieve when the NLI designer is the same person or group as the application domain designer, but this

is not always the case, especially in nonresearch-oriented NLIs in which the application software is likely to predate the NLI. This problem can become very challenging in an NLI to a database in which many synonyms and paraphrases for entities and relationships may be present in the NLI.

This same principle applies to the natural language generation (NLG) component. This component must be able to take the representations for responses that come from the application program and produce appropriate natural language responses.

Principle 3: Decide early the level of separation to be maintained between language processing components of the NLI and the application's domain reasoning components. Greater reusability is possible if the NLI software is kept completely separate from the application domain software, but it is not always easy to do. The issue becomes particularly complex when choices of meaning representations are made. Consider the following statements about a numeric electronic display called an LED:

1. The LED is displaying a flashing five.
2. The LED is not displaying a flashing five.
3. The LED is displaying only a flashing five.

The simplest way to keep a separation is to have the NLI produce parse trees for the sentence structure and then send them to a hybrid component that produces a meaning representation usable by the domain reasoning component. The complication arises when domain context is needed to get a complete and accurate meaning representation. Suppose for example, the desired LED display is an alternately flashing five and seven. Given that context, the domain-specific meaning for each utterance would be the following

1. The seven may or may not be displaying with the flashing five.
2. The five may be displaying without flashing (or not displaying at all).
3. The specification is reasonably unambiguous.

When system designers are constrained by development time, it is convenient to have the Natural Language Understanding (NLU) component parse the user response using a semantic grammar (Jurafsky and Martin, 2000) that translates the input directly into a domain-usable representation. In such cases, the opportunity for portability and reusability is normally sacrificed. It is important to take this trade-off into consideration early in the development process.

Figure 1 shows a generic architecture for an NLI to some type of functional application (such as a database manager). This diagram is not meant to imply

Figure 1 Generic architecture for a natural language interface.

that only one design is possible, but it is meant to describe the primary required components of an interface that will be present in some form in all NLIs (sometimes the response component may not use natural language). Users can provide input to the interface through a variety of devices, primarily keyboard and microphone for the NL text/speech, but input may be augmented via devices designed to capture aspects of body language that people also use in face-to-face communication (e.g., gesture and eye gaze).

Once the input signal is acquired, it will be transmitted to the NLU component for analysis. The NLU component may optionally need to interface with domain-specific information in order to complete its task.

In addition, the NLU component may need to communicate with the interaction manager (IM) as part of the understanding process. Generically, we consider

the IM to be all components of the NLI that maintain information about the ongoing interaction. The most common component of the IM would be a dialog manager and associated components designed to track contextual information.

Once the understanding process is complete and a semantic representation of the user input is created, the IM must take the user input and, in conjunction with its knowledge about the interaction and relevant information provided by the domain-processing component (e.g., the content for a response to a user query), formulate a response and send the result to the NLG component. This component will then produce an appropriate response involving NL text and possibly other output forms (e.g., graphical) and transmit the result to output devices such as a monitor, speech synthesizer, or printer.

The following section describes how several application NLIs were designed. How each interface implements the different components in the diagram and handles the key design principles previously described is the focus of the presentation.

Representative NLIs

Text-Based Interfaces

A classic early example of a research system for studying issues in developing NLIs is the Berkeley UNIX Consultant (UC) (Wilensky *et al.*, 1988). The system takes as input typed statements that specify aspects of UNIX about which a user wants to know and produces natural language responses. For instance, suppose a user wishes to remove a directory. Any of the following forms of input would be acceptable:

> "I want to delete a directory."
> "I want to remove a directory."
> "What's the best way to delete a directory?"

In all cases the response would be the following:

> "use rmdir. For example, to delete the directory named foo, type 'rmdir foo'."

The system carries out the NLU process via a two-step mechanism. The first step produces a semantic representation of what is termed the 'primal content' of an utterance. This idea is related to the notion of literal meaning, but it can be more abstract than that. For example, in representing the meaning of prepositions, the word *on* can function in various ways (e.g., "The dog is on the chair" vs. "The picture is on the wall"). However, in a primal content representation *on* is considered to have the same usage in both (i.e., it indicates a support relationship).

In the second step, a more domain-specific representation that is termed the 'actual content' is produced.

Once the NLU processes are complete, domain processing carries out goal analysis, user modeling, and domain planning. The IM takes the inferred user goals (e.g., learning how to delete a directory) and normally will just specify that the NLG components produce an appropriate answer (e.g., telling the user how to delete a directory), but it can also check to ensure that the user's goals are not malicious. However, it is not capable of managing extended dialog about a topic. It manages the interaction in terms of user/system response pairs.

An example of a text-based interface that illustrates the advance in core technologies of NLP to create more sophisticated NLIs is the Why2-Atlas physics tutor (VanLehn *et al.*, 2002). The system teaches qualitative physics by having students write paragraphs explaining simple mechanical phenomena. The explanations are translated into proofs that are then analyzed for correctness. Here is a sample interaction (transcript courtesy of Pamela Jordan):

System: Suppose a man is in a free-falling elevator and is holding his keys motionless right in front of his face. He then lets go. What will be the position of the keys relative to the man's face as time passes? Explain.

Student: The keys should remain in a constant relation to the man's face. Both objects will be in a state of free-fall, and the force of air-resistance should be negligible in an enclosed elevator, so the keys, and the man's face, which are falling and accelerating at the same speed, should remain in the same relation.

System: You have answered the problem correctly except that what you have in your essay is not a sufficient explanation. Before the release, what is the relationship between the man's velocity and the keys' velocity?

Student: equal.

System: Uh huh. If gravity is the only force acting on an object, will it be moving or staying still?

Student: moving.

System: Good. Not only are the person, keys, and elevator moving, they have only gravitational forces acting on them. When an object is falling and has only gravitational force on it, it is said to be in what?

Student: normal force state.

System: Well ... it's said to be 'in freefall.' Thus, after the release the only force on the keys and man is the downward force of earth's gravity, so they are in freefall. What force acts on all objects within close proximity to earth?

Student: the gravitational pull of the earth.

System: Yes. Besides the earth's gravitational force, are there any other forces acting on the person, keys, and elevator after the release?

Student: no, perhaps air resistance on the elevator.

System: Good. Thus, keep in mind that after the release, the only force on the person, keys, and elevator is the force of gravity.

For Why2-Atlas, the NLU is separated into two components, the sentence-level understanding (SLU) component and the discourse-level understanding (DLU) component. The SLU parses each sentence in the student's response and produces a set of logical propositions to represent the meaning of a sentence. It consists of a lexical preprocessor, parser, repair module, and statistical analyzer. The lexical preprocessor will perform spelling correction and stripping of prefixes and suffixes to produce root forms of words. The parser then does both the syntactic analysis and the construction of the logical form. It handles ungrammatical input through a variety of techniques, including skipping words, inserting missing syntactic categories, and possibly relaxation of grammatical constraints. If an excessive number of analyses is produced, statistical information about word root frequencies and grammatical analyses is used to determine the most likely parse. If the parser cannot produce a complete analysis, its partial results are passed to the repair module. If this module also fails, then statistical approaches are used, including latent semantic analysis (Graesser *et al.*, 2000).

The DLU takes the collection of logical forms produced by the SLU and constructs an explanation in the form of a proof using abductive reasoning (i.e., if $P \Rightarrow Q$, and we know Q, then hypothesize P). After the proof is constructed, the DPC, a tutorial strategist, analyzes the proof to find flaws. Each flaw that is found is associated with a tutorial goal to have the student remedy the flaw in the explanation. The goals are prioritized and sent to the IM, which then sends appropriate specifications to the NLG component for construction of a response. The IM will also insert transitions as each flaw is remedied (e.g., "Good. Not only are the person, keys, and elevator moving, they have only gravitational forces acting on them . . . .").

Recent work with this system involves the use of a speech interface ITSPOKE (Litman and Silliman, 2004) for engaging the student in the follow-up interaction after the initial explanation has been typed, submitted, and analyzed. In general, speech has become a prevalent input device for NLIs; consequently, the focus of the remaining NLIs to be discussed is on those for which speech is the primary input device.

Speech-Based Interfaces

Robust Language Analysis   Depending on the domain, one key factor in the construction of speech-based NLIs that must be handled is that traditional NLU strategies based on the assumption that the input is grammatical are not likely to succeed. This is due to the nature of human speech and the accuracy limitation of speech recognition technology. A system that successfully demonstrates the use of alternative strategies for NLU is the "How May I Help You" system of AT&T (Gorin *et al.*, 2002). The purpose of this system is to allow users to avoid the use of frustrating menu systems for obtaining customer service. A sample interaction is shown in the following dialog excerpt from Gorin *et al.*:

> Machine: AT&T. How may I help you?
> User: I have a question about my June bill.
> Machine: Okay, what is your question?
> User: There's a call to Tallahassee, but I don't know anyone there.
> Machine: I can help you with that. Are you calling from your home phone?
> User: I'm calling from my house.
> Machine: Please hold on while I transfer your call.

The idea of the system is to direct user requests more quickly and accurately to the correct service provider. In fact, the authors report greater than 90% success, which represents an improvement on customers' ability to select and navigate through the alternative of hierarchical menus.

Once the word recognition process is complete, the system attempts to find phrases within the user response that are meaningful, where a mathematical measure is used to estimate meaningfulness. Furthermore, information must be used from the IM as the language model changes depending on the state of the dialog. That is, once an initial context has been established (e.g., "I have a question about my June bill"), the next response to the system query will be based on a different language model than the response to "How may I help you?"

Architecturally, this part of NLU is done by the system's speech recognition component, and the NLU component focuses on classifying the type of call the user is making. The IM decides if confirmation and clarification are required as part of the system's response and also decides if additional information is needed in order to properly route the call. It interacts with the DPC that provides a hierarchical description of operator services.

A contrasting approach that is also a commercial phone application is reported in Dybkjær and Dybkjær (2004). Their system responds to frequently asked questions for employees about holiday benefits.

The system combines the use of menus with natural language. (For a discussion of recent design issues for speech interfaces see below).

NLIs That Focus on Dialog Management   As technological advances have occurred in NLU and NLG, and speech recognition, although still imperfect, has become usable, many researchers have built NLIs in which the focus has been on enhancing conversational capabilities of systems through the development of more sophisticated IMs (commonly referred to as dialog or discourse managers in specific systems). Two examples of this type of NLI work are the Carnegie Mellon Communicator System (Rudnicky *et al.*, 1999) and the Paco tutorial agent (Rickel *et al.*, 2002).

The Carnegie Mellon Communicator agent is a speech-based NLI that allows users to create travel itineraries that involve multileg airplane trips as well as hotel and car reservations. For speech recognition, NLU, and NLG components, it uses preexisting modules and techniques, sometimes with slight modifications based on domain language modeling. The IM is designed to be domain independent by creating an interpreter that can use a task-dependent script that is provided as part of the DPC. The script provides an overall guide for the structure of the interaction but does not rigidly specify a fixed order for the interaction.

The Paco tutorial agent makes use of the Collagen software system (Rich *et al.*, 2001) for managing extended collaborative interactions. One implemented instructional domain is the operation of a gas turbine engine that propels a ship. An excerpt of a sample interaction from Rickel *et al* (2002) is given below.

> Student: "What next?"
> Paco: (pointing) "Press the on button on engine one."
> Student: presses the on button on engine one.
> Paco: "Good."
> Student: "I think I should set the throttle speed."
> Paco: "Right."
> Student: "What should the speed be?"
> Paco: "The speed should be stop."
> Student: sets the throttle speed to stop.
> Paco: "Good."

Note that in this sample, both linguistic and nonlinguistic inputs are handled by the interface. Collagen's theory of discourse is based on the work of Grosz and Sidner (1986), which includes information about the current focus of attention in the task as well as the mutually believed plans of the dialog participants. Ongoing work uses Collagen to develop NLIs for GUI applications (Sidner, 2004).

There are many other examples of NLIs that make use of sophisticated dialog management that cannot be discussed at length in this article. One particularly

notable interface is the TRIPS system (Allen *et al.*, 2001). This broad body of work includes an emphasis on issues involving speech acts and planning. We now turn our attention to the future of NLIs, a future being driven by technological advances in computer hardware, particularly in regard to alternative communication modalities used by people.

The Future of NLIs: Integration with Other Communication Modalities

We saw with the Collagen-based system, Paco, the ability to handle nonlinguistic inputs as part of the NLI. Another recent development with interfaces is the ability to combine the linguistic and nonlinguistic inputs into a single user communication. This type of input is known as multimodal input and has been shown to improve accuracy in human–computer communication (Oviatt, 2000).

An example of such a system is Smartkom (Wahlster *et al.*, 2001). Smartkom merges ideas about user interfaces from spoken interaction, GUIs, and natural gestural interaction (e.g., touch-screen technology) into a single system. As part of the project, a set of large-scale WOZ experiments were conducted that captured both audio and visual data in order to develop statistical language models based on machine learning techniques. In addition, the system makes use of both NLG techniques and graphical displays for communication with users. Two other representative systems that use multimodal communication are the AdApt system (Gustafson *et al.*, 2000) and the MATCH system (Johnston *et al.*, 2002). These systems demonstrate how NLIs can evolve to be incorporated into more complex interfaces that exploit even more of the means by which humans have been able to communicate with each other – and are now able to use in a limited fashion with computers as well. In general, the future of NLI research and development should see continued efforts in this type of integration work with other modalities. In addition, there should be continued application of more advanced core techniques in NLP, particularly in the area of dialog management, that will increase the range of communicative power by which computer applications can interact with human users.

See also: Adaptability in Human-Computer Interaction; Cognitive Technology; Conversational Agents: Synthetic.

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Neo-Gricean Pragmatics

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In 1967, H. P. Grice delivered his Williams James Lectures at Harvard. In these lectures, Grice presented a panorama of his thinking on meaning and communication – what he called his "tottering steps" (Grice, 1989) toward a systematic, philosophically inspired pragmatic theory of language use, which has since come to be known as 'Gricean pragmatic theory.' Since its inception, Gricean pragmatics has revolutionized pragmatic theorizing and has to date remained one of the cornerstones of contemporary thinking in linguistic pragmatics and the philosophy of language. This article undertakes to present and assess a neo-Gricean pragmatic theory of conversational implicature, focusing on the bipartite model developed by Laurence Horn and the tripartite model advanced by Stephen Levinson (*see* **Implicature; Maxims and Flouting**).

The Hornian System

Horn (1984, 1989, 2004) developed a bipartite model. In Horn's view, all of Grice's maxims (except the maxim of quality) can be replaced with two fundamental and antithetical principles: the quantity (Q-) and relation (R-) principles.

(1) Horn's Q- and R-principles:
   (a) The Q-principle:
       Make your contribution sufficient.
       Say as much as you can (given R).
   (b) The R-principle:
       Make your contribution necessary.
       Say no more than you must (given Q).

In terms of information structure, the Q-principle is a lower bounding pragmatic principle that may be (and characteristically is) exploited to yield upper bounding conversational implicatures: a speaker, in saying '...p...,' conversationally implicates that (for all he or she knows) '...at most p...' (*see* **Implicature**). The *locus classicus* here is those conversational implicatures that arise from a prototype Horn-scale. Prototype Horn-scales are defined in (2) (see Levinson, 1987, 2000):

(2) Prototype Horn-scales:
   For <*S, W*> to form a Horn-scale:
   (a) A(*S*) entails A(*W*) for some arbitrary sentence frame A.
   (b) *S* and *W* are equally lexicalized, of the same word class, and from the same register.
   (c) *S* and *W* are 'about' the same semantic relation, or from the same semantic field.

An example of Q-implicature is given in (3) (the symbol '< >' represents 'Q-scale'; '+>' represents 'conversationally implicates'):

(3) <all, some>
   Some of his friends took a taxi to the station.
   +> Not all of his friends took a taxi to the station.

On the other hand, the counterbalancing R-principle is an upper bounding pragmatic law that may be (and systematically is) exploited to engender low-bounding conversational implicatures: a speaker, in saying '...p...,' conversationally implicates that (for all he or she knows) '...more than p...' (Atlas and Levinson, 1981). This is illustrated in (4):

(4) Have you got a watch?
   +> If you have got a watch and know the time, please tell me what time it is.

Viewing the Q- and R-principles as instantiations of Zipfian economy (Zipf, 1949), Horn explicitly identified the Q-principle ("a hearer-oriented economy for the maximization of informational content") with Zipf's 'auditor's economy' (the force of diversification), and identified the R-principle ("a speaker-oriented economy for the minimization of linguistic form") with Zipf's 'speaker's economy' (the force of unification). Furthermore, Horn argued that the whole Gricean mechanism for pragmatic inference can be largely derived from the dialectic interaction (in the classical Hegelian sense) between the Q- and R-principles in the following way:

(5) Horn's division of pragmatic labor: The use of a marked (relatively complex and/or prolix) expression when a corresponding unmarked (simpler, less 'effortful') alternate expression is available tends to be interpreted as conveying a marked message (one that the unmarked alternative would not or could not have conveyed).

In effect, what (5) says is this: the R-principle generally takes precedence until the use of a contrastive linguistic form induces a Q-implicature to signal the nonapplicability of the pertinent R-implicature (for further discussion, see Huang, 1991, 1994, 2000, 2003, 2004a,b, 2005).

The Levinsonian System

Horn's proposal to reduce Grice's maxims to the Q- and R-principles was called into question by Levinson (1987, 1991, 2000). In Levinson's view, Horn failed to draw a distinction between what Levinson called semantic minimization ("semantically general expressions are preferred to semantically specific ones") and expression minimization ("'shorter' expressions are preferred to 'longer' ones"). Consequently, inconsistency arises with Horn's use of the Q- and R-principles. For example, in Horn's division of pragmatic labor (see (5)), the Q-principle operates primarily in terms of units of speech production, whereas elsewhere, in Horn-scales (see (2)), for instance, it operates primarily in terms of semantic informativeness.

Considerations along these lines led Levinson to argue for a clear separation between pragmatic principles governing an utterance's surface form and pragmatic principles governing its informational content. He proposed that the original Gricean program (the maxim of quality apart) be reduced to three neo-Gricean pragmatic principles, or what he dubbed the quantity (Q-), informativeness (I-), and manner (M-) principles. Each of the three principles has two sides: a speaker's maxim, which specifies what the principle enjoins the speaker to say, versus a recipient's corollary, which dictates what this allows the addressee to infer:

(6) Levinson's Q-principle (simplified):
Speaker's maxim: Do not say less than is required (bearing I in mind).
Recipient's corollary: What is not said is not the case.

The basic idea of the metalinguistic Q-principle is that the use of an expression (especially a semantically weaker one) in a set of contrastive semantic alternates (such as a Horn-scale) Q-implicates the negation of the interpretation associated with the use of another expression (especially a semantically

stronger one) in the same set. In other words, as already mentioned, the effect of this inference strategy is to give rise to an upper bounding conversational implicature. Seen the other way round, from the absence of an informationally stronger expression, it is inferred that the interpretation associated with the use of that expression does not hold. Hence, the Q-principle is essentially negative in nature.

Three types of Q-implicatures can then be identified: $Q_{\text{-scalar}}$ implicatures, $Q_{\text{-clausal}}$ implicatures, and $Q_{\text{-alternate}}$ implicatures. The $Q_{\text{-scalar}}$ implicatures are derived from prototype Horn-scales. They were illustrated in (3) (recall that '+>' represents 'conversationally implicate') and are shown schematically in (7):

(7) $Q_{\text{-scalar}}$: $<x, y>$
$y +> Q_{\text{-scalar}} \sim x$

$Q_{\text{-clausal}}$ implicatures are inferences of epistemic uncertainty (Gazdar, 1979). They are shown schematically in (8) and are exemplified in (9):

(8) $q_{\text{-clausal}}$: $< x(p), y(p) >$
$y(p) +> q_{\text{-clausal}} \, p, \sim p$

(9) $<(\text{since } p, \text{then } q), (\text{if } p, \text{then } q)>$
If you want to sell more, you should reduce your prices.
+> You may want to sell more, or you may not; perhaps you should reduce your prices, or perhaps you should not.

$Q_{\text{-alternate}}$ implicatures come from a nonentailment semantic contrast set (Harnish, 1976; Horn, 1989; Hirschberg, 1991; Levinson, 2000). Roughly, there are two subtypes here. In the first, the expressions in the set are informationally ranked, as in (10). Following Huang (2005), let us call this subtype 'Q-ordered' alternate implicatures. By contrast, in the second subtype, the expressions in the set are of equal semantic strength, as in (11). Let us term this subtype 'Q-unordered' alternate implicatures:

(10) $<\text{marry, engage}>$
They've engaged.
+> They haven't got married.

(11) $<\text{dog, cat, hamster, } \Lambda>$
John has a dog.
+> He doesn't have a cat, a hamster, and Λ as well.

We come next to Levinson's I-principle:

(12) Levinson's I-principle (simplified):
Speaker's maxim: Do not say more than is required (bearing Q in mind).
Recipient's corollary: What is generally said is stereotypically and specifically exemplified.

Mirroring the effects of the Q-principle, the central tenet of the I-principle is that the use of a semantically general expression I-implicates a semantically specific interpretation. In other words, as already noted, the working of this inferential mechanism is to induce a lower bounding conversational implicature. More accurately, the conversational implicature engendered by the I-principle is one that accords best with the most stereotypical and explanatory expectation, given our real-world knowledge. This is depicted schematically in (12) (the '[ ]' here is intended to indicate an 'I-scale'):

(13) I-scale: [x, y]
   $y +>_I x$

The class of I-implicature is heterogeneous, ranging from conjunction buttressing (as in (14)) through negative raising to interpretation of spatial terms, but I-implicatures do share a number of properties, notably: (a) they are more specific than the utterances that engender them, (b) unlike Q-implicatures, they are positive in nature, (c) they are characteristically guided by stereotypical assumptions, (d) they are nonmetalinguistic, in the sense that they make no reference to something that might have been said but was not (*see* **Metapragmatics**), and (e) unlike Q-implicatures, they normally cannot be canceled by metalinguistic negation (for an attempt to formalize the Q- and I-principles, see Blutner (1998)):

(14) p and $q +> p$ and then q
   $+> p$ therefore q
   $+> p$ in order to cause q
   John pressed the spring and the drawer opened.
   $+>$ John pressed the spring and then the drawer opened.
   $+>$ John pressed the spring and thereby caused the drawer to open.
   $+>$ John pressed the spring in order to make the drawer open.

We finally turn to Levinson's M-principle:

(15) Levinson's M-principle:
   Speaker's maxim: Do not use a marked expression without reason.
   Recipient's corollary: What is said in a marked way is not unmarked.

Unlike the Q- and I-principles, which operate primarily in terms of semantic informativeness, the metalinguistic M-principle operates primarily in terms of a set of alternates that contrast in form. The fundamental axiom on which this principle rests is that the use of a marked expression M-implicates the negation of the interpretation associated with the use of an alternative, unmarked expression in the same set. Putting it another way, from the use of a marked linguistic expression, it can be inferred that the stereotypical interpretation associated with the use of an alternative, unmarked linguistic expression does not obtain. This can be represented schematically as in (16) (the symbol '{ }' indicates an 'M-scale'):

(16) M-scale : {x, y}
   $y +>_M \sim x$

An example of M-implicatures is given in (17b):

(17a) Mary went from the bathroom to the bedroom.
   $+>$ in the normal way

(17b) Mary ceased to be in the bathroom and came to be in the bedroom.
   $+>$ in an unusual way, e.g., in a magic show, Mary had been made to disappear by magic from the bathroom and reappear in the bedroom.

Given the preceding tripartite classification of neo-Gricean pragmatic principles, the question that arises next is how inconsistencies arising from these potentially conflicting inference apparatuses can be dealt with. According to Levinson (1991, 2000), they can be resolved by an ordered set of precedence, which encapsulates in part Horn's division of pragmatic labor, as previously discussed.

(18) Levinson's resolution schema for the interaction of the Q-, I-, and M-principles:
   (a) Level of genus: Q > M > I.
   (b) Level of species: e.g., $Q_{\text{-clausal}} > Q_{\text{-scalar}}$.

This is tantamount to saying that genuine Q-implicatures (whereby $Q_{\text{-clausal}}$ cancels rival $Q_{\text{-scalar}}$) takes precedence over inconsistent I-implicatures, but otherwise I-implicatures take precedence, until the use of a marked linguistic expression triggers a complementary M-implicature, leading to the negation of the applicability of the pertinent I-implicature (for further discussion, see Levinson, 2000; Huang, 1991, 1994, 2000, 2003, 2004a,b, 2005).

Further Neo-Gricean Contributions

Building on the Gricean generalized versus particularized implicatures dichotomy, Levinson (1995, 2000) developed a theory of presumptive meaning. He proposed to add a third level – utterance-type meaning – to the two generally accepted levels of sentence-type meaning and utterance-token meaning. This third layer is the level of generalized, preferred, or default interpretation, which is not dependent on direct computations about speaker intentions, but rather on expectations about how language is characteristically used. Stated thus, a neo-Gricean pragmatic theory

of conversational implicature is essentially a theory of presumptive meaning – pragmatic inference that is generalized, arises by default, and thus is presumed. Furthermore, on a classical Gricean account, the total signification of an utterance is divided into what is said and what is implicated. Simply put, what is said is generally taken to be mapped onto the truth-conditional content of an utterance. What is implicated is then defined in contrast to, and is calculated on the basis of, what is said (and in the case of M-implicatures, together with how what is said, is said). Seen in this light, what is said is supposed to provide the input to what is implicated.

To work out what is said, according to Grice (1989), it is required to (a) resolve reference, (b) fix deixis, and (c) disambiguate expressions. To these requirements, Levinson (2000) added (d) unpacking ellipsis, and (e) narrowing generalities. It turns out, however, that the determination of requirements (a)–(e) involves pragmatic inference of some kind. Put another way, there is 'pragmatic intrusion' of some sort, namely, the intrusion of pragmatically inferred content into truth-conditional content, involved in the working out of what is said. The question that arises next is what kind of pragmatic intrusion it is. Roughly, there are two positions. The first is that the pragmatic inference under consideration is of a special kind, which differs from conversational implicature. Within this camp, of particular interest are two lines of argument. According to Sperber and Wilson (1986), the pragmatic inference is an 'explicature' (*see* **Relevance Theory**). Another argument is due to Bach (1994), who proposed a third category of communicative content, intermediate between Grice's 'what is said' and 'what is implicated.' Bach dubs the vehicle of such a content 'implicature,' since it is implicit in what is said. The second position is represented by Levinson (2000), who argued that these so-called explicatures/implicitures result from the same pragmatic apparatus that engenders what is implicated. Therefore, they are largely the same beast as conversational implicature. Consequently, this gives rise to a problem known as 'Grice's circle,' namely, how what is implicated can be defined in contrast to, and calculated on the basis of, what is said, given that what is said seems both to determine and to be determined by what is implicated (e.g., Huang, 1991). Levinson's (2000) proposal was to reject the 'received' view of the pragmatics–semantics interface, namely, the view that the output of semantics is the input to pragmatics, and even to allow implicatures to play a systematic role in 'pre'-semantics, i.e., in the derivation of the truth-conditional content of an utterance. These matters will continue to be debated (*see* **Pragmatics and Semantics; Maxims and Flouting; Principles and Rules**).

In recent years, the classical Gricean theory of conversational implicature has successfully and profitably been generalized to other core areas of linguistics. One such area is formal syntax, and the particular topic of inquiry is anaphora. Levinson (1987, 1991, 2000) and Huang (1991, 1994, 2000, 2004a) developed a (revised) neo-Gricean pragmatic theory of anaphora (*see* **Deixis and Anaphora: Pragmatic Approaches**). The theory has effected a radical simplification of formal syntax, especially as regards Chomsky's binding theory (*see* **Syntax-Pragmatics Interface: Overview; Pragmatics: Optimality Theory**) Finally, a number of neo-Gricean experimental works have appeared, putting various aspects of classical and neo-Gricean pragmatic theory to a test (for further discussion, see Huang, 2003, 2004b).

See also: Deixis and Anaphora: Pragmatic Approaches; Implicature; Maxims and Flouting; Metapragmatics; Pragmatics and Semantics; Pragmatics: Optimality Theory; Principles and Rules; Relevance Theory; Syntax-Pragmatics Interface: Overview.

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Newspeak

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Newspeak

The word 'Newspeak' was introduced by George Orwell in his novel *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, which was first published in Great Britain in 1949. In that novel, Orwell represents a totalitarian society in which the ruling party is in the process of inventing a new artificial language, Newspeak. According to a definition given in an appendix to the novel, "the purpose of Newspeak was to provide a medium of expression for [a] world-view," and at the same time to "make all other modes of thought impossible."

According to Orwell's fiction, Newspeak is based on the premise that a particular 'reality' can be imposed by imposing a particular language. A number of other details are given in the novel, almost all of which are psychologically and linguistically implausible. There were three classes of Newspeak: a class required in everyday life; a class "deliberately constructed for political purposes"; and a scientific and technical class. The vocabulary of each is supposedly constructed to express only ideologically approved meanings. Thus, some words are removed entirely, new words representing new concepts are introduced, and old words are 'stripped' of unorthodox meanings. Orwell seems to have been aware of the difficulty of preventing speakers from producing new meanings, for he notes that Newspeak also eliminates "the possibility of arriving at them by indirect methods." Thus, the word *free* would have its political and philosophical sense removed and would be restricted entirely to the sense found in a sentence such as *this field is free from weeds*. Morphological processes and categories are simplified. Nouns and verbs have the same form. Thus, the noun *thought* is replaced by *think*. Semantically connected terms have similar morphology: *cut* is eliminated and replaced by the verb *knife*. Adjectives are formed by regular suffixation of nouns (*speed*, *speedful*), with a only a small set of independent adjectives (*good*, *strong*, *black*, etc.) being retained. Comparative and superlative forms are formed by regular suffixation: *good–gooder–goodest*; suppletive forms are suppressed. All adverbs are formed by the suffix *-wise*: e.g., *goodwise* replaced *well*. Antonyms are all derived by the prefix *-un*: *good–ungood*, *cold–uncold*, *person–unperson*. Other prefixes are *ante-*, *post-*, *up-*, *down-*, etc., and the intensifiers *plus-* and *doubleplus-*, giving, e.g., *pluscold* and *doubleplusungood*. The tense morphology of verbs is regularized: *think–thinked*, *steal–stealed*, etc. The number morphology of nouns is also simplified: *mans*, *lifes*, etc. The principle behind these changes or tendencies, according to the novel, is ease of pronunciation, but the major principles are evidently agglutination and one-to-one correspondence of meaning and morpheme.

Compounding and abbreviation are supposed to be additional characteristics of Newspeak. For example, *goodthink* replaces *orthodoxy* and has the forms *goodthinked*, *goodthinkful*, *goodthinkwise*, *goodthinker*, *crimethink*. These forms are modified (in the political version of Newspeak) by apocope and 'euphony' principles: *Thinkpol* (Thought Police), *Minitrue* (Ministry of Truth)–*Minitruthful*, *Minipax–Minipeaceful*, *Miniluv–Minilovely*.

Newspeak meanings are supposed to be unique to the system and intelligible only to its speakers. Thus, *oldthinkers unbellyfeel Ingsoc* had a language-specific and untranslatable meaning, according to Orwell. The Newspeak sentence *all mans are equal* could only mean 'equal in size'. The 'Declaration of the Rights of Man' is untranslatable. Newspeak meanings are also unique in the sense that there is supposedly no ambiguity, polysemy, or connotation: "Every concept that can ever be needed will be expressed in exactly *one* word, with its meaning rigidly defined and all its subsidiary meanings rubbed out." But Newspeak also aims to reduce the number of words in its lexicon and to achieve this end some meanings are simply eliminated. (Orwell, or his novel, does not tell us how.) Thus, the meanings covered by the English words *honour, justice, morality, internationalism, democracy, science,* and *religion* cease to exist along with the words themselves. They are replaced, we are told, by semantically vague words, such as *crimethink, oldthink, goodsex,* and *sexcrime*.

The meanings of all lexical items in Newspeak are ideological; many are euphemisms and some terms are supposed to invert the evaluative associations of 'oldthink' terms: *joycamp* (forced-labor camp), *Minipax* (Ministry of War). This principle is followed in the sentences of party propaganda: "Ignorance is Strength," "War is Peace," "Slavery is Freedom." Since the political vocabulary of Newspeak is an elite variety, some words represent the structures of society with cynical literalness, e.g., *prolefeed* (cheap entertainment for the proletariat).

Names of organizations, countries, institutions and the like are abbreviated: *Recdep* (Records Department), *Ficdep* (Fiction Department), *Teledep* (Tele-programmes Department), *Minitrue*, and *Ingsoc* (English Socialism). Orwell presents these fictional forms as a continuation of the real historical tendency to produce forms such as *Nazi, Gestapo, Comintern,* and *Agitprop*. According to Orwell, the reason for these forms is not just economy of effort, but the intention to limit and control associations. He also claims that the syllabic structure of Newspeak words (always one or two syllables), together with a regular word-stress pattern, has not only a phonological function (to permit rapid speech), but also a cognitive function: to reduce conscious reflection. The use of such words is termed, non-pejoratively, *duckspeak*.

Orwell's Newspeak is part of a tradition. Utopian fictions often portray idealized languages; *Nineteen Eighty-Four* turns the idea on its head. Speculation about language from the 17th century rationalists to Wittgenstein raised suspicions about natural language and proposed ideal rational systems that would mirror the world directly. Some writers, such as Jonathan Swift, satirized the idea; some writers, such as C. K. Ogden in the 20th century, popularized it. Orwell, appalled by contemporary totalitarianism, gave it a contemporary political twist.

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O

Oracy Education

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Spoken communicative competence is of vital importance in the establishment and maintenance of individual identities, in the development of communities of shared interest, in the resolution of conflict between and among individuals or groups, in learning to read (Wells, 2003), and underlying all of these, spoken communicative competence is central to learning to think (Barton *et al.*, 2000; Measures *et al.*, 1997; Mercer *et al.*, 2004; Snyder, 2003; Young, 2000). Communicative competence might thus be thought to be central to oracy education. Bearne *et al.* (2003: 1–2) argue, however, that the interest in communicative competence that began in the 1980s and 1990s has been overtaken by a new interest in technologies of control that do not necessarily engender learning:

> In the 1980s and 1990s there were many studies in Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States about classroom interaction. In particular, Douglas Barnes, Jerome Bruner, and Gordon Wells were influential in prompting close attention to the role of language in group interactions. At that time, the idea of learners being encouraged to shape and build meanings for themselves, scaffolded by their teachers, indicated a particular stance toward pedagogy. Since that era, in which rich contributions to educational thinking were made, the term 'interaction' has gone underground; recently, however, it has been resurrected to denote a particular view of pedagogy. 'Interactive teaching' has currently come to have a new stipulative definition, one that assumes the teacher controls the interaction and that teaching will be organized through whole class arrangements. Rather than describing a dynamic exchange between partners in education, interactive teaching has taken on the flavor of transmissional teaching. Greater attention to talk and learning is welcome but tends to sideline the important interactions between, for example, reader/writer and text, or child and child.

Research on talk in classrooms in the new millennium focuses primarily on three areas:

- 'behavior management' – how to prevent students from engaging in 'inappropriate' talk, or to get them to speak in ways that fit within the discourses deemed relevant and appropriate for classrooms and for specific disciplines (Sage, 2002);
- special education – what to do with the ones who didn't learn to talk or to talk properly (Martin and Miller, 2003; Pagliano, 2002); and
- multicultural education – how to teach students whose first language is not the language of the classroom (Heller, 2003; Heller and Martin-Jones, 2001; Kennar, 2003).

The questionable assumption underlying talk only being made relevant in the areas where there are perceived deficits, is that in the normal course of events children will naturally acquire spoken communicative competence in the absence of education in oracy. This is in marked contrast to the ways in which literacy is approached as vital to learning.

The new focus on technologies of control may lead to classrooms becoming places in which the communicative practices between teachers and students restrict rather than facilitate and foster spoken communicative competences. It is a matter of concern that students are not being taught how to engage in reasoned argument and how to constructively challenge established patterns of thought (Grundy, 1997). Students with oral competence are arguably better able to deal with ambiguity, to appreciate multiple perspectives, and to be open to alternative ways of seeing things and doing things (Grainger, 2003).

In the absence of attention to and work on forms of spoken language in the classroom and playground, speaking-as-usual establishes and maintains the power of dominant groups, in terms of class (Edwards, 1997) and also in terms of gender and ethnicity (Alloway and Gilbert, 1997; Alloway *et al.,* 2003; Bjerrum-Nielsen and Davies, 1997; Tannen *et al.,* 1997). And as Bjerrum-Nielsen and Davies (1997) point out, no simple set of guidelines will change these deeply entrenched patterns of speech

through which status and power are established and maintained. The extent to which communicative competences and oral competences are regarded as natural is a problem here, because it makes invisible the central means by which the differences, which perpetuate patterns of advantage and disadvantage, are established and maintained.

Formal assessment of an oral component within first language in the secondary classroom is becoming common. In this assessment students must perform themselves as individual speaking subjects in front of an audience of their peers. Informal talk generally runs alongside classroom talk and is often defined as being at odds with classroom talk. Such talk is rarely made subject to serious pedagogical attention, other than to silence it. Scrimshaw (1997) observes that the unsupervised 'talk' on computers may be leading to the entrenching of discriminatory actions and thoughts.

The relations between formal and informal talk in classrooms are complex. Alloway *et al.* (2003) observe that there is often a small group of dominant, powerful boys who are the noisiest members of their class, such noisy and impromptu oral contributions being seen as inappropriate by teachers in the classroom context. They are "noisy, disruptive and frequently off-task. Typical disruptive activities included hitting, punching, pulling out each other's chairs, walking around the classroom, calling out loudly to the teacher" (Alloway *et al.,* 2003: 356). Even when they thus address the teacher, their oral performances are not constituted as acceptable, and they may serve to intimidate both girls and nondominant boys. Nondominant boys, for example, may be marginalized and silenced, feeling that they cannot engage confidently in nondominant masculinity in front of such dominant peers (Alloway and Gilbert, 1997; Alloway *et al.,* 2003; Paechter, 2000). These boys who engage in assertive forms of informal speech may profit from the inclusion of oral performance as part of their assessment (Harris, 1998), or they may reject public formal oral performance as 'feminine' (Gilbert and Gilbert, 1998). But even the dominant boys may perform poorly when asked to do formal assessable oral presentations if these are incompatible with their particular skills or their idea of themselves (Alloway and Gilbert, 1997; Alloway *et al.,* 2003).

Forms of speech such as those described above are often interpreted in individualistic terms and made punishable. Green and Dixon (1997) have shown that the mode of spoken interaction taken up by any individual stems from the presuppositions that are inherent in the communicative repertoire of their culture; speaking, interacting and interpreting particular

contexts stem from cultures rather than from individuals. Davies and Kasama (2004), for example, show how preschool children's free play establishes and maintains detailed aspects of Japanese culture, particularly in terms of status hierarchies involving age and gender. Well before written language is accessible by them, children are actively acquiring through spoken language the understandings of status and power that their culture makes available to them. At the same time, Pagliano (1997) shows how inability to speak is often interpreted as lack of knowledge. Through a study of those who are unable to engage in oral discourse, Pagliano shows just how central spoken language and communicative competence are to the formation of identity.

Finally, there is a strong case to be made for the importance of teaching collaborative and exploratory talk (Lyle, 1997; Westgate, 1997), where teachers give up their positioning as the authority and work with students to enable them to clarify their own understandings; of teaching joint reasoning talk (Pontecorvo, 1997), where teachers scaffold the development of students' understandings; and teaching skills for generating shared understandings through ongoing talk (Mercer, 1997; Rojas-Drummond and Mercer, 2004). As Young (2000: 546) says: "Conversation ... mediates collective validity judgements, carries forward social tasks, negotiates meanings, and ... comprises at the same time the constraints on these processes .... The bringing into existence of new meanings, albeit adaptively valid ones, is a necessary feature of inquiry."

See also: Communicative Competence; Cultural and Social Dimension of Spoken Discourse; Classroom Talk.

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Orality

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Orality, both as a theoretical concept and as an empirical phenomenon, has been central to the development of theory and method in modern linguistic anthropology and sociolinguistics, as well as in sociocultural anthropology and social science more generally. Like the concept of 'culture,' orality is massive in its shaping influence on sociolinguistic (and anthropological)

theory, elusive in its definitional essence, and in its very invocation a metonym for ethical, political, and theoretical controversies that far exceed the scope of the present article to review. Clearly, however, an understanding of 'orality' has significance both for the implied or explicit **historical** imagination of Western social science and its readers and for our understanding of how cultural processes are semiotically mediated in a more synchronic and processual sense.

In a deceptively simple formulation, orality could be defined as a phenomenological quality of a given

cultural ethos or social institution that is dependent on the production of embodied sound as a primary vehicle or channel for discursive mediation. Such a definition only begins to suggest the productivity of a focus on sound as a medium for meaning for theories of discourse and discourse genres, for basic understandings of what language 'is' in relation to nonlanguage, and for a wide-ranging critique of some key models of social action, change, and organization that have dominated modern Western social thought. The importance of sound is suggested by the widely adopted terminological refinement 'orality/aurality,' underscoring the mediation (and embodiment, to which I shall return) of culture in and as sound, a phenomenology of culture that does not reduce to production ('orality') or reception ('aurality') and in which the key theoretical metaphors for cultural processes are 'dialogue' and 'discourse' rather than mechanical, cybernetic, or organic visual images.

Sound, on this account, has generic phenomenological properties (including in its interface with other modalities of semiotic mediation) that specifically contrast with, especially, the visual channel of mediation. This contrast is immediately problematic, suggesting the importance of other axes of contrast discussed below. Indeed, gesture, which is a significant nonsounding and largely visual dimension of all language grammars (and central to some syntactic systems) and of almost all discursive practice, has co-existed happily within theoretical accounts of orality and (with the exception of sign language research) been fundamentally distinguished from literacy, with which it shares the visual channel. This is of course because gesture shares with orality a fundamental inalienability from the context of copresent embodied social interaction, a point I will address below.

The key theoretical opposing term to 'orality' is, canonically, 'literacy,' roughly the porting of language into a fully visual medium dependent on extra-individual technologies of inscription, duplication, circulation, storage, and reception of written texts, and the consequences of that porting for all communicative practices it affects. ('Digitality' has also found its way into the keyword canon of late, suggesting another line of theoretical development now under way.) Whether implied or argued, 'literacy' has been widely understood to be a second-order cultural and social phenomenon (or set of phenomena), arising on the foundation of a more 'natural' human condition of orality under specific historical and social conditions. (It is of course simply true that oral communication historically precedes the development of literacy, and that human beings have evolved biologically to be oral/aural/gestural communicators; however, it is now widely believed that

gestural communication, using the visual channel, is of similar or greater evolutionary antiquity to speech and conferred certain evolutionary advantages in the course of human evolution.) When those specific historical conditions that favor literacy's emergence are theoretically or politically valorized, literacy is seen as a progressive force in human development. When they are the object of critique, the valorized 'naturalness' of orality is often invoked. In both cases, 'orality' is constructed as a more 'primitive' mode of communication and phenomenology of culture, one that partakes of either noble or barbaric qualities attached to the 'primitive' more broadly, and one that either persists in the form of threatened 'survivals' and commodified simulacra, or is an inalienable component of human nature and thus a living social force. A more recent tradition of thought has come to view the entire orality/literacy distinction (along with the idea of the 'primitive') as ideologically diagnostic of (Western) modernity itself, with 'orality' largely a political construction of the 'literate' imagination (a view widely linked with deconstructionist theory).

Most students of orality, like most students of literacy (who are sometimes the same students), have moved in recent decades toward an interest in the **interaction** of these communicative modes and cultural phenomenologies in modern discursive formations. In many ways, the theoretical discourse on literacy has inversely mirrored that dealing with orality. For example, both orality and literacy are now widely understood to have diverse manifestations, both within and across social, cultural, political, contextual, and linguistic boundaries, and there is no doubt that 'oral' and 'literate' communities and genres (a key concept, see below) can and do interact and mutually shape a total discursive universe. It is indeed now common to write (or talk) pluralistically of 'oralities' and 'literacies' and to avoid generalizations about the overdetermined social effects of the predominance of any one technology of discursive mediation. It is, however, an open question whether advances in theoretical specificity and complexity have caused the obsolescence of the 'Great Divide' tradition, either among social scientists or the educated public. Both groups, after all, are deeply enmeshed within ideologies and institutions in which 'literacy' reflexively rationalizes the social privilege of the literate. Nor is it clear that 'Great Divide' theories (which attribute fundamental differences in consciousness, learning processes, and world view to oral and literate cultures) are without merit as a mode of historical explanation and filter for social understanding, for example, when they are applied to the study of the systematic discrimination against 'oracy' in modern educational institutions.

However, for linguistic anthropologists, the usefulness of the 'orality' concept has centered on its phenomenological implications for an account of communication as a culturally, contextually, socially, individually, and linguistically variable range of practices in the modern present. While most linguistic anthropologists do believe they are developing a general description of the semiotic codes of cultural life – that is, a comparative science aimed at developing a general, crossculturally valid historical and processual theory of communication – contemporary research practice is rooted in contextualized descriptions of specific communicative phenomena, with a strong emphasis on metacommunicative practices, expressive performance and poetics, the integration of various communicative channels (such as spoken language, writing, and gesture), textuality and entextualization, and the mechanics of referential practice in discourse.

Ethnography is the privileged medium for this research, though works of general theory also abound (with Peircian semiotic theory and functionalist sociology providing primary models and metalanguages). The privileging of ethnography (and especially an ethnographic practice that has been shaped by critiques of 20th-century anthropology's main current of ethnographic theory and method) has serious implications for the standing of orality even among students of social and communicative life in communities and societies that are broadly and stereotypically 'literate.' Another way in which a privileging of orality has served the sciences of communication has been through the development of interdisciplinary links between linguistic anthropology and, especially, ethnomusicology and performance-centered folkloristics, as well as with other disciplines. Obviously, what unites these perspectives is a concern with the sound channel of cultural mediation as a unified (or at least re-integrated) field of research. Within the disciplines of linguistic science, acoustic and articulatory phonology have enjoyed a renewed privilege in the sociolinguistic study of orality, as has, more recently, a lexical semantics focused on sound symbolism, and research on suprasegmental sound elements of language structure, especially sentence intonation and nonphonemic stress. Relationships between music and language and speech and song have also brought certain kinds of musical analysis into a much more central place in the study of communication in general and language in particular. Another link worth mentioning is to literary disciplines, such as translation, in the context of a general advocacy for indigenous cultural rights, language maintenance, and political discourses.

Research falling under the broad heading of a focus on the phenomenology of sound as a medium for cultural reproduction has systematically addressed and altered many key theoretical concepts in linguistic anthropological, literary, and musical scholarship. Among the most important of these concepts are 'text' (and related concepts such as 'context' and 'intertextuality'), 'performance' (which has been systematically recovered from its marginalization within cognitive linguistics and is central to orality research as both an alternative to and an instantiation of 'textuality'), 'genre,' 'social power,' and, most fundamentally, our baseline models of 'cultural memory' and 'dynamics.' Literacy appears to effect an epochal transformation of any given culture's 'archive' of knowledge, making possible the rapid accumulation of massive amounts of specialist knowledge that can be transmitted across space and time (and between genres and texts) without being systematically relearned within each generation or local community. On this account, literacy both enables and is enabled by a ramifying division of intellectual and physical labor, and fosters new kinds of institution that create and sustain characteristic regimes of social power (the valuing of intellectual over physical labor, for example, in the emergence of social class systems). Innovation, or the addition of new material to the archive of stored ('written') knowledge, supersedes replication, and cultural innovators are valorized above cultural replicators. Abstraction of general principles from vast collections of facts (now increasingly modeled after the 'hypertextual' archive of the Internet) becomes the focus of education and social evaluation, rather than mastery of a specific and stable set of 'memorized' facts. Orality depends on a different sort of specialization of intellectual labor, favoring a more conservative emphasis on replication of concrete forms, techniques, formulas, and facts, and a fundamental responsibility of discourse specialists to their constituents to be, themselves, archives (and thus curators) of community knowledge (a key argument of performance-centered folkloristics since the 1970s).

Underlying these theoretical emphases is a basic phenomenological premise: oral/aural discourse (with embodied sound and gesture as its media) is fundamentally context bound in space and in time. Orality depends upon a real or simulated 'live' and copresent interaction. Sound emerges and dies away in the instant of communication, gesture in the blink of an eye. Its inscription freezes some essence of meaning, making meaning available in new and unforeseen contexts of use and interpretation. Clearly, written texts must be able to recover or create their own contexts of use, whether these are generic or novel, or literacy would not be the globally ascendant technology of meaning making and storage that it has become. But an account of orality/aurality as a distinctive phenomenology of

culture must be premised on the claim that the meaning of discourse depends on a calibration of shared social experience in the fleeting moment of instantiation, and that some kinds of meaning are greatly enhanced and amplified under these conditions, just as others are diminished or obscured. (It should be pointed out that the technological mediation of sound problematizes this distinction, and has emerged as a major focus of research in ethnomusicology and cultural studies in recent years).

A related formulation might be called the 'naturalization' of sound as a medium, evident in the persistence and continued development of the study of 'sound symbolism' in linguistic anthropology, maintaining a challenge to the privileging of the 'arbitrariness' of the linguistic sign in structuralist linguistic traditions. Another focus of this perspective (strongly shaped by the influence of Mikhail Bakhtin, ironically a theorist primarily of literary discourse) has been 'reported speech' phenomena, and especially 'direct' discourse idioms, in which the discursive and syntactic principles of imitation and preservation of the context of original 'quoted' utterances favor an elaboration of grammatical markers of evaluation and interpretation carried entirely in such suprasegmental dimensions as tone of voice and rate of speech. Bakhtin's work is also influential for its demonstration of the embedding of oral grammar within literate genres of discourse.

In principle, the visual channel is amenable to the same suspension of the privileging of arbitrariness and investigation of naturalizing mimesis bound to a specific interactive context. The temporal ordering of actions in relation to their agents and objects in syntax, for example, is as much a feature of written as of spoken language, and is subject to a significant range of variation between oral and written discourse within and across languages and dialects. Deictic gestures are, of course, highly context dependent, for example, and appear to vary widely across languages in their grammatical integration with other elements of syntax and discursive form. The iconicity of visual signs has been a major topic in sign language research, and has been treated integrally with other grammatical dimensions of oral poetics (with a focus on reference and deixis) by students of oral discourse. It is significant that so much work on gestural grammar and poetics has occurred in conjunction with work on oral discourse, suggesting an orienting distinction not between the sonic channel and the visual channel, but between the context-bound (and 'naturalized') ground of oral/aural discourse and the decontextualizable and 'arbitrary' ground of written/read discourse.

One further way of locating orality as a distinctive research tradition and perspective must be mentioned. If sound is the physical channel of oral/ aural cultural processes, whether in 'primary oral' or 'secondary oral' settings, the body is the instrument or technology for the production and reception of that sound. Anthropological theory, especially under the influence of feminist thought and social phenomenology, has undergone a general and revolutionary 'return' to a privileging of the body in social explanation in recent decades, after a long phase of privileging culture as a mental phenomenon. While reading and writing are certainly embodied processes, they have rarely been studied as such, and embodiment has rarely been viewed as fundamental to the function of literate discourse. The main stream of linguistic science has, certainly since the 1960s, viewed language as primarily a cognitive faculty, somewhat to completely independent of its channel or medium of discursive mediation (though the brain has of course been understood as the embodied locus of that faculty). Linguistic anthropology, however, after a long engagement with cognitivist theory (though not brain science), has increasingly been concerned with discourse as specifically embodied in voice, gesture, and copresent social interaction, with the body seen as the semiotic ground of cultural meaning and experience. In this view, discourse is the embodiment of meaning in social interaction, with the voice as a sign of the social body and a site of a very practical kind of knowledge and consciousness. This has been very productive for the aforementioned engagements between linguistic anthropology and ethnomusicology, especially around the study of song and musical 'speech surrogates,' acoustic iconicity of natural and social worlds, the interaction of phonemic tone, prosodic intonation, and melodic structure and, above all, in the growing attention being paid to the intertwining of speech and song in particular communities and their expressive economies.

Among the most heartening implications of the contemporary research literature in linguistic anthropology and allied disciplines is that orality need not be understood as an overdetermined (or overdetermining) phenomenology of culture. 'Great Divide' views persist, and continue to play an implicit role in shaping the field of anthropological inquiry. But we have also come to see oral discourse as amenable to a sophisticated description using modified concepts developed largely with reference to the grammar, poetics, and social function of literary texts, while we have had our view of literate discourse challenged and altered by what we now understand as the richness, diversity, and orderliness of oral grammar. Earlier fears of the disappearance of orality under a regime of global literacy appear to be unfounded, along with the related fear that primarily oral cultures (or nonliterate individuals) were doomed to be

isolated from the developmental benefits of modernity, or condemned to symbolize a lost golden age of unmediated 'natural' discourse and social experience. We are early in an era during which we will see oral grammars systematically described without literate prejudice, and in which the focus of empirical research will increasingly traverse the 'Great Divide,' co-evolving with modern language ideologies, discursive regimes, and communicative technologies and practices.

See also: Cultural and Social Dimension of Spoken Discourse; Dialogism, Bakhtinian; Literacy Practices in Sociocultural Perspective; Oracy Education; Spoken Discourse: Types; Text and Text Analysis.

Ordinary Language Philosophy

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'Ordinary language philosophy' is the name given to some conceptions of philosophy, which emanated, after the Second World War, from J. L. Austin in Oxford and from Wittgenstein in Cambridge, and which championed the importance for philosophy of attention to ordinary language. The name itself, the origin of which is not recorded, has perhaps been more used by opponents of these ideas then their friends and so has, to some extent, become a term of mild abuse.

Language and Philosophy

Language itself has always been of interest to philosophers. Our ability to understand and use language is such an obvious feature of our cognitive capacities that any attempt to describe and explain cognition must consider language. In the early modern period such philosophers as Locke and Berkeley provided theories of the nature of language, trying to account principally for its semantic properties. Their thinking, however, was dominated by a belief in the priority of thought, conducted according to them in a prelinguistic medium of ideas, over language. Language was regarded as a medium for public expression of private thoughts, and its interpretation was viewed as making words public 'signs for' private ideas. For them the problem, which generated considerable disagreement, was whether the seemingly manifest differences between different parts of language, between, say, names and adjectives, required the postulation of different sorts of ideas. This was, of course, a concern about the nature of ordinary language. By the beginning of the 20th century, a more comprehensive philosophical engagement with the nature of language emerged in the writings of Frege, Wittgenstein, and Russell. This engagement was inspired by the emergence of formal logic, with its semantic categories, and it was not driven by any prior commitment to the priority of thought over language. There was a real concern with a wide range of different constructions in ordinary language. Thus began what became a, perhaps the, central branch of philosophy, the philosophy of language. Of course, this concern with language was a concern with ordinary language, amongst other sorts of language.

Ordinary Language Philosophy

The name 'ordinary language philosophy' does not stand for this general theoretical concern in philosophy with the nature of ordinary language or for any particular theory about ordinary language. Rather, it stands for two linked approaches to, or theories about *philosophy* itself. The approaches shared the conviction that the key to, or at least a necessary condition for, finally solving philosophical problems lies in some sort of detailed attention to ordinary language. This common theme led philosophers at the time to think that there was a single movement, representing a revolutionary approach to philosophy, which held out hope of laying recalcitrant philosophical problems to rest. However, as we shall see, it is an illusion to think there is a common movement here.

The Oxford Version: Austin

The Oxford ordinary language movement was lead by, or inspired by, J. L. Austin, who became White's Professor of Moral Philosophy at Oxford in 1956. Austin himself did not publish much during his lifetime, but established his leadership within a group of highly talented philosophers in Oxford, including Grice, Strawson, Urmson, and Warnock, partly due to his seniority, but also to his extraordinary critical intelligence and personality. Austin had a deep interest

in language and wrote about what he called performative utterances, that is utterances such as saying, in the right circumstances, 'I name this ship Victory,' whereby the act of speech itself accomplishes what it ascribes, in this case conferring a name on a ship. He developed a more general theory of the acts we perform by speech in the William James Lectures he gave at Harvard in 1955, published under the title *How to do things with words.* In these he criticizes his earlier views on performatives and then introduces the famous distinction between locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary acts, which are categories for different types of acts we do in or by using language. Austin also presented his own theory of truth. These publications contain Austin's theories of language and of some of its properties.

Austin, however, thought that, in general, the right method when doing philosophy is to "proceed from ordinary language, that is, by examining *what we should say when,* and so why and what we should mean by it" (Austin, 1961: 129). In the most systematic presentation of his views, in his article 'A plea for excuses,' Austin recommended this for three reasons. The first is that philosophers need to ensure their own language is clear; the second is that we need to prize words apart from the world so that we can look at the world without blinkers; finally, ordinary language contains many distinctions and subtleties that have withstood the tests of time and so must represent a subtle and plausible way of thinking about things, particularly things in normal life. Austin added that his view is that ordinary language will be the 'first word' when doing philosophy, though it need not be the 'last word.' He recommended that one should regularly consult a dictionary to get the sense of the categories and words related to a certain area or domain. Austin himself spent considerable effort plotting the distinctions that ordinary language categories embody. For example, what is the difference between a tool and a utensil? What is the difference between doing something willingly and voluntarily? Questions such as these were studied in Austin's famous Saturday morning discussion group in Oxford. It is indeed a reasonable conjecture that one thing that appealed to Austin about pursuing such questions is that they can be answered by cooperation within a group, amongst whom agreement can be reached, in sharp contrast to what has traditionally been the very solitary methods of philosophy with its continual disagreements.

Some Questions about Austin's Approach

There is, surely, no doubt that plotting the incredibly subtle distinctions of ordinary language is of interest in itself, and it certainly fascinated Austin. The main question that arises, of course, is what is its relation to, or value for, philosophy. The questions of philosophy are characteristically highly general, such questions as 'Is the will free?,' and 'Do we know about the external world?' How, then, does a study of the subtle and rather specific categories of ordinary language help with them? The major weakness of Oxford-style ordinary language philosophy is that it is not based on any theory of the nature of philosophical questions that explains and justifies the relevance of a study of ordinary distinctions to it. In fact, it would have been somewhat anathema to the mind set of such ordinary language philosophers to have a general theory of philosophy, but it meant that its relevance remained obscure.

When Austin discussed philosophy head on, as he did in *Sense and sensibilia,* criticising the sense datum approach of Ayer, he noted that philosophers employ expressions in a way which does not fit their ordinary use. For example, he pointed out that the central terms 'direct perception' which often figure in the very formulation of the problem are used in a special way (see Austin, 1962: 14–19). It is a mistake though to take this discrepancy as a basis for criticism of the talk by the philosophers. It merely reveals that the philosopher's use is technical and in need of an explanation. Austin also clearly thought that the categories of philosophers are far more general than those which are of normal employment. But, again, this fact, in itself, does not amount to a criticism of those general categories.

If this assessment of the gap at the core of Austin's approach is correct, it explains why the approach, despite the fascinations of its ordinary language investigations, simply withered in its appeal to those engaged by philosophical questions. A crucial moment was the publication in 1959 of Strawson's *Individuals,* with its self-avowed aim of doing highly general metaphysics.

The Cambridge Version: Wittgenstein

The second attitude to philosophy that was called 'ordinary language philosophy' is that of the later Wittgenstein, during his period after 1929 when he was primarily at Cambridge. The major presentation of the approach is in *Philosophical investigations,* published in 1953 after Wittgenstein's death in 1951. In the evolution of his later philosophy Wittgenstein was, in part, attempting to explain why his earlier, highly abstract and metaphysical philosophy, contained in the *Tractatus,* is wrong. In that earlier work, Wittgenstein attempted to describe the essential nature of contingent propositions, and the states

of affairs that they report, basically by picturing the elements. There are also the tautologies of logic and mathematics. The pronouncements of philosophy itself seem not to belong to either category, and so the contents of the *Tractatus* were themselves inexpressible by its own standards. Philosophy itself was, therefore, a process you went through in order to realize you had to leave it behind. It is, as Wittgenstein put it, like a ladder you climb only to throw away, no longer needing it. In the process, though, something profound is shown, although not said. This is a highly unusual and paradoxical conception of philosophy.

In the later period Wittgenstein rejected his earlier ideas about the essence of saying, holding instead that speech and understanding are parts of human life, which may take many forms (as Wittgenstein might have said, 'We play many language games'), and which have no hidden common essence that a reflective process like philosophy can discern. However, he retained even in the later period an attitude to what philosophy is that is unusual and paradoxical. His theory is that there are what we might call two activities, which go under the name 'philosophy.' There is, first, traditional philosophy, which for Wittgenstein was often taken to be the *Tractatus,* according to which there are supposed to be distinctively philosophical problems, concerned with the essence of things and our knowledge of the world, and theories are proposed as answers to these questions and rationally assessed. According to the later Wittgenstein, traditional philosophy is not actually engaging with real problems. They are, rather, pseudo problems. He suggested that engagement in traditional philosophy always stems from an initial mistake when one speaks, employing the words of ordinary speech, in a way which is not actually in accordance with how the term in question is really used. They start, that is, from linguistic mistakes. Wittgenstein's view is that these mistakes are not random, but stem from properties of the language we employ. For example, the fact that I can say both I have a pain in my foot and I have a bone in my foot may lead us to imagine that pains are special objects located in space in the same way as bones. He said, "A picture held us captive. And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably" (Wittgenstein, 1963: sec. 115). Wittgenstein likened being misled to being tricked. "The decisive moment of the conjuring trick has been made, and it was the very one that we thought quite innocent" (Wittgenstein, 1963: sec. 308). This is a schematic characterization of what is, in many ways, itself a schematic conception of traditional philosophy.

What we might call real philosophy should, according to Wittgenstein, consist in doing what is necessary to remove the impulse to engage in pseudo theorizing. As he famously said; "What is your aim on philosophy? – To show the fly the way out of the fly bottle" (Wittgenstein, 1963: sec. 309). How is this to be done? Wittgenstein had a negative and a positive claim to make. The negative theme is that the impulse is not removed by offering a positive and novel theory about anything that philosophers have attempted to theorize about. That would be to engage in pseudo theorizing itself. The task, rather, is to remove the impulse, and it should be viewed as akin to exterminating a disease. "The philosopher's treatment of a question is like the treatment of an illness" (Wittgenstein, 1963: sec. 255). So the real philosopher should produce something like a pill which removes a headache. It is this idea that is meant when Wittgensteinians talk of philosophy as therapy. The positive recommendation is that the pill should be a reminder how language is actually used. "What we do is to bring back words from their metaphysical to their everyday use" (Wittgenstein, 1963: sec. 116). He added that "when I talk of language … I must speak the language of every day" (Wittgenstein, 1963: sec. 120). Hence, the idea is that proper philosophy consists in reminding those in the grip of traditional philosophy how we ordinarily speak. This, then, is the idea of Wittgensteinian ordinary language philosophy.

Some Questions About Wittgenstein's Approach

Of the many questions that Wittgenstein's later conception of philosophy prompts, I shall restrict myself to two. Does Wittgenstein's own practice actually fit it? It is fair to say that Wittgenstein is, in his later period, primarily a negative thinker, his primary aim being to show what is wrong with standard philosophical ideas about, for example, understanding, following rules, sensations, action, and necessity. However, he did not think that simply reminding people of what they say accomplishes such criticisms. Rather, his practice was to think himself into the views in a highly creative way to the point where it becomes clear that they represent illusions, but where it is also revealed why they might seem attractive. It is therefore highly misleading to summarize Wittgenstein's own practice as reducing to reminders of what ordinary people say. Second, although Wittgenstein officially seems to think that proper philosophy does not propose theories or add to understanding, he clearly advances theories or

semi-theories himself. Thus, he positively links meaning and use (see Wittgenstein 1963: sec. 43), and he is often taken to be arguing for the clearly philosophical proposition that a private language is impossible (see for example, Wittgenstein, 1963: secs. 258–279). It is, therefore, colossally misleading to think that describing Wittgenstein as an ordinary language philosopher captures his real approach to philosophy.

The second question is whether there is any reason to accept Wittgenstein's official account of the nature of philosophy. There is no *a priori* demonstration by Wittgenstein that the massive variety of questions that traditional philosophers have grappled with are all pseudo problems, grounded at some point in a misuse of ordinary language. Indeed, that seems a remarkably implausible thought. To take an example, traditional philosophers often debated what it is to understand a word. Wittgenstein brilliantly criticized the most popular answer, but it does not follow that the question is misconceived and does not merit a theoretical answer. Moreover, Wittgenstein was, as we have seen, moved to indicate his own answer in terms of use and practice. It seems to me, therefore, that we should regard the attitude to philosophy in the later Wittgenstein as simply an ungrounded and independent commitment within his thought, which does not even fit his own practice.

Conclusion

Austin's own theories about language and knowledge and his critical discussions of the philosophy of perception have remained influential, but both the rhetoric about the centrality to philosophy of ordinary language and the practice of attending to it for the reasons that Austin gives have vanished. Wittgenstein's approach to philosophy is still accepted by some people, but for most the real interest of the later Wittgenstein lies in his discussions of such central concepts as understanding, meaning, rule following, privacy of experience, and so on, and not in his extreme attitude to philosophy.

However, the emphasis on attending to ordinary language lead to significant advances in the theory of language. When philosophers recommended studying ordinary language, they usually meant, or at least said, that it was to be done by asking whether we would or would not say a certain thing in a certain circumstance. So determining the verdict of ordinary language meant determining what would be said. The philosophical relevance of this was supposed to consist in its showing that a philosophical theory which affirmed that P is actually true in circumstance C,

would be wrong if we would not say that P in those circumstances. This prompted Grice, who had been part of the circle around Austin, to reflect on the relation between what is true and what we would say. He noted that truth alone is not usually sufficient to lead to speech, but rather, speech is governed by principles, such as 'Be helpful' or 'Be informative.' He explained in terms of this theory how the saying of something can carry an implication that in no way corresponds to what the remark literally entails. For example, if I remark 'The Provost is sober today' my doing so carries the implication that he is normally not sober. Whether Grice's theory is correct is still under discussion, but the contrast between speech and truth, which is damaging to the rhetoric of 'ordinary language philosophy,' has now become conventional wisdom in philosophy. This insight probably emerged when it did because of those tendencies known as 'ordinary language philosophy.'

See also: Austin, John L.; Grice, Herbert Paul; Speech Acts; Wittgenstein, Ludwig Josef Johann.

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Organizational Speech

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Despite the diversity of their approaches, agendas and objects of scrutiny, several fields of study can be said to be devoted today to the analysis of organizational discourse, that is, the analysis of talk, writing and nonverbal communication in organizational settings. Although sources of disagreement are plentiful (Putnam and Fairhurst, 2001; Fairhurst and Putnam, 2004), scholars interested in this type of inquiry generally agree that the manner people communicate makes a difference in the way organizations come to exist, function and dysfunction. Whether the objective is to describe or denounce what is happening in organizations, studying organizational discourse enables analysts to reveal key organizational phenomena as varied as identity (Phillips and Hardy, 1997), leadership (Fairhurst, 1993, 2001; Fairhurst and Sarr, 1996), negotiation (Hamilton, 1997; Putnam *et al.*, 1991), domination (Deetz, 1992; Mumby, 1987), or control (Yates, 1993; Winsor, 2000).

For the past 10 years, a growing body of literature has, for instance, developed around the topic of organizational communication as(a) genre(s). At the origin of this movement, one can identify an article by Miller (1984), who problematizes genre as a form of social action, that is, as 'a typified rhetorical action' (Miller, 1984: 151) connecting specific ways of doing things with recurrent situations. Typical genres that can be identified in organizational settings are documents such as memos (Yates, 1989), work orders (Winsor, 2000), checklists (Bazerman, 1997), records (Schryer, 1993) but also social events such as meetings or training seminars (Orlikowski and Yates, 1994). As 'typified communicative practices' (Yates and Orlikowski, 1992), these organizational genres are characterized by forms that organizational members, by imitation, tradition or imposition, reproduce when they communicate. By focusing on these patterns, those studies demonstrate how the routinization of situations, practices and objectives, so typical in organizational settings, come from the **iteration** of textual and physical modes of communication. These forms, which always evolve historically (Yates, 1993; Zachry, 2000), not only punctuate the identity game of a given organization, but also participate in the very process of organizing.

Another way to approach organizational discourse, which has been the focal point of a very important body of literature, is to focus on organizational narratives and storytelling. Why narratives? One explanation is that these discursive forms are not only action-oriented (they speak about events that happen in a given world, whether fictional or real), but also organized and ordered (they articulate these different events in a structured whole). These two qualities make organizational stories especially interesting to scholars interested in organizational values and identities (Meyer, 1995; Czarniawska, 1997), socialization processes (Brown, 1985, 1990; Kreps, 1990), organizing (Browning, 1992; Weick, 1995; Weick and Browning, 1986), ideologies (Mumby, 1987, 1993) or organizational tensions and conflicts (Helmer, 1993). To paraphrase Czarniawska's (1997) book title, all these studies show how organizational members 'narrate the organization' to make sense of their organizational experiences. This type of activity can of course be used strategically to advance a specific way of interpreting what is happening inside or outside the organization (Boje, 1995; Boje *et al.*, 1997). Given that each narrative represents a specific mode of ordering experiences, it constitutes a privileged way to manage meaning (Weick, 1995) and influence the interpretation of events (see especially Robichaud 1998a, 1998b, 2001, 2002, 2003) (*see* **Narrativity and Voice**).

The study of interactions also constitutes an important center of attention for scholars interested in organizations. Following the interpretive turn in organizational studies (Putnam and Pacanowsky, 1983), more and more analyses are indeed devoted to the way organizational members interact and exchange in organizational settings. For instance, the movement called interaction analysis (McDermott and Roth, 1978) principally focuses on how 'individuals constrain each other's linguistic behavior' (Fairhurst, 2004) and highlights the sequential effects of interactions, so crucial in organizational processes (Fairhurst and Cooren, 2004). For interaction analysts, studying organizational discourse thus consists in identifying patterns of coordinated behaviors, which leads them to conceive of organizations as temporal forms: a bottom-up approach that presents a dynamic view of organizing. This approach involves the classification of turns of talk according to a predefined set of codes, which enables analysts to assess the frequency and iterability of specific patterns of verbal exchanges between organizational members (Bakeman and Gottman, 1986; Gottman, 1982). This type of analysis has been especially useful in identifying models of interaction for negotiation and bargaining sequences (Putnam, 1990), decision-making processes (DeSanctis and Poole, 1994), or manager–employee relationships (Fairhurst *et al.*, 1995).

Another dynamic view of organizational processes can also be found in the work of conversation analysts and ethnomethodologists who have devoted some or most of their analyses to the functioning of interactions in organizational and institutional settings (Drew and Heritage, 1992). In this respect, Boden's (1994) book, *The Business of Talk*, certainly constitutes one of the most important contributions to this field of research. Paraphrasing Heritage (1984), Boden contends that, '[w]hen people talk, they are simultaneously and reflexively talking their relationships, organizations, and whole institutions into action or into 'being'' (Boden, 1994: 14). In other words, any organizational phenomenon, whether it is a matter of identity, control, leadership, or even power, has to be incarnated and negotiated in interaction in order to be brought into being. Through a very detailed analysis of the organization of talk-in-interaction, conversation analysts have, for instance, convincingly shown how key conversational phenomena such as openings and closings, turn takings, adjacency pairs, topic shifts, disclaimers or alignments (Fairhurst and Cooren, 2004; *see* **Conversation Analysis**) can play central roles in processes as diverse as calls for emergency assistance (Whalen and Zimmerman, 1998; Zimmerman, 1992), group discussions (Adkins and Brashers, 1995), or decision-making processes (Boden, 1994).

Finally, and in keeping with the view according to which written, oral and gestural forms of communication participate in the very constitution of organization (Fairhurst and Cooren, 2004; Grant *et al.*, 1998; Keenoy *et al.*, 1997; Mumby and Clair, 1997; Putnam and Cooren, 2004), an effort at synthesis has also been developed around Taylor and Van Every's (2000) work. One of the main critiques addressed to scholars studying the microphenomena of organizational speech is that their study does not always do justice to the translocal dimension of organizations. In other words, most of the analyses in this field of research tend to focus on what happens **in** organizations, but do not necessarily go as far as to question the **mode of being** of these collective entities. Following an original intuition by John Dewey (1964), Taylor (1993) has, for the past 10 years, set about showing that instead of focusing on the communication in the organization, one should rather concentrate on the organization in the communication (Taylor and Robichaud, 2004).

This new approach to organizational discourse leads us not only to focus on the organizing property of communication (Cooren, 2000), i.e., how speech acts organize, but also on the communicative constitution of organizations (Taylor *et al.*, 1996). According to this view, the mode of being of an organization articulates itself around two essential modalities of communication: the conversational modality, which corresponds to the local, fluid, and actional dimension of speech, and the textual modality, which relates to its translocal, relatively fixed, and iterable dimension. By analyzing these two modalities of organizational discourse, one can show that the way people communicate, i.e., the conversational form, does make a difference in the way organizations come to exist, but that this existence also depends on what is communicated, the textual forms, which transcends the here and now of interactions. According to Taylor and Van Every (2000), the organization as a form of life lies in this interplay between the relative fixity of texts and the fluidity of conversations.

See also: Conversation Analysis; Critical Discourse Analysis; Narrativity and Voice; Speech Acts, Classification and Definition.

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Participatory Research and Advocacy

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Linguistic studies that can legitimately be classified as 'participatory research and advocacy' typically include face-to-face fieldwork within speech communities resulting in findings that support greater equality and opportunity for members of the corresponding language community (or communities). Concepts of community vary across disciplines; advocacy may often be limited to subsets within a given society or culture, such as members of ethnic or religious minorities, or recent immigrants who are not yet proficient speakers or writers of the local dominant language(s).

Whereas some linguists devote attention to particular regions, others devote primary attention to members of racial groups. Others may choose gender or sexual orientation as the basis of their studies and corresponding public advocacy.

One of the earliest recorded linguistic acts of public advocacy underlies the classical Sapir-Whorf hypothesis that gave rise to the concepts of 'linguistic relativity' and 'linguistic determinism.' When pondering the relationship between language and thought processes, Sapir and Whorf hypothesized that certain linguistic concepts tended to directly influence human perceptions and thought processes. These formulations varied from language to language, typically resulting in alternative ways of describing (and perceiving) the same object or concept in two or more different languages. Their pioneering efforts grew directly from Whorf's occupation as an insurance adjuster who worked with Native Americans. Whorf observed that considerable linguistic confusion and ambiguity existed between English and Hopi. He hoped that his linguistic analyses might better serve his employer, a prominent insurance company, resulting in adjustments in policies and practices that would not only be safer for the Hopi, but which might ultimately save his employer money at the same time.

Milestones in social history tend to parallel advances in studies of language in use that have relevance beyond that of basic research. When president Lyndon Johnson declared war on poverty in the United States, William Labov began his quest for socially based linguistic analyses that revealed differences in reading abilities and the logic of nonstandard English (see Labov, 1972). Labov's mentor, Uriel Weinreich, used many explicit linguistic illustrations to account for differences in pronunciation that were attributed to Yiddish. In doing so he simultaneously shattered many bigoted stereotypes about Yiddish and its speakers (see Weinreich, 1953).

Labov's advocacy for speakers of nonstandard English was direct and emphatic on many occasions, particularly when he dispelled linguistic and cognitive myths regarding the inferiority of vernacular Black English, as well as other nonstandard dialects. Wolfram *et al*. (1999) extended educational advocacy to others who spoke nonstandard varieties of American English in overt ways, including educational exhibits and documentary films. Weinreich's early efforts regarding the linguistic liberation of Jews in the United States were indirect, and ancillary to advances in linguistic science regarding evaluations of languages and dialects in contact. Labov and Wolfram's independent acts of linguistic advocacy have been intentional and consistent with applied linguistic tradition.

Within the United States, issues of linguistic advocacy became pronounced with the 1974 passage of the National Council of Teachers of English resolution regarding 'Students' right to their own language.' Despite the predominance of English in the United States, delegates of the NCTE "became concerned in the early 1970s about a tendency in U.S. society to categorize nonstandard dialects as corrupt, inferior, or distorted forms of standard English, rather than as distinct linguistic systems, and the prejudicial labeling of students that resulted from this view."

The NCTE's concern had been informed by an extensive body of sociolinguistic literature, some of which was directly devoted to language development for educational and professional purposes. Others were devoted to studies outside of educational settings. Works by Abrahams (1985), Fought (2003), Kochman (1981), Rickford and Rickford (2000), Wolfram,

Adger and Christian (1999), Valdés (1996, 2003), Zentella (1997), and others were indicative of linguistic scholars who had served directly or indirectly as advocates for speakers of minority languages or dialects.

England and Australia witnessed different approaches to matters of social and educational advocacy in the works of Bernstein (1971, 1975) and Halliday (1994). Bernstein (1971) was well known for his formulation of the concepts of 'elaborated codes' and 'restricted codes' based on studies in England. Halliday (1994) embraced complex models of language usage that were holistic, seeking to be comprehensive and universally applicable. Research by Cheshire (1982), Giles and Coupland (1991), and Milroy (1987) added alternative models of research that explored second dialect acquisition, social networks and their linguistic consequences, and the impact of linguistic accommodation. Trudgill's (2000) broad, English-based studies provided the foundation for comprehensive surveys of the entire field of sociolinguistics. As is the case in the United States, efforts among linguists throughout the world to serve as social advocates include direct and indirect approaches.

Another dimension of linguistic advocacy is related to sex. Eckert and McConnell-Ginet (2003), Holmes and Meyerhoff (2003), and others analyzed actual and idealized differences in men's and women's language, and the usage of language among women when men are absent. The advocacy dimension that these works share sought to advance greater opportunities and equality for women worldwide. They cut across race, region, class, and education, which are often discussed in isolation of matters pertaining exclusively to women.

Skutnabb-Kangas and Phillipson (1994), Alexander (1989), Gibson (2004) and Mesthrie (1992) sought to address 'human linguistic rights' as a generic subject, or as related to the specific sociolinguistic and political circumstances of specific nations. Complementary studies of linguistic foundations of social strife were developed by Joshua Fishman, growing directly from his pioneering studies of the sociology of language.

Additional linguistic research devoted to public advocacy of various kinds, say, attending to education, women, or uses of language in the workplace, will often have an explicit regional orientation. This survey does not adequately reflect efforts by scholars who study their local linguistic community (or communities) with sensitivity to their immediate sociohistorical circumstances.

Pennycook's (1998) studies of language usage in Australia and elsewhere had relevance to other nations that are post-colonial with populations from diverse backgrounds. Similarly, Bortoni's (1985) linguistic studies in Brazil drew attention to the special plight of indigenous people in the wake of European colonization and its corresponding educational consequences. Many other studies of indigenous people strove to advance linguistic dignity with greater educational and social opportunities for people who were, or remain, marginalized – if not displaced – in their native homeland. These concerns are strongly evident in societies that are former European colonies, where European languages continue to serve dominant institutional functions while indigenous languages are often subordinate.

Differences in social opportunity become pronounced when viewed in terms of the distribution of various social services that are provided either publicly or privately in nations throughout the world. Linguistic research has also observed differential access to medical treatment or justice based on proficiency, or the lack thereof, of the dominant standard language in a given society.

Medical applications of linguistics also fall within the realm of advocacy research, and Labov and Fanshel's (1977) *Therapeutic discourse*, which was complemented by Ferrarra's (1994) *Therapeutic ways with words*, was illustrative of analyses that employed discourse analyses to the benefit of medical application in general, and therapeutic application quite specifically. Studies of doctor/patient interaction are pervasive, as are studies of language usage in the courts. Policy implications abound from these efforts, because they frequently expose the relative linguistic strengths and weaknesses that exist within a society, particularly if that society seeks to serve populations that do not share a common language or culture.

Preston's (1989) studies of dialect perceptions emphasized another reality; namely, that people tend to judge others' linguistic behavior based on egocentric impressions that are reflective of personal linguistic exposure. Long before Preston discovered this among speakers of English throughout the United States, Lambert (1972) and Tucker and Lambert (1972) demonstrated that bilingual and bidialectal attitudes toward speakers of other languages or dialects are firmly entrenched, and they have real consequences for people who are perceived to be more or less qualified for jobs or educational opportunities based on their speech.

Research by Baugh (2003) and Smalls (2004) explored the consequences of linguistic profiling and other forms of linguistic discrimination in U.S. housing markets, where speakers of minority dialects or languages have been denied access to fair housing or fair lending over the telephone. Whereas the courts in the United States are well equipped to prosecute cases where alleged racial discrimination is based

on face-to-face encounters, Smalls (2004) demonstrated that U.S. courts are less capable of prosecuting cases where discrimination takes place during telephone conversations. Complementary dialectology studies illustrate that stereotypical names associated with particular racial groups within the United States result in different opportunities in the workplace. For example, identical resumes were submitted to prospective employers with only the name of the applicant changed. Jamal is less likely to get a job than is Greg, and Lakisha is less likely to get a job than is Emily; that is, with all other professional and personal attributes being strictly controlled by experimental design.

These more recent studies of linguistic prejudice have direct legal and policy implications that are currently reflected by a body of scholarship devoted to linguistic applications under special circumstances (e.g., with respect to lending practices, helping to overcome linguistic barriers to unequal access to fair housing, or the extent to which voice identification plays a direct role in civil and criminal legal proceedings (see Smalls, 2004)). Building upon studies of linguistic perceptions that were pioneered by Preston (1989), Giles and Powesland (1975), Labov (1972), Wolfram (1991) and others, studies of linguistic profiling began when Purnell, Idsardi, and Baugh (1999) exposed clear patterns of racial discrimination in housing markets based exclusively on telephone conversations. Those findings were replicated and modified by Massey and Lundy (2001), who integrated their innovative linguistic and sociological experiments into course work. Graduate students from different racial backgrounds made systematic telephone calls to prospective landlords, revealing a statistically significant bias against housing opportunities for poor African American women, in greatest contrast to white males who were proficient speakers of Standard American English.

Small's (2004) legal analysis titled 'Linguistic profiling and the law' provided a comprehensive survey of U.S. court cases where African American voice identification played a central role. Her efforts grew directly from observations made regarding a Kentucky Federal District Court that upheld the conviction of an African American defendant, based on the testimony of a white police officer who had never seen the defendant in person, but who had previously heard the alleged voice of the defendant through a wiretap.

In South Africa we find that Alexander's (1989) formulation of an expansive national language policy was a direct political result of efforts to advance racial equality in the new South Africa. Similarly, the extraordinary global event of South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) has created an exceptional corpus of discourse that graphically confirms astonishing acts of inhumane maltreatment. Gibson (2004) went beyond the text of the TRC and accounted for many of the significant social and political circumstances that lay beyond discourse. Who held power, and who did not, influenced many non-verbal or non-linguistic events within the TRC. Speakers needed to compose themselves; others wept openly, while still others seethed with controlled anger. The transcript alone does not fully convey the meaningful exchange of information that was communicated during the TRC.

The scholarly ventures described here, and many others that are supported by scholars throughout the world, continue to use linguistic science in support of advancing greater social opportunities and justice among linguistically heterogeneous people. Within the context of the current global economy, those who support these efforts do so frequently to the benefit of advancing enhanced communication among diverse populations. I believe such efforts are consistent with the enduring quest to advance world peace.

See also: Bilingualism and Second Language Learning; Gender and Political Discourse; Identity: Second Language; Interactional Sociolinguistics; Language Attitudes; Law and Language: Overview; Sociolinguistics and Political Economy; Speech and Language Community.

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Life

Charles Sanders Peirce (pronounced 'purse') was born on September 10, 1839, in Cambridge, Massachusetts. He was regarded as a child prodigy in science and philosophy. His father, Benjamin Peirce, was a renowned mathematician at Harvard University who liked to stimulate his son's thinking by presenting intricate and original problems. This unique didactic atmosphere may have been a stimulus for Peirce's development as an original thinker. However, despite a promising youth and a brilliant mind, Peirce never achieved a tenured academic position.

Peirce graduated from Harvard in 1859 and received his bachelor's degree in chemistry from Lawrence Scientific School in 1863. That same year he married his

first wife, Harriet Melusina Fay. For the most part of his life – i.e., from 1859 until the end of 1891 – he was an employee with the U.S. Coast and Geodic Survey (of which his father was a cofounder), where he performed gravity research and pendulum experiments. His work brought him to Europe on five occasions, each time for a stay of several months. From 1879 until 1884, Peirce held a parallel job at Johns Hopkins University, teaching logic at the department of mathematics. His early resignation is said to be due to his personal problems (he got divorced and later remarried).

After his forced resignation from the U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey in 1891, Peirce was never again able to obtain a steady job, although he was invited for short-term lecturing posts at various institutions such as Harvard (1865, 1869–70, 1903, 1907) and the Lowell Institute in Boston (1866, 1892, 1903). Most of his writing after 1891 was done for pay. Peirce reviewed and translated books and contributed to several dictionaries and encyclopedias. His articles, in which he worked out his theories, often remained unfinished or were rejected by editors. He also did some consultancy work as a chemist. During the last years of his life, despite inheriting money and some possessions from his mother and aunt, he often had to rely on the financial support of his friends, e.g., William James. Peirce died of cancer in Milford on April 19, 1914.

His Work

Peirce's work covers an astonishingly wide variety of subjects. He wrote on chemistry, physics, religion, perception and categories, epistemology, history of philosophy, philosophy of science, and mathematics (ranging from fundamental theoretical issues to the mathematics of card tricks). Yet he regarded himself first and foremost as a logician. His modifications and extension of Boolean logic and his work on the logic of relatives following De Morgan are still considered to be major paradigm shifts in modern logic. But even more importantly, perhaps, Peirce may be regarded as the founding father of two still very influential traditions, viz. philosophical pragmatism – later further developed by William James and James Dewey – and semiotics (which Pierce himself labeled 'semeiotic').

Categories and Signs

From a very early age Peirce was well acquainted with the works and ideas of Kant, whose *Critique of pure reason* greatly influenced his thought. Peirce disagreed with Kant's categories, however, and developed his own original and coherent set of universal categories that include ideas as well as objects.

Peirce's philosophy distinguishes three universal categories: firstness, secondness, and thirdness. (Peirce always preferred trichotomies over dichotomies in his writings.) The first category refers to a mere quality or feeling, e.g., the quality of red (or the redness of red) such as it is, regardless of anything else. Secondness is the experience of pure reaction, e.g., the experience of red in reality. When a regularity or habit comes in, secondness turns into thirdness. Signs are instances of thirdness par excellence.

A sign consists of a triadic relation between a representamen, an object, and an interpretant, i.e., as a representamen a sign stands for an object with respect to a third, which is an interpretant or a sign in the mind of an interpreter. As every interpretant is again a sign, semiosis or the sign process is infinite, according to Peirce.

Classification of Signs

Another triadic distinction is applied to his classification of signs. In its simplest form, Peirce's classification distinguishes ten classes of signs based on three trichotomies that are themselves derived from his three universal categories. In later work, however, Peirce argued, albeit without offering a satisfying analysis, that there are no less than sixty-six classes based on ten trichotomies.

The first trichotomy is based on the character of the sign itself. *Qualisigns* are qualities (e.g., hardness) which may act as a sign; signs which are actual events or things (such as *a* sign in the previous sentence) are *sinsigns*, and a regularity (or 'law') that is a sign is termed a *legisign* (e.g., the determiner *a* as a linguistic item).

The second trichotomy is based on the relationship between the sign and its object. An *icon* is a sign that refers to its object merely because of the features it possesses. It is important to note that sheer similarity between sign and object is not what makes a sign an icon; rather, iconicity is based on the fact that the two are interpreted as similar. The second type of sign in relation to the object is called *index*. An index is a sign that is affected by its object, in other words there is a real physical relationship between the two. One popular example is smoke as a sign of fire. Fire produces smoke, so there is a direct (causal) relationship. Finally, a *symbol* is a sign that refers to its object only because there is an interpretant who links the sign to the object, e.g., words and other conventional signs. This second trichotomy is the most interesting (and most widely known) one from a linguistic point of view as it addresses the time-honored topic of the arbitrariness of the linguistic sign and whether there is iconicity involved in language. The linguist R. Jakobson was the first to use Peirce's terminology

to address this topic in his influential article 'Quest for the essence of language' (1966). Since the 1980s a growing number of linguists (mainly in the wake of the work of John Haiman) have argued against arbitrariness in language and in favor of the pervasiveness of iconicity.

The third trichotomy is concerned with how the sign is interpreted and corresponds to the older distinction between term, proposition, and argument. A *rheme* is understood to represent its object merely in its possibilities or features and is neither true nor false. A *dicent sign* or *dicisign* represents its object in respect to actual existence and as such it is either true or false. Finally, an *argument* signifies a 'law' leading from a set of premises to a conclusion.

Pragmatism and Abduction

One of the hallmarks of Peirce's work is his disappointment with the results of philosophy compared with those of the natural sciences. According to Peirce, the success of science is due to its methodology; he argued that philosophy should adopt the same methods, including the use of a well-defined nomenclature. Pragmatism (which Pierce renamed 'pragmaticism' in his later writings) may be regarded as an attempt to establish philosophy as a science, i.e., 'a method of thinking' through which the impact of concepts on man's conduct can be assessed. Thus, pragmatism is ultimately a method to ascertain the true meanings, understood as possible pragmatic values, of concepts. Later pragmatists such as William James and John Dewey extended pragmaticism to other issues as well (e.g., the problem of truth).

Peirce argued that *abduction* is fundamental in scientific as well as everyday reasoning, being the only type of inference that leads to genuinely new ideas and theories – something that *induction* (i.e., reasoning from some given facts to a general law) and *deduction* (reasoning from a general idea to a particular case) never do. Abduction is the creative process of forming and provisionally accepting an explanatory hypothesis for the purpose of testing it. However, since abduction can only suggest what *may be* the case, it can ultimately never be more than ordinary guesswork.

See also: Iconicity; Jakobson, Roman.

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Phonetics and Pragmatics

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Linguistic and Semiotic Matrices of Phonetics and Pragmatics

If we define pragmatics as what we do with words, that is, performing acts of referential and nonreferential (social–indexical) signification, involving both (signifying) signs and objects (i.e., what is signified), then phonetics is part of pragmatics, since verbal articulations constitute a kind of action. On the other hand, if we narrowly define pragmatics as the referential or nonreferential speech acts that result from the use of sounds, mediated by a denotational code called linguistic structure, pragmatics appears located at the signified pole of signification and thus diametrically opposed to phonetics at the signifying pole (*see* **Pragmatics: Overview**). Although the latter definition is usually adopted in linguistics, the former definition is preferred in philosophy, semiotics, and communication studies, which see phonetics and pragmatics as fields dealing with actually occurring indexical acts, events, or their regularities in the extensional universe, as opposed to the intensional, abstract codes of symbolic signs such as make up

linguistic structure (*see* **Deixis and Anaphora: Pragmatic Approaches**). In this model, pragmatics includes phonetics (i.e., phonetically articulated signs), which, along with graphic, visual, olfactory, and other kinds of signs, may be used to signify some objects, that is, make meaningful significations.

As we shall see later, the linguistic model, which is centered around linguistic structure (i.e., a denotational code presupposingly used in the referential acts of communication), is, as Saussure and Peirce have noted, properly and systematically included in the semiotic matrix, which is concerned with communication as such, including both the referential and social–indexical aspects and both codes and processes (*see* **Peirce, Charles Sanders**).

The Linguistic Matrix

In the narrower matrix of linguistics, pragmatics and phonetics are polar opposites in terms of methodology and disciplinary organization, partially because linguistics sees language primarily as structurally mediated denotational signification, starting with phonetic sounds and ending with pragmatic referents. Although this is a partial (and, in fact, a somewhat limited) view of communication, inasmuch as it abstracts away the latter's dialectic (interactively processual) and social–indexical aspects, the model is compatible with the total matrix of communication and captures the asymmetric directionality of signification (see following discussion for details).

Let us briefly observe the linguistic matrix, focusing on the methodological aspect. Here, one may find a scale consistent with the flow of denotational signification and extending from phonetics to phonology, morphophonology, morphology, syntax, semantics, and pragmatics. On this scale, the positivistic evaluation of facts over interpretations tends to become gradually more dominant as we approach the leftmost pole (i.e., phonetics) and inversely for the hermeneutic evaluation of contextual interpretations regarding bare facts, as it is most prominently seen in pragmatics. Apparently, this configuration suggests that the process of signification moving from sounds to meanings is seen as the transition from physical nature to hermeneutic culture.

Thus, the distinct *modi operandi* of phonetics and pragmatics appear to fit neo-Kantian epistemology, which classifies all kinds of sciences into two methodological ideal types, namely (1) nomothetic natural sciences of *Erklären*, explanation, based on laws and other regularities that can be abstracted from contextualized actions and events; and (2) idiographic, cultural-historic sciences of *Verstehen*, understanding, holistically and hermeneutically dealing

with uniquely contextualized eras, cultures, individuals, or events (cf. Mey, 2001). One may count classical physics and chemistry among the prototypical nomothetic sciences, in contrast to historiography and ethnography as prototypical idiographic sciences; between these two extremes, the soft sciences, including linguistics, are pulled in two directions and thus contain two opposing fields within themselves, to wit: physicalistic phonetics and interpretive pragmatics, with (nomothetic but not physicalistic) structural linguistics in the middle (cf. Koyama, 1999, 2000).

Such is the *de facto* condition of phonetics and pragmatics in our times. Yet, once we take a critical stance to the actual condition, it becomes clear that pragmatics, too, can be construed positivistically, as was done by people like Bloomfield and (later) Carnap, who understood referents as physical things 'out there,' existing independently of any signifying communication; inversely, phonetics may similarly be construed interpretively and idiographically, inasmuch as phones (unlike the abstract regularities called phonemes) are singular happenings in context. Phonetics and pragmatics both concern actual acts (i.e., unique happenings), which may show some regularities; hence, they can be studied idiographically or nomothetically, whereas linguistic structure is an abstract code of denotational regularities, which can be studied only nomothetically. Thus, a critical understanding points to the semiotic matrix of phonetics and pragmatics, to be explicated later.

The Semiotic Matrix of Communication

Pragmatics, Phonetics, and Indexical Semiosis

Communication, as a pragmatic (including phonetic) act or event, is a process of referential or social–indexical signification (i.e., an actual happening that occurs in the extensional universe that may presupposingly index contextual variables) (*see* **Context, Communicative**). These variables include contextually presupposable intensional codes such as are embodied in the linguistic structure and create certain effects in the extensional universe, such as referential texts, dealing with what is said, and social–indexical texts, dealing with what is done. In this model, as we will see, phonetics becomes a thoroughly pragmatic phenomenon (*see* **Pragmatic Presupposition**).

The signifying event, whether phonetically executed or not, is a singular happening in the extensional universe and functions indexically, as it points to the context of its occurrence at the *hic et nunc* (*origo*) of the signifying process. Also, the signifying event may present itself as a replica of some objects that appear similar to the event and thus iconically signify

these objects, as in quotative repetition and mirroring reflection. In these ways, the signifying event may signal a number of presupposable objects, which may be types (regularities) or individual objects, and such objects may become signs signifying other objects (*see* **Peirce, Charles Sanders**). Thus, the signifying event iconically signals or presupposingly indexes regularities and individuals in the context of its occurrence (i.e., it contextualizes them) and creates (i.e., entextualizes) some effects: the aforementioned referential and social–indexical texts (what is said and what is done), the latter primarily concerning the group identities and power relations of discourse participants and other social beings (*see* **Identity and Language; Power and Pragmatics**).

The preceding is a general picture of signification, as it obtains across the two dimensions of (a) reference and predication, and (b) social indexicality. Note that the objects that are contextualized (i.e., presupposingly indexed) in signifying events may be of various types: *viz*. (1) individual particulars found in the microsocial surrounds of the signifying event, including cooccurring signs (sounds, gestures, etc.), the discourse participants, and what has been already said and done (i.e., referential and social–indexical texts that have been entextualized and become presupposable at the time of the signifying event); (2) microsocial regularities of referential indexicality (e.g., the usage of deictic expressions) and social indexicality (e.g., addressee honorifics, turn taking, adjacency pairs, activity types, frames, scripts, pragmatic principles, maxims, norms) (*see* **Conversation Analysis**; and (3) macrosocial regularities of referential indexicality (e.g., the causal chain of reference) (Putnam, 1975: 215–271). The latter are involved in the use of proper names (*viz*., as macrosocially mediated references to individuals that are not found in the microsocial context) and in usage-related social indexicality (e.g., speech genres and socio- and dialectal varieties, characterized by such macrosociological variables as regionality, ethnicity, class, status, gender, occupation, or age) (*see* **Genre and Genre Analysis; Maxims and Flouting; Politeness; Pragmatics: Overview**). Importantly, these three kinds of presupposingly indexed objects are often phonetically signaled; also, they are all pragmatic in character, as they belong to the extensional universe of actions (vs. the intensional universe of concepts). Indeed, any actions, including body moves and phonetic gestures such as involving (non-phonological) intonation, pitch, stress, tempo, vowel lengthening, breathing, nasalization, laughter, belching, clearing one's throat, snoring, sneezing, going tut-tut, stuttering, response crying, or even pauses and silence, may be contextualized in the speech event so as to create some particular social–indexical (interactional) effects or to become presupposable regularities that may be expected to occur in certain contexts of particular speech communities (cf. Goffman, 1981; Gumperz, 1982; Tannen & Saville-Troike, 1985; Duranti & Goodwin, 1992; Mey, 2001 for details) (*see* **Gestures, Pragmatic Aspects; Silence**).

Linguistic Structure and Other Symbols in Indexical Semiosis

A fourth kind of object may be contextually presupposed, namely, the macrosocial regularities constituting symbolic codes. Recall that icons and indexicals signify objects on the empirically motivated basis of contextual similarity and contiguity, respectively. There are, however, numerous attested instances of signification that cannot be totally accounted for by these empirical principles. In such cases, discourse participants appear to indexically presuppose the intensional kind of signs that, without any observable empirical motivation, regularly signify extensional objects. Such signs, called symbols, constitute the system of concepts (cultural stereotypes) and the denotational code called linguistic structure. The linguistic system is thus made up of the intensional signs that are presupposingly indexed in the speech event and symbolically denote extensional entities. Therefore, these intensional systems of symbols are indexically anchored on the extensional universe. This linguistic structure, at the center of which we find the maximally symbolic lexicon, that is, arbitrary (in the Saussurean sense) combinations of morphophonemes and morphosyntactic forms, is organized by the systematic interlocking of symbolic arbitrariness (language-particular structural constraints) and indexical motivation (extensionally based constraints). Of these two, the latter gradually increases as we move from (more abstract) morphophonemes to (more concrete) phonemes and to allophones and other surface phonetic phenomena such as phonotactic filters (*see* **Pragmatics: Optimality Theory**), and as we move from (formal) morphosyntax to (denotational) semantics and to (referential) pragmatics (see **Pragmatics and Semantics**). Further, just as the markedness hierarchy of distinctive features such as [syllabic] (i.e., [vocalic]), [sonorant], [voiced], which is anchored on and characterized by phonetic extensions (degrees of sonority), can be formulated to describe the differences among (morpho)phonemes and their correspondences, the markedness hierarchy of grammatical categories such as [pronoun], [proper noun], [concrete noun], which is anchored on and

characterized by pragmatic extensions (degrees of the contextual presupposability of referents), can be formulated to describe the differences among morphosyntactic and semantic categories (see the Jakobsonian literature: e.g., Lee, 1997; Koyama, 1999, 2000, 2001 for details) (*see* **Jakobson, Roman**).

Dialectics of Signs: Interactions of Structure and Discourse

Similarly, at the interface of the intensional and extensional universes, just as semantic categories (e.g., [animate]) may have contextually variable extensions such as [animal] (inclusive use), [nonhuman animal] (exclusive use), as well as particular contextual referents, phonemes may have various allophones, which are contextualized happenings distinct from one another. These phonetic variants and other varying surface expressions, such as allomorphs (e.g., 'matrixes' vs. 'matrices') and syntactic variants (e.g., "It's me" vs. "It's I") appear denotationally identical; in addition, they may clearly show statistically different patterns of cooccurrence with some social categories (e.g., of class, gender, ethnicity), as the variable of 'denotation' is naturally controlled in this environment (*see* **Class Language; Gender and Language**) As a consequence, the variations in surface forms get distinctly associated with the variations in social categories (cf. Lucy, 1992; also see the journal *Language Variation and Change*). Under such circumstances, language users may essentialize such merely statistical (probabilistic) correspondence patterns by perceiving them as categorical and thus ascribing particular sociological categories to particular linguistic forms. The latter thereby become sociolinguistic stereotypes (Labov, 1972) or registers (made up of lexicalized stereotypes), that is, symbols having the illocutionary forces of social–indexical character (e.g., masculinity, honorificity) in themselves, independent of the actual contexts of their use (*see* **Register: Overview**). The decontextualizing process also underlies the formation of diminutives, augmentatives, and performative formulae (e.g., "I baptize thee"), which may be used as formulaic one-liners to create rather strong effects in discourse (cf. Lucy, 1993; Hinton *et al.,* 1994; Schieffelin *et al.,* 1998; Koyama, 2001) (*see* **Speech Acts; Pragmatic Acts**). This illustrates the general process in which the quotative use of a symbol achieves the effect of iconically presenting itself as a replica (token) of the symbolic pattern (type), imposing the presupposable pattern on discursive interaction, and thus creating a text that is more or less bracketed from its contextual surrounds and possesses the social–indexical meanings commonly ascribed to the symbol. More generally, the enunciative, phonetico-pragmatic act of repetition (cf. the Jakobsonian 'poetic function') saliently serves to create textuality, as witnessed by the poetic use of rhymes; the religious, political, commercial use of chants, slogans, and divinations; the quotidian use of turns, adjacency pairs, and other everyday conversational routines; and any other metapragmatic framings of discourse (cf. Tannen, 1989, 1993; Koyama, 1997; Silverstein, 1998) (*see* **Discourse Markers; Metapragmatics**).

Conclusion

Being abundantly demonstrated in the literature, the facts referred to in the preceding discussion unmistakably show that phonetics is a semiotically integrated part of pragmatics; it is what we do in the social context in which we live by creating referential and social–indexical texts through the iconic or presupposing indexing of contextual particulars and regularities (types), of which the latter are systematically anchored on phonetic and other pragmatic (i.e., contextual) extensions, thus forming the basis of the relationship between phonetics and pragmatics.

See also: Conversation Analysis; Deixis and Anaphora: Pragmatic Approaches; Discourse Markers; Jakobson, Roman; Maxims and Flouting; Power and Pragmatics; Pragmatic Acts; Pragmatic Presupposition; Pragmatics and Semantics; Pragmatics: Overview; Speech Acts.

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Politeness

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Introduction

Despite several decades of sustained scholarly interest in the field of politeness studies, a consensual definition of the meaning of the term 'politeness,' as well as a consensus on the very nature of the phenomenon, are still top issues in the current research agenda.

In ordinary, daily contexts of use, members of speech communities possess clear metalinguistic beliefs about, and are capable of, immediate and intuitive assessments of what constitutes polite versus rude, tactful versus offensive behavior. Politeness in this sense is equivalent to a normative notion of appropriateness. Such commonsense notions of politeness are traceable as products of historical developments and hence are socioculturally specific.

Scholarly definitions of the term, by contrast, have been predicated for several decades on a more or less tacit attempt to extrapolate a theoretical, abstract notion of politeness, capable of transcending lay conceptualizations and being cross-culturally valid. The theoretical constructs proposed, however, have proven unsatisfactory as heuristic instruments for the analysis of empirical data. Much of the current scholarly debate is focused on taking stock of recent critiques of past dominating paradigms and epistemological premises, and on formulating new philosophical and methodological practices based on a radical reconceptualization of the notion of politeness. The point of contention is the very possibility of survival of any useful notion of politeness, when the construct is removed from a historically determined, socioculturally specific, and interactionally negotiated conceptualization of the term.

Constructs of Politeness

The 'Social Norm View'

Politeness has been an object of intellectual inquiry quite early on in both Eastern (Lewin, 1967; Coulmas, 1992, for Japanese; Gu, 1990, for Chinese) and Western contexts (Held, 1992). In both traditions, which loosely can be defined as pre-pragmatic, observers tend to draw direct, deterministic links between linguistic realizations of politeness and the essential character of an individual, a nation, a people, or its language. Thus, the use of polite language is taken as the hallmark of the good-mannered or civil courtier in the Italian conduct writers of the 16th century (Watts, 2003: 34), or as a symbol of the qualities of modesty and respect enshrined in the Japanese language in pre-World War II nationalistic Japan.

Linguistic realizations of politeness are inextricably linked to the respective culture-bound ideologies of use; accounts, which often are codified in etiquette manuals providing exegeses of the relevant social norms, display a great deal of historical relativity.

Pragmatic Approaches

Pragmatic approaches to the study of politeness begin to appear in the mid-1970s. Robin Lakoff (1973) provided pioneering work by linking Politeness (with its three rules: 'don't impose'; 'give options'; 'make the other person feel good, be friendly') to Grice's Cooperative Principle to explain why speakers do not always conform to maxims such as Clarity (1973: 297) (*see* **Grice, Herbert Paul; Cooperative Principle; Maxims and Flouting**). In a similar vein, but wider scope, Leech's (1983) model postulates that deviations from the Gricean conversational maxims are motivated by interactional goals, and posits a parallel Politeness Principle, articulated in a number

of maxims such as Tact, Generosity, Approbation, Modesty, Agreement, and Sympathy. He also envisages a number of scales: cost-benefit, authority and social distance, optionality, and indirectness, along which degrees of politeness can be measured. Different situations demand different levels of politeness because certain immediate illocutionary goals can compete with (e.g., in ordering), coincide with (e.g., in offering), conflict with (e.g., in threatening), or be indifferent to (e.g., in asserting), the long-term social goals of maintaining comity and avoiding friction. This so-called conversational maxim view of politeness (Fraser, 1990) is concerned uniquely with scientific analyses of politeness as a general linguistic and pragmatic principle of communication, aimed at the maintenance of smooth social relations and the avoidance of conflict, but not as a locally determined system of social values (Eelen, 2001: 49, 53) (*see* **Communicative Principle and Communication**).

Another model, proposed by Brown and Levinson in 1978, *de facto* set the research agenda for the following quarter of a century (the study was republished in its entirety as a monograph with the addition of a critical introduction in 1987).

Like Lakoff and Leech, Brown and Levinson (1987) accept the Gricean framework, but they note a qualitative distinction between the Cooperative Principle and the politeness principles: while the former is presumed by speakers to be at work all the time, politeness needs to be ostensibly communicated (ibid.: 5).

Brown and Levinson see politeness as a rational and rule-governed aspect of communication, a principled reason for deviation from efficiency (ibid.: 5) and aimed predominantly at maintaining social cohesion via the maintenance of individuals' public *face* (a construct inspired by Erving Goffman's notion of 'face,' but with crucial, and for some, fatal differences: see Bargiela-Chiappini, 2003, Watts, 2003) (*see* **Face**; **Goffman, Erving**). Brown and Levinson's 'face' is construed as a double want: a want of freedom of action and freedom from impositions (this is called 'negative' face), and a want of approval and appreciation (a 'positive' face). Social interaction is seen as involving an inherent degree of threat to one's own and others' face (for example, an order may impinge on the addressee's freedom of action; an apology, by virtue of its subsuming an admission of guilt, may impinge on the speaker's want to be appreciated). However, such *face threatening acts* (FTA) can be avoided, or redressed by means of polite (verbal) *strategies*, pitched at the level needed to match the seriousness of an FTA x, calculated according to a simple formula:

$$W_x = P(H, S) + D(S, H) + R_x$$

where the Weight of a threat x is a function of the Power of Hearers over Speakers, as well as of the social Distance between Speakers and Hearers, combined with an estimation of the Ranking (of the seriousness) of a specific act x in a specific culture (*see* **Face**).

Brown and Levinson compared data from three unrelated languages (English, Tamil, and Tzeltal) to show that very similar principles, in fact universal principles, are at work in superficially dissimilar realizations. The means-end reasoning that governs the choice of polite strategies, and the need to redress face threats, are supposed to be universal. The abstract notion of positive and negative aspects of face (although the content of face is held to be subject to cultural variation) is also considered to be a universal want.

The comprehensiveness of the model – in addition to being the only production model of politeness to date – captured the interest of researchers in very disparate fields and working on very different languages and cultures. One could even say that the Brown and Levinsonian discourse on politeness practically 'colonized' the field (domains covered include cross-cultural comparison of speech acts, social psychology, discourse and conversation analysis, gender studies, family, courtroom, business and classroom discourse, and so on: see Dufon *et al.,* 1994, for an extensive bibliography; Eelen, 2001: 23 ff.; Watts, 2003). Interestingly, a paper by Janney and Arndt made the point, in 1993, that despite considerable criticism of the then still dominant paradigm, the very fundamental issue of whether the universality assumption could be of use in comparative cross-cultural research went by and large unquestioned (1993: 15).

The most conspicuous criticism – paradoxically, for a model aspiring to pancultural validity – was perhaps the charge of ethnocentrism: the individualistic and agentivistic conception of Brown and Levinson's 'model person' did not seem to fit 'collectivistic' patterns of social organization, whereas their notion of 'face' seemed to serve an atomistic rather than interrelated notion of self (Wierzbicka, 1985; Gu, 1990; Nyowe, 1992; Werkhofer, 1992; de Kadt, 1992; Sifianou, 1992; Mao, 1994). Going one step further, some criticized Brown and Levinson's emphasis on the 'calculable' aspects of expressive choice (and the idea that individuals can manipulate these 'volitionally'), to the expense of the socially constrained or conventionalized indexing of politeness in some linguacultures (especially, though not exclusively, those with rich honorific repertoires; Hill *et al.,* 1986; Matsumoto, 1988, 1989; Ide, 1989; Janney and Arndt, 1993) (*see* **Intercultural Pragmatics and Communication**).

The Gricean framework implicitly or explicitly adopted in many politeness studies has been criticized for arbitrarily presupposing the universal validity of the maxims, and for a relatively static account of inferential processes. In particular, Sperber and Wilson's (1995) Relevance Theory recently has been adopted by politeness theorists as a way to compensate for this lack of interpretative dynamism (Jary, 1998a, 1998b; Escandell-Vidal, 1998; Watts, 2003: 201) (*see* **Relevance Theory**) and the conversational maxims have been reinterpreted as 'sociopragmatic interactional principles' (Spencer-Oatey, 2003) (*see* **Maxims and Flouting**).

Others have lamented Brown and Levinson's exclusive focus on the speaker, as well as their reliance on decontextualized utterances and speech acts (Hymes, 1986: 78), choices that similarly detract from a discursive and interactional understanding of communicative processes (*see* **Speech Acts**).

Social Constructivist Approaches

Hymes (1986) pointed out quite early on that although Brown and Levinson's model was impressive as an illustration of the universality of politeness *devices*, any useful and accurate account of politeness *norms* would need to "place more importance on historically derived social institutions and cultural orientations" (p. 78).

The scientific extrapolation of an abstract, universal concept of politeness was similarly questioned by Watts *et al.* (1992), who drew attention to the serious epistemological consequences of a terminological problem. According to these authors, the field had been too casual in overlooking the difference between mutually incommensurable constructs of politeness: a first-order politeness (politeness$_1$) derived from folk and commonsense notions, and a second-order politeness (politeness$_2$), a technical notion for use in scientific discourse. Although the latter (echoing the Vygotskyan characterization of spontaneous versus scientific concepts; *see* **Vygotskij, Lev Semenovich**) can be thought to emerge from an initial verbal definition, the former emerges from action and social practice (Eelen, 2001: 33). As social practice, politeness$_1$ is rooted in everyday interaction and socialization processes: it is expressed in instances of speech (*expressive* politeness), it is invoked in judgments of interactional behavior as polite or impolite behavior (*classificatory* politeness), and is talked about (*metapragmatic* politeness) (ibid.: 35) (*see* **Metapragmatics**).

Eelen (2001)'s watershed critique of politeness theories articulates this point in great detail and thus opens up promising new avenues of thought for researchers. The lack of distinction between politeness$_1$ and politeness$_2$ represents a serious ontological and epistemological fallacy of all previous politeness research, as it has determined the more or less implicit 'reification' of participants' viewpoint to a scientific viewpoint (the 'emic' account is seamlessly transformed into an 'etic' account). This conceptual leap fails to question the very *evaluative* nature of politeness$_1$ (ibid.: 242) and thereby conceals this 'evaluative moment' from analysis.

Empirical studies into commonsense ideas of politeness$_1$ (Blum-Kulka, 1992; Ide *et al.*, 1992) indicate that notions of politeness or impoliteness are used to characterize people's behavior judgmentally. This evaluative practice has a psychosocial dimension: individuals position themselves in moral terms *vis-à-vis* others and categorize the world into the 'well-mannered,' the 'uncouth,' etc., and a more concrete everyday dimension: it enables indexing of social identities and thus group-formation: in other words, it positively creates social realities (Eelen, 2001: 237). Politeness is said to be inherently *argumentative*: evaluative acts are not neutral taxonomic enterprises; they exist because there is something at stake socially. Moreover, carrying out an evaluative act immediately generates social effects. (ibid.: 37–38). A particularly problematic aspect of much of the theorizing about politeness is that in spite of the fact that norms are held by users to be immutable and objective (recourse to a higher, socially sanctioned reality grants moral force), and by theorists to be unanimously shared by communities, one still has to admit that the very acts of evaluation may exhibit a huge *variability*, and that this is hardly the exception.

Capturing the qualities of evaluativity, argumentativity, and variability of polite behavior requires a paradigmatic shift in our underlying philosophical assumptions. Eelen proposes to replace what he sees as a Parsonian apparatus (exemplified by "priority of the social over the individual, normative action, social consensus, functional integration and resistance to change," p. 203) with Bourdieu's (1990, 1991) theory of social practice (a proposal followed and developed by Watts, 2003). The following are some of the important consequences of this proposal.

The first is a reconceptualization of politeness as situated social action – its historicity is duly restored. Politeness is no longer an abstract concept or set of norms from which all individuals draw uniformly, but is recognized as the very object of a social dispute. Variability, resulting from the properties of evaluativity and argumentativity of politeness$_1$, ceases to be a problem for the researcher, and instead provides evidence of the nature of the phenomenon. As a consequence, even statistically marginal behavior

(problematic for traditional approaches: Eelen, 2001: 141) can be accounted for within the same framework.

Second, the relation between the cultural/social and the individual is seen as less deterministic. On the one hand, the cultural is part of an individual's repertoire: it is internalized and accumulated through all past interactions experienced by an individual, thus determining the nature of that individual's *habitus* (or set of learned dispositions; Bourdieu, 1991). On the other hand, the cultural can be acted on – be maintained or challenged – to various extents by individuals, depending on those individuals' resources, or symbolic *capital*; the cultural is never an immutable entity.

This *discursive* understanding of politeness enables us to capture the functional orientation of politeness to actions of social inclusion or exclusion, alignment or distancing (and incidentally uncovers the fundamentally ideological nature of scientific metapragmatic talk on politeness, as one type of goal oriented social practice; see Glick, 1996: 170) (*see* **Discourse Markers**).

Politeness ceases to be deterministically associated with specific linguistic forms or functions (another problem for past approaches): it depends on the subjective *perception* of the meanings of such forms and functions. Moreover, in Watts's (2003) view, behavior that abides by an individual's expectations based on 'habitus' (i.e., unmarked appropriate behavior) is not necessarily considered politeness: it is instead simply *politic behavior*. Politeness may thus be defined as behavior in excess of what can be expected (which can be received positively or negatively but is always argumentative), whereas impoliteness similarly is characterized as nonpolitic behavior (on the important issue of the theoretical status of *impoliteness*, see Eelen, 2001: 87 and Watts, 2003: 5).

As sketched here, the path followed by the discourse on politeness illustrates how the struggle over the meaning and the social function of politeness is at the very centre of current theorizing. Watts adopts a rather radical position and rejects the possibility of a theory of politeness2 altogether: scientific notions of politeness (which should be nonnormative) cannot be part of a study of social interaction (normative by definition) (Watts, 2003: 11). Others, like House (2003, 2005), or O'Driscoll (1996) before her, maintain that a descriptive and explanatory framework must include universal (the first two below) and culture/language-specific levels (the last two below):

1. a fundamental biological, psychosocial level based on animal drives (*coming together* vs. *noli-me-tangere*)

2. a philosophical level to capture biological drives in terms of a finite number of principles, maxims, or parameters
3. an empirical descriptive level concerned with the particular (open-ended) set of norms, tendencies, or preferences
4. a linguistic level at which sociocultural phenomena have become 'crystallized' in specific language forms (either honorifics or other systemic distinctions)

(adapted from House, 2003, 2005).

Future Perspectives

Although the legacy of the 'mainstream' pragmatic approaches described above is clearly still very strong (see, for instance, Fukushima, 2000; Bayraktaroğlu and Sifianou, 2001; Hickey and Stewart, 2005; Christie, 2004), the critical thoughts introduced in the current debate on linguistic politeness promise to deliver a body of work radically different from the previous one.

The future program of politeness research begins from the task of elaborating a full-fledged theoretical framework from the seminal ideas recently proposed. It must acknowledge the disputed nature of notions of politeness and explore the interactional purposes of evaluations (see, for example, Mills's 2003 study on gender, or Watts's 2003 'emergent networks'; compare also Locher's 2004 study on the uses of politeness in the exercise of power). It must articulate how norms come to be shared and how they come to be transformed; it must explore the scope and significance of variability. Relevance theory, Critical Discourse Analysis, and Bourdieuian sociology have all been proposed as promising frameworks for investigation. Empirical research that can provide methodologically reliable data for these questions must also be devised: the new paradigm would dictate that the situatedness of the very experimental context, the argumentativity of the specific practice observed are recognized as integral part of the relevant data.

Politeness consistently features in international symposia, and has, since 1998, had a meeting point on the Internet; the year 2005 will see the birth of a dedicated publication, the *Journal of Politeness Research*.

See also: Communicative Principle and Communication; Cooperative Principle; Discourse Markers; Face; Goffman, Erving; Grice, Herbert Paul; Intercultural Pragmatics and Communication; Maxims and Flouting; Metapragmatics; Relevance Theory; Speech Acts; Vygotskij, Lev Semenovich.

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Relevant Website

http://www.lboro.ac.uk/departments/ea/politeness/index/htm

Politeness Strategies as Linguistic Variables

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Although linguists have had a good deal to say about it, politeness is not just a matter of language. When people say about someone, "she is very polite," they are often referring to respectful, deferential, or considerate behavior which goes well beyond the way the person talks or writes. In Japan, for example, polite behavior encompasses bowing respectfully; in Samoan culture, being polite entails ensuring you are physically lower than a person of higher status. And in formal situations, all cultures have rules for behaving appropriately and respectfully, which include ways of expressing politeness nonverbally as well as verbally. In this article, however, we will focus on linguistic politeness and the social factors that influence its use. We begin by addressing the question 'What is linguistic politeness?'

What Is Linguistic Politeness?

Language serves many purposes, and expressing linguistic politeness is only one of them. In example 1, the main function of the interaction can be described as informative or referential. The two people know each other well, and they do not engage in any overt expressions of linguistic politeness. [Note: Specialized transcription conventions are kept to the minimum in the examples in this article. + marks a pause; place overlaps between // and /. Strong STRESS is marked by capitalization.]

> (1) Context: Two flatmates in their kitchen
>   Rose: what time's the next bus?
>   Jane: ten past eight I think

By contrast, in example 2 (from Holmes and Stubbe, 2003: 37), there are a number of features which can be identified as explicit politeness markers.

> (2) Context: Manager in government department to
>   Ana, a new and temporary administrative
>   assistant replacing Hera's usual assistant.
>   Hera: I wondered if you wouldn't mind
>   spending some of that time in
>   contacting + while no-one else is around
>   contacting the people for their interviews

Hera's basic message is 'set up some interviews.' However, in this initial encounter with her new assistant, she uses various politeness devices to soften her directive: the hedged syntactic structure, *I wondered if you wouldn't mind,* and the modal verb (*would*). Providing a reason for being so specific about when

she wants the task done could also be regarded as contributing to mitigating the directive. Hera's use of these politeness devices reflects both the lack of familiarity between the two women, and the fact that, as a 'temp,' Ana's responsibilities are not as clearly defined as they would be if she had been in the job longer. This illustrates nicely how linguistic politeness often encodes an expression of consideration for others.

Linguistic politeness has generally been considered the proper concern of 'pragmatics,' the area of linguistics that accounts for how we attribute meaning to utterances in context, or "meaning in interaction" (Thomas, 1995: 23). If we adopt this approach, then politeness is a matter of specific linguistic choices from a range of available ways of saying something. Definitions of politeness abound (see, for example, Sifianou, 1992: 82–83, Eelen, 2001: 30–86), but the core of most definitions refers to linguistic politeness as a 'means of expressing consideration for others' (e.g., Holmes, 1995: 4; Thomas, 1995: 150; Watts, 2003). Note that there is no reference to people's motivations; we cannot have access to those, and arguments about one group being intrinsically more polite or altruistic than another are equally futile, as Thomas (1995: 150) points out. We can only attempt to interpret what people wish to convey on the basis of their utterances; we can never know their 'real' feelings. We can, however, note the ways in which people use language to express concern for others' needs and feelings, and the ways that their expressions are interpreted. Linguistic politeness is thus a matter of strategic interaction aimed at achieving goals such as avoiding conflict and maintaining harmonious relations with others (Kasper, 1990).

Different cultures have different ways of expressing consideration for others, and the most influential work in the area of linguistic politeness, namely Brown and Levinson's Politeness Theory (1978, 1987), adopts a definition of politeness that attempts to encompass the ways politeness is expressed universally. This involves a conception of politeness that includes not only the considerate and nonimposing behavior illustrated in example 2, which they label 'negative politeness' (Brown and Levinson, 1987: 129), but also the positively friendly behavior illustrated in example 3. (see also Lakoff, 1975, 1979).

> (3) Context: Small talk between workers in a plant
>   nursery at the start of the day. Des is the
>   manager. Ros is the plant nursery worker.
>   Des: be a nice day when it all warms up a bit
>   though
>   Ros: yeah + it's okay
>   Des: so you haven't done anything all week eh
>   you haven't done anything exciting

This is classic social talk: the content is not important; the talk is primarily social or affective in function, designed to establish rapport and maintain good collegial relationships. Brown and Levinson (1987: 101) use the term 'positive politeness' for such positive, outgoing behavior. Hence, their definition of politeness includes behavior which actively expresses concern for and interest in others, as well as nonimposing distancing behavior. Linguistic politeness may therefore take the form of a compliment or an expression of goodwill or camaraderie, or it may take the form of a mitigated or hedged request, or an apology for encroaching on someone's time or space.

Politeness Theory

Brown and Levinson's definition describes linguistic politeness as a means of showing concern for people's 'face,' a term adopted from the work of Erving Goffman. Using Grice's (1975) maxims of conversational cooperation (*see* **Grice, Herbert Paul**), they suggest that one reason people diverge from direct and clear communication is to protect their own face needs and take account of those of their addressees. While it is based on the everyday usages such as 'losing face' and 'saving face,' Brown and Levinson develop this concept considerably further, and they analyze almost every action (including utterances) as a potential threat to someone's face. They suggest that linguistic politeness comprises the use of interactional

strategies aimed at taking account of two basic types of face needs or wants: firstly, positive face needs, or the need to be valued, liked, and admired, and to maintain a positive self-image; and secondly, negative face needs or the need not to be imposed upon, the need for relative freedom of thought and action, or for one's own 'space.' As illustrated in example 2, behavior that avoids impeding or imposing on others (or avoids 'threatening their face') is described as evidence of 'negative politeness,' while sociable behavior conveying friendliness (as in example 3), or expressing admiration for an addressee is 'positive politeness' behavior (Brown and Levinson, 1987) (**Figures 1** and **2**). Adopting this approach, any utterance that could be interpreted as making a demand or intruding on another person's autonomy may qualify as a potentially face threatening act (FTA). Even suggestions, advice, and requests may be experienced as FTAs, since they potentially impede the addressee's freedom of action.

Brown and Levinson (1987) outline a wide range of different kinds of politeness strategies, including, as positive politeness strategies, making offers, joking, and giving sympathy, and, as negative politeness strategies, hedging, apologizing, and giving deference (see figures 3 and 4 in Brown and Levinson, 1987: 102 and 131). In support of their claims for the universality of their theory, they illustrate these strategies with numerous examples from three different languages: South Indian Tamil, Tzeltal, a Mayan

Figure 1 Chart of strategies: Positive politeness. From Brown, P. and Levinson, S.C. (1987). *Politeness. Some universals in language usage.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. © Cambridge University Press. Reproduced with permission.

Figure 2 Chart of strategies: Negative politeness. From Brown, P. and Levinson, S.C. (1987). *Politeness. Some universals in language usage.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. © Cambridge University Press. Reproduced with permission.

language spoken in Mexico, and American and British English. Example 4 is an illustration from Tzeltal of the use of the negative politeness strategy of hedging, in the form of the particles *naš* and *mak,* to mitigate a FTA and thus render the utterance more polite.

> (4) ha? *naš* ya smel yo?tan, *mak*
>   It's *just* that he's sad, *I guess*
>   [Final segment in naš is the sound at the
>   beginning of 'ship']

Since this example, from Brown and Levinson, 1987: 149, like many others, is provided by them without contextual information, the reader has no way of assessing exactly why the utterance is interpretable as a FTA, a point I return to below.

Brown and Levinson do, however, recognize the importance of three fundamental sociocultural variables in assessing the relative weight of different FTAs: firstly, the social distance (D) between the participants; secondly, the power (P) that the addressee has over the speaker; and thirdly, the ranking of the imposition (R) expressed in the utterance in the relevant culture. Moreover, they note that the way these variables contribute will differ from culture to culture. Each of these components contributes to the relative seriousness of the FTA, and thus to the assessment of the appropriate strategy or level of politeness required to express the speaker's intended message. So, for example, if my son wants to borrow my car, he

is likely to judge that although he knows me well (low D), I have a relatively high amount of power in our relationship (compared, say, to his relationship with his brother, though perhaps not as much as is involved in his relationship with his boss), and that he is asking a big favor (high R). He is therefore likely to select a linguistically very polite way of asking this favor, as illustrated in example 5.

> (5) Context: Son to mother in the family living room
>   [+ marks a very short pause]
>   D: um mum + um do you think um I could
>   possibly just borrow your car +
>   M: [*frowns*]
>   D: um just for a little while +
>   M. um well [*frowns*]
>   D: it's just that I need to get this book to
>   Helen tonight

In making his request, D includes a number of negative politeness strategies in the form of mitigating devices or hedges (hesitation markers *um,* modal verb *could* and particle *possibly,* minimizers *just, a little*) as well as the positive politeness strategies of using an in-group identity marker (*mum*) and providing a reason for the request. If he had been asking for a lift or a loan for bus fare, the weight of the imposition would have been considerably less of a FTA in New Zealand culture. In cultures where cars are either more or less valuable, the imposition represented by such a request would be ranked differently; and

if the requestor was an equal or superior (such as a husband in some cultures), the P variable would be reduced. Thus the theory attempts to take account of contextual and social considerations and cultural contrasts.

The following sketch by Harry Enfield illustrates how the factors D, P, and R interact in different ways with a consequent effect on the different politeness strategies evident in the way Kevin and his friend Perry speak to (a) Kevin's parents, (b) Perry's parents on the phone, and (c) each other.

> Transcript 1: 'Kevin the Teenager'
> Father: Thanks, mum +
> Father: Kevin.
> Kevin: What?
> Father: Are you gonna thank your mum?
> Kevin: Ugh! Deurgh! +
> Father: Are you going to say thank you?
> Kevin: I JUST BLOODY DID!
> Mother: Forget it, Dave – it's not worth it.
> Kevin: [*sighs*]
> Father: Oh, this is lovely, mum [to Kevin] How's the exam today?
> Kevin: Mawight.
> Father: What was it today – maths?
> Kevin: Ner. Nurrr. +
> Father: Sorry, what did you say?
> Kevin: Urgh!
> P-H-Y-S-I-C-S! +
> Mother: Well, we can't hear you if you mumble, Kevin! Kevin: Muh! Uh! Nuh-muh!
> [*the doorbell rings. Kevin goes to answer it*]
> Kevin: Awight, Perry?
> Perry: Awight, Kev? 'ere – guess wot I dun at school today? I rubbed up against Jennifer Fisher an' me groin wen' 'ard!
> Perry: Hmm?
> Father: Hello, Perry!
> Mother: Hello, Perry! How are you?
> Perry: 'ullo, Mrs Patterson, Mr Patterson.
> Mother: How are your mum and dad?
> Perry: All right, thank you.
> Kevin: Come on, Perry – let's go.
> Father: Kevin?
> Kevin: What?
> Father: Where d'you think you're going with all that food?
> Kevin: Bedroom. Snack.
> Mother: Your dinner's on the table – come and finish it.
> Kevin: Ugh! P-e-r-r-y!
> Father: Well, Perry can join us. Now, come and sit down.
> Kevin: [*snorts*] So unfair!
> Mother: Now – do you want something to eat, Perry?
> Perry: No thanks, Mrs Patterson.
> Mother: Are you sure?
> Kevin: HE JUST BLOODY SAID "NO"!

> Father: Kevin. Don't shout at your mum.
> Kevin: What? I didn't say anything! What? Ugh! Ugh! Ugh! Ugh!
> Father: Oh, Perry – I think you've known us long enough not to call us Mr and Mrs Patterson any more.
> Kevin: Eeurgh!
> Father: Just call us Dave and Sheila.
> Kevin: (Eeurgh!)
> Mother: Is that OK, then?
> Perry: Yes, Mrs Patterson +
> Mother: So – what sort of music do you like at the moment, Perry?
> Kevin: Eeurgh!
> Mother: I think Bad Boys Inc. are rather fun.
> Perry: Bad Boys Inc. suck, Mrs Patterson +
> Mother: So – who do you like, then?
> Perry: We only like Snoop Doggy Dog.
> Mother: Oh, from Peanuts.
> Kevin: Muh-eeurgh!
> Kevin: Finished! Come on, Perry.
> Mother: No, no, darling-you've still got pudding.
> Kevin: Agh! I don't want any bloody pudding!
> Mother: It's Chocolate Choc Chip Chocolate Ice-cream with Chocolate Sauce. But you don't have to have any if you don't want it.
> Kevin: Mmmnnnnrrrr!
> Mother: Perry, would you, er, like –
> Perry: Yes please, Mrs Patterson. Please. Thank you, Mrs Patterson. Please. Thank you!
> [*slight pause as the icecream is shared out*]
> Father: Have you got a girlfriend yet, Perry?
> Perry: Munurr!
> Father: I remember I got my first girlfriend when I was about your age. Tracey Thornton. I remember our first snog. Outside the cinema.
> Kevin: Eeeeuurrgghh!
> Mother: I was fourteen when I had my first snog.
> Kevin: [*whimpers*]
> Perry: I gotta go toilet!
> Kevin: YOU'RE SO BLOODY EMBARRASSING!
> Mother: Why can't you be a nice, polite boy – like Perry?
> [*the telephone starts ringing*]
> Kevin: Ugh! WHAT? WHAT'S WRONG WI' ME? WHAT'S BLOODY WRONG WIIH' ME EH?
> Kevin: Hello? Mnuh! Hello, Mrs Carter. Yes, Perry is here, yes. Oh, very well, thank you. Yes, would you like to speak to him? Please? Yes?
> [*to Perry*] Perry – it's your mum.
> Perry: Eek!
> What? NO! I DON'T WANT TO! NO! IT'S SO UNFAIR! I HATE YOU! YOU'RE SO BLOODY EMBARRASSIN'! I HATE YOU!
> Perry: I gotta go now, Mrs Patterson. Fank you
> Father: Cheerio, Perry!
> Mother: Bye, Perry!
> Kevin: See ya
> Perry: Later
> Kevin: So you like him more than me do you? I HATE YOU! I WISH I'D NEVER ***BEEN BORN!***

Criticisms of Brown and Levinson's Theory

While it has been hugely influential, Brown and Levinson's theory has attracted a good deal of criticism. I here mention just a few of the most frequently cited conceptual weaknesses. See Craig *et al.* (1986) and Coupland *et al.* (1988) for valuable early critiques, and Eelen (2001) and Watts (2003) for more recent, thorough reviews of criticisms.

Firstly Brown and Levinson's theory relies heavily on a version of speech act theory that assumes the sentence as its basic unit and places the speaker at the center of the analysis. Much early work that used Brown and Levinson's model adopted this focus on the utterance: e.g., some researchers asked people to judge single decontextualized utterances for degrees of politeness (e.g., Fraser, 1978). However, it is clear that FTAs are certainly not expressed only in sentences or even single utterances. Often they extend over several utterances and even over different turns of talk, as illustrated in example 5. Meaning-making is a more dynamic process than Brown and Levinson's approach allows for, and is often a matter of interactional negotiation between participants.

Secondly, Brown and Levinson have been criticised for mixing up different types of data, and providing very little indication of its source or context. As they admit in the extensive introduction to their 1987 book, their data is "an unholy amalgam of naturally occurring, elicited and intuitive data" (1987: 11), and, moreover, readers have no way of knowing which is which. Most current researchers in the area of pragmatics and discourse analysis use naturally occurring recorded data, and they provide information about the context in which it was produced.

Thirdly, the levels of analysis of different politeness strategies are quite different. So, for instance, negative politeness strategy 3, 'Be pessimistic,' is very much more general and can be realized in a very much wider variety of ways than strategy 9, 'Nominalize,' which identifies a very specific syntactic device that can be used for distancing the speaker from the addressee. In addition, overall, negative politeness strategies involve a more specific range of linguistic devices (e.g., hedge, nominalize, avoid the pronouns 'I' and 'you') than positive politeness strategies, which seem much more open-ended and difficult to restrict.

Fourthly, context is crucial in assessing politeness, but the range of social factors which may be relevant in analyzing the weight of a FTA is much more extensive than the three Brown and Levinson identify. Factors such as the level of formality of the speech event, the presence of an audience, the degree of liking between the participants, and so on, may well affect the weightiness of the FTA, or even the judgment about whether an utterance counts as polite at all. So, for example, as Thomas (1995: 156) points out, "if you'll be kind enough to speed up a little" appears superficially to be a very polite way of saying "hurry up," but in the context in which it was produced, addressed by a wife to her husband, it expressed intense irritation. And while Brown and Levinson's rather flexible concept R might be a means of taking account of some of these additional factors, computing R clearly requires detailed familiarity with relevant sociocultural and contextual values.

Fifthly, Brown and Levinson's theory assumes an ideal and very individualistic intentional agent (labelled a Model Person) as its starting point, and has been criticised by many researchers as culturally very restricted and even Anglo-centric in basic conception (e.g., Ide *et al.*, 1992; Eelen, 2001; Watts, 2003). Asian and Polynesian societies, for instance, place a greater emphasis on public undertakings and social commitments (a point discussed further below), and are not interested in trying to figure out what a speaker intended by a particular speech act (e.g., Lee-Wong, 2000); but this is a basic requirement of any analysis using Brown and Levinson's framework. The implication of these criticisms is that a theory of politeness based on intention recognition cannot apply cross-culturally and universally.

Measuring Politeness

Brown and Levinson's very specific approach to identifying ways of expressing linguistic politeness led to a spate of empirical studies which explored manifestations of politeness in a wide range of contexts and cultures and in many disciplines, including social and cognitive psychology, legal language, communication studies, gender studies, business and management studies, second language acquisition, and cross-cultural communication. A number of these researchers attempted to use Brown and Levinson's list of strategies as a basis for quantification. Shimanoff (1977), for instance, identified 300 different politeness strategies in an attempt to compare the number of politeness strategies used by men and women in interaction. She found no sex differences but she also found that the distinction between positive and negative politeness strategies was sometimes difficult to maintain. Moreover, there was often an unsatisfactory relationship between the number of strategies used and the intuitions of native speakers about how polite an utterance is (see also Brown, 1979).

It soon became apparent that counting strategies is basically a fruitless exercise, since context is so important for interpreting the significance of any

linguistic form, and, moreover, the balance of different strategies may be crucially important in assessing the overall effect of a contribution to an interaction. In the following script for the video 'Not Like This', for example, Lorraine uses teasing humor, a positive politeness strategy, to soften her criticism of Sam's inadequate checking of the packets of soap powder.

> Transcript 2: 'Not Like This' *(Clip 7 from Talk that Works)*
>
> *Context:* Factory packing line.
>
> The supervisor, Lorraine, has noticed that Sam is not doing the required visual check on the boxes of soap powder as they come off the line, and she stops to demonstrate the correct procedure. [+ marks a pause; place overlaps between // and /]
>
> 1. Lor: [*picks up a box and pats it*]
> 2. you know when you check these right
> 3. you're supposed to look at the carton
> 4. to make sure it's not leaking
> 5. not like this [*pats box and looks away*]
> 6. Sam: oh that's that's good checking
> 7. Lor: /you're not going to see anything if you're like this\
> 8. Sam: /that's all right that's all right\ that's all right
> 9. Lor: oh my gosh [*smiles*]
> 10. Sam: [*laughs*] ++ [*picks up a box and gives it a thorough shake*]
> 11. Lor: and what's with the gloves
> 12. Sam: [*smiling*] don't want to get my hands dirty
> 13. Lor: don't want to ruin your manicure

It is clear that counting how many times she expresses the criticism (lines and 3, 5, perhaps 7) is not only tricky but also meaningless in terms of measuring the FTA. Similarly, while it is clear that the humorous exchange between the pair functions as positive politeness, analyzing its precise relationship to the FTA and assessing the precise relative contribution of different components is very complex and ultimately pointless.

In addition, many utterances are multifunctional and assigning just one meaning to a linguistic device is thus equally misleading. We cannot know if Lorraine's question "and what's with the gloves?" (line 11) is asking for information (i.e., she is genuinely puzzled or concerned about why Sam needs to wear gloves), or if this is a preliminary tease which she follows up more explicitly in line 13. Leech (1983) also notes that utterances are often (deliberately) ambivalent, allowing people to draw their own inferences about what is intended, and even about whether they are the intended addressee. As Thomas notes, example 6 (from Thomas, 1995: 159) is a "potentially very offensive speech act (requesting people not to steal!)," but it is expressed in an ambivalent form, allowing readers to decide about the precise

degree of pragmatic force, and whether it applies to them.

> (6) Context: Notice in the Junior Common Room, Queens College, Cambridge
> These newspapers are for all the students, not the privileged few who arrive first.

Leech's Politeness Principle

There are a number of alternatives to Brown and Levinson's approach to the analysis of politeness (see Eelen, 2001: 1–29). Some share a good deal with Brown and Levinson's approach; others provide elaborations which address some of the criticisms identified above. Robin Lakoff has been labeled "the mother of modern politeness theory" (Eelen, 2001: 2), and her work (1973, 1975) predates Brown and Levinson's (1978) substantial model by several years. However, her 'rules of politeness' (Don't impose, Give options, Be friendly) have a good deal in common with Brown and Levinson's politeness strategies. Another approach by Fraser (1990: 233) provides a very broad view of politeness: being polite is regarded as the default setting in conversational encounters, i.e., simply fulfilling the 'conversational contract.'

One of the most fully developed alternative frameworks is Geoffrey Leech's model, which was developed at about the same time as Brown and Levinson's (Leech, 1983), and which shares many of the assumptions of their approach, as well as their goal of universality, but takes a somewhat different tack in analyzing linguistic politeness. Rather than focusing on 'face needs,' Leech addressed the issue of "why people are often so indirect in conveying what they mean" (1983: 80). To answer this question, (i.e., basically to account for why people do not consistently follow Grice's Cooperative Principle and adhere to his Maxims (*see* **Grice, Herbert Paul; Neo-Gricean Pragmatics**). Leech proposed a Politeness Principle (PP), and a set of maxims which he regards as paralleling Grice's Maxims. Leech's PP states:

> Minimize (other things being equal) the expression of impolite beliefs. . . . Maximize (other things being equal) the expression of polite beliefs (1983: 81).

So, for example, recently my niece asked me if I liked her new shoes – bright pink plastic sandals, decorated with glitter. I thought they were ghastly, but rather than saying "I think they're awful," I replied "they look really cool." The Politeness Principle accounts for my nicely ambiguous response, which was strictly truthful but minimized the expression of my very impolite beliefs about her shoes.

Leech's set of maxims is very much larger that Grice's four, and while some are very general, others

(such as the Polyanna Principle) are "somewhat idiosyncratic," to quote Thomas (1995: 160). The more general ones are the maxims of Modesty, Tact, Generosity, Approbation, Agreement, and Sympathy. The Modesty Maxim, for example, states "Minimize the expression of praise of self; maximize the expression of dispraise of self." Obviously this maxim applies differentially in different cultures. In parts of Asia, including Japan, for instance, this maxim takes precedence over the Agreement Maxim, which states that agreement should be maximized and disagreement minimized. Hence Japanese and Indonesian students in New Zealand often reject a compliment, denying it is applicable to them, as illustrated in examples 7 and 8.

(7) Context: Two Malay students in Wellington, New Zealand. This interaction takes place in English.
S: eeee, nice stockings
R: ugh! there are so many holes already

(8) Context: Teacher to a Japanese student who is waiting outside the teacher's room in the corridor
T: what a beautiful blouse
S: [*looks down and shakes her head*] no no
T: but it looks lovely
S: [*stays silent but continues to look down*]

People from Western cultures, on the other hand, are more likely to allow the Agreement Maxim to override the Modesty Maxim, and this accounts for the greater tendency among New Zealanders to agree with a compliment, although they may downgrade it or shift the credit for the object of the praise, as illustrated in example 9.

(9) M: that's a snazzy scarf you're wearing
S: yeah it's nice isn't it my mother sent it for my birthday

Leech's maxims thus provide a way of accounting for a number of cross-cultural differences in politeness behavior, as well as in perceptions of what counts as polite in different cultures and subcultures.

The main problem with Leech's approach to the analysis of politeness, as a number of critics have pointed out (e.g., Thomas, 1995; Brown and Levinson, 1987; Fraser, 1990), is that there is no motivated way of restricting the number of maxims. This means it is difficult to falsify the theory since any new problem can be countered by the development of yet another maxim. Thomas (1995: 168) suggests that the maxims are better treated as a series of social-psychological constraints on pragmatic choices, which differ in their relative importance in different cultures. Adopting this approach, their open-endedness is not such a problem.

Post-Modern Approaches to Politeness

More recently a number of researchers have adopted a post-modern approach to the analysis of politeness, challenging the "transmission model of communication" (Mills, 2003: 69), and questioning the proposition that people necessarily agree on what constitutes polite behavior (e.g., Eelen, 2001; Locher, 2004; Mills, 2003; Watts, 2003). Researchers such as Brown and Levinson (1987), Leech (1983), and Thomas (1995: 204–205) support their analyses of the interactional meaning of an exchange with evidence such as the effect of an utterance on the addressee, and by referring to metalinguistic commentary and the development of the subsequent discourse. By contrast, post-modernist researchers eschew any suggestion that the meaning of an utterance can be pinned down. They emphasize the dynamic and indeterminate nature of meaning in interaction, including the expression of politeness.

This approach emphasizes the subjectivity of judgements of what counts as polite behavior; meaning is co-constructed, and hence politeness is a matter of negotiation between participants. Adopting this framework, interaction is regarded as a dynamic discursive struggle with the possibility that different participants may interpret the same interaction quite differently.

Gino Eelen (2001) led this revolution in politeness research with his in-depth critique of earlier so-called structuralist, positivist, or objective approaches to the analysis of linguistic politeness. Following Bourdieu, he provides a detailed outline of a post-modern approach which synthesizes subjective and objective approaches by focusing on social practice. Eelen makes a fundamental distinction between what he called 'first-order (im)politeness,' referring to a common-sense, folk, or lay interpretation of (im)politeness, and 'second-order (im)politeness' to refer to (im)politeness as a concept in sociolinguistic theory (2001: 30). He also uses the term 'expressive politeness' (2001: 35) to describe instances where participants explicitly aim to produce polite language: e.g., use of polite formulae such as *please* or *I beg your pardon*. These terms, or at least the distinctions they mark, have proved useful to others who have developed Eelen's approach in different ways.

Mills (2003), for instance, uses this framework to analyze the role of politeness in the construction of gendered identities in interaction. She dismisses attempts to capture generalizations and to develop a universal theory of politeness, arguing that politeness is a contentious concept. Her approach places particular emphasis on the role of stereotypes and norms as influences on people's judgements of

gender-appropriate politeness behavior. In assessing the politeness of an act you have to make a judgement of 'appropriateness' "in relation to the perceived norms of the situation, the CofP [community of practice], or the perceived norms of the society as a whole" (2003: 77; though it must be said that it is not clear how the analyst establishes such judgments, especially since post-modernists strongly critique quantitative methodology, and tend to rely on rather small data sets).

The following excerpt from the film *Getting to Our Place* illustrates the relevance of perceived norms in the interpretation of the degrees of politeness and impoliteness expressed in a particular interaction between two New Zealanders. The interaction involves the powerful and influential Sir Ron Trotter, Chairman of the Board planning the development of the New Zealand National Museum, and Cliff Whiting, the highly respected Maori museum CEO. The museum is to include within it a marae, a traditional Maori meeting house and surrounding area for speech-making, for which Cliff Whiting is responsible. At the beginning of the excerpt, Sir Ron Trotter is just finishing a statement of how he sees the museum marae as being a place where pakeha (non-Maori) will feel comfortable (whereas most New Zealand marae are built by and for Maori in tribal areas).

> Transcript 3: Excerpt from the film *Getting to Our Place* [+ marks a pause; place overlaps between // and /; (. . .) indicates an unclear word. Strong STRESS is marked by capitalization.]
>
> RT: but comfortable and warm and + part of the place ++ for any Pakeha who er ++ part of the (. . .) that we talked about in the concept of we're trying to + develop
> CW: there are two main fields that have to be explored and er + the one that is most important is it's customary role in the first place because marae comes on and comes from + the tangatawhenua who are Maori ++ /to change it\
> RT: /but it's not just\ for Maori
> CW: /no\
> RT: you you MUST get that if it is a Maori institution and nothing more.
> THIS marae has failed + and they MUST get that idea
> CW: /how\
> RT: because
> CW: /(. . .)\
> RT [*shouts*]: we are bicultural + bicultural (talks about two) and if it is going to be totally Maori ++ and all + driven by Maori protocols and without regard for the life museum is a is a Pakeha concept

Many New Zealanders viewing this episode perceive Sir Ron's behavior as rude, and specifically comment on his disruptive interruption of Cliff Whiting's verbal contribution, and on the way Sir

Ron Trotter raises the volume of his voice as he talks over the top of others. This assessment and interpretation of the interactional meaning of what is going on here draws on generally recognized norms for interaction in New Zealand society. In fact, analyses of cross-cultural differences in interactional patterns between Maori and Pakeha (Stubbe and Holmes, 1999) suggest that this disruption would be perceived as even more impolite by a Maori audience, since Maori discourse norms, even in casual conversation, permit one speaker to finish before another speaker makes a contribution. Stereotypical expectations and norms are thus an important contributing factor in accounting for different people's judgements of the relative politeness or impoliteness of particular interactions.

Focusing on common sense (im)politeness (i.e., Eelen's first-order (im)politeness), Watts (2003) also pays attention to the relevance of affect and sincerity judgments in an approach which emphasizes that politeness strategies may be used strategically and manipulatively. His particular contribution to research on linguistic politeness is a distinction between what he calls 'politic' behavior, i.e., socially constrained politeness, and strategic politeness, where the speaker goes beyond what is required (2003: 4). Politic behavior is "what the participants would expect to happen in this situation, and it is therefore not polite" (2003: 258). It is 'appropriate,' 'non-salient' and 'expectable' (2003: 256–257). Polite behavior is "behavior in excess of politic behavior" (2003: 259); it is marked behavior indicating the speaker's wish to express concern or respect for the addressee (Locher, 2004).

It is moreover an area where subjective judgements become relevant and is thus an area of dispute: "not everyone agrees about what constitutes polite language usage" (Watts, 2003: 252). As an example, Watts argues that there are alternative possible interpretations of the following contribution from a politician in a television debate: "can I come back on Mandy's point because I think this is one aspects of TVEI which has been really underemphasised tonight." He suggests that "some commentators might assess his expression 'can I come back on Mandy's point' . . . as polite behavior; others might suggest . . . that, far from being genuinely polite, he is only simulating politeness and is in reality currying favour with the person he is addressing or some other person or set of persons" (2003: 3). It is interesting to note that while both Mills and Watts highlight the indeterminacy of meaning, both researchers frequently assign interpretations quite confidently in discussing their examples.

Having outlined a number of approaches to analyzing politeness, and indicated some of their

strengths and weaknesses, the final sections of this article discusses research on the interaction of linguistic politeness with different social and cultural variables.

Social Variables and Politeness

As the discussion has indicated and the examples have illustrated, the ways in which people express or negotiate politeness is obviously influenced by a range of sociocultural variables, including power relationships, degrees of solidarity, intimacy, or social distance, the level of formality of the interaction or speech event, the gender, age, ethnicity, and social class backgrounds of participants, and so on. Kasper (1997: 382–383) provides a very extensive list of data-based studies which investigate the relevance and the complexity in sociolinguistic and sociopragmatic research of Brown and Levinson's three social variables (P, D, R) each of which is a composite sociocultural construct. The core variationist literature, however, which pays careful attention to such social variables, and which adopts rigorous statistically-based quantitative measures, rarely explicitly addresses the expression of politeness *per se*, though some have argued, controversially, that politeness may entail using more standard speech forms (Deuchar, 1988), and research on style offers potential insights into the interaction between formality and politeness.

Classifying women and men as members of different (sub-)cultures led to some interesting insights in language and gender research about the relativity of particular discourse features. So, for instance, an 'interruption' might be perceived as disruptive by one group but as supportive by another; and back-channeling or 'minimal feedback' (*mm, yeah, right*) and certain pragmatic particles (*you know, I think*) function variably and complexly as markers of (im)politeness in the usage of different social groups (e.g., Holmes, 1995). Tannen (1990), Coates (1996), and Holmes (1995), for instance, identified linguistic and pragmatic features of (respectively American, British, and New Zealand) English which were widely regarded as indicators of more polite speech, and which tended to be used more frequently in certain social contexts by middle-class, professional, and majority group women than by men from similar backgrounds.

Extending such analyses, which introduced a qualitative dimension to the analysis of linguistic and pragmatic features, the work of a number of discourse analysts further explores the influence of a range of social variables on the expression of politeness. Speech act research provides a particularly rich source

of insights into the diversity and complexity of different influences on politeness. See Kasper (1997) for a summary of relevant research up to the mid–1990s. Locher (2004) examines the interaction of power and politeness in the expression of disagreements in a family, at a business meeting, and in a political interview involving President Clinton. She demonstrates that power is most usefully regarded as dynamic, relational, and contestable, and that while participants of very different statuses exercise power as well as politeness in their use of discourse in context, status tends to influence the degree of negotiability of a disagreement in an interaction, along with many other factors, including the topic's degree of controversiality, the participants' degree of familiarity with the topic, and their speaking style, cultural backgrounds, and gender. She also notes great variability in the amount and degree, and even the discursive positioning, of politeness or relational work which accompanies the exercise of power in disagreements in the interaction.

Mills (2003) also discusses the relevance of politeness as a factor in the construction of gender identity, especially in British English society. Holmes and Stubbe (2003) describe the interaction of power and politeness in a wide range of New Zealand workplaces, and Harris (2003) applies politeness theory to talk collected in British magistrates courts, doctors' surgeries, and a police station. Researchers taking this approach highlight the complexities of spoken interaction, and the importance of taking account of the differing and intersecting influences of different social factors (e.g., age, ethnicity, social class, gender) as well as contextual factors (e.g., power and social distance relations, social and institutional role, formality of the speech event, and speech activity) in accounting for the complex ways in which politeness is expressed and interpreted in the very different situations they analyze.

Cross-Cultural Analyses of (Im)Politeness

Politeness is also conceptualized and expressed very differently in different cultures (e.g., Siafanou, 1992; Kasper and Blum-Kulka, 1993; Ting-Toomey, 1994; Scollon and Scollon, 1995; Spencer-Oatey, 2000). Nwoye (1989), for example, illustrates the strategic use of euphemisms and proverbs as means of expressing face-threatening acts politely in interactions between the Igbo of Southeastern Nigeria. Using a unified theoretical framework and methodology involving discourse completion tasks which has subsequently been very influential and widely applied, Blum-Kulka *et al.* (1989) provide information on contrasting patterns in the (reported) use of politeness

strategies in speech acts such as apologies and requests in a number of languages, including English, Hebrew, Canadian French, Argentinian Spanish, German, and Danish (see also House and Kasper, 1981). This approach has been applied and adapted for many different languages and with many different speech acts (e.g. Boxer, 1993; Márquez-Reiter, 2000; and many, many more).

Focusing just on Europe, Hickey and Stewart's (2004) very useful collection of papers provides information on linguistic politeness strategies in 22 European societies, ranging from Germany, Ireland, and Belgium in western Europe to Norway, Denmark, and Finland in northern Europe; Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in eastern Europe; and Greece, Cyprus, and Spain in southern Europe. The papers in Bayraktaroglu and Sifianou (2001), on the other hand, focus just on Greek and Turkish but provide information on realizations of politeness in social contexts ranging from classrooms to television interviews. The role of code-switching in the expression of politeness is also relevant in cross-cultural analyses, as illustrated, for example in a study of how London Greek-Cypriot women exploit the fact that directness is more acceptable in Greek than in English, and thus code-switch to Greek to express positive politeness in ethnically appropriate ways (Gardner-Chloros and Finnis, 2003). Greek words, phrases, and clauses are inserted in English macrostructures to soften the effect of a direct criticism, for instance, or an expression of irritation or a demand for a response is interactionally managed by shifting to Greek.

Expanding consideration to other times and cultures has led researchers to challenge some of the assumptions made about conceptions of linguistic politeness in early models. Even confining attention to English-speaking societies, there is a good deal of variation in what is included in commonsense understandings of what constitutes polite behavior. As Watts points out, understandings "range from socially 'correct' or appropriate behavior, through cultivated behavior, considerateness displayed to others, self-effacing behavior, to negative attributions such as standoffishness, haughtiness, insincerity, etc." (2003: 8–9). Nevertheless, a good deal of early research reflected a rather Western and even middle-class British English conception of politeness. These ethnocentric assumptions were often challenged by researchers from other cultures.

Researchers on Asian cultures, for instance, pointed to the importance of recognizing that in some languages, a speaker's use of certain polite expressions (and specifically honorifics) is a matter of social convention ('discernment') or social indexing (Kasper, 1990) rather than strategic choice (e.g., Ide *et al.*, 1992; Matsumoto, 1989; Usami, 2002; Mao, 1994). (Fukishima (2000) argues that social indexing is a sociolinguistic rather than a pragmatic matter and as such is irrelevant to the analysis of [strategic] politeness.) These researchers point out that Western conceptions of 'face' are very individualistic, and approaches to politeness based on such conceptions do not account satisfactorily for more socially based notions, such as the twin Chinese concepts of 'mien-tzu' (or 'mianzi') and 'lien' (or 'lian'). 'Mien-tzu' refers to "prestige that is accumulated by means of personal effort or clever maneuvring," and is dependent on the external environment (Hu, 1944: 465), while 'lien' is the respect assigned by one's social group on the basis of observed fulfilment of social obligations and moral integrity. Loss of 'lien' makes it impossible for a person to function properly within the community. "*Lien* is both a social sanction for enforcing moral standards and an internalized sanction" (Hu, 1944: 45). This is a rather different conception of face than that used in Brown and Levinson's theory, and it influences conceptions of what is considered 'polite' as opposed to required by social sanction and sociolinguistic norms.

So, for example, in some languages (e.g., Chinese, Japanese, Korean) choice of stylistic level and address forms are largely a matter of social convention or 'linguistic etiquette'; respect or deference is encoded in certain linguistic forms which are required when talking to one's elders or those of higher status, for instance. It has been argued that such sociolinguistically prescribed deference behavior must first be taken into account in assessing 'politeness' (Usami, 2002). (There is an obvious parallel here with Watts' 'polite/politic' distinction mentioned above which was formulated in part to take account of this cross-cultural issue.) So, in assessing politeness, Chinese participants, for instance, evaluate both whether an appropriate degree of socially prescribed respect or deference has been expressed, as well as the extent to which the addressee's face needs are addressed discursively in any specific interaction (Lee-Wong, 2000; Usami, 2002). Lee-Wong shows, for instance, that sociocultural values such as 'sincerity,' 'respect,' and 'consideration' are crucially involved in a Chinese speaker's perception and conceptualization of the politeness. Moreover, in such societies the discursive expression of politeness generally involves the use of avoidance and mitigation strategies (i.e., Brown and Levinson's negative politeness strategies), and even address terms are extensively used in this way.

By contrast, in communities where social relationships are not marked so formally or encoded so explicitly in the grammar or lexicon, politeness is

expressed somewhat differently. Greek interactants' view of politeness, for instance, focuses around expressions of concern, consideration, friendliness, and intimacy, rather than imposition-avoidance and distance maintenance (Siafanou, 1992). Similarly, Bentahila and Davies (1989) claim that Moroccan Arabic culture places greater weight on positive politeness than does the British English culture, which often functions implicitly as the unacknowledged norm in politeness research. Overall, then, it is apparent that the area of the cross-cultural expression of linguistic politeness requires careful negotiation, with the ever-present danger of ethnocentric assumptions a constant potential minefield. Nonetheless, the burgeoning of research in this area in recent years, especially involving Asian researchers, suggests that better understandings of what is meant by linguistic politeness in different cultures are steadily being forged.

Impoliteness

Finally, a brief comment on impoliteness, which, despite being less researched, is at least as complex a matter as linguistic politeness. Watts comments that since breaches of politeness are salient, while conforming to politeness norms goes unnoticed, one would expect impoliteness to have attracted more attention than it has. He summarizes research on linguistic impoliteness in one brief paragraph (2003: 5), encompassing research on rude or even insulting behavior in a variety of communities, including middle-class white New Zealanders (Austin, 1990; see also Kuiper, 1991).

Austin draws on Relevance Theory to account for behavior perceived as intentionally rude. She introduced the useful term Face Attack Acts for what she calls "the dark side of politeness" (1990: 277), namely speech acts perceived as deliberately intended to insult the addressee. She provides a fascinating range of examples, including the following (from Austin, 1990: 282):

> (10) Context: Transactional interaction between
>   member of the business community and
>   well-educated middle-class woman
>   [the author, Paddy Austin].
>   A: Now that will be Miss, won't it?
>   B: No, Ms.
>   A. Oh, one of *those*.

Austin details the contextual inferencing which led her to interpret as an insult A's response to the information that she preferred the title Ms.

By contrast to such a subtle and indirect instance of impoliteness, one might think that swearing at someone would always qualify as impolite behavior, but there is a range of research illustrating that swearing serves many different functions and that even when addressed to another person, it may serve a positive politeness solidarity function, rather than acting as an insult (see, for example, Daly *et al.,* 2004).

Some researchers incorporate the analysis of politeness within the same theoretical framework as politeness. Indeed, Eelen (2001) and Watts (2003) use the formulation (im)politeness to signal this. Mills (2003: 124) stresses that impoliteness is not the polar opposite of politeness, but her discussion (2003: 135 ff) suggests that impoliteness can be dealt with using the same analytical concepts as those relevant to the analysis of politeness (appropriacy, face threat, social identity, societal stereotypes, community norms). So, for example, the utterances produced in the Prime Minister's Question Time in the English House of Commons do *not* qualify as impolite, despite superficially appearing as if they might, because they are generally assessed as perfectly appropriate in this context (2003: 127). Thomas (1995: 157) suggests some speech acts "seem almost inherently impolite": e.g., asking someone to desist from behavior considered very offensive; in such cases the linguistic choice made will be irrelevant to politeness judgments.

Where Next?

It seems likely that exploring what counts as linguistic impoliteness will prove a challenging area for future research. Formulating a satisfactory definition of impoliteness will certainly provide a challenge for those attempting to develop adequate theoretical frameworks, as well as providing a robust testing ground for claims of universality and cross-cultural relevance, always assuming, of course, that researchers accept these as legitimate and useful goals for future research in the area of pragmatics and politeness.

Another relatively recent development is the exploration of the broader concept of 'relational practice' (Fletcher, 1999; Locher, 2004). Both solidarity-oriented, positive politeness and distance-oriented, negative politeness are fundamental components of relational practice, and it seems likely that this will be another fruitful direction for future research in the area of linguistic politeness.

Finally, the use of different languages as strategic resources in balancing different social pressures is another area where insights into cross-cultural politeness seem likely to continue to emerge over the next decade.

See also: Grice, Herbert Paul; Neo-Gricean Pragmatics.

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Politics and Language: Overview

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Development of a New Field

In this overview to the section, we deal very briefly with the history of research on Language and Politics, as well as with fields that are not or are only very briefly covered in the entire section. Moreover, we propose working definitions of basic concepts fundamental to the whole field of research. Finally, we summarize some of the most important research strands according to topic-oriented questions arising out of the developments and changes in our globalized and globalizing societies.

The entries in this overview cover the most important research domains in the field of language and politics, both on a theoretical and on a methodological level. Thus, we cover aspects of classic and modern rhetoric up to more sociologically oriented methods, such as 'frame analysis,' as well as new and hybrid multimodal genres (the Internet). We also elaborate on such topics as politics and gender, ideology, discrimination, political speeches, and the representation of war.

History of Research in the Field of Language and Politics

The research on language in/and politics in the field of linguistics seems to be quite young, although rhetoric is one of the oldest academic disciplines and was already concerned with aspects of political communication in ancient times.

After World War II, Lasswell and Leites (1949) published one of the most important studies on quantitative semantics in the field of language and politics, developing approaches from communication and mass media research. The famous economist Friedrich von Hayek (1968) similarly discussed the impact of language on politics during his stay at the London School of Economics. In the same vein, research started in Central Europe, mainly in Germany, in the late 1940s.

Moreover, the novel *1984* by George Orwell most certainly was a significant point of departure for the development of the entire field (*see* **Newspeak**). Of course, all this research was influenced by the massive use of propaganda in World War II and in the emerging Cold War in the 1950s.

'Political linguistics' (*Politolinguistik*) is an attempt to integrate scientific research dealing with the analysis of political discourse into an academic discipline. Klein (1998) argued that the "linguistic study of political communication" is a subdiscipline of linguistics that developed mainly in the German-speaking area since the 1950s. He cited the critical linguistic research that started in the wake of National Socialism, as it was initiated by Klemperer (1947) and Sternberger *et al.* (1957) as paving the way for the new discipline. Because these studies provoked criticism for being inadequate from the perspective of linguistic theory, a new methodological approach emerged in the late 1960s. It drew on various linguistic subdisciplines (pragmatics, text linguistics, media research) and primarily pragmatic theories or theoretical concepts. Organizational academic structures have developed only recently: For example, the "*Arbeitsgemeinschaft Sprache in der*

Politik" was registered as a nonprofit organization in 1991 and has been organizing major conferences every two years since 1989.

Political linguistics was characterized by Burkhardt (1996) in a programmatic article as a "subdiscipline between linguistics and political science" that to a large extent still needed to be established. Its purpose was to remedy the confusion of concepts identified by him in this research field. Burkhardt proposed the use of 'political language' as the generic term comprising "all types of public, institutional and private talks on political issues, all types of texts typical of politics as well as the use of lexical and stylistic linguistic instruments characterizing talks about political contexts." It included talking about politics and political media language, as well as the so-called language of politics. Moreover, he suggested that a differentiation should be made between the 'language of politicians' and 'language in politics' as such. Burkhardt proposed the term 'political linguistics' (*Politolinguistik*) for the "hitherto nameless discipline" that was committed to studying political language (in the above sense).

Previous research in this field investigated, rather randomly, individual phenomena of political language. As particularly promising methods and techniques to be used for 'ideological reconstruction,' Burkhardt listed four different procedures: "lexical-semantic techniques" (analysis of catchwords and value words, of euphemisms, and of ideological polysemy); "sentence and text-semantic procedures" (e.g., analysis of tropes, of "semantic isotopes," and of integration and exclusion strategies); "pragmatic text-linguistic techniques" (i.e., analysis of forms of address, speech acts, allusions, presuppositions, conversation, argumentation, rhetoric, quotations, genres, and intertextuality); and finally 'semiotic techniques' (icon, symbol, and architecture-semiotic analysis). This catalogue of methods could be particularly useful as a checklist for the concrete task of analysts. In the future, Burkhardt suggested, political linguistics should go beyond studies critical of the present and aim at comparative analysis both in diachronic and intercultural terms so as to overcome the 'obsession' with politicians (i.e., to make not only the language of politicians but also the 'act of talking politics' the subject of study). In terms of 'bottom-up linguistics,' the voter was to become the subject of linguistic analysis as well.

As noted above, National-Socialist language, one of the important starting points for the study of language and politics, became the object of critical philological observations first by Viktor Klemperer (1947). Utz Maas was, however, the first linguist to subject the everyday linguistic practices of National Socialism (NS) to in-depth analysis: he used NS texts to exemplify his approach of '*Lesweisenanalyse*' (Maas, 1984). His historical "argumentation analysis" based on the theories of Foucault demonstrated how discourse is determined by society (i.e., in what may be termed 'a social practice').

In his detailed analysis of language practices during the NS regime between 1932 and 1938, Maas was able to show how the discourses in Germany were affected by NS ideology, which was characterized by social-revolutionary undertones. Nazi discourse had superseded almost all forms of language (practices), a fact that made it difficult for the individual who did not want to cherish the tradition of an unworldly Romanticism to use language in any critical–reflective way. Discourse in Maas's approach was understood as the result of 'collusion': the conditions of the political, social, and linguistic practices quasi-impose themselves behind the back of the subjects, while the actors do not "see through the game" (cf. also Bourdieu's notion of '*violence symbolique*').

Discourse analysis thus identifies the rules that make a text into a fascist text. In the same way as grammar characterizes the structure of sentences, discourse rules characterize utterances/texts that are acceptable within a certain social practice. The focus is not on NS language *per se,* but rather the aim is to record and analyze the spectrum of linguistic relations based on a number of texts dealing with various spheres of life in the Nazi period. These texts represent a complicated network of similarities that overlap and intersect. Therefore, it is also important to do justice to the 'polyphony' of texts resulting from the fact that social contradictions are inscribed into them. Texts from diverse social and political contexts (cooking recipes, local municipal provisions on agriculture, texts by NS politicians, and also by critics of this ideology, who were ultimately involved in the dominant discourse) are analyzed by Maas in a sample representative of almost all possible texts and genres of NS discourse; discourse is understood in the sense of linguistic 'staging' of a certain social practice.

Ehlich (1989) proposed different methodological approaches to "language during fascism," including content analyses, language statistics, historical philology, semantics, and stylistics based not only on linguistic–sociological approaches but also on 'argumentation analysis.' He stressed the central role of linguistic activity during fascism, in which verbal action was *de facto* limited to acclamation, whereas the contrafactual impression of self-motivated activity was created in a setting of mass communication. From a perspective of "linguistic pragmatics oriented towards societal analysis" (Ehlich, 1989: 31), he identified these characteristics of fascist

linguistic action: the strategy of making communication phatic; the propositional reduction of communication, which in turn is closely linked to the promise of a 'simple world'; the order as another central pattern of linguistic action characterized *inter alia* by the systematic elimination of the listener's decision and consciousness and implying a "mandatory speechlessness of the addressee"; linguistic actions serving the purpose of denunciation, which become extremely common, a fact that has decisive effects on elementary linguistic actions, such as jokes entailing life-threatening risks. Given this mental terror, many people demonstrated 'conformity' in their linguistic actions as a form of self-protection, and sometimes linguistic action turned into linguistic suffering mainly expressed by silence. Against this background, only a minority managed to transform suffering into linguistic resistance, which had to be anonymous and subversive.

Language and Politics/Language Policies/ Language Planning

The delimitation between different research areas and topics in the context of language and/in politics is by nature difficult, and the distinction between language and politics/language policies and language planning is blurred. Although this extensive area cannot be covered in detail in this section (*see* **Language Planning and Policy: Models**), it does highlight some basic facts about language policies.

Language policies deal with two main areas: (1) political measures targeted at an individual language (e.g., the prohibition of certain terms), or (2) the relations among different languages and their social importance, function, relevance in international communication, etc. Measures that target usage of an individual language influence the awareness of speakers by prohibiting or making mandatory the use of special terms and phrases or through the government regulation of language use. In general, imposing such measures requires extensive political power and can be done more easily in totalitarian political systems. The homogenization of language use in terms of regulating specific vocabularies and prohibiting specific modes of expression under the NS regime offers illustrative examples: the absurd racist categorization of people as 'Jews,' 'half-Jewish,' and 'quarter-Jewish' to prepare and justify the Holocaust; the use of cynical euphemisms like 'Crystal Night' for the pogrom of November, 1938; or defining 'Aryanization' as the expropriation of Jewish property organized by the state. These examples show that there is no clear-cut distinction between language and/in politics, on the one hand, and language policies, on the other hand. Another example is the systematic avoidance of the term *assimiljacja* (assimiliation) in the former Soviet

Union when describing the phenomenon of switching from a mother tongue (L1) into Russian. The phrase 'transition to the second mother tongue' (*vtoroij rodnoj jazyk*) was used instead, and thus a term with a negative connotation was replaced by one with a positive connotation (see Haarmann, 1987).

However, everyday language also shows that language and politics are two overlapping subjects, which is the focus of this article. Such terms and phrases as 'to make redundant,' 'Social Security scroungers,' 'economic migrants,' 'free-market economy,' and 'pay agreement adjustment' convey a specific approach to reality and are partly consciously created for this purpose. This also applies to word coining aimed at political correctness (Negro–black–nonwhite–colored–African–American, as well as 'ebonics' for the speech and language of African–American people). An important issue in this context is gender-neutral wording, which affects not only the vocabulary but also the morphology of a language (e.g., by inserting in German nouns a capital 'I' and adding a female ending; e.g. Arbeiter Innen '(wo) men workers').

Language policies pursued to reduce the impact of English on other languages are a recent development. In some countries, such as France and Poland, legislation has been adopted to prevent the spread of Anglicisms. In France, the "Act on the Use of the French Language" was passed in 1994 (Loi Toubon, Act No. 669/94 of August 1994), making the use of Anglicisms in specific contexts – at least theoretically – a punishable offense. A terminology committee at the ministerial level prepared proposals for replacing Anglicisms by words of French origin (e.g., *remue méninges* for brainstorming; *restovite* for fast food, or *bande promo* for video clip) and compiled a glossary with about 3000 terms. This measure of language planning also comes under the heading 'language and politics.' In Poland a law similar to that in France was passed in 1999; the 'Act on the Polish Language' stipulated that all names of goods and services have to in Polish. This measure can be classified as 'status planning.' The reasons given for adopting this law were the great importance of the Polish language for the national identity and the prevention *inter alia* of the 'vulgarization' of the Polish language, as the English version of this Act reads.

A second important aspect of language policies is concerned with the status and social function of languages. This area covers such issues as the social role and significance of languages or varieties of languages, language conflicts, language and identity, measures to grant specific languages used in a state, the status of an official language in the national territory, and measures to promote languages as languages of communication and foreign languages at the international level. Two different aspects of the social

function of languages have to be distinguished: (1) issues regarding language policy theory and language planning (language politics), and (2) issues concerning the concrete implementation of language policy measures adopted more or less consciously (language policies).

At the national level, governments may enact language policy and language planning measures, as well as legislation concerning the role and status of languages spoken by the inhabitants of the state (i.e., all measures concerning the standardization, use, and active promotion of these languages within and also outside the territory of the state). Even if no consciously planned measures are undertaken and if these phenomena are ignored or rejected, this *laissez-faire* policy can be classified as a language policy. Important questions relating to the status of languages include the following: Which language fulfills the function of a national language and of an official language used as a means of communication between the state and its citizens, which languages are used as languages of instruction, and which languages are taught as foreign languages?

International language policy is influenced by the status and the significance of different languages as a means of supranational and international communication; for example, as a supraregional or global language of communication or as official and working languages in international organizations, such as the UN, the Council of Europe, or NATO and in federations of states like the EU or the former USSR. Important questions in this area include the selection and use of language/s in negotiations between two or more states and the language/s of diplomacy, or of international agreements and treaties (authentic versions). Important issues in the arena of international language policy include phenomena of linguistic imperialism, the increasingly dominant role of English as an international *lingua franca*, models of supranational communication within the EU at the European level, linguistic phenomena in the wake of European labor migration, and the emergence of new allochthonous linguistic minorities in countries experiencing large waves of migration.

In the context of immigration and in connection with the increasing deconstruction of national states, with their dwindling influence on language policy, a change of paradigms in the perception of language and the state, and also language and the individual, has taken place in sociolinguistics. Individual multilingualism and social plurilingualism are now considered the standard – "monolingualism is curable," as the editors of the journal *Sociolinguistica* (Ammon *et al.*, 1997) put it. Foreign language policy (which languages are taught to what extent in

which countries?) as well as measures to promote the use of languages through foreign cultural policies and cultural institutes (e.g., the British Council, *Institut Français, Goethe Institut, Istituto Cervantes*) play a crucial role in international language policy.

Discourse/Text/Politics

In this section, we first define relevant concepts and terms used in research on language and politics, then pull together the most important characteristics of significantly different approaches, and finally present some of their most important findings and studies.

Research in the field of language and politics has expanded enormously in recent years (Fairclough, 1992; Blommaert and Verschueren, 1998; Reisigl and Wodak, 2001; Wodak, 2001a; Wodak, 2001b; Gruber *et al.*, 2003; Chilton, 2004). According to the underlying specific theoretical approach, the notion of discourse is defined in many different ways. Since the 1970s and 1980s, this notion has been subject to manifold semantic interpretations. These vague meanings have become part of everyday language use, a fact highlighted *inter alia* by Ehlich (2000), who also presented specific definitions of discourse that were linked to the British, French, and German research traditions. For example, in British research, the term 'discourse' is often used synonymously with the term 'text' (i.e., meaning authentic, everyday linguistic communication). The French *discours*, however, focuses more on the connection between language and thought; that is, the "creation and societal maintenance of complex knowledge systems" (Ehlich, 2000: 162). In German pragmatics, *Diskurs* denotes "structured sets of speech acts." Other possible definitions range from a "promiscuous use of 'text' and 'discourse'" (Ehlich, 2000), as found predominantly in Anglo-Saxon approaches, to a strict definition from the perspective of linguistic pragmatics (see Titscher *et al.*, 2000).

We endorse Lemke's (1995: 7) definition, which distinguishes between text and discourse in the following way:

> "When I speak about discourse in general, I will usually mean the social activity of making meanings with language and other symbolic systems in some particular kind of situation or setting.... On each occasion when the particular meanings, characteristic of these discourses are being made, a specific text is produced. Discourses, as social actions more or less governed by social habits, produce texts that will in some ways be alike in their meanings.... When we want to focus on the specifics of an event or occasion, we speak of the text; when we want to look at patterns, commonality, relationships that embrace different texts and occasions, we can speak of discourses."

The notion of politics is also defined in many different ways depending on the theoretical framework: It ranges from a wide extension of the concept according to which every social utterance or practice of the human as a *zoon politikon* is 'political' to a notion of politics referring only to the use of language by politicians in various settings and in political institutions:

> "On the one hand, politics is viewed as a struggle for power, between those who seek to assert their power and those, who seek to resist it. On the other hand, politics is viewed as cooperation, as the practices and institutions that a society has for resolving clashes of interest over money, influence, liberty, and the like" (Chilton, 2004: 3).

Chilton (2004) embraced an interactive view of politics, which cuts through both these dimensions mentioned above. This is also the perspective endorsed in this article.

Furthermore, it is important to define the political domains and the genres that are relevant in this field (in the sense of Bourdieu's theory of fields, habitus, and capitals). The most important domains are summarized in **Figure 1**.

The triangulatory discourse–historical approach is based on a concept of context that takes into account four levels; the first one is descriptive, whereas the other three levels are part of theories dealing with context (see **Figure 2**);

1. the immediate, language or text internal cotext
2. the intertextual and interdiscursive relationship among utterances, texts, genres, and discourses
3. the extralinguistic social/sociological variables and institutional frames of a specific 'context of situation' (Middle Range Theories)
4. the broader sociopolitical and historical contexts, in which the discursive practices are embedded and related.

Figure 1 Selected dimensions of discourse as social practice. (From Reisigl and Wodak, 2001: 38).

Figure 2 Levels of theories and linguistic analysis. (From Wodak and Meyer, 2001: 69).

The most salient feature of the definition of a discourse is the macrotopic, such as language policies. Interdiscursivity can be detected when, for example, an argument (taken from the discourse on immigration restrictions) is used while arguing for other policies to combat unemployment. Each macrotopic allows for many subtopics: Unemployment thus covers such subtopics as market, trade unions, social welfare, global market, hire and fire policies, and many more. Discourses are not closed systems at all; rather, they are open and hybrid. New subtopics can be created, and intertextuality and interdiscursivity allow for new fields of action and new genres. Discourses are realized in both genres and texts (*see* **Genres in Political Discourse**).

Inter/Trans/Multidisciplinarity

Research on language and/in politics is primarily inter- or transdisciplinary. The concepts 'theory' and 'interdisciplinarity' refer to the conceptual and disciplinary framework conditions of discourse–analytical research. Discourse analysis has concentrated on the process of theory formation and has emphasized the interdisciplinary nature of its research since its beginning (Weiss and Wodak, 2003). The plurality of theory and methodology can be highlighted as a specific strength of the research summarized in this overview. Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999: 16) described the eclectic nature of critical discourse analysis (CDA) as follows:

"We see CDA as bringing a variety of theories into dialogue, especially social theories on the one hand and linguistic theories on the other, so that its theory is a shifting synthesis of other theories, though what it itself theorizes in particular is the mediation between the social and the linguistic – the 'order of discourse,' the social structuring of semiotic hybridity (interdiscursivity). The theoretical constructions of discourse which CDA tries to operationalize can come from various disciplines, and the concept of 'operationalization' entails working in a transdisciplinary way where the logic of one discipline (for example, sociology) can be 'put to work' in the development of another (for example, linguistics)."

This statement underlines the direct connection between theory and interdisciplinarity or transdisciplinarity that is typical of discourse analysis.

The sociologist Helga Nowotny (1997: 188) outlined the concepts of inter/trans/pluri-disciplinarity briefly and very accurately:

"Pluri(multi-)disciplinarity shows in the fact that the manifold disciplines remain independent. No changes are brought about in the existing structures of disciplines and theories. This form of academic cooperation consists in treating a subject from differing disciplinary perspectives. Interdisciplinarity may be recognized in the explicit formulation of a standardized transdisciplinary terminology. This form of cooperation is used to treat different subjects within a framework of an interdisciplinary or transdisciplinary design. Transdisciplinarity manifests itself when research across the isciplinary landscape is based on a common axiomatic theory and the interpenetration of disciplinary research methods. Cooperation leads to a bundling or clustering of problem-solving approaches rooted in different disciplines and drawing on a pool of theories."

Current Research in Language and Politics

Some Research Dimensions

Having reviewed the relevant theoretical concepts and studies, we present here a summary of the important research issues:

- How widely or narrowly should political action (or political language behavior) be defined? Should it be restricted to the study of traditional political genres (like speeches, slogans, debates), or are all everyday actions in some way 'political'?
- What is the role of the political elites? Who determines political issues? Is it thus important to investigate the media; the rhetoric of politicians, teachers, and scholars, as well as managers; or the language used by 'men and women on the street' and their respective belief systems? This question leads to the debate about possible causalities: whether it is top down or bottom up. Do people believe what the politicians (media) tell them, or do the citizens influence the slogans in an election campaign? What about grassroots movements?
- Politics is tied to ideologies, party programs, opinion leaders, and political interests. How do ideologies and belief systems manifest themselves in various genres of political discourse? How are *topoi* and arguments recontextualized through various genres and public spaces? (*see* **Rhetorical Tropes in Political Discourse**).
- What are the main functions of political discourses? To answer this question, we have to examine strategies of persuasion, negotiation, polarization, etc. On the one hand, politics serves to find consensus and compromises and to make decisions. On the other hand, politics leads to wars and conflicts (*see* **Metaphors in Political Discourse**). How do power structures influence decision-making strategies?
- Finally, what are the main settings where political practices take place ('doing politics')? How do the structures of various organizations and institutions influence political discourses?

There are certainly many more related questions, such as the influence of globalizing processes on language change or changes in political rhetoric and its functions over time (*see* Kovács and Wodak, 2003).

Critical Linguistics and Critical Discourse Analysis and the Analysis of Political Discourses

The terms 'Critical Linguistics' (CL) and 'Critical Discourse Analysis' (CDA) are often used interchangeably.

CL developed in the 1970s and 1980s, primarily at the University of East Anglia, around the work of Roger Fowler, Tony Trew, and Gunther Kress. In more recent research, it seems that the term CDA is preferred and is used to denote the theory formerly identified as CL. CDA sees "language as social practice" (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997) and considers the context of language use to be crucial (Weiss and Wodak, 2003; Wodak and Weiss, 2004). Moreover, CDA takes a particular interest in the relation between language and power. CDA research specifically considers institutional, political, gender, and media discourses (in the broadest sense) that testify to more or less overt relations of struggle and conflict (*see* **Critical Discourse Analysis**).

The shared perspective of CL and CDA relates to the term 'critical,' which in the work of some 'critical linguists' could be traced to the influence of the Frankfurt School or of Jürgen Habermas. The continuity between CL and CDA is visible mostly in the claim that discourses are ideological and that there is no arbitrariness of signs. Functional–systemic linguistics has proven to be most important for the text analysis undertaken by CL (see Halliday, 1978).

CL and CDA are rooted in classical rhetoric, text linguistics, and sociolinguistics, as well as in applied linguistics and pragmatics. The objects under investigation by the various departments and scholars who apply CDA differ, although gender issues, issues of racism, media discourses, the rise of right-wing populism, and dimensions of identity politics have become very prominent (*see* **Media, Politics and Discourse Interactions; Gender and Political Discourse; Newspeak**). The methodologies used also differ greatly: Small qualitative case studies can be found, as well as large data corpora, drawn from fieldwork and ethnographic research.

CL and CDA may be defined as fundamentally interested in analyzing both opaque and transparent structural relationships of dominance, discrimination, power, and control as manifested in language. Four concepts figure indispensably in all CDA work: the concepts of critique, power; history; and ideology (*see* **Gender and Political Discourse**).

The notion of critique carries very different meanings: Some adhere to the Frankfurt School and others to a notion of literary criticism or to Marx's notions (see Reisigl and Wodak, 2001 for an overview). Ideology is seen as an important aspect of establishing and maintaining unequal power relations. For Eagleton (1994), the study of ideology must consider the variety of theories and theorists who have examined the relation between thought and social reality. All these theories assume "that there are specific historical reasons why people come to feel, reason, desire and imagine as they do" (Eagleton, 1994: 15).

For CDA, language is not powerful on its own: Rather, it gains power by the use powerful people make of it. Thus, CDA focuses on processes of inclusion and exclusion, of access to relevant domains of our societies. Moreover, CDA emphasizes the need for interdisciplinary work in order to gain a proper understanding of how language functions in, for example, constituting and transmitting knowledge, organizing social institutions, or exercising power.

Texts are seen as sites of struggle in that they show traces of differing discourses and ideologies ('voices' in the Bakhtinian sense), contending and struggling for dominance. Not only the struggles for power and control but also the intertextuality and recontextualization of competing discourses are closely attended to in CDA.

Different Theoretical Approaches Concerning Discourse and Politics

Fairclough set out the social theories underpinning CDA, and as in other early critical linguistic work, a variety of textual examples are analyzed to illustrate the field, its aims, and methods of analysis. Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999) showed not only how the analytical framework for investigating language in relation to power and ideology developed but also how CDA is useful in disclosing the discursive nature of much contemporary social and cultural change. They particularly scrutinized the language of the mass media as a site of power and of struggle and also where language is apparently transparent. Media institutions often purport to be neutral in that they provide space for public discourse, they reflect states of affairs disinterestedly, and they give the perceptions and arguments of the newsmakers. Fairclough showed the fallacy of such assumptions by illustrating the mediating and constructing role of the media with a variety of examples.

van Dijk and Kintsch (1983) considered the relevance of discourse to the study of cognitive language processing. Their development of a cognitive model of discourse comprehension gradually developed into cognitive models for explaining the construction of meaning on a societal level. The notion of 'strategy' proved to be fruitful for a number of studies on language and politics (see below).

In critically analyzing various kinds of discourses that encode prejudice, van Dijk was interested in developing a theoretical model that explained cognitive discourse processing mechanisms related to the production and reproduction of racism. Most recently, van Dijk (2004) has focused on elaborating models of context and knowledge.

The Duisburg School of CDA draws on Foucault's notion of discourse, on the one hand, and Alexej N. Leont'ev's "speech activity theory" (Leontjew, 1984) and Jürgen Link's "collective symbolism" (Link, 1988), on the other hand. As institutionalized and conventionalized speech modes, discourses express societal power relations, which in turn are affected by discourses. This 'overall discourse' of society, which could be visualized as a "*diskursives Gewimmel*" (literally, discursive swarming), becomes manifest in different 'discourse strands' (comprising discourse fragments of the same subject) at different discourse levels (science, politics, media, etc.). Every discourse is historically embedded and has repercussions on current and future discourse. In addition to the above levels, the structure of discourse may be dissected into special discourse vs. interdiscourse; discursive events and discursive context; discourse position; overall societal discourse and interwoven discourses; themes and bundles of discourse strands; and the history, present, and future of discourse strands. These fragments are analyzed in five steps – institutional framework, text 'surface,' linguistic–rhetoric means, programmatic-ideological messages, and interpretation – for which concrete questions regarding the text are formulated.

For example, the discourse of the so-called New Right in Germany was analyzed by Jäger and Jäger (1993), who based their research on different right-wing print media. They identified important common characteristics – specific symbols, 'ethnopluralism' [apartheid], aggressiveness, and antidemocratic attitudes – as well as significant linguistic and stylistic differences relating to the different target groups of the newspapers.

The combination of political science and political philosophy (predominantly with a strong Marxist influence) and of French linguistics is typical of French discourse analysis. Essentially, two different approaches may be distinguished.

The first is 'political lexicometry,' a computer-aided statistical approach to political lexicon developed at the Ecole Normale Supérieure at Saint-Cloud. A text corpus (e.g., texts of the French Communist Party) is prepared. Texts are then compared on the basis of the relative frequency of specific words. One study shows, for example, how the relative frequency of the words '*travailleur*' and '*salarié*' varies significantly among French trade unions, reflecting different political ideologies; it also shows how that frequency changes over time (Groupe de Saint-Cloud, 1982).

Althusser's theory on ideology and Foucault's theory were major points of reference for the second approach in French discourse analysis, notably the work of Michel Pêcheux (1982). Discourse is the place where language and ideology meet, and discourse analysis is the analysis of ideological dimensions of

language use and of the materialization in language of ideology. Both the words used and the meanings of words vary according to the position in the class struggle from which they are used; in other words, according to the 'discursive formation' within which they are located. For instance, the word 'struggle' itself is particularly associated with a working class political voice, and its meaning in that discursive formation is different from its meanings when used from other positions.

Pêcheux's main focus was political discourse in France, especially the relationship between social-democratic and Communist discourses within left political discourse. He emphasized the ideological effects of discursive formations in positioning people as social subjects. Echoing Althusser, he suggested that people are placed in the 'imaginary' position of being sources of their discourse, whereas actually their discourse and indeed they themselves are the effects of their ideological positioning. The sources and processes of their own positioning are hidden from people, who are typically not aware of speaking/writing from within a particular discursive formation. Moreover, the discursive formations within which people are positioned are themselves shaped by the 'complex whole in dominance' of discursive formations, which Pêcheux called 'interdiscourse'; however, people are not aware of that shaping. Radical change in the way people are positioned in discourse can only come from political revolution.

In the 1980s, the influence of Michel Foucault increased, as did that of Mikhael Bakhtin. Studies began to emphasize the complex mixing of discursive formations in texts and the heterogeneity and ambivalence of texts (for example, see Courtine, 1981).

An increased recognition of the contribution of all aspects of the communicative context to text meaning, as well as a growing awareness in media studies of the importance of nonverbal aspects of texts, has focused attention on semiotic devices in discourse other than linguistic ones. In particular, the theory put forward by Kress and van Leeuwen (1996) provided a useful framework for considering the communicative potential of visual devices in the media. This research is closely related to the role and status of semiotic practices in society, which is currently undergoing change because, increasingly, global corporations and semiotic technologies, rather than national institutions, are regulating semiotic production and consumption.

This emphasis on regulatory practices has led to a three-stage research approach, starting with the analysis of a particular category of texts, cultural artifacts, or communicative events; then moving to a second set of texts (and/or cultural artifacts and/or communicative events) – namely those that seek to regulate the production and consumption of the first set; and finally moving to a third set of texts, namely actual instances of producing or consuming texts (etc.) belonging to the first set. This type of work creates a particular relation among discourse analysis, ethnography, history, and theory in which these disciplines are no longer contributing to the whole through some kind of indefinable synergy or triangulation, but are complementary in quite specific ways.

In the last few years, Jay Lemke's work has emphasized multimedia semiotics, multiple timescales, and hypertexts/traversals. He extended his earlier work on embedded ideologies in social communication from an analysis of verbal texts to an integration of verbal texts with visual images and other presentational media, with a particular focus on evaluative meanings. His work has emphasized the implicit value systems and their connections to institutional and personal identity. In all this work, Lemke uses critical social semiotics as an extension of critical discourse analysis, combined with models of the material base of emergent social phenomena. His concern is with social and cultural change: how it happens, how it is constrained, and the ways in which is it expectably unpredictable (Lemke, 1995).

Lemke's latest work has developed the idea that, although we tell our lives as narratives, we experience them as hypertexts. Building on research on the semantic resources of hypertext as a medium, he proposed that postmodern lifestyles are increasingly liberated from particular institutional roles and that we tend to move, on multiple timescales, from involvement in one institution to another; we create new kinds of meaning, being less bound to fixed genres and registers, as we 'surf' across channels, websites, and lived experiences. This lifestyle is seen as a new historical development that does not supplant institutions, but rather builds up new sociocultural possibilities on top and over them. These new lifestyles imply new forms of participation in politics as well as in the media.

The problem that Ron and Suzie Wong Scollon address in their recent work is how to build a formal theoretical and a practical link between discourse and action. Theirs is an activist position that uses tools and strategies of engaged discourse analysis in taking action and thus requires a formal analysis of how its own actions can be accomplished through discourse and its analysis. Ron Scollon's (2001) recent work furthers the idea developed in *Mediated discourse: the nexus of practice* that practice in general is understood most usefully as many separate practices that are linked in a nexus, an overlap of topical discourses. The relations between discourse and a nexus of

practice are many and complex and rarely direct. His current interest is in trying to open up and explicate these linkages through 'nexus analysis.' The focus of his recent work has been to theorize the link between indexicality in language (and discourse and semiotics more generally) and the indexable in the world. This could also be described as theorizing the link between producers of communications and the material world in which those communications are placed as a necessary element of their semiosis. Ron Scollon is applying this model of analysis to the 'discursive politics of food production and to the discourses of environmental politics.'

The study in which the discourse–historical approach was actually first developed tried to trace in detail the constitution of an anti-Semitic stereotyped

image or '*Feindbild*,' as it emerged in public discourse in the 1986 Austrian presidential campaign of Kurt Waldheim (Wodak *et al.*, 1990). The discourse about the Waldheim Affair spread to different fields of political action, involving many different genres and topics. **Figure 3** illustrates in simplified terms the discourse and the most relevant relationships among fields of action, genres, and discourse topics.

To illustrate this context-dependent approach, we present some of the many layers of discourse investigated in the study of the Waldheim Affair. During the 1986 election, Waldheim had at first denied active involvement with Nazism and Nazi military operations in the Balkans.

To contradict his assertion, there were documents of the *Wehrmacht* about the war in the Balkans in

Figure 3 The discourse about the Waldheim Affair. (From Wodak, 2004: 192).

general, as well as documents relating specifically to Waldheim's activities there. There were also several statements and interviews with *Wehrmacht* veterans who had served with Waldheim. One step removed from these materials was the research by historians on the Balkan war in general and on Waldheim's war-time role in particular. At still another level there was the reporting in Austrian newspapers on the Balkan war, on Waldheim's past, and on historical research into the war and Waldheim's role in it. There were reports in newspapers on Waldheim's own explanation of his past; in addition, all these previously mentioned aspects were reported in foreign newspapers, especially in *The New York Times*. Simultaneously, the press releases and documents of the World Jewish Congress provided an autonomous informational and discursive source. Finally, there were statements of and interviews with politicians, as well as the '*vox populi*,' on all these topics.

Though sometimes tedious and very time consuming, such a discourse–historical approach allowed us to record the varying perceptions, selections, and distortions of information. As a result, we were able to trace in detail the constitution of an anti-Semitic stereotyped image or '*Feindbild*' of 'the others' as it emerged in public discourse in Austria in 1986.

The discourse–historical approach has been elaborated further in several more recent studies; for example, in studies on right-wing populist rhetoric, as developed by Jörg Haider and the Freedom Party in Austria on discourses about coming to terms with traumatic pasts; and on the discursive construction of national and European Identities (Wodak *et al.*, 1999; Martin and Wodak, 2003; Wodak and Weiss, 2004). Particularly, the mediation between context and text has been elaborated further (see **Figure 2**).

Questions of identity politics are becoming increasingly important in societies full of tensions between globalizing processes and nationalistic trends (who is included and who is excluded). Five questions have proven to be relevant for new theoretical and methodological approaches:

1. How are persons named and referred to linguistically?
2. What traits, characteristics, qualities, and features are attributed to them?
3. By means of what arguments and argumentation schemes do specific persons or social groups try to justify and legitimize the inclusion/exclusion of others?
4. From what perspective or point of view are these labels, attributions, and arguments expressed?
5. Are the respective utterances articulated overtly, are they even intensified, or are they mitigated?

To answer these questions, we are especially interested in five types of discursive strategies, which are all involved in the positive self- and negative other-presentation. We view, and this needs to be emphasized, the discursive construction of 'US' and 'THEM' as the basic fundaments of discourses of identity and difference.

By 'strategy' we generally mean a more or less accurate and more or less intentional plan of practices (including discursive practices), adopted to achieve a particular social, political, psychological, or linguistic aim. We locate the discursive strategies – that is to say, systematic ways of using language – at different levels of linguistic organization and complexity (see **Table 1**).

For example, when analyzing patterns of exclusion/inclusion, we have to demonstrate how certain

Table 1 Discursive strategies for positive self- and negative other-representation

Strategy	Objectives	Devices
Referential/nomination	Construction of in-groups and out-groups	Membership categorization Biological, naturalizing and depersonalizing Metaphors and metonymies Synecdoches (*pars pro toto, totum pro pars*)
Predication	Labeling social actors more or less positively or negatively, deprecatorily or appreciatively	Stereotypical, evaluative attributions of negative or positive traits Implicit and explicit predicates
Argumentation	Justification of positive or negative attributions	*Topoi* used to justify political inclusion or exclusion, discrimination or preferential treatment
Perspectivation, framing, or discourse representation	Expressing involvement Positioning speaker's point of view	Reporting, description, narration, or quotation of events and utterances
Intensification, mitigation	Modifying the epistemic status of a proposition	Intensifying or mitigating the illocutionary force of utterances

From Wodak (2001b: 73).

utterances realized through linguistic devices point to extralinguistic contexts, diachronically and synchronically. Moreover, the strategies for positive self- and negative other-presentation are systematically used in constructing discourses on identity and discrimination at all levels of group formation (local, regional, national, transnational, and global).

Perspectives

Questions of identity politics are always tied to issues of difference and discrimination, as well as globalizing and localizing processes. One the one hand, we observe enormous complexity; on the other hand, we see tendencies to simplify through dichotomizing strategies. Righturing populist discourses employ *inter alia* such simplifying strategies. Ongoing research is taking these tensions, contradictions, and new tendencies into account.

See also: Critical Discourse Analysis; Dialogism, Bakhtinian; Gender and Political Discourse; Genres in Political Discourse; Linguistic Habitus; Media, Politics and Discourse Interactions; Metaphors in Political Discourse; Newspeak; Text and Text Analysis.

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Politics of Teaching

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Introduction

This article examines the role of politics in applied linguistics and second language teaching. It begins with the traditional, mainstream understanding of the interface between politics and applied linguistics, i.e., language policy and planning, and moves from there to the rise since the 1990s of an alternative view of that interface, i.e., critical applied linguistics. The characteristics and positions of critical applied linguistics are outlined, and the major domains of applied linguistics such as international English and English for academic purposes are discussed from the perspectives of both mainstream and critical applied linguistics.

The Politics of Mainstream Applied Linguistics

Language Policy and Planning

The branch of mainstream applied linguistics inextricably tied to politics and sociopolitical relations is language policy and planning (LPP). Indeed, as Kaplan and Baldauf pointed out, LPP may be considered the *ne plus ultra* of applied linguistics in society, or, as they put it, "linguistics applied" (1997: 307),

and Kaplan has advocated an active role for applied linguists in the sociopolitical processes of LPP (2001: 9). Possible methods of political activism include forming interest groups, attending and participating in meetings of the board of education and/or the state assembly, writing position papers, serving as professional consultants, and working to inform and affect public opinion about language-based issues, e.g., through letters to the editor or websites – in short, utilizing whatever mechanisms for influence and change that one's political system provides.

LPP deals with issues of language decision making, implementation, and evaluation at every level of society, from local to national, and these issues are always directly or indirectly political. They are directly political when local, state, or federal governments engage in formal debate and legislation in an attempt to mediate or resolve questions of language in society. But even when governments do not become formally involved in language policy, opting instead for a *laissez-faire* approach, language issues are nonetheless indirectly political because they affect the lives of individuals and groups in all but the most linguistically homogeneous societies. In addition, it may be said that government nonintervention in matters of language is itself a language policy, though a tacit rather than a formal one, and, generally speaking, as societies with histories of governmental nonintervention become increasingly heterogeneous

and/or find linguistic minority groups challenging the tacit language policy, governments will feel compelled by public pressure to deal directly with matters of language policy. This has been the case in the United States, which on one hand has no formal language policy at the federal level, but on the other hand has seen local and state governments legislate English as the official language.

A look at some of the typical questions asked in LPP clearly shows their inherent sociopolitical and socioeconomic nature, involving, as they do, crucial matters of national identity, linguistic advantage, educational opportunity, social relations, political participation, and fiscal resources:

1. What is/are/should be the national and/or official language(s) of the society?
2. What is/should be the role of minority language(s)?
3. Which language(s) should be taught in schools, e.g., the national/official language only? the native language(s) of linguistic minority groups? a language of international communication, e.g., English, Spanish, French?
4. What are/should be the goals of minority and foreign language instruction, e.g., equality of status between the majority and minority languages of the society? oral communicative competence in a foreign language or literacy proficiency only?
5. When does/should instruction in the minority and foreign languages begin, how much time during the school day is/should be devoted to language instruction, and how many years does/should it continue?
6. Are there sufficient numbers of trained teachers proficient in the languages of instruction to carry out the mandated policies? What are the plans and procedures for producing trained teachers?

Researchers employ a variety of techniques to investigate questions such as these, and despite the multidisciplinary nature of LPP, which draws from fields with their own research traditions and trends, e.g., anthropology, economics, education, political science, and sociolinguistics, we can identify some of the most common LPP research methodologies (Kaplan and Baldauf, 1997; Baldauf, 2002):

1. Quantitative studies in the form of surveys and questionnaires in order to determine as accurately as possible the number of languages and dialects spoken in the society, and by how many people each one is spoken.
2. Discourse analyses of the uses and patterns of communication in the various linguistic communities, including patterns of literacy as well as speech. Discourse studies help to inform language-in-education planning for both linguistic majority and minority groups (Hornberger, 1995).
3. Historical analyses of the development, roles, and relationships of the languages in the society, since history and historical memories have a significant effect on the success or failure of LPP, e.g., Aboriginal languages *vis-à-vis* English in Australia.
4. Quantitative and qualitative studies of language attitudes among groups in the society. Attitudes need to be taken into account, particularly in language-in-education planning, in order to understand, for example, the hopes and desires of linguistic minority parents for their children, e.g., whether they want their children to be educated bilingually, or in the national/official/ dominant language of the society, and/or in a language of wider communication, such as English.
5. Longitudinal studies evaluating the processes and outcomes of LPP and language-in-education planning. Although both ideal and necessary, long-term evaluative studies in all areas of applied linguistics, including LPP, tend to be scarce. Only with the aid of longitudinal empirical studies, however, can adjustments and improvements in policy and planning be made.

To illustrate the complex sociopolitical, socioeconomic, and sociocultural realities of LPP, the language situation of the southeast African country of Mozambique will be described in brief in the next section.

Mozambique An independent country since 1975 after nearly five centuries as a Portuguese colony, Mozambique is a highly linguistically diverse nation, with 39 languages listed in the 2004 online database of *Ethnologue: languages of the world*. Almost all are Bantu languages, but the total also includes Portuguese, Chinese, and languages of India and Pakistan. No language is spoken by a majority of the population of over 16 million.

When Mozambique became independent in 1975, Portuguese continued as the *de facto* official language, since it was already the language of government and administration from colonial history. Only in the 1990 revised version of the constitution, however, was Portuguese formally declared the official language, not only because it was already unofficially in place in that capacity but because of its perceived national unifying effect on this highly multilingual nation ravaged by 16 years of civil war. Native speakers of Portuguese constitute approximately 3% of the population, and an estimated 40% speak and understand

the language at varying levels of proficiency, a percentage corresponding to the estimated literacy rate. Portuguese is the language of instruction in the public school system, with English introduced as a required foreign language at the secondary level, and French offered at the secondary level only for certain specified university majors in the humanities and social sciences.

The rewriting of the constitution in 1990 also represented a significant turning point in the official language policy of Mozambique in that for the first time the issue of the country's indigenous languages was directly addressed: "The State shall value the national languages and promote their development and their growing usage as vehicular languages and in the education of citizens" (Lopes, 1999: 104). It is doubtful whether this clause would have been included had it not been for the ongoing debates and discussions about Mozambican languages in relation to Portuguese that took place in the Ministry of Education and the Office of the Secretary of State for Culture in the 1970s and 1980s. In addition, efforts by language professionals and others committed to the recognition of indigenous languages led to a conference in 1988 called the 1st Seminar on the Standardization of Orthography of Mozambican Languages, with a report of the meeting published the following year, and the subsequent influence on the writers of the revised constitution a year after that.

The wording of the clause in the constitution suggested two courses of action: (1) the development of the indigenous languages of Mozambique in the direction of literacy, e.g., vocabulary expansion, grammar usage, standardized spelling, etc.; and (2) the development and implementation of bilingual education programs to give all language groups in the society equality of opportunity. Both implications also pointed to the need for the services of linguists and applied linguists trained in methodology, materials development, and language-in-education planning.

However, the reality of the language situation in Mozambique has presented difficulties to this day in carrying out the goals expressed in the statement of the revised constitution. According to Lopes (1999), parents of school-age children want Portuguese and English proficiency for their children, not their native Bantu languages, for they see Portuguese and English as means to upward mobility; thus, "consciousness raising and improvement of attitudes toward indigenous languages" (Lopes, 1999: 100) need to take place before bilingual education programs can be successfully implemented. In addition, Mozambique already suffers from a shortage of qualified teachers in the present Portuguese-based system, which raises a formidable obstacle, both in terms of human and fiscal

resources, for the training of bilingual teachers in the indigenous languages of the country. Despite the difficulties, however, five bilingual education programs at the primary level were developed in the 1990s, as well as an adult literacy bilingual program for women. Both projects have drawn on the expertise of linguists and applied linguists for materials development and methodology, and while it is still too early to judge the outcomes of these programs, it is an encouraging sign that the indigenous languages and peoples of Mozambique are beginning to receive the official recognition and attention they deserve.

The Politics of Critical Applied Linguistics

Critical Theory

Critical applied linguistics is an alternative, oppositional approach to mainstream applied linguistics. It derives its name from critical theory, the umbrella term for the neo-Marxist-based work that originated in the 1930s at what has come to be known as the Frankfurt school, i.e., the Institute for Social Research at the University of Frankfurt, Germany. The members of the Frankfurt school themselves called their mix of theory, research, and philosophy 'critical theory,' for their intent was to critically analyze capitalist society, culture, and Western civilization, and to find ways of making a revised form of Marxism viable. The contemporary influence of the Frankfurt school reached its height in the 1960s and early 1970s, for example with the writings of Habermas (1972), and then the focus of attention in critical theory shifted to the work of French intellectuals, such as Foucault (1980) and Bourdieu (1991).

As an umbrella term, critical theory encompasses a broad range of concepts in areas such as linguistics, philosophy, literary theory, cultural studies, legal studies, and gender studies. Despite its diversity, however, we can identify some common core words and tenets borrowed from the vocabulary of Marxism, updated by theories of poststructuralism and postmodernism, reshaped by the realities of global capitalism and postcolonialism, and shared by critical theorists in all disciplines:

1. Ideology and the status quo. Critical theory starts with the assumption that societies are based on ideology, defined as the dominant systems of values, beliefs, attitudes, preferences, and structures (social, political, economic, legal, educational, religious, etc.) in a society. What is often called culture in noncritical perspectives is subsumed under the all-encompassing term 'ideology' in critical theory, and to accept the ideology of one's society is to acquiesce to the *status quo*.

2. Critique. In accordance with its name and origins, critique is the first analytic step in critical theory, the purpose of which is to deconstruct ideology, defined by critical theorists as all foundational principles, assumptions, and models of society.

3. Problematicization, contestation, power, transformation. Critique, which analyzes, leads to problematicization, which questions and challenges, and then to contestation, which resists and opposes. What is always critiqued, problematicized, and contested is power, for power relations in society inevitably mean hierarchy, with social, political, economic, educational, racial, ethnic, or sexual privilege for some and inequality for others. The ultimate goal of critical theory is social transformation, i.e., the elimination of inequality, through the work of "transformative intellectuals" (Aronowitz and Giroux, 1993: 45), and in this, critical applied linguistics is very much an outgrowth of critical theory.

4. Discourse(s). The concept of discourse was brought to the fore by Foucault (1980), and it refers to the construction and organization of systems of knowledge, meaning, and identity. Often used in the plural to reflect their multiplicity and not meant to be limited solely to the system of language, discourses are seen as assigning and mediating social values to all aspects of human interaction, e.g., speech, writing, images, gestures. In addition, according to Foucault (1980), discourses are systems of power and knowledge, which means that not only do we construct discourses but discourses construct us as subjects in dominant or nondominant power positions. Dominant discourses, however, can always be contested, and "the counter-discourse always projects, just over its own horizon, the dream of victoriously replacing its antagonist" (Terdiman, 1985: 56).

Language Policy and Planning

Critical applied linguistics places politics at the center of its framework, but, unlike mainstream LPP, it rejects the traditional meaning of the word 'politics,' which is typically understood to be concerned with the activities and affairs of government and its associated institutions. Pennycook made the rejection explicit:

> Language policy [is] sometimes taken to represent the political focus of applied linguistics [re] governmental decisions about the use and status of languages. Yet I want to resist this view that politics has to do with policy making or with the more formal domains of politics . . . (2001: 27)

Instead, politics is generalized to become synonymous with power, a key operative word in critical theory.

This expansion of the concept of politics leads to the assertion found in every critical perspective that everything is political because power, and, with it, inequality, exist in all currently constituted social and institutional relations. Thus, Tollefson (2002: 4), was critical of mainstream LPP, while also acknowledging its widespread acceptance as the norm, for "too often accept[ing] uncritically the claims of state authorities" or, in other words, for not engaging in the problematicization and contestation of linguistic power relations. For example, he did not accept the view that language policies are put into place "to enhance communication, to encourage feelings of national unity and group cooperation, and to bring about great social and economic equality" (2002: 5). Rather, he and other critical applied linguists, e.g., Luke and Baldauf (1990), argued that such assertions are merely covers for the *status quo*, and they criticize LPP for working within systems of dominant ideologies, thereby contributing to elitism, inequality, the privileging of Western-style models of development, and the repression or even extinction ("linguistic genocide," Skutnabb-Kangas, 2000a) of multilingualism and multiculturalism.

One response by specialists in mainstream LPP to these charges has been that critical approaches critique, problematicize, and contest LPP, but do not offer workable and productive alternatives to put in their place (Fishman, 1994). Another has been that the language policies that are actually carried out in societies are seldom based on knowledgeable language planning theory, thus creating a large gap between informed analysis on one hand, and sociopolitical, socioeconomic, and sociolinguistic practices on the other. Another response has been that, while LPP methods can be improved, the underlying issues "raised by this [post-structuralist and neo-Marxist] criticism cannot be fully rectified, even were society to be entirely overturned and rebuilt. Authorities will continue to be motivated by self-interest. New structural inequalities will inevitably arise to replace the old ones" (Fishman, 1994: 98). If so, there is always the danger of exchanging one powerful group for another, particularly if the new group in power bears resentments over its former subordinate position and is eager to settle scores.

Finally, there is the concern that ideological motivations in LPP can lead to unintended negative consequences, or "unplanned language planning" (Eggington, 2002). Critical theorists who have accepted "the postmodern notion that ideologies of power inform and control every action, regardless of any attempts to create objective, or scientific, procedures in the language planning process" (Eggington, 2002: 410) are often unmindful of real world, human

factors that can, and probably will, thwart an ideological course of action, to the detriment of the people it was designed to help. Eggington (2002: 410) cited the demand for "linguistic human rights" (Skutnabb-Kangas, 2000b: 22) as an example of an "ideologically driven template". Linguistic human rights takes the position that all linguistic minority children should be granted the right to learn and be educated in their parents' native languages. As Eggington pointed out, the attempts to implement this ideology in the form of bilingual education programs have proven to be largely a failure because the ideological mindset behind them failed to foresee or take into account the human elements involved, e.g., the wishes of the parents for their children, the difficulties of training sufficient numbers of bilingual teachers, and the costs of establishing, maintaining, and ensuring quality programs.

Second Language Teaching

English as an International Language Historically, applied linguistics has been linked to second language (L2) teaching; consequently, critical applied linguistics has also given considerable attention to the sociopolitical critique of L2 education, in particular the role and position of English as an international language. In mainstream applied linguistics, the global expansion of English tends to be seen as either beneficial or neutral (Crystal, 1997). The English-as-beneficial position points to the advantages of having a worldwide lingua franca for international communication, while the English-as-neutral position considers it a utilitarian phenomenon resulting from events and processes that have been decades, if not centuries, in the making – and a phenomenon that may not survive long term, as has historically been the case with other languages of wider communication, e.g., Latin.

For critical applied linguistics, English is the international language of communication not for historical and now commercial, scientific, technological, diplomatic, and travel reasons, but rather for ideological, imperialistic, hegemonic, capitalistic – in short, political – reasons (Pennycook, 1994). Viewing language as inextricably tied to power, class, and socioeconomic relations, critical applied linguists reject the idea that global English can be regarded as either beneficial or neutral. In response to the former, they ask, "Beneficial for whom?" and their answer is that only the powerful and privileged elites in the world are advantaged by international English, whereas the less powerful or powerless are increasingly marginalized by not having access to English. In response to the English-as-neutral point of view,

critical applied linguists assert that there is no such thing as a neutral position, and that accepting the role of English in the world without a struggle is "an uncritical endorsement of capitalism, its science and technology, a modernization ideology, … the Americanization and homogenization of world culture, linguistic culture, and media imperialism" (Phillipson, 1999: 274). An extension of the charge of imperialism is that in attaining linguistic dominance, English has contributed to the diminishment and death of other languages, as globalization, mediated above all through English, swallows up local cultures and languages, while educational systems throughout the world require students to study English at the expense of their local, indigenous languages.

Although English is currently the ascendant international language, indictments against the effects of its power can also be made against other major languages of the world. The dominance of Chinese (Mandarin Chinese), for example, has threatened the survival of at least 20 local languages in China. Spanish and Portuguese have contributed to the extinction or near-extinction of dozens of indigenous languages in Mexico and Central and South America. The power of Russian in Siberia has caused the disappearance of nearly all of the 40 local languages there. Moreover, Russian was so oppressively imposed on educational systems in the former Soviet Union that after its break-up one of the first acts of the newly independent eastern European countries was to replace Russian with English as a second language in the schools. And to this day France and Germany spend millions to promote French and German language and culture around the world. Whether through force of numbers, political and economic power, repressive measures, *laissez-faire* indifference, global competition, cultural marketing, or all combined, the pattern is unequivocal that the most widely spoken languages in the world have overwhelmed smaller languages in their spheres of power and influence.

This pattern is not set in stone, however, and there are indications of efforts to slow or halt the trend. As the realities of language endangerment and extinction have been increasingly publicized (e.g., by UNESCO), governments or official bodies have attempted to intervene on behalf of threatened languages through language policy and planning. For example, the European Bureau for Lesser Used Languages was established by the European Parliament in 1984 to protect the language rights of the more than 50 million people in the European Union who speak one of the 40 identified minority languages. As mentioned earlier, Mozambique as well as other African nations have worked to set up bilingual education programs

in order to provide linguistic minority children with greater access to education in both their native language and the official language.

There is also the possibility that the dominance of English may become increasingly resented, and in response, the emerging condition may be the decline of global languages and the rise of regional languages, e.g., Arabic. In Africa, for example, "English is neither the only nor even the best means of communication. Throughout East Africa, Swahili is typically the first language that two strangers attempt upon meeting. In West Africa, [it is] Hausa" (Fishman, 2000: 1). Regional languages may meet the wider communicative needs of people more effectively and may provide a greater sense of identity for its speakers than any international language. Perhaps, too, replacing English with a regional language in schools could help reduce the resistance many students display to the requirement of English as a second language in countries such as Sri Lanka (Canagarajah, 1993b). If these scenarios are realized, the role of English as a world language could be narrowed to a few academic and technical specializations in which journals for international audiences would continue to be published largely in English, with abstracts translated into other major international and regional languages. "There is no reason to assume that English will always be necessary … for technology, higher education, and social mobility, particularly after its regional rivals experience their own growth spurts" (Fishman, 2000: 2).

English for Academic Purposes   In mainstream applied linguistics, English for Academic Purposes (EAP) is a branch of English for Specific Purposes that came to prominence in the 1980s in response to the academic needs of the increasing population of L2 students enrolled in universities in which English was the medium of instruction. The goal of EAP is to help prepare L2 students for university study, usually in intensive programs of limited duration. It focuses on the development and improvement of academic language skills required for effective participation in undergraduate and graduate university programs, and to the extent possible, it is tailored to meet the needs of the students enrolled in EAP classes. Therefore, the first step in EAP is a needs analysis of the students' academic goals and the types of language proficiency necessary to achieve them. Typically, EAP courses deal with (1) academic reading and the critical analysis of texts; (2) academic writing, both generally, e.g., the writing process, summarizing, paraphrasing, citing sources, and specifically, e.g., genre analysis or discipline-specific academic discourse such as the use of passive constructions in scientific and technical writing; (3) fluency and intelligibility of

speech, e.g., small-group discussions, oral presentations; and (4) academic listening skills, e.g., gleaning the gist and key points of lectures. Because the intent of EAP is to help students succeed in an academic setting, it is often characterized as a practical or pragmatic approach to L2 teaching (Benesch, 1993; Santos, 2001).

In critical EAP, the pragmatism of mainstream EAP is politically critiqued from the top down, starting with institutional power relations between EAP students and the academy. Academic institutions are seen in critical EAP as inherently and inequitably hierarchical in structure, and both students and the EAP faculty need not only to be aware of the power relations as such but also to be actively engaged in modifying their subject positions within them. Indeed, the very concept of EAP has been contested for accepting "an unproblematic relationship between English and academic purposes" (Pennycook, 1997: 257) rather than helping "students articulate and formalize their resistance [to academic requirements], to participate more democratically as members of an academic community and in the larger society" (Benesch, 2001: 61). Mainstream EAP is criticized for assuming (1) that institutional academic demands of students are the same as the academic interests of students themselves, and (2) that the appropriate goal of L2 teaching at the university level is to acculturate students to academic discourse rather than to encourage them to problematicize and work to change it.

Thus, for example, to accept needs analysis as the starting point in EAP is to risk maintaining and perpetuating institutional conditions in which subject matter courses and content are elevated to the highest status, while English is relegated to serving merely as a medium for content. Instead, critical needs analysis emphasizes the political nature of academia and deconstructs "who sets the goals, why they were formulated, whose interests are served by them, and whether they should be challenged" (Benesch, 2001: 43). Rather than a medium, English is seen as a discourse for contesting and countering existing power relations. As a replacement for needs analysis, therefore, critical EAP introduces the notion of rights analysis, which focuses on alternatives to the academic *status quo* and posits that L2 students are entitled to more rights than they are accorded in determining the nature and substance of their academic experience in the university. "**Rights** … highlight academic life as contested …. Rather than viewing students as initiates who must earn their place by adopting the discourse of faculty-experts, rights analysis assumes students are already members by virtue of paying tuition and taking classes" (Benesch, 2001: 62). In other words, instead of accepting as given the university's expectations of students, rights analysis

emphasizes students' expectations of the university. EAP instructors are complicit in the marginalization of L2 students if they do not encourage them first to engage in a critical analysis of their positions as students *vis-à-vis* the faculty and the university, and then to exercise their rights by negotiating for change in their own academic interests.

What is also critiqued and contested is the academic discourse(s) that L2 students are typically socialized into in their EAP classes. Critical EAP challenges the academic language that L2 students are required to learn on the grounds that it also requires them to relinquish an essential part of their linguistic and social identities; more broadly, the academic knowledge they acquire in their majors or areas of specialization leads to the devaluation or destruction of the local knowledge they acquired in their native countries (Canagarajah, 1993a). In this way, dominant Western cultural traditions and knowledge threaten the survival of non-Western cultural traditions and knowledge, just as dominant languages threaten minority languages. An example of resistance to this domination can be seen today in France, where Arab language and culture is in conflict with French language and culture in the schools and the society. From the critical perspective, a resolution to the conflict is for minority groups to be encouraged "to construct alternate discourses that derive from a negotiation of the academic discourse and English [or French] language in light of their indigenous forms of knowledge, discourses, and languages" (Canagarajah, 1993a: 304). While acknowledging that educational systems might not welcome alternate discourses to academic conventions, Canagarajah argued that indigenous languages and knowledge systems should be considered equal to dominant academic discourses, and that ultimately, schools and universities will be enriched by accepting linguistic, intellectual, and academic pluralism.

The responses of mainstream EAP to the positions of critical EAP take several forms. One is that it is not L2 students themselves who are calling for challenge and change to the academic institutional structure of higher education or to the dominant academic discourses and knowledge systems; rather, it is critical educators who consider power relations paramount in all institutional arrangements and who therefore take it upon themselves to work to raise the consciousness of their students so that they are made aware of their subordinate subject positions and will act to change them. Another is that it is unrealistic and perhaps undesirable to think that the accretion of generations of knowledge and discourse that go into the development of an academic discipline can, will, or should quickly give way to the kind of linguistic

and intellectual modifications proposed by critical theorists, especially when students are usually not only willing but eager to be socialized into their chosen disciplines. A third is that the very presence of a critical mass of L2 students in higher education naturally and unobtrusively promotes pluralism in academia. Influence and negotiation are a two-way street, and just as Third World students are changed by immersion in Western intellectual traditions, so are Western universities changed by the linguistic, cultural, and intellectual resources that Third World students bring to them. The changes may at first seem minor or imperceptible, but over time they are felt and noticed, particularly in terms of language. Perhaps an appropriate analogy here is the way English as an international lingua franca has led to naturally occurring varieties such that we now talk about world Englishes – the plural signifying pluralism *par excellence*.

Adult Second Language Teaching The mainstream approach to adult second language teaching, which takes place in societies where the second language being learned and taught is the dominant/national/official language, is typically characterized as learner centered. Learner-centeredness is understood to mean that, since most adult learners have voluntarily chosen to attend language classes, their goals and desires for learning the language should be not only respected in the abstract but also acted upon by incorporating them into the syllabus and classroom practice, even in cases where the teacher may be philosophically opposed to the students' wishes, e.g., explicit instruction in grammar. Adult language learners are consulted as to (1) the content of the class based on common needs and interests, e.g., employment or housing issues; (2) the pacing of the course, i.e., when students feel they have reached a satisfactory level of understanding, proficiency, and practice for a particular concept or lesson, and are ready to move on; and (3) the degree to which the class is teacher centered, e.g., with explicit explanations, corrections, etc., or student centered, e.g., with pair work, group work, and other communicative activities.

A critical approach to adult language teaching rejects the mainstream view of learner-centered classrooms and its foundational assumption that adult learners "know what they want and what is 'best' for them, that giving learners choice is **in itself** empowering, and that the teacher should follow their lead" (Auerbach, 2000: 145). Learner-centeredness is also criticized for its unquestioning acceptance of the primacy of meeting students' needs and for implicitly supporting the ethos of opportunity and upward mobility that assumes an environment of individual choice and betterment. Instead, critical

pedagogy in adult education – often called 'participatory learning,' after Freire (1970) – is based on the premise that empowerment and improvement in the lives of subordinate groups can come about only through an understanding of the inequitable power relations in society and subsequent collective action to change these oppressive conditions. Therefore, in keeping with the tenets of critical theory, the explicitly political goals of the adult language classroom, whether in Latin America, Africa, North America, or Europe, are (1) sociopolitical critique of students' lives, daily experiences, and circumstances in their communities *vis-à-vis* the dominant ideology and power relations of their societies; (2) problematicization, or Freirean problem posing, of these experiences and circumstances through critical reflection and discussion; and (3) strategies for collective social and political action to effect change through a democratic process and to try to provide marginalized groups with the means to work within their own systems for the betterment not only of their own lives but also of their communities.

In contrast to critical pedagogy at other levels of education, which has tended to avoid presenting specific pedagogical practices out of fear of becoming a prescriptive methodology, adult language teaching from the critical perspective has from the start provided examples and case studies of alternative rationales, curricula, and activities; moreover, these have been sufficiently detailed to allow interested teachers and other applied linguists to envisage what a critical classroom would actually look like in practice. Auerbach and Wallerstein (1987) were among the first to outline their work with adult ESL learners in the United States, and Auerbach (1992, 1996, 2000) has continued to present her principles and practices of participatory pedagogy. Drawing on the common issues in the lives of Latina women in Washington, D.C., Frye (1999) discussed the critical, participatory curriculum she developed for her ESL class. In Canada, Norton (1995) and Morgan (1998) gave accounts of critical approaches to teaching adult ESL in different settings in Ontario. Kerfoot (1993) described the critical/participatory curriculum and materials developed by a nongovernmental organization for adult ESL programs around Cape Town, South Africa. And two volumes (Smoke, 1998; Sauve, 2000) have been devoted entirely to programs and practices in critical adult ESL.

It is interesting to note that, alone, among the branches of critical applied linguistics, adult language teaching has received no oppositional response from the mainstream. Why this is so is a matter of speculation, but it may speak to the general lack of interest and attention, even among professionals, both to adult basic education and to adult second language programs. Public funding for the development and maintenance of such programs is almost always inadequate, and the minority and/or immigrant groups in need of adult second language classes are typically viewed by the public with indifference or even hostility. Just as the students are socioeconomically and sociopolitically marginalized, so, too, are the mostly part-time language teachers who work with them. The combination of these circumstances contribute to, if not cause, the outlier effect for adult language education; adult second language learning and teaching seem to fly under the radar. However, it may also be that a critical/participatory approach to adult second language teaching is seen as the most appropriate for this student population, more than for any other. The sociopolitical critique of structural inequalities, the concomitant questioning of these inequalities, and the search for collective ways to work for social and political change may be the most realistic and effective way to structure adult second language classes.

Conclusion

A political, and politicized, approach to applied linguistics and second language teaching has been variously described as "applied linguistics with an attitude" (Pennycook, 2001: 177), as a series of "social visions" (Norton and Toohey, 2004: 1), and as a pedagogy that is "in your face" (Santos, 2001: 182). As a relatively recent movement that began in the late 1980s, gained momentum in the 1990s, and continues into the 21st century, it is not clear whether critical theory and pedagogy will remain an oppositional, alternative perspective or whether it will gain currency in mainstream applied linguistics. It has attracted dedicated specialists who are drawn to its hope of sociopolitical transformation and who seek ways to realize that hope through localized practices in language education.

One of the hidden dangers of a critical approach is the possibility of an activist counterresponse from its political polar opposite. Critical theory and pedagogy assume a shared **liberatory** vision; however, a shared conservative vision that is anything but liberatory is not out of the question. Indeed, Pennycook (2001: 29) touched on this very point when he acknowledged the possibility of "a potential position … that combines conservative politics and applied linguistics." But instead of exploring the implications of such a potential, he dismissed it by saying, "Since conservatism is an anathema for my vision of critical applied linguistics …, I do not dwell on this possibility" (2001: 29). Whether too distasteful to dwell on or not, however, the possibility remains.

Finally, when speculating on the role of critical applied linguistics in the future, it is necessary to consider such factors as the number of students in teacher preparation courses who can be won over to an overtly political approach to language teaching; whether conditions they find in language programs in which they are hired to teach allow for or are conducive to critical approaches; whether their language students are accepting of or resistant to critical classroom practice; whether alternative teaching and learning materials are available or permitted; and the degree of individual commitment to critical pedagogy even in the face of indifference or opposition. In all likelihood critical theory will continue to be espoused; the question is whether critical pedagogy will be carried out on any but a relatively small scale.

See also: Applying Pragmatics; Critical Applied Linguistics; Critical Discourse Analysis; Dialogism, Bakhtinian; Discourse, Foucauldian Approach; Freire, Paulo; Language Policy in Multinational Educational Contexts; Linguistic Habitus; Linguistic Rights; Participatory Research and Advocacy.

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Power and Pragmatics

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Introduction

Pragmatics is concerned with meaning in the context of language use. Basically, when we communicate through language we often mean more than we say; there is often a gap between speaker meaning and sentence meaning. For example, why is it that we interpret *Can you pass the salt*? as a request and not simply a question? Why do we tend to interpret *John has three children* as meaning **no more** than three children? Why, when we say *some of the boys came to the party*, do we know that **not all** of the boys came to the party? And why do we find that certain utterances are paired, such as greeting/greeting, question/answer, or request/response? Pragmatic theories attempt to explain this knowledge by seeing communication as a process of rational and reasoned interpretation, which draws not only on linguistic structure but also shared and world knowledge, cultural norms, and individual components of specific interactional contexts (see Levinson, 1983, 2000; Sperber and Wilson, 1995; Yule, 1998; Mey, 2001; Blakemore, 1992). The question we want to consider here is how this view of human communication is related to the operation of power in society.

Pragmatics, Power, and Language

Pragmatics is recognized as a branch of language study and in recent times the operationalization of power within, or through, the use of language in society has become a central concern of discourse analysis, sociolinguistics, and pragmatics. Textbooks are now giving specific emphasis to the area (see Mesthrie *et al.*, 2000) and there are emergent branches of study, such as critical linguistics, critical discourse analysis, or critical sociolinguistics (see Fairclough, 2001; Wodak, 1996; Talbot *et al.*, 2003), where it is the analysis of power within linguistic practices that is the core focus. The term 'critical' links these approaches closely with social theory and their central aim is to demystify the way in which language operates in society. The term 'power' is not always easily defined, however (see Thornborrow, 2001). Power can be ideological, economic, or cultural, for example, and within these confines, power can operate at a range of different levels: the social, individual, military, state-based, legal, and so on. Though all this is true, there is a general understanding that the operation of power is the ability to get an individual to behave or not to behave in a particular manner. Although this process may be realized in different ways and in different social environments, the pragmatic resources utilized may be of the same type. The problem is, of course, that not everyone has the same access to such resources, and, even when they do, not everyone has the same ability to use those resources in the same way. Hence, some individuals or groups may access or use pragmatic resources to maintain a position of power over others (Harris, 1984; Lakoff, 2000; Hutchby and Wooffitt, 1998).

Consider, for example, the act of ordering someone to do X. Parents may order a child to be quiet, an army officer may order soldiers to *march*, or a police officer may order a motorist to *stop*. Orders or commands such as *Stop!*, *Be quiet*, or *Quick march*, are imperative forms that function to signal a specific

action or, as it is known, a 'speech act' (Austin, 1962; Searle, 1969) (*see* **Speech Acts**). Speech acts frequently have linguistic markers that indicate which act is being performed, such as *I apologize*, or *I order you to X*, but frequently the act is underlying or indirect, as in *(I order you) March!* But equally important in producing speech acts is the recognition that certain conditions hold, such as X has the authority, right, or power to order Y. In the examples above, this power condition is institutionalized within the system of parental control, within the legal system for traffic law, and within the formal authority of army hierarchy. Thus, although we can all produce orders, we do not all have access to formal roles that ensure the order is carried out. Hence, in contexts such as schools, medical encounters, or certain forms of business organizations, the power to utilize selected pragmatic resources is differentially distributed (Drew and Heritage, 1992; Bourdieu, 1991; Lippi-Green, 1997) (*see* **Institutional Talk**).

This type of control may be seen in the organization of talk in interaction. Here, there are issues of not only who can say what, but who can speak when and about what topic. Studies of the distribution and organization of taking turns at talk clearly show that in schools it is the teacher who organizes and distributes the turns at talk (Coulthard, 1977). Similarly, in the doctor's surgery, it is the doctor who is in control; it is his job to ask the questions and the patient's job is simply to respond (Wodak, 1996). In these contexts, there is an interactional asymmetry in relation to responsibility for talk organization. Indeed, in the case of either the school or the surgery, for the student or the patient to begin to ask questions or to take the lead in talking would be seen as a challenge to the power and control of the doctor or teacher.

But it need not be a specifically formal situation where such forms of control operate. Studies of gender differences have continually indicated that in mixed-gender interactions, men attempt to dominate the control of turns, access to the floor, and topic content and distribution (Talbot, 1998; Tannen, 1994). As Shaw (2000) has shown, things become even more complicated when gender and formal context are mixed. In a study of what may be termed 'illegal' interruptions in British House of Commons Proceedings, Shaw noted how male MPs made such interruptions more frequently than female MPs. Furthermore, when women MPs did carry out such actions, they were more frequently censured for this by the Speaker of the House.

Instrumental and Influential Power

The pragmatic control of turns or of specific speech actions could be seen as the use of instrumental power. Instrumental power is often formally embedded as a system of control either explicitly formulated as within the law or more subtly ingrained within what Foucault called "regimes of truth" (Foucault, 1980), that is, the control over access to certain forms of knowledge. But there is also what is seen as influential power in the operation of pragmatics, and here this may be seen in almost all walks of life, although influential power is more often highlighted in the workings of the media, particularly in advertising, and in politics (Talbot *et al.*, 2003; Bell, 1991).

Consider a burger chain advertising statement: *where good people go for good food*. How are we meant to understand this? There is a clever juxtaposition between *good* as a moral/reflective issue and *good* as a comparative adjective of assessment. In the advertising strap line, there is an effort to get us to process the phrase *good people* and *good food* together. But why? According to Grice (Grice, 1975; see also Sperber and Wilson, 1995) what happens is that the juxtaposition of *good people* and *good food* creates an incongruity in terms of the relevance of the claim. It is incongruent, argues Grice, because communication is based an assumption of cooperation, where we try to speak the truth in a clear and concise manner as simply as is necessary to convey a message relevant to the talk. This gives one answer to our question above as to why we assume that John has no more than three children when someone says *John has three children*. If John had more or less than three children, then according to the pragmatic principles espoused by Grice, the speaker would have said so (see **Grice, Herbert Paul**).

Grice does not say that his principles are rules that must always be in operation, or which must be obeyed, merely that they provide a heuristics for interpretation. Interestingly, he also suggested that when a speaker says more or less than required, is obscure, or seemingly irrelevant, this may be an indicator that they intend their hearer to look beyond the meanings of the words themselves in order to retrieve the message. In this case, the speaker may be generating a specific kind of inference referred to as a 'conversational implicature' (see Levinson, 1983). For example, if I say *John was in the room* in response to your question *Where have all the apples gone?*, this does not seem to be an answer at all. However, if you assume I am being relevant and saying as much as possible, then you will try to see my response as an answer. Perhaps in this case we both have shared knowledge that John likes to eat apples; if that was the case, you could then infer both that although I do not know who took the apples (if I did I would have said so) I believe/infer

that John has taken the apples. The reason I believe this is because, as we jointly know, John really likes his apples, he was in the room, and now the apples are missing. Formally, there would be more to explain here, but the general point is that from a particular utterance we can gain more information than is readily available from sentence interpretation alone (*see* **Implicature**).

What then has the process of eating *good food* to do with the moral or other inclinations involved in being *good people*? One answer is that eating food involves choice. We often hear it said after an enjoyable meal at a restaurant that either the food or the restaurant itself, or both, was a *good choice*. Hence, eating out also involves some discernment on behalf of the customers. And those who are *good* at this get *good food*. Hence, in this case, not only can you enjoy the *good food* but you can give yourself a pat on the back as one of the *good people* capable of making a good choice.

> Good people (those who know or care) go for good food to X.

There is also a more general interpretation here, simply that this restaurant is where *good* people go for their food. Since most of us wish to think of ourselves as *good*, then this restaurant is the place to be. Both assumptions would be worked out using a similar approach. In both cases, the message is clear: if you consider yourself *good* in either (or even more) of the interpretations provided, then you should be in restaurant X.

This kind of influential power attempts to control our actions by pushing our choices in a particular direction. Since *good* may be taken in a number of ways, it expands the range of audiences that it might influence. Thus, any ambiguity is utilized for a positive purpose, as is the case with the politician before an election who says *We have no intention and see no reason at this time to raise taxes*. In this case there are two elements worthy of attention. The first is the negation of the term *intention*. If intention means one is going to do X (raise taxes), then this is denied. However, in the second part of the sentence the adverbial *at this time* marks any intention as time- and context-based. Consequently, if at a later time one does raise taxes (after being elected for example), one could not be accused of having previously misled the public.

Such time-controlled modifications are frequent in the political domain. The British Prime Minister stated, in relation to Britain's involvement in the Iraq conflict in 2004, that "At the present time, we believe, we have sufficient troops" (in Iraq). We see the use of the adverbial again, but also in this case the use of an epistemic marker of knowledge,

i.e., *believe* as opposed to *know* (see Chafe and Nichols, 1986). *Believe* is weaker than *know* and may be used to 'hedge' any claims. Should future events prove against one's statement, one can always say that is what I believed at the time.

Pragmatics, as may be seen, is central to the operation of power in society. In formalized contexts, it explains acts in terms of their conditions of operation; similarly, it explains in such contexts, and others, who is expected talk when and about what. It also allows us to see how embedded inferential information may be calculated to explain specific messages and similar embedded information may be used to sidetrack us or to protect the speaker. Knowledge of pragmatics is therefore central to understanding power and its role in human communication.

See also: Critical Applied Linguistics; Grice, Herbert Paul; Implicature; Institutional Talk; Maxims and Flouting; Speech Acts; Speech Act Verbs.

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Pragmatic Acts

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A Philosophers' Mistake

An often heard critique of the Searlean approach to speech act theory (and, by implication, also of Austin's and Grice's; see Mey, 2001: 93–94) is that it concentrates on 'speech' to the exclusion of other phenomena (e.g., writing) that also fall into the category of 'language.' As a result of this critique, some linguists have suggested that we replace the term 'speech act' by a more 'general' one, such as 'act of language' (compare also the French distinction between *acte langagier* and *acte de parole*; German has *Sprachhandlung* as opposed to *Sprechakt*; Bühler, 1934) (*see* **Speech Acts; Grice, Herbert Paul; Austin, John L.**).

What is at stake here is more than a terminological quibble. Those who want to consider speech as different, less comprehensive than 'language' overlook the fact that all language originates in speech; writing is a later development, arising from the need to preserve the spoken word for later and remote use. However, there is a wider implication, one that is equally often overlooked by linguists and many philosophers alike. As Searle (1969: 16) remarked,

> When I take a noise or a mark on a piece of paper to be an instance of linguistic communication, as a message, one of the things I must assume is that the noise or mark was produced by a being or beings more or less like myself and produced with certain kinds of *intentions*.

In the standard philosophical approach to language, as we encounter it in works by thinkers such as Frege, Russell, Carnap, Reichenbach, Lewis, and a host of other earlier philosophers, the fundamental unit establishing and legitimating our acts of thinking and speaking is the abstract proposition, as it manifests itself in the well-formed linguistic sentence. In this approach, the user of language is conspicuously absent, and consequently so, too, are his or her intentions. For linguists such as Chomsky and his followers, the persistent problem is how to connect a certain representation of the world with a given, well-formed linguistic expression. However, people do not always necessarily think in propositions representing well-formed abstract formulae; nor do they speak in correct sentences, derived according to the rules of an abstract grammar. Regarding people's world representations, the 'intentionality' that Searle points to comprises more than just cognizing: Affect, will, ethical considerations, and so on have to be taken into consideration when we talk about 'mental states.'

Combining these different facets of human mental activity is often thought of as a process of 'addition': To a given propositional content (e.g., 'to shut the door') I can add a volitional component (as in 'I want you to shut the door'), a component of ordering (as in the imperative 'shut the door!'), a component of questioning (as in 'is the door shut?'), and so on. These additional components are then manifested by their appropriate speech acts: wanting, ordering, questioning, etc. It is this kind of thinking that is at the basis

of Gazdar's (1979: 4) often quoted formula: 'Pragmatics is meaning without semantics.'

The main difference between speech act theorists such as Searle (one could also mention others, such as Austin, Ryle, and Grice) and linguists such as Chomsky is that the former include the speaker's mental state in their considerations of 'how to do things with words' (Austin, 1962). However, another problem arises here, having to do with the nature of the speech act as primarily defined (in the Searlean approach) in relation to an 'ideal speaker' (the hearer, if present, is similarly idealized). Thus, Searle's approach not only is basically speaker oriented (the hearer being thought of as a speaker who is temporarily 'out of function' – one who is listening to a speaking person in order to become a speaker him- or herself) but also, both speaker and hearer are located in some abstract, idealized universe, devoid of any relation to their actual status as language users. Even where dialogue or conversation is concerned, the question of what the speakers are saying to each other is discussed from a strictly idealized, speaker-oriented viewpoint; thus, questions as well as answers are uttered by dummies figuring as speaker/hearers (e.g., the ubiquitous 'Peter' and 'Mary'). It is in this sense that we must understand Levinson's (1983: 293) often quoted remark that there is no such thing as abstract 'questionhood' or 'answerhood': all questions and their corresponding answers originate in real-world language users. A question is always a concrete somebody's question, and an answer is always given by somebody with real expectations, needs, and obligations.

However, if this is true for questions and answers, then it must hold for other speech acting as well. There are no orders except those given by a superordinate to a subordinate. The speech act of ordering is widely different, for example, in the military than in the family; although it is true that everywhere certain people give orders while others have to take them, the difference is in the people and their placement in society. Similarly, there are no promises except those given by a concrete 'promiser' to a concrete 'promisee,' as they are characterized by their actual living conditions, especially when it comes to understanding what a promise is about, being able to accept a promise, and so on. Also, regarding ordinary conversation, the accepted ordering sequence of the individual replies not only represents some external schema (as used in conversation analysis) but also reflects and reproduces the power structure of our society: The powerful grab the floor, whereas the weak withdraw under pressure (*see* **Conversation Analysis**).

A final aspect (partially adumbrated in the preceding) is essential to our understanding of speech acting. A speech act never comes alone but carries always with it a bevy of other acts on which it essentially depends for its success (*see* **Speech Acts and Grammar**). Some of these are strictly speech oriented, whereas others are of a more general nature and include, besides speech, those aspects of communication that often are referred to as 'extralinguistic': gestures, intonation, facial mimics, body posture, head movements, laughter, and so on. It is these inclusive acts that I call 'pragmatic acts (*see* **Pragmatics: Overview**).'

An Illustrative Case: The Irony of Irony

I now illustrate the previous discussion by adducing a classical instance of purported speech acting: the use of irony in speech. Much has been written about irony by linguists, philosophers, sociologists, computer scientists, psychologists, and others. I limit myself here to contrasting two characteristic approaches from different camps: one linguistically and philosophically oriented, and the other more geared toward a computational view (*see* **Irony**).

Sperber and Wilson, two of the best known authors writing on the subject of irony from a philosophical–linguistic standpoint, have expressed their views on the subject in a number of important contributions. Here is a typical quote:

> "Irony plays on the relationship between speaker's thought and the thought of someone other than the speaker" (Sperber and Wilson, 1986: 243).

According to these authors, the speech act of irony is, in the final instance, expressive of a purely mental process, contrasting two thoughts: the speaker's and someone else's.

In contrast to this mentalistic view of irony, others have taken the stance that irony is first of all a situational phenomenon: "Ironic language presupposes an ironic situation, either in the *hic et nunc* or . . . in the human condition at large" (Littman and Mey, 1991: 134). Specifically, a situation is ironic whenever the acting persons' explicit or implicit goals clash with the reality of their acts. For example, consider the firefighter whose smoking in bed causes the fire station to burn down: His implicit goal, to prevent fires, clashes with his explicit acting, causing a fire to break out. This 'clashing' of act and intention is not only typical for irony but also typical for all sorts of humor; cf. especially Freud's definition of humor as "a shock between two heterogeneous or incompatible worlds" (as quoted in Haverkate, 1990: 107; Freud, 1916/1948). Similarly, in Littman and Mey's (1991: 135) terminology, irony is based on a 'twist' that

"appears to depend upon some relationship between (1) the actor's goals, (2) the actor's plans, and (3) the actor's state of knowledge about the likelihood of the plan succeeding."

Irony thus presupposes an ironic situation, one in which an actor's plans somehow come to naught through his or her own fault or lack of knowledge, as attested by Robert Burns's "best laid schemes of mice and men" that sooner or later all "gang agley" – most often through the actors' own doings. If we accept this view of irony, then it should be evident that the acting is a central ingredient of any kind of ironic utterance; in fact, ironic utterances are only possible within some kind of action frame, viz., an ironic situation that makes the irony possible. Irony is thus, strictly speaking, not a speech act by its own volition and authority; its quality of 'act' depends on the acting persons and their views and knowledge of the situation in which they act.

It follows that ironic utterances are not, as Sperber and Wilson (1981: 302) maintain, basically to do with speaker attitude but with the world; not principally with speaking but with acting. The distinction between 'using' an utterance and 'mentioning' it (in irony) that these authors advocate (Sperber and Wilson, 1981) thus turns out to be just as vacuous as the time-worn distinction between 'saying' and 'meaning' when applied to irony (cf. Booth, 1974). As to 'mentioning,' this is itself a case of language use and thus not essentially different from other 'use'; as such, it is situation dependent. Speech, by itself, does not act: strictly speaking, there are no speech acts since, ultimately, all speech acting crucially depends on the situation in which the action takes place. Hence, speech acts, in order to be viable, have to be 'situated,' as discussed next.

Acting in a Social Situation

Previously, I stressed the need to think of speakers and hearers as acting in a social context. In traditional linguistics, the user, when and if he or she appears on the scene (as we have seen it happen in Searle's or in Sperber and Wilson's works), is always defined as an individual speaker whose words are spoken in the abstract space of 'exemplary thinking': The utterances that are produced lack any anchoring in the societal reality and invoke a context only as needed to make (minimal) sense. Such a context is never extended beyond the immediate needs of the description; it is not one that is solidly placed in the speakers' and hearers' actual social environment, a *situated* context. Similarly, the voices that we are hearing in the constructed dialogues of linguists' examples belong to lifeless characters (e.g., the famous 'Mary'

and 'Peter') and not to real, interacting persons on a common, social scene (Mey, 1994: 155) (*see* **Context, Communicative**).

Typical for the social situation is that it is a common scene – that is, a situation whose participants are on some kind of shared footing. Elsewhere (Mey, 2001: 135), I have advocated the necessity of situating our speech acts in context, especially with regard to analyzing people's conversation. The reason is that no speech act, or any conversational contribution, can be understood properly unless it is situated within the environment in which it was meant to be understood. 'Quoting out of context' is a well-known means of manipulating a conversational partner; the proper use of conversational techniques excludes such manipulation precisely in the name of good conversational behavior.

In particular, the French sociologist Jacques Rancière (1995) applied the notion of 'common scene' to the political domain. Here, politics is defined as the "battle for the common scene of understanding" (Rancière, 1995: 13) – a battle that is not merely about defining a common ground, in the sense of establishing some common definitions or some common conceptual framework, but primarily about what is understood as being common, by ruling out various kinds of 'misunderstanding' (the title of Rancière's work). The point is that such a 'ruling out' should not be conceived of as a one-sided 'ruling' (in the sense of a judge ruling some question out of order) but as an appeal to the commonly accepted rules for making and breaking a social relationship. It is here that the notion of 'social' situation becomes crucial.

Rancière's 'social scene' is more than a simple context, understood as a common platform of conversation; rather, the question that he raises concerns the underlying presuppositions making the scene possible. This possibility involves what the actors can afford, not just what they can think and cognize. Thus, the common scene is 'transcendental' in an even deeper sense than Kant's: Not only the possibility of thinking and cognizing but also the very possibility of acting is questioned. This is why Rancière's notion of common scene is so important for the theory of pragmatic acts (*see* **Pragmatic Presupposition**).

Understanding a scene depends entirely on the acting. An active understanding implies having an idea of what to do on the scene, not just of what to say or think (these latter, although important, are still subordinated to the acting). Conversely, one's understanding of others depends on understanding their acting and the role they assume on the scene. What may appear as crazy behavior outside of the theater

(cf. the expressions, a 'theatrical' laugh, to assume a 'tragic' posture, or even to put on 'an act') is perfectly understandable and rational on the scene, where role and rationality depend on each other. Rational acting is to act in accordance with one's role; any acting outside of that role is irrational (besides being strictly speaking impossible if one wants to keep one's place, both as an actor on the scene and as a member of the theatrical company).

Pragmatics tries to place the common scene within society by making it clear that also on the societal scene at large (and not just in politics) a 'battle' for domination is going on. If we do not understand this battle as a struggle between the forces of society, our understanding of the common scene and its actors will be incomplete. Conversely, our acting is determined by the scene: The scene's 'affordances' (a term from psychology; Gibson, 1979) are the limits of our actions. Common affordances create a common platform for action; a lack of such affordances restricts our possibilities of acting socially. Inasmuch as our acting depends on our understanding of the scene and its affordances, the scene is only 'actable' for all actors if it has been established as common – that is, affordable for everybody and by everybody.

From the previous discussion, it is clear that not only the scene determines our acting but also, conversely, our actions determine and reaffirm the existing scene. We profess adherence to our common platform by acting within its confines, by obeying its limitations, and by realizing our possibilities. Our acting on the scene (this includes our so-called 'speech acts') is thus always a 'situated action' – that is, an action made possible and afforded by and in a particular situation. The next section explores in more detail what this has to say for the question of pragmatic acts.

The Indirect Speech Act Paradox

In the literature, one frequently comes across the following vexing question (e.g., Mey, 2001: 113, 219; Searle, 1975: 82): How to explain that our speech acts more often than not are realized by expressions having very little to do with the literal interpretation of those expressions, but rather much with their conventional interpretation?

The traditional approach to this 'indirect speech act paradox' suggests that we either rely on such expressions being understood as idioms or rely on our using certain rules of inference (Levinson, 1983: 268–272, 2000: 16). A pragmatic solution to the paradox would have to go further and specifically ask what those rules are and how they are administered. Just like other speech acts (or, generally, any way of using words to do things), the so-called indirect speech acts derive their force not from their lexicosemantic buildup but from the situation in which they are appropriately uttered. This 'situational support' rests on the assumption that every situation carries its own organizing principle. That is, the conventions and rules of society determine what is appropriate speaking behavior for a particular situation.

In early speech act theory, this led to the erroneous assumption that the preferred response was the only legal one: the so-called 'canonical' speech act, expressed by an appropriate speech act verb – promises require a verb of 'promising,' orders one of 'ordering,' and so on (Mey, 2001: 184) (*see* **Speech Acts, Classification and Definition**). Although this rigid interpretation of the principle is unacceptable (it would lead, among other things, to the rejection of indirect speech acts as 'improper'), the notion that the situation has a heavy hand in defining and determining what we say is valid. The situation, so to speak, creates the 'affordances' by which we are guided toward a correct interpretation of what we are hearing, and indeed of what we ourselves are saying (in accordance with the observation that we have not properly understood our own utterances until somebody has understood them with us – an insight due to the Danish linguist Jesper Hermann (1992)). Here, we are in touch with the very roots of speech act theory, as it was conceived by Austin (1962: 100, scare quotes as in the original), who carefully (not to say cautiously) referred to the situated utterance as "[words] to some extent 'explained' by the 'context' in which they have been actually spoken." Recall also that it was Austin's original intention to "study the total speech in the *total situation*" (Austin, 1962: 148 (italics added)).

Summing up, speech acts, in order to be effective, have to be situated. That is, they both rely on and actively create the situation in which they are realized. Thus, a situated speech act comes close to what Hymes (1964/1977) called a 'speech event' in ethnographic and anthropological studies (cf. Bauman and Sherzer, 1974): speech as embedded in an institutionalized social activity of a certain kind, such as teaching, visiting a doctor's office, and participating in a tea ceremony. In all such activities, the role of speech is prescribed; only certain utterances can be expected and will be acceptable. On the other hand, by their very acceptance of whatever is said as a situated utterance, the participants establish and reaffirm their social situation. The emphasis is no longer on describing individual speech acts (as it was for Searle and his followers) but on figuring out how a particular act of language came to be used in this particular situation and with what effect. Regarding Hymes's speech event, although the words spoken by

the participants require an understanding in terms of the language used, the individual speech acts make sense only when framed in the event.

In this way, the indirect speech act paradox can be dissolved by moving the focus of attention from the words being said to the things being done. In the sense that 'indirectness' is a straight derivative from the situation, and inasmuch as all speech acting depends on the situation (with its dialectic feedback, as we have seen), one may say that in this situational sense, there are only indirect speech acts; alternatively, no speech act, in and of itself, makes any sense. *A fortiori*, there are, strictly speaking, no such 'things' as speech acts *per se*, only acts of speech in a situation. The next section provides more details.

Situated Acting: "The Body Speaks" (John Donne)

The philosophers' mistake, referred to previously, was to believe that we can explain our use of 'words in action' by referring to individual speech acts with well-defined properties, assigned in accordance with certain philosophical and linguistic criteria. We have seen how efforts to break out of this linguistic and philosophical straitjacket (such as by Searle and the post-Searleans or by the followers of Sperber and Wilson) have failed in the end. The reason is that no isolated theory of language or the mind will be able to explain the workings of the human user in a concrete situation that depends neither on the mind nor on language exclusively and that consequently cannot be expressed in terms specifically created for describing the linguistic or mental domains.

In contrast, a pragmatic approach to speech acting will, as its first and most important business, raise the question of the user's possibilities in a situation. To use a parallel from another mental activity, vision: seeing is not a simple matter of an object reflecting itself in the mind, it is the situation that, along with the active perceptive categories, 'creates' the objects of perception in accordance with the possibilities afforded by the situation (aptly called 'affordances' by Gibson, 1979). Similarly, when we use language for communication, what we expect to hear is what we can, and actually do, understand in the situation. However, this situational 'affordability' comprises more than just the words spoken. As Charles Goodwin (2000: 1492) pointed out, in the "situated interaction" that takes place, for example, among girls playing hopscotch,

> the construction of action through talk … is accomplished through the temporally unfolding juxtaposition of quite different kinds of semiotic resources … through this process, the human body is made publicly visible as

the site for a range of structurally different kinds of displays implicated in the constitution of the actions of the moment.

Goodwin goes on to illustrate this 'use of the body' as one through which participants in situated action make reflexive references to their speech by positioning themselves in the other participants' line of vision, using gestures not just to illustrate but also to actually execute speech acts (e.g., of asserting, contesting, and supporting). More generally, conversational 'moves' are not only realized through speaking in ordered sequences; the body may 'jump into' the conversational fray and change the course of the interaction, preempt a conversational turn, seize the floor, and the like. An act such as 'seizing the floor' is accomplished nonverbally; turn-taking is not only prefaced by, or even merely accompanied by, a body movement: The body move *is* the taking of the turn, as it is performed by dint of a "hybrid system" (Goodwin, 2000: 1516). This interaction between action and speech cannot be captured by a simplistic notion of 'speech act,' no matter how well defined. A proper label to put on those concerted actions is that of the 'pragmatic act' as the locus where all the different linguistic and semiotic structures converge and are properly ordered in communication.

Conclusion: Pragmemes and Practs

The theory of pragmatic acts does not explain human language use by starting from the words uttered by a single, idealized speaker. Instead, it focuses on the interactional situation in which both speakers and hearers realize their aims. The explanatory movement is from the outside in, rather than from the inside out: Instead of starting with what is said, and looking for what the words could mean, the situation in which the words fit is invoked to explain what can be (and is actually being) said.

The emphasis here is not on rules for use of individual speech acts but on characterizing a typical, pragmatic act as it is realized in a given situation. Adopting familiar linguistic terminology (cf. terms such as phoneme, morpheme, etc.), I call this (proto-)type of act a 'pragmeme.' Individual pragmatic acts realize a particular pragmeme (e.g., 'inciting to declare war'); we may call these 'practs.' However, since no acts ever will be completely identical (every situation in which war is declared is different from every other), every pract is also an 'allopract' – that is, a different realization of a particular pragmeme. The Israeli linguist Dennis Kurzon, who has worked specifically in the area of 'incitement,' supported this view when he said that "any utterance may constitute an act of incitement if the circumstances are

Figure 1 Pragmeme, pract, allopract. Adapted from Mey (2001: 222).

appropriate to allow for such an interpretation" (Kurzon, 1998: 587; Mey, 2001: 221).

With regard to pragmatic acts, one is not primarily concerned with matters of grammatical correctness or strict observance of rules. What counts as a pract (i.e., what can be subsumed under a particular pragmeme as an allopract) depends on the understanding that the participants have of the situation and on the outcome of the act in a given context. Schematically, this can be represented as shown in **Figure 1**.

In **Figure 1**, the various abbreviations to the right have to do with textual features, such as INF for 'inferencing,' REF for 'establishing reference,' REL for 'relevance,' VCE for 'voice' (cf. Mey, 2000), SSK for 'shared situation knowledge,' and MPH (for 'metaphor'). The symbol 'M' denotes a 'metapragmatic joker' – that is, any element that directs our attention to something happening on the metapragmatic level. For instance, changing the order of the words in a sentence may tell us something about the relative importance of the transposed elements. Using the standard expression 'alleged' in a report may serve to exonerate the journalist from implicitly proffering an accusation by imputing guilt to an ('alleged') defendant in a criminal case, and so on. However, because it is impossible to catch all of these metapragmatic functions of the 'joker' under one hat, I prefer to wave my hands at terminology by simply labeling this elusive character (with homage to Fritz Lang) M for 'metapragmatic.'

In this way, the right side of the schema symbolizes the elements that are present in the textual chain (the listing is of course not complete). Regarding the column to the left in **Figure 1** it should be read as a feature matrix whose cells can either be filled or empty. If the latter is the case for all of the cells, the matrix renders the value zero (Ø).

In conclusion, let me quote a contemporary Chinese pragmaticist, talking about the 'perlocutionary' effect of speech acts. Yueguo Gu (1993: 428) remarked that "perlocution is not a single act performed by S[peaker]. Nor is its effect being caused by an utterance. It involves a [rhetorical] *transaction* (italics added)." This is, *mutatis mutandis*, what the current entry has been arguing for. Like perlocutions, pragmatic acts involve minimally not only a speaker and a hearer but also, in addition, a number of other factors. When all is said (illocutionarily) and not least (perlocutionarily) done, the 'rhetorical transactions' involved in speech acting rest on the assumption of the force of the utterance. This force is pragmatic, to wit: the force of the pragmeme.

See also: Austin, John L.; Context, Communicative; Conversation Analysis; Gestures, Pragmatic Aspects; Grice, Herbert Paul; Irony; Pragmatic Presupposition; Pragmatics: Overview; Speech Acts; Speech Acts and Grammar; Speech Acts, Classification and Definition.

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Pragmatic Determinants of What Is Said

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Imagine that Jack, pointing at a book on the table, utters the sentence "That is better than Jill's book." What, we might ask, is said by his utterance? Well, since the sentence contains a context-sensitive expression – the demonstrative 'that' – we know that determining what is said will require an appeal to the context of utterance to provide a referent (*see* **Indexicality: Theory**). Thus, this is one kind of pragmatic determinant of what is said by Jack's utterance. The sentence is also context sensitive in another, slightly less obvious, way: it is in the present tense, so an appeal to the context of utterance will also be needed to fix a time for Jack's claim. Finally, many theorists recently have argued that the sentence is also context sensitive in a third, much less obvious, way: for to grasp what is said by Jack it seems that we also need to know what kind of relationship he envisages between Jill and her book. Does Jack intend to say that the book he is demonstrating is better than the book Jill wrote, better than the book Jill owns, the book Jill is reading, etc? And what does he mean by 'better'

here – better written, better researched, better for standing on to reach a high shelf? Surely Jack says more than merely that the book he is demonstrating is better in some respect or other than a book bearing some relationship or other to Jill, but, if so, then any such additional information can only come from consideration of the context of utterance.

Furthermore – and this is where the current case differs from that of demonstratives and tense – it's not obvious that this last type of pragmatic determinant of what is said is traceable to any overt (i.e., syntactically represented) context-sensitive element. Jack's utterance does contain the syntactically marked possessive, but *'s* certainly doesn't appear on the list of usual suspects for context-sensitive expressions. And in many cases even this degree of syntactic representation is missing. Consider an utterance of "It's raining," where what is said is that it is raining at some location, or "You won't die," saying that you won't die from that cut, or "Nietzsche is nicer," meaning that Nietzsche is nicer than Heidegger. Or again, consider the speaker who produces a non-sentential utterance, e.g., pointing at a child and saying "George's brother," thereby conveying that this is George's brother. In all these cases we have additional

information contributed by the context of utterance yet which seems unmarked at the syntactic level.

These types of pragmatic determinant of what is said (i.e., contextually supplied information which is semantically relevant but syntactically unmarked) have come to be known as 'unarticulated constituents' (UCs). Such elements are extremely interesting to philosophers of language since they seem to show that there are problems with a quite standard conception of formal semantics, according to which the route to meaning runs along exclusively syntactic trails.

Now, as noted above, even in formal theories of meaning, like truth-conditional accounts, some appeal to a context of utterance must be made in order to cope with overtly context-sensitive expressions. However, the thought has been that this need not contravene the essentially formal nature of our theory, since the contextual instructions can be syntactically triggered in this case (crudely, the word 'that' tells us to find a demonstrated object from the context of utterance). Much more problematic, then, are pragmatic determinants of what is said which apparently lack any syntactic basis, for they show that context can come to figure at the semantic level regardless of whether it is syntactically called for (thus there will be no purely syntactic route to meaning).

In response to the challenge posed by UCs, advocates of formal semantics have sought to reject the idea that there are any such things as syntactically unrepresented but semantically relevant elements, claiming either that

1. every contextual element of what is said really is syntactically represented, even though this fact may not be obvious from the surface syntax of a sentence (i.e., there is more to our syntax than initially supposed), or that
2. any contextual contributions which are not syntactically marked are not semantically relevant (i.e., there is less to our semantics than initially supposed).

The first of these moves is pursued by a number of theorists who argue that, if one pays proper attention to all the information given at the syntactic level, one will find that many cases of supposedly syntax-independent semantic contribution are, in fact, syntactically required (see Stanley, 2000; Stanley and Szabo, 2000; Taylor, 2001; Recanati, 2002). Now, that there is some discrepancy between surface form and underlying syntax is a well-rehearsed point. For instance, Russell's theory of descriptions invokes a clear distinction between surface form and logical form. Furthermore cases of so-called syntactic ellipsis (like the contraction in "Jack likes dogs and so does

Jill," where the second sentence is held to have the underlying syntactic form "Jill likes dogs" despite its reduced verbal form) show that surface constituents may be poor indicators of syntactic elements. If this is correct, then the principle that there is more to our syntax than is apparent at first glance is independently well motivated.

Given this, there certainly seem to be cases in which (1) is an appealing response to putative examples of UCs. To give an example: someone might claim that, because an utterance of "Jack plays" can be used in one context to say that Jack plays the trombone and in another to say that Jack plays football, there must be a syntactically **un**marked, contextual contribution to the semantic content of an utterance of this kind. However, closer inspection of the syntax shows this conclusion is dubious: 'plays' is a transitive verb requiring a subject and an object and, although the argument place for an object can be left unfilled at the surface level without this making the sentence ill formed, it might be argued that the additional argument place **is** marked in the underlying syntax of the verb. Since 'plays' is a transitive verb, the competent interlocutor will, on hearing "Jack plays," expect to look to a context of utterance to discover what Jack plays, but this is precisely because she is sensitive to the syntactic structure of English in this case. Thus sometimes an appeal to an enriched syntax seems the best way to cope with putative UCs. However, there are also cases where (1) seems less compelling. For instance, in certain contexts, it seems that Jack can use an utterance of "The apple is red" to convey the proposition that the apple is red to degree n on its skin. Yet it is far from clear that the correct syntactic structure for color terms includes argument places for the shade, or precise manner of instantiation, of the color. Furthermore, the idea that syntactic structure can outstrip surface form at all (or at least in the ways required by [1]) has been rejected by some.

So, the opponent of UCs might seek to supplement (1) with (2), allowing that some contextually supplied information is not marked at the syntactic level but denying that such information is semantically relevant. The advocate of this kind of response wants to accept that, at an intuitive level, the speaker who utters "The apple is red" (or "You won't die," etc.) clearly does convey the contextually enriched proposition (i.e., that the apple is red on the outside, or that you won't die from that cut) but that this is an instance of speaker meaning rather than semantic content (*see* **Semantics-Pragmatics Boundary**). Now, whether this move is warranted in all cases is again something of a moot point. One objection might be that it is a mistake to seek to separate speaker intuitions about what is said and claims of

semantic content to the radical degree predicted by this kind of move. So, for instance, it seems that the message recovered from an utterance of "That banana is green" will always be that that banana is green in some salient respect, but if this is the kind of proposition competent speakers can and do recover in communicative exchanges, shouldn't this be what semantics seeks to capture? What role could there be for a more minimal kind of semantic content (e.g., which treats semantic content as exhausted by the proposition that that banana is green *simpliciter*)? (See Borg, 2004; Cappelen and Lepore, 2005, for attempts to answer this question.) A second worry for the formal semanticist who pursues (2) is that it may undermine her claim that semantics deals with complete propositions or truth-evaluable items. For instance, take the situation where the book Jack demonstrates is better than the book Jill is reading, but worse than the book she wrote. To assess Jack's opening utterance as true or false in this situation, it might seem that we need first to determine what relationship Jack intended by his utterance of "Jill's book." Without this pragmatically determined aspect of what is said, it is argued, the sentence Jack produces is simply not truth evaluable, it doesn't express a complete proposition (cf. Recanati, 2003).

Clearly, then, although the formal semanticist can respond to the challenge of UCs with moves like (1) and (2) it is not at all obvious that these responses are sufficient. However, we should also be aware that there are problems to be faced on the other side, by the proponent of UCs, as well. One major worry is how to preserve our intuitive distinction between semantically relevant elements and elements which are only pragmatically relevant. Given the traditional conception of formal semantics, the answer to this question was clear: something is semantically relevant if it can be traced to the syntax of the sentence, it is pragmatically relevant otherwise. Once we admit of semantically relevant but syntactically unmarked elements, however, this way of characterizing the distinction is clearly unavailable, so the proponent of UCs owes us some other account. If Jack utters "I've eaten" then it might seem plausible to claim that the semantic content of this utterance is that he has eaten breakfast today, but he might also succeed in conveying the messages that he has eaten a cooked breakfast within the last hour, or that he is not hungry, or any number of further propositions. How do we decide which elements come to figure in the supposed semantic content of the utterance, and on what basis do we rule some conveyed messages as merely pragmatic?

A further worry seems to be that, for each additional contextual contribution we introduce, this contribution is itself open to further qualification:

an utterance of "That banana is green" might intuitively be contextually enriched to that banana is green on its skin, but why stop here? Does the speaker mean to say that that banana is green all over its skin, that that banana is mostly green on a particular patch of skin, or that that banana is a bit green on this bit of surface skin and to a depth of degree n through the skin? The problem is that, for any piece of contextual information we introduce via a UC, this piece of information is itself likely to allow for a number of different contextual qualifications or sharpenings, and we seem to lack any principled reason to disallow these further sharpenings from appearing as part of the semantic content of the utterance. Yet, without such a reason, we run the risk of being launched on a slippery slope whereby the meaning of every utterance turns out to be a proposition which is somehow 'complete' in every respect. Yet no such conclusion seems palatable: it undermines notions of systematicity for meaning and makes it completely unclear how we ever come to learn and use a language given our finite cognitive resources.

So, it seems there are problems on both sides of the debate here and the question of how to handle pragmatic determinants of what is said remains a vexed one. The advocate of formal semantics needs to deliver an account both of overtly context-sensitive expressions – the indexicals, demonstratives, and tense markers of a natural language – and of the more covert kinds of context sensitivity discussed here. Reflecting on the multitude of ways in which a context of utterance can apparently affect issues of linguistic meaning certainly seems to show that the formal semanticist runs the risk of undervaluing the role played by pragmatic determinants in what is said. Yet it remains to be seen whether this constitutes merely a potential oversight on her behalf (cf. Stanley, 2000; Stanley and Szabo, 2000; Borg, 2004) or a fundamental failing of the whole approach (cf. Sperber and Wilson, 1986; Carston, 2002).

See also: Indexicality: Theory; Semantics-Pragmatics Boundary.

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Pragmatic Indexing

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Indexicality is just the principle of contextualization of linguistic and other signs-in-use, seen as a component of the meaning of the occurring sign-forms. Indexicality is revealed in the way that, by degrees, linguistic and other signs point the users of these signs to the specific enveloping conditions in which they use them. Signs point to context in two ways: indexical signs link users to contextual conditions of which users have knowledge, independent of the occurrence of the particular indexical sign at issue; indexicals also link users to contextual conditions that, for those users, come into being only as a function of the occurrence of the indexical sign at issue (*see* **Context, Communicative**). For its users, the occurrence of an indexical sign is an event that, like a mathematical function, maps a context configured in a certain way into a context now configured in perhaps another way. Consider an expression, the use of which counts as an insult under particular, already mutually understood conditions. When it is directed as such to an addressee, once emerged in the interpersonal space between two people, its directed occurrence irreversibly transforms social relations so that much interpersonal work – further signs-in-use – might have to be undertaken, and things are never again quite as they were in the *status quo ante*.

The two contextualizing directions of indexicality – presupposing indexicality and creative or entailing indexicality (Silverstein, 1976; 1993) – are not, then, simply converse equivalents. They correspond to the two intuitions that sign users manifest, on the one hand about the 'appropriateness' of their messages to the momentary givens of the context as they understand them, and on the other hand about the performative 'effectiveness' of their messages in bringing about intersubjective consequences in the contexts in which they communicate. For semiotic pragmatists, empirical study of indexicality investigates how actual messages, used on specific occasions of communication, relate to norms of appropriateness and effectiveness implicitly shared by users of the various sign modalities studied (*see* **Pragmatics: Overview**). Are there norms of 'who-can-communicate-what-message-to-whom-about-whom-or-what-under-what-conditions'? Are there norms of 'what-kind-of-act-is-performed-or-event-brought-about-in-the-communication-of-certain-message-forms'? How people use signs in actual event contexts can be interpreted only in relation to such norms; that is, events of how signs occur in their contexts of use can be studied as the medium through which social relationships among actual communicators are established, maintained, and transformed relative to the norms being invoked in actual practice.

Many writers, ancient and modern, have recognized and remarked on essentially this property of signs; the whole field of rhetoric in the Western tradition, we can see retrospectively, has been focused on it. It was Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914) who first systematized the concept of indexicality within a more encompassing framework of the semiotic (sign-based) foundations of all epistemology and ontology (*see* **Peirce, Charles Sanders**). Of all the grand – and ever unfinished – architectonic of his philosophy, Peirce's specific trichotomous distinction in which indexicality figures has been particularly influential for the analysis of cultural systems such as language. Peirce distinguished among *iconic* sign relationships (signs by resemblance or likeness to their semiotic targets), *index-ical* sign relationships (signs of spatiotemporal or other

contiguity, including causal connection to another object, to which they point), and *symbolic* signs (implicit sign regularities, depending on general classificatory conventions that any instance of the sign invokes in use).

Many philosophers, logicians, and other students of cognition have considered how natural languages measure up against algorithmic systems invented for formally modeling the (normative, if not actual) coherence of human inferencing (what is sometimes termed 'symbolic logic'). All have therefore been obligated to treat the pervasive fact of indexicality in natural languages, as language is the recognized human instrument for referring and predicating (Reichenbach, 1947; Bar-Hillel, 1954). Such accounts have at least recognized referential deixis, the way that objects of reference can be relationally located in respect of the – indexed! – contextual conditions under which an instance of a deictic form is used and to which it therefore points (*see* **Deixis and Anaphora: Pragmatic Approaches**). That is, every human language includes paradigms of grammatical forms (such as French *celui-ci* 'this one [masc.]' and *celui-là* 'that one [masc.]') that locate an object of reference in relation to its position in the (broadly speaking) 'spatial' configuration of the triad sender (speaker)–receiver (addressee)–referent in a communicational situation. In short, the 'sense' – the presumed-upon norm of form-meaning relationship – for such a deictic is a rule for the 'appropriate' use of each instance of the form to pick out a referent that conformingly co-occurs in the communicative context. All such systems of grammatical deixis impose upon instances of communication a kind of radial topology as a structuring principle, with various elaborations of a basic two-valued distinction ('here'-and-'there' kinds of systems), as in Latin three-valued demonstrative paradigms, and with various generalized usage beyond the merely physical arrangement of an inhabitable speech context (for example, using deictics also to track the order of introduction of referents in the grammaticized topological flow of temporally unfolding discourse; cf. English *former* vs. *latter*).

Roman Jakobson (1896–1982), Emile Benveniste (1902–1976), and Jerzy Kuryłowicz (1895–1978), however, among linguists, saw the pervasive role of indexicality in every natural language, far beyond mere deictic reference. The notion that every structure of what Saussure termed *langue*, or Chomsky termed 'competence,' was formally pervaded and functionally framed by Saussurean *parole*, or by Chomskyan 'performance,' was developed in Jakobson's seminal *samizdat* of the annus mirabilis 1957, entitled *Shifters, verbal categories, and the Russian verb* (Jakobson, 1971), in Benveniste's series of papers of the same period, reprinted in his *Problèmes de linguistique générale* (1966, 1971), and in Kuryłowicz's generalizations from historical morphosyntactic studies of the Indo-European languages, beginning with his theories of 'derivation' (1936) and culminating in his *Inflectional categories of Indo-European* (1964; cf. 1960, 1972) (*see* **Jakobson, Roman**). At once, matters of context and its configuration came into view in the grammatical analysis of how people achieve even the simplest of communications in the way of grammatically formed referring and predicating: relying systematically on the minutest processing of details of context, such as role relationships of speakers, addressees, audiences, and referents, as manifested in categories of 'person'; on presumptions of prior communicational events underlying warrants for speaking, as is manifested in categories of 'evidentiality'; on differentiation of interests of speaker and addressee in the events being narrated, as manifested in the 'epistemic' differentiation of two planes of tense systems; and so forth. Peirce's concept of indexicality was, then, generalizable beyond deictic reference as such to encompass the essentially context-dependent, context-suffused character of all linguistic communication and, more importantly, of anything one might term the structural norms for the referential and predicational use of verbal signs.

In this light, it becomes clear that as modern linguistic anthropology developed by phases through an 'ethnography of speaking' (or 'of communication') (Gumperz and Hymes, 1964, 1972; Hymes, 1974; Gumperz, 1982), its concerns for the sociocultural contextualization of language use were the same as those of these European theorists of a *linguistique de la parole* (*see* **Linguistic Anthropology**). Similarly, the studies of social interaction following on the Chicago School symbolic interactionism within the discipline of sociology – Goffman's (1967, 1969, 1974, 1981), those of ethnomethodology (Garfinkel, 1967; Cicourel, 1974), and conversation analysis (Sudnow, 1972; Levinson, 1983; Duranti and Goodwin, 1992) – are readings of the flow of interactional events achieved in the course of interpersonal co-participation in linguistically mediated communication (*see* **Conversation Analysis; Goffman, Erving; Interactional Sociolinguistics**). Intellectually, if not disciplinarily, it remained only to bring together all these interests to the study of actual language forms through the concept of the pervasive indexicality of the linguistic sign, and to understand the indexicality of language and its perilinguistic semiotic modes in terms congenial to the social and cultural analysis of situations of communication.

By so doing, contemporary linguistic anthropology (see Duranti, 2001, 2004; Silverstein and Urban, 1996) has been centered on the analysis of indexicality in every aspect of semiotic codes in use, and particularly of language: how does the flow of discourse, as it comes to cohesive textual form, indexically construe and construct relevant sociocultural framings of its producers (speakers, addressees, audiences, even analysts) and its denoted characters? Such framings are on the order of shared, or at least sharable, schematizations of identity (kinds of persons), of discourse genre (kinds of social occasions and events), of institutional space (kinds of allocated realms of access), and so forth. In the course of using language and such, communicative interlocutors locate themselves and others in such framings; the very forms they use among a language community's varied possibilities indexically project these framings as the understood conceptual surround of the current communication, making them relevant to its course and outcome. The way that the personnel of social interaction, as we might term them, come to be projectively located or positioned is a central part of the work of communication. Once they are so located, what goes on in the way of moving participants to new relative social locations, or of adding further, concurrent social locations to ones already presupposed, constitutes the dynamic indexical work of conversation. It is in this sense that much of the work of social identity is achieved and clarified in conversation, making it seem that aspects of social personae, like gender, class, and ethnicity, are 'performed.' When we view the matter as one of social indexicality, however, the real issue is not the normative existence of schemata of social classification, so much as the indexical clarity – in terms of directness vs. indirectness of indexation, ambiguousness vs. discernibility, congruence vs. contradictoriness, etc. – with which particular individuals in particular kinds of interactional events come to be consequentially positioned in one or more of these frameworks. (For example, on gender as 'performed' in relation to other aspects of relational identities, see Silverstein (1985), Ochs (1992), Kiesling (2001a,b), Cameron and Kulick (2003), Eckert and McConnell-Ginet (2003), Bucholtz and Hall (2004), and Hastings and Manning (2004)).

Indeed, to a great extent, interactional moves seemingly concerned with denotational content, such as taking a contrary stand on something predicated by a conversational partner, or agreeing with the interlocutor while transforming the denoting terms of what seems to be agreed upon, are not really concerned with denotational content, or are concerned with it only residually. Rather, as conversational moves

doing interactional work, such discursive contributions dynamically index what is going on; they figurate in the medium of denotational content acts of self/other repositioning within a relevant cultural framework indexically rendered 'in play' at such a point in interaction. In this way, 'other-mindedness' in respect of explicitly denoted content comes to count, implicitly and interactionally, as mutual counter-alignment of communicative participants in a social sense in a framework of identities and interests, whether momentary or with more perduring consequences of symmetric or asymmetric exclusion. All this social work, moreover, is generally accomplished only indexically, that is, entirely implicitly, and can therefore go officially unnoticed – it can even be plausibly denied – by participants, even if it materializes to indexical interpretation under the analytic lens of the student of interactional events.

See also: Context, Communicative; Conversation Analysis; Deixis and Anaphora: Pragmatic Approaches; Goffman, Erving; Indexicality: Theory; Jakobson, Roman; Peirce, Charles Sanders; Pragmatics: Overview.

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Pragmatic Presupposition

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Introduction

Both concepts – 'pragmatic' and 'presupposition' – can be interpreted in different ways. On the one hand, not being very remote from the intuitive, pretheoretical concept of presupposition as 'background assumption,' the concept of presupposition covers a wide range of heterogeneous phenomena. Owing to the principle of communicative economy as balanced by the principle of clarity (Horn, 1984), in discourse much is left unsaid or taken for granted.

In order to clarify the concept of presupposition, some authors have compared speech with a *Gestalt* picture in which it is possible to distinguish a ground and a figure. Presuppositions are the ground; what is actually said is the figure. As in a *Gestalt* picture, ground and figure are simultaneous in speech; unlike the two possible representations in the *Gestalt* pic-

ture, speech ground and figure have a different status, for instance with respect to possible refutation. What is said, i.e., the figure, is open to objection; what is assumed, i.e., the ground, is "shielded from challenge" (Givón, 1982: 101). What crucially restricts the analogy is the fact that discourse is a dynamic process, whereas a picture is not. At the same time that an explicit communication is conveyed in the ongoing discourse, an intertwined level of implicit communication is unfolding: understanding a discourse requires an understanding of both. When communicating, we are constantly asked to choose what to put in the foreground and what in the background. Discourses and texts are multilevel constructs, and presuppositions represent (at least a part of) the unsaid (*see* **Pragmatics: Overview**).

On the other hand, the label 'pragmatic' can be used in different ways. It may refer, first, to a number of objects of study and, second, to a number of methods of analysis linked by the fact that they take into account elements of the actual context (*see* **Pragmatics: Overview; Metapragmatics; Pragmatic Indexing;**

Indexicality: Theory). What is called 'pragmatic' may in fact be an expanded semantic object (*see* **Semantics-Pragmatics Boundary**). Generally speaking, a requirement for a truly pragmatic treatment seems to be that it is concerned more with real usages of language(s) than with highly abstract models dealing with oversimplified, construed examples. Ultimately, "what I can imply or infer, given a presupposition, depends on an active choice made in the face-to-face confrontation with my interlocutor" (Mey, 2001: 29).

The origin of the concept of pragmatic presupposition must be sought in the recognition by philosophers of language and logicians that there are *implicata* of utterances that do not belong to the set of truth conditions. Their starting point is the awareness that there are other relations between utterances besides that of entailment.

The definitions of pragmatic presupposition proposed in the 1970s have brought about a pragmatic rereading of a problem that was above all logical and that had not found adequate explanation in the available semantic theories. This rereading was basically methodological (*see* **Semantics-Pragmatics Boundary; Pragmatics and Semantics**).

From Stalnaker's definition (1970) onward, a pragmatic presupposition was no longer considered a relation between utterances but rather was considered one between a speaker and a proposition. This is a good starting point, but it is far from satisfactory if the label 'pragmatic' is meant to cover more than 'semantic and idealized contextual features,' i.e., if we adopt a radical pragmatic standpoint.

Let us provisionally define a pragmatic presupposition as a '*ménage à trois*' between a speaker, the framework of his/her utterance, and an addressee. From a radical pragmatic standpoint, a substantivist view of presuppositions – i.e., what the presupposition of an utterance is – is less promising than a functional, dynamic, interactional, contractual-negotiating view; the question here is how presupposition works in a communicative exchange. The pragmatic presupposition can be considered as an agreement between speakers. In this vein, Ducrot proposed a juridical definition whereby the basic function of presuppositions is to "establish a frame for further discourse" (1972: 94; my translation). Presuppositions are based on a mutual, tacit agreement that has not been given before and that is constantly renewed (or, as the case may be, revoked) during interaction. Presuppositions are grounded on complicity.

Having been the focus of lively discussions by linguists and philosophers of language during the 1970s, presuppositions seem now to have gone out of fashion. At the time, the "wars of presupposition" (Levinson, 2000: 397) were fought between partisans of a semantic vs. a pragmatic view on the phenomenon. Another war is presently being fought with regard to another – though adjacent – territory, that of the intermediate categories covering the conceptual space between presupposition and implicature (*see* **Implicature**). The fight involves the overall organization of the different layers of meaning (and their interplay); it could be labeled the 'war of (generalized) conversational implicature,' if the latter term were neutral, rather than being the banner of the faction representing one side of the debate, namely the post-Gricean theorists (eminently, though not exclusively, represented by Levinson [2000]). The other side counts among its representatives, first of all, the relevance theorists, as represented by Carston (2002), who advance an alternative concept, called 'explicature,' that is intended to bridge the notions of encoded meaning and inferred meaning (*see* **Relevance Theory; Implicature**).

On the whole, the decline of the interest in presupposition as such can be understood, and partly justified, inasmuch as subtler distinctions between the different phenomena have been suggested, and a descriptively adequate typology of *implicata* is in the process of being built (see Sbisà, 1999b). The decline is less justified if the substitution is only terminological, that is, if the intuitive concept of presupposition is replaced by a gamut of theory-dependent concepts without offering any increase in explanatory power with respect to authentic data. In the latter case, it is not clear what advantages might result from the replacement of the umbrella term 'presupposition' by some other, more modish terminology. The point is, once again, the meaning we assign to the word 'pragmatic' and the object we make it refer to: either the rarefied world of construed examples or the real world, where people constantly presuppose certain things in order to reach certain goals.

Once it is clear that a radical pragmatic approach to the issue necessarily takes only the latter into consideration, the question is whether the term 'presupposition' refers to a range of heterogeneous phenomena or, on the contrary, to a particular type of *implicatum*, to which other types can be added. But even before that, we should ask whether, between the established notion of semantic presupposition and the Gricean notion of implicature (which, despite its popularity, still is under scrutiny by both philosophers and linguists), there is room for a concept like pragmatic presupposition. To answer this question, we need to say a few words on how pragmatic presupposition is distinct from the two types of adjacent *implicata* mentioned earlier: semantic presupposition and implicature.

Relation with Semantic Presupposition

The concept of semantic presupposition is relatively clear. Its parentage is accredited: Frege (*see* **Frege, Gottlob (1848–1925) (01250)**), Russell, Strawson. Its lineage seems to be traceable back to Xenophanes, quoted in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, via Port-Royal and Stuart Mill. There is substantial agreement as to its definition: the presupposition of a sentence is what remains valid even if the sentence is denied; its truth is a necessary condition for a declarative sentence to have a truth value or to be used in order to make a statement. A respectable test has been devised to identify it – the negation test. There is a list of the linguistic facts (Levinson, 1983: 181–185) that trigger the phenomenon of presupposition: thirty-one have been listed, from factive verbs (e.g., *know*, *regret*; to change-of-state verbs (e.g., *stop*, *arrive*), to cleft sentences.

The notions of semantic presupposition and conventional implicature (*see* **Maxims and Flouting**), as identified by Grice (who exemplified the latter with *therefore*), can be unified to a certain degree, as both depend on a surface linguistic element that releases the presupposition. The difference between semantic presuppositions and conventional implicatures is that the latter, unlike the former, are irrelevant with respect to truth conditions (*see* **Semantics-Pragmatics Boundary**). In contrast, unlike semantic presuppositions and some conventional implicatures, pragmatic presuppositions are not directly linked to the lexicon, to the syntax, or to prosodic facts (e.g., the contrastive accent in 'MARY has come'; but are linked to the *utterance act* (*see* **Pragmatic Acts**).

We should distinguish types of *implicata* that are recorded by dictionaries and that either are part of the semantic representation of a lexeme or are conveyed by given syntactic or prosodic structures, from *implicata* that are independent of both dictionary and grammar: in particular, pragmatic presuppositions are triggered by the utterance and the speech act involved. They are presuppositions neither of a lexeme nor of a proposition nor of a sentence. They are presuppositions that a speaker activates through the utterance, the speech act, and the conversational or textual moves that a given speech act performs. Thus, pragmatic presuppositions concern not imperative *sentences* but orders; not declarative *sentences* but assertions; and so on. In other words, one ought to stress once more the distinction between syntactic and pragmatic functions: between them there is no one-to-one correspondence (see Lyons, 1977). The same linguistic structure, the same utterance, can perform different functions, convey different speech acts, and refer to different sets of presuppositions

(*see* **Pragmatics and Semantics**). The acknowledgment of a level of theorizing that goes beyond the sentence is the *sine qua non* for the analysis of pragmatic presuppositions. Pragmatic presuppositions are related to knowledge that is not grammatical but encyclopedic, that is, knowledge that concerns our being in the world (*see* **Metapragmatics**). Or, rather, they consist not in knowledge, in something that is already known, but in something that is *given as such* by the speaker, in something that is *assumed as such* and is therefore *considered irrefutable* (Van der Auwera, 1979).

Once we have recognized the semantic nature of lexical and grammatical (syntactic and prosodic) presuppositions, we should stress the connection between semantic and pragmatic presuppositions. First, the connection is of a general nature and concerns the obvious (but by no means negligible) fact that, when we are dealing not with abstractions but with real utterances, the phenomenon of semantic presuppositions becomes one of the available means by which the speaker can change the communicative situation (*see* **Communicative Principle and Communication**). If the link between, for instance, a certain lexeme and the presupposition it triggers is semantic, their analysis within an utterance and a context must face the pragmatic problem of their use and effects.

Second, on closer examination, this connection is bound up with the specific pragmatic functions performed by phenomena that can be labeled as *semantic* presuppositions. For instance, it is important to recognize the effectiveness of semantic *implicata* (lexical presuppositions, conventional implicatures, presuppositions linked to syntactic constructions such as cleft sentences, etc.,) both in the construction of texts and in the pragmatic strategies of manipulation of beliefs, or, to use Halliday's categories, both in the textual function and in the interpersonal one (*see* **Systemic Theory; Halliday, Michael Alexander Kirkwood**). On the one hand, the analysis of the different types of anaphora and their functioning whenever their antecedent is not what the preceding text stated but what it presupposed, has both textual and pragmatic relevance. On the other hand, precisely because it is shielded from challenge, communication *via* presuppositions lends itself to manipulatory purposes (see Sbisà, 1999a): suffice it to compare the different persuasive effects of an assertion embedded in a factive verb vs. a simple assertion (e.g., "People know that solar energy is wishful thinking" vs. "Solar energy is wishful thinking"). Having defined the semantic nature of the different types of presuppositional triggers, we should then recognize the role of pragmatics in the study of the production and interpretation of these

potentially highly manipulatory *implicata*. Obviously, it is more difficult to question something that is communicated only implicitly rather than to attack something that is communicated openly, if only because what is implicit must be recognized before it can be attacked. This is attested by the highly polemical and aggressive value inherent in attacks on presuppositions; such moves always represent a serious threat for 'face' (*see* **Face**; **Mitigation**).

Relation with Conversational Implicature

The criteria put forward by Grice to distinguish conversational implicature (*see* **Cooperative Principle**; **Grice, Herbert Paul**) from other *implicata* (i.e., calculability, nondetachability, nonconventionality, indeterminacy, cancelability) have not proven to be entirely satisfactory, even when integrated with the further criterion of 'reinforceability' (Horn, 1991). In particular, the criterion of cancelability, viewed as crucial by many authors, seems to be problematic (for a discussion, see Levinson, 1983). And in any case, cancelability is linked to the degree of formality of the interaction: in unplanned speech, it is easily tolerated.

If we are satisfied with an intuitive differentiation that nevertheless uses these criteria, we can reasonably maintain that pragmatic presuppositions are oriented, retroactively, toward a background of beliefs assumed to be shared. Implicatures, on the other hand, are oriented, proactively, toward knowledge yet to be built. Besides (at least if we prototypically think of *particularized* conversational implicatures, i.e., the kind that, according to Grice, strictly depends on the actual context; see Levinson, 2000: 16), such knowledge does not necessarily have to be valid beyond the real communicative situation. Thus, in order to distinguish the two types of *implicata*, the criteria of different conventionality (presuppositions being more conventional than implicatures) and of different validity (the latter being more general in the case of presuppositions, more contingent in the case of implicatures) are called into play. Presuppositions concern beliefs constituting the background of communication. They become the object of communication (thus losing their status of presupposition) only if something goes wrong, if the addressee does not accept them or questions them, forcing the speaker to put his or her cards on the table. Implicatures, on the contrary, concern a 'knowledge' that is not yet shared and that will become such only if the addressee goes through the correct inferences while interpreting the speaker's communicative intention. The distinction is thus more a matter of degree than a true dichotomy, the latter, more than the former, requiring the addressee to abandon his or her laziness – the "principle of inertia," as Van der Auwera (1979) called it, i.e., the speaker's reliance on shared beliefs – and to cooperate creatively with the discourse. With implicatures, a higher degree of cooperation and involvement is asked of the addressee (the more I am emotionally involved, the more I am willing to carry out inferential work) (see Arndt and Janney, 1987; *see* **Cooperative Principle**). Presuppositions can remain in the background of communication and even go unconsidered by the addressee without making the communication suffer. Implicatures must be calculated for communication to proceed in the direction desired by the speaker.

The roles of presuppositions and implicatures, seen against the backdrop of the speaker's expectations and the discourse design, are therefore different; the former are oriented toward the already constructed (or given as such), the latter toward the yet to be constructed or, even better, toward a 'construction in progress': the former concern a set of assumptions, the latter their updating.

Presuppositions are more closely linked to what is actually said, to the surface structure of the utterance; implicatures are more closely linked to what is actually meant. Their respective degrees of cancelability also seem to be different: presuppositions are less cancelable than implicatures. This difference between presuppositions and implicatures with respect to the criterion of cancelability could be reformulated in terms of utterance responsibilities and commitment. With presuppositions and implicatures, the speaker is committed to different degrees – more with the former, less with the latter – with respect to his or her own *implicata*. Thus, a definition of pragmatic presuppositions could be formulated as 'that which our hearer is entitled to believe on the basis of our words.' In the case of presuppositions, this implicit commitment is stronger, and so, too, is the sanction, should the presupposition prove to be groundless. And the reason is that in the case of presuppositions, an attempt to perform a given speech act has been made: the linguistic devices have traced out, however implicitly, a detectable direction. The addressee is authorized to believe that the speaker's speech act was founded, i.e., that his or her own presuppositions were satisfied. A character in Schnitzler's *Spiel im Morgengrauen* implacably says to the second lieutenant who has lost a huge amount of money playing cards with him and does not know how to pay his debt: "Since you sat down at the card-table you must obviously have been ready to lose." Communicating is somehow like sitting down at the card table: presuppositions can be a bluff.

The Gricean concept of implicature can be compared to Austin's concept of perlocution (*see* **Speech**

Acts; Speech Acts, Classification and Definition; Austin, John L.), with which it shares the feature of nonconventionality: implicature is an actualized perlocution. From the utterance 'My car broke down,' I can draw a limited number of presuppositions, e.g., 'there's a car,' 'the car is mine,' 'the car was working before,' but an indefinite number of implicatures, e.g., 'Where's the nearest garage?,' 'I can't drive you to the gym,' 'Can you lend me some money to have it repaired?,' 'Bad luck haunts me.'

Finally, an interesting relationship is the symbiosis of pragmatic presuppositions and implicatures in indirect speech acts (see Speech Acts; Pragmatic Acts): the presuppositions of the act (preparatory conditions in particular) are stated or questioned so as to release a (generalized conversational) implicature (see Implicature).

Pragmatic Presuppositions: 'Classical' Definitions

Officially, at least, pragmatic presuppositions have had a short life. The available registry data on pragmatic presuppositions reveal the following: born 1970 (Stalnaker); died (and celebrated with a requiem) 1977 (Karttunen and Peters). The two latter authors proposed to articulate the concept of presupposition into (a) particularized conversational implicatures (e.g., subjunctive conditionals), (b) generalized conversational implicatures (e.g., verbs of judgment), (c) preparatory conditions on the felicity of the utterance, (d) conventional implicatures (e.g., factives, *even*, *only*, *but*). The reader edited by Oh and Dinneen (1979) can also be seen as a *post mortem* commemoration.

Against the backdrop of the inadequacies of the concept of semantic presupposition, Stalnaker (1970: 281) introduced the concept of pragmatic presupposition as one of the major factors of the context. Pragmatic presupposition enabled him to distinguish contexts from possible worlds; it was defined as a "propositional attitude" (see Context, Communicative). In the same paper, Stalnaker (1970: 279) also said that the best way to look at pragmatic presuppositions was as "complex dispositions which are manifested in linguistic behavior." Confirming the equivalence between pragmatic presupposition and propositional attitude, Stalnaker (1973: 448) defined pragmatic presupposition in the following way: "A speaker pragmatically presupposes that B at a given moment in a conversation just in case he is disposed to act, in his linguistic behavior, as if he takes the truth of B for granted, and as if he assumes that his audience recognizes that he is doing so." Stalnaker's definition showed a tension

between the definition of pragmatic presupposition on the one hand as a disposition to act and on the other as a propositional attitude: pragmatic terms and concepts, such as 'disposition to act' and 'linguistic behavior,' were used alongside with semantic terms and concepts, 'the truth of B' in particular. In Stalnaker's treatment (1970: 277–279), a narrow meaning of the concept of 'pragmatic' was associated with an extended meaning of the concept of 'proposition,' which was the object both of illocutionary and of propositional acts. This tension is still present and verges on a clash in Stalnaker (2002), where the most distinctive feature of the propositional attitude (which, according to Stalnaker, was constitutive of a presupposition) was defined as a "social or public attitude" (2002: 701).

Keenan, distinguishing between logical and pragmatic notions, defined pragmatic presupposition as a relation between "utterances and their contexts" (1971: 51): "An utterance of a sentence pragmatically presupposes that its context is appropriate" (1971: 49) (see Context, Communicative). In an almost specular opposition to Stalnaker, Keenan seemed to extend his view of pragmatics until it almost coincided with "conventions of usage," as Ebert (1973: 435) remarked. At the same time, Keenan also seemed to hold a restricted view of the phenomenon of 'presupposition,' as exemplified by expressions that presuppose that the speaker/hearer is a man/woman (sex and relative age of the speaker/hearer), by deictic particles referring to the physical setting of the utterance and by expressions indicating personal and status relations among participants (e.g., French '*Tu es dégoûtant*', literally, 'You [informal] are disgusting [male]').

Among other interesting definitions, there is the following one, offered by Levinson (1983: 205): "an utterance A *pragmatically presupposes* a proposition B iff A is *appropriate* only if B is *mutually known* by participants."

Givón's definition (1982: 100) articulated the prerequisite of mutual knowledge (see Shared Knowledge) more clearly: "The speaker assumes that a proposition **p** is *familiar* to the hearer, likely to be *believed* by the hearer, *accessible* to the hearer, within the reach of the hearer etc. *on whatever grounds*."

Some conclusions are already possible. In particular:

1. The two definitions of presupposition as semantic and pragmatic (Stalnaker) or as logical and discursive (Givón, 1982) are compatible (cf. Stalnaker, 1970: 279).
2. Logical presupposition is a subcase of discursive presupposition: "logical presupposition is [...] the

marked sub-case of discourse backgroundedness" (Givón, 1984: 328).

One element occurs with particular frequency in the definitions – it is that of presupposition as 'common ground.' Here, the preliminary move from presupposition as propositional attitude to presupposition as shared knowledge (*see* **Shared Knowledge**), from the world of utterances to the world '*en plein air*,' was Stalnaker's (1973).

Now, both the narrow definition (presupposition as propositional attitude) and the extended one (presupposition as shared belief) involve a high degree of idealization. We are entitled to ask: What is common ground? What is shared knowledge? Is there a different 'common ground' for different communities of speakers? And to what extent and on the basis of what kind of conjecture, even within the same community, can we speak of 'common ground'? Stalnaker (1974) realized the Platonic flavor of this notion when he gave examples of asymmetry in 'shared knowledge' (such as in his imagined conversation with one's barber). According to Stalnaker, defining presupposition in terms of common knowledge worked "[i]n normal, straightforward serious conversational contexts where the overriding purpose of the conversation is to exchange information [...] The difficulties [...] come with contexts in which other interests besides communication are being served by the conversation" (1974: 201). But what are the criteria that define a conversation as 'normal,' 'straightforward,' and 'serious'? Further, are there no other interests in play beyond those of exchanging information (such as are present in *every* conversation)?

Finally, it is worthwhile stressing that the concept of 'common ground' is effective only as a '*de jure*,' not as a '*de re*,' concept, i.e., not as something ontologically stated but as something deontically given by the speaker (Ducrot, 1972); that is, it represents a frame of reference that the hearer is expected to accept. On the one hand, a field of anthropological, sociological, and rhetorical investigation opens up before us. On the other hand, the characterization of presupposition as shared knowledge risks being static and idealizing and contains a high amount of ideological birdlime (*see* **Anthropology and Pragmatics; Context, Communicative**).

Pragmatic Presuppositions as Felicity Conditions

At this point, a few further remarks are in order. First of all, the classic presuppositional model is *semantic*; even when a notion of pragmatic presupposition is invoked, what is in fact presented is no more than an analysis of some semantic phenomena. Pragmatic notions such as that of 'utterance' or 'context' (*see* **Context, Communicative**) are invoked with the main aim of avoiding the contradictions inherent in purely semantic models. The most refined treatment of pragmatic presupposition, by Gazdar (1979), did not escape this kind of contradiction. Second, an assertive model underlies the different definitions of pragmatic presupposition. A point of view centered on truth value is lurking behind allegedly pragmatic presuppositions: the concept of proposition (content of an assertion, whether true or false) is the relevant theoretical unit of measurement here. But can this theoretical construct work also as the pragmatic unit of measure? In particular, can this construct adequately deal with communicative behavior? Nothing seems to escape the tyranny of propositions, from the content of the actual utterance to mental content (which, if not presented in propositional form, assumes that shape after being embedded in a predicate like 'know' or 'believe'), to a common or shared knowledge, and to the representation that a logician or a philosopher gives of that content. To what extent is the concept of proposition adequate here? Pragmatic presuppositions concern not only knowledge, whether true or false; they also concern expectations, desires, interests, claims, attitudes toward the world, fears, and so on. The exclusive use of the concept of 'proposition' is idealizing and in the long run misleading, especially when it gives rise to the restoration of the dimension of truth/falsehood as the only dimension of assessing an utterance, whereas this dimension is only one among many possible ones (*see* **Speech Acts, Classification and Definition**).

Neither is the pragmatic level homogeneous with respect to the other levels of linguistic description, such as syntax or semantics; it triggers other questions and anxieties. Pragmatic presuppositions are not a necessary condition to the truth or the falsehood of an utterance; rather, they are necessary to guarantee the felicity of an act.

Once we have abandoned the logico-semantic level of analysis, that is, once we have decided to consider the data of the real communication as our main object, the fact that Oedipus has killed his father is – prior to being an entailment or a presupposition of "*Oedipus regrets having killed his father*" – a shared knowledge common to a particular (Western) culture. "Perched over the pragmatic abyss" (Givón, 1982: 111), we feel giddy. Pragmatic presupposition could actually be God, or the autonomy of cats (of course, excepting the logicians' cats, who, as is well known, invariably remain on their mats). But here the notion of presupposition is being spread so thinly as to

run the risk of becoming useless. There is, though, a narrower and more technical meaning of pragmatic presupposition that may help us build a protective wall at the edge of the abyss: it is that of pragmatic presuppositions as the felicity conditions of an illocutionary act.

Let us assume that the relevant unit for the concept of pragmatic presupposition is not the sentence nor the utterance, but the speech act in its entirety (*see* **Speech Acts and Grammar**). Pragmatic presuppositions can be regarded as felicity conditions or, if we adopt Searle's model, as constitutive rules (*see* **Principles and Rules**) of conventional speech acts (e.g., promises, requests, assertions). If a presupposition functioning as a felicity condition of the act does not hold, the act fails. (Note, incidentally, that a failure of a presupposition has different consequences with respect to a failure of an implicature; in fact, the failure of the latter has no bearing on the success or failure of the illocutionary act).

The identification of presuppositions with felicity conditions is not a new idea: "By the presuppositional aspect of a speech communication," argued Fillmore (1971: 276), "I mean those conditions which must be satisfied in order for a particular illocutionary act to be effectively performed in saying particular sentences. Of course, we need not be concerned with the totality of such conditions, but only with those that can be related to facts about the linguistic structure of sentences." For a pragmaticist, this definition is attractive in that it underscores the need to research systematic relations between utterance function and form. However, it cannot be accepted to the extent that felicity conditions necessarily are of a heterogeneous nature (*pace* Katz, 1977), in that they involve the extralinguistic world; in other words, they concern the place where language and world meet – the communicative situation.

Toward a Pragmatic Definition of Pragmatic Presupposition

A philosophical approach to the problem of linguistic action, seen as a kind of social action, was represented by Austin's typology of infelicities (1962). This was a step forward with respect to undifferentiated notions, such as that of 'appropriateness,' often used in the definition of pragmatic presupposition. Austin's typology helped distinguish between presuppositions without which the act is simply not performed (e.g., in promising somebody something that we do not have) and presuppositions that, if unsatisfied, make the act unhappy (e.g., in promising something insincerely). There are presuppositions whose satisfaction can be seen in binary

terms; in other cases, satisfaction occurs according to a scale, in the sense that the presuppositions can be more or less satisfied: the latter cases are the ones concerning the appropriateness of an act on which it is possible to negotiate (an order, however insolent, has been given; advice, although from an unauthoritative source, has been put forward, etc.). The role of nonverbal communication in the successful performance of acts has to a large extent still to be investigated: e.g., if someone offers me congratulations on my promotion, displaying a sad, long face, can I still say he or she is congratulating me (*see* **Gestures, Pragmatic Aspects**)?

In any case, the different types of infelicity help recall the substantial homogeneity of linguistic action to action: pragmatics must be connected to praxeology, to the study of actions as effective or ineffective, even before they can be considered true or false, appropriate or inappropriate (*see* **Pragmatic Acts**).

A decisive move in analyzing pragmatic presuppositions is that of connecting the typology of infelicities to empirical research on the functioning of linguistic and nonlinguistic interaction. For example, in conversation the typology can be related to the various mechanisms of repairs or, more generally, to research on misunderstandings in dialogue (for a survey, see Dascal [ed.], 1999) and on pathological communication (*see* **Conversation Analysis**). To achieve this more dynamic view of pragmatic presuppositions, it is crucial to consider presuppositions not only as preconditions of the act (e.g., as done by Karttunen and Peters, 1977) but also as effects: if the presupposition is not challenged, it takes effect retroactively. If you do not react against my order, you acknowledge my power; if you follow my advice, you accept me as an expert who knows what is best for you; if you do not question my assessment, you ascribe a competence to me (see, among others, Ducrot, 1972: 96–97).

The analysis of *implicata* still requires much theoretical and applied work. Some steps may be sketched out as follows. We can imagine the *implicata* of which pragmatic presuppositions are part, as types of commitments assumed by the speaker in different degrees and ways. The different degrees of cancelability according to which the types of *implicata* have been traditionally classified are related to a stronger or weaker communicative commitment: the speaker is responsible for the *implicata* conveyed by his or her linguistic act; if the addressee does not raise any objection, he or she becomes co-responsible for it. A decisive step is that of leaving behind the truth-functional heritage: rather than recognizing a presupposition as true, the issue is whether or not to accept it as valid.

In a pragmatic analysis of pragmatic presuppositions, it is furthermore necessary to consider the following dimensions:

1. *Sequential-textual and rhetorical* (Eco, 1990: 225). Presuppositional phenomena can be explained only by taking into account the cotextual sequential dimension (this was implicit, albeit in an idealized way, in Grice's criterion of cancelability), as well as the rhetorical dimension (which was implicit in Sadock (1978) and Horn's (1991) criterion of reinforceability). For a study of pragmatic presuppositions, it is necessary to move from an analysis of predicates within single sentences to the analysis of textual structures in which the presupposition is one of the effects (*see* **Text and Text Analysis**). Presuppositions change the legal situation of speakers (Ducrot, 1972: 90*ff.*), that is, their rights and duties within a context that is being constructed along the way. The projection problem (see, among others, Levinson, 1983; van der Sandt, 1988) – namely, the problem of how the presuppositions of a simple sentence are or are not inherited from a complex sentence – may be reformulated in a pragmatic and textual perspective as a problem of the constraints, not only thematic, on coherence and acceptability that arise in the construction of a discourse (*see* **Constraint, Pragmatic**).

2. *Anthropological-cultural-social.* Much work has still to be done on shared knowledge, on the kinds of beliefs that can be taken for granted within a given cultural and social group. Presuppositions are a way of building up such knowledge and of reinforcing it. The social relevance of this research, which might be profitably connected to work in the theory of argumentation (e.g., see Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's classical analyses [1958]) is obvious. As Goffman (1983: 27) wrote: "[T]he felicity condition behind all other felicity conditions, [is]... *Felicity's Condition*: to wit, any arrangement which leads us to judge an individual's verbal acts to be not a manifestation of strangeness. Behind Felicity's Condition is our sense of what it is to be sane" (*see* **Social Aspects of Pragmatics**).

3. *Psychological.* The analysis of implicit communication, even if one takes care to avoid undue psychologizing, does require psychological adequacy. Just an example will clarify this point: we tend to choose those topics that are at least partially shared, that enable us to be allusive and elliptical; we produce 'exclusive' utterances that only the addressee can understand at once. In other words, we engage the maximum of knowledge shared between ourselves and (only) the addressee.

The pragmatic analysis of presuppositions is a task that, for the most part, still has to be performed. It is a truly vertiginous enterprise, yet one that cannot be abandoned if, moving beyond the logical relations between utterances, human communication is to be considered a relevant object of study.

See also: Anthropology and Pragmatics; Austin, John L.; Communicative Principle and Communication; Constraint, Pragmatic; Context, Communicative; Conversation Analysis; Cooperative Principle; Discourse, Narrative and Pragmatic Development; Face; Frege, Friedrich Ludwig Gottlob; Gestures, Pragmatic Aspects; Grice, Herbert Paul; Halliday, Michael Alexander Kirkwood; Implicature; Indexicality: Theory; Maxims and Flouting; Metapragmatics; Mitigation; Pragmatic Acts; Pragmatic Indexing; Pragmatics and Semantics; Pragmatics: Overview; Principles and Rules; Relevance Theory; Semantics-Pragmatics Boundary; Shared Knowledge; Social Aspects of Pragmatics; Speech Acts; Speech Acts and Grammar; Speech Acts, Classification and Definition; Syntax-Pragmatics Interface: Overview; Systemic Theory; Text and Text Analysis.

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Pragmatics and Semantics

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Critical Introduction: Metatheoretical Presuppositions as Ideological Norms Constraining the Empirical Sciences of Pragmatics and Semantics

As a first approximation, pragmatics may be defined as the science of language use (*parole*) or the discursive functions of language, including its contextual uniqueness and variability (irregularities), whereas linguistics may be defined as the science of the abstract (decontextualizable) regularities that constitute linguistic structure (*langue*), including semantics as a formally encoded system of denotational meanings.

This is a very general and common characterization of pragmatics and semantics that, however, may not be universally accepted by linguists and pragmaticians; among them, there is no consensus on what those fields are about, where the boundaries lie, or even whether we can or should draw boundaries (*see* **Pragmatics: Overview**). At the same time, most scholars nonetheless seem to think that the relationship between semantics and pragmatics is a primary metatheoretical issue, having direct and profound bearings on how things are done in these disciplines, that is, how we conceptualize the relationship constitutes primary principles, norms, or postulates at the metatheoretical level, explicitly or implicitly presupposed in the context of any scientific practices concerning language at the object level. Such metatheoretical presuppositions clearly constrain

object-level activities and analyses (*see* **Metapragmatics**). Here, we may think of how meta-level phenomena such as Gricean maxims and frames are indexed by object-level phenomena such as floutings and contextualization cues, respectively, and relatively strongly constrain the interpretations of what is done in the speech event in which such phenomena occur (cf. Lucy, 1993; Mey, 2001: 173–205; *see* **Maxims and Flouting; Constraint, Pragmatic; Grice, Herbert Paul**). Note that such metatheoretical principles are, in social-scientific terms, evaluative norms to which the individual scientists differentially orient and against which they evaluate their behaviors; in so doing, they discursively mark their distinct group identities and constitute themselves as members of particular 'schools' (cf. Woolard and Schieffelin, 1994; Koyama, 1999, 2003; Kroskrity, 2000). Thus, these value-laden, normative conceptualizations of the relationship between semantics and pragmatics may be seen as the metalinguistic ideologizations that index the social positions and stances of particular scholars. Below, we describe the general frameworks of such ideologizations, place them in a historical context from the perspective of critical pragmatics, and examine what language users, including semanticians and pragmaticians, do with words, that is, how they (re)create their theories, disciplines, and themselves in their sociohistorical contexts (cf. Koyama, 2000b, 2001a; Mey, 2001).

Because metatheoretical conceptualizations may focus on methodological stances or the more empirical issue of how to set the boundaries of pragmatics (*vis-à-vis* semantics or 'extralinguistics,' i.e., semanticism, complementarism, and pragmaticism), we shall, for analytic purposes, deal with them separately. Starting with the former, we show the correspondences between metatheoretical conceptualizations and the sociohistorical contexts that endow them with socially interested values.

Three Methodological Stances to Pragmatics and Semantics

The Componential View

The first way to articulate the relationship concerns methodologies of, or metatheoretical stances toward, linguistic sciences. Clearly, they can be objective (de-agentivized) or subjective (agentive), analytic (compositional) or synthetic (holistic), or various combinations thereof; but we may detect three ideal types in the recent history. The first of such types, best represented by the Chomskyan approach and generally characterized by objective **and** analytic attitudes, is called

'componential,' 'compartmental,' or 'modular.' It sees the linguistic sciences as analytic pursuits dealing with decomposable objects (i.e., modules) such as phonetics, phonology, morphophonology, morphology, syntax, semantics, and pragmatics, naturalistically studied by compositional methods and described independently of the particular sociohistorical contexts in which analysts are involved as social agents. Clearly, this metatheoretical stance, which underlies the organizational institutions and academic curricula of linguistics, is typical of the modern sciences coming out of Baconian natural philosophy in 17th-century England (cf. Bauman and Briggs, 2003). That is, it is the stance of the modern natural sciences (*Naturwissenschaften*), with their laws and other regularities, which try to explain empirically occurring phenomena by appealing to hypothetically idealized quasiempirical regularities ('covering laws') analytically abstracted from the total contexts of scientific activities, which are thereby decomposed into distinct fields, in our case semantics and pragmatics.

This epistemological characterization may be supplemented with a pragmatic understanding of the social and historical processes of epistemic authorization (cf. Kroskrity, 2000: 85–138). That is, the componential stance toward language is pragmatically positioned in, and presupposingly indexes, the historical context of the post-Baconian specialized sciences and, more broadly, Durkheimian 'organic society' in modernity, or the age of social specialization and the division of labor. Because the truthfulness, appropriateness, and effectiveness of any actions, including scientific ones, depend on the contexts in which they take place, this implies that the componential stance and its 'scientific' results receive their authority primarily from the post-Baconian modernization project. This project is characterized not only by social and epistemic specialization, but also by the standardizing regularization, methodical rationalization, and experimental controlling of contextual contingencies, chance happenings, and unique events, which earlier were understood as fate, epiphanies, and other phenomena originating in the heavenly universe, and transcending the sublunar, empirically manipulable space of human agency (cf. Hacking, 1990; Owen, 1994; Koyama, 2001b). Here, we must note that standardizing regularization, Saint-Simonian technocratic specialization, and Benthamite instrumental rationalization generally characterize the modern discipline of logic (or, when applied to linguistics, of formal syntax and semantics), which came to dominate American philosophy around 1900 and whose rise is precisely due to these social forces (cf. Kuklick, 1977).

The Perspectival View

The second stance is less objectivizing and more synthetic because it emerged as a critical reaction to the crisis of the Baconian sciences and the modernization project in the early 20th century. This critical reaction may be characterized as the Husserlian phenomenological movement, genealogically going back to Hegel's totalistic dialectic phenomenology and Kant's critical philosophy and encompassing some of the early structuralists, Gestalt psychologists, and other (broadly defined) neo-Kantians who emphasized the processual nature of scientific knowledge as empirically anchored in the holistic context of human beings in their worlds, with their origin located at the *hic et nunc* of agentive experiences (cf. Jakobson, 1973). One of the critical aspects differentiating this stance from the nomothetic one of the natural sciences is the understanding of scientists and their activities as a contextually integrated part of the phenomena analyzed by the scientists themselves, here theorized as contextualized beings. Hence, the phenomenological sciences are closer to a *Geisteswissenschaft* such as Weberian interpretative sociology, in that it tries to come to grips with the dialectic fact that scientists, always already involved in their social contexts, cannot ever get rid of socially contextualized perspectives (cf. Geuss, 1981; Duranti and Goodwin, 1992). Hence, the phenomenological stance toward the linguistic sciences is characterized by a perspectival and ethnomethodological (i.e., critically agentive) understanding of such sciences, in particular the understanding that language can be studied from an objectivizing or agentive perspective and that scientific findings are largely a function of the particular methodological perspectives chosen by social agents (cf. Calhoun *et al.,* 1993; Verschueren, 1999; note the perspectivalist notion of 'seeing-as,' genealogically derived from Wittgenstein's, Nietzsche's, and Kant's epistemological focus on form, epistemology, and methodology rather than on substance, ontology, or the *Ding an sich*). In this understanding, semantics studies the linguistic phenomena that emerge when scientific agents take a deagentivizing, decontextualizing perspective, whereas pragmatics is a study of linguistic phenomena seen from the perspective of 'ordinary language users' who nonetheless critically examine **their own** linguistic activities 'from within.' Hence, pragmatics in the phenomenological tradition is a critical science **of, by**, and **for** ordinary language users (cf. Mey, 2001).

Here, we may note that the perspectival view is generally preferred by pragmaticians, presumably because 'perspective' is a pragmatic notion *par excellence*, whereas the componential view is preferred by semanticians. This suggests that analytic decomposition is a methodological action that displaces or suppresses perspectival indexicality, compartmentalizes linguistic sciences, and privileges (or generates) structural objects such as semantics, in opposition to pragmatics, which it relegates to the 'waste-basket' of linguistics (cf. Mey, 2001: 19–21).

The Critical Sociological View

The previously discussed methodological understanding of the sciences goes back to Kant's transcendental critical philosophy; it was the turn-of-the-century neo-Kantians, in particular, Weber, Adorno (the Frankfurt School), and other critical sociologists, who, following Nietzsche, came to squarely understand this methodological, Kantian condition of modern sciences and its consequences, especially its epistemological relativism (cf. Geuss, 1981; Owen, 1994; Mey, 2001: 315–319). More importantly, such scientists followed the critical spirit of Kantian philosophy and launched a **meta**critique of methodologically critical Kantian science and its relativism, shown to reflect and partially constitute the contextual, social condition of the age in which such science had been created, viz., modernity. In this metacritical view, what is needed is a metacritical science that can relate the critical methodological instances of Kantianism to their sociohistorical context – that is, the political-economic and other kinds of pragmatic 'reality' that have endowed these instances with plausibility, if not verity – so as to show the critical limits of methodological relativism that are inherent in its historical and societal context.

Thus, just as methodologically critical perspectivalism and its sociological metacritiques (i.e., critical pragmaticism) came out of Kantian critical philosophy, so, too, pragmatics itself and, at least in part, semantics evolved out of this philosophy. This is illustrated by the following brief excursion into the historical context in which these two fields originated.

First, we note that the term 'pragmatics' was coined by the American pragmatist Charles Morris (1901–1979), who articulated the tripartite distinction among syntax (form), semantics (meaning), and pragmatics (context), appealing to the semiotic Pragmati(ci)sm of Charles Peirce (1839–1914), which tried to base knowledge on *praxis* (actions). Peirce's Pragmati(ci)sm, characterized by the phenomenological and critical orientations of neo-Kantianism, explicitly pointed to Kant as the founder of critical sciences, primarily because Kant articulated philosophy as a **critique**, in particular of philosophy itself. Hence, post- or neo-Kantians advanced 'semantics'

and 'pragmatics' as means to critically examine and articulate the foundations of modern epistemological and praxeological pursuits, respectively. More importantly, the contextual motivations for these critical sciences came from the historical conditions of the Enlightenment (or early modernity), which replaced the older schema in which *ratio* was subordinated to *intellectus* (emanating from the heavens to the sublunar human world, which was passively affected by it) with a new schema in which reason (epistemology) came to preside over imagination, fancy, or even madness (aesthetics). This was part of the comprehensive historical shift that replaced the theocentric, religious universe of the late Middle Ages – in which the universal, catholic, and absolute truth resided in the heavens, transcending the empirical, earthly, contingent, relative, human universe – with the anthropocentric, secular universe of modernity, in which human beings became empirical and transcendental (i.e., autonomous) subjects, no longer relying on the once transcendental heavens for their existence. By the same token, philosophy became anthropocentric and relativistic too, as the sciences of, by, and for humans (cf. Foucault, 1973; Koyama, 2001b, 2003; *see* **Foucault, Michel**). This transformation followed the development of commerce in Europe from the 12th–13th centuries onward, which brought together radically diverse cultures and histories, thus eventually giving rise to (1) the relativistically skeptic philosophy of Descartes, which started with doubting; (2) the speech genre of travel journals (developing into modern novels and (Alexander) Humboldtian 'natural histories,' out of which emerged modern anthropology and comparative sociology); and (3) humanism (eventually turning into philology and linguistics). The relativistic social **and** epistemic condition of modernity is correlated with the historical transfer of transcendence from the heavenly realm to the empirical realm of humans, who thus became transcendental-empirical doublets, obliged to justify themselves by means of, precisely, such metalinguistic critiques as semantics, pragmatics, and, more generally, Kantian transcendental philosophy.

Thus, modern semantics and pragmatics came out of Kantian critical philosophy and show historical characteristics of modernity, whereas philosophy (science) tries to critically examine and justify – within limits – itself because there is no longer any God (or *deus ex machina*) available to ground the human-made edifice (cf. Vico's *scienza nuova*). Post-Kantian modern semantics carries out a metalinguistic (metasemantic) critique of scientific and nonscientific languages, concepts, and (correct and literal) referential acts (cf. logical positivism, General Semantics, and the work of Ogden and Richards), whereas pragmatics

(often incorporated into the social sciences, in the tradition of Durkheim, Weber, Boas, Marx, Hegel, the brothers Humboldt, Herder, and ultimately, Kant) carries out a metalinguistic (metapragmatic) critique of scientific and nonscientific discourses and other actions in the sociohistorical context of modernity and beyond. This is what the post-Kantian demand of critical science requires us to do, by reflexively examining post-Kantian sciences **themselves**, including semantics and pragmatics, and articulating their historical, cultural, social limits as shown by (1) the decontextualized, dehistoricized notion of 'truth' advanced by the semanticians who ethnocentrically assume their cultural stereotypes as universal concepts; (2) the modern anthropocentric, 'phonocentric' understanding of discourse as having its foundational origin in the *hic et nunc* of microsocial communication; and (3) methodological relativism (cf. Koyama, 1999, 2000b, 2001b, 2003).

Thus, the third, critical-sociological, view tries to transcend modern perspectivalism and methodological relativism by showing their historical limits and advancing a transcendentally ideal **total** science that attempts to integrate a legion of specialized sciences and perspectives, in particular trying to overcome the division between the theoretical (conceptual, analytic, and linguistic-structural) and the pragmatic (empirical, social, and contextual) (cf. Koyama, 2000a). This approach, which underlies Pragmati(ci)sm as a project seeking to anchor theoretical knowledge in contextualized actions, and pragmatics as a project aimed at the unification of theoretical and applied linguistics, can be called 'semiotic,' insofar as semiotics is a science that tries to integrate decontextualized and contextualized epistemic, praxeological, **and** aesthetic phenomena, separately studied by specialized sciences, under the unitary umbrella of semiotic processes anchored in the pragmatics of social actions and events. In this view, it is the socially embedded discursive interaction that contextually presupposes or even creates the variety of perspectival stances assumed by social agents such as linguistic scientists and language users. Thus, this view is less agentivist than the phenomenological one in that it tries to articulate the contextual mechanisms that give rise to agentive, perspectivalized, and ideologized accounts and uses of language. Such a 'discursive-functional' approach was advanced by Peirce, Sapir, Whorf, Jakobson, Bateson, Hymes, and other semioticians, one of the most important frameworks being Jakobson's (1960) model of the six functions of (linguistic) communication: the referential, emotive, conative, phatic, poetic, and 'metalingual' (metalinguistic, metacommunicative) functions (*see* **Jakobson, Roman**). The critical

significance of this framework is that it is a model of linguistic phenomena reflexively including itself (cf. Lucy, 1993; Mey, 2001: 173–205): Any linguistic theorizing or understanding, be it explicit or implicit, whether carried out by professional linguists or ordinary language users, can be characterized in terms of the metalinguistic (metasemantic and metapragmatic) functions of discursive interaction. In this model, semantics is characterized as the metasemantic function of discursive interaction, that is, the system of the symbolic signs that discursive interactants believe exist prior to the discursive interactions in which those signs are presupposingly used to interpret the referential 'meanings' (what is said) of such interactions; on the other hand, pragmatics is equated with discursive interaction, encompassing all six functions, including the metasemantic function (to which pragmatics in the narrow sense is opposed) and the metapragmatic function, that is, the principles, maxims, norms, and other reflexive devices for textualization (framing, intertextual *renvoi*, and Bakhtinian voicing) that language users such as linguists use in order to regiment, interpret, and create referential and social-indexical meanings (i.e., effects) in discursive interactions (*see* **Principles and Rules; Dialogism, Bakhtinian**). In the next section, we articulate the relationship between semantics and pragmatics in this critical view, specifically in relation to the boundary problem.

The Boundary Problem

As has been noted, we may articulate the relationship between pragmatics and semantics in terms of the empirical boundaries between them and between pragmatics and extralinguistics. Obviously, how we distinguish semantics from pragmatics may significantly affect how we delimit pragmatics from 'the beyond,' and conversely.

Semanticism

First, as to the boundary between semantics and pragmatics, we may discern three approaches: semanticism, pragmaticism, and complementarism. Semanticism envisions pragmatics as the extension of semantically encoded yet metapragmatically characterizable categories (especially moods and *verba dicendi*, or verbs of saying), just as traditional logic has understood pragmatics (discourse) as the extensional universe onto which intensional (i.e., metasemantically characterizable) categories are projected. Naturally, semanticism is aligned with the decontextualized, analytic methodological perspective and sees language in use from the metasemantic perspective of the denotational

code (linguistic structure) presupposingly used by language users, including linguistic scientists, to interpret the referential significances of discursive interactions in which they are involved as discourse participants. Hence, this approach, typically taken by the philosophers of language such as Austin and Searle, characteristically uses the method of 'armchair' introspection, in which only the presupposable (and referential) aspects of communicative processes may readily emerge. This approach generally excludes the social-indexical aspects of pragmatics, particularly as regards group identities and power relations among discourse participants and other contextual beings, inasmuch as these are **created** (vs. presupposed) in discursive interaction and only coincidentally, indirectly, or opaquely related to linguistic-structurally encoded symbols (cf. Lucy, 1992; Mey, 2001). In this approach, pragmatics is mostly reduced to metapragmatically characterizable types in what essentially is a semantic, denotational code; examples are mood/modality/tense categories, verbs of saying, pronouns, and other shifters (i.e., 'denotational–indexical duplexes'; cf. Lee, 1997) or their psychological correlates, as observed in Austin's 'performative utterances' and Searle's 'primary illocutionary forces,' allegedly underlying the perlocutionary effects regularly created by the indirect (nonliteral) use of the tokens of such types (*see* **Deixis and Anaphora: Pragmatic Approaches; Speech Acts; Austin, John L.**). Hence, this approach can be characterized as denotationalist, universalist, and presuppositionalist; it is based on, and expresses, a consensualist linguistic ideology adopted by the scientific agents who, like many other language users, are inclined to see only or primarily the denotationally explicitly characterizable parts of language (cf. Lucy, 1992), while their social interest is limited to seeing language *in vitro* (vs. *in vivo*), essentially consisting of a set of universal categories commonly presupposed rather than contextually created in discursive interaction (cf. Mey, 2001). Historically, this ideology derives from the 17th-century Lockean ideas about language and communication that started to prescribe and advocate, against the rhetorical practices of Scholastic disputants and the radically egalitarian Puritans, the transparently referential ('correct and literal') use of language based on the 'universal public (i.e., bourgeois) consensus' about the proper, cooperative, rational use of language that should be presupposed by 'anyone' (in reality 'Modern Standard Average Middle-Class Man'; cf. Silverstein, 1985; Bauman and Briggs, 2003).

Complementarism

Unlike semanticism, complementarism advocates the coexistence of semantics and pragmatics as 'different

but equal' disciplines. Hence, it is compatible with both the compartmental and perspectival methodologies, as well as with the general ideologies of modern liberalism, relativism, and specialization. This may partially account for the current popularity of this approach, at least since the demise of the more ambitious projects of Generative Semantics and Searle's semanticism in the 1970s (cf. Koyama, 2000b). The approach, espoused by mainstream pragmaticians such as Leech (1983) and Levinson (1983), has its roots in Grice, who set up the uniquely pragmatic Cooperative Principle to delimit and save the symbolic realm of logico-semantics from the caprice of contextual variability and irreducible contingency (*see* **Cooperative Principle**). As this indicates, insofar as complementarism tries to construct a kind of pragmatic theory that complements the semantic theory of decontextualized signs, it is inclined to focus on pragmalinguistics, that is, the aspects of pragmatics adjacent to and compatible with semantics, such as the universal principles, maxims, and other regularities of language use that can be fairly transparently linked to propositions and other referential categories. Thus, complementarism may be characterized as a weak version of semanticism that does not try to reduce pragmatics to semantics but attempts to create a pragmatic correlate of semantic theory, as witnessed by the affinity between Searle's semanticist doctrine of indirect speech acts and Grice's complementarist doctrine of implicature or, more fundamentally, by the referentialist, universalist, rationalist, and consensualist characteristics shared by traditional semantics and the pragmatic theories advanced by Grice and Levinson.

From Complementarism to Pragmaticism

Nonetheless, complementarism is distinct from semanticism insofar as the former advances a uniquely pragmatic principle (or perspective). This principle (or perspective) is communication, a notion that conceptualizes discursive interaction as opposed to linguistically encoded semantic categories (even though communication is still often taken as the intentional correlate of semantic categorization). This shift from decontextualized code to contextual process is also observed in the robustly pragmatic understanding of presupposition that has emerged in the wake of Karttunen's complementarist distinction between 'semantic' and 'pragmatic presuppositions' (cf. Mey, 2001: 27–29); in the discursive-functional model of communication, presupposition is a fundamentally pragmatic contextual process rather than an essential property of semantic types or their tokens. Discursive

interactions indexically presuppose and create their (con)texts, yielding contextual appropriateness and effectiveness, both in the referential and social-indexical domains of discourse. The focus of pragmatics is thus on the discursive interactions that indexically create referential and social-indexical texts by indexically presupposing contextual variables, including but not limited to metalinguistic codes such as metapragmatic principles and metasemantic relationships (*see* **Pragmatic Presupposition**).

Thus, complementarism may lead to the kind of pragmaticism that tries to include semantics as a part of the all-encompassing pragmatic processes of presupposing and creative indexicality in both referential and social-indexical dimensions, involving not just ordinary language users but also linguistic scholars and including not just linguistic but also extralinguistic (sociohistorical) domains. There is, however, another, reductionist kind of pragmaticism, which is actually a variation of complementarism that narrowly limits the realm of pragmatics and exclusively deals with the part of pragmatics that correlates with semantics – the area of referentially focused pragmatic regularities. For instance, in Relevance Theory, the dialectically indexical processes of presupposing contextualization and creative textualization in discursive interactions are theorized exclusively from the referentialist perspective that tries to relate 'what is said' (referential text) to 'what is meant' (rather than to 'what is done'), the gap between the two being bridged by the ideological assumption that discursive participants universally share the rationalistic and consensualist notions of economy, cooperation, and regular and eufunctional communication (cf. Mey, 2001: 179–181). Hence, this approach excludes the vast realm of pragmatics dealing with social conflicts in group identities and power relations, as well as historically contextualized contingent happenings, which can always defeat regularities and other contextual presuppositions and create different presuppositions and texts (cf. Auer and Luzio, 1992; Koyama, 2001a) (*see* **Relevance Theory**).

Historical Contextualization of the Ideologies of Pragmatics and Semantics

Thus far, we have explored how the three methodological stances are related to how we define the disciplinary boundaries and noted the correspondence between the methodological scale, stretching from componentialism to perspectivalism to critical pragmaticism, and another scale, extending from semanticism to complementarism, reductionistic pragmaticism, and total pragmaticism. Like any ideology, this configuration of

metalinguistic ideologies is also embedded in the sociohistorical context; thus, we may observe a historical drift of pragmatics from componentialism and semanticism to perspectivalism and complementarism and, finally, to total and critical pragmaticism (cf. Koyama, 2001b).

Again, let us start with Kant's critical turn, which yielded two traditions: the semantic and the social scientific (i.e., pragmatic). Whereas Kant's central concerns were '(re)cognition' and 'judgment,' behind which the problematics of 'meaning' and 'language' were still hidden (cf. Coffa, 1991), Frege's (1848–1925) later discovery of predicate logic replaced the Kantian notion of synthetic judgment (or value) with analytic logic and the notions of 'proposition' and 'sentence,' further divided into 'force' (assertoric, interrogative, imperative, and so on) and propositional content (represented by structurally decomposable units such as the subject, predicate, and their subcategories). This led to the birth of modern semantics, as it came to be pursued by Russell (1872–1970), Carnap (1891–1970), Tarski (1902–1983), and Quine (1908–2000), as well as by the linguistic formalists of the Copenhagen and the Neo-Bloomfieldian Schools, whose impressive successes allowed the componential semantic tradition to penetrate into more empirical disciplines such as psychology and anthropology, where 'ethnoscience' came to flourish in the mid-20th century (*see* **Anthropology and Pragmatics**). Moreover, the semantic traditions of Carnap and the Neo-Bloomfieldian structural linguists, especially Harris (1909–1992), converged in Chomsky (1928–), whose generativism began to dominate linguistics in the 1960s, when the semantic tradition moved more deeply into the empirical fields, thereby giving rise to empirical semantics, as witnessed by the rise of Generative Semantics, fuzzy logic, and Rosch's prototype semantics in the late 1960s to mid-1970s, eventually congealing into today's cognitive linguistics.

Such was the evolution of the branch of the post-Fregean semantic tradition that focused on propositional content. In contrast, the other branch, focusing on 'force,' was developed by the Ordinary Language Philosophers, starting with Austin, who translated Frege's *œuvre* into English, to be followed by Searle, Grice, and others (*see* **Grice, Herbert Paul**). This branch is usually called 'pragmatics,' but (as we have already seen) it is actually a kind of empirical semanticism, dealing with pragmatic matters only insofar as they can be systematically related to propositions or referential texts ('what is said'; *see* **Pragmatics, Overview**).

In the early days, modern pragmatics was dominated by Speech Act Theory and by Gricean thinking:

It was practiced by extending the methodological orientations of logic and structural linguistics, with their focus on denotational regularities. In those quasipragmatic theories, contingent occurrences of actual language use were still theorized as tokens of some regular Searlean type of speech act (or speech act verb) or some Gricean postulates (principle and maxims) rather than as indexical events presupposingly contextualizing other indexical events, indexical event types (e.g., speech genres, sociolects, and dialects), and symbolic structures and contextually creating certain pragmatic effects (cf. Auer and di Luzio, 1992; Koyama, 2001a) (*see* **Pragmatic Indexing**). In short, the notions of context and contextualization, which constitute the core of our pragmatic understanding, were yet to be given full theoretical significance, especially in comparison with the anthropological tradition, which, since the days of Malinowski and Sapir, has focused on the (socially situated) 'speech event' (cf. Gumperz and Hymes, 1964; Duranti and Goodwin, 1992; Duranti, 2001; *see* **Context, Communicative**). Thus, it was only in the late 1970s and 1980s, when anthropology and linguistic pragmatics began to influence one another more intimately, that the genuinely pragmatic view of 'pragmatics' as the idiographic, ethnographic, historiographic science of contextualization started to emerge. Then, it became clear that the (con)text indexed by language in use ('what is done') includes not just 'what is meant' (i.e., the part of the context that may be regularly related to 'what is said'); rather, the context of language in use is primarily captured by social-indexical pragmatics dealing with 'what is done,' that is, with the power relations and group identities of discourse participants, involving their regionality, class, status, gender, generation, ethnicity, kinship, and other macrosociological variables, indexed and actualized in microsocial speech events to entail some concrete, pragmatic, 'perlocutionary' effects (*see* **Power and Pragmatics**). The changing focus is reflected, first, in the move from the early quasipragmatic theories, which generally embraced the componential view and focused on illocutionary and other propositionally centered referential pragmatic regularities in microsocial speech events, to the next generation of more full-fledged pragmatic theories, which based themselves on the perspectival view, paying attention to the social-indexical (especially cultural) aspects of pragmatics as well. Further, the changing focus is also observed in the more recent move toward a 'total pragmatics,' with its critical view and its emphasis on the (micro- **and** macro-)contextual aspects of pragmatics. These aspects focus especially on a social-indexical

pragmatics (including not just culture but also class, gender, and other sociological and historical variables) that views as its core 'what is done' (the pragmatic, *praxis*), a special subset of which is constituted by 'what is said' (referential practice) and by linguistic structure, including semantics (as presupposingly indexed in referential practice) (cf. Koyama, 2000a, 2000b, 2001a; Mey, 2001). Only then can semantics and pragmatics be united in their proper contextualization within the macrosocial historical matrix.

See also: Anthropology and Pragmatics; Austin, John L.; Communication: Semiotic Approaches; Communicative Principle and Communication; Constraint, Pragmatic; Context, Communicative; Cooperative Principle; Deixis and Anaphora: Pragmatic Approaches; Dialogism, Bakhtinian; Discursive Practice Theory; Foucault, Michel; Grice, Herbert Paul; History of Pragmatics; Jakobson, Roman; Maxims and Flouting; Metapragmatics; Pragmatic Acts; Pragmatic Indexing; Pragmatic Presupposition; Pragmatics: Overview; Principles and Rules; Relevance Theory; Semantics-Pragmatics Boundary; Social Aspects of Pragmatics; Speech Acts.

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Pragmatics of Reading

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Introduction

Reading is a matter of communication. Not just in the usual sense that an author has a message to communicate to a reader (a story, the description of an experiment, an opinion about an event, and so on), but the reader also communicates with the author by showing interest in the story, by ratifying the experiment described, by approving of the opinion proffered, and so on. This 'active communication' is often expressed in writing or orally (e.g., by talking about the story to others, by commenting on the experiment, or by writing a commentary to the editor of the paper or journal in which the author's opinion had appeared). Usually, though, readers 'vote with their eyes', silently, by simply sharing their precious time with authors and entering into a readerly relationship with them – a relationship that starts when prospective readers acquire the authors' written product (a book, scientific journal, etc.).

Prospective readers become real readers by *negotiation*. More will be said on this later; for the moment I simply emphasize the fact that negotiation involves people (here, author and reader), and essentially happens on the basis of some common *language*. Readers must be able to understand the language used by authors – not just in the sense of a common 'national' language, but also with regard to the different levels of expression and local and professional idioms. Readers' reactions are also expressed in language (internally, by 'following' authors' narrative paths, or externally, in the form of oral or written comments). Moreover, in all of this, we must not forget the environment in which both readers and authors are situated: their social *context* is what makes mutual understanding and communication possible (*see* **Context, Communicative**).

Reading, as a communicative process, relies on the presence of users in a social context – a context mediated by language. In other words, reading can be characterized as a *pragmatic* process, involving "the study of the use of language in human communication as determined by the conditions of society" (Mey, 2001: 6) (*see* **Pragmatics: Overview**).

Negotiation and Reading

In all reading, there is negotiation. Authors have to persuade readers to take the story seriously, to enter the 'fictional space' (Mey, 1994). To do this, the author ensures that whatever is said in the story will be taken at 'story value' by the readers, and that no hitches will develop in the smooth spinning of the narrative yarn. When this condition is not fulfilled, the texture of the story is disrupted: a hole appears in the narrative fabric or a 'clash of voices' occurs (Mey, 2000) (*see* **Literary Pragmatics**).

Authorial persuasion displays parallels with another kind of negotiation, the business deal: one puts certain things on the table (an offer, a counteroffer, conditions, etc.), while other matters are held back, kept 'under the table' (sometimes even after the deal is concluded). To buttress one's argumentation in the negotiation process, one must produce evidence of credibility: previous contracts, a reputation, 'goodwill', concrete enticements (such as money, again often under the table), and above all, a proof of trustworthiness based on one's credentials as a serious negotiator. These proofs can more or less subtle; less subtle are outward appearance such as the right kind of business attire; personal accouterments showing status (watch, jewelry, tie, correct hair styling including – if applicable – facial hair, etc.; even such minor things as flying the right airline in the right class can be important); the right language to bring to the negotiation table; correct manners; and most of all, a thorough knowledge of the matters to be discussed. In all this, as Dr Chester Karass incessantly admonishes us: "In business you do not get what you deserve, but what you negotiate."

There are similarities between business negotiation and creating contracts between author and reader. The author has to speak the 'right' language (in the sense of: appropriate to the occasion). That is, the narratorial voice and the voices of the characters should be balanced, both with each other and between themselves (for details, see Mey, 2000). But also, the author should be knowledgeable about what is on the narrative negotiation table: the voice of the text should be credible, as regards the factual circumstances of the narrative. Details about times and places should accord with the facts as they are familiar to both author and readers; alternatively, the details should be such that the readership can live with them for the duration of the narrative. The latter requires author and reader to negotiate, as we will see in the following.

Negotiating the Scene

The details of time and place mentioned above belong to a metaphorical 'scene.' In it, characters play their

roles, and utter their lines; their scenic location in time and place makes their roles trustworthy and their voices credible. Similarly, the characters of a story have their particular roles and voices, recognized as authentic and consistent by the readership. The scene thus is both the condition for, and the result of, a successful reader-author relationship (*see* **Literary Pragmatics**).

If an author invites us into an unfamiliar scene, possibly remote from our own (as in many historical novels or in modern science fiction), negotiation is necessary to make the unfamiliar authentic: the strange world into which the author introduces us should not be unacceptably strange. We are all 'strangers in a strange land,' but we are supposed to stay inside this "ambiguous territory" (as Julio Cortázar (1985) puts it), at least during the narration, and not run away, scared by unfamiliar surroundings and technological innovations.

Often, such innovations and strange environments are projections from familiar situations and technologies which now appear distorted or exaggerated. People travel with the speed of light in *A hitchhiker's guide to the galaxy*; men have menstrual periods in Ursula Le Guin's *The left hand of darkness*; banal objects such as eyeglasses become sophisticated prosthetic body parts able to tell the time, access databases, and orchestrate weaponry, as happens in William Gibson's *Neuromancer*; and so on. If successful, such 'defamiliarizing' features strengthen the ties between author and reader; the 'bestrangement' that occurs is a powerful factor in the negotiation discussed above.

'Bestrangement' and Reader's Role

Above, we saw how the success of a literary text depends upon readers accepting and voluntarily entering the 'scene' created by the author. One way to overcome the readership's reservations is to make the fictional world attractive by appealing to readers' sense of familiarity and normativity ("those people are just like us"). Another, far more powerful, way to intrigue readers is to make things difficult or to titillate readers with special narrative effects. Especially important is 'bestrangement', which exploits unfamiliarity and disregard for narrative conventions. It is based on a 'willful suspension of disbelief' (in Samuel Taylor Coleridge's classic formulation; 1817, 1956), an acceptable and accepted infraction of the rules as normal authorial behavior. At the same time, this infraction is what makes a 'bestranged' piece of literature interesting.

As Shklovskij put it, to see things as they are, we need to escape the 'tyranny of the ordinary,' the established ways of viewing the world as codified through language, especially its literary and poetic varieties. The phenomena of the outside world reveal their true identity only if seen with a stranger's eyes. Conversely, we may be able to grasp things as they are in themselves by transforming into strangers and outsiders. The point is to *see* the world, not just to recognize it: art re-creates our experience of the world and its objects, causing us not just to register and recognize them but to see them. Shklovskij (1917: 14; my translation) declares that "Art does this by 'bestrangement': by making things unfamiliar, by making their shapes hard to recognize and 'strange'."

The importance of changing perspective has long been recognized by visual artists. The contemporary Danish painter Per Kirkeby, writing about his 19th century colleague N. A. Abildgaard, says: "At intervals the earth has to be made flat in order that we may see clearly" (Kirkeby, 1993: 14). But the perspective has to be grounded in an acceptable context; the scene must be 'natural' (even though not necessarily naturalistic, in the common sense of the word). This includes the characters and their roles, as expressed in dialogue, both the one that is verbally expressed and the underlying, invisible subtitles that are left to the readers' imagination and co-creative activity (*see* **Dialogism, Bakhtinian**).

Negotiating the Fictional Space

Perspective and Change

How does a competent or 'versatile' (Tsur, 1992) reader deal with changes of perspective in literary texts? Three questions may be asked:

(1) What happens when an author disturbs the temporal and spatial fabric of the story?

(2) What are the author's aims in making the reader lose touch with normal, perceived reality?

(3) In what ways and to what extent does the author realize those aims?

The first question is about the technique of 'bestrangement' in fiction, as discussed above.

The second question touches on the author's need to establish the scene or fictional space as an independent world where normal relations of time and space may be suspended. The reader must see the normal reality as abnormal and the deviant reality of the fictional space as normal.

The third, more general, question deals with how a fictional space is built up by the characters playing out their roles on the fictional scene, and by the intricate interplay of the voices that express the characters' stance toward, and participation in,

the fictional reality. As for the readers, they enter the fictional scene *qua* readers, and participate in the world-building by expressing themselves in a 'reader-ly voice,' manifesting their active cooperation in the textual process.

Disturbing Reality

The initial negotiation in the 'act of reading' (Iser, 1982) is implicit in the act of buying or borrowing a book; continuing negotiation depends on our perseverance as 'competent readers' (see Tsur, 1992; Mey, 2000).

During our reading, the implicit contract will have to be renewed: either by our continued reading, or by an explicit move. Here, we may distance ourselves from the text (physically, by discarding the book, or mentally, by losing interest or stopping reading); alternatively, we may get so involved in the story that we start inhabiting the fictional space as if it were a real one. Our 'bestrangement' may express itself in a feeling of dislocation, as when we wake up in unfamiliar surroundings and don't know where we are or how we got there. The world may have been changed so that we see its true reality, as when we contemplate a surrealist painting.

A prime example of this process is found in a famous scene from *Anna Karenina*. Returning by train from Moscow to St. Petersburg, after the ball at the Oblonskij palace and her spectacular dance with Vronskij, Anna is reading a trashy English story about a young nobleman and his aspirations to a manor and a baronetcy. Realizing that she is getting involved in the silly story, Anna experiences a sense of shame, and closes the book.

> The hero of the novel had already started on the path toward achieving his English happiness, a baronetcy and a manor, and Anna wanted to join him in his journey toward that manor, when she suddenly realized that he ought to be ashamed, and that she ought to be ashamed likewise. But what [should] he [be] ashamed of? "And what [am] I [to be] ashamed of?" she asked herself in irritated wonder. (*Anna Karenina*, I: xxix, p. 114 in the 1962 edition; translation mine.)

Like many readers, Anna enters the 'fictional space' and participates in the novelistic life on stage. When readers 'identify' with a particular hero or heroine in a story, they do so actively, with their "whole body and deeds," as Bakhtin says. They can also give notice, and 'cancel' the reading contract, by either putting away the book, or assuming a critical stance toward it.

Anna, however, cannot escape the powerful hold of the fictional space she has entered. In the end, her identification with the hero's world, including the feeling of shame, turns out to be grounded in the real world: her burgeoning love for Vronskij, whom she then goes out to meet on the platform when the train makes the next stop.

A further, particularly gripping illustration of Anna's entering the fictional scene and participating in it, more or less against her will, comes later in the chapter. Here, Anna finds her thoughts wandering from the text she is reading, to her own, actual situation. This slipping is not simply a matter of Anna being preoccupied, having her thoughts elsewhere; rather, it is her entry into the fictional space of the novel that forces Anna into a dialogue with her own self, with her 'inner' voice, on a theme only partly suggested to us (and to her) by the text. Anna reviews her pleasant memories of the dance and of Vronskij's tender loving face. Suddenly, a new feeling surges up.

> But at the same time, at exactly the same spot in her remembering, a feeling of shame made itself strongly felt; as if an inner voice, precisely whenever her thoughts went back to Vronskij, told her: "Hot, very hot, burning." "So what of it?" –
>
> she said to herself peremptorily, sitting up in her chair. – "What on earth does this mean? Am I perhaps afraid to look this thing straight in the face? Then what of it? How should there be, how could there be, between me and this stripling officer, any other relations than I would have with any normal acquaintance?" She let out a contemptuous laugh and went back to her book, but this time she was totally unable to concentrate on her reading. She took the paper cutter and drew a line on the window pane, then put its smooth, cool surface to her cheek and could barely refrain from bursting out in cries of joy – a joy that, coming from nowhere, suddenly engulfed her. (*Anna Karenina*, I: xxix, 1962 ed., p. 114; my translation.)

Anna is overcome by a near-hallucinatory state of euphoria. At the end of the chapter, the series of intense emotional experiences culminates in her finding herself on the station platform of 'Bologov' (actually, Bologoye Tver' province), where her famous, and fatal, encounter with Vronskij is about to happen.

Anna's reading of her trashy novel is 'set up' (Mey, 2001: 211–212) by her circumstances after the initial meeting with her future lover. Dialoguing with the text, Anna is engaged in what I call a *pragmatic act* of reading (Mey, 2001: 252ff) (*see* **Pragmatic Acts**). This is most clearly seen in the passage above where Anna, as reader, actually is engaged in a kind of parlor game with an 'inner voice,' telling Anna that she is getting "[h]ot, very hot, burning," ever closer to

discovering the true nature of her confused state of mind and lack of concentration: she is in love.

This discovery, of course, does not result from the act of reading as such. Still, the text, in its dialogic foreplay with Anna as reader, does lead up to the real thing: her textual immersion results in a sexual de- or even re-construction. Anna's hidden emotions and the recognition of her true feelings are lying in waiting just outside her novel's fictional space. As soon as she puts the book away and leaves its fictional space, having symbolically cut her textual ties by drawing a line on the compartment window with her paper-knife (a metaphoric 'text cutter'), she crosses a physical threshold by leaving the compartment and exchanging her fictional space for the real world: text for sex. It is in this real space, physically materialized as the storm-blown, snow-covered railway platform at 'Bologov', that the textually de-constructed, sexually re-constructed Anna meets Vronskij in what Bakhtin has called an "open-ended dialogue of life," with the well-known consequences that form the backbone of the dramatic plot for which Tolstoy's novel is justly famous (*see* **Bakhtin, Mikhail Mikhailovich**).

Does the Reader Have a Voice?

In all this, the role of the reader, as an active participant in the building of the story world, through 'creative reading' has yet to be determined, but the reader's role presupposes a 'readerly voice' in the orchestration of the text. When discussing literary activities around text, we focus on authors but often gloss over the important role of the reader. Readers approach the text with a particular set of preconditions which, from a reader's point of view, make the text possible; there is no reader's text without a reader, because stories describe *possible* worlds, not actual occurrences: only readers can bring these possibilities into existence.

Speaking on the general conditions of novelistic work, the Czech author Milan Kundera has remarked:

> A novel examines not reality, but existence. And existence is not what has occurred, existence is the realm of human possibilities, everything that man can become, everything he's capable of. Novelists draw up the *map of existence* by discovering this or that human possibility. But again, to exist means: "being in the world." (Milan Kundera, *The art of the novel*, p. 42.)

Only through the intermediary of an actually existing reader can the text achieve *existence*. A text, taken by itself, is merely an author's product, and as such only realizes a *possibility* – one out of the many

ways of 'being in the world' that a text assumes by being consumed by a reader (*see* **Literary Pragmatics**).

Certain schools of literary criticism have emphasized a so-called 'objective' approach to text understanding and analysis. In this view, the text, the whole text, and nothing but the text should be the target of our investigation (see Mey, 1994 for a critique). To see the limitations of this kind of approach (usually referred to as 'New Criticism'), consider the following passage from a contemporary novel by Jay McInerney, *Brightness falls*:

> [The talk here is about money; the context is that of the attempted hostile takeover of a New York publishing house by another firm. The manager of the threatened enterprise is speaking.]

> Nobody *pays* for anything anymore, that's the fucking problem. They're totally leveraged. Bridge loans, junk bonds, whatever. The money's out there. Money's cheap. The banks used to be like convent girls, you couldn't get a feel without a marriage license. Then Drexel started to practically give it away, and now they've all got red lights on over the door. (McInerney, 1992: 217; emphasis original.)

The excerpt describes the United States in the late 1980s, when the world of finance was characterized by an expanding money market with no real assets to back it up (cf. "junk bonds"). Buying something big without having the money was possible if you had "leverage," that is to say, you were able to find some of the ("cheap") money you needed, waving your hands at the rest. You could borrow the money, preferably on borrowed, or even fake, collateral. All this was because the banks had a cash glut: interest to wealthy overseas depositors had to be paid on time, so the money was "practically given away," even to less than serious borrowers.

The text is distinguished by an intricate use of composite metaphors, appealing to the (mostly) male sexual experience: 'convent girls,' 'feel,' 'marriage license,' 'red lights.' But many respectable firms became players in this risky game (such as "Drexel," the since failed Wall Street broker firm of Drexel Burnham Lambert).

The point to note here is that reading such a text requires active, understanding, co-creative readers who are at least aware of the way American males of a certain type regard their female counterparts, and where sexual activities are mainly configured in terms of finance: buying and selling, negotiating a deal, and so on. The reader's participation in the textual process is necessary for it to be understood properly, or understood at all. This is why texts from earlier periods or far-away cultures often strike us as insipid

or totally opaque. Conversely, even nonfictional texts exhibit some of the same characteristics as fictional prose.

For example, Stanley Kauffman concludes a scathing movie review with the innocuous remark: "The suggestion in the title [of the film] is off target" (Kauffmann, 1973: 41). Because the reader has been informed earlier in the review that the title is *Up the sandbox* (National General, 1972), the reader is obliged to supplying the missing reference and provide the proper 'target.' This is made possible by the author's implicit appeal to the reader to identify certain common vulgar English expressions containing a propositional phrase $Prp + NP$, where the Prp in this particular case is *up*, while the NP is ({*the, yours, . . .*} + N), where N stands for (*Body Part* [+*Intimate*]). The competent reader will rise to the challenge posed by the author's unfinished expression, thus actively taking part in the creation of the fully fledged piece of text.

Conclusion

As Scholes (1982) remarks, we cannot add to the facts of a story (just as we normally cannot 'do' anything with the objects in a painting or the parts of a sculpture). However, we can place the facts in their proper environment: we can extend the story into other stories, especially our own, and into the stories that we are familiar with from our reading. As Scholes says, "As semiotic interpreters we are not free to *make* meaning, but we are free to *find* it by following the various semantic, syntactic, and pragmatic paths that lead away from the words of the text" (1982: 30; italics in original).

The reader who is thus able to ''find meaning' in the text (the *Lector in fabula*, Eco, 1979) is also a *co-creator* of the text. To collaborate with the author, readers follow the "various syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic" paths that lead into as well as "away from . . . the text." Readers who can do this are competent or 'versatile.' In particular, competent readers work with the author to construct the 'fictional space' in which the characters play their roles to create, not a dead letter, but a living text re-created in the reader.

This reader-author relationship is a relation of mutual influence. If reading can be called a game, it is one in which each side's moves are affected by and affect those made by the other; it is a play in which all the players have a voice, including the reader.

See also: Bakhtin, Mikhail Mikhailovich; Context, Communicative; Dialogism, Bakhtinian; Literary Pragmatics; Pragmatic Acts; Pragmatics: Overview.

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Pragmatics: Linguistic Imperialism

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The study of linguistic imperialism focuses on how and why certain languages dominate internationally, and on attempts to account for such dominance in an explicit, theoretically founded way. Language is one of the most durable legacies of European colonial and imperial expansion. English, Spanish, and Portuguese are the dominant languages of the Americas. In Africa, the languages of some of the colonizing powers, England, France, and Portugal are more firmly entrenched than ever, as English is in several Asian countries.

The study of linguistic imperialism can help to clarify whether the winning of political independence led to a linguistic liberation of Third World countries, and if not, why not. Are the former colonial languages a useful bond with the international community and necessary for state formation and national unity internally? Or are they a bridgehead for Western interests, permitting the continuation of a global system of marginalization and exploitation? What is the relationship between linguistic dependence (continued use of a European language in a former non-European colony) and economic dependence (the export of raw materials and import of technology and know-how)? In a globalizing world, has English shifted from serving Anglo-American interests into functioning as an instrument for more diverse constituencies? Or does U.S. dominance in the neoliberal economy constitute a new form of empire that consolidates a single imperial language?

Imperialism has traditionally been primarily concerned with economic and political aspects of dominance (Hobson, 1902). Later theorists have been concerned with analyzing military, social, communication, and cultural activities, and the underlying structures and ideologies that link powerful countries, the 'Center,' with powerless countries, the 'Periphery,' and the structure of exploitation from which rich countries benefit and poor countries suffer (Galtung, 1980). Resources are distributed unequally internally within each country, which has its own Center and Periphery, which in Marxist analysis is seen in terms of class (Holborrow, 1999) (*see* **Class Language**). Linguistic imperialism was manifestly a feature of the way nation-states privileged one language, and often sought actively to eradicate others, forcing their speakers to shift to the dominant language. It was also a feature of colonial empires, involving a deeper degree of linguistic penetration in settler countries (e.g., Canada, New Zealand) than in exploitation and extraction colonies (e.g., Malaya, Nigeria).

Linguistic imperialism presupposes an overarching structure of asymmetrical, unequal exchange, where language dominance dovetails with economic, political, and other types of dominance. It entails unequal resource allocation and communicative rights between people defined in terms of their competence in specific languages, with unequal benefits as a result, in a system that legitimates and naturalizes such exploitation (Phillipson, 1992) (*see* **Minorities and Language** and **Linguistic Decolonialization**).

Linguistic imperialism can be regarded as a subcategory of cultural imperialism, along with media imperialism (e.g., news agencies, the world information order), educational imperialism (the export of Western institutional norms, teacher training, textbooks, etc., and World Bank policies privileging Center languages in education systems; Mazrui, 2004), and scientific imperialism (e.g., dissemination of paradigms and methodologies from the Center, which controls knowledge about the Periphery). Linguistic imperialism may dovetail with any of these, as for instance when English as the dominant language of science marginalizes other languages, English as 'Lingua Tyrannosaura' (Swales, 1997; Ammon, 2001; Phillipson, 2002).

The mechanisms of linguistic imperialism are documented in works that link linguistics with colonialism (Calvet, 1974 refers to linguistic racism, confirming the interlocking of 19th century philology with European racist thought), relate the promotion of English in educational 'aid' to the economic and political agendas of Center countries (Phillipson, 1992), and discuss the effect of literacy on the local language ecology, including the role of missionaries (Mühlhäusler, 1996). Linguistic dominance has invariably been buttressed by ideologies that glorify the dominant language: as the language of God (Arabic, Dutch, Sanskrit), the language of reason, logic, and human rights (French over several centuries), the language of the superior ethnonational group as advocated by (imperialist racism, German in Nazi ideology), the language of modernity, technological progress, and national unity (English in much postcolonial discourse). A Ghanaian sociolinguist describes linguistic imperialism as

> the phenomenon in which the minds and lives of the speakers of a language are dominated by another language to the point where they believe that they can and should use only that foreign language when it comes to transactions dealing with the more advanced aspects of life such as education, philosophy, literature, governments, the administration of justice, etc. ... Linguistic imperialism has a way of warping the minds, attitudes, and aspirations of even the most noble in a society and preventing him from appreciating and realizing the full potentialities of the indigenous languages (Ansre, 1979: 12).

There are studies that focus on the discourses accompanying linguistic hierarchies (Pennycook, 1994), and the ambivalent role of English in contemporary India (Rajan, 1992). English in Africa is seen as "an imperial language, the language of linguistic Americanization, a language of global capitalism, ... creating and maintaining social divisions serving an economy dominated primarily by foreign economic interests and, secondarily, by a small aspiring African bourgeoisie" (Mazrui, 2004: 30, 40, 52), though English is simultaneously appropriated for Afrocentricity in Africa and in the United States. The tension between the need to learn English for local empowerment alongside local languages, and the adequacy of our theories for addressing these issues has been explored (Canagarajah, 1999, several contributions in Ricento, 2000) (*see* **Power and Pragmatics**).

Fishman *et al.* (1996) is an anthology on *Post-Imperial English: Status Change in Former British and American Colonies, 1940–1990*, with contributors from many countries, who were asked to assess linguistic imperialism in each context. The editors see the need for English to be "reconceptualized, from being an imperialist tool to being a multinational tool .... English ... being postimperial (as the title of our book implies, that is in the sense of not directly serving purely Anglo-American territorial, economic, or cultural expansion) without being postcapitalist in any way." Fishman, in a 'summing-up and interpretation' of the contributions to the book, correlates the status of English with hard data on the use of English in the media, education, studies abroad, technology, administration, etc., and more subjective assessments. He tabulates the degree of 'anglification' in each state. His assessment is that the "socioeconomic factors that are behind the spread of English are now indigenous in most countries of the world" and that the continued spread of English in former colonies is "related more to their engagement in the modern world economy than to any efforts derived from their colonial masters" (1996: 639). Fishman seems to ignore the fact that 'engagement in the modern world' means a Western-dominated globalization agenda set by the transnational corporations, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organization, with the U.S. military intervening whenever 'vital interests' are at risk. Although some contributors conclude that linguistic imperialism is not present, they have no difficulty in using the concept in country studies, and none question its validity or utility.

Others are more robust in distancing themselves from a linguistic imperialism approach, when reassessing the language policies of the colonial period and in theorizing about the role of English in the modern world (Brutt-Griffler, 2002) and when describing the global constellation of languages (de Swaan, 2001), on which see Phillipson (2004). English plays a supremely important role in the ongoing processes of globalization, which is seen by some scholars as synonymous with Americanization. English is playing an increasingly prominent role in continental European countries and in the institutions of the European Union, though in principle and law these are committed to maintaining linguistic diversity and the equality of the languages of the member states (Phillipson, 2003). Increased European integration and market forces are, however, potentially leading to all continental European languages becoming second-class languages. This concern has led to the advocacy of Europe-wide policies to strengthen foreign language learning, but few European states (probably Sweden and Finland are those most active) have elaborated language policies to ensure the continued strength of national languages alongside competence in English and full respect for linguistic human rights (*see* **Linguistic Rights**).

One symptom of market forces is the major effort by 'English-speaking' states to expand their intake of foreign students. Higher education is increasingly seen as a market opportunity, a sector that the British government seeks to expand by 8 per cent per year between 2004 and 2020. The British economy benefits by £11 billion directly and a further £12 billion indirectly (British Council). Over half a million foreign students attend language schools in Britain each year. The English Language Teaching business is of major significance for the British economy. These figures reveal something of the complexity of the supply and demand elements of English as a commodity and cultural force. They also demonstrate the need for the analysis of linguistic dominance to shift from a colonial and postcolonial perspective to contemporary patterns that are maintained by more subtle means of control and influence, language playing an increasingly important role in the internationalization of many domains.

Thus in the teaching and marketing of 'communication skills,' a shift from linguistic imperialism to communicative imperialism can be seen: "Language becomes a global product available in different local flavours .... The dissemination of 'global' communicative norms and genres, like the dissemination of international languages, involves a one-way flow of expert knowledge from dominant to subaltern cultures" (Cameron, 2002: 70). A focus on communication skills may well entail the dissemination of American ways of speaking and the forms of communication, genre, and style of the dominant consumerist culture, which globalization is extending

worldwide (*see* **Intercultural Pragmatics and Communication**).

In *Empire*, Hardt and Negri (2000) draw together many threads from political, economic, and cultural theory and philosophy, and astutely unravel the role of communication in global social trends, and the ways in which language constitutes our universe and creates subjectivities. They reveal how the hegemonic power imposes or induces acceptance of its dominion. They show why it has been so important for the corporate world not only to dominate the media but also education, which is increasingly run to service the economy and to produce consumers rather than critical citizens. Linguistic dominance as such is not pursued in their book, and it is also largely neglected in social and political science. Linguistic imperialism, or linguistic dominance in the sense of the maintenance of injustice and inequality by means of language policies, is invariably connected to policies in commerce, science, international affairs, education, culture, and the media, all of which involve material resources and attitudes, and all of which evolve dynamically.

See also: Intercultural Pragmatics and Communication; Linguistic Decolonialization; Linguistic Rights; Minorities and Language; Power and Pragmatics.

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Pragmatics: Optimality Theory

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Introduction

Optimality theory (OT) starts from the idea that the products of linguistic behavior are optimal with respect to a set of criteria for a certain task. The products can be pronunciations, language expressions, recognitions (of pronounced words), understandings (of, e.g., sentences or moves), the corresponding tasks being pronouncing a word, expressing a thought, recognizing a word, and understanding the contribution of an utterance. An important insight here is that optimality need not imply a perfect fit to the criteria – something which would be impossible in the (frequent) case of conflicting criteria.

A typical theme in OT phonology and syntax is precisely the conflict between various criteria, such as those enforcing economy vs. those enforcing expressivity. A similar conflict in interpretation would be that between simplicity and stereotypicality on the one hand, and the need to interpret a given message completely and coherently on the other. These criteria are in conflict by their very nature and therefore, some of the criteria are (or may be) typically violated.

Criteria (such as constraints) can be implemented in neural nets, provided they are sufficiently simple (*see* **Constraint, Pragmatic**). The nets can be combined to select optimal solutions. In OT, the combination is done by ranking the constraints and by settling the competition between candidates by giving full priority to the highest-ranking criterion. A candidate loses out to another candidate if there is a highest ranked constraint on which it does worse, while both candidates do equally well on all constraints that are ranked higher.

The simplest view on criteria is that there is a single set of criteria applying to all languages; on this view, the criteria basically belong to the psychological conditions of the tasks involved in speaking and understanding human language. Language production is made easier if one uses shorter, less complicated structures, whereas understanding is improved by the use of longer, more complicated structures. But since production should make understanding possible, production must produce enough structure to allow understanding. This idea is at the basis of an OT-oriented typology of languages, which assumes that all human languages have the same constraints and only differ in their ranking of these constraints).

Optimality Theory and Pragmatics

Pragmatics is an obvious area of application for OT. For instance, Grice's well-known conversational maxims are naturally understood as a set of criteria on utterances; as is likewise known from the pragmatics literature, such criteria maybe violated (*see* **Grice, Herbert Paul; Neo-Gricean Pragmatics; Maxims and Flouting**). Conflicts of this kind are natural, since, for example, it is impossible to give all the information that is required (by the maxim of quantity) and be maximally brief (as required by the maxim of manner). Treatments of presupposition tend to be formulated in terms of preferences or defaults to get correct (or more correct) solutions to the projection problem (*see* **Pragmatic Presupposition**). In relevance theory, the aim of the hearer is to maximize the relevance of the interpretation, another optimizing problem (*see* **Relevance Theory**).

Discourse coherence is often treated as a matter of degree, but, again, maximizing coherence in discourse interpretation is matter of enhancing optimality.

When we look at more specific tasks such as pronoun resolution, recognizing information structure, choosing between different readings of an expression, or deciding on the rhetorical relations prevalent in a piece of text, it turns out that most of the suggested solutions to these problems rely on defaults and heuristics. Being able to reduce all of these phenomena to a small set of simple optimality-theoretical constraints would carry with it a big descriptive and theoretical gain. In addition to the possibility of simplifying and unifying pragmatics, this would also provide more insight into the psychology of the pragmatic component of the grammar, and furthermore offer the perspective of efficient implementation of some important building blocks of future dialogue systems.

It is currently hard to see where a program of this kind would lead to, or, indeed, whether it is possible at all. In an OT perspective, pragmatics has a special status. First of all, it is often impossible to state constraints that are equally meaningful for the production and for the interpretation of a text, as the two processes move in opposite directions. This may have something to do with the tradition that thinks of pragmatics as an interpretive theory: interpretation follows a process of semantic interpretation, presumably realized by compositional means (*see* **Frege, Friedrich Ludwig Gottlob**). Even though this approach is less popular nowadays (a semantics that operates independently of pragmatics becoming more and more problematic), in many areas of pragmatics it is still the preferred view: a path leading from form to interpretation. For example, the constraint that prefers to interpret a 'presupposition trigger' (*see* **Pragmatic Presupposition**) by identifying the presupposition with the content already present in the context (by way of resolution), rather than adding the presupposition to the content, as new material (by way of accommodation) does not put any restrictions on the form of the utterance (or on its relation to the input). Presupposition triggers seem to function just as adequately in a resolution as in an accommodation approach; the intended effect is the same in both cases.

In all these respects, OT pragmatics is quite different from OT phonology and OT syntax, which are both dominated by constraints on form. Perhaps even more important is the fact that there is no indication that pragmatic constraints need to be differently ranked to account for different languages. For this reason, pragmatics may continue to be called a universal discipline, in accordance with the requirements of a typological classification of languages.

An important exception here is the class of pragmatically relevant items in a language. These can be certain kinds of anaphoric pronouns (including semantically empty, purely morphological agreement-type anaphors; *see* **Deixis and Anaphora: Pragmatic Approaches**); the different ways in which coherent discourse structure is built up; the kind of particles and modal verbs that a language disposes of; or the aspectual distinctions that can be made in a particular language. These factors have an important influence on the interpretation of different kinds of morphological items such as pronouns; on how we infer the existence and nature of discourse relations; on the various ways of expressing politeness; and on the central pragmatic issue of conversational implicature (*see* **Politeness; Implicature**).

The exception makes it necessary to consider both production and interpretation (cf. above). An important hypothesis here is that of 'bidirectionality,' originally put forward by Smolensky (1996) as the simple claim that there is a single system of constraints that operates in both directions, production and interpretation; however, since the candidates are at one time the set of possible forms, but at another time the set of possible interpretations, they compete in different venues. A form–meaning pair is strongly superoptimal if and only if, in their respective competitions, the meaning makes the form win and the form makes the meaning win. Limiting oneself to cases of superoptimal production and interpretation, one may end up with a system where forms lack a meaning (because all meanings are better expressed by other forms) and meanings cannot be expressed (because all forms have better meanings). A famous example is due to McCawley (1978), who observed that, whereas the unmarked sentence (1a) below can be used to express standard ways of murdering the sheriff, the marked form (1b) forces the interpretation that the murder was unusual (e.g., Bart killed him by plugging the barrel of his gun, thus causing the gun to explode).

(1a) Black Bart killed the sheriff.
(1b) Black Bart caused the sheriff to die.

Under 'strong superoptimality,' (1a) indeed pairs with the interpretation 'simple killing,' whereas (1b) cannot be used: it always (for reasons of economy) loses out to (1a) in the production competition, just as it always (again, for reasons of economy) loses out in the interpretation competition to the stereotypical meaning associated with (1a). This situation caused Blutner (2001) to propose an alternative, called 'weak superoptimality,' where a form–meaning pair is disqualified only if it loses out to another weakly superoptimal pair. In the example, (1a) does not lose

out to any competitors, so it is (at least) weakly superoptimal. In contrast, neither (1a) with the nonstandard meaning, nor (1b) with the standard meaning, are (weakly or strongly) superoptimal: both lose out when competing with the superoptimal (1a) with the standard, nonmarked meaning. That makes (1b) with the marked meaning weakly superoptimal. Weak bidirectionality is thus able to associate marked meanings with marked forms and unmarked meanings with unmarked forms, and in this way seems able to provide an explanation of the phenomenon of iconicity (*see* **Iconicity**).

Bidirectionality is a near-straightforward formalization of Grice's theory of meaning, according to which successful communication rests on the speaker's grasping the hearer's intention and vice versa: the speaker needs to take the hearer's point of view in deciding what signal to produce, and the hearer needs to take the speaker's point of view in deciding what intention to attribute to the speaker. Bidirectionality has a similar direct relationship to the neo-Gricean reconstructions of Horn (1984) and Levinson (2000) (*see* **Neo-Gricean Pragmatics**); it is therefore not surprising that one of the areas in which the bidirectionality hypothesis holds out promises of success is precisely pragmatics.

As to the part played by the bidirectionality hypothesis in language description, there are some serious problems with both strong and weak bidirectionality (an overview is found in Beaver and Lee, 2003). Other bidirectional phenomena can be understood as conventionalizations arising in language evolution; often, bidirectionality is reduced to a role in the simulation of language evolution.

Pronouns

A first optimality-theoretic study on pronouns is Bresnan's (2001) exploration of pronominal typology. Reduced realizations such as weak and clitic pronouns or agreement markers (bound or zero pronouns) represent the typologically marked case, whereas the full pronoun is typologically unmarked. Reduced pronouns associate with topical antecedents, full forms with nontopical antecedents. Beaver (2004) explored the potential of OT in pronoun resolution, or the task of finding the correct antecedent for pronouns. An influential and well-studied computational linguistic approach to this problem is the model called 'centering' (Grosz *et al.*, 1985 is the original source; for a recent, much changed version, see Strube and Hahn, 1999). Beaver (2004), using a small system of constraints, provided a faithful reconstruction of the centering algorithm and

shows that a form of restricted bidirectionality must be assumed so that the resulting system may also be successful in the production direction. Another attempt at finding an optimal pronoun resolution algorithm (not restricted to a reconstruction of the centering algorithm) is due to Bouma (2003). Mattausch (2003) gave a reconstruction of the complementary distribution of pronouns and reflexives in the development of English and was able to use the method of evolutionary OT developed by Jaeger (2003) to reconstruct the various stages the English reflexive system passed through before reaching its modern form.

Presupposition

In their study of the German particle *wieder* ('again'), Blutner and Jaeger (1999) gave a quite simple and convincing OT-based reconstruction of the presupposition theory as formulated by Van der Sandt (1992) and Heim (1983). In either theory, there are two defaults or preferences. The first preference in both theories is to identify the induced presupposition in the context of the utterance; this is called resolution. The second default prefers to add the presupposition either to the global context (Heim) or to the highest accessible context, wherever this is possible (Van der Sandt); this is called accommodation. The reconstruction has the following steps: Consistence > Resolve > Do Not Accommodate > Strength. Consistence stipulates that the current utterance does not conflict with what is known already. Resolve asks for the presence of the presupposed information at an accessible position. Do Not Accommodate forbids the addition of the presupposed information, while Strength excludes interpretations that are informationally weaker than the ones already available.

The reconstruction in the OT system improves in several ways on the earlier theories. Do Not Accommodate prefers partial resolutions to full accommodations; it does not outlaw copying presuppositions. Strength often gives a better prediction of the accommodation site than is the case in Van der Sandt's (1992) original theory. In particular, Zeevat's (2002) reconstruction allows for the exploration of particles such as *too* and their exceptional behavior in accounts of presupposition: they do not allow (full) accommodation and are obligatory in the contexts where they occur. In order to explain the latter phenomenon, one needs a 'max(F) constraint' (similar to that known from OT phonology): certain contextual relations are obligatorily marked. By contrast, the other phenomenon seems to allow for a bidirectional explanation: Do Not Accommodate, in a bidirectional interpretation,

excludes candidate expressions that force accommodations, whenever there is a simple alternative that means the same and does not force the accommodation. In the case of particles, the sentence without the particle is always such an alternative.

The Future

Pragmatics offers a rich field for potential developments in OT. Among the possible areas for optimization one could mention the intonational phenomena studied by Blutner (2001), De Hoop (2003), and Hendriks (2003); here, much remains to be done. Another area that is waiting for an OT treatment is that of discourse structure and discourse relations. The work done by Asher and Lascarides (2003), using a mixture of optimization and default logic, would benefit from the relative simplicity of the OT architecture. Very few people have so far tried to address implicatures and explicatures in this framework; explorations by Blutner (2001) and Krifka (2002) are quite promising, though. An important new strand of research is the investigation of language change by evolutionary simulation, based on systems of OT constraints. The reconstruction of pragmatics along the lines of bidirectionality is the central concept in these endeavors, which focus on an investigation of how systems reach stability under 'pragmatic pressure.'

The phenomena investigated so far have been relatively simple, though of fundamental importance. In a wider perspective, one may hope that some day, we may be able to account for the peculiarities of human language as they arise in linguistic evolution under the influence of pragmatic pressure. Such results may still be far away, but the investigation of pragmatic problems in the light of optimality theory has laid some of the groundwork for this enterprise.

See also: Constraint, Pragmatic; Deixis and Anaphora: Pragmatic Approaches; Frege, Friedrich Ludwig Gottlob; Grice, Herbert Paul; Iconicity; Implicature; Maxims and Flouting; Neo-Gricean Pragmatics; Politeness; Pragmatic Presupposition; Pragmatics: Overview; Relevance Theory; Spoken Discourse: Types.

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Pragmatics: Overview

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Introduction

Traditionally, pragmatics has been considered as forming a triad with syntax and semantics (a partition originally ascribed to Charles Morris, and inspired by ideas from the philosopher Charles S. Peirce). (*See* **Morris, Charles; Peirce, Charles Sanders**). Here, syntax is considered to be the study of the formal relations of one sign to another, while semantics studies the relations of signs to objects in the outside world. Finally, pragmatics is thought of as the relation of signs to those who interpret the signs, the users of language (Morris, 1938: 6). It is the latter part of Morris' definition that will be the guiding point of this article; however, the original restriction to signs will be relaxed, such that we now speak of communication in a very broad sense, also including nonverbal means such as gestures and body movements. The emphasis of this modern study of pragmatics is, as it was for Morris, on the user; however, the user is not thought of here as an isolated individual, but as a social animal in the Aristotelian sense: a being that is dependent on the context in which she or he lives, but at the same time is able to interact with and change that context through the use of signs – read: human language and other human communicative means.

Understanding and Misunderstanding

People talk in order to communicate. Good communication happens when speakers understand each other correctly, that is, in accordance with what the speaker means and the hearer understands the speaker to mean. When such an understanding does not occur, the communicative situation becomes one of misunderstanding rather than of understanding.

Many people (including most linguists) believe that communication, and hence understanding, depends solely on the words spoken. The famous reply to a journalist's question, "Read my lips," attributed to former U.S. President George H. W. Bush, expresses a belief in the validity of the verbal utterance as proffered by a speaker, without regard either to what the speaker may have had in mind or to the actual circumstances of the speaking and reading.

Another widespread error is made by people who believe that human communication should obey (or actually obeys) the rules embodied in what is usually called grammar (by many linguists interpreted as "a device that will generate all the correct sentences of a language, and no incorrect ones," as Noam Chomsky and his followers have preached ever since 1957, the year in which Chomsky's first and very successful treatise on syntactic structures appeared; Chomsky, 1957). This assumption (which has survived in a number of avatars, also among nonlinguists) was publicly denounced as a fallacy soon after its first public appearance; celebrated linguists such as Archibald Hill, anthropologists such as Dell Hymes, and sociologists such as Erwing Goffman all were quick to point out that human communication very rarely proceeds in accordance with the strict rules of grammar. Pronouncing a correct sentence belongs in the realm of the impossible, not to say pure fantasy: real people speak in ways that are rather far away from the strictures of the grammarians, yet they are often, if not always, understood correctly (in the sense in which I used this word above).

But what happens when misunderstandings occur? What are the reasons for people's wrong apprehensions of their interlocutors' utterances? Is it the case that they do not understand the words that are spoken? Or are there deeper reasons for misunderstanding?

While it is true that understanding a message to some degree depends on a correct interpretation of the words being used, as well as on a certain respect for the usual form these words and their combinations take in any given language (not to speak of a pronunciation that is not prone to being perceived wrongly, or not at all), it remains the case that words, no matter how well chosen and correctly joined and pronounced, do not convey the entire message, or even the major portion of what we intend to say. Popular handbooks of communication and advertising often propagate the slogan that in business, the words count for 5%, the body language for the remaining 95% of your message. While this may be somewhat of an exaggeration, the point these business communication experts want to make is clear: words taken by themselves will not do the job; understanding a message is more than a verbal matter.

The French philosopher Jacques Rancière (1995) distinguishes between a simple misunderstanding (French: *malentendu*, or *méconnaissance*, i.e., a wrong understanding, or even a lack of understanding) and a misunderstanding on a deeper level (French: *mésentente*), where understanding is not only difficult, but even impossible, because there is not, and cannot be, any common platform where all the involved parties can meet. According to Rancière, this is the usual, unfortunate situation especially in politics (1995: 12–13); but also in daily life, it frequently happens that one person does not understand what the other is saying, not because the words are not clear or the phrasing ambiguous, but simply because the one interlocutor does not **see** what the other is talking about, or because she or he interprets that which the other is talking about as something entirely different. In Rancière's words,

> The cases of misunderstanding are those in which the dispute on "what speaking means" [an allusion to the seminal work by the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, *Ce que parler veut dire*; 1982] constitutes the very rationality of the speech situation. In that situation, the interlocutors both do and do not mean the same thing by the same words. There are all sorts of reasons why a certain person X understands, and yet does not understand, another person Y: because, while he perceives clearly what the other tells him, he also does not **see** the object of which the other speaks to him; or even, because he understands, and must understand, sees and wants to make seen, another object represented by the same words, another reasoning contained in the same argument (Rancière 1995: 13; my translation and emphasis).

It is the task of pragmatics to clarify for us what it means to 'see and not to see' an object of which the 'same words' are being used, yet are understood in different, even deeply diverging ways. Notable examples of this '(mis-)use' are found in political discourse, the very subject of Rancière's reflections: words such as 'freedom,' 'democracy,' 'peace,' and so on have over the ages been consistently and willfully misunderstood and misused in political discourse. The deeper reason for such misunderstandings is not in what the words mean (and certainly not what they originally may have meant; here, the Greek roots of the word 'democracy' and its original meaning of 'people power' provide a sad example). The way we understand a word has to do with the situation in which it is being used, and that means: a situation where speakers and hearers engage in a 'common scene' (Rancière's expression) where they meet and discuss, respecting each other's background and underlying assumptions about what exactly is common to them as actors on that scene, in a particular situation of language use.

Situations and Contexts

A situation can be roughly described as a meeting of human interactants having a common background and trying to realize a common goal. Exactly how common those backgrounds and goals are can be the subject of much dispute, and even seemingly insignificant details may generate heated controversy (such as the seating order at a conference table; enter the round table, which minimizes to a certain degree problems of seating and precedence). The situation also comprises the various real world circumstances that either have occasioned the meeting or are material in creating its context. More broadly speaking, the notion of context may be taken as comprising all the circumstances that go into defining the backgrounds and goals of the interactants, including what has been, and is being, and possibly will be, said at a meeting. More narrowly, we may concentrate on the verbal part of the meeting and the immediate environment of the words spoken, and talk of cotext, rather than context; I will use the broader term here (*see* **Context, Communicative**).

A situational context is not just a listing of what is there and who are there: it must take into account where they, the interactants, come from, in more than one sense of the term. The background from which the interactants act and speak is decisive for their possibilities of interacting (in political meetings, this is often captured by the term 'mandate'). Moreover, a context is not just given once and for all: it is a dynamic notion in that it constantly adjusts itself to the new developments in the interaction, seen against the original background (which may then be changed itself, and a new mandate given). What people bring to the situation in the guise of presuppositions and expectations is an important, albeit often not too visible part of the context. Nevertheless, and precisely because it is not directly observable, this hidden context plays a major role in determining the possibilities and liabilities of the interactants. It would be a mistake, however, to think that bringing such presuppositions out in the open automatically furthers successful interaction; in many situations, e.g., in business transactions, the interlocutors play their cards close to their chests and rely on the tacit understanding of their backgrounds that the others hopefully have, or at least pretend to have (*see* **Pragmatic Presupposition**).

Most importantly, all situations are subject to major world constraints, which govern the interactants and keep them in line, so to speak. There are both written and unwritten rules for what can be said and done and what cannot be said or done in a situation; these rules of the game depend on the way the situation is incorporated into a larger political and social frame (e.g., labor negotiations have to abide by certain rules limiting the length of the negotiating period or the extent to which existing agreements can be changed or renounced). The power that resides in the individual interlocutors (e.g., to strike a deal, to call off a strike or lockout, to conclude an accord, and so on) is vested in them on account of their social and commercial position. An interlocutor speaks not only with his or her own voice, but repeats, or re-sounds, the Voice of the Master, i.e., the institution to which he or she belongs.

This leads us to consider the speaker's role in a situation as bound by social and other convention; any speech act (see below) that is uttered during a negotiation situation can only have the force that is allowed it, based on the speaker's social and institutional placement. Conversely, such a voicing of the situation can itself contribute to the establishment of a powerful or power-like situation; words and actions interact dialectically with contexts and situations. Consider the following case, adapted from the Swiss novelist Friedrich Dürrenmatt's short story *The breakdown* (Dürrenmatt, 1956).

In the story, a traveling salesman meets three people in the dining room of a hotel in the little provincial town where he has to spend the night because his car has broken down. For some reason, the three gentlemen seem to be happy to see him, and invite him for a late supper at the home of one of their number. During and after the meal, the conversation focuses more and more on the hosts' past occupations of attorney general, judge, and trial lawyer, respectively. In the end, the trio enacts a mock court session in which the traveling salesman (who by now has lost all sense of time and space) is condemned to the severest penalties for his past misdeeds.

What is interesting here is the way in which, by force of their earlier societal standing, the three men manage to create the illusion of a court session in which the accused ends up confessing his crimes and accepting his sentence. The relevance of Dürrenmatt's legal game is that it shows us how the law is not only embodied in institutional roles and legal language, but depends on the social environment, the context in which that language is practiced. The hapless traveler who fell into the clutches of the quasi-practicing legal trio was every bit as damned as he would have been had he been condemned by a regular court.

Societally institutionalized speech acts were among the first to be discovered by Austin (1962). (See **Austin, John L.**). The concept of the social context has been valuable not only as a classificatory criterion, but also because it makes us look at what speech acts

really do, and how they are able to do what they do, as we will see below. In our example, the speech act of sentencing not only brought about a changed state of affairs (the sentenced person was supposed to go to jail), but it also (re-)created the legal system whose reality it confirmed (by the pronouncing of the sentence). Not only does the social context allow for and determine what is appropriate speech acting in the context, it is itself construed through the use of the appropriate language: societal institutions are (re-)instituted through the use of speech acts. This is the social, psychological, and above all pragmatic significance of the practical joke perpetrated on the poor traveler in the Dürrenmatt story.

Speech and Speech Acts

Above, I mentioned John L. Austin, the Oxford philosopher, as one of the great sources of inspiration for our modern thinking on how language works, or on "how to do things with words," in Austin's own immortal formulation (1962). Austin's contribution is linked to the concept of the speech act, a use of language that not only says, but does. The idea is of course not new: many of us are familiar with the institution of the religious sacrament (such as the Christian baptism). Here, the notion that a formula (such as used in administering baptism) works in force of the words spoken ("I baptize thee"), in tandem with the action performed (letting water flow across the baptizee's head). That the sacral action is performed as denoted by the words is at the basis of the belief according to which the sacrament is effective, not by force of the sayer, but by force of the words spoken and the act done. In Catholic theology, this aspect of the action goes by the label of *ex opere operato* 'in force of the act that is performed'; in speech act theory we talk about an aspect of a speech act, the performative or perlocutionary effect, that comes in addition to the words spoken (the locutionary aspect) and the point of the act (the illocutionary aspect), which makes it into precisely this act and no other (*see* **Speech Acts and Grammar**).

For Austin, speech acts could be distinguished and neatly labeled according to their 'point' or illocutionary force: ordering, asserting, requesting, and so forth. Austin's student John R. Searle, who later went back to the United States and taught at Berkeley, systematized and extended Austin's classification of speech acts and in particular, systematized the conditions that would make a speech act legal and effective (rather than 'misfiring,' as Austin called it, e.g., when the person executing an institutional act such as a marriage ceremony does not have the

necessary credentials). These felicity conditions, as they often are called, comprise such matters as the agent's sincerity (e.g., in proffering a promise), the agent's or recipient's ability to be acted upon (in our society, a person cannot be legally married a second time as long as his or her first marriage is in force), and so on. Searle's merit is to have systematized not only Austin's speech acts, but in particular to have perfected his assignment of the conditions that must be met before a speech act can be said to be valid (*see* **Speech Acts**).

But there is more to this than meet the eye (or the act). Unfortunately, Searle not only developed Austin, but in doing so technologized him (Melrose, 1996: 61–62). Searle's main interest was not how to do things with words, but how to systematize and describe the words that do those things, the speech acts as such. It may be said about Austin that he never was overly technical about his speech acts – something which earned him scorn from later speech act theorists (Mey, 2001: 117–118). In Austin's original thinking, it is the words that have to be "to some extent 'explained' by the 'context' in which they have been actually spoken" (Austin, 1962: 100; the scare quotes are Austin's own). Austin is interested in the context because he wanted to "study the total speech in the total situation" (Austin, 1962: 148), which is exactly what pragmatics is all about. Whereas Austin was doing things with words, Searle is describing acts of speech.

The Problem of the Indirect Speech Act

For Austin and many of his followers, a speech act is primarily expressed by what is called a speech act verb, that is, a verb whose main function is to signal and execute the appropriate act. For instance, when I say *I promise*, the verb *to promise* is the appropriate (sometimes called canonical) expression for this particular act (*see* **Speech Acts and Grammar**).

Early on, it was noticed that many speech acts are performed successfully without the help of the canonical verb. For instance, I can confirm a promise, or even make one, by simply saying what I'm going to do, or by uttering an affirmative reply to a question. The most outstanding example of a solemn promise (a vow) that does not use the verb *to promise* is when man and wife promise each other to be faithful and supportive *until death doth them part*. The promise is uttered by the auxiliary (or tag) verb 'to do' (a tag verb is one that repeats the tagged portion of the main verb construction, as in *Do you...? Yes I do*).

More generally, the appropriate speech act can be expressed by reference to one of the conditions

that Austin and Searle stipulated as necessary for successfully performing such an act. One can, for example, inquire about a person's ability to give information or perform a task, as in *Can you tell me the time?* or *Could you close that window?* In such cases, the inquiry is understood not as a mere preliminary to a request for information or action, but as the act itself of asking for information or requesting a favor, respectively. Such acts are called indirect, since they lead the addressee to infer, from the fact that a request was formulated regarding an ability or willingness, that the request in fact was about the object of the ability or willingness (in this case, to give out information or to close a window).

Interestingly, contrary to what seemed to be the original motivation behind classifying speech acts and speech act verbs, the indirect way of doing things with words is, in many cases, the preferred one. I have called this phenomenon the 'indirect speech act paradox' (Mey, 2001; *see* **Pragmatic Acts**); it is confirmed by observations such as that by Levinson (1983) that "most usages of requests are indirect," whereas such speech as orders are seldom, if ever, executed by the canonical verb form, the imperative mood: "imperatives are rarely used to command or request" (Levinson, 1983: 264, 275; see further Mey, 2001: 111). A particular use of indirectness in speech acting is found in the phenomenon called inferring by implicature; more on this below.

Indexing and Inferring

To get a handle on the phenomenon of inference, let's first consider the use of what linguists call deictic elements. These are words and expressions that directly refer to persons, objects, situations, etc. by 'pointing' to them, using what is called *deixis* (the Greek word for 'pointing to, indicating'; the human forefinger is called 'index' because it is our first and foremost natural pointing instrument). Thus, when I say *I* about myself, I point to the person that I am; *you* points to the person away from me, *viz.*, an actual or potential interlocutor (*see* **Deixis and Anaphora: Pragmatic Approaches**).

Most languages have a more or less elaborate system of such 'pointers' that help us identify persons and situations when we are interacting verbally and otherwise. We can refer to a book that is mine, as 'this book,' whereas a book that is yours, or in your possession, may be called 'your book' or 'that book.' But deictics have other functions as well. 'That' can also express contempt (*that son of a bitch*) or respect (*gimme that old time religion*). Moreover, such 'indexing' can happen even without my knowing

or willing, as when "my speech betrays me": the language I speak reveals ('indexes') (*see* **Indexicality: Theory**) my social or local roots, as happened for St. Peter in the famous betrayal scene, after he had three times publicly denied having ever set eyes on "that man," Jesus of Nazareth (Matt. 27:70–72).

Conversely, we can use this kind of indexing to provoke a reaction in our interlocutors. For instance, using high-falutin language and 'expensive' words can create an impression of scholarship and learning. When I doctor my speech to create such a (possibly false) impression, I base myself on the hopeful assumption that people who hear this particular kind of language will infer that I indeed belong to the class of educated people (alternatively, they may infer that I am a terrible snob).

As in the case of the indirect speech acts, what is said is not the whole story. Based on my actual knowledge of the world and the input from my interlocutors, I make certain inferences, albeit indirectly and perhaps not always convincingly and/or justifiably. The main point is that we are able to communicate certain thoughts or feelings, using indirect means and relying on the common world situation (or scene) that we are part of.

We imply certain things about ourselves and the world when we use deictics and other indexicals in this way; our interlocutors are supposed to make the proper inferences in order to successfully understand us or communicate with us. That such an understanding may be wrong, or even willfully distorted, is one of the secrets of the successful mystery or detective story; the innocent reader is led down a 'garden path' of false inferences, to be suddenly confronted with the real state of affairs in a moment of truth.

As an example, consider the Argentine writer Julio Cortázar's 'Story with spiders' (*Historia con migalas*; Cortázar, 1984), in which the readers are made to believe certain things about a couple vacationing on an island in the Caribbean. The sinister impact of their activities and the relationship to their earlier exploits of the same murderous kind is hinted at in the very last lines of the narrative, when the couple is unmasked as a nefarious, female duo bent on destroying men (hence the title word 'spiders,' which contains an important, but not sufficient clue). What the author does here is to play on our implicit understanding of the language (in Spanish as in English, the default couple is male plus female), in order to have us infer the normalcy of the situation, only to shock us back into the real world when the identity of the spiders is revealed, again by the use of an indexical element: a female adjectival ending. Only then do we infer the couple's identity; the rest of the

gruesome inferences are left to our imagination and our ability to put two and two together on the basis of clues provided earlier. (A complete analysis of this intriguing piece of text is given in Mey, 1992) (*see* **Literary Pragmatics**.)

Next, we will discuss a particular way of implying, and see how proper inferences may be drawn using the notion of cooperation. (On inferring vs. implying, see Thomas, 1996: 58–59).

Cooperating and Implying

A pragmatic view of language bases itself, as we have seen, on the ways speakers and hearers are able to communicate in a given situation. A very important factor in this is the speakers' willingness to enter the situation with a decision to cooperate with their partners. The Berkeley philosopher H. Paul Grice (*see* **Grice, Herbert Paul**) is famous for having formulated the Cooperative Principle, stating the human need for, and extent of, cooperation in conversation, a principle that he detailed further in the four so-called conversational maxims, which guide the speakers and hearers through the conversational maze in a mutually satisfying way (see Mey, 2001: 71ff) (*see* **Cooperative Principle**).

The fact that cooperation is, so to speak, built into the very marrow of conversation makes us prepared to accept what is offered in conversational exchange, as being of relevance to our needs and interests. If I ask somebody for the time of day, I take it that he or she will cooperate and tell me the time, and not make some completely ludicrous remark about the state of the world. Or, "What man of you, if his son asks him for bread, will give him a stone?" as the Gospel tells us (Matt. 7:9). Conversely, we may make our intentions clear by precisely not answering a question in the expected way, or not fulfilling a reasonable request. If the father did give his son a stone for bread, he probably wanted to tell him something about the way the world is organized: people taking advantage of each other, even cheating on each other. However, in a more subtle way I can use this indirectness to appeal to an understanding of the situation that is built into the very question, so to speak. The innocent question *What time is it?* can correctly and satisfactorily be answered indirectly by referring to an event that both interlocutors know as denoting a particular time. In my Norwegian house, where we had very little traffic on the county road passing by our house, the utterance: *The bus just went by* would be a completely happy answer to a request for the correct time: there was only one bus a day, and it passed our house at exactly 7:45 AM on its way to Oslo.

When we answered the time question indirectly, we implied a reference to something that was commonly known. Grice has extended this notion of implying to something he called (with a self-concocted term, as he admits; Grice, 1981: 184–185) an *implicature* (*see* **Implicature**). Implicatures can be thought of as infringements on conversational cooperation, by going against one or the other of the conversational maxims. One such maxim is that of relation (or relevance: my answer must have some relevance to the question asked; *see* **Relevance Theory**). When we look for a relevant feature in an answer that *prima facie* seems to have little to do with what I was asking about, the implicature is of something behind the answer.

Grice's famous example is of the uncooperative college professor who, in reply to a request for a recommendation, writes that the student in question has always attended his lectures, and is a capable English speller. By not saying anything that is relevant (e.g., in a job application for an academic position), the professor implicitly indicates that the student is not a person he wants to recommend. So what at first looked like an uncooperative answer, in the end achieves the communicative needs of the situation by implicitly providing an answer that is useful to the requester.

Or consider the case of the person (related in Mey, 2001: 78–79) who is asked for an I.D. card on entering a discotheque and remarks to the doorman that she is the mother of four. Given that the drinking age at that point of time in this particular state (Louisiana) was 18, the fact of having four children more or less precludes the speaker's being under age for the purpose of drinking. But this is not said directly; the answer is a 'flout' of the maxim of relation (what does having children have to do with drinking?), but the implicature makes this a potentially good reply. In the actual case, however, the doorman refuses to recognize the implicature, and answers by another flouting of the maxim of relevance: "Yes, and I'm the Pope's granddad" – a truly absurd assertion given the ages of the then reigning pope (Paul VI in his later years) and of the doorman (at most 25). This new flout therefore implicated an answer in the spirit of: "You can tell me what you like but I cannot believe you at face value; show me an I.D. or just leave" (*see* **Maxims and Flouting**; refer also to an important study by Greenall, 2002).

The 'Garden Path' and 'Bestrangement'

A particular form of implying is often called the already mentioned 'garden path': an interlocutor is made to infer an implicature that is not really

there (but only exists in the speaker's mind), but then is intentionally suggested as valid in order to lead the conversational partner(s) astray. The motivation for creating such implicatures can be either political, as in the anecdote below (which I have called 'Adam in the Garden'; Mey, 2001: 258–259), or of a literary kind (as in the Cortázar example referred to earlier).

During the election campaign of 1970, incumbent Congressman Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., of the 18th Congressional District, was giving a press conference outside his opponent's headquarters at 135th Street and 7th Avenue in Harlem, New York City. A heckler interrupted him, asking him if he was going to be present at the antinarcotics parade to be held the next day, a Saturday, "like he'd promised." To which Powell replied that of course, nothing would keep him from attending. A moment later, the heckler interrupted again, wanting to make absolutely sure that the Congressman would be present at the parade. Powell, visibly irritated, reiterated his assurance, and went on with his speech. The heckler then intervened a third time, stating that "Well, Mr. Powell, sir, you ain't gonna be at that parade, 'cause there ain't gonna be one and we never spoke of one" (Source: *Harper's Magazine*, April 1971).

If we ask ourselves what was happening on that preelection Harlem Friday, we can say that the speech acts of asking questions (by the heckler) did not presuppose the existence of a real answer. The questions were disingenuous: the person asking them was well aware of their duplicity. The technique of the garden path leads the unsuspecting listener (or reader) into a verbal trap, which is then sprung at the crucial moment. Often (as in the case above), this is done with the intention of making a fool of the listener and (for political reasons, as in this case) humiliating him or her publicly. In order to better understand this technique, one could ask questions such as what speech acts can be identified in this interchange and how the Cooperative Principle applies here (if it does at all). Another interesting question would be how one could have saved Congressman Powell from going down the path, asking in particular where he took what first wrong step, and how he could have counter speech-acted to the heckler's remarks.

In other cases (mostly in a literary context) the use of the garden path is akin to the technique of making familiar things unfamiliar, a procedure called defamiliarization or bestrangement (*see* **Literary Pragmatics**). The point here is to jolt the reader and obtain some kind of narrative shock effect; the effect is obtained by allowing the reader to make the normal inferences based on what we know about society,

language, and ourselves. When we enter a room, we expect there to be windows; anything that looks like a window will be seen and perceived as such. When we read about a couple taking a vacation, our inference is that of the normal, heterosexual couple. When Cortázar, in the story referred to above, suddenly breaks into our normal world by unveiling the true character of this couple, we are suddenly confronted with another view of our society, one in which the normal couple may be a same-sex one. The garden path teaches us something about the paths that are there, as well as about paths not taken by everybody.

Situated Speech and Pragmatic Acts

On the basis of the examples given, we conclude that any speech act, in order to be successfully executed, not only has to obey the conditions laid down by speech act theorists such as Searle and Grice, but in addition must be appropriately uttered, that is, it has to respect and conform with the situation in which it is executed.

A recent controversy erupting around the Danish army contingent stationed in Iraq was provoked by the fact that one of their translators balked at rendering Danish swear words verbatim into Arabic during prisoner interrogation at the Danish contingent's headquarters. Whereas the Danish interrogating officer was of the opinion that the Iraqi prisoners ought to be roughed up a bit by among other things, verbal intimidation, including threats and swear words, the native Syrian interpreter (who had spent most of his adult life in Denmark and hence was completely familiar with typical Danish swearing behavior) refused to go ahead and use words that, in his view, not only were offensive, but also would not work in the situation. He expressed as his considered opinion that an Iraqi would attribute the use of such swear terms, when translated literally into Arabic, as offensive verbal behavior, indexing an uneducated person. It would put the speaker far below the addressee, socially and interactionally, and preclude any cooperation. Hence the technique that the Danish interrogation officer wanted to employ was not appropriate to the situation, and an inappropriate act of interrogating would elicit no proper response. The interpreter, who clearly perceived the Danish and the Iraqi attitude as situationally incompatible sent in his letter of resignation 5 weeks prior to the expiration of his term, accompanied by an explanatory letter addressed to his commanding officer. This letter was then printed in the Danish press, causing a huge commotion; a public scandal erupted, resulting among

other things in the Danish interrogation officer being recalled from duty in Iraq.

As we saw in the case of the indirect speech acts, such acts receive their full potential usefulness from the situation in which they are properly uttered. What is lacking in verbal explicitation, is supplied by the implicit conditions of the situation. But conversely, the situation conditions the appropriate utterances in the sense that it enables certain utterances and excludes others, as we saw in the case of the bilingual Danish-Arabic interpreter.

Generalizing these observations, we may say that no speech act is complete, or even possible, without, and outside of, its proper situational conditions. A speech act, in order to be properly executed, has to be situated properly. This condition comprises not just the words spoken, but the presuppositions that are inherent in a situation, such as a nationally and culturally oriented understanding of proper linguistic behavior; a familiarity with conditions leading up to, as well as away from, a situated speech act; an understanding of the individual utterer's personal and social self-image; a correct interpretation of the accompanying body language and gestures; and so on and so forth. If we take all these aspects together, we arrive at the conclusion that there are no speech acts as such (except in the treatises and grammars written by linguists) and also, that every speech act, in order to be a valid act, must be rooted in a situation that supplies it with legitimacy (*see* **Pragmatic Presupposition; Intercultural Pragmatics and Communication**).

As we have seen, this legitimacy has not just to do with speaking, but more so, maybe even mostly, with the social and situational command that one has of the situation in which the words are spoken. Already Austin, in his *How to do things with words*, had had this insight (cf. the quotation above); for him, the primordial speech act was precisely a situated one. True, Austin interpreted this situation as one of strict societally defined custom (such as institutional surroundings in a court room, a lecture hall, or a church); my interpretation expands on this by saying that every situation belongs to some institution, whether officially constituted or not, and that every act of speaking is a situationally grounded and legitimated activity (*see* **Institutional Talk**). To characterize such an activity, I have coined the term 'pragmatic act' (*see* **Pragmatic Acts**). "Pragmatic acts are pragmatic because they base themselves on language as constrained by the situation, not as defined by syntactic rules or by semantic selections and conceptual restrictions. Pragmatic acts are situation-derived and situation-constrained; in the final analysis, they are determined by the broader social context in which they happen, and they realize their goals in the conditions placed upon human action by that context" (Mey, 2001: 228).

The Pragmatic Turn

From the early 20th century on, the study of language had been defined, following Saussure, as the study of its system and structure. The methods for studying language were borrowed from the natural sciences; the rules that were assumed to govern the use of language were thought of as operating on the model of physical laws, being testable according to the prediction method: a hypothesis generates a statement about certain phenomena, and we can empirically ascertain whether or not the prediction holds. So, too, a rule in linguistics should correctly predict what happens in language, and it should be as general and simple as possible, while capturing all and only the facts.

This model of linguistic methodology (accepted by all those working in the structuralist tradition, from Bloomfield to Hjelmslev to Chomsky) was subsequently refined by the incorporation of mathematical and computational methods and techniques. Chomsky's main thesis, in particular, that a grammar of a language should be able to generate all the correct sentences of a language and none of the incorrect sentences, met with wide acclaim, and became the implicit code for much of linguistic work during the latter half of the last century.

Meanwhile, as we have seen, opposition to this mechanistic way of thinking about language arose from several quarters. Not only among the linguists, but mainly among the philosophers (Austin, Searle, and their followers) and anthropologists (Hymes, Hanks), among the sociologists and conversational analysts (Goffman, Sacks, Schegloff), the insufficiency of the standard linguistic method when it came to capture the full reality of human language use was keenly felt. Also among the literary theorists, following the rediscovery of the pioneering works of Soviet thinkers such as Bakhtin, Voloshinov, and others, the interest in the social aspects of language and its use in narration in particular became a prime factor in destabilizing the current linguistic paradigm, especially as embodied in the Saussurean distinction between *langue* and *parole* (*see* **Bakhtin, Mikhail Mikhailovich; Voloshinov, Valentin Nikolaevich**). In Western Europe, where the Russian scholars, for political reasons, had been rather poorly known, the surge of anti-establishment thinking of the 1960s and 1970s (spearheaded by a return to Marx) had a

great impact on what we now can see and name as the pragmatic turn in language studies (*see* **Marxist Theories of Language; Social Aspects of Pragmatics; Literary Pragmatics**).

In order to properly understand the import of this turn, let's go back to the case of speech acts, referred to above. There are basically two ways of looking at human speech activity: one is to consider the language used, the other is to look at the situation in which the language is used. Clearly, the two aspects should not be separated: there is no language use except in situations, and no situation is complete without the language that goes with it. However, in a linguistics-oriented approach we will always start out with the words, then try to "fit them to the world," as Searle used to say. The question is then: given these words, what can they do? If I say *Open the window, please*, what is the effect of this language use on the world (including the window in question, but also myself and my interlocutors, far and near)? In this approach, I start with the language and work my way to the outside, the world. The main focus in most cases is on the language used for ordering and the conditions that accompany this speech act.

Conversely, I may start out with a given situation: a window has to be closed. The question is: What language is appropriate, given the situation? I may say *Close the window, please* to somebody nearby; but I could also say, *Isn't it a bit cold in here?*, or any other indirect speech act that will do the job (sometimes even a grunt or a significant look will be sufficient). Rather than focusing uniquely on the words, pragmatics tries to capture the situation as a whole, and work its way to the inside, where the spoken words are found. Here, the use of language, such as a speech act, is an important part, but not the only one, of the situation.

In this, as in all use of language, the main protagonist is neither the language nor the situation, but the user and his or her situational conditions. The user decides on what language to use, but does this strictly in accordance with the situational context, as we saw above. Indeed, in many situations the use of a specific, canonical speech act is probably the user's last choice. One does not say *I hereby incite you to riot* to effectuate a speech act of inciting to riot – in fact, given a situation of inciting, almost any speech act will do, as Kurzon has remarked (1996). This line of thinking has led me to believe that the indirect speech act, as it is usually described, is not the exception but the normal case: all speech acts are situationally bound and conditioned, hence to a certain degree indirect in that they depend on the situation in which they are uttered.

In other words, a pragmatic approach to speech acting, and in general to language use, moves from the outside in: given this situation, what words will be appropriate for a particular act? In contrast, speech act theory, in its classical shape, works from the inside out (as does linguistics): given these words, how can I use them in a situation? This is basically the traditional semantic problem of the meaning of words; it is solved by trying to find a context in which the words will fit, rather than by starting out with the context and determining which words or expressions will fit a particular contextual slot. Curiously, it is this latter, textually based, prepragmatic approach to linguistics that was also the ideal of a structuralist like Hjelmslev: one starts from the entire text and arrives at the text's minimal constituent units through successive analytic operations; the problem was that in this kind of analysis, the user never was taken into account.

When we speak of a pragmatic turn, it is this kind of change of direction we have in mind. It is not just that some linguists turned to pragmatics, or even turned themselves into pragmaticists by fiat or "chosen affinity" (Goethe's expression). It is the method itself that has been turned on its head (or stood on its legs, if one prefers): rather than being a language-based operation, pragmatics advocates a user- and situation-based approach. It is also here that the relationship between semantics and pragmatics can be turned from an "unhappy marriage" if ever there was one (to borrow Georgia Green's expression, when she characterized the relationship between syntax and semantics; Green, 1989) into a healthy relation of mutual respect. Thus, the pragmatic turn in linguistics can be described as a shift from the paradigm of theoretical grammar (in particular, syntax) to the paradigm of the language user. The latter notion is of particular importance for defining pragmatics, since it brings a number of observations to the same practical denominator (see below; cf. Mey, 2001: 4).

It is also in this sense that we can define pragmatics as "studying the use of language in human communication as determined by the conditions of society" (Mey, 2001: 6). For, while it is true that communication in society chiefly is practiced by means of language, still, the language users, being social animals, can only use their language on society's premises. The social order controls and conditions communication in society; society controls and conditions people's access to the communicative means, in particular the linguistic ones. Given its focus on the human use of language and other communicative

means, the proper task of pragmatics is to study how those societal conditions allow and determine such a use.

The Difference that Makes a Difference

A final question needs to be answered: given that we do have this pragmatic turn, and admitting that it is the right direction to take in our study of the human use of language, a question still lingers in ours minds, *viz.*: does it really mean that much which way we look at the relation between humans and their language, inside-out or outside-in? What I would like to show in this final section is that there is a difference, and that this difference indeed does "make a difference" (using Bateson's formulation).

First off, there is the emphasis that the outside-in approach places on the social aspect of all language use. Placing the user in focus, as I advocate in the definition given above, reflects this primordial character of pragmatics as a societally based and societally conditioned study. This is not just to say that we look at social classes or groups, and then try to figure out what kind of (different) language and dialects they speak (the classical sociolinguistic approach, as practiced by, for example, William Labov and his school. In pragmatics, the concern is first of all to 'read' the user as a social *siglum*, a 'sign' to be decoded in accordance with societal parameters.

One of the first questions to ask then, is not what does this utterance mean? but how come this utterance could be produced at all? (Haberland and Mey, 1977, 2002) Asking the question in this way opens up an understanding of the speaker's and hearer's "affordances" (Mey, 2001: 220–221): what can a language user afford to say/hear/understand/execute as a speech act? Clearly, as already the original speech act theorists had seen, an order in the military or some other hierarchically organized body that is issued without proper authority is null and void. But even in more mundane situations (such as asking a simple question), one has always to think of what this question represents for the person who is asked to answer. Certain items may be tabooed in a particular culture; take for instance the proper name that is given a person in the Navajo community upon attaining adulthood, a name that is not to be divulged except to those with whom one has the greatest intimacy. Similarly, the old adage *De mortuis nil nisi bene* ('Say only good things about the dead') may reflect an age-old taboo: the dead may come back and take revenge when spoken about disrespectfully. The social norm, as expressed in what we now would call a superstitious belief, allows for certain types of speech and forbids the use of others, depending on the situation.

The importance of this point of view in, for instance, a teaching situation is enormous. Getting to know the background from which one's students speak is not only important in an inner city school with a majority of Black students (and often a sizable portion of White teachers), where the curriculum is geared towards White middle class values and White middle class ways of speaking and thinking are preferred (*see* **Classroom Talk; Class Language**). Pragmatics is also of help when trying to avoid language clashes, or even language wars, in which we construct linguistic and social differences as the barricades from which deadly battles are fought. In perhaps less serious cases, the educational future of whole generations is jeopardized because of the teachers' lack of understanding of their pupils' social and cultural background: in Botswana primary schools, students sit in the classroom and do "safe time" without learning anything useful, as Arthur (2001) has made clear; elsewhere, misunderstood language policies are imposed without regard to the students' needs (as superbly demonstrated by Canagarajah in his discussion of the language situation in Jaffna, Northern Sri Lanka; Canagarajah, 2001).

In a broader framework, one could raise the question of whether pragmatics is useful in situations like those experienced on a daily basis in the developed countries of Western Europe, where immigrants from poorer parts of the world arrived *en masse* during the 1960s and 1970s and will continue to pose problems of acculturation for many generations to come. The problems can basically be reduced to this dilemma: should people from other cultures be politely asked (or even forced) to leave their cultural baggage behind and dress up in the hosts' cultural garb, or should they be allowed (or maybe even forced) to set up their own cultural ghettoes, where they can live and breathe the familiar air of their home surroundings?

The problem hinges on a proper (that is, pragmatic) interpretation of the term 'culture' and its epiphenomenal adjective, 'intercultural.' Such a view bases itself on a pragmatic and mainly contextual understanding of culture. On the one hand, culture, in order to flourish, has to have a cultivating environment, a context; pragmatics, on the other hand, in order to be true to its definition, has to respect the individual's choice. As to the first point, no culture belongs exclusively to any individual or group of individuals; neither can culture be freely and noncontextually moved around. A culture presupposes a cultural environment, a growth context, just as the properly conditioned soil is necessary for a successful (agri)culture. But also,

pragmatics as defined above is a theory of human behavior (linguistic and otherwise), which explicitly depends on, and is conditioned by, the profile of the user. Hence we must inquire as to what in the actual circumstances is culturally feasible and pragmatically desirable for the individual as well as for the group.

A great deal of flexibility is required in order to avoid either of the two extremes: the culture-only view, where one blindly focuses on a particular culture and wishes for its perpetuation, no matter what, and the pragmatic-only view, which defines the uses of language simply from a (mostly utilitarian) user point of view: what is needed to guarantee the immigrants a not only culturally, but also economically viable existence?

Through research and practice, the field of intercultural pragmatics tries to build a bridge between the two extreme positions; it safeguards the culture as culture while attending to the needs of the users. Here, it should be borne in mind that cultures are not absolute or eternal values; even more important is the realization that humans are humans and have human needs that neither the cultural nor the pragmatic view should be allowed to abrogate. Among these needs belongs, first and foremost, the need to self-determine one's relationship to one's culture and to the culture of the host country. As pragmatic researchers, we should consequently steer a middle course between the extremes of pious romanticism and bone-hard realism, as I have indicated elsewhere (Mey, 2004) (*see* **Intercultural Pragmatics and Communication**).

Conclusion: 'Out of the Waste Basket'

From its humble beginnings as a place where one could deposit the unsolved (and perhaps unsolvable) problems that the classical parts of linguistic studies (such as syntax and semantics, perhaps even phonology) wanted to get rid of, at least temporarily, to the present state of pragmatics as a fully fledged representative of the linguistic disciplines, not much time has elapsed.

Forty odd years ago, the famed Israeli linguist Yehoshua Bar-Hillel (1971) coined the catchy phrase that figures at the head of this section; in his opinion, pragmatics served as a temporary stop for all the things that syntax and semantics could not deal with: a kind of linguistic waste basket. Now, not so many decades later, the waste basket has served its function – I am not saying it is quite empty yet, but we have managed to upgrade the basket to a more prominent position, and accorded it descriptive and explanatory status as a recognized field of language studies.

The relationship between pragmatics and the other linguistic disciplines, especially semantics and pragmatics, may still give rise to heated dispute (cf. what is said above; *see* **Pragmatics and Semantics; Phonetics and Pragmatics**), but nobody today would deny pragmatics its place in the sun. Moreover, pragmatic studies have diversified themselves into such various fields as second language education and educational settings in general, questions of gender-based language use and language discrimination (*see* **Gender and Language**), the intercultural dilemma of assimilation vs. ghettoization (*see* **Intercultural Pragmatics and Communication**), the struggle for linguistic rights and the fight against linguistic imperialism (*see* **Linguistic Rights; Pragmatics: Linguistic Imperialism; Linguistic Decolonialization; Minority Languages: Oppression**), and so on. Even recent developments in the area originally known under the label of human–computer interaction have begun to recognize the impact of pragmatic thinking (*see* **Cognitive Technology; Adaptability in Human-Computer Interaction**).

What this shows is first that pragmatics is not a unified discipline in the sense that it acknowledges a unique method and focuses on only one object. Second, the diversity of the areas where pragmaticists are active is best captured if we consider pragmatics not to be an independent component of linguistics (on a line with, say, semantics or syntax) but rather as a perspective on the way we study language – a perspective that at the same time informs our study of human interaction in the direction outlined above. As the British pragmaticist Norman Fairclough has observed, the pragmatic perspective being a critical one, it examines and states "the conditions under which interactions of a particular type may occur" (Fairclough, 1995: 48) – interactions that include speech acting, conversational interaction, language use in institutional settings, the discourse of literature, the prescribed language use in schools and other official surroundings, the language of sexual oppression and counter-oppression or emancipation, the fight for linguistic rights, and so on and so forth. Fairclough continues: "such a statement cannot be made without reference to the distribution and exercise [of power] in the institution and ultimately, in the social formation," that is, in society at large. (Fairclough, 1993: 48; Mey, 2001: 320–321). On the notion of perspective, see further Haberland and Mey (1977: 21), Verschueren (1999: 7), and Mey (2001: 9–11) (*see* **Power and Pragmatics; Critical Language Studies**).

See also: Adaptability in Human-Computer Interaction; Bakhtin, Mikhail Mikhailovich; Class Language;

Classroom Talk; Cognitive Technology; Cooperative Principle; Deixis and Anaphora: Pragmatic Approaches; Gender and Language; Intercultural Pragmatics and Communication; Linguistic Decolonialization; Linguistic Rights; Literary Pragmatics; Marxist Theories of Language; Maxims and Flouting; Minority Languages: Oppression; Phonetics and Pragmatics; Pragmatic Acts; Pragmatic Presupposition; Pragmatics and Semantics; Pragmatics: Linguistic Imperialism; Relevance Theory; Social Aspects of Pragmatics; Speech Acts; Speech Acts and Grammar; Speech Acts, Classification and Definition; Voloshinov, Valentin Nikolaevich.

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Principles and Rules

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The concept of 'rule' and 'principle' is perhaps as venerable as the study of language practices. The view that one particular variety of language is inherently more valuable contributes to the formation of prescriptive rules in relation to grammar, vocabulary, and pronunciation. The 18th century witnessed the need to standardize, to codify English, whose uniformity was promoted in the interest of the newly created union (Crowley, 1996) and whose imposition throughout the British Isles became part of what Leith (1997: 151) calls "internal colonization". On the other hand, China at the turn of the 20th century experienced the need to break loose from the rules and conventions of classical Chinese as it tried to vernacularize its language as part of its modernization effort to create a new language of modernity and progress (Gunn, 1991).

In contemporary linguistics the term 'rule' assumes a new meaning, one that should not be confused with prescriptive rules. According to Noam Chomsky (1957), the rules of language are syntactic and generative, because language is both rule governed and predictable. Chomsky further distinguished the rules of grammar from principles of grammar – the latter do not generate sentences, but act as a set of tests that a sentence must pass to be part of a given language (1986).

However, meaning often defies both predictability and testability, especially when it becomes extralinguistic, and when well-formedness transcends syntax. Instead of focusing on rules of grammar, be they prescriptive or generative, language philosophers and pragmatists focus on "the total speech act in the total speech situation" (Austin, 1962: 149), on rules that either regulate (preexisting) language behavior or create or define new forms of language behavior (Searle, 1969), and on pragmatic principles that can account for the use of language as determined by societal conditions (Mey, 2001). For example, Grice (1975, 1989) developed the cooperative principle, whereby anyone who has a rational interest in participating in talk exchange is expected to be cooperative, to make his or her contribution as required. The cooperative principle, which for Grice is assumed to be in force all the time, and which has been faulted because it elides interpersonal, intercultural power dynamics, subsumes the conversational maxims of quantity, quality, relation, and manner (Grice, 1989: 26). What has to be underscored is that we comply with the maxims as much by flouting them as by honoring them – hence we can mean more than or other than what we say.

Brown and Levinson (1987) turned their attention to politeness principles, proposing that there is a public-self image that we all want to claim and protect – one that consists of the want to be stroked (positive face) and the want to be left alone (negative face). These two competing wants and their concomitant claims for universality have spawned a large body of work on politeness pragmatics. Leech (1983) offered his own principle of politeness, which is predicated upon the notions of cost and benefit, and directness versus indirectness; he further offered a number of subprinciples to account for stylistic aspects of expression. And like Horn (1984), who tried to reduce Grice's conversational maxims, Sperber and Wilson (1995) contended that what is only required for the hearer to work out the speaker's intended message is the principle of relevance, because we humans turn our attention to what seems most relevant to us automatically.

While the formulation of pragmatic principles has greatly extended the scope of linguistics, pragmatic principles themselves do not equip language users with the means to reflect upon the conditions under which they use, or fail to use, language. Metapragmatic principles seek to promote metadiscursive awareness and to account for those underlying forces that, be they local or crosscultural, motivate or constitute particular pragmatic principles (Mey, 2001). This kind of self-reflectiveness becomes central to cultivating critical language awareness, to facilitating an emancipatory use of language (Fairclough, 1989), and to forever asking ourselves: "Whose language are we using?" (Mey, 1985).

See also: Austin, John L.; Cooperative Principle; Critical Discourse Analysis; Grice, Herbert Paul; Maxims and Flouting; Metapragmatics; Politeness; Relevance Theory.

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Proxemics

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Introduction

An intrinsic feature of social contact rituals involves the maintenance of specific zones that people perceive as meaningful. The study of such zones now falls under the rubric of 'proxemics,' a word derived from the Latin *proximus* 'near' and the suffix -*emics*, in analogy with such terms as 'phonemics' and 'morphemics' in linguistics. The term thus betrays a connection to linguistic notions as the basis for studying and describing interpersonal zones, which involve knowing how close to stand to someone during social interaction on the basis of age, degree of familiarity, gender, etc.

Proxemics was founded by the American anthropologist Edward Twitchell Hall (1914–) in the late 1950s and early 1960s (1959, 1963a, 1963b) after his systematic study during World War II, when he served in the US Army in Europe and the Philippines, of the zones people maintain. Hall came to realize that failures in intercultural communication arose typically from unconsciously coded differences in the ways that members of different cultures perceived interpersonal distances and in the ways they acted within them. Hall developed proxemic methodology throughout the 1960s and 1970s (1959, 1963a, 1963b, 1964, 1966, 1968, 1974, 1976, 1983). Using American culture as his test case, he showed how it is possible to measure and assess critical interpersonal zones.

In 1963, Hall defined proxemics broadly as "the study of how man unconsciously structures microspace – the distance between men in conduct of daily transactions, the organization of space in his houses and buildings, and ultimately the layout of his towns" (Hall, 1963b: 1003). A year later, he limited its purview somewhat to "the study of the ways in which man gains knowledge of the content of other men's minds through judgments of behavior patterns associated with varying degrees of proximity to them" (Hall, 1964: 41), which he restricted further a few years later to the study of "the interrelated observations and theories of man's use of space as a specialized elaboration of culture" (Hall, 1966: 1).

Hall's proposal to study the distances people maintain between each other has led to a large body of data on this aspect of social behavior. Most of the data shows that interpersonal zones are measurable with statistical accuracy, varying predictably and systematically according to age, gender, and other social variables (e.g., Segaud, 1973; Loof, 1976; Pinxten *et al.*, 1983; and Watson and Anderson, 1987). Today, proxemics is a robust area of research pursued by all kinds of social scientists (Mehrabian, 1969, 1972, 1976; Sundstrom and Altman, 1976; Canter, 1977; Moles and Rohmer, 1978; Harper *et al.*, 1978; Argyle, 1988; Lawrence and Low, 1990; Niemeir *et al.*, 1998). Hall did not explicitly use semiotic notions to study proxemic behavior, but his whole outlook and framework are, *de facto*, semiotic in nature. The inclusion of proxemics as a branch of nonverbal semiotics started with Eco (1968: 344–349) and Watson (1970, 1974).

The Proxemic Paradigm

The study of proxemic behavior consists of three general components (Hall, 1966; Watson, 1974): (1) spatial dimensions, (2) levels of interpretation of these dimensions, and (3) physical features of spaces. Each one consists of three subcomponents, called 'micro,' 'meso,' and 'macro.' 'Microspace' is the immediate physical environment constituting a sphere of privacy, 'mesospace' is the next zone that is within the person's reach but that falls outside the privacy sphere, and 'macrospace' refers to the larger social spheres, including settlements, cities, and beyond. The three levels of interpretation are called 'infra,' 'pre,' and 'micro.' The infra level is rooted in our 'biological past' (Hall, 1966: 95), involving our innate sense of territoriality as the guiding force in establishing boundaries. The pre level is rooted instead in inborn sensory (tactile, visual, etc.) perceptions of space that crystallize over time into culture-specific codings of space. Those are interpreted at a micro level. The three physical features are called 'fixed,' 'semi-fixed,' and 'dynamic.' Fixed features include such things as walls and territorial boundaries, semi-fixed features are mobile elements such as curtains and screens, and dynamic features are those such as vehicles that can vary in certain spaces.

Territoriality

Animals reside in territories that they have appropriated as their own, or in some negotiated arrangement with other animals, so that they can procure shelter, alimentation, and habitation. This applies to humans as well. But, unlike other species, humans also manifest a compulsion to ascribe social meanings to the territories in which they are located as groups.

Biologists define 'territoriality' as: (1) an innate survival mechanism that allows an animal to gain access to, and defend control of, critical resources such as food and nesting sites that are found in certain habitats, and (2) the instinctive need of an animal to procure a safe boundary around itself. The Austrian zoologist Konrad Lorenz (1903–1989) was among the first scientists to identify and document the patterns animals display in marking territoriality. Such patterns, he proposed, were an important part of an animal's repertory of survival strategies, as critical in evolutionary terms as its physiological endowments. Lorenz also suggested that human aggression and warfare were explainable as residual territoriality impulses – a controversial theory that gained widespread popularity through a best-selling book written in 1966 by Robert Ardrey, generating a heated debate in academia and society at large on the nature and origin of human aggression. The notion of territoriality in human life continues to receive much support because of its intuitive appeal – intrusions into appropriated territories (e.g., into one's home, car, etc.) are indeed perceived typically as signals of aggression, in the same way that a cat, for example, would likely react aggressively to another cat intruding upon the boundaries it has claimed by urination.

The main implication to be derived from the work on territoriality is the fact that we all need to maintain a boundary around ourselves for our protection and sanity. Hall was among the first to see the relevant social implications of this, and thus to investigate the proxemic patterns people establish and maintain between each other when interacting. He noted that these could be measured very accurately, allowing for predictable statistical variation, and that the dimensions varied from culture to culture. In North American culture, Hall found that a distance of under six inches between two people was perceived as an 'intimate' distance; while a distance at from 1.5 to 4 feet was the minimum one perceived to be a safe distance. Intruding upon the limits set by this boundary causes considerable discomfort. For example, if a stranger were to talk at a distance of only several inches away from someone, he or she would be considered rude or even aggressive. If the 'safe' distance were breached by some acquaintance, on the other hand, it would be interpreted as a sexual advance.

Factors

Once the levels and features are determined, Hall posits eight factors as significant in proxemic behavior. These are:

1. Postural-sex identifiers (standing vs. sitting, male vs. female)
2. Sociofugal-sociopetal orientation factors (face-to-face, back-to-back)
3. Kinesthetic factors (distances of body parts, from reaching to contact)
4. Touching factors (from caressing and holding to no contact)
5. Visual factors (gazing, looking away, looking directly into the eyes)
6. Thermal factors (whether radiated heat is detected or not)
7. Olfaction factors (detection of odor or breath)
8. Vocal factors (loudness of voice, tone of voice).

As in linguistics, the idea of scientifically studying interpersonal zones involves two levels: (1) the actual physical description of the factors used *in situ*, known as 'proxetic' description (in analogy with 'phonetic'

description), and (2) the analysis of how these relate to each other structurally, known as 'proxemic' analysis (in analogy with 'phonemic' analysis). The relevant 'proxemes' are determined by comparing them and contrasting them to each other within the broader framework of an interaction.

Interpersonal Zones

Overall, Hall found that there are four main types of zones: 'intimate,' 'personal,' 'social,' and 'public.' Hall further subdivided these into 'far' and 'close' phases. For American culture, he found these to be as follows: (1) intimate distance (0 in.–18 in.), (2) personal distance (1.5 ft.–4 ft.), (3) social distance (4 ft.–12 ft.), and (4) public distance (12 ft. and beyond).

At intimate distance, all the senses are activated and the presence of the other person or persons is unmistakable. The close phase (0 in.–6 in.) is an emotionally charged zone reserved for love-making, comforting, and protecting; the far phase (6 in.–18 in.) is the zone in which family members and close friends interact. Touch is frequent at both phases of intimate distance. Personal distance is the minimum comfortable distance between non-touching individuals. In the close phase (1.5 ft.–2.5 ft.), one can grasp the other by extending the arms. The far phase (2.5 ft.–4 ft.) is defined as anywhere from one arm's length to the distance required for both individuals to touch hands. Beyond this distance the two must move to make contact (e.g., to shake hands). In essence, this zone constitutes a small protective space. Social distance is considered non-involving and non-threatening by most individuals. The close phase (4 ft.–7 ft.) is typical of impersonal transactions and casual social gatherings. Formal social discourse and transactions are characteristic of the far phase (7 ft.–12 ft.). This is the minimum distance at which one could go about one's business without seeming rude to others. Public distance is the distance at which one can take either evasive or defensive action if physically threatened. Hall noticed that people tend to keep at this distance from important public figures or from anyone participating at a public function. Discourse at this distance tends to be highly structured and formalized (lectures, speeches, etc.).

Conclusion

Semiotically, zones are signs that are governed by 'body codes' that also regulate bodily orientation. If someone is standing up at the front of an audience, he or she is perceived as more important than those sitting down. Speeches, lectures, classes, musical performances, etc. are oriented in this way. Officials,

managers, directors, etc. sit behind a desk to convey importance and superiority. Only their superiors can walk behind the desk to talk to them. To show 'friendliness,' the person behind the desk will have to come out and sit with his or her interlocutor in a different part of the room.

The study of such proxemic behavior has made it obvious that physical environments and the features within them are perceived as signifying structures. This is the reason why proxemics is now considered to be largely a branch or subfield of semiotics and is included in basic textbooks in the field (e.g., Nöth, 1990; Danesi and Perron, 1999).

See also: Communication: Semiotic Approaches.

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Psycholinguistics: History

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Our faculty for language has intrigued scholars for centuries. Yet most textbooks assume that psycholinguistics has its origins in the late 1950s and 1960s, and that nothing of note contributed to its evolution before then. In some respects this is true, in that it was only then that psycholinguistics began to proliferate as an identifiable discipline within the psychology literature. This proliferation was marked by the founding in 1962 of the *Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior* (which subsequently, in 1985, became the *Journal of Memory and Language*). Why the original journal was so titled, and why its title presents us with a historical paradox, will become clearer as this review unfolds. The review's purpose is to consider how the present-day state of the art evolved. In so doing, it will touch briefly on ancient Greek philosophy, 19th century neuroscience, 20th century psycholinguistics, and beyond. It will consider approaches to the brain as practiced in both ancient Egypt and modern neuroscience. It will be necessarily selective, in order to make some sense of the historical developments that contributed to psycholinguistic science.

From the Ancient Egyptians to the Greek Philosophers

The earliest to write about language and the brain were the ancient Egyptians – the first to write about anything at all. A catalog of the effects of head injury (and injuries lower down the body also) exists in what is now referred to as the Edwin Smith Surgical Papyrus, written about 1700 B.C. The writer (believed to have collected together information spanning perhaps another 1000 years before) referred there to what is presumed to be the first recorded case of aphasia – language breakdown following brain trauma. However, the Egyptians did not accord much significance to the brain, which unlike the other organs of the body, was discarded during mummification (it was scraped out through the nose). They believed instead that the heart was the seat of the soul and the repository for memory, a view largely shared by the Greek philosopher Aristotle (384–322 B.C.) – a somewhat surprising position to take given that he was a student at Plato's Academy and that Plato (427–347 B.C.) believed the brain to be the seat of intelligence.

Plato was possibly the earliest to write at length on language (where others may have spoken, but not written). Certainly, his writings were the most influential with respect to the philosophy of language and the question 'what does a word mean?' Plato, in his *Republic*, considered the meaning of words in his Allegory of the Cave (as well as in *Cratylus*). In this allegory, a group of prisoners have been chained all their lives within a cave. All they see are the shadows of objects cast upon a wall by the flames of a fire. They experience only those shadows (in much the same way that we can only experience the results of our sensory percepts), and their language similarly describes only those shadows. Plato noted that when using a word, the prisoners would take it to refer to the shadows before them, when in fact (according to Plato), they would refer not to objects in the shadow

world, but (unbeknown to the prisoners) to objects in the real world. Thus, for Plato (and a host of more contemporary philosophers, from Frege to Puttnam), the true meaning of a word – its reference – is external to the person who, by using the word, is attributing meaning to it. But why should it matter what a word refers to?

The *psycholinguistic* endeavor is to uncover the mental processes that are implicated in the acquisition, production, and comprehension of language. Just as psychology is the study of the control of behavior, so psycholinguistics is the study of the control of linguistic behavior. A part of any psycholinguistic theory of mental process is an account of what constitutes the input to the mental process – that is, what information is operated upon by those processes. While Plato was of course correct that the form of the real-world object dictates the form of the sensory image presented to the allegorical prisoner, the mental processes involved in that prisoner's use of language can operate only on mental derivatives of that sensory image. There may be properties of the real-world object (such as color, texture, and density) that are not represented in their shadow-forms, and thus mental processes that might otherwise (outside the cave) develop sensitivity to those properties need never develop such sensitivities if constrained to living a life inside the cave. But while the shadows would not permit the distinction between, say, a tennis ball and an orange, the *contexts* in which the shadows were experienced, or their names heard, *would* distinguish between the two – mental sensitivities would develop, but they would not necessarily be grounded in the perceptual domain. These distinctions, between the actual world and our *experience* of the world, and between an object or word and the *context* in which that object or word might occur, led other philosophers, most notably Wittgenstein in his *Philosophical Investigations*, to propose that the meaning of a word is knowledge of its use in the language – that is, knowledge of the contexts in which it would be appropriate to utter that word, where such knowledge is shaped by experience. We return to this theme when we consider in more detail the more recent history (and possible future) of psycholinguistics.

The Earliest Empirical Studies

The pre-history of psycholinguistics (up until the 19th century) was dominated by philosophical conjecture. The term *dominated* is used loosely here, as there was no *systematic* and ongoing questioning of the relationship between mind and language, or indeed, brain and language – there was no *community* of researchers asking the questions. But modern-day

psycholinguistics is dominated not by philosophy (although it had its moments), but by experimental investigations that measure reaction times, monitor eye movements, record babies' babbles, and so on. Its pre-history lacks such experimentation. This is not to say that no experiments were performed. Certainly, there were isolated cases, generally of a kind that would not be tolerated in the modern age. Indeed, one of the most widely replicated studies (if one is to believe the historians) is a study that was carried out on at least three and possibly four independent occasions between the 7th Century B.C. and the 16th Century A.D. In each case, some number of babies were apparently brought up in isolation (except for carers who were either mute, or instructed not to speak), with the aim of the experiment being to discover what language, if any, the children would grow up speaking. The results varied. The Egyptian Pharaoh Psamtik (7th C.B.C.) was credited by Herodotus with discovering that they spoke Phrygian. The Roman emperor and German king Frederick II (1194–1250 A.D.) carried out a similar study, but all the infants died. King James IV (1473–1513 A.D.) is supposed to have performed a similar experiment on the island of InchKeith, although it is likely that this study never in fact took place (the fact that the children are reported to have emerged from their isolation speaking Hebrew is one reason to doubt the truth of the story). And finally, Akbar the Great (1542–1605), the grandfather of Shah Jahan who built the Taj Mahal, similarly failed to discover man's 'natural language' (although there is some suggestion that in this case, the infants acquired a form of signed language inherited, in part, from the infants' carers).

The 19th Century Emergence of the Cognitive Neuropsychology of Language

The first *systematic* studies of the relationship between language and brain were conducted in the 19th century. This is probably the earliest point in the history of psycholinguistics from when a *progression* of studies can be traced, with one author building a case on the basis of earlier studies coupled with newer data. The protagonists at this time were Gall, Boulliard, Aubertin, Broca, Wernicke, and Lichtheim, to name a few. None of them would be described as 'psycholinguists,' but to the extent that their work (like modern-day *cognitive neuroscientists*) informed accounts of the relationship between brain and language, they are no less a part of the history of psycholinguistics than are the linguists, philosophers, psychologists, and cognitive scientists who have influenced the field through their own, sometimes radically different, perspectives.

Franz Gall is perhaps better known for his work on phrenology, but he believed that language function was localized in the anterior parts of the brain. His student Jean Boulliard collected clinical evidence in support of Gall's theory, and in turn, Boulliard's student Ernest Aubertin did the same. It was at a meeting in April of 1861 that Aubertin made his beliefs plain: If a case of speech loss could be found that was not accompanied by a frontal lesion, he would give up his (and his intellectual forbearers') belief in the localization of language. In the audience was Paul Broca, after whom are named Broca's aphasia and, within the left frontal lobe, Broca's area. Broca was struck by Aubertin's empirical challenge, but at the same time realized that craniology (Gall's lasting influence on his students) could not provide the proof that was required to establish a link between language loss and cerebral localization – only anatomical inspection of the brain could do that. Coincidentally, within a few days he was presented with a patient suffering from speech loss who died a few days after that. Broca's postmortem analysis of this patient's brain (and the damage to what is now referred to as Broca's area), coupled with earlier observations made by Marc Dax (on right hemiplegia and its correlation with speech loss), but published at the same time, established the anatomical validity of the localization hypothesis. About 10 years later (in 1874), Carl Wernicke published his work on 'sensory aphasia' (deficits in the comprehension of language). This work was considerably enhanced by Wernicke's student Ludwig Lichtheim who, in 1885, produced a schematic (cf. a 'model') of how three interlinked centers in the brain are implicated in aphasia: Broca's (the 'center of auditory images'), Wernicke's (the 'center of motor images'), and a diffusely located 'concept center.' Lesions to each of these areas, or to the connections between them, produce different kinds of aphasias. Most interesting of all, his schematic enabled him to predict disorders that had not yet been described. This ability of a conceptual 'model' to make as yet untested predictions is a theme we shall return to.

The Early 20th Century Influence of Behaviorism

By the end of the 19th century, the study of language began to change, as did the study of psychology more generally. Interest in the psychology (as opposed to *philosophy*) of language shifted from being primarily (or even solely) concerned with its breakdown to being concerned also with its normal use. Wilhelm Wundt in *Die Sprache* (published in 1900) stressed the importance of mental states and the relationship between utterances and those internal states. William James similarly (at least early on) saw the advantages of introducing mental states into theories of language use (see his 1890 *Principles of Psychology*, in which several contemporary issues in psycholinguistics are foreshadowed). But the early 20th century was a turbulent time for psycholinguistics (as it was for psychology): J. B. Watson argued that psychology should be concerned with behavior and behavioral observation, rather than with consciousness and introspection (the Wundtian approach). And whereas Wundt had argued that a psychology of language was as much about the mind as it was about language, behaviorists such as J. R. Kantor argued against the idea that language use implicated distinct mental states. For Kantor, the German mentalist tradition started by Wundt was simply wrong. Even William James turned away from Wundtian psychology. Thus, the behaviorist tradition took hold.

The late 19th and early 20th centuries were a time of great change in linguistics, too. The 19th century had seen the emergence of the Neogrammarians, a group that studied language *change*. They were interested in how the sounds of different languages were related, and how within a language, the sounds changed over time. They were less interested in what a language 'looked like' at a particular moment in time. This changed at the beginning of the 20th century when Ferdinand de Saussure brought *structure* into the study of language. He introduced the idea that every element of language could be understood through its relation to the other elements (he introduced *syntactic* distinctions that are still central to contemporary linguistics). In the 1930s, the Bloomfieldian school of linguistics was born, with the publication in 1933 of Leonard Bloomfield's *Language*. Bloomfield reduced the study of language structures to a laborious set of taxonomic procedures, starting with the smallest element of language – the *phoneme*. In doing so, Bloomfield firmly aligned the linguistics of the day with behaviorism. And just as behaviorism eschewed mental states in its study of psychology, so the Bloomfieldian tradition eschewed psychology in its study of language. The study of language was firmly caught between the proverbial rock and a hard place – between behaviorism on the one hand and taxonomy on the other. Mental states were, the argument went, irrelevant – whether with respect to psychological or linguistic inquiry.

The behaviorist tradition culminated (with respect to language) with B. F. Skinner's publication in 1957 of *Verbal Behavior*. Here, Skinner sought to apply behaviorist principles to verbal learning and verbal behavior, attempting to explain them in terms of conditioning theory. Verbal behavior (and *Verbal Behavior*) proved

to be the final battleground on which the classical behaviorists and the mentalists would clash.

The Mid-20th Century and the Chomskyan Influence

In 1959, Chomsky published a review of Skinner's *Verbal Behavior*. He argued that no amount of conditioned stimulus-response associations could explain the infinite productivity or systematicity of language. With Chomsky, out went Bloomfield, and in came mental structures, ripe for theoretical and empirical investigation. Chomsky reintroduced the mind, and specifically mental representation, into theories of language (although his beliefs did not amount to a theory of psychological process, but to an account of linguistic structure). So whereas Skinner ostensibly eschewed mental representations, Chomsky apparently proved that language was founded on precisely such representation. Some later commentators took the view that the Chomskyan revolution threw out the associationist baby with the behaviorist bathwater. Behaviorism was founded on associationism. Behaviorism was 'out,' and with it, associationism. Symbolic computation was 'in,' but with it, uncertainty over how the symbolic system was acquired. It was not until the mid-1980s that a new kind of revolution took place, in which the associationist baby, now grown up, was brought back into the fold. The intervening 20 years were typical teenage years – full of energy, punctuated by occasional false hopes that nonetheless proved essential to the maturation process.

Two years before his review of *Verbal Behavior*, Chomsky had published *Syntactic Structures*, a monograph devoted to exploring the notion of abstract grammatical rules as the basis for generating sentential structure. According to Blumenthal in his 1970 account of the history of psycholinguistics, Chomsky's departure from the Bloomfieldian school was too radical for an American publisher to want to publish a lengthy volume that Chomsky had written outlining the new approach, and only Mouton, a European publisher (and presumably more sympathetic to the tradition that Chomsky was advocating) would publish a shorter monograph based on an undergraduate lecture series he taught at MIT. In fact, this is not quite accurate (N. Chomsky, personal communication); Chomsky had indeed written a longer volume (subsequently published in 1975), and it is true that initial reactions to the manuscript were negative (but, according to Chomsky, not unreasonable), but *Syntactic Structures* was not a compromise brought about through Chomsky's search for a publisher; he had not, in fact, intended to publish it.

Instead, Cornelis van Schooneveld, a Dutch linguist and acquaintance of Chomsky's who was visiting MIT and happened to edit a series for Mouton, suggested that Chomsky write up his class notes and publish them. This he did, and modern linguistics was born. Psycholinguistics became caught up, almost immediately, in its wake.

Chomsky's influence on psycholinguistics cannot be overstated. He drew an important distinction between 'competence,' or the knowledge we have about a language, and 'performance,' the use of that language (a distinction that was reminiscent of Saussure's earlier distinction between *langue* and *parole*). Both, he claimed, arise through the workings of the human mind – a mind, which furthermore is innately enabled to learn the structures of human language (although not everyone agreed with the arguments for a language acquisition device akin to a mental organ – a concise summary of the counterarguments was written by Bates and Goodman (1999)). It is perhaps surprising that against the backdrop of *Syntactic Structures* and Chomsky's *Review of Skinner's Verbal Behavior*, a new and influential journal dedicated to research into the psychology of language should nonetheless, in 1962, give itself a title (the *Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior*) that firmly placed it in the behaviorist tradition.

From Linguistic Competence to Psychological Performance

Chomsky's theories of grammar were theories of competence, not performance. And yet, his work on *transformational grammar* initiated a considerable research effort in the early 1960s to validate the psychological status of syntactic processing (the construction of representations encoding the dependencies between the constituents of a sentence). Many of these studies attempted to show that perceptual complexity, as measured using a variety of different tasks, was related to linguistic complexity (the so-called Derivational Theory of Complexity). However, whereas the syntactic structures postulated by transformational grammar did have some psychological reality, the devices postulated for building those structures (e.g., the transformations that formed a part of the grammatical formalism) did not. It soon became apparent that the distinction between competence and performance was far more important than originally realized – the linguists' rules, which formed a theory of competence, did not make a theory of psychological process.

Subsequently, the emphasis shifted toward examination of the psychological, not linguistic,

mechanisms by which syntactic dependencies are determined (a process referred to as *parsing*). In a seminal paper published in 1970, Thomas Bever pointed out that in cases of ambiguity, when more than one structure (i.e., dependency relation) might be permissible, there appear to be consistent preferences for one interpretation rather than another. This consistency appeared to hold not only across different examples of the same kind of ambiguity, but across different people, too. Thus, despite the grammaticality of '*the horse raced past the barn fell*' (cf. '*the car driven past the garage crashed*'), the preference to interpret '*raced*' as a main verb (instead of as a past participle equivalent to '*driven*') is so overwhelming that the sentence is perceived as ungrammatical (and the preference is then said to induce a 'garden path' effect). Evidently, grammaticality and processability are distinct mental phenomena.

On the Influence of the Digital Computer

The 1970s saw enormous growth in psycholinguistics. Advances were made across a wide range of phenomena, including the identification of both printed and spoken words, the reading process, sentence comprehension (with much of the emphasis on the resolution of ambiguities of the 'garden path' kind), and the mental representation of texts. Whether there was a 'spurt' in the number of publications is contentious, because although there undeniably was such a spurt, the whole of psychology experienced the same rapid growth. It would be wrong, however, to attribute all this advancement to the influence of Chomsky. The demise of behaviorism played a part (and certainly Chomsky played a part in that demise), but so did the advent in the 1950s of the digital computer. The 'mind-as-computer' metaphor had a subtle but pervasive influence on both psycholinguistics and the study of *cognition* generally. Computer programs worked by breaking down complex behaviors into sequences of simpler, more manageable (and hence more understandable) behaviors. They relied on *symbol manipulation* and the control of *information flow*. They distinguished between different levels of explanatory abstraction (the high-level programming language, the assembly code, and the flow of electrical currents around the hardware). And perhaps most important of all to the empirical psychologist, they enabled novel predictions to be made that might not otherwise have been foreseen had the 'model' not been implemented in full; complex interactions among the components of a program were not easy to foresee.

The influences of the digital computing revolution were felt in different ways. Some were direct, with researchers building computer simulations of mental behavior (in the growing field of *Artificial Intelligence*, several language 'understanding' programs were written, some of which are still relevant 35 years later – e.g., Terry Winograd's SHRDLU program written in 1968–1970). Other influences were indirect, coming to psycholinguistics via philosophy. One such example was Jerry Fodor's Modularity of Mind hypothesis (from 1983). One simplified interpretation of this hypothesis (it was interpreted in different ways by different researchers) was that there are two alternative ways of theorizing about the mind: one is to assume it is incredibly complex and that multiple sources of information interact in multiple ways, and the other is to assume that it can be broken down into a number of modules, each of which performs some particular function and is 'blind' to the workings of the other modules (perhaps taking as input the output of one or more of those other modules). Fodor argued that certain aspects of cognition were modular (the input systems), and certain others were not (central processes). This hypothesis had considerable influence in psycholinguistics, and for a time (the mid-1980s to early 1990s), hypotheses were evaluated according to whether they were modular or not. There seemed little agreement, however, on where one drew the boundaries (for example, was spoken language recognition a part of an input system? If it was, how could 'higher-level' knowledge of the context in which the language was being interpreted influence the modular and encapsulated recognition process? – Some argued it could not, while others argued it could). It was about this time, in seeming opposition to the trend toward *symbolic computation*, that a new computationally motivated approach to cognition emerged in the mid 1980s, apparently eschewing symbolic computation *and* modularity.

The Late 20th Century Emergence of Connectionism: Statistical Approaches to Language

In 1986, David Rumelhart and Jay McClelland published *Parallel Distributed Processing*. This edited volume described a range of *connectionist*, or *neural network*, models of learning and cognition, and marked a 'coming of age' for connectionism. It was, for many researchers in psycholinguistics, their first introduction to a wide range of research in this emerging field. Of particular interest were the facts that 'knowledge' in connectionist networks is encoded as patterns of connectivity distributed across the neural-like units, and 'processing' is manifest as spreading patterns of activation. These networks can learn complex associative relations largely on the basis of

simple associative learning principles (based primarily on work published in 1949 by Donald Hebb, a student of Lashley's). Various algorithms exist to set the 'strengths' of the connections between the units automatically, so that a given input pattern of activation across some set of units will spread through the network and yield a desired output pattern across some other set of units. Indeed, multiple input-output pairings can be learned by the same network. Importantly, and in contrast to the ideals of the behaviorist traditions, neural networks can develop internal representations.

Several connectionist models had profound effects on developments in psycholinguistics. TRACE, for example, developed by McClelland and Jeff Elman in the 1980s, was a model of spoken word recognition that formed the focus of empirical research for a good 20 years after its inception. But TRACE did not learn anything – it was hardwired. An extremely influential model that *did* learn by itself was described by Elman (1990), who showed how a particular kind of network could learn the dependencies that constrain the sequential ordering of elements (e.g., phonemes or words) through time. In effect, it learned which kinds of word could follow which other kinds of word (hence, it was a *statistical model*, because it encoded the statistics of the language it was trained upon). Interestingly, it developed internal representations that appeared to resemble grammatical knowledge; words that occurred in similar sentential contexts came to evoke similar internal representations (that is, internal patterns of activity when the word was presented to the network) – and because words of the same grammatical category tend to occur in the same sentential contexts, different 'clusters' of words emerged, with each cluster representing a different category of word.

Not surprisingly, the entire connectionist enterprise came under intense critical scrutiny from the linguistics and philosophy communities, not least because it appeared to reduce language to a system of statistical patterns, was fundamentally associationist, nonmodular, and eschewed the explicit manipulation of symbolic structures (because the internal representations that emerged as a result of the learning process were not symbolic in the traditional sense). Within the context of the symbolic-connectionist debate there developed what became perhaps one of the longest surviving disputes in contemporary psycholinguistics; between those that believe that word formation (e.g., the formation of 'walked' from 'walk,' 'ran' from 'run,' and 'went' from 'go') is driven by knowledge of *rules* and *exceptions* to those rules, and those who believe it is driven by *statistical regularity* (which can apparently capture, in the right model, both the

regularly and irregularly formed words). The debate shows little sign of abating, even 20 years later.

Critics notwithstanding, statistical approaches to language (both with respect to its structure and its mental processing) are becoming more prevalent, with application to issues as diverse as the 'discovery' of words through the segmentation of the speech input, the emergence of grammatical categories, and even the emergence of meaning as a consequence of statistical dependencies between a word and its context (cf. Wittgenstein's views on the meaning of words). Empirically also, the statistical approach has led to investigation of issues ranging from infants' abilities to segment speech and to induce grammar-like rules to adult sentence processing. The reason that such approaches have proved so appealing is that statistics are agnostic as to the nature of the real-world objects over which the statistics are calculated – thus, the fundamentally same algorithm can be applied to sequences of phonemes, words, or sentences. Their implementation within a neural network is similarly agnostic – the same network and the same algorithms that enable that network to induce the appropriate statistics can be applied to many different domains. Connectionism opened up experience-based learning to a range of psychological domains, not just the linguistic domains. And experience-based learning was attractive not least because it required fewer assumptions about the existence of innately specified domain-specific faculties (and in a multi-authored volume published in 1996, Jeff Elman teamed up with a variety of developmental psychologists to argue that connectionism was attractive precisely because it enabled a new perspective on how innate constraints on learning and neural structure might be an important component of human language acquisition (Elman, 1996)).

Neural networks can be criticized for being (among other things) too unconstrained – they can, in principle, do more than might be humanly possible – but the opposite criticism, that they are too small and do not necessarily 'scale up' is another criticism that is often heard. Neural networks as currently implemented are just the 'medium' on which are offered up the statistics. To misuse a common adage, the proof will be in the pudding, not in the plate that serves it up. There is little doubt, from the historical perspective, that although the emergence of connectionism has offered a powerful theoretical tool, its emergence has also polarized sections of the psycholinguistic community, between 'connectionists' on the one hand, and 'symbolists' on the other. This polarization is not unique to psycholinguistics, however, but pervades the study of cognition more broadly. And as if to further muddy the theoretical waters, the beginning

of the 21st century has seen renewed interest in yet another (no less controversial) paradigm – one that grounds language (and cognition) in action.

The Early 21st Century and the Grounding of Language in Action and the Brain

Traditional theories in cognition suppose that the job of the perceptual system is to deliver to the cognitive system a representation of the external world. The job of the cognitive system is then to reconstruct, mentally, that external world. This reconstruction subsequently forms the basis for 'commands' sent to, for example, the motor system. Cognition thus mediates between perception and action. An alternative approach, termed 'embodied cognition,' is that cognition and action are encoded within the same representational medium. Cognition is thus rooted in the same motoric and sensory representations that support interaction with the external world. Or, put another way, cognition is grounded in the same neural substrates that support sensory-motoric interaction with the external world. One consequence of this view is that language, a component of cognition, should, like the other components of cognition, be studied in the context of (i) the interactions it causes between the hearer and the world, and (ii) the neural substrates that support those interactions. Coincidentally, the 1990s saw a boom in research into the neural substrate of language, in part due to the increased availability of neuroimaging technologies (predominantly *PET* and *fMRI,* with *EEG* and more recently *MEG* also proving influential). It also saw increased research into the relationship between language and action. Taken together, these two streams of research provided increasing evidence for embodied cognition.

With respect to imaging, a variety of studies demonstrated what Lichtheim had alluded to a century earlier – that concepts are not represented in some discrete location within the brain, but are distributed across different regions. For example, words whose meanings implicate tool use (e.g., 'hammer') activate regions of the brain responsible for controlling motoric action (during the use of the tool) and other regions involved in the recognition of object form (during perception of the tool). Color words (e.g., 'yellow') and words referring to non-manipulable artefacts (e.g., 'house') do not activate motoric areas to the same extent, but they do activate regions close to those implicated in form perception and, for color words, color perception. Importantly, there is no single region that is primarily active; rather, words and concepts activate complex patterns of activity that are distributed and overlapping within different parts of the brain that are known to have (other) motoric and sensory functions. The meanings of (at least some) words do appear, then, to be grounded in those neural substrates that support sensory-motoric interaction.

About the same time that increased attention was focusing on neuroimaging, new techniques for studying language and its effects on *action* were also being developed. One of these involved the monitoring of eye movements as participants listened to commands to manipulate objects in front of them, or as they listened to descriptions of events that might unfold within the scene before them (one can view language-mediated eye movements as central to the relationship between language and action, because eye movements signal overt shifts in attention, and because attention to something necessarily precedes (deliberate) action upon it). It was found that eye movements were closely synchronized with processes implicated in both spoken word recognition and sentence processing, and that much could be gleaned about what kinds of information were recruited at what point during a word or sentence in order to interpret the unfolding language with respect to the scene in front of the participant (it is not without some irony that in L. N. Fowler's famous Phrenology bust, from about 1865, the faculty for language is located just below the left eye). Another technique involved measuring motoric responses to different kinds of linguistic stimuli – for example, words or sentences referring to movements toward or away from the body were found to interfere with responses in a judgment task (e.g., 'does this sentence make sense?') that involved moving a finger toward or away from a response button. A range of studies, some involving TMS (Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation – a method for either temporarily stimulating or suppressing a part of the brain, such as parts of motor cortex) have confirmed this motoric component to language comprehension.

It is noteworthy, with respect to the embodiment approach to cognition, that some of its basic tenets have been around since the earliest days of (contemporary) psycholinguistics. Winograd's SHRDLU program, for example, viewed the meaning of a word such as 'place' or 'lift' as that part of the program that caused placing or lifting – language comprehension within that program was grounded in sensory-motoric representation – and as such, SHRDLU followed in the Wittgensteinian tradition of treating meaning as use. Similarly, it is noteworthy that although most of the neuroimaging of language has been carried out independently of theories of embodied cognition, much of the work converges on the same theme – that aspects of language are represented in the same

representational substrates that control our sensory-motoric interactions with the external world.

Epilogue

And that, broadly speaking, is where the field is now. In the space available, it is impossible to document all the trends that have influenced contemporary psycholinguistics, and which have influenced not just what kinds of language behavior we study (e.g., language breakdown, normal language use, ambiguity resolution, and so on), but also how we study those behaviors (through studying aphasis, neuroimaging, language-mediated eye movements, and so on). And we have still to see the full influences of connectionism, statistical learning, embodied cognition, and the neuroscience of language. What we can be sure of is that the boundaries between the study of language and the study of other aspects of cognition are wearing thinner (the eye movement research mentioned above is at the interface of language and vision, for example). No doubt there are already developments in 'neighboring' fields of study (e.g., the computational sciences and non-cognitive neurosciences) that will also have an impact, but have yet to emerge as quantifiable influences on psycholinguistics. For example, researchers are already using computational techniques coupled with detailed neuroanatomical research on the neural structure of the brain to attempt to understand the kinds of 'computation' that distinct parts of the brain may be capable of. Such research promises greater understanding of the brain's ability to learn, represent, and deploy language. And although the history of psycholinguistics is relevant to understanding where the field is today, perhaps of greater interest is where the field will be tomorrow.

Acknowledgments

This article is a substantially expanded version of a short, 1500-word section on the history of psycholinguistics that appeared as part of a broader review of issues in psycholinguistics (Altmann, 2001). The reader is referred to this paper for in-depth review of (some of) the topics that constitute the field of psycholinguistics. The author would like to thank the publishers of this article for donating his fee to the charity Médecins sans Frontières, and Silvia Gennari for advice on topics ranging from Plato to neuroimaging.

See also: Psycholinguistics: Overview.

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Psycholinguistics: Overview

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Emergence of Psycholinguistics in the Late 1950s and 1960s from the Chomskyan Revolution

Although the study of language has been part of psychology from its earliest years, including for example in the work of Wilhelm Wundt, the father of psychology, a distinct field of psycholinguistics emerged in the late 1950s largely in response to the impact of Chomsky. In the preceding decades, notably in the United States, psychology had been dominated by the behaviorist approach of researchers such as B. F. Skinner. They treated language as a form of verbal behavior, which, like all other behavior, they believed was governed by simple stimulus–response associations. Chomsky demonstrated the shortcomings of the behaviorist approach in explaining the productivity of language and its complexity, and his work, notably *Syntactic structures* (1957), provided a major impetus for a new kind of psychological investigation of language. This was driven by an interest in the mental representation of language in general and syntactic structures in particular (*see* **Psycholinguistics: History**).

Psychology since the demise of behaviorism has again been concerned with understanding the way that people accomplish various information-processing tasks. In the field of psycholinguistics this means a concern with the cognitive processes by which a string of sounds in an utterance, or marks on a page, are processed to identify individual words and sentences, and how this emerging structure becomes mentally represented as a meaningful concept. The goal of this process is to derive models that account for how people achieve this so rapidly and successfully, given what we know about the general limitations of human cognitive processing. To oversimplify: the psychologist is concerned with **how** the linguistic units are processed and represented; the linguist is concerned with the description of the structures that emerge from any such processes.

Research Topics in the Early Years of Psycholinguistics

In its early years psycholinguistics reflected the concerns of linguistics and the central role of syntax. Psychologists such as Miller and Isard (1963) showed that the syntax influences the way people interpret sentences, and even how many words people can remember from a string of words that make no sense. More words are remembered from a 'sentence' like 'Accidents carry honey between the house' than from strings with no syntactic structure such as 'On trains hive elephants the simplify.' The focus on syntax and its importance in language processing led many psycholinguists to try to test the psychological reality of Chomsky's theory of generative grammar. Experiments were designed to explore the notion that when people process sentences, what they are doing is retrieving the deep syntactic structure as described in Chomsky's transformational grammar. So initially, a number of studies seemed to show that the relative ease or difficulty with which a reader or listener could process a given sentence was directly related to its syntactic complexity. Chomsky's kernel sentences, equivalent to active affirmative declarative sentences, were recalled most easily and processed most quickly, while sentences including one or more transformations such as negative or passive forms were more difficult to process. These kinds of study led to the so-called derivational theory of complexity. This was superseded as it became clear that the results of many of the studies that apparently provided support for this purely syntactic view of how people process sentences could also be accounted for by the influence of semantic factors. Although sentence processing remains one of the most significant topics in psycholinguistics, the range of language phenomena that are studied has broadened considerably since the early 1960s. The assumption that the role of psycholinguistics is to demonstrate the psychological validity of any particular syntactic theory has also been overtaken.

Models of Sentence Comprehension

Many of the models of sentence comprehension that have been developed in psycholinguistics try to elucidate the cognitive processes that are involved when a reader or listener interprets a sentence. There is considerable experimental evidence that sentence comprehension is incremental, that is, that an interpretation is built up on a moment-by-moment basis from the incoming linguistic information. The evidence for this incremental processing is particularly striking in the way listeners recognize spoken words (see below), which are often identified before all the acoustic information has been heard.

Even in written language processing we have clear signs of the incremental nature of linguistic processing. This is illustrated by the difficulties most readers have with sentences like the following: 'The horse raced past the barn fell' (Bever, 1970). This is known

as a garden path sentence, because nearly all readers interpret this **while** they are reading, with 'raced' as an active verb and so expect the sentence to end after 'barn.' They do not realize that the sentence could have an equivalent interpretation to 'The horse that raced past the barn, fell.' The incremental way that sentences seem to be interpreted by readers or listeners is a major source of potential ambiguities of interpretation. Many sentences in a language have potentially more than one interpretation as they are processed, yet the reader or listener is usually not aware of any problem in arriving at one clear interpretation of a sentence.

The cognitive architecture that underpins such an achievement has been a source of much debate in psycholinguistics. Some researchers have held that in the frequent cases where more than one analysis of a sentence is possible, the reader or listener computes all possible analyses in parallel. The difficulty of garden path sentences has led others to propose serial models, where it is assumed that a single analysis is computed and corrected later if this is needed. Models have been proposed to account for the empirical evidence on sentence-processing difficulties. These often involve various versions of parallel analyses, where candidate analyses are only active for a brief period of time or are ranked according to frequency in the language or plausibility with the context. One of the most influential of these accounts is the constraint-based model of MacDonald *et al.* (1994). The weightings attached to each candidate analysis are based on the frequency of a syntactic structure in the language, the plausibility of the words in the sentence to their assigned syntactic roles, etc. So this model is an example of an interactive model where many different sorts of information, syntactic, semantic, pragmatic, contextual, and frequency, can all play simultaneous roles by activating alternative interpretations of the incoming linguistic information. In models of this type, semantic factors can override syntactic processing biases. This model is attractive to psychologists for a number of reasons. It is amenable to modeling by connectionist approaches and it avoids the problem of having to base cognitive processes on syntactic rules, which for psychologists appear to change arbitrarily with changes in linguistic theories.

In contrast, one of the other most influential models of sentence processing is the garden path model (Frazier, 1979). This uses only syntactic principles in its initial stage. An analysis is computed based on two syntactic preferences, the most important being the principle of minimal attachment, the other being the principle of late closure. The first principle means that the parsing of the sentence that produces the simplest parse tree, with fewest nodes, takes precedence. So a sentence like 'Mary watched the man with the binoculars' is usually interpreted to mean that Mary (not the man) was using binoculars. According to Frazier's interpretation of phrase structure rules, this interpretation involves one node fewer than the alternative and so demonstrates the principle of minimal attachment in action. This principle takes precedence over the principle of late closure. This is the preference to attach incoming materials to the current phrase or clause. This latter principle is used to explain the preference for interpreting sentences like 'John said he will leave this morning' to mean that the phrase 'this morning' relates to the verb 'leave,' not the verb 'said.'

As part of the ongoing debate about the adequacy of different models of the parsing process there has been an active discussion in the experimental literature over several years about the extent to which semantic factors can override or guide the analysis of syntactic structure. This has been explored in several studies focusing on the ease or difficulty with which sentences containing reduced relative clauses can be processed. Several studies have tested how people interpret sets of sentences like the following:

(1a) The defendant examined by the lawyer turned out to be unreliable.
(1b) The defendant that was examined by the lawyer turned out to be unreliable.

(2a) The evidence examined by the lawyer turned out to be unreliable.
(2b) The evidence that was examined by the lawyer turned out to be unreliable.

Sentences like (1a), which contain a reduced relative clause, are more difficult to process than their equivalent full relative clause (1b). Readers initially treat 'examined' as a main verb whose subject is 'the defendant.' They then have to reanalyze this garden path when they reach the phrase 'by the lawyer.' The argument is the extent to which structurally similar sentences (e.g., [2a]) cause readers to have equivalent processing problems. This is what might be expected from a purely syntactic view of parsing. In contrast, in an interactive constraint-based model, the semantic implausibility of interpreting an inanimate noun such as 'evidence' as the subject of the verb 'examined' should protect the reader from the need to reanalyze an initial incorrect syntactic structure.

Trueswell *et al.* (1994) seemed to show just such a pattern. This was considered powerful evidence in support of interactive constraint-based models of sentence processing. More recently, Clifton *et al.* (2003) have challenged the evidence that semantic factors override syntactic processing in the initial stages of parsing. They used more sophisticated techniques for

monitoring and analyzing eye movements to determine the processing difficulties experienced by readers. They found that reduced relative clauses caused disruption to processing, irrespective of the semantic plausibility of the relationship between the apparent subject and main verb. Semantic factors, however, influenced how quickly the readers **recovered** from their wrong analysis of the syntax of the sentence. Clifton *et al.* (2003) stressed that the key thing for psycholinguistic models of sentence processing is not whether the data on processing reduced relative clauses support garden path or constraint-based models. They claim that the important goal is to develop parsing models that deal both with the task of creating structure and evaluating the structure that is created.

Although there have been numerous studies of sentence processing conducted by psycholinguists over the decades, the vast majority of these have focused on how readers interpret written sentences. A few studies have tackled the issue of how listeners use the cues in spoken language during parsing. Minimal attachment strategy can be shown to be overcome by the prosodic cues in real spoken sentences. Similarly, the principle of late closure, which can cause syntactic ambiguities in written sentences, can be less problematical in spoken materials because of clear prosodic cues to the intended interpretation. Even the apparent errors in spoken sentences, such as the disfluency 'uh,' can have an impact during the parsing process. Bailey and Ferreira (2003) presented sets of sentences to listeners such as the following:

(3a) Sandra bumped into the busboy and the uh uh waiter told her to be careful.
(3b) Sandra bumped into the busboy and the waiter uh uh told her to be careful.

These sentences are ambiguous up to the point when the listeners hear 'told.' 'Sandra' could have bumped into 'the busboy' or 'the busboy and the waiter.' Yet the listeners who heard the materials most often interpreted sentences like (3a) to mean that 'the waiter' was the subject of a new clause, i.e., that it was the subject of the verb 'told.' This shows that disfluencies can systematically influence the way listeners parse incoming sentences. The same effect was observed when the interruption was not a disfluency but an environmental sound such as a telephone ringing.

Speech Production and Speech Errors

These studies represent a welcome aspect of the broadening of the psycholinguistic research agenda to include more consideration to the production and comprehension of spoken as well as written language. The study of speech disfluencies is one part of this. Speech disfluencies encompass a range of phenomena, including pauses in speech such as silences, filled pauses, and fillers such as 'uh' and 'um,' as well as speech errors such as slips of the tongue, spoonerisms, and malapropisms. When we speak we aim to produce a grammatically well-formed utterance with no noticeable hesitations. Yet this ideal delivery cannot always be achieved. It is estimated that around 5% of words in speech are disfluent in some way. Yet these disfluencies are not random in their patterns of occurrence. Even the similar-sounding disfluencies 'uh' and 'um' have been shown to have systematic contexts of use. Speakers use 'uh' before a short delay in their speech production but use 'um' before a more significant delay. Speakers seem to become disfluent because they are experiencing some kind of problem in planning and producing their utterance. Speakers have been found to pause more before unpredictable words, suggesting they might be experiencing word-finding difficulties. Speakers also pause more at the start of an intonation unit, which suggests that pausing is related to the speech-planning process.

Speech errors have also been studied by psycholinguists, who have classified them according to the assumed units of processing and types of mechanism involved in their production. For example, speech errors can relate to the phonemic features of the word, the syllabic structure, or the phrase or sentence being produced. This is illustrated in one of the famous errors reportedly produced by Dr Spooner in the 19th century when rebuking one of his students: 'you have tasted the whole worm' when he presumably intended to say 'you have wasted the whole term.' Here the initial phonemes are swapped but the rest of the morphemic and syntactic structure of the target utterance is preserved. Errors of this type became known as 'spoonerisms' as a result.

The kinds of error that occur can tell us a good deal about how speech is produced. Speech errors are very varied. They can reflect many different linguistic levels. Errors can involve the sounds of the words involved, for example saying 'the lust list' for 'the lush list.' They can relate to the intended words in a phrase, 'the pin of a head' being said in place of 'the head of a pin.' Errors may also focus on the semantic relations of the intended words, so a speaker may produce 'I like berries with my fruit' rather than 'I like berries with my cereal,' among many other forms of errors.

Some types of errors, however, do not occur and these patterns of occurrence and nonoccurrence have been used to help understand the speech production process. Content and function words are not

substituted for one another and indeed substitute words are usually the same part of speech as the intended target word. When the wrong sound is produced, however, the substituted phoneme seems to have no grammatical relation with the intended target sound. The spacing between the errors is also informative for models of production. Errors of word substitution usually involve words that are a phrase apart. Yet sound errors seem to relate neighboring words. This sort of evidence has been used by several researchers to develop general models of the speech production process.

Speech Recognition

Psycholinguists have also been concerned with exploring the processes involved in speech perception. Jusczyk and Luce (2002) summarized over 50 years of research on this topic. They described key research issues in the domain as understanding invariance, constancy, and perceptual units. In speech there are no invariant acoustic features that map directly to corresponding phonetic segments. The acoustic properties of sounds vary widely depending on the surrounding linguistic context. To make matters even more complex for the listener, there is also wide variability in the way phonetic segments are produced by different speakers depending on age, sex, and individual speaker characteristics. It is not even easy to determine what are the basic perceptual units that listeners use to recognize speech. Some research studies seem to suggest the phoneme as the basic building block of perception while others show advantages of the syllable over the phoneme. Conversational speech is therefore a very variable signal that does not even provide clear cues to boundaries between words. Yet understanding words in speech is an effortless and successful process for listeners with normal hearing. How is it done?

One of the key research challenges for psycholinguists was therefore to produce models of spoken word recognition. One of the most influential models is the Cohort Model (Marslen-Wilson and Welsh, 1978; Marslen-Wilson, 1989). In this account, when a listener hears an initial sound, all the words known to start with that sound become activated. This cohort of candidate words is gradually whittled down to a single word, as more acoustic information is processed and candidate words are eliminated. An important feature of the model is the uniqueness point. This occurs when the listener has heard enough acoustic information to reduce the cohort to a single candidate, i.e., there are no other words known to the listener with that particular sequence of phonemes. Syntactic and semantic context from the surrounding

discourse can also play a role in rejecting potential candidate words. In later versions of the model, this can only occur after the uniqueness point, though in earlier versions, context could also be used to eliminate possible words before the uniqueness point. The recognition point occurs when a single item remains in the cohort. This may be before the end of a word.

One of the strengths of the model is the way it can account for the speed with which spoken word recognition often occurs, often occurring before the word offset. In later versions of the model the activation of candidate words is a graded process. Candidate words are not completely eliminated as acoustic information accumulates, but rather they have their activation level reduced. This can rise again if later acoustic information matches a rejected candidate word. This is important, as one of the problems of conversational speech is that individual words or phonemes are often not articulated clearly and the listener must be able to recover and recognize words whose initial sounds were mispronounced or misheard in a noisy environment.

The main competitors to speech recognition models are various connectionist accounts, notably Trace (McLelland and Elman, 1986). This is a connectionist or parallel distributed processing (PDP) account of spoken language processing. In such models researchers were attempting to produce computational models of language processes which were inspired by what was known about the structure and processes of the human brain. In spoken word recognition models, this meant that the feature units were simple units with dense series of interconnections, which processed by sending many messages in parallel. Such structures were developed as analogous to the neural architecture of the brain with its many nerves and interconnections.

The Trace model has three layers of units, corresponding at the lowest level to features, then at the next layer to individual phonemes, then at the top layer to complete words. All have dense arrays of interconnections between them, which like nerve pathways can be excitatory or inhibitory. The connections between levels are excitatory and connections within levels are inhibitory. Connections between levels operate in both directions, so both top-down and bottom-up processing can occur. The connectivity of Trace means that evidence is boosted and plausible hypotheses about the possible words emerge strongly. So a feature such as voicing will energize the voice feature units. These will then transmit activation to all the voiced phonemes at the phoneme level, which will in turn activate all the words that begin with these phonemes. At each level the activated units inhibit competitors at the same level, so reducing

possible competitors. A word is recognized when in the end a single active unit remains.

Trace is a very interactive model. It gives context a bigger role in recognition than the cohort model. As a computational model it has the virtues of specificity. Trace models can be built and simulations run and then compared with the experimental data from human listeners. These comparisons have generally shown that Trace can cope with some of the problems of variability in production of features and phonemes, can account for the context effects on spoken word recognition that have been reported in the literature, and can cope with the kind of degraded acoustic input that is so typical of real conversational speech. The main criticisms that have been leveled at Trace concern the large role that context is given, which may be an overstatement of how this operates in human recognition. The other limitation is the less than elegant way that the time course of speech recognition is modeled, with duplication of the levels and nodes over successive time periods.

Other connectionist models have also been developed. Despite the competing architectures of the models, there is general agreement on key aspects of the speech recognition process. This involves activation of multiple candidate words, followed by competition among those known lexical items that share a similar sound profile; these processes have to be able to cope with less than ideal acoustic input and deliver perceptions of words very rapidly.

Discourse Processing

The gradual broadening of the psycholinguistic research agenda has not been limited to the inclusion of speech alongside written language. Psycholinguists have also shown a growing interest in the processes involved in the interpretation not just of single sentences, but of complete texts. One of the first psychologists to explore the complexities of this process was Bartlett (1932). In his research on the way people remembered and reproduced stories that they had heard, he highlighted key research themes in discourse processing that are still current research topics. Bartlett noted how quickly the surface form of the story is lost and an individual's own interpretation of the text is what is remembered. He introduced the concept of a 'schema,' which was used when readers recalled a narrative. This consisted of an organized set of information based on prior experiences that is used in interpretation and recall. The interpretation of a narrative that is retained consists of a mix of input from the text and from schemata. In some of Bartlett's studies, British students listened to North American folktales. When asked to recall the stories accurately, strange narrative details relating to the activities of ghosts were unconsciously altered and supplemented by details from the participants' world knowledge, so that the recalled version of the stories became more coherent by conventional Western standards.

More recently, a growing body of psycholinguistic research has been addressing the challenges of how readers build up a coherent mental representation to create a sense of the narrative world. One of the key concerns of psycholinguistic studies of text or discourse processing is the problem of inferences. Since Bartlett's seminal studies, it has been known that readers expand on what is in the text by drawing inferences based on their knowledge of the world. But what are the time course and limits of such inferencing? Many studies have been concerned with addressing such questions. Experimental studies have shown that some inferences seem to be made automatically **as** we read a text while some are made **later** to resolve apparent problems or inconsistencies. This was demonstrated in a study by Sanford and Garrod (1981), who presented readers with pairs of sentences such as the following:

(4a) Mary was dressing the baby.
(4b) The clothes were made of wool.
(5a) Mary was putting the clothes on the baby.
(5b) The clothes were made of wool.

The participants read the second sentence just as quickly in both cases. This suggests that verbs such as 'dress' cause readers to automatically draw the inference concerning 'clothes.' In contrast Haviland and Clark (1974) found that some inferences took a small but significant amount of time during reading. In their experiment they used pairs of sentences like the following:

(6a) Harry took the picnic things from the trunk.
(6b) The beer was warm.
(7a) Harry took the beer from the trunk.
(7b) The beer was warm.

They found that sentences like (6b) took longer to read than (7b), because the readers had to make the backward inference that the beer was part of the picnic supplies.

Researchers wished to determine the limits on the kinds of inferences which are made immediately and automatically and which are made later. Clearly, there must be limits on the amount of background knowledge readers activate and one of the research goals is to understand what these limits are and the cognitive processes which support this. Models have been developed that attempt to specify the way inferences are made and the way coherent mental representations are derived from texts.

Although there are significant differences between the models, there are several agreed features of how discourse processing operates in terms of the way readers update their mental representations of a text, the way some information is held in the foreground of processing while others is background, and the way that certain inferences are drawn automatically to maintain a coherent account of the text. For details of the various models of discourse processing that have been proposed (*see* **Discourse Processing**).

Reading as a Developmental and Educational Process

Before an interpretation of a written text can be made, the words on the page have to be read. Although apparently effortless for the skilled adult reader, the processes of identifying letters, recognizing words, and thus distinguishing the meaning conveyed in even a simple sentence, are complex. One key to unraveling how this is accomplished has been to study readers' eye movements. These have been shown to be very systematic and to consist of three main types: short forward movements of around 6–9 letters called saccades, which last on average 20–50 ms; backward movements called regressions; and the pauses or fixations when the readers' eyes rest on a word for around 250 ms.

Rayner and colleagues have shown there are consistent patterns in these movements (see e.g., Rayner, 1998). When reading more difficult texts, fixations grow longer, saccades grow shorter and regressions become more frequent. Even within a single text, readers will spend more time fixating relatively uncommon words compared to familiar ones. Eye movements are designed to keep the middle of our visual field, where our vision is best, aimed at new areas of interest. However, we are able to distinguish quite a lot of information within a single fixation. A skilled adult reader of English will usually be able to identify 15 letters to the right of the fixation point but only three or four letters to the left.

When children begin to learn to read they fixate words for longer than skilled readers. They also have a shorter perceptual span than adults, which means that in a single fixation they are able to identify fewer letters. Gradually these patterns approach those of adults as reading proficiency increases. The typical English reader's asymmetric perceptual span starts to appear in most young readers within a year of starting to learn to read. This seems to reflect the left-to-right nature of reading English, as readers of Hebrew, which is read right to left, show the opposite pattern in their perceptual spans. Like much of psycholinguistics, the study of skilled reading has largely been the study of skilled English reading but more recently interesting studies have been conducted on other languages, notably on nonalphabetic scripts such as Chinese and Japanese.

Visual Word Recognition

One aspect of the reading process has received a great deal of research attention in psycholinguistics: the process of visual word recognition. A whole set of phenomena have been identified in the processes of recognizing written words. These include the process of priming. Words are recognized more quickly if they have been read previously. This is known as repetition priming. Words are also recognized more quickly if a word of similar meaning has just been presented, so 'butter' is recognized more quickly if 'bread' has just been read. This is known as semantic priming. Priming can also occur between words which do not seem to have a direct semantic relationship, such as 'music' and 'kidney,' which are linked by an intermediate word 'organ,' which was not presented to the readers.

Other phenomena which researchers have identified in word recognition include the fact that words which are common in the language, such as 'road,' are recognized more quickly than similar words that are less common, such as 'rend.' This word frequency effect is a strong influence on recognition speeds, with even fairly small differences in word frequency influencing reaction times. It is the most robust effect in studies of word recognition, appearing in many different studies using a wide variety of research methods.

These and other phenomena about how words are recognized have been used to develop a variety of models of word recognition. These can be grouped into families of related accounts. Some of the proposed models are direct access models, where perceptual information goes straight to feature counters or units. Other accounts propose that perceptual information is used to trigger a search through the mental lexicon, that is, the stored representation of all the words known to the reader.

One of the best-known serial search models was proposed by Forster (1976). In this account, the perceptual input is used to build a representation of the word to be recognized which is then checked in two stages by comparisons with a series of access files, which are analogous to the cards in a library index system. Once an input string is matched to an access file it is then linked to the master files, analogous to the books on the shelf, which contain the full lexical entries for each word. The files are organized to speed up the process of word recognition, with groups of files being arranged in bins that contain similar words. Within a bin, files are organized by

word frequency. The details of the model are described to account for the observed features of the recognition process. For example, there are cross-references between master files that would support semantic priming. Despite these features it is not clear that this kind of serial search model can convincingly account for the speed with which words are recognized. It has also been criticized as being based on a rather dated analogy with the cognitive system as a digital computer rather than as a neural system.

More recently, however, Murray and Forster (2004) have published an account of a series of word recognition studies that are claimed to show strong support for the serial search model. They claim that the structure within bins, notably the **rank** ordering of words within a bin in terms of frequency, accounts for the pattern of experimental results on word frequency effects more parsimoniously than alternative direct access models.

More popular models of word recognition involve direct access from the sensory information to the lexical units. One of the most influential of the early accounts of this sort was the Logogen Model (Morton, 1969). In this model, perceptual information, either from visual or auditory analysis, feeds directly into the logogen system. This consists of a series of units, logogens, which represent known words. Logogens act as feature counters and when a logogen has accumulated sufficient evidence to reach a threshold it fires. A word then becomes available to the output buffer, is recognized, and can be articulated. The logogens receive input from the cognitive system as well as the sensory input routes and so the resting threshold of the logogen can be varied by, for example, prior experience of a word, or from the sentence or discourse context. Common words with which an individual has had a lot of prior experience will have a lower threshold and will fire with less sensory input and hence be recognized more quickly. Similarly, words that are highly predictable from context will also have their thresholds raised and so will be recognized rapidly.

The Logogen Model has been used as the basis of computational models of word recognition, notably the interaction activation model (IAM) proposed by McLelland and Rumelhart (1981). This was one of the early connectionist or PDP accounts of language processing. Researchers were trying to produce computational models of language processes which were inspired by what was known about the structure and processes of the human brain. In word recognition models, this meant that the feature units were simple units with dense series of interconnections, which processed by sending many messages in parallel. The IAM consisted of three layers of units,

corresponding at the lowest level to the visual features of letters, then at the next layer to individual letters, then at the top layer to complete words, all with dense arrays of interconnections between them, which like nerve pathways could be excitatory or inhibitory. The model was able to account for a wide range of experimental observations on word recognition.

Models of this type have become very widely used in psycholinguistics to explore a wide variety of language processes. This trend towards testing computational models against the existing experimental literature in a way that can link to new insights about the neural processes involved in language and cognitive processes is a popular approach in current psycholinguistics.

Dialogue and Gesture

In parallel to this concern with understanding the cognitive processes and the possible neurological architecture involved in language processing has been a growing interest in language processing in context. This means not only the growth in studies of how extended texts are processed but also a developing field of psycholinguistic studies of interactive language use. These studies have focused on language in its natural setting, interactive dialogue.

Dialogue represents the most ubiquitous form of language use. As young children, we learn to use language through dialogues with our parents and caregivers. Even educated adults spend a great deal of their time in conversations with family, friends, colleagues. Spoken dialogue is still used to obtain many forms of goods and services. In the many nonliterate cultures in the world dialogue is the main or only form of linguistic interaction.

Yet till recently dialogue received rather little research attention in psycholinguistics. One of the challenges for psycholinguists who wished to study dialogue was to derive methods of exploring the phenomenon which would produce testable and generalizable research questions and findings. One experimental method which has been used to allow the study of comparable dialogues from many pairs of speakers is the referential communication paradigm, developed by Krauss and Weinheimer (1964). In this, pairs of speakers are presented with an array of cards depicting abstract shapes. The speakers have to interact to determine which card a speaker is referring to at a given point in the dialogue. These early studies revealed key aspects of dialogue, including the way that over the course of a dialogue, the lengths of descriptions of even complex and abstract stimuli become much shorter and more concise.

The interaction between the speakers was found to be crucial in this process. If this interaction was disrupted the speakers were not able to reduce their descriptions to the same extent.

Later studies on referential dialogues were conducted by Clark and colleagues. In one influential paper, Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs (1986) developed a collaborative model of dialogue. From studying many pairs of speakers engaged in dialogues, they highlighted the way speakers work together through their contributions to dialogue to arrive at a shared and mutual way of referring to things they wish to discuss. This means that the speaker and the listener both take responsibility for assuring that what has been said is mutually understood or 'grounded' before the dialogue proceeds.

In this view of dialogue, speakers follow the principle of collaborative effort and try to minimize their overall effort in arriving at an agreed description. This is done iteratively over a number of turns of speaking, often with each speaker contributing part of the description. This process makes use of the opportunities and limitations of spoken dialogue in a way that highlights its differences from written language. In text, the writer can take as much time as is needed to produce a description that she thinks the reader will understand. In dialogue, however, the speaker is under time pressure, as conversation rarely allows long gaps in which to plan an utterance. The speaker therefore has to produce an immediate description and may not be able to retrieve the most appropriate description or judge what way of describing a referent will be interpretable by the listener. The advantage of dialogue, however, is that the speaker and the listener can work together to refine or clarify the speaker's initial description till they both share a common understanding.

The highly collaborative nature of this process is reinforced in two key studies by Clark and colleagues. Clark and Schaefer (1987) showed how contributing to dialogue is characterized by two phases. Each time a speaker wishes to make a contribution, they produce a stretch of speech that is the content of what they wish to contribute. This is called the presentation phase. They then require an acceptance phase, in which their listener gives evidence of understanding the previous contribution. So the dialogue involves two activities: content specification and grounding, that is attempting to ensure that both speakers understand the content sufficiently for their current conversational purposes.

The importance of the ability to actively contribute to the dialogue interaction was demonstrated in a study Schober and Clark (1989). Using the referential paradigm they had pairs of speakers complete the task. An additional participant was included in each interaction who overheard everything that was said but did not take part in the dialogue. This overhearer had a much harder time trying to identify the intended referents of the descriptions than the conversational participant, despite having the same pictures and having heard everything that was said. The suggested explanation is that the descriptions were not grounded for the overhearers. They had no chance to collaborate and ensure that they understood each description as it emerged during the dialogue.

So there is clear evidence that dialogue is an interactive and collaborative process that involves speakers and listeners attempting to cooperate and achieve mutual understanding. The detailed mechanisms that underpin these general processes of adaptation to the interlocutor are now the focus of a good deal of psycholinguistic study. There is some controversy over the extent to which speakers are able to adjust and adapt their output to their listener's needs. In terms of the forms of referring expressions chosen by speakers there is evidence of adjustment to the listener's general level of knowledge of the domain. When it comes to adjusting the intelligibility of their articulation, speakers seem to be largely egocentric. They reduce the clarity of their word production in terms of what is familiar to them as speakers rather than modeling their listeners' needs. The time course of adaptation is also debated, with some studies showing speakers initially produce utterances from their own perspective but later monitor their listeners and adapt. Other studies show listener adaptations from the start of speaking.

As language processing is studied in more natural contexts of use, it becomes clear that speakers and listeners do not just communicate using the verbal channel. Visual signals from the mouth, face, hands, and eyes are all important features of communication. Researchers have begun to explore the way the visual channel is used by speakers and listeners and the relationship between verbal and visual signals.

More generally, in a dialogue, what we say, how much we say, and even the clarity of the way the words will be spoken have all been shown to change when speakers do or do not have access to visual signals. So speakers who can see one another need to say less to complete a task, use more gestures, can exchange turns of speaking more smoothly, and articulate their words less than when they cannot see one another.

The important role of visual signals in the perception of speech and how these are integrated with acoustic information is a fascinating research area. This was highlighted in a seminal study by McGurk and MacDonald (1976). They demonstrated that

when a listener hears a phoneme such as 'ba' while watching a face mouthing 'ga,' the sound which is heard is a fusion 'da.' This is a powerful illusion that occurs even with knowledgeable listeners/viewers and has been demonstrated with young babies.

The role of visual signals in the production and comprehension of more extended stretches of discourse has also been the subject of considerable study. From studies of conversation and storytelling, the important role of gestures and their relationship to the accompanying speech has been established. For some kinds of gestures there is a close temporal relationship with the accompanying speech. Listeners also seem to fuse information presented visually and verbally. If they are told a story by a speaker who uses speech and gesture and are then asked to retell the story later, information originally presented by gesture, such as the speed of an action or the manner of leaving, is often relayed in speech and vice versa (for more information **Gesture and Communication**).

Future Directions in Psycholinguistics

Several trends seem apparent in psycholinguistics. Some of these seem to be the result of improvements and developments in the research methods available to psycholinguistics. One is an increased interest in detailed investigations of language in richer, more naturalistic, contexts. New research techniques such as improved methods of tracking a speaker or listener's eye movements mean, for example, that studies of dialogue, or the relationship of a speaker's production to the surrounding context, can be studied with the precision that used to be only possible in studies of isolated word recognition or sentence processing.

Improvements in the ease and accessibility of various brain-imaging techniques mean that these are being used not only as contribution to our understanding of the neural substrate of different language processes. Techniques such as ERP (event-related brain potentials) can now be used more and more as means to explore the precise time course of language processing. Newer techniques such as MEG (magneto-encephalography) are beginning to offer psycholinguists not just good information about the temporal patterns of language processing but also detailed information about the location of associated brain activity. The growing interest in the neural substrates which support language processing has received a major boost from the development of these new forms of brain imaging.

The interest in how to build neurologically plausible models was of course one of the drivers behind the expansion over the last 20 years in connectionist models of language. These have made a major contribution to our understanding of how a wide variety of language processes, such as spoken or written word recognition, might operate and be learned. The challenge in the future will be to see whether connectionist models can be implemented for more extensive language processing, such as text comprehension or contribution to dialogues. The way such models can or cannot be scaled up to simulate more complex language processing will be one of the key challenges for the next few years.

In the future psycholinguistics will also need to address its undoubted Anglocentric bias. The vast majority of studies of language processing are in fact studies of English language processing. In a number of areas a few studies are emerging which consider other languages but this effort needs to be greatly increased. Over the last 50 years psycholinguistics has expanded dramatically and made considerable progress in understanding a wide variety of language processes. With new research techniques and a more balanced research portfolio in terms of the languages studied and the research efforts applied to production as well as comprehension, spoken as well as written language, future progress seems assured.

See also: Discourse Processing; Gesture and Communication; Psycholinguistics: History.

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Queer Talk

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Queer Language and Queer Linguistics

The word 'queer' has been used in a variety of ways (see McConnell-Ginet (2002) for a detailed discussion). In the early 20th century in the United States, the term queer was used as a term of self-reference (or identity category) for homosexual men who adopted masculine behavior (Chauncey, 1994: 16–18). By the 1970s, 'queer' had been appropriated by heterosexuals as a pejorative and ceased to be used as a term for self-reference by homosexual men. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, a political activist organization known as Queer Nation attempted to reclaim 'queer' as a general term for sexual and gender minorities. The term was subsequently taken up in academic writing in the emerging field of queer theory, an extension of theoretical work in feminist theory that deals with issues of sexuality, sexual identity, and gender identity. The term queer has since been used in different and often conflicting ways. As originally used in queer theory, the term queer was not intended as an identity label to refer to a particular externally defined group. Queer theorists rejected terms such as 'gay' or 'lesbian' as inherently exclusionary and argued that identity categories marginalize individuals who are not prototypical members of a given identity category. The use of 'queer' was intended as a means of rejecting identity labels by proposing a term that referred to all individuals who were marginalized in some way by heteronormativity, the social norms associated with hegemonic heterosexuality. Thus, 'queer' includes (but is not restricted to) all sexual and gender minorities. In this usage, the actual membership in a 'queer' community is left intentionally vague because 'queer' is defined not in terms of who belongs but in terms of what queers react against. Thus, the common denominator for queers is their marginalization and exclusion rather than being unified by some common identity or shared social practices. The 'queering' of academic disciplines was proposed as a means of turning attention toward those individuals who had been traditionally marginalized in social theory. By focusing on individuals who are not prototypical members of traditional (etic) identity categories, queer theory attempts to gain insight into the normative forces that underlie social practice. Research that falls within the realm of queer linguistics does not always deal with speakers who are gay, lesbian, or transgendered but may deal with speakers who are marginalized in other ways, as with Mary Bucholtz's (1999) research on the language of self-proclaimed 'nerds.'

Within linguistics, this use of 'queer' has been adopted by those working in 'queer linguistics' (Barrett, 1997, 2002; Bucholtz and Hall, 2003, 2004; Hall, 2003; Livia and Hall, 1997a) in an attempt to adopt and amend proposals from queer theory into a framework for the study of language. Although 'queer' within queer linguistics was intended to refer to queer theory (rather than any community of actual queers), this use of 'queer' has been criticized primarily on the grounds that it does not refer to any externally definable social group (Kulick, 2000; Leap, 2002). In contrast to sociolinguistic frameworks focusing on norms of language variation that categorize individuals into speech communities based on etic identity categories, queer linguistics assumes that speech communities are prototype categories that do not have clearly definable boundaries. The field of queer linguistics emphasizes the language practices at the margins of traditional approaches in order to examine how membership in particular speech communities is negotiated and contested (Bucholtz and Hall, 2003, 2004). Central to queer linguistics is the view that the indexical meanings associated with linguistic variables are performative in that they may create both speaker identities and social contexts. By using particular linguistic variables, speakers may associate themselves with (or in opposition to) particular identity categories and norms for the interpretation and use of indexical meanings (Bucholtz and Hall, 2003, 2004) (*see* **Pragmatic Indexing**).

In usage outside of academic writing, the term queer is often used as a cover term to refer to gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgendered people. However, recent

usage suggests that in public discourse 'queer' may be shifting toward use as an androcentric generic, similar to 'man' or 'gay' (Cohen, 2002). Rather than attempt to discuss the language of a hypothetical group of queers, the remainder of this article focuses on studies that have been central in the development of queer linguistics, including gay and lesbian language use, transgendered language, and the role of language in maintaining heteronormativity.

The Study of Gay Male and Lesbian Language

The study of gay male ways of speaking first emerged in the early 20th century (see Cameron and Kulick (2003) for a summary of the history of this research). During this period, male homosexuality was understood largely in terms of gender expression, and men and women who displayed normative gendered behaviors were not generally considered homosexual, even if they engaged in sexual acts with members of their own sex (Chauncey, 1994). Early work typically viewed homosexuality as a psychological disorder and usually involved collecting lexical items from the 'secret' argot of homosexual men. Because gay male language was seen as a byproduct of deviant sexuality and gender expression, research focused primarily on sexual vocabulary and the alternative use of gendered language, such as the use of female pronouns and feminine proper names by gay men. During this period, the language of lesbians received much less attention, given the centrality of effeminate men in prevalent understandings of homosexuality.

In the years before and after World War II, views of homosexuality shifted so that 'gay' identity was understood in terms of sexual practices rather than gender expression. It was during this period of research that current debates about gay and lesbian language began to emerge. Whereas some linguists saw gay male and lesbian language as a unique form of cultural expression, others viewed gay and lesbian 'argot' as a result of oppression and marginalization. Those who favored assimilation and believed that gay men and lesbians should differ from heterosexuals only in terms of sexual practice viewed homosexual 'slang' as a byproduct of oppression against homosexuality.

After the Stonewall riots in New York in 1968 and the passage of the 1967 Sexual Offences Act in the United Kingdom, the gay and lesbian civil rights movement began to gain ground. During the 1970s, research on gay male language continued to focus primarily on lexical items and gender crossing. Building on the 'ethnic model' of the civil rights movement, linguists typically viewed gay male language as a basic component of gay and lesbian culture. During this period, scholars such as Bruce Rogers (1972) and Julia Penelope Stanley (1970) collected extensive vocabularies of lexical items that were typically seen as reflecting the unique cultural identity of gay and lesbian speakers. Some scholars, however, continued to view gay and lesbian language as a secretive argot (Farrell, 1972).

The first major collection of research specifically examining gay and lesbian language was *Gayspeak* (Chesebro, 1981). This collection laid out many of the debates that had been building in the field and continue into more recent research (Barrett, 2003). Hayes (1981) argued that 'gayspeak' was an authentically gay way of speaking that differed from heterosexual language in three particular contexts: the 'secret setting,' the 'social setting,' and the 'activist-radical setting.' In the secret setting gay men use particular forms of language to convey their sexuality to one another without making their sexuality known to heterosexuals who might hear their conversation. Painter (1981) also described this type of covert communication among lesbians. In the social settings, Hayes described the use of specific vocabulary and discourse styles associated with contexts in which all participants were gay, whereas the activist-radical setting referred to the language of the gay and lesbian civil rights movement. In responding to Hayes, Darsey (1981) questioned the existence of gayspeak, arguing that the structures described by Hayes were not unique to gay or lesbian communities. Like earlier scholars who believed that the unique elements of gay language resulted from resistance to social stigma, Darsey argued that gay male language was not particularly different from the language used by other marginalized groups.

The debate between Darsey and Hayes resurfaced in response to the work of William Leap (1996). Leap followed Hayes in arguing for an authentically gay male language, gay men's English, that differs from the language of heterosexuals. Leap described gay men's English largely in terms of norms for interaction such as the use of cooperative discourse. Kulick (2000) followed Darsey in claiming that none of the structures described by Leap are unique to gay men and, therefore, gay men's English does not exist. However, Leap openly admitted that his view of gay men's English is restricted to a specific subset of gay men, namely white middle-class men in the United States. Leap argued that although gay men's English does not reflect the language of all gay men who speak English, it is an important marker of gay identity for many speakers and has spread to other groups of gay men with the globalization of Western views of homosexuality (Leap and Boellstorff, 2004).

Work in queer linguistics proposes an alternative to this argument (Barrett, 1997; Queen, 1997), arguing that although the linguistic structures of gay and lesbian language overlap with the speech of other social groups, it is more likely that the distinctive character of gay and lesbian language might be found in the ways in which those structures are combined (instead of the structures themselves). For example, Harvey (1998, 2000) analyzed what he called 'camp talk' as a set of rhetorical devices that produce a style that indexes gay male identity. Harvey argued that camp talk involves four basic linguistic strategies: paradox (the juxtaposition of contradictory or conflicting meanings), inversion (the reversal of the expected meanings of signs, such as the use of 'she' to refer to a man), ludicrism (utterances that highlight ambiguity or indeterminacy in meaning), and parody (forms that exaggerate stereotypes about speaker orientation). In Harvey's analysis, the linguistic structures involved are not uniquely gay, but the way in which particular structures are combined serves to index gay male identity.

Structural Aspects of Gay Male and Lesbian Language

Although current views of homosexuality distinguish gender expression from sexual orientation, stereotypes of gendered language use continue to play an important role in the perception of speech as 'gay' or 'straight.' Several studies have examined the linguistic features stereotypically associated with gay male or lesbian speech (see Jacobs (1996) for a review). Although some of this research suggests that these features may be used by listeners in perceiving speech as gay or straight, researchers have found no direct correlation between these forms and actual use by those who identify as gay or lesbian. The phonetic aspects of speech that are stereotypically perceived as 'gay male' in English include hyperstandard pronunciation, such as longer duration of sibilant fricatives and /l/ (Crist, 1997), a longer voice onset time for voiceless aspirated stops, and the release of word-final stops (Podesva *et al.*, 2002). Also, a wider intonational pitch range is often associated with stereotypical gay-sounding speech (Gaudio, 1994; Smyth *et al.*, 2003). In contrast, stereotypes of lesbian speech include a narrow pitch range and 'flat' intonation patterns (Moonwomon, 1997; Queen, 1997).

These stereotypes of gay male and lesbian speech often reflect stereotypes of gendered language use. This is the case, for example, with syntactic and lexical variation. Gay male speech is often viewed as having hyperstandard speech and using lexical items stereotypically associated with women, whereas lesbian speech is often associated with male stereotypes, such as nonstandard or working-class speech and the use of obscenities. Although these features do no reflect actual usage by gay men and lesbians, speakers may use these linguistic stereotypes to convey sexual orientation in specific contexts. Livia (1995), for example, demonstrated how literary representations of lesbians rely on stereotypes of 'men's language,' including limited responses, avoiding expressions of emotion, and the use of sexually explicit vocabulary. A number of research questions remain largely unexplored, including a more detailed understanding of when and how these stereotypes are exploited by gay men and lesbians, whether or not (and how) they might be used by speakers who identify as bisexual, and the various indexical meanings listeners associate with specific variables that have been associated with stereotypes of sexual orientation.

Gay and Lesbian Lexicons

Most early studies of gay male and lesbian language use focused on 'homosexual slang,' or the lexical items unique to gay and lesbian communities. A number of researchers have published lexicons of terms used in gay and lesbian communities (Baker, 2002a; Cory, 1965; Legman, 1941; Stanley, 1970; Rodgers, 1972). Many early researchers viewed gay and lesbian vocabulary as a mechanism for dealing with the stigma of homosexuality. Some viewed gay/lesbian slang in a positive light, holding that unique vocabulary was a survival strategy creating a social space in which being homosexual was acceptable. Others viewed the gay/lesbian vocabulary as a negative result of social marginalization that continued to exclude gay men and lesbians from larger society, whereas others argued that gay vocabulary was not simply a mechanism for dealing with stigma but that it was a means of defining social roles in gay and lesbian communities (Kulick, 2000). As is common in research on homosexual language, these studies typically gave comparatively little attention to lesbian vocabulary.

The most well-known and structurally distinct gay male language variety was Polari (Baker, 2002b) used in the United Kingdom. Polari evolved from a variety of sources, including Lingua Franca as used by English sailors, the language of those working in the entertainment industry, Cockney rhyming slang, and the language of prostitutes. Although Polari contains some unique syntactic patterns (Baker, 2002b: 52–56), the primary difference between Polari and other varieties of English is the use of a unique vocabulary. The vocabulary of Polari, however, is unique among

gay/lesbian varieties in that it is so extensive as to be unintelligible to the majority of English speakers, as in the following example (Baker, 2002b: 53):

| Polari: | varda the naff hommie with nante pots in the cupboard |
| Translation: | look at this unsightly wretch with the appalling dentistry |

Use of Polari has declined dramatically since the 1960s. The lack of knowledge of Polari among younger speakers leads Baker (2002b: 109–111) to conclude that Polari is a dying language.

The decline of Polari is related to the shift in understandings of homosexual identity from being based primarily on difference in gendered behavior to being based on sexual attraction and behavior. The culmination of this shift in the gay and lesbian civil rights movement led to a period in which gay male identity was typically conveyed through behaviors that reflected a unique form of masculinity rather than through stereotypical 'feminine' behavior (Levine, 1998). The backlash against camp or feminine behavior during the 1970s and early 1980s led to a similar decline in the use of many gay male lexical items in the United States. The rejection of in-group language that was viewed as feminine did not, however, end the use of in-group forms of communication but led to the formation of new systems of in-group communication. For example, in the 1970s the 'hanky codes' emerged in the 'clone' community in the United States. The hanky codes involved the use of colored bandanas in one's back pocket as a way of signaling preferences for particular sexual acts. For example, light blue signified a preference for oral sex, whereas dark blue signified anal sex. Bandanas worn on the left side indicated a preference for being the active partner (or 'top'), whereas those worn on the right side indicated a preference for being the passive partner ('bottom') (Levine, 1998: 65–66).

Gay Male and Lesbian Discourse

Given that grammatical features associated with gay and lesbian language seem to be related to stereotypes rather than actual usage, a number of linguists have focused on gay and/or lesbian norms for structuring discourse and conversational interaction instead of the use of particular linguistic structures (McIlvenny, 2002). Studies of both gay male and lesbian discourse have tended to focus on the collaborative nature of gay and lesbian interaction. Although collaborative discourse is certainly not unique to gay or lesbian speakers (*see* **Cooperative Principle**), some linguists have argued that gay men and lesbians use cooperative norms for interaction as a means of asserting a

shared identity based on sexual orientation. The most distinctive aspect of this cooperative discourse is the assumption of shared cultural knowledge associated with sexual orientation. Studies have highlighted the role of cooperative discourse in the affirmation of both gay male (Leap, 1996) and lesbian (Morgan and Wood, 1995) identity as well as the role of cooperative discourse in asserting shared identity between gay men and lesbians (Queen, 1998a, 1998b). In a detailed study of crosssex conversation between gay men and lesbians, Queen (1998b) found that although speakers used language to form a unified identity as homosexuals based on shared cultural knowledge, gay men and lesbians also used structures stereotypically associated with gendered conversational styles. Although an assumption of shared cultural knowledge may be important in particular contexts, it is not the case that all gay or lesbian interactions are necessarily 'cooperative.' For example, several studies have examined the genre of verbal dueling and the use of ritual insults among gay men (Goodwin, 1989; Murray, 1979; Read, 1980).

Another aspect of gay and lesbian discourse that has received a great deal of attention is the ways in which gay men and lesbians convey sexual orientation to one another through the use of conversational implicature (*see* **Implicature**) (Hayes, 1981; Leap, 1996; Liang, 1999; Painter, 1981). As with cooperative discourse, this use of implicature is not uniquely gay or lesbian but relies on the assumption of shared knowledge of gay or lesbian cultural norms as a means of conveying sexual identity. Speakers may use implicature to convey homosexual orientation such that the actual meaning ('I am gay/lesbian') can only be inferred if the listener has some prior knowledge of gay/lesbian culture. Such a use of implicature allows gay and lesbian speakers to reveal their sexual orientation to one another without necessarily revealing themselves to heterosexuals involved in the same conversation. A speaker might, for example, respond to a question about how one spends his or her free time by referring to spending time in a particular neighborhood with the understanding that only other gay men or lesbians will recognize that neighborhood as a center of gay/lesbian culture. Similarly, before the use of the term 'gay' became widely recognized as meaning homosexual, men might have used the word to convey their sexual orientation to one another with the assumption that heterosexual listeners would not likely understand that the word referred to sexual orientation, as in the following example from Hayes (1981: 46):

Mr. X: You certainly have a colorful tie.
Mr. Y: Yes, I really like gay apparel.

Another aspect of gay and lesbian discourse is the use of particular verbal genres such as ritual insults or verbal dueling. The most widely studied genre associated with gay and lesbian speakers is the 'coming out story.' 'Coming out (of the closet)' refers to the act of revealing one's homosexual identity. There are competing notions of what exactly it means to be 'out' (i.e., openly homosexual), and one may be 'out' in particular social contexts and 'not out' in others (Zwicky, 1997). Studies of coming out stories in a variety of local communities have found strikingly similar structure in the genre (Liang, 1997; Maher and Pusch, 1995; Wood, 1997, 1999). Coming out narratives typically include the following stages (Liang, 1997):

1. Recognition of the processual nature of coming out
2. Coming out to self
3. Coming out to other

As with concepts such as cooperative discourse or the use of implicature to convey sexual identity, the coming out story is founded on assumptions of shared knowledge of gay and lesbian cultural norms. One common feature of studies of gay and lesbian discourse is the critical role of a shared sexual identity in establishing cultural norms for language use.

Transgendered Language

The term 'transgender' is an umbrella term for individuals who display behavior patterns typically associated with the opposite sex, including transsexuals, drag queens/kings, and transvestites. Transsexuals are those who believe that the sex they have been assigned based on physical appearance does not correspond to their psychological and social experience. Some transsexuals undergo sex-reassignment surgery to repair the dichotomy identity vs. biology. In terms of language, transsexuals typically attempt to adjust their speech patterns to reflect normative expectations of gendered use of language. For male-to-female (MTF) transsexuals, language is a central component in changing one's gender identity. MTF transsexuals typically adopt stereotypes of gendered language use and may undergo speech therapy in order to sound more feminine. The move toward stereotyped 'women's language' typically involves raising the pitch of one's voice, using a wider range of intonation patterns, speaking more softly, and using lexical items stereotypically associated with women's language. Although research on MTF transsexuals almost always includes a linguistic component, the language of FTM (female-to-male) transsexuals receives very little attention. This is often explained by the fact that the

testosterone taken by FTM transsexuals thickens the vocal chords, lowering a speaker's pitch. Thus, it is often assumed that learning to speak 'like a man' is not a problem for FTM transsexuals. However, the lack of attention given to FTM speech is also tied to an ideology in which men's language is unmarked with respect to women's language (Kulick, 1999).

Although the language of transsexuals is typically seen as reproducing stereotypes of gendered language, other forms of transgendered language seem to center around undermining these stereotypes. Drag queens (gay men who dress in women's clothing) often use stereotyped women's language, but often mix stereotypically masculine forms into their feminine speech. African–American drag queens, for example (Barrett, 1998, 1999), typically juxtapose linguistic forms that stereotypically index identities that are in opposition. For example, a speaker may use stereotyped feminine 'ladylike' speech mixed with obscenities or juxtapose language that indexes a white middle-class identity with forms from African–American English. Although the use of feminine speech for MTF transsexuals is an attempt to change general speech patterns in all situations throughout one's life, the use of feminine speech for drag queens is temporary and highly dependent on social context.

Descriptions of linguistic forms that index a speaker's gender have noted transgendered speech in a variety of languages. A number of Native American languages contain grammatical elements described as corresponding to the gender of a speaker. Most of the descriptions note that there are 'exceptional' speakers who sometimes use the forms corresponding to the opposite gender (Hall, 2003). Detailed research on Lakhota (Trechter, 1999) suggests that use of gender-marked elements by members of the opposite sex does not simply convey a transgendered identity. Rather, the meaning of gendered elements is highly dependent on context and may convey personal attributes other than gender. Hall and O'Donovan (1996) also found that Hindi-speaking *hijras* use grammatical gender marking to convey a variety of indexical meanings. Whereas hijras generally use forms marked as feminine for self-reference, they use masculine forms when foregrounding positive personal attributes associated with masculinity (e.g., owning a home or being trustworthy). Rudes and Healey's (1979) study of the uses of 'he' and 'she' by gay men in the United States also found that gendered pronouns were associated with particular indexical meanings. Although 'she' was used in positive references to physical attractiveness, most uses of 'she' were associated with negative attitudes toward the referent.

An important insight of this research has been the confirmation that the indexical meanings associated with gender are indirect (Ochs, 1992). Even in languages in which particular linguistic structures have been assumed to be direct markers of speaker gender (e.g., Lakhota or Hindi), these structures do not necessarily directly refer to speaker (or referent) gender. Rather, the structures associated with gender index particular social attributes, stances, or personality traits that are in turn associated with cultural assumptions about the particular attributes that are associated with masculine or feminine behavior. For example, Eckert (2002) noted that in American English, the release of word-final stops has been associated not only with the speech of gay men (Podesva *et al.*, 2002) but also with indexing 'Jewish speech' and the identity of female nerds. Rather than directly marking a given sexual identity or gender, released final stops seem to index something like "articulateness" (Eckert, 2002: 102). The relationship between indexical meanings and social categories is not direct, but it is negotiated through indexing attributes that may in turn be associated with social categories.

Language and Heteronormativity

A final aspect of queer language is the role of language in maintaining heteronormativity, or the social norms that enforce hegemonic (compulsory) heterosexuality and marginalize gay, lesbian, or transgendered speakers. Although there is no *a priori* reason to assume that there is any relationship between norms for gendered behavior and sexual orientation, it is clear that speakers (and often researchers) assume some relationship between gender and sexuality. This research has transformed the field of language and gender (*see* **Gender and Language**) into the field of language, gender, and sexuality (Bucholtz, 2004). Speakers may refer to sexual orientation as a means of performatively asserting gender identity and vice versa.

Cameron (1997) examined the way in which a group of heterosexual male college students use references to homosexuality to convey masculine gender identity. Cameron examined a conversation in which the men discuss 'gay' classmates at length. The most important aspect of Cameron's analysis is the fact that some of the 'gay' classmates are clearly heterosexual (one is described as constantly "hitting on girls"). The men are able to assert a masculine identity by distinguishing themselves from a classmate who they depict as homosexual (and hence effeminate). The actual sexual desires of the 'gay' classmates have little relevance to the interaction, and the discussion of sexual orientation is primarily used to construct masculine gender identity. Cameron's study demonstrates that linguistic references to sexual identity may be entirely divorced from actual sexual desires or sexual practices (Bucholtz and Hall, 2004).

Studies have also examined the reverse phenomenon, in which gender identity is used as a means of asserting sexual identity. Peebles (2004) examined the language in an ex-gay ministry in the United States. Ex-gays are evangelical Christians who have experienced (or continue to experience) same-sex attraction (and who may have identified as gay or lesbian) but who attempt to transform their sexual identity to that of heterosexuals based on their religious belief that homosexuality is morally wrong. The transformation to a heterosexual identity revolves around negotiating and acquiring new norms for gendered behavior. The ex-gays in Peebles's study view the transformation as one of adopting some aspects of traditional normative gender behavior while questioning other aspects of stereotypical masculine or feminine behavioral norms (including norms for language use). Peebles's research demonstrated the inverse of Cameron's study, showing that sexual identity may be expressed through markers of gender identity.

Conclusion

The field of language and sexuality is a very recent phenomenon and its emergence has involved much debate (Bucholtz and Hall, 2004; Campbell-Kibler *et al.*, 2002). The focus on marginalized speakers in queer linguistics has resulted in new perspectives on the ways in which speaker identities are conveyed through language. In particular, the assumption that there are 'gender-exclusive' forms of language (i.e., structures used only by males or only by females) is no longer tenable given this attention to speakers who have generally been classified as 'exceptions' (Hall, 2003). However, much additional research is needed before we can begin to fully understand the relationship between language and sexual and gender identities.

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Reading and Multiliteracy

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A rich vein of articles and books has recently offered new perspectives on reading and literacy, invoking such terms as 'multiliteracies' and 'multiple literacies.' In this piece, I will signal some of the debates and concepts in this emerging field, with particular reference to New Literacy Studies (NLS), both in terms of theoretical perspectives and of their implications in schooled contexts, as theorists and practitioners address the tensions and possibilities that arise when students and teachers apply such innovations to curricula and classrooms. While 'reading' has generally been seen in educational contexts as about decoding and much of the policy literature follows this line (cf. Snow, 1998), those researching literacy from a social practice perspective offer a broader interpretation of reading as well as of literacy that has profound implications for classroom practice.

Such reconceptualization begins from the problematizing of what counts as literacy at any time and place and asks 'whose literacies' are dominant and whose are marginalized or resistant. This query entails the recognition of multiple literacies, varying according to time and space but also contested in relations of power. To address these issues ethnographically, literacy researchers have focused on 'literacy events' and literacy practices,' the latter representing an attempt to handle the events and the patterns of activity around literacy but to **link** them to something broader of a cultural and social kind: part of that broadening involves attending to the fact that in a literacy event, we have brought to it concepts, social models regarding what the nature of this practice is and that make it work and give it meaning. This reconceptualizing of literacy has produced a wealth of 'ethnographies of literacy' (cf. Street, 1984, 2001; Barton, 2000; Baynham, 2004). The strength and significance of this approach and this considerable literature is attested by a recent spate of critical accounts that have addressed some of the problems that they raise, both in general and, more specifically, for educational applications.

An apt place to begin is with the contestations over the terms 'multiple literacies' and 'multiliteracies.' The notion of multiple literacies was coined in the early 1980s (Street, 1984) in order to make a contrast with a reified autonomous notion that dominated the field at that time, which assumed that there was only one thing called 'literacy' – which had a big 'L' and a little 'y': which was singular and autonomous in the sense that it was a factor that independently had effects on other things. The idea of multiple literacies, then, was an important construct in challenging that autonomous singular literacy: literacies vary according to cultural contexts and uses and what is taught in schools as 'the' literacy is only one variety among many.

The concept of multiliteracies that has been put forward by the 'New London Group' (NLG) (Cope and Kalantzs, 2000) refers not to multiple literacies, associated with different cultures or contexts, but to multiple forms of literacy associated with different channels or modes, such as computer literacy or visual literacy. Kress (1997), a member of the NLG, has criticized the further extensions of multiliteracy into, for instance, political literacy, or emotional literacy, thereby using the term as a metaphor for competence. The NLG are more interested in channels and modes of communication that can be referred to as 'literacies.' For Kress, multiliteracy signals a new world in which the reading and writing practices of literacy are only one part of what people are going to have to learn in order to be 'literate' (Kress and van Leeuwen, 1990). They are going to have learn to handle the icons and the signs, the Word for Windows package with all its combinations of signs, symbols, boundaries, pictures, words, texts, images, etc. The extreme version of this position is the notion of 'the end of language' – that somehow we are no longer talking about language in its rather traditional notion of grammar, lexicon, and semantics, but rather semiotic systems that cut across reading, writing, speech, into all these other semiotic forms of communication. This collection, then, is what is signaled by the term 'multiliteracies': a rather different approach from that entailed by the 'multiple literacies' view outlined above.

These approaches are currently being debated not only in terms of the boundaries of the concepts but also in terms of broader theoretical and methodological issues. In terms of theory, for instance, Brandt (2002) recently commented on 'the limits of the local' evident, she believes, in the ethnographic approach to multiple literacies. She argues that NLS ought to be more prepared to take account of the relatively 'autonomous' features of literacy without succumbing to the autonomous model with its well-documented flaws: this approach would involve, for instance, recognizing the extent to which literacy does often come to 'local' situations from outside and brings with it both skills and meanings that are larger than the emic perspective favored by NLS can always detect. This recognition, of course, is exactly what many educationalists would argue regarding the relationship between local literacy practices and those of the school. Likewise, Collins and Blot (2002) were concerned that, while NLS has generated a powerful series of ethnographies of literacy, there is a danger of simply piling up more descriptions of local literacies without addressing more general questions of both theory and practice. They proposed the terms 'texts power and identities' as a basis for comparative generalization, building on the descriptive capacity of the lenses offered by NLS to engender a more powerful set of generalizations about the uses and meanings of literacy practices. Those lenses were themselves sharpened by a number of contributors to an edited volume *Situated literacies* (Barton *et al.*, 2000). Gee, for instance, located the situated approach to literacies in relation to broader movements towards a 'social turn' that he sees as a challenge to the behaviorism and individualism that NLS has also pursued. Maybin, in the same volume, also links NLS to wider strands of social-critical work, offering a way of linking Foucauldian notions of Discourse, Bakhtinian notions of intertextuality, and work in Critical Discourse Analysis with the recognition from NLS of "the articulation of different discourses [as] centrally and dynamically interwoven in people's everyday literacy activities." Bartlett and Holland (2002) likewise proposed an expanded conception of the 'space of literacy practices,' drawing upon innovations in the cultural school of psychology, sociocultural history, and social practice theory. They are particularly concerned to harness NLS to broader concerns with identity and suggest three concepts: figured world, artifacts, and identities in practice. As with the other papers and books, they build these extensions and developments upon the basic tenets of NLS, using ethnographic case studies of literacy in practice.

Another update and extension of NLS is to be found in Hornberger's edited volume (2002) in which authors attempt to apply her conception of the 'continua of biliteracy' to actual uses of reading and writing in different multilingual settings: 'biliteracy' is defined as "any and all instances in which communication occurs in two (or more) languages in or around writing" and is described in terms of four nested sets of intersecting continua characterizing the contexts, media, content, and development of biliteracy. A number of the authors, as in the Martin-Jones and Jones (2001) book, drew out the links of NLS to such multilingual settings. Peter Freebody's recent account of the different ways in which 'Critical Literacy' has been construed (Freebody, forthcoming) offered a further, critical perspective on NLS and its implications for education. He argued that the meanings of CL vary according to both "focus and method of study on the one hand and, on the other, the disciplines that have developed these approaches." Thus:

- Linguists have generally taken the text as a semiotically structured object, to be the prime unit of focus of critical literacy;
- Sociologists have generally focused on how language uses signal as the operation of social formations such as race, gender, and class, and how these formations in turn give shape to how we read, write, look, talk, and listen; and
- Anthropologists have taken cultural practices and the ways that different literate representations variously implicate and afford these.

Being rooted in anthropological approaches, although perhaps recently focused more in ethnographic methods from a range of sources, New Literacy Studies can be seen to focus more on practices than on texts and more on fine-tuned processes of identity construction than on gross categories of class, race, and gender. However, all three approaches would probably agree with Freebody's general characterization of CL as concerned "with giving access to texts, transforming sociopolitical processes and" – most crucially for NLS – "developing the practical understanding that people are educated to become variously the objects and subjects (both the topics of and the readers and writers) of a selected tradition of representing reality in public and official forms." How such traditions are constructed and reproduced and how individuals and social groups are inserted into them is a central focus of NLS – taking nothing for granted with respect to literacy and the social practices with which it becomes associated.

The effects of these critical engagements is that NLS is now going through a productive stage of

theory building that first establishes and consolidates many of the earlier insights and empirical work, and second builds a broader and perhaps less beleaguered field of study that can appeal beyond the specific interests of ethnographers on the one hand and educationalists on the other, to those engaged in more general issues of identity, power, and textuality. The next stage of work in this area, then, is to move beyond simply theoretical critiques of the autonomous model of literacy and to develop positive proposals for interventions in teaching, curriculum, measurement criteria, and teacher education in both the formal and informal sectors, based upon these principles. It will be at this stage that the theoretical perspectives brought together in the 'New Literacy Studies' will face their sternest test: that of their practical applications to mainstream education. In a recent edited volume (Street, 2005), a number of authors took on this challenge and attempted to follow through such practical applications of the NLS approach, in terms of the links between such theoretical debate and the work of teachers in school addressing literacy issues. Likewise, Hull and Schultz (2001) built upon the foundational descriptions of out-of-school literacy events and practices developed within NLS, to return the gaze back to the relations between in and out of school, so that NLS is not seen simply as 'antischool' or as interested only in small scale literacies of resistance. They want to use the understandings of especially children's emerging experiences with literacy in their own cultural milieus to address broader educational questions about learning of literacy and of switching between the literacy practices required in different contexts. This issue was also addressed in current research by Baker, Street, and others applying literacy theory to the understanding of numeracy practices in and out of school (Baker and Street, 2004; Baynham and Baker, 2002).

Meanwhile, Larson's edited volume (2001) addressed the relationship between current policy initiatives that stress a more decontextualized view of literacy and the approaches indicated here, including NLS and 'critical' perspectives: the authors demonstrated the problems with the dominant narrow approach and attempted to construct more meaningful solutions. This theme was developed further in a volume, *Framing literacies* (2005), in which Larson and Marsh attempted to reconnect what we know about literacy learning to what we do. The book took three prominent theoretical frameworks, New Literacy Studies, Critical Literacy, and Sociocultural Theory, and illustrated what these frameworks look like in real case examples, articulating how the frameworks discussed work together to construct rich and complex contexts for literacy learning and progressive

frameworks for research. Another volume in this genre, edited by Rowsell and Pahl (forthcoming), also attempted to make links explicitly between theory and educational practice. At a theoretical level, they attempted to combine the multiliteracies and the multiple literacies positions: "To meet the demands of our changing communicational landscape, we need to adjust our notion of literacy and its implications on how we produce texts in multiple settings, at different times, by different sets of actors." At the same time, they want to follow through the implications of this production for pedagogy and curriculum, and the authors in their volume provided examples of actual classroom practice where such shifts can be identified. The same two authors (Pahl and Rowsell, 2005) have also written a book for classroom teachers offering a practical guide to applying New Literacy Studies within primary, secondary, and family literacy contexts. It aimed to offer ways to rethink, redefine, and redesign language and literacy in the classroom to meet the contemporary needs and skills of students.

All of these initiatives, then, make considerable demands on both theorists and practitioners in the area of language and education in general and of literacy and reading in particular, challenging dominant views of each term and its applications. From this perspective, reading is now located in the broader field of literacies, and the understanding of literacies is in turn contested between approaches from ethnography, critical theory, and sociocultural views of language and learning. Whichever position one takes in this fast moving field, it will no longer be possible to envisage either reading or literacy in the simple, unidimensional ways that have dominated schooling until now.

See also: Critical Discourse Analysis; Dialogism, Bakhtinian; Discourse, Foucauldian Approach.

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Reference: Psycholinguistic Approach

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Language can be used as a means of communication because (some of) its elements have meaning. But what is 'meaning' and what is communicated? These questions are complex, and have not always been carefully considered in psycholinguistics. Since the late 1970s, however, there has been a growing agreement that one thing – not the only thing – that is communicated is information about situations in a world. Sometimes that world is the real world, as in news broadcasts or conversations about what happened last night. Sometimes it is a fictional world, for example in novels and short stories, and sometimes it is an abstract domain, as in many articles in this encyclopedia. Communication about situations is primarily associated with literal meaning (and knowledge-based inferences from literal meaning), which is considered to be largely compositional. Communication therefore depends on mental representations of situations.

Situations comprise individuals with properties, and relations among those individuals. Some of those relations make up events, states, and processes (sometimes called, as a class, eventualities). These latter also stand in relations to one another, such as cause and effect. To convey information about situations, it is necessary to convey information about their component parts. To do so, it is necessary to refer to individuals, properties, and eventualities.

Reference is one kind of 'meaning of meaning,' though it is perhaps not the most obvious one. Another kind of meaning is sense, or connotation. The distinction between sense and reference, and the connection between them, was made explicit by the logician Gottlob Frege in the late 19th century. Frege was unimpressed by natural languages, and sought to construct a logically well-behaved language in which he could describe the logical foundations of mathematics. In this *Begriffschrift* (conceptual notation), meaning is compositional: The meaning of a complex expression is determined by the meanings of its parts and their method of (syntactic) composition. Sense (*Sinn*) corresponds roughly to conceptual content (or mode of presentation, as Frege sometimes put it). Reference (*Bedeutung*) is what an expression stands for (in any possible context of use). 'The morning star' and 'the evening star' are two modes of

presentation of the planet Venus (expressions with different senses). In the real world, the two expressions have the same reference (or referent in more modern English parlance), Venus itself. Ideally, both sense and reference are compositional.

In ordinary language, it is natural to think of noun phrases, such as 'John,' 'the table,' and 'the book I lent you last week,' as expressions that refer to particular people or objects, at least when those expressions are used in appropriate contexts. However, in Frege's view, every expression has a sense and a reference. In particular, sentences have truth values (true or false) as their referents. Mathematical statements are either true or false. In everyday language, the truth of a sentence depends on the context in which it is used. Whether it is true that 'John is tall' depends on which John is being talked about. The other base point of Frege's system is the proper name, in an extended sense. In arithmetic, for example, '2' is a proper name for the number two. Proper names have objects as their referents. In the case of '2,' that object is an abstract object (Frege was a Platonist).

For Frege, and many 20th-century philosophers and logicians inspired by his work, objects (or entities) and truth values are the two basic semantic types. Montague (see Thomason, 1974), for example, who made the first detailed attempt to apply broadly Fregean ideas to natural language, followed Frege on this point. However, it has more recently been suggested (e.g., by Parsons, 1990) that eventualities and properties are basic semantic types (rather than derived types, as Montague and Frege claimed). For example, a property such as 'is an even number' is, for Frege, a function from objects to truth values (it maps 2 to true and 3 to false, for example).

Frege focused on proper names as expressions that refer to objects. What about expressions such as 'the bag,' often referred to as definite descriptions in the philosophical literature? Informally, it is natural to consider such expressions as referring to objects. However, a tradition going back at least to Bertrand Russell considers that definite descriptions are not referring expressions at all, but rather quantifier expressions used to state (in the case of a singular definite description) that there is one and only one entity that has a certain property. Thus, Russell was able to claim that 'the present King of France is bald' is false, if France has no king, because it asserts that France has one and only one present king.

Psychological Issues

The ideas presented so far may seem far removed from psychological considerations. However, if all expressions have (a sense and) a referent, and the sense and reference of complex expressions can be built up compositionally, word identification plus syntactic analysis can form the basis for semantic interpretation in language comprehension.

As has already been noted, natural languages do not behave like logical languages of the kind Frege studied. In mathematics, '2' always means the number two. In English, 'John' may be John Smith on one occasion and John Brown on another, even in the same text. Likewise, Russell's 'the present King of France' is an atypical definite description. There is only one France, and if a country has a king, it only has one. A more typical definite description, such as 'the cold cup of tea' will have different referents in different contexts (and no referent in many contexts).

Language is used in context. Part of the context, particularly in spoken language, is the nonlinguistic context in which the language is used. Another part is the linguistic context – what has been said or written so far. From a psycholinguistic perspective, what is crucially important is the mental representation of the context, whether linguistic or nonlinguistic, which mediates language understanding. This claim should not be mistaken for the idea that language refers to the mental representation rather than the real world. Rather, the claim is that, from a psychological perspective, language use must be regarded as mediated by mental representations.

Situation Models

Given the idea that language conveys information about situations in the real world, or fictional or abstract worlds, the relevant mental representations must represent those situations. Such representations are called situation models or mental models. Mental models must contain elements corresponding to the basic building blocks of the world (entities, properties, eventualities, truth values, or whatever) and there must be computationally tractable methods for constructing them. A single clause usually presents an eventuality, whose type is determined by the verb. Entities are typically introduced by noun phrases in various syntactic positions and playing various thematic roles. Local 'who did what to whom' information can be constructed compositionally. Relations between eventualities are sometimes indicated explicitly, for example by the use of connectives such as 'but,' 'because,' and 'however.' Sometimes they are implicit and can only be computed by using background knowledge.

Psycholinguists have not paid a great deal of attention to questions about what different types of expression refer to. They have assumed that local 'who did what to whom' information is computed, perhaps

with reference to background knowledge, and then integrated (again perhaps using background knowledge) with other bits of 'who did what to whom' information from elsewhere in the text.

Coordination between Speakers

One issue that has been investigated in psycholinguistics is how speakers coordinate with one another to ensure successful reference. When a speaker talks about an object or a writer writes about one, the addressee must correctly identify the object being talked about if communication is to be successful. In many cases nonverbal context plays a crucial role in such coordination: speaker and addressee are looking at, or handling, the same object, for example, while talking about it. However, not all cases are so straightforward. Johnson-Laird and Garnham (1980) identified some very general considerations that help to determine successful reference, for example whether an addressee will recognize that a particular description (e.g., 'the man I met last night') refers to a particular person. More recent work on dialogue has found that while speakers may not consider the knowledge that they share with their addressee (common ground) when initially planning an utterance (Horton and Keysar, 1996), under normal discourse conditions utterances often ultimately reflect the common ground between an speaker and hearer (Clark, 1996). Furthermore, over successive turns in a dialogue, interlocutors will coordinate the use of different expressions, converging on a single means of referring to a particular object (Garrod and Anderson, 1987).

Anaphoric Reference

Another issue that psycholinguists have looked at in some detail, and perhaps the major question about reference that they have concerned themselves with, is that of second and subsequent reference to the same entity, via pronouns or other anaphoric expressions. One piece of 'who did what to whom' information might be that John sent a letter to Jill and the next piece might be that he hoped she would receive it the next day. To an English-speaking reader it will be obvious that 'he' is John, 'she' is Jill, and 'it' is the letter that John sent to Jill. However, it is not apparent just from the form of the expressions 'John' and 'he' that they refer to the same person and, indeed, in many contexts they would not, for example (1).

> (1) John confessed to Bill because he offered a reduced sentence.

Anaphora is not confined to coreferential noun phrases, though such cases are the most commonly studied in psycholinguistics. As well as identity of reference anaphora, there is identity of sense anaphora, which includes most uses of indefinite pronouns, as in (2), and some uses of definites, for example in 'paycheck' sentences such as (3).

> (2) John has eaten a big bowl of vanilla ice cream and now Judy wants some.

> (3) The man who gives his paycheck to his wife is wiser than the man who gives it to his mistress.

Here, 'it' is a paycheck, but not the one that was referred to in the first part of the sentence. Furthermore, not all anaphora is nominal. English, in particular, is rich in verbal anaphors, such as the verb phrase ellipsis in (4).

> (4) I have always wanted to travel to China and next summer I am going to.

Verbal anaphors are typically identity-of-sense anaphors, and many of them are ellipses in the technical sense of Sag and Hankamer (1984): what is elided or replaced by a verbal anaphor must have an exact counterpart in the surrounding, usually preceding, text.

Another issue is that some uses of definite noun phrase anaphors, and in particular pronouns, are analyzed as bound variables, and not as referential expressions, as for example in (5).

> (5) Every dog loves its owner.

However, the parallel between (5) and (6) suggests that they should, perhaps, be treated similarly, which they are in theories such as discourse representation theory (Kamp and Reyle, 1993).

> (6) Fido loves his owner.

Psychological accounts of anaphoric reference are concerned with the mental mechanisms, representations, and processes that underlie the production and comprehension of anaphoric reference. They must be informed by linguistic accounts of how and when different types of anaphoric expression can be appropriately used. However, they must also be subject to empirical tests in psychological studies generating standard types of psychological data. Linguists describe the morphosyntactic properties of anaphoric expressions, such as gender and number marking on definite pronouns, which affect their interpretation. They also describe syntactic constraints on the interpretation of pairs of noun phrases as (possibly) coreferential, for example through the principles of binding theory. At a higher (discourse) level, attempts

have been made to specify constraints on the form that anaphoric noun phrases should take. Some researchers have considered the accessibility or givenness of the antecedent (e.g., Ariel, 1990; Gundel *et al.*, 1993) to account for when particular forms are required or permissible, and we shall return below to other accessibility- or focus-based accounts of the form of referring expressions. Others have considered the discourse function of anaphoric forms in order to account for their use, including the purpose of particular forms, such as the demonstrative 'this X' to refer to antecedents currently out of focus, and overspecific forms (e.g., a proper name when a pronoun would be sufficient for identification) to shift discourse topic (e.g., Vonk *et al.*, 1992).

The most straightforward kind of reference is to people, animals, and objects. It therefore seems likely that reference to such objects is mediated by representations in which those people, animals, and objects are represented. Mental models (or situation models) are representations of this kind. People talk about situations in the real world or in imaginary worlds or abstract domains, and mental models of these situations can be used to guide the selection of referring expressions, and can be constructed and modified in response to the comprehension of referring expressions. There must, therefore, be a set of procedures for generating referring expressions from mental models and for generating and modifying mental models on the basis of referring expressions. In addition, items can be represented in mental models on the basis of perceptual information.

On one view, once an item is represented in a mental model, anaphoric expressions might make direct contact with their representations in comprehension, which need not be tied to the particular linguistic expression used to introduce them. Sag and Hankamer (1984) proposed that definite pronouns and other deep or model-interpretive anaphors worked in just this way. They also proposed that many verbal ellipses were indeed ellipses, and had to be interpreted by effectively copying part of a fairly superficial representation (Logical Form, in their view) of a piece of nearby text. Garnham *et al.* (1995) showed that, at least when a pronoun is fairly close to its antecedent, the linguistic form of the antecedent expression does affect the interpretation of definite pronouns. However, this could be because mental models contain information about how their elements have been or might be referred to. Garnham and Oakhill (1987) have also shown that the interpretation of ellipses can be influenced by an underlying mental model, in a way not allowed for by Sag and Hankamer. Another line of evidence supporting the

idea that anaphoric expressions take their meaning via mental representations of objects rather than linguistic descriptions of those objects comes from the study of indirect reference in which the referent of an anaphor is not explicitly mentioned in previous text, as in (7).

(7) James tried to write to Alison many times, but always tore them up in the end.

In this case, a previous antecedent trigger ('write'; Cornish, 1999) makes the referent ('letters') available for anaphoric reference ('them') by allowing it to be represented in the mental model of the text. If reference depended on the literal text then such indirect reference would be impossible; however, some researchers have reported it to be relatively common (Yule, 1982).

Perhaps the most important factor in anaphoric reference is focus. As we mentioned earlier, in natural languages, unlike the logical languages studied by Frege and others, the interpretation of referring expressions is often highly context dependent. A simple definite description such as 'the bird' is referentially highly indeterminate out of context, but in a particular text or conversation it can readily be used to refer to a particular individual bird. Because mental models are specific to individual texts, they help to explain this fact. However, in a text of any length an expression such as 'the bird' might refer to different individuals on different occasions, suggesting that mental models are partitioned and that different sets of individuals are more salient at different points in the text. Furthermore, depending on the particular local structure of the text, an individual that could be referred to as 'the bird' might be more appropriately referred to as 'it' or 'Joey' or 'the parrot or 'the large bird.' Attempts to explain these facts, both from the point of view of production, or selecting appropriate referring expressions, and from the point of view of comprehension, or how difficult certain referring expressions are to interpret in different contexts, are usually discussed in terms of the accessibility, prominence, or focus status (in the psychological, rather than linguistic sense) of the antecedent.

The work of Grosz, Sidner, and others (see especially Grosz and Sidner, 1986) has led to the distinction between global and local focus. Global focus is related to episode structure (Anderson *et al.*, 1983), or more generally to that of discourse segments and their relations to one another. As Sidner (1983) and others have pointed out, in narratives and other texts about people, protagonists are important in determining focus, though Grosz and Sidner subsume such effects under more general principles. Anderson

et al.'s (1983) episode structure effects are linked to the status of protagonists, as is the finding that proper names produce a stronger focusing effect than definite noun phrases.

Local focusing is particularly important in determining which recently mentioned people (or things) would preferentially be referred to pronominally. Centering theory is a theory of local focusing that has been developed within Grosz and Sidner's framework. It is couched as a theory of how attention shifts within a discourse segment. It identifies, within any utterance, a set of forward-looking centers, or things likely to be rereferred to in the upcoming discourse. It also identifies one backward-looking center, which is the current (local) topic, and which should be the same as one of the forward-looking centers of the previous utterance.

Centering theorists have made various attempts to specify when references should be pronominal. An early view, which focused on the idea that the backward-looking center should be pronominalized (particularly if it picks up the highest ranked forward-looking center of the previous utterance), led to a series of experiments by Peter Gordon and his colleagues on the repeated name penalty (Gordon *et al.*, 1993 and later work), a difficulty in comprehension caused by repeating a proper name or a common name rather than using a pronoun. Gordon found empirical evidence for this effect, particularly for anaphors in syntactic subject position, and when there was not a shift of center. However, later versions of centering theory have, on empirical grounds, relaxed the pronominalization rule to say merely that if any of the forward-looking centers of the previous utterance are pronominalized in the current utterance, the backward-looking center of the current utterance must be pronominalized.

A different approach to focusing, and the way it affects anaphoric reference, is found in Amit Almor's (1999) informational load hypothesis (ILH), which is founded more directly in psychological research than is centering theory. The ILH asks: what factors make a particular form of anaphoric reference easy or difficult to process, given the context in which it occurs and, in particular, given what its antecedent is? According to Almor, three factors are important: the focus status of the antecedent, whether the anaphor adds new information about its referent, and the informational load of the antecedent–anaphor pair. From the examples he considers, Almor appears to be investigating local focus, and in his experimental work he focuses items using wh- and it-clefts, which are thought to mark contrastive focus. Informational load is the crucial new concept in this hypothesis and it is defined in terms of the conceptual distance between antecedent and anaphor, with conceptual distance taken to be positive when the antecedent is less specific that the anaphor ('... the bird ... the robin ...') and negative when it is more specific ('... the robin ... the bird ...'). Thus, for anaphors that are less specific than their antecedents, informational load decreases (by becoming more negative) as conceptual distance increases. Informational load can be justified if the antecedent is not in focus, as it helps to reactivate the representation of the antecedent. Indeed, previous work by many researchers supports the idea that increased overlap between an antecedent and its category anaphor aids in anaphor resolution, with more typical antecedents (e.g., robin) for a given category (e.g., bird) leading to faster processing times for the anaphor compared to atypical antecedents (e.g., ostrich). However, when the antecedent is in focus the increased information load produced by semantic overlap is not justified. According to Almor, informational load arises because semantic overlap in working memory produces an interference effect, just as phonological overlap does, and this interference competes with the facilitatory effect of semantic overlap just described. Thus, the ILH leads to the surprising prediction of an inverse typicality effect in anaphor resolution for focused antecedents. Since 'ostrich' is conceptually more distant from 'bird' than 'robin' is, the pair '... the ostrich ... the bird ...' has a lower (more negative) informational load than '... the robin ... the bird ...,' and the former pair should be easier to process. With clefted antecedents, Almor reports this result.

In our own lab we have failed to replicate this result consistently with a typicality manipulation, though we have shown it in a category hierarchy, where the conceptual distances are clearer ('...the cobra...the reptile...' is easier than '... the snake ... the reptile ...'). However, we have been unable to find evidence for semantic interference in working memory.

In describing the ILH, Almor does not discuss the effect of multiple possible antecedents for an anaphor. However, potential antecedents that turn out not to be antecedents ('Phil' in [8], for example) affect anaphor resolution.

(8) Jack threw a snowball at Phil, but he missed.

Gernsbacher (1989) showed that once an anaphor was resolved, the nonantecedents were suppressed, and that, for pronouns at least, this process took some time. Garrod *et al.* (1994), however, suggested that pronouns could be resolved immediately if they referred unambiguously to focused main characters.

The ILH tries to provide an integrated account of the ease of processing of noun phrase anaphors

of various types. In this respect it differs from previous work, which has tended to produce lists of (apparently independent) factors that affect the ease of interpreting anaphoric reference. One such factor is the distance between a noun phrase anaphor and its antecedent, which is particularly important in the case of pronouns. However, it is likely that foreground or focus interacts strongly with this factor, since material intervening between a pronoun and its antecedent is likely to shift the focus away from the antecedent. A related issue is the interaction of distance and working memory, or how near is 'near'? Ed O'Brien (e.g., 1987) has emphasized the need to distinguish between potential antecedents that are still likely to be represented in working memory and those that are not.

Another factor that has been investigated in the case of pronoun resolution in particular is implicit causality. When a pronoun occurs in a statement of an explicit cause following the description of an interpersonal event, the interpretation of the pronoun can depend on the verb used to describe the interpersonal event. For example, in (9) 'he' is likely (though not certain) to be taken to refer to Bill, whereas in (10) it is likely to refer to John.

(9)   John blamed Bill because he. . .

(10)   John called Bill because he. . .

Garnham *et al*. (1996) suggested that this effect might be a focusing effect, but found no evidence in favor of this view. Rather, it appears, in the comprehension of a completed sentence, to reflect how easy it is to integrate the information in the 'because' clause with the information in the main clause. Thus, a complete sentence such as (11) is easier to process than a sentence such as (12).

(11)   John blamed Bill because he had been careless.

(12)   John blamed Bill because he needed a scapegoat.

Implicit causality effects may be an example of the use of world knowledge in the interpretation of pronouns, as indeed may the more general effect of the coherence relations between clauses or sentences, which as we mentioned above are often signaled by connectives, on anaphor resolution.

Other factors that have been found to influence anaphor interpretation are more formal, and are possibly used as fallback strategies when content-based strategies fail. These strategies include parallel function (taking the referent of an anaphor to be the item in the preceding clause that plays the same grammatical role as the anaphor in its clause), and preference for syntactic subjects or first-mentioned items in preceding clauses as antecedents for anaphors in the current clause (though preferences for syntactic objects have also been reported, often depending on the prosodic stress given to the anaphor). Parallel function effects are strongest when the syntactic parallelism between the clauses is strongest. They are interesting because they are difficult to accommodate in both centering theory and Almor's ILH.

The strongest evidence for an overall preference for (unaccented) pronouns to be taken as referring back to an antecedent when it has been mentioned first compared to other possible antecedents comes from probe word tasks (Gernsbacher and Hargreaves, 1988). However, there is evidence that this preference may be an artifact of the testing procedure.

While these factors have been proposed independently of more general theories such as centering theory and the ILH, many of them could be taken up under the notion of focus within these theories. For example, centering theory proposes that an utterance's forward-looking centers are partially ordered to reflect which ones are most likely to be referred to again. This ordering may be based on factors such as syntactic position (indeed, the highest ranked forward-looking center has often been assumed to be the grammatical subject of the sentence). In the ILH, such factors also affect focusing.

Finally, it should be noted that while syntactic considerations undoubtedly influence reference, the reverse can also be true: there is evidence that syntactic processing is influenced by referential considerations. In a story about two women, the noun phrase 'the woman' is likely to be referentially indeterminate. So, although a 'that' clause is preferentially interpreted as a complement clause rather than a relative clause, if a postmodifier is needed to disambiguate a reference, this preference may be overridden, even in initial parsing (Altmann *et al*., 1992).

Summary and Conclusions

A psycholinguistic perspective on reference focuses on the mental representations and processes that underlie people's ability to use language, both as speakers and writers and as listeners and readers. Mental representations mediate references to things in real, imaginary, and abstract worlds. Linguistic and philosophical analyses bring to light some of the complexities that psychological theories must take account of.

A major concern within psycholinguistics has been to explain second and subsequent anaphoric references to the same person or thing. A variety of factors have been identified as influencing this process, and more recently the more unified approaches of centering theory and the informational load hypothesis have been suggested. These approaches are best

located within a mental models framework that stresses the importance of representations of situations in the world as mediating language processing.

See also: Discourse Processing; Psycholinguistics: History; Psycholinguistics: Overview; Reference: Semiotic Theory.

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Reference: Semiotic Theory

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Frege's Legacy

Classical theories of reference assume a strong connection between a sign, its meaning, and its reference. A word connected to a particular object embodies a description containing a rundown of the object's properties. This is to say that a word possesses the capacity to evoke in the mind a cluster of properties that serve to specify the nature of the object to which the word refers. Knowing the meaning of a sign is knowing how it refers, and knowing how it refers is presumably knowing truth – all of which can easily land one in a vicious circle.

Gottlob Frege simplified this formula. He drew a distinction between 'sense' (*Sinn*) and 'reference' (*Bedeutung*). Sense is grasped when a sign is understood, and this sense determines its reference. Frege is often regarded as the prime initiator of 'logicism' – the wedding of logic and mathematics, with the former hopefully becoming the patriarchal repository of all thought and the latter the queen of the sciences. This grand project called for a divorce of signs in general and most particularly of arithmetical signs from 'psychologism.' The idea was to purify language, to rescue it from the swamp of semantic muck into which it had presumably wandered, and to use it against itself in elevating it to clarity and precision. According to Frege and all kindred thinkers, if language could be liberated once and for all time from vagueness, ambiguity, and sticky generalities, it could become a respectable instrument of unequivocal thought. It could be used to paint a faithful 'picture' of any and all meaningful states of affairs. In other words, by 'logicizing' language, its weaknesses could be strengthened, its blemishes could be erased, and future mistakes could be avoided. From the Olympian reaches of the highest rooftops, the world could eventually be seen from a detached God's eye view.

So, the task Frege set for himself by way of this 'sense/reference' distinction was monumental: to establish a method for determining linkages between the objective world and its representation in signs. Equality of meaning of different signs referring to the same object became the watchword. The dilemma was that Frege's grand game plan involved rendering two virtually incompatible domains virtually equivalent: language, on the one hand, and the furniture of the world, on the other. Frege argued that, although two signs with the same reference – *Venus*,

for example – could have two senses (the 'morning star' and the 'evening star'), two signs with the same sense could not enjoy the luxury of different reference.

By way of definitions, the 'intension' (sense) of a sign consists of the conception of the sign, irrespective of that to which it refers. 'Extension' (reference) consists of the things to which that conception refers. Intension used in this context must be distinguished from 'intentionality,' a phenomenological term entailing the property of consciousness whereby it refers to or intends an object. The intensional object is not necessarily existent, but can be merely what the mental act is about, whereas extension presumably involves the 'real' furniture of the objective world.

Thus, 'Venus is Venus' is a tautology. In contrast, 'That star up there in the dark expanse is Venus' is not. It bears reference, extension. 'The evening star is Venus' has both reference and sense, intension. However, 'The morning star is Venus' also sports reference and sense. Reference is one ('Venus'), but sense is two ('evening star,' and 'morning star'). Yet, Frege assured us that no problem exists inasmuch as we specify 'reference' to objects in the physical world, so it is still smooth sailing toward clear and distinct thinking and meaning. Apparently, the relations between Frege's signs and the world are not characterized by symmetry, but by asymmetry. However, this problem was in a manner of speaking pushed under the rug, for the sign's intension (sense) was highlighted somewhat at the expense of extension (reference), and language itself, that apparently ubiquitous partner to mind, held the trump card. This outcome is what we might have expected, since Frege stacked the deck from the beginning.

More questions arise: do sentences impart any information regarding their presumed objects of reference (*Venus*, *morning star*, *evening star*), or simply about the signs themselves ('Venus,' 'morning star,' 'evening star')? If the latter is the case, then why do we like to be comforted by the soothing idea that 'reference' is fixed while meanings may suffer alterations? If meanings change, how can signs actually 'refer to' the same things in the world? If signs do not necessarily refer to the same things but to variable 'semiotic entities,' then do the 'real' things of the world actually make much difference regarding meaning? Can meanings be something found in things referred to, or are meanings embodied within their respective signs? Or in the final analysis, do words hook onto worlds?

The dilemma coiled within Frege's project soon became obvious. No real feeling and thinking mortal could expect to survive in the Fregean desiccated

world that afforded absolute purity of expression. If all fuzzy edges could somehow be smoothed for all time, then eventually even the artist's brush would run dry, the musical score would contain no notes, the dance troupe would be paralyzed, the poet would be condemned to silence and the blank page, and science would find itself suffering from interminable catatonia.

Actually, the demarcation between Frege's 'object' and 'reference' is quite tenuous. It seems safe to say that the idea of 'reference' is not coterminous with the percept and concept of a 'referent.' More adequately stated, it entails the act of referring, or better, the act of interrelating. Once the act has occurred, an 'object' then bounds onto the scene, which is now the incorporation of what is in the Fregean tradition called the sign's 'reference.'

Referential Paradise Lost?

In addition to Bertrand Russell's critique of Frege, Willard V. O. Quine upended the Fregean dream of clear and distinct reference with his 'inscrutability of reference' thesis. Quine *qua* lay physicist conceded that, in point of epistemological footing, physical and mental objects differ only in degree: Both interact with our general conception of things as cultural posits (1953). Yet, he placed greater stock in physical objects than he did in, say, Homer's gods. Physical objects are epistemologically superior to purely mental constructs insofar as they have in the past proved more efficacious as a device for ordering the flux of experience. Lest our confidence run rampant, however, we are reminded that physicalism provides us with no guarantee.

Quine argued that not only does sense not determine reference but that sense is itself indeterminate, as is reference. In his classical example, a field linguist overhears "Gavagai!" from the mouth of a native informant when a rabbit is sighted scurrying through the bushes, and the linguist cannot know whether the word means 'rabbit,' 'undetached rabbit parts,' or 'a rabbit space-time stage.' Because each of these phrases has different extensions, reference to 'Gavagai!' remains radically indeterminate. If this holds true of someone else's language, it is also true of one's own language when one is conversing with a fellow language user. How is one to know if the other person is using her words in the same manner one would be prone to use them? Quine's elaborate argument leads to the conclusion that we must give up the idea that we can refer determinately to that of which we think we speak. However, we are left with a queasy feeling. Quine wrote quite convincingly about the indeterminacy of reference; however, he did so by talking about 'rabbit,' 'rabbit parts,' and

'rabbit stages' as if his words enjoyed some sort of reference or other. Indeed, the very assumption that we cannot refer determinately to the furniture of our world presupposes that we can somehow refer by the fact of our talking about the furniture of our world when claiming we cannot refer to the furniture of our world. In a manner of putting it, the indeterminacy of reference cannot be said, yet we can apparently say it.

What is Quine's solution? Bite the bullet and concede that the very idea of reference is meaningless. Saving grace can be had, Quine has told us, if we have a background language against which to gauge the meanings of the words in the target language. The sentence, "Gavagai!" refers to rabbit in what sense of 'rabbit?' kick-starts a regress, and we need a background language as a fulcrum point to regress into so that the regress will not continue unabated. The background language gives words in the target language sense, if only relative sense: sense relative to the background language. Demanding determinate reference would be like quantum physics demanding *both* determinate position *and* velocity, rather than *either* position *or* velocity relative to a given frame of reference – the background language. So, we acquiesce to our mother tongue, take words at face value, and do the best we can with what we have.

Yet, why, we might ask, should we have faith in our mother tongue?

A Retreat into Imaginary Worlds and Language in Search of an Answer

Historically, extension has been supposedly upfront and stalwart, intension uncertain and anemic. However, Quine claimed that both are inscrutable. Of course, within the parochial confines of our own language, extension continues to seem more reliable than intension. However, this is not necessarily so: The empirical determinacy of extension, through time, cannot even be guaranteed within our own language. Thus for Quine, and, more recently from another vantage point, that of Jacques Derrida (1973), there is no experience that can provide data with which a statement can be absolutely verified. There are no data, because there is no absolute 'immediacy' or 'presence.' This lack renders the meaning of the most basic of statements such as "That raven is black" simply undecidable, for such statements do not refer instantaneously to some independent empirical entity in the 'real' world. We can do no more than gather up an unruly collection of unfixed meanings and muddle along. Reference is ultimately imaginary, or at most it is a linguistic act.

Most Fregeans of a positivist bent contended that, regarding imaginary constructs or fictions,

there can be no meaningful concern for reference or truth. Recently, a new generation of language philosophers and literary theorists has undertaken the analysis of reference in fiction; their efforts often have been governed by contrived explanations of the difference between normal reference and the presumably aberrant, abnormal practice of reference to nonexistent objects. Literary theorist Thomas Pavel (1986), for example, argued that there *is* reference to fictional worlds, whether the 'objects' contained within them exist in the 'real' world or not and whether they are possible or impossible 'objects.' He brandished his idea that normal and marginal referential practices are different in degree rather than in kind because they display many identical characteristics: Fictional reference is by no means a logically strange activity, but rather is a close cousin to our conventional manner of making reference. Although at one point Pavel admitted to a 'complex and unstable' relationship between texts and worlds and between the 'real' world and fictional worlds, he suggested a deep-seated, tacit human assent toward 'textual realism'; this is rooted in our very nature to the degree that we tend to compensate for the lack of referential immediacy "by the strength of our ontological commitments," for we confidently "regard our worlds as unified and coherent, our fits of ontological prodigality notwithstanding" (Pavel, 1986: 73).

The notion of imaginary or fictive reference as a linguistic act tends to historicize reference, to render it a matter of language conventions: How we use our words determines that to which they refer. This is also to assume that extension enjoys no necessary priority over intension. Richard Rorty (1982) also historicized reference. Our ancestors, he wrote, believed in many things that do not really exist – they are purely intensional objects the likes of which we label 'unicorns,' 'werewolves,' 'mermaids,' and such. Ordinarily, we tend patronizingly to dismiss these hapless predecessors; they were steeped in prejudice and superstition. Century after century, they failed to name the 'real,' whereas we somehow would like to believe we are finally getting things right. However, Rorty argued that the traditional notion of reference provides no axiom by means of which to solve the problem of our ancestors invariably being wrong while we are largely right. On so doing he referred to three senses of 'refer.'

Hilary Putnam's (1990) 'opaque' A-reference is commonsensical: It involves things we refer to not by 'metaphysical realism' but by the very act of thinking we are referring to them (including nonexistent entities), which is what Putnam termed 'internal realism.' 'Transparent' B-reference is of the Bertrand Russell type in the sense that only what exists can

be referred to, the technical use of the term generally being limited to linguistics and philosophy (or, in Putnam's words, 'metaphysical realism'). C-reference entails something like what Thomas Pavel (1986) called 'mixed sentences.' The statement, 'Jove's thunderbolts are actually electrical discharges from the clouds,' includes both our misguided ancestor's A-reference ('Those are Jove's thunderbolts') and our own enlightened and presumably superior B-reference ('Those are nothing but electrical discharges from the clouds'). The question Rorty asked is: How was perennial ancestral error suddenly seen as error by means of its alteration to produce an apparent truth? The best we can do is to assume our ancestors did the best they could, expect the same of ourselves, and trust our descendants will do likewise.

If we apply Rorty's notion to the idea of fictive worlds and their interpretation by successive communities of literary addicts, we might surmise that the *Don Quixote* our ancestors read 'referred' to a relatively limited fictive space, the borders of which were expanded with subsequent readings by future readers. Consequently, our *Don Quixote* world is exceedingly vast in comparison with that of our ancestors. In this vein, previous readings of Cervantes's masterpiece actualized a certain part of the potential representing the novel's fictional universe, whereas current readings are capable of actualizing a greater portion. But are they? Our ancestors' form of life had myriad facets, many of which are not known to us or are simply no longer accessible to us. Of course, our readings are contextualized within the numbing complexity of our contemporary milieu, in addition to our awareness of intertextual implications. Yet, our ancestors had their own access to the intricately woven fabric of their oral tradition, as well as the literary works of their day, some of which we have relegated to the attic. Do not readings separated by vast expenses of space and time become radically distinct? Can there be a set of criteria for determining the magnitude of textual fictive space?

In view of these difficulties in conceptualizing an ontological framework for fictions, one might tend to concur with Rorty that over the long haul reference is pointless. All we need is the common sense notion of 'talking about' – A-reference – according to which the criterion for what a statement is 'about' is, in varying degrees of approximation, whatever we think we are talking 'about.'

Our Fallible Limitations

Yet, perhaps Rorty's commonsensical talking 'about' some-*thing* and therefore merely talking and

somehow getting along swimmingly is tantamount to Pavel's counsel that we minimize indeterminacy of reference and the incompleteness of all worlds by gracefully acknowledging their complexity and risking "the invention of a completeness-determinacy myth." The example of *Don Quixote* is once again evoked. Our venerable Hidalgo reads the world around him according to novels of chivalry, regardless of empirical evidence disproving his hypothetical framework. However, in a sense his hypothesis is correct. After all, he manages to succeed "in the detailed construction of a coherent, if precarious and incomplete, world version" (Pavel, 1986: 111).

Granted, Cervantes's hero packed his universe into the Procrustean bed of 16th-century prose. In so doing, he read fiction as if it referred to the real, serving as a warning to all readers, whether they are engaged in reading the text of the universe or the universe of texts. A certain 'referential fallacy' surfaces here. Regarding our present-world version as the field of reference, which we would by and large like to take as 'real,' there is no guarantee that we somehow got things right. Therefore, if in the sense of Karl Popper (1963), confirmation is inevitably failed refutation, we must go on being wrong with the idea that in the long run somehow we will be able to succeed. Regarding our textual worlds offering up their points of reference to us, which we take to be fictions and 'irreal' and perhaps at their best 'real' by proxy, no matter how complete our interpretation may take us, there will always be some way to take it a mite further. Either way, pinning our words and signs onto whatever imaginary or physical world or worlds lie before us is at worst inconsistent and at best it remains an incomplete project. This 'referential fallacy' is not of the Umberto Eco (1976) sort (for a critique of Eco's argument against the notion of reference, see Ponzio, 1993; Knuuttila, 2003).

Alternatives Emerge

In a last-ditch effort to salvage the idea of reference, we have the 'causal theory,' which at the same time delivers a death certificate to any and all attempts to derive reference from a description of the object of a word's properties or attributes.

The causal theory says words, and all signs for that matter, refer to the furniture of the world in terms of historically determined causal chains involving that furniture and our linguistic – and general semiotic – representations of them. This theory demands nothing less than the condition by means of which one part of the world is semantically related to another part. This is a tall order indeed, and it can

place us in a quandary. How many possible causal chains are there for a particular sign and its representation? One culture's, and even one person's, causal chain is another culture's or person's falsity, absurdity, nonsense, or merely silliness. What a causal theory needs is a corollary of counterfactuality; a causal theory must specify reference in conditional terms: What would be the case were certain causal relations to inhere?

Now enter Donald Davidson (1990). Davidson tossed 'reference' into the trash bin of misused concepts. He would like to convince us that reference, whether intensionally or causally construed, cannot support the entire conceptual weight of a theory of interpretation. He alluded to Alfred Tarski's (1956) theory of truth, the paradigm case for which is his T-sentence: '"Snow is white" if and only if snow is white.' The Tarskian assumption has it that truth is explicable in terms of reference. With respect to the T-sentence, truth is determined by inspection of the object of reference; truth is explicable in terms of reference.

However, Davidson, in disagreement with Tarski, had no use for such a correspondence theory of truth. He abandoned reference altogether, but held tight to the idea of truth. Availing himself of the 'Principle of Charity,' he argued that truth for one human speaker and truth for another human speaker will always have enough in common for them to find common ground and so they will be able to communicate. Truth, in other words, is a matter of belief, and belief is somehow dependent on the nature of the world. Since the world is a certain way, one speaker cannot interpret another speaker as believing that the world is any way other than the way it is. This is to imply, it would seem, that a human language is a language only on the premise that it can be translated into – and thus interpreted by – another human language. Translation is tantamount to interpretation, and interpretation arises out of beliefs regarding what is true and what is not true, regardless of what might be taken as reference. Fortunately for us, human speakers in the Davidsonian theory will be more rational than irrational, more logical than illogical with respect to their beliefs about the world.

All this is to take the furniture of the world as not some fixed collection of things out there that are waiting for words properly to be slapped onto them. Yet, speakers usually take the world, their world, for what it is, as if it were quite fixed. Davidsonian theory also takes human speakers as generally correct, and any error or disagreement is dependent upon their general correctness. The problem is that error and with it disagreement are not merely possible but actual, for whatever is known of the world is

incomplete, and if presumably complete, then it will often be inconsistent. However, there will always be alternatives from which we stand to learn something more.

This brings us once again to Putnam. Putnam's meaning is neither in the mind, nor the sign, nor the conduit of information flow between signs and speakers and speakers, nor in the thing to which the sign presumably refers. There is no God's eye view of a fixed world replete with mind-independent objects, acts, and events. Signs do not by their nature hook onto things; neither do they correspond to things. Neither does mind create the hooks or establish the correspondence. Rather, "The mind and the world jointly make up the mind and the world" (Putnam, 1981: 55). If we can speak of reference at all, it is reference with respect to the interdependent, interrelated interaction among mind, sign, and world, within the whole of all contexts, both actual and possible, and past, present, and expected in the future. We must take the world, our world, as objective ('external,' 'real,' 'mind-independent'), for it is the only world we have for the moment; yet, we must acknowledge that it could always be taken for something slightly to radically different, so it is 'ideal' ('internal,' 'mind-dependent'). Now, how can we hope to integrate this assertion with the notion of reference?

Reference within the Triadic Concept of the Sign: Peirce

Frege's 'sense' embraced the notion of understanding, and understanding a language cannot be divorced from knowledge. So a theory of knowledge would seem to be in question. In this manner, a theory of sense should be a component of a general theory of knowledge, and knowledge in this respect should involve the idea of 'truth.'

This is not entirely the case, however. The Fregean reference of a name implies the bearer of that name, the object. To know 'reference' is to know the object, but not necessarily to know the 'truth' of the object. Knowledge of objects, acts, and events is not tantamount to knowledge of the 'truth' of those objects, acts, and events. It is, rather, knowledge of the linguistic use of words that interrelate with those objects, acts, and events. 'Sense,' it would seem to follow, is a matter of understanding how those words are used. This linguistic manner of distinguishing between sense and reference serves to liberate us from a psychological interpretation of meaning and from worry about the ontological status of sense and the objects, acts, and events of reference.

Then, do sense and reference give us a way of recognizing or identifying objects, acts, and events

as the bearers of sense and reference? If that is the case, then where are interpretation and understanding: in those very objects, acts, and events; in the words or signs used; in sense and reference; or in the medium carrying those words? Obviously, Frege discarded psychologism, so interpretation and understanding are not in the head. He also had little need for ontology, so they are not in the objects, acts, and events. Neither are they exclusively within the words or signs nor in the communicative meaning (marks on pages or sound patterns in the air). Interpretation and understanding come about within the sentential context; 'The morning star,' 'The evening star,' for example (McDowell, 1993). Yet, such understanding involves words and things; it is basically a dyadic affair, as are the majority of the theories of reference that have popped up since Frege.

That much said, briefly consider Charles S. Peirce's concept of the sign, which is indelibly triadic. Peirce's sign consists of a 'Representamen' (akin to what usually goes by the name 'sign'), an 'Object' (a 'semiotic entity' as some physical object, act, or event is perceived, conceived, or imagined), and an 'Interpretant' (roughly comparable to the interpretation or meaning of the sign emerging from Frege's 'sense'). However, in the Peircean sense an Interpretant, once at least tentatively understood, can then become a sign in its own right. The same can be said for the Object as it is 'semiotically' perceived, conceived, or imagined by some interpreting agent. In this manner, neither reference nor meaning is fixed, for signs are processual.

Thus, **Figure 1** depicts a three-dimensional tripod, not a triangle. The tripod illustrates that each sign component interrelates with its pair of companions in the same way they interrelate with each other and with it. Where are reference and the referent located? The question reveals the problem. There is no location. There is only interdependent, interrelated, interactive triadicity. So, where do sense, meaning,

Figure 1 Peirce's conception of the three-dimensional tripodic sign.

interpretation, and understanding take place? Once again, there is a problem with language. They do not 'take place,' for there is no specifiable 'place.' Interpretation, meaning, and understanding are not in the head; the signs; the objects, acts, and events; or in the communicative medium. They are in the entire context, which includes body and mind (*bodymind*) of the semiotic subject or agent. Moreover, they are always becoming something other than what they were becoming – this feature puts them within the now gently flowing, now undulating, now bucking and unruly semiotic stream of Peirce's process philosophy.

How can one account for this apparently disorderly universe of reference and meaning making? In the first place, understanding a language and other sign uses, sense and reference, and meaning making does not necessarily entail explicit knowledge of some theory. The knowing semiotic agent implicitly knows how to make meaning with the tacit assumption that sense and reference are somehow in the meaning making and so gets on with the task with no further ado. There is hardly any demand for describing and explaining what is done. It is just done because the semiotic agent knows what to do and does it. At the same time, because the agent does not ordinarily use nor needs to use some hard-rock theory, rules for doing what she does cannot help but suffer virtually imperceptible to radical jerks, shifts, and upheavals along the way. Thus, what she does is processual and ever changing. Everything changes in her semiotic world except change itself. How so?

Unstable Semiotically Engendered Worlds

Figure 2 gives us the sign or Representamen as either (1) a model of the H_2O molecule in a high-school chemistry class, (2) a mannequin in front of a class for the purpose of studying human anatomy, or (3) a dinosaur model before a group of fifth-grade students. The respective objects – and presumably, the means of reference and the referents – of the signs are (1) unempirical in the unaided concrete sense, yet theoretically existent; (2) empirical, and shared by the entire class; and (3) unempirical, and nonexistent in the present, yet theoretically empirical with respect to human observers in the past.

The teacher in each case has the task of rendering the sign meaningful in terms of some referent, whether unseeable without elaborate equipment, evident to the senses, or presumably seeable by some semiotic agent living in the remote past. To complete this task, she must become a sign, because her students interpret her while they interpret her words and her assortment of extralinguistic signs. At the same time, each student and the collective body of students become signs, because she interprets them through the array of nonverbal cues, questions, and comments she receives from them. In this broader, more inclusive sense, the original signs (1), (2), and (3) become semiotic Objects while the teacher and students become Representamens and Interpretants for one another. So we have two tripods, with the inclusion of the sign makers and sign takers. Put in another

Figure 2 The sign or Representamen given three different ways, creating a 'tripodulation.'

way, we have a 'tripodulation' of what Donald Davidson (1990) called 'triangulation' in the process of bringing semiotic agents into the equation (Pagin, 2001). The upshot is that reference and referents are of hardly any account if we simply consider meaning to reside exclusively in the word, the sentence, or the entire text. Reference, referents, interpretations, meanings, and understanding are holistic affairs. They require entire contexts. There is no clear-cut demarcation between time and place here. Everything, everywhere, in the past, the present, and the future, to a greater or lesser degree come into play.

This is to say that signs, reference, referents, interpretations, meanings, and understanding, as well as the agents of understanding, are all involved in a co-participatory process. The participatory semiotic universe entails interdependence, interrelatedness, and interaction in the widest sense. It is much like one of physicist John Archibald Wheeler's examples illustrating his notion of what he calls the 'participatory universe.' Wheeler offered the example of three baseball umpires (1980). One says, "I sees 'em the way they are" (a naive realist or referential causality theorist). Another rebuts, "I says 'em the way I sees 'em" (a perspectivist, who believes sense determines reference). The third umpire, somewhat more cautiously observes, "They ain't nothing 'til I sees 'em" (a process philosopher coparticipating with signs and their meanings). Our third umpire will have no truck with anything less than the inclusion of herself, ecologically, within the whole of what is becoming (as illustrated in **Figure 2**). As she becomes, so also everything becomes; everything is always in the process of becoming something other. Indeed, "reference is rather a process than an entity, something that needs to be accomplished every time anew" (Knuuttila, 2003: 109).

Reference is always there, for the making and taking, like all signs. For, the semiotic object, like the semiotic agent herself, is nothing more and nothing less than a sign among signs.

See also: Reference: Psycholinguistic Approach.

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Reflexivity

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Reflexivity is a term variously applied to certain properties of the grammatical systems and lexical forms of language, to the meanings of such forms, to the mental or cognitive capacities of language users, to the textually formed discourses that users create, to states of agentive consciousness of people acting in social situations, and to the special case of researchers as agents seeking to understand social behaviors such as the use of language in society.

Reflexivity as a grammatical phenomenon indicates the referential identity or equivalence of two grammatical terms, generally propositional arguments, of a clause-sized grammatical phrase. The prototype is the relationship of grammatical subject to grammatical object, revealed in English *-self* reflexive pronouns, but indirect reflexives (Takelma), reflexive possessors of nominals (Slavic languages), cross-clause reflexives (Inuit), etc., also are found.

Reflexivity is a lexical phenomenon, in that certain words of a metalinguistic sort, terms denoting or describing phenomena in language itself, are examples in the real world of the very phenomenon. Conceptualizing metalinguistic reflexivity, some logicians devised a special terminological contrast, (German) *autologisch* (English: *autological*, also *homological*) vs. *heterologisch* (*heterological*) for a logical predicate, particularly an adjective, denoting a property true of the metalinguistic form itself; hence English *short* is a (relatively) short word form of one syllable, and autological, while *long*, of similar form, is heterological. A large number of the Indian grammatical terms for describing derivational phenomena of Sanskrit, now applied more widely as standard technical terms, are themselves examples of the phenomenon denoted, e.g., *tat + puruṣa-* (literally, 'that'+'man') denotes the class of compound stems composed of modifier (here, the stem of a third person anaphor) plus modified; thus *tatpuruṣa-* is itself a tatpuruṣa compound (meaning 'that-(person's)-man').

Reflexivity is, as well, a fact of denotational usage. Among the grammatical and lexical categories of languages, the token-reflexives, or shifters (*see* **Deixis and Anaphora: Pragmatic Approaches**), or indexical-denotational forms, are pervasive and universal. Most obviously, these include the paradigms of personal deictics such as French singulars *je/moi/me/mon* and *tu/toi/te/ton*, the referents of which can be located only when one can identify the individual who is communicating with the instance, or 'token,' of the form, and the individual to whom the instance or token has been directed. The reference of such forms reflexively depends on the actual role inhabitance in the communicative event in which a token is used. Not only nominal – functionally referential – but pervasive verbal – hence, predicational – categories show token reflexivity of this sort; rules of token-reflexivity underlie the language structure and its anchoring to specific contexts of communication as experienceable events.

Reflexivity, for some writers, also means having a conceptual capacity to communicate token-reflexively, that is, having a metacommunicative intentionality, whether conscious or, to varying degrees, unconscious. Deploying token-reflexivity in respect of community or group norms for communicating, so that language use is appropriate to particular contextual conditions and effective in bringing about contextual conditions, presumes such a reflexive, or 'metapragmatic,' level of cognition (*see* **Metapragmatics**). This is most transparently revealed in explicit primary performative utterances, where reflexively used forms (such as the Kiksht (Wasco-Wishram) metapragmatic verb/root -pgna- in yamupgna 'diálax' 'I-name/pronounce-you 'Diálax.'') token- reflexively describes as true of the event in which it is used, the effective (i.e., causally consequential and successful)

act of which the very utterance of the formula with its token consists. Such possibly performative effects of any utterance whatsoever – as much constructing as construing the world-as-denoted – are a constant concern of reflexive constructivism as an epistemological stance.

In the study of cultural texts , e.g., in literary and media criticism, reflexivity is the quality of signaling a metapragmatic relationship of a text to its genre conventions and intertextual field of comparison. An art work thematically depicting 'doing art'; advertisements that quote or spoof other advertisements or that imply with a wink that addressees know this is one; a film that sets up a scene that is diagrammatically like a famous earlier one, etc. – these all show textual reflexivity, and, by interpretative inference, reveal that the communicators – senders and receivers – too, probably have the metapragmatic agentive consciousness to formulate and understand the reflexive message.

Reflexivity is, increasingly, becoming an important concept in research methodology in the social and behavioral sciences, as well as in contemporary humanistic fields. Originally seen as merely a source of potential bias or error against which positivist social and behavioral science had to struggle, we now recognize the researcher's own reflexive metapragmatic consciousness and inevitable actual participant status in any contexts of research on humans. This makes all research a dialectical process of moving, reflexively, back and forth between 'objective' and inductive accounts of data in a research context, on the one hand, and on the other, a metapragmatic analysis of the communicative situation in which such data arise to and for the researcher.

See also: Deixis and Anaphora: Pragmatic Approaches; Metapragmatics.

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Register: Overview

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Introduction

Native speakers of a language choose among different words and grammatical structures depending on the communicative situation. For example, we do not use the same words and structures to write an academic term paper that we would use when talking to a close friend about weekend plans.

Researchers study the language used in a particular situation under the rubric of 'register.' 'Register' is used here as a cover term for any language variety defined by its situational characteristics, including the speaker's purpose, the relationship between speaker and hearer, and the production circumstances.

Speech and writing can be considered as two very general registers. The most obvious difference between the two is the physical mode of production. In addition, spoken discourse is often interactive and speakers often do not plan their language ahead of time. In contrast, written discourse is usually not interactive. In fact, writers are usually addressing a large audience, rather than a single reader. However, writers can plan and revise the text as much as they want. The final written text includes only the revised and edited language (*see* **Pragmatics of Reading**).

At the same time, there are many more specified spoken registers. For example, a formal lecture is very different from conversation: it is carefully planned ahead of time, it is addressed to a large audience, it will probably not be interactive, and the speaker will usually want to communicate information about the world rather than telling us a lot about him- or herself. Similarly, there are many specific written

registers. For example, e-mail messages are very different from textbooks: e-mails are not always edited or revised carefully; they probably will be written to a single person, who will respond; and they may talk about the personal feelings and activities of the writer (*see* **E-mail, Internet, Chatroom Talk: Pragmatics**).

Different cultures recognize different registers. One way to figure out the registers in a culture is to list the text categories that have names, such as 'letters,' 'textbooks,' 'e-mail messages,' 'newspaper articles,' 'biographies,' 'shopping lists,' 'term papers,' 'novels,' and so on. However, registers can be defined at any level of generality, and more specialized registers may not have widely used names (see Biber, 1994). For example, 'academic prose' is a very general register, whereas 'methodology sections in experimental psychology articles' is a much more highly specified register.

Registers differ in their situational characteristics. They are planned to different extents, interactive to different extents, and addressed to different kinds of audiences. They also have different topics, and they are written with different goals or purposes.

Registers are identified by 'nonlinguistic' or 'situational' characteristics, such as the setting, the audience, interactiveness, and extent of planning. There have been numerous studies that describe the situational parameters that distinguish among registers (see, e.g., Crystal and Davy, 1969; Hymes, 1974; Brown and Fraser, 1979; Duranti, 1985; Biber, 1994). Several situational characteristics are identified in most of these frameworks, including the participants (including their relationships and their attitudes toward the communication); the setting (including factors such as the extent to which time and place are shared among participants and the level of formality); the channel (or mode) of communication; the production and processing circumstances; the purpose of communication; and the topic. A register can be defined by a particular combination of values for any (group) of these situational characteristics.

Although registers are defined in situational terms, they can also be described in terms of their typical linguistic characteristics. This is because linguistic features serve important communicative functions and therefore tend to occur in registers with certain situational characteristics. For example, first- and second-person pronouns (*I* and *you*) are especially common in conversation. These linguistic features are associated with the normal situational characteristics of conversation: speakers in conversation talk a great deal about themselves, and so they use the pronoun *I* a lot. They are also interactive, talking to another individual person, and so they also use the pronoun *you* a lot.

There are many studies that describe both the situational and linguistic characteristics of a particular register. These are often highly specialized registers, such as sports announcer talk (Ferguson, 1983), note-taking (Janda, 1985), personal ads (Bruthiaux, 1994), and classified advertising (Bruthiaux, 1996). Many register studies have also been carried out within a Hallidayan functional–systemic framework (see, e.g., Halliday, 1988, and the collection of papers in Ghadessy, 1988, which include descriptions of written sports commentary, press advertising, and business letters) (*see* **Halliday, Michael Alexander Kirkwood**). Several studies adopting this approach have been concerned with school-based registers and their implications for education generally (see, e.g., Martin, 1993). The academic journal *English for Specific Purposes* publishes articles that describe the characteristics of specialized registers, providing the foundation for more focused curricula for the teaching of English as a Foreign Language (*see* **Second and Foreign Language Learning and Teaching; Languages for Specific Purposes**).

In addition to the study of individual registers, many studies have made comparisons across registers, studying the patterns of 'register variation.' Register variation is inherent in human language: a single speaker will make systematic choices in pronunciation, morphology, word choice, and grammar, reflecting a range of situational factors. The ubiquitous nature of register variation has been noted by a number of scholars, such as Ure: "each language community has its own system of registers ... corresponding to the range of activities in which its members normally engage" (1982: 5); Ferguson: "register variation, in which language structure varies in accordance with the occasions of use, is all-pervasive in human language" (1983: 154); or Hymes: "no human being talks the same way all the time .... At the very least, a variety of registers and styles is used and encountered" (1984: 44).

Comparative register analyses are important for two major arenas of linguistic research: (1) linguistic descriptions of lexical and grammatical features, and (2) descriptions of the registers themselves. With respect to traditional lexical and grammatical descriptions, register studies have shown that functional descriptions of a grammatical feature are generally not valid for the language as a whole. Rather, characteristics of the textual environment interact with register differences, so that strong patterns of use in one register often represent only weak patterns in other registers. For register descriptions, a comparative register perspective provides the baseline needed to understand the linguistic characteristics of any individual register.

Register differences can exist at any linguistic level. The following sections discuss some of these differences at the lexical, grammatical, and lexico-grammatical levels. Then, I return to the description of registers and the overall patterns of register variation.

Lexical and Grammatical Differences among Registers

One analytical approach that has been especially productive for studying register variation is corpus-based analysis, with its emphasis on the representativeness of the database, and its computational tools for investigating distributional patterns across registers and across discourse contexts in large text collections (see McEnery and Wilson, 1996; Biber *et al.*, 1998; Kennedy, 1998; Meyer, 2002; and Hunston, 2002 for introductions to this analytical approach). The *Longman grammar of spoken and written English* (LGSWE; Biber *et al.*, 1999) applies corpus-based analyses to show how any grammatical feature can be described for both its structural characteristics and its patterns of use across spoken and written registers. The analyses in the LGSWE are based on texts from four registers: conversation, fiction, newspaper language, and academic prose. Although these are general registers, they differ from one another in important ways (e.g., with respect to mode, interactiveness, production circumstances, purpose, and target audience). The analyses were carried out on the Longman Spoken and Written English (LSWE) Corpus, which contains ca. 40 million words of text overall, with ca. 4–5 million words from each of these four registers. Selected analyses from the LGSWE are used in the following sections to illustrate the systematic lexical and grammatical differences found across registers.

Lexical Differences across Registers

Probably the most obvious linguistic difference among registers is word choice. For example, in conversation we rely heavily on vague nouns with general content – such as *stuff* and *thing* – whereas these nouns are rarely used in registers such as textbooks or newspaper editorials.

In fact, the most common words in each word class show sharp differences among registers. **Table 1** shows some of the contrasts between the common verbs, adjectives, and adverbs used in conversation versus the words belonging to the same lexical categories used in academic prose.

Similar differences could easily be identified for other registers. In part, these differences reflect the different topics and communicative purposes

Table 1 Selected common verbs, adjectives, and adverbs in conversation versus academic prose

Conversation	*Academic prose*
Verbs	
Get	Produce
Go	Provide
Come	Obtain
Make	Form
Take	Describe
Say	Develop
Know	Require
Think	Occur
See	Involve
Want	Include
Adjectives	
Big	Same
Little	Different
Old	Important
Good	Necessary
Nice	Difficult
Sure	Possible
Right	Likely
Adverbs	
Just	Often
Really	Usually
Too	Especially
Pretty	Relatively
Real	Particularly
Like	Generally
Maybe	Indeed

Source: Based on LGSWE (Biber *et al.*, 1999: 512–513, 517, 561–562).

typically associated with a register. However, these differences can also reflect conventional associations of particular words with particular situations of use.

Grammatical Differences across Registers

Although they are not as easily noticed, grammatical differences among registers are as pervasive as lexical differences. The descriptions in the LGSWE show that nearly any grammatical feature will be distributed in systematic ways across registers. **Tables 2** and **3** contrast some of the most important distinctive grammatical characteristics of conversation versus academic prose.

Many of the grammatical features typical of conversation listed in **Table 2** reflect a heavy reliance on verbs, adverbs, and pronouns instead of complex noun phrases. These features result in the dense use of short, simple clauses. However, it also turns out that several dependent clause features are much more common in conversation than other registers. These are mostly complement clauses controlled by verbs, especially *that*-clauses (the complementizer *that* is

frequently omitted in these structures). These features are often used to express 'stance' in conversation: the controlling verb expresses the stance, and the complement clause contains the new information, for example, *I just think [it's cool]* or *I know [what you're talking about].*

The typical characteristics of conversation can be contrasted with the typical features of academic prose. Three different word classes are especially prevalent in academic prose: nouns, adjectives, and prepositions. Overall, these grammatical classes are more frequent in academic prose than in other registers, but there are many related specific features that are especially characteristic of academic prose (e.g., nominalizations, noun phrases with multiple modifiers). In contrast, verbs overall are much less common in academic prose than in other registers, although there are specific verb categories that are especially common in academic prose (e.g., copula *be*, existence verbs, derived verbs, and passive voice verbs). Similarly, there are specific categories of adverbs and adverbials (e.g., linking adverbials) that are especially common in academic prose. **Table 3** lists some of the major grammatical features that are especially common in academic prose.

A comparison of the typical linguistic characteristics of conversation and academic prose reveals several unanticipated differences, showing how empirical register analyses can run counter to our prior expectations. One of the most surprising differences relates to the use of dependent clauses, contradicting the widespread belief that academic prose is more 'complex' than conversation and that dependent clauses are therefore especially common in academic prose. Rather, empirical register studies have shown that only some dependent clause types are common in written registers and that specific clause types have their own distributions among registers. For example, finite relative clauses are much more common in writing than in conversation, but they are most common in newspaper writing and fiction rather than in academic prose. However, relative clauses with the relative pronoun *which* are most frequent in academic prose. Nonfinite relative clauses (*-ing* clauses and *-ed* clauses) are also most common in academic prose (although they are frequently found in newspaper writing as well) (*see* **Media: Pragmatics**).

Other dependent clause types turn out to be more common in speech. For example, many complement clause types are much more common in conversation than in academic prose (see **Table 2**). These complement clauses often serve important stance functions in conversation (e.g., *I think that…; I don't know what…; I want to…*), making them an especially

Table 2 Grammatical features that are especially common in conversation

Feature	Pattern of use
Verbs and verb phrases	
Verbs, overall	Verbs are much more common in conversation than in informational written registers (almost 1/3 of all content words in conversation are lexical verbs) (p. 65, 359)
Mental verbs	Mental verbs (e.g., *know, think, see, want, mean*) are more common in conversation (p. 366, 368)
Modal verbs	Modal verbs are also much more common in conversation than in the written registers, especially *can, will, would* (p. 486 ff.); semimodal verbs (such as *especially, have to, (had) better, (have) got to, used to*) are common only in conversation (p. 486 ff.)
Tense and aspect	ca. 70% of all verb phrases in conversation are present tense (p. 456 ff.); the progressive aspect (verb + *-ing*) is common in conversation (and fiction) (p. 462 ff.)
Adverbs	
Simple adverbs	Most common in conversation (pp. 540–542)
Adjectives used as adverbs	Common only in conversation, e.g., *It's running real good* (pp. 542–543)
Adverbs of 'stance'	Most common in conversation, especially *really, actually, like, maybe* (pp. 859, 867–871)
Pronouns	
Personal pronouns	Most common in conversation, especially *I, you, it* (pp. 92, 235, 237, 333–334)
Demonstrative pronoun *that*	Extremely common only in conversation (pp. 349–350)
Simple clauses	
Questions	Common only in conversation (p. 211 ff.)
Imperatives	Common only in conversation (pp. 221–222)
Coordination 'tags'	Common only in conversation, e.g., *or something* (but note the use of *etc.* in writing) (pp. 116–117)
Dependent clauses	
Verb + *that*-clause	Most common in conversation, especially *think, know, guess*, + *that*-clause (pp. 668–670, 674–675); overall, over 80% of all *that*-clauses in conversation omit *that* (pp. 680–683)

Source: Based on a survey of LGSWE (Biber *et al.*, 1999). Page numbers refer to specific pages in the LGSWE.

Table 3 Some grammatical features that are especially common in academic prose

Feature	Pattern of use
Nouns and noun phrases	
Nouns, overall	Approximately 60% of all content words in academic prose are nouns (p. 65)
Pronouns	Nouns are much more common than pronouns in academic prose, especially in object positions (pp. 235–236); as to specific pronouns, such as *this* and generic *one*, they are much more common in academic prose (pp. 349–350, 354–355); *this* is used for immediate textual reference, whereas *one* is used for generic rather than specific reference
Plural nouns	Much more common in writing than in conversation; most common in academic prose (pp. 291–292)
Nominalizations	Much more common in academic prose, especially nouns formed with *-tion* and *-ity* (pp. 322–323)
Definite article *the*	Much more common in writing than in conversation; most common in academic prose (pp. 267–269)
Demonstratives	Most common in academic prose; especially *this* and *these* (p. 270, 274–275)
Modifiers	60% of all noun phrases in academic prose have a modifier (p. 578)
Adjectives	
Adjectives, overall	Adjectives are much more common in academic prose than in conversation or fiction (pp. 65, 506)
Attributive adjectives	Much more common in academic prose (pp. 506, 589)
Derived adjectives	Much more common in academic prose, especially adjectives formed with *-al* (pp. 531–533)
Verbs and verb phrases	
Copular verbs *be, become*	Most common in academic prose (pp. 359–360, 437–439)
Existence verbs	Much more common in writing than in conversation; most common in academic prose (e.g., *include, involve, indicate*) (pp. 366, 369, 419)
Verbs with inanimate subjects	Common only in academic prose (e.g., *this quotation shows; the test sequence proves*) (pp. 378–380)
Derived verbs	Most common in academic prose, especially verbs formed with *re-* and *-ize* (pp. 400–403)
Passive voice	Much more common in academic prose, especially the 'short' passive (without *by*-phrase) (pp. 476–480, 937–940)
Adverbs and adverbials	
Linking adverbials	Most common in academic prose, especially *however, thus, therefore, for example* (e.g.) (pp. 766, 880–882)
Purpose and concessive adverbials	Most common in academic prose (*in order to, so as to, even, (al)though, albeit*, etc.) (pp. 784, 786, 820–821, 824–826)
Dependent clause features	
Relative clauses with the relative pronoun *which*	Most common in academic prose (pp. 609–612)
Noun + *that*-complement clause	Most common in academic prose (e.g., *the fact that . . .*); frequent head nouns are *fact, possibility, doubt, belief, assumption* (pp. 647–651)
Abstract noun + of + *ing*-clause	Most common in academic prose (e.g., *methods of assessing error*); frequent head nouns are *way, cost, means, method, possibility, effect, problem, process, risk* (pp. 653–655)
Extraposed clauses	Most common in academic prose, especially *that*-clauses controlled by the adjectives *clear, (un)likely,* and *(im)possible* (e.g., *it is likely that . . .*), and *to*-clauses controlled by adjectives (e.g., *it is important to . . .*) (pp. 672–675)
ing-clauses controlled by adjectives	Most common in academic prose (e.g., *capable of, important for/in, useful for/in*) (p. 749)
Concessive adverbial clauses	Most common in academic prose (and newspapers) (pp. 820–825)
Other features	
Prepositions	Most common in academic prose (p. 92)
Of-phrases	Much more common in writing than in conversation; most common in academic prose (pp. 301–302)
Stance noun + *of*-phrase	Most common in academic prose, especially *possibility of, value of, importance of, problem of, understanding of* (pp. 984–986)
Dual-gender reference	Common only in academic prose (*he or she, his or her, he/she*) (pp. 316–317)

Source: Based on a survey of the LGSWE (Biber *et al.*, 1999). Page numbers refer to specific pages in the LGSWE.

frequent and important part of everyday interactions. Only one major type of complement clause is especially characteristic of academic prose: extraposed clauses controlled by adjectives (e.g., *It is possible that...*, *It is important to...*). Adverbial clauses have a different distribution across registers, being most common overall in fiction. However, conversation also uses adverbial clauses to a slightly greater extent than academic prose (and conditional clauses are especially common in conversation). Only one subtype of adverbial clause is especially frequent in academic prose: concessive clauses.

Overall Patterns of Register Variation: The MD Approach

As noted above, a complementary research goal is to describe the general characteristics of a register and the overall patterns of register variation in a language. Despite the fundamental importance of register variation, there have been few comprehensive analyses of the register differences in a language. This gap is due mostly to methodological difficulties: until recently, it has not been feasible to analyze the full range of texts, registers, and linguistic characteristics required for comprehensive analyses of register variation. With the availability of large on-line text corpora and computational analytical tools, such analyses have become possible. (*see* **Computational Lingustics: Overview**).

The multidimensional (MD) analytical approach was developed for the comprehensive analysis of register variation, to discover and interpret the patterns of linguistic variation among registers in a corpus of texts (see, e.g., Biber, 1988). Early researchers in sociolinguistics (e.g., Ervin-Tripp, 1972; Hymes, 1974) argued that linguistic features work together in texts as constellations of co-occurring features (rather than as individual features) to distinguish among registers. Although this theoretical perspective is widely accepted, linguists lacked the methodological tools required to identify these co-occurrence patterns before the availability of corpus-based analytical techniques. MD analysis provides these tools, using automatic corpus analysis to analyze the quantitative distribution of numerous linguistic features across the texts and text varieties of a corpus and multivariate statistical techniques (especially factor analysis) to identify the co-occurrence patterns among features.

The dimensions identified in MD analysis have a linguistic basis, but they are interpreted functionally. The linguistic dimension exhibits a group of features (e.g., nouns, attributive adjectives, prepositional phrases) that co-occur with a markedly high frequency in texts. These co-occurrence patterns are interpreted to assess their underlying situational, social, and cognitive functions. For example, the frequent co-occurrence of first-person pronouns, second-person pronouns, hedges, and emphatics in conversational texts is interpreted as reflecting directly interactive situations and a primary focus on personal stance and involvement (*see* **Mitigation**).

Biber (1988) identified five main dimensions of variation in a general corpus of spoken and written registers. He used factor analysis to identify the groups of linguistic features associated with each dimension (i.e., the linguistic features that co-occur in texts with markedly high frequencies). The co-occurring groupings of features on each dimension reflect distinct functional relations, indicated by the interpretive labels for each one: *Involved versus informational production, Narrative discourse, Situation-dependent versus elaborated reference, Overt expression of persuasion*, and *Impersonal style*. Biber (1988: Chap. 6–7; 1995: Chap. 5–7) and Conrad and Biber (2001: Chap. 2) provided detailed justification for these interpretations based on the shared communicative functions of the co-occurring linguistic features on each dimension plus the distribution of registers along each dimension.

MD analyses of register variation in English have been carried out by numerous researchers focusing on a wide range of specific research questions. The papers by Atkinson, Burges, Connor-Linton, Conrad, Helt, Shohamy, Reppen, and Rey (all included in Conrad and Biber, 2001) provide a sampling of MD studies by U.S.-based scholars.

Early MD studies investigated the synchronic relations among spoken and written registers in English (e.g., Biber, 1988), whereas later studies focused on diachronic register variation (e.g., Biber, 1995; Biber and Finegan, 1989a), more specialized discourse domains (e.g., Biber *et al.*, 2002; Conrad, 1996, 2001; Connor and Upton, 2003), and the patterns of register variation in other languages (e.g., Kim and Biber, 1994 on Korean; Biber and Hared, 1992 on Somali). Biber (1995) synthesized these studies to investigate the extent to which the underlying dimensions of variation and the relations among registers are configured in similar ways across languages.

Conclusion

This article has surveyed the kinds of situational and linguistic differences that distinguish among registers. Registers differ with respect to a wide array of situational characteristics, relating to purpose, topic, physical setting, production circumstances, and the relations among participants. These situational differences are associated with important linguistic differences at the lexical, grammatical, and lexico-grammatical levels. Furthermore, corpus-based analytical techniques can be employed to identify the linguistic co-occurrence patterns that regularly occur in texts from different registers, providing the basis for comprehensive analyses of register variation.

All language users adapt their language to different situations of use. It would be nearly impossible to spend an entire day using only one register – only having casual conversations, or only reading a news-

paper, or only writing an academic paper. Rather, switching among registers is as natural as human language itself. Consequently, the study of register variation is not a supplement to the description of grammar, discourse, and language use; rather, it is central to these enterprises.

See also: E-mail, Internet, Chatroom Talk: Pragmatics; Genre and Genre Analysis; Languages for Specific Purposes; Media: Pragmatics; Mitigation; Pragmatics of Reading.

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Relevance Theory

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Relevance theory (henceforth RT), a cognitive theory of human communication developed by D. Sperber and D. Wilson, was fully described in their 1986 book (Sperber and Wilson, 1986, 2nd edn., 1995), but it really emerged in the late 1970s and early 1980s as a cognition-centered alternative to Grice's cooperation-ruled explanation of human communication (see Wilson and Sperber, 1981). Since then, it has been a highly influential theory in pragmatics producing a good number of studies backing it up, criticizing it, or applying it to different pragmatic research areas (see Yus, 1998; Wilson and Sperber, 2002a; and RT Bibliography).

The main assumption of the theory is that human beings are endowed with a biologically rooted ability to maximize the relevance of incoming stimuli (including linguistic utterances and other communicative behavior). Relevance is not only a typical property of external stimuli (e.g., utterances), but also of internal representations and thoughts, all of which may become inputs for cognitive processing. The pursuit of relevance is a typical aspect of the mental activity of human beings, always geared to obtaining the highest reward from the stimuli that they process. This biological endowment is the result of the evolution of the architecture and complexity of the human mind and part of a general human ability to meta-represent one's and other people's thoughts and intentions: "As a result of constant selection pressure towards increasing efficiency, the human cognitive system has developed in such a way that our perceptual mechanisms tend automatically to pick out potentially relevant stimuli, our memory retrieval mechanisms tend automatically to activate potentially relevant assumptions, and our inferential mechanisms tend spontaneously to process them in the most productive way" (Wilson and Sperber, 2002a: 254). Together with another uniquely human cognitive endowment, the ability to metarepresent one's and other people's thoughts and intentions, this tendency to maximize relevance allows us to predict what information is likely to be relevant to other people and what interpretive steps might be involved in its processing, and therefore allows for the manipulation of other people's thoughts.

Basic Claims

Four statements can summarize this theory (Wilson, 1994: 44): (a) the decoded meaning of the sentence is compatible with a number of different interpretations in the same context; (b) these interpretations are graded in terms of accessibility; (c) hearers rely on a powerful criterion when selecting the most appropriate interpretation; and (d) this criterion makes it possible to select one interpretation among the range of possible interpretations, to the extent that when a first interpretation is considered a candidate matching the intended interpretation, the hearer will stop at this point.

These statements can be broken down into a number of basic claims, as summarized below.

Code versus Inference

Unlike the so-called **code model** of communication, according to which messages are simply coded and decoded, Sperber and Wilson favor an **inferential model** in which decoding plays a minor role compared with the inferential activity of the interpreter. Within this approach, the decoding of utterances underdetermines their interpretation and serves rather as a piece of evidence about the speaker's meaning. Verbal communication does involve the use of a code (i.e., the grammar of the language), but inference plays a major role in turning the schematic coded input into fully propositional interpretations.

One of the most interesting contributions of RT is, precisely, the claim that there is a wide gap between the (coded) sentence meaning and the (inferred) speaker's meaning, which has to be filled inferentially. Comprehension starts at the context-free identification of the utterance's logical form, which is then enriched to yield explicit information (**explicatures**) and/or implicit information (**implicatures**) (*see* **Implicature**).

A Post-Gricean Theory

Sperber and Wilson acknowledge the filiation of RT from Grice's view of communication, but there are several aspects in which they depart from Grice. This is the reason why we can call RT a post-Gricean theory (*see* **Neo-Gricean Pragmatics**), a theory that takes the Gricean approach to communication as a mere starting point, as opposed to neo-Gricean theories which stay much closer to Grice's cooperative principle and its maxims (*see* **Grice, Herbert Paul; Cooperative Principle; Maxims and Flouting**) Several points deserve explanation:

1. One of the major contributions by Grice was to underline the role that intentions (roughly defined as mental representations of a desired state of affairs) play in human communication. His emphasis on the expression and recognition of

intentions laid the foundations of the inferential model of communication. Crucially to Grice, the hearer explains the speaker's communicative behavior by identifying the underlying intention, a typically human form of mind-reading activity. However, Sperber and Wilson do not agree with the complex schema of human reasoning that Grice proposed for the derivation of implicatures.

Sperber and Wilson also point out that Grice's emphasis on the role of intentions corroborates the fact that communication can exist without the need for a code. All that the communicator has to do to communicate a thought is to get the addressee to recognize his/her intention to convey it.

Sperber and Wilson distinguish two levels of intention: **informative** (an intention to inform the hearer of something) and **communicative** (the intention to inform the addressee of that informative intention). In inferential communication, the identification of the informative intention is done through the identification of the communicative intention, the process being activated by verbal ostensive communication, in which it is clear to both speaker and hearer (**mutually manifest** in Sperber and Wilson's terminology) that the speaker has the (metarepresentational) intention to communicate something. Unlike other forms of information transmission, 'ostensive inferential communication' involves both types of intention, and is achieved by ostensively providing an addressee with evidence that helps him/her infer the speaker's meaning.

2. RT explains the hearer's inference of the (intended) speaker's meaning from the coded sentence meaning by resorting to another central claim suggested by Grice: that ostensively communicated utterances automatically generate expectations that activate the hearer's search for the speaker's meaning. But whereas Grice explained these expectations in terms of the assumption by hearers that speakers were observing the cooperative principle and its maxims, within RT these expectations are explained in cognitive terms (basically proposing the existence of a Cognitive Principle of Relevance), without reliance on a cooperative principle.

3. For Sperber and Wilson, no maxims, in the Gricean sense, are required for the explanation of communication. This is especially evident in the case of the Maxim of Quality (roughly, 'tell the truth'), which Grice proposed for the explanation of figurative language and irony. Sperber and Wilson have shown that people are normally 'loose' when they speak and only on very specific occasions do they intend their utterances to be regarded as literally true. In addition, Sperber and Wilson propose that all uses of language, whether loose (metaphor, hyperbole, etc.) literal can be addressed with a single explanatory framework based on general expectations of relevance.

Two Principles of Relevance

Initially, Sperber and Wilson proposed one Principle of Relevance to account for the fact that an act of 'ostension' carries a guarantee of its eventual relevance, but in the Postface to the second edition of their book (Sperber and Wilson, 1995: 260ff.), they propose that we can distinguish a broad **cognitive principle of relevance**: "human cognition tends to be geared to the maximisation of relevance," as well as a narrower (**communicative principle of relevance**: "every act of ostensive communication communicates a presumption of its own optimal relevance"; 1986: 158), the latter being the main focus of analysis within pragmatics. But the former is important, too, because it stresses the fact that we are biologically geared toward processing the most relevant inputs available. In addition, it is this evolved disposition that allows for the prediction of the mental states of others, which is crucial in human communication.

The communicative principle involves a definition of optimal relevance comprising two parts: (a) The ostensive stimulus is relevant enough for it to be worth the addressee's effort to process it; and (b) The ostensive stimulus is the most relevant one compatible with the communicator's abilities and preferences (Sperber and Wilson, 1995: 267, 270). As Wilson and Sperber (2002a: 257–258) correctly point out, communicators "cannot be expected to go against their own interests and preferences in producing an utterance. There may be relevant information that they are unable or unwilling to provide, and ostensive stimuli that would convey their intentions more economically, but that they are unwilling to produce, or unable to think of at the time." All this is covered by clause (b) of the definition of optimal relevance, which states that the ostensive stimulus is the most relevant one "that the communicator is WILLING AND ABLE to produce" (Sperber and Wilson, 1995: 258).

Assessing Relevance: Cognitive Effects versus Processing Effort

Unlike what is the case in 'static' pragmatics, which foregrounds the importance of context but somehow takes it for granted or is merely interested in dissecting, as it were, its elements, Sperber and Wilson's theory views the context as a dynamic, mental entity made up of a subset of the person's assumptions about the world; it is this subset that is accessed in

the search for relevance. Often several extensions of context are required to arrive at an optimally relevant interpretation, but as soon as one interpretation is found to be satisfactory, interpretation stops and no other interpretive hypotheses are considered: "When a hearer following the path of least effort finds an interpretation which satisfies his expectations of relevance, in the absence of contrary evidence, this is the best possible interpretive hypothesis" (Wilson and Sperber, 2002b: 605).

The aforementioned Communicative Principle of Relevance predicts a basic procedure for hearers when hypothesizing about contextual extensions required for the interpretation of a verbal stimulus: to consider interpretive hypotheses in order of accessibility (following a path of least effort) and to stop when they arrive at an interpretation which satisfies the expectations of relevance raised by the stimulus itself. Relevance, then, is a matter of balance between the interest that the utterance might provide (in terms of so-called 'positive cognitive effects') and the mental effort that obtaining this interest demands.

Relevance is a characteristic of an input to the human cognitive processes which, when processed in a certain context, yields positive cognitive effects. Because there are too many possible stimuli to which we can pay attention, our cognitive architecture is designed to allocate our processing effort in such a way that benefit is maximized. Hence, relevance has to do with the improvement of the person's knowledge; this can be achieved either by adding new information, by revising existing assumptions, or by yielding new conclusions resulting from the combination of old and new information (in this case **contextual implications** are generated) (*see* **Context, Communicative**).

The definition of relevance of an input to an individual involves two clauses: "(a) everything else being equal, the greater the positive cognitive effects achieved in an individual by processing an input at a given time, the greater the relevance of the input to that individual at that time; and (b) everything else being equal, the smaller the processing effort expended by the individual in achieving those effects, the greater the relevance of the input to that individual at that time" (Wilson and Sperber, 2002b: 602).

Current Issues and Open Debates

The Explicit/Implicit Distinction

One of the key differences between Grice's model and Sperber and Wilson's lies in the demarcation of explicit and implicit communication. For Grice, **what is said** involved little inference, mainly reduced to

disambiguation and reference assignment, while all the inferential load was laid upon the derivation of implicatures, the latter being obtained **after** an interpretion reduced to the literal meaning has been found inappropriate, in a so-called **dual-stage processing**. Sperber and Wilson reject this view and favor a more adequate, **mutual parallel adjustment** of explicit content – explicatures – and implicit import – implicatures – during interpretation, and with no preconceived sequential arrangement.

Within RT, explicitly communicated information not only demands as much contextualization as do implicatures, but also covers aspects of communicated meaning which Grice included in the term implicature (e.g., the so-called **generalized conversational implicatures,** most of which are now pictured as explicit information, see Levinson, 2000; Carston, 2002).

In addition to implicatures, Sperber and Wilson propose two types of explicitly communicated information: the **basic-level explicature**, and the **higher-level explicature**. The latter also includes the speaker's attitude (*to regret that ... to be happy that ...* etc.) or a higher-order speech-act schema (*to be asking that ... to be ordering that ...* etc.). Both explicatures and implicatures allow for degrees (i.e., strong and weak explicatures/implicatures), depending on the addressee's responsibility for their derivation and the amount of mental processing required.

Other notions used by other authors in the definition of explicit information, for instance **literal meaning** or **what is said,** are put into question by Sperber and Wilson, because these do not play any useful role in the study of verbal comprehension: "even when a literal meaning is available, it is not automatically the preferred interpretation of an utterance. In fact, literalness plays no role in our account of language comprehension, and nor does the notion of what is said" (Wilson and Sperber, 2002b: 586). This is because, among other reasons, hearers commonly derive loose interpretations rather than purely literal ones: "hearers have no objection to strictly false approximations as long as the conclusions they bother to derive from them are true. In fact, they might prefer the shorter approximations to their longer-winded but strictly true counterparts for reasons of economy of effort" (Wilson and Sperber, 2002b: 598).

Whereas Bach (1994) has proposed a third term, **impliciture**, half-way between explicatures and implicatures, other authors, such as Vicente (2002), reject this blurring of the explicit/implicit dichotomy. The term 'impliciture' covers several cases which would fit into Sperber and Wilson's notion of explicature, basically being completions of the semantic representation of the sentence (e.g., 'The table is too wide' [to go through the door]) and nonliteral uses of

sentences in which no constituent is being used non-literally, what Bach calls **standardized nonliterality** (e.g., (said to a person who has cut himself) 'You are not going to die' [from this cut]).

Conceptual and Procedural Encoding

One of the most interesting lines of research within relevance theory is the one that differentiates between **conceptual meaning** and **procedural meaning.** Wilson and Sperber (1993: 10) summarize this dichotomy as follows: "inferential comprehension involves the construction and manipulation of conceptual representations; linguistic decoding feeds inferential comprehension; linguistic constructions might therefore be expected to encode two basic types of information: concepts or conceptual representations on the one hand, and procedures for manipulating them on the other."

Most words encode concepts, but some words give instructions as to how conceptual representations are to be manipulated and hence encode procedural meaning. Blakemore and her followers applied the notion to connectives (Blakemore, 1987) and discourse markers (Blakemore, 2002), which constrain the inferential phase by indicating the kind of inferential process that the hearer should go through (hence reducing the eventual overall effort) in the subsequent stretch of discourse. In recent research, the list of procedural items has been extended to cover nonverbal elements such as intonation.

Ad hoc Concept Formation

The notion of **ad hoc** concept construction is one of the latest developments of relevance theory in the area of figurative language (especially metaphors), which has also been extended to the analysis of how concepts in general are processed (cf. Carston, 2002; Pilkington, 2000).

The traditional relevance–theoretic account of figurative language relies on the assumption that there is an interpretive resemblance between the coded concept and the intended thought. And we can say the same about the whole utterance whose propositional form resembles the propositional form of the communicator's thought (Pilkington, 2000: 90). From this viewpoint, the interpretive resemblance between, for instance, a coded metaphor and the thought which it resembles would lead to the hearer's derivation of stronger/weaker implicatures.

Within an alternative account of utterance interpretation, it is claimed that the metaphor provides a new *ad hoc* concept for the proposition expressed by the utterance (instead of favoring the derivation of

implicatures) (*see* **Metaphor: Psychological Aspects**). Encyclopedic entries would be explored in such a way that an increase in the *salience* of a number of assumptions is created, providing an encyclopedic entry for the new concept (Pilkington, 2000: 95-96; for 'salience,' see Giora, 2002). They are *ad hoc* "because they are not linguistically given, but are constructed online in response to specific expectations of relevance raised in specific contexts. There is a difference then between *ad hoc* concepts, accessed by a spontaneous process of pragmatic inference, and lexicalized concepts, which are context-invariant" (Carston, 2002: 322).

Mutual Knowledge versus Mutual Manifestness

Sperber and Wilson reject the traditional notion of mutual knowledge because it generates an endless recursion (A knows that p, B knows that A knows that p, A knows that B knows that A knows that p, and so on). Instead, they propose the notion of **mutual manifestness** (see Sperber and Wilson, 1990). What is 'manifest' is what one is capable of inferring or capable of perceiving, even if one hasn't done so yet. The sum of all the manifest assumptions is the person's **cognitive environment**. A set of assumptions manifest to several individuals constitutes their shared cognitive environment. When it is manifest to all the people sharing a cognitive environment that they share it, then, this is a **mutual cognitive environment**, made up of mutually manifest assumptions. Communication is a matter of making certain assumptions mutually manifest to both speaker and hearer.

Several authors have criticized the notion of mutual manifestness. For example, Mey and Talbot (1988) point out that what Sperber and Wilson do is to send mutual knowledge out at the front door and then let it in at the back, disguised as 'mutually manifest assumptions.' For these authors, cognitive environments are not distinguishable from mutual knowledge; thus, Sperber and Wilson appear to be using the same concept that they want to abandon. To my knowledge, neither Sperber and Wilson nor their critics have been persuaded to abandon their differing claims on mutuality.

Communicated and Noncommunicated Acts

One of the most underdeveloped areas within relevance–theoretic research is the relationship between RT and speech acts. In short, Sperber and Wilson (1986: 244–246) distinguish between communicated and noncommunicated acts. The former depend on the addressee's perception that a certain

speech act has been performed (e.g., admitting, promising, thanking), while in non-communicated acts, communication does not depend on the identification of a particular speech act (e.g., predicting, warning, suggesting). In this case, successful communication lies in the hearer's recovery of adequate cognitive effects from the utterance with the aid of context and in the recovery of the speaker's intentions.

In his (2002) paper, Nicolle has argued against the existence of noncommunicated speech acts in the RT sense. Examples of noncommunicated acts (such as the act of warning in "The path is slippery here") are reconsidered by Nicolle in social terms, and their influence on the interlocutors' social environments implies that they also have to be communicated: "the recovery of information relating to social relations is an essential element of the comprehension process. When the recovery of such information depends on the identification of a particular speech act, that speech act is by definition a communicated act" (Nicolle, 2000: 239).

Irony and the Notion of Echo

In Wilson and Sperber (1992), the authors conceptualize irony in **interpretive** terms. An ironic utterance is an interpretation of another thought, utterance, or assumption that it resembles and which the speaker attributes to a different speaker or to himself/herself at another time. Ironic utterances are echoic, that is, they simultaneously refer to an attributed thought – or utterance, or assumption – and express an attitude to it. More specifically, the speaker's attitude toward what is echoed has to be dissociative. This dissociation may apply to either the proposition expressed by the utterance, or to some effect that is generated by that utterance.

Several authors have commented upon this proposal. For instance, in some of the papers collected in Carston and Uchida (1998) it is claimed that irony can be nonechoic. In their reply, Sperber and Wilson (1998) maintain that although most utterances cannot be understood as echoic (i.e., there is no accessible representation that they might be taken to echo), an utterance has to be echoic to be interpreted as ironical (*see* **Irony**).

Modularity

Initially, Sperber and Wilson adopted the view of the mental architecture of the mind proposed by Jerry Fodor in the early 1980s: several modules feeding a central processor with specific information.

Modules are evolved, special-purpose mental mechanisms, typically automatic, informationally encapsulated, and domain-specific. For instance, the language module is only (and automatically) activated by verbal stimuli, feeding the central processor with a schematic logical form which then has to be enriched inferentially.

Over the last few years, this view of the mind has changed within RT (and also within evolutionary psychology), especially concerning the structure of the central processor, which is also regarded to be modular (Carston, 1997; Sperber and Wilson, 2002; Wilson, 2003). The most important module, specifically a submodule of the general 'theory of mind' ability, is **the pragmatic module**, which also exhibits qualities typically associated with modules. For example, this pragmatic module is biologically endowed, only activated by a specific type of information (ostensively communicated information), and constrained by its own principle: the Communicative Principle of Relevance.

Relevance Theory as Asocial

RT has been criticized for being hyperindividualistic and for avoiding the social aspects of communication (Mey and Talbot, 1988). Sperber and Wilson (1997: 147) acknowledge that they have concentrated on the inferential activity of the individual, but inferential communication is **also** essentially social: "Inferential communication is intrinsically social, not just because it is a form of interaction, but also, less trivially, because it exploits and enlarges the scope of basic forms of social cognition. Right or wrong, this is a strong sociological claim." Although Sperber and Wilson have not studied uses of communication to convey information about the social relationship between the interlocutors, they do not mean to deny its importance, or to express a lack of interest in the issues or the work done; they merely feel that, at this stage, they can best contribute to the study of human communication by taking it at its most elementary level, and abstracting away from these more complex (socially connoted) aspects (Sperber and Wilson, 1997). Hence, for them, although "so far, the contribution of relevance theory to the study of human communication has been at a fairly abstract level . . . it seems to us to have potential implications at a more concrete sociolinguistic level" (Sperber and Wilson, 1997: 148).

A proposal by Escandell-Vidal (2004) aims at integrating inferential and social issues in terms of principles and norms, respectively, and as part of a domain-specific picture of mental activity. The mind operates according to principles that are in charge of obtaining fully propositional interpretations from coded stimuli. When dealing with norms, the mind is engaged in both a long-term and a short-term task.

The short-term one analyzes and categorizes incoming information, and the long-term task builds up and updates socially accepted behavior.

Empirical Evidence

A common criticism of RT is that it is highly speculative, predicting without empirical evidence the mental procedures and interpretive steps the human mind goes through in human communication. Obviously, we are dealing with an object of study, the human mind, which is highly complex and still largely unexplained.

Sperber and Wilson (2002: 143) acknowledge that in much pragmatic research, there is a certain reluctance to get down to experimentation. However, relevance theorists have been particularly eager to combine theoretical issues with all the possibilities of testing provided by the careful use of linguistic intuitions, observational data, and the experimental methods of cognitive psychology (see Wilson and Sperber, 2002b: 607, note 7 for references). Recent research has aimed at an empirical explanation of central claims of the theory. For instance, Van der Henst and Sperber (2004) review various experimental tests of the two Principles of Relevance. They claim that the hypothesis that hearers spontaneously rely on a relevance-guided interpretive procedure can be experimentally tested either by intentionally manipulating the effort required to process a stimulus or by changing the order of accessibility of several competing interpretations for the same stimulus. Another possible test is a manipulation of the effect factor by making a specific interpretation more or less likely to satisfy the expectations of relevance.

Other studies have focused on other possible areas of RT-based empirical research. Among them we can underline the ones on the Wason selection task. For example, Sperber *et al.* (1995) tested how participants derive implications from conditional statements in order of accessibility, stop when their search for relevance reaches an adequate balance of cognitive effects and processing effort, and select cards on the basis of this interpretation. The authors were able to manipulate the effort and effect factors by varying the content and context of the conditional statement, so as to elicit correct or incorrect selections at will (cf. Wilson and Sperber, 2002a: 279).

The plausibility of a Gricean maxim of truthfulness to explain human communication has also been tested (Van der Henst *et al.*, 2002). These authors showed that when people ask a stranger the time in the street they get, as a reply, "a time that is either accurate to the minute or rounded to the nearest multiple of five,

depending on how useful in the circumstances they think a more accurate answer would be" (Wilson and Sperber, 2002b: 598), regardless of whether the people asked have (accurate) digital watches. These rounded answers are not strictly true, but they are easier for their audience to process.

Applications

RT has been applied to a number of research areas, among which we can distinguish the following.

1. **Grammar.** For RT the interest lies in how grammatical attributes constrain the choice of a candidate interpretation. In this sense, the grammatical arrangement of utterances plays an important part throughout this cognitive contextualization. From this point of view, several aspects of grammar have been addressed, including connectives (often within a conceptual/procedural account), conditionals, modals and modality, adverbs and adverbials, mood(s), tense(s), the article, etc.

2. **Humor.** Within a relevance–theoretic approach, humor is no longer a property of texts and, instead, what we need to characterize are the audience's mental processes in the interpretation of humorous texts.

   Underlying this approach to humor lies the premise that communicators can predict and manipulate the mental states of others. Knowing that the addressee is likely to pick out the most relevant interpretation of the joke (or some part of it), the humorist may be able to produce a text that is likely to lead to the selection of an accessible interpretation, which is then invalidated at some point. In Yus (2003), for instance, it is claimed that in many jokes the initial part has multiple interpretations, which are graded according to their accessibility. The hearer is led to select an overt (i.e., relevant) interpretation of this part of the joke. Suddenly, the hearer notices that the subsequent part has a single covert interpretation which is eventually found to be the correct one (and the one providing a coherent interpretation to the whole text) and which humorously surprises the hearer (*see* **Humor in Language; Accessibility Theory**).

3. **Media discourses.** RT has also been successfully applied to the interpretation of media discourses, including films, newspaper headlines, comics, Internet discourse, and advertising. The last one is probably one of the most extensive applications of the theory. The control over the amount of information provided, the predictability of consumers'

responses, and the calculation of the effort required to process information, all typical features of the strategies by the advertisement makers, can easily be analyzed using a relevance–theoretical approach (see Tanaka, 1994).

4. **Literature**. Several studies have applied RT to literary discourse (Pilkington, 2000 is an example). Within an RT approach, literariness has to be analyzed as cognitive effects triggered by textual stimuli, involving special mental processes which, through a relevance-driven cognitive exploration, result in the marginally increased salience of a wide range of assumptions (Pilkington, 2000: 189). Because in literature it is more difficult (if not impossible) to make assumptions mutually manifest, a greater load of responsibility is laid upon the reader in extracting the intended (or, alternatively, his/her own) interpretation of the text, plus whatever feelings and emotions are associated with the comprehension of the text.

5. **Politeness**. This is a typical social feature of communication that somehow appears not to suit the individual-centered approach within RT (*see* **Politeness**). However, several studies have attempted an explanation of politeness in relevance–theoretic terms. For instance, politeness has been explained within RT as a verbal strategy compatible or incompatible with the background expectations about the current relationship holding between speaker and hearer, thus leading to different relevance-oriented interpretive paths (see Jary, 1998).

6. **Translation**. In RT-bases studies such as Gutt's (2000), there is a tendency to exploit the idea of resemblance between the intended interpretations of utterances. (For an account of relevance–theoretic applications to translation, *see* **Translation, Pragmatics**.)

Concluding Remarks

In RT, Sperber and Wilson propose a coherent cognitive account of how the human mind proceeds when attempting to select a plausible interpretation of ostensively communicated stimuli. They rely on the hypothesis that a biologically rooted search for relevance aids human beings in the inferential enrichment of typically underdetermined coded texts and utterances resulting in fully propositional interpretations.

The theory has provided insights in several debates in pragmatics and cognitive science and has been applied to a good number of research areas. Undoubtedly, RT will continue to stir fruitful intellectual debates on the explanation of human communication.

See also: Accessibility Theory; Communicative Principle and Communication; Context, Communicative; Cooperative Principle; Grice, Herbert Paul; Humor in Language; Implicature; Irony; Maxims and Flouting; Neo-Gricean Pragmatics; Politeness; Shared Knowledge; Social Aspects of Pragmatics; Translation, Pragmatics.

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Reported Speech: Pragmatic Aspects

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Every speech event involves a speaker, who usually commits him- or herself to its propositional, functional, and evaluative contents. But we can also refer to utterances of others and report what they said, wrote, meant, or thought. Reporting, a metalinguistic act, may be done through quoting (direct speech, *oratio recta*), paraphrasing (indirect speech, *oratio obliqua*) or in other ways and can relate to every aspect of an utterance. It is a powerful communicative strategy, whose different pragmatic functions are conventionalized (e.g., as a way of characterizing speakers rather than reproducing their utterances) or merely rhetorical (Roncador, 1988).

Multifunctionality of Reported Speech

Reported speech is multifunctional on several levels. On a very general level of establishing social order through talk, speakers report in order to display their understanding both of what occurred during a previous conversation and how it fits into the current communicative event. On a more pragmatic level, and with different degrees of authenticity and correspondence with the reported speech event, the reporter may simultaneously relate the propositional and functional content of the reported discourse, its contextual and situational environment, the way in which it was presented, and the speaker's (and/or the reporter's) emotional state and attitudinal stance.

Evaluative Functions

Evaluation is the central pragmatic function of reported speech. It can be related to its three main components: the source (who is responsible for the reported proposition), the reporting expression (referring to the source's saying), and the reported proposition(s) (what is reported).

The Source

Descriptions and qualifications of the source can be used strategically by speakers with the aim of influencing the hearer's judgment of the reliability of what is reported.

Credentializing Giving high credibility to one's source (credentializing) is a means of giving high credibility to the reported proposition(s) (Stubbs, 1986; Fairclough, 1988; Hunston, 2000). In general, speakers pursuing this technique assume that the more reliable and credible (in other words, the more expert) the source is portrayed as, the more reliability will be attached to the content of the reported speech by the hearer. This technique also includes references to well-known, universally accepted authorities, as in *As Chomsky reminds us, "revolutionary new ideas appear infrequently"* (Haiman, 1989: 137). The qualification of the source may include further

evaluation by means of attributive adjectives, as in *The noted educationalist A. H. Halsey has claimed that p* (Stubbs, 1986: 3).

Power and Solidarity   Descriptions of sources can also be varied according to degrees of intimacy and distance. In studies on naming practices, the difference between referring to partners by first name (FN) and by title and last name (TLN) is related to the notions of intimacy and power (*see* **Power and Pragmatics**). Assuming that this practice can be transferred to ways of referring, reference to FN seeks to establish intimacy with and/or powerlessness of the referent, whereas reference to TLN establishes the referent as distant and/or powerful. Such references again involve the speaker's evaluation of the source, an evaluation that may be transferred to the evaluation of the reported proposition.

Labeling   If sources are not explicitly identified by their names, labels are often employed to refer to them; such labels may be potentially evaluative. In newspapers, references to unspecified sources, experts, officials, professionals, etc., are extremely frequent. Labels like these are highly indeterminate in their referential meaning but imply more reliability than do other semantically vague labels (*a woman, a man*). The labels suggest that there was some well-founded reason for the journalist's consulting the reported speaker, namely that she or he is an authority on the matter. They imply the reliability of sources without having to identify them. Metonymy can be used to a similar effect, implying authority and/or reliability without mentioning named speakers (e.g., metonymic references to countries, institutions, etc.) (*see* **Metonymy**).

Paralinguistic Information   Paralinguistic descriptions of the source's presumed emotional state, or of his or her manner of speaking may also have an impact on the hearer's evaluation of the source and the reliability of the reported proposition(s). Consider this example: *A downcast Mr. Trimble said that the evidence given to him by the commission was insufficient* (*Daily Telegraph* 11/22/03).

Explicit Evaluations   Whereas the above-mentioned evaluations of sources are more or less implicit, explicit evaluations of the source may also be employed as a means of influencing the presumed reliability of reported propositions. Thus, labels with negative or positive connotations (*terrorists, fanatics, resistance fighters*), premodifying adjectives (*callous, racist, intelligent, cultivated*), or other explicit means of evaluation may be employed in order to credentialize or discredentialize sources.

The Reporting Expression

The other main way of evaluating the reliability of reported propositions is by virtue of the reporting expressions used. The most well-known are reporting verbs such as *say, state, claim*. But there are also reporting nouns (*disclosure, claim*), adjectives (*alleged, reported*) and prepositions (*according to*). Such expressions may communicate degrees of speaker agreement, as well as positive and negative evaluations.

Degrees of Speaker Agreement   As has often been pointed out, reporting expressions may be neutral as to whether the speaker agrees with the reported proposition (*say, write*), positive/supporting (*X has rightly pointed out, proven, shown*) or negative/skeptical (*claim, pretend*) (Hunston, 2000; Thompson and Ye, 1991). By varying their use of such reporting expressions, speakers can again try to influence the hearers' perception of the reported proposition.

Positive and Negative Evaluations   Like descriptions of sources, certain reporting expressions can also (more or less) explicitly trigger hearers' evaluations. Clayman (1990) has shown that the use of reporting verbs that refer to the discourse process invites hearers to make evaluative inferences about sources. Verbs such as *concede, admit*, for example, can imply that the source did not speak voluntarily and may prompt hearers to ask why; verbs such as *refuse, decline* indicate that the source did not in fact answer a question and may again prompt hearers to ask why. Similarly, illocutionary verbs that do not refer to the discourse process may be employed for purposes of evaluation. Whether someone *quips, jokes* and *promises* or *threatens*, *mocks* and *vows* can crucially influence hearers' interpretations. Combinations with adverbs can enhance or neutralize negative reporting expressions (*he reluctantly admitted that* vs. *he frankly admitted that*). At the more explicit cline of evaluation, we can posit the use of reporting expressions that are almost unequivocally evaluated as negative (*boast, brag*). In making explicit the illocutionary force of speech acts, speakers thus signal their own evaluative stance toward the reported discourse and may predispose readers' interpretation (Fairclough, 1988). (Of course, even if the reporter faithfully reports the illocution of the speaker's utterance, the act is merely mentioned, not performed.) (*see* **Speech Acts**).

The Reported Proposition(s)

The last component of reported speech discussed is the reported proposition, with a focus on the different types of reported speech (i.e., direct speech, indirect speech, etc., and narrative reports of speech acts as distinguished by Leech and Short, 1981). Besides serving as résumés, abstracts, or conclusions of the reported speech, these types fulfill a gamut of pragmatic functions. Direct speech is generally regarded as highly reliable, because it purports to report the original speaker's actual choice of words, and hence functions pragmatically to lend reliability to the discourse (except when used as an expression of irony or "mocking mimicry"; Haiman, 1995). Indirect speech, on the other hand, does not claim to represent the original speaker's actual use of lexicogrammar, focusing on the ideational rather than the interpersonal meaning of reported propositions (*see* **Systemic Theory**). In spoken discourse, indirect speech is therefore often employed to clarify, to provide clear factual information to hearers (Mayes, 1990). In fiction, the "loss of ... vivid, colloquial, partisan and engaged lexis" renders the narration "more 'neutral' and formal" (Toolan, 2001), resulting in greater distance between the reader and the characters. In free indirect speech the voices of the original speaker and the reporter are not as clearly demarcated as in direct speech: the two levels of discourse are merged (Fairclough, 1988) (*see* **Literary Pragmatics**). Consequently, free indirect speech (FID) is a powerful instrument in mystifying what could be called, with an allusion to Goffman, principalship (Fairclough, 1988) (*see* **Goffman, Erving**). In fiction, FID is a characteristic of modernist stream-of-consciousness writing and serves a "strategy of ... alignment, in words, values and perspective, of the narrator with a character" (Toolan, 2001), which may convey the speaker's irony or empathy (Toolan, 2001; Leech and Short, 1981). Narrative reports of speech acts, finally, may be regarded as the most evaluative, in that they consist wholly of the speaker's interpretation of an utterance or utterances she or he has heard. Since the speaker reports the occurrence of a speech act without mentioning its meaning, hearers have no possibility whatsoever to double-check the reporter's interpretation of the original speaker's words.

Social Functions

The choice of reported speech can be a means of establishing, maintaining, and securing social relations. By deciding what to report and how to report it, the reporter indicates different degrees of evaluative and social closeness or distance, of familiarity and formality, of politeness and respect (*see* **Politeness**). This may be achieved by verbal (including prosodic) and also nonverbal means (gestures, mimics, etc.), which originate with the reporter or else accompany the reported utterance (*see* **Gestures, Pragmatic Aspects**). (Rather than using *verba dicendi et sentiendi*, verbs related to 'body language' as in *She frowned/shrugged/smiled: '...'* can be used.).

Textual Functions

Regarding textual functions, direct quotations can be used to dramatize and highlight important elements in a narrative (Mayes, 1990; Fairclough, 1988). In fiction, they are associated with a "scenic showing of pace, enhanced focus on the specificity and detail of an interaction" (Toolan, 2001), in short, "vivid and engaging" (Toolan, 2001) narration. Indirect speech seems less vivid and colorful, and narrative reports of speech acts appear to be often used when speakers do not want to transmit the actual words of the reported speaker, e.g., for purposes of abridging and summarizing.

Future Research

Many aspects of the pragmatics of reporting speech allow room for future research. A starting point could be the exploration of cross-cultural as well as genre-specific differences. Further research could investigate the connection between reporting speech and reporting thought as well as the relation between reported speech and notions such as evidentiality (Chafe and Nichols, 1986), commitment (Stubbs, 1986) and evaluation (Thompson and Ye, 1991).

See also: Addressivity; Gestures, Pragmatic Aspects; Goffman, Erving; Literary Pragmatics; Metonymy; Narrativity and Voice; Power and Pragmatics; Pragmatics of Reading; Speech Acts; Systemic Theory.

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Rhetoric: History

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Rhetoric is the systematic analysis of human discourse for the purpose of identifying useful precepts for future discourse. Since it deals with human thought and expression, it has been linked through the centuries with psychology, philosophy, ethics (both private and public), and education.

Aristotle's Rhetoric

Rhetoric originated in ancient Greece, primarily in Athens, and was connected with a rising democracy that placed a premium on the speaking ability of each individual citizen. Even the philosopher Plato wrote on rhetoric, notably in his *Phaedrus*. The first major effort at a comprehensive theory of public speaking, however, was made by Aristotle in his *Rhetoric* (before 322 B.C.E.). He defined rhetoric as the faculty of observing in any given case the available means of persuasion. Aristotle named three types of orations: political, forensic, and epideictic (occasional). He declared that the object of rhetoric, persuasion, is achieved through the use of three 'proofs': *ethos*, the credibility of the speaker; *pathos*, the emotions of the audience; and *logos*, the arguments used. The main types of arguments are the example and the enthymeme, a rhetorical syllogism; Aristotle provided 28 sample 'topics' or lines of argument on which enthymemes can be based. He began Book Three by stating that it is not enough to know what to say; the speaker must also know how to say it. The subsequent discussion of style noted that the foundation of good style is correctness of language; at the same time Aristotle called for 'distinctiveness' of language, achieved through use of such devices as metaphors.

Interestingly, Aristotle's *Rhetoric* had very little influence in antiquity or the Middle Ages, becoming influential only after its translation into Latin in 1475 in Renaissance Italy.

Roman Rhetoric

Aristotle died in 322 B.C.E. We know very little about the development of rhetorical theory between that date and the emergence of a homogenous set of rhetorical doctrines shortly after 100 B.C.E. Though these ideas are embodied in his *De inventione* and six other rhetorical works of Marcus Tullius Cicero (105–43 B.C.E.), in the anonymous *Rhetorica ad Herennium* (c. 87 B.C.E.), and in the *Institutio oratoria* (95 C.E.) of Marcus Fabius Quintilianus, the concepts are so similar in all these works that it seems fair to describe this common body of rhetorical doctrine as a 'Roman' rhetoric. It laid out five 'parts of rhetoric': (1) invention, the discovery of valid or seemingly valid arguments that render one's case plausible; (2) arrangement, the distribution of these arguments

in a proper order; (3) style, the fitting of the proper language to the invented matter; (4) memory, the firm mental grasp of matter and words; and (5) delivery, the control of voice and body in a suitable manner. This theory of 'five parts' dominated Western rhetoric at least until the early 20th century and is still important today; its longevity is due at least in part to the fact that it is a natural progression of composition.

Roman invention included both 'topics' (as in Aristotle) and 'issues' or the points to be resolved in a controversy. In arrangement, the Romans specified a sequence of six parts of the oration itself: introduction, narration of background, partition (or outline of the case), confirmation, refutation, and peroration (conclusion). Style is identified under three levels – plain, middle, and grand – with distinction (*dignitas*) to be achieved through the use of 'figures.' Book Four of the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* is the first to name 64 figures, divided into figures of speech and figures of thought, that were to become a standard for nearly two millennia; 10 of the figures of speech (e.g., metaphor, metonymy) later went under the name of 'Tropes.' So dominant was this set that this fourth book was often copied separately in the Middle Ages and Renaissance. The *Rhetorica ad Herennium* is also the first rhetorical treatise to offer a section on memory, involving the use of mental backgrounds into which mental images of remembered things can be placed. Delivery calls for the speaker's regulation of his voice, facial expression, and gestures.

The Roman educator Quintilian in his *Institutio oratoria* (95 C.E.) not only reinforced all these doctrines but outlined a systematic training program in grammar, literature, and rhetoric that set an educational standard followed for nearly 2000 years in Europe and America.

By the end of the classical period, then, a large number of sophisticated rhetorical concepts had been identified and combined into a well-coordinated, effective Roman system. In fact, some modern scholars, such as Brian Vickers and George A. Kennedy, evaluate later rhetorical developments according to the rate at which they accord with classical rhetoric.

Medieval Rhetoric

The Roman concept of 'seven liberal arts' – which included the subjects of grammar, rhetoric, and dialectic – was introduced into the Middle Ages by encyclopedists such as Martianus Capella, Isidore of Seville, and Cassiodorus. These encyclopedists offered highly condensed abstracts of rhetorical lore, usually without examples. They were, however, a main source of knowledge about rhetoric for many in the Middle Ages. The copying of Ciceronian rhetorical texts, especially his *De inventione* and the anonymous *Rhetorica ad Herennium* generally ascribed to him, continued throughout the Middle Ages; these were often accompanied by glosses or commentaries – usually a sign that the texts were used for teaching in schools. It is important to note that during the Middle Ages, rhetoric was taught in what we would call secondary schools, rather than in universities.

Aristotle's *Rhetoric* was copied often in Latin translation, but not used as a rhetoric text; instead it was typically included in manuscript collections on moral philosophy.

The original rhetorical treatises composed during the Middle Ages fall into three categories, each a separate rhetorical genre. The first, developed in the 11th century, was the *ars dictaminis*, or art of letter-writing. Basically this art took the Ciceronian pattern of six parts of an oration and set up a five-part format for writing a letter: salutation (based on the social level of writer and addressee), introduction, narration, petition, and conclusion. Many of the 300 surviving dictaminal manuscripts are accompanied by model letters. All are in Latin. The second genre, the *ars poetriae* or art of writing poetry, was in teaching practice, the art of writing both verse and prose. The *Poetria nova* (c. 1210) of Geoffrey of Vinsauf was the most important of the six major Latin works that appeared between 1170 and 1280. Relying heavily on the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, including the use of all 64 figures from the fourth book of that text, Vinsauf laid out a Ciceronian pattern for the composition of verse and prose. The fact that it survives in 200 manuscripts indicates that the book was enormously popular. It is important to note that in the Middle Ages poetry (and some prose) was meant to be read aloud, so the application of Ciceronian rhetorical principles to poetry was not as unusual as it might seem to modern readers. All the authors of the *ars poetriae* were grammarians, and in fact one of them, John of Garland in his *De arte prosayca, metrica et rithmica* (after 1229), tried to establish a linguistic base for all language use.

The third medieval rhetorical genre was the *ars praedicandi*, or art of preaching.

The medieval oral sermon shared some of the characteristics of the ancient oration, but the circumstances were quite different. Persuasion was not the objective, since the congregation consisted of people already committed to Christianity. Consequently, the emphasis was on explanation and reminders of the text of the Bible. More than 300 separate 'arts of preaching' appeared between approximately 1200 and 1500, following a basic format of elaborating on

a 'theme' (usually a passage from Scripture). The theme was divided into parts (usually three), each part was then redivided, and each of these parts was 'amplified' and or 'proved' in a variety of ways. Some commonly used means of amplification were the exemplum (narrative example), authority, reasoning, etymology, allegory, and metaphor. Despite the oral nature of the sermon, the treatises seldom discuss delivery.

The Renaissance

Two factors led to an explosion of interest in rhetoric in early modern Europe. One was the recovery of all the ancient rhetorical works of Greece and Rome, most of which had not been known during the Middle Ages. For example, the complete text of Quintilian's *Institutes of oratory* was discovered in Switzerland in 1417, and Greek texts were brought to Italy from places such as Constantinople for study by humanist scholars.

The other factor was the advent of printing. A staggering number of rhetoric texts were printed between 1465 and 1700: Lawrence D. Green and James J. Murphy have identified 3842 titles by 1717 named authors and 120 anonymous authors, produced in 310 printing towns by 3340 printers and publishers.

It is obviously impossible to summarize all the developments during this period, but some important features are the application of classical rhetoric to preaching, the attack of the new empirical science on the epistemological assumptions of classical rhetoric, the rise of 'general rhetoric' (an amalgam of Greek and Roman sources), and the gradual democratizing of rhetoric from an elite Latin to a popular vernacular art. One particular development, though, is important enough to note. The French university master Peter Ramus, following the lead of Rudolph Agricola's work on logic, declared in 1543 that Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian were all wrong about rhetoric. He assigned Invention and Arrangement to dialectic, leaving only Style and Delivery to rhetoric (and leaving Memory out as a separate part). Ramus was immensely popular, especially in Protestant countries, and had great influence in colonial America as well. Walter J. Ong has calculated that 1400 editions of his and his followers' works were printed. The resulting controversy between Ramists and Ciceronians lasted well into the next century.

Modern Rhetoric

Since 1700, rhetoric has gone from being an integral part of education and civic life to an ignored or even opposed entity today. Some even believe that rhetoric today is so diluted in its efforts to be all-encompassing that it is difficult to identify the core of the subject. But there has been no single climactic event to which this change can be assigned. Of course, there have been many variations of basic rhetorical theories and there have been differences in emphasis on one part of rhetoric or another. For example, the so-called 'elocutionary movement' of the 18th century in works by authors such as Thomas Sheridan and Gilbert Austin focused on pronunciation and other aspects of delivery. The Scotsman George Campbell argued in his *Philosophy of rhetoric* that to achieve persuasion rhetoric must address four 'faculties' of the mind – the understanding, the imagination, the passions, and the will; he also declares scientific linguistics to be the foundation of rhetoric. The 'belletristic movement' linked rhetoric, literature, and 'taste,' as marked in books such as the influential *Lectures on rhetoric and belles lettres* (1793) of the Scotsman Hugh Blair. Another Scottish development, linked to growing demands for socially advancing education, was the application of rhetoric to writing – a movement that was to affect pedagogy in the United States. The 19th century philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche declared that language is rhetoric, because it can express only opinion, not knowledge; consequently 'truth' can be seen as a linguistic social agreement rather than objective fact. In the opinion of rhetorical historians Patricia Bizzell and Bruce Herzberg, Nietzsche anticipates themes developed by 20th-century rhetoricians such as I. A. Richards, Richard Weaver, and Chaim Perelman, as well as philosophers Michael Foucault and Jacques Derrida. Finally, the application of the methods of social science to discourse analysis in recent years has produced a field of 'communication' markedly different from a rhetoric relying on thought and on perceptions by individuals.

At the beginning of the 21st century, then, rhetoric is like the multistream delta of a long river that spreads its central channel into a variety of channels. This is perhaps, not surprising, after such a long history.

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Rhetoric: Semiotic Approaches

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Introduction

'Rhetorics' is a polysemic word. All the meanings connected with it fall into two major groups: in the first one, rhetorics is regarded in a narrower and more traditional sense, in relation to verbal texts; in the second one, rhetorics is treated in a more universal and modern sense, in relation to expressing any information (e.g., visual rhetorics). It is nevertheless clear in both cases that rhetorics operates with signs and therefore fits completely into the framework of semiotics. Consequently, we could regard rhetorics simply as part of semiotics and semiotics as the ground for rhetorics. On the other hand, Charles Sanders Peirce distinguished three aspects of semiotics (Peirce identified semiotics with logic): speculative grammar, speculative critic, and speculative rhetoric (Peirce, 2.93). Thus, it is rhetorics rather than semiotics that proves to be a more general and basic knowledge. Attention needs to been drawn to the dangers of terminological amorphousness resulting from the nondistinction of rhetorics and metarhetorics; in order to avoid this, we will further speak of rhetoric phenomena when we refer to the object level, and of rhetorical phenomena when we refer to the metalevel.

Different treatments of rhetorics within the semiotic framework complicate the matter even more, since there is no clarity even in the approaches, not to mention the basic concepts. The researchers proceeding from the Peircean tradition drew attention to the fact that the most important tropes – metaphor and metonymy – are clearly related to the **icon**ical and **index**ical signs (Jakobson, 1956, 1980; Shapiro and Shapiro, 1976). Saussure's disciples, on the other hand, used the concepts and methods of structural linguistics and text grammatics to describe rhetoric phenomena, which gave rise to different directions of structural rhetorics (e.g., Dubois *et al.*, 1970), as well as to deconstructional rhetorics, which was in clear opposition with both traditional and structural rhetorics (e.g., de Man, 1986). An entirely different approach to certain rhetoric phenomena (above all, metaphor and irony) developed within the framework of analytical philosophy (cf. Searle, 1979); from the cognitive linguistics evolved the "everyday rhetorics" (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980). To this, Paul Ricoeur's hermeneutical approach to metaphor (Ricoeur, 1975) and a whole range of *ad hoc* linguistic, philosophical, and poetical treatments of different tropes and figures should be added. Some approaches focus on the rhetoric structure of the text; others

focus on characterizing different styles, movements, or genres; yet others, on describing different figures and tropes (primarily metaphor) or on solving problems related to the transfer of meaning, etc. At first sight, all this presents an ambiguous picture of the landscape of contemporary rhetorics.

Before we discuss the semiotic aspects of rhetorics, it is necessary to determine what rhetorics is as a whole – or, to be more specific, what is the field where the phenomenon of rhetorics emerges – and second, how and to what extent the semiotical analysis could approach it.

Ancient Rhetorics

Human nature is universal: in different cultures independently of one another evolves congeneric knowledge related to astronomy, geometry, physics, medicine, etc. The existence of linguistic and poetic doctrines is also rather universal. Against this background, rhetorics has an unusual history: it originated in the specific settings of the Ancient Greek civilization, and all the subsequent rhetorical schools and traditions have derived from this source. No other ancient culture has developed anything that could be likened to classical rhetorics. This fact is even more remarkable as rhetorical matter is unspecific: all rhetoric phenomena can be entirely distributed among grammar, stylistics, poetics, and logic. Thus, most *rhetoric figures* and *tropes* have analogues in Persian, Arabic, Indian, as well as Chinese poetical traditions. Moreover, for instance Aristotle, within the Greek tradition itself, discusses the same phenomena in his *Rhetorics* and *Poetics*. The differences between these lie not in the matter but in the purpose: the aim of the poetic text is catharsis; that of the rhetoric text, to convince a listener.

The specific setting that made possible the rise of rhetorics in the European civilization involved the liberation from tyranny and the establishment of democracy in Athens and the restoration of usurped land to its legal owners. In a culture with no written ownership acts, the oral public word became the main tool in the settlement of disputes, and, above all, legal disputes. Rhetorics as an art of speech grew out of the practical needs of democratic institutions (republic, public political competition, freedom of speech, public justice); court and political speeches became the most important rhetoric genres.

Of course, Greek culture was not the only one where the art of public speech was fostered: Japanese, Chinese, and Muslim cultures present remarkable examples of this kind. Nevertheless, the corresponding fields cannot be really compared to ancient rhetorics, as in their case we are rather dealing with poetics, speech etiquette, etc. Rhetorics needs freedom and competitive public debate in the condition of equality of debate partners; speakers enter the contest where their only resources and weaponry are words and the skill of using them.

Even those schools of rhetoric that were primarily oriented toward ornamental style (the Asian school) – or those that claimed, similarly to Gorgias and in the spirit of Sophists, that they could prove anything – pursued the right influence of speech, i.e., they proceeded not from the semantic but from the pragmatic notion of truth. Thus, Gorgias compares his speeches to *phármakon* ('drug') that a speaker uses to take his listener to a desired state of mind. In any case, ancient speech practice usually regarded ornaments as tools, not as an aim *per se*. It is informative to compare Greek rhetorics with Sanskrit poetics, since both evolved from the same Indo-European tradition. In the older stratum of the Sanskrit poetics (which has been preserved in Bhamaha's and Dandi's treatises of the 7th and 8th centuries) the central concept is *alankara* ('ornament'), which is comparable to the Greek *schema* ('figure'). The aesthetics of *alankaras* is very simple: the more ornaments there are and the more complex the constructions they form, the higher is the aesthetical value of an utterance. The later Indian tradition focused on the concept of *dhvani* (Anandavardhana's *Dhvanyaloka,* 9th century), which is not easy to translate: it is a hidden image, not expressed through words. Although the mechanistic doctrine of *alankaras* differs radically from the spiritualistic teaching of *dhvani*, both are entirely different from the Greek concept of rhetorics, where *schemata* do not have a sovereign value and every meaning can be expressed through word.

As it became an independent discipline, rhetorics had to define and position itself in relation to other branches of learning. Rhetorics opposed poetics as a skill of verbalizing real events against the skill of verbalizing fictional events; rhetorics opposed dialectics as an art of monological speech against the art of dialogue; rhetorics opposed logic as an art of expressing one's thoughts against the art of thinking (according to Aristotle, rhetorics is something like applied logic; logic which uses syllogisms is an art of proving, rhetoric is an art of persuasion, instead of syllogism it uses *sorites* consisting of *enthymemata*), etc. Already by the 5th century B.C., there had emerged an intuitive notion of truth that could be termed the *rhetorical ideal*. According to this ideal, thinking, speaking, and acting form an inseparable complex: it is possible for a human being to develop and formulate his or her thoughts and ideas properly (the sphere of logic), to express them properly (rhetorics), and, in

accordance with these, to act properly (justice). In the Roman Republic, rhetorics became even more connected with truth and justice; i.e., Cicero treated such 'hermeneutical' problems like the use of torture during the interrogation. Rhetorical ideal, which provided a foundation for the European mentality, prevailed at least until the 18th century and applies to some extent today. The rhetorical ideal was based on the intuition that the road to truth is the straightest of all possible roads and has to be followed in one's thoughts, words, and actions. An outstanding 17th-century pedagogue, Jan Amos Komensky, started his treatise *Orbis sensualium pictus* (1658), which was intended to be a textbook, with a definition of wisdom: "*recte intellegere, recte agere, recte eloqui*" ("to comprehend properly, to act properly, to speak properly"). It is important to emphasize that an initial conception of rhetorics treated it as the art of speaking the truth.

Classical rhetorics consisted of five subdivisions: (1) invention (*heuresis*, *inventio*), (2) arrangement (*taxis*, *dispositio*), (3) style (*lexis*, *elocutio*), (4) memory (*mneme*, *memoria*), (5) delivery (*hypokrisis*, *pronuntiatio*). These subdivisions formed a logical whole, but at the same time their sequence marked an ideal succession of rhetoric activities that corresponded to the rhetorical ideal: the logical sequence expresses itself on the operational level.

During the Roman Empire, public speech lost its social role related to the seeking and expressing of truth. This diminished greatly the relevance of the first and, to a large extent, the second subdivision. The spread of the written word reduced the importance of also the fifth and especially the fourth subdivision. In contrast, the significance of the third subdivision had been increasing since the Hellenistic period. In the Middle Ages, the field of rhetorics was divided in two: the first, speculative rhetorics, became essentially a part of scholastic philosophy, which focused on the classifications of figures and tropes. As a practical oratory, rhetorics retained its relevance in sermons, forming the sphere of homiletics.

At the same time, already in the late antiquity but especially in the Middle Ages, rhetorics started to interfere with poetics, above all with regard to written texts. Rhetorics became the teaching of prose. It is interesting that even Dante and Petrarca in their Italian prose attempted to follow instructions for *cadentia* at the ends of periods. Consequently, at least for the early humanists, the Latin speech rhythm codified by Cicero became the general principle of style for written language. The decline of scholastic philosophy and the secularization of culture inevitably led to the crisis of rhetorics.

The first criticism of rhetorics evolved in the context of rationalism and especially of the philosophy of enlightenment. The crisis of rhetorics was inseparably connected with the crisis of (Aristotelian) logic. For instance, in Molière's play *The would-be gentleman* (1670), the teacher of logic and rhetorics is presented as a charlatan. For Molière, Rousseau, and others, rhetorics came to mean the art of lying; truth required no skills. Interestingly enough, the crisis of rhetorics stemmed also from the rhetorical ideal (the purpose of speech is to approach the truth); only the notion of rhetorics changed: it was now regarded as an art of evasion.

The rhetorical ideal survived the classical rhetorics; we can come across its reflexes in the modern Western civilization in such different spheres as analytical philosophy, which advanced the notion that telling the truth is a simpler and more logical way of speaking than lying, and the assessment of utterances with the help of a lie detector, a practice based on the presumption that the organism of a lying person undergoes psychosomatic changes.

Ancient Semiotics and Rhetorics

Although the first treatise devoted to semiotics – *Cratylus* by Plato – had by the 5th century B.C. already been written, semiotics as a discipline and even the word 'semiotics' was then unfamiliar. In antiquity, rhetorics as a branch of knowledge was not related to the semiotics of that time. *Cratylus* focused on the problem of the motivation of sign without relating this to the art of speech. In *Phaedrus* we encounter both semiotical and rhetorical issues, but these were not brought together.

Probably the first to use the term 'semiotics' was a doctor and medical theoretician, the developer of the Hippocratic tradition Galen (2nd century A.D.); he employed it to refer to symptomatology – in modern terms, diagnostics. It should be emphasized that such treatment of semiotics has no connection with rhetorics. Ancient (medical) semiotics belongs to the sphere of what Carlo Ginzburg calls "the evidential paradigm."

It could be said that this paradigm is in direct opposition to the spirit of rhetorics: the basis of rhetorics is the skill of speaking the truth and a notion that truth is simple and logical, while telling the truth can be governed by *a priori* fixed rules; semiotics, on the other hand, studies indirect signs to find out the unsaid truth and takes roundabout routes – one and the same disease can have different symptoms.

To modern semiotics, however, rhetorics is the closest of all the ancient spheres of knowledge. Many problems of contemporary semiotics (denotation,

the relationship between name and description, etc.) found their first treatment precisely in ancient rhetorics. In addition, there are clear correlations between the principal dimensions of semiotics and the main subdivisions of classical rhetorics: the syntactical approach reveals itself in arrangement and partially also in style; the semantical approach can be observed both in invention and in style – in the case of invention, we are dealing with strong, referential semantics; in the case of style, with weak, significative semantics; the pragmatic approach manifests itself in memory and pronunciation.

Structural Rhetorics

The crisis of rhetorics lasted until the middle of the 20th century, when structural linguistics rediscovered tropes and figures. A central figure of structural rhetorics was Roman Jakobson, who linked different tropes with art forms and schools on the one hand and with different cognitive processes on the other hand. These phenomena had never before been related to rhetorics, which therefore meant a substantial expansion of the field of rhetorics; at the same time, Jakobson reduced the whole subject matter of rhetorics to two tropes, metaphor and metonymy, and treated these as universal semiotic mechanisms. Metaphor is the basis for the mechanisms of romanticism and poetry; metonymy, for that of realism and prose. According to Jakobson, the grounds for metaphor and metonymy could be found in the structure of natural language, in its two axes. The axis of combination (syntagmatics, in Jakobson's words) was the basis of metonymical relations; the axis of selection (paradigmatics), that of metaphorical relations. Since according to Jakobson the mechanism of poetry lay in the projection from the axis of selection onto the axis of combination – which led to the organization of sequences in verse according to the principle of equivalence – it is clear why verse is dominated by metaphor. However, in the case of prose, we are dealing with pure sequence, which creates a basis for the predominance of metonymy.

All this, in turn, correlates on the one hand with the difference between visual and acoustic signs and on the other with the functional asymmetry of the brain. Comparing fine arts and music, Jakobson called attention to the fact that the first is governed mostly by the principle of iconicity – i.e., the signifier is motivated by the signified, and so-called abstract art based on arbitrary signs is always problematic. At the same time, in music the situation is reversed: music employs predominantly arbitrary signs or symbols, and so-called concrete music based on icons (e.g., the sound of a cuckoo) and indexes (e.g., the whistle

of a train as a sign of journey) – even if it does not cause displeasure – is clearly a different kind of music. Jakobson concludes that visual and acoustic information differ in principle: for some reason our eyes prefer to trust icons, but our ears tend to trust symbols. Visual signs represent space, and the principles of space are symmetry and similarity – i.e., equivalence. Acoustic signs represent time; their principle is sequence. Again, all this is related to the functional asymmetry of the brain. The subdominant (usually right) hemisphere is oriented toward visual information and its metaphorical treatment; although the prevailing sign type is icon, indexes belong to this sphere as well. The dominant (usually left) hemisphere is oriented toward acoustical information, metonymy; the prevailing sign type is symbol.

Yuri Lotman drew on Jakobson's approach but made some important additions and elaborations. First of all, Lotman argued that the sphere of rhetorics cannot come into being on the basis of only one (e.g., natural) language: rhetoric phenomena emerge when at least two semiotically different languages collide. Already the basic concepts of rhetorics – 'image,' 'figure,' etc. – have clear connotations of the visual sphere. Lotman drew attention to the fact that a large number of metaphors are related to the visual semantics, but visuality alone is not sufficient: visual information has to be transmitted by verbal means. Thus, metaphor is a translation from the language operating with visual signs into the verbal language. These languages have different semiotic statuses: visual codes are mimetic, are founded on iconicity, and are continual, while verbal codes are discursive, are discrete, and are founded on symbolism. Even when a metaphor or a metaphorical epithet is not related to a visual image (e.g., 'sweet dreams'), we are still dealing with the recoding of iconic information by means of symbols. The above is characteristic of the traditional sphere of rhetorics, but Lotman recognized the possibility of a reverse situation as well: information encoded with a symbolic code can be transmitted through an iconic code. This way visual symbols are formed, and here too we can speak of different tropes – e.g., visual metaphor and metonymy. While verbal images come into being through the transmitting of visual messages by verbal means, visual images emerge through the transmitting of verbal messages by visual means.

Structural Rhetorics and Text Theory

Independently of Jakobson, but simultaneously with his work of solving rhetorical problems with the help of modern linguistic and semiotic methods, the peripheral areas of linguistics developed a contact with topics that traditionally belonged to the sphere

of rhetorics. As late as the middle of the 20th century, linguistics still considered the sentence to be the maximum unit of language (Émile Benveniste even presented special arguments in favor of this view). But by 1952, Zellig S. Harris demonstrated that syntactic relations between constituents cross the sentence boundaries. From this observation evolved text linguistics, one of the leading areas of linguistics during the years 1970–1980. Within the field of text linguistics, different tendencies can be discerned. There were authors who, in the spirit of Harris, confined themselves to purely formal textual parameters, such as (a) anaphoric repetitions (in contrast to classical rhetorics, which held that anaphora could occur only at the beginning of a colon or a period, text linguistics understood anaphora in a much wider sense: as any lexical repetitions in different syntactic sections); (b) substitution of lexemes with pronouns in consecutive sentences; (c) grammatical restraints that exceed sentence boundaries (Gasparov, 1971). Other authors examined syntactic relations between sentences in a wider semantic and pragmatic context (Van Dijk, 1972, 1981). Pragmatic aspects come in, in connection with describing the communicative structure of the relations between sentences.

It has been observed that sentences join into a coherent text according to a certain rule: what is the rheme in a previous sentence becomes the theme in the next. In contrast to Harris, who operated mainly with the terms of sentence structure, in such an approach the main element becomes text as a communicative whole. Although text theorists seldom refer to classical rhetorics, they deal with similar problems. The structure of a coherent text is based on repetitions on different levels, and the majority of rhetoric figures and tropes (anaphora, epistrophe, symploce, alliteration, parallelism, antithesis, simile, etc.) follow the same principle. When we look at a text as a whole, we can see that the use of tropes forms a definite system in the text. For example, if a text contains many metaphors, it is likely to also have plenty of similes and epithets. If metonymies prevail, synecdoche and irony tend to appear frequently as well.

The Semantic Foundations of Structural Rhetorics

Already Roman Jakobson in his study of tropes paid close attention, in the spirit of the Prague Linguistic Circle, to semantic elements smaller than words. This made it possible for us to be considerably more specific than the ancient teaching of tropes as figures of thought. For example, when we speak of transferred meaning in the case of metaphors, it is clear that what is transferred is not the whole meaning of the word but only a part of it. Different models of structural rhetorics approached the problem of the figurative meaning differently. For instance, if we proceed from the concept of semantic fields, we can represent meaning as space in the topological sense. In such a case, metaphor can be described as an intersection of two semantic fields, and the more distant the meanings are, the stronger the effect of the metaphor is. Greater influence, however, was gained by an approach based on the componential analysis of meaning. If we picture the meaning of a word as a matrix of markers and distinctors (to use the terms of Jerrold J. Katz and Jerry A. Fodor), the metaphorical expressions can be described as constructions where the *vehicle* projects one or several of his markers onto the *tenor*.

An important role in the description of language-semantic mechanisms of metaphor has been played by Uriel Weinreich (1966). He demonstrated that semantic syntax is not based on only one operation (as Katz and Fodor assumed), an operation that could be called "linking of meanings," but that there exists at least one more relationship – 'nesting,' in Weinreich's vocabulary. Thus, if we represent the meaning of a word in the form of a matrix, we have to accept the possibility that the matrix contains another matrix as its component. In addition, he argued that rules of semantic syntax could be formulated more effectively if we assumed that the matrices of meaning might contain lacunae in which the components of meaning could be nested. Different operations produce different tropes. Linking creates epithets: for instance, linking the meaning 'ball' with the component 'red' produces the expression 'red ball.' However, it must be added that this mechanism characterizes only modern epithets oriented toward creating new information; archaic epithets, on the contrary, are pleonastic, utterly redundant. For instance, in the expression 'round ball,' roundness is not linked to the meaning 'ball' but instead extracted from it. Metaphor, on the other hand, is created as a result of nesting. Unlike Katz and Fodor, Weinreich does not regard expressions like "a rock is dreaming" as having a conflict in semantic syntax: 'rock' [− *alive*] cannot be joined to 'dreaming' [+ *alive*]; 'dreaming' is nested in 'rock.' A classification of different rhetoric tropes and figures deriving from componential analysis was proposed by Groupe *μ* (Dubois *et al.*, 1970).

Pragmatic Rhetorics

The various branches of structural rhetorics differed substantially in their purposes from the classical

rhetorics. All of the new branches are occupied with the structure of text, not its effect, and therefore the approaches of both Roman Jakobson and Groupe μ pertained more to the field of poetics than to that of rhetorics. Speech act theory, together with the adjacent fields, can be regarded as an attempt to revive, with the tools of modern philosophy, the rhetorical ideal, according to which *plan*, *construction*, and *activity* form an inseparable unity and at the same time a natural sequence. John L. Austin, regarding language activity, joins the first two (plan and construction) under the name "locutionary speech act," names the third one (action) "illocutionary act," and adds to these *consequence*, under the name "perlocutionary act." (Classical rhetorics was not concerned with the effect of speeches, but it is clear that the principle of perlocutionarity derives from the spirit of rhetorics, which regards speech as a responsible activity.) For example, John Searle's discussion of metaphor from the perspective of speech act theory represented the return of the aims of classical rhetorics. At the same time, in comparison with that of classical rhetorics, Searle's approach was clearly much more limited – of all the tropes and figures, he paid attention only to metaphor and irony (it has often been questioned whether the latter should be regarded as a trope at all).

Searle's approach was above all characterized by his position that metaphor is not a figure of thought obtained by the joining of words but rather an utterance. Furthermore, Searle argued that such a phenomenon as figurative meaning does not and cannot exist at all: words and sentences mean what they mean. The phenomenon of metaphoricality emerges not in words but in their use and, hence, not in the field of semantics but in pragmatics. Searle proposed the following hierarchy: direct speech acts, indirect speech acts, metaphor, irony. Metaphor emerges when the sentence meaning diverges from the utterance meaning. Searle distinguished between simple and complex metaphors: in the first case, the relationship between a sentence and an utterance is one-to-one; in the second case, several utterances correspond to one sentence. However, in both cases the utterance meaning can be inferred from the sentence meaning.

The rhetorics based on the speech act theory is the complete opposite of George Lakoff and Mark Johnson's "everyday rhetorics": whereas Searle accepted only the literary meaning, for Lakoff and Johnson the figurative word use was basic. Lakoff and Johnson's approach resolutely dismissed the traditional teaching of metaphor, which rested on an assumption that there exists a neutral, nonfigurative speech that an author embellishes with figures and tropes. They pointed out that there is no such thing as a neutral, nonmetaphoric background in language: common speech is full of metaphors, but speakers and listeners usually do not notice them, since they live by them. Lakoff and Johnson demonstrated that metaphors are not accidental semantic curiosities; rather, they have a systemic nature that has a great influence on the speakers' worldview. One of Lakoff and Johnson's examples concerned speech activity. The metaphorical expression "argument is war" forms an entire linguo-cultural paradigm that treats different aspects of argument in terms of warfare. Although it seems that the relationship between the approaches of Searle and of Lakoff-Johnson is antagonistic, they complement each other substantially. Speaking cannot be totally controlled by reason and entirely imposed by discourse and culture. The processes described by Searle and Lakoff-Johnson form two opposite poles in the continuum of speech activity. The Russian philosopher Mikhail Bakhtin raised an analogical problem in his work *Toward a philosophy of the act* (1919–1924), Bakhtin's doctrine was named the rhetoric of act. Act is not any deed, but only a meaningful and responsible one – i.e., it changes *status quo*, and an agent takes a full responsibility for it. The speech act theory is very close to Bakhtin's views.

Rhetorics and Semiotics of Culture

From the viewpoint of the semiotics of culture, two levels of rhetorics should be distinguished: implicit rhetorics as a strategy of generating texts (on this level, rhetorics is a cultural universal), and explicit rhetorics (or rhetorics in the direct sense of the word) as a teaching of generating texts. The semiotics of culture, especially the semiotics of culture of the Tartu-Moscow school, is characterized by an an extended understanding of text: text is a vehicle not only of verbal but of any kind of information; text is a signal that an addresser sends to an adressee, and in the positions of both the sender and receiver, there can appear individuals and social groups as well as whole cultures. In this sense it is possible to regard, for example, ballets, commercials, chess games, election campaigns, and wars as texts. Every such text has its own grammar, stylistics, and rhetorics. From the viewpoint of cultural typology, each culture displays its own clear rhetorical characteristics. The Western European rhetorical ideal is simplicity and straightforwardness, based on Cratylean understanding that things have their right names and speech activity is controlled by reason. It is interesting that although the expression "the beginning of wisdom is to call things by their right names" is attributed to Confucius, in Chinese and in Far Eastern speech practice in

general, there prevail indirect speech strategies and an idea that many different roads lead to truth. Such understanding permeates different strata of culture: for instance, we can see how the rules of rhetorics are reflected in the art of warfare. The metaphor "argument is war," analyzed by Lakoff and Johnson, is effective in different cultures; at the same time, it reflects the important characteristics of these cultures. While European warfare, which developed from the ancient model, focuses on two main operations – attack and defense – in the Chinese art of warfare, the central role is played by the roundabout maneuver; the highest art of warfare lies not in the battle but in avoiding the battle: "The skillful leader subdues the enemy's troops without any fighting; he captures their cities without laying siege to them; he overthrows their kingdom without lengthy operations in the field" (Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*). The differences between the Greek and the Chinese arts of war reflect the leading strategies in the speech etiquettes of these cultures. Whereas the Greek orator and military leader both build their argumentation resp. military forces following ideal forms (e.g., in Plato's case, the ideal for both rhetorics and warfare is geometry) with the aim of destroying the opponent's argumentation resp. military forces, the Chinese art of war follows the prevailing rule of Chinese speech etiquette, according to which the speaker (especially when the speech is directed to an equal or a superior) cannot express the message explicitly: a speech act is considered successful if the adressee receives the information without the speaker's having expressed it directly – the problem is solved without a debate (Jullien, 1995).

It would be an extreme oversimplification to link two rhetoric strategies rigidly with geographical parameters of different cultures: we come across both mechanisms in the East as well as in the West; what becomes decisive is their proportion. Even in the context of Western European culture, H. Paul Grice's maxims of conversation and Searle's treatment of speech acts should be characterized as a utopian ideal picture that is never achieved in a real communication. Yuri Lotman pointed out that in Europe, different periods are dominated by different rhetoric strategies, but unlike Jakobson, he refrained from straightforwardly associating them with Romanticism and realism. For example, mannerist literature and the speech practices of marginal groups in the era of Romanticism (the parlance of English dandies, the language of French precious ladies, etc.) are clearly oriented toward indirect speech acts, the use of descriptions instead of naming: these are exactly the aspects that attract the attention of a European in the Far Eastern speech etiquette.

See also: Discourse Anaphora; Irony: Stylistic Approaches; Irony; Jakobson, Roman; Metaphors and Conceptual Blending; Metaphor: Psychological Aspects; Metonymy; Rhetoric: History; Speech Acts, Literal and Nonliteral.

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Rhetorical Structure Theory

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Introduction: What is Rhetorical Structure Theory?

Readers feel that natural texts are coherent and well structured, and that texts achieve rhetorical goals of various kinds. There is also wide agreement that subparts of texts are related to one another in various ways. Understanding these relationships can be seen as an important aspect of having understood a text at all, but linguistic accounts of these uncontroversial phenomena are still limited. Rhetorical Structure Theory (RST) is one of the most significant theoretical and practical advances that has been made in recent times toward making it possible to analyze this kind of structure linguistically. RST seeks to explain the coherence of text by describing how each individual component of a text contributes to the communicative goals of the text as a whole. To do this, RST employs a set of rhetorical relations. These are in principle open-ended, but in practice rather narrowly constrained. An RST analysis, then, progressively deconstructs a text into its smaller component parts. Crucially, because what is being captured is not just a structure but a relationship, each subcomponent itself has (at least) two parts. In every relation, one of the subparts is seen as the most important, or nuclear, component at that level in structure. The other subparts, called satellites, are subservient to the part identified as the nucleus. Each complex of subparts taking part in the relationship is described according to a set of rhetorical relations defined by the theory. A complete analysis then consists of a single hierarchical rhetorical structure defined by rhetorical dependency links between structural siblings and composition between parts and their subparts. The smallest parts of the structure are called units and correspond directly to portions of the analyzed text.

A text is seen to be coherent and 'well-formed' according to RST when it is possible to construct at least one single overarching hierarchical rhetorical structure for the text as a whole. This structure must obey the organizational principles set out by RST, most important of which are the conditions that RST places on the rhetorical relations that must be used to relate contiguous parts of the text, or text spans. Most natural texts will allow at least one complete analysis. Uncovering that analysis – i.e., making the rhetorical relations involved explicit – can be a significant aid toward understanding how the text achieves the effects that it does.

RST has been used successfully for a variety of tasks, ranging from linguistic text interpretation to computational applications in language production and automatic analysis.

The Origins of RST

RST was originally developed during the mid-to-late 1980s by William C. Mann at the Information Sciences Institute of the University of Southern California (USC/ISI) and Sandra Thompson at the University of California at Santa Barbara. Mann was seeking a model of textual coherence sufficiently explicit to drive automatic text production (see Mann and Moore, 1981) and Thompson had been involved with issues of discourse coherence for many years, particularly researching the textual signals of discourse relations. The concerns of Mann and Thompson were combined in the original formulation of RST. Subsequently, further refinements to the

theory in relation to its links with other kinds of linguistic description were contributed by Christian Matthiessen (then also of USC/ISI).

Mann and Thompson observed that certain sequences of textual material appeared to suggest additional assertions over and above those explicitly made in the text itself (Mann and Thompson, 1986). For example, in the textual sequence in (1), we need to see that the two sentences are related in some way in order to understand why they have been said:

(1) He explains things well. He'll make a good teacher.

In particular, unless we can see that an additional assertion of the form in (1a) is being made, we will not have understood the text:

(1a) Because he explains things well, I think he'll make a good teacher.

What we understand in understanding (1) is that the first sentence is being given as evidence for the statement made in the second sentence.

We can readily find sequences where other relations between the parts need to be posited in order to explain the coherence of combinations of linguistic units. For example, in the text extract in (2), we need to posit a relationship of reason between the two sentences.

(2) The lorry veered off the road. The brakes had failed.

In addition, both of these relationships are quite different from the kind of temporal sequence that we find between sentences in a simple narration. These kinds of relations were identified and catalogued by Mann and Thompson as a move toward understanding how texts 'mean' in addition to the basic or propositional content of the individual sentences, even when there is no explicit linguistic marker of the relation being expressed. These 'implicit assertions' are necessary for both speaker and hearer: a hearer must uncover them in order to understand why sentences are being placed together, and a speaker relies on a hearer uncovering them in order to understand the message.

These kinds of relationships can hold at any level in the text; they are not exclusively relations between individual sentences. This leads to the necessity for a recursive definition of rhetorical structure – that is, text segments in which rhetorical relations of particular kinds are being employed can themselves, as aggregates, take part in rhetorical structures at higher levels. RST does not relate the individual sentences themselves, but the rhetorical intent of the discourse portions over which the rhetorical relations hold – and this can correspond to individual sentences, units smaller than sentences, and larger units taking in more extensive portions of a text.

Mann and Thompson carried out a detailed examination of the kinds of rhetorical relationships and corresponding rhetorical structures needed to carry out text analysis of texts of any kind. They based this examination initially on a corpus of several hundred texts drawn from a variety of text types. The result was a collection consisting of around 20 relations sufficient for covering the texts they investigated. These relations, now termed classical RST, are set out and defined in detail in several papers, most prominent of which are Mann and Thompson (1986, 1988) and Mann et al. (1992). Although Mann and Thompson explicitly stated this list of relations to be open-ended, it has in fact proved very stable over the years. However, occasional evidence has been found for further rhetorical relations that were not included within the original set, and so most researchers now accordingly work with what is called the extended RST set, which now includes around 30 relations. A list of these relations is shown in **Table 1**.

As intended by Mann, the framework was soon taken up for computational systems, particularly for automatic text generation. The theory has also been taken further by text linguists, who have applied it to a wider range of texts than the original starting point of Mann and Thompson. The extended RST list has also been validated across several languages; contrastive RST analyses have been performed, for example, for Dutch (Abelen et al., 1993), Chinese (Chinese, Mandarin) (Marcu et al., 2000), French, Portuguese, and German (German, Standard) (Delin et al., 1996), Spanish (Taboada, 2004) and a host of

Table 1 A list of RST relations

Subject-matter relations	Presentational relations	Multinuclear relations
Circumstance	Antithesis	Contrast
Condition	Background	Joint
Elaboration	Concession	List
Evaluation	Enablement	Restatement
Interpretation	Evidence	Sequence
Means	Justify	
Nonvolitional cause	Motivation	
Nonvolitional result	Preparation	
Otherwise	Restatement	
Purpose	Summary	
Solutionhood		
Unconditional		
Unless		
Volitional cause		
Volitional result		

other languages. RST therefore continues to be an active area of research into text organization.

Although primarily developed for the analysis of written texts, there have also been attempts to apply RST in the analysis of dialogue (cf. Fawcett and Davies, 1992; Maier and Sitter, 1992; Daradoumis, 1995). Martin (1992) criticized RST from this perspective, arguing that the deep structural embeddings that RST requires do not align well with the kind of clause combining observable in spontaneous speech. This continues to be an active area of debate.

Definitions

We gave an informal indication of the structure of an RST analysis above. We need to refine this somewhat for a full definition of RST. First, there are two kinds of rhetorical relations: asymmetric relations, where one of the related rhetorical units is singled out as the rhetorical head, or nucleus, and symmetric relations, also termed multinuclear, where all of the related units are of equal status. Examples of multinuclear relations are Contrast, which draws a relation between two elements – we cannot say that one of these elements is then more important than the other, it is precisely the function of the contrast to present them both – and Sequence, which orders an arbitrary number of elements in a temporal or other organizational sequence – again, we cannot pick one of these out as being more essential than the others.

In **Figure 1**, the symmetric relation of Sequence is shown. In this relation, the nuclei have identical status. The notation is standard in RST analysis, showing each relevant text span surmounted by a line showing its extent. The straight lines emerging from the text spans show that each span is analyzed as a nucleus.

The relation in **Figure 2**, which shows an example of a relation called Enablement, is an asymmetric relationship. The nucleus is still indicated by a straight line – vertical now – while satellites and their link with the nucleus to which they relate are shown by an arc.

The importance of a nuclear element is defined in terms of its contribution to the rhetorical goals of the text as a whole. Within RST, these goals are intended to correspond with the intentions of the speaker. A nuclear element cannot be removed from a text without damaging its coherence, whereas satellites can often be removed without compromising overall coherence (i.e., the text would still be perceived as attempting to fulfill the same broad communicative function).

The rhetorical relations themselves are defined in terms of applicability conditions; these are the rules that make up each relation and form a valuable guide

Figure 1 Symmetric relation: sequence.

Figure 2 Asymmetric relation: enablement.

to the analyst in explaining what is meant by each relation and how to select which one to use in a given context. Each relation defines:

- a set of conditions that must hold of the nucleus
- a set that must hold of the satellites
- a set of imputed conditions that must hold of the nucleus and satellite combination
- a specification of the effect that is achieved with the rhetorical relation on the hearer/reader.

The conditions are usually expressed in terms of the beliefs, intentions, and desires of the speakers and hearers. RST also considers the effect intended by the speaker/writer in using a relation.

For a good example of a relation definition, we can revisit the RST relation of Enablement. An example of a minimal text fragment involving Enablement can be seen in the sentence:

(3) Open the doors by pressing the red button.

In (3), the reader is told to do something, but is also told (in the 'by' phrase) how to do it. This is an example of Enablement, which relates the action to be performed to some subsidiary information that enables it (i.e., that makes the performance of the action easier or possible). It would also have been possible to present the information in two wholly separate clauses – 'Open the doors – press the red button.' for example. The relation definition is made up of four slots, as follows:

- Conditions on the nucleus (N): N identifies some action that it is possible for the reader/hearer (H) to

perform and which is, at the point in time at which the relation is given, 'unrealized.'

- Conditions on the satellites (S): S identifies some information that improves the H's ability to carry out the action identified in N.
- Conditions on the N+S combination: H comprehending S increases H's potential ability to perform the action in N.
- The effect of the relation: H's potential ability to perform the action in N increases.

Rhetorically, then, Enablement sees the action to be performed as the nucleus and the subsidiary information as satellites. We can see this with the current example by leaving out the enabling information 'by pressing the red button.' The main purpose of the text fragment appears to be that the hearer open the doors; this remains even when the enabling information is omitted. A generally useful way of viewing the nucleus–satellite relationship is therefore to say that the satellites increase the range of situations where the rhetorical force covered by the nucleus will be successful. In the current example, if the hearer knows how to open the doors anyway, then the enabling information may be safely omitted. But in situations where the hearer does not know this, the rhetorical force will fail without the satellites being present.

All of the rhetorical relations employed within RST are defined in this manner. A full list can be found in the definitive report of Mann and Thompson (1988), extracts from which, including the full relation definitions, are given on the RST website (see references). An almost exhaustive survey of the current state of the art in RST, the applications that are being pursued, references to RST analyses for a broad range of languages, as well as discussions of problems and issues, is available in two papers by Taboada and Mann (2005, 2006).

An analyst approaches a text through applying the relation definitions progressively, decomposing the text into ever-finer segments. Which relation to choose is determined by a good understanding of the applicability conditions (the information in the four slots seen above in the Enablement relation). Importantly, the applicability conditions must respect which discourse segments have been selected as nuclear and which as satellites. Sometimes it is possible to find situations where the conditions hold, but the nuclearity assignment would be wrong; this is sufficient to rule out the applicability of the relation considered. Moreover, when combining an RST fragment into a larger structure, it is the effect of the N+S combination that must be taken into consideration as a possible nucleus or satellite for the next level 'up.'

In this way, the combination of structures into larger hierarchical structures is made to enforce a rhetorical consistency of purpose for a text as a whole.

The smallest piece of text that can participate in rhetorical relationships, the text span that is the finest level of rhetorical structure, is left open for the analyst to decide. Mann and Thompson deliberately allow this to vary depending on the purposes for which an analysis is undertaken. It may be fixed as sentences, as grammatical clauses, or as entire paragraphs, just as, in grammatical analysis, the analyst can decide how fine he or she needs the analysis to be. For English, a typical analytic decision is that the relations should apply to grammatical clauses but not within clauses. This may not be appropriate for all languages, however, because what may well be a grammatical clause in English could be a smaller grammatical unit in another language. Examples discussed here from the text type of instructions include the following contrasting pair from English and German:

(4a) Twist the top until it locks.
(4b) Drehen Sie den Deckel bis zum Anschlag.

What in the English version appears as a grammatical dependent clause ('until it locks') is in the German version a prepositional phrase ('bis zum Anschlag'). Therefore, either the text spans for the rhetorical analysis must include at least prepositional phrases for German or the two corresponding sentences must receive differing rhetorical analyses – which may be unsatisfactory, given their very similar purpose. The exact positions taken on this issue in the literature vary; an extensive discussion was given by Grote (2004).

There are still many questions concerning how a body of rhetorical relations such as those proposed in RST are to be best identified, defined, and represented. Since the original collection of relations was presented as a simple set, many subsequent researchers concerned themselves with the question of just how large this set might need to become – in one collection, Maier and Hovy (1993) presented over 300 'rhetorical relations' in a classification hierarchy. Moving in the other direction, Sanders *et al.* (1992) focused attention on four contrasting features for describing coherence relations and investigated these in terms of their psychological effects. Combining features then gives rise to particular rhetorical relations. One of these features, which they termed the basic rhetorical relation, concerns causality (i.e., whether two consecutive discourse segments are related in the world by causality or not). Here, Sanders *et al.* were able to demonstrate clear psychological effects that differentiate reliably between several distinct classes of relations. Reliability varied, however, across

the features considered, and so further work has subsequently investigated these issues more closely.

RST has been criticized because it only allows one rhetorical relation to hold between discourse segments. Some authors, e.g., Moore and Pollack (1992) and later Maier and Webber and colleagues (Maier, 1996; Webber *et al.*, 1999), argued that this particular RST constraint needs to be relaxed. Moore and Pollack suggested a solution by distinguishing between two main types of relations among those posited by Mann and Thompson – subject-matter and presentational relations. Subject-matter relations are those that take their applicability conditions from the states of affairs being described; presentational relations are dependent on the particular rhetorical argument being pursued by the writer/speaker. Moore and Pollack suggest that these two different types of relation should be allowed to hold at the same time.

In a move in some ways similar to the use of features by Sanders *et al.* mentioned above, Bateman and Rondhuis (1997) argued that rhetorical relations are not atomistic theoretical constructs at all, but bundles of features. They proposed that these features can be drawn from the three kinds of meanings commonly proposed in systemic–functional linguistics (see, e.g., Halliday and Matthiessen, 2004), thereby adding 'textual' meaning (concerned with nuclearity choices) to the 'ideational' (subject-matter) and 'interpersonal' (presentational) meanings already suggested by Mann and Thompson's original account. This solves the multiple simultaneous relations problem by moving simultaneity to the features that hold rather than needing to maintain individual and separate rhetorical relations in the rhetorical structure.

An Example of RST Analysis

In this section, we give a very short worked example of text analysis according to RST. We take a simple recipe as indicative of the kind of analytic decisions and rhetorical relationships employed. The recipe is as follows:

> Potted Cheese
> Beat 225 g mature cheddar cheese and 50 g salted butter with 1 tsp dry mustard so that it forms a stiff cream. Spoon into small ramekin dishes. Cover with 50 g melted butter and refrigerate for 2 hours. When the potted cheese has set, serve spread on brown toast or crackers.

As many recipes do, this recipe consists of a set of sequential steps. These are represented in RST as a Sequence relation. However, there are two steps that are slightly more complex than the others. In the first,

a beating action is carried out *so that it forms a stiff cream*. This clause tells the reader why the beating is done, and is recognized in RST as a Purpose relation. In the second, the instruction is to *serve* only *when the potted cheese has set*. Because the *when* clause places a condition on when the action can be done, RST recognizes this as a Condition relation. So as well as taking part in the Sequence relation, these elements are themselves complex. The diagram in **Figure 3** shows the full RST analysis of the recipe text.

Relations to Other Levels of Linguistic Description

RST is intended to cover the domain of linguistic description to do with 'text structure.' However, it is also necessary that this domain be related to other areas of linguistic description. One systematic problem haunting text linguistic accounts of many kinds has been that it is difficult to draw conclusions about what a particular text structure says about possible or impossible grammatical, lexical, and semantic expressions. This also has repercussions for the reliability of a text analysis; if it is not possible to state the observable linguistic signs of a text structural analysis, then it is possible to suggest several plausible analyses and hard to decide between them. RST does not position itself on this issue particularly clearly. While it is possible to posit a rhetorical relationship between elements without any supporting linguistic marker such as a discourse connective, it is much clearer positive evidence for a relation if an explicit marker is present.

In some cases at least, enough explicit evidence can be gleaned from texts to allow an RST analysis to be produced automatically. Marcu (2000a) followed this approach in considerable detail. Speakers also give explicit intonational signals that correspond to quite subtle distinctions in the rhetorical structure – in particular to structural embedding and nuclearity (see den Ouden, 2004). Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that fully automatic RST text analysis can ever be infallible. RST analysis explicitly draws on judgments of intention and belief, and reasoning about these is notoriously difficult to do automatically.

There are also situations where an RST analysis overlaps with analyses at other levels of linguistic description. For example, whenever an RST analysis is suggested for combinations of clauses, the relationships involved might also be described purely on the basis of grammar. For example, what, in RST terms, might be considered a Purpose relationship between a rhetorical nucleus and a satellite might, in terms of grammar, be seen as a purposive adverbial clause. There is probably little sense in asking which of

Figure 3 RST analysis of recipe for potted cheese.

these analyses is the 'correct' one; it simply depends what the analysis is trying to achieve. The fact that structural signaling can take place at either level has been studied in detail for clause combining by Matthiessen and Thompson (1989). The relationship with lower levels of grammatical structure may also be considered: Martin (1992) looked at how conjunctive semantic relations find linguistic realizations inside clauses and even within nominal and prepositional phrases, while Bateman and Rondhuis (1997) looked at the relationships between differing levels of abstraction in rhetorical organization in general.

Sometimes when an RST analysis is possible, it still seems less than useful to do so. An example offered by Mann and Thompson is that of analyzing a letter. There are segments of the letter, such as the address of the addressee, that of the sender, the date, the place where it was written, the salutation ('Dear Ms Smith'), the sign-off ('Yours in haste'), etc., which are normally part of letters but whose rhetorical linkage is weak. One could provide a rhetorical analysis, but for the most part it seems more appropriate to describe the textual structure involved as a generic structure for this particular text type. As such, it is similar to a partly frozen idiom that allows only limited innovation; the original rhetorical motivations (if any) of the organization have been lost, and one is left with a generic template of how instances of such text types are constructed.

The benefits of RST analysis obviously diminish progressively as one moves away from the central area for which RST is intended to operate. Carrying out analysis in terms of RST and other levels of description may, however, be useful when we are considering aspects of linguistic change, of the emergence of new grammatical configurations or generic text structures. Here, the kind of motivations that we obtain from the rhetorical level of description can indeed be useful indicators of reasons for change.

Applications of RST

As explained above, the first application of RST was in computational linguistics. Mann had been searching for an account of text structure that would be amenable to computational formalization, and with RST he succeeded. Two approaches to automatic text generation using RST were developed independently at the Information Sciences Institute; one by Hovy (1988) was essentially bottom-up, in that a collection of data was 'structured' in order to produce a well-formed RST tree; the other, developed by Moore and Paris (1988), interpreted the applicability constraints in the RST relation definitions as plan operators, i.e., methods for achieving goals that could be performed using the top-down hierarchical planning paradigm well-established in Artificial Intelligence (AI; see Sacerdoti, 1973). A detailed description of these uses of RST was given by Hovy

(1993), while computational introductions were given, for example, by Bateman and Zock (2003) and Vander Linden (2000). Essentially, production of a text starts with a communicative goal to be achieved, and the planning process successively refines this goal according to a library of plans into 'smaller' goals until an appropriate granularity for expression through rhetorical relations and unitary propositions is reached. The result is then a completed RST tree with constraints attached to all the leaves concerning the content and form of the linguistic material that is to be generated there, resulting in a specification for a well-formed text that realizes all the rhetorical goals. The approach was subsequently adopted in several large-scale natural language generation projects and for several languages (see, e.g., Rösner and Stede, 1992; Delin *et al.*, 1994); multilingual results have also fed into new accounts of contrastive pragmatics (Delin *et al.*, 1996).

RST subsequently became the approach to text planning most widely adopted in automatic text production but was not considered for text interpretation due to the perceived subjectivity – and therefore unreliability – of RST analyses. This changed substantially with the work of Marcu and colleagues (Marcu, 2000a; Marcu *et al.*, 2000), which sought to produce RST analyses of text automatically, drawing on a broad basis of surface linguistic cues. This could then be used for summarization of texts in the manner suggested by O'Donnell (1997), where successively removing deeply embedded satellites naturally results in shorter texts without impairing text coherence. Marcu (2000b) provides a book-length discussion of the issues and methods of RST-based automatic summarization and some of the problems of the approach.

A further development arising out of the use of RST for automatic text production was the extension to consider the creation of multimodal documents. The underlying intuition here is that, just as segments of a text contribute to that text's coherence in systematic and specifiable ways, segments of a multimodal document, involving pictures, diagrams, and texts, could also be related in an analogous manner. Such an extended RST approach involving relationships between text, diagrams, and pictures was set out by André and Rist (1993). This basic approach was subsequently adopted by a number of researchers and also used for computational implementations of document production systems. Perhaps surprisingly, little of the original RST specification needed to be changed in these efforts, although some more recent and detailed investigations of the differences between RST for texts and RST for multimodal documents have modified this view somewhat. Bateman *et al.*

(2004) showed, for example, that it is necessary both to extend the kinds of relations that are involved when we are relating parts of a document that are realized in different 'modes' and to consider the influence of the (at least) two-dimensional representational medium (e.g., the page or screen) rather than the one-dimensional medium of language assumed by RST (see also Henschel, 2002). Applications for the analysis and critique of multimodal documents, particularly of page layout and design, are one result of such studies (Delin and Bateman, 2002).

A further, recent proposal for an application of RST is for driving speech synthesis. In a series of detailed empirical studies, den Ouden (2004) shows that fine details of intonational delivery of texts read aloud correlate significantly with the RST analyses of those texts. These details include speed of delivery as well as intonational phrasing. It is then suggested that incorporating a responsiveness to the RST structure of a text would contribute to the naturalness of any synthesized speech for the text.

Finally, RST also continues to be influential both in linguistic approaches to investigations of text structure and in psycholinguistic attempts to validate or refine such approaches. Particularly important for the former are approaches that combine RST with aspects of information structure (Chiarcos and Stede, 2004; Taboada, 2004) and with interclausal coherence/ cohesion when linearising a rhetorical structure in text (Bateman, 2001). For the latter, RST has offered a number of variables for more systematic investigation: nuclearity, structural embedding, and type of rhetorical relation are all clear claims of an RST analysis that can be subjected to empirical study. A range of investigations and theoretical discussion are presented by den Ouden (2004).

Compared with more traditional text linguistic approaches to describing and motivating text structure, RST can be distinguished by the detail given both to the methodology pursued when constructing an analysis and to the level of detail of the resulting analyses. The definitions of the individual rhetorical relations and the structural schemata in which they can be embedded significantly constrain analysis results. In studies carried out by den Ouden and colleagues (den Ouden *et al.*, 1998; den Ouden, 2004) it has been found that trained annotators reliably produced compatible RST analyses independently of one another; the rhetorical structures produced agreed most with respect to their segmentation and attribution of nuclearity, and less concerning the identity of individual relations. Detailed combinations of RST with other, more recent and formally specified linguistic approaches to text organization such

as Asher and Lascarides's Segmented Discourse Representation Theory (SDRT; Asher and Lascarides, 2003) or Discourse Tree Adjoining Grammars (e.g., Webber *et al.*, 1999) remain to be done but would no doubt be highly beneficial for subsequent research in text structure in general.

See also: Discourse Markers; Discourse Markers; Discourse Processing; Rhetoric: Semiotic Approaches; Speech Acts, Classification and Definition; Writing and Cognition.

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Relevant Website

http://www.sfu.ca/rst/ – The RST website includes definitions of all the RST relations, many example analyses, and translations of basic introductions in French and Spanish.

Rhetorical Tropes in Political Discourse

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Classical Rhetorical and Actual Characterization of Tropes

The Greek substantive 'trópos,' originally meaning 'turn' or 'direction,' is derived from the verb 'trépein,' which signifies 'to turn (over/round).' The classical rhetorical term encompasses all figures of speech that involve a turn of meaning (i.e., a linguistic transference from one conceptual sphere to another). Conventionally, tropes are considered to be conventionalized means of expression of so-called 'improper speech' or 'nonliteral speech,' which is characterized by a (poetically) licensed difference between the 'ordinary' literal and the 'extraordinary' intended meaning of a speech. This tropological theory of deviation or substitution is nowadays often criticized for mistakenly assuming that tropes are deviations from linguistic normality and can thus simply be replaced by 'proper' expressions or phrases. However, tropes are, in fact, very common in 'everyday language,' and there is no such thing as an original *verbum proprium* or *substituendum* that perfectly corresponds to the trope (cf., among others, Kienpointner, 1999: 66–68).

In contrast to other figures of speech (e.g., figures of repetition like anaphora, epiphera, alliteration, assonance, consonance, and parallelism), tropes are said to be more closely related to content than to form or structure. Concerning the relationship between what is said or written and what is meant, Heinrich

Lausberg (1990a: 64–79) distinguishes between two types of tropes.

Tropes of shifting boundaries ('Grenzverschiebungstropen') consist of moving the borders of neighboring semantic fields or the borders within one and the same semantic field. These tropes are determined by a relationship of inclusion or (factual) contiguity between what is said or written and what is meant. They are, accordingly, divided into two subcategories. Periphrasis, litotes, hyperbole, emphasis, antonomasia, and synecdoche are assigned to the first subcategory. They are constituted by shifting the boundary within a semantic sphere. The second subcategory involves a relationship of adjacency. It is prototypically represented by metonymy.

The second type of tropes is labeled 'leaping tropes' ('Sprungtropen'). In comparison to tropes that involve shifting boundaries, leaping tropes are grounded on a 'leap' from one semantic sphere to another sphere that is not adjacent to the first one. Traditionally, metaphor, allegory, and irony are taken as leaping tropes. Their intended meaning is to be found in a semantic domain that clearly differs from what is actually said or written. In concrete rhetorical analyses, a neat distinction between the two types of tropes – as well as between the single tropes allocated to these two types – is not always feasible, as simultaneous tropic membership of specific linguistic realizations is not unusual (see Fontanier, 1977; Morier, 1989; Lausberg, 1990a, 1990b; Groddeck, 1995; Plett, 2001, for various proposals to classify tropes; see Goossens, 1995, for multiple tropic membership, discussed with the example of 'metaphtonymy,' the simultaneous combination of metaphor and metonymy).

Antique rhetoric ascribes primarily an ornamental function to tropes. It considers them to be deviations from ordinary language for the sake of adornment. This view of tropes as purely decorative linguistic appendices that are 'added' to the linguistic raw material in the rhetorical production stage of elocution to give glamour to one's speech has widely been overcome by a reassessment that sees language as basically tropic. Nowadays, it is almost commonplace in modern rhetoric, linguistics, language philosophy, and cognitive science that all areas of language are pervaded with tropes, and that tropes, like metaphors, metonymies, and synecdoches, function as elementary cognitive principles that – often unconsciously – shape and structure human perception and thinking. Tropes are no longer exclusively associated with the stage of elocution; rather, they are also related to the stage of *inventio* and, of course, to processes of the speech's reception or apperception.

Political Discourses

The contention of the tropes' pervasiveness in language holds also for the realm of political language, which – generally speaking – evolves in a tension between the preservation and transformation of power relations, public decision making, and problem solving, as well as political order. Many names of political institutions and 'collective' political actors have their origin in metaphorization and metonymization (e.g., 'government,' 'parliament,' 'minister,' and 'ministry'). Political discourses are full of tropes related to the three political dimensions of form (i.e., polity, the basic order related to political norms, institutions, system, and culture), content (i.e., policy, the policy-field-related planning and acting concerning the identification of political problems, the development and implementation of political programs, and the evaluation and correction of their implementation), and process (i.e., politics, the political competition related to the conflicts between political actors and to the achievement of followers and power). In all fields of political action – within and across which discourses manifest themselves – politicians employ these figures of speech as effective rhetorical means of constructing, representing, and transforming political 'reality,' as well as a means of political persuasion.

'Fields of action' (cf. Girnth, 1996) may be understood as "places of social forms of practice" (Bourdieu, 1991: 74) or, in other words, as frameworks of social interaction (Reisigl, 2003: 148). The spatiometaphorical distinction among different fields of action can be understood as a differentiation between various functions or socially institutionalized aims of discursive practices. Among the political fields are the law-making procedure; the formation of public attitudes, opinions, and will; the party-internal formation of attitudes, opinions, and will; the interparty formation of attitudes, opinions, and will; the organization of international and (especially) interstate relations; political advertising; the political executive and administration; and the various forms of political control (for more details, see Reisigl, 2003: 128–142). A political 'discourse' about a specific topic may have its starting point within one field of action and proceed onward through another one. In this respect, discourses and discourse topics 'spread' to different fields and discourses. They cross between fields, overlap, refer to each other, or are in some other way sociofunctionally linked with each other (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001: 36 f.).

In the given context, 'discourse' is to be seen as topic-related concept that, among others, involves argumentation about validity claims such as truth

and normative validity, as well as pluri-perspectivity constituted by the discursive participation of various social actors who assume different points of view (Reisigl, 2003: 92; for a mono-perspectivist conceptualization of 'discourse,' see Fairclough, 1995: 14). Discourses represent semiotic social practices that are both socially constitutive and socially constituted. A political discourse about a particular topic can be understood as a complex bundle of simultaneous and sequential interrelated linguistic acts. These manifest themselves within, and across, the above-mentioned fields of political action as thematically interrelated and problem-centered semiotic (e.g., oral or written) tokens, very often as 'texts' that belong to specific semiotic types (i.e., textual types or genres), which serve particular political purposes (see Reisigl & Wodak, 2001: 36).

Rhetorical tropes fulfill many different purposes in political discourses, especially in regard to positive political self-presentation and negative political other-presentation. With respect to the ideational metafunction of language, these tropes help to 'invent' or construct a political 'reality' (e.g., via incorporating metaphors or allegories like the boat or ship metaphor/allegory, referring to a state), to reduce complexities by simplistic categorization and imaginary representation of political 'reality' (e.g., via color metaphors referring to alleged human 'races'), to vivify, personify, and illustrate abstract or unclear political ideas (e.g., via personifications and other animalizing metaphors), to selectively foreground specific traits of political entities or 'reality' sectors (e.g., via particularizing synecdoches), and to background or hide specific political aspects, actors, or actions (e.g., via metonymies that represent persons by place names).

With respect to the interpersonal metafunction of language, these tropes are employed to promote the identification with single or 'collective' political actors (e.g., leaders, parties, states, or nations), as well as with their political aims and ideologies (e.g., via the heart metaphor relating to a specific nation-state within a confederation of states); to promote in-group solidarity (e.g., via family or kinship metaphors, such as the androcentric metaphor of brotherhood), referring to the imagined community of a nation or of politically united nations; to support out-group segregation and discrimination (e.g., via deprecating animalizing metaphors like parasite, rat, and vermin); to create a feeling of security by suggesting stability and order (e.g., via construction metaphors like house, referring to a state); to create a feeling of insecurity by suggesting chaos, disorder, danger, and threat (e.g., via flood or wave metaphors

referring to immigrants); to justify, legitimize, or delegitimize specific political actions or their omission (e.g., via metaphors of gain or cost relating to the consequences of a specific action or omission of action); and to mobilize political followers to perform specific actions which can culminate in physical or military aggression, such as war (e.g., via instigating militarizing metaphors or rape and monster metaphors relating to 'the enemy'). Some of these functions will be elaborated on in greater detail in the following section.

Toward a Tropology of the Political

For a long time, analysis of political language has merely been carried out as a side job both on the part of political scientists interested in issues of language and on the part of linguists interested in political issues. As a consequence, the respective studies in linguistics and political science have frequently been amateurish with respect to theory, methods, and methodology. This critique also relates to the study of tropes in political discourses. Linguistic, and especially rhetorical, approaches often have suffered from politological ignorance and did not venture beyond a positivist identification and enumeration of figures of speech, as well as a very general characterization of the persuasive or manipulative potential of single tropes, especially of metaphors. The analyses of tropes in political science did, however, often not exceed everyday linguistic triviality when selectively looking at 'linguistic images' with political significance.

A remedy for the many shortcomings in the area can be found in a transdisciplinarian politolinguistic approach that tries to connect and synthesize rhetoric, linguistic discourse analysis, and political science. Such an approach should theoretically rely on actual concepts in political science, as well as on rhetorical and discourse analytical categories. With respect to the topic in question, politolinguistics should build a 'tropology of the political' (i.e., a theory of tropes that systematizes and explains the political and linguistic functions or purposes of tropic language in polity, policy, and politics; for a first sketch, see Reisigl, 2002, and Reisigl, 2003: 237–258). In what follows, this tropology is outlined with the example of three of the four so-called 'master tropes' (see Burke, 1969: 503–517); that is to say, with the example of metaphor (including personification and allegory, the latter being conceived as continuous, expanded metaphor), metonymy, and synecdoche (including antonomasia as a special form of synecdoche). The fourth alleged 'master trope,' irony, will be dropped,

as its character is very different from that of the three basic tropes. In contrast to metaphor, metonymy, and synecdoche, irony is much more heterogeneous. It often involves the prosodic, gestural, or facial-expressive dimension of language, which enables one to recognize that what has been said is not to be taken literally, but ironically. To explicate the complex character of irony would go beyond the scope of this introductory article.

In addition, in the present context, for reasons of limited space, no attention can be paid to other linguistic occurrences traditionally also apostrophized as 'tropes.' Periphrasis, litotes, hyperbole, and emphasis are – as is irony – much more heterogeneous than metaphor, metonymy, and synecdoche. As rhetorical phenomena, they do often derive from the three basic tropes or manifest themselves in manifold tropic ways. Periphrasis, for instance, can linguistically be realized as antonomasia (which is characterized as a descriptive phrase standing for an individual to be identified with a proper name or, conversely, as a proper name standing for a general character trait), synecdoche, etymology (which is based on the principle of 'nomen est omen'), metaphor, allegory, metonymy, euphemism, *descriptio* and *definitio*, and so forth (Plett, 2001: 91). However, some of these other 'tropes' frequently involve linguistic dimensions that are not genuinely related to tropes, such as the so-called 'trope of emphasis,' for example, which comprises numerous phonological, morphosemantic, and syntactic characteristics that are not to be seen as tropic qualities (Reisigl, 1999: 197–199). To take into consideration all these various aspects and their complex interplay would not be feasible within the limits of this overview.

Metaphors

Of all tropes, metaphors certainly receive the most attention in the analysis of political discourses. Many studies have been carried out in the last decades that focus on metaphorical speech in different political and historical contexts (cf., among many others, Lakoff, 1991, 1992; Chilton & Ilyin, 1993; Chilton & Lakoff, 1995; Schäffner, 1995, 2002; Chilton, 1996; Semino & Masci, 1996; Böke, 1997, 2002; Musolff, 2000; El Refaie, 2001; Klein, 2002; Panagl & Stürmer, 2002; Stürmer, 2002).

Theoretically, metaphors can be understood as 'impertinent predications' (Ricœur, 1986), in the sense that an expression is semantically incompatible with the context of meaning in which the expression is uttered. Metaphor establishes a similarity between two different semantic domains. As it "is a device for seeing something *in terms of* something else" (Burke, 1969: 503), it is most closely connected with the question of perspectivation.

Many different types of metaphor occur in political discourses. Some metaphors transform inanimate 'objects' into animate ones, whereas others transform animate 'objects' into inanimate ones. Some metaphors predicate onto animate 'objects' the quality of other animate 'objects,' whereas others predicate onto inanimate 'objects' the quality of other inanimate 'objects.' Some transform abstract entities into concrete ones that are sensually perceivable, and others merge different human senses synesthetically or into catachresis (cf. Plett, 2001: 101–104). Many metaphors in political discourses transfer aspects from the economic to the political domain, and many from the domain of private life and family life onto public life and 'collective actors.' Various metaphors project elements from the domains of sports onto the political domain. All these and many other metaphorical types (including those that will be mentioned in the following explications, which for the most part are also to be found in Reisigl & Wodak [2001: 58–60]), should be taken into consideration by an elaborated phenomenology of metaphors in political discourses.

Personifications or anthropomorphizations are metaphors that bring together and link two different semantic fields, one with the semantic feature (−human), the other bearing the semantic feature (+human) (cf. Lakoff & Johnson, 1980: 34). Personifications are rhetorically used to give a human form, to humanize inanimate objects, abstract entities, phenomena, and ideas. They play an important role in animating imagined 'collective subjects' – as, for example, 'races,' 'nations,' 'ethnicities,' 'states,' 'state unions,' and many other political 'collective' actors (cf. Goodwin [1990] for the question of 'engendered' nations). Their apparent concreteness and vividness often invites hearers or readers to identify or to feel solidarity with or against the personified political entity.

In addition to personifications, there are many other forms of metaphors that are important in referentially and predicationally constructing in-groups and out-groups in politics and polity, whether they are imagined as 'races,' 'nations,' 'ethnicities,' 'states,' and 'tribes' or as specific 'racialized,' 'national,' 'ethnic,' or 'religious' majorities or minorities. Many of these metaphors function as 'collective symbols.' Very often, they are simultaneously used both as metaphors and representative synecdoches (cf. Gerhard & Link, 1991: 18).

In discourses about 'races,' 'nations,' and 'ethnicities,' these metaphors and synecdoches, but also the

respective metonymies, are almost always connected with specific dychotomic, oppositional predications that can form networks of semantic isotopes that help politicians to polarize and divide the world of social actors into 'black and white' and into 'good and bad.' The most frequent and conspicuous of these predications to 'real' or imagined social actors and political systems that serve positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation are those of singularity/uniqueness/distinctiveness or individuality, of identity or similarity, of collectivity, of difference, of autonomy/independence, of heteronomy/dependency, of continuity, of discontinuity, of (social) inclusion, of integration, of union or unity, of (social) cohesion, of (social) exclusion, of fragmentarization, of multiplicity, and of dissolution.

Apart from these rather abstract identity-related attributions realized by metaphors, 'national,' 'racial,' and 'ethnic' stereotypes or 'characters' are predicated on the basis of metaphors, relying on the collective symbolic concepts of materiality and body; of material status (e.g., the thermostat settings of 'warm' versus 'cold') and states of matter (solid, fluid, and gaseous); of material qualities like weight ('heavy' versus 'light'); of spatiality, spatiodynamics, and temporality ('fast,' 'fast-moving,' 'ephemeral,' 'persistent,' 'tenacious,' 'lively,' 'mobile,' 'flexible,' 'slowly,' 'inert,' and 'lethargic'); and of the five sensorial concepts of visuality ('fair,' 'pale,' 'clear,' and 'transparent' versus 'dark,' 'gloomy' 'obscure'), audibility ('harmonious' versus 'loud' and 'noisy'), tactile sensation ('hard' versus 'soft'), olfactory ('nice-smelling' versus 'stinking'), and taste ('tasteful' versus 'tasteless').

Racializing, nationalizing, and ethnicizing metaphors of spatiality are primarily ordered around the symbolically and evaluatively loaded binary oppositions of 'internal' versus 'external' or 'internality' versus 'externality,' of 'height/top' and 'up' versus 'bottom' and 'down/low,' of 'foundations/ profundity/ ground' versus 'bottomlessness,' of 'superficiality' and 'flatness' versus 'depth,' of 'center' versus 'periphery/margin,' and of 'boundary,' 'limit,' and 'extension/expansion' and 'spreading' (see Mayr & Reisigl, 1998).

Metaphors of 'racial,' 'national,' and 'ethnic bodies' and 'materiality' are often also derived from naturalizations; that is, from meteorologizations, geologizations, and biologizations. To the latter belong, in addition to the personifications already mentioned (both nongendered and gendered), animalizations (of both sexes) and florizations.

Taking the example of German and Austrian discourses about migrants and 'racialized,' 'national,' and 'ethnic' minorities, the most frequent and stereotypical metaphors employed in the negative construction or identification of social actors and in the negative predicational qualification of them, of their migration, and of the alleged effects of immigration are the following (see Böke, 1997, 2002; Gehard & Link, 1991): *natural disasters*: immigration/migrants as avalanches or flood disasters; *dragging/hauling*: illegal immigration as dragging or hauling; *water*: immigration/migrants as a watercourse/current/flood that has to be 'dammed'; *fire*: alleged effects of immigration/conflicts between 'racialized, 'nationalized,' or 'ethnicized' groups' as a smoldering fire; *thermostatics*: effects of immigration as pressure within the pot and conflicts between 'racialized, 'nationalized,' or 'ethnicized' groups' as bubbling; *plants and fertile soil*: migration and effects of migration as transplantation/repotting,' uprooting, (alleged) causing of social conflicts as seeding; *genetic material*: cultural and social traditions and 'heritage' as genetic material; *growth/growing*: increasing immigration and increasing conflicts as growing; *pollution and impurity*: intergroup contacts, exchanges, and relations as pollution and impurity; *melting*: intergroup contacts, relations, exchanges, and assimilation as melting; *body*: 'racialized,' 'nationalized,' 'ethnicized' groups are metaphorically ascribed 'collective (racial, national, ethnicity) bodies,' outgroups are metaphorized as 'foreign bodies' or alien elements; *blood*: immigration as bleeding white or bloodletting of the imagined 'collective bodies,' intergroup relations as blood impurity; *disease/infection*: immigration/migrants as an epidemic, intergroup contacts and relations as an infection; animals/animal-owning: immigrants/minorities as parasites, as 'attracted like the moths to a flame,' as herded together; *war/fight/military*: immigration as military activity/invasion; *goods/commodities and exchange of goods*: migration as import and export of workers/workforce, migrants as 'freight'; *food*: 'good/ welcome immigrants/minorities' versus 'bad/ unwelcome immigrants/minorities' metaphorized as the wheat that has to be separated from the chaff; *vehicle/boat/ship*: effects of immigration as overcrowded boat; and *house/building/door/gateway/ bolt*: the ingroups' (e.g., 'national') territory as house or building, and stopping immigration as bolting the door. All of these metaphors are employed in discourses about migrants and migration as implicit argumentation schemes (i.e., as implicit and often fallacious conclusion rules that serve to legitimise discrimination; cf. Pielenz, 1993). The persuasive function of these metaphors may be exemplified with the metaphors of avalanches and flood. The two metaphors suggest that 'If something (e.g., immigrants) is an avalanche or flood, it should be avoided or prevented.' The implicit argumentation function

of all the above-mentioned conceptual metaphors is explicable by corresponding if-then schemes.

The suggestive force of metaphors can be so strong as to motivate metaphorologists like Lakoff to contend that 'metaphors can kill' (Lakoff, 1991). In view of animalizing metaphors such as 'rat,' 'parasite,' and 'vermin,' referring to Jews during the National Socialist dictatorship, and implying that if somebody is a harmful vermin, rat, or parasite, he or she should be exterminated, such a metonymical assertion does not appear to be an exaggeration.

The tension between the preservation and transformation of political order, problem-solving, and power relations becomes clearly manifest in the area of metaphorical language. Just to offer a few hints: static metaphors, metaphors of incorporation as well as space and container metaphors seem to be favored if questions of polity, policy, and politics are a matter of consolidation and preservation, whereas destructive and (re)building metaphors, as well as dynamic metaphors (e.g., metaphors of movement and journey), indicate (intended) political transformation. Metaphors with negative connotations implying standstill are employed to evaluate preservation negatively (e.g., 'fossilization of political structures'). Metaphors with negative connotations implying political change are employed to evaluate transformation negatively (e.g., 'dismantling of political infrastructures').

Metonymies

Metonymies (from the Greek: 'renaming,' 'name change') are constituted by a shift involving two semantically (and materially, causally, or cognitively) adjacent fields of reference: a name of a referent stands for the name of another referent, which semantically (abstractly or concretely) adjoins the referent of the name (cf. Morier, 1989: 749–799; Lausberg, 1996: 292–295; Groddeck, 1995: 233–248; Plett, 2001: 98–100).

Depending on the relationship between the two neighboring conceptual fields, one can, among other things, distinguish between the following metonymies: (1) the name of a product or effect stands for the cause or author/creator ('The racist book [standing for its author] provoked many enraged reactions.'); (2) the name of a cause or author/creator stands for the product or effect ('The new Clinton [standing for the new book authored by Clinton] is a best-seller.'); (3) the name of an object stands for the user of the object ('The cars [standing for their drivers] pollute and endanger the environment more and more.'); (4) the name of a container stands for the container's content ('Bush used to drink several glasses [standing for the alcoholic liquid the glasses were filled with] every day.'); (5) the name of a place (e.g., a state/country, town, city, district, or village) stands for the person or persons living at the place ('Italy is not willing to accept more refugees.'; 'Haider says what Austria thinks.'); (6) the name of a building stands for the person or persons staying, working, imprisoned, and so forth, there ('The White House decided to attack Iraq.'; 'The concentration camp Dachau was liberated in 1945 on May 2nd.'); (7) the name of a place stands for an action performed at the place or an event located at the place ('Auschwitz must never ever happen again.'); (8) the name of a person stands for the country or state in which the person is living ('Cooperation is important because we are too small to allow disharmony in vital areas of our country.', as the former Austrian foreign minister, Wolfgang Schüssel, said on 15 May 1995, in his speech commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of the signing of the international 'Austrian State Treaty.'); (9) the name of a person or of a group of persons who have lived in the past stands for a person or a group of persons who are living in the present ('We already fought against Prussians' imperialism centuries ago.'); (10) the name of a time, time period, or epoch stands for the persons living in the time, time period, or epoch ('The twentieth century has seen the most extreme political developments in human history.'); (11) the name of an institution stands for (responsible) representatives of the institution ('The government proposes a more restrictive asylum act.'); (12) the name of an institution stands for actions performed within the institution or events that take place in the institution ('The Second Austrian Republic has almost always been described as a history of successes.'); and so on.

As one can see from examples 1, 3, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, and 12, metonymies enable speakers and writers within all of three political dimensions to conjure away responsible, involved, or affected actors (whether victims or perpetrators) or to keep them in the semantic background. Example 9 illustrates how a nationalist identification with the past manifests itself by the usage of the 'historical we.' Example 2 realizes the strategy of metonymic personalization, which aims to stress the focus on a single politician. Example 8 illustrates the strategy of metonymic concretizing and personifying (please note the doubled tropic membership) that aims to promote political identification and solidarity. Example 4 finally shows a very conventional type of metonymy, which in the specific context, could also be read as euphemistic circumlocution of Bush's former alcoholism.

Metonymies of the type 'place name for persons' seem to be among the most frequent ones in political

discourses. They often realize the strategy of presupposing intragroup or intra-'collective' sameness or similarity (see Wodak *et al.*, 1999: 43). Such an assimilating or homogenizing function is, however, also fulfilled by synecdoches and specific metaphors.

Synecdoches

Synecdoches (from the Greek: 'understanding one thing with another') are turns of meaning within one and the same semantic field: a term is represented by another term, the extension of which is either semantically wider or semantically narrower (cf. Morier, 1989: 1159–1175; Lausberg, 1990b: 295–298; Zimmermann, 1989; Groddeck, 1995: 205–220; Plett, 2001: 92–94). According to the direction of representation, two types of synecdoches are distinguished (cf. Plett, 2001: 92–94).

The particularizing synecdoche is constituted by a representative relation that consists of a semantically broader concept standing for a semantically narrower concept. The three main subcategories of this type of synecdoches are *pars pro toto* (i.e., the part stands for the whole: 'Hitler [representing Nazi Germany] was finally defeated.'), *singularis pro plurali* (i.e., the singular stands for the plural, forms a 'collective singular': 'The Swiss is industrious.'), and *species pro genus* (i.e., the species stands for the genus: 'The refugee doesn't have a penny to her name ['penny' stands for 'money'].').

The generalizing synecdoche is established by a semantically broader concept that represents a semantically narrower one. The three principal subcategories of generalising synecdoches are *totum pro parte* (i.e., the whole stands for the part: 'Denmark is world champion.' [this synecdoche is also a metonymy]), *pluralis pro singulari* (i.e., the plural stands for the singular: 'We [representing a single person like a queen or a state's president; cf. *pluralis maiestatis* or *pluralis modestiae*] hereby enact a general amnesty.'), and *genus pro specie* (i.e., the genus stands for the species: 'Mankind has not learnt anything from history.').

In political discourses, the particularizing synecdoche, just like the generalizing synecdoche, is a means of referential annexation, assimilation, and inclusion. Particularizing synecdoches like the 'foreigner,' the 'Jew,' and the 'American' serve stereotypical generalization and essentialization, which refer in a leveling manner to a whole group of persons. In languages like German, Italian, and French, these are almost always realized in their masculine grammatical form.

Lakoff & Johnson (1980: 38) have introduced – as a special conceptual synecdoche – the synecdoche of the 'controller for controlled' type –, in which leaders, people in power, rulers, and so on stand for the persons who are actually carrying out an action (e.g. 'Bush bombarded Baghdad.'; see also the first synecdoche example). The use of this form of particularizing synecdoche is a central feature of all 'monumentalist historiography' (Nietzsche, 1985) that hides social actors behind their leaders if speakers and writers judge them to be historically insignificant. Even if one does not assume, as do Lakoff and Johnson (1980), that the synecdoche is a special form of metonymy, it seems equally plausible to allocate the type 'controller for controlled' to the category of metonymy.

The crucial role of synecdoches in polity, policy, and politics has not yet been recognized adequately, even though there are first attempts to grasp the political relevance of this trope (see, for instance, Palonen [1995], who analyses party names like 'The Greens' as synecdoches), and even though Kenneth Burke stated more than 35 years ago that every act of social representation and every theory of political representation involves the trope of synecdoche, if "some part of the social body (either traditionally established, or elected, or coming into authority by revolution) is held to be 'representative' of the society as a whole" (Burke, 1969: 508).

Burke's observation may serve as a starting point for a general conceptualization of the relationship between synecdoche and political representation. Synecdochic representation is a basic political principle wherever more stands for less, or less stands for more. Several factors determine whether or in what way a political system of representation is organized democratically: Who is entitled to be a political representative, and who decides on the question of who will be a representative (active and passive right to vote)? What does the procedure of political authorization to be a representative look like (direct or indirect democracy)? Under which conditions and when can the relationship of representation be dissolved or confirmed (representation for a set time)? To what extent are representatives bound to those who are represented (free or imperative mandate)?

There are different levels of political representation, which can be differentiated when looking at political systems. On the highest level, there are to be found, according to the political system, imperators, kings and queens (monarchy), states' presidents and chancellors (republic and democracy), or dictators (totalitarian dictatorship). Depending on the level of representation, one and the same politician is more or less representative. That is to say, at a lower level of integration, a politician (e.g., a party leader) may represent all members of a specific group

or political organization, whereas she or he just represents a minority at a higher level of the system (e.g., in the case that the party is a very small one). These dynamics become very complex in modern democracies, and all the above-mentioned determinants have to be taken into consideration by a tropological model of political representation (for more details, see Reisigl, 2003: 252–258).

Until now, an elaborated tropology of the political does not yet exist, although a developed politolinguistic theory of tropes that scientifically and fruitfully connects rhetoric, linguistic discourse analysis, and political science is an urgent desideratum. Only such a transdisciplinarian approach is capable of systematizing and explaining the many different political and linguistic functions of tropic language in polity, policy, and politics in a differentiated way that does justice to the complex topic in question.

See also: Irony; Metaphors in Political Discourse; Metonymy; Rhetoric: Semiotic Approaches.

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Sacks, Harvey

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Harvey Sacks graduated from Columbia College, New York in 1955 and earned his Bachelor of Law at Yale Law School in 1959 and his Ph.D. in sociology at the University of California, Berkeley in 1966. Aged 40, he died in an automobile accident in California, where he had taught at the University of California in both Los Angeles and Irvine since 1963. Sacks is best known for his invention of 'conversation analysis.' Even though he published relatively little in his lifetime, his ideas spread continually, chiefly through his numerous university lectures and conference papers; his influence expanded greatly when his lectures were published posthumously in 1992.

Most consequential for the development of his highly original accomplishments in sociology and linguistics was his contact with Harold Garfinkel (and his ideas on ethnomethodology) and Erving Goffman. The influence of Goffman's work in interaction analysis, i.e., the description of how participants behave in normal, everyday interactive encounters, is particularly evident in Sacks's early studies (on suicide help conversations), in which he began to move away from the established quantitative techniques and preanalytic methodology of mainstream American sociology. Instead, he adopted central concepts of ethnomethodology, which is chiefly concerned with the means and methods employed by interactants to create and act within their own social reality. Accordingly, he strongly argued against the widely shared belief that social norms, roles, and rules are statically and objectively given, prior to and independent of the interactants' verbal (and accompanying non-verbal) behavior, in which they are merely reflected. Being convinced that, on the contrary, social order is continuously achieved in social encounters by the participants' skillful use of language, he introduced 'conversation analysis' as an alternative (and by now major) approach. His aim was to prove that social norms are most adequately described not from a global but from a local point of view. The analyst's task is to meticulously describe the minute details of as many instances of ordinary everyday conversational events (telephone conversations, newspaper stories, jokes) as possible in order to discover systematically recurrent patterns of methods and means that interactants use collaboratively and routinely to negotiate, i.e., establish, maintain, and vary, social order. Conversation analysis is thus an inductive and strictly empirical data- though not theory-driven approach. Preexisting theories with their descriptive categories and rules, which have been independently developed for unspecified sets of data, are rejected as being neither necessary nor applicable to the analysis of naturally occurring (recorded and transcribed) discourse. Instead, analysts develop the necessary descriptive categories while analyzing the data; categories arise in and out of the analytical process and are based on observation, not intuition.

Conceptual landmarks of Sacks's studies of the mechanisms of talk-in-interaction include turn-taking organization (how and where speaking turns occur, how speakers select others or are selected themselves as next speakers, how turns are structured, etc.), topic organization, opening and closing procedures, mechanisms of self-correction and repair, preferred ways of referring to other people and telling stories in conversation, and the sequential organization of conversation with 'adjacency pair' as its key concept. These are pairs of speech acts whose first part sets up a slot with a 'conditional relevance' for an expected, i.e., preferred, second part, thus constraining the interlocutor's choice; examples are question–answer, statement–agreement or – contradiction, invitation–acceptance or – decline, reproach–justification, and also greeting–greeting. It follows that each contribution to an ongoing conversation is both responsive and initiative. By simultaneously taking up the preceding and setting up expectations for the following turn, each interactant reveals his or her understanding of what is going on, what activities are currently performed, and what interactional frames are shared. In this way, participants continually display their awareness of how their use of language contributes

to the constitution of the social event they are engaged in. In his later work (from 1968 onward), Sacks broadened his perspective and preferred a more global to the earlier local, occasionally *ad hoc*, and detailed approach to conversational interaction; his work took "a turn toward systematicity and toward the relevance of substantial amounts of data" (Schegloff, 1992b: xi).

Summing up Sacks's legacy, Schegloff lists four aspects: methodology ("of how to study human sociality"), topic (the "recognition...that talk can be examined in its own right, and not merely as a screen on which are projected other processes"), discipline, and inspiration (Schegloff, 1992a: xii ff.). However, even though the richness, originality, and intellectual vigor of his work together with his "ability to turn the apparently trivial into the gripping and insightful" (Silverman, 1998: x) are apparent from the available oeuvre, the significance of his beliefs is not generally recognized (Silverman, 1998). Not surprisingly, the methods of conversation analysis (being rigorously empirical, inductive, and interactant centered) have also been criticized as being too positivistic, operating in an interest-, ideology-, and culture-free vacuum.

See also: Conversation Analysis; Goffman, Erving.

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Sapir, Edward

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Edward Sapir was born in Lauenberg, Pomerania. His family immigrated to the United States in 1889. He received his higher education at Columbia University, earning his B.A. in 1904, an M.A. in Germanic languages the next year, and completing his Ph.D. in anthropology in 1909, along with some advanced studies in historical and comparative linguistics.

He was first exposed to Native American languages as a graduate student under the direction of Franz Boas. The new approach to anthropology developed (and largely administered) by Boas integrated the study of cultures and their languages, as both were manifested in the content and form of traditional texts. Few would dispute that Sapir was unequalled among American anthropologists of his generation. Between 1907 and 1910 he held research fellowships at the University of California and the University of Pennsylvania. From 1910 to 1925, he was in charge of the new Division of Anthropology of the

Geological Survey of Canada, based in Ottawa, enabling him to sponsor field studies by himself and others.

Sapir's intense, far-reaching field work began in 1905, with a Wasco-Wishram Chinookan, and over the next five years alone he covered six other languages, including his landmark description of Takelma (completed in 1911, and published in 1922) making him the paragon of Boasian, linguistically driven anthropology. Sapir's extraordinary energy and phonetic skills were the foundation for his capacity for quickly, accurately, and insightfully compiling and analyzing vast amounts of textual and grammatical data from a wide range of American languages. Unlike his contemporary Leonard Bloomfield, whose informant sessions were carefully nondirective, Sapir drew in and mobilized his informants, training them to write accurately in their own languages and to compile and translate traditional texts, which he then worked through with them. Early in their careers, the descriptive writings—the linguistics—of Sapir and Bloomfield seemed more alike in method than their later works. These apparent differences owe something to their very different personalities and their divergent rhetorical styles. It seems likely also that Sapir's wider anthropological responsibilities played a role. That each understood and respected the other's work can be seen in Sapir (1931) and Bloomfield (1922).

Sapir's training in historical and comparative linguistics prepared him to exploit the growing body of data from American languages as a means of dating cultural contacts and migrations through linguistic evidence. In his extremely important monograph on *Time perspective* (1916; reprinted in Mandelbaum, 1949) he recast the older Powell classification of language relationships produced by the Bureau of American Ethnology, which recognized 55 separate stocks. Sapir reduced these to six, in a bold reclassification that is still an active topic of discussion.

In 1925 Sapir accepted an appointment to the University of Chicago. The position opened up new interdisciplinary connections for him: there were linkages with distinguished colleagues in sociology, psychology, and political science. Sapir moved again, to Yale, in 1931. During this period, he worked extensively in culture and personality studies, a field he was instrumental in launching. One of his students at Yale was Benjamin Lee Whorf, whose name is linked with his in connection with a characteristically intuitive hypothesis concerning the mutual influence of habitual forms and patterns in language and culture.

Mandelbaum (1949) presented a selected cross-section of Sapir's important linguistic and anthropological publications. This collection prompted Zellig Harris (1951) to give Sapir's linguistics and its role in the development of the field a long, insightful review. Sapir's collected works, to appear in 16 large volumes, are even now only half published. Native American language texts, grammars, and related linguistic anthropology amount to more than half of this material, an imposing monument to his genius, his energy, and his mastery of the arts of phonetic transcription and morphological analysis. His skill in addressing the public can be enjoyed in his popular book *Language* (1921), which is still in print, still gives the clearest, most accessible picture of a linguist's work, and still attracts new readers to the field.

See also: Anthropology and Pragmatics; Whorf, Benjamin Lee.

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Scaffolding in Classroom Discourse

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The concept of scaffolding is grounded in the classroom discourse tradition and draws on two scholarly perspectives, developed in the realms of psychology and sociolinguistics, namely, the sociocultural theory of language and learning, as put forward by the Russian psychologist Lev S. Vygotskij, and the sociolinguistic approach to human interaction according to John Gumperz and others. These two strands of theory share a view of language as the foundation of learning and place emphasis on human actions as jointly constructed efforts.

Scaffolding is a metaphorical concept that refers to the visible or audible assistance that a more expert member of a culture can give to an apprentice.

Scaffold work is most often analyzed as an instructional strategy in the school domain, but it occurs in any social setting where socialization processes take place.

The term 'scaffolding' was introduced by the American psychologist Jerome Bruner (1983) whose main interest was in the institutional forms by which culture is passed on. A basic concept underlying his work is Vygotskij's zone of proximal development (ZPD). This zone lies in between what learners can do without assistance and the maximum they can do with the help of a more experienced partner (*see* **Vygotskij, Lev Semenovich**).

According to Vygotskij's sociohistorical theory, external speech affects internal thoughts: the intrapsychological apprehension of knowledge is made possible by the interpsychological action.

Another concept underlying the rationale of scaffolds is contextualization cues as advanced in Interactional Sociolinguistics, i.e., "any feature of linguistic form that contributes to signalling to the participants whether communication is proceeding smoothly and how intentionality is being communicated and interpreted" (Figueroa, 1994: 113). Contextualization cues are conveyed through multiple linguistic and paralinguistic channels, such as prosodic features (pitch and tone, loudness, rhythm) and kinesics (facial decoration, eye gaze, smiles, frowns, and any other resources of the body idiom), which are important tools in the management of scaffold-like actions (*see* **Gestures, Pragmatic Aspects**). Hence the advantage of using a microethnographic methodology to segment any scaffolding episode into smaller interaction units.

In the tradition of classroom discourse, scaffolding is associated with teacher initiating and evaluating the students' responses within the IRE (initiation-response-evaluation) framework of classroom interaction. This can take the form of prefaces to questions, overlapping, backchanneling, comments, rephrasing, and expansion of pupils' answers that will provide them with an opportunity for reconceptualization (Cazden, 1988) (*see* **Classroom Talk**).

A basic feature of scaffolds is the establishment of a positive atmosphere between the participants whereby teachers support (scaffold) the students' enactment of a competent behavior. This can be done through ordinary actions that ratify the learner as a legitimate participant, such as listening to them, as the late Brazilian educator Paulo Freire has pointed out (Freire, 1997). The scaffolding assistance in the classroom can come from the teacher as well as from peers.

Scaffolding strategies are culture-specific and can vary largely across social networks, ethnic and cultural groups, and national communities.

See also: Gestures, Pragmatic Aspects; Vygotskij, Lev Semenovich.

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Second and Foreign Language Learning and Teaching

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Not that long after the execution of his brother, Vladimir Lenin was himself banished to Siberia because of his political activities. In Imperial Russia, Lenin knew that the sequence of punishments for political offenses was first imprisonment, then banishment to Siberia, then banishment abroad, and then, execution. He was on step 2 of this sequence. He also knew that after his period in Siberia he would not cease his political activities and that the next stage would very likely be banishment outside Russia. Anticipating this possibility, he had evidently decided that his countries of choice for banishment would include Britain, and therefore it would be sensible to prepare himself, in Siberia, by learning English. Accordingly, he devised his own method. First, he tabulated and learned all the nouns. Then he went on to the verbs, the adjectives, the syntactic rules, and so on. He concluded that this systematic approach would enable him, on arrival in London, to converse with the locals. As it happened, he was amazed to discover that not only could he not converse well, he could not converse at all, and still less understand what people said! This chapter will explore factors that are relevant to the learning of a language, as well as the teaching that can promote such learning. It will review research into the nature of learning and acquisition and then go on to consider current views on the nature of language instruction. These reviews may shed light on the alternative courses of action that Lenin might have adopted.

Learning and Learners

We will consider language learning first, since it has a more fundamental role. A number of preliminaries are unavoidable here. First, there is the issue of a critical period for language, that is, a period during which acquisition is different from other learning processes. It will be assumed that there is such a critical period. Robert DeKeyser has demonstrated clear age-on-arrival effects for ultimate level of proficiency for Hungarian immigrants to the United States, that is, the younger the arrival, the higher the eventual performance. This research is far-reaching in its consequences. It implies that subsequent (second) language learning is mediated by general cognitive processes, an interpretation that has important consequences for instruction especially.

The second underlying issue concerns the concept of a focus-on-form. Michael Long has argued consistently that when learners engage in interaction, it is natural to prioritize meaning, with the result that form does not obviously come into focus. As a result, for effective learning to occur, it is necessary to *contrive* a focus-on-form, but in such a way that meaning is not compromised or distorted. A focus-on-form approach is consistent with current conceptualizations within cognitive psychology regarding the functioning of limited capacity attentional and memory systems. We cannot attend to everything, and so attention has to be directed selectively, and memory resources, especially working memory, have to be used efficiently.

The third underlying issue is over whether what is learned (the representation issue) is implicit or explicit, and indeed whether the learning process is itself implicit or explicit (the transition issue). Allied to this is the question as to whether something that was initially explicit, e.g., a language rule or a structural pattern, can become implicit, or vice versa. The implicit-explicit distinction has largely replaced the earlier contrast between learning (explicit) and acquisition (implicit), and this realignment has been associated with a greater influence from contemporary psychology, and a strong interest in operationalizing the difference between implicit and explicit learning. Where people stand on this issue also has an important impact on different views of instruction.

Finally, by way of preliminaries, there is the question of the stages through which learners pass. It is useful to think of:

- Input processing strategies and segmentation
- Noticing
- Pattern identification, restructuring and manipulation
- Development of control
- Integration and lexicalization

Learners, of course, may be at different stages in this sequence for different parts of their developing language systems.

Each of these stages raises issues regarding the nature of second language learning. Bill VanPatten has argued that learners can benefit from being taught how to process input more effectively in order to focus on form. At the next stage, Dick Schmidt has developed the concept of noticing, arguing that before some aspect of language structure can be learned, it first has to be noticed, preferably with awareness. For Schmidt, the gateway to subsequent development

is attentional focus, since it can permit deeper processing. In taking this position, Schmidt is arguing against Krashen's ideas on naturalistic learning and the acquisition-learning distinction. Clearly, though, whether noticing triggers explicit or implicit processes, the next stage in development is that the element that is noticed should become the basis for the learner identifying some sort of structural regularity in the language. This might be a new pattern, or the complexification of an existing pattern, and is the phase that accounts for development in the interlanguage system.

To perceive a structural regularity in the target language, however, does not mean that it can be used. Interlanguage development may sometimes be sudden and complete, but most accounts of second language learning assume that first insight has to be followed by a process of gradually increasing control over a new form. During this process, it is assumed that slow, effortful, and attention-demanding performance, which may also be error-prone, is progressively replaced by less conscious, easier, automatic, and fast performance. In this, the skilled control that is achieved over language performance resembles learning that occurs in other domains. Researchers have been interested in exploring the conditions that can enhance this development optimally, as well as describing the course and speed of such learning. A number of researchers, such as Nick Ellis, use general laws, for example, the power law of practice, to describe such learning.

In previous years, it was generally thought that the development of a high degree of automatization and control would have been the end-point of the learning process. In the last twenty years or so, linked perhaps with the development of corpus linguistics, there has been a greater realization of the importance of formulaic sequences and idiomatic language. That is, rather than prefabricated language being a minor part of the psycholinguistic abilities of the speaker, they are now seen as pervasive and vital for real-time communication. It is assumed that highly competent language users rely on formulaic language to ease the processing or computational burden during ongoing language production, and to sound native-like.

Having explored these preliminaries at a more explanatory level, there are a number of theoretical accounts relevant to the nature of second language development. Obviously the first to consider here is Universal Grammar (UG). Researchers influenced by this approach take a range of different positions, for example, full transfer/full access, vs. for example, residual access through previous parameter settings. Basically, all approaches assume the importance for second language learning of the continued existence of a Universal Grammar but differ over the impact that L1 learning has on this development. Lydia White proposed that it would be more appropriate to consider the role of UG in second language development as constraining the problem space, and requiring that L2 grammars be consistent with it, rather than expecting the L2 grammar to follow a deterministic path. In any case, in terms of relevance for instruction, there is the issue that UG researchers, necessarily, investigate features of language that are thought to be revealing about the operation of UG. In the main, these features, for example, the 'empty category principle,' the 'overt pronoun constraint,' do not follow the priorities of others, for example, language teachers. Second language research may therefore be more revealing for Universal Grammar than Universal Grammar is for language teaching.

An interesting contrast to UG that has emerged in recent years is William O'Grady's 'general nativism.' In this, there is acceptance, as with UG (which O'Grady terms 'grammatical nativism'), that human beings are 'wired' to perform learning tasks in a certain way, but O'Grady proposes that this nativist capacity is general in nature, rather than a module specialized for language. He suggests that the more general propensities (a) to operate on pairs of elements, and (b) to combine functors with their arguments at the first opportunity, are sufficient to account for the nature of language development and the structures that emerge. It is too early to evaluate this approach as yet, but it is interesting that there are slight affinities between it and that of another theorist, Manfred Pienemann and 'processability theory.' Drawing upon lexical functional grammar and Levelt's processing model, Pienemann takes as fundamental a performance-based incremental approach to language generation. He offers a different set of processing procedures and routines to O'Grady, for example, lemma access, the category procedure, etc., but he, too, then makes predictions about sequences in second language development. So in either case, the nature of the grammar that results, is seen as the consequence of processing procedures.

In contrast, there have also been proposals in recent years to account for second language development through connectionist architectures. These are networks of associations, involving several layers to connect inputs and outputs, i.e., containing hidden layers that serve as general-purpose learning devices. They are implemented through computer software, and this software can 'learn' and be tested. For example, it could take the input of a simple verb form in English and the output would be a past tense form. Such networks can be trained to produce highly accurate past tense outputs, for example, including

characteristic mistakes that second language learners make. There is nothing specifically linguistic about the networks, so they are used to support the claim that specialist modules are not required for languages to be learned. The best known example of a connectionist network applied to second language learning is the competition model. This uses cues such as animacy and word order to predict how well learners with different L1/L2 combinations will learn how to assign subject and object roles in sentences.

The approaches to learning covered so far have focused on individual mental structures and processes. But other approaches have been more concerned to situate learning within a social context, and to explore the potential that interaction provides to give learners useful data. One example of this is Long's interaction hypothesis. Assuming the inadequacy of input alone (i.e., positive evidence), Long focuses on the provision of negative evidence, i.e., evidence that a mistake has been made. He proposes that such evidence can be obtained within natural interaction. In particular, he proposes that particular sorts of interactive encounter, i.e., those in which there is negotiation of meaning, leading to feedback moves such as confirmation checks, comprehension checks, clarification requests, and especially interlocutor recastings of the L1 speaker's utterance, provide timely and personalized negative evidence without compromising the (vital) naturalness of communication. This approach is located within Long's proposals for the importance of a focus-on-form, since form is brought into focus incidentally through these conversational devices, enabling learners to attend to it and perhaps, at a later stage, incorporate the effects of such feedback into their interlanguage. There have been questions as to whether there is immediate uptake of recasts that are offered, but Cathy Doughty argued that immediate uptake may not be the most effective way to detect the influence of recasts on subsequent development.

Also concerned with interaction, but from a radically different perspective is sociocultural theory (SCT). Drawing on Vygotskyan theory, the emphasis here is on the collaborative, unpredictable meanings that will develop through conversation, with each partner making contributions that can be taken up and extended by their interlocutor. Jim Lantolf argued that this is a fertile ground for second language development, and sociocultural theorists claim that tasks that generate lower negotiation for meaning indices (e.g., a discussion task) may provide other more useful scaffolding for language development, since they push learners to build meanings collaboratively, and to engage in more extended turns. Indeed, developing the notion of interaction, Merrill Swain

has proposed that output is vital for second language learning since it pushes learners to do things like notice gaps in their interlanguage; to explore and test out hypotheses; and to attain a metalinguistic level of processing.

We turn now to consideration of learner characteristics and differences. The remainder of this section on learning will cover language learning aptitude, motivation, language learning strategies, and personality. Earlier conceptions of foreign language aptitude, strongly associated with J. B. Carroll, proposed that there is a specific talent for language learning, consisting of four components; phonemic coding ability (the capacity to analyze sound so that it can be better retained); grammatical sensitivity (the ability to identify the functions that words fulfill in sentences); inductive language learning ability (the ability to take a sample of a language and extrapolate to further language); and associative memory (the capacity to make links between items in memory). This view of aptitude, underpinning older aptitude test batteries (for example, the Modern Languages Aptitude Test), was reasonably successful, since these batteries led to correlations of around 0.40 between aptitude and achievement test scores. It has not, however, had great recent influence, partly because it has been argued that this conception of aptitude is irredeemably linked to instruction, indeed particular forms of instruction, such as audiolingualism, rather than to informal and acquisition-rich contexts.

More recently, however, a reassessment of aptitude has taken place. A new aptitude battery has been developed, CANAL-F. The battery incorporates cumulative, thematized learning within the sequence of subtests. Aptitude has also been reconceptualized and linked with second language acquisition processes, following the stages outlined above (noticing, pattern identification, etc.), and this sequence can also be related to the constructs that are said to underlie CANAL-F, such as selective encoding (noticing) and selective transfer (inductive language learning ability and pattern restructuring). Complementing this, there have been studies that have linked aptitude information to acquisitional contexts. These studies have shown that aptitude generates correlations with informal and implicit learning conditions as well as explicit ones. Indeed, reviews of the available evidence demonstrate that predictive relationships emerge in both informal and formal settings.

Motivation has seen an even greater diversification of research. This area has been dominated by the work of Robert Gardner, whose analysis of motivation in terms of integrative and instrumental orientations has been fundamental. He has continued to publish and to extend his model of second language learning.

However, some earlier reviews of his work that called for a widening of the research agenda have led to different perspectives. There have been proposals for slightly different conceptualizations of motivational orientation, but essentially still within the Gardner framework (for example, proposals for knowledge, travel and friendship orientations, and suggestions that a world 'modernity' orientation is relevant).

There has also been a widening of the theoretical framework for motivation, with greater connections with mainstream psychology. For example, one perspective emphasizes linguistic self-confidence, which links with willingness to communicate research (WTC). This explores the reasons that underlie a learner's readiness to actually engage in communication. There have also been some studies on motivational attributions, and these indicate the richness of attributional thinking on the part of language learners and the impact such thinking can have on the maintenance of motivational strength. Such studies also indicate how qualitative methodologies can be applied to the motivational arena.

Perhaps the greatest change in motivation research concerns the temporal dimension. Many have argued that motivation needed to be related more clearly to the classroom, and conceptualized dynamically, rather than in terms of static, unchangeable orientations. Zoltan Dornyei, for example, uses action control theory as a way of achieving this. He argues that one needs to explore influences before a task is done (for example, motivational orientations), different influences on motivational levels while a task is done (stimulating activities), and also the post-actional stage, where learners reflect after learning on the degree of success they have achieved, and its likely explanations, such as a personal lack of effort. Such posttask refection may lead learners to make attributions that will influence future motivational levels. Interestingly, Gardner's latest research also explores the issue of the malleability of motivation, and how some aspects of the Gardner model, such as integrative orientations, do not seem malleable, while other areas, such as attitudes towards the teacher, are.

Learning strategies research has continued to be researched intensively. Some early problems with this area continue to cause difficulty. One of these is the categorization of learning strategies, and area about which Ellis suggested: "definitions of learning strategies have tended to be *ad hoc* and atheoretical." In response to this, Zoltan Dornyei and Peter Skehan suggested that one should operate with four main classes of strategy:

- Cognitive strategies
- Metacognitive strategies
- Social strategies
- Affective strategies.

They also draw attention to the way that within mainstream psychology, there has been a movement away from learning strategies and toward the term 'self-regulated learning,' which more generally captures the learners' conscious and proactive contribution to enhancing their own learning process. Interestingly, though, there has been recent evidence based on a confirmatory factor analysis in an attempt to distinguish between the various models that classify learning strategies, and this suggests that Rebecca Oxford's six-factor model (the above four, plus a separation of cognitive into cognitive and memory, and the addition of compensatory) best satisfied the data.

Perhaps the one other learner difference area where there has been interesting progress has been that of personality. Some researchers have tended to dismiss personality as the source of empirically-verifiable correlations with language learning achievement. However, if one focuses on extroversion, it appears that applied linguists tend to have done two things (a) they have not been conversant with current theories of personality, or of associated standardized forms of personality assessment, and (b) they have tended to focus on possible relationships between personality variables and learning. When personality assessment is carried out using contemporary and validated personality inventories, results are clearly more stable. In addition, consistent correlations emerge between such extroversion–introversion measurements and foreign language performance – not with learning but with, for example, tests of speaking.

Teaching

Some twenty-five years ago, when second language acquisition research first began to have an impact, the value of instruction itself came under question, since direct evidence of its beneficial effects was slender, and it was proposed that exposure to language (and incidental learning) was sufficient for interlanguage development to occur. An important review article by Michael Long, "Does second language instruction make a difference?" responded to these issues and evaluated the available research on instructional effectiveness. Long's work was a meta-analysis – he evaluated, reanalyzed, and synthesized a wide range of studies and argued that the balance of evidence suggests that instruction does make a difference, and is associated with faster learning, and higher ultimate attainment. More recently, a major updated and extended meta-analysis has been published that demonstrates instruction does have an appreciable effect

on performance; that explicit instruction produced larger gains than an implicit approach, which was, in turn, significantly greater than for control group conditions; and that instruction is durable in its effects.

What John Norris and Lourdes Ortega, in this updated meta-analysis, did not set out to do is provide a detailed justification of how instruction works, or, what specific aspects of instruction generate the differences that are found. Consequently, it is not easy to point to evidence of optimal learning environments – we simply know that having instruction compared to not having instruction is a good thing. How this lack of a fine-grained understanding of the effects of specific instructional types will be resolved is not clear. One approach is to continue to use research designs that do explore methodological comparisons that would be recognizable by teachers. Alternatively, the question may need to be posed differently. As Cathy Doughty recommends: "Rather than at the level of 'method,' the operationalization of instructional treatments is now considered best analyzed psycholinguistically in terms of input-processing enhancements that facilitate L2 learners' extracting forms and mapping them to meaning and function." She discusses a range of techniques that might achieve this, examining them in terms of degree of obtrusiveness, and also relating them to the functioning of limited capacity attentional functioning.

The preceding discussion means that explorations of language teaching options cannot be conducted simply in relation to evidence. But of course teachers need to act, and any broader research findings and theories about learning are going to be only one of the influences on such actions. We will next consider the major issues that motivate debates about teaching. Most fundamental of all, perhaps, are the topics of syllabus and methodology. The former concerns what is taught, and is traditionally approached in terms of the units of teaching, as well as their sequencing. The latter is concerned with how whatever is taught is taught. As we shall see, there have been changes with respect to each of these, although it is a moot point as to whether these changes are more characteristic of the 'chattering classes' of language teaching professionals rather than what happens in most actual classrooms.

Until relatively recently – the early 1970s – there seemed relatively little controversy in syllabus or methodology. The units of syllabus were seen to be language forms, and their sequencing was subject to reasonable consensus. True, the criteria that were used to establish syllabus ordering were not entirely convincing (for example, buildability, frequency), but there was considerable agreement about a high proportion of the ordering that was characteristic for the teaching of English, at least. This consensus was challenged during the 1970s and 1980s, and alternative proposals were put forward, with alternative units, such as functions and notions and lexical elements, and alternative classroom activities such as tasks and procedural syllabuses. Most radical of all, perhaps, was Candlin's proposals for retrospective syllabuses, where the syllabus that is taught is the result of negotiation between the teacher and learners, building on the distinction between the plan for teaching and the classroom reality of what actually happens, which are not going to be the same thing, Chris Candlin has suggested that one can only really say what a syllabus has been *after* a course has taken place. There were also vigorous attempts to develop specific purpose syllabuses based upon the analysis of learner needs.

Interesting issues have also been raised about the feasibility and limitations of planning courses, and whether it is even worthwhile to use course books. There seemed to be strong moves to use meaning-units as the basis for teaching, and to bring the learner more centrally into decision making. But what is interesting is how this debate has lost vitality. Now there is much less debate on these issues, and, paradoxically, the solution has been something of a consensus to use forms of what are called 'multi-syllabuses,' where the early pages of a course book or syllabus document will contain a table indicating how structural units, functional units, context, themes and tasks are meant to exist in harmony, so that the syllabus can claim to comprise all the potential syllabuses in one. Even so, it would appear that some of the strands in a multisyllabus are more equal than others, and it is no surprise that the most dominant of these is the structural core.

There have also been discussions regarding what should be done within classrooms, and what methodologies are better. Significant reviews are available of the major contrasting methodologies, such as grammar translation, audiolingualism, functional-notional, and communicative approaches. Grammar-translation emphasizes written language and the use of rules (and exceptions) to construct sentences in a deductive manner. Grammar is preeminent and item-based vocabulary learning is extensive. Audio-lingualism, in contrast, emphasizes the spoken language and teaches this inductively through stimulus-response-influenced pattern practice. Functional-notional and communicative approaches share a much greater emphasis on meaning and the use of (more) authentic materials. Functional-notional approaches use itemized meaning-units as a syllabus basis and are usually concerned with language use

and contextualized teaching. Even so, there is the possibility that functional–notional approaches, although using meaning units, can be associated with fairly traditional practice-oriented methodologies.

Functional–notional approaches were really the foundation for the development of a communicative approach to language teaching, which is now regarded as the orthodoxy in many parts of the world. Communicative approaches come in two strengths: weak and strong. The weak form is compatible with multisyllabuses and gives communicative activities an important role, since it is assumed that learners will need to work on the development of communicative competence, and that they will not be able to do this without engaging in realistic communication of individual meanings. This goes well beyond the production phase of the three Ps, and requires authenticity of language use and genuine interaction. However, the weak form can be associated with optimism that teaching materials can blend structure, function, and communicative activity to promote balanced and integrated progress. The strong form of communicative teaching, now associated with task-based approaches, regards task itself as the primary unit and then sees language as following the demands of the task, so that the role of the teacher is to respond to whatever language the task generates as important. Jane Willis described a methodology for approaching instruction in this way, in which a language focus is the last phase in teaching, after some new language has been made salient by the need to do a task.

Of course, these are not the only methodologies that have been used, and there are other 'fringe' approaches. There are also, for example, total physical response, the silent way, suggestopedia, and community language learning, although it is interesting to note that while each of these has its devotees, it can be argued that they are becoming even less central (cf. the change in the amount of coverage in the first and third editions of Harmer's *The practice of communicative language teaching*).

The debates over methodology have been intense. In an attempt to make progress in these debates, in which distinctions between syllabus and methodology were not always clear, it has been proposed that it is fruitful to look at these issues in terms of approach (underlying theory), design (syllabus considerations), and procedure (methodology) and what goes on in the classroom, in order to characterize a broader concept of 'method.' In an ideal world, an approach to language teaching should balance all these things, but in practice, one of the three might dominate, somewhat at the expense of the others. Hence, with audiolingualism, the focus is on

procedure, as well perhaps as approach, but there is much less to motivate design. In contrast, one could argue that functional-notional approaches emphasized design, but with less emphasis on approach and procedure.

It is interesting now to reflect on these debates and the intensity they used to provoke. Two issues stand out. First, prevailing practice would generally be seen as a communicative approach to language teaching, or at least this is what would be said, even if what happens in any particular classroom might not indeed be communicative language teaching. The approach has become the general orthodoxy. Second, and probably more important, we have seen the emergence of the course book series. We are now in a position where the production of course book materials is big business and associated with the commitment of very considerable resources. These resources are directed at the preparation of the course book proper, the extensive piloting of material, the development of a wide range of supplementary and ancillary materials (including websites), even the development of associated tests. One consequence of these developments is that the role of the teacher is changed. There is less reason for teachers to devise their own materials and it is much more possible simply to 'teach the book' as the course book's ubiquitous multisyllabus is followed.

An interesting way of exploring changes in language teaching is a comparison between two editions of the same book, Jeremy Harmer's *The practice of English language teaching*. In addition to a great deal of common ground, there are some interesting changes. First, there is something of a retreat from grander ideas on syllabus and methodology, to a greater concern for techniques at a more micro level, and issues connected with classroom management. Interestingly, there is more emphasis on how to handle mistakes and how to provide feedback. Second, there is greater coverage of language itself, and of how it may now be studied through corpus analysis so that more realistic language is used. Third, there is a greater concern with course books. Coverage is provided about course book selection and how to work with a course book, changes that reflect the point made earlier regarding the greater domination of course book series presently. Finally, there is very significantly increased coverage of the role of technology in language learning, with complete chapters devoted to teaching using video, and educational technology. This last development is undoubtedly going to grow enormously in importance. There are now increasing numbers of books about the use of computers and the internet in language teaching, and leading journals such as *English Language Teaching*

Journal contain regular sections detailing useful Web resources.

Language teaching, happily, still has some active areas of disagreement and debate. There are interesting proposals regarding process syllabuses, where the role of the learner in negotiating what will happen in the classroom is recognized and fostered, even to the extent of allowing learners to influence the nature of assessment. This work nicely complements applications of sociocultural theory to second language acquisition, which also regards the joint construction of meanings as fundamental (although in this case more because it facilitates acquisition itself). Process syllabus proponents are perhaps more interested in the rights of learners to influence their instruction as well as the broader societal benefits that follow from learners who learn how take personal responsibility in this way.

A second area for lively exchange concerns the role of tasks in language teaching methodology. Two sub-questions are relevant from this debate. First, there is the issue of how predictable tasks are in terms of the effects of task types and task implementation, for example, pretask planning, on the language that is produced. One response is to doubt any predictability because learners will negotiate their own interpretations in ways that reflect their own interests and desires, whereas another is to research these factors in the hope of providing evidence to assist teacher decision-making. Second, there is the issue that tasks have been attacked because it is proposed that what should really be the focus for teaching is grammar. In this view, tasks might be permissible as a form of language use after more conventional grammar teaching has taken place. It has been suggested that they should not used as the unit of language teaching, or even regarded as a means to enable interlanguage to change and develop. In contrast, others argue that tasks provide a way for acquisition processes to be brought into the classroom and become the basis for learner-driven development.

A final area of debate within methodology concerns the issue of appropriateness. There have been general debates about the connections between language teaching – especially English language teaching – and imperialism. The argument is that the teaching of English is not a neutral activity, but contributes to the perpetuation of existing international power structures, and implicitly the downgrading of local cultures and power. At a much more specific level, Adrian Holliday has argued that there has been insufficient attention paid to local needs and to the different conditions that operate in many language teaching contexts, and that another form of imperialism is the way methodologies devised in one set of circumstances are assumed to be relevant for wholly different context. At the broadest level, he contrasts two contexts and the imbalance between them. The first concerns approaches to language teaching developed for favorable circumstances (for example, Britain, Australasia, and North America, which he refers to, using the relevant initials, as BANA), a context in which individuals often pay fees for their instruction, are studying voluntarily, and in relatively small groups with good resources. In contrast, the second context, referred to as TESEP (*Te*rtiary, *Se*condary, *P*rimary) relates to state school education in the rest of the world, where there are usually large classes, with less favorable resourcing, different home-school relations, and learners who have no choice but to be in a classroom. They are also likely to be heading for a testing system that is less communicative in nature. Methodological options appropriate in the former context do not generalize easily to the latter, so more attention needs to be paid to local cultures, realism about local resourcing, and local educational traditions.

Conclusion

As the first section of this chapter indicated, the field of second language acquisition research has made a range of interesting contributions to our understanding of how languages are learned. There are alternative accounts available and regular research output. It can even be argued that the two subfields of acquisition/learning processes and learner differences are coming together for the first time, to the mutual benefit of each. We have also seen that language teaching is an area with considerable vitality. Teaching is still strongly influenced by language description, but the consensus communicative approach has meant that a range of activities focusing on meaning are also central, and that the quality of materials available (if not always their accessibility) has improved dramatically.

As a final point, it is worth making the observation that although the two areas of learning and teaching might reasonably be expected to have strong relationships with one another, in practice, they do not. Learning/acquisition tends to have a research emphasis, and while it does have relevance for teaching, this requires some extrapolation. Teaching, in contrast, while not without interesting research work, nonetheless emphasizes other criteria in establishing and justifying its procedures. It would be desirable to see this separation reduce in the future, for the benefit of both.

See also: Communicative Language Teaching; Identity: Second Language; Language Teaching Traditions: Second Language.

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Second Language Listening

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Introduction

It was not until well into the second half of the 20th century that second language listening was widely recognized as a skill that could and should be systematically developed and assessed by those teaching a second language. Whereas earlier scholars such as Henry Sweet and Harold Palmer had stressed the importance of teaching the spoken language, in their view such teaching was to be based on "the science of phonetics," which effectively meant that the aspect of the spoken language actually taught was its pronunciation. It seems that these scholars supposed that, if you could pronounce the target language reasonably well, it must follow that you would be able to understand it when you heard it spoken. So, in early work on listening comprehension based on the structuralist tradition, it was assumed that the main problems in second language listening would be a mirror image of problems with pronunciation. Students were systematically taught to identify differences between those sets of vowels or consonants in the target language that a contrastive analysis of the phonological systems of the L1 and L2 predicted would be difficult for the L1 speakers to distinguish in L2 speech. Students listened to triplets of words, such as *bit bit beat* or *try dry try*, and were required to identify which of the three words was different from the other two. They listened to sets of words with similar consonantal and vocalic structure but different stress patterns and identified those with different stress patterns. And they listened to phrases like *the pink one* uttered with either falling or rising intonation and identified the one with rising intonation as a question.

With the advent of mass tourism in the 1960s, the gulf became glaringly apparent between being able to identify a sequence of words spoken slowly and carefully in the foreign language and being able to identify words in the acoustic blur of normal conversational speech. As Wilga Rivers (1968: 135) remarked, emphasis in language teaching had hitherto been placed on students' production of the language, disregarding the fact that communication takes place between (at least) two people. She suggested that the primary difficulty for a traveler in a foreign country was not the problem of making himself understood but of being unable to "understand what is being said to him and around him".

On the rare occasions when students were invited to listen to a tape to understand the content of what was said, they typically listened to a text that consisted of a narrative or discursive text read aloud slowly and distinctly by a native speaker. After listening to the tape, they were asked questions on the content. The questions, often as many as 10 or more, concerned information spaced at roughly equal intervals through the text, following the format widely used in 'teaching' the comprehension of the written language. Consider what these second language learners were being required to do: "treat all spoken language as primarily intended for transference of facts ... listen with a sustained level of attention, over several minutes to spoken language ... interpret *all of it* ... commit that interpretation to memory ... answer random, unmotivated questions on any of it" (Brown and Yule, 1983: 60). Sophisticated adult native speakers often had difficulty in recalling some of the trivial detail that such 'comprehension questions' addressed. For most second language learners, the experience was negative and demotivating.

The challenge since the 1960s has been to help students identify words in the stream of speech and to equip them with strategies to enable them to interpret the content of utterances in the relevant context of utterance and to work out what speakers mean by what they say.

Bottom-up Interpretation

It seems clear that structuralists were correct in claiming that being able to identify words in the stream of speech is fundamental to understanding what a speaker is saying. In some genres of speech, notably in relaxed conversation, where the focus is on the establishment or maintenance of social relationships, it may not be necessary to identify all the words that are spoken but, to participate meaningfully in the conversation, it is essential to identify at least those expressions that indicate the topic of the utterance and what is said about that topic. In primarily transactional genres, on the other hand, where the transfer of information will have some effect in the world, it may be essential to identify even the detail of those unstressed grammatical words that you can often afford to leave only vaguely guessed at in social conversation. When you are listening in your first language, you tend to be quite relaxed about how much you can afford not to fully interpret. In a second language, particularly in the testing situation of a classroom, it is hard not to panic if you realize that a series of unidentified words is rushing past your ears.

It is sometimes suggested that, in order to identify words in the stream of speech, it is necessary to be

able to identify all the consonantal and vocalic oppositions that occur in the accent of the target language that students are being exposed to. This is a counsel of perfection. We should remember that in any accent of English, some of the oppositions found in other accents will not occur. Thus, standard American English does not distinguish between the words *balm* and *bomb*; young speakers of southern British English ('RP') do not distinguish between the words *paw*, *pore*, and *poor*; Scottish English does not distinguish between the words *cot* and *caught*, *cam* and *calm*, or *pull* and *pool*; Yorkshire English does not distinguish between the words *put* and *putt*; and London Cockney English does not distinguish between the words *sin* and *sing*, *thin* and *fin*, or *that* and *vat*. Yet, on the whole, speakers of different accents of English understand one another's speech well enough, even though in their own accent they do not make exactly the same set of phonological distinctions that their interlocutor makes. Second language learners are likely to encounter speakers from a range of different English accents and need to learn to identify the basic distinctions that are maintained in stressed syllables in all English accents, rather than spending much time on rare sets of oppositions that do not occur in most accents and which, even there, may carry only a low functional load. Whereas courses in pronunciation will normally be based on only a single native accent, courses in second language listening need to be much less constrained and to be relevant to a variety of major English accents.

There is obviously a significant difference between encountering words in the written and spoken forms of the language. In the written form, spaces between words unambiguously demarcate individual words. A major difficulty in interpreting the spoken form of a second language lies in determining where word boundaries occur. It is not always appreciated that crucial information needed in the task of segmenting the acoustic blur of the stream of speech lies not only in discriminating between phonological oppositions but also in identifying the phonologically conditioned variables that characterize particular consonants when they occur initially or finally in a word or stressed syllable. For historical reasons, much has been made in teaching English as a second language of the 'aspiration' (delayed voice onset time) that follows the articulation of a voiceless stop when it is initial in a stressed syllable. On the other hand, the glottalization that precedes the articulation of the same set of phonemes in the coda of a syllable in most accents is typically ignored. Yet each feature is equally informative in identifying relevant parts of word structure (Brown, 1990: Chap. 2). Similarly

much has been made in British ELT of the distinction between palatalized ('light') and velarized ('dark') /l/, without noting the generalization that the structure of the syllable in the RP accent is always more palatalized in the onset and more velarized in the coda of the syllable, a fact that affects the articulation of all consonants in these positions. The effect is most easily heard in sonorants and continuants where syllable-initial (onset) consonants will be heard as more palatalized, and hence higher in pitch, than syllable-final (coda) consonants. There are, of course, accents whose syllables are differently structured: the English of Glasgow has velarized consonants initially as well as finally, and Welsh English has palatalized consonants finally as well as initially.

Much more generalizable across accents than these palatal/velar subtleties is information about those phonotactic constraints that are helpful in identifying syllable and word boundaries, information that is sadly underexploited in the teaching of second language listening. For example, if an ESL listener hears a sequence /ml/ in the stream of speech, it is relevant to know that, since this cannot form an onset cluster in a syllable of English, it cannot mark the beginning of a word. The /l/ must be syllable initial, which means that the /m/ must be final in the preceding syllable; the significance of this fact is that where there are syllable boundaries, there are potential word boundaries (Cutler and Norris, 1988). An essential requirement is to learn to identify and to pay attention to the stressed syllable of words, since this is the syllable that is most reliably clearly articulated. In the stream of speech, a great deal of the phonological information that is available when words are pronounced slowly and clearly in citation form is routinely lost, particularly in unstressed syllables. Unstressed syllables are frequently elided, particularly when they occur as one of an unstressed sequence (for instance, in words such as *library, governor, extraordinary*). Processes of elision and assimilation take place across syllable boundaries and radically alter the familiar features of the citation form. Such processes occur densely in normal, informal speech whose relevance for learners is much greater now than it was pre-1970 since this type of speech is used in a much wider range of situations than it used to be. It is not only found in informal conversational contexts but is regularly heard on radio and television (even in news broadcasts, once models of slow, carefully articulated speech) and is standardly used in academic lectures and in public speaking more generally. (Harris (1994) and Shockey (2003) gave detailed accounts of these processes.)

I have suggested that a crucial component of second language listening is identifying words

correctly. More to the point may be identifying the larger, prefabricated structures of which so much spoken language is constructed. Wray (2002) reviewed an array of studies that demonstrated the crucial significance of such structures, particularly in the early stages of learning a second language. It seems likely that many expressions are, initially at least, learned as unanalyzed chunks. Other expressions may be incorrectly analyzed (as in the case of the L2 learner of French who analyzed the spoken version of *chocolat* as *chaud cola*). In many cases, it may be that such expressions are stored and used quite effectively until eventually confrontation between spoken and written forms (or the utterance and the world) leads to a reanalysis. The acquisition of lexis, and of formulaic expressions in particular, is still the subject of extensive research.

Having identified (some of) the expressions in an utterance, the listener needs to order them into chunks that can be understood as syntactically structured and co-interpretable semantically. Just as the written language uses punctuation and layout to indicate the organization of discourse, there are various signals in speech, for instance, intonation, slowing down, and pausing, that indicate the boundaries of chunks of speech that need to be co-interpreted. In most accents of English, the beginning of a new sentential structure is typically indicated by being placed relatively high in the speaker's pitch range, and the rest of the structure is included within the overall contour that follows. The end of the structure is usually marked by being uttered at a lower level in the pitch range than the onset and is often followed by a pause. Internal sentential boundaries may be marked by shorter pauses and sometimes by variation in pitch height or direction (cf., Ladd, 1996).

Where spoken language differs dramatically from written language is in the scale of interruptions, modifications, and use of interpersonal markers in its production and in its reliance on the present context of utterance to constrain possible interpretations by the listener. Most speakers have had the experience of interrupting themselves, pausing, reconsidering, planning again, beginning to express themselves in one way, and then immediately modifying what they have just said. Unlike writers, they cannot undertake such operations secretly, without the interlocutor knowing. Second language learners unused to listening to spontaneous speech that has not been previously at least partially planned are in danger of having their attention distracted from the message by material that is introduced as part of the planning process. Often the changes speakers make are marked by interpersonal and modal expressions such as *well, erm ... I mean, so ... you see ... , if you get my*

meaning ..., as far as I'm concerned ..., I think ..., I'm sure ..., phrases that disturb the smooth flow of a sentential structure at both a syntactic and an intonational level. A feature of spontaneous conversational speech that second language learners need to become accustomed to is how such universal features of spoken language are managed in the second language.

As speech plays such an important role in interpersonal relationships, its production is often modified by paralinguistic features that express the attitude of the speaker toward the listener and/or toward what is being said. English speakers who are being particularly polite to the interlocutor often speak higher in their voice range, relatively softly, and with a 'breathy' voice, whereas those who are being aggressive typically speak lower in their pitch range, more loudly, and with a 'harsher' voice quality. Speakers who are being sympathetic or kind speak low in their voice range, slowly, and typically with a 'creaky' voice. Whereas it seems plausible that basic human emotions such as fear, anger, or timidity are expressed similarly in all languages, it seems probable that attitudes that are more culturally conditioned are more likely to be variable in their expression across languages. Second language learners, at quite an early stage in their exposure to tapes and videos of L2 speakers interacting, might profitably pay attention to paralinguistic features of speech in order to identify whether speakers are agreeing or disagreeing with each other, being polite or aggressive, or friendly or unfriendly, long before they can understand the linguistic details of what is being said (Brown (1990), summarized in Rost (2002)).

Interpretation and Inference

Clark and Clark (1977: 45) drew a helpful distinction between 'constructing an interpretation' and 'utilizing an interpretation,' drawing attention to the fact that, in everyday life, we use language to get things done. In doing a crossword puzzle, we might construct an interpretation without putting the interpretation to further use but most speech is functional, either to interact with someone socially or to transfer or extract information. This implies that there is more to the interpretation of an utterance than simply identifying words, syntactic structures, and thin semantic meanings; we must infer what the speaker who produced the utterance intended to achieve by it. The term 'interpretation' reflects this process better than the term 'comprehension.' To have comprehended an utterance suggests a total, correct product now present in the listener's mind. For a listener who is trying to understand a decontextualized utterance

in a language test, a translation equivalent of the thin semantic meaning may yield a judgment of 'correct' but, as Goffman (1981: 28) remarked, "the mental set required to make sense of these little orphans is that of someone with linguistic interests" rather than someone who is using language purposefully. It might be supposed that a total, correct product could be achieved in understanding short, banal utterances such as *what is the time?* But even such a familiar utterance may have been produced by the speaker primarily to bring about an awareness of the passage of time on the part of the listener, an intention that the listener may remain unaware of even after having produced an apparently appropriate translation. 'Interpretation' gives a better impression of the riskiness of the listener's effort to understand what the speaker means by producing the utterance and it gives no impression of finality – once constructed, an interpretation is not fixed and immutable but may subsequently be modified. It is because, in most genres, there can be no single 'correct' interpretation of what is said that some scholars question the possibility of measuring or assessing the degree of a student's 'spoken language comprehension' (issues discussed in Shohamy (1996); Spolsky (1994)).

To arrive at an interpretation, the listener needs to make inferences at many levels. To begin with, the listener may need to infer the identity of words not clearly heard but which would make sense of the utterance. Then, the effect of the immediate verbal context on the sense (meaning) of words must be taken into account. For instance, the word *red* prototypically denotes a strong, saturated red hue and the word *face* prototypically denotes the configuration of eyes, nose, mouth, and chin that would be represented in a child's drawing. However, once these words occur in the phrase *red face, red* must be interpreted as denoting a pinky, blotchy color, whereas *face* will draw attention particularly to the cheeks and perhaps the forehead but certainly not the eyes or mouth. The listener must infer which of a wide range of senses is appropriate in a given verbal context. For a second language listener, particularly one who has learned the foreign words in terms of one-word translation equivalents, extending the interpretation of a word well away from its central translational sense requires considerable confidence since it is obviously an operation fraught with risk (Færch and Kasper, 1986).

The issues of syntax, of combining words in one syntactic structure rather than another, and of the choice of syntactic structure having any effect on interpretation have been curiously neglected in cognitive models of comprehension. Most accounts of discourse meaning simply ignore the nature of the syntactic structures selected by the speaker and produce representations of discourse meaning consisting of a set of abstract semantic 'propositions' from which all specifically syntactic information has been expunged. A few writers have insisted on the significance of syntactic structure in determining how the semantic content of an utterance is understood (e.g., Brown, (1994); Levinson (2000)). Halliday (1978) pointed out the disruptive effect on the listener's presuppositional coherence of using inappropriate syntactic structures (consider which is the most appropriate radio commentary on a ceremony: *The sun's shining. The day's perfect.* versus *It's the sun that's shining and the day that's perfect*). Davison (1980) noted the effect on interpretation of using passive rather than active constructions in some circumstances, and Sanford and Moxey (1995) have drawn attention to the inadequacies of any account of interpretation based solely on propositional representation. It is far from clear why a language should develop different ways of expressing the same propositional content if using a different syntactic structure has absolutely no effect on meaning. Rather little experimental work has been conducted on the effect on interpretation of varying syntactic form but at least we should note that a competent listener would need to draw inferences when an unexpected syntactic structure is employed: compare the effect of *He certainly spoke to her* with *She was certainly spoken to by him*.

The Context of Utterance

It is a truism that spoken language typically relies heavily on context for its interpretation. There is a widespread view that speakers and listeners 'share' the context of utterance. Yet a moment's thought reminds us that speaker and listener can usually see each other's face and facial expression but not their own, and each of them has private interests, perceptions, judgments, and prejudices and brings to any interaction different hopes and expectations for its outcome. As Johnson-Laird (1983: 187). remarked, "the notion of the context overlooks the fact that an utterance generally has two contexts: one for the speaker and one for the listener. The differences between them are not merely contingent but...a crucial datum for communication". I shall consider three aspects of context from the point of view of the listener: external context of situation, social context, and textual/discoursal context. Each of these aspects of context interacts and overlaps with the others, more or less obviously in different genres (Brown, 1998).

The External Context

Utterances are produced in a particular place and at a particular time. Much of what is said will be assumed to be relevant to the place and time of utterance. If someone comes into a room, shivers, and says *It's cold*, the listener will understand that the comment applies to the current place and time – if not to the temperature within the room, then to the local external temperature. If I, in a temperate country, say in winter *It's warm today,* I mean that it is relatively warm for this locality at this time of year, not that it is as warm as it might be in August or in Singapore. If the speaker says *She's coming on Monday,* the listener will assume that the relevant 'Monday' will be the next one after the day of utterance. If the conversation is about 'the president,' 'the doctor,' or 'the school,' the listener should assume that it is the participants' current, local president, doctor, or school, if no contrary information is given. Conversations will, by default and in the absence of contradictory information, be assumed to be relevant to 'local' conditions, where 'local' can be interpreted as widely as *here* can be interpreted in *here in my hand, here in this room, here on this street, here in this town, here in this country*, and so on.

A concept of 'appropriate behavior,' which may differ in different cultures, will set limits on what it is appropriate to say and how it is appropriate to say it in particular places and at particular times. There are appropriate greetings for different times of day, for meeting, and for parting. There are some places, places of worship, for instance, where some topics or manners of speaking would be judged inappropriate. If I have a trivial message for you about the postponement of some distant future event, it would be inappropriate for me to come to speak to you about it in your hotel room at midnight, invading your personal space and possibly awakening you from sleep. If, in defiance of convention, I were to insist on speaking to you in such circumstances, you might well infer that I meant more than I was overtly expressing. The subtleties of contraventions, deliberate or intentional, of conventions governing types of utterance appropriate to particular external contexts are peculiarly difficult for second language learners to interpret with any confidence without extensive experience of the culture where the second language is used.

The Social Context

For the listener, the most significant figure in the social context is the speaker, and the significant relationship is that between speaker and listener. Whether the speaker is speaking to a group of listeners or shaping the utterance for just one listener, the speaker must make judgments about how far they will share what Clark called "communal lexicons" (1998: 60–87). Communal lexicons, Clark suggested, are built on such social features as shared nationality, education, occupation, hobbies, language, religion, age cohort, and gender. The more social features that the speaker and listener share, the more the speaker can rely on the listener being able to understand specialist vocabulary. Where speaker and listener share an occupation, suppose both are ship's engineers, even where the listener is a second language learner, they are likely to be able to negotiate the senses of technical terms with some confidence that each understands what the other is speaking of as long as the listener feels relaxed and is able to think clearly. However, when the speaker is the dominant participant in an interview that is communicatively stressful for the second language learner, for instance, when the learner is a junior doctor being interviewed for a job by a senior member of the profession, the ability of the listener to negotiate a shared understanding of a term may be curtailed, which may result in a breakdown of communication. For nervous students in examination conditions who are exposed to tapes of speakers with whom they share few, if any, of Clark's social features, only the most self-confident of students are likely to arrive at an adequate interpretation in the lottery of a speaker, or speakers, talking on a quite unpredictable topic that may be distant from any of the student's own interests. It will always be the case that a second language learner will have least difficulty in understanding language that the speaker is sympathetically shaping for that particular individual, taking account of the learner's current state of control of the second language and anticipated knowledge of the topic.

When listening to speakers from their own speech community, listeners will often make stereotypical judgments about the speaker on the basis of the speaker's self-presentation in terms of dress, hair, posture, and what the listener knows about the speaker's occupation. Such stereotypical judgments may influence the listener's interpretation of what the speaker says. If asked in the street what the time is by a smartly turned-out passer-by as opposed to one who gives the general impression of having just stumbled out of bed, different listeners may respond with different degrees of helpfulness in each case. If the listener hears *This is yet another example of hard work by the left* said by a left-wing politician, the listener will infer that the expression is used positively and appreciatively, but if the very same remark is uttered by a right-wing politician, the listener will infer that it is used negatively and critically.

Second language listeners may feel uneasy about importing stereotypical knowledge of the world from their own culture into interpreting what is said in another language.

They may also fail to notice when they have not properly understood what someone says, as young L1 listeners have been shown to do in their own language (Markman, 1981) or blame themselves for not having understood when native speakers express the content of their message inadequately. Robinson (1981), working with native speakers of English, showed young children who hear elliptical or ambiguous messages from adults may be 'listener blamers,' who attribute their difficulties in understanding such messages to their own inadequacy, rather than 'speaker blamers,' who are capable of recognizing that the speaker has produced a confused and confusing utterance. If second language learners hear a native speaker assert something that the listeners cannot make sense of, like 'listener blamer' children they may believe that they have not interpreted what the speaker said correctly, simply because they are reluctant to question the authority of a native speaker.

The Context of Discourse

The discourse context is created by whatever the conversational participants are currently paying attention to and by what has already been said on the topic. It is the structure of what has already been established in the discourse context that allows the listener to determine what anaphoric expressions refer to and what, within the discourse world, new expressions refer to (Gernsbacher, 1990; Smith, 2003). How much the listener must carry in memory from the previous discourse varies with the type of genre at issue. In genres such as instructions on how to complete a task, where each instruction is followed by a pause while the listener completes that step in the task, there is minimal burden on memory. Instruction tasks may be made easier by limiting the number of parts or participants and making them clearly distinct from one another. Narrative genres, where an understanding of what is happening now depends on your understanding of what has happened earlier, are likely to impose a greater burden on memory. Again, narratives can be simplified if events are narrated in the order of occurrence ('*ordo naturalis*'), if the number of participants is limited, and each participant is physically clearly distinguished from the other participants (Brown, 1995). The more complex the task, the more difficult it is to arrive at a secure interpretation, culminating in the problems of following abstract arguments in academic lectures (Chaudron, 1995).

Listening as 'Input' to Second Language Learning

When we consider the complexity of the demands made on the learner listening to a second language, it seems truly remarkable that such input can form the basis for learning the second language. Nevertheless, it is clear that to a greater or lesser extent, in different contexts of acquisition, some learners do successfully learn to control a second language to an impressive extent, largely from absorbing aspects of spoken input while simultaneously putting that input to use in constructing an interpretation of what a particular speaker intends to convey on a particular occasion of use. How this is achieved is the subject of extensive speculation in the second language acquisition literature (for a useful critical overview of the literature and an initial stab at a theoretical approach that distinguishes between the procedures of processing language for meaning and the processes of language learning, see Carroll (1999)). The most promising research thus far on this topic is that concerned with the acquisition of lexis, given spoken input (see, e.g., Ellis and Beaton (1993); Vidal (2003)).

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Semantic Change: the Internet and Text Messaging

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Electronic Communication: Efficiency and Expressivity

Since the 1980s, computer technology and mobile technology have given rise to various forms of text-based, electronic communication: e-mails, newsgroups, chatrooms, and, more recently, blogs (web logs that function as on-line diaries) and text messaging (Short Message Service, SMS). The language used in electronic communication has been described as a hybrid, showing both speech-like and writing-like features, as well as features that are unique to the digital medium and are, to some extent, the result of its technological restrictions. For instance, slow modems, limited bandwidth, costs, small screens, and typing speed are often cited as reasons for the preponderance of abbreviations in text-based electronic communication (cf. Baron, 2000; Shortis, 2000; Crystal, 2001).

The communicative need to use language efficiently within the constraints of the medium is complemented by the users' desire for conceptual and communicative expressivity (on efficiency and expressivity in semantic change cf. Geeraerts, 1997: 102–108). Crystal (2001: 67) has highlighted the "strong, creative spirit" that characterizes the language of Internet users: "The rate at which they have been coining terms and introducing playful variations into established ones has no parallel in contemporary language use." Linguistic creativity and playfulness can be described as conversational maxims of electronic communication and are most noticeable in recreational contexts (such as chatting and texting; Danet, 2001; Crystal, 2001: 168–170). Other conversational maxims (politeness, relevance, truth) can at times be suspended (or at least take

second place; cf. Wallace, 1999: Chap. 3, on deception, masquerades, and lies on the Internet). Innovative in-group language use and a predilection for speech play was already a defining characteristic of those pioneer Internet users who engaged with the culturally still uncharted medium in the early 1980s. Raymond (2003) comments, e.g., on the popularity of form-vs.-content jokes among hackers (a person who enjoys exploring the workings and capabilities of programmable systems) and cites the tradition of 'hacker punning jargon' as an example. ('Hacker punning jargon' is the *ad hoc* use of intentionally transparent puns: FreeBSD → FreeLSD or IBM 360 → IBM Three-Sickly.)

Some Aspects of Semantic and Lexical Change in Netspeak and Texting

Users of electronic communication, despite their geographical dispersion, form a relatively cohesive, subcultural group and have been described as a 'virtual speech community' (Paolillo, 1999). Much linguistic work has concentrated on documenting the in-group national and international vocabularies that are used in electronic communication. The six standard categories of semantic change (cf. Traugott, 2000) can be identified in the specialist Internet lexicon (or jargon) that has its roots in hacker usage:

- Broadening/Generalization/Extension: *grep*, a UNIX command meaning 'Get REpeated Pattern,' is now used widely as a verb with the meaning 'to search.'
- Narrowing/Restriction: *banner* (top-centered graphic on a webpage), *to compress* (to reduce data size through the application of a mathematical algorithm).
- Amelioration: *nerd, geek* (which have acquired highly positive in-group connotations), *a hack* (a good and clever piece of work).
- Pejoration: *tourist* (an uninvited and usually non-participating guest on a discussion group), *random* (has a pejorative meaning of 'unproductive' 'undirected,' e.g., 'he is a random loser').
- Metaphor: *information superhighway, web-surfing, nipple mouse, gopher* (a software program designed 'to gopher' through information).
- Metonymy: *a suit* (someone involved in information technology who habitually wears suits and works in management, distinct from a real programmer or 'techie'; pejorative), *vanilla* ('ordinary' < vanilla ice cream, the default flavor in many countries, e.g., United States, United Kingdom).

Acronyms and abbreviations are a salient feature of what Crystal (2001) has called Netspeak, e.g., IRL 'in

real life,' AFAIK 'as far as I know,' and BFN 'bye for now.' Media citations (from movies and computer games) have long been common in the in-group language of hackers and are moving into mainstream Netspeak: 'all your base are belong to us' is an expression used to declare victory or superiority (from a 1991 computer game; the citation spread through the Internet in 2001); 'and there was much rejoicing' can be used to acknowledge an accomplishment (from the movie *Monty Python and the Holy Grail*). Overlexicalization and the clustering of synonyms is another characteristic feature (e.g., *nick, handle, screen name,* and *pseudo* are all used to refer to the pseudonyms used by participants in chatrooms or newsgroups), as is the on-going creation of portmanteau neologisms (*netiquette, newbie, progasm, screenagers,* etc.). There are also conventions for the encoding of prosody and paralinguistic meaning: emoticons (smiley icons such as :-)), the use of capitals (to indicate shouting), and repetition of letters (for emphasis) are used to disambiguate written messages.

With regard to derivational morphology: the *e* prefix and the *bot* suffix (from 'robot') have established themselves as productive morphemes (*e-loan, e-government, e-cards, e-books, annoybot, mailbot,* etc.). In inflecting languages, such as German, a new and productive lexical class has emerged in the context of chat communication: nonfinite verb-last stems. These are used by participants to describe actions that are performed in the context of the conversation. The action descriptions are inserted in asterisks: **away sei** (*away be*; the full German infinitive of 'to be' is *sein*), **schnell zu dir renn** (*quickly run to you*; the full German infinitive of 'to run' is *rennen*; cf. Schlobinski, 2001). Verbal stems (*schluck* 'swallow,' *gähn* 'yawn') have long been used in comics and also colloquially in German youth language. In English, on the other hand, action descriptions such as *nod* and *sigh* are structurally ambiguous and not necessarily identifiable as stems; moreover, inflected forms such as *shakes hand* are not unusual in English chat communication (Werry, 1996).

The lexical structure and character of nicknames ('nicks') is another aspect of the linguistics of Netspeak. In terms of semantic preferences, Bechar-Israeli (1996) identified six main semantic fields from which nicks are drawn: self-descriptors (<shydude>, <Dutchguy>, <irish>); technology (<Pentium>); real-world objects (<froggy>, <tulip>, <cheese>); play on words and sounds (<kukyMNSTR>, <whathell>); famous characters (<Elvis>, <Barbie>); and sex and provocation (<fuckjesus>, <sexpot>).

The language of text messaging/texting, which has become a popular form of interpersonal

communication from the mid-1990s, is partially based on Netspeak, but shows a more radical use of abbreviations (e.g., 'it's prty low 4 sum 1 2 dump their b/f or g/f by sms' 'it is pretty low for someone to dump their boyfriend or girlfriend by sms'; special conventionalized abbreviations are also used in SMS, e.g., SWDYT 'so what do you think?'). The trend toward letter reduction (mostly achieved through a technique called 'consonant writing') and a generally telegraphic style have usually been interpreted as a response to the limited number of characters (max. 160) per message, and the small and awkward keyboard. They have since developed into a characteristic feature of the genre. It is not yet clear how technological innovations, such as predictive text software (which 'guesses' words after only a few key strokes), and market-related changes, such as the introduction of flat rates (rather than charging users per character), have affected (and will affect) the language of texting.

The Meanings of LOL: Semantic–Pragmatic Change in Electronic Communication

A well-known type of semantic–pragmatic change is subjectification, that is, the overall tendency for speakers/writers to construct new meanings on the basis of conversational implicatures reflecting speaker attitude or intention (cf. Traugott, 2000). In Internet Relay Chat (IRC), subjectification of meaning can be observed in the case of the popular abbreviation LOL/lol. The original propositional meaning of LOL is 'laughing out loud' and as such it can be used in response to, for example, a successful joke or an amusing story. This usage is indicated by metalinguistic comments such as 'I type it in after something funny is said … and I am laughing.' However, LOL, which has the structural advantage of shortness (i.e., it can be typed quickly), has been recruited and conventionalized by IRC users to express a range of discursive and interpersonal meanings (on laughter as a contextualization cue in spoken conversations; cf. Adelswärd and Öberg, 1998).

(1) LOL can be used as a discourse marker. This usage is illustrated in Example 1 (from a German chatroom, #Berlin), where <mib> closes his turn (a factual question addressed to another participant) with LOL, inviting a response from the addressee. The meaning of LOL in this example can be glossed as 'I have finished my turn, please answer my question.' (The spelling in Examples 1–4 is that of the original transcript and has not been corrected by the author of this paper.)

Example 1: #Berlin (8/7/2002)
<mib> kommst du eigendlich zum rl-treffen? ('will you come to the rl ('real-life')-meeting')
<mib> lol

(2) LOL can also be used as a supportive backchannel and as a means of establishing rapport between participants (emoticons can take on similar pragmatic and interactional meanings; cf. Crystal, 2001: 38). The following extracts come from two South African chatrooms (#Afrikaans; #India) and a German chatroom (#Berlin). In Example 2, <perfume_girl> uses LOL as an interpersonal modifier to soften her rejection of <Pyro>; her use of LOL fulfills pragmatic functions of hedging and face-saving. In Example 3, LOL is used in the context of a virtual drinking game. It functions as an emphatic textual marker and creates emotional and interactional coherence (cf. Herring, 1999). In Example 4, <toxisches ei> ('toxic egg') uses LOL (as well as a positive emoticon) in response to the comment by <|Phylax|schule|>. The use of LOL is followed by supportive spoken-language discourse markers (*naja, hmm*).

Example 2: #Afrikaans (8/7/2002)
[1] <perfume_girl> sorry oom ('uncle')
[2] <perfume_girl> better luck next time
[3] <perfume_girl> lol
[3] <Pyro> ek is skat ry ('I am super rich')
[3] <perfume_girl> if u know what i mean
[4] <Pyro> help dit? ('does this help')
[5] <perfume_girl> lol
[6] <perfume_girl> nee ('no')
[7] <perfume_girl> sorry
[8] <Pyro> damnit

Example 3: #India (26/7/2002)
[1] <Renzo_ReXXXeL> what did he say?
[2] <PsYcHoMiKe> ehehe
[3] <MizHOttie> lets drink!
[4] <Miz_KeWL> LOL!
[5] * Miz_KeWL downs it!
[6] <MizHOttie> LOL!
[7] <MizHOttie> lol, wat he say

Example 4: #Berlin (19/8/2002)
[1] <|Phylax|schule|> beio uns ist der gk deutsch scwerer als der lk deutsch ('here (at our school) O-level German is more difficult than A-level German')
[2] <toxisches_ei> lol :D
[3] <toxisches_ei> naja
[4] <toxisches_ei> hmm

In the examples given above, LOL no longer has a clear propositional meaning. It appears to be 'desemanticized' or 'bleached' and is used as an interactional device that allows individuals to claim the floor, to express a range of interpersonal meanings

(hedging, face-saving), and to provide supportive back-channeling and textual cohesion in the ongoing conversation.

(3) LOL can also occur as an adverb (expressing connotations of affection; cf. Example 4) and has developed a number of variants (*lolol, lololololo, lölchen* 'little lol' in German chats, *ol, olo*).

> Example 5: #Berlin (17/7/2002)
> \<[c]hrono> mib du bist so lol :) ('mib you are so lol')

(4) Finally, the propositional meaning of LOL is increasingly and creatively deconstructed by Internet users, and a range of alternative meanings have been promoted in various on-line forums: 'lists of links,' 'lots of love,' 'lots of luck,' 'love on-line,' 'little old lady,' 'lovingly ornamented long-johns,' 'leagues of lemmings,' 'love of libraries,' etc.

Conclusion: Diversity of Usages

There is a constant tension between global and local practices in electronic media, and although the influence of, in particular, American English is paramount, local usages and variations persist (Danet and Herring, 2003). This refers not only to the large numbers of non-English-speaking Internet users who have developed their own jargons and usages, but also to those who do not participate fully in the subcultural linguistic practices of Netspeak. The degree to which individual users employ the innovative vocabulary of Netspeak and other highly marked ingroup writing practices (e.g., consonant writing, emoticons, and abbreviations such as LOL) depends not only on the degree of their integration into the virtual speech community (Paolillo, 1999), but also on the genre (e.g., business e-mail vs. IRC) and the identity they wish to project within a particular communicative context (cf. also Crystal, 2001 on differences in language use across various 'Internet situations').

See also: Discourse Markers; E-mail, Internet, Chatroom Talk: Pragmatics; Languages for Specific Purposes; Language in Computer-Mediated Communication.

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Semantics-Pragmatics Boundary

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The Philosophical Debate

Texts in the philosophy of language frequently cite the tripartite distinction between syntax, semantics, and pragmatics made by Morris (1938). According to Morris, syntax is concerned with the structural properties of signs (i.e., with word-word relations), semantics with the relations between signs and the things they signify (i.e., with word-world relations), and pragmatics with the uses of signs by speakers and hearers to perform communicative acts (i.e., with word-user relations).

Philosophers generally follow Frege in rejecting any form of mentalist semantics. They think of languages as "abstract semantic systems whereby symbols are associated with aspects of the world" (Lewis, 1972: 170). There is a potential infinity of both syntactically well-formed (grammatical) and semantically well-formed (meaningful) sentences in any language, and it is the job of semantics to identify rules that generate this potential infinity. On the other hand, since we are interested in the semantics of **natural** languages, these rules must be ones that are learnable by humans with finite minds. Semanticists are interested in what a competent speaker knows when she knows a language (i.e., her syntactic and semantic competence). Hence they assume that what a speaker knows is a **finite** set of rules that can compositionally generate the potential infinity of syntactically well-formed sentences and that can deliver a **semantic interpretation** for every meaningful sentence of the language.

Philosophers generally assume that there is a sharp division between syntax/semantics and pragmatics. While semantics studies the rules that a competent speaker knows when she knows the meanings of sentences, pragmatics studies how sentences are used in conversational contexts to communicate a speaker's messages. Pragmatics is thus concerned with linguistic **performance** rather than competence. It is **by** using sentences with certain syntactic and semantic properties that speakers succeed in communicating certain things. So, the central question of pragmatics is how we succeed in our communicative tasks.

Many philosophers are convinced that Grice (1975, 1989) made an important start in answering this question by articulating his Cooperative Principle and maxims of conversation. Grice sees conversations as rational cooperative activities where hearers use their linguistic knowledge, together with mutually available nonlinguistic contextual knowledge, to infer what the speaker means to communicate. The principles that guide conversations are analogous to the principles that guide any sort of rational cooperative activity, such as the joint activity of building a house or sailing a ship. Pragmatic principles on this view are not tied essentially to any language mechanism and are certainly not language-specific rules, unlike the syntactic and semantic rules that define a language.

An alternative view, argued for by Prince (1988, 1997), assumes that there are rules of use associating certain linguistic forms with certain functions. Moreover, these rules are language-specific, in the sense that the same pragmatic function could be served in different languages by different forms; so any competent speaker of the language must learn these rules. Knowledge of these rules constitutes the speaker's pragmatic competence. Hence it is incorrect to put the study of pragmatics on the performance side of the competence/performance divide. Related to Prince's ideas are those of Kasher (1991), who argues for a modular conception of pragmatics. Just as linguists have postulated a grammar module, so Kasher argues there is a module governing pragmatic processes, with its own proprietary rules and representations. Since it is Grice's conception of pragmatics that has set the agenda for debate in the philosophy of language, these alternative views will be set aside here.

Gricean pragmatics introduces the idea that it is **by** saying certain things in certain contexts that speakers are able indirectly to communicate (to implicate) certain further things. In working out what a speaker has implicated, a hearer will use his knowledge of the conversational maxims, together with contextually available knowledge, to infer what the speaker communicated. For example, after a terrible ordeal in which a man is rescued from a remote mountainside after a plane crash, a TV reporter interviews him. The reporter asks: 'Were you ever afraid?' and the man replies: 'I felt a twinge or two.' By his understatement he has implicated that things were pretty bad. The understatement is a violation of Grice's first Maxim of Quantity, which enjoins speakers to say as much as is required by the purposes of the talk exchange. The hearer, having recognized the violation, but assuming that the speaker is still bound by the Cooperative Principle, will search the context for further information that the speaker might have intended to convey. It is his background knowledge – of human psychology, of the probable consequences of plane wrecks, and of the low probability of survivors being found

in remote, sparsely populated places – that allows the reporter to infer the speaker's intended meaning.

The currently dominant view in philosophy of language is that a theory of meaning for a language specifies the truth-conditions for each of the sentences of a language. It does this by specifying a finite set of rules that compositionally generates these truth-conditions. This truth-conditional approach to semantics has been grafted onto a Gricean view of pragmatics. It is generally accepted that saying and implicating are neatly separated. Saying is tied to sentence meaning and the expression of truth-conditional content. What a speaker says when she utters a sentence (i.e., the locutionary content of her utterance) corresponds to the truth-conditional content of the sentence. (Note that the notion of **saying** is not to be conflated with the notion of **stating**. The former is a locutionary act, namely the act of expressing some content. The latter is an illocutionary act. It is the expressing of some content with a particular illocutionary force.) Implicating is tied to (indirectly or implicitly) communicated content that can be inferred once the hearer has figured out what the speaker has (directly or explicitly) said. Since truth-conditional content is the province of semantics and implicature is the province of pragmatics, the saying/implicating divide goes along with a neat divide between semantics and pragmatics. Consequently, many believe that truth-conditions can be specified in a way that is essentially free from pragmatic considerations.

But there are problems with this Gricean view. One of the first indications of trouble for this view came from some observations by Cohen (1971). Others, such as Carston (1988, 2002), Levinson (1995, 2000) and Recanati (1989, 2004) have used examples similar to Cohen's to challenge the Gricean picture. Consider examples such as the following:

(1) Mary fell pregnant and she got married.
(2) Mary got married and she fell pregnant.

Grice would say that (1) and (2) have the same truth-conditional content, but that they implicate different things. (1) implicates (in a generalized way) that the pregnancy occurred before the marriage, whereas (2) implicates the opposite. (1) also implicates that the reason for Mary's marriage was her pregnancy. However consider examples such as the following:

(3) If Mary fell pregnant and she got married, her grandma will be shocked.
(4) If Mary got married and she fell pregnant, her grandma will be shocked.

According to Grice, the antecedents of the two conditionals have the same truth-conditional content. Therefore, (3) and (4) should themselves have the same truth-conditional content, yet intuitively they do not. (3) could be true while (4) is false. It looks as though the implicated content of (1) and (2) has become incorporated into the truth-conditional content of (3) and (4). In other words, (3) and (4) in effect express the following:

(3′) If Mary fell pregnant *and then for that reason* she got married, her grandma will be shocked.
(4′) If Mary got married *and then* she fell pregnant, her grandma will be shocked.

Clearly, (3′) and (4′) differ in content, so it is not a problem if one is true and the other is false.

These appear to be cases of pragmatic intrusion into truth-conditional content. Such pragmatic intrusion creates a problem for Grice that Levinson (2000) calls 'Grice's Circle.' The trouble is that to figure out what is conversationally implicated, the hearer must first determine what is said (since it is **by** saying such-and-such that a speaker succeeds in implicating something else). However, in figuring out what was said by (3) or (4), it looks as though one must first determine their implicated contents.

Levinson (1995, 2000) argues that pragmatic intrusion is not problematic, since it is limited to the intrusion of **generalized** conversational implicatures (GCIs), and these, he argues, are **default meanings** that will be automatically triggered by the use of certain kinds of expressions. The derivation of GCIs is governed by various heuristic principles. For example, the I-Principle can be summarized in the slogan 'What is simply described is stereotypically and specifically exemplified.' It applies only to 'unmarked, minimal expressions' (Levinson, 1995: 97). It enjoins speakers to minimize what they say when their hearers are able to use contextually accessible information to enrich the informational content of their utterances. Conversely, it enjoins hearers to amplify or enrich the informational content of the speaker's utterance up to the point that they judge is the speaker's intended meaning. Since 'and' is the sort of minimal, unmarked expression that calls for a stereotypical interpretation, conjunctions such as (1) and (2) will be given an interpretation according to which the events described by the two conjuncts are temporally ordered. The net effect is that (3) and (4) will be understood to express (3′) and (4′) respectively.

Not everyone would agree that in (3) and (4) we have pragmatic intrusion into truth-conditional content. Cohen (1971) appeals to examples of embedded conjunctions that seem to affect the truth-conditions of the larger sentences in which they are embedded to argue for a **semantic ambiguity** account of 'and.' If the suggestion of temporal ordering associated with (1) affects the truth-conditions of (3), Cohen

concludes that this feature must be part of the semantically encoded meaning of 'and.' Since relations other than temporal ordering can be suggested by a conjunction, this view is committed to a multiple ambiguity account of 'and.' In addition to conjunctions such as (1) and (2), consider examples such as:

(5) It is summer in Europe and winter in Australia.

(6) The fan turned on and {as a result} a cool breeze blew through the room.

(7) Peter took a shower and {while in the shower} he practiced his singing.

In some cases, as in example (5), 'and' expresses simple truth-functional 'and,' and the conjuncts can be reversed without changing the meaning. In others, such as (6), it expresses a causal relation 'and as a result,' or, as in (7), a temporal containment relation 'and while.' In these last two cases, the relations are asymmetric, and reversing the conjuncts changes the meaning. For instance, reversing (6) suggests a different causal scenario, where the breeze somehow turns on the fan. Examples could be multiplied, and for each case where a different relation is suggested, Cohen would have to posit yet another meaning for 'and.'

Carston (1988) and Recanati (1989) argue against positing a semantic ambiguity for 'and,' maintaining instead that the contents represented between brackets in the above examples are **pragmatically determined aspects of what is said**. (See entry on **Pragmatic Determinants of What Is Said**.) Rather than being semantically ambiguous, 'and' is **semantically underspecified**. It will be pragmatically enriched in different ways, depending on the assumptions that are operative in the conversational context.

Carston and Recanati agree with Levinson that there is pragmatic intrusion. However, they point to embedded contexts, like the conditionals (3) and (4), to argue that the pragmatic content associated with (1) and (2) belongs to what is said, rather than being conversationally implicated. (Carston (2002) prefers to use Sperber and Wilson's (1986) technical term 'explicature' instead of the term 'what is said,' since the latter has a commonsense usage that interferes with attempts at terminological regimentation.) If the pragmatic content of a simple sentence has an effect on the truth-conditional content of the compound sentences in which it is embedded, then that pragmatic content is part of what is said by the simple sentence, not something that is merely implicated. Recanati calls this the Scope Test.

Other tests have been proposed for determining whether some pragmatically determined content is part of what is said. Recanati (1989) proposes his Availability Principle, according to which any content

that intuitively seems to affect truth-conditions should be regarded as a part of what is said. Carston (1988) proposes her Functional Independence Principle, which requires both explicatures and implicatures to occupy independent roles in inferential interactions with other assumptions. Take example (8) discussed below. The simple encoded content that Mary engaged in an act of swallowing is not functionally independent of the enriched content that Mary swallowed a bug. The latter entails the former, and it is from the latter that further contextual effects can be derived. This suggests that it is the enriched content that corresponds to what is said, not the more minimal encoded content, which has no autonomous role to play.

Explicatures are pragmatic developments of semantically encoded content and can be either **enrichments** or **loosenings** of encoded content. Carston argues that the processes involved in the recovery of explicatures are inferential processes and, hence, no different from the sorts of inferential processes involved in the derivation of conversational implicatures. What distinguish explicatures from implicatures are not the sorts of processes involved in their derivation but the starting points of these inferential processes. Derivations of explicatures begin with the semantically underspecified representations of logical form (LF) that are the output of processes of grammatical decoding. Implicatures, on the other hand, as Grice insisted, are contextual implications that follow from contexts including assumptions about what was said (i.e., including explicatures). This is **not** a commitment to the claim that explicatures are processed before implicatures. In fact, Carston thinks that the processing of explicatures and implicatures happens in parallel, and that the overall interpretation of a speaker's utterance is something arrived at via a process of mutual adjustment.

Recanati, on the other hand, distinguishes local from global pragmatic processes. The sorts of processes involved in the derivation of pragmatic determinants of what is said are of the local sort and are noninferential. For instance, such local processes might involve spreading activation within an associative conceptual network, or the accessing of stereotypical information from conceptual frames or scripts. Such processing happens at a subconscious level, and only the output of such processes is consciously available. In contrast, global pragmatic processes are inferential processes of the sort that Grice claimed are involved in the derivation of conversational implicatures. Such inferential processing is in principle consciously available, in the sense that language users can become aware not just of the conclusions of such reasoning but also of the inputs to such reasoning,

as well as to the (putative) fact that premises and conclusions are inferentially connected.

Bach (1994) provides yet another perspective on these matters. Bach wishes to maintain a more minimalist conception of semantics and of what is said. Yet he acknowledges that there are pragmatically determined contents that are not Gricean implicatures. He introduces a third category of contents, intermediate between what is said and what is implicated, that he labels 'implicitures.' He regards these as contents that are implicit in what is said and that require pragmatic processes of either **completion** or **expansion** to be made explicit. Consider the following, where the content in brackets is supplied from contextually available information:

(8) Mary swallowed {the bug that flew into her mouth}.

(9) Mary invited everyone {in her department} to her wedding.

The sentence 'Mary swallowed' is syntactically and semantically complete. (Compare it to 'Mary ate,' which is syntactically but not semantically complete, since 'eat' is a two-place relation. Or to 'Mary devoured,' which is neither syntactically nor semantically complete, since 'to devour' subcategorizes for an obligatory second NP, and 'devour' has two semantic arguments). Bach regards (8) as an example of **conceptual** incompleteness, and hence a pragmatic process of completion must operate, resulting in the derivation of the impliciture that Mary swallowed the bug that flew into her mouth.

On the other hand, 'Mary invited everyone to her wedding' expresses a complete proposition. Bach calls this a **minimal proposition,** since the domain of the quantifier is not restricted in any way (beyond the restriction to persons that is encoded by 'one' in 'everyone'). However, this minimal proposition is not the one that the speaker intends to communicate. A pragmatic process of expansion is required, yielding the impliciture that Mary invited everyone in her department to her wedding. Bach calls examples such as (9) cases of **sentence nonliterality**. No expression in the sentence is used nonliterally, yet the minimal proposition expressed by the sentence is not what the speaker intends to convey.

Bach denies that there are pragmatically determined aspects of what is said. What is said for Bach is a more minimal notion, which is tied to explicitly encoded semantic content. Bach in effect accepts what Carston (1988) calls the Linguistic Direction Principle. The only contextually determined content that belongs to what is said by the utterance of a sentence is content that corresponds to some element that is syntactically realized in that sentence. Thus the contextual values of the indexicals in 'She is swallowing now' will be part of what is said by an utterance of this sentence, but the implicit content that specifies what was swallowed (if anything) will not be a part of what is said, since that content corresponds to no element in the sentence. Bach's minimalism requires him to admit that on some occasions what a speaker says does not correspond to a complete proposition. Such is the case in example (8) above. In such cases Bach argues that what is said corresponds to a 'propositional radical,' a gappy object whose missing conceptual elements must be supplied by the context.

Each of the authors discussed above posits a different view of the boundary between semantics and pragmatics. According to Grice, sentence meaning, truth-conditional content, and what is said are all aligned and fall on the side of semantics, whereas implicatures fall on the side of pragmatics. Cohen basically preserves Grice's dichotomy. Cases that may seem to be pragmatic intrusions into truth-conditional content are instead incorporated into semantics. If there is a challenge to Grice it is simply that some phenomena that Grice would label as conversational implicatures are reanalyzed by Cohen as part of semantically encoded content, so that the domain of pragmatics shrinks.

Subsequent views can all in one way or another be seen to challenge Grice's neat dichotomy. Bach remains the most faithful to Grice, since on the whole he preserves the alignment of sentence meaning, truth-conditional content, and what is said on the side of semantics. Truth-conditional content may sometimes come apart from what is said, in those cases in which what is said is conceptually incomplete and hence does not correspond to a complete, truth-evaluable proposition. But when we have truth-conditional content, it is something that is delivered purely by semantics. However, Bach argues that Grice's view of what lies on the side of pragmatics is inadequate. The phenomena of semantic underspecification and sentence nonliterality require us to recognize a category of pragmatic content intermediate between what is said and what is implicated – the category of implicitures.

Levinson's (1995, 2000) views are also quite close to Grice's. He accepts that sentence meaning and what is said line up, and that these are semantic phenomena. However, he allows that there can be pragmatic intrusion into truth-conditional content, so this notion is not a purely semantic notion. On the other hand, Levinson's conception of pragmatics is conservative. He does not challenge the adequacy of the Gricean conception of pragmatics as the domain of conversational implicatures. He does, however, develop Grice's notion of a generalized

conversational implicature (GCI) to a substantial degree. GCIs are said to be default meanings, which belong to a third level of meaning that Levinson calls utterance-level meaning, different from either sentence meaning or speaker meaning. It is only GCIs that are involved in pragmatic intrusion.

Carston's and Recanati's challenges to Grice are more radical. For them, the only purely semantic notion is sentence or expression meaning. What is said (which is equated with truth-conditional content) falls on the side of pragmatics, since there is pragmatic intrusion into truth-conditional content. (Remember, Carston prefers the term 'explicature.') Carston (2002) suggests that we make a distinction between lexical and truth-conditional semantics. Lexical semantics studies those aspects of meaning that have some sort of syntactic reflex in the language and hence that are a part of the mental lexicon. The lexicon is a store of words in long-term memory. An entry in the mental lexicon is in effect a rule correlating the phonological, syntactic, and semantic information associated with a word. Lexical semantics on this conception is a mentalist enterprise. We can continue to talk of truth-conditional semantics, so long as we realize that the project is very different from the traditional one. Truth-conditions are not assigned directly to the sentences of a language, since sentences by themselves do not have truth-conditions. It is only sentences as used by speakers in particular conversational contexts that have truth-conditions. For a defense of a similar claim, see Stainton (2000).

Moreover, both Carston and Recanati reject Gricean pragmatics as inadequate, since for them pragmatics is not confined to the study of conversational implicatures. Recanati's rejection of Gricean pragmatics may be the most thoroughgoing, since for him, the pragmatic processes involved in the recovery of what is said are not even of the same type as the global pragmatic processes involved in the recovery of implicatures. They are noninferential processes.

Many other voices have been added to this debate. For example, Stainton (1995) argues for the view that semantic underspecification and pragmatic intrusion is rife. He points to the fact that many utterances are of sentence fragments, rather than of complete sentences. Consider:

(10) Top shelf.

Suppose Mary is making herself a sandwich and is rooting around in the kitchen cupboard looking for jam to spread on her toast, and that this is mutually manifest to Mary and her husband Peter. Peter could utter sentence fragment (10), meaning to convey the proposition that the jam that Mary is looking for is on the top shelf of the cupboard she is searching in. Stainton argues that cases such as these are not to be treated as cases of ellipsis. The missing content in (10) need not correspond to any well-defined syntactic element, as happens in standard cases of syntactic ellipsis, such as the VP-ellipsis in 'Mary donated blood and so did Peter.' (Ellipsis is a very vexed subject. Whether it is something that can be handled in the syntax is not at all clear. See Jackendoff, 1997: 75–78, for a discussion of some problematic cases.) We should accept that language understanding is able to proceed on the basis of fragmentary clues from semantically decoded content. A large burden is placed on the inferential capacities of hearers, who must elaborate these clues on the basis of contextually available information.

Stanley (2002) argues for a diametrically opposed view. According to Stanley, there is much more syntactic and semantic structure than meets the eye, and many of the alleged cases of semantic underdetermination calling for pragmatic enrichment can be reanalyzed as cases where some hidden element in the underlying sentential structure is directing the process of content retrieval. In other words, we preserve the idea of the linguistic direction of content, although the elements doing the directing are often hidden elements (ones that are not phonetically realized, although they are a part of underlying logical form).

Stanley's views have been especially influential in accounting for cases of quantifier domain restriction, such as (9) above or (11) below:

(11) Every child has been vaccinated against polio.

(12) In every country, every child has been vaccinated against polio.

It is possible to use (11) in an appropriate context to convey the proposition that every child **in the United States** has been vaccinated against polio. Stanley's view is that there must be a hidden free variable in (11) whose value is specified in that context as the United States. This variable is present in the underlying logical form of (11) but is not phonetically realized. (Strictly speaking, what is implicit is a free **function** variable, and what must be specified in context is both the function and the values of the arguments of this function. In (11) the function is something like 'resident-in(x).') The evidence that there is a hidden free variable in (11) is that this variable can sometimes be bound by a quantifier. For example, when (11) is embedded in a sentence with a quantifier that has wide scope over the embedded quantifier, as is the case in (12), what is said is that in every country x, every child *in x* has been vaccinated. For more detailed arguments, both pro and con, see Stanley and Szabó (2000), Bach (2000)

and Neale (2000). This hidden indexical view has consequences for the quantificational analysis of definite descriptions and has led to some controversy as to the correct analysis of so-called incomplete descriptions. See the chapters in Part I of Reimer & Bezuidenhout (2004).

The Mentalist Picture of the Semantics-Pragmatics Boundary

It was noted above that many philosophers follow Frege in rejecting mentalist semantics. Many linguists on the other hand embrace mentalism, and in fact regard it as the only sensible perspective from which to study language. See Chomsky (2000), Jackendoff (1997, 2002). From the point of view of mentalism, the dispute about the semantics-pragmatics boundary is not one about how to delineate the notions of explicature, impliciture, implicature, etc. Rather, it is concerned with the question as to how semantic and pragmatic knowledge are represented and organized in the human mind/brain and how this information is combined in the course of on-line production and comprehension of language. Several of the authors discussed above straddle the divide between philosophy and linguistics. Carston, for instance, works in the mentalist tradition. She is concerned to offer a mentalist theory of language **performance**. (So the suggestion made at the outset that semantics is concerned with competence and pragmatics with performance is one that Carston would reject.) On the other hand, although she is interested in articulating a cognitive theory of performance, she has also been an active contributor to the philosophical debate about how to delineate what is said from what is conversationally implied.

Within the mentalist framework, the dominant picture of the semantics-pragmatics interface has been that it is the interface between the language system proper and what Chomsky (1995) calls the conceptual-intentional system. From the comprehension perspective, this interface is where the output from the hearer's language system, namely a representation of the logical form (LF) of the speaker's utterance, is interpreted by processing it in the context of currently active pragmatic information, including information about the speaker's likely communicative intentions. From the production perspective, this interface is where the process of giving expression to a speaker's communicative intentions is initiated. Appropriate lexical-conceptual entries in the speaker's mental lexicon are accessed, thus initiating a process that will ultimately result in the output of an appropriate phonetic form (PF) at the interface between the language system and the articulatory system.

Jackendoff (1997, 2002) challenges this Chomskyan view while remaining within the mentalist camp. He argues that the language system has a tripartite parallel architecture. There are three independent generative systems or modules, the phonological system, the syntactic system, and the conceptual system. Each contains its own compositional rules and proprietary set of representations, of, respectively, phonological structure (PS), syntactic structure (SS), and conceptual structure (CS). However, it is necessary for these systems to communicate with one another, and they do this via various interface modules, whose job it is to map representations from one system into the representations of another. There is a PS-SS interface, an SS-CS interface (which Jackendoff calls the syntax-semantics interface), and a PS-CS interface. The lexicon is also an interface module, and the interfaces already mentioned are in effect parts of this larger interface system. The lexicon is a long-term memory store whose entries are triples of the three sorts of structures mentioned, namely of PS, SS, and CS. The lexical entry for expression α, $<PS_\alpha, SS_\alpha, CS_\alpha>$, is in essence a correspondence rule mapping representations from the three systems into each other. (Lexical entries may be for words, for phrases, such as idioms, or for expressions below the word level, such as agreement markers.)

What Jackendoff calls the syntax-semantics interface (namely the SS-CS interface) is of relevance to the current discussion, since he justifies his claim that CS is the level of semantics, and that it is a level separate from syntax, by appeal to phenomena of the sort that Carston, Recanati, and others appeal to in arguing for pragmatic intrusion into what is said (i.e., into the proposition expressed by an utterance). Jackendoff (1997) argues for what he calls enriched semantic composition. At the level of CS, the compositional principles that form propositions (or thoughts) are sensitive to information that comes from the pragmatic context. But not all this conceptual structure is reflected in the corresponding syntactic structures. Consider the following:

(13) Peter kept crossing the street.
(14) Mary finished the book.
(15) The ham sandwich wants his check.

(13) illustrates the process of aspectual coercion, (14) of co-composition, and (15) of pragmatic transfer. See Pustejovsky (1995) for an account of the first two processes and Nunberg (1979) for an account of the third.

A single act of crossing the street is not a repetitive and (potentially) open-ended action like clapping one's hands or bouncing or spinning a ball. But 'kept' requires such repetitiveness and/or open-endedness. Thus, in the case of (13), 'kept' coerces an interpretation of 'crossing the street' according to which there is either a repeated or an extended action. That is, either we understand Peter to have crossed the street multiple times, perhaps in his effort to lose the detective tailing him. Alternatively, we zoom in on Peter's action of crossing the street and see it as one whose end point is still in Peter's future. Perhaps the street is a very broad one, with a median strip, where Peter pauses briefly before continuing with his crossing.

In the case of (14), finishing is something that can be predicated of an event, but 'the book' refers to an object, not an event. Pustejovsky (1995) argues that the lexical-conceptual entry for 'book' contains information about the typical features of books, namely that they have authors, are read by readers, etc. This conceptual information, presumably along with other contextual information, can be used to arrive at an enriched interpretation of (14) according to which Mary finished reading (or writing, or binding, or illustrating, etc.) the book. In the case of (15), contextual knowledge about restaurants and what goes on in them is used to arrive at an interpretation according to which the ham sandwich orderer wants his check.

In all these cases Jackendoff argues that there is more conceptual (semantic) structure than is represented syntactically. Some will be inclined to argue that there must be covert syntactic structure to match the semantic structure – structure that is there but is not phonetically realized. But Jackendoff argues that this is a mistake. Those who argue for covert structure are in the grip of an assumption that he calls syntactocentricism, namely the view that the only source of compositional structure is syntax. This is an assumption he attributes to Chomsky, since it is built into all the theories of the organization of the language system that Chomsky has proposed, from the Standard Theory of the 1960s, through the extended and revised versions of the Standard Theory in the 1970s, to the Government and Binding (GB) approach of the early 1980s and the minimalist approach of the 1990s. But Jackendoff's account of the tripartite parallel architecture of the language system rejects this assumption.

Moreover, Jackendoff goes further and argues that it is a mistake to talk of **any** semantic structure being directly encoded in the syntax, as Chomsky seems to suggest when he introduces the level of logical form (LF) and talks of it as the level in syntax that directly represents meaning (Chomsky, 1986: 68). It is

unnecessary and perhaps even incoherent to talk in this way. First, it is unnecessary, since the correspondence rules belonging to the syntax-semantics interface (the SS-CS interface) will do the work of correlating syntactic and semantic structures. Note also that the correspondence doesn't have to be perfect. There may be only a partial homology between these two systems. If the communicative system as a whole works in such a way that semantic structure is recoverable from readily available contextual knowledge, then the fact that some of this structure is invisible to the syntactic system is no bad thing.

Second, talk of semantic structure being encoded in syntax may be incoherent if that is allowed to mean that semantic distinctions are directly represented in the syntactic system. The syntactic system is a module whose internal operations are defined over representations in its own proprietary code. So the syntactic system knows about nouns and verbs, case markings, active and passive constructions, WH-movement, etc., not about objects and events, predicate-argument structure, the telic/atelic distinction, thematic roles, etc. Thus it could not represent the sort of pragmatic knowledge needed to interpret examples such as (13)–(15).

As already mentioned, Carston accepts Chomsky's picture, including the assumption of syntactocentricism. She holds that the output from the language system is a representation of LF, which includes those semantic features that are directly syntactically encoded. Earlier we saw her acceptance of the idea that lexical semantics is the study of such encoded aspects of meaning. So, for her, the SS-CS interface would be better called the semantics-pragmatics interface, not the syntax-semantics interface. This makes it seem that her views are very far from those of Jackendoff. Yet Carston's notion of pragmatic enrichment and Jackendoff's notion of enriched composition are very similar.

Jackendoff (2002: 273) does briefly allude to what he might call the semantics-pragmatics interface. It turns out to be an interface level between two sub-levels **within** the conceptual system. It is the level that integrates thoughts that are conveyed by means of language with one's previous knowledge, including knowledge of the communicative context and the speaker's intentions. Such integration may lead one to inferentially derive further thoughts (i.e., Gricean implicatures). In other words, Jackendoff's conception is basically the Gricean conception that is rejected by Carston, since it confines pragmatics to the derivation of implicatures, whereas Carston thinks pragmatic processes are also involved in the enrichment of lexical concepts (encoded meanings) to

arrive at ad hoc concepts (contextualized meanings). Of course, Jackendoff can use terminology in the way he pleases. However, to make it clearer that his views are in fact very close to those of Carston, it might be more appropriate to relabel Jackendoff's SS-CS interface the syntax-**pragmatics** interface.

This does of course still leave some disagreements unsettled. In particular, it leaves unsettled the issue of syntactocentrism and the debate as to whether there is a specifically linguistic part of semantics, separate from nonlinguistic knowledge, thought, and contextualized meaning. (See Jackendoff, 2002: 281–293, for reasons to deny that there is any such level of semantics.)

See also: Cooperative Principle; Grice, Herbert Paul; Metaphor: Philosophical Theories; Morris, Charles; Pragmatic Determinants of What Is Said; Speech Acts.

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Shared Knowledge

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What is it to know a proposition? A person A knows that proposition p if and only if (iff):

> A believes that p;
> A is justified in believing that p;
> p is true.

So there are three clauses that must be satisfied for a state of knowledge to be correctly ascribed to A. To explicate each of the three clauses would be a Herculean task, for the first clause would require a theory of propositional attitudes, the second clause would require a theory on what counts as appropriate justification for a belief, and the third clause requires a theory of truth. We accept, without making a real effort to justify it, the idea that for A to believe a proposition p is to be in a mental state that is likely to influence A's conduct; we also accept that a person has appropriate justification for a belief if he or she has canonical evidence guiding him or her toward ascertaining the truth; we accept that a proposition p is true if the world conforms to some mental state p or some fact p or if p is a proposition accepted by convention or stipulation within a certain society.

Having defined knowledge in this way, we are able to refute the skeptics and in particular to counter the skeptics' attacks on shared knowledge. From the fact that knowledge can be revised, we should not deduce that there is no knowledge or no shared knowledge.

What is shared knowledge? An intuitive definition could be one like the following: two persons, A and B, share knowledge of a proposition p iff they both know that p and if they both know that the other knows that p and that B knows that A knows that B knows that p and A knows that B knows that A knows that p. In other words, shared knowledge is not just knowledge on A's part that the other person, B, knows a proposition p that A also knows, but also knowledge that the other person knows that A knows that p. The definition does not necessarily generate

infinite recursion; a regress of the second or third order may suffice for the purpose of practical understanding. In any case, even infinite recursion can be finitely represented, albeit not at the conscious level (a simple mathematical example is the case of recursion in 3.3 periodical).

How can shared knowledge be obtained? Shared knowledge can be constructed through shared perceptual stimuli or through publicly vocalized utterances. Suppose you and I stand in front of the Statue of Liberty in New York City: both of us see the imposing statue, and there is little doubt that it does not escape our attention; we are confronted with something that we cannot but see. Shared knowledge can also be constructed linguistically, by referring to an authority, or in general, to human linguistic productions.

Of course, shared knowledge is a testable assumption; one assumes it to be present unless there are overwhelming reasons for doubting that things are as they are assumed to be. It is possible, albeit unlikely, that you are momentarily blinded, that I do not realize that fact, and that I erroneously assume that you know that the Statue of Liberty is there in front of you; however, this assumption can easily be tested by analyzing your reply (or absence of reply) to my casual remark, as when I say "That statue is impressive"; in the absence of an appropriate reply, I realize that the presumption of shared knowledge was not justified. But this is not the way we standardly proceed. We just assume that salient visual (and other) stimuli are part of our shared knowledge, and we do not put this assumption to the test.

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Takesi Sibata was born in Nagoya, Japan on July 14, 1918. He graduated from the University of Tokyo with an M.A. in 1942 and received his D.Litt. in 1969 from the same university. He was a professor at Tokyo University of Foreign Studies from 1964 to 1968 and then became professor at his alma mater in 1968, where he was chairman of the Department of Linguistics from 1969 to 1978 and remained there until his retirement in 1979. He received the title of Professor Emeritus of the University of Tokyo in 1987.

His major fields include Turkish, linguistic geography, sociolinguistics, onomastics, and Japanese lexicology. He worked for the National Institute for Japanese Language Research from 1949 to 1964. His major work there was the preparation of the massive *Nihon Gengo Chizu* (*Japanese Linguistic Atlas*), which was published in six volumes from 1966 to 1975. Parallel with this work, he carried out other intensive fieldwork on linguistic geography in Itoigawa area, Niigata Prefecture, with several collaborators. The unique feature of the survey was a microscopic survey of every inhabitant in the area. Through the analysis of the survey, he developed an original method of linguistic geography, the outline of which can be seen in Sibata (1969). The publication of the whole work was completed in the form of Sibata (1988–1995).

In the field of sociolinguistics, he put forward a new point of view from which to survey people's verbal behavior in every aspect of everyday life: when and how people speak, listen, write, read, and keep silent. This whole complex of activities is called in Japanese *gengo seikatsu*, which literally means 'verbal life'.

Sibata has also contributed greatly to the development of Japanese lexicology and lexicography. He produced three volumes on the semantic analysis of basic Japanese words with other colleagues. He is a co-editor of several Japanese dictionaries, and was especially responsible for the description of word accents and the meaning of loanwords. Since 1966, he has been a member of the Committee for Japanese for Broadcasting at Nihon Hoso Kyokai (Japanese Broadcasting Corporation) and a member of the government committee for Japanese language policy. He also served as a member of the Japan Academic Association from 1988 to 1994.

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Sign Language: Overview

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In many ways, sign languages are like spoken languages: They are natural languages that arise spontaneously wherever there is a community of communicators; they effectively fulfill all the social and mental functions of spoken languages; and they are acquired without instruction by children, given normal exposure and interaction. These characteristics have led many linguists to expect sign languages to be similar to spoken languages in significant ways. However, sign languages are different too: As manual–visual languages, sign languages exploit a completely different physical medium from the vocal–auditory system of spoken languages. These two dramatically different physical modalities are also likely to have an effect on the structure of the languages through which they are transmitted.

It is of special interest, then, to compare natural languages in the two modalities. Where the two systems converge, universal linguistic properties are revealed. Where they diverge, the physical medium

of transmission is implicated, and its contribution to the form of language in both modalities is illuminated. Neither can be seen quite so clearly if linguists restrict their study to spoken language alone (or to sign language alone). For this and other related reasons, it is often remarked that sign languages provide us with a natural laboratory for studying the basic characteristics of all human language.

Once the existence of natural language in a second modality is acknowledged, questions such as the following arise: How are such languages born? Are the central linguistic properties of sign languages parallel to those of spoken languages? Is sign language acquired by children in the same stages and time frame as spoken language? Are the same areas of the brain responsible for language in both modalities? What role does modality play in structuring language? In other words, within the architecture of human cognition, do we find the structure of one language 'faculty' or two? Although there is no conclusive answer to this deceptively simple question, an impressive body of research has greatly expanded our understanding of the issues underlying it.

How Do Sign Languages 'Happen'?

Evolution made language possible scores of millennia ago, and there is no human community without it. What sign language teaches us is that humans have a natural propensity for language in two different modalities: vocal–auditory and manual–visual. Since the human ability to use language is so old, and since speech is the predominant medium for its transmission, it seems that spoken languages are either also very old or descended from other languages with a long history. However, sign languages do not have the same histories as spoken languages because special conditions are required for them to arise and persevere, and for this reason they can offer unique insight into essential features of human language.

The first lesson sign language teaches us is that, given a community of humans, language inevitably emerges. Although we have no direct evidence of the emergence of any spoken language, we can get much closer to the origin of a sign language and, in rare instances, even watch it come into being.

Wherever deaf people have an opportunity to gather and interact regularly, a sign language is born. Typically, deaf people make up a very small percentage of the population (approximately 0.23% in the United States, according to the National Center for Health Statistics, 1994) so that in any given local social group, there may be no deaf people at all or very few of them. The most common setting in which a deaf community can form, then, is a school for deaf children. Such schools only began to be established approximately 200 years ago in Europe and North America. On the basis of this historical information and some reported earlier observations of groups of people using sign language, it is assumed that the oldest extant sign languages do not date back farther than approximately 300 years (Woll *et al.*, 2001). Currently, linguists have the rare opportunity to observe the emergence and development of a sign language from the beginning in a school established in Nicaragua only approximately 25 years ago – an opportunity that is yielding very interesting results.

Graduates of such schools sometimes choose to concentrate in certain urban areas, and wider communities arise and grow, creating their own social networks, institutions, and art forms, such as visual poetry (Padden and Humphries, 2005; Sandler and Lillo-Martin, 2005; Sutton-Spence and Woll, 1999). Deaf society is highly developed in some places, and the term 'Deaf' with a capital D has come to refer to members of a minority community with its own language and culture rather than to people with an auditory deficit.

It is not only the genesis of a sign language that is special; the way in which it is passed down from generation to generation is unusual as well. Typically, fewer than 10% of deaf children acquire sign language from deaf parents, and of those deaf parents, only a small percentage are native signers. The other 90+% of deaf children have hearing parents and may only be exposed to a full sign language model when they go to school. These social conditions taken together with certain structural properties of sign languages have prompted some linguists to compare them to spoken creoles (Fischer, 1978).

Another way in which a deaf social group and concomitant sign language can form is through the propagation of a genetic trait within a small village or town through consanguineous marriage, resulting in a proportionately high incidence of deafness and the spread of the sign language among both deaf and hearing people. Potentially, this kind of situation can allow us to observe the genesis and development of a language in a natural community setting. Although the existence of such communities has been reported occasionally (see Groce, 1985), no comprehensive linguistic description of a language arising in such a community has been provided.

These, then, are the ways in which sign languages happen. The existence of many sign languages throughout the world – the number 103 found in the Ethnologue database is probably an underestimate – confirms the claim that the emergence of a highly structured communication system among humans is

inevitable. If the oral–aural channel is unavailable, language springs forth in the manual–visual modality.

Not only does such a system emerge in the absence of audition, but its kernels can be also observed even in the absence of both a community and a language model. Deaf children who live in hearing households in which only oral language is used, who have not yet experienced speech training, and thus have no accessible language model, devise their own systematic means of communication called home sign, studied in exquisite detail by Goldin-Meadow and colleagues (Goldin-Meadow, 2003). The gesture talk of these children contains the unmistakable imprint of a real linguistic system, and as such it offers a unique display of the fundamental human genius for language.

At the same time, the form and content of home sign are rudimentary and do not approach the richness and complexity of a language used by a community, spoken or signed. This confronts us with another important piece of information: Language as we know it is a social phenomenon. Although each brain possesses the potential for language, it takes more than one brain to create a complex linguistic system.

The Linguistic Structure of Sign Language

Hearing people use gesture, pantomime, and facial expression to augment spoken language. Naturally, the ingredients of these forms of expression are available to sign languages too. The apparent familiarity of the raw material that contributes to the formation of sign languages has led many a naïve observer to the mistaken assumption that sign languages are actually simple gesture systems. However, instead of forming an idiosyncratic, ancillary system like the one that accompanies speech, these basic ingredients contribute to a primary linguistic system in the creation of a sign language, a system with many of the same properties found in spoken languages. In fact, linguistic research has demonstrated that there are universal organizing principles that transcend the physical modality, subsuming spoken and signed languages alike.

The Phonology of Sign Language

William Stokoe (1960) demonstrated that the signs of American Sign Language (ASL) are not gestures: They are not holistic icons. Instead, Stokoe showed that they are composed of a finite list of contrastive meaningless units like the phonemes of spoken languages. These units combine in constrained ways to create the words of the language. Although there are some differences among different sign languages in their phonological inventories and constraints, there are many common properties, and the generalizations

presented here hold across sign languages, unless otherwise indicated.

Stokoe established three major phonological categories: hand shape, location, and movement. Each specification within each of the three major categories was treated as a phoneme in Stokoe's work. Later researchers accepted these categories but proposed that the specifications within each category function not as phonemes but as phonological features. The ASL signs SICK and TOUCH, illustrated in **Figure 1**, have the same hand shape and the same straight movement. They are distinguished by location only: The location for SICK is the head, whereas the location for TOUCH is the nondominant hand. Minimal pairs such as this one, created by differences in one feature only, exist for the features of hand shape and movement as well. Although the origins of these and other (but certainly not all) signs may have been holistic gestures, they have evolved into words in which each formational element is contrastive but meaningless in itself.

Two other defining properties of phonological systems exist in sign languages as well: constraints on the combination of phonological elements and rules that systematically alter their form. One phonological constraint on the form of a (monomorphemic) sign concerns the set of two-handed signs. If both hands are involved, and if both hands also move in producing the sign (unlike TOUCH, in which only one hand moves), then the two hands must have the same hand shape and the same (or mirror) location and movement (Battison, 1978). An example is DROP, shown in **Figure 2B**: Both hands move, and they are identical in all other respects as well. The second defining property, changes in the underlying phonological form of a sign, is exemplified by hand shape assimilation in compounds. In one lexicalized version of the ASL compound, MIND + DROP = FAINT, the hand shape of the first member, MIND, undergoes total assimilation to the hand shape of the second member, DROP, as shown in **Figure 2**.

Figure 1 ASL minimal pair distinguished by a location feature. (A) SICK and (B) TOUCH.

Figure 2 Hand configuration assimilation in the ASL compound. (A) MIND + (B) DROP = (C) FAINT.

Figure 3 The canonical form of a sign. From Sandler (1989).

Stokoe believed that hand shapes, locations, and movements cooccur simultaneously in signs, an internal organization that differs from the sequentiality of consonants and vowels in spoken language. Liddell (1984) took exception to that view, showing that there is phonologically significant sequentiality in this structure. Sandler (1989) further refined that position, arguing that the locations (L) and movement (M) within a sign are sequentially ordered, whereas the hand configuration (HC) is autosegmentally associated to these elements – typically, one hand configuration (i.e., one hand shape with its orientation) to a sign, as shown in the representation in **Figure 3**. The first location of the sign TOUCH in **Figure 1B**, for example, is a short distance above the nondominant hand, the movement is a straight path, and the second location is in contact with the nondominant hand. The hand shape of the whole sign is ✿.

Under assimilation, as in **Figure 2**, the HC of the second member of the compound spreads regressively to the first member in a way that is temporally autonomous with respect to the Ls and Ms, manifesting the autosegmental property of stability (Goldsmith, 1979). The sequential structure of signs is still a good deal more limited than that of words in most spoken languages, however, usually conforming to this canonical LML form even when the signs are morphologically complex (Sandler, 1993).

Morphology

All established sign languages studied to date, like the overwhelming majority of spoken languages, have complex morphology. First, as shown in **Figure 2**, compounding is very common. In addition, some sign languages have a limited number of sequential affixes. For example, Israeli Sign Language (ISL) has a derivational negative suffix, similar in meaning to English -*less*, that was grammaticalized from a free word glossed NOT-EXIST. This suffix has two allomorphs, depending on the phonological form of the base, illustrated in **Figure 4**. If the base is two-handed, so is the suffix, whereas one-handed bases trigger the one-handed allomorph of the suffix.

Sign languages typically have a good deal of complex morphology, but most of it is not sequential like the examples in **Figures 3** and **4**. Instead, signs gain morphological complexity by simultaneously incorporating morphological elements (Fischer and Gough, 1978). The prototypical example, first described in detail in ASL (Padden, 1988) but apparently found in all established sign languages, is verb agreement. This inflectional system is prototypical not only because of the simultaneity of structure involved but also because of its use of space as a grammatical organizing property.

The system relies on the establishment of referential loci – points on the body or in space that refer to referents in a discourse – that might be thought of as the scaffolding of the system. In **Figure 5**, loci for first person and third person are established.

In the class of verbs that undergoes agreement, the agreement markers correspond to referential loci established in the discourse. Through movement of the hand from one locus to the other, the subject is marked on the first location of the verb and the object on the second. **Figure 6A** shows agreement for the ASL agreeing verb, ASK, where the subject is first person and the object is third person. **Figure 6B** shows the opposite: third person subject and first person object. The requirement that verb agreement must refer independently to the first and last locations in a sign was one of the motivations for Liddell's (1984) claim that signs have sequential structure.

Although each verb in **Figure 6** includes three morphemes, each still conforms to the canonical LML form shown in **Figure 3**. The agreement markers are

Figure 4 Allomorphs of an ISL suffix. (A) IMPORTANT-NOT-EXIST (without importance). (B) INTERESTING-NOT-EXIST (without interest).

Figure 5 Referential loci. (A) First person. (B) Third person.

Figure 6 Verb agreement. (A) 'I ask him/her.' (B) 's/he asks me.'

encoded without sequential affixation. Sign language verb agreement is a linguistic system, crucially entailing such grammatical concepts as coreference, subject and object, and singular and plural. It is also characterized by sign language-specific properties, such as the restriction of agreement to a particular class of verbs (Padden, 1988), identified mainly on semantic grounds (Meir, 2002).

Another productive inflectional morphological system found across sign languages is temporal and other aspectual marking, in which the duration of Ls and Ms, the shape of the movement path, or both may be altered, and the whole form may be reduplicated, to produce a range of aspects, such as durational, continuative, and iterative (Klima and Bellugi, 1979). This system has templatic characteristics, lending itself to an analysis that assumes CV-like LM templates and nonlinear associations of the kind McCarthy (1981) proposed for Semitic languages (Sandler, 1989, 1990).

Figure 4 demonstrated that some limited sequential affixation exists in sign languages. However, the most common form of sign language words by far, whether simple or complex, is LML (setting aside gemination of Ls and Ms in the aspectual system, which adds duration but not segmental content). In fact, even lexicalized compounds such as the one shown in **Figure 2** often reduce to this LML form. If movement (M) corresponds to a syllable nucleus in sign language, as Perlmutter (1992), Brentari (1998), and others have argued, then it appears that monosyllabicity is

ubiquitous in ASL (Coulter, 1982) and in other sign languages as well. In the midst of a morphological system with many familiar linguistic characteristics (e.g., compounding, derivational morphology, inflectional morphology, and allomorphy), we see in the specific preferred monosyllabic form of sign language words a clear modality effect (Sandler and Lillo-Martin, 2005).

No overview of sign language morphology would be complete without a description of the classifier subsystem. This subsystem is quintessentially 'sign language,' exploiting the expressive potential of two hands forming shapes and moving in space, and molding it into a linguistic system (Emmorey, 2003; Supalla, 1986). Sign languages use classifier constructions to combine physical properties of referents with the spatial relations among them and the shape and manner of movement they execute. In this subsystem, there is a set of hand shapes that classify referents in terms of their size and shape, semantic properties, or other characteristics in a classificatory system that is reminiscent of verbal classifiers found in a variety of spoken languages (Senft, 2002). These hand shapes are the classifiers that give the system its name. An example of a classifier construction is shown in **Figure 7**. It describes a situation in which a person is moving ahead, pulling a recalcitrant dog zigzagging behind. The ⑂ hand shape embodies an upright human classifier and the ⑃ hand shape a legged creature.

What is unusual about this subsystem is that each formational element – the hand shape, the location,

Figure 7 Classifier construction in ASL.

and the movement – has meaning. That is, each has morphological status. This makes the morphemes of classifier constructions somewhat anomalous since sign language lexicons are otherwise built of morphemes and words in which each of these elements is meaningless and has purely phonological status. Furthermore, constraints on the cooccurrence of these elements in other lexical forms do not hold on classifier constructions. In **Figure 7**, for example, the constraint on interaction of the two hands described in the section on phonology is violated. Zwitserlood (2003) suggested that each hand in such classifier constructions is articulating a separate verbal constituent, and that the two occur simultaneously – a natural kind of structure in sign language and found universally in them, but one that is inconceivable in spoken language. Once again, sign language presents a conventionalized system with linguistic properties, some familiar from spoken languages and some modality driven.

Syntax

As in other domains of linguistic investigation, the syntax of sign languages displays a large number of characteristics found universally in spoken languages. A key example is recursion – the potential to repeatedly apply the same rule to create sentences of ever increasing complexity – argued to be the quintessential linguistic property setting human language apart from all other animal communication systems (Hausser *et al.*, 2002). Specifically, through embedding or conjoining, recursion can result in sentences of potentially infinite length. These two different ways of creating complex sentences have been described and distinguished from one another in ASL. For example, a process that tags a pronoun that is coreferential with the subject of a clause onto the end of a sentence may copy the first subject in a string, only if the string contains an embedded clause, but not if the second clause is coordinate (Padden, 1988). In example (1), the subscripts stand for person indices

marked through verb agreement, and INDEX is a pointing pronominal form, here a pronoun copy of the matrix subject, MOTHER. (These grammatical devices were illustrated in **Figures 5** and **6**.)

(1a) MOTHER SINCE $_i$PERSUADE$_j$ SISTER
    $_j$COME$_i$ $_i$INDEX
    'My mother has been urging my sister to come and stay here, she (mother) has.'

(1b) * $_i$HIT$_j$ $_j$INDEX TATTLE MOTHER $_i$INDEX.
    'I hit him and he told his mother, I did.'

The existence of strict constraints on the relations among nonadjacent elements and their interpretation is a defining characteristic of syntax. A different category of constraints of this general type concerns movement of constituents from their base-generated position, such as the island constraints first put forward by Ross (1967) and later subsumed by more general constraints. One of these is the WH island constraint, prohibiting the movement of an element out of a clause with an embedded WH question. The sentence, *Lynn wonders [what Jan thinks]* is okay, but the sentence **It's Jan that Lynn wonders [what __ thinks]* is ruled out. Lillo-Martin (1991) demonstrated that ASL obeys the WH island constraint with the sentences shown in example (2). Given the relative freedom of word order often observed in sign languages such as ASL, it is significant that this variability is nevertheless restricted by universal syntactic constraints.

(2a) PRO DON'T-KNOW ['WHAT' MOTHER
    LIKE].
    'I don't know what Mom likes.'

    _____t
(2b) MOTHER, PRO DON'T KNOW ['WHAT'
    ____ LIKE].
    * 'As for Mom, I don't know what likes.'

The line over the word MOTHER in (2b) indicates a marker that is not formed with the hands, in this case a backward tilt of the head together with raised eyebrows, marking the constituent as a topic (t) in ASL. There are many such markers in sign languages, which draw from the universal pool of idiosyncratic facial expressions and body postures available to all human communicators. These expressions and postures become organized into a grammatical system in sign languages.

A Grammar of the Face

When language is not restricted to manipulations of the vocal tract and to auditory perception, it is free to recruit any parts of the body capable of rapid, variegated articulations that can be readily perceived and processed visually, and so it does. All established

sign languages that have been investigated use non-manual signals – facial expressions and head and body postures – grammatically. These expressions are fully conventionalized and their distribution is systematic.

Early research on ASL showed that certain facial articulations, typically of the mouth and lower face, function as adjectivals and as manner adverbials, the latter expressing such meanings as 'with relaxation and enjoyment' and 'carelessly' (Liddell, 1980). Other sign languages have been reported to use lower face articulations in similar ways. The specific facial expressions and their associated meanings vary from sign language to sign language. **Figure 8** gives examples of facial expressions of this type in ASL, ISL, and British Sign Language.

A different class of facial articulations, particularly of the upper face and head, predictably cooccur with specific constructions, such as yes/no questions, WH questions, and relative clauses in ASL and in many other sign languages. Examples from ISL shown in **Figure 9A** illustrate a yes/no question (raised brows, wide eyes, and head forward), **Figure 9B** a WH question (furrowed brows and head forward), and **Figure 9C** the facial expression systematically associated in that language with information designated as 'shared' for the purpose of the discourse (squinted eyes). Although some of these facial articulations may be common across sign languages (especially those accompanying yes/no and WH questions), these expressions are not iconic. Some researchers have proposed that they evolved from more general affective facial expressions associated with emotions. In sign languages, however, they are grammaticalized and formally distinguishable from the affective kind that signers, of course, also use (Reilly *et al.*, 1990).

Figure 8   Lower face articulations. (A) ASL 'with relaxation and enjoyment.' (B) ISL 'carefully.' (C) BSL 'exact.'

Figure 9   Upper face articulations. (A) yes/no question, (B) WH question, and (C) 'shared information.'

Observing that nonmanual signals of the latter category often cooccur with specific syntactic constructions, Liddell (1980) attributed to them an expressly syntactic status in the grammar of ASL, a view that other researchers have adopted and expanded (Neidle *et al.*, 2000; Petronio and Lillo-Martin, 1997). A competing view proposes that they correspond to intonational tunes (Reilly *et al.*, 1990) and participate in a prosodic system (Nespor and Sandler, 1999). Wilbur (2000) presented evidence that nonmanuals convey many different kinds of information – prosodic, syntactic, and semantic. A detailed discussion can be found in Sandler and Lillo-Martin (2005).

Acquisition of Sign Language

Nowhere is the 'natural laboratory' metaphor more appropriate than in the field of sign language acquisition. This area of inquiry offers a novel and especially revealing vantage point from which to address weighty questions about the human capacity for language. Research has shown, for example, that children acquire sign language without instruction, just as hearing children acquire spoken language, and according to the same timetable (Newport and Meier, 1985). These findings lend more credence to the view, established by linguistic research on the adult system, that languages in the two modalities share a significant amount of cognitive territory; children come equipped for the task of acquiring language in either modality equally.

Studies have also shown that signing children attend to grammatical properties, decomposing and overgeneralizing them as they advance through the system, sometimes even at the expense of the iconic properties inherent in that system. For example, even the pointing gesture used for pronouns (see **Figure 5**) is analyzed as an arbitrary grammatical element by small children, who may go through a stage in which they make mistakes, pointing at 'you' to mean 'me' (Pettito, 1987). Meier (1991) discovered counter-iconic errors in verb agreement (see **Figure 6**), similarly indicating that children are performing a linguistic analysis, exploring spatial loci as grammatical elements and not as gestural analogues to actual behavior and events.

Due to the social conditions surrounding its acquisition, sign language lends novel insight into two key theories about language and its acquisition: the critical period hypothesis and the notion that the child makes an important contribution to the crystallization of a grammar. Some deaf children are raised in oral environments, gaining access to sign language later in life. Studies comparing the ASL performance of early and late learners found that the age

of exposure is critical for acquisition of the full grammatical system (Newport, 1990) and its processing (Mayberry and Eichen, 1991), providing convincing support for Lenneberg's (1967) critical period hypothesis. An untainted perspective on the child's contribution can be gained where the input to the child is simpler and/or less systematic than a full language system, as with pidgins (Bickerton, 1981). Researchers of the sign language that originated in the Nicaraguan school mentioned previously studied the communication system conventionalized from the home sign brought to the school by the first cohort of children. This system served as input to the second cohort of children younger than the age of 10 years who later arrived at the school. Comparing the language of the two cohorts, the researchers found that children make an important contribution: The second cohort of signers developed a significantly more structured and regular system than the one that served as their input (Kegl *et al.*, 1999; Senghas *et al.*, 2004).

Sign Language and the Brain

Broadly speaking, it is established that most spoken language functions involve extensive activity in specific areas of the left hemisphere of the brain, whereas much of visuospatial cognition involves areas of the right cerebral hemisphere. Therefore, the discovery that sign language, like spoken language, is primarily controlled by the left hemisphere despite its exploitation of the visuospatial domain is striking and significant (Emmorey, 2002; Poizner *et al.*, 1987). Various explanations for left hemisphere dominance for language are currently on the table, such as the more general ability of the left hemisphere to process rapidly changing temporal events (Fitch *et al.*, 1997). This explanation has been rejected for sign language by some researchers on the grounds that sign language production is slower than that of spoken language (Hickock *et al.*, 1996). Whatever explanation is ultimately accepted, Emmorey (2002) and others have argued that similarities in the kind of cognitive operations inherent in the organization and use of language in the two modalities should not be ignored in the search.

Although most language functions are controlled by the left hemisphere, some do show right hemisphere involvement or advantage. With respect to sign language, there is evidence that the right hemisphere may be more involved in producing and comprehending certain topographic/spatial aspects of sign language, particularly those involving classifier constructions (Emmorey *et al.*, 2002). Although this result sits well with the known right hemisphere

advantage for spatial processing, it is made even more interesting when added to discoveries of right hemisphere dominance for certain other spoken and sign language functions that may be related to the classifier system, such as processing words with imageable, concrete referents (Day, 1979; Emmorey and Corina, 1993). Findings such as these are an indication of the way in which sign language research adds important pieces to the puzzle of language organization in the brain.

Language Modality, Language Age, and the Dinner Conversation Paradox

A large body of research, briefly summarized here, attributes to sign languages, essential linguistic properties that are found in spoken languages as well (Sandler and Lillo-Martin, 2005). Also, like different spoken languages, sign languages are not mutually intelligible. A signer of ISL observing a conversation between two signers of ASL will not understand it. Although cross sign language research is in its infancy, some specific linguistic differences from sign language to sign language have already been described.

At the same time, there is a rather large group of predictable similarities across sign languages and, as Newport and Supalla (2000: 109) stated, "A long dinner among Deaf users of different sign languages will, after a while, permit surprisingly complex interchanges." Here we find a difference between signed and spoken languages: One would hardly expect even the longest of dinners to result in complex interchanges among monolingual speakers of English and Mandarin Chinese. Although it is clear that more differences across sign languages will be uncovered with more investigation and more sophisticated research paradigms, it is equally certain that the dinner conversation paradox will persist. Two reasons have been suggested for crosssign language similarities: the effect of modality on language structure and the youth of sign languages.

Modality Effects

Modality is responsible for two interwoven aspects of sign language form, both of which may contribute to similarities across sign languages: (i) an iconic relation between form and meaning, and (ii) simultaneity of structure. Because the hands can represent physical properties of concrete objects and events iconically, this capability is abundantly exploited in sign languages, both in lexical items and in grammatical form. Although spoken languages exhibit some iconicity in onomatopoeia, ideophones, and the like, the vocal–auditory medium does not lend itself to direct correspondence between form and meaning so that

Figure 10 An iconic sign: (ISL) BOOK.

the correspondence in spoken language is necessarily more arbitrary.

Iconicity in Sign Language Leafing through a sign language dictionary, one immediately notices the apparent iconicity of many signs. An example is the ISL sign for BOOK, shown in **Figure 10**, which has the appearance of a book opening. Although clearly widespread, iconicity in sign language must be understood in the right perspective (*see* **Iconicity**). Many signs are not iconic or not obviously motivated, among them the signs for abstract concepts that exist in all sign languages. Interestingly, even the iconicity of signs that are motivated is not nearly so apparent to nonsigners if the translations are not available (Klima and Bellugi, 1979). In addition, the presence of iconicity in sign language does not mean that their vocabularies are overwhelmingly similar to one another. In fact, although even unrelated sign languages have some overlap in vocabulary due to motivatedness, their vocabularies are much more different from one another than one might expect (Currie *et al.*, 2002). Nevertheless, the kind of symbolization and metaphoric extension involved in creating motivated signs may be universal (Taub, 2001). For example, a bird is represented in ISL with a sign that looks like wings and in ASL with a sign that looks like a beak, and experience with this kind of symbolization in either sign language may make such signs easier to interpret in the other.

Simultaneity in Sign Languages Another modality feature is simultaneity of structure, alluded to previously. Some researchers have argued that constraints on production, perception, and short-term memory conspire to create simultaneity of linguistic structure (Bellugi and Fischer, 1972; Emmorey, 2002). Interestingly, iconicity also makes a contribution to simultaneity of structure, especially when one looks beyond the lexicon to grammatical forms of a more complex nature.

The hands moving in space are capable of representing events that simultaneously involve a predicate

and its arguments (e.g., giving something to someone or skimming across a bumpy surface in a car) with a form that is correspondingly simultaneous. The result is verb agreement (exemplified in **Figure 6**) and classifier constructions (exemplified in **Figure 7**). Therefore, these structures, with particular grammatical properties, are found in all established sign languages that have been studied, leading to the observation that sign languages belong to a single morphological type (Aronoff *et al.*, 2005). Although the grammatical details of this morphology differ from sign language to sign language, the principles on which they are based are the same, and this similarity makes another welcome contribution at the dinner table.

The Role of Language Age

Recent work pinpoints the role of language age in the structure of sign language, indicating how age may be partly responsible for the impression that crosssign language differences are less abundant than is the case across spoken languages. It does so by comparing the type of morphology ubiquitously present in sign languages with a language-specific type (Aronoff *et al.*, 2005). This study noted that the form taken by the verb agreement and classifier systems in all established sign languages is similar (although not identical) due to the modality pressures of iconicity and simultaneity sketched previously, but that sequential affixes of the kind exemplified in **Figure 4** vary widely between the sign languages studied. Such affixes, arbitrary rather than iconic in form and limited in number, develop through grammaticalization processes, and these processes take time. Given time, more such arbitrary, sign language-specific processes are predicted to develop.

The physical channel of transmission affects language in both modalities. Where sign languages are more simultaneously structured, spoken languages are more linear. Where spoken languages are mostly arbitrary, sign languages have a good deal of iconicity. However, none of these qualities are exclusive to one modality; it is only a matter of degree.

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Sign Languages of the World

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The Current State of Knowledge

After more than 30 years of systematic sign language research, most sign languages throughout the world still remain scarcely documented or even entirely unknown. We can only estimate how many sign languages exist in the world, and we are even less sure about how they may be grouped into language families. A few sign languages in industrialized countries are reasonably well documented, whereas little is known about sign languages in other areas of the world, such as sub-Saharan Africa, Southeast Asia, and the Arab world. Nevertheless, increasingly more information has been coming to light during the past decade, although we are still far away from systematic linguistic documentation in most cases.

Based on what we know to date, it is fairly clear that the sign languages of the world number in the hundreds rather than in the thousands and are thus much fewer in number than their spoken counterparts. For all we know, they are also much younger than spoken languages, although other forms of gestural communication are as old as humanity itself. The 2004 edition of the *Ethnologue* (Grimes, 2004) lists approximately 100 living sign languages. However, there are many omissions and errors in this list, so the actual number of sign languages in the world is likely to be at least three or four times greater.

The maximum documented age for a sign language is slightly more than 500 years for the sign language used at the Ottoman court in Turkey (Miles, 2000). There is no reason why the large cities of antiquity more than 2000 years ago should not have had groups of sign language users, but we do not have any reliable sources for these times. On the other hand, it is quite unlikely that communities of sign language users as we know them today would have existed even earlier. Only after urbanization had created reasonably large populations could critical numbers of deaf people theoretically have come together to use a sign language.

For many known sign languages, there is more or less detailed anecdotal evidence of historical links with other sign languages. These links may have to do with colonial history, migration of populations, or, in more recent times, the establishment of deaf education with the help of another country. The principal difficulty lies in determining whether a particular relationship between sign languages is genetic in nature (i.e., in how far we can speak of a sign language family) or whether we are dealing with a language contact situation. Attempts at addressing this issue

have been largely unsuccessful, and no theoretically sound method of investigating historical relationships between sign languages is available.

In recent years, increasingly more sign languages are beginning to be documented. A first step is usually the compilation of basic vocabulary in word lists (pairing a word and a picture of a sign), which are often wrongly called 'dictionaries' (see **Figure 1**). During the past decade, these and other developments have resulted in a situation in which it is now possible to systematically compare linguistic structures across a much wider range of sign languages than in the past. The newly emerging field of sign language typology is concerned with the issue of how to systematize this new knowledge in a theory of variation across sign languages.

Sociocultural and Sociolinguistic Variables

Signed communication occurs in a variety of situations. This article is concerned exclusively with natural full-fledged sign languages that are the primary languages of their users. We are not concerned with artificially created sign systems such as 'Manually Coded English,' 'Signed Japanese,' and 'Dutch in Signs,' which have been invented for educational purposes with the aim of mirroring spoken language structures 'on the hands'. We are also not concerned with secondary sign languages that are used in communities where the usual mode of communication is through a spoken language but where signed communication plays a supplementary role for certain purposes, such as conditions of speech taboo. Rather, the sign languages we are interested in involve groups of deaf people for whom the sign language is the primary means of communication.

The first sign languages that were documented in detail from the 1970s onwards are used by communities of deaf people in urban settings. These are minority languages in which most of the users are deaf and there is constant language contact with the surrounding spoken/written language of the majority culture of hearing people. This situation is well described and occurs in urban areas in all regions of the world.

However, sign languages also exist in an entirely different sociocultural setting that is less well documented but highly significant for cross-linguistic comparison. These sign languages are used in village communities with a high incidence of hereditary deafness. Village-based sign languages arise because deaf individuals have been born into the village community over several generations, and therefore a sign language has evolved that is restricted to the particular village or group of villages. These sign languages are typically used by the whole village population no matter whether deaf or hearing, and in this sense, they are not minority languages, nor do they face any linguistic oppression. They have developed in isolation from other sign languages and are not used in any educational or official context. Deaf people are fully integrated into village life and may not be considered to be 'disabled' in any sense (Branson *et al.*, 1999). The existence of village-based sign languages has been reported from places as diverse as Bali, Ghana, Thailand, Mexico, an Arab Bedouin tribe in Israel, and a native Indian tribe in the Amazon, but their linguistic documentation is only just beginning. These languages have the potential to call into question many of the general assumptions that were made previously about the structure of sign languages.

Some village-based sign languages are already endangered and have not been documented in detail. As the larger, urban sign languages move in through formal education and the media, these small, locally restricted sign languages face similar pressures as their spoken language counterparts (*see* **Endangered Languages**). Similarly, sign languages in some developing countries have been under pressure from foreign sign languages, as in many African countries. In places where the deaf community is very large and the indigenous sign language has had time to develop on its own, it is relatively immune to foreign influences, as is the case in China and in the Indian subcontinent.

Despite similarities with respect to language endangerment, the life cycle of sign languages also differs from that of spoken languages in that new sign languages continuously emerge throughout the world, as most famously documented in Nicaragua (Kegl *et al.*, 1999). Throughout the world, urbanization and the spread of special education for the deaf create new deaf communities with newly emerging sign languages. The stage of a sign language's life cycle is an important consideration for comparing the structures of sign languages.

Relationships between Sign Languages

For a number of individual sign languages as well as groups of sign languages, the notion of sign language family has been proposed, based on known facts about their relationship with each other. For example, it is well-known that sign language was brought to New Zealand and Australia from the United Kingdom, and therefore these three sign languages make up the 'British Sign Language family.' For different historical reasons, the Japanese Sign Language family includes sign languages in Taiwan and Korea, both of which had been under Japanese occupation. In cases in which one and the same sign language-using

NANASI
pineapple

Hutumika pia kwa Katani
it is alsoused for "sisal"

Alama sanifu
standard sign

169:571

NAZI
coconut

Alama sanifu
standard sign

LANGUAGE RULES AND TERMINOLOGY OPPOSITES

LESS

MORE

COLD

SAD

HAPPY

HOT

Figure 1 Entries from sign language dictionaries (Tanzania, Pakistan).

community seems to have split and subsequently developed independently from each other, the traditional family tree model can be applied, and the shared history is visible and interpretable. Sign languages in Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom are still mutually intelligible to a large extent and share most of their vocabulary, to the extent that it is doubtful whether they should not be classified as dialects of one and the same language. Sign languages in Korea, Japan, and Taiwan all share a peculiar grammatical mechanism of gender marking, with the thumb indicating male and the little finger female gender as formative elements in complex signs (see **Figure 2**). This feature is not found in any other known sign language and, together with other factors, makes a strong case for positing a shared history of this sign language family.

However, the situation is usually not so clear-cut. In most cases, it is impossible to determine whether similarities between two sign languages are the result of a genetic relationship or the result of language contact. Instead of the 'pure' kind of family tree relationship, a more common type of relationship between two sign languages involves various kinds of language contact situations, language mixing, and creolization. For example, American Sign Language is said to have arisen in a creolization process, where Old French Sign Language came in contact with indigenous sign varieties, resulting in a new language with input from both of these sources. This kind of relationship cannot be considered genetic in the usual sense of the term.

In many cases, there is more or less clear historical evidence of relationships between sign languages. This may be related to colonial history so that, for instance, sign language communities in the Indian subcontinent use a two-handed manual alphabet as in British Sign Language. However, actual historical documentation of how this came to be the case is lacking, there are very few meaningful similarities in

the vocabulary and grammar of the two sign languages, and there is thus no evidence for including Indo-Pakistani Sign Language in the British Sign Language family. Another common factor in linking two sign languages often involves the establishment of educational facilities for the deaf. For instance, the sign language in Brazil is said to have its root in French Sign Language because a deaf Frenchman established the first school for the deaf in Brazil, and Swedish Sign Language was similarly brought to Finland. We find this kind of link between many African countries and one or more Western 'source' sign languages (Schmaling, 2001). American Sign Language (ASL) has had a major impact on deaf communities in other countries, such as Thailand, the Philippines, Uganda, Zambia, Ghana, Malaysia, and Singapore, and it is often unclear whether the sign languages used in these countries should be considered dialects of ASL, descendants of ASL in a family tree of languages, ASL-based creoles, or independent sign languages with extensive lexical borrowing from ASL. To the extent that indigenous sign languages already existed in these countries and secondarily came under the influence of a foreign sign language, the relationships between them are not genetic in the usual sense but are instances of language contact.

This kind of problem is not unknown for spoken languages but is aggravated by a number of complicating factors in the case of sign languages. First, the familiar historical–comparative method that is used to determine language families and reconstruct older forms of source languages has never been applied to sign languages. No process of regular sound change has been identified, and the comparison of morphological paradigms is often compromised because the forms in question are iconically motivated. Vocabulary comparisons are highly unreliable, and there seems to be a considerable 'baseline level' of iconically determined lexical similarity even between unrelated sign languages (Guerra Currie *et al.*, 2002).

Figure 2 Gender marking in South Korean Sign Language: SCOLD(someone), SCOLD(me), SCOLD(a male person), SCOLD(a female person).

The first family trees that were proposed for sign languages were based on historical evidence and lexical similarities, and later attempts at using glottochronology on the basis of word list comparisons (Woodward, 1993, 2000) are similarly unreliable.

Another complicating factor in many cases is the uncertainty about whether or not there were indigenous sign varieties before the influence of a foreign sign language set in and, if so, what the linguistic status of this signed communication might have been. It is possible that in a particular region, limited home sign systems came in contact with a foreign full-fledged sign language, resulting in a new sign language in a process that has no counterpart among spoken languages. Finally, the lack of any historical records makes it difficult to directly test and evaluate any proposed historical relationship between sign languages. In the absence of any sound methodology for establishing sign language families, the issue of how one sign language is related to another one usually remains unresolved.

Grammatical Similarities and Differences across Sign Languages

Over time, sign language linguists have come to expect certain features in the structure of sign languages that have been shown to occur with great regularity in most or all sign languages known and described so far. Accordingly, there are attempts at accounting for these putative sign language universals on the basis of their visual–gestural modality. For instance, sign languages offer the possibility of using spatial grammatical mechanisms by virtue of being three-dimensional languages, and therefore they tend to use movement modifications to express aspectual distinctions or to use movement direction to code verb agreement. Since the articulators in sign language are larger and slower than in a spoken language, sign languages tend to mark grammatical functions in a simultaneous rather than a sequential fashion; therefore, they use nonmanual behaviors such as facial expressions to mark sentence types (questions, negation, and

subordination), and they use complex signs with numeral incorporation (e.g., a single complex sign meaning 'three months'). It has been claimed that sign languages are similar in the kinds of complex simultaneous morphology just mentioned but differ from each other in sequential morphology such as clitics and affixes, with sequential morphology being comparatively rare in sign languages (Aronoff *et al.*, 2000).

Most of these generalizations about the similarities between sign languages are based on investigations of a limited number of languages, mainly in Europe and North America. The picture changes somewhat when examining a larger range of the world's sign languages. Although the previous observations are indeed true of many sign languages throughout the world, this is only part of the story. First, some sign languages do not show the 'expected' types of structures. Two unrelated village-based sign languages, in Bali and Israel, do not show an elaborate system of spatial verb agreement as is familiar from other sign languages. Another village-based sign language in Ghana does have spatial verb agreement but does not use the so-called 'classifier' hand shapes to refer to categories of moving persons, animals, and vehicles. Given that village-based sign languages have developed in isolation from any other sign language and exist under very different sociolinguistic conditions, it is not unexpected to find important differences in their structures in comparison with urban sign languages.

The range of possible structures in sign languages expands considerably when we consider non-Western, lesser-known sign languages. The gender marking system in the Japanese Sign Language family represents one such example. Sign language varieties in China also show many particularities that are not familiar from documented Western sign languages. Chinese Sign Language varieties include so-called 'character signs,' a particular type of borrowing in which the shapes and movements of the hands imitate the whole or part of words from the Chinese writing system (see **Figure 3**). Both northern and southern

Figure 3 Character signs in Chinese Sign Language.

sign language varieties in China also make use of a productive mechanism of negation in which negative signs are marked by an extended little finger and the positive counterparts have an extended thumb (see **Figure 4**). Finally, question words for quantifiable concepts include one or two open hands with finger wiggling as part of complex signs, forming a large paradigm of interrogatives. The study of a greater range of sign languages thus reveals a large number of previously undocumented grammatical structures, just as the study of 'exotic' spoken languages did in earlier stages of spoken language linguistics.

Other structural differences between sign languages are more subtle and only come to light after systematic investigation. Typologically oriented studies across sign languages exist for a limited number of grammatical domains (for pronouns, see McBurney, 2002; for questions and negation, see Zeshan, 2004a, 2004b). Such studies show that the degree of structural differences between sign languages may be considerable but is unevenly distributed across different parameters of investigation. For example, sign languages differ as radically as spoken languages with respect to the set of their possible question words. A sign language may have only a single question

word, as in certain dialects of Indo-Pakistani Sign Language (see **Figure 5**), or more than a dozen, as in Hong Kong Sign Language. On the other hand, the facial expressions accompanying questions tend to be very similar across unrelated sign languages, with eye contact, forward head position, and eyebrow movement as prominent features. Understanding the reasons for these patterns is important for building a theory of typological variation across sign languages.

Another important result from comparative studies is that certain sign language forms may look very similar superficially but in fact have very different properties. For instance, in a broad range of 38 sign languages throughout the world (see **Figure 6**), it has been found that in each case, negation can be expressed by a side-to-side headshake (Zeshan, 2004a). However, the grammatical constraints governing the use of headshake negation in fact differ greatly across sign languages. Whereas in some sign languages, such as in the Scandinavian region, headshake negation is a primary negation strategy and may often be the only instance of negation in the clause (Bergman, 1995), other sign languages, such as in Japan and Turkey, obligatorily use a manual negative sign with or without headshake negation as a secondary accompaniment. Sign languages in the eastern Mediterranean region (Greece, Turkey, and neighboring Arab countries) additionally use a single backward head tilt for negation that has not been found in any other region of the world (Zeshan, 2002).

It can be assumed that the significance of many possible parameters of variation across sign languages has not been recognized. For example, mouth movements deriving from a silent representation of spoken words, so-called 'mouthing,' carry an important functional load in some sign languages (e.g., in Germany, The Netherlands, and Israel) but are functionally largely irrelevant in Indo-Pakistani Sign Language (Boyes Braem and Sutton-Spence, 2001). The presence or absence of contact with literacy may be another important factor, evidenced by the

Figure 4 Chinese Sign Language signs with ''little finger'' negative morpheme: DEAF and TASTELESS.

Figure 5 Combinations with the Indo-Pakistani Sign Language question word (WH): PLACE+WH ''where'', TIME+WH ''when''.

Figure 6 Sign languages represented in the typological survey on questions and negation.

fact that not all sign languages use an indigenous manual alphabet for fingerspelling.

Future Developments

The dynamics of developments throughout the world with respect to sign languages and their documentation carry considerable momentum. Some sign languages are endangered, whereas others are expanding in geographical spread and contexts of use, and some are only just being created by new communities of users. Forces such as intensive contact between sign language and spoken language, as well as between one sign language and another, and the move toward official recognition for sign languages and the deaf communities that use them rapidly change and reshape the makeup of many sign languages worldwide. It is a continuous challenge for sign language linguistics to keep up with these developments and put together an increasingly detailed picture of linguistic diversity among the world's sign languages.

See also: Sign Language: Overview; Sign Languages: Discourse and Pragmatics.

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Sign Languages: Discourse and Pragmatics

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Culture and the Pragmatics of Discourse

In every culture, conversations have structures that reflect their values, for example, whether the information provided is truthful, or satisfies the questioner, or is polite. As an example, Weiser (1975) notes that an answer can be acceptable in discourse if the answer addresses the questioner's purpose for asking the question. She illustrates this with (1):

(1) Q: How old are you?
 A: Don't worry, they'll let me in.

The questioner thinks something like: We are going to a bar; there is a minimum age of 21 to get in; I wonder if my date is old enough. The questioner asks for specific information. The date responds with reassurance that his underlying concern will not be a problem. The date's age remains a mystery. Such a conversation is considered polite in a culture that places high value on not invading a person's privacy by requesting personal information, such as age.

Conversational style and structure differ significantly between Deaf and hearing communities. Because signers can see, and be seen by, anyone who is present, it is especially difficult to maintain privacy.

Furthermore, as Hall (1989) observes, the Deaf community functions as a surrogate family – everyone knows everyone. The politeness conventions that dominate Deaf community interactions help promote unity among the Deaf. Since maintaining privacy is problematic, conversations among Deaf people lean toward the opposite – being more direct, which may feel intrusive to people unfamiliar with this cultural priority. Attempts at evasive answers may lead to joking, teasing, and not-so-subtle prodding.

Minority Language Status and Signing Style in Discourse

As with spoken languages, there are sign register differences, such as formal/informal articulation, larger signing and signing space when 'shouting' across the room, and so on. Signing style is also heavily affected by its minority language status, especially when hearing people are present. If the hearing people are supposed to be conversational participants but do not know sign, signers may switch to voice and speak the dominant spoken language, or they may resort to writing with paper and pen. Others may continue to sign, but in an altered form that involves speaking while putting the signs into the word order of the dominant language (known as 'signed English,' 'signed Croatian,' etc.). Such

simultaneous speaking and signing is a hybrid communication technique that distorts both speech and signing, and is not itself a natural language (Wilbur and Petersen, 1998). If the hearing people do know some signing, Deaf signers may continue in their own sign language, but with a slowed signing rate, and perhaps with altered choice of signs. There is a signing style (rate of signing, lexical choice, use of facial expressions) reserved for use among members of the Deaf community.

Modality Effects on the Pragmatics of Discourse Structure

Conversations in sign language always take place face-to-face, even when facilitated by new technology such as web cameras that allow signers to be seen across great distances. Face-to-face interaction is likely to be infrequent among people who live at distances from each other, and may be limited in duration. This may be the reason for a prominent characteristic of signed conversations, namely, that they start informally, get right to the point, and conclude formally and slowly (Hall, 1989 for ASL). In contrast, American speakers of English begin formally and slowly, conclude informally and quickly, and tend not to be direct about getting to the main point.

Getting Attention

Conversations in SLs require the participants to be paying attention to each other. Ways to obtain attention include waving at or tapping someone, or enlisting a third person to help with this procedure. In larger groups, the lights may be flicked off once or twice to get everyone's attention.

Saying Good-bye

It takes a while to say good-bye to each person in a conversation or large gathering. Saying good-bye ends a face-to-face interaction, leaving communication to be resumed at some uncertain future time. Thus, saying good-bye includes some discussion of when that might be, such as other upcoming events.

Turn Taking

Hand Position Given that all interaction is face-to-face, an orderly system of turn taking is necessary to ensure that participants do not miss part of the communication. Baker (1977) observed regulators that mark turns within conversations, such as hand position. When a signer is listening and not intending to take a turn, the hands are down. When a signer is preparing to sign, perhaps to interrupt or waiting for a turn but wants the current signer to acknowledge

that he is waiting, the hands assume half-rest position, generally at waist level. Hands higher than this are in quarter-rest position, a strong indication to the current signer to yield the floor. Of course, a signer can simply begin to sign and hope that the other signer will yield the floor. The floor is yielded by returning hands to full-rest or half-rest position as an indication of wanting the floor back.

Nonmanuals Eye contact plays a significant role in regulating conversational turns. A conversation cannot begin without eye contact between participants, after which the addressee must continue to watch the signer, but the signer is free to look away, for organizing thought or maintaining the floor. As in speech, the signer must check back with the addressee to be certain that the addressee is following the conversation. A signer can ignore an interruption by not establishing eye contact with the person attempting to interrupt (Baker, 1977).

Information Flow and Discourse Structure

Information Flow and Focus

The presentation of information in a discourse is structured according to the sender's belief regarding the receiver's knowledge and attentional state (whether something is in the receiver's mind at the time). Gundel (1999) separates three types of 'focus': psychological 'salience'; semantic 'new information'; and contrastive focus. Psychological focus is what the sender and addressee are attending to. Joint attention ensures that what is the current center of attention is salient to both partners, making it old or given: the 'topic' of conversation. Linguistically, nonfocused information tends to be referred to with pronouns (which refer back to something), definite articles ('the') in languages that have them, and pro-drop in languages that allow it (that is, not expressed at all in the sentence).

In contrast, the term 'focus' is used to refer to new information. By definition, all sentences have new information (Gundel's 'semantic focus'). This is the assertion of the utterance; that part which cannot be deleted. Other terms used for the new information include 'comment' in topic-comment constructions, and 'rheme' in theme-rheme constructions. The term 'focus' will be used here.

Focus Prominence Placement and Marking

Broad Focus Every language has a procedure for determining (a) where the stress prominence falls in a 'neutral' sentence, that is, one that is entirely in focus; and (b) how the prominence will be marked

phonetically. When the whole sentence is in focus, stress may be placed on whatever word happens to occur in a particular position, such as final. Or it may be placed on the last lexical item, ignoring functional words. Other strategies include placing it on the last argument of the predicate, or if that argument is a phrasal constituent, on the lexical head of the phrase.

In spoken languages, the marking of linguistic stress itself may include increased duration of the prominent item, higher fundamental frequency (pitch), and increased amplitude. SLs do not have access to pitch. Research on ASL shows that it uses increased peak velocity of signed movement for stress prominence, and uses increased duration of signs primarily for Phrase Final Lengthening (Wilbur, 1999). ASL also has many other cues to indicate stress, including nonmanuals of head and eyes, and body leans, discussed below.

Narrow Noncontrastive Focus When the whole sentence is not in focus, a variety of distinctions are made. The first is Gundel's 'semantic' focus or what Dik (1989) calls 'completive' focus. This is the part of the sentence that provides the relevant new information; if someone asks 'What flavor do you want?' and the answer is 'I want chocolate,' 'chocolate' is the focused part of the sentence and 'completes' the exchange. A second is focus particles, such as 'even,' 'only,' 'both,' and 'also,' which are traditionally distinguished as lexical focus markers; the items they focus on are called 'focus associates.' In ASL, the sign glossed as SAME functions as 'even,' and ONLY-ONE as 'only.' The focus associates may precede or follow the particle; if it precedes, a brow raise is required on the associate but not on the focus particle. A third is intensive focus, which uses reflexives, e.g., 'Only the defendant *herself* remained completely calm.' In ASL, the sign SELF is used for this.

Narrow Contrastive Focus A more emphatic type is 'contrastive' focus. Gundel argues that contrastive focus is used "because the speaker/writer doesn't think the addressee's attention is focused on a particular entity and for one reason or another would like it to be, because a new topic is being introduced or reintroduced (topic shift), or because one constituent (topic or semantic focus) is being contrasted, explicitly or implicitly, with something else" (Gundel, 1999: 296). By this definition, 'topics' can be 'focused' when they are new or reintroduced.

When contrastive focus selects a correct form from a closed and known set (Dik's 'selecting' focus), ASL uses a lean forward on the selected item. If the

question is 'Do you want vanilla, chocolate or strawberry?' (a closed set) and the answer is 'I want strawberry,' it is 'strawberry' that is 'selected' or contrasted with the other items. When 'replacing' focus is involved ('chocolate' not 'strawberry'), a lean forward is used to mark the correct response 'chocolate' and lean backward is used to mark the rejected response 'strawberry.' When two items in the same sentence are contrasted with each other ('and/or/but'), 'parallel' focus is involved and ASL uses left/right leans as well as forward/backward leans.

Syntactic Mechanisms of Focus Marking

Contrastive focalization ('topicalization') is the movement of a constituent to sentence initial position for purposes of contrasting it with a previously mentioned item. Aarons (1994) gives example (2):

(2)
$$\overline{\qquad t \qquad}$$
JOHN$_i$ NOT-LIKE JANE. MARY$_j$, HE$_i$ LOVES Ø$_j$
'John doesn't like Jane. It's Mary he loves.'

Another syntactic focus construction is the cleft ('It was a new sweater that Kio gave Mia for her birthday'). ASL uses the focus sign THAT in the cleft, with nonmanual marking (brow raise) on the focused nominal ('a new sweater'), which must precede THAT. When the sequence THAT NP does occur, its interpretation is purely demonstrative ('that man'), and no brow raise is used.

Languages also have syntactic constructions that put words or phrases in focus, such as the wh-cleft ('What Kio gave Mia for her birthday was a new sweater'). The wh-cleft (so-called 'rhetorical question') is particularly useful for focusing large constituents ('sterilize surgeon's tools'):

(3)
$$\overline{\qquad\qquad\qquad\qquad br \qquad}$$
ELLEN WORK DO++ WHAT, CLEAN STERILIZE SURGEON POSSESSIVE TOOLS
'What Ellen does for a living is sterilize surgeon's tools.'

Language Typology for Focus

When only part of the sentence is in focus, some languages may move the prominence marking to the focused item ([+plastic], Vallduví, 1991, 1995). English is plastic in this sense, as seen in (4), where bold indicates prominence:

(4a) Juan saw Mariko **leave** the party early.
(4b) Juan saw **Mariko** leave the party early.

In contrast, nonplastic languages, such as Catalan, have reserved locations for focus, usually in sentence

initial, preverbal, or final position. The word order may be changed in order to put different focused items in the reserved position. In ASL, the wh-cleft puts the focused material in final position and uses brow raise on the nonfocused part (5) (Wilbur, 1997, 1999).

(5)
                                         _br_

   (i) HELENA SEE KIM PUT BOOK WHERE, TABLE
       'The place where Helena saw Kim put the book was the table.'

                                          _br_

   (ii) HELENA SEE KIM PUT-ON-TABLE WHAT, BOOK
       'What Helena saw Kim put on the table was the book.'

                                          _br_

   (iii) HELENA SEE BOOK PUT-ON-TABLE WHO, KIM
       'The person who Helena saw put the book on the table was Kim.'

                                          _br_

   (iv) HELENA SEE KIM DO++, BOOK PUT-ON-TABLE
       'What Helena saw Kim do was put the book on the table.'

Common Sign Language Structure for Emphasis

Finally, linguistic prominence for 'emphasis' can be separated from focus. While focused items may also be emphasized, not all emphasized items are focused. SLs frequently have a process of 'copying' or 'doubling' certain lexical categories, including modals, negation, wh-words, subject pronouns, quantifiers, and numerals. Such doubling of signs often leads nonsigners to erroneously conclude that sign languages are just repetitive gestures with no systematic structure. But typically, a doubled item will occur sentence initially or in its in situ position, and the double will occur sentence finally. Items such as these are not new information or in focus. The repetition of them by doubling serves to emphasize them as important (but not as new) (Petronio, 1993).

See also: Cooperative Principle; Discourse Markers; Shared Knowledge; Sign Language: Overview.

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Sign Languages: Semiotic Approaches

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'Sign languages,' or 'gestural languages,' mostly arise in place of voice languages when voice languages are unavailable to people because they are profoundly deaf, because they speak different languages that are mutually unintelligible, or because speaking is barred by custom. ('Gestures' in this context include facial expressions.) Examples are the gestural language of the American deaf – 'Ameslan' or 'ASL' (American Sign Language) – and the gestural languages of the American Plains Indians and of certain monks sworn to silence. A gestural language is a language just as English is; lesser gestural systems such as the signals used by traffic cops or landing signal officers on aircraft carriers do not offer a sufficiently rich repertoire of signs – or above all, a syntax – to enable their users to convey whatever they wish. A landing signal officer can convey 'OK to land' but not, as English can so easily, 'A two-mile-long aircraft carrier has just been commissioned that can land 747s.'

Because gestural languages mainly use hand gestures to produce their sentences and eye recognition to receive them, they differ significantly from voice languages produced by the vocal tract and received by the ear. For example, voice languages convey much by intonation and stress – thereby distinguishing between 'You've been to Paris' and 'You've been to *Paris*?' – while in a gestural medium, these are conveyed by gestures alone.

True gestural languages must be distinguished, not only from the communications available to traffic cops and the like, but also from another limited medium, the 'fingerspelling' that the deaf sometimes resort to. Fingerspelling, whether assigning areas on one hand to stand for a letter to be pointed at by the forefinger of the other (Dalgarno, 1680), or more directly indicating the letters with finger configurations (often mimicking letter shapes) (Stokoe, 1974), is only a way of conveying the spelling of some voice language (e.g., English). In contrast, Ameslan is quite independent of American English (and differs from its British counterpart). Their autonomy is another criterion by which gestural languages can be judged 'true languages.'

Gestural languages combine partial gestures that are functionally equivalent to phonemes (West, 1960: vol. I, 9–18) to form morphemes and words. These partial gestures are variously called 'cheremes' or 'kinemes' and are syntactically structured into sentences. Thus, the Ameslan morpheme 'girl' is gesturally conveyed, rather than by the four phonemes /g/, /ʌ/, /r/, and /l/, by three concurrent 'cheremes' characterized as 'drawing down,' 'the ball of the thumb,' and 'along the cheek' (Nöth, 1990: 284). Despite their structural similarities, however, other gestural languages typically have less expressive power than those of the deaf.

Gestural languages have been studied in depth by linguists, other semioticists, amateur and professional anthropologists, psychologists, and neurologists, whether they are used by the deaf (e.g., Bellugi and Studdert-Kennedy, 1980, esp. 29–40, 115–140, 291–340), by people lacking other inter-tribal communicative means (Umiker-Sebeok and Sebeok, 1978), by people who must abjure speech when orating stories or rituals (West, 1960: vol. II, 9, 62, 68), or by people for whom speech is taboo, such as certain monks (Umiker-Sebeok and Sebeok, 1987) and newly widowed Aboriginal women (Kendon, 1980).

See also: Sign Language: Overview; Sign Languages of the World.

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Silence

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What monochrome painting, in its richness and multitude of manifestations is to history of art, silence is (or should be) to linguistics. Functionally, the question what silence 'does' is best answered in the same way as is the question what speech, or any other semiotic system, can 'do' in communication. Taking Halliday's (1978) view of semiotic systems, for example, silence can be shown to fulfill three major functions: ideational, interpersonal and textual (*see* **Systemic Theory; Halliday, Michael Alexander Kirkwood**). In its ideational function, i.e., describing or referring to the nonlinguistic reality, silence's primary function is to conceal information. But it can also allow ideational inferences to be made, as when a silent response follows a request for information. Consider the following (constructed) example:

A: Who ate all the cookies?
B: [silence]
A: I knew you did!

Not unlike other forms of nonverbal communication, what silence serves best is the interpersonal function, i.e., managing social actors' relations of power and solidarity. Thus, silence can either mark interpersonal intimacy or extreme distance in situations where 'small talk' is normally required between casual acquaintances (Jaworski, 2000); alternatively, it may signify an extreme power differential between interactants (Braithwaite, 1990) (*see* **Power and Pragmatics**). In its textual function of organizing coherence, or the framing of talk, pauses are often used to add emphasis to what is going to be said next (Duez, 1982), or they may occur before and during a stretch of talk marked as a performance (e.g., when reciting a poem) (Bauman, 1997).

Silence has been studied more or less explicitly in most functionally oriented frameworks of linguistic analysis. Saville-Troike (1985) has offered a holistic view of silence from an ethnographic perspective, arguing that silence in the form of pauses and hesitations carries predominantly affective and connotative meaning, whereas silent communicative acts (such as responses to greetings, queries or requests) may carry propositional meanings on a par with other verbal communicative acts, such as questions, promises, denials, warnings, threats, insults, and so on (*see* **Speech Acts; Pragmatic Acts; Speech Acts, Literal and Nonliteral**). In Conversation Analysis, pauses have been identified as 'dispreferred seconds' (e.g., Davidson, 1984) such that, if an invitation is followed by a pause, other things being equal, it is most likely going to be interpreted as a 'refusal' (*see* **Conversation Analysis**). Numerous versions of Critical Discourse Analysis have focused on silence and silencing as forms of sociopolitical control and oppression (Gal, 1989; Theismeyer, 2003) (*see* **Critical Applied Linguistics**). Other approaches have included semiotics (Kurzon, 1998) and politeness theory (Sifianou, 1997) (*see* **Politeness**). Many studies have been concerned with crosscultural differences in the use and 'toleration' of silence, including differing attitudes to talk and nontalk, relative length of intra- and interturn pauses, and silence or volubility as sources of miscommunication (e.g., Philips, 1976; Scollon, 1985; Enninger, 1987; Jaworski & Sachdev, 2004) (*see* **Intercultural Pragmatics and Communication**).

Another productive way of studying silence is by examining specific domains of language use and genres of communication in which silence plays a

prominent communicative or expressive role. These include ritual (including religious) communication (cf. Bauman, 1983), censorship (Jaworski, 1993; Jaworski and Galasiński, 2000), literature and performance art (Tannen, 1990; Jaworski, 1998) (*see* **Narrativity and Voice; Literary Pragmatics**).

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Social Aspects of Pragmatics

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Introduction

It might seem somewhat strange to talk of 'the social aspects of pragmatics' because the very choice of such a topic might lead a newcomer to the field to think that, strictly speaking, there is nothing social about pragmatics. That such an inference is perfectly in order may be verified by comparing the expression to an analogous one like 'the economic aspects of the AIDS pandemic' where clearly no one is suggesting that economics is of the very essence as far as AIDS is concerned. Does it at all make sense, one might ask, to conceive of pragmatics in any terms other than social? Alternatively, is it not pleonastic to speak of the social aspects of pragmatics, given that, no matter how you define the field of research called linguistic pragmatics, the social dimension of language will – or should, if it is to remain faithful to

its object of study – turn out to be constitutive of it, rather than something added on to it subsequently, say, by way of an afterthought? As Koyama (1997: 1) put it, "[…] a pragmatic theory is evidently a linguistic and social theory at once."

Furthermore, if it is granted that pragmatics addresses issues relating to the use of language, as most scholars would agree it does, one might equally wonder how one can sensibly approach such issues except by first recognizing their social embeddedness. Finally, isn't language itself, as Dummett (1975: 135) aptly put it, "something *essentially social*, a practice in which many people engage" (italics added)? Or isn't it essentially "dialogic," as Bakhtin (1981) forcefully argued, thus, to quote Dentith (1995: 91), "radically socializ[ing]" the way the speaking subject is theorized? Mey (1985: 11) goes straight to the heart of the matter when he says:

> We cannot describe language and its use outside the context of that use, viz. the society in which language is used. To start out either with a definition of language (which one?), and then define society (what kind of?), or the other way around, will only lead to endeavors (as frantic as they are makeshift) to paste together what never should have been separated in the first place.

Neglect of Society in Language Studies

But the fact remains that many scholars have traditionally preferred to theorize language in complete disregard for its social setting. There has been a strong tendency among linguists to reify language and view it as a purely mental phenomenon and, as such, the attribute of a single individual existing, as it were, in an idyllically pre-social, Adamic or pre-Fall state. The following remark by Whitney (1827–1894) is typical of a research orientation that dominated most of the thinking on the nature of language in the 19th and 20th centuries.

> There can be asked respecting language no other question of a more elementary and at the same time of a more fundamentally important character than this: how is language obtained by us? How does each speaking individual become possessed of his speech? Its true answer involves and determines well-nigh the whole of linguistic philosophy (Whitney, 1875 [1979]: 7).

Notice that the whole emphasis is on the individual acquiring his/her linguistic skills – the initial mention of "us" gives way, with no justification or apology whatsoever, to "each speaking individual" now being considered severally rather than collectively. The fact that, for a language to be said to exist in any minimally meaningful sense of the word there must be at least two speakers who use that language to communicate to each other, is treated as being of secondary or marginal interest. Instead, all attention is directed at the single individual and his/her knowledge of the language in question. This is all the more intriguing because, as has been pointed out (cf. Andresen, 1990), Whitney belonged to a period in the history of the United States when scholarly research on language was intimately tied to a wider agenda of national self-affirmation, so that, far from being considered an autonomous entity, language was seen as a national symbol, hence approached from an eminently political perspective.

Linguistics and the Focus on the Individual Speaker

In focusing on the individual speaker, Whitney was anticipating what was to become a central tendency in linguistics as the discipline consolidated itself in the first half of the 20th century. When in the mid-1950s, Noam Chomsky revolutionized linguistics with his radically new approach, the centerpiece of his theorizing was, true to this long tradition of relegating the social to the margins, an idealized speaker-hearer, that is to say, the two clearly distinguishable ends of a minimal communicative event (Saussure's twin "talking heads") fused into one. Society or the social embeddedness of the speaker was, in Chomsky's view, a fact of no great consequence. Here is how he put it: "As for the fact that the rules of language are 'public rules,' this is, indeed, a contingent fact." (Chomsky, 1975: 71). Society is viewed as nothing but the backdrop against which the individual is to be singled out and focused on. The 'social context' is then equated with 'extra-linguistic context' (Fetzer and Akman, 2002: 395), thus giving short shrift to the fundamental role played by society in constituting a language. Such principled neglect of society has been justified in the name of 'autonomism' by Frederick Newmeyer, who summed up the guiding spirit of the whole approach in the following words:

> (The advocates of autonomism) approach language as a natural scientist would study a physical phenomenon, that is, by focusing on those of its properties that exist apart from either the beliefs and values of the individual speakers of language or the nature of the society in which the language is spoken (Newmeyer, 1986: 5–6).

Dissident Voices

No doubt, there are important exceptions to the dominant tendency to construct a theory of language around the figure of a single individual. Thus, Hymes warned: "A perspective which treats language

only as an attribute of man leaves language as an attribute of men unintelligible" (Hymes, 1973: 60). Writing in much the same vein, Halliday characterized linguistics as a "social semiotic" and insisted that "[a] speaking man does not talk; men talk" (Halliday, 1974: 17). Outside the disciplinary bounds of linguistics, Wittgenstein (1953) had already put forward what is famously known as the 'private language argument': an argument against the very possibility – not empirical, but conceptual – of a language so exclusively private that no one else has access to it. As Itkonen (1996) has forcefully argued, Wittgenstein's argument strikes at the heart of Chomsky's conception of language. So, too, from a completely different perspective, the Russian psychologist Lev Vygotskij (1896–1934) had insisted on the importance of social interaction in the development of cognition, arguing that

> All the higher functions [including voluntary attention, logical memory, and the formation of concepts] originate as actual relationships between individuals (Vygotsky, 1978: 57).

Speaking from a philosophical perspective, Hacker (1988: 171) preferred not to mince matters when he declared:

> The study of language is not a branch of psychology. Little but confusion has stemmed from the supposition that linguists are investigating the nature of the mind, or the mechanisms of understanding.

The Genealogy of the Lone Individual

Given the predominant tendency among linguists to start their inquiry into the nature of language around single speakers and their linguistic competence and only subsequently pan out in order to look at the society of which the individual is an integral part, it is useful to begin by asking why it is that the lone individual occupies such a central place in much of the thinking about language.

The Broader Canvas

It is not all that difficult to track down the origins of modern linguistics' excessive emphasis on the individual speakers and their linguistic competence, in combination with its relative neglect of society which is where, as we have seen, a language can truly be said to exist. As has been argued by a number of scholars (e.g., Hutton, 1996), modern linguistics is a discipline heavily premised on principles that date back to the 19th century. Taylor (1992: 25ff) points out that,

some time during the 18th century, the idea of man as a socially inscribed being gave way to that of a uniquely constituted self, based on self-awareness and self-reflection. In Germany, Herder (1744–1803) contributed to the shaping of not only an individual identity, but also of a collective one, modeled on that individual identity (for instance, that of a people or *Volk*), by insisting that the Germans could only aspire to a national identity by being true to themselves and their past and not, say, by aping the French.

Ian Watt (1957, 1996) has painstakingly documented the growth of individualism in the 18th through 19th centuries, as reflected in the literary works of the period. The new sense of realism that swept across Europe during that period was accompanied by the equally new spirit of individualism, and the two together underpinned what one might call the cultural and sociopolitical ethos of the period. Daniel Defoe's *Robinson Crusoe* is a synthesis of that ethos. Modeled on the real life story of a man called Alexander Selkirk, the protagonist of what many literary critics consider the first English novel is the finest example of the glorification of the loner. The importance of Crusoe as a key to the understanding of changing perceptions of the lone individual can only be fully appreciated if we compare him to Faust, Don Juan, and Don Quixote, all originally conjured up between the 16th and the 18th centuries by their respective creators as prototypes of 'anti-individuals' – the first two are burned in hell-fire and the last is publicly mocked and ridiculed. Incidentally, it is also the very same figure of the loner who is glorified when historians of modern philosophy fondly register that René Descartes, its founding father, experienced a moment of intense inspiration during a dream "in a stove-heated room" when he was serving at Ulm in 1619 (Blackburn, 1994: 100). Linguistics in general and much of early pragmatics is thus wedded to the idea of "the Cartesian autonomous agent" (Kopytko, 2001).

As Watt shows, by the 19th century, this inward-looking and narcissistic individualism had firmly taken hold of the European psyche. The spirit of colonial expansionism that swept across the continent glorified the figure of the loner who braved the elements and conquered distant lands – a Tarzan in the land of apes. The spirit of Enlightenment also took its cue from Descartes and elected the loner as the prototype of the reasoning man in intense meditation, away from the madding crowd, as portrayed in the familiar tale told about Socrates, the Father of Western Philosophy, lost in a philosophical trance while perched on his doorstep before being rudely awakened by a bucketful of cold water tossed at him

by Xanthippe, his notoriously cantankerous wife. Radical, navel-gazing forms of individualism have been complicit in the history of European colonialism (cf. Said, 1978) on the one hand, and, on the other, tied up with the very emergence of modern society (Berman, 1971). It is interesting to note in this context that even Freudian psychoanalysis, which otherwise called into question some of the fundamental tenets of modernism, such as the centrality of the all-knowing rational agent, was built around the concept of the lone individual. In writings such as *Totem and Taboo* and *Civilization and its Discontents*, Freud took a view of the progress of human civilization (as evolving, according to him, from savagery to monotheism and patriarchy) along essentially the same lines as he considered the child's development to adulthood; thus, Freud became the lightning rod for charges of ethnocentrism, and the accusation that the very idea of Oedipus is "colonialism pursued by other means" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1977: 170).

In thinking about and theorizing about language, the intellectual stance adumbrated in the foregoing paragraphs contributed to the consolidation of the idea that language itself is but the visible manifestation of the reasoning mind. It is not surprising therefore that, to the extent that the human linguistic faculty was seen as a property of man's reasoning mind, language itself was seen as primarily pertaining to the individual speaker-listener and only secondarily and derivatively to the society. Indeed, the centrality accorded to the lone individual underwrites the widespread practice among scholars working in the area of language acquisition of simply taking it for granted that phylogeny follows the same course as ontogeny. The underlying principle may be seen as authorizing the widespread use of biological metaphors such as 'growth', 'decline, 'death', etc., to depict specific moments in the history of an irreducibly social object such as language.

The More Immediate Context

The reason why many pragmaticists have tended to concentrate on the cognitive dimension, often to the total neglect of the social – Steven Davis' 1991 book *Pragmatics: a reader* (Davis, 1991) has an entire section devoted to Psychology and Pragmatics but none whatsoever entitled Sociology and Pragmatics) – has more to do with the way this 'branch of linguistics' developed historically, in spite of claims such as made by the editors of the first of issue of the *Journal of Pragmatics* to the effect that the "science of language use," as it is pursued by contemporary researchers, has "no direct ties with the historical use

of the term" (Haberland and Mey, 1977: 1). Originally conceived as part of a general theory of signs, pragmatics is often seen as dealing with those aspects of meaning that cannot be adequately handled by semantics, thus representing, as Tyler (1978: 461) lamented, "a mere appendage of semantics"; alternatively, from the perspective of contemporary generative grammar, pragmatics should be dealt with by syntax, given that a central tendency within this paradigm today is to empty semantics of most or all of its contents, distributing the spoils between the other two components of the old triad (*see* **Syntax-Pragmatics Interface: Overview**). Katz and Fodor (1963) famously delimited the domain of semantics by stipulating that "Linguistic description minus grammar equals semantics," and Gazdar (1979), most likely taking his cue from them, went on to characterize pragmatics as "meaning minus semantics." In other words, pragmatics became the "wastebasket" (Bar-Hillel, 1971) of linguistics and the working motto of linguists became: "When in trouble call it pragmatics and jump!" (Haberland and Mey, 1977: 7) (*see* **Pragmatics: Overview**).

The tripartite division of the theory of signs into syntax, semantics, and pragmatics has led many unwitting scholars to conclude that syntax is the crux, or, if you will, the real hard core of linguistics, with a progressive 'softening up' of rigor and internal coherence as one moves from syntax through semantics to pragmatics. This attitude is spelled out in such remarks as

> Pragmatics, though less so than syntax and semantics, is characterized by a set of central research issues forming a coherent scientific program of linguistic inquiry (ter Meulen, 1978: 439).

The underlying preoccupation in such descriptions of the role of pragmatics seems to be to define the subfield relative to what by implication is treated as its 'meatier' sister subdisciplines. It is as though the scientific credentials of pragmatics could only be established by parading it alongside the other two members of the triad and conceding how miserably it pales in comparison.

On Defining a New Role for Pragmatics

A more liberating view of what pragmatics should concern itself with is taken by Cook when he says:

> Pragmatic philosophy is not, as it is often taken to be, a ready-made technique for analyzing occurring discourse.... The subjective, selective, and fundamentally unscientific nature of analysis of language in context should be acknowledged and not disguised by adopting the symbols and signs of more confident (if less exciting) approaches (Cook, 1990: 15).

In fact, a positive development in recent years has been a clearly discernible tendency among leading pragmatists to rethink the very contribution of pragmatics to an understanding of language. Thus McHoul (1997) makes a clarion call for a 'programmatology' on the strength of Jacques Derrida's candid admission that "[g]rammatology has always been a sort of pragmatics" (Derrida, 1988: 159), and urges fellow pragmatists to "'deconstruct' all hitherto-existing pragmatics." Verschueren pleads for a sea-change in the way we conceptualize pragmatics, starting with viewing it as "not a layer or component but a perspective" (Verschueren, 1987, 1999a) and argues that "[a] thorough 'ideological' critique of the pragmatic literature is urgently called for" (Verschueren, 1999b: 877).

Mey has been one of the leading scholars in the crusade to openly politicize research in pragmatics, thus initiating what one might refer to as the 'critical turn' in contemporary pragmatics. With hindsight, one may consider the following excerpt as marking a watershed:

> One of the main theses is that our use of language cements the dominant interests of our society, helping to oppress a large segment of the population (Mey, 1985: 16).

For Mey, work done in linguistic pragmatics should go beyond the merely descriptive or explanatory ambitions of mainstream linguistics and embrace transformative or emancipatory goals. The idea of pragmatics as a 'perspective of linguistics' is also forcefully defended by Mey (2001 [1993]).

Not just a perspective *of* linguistics, one may note, but a perspective *on* linguistics. Thus Haberland and Mey (2002: 1672) underscore the urgent need for ensuring that work done in pragmatics is socially relevant, drawing attention to the "society's need for language studies." The rhetorical question posed by the authors (Haberland and Mey, 2002: 1673) when they ask whether pragmatics should be defined "from the inside out" or "from the outside in," "by considering the conditions that make the object possible" may be read as a powerful indictment of the hallowed practice in mainstream linguistics of conceptualizing language by starting with the lone speaker, i.e., starting with what goes on in the mind of the individual speaker and finally paying lip service to the idea that that individual, as it happens, is socially embedded.

The Politics of Pragmatics

The New Orientation

The basic upshot of the discussion in the foregoing section is that research in pragmatics is inescapably caught up in the politics of language and, no less important, in the politics of linguistics. What the recent about-face in pragmatic research – implied in the transition from a component of to a perspective of/on linguistics – really amounts to is a desire on the part of leading researchers to carve out a disciplinary matrix where they no longer have to wait to work on unresolved problems in so-called 'hard core linguistics' (i.e., linguistics where the social question enters as at best an afterthought), but to rethink the very role of society in molding and sustaining language. It is, above all, a desire to free research on language from its time-honored tendency to concentrate on "the language user as an autonomous agent, a kind of linguistic Robinson Crusoe, always reinventing the linguistic wheel" (Mey, 2000: 7).

Interesting Consequences

It is important to point out that a willingness to look at language "from the outside in" rather than "from the inside out" has interesting and often dramatic consequences for the way we identify problems and propose solutions. To begin with, there is a need to recognize that many of the problems we have customarily identified in language are the result of our "inside out" way of conceiving of language. Examples are legion. Consider, for example, the treatment standardly given to the phenomenon linguists have identified as the 'context.' The practice of forcibly isolating naturally occurring utterances in order to study them as mere ordered sequences of words or sentences, or what has been referred to as "context-excluding fact fetishism" (Mey, 2003), is what made the whole concept of context so attractive to begin with and at the same time ever so elusive.

Recent work on context and the whole idea of 'recontextualizing' in order to solve such problems as ambiguity and vagueness (both of which only exist when sentences are focused on in isolation from their contexts) shows that a radically new approach is called for (Scharfstein, 1989; Akman and Bazzanella, 2003) (*see* **Context, Communicative**). Nerlich and Clarke (2001) illustrate one interesting possibility of looking at ambiguity, not as a structural given, but as something that language users purposively exploit to certain communicative ends. Contrary to what theorists of implicature and relevance imagine, these authors contend "that people who engage in conversation do not always strive for rationality and relevance, that they do not always intend words to have one meaning and 'disambiguate' polysemous words automatically in context" (Nerlich and Clarke, 1002: 1) (*see* **Conspicuity**).

The Lure of Cognitivism

Athough, as we have seen, there is today a clearly recognizable move today toward rethinking pragmatics by recognizing the inalienable social nature of language, one should by no means overlook what Haberland and Mey call "a revisionist or reductionist tendency" among certain practitioners, as manifested in the attempts "to revise and 'redo' especially Grice and, to a lesser degree Austin" (Haberland and Mey, 2002: 1674).

Perhaps the best-known attempt at 'revising' Grice is Sperber and Wilson's (1986) work on relevance, aptly described by Levinson (1989: 469) as "an ambitious bid for a paradigm-change in pragmatics" whereby "pragmatics is reduced to a single cognitive principle, a mental reflex, which governs much else besides language use." For Carston (2000: 87), relevance theory brings pragmatics in line with formal linguistics with the only difference that "it is an account of performance mechanisms" (*see* **Relevance Theory**).

There is no doubt either that Austin, too, has been hijacked to fit into the mold of mainstream linguistics. It has been argued (Rajagopalan, 2000) that Searle's intervention has been pivotal in 'domesticating' Austin and revising his thoughts in such a way that they could be incorporated into the formal structure provided by generative grammar in what is referred to as the 'abstract performative hypothesis.' By decontextualizing the individual speech act, i.e., by prying it from its context in order to consider it in isolation as a unit invested with a certain communicative (illocutionary) potential, Searle made it possible for the concept to be smoothly absorbed into the model of syntax being proposed by the advocates of 'generative semantics', inviting such pointed criticisms as:

> There is, to my mind, no escaping the observation that context, which is most proximately and consequentially temporal and sequential, is not like some penthouse to be added after the structure of action has been built out of constitutive intentional, logical, syntactic, semantic and pragmatic/speech-act-theoretic bricks (Schegloff, 1992: 125).

Societal Pragmatics as a Politically Self-conscious Way of Doing Pragmatics

Margaret Thatcher's famous words "There is no such thing as society. There are individual men and women, and there are families" (Thatcher, 1987)

were not uttered before an audience of linguists. Yet, her words have important implications for the way we go about setting up priorities in our research in the field of pragmatics. Cognitivism and societalism are not simply two purely theoretical alternatives. Neither is the choice between them simply a matter of attaining adequacy at the descriptive or explanatory levels. The choice between the two is political.

Cognitivism and societalism in pragmatics have their counterparts in political philosophy in individualism and collectivism – which entail conflicting views on the nature of the human being, society, and the relationship between the two. Thatcher's summary dismissal of society has important political connotations. So, too, does the dominant attitude in many mainstream theories in linguistics of relegating the social underpinnings of language to a lesser status.

Thus Mey and Talbot (1988) criticize what they see as "the presumed lack of social consciousness that is inherent in relevance theory." "The important bit here," they note, "is the social anchoring of language use – not, as some would like to have it, the reduction of all society to language use, i.e., to competing discourses."

Conclusion

As one surveys the recent history of intense research in the field of linguistic pragmatics, one cannot but be struck by the perception that, despite great advances made in the direction of recognizing the social nature of language as the key to coming to grips with language in use, there has also been some rearguard maneuvering to suppress the social dimension by privileging the cognitive. The road ahead is thus one paved with political considerations.

See also: Communicative Competence; Communities of Practice; Conspicuity; Context, Communicative; Intercultural Pragmatics and Communication; Language Socialization; Pragmatic Determinants of What Is Said; Pragmatics: Overview; Relevance Theory; Scaffolding in Classroom Discourse; Shared Knowledge; Speech Acts; Syntax-Pragmatics Interface: Overview; Vygotskij, Lev Semenovich.

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Social Class and Status

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The key concepts of social class and status are like most in the social sciences, subject to change in purpose and meaning. Both are rooted in the discipline of sociology, and are central concepts in attempts to describe and explain social inequality and division arising from industrialization, capitalism, and democracy spanning two centuries in industrial and postindustrial societies throughout the world. As to be expected, the major theories differ as to how they define social classes and status groups.

To complicate matters, the concepts of social class and status have been absorbed into linguistic and sociolinguistic theory from different and often conflicting sociological perspectives creating substantial debate. Indeed, some authors would argue that normative sociological concepts have been introduced into linguistic endeavor in an extremely uncritical fashion (Coupland, 2001: 1–26; Williams, 1992; Le Page, 1997).

Since the 1960s, there has been an added interest in the nature of cultural capital, educational credentials, accumulation of knowledge, symbolic systems, and their relationship to social class (Bell, 1974; Habermas, 1987). The investigation of symbolic systems such as language, has in this way contributed to attempts to describe and understand the nature of social class and status. The use of class and status in linguistics, and specifically sociolinguistics, broadens the attempt at understanding society from the socio-economic base to the super structural and cultural spheres of society. The emergence of sociolinguistics as an area of enquiry coincides with this period.

Common Sense and Class

Social class has its etymological root in the Latin term *classis*, used by census takers to differentiate social strata based on wealth, in order to assess Roman citizens's obligations to military service (Mann, 1983). Within sociological thought, the concept of social class emerged from common sense concepts. For example, the term 'the working class' emerged in English in the early 1800s to describe anyone who worked for a living, as opposed to landlords, who did not have to work and who had a guaranteed income. It slowly shifted its meaning to people who did mainly physical and skilled labor. The common sense use of class, such as in 'lower class' and 'upper class,' are general and relative terms, not always well defined, and still used as such in sociological and sociolinguistic writing. The terminology of social class is, in other words, not exact and is in need of some explanation if we are to get beyond a common sense notion (Williams, 1983). It is necessary to trace the two 'classical' approaches to social class and status, and then to link them to approaches to research on language and society.

Two Approaches to Class as Social Formation

If defining social class presents problems, it is useful for linguists to know which conceptualization within sociology is being drawn on. 'Class as social formation' refers to the development of class in its dual manifestation. A 'class in itself' encapsulates the objective criterion of the structural emergence of class in relation to the means of production. Once a class develops consciousness and self-awareness as a social group, it becomes a 'class for itself,' as characterized by Marx – the subjective criterion of being a class – and engages with other classes in the furtherance of its own interests. This approach to class as social formation is found in the work of two key theorists in sociology, Karl Marx and Max Weber. These two strands of sociological thought have been elaborated in subsequent generations; their advocates are now described as neo-Marxist and neo-Weberian.

The Marxist Perspective

A Marxist view of social class is based on a subjective notion, with social classes determined by

relationships and consciousness. The early Marxist categories of social class, defined the social groups' relationships to the ownership of the means of production. The key ones were: peasantry (small, largely subsistence farmers), lumpen proletariat (unemployed and criminal strata), proletariat (employed working class), petite bourgeoisie (the middle class) and bourgeoisie (the capitalist class). The relationships were defined by exploitation under capitalism, this entailed the process whereby the bourgeoisie benefited from the surplus created by the proletariat.

The social process surrounding the formation and relationships of these classes was for Marx one of intense conflict and struggle; it was central to determining the course of history. For him, the proletariat was the key to social change, and the class that would ultimately bring freedom from capitalist domination. Hence, his notion that the central social conflict under capitalism was between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. He discussed other classes but did not portray their role as formative.

This was literally a world-dividing perspective on society. Some within the Marxist tradition were partially critical and wished to modify Marx's arguments. For example, while adopting many of Marx's explanations, members of the Frankfurt school in the 1920s, did not view the working class as a key liberating force. In contrast, they sought to explain its fragmentation on the one hand and on the other, its identity with authoritarian forms of thought in the 20th century (Held, 1980).

Marx had little to say about language and symbolic systems and their relationship to class. For him, these were questions about culture and the superstructure of society. A specifically Marxist perspective on language did not emerge until the 1930s, when the Russian author V. N. Voloshinov wrote his treatise *Marxism and the philosophy of language* (Voloshinov, 1986). This particular work only became generally known in the 1970s through its translation from Russian; written some forty years earlier. It was the first text to look at the relationship between class, semiotic social systems and language from a Marxist perspective. The empirical interest in the text is firstly a stylistic question on the nature of reported speech and then on questions of discourse.

The Weberian Perspective

Max Weber's perspective of class as a social formation differs in important respects. In a key paper, 'Class, status and party,' he added the concepts of status and political party, social groupings that cut across and create social cleavages in social classes. He gave examples of religious and ethnic associations

forming status groups, with strong ties of identity and subjective perceptions of community. Weber redefined the concept of status, and gave it equal importance to class as a motivating feature of conflict and change in society. As a result, the combined power of class, status, and party were what determined historical and social change in an industrializing and bureaucratizing world; social class alone was not the sole determinant for Weber. In addition, he emphasized market and consumption, and saw property or lack of property, as a key to defining class. In the 1920s, Weber saw the future unfolding in what he described as the 'iron cage of capitalism,' the inexorable continuation of class, status group, and party conflicts; and that social mobility was one of the few factors that could temper the consequences of such conflict.

Weber argued that neither class nor status were dominant; instead, he asserted that the one that prevailed at any time depended on economic circumstances. While status group competition predominated during periods of relative stability, class conflict emerged when rapid or extensive economic and technological change took place. From this Weberian perspective, power did not always lie with the dominant social groupings. Social closure, a mechanism for excluding other groups and classes from decision-making positions, was for Weber a means by which status groups or classes organized their conflict.

Both Marxist and Weberian approaches viewed society in terms of conflicting human interests, and held that the nature of class composition, relationships, status, political party, and property constantly changed. (Weber redefined status and added political party and property, and emphasized that power does not always lie with dominant social groupings.) Weber in essence offered a critique of Marx's theory, in that he extended the concept of social class. For linguistics, the significance of social class as a form of stratification involving domination and subordination is that the linguistic and symbolic differences between classes are often readily observed in speech and in communicative practices. The particular perspective that linguists and sociolinguists adopt towards social class will significantly shape how they research language in society.

Neo-Marxists and Neo-Weberians

Contemporary analysis of class has involved a rethink about which groupings are socially significant, and who belongs to which grouping. Neo-Marxist perspectives continue to stress social class as the most significant social cleavage. Neo-Marxists are divided into three groups of theorists: minimalists (Structuralist Marxists), maximalists, and intermediates:

1. The minimalists believe that only manual workers belong to the working class; all other members traditionally thought of as working class are more properly classified in the petite bourgeoisie. Structuralist Marxists such as Louis Althusser and Nicos Poulantzas, held this view (Althusser, 1984; Poulantzas, 1973).
2. The maximalists believe a broad band of the middle class is in fact better classified with the interests of the working class, since they are squeezed by the bourgeoisie to such an extent that their lot is similar to that of workers (a classic position can be found in Baran and Sweezy, 1966).
3. The intermediates believe that many in society fall within a contradictory class location, where their identities and allegiances are insecure and oscillate between classes. No firm social group identity can be forged under such circumstances (Olin Wright, 1985).

First introduced by Weber, the concept of closure, analyses group and class behavior in terms of the exclusion or inclusion of other social groups, and the resulting conflict, was examined by the neo-Weberian writer Frank Parkin, who categorized the workings of social closure as follows: (1) Social closure from below, a subordinate group keeps a dominant group out. (2) Dual social closure, an intermediate group keeps a dominant group and a subordinate group out. (3) Usurpationary social closure, a previously subordinate group comes to dominate and exclude a previously dominant group (Parkin, 1983).

This particular approach using social closure can also be used to link social consciousness and communicative action to class and status, which has particular relevance for the study of sociolinguistics in areas such as code switching (Myers Scotton, 1995).

Table 1 is a brief tabulation (based on Bradley, 1992: 15) of some key contemporary differences between neo-Marxist and neo-Weberian approaches.

Giddens has commented that the various permutations of the meanings of social class bring neo-Weberian and neo-Marxist understandings of class very close together at times. For example, the understanding of social mobility is difficult to distinguish from 'contradictory class location,' where people appear to occupy an intermediary position and switch their allegiances and identities between classes (Giddens, 1993).

Class as Category

In stark contrast to the idea of class as social formation, class as category presents a consensual, normative view of society. This idea of class has an affinity with Émile

Table 1 Comparing Neo-Marxists with the Neo-Weberians

Neo-Marxist	*Neo-Weberian*
1. Class divisions generated by relations of production	1. Class divisions generated by operation of market
2. Classes unified by exploitation	2. Classes fragmented by markets
3. Conflict between classes dominates social relationships	3. Conflict within classes as important as conflict between them
4. Middle class linked to one of major classes	4. Middle classes are autonomous groupings as significant as the propertied and working classes
5. Consciousness arises from relations of production	5. Consciousness has many different sources

(Based on Bradley, 1992: 15).

Durkheim's structuralist interpretation of the division of labor in any society, but specifically industrial society, and the structural analysis of all social institutions in relation to their social functions within society. Durkheim was interested in the basis of social order and the establishment of social norms, rather than conflict. By the 1950s, structuralism had a far-reaching impact on social thought, even influencing Marxism. Most importantly, it spawned the structural functionalism and normative sociology of Talcott Parsons in the United States (Parsons, 1964).

The approach of defining class as category, brings us somewhat closer to the original Latin meaning *classis*. By measuring income levels or classifying people into occupations, one can determine social class. This is a socioeconomic definition of class, with no reference to subjective notions of consciousness of class position and status. It is referred to as a 'scale and category' measurement of social hierarchy, which tends to permeate a bureaucratic understanding of social hierarchy. It is a form of measurement that has been used, for example, to determine actuarial predictions of life expectancy and insurance risk, and to analyze potential markets. As a gradational measurement, it is well suited to quantitative empirical investigations of society.

The structural functionalist perspective of Talcott Parsons was the dominant postwar voice in American social theory. Parsons claimed the influence of Weber, whom he encountered as a student, and whose work he translated and published. Yet, he adopted a normative, consensual approach to social structure, and largely used the perspective of social class as an occupational role. This body of social theory emphasizes the possibility of social mobility, and has used the version of

industrial democracy as developed in the United States, as its social exemplar of advanced social development. It has been influential as a framework in sociolinguistic studies, particularly in understanding of the relationship between language and social class, since variables such as income, occupation and educational level are all deployed in understanding the normative category of class. An example is William Labov's use of occupational hierarchy to assess class speech variation in his survey of New York City (Labov, 1966).

The Use of Class and Status in Sociolinguistic Research

Class, Codes and Control

Bernstein's seminal work, *Class, codes and control* was one of the first systematic attempts to investigate the cultural features of social class and its relationship to education. His concept of code, is in essence, a communication process deeply embedded in the nature of social stratification. It is not readily evident, and has therefore to be subjected to decodification and analysis in order to be rendered explicit. Drawing on the work of Marx, Weber, and Durkheim, Bernstein looked for reasons for the perpetuation of working class failure in the educational system; his research typified the turn to cultural and superstructural analysis of social inequality.

His research in 1960s Britain consisted of a relatively homogeneous social context, with very small minority populations. As in many European societies at the time, the articulation of class interest and conflict was well reflected in the major competing political parties. Bernstein's belief was that the reproduction of working class failure in the face of postwar educational reforms could in fact be understood and rectified. He developed Durkheim's profiles of the working class and middle class family, and typified their communicative codes as 'mechanical' in the case of working class (an understood, implied process of communication with much left unspoken), and 'organic' in the case of the middle class (a more explicit negotiation of social meaning). In turn, he investigated the structure and process of communication within the schooling system, and the congruence or lack of congruence between the school and the family. He sought to establish patterns in communication and socialization that disposed the middle class to success in educational contexts.

Bernstein developed the notion of 'elaborated' and 'restricted' codes, the working class had a restricted code and the middle class an elaborated one. Code, in fact, referred to a great deal more than the surface features of morphology and syntax.

Unfortunately for Bernstein, this was the feature that became synonymous with the so-called 'deficit hypothesis.'

In what was a voluminous work based on the contributions of many researchers, one Bernstein article dealt with grammatical and semantic structure and linked this, in a strong expression of the Whorfian hypothesis, to the concept of working class language being in itself cognitively deficient. It described the features of a restricted code at a syntactic and morphological level, which was thought to inhibit communication and conflict with the communicative systems in education, in contrast to the middle class elaborate and explicit code, which enhanced this process. This was in turn thought to create problems in the communicative adaptation to schooling for working class children.

This aspect of the research became enlarged and was misconstrued as the substance of Bernstein's work. In fact, as argued above, many of the features of Bernstein's analysis of the working class family drew on structuralism, and were concerned with processes of communication, which had nothing to do with surface features of language and even contradicted their importance (Atkinson, 1985). Yet, many subsequent research works repeatedly drew attention to the surface levels of working class speech, and claimed that specific means of expression were deficient and at odds with institutional forms of communication. It was also this feature of the research that made it extremely significant to linguistic and sociolinguistic discussion.

This small aspect of Bernstein's work was taken up in the educational reformism of the 1960s in the United States by a project called Operation Head Start (Bereiter and Engelmann, 1966). This project advocated the teaching of standard grammar as the solution to educational failure in the black ghettos. Drills were developed for the development of standard speech varieties; the result was to further alienate the communities from the schooling process.

The result was the celebrated but unfortunately one-dimensional critique of Bernstein developed by William Labov in support of the logic of nonstandard English of African-Americans, the key target of educational reform at the time. The implied acceptance of the strong version of the Whorfian hypothesis in Bernstein's work was the basis for the critique. Labov demonstrated very adequately how surface features and sociolect had nothing to do with rational thought and established, in contrast, the difference hypothesis (Labov, 1966). This much-remembered debate, in many ways, was built on straw characterizations of each side of the argument.

Bernstein did not anticipate that his work would be used in the context of a minority status group along with a prejudiced perception of the group's speech patterns. He did not expect the degree of misconstrued interpretations of his work in the United Kingdom. Any validity on the sociological side of Bernstein's research was muted in the face of the barrage of criticism that was directed against what was perceived to be a restatement of class prejudice in his work.

There were in essence many more concerns in Bernstein's research, not least of which was the acquisition of literacy, the graphic shibboleth of all educational systems. The linguist Halliday defended Bernstein's work and qualified his understanding of it, on the basis that it was concerned with questions of literacy, and creative work in educational practice. As Bernstein himself pointed out, "We are told and socialized into what to reject, but rarely told how to create (Bernstein, 1977: 167)." Much was produced in the concern for language across the curriculum, and the methods of teaching reading and writing that emerged from this period of critical debate about language teaching and the development of literacy in the United Kingdom at the time (Hasan, 1996: 34; Halliday, 1978). The debate over restricted and elaborated codes and its tenor probably lost more ground for sociolinguistic enquiry than it gained.

Bernstein continued to look at notions of horizontal and vertical knowledge and issues that are of central concern to sociology in more recent times. Bernstein's death in 2000 led to a great deal of revisiting of his work (Moore and Muller, 2002: 627).

Variation Studies and Class as Category

A number of large-scale quantitative studies on language variation were conducted in the 1960s and 1970s, by researchers such as Trudgill in the United Kingdom and Labov in the United States (Trudgill, 1974; Labov, 1966). These studies were symptomatic of the nature of quantitative social enquiry at the time, but their important common feature was that they focused on socioeconomic and stylistic stratification of linguistic variables over large populations. This approach adopted a consensual view of language and social class; that is, class as category, as outlined above. For a period, these approaches sought to define linguistic and sociolinguistic research endeavor as having scientific validity.

Labov's work is interesting in that it applies a very clearly developed category approach to class. The categories he used in his survey of New York City in 1966 are shown in **Table 2** (from Eckert, 2000: 26).

This research is very much part of the investigation of cultural phenomena and their relationship to class,

Table 2 Labov's class categories

Category	Description
Upper class	First rate professional, manager, official, or proprietor of a large business
Upper middle class	Career man in professions, managerial, official, or large business positions
Lower middle class	Semiprofessional, petty businessmen, white collar, foreman, and craftsman
Working class operatives	Blue collar workers dependent on labour market
Lower class	Laborers with insecure job status

(In Eckert, 2000: 26).

which has been typical of the postindustrial research endeavor, particularly in advanced industrial societies. The consensual nature of this form of social investigation is criticized for failing to portray the dynamic nature of social change and innovation necessary for social explanation. What Labov produced with this research was a series of functionally explained categories, where occupation was seen as the very basis of class, and the agent of language change. For him, it proved the plasticity of the vernacular and the endurance of the standard variety.

His identification of the linguistic insecurity in the lower middle class, and the desire for hypercorrection on both a class basis and a gender basis, is interesting for its depiction of class semiotic and its interface with a status group such as gender. Little is made of the social groupings and networks in the construction of the standard and vernacular that Labov portrays on his linguistic scale: the interpretation of different styles and relation to social class is limited.

Labov's former student, Penelope Eckert, has completed an interesting reinterpretation, using a Bourdieu-like analysis of the networks that sustain standard and vernacular forms. She shows the significance of past and present variation studies for current social description and understanding of the nature of social class and status (Eckert, 2000: 16). Her work represents an ongoing debate with Labov, which makes the latter's work as pertinent today as Bernstein's.

Bourdieu's Cultural Capital, Linguistic and Symbolic Markets

Pierre Bourdieu is perhaps the strongest voice in sociological writings, other than Bernstein, to have rearticulated the question of culture and its meaning in the stratification of society. He has developed the concepts of 'cultural capital,' 'fields,' and 'habitus.' Cultural capital is the value placed on an aspect of culture; a field is an area of endeavor, such as education; and a habitus is 'embodied social structures that serve as principles organizing practice.' His

work has permeated the field of sociolinguistics since his first essays on the linguistic market on the value of the symbolic system to the accumulation of cultural capital. His work has been highly influential.

Class codes, unlike Bernstein's elaborated and restricted, are simply described by Bourdieu and his associate Passeron in terms of 'bourgeois,' and 'common' parlance. A Latinate vocabulary and a striving for novel expressions mark bourgeois parlance. Common parlance is characterized by situational reliance, non-learned vocabulary, and reliance upon shared figures of speech (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1977: 116). The bourgeois code is fostered in the educational system, and where the dominant language is also the official language. The privileged, through their command of a bourgeois code, are better able to cope with the demands of the education system. Those students who possess common parlance cannot develop an understanding of what might be expected of them in such a field. Bourdieu, unlike Bernstein, did not express any hope for educational reform through remediation, as he treated the schooling system as one that systematically served the interests of class-divided societies.

For Bourdieu, the concept of linguistic capital is but one dimension of the concept of cultural capital. Language use is valued in different domains. The state, Bourdieu argues, unifies the linguistic market. He asserts that the school-based standard language underpins the requirements of a literate class, in which text falsely corresponds with truth and social domination is represented falsely as mental development.

As influential as Bourdieu's work has been, it has also attracted criticism. Collins argues that the determinist nature of class in his work is not able to deal with both structure and agency/practice in understanding the subjective conditions of dominated groups (Collins, 1993: 121–123). It is this balance between structure and agency in understanding social class that Giddens has termed 'structuration' (Giddens, 1979). Eckert has also drawn on this more complex concept of social class and its social determinants in her work (Eckert, 2000: 44).

Sociolinguistics is concerned with sociological explanations of the semiotic system. According to Eckert, a social theory of language cannot view *langue* as a given, but must be about the process of being conventional. What the creolist Le Page claims is needed is to understand how languages are 'named, formalized, standardized and totemized by society' (Le Page, 1997: 32). The ideas of ideal speaker and listener, and the dichotomy of competence and performance, are abstractions that are meaningful only in the context of showing us the nature of domination and subordination in understanding language and society. In this regard, Bourdieu is not alone in going

to the root of questioning the very concept of 'a language' in order to provide it with an adequate sociological explanation (Bourdieu, 1992: 43–65).

Social Network and Social Class

Milroy and Milroy argue that the concept of being 'local,' or district-based is strongest amongst working class communities. They build on the arguments of Thomas Højrup, who found that working class communities are more fragmented than others, and developed a concept known as a 'life mode' analysis, to construct a model that examines cultural aspects of social existence. In their research in Belfast, Milroy and Milroy traced the existence of close-knit networks that served as the basis for vitality of the vernacular forms of working class language. Williams has criticized this perspective as being a rejection of sociological analysis, on the grounds that network theory is incompatible with social class. Le Page defends the Milroy network research, by claiming that their network theory is both compatible with social class analysis and a useful tool to explore working class solidarity and linguistic identity (Milroy and Milroy, 1997: 61; Le Page, 1997; Hojrup, 1983). This technique for exploring language change and understanding the manifestations of class and status has been followed in a number of studies (Le Page, 1997; Williams, 1992).

Sociolinguists have sometimes naively deployed the concepts of class and status on the supposition that 'language mirrors society.' The relationship is rather more complex. Class and status are not fixed notions in sociology and have been interpreted very differently, as has been seen. Sociology and social theory are now moving beyond the characterization of the societies we live in as 'postindustrial,' and now look to the notion of the transition in capitalism to 'the iron cage of the information age,' and the rise of the network society and the rapidly changing nature of local social class and status groups globally (Castells, 1996). The implications for the understanding of language in society are enormous, the way forward is to maintain close but critical links between the ideas of social class, social status, and sociolinguistic theory.

See also: Codes, Elaborated and Restricted; Communities of Practice; Halliday, Michael Alexander Kirkwood; Language Politics; Linguistic Habitus; Society and Language: Overview.

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Social-Cognitive Basis of Language Development

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Linguistic communication is a form of social interaction. It is a special form because it is mediated by linguistic symbols. Linguistic symbols are social conventions used by human beings to direct one another's attention to various aspects of their shared environment. Different societies have created different sets of linguistic symbols – at the moment there are approximately 6000 languages in the world – and indeed the linguistic symbols of each society evolve fairly rapidly over historical time as speakers modify

existing ways of talking to meet changing communicative circumstances.

Children are exposed to the linguistic conventions of their speech community as they interact socially with mature language users. To acquire productive use of linguistic conventions children must have the social-cognitive skills to:

- participate with others in the joint attentional interactions that provide a common referential ground for symbolic communication (joint attention);
- understand the communicative intentions of others as embodied in linguistic symbols of various types (intention reading);
- take the perspective of others in tailoring the choice of linguistic expression to particular communicative contexts (perspective taking);
- collaborate with others in coconstructing a conversation with a shared topic and 'relevant' contributions of new information (communicative collaboration).

Other animal species do not possess any of these social-cognitive skills – at least not in their human form – and that is the main reason why they are unable to create or to learn a human language (Tomasello, 1999, 2003).

Joint Attention, Intention Reading, and Word Learning

The social-cognitive foundations for language acquisition begin to emerge in human ontogeny near the end of the first year of life in various of infants' nonlinguistic activities. Most importantly, at around 9 months of age infants begin to interact with other people triadically around a 'topic' of mutual interest ('the primordial sharing situation'). Thus, they begin to follow others' attention to external events and entities (Tomasello, 1995), to direct others' attention to external events and entities using nonlinguistic gestures for both imperative and declarative purposes (Bates, 1979), and to engage with others in relatively extended bouts of joint attentional activity (Bakeman and Adamson, 1984). Other animal species engage rarely, if at all, in triadic communicative interaction.

Children acquire their earliest linguistic conventions within the context of routine joint attentional activities such as having a meal together, taking a bath together, going for a ride together in the car, and so forth (Bruner, 1983). These routines serve as necessary scaffolding because linguistic symbols are associated with their communicative functions only conventionally – which presents a unique learning situation. That is, no matter how intelligent a child is, she cannot on her own figure out what some sound means, but rather she must experience a speaker using that sound for the purposes of communication and then determine why, toward what communicative end, he is using it. This determination requires the child to have some nonlinguistic access to the kinds of thing the adult may be communicating about. This is provided by the joint attentional activity, which basically defines 'what we are doing' and so determines a kind of domain of relevance. For example, if a child hears the new word *gavagai* from an adult out of the blue, so to speak, she will not learn it because she has no idea why, for what communicative purpose, the adult is using this word. But if she and the adult are giving her a bath together and the adult looks at the rising water level and says *gavagai* while turning the faucet off, there are only a limited number of plausible meanings for this expression – assuming it is relevant to the activity. It is thus not surprising that Carpenter *et al.* (1998) found that the size of children's early vocabularies is highly correlated with the amount of time they spend in joint attentional engagement with others.

For the child to be able to zero in on a single one of the plausible meanings of a new expression used within a joint attentional activity, she must be able to read the communicative intentions of other people more specifically; that is, she must be able to determine specifically what the adult intends for her to attend to. Initially, it is very helpful if adults do most of the work and follow into the child's already existing focus of attention when using a new expression (see Tomasello, 1988 for a review). But as development proceeds, children become ever more skillful at determining adult communicative intentions in novel contexts in which the two of them are focused on different things. Thus, if an adult uses a novel word when he, the adult, is attending to one object and the child is attending to a different object, the 18-month-old child will follow the adult's attention to the object on which he is focused in determining the intended referent (Baldwin, 1993). Further, if the adult is picking his way through a toy box full of objects in search of a 'modi,' 18-month-old children will be able to pick out his intended referent by the fact that he rejects some objects and finally accepts one – despite the fact that he looks equally at them all. And if the adult uses a novel verb to announce an intended action ("Now, let's dack Ernie") and then performs one act on purpose and another by accident on Ernie – with different orders of these two across children – 24-month-old children know that the intended referent of *dack* is the one done on purpose (see Tomasello, 2001 for a review of these and similar studies).

Children's acquisition of linguistic symbols thus depends most fundamentally on their ability to participate in the joint attentional activities that create a common communicative ground with their interlocutor and on their ability to read the intentions of others in particular communicative contexts.

Perspective Taking and Construction Learning

The broader social purposes for which people use language are such things as greeting others, informing others, asking questions, requesting favors, and so forth. In many cases the speakers of a language have conventionalized entire grammatical constructions for the most frequently occurring of these functions, for example, English wh-questions for requesting information and imperatives for requesting favors. In addition, speakers use different conventionalized grammatical constructions depending on who the listener is and what she knows and expects. For example, if we are conversing about my sister and I want to tell you something that happened to her, I might very well use an English passive construction such as *She was sued by her landlord*. Or perhaps I learn that you erroneously believe that my sister's therapist sued her, in which case I might correct you by using a cleft construction such as *It was her **landlord** that sued her.* If we have been talking about something else I might introduce the topic by using some kind of presentational construction like *You know my sister's landlord, he* . . . . In theories of language such as cognitive linguistics and construction grammar these kinds of constructions are, like words, linguistic symbols that pair a linguistic form and communicative function (i.e., the communicative intentions the symbol embodies). Children thus learn these constructions in a way that is not totally different from the way they learn words, that is, by observing people use them for particular communicative functions – which they determine by intention reading, including the subintentions of any subconstructions involved (e.g., noun phrases, locative phrases; see Langacker, 1987; Goldberg, 1995).

From a social-cognitive point of view, the most interesting thing about the acquisition of constructions is that children must learn when to use which one, and this often involves a subtle assessment of the knowledge and expectations of the listener. For instance, in their acquisition of noun phrases 2-year-old children learn to do such things as use pronouns to refer to an entity when they are jointly attending to that entity with their listener, but use a lexical noun with a determiner (or even a relative clause) when the two of them are not jointly attending (see Tomasello,

2003: Chap. 6 for a review). Similarly, to learn to use a cleft construction (e.g., *It was Jeffrey that took the cookies*) children must be able to tell that their listener is currently under the mistaken impression that someone else took the cookies and then choose a construction that makes contact both with the mistaken impression and its correction. Saying *The vase broke* enters the event from the perspective of the vase whereas saying *I broke the vase* enters it from the perspective of me and my activity (Budwig, 2000).

In all these cases, then, children must learn the perspective, in the broad sense of that term, that a construction embodies, and the communicative situations in which it is appropriately used. They do this initially in a very local and item-based way. For example, they might initially be able to alternate between the object's and the actor's perspectives only with the verb *break*, with extension to other verbs coming only very gradually (Tomasello, 2000).

Communicative Collaboration in Conversation

As children are acquiring the various symbols and constructions of their language they are at the same time learning how to use these symbols and constructions to communicate more effectively in extended conversational interactions with other people. Conversational and discourse skills are concerned not so much with the mastery of the grammaticized and conventional aspects of a language, but more with the mastery of strategies for using those constructions effectively to manage the flow of information across turns in a developing conversational interaction. Skill at conversation involves such things as taking turns appropriately, managing the conversational topic effectively, and repairing a conversational interaction when it breaks down.

Becoming a skilled conversationalist requires children to read the intentions and take the perspective and role of their listener in many complex ways in novel contexts, and so many conversational skills do not fully develop until late in the preschool period. Thus, at 2 years of age only a minority of children's utterances are semantically contingent on the adult's previous utterance, and very few of their turns include reference to both the preceding topic and also some new information – the prototype of a mature conversational turn. When they do engage in a relatively extended conversation on a single topic, 2-year-olds typically take only one or two turns per conversation, with this value doubling by about 4 years of age (Pan and Snow, 1999).

Conversation is a form of collaboration in the sense that from a very early age there is a 'negotiation

of meaning' between the two conversationalists (Golinkoff, 1983), and there are requests for clarification back and forth when one person does not understand something in the other's formulation. Almost from the beginning of the language acquisition process, young children both respond to requests for clarification and, less frequently, request clarification of others in their conversations (see Tomasello, 2003: Chap. 7 for a review). This again requires sophisticated skills of intention reading and perspective taking.

Collaborative activities, either nonlinguistic or linguistic, thus require participants to have a common goal and to work together in coordinated ways to achieve it. This coordination is not a foregone conclusion, and indeed animals that communicate with one another in fairly sophisticated nonsymbolic ways still do not engage in the back and forth of conversational interaction (and often engage very little in collaborative, turn-taking interactions of any kind).

Conclusion

Children thus employ their species-unique social-cognitive skills to acquire and use a natural language – skills of joint attention, intention reading, perspective taking, and communicative collaboration. But in the process of acquiring a language, children are led to consider various particular intentions and perspectives that they almost certainly would not have created on their own: the very same animal is referred to on different occasions as a dog, an animal, a pet, or a pest; the very same action is referred to as running, fleeing, chasing, or exercising. Acquiring a natural language in interaction with other persons thus leads young children to create some species-unique forms of cognitive representation, namely, perspectival cognitive representations (Tomasello, 1999).

A number of theorists have also proposed that conversation and discourse might play an important role in children coming to have a 'theory of mind,' that is, in coming to view other persons as mental agents who can have beliefs (including false beliefs) about the world (Harris, 1996). Thus, to engage in true conversation children must in some sense simulate the perspective of other people as they express themselves linguistically, and thus the back and forth of discourse involves the child in a constant shifting of perspectives from her own to that of others and back again – which helps her to construct both social norms and individual attitudes and beliefs (Tomasello and Rakoczy, 2003).

And so the relationship between children's social cognition and language is not one way. They must have certain social-cognitive skills to acquire a language, but then engaging in linguistic communication leads them to create new social-cognitive skills. Acquiring a language may thus be seen as another manifestation of the basic dialectic in which children are biologically prepared for culture, but then participation in culture – whose artifacts embody the skills, attitudes, and perspectives of other individuals – takes their cognitive skills to new places.

See also: Communicative Principle and Communication; Context, Communicative; Cooperative Principle; Cultural and Social Dimension of Spoken Discourse; Discourse Anaphora.

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Socialization

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In anthropology, sociology, as well as social psychology, studies of children are traditionally found under the heading of 'socialization.' In the widest sense, this term refers to an indefinite array of social events taking place in ordinary life surroundings as well as in institutional settings, representing events through which people become skilled in the ways of society. However, researchers within the social and behavioral sciences have settled for a much narrower conceptualization, typically treating socialization as the process through which adults secure the transition of the youngest generation from childhood into ordinary membership of society.

For the early sociologists such as Durkheim and Parsons, who conceived of society largely in moral terms, socialization is primarily a matter of the individual internalizing a set of norms and values crucially shared by members of society. For sociologists and psychologists alike, socialization is the process through which the individual acquires a sense of a social 'self.' Within traditional social anthropology (e.g., Mead, 1930), this process is taken to also include the development of particular skills in relation to the socioeconomic order of a culture. Thus, the notion of socialization has provided sociologists and anthropologists with a way of accounting for the maintenance and reproduction of social order, and furnished psychologists with an axiomatic for understanding the individual's social as well as moral development (Tholander and Cromdal, 2005).

Norms, Rules, and the Maintenance of Social Order

One of the central tasks of early sociology was to explain how societies are held together. Assuming that humans are born into society as virtually asocial beings, Durkheim (1979) came to the realization that the notion of mutual economic interdependence, with its resulting division of labor among members of society, is not enough to account for the maintenance and reproduction of social order. For society to be possible, there must be an underlying consensus among its members concerning the most central values and beliefs that inform and crucially constrain social behavior. This assumption raised questions about how society's central norms and values are transmitted across generations, how in becoming part of society, children come to internalize these most central features of social life. For Durkheim, this task is handled by society's institutions: the family, the church and most importantly the school, which is responsible for the moral education of the child. (*see* **Institutional Talk**).

Following up on these ideas, Parsons (1951) sought to elaborate how societal norms and values are translated into concrete rules of behavior, i.e., how they inform and essentially govern people's actions. Central in his work is the notion of 'value orientation patterns,' which allow individuals to infer the expected forms of behavior from the social roles participants occupy in a variety of settings. This allows people not only to recognize what is expected of them when acting within their roles but also to assess other people's role performance. This is a crucial aspect of the normative nature of social structures, as it enables society's actors to impose social control on each other. Moreover, it allows adult members of society to socialize the children. In this way, the processes of social control and socialization operate within the social system toward an ideal state of equilibrium.

A Developmental Orientation

A notable feature of these early works as well as their subsequent applications is that the concept of socialization is almost exclusively applied to the study of children. In his work on society as a social system, Parsons readily acknowledged that socialization is a life-long process, only to argue later on the same page that sociological inquiry should remain focused on

childhood, or the period of 'primary socialization.' It is during this period in life, Parsons argued, that the 'major value-orientation patterns,' comprising normative patterns of behavior, are 'laid down' with in the social actor (Parsons, 1951: 208). These orientations to shared values were seen as foundational to an individual's 'basic personality structure,' and as such they would not undergo substantial change later in life. Among the specific processes of socialization, Parsons identifies such mechanisms as *reward-punishment*, *instruction*, and a set of *mechanisms of value-acquisition*, of which the most important one is the child's *identification* with the adult.

Parsons's integration of various streams of concurrent psychological reasoning within his systemic theory of society suggests that socialization theory is not a strictly sociological enterprise. Indeed, it provides something of a paradigmatic perspective for social and behavioral studies of children. Hence, issues of socialization have been addressed by virtually all the major psychological theories of development, and there are few major works within social anthropology that do not attend to the problem of cultural transmission across generations, often referred to as 'enculturation.' Common to all the traditional – and much of the contemporary – socialization research is a view of childhood as a period of transition, during which children gradually become (or fail to become) full-fledged members of society. In this way, socialization research trades on massively commonsensical and normative notions of children and childhood. At the same time, it provides a scientific foundation for these cultural beliefs.

Socialization: Critical Perspectives

One of the earliest criticisms of socialization theory appeared in Wrong's (1961) essay on the 'oversocialized conception of man,' in which he argues that the notion of socialization is used as an automatic account for any queries of social order:– Why does society hold together? – Because people are socialized to follow common rules of behavior. The problem here, according to Wrong, is the implication that, having been socialized into society, people have little choice but to follow its rules. Apart from its social determinism, this view renders sociological inquiry trivial.

Similar problems were addressed in Garfinkel's early ethnomethodological investigations (1967), in which he points out that sociological theory construes the member of society as a 'judgmental dope,' who 'produces the stable features of the society by acting in compliance with preestablished and legiti-

mate alternatives of action that the common culture provides' (Garfinkel, 1967: 68). Garfinkel then proposes that in billing the member of society as a judgmental dope, social science scholars employ a variety of (research) procedures, designed to preclude the practical concerns of members in actual social situations. The concept of socialization can then be seen as an analytical resource to this end, in that it allows researchers to gloss over (Mackay, 1975), rather than investigate, the lived features of cultural (re)production. Indeed, the invisibility of actual practices of socialization is already built into Parson's sociological theory, in which he proposes that 'many features of the actual process of socialization of the child are obscure' (Parsons, 1951: 214).

A related set of problems in socialization theory pertains to the specific status of the child as social actor, including, as we have noted, a general research bias toward issues of development. As Speier (1971: 188) points out:

> sociologists (and this probably goes for anthropologists and psychologists) commonly treat childhood as a stage of life that builds preparatory mechanisms into the child's behavior so that he is gradually equipped with the competence to participate in the everyday activities of his cultural partners, and eventually as a bona fide adult member himself.

Speier refers to this view as the 'classical' formulation of socialization because, although employed by researchers for 'scientific' purposes, it is rooted in folk beliefs about children. These beliefs form a set of ideological conventions, according to which children are treated as incomplete social participants, as 'incipient beings' (Durkheim, 1979). On this view, children's social skills are thought of in terms of incompetence, or at best, pre-competence, and therefore, children need to be guided into social life by adults.

Jenks (1997) proposes that most social theories adopt this adult-oriented perspective on children and therefore 'spectacularly fail to constitute the child as an ontology in its own right' (Jenks, 1997: 10). We should note that the adult perspective not only casts children as less-than-competent participants in society's business but also ascribes the problem of participation in social life *to the child* (Speier, 1976). One important implication of this interpretive imposition is that children's actions will be understood in ways that conform to, ratify and elaborate the biased, adult-folklore-oriented view of what goes on between children and adults. This in turn inevitably precludes not only any adequate understanding of children's social worlds but also inhibits an understanding of the joint interactional work in which both parties to adult-child exchanges must necessarily

engage. Ironically, it is precisely these situated practices of action and reasoning that form the very basis of socialization (see Edwards, 1995, and Waksler, 1991, for further discussions).

These concerns led Speier (1971) to respecify the very notion of socialization as above all a matter of developing skills for participation in social events. This opens up for empirical investigation of socialization from within social events, by attending to the organization of talk-in-interaction. In this vein, pioneering ethnomethodological works by Sacks (1992, Vol. 1, Lecture 2, Spring 1966: *et passim*), Speier (1976), and Mackay (1975) demonstrate how children manage to participate in talk under overwhelmingly restricted conversational rights with adults. (*see* **Sacks, Harvey.**) In later years, analysts of social interaction have focused on the organization of talk within a range of activities within the peer group such as negotiations of local alignments and friendship relations (Goodwin, 1990; Whalen, 1995), teasing (Tholander, 2002), and the management of conflict (Cromdal, 2004; Maynard, 1985). (*see* **Organizational Speech; Institutional Talk.**)

The focus on socialization within the peer group arose out of an increasing sociological interest in children's play. As Sutton-Smith pointed out, "Peer interaction is not a preparation for life. It is life itself" (1982: 75). In this vein, interpretive sociologists and social psychologists argued that it is through the management of peer group concerns that children appropriate the values and beliefs of the adult world, and it is through these necessarily communicative practices that children produce their own unique peer culture (e.g., Corsaro and Eder, 1995; Harris, 1995).

The necessity of studying the communicative practices within the peer group is also highlighted by language-oriented ethnographers, who not only demonstrate how children are socialized through language but, crucially, demonstrate how the children are socialized to use language appropriately within distinct social groups (e.g., Ochs and Schieffelin, 1995). These studies, commonly known as 'language socialization,' provide a critical perspective on the relation among language, culture, and communicative practice, and its role in children's language acquisition.

In 1990, James and Prout outlined a social constructionist framework for the study of children and childhood. This interdisciplinary enterprise was designed to revitalize and redefine the status of childhood on the social studies research agenda, and was accordingly launched as a 'new paradigm for the study of childhood' (James and Prout, 1990: 5). Echoing the early ethnomethodological critique, research-

ers embracing this orientation strongly dispute the traditional view that studies of childhood are interesting only insofar as they tell us something about future adulthood, along with its allied notion of children as passive recipients of culture. Instead, within this approach – sometimes referred to as 'the new social studies of childhood' – researchers insist that children be recognized as social agents, capable of constructing their own social worlds. A further interest is in understanding the relations between children's social worlds and society's institutions, such as the family, school, or any other of the adult-dominated spheres of social life in which children routinely participate. Stressing the constructed nature of cultural conceptions of children and childhood, researchers clearly recognize that this process of construction is part and parcel of everyday interactional practices. However, although James and Prout emphasize the need for empirical studies to equal the theoretical development of this enterprise, analyses of situated interactions through which children create their peer cultures within society have hitherto been scarce. Hence, the current challenge for studies of children and childhood lies in exploring the overwhelmingly language saturated practices through which children take part in society's business.

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Socialization: Second Language

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Second Language Socialization

Socialization refers to the interactional processes through which a child or other novice develops the competence required for participation in the social life of a particular community or communities, including routine cultural practices, such as language and literacy activities, and local preferences for action, thought, and emotion. These processes occur in large part through language, the primary symbolic medium of cultural reproduction and transformation. Language socialization researchers invoke Whorfian views of linguistic relativity in articulating the view that "acquiring a language is part of a much larger process of becoming a person in society" (Ochs, 2002: 106). Accordingly, the language socialization paradigm is concerned with two interconnected phenomena: how children and other novices are socialized to use language and how these same individuals are socialized through the use of language. Language socialization research strives to relate individual processes to broader sociocultural contexts, seeking a maximally holistic perspective while simultaneously attending to the microlevel details of language use.

Background and Key Concepts

Originally articulated nearly two decades ago (Ochs and Schieffelin, 1984), this paradigm has retained an emphasis on the dialectic of language learning and socialization. Early language socialization research emerged as a branch of linguistic anthropology, opening new analytic pathways, through the combined use of ethnography and microlinguistic analysis, toward an understanding of first language and literacy development in childhood. Focusing on young children acquiring their L1 in diverse sociocultural settings (Ochs, 1988; Schieffelin and Ochs, 1986), and on relationships between culturally specific patterns of language socialization at home and in school (e.g., Heath, 1983), this research clearly documented the cultural specificity of language and literacy socialization practices and their developmental consequences during the transition from home-based to schooled activities. In subsequent years, language socialization research has expanded beyond its original emphasis on first language learning in childhood, incorporating studies of second and multiple language learning across the life span.

Inspiration for the genesis of the approach is often traced to seminal work on interactional and communicative competence by Gumperz (1982) and Hymes (1972), especially Hymes' formulation of the construct of communicative competence. To recall, Hymes opposed the view that only knowledge of

formal structure was relevant to a theory of competence, arguing instead that competence consists of **variable** knowledge about patterns of language **use**. "Communicative competence involves knowing not only the linguistic code, but also what to say to whom, and how to say it appropriately in any given situation" (Saville-Troike, 2003: 18). Additional disciplinary sources of language socialization research are to be found primarily within scholarly domains privileging various integrated views of language and culture, including, as noted above, linguistic anthropology, but also sociocultural–historical psychology, discourse analysis, and, more recently, cultural and practice theory.

Second language socialization research draws its views on cognition as an integrity of language, mind, and society from sociocultural psychology as originally outlined by Vygotskij (1962, 1978) and Leontiev (1981), with its emphasis on the development of higher-order cognitive functions from the outside in, that is, through social interaction with adults or other experts where performance is assisted. Novices are seen to develop capacities through active and selective participation in social practices at various degrees of engagement (from legitimate peripheral to full participation) and, in so doing, to transform not only their own cognition, but also the qualities of the practices themselves (Lave and Wenger, 1991) (*see* **Communities of Practice**).

A perspective on language integrating linguistics and social practice is taken from discourse analysis, a field of linguistics that emphasizes the study of language in use, examining how the elements of language systems are used for communicative purposes within and across particular social and cultural contexts. "Language is seen as fully integrated into sociocultural behavior, as both the result and the creator of context and structure" (Watson-Gegeo and Nielsen, 2003: 163).

In recent years, language socialization research has been influenced by "…the poststructuralist realization that learning is a non-linear, relational human activity, co-constructed between humans and their environment, contingent upon their position in space and history, and a site of struggle for the control of power and cultural memory" (Kramsch, 2002: 5). Poststructuralist and critical theories attempt to unite research on language and power and thereby to enhance the relevance of this research through agendas of social critique. These approaches highlight the role of language as symbolic capital and the subtle mechanisms by which power is circulated and reproduced in the discourse of socialization practices. Whereas language socialization was once portrayed as inevitable, desirable, and uniformly accessible, many researchers are now sensitive to the dynamic and negotiated nature of the process, including the possibility that novices may not have ready access to socialization, and the fact that they are endowed with agency (to accept, accommodate, resist, or reject socialization processes).

Foci and Methodologies

A constant in language socialization (LS) studies is their emphasis on developmental processes and their longitudinal design, requiring selection of research sites believed to be places of transformation, whether such change is observed in classrooms or chatrooms, in homes, schools, or workplaces. Research involving educational contexts has examined foreign and second language classrooms and participants of varying age, but has also examined the role of socialization practices in technology-enhanced learning environments, study-abroad programs, and adult language and literacy courses. The research on second language socialization is not limited to educational contexts, however, but also includes studies in homes, workplaces, and bilingual or multilingual communities.

Whereas the original methodology combining ethnography and microlinguistic analysis has remained at the core of the approach, language socialization research has also been enriched and refined in the intervening years through inclusion of a variety of definitional constructs, data elicitation practices, and analytic procedures. Thus, ethnographic approaches, in particular the ethnography of communication (EC), feature prominently in the literature on second language socialization. However, this literature is characterized by great variety in the choice of theoretical and analytic emphasis. Some studies take their primary inspiration from sociocultural psychology, examining the mediating role of language in the development of higher-order cognitive functions as individuals participate in 'activity systems'. Other studies focus less on the achievement of a 'thick description' of the surrounding sociocultural context (Geertz, 1973) and more on detailed analysis of particular discourse practices, often in second language classrooms. Still others, often inspired by poststructuralist theories of second language learning, investigate autobiographical representations of language socialization as they are presented in narrative and other texts.

Language socialization research varies considerably with respect to focal scale. Some studies involve minimal engagement with large numbers of participants, whereas others scrutinize the activity of one participant in multiple ways. Some studies examine the activities of participants in a range of contexts, whereas others confine their perspective to one (the

classroom, the chatroom, the workplace). Time frames for longitudinal studies also vary considerably, with some studies emphasizing microgenesis of skills and capacities over relatively short developmental periods, such as one academic semester, and others attempting to trace ontological or developmental histories over periods of years or entire life spans.

Overview of Second Language Socialization Research

The overview of second language socialization research presented here is organized by primary methodological emphasis. Although division of studies into such categories is admittedly somewhat artificial, risking simplification, this descriptive account also provides a clear organizational framework for characterizing how differing epistemological goals and methodological resources are organized in illustrative individual studies. Therefore, the review begins with studies that are primarily ethnographic in orientation and then proceeds to examine the activity-theoretical approach, research examining socialization in second language classroom discourse, and investigations based on narrative study.

Ethnographic Approaches

As defined by Duff (2002), the EC is a "composite of approaches" (p. 292) for conducting qualitative or interpretive research on communication within or across cultures. EC combines etic and emic analyses of communication (i.e., outsider's and insider's views) as well as macro- and microanalyses of discourse in order to examine what a speaker needs to know in order to communicate effectively within a particular speech community and how he or she learns to do so (Saville-Troike, 2003). Ethnographic research normally requires prolonged engagement with the community under study and an effort at data triangulation, as well as careful observation of authentic communicative practices in their naturally occurring context.

Within ethnographic approaches, microlevel analyses of discourse are organized around the "communicative event" as the basic descriptive unit, defined by "a unified set of components throughout, beginning with the same general purpose of communication, the same general topic, and involving the same participants, generally using the same language variety, maintaining the same tone or key and the same rules for interaction, in the same setting" (Saville-Troike, 2003: 23). Within contemporary second language socialization research, routine cultural practices are often mined in attempts to uncover the cultural or ideological underpinnings of everyday

language and the processes by which accompanying values or worldviews are inculcated in children or other novices.

Thus, in many cases, data elicitation begins with a multimethod, holistic approach to thick description (Geertz, 1973) of socialization practices, followed by a choice of relevant communicative events based on this emic analysis. These events are then observed closely and repeatedly as they are audio- or video-recorded and transcribed. The choice of method for microanalysis of socialization practices varies greatly, with some researchers opting for close analysis of emergent routines through conversation analysis and others choosing various other forms of discourse or interaction analysis.

The work of Duff (1995, 2002) offers several examples of ethnographic research, examining the interface between macro- and microlevels of educational discourse in secondary schools. Duff (1995) investigated the consequences of post-Soviet educational reform in English language immersion classes in a progressive Hungarian school. Duff's study revealed how macrolevel changes are reflected in the qualities of classroom discourse as students in English-medium history classes are socialized to accept the replacement of traditional oral assessment through recitation (*felelés*) by student-led activities and open-ended discussion. More recently, Duff (2002) performed an ethnographic study in a mainstream Canadian high school with a large proportion of students who speak English as a second language. Concerned with the creation of cohesive and harmonious school communities that nonetheless accommodate diversity, the study analyzed the sequential organization of talk in a social studies course, including the organization of turn taking, alignment, and other features of participation. Results revealed that the teacher's emphasis on social justice and empathy for others was enacted in her attempts to allocate turns equitably and to have all students, local and nonlocal, draw cultural connections based on personal experience. However, some ESL students often declined to participate in discussions where they were positioned in various ways as outsiders. Thus, the teacher's efforts to foster a cohesive classroom community in which all members participated were often unsuccessful.

Another exemplary ethnographic study was performed by Willett (1995), focusing on the participation of ESL children in the daily routines of a mainstream first-grade classroom in the United States. Willett investigated the qualities of interactional routines embedded in communicative events as four children acquire English in first-grade classroom. The study reveals how the "micropolitics of

social interaction" (p. 475) in this case positioned the three girls in the study as successful learners, able to collaboratively appropriate desirable social, linguistic, and academic competence. The one male participant, however, needed a public status in order to build solidarity with other boys. Having first acquired the public and often crude language used by these boys, he was isolated from his peers and was subsequently deemed an excessively needy and problematic student.

Additional ethnographic studies of note have been carried out in a wide array of contexts. Studies of schooling include Moore's (1999) report of major discontinuities between community and classroom language socialization practices in a Cameroon village, a gap that contributes to widespread rejection of French-based schooling due to the inaccessibility of the French language. Miller's (1999) ethnographic study of ESL students' socialization in a mainstream Australian high school showed how Chinese students' use of English is not legitimated in the same way that it is for European immigrants.

Ethnographic studies of socialization in multilingual workplaces include, for example, Goldstein's (1997) study documenting the complex interaction of community resources and identities combining to limit access to English for Portuguese immigrant factory workers. An ethnographic case study by Li (2000) focused on the pragmatics of higher-stakes social communication, illustrating how one woman, a Chinese immigrant to the United States, came to internalize second language norms and develop communicative competence in English through participation and exposure to social interactions and assistance from experts and more competent peers.

A number of studies have examined the study-abroad sojourn as a context for language socialization. DuFon's (2000) study of the acquisition of linguistic politeness by U.S. sojourners in Indonesia revealed conflicts between the participants' own gender- and religion-related identities and the parallel options available in Indonesian. Talburt and Stuart (1999) discussed the manner in which an African American woman studying in Spain was subjected to continuous and humiliating emphasis on race and sexuality in her interactions with Spaniards. Kline (1998) reported that American women studying abroad in France sought refuge in literacy following repeated encounters with sexist and hostile attitudes in the French-speaking community.

Sociocultural Theory and Language Socialization

Researchers primarily inspired by sociocultural perspectives, including activity theory (Vygotsky, 1978; Leontiev, 1981), have also begun to contribute to the literature on second language socialization. As Kasper has noted (2001), sociocultural theory and language socialization perspectives differ in their epistemological goal: whereas sociocultural theory aims to explain the mediating role of language (and other symbolic or physical tools) in the development of higher forms of cognition, language socialization strives toward an integrated account of language and culture acquisition. Nonetheless, the compatibility of the two perspectives derives from certain basic theoretical and methodological premises.

Just as LS strives to link individual processes to their sociocultural context, activity theory aims to overcome the traditional Cartesian dualism in the social science between the individual and surrounding social environment (Lantolf, 2000). It does so through the concept of mediation, or the observation that all human activity is mediated by culturally created physical and symbolic artifacts, including language.

Whereas LS studies aim to comprehend the norms of 'speech communities', activity theory defines the scope of sociocultural context in relation to the organization of practice. In any activity system, there exists a division of labor according to which certain roles are assigned or negotiated among the participants, and from which emerge the tacit or explicit rules that individuals and the community as a whole follow when interacting with one another and with mediating artifacts. The community of practice, an affiliated term, is seen to emerge from this division of labor and is the prime context in which individuals can work out common sense through (continuous) mutual engagement, a joint enterprise, and a shared repertoire of communicative resources (Wenger, 1998).

A crucial aspect of activity theory is its tracing of human behavior to historical rather than biological sources. The study of development is conceived as observation of genetic processes occurring over time. Language socialization research focuses primarily on two historical domains: ontogenesis (life history of individuals) and microgenesis (history of particular psychological functions over short periods of time). Thus, in practice, methodology of activity-theoretical research shares with LS a concern with prolonged, ecologically valid observation of human action.

From the perspective of activity theory, the meaning of human behavior arises from a need directed toward an object. The projection from the object to the outcome of the behavior is the motive. Motives are not always pre-established, but are dynamic and malleable and may be formulated in the process of activity itself.

An example of an activity-theoretical approach to language socialization is to be found in a study by

Lantolf and Genung (2002) documenting the history of one graduate student's failure to learn Mandarin Chinese as a participant in a summer intensive Chinese course. The participant, P.G., a colonel in the U.S. Army, is an experienced language learner and teacher specializing in applied linguistics who is required to complete a requirement of six credits in a non-Western language. The study focuses on the conflict between P.G.'s historically formed self-image as a good language learner and the rules for interaction imposed by the activity system of the classroom and institution, where an authoritarian methodology is enforced. The study traces the transformation over time in this learner's motives for participating in the course. Whereas initially, P.G. defined her goal as developing communicative competence in Chinese, when her efforts to do so were repeatedly thwarted, she reframed her efforts as related to success in the course so as to meet the requirement and fulfill her obligation to the Army in securing a graduate degree. Thus, the study documents the dynamism of learner motives and accompanying social and cognitive activity as they evolved through participation in the course.

Classroom Discourse

In research on the qualities of classroom discourse, the socialization perspective serves to illuminate the nature and function of interaction as a cultural medium for language learning, focusing on both socialization through language and socialization to use language. For example, in a study of beginning ESL classes in the United States, emphasizing socialization through language, Poole (1992) demonstrated that routine interactional sequences led by the teacher bear significant resemblance to American caregiver language behavior in general. In this context, the teacher/expert coconstructed learner responses, attributed collective task accomplishment to individuals, and avoided an overt display of hierarchical asymmetry, thus expressing cultural preferences for conjecture on the mental states of others, individual achievement, and suppression of power differentials. In a longitudinal study of similar aim, He (2003) examined the heritage Chinese-language school as a locus for socialization into cultural norms, focusing on the speech roles assigned to students. His study demonstrated the variability of novices' responses to socialization practices, showing how the opportunity to acquire Chinese and associated cultural values may be accepted or contested, even by young children.

For adults, socialization through a second language may present particularly complex problems related to language use and identity. Siegal (1996) presented a case study focusing on the role of learner subjectivity in the acquisition of sociolinguistic competence by European women learning Japanese in Japan. The study examined the conflict concerning sociolinguistic appropriateness experienced by one learner in conversation with her professor, where unequal power and positionality exerted influence on the quality of the interaction. Although she did understand the pragmatics of appropriate demeanor for a woman in Japanese society, in attempting to craft a voice for herself as a professional woman in Japanese, the student manipulated honorifics, modality, and topic control in ways that sometimes resulted in inappropriate language use.

Other classroom discourse studies orient their analysis more closely toward socialization to use language. Ohta (1999) probed interactional sequences in a Japanese-as-a-foreign-language classroom, emphasizing how these sequences engage learners' participation. The study tracked the pragmatic development of a learner over the course of 1 year, demonstrating that active and peripheral participation in the routines of classroom language use shaped the learner's ability to use the follow-up turn of the Initiation–Response–Follow-up routine to perform assessments and other responses to interlocutors' utterances. Hall (1995) scrutinized the interactive environment of a first-year high school Spanish class intended to provide speaking opportunities. The teacher's primary method of developing and maintaining topical coherence took place through repetition and chaining of a small number of lexical items. This practice differs considerably from the ways in which topics are discursively established and managed outside the classroom and produces a limited repertoire of communicative practices for the students. Students in such classrooms are not socialized to use discursive forms and functions for engaging in complex, extended talk about a topic and, indeed, in the absence of overarching topic relevance, these students cannot orient to the talk in ways that permit coherent contributions.

With the arrival and widespread use of computer-mediated communications (CmC) technology in the language classroom, researchers have also begun to investigate the implications of CmC use for language socialization. For example, in a study focused on the development of pragmatic competence in the use of address forms (du vs. Sie), Belz and Kinginger (2003) examined the discourse of intercultural exchanges in German and English in the context of a telecollaborative language course. Internet-mediated contact with peers who are expert users of German offered participants in the United States many opportunities for assisted performance in socially acceptable use of the address form system in German.

Narrative Study and Second Language Socialization

The contemporary literature includes a number of narrative approaches to second language socialization, aiming to understand how multilinguals represent the process of language socialization and how this process impacts on the qualities of communicative repertoires. Research on the representation of language socialization examines learners' autobiographical accounts of language learning. Based on representations of language learning history, often written by exceptional learners and users of multiple languages, this research offers insights into the ontogenesis of multilingualism over time and in relation to personal identity and historical context.

Pavlenko (2001), for example, adopted a poststructuralist approach to narrative study in a series of studies linking L2 socialization to various aspects of identity. Poststructuralism is "understood broadly as an attempt to investigate and to theorize the role of language in construction and reproduction of social relations, and the role of social dynamics in the processes of additional language learning and use" (Pavlenko, 2002a: 282). Narrative study is a socioculturally and sociohistorically situated literary analysis in terms of genre conventions, metaphors, and tropes (e.g., the self-made man, language learning as appropriation of voice) (Pavlenko, 2002b). Pavlenko (2001) posited cross-cultural differences in societal conceptions of normative gender-related identities. Based on a corpus of 30 second-language learning stories, Pavlenko analyzed learners' encounters with ideologies of gender and their associated discursive practices. She explored the dilemma of border crossers who find themselves in situations where their previous subjectivities cannot be legitimately produced and understood and who must choose to resist or produce new social identities, beginning with perception and critical examination of these identity options, through the processes of choosing assimilation or resistance and of undergoing gender socialization.

Narrative approaches may also be applied to the study of bilingual communicative repertoires, as exemplified in the work of Koven (1998) examining the performance of identity in narrative by Portuguese–French bilinguals. The study involved elicitation of the same oral narratives of personal experience in Portuguese and French, with analysis of communicative style and use of register in each. Development of communicative repertoires in each of the two languages was closely tied to the sociocultural context of socialization, such that, in effect, the participants appeared to be performing different "selves" in each of their two languages. Having grown up in Paris, with family ties and frequent visits to rural Portugal, when narrating in French the participants employed contemporary urban speech styles expressing progressive values and gender roles in which, for example, women's self-expression is relatively unconstrained. When narrating in Portuguese, however, the same participants employed speech styles characteristic of rural settings and presented a more conservative version of their identity.

Taken together, these narrative approaches represent a promising new direction in the study of language socialization as a complex, lifelong process with consequences for discursive performance of identity.

Conclusion

Within second language studies, language socialization is now represented in numerous domains, including bilingualism, multilingualism, and foreign language learning in homes, workplaces, and educational settings of various kinds. Edited volumes (Kramsch, 2002; Bayley and Schecter, 2003) and a summary article (Watson-Gegeo and Nielsen, 2003) have marked the general acceptance of language socialization perspectives. At the same time, this growth has not gone uncontested, largely because the disciplinary roots and epistemology of socialization research are seen as fundamentally incompatible with those of the field known as Second Language Acquisition (SLA). Kramsch (2002), for example, expressed this conflict in terms of basic conceptual metaphors, with SLA preferring the Learner as Computer, and language socialization, the Learner as Apprentice. Historically, she noted, there has been little communication between these fields despite the fact that in practice (e.g., the practice of language learning and teaching) the goals of each may be seen as complementary, as, for example, when the aim of second language instruction is expressed as communicative development that requires precise knowledge of grammar and lexis. It is to be hoped that the complementarity of these approaches will increase in salience as researchers continue to design investigations of language learning.

See also: Communicative Competence; Communicative Language Teaching; Communities of Practice; Identity in Sociocultural Anthropology and Language; Identity: Second Language; Language Socialization; Narrative: Sociolinguistic Research.

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Society and Language: Overview

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Language

'Linguistics' may be somewhat blandly defined as the study of language. Such a characterization leaves out the all-important formulation of how such study is to be conducted, and where exactly the boundaries of the term 'language' itself lie. Broadly speaking, different branches of linguistics are concerned with language structure, acquisition, and use. 'Sociolinguistics' is one of the branches that is concerned more with the use of language than the other two aspects. And unlike branches like pragmatics and discourse analysis, which are also concerned with 'use,' sociolinguistics lays particular emphasis upon the social embeddness of language. When we use the term 'language' as a general phenomenon, we refer to a system of arbitrary symbols used for human communication. Having 'human communication' as part of the definition of language makes it impossible to study language comprehensively without due regard to the social context of speech. Such an emphasis was not always explicit in linguistics.

Antecedents of Sociolinguistics

While sociolinguistics as a specially demarcated area of language study dates only to the early 1960s (e.g., Paulston and Tucker, 1997; Shuy, 1997: 23, who cite the summer of 1964 as a crucial time), attention to the social was implicit in many earlier studies. It is possible that just as most linguists accept that scholarly linguistics was first practiced in ancient India, culminating in Panini's *Astadhyayi* (ca. 500 B.C.E.), Panini may prove a pioneer of sociolinguistics too. The suggestion has been made that Panini's rules are, *inter alia*, "sophisticated attempts at capturing the stylistic preferences among variants which are characteristic of any living language" (Kiparsky, 1979: 1). In terms of a continuous lineage for modern sociolinguistics, however, four western traditions have been most influential: historical and comparative linguistics, anthropology, rural dialectology, and the study of mixed languages.

Historical and comparative linguists became interested in modern speech forms (or 'dialects') for the possible light they could shed on theories of language change that had previously been based on written materials. Two branches of what is now called 'sociolinguistics' had strong 19th-century antecedents: the study of rural dialects in Europe and contact between languages that resulted in new 'mixed languages.' The work of Hugo Schuchardt (1882), Dirk Hesseling (1897) and Addison Van Name (1869–1870) challenged many of the assumptions of their contemporaries.

Even Saussure, who is most frequently associated with modern structuralism, stressed in his work that language was a 'social fact,' i.e., it belonged to a realm larger than that of the individual. A society is not just the lowest common denominator of its individuals. For Saussure, the concrete data of language (what he called '*parole*') are produced by individual speakers, but "language is not complete in any speaker; it exists perfectly only within a collectivity" (1959: 14).

In the early 20th century, structuralists in the United States were partly motivated by the need to describe rapidly eroding American Indian languages before they became extinct. Becoming acquainted with the cultural patterns of societies that were novel to them led scholars like Franz Boas, Leonard Bloomfield, and Edward Sapir to establish what became the foundations of studies of language, culture, and cognition. Such an anthropological perspective on language was a forerunner to some branches of sociolinguistics, especially the ethnographical approach.

The term 'sociolinguistics' appears to have been first used in 1952 by Haver Currie, a poet and philosopher who noted the general absence of any consideration of the social in the linguistic research of his day. Significant works on sociolinguistics appearing after this date include Weinreich's influential *Languages in contact* (a structural and social account

of bilingualism; 1953), Einar Haugen's two-volume study of the social history of the Norwegian language in America (1953), and Joos (1962) on the dimensions of style.

Emphases in Sociolinguistics

Chomsky's emphasis in the 1960s on an approach that abstracted language away from everyday contexts ironically led to the distillation of a core area of sociolinguistics, which was opposed to his conception of language. In a now infamous passage, Chomsky (1965: 3) argued that linguistic theory should be concerned primarily with an ideal speaker-listener in a completely homogeneous speech community, who knows its language perfectly and who is unaffected when applying his knowledge of the language in actual performance. While such an approach brought significant gains to the theory of syntax and phonology, many scholars felt that abstracting away from society could not lead to an encompassing theory of human language. This period marked a break between sociolinguists, who had an interest in language as communication within human societies, and the 'generativists,' who were interested in an idealized, nonsocial, psycholinguistic competence. Whereas the Chomskyan framework focused on what could be generated in language and by what means, the social approach tried to account for what can be said in a language, by whom, to whom, in whose presence, when and where, in what manner and under what social circumstances (Fishman, 1971; Hymes, 1971; Saville-Troike, 1982: 8). For the latter group, the process of acquiring a language is not just a cognitive process involving the activation of a predisposition in the human brain: it is a social process as well, that only unfolds in social interaction. The child's role in acquiring its first language is not a socially passive one, but one which is sensitive to certain 'environmental' conditions, including the social identity of the different people the child interacts with.

Dell Hymes (1971) was the principal objector to the dominance of Chomsky's characterization of what constituted the study of linguistic competence. He suggested that a child who might produce any sentence whatever without due regard to the social and linguistic context would be "a social monster" (1974: 75) who was "likely to be institutionalized." Hymes coined the term 'communicative competence' to denote our ability to use language appropriately in different settings. His stress on language **use** was in strong contrast to Chomsky's focus on the abstract code. Hymes interest was not just in the production of sentences, but in characterizing the more social-bound aspects, such as the amount and volume of talk in different communities, acceptability of silence, rules for turn-taking, amount of simultaneous talk, etc. In this view, there are rules of use without which the rules of grammar are, at best, abstractions (at worst, Hymes said, "useless"). William Labov (1972: xiii), whose name features prominently in the discipline, expressed uneasiness about the term 'sociolinguistics,' since in his view there can be no linguistics that is not social. Still others are slightly suspicious of the term, since it privileges the linguistic over the social. One distinction that is sometimes made is that between 'sociolinguistics' (proper) and the 'sociology of language.' Some scholars believe that the former is part of the terrain mapped out in linguistics, focusing on language in society for the light that social contexts throw upon language. For these scholars, the latter ('sociology of language') is primarily a subpart of sociology, which examines language use for its ultimate illumination of the nature of societies. One writer (Fasold, 1984, 1990) has attempted to capture this formulation by writing two scholarly books: *The sociolinguistics of society* and *The sociolinguistics of language*. While there is some basis for such a partition, and something to be gained by it, in practice the boundaries between the two areas of study are so flexible as to merit one cover term (although, as in this entry, there is a slight difference in nuance between 'sociology of language' and the more common and general term 'sociolinguistics'). Sometimes the distinction between the two orientations is expressed by the terms 'macrosociolinguistics' and 'microsociolinguistics.' As in other subjects, notably economics, macrostudies involve an examination of interactions at a broader level (the focus is broad, as in the study of multilingualism or language attitudes in a community). Microstudies examine finer patterns on a local level (e.g., the details of conversational structure or accents in a particular community). Macrosociolinguistics tends to overlap with applied linguistics to some extent, especially regarding language policy, language use in the domain of education, and the interface between dialect and standard. The two fields are separated by the greater interest among applied linguists in the psychology of language learning, especially in second-language acquisition. There is also a more practical orientation among applied linguists in their educationally focused work on curriculum issues, materials development, language assessment, remediation, and so forth.

'A Language' as a Social Construct

Up to now we have been dealing with 'language' in the abstract, as a collective term. When we turn to 'languages' as individual entities, the possession of specific societies, we run into problems of definition.

It may come as a surprise to the nonspecialist to learn that linguists are unable to offer a definition of what constitutes 'a language' (as against overlapping entities such as 'dialects'). For this reason the term 'variety' is employed as a neutral one, referring to any form of speech. The term 'variety' is particularly useful when the status of a speech form is unclear and one wishes to avoid prejudging the issue whether a given speech form is (in popular terms) a 'language' or a 'dialect.' In many instances the boundaries between languages are far from clear, especially where historical and geographical links are involved. Mutual intelligibility might seem a useful test of whether two varieties are distinct or not. In practice, however, it is almost always sociopolitical criteria that decide the status of a variety, rather than linguistic ones.

The case of Norwegian and Danish provides a clear illustration of the sociopolitical nature of the distinction between what counts as a language and what does not. For four centuries Norway was ruled by Denmark. Danish was considered the official language, with Norwegian speech having dialect status (i.e., it was considered a dialect of Danish). Upon Norway gaining its political independence in 1814, Norwegian was declared an 'official language,' distinct from Danish. The same has happened in what was formerly Yugoslavia, where Serbian and Croatian did not have independent status but were considered as 'eastern' and 'western' variants of the same language called Croato-Serbian (or Serbo-Croatian). With the bloody conflict that accompanied the breakup of the federation in the 1990s, differences between the two varieties were emphasized, and each of them have come to be considered independent 'languages.'

The opposite case is that of two varieties classified by linguists as distinct languages but considered the same by a community. Linguists consider creole forms of language to be separate systems from the languages they drew much of their vocabulary from (e.g., Jamaican Creole English is a different system from the standard English of southern England). Yet their coexistence of the two systems in the same society and the dominance of the more standard forms of English may not always lead to the recognition of the two as separate languages.

Language Is Not a 'Given'

The work of Le Page (1978) and Le Page and Tabouret-Keller (1985) has been influential in showing the potential diffuseness of the notion of 'a given language' and the way that the identities of groups of people are shaped by, and in turn shape, language use. For Le Page and Tabouret-Keller (1985: 14), linguistic behavior is "a series of **acts of identity** in which

people reveal both their personal identity and their search for social roles." In this view, identity and language use are potentially fluid; and individuals have priority. Well-defined social groups may or may not exist beforehand. In the highly multilingual and heterogeneous communities they studied in the Caribbean, the researchers found it necessary to pay attention to the processes of emergence and disintegration of identities in relation to linguistic processes of focusing and diffusion. The terms 'focusing' and 'diffusion' are based on the imagery of the movie screen. Speech acts are acts of projection: the speaker projects his inner universe via a common language (with its nuances of grammar, vocabulary, and accent) or via a particular choice of language where choices exist (in multilingual settings). The speaker implicitly invites others to share his projection of the world, insofar as they recognize his language as an accurate symbolization of the world, and to share his attitudes toward it (Le Page and Tabouret-Keller, 1985: 181). The feedback he receives from those with whom he talks may reinforce his perceptions, or they may cause him to modify his projections, both in their form and content. To the extent that he is reinforced, his behavior in that context may become more regular, more focused; to the extent that he modifies his behavior to accommodate others, it may for a time become more variable, more diffuse. In time, however, the behavior of the group – that is, he and those with whom he is trying to identify – will become focused. The individual thus creates for himself patterns of linguistic behavior so as to resemble those of the group or groups which he wishes to be identified at different times. Le Page stressed four provisos to this hypothesis:

a. that one can identify the groups
b. that one has adequate access to the groups and the ability to analyze their behavioral patterns
c. that the motivation for joining the group must be sufficiently powerful and is either reinforced or lessened by feedback from the group
d. that one has the ability to modify one's behavior.

Le Page and Tabouret-Keller's model thus teases out the kind of variation evident in a society from its historical moments: is it a society in the making or in flux (diffuse) or is it, historically speaking, focused?

Sociolinguistics Is Not Prescriptive

Following studies like those of Le Page and Tabouret-Keller, sociolinguists now accept the idea that language is partly inherited and partly made and remade by its speakers. This perspective does not fit well with the traditional views one encounters among some writers, educationists, parents, and policy makers.

The latter are more concerned with inculcating and transmitting a formal, written, and relatively homogeneous standard form of a language. There is nothing wrong with this ideal, provided that all citizens have access to the resources that are necessary for the mastery of the standard. Sociolinguists and linguists generally do, however, insist that inculcation of a standard norm among schoolchildren should not be accompanied by the denigration of the vernacular forms of language that pupils bring to the school. Children have in place a full language system, capable of considerable communicative nuance, before arriving at school. The vernacular has been demonstrated (see Labov, 1969) to be rule governed, even if it does not always meet the preconceived notions of correctness that two centuries of prescriptivism have inculcated among educators. Linguists (see Palmer, 1971; Crystal, 1971) have long shown the subjectivity and contradictions of the prescriptive rules insisted on by teachers ('don't split infinitives'; 'two negatives make a positive'). For English, these norms evolved over a period of time after considerable subjective pronouncements by 18th-century writers and grammarians (see Milroy and Milroy, 1985). They can easily be shown to have logical flaws. (In Latin, the infinitive occurs as a single word, which cannot be split; English, by contrast, expresses the infinitive in two words – $to +$ verb – which occasionally permits an intervening adverbial element, as in *I want you to really try, for my sake*. The insistence that two negatives make a positive in English is nullified by prescriptivists' views of collocations of three negatives, as in *Nobody never said no such thing*. Prescriptivists would not accept this sentence as grammatical, even though the mathematics they appeal to makes it negative, rather than positive.) Prescriptive judgments ultimately serve upper- and middle-class interests, stamping their ideology as relating to 'taste,' 'discrimination,' and 'culture.' The sociologist Basil Bernstein (1974) argued that the orientation of children from working-class backgrounds toward language was 'restricted' compared to the relatively 'elaborated' norms of the middle classes. And since school success demanded the mastery of the latter, children from working-class backgrounds were less likely to succeed, given their limited access to those norms. Furthermore, their class position militated against acquiring norms that are associated with forms of authority and/or lifestyles that they see no point in emulating. Bernstein's dichotomy between restricted and elaborated codes has been argued to be more an assumption than a linguistic reality (Labov, 1969; Edwards, 1979). However, his foregrounding of language and class issues in education is a lasting contribution to the sociology of language.

Society

A coherent theory of language in society can unfold only within a particular theory of society. Within sociology there are three dominant theories of human society, and there is little agreement between their adherents. The three theories (or sets of ideas about how society works) that have informed different approaches to sociolinguistics are 'functionalism,' 'Marxism,' and 'interactionism.'

Functionalism

Functionalism was the dominant theoretical perspective in western thought between the 1940s and mid-1960s. It pursued the view that a society may be understood as a system made up of functioning parts. To understand any part of society (e.g., the family or school), the part must be examined in relation to the society as a whole. Haralambos and Holborn (1991: 8) stressed the analogy with biology: just as a biologist might examine a part of the human body (e.g., the heart) in terms of its contribution to the maintenance of the human organism, the functionalist examines a part of society (e.g., the family) in terms of its contribution to the maintenance of the social system. The social system has certain basic needs (or functional prerequisites) that must be met if is to survive (e.g., food and shelter). The value of the function of any part of society lies in its contribution to the maintenance of the overall whole. There is a certain degree of integration between the parts (social institutions) that make up the society. Functionalists argue that the order and stability they see as essential for the maintenance of the social system are provided by 'value consensus,' i.e., agreement about values by members of society. In this view, two major occupations of the sociologist are the study of social subsystems and the value consensus that binds them together. Concepts stressed within (but not exclusive to) this brand of sociology that are particularly useful to sociolinguists include the following.

Culture Although the popular sense of this word stresses 'high' culture (e.g., musical, literary, and artistic achievements), in the technical sociological-anthropological sense, the culture of a society is "the way of life of its members; the collection of ideas and habits which they learn, share and transmit from generation to generation" (Linton, 1945). Culture in this sense is a "design for living" that defines appropriate or acceptable ways and forms of behavior within particular societies.

Socialization 'Socialization' refers to the process through which people learn the culture of their society. Primary socialization takes place in childhood, usually within the family. From a linguistic point of view, the peer group (e.g., the child's circle of playmates within and outside the home) soon overtakes the parents as the main reference group in transmitting linguistic behavior. Socialization continues into adulthood, and upon permanently entering a new society that differs considerably from one's own a person may undergo resocialization.

Norms and Values "A norm is a specific guide to action which defines acceptable and appropriate behavior in particular situations" (Haralambos and Holborn, 1991: 5), as evident in dress codes at school, at home, and at a party. In the course of socialization, 'norms' are inculcated by rewards (a sweet, a kind word) or punishments. Some norms become enacted in law to serve a larger society, e.g., a law forbidding nude bathing or the exposure of a woman's face in public in some societies. 'Values,' on the other hand, provide general guidelines regarding qualities that are deemed to be good, desirable, and of lasting worth. In many modern societies, the value placed on human life is a basic one that determines norms of behavior (e.g., standards of hygiene, settling of disputes, work safety regulations, etc.). Functionalist sociology proceeds from the premise that unless norms are shared, members of society would be unlikely to cooperate and work together. In this view, an ordered and stable society requires shared norms and common values.

Status and Role 'Status' refers to social positions that society assigns to its members (not just the high ones, as in popular parlance). Such a status may be ascribed, i.e., relatively fixed by birth (e.g., one's gender status, or aristocratic titles in some societies); or it may be achieved. The latter refers to statuses that result from some degree of personal endeavor, e.g., a career as a teacher or an athlete. In a caste-based society, one's occupation is ascribed, i.e., determined by birth; whereas in other societies it is achieved (i.e., by choosing one's training). According to Haralambos and Holborn (1991: 7) each status in society is accompanied by a number of norms that define how an individual occupying a particular status is expected to act. This group of norms is known as a 'role.' Social roles regulate and organize behavior. In the course of a day, a person may play out several roles: that of teacher (at work), mother and wife (at home), client (with a bank), poet (at a leisure society), etc. These roles are defined by their interactive nature: the role of doctor usually assumes the existence (if not the presence of) a patient, that of mother the existence

of the child, and so on. Each of these roles calls upon different forms of behavior, including linguistic behavior.

Marxism

Since the 1970s Marxist approaches in sociology have become increasingly influential. Differing sharply from the functionalist belief that all social groups benefit if their society functions smoothly, Marxism stresses fundamental differences of interest between social groups. These differences ensure that conflict is a common and persistent feature of society, not just a temporary disturbance of the social order (as functionalists believe). Karl Marx (1818–1883) stressed the economic basis of human organization, which could be divided into two levels: a base (or infrastructure) and a superstructure. The 'base' is determined by the forces of production (e.g., the raw materials and technology of a particular society) and the social relationships of production (e.g., social relationships that people enter into – such as manager and worker – to produce goods). The other aspect of society, the 'superstructure,' is made of the political, legal, and educational institutions, which are not independent of the base but shaped by it. Marx believed that all societies in historical times contain basic contradictions that preclude them from existing permanently. These contradictions, involving the increasing exploitation of one group by another (e.g., the exploitation of serfs by lords in feudal times), have to be resolved, since a social system containing such contradictions cannot survive unchanged.

The concepts that Marxists emphasize in their studies include social class; exploitation and oppression; contradiction, conflict, and change; and ideology and false consciousness. 'Class' denotes a social group whose members share a similar relationship to the means of production. Essentially, in capitalist societies, there is the ruling class, which owns the means of production (e.g., land, raw materials) and the working class, which must sell its labor power to earn a living. In feudal society the two main classes are distinguished relative to ownership of the land: the feudal nobility who owns it and the landless serfs who work it.

'Exploitation' in this theory is a technical term that stresses that the wealth produced by the labor power of workers is appropriated in the forms of profits by the ruling class. 'Ideology' within Marxist theory refers to the set of dominant ideas of an age: it emanates from the control of the ruling classes of the institutions of the superstructure. Such ideas serve ultimately to justify the power and privilege of the ruling class "and conceal from all members of society the basis of exploitation and oppression on which

their dominance rests" (Haralambos and Holborn, 1991: 14). A clear example comes again from the feudal age in Europe, when the dominant concepts were honor and loyalty, which appeared to be the natural order and were celebrated in literature and implicit in superstructural institutions such as the law courts and education. Similarly, according to many theorists, in the capitalist age, exploitation is disguised by the ideology of equality and freedom, which appear to be not just sensible and true but natural and desirable. This, Marxists argue, conceals the reality that capitalism involves fundamentally unequal relationships: workers are not ultimately 'free' since they are forced to work to survive: all they can do is exchange one form of wage subordination for another.

Interactionism

A third school of thought within sociology, less influential than the previous two, proceeds from a bottom-up approach of examining small-scale encounters, rather than large-scale social systems. It seeks to understand action between individuals. Haralambos and Holborn (1991: 15) emphasized that interactionism begins from the assumption that action is meaningful to those involved, and that those meanings are accordingly not fixed, but created, developed, modified, and changed within the actual process of interaction. Not only is the meaning of a social encounter a negotiated entity, but the individual develops a 'self-concept' (or idea of oneself) according to the interaction processes he or she takes part in and according to the way he or she is evaluated therein. For the interactionist, social roles are not as clearly defined as within functional theory. Furthermore, interactionists argue that roles are often unclear, ambiguous, or vague. This may provide actors with considerable room for negotiation, improvisation, and creative action.

Much sociolinguistics has proceeded implicitly from a functionalist perspective of society, although it must be said that within the discipline the linguistic tends to overshadow the sociological. The latter is often considered useful, largely for informal background information and orientation. Marxist approaches are not typically emphasized in the West, and while the skepticism with which Marxist/ communist political practice has come be to viewed worldwide is understandable, from a scholarly point of view, many of the insights emanating from sociolinguistics do fit the Marxist critique of social systems quite well. Some sociolinguists have explored the linguistic ramifications of rule, control, and power. And class differences (which often criss-cross with gender or ethnicity) remain at the heart of studies of

sociolinguistic variation. Interactionism, which may not seem as substantial a sociological approach as the other two, has nevertheless inspired some important work in sociolinguistics (*see* **Interactional Sociolinguistics**).

Language in Society, Society in Language

A concern for the 'human communication' aspect within the definition of language implies attention to the way language is played out in societies in its full range of functions. This function is not just 'denotational'; the latter term refers to the process of conveying meaning, referring to ideas, events, or entities that somehow exist outside language. Even while primarily concerned with this function, a speaker will inevitably give off signals concerning his or her social and personal background. Language is accordingly said to be 'indexical' of one's social class, status, region of origin, gender, age group, etc. The term 'index' here is drawn from semiotic theory (or the science of signs), in which it refers to a particular relation between a sign and the object it stands for. In the sociolinguistic sense 'index' refers to certain features of speech (including accent) that indicate an individual's social group (or background); the use of these features is not exactly arbitrary, since it signals (or indexes) that the individual has access to the lifestyles that support that type of speech.

The relationship between region of origin, age, and – especially – social status and characteristic ways of using language are emphasized in 'variation theory,' as developed by William Labov (1966). Variationists use correlational techniques in revealing the relationship between linguistic variables (e.g., a vowel sound that has different variants that result in different accents) and social variables (age, gender, class, etc.). This is a vibrant and rigorous branch of sociolinguistics – to the extent that many characterize it as 'core sociolinguistics' or 'sociolinguistics proper.' Many sociolinguistics, however, argue that correlation does not capture the complex way in which language is intertwined with human existence. That is, they stress that talk is not just a reflection of social organization; rather, it is a practice that is one of social organization's central parts. This approach has informed much work on language and gender in linguistics. In earlier gender and language research (see Lakoff, 1975) the main aim was to demonstrate a broad linguistic split between the sexes. Subsequent researchers went beyond the descriptive framework to an action-research mode that popularized the argument that languages could be sexist – that is, they could discriminate against women by presenting things from a male perspective (see, e.g., Spender,

1990). Language thus not only reflects existing inequalities but also helps to sustain and reproduce them, unless challenged. Subsequent gender research has increasingly become more nuanced. Eckert (1989) stressed the interplay between gender and social class in setting up various overlapping identities. From anthropology and gay studies has come the notion that a simple two-way dichotomy is misleading; there are differing degrees of masculinity and femininity (Johnson and Meinhof, 1997; Kulick, 2000).

Similar arguments hold for sociolinguistic approaches to ethnicity. In some societies, ethnicity may be more salient than class stratification, and language may play a key role in reflecting and indeed in maintaining and 'reproducing' an ethnic identity. Ethnicity is notoriously difficult to define and may not be as objective a phenomenon as sometimes assumed. Edwards (1985: 8) quoted Weber (1968), who regarded ethnic groups as "those human groups that entertain a subjective belief in their common descent . . . it does not matter whether or not an objective blood relationship exists. Ethnic membership . . . differs from the kinship group precisely by being a **presumed** identity." Sociolinguists therefore argue against the notion of a 'primordial ethnicity' that one sometimes finds in the literature on language maintenance. After all, group identity can survive language shift and frequently does. On the other hand, it is difficult to imagine a sense of ethnicity that does not entail significant differences in language use (e.g., religious and cultural vocabulary and nuances of accent are well attested in ethnic dialects). Postmodern urban people of the 21st century frequently have multiple identities, playing out a number of roles in a single day, each of which may require different language choices.

The idea was once popular in linguistics and anthropology that language and thought are more closely entwined than is commonly believed. An extreme form of this belief is what has come to be known as the 'Sapir–Whorf hypothesis': It is not just that language reflects thought; but conversely, thought is influenced by the language one is 'born into.' Mind, according to this hypothesis, is in the grip of language, and so are social consciousness and organization. Edward Sapir, and – especially – Benjamin Lee Whorf were led by their studies of Amerindian languages to argue that speakers of certain languages may be led to different types of observations and different evaluations of externally similar phenomena. According to Whorf (1956: 213), "we dissect nature along lines laid down by our native language." He said that using a language forced us into habitual grooves of thinking, almost like putting on a special pair of glasses that heighten some aspects of the physical and mental world while dimming others. One example provided by Whorf concerned the distinction between nouns and verbs in Hopi as opposed to English. The Hopi terms for 'lightning,' 'wave,' 'flame,' 'meteor,' 'puff of smoke,' and 'pulsation' are all verbs, since events of necessarily brief duration fall into this category. The terms for 'cloud' and 'storm,' on the other hand, are of just enough duration to qualify as nouns. Another of Whorf's striking examples concerns tense and time. Whereas English dissects events according to their time of occurrence (relative to the act of speaking), Hopi expresses other categories in the verb, notably the kind of validity that the speaker intends the statement to have: is it a report of an event, an expectation of an event, or a generalization or law about events?

The Sapir–Whorf hypothesis is a thought-provoking one, whose strong form suggests, among other things, that real translation between widely different languages is not possible. The hypothesis has proved impossible to test: how would one go about ascertaining that the perceptions of a Hopi speaker concerning the world are radically different from that of, say, a French speaker? Generative linguists today insist that there are limits (or parameters) along which languages vary. In appealing to the notion of deep structure (or its more recent mutations), this school of linguistics stresses an underlying capacity for language that is common to humans. What seem to be radical differences in the grammatical structure of languages are held to operate 'on the surface,' as mappings from an abstract and quasi-universal deep structure. Linguists feel safer in accepting a 'weak form' of the Sapir–Whorf hypothesis: that our language influences (rather than completely determines) our way of perceiving things. But language does not grip us so strongly as to prevent at least some individuals from seeing things from different perspectives, from forming new thoughts and ideas. Within sociolinguistics, studies in the way that languages influence each other (by borrowing and mixing) also cast doubt on the strong form of the hypothesis. As Gillian Sankoff (1986: xxi) put it: "my conviction [is] that in the long term language is more dependent on the social world than the other way around . . . Language does facilitate social intercourse, but if the social situation is sufficiently compelling, language will bend."

Types of Societies, Types of Language?

Societies may be characterized in terms of their complexity, as defined by their size, hierarchical organization, specialization of tasks, and interaction with other societies. It is important to note that

there is no linguistic analogy to this. Languages cannot be arranged in a list from least complex to most complex. The structure of a language does not correlate with the complexity of the communities that typically use them. In terms of morphology, syntax, and semantics, a language of an isolated mountain-bound community in the Himalayas is no less complex than any of the six world languages of the United Nations. The poet-cum-linguist Sapir (1921: 219) put it as follows: "When it comes to linguistic form, Plato walks with the Macedonian swineherd, Confucius with the head-hunting savage of Assam." Sapir's student, Whorf (1956: 84), who was intimately acquainted with the structure of Hopi and other Amerindian languages, was just as emphatic, if less poetic:

> The relatively few languages of the cultures which have attained to modern civilization promise to over-spread the globe and cause the extinction of the hundreds of diverse exotic linguistic species, but it is idle to pretend that they represent any superiority of type. On the contrary, it takes but little real scientific study of preliterate languages, especially those of America, to show how much more precise and finely elaborated is the system of relationships in many such tongues than is ours.

A reverse argument sometimes holds: people maintain that languages rich in inflections or in ways of combining basic grammatical units (morphemes) into words are perhaps too complex to function as languages of wider communication. Conversely, they suggest that the inflectional simplicity of English enables it to be effective as a language of international transactions. Several things are wrong with this argument. In the first place, notions of complexity should not be limited to the morphology of a language. Modern linguistics emphasizes the enormously complex organization of all languages. One language might appear to be morphologically richer on the surface, but a relatively simpler morphology (as with English) has to be made up in other components of the grammar – in the syntax and lexicon. If we are to look for reasons for the spread of one language over another, the wrong place to start would be the structure of the language, as Edwards (1995: 40) forcefully suggested:

> It is [...] clear, to the modern linguist at any rate, that these varieties [dominant languages] achieved widespread power and status because of the heightened fortunes of their users, and not because of any intrinsic linguistic qualities of the languages themselves. The most common elements here have to do with military, political and economic might, although there are also examples in which a more purely cultural status

supports the lingua franca function. However, in this latter case, the cultural clout which lingers has generally grown from earlier associations with those more blatant features just mentioned. The muscle, in any case, which these languages have, derives from the fact that their original users control important commodities – wealth, dominance, learning – which others see as necessary for their own aspirations. The aphorism 'all roads lead to Rome' has linguistic meaning too.

It is sometimes said that if languages are all linguistically equal, they are not all sociolinguistically equal. In this vein, Joseph (1987: 25–39) pointed to the effects of print literacy and standardization in giving some forms of language and some languages an advantage over others, so that certain forms of language come to be seen as more important than others. But this should not be taken to mean that some languages are better placed in an absolute sense to serve a range of sociolinguistic functions (e.g., in formal speeches, writing, or television) than others. Every language has the potential to add to its characteristic vocabulary and ways of speaking if new roles become necessary. Some languages have a superior technical vocabulary to that of others in certain spheres. This is a difference in actuality rather than in potential.

Multilingualism: One Society, Many Languages

Many countries, especially in the West, attach special significance to one of their languages over others, adhering to an ethos of 'one state, one language.' Many of the states of Europe arose during a period of intense nationalism, with accompanying attempts to make national borders coterminous with language (and vice versa). The dominance of European powers in modern history has made this seem a desirable situation, if not an ideal one. The nonaligned sociolinguist instead points to the essentially multilingual nature of most human societies and to the fact that there are almost no countries in the world – even in western Europe – where everyone speaks, or identifies with, one language. In statistical terms, Grosjean (1982: vii) estimates that about half the world's population is bilingual. Romaine (1989: 8) points out further that there are about 30 times as many languages as there are countries. Even countries like France and England, which we are tempted to think of as monolingual, have, in fact, a vast array of languages within their borders. In France, for example, the following languages are still in use: French, Breton, Flemish (Vlaams), Occitan (Languedocien), Catalan (Catalan-Valencian-Balear), Basque (Navarro-Labourdin and Souletin varieties), Alsatian (a dialect of Allemanisch), and Corsican.

While multilingualism is not uncommon throughout the world, many schools have a policy that recognizes (and replicates) the hierarchy of relations within a territory and in the world as a whole. Only a small proportion of the 5000 or so languages of the world are used at the secondary level as media of instruction, and still fewer are used at the university level. Schools have often downplayed the value of the 'vernaculars' by minimizing their use in classrooms or recognizing them only as means of facilitating competence in the dominant language(s). Since the 1950s, and more especially since the 1970s, educationists have begun to recognize that multiculturalism is not a transient phenomenon. Sociolinguists are generally sympathetic to an approach that gives recognition to – and valorizes – as many of a society's languages as possible. This is in keeping with a holistic approach that is sensitive to the needs of children from different backgrounds ('bottom up') and not just the bureaucratic needs of the state ('top down').

Language Variation and Contact between Languages

These two branches of sociolinguistics ('language variation' and 'language contact') show above all others how much language and society influence each other. Some variation studies that are concerned with 'style, situation, and function' deal with the importance of contextual factors in determining different registers, styles, and genres. They also deal with the use of language in specific domains and functions, such as in advertising, religion, business, and e-mailing. The notion of a 'domain' is a particularly useful one. Fishman (1965) defined a domain as a sphere of activity arising from combination of specific times, settings, and role relationships, which results in a specific choice of language or style. The notion of 'register' is a linguistic counterpart of the sociological concept of domain. A register (Halliday *et al.*, 1964) refers to variation according to the context in which language is used. Relatively well-defined registers include the language of the law, the language of science, and the language of hip hop or jazz. Whereas register studies focus upon language use relatively independent of the users, social dialectology does the reverse. Dialects and social groups in the modern Labovian tradition are central to an understanding of language variation and change. The emphasis in this tradition falls upon the finely nuanced differences within a language according to social groupings, based especially on class, gender, ethnicity, and region. The subfield of language contact stresses the reality that societies are rarely monolingual; languages exist amidst other languages. The idea of a pure and self-contained language is a poor, simplifying assumption,

compared to the challenges of studying the ways in which speakers of different languages influence each other – how new languages (e.g., pidgins, creoles, 'New Englishes') may be borne out of struggle and how multilingualism is 'managed' by speakers at a microlevel and by societies at a macrolevel.

Social Interactions via Language

This section serves to introduce many of the 'Language in Society' entries covered in this encyclopedia (specifically excluding variation theory and language contact, which are covered elsewhere). The concept of communicative competence, as cited above, describes and accounts for the knowledge that people have that enables them to communicate appropriately in different social contexts. Speakers possess more than just grammatical knowledge. In a multilingual context, for example, interlocutors choose an appropriate code according to context. 'Context' includes the relative status of the interlocutors, the purpose of the communication, the respective rights and obligations associated with different language varieties, background knowledge, cultural rules of politeness, etc. This fine-tuning also applies to monolingual societies – this time relating to the choice of style to determine and reinforce the appropriate 'tenor' of the interaction. An example comes from the choice of an appropriate second-person pronoun in Hindi: *āp* for formal and respectful usage, *tum* for neutral usage, and *tū* for intimate or disrespectful usage. Such important determinants upon the use of language cannot be relegated to the study of 'performance' and hence be excluded from the domain of linguistics as a discipline (as it is within Chomskyan linguistics). Hymes popularized the field of the 'ethnography of speaking' within sociolinguistics, drawing upon anthropological traditions of studying speech in its social context and in terms of the value and meaning placed by individual speech communities upon specific speech events. Interactional sociolinguistics, associated with Hymes's occasional collaborator John Gumperz (e.g., 1982), is a subpart of the study of communicative competence that stresses the dialogic nature of speech. Like Bakhtin, the Russian linguist/critic who wrote in the 1920s to the 1940s, Gumperz insisted that linguistic signs are socially grounded, existing in context-bound encounters between individuals. Social and cultural forces, together with grammar and lexicon, constrain what can be said and how it can be said. An important part of this work concerned the identification of 'contextualization cues.' These are constellations of features of the verbal (e.g., vocabulary, prosody, syntactic choices) and nonverbal (e.g., gestures, facial expressions)

configurations, which in the light of previous experience signal what kind of speech activity interlocutors consider themselves to be engaged in (e.g., banter, negotiating a loan, telling a story). The cues help establish social relations, set the frame for what will come next, fill in implicit information, and make inferences about the nature of the speech act. The allied field of 'ethnomethodology' (Garfinkel, 1967) in the social sciences, places such conversational and interactional speech analysis within a wider framework that encompasses all human action, which is seen as reflexively related to the occasions and settings within which it occurs. The focus falls on the perspective of participating members. For ethnomethodologists, the study of members' methods, including all types of practical reasoning and actions, is significant.

'Speech accommodation' is a particular perspective upon the communicative competence that fosters variation in speaker style. Giles and Powesland (1975) held that speakers attune their communicative style in relation to their interlocutor. The basic forms of accommodation are 'convergence' and 'divergence,' depending on the relative status of the speakers and the intended social relations. Bell's (1984) 'audience design' framework elaborated this scheme, taking into account not just the speaker, but the audience (authorized participants, overhearers, eavesdroppers, a displaced mass audience on radio, etc.)

The communicative competence of a speaker might involve proficiency in more than one language co-existing in a society. Whereas Chomskyan syntax focused on an ideal monolingual native speaker, scholars working in multilingual environments have called into question the idea of the native speaker. (As noted in the section above, "Language Is Not a 'Given,'" some scholars have also questioned the very assumption of a prior, well-defined heritable language.) Several commentators have pointed out that such definitions of a native speaker seem to be premised on the norms of monolingual societies, whereas in fact the world is largely multilingual (see Singh, 1998). In some multilingual societies, a child may be said to have several native languages, with the order of acquisition not being an indicator of ability. Multilingual speakers may switch languages according to situation in a way that monolingual speakers switch styles of the same language 'natively' (Scotton, 1985). For many 'New English' speakers, monolingualism is the marked case, a special case outside of the multilingual prototype. Today's ideal speaker lives in a heterogeneous society (stratified along increasingly globalized lines) and has to negotiate interactions with different people representing all sorts of power and solidary positions on a regular basis.

What is this ideal speaker a native speaker of, but a polyphony of codes/languages working cumulatively (and sometimes complementarily), rather than a single, first-learned code?

Studies of code-switching reinforce the notion that communicative competence goes beyond that of the monolingual's mastery of syntax. Accounts of the social and contextual motivations for code-switching have proven a necessary complement to purely structural approaches that seek to account for when in a sentence a speaker may (or may not) switch to another language (Myers-Scotton, 1993). Interaction between speakers, degrees of convergence and divergence, and intentions to alter the rights and obligations associated with one code rather than another have all been fruitfully employed to account for the facility that fluent bilinguals show in switching between languages. 'Crossing' is a particular kind of code-switching in which speakers use a variety that is not generally associated with their group (Rampton, 1995). It permits speakers from one group to overcome social boundaries and build links with members of what may be otherwise seen as an 'outgroup.' Crossing may have an accommodative and emblematic function, but it can also emphasize boundaries if the code used in the crossing reflects stereotypes about the outgroup's language use, rather than their actual practice. Crossing, which is done mainly by adolescents or postadolescents, is one way of calling into question set identities associated with older generations. The notion of identity is crucial in sociolinguistics, in which emphasis falls more on small, self-selected groups or larger groups tied to a regional identity, rather than on national identities.

A 'community of practice' is a collection of people who engage in a common activity on an ongoing basis. The value of the concept, introduced into sociolinguistics by Eckert and McConnell-Ginet (1992), lies in the identification of a social grouping not on the basis of shared abstract characteristics (class, ethnicity etc.) but on the basis of shared practice. The community of practice concept thus mediates between the vernacular (and its basis in early learned, localized forms of language) and official/bureaucratic/transactional language. A focus on the domains of usage and code choice pertaining to those domains necessitates an examination of language in its more bureaucratic modes. The field of language planning deals with the management of language resources of a state or other political entity. A formal language policy may be the outcome of language planning. Language policy may also refer to the norms of the speech community in its characteristic choices of language items or language varieties in relation to some conscious or unconscious ideology. Whereas one

policy or another may have significant influence on the fate of a language, the field of language maintenance and shift shows that language legislation is seldom sufficient to halt the decline of a language. Factors associated with perceived economics and prestige amongst speakers and would-be speakers are equally important.

A fitting though sobering conclusion has to record sociolinguists' involvement in studies of language maintenance and shift in minority communities, and of language endangerment. It is predicted that the vast majority of the world's languages will face a struggle to survive in the present century (Krauss, 1992) as regionally and globally more powerful languages spread. The very cultural and linguistic diversity that sustained small and less powerful communities and that formed the core concerns of sociolinguistics and anthropology is under threat. Recording, cataloguing, archiving, and even teaching languages to communities who have few or no native speakers left have become vital concerns in linguistics.

Applications of Sociolinguistics

There are many practical outcomes of sociolinguistic research, especially in the field of language in education. Sociolinguists have contributed considerably to areas like the home language/school language interface, public debates about less-feted varieties like Ebonics (African American Vernacular English or Black English), an understanding of educational failure, enhancement of gender sensitivity in male-dominated classrooms, and so forth. Sociolinguists provide expert testimony in courtrooms based on their studies of discourse and accent patterns. They also contribute significantly to the growing attempts to save endangered languages and record their heritage, and they cooperate with educationists in government and nongovernment committees on language matters, especially those pertaining to minorities. Sociolinguists also contribute to cultural vitality by recording, describing, and popularizing rural speech and other varieties that are either denigrated or not always recognized as 'legitimate' language. This smooth and holistic interface between theory and application promises health and longevity to a young discipline.

See also: Codes, Elaborated and Restricted; Communicative Competence; Communities of Practice; Discrimination and Language; Endangered Languages; Identity and Language; Interactional Sociolinguistics; Language Attitudes; Language Maintenance and Shift; Language Planning and Policy: Models; Marxist Theories of Language; Minorities and Language; Native Speaker; Sapir, Edward; Social Class and Status; Whorf, Benjamin Lee.

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Sociolect/Social Class

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Those working in the field of variationist sociolinguistics generally look for some extralinguistic factor that may help to identify features of speech characteristic of groups of speakers. Although all speakers belong to multiple speech communities, four factors have proved the most durable: age, gender, ethnicity, and social class.

In principle, the easiest social factor to determine is age because at any given time an individual is a certain age, though some people may be reluctant to say what it is. Where precise information is not available, classification into broad categories can usually be estimated on the basis of appearance (Chambers, 1995). It is therefore not surprising that

age regularly appears as an extralinguistic variable in sociolinguistic studies (e.g., Labov, 1963, 1966, 2002; Wolfram, 1969; Fasold, 1972; Trudgill, 1974; Macaulay, 1977; Feagin, 1979; Milroy, 1980; Haeri, 1996; McCafferty, 2001).

However, as Eckert (1997) has pointed out, using age as an extralinguistic variable is not a simple matter. The obvious problem is that age is a continuous variable so that for purposes of correlation with linguistic features, speakers must be classified in age groups. Thus, any use of age as an extralinguistic variable requires a decision about how such age groups are to be identified and justified. Even a simple classification into adults and children is complex, not only because the age at which one can be counted as an adult is itself problematic but also because neither category will be homogeneous.

In comparison to age, gender, seen as a division into male and female, rather than sexual orientation, is relatively simple. Most people are accustomed to declaring their sex/gender in response to many kinds of enquiry and thus this information is usually available to the investigator. Gender is also generally fairly easy to determine on external criteria, although there may be ambiguous cases. Again, it is not surprising that gender is one of the factors frequently examined in sociolinguistic investigations (e.g., Fischer, 1958; Labov, 1966, 2002; Wolfram, 1969; Fasold, 1972; Trudgill, 1974; Macaulay, 1977; Feagin, 1979; Milroy, 1980; Cheshire, 1982; Coupland, 1988; Haeri, 1996; Eckert, 2000; McCafferty, 2001).

Ethnicity is an even more problematic category than gender, not least because it can be determined with reference to a number of characteristics: race, nationality, religion. Any sociolinguistic investigation that includes ethnicity as an extralinguistic category will consequently need to specify clearly how membership in that category is to be established. However, in many situations the population is not ethnically diverse and thus such differences will not be salient in the community.

Social class is perhaps the category that has received the most regular attention from the earliest sociolinguistic studies (e.g., Fischer, 1958; Labov, 1966; Wolfram, 1969; Fasold, 1972; Trudgill, 1974; Macaulay, 1977; Feagin, 1979), and it has continued to be examined in later studies (e.g., Coupland, 1988; Macaulay, 1991, 2005; Haeri, 1996; Foulkes and Docherty, 1999; Labov, 2001; McCafferty, 2001), though it has recently received less consistent attention as a key variable than in earlier studies. However, social class is a much more problematic category than the other three.

Despite receiving considerable attention in recent years by a range of scholars (e.g., see the references in Crompton *et al.*, 2000), social class remains a controversial subject with many conflicting views. From Lloyd Warner's pioneering studies (Warner, 1949) to Gilbert (2003) in the United States and accounts such as Reid (1989), Argyle (1994), and Cannadine (1998) in Britain, no clear method of identifying social membership has emerged. As Gilbert observes: "there is as much art as science in the study of social stratification" (Gilbert, 2003: 16). For sociolinguists, there is the added problem that the categories identified by sociologists or political scientists may not be the most useful for investigating language variation. Categories that are developed for studying national voting patterns or marketing strategies may not be the most appropriate for examining stratified uses of language in a smaller speech community.

There are two basic questions that are crucial in employing social class as an extralinguistic variable: (1) How many divisions are there within the category of social class? (2) How is membership in any of these divisions to be identified? In response to the first question some investigators (e.g., Fischer, 1958; Trudgill and Foxcroft, 1978; Macaulay, 1991; most contributors to Foulkes and Docherty, 1999; McCafferty, 2001) have treated social class as a dichotomous variable similar to gender with two polarized categories, usually working-class vs. middle-class, or blue-collar workers vs. white-collar workers (Chambers, 1995: 37). Other investigators (e.g., Labov, 1966; Wolfram, 1969; Fasold, 1972; Trudgill, 1974) have treated social class as a continuous variable similar to age and divided the continuum into categories on the basis of certain criteria. Still other investigators (e.g., Macaulay and Trevelyan, 1973; Feagin, 1979; Winford, 1993) have used a judgment sample based on a notion of several discrete social class divisions within the community. Feagin chose a sample that contrasted upper class with working class but also included distinctions according to age (adults over 65 vs. teenagers) and a rural/urban dimension. Winford chose a sample of Trinidadian males on the basis of occupation: middle-class (white-collar workers), upper working class (skilled and semi-skilled workers), and lower working class (unskilled workers and low-paid laborers). The method employed by Macaulay and Trevelyan will be presented below.

The answer to the second question about determining membership in a particular class will differ depending upon the way the sample is chosen. In a judgment sample, the membership in a certain category is determined in advance according the criteria employed (e.g., occupation, residence). In a random sample, the speakers will also be grouped according to similar criteria, but the linguistic data are

sometimes used to refine this classification, as will be illustrated below.

The answer to both questions will also be affected by the degree to which social class is a salient category in the community. Social stratification may be nearly as universal as language but, like language, social stratification takes different forms in different societies. The extent to which social class differences are a common feature of public discourse will affect the ways in which membership in a particular category can be identified. Cannadine (1998) and Milroy (2004) have pointed out that social class is a much more salient notion in Britain than in the United States.

Argyle (1994) points out that with regard to the situation in Britain: "Part of the evidence that there *is* a class system is that about 95 per cent of the population think there is, and can say which class they belong to themselves" (Argyle, 1994: 3). Given the desire to use social class as an extralinguistic variable, it is necessary to have some basis on which to choose the sample. Labov (1966) was able to make use of an earlier survey that had been designed by the New York School of Social Work for the Mobilization for Youth survey with a team of 40 interviewers. Probably no other sociolinguist has had such a large randomly chosen sample to work with in a single community.

Labov made use of a 10-point socioeconomic class index developed for the Mobilization for Youth survey by John Michael based on measures of occupation, education, and income. Labov points out that Michael gave "considerable attention to the problem of dividing the continuum of social class" (Labov, 1966: 216), and this was a problem for Labov, too. Labov did not only correlate use of the linguistic variables with speakers from each of the ten points on the scale. Instead, he usually grouped the speakers into three or four social class groups and illustrated the difference this can make (Labov, 1966: 220–248). The most interesting of these is the difference between Labov's figure for the class stratification of the variable (r) (1966: 22, Figure 1) and another figure (1966: 240, Figure 11) for the same variable. In the first, Labov has three groups: 0–2 (the lowest group), 3–5 (the middle group), and 6–9 (the highest group). The three groups show the same stylistic stratification. In the other figure (which is the most frequently cited example of hypercorrection), there are six groups (0, 1, 2–3, 4–5, 6–8, and 9). The separation of 9 from 6–8 shows that the speakers in the latter group use more /r/ in reading aloud word lists and sets of minimal pairs than the speakers in the highest group. This difference was concealed by the grouping used in the first figure. The example illustrates one of the problems with 'dividing the continuum of social class.' There is clearly a linguistic justification for the grouping in the latter figure, but is there other evidence that the speakers in, for example, category 8 belong with those in categories 6 and 7 rather than with those in category 9? For the (dh) variable (i.e., the use of a stop or an affricate instead of a fricative in words such as *this* and *then*), Labov divides the continuum into three groups: 0–4, 5–6, 7–9. This produces a regular stylistic pattern in a third figure (Labov, 1966: 246, Figure 15). However, from the list of speakers who used either stops or affricates (Labov, 1966: 259, Table 5), there is an argument for dividing the speakers into only two groups 0–4 and 5–9. In the first group, 14 of the 46 speakers (30%) used stops or affricates, in contrast to the second group, in which only 2 of the 35 speakers (6%) used any stops or affricates, a highly significant difference. Later, Labov (1966: 274, Figure 2) shows that educational level accounts for this dichotomy: speakers with less than a 10th-grade education have a much higher frequency of stops and affricates. However, rather than employ the division into two social classes, Labov goes on to develop a four-point social class scale on the basis of education and employment (Labov, 1966: 278) that shows a more regular distribution of the speakers from the lowest social class to the highest in their use of (dh). However, in a re-analysis of Labov's data, Horvath (1985: 64–65) showed that gender was also a powerful determinant of (dh) and better helped to explain the deviant case of Nathan B. (Labov, 1966: 249–253). Chambers (1995: 55–57) points out that the use of fewer non-standard variants of (dh) is an important feature of upwardly mobile speakers, suggesting that this variable is salient for such speakers.

Labov thus presents various arguments for different social class groupings of the speakers, but his questionnaire does not include any question for the speakers about their own view of their class affiliation. Either he did not think it was appropriate, or perhaps he thought his respondents might have difficulty in answering it. However, their answers might have helped to choose between the various groupings rather than depending upon the linguistic analysis to justify the categories. Plausible criteria for identifying social class categories and membership are crucial when social class is employed as one of the extralinguistic variables.

Labov (2001) followed a similar strategy in his later Philadelphia Neighborhood Study. On the basis of education, occupation, and residence value, he developed a 16-point scale which he then divided into six social classes. Labov used regression analysis to tease out the different effects of occupation, education, and residence value on the use of the variables

(2001: 183–186). He concluded that occupation was the most important factor (Labov, 2001: 185). The other factors are perhaps more relevant to notions of social prestige in general than to categories of social stratification. The differences in occupation, however, do not provide a clear answer to the question of how many social classes there are.

It is hard to be sure from Labov's charts (2001: 168–171), but there would appear to be a major difference between his first three groups (the working class groups) and the other three (the middle class and upper class groups). In terms of social class differences, a two-way division would probably have provided clear evidence of the difference between the two. Would this have been a more accurate picture of social class differences in speech than the one that Labov presents? In the absence of any corroborating evidence, it is impossible to tell, but the question is central to an understanding of the relationship between language variation and social class.

Trudgill (1974) also selected a quasi-random sample, from the local register of electors from four of Norwich's electoral wards. Trudgill then developed a social class index on the basis of six separate indicators: occupation, father's occupation, income, education, locality, and housing. One problem with this approach is that each of the indicators is taken to have an equal effect on social class, and that assumption may not be justified (Macaulay, 1976: 185). Like Labov, Trudgill then, on the basis of linguistic data, grouped the scores on the 30-point range into groups that he labeled Middle middle-class, Lower middle-class, Upper working-class, Middle working-class, and Lower working-class. Trudgill was able to show fine stratification in these five categories, but a skeptic looking at his results might wonder whether the separation of the working-class speakers into three categories is justified. Like Labov, Trudgill did not ask his speakers about social class or where they would put themselves.

Labov's and Trudgill's methods are worth examining closely because they are scrupulously honest and make it quite clear how they arrived at their categories. However, they also illustrate the difficulties that sociolinguists face in employing categories such as social class. It is not enough to choose a way of dividing up the sample into discrete groups; there has to be some reason to believe that these groups correspond to actual social divisions. Those who have not employed multiple indices have usually taken occupation as the main criterion for membership of a particular social class (e.g., Macaulay, 1977; Coupland, 1988; McCafferty, 2001), but some investigators have used place of residence (e.g., Stuart-Smith, 1999). Such criteria, however, are no guarantee that the resulting categories correspond to actual social classes.

When I was planning my work in Glasgow (Macaulay and Trevelyan, 1973; Macaulay, 1977), the most recent work on Scottish society was Kellas (1968) in which it was suggested that there were three major social class divisions in Scotland, based on occupation. In adopting this classification, I modified it, splitting Kellas's middle category by separating manual workers from non-manual. This gave four social class groups: I, IIa, IIb, III. The Registrar-General's list of occupations provided a guide to membership in each of these categories. I used these categories to identify a judgment sample of speakers, balanced for gender and age (10-year-olds, 15-year-olds, and adults), and the use of five linguistic variables was correlated with these categories. On the basis of the results of the analysis, it became obvious that there were no significant differences between groups IIb and III. In other words, the difference between manual (IIb and III) and non-manual (IIa) workers proved important. Thus, like Labov and Trudgill, I modified my classification on the basis of the linguistic data.

As part of the interview, I had included questions for the adult speakers about the number of social class categories in the city and where they would place themselves. Their responses were consistent with the notion of a three-part division (Macaulay, 1976) that matched the results of the linguistic analysis. However, it also appeared that there was no clear label for those who fell between the polarized groups of working-class and middle-class. As one woman put it:

> Well I wouldn't call myself middle-class but on the other hand I would call myself middling. In other words, I'm not up there and I'm not down there. I just reckon I'm pretty average. [Macaulay, 1977: 63]

This speaker sees the middle-class as being 'up there' and the working-class as being 'down there,' but she does not have a simple label for people like herself who are 'pretty average.' This comment illustrates the danger of taking a label such as 'middle-class' literally. The Class I speakers also resisted the suggestion that they were 'upper class', although they admitted that they belonged to the upper stratum of Glasgow society.

Responses such as this one and others collected in the Glasgow survey (Macaulay, 1976) show that even when social class divisions are salient in the society, there may not be an adequate public language in which to label the differences. Nevertheless, the kind of subjective opinions elicited in the Glasgow survey can be useful in identifying how the speakers

themselves perceive the critical social class divisions in a society. Perhaps investigators carrying out large-scale sociolinguistic surveys could incorporate some of the methods of perceptual dialectology (Preston, 2002).

There is, however, little evidence that many investigators are planning large-scale surveys of specific communities in which social class differences might be significant in accounting for language variation. A preoccupation with linguistic change has perhaps deflected attention from wider goals. This is unfortunate because social class differences are obviously important in predicting educational achievement, and language skills are fundamental to success in the school system. More attention by sociolinguists to aspects of language variation other than pronunciation might be helpful in educational planning.

Given the complexity of dealing with social class, some investigators have followed the example of the Milroys (Milroy and Milroy, 1978; Milroy, 1980) in using social networks as the basis for examining language variation. Social networks are "personal communities which provide a meaningful framework for solving the problems of daily life" (Milroy, 2001: 550). A network approach "provides a set of procedures for studying small groups where speakers are not discriminable in terms of any kind of social class index" (Milroy, 2001: 556).

A similar kind of approach is to examine a community of practice. "A community of practice is an aggregate of people who come together around mutual engagement in an endeavor" (Eckert and McConnell-Ginet, 1992). Eckert (2000) demonstrates the value of this approach in her study of high school students in Detroit. The difference between a social network and a community of practice is not simply one of size, though networks have the potentiality to be much larger than communities of practice. One important difference is that an individual 'may belong to or participate in a number of different communities of practice' (Meyerhoff, 2001: 531), while individuals will rarely belong to numerous social networks.

Social networks and communities of practice provide an alternative basis for approaching language variation, but they do not replace the larger notions of age, gender, ethnicity, and social class, because individuals will still have these characteristics. However, all four categories interact in complex ways (Eckert, 2003; Macaulay, 2005) and thus generalizations about the effect of one factor may be misleading without taking the others into consideration. For this reason, claims about social class differences in language should always be carefully examined for possible sources of bias and the empirical basis for the claims. For example, it is not always

made clear that Basil Bernstein's wide-ranging claims about social class differences in Britain (Bernstein, 1962) were based on small samples of speech from ten middle-class boys and fourteen working-class boys, aged between 15 and 18, recorded under inadequate conditions of control (Macaulay, 2005).

Despite the problems, social class has been shown to be related to variation in many aspects of language. It is not possible here to review all the work that has been done in many parts of the world, but some illustrative examples will suggest the range of investigation. The majority of studies have dealt with phonological variables. Differences in vowel quality have been found to correlate with social class differences in a number of studies (e.g., Labov, 1966, 2001; Trudgill, 1974; Macaulay, 1977, 1991; McCafferty, 2001), but interestingly more robust correlations have often been found for consonants (e.g., Labov, 1966; Wolfram, 1969; Trudgill, 1974; Macaulay, 1977; Coupland, 1988; Milroy *et al.,* 1994; McCafferty, 2001). This may be because consonantal variables are often stable sociolinguistic features, though the recent spread of glottal stops in Britain is an obvious exception. Social class differences in intonation have not been investigated systematically, but that may change with developments in instrumental techniques of measurement. Stuart-Smith (1999) has examined social class differences in voice quality in Glasgow. She found that working-class Glaswegian voice quality had more open jaw, raised and backed tongue body with possible retracted tongue root, and whispery voice. She observes that middle-class Glaswegian voice quality "is best described in terms of the *absence* of WC traits" (Stuart-Smith, 1999: 215).

In morphology, social class differences have been found in tense marking (e.g., Wolfram, 1969; Fasold, 1972; Feagin, 1969; Macaulay, 1991). Social class differences in forms of negation have also been found in widely different communities (e.g., Wolfram, 1969; Feagin, 1979; Macaulay, 1991). With regard to modality, Feagin (1979) showed that there were social class differences in the use of double modals (e.g., *she might could be a big help to you*) and the quasi-modal *liketa* (e.g., *she liketa had a heart attack!*) in Anniston, Alabama. Thibault (1991) identified social class differences in the use of *devoir* as a modal in Montreal. Winford (1993) found social class differences in the use of perfect *have* in Trinidadian English.

A small-scale study showed social class differences in the use relative pronouns in Ayr (Macaulay, 1991) with the middle-class speakers much more likely to use *wh*-relatives. In a longitudinal study of Montreal French, Blondeau (2001) found that simple non-clitic pronouns (e.g., *nous* vs. *nous autres*) were more

common in the upper levels of the social scale in Montreal. In another Montreal study, Dubois (1992) described social class differences in the use of extension particles with the professional class more likely to use forms such as *et cetera* while the working-class speakers preferred forms such as *patati patata*. Macaulay (2001) showed that in Ayr and Glasgow, working-class speakers used significantly fewer derived adverbs and intensifiers such as *very* than the middle-class speakers.

In a study of discourse variation in a sample of Glasgow adolescents and adults, Macaulay (2005) found that three-quarters of the 32 discourse features examined showed no social class differences. In addition to the differences in adverbs and relative pronouns mentioned above, the working-class speakers used more modal auxiliaries and more dislocated syntax, such as clefting or right and left dislocation (e.g., *Mr. Patterson he was a gentleman*). The middle-class speakers used more passives and more evaluative adjectives, as well as the hedge *sort of*. The lack of more significant differences led to the conclusion:

> Despite important differences in education, income, and place of residence, the Glasgow speakers use language for the most part in very similar ways. (Macaulay, 2005: 157)

This point perhaps needs emphasizing in any account of language variation. While age, gender, ethnic, and social class differences in language are of interest and may often be socially important, these differences are small in comparison with what the speakers have in common with each other.

See also: Communities of Practice; Society and Language: Overview.

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Sociolinguistics and Political Economy

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Since the beginnings of sociolinguistics, it has been well established that language and economic structures are interrelated. Other social sciences concerned with political economy have been largely dismissive of language, viewing it as an entirely symbolic rather than material phenomenon. By contrast, sociolinguists – including both those who describe and those who critique capitalist systems – have repeatedly and conclusively demonstrated that language is intimately tied to speakers' material economic position.

The earliest work examining this relationship concentrated on the linguistic dimensions of social class, particularly the social and economic reflexes of the standard and the vernacular forms of a language. The robust correlations that variationist sociolinguists found between socioeconomic status and language use were cited as powerful evidence of the social organization of linguistic variation. Variationist sociolinguistics was also instrumental in redirecting scholarship on speakers living in poverty from a framework centering on language deficiencies to one focused on linguistic difference.

Whereas the first studies of language and social class were largely framed within a structural-functionalist paradigm in which social classes orient to the same social norms, and in which class organization is consensual, scholars informed by Marxist theory have argued that a conflict-based model of class would improve the fit between sociolinguistic findings and the social theories used to account for them, insofar as language is used not only in parallel fashion across classes but also to carve out social differences between classes. The difficulties of objectively determining class led other researchers to focus on social networks, in which occupation figured heavily, as a way of arriving at locally meaningful social groupings for linguistic analysis.

Social class has been at the center of a longstanding debate in sociolinguistics: how to account for the widespread pattern in which women are frequently found to surpass men in the use of standard variables. One early explanation for this pattern was that women, lacking equal access to real-world power, use language as a symbolic resource to claim social prestige by projecting through their speech a class position above their actual material circumstances. A revised version of this argument posits that women more than men are socially evaluated not on their accomplishments but on their personhood, and that language is a crucial component of self-presentation. This account allows for the possibility (which has been empirically demonstrated in variationist-sociolinguistic research) that some female speakers might seek to project a working-class rather than middle-class persona and hence will outpace their male counterparts in the use of vernacular rather than standard variables.

This analysis of the semiotic power of language relies heavily on the work of Pierre Bourdieu, a central theorist in sociolinguistic discussions of political economy. For Bourdieu, language is a form of capital, a term that for him includes not only economic power but also social, cultural, and symbolic power. Bourdieu argues that when a linguistic market is constituted in a society, the distribution of linguistic capital – that is, the form of the language imbued with the most power within the market – is uneven across speakers. The economic analogy is not wholly metaphorical, for Bourdieu notes that power in the linguistic marketplace tends to extend to power in the economic marketplace as well. However, language can function as a primarily symbolic form of capital

that enables speakers to accrue local prestige, such as popularity among high school students in the United States, although even in this situation speakers' choice of linguistic variables tends to correlate with their orientation to socioeconomically divergent pathways after high school: jobs versus college.

The relationship between language and work, which has long informed variationist sociolinguistic research, has also been explored within other paradigms. Ethnographic sociolinguists have documented the ways in which opportunities in the labor market are tied to language, demonstrating not only that lack of access to linguistic capital prevents economic mobility, but also that even within a limited field of options speakers may make agentive and strategic linguistic choices to promote their own social goals, whether these involve economic advancement or participation within a local linguistic and economic market. Although scholarship on standardization, language shift and loss, and the international spread of English has shown that broad political-economic forces such as nationalism, colonialism, industrialization, and globalization have dramatic and often catastrophic consequences for language, such research also demonstrates that these forces cannot fully determine speakers' linguistic practices.

In contrast to much of the work on language and economic systems discussed above, which considers the linguistic consequences of broad economic structures and processes, research within discourse analysis considers the details of language use within specific economic contexts. A body of literature in several subfields has examined a wealth of issues regarding language in the workplace. Interactional sociolinguists, concerned with how cultural differences in interactional style may lead to misunderstandings and conflicts between interlocutors in culturally diverse work settings, seek to document the pragmatics of talk among coworkers and between service providers and customers or clients. Scholars working in the traditions of interactional sociolinguistics, conversation analysis, critical discourse analysis, and other approaches have also given extensive attention to language use in institutional settings such as medical contexts, the legal system, the educational system, and the media, in which issues of power and economic access are centrally relevant. And as both multilingual linguistic competence and friendly, facilitative interactional practices have emerged as marketable skills within the postindustrial service economy, scholars have begun to document the ways in which the linguistic abilities of a diverse workforce come to be shaped to the needs of late capitalism.

Although socioeconomic structures and institutional contexts have been the aspects of economic systems most central to sociolinguistic research, another crucial element of economic processes, consumption, has begun to gain ground. The relationship between language and consumer culture has been of deep interest particularly within critical discourse analysis and other politically oriented sociolinguistic frameworks. Focusing on advertising discourse, popular media textual products such as mass-market fiction and television shows, and other commodified forms of discourse, this body of work offers a critical perspective on how members of the public are transformed into consumers. However, research is still greatly needed on how people both at the center and on the periphery of consumer culture use language to make sense of such texts and of other aspects of consumption in their daily lives.

Related to this issue is the phenomenon of commodified language – language that functions not only as labor but as a product for consumption. Such commodification is most vividly seen in the appropriation of symbolically laden languages and dialects in advertising, mass media, and popular culture to enhance corporate profits, but it is also evident in the promotion of talk as a valued object in its own right in all aspects of late capitalist society, as seen in the marketing of verbal intimacy from psychotherapy to phone sex to coffeehouse conversations.

Many other arenas of language and political economy are only recently being explored by sociolinguists, particularly within newly industrializing societies and those most dramatically reshaped by globalization. Indeed, it is not an overstatement to assert that every aspect of sociolinguistics touches on political-economic issues. As those working in the many branches of the field continue to pursue their diverse research agendas, scholarship will benefit greatly from deeper and more extensive attention to this powerful and pervasive aspect of sociolinguistic life.

See also: Conversation Analysis; Critical Discourse Analysis; Gender and Language; Institutional Talk; Interactional Sociolinguistics; Linguistic Habitus.

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Speech Accommodation Theory and Audience Design

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Accommodation theory is an approach to language style developed by the social psychologist Howard Giles and associates since the 1970s. Accommodation is "the adjustment of one's speech or other communicative behaviours *vis-à-vis* the people with whom one is interacting" (Giles, 2001). Initially called Speech Accommodation Theory (SAT), it was broadened in the 1980s to encompass wider aspects of interaction under the label of Communication Accommodation Theory (CAT).

In its early stages accommodation theory was concerned with the causes and consequences of the convergence or divergence of speech styles. The model proposed that speakers accommodate their speech to their addressee in order to win their approval (Giles and Powesland, 1975). This means that the common form of accommodation is convergence, by which speakers shift their style of speech to become more like that of their addressees. A range of experiments (e.g., Giles and Smith, 1979) demonstrated how speakers converge with other each other on a number of levels such as speech rate, accent, content, and pausing. Studies have shown that convergence tends to be positively evaluated by recipients, being registered as a desire for social integration, identification, and approval. Giles, Taylor, and Bourhis (1973) found that in the bilingual context of Montreal, the amount of effort a speaker was perceived to have made in language choice between French and English affected how highly they were evaluated.

Classically, convergence occurs when a speaker intends to converge; linguistic analysis shows that this has indeed occurred; and the psychological climate of the interaction is one of interpersonal association (Giles, 2001). Convergences have been categorized under various distinctions, usually binary. A convergence may be upward or downward, depending on the relative social status of the interlocutors; full or partial, depending on how far a speaker moves toward her interlocutor; symmetrical or asymmetrical, depending whether the shift is unilateral or not.

Alternatively, instead of converging, speakers may maintain their style of speech or even diverge from their addressee. Divergence is regarded as a tactic of intergroup distinctiveness, by which individuals or groups differentiate themselves from other individuals or groups. As later studies have shown, however, there is no automatic interpretation of the meaning of convergence, as it can in some circumstances be construed as psychological divergence.

The social psychological aspect of accommodation theory became increasingly complex as it tried to encompass facts such as these that do not sit easily with simple convergence or divergence. The theory originally suggested that the greater the desire for approval, the greater would be the convergence. Some early experiments (e.g., Street, 1982) do show that. However, Giles and Smith (1979) found that speakers can converge too much, causing addressees to react unfavorably to what they may feel is patronizing or ingratiating behavior. Conversely, addressees need not always disapprove of divergence.

Riders to the theory have proliferated, especially in the comprehensive refinements by Thakerar *et al.* (1982), Coupland *et al.* (1988), and Giles *et al.* (1991). Thakerar *et al.*'s (1982) three-dimensional model of accommodation allows for a complex range of options and remains a core statement of the sociopsychological foundation of the theory. They introduced a distinction between psychological and linguistic accommodation, including the possibility that a speaker may converge linguistically while diverging psychologically.

Coupland *et al.* (1988) expanded accommodation to a wider set of attuning strategies, specifically in health- and age-related communication, by which communicative dimensions other than language are accommodated to a speaker's perceptions of an interlocutor. Giles *et al.* (1991) explored the distinctions that have been made in accommodation theory, providing a detailed historical view of the development of the theory to that time. Further aspects of convergence and divergence are characterized, including uni- versus multimodal and subjective versus objective accommodation. They acknowledge the possibility that, given the multiplicity of linguistic and extralinguistic features involved in any interaction, a speaker may converge in some features and diverge in others.

The weight of accommodation theory's apparatus thus expanded in the 1980s to cover the more nuanced findings that were emerging through empirical work. Elaboration of the theory has not extended greatly since then, doubtless in part because the models had already become very complex and not easily capable of further refinement. However, the basic insights of accommodation remain sound: that speakers accommodate their style to their audience. If we understand accommodation encompassing any style shift that occurs in response to an audience, the theory is a powerful explanatory model of style.

It goes beyond the descriptive taxonomy and non-directional correlation in earlier sociolinguistic approaches to propose an explanation of what causes style shift. Shepard *et al.* (2001) provide a review of accommodation studies to the end of the 20th century. Contemporary research continues to use the accommodation framework as an approach to a variety of sociolinguistic issues such as gender-related accommodation by children (Robertson and Murachver, 2003) and accommodation in intergenerational communication (Williams and Garrett, 2002).

To linguists, early accommodation theory's chief deficiency was its linguistic naïveté, dealing largely in quasilinguistic parameters such as speech rate or utterance length, or intentionally unsophisticated ratings of whole accents. By the 1980s some sociolinguists came to accommodation theory to explain the patterns they were finding in their study of specific linguistic features. Conversely, both social psychologists (e.g., Giles, 1973) and sociolinguists (e.g., Bell, 1984; Coupland, 1984) had critiqued the accepted Labovian paradigm (1966) that held that style was controlled by the amount of attention paid to speech. Major studies by Bell (1982) and Coupland (1984) were early examples of a more fine-grained sociolinguistic analysis that utilized the insights of accommodation theory (see also Trudgill, 1981).

The most widespread approach to style in sociolinguistics (Eckert and Rickford, 2001) has been audience design, which has close parallels to accommodation theory, but arose disciplinarily from (socio)linguistics rather than social psychology. Developed by Bell (1984), who derived the term from Clark (Clark and Carlson, 1982), audience design proposes that speakers' style choices are primarily a response to their audience. The framework has been summarized (Bell, 1997, 2001) under nine headings:

1. Style is what an individual speaker does with a language in relation to other people. Style is essentially interactive and social, marking interpersonal and intergroup relations.
2. Style derives its meaning from the association of linguistic features with particular social groups. The social evaluation of a group is transferred to the linguistic features associated with that group. Styles carry social meanings through their derivation from the language of particular groups.
3. The core of audience design is that speakers design their style primarily for and in response to their audience. Audience design is generally manifested in a speaker shifting her style to be more like that of the person she is talking to – convergence, in terms of accommodation theory.

4. Audience design applies to all codes and levels of a language repertoire, monolingual and multilingual.
5. Variation on the style dimension within the speech of a single speaker derives from and echoes the variation that exists between speakers on the social dimension. This axiom claims that quantitative style differences are normally less than differences between social groups.
6. Speakers show a fine-grained ability to design their style for a range of different addressees, and to a lessening degree for other audience members such as auditors and overhearers.
7. Style shifts according to topic or setting derive their meaning and direction of shift from the underlying association of topics or settings with typical audience members.
8. As well as the responsive dimension of style, there is the initiative dimension, where a style shift itself initiates a change in the situation rather than results from such a change. Sociolinguists have drawn attention to this distinction at least since Blom and Gumperz's (1972) proposal of situational versus metaphorical styles. In responsive style shift, there is a regular association between language and social situation. Initiative style trades on such associations, infusing the flavor of one setting into a different context, in what Bakhtin (1981) has called 'stylization.' Language becomes an independent variable that shapes the situation.
9. Initiative style shifts are in essence referee design, by which the linguistic features associated with a group can be used to express affiliation with that group. They focus on an absent reference group rather than the present audience. This typically occurs in the performance of a language or variety other than one's own (cf. Rampton's concept of crossing, 1995).

Audience design has been applied in detail as a framework by, for example, Rickford and McNair-Knox (1994) in their study of style shifting by an African American teenager. It has also been contested on a variety of grounds – the priority it gives to social variation over style (Finegan and Biber, 1994), its disregard of the role of attention to speech (Labov, 2001), and in particular, its inadequate attention to the active, constitutive role of language in interaction (Coupland, 2001; Schilling-Estes, 2004). Later developments in audience design (e.g, Bell, 2001) have countered by stressing the proactive nature of language style in identity formation and presentation. Responsive and initiative style are treated as different but concurrent dimensions of language usage, manifesting the structure/agency duality familiar in

social theory. This accords both with the stress in contemporary social theory on language as constitutive, and with the dialogical theory of Bakhtin (1981). The range of linguistic analysis in audience design has also been increasingly extended to include qualitative and cooccurrence analyses as well as quantification (Bell, 1999).

The state-of-the-art reader edited by Eckert and Rickford (2001) brings together a wide range of contributions on accommodation theory, audience design, and other sociolinguistic approaches to style. Subsequent work (e.g., Coupland, 2001; Schilling-Estes, 2004) combines strengths from different approaches, including audience design and accommodation theory.

See also: Identity and Language.

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Speech Act Verbs

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Definition and Terminology

The term 'speech act verbs' has variously been defined as applying either to all verbs used to refer to any type of verbal behavior or to the much smaller subset of verbs expressing specific speaker attitudes. According to the first, more encompassing definition, verbs such as *to claim*, *to promise*, *to threaten*, *to praise*, *to boast*, *to complain*, *to say*, *to whisper,* and *to interrupt* all count as speech act verbs, whereas the last three of this set are excluded by the second and stricter definition. The terms 'illocutionary verbs,' 'verbs of communication,' and 'verbs of saying,' which have been used as synonyms of 'speech act verbs,' have likewise been defined in either a more or less inclusive fashion. Because verbs such as *to say, to whisper,* and *to interrupt* do not lexicalize speaker attitudes, they are semantically less specific than speech act verbs in the narrow sense of the term. For this reason, this contribution is concerned only with speech act verbs that lexicalize combinations of speaker attitudes.

Speech act verbs are used to refer to situations characterized by the following features or situational roles: a speaker (S), a hearer (H), a set of speaker attitudes, and an utterance (Utt) mostly containing a proposition (P). These four elements are part of any situation referred to by speech act verbs and constitute the unifying feature of the meaning of these verbs (Verschueren, 1980: 51–57; 1985: 39–40; Wierzbicka, 1987: 18; Harras *et al.*, 2004: Intro.). They distinguish them from other elements of the lexicon, especially from other types of verbs. Adopting the terminology used by Harras *et al.* (2004) here I call the type of situation referred to by all speech act verbs the 'general resource situation type.' Special types of situations referred to by speech act verbs are called 'special resource situation types.'

Classes of Speech Act Verbs

Special resource situation types constitute the framework for the classification of different types of speech act verbs. They are built up from specifications of the role of the utterance and of the speaker attitudes, which are both elements of the general resource situation type. The set of speaker attitudes may be specified as consisting of the speaker's attitude to the proposition, the speaker's intention, and the speaker's presuppositions. The speaker's propositional attitude may be further specified as S's taking P to be true, S's wanting P, S's evaluating P positively or negatively, and so on. Specifications of the speaker's intention include S's intention to make H believe something or to get him/her to do something. Examples of specifications of the speaker's presuppositions are S's presupposition that H does not know P, that H will do P in the normal course of events, and that H is able to do P. The role of the utterance is specified by properties of the propositional content. These include the event type of P (that is, whether P is an action, event, or state of affairs), the agent of P (in the case that P is an action), and the temporal reference of P (specifically, whether P precedes, coincides with, or follows S's uttering P).

Figure 1 shows the different types of specifications of each of the elements of the general resource situation type. Following a procedure proposed by Baumgärtner (1977: 260–264), the specifications in **Figure 1** are obtained from a comparison of sentences containing speech act verbs. The well-formedness of some of these and the ill-formedness of others shows which elements are relevant to the meaning of the verbs they contain. For example, a comparison of the sentences *I order you to leave the room*, **I order you to have left the room,* and **I order you for me to leave the room* shows that *to order* lexicalizes the specification 'future action of H' for the properties of the propositional content.

Different combinations of specifications of the different kinds of speaker attitudes and of the properties of the propositional content constitute special resource situation types, which are referred to by distinct types of speech act verbs. The combinations listed in **Table 1** represent situations that are referred to by specific types of verbs. Elements of the situations referred to are also components of the meaning of the corresponding verbs. If the assertives and information verbs in **Table 1** are subsumed under the larger class of representatives and verbs expressing emotions are grouped together with those expressing evaluations, all speech act verbs in **Table 1** may be classified as belonging to one of four main classes: representatives, directives, commissives, and expressives. These correspond to four of the main types of speech acts distinguished by Searle (1975: 354–361). In addition, there exists a fifth class of verbs that may be used to refer to speech acts, which Searle called 'declarations.' These are speech acts in which a particular institutional fact is brought about by a speaker who has the authority to do so because he or she is a representative of

General resource situation type

Specifications

Figure 1 Specification of the elements of the general resource situation type.

a particular institution. The performance of declarations does not involve any particular speaker attitudes apart from the speaker's being willing to bring about the relevant institutional fact. Accordingly, declaratives, that is verbs used to refer to declarations, differ from other kinds of speech act verbs in that they lexicalize no speaker attitudes other than the speaker's intention to bring about a particular institutional fact. Examples of declaratives include *to absolve*, *to baptize*, *to bequeath*, *to condemn*, *to excommunicate*, *to fire*, *to nominate*, and *to resign*.

Other classifications have much in common with Searle's taxonomy. Austin's (1962: 150–163) classification of speech act verbs, for example, comprises five classes (expositives, exercitives, commissives, behabitives, and verdictives, which approximately correspond to Searle's representatives, directives,

commissives, expressives, and declarations, respectively). Vendler's classification was based on Austin's. Due to the fact that Vendler distinguished two types of exercitives (interrogatives and genuine exercitives) as well as two types of verdictives (operatives and true verdictives), his classification consists of seven rather than five classes (Vendler, 1972: 16–25). Bach and Harnish divided speech acts into six general categories. Four of these (constatives, directives, commissives, and acknowledgements) "correspond roughly to Austin's expositives, exercitives, commissives and behabitives respectively, and closely to Searle's representatives, directives, commissives and expressives" (Bach and Harnish, 1979: 40–41). Taken together, the remaining two classes, effectives and verdictives, correspond to what Searle called "declarations." Using H's evaluations as criteria,

Table 1 Classes of speech act verbs

(1a)	**Assertives:** *claim, assert . . . ,*	
	Propositional attitude (S):	S takes to be true: P
	Intention (S):	S wants: H recognize: S takes to be true: P
	Presupposition (S):	H does not know: P
	Event type (P):	Action/Event/State of Affairs
	Temporal reference (P):	[-FUTURE]/[+ FUTURE]
(1b)	**Information Verbs:** *inform, tell, impart, communicate, etc.*	
	Propositional attitude (S):	S knows: P
	Intention (S):	S wants: H know: P
	Presupposition (S):	H does not know: P
	Event type (P):	Action/Event/State of Affairs
	Temporal reference (P):	[-FUTURE]/[+ FUTURE]
(2)	**Directives:** *ask* (*sb. to do sth.*)*, order, request . . . ,*	
	Propositional attitude (S):	S wants: P
	Intention (S):	S wants: H do P
	Presupposition (S):	H will not do P in the normal course of events
		H is able to do P
	Event type (P):	Action
	Agent (P):	Hearer
	Temporal reference (P):	[+ FUTURE]
(3)	**Commissives:** *promise, guarantee, pledge, vow . . . ,*	
	Propositional attitude (S):	S wants to do P
	Intention (S):	S wants: H recognise: S wants to do P
	Presupposition (S):	P is in the interest of H
	Event type (P):	Action
	Agent (P):	Speaker
	Temporal reference (P):	[+ FUTURE]
(4a)	**Verbs Expressing Emotions:** *rejoice, complain, scold . . . ,*	
	Propositional attitude (S):	S feels joy/anger/sorrow because of P
	Intention (S):	S wants: H recognise: S feels joy/anger/sorrow because of P
	Presupposition (S):	P is the case
	Event type (P):	Action/Event/State of Affairs
	Temporal reference (P):	[-FUTURE]
(4b)	**Verbs Expressing Evaluations:** *praise, criticise . . . ,*	
	Propositional attitude (S):	S evaluates P positively/negatively
	Intention (S):	S wants: H recognise: S evaluates P positively/negatively
	Presupposition (S):	P is the case
	Event type (P):	Action
	Agent (P):	Hearer or Third Person
	Temporal reference (P):	[-FUTURE]

Allan (1994: 4125; 1998: 10–11) distinguished four types of speech acts. Statements include speech acts such as denials, reports, and predictions (Searle's representatives) as well as promises and offers (Searle's commissives). Invitationals are a subset of Searle's directives and include speech acts such as requests, suggestions, exhortations, and warnings. The rest of Searle's directives are grouped together with his declarations into a class called 'authoritatives.' Expressives, finally, include greetings, thanks, apologies, and congratulations. **Table 2** compares the classifications discussed.

Speech Acts and Speech Act Verbs

The examples considered so far suggest that the meanings of speech act verbs may be described in terms of properties of speech acts. The components of speech acts and those of speech act verbs do indeed display substantial overlap. This may be observed from the fact that the components of the meanings of speech act verbs correspond to at least five of the seven components of illocutionary force that serve to determine under which conditions a particular type of speech act is both successful and nondefective (Searle and Vanderveken, 1985: 12–20). These correspondences are summarized in **Figure 2**.

In spite of these correspondences, special resource situation types do not suffice to capture the meaning of all speech act verbs. Examples of verbs whose meanings cannot completely be described in terms of elements of special resource situation types are *boast, flatter,* and *lie*. In addition to the attitudes of a resource situation speaker, these verbs lexicalize

Table 2 Different types of classifications of speech acts/speech act verbs

Austin (1962)	Vendler (1972)	Searle (1975)	Bach & Harnish (1979)	Allan (1994)
Expositives	Expositives	Representatives	Constatives	Statements
Commissives	Commissives	Commissives	Commissives	
Exercitives	Interrogatives	Directives	Directives	Invitationals
	Exercitives			Authoritatives
Verdictives	Operatives	Declarations	Effectives	
	Verdictives		Verdictives	
Behabitives	Behabitives	Expressives	Acknowledgements	Expressives

Source: Allan (1998: 11).

Figure 2 Correspondences between components of illocutionary force and components of the meaning of speech act verbs.

different types of evaluations by a speaker who uses these verbs to describe the speech act of the resource situation speaker. Following Barwise and Perry (1983: 32–39), here I call the situation in which a speaker describes an act performed by a resource situation speaker the 'discourse situation.' As **Figure 3** shows, the discourse situation comprises the same types of elements as the resource situation: a speaker, a hearer, and an utterance containing a proposition. The meaning of verbs such as *boast*, *flatter*, and *lie* comprises elements of a resource as well as a discourse situation. For example, *boast* lexicalizes not only a positive evaluation of P (one of S's own actions or properties) by the speaker of the resource situation but also a negative evaluation of the resource situation speaker's

positive representation of P by a discourse situation speaker. In particular, a discourse situation speaker describing a resource situation speaker's act of self-praise by means of the verb *boast* thereby indicates that he or she considers the resource situation speaker's positive representation of P to be exaggerated. Similarly, *flatter* and *lie* lexicalize a combination of attitudes of a resource situation speaker as well as a discourse situation speaker's evaluation of the speech act performed by the resource situation speaker as being strategic (*flatter*) or insincere (*lie*). These examples show that for many illocutionary verbs, there is no corresponding speech act. Nor may any type of speech act be referred to by a corresponding illocutionary verb. An example is the apparent lack of a

Discourse situation   Resource situation

Figure 3 The inventory of situational roles of the discourse and the resource situation (S_{DS}, discourse situation speaker; S_{RS}, resource situation speaker; P_{DS}, proposition uttered by S_{DS}; P_{RS}, proposition uttered by S_{RS}; H_{DS}, discourse situation hearer; H_{RS}, resource situation hearer). From Harras *et al.* (2004: 10); used with permission of Walter de Gruyter, GmbH. & Co.

special illocutionary verb in English to refer to an act in which a speaker predicts a future event that he or she considers to have negative consequences. Although there are special illocutionary verbs to describe such acts in German (e.g., *unken*) and Russian (e.g., *karkat*), the relevant act has to be referred to in English by less specific verbs such *predict*, *foretell*, and *prophesy*, whose meanings do not include an evaluative component.

The lack of a one-to-one correspondence of speech acts and speech act verbs also becomes evident from the fact that some verbs are systematically ambiguous among several illocutionary points (Vanderveken, 1990: 168). For example, *to promise* may be used to refer to acts of threatening (as in *I promised him that he would be punished if he did not come back in time*), acts of promising (as in *I promised to help him*), and acts of assuring somebody of something (as in *I promised her that she would be free tomorrow* uttered by a speaker who is not the agent of P but only a confident news bearer). Other examples are *warn* and *advise*, which may both be classified as being either representatives (verbs used to denote an act of telling somebody that something is the case) or directives (verbs used to refer to an act of telling somebody to do something to avoid an imminent danger) (Searle and Vanderveken, 1985: 183). In spite of Austin's claim that speech act verbs are a good guide to speech acts (Austin 1962: 148–149), the absence of a one-to-one correspondence between speech acts and speech act verbs indicates that differences in the meaning of speech act verbs are "a good guide but by no means a sure guide to differences in illocutionary acts" (Searle, 1975: 345).

Performativity

Some speech act verbs can be used not only to denote but also to perform a particular speech act. To test whether a given speech act verb may be used in this way, Austin suggested that it be substituted for the variable x in the formula 'I (hereby) x ...'. Any verb that may be used as a part of this formula may be used performatively (Austin, 1962: 67). Examples of performative verbs are *to order*, *to promise*, *to inform*, *to criticize,* and *to assert*. The performative formula is often part of the institutionalized procedure by which a speaker brings about a particular institutional fact. Consequently, declaratives may generally be used performatively as in *I hereby name this ship the 'Queen Elisabeth'* and *I appoint you chairman*. Other types of speech act verbs can be used performatively only if they may be used in utterances that do not require an additional linguistic or nonlinguistic action for a particular speech act to be performed. For example, a speaker may promise a hearer to help him or her solely by uttering a sentence such as *I promise to help you tomorrow*. By contrast, an act of convincing somebody that something is the case requires more than a speaker's uttering a sentence such as ?*I convince you that Beowulf is the single most important work of English literature*. This difference accounts for the fact that *to promise* may be used performatively, whereas *to convince* may not (Harras 2004: 152–154).

See also: Austin, John L.; Speech Acts; Speech Acts, Classification and Definition.

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Speech Acts

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Speech act theory, though foreshadowed by the Austrian philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein's views about language-games (*see* **Wittgenstein, Ludwig Josef Johann**), is usually attributed to the Oxford philosopher J. L. Austin (*see* **Austin, John L.**). The basic ideas, which were formed by him in the late 1930s, were presented in his lectures given at Oxford in 1952–1954, and later in his William James Lectures delivered at Harvard in 1955. These lectures were finally published posthumously as *How to do things with words* in 1962. After his death in 1960, Austin's ideas were refined, systematized, and advanced, especially by his Oxford pupil, the American philosopher John R. Searle. Simply stated, the central tenet of speech act theory is that the uttering of a sentence is, or is part of, an action within the framework of social institutions and conventions. Put in slogan form, saying is (part of) doing, or words are (part of) deeds.

J. L. Austin

The Performative/Constative Dichotomy

In the 1930s, a very influential school of thought in philosophy was logical positivism, developed by a group of philosophers and mathematicians principally in Vienna. One of the central doctrines of logical positivism is what is now called 'the descriptive fallacy,' namely, the view that the only philosophically interesting function of language is that of making true or false statements. A particular version of the descriptive fallacy is the verificationist thesis of meaning, namely, the idea that 'unless a sentence can, at least in principle, be verified (i.e., tested for its truth or falsity), it was strictly speaking meaningless'

(Levinson, 1983: 227). On such a view, sentences that are not used to make verifiable or falsifiable propositions are simply meaningless.

It was against this philosophical background that Austin set about to develop his theory of speech acts (Austin, 1962). He made two important observations. First, he noted that some ordinary language sentences such as those in (1) are not employed to make a statement, and as such they cannot be said to be true or false.

(1a) Good afternoon!
(1b) Is he a Republican?
(1c) Come in, please.

Secondly and more importantly, Austin observed that there are ordinary language declarative sentences that similarly resist a truth-conditional analysis. The point of uttering such sentences is not just to say things, but also actively to do things. In other words, such utterances have both a descriptive and an effective aspect. Accordingly, Austin called them 'performatives,' and he distinguished them from assertions, or statement-making utterances, which he called 'constatives.' In other words, performatives are utterances that are used to do things or perform acts, as in (2), whereas constatives are utterances that are employed to makes assertions or statements, as in (3).

(2a) I christen/name this ship the Princess Elizabeth.
(2b) I now pronounce you man/husband and wife.
(2c) I promise to come to your talk tomorrow afternoon.
(3a) My daughter is called Elizabeth.
(3b) A freshly baked loaf doesn't cut easily.
(3c) Maurice Garin won the first Tour de France in 1903.

Unlike those in (3), the declarative sentences in (2) have two characteristics: (i) they are not used intentionally to say anything, true or false, about states of affairs in the outside world, and (ii) their

use constitutes (part of) an action, viz., that of christening/naming a ship in (2a), that of pronouncing a couple married in (2b), and that of promising in (2c). In addition, there are two further differences between (2a–b) and (2c). The first is that while (2a–b) is part of a conventional or ritual behavior supported by institutional facts (see also Strawson, 1964), (2c) is not. Secondly, while the performative verb, that is, the verb naming the action while performing it in (2a–b) is in general an essential element and cannot be omitted, it can in (2c). In other words, whereas, for example, we cannot christen/name a ship without using the verb *christen* or *name*, we can make a promise without using the verb *promise*, as in (4).

(4) I'll come to your talk tomorrow afternoon.

Performatives can further be divided into two types: explicit and implicit. Explicit performatives are performative utterances that contain a performative verb that makes explicit what kind of act is being performed. By contrast, implicit performatives are performative utterances in which there is no such verb. Thus, the performatives in (2) are explicit ones, and the performative in (4) is an implicit one.

Austin also isolated a number of syntactic and semantic properties of explicit performatives in English: (i) explicit performatives contain a performative verb, (ii) the performative nature of such a verb can be reinforced by adding the adverb *hereby*, and (iii) explicit performatives occur in sentences with a first-person singular subject of a predicate (verb) in the simple present tense, indicative mood, and active voice.

However, as Austin himself was aware, there are exceptions. Explicit performatives can sometimes take a first-person plural subject, as in (5); a second-person singular or plural subject, as in (6); and a third-person singular or plural subject, as in (7). In addition, there are cases where the explicit performative verb is 'impersonal,' that is, it does not refer to the speaker, as in (8). Furthermore, as (6), (7), and (8) show, explicit performatives can occur in sentences where the verb is in the passive voice. Finally, as (9) indicates, they can also occur in sentences of present progressive aspect.

(5) We suggest that you give up smoking immediately.

(6) You are fired.

(7) Passengers are hereby requested to wear a seat belt.

(8) Notice is hereby given that shoplifters will be prosecuted.

(9) I am warning you not to dance on the table.

Austin's Felicity Conditions on Performatives

As already mentioned, it makes no sense to call a performative true or false. Nevertheless, Austin noticed that for a performative to be successful or 'felicitous,' it must meet a set of conditions. For example, one such condition for the speech act of naming is that the speaker be recognized by his or her community as having the authority to perform that act; for the speech act of ordering, the condition is that the speaker have authority over the addressee; and finally, for the speech act of promising, one condition is that what is promised by the speaker must be something the addressee wants to happen. Austin called these conditions 'felicity conditions,' of which he distinguished three types, as shown in (10).

(10)   Austin's felicity conditions on performatives
(10a) (i) There must be a conventional procedure having a conventional effect.
(10a) (ii) The circumstances and persons must be appropriate, as specified in the procedure.
(10b) The procedure must be executed (i) correctly and (ii) completely.
(10c) Often
         (i) the persons must have the requisite thoughts, feelings and intentions, as specified in the procedure, and
         (ii) if consequent conduct is specified, then the relevant parties must so do.

Violation of any of the conditions in (10) will render a performative 'unhappy' or infelicitous. If conditions *a* or *b* are not observed, then what Austin described as a 'misfire' takes place. For instance, in England, a registrar conducting a marriage ceremony in an unauthorized place will violate condition *a (i)*, thus committing a misfire. The same is true for a clergyman baptizing the wrong baby, because in this case, condition *a (ii)* is not fulfilled. Next, as an illustration of a violation of condition *b (i)*, consider the case of a bridegroom not saying the exact words that are conventionally laid down for a Church of England marriage ceremony. As to condition *b (ii)*, it dictates that the procedure be complete. Thus, in making a bet, the bet is not 'on' unless *You are on* (or something with the same effect) is uttered by the addressee; in Austin's terminology, this counts as a satisfactory 'uptake,' the absence of which will again cause a misfire. Finally, if condition *c* is violated, then what Austin called an 'abuse' is committed (including, but not only, cases of insincerity). Examples include: congratulating someone when one knows that he or she passed his or her examination by cheating (condition *c (i)*); making a promise when one already intends to break it (condition *c (ii)*); and marrying without intending to consummate the marriage

(see also Sadock's (2004) discussion of these conditions in terms of misinvocation, misexecution, and abuse).

Locutionary, Illocutionary, and Perlocutionary Speech Acts

The initial distinction made by Austin between performatives and constatives was soon to be rejected by him in favor of a general theory of speech acts. In fact, as pointed by Levinson (1983: 231), there are two internal shifts in Austin's arguments. First, there is a shift from the view that performatives are a special class of sentences/utterances with peculiar syntactic and semantic properties to the view that there is a general class of performatives that encompasses both explicit and implicit performatives, the latter including many other types of sentences/utterances. The second shift is from the performative/constative dichotomy to a general theory of speech acts, of which the various performatives and constatives are just special sub-cases (*see* **Speech Acts and Grammar**).

What led Austin to abandon the performative/constative dichotomy? In the first place, he noted that like performatives, constatives are also subject to the felicity conditions stated in (10). Consider the so-called 'Moore's paradox,' illustrated by (11).

(11) ?Princess Diana died in a fatal car crash in
      Paris with Dodi Al Fayed, but I don't
      believe it.

This utterance is infelicitous because it violates condition *c (i)* in (10) above. In the same vein, if someone utters (12) when he or she knows that John does not in fact have a wife, then its presupposition will not go through. The reason the presupposition fails to carry through is that condition *a (ii)* in (10) above is not adhered to.

(12) I'm sure John's wife is a feminist.

Secondly, Austin observed that performatives and constatives may be impossible to distinguish even in truth-conditional terms. On the one hand, there are 'loose' constatives that may not be assessed strictly by means of truth conditions, as in (13). On the other hand, there are utterances like those in (14) that pass the *hereby* test and therefore are performatives by definition but that nevertheless are used to state or assert. In these cases, the performatives must be counted simultaneously as constatives. On the basis of such evidence, Austin concluded that constatives are nothing but a special class of performatives, and that the two-way distinction between performatives, as action-performers, and constatives, as truth-bearers, can no longer be maintained.

(13a) France is hexagonal.
(13b) The fridge is empty.
(13c) New York is sixty miles from where I live.
(14a) I hereby state that Da Vinci started to paint
       Mona Lisa in 1503.
(14b) I hereby tell you that the bill is right.
(14c) I hereby hypothesize that there is water on
       Mars.

Consequently, Austin claimed that all utterances, in addition to meaning whatever they mean, perform specific acts via the specific communicative force of an utterance. Furthermore, he introduced a three-fold distinction among the acts one simultaneously performs when saying something, as illustrated in (15):

(15) (A speech act's three facets)
     (i) Locutionary act: the production of a
         meaningful linguistic expression.
     (ii) Illocutionary act: the action intended to be
         performed by a speaker in uttering a linguistic
         expression, by virtue of the conventional
         force associated with it, either explicitly or
         implicitly.

     (iii) Perlocutionary act: the bringing about of
         consequences or effects on the audience
         through the uttering of a linguistic expression,
         such consequences or effects being special to
         the circumstances of utterance.

A locutionary act is the basic act of speaking, which itself consists of three related sub-acts: (i) a phonic act of producing an utterance-inscription; (ii) a phatic act of composing a particular linguistic expression in a particular language; and (iii) a rhetic act of contextualizing the utterance-inscription (Austin, 1962). The first of these three sub-acts is concerned with the physical act of producing a certain sequence of vocal sounds (in the case of spoken language), or a set of written symbols (in the case of written language). The second refers to the act of constructing a well-formed string of sounds/symbols (a word, phrase, or sentence in a particular language). The third sub-act is responsible for tasks such as assigning reference, resolving deixis, and disambiguating the utterance-inscription lexically and/or grammatically (*see* **Deixis and Anaphora: Pragmatic Approaches**).

The illocutionary act refers to the fact that when we say something, we usually say it with some purpose in mind. In other words, an illocutionary act refers to the type of function the speaker intends to fulfill, or the action the speaker intends to accomplish in the course of producing an utterance; it is also an act defined within a system of social conventions. In short, it is an act accomplished in speaking. Examples of illocutionary acts include accusing, apologizing, blaming, congratulating, declaring war, giving

permission, joking, marrying, nagging, naming, promising, ordering, refusing, swearing, and thanking. The functions or actions just mentioned are also commonly referred to as the illocutionary 'force' (or 'point') of the utterance. Illocutionary force is frequently conveyed by what Searle (1969) called an 'illocutionary force indicating device' (IFID), the most direct and conventional type of which is an explicit performative in the form of (16) (where Vp stands for performative verb). Indeed, the term 'speech act' in its narrow sense is often taken to refer exclusively to illocutionary acts (see **Speech Acts, Classification and Definition**).

(16) I (hereby) Vp you (that) S

It should be mentioned at this point that the same linguistic expression can be used to carry out a wide variety of different speech acts, so that the same locutionary act can count as having different illocutionary forces in different contexts. Depending on the circumstances, one may utter (17) to make a threat, to issue a warning, or to give an explanation.

(17) The gun is loaded.

In fact, Alston (1994) has argued that the meaning of a sentence consists in its having a certain illocutionary act potential (IAP) that is closely and conventionally associated with its form. On this view, to know what a sentence means is to know what range of illocutionary acts it can be conventionally used to perform.

Conversely, the same speech act can be performed by different linguistic expressions, or the same illocutionary force can be realized by means of different locutionary acts. The utterances in (18), for example, illustrate different ways of carrying out the same speech act of requesting.

(18) (At ticket office in railway station)
(18a) A day return ticket to
        Oxford, please.
(18b) Can I have a day return ticket to
        Oxford, please?
(18c) I'd like a day return ticket to Oxford.

Finally, a perlocutionary act concerns the effect an utterance may have on the addressee. Put slightly more technically, a perlocution is the act by which the illocution produces a certain effect in or exerts a certain influence on the addressee. Still another way to put it is that a perlocutionary act represents a consequence or by-product of speaking, whether intentional or not. The effect of the act being performed by speaking is generally known as the perlocutionary effect. There is an extensive literature on the differentiation between locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary acts (see e.g., Sadock (2004) for a survey).

J. R. Searle

Searle's Felicity Conditions on Speech Acts

Just as its truth conditions must be met by the world for a sentence to be said to be true, its felicity conditions must also be fulfilled by the world for a speech act to be said to be felicitous. Searle (1969) took the view that the felicity conditions put forward by Austin are not only ways in which a speech act can be appropriate or inappropriate, but that they also jointly constitute the illocutionary force. Put in a different way, the felicity conditions are the constitutive rules – rules that create the activity itself – of speech acts (see **Principles and Rules**). On Searle's view, to perform a speech act is to obey certain conventional rules that are constitutive of that type of act. Searle developed the original Austinian felicity conditions into a neo-Austinian classification of four basic categories, namely (i) propositional content, (ii) preparatory condition, (iii) sincerity condition, and (iv) essential condition. As an illustration of these conditions, consider (19).

(19) Searle's felicity conditions for promising
    (i) propositional content: future act A of S
    (ii) preparatory: (a) H would prefer S's doing
        A to his not doing A, and S so believes
    (b) It is not obvious to both S and H that S will
        do A in the normal course of events
    (iii) sincerity: S intends to do A
    (iv) essential: the utterance of e counts as an
        undertaking to do A

where S stands for the speaker, H for the hearer, A for the action, and e for the linguistic expression.

The propositional content condition is in essence concerned with what the speech act is about. That is, it has to do with specifying the restrictions on the content of what remains as the 'core' of the utterance (i.e., Searle's propositional act) after the illocutionary act part is removed. For a promise, the propositional content is to predicate some future act of the speaker, whereas the preparatory conditions state the real-world prerequisites for the speech act. In the case of a promise, the latter are roughly that the addressee would prefer the promised action to be accomplished, that the speaker knows this, but also that it is clear to both the speaker and the addressee that what is promised will not happen in the normal course of action. Next, the sincerity condition must be satisfied if the act is to be performed sincerely. When carrying out an act of promising, the speaker must genuinely intend to keep the promise. Notice that if the sincerity condition is not fulfilled, the act is still performed, but there is an abuse, to use Austin's term. Finally, the essential condition defines the act being performed in

the sense that the speaker has the intention that his or her utterance will count as an act, and that this intention is recognized by the addressee. Thus for a promise, the speaker must have the intention to create an obligation to act. Failure to meet the essential condition has the consequence that the act has not been carried out.

Searle's Typology of Speech Acts

Can speech acts be classified, and if so, how? Austin (1962) grouped them into five types: (i) verdictives: giving a verdict, (ii) exercitives: exercising power, rights or influence, (iii) commissives: promising or otherwise undertaking, (iv) behabitives: showing attitudes and social behavior, and (v) expositives: fitting an utterance into the course of an argument or conversation. Since then, there have been many attempts to systematize, strengthen, and develop the original Austinian taxonomy (Bach and Harnish, 1979; Allan, 2001; Bach, 2004). Some of these new classifications are formulated in formal/grammatical terms, others, in semantic/pragmatic terms, and still others, on the basis of the combined formal/grammatical and semantic/pragmatic modes (see Sadock (2004) for a review) (*see* **Speech Acts, Classification and Definition; Pragmatics: Overview**). Of all these (older and newer) schemes, Searle's (1975a) neo-Austinian typology remains the most influential. Under Searle's taxonomy, speech acts are universally grouped into five types along four dimensions: (i) illocutionary point, (ii) direction of fit between words and world, (iii) expressed psychological state, and (iv) propositional content (see also Searle (2002)). The five types of speech acts are further explained next.

(i) Representatives (or assertives; the constatives of the original Austinian performative/constative dichotomy) are those kinds of speech acts that commit the speaker to the truth of the expressed proposition and thus carry a truth-value. They express the speaker's belief. Paradigmatic cases include asserting, claiming, concluding, reporting, and stating. In performing this type of speech act, the speaker represents the world as he or she believes it is, thus making the words fit the world of belief.

(20) The Berlin Wall came down in 1989.

(ii) Directives are those kinds of speech acts that represent attempts by the speaker to get the addressee to do something. They express the speaker's desire/wish for the addressee to do something. Paradigmatic cases include advice, commands, orders, questions, and requests. In using a directive, the speaker intends to elicit some future course of action on the part of the

addressee, thus making the world match the words via the addressee.

(21) Put the cake in the oven.

(iii) Commissives are those kinds of speech acts that commit the speaker to some future course of action. They express the speaker's intention to do something. Paradigmatic cases include offers, pledges, promises, refusals, and threats. In the case of a commissive, the world is adapted to the words via the speaker himherself.

(22) I'll never buy you another computer game.

(iv) Expressives are those kinds of speech acts that express a psychological attitude or state of the speaker such as joy, sorrow, and likes/dislikes. Paradigmatic cases include apologizing, blaming, congratulating, praising, and thanking. There is no direction of fit for this type of speech act.

(23) Well done, Elizabeth!

(v) Declarations (or declaratives) are those kinds of speech acts that effect immediate changes in some current state of affairs. Because they tend to rely on elaborate extralinguistic institutions for their successful performance, they may be called institutionalized performatives. In performing this type of speech act, the speaker brings about changes in the world; that is, he or she effects a correspondence between the propositional content and the world. Paradigmatic cases include (officially) opening a bridge, declaring war, excommunicating, firing from employment, and nominating a candidate. As to the direction of fit, it is both words-to-world and world-to-words.

(24) I object, Your Honor.

Illocutional point (or speech act type), direction of fit, and expressed psychological state can be summarized as in (25).

(25)	Illocutionary point/Speech act type	Direction of fit	Expressed psychological state
	representative	words-to-world	belief
	directive	world-to-words	desire
	commissive	world-to-words	intension
	expressive	none	variable
	declaration	both	none

Indirect Speech Acts

What is an indirect speech act? Most of the world's languages have three basic sentence types: declarative, interrogative, and imperative. In some languages, the three major sentence types are distinguished morphologically and/or syntactically; as instances,

compare Somali, Greenlandic, or Lakhota (Lakota) (see Huang (2006) for further discussion). The three sentence types are typically associated with the three basic illocutionary forces, namely, asserting/ stating, asking/questioning, and ordering/requesting, respectively.

In the case of a direct match between a sentence type and an illocutionary force, we have a direct speech act. In addition, explicit performatives, which happen to be in the declarative form, are also taken to be direct speech acts, because they have their illocutionary force explicitly named by the performative verb in the main part (or 'matrix clause') of the sentence. On the other hand, if there is no direct relationship between a sentence type and an illocutionary force, we are faced with an indirect speech act. Thus, when an explicit performative is used to make a request, as in (26), it functions as a direct speech act; the same is the case when an imperative is employed, as in (27). By comparison, when an interrogative is used to make a request, as in (28), we have an indirect speech act.

(26) I request you to pass the salt.

(27) Pass the salt.

(28) Can you pass the salt?

In short, the validity of the distinction between direct and indirect speech acts is dependent upon whether or not one subscribes to what Levinson (1983: 264, 274) has called the 'literal force hypothesis' – the view that there is a direct structure-function correlation in speech acts and that sentence forms are direct reflexes of their underlying illocutionary forces.

There are, however, problems at the very heart of the literal force hypothesis. One is that there are cases of speech acts where even the direct link between performative verbs and speech acts breaks down. Consider (29).

(29) I promise to sack you if you don't finish the job by this weekend.

In (29), the performative verb is *promise*, but the force that is most naturally ascribed to this speech act is that of either a threat or a warning. This shows that, contrary to the literal force hypothesis, we cannot always identify speech acts, even with sentences containing a performative verb.

Secondly and more importantly, as also pointed out by Levinson (1983: 264), most usages are indirect. The speech act of requesting, for example, is very rarely performed by means of an imperative in English. Instead, it is standardly carried out indirectly. Furthermore, there are probably infinitely many

varieties of sentences that can be used to indirectly make a request, as shown in (30).

(30a) I want you to put the cake in the oven.
(30b) Can you put the cake in the oven?
(30c) Will you put the cake in the oven?
(30d) Would you put the cake in the oven?
(30e) Would you mind putting the cake in the oven?
(30f) You ought to put the cake in the oven.
(30g) May I ask you to put the cake in the oven?
(30h) I wonder if you'd mind putting the cake in the oven?

As to how to analyze indirect speech acts, there are roughly three approaches. The first is to assume the existence of a dual illocutionary force (as proposed by Searle, 1975b). On this assumption, indirect speech acts have two illocutionary forces, one literal or direct, and the other nonliteral or indirect. While the literal force is secondary, the nonliteral force is primary. Next, whether an utterance operates as an indirect speech act or not has to do with the relevant felicity conditions. For example, (28) both infringes the felicity condition for a question and queries the preparatory condition for a request. This explains why it can function as an indirect speech act, whereas (31), for instance, cannot; the reason is that in the case of (31), felicity conditions are irrelevant.

(31) Salt is made of sodium chloride.

Finally, on Searle's view, because a speaker's performing and an addressee's understanding an indirect speech act always involves some kind of inference, the question is how this inference can be computed. Searle's suggestion is that it can be computed along the general lines of the rational, cooperative model of communication articulated by Grice (1989) (*see* **Grice, Herbert Paul; Cooperative Principle**).

One interesting characteristic of indirect speech acts is that they are frequently conventionalized (see, e.g., Morgan, 1978). This can be illustrated by the fact that of various, apparently synonymous linguistic expressions, only one may conventionally be used to convey an indirect speech act, as illustrated in (32).

(32a) Are you able to pass the salt?
(32b) Do you have the ability to pass the salt?

Under Searle's analysis, both (32a) and (32b) would be expected to be able to perform the indirect speech act of requesting, because (i) they are largely synonymous with (28), and (ii) they, too, inquire about the satisfaction of the addressee-based preparatory condition for making a request. But this expectation is not fulfilled.

Searle's response to this puzzle is that there is also a certain degree of conventionality about indirect speech acts, and that this may be accounted for in terms of conventions of meaning/usage. Inspired by this insight, Morgan (1978) developed the notion of 'short-circuited implicature' to cover inference involved in cases like (28) (*see* **Implicature**). While the relevant implicature is in principle calculable, in practice it is not calculated in cases like these. From a linguistic point of view, the conventionality here is correlated with the possible occurrence of *please*. While *please* can be inserted before the verb *pass* in (26)–(28), it cannot in (32), as shown in (33).

(33a) I request you to please pass the salt.
(33b) Please pass the salt.
(33c) Can you please pass the salt?
(33d) ?Are you able to please pass the salt?
(33e) ?Do you have the ability to please pass the salt?

Furthermore, the conventionality indicated by *please* in (33a) and (33b) is one of meaning, hence the speech act of requesting is performed directly. By contrast, the conventionality signaled by *please* in (33c) is one of usage, and thus we have an indirect speech act.

A second, rather similar, approach is due to Gordon and Lakoff (1975). In their analysis, there are inference rules called 'conversational postulates' that reduce the amount of inference needed to interpret an indirect speech act. Thus, in the case of (28), if the interpretation as a question cannot be intended by the speaker, then the utterance will be read as being equivalent to his or her having said (26), thus resulting in the performance of the indirect speech act of requesting. Stated this way, the conversational postulates proposed by Gordon and Lakoff can be seen as another reflection of the conventionality of indirect speech acts. As to the similarities and differences between Searle's and Gordon and Lakoff's analyses, the major similarity is that both accounts assume that the interpretation of indirect speech acts involves inference as well as conventionality; the major difference concerns the question of balance, namely, how much of the work involved in computing an indirect speech act is inferential and how much is conventional.

Finally, in contrast to the inferential models we have just discussed, there is the idiom model. In this model, sentences like (28) are semantically ambiguous, and the request interpretation constitutes a speech act idiom that involves no inference at all. On this view, (28) is simply recognized as a request, with no question being perceived. This is the position taken by Sadock (1974). There are, however, problems with this analysis, too. One is that it fails to capture the fact that (in contrast to what is the case for idioms) the meaning of an indirect speech act can frequently (at least in part) be derived from the meaning of its components (the technical term for this is 'compositionality'; *see* **Frege, Friedrich Ludwig Gottlob**); in addition, these would-be 'idioms' turn out to be quite comparable cross-linguistically (something which idioms are not). For example, an utterance like (34) may be used, with the same force as in English, in its Arabic, Chinese, German, or Modern Greek versions to indirectly request the addressee to switch on the central heating system (of course, always depending on the context).

(34) 'It's cold in here.'

A further problem is that in the idiom model, an interpretation that takes into account the literal meaning or the direct illocutionary force of an indirect speech act is not allowed. This, however, leaves examples like (35) unexplained.

(35) A: Can you pass the salt?
     B: Yes, I can. (Here it is.)

Why, then, do people use indirect speech acts? One answer is that the use of indirect speech acts is in general associated with politeness. Indirect speech acts are usually considered to be more polite than their direct counterparts (see the considerable literature on the analysis of speech acts, especially the work on face-threatening acts (FTAs) like requests, complaints, and apologies in the tradition of Brown and Levinson's (1987) classical 'face-saving' politeness model *see* **Face**; **Politeness**; **Pragmatic Acts**).

Speech Acts and Culture

Cross-Cultural Variation

Many speech acts are culture-specific. This is particularly so in the case of institutionalized speech acts, which typically use standardized and stereotyped formulae and are performed in public ceremonies. A good example is provided by the speech act of divorcing. In some Muslim cultures, under the appropriate circumstances, the uttering of a sentence with the import of (36) three times consecutively by a husband to his wife will *ipso facto* constitute a divorce. By contrast, in Western cultures, no one (no matter what his or her religion is) can felicitously use (36) to obtain a divorce.

(36) 'I hereby divorce you.'

But how about non-institutionalized speech acts? First of all, as said above, any given speech act may be culture-specific. Rosaldo (1982), for example,

observed that the speech act of promising has no place among the Ilongots – a tribal group of hunters and horticulturalists in the Philippines. She attributes the absence of this speech act in the conceptual repertoire of the Ilongot to a lack of interest in sincerity and truth in that community. The Ilongot, argues Rosaldo, are more concerned with social relationships than with personal intentions. On the basis of anthropological evidence such as this, Rosaldo claims that the universality of Searle's typology of speech acts cannot be maintained. Another example of this kind has been reported for the Australian aboriginal language Yolngu. According to Harris (1984: 134–135), there does not seem to be any speech act of thanking in the Yolngu speaker's repertoire.

Conversely, a given speech act may be present only in certain cultures. For example, in the Australian aboriginal language Walmajari, one finds a speech act of requesting that is based on kinship rights and obligations. The verb in question is *japirlyung* (Hudson, 1985), and the speech act may be called 'kinship-based requesting,' because it conveys a message meaning roughly 'I ask/request you to do X for me, and I expect you to do it simply because of how you are related to me'. Thus, for the speakers of Walmajari, it is very difficult to refuse a kinship-based speech act of requesting (see also Wierzbicka, 1991: 159–160). 'Exotic' speech acts such as the kinship-based requesting do not seem to be present in other East Asian or Western cultures.

Secondly, given a particular situation, pertinent speech acts are carried out differently in different cultures. For instance, in some East Asian and Western cultures, if one steps on another person's toes, one normally performs the speech act of apologizing. But apparently this is not the case among the Akans, a West African culture. As reported by Mey (2001: 287, crediting Felix Ameka), in that culture, such a situation does not call for apologies but calls for the expression of sympathy: "The focus is on the person to whom the bad thing has happened rather than the person who has caused the bad thing" (Mey, 2001: 287). Another example: while in English, thanks and compliments are usually offered to the hosts when leaving a dinner party, in Japanese society, apologies such as *o-jama itashimashita* 'I have intruded on you' are more likely to be offered by the guests. A similar speech act of apologizing is performed in Japanese upon receiving a present, when a Japanese speaker is likely to say something like *sumimasen* – the most common Japanese 'apology' formula or one of its variants. Conversely (as pointed out by many authors), apologies can be used in a much broader range of speech situations in Japanese than in English.

Thirdly, in different cultures/languages, the same speech act may meet with different typical responses. For example, a compliment normally generates acceptance/thanking in English, but self-denigration in Chinese, Japanese, or even Polish. A typical compliment/response formula in Chinese would be something like (37).

(37) A: ni cai zuode zhen hao!
B: nali, nali, wo bu hui zuocai.
A: bie keqi. ni cai zhende zuode hen hao!
B: ni tai keqi le.
A: 'You cook really well!'
B: 'No, no, I don't really know how to cook properly.'
A: 'Please don't be too modest. You really cook very well.'
B: 'You're too kind.'

The same is even more true in Japanese. According to Mizutani and Mizutani (1987: 43), "[T]he Japanese will never accept a compliment without saying *iie* ['no']". Given the general Japanese reluctance to say 'no' under almost any other circumstances, the compliment response pattern is rather striking.

Fourthly, the same speech act may differ in its directness/indirectness in different cultures. Since the late 1970s, a great deal of research has been conducted on how particular kinds of speech acts, especially such face-threatening acts as requests, apologies, and complaints are realized across different languages (*see* **Face**). Of these investigations, the most influential is the large-scale Cross-Cultural Speech Act Realization Patterns Project (CCSARP) (Blum-Kulka *et al.*, 1989). In this project, the realization patterns of requesting and apologizing in German; Hebrew; Danish; Canadian French; Argentinean Spanish; and British, American, and Australian English were compared and contrasted. In the case of requests, the findings were that among the languages examined, the Argentinean Spanish speakers are the most direct, followed by the speakers of Hebrew. The least direct are the Australian English speakers, while the speakers of Canadian French and German are positioned at the midpoint of the directness/indirectness continuum. Building on the CCSARP, strategies for the performance of certain types of face-threatening acts in a much wider range of languages have since been examined. These languages include Catalan, Chinese, Danish, Dutch, French, German, Greek, Hebrew, Japanese, Javanese, Polish, Russian, Thai, Turkish, four varieties of English (British, American, Australian, and New Zealand), two varieties of French (Canadian and French), and eight varieties of Spanish (Argentinean, Ecuadorian, Mexican, Peninsular,

Peruvian, Puerto Rican, Uruguayan, and Venezuelan). As a result of these studies, it has now been established that there is indeed extensive cross-cultural variation in directness/indirectness in speech acting, especially in the realization of face-threatening acts (FTAs), and that these differences are generally associated with the different means that different languages utilize to realize speech acts (see **Intercultural Pragmatics and Communication**). These findings have undoubtedly contributed to our better understanding of cross-cultural/linguistic similarities and differences in face-redressive strategies for FTAs (see Huang (2006) for detailed discussion).

Interlanguage Variation

A number of studies have recently appeared that explore speech acts in interlanguage pragmatics. Simply put, an interlanguage is a stage on a continuum within a rule-governed language system that is developed by L2 learners on the way to acquiring the target language. This language system is intermediate between the learner's native language and his or her target language.

Some of these studies investigate how a particular type of speech act is performed by non-native speakers in a given interlanguage; others compare and contrast the similarities and differences in the realization patterns of given speech acts between native and non-native speakers of a particular language. The best studied interlanguage is that developed by speakers of English as a second language. Other interlanguages that have been investigated include Chinese, German, Hebrew, Japanese, and Spanish (see Huang (2006) for further discussion).

A few recent formal and computational approaches to speech acts and speech act theory are worthy of note. One important theoretical development is the integration of speech acts with intensional logic, resulting in what is called 'illocutionary logic' (Searle and Vanderveken, 1985; Vanderveken, 1994, 2002). Similarly, Merin (1994) has endeavored to produce an algebra of what he calls 'social acts.' Finally, recent formalizations of various aspects of speech act theory in artificial intelligence and computational linguistics can be found in Perrault (1990), Bunt and Black (2000), and Jurafsky (2004) (see also Sadock, 2004).

See also: Austin, John L.; Cooperative Principle; Deixis and Anaphora: Pragmatic Approaches; Face; Frege, Friedrich Ludwig Gottlob; Grice, Herbert Paul; Implicature; Intercultural Pragmatics and Communication; Politeness; Pragmatic Acts; Pragmatics: Overview; Principles and Rules; Speech Acts, Classification and Definition; Wittgenstein, Ludwig Josef Johann.

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Speech Acts and Grammar

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Language as Action: Performatives vs Constatives

J. L. Austin (1962), in his posthumously published book *How to do things with words* was the first to introduce the idea of speech acts (SA), analyzing the relationships between utterances and performance. His first goal was to point out the limitations of truth conditional semantics, i.e., the (logical positivist) view of language that places truth conditions as central to language understanding. Austin was convinced that we do not just use language to **say** things (make statements), but also to **do** things (perform actions). He formalized this opposition in his so-called performative hypothesis (which he would later abandon) by contrasting two types of utterances: constative utterances, or constatives, and performative utterances, or performatives (*see* **Speech Acts**).

Constatives are essentially like the classical statements. Their function is to describe some event, process, or state of affairs. The proposition that is expressed can be either true or false. Some examples are given in (1). Note that actually, at the time of this writing, at least one of these utterances is false.

(1) a. I'm driving a green car.
    b. I have four children.
    c. I am expecting a baby.

By contrast, performatives are utterances that have no truth conditions (see below), but this does not mean that they are meaningless, as illustrated by the examples in (2) (from Truckenbrodt, 2004).

(2) a. I sentence you to 2 years in prison.
    b. I name this ship 'Liberté.'
    c. I accept your offer.
    d. I promise to pick you up at the airport.
    e. I warn you not to come to my house again.
    f. I advise you to stop smoking.

Formally, the utterances in (1) and (2) are alike. They are all declarative sentences, in the first person singular, and use the present tense. They do not, however, do the same job. While the utterances in (1) are statements, the utterances in (2) are used to perform an action, i.e., to do something (promising, warning, advising, etc.), rather than to say that something is or is not the case. To be successful, the performative must be issued in a situation that is appropriate, in all respects, for the act in question: if the speaker does not meet the conditions required for its performance, then the utterance will be 'unhappy,' 'void,' or 'infelicitous' (Austin, 1975: 14).

The conditions of 'happiness' of performative utterances (later called felicity conditions, see below) state how and when utterances are valid, in a real situation. A performative can be unhappy in two ways:

- The circumstances and conditions in which the utterance is performed are not appropriate

(incorrect uttering of the formula, the actors involved do not meet the conventional requirements, the speaker is joking, etc.), in which case the act in question is not successfully performed at all, i.e., it is not achieved; or

- The utterance is issued insincerely (such as when I say *I promise* and have no intention of keeping it), in which case the act **is** achieved but with abuse of the procedure (I have promised but will not follow my promise).

Summing up, performatives are different from constatives in at least two ways (see also Truckenbrodt, 2004). First, performatives are used to do something, they create new facts (other than the fact that someone has said that something is or is not the case). Thus, a judge saying (2a) under the right circumstances in court creates the fact that the hearer is sentenced to 2 years in prison. An authorized person saying (2b) in the right circumstances creates the fact that the ship now has a name. Likewise, by saying (2c) the speaker creates a fact of commitment to accept the offer. By promising, as in (2d), a promise has been made that has consequences. Similarly, in (2e), the listener has been warned; and in (2f), the listener has been given advice. These facts may seem to be relatively similar to the fact created by a statement (*viz.*, that someone has said that something is true). Nevertheless they are different. As Austin clearly indicated, for example, an explicit promise as in (2d) is not, and does not involve, the statement that one is promising. It is an act of a distinctive sort, the very sort named by this particular performative verb (*to promise*). Of course one can promise without doing so explicitly by using the performative verb *promise*, but if one does use it, one is, according to Austin, making explicit what one is doing but not stating that one is doing it.

The second way in which performatives are different from constatives is that performatives cannot be said to be true or false. If the utterances in (2) are performed under the appropriate circumstances, there is no issue of them being true or false. If they are made under the right circumstances, and by the right person, they may be said to be automatically true, in a certain sense. But if they are not made under the appropriate circumstances, they do not become false; rather they become unhappy or void, as shown above. It is clear that this is different from a statement being false. Instead, the statement represents an attempt to perform an act of the relevant kind, but an attempt that does not work out.

What About Grammar?

Performatives normally involve a first person subject (typically *I*) and a performative verb, as in (2) above (where the performative verbs are *promise*, *name*,

etc.). Working with examples of everyday language to show how performances can happen, Austin (1975: 151) claimed five general classes of performative verbs (even though he admits that the distinction between various kinds of utterances is not always clear):

1. Verdictives, which give a finding or verdict by a jury, arbitrator, or umpire (sentencing, pleading, pronouncing, etc.).
2. Exercitives, which are the exercising of a power, right, or influence (appointing, voting, ordering, urging, advising, warning, etc.).
3. Commissives, which commit you to an action, including declarations or announcements of intention (promising, announcing, opening, declaring, etc.).
4. Behabitives, expressing attitudes about social behavior (apologizing, congratulating, commending, condoling, cursing, challenging, etc.).
5. Expositives, which make plain how utterances fit into conversations or arguments (I reply, I argue, I concede, I illustrate, I assume, etc.).

Performatives moreover tend to use the simple present tense and are indicative (*I promise I'll come tomorrow*). This is because they are pronounced for the purpose of acting on a real situation, and thus they usually cannot refer to past events. Nevertheless, performatives are also regularly found in the passive voice, as in (3) (from Austin, 1975: 57).

(3) You are hereby authorized to pay.
Passengers are warned to cross the track by the bridge only.
Notice is hereby given that trespassers will be prosecuted.

Noteworthy about these examples is that they contain the adverbial *hereby*. The insertion of this adverb is indeed often suggested as a test meant to distinguish performatives from constatives. All utterances in (2) allow the presence of *hereby* (see [4]), while the constatives in (1) do not (see [5]).

(4) a. I *hereby* sentence you to two years in prison.
b. I *hereby* name this ship 'Liberté.'
c. I *hereby* accept your offer.
d. I *hereby* promise to pick you up at the airport.
e. I *hereby* warn you not to come to my house again.
f. I *hereby* advise you to stop smoking.

(5) a. # I'm *hereby* driving a green car.
b. # I *hereby* have four children.
c. # I am *hereby* expecting a baby.

This difference between constatives and performatives is found across languages. In French *par la présente* works like English *hereby*, the German

counterpart is *hiermit*, the Dutch one is *bij deze(n)*, the Spanish one is *por la presente*, etc.

As mentioned above, it is not absolutely necessary to actually pronounce the performative verb *to promise* to perform the action of promising. In principle, utterance (6a) will probably have a similar effect on the hearer as does utterance (2d), repeated here as (6b) for convenience.

(6) a. I'll pick you up at the airport.
    b. I promise to pick you up at the airport.

Thus, in some sense, all verbs can be performatives. To account for this, Austin refined his classification: the utterances called performatives above are now called explicit performatives. These are distinguished from primary performatives, in which the performative part is implicit, as in (6a). Austin eventually realized that explicit constatives function in essentially the same way as performatives. After all, a statement can be made by uttering *I assert . . .* or *I predict . . .*, just as a promise or a request can be made with *I promise . . .* or *I request . . .* In addition, the utterances in (7) illustrate that explicit constatives can co-occur with *hereby*, and that they are automatically true, which makes them totally identical to explicit performatives, whereas the corresponding primary performatives to (7) are statements, not actions (see [8]).

(7) a. I (hereby) tell you that I am not traveling to the U.S. next week.
    b. I (hereby) assert that this president is the most stupid one we ever had.

(8) a. I am not traveling to the U.S. next week.
    b. This president is the most stupid one we ever had.

As pointed out by Thomas (1995), Austin's performative hypothesis convincingly documented the fact that people do not use language just to make statements about the world: they also use language to perform actions that affect the world in one way or another. However, the position that **only** performative verbs could be used to perform actions turned out to be untenable. Thomas (1995: 44–46) gives three different reasons for the collapse of Austin's performative hypothesis.

- There is no formal (grammatical) way of distinguishing performative verbs from other sorts of verbs. Like all other verbs, performatives can be plural as well as singular, they can be written and spoken, they do not have to be in the first person, nor is it essential that they be in the active mood.
- The presence of a performative verb does not guarantee that the specified action is performed. One can indeed use the verb *to promise* to actually perform a threat, rather than a promise, as in

I promise things will go wrong for you if you don't go to bed immediately!
- There are ways of doing things with words that do not involve using performative verbs. Indeed, for a great many very common acts such as offering, boasting, expressing an opinion, hinting, insulting, etc., it would be most odd to use a performative verb. In addition, there are also acts for which the language does not even have a performative verb, such as letting the cat out of the bag, putting one's foot in it, pulling someone's leg, etc.

As a consequence, Austin completely abandoned his original distinction between constative and performative utterances; instead, he distinguished between the truth conditions of statement and those of the action it performs. In other words, the proper distinction is that between locutionary and illocutionary acts.

Locution, Illocution, Perlocution

In addition to providing the insight that utterances are used to perform actions, speech act theory assumes that speakers are simultaneously involved in three different speech acts when uttering a sentence:

1. a locutionary act: the act of using words to form sentences, those wordings making sense in a language with correct grammar and pronunciation.
2. an illocutionary act: the intended action by the speaker, the force or intention behind the words, within the framework of certain conventions.
3. a perlocutionary act: the effect that an utterance has on the thoughts, feelings, attitudes, or actions of the hearer.

These acts are not parts, but dimensions of a speech act, which means that they cannot be performed in isolation. Any utterance will always exhibit all of these different dimensions. Thus, in order to have a speech act one needs a meaningful linguistic expression (locution), that is produced, one, with some kind of function or communicative purpose in the speaker's mind, such as making a statement, an offer, an explanation, a threat, etc., (illocution), and two, with some intended effect on the hearer, such as to get the hearer to perform some action, or to have her/him understand a problem, etc., (perlocution). Bach (2003) illustrates this with the example given in (9):

(9) The bar will be closed in five minutes.

In uttering (9), a bartender would be performing the *locutionary* act of saying that the bar (i.e., the one he is tending) will be closed in 5 minutes (from the time of utterance). In saying this, the bartender is performing the illocutionary act of informing the

patrons of the bar's imminent closing (and perhaps also, and not unimportantly, the act of urging them to order a last drink). Finally, the bartender also intends his utterance to produce further effects, by performing the perlocutionary acts of causing the patrons to believe that the bar is about to close and of actually getting (and not just urging) them to order one last drink. He is performing all these speech acts, at all three levels, just by uttering the above words.

Of these three dimensions, the one most discussed is the illocutionary act (also referred to as the illocutionary force). The term 'speech act' has indeed come to refer exclusively to this kind of act, which thus corresponds most closely to the notion of performative described above, as they can (but need not) be performed by means of a performative formula.

What About Grammar?

Generally speaking, there is a close and predictable connection between locution and illocution of an utterance. That is, all competent (adult) speakers of a language can mostly predict or interpret the intended illocutionary force of an utterance with reasonable accuracy. As pointed out by Thomas (1995: 50), "human beings simply could not operate if they had no idea at all how their interlocutor would react (...)." Most typically, the sentential moods declarative, interrogative, and imperative are used with the functions shown in **Table 1** (based on Truckenbrodt, 2004) .

However, this relation between form and function only works in the typical cases (and it remains questionable whether these cases are the most frequent ones). Clearly, we cannot say: a declarative has by definition the function of a statement, or an interrogative has by definition the function of a question (see below). This means that sometimes things can go wrong, mostly because the same locutionary act can have different illocutionary forces. For instance, depending on the context of utterance, (10) – a declarative – could count as a prediction, a promise, or a warning.

(10) I'll be back.

The most obvious way to help the hearer recognize the intended illocutionary force of an utterance is by using an explicit illocutionary act. Explicit acts contain a so-called IFID or illocutionary force indicating device, i.e., an expression naming the act. In most cases, this is a performative verb that explicitly names the illocutionary act being performed (I *warn* you that, I *predict* that, I *promise* that, etc.). While speakers do not always make their speech acts this explicit, still the context may force them to identify the speech act being performed. This is illustrated in the (constructed) telephone conversation in (11) (from Yule, 1996: 49–50).

(11) Him: Can I talk to Mary?
Her: No, she's not here.
Him: I'm asking you – can I talk to her?
Her: And I'm telling you – SHE'S NOT HERE!

In this scenario, each speaker describes the illocutionary force of their utterances. Most of the time, however, no performative verbs are mentioned. Yule (1996) mentions some further IFIDs that can draw the attention to the illocutionary force being employed, such as word order, stress, intonation, changes in voice quality, etc.

Of course, to be recognized, the utterance should also be produced under certain (conventional) conditions for it to count as having the intended illocutionary force; that is, it should meet a number of felicity conditions, a notion that was developed by Searle (1969), building on Austin's original work. In addition to the general conditions on the participants (such as that they understand the language being used and that they are not play-acting or uttering nonsense), Searle distinguishes preparatory, propositional, sincerity, and essential conditions, differing as to the function of the speech act at hand. Example (12) illustrates the conditions for the act of *promising* (Searle, 1969: 62ff; as cited in Saeed, 2003: 229):

(12) Conditions for promising
[where S = Speaker, H = Hearer, A = the future action, P = the proposition expressed in the speech act, e = the linguistic expression]
a. Preparatory 1: H would prefer S's doing A to his not doing A and S believes H would prefer S's doing A to not doing A.
b. Preparatory 2: It is not obvious to both S and H that S will do A in the normal course of events.
c. Propositional: In expressing that P, S predicates a future act of S.
d. Sincerity: S intends to do A.
e. Essential: the utterance e counts as an undertaking to do A.

Thus, the preparatory conditions for a promise should guarantee that when I promise to do something, the event will have a beneficial effect on the

Table 1 Relationship between form and function of speech acts

Syntactic form	Illocutionary act	Illocutionary force
Declarative	Statement	Speaker commits to content
Interrogative	Question	Request for information
Imperative	Command	Attempt to get listener to do something

hearer, and second, it will not happen by itself. So, telling one's spouse *I'll be home at six* when leaving for work might not be considered a typical promise, unless I usually come home at seven or eight and my spouse would like me to come home earlier. The propositional condition reflects the fact that the content of the utterance has to concern a future event – I cannot promise something that already has happened – and that the future event will be an act of the speaker – I cannot promise my family that our neighbor will do the dishes tonight. Related to these conditions is the sincerity condition: when I promise to do something, I really must intend to carry out the future action – I cannot genuinely promise that I will be home at six if I already know that I have a meeting starting at six! Finally, the essential condition covers the fact that by uttering my promise, I commit myself to the obligation of carrying out the future action.

According to Searle, the conditions related to the speech act of promising are of general applicability and thus it should be possible to establish rules of this type for every speech act. Searle does so for some eight additional speech acts: requesting, asserting, questioning, thanking, advising, warning, greeting, and congratulating. Thomas (1995: 95ff), however, criticizes Searle's endeavor and raises four interrelated sets of problems with respect to these rules:

- It is not always possible to distinguish fully between one speech act and another (partly because the conditions specified by Searle only tend to cover the central or most typical usage of a speech act verb).
- If we attempt to plug all the gaps in Searle's rules, we end up with a hopelessly complex collection of *ad hoc* conditions.
- The conditions specified by Searle may exclude perfectly normal instances of speech act, while they would permit anomalous uses.
- The same speech act verb may cover a range of slightly different phenomena and some speech acts do indeed overlap; Searle's rules do no account for this.

Categorizing Speech Acts

Any language has probably several hundred verbs that can be used to describe a kind of action that can be performed with an explicit or an implicit speech act. Is there a plausible way of grouping all these different speech acts into categories? In contrast to Austin's (1962: 109ff) first, very tentative classification, based on actual performative verbs

(a classification which he did not consider definitive), Searle's (1976) categorization of speech acts into five types, each with their general function, has become a classic, and is still often referred to today. Its main improvement with respect to Austin's is probably that it clearly separates the notion of speech act from that of speech act verb. In other words, "the existence or nonexistence of [a speech act verb (or performative verb)] cannot be a criterion for the existence or nonexistence of a particular speech act" (Mey, 2001: 117) (*see* **Speech Acts, Classification and Definition**).

1. Representatives commit the speaker to something's being the case, to the truth of the expressed proposition, typically statements, assertions, conclusions, descriptions, etc., such as *The earth is flat; It's cold here; Chomsky didn't like butterflies*.
2. Directives are attempts by the speaker to get the hearer to do something. They express what the speaker wants; typical representatives are commands, orders, requests, suggestions, etc., such as *I warn you to stay away from my house!; Mum, can I have a cookie, two please?*
3. Commissives commit the speaker to some future course of action. They express what the speaker intends: typically, promises, threats, refusals, offerings, etc., such as *I promise that I'll be home at six; I'll be back; I will not marry you*.
4. Expressives are used to express the psychological state of the speaker. They state what the speaker feels and can be statements of joy, pain, sorrow etc., but also expressions of thanking, apologizing, welcoming, congratulating, etc., such as *I congratulate you on winning the race; I'm really sorry; YESSS!*
5. Declarations effect immediate changes in the institutional state of affairs, i.e., they change the world via the utterance. The speaker has to have a special institutional role, in a specific context, in order to be able to perform a declaration appropriately; typical examples include excommunicating, declaring war, marrying, firing from employment, nominating, etc.

Searle uses a mix of criteria to establish these different types; these include the act's illocutionary point, its fit with the world, the psychological state of the speaker, and the content of the act (cf. Saeed, 2001: 228–229; Mey, 2001: 119–126). The illocutionary point is the purpose or aim of the act; it corresponds most closely to the definition of the speech act types given above. The fit concerns the direction of the relationship between language and the world: should the words conform to the world (representatives, expressives) or is it the world that should conform to the words (directives,

commissives), or be changed by the words (declaratives)? The psychological state relates to the speaker's state of mind or attitude toward events: e.g., does the speaker believe what is uttered in the speech act, or not? Finally, the content is directly related to the propositional felicity condition described above.

What About Grammar?

An alternative way of classifying speech acts is to take their structure as a point of departure. In their cross-linguistic analysis of speech acts, Sadock and Zwicky (1985: 160) note "that most languages are similar in presenting three basic sentence types with similar functions and often strikingly similar forms." These three basic sentence types are the declarative, the interrogative, and the imperative. Roughly, they can be described as follows: The declarative is used for making announcements or declarations, stating conclusions, making claims, telling stories, and so on. The interrogative is used to gain information; it asks for a verbal response from the addressee. The imperative is used for making requests, giving orders or advice, making suggestions, and the like; its use is meant to influence the course of (future) events. While there are many differences in detail between individual languages, there seems to be "an easily recognized relationship between the three structural forms (declarative, interrogative, imperative) and the three general communicative functions (statement, question, command/request)" (Yule, 1996: 54), as illustrated in (13):

> (13) a. She eats an apple. declarative/statement
> b. Does she eat an apple? interrogative/ question
> c. Give me her apple! imperative/command

Whenever there is such a direct relationship between the sentence type and its communicative function, we are faced with a direct speech act. Whenever the relationship between structure and function is indirect, we are dealing with an indirect speech act. Thus, an interrogative used to ask a question is a direct speech act (as in 13b), but an interrogative used to inquire about a capability (*could, can*) or willingness (*would*) in order to elicit information (14a) or to make a request (14b, 14c) represents an indirect speech act (*see* **Speech Acts, Literal and Nonliteral**).

> (14) a. Could you tell me whether she's eating an apple?
> b. Can you give me the salt, please?
> c. Would you give me your suitcase, Madam?

The examples in (14) actually display "a typical pattern in English whereby asking a question about the hearer's assumed ability (*Can you?*, *Could you?*) or future likelihood with regard to doing something (*Will you?*, *Would you?*) normally counts as a request to actually do that something" (Yule, 1996: 56). The same goes for other languages (such as Dutch, French, German, Spanish, and so on) where similar patterns are displayed.

From a more general point of view, indirectness is a universal phenomenon (Thomas, 1995: 119). It can be used to make one's language more or less interesting; to increase the force of one's message, to reach competing goals; and to be more polite or to save one's face (see Thomas, 1995: 143–146) (*see* **Face**). Indirect speech acts, in particular, are generally associated with greater politeness than are direct speech acts. However, it is not possible to assess politeness out of context. The linguistic form, as well as the context of utterance, and the relationship between speaker and hearer, all play a role in rendering a speech act more or less polite (or impolite; see Thomas, 1995: 155–157) (*see also* **Politeness; Pragmatics: Overview; Pragmatic Acts**).

See also: Politeness; Pragmatic Acts; Pragmatics: Overview; Speech Acts; Speech Acts, Classification and Definition; Speech Acts, Literal and Nonliteral.

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Speech Acts, Classification and Definition

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To speak a language is to express thoughts in the form of linguistic utterances that employ words and follow combinatorial rules. When a person A speaks communicatively, she transmits a thought to a hearer H with a certain **official aim** and possibly with other consequential effects. By an utterance, a speaker can inform the hearer of a certain situation, express an inner state of mind (emotions or feelings), or modify the behavior of the recipient. In all cases, a certain thought is expressed by the vocalization of an utterance. A speech act, though, is not merely the expression of a thought. It is the vocalization of a certain representation of the world (external or internal) aimed at making official the display of an intention to change a state of things and at changing things by the public display of that intention. A speech act is a **public utterance**; it cannot be a silent thought, and its effects are obtained in virtue of its being a public thought. I hope that this suffices to settle the question of whether the communicative or the representational

view of language should have priority. My stance is that we have to start with the basic function of language, which is that of expressing or articulating thoughts, before we can move on to the public function of language, which is to express communicative intentions to obtain a number of effects on other people and on society. Thus, this view reconciles opposite stances to language.

We have to distinguish 'locutionary,' 'illocutionary,' and 'perlocutionary' acts. A locutionary act is the vocalization of a sentence endowed with a certain meaning. For example, an actor on the stage vocalizes a locutionary act, because the meaning that the utterance has, is not interpreted as being a display of the speaker's intention. An illocutionary act is an utterance proffered with the intention to change the context, updating it with a certain public intention to do things or modify the hearer's cognitive state. A perlocutionary act is an utterance that achieves the speaker's intention, not directly through the expression of that intention, but **as a consequence** of the display of a speaker's intention to do something. For example, an anonymous letter to the police may have as its point the (perlocutionary)

intention to jam the police activities and divert the course of justice.

In this article, I contend that there is a general algorithm, mapping a sentence type to a literal speech act; in other words, there are conventions of language use associating certain forms with certain speech acts. This is certainly the case of 'performatives' (e.g., *I promise to come tomorrow*; *You are fired*; etc.), forms which **unambiguously** express a certain illocutionary intention and the utterance of which counts as carrying out certain social actions. When a performative formula is used by a person having certain socially recognized characteristics (status, power, etc.) in an appropriate context, then a certain social action is carried out in virtue of the speaker having proffered the formula in that context. The case of utterances that do not wear their illocutionary potential on their sleeves is less certain, in that the context can shape the final illocutionary force of the utterance. However, it is useful, in my opinion, to think of the language system as providing default conventions whereby proffering a certain utterance, in virtue of a convention of use, counts as performing a certain speech act, unless the context intervenes to enrich the force of the utterance further. The basic objections to this view (counterexamples to basic correlations) can be answered by having some weak conventions of language use map utterances to very generic illocutionary forces that can be enriched further by the specification of the full context in which the utterance is situated.

It is useful here to abandon the view that there are sentences whose illocutionary potentials can be studied in isolation, and to replace it with one in which, although the very basic contribution of linguistic semantics is not dismissed altogether, one specifically studies speech acts in actual interaction, embedding them in large portions of context having the function of incrementing the illocutionary potential of a certain sentence. We will thus move on to a higher unit of linguistic analysis: the 'pragmeme.' (Mey, 2002: 222) We may provisionally define the pragmeme in this way:

> Take an utterance U of a sentence S in a cotext S′, S″, S‴, Sn, or a sequence Sq of utterances, uttered in a situation of utterance C, in which the language users know that the sequential placement of U or Sq contributes to the illocutionary force in virtue of a rule of language use pertaining to that limited area of use. Then the utterance of U or Sq in the cotext S′, S″, S‴, Sn and in the situation C will transform U or Sq into a pragmeme Pr having a certain illocutionary force IF, partially determined by the semantic import of the sentence in question, by referential pragmatic enrichments and explicatures, and by the final transformation due to the contextual and cotextual elements of the sequence S′, S″, S‴, Sn, in C.

As can be noted, in the definition above we have avoided the ordinary assumption that there is a one-to-one mapping between an utterance (consisting of a single sentence) and an illocutionary act, preferring the general case in which a sequence of sentences (or utterances) counts as the vocalization of a single speech act (*see* **Pragmatic Acts**).

Before moving on to the important issue of speech act classification, it is important to try to settle the perennial question of whether speech acts can or cannot be reduced to truth-conditional meaning. In fact, speech act theory, as worked out by Austin (1962), seems *prima facie* to challenge the view that semantics can be reduced to truth-conditional meaning, because at least a number of speech acts (e.g., promises, directives, requests, etc.) do not represent thoughts or facts, but are instructions to change the world in a manner specified by the speech act at hand. In fact, Gazdar (1979) and Levinson (1983) persuasively write that speech acts are best described as transformations from a certain context to a new one (*see* **Austin, John L.; Speech Acts**). Of course, there are advantages to glean from this perspective, but it has not been demonstrated, according to a number of authoritative scholars, that a speech act does not express a thought, the intention on the part of the speaker to carry out a certain action. Surely, a person who asks a question expresses the wish to know a certain answer; a person who proffers a directive vocalizes the wish that the world be changed in such-and-such a way; a person who utters a promise expresses the thought that he or she will act in a certain manner in the future that will create some advantages for the hearer. I believe that all this is indisputable, and I am not sure how it can be reconciled with the drastic view proposed by Austin and then followed by Levinson (1983) that speech acts cannot be reduced to truth-conditional meaning. After all, having a thought amounts to creating a state of affairs (albeit enveloped in the mind) that surely can be expressed by truth-conditional semantics, as this is specifically intended to describe states of affairs, either in the world or in the mind (and states of affairs in the mind are in the world, as a consequence of the fact that the mind is in the world).

One way to reduce speech acts to truth-conditional meaning is through partitions (Higginbotham, 1995). Consider a question such as 'Is John at home?' Because the question just admits two possible replies (Yes, he is; No, he is not), the speech act is associated with the partition [He is at home/he is not at home], which expresses the basic truth-conditional import of the question. A crucial observation to make, following Schiffer (2003), is that while we can happily say that the question is associated with this partition, it is

not clear (and it is possibly wrong to think) that we are entitled to say that the question means what the partition means. At least, this is not the way we would ordinarily speak. More complicated are questions such as 'Which boy did you see in town?' where the partition consists of all the reply options related to the domain of the boys present in town (for all those boys, we have to consider the reply option [I saw x/ I did not see x]).

I tentatively propose another way to solve the problem of speech acts' reduction to truth-conditional meaning, by recourse to modal notions. Consider the following sentence:

Go and buy some bread.

This sentence can be represented in the following way:

In a world w that is maximally similar to the actual world, such that the obligations imposed by the speaker on the hearer in virtue of linguistic conventions and of social conventions (for example, the institutional role played by the speaker or the kind of obligations under which the hearer has put himself are fulfilled, the hearer (or the recipient of the speech act in question) buys some bread.

Of course, this is no more than a sketch of a possible solution, but I am persuaded that it goes some way toward remedying the dichotomy between assertions and nonassertive speech acts, while allowing us to retain a more commonplace notion of meaning than that advocated by Higginbotham and his followers, using the plain and salutary intuitions by Schiffer.

It is now time to move on to a basic classification of speech acts. Let us start with 'assertions.' A speaker S asserts P: (a) if he or she believes he or she knows that P is true (or he or she feels justified in believing that P is true), and (b) if he or she further believes that the proffering of the assertion will effect a substantial change in hearer H's information state. The presupposition of an assertion P (which is not to be treated as a 'reminder') is that (a) the hearer does not know P, and (b) either he or she is interested in knowing P, or even in the case when he or she would prefer not to know P, the speaker has a moral duty to inform H of P. Part of the dynamics of asserting P is that the speaker believes that H can use the information contained in P to make plans for successful action. Although the assertion P amounts to an implicit claim on the part of the speaker that he or she knows that P is true, it is not necessary for the speaker to actually know that P is actually true in order to make such an assertion. What is indispensable is that the speaker has (subjective) reasons to believe that he

or she has good grounds for asserting P. Neither is it necessary that the speaker should stick to his or her asserted proposition after it has been demonstrated through an evidential procedure that it is wrong. He or she can change his or her mind about P and retract the assertion, although by doing so he or she must give reasons for entertaining a different thought. 'Expressives' are to be treated separately from assertions because they are disclosures of the reality of the mind and of the heart, and are not verifiable except by reference to the consonance of a speaker's behavior with such disclosures. 'Directives' express the speaker's wish that the hearer do such-and-such a thing and are uttered with the presumption that the hearer is under some obligation to carry out the action in question (status and roles within an office or an institution determine the right to utter the directive in question). 'Requests' also express the speaker's wish that the hearer behave in such-and-such a way. Requests are not licensed by the formal rights acquired by being part of an institution, but by the obligations contracted by the hearer throughout previous interaction. 'Promises' are revelations of future behavior on the part of the speaker from which the hearer will glean some advantages. Promises concern actions that have been presumably solicited by the hearer (or by someone close to the hearer) (*see* **Speech Acts and Grammar**).

See also: Austin, John L.; Pragmatic Acts; Pragmatics: Overview; Speech Acts; Speech Acts and Grammar.

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Speech Acts, Literal and Nonliteral

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There has been a long and fierce battle between the communication-oriented philosophers of language and the formal linguistics theoreticians regarding the priority of language as a means of expressing thought over a vision of language as an instrument of communication. The philosopher Dummett, in a conciliatory tone, has attempted to demonstrate that both positions – in their radical assumption that the other view is misguided – are wrong and that the two ideas about language are compatible. According to Dummett (2003), the idea that language is used to communicate presupposes the view that language is a way of expressing (or articulating) thoughts. The idea that language is merely an instrument of the expression of thought, in his view, collapses when we consider solipsistic uses of speech acts (a person's writing a reminder to himself and hanging it on a kitchen wall, or a person's trying to find an answer to his own question). Such solipsistic uses still presuppose a derived idea of communication.

In this article, we grant that language is primarily an instrument of thought (enabling the articulation of thought); however, we also think that language is an instrument of social action. An utterance U expressing the thought X performs an action A if, by the expression of X, a certain configuration of elements (roles, rights, duties) is changed from state S to state S' (A) (S' being a function of A) not as a result of the indirect consequences of the thought X but as a result of the socially recognized effects of vocalizing it, brought about by the recognition of the thought X and of the official position that the speaker of U has taken by publicly vocalizing such a thought. A speech act is not brought into effect unless a thought X expressed by an utterance associated with X is recognized as having been in the mind as well as in the mouth of a speaker. Suppose I have the ability to decipher Sally's intentions by reading her mind, and her thoughts contain a sentence S conventionally associated with a speech act A; nevertheless, the silent utterance (her thought) has no social effect, as its vocalization has not been heard in public.

Speech acts have their effects not only because certain persons have appropriate thoughts, but mainly because these thoughts have been publicly expressed by means of utterances, that are socially noticeable events, bound to have certain conventional social consequences. A speech act A is normally brought into effect by means of a device that indicates illocutionary force, essentially some linguistic means conventionally adopted to vocalize a certain thought that, once it is vocalized in public, becomes associated with an action A. There has been a long controversy as to whether moods are in some ways associated with certain illocutionary forces, resulting in the abandoning of the respectable and reasonable orthodoxy that declarative sentences, interrogative sentences, and imperatives are normally associated with certain actions, such as expressing thoughts, asking questions, and modifying other people's behavior (Levinson, 1983). Very luckily, a number of linguists, including Geis (1995) and Capone (2003), have returned to the orthodoxy. It would be unreasonable to suppose that distinctions of mood have no semantic counterparts, as that would require admitting the vacuity of certain fundamental linguistic distinctions. If there are linguistic distinctions, these must have semantic work to do, and it is reasonable to expect them to be related to illocutionary forces, at least of basic types (very generically specified). This article follows Geis in distinguishing between the *literal speech act* performed in virtue of uttering a sentence having a certain mood and the *full, context-dependent cognate speech act*. The full, context-dependent speech act, in this author's opinion, is still a function of the corresponding literal speech act, context playing a role in further determining the illocutionary force of the utterance. The role pragmatics plays in fully determining the content of a speech act in context is to add features of meaning to the underdetermined speech act; thus, it is always possible to return from the contextualized speech act to the literal speech act by subtracting the features added by the context. Contextual transformations, in this author's view, are **conservative**, and the basic meaning structure can be identified both at the beginning and at the end of the transformation.

The full import of a speech act is determined by the interaction between the literal speech act and the context of use. As Mey says:

> Speech acts, in order to be effective, have to be situated. That is to say, they both rely on, and actively create, the situation in which they are realized. Thus, a situated speech act comes close to what has been called a speech event in ethnographic and anthropological studies (Bauman and Sherzer, 1974): speech as centered on an institutionalized social activity of a certain kind, such as teaching, visiting a doctor's office, participating in a tea-ceremony, and so on. In all such activities, speech is, in a way, prescribed: only certain utterances can be expected and will thus be acceptable; conversely, the participants in the situation, by their acceptance of their own and others' utterances, establish and reaffirm

the social situation in which the utterances are uttered and in which they find themselves as utterers (Mey, 2001: 219).

I will call fully contextualized speech acts 'pragmemes,' on the basis of terminology by Mey (2002). A pragmeme is a speech act – an utterance associated with a goal (and an intention to bring about such and such effects), which is to modify a situation and change the roles of the participants within that situation or to keep the roles the same while bringing about other types of effects, such as exchanging or assessing information, or engaging in an interactional episode whose significance lies in the production of social gratification or, otherwise, social bonds.

Such a speech act is *situated*, which means that the specific form the utterance takes, interacts with features of the cotext and with the situation of utterance (*see* **Context, Communicative**), including the rules entailed by such a situation, that jointly determine (or contribute to determining) the global significance of the act in question. Given a sequence of utterances – literally interpretable as having a certain meaning and a certain goal – features of the situation of utterance, in the form of pragmatic reasonings based on the Gricean maxims (*see* **Maxims and Flouting**), will complete or expand the minimal proposition presented by the utterance, anchoring it to the discourse in question; other features of the context of utterance, in the form of defeasible or otherwise noncancellable aspects of meaning, will transform the literal signification of the utterance into a situational signification, removing ambiguities and imposing the stamp of the situation on the utterance, making certain rules of interpretation relevant to it and constituting a set of constraints that strictly enforce certain readings by discarding or eliminating other, irrelevant interpretation options.

A pragmeme is a situated speech act (Mey, 2001: 94) in which both the rules of the language and the rules of society intervene in determining meaning, intended as a socially recognized object sensitive to social expectations about the situation in which the utterance to be interpreted is embedded. A pragmeme always requires three types of embedding: the embedding of an utterance in a context of use, with an aim to determine the referential anchors that complete the signification of the utterance; the embedding in rules that systematically transform whatever gets said in a context into whatever is meant there; the embedding in the cotext, whose features are transferred onto the utterance by eliminating semantic or otherwise interpretable ambiguities and enriching further its (range of) interpretations, by making them more specific.

This article now discusses another example of language use in which the macro aspects of the situation contribute to transforming the illocutionary potential of an utterance. Capone (2005) discusses the utterance 'I saw you' in the context of a story by the Italian novelist Italo Calvino. Within the theoretical apparatus of Gricean pragmatics, the author argues that the standard illocutionary force of the utterance (both in the Italian and in the English version) is that of an accusation. There are, however, special contexts in which the utterance acquires particular illocutionary forces.

Let's look at the game played by children, usually under 10 years old, called hide-and-seek. In this game, one of the children has to count up to (say) 20, facing a wall or a tree and with his or her eyes shut. Upon finishing the count, he or she must then look for the other children. When he or she spots one of them, he or she has to call out 'I saw you' and then runs back to the place where the game started (wall or tree). The child who arrives there first wins. Now, what is the import of 'I saw you' in this situation? Do we proceed from literal meaning until we arrive at the socially situated meaning? Do the literal meaning and the socially situated meaning diverge? It is not altogether clear to me that we are faced here with a crucial divergence. But what is the socially situated meaning of 'I saw you'? We can assume that in the situation of the game, from an informational point of view 'I saw you' is totally purposeless, as visual contact ensures in the standard case that it is obvious to both the speaker and the addressee that the latter has been spotted (of course, there may be situations in which a physical obstacle prevents this mutual vision). In the game, however, the purpose associated with the utterance is to start a sequence in which the children start running at the same time to the place where the game started. In its performative aspects, the utterance roughly amounts to 'Let's start running.' The socially embedded meaning is not at odds with the literal meaning – after all, the assertion 'I saw you' provides the reason that the running sequence is initiated.

Another situation in which it is possible to observe utterances such as 'I saw you' is the classroom. The teacher notices that Michelangelo (his favorite student) whispers the answer to a question to his desk mate. The teacher says 'I saw you.' This is not just an utterance of blaming but an order to Michelangelo to stop doing what he has been doing. How can this speech act be transformed into the pragmeme 'Stop prompting'? It is the social situation, the rules and expectations about students' obligations and teachers' tasks, that promote the *inhibitive interpretation* of 'I saw you.' In this context, it is out

of the question that the utterance could count as a compliment – such an interpretation simply cannot occur. In fact, even though the teacher thinks highly of Michelangelo and also admires him for helping his fellow students and even though Michelangelo knows that the teacher has this positive opinion about him, it is unlikely that he will choose a tortuous path of individual interpretation and proceed from considerations about his teacher's high esteem for him to the interpretation that the speech act counts as a compliment. Michelangelo will almost certainly prefer to follow the social path of interpretation rather than construct his own individual path. Thus, he is able to work out that in fact the teacher, despite his high opinion of him, wants Michelangelo to stop prompting answers to his desk mate. This example nicely instantiates the view that the context is the total social setting in which the speech event takes place, the meaning of an utterance being determined by its place in an interactional sequence. It also provides support for Mey's view that users and their language are at the core of all things pragmatic, the world of users being the very condition for doing pragmatics (Mey, 2001: 29).

See also: Context, Communicative; Grice, Herbert Paul; Implicature; Maxims and Flouting; Pragmatic Acts; Principles and Rules; Principles and Rules; Speech Acts; Speech Acts and Grammar; Speech Acts, Classification and Definition.

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Speech and Language Community

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'Language community' and 'speech community' are constructs developed by scholars of language to refer to a social aggregate within which language is used. Over a century or more of discussion, scholars have differed as to whether the two terms referred to the same type of social formation or two different types. They have also differed as to whether the 'community' is to be understood as an empirically describable object in the world, or as an abstraction or idealization; whether to focus on speakers' knowledge or on their practice – or some combination; whether the aggregate should be considered from the perspective of its homogeneity or its internal diversity; and, most recently, whether the aggregate can be understood as a social whole – a bounded social universe – or whether it can only be understood as part of some larger field of social (and linguistic) relationships. Within these debates lurk different ontologies of language, society, and their relationship.

Briefly put, then, the problem of defining and identifying the speech community (and/or related terms) is both a theoretical and a methodological problem. The problem is theoretical because it concerns the locus and nature of the forces that shape language(s). What kinds of social relationship or grouping are implicated in what kinds of linguistic system, subsystem, or practice – and vice versa? Do the specifics of social organization matter, or is society no more than a prerequisite and general constraint on what really counts, a neuropsychology of language? The problem is methodological because it concerns where to locate and focus one's research. What is the arena within which to investigate how language is structured? Where should one look, to see how language takes form as social action?

Large though these questions loom in linguistic anthropology, outside this field they are not always seen as problematic. To some commentators it has

seemed obvious that the 'speech community' must be an ethnic group that 'has' a single common language. This view is associated with the romantic nationalism of the late-18th-century scholar Johann Gottfried Herder, who maintained that a language is the natural hallmark, and the most precious possession, of a people (*Volk*) or nation, reflecting its special spirit and identity. To Herder's heirs, scholarly and lay, it has seemed natural to suppose that language itself creates – or automatically reflects – community: that there is always some aggregate of people who could be said to 'share' a language and who must, by virtue of that fact alone, share a cultural tradition, feel that they 'belong' together, and participate jointly in a social formation of some specifiable type – a people (or ethnic group, or nationality). In contrast, many linguistic anthropologists and sociolinguists problematize these connections, resisting the assumption that there is any 'natural' relationship between language and community that maps linguistic facts onto social groupings in some universal way. In arguments that have been foundational to our discipline, Franz Boas maintained that language, race, and culture are independent classifications of humankind, and that the distribution of particular linguistic forms does not necessarily predict the distribution of other social and historical facts. Since Boas's time the issues under debate have become more subtle, but the central theme remains. How languages and linguistic varieties map onto people, activities, and social relations – and how the social constructs may depend on linguistic practice – are the central problems we must address, along with their constituent terms such as 'community of speakers.'

This article first traces two threads in the history of 20th-century scholarly writings on 'speech community,' up to approximately the 1970s. During this period scholarly debate turned on the relationship between individual and society, and on whether to focus attention on what members of a community have in common or on how they differ. I then turn to some more recent discussions and issues, such as the notion of 'communities of practice,' language's relation to social networks, distinctions between 'language community' and 'speech community,' and debates about the relevance of conflict-based (as opposed to consensus-based) social theories. Finally, I consider whether 'communities' can be conceived as wholes or only as parts.

The Homogeneous Speech Community

Let us begin with Ferdinand de Saussure's 'mass of speakers' (*masse parlante*, rendered as 'community of speakers' in the widely distributed Baskin

translation of the 1916 *Course in general linguistics* [1966: 77, 78]). The *masse parlante* is the social collectivity that is necessary for language (*langue*) to exist in the real world. This collectivity is the foundation of the 'social fact,' the social conventions that establish linguistic signs as vehicles for semiosis. In emphasizing the social nature of language, and the importance of the 'social fact' for linguistic theory, Saussure moved away from the individualistic focus of some prominent earlier linguists such as the Neogrammarian Hermann Paul. For Saussure, language as a structured system is collective rather than individual, and because it is collective it is not subject to personal will or the vagaries of individual action. (The history of intellectual links between Saussure, Paul, and other scholars, particularly William Dwight Whitney, is actually more complex but need not concern us here.)

As a collectivity, Saussure's 'mass of speakers' is neither structured nor internally differentiated, and it has no social properties that would lead to differentiation in its participants' language (*langue*, the representation of linguistic structure). Instead, the collective consciousness exerts pressure on individuals to conform. All representations of language in individual brains are essentially alike, so that a language is like a book whose (virtually) identical copies are deposited in the minds of its speakers. According to the *Course* (Saussure, 1966: 13–14), "[language is] a grammatical system that has a potential existence in each brain, or more specifically, in the brains of a group of individuals. For language is not complete in any speaker; it exists perfectly only within a collectivity." As the locus of a synchronic collective consciousness, imagined as if extracted from time and action, the 'social mass' can only be an abstraction, a virtual community rather than a real one. (Later in the *Course*, Saussure suggests (1966: 223) that the 'linguistic community' is generally an ethnic unity. This passage stands quite apart from his discussion of linguistic structure, however.)

Readers today may find that Saussure's discussion of linguistic systematicity as a matter of mental representations in an abstract, undifferentiated virtual community has much in common with a well-known statement in Chomsky's *Aspects of the theory of syntax* (1965: 3): "Linguistic theory is concerned primarily with an ideal speaker-listener in a completely homogeneous speech community, who knows its language perfectly..." Like the *masse parlante*, Chomsky's speech community is an abstraction, not a misperception of an empirical world in which human communities are not perfectly homogeneous. In this view the speech community is little more than a precondition for language, whose locus – and here

Chomsky departs from Saussure – is not in the collectivity but in the 'mind/brain' of the individual speaker. So strong is this emphasis on the biological individual, and so downplayed is the speech community, that linguistics is to be conceived as a branch of cognitive psychology.

In contrast to these views of the speech community as an idealization, Leonard Bloomfield's classic definition (in *Language*, 1933: 29) places the speech community in an empirical world of economic practicality that makes it homogeneous: "A group of people who use the same system of speech-signals is a **speech community**. Obviously, the value of language depends on people's using it in the same way" [emphasis original]. The value, that is, for a social division of labor where producers with different skills rely on a common code to coordinate the exchange of their products – or so Bloomfield supposed. Notice that this community is envisioned as socially and economically diverse, but uniform in (monolingual) language. Bloomfield's statement is about society as well as about language, and it makes an empirical claim.

How would this linguistic conformity come about? People who interact frequently will tend to speak alike, Bloomfield believed, because language acquisition is based on imitation and behavioral conditioning. Arising out of the density of communication, which has made participants speak alike, a speech community would be distinguished from its neighbors by breaks in the frequency or intensity of interaction. (In practice, Bloomfield seems usually to have identified the speech community with a tribe or ethnic group – though not, incidentally, with a culture-bearing group, which he suggested was broader.) Within the community there can be 'lines of weakness,' slight differences in the frequency of interaction, corresponding to subgroups with slightly different forms of speech. As an example, Bloomfield cited Sapir's work on male and female speech in Yana. But although he mentioned that the differences between male and female speech in Yana are systematic – a point Sapir had stressed – Bloomfield did not discuss how 'lines of weakness' might give rise to differences that were systematic or conventional, rather than random. To propose that differentiation might be conventional would require the linguist to distinguish between the knowledge of linguistic forms and their use in acts of speaking, a distinction Bloomfield's behaviorist psychology did not easily support.

Anthropologists and linguists have long since discarded Bloomfield's behaviorist psychology of language. More durable, however, has been his notion that the speech community – the social site for linguistic description – is defined by interaction frequency. In his early works, John Gumperz identified the 'speech community' (or 'linguistic community' – in the early 1960s the terms were interchangeable) with some large social unit having a definite boundary around the outside and dense, frequent interaction inside. Unlike Bloomfield's, however, Gumperz's speech community could be multilingual. Its presumably dense interaction did not automatically produce homogeneity. So, in a study of a north Indian village, Gumperz (1958) suggested that Bloomfield's concept needed to be refined so as to distinguish between different kinds of communicative interaction: those that lead to behavioral convergence and those that do not. Despite regular patterns of interaction, the residents of this village did not all speak alike, and the study dealt with the social setting of these linguistic differences.

Similar lessons can be drawn from his work on convergence and creolization (Gumperz and Wilson, 1971), a study of language repertoires in a Maharashtran village whose population included speakers of Kannada, Telugu, Urdu, and Marathi. As a result of long-term proximity, the local varieties of these languages had changed, the authors concluded, in ways that made them more like each other. While the paper is justly known for this argument about grammatical convergence – even utterly unrelated languages may converge in several areas of linguistic structure if their speakers happen to live together for long enough – the convergence can only be described because other aspects of language have remained distinct. In fact, the villagers considered it important to maintain the linguistic distinctness of population subgroups in their multilingual community, and to differentiate between contexts of language use.

The Speech Community as the Organization of Diversity

As Gumperz's work illustrates, a new focus on linguistic diversity within communities began to emerge in the 1960s in studies of language contact, dialectology, and change. Led by Gumperz, Dell Hymes, Uriel Weinreich, and William Labov, the new work attacked the identification of structuredness with homogeneity (Weinreich *et al.*, 1968: 101). The speech community was now redefined as "a field of action where the distribution of linguistic variants is a reflection of social facts" (Gumperz, 1968: 383). Structure in the speech community rested on the organization of diversity, not merely on the replication of uniformity; its linguistic variation was not just random (Hymes, 1974: 75). The perspective recalls Durkheim's discussions of organic solidarity, where it is precisely people's complementary differences that bind them

together, as opposed to mechanical solidarity, where social cohesion rests only on similarity. Thus multilingualism is not chaos, nor is it necessarily a transient or abnormal condition. Instead, it can represent an orderly social consensus.

This vision of speech community places multilingualism, multidialectalism, and communicative repertoires on center stage for observation and analysis, not on the periphery. The repertoire and its deployment in communicative practice are now seen as the crucial place where the relationship between language and social organization lies. Here we might observe how ways of speaking are linked with, and constitute, social groupings and identities, and how ways of speaking are situated in social activities. 'Community,' in the sense of sharing and commonality, lies in the interpretation, not the production, of behavioral forms (including speaking). What is shared is knowledge of how the differences in ways of speaking are organized.

As one of many examples, Hymes pointed to Paraguayan multilinguals who switch between Spanish and Guaraní according to the intimacy or distance of the communicative context. Gumperz (1964), meanwhile, compared the repertoires of two communities, one in India and one in Norway; the two communities' quite different social structures were reflected in the different ways their linguistic repertoires were organized. In each community, members did not equally command all varieties, yet they understood when and where a code might be used – what its social implications were. Elsewhere, the Vaupés region of the northwest Amazon basin offers a particularly compelling example of the organization of linguistic diversity, since the social organization of the region has traditionally depended on a principle of linguistic exogamy: language is a badge of membership in one's patrilineal descent group, within which one may not marry. The marriage relationships that connected these groups and organized them in communities had to be contracted with persons whose linguistic 'badges' differed (see Jackson, 1974). Residential communities necessarily included spouses having different linguistic affiliations, and individuals were highly multilingual.

Notice, however, that if linguistic diversity does not prevent the formation of community in a social sense, then – by the same token – using the same language does not automatically create it. Illustrating this point, Gumperz (1979) described the communicative difficulties faced by a South Asian immigrant and a British interviewer. Despite the fact that their English was grammatically quite similar, the two interlocutors never succeeded in interpreting one another's responses, or in establishing a common understanding of the interview's purpose. As the example showed, using the same language (in the sense of 'denotational code') does not guarantee shared interpretation of the discourse's social import. Hymes (1968), meanwhile, in a survey of linguistic and anthropological literature, assembled a massive array of counterexamples challenging the Herderian assumption that common language reveals common ethnicity. Only in ideology must linguistic and ethnic boundaries coincide.

In the course of these arguments, Hymes and Gumperz sifted through some aspects of language and speaking that had often been assumed to coincide, yet (as they showed) could vary quite independently of one another. These distinctions must remain important in any adequate account of the social setting of linguistic practice:

- knowledge of a code (or, linguistic variety); i.e., the ability to interpret the denotational and predicational value of a symbolic system;
- behavior – the deployment of that code;
- claims to affiliation with a code, and claims to knowledge of it;
- knowledge of 'rules of use,' i.e., understanding the social distribution and appropriate deployment of codes.

Thus one might claim affiliation with a language one does not speak, as did an Italian-American student of mine who wrote a paper entitled 'Why can't I speak my language?' The Yana woman of Sapir's day could interpret all the forms of 'male speech' even if she never uttered them. (Actually, she might utter them if she quoted a male character while telling a story; but she would not produce these forms while speaking in her own social persona.) And rules of use may distinguish among addressees and contexts, even if the addressee does not reply in the same code – as when I reserve a special way of speaking for my pet cat's ears alone.

The recognition of linguistic diversity and its engagement with the structuring of social relations opened up vast areas of sociolinguistic research. As that research proceeded, however, and the sociolinguistic conception of speech community was to be operationalized, new questions arose. In particular, if speech communities are supposed to be objects of empirical description, how are they to be identified? If the community is delimited by some radius of shared knowledge, exactly what is shared? How much knowledge must be shared, and by whom? Recognizing that 'shared knowledge' can never be all-inclusive, Gumperz proposed that what the speech community shared was knowledge relevant to some

significant number of social situations. But what is a significant number, and what makes a social situation significant? Consider, for example, gender-segregated initiation systems where initiates learn special linguistic varieties – such as male initiates in Walbiri and other societies of aboriginal Australia. Perhaps Walbiri women were aware that such varieties existed, but they were in no position to control them, or even to know the details of the appropriate situations of use. Some kinds of knowledge depend on a person's position in a social structure and access to situations in which a particular code is used.

To address this problem, one might envision a hierarchy of speech communities, or overlapping communities, depending on the scope of shared knowledge. In a study of creole language use in Guyana, Rickford (1986) pointed out that the ability to recognize linguistic indices of broad social categories was shared not only within the community of Cane Walk but also within larger communities, even in the whole country, while more subtle sociolinguistic meanings were known only more narrowly. The difference in social scale involved not only a difference in the amount and delicacy of sociolinguistic knowledge but also a difference in evaluative schemata. But if the 'speech community' is taken to delimit the social unit within which linguistic diversity is socially constituted and accounted for – an empirical object that is also the locus of its own explanation – rather than marking the bounds of a particular study with specified goals, then speech communities may well **seem** to be discrete units, although it is only the researcher's approach that makes them so. It is tempting, moreover, for researchers to slip back into older notions of 'community' and to take a village, or an ethnic group – or a village as localized instantiation of ethnicity – as the sole unit of description.

Finally, how does one investigate knowledge, and how does one determine whether knowledge is shared? To what extent is the relevant knowledge available to conscious articulation, or is it embedded in practice? It is all too easy to take a few informants' claims as being an analysis of the relevant groups, varieties, and uses of language – and so to mistake a particular participant's ideology of language for a description and analysis. One solution has been to abjure informants' explicit analyses, except insofar as they identify some locality or grouping, such as a town or a neighborhood, within which to describe linguistic practices. This is the approach taken by Labov and his followers, who emphasize empirical reliability via consistent interview protocols and representative samples of community members. Labov's

speech community (1972: 120–121) is defined not by members' producing the same linguistic forms in the same way, but rather by "participation in a set of shared norms; these norms may be observed in overt types of evaluative behavior, and by the uniformity of abstract patterns of variation which are invariant in respect to particular levels of usage." While 'shared norms' may suggest shared ideas and values, what looms larger in Labov's work are norms of use (statistical norms). It is the patterns of linguistic variation – i.e., overlapping patterns of usage, within a controlled sample of contexts – which he puts forward as the crucial evidence of participation in the speech community.

The speech community described in Labov's most recent book (2001) is Philadelphia, represented by samples of speakers from five neighborhoods and a random sample from the city telephone directory. These samples do not actually represent the city, however, because they were purposely restricted to American-born whites. Other speakers, including Philadelphia's large African-American and Latino populations, are excluded because, Labov argues (2001: 506), they do not share in the same patterns of linguistic variation. The purpose of the study, and rationale for the sampling decisions, was to explore linguistic change in the local vernacular English, not to describe all linguistic practice in the city. The question remains, however, as to whether the presence of nonwhite and nonnative speakers is or is not relevant to currents of change.

Observe that this 'speech community' is defined in terms of sharing in a particular pattern of language use – a single 'local vernacular' whose manifestation varies principally in whether a speaker is leading or lagging in its ongoing currents of change, and whether the speech situation is such as to reveal the vernacular most clearly. These variations distinguish among genders and socioeconomic classes within the set of native white Philadelphians, but it is only in that sense that they describe linguistic diversity. Whatever analysis one might envision of the linguistic practices of the city's broader ethnic and racial composition – an analysis that would need to consider multilingualism, multidialectalism, and the social organization of exclusion and avoidance – is precluded from this approach and this conception of 'speech community.' (One might ask, however, whether 'community' is the best rubric for the larger analysis.)

These questions about boundaries, sharing, and the relationship of meaning to practice have given rise to some alternative formulations of the object(s) of study. By the mid-1980s, ethnographically oriented scholars were beginning to reconsider the social theory underlying then-current analyses of linguistic

repertoires and social actors, and to rethink concepts such as 'community' and 'class.'

Speech Networks and Communities of Practice

In a large city it cannot be taken for granted – as indeed it should not anywhere – that the social ties most relevant to linguistic practice are geographically concentrated. Residence, work, recreation, and other activities may be dispersed, and one person's set of social contacts may differ from another's. Network analysis, an approach first developed in urban anthropology and sociology, tracks the webs of personal relationships wherever they occur, starting from an individual and that person's interlocutors. The analysis collates and compares such person-anchored networks and considers how they may reflect or influence linguistic practice. For example, networks may be relatively closed (members have more contacts with each other than with outsiders) or relatively open (less overlap among individuals' social ties). In an early use of the network approach, Gumperz (1964) argued that these properties of networks accounted for differences between the linguistic repertoires of two communities, one in India and one in Norway. Another way to compare networks concerns whether ties are strong (multiplex – an individual has many kinds of relationship with the same person) or weak (relating to the other person in only one situation). Lesley and James Milroy (1992, and elsewhere) have proposed – initially from research on linguistic variation in spoken English in inner-city neighborhoods in Belfast – that close-knit networks with many multiplex ties foster linguistic conservatism, while weak ties are vehicles of linguistic change. Emphasizing close-knit networks' importance as the site of (emergent) shared experience, Gumperz and the Milroys have linked them with notions of 'community,' although Gumperz also calls open networks 'communities' and maintains they still hold something in common.

A related construct is the 'community of practice,' a grouping that is based on participation in some activity or project (*see* **Communities of Practice**). As with network analysis, the point is that any 'shared' understandings are accounted for as products of joint experience and coconstructed relationships. As Eckert and McConnell-Ginet write (1992: 464), "ways of doing things, ways of talking, beliefs, values, power relations – in short, practices – emerge in the course of this mutual endeavor." Participation in the activity, and members' definition of it, distinguish this grouping from older notions of community. This approach is especially useful, the authors find, for studying

gendered language practices. Because activity-based groups such as football teams, armies, and boards of directors are likely to have a predominantly male membership, while secretarial pools and aerobics classes mainly draw women, these groups' distinctive linguistic practices easily become associated with gender (Eckert and McConnell-Ginet, 1992: 472). A focus on community of practice asks how an activity, a group, an individual as participant, and the meanings of linguistic practices mutually constitute one another.

Both these constructs, speech network and community of practice, suit a social theory in which 'community' is not assumed *a priori*; instead, it has to be achieved. Recently, Duranti (1997: 82) defined the speech community itself in this vein, as "the product of the communicative activities engaged in by a given group of people" – and the work of Ochs, Duranti, and their associates has emphasized the detailed study of activities and social interactions as communicative practices. This emphasis on the emergent character of social relations and the understandings connected with them resembles the ways many anthropologists have rethought the concept of 'culture.' Where older concepts of speech community, in their focus on the distribution of knowledge, presented a relatively static picture in which knowledge was unaffected by the action that applied it, discussions of community of practice and speech network permit a view of culture as public, negotiated, and located in interactional space rather than in a sort of mental museum.

Ideologized Representations and Imagined Communities

Eckert's mention of meaning and beliefs reminds us that sociolinguistic 'knowledge' is not just a tape recording of utterances, but an ordered, cognized, and filtered set of representations. Our interpretations of the linguistic practices around us depend not only on what is actually said, but also on stereotypes we have built up out of our experience – built and (re)configured (Agha, 1998; Irvine and Gal, 2000; Silverstein, 2003). Thus, in a discussion of honorific language in Tibetan, Javanese, and elsewhere, Agha shows how speakers' ideologies of deference, social hierarchy, and linguistic 'purity' lead to asymmetric distributions of linguistic forms across social categories – aristocrats and peasants, for example, deploy different constellations of forms – and these usages yield, in turn, stereotypes of speaker identity and rank (Agha, 1998: 166). Although Agha and Silverstein emphasize that the stereotypes are based on evidence – grounded in participants' discriminable experiences of language use – the

stereotypes can also overwhelm the input, influencing the interpretation of utterances that do not precisely conform to them. Since people's experiences differ, and since interpretations also reflect the interpreter's position in society – and these differences pertain even to coparticipants in a particular activity group – cultural stereotypes and sociolinguistic knowledge cannot be perfectly 'shared.'

The object of study in this line of research reaches beyond the immediate. Distinguishing between representations that are experience near and those that are experience far, we must explore the latter in their own right. The people I imagine as co-inhabitants of my social world, including those I envision as past and as potential interlocutors – as well as those I know I will never meet and those I hope to avoid – are a population not limited to the history of my actual contacts. A recent strand of research on speech communities has considered these distant and imagined relationships. For example, Spitulnik (1996) examined the role of Zambian radio programs, whose audience may imagine itself a community of shared listening practices. In the circulation of 'public words,' such as catchphrases from well-known programs and announcers, listeners repeat the expressions that show their familiarity with the broadcast, and so constitute a colistenership with people they have never met. 'Hello Kitwe?' – a channel-checking expression with which the broadcaster based in the Zambian capital tries to transfer operations to a broadcaster based in the provincial city Kitwe – when repeated in a crowded shop by a customer trying to get attention, arouses knowing smiles in other customers who recognize the phrase (Spitulnik 1996: 168).

The social groupings defined by the circulation of 'Hello Kitwe,' and by a radio broadcast's audience (actual or potential), are perhaps more often counted as 'publics' than as 'communities.' The terminological difference stems from the impersonal character of the 'public,' which is linked to its potentially large scale as an arena of communication and signals its connection with political institutions. As Gal and Woolard (2001: 1) wrote, "the work of linguistic representation produces not only individualized speakers and hearers as the agents of communication, but also larger, imagined social groupings, including ... publics. Such representational processes are crucial aspects of power, figuring among the means for establishing inequality, imposing social hierarchy, and mobilizing political action." Our lives, including many aspects of linguistic practice, are affected by these representational processes and the actions they lead to, sometimes at a considerable distance.

Notice now that the publics imagined from different social standpoints may not define the same sets of people, and may fail to coincide with any concretely traceable social network. Zambian policy makers, like many others in Africa, distribute radio broadcasting – schedules and topics – among seven 'official Zambian languages' plus English, according to a model that equates language with ethnicity and region. Since most listeners are multilingual and some languages far outreach the ethnic populations they supposedly identify, actual audiences for a program are often quite different from the ethnic communities imagined in radio policy. Of course, the propensity to identify (homogeneous) language with ethnicity and region has a wide distribution and a long history, taking us back at least to the Herderian formulations mentioned early in this article. The same kind of equation underlies Benedict Anderson's otherwise brilliant discussion (1991) of the nation as 'imagined community' – imagined as the readership of newspapers and novels published in standardized languages and distributed via the mechanisms of print capitalism. As if it were an ethnic group writ large and mediated by print capitalism, this 'community' resembles the Saussurean homogeneous speech community in that Anderson assumes the population is monolingual in 'their' language, whose slight phonetic variations do not interfere with reading. This community is doubly imaginary, then – in its members' imagination and in Anderson's. It exists only in an ideology that imagines the standardized language of the nation-state as the common natural resource of its citizenry, so that linguistic diversity is interpreted either as something trivial, or as deviance and inadequacy. Images of the nation, and of the 'authentic' citizen, are at stake.

A good example is the debate over an orthography for Haitian Créole/Kreyòl (Schieffelin and Doucet, 1998). The spelling of the language's name illustrates the problem: the contest between those who see 'Créole' as fundamentally French – and speakers of standard French as the most authentic citizens – and those who see 'Kreyòl' as fundamentally other. The authors ask (1998: 303): "What is the real, authentic kreyòl? Thus, who is the real, authentic Haitian – the dominated 'Africanized' masses or the dominant 'Frenchified' elites? Is there a 'pure' kreyòl? ... The sound system leads directly into the core of the debate about social classes, legitimacy, and authenticity."

Those who reject the Herderian formulation of language-based community must nevertheless recognize its prevalence in many parts of the world as the ideological grounds for political, territorial, and other kinds of claims. Silverstein (1996, 1998) therefore distinguished between 'language community,'

which is based on its population's allegiance to norms of some 'shared' specified denotational code (such as a prescriptive standard) – conceived as 'their language' – and 'speech community,' based on indexical facts of repertoire deployment and their associated norms of use. The distinction recalls our two earlier threads in the conception of 'speech community,' the Saussurean and the sociolinguistic, but it places the former in the realm of ideologies of allegiance and the latter in the realm of situated experience. Although this pluralistic view of community is appropriate for many kinds of analysis, Silverstein (1996) showed its particular utility in understanding the dynamics of language contact in North American ethnohistory. The spread of European languages and their eventual dominance over indigenous ones took place within local settings which had varying social histories and shifting allegiances.

This analysis depends on looking at social (and linguistic) relationships of different kinds and on different scales. In the contact zone, indeed anywhere, 'language community' and 'speech community' do not identify the same population. Yet, the social dynamics of each kind of community affects the other. As Silverstein (1998: 401) put it, they are dialectically constituted cultural forms. Moreover, localized forms of speech and local social ties are in a similarly dialectical relationship with larger-scale, even global, currents. The proponents of *francophonie*, for example, must contend with local social dynamics and multilingual scenes, while populations in localities as disparate as Québec and Rwanda contend, in turn, with *francophonie*'s language-based claims to their allegiance. The 'local' is itself an emergent construct, produced in relation to larger-scale processes. In sum, speech communities and language communities are different; neither stands alone; and an account of either must look outside its bounds.

The View across the Boundary

Questions about the speech community's boundary have already been raised with respect to the scale of analysis – a gradient in which face-to-face social groups, where everyone knows a great deal about everyone else, are embedded in larger settings where people are less well acquainted or not actually encountered at all. The question of boundaries is not just a matter of scale, however, but also of opposition. If, for example, boardrooms and Tupperware parties define different communities of practice and if they are associated with gender, then their relationship is one of opposition, not merely of random difference. And while it could be argued that gendered practices, however divergent they might be, are nevertheless

part of some larger 'community' whole, any community X is only identifiable in relation to some population that is not-X. Even in face-to-face interaction, the participants establish their distinct identities as well as their commonalities.

Interaction is thus as much a process of differentiation as of accommodation. The crucial question is what kinds of differentiation and accommodation are produced, and by what semiotic means, in each empirical case. A similar question was asked decades ago about the signs distinguishing different ethnic groups. In *Ethnic groups and boundaries*, Frederik Barth argued (1969: 10) that "ethnic distinctions do not depend on an absence of social interaction and acceptance." Instead, the persistence of an ethnic boundary depends on people's defining themselves in opposition to others whom they know. Similarly, Labov's classic research on Martha's Vineyard showed that the residents' speech forms were being reconfigured because – after the island's economy shifted away from fishing and toward the tourist trade – the contrast between native islanders and visiting mainlanders increasingly outweighed the islanders' internal divisions. Apparently, the Vineyard dialect was diverging from mainland speech because of, not in spite of, increased contact.

Following these precedents, Irvine and Gal (2000) argued that attention to boundaries and processes of differentiation should replace the concept of 'speech community,' which was overburdened with problematic baggage. Descriptions framed in terms of the 'speech community' tend to privilege a particular scale or type of social organization and to preclude exploring relationships that extend beyond its boundary. Moreover, many scholars now disavow the consensus-based social theory that underlay much earlier sociolinguistic and linguistic discussion of 'community' and discouraged attention to processes of exclusion, conflict, and domination. Rickford and the Milroy & Milroy, for example, have proposed that conflict models of social class account better for the observed patterns of sociolinguistic variation than the consensus model can. In a related vein, Morgan (2003) argued that "speech communities are recognized as distinctive in relation to other speech communities.... They come into collective consciousness when there is a crisis of some sort, often triggered when hegemonic powers consider them a problem ... Speech community represents the location of a group in society and its relationship to power." This emphasis on crises and power relations external to the community is borne out in Morgan's writings on the discursive practices of African-Americans, especially women.

Social life includes both agreement and conflict, sometimes both at once. In our joint work, Susan

Gal and I have tried to capture this complexity by focusing on (linguistic) differentiation as a semiotic process that accommodates, but does not in itself entail, contestation. This complex process, we argue, includes a principle of fractal recursivity: an opposition that has been understood at one level of relationship can be projected onto other levels, yielding subcategories and supercategories. Thus the same process accounts for the possibility that linguistic varieties, social identities, or any other sociolinguistic formation may sometimes be seen as (sub)divided, but sometimes as unified. For example, in research on rural Wolof speech patterns I have proposed (Irvine, 1990) that a principle which (ideologically) distinguished the speech of high and low Wolof castes applied recursively. Applied within the high caste it marked subtler distinctions of rank; applied between languages it distinguished Wolof from French, to the latter's disadvantage.

We focus on differentiation because difference and distinction are what makes possible the logic of relations on which society and language depend. Just as Jakobson and Sapir showed for language, society too consists in relations and fields, not things. A focus on 'community' that does not look across the grouping's boundaries tends to obscure the relational logic that organizes a social field, by overemphasizing what people have in common and treating its object of study as an autonomous thing, rather than an artifact of the researcher's approach. No community is an island.

Conclusion

Researchers investigating the relationships of language, culture, and social life need ways to think about the social aggregates in which those relationships are located. Most authors refer – whether loosely or rigorously – to some sort of 'community.' As we have seen, however, definitions of 'speech community' have varied widely, and many scholars now argue that it cannot be entirely self-contained as an object of study. Just as most anthropologists no longer see 'culture' as a homogeneous object that can exist in isolation (and should not be treated as if it did), we realize that speech communities are related to other social formations that intersect with them, or are incorporated within them, or contrast with them, or include them. A crucial step away from the speech-community-as-ethnic-island approach is to see language community as distinct from speech community, and the two in dynamic relationship – a step that puts the Herderian formulation in its (ideological) place.

Nevertheless, the word 'community' invokes an aura of consensus and common cause, even if you try to define it in some other way. It is tempting, therefore, for 'community' – whether researcher's or participant's construct – to conflate, or slide among, at least three quite different axes of relationship: homogeneity and difference, consensus and conflict, solidarity and distance. Just as difference is not the same thing as conflict, so any conflation of homogeneity, consensus, and solidarity under the rubric of 'community' is misleading. It is all the more so when language is added into the mix, as if languages were based upon – or could produce – these qualities of community. These issues ought to be disentangled.

Even if its technical utility is limited, however, 'community' is a term it is hard to do without. Its various formulations each address something of interest as to how the practices that make social relationships rely on systems of signs. Although the scholar who looks for standardized off-the-rack technical terms will not find one here, there is much to be gained from exploring the surrounding debates.

See also: Communities of Practice; Linguistic Anthropology; Society and Language: Overview; Shared Knowledge.

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Speech and Thought: Representation of

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Introduction

This article addresses the Representation of Speech and Thought (henceforth RST). The overwhelming focus will be RST in literature, but many of the principles can be extended to the representation of speech – and even of thought – in other varieties and genres: journalism, records of parliamentary debates, commissions of inquiry and committees, police interviews, etc. Still it is worth noting at the outset that literary representation of speech and thought emerges from the potential in all written languages – a potential of inestimable value – to record ('capture', render inspectable) in semipermanent form (hence usable at later times and in different places) what someone said at one particular time and place. More remotely yet, written records of speech must derive, as a counterpart, from the reporting of others' communicative acts that is so important a part of spoken and sign languages.

RST is therefore bound up with writing rather more than is always acknowledged. Younger readers, fully of the digital age, may be puzzled that these opening remarks about the power to record or represent speech are not focused on audiotape recording and digitized sound files, now very widespread means of representing speech. But this article is about an affordance of the much earlier and more culture-changing technological breakthrough, the development of writing, and literary authors' rich repertoires of means for presenting characters' words on the

page. Little further mention will be made of Internet literature or Web-based fiction; but it may be noted in passing that modern technology is such that there is nothing to stop a Web-based fiction writer from using sound files for some or indeed all of the discourse categories shortly to be described (characters' direct speech, indirect speech, narratorial discourse, etc.). One literary format of increasing importance that might here merit further comment is the audio novel, widely used by travelers and the print-weary: typically using just one performer as teller, they deserve fuller study to see how they resolve the tricky problem of conveying direct speech and the narratorial forms distinct from each other. And then how do they cope with those passages of FID or combined discourse (to be described later), where the voices of narrator and a character are impossibly mixed or calqued? Nowhere do Bakhtinian ideas of the polyphony or clash of voices seem more palpably applicable. The potential 'reoralization' of the written genres of the novel and the short story, triggered and sometime perhaps prompted by the spread of audio-books, may come to require extensive scholarly treatment.

RST, then, comprises some processes for the partial simulation of speech or thought that have emerged in written language. A general caveat at the outset: this article focuses on and takes its examples from literature in English, although there is no reason to suppose that RST and its subtle subtypes do not flourish in all the languages with a developed literary tradition; certainly it has been extensively studied and discussed in most European languages, and cross-linguistic studies are increasingly proposed, where much of the interest lies in comparing and contrasting the formal exponents of distinct subtypes (in particular the tense-aspect requirements in FID) and indeed whether certain subtypes are prominent in one literature while nonexistent in another, or developed much later, and so on.

Direct Speech and Indirect Speech

Direct Speech

"My dear Mr. Bennet," said his lady [Mrs Bennet] to him one day, "have you heard that Netherfield Park is let at last?"
Mr. Bennet replied that he had not. (Jane Austen, *Pride and prejudice*, chap. 1)

In the canonical forms of both direct and indirect speech today (henceforth DS and IS, respectively), a fundamental distinction is made between the reporting or inquit clause, in which the speaker of the reported material is identified and cast as the subject of a verb of communication, and the reported clause,

in which that speaker's message is presented. The reported clause of direct speech is usually set off, by speech marks at its boundaries, from the reporting clause; and sentence-initial reporting clauses may be followed by a comma or colon. The reported clause is understood to give the speaker's actual words, *verbatim*, hence all the deictic elements (pronouns, tense, time and place expressions) within the clause or fragment reflect the speaker's deictic center, at the time of speaking, as in Mrs Bennet's speech. Here, the present tense is used for events/states that are true at the time of Mrs Bennet's speaking, she denotes herself by first-person pronouns (here *my*) and her addressee by second person pronouns, and all evaluations (*My dear ... at last*) are entirely hers. Mr Bennet's reply is rendered in IS – which specifically denotes the segment *that he had not* – and this, like the reporting clause *Mr Bennet replied* that precedes it, is wholly based on the narrator's deictic perspective and as a result uses a third-person pronoun to denote the reported speaker and past tense. Various DS features are difficult or impossible in IS; here, for example, if Mr Bennet had echoed his wife's formulaic endearment this would be problematic within an IS construction:

? Mr. Bennet replied that (his) dear Mrs Bennet, he had not.

Terms like 'difficult' and 'problematic' are often applied here, where in canonical DS and IS the linguist is usually quite prepared to specify what is grammatical or ungrammatical. The manipulations of what is possible or acceptable in variant free forms of IS (in modern English at least) make firm grammaticality judgments particularly difficult in this area.

The reporting clause in DS can follow the reported speech, and in such cases there is scope for inversion of the verb and (usually) nonpronominal subject in the reporting clause. Or the reporting clause is 'flanked' on either side by direct speech:

"Kitty has no discretion in her coughs," said her father; "she times them ill." (*Pride and prejudice*, chap. 2)

In present-tense feature-article journalistic reporting, such inversion within the reporting clause is frequent and possible even where that inquit clause comes first (again, provided the subject is nonpronominal):

Adds Smith, "The key to utilizing a mammogram to its fullest potential is by getting a high-quality screening performed by a competent clinician ... ." (*USA Today* 19 July 2001)

Although opening and closing inverted commas remain a standard marker of direct speech in all

written varieties, many 20th-century fiction writers dispense with them, instead marking the onset of a character's turn of talk by a new line, an indent, and a long dash. But for those writers who retain reporting clauses with direct speech, it is important to note that they provide more than a perfunctory speaker-attribution: they often carry information about the speaker's emotions or attitude and may include information about gesture, facial expression, or body movement, all of which may be evaluative or indexical.

Indirect Speech

Whereas DS supplies the reported speaker's actual wording, IS relays only the content, gist, or illocution of the actual or implied DS utterance (implied in all cases of fictional IS, where there is no actual DS precursor). In indirect speech with a sentence-initial reporting clause, no graphic devices set off the reported material from the reporting clause, but the reported clause is introduced by a complementizer or subordinator (commonest is *that*, as in the Austen sentence above: *Mr. Bennet replied that he had not*). Where the reporting clause comes first, as in this example, complementizing *that* is often ellipted (cf. obligatory *que* in comparable French constructions), whereas more semantically specific ones cannot be: *if*, *whether*, and *wh*-words introducing indirect questions and exclamations. In the case of IS reports of requests and other directives, *that* may or must be replaced by an infinitival construction, with raised reported clause subject: compare *She asked that he shut the door / She asked him to shut the door* and *She told him to leave at once/ *She told that he leave at once*.

The reported clause gives a version, and not the precise wording, of the original speaker's utterance, but all deictic elements now conform to the spatio-temporal coordinates of the narrator or reporter, already responsible for the reporting clause. Thus the original speaker of the reported clause is now denoted by third-person pronouns, and time and place expressions are to be interpreted relative to the narrator/reporter.

(1) Mrs Bennet asked whether he had heard that Netherfield Park was let at last.

The grammar of IS entails a wholesale adoption of the deictic orientation of the narrator. All deictic indicators that might appear in a character's direct utterance, keyed to the character's assumed point in space and time (in addition to tense and personal pronouns, words like *here*, *today*, *this*, and *now*), will be displaced by deictic indicators, which makes

sense from the narrator's perspective (typically, the 'nonproximate' deictic forms: *there*, *on that (same) day*, *that*, *then*). Among the deictic indicators must be included the use in DS of a few verbs of specific directional movement, implying movement toward or away from the speaking character (*Come here!*; *Go away!*); by contrast in IS the movement verbs will be directionally nonspecific or, like other deictic elements, oriented to the narrator.

Although DS and IS are in a sense equivalent and -alternative forms, there are also asymmetries involved, particularly in fictional and literary contexts. For example, normally a conversational utterance will have just one DS form, but may have several IS versions, varying from each other in minor ways. Compare (1) above with other IS versions, (2) and (3):

(2) Mrs Bennet asked whether Mr Bennet had heard that Netherfield Park had finally been let.

(3) Mrs Bennet asked her husband whether he had been told that someone had finally taken Netherfield Park.

By the same token, when contemplating an IS sentence, several distinct possible DS versions can be proposed, without any certainty as to which if any was the actual source: any of (1), (2), or (3) could 'derive' from the following (among others) rather than Austen's actual formulation above:

(1)' Mrs Bennet said "Have you heard that Netherfield Park has been rented at last?"

It should be stressed that such variations of 'source' (DS) or of 'derived' (IS) forms are particularly associated with fictional narrative (where, for example, there simply is no actual DS counterpart of the IS construction that the writer has composed). In nonfictional contexts, the *vraisemblance* or 'faithfulness' standard may be set much higher, so that IS reporting of speakers may be required or expected to match closely the wording of the real DS source, to limit misrepresentation. In extreme cases or genres (e.g., when giving witness evidence in a criminal trial), IS may be disallowed.

When contemplating Direct Speech (and to diminishing degrees when considering each of the other forms to be discussed in this article), at least two binary distinctions need to be considered: is the text in which it appears literature or nonliterary; and is it hypothetical or actual (e.g., fictional DS may be used in philosophical and moral arguments). On that basis we can distinguish DS in novels and in philosophical arguments, letters recording personal experience, and hard news journalism or Hansard-like parliamentary

records. The literary-and-actual is a less-exploited category, but there are enough novels that incorporate if only fleetingly famous individuals and some of their reliably documented utterances for this to be a real category. What distinguishes the nonliterary and actual from the literary and the hypothetical is that there is some process of transcription prominent in the former, and by contrast some kind of invention prominent in the latter (although neither variety is *purely* transcriptional or inventive).

Some Major Points of Difference between Direct and Indirect Speech

Indirect discourse maintains the tense of the encompassing narrative (in traditional English fiction, this is past tense; in some contemporary literature, this may be present tense). Direct discourse is in present tense, the norm for natural conversation of which it is a simulation. First- and second-person pronouns in the direct version, denoting the speaking character and their addressees, contrast with gender-appropriate third-person pronouns in the indirect version, being the narratorial designations of those characters (a large exception to this are those stories where the narrator is also a story participant and is accordingly designated within the story by first-person pronouns; a rarer exception are 'you-narratives'; but even in these exceptions, the pronouns denoting addressees, in the former case, and those for seemingly representing the narrator, in the latter case, diverge from the direct I-you pattern. The two patterns are *I-him/her/them* and *you-[all accusative forms]* respectively. One general upshot is that English indirect forms are more explicit than the direct ones with respect to the gender of the addresser and addressee.

It has been traditional to describe the reporting and reported clauses in DS and IS as syntactically related to each other differently; in typical IS where the reporting clause comes first, they are syntactically related hypotactically, with a clear sense of matrix and embedded clause; but in DS the relation is paratactic, with the reported clause as nonembedded complement. But the most suitable grammatical description is certainly a matter of debate (see Huddleston and Pullum, 2002: 1023–30, for arguments). But it is clear that 'robustly paratactic' DS constructions, such as imperatives and exclamatives, resist incorporation into IS format. Thus when in Joyce's 'The Dead' Mr Brown takes a first sip of his whiskey and the text runs (using DS):

-God help me, he said, smiling, it's the doctor's orders.

it is hard to devise a truly plausible IS version:

?/* He smilingly cried that God should help him but it was the doctor's orders.
?/* God would help him, he said, it was the doctor's orders.

None of the 'colorful' idiosyncratic and dialectal qualities of the speech or thought of a character who is reported directly survive the transfer to a canonical IS version; the speech undergoes a kind of translation, into the language of the narrator, and the latter is conventionally (but not obligatorily) 'standard', 'neutral', detached, a superior knower even if they do not assert 'omniscience'. The narrator is sole authority, solely responsible, for the wording of both components, reporting and reported, of the IS construction. By contrast there is an explicit division of authority in DS constructions, with the reported speaker solely responsible not merely for the sense but also the actual wording of the reported material.

Still, it is worth emphasizing that what is certainly lost, in IS reporting, is not 'colorful language' necessarily, but 'the *character's* (possibly colorful) language'. That is to say, typically and conventionally, especially in literary fiction, narrators are more 'neutral' and formal than the characters of whom they tell. But this is only a convention or pronounced tendency and will be overridden in many particular cases. One is the novel *The adventures of Huckleberry Finn*, where Huck himself, as first-person narrator, reports nonstandardly the presumably standard speech of some of the protagonists in his story.

A Minor Variant of Direct Speech: Free Direct Speech

Where direct speech is presented without accompanying a reporting clause, it is given the more specific label free direct speech (FDS) by some analysts. In just this respect (lack of the reporting, inquit or 'framing' clause), FDS is like FIS, but in other respects it is really only a variant of DS (no difference is assumed or demonstrable between the exact content of DS and FDS versions) and not an independent category as the free indirect ones are. Reflecting its status as a variant, there are only slightly different functions or effects achieved by FDS that are not achieved by all DS. An alternative conceptualization would be to note that, unlike IS, the *inquit* clause is not essential or integral to a direct speech report, and that therefore those direct speech reports with a framing clause are the supplementary variant (ADS – attributed direct speech, in contrast with the unattributed form, which might now be labeled simply DS).

Often in cases of FDS the reporting clause is as close as the adjacent sentence. Or one reporting

clause introduces (hence has 'scope' over) a series of (distinct) utterances from an individual, so that the technically FDS sentences are so created for purposes of textual economy as in ellipsis cohesion. More interesting may be sequences of FDS dialogue, typically between two parties (metronomic speech), where speaker change and speaker identification must be inferred by the reader, and with less than full certainty. Where DS has the reporting clause following, some analysts label the speech FDS, by analogy with parenthetical framing clauses in FID (see following).

Free direct speech may also be exploited to give the impression of rapid interchanges (as in fictional dialogue in Hemingway, Ivy Compton Burnett, etc.). Constructions that have the appearance of DS are widely used in print newspaper headlines (particularly tabloids), although it often transpires that the 'speech' is the creation of a copy editor who has rephrased one participant's most forceful remarks in more pithy and dramatic style or has synthesized the more subtly expressed views of several protagonists. By convention strict fidelity to the speaker's precise words is not always expected or required, but misrepresentation and trivialization are recurrent risks in this pursuit of entertaining, sales-generating copy.

NRSA and NV

Two categories have been proposed (by Semino and Short, 2004) as lying at the most indirect end of the speech representation continuum: these are NRSA, narrative report of speech acts, and NV, narrator's representation of voice. The former, a more established and accepted category, equivalent to what McHale (1978) called 'diegetic summary', covers those reports of speech in which the content is severely abridged (to the point where arguably there is no genuine speech representation) but a scant indication of the type of illocutionary or perlocutionary force of the act is provided:

> All evening they argued and quarreled over how best to economize.
> Mary's father stepped in with congratulations. (Graham Greene, *Brighton rock*, p. 137)

As the most indirect form of speech representation, NRSA is a useful device for novelists who wish to keep firm control on the narrative, but at the cost of creating a non-scenic detachment from the living voices of particular speaking characters. NRSA is suited to an aggregative and abridged recording of views, particularly where these are in broad agreement, as in summarizing the view of a committee or even a large meeting

> [For hours] 8,000 hunt supporters . . . made themselves heard . . . . They vowed to go on protesting until the government reversed its plan to ban hunting with dogs. (*The Guardian*, 29 September 2004)

Whereas in NRSA utterances one arguably reaches the limit of speech representation, often with only a slight indication of the actual wording of the anterior speech, with NV (narrator's representation of voice) attention has turned away from representation altogether, to simply reporting that the activity of talking has occurred. NV covers those occasions where the narrative reports that an individual spoke, but "we are not given any explicit indication as to what speech acts were performed, let alone what the form and content of the utterances were" (Semino and Short, 2004: 44), or there is "summary reference to speech events that involved a large number of participants" (Semino and Short, 2004: 45). This new category (and even more so its near equivalent in thought-reporting, NI, discussed later) proved useful to Semino and Short, whose interest was in a corpus-based comparative study of frequencies of distinct types of category-use in a corpus of fiction, journalism, and (auto)biography. Two NV examples are given in bold here:

> We **exchanged a few words lazily**. (Conrad, *Heart of darkness*, p. 28)
> **After talks in Belgrade**, Mr Milosevic said he fully agreed with the international peace plan. ('Milosevic backs Hurd peace plea', *Guardian*, 5 December 1994)

Free Indirect Speech

> A conversation then ensued, on not unfamiliar lines. Miss Bartlett was, after all, a wee bit tired, and thought they had better spend the morning settling in; unless Lucy would at all like to go out? Lucy would rather like to go out, as it was her first day in Florence, but of course, she could go alone. Miss Bartlett could not allow this. Of course she would accompany Lucy everywhere. Oh, certainly not; Lucy would stop with her cousin. Oh, no! That would never do! Oh yes! (E. M. Forster, *A room with a view*, Penguin, p. 36)

At this point we must turn to the phenomenon that alone justifies dwelling on the topic of RST at such length in an encylopaedia of linguistics – a phenomenon interest in which, as a topic of some theoretical importance to linguistics, was greatly stimulated by German scholars of the *Sprachseele* school and linguists such as Charles Bally and Marguerite Lips in the early 20th century, the latter calling it *le style indirect libre*. Since then this narratological hybrid, lying somewhere between but apart from either the wholly narrated, or the reported, or the direct representation

of speech, has acquired many names in different languages, including: *erlebte Rede*, represented speech, combined discourse, quasi-direct discourse, and free indirect speech (FIS).

FIS is the narratorially most fascinating of styles of discourse reporting, carrying some of the formal features of both character-expressive DS and narrator-expressive IS. FIS is a blending of the IS or narratorial options for tense, pronouns, and graphological non-removedness, but the DS or characterological options in syntax (especially noticeable in interrogatives and imperatives and exclamations), in its dispensing with complementizers, and its adoption of the character's space/time deixis, expressive lexis, and subjective modality.

But FIS is not simply a judicious combination of DS and IS features, nor simply some middle way between these two. Both DS and IS are accompanied by a framing or matrix clause: canonical FIS eschews one altogether (noncanonical FIS, with reporting clause present, is discussed later). Thus FIS is 'a bit of both' DS and IS, but also 'a bit of neither'. FIS styles of speech representation, then, are neither direct nor indirect according to orthodox prescriptions, but mixings or mergings of narratorial indirectness with characterological directness. And despite the earlier comparisons with DS and IS, the mode that FIS most crucially complements or contrasts with is PN (pure narrative: pure in the sense of being the narrator's direct address of the reader, without any traces of the words actually spoken or thought by characters; hence PN is chiefly reports of events and actions, and descriptions). Where uncertainty arises for the reader in the evaluating of possibly FIS phrasings, the confusion is one between character voicing and narratorial voicing. Between DS, IS, and FIS we finally have only variations in the fullness or editedness of rendering of the same individual's voice; but where we cope with the risk of confusing FIS and PN we are in danger of misattributing or misidentifying two entirely different voices and two different individuals, the character and the narrator.

If there is one linguistic feature that seems noticeably more prominent in FIS than in alternative modes of discourse representation, it is modality. FIS is marked by frequent use of modal verbs (*must*, *should*, *had to*, *could*, *might*, *would*) and sentence adverbials (*certainly*, *perhaps*, *maybe*, *surely*, *of course*, etc.) expressing judgments about the likelihood or necessity or desirability of some action or state transpiring. All such modality discloses the character's needs and wants and is frequently woven into contestable judgments. Postponing further discussion of the functions of FIS to a more inclusive section on FID

generally, we turn to cases of indirect speech report with parenthetical inquit verb.

Preposed Reported Clauses: IS or FIS?

Of considerable interest are all cases where the reporting clause follows the reported one, and the latter has the 'backshifted' tense and distal or narratorial deictics that would suggest IS:

> Could he accompany her home, he asked.
> What an appalling summer she was having, she said.

These are not standard IS: both have, in the reported component, the syntactic inversions of direct questions and exclamations respectively, whereas with framing-clause-first IS noninversion of elements is the norm. Neither of the two cited sentences, if simply reversed, would be regarded as canonical IS, particularly in light of more grammatically unified alternatives. Thus both

> He asked could he accompany her home.
> She said what an appalling summer she was having.

would be judged nonstandard or dialectal, by contrast with 'standard' IS:

> He asked if he could accompany her home.
> She said that she was having an appalling summer.

But whereas *He asked could he accompany her home* might be classed simply as nonstandard IS, there are grounds for treating *Could he accompany her home (he asked)* as FIS, the belated reporting clause being processed by the reader only when the reported speech has already been understood to express the words and 'voice' of the character denoted by *he*, albeit expressed within the narratorial deictic regimen. As for the treating of *He asked could he accompany her home* as nonstandard IS, again it is hard to see a definitive formal or criterial basis for specifying where such nonstandard IS shades into some form of FIS (consider more character-expressive versions such as *He asked could he please please please accompany her home*).

Returning to the 'standard' IS sentences earlier, with reporting clause first, it is evident that a 'mechanical' inversion of the reporting and reported clauses of the kind possible in relation to DS utterances (She said "I'm lost!" ⇔ "I'm lost!" she said) yields ungrammatical forms:

> *If he could accompany her home, he asked.
> *That she was having an appalling summer, she said.

To be grammatical, the complementizer must be removed, and subject–verb inversion must apply in the reported question, but those steps move the

reported clauses closer to direct speech, i.e., into the notional territory of FIS, than would otherwise be the case. And like FIS and DS sentences (and unlike those in IS) the reported clauses are also grammatically independent. One is drawn to conclude that where speech is reported using the narrator's tense and pronoun selections and with the reported clause preceding the inquit clause, there is no option of normal IS, and the only reason for withholding the label FIS from such cases would be adherence to the view, as axiomatic, that any within-sentence *inquit* clause cancels free indirect status.

Representation of Thought: Direct, Indirect, Free Indirect

Direct and Indirect Thought

In English literary fiction, all the speech representation categories discussed above have become matched, over the last 200 years or so, by loosely equivalent ones for the representation of thought. Indirect thought was the first to become widespread, but it is convenient to begin with direct thought (DT), which purports to give an accurate record of a character's verbalized thoughts. And like DS, which tends to be far more coherent, free of the repetitions, false starts, and other phenomena reflective of limited planning time than actual speech, so DT also, by convention, denotes a form of thought reporting that observes the norms of sentential grammar (e.g., expressing 'complete' ideas or propositions).

> He looked very tall on the darkening grass, and the thought crossed her mind, "He is like a weed." (K. Mansfield, *At the bay*, chap. 1)

> She looked up at the pale sky, and all she thought was, "Yes, it was the most successful party." (K. Mansfield, 'The garden party')

DT is used for self-addressed, self-instructing conclusions, at moments of crisis, high emotion, and revelation. In the reporting frame, forms of the verb *think* are commonest, but other verbs and formulations are found, including *say* without a reflexive pronoun. In context, Elizabeth Bennet's words that follow are clearly DT:

> With the mention of Derbyshire there were many ideas connected. It was impossible for her to see the word without thinking of Pemberley and its owner. "But surely," said she, "I may enter his county without impunity, and rob it of a few petrified spars without his perceiving me." (*Pride and prejudice*, chap. 42)

Like all thought-reports, DT is indicative of a narrator who is 'intrusive' and even 'omniscient'

(although the suitability of the latter term is now much debated), one who claims and demonstrates exceptional inward knowledge of characters' minds and motives. Even in fiction, 'full' DT with reporting clause preceding is rare; less rare is DT with the reporting clause falling medially (as above) or later, so that the construction is partly or wholly FDT. Unlike Austen in the preceding example, few writers use quotation marks or even an indented new line to mark off the DT from any reporting of its source.

As noted earlier, DT is normally reserved as a label to describe text that represents character-expressive thought, but does so while conforming to the prescriptions of standard grammar, without abrupt fractures or jumps in the flow of structure or sense. Where those constraints seem to be absent, and we feel we are reading a transcript of the mind uncensored and unedited and freely associating, it is customary to refer to this mode as interior monologue (or 'very free' direct thought); literary critics often call it 'stream of consciousness'. In the novels of Woolf and Joyce, and especially in the latter's *Ulysses*, extensive direct thought of this kind is deployed brilliantly, to characterize individuals in all the fecundity and heterogeneity of their thoughts and desires; the mode is exceptionally effective in displaying and dramatizing the depth of human reflexivity – our ability to think about several things at once, to see significance or mutual relevance in disparate things, and to think *about* how we think about such things. Here, for example, is the opening of Molly Bloom's famous interior monologue, which comes at the end of *Ulysses*:

> Yes because he never did a thing like that before as ask to get his breakfast in bed with a couple of eggs since the City Arms hotel when he used to be pretending to be laid up with a sick voice doing his highness to make himself interesting for that old faggot Mrs Riordan that he thought he had a great leg of and she never left us a farthing all for masses for herself and her soul greatest miser ever was actually afraid to lay out 4d for her methylated spirit telling me all her ailments she had too much old chat in her about politics and earthquakes and the end of the world let us have a bit of fun first God help the world if all the women were her sort down on bathingsuits and lownecks of course nobody wanted her to wear them I suppose she was pious because no man would look at her twice. (Joyce, *Ulysses*)

Indirect Thought

As in IS, in indirect thought there is a framing or reporting clause identifying the individual who is the source of the reflection, and a following clause of reported thought.

She blushed at the very idea [of accidentally meeting Mr. Darcy], and thought it would be better to speak openly to her aunt than to run such a risk. (*Pride and prejudice*, chap. 42)

Constructions of this form, in the narration rather than within direct speech, with initial reporting clause, are not particularly frequent in literature – especially when one has excluded instances (such as the following, in bold) that in context are IS and not IT:

Mr. Bartell D'Arcy ... praised very highly the leading contralto of the company but Miss Furlong thought **she had a rather vulgar style of production**. (Joyce, 'The dead')

In many constructions, the reporting clause is followed by something – e.g., a preposition – rather than the default subordinator *that*, and this preposition is in turn perhaps followed by a nonfinite clause or only a phrase: *she wondered at . . . , he thought of the way . . . , she told herself of*, etc.

He thought of how she who lay beside him had locked in her heart for so many years that image of her lover's eyes when he had told her that he did not wish to live. (Joyce, "The dead")

In such cases, the passage may be felt to be shading toward the 'more indirect' mode than that of IT, namely NRTA (see later discussion), with its more summarized or rephrased representation of a character's thoughts. As in the cases of IS with noninitial reporting clause discussed earlier, it is often more appropriate to classify as free indirect thought (FIT) those cases of apparent indirect thought report where the reporting clause is medial or final. In the first of the following examples, the FIT status of the bolded words is supported by the fact that in the context the preceding sentences are also clearly Mrs Ramsay's FIT rather than narratorial:

No. He could not say it right. He could not feel it right. **But why not?** she wondered. (Woolf, *To the lighthouse*, Penguin, p. 16)

Odious little man, thought Mrs Ramsay, why go on saying that? (Woolf, *To the lighthouse,* p. 19)

Free Indirect Thought

As in FIS, FIT combines linguistic markers reflective of the narratorial function (such as narrative tense, use of pronouns as if participants are being named from the narrator's point of view) with some or all of the expressive and subjective reflections of the character's voice (here, in the realm of thought, the character's 'inner' voice). Like FIS, the additional absence (in nearly all cases) of a governing,

utterance-initial reporting clause is important. The text therefore has some of the appearance of narrative, but in the detail it is very much a voicing of the character's mentality, in the character's words. And, again, the absence of reporting clause erases some of the impression of clear hierarchy, of an external teller and an observed character being told about. The sense of thoughts being reported is displaced by a sense of thoughts being disclosed, of mental reaction and reflection shown in the course of its being experienced. A very powerful effect of alignment of narrator and character can be achieved, if fleetingly: FIT is, it should be stressed, a relational category: it often draws its strength from its difference from adjacent Narrative, DT, or IT material:

The possibility of meeting Mr. Darcy, while viewing the place, instantly occurred. **It would be dreadful!** She blushed at the very idea, and thought it would be better to speak openly to her aunt than to run such a risk. (Austen, *Pride and prejudice*, End of chap. 42)

It seemed to her such nonsense – inventing differences, when **people, heaven knows, were different enough without that. The real differences**, she thought, standing by the drawing-room window, **are enough, quite enough**. (Woolf, *To the lighthouse*, Penguin, p. 13)

And there is always something necessarily surreptitious and covert about it, by comparison with its neighboring types: the latter through punctuation and reporting clauses and tense and pronoun forms make quite explicit their direct or indirect status, respectively. Like DT, FIT is used for moments of heightened emotion or insight or resolve, but also for moments or thoughts that are implicitly buried deeper within the character's psyche than DT material, and thus less amenable to full-sentence first-person expression – in some cases, sufficiently deeply buried that (we infer) the character will not go on record as explicit source of the thought.

It has become customary to talk of the 'free' in FDS, FIT and so on, as meaning 'free of a framing clause in which who speaks or thinks is explicitly identified'; but in practice one encounters degrees of freedom. On the one hand a parenthetical reporting clause does not govern, syntactically, whatever clause precedes it, and such clauses can have all or some of the word-order, deixis, modality and lexical subjectivity of the character in quasi-direct form, to the point that readers will confirm that the 'voice' or intonation of the character seems to predominate: largely free, then, at least until the reporting clause is encountered. On the other hand many grammatically complete utterances that combine character expressivity with narratorial tense- and pronoun-selections – thus, canonical FIT or FIS – have explicit indications, in adjacent sentences, of the

particular character who is the source of the thoughts or speech: only free very locally, then, and not when cotext is fully taken into consideration. Ultimately those occasions of FID and FDD that are of most interest to literary linguists are those where uncertainty over the answer to the question 'who speaks here, who thinks here?' persists even after a thorough rereading – where some ambiguity remains as to whether a judgment or insight is the narrator's or the character's, or that of one character and not another. And such uncertainties are often connected to the content and intent of the represented comment or judgment: if this appalling remark was intended seriously it must be from the character, but if intended ironically it is probably the narrator's. 'Undecidable' free forms – particularly free indirect ones – foreground uncertainties in readers' knowledge of characters and narrator. Consider the following extract, for example, which comes late in Lawrence's *Women in love*, when a womanservant confirms to Gudrun that her former lover, Gerald Crich, has, as suspected, perished in the Alpine cold. The final sentence seems largely to be the womanservant's FIT, but it may have something of the narrator's voice in it, and even something of Gudrun's own thoughts (as in the preceding Gudrun FIT); and is it not, in a sense, a fair comment on Gudrun?

> "Il est mort?"
> "Yes – hours ago."
> Gudrun did not know what to say. What should she say? What should she feel? What should she do? What did they expect of her? She was coldly at a loss.
> "Thank you," she said, and she shut the door of her room. The woman went away mortified. Not a word, not a tear – ha! Gudrun was cold, a cold woman. (Lawrence, *Women in love*, chap. 31)

A final remark is in order concerning the importance of forms of thought representation in modern literature, notwithstanding the degree of artifice or counterfactuality entailed in purporting to report the contents of another person's mind. For although new technologies and art forms have come along, diverting attention away from literature, the latter retains a particular special status as a forum for the exploration and dramatization of consciousness. It is then as much an opportunity as a difficulty that, by contrast with the establishment of DS as the normal way of relaying other's heard utterances, thoughts are represented in more various ways. Thought is such an amorphous entity, seemingly a cover term for a range of mental activities only some of which are remotely capturable with the linearity of language, that no single format of presentation has emerged as the standard. Many commentators would argue that there can be no such thing as 'thought transcription'

truly on a par with 'speech transcription', and that at best thoughts can be described, not transcribed (just as body movements might be described but not transcribed). Another major distinction concerns genres of use: although speech representation is central to a host of human activities and institutions, thought representation has been largely confined (with exceptions in, e.g., biography and personalized journalism) to the realms of literary fiction. In fact thought representation is a distinguishing feature of modern literature and one of its chief assets; despite all the advances in neurological and cognitive science, perhaps no other cultural form is so powerful at appearing able to make available to us other peoples' minds, and the unlimited movements of consciousness. High in the roll call of great novelists who have given us, via thought representation, insights into the chaotic architecture of others' minds and the oceanic storms of emotion and desire that may rage therein are Dostoyevsky, Proust, Joyce, and Woolf. But the examined mental life has been a literary interest since the earliest times, and only became more entrenched, a preoccupation, in the modernist period, roughly contemporaneously with an explosion of interest in psychology and psychiatry ushered in by the work of William James, Freud, and Jung.

Discourse Categories as Superordinate to Speech and Thought Modes

So far in this article, the major categories of speech representation have been discussed separately from those of thought representation, and there are certainly good reasons for doing so. On the other hand, as has been clear in the foregoing, there are many similarities of form, and some of effect also, between the core speech categories DS, FIS, IS, and NRSA and counterpart core thought ones of DT, FIT, IT, and NRTA. Accordingly a useful practice has developed of replacing the terms *speech* and *thought* by a superordinate one, *discourse*, giving rise to a set of superordinate labels (especially DD, FID, and ID), and in the remainder of this article these portmanteau terms will sometimes be used. But it remains true that in the actual reading of a text one encounters not ID but something that is clearly either IS or IT (and only rarely – but interestingly – is assignment of an utterance to the 'S' or the 'T' scale undecidable). So in analysis the more precise labels are preferable.

Who Speaks, Who Thinks?

In the reading and analysis of literary (and other) narratives, it is often crucial to determine who

is underlyingly responsible for the words – possibly implied to have been spoken, or simply thought – that one encounters. With regard to FIS and FIT, the question amounts to the following: 'To whom do we attribute these spoken words or articulated thoughts?' The 'Who is saying/thinking this?' question is useful to keep in mind, because FID is a very open category. Despite the foregoing list of usual indicators of FID, there is no single *necessary* feature of FID, which you have to have in order for a phrase or clause to qualify as FID. Narratives in the present tense (where there will be no tense difference between direct and indirect discourses) or with first-person narrators can just as easily contain FID as other types. As Leech and Short (1981: 328–33) show in the following two examples, a single character-attributed expletive, or even a single character-expressive punctuation mark, can in suitable context signal the presence of FID rather than narratorial indirect discourse:

> He said that the bloody train had been late.
> He told her to leave him alone!

We assume that the *bloody* is the character's (*He*), and not the narrator's, and similarly that at least the exclamation mark is the character's. These examples highlight another interesting uncertainty of FID examples: the lack of a decisive indication of the mode's extent. Thus in the first example, 'how much', before and after the word *bloody*, is also essentially attributable to the character? And in the second example, is the entire clause 'leave him alone!' FID, or only 'alone!', or merely the exclamation point?

Finally, how all-encompassing should FID and similar discourse-representing categories be conceived to be? A traditional distinction (from Genette) has proposed separate answers to the questions 'Who speaks?' and 'Who sees?,' the former giving rise to the range of speech and thought presentation categories, the latter being addressed by specification of various kinds and degrees of focalization. But this division is by no means universally accepted among narratologists and stylisticians. It is so often the case that, for example, FIT goes hand in hand with focalization from the viewpoint of that character, that it seems that only in exceptional cases are the two noticeably distinct or held apart. Or some have wondered whether all cases of focalization as encoded or expressed in the text cannot be reinterpreted as kinds of FID. On the other hand those who argue that it is useful to address focalization choices separately from speech and thought presentation ones are also, in effect, arguing for a more delimited notion of ID and FID; they maintain that we should not include, under ID or FID, cases of narrative report that adopt or express only the character's spatio-temporal viewpoint, their orientation, without any of the character's (outer or inner) words.

Testing for FID

Two simple framing or commutation tests can be helpful in probing for the FID status or (or otherwise) of doubtful extracts. Those frames are (to support a PN – purely narratorial – or ID categorization):

> **I, the narrator, tell you, the reader** [insert text to be probed, unmodified]

and, alternatively (to support categorization as FID):

> [insert text to be probed, with any pronouns referring to the putatively discoursing character converted to first person, and with tenses converted to the present tense of thinking/speaking], **the character remarks, to themself or to other characters.**

Any sentence, or sentence part, can be put to these framing tests to help clarify their FID or PN status. But it has to be conceded that the shorter the fragment to be probed, the more difficult is this test to use; and FID does not invariably come in clause-size chunks. Still, to see how on longer fragments the test can be useful confirmation, consider these sentences from an early point in Gabriel's final revery in 'The Dead':

> Perhaps she had not told him all the story.(1) His eyes moved to the chair over which she had thrown some of her clothes. . . .(2) Poor Aunt Julia! She, too, would soon be a shade . . . (3)

Taking these slightly out of order, the second of these sentences is clearly narratorial: although it fits the narratorial frame quite unexceptionally, it is clearly ludicrous if explicitly cast as characterological, via the second frame:

> My eyes move to the chair over which she has thrown some of her clothes, the character remarks (to himself).

Conversely, sentence (3) is almost as incontestably characterological, FIT. Finally, the first sentence *Perhaps she had not told him all the story*, taken alone would seem to pass both the narratorial and characterological probe test: good evidence that, in theory, the sentence could be either narrator's suggestion or character's speculation. Again, context and cotext (and content: despite his rather protracted interrogation of her, it would be in Gabriel's character to fear or suspect that not even Gretta had been entirely honest with him) make it overwhelmingly more appropriate to read this potentially ambiguous observation as Gabriel's, in FIT.

As much as anything else, it is the modality in this last example – *Perhaps she had not told* etc. – and the expressive evaluation in the previous example – *Poor Aunt Julia! She, too*, etc. – that encourage us to assign FID interpretations. In seemingly narrative text, FID has the capacity to 'put back' all the immediacy and subjectivity and expressivity that otherwise, in standard ID, gets edited out. And this 'restored' subjective expressivity can extend to eccentricities of spelling and writing in general, reflecting the nonstandardness of the character: such features are comfortably accommodated in some kinds of FID. All of this amounts to a restoration of the colorful individuality of characters' direct expression. We feel FID to be more vivid and colorful than PN and ID report because both the latter tend to be more detached, sober, restrained, and standard-English-speaking than the words of the character *in situ*, undergoing the experience and talking and thinking their way through that experience in frank and uninhibited ways. Of course the latter is an *effect* of direct experiential reaction, but no less significant for that.

As elsewhere in narrative study, it is the perception of difference (here between character speech and narrator speech) that is the true criterion. And in some narratives, as in the novels and stories of Henry James, where narrator and characters seem to share a single lect so that contrasts scarcely arise at lexico-grammatical levels at all, the differences can only be painstakingly derived from a reader's assessment of protagonists and their discourse (e.g., its varying degrees of reasonableness).

FID: Functions and Effects

Perhaps no other feature of literary language has attracted as much attention from so broad a range of critics and linguists in the last 100 years as FID. Some have especially emphasized the 'dual voice' effect of FIS: notably in the work of Ullman, Pascal (1977), and McHale (1978), as well as in various of Bakhtin's writings. Others, developing ideas in Benveniste and Hamburger, have dwelt on the 'unspeakability' of the FID sentence and of narrative sentences generally (especially Banfield, 1982). For Banfield, narration is unspeakable because, unlike discourse (which is both communicative and expressive), it is a text with neither a genuine addressee (nor any textual traces of one) nor a genuine expressivity-disclosing speaker. FID, in partial contrast, carries abundant expressivity (that of the character), but still no genuine I-you communicativity, and as a result remains unspeakable. Depending upon how the object of study – the novel, for example – is viewed, both or all of these seemingly disparate claims are

defensible and insightful. And it certainly seems likely that the 'disappearance' of the teller from heterodiegetic narratives, the bleaching out of the narrator as a felt presence in the text and denoted by prominent use of the first person singular pronoun and by evidentials, may have created the conditions in which free indirect effects could first emerge.

FID can be related to such fundamental literary distinctions of narrative method as those between showing and telling, or the neo-Platonist terms *mimesis* and *diegesis*. Mimesis presents 'everything that happened' as this might be perceived by a witness within the scene (thus a partial and far from comprehensive account). Stanzel (1981) noted that it typically comes with internal character focalization. Diegesis presents everything that a detached external reporter decides is worth telling – a reporter who is able to reflect, reorganize, and decide upon the point or teleology of the story prior to narrating it. In terms of mimesis and diegesis, FID amounts to a mimetic diegesis (a telling that shows or presents aspects of the character's 'own' words or thoughts). In particular it is a showing that does not, by comparison with DD forms, draw so much attention to itself or to the fact that it is a showing. As a device for character portrayal by covert showing, FID can be related to a more thoroughgoing narrative strategy for showing character, known as Mind Style, in which the whole style of a passage or section seems to reflect the quality of someone's mind – usually the mind of a focalizing character.

But there are numerous ways of characterizing FID, in fact, and these varied characterizations reflect the various functions that, in different circumstances, it can serve. It has been called substitutionary narration; combined discourse; 'contaminated' narrative, a tainting or coloring of the narrative; and dual voicing. Yet another approach is to view FID as a strategy of (usually temporary or discontinuous) alignment, in words, values, and perspective, of the narrator with a character. The idea of alignment does not prescribe whether that closeness of narrator to character is used for purposes of irony, empathy, as a vehicle for stream-of-consciousness or the clashing of two voices, or some other purpose.

Like McHale and others (Pascal, 1977; Ginsberg, 1982), Jefferson recognized that a key source of the impact of the FID sentence is its ambiguous mixture of proper narrative and proper speech or thought:

> The dual voice of FID which is responsible for the superficially realist effect of immediacy is also an ambiguity which is highly unrealistic. From a realist point of view, FID is a doubly disconcerting use of language: its ambiguities cut it adrift from the two points at which we

commonly imagine language to be anchored to reality, the speaker and the referent. It is neither fully expressive nor fully referential, and this *invraisemblance* differentiates it most profoundly from other forms of reported discourse. (Jefferson, 1981: 42)

By *invraisemblance* Jefferson alludes in part to FID's lack of *vraisemblance*: the effect or convention of faithful and 'realistic' representation of the real world that many novels foster and many readers demand. The *invraisemblance* of FID stems from the fact that it gives rise to sentences such as *Perhaps she had not told him all the story*, and *She too would soon be a shade* and *Yes, the newspapers were right* which, in just those forms and with just those referential commitments, none of us in the discoursing of everyday lives, including our storytellings embedded in conversations, could ever actually say. FID sentences are in this sense unsayable or unspeakable, impossible to anchor to one speaker at one place and time, because they are impossibly divided between two distinct speakers (narrator and character) and anchorages. Following Bakhtin, critics have argued that in some of these cases the represented speech or thought is 'reaccented' by the representing narrator, so that two distinct accents, dialects, or intonations (which are never neutral, always evaluative) are held in a rich, unresolved tension. Certainly on some occasions, the clash of (character's and narrator's) sentiments within the FID passages is so palpable that a kind of internal conflict or mutual contradiction seems to be enacted.

Carefully handled FIT rendering can contribute to a subtle narrative presentation of characters' thoughts, in which the reader's awareness that a narrator is relaying those thoughts (even though narrator-oriented tense and pronoun choices are made) is thoroughly backgrounded. No matter how audacious or unreasonable the character's views become, no narratorial voice of 'true judgment' intrudes to censure the character or to dissociate itself from the character and *alert* the reader to the errors being broadcast. But actually FIT is often most powerful where the articulated ideas are *not* glaringly at odds with the narrator's assumed stance. Rather than by insulting or at least ignoring the reader's intelligence by imposing a narratorial gloss on the character's thoughts (there is no guarantee that the narrator is wiser, fairer, and more consistent than the characters, but that is the usual expectation), narration involving copious FIT – particularly when, as noted earlier, there is little reliably or blatantly to distinguish what the narrator might have reported in their own voice from what the character may have privately thought – may challenge the reader's intelligence and moral sensibility or

discernment. And in exercising that discernment we may have help only from juxtaposition: e.g., of one character's self-serving evaluations with actual outcomes or other characters' actions. Such effects are continually achieved in the novels of Henry James.

Finally, another indicator of the exceptionality of FID is the way that it often presents particular challenges to the translator. Translation of FIS and FIT passages creates all kinds of challenges – e.g., when expressing what might be rendered in English as *How she loathed him!* in a language such as Finnish, which has only one gender-neutral third-person singular personal pronoun, *hän*. Or it may be that the prohibitions on introduction of character-expressive features into a sentence with ID tense and deictic selections may be rather stricter in the target language than in the source language (or vice versa) creating further incommensurabilities.

'Beyond' IT: NRTA and NI

The work of Leech and Short (1981), and very recently Semino and Short (2004), has done much to develop a systematic typology of speech and thought (and latterly, writing) representation categories relevant to English. Most of the categories they propose are widely adopted, but the two 'most indirect' ones for thought representation, merit further comment (the counterpart ones for speech, NRSA and NV, were discussed earlier). They are NRTA and NI. NRTA denotes narrative report of thought acts, and is roughly parallel to Cohn's category of psychonarration, in which the heterodiegetic narrator remains in the foreground throughout, even adds some general observations not originating in the character ("as others [...] had done before him"). In NRTA, then, there is a highly indirect report of a character's or characters' thought, in which the content is noticeably summarized and cast in narratorial terms. Very often an NRTA sentence serves to introduce a passage of more character-expressive discourse. In the following example, an NRTA sentence (here in bold) is flanked by FIT ones:

> She had consented to go away, to leave her home. Was that wise? **She tried to weigh each side of the question.** In her home anyway she had shelter and food; she had those whom she had known all her life about her. O course she had to work hard, both in the house and at business. (Joyce, 'Eveline', *Dubliners*)

The new internal narration (NI) category has been proposed for "reports of mental states and changes that involve cognitive and affective phenomena but that do not to amount to specific thoughts" (Semino and Short, 2004: 132), that is, reports of mental activity that is even less a matter of inner speech

than NRTA instances. The examples include the following (which all need to be imagined in appropriate contexts):

Jim envied Mr Mulvaney;
The phrase made me a little sad;
I couldn't get the image out of my head.

That there is narrational activity of this kind, where a character's affective or evaluative response is conveyed in nonspecific terms, is widely accepted. But whether this amounts to *thought*-presentation, where 'thought' denotes 'the reported words or wording that we treat as having run through the character's or narrator's head', is more open to question. It is not claimed or assumed that the actual words *envy* or *sad* or *can't get the image* registered on the consciousness of the individuals here reported experiencing these emotions or reactions, any more than if the text reported *Jim pummeled Mr Mulvaney* it would imply that the word *pummel* crossed Jim's consciousness. For that reason, some analysts prefer to categorize such examples on the other side of a watershed setting apart thought representation from narration, i.e., on the narration side. These examples are then treated as more about narration, mental response narration perhaps, than thought presentation – as indeed the NI labeling partly recognizes. They are judged not to sit comfortably within the same grouping as DT, FIT, and IT (where NRTA is regarded as the outlier, or 'most indirect' category). Whatever classification is adopted, the recent study of Semino and Short suggests that NI-type narrations of mental reactions are by some way the most frequent means of thought presentation (presentation, not representation, is significantly their preferred term) in modern fiction, biography, and journalism. They therefore merit further analyses and appropriate classification on a comprehensive narrational scale that might encompass the whole range from discourse representation, through narrative report, description, and comment (Bonheim, 1984).

Conclusion

As a topic in narratology and literary linguistic analysis, speech and thought representation will continue to dwell on the different ways and effects of rendering direct speech in fiction and on the subtly changing ways that writers are finding to create mergers, blends, alignments, and clashes of voices and viewpoints within FID. The point is worth emphasizing that all six main speech and thought representation types (DS, IS, FIS; DT, IT, FIT) are effects as much as they are stable formats defined by essential criteria (DS is in the present tense of actual speech, but so too can narration be; it may or may not have

quotation marks, be set out on the printed page on a new line, with indentation, at each change of speaker, and so on). And in various ways just what is 'licensed' or acceptable in each of these mutually defined formats changes in step with larger changes in the status and function of literature, with changes of technology and living conditions, and especially in the face of the rivalry from alternative (and themselves changing) modes of cultural production and consumption, such as film, theater, and television. In short what is grammatical in each of these formats has shifted over time, and to some degree will continue to, and such shifts are both a cause and an effect of readers' changing literacy skills in this area – their adjusted ability to read and accept such a format as an effective rendering of a character's articulated thoughts, or of such thoughts interwoven with a narrator's distinct (and variably sympathetic or critical) viewpoint.

See also: Bakhtin, Mikhail Mikhailovich; Deixis and Anaphora: Pragmatic Approaches; Narrativity and Voice.

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Spoken Discourse: Types

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Introduction

By definition, spoken discourse consists of at least two people taking turns who interact in an initiation and response structure (Sinclair and Coulthard, 1992). Some of the most typical features of spoken discourse are personal involvement and real-time constraints. Involvement is generally marked by using first and second personal pronouns; by monitoring the communication channel through rising intonation, pauses, requests for back-channel responses; by giving emphasis to people and their relationship; by reporting speakers' mental processes and by using emphatic particles (*really*, *just*, etc.). Real-time constraints, on the other hand, are highlighted by place and time adverbs, or by verb tense and aspect (Biber, 1986; Tannen, 1982). This description of spoken texts emphasizes the contrast with written texts, which may also be represented by the following oppositions: involvement vs. detachment; maximal use of context vs. maximal background information; inexplicitness vs. explicitness; dependence for effect of paralinguistic and nonverbal channel vs. dependence on lexicalization to establish cohesion; and so on (Tannen, 1982).

Spoken discourse features are not determined by contrast to written discourse features alone. As the range of variation of spoken texts is so great, from trivial conversation to elaborate political speeches, etc., reference is made to a typology of spoken discourse. Discourse types are characterized by different uses of linguistic structures, refer to specific social contexts and situations, to participants having specific roles and status, and are controlled by social rules and conventions.

The main problem with assigning type labels is whether discourse should be classified from a structural or from a functional point of view. Researchers have questioned which of the two perspectives is more relevant in a typology of spoken discourse. On one hand, all utterances have a meaning, a purpose, or an intention (the functions of the utterances). On the other hand, the words in the utterance, the linguistic structure, determine its functions. More often than not, the only way to understand the function of the utterance is by referring to situation, discourse structure, and intonation, whereas the linguistic structure of the utterance is the least helpful in this respect.

The next section briefly explores these different approaches. Here, we will use *text* and *discourse* as synonyms. In fact, the two terms have a different background of uses in linguistic studies. According to Virtanen (1990: 447), "*text* is often used of a static concept – the product of a process – while *discourse* is used to refer to a dynamic notion – the process of text production and comprehension. It is the processual approach that naturally takes situational context into account."

Types of Spoken Discourse: A Review of Functional and Structural Approaches

Over the last few years, many studies have attempted to determine the nature and extent of structural and functional similarities and differences between spoken and written texts, in order to provide some theoretical and empirical prerequisites for comparative discourse research.

Traditionally, and according to rhetorical theory, four basic kinds of discourse exist: narration, description, exposition, and argumentation (De Beaugrande & Dressler, 1981; Werlich, 1983). These theories emphasize the functional aspects, and the different kinds of speaker contributions are considered prominent. Levelt (1989) states that one of the most important features in a typology of texts is the mutual agreement

that interlocutors have in the interaction. Levelt (1989: 111–112) affirms that it would be a problem if a speaker "constructs his messages in the framework of the wrong discourse type – for example, if he takes an examination to be a debate, or air-traffic-control discourse to be everyday conversation." Discourse type is established by considering the way the talk is led; for instance if a person talks like a doctor (i.-e., speaking of hematoma instead of a bruise) the interlocutor recognizes that the discourse is of the doctor–patient type.

Considering this, Levelt lists some of the different types of discourse as follows: informal everyday conversation, narrations, lectures, examinations and interviews, debates, planning discourse, route direction, radio talk, and therapeutic discourse. One of the main characteristics of informal everyday conversation is "the interlocutors' awareness of informality, of roughly equal rights to the floor, and of the freedom to change topic" (Levelt, 1989: 111). One of the most remarkable differences between informal and formal discourse concerns the turn-taking rules to follow. Heritage (1998: 164) observes that in analyzing interactions one should immediately consider if they involve the use of a special turn-taking organization. In institutional interaction, we normally have a turn-taking organization and the types of contributions speakers are expected to make can be predictable. Consequently, departures from it can be explicitly sanctioned, such as "in meetings when speakers are ruled 'out of order', in the courts when persons are sanctioned for answering when they should not, or failing to answer appropriately, or when children in classrooms are punished for 'shouting out' answers, or talking when the teacher is talking" (Heritage, 1998: 165).

Informal everyday conversation is a label under which many other sublabels could be included. The range of informal everyday conversation is indeed very wide: from chatting with peers to chatting with parents or children, from male to female ways of chatting; from narrations to dialogues, etc. There are some considerable differences between male and female discourse. According to Tannen (1992), one of the greatest differences is the way they report facts: women complain that men tend to tell only the indispensable, whereas men complain that women give too much useless information (see also Carter *et al.*, 2003: 286–287). Tannen thinks this happens because men and women have different approaches to narrations: men see the recounting of incidents as a reporting, while women pay more attention to the metamessage because they feel that recounting experiences is a way to relate to the listener. Another

difference between male and female discourse is represented by what Kendall and Tannen (2001: 555) refer to as the taking up of roles of expertise or authority. Men tend to take up this role very often, while women are more likely to avoid it.

An important feature of narrations is interlocutor awareness of the following: "a single speaker has a preferential right to the floor until the narrative is completed. The speaker can count on the suspension of disruptive self-selection by other participants, but has to pay by having to generate a structured sequence of messages" (Levelt, 1989: 111).

A more formal type of discourse includes lectures, examinations, interviews, and debates. Levelt (1989: 112) defines lectures as more serious and impersonal, remarking that when lecturing the speaker is supposed to make his views known to a "spatially marked audience." Examinations and interviews are instead "characterized by a fixed question-answer turn order, in which roles are clearly divided as to who does the questioning and who gives the answers" (Levelt, 1989: 112). Debates are considered to "share much of the question-answer nature of examinations, but the role of questioner is now equally distributed between the participants, and each participant has some thesis to defend" (Levelt, 1989: 112).

The informal vs. formal conversation opposition may also be referred to in terms of institutional vs. noninstitutional interaction. According to Heritage (1998: 164, 175), some features of institutional interaction are the asymmetries of participation and the involvement of the participants in specific goal orientations connected to their institutional identities: doctor and patient, teacher and pupil, etc. For example, in a medical setting, Tannen and Wallat (1993) observed information exchanges between a mother, a child, and a pediatrician. Results showed that the pediatrician used three different registers depending on the three different audiences. She switched from one code to another, using different intonation, voice quality, content, and lexical and syntactic structures. The register used when addressing colleagues and performing diagnostic procedures can be defined as reporting. It is characterized by flat intonation, rapid rate of speech, relatively low pitch, and the absence of marked facial expressions and gestures. However, when addressing the child the pediatrician used motherese, as in the following example:

Doctor: Let me look in your ear. Okay? Do you have a monkey in your ear?
Child: [laughing] No.
Doctor: No? . . . Let's see . . . I see . . . a birdie. (Tannen and Wallat, 1993: 39)

Finally, she used everyday conversation register when addressing the mother:

> Mother: It just appears that way?
> Doctor: Yes. It's very … it's really … it's like floppy you know and that's why it sounds … the way it is.
> Mother: She worries me at night (Tannen and Wallat, 1993: 39).

Tannen and Wallat also noticed that the pediatrician suppressed her emotional responses and monitored the amounts and the impact of information imparted. Emotional response to a medical problem by a friend is quite appropriate, whereas a doctor's emotional response could cause the patient to panic.

Another way speakers adapt to institutional contexts is by selecting descriptive terms. For instance, one could use 'cop' in everyday conversation, but when giving evidence in court one would select 'police officer' instead (Sacks, 1979). In medicine, where references to pain are often euphemistic, a patient will be asked 'Is it sore?' instead of 'Is it painful?' (Heritage and Sorjonen, 1994: 174).

The typologies described so far give priority to functional rather than structural analysis: first functional characteristics are isolated, and only later linguistic features are identified on the basis of the predefined functional distinctions. As opposed to this methodology, Biber (1988: 13) noted that even if a set of texts have similar functions, texts may not necessarily have similar forms. On the contrary, if texts share similar linguistic features, they are also expected to have functional similarities, "because linguistic cooccurrence reflects shared function. The order analysis is reversed from previous studies, however. The types are first identified on the basis of their linguistic characteristics and only subsequently interpreted functionally" (Biber, 1989: 4). Biber (1995: 320) also remarked the salient difference between text types and registers, and highlighted the linguistic predominance in identifying text types. He noticed that text types are similar to registers in that they "both can be described with respect to their linguistic characteristics and with respect to their situational/ functional characteristics. However, these two constructs differ in their primary bases: registers are defined in terms of situational/functional characteristics, while text types are defined linguistically."

Biber's new approach to identifying text types is based on sets of syntactic and lexical features that frequently co-occur in texts. He calls these feature sets, empirically identified dimensions of variation, and the linguistic characteristics of any given text can be specified precisely with respect to each dimension. The dimensions and associated text characterizations provide the basis for his typology. According to Biber (1989: 7), there are 16 main grammatical categories that the linguistic features fall into:

> (A) tense and aspect markers, (B) place and time adverbial, (C) pronouns and pro-verbs, (D) questions, (E) nominal forms, (F) passives, (G) stative forms, (H) subordination features, (I) prepositional phrase, adjectives, and adverbs (J) lexical specificity, (K) lexical classes, (L) modals, (M) specialized verb classes, (N) reduced forms and dispreferred structures, (O) coordination, and (P) negation.

After preliminary analysis, he identifies a five-dimension system to represent communicative functions, in order to deal with all text types (e.g., face-to-face, telephone and public conversation, debates, interviews, broadcast, spontaneous speech, and planned speech). The five dimensions are labelled as follows (Biber, 1989: 10):

1. Involved vs. informational production
2. Narrative versus non-narrative concerns
3. Elaborated vs. situation-dependent reference
4. Overt expression of persuasion
5. Abstract vs. nonabstract style.

Biber uses quantitative techniques to identify the groups of features that co-occur in texts, and then groupings are interpreted in functional terms. However, Biber (1989: 41) underlines the continuous range of variation among texts and the different score the text may have on each dimension, in a continuous, multidimensional space of variation.

In order to handle this lack of balance between linguistic structure and function, Sinclair and Coulthard (1992) developed a model for spoken discourse analysis, using Austin's speech act theory and Halliday's description of grammar based on a rank scale (they were inspired by Halliday [1961]. Their model first appeared in Sinclair and Coulthard [1975], *Towards an analysis of discourse: the English used by teachers and pupils*, and then in Sinclair and Coulthard [1992]). Sinclair and Coulthard aimed at making a practical and functional description of discourse. They began with classroom settings because of their simple interaction patterns, and similar discourse rules with other situations, thus creating a system suitable for all discourse analysis. Sinclair and Coulthard observed that in classrooms, the teacher initiated (I) all exchanges, the students responded (R), and the teacher would follow up (F) on what had been said or done, creating an I-R-F type of discourse. This system is useful as it focuses on the speaker tactics used to determine the purpose of utterances. Sinclair and Couthard define lessons as the greatest unit of classroom discourse, consisting of several transactions marked off by the boundary elements,

the 'frame': *right*, *well*, *good*, *OK*, *now*. These terms are frequently used by all teachers, and mark the end of one stage and the beginning of the next. The function of the 'focus' (a special kind of statement) in the transaction is to tell the class what is going to happen; and they generally occur after frames. Sinclair and Coulthard are aware that the order of transactions varies for each teacher and there is no restriction on the occurrence of different types.

Types have no defined boundaries; on the contrary, they are characterized by a continuous range of variation, which can be grasped only when observing concrete data. It is impossible to label types without data. Theoretical findings do not always reflect what in effect happens in practice. For example, Basturkmen (2003: 21–22) has investigated the ways the presence and absence of the tutor impacted on the exchange structure of an academic discussion. In contrast to his expectations, his analysis did not show that the authority figure dominated by controlling the interaction, i.e., by initiating exchanges; on the contrary, during interaction in presence of the tutor, half the exchanges were initiated by students. He also observed that the arrival of the tutor made the discussion become more solution-driven rather than idea focused, with a large number of student–student exchanges.

A further example of spoken discourse is sports broadcasting. According to Ferguson (1983), sports broadcasting shows a particular use of syntax and register. He considers it as a discourse genre and analyzes it in terms of register variation. The register is located by the characterization of its occasions of use – such broadcasts start with background information about the game, the occasion, the teams, and so forth; they include components of direct reportage, comment, advertising commercials, and conclude with interviews of players and coaches. These elements are in relatively fixed proportions and relatively fixed sequence, and selected syntactic characteristics are also identified such as simplification (deletion of copula and sentence initial nominals, which give both the lowering of pitch and loudness for parenthetical expressions and structural simplification), inversions ("Holding up at third is Murphy"; Ferguson, 1983: 160), heavy modifiers ("Eddie Yost, *a crackerjack, who was not a power hitter*, …"; Ferguson, 1983: 163), result expressions (*for* + noun "He throws *for* the out"; *to* + phrase "And he just keeps alive, reaching out *to* foul-tip one back"; Ferguson, 1983: 161), routines (e.g., giving the count: "One and one"; Ferguson, 1983: 166).

Conclusion

The list of types of spoken discourse taken into account here is in no way complete. Instead, our aim was to emphasize some critical points related to the problem of establishing the typology of spoken discourse, such as the limits and the indistinct boundary of all kinds of typology, and finally the priority of the functional or structural perspective.

Rather than trying to encourage a tolerant attitude conciliating both approaches, or to establish priorities between them, the old chicken and egg problem remains: how to decide which comes first? "The situation we're in (e.g., a committee meeting)? Or the language we use (our committee ways of talking and interacting)?" (Gee, 2003: 11). According to Gee, this reciprocal process through time is just the core of the magic property of language: "when we speak or write we craft what we have to say to *fit* the situation or context in which we are communicating. But, at the same time, how we speak or write *creates* that very situation or context" (Gee, 2003: 11).

See also: Class Language; Classroom Talk; Institutional Talk; Queer Talk; Understanding Spoken Discourse.

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Stylistics

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Definition and Domain

Stylistics is broadly and simply 'the study of style,' a concept that is widely known and used, but that is difficult to define and has many different shadings. What is certain, however, is that its essence is 'distinction,' 'variation,' or 'choice': in any language there is always more than one way of writing or speaking the same (sic) message, but with a different connotation or effect as a result. Stylistics as a discipline takes as its base this essential variation, whether at the level of phonology, grammar, lexis, semantics, or discourse. It differs from sociolinguistics, where style is seen as a variable within a continuously evolving sociolinguistic system, in being concerned with the functional significance of style. It characteristically deals with the interpretation of texts by focusing in detail on relevant distinctive linguistic features, patterns, structures, or levels and on their significance and effects on readers. It presupposes that every linguistic feature in a text has potential significance. It draws its terminology and models from various appropriate branches of linguistics, and one of the commonest collocations and metaphors associated with it is 'toolbox' or 'tool kit.' Since attention is predominantly text centered, stylistics could arguably be a branch of text linguistics; and since it uses linguistic frameworks, it could also be seen as a branch of applied linguistics. It is sometimes also called *literary stylistics or literary linguistics* (see, e.g., Fabb, 1997; Stockwell, 2000) because the most common kinds of texts traditionally analyzed have been literary. It could also be regarded as a branch of poetics, which is primarily concerned with the classification of the essential properties or conventions of genres, or theories of form. There is some overlap in usage, however, and in territory: there are stylistic studies of satire, parody, and humor, for instance.

Nonliterary discourse and varieties or registers are well within the scope of general stylistics or sociostylistics, and spoken as well as written; increasingly attention is being drawn cross-modally to media discourses such as those of film, news reporting, advertising, politics, and hypertexts and to the oral discourses of storytelling and song lyric. The term *linguistic stylistics* is sometimes found, which acknowledges the fact that some stylistic studies are as interested in providing insights into the workings of language and in testing the validity of linguistic models as they are in providing insights into how texts mean. However, it has to be said that a stylistic study of any merit will say as much about (the limitations of) the model as about the text under scrutiny.

Roger Fowler's term for stylistics was *linguistic criticism* (1986), reflecting not only the fact that primacy is assigned to language, but also that the goal of stylistic studies is not simply a mechanistic description of the formal features of texts for their own sake, whether phonological, grammatical, or lexical – a common myth about the early years of stylistics in Britain in the 1960s. Linguistic analysis, however objective or empirical, is no substitute for deductions and judgments. The aim is to find linguistic evidence for a critical judgment; to ground intuitions or hypotheses in a rigorous, methodical, and explicit textual basis; to produce an analysis that is verifiable. Fowler's term, *linguistic criticism,* also implicates stylistics with literary criticism and practical criticism, with their own focus on relating analysis to textual interpretation, but usually more broadly. A related term to Fowler's is *practical stylistics* (see Widdowson, 1992). Both literary criticism and stylistics can thus be seen as subdisciplines of hermeneutics, but stylistics is as much focused on *how* texts mean, as on *what* they mean, even though the goal may well be a specific literary-critical reading. Unlike literary critics, however, stylisticians must be concerned with language, and stylistics provides a metalanguage for principled and systematic discussion of it, in its concern also to avoid subjective or impressionistic judgments based on unverifiable intuitions. (Not that good literary criticism is vague or impressionistic).

Stylistics in Britain at least has tended to fight shy of evaluation, of what is good or bad style, possibly as a reaction against the prescriptivist Leavisite tradition of literary criticism and notions of the canon. Assessments are indeed made, but of the effectiveness or appropriateness of specific stylistic features to their perceived function or contribution to the totality of interpretation. Stylisticians have to be wary, however, of making oversimplistic iconic equations between language forms and functions or meanings (the so-called enactment fallacy), despite the characteristic symbiosis in poetry in particular between form and meaning. For, as Simpson rightly argues (2004: 2), linguistic features 'do not of themselves constitute a text's meaning', but act as a 'gateway' to its interpretation. It therefore follows that more than one interpretation is possible. In recent years it has certainly been the case that stylistics has developed a harder edge and engaged in critique. For example, many stylistic studies draw their frames of reference from critical theory (e.g., postcolonialism and the writings of Foucault on *discours*) and feminist stylistics is an important subbranch (see Mills, 1995). This has exposed areas of bias, inequality, and subjectivity where ethical issues can be raised. Very significantly, as a result of Roger Fowler's interest from the 1980s onward in critical linguistics, stylistics began to place emphasis on language and texts located and functioning in particular social, ideological, and political practices and has exposed linguistic ambiguity and obfuscation. So it has come increasingly to overlap with the Faircloughian critical discourse analysis (CDA), by which it has also been much influenced. But stylistics has always stressed the inseparability of form and content, which underpins the CDA approach, and the impossibility of a neutral or unmarked style. Deidre Burton's piece (1982) on the grammatical choices in Sylvia Plath's *The Bell Jar* could indeed be seen as a forerunner of CDA, in its argument for a radical stylistics that actually effects social change. In turn, CDA tends to use the 'tool kit' approach of stylistics as part of its methodology.

Stylistics in Academia

Because of its interface with many other different kinds of disciplines, stylistics tends to find itself both marginalized and appropriated at one and the same time in higher education in the United Kingdom. Stylisticians have tended to find themselves caught between a literature and linguistic divide that has been slow in narrowing. At the end of the 1970s the Poetics and Linguistics Association (PALA) was founded by a group of like-minded scholars (including Ronald Carter, Roger Fowler, Mick Short, and Katie Wales) to provide a common forum and to legitimize stylistics as a professional discipline. The name of the association was chosen to reflect Roman Jakobson's famous statement that "a linguist deaf to the poetic functions of language and a literary scholar indifferent to linguistics are equally flagrant anachronisms." By the end of the 20th century, PALA had grown worldwide, with an annual conference and its own international journal, *Language and Literature*, which produces an annual resume of the year's work in stylistics.

As a branch of applied linguistics, stylistics even today may or may not be studied in the United Kingdom as part of a linguistics degree; with an emphasis on literature, it may or may not be part of an English or modern languages degree, although increasingly it features as a component of courses introducing students to critical theories and practices for text analysis and most recently as a component of creative writing courses. In the future this will undoubtedly mean that more attention will be paid to the pragmatic evaluation of style and the rhetoric of composition. Stylistics is increasingly studied as part of an

English language degree, because of its popularity with English-speaking linguists researching aspects of English language, both synchronically and diachronically. English language degrees are themselves now flourishing as a result of the increased attention paid to English language studies in the last decades of the 20th century at the advanced level, and stylistics has accordingly found itself a receptive audience among secondary-level teachers and students of both language and literature.

The attraction of stylistics in the pedagogic context, namely that it combines a knowledge of the principles of language and usage with a critical interest in the interpretation of texts, has long been known outside the United Kingdom, in institutions and courses from Europe to Japan (e.g., those run by the British Council) where the language and literature of second languages, English in particular, are taught. The argument of those involved in pedagogical stylistics is that it enables students to be more aware of, and to be more explicit about, language features and use and at all levels of phonology, graphology, grammar, lexis, meaning, and discourse by providing them with an appropriate framework and vocabulary: the 'tool-kit.' It also helps students to be more independent in their judgments, by forming their own interpretations of literary texts based on close readings and to be more confident in articulating them. Some teachers believe that stylistics helps students to improve their own writing skills, as well as their reading skills, but empirical evidence for this is hard to find. The stylistics approach has always been very accessible, practical, and interactive, and publications in this area have focused on teaching materials (see, e.g., McRae, 1998; Widdowson, 1992). Rewriting exercises of the kind practiced in pedagogical stylistics (e.g., from prose to verse, changing perspective or focalization) have refreshingly found their way into United Kingdom textbooks like Rob Pope's (1995). With the increasing interest in English in China in recent decades, stylistics has become a major discipline; here as elsewhere, it has proved a staple of translation studies in both ancient and modern languages as well as English (see further Shen, 1995).

A Brief History of Stylistics

Already it can be seen that stylistics continually overspreads any firm discipline boundary because of its engagement with other related disciplines across the arts, humanities, and even social sciences. Historically this has resulted in what can be termed a paradigm shift, although many concepts and strategies remain central or are continually being reassessed or even revived.

It is difficult to pinpoint the exact beginning of stylistics, because of its probable multinational origins at different times. One major root lies in the earlier study of *elocutio* in Western and European rhetoric, concerned with stylistic devices and patterned language such as schemes and tropes, which still plays a significant part in the teaching of composition in higher education in the United States. Other aspects of rhetoric remain of significance (e.g., its concern with the skills of public speaking as a means of persuasion, as having an effect on the audience). A general interest in rhetoric has recently been revived from a cognitive stylistics perspective (see further later discussion). The term *stylistique* was introduced by Charles Bally (1909), a pupil of Ferdinand de Saussure, and interest spread across Europe aided by the work of Leo Spitzer in particular (1928, 1948). Spitzer's interest tended to be writer centered: style seen as revealing the soul of the writer, and with an aim to find the creative principle of the text (expressive stylistics). His concept of the *philological circle* has been more enduring and is characteristic of the stylistician's procedure still today: constantly and delicately moving between hypothesis, linguistic analysis of data, and critical explanation and aesthetic response, with a revised hypothesis if necessary. Later continental stylistics in France aligned itself with semiotics, narratology, and philosophy; in Germany it acquired a diachronic and nonliterary emphasis. (For useful summaries of preoccupations in present-day *Stilistik* in Germany, see Sowinski, 1999; for *la stylistique* in France, see Molinié, 1997.)

In the 1960s stylistics took hold in Britain and the United States, given impetus from developments in descriptive linguistics, particularly grammar. The United States led the way in international journals of stylistics, notably *Language and Style* and *Style*. Michael Halliday proved a key figure in Britain (and subsequently Australia), first of all with his scale and category grammar, and also his concept of register as a situational use of language. But it is his later systemic-functional model of grammar that persistently provides one of the most popular tools in stylistic analysis, because of its comprehensive set of lexico-grammatical categories that label mental processes, verbal and material actions and so are able to tackle full-length naturalistic texts more easily than a generative grammar. His idea of *transitivity* in particular also underpins many writings in feminist stylistics and CDA.

Early stylistic studies of the 1960s in Britain and the United States were much influenced by the newly discovered early 20th-century works of the Russian Formalists, the Prague School, and the writings on poetic language and meter by Roman Jakobson; and terms like *parallelism, norm, deviation,* and *foregrounding* entered the stylisticians' vocabulary (see van Peer, 1986 for the latter): concepts and terms recently revived with a cognitive slant by Cook (1994). Leech (1969) happily blended Formalism and *elocutio* in his schematic reassessment of patterned language and metaphor in poetry. There was certainly a tendency in the early days of stylistics, later corrected, to study poetic texts, particularly those showing a high degree of linguistic creativity or experimentation. Jakobson's notion of literariness was much debated and still is, although stylisticians today tend to agree with literary critics in seeing a continuum of literariness in language across nonliterary as well as literary discourses (whether high or noncanonical). They tend to argue also that cultural expectations about what makes a text literary are as highly significant as prototypical linguistic, metrical, and textual features. Nonetheless, there are those who would argue, in line with Jakobson's emphasis, that literary texts have a different social function from nonliterary texts (see Widdowson, 1975, 1992; Verdonk, 2002); and it is certainly the case that aesthetic uses of language remain of central interest in stylistics, and studies of poetic form and prosody provide a flourishing subbranch of the discipline.

At around the same time there was also a brief flirtation with generative grammar as a model, because of its then interest, for example, in deviation, by the violation of selection rules or by degrees of grammaticalness, particularly in modern poetic texts such as those by e. e. cummings. The inheritance of generative grammar, however, as indeed of Formalism, proved more robust in generative metrics and in later evolved studies of metrical form (see, e.g., Fabb, 1997).

From the outset in Britain stylistics tended not to be writer centered. Although concerned with the concept of *narrator,* it showed little interest in authorial intention, as in traditional literary criticism. Periodically, however, there has been interest in stylistic features that mark an author's *idiolect* or voice print across an oeuvre or in changes of style between early and later works or that indicate provenance, especially in computational stylistics and forensic stylistics, where cases of disputed authorship arise. There has also been an implicit awareness that any choice or selection of stylistic features must have been the author's. The concern in the 1960s and early 1970s was very much with the reification of the text as an artifact (formalist stylistics). One inheritance of this is the implicit assumption that the text under scrutiny is coherent and cohesive.

However, with the development in the 1970s of disciplines such as discourse analysis and pragmatics in linguistics on the one hand and reception aesthetics and reader-response criticism in literary theory on the other, stylistics shifted its focus to the text in its interactive discourse context (functional stylistics, discourse stylistics, or contextualized stylistics) and to the reader as constructing the meaning of the text, rather than as simply the decoder of a given message or single or eternal truth encoded by the writer. There was a more explicit recognition that the parameters of the situational context contributed to a text's meaning, and that therefore contextualization needs to be part of the theory or model. The writings of the Russian linguist-philosopher Mikhail Bakhtin, newly discovered and translated in the West, gave a refreshing boost in the 1980s to the study of the style and structure of prose fiction in a sociostylistic context and introduced the notion of *intertextuality*, texts and their voices in a creative dialogue with others. Prose fiction inevitably lent itself to macrodiscoursal approaches, such as *focalization* or *point of view* and *speech and thought presentation* (see Leech and Short, 1981), which continue today, aided by the advent of corpora for empirical testing and verification. However, stylisticians are still firmly committed to linking macrostructures to the micro, specific linguistic features, themselves. Burton (1980) led the way in the stylistic analysis of drama by applying a comprehensive discourse model matching fictive dialogues against real-life conversational practices. This was later followed in many studies by the application of pragmatic models of politeness and speech act theory. Herman (1995) remains the most comprehensive analysis of drama from different perspectives, recognizing that drama's discourse context is characteristically complex.

Certainly, in general, the awareness of context meant that a diachronic stylistics could valuably develop, matching trends in pragmatics, with a sensitivity to nuances of style and significance in texts grounded in a sociohistorical, rather than simply in an ahistorical context; and taking into account differences of reader or audience expectations from earlier periods (see, e.g., Adamson, 2000). A diachronic stylistics also looks at the historical development of significant stylistic devices, such as free indirect speech and thought. The increasing awareness in pragmatics also of the need to embrace a cross-cultural perspective, for example in politeness theory,

is influencing many studies in contrastive rhetoric, especially those embedded in English as a Foreign Language pedagogy and also drawing inspiration from the field of genre analysis.

Current Trends in Stylistics—and the Future?

Stylistics today is still broadly concerned with the creative negotiation of meaning and affect between texts, contexts, and readers, and this emphasis has been reinforced by developments not only in pragmatics, but also in cognitive linguistics. The 1990s saw an emerging interest in the application of relevance theory (relevance stylistics): phenomena such as poetic metaphors leading to extra interpretive effort on the part of the reader. In what is called cognitive stylistics, or cognitive poetics more generally, there is a strong interest in the actual reading **process** (rather than the end **product**) and how specific linguistic features or textual elements trigger a reader's understanding and the mental creation of the world of the text, especially in fiction (see Emmott, 1997; Werth, 1999); also in the understanding and processing of metaphors and the manipulation of prior mental schemas and frames of knowledge (see Semino and Culpeper, 2002). As with other strands of stylistics, the most interesting research tests the strength of the cognitive models much as illuminating the text under discussion. Cognitive linguistics in general breaks down the traditional binary opposition between *literal* and *figurative* meaning, which is appealing to stylisticians. In its history it has contested many such oppositions, inherited from the worldview of a Saussurian structuralism (e.g., *text* vs. *context*; *literary* vs. *nonliterary*; *mimesis* vs. *diegesis*).

Although a focus on process is to be welcomed, for the future, however, stylistics must continue to concern itself as much with the social, cultural, and historical contexts as the cognitive and take more notice of global discourse communities, rather than Anglocentric, in which texts are constructed and construed, and to the diverse nature of real readers and reading publics. Recent work at the University of Nottingham on spoken corpora under the direction of Ronald Carter has highlighted the creativity of ordinary speech, but there is also still a great need for the stylistic analysis of computer-enhanced large-scale corpora of a range of text and discourse types and from different periods and also for a stylistic perspective on lexical phenomena such as collocations and formulas in such corpora: all under the heading of a corpus stylistics. The new aesthetic multimodal genres of video games and Internet literature also await more attention. Literary theorists have long prophesied the replacement of the study of literature by cultural studies. Stylistics is well placed to move into the analysis of forms of cultural production other than written texts.

Conclusion

As this account of stylistics illustrates, Lecercle (1993) is right to state, on the one hand, that no one has probably ever known exactly what the term *stylistics* comprises, yet, on the other hand, that the discipline is forever being reborn. Those engaged in stylistics see this as a strength, as in other disciplines that continually reassess their models and theories, and they embrace its eclecticism with zeal. That there is no one way to do stylistics might be disconcerting to some. However, stylistics is no different from many other disciplines at the present day in that there is continual cross-fertilization of ideas across subject boundaries and the stretching of its own boundaries at the same time. And although models may change or vary, the fact remains that those stylistic studies that are the most illuminating provide scrupulous insights into both the workings of language and the interpretations of texts that remain plausible and convincing to new generations of readers.

See also: Critical Discourse Analysis; Literary Theory and Stylistics; Stylistics: Pragmatic Approaches.

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Stylistics: Pragmatic Approaches

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Introduction

Pragmatics is typically defined in contrast with semantics. While both semantics and pragmatics are concerned with meaning, semantics deals with abstract and relatively stable meanings within the linguistic system, and pragmatics concerns itself with variable aspects of meaning which are derivable from utterances within contexts of use. As such, pragmatics can be, and often is interpreted, as covering a wide range of contextual factors, including, for some researchers, aspects of sociolinguistics, conversational turn-taking and narrative structure (see Traugott and Pratt, 1980), and cognitive poetics (see Radwańka-Williams and Hiraga, 1995).

Mainstream pragmatics; however, tends to focus on one or more of four models of language in use: Grice's cooperative principle and conversational maxims, Austin's speech act theory, Brown and Levinson's politeness principle, and Sperber and Wilson's relevance theory. These models are all originally developed with reference to nonliterary uses of language. In literary stylistics, pragmatic approaches fall broadly into two areas. First, there are those that take a general contextualized approach to understanding the reading of literary texts. These approaches overlap to some extent with reader response theories, and are outlined in the section on wider literary reading contexts below. Second, there are those that use the particular pragmatic models mentioned above and apply them to literary texts, sometimes innovating on the complexities of problem solving and developing the models themselves, in order to account for literary communicative processes. Within this second area, there is a further distinction to be made between work that applies the pragmatic models to examples of communicative interaction between fictional participants in literary texts, and work that addresses the nature of the interaction between writer and reader. Some work addresses both of these communicative situations, and indeed views the complexity of embedded interactions as characteristic of the literary text. Examples of the application of specific pragmatic models are outlined here in the sections on speech act theory, Grice's pragmatics, and politeness. The stylistic applications of relevance theory are discussed in a separate entry, and so are not considered here.

Speech Act Theory

In speech act theory, an utterance is defined as an illocutionary act with recognizable syntactic form. In addition, the utterance has a locutionary force relating to the intention of the speaker, and an effect on the hearer. Speech acts, according to the theory,

fall into various categories such as representatives (i.e., stating what is believed to be a fact), verdictives (evaluating an event or situation), commissives (i.e., promising), declarations (bringing about a state of affairs, i.e., marrying). At different stages of its development, the theory has posited different sets of categories; and those given here are just a few examples. An important difference between types of speech acts is that some are truth conditional, and others simply have appropriateness conditions (also known as felicity conditions). Representatives are typically truth conditional in that the speaker is committing to the truth of his/her assertion, while declarations depend for their success on certain contextual factors; the declaration, 'I now pronounce you man and wife' is only valid if uttered in culturally appropriate circumstances by a person invested with the authority to marry.

In various pragmatic accounts of literature, a central concern is to define literature as what seems to be a rather a peculiar type of speech act; fiction appears to make assertions, but clearly without truth conditions. Austin himself claimed that his theory did not apply to "non-serious uses of language" such as poetry (see Levin, 1976). This view was elaborated by Searle (1979; see also Genette, 1990) and provoked a heated debate with deconstructionist critical theorists, who saw his characterization of literature as 'parasitic' upon the 'normal' use of language as a fundamental theoretical flaw (see Derrida, 1988; Rabinowitz, 1995). Others have taken a more constructive view, arguing that speech act theory can be developed in relation to literary communication.

Van Dijk (1976) does this by introducing the notion of speaker-hearer possible worlds, or S-worlds, which are relative, in terms of their truth conditions, to the individual speaker or hearer. The illocutionary force of the speaker is thus to change the S-world(s) of the hearer, but in literature there is a range of possible interpretations from which the hearer chooses the one that best matches his/her S-worlds. Literary speech acts, in van Dijk's view, do not function as acts whose intended outcomes are practical changes, but simply give access to the writer's S-worlds in the same way as saying how you feel or telling a joke might result in shared feelings and evaluations.

Levin (1976) discusses Ohmann's (1971, 1973) notion that literary utterances are mimetic of non-literary utterances, allowing the reader to construct a fictional situation that to some degree resembles his/her experience of reality. Levin, clearly influenced by generative grammar, goes further than Ohmann in proposing a higher-level implicit sentence in the deep structure of poems that announces its overarching illocutionary force of constructing a fictional world.

The deep structure of the first line of Yeats's poem *Byzantium* is, for Levin, '[I imagine myself in and invite you to conceive a world in which I ask you] What shall I do with this absurdity?' with the words in parentheses omitted in the surface structure of the poem. Levin also suggests that literary features such as meter, rhyme, assonance, etc., in the poetic locutionary act signal the unusual nature of its illocutionary force.

Traugott and Pratt (1980) also take a speech act approach to the literary text, based in part on Pratt's earlier book (Pratt, 1977), giving an overview of work in this area, and like Levin and Ohmann, arguing that literary speech acts are mimetic of non-literary speech acts. They offer several possibilities for the illocutionary force of the literary speech act, such as the intention to give pleasure, to establish shared understanding and values, to teach, and conclude by suggesting that literature allows for many communicative functions. Further detail of the aspects of their approach based in Pratt's earlier work is given in the following section.

Grice's Pragmatics

The aspects of Grice's theory relevant to this discussion concern his model of conversational interaction as dependent upon a cooperative principle along with four conversational maxims. According to this model, speakers and hearers in successful conversational exchanges engage in cooperative behavior that is manifested by adhering to, and trusting that the other participant is adhering to the maxims of quality, quantity, relation, and manner. The maxim of quality requires that a speaker should assert only what she or he believes to be true. The maxim of quantity involves giving just the right amount of information for the purpose of the utterance, neither too much nor too little. The maxim of relation requires us to use appropriate utterances relevant to the preceding discourse, and the maxim of manner requires us to give separate pieces of information in a clear and helpful order. Of course, people do not always behave cooperatively in conversations, and according to Grice, the cooperative principle breaks down when participants fail to adhere to, or violate the maxims. Violating the maxim of quality, for example, results in lying. Even when the cooperative principle is upheld, the maxims can be flouted for particular effects. Metaphor and irony, for example, are said to flout the maxim of quality, giving rise to certain implicatures (implications discernibly intended by the speaker).

Pratt (1977), also summarized in Traugott and Pratt (1980), suggests that in the literary text, the

cooperative principle is relaxed, and that this relaxation is enabled by the use of fictional characters and implied narrators (distinct from authors) as speakers. Referring to the third and fourth sentence of *Tristram Shandy*, Pratt reveals that Shandy's utterances violate all four of the maxims in numerous ways, implicating the author's intention to amuse the reader by enacting the ramblings of an uncooperative speaker. In another example, Pratt discusses Benjy, the retarded narrator of *The sound and the fury*, describing a game of golf in barely recognizable terms. Benjy's narrative fails to give enough information, and lacks indication of causal relationships between events. Pratt reads this as leading to an implicature on the part of Faulkner to the effect that Benjy's (or such people's) perspective is interesting because it is so different from our own.

Politeness

Brown and Levinson's (1987) model of politeness was developed to complement Grice's pragmatics, and to account for utterances which appear to violate the cooperative principle although participants still appear to be engaged in cooperative behavior. Some violations of the maxim of quality, for example, involve lying to avoid being rude to a hearer, and indirect requests similarly seem to violate the maxim of manner in order to avoid causing offence with a more direct equivalent. In this model, Brown and Levinson invoke the notions of positive and negative face. In polite exchanges, participants attend to positive face needs by attempting to meet one another's desires, and attend to negative face needs by not impeding or imposing on these desires. Departures from the conventions of the politeness principle involve what are termed face-threatening acts. Just as adhering to the politeness principle might involve violating the cooperative principle, performing a face-threatening act might conform to the cooperative principle. The two principles might operate in tandem, but will often require different verbal behaviors.

Simpson (1989) makes use of the cooperative principle in an analysis of Ionesco's play *The lesson*. His argument is less to do with what Ionesco might be communicating through the use of stage characters than with the use of politeness strategies as indicators of character construction and development. He discusses the interaction between two characters, a professor and his pupil, who meet for the first time early in the play. Tracing their conversations through the acts, Simpson shows that the professor begins as a diffident character and gradually becomes dominant in the relationship, while the pupil, who makes a confident start, becomes passive. These changes are signaled primarily through their linguistic exchanges;

the professor, for example, hedges and apologizes at the beginning of the relationship, but by the end is performing 'bald on record' face-threatening acts.

Leech (1992) takes a similar approach, using politeness theory in an analysis of Shaw's play, *You never can tell*, focusing in particular on the conflicting requirements of the cooperative and politeness principles, and examining the characters' attempts to resolve these conflicts in various ways, often to comic effect. Other uses of politeness theory in analyses of literary texts include works of Sell (1991b), Herman (1995), Kopytko (1995), and Lafuente Millán (2000).

Wider Literary Reading Contexts

Other pragmatic approaches address wider questions about the literary text and the literary reading process, making less use of the traditional pragmatic models, but still insisting on an attention to context and literary function as necessary to any explanation of literature. In several of these approaches explicit reference is made to literary pragmatics as a discipline that seeks to restore the significance of context in literary linguistics, and the consideration of works of literature as communicative acts, following the decontextualizing trends of New Criticism and the antiintentionalist ethos of late 20th-century critical theory, (see Sell, 1991a; Engler, 1991; McGann, 1991); Engler (1991), for example, rejects what he sees as one type of pragmatic approach to texts, which assumes determinate readings and commonality of readers' experiences, and privileges authorial intention, but he also rejects literary theoretical notions of interpretive communities (Fish, 1980) determining the direction of interpretation, arguing instead for a focus on the 'collaborative nature of textuality.' Lecercle (1999) sees the literary reading process as one that self-consciously raises questions about interpretation, arguing that reading itself *is* a kind of pragmatics.

How Literary Texts Work

Much of contemporary literary pragmatics is concerned to define literature as having a special functional and communicative status, yet at the same time operating on principles recognizably similar to those of nonliterary discourses. In this sense, a range of broadly pragmatic work approaches the literary text with the same questions as the speech act theorists of literature discussed earlier, but without recourse to the speech act model.

Van Peer (1991) introduces the notion of the homiletical texts and discourse, which occur outside of institutional situations. Literature, in van Peer's view, along with other texts and discourses,

is homiletical, and is therefore functionally vague. Homiletical texts generally have one or two of three characteristics: they are reflective, socially cohesive, or entertaining. Literary texts can be defined as having all three of these characteristics, and this combination, along with its homiletical status is what makes literature unique.

Generic conventions are pragmaticized in Chapman and Routledge (1999) by using the idea that readers entertain a set of presuppositions in approaching different types of fiction; for example, detective fiction. Just as in other nonfictional types of discourse, presuppositions can fail. Presupposition failure in a conversation between friends might lead to communicative problems, and will probably violate truth conditions; 'My dog needs a walk,' existentially presupposes that I have a dog, and violates truth conditions if I do not. In literature, on the other hand, Chapman and Routledge argue there is 'greater pragmatic flexibility,' allowing for generic deviations from normative sets of presuppositions for communicative effect. Paul Auster's postmodern novel *City of glass* is said to do this in various ways; for example, in manipulating narrative point of view, blurring the distinction between narrator and author and thus problematizing the notion of identity in a manner that would not be possible in nonliterary discourse.

What Literary Readers Do

The other side of the contextual question involves the role of the reader and the act of interpretation. Most work in this area challenges the notion that a text is simply a set of linguistic structures available to any reader able to decode them, and explores interpretive variability and the contextual factors influencing individual interpretations.

An example of this approach is Verdonk (1991), where the concern is with poetry as an act of communication that cannot only be determined by its form. The contexts relevant in a reading of a poem include, for Verdonk, the broad cultural environment of its reading, and the reader's knowledge of literary conventions and literary form. Formal features of literary language such as parallelism and deviation are said here to trigger pragmatic processing, but the direction of this processing will be determined by its context. For a more specific and localized account of the relationship between linguistic form and interpretation, see Alonso's (1995) analysis of responses to a short story by Katherine Mansfield.

The reader's cultural environment is a significant contextual factor in the interpretation of literary texts. A detailed account of culturally influenced reading is given in Ben-Porat (1991), with reference to Israeli readers' interpretations of a 12th-century poem that describes a city of beauty and grandeur,

without naming the city as Jerusalem. Ben-Porat shows how Israeli students given an unseen exercise on the poem easily interpret the reference to Jerusalem, in spite of a rather different experience of the contemporary city. Their readings are attributable to a culturally constructed concept of the city, shaped, in part, by descriptions in other works of literature.

Avant-garde, modernist, and postmodern texts, in which forms and conventions, including linguistic forms, are manipulated to an extent not usually encountered in nonliterary contexts, pose a challenge to the reader of literature. The interpretation of these texts also holds particular interest for the literary pragmaticist. Enkvist (1991), for example, considers more experimental literary texts, such as Dadaist poems, which defy interpretation in the deviation from recognizable linguistic form. He suggests that these genres are simply the endpoint of a literary function which aims to maximize the work entailed in the reading process. For Enkvist, most utterances involve intelligibility (linguistic well-formedness), comprehensibility, and interpretability, but literature, to varying degrees, prioritizes interpretability, sometimes at the expense of the other two factors. The successful reader of literature is able to construct a text world that makes some sense in spite of this difficulty, and the literary text thus gives rise to aesthetic tension.

Conclusion

The examples of pragmatic approaches to literature given here show that the range and purpose of literary pragmatics is wide. Some approaches take the technical apparatus of nonliterary pragmatics as a starting point, arguing that, with some adjustments, a case can be made for considering literary texts in terms of speech act theory, the cooperative principle and the politeness principle. Others abandon the pragmatic models altogether, but still aim to characterize literary effects with reference to literary function and the literary reading process. A central feature in all of the work is its attempt to establish literary works as acts of communication that relate, sometimes obliquely, to acts of communication in nonliterary discourses.

See also: Cooperative Principle; Literary Pragmatics; Politeness; Pragmatics: Overview; Relevance Theory; Semantics-Pragmatics Boundary; Speech Acts.

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Syntax–Pragmatics Interface: Overview

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Conflicting Priorities

Since the inception of generative grammar, formally oriented researchers have been aware of the significance of pragmatic factors for adequately describing/theorizing about the domain of syntax. Morgan (1975) and Gazdar (1980), for example, pointed to the inescapable pragmatic influence on sentence structure. This dependency of syntax on pragmatics, however, had largely been ignored by generative syntacticians for quite some time because they had been preoccupied by their quest for universal grammar. In contrast to this, functionally oriented thinkers considered communicative demands to be the primary motivation for grammar. Reflecting this state of affairs, there have been two general, major approaches to the syntax–pragmatics interface. The first is syntactico-centrism, which relegates pragmatics

to the status of a secondary linguistic system, excluded from the self-contained syntactic component (or grammar in general). The second approach is pragmatico-centrism, which relegates syntax to a derivative role and makes pragmatics central. However, a third approach, the syntax–pragmatics alliance, in which different degrees or depths of interaction between syntax and pragmatics are accommodated, has resurfaced recently, in particular from within the generative orientation.

Interface in Retrospect

The Centrality of Syntax

Proponents of syntactico-centrism are Gazdar and Klein (1977), Chomsky (1986), and Carston (1998). These researchers were agnostic about the exact nature of the interaction between syntax and pragmatics (especially the actual mechanisms involved) and treated pragmatics as a postgrammatical filter. Gazdar and Klein allocated a placeholder in the syntactic structure, to be filled with an extragrammatical pragmatic condition to determine the acceptability of the structure. Chomsky (1986) included pragmatics (use of language) as one agendum of linguistic inquiry, but considered the elucidation of language structure (knowledge of language) and its acquisition as having priority status. Carston designated pragmatics as supplying a selection criterion for a particular sentential structure from a set of sentences with equivalent truth conditions (for example, *A dog bit you/You were bitten by a dog/It was a dog that bit you*). The criterion is based on the amount of 'processing effort' in the sense of Relevance Theory (Sperber and Wilson, 1986; *see* **Relevance Theory**).

The Centrality of Pragmatics

Pragmatico-centrism is represented by Givón (1979) and Hopper (1987). Givón considered that loose, paratactic pragmatic discourse structures (the pragmatic mode) gave rise to tight, grammaticalized syntactic structures (the syntactic mode). The differences between the two are illustrated by the following (nonexhaustive) opposing characteristics: (1) topic-comment versus subject-predicate structure, (2) loose conjunction versus tight subordination, (3) slow versus fast rate of delivery, (4) word-order-based on old/new information versus case functions, and (5) absence versus elaborate use of grammatical morphemes. The opposing pairs are mirrored by the disparities observed between pidgins versus creoles, child versus adult language, and informal versus formal speech. To the extent that the first members

of these pairs are considered to be 'prior,' the primacy of the pragmatic mode is justified. Even more radical is Hopper, who claimed that grammar is 'emergent' in the sense that discourse gives rise to and shapes structure (or regularity) as an ongoing process. An emergent structure is neither determined nor fixed – it is constantly open and in flux. In this view, grammar is simply a name given to certain categories of observed repetitions in discourse.

Classical Attempts at Syntax–Pragmatics Integration

Classical variants of the syntax-pragmatics alliance are the proposals by Ross (1970) and Gordon and Lakoff (1971). Ross suggested that on top of a declarative sentence, there is an extra layer of syntactic projection with a phonetically empty speech act verb taking a null subject (speaker) and object (addressee), as shown in **Figure 1**. His performative hypothesis was an attempt to represent pragmatic aspects as syntactic constituents. However, as is well known, Ross's approach fails to distinguish the following two sentences in terms of truth conditions: *John laughed* (a contingent fact) and *I claim that John laughed* (true when uttered). With the recent development of more elaborate syntactic apparatuses, Ross's idea has been reincarnated, as described in the next section.

Gordon and Lakoff (1971), who employed conversational postulates as a component for a transderivational rule. To derive (1) *why paint your house purple?* from (2) *why do you paint your house purple?*, the conversational postulate 'Unless you have some good reason for doing x, you should not do x' is supposed to be entailed by the logical structure of (2), a class of contexts, and a set of conversational postulates. Their approach was an attempt to constrain

Figure 1   Ross's performative hypothesis: In a declarative sentence, there is an extra layer of syntactic projection with a phonetically empty speech act verb taking a null subject (speaker) and object (addressee).

syntactic derivation pragmatically. According to Green (2004), Gordon and Lakoff confused a speaker's intentions and beliefs with semantic matters of truth. Although it is true that the contextual use-interpretation relation associated with a linguistic form is dependent on the speaker's and addressee's beliefs and intentions about one another's beliefs and intentions, Gordon and Lakoff's approach obscured this aspect.

Pulling All That Together

Syntactico-centrists do not at all deny the relevance of pragmatics for syntax; the interaction between syntax and pragmatics is simply not a central concern for them. But why not? (See Newmeyer, 1998). Also, as suggested by Givón (1995), pragmatico-centrists need to take syntactic structure seriously. After all, some items of the pragmatic mode are made available courtesy of **syntactic** mechanisms assembling constituents in accordance with some ordering or combinatory criteria. Because syntax and pragmatics interact with, influence, and complement one another, it would be desirable if we could devise ways to synthesize the two. Recent attempts at achieving such a goal are illustrated in the next section.

Interface Now: The Syntax–Pragmatics Alliance Revisited

Functional Categories and Pragmatics

With the advent of functional categories in the Chomskyan Principles and Parameters framework (e.g., Agr and D heads projecting AgrP and DP), a path was cleared for the inclusion of abstract syntactic elements in a structural description. Researchers investigating languages with topic-focus structures quickly embraced the creation of pragmatically oriented functional categories (such as Focus Phrase), which opened up possibilities for describing languages, such as Hungarian, that had evaded a rigid English-centered theoretical mold (e.g., Horvath, 1985; Kiss, 1995; see also Szendröi, 2004).

The invention of pragmatically oriented functional heads (as seen, e.g., by Cinque, 1999) soon came to include **syntactic** projections for speech act (**sa**), evaluativity (**eval**), and evidentiality (**evid**) (Speas and Tenny, 2003). As an example embodying such a neoperformative hypothesis, compare **Figure 2**, which represents a declarative sentence structure projected by the **sa** head. The pragmatic roles, Speaker (the 'agent' of a speech act), Utterance Content (the 'theme'), and Hearer (the 'goal'), are not primitives but defined structurally: Speaker c-commands state of

Figure 2 The neoperformative hypothesis: A declarative sentence structure is projected by the speech act head (sa, speech act; sa*, 'lower shell' structure of the SaP. SaP, speech act projection). Adapted from Speas and Tenny (2003).

Figure 3 A syntactic transformation deriving an interrogative structure from the declarative structure.

knowledge within utterance content, making Speaker the locus of the point of view. From the declarative structure, a syntactic transformation derives an interrogative structure, as shown in **Figure 3**. Hearer is now the closest c-commander for state of knowledge and the point of view is attributed to Hearer. Imperative and subjunctive **sa** structures are shown in **Figures 4** and **5** respectively.

The motivation for such speech act projections (SaPs) is the fact that languages, out of many possible illocutionary acts, grammaticalize only up to five or six distinct types. More significantly, there appear to be agreement-like phenomena involving Speaker and Hearer, for example, the Arabic complementizer '*inna* and the morpheme *nuwa* in Mupun (Mwaghavul), respectively.

What is peculiar about SaPs is the lack of correspondence between actual speech acts and the particular, syntactically defined speech act structures. Thus, the Utterance Content of any syntactic type (*modulo*

Figure 4   A syntactic structure for an imperative sentence.

Figure 5   A syntactic structure for a subjunctive sentence.

the choice of tense) can, in principle, be embedded under a given SaP, and its speech act property is determined by the SaP's configurational characteristics. Because, for example, Speas and Tenny recognized the multifunctionality (claim, promise, request, etc.) of the declarative SaP, they needed but lacked an additional interpretive mechanism to determine the **actual** speech act type of the SaP.

Let us consider the following direct/rhetorical question: *Who can defeat Godzilla?* Embedding this within either the interrogative or declarative SaP structure seems to superficially guarantee the desired interpretations. Why, then, can the imperative sentence, *(you) beware of Godzilla!*, not be subjunctive (since both are [-finite])? The difference between the two seems to hinge on their pragmatically determined conventional use. This means that, to obtain proper embedding of Utterance Content within an SaP structure, the speech act type of Utterance Content needs to be determined **prior to** such embedding. That seems to render the pragmatic relevance of SaP structures questionable. Speas and Tenny appeared to be

preoccupied with a narrow range of pragmatico-syntactic phenomena (e.g., agreement, point of view, etc.); also, they seemed to be hampered by their **exclusive** reliance on syntactic concepts, from which pragmatic notions are **unidirectionally** obtained as derivatives.

An Inclusive Theory of Grammar and Pragmatics

Another way to implement the syntax-pragmatics alliance is by employing what Fukushima (2002) called an "inclusive theory of grammar," such as a framework like Head-Driven Phrase Structure Grammar (HPSG) (see Pollard and Sag, 1994; Sag *et al.*, 2003). Here, grammar is a collection of linguistic constraints on lexical and nonlexical linguistic signs (words and phrases), expressed via feature structures (with FEATURE-value pairs). The linguistic constraints are **both** grammatical (phonology, category, and content) **and** pragmatic (context). An example of such a set of constraints or properties is the lexical sign *John* in **Figure 6.** The sign *John* satisfies the following constraints: It is a noun (syntax), used to refer to a third-person singular referent (semantics), who bears the name *John* (pragmatics). (The shared structures are indicated in **Figure 6** by [1], showing the identity of feature values.) In such a feature structure, linguistic constraints are imposed on linguistic signs **simultaneously** and **nondirectionally**. No privilege, for example, is given to syntactic over pragmatic information.

Let us see how such a framework can be called on to handle speech acts. The illocutionary force of warning, for example, is rendered as in **Figure 7.** It says that a linguistic sign with the phonological shape [1] can be uttered by a speaker [2] to an addressee [3]. This is done in order to bring about a state of affairs in which the speaker's uttering [1] to the addressee results in the addressee's becoming aware of a danger, originating from some unspecified element [4]. Thus, the same technical apparatus both is used as a grammatical description and serves to elucidate illocutionary conditions.

Based on this, we can account for the behavior of lexical items with restricted syntactic distribution, such as the verb *beware*: *Beware of Godzilla!* and *I want you to beware of Godzilla* but not **I'm confident I'll beware of Godzilla.* As part of its lexical definition, *beware* makes reference to the pragmatic condition on warning in **Figure 7**, as indicated in **Figure 8.** The lexical definition tells us that *beware* is a verb that is used uninflected and takes two arguments, NP[3] and PP[5]. The subject [3] watches out for the object [5], and the speaker [2] believes that the object endangers the subject.

An extended version of HPSG simultaneously accommodates constructional (syntactic), clausality (semantic), and illocutionary (pragmatic) aspects of sentences (Ginzburg and Sag, 2000; Ginzburg *et al.*, 2003, the latter another instance of the neo-performative hypothesis) and allows us to solve our previous question-imperative dilemma. First, the *illocutionary-relation* type *ask-relation* is normally associated with a *clausality* type *question*. Given that there is no contextual infelicity, the direct question is simply a question. Second, the *illocutionary-relation* type *assert-relation* is normally associated with the *clausality* type *proposition*. One illocutionary condition (similar to **Figure** 7) that is associated with the direct question construction allows it to

be a rhetorical question. With that, a conversational implicature (in BACKGROUND) – arising from the fact that uttering the direct question (*ask-relation*) in a given context is insincere – helps establish a new connection between the *illocutionary-relation* type *assert-relation* and the clausality type *question*, overriding the default association between *ask-relation* and *question* (*see* **Implicature**). In contrast, no illocutionary condition would allow the imperative construction (of the *clausality* type *outcome*) to be compatible with subjunctive use. This type of account is available due to the inclusiveness of the HPSG architecture, in which grammatical information and pragmatic information can be brought together and synthesized under a single structural representation.

Summary

A syntactic theory that claims to be a viable basis for explaining language use in real time cannot avoid the issue of the syntax–pragmatics interface. After some 30 years of neglect, attempts have now resumed to identify the proper ways of approaching the problems existing in this domain (although so far, no definitive conclusions have been reached). Such attempts need to consider (nonexhaustively) questions regarding

Figure 6 An inclusive theory of grammar: The lexical sign *John* as a set of constraints.

Figure 7 The illocutionary force of warning; SOA (state of affairs) is roughly equivalent to a proposition, and ref-intend is shorthand for the sequence of predicates *intend-recognize-intend-believe*. Adapted from Green (2000).

Figure 8 The lexical definition of *beware*. Adapted from Green (2000).

(1) ways of representing pragmatic information in conjunction with a structural description; (2) ways of accommodating the psycholinguistic properties of language processing, in particular incrementalness and speed; and (3) the adequacy of the performative hypothesis (see Kühnlein *et al.*, 2003b).

See also: Cooperative Principle; Implicature; Pragmatic Determinants of What Is Said; Pragmatic Presupposition; Relevance Theory; Speech Act Verbs; Speech Acts and Grammar; Speech Acts, Classification and Definition; Speech Acts.

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Systemic Theory

M A K Halliday

Origins of Systemic Theory

Systemic, or systemic–functional, theory has its origin in the main intellectual tradition of European linguistics that developed following the work of Saussure. Like other such theories, both those from the mid-twentieth century (e.g., Prague school; French functionalism) and more recent work in the same tradition (e.g., that of Hagège), it is functional and semantic rather than formal and syntactic in orientation, takes the text rather than the sentence as its object, and defines its scope by reference to usage rather than grammaticality. Its primary source was the work of J. R. Firth and his colleagues in London. As well as on other schools of thought in Europe such as glossematics, it also draws on American anthropological linguistics, and on traditional and modern linguistics, and on traditional and modern linguistics as developed in China.

Its immediate source is as a development of scale and category grammar. The name 'systemic' derives from the term 'system,' in its technical sense as defined by Firth (1957); system is the theoretical representation of paradigmatic relations, contrasted with 'structure' for syntagmatic relations. In Firth's system–structure theory, neither of these is given priority; and in scale and category grammar this perspective was maintained. In systemic theory the system takes priority; the most abstract representation at any level is in paradigmatic terms. Syntagmatic organization is interpreted as the 'realization' of paradigmatic features.

This step was taken by Halliday in the early 1960s so that grammatical and phonological representations could be freed from constraints of structure. Once such representations were no longer localized, they could function prosodically wherever appropriate. The shift to a paradigmatic orientation added a dimension of depth in time, so making it easier to relate language 'in use' to language being learnt; and it enabled the theory to develop both in reflection and in action – as a resource both for understanding and for intervening in linguistic processes. This potential was exploited in the work done during the 1960s on children's language development from birth through their various stages of schooling.

Systems and Their Realization

The organizing concept of a systemic grammar is that of choice (that is, options in 'meaning potential'; it does not imply intention). A system is a set of options together with a condition of entry, such that if the entry condition is satisfied one option, and one only, must be chosen; for example, in English grammar, [system] 'mood,' [entry condition] finite clause, [options] indicative/imperative. The option selected in one system then serves as the entry condition to another; e.g., [entry condition] indicative, [options] declarative/interrogative; hence all systems deriving from a common point of origin (e.g., [clause]) are agnate and together form a 'system network.' At the present stage of development, system networks for English grammar in computational form contain about 800 systems. An entry condition may involve the conjunction of different options; hence a system network is not a taxonomic structure but has the form of a lattice.

The system has one further component, namely the 'realization statement' that accompanies each option. This specifies the contribution made by that option to the structural configuration; it may be read as a proposition about the structural constraints associated

with the option in question. Realization statements are of seven types:

1. 'Insert' an element (e.g., insert subject);
2. 'Conflate' one element with another (e.g., conflate subject with theme);
3. 'Order' an element with respect to another, or to some defined location (e.g., order finite auxiliary before subject);
4. 'Classify' an element (e.g., classify process as mental: cognition);
5. 'Split' an element into a further configuration (e.g., split mood into subject + finite);
6. 'Preselect' some feature at a lower rank (e.g., preselect nominal group: human collective); and
7. 'Lexify' an element (e.g., lexify subject: *it*).

When paths are traced through a system network, a 'selection expression' is formed consisting of all the options taken up in the various functional components. As the network is traversed, options are inherited, together with their realizations; at the same time, new realization statements continue to figure throughout. The selection expression constitutes the grammar's description of the item (e.g., the particular clause so specified); it is also, by reference to the network, the representation of its systemic relationship to other items in the language – since the grammar is paradigmatic, describing something 'consists in' locating it with respect to the rest (showing its total lineage of agnate forms).

Other Basic Concepts

Systemic theory retains the concepts of 'rank,' 'realization,' and 'delicacy' from scale and category grammar. 'Rank' is constituency based on function, and hence 'flat,' with minimal layering; 'delicacy' is variable paradigmatic focus, with ordering from more general to more delicate; 'realization' (formerly 'exponence') is the relation between the 'strata,' or levels, of a multistratal semiotic system – and, by analogy, between the paradigmatic and syntagmatic phases of representation within one stratum. But in systemic theory, realization is held distinct from 'instantiation,' which is the relation between the semiotic system (the 'meaning potential') and the observable events, or 'acts of meaning,' by which the system is constituted.

The shift to a paradigmatic orientation led to the finding that the content plane of a language is organized in a small number of functionally defined components which Halliday labeled 'metafunctions.' According to this theory the grammar of natural languages evolved in simultaneously (a) 'construing' human experience (the 'experiential' metafunction)

and (b) 'enacting' interpersonal relationships (the 'interpersonal' metafunction), both these being underpinned by (c) the resources of (commonsense) logic (the 'logical' metafunction; (a) and (c) are grouped together as 'ideational'). The stratal role of the lexicogrammar lies in mapping these semantic components into a unitary construct, one that is capable of being linearized; in doing this, the grammar (d) 'creates' its own parallel universe in the form of discourse (the 'textual' metafunction). These metafunctions define the dimensions of semantic space; and since they tend to be realized by different structural resources – experiential meanings segmentally, interpersonal meanings prosodically, logical meanings in iterative structures, and textual meanings in wave-like patterns – they also determine the topological formations that are characteristic of human speech.

A systemic grammar is therefore 'functional' is three distinct though related senses:

1. Its 'explanations' are functional: both the existence of grammar (why grammar evolved as a distinct stratum), and the particular forms that grammars take, are explained in terms of the functions that language evolved to serve.
2. Its 'representations' are functional: a structure is an organic configuration of functions, rather than a tree with nodes labeled as classes.
3. Its 'applications' are functional: it developed as an adjunct to practices associated with language use, requiring sensitivity to functional variation in language ('register' variation). These considerations both relate it to, and at the same time distinguish it from other functional theories.

Other Features of the Theory

Like the Firthian linguistics from which it evolved, systemic theory is oriented towards language as social process; the individual is construed intersubjectively, through engagement in social acts of meaning. This is not incompatible with a cognitive perspective, which has been adopted in some systemic work (notably Fawcett 1980); but it does rule out any claim for 'psychological reality.' Halliday formulated this general stance as 'language as social semiotic,' thereby also locating systemic theory in the thematic context of semiotics, defined as the study of systems and processes of meaning. The relation between language and other sociocultural phenomena is then modeled on that of realization (the perspective here is Firthian rather than Hjelmslevian): language 'realizes' culture in the way that, within language, sound realizes wording, and the realization of wording in sound, in its turn, realizes meaning.

It follows from this that systemic theory gives prominence to discourse, or 'text'; not – or not only – as evidence for the system, but valued, rather, as constitutive of the culture. The mechanism proposed for this constitutive power of discourse has been referred to as the 'metafunctional hookup': the hypothesis that (a) social contexts are organic–dynamic configurations of three components, called 'field,' 'tenor,' and 'mode': respectively, the nature of the social activity, the relations among the interactants, and the status accorded to the language (what is going on, who are taking part, and what they are doing with their discourse); and (b) there is a relationship between these and the metafunctions such that these components are construed, respectively, as experiential, as interpersonal, and as textual meanings. Register, or functional variation in language, is then interpreted as systemic variation in the relative prominence (the probability of being taken up) of different options within these semantic components.

In fact such register variation (spoken/written, commonsense/technical, transactional/expository, . . . and so on) lies on the continuum between system and text; the characteristic of systemic work is that it brings all parts of this continuum under focus of attention. Analogously, it encompasses both speaker and listener perspectives (in computational terms, text generation, and parsing – there are, for example, no nonrecoverable operations such as deletion), and both synoptic and dynamic orientations; and uniquely among current theories, it assigns as much value to interpersonal and textual meaning as to ideational. On the other hand, in other respects systemic work is notably ill-balanced; there has been little study of morphology and phonology, and a disproportionate amount of research relates to English. These reflect on the one hand the contexts of its own development, especially the kinds of application for which it has been sought out; and on the other hand its requirement of comprehensiveness, demanding a coverage which is at once both broad and deep.

Development of Systemic Theory

The outlines of systemic theory were formulated in London in the 1960s by Halliday together with Huddleston, Hudson, and others, and others, and in application to Bernstein's work by Hasan, Mohan, and Turner; other significant input came from the application of systemic concepts in curriculum development work, in the analysis of scientific writings and of natural conversation, and in descriptions of a number of Asian and African languages. The theory was further developed in the 1970s: by Fawcett, Berry, and Butler in the UK; by Halliday and Hasan in Australia; and by Gregory and his colleagues in Toronto. Since 1980 systemic work has expanded considerably in various directions (artificial intelligence, child language development, discourse analysis and stylistics, and language education). It is typical of systemic practice that major extensions both to description and to theory have taken place in these 'applied' contexts; for example, the very large systemic grammars of English that now exist in computational form (PENMAN 'Nigel'; COMMUNAL), and the extensive studies of children's writing and of the language of educational texts in science, history, and other subjects that have been carried out by Martin and his colleagues in contexts such as the New South Wales Disadvantaged Schools Program.

Since 1980, further studies have been devoted to languages other than English, notably Chinese (Fang; Hu; Long; McDonald; Ouyang; Zhang; Zhao; Zhu), French (Caffarel), Indonesian (Sutjaja; Wirnani), and Tagalog (Martin); and work in text generation has begun to take in Chinese and Japanese (Matthiessen *et al.,*) and German, French, and Dutch (Bateman; Steiner). In English, Halliday's *Introduction to Functional Grammar* brought together some of his studies begun in the late 1960s (1967/68); and advances were made in all areas of the grammar: experiential (Davidse; Martin), interpersonal (Butler; Thibault), and textual (Fries; Hasan; Matthiessen). Matthiessen (1992a) presented a system-based account of English grammar, deriving from materials he had written to accompany the 'exporting' of Nigel.

Many general theoretical discussions have appeared (Fawcett; Halliday; Lemke, etc.), as well as new theoretical underpinning of key areas, especially lexicogrammar, discourse semantics, and text structure (Matthiessen; Martin; Berry; Hasan, etc.). Matthiessen's (1992b) account of register theory emphasizes the integrative character of systemic work: while there are often alternative interpretations, especially where new problems are being addressed, these are not detached from their overall context in language and in linguistics. Thus there is no disjunction between grammar and discourse, or between the system and the text.

With the strengthening of what Halliday calls the 'grammatics' (that is, theory of grammar as metatheoretic resource), systemic writings have increasingly foregrounded the constructive power of grammar; this is reflected in numerous studies which began with the 'critical linguistics' of the late 1970s (Fowler *et al.*; Kress and Hodge; subsequently Butt; Hasan; Kress; Lemke; Martin; McGregor; O'Toole; Thibault; Threadgold; cf. Threadgold *et al.,* 1986, and the journal *Social Semiotics*). In a large-scale investigation of natural conversation between

mothers and their preschool children, Hasan and Cloran (1990) have developed semantic networks to explore the effects of social factors on children's learning styles, and their consequences for education. Martin's work on register and genre (1992) extends the constructivist model of language to include strata of genre and ideology. It is in this overall perspective that language becomes central to the educational initiatives of Martin, Rothery, Christie, and others in Australia; compare also the work of Carter *et al.* in the LINC ('Language in the National Curriculum') program in the UK.

In 1974 Fawcett organized the first systemic workshop, at the West Midlands College of Education, with 16 participants from four centers in the UK. Since then the workshop has been an annual event; the first international workshop was the ninth, held in Toronto (York University) in 1982. In the 1990s, now as 'International Systemic (or Systemic–Functional) Congress,' meetings have been held at the University of Stirling (1990) and at the International Christian University in Tokyo (1991); in addition, regular national systemics seminars are held in Australia, in the UK, and in China. The newsletter *Network* provides information on these activities, along with short articles, reviews, bibliographies, and conference reports. The regularly updated *Select Bibliography of Systemic Linguistics* now lists about 800 books and articles. Selected conference papers from 1983, 1985, 1986, 1988, 1989, and 1990 have appeared in published form (see Bibliography).

Influences and Trends

In the period from its inception in the early 1960s the main influences on systemic theory (other than those coming in via specific applications such as computational linguistics) have come from Lamb's work in stratificational grammar and from Sinclair's in discourse and in lexical studies. Lamb and Halliday collaborated regularly over a number of years. Sinclair had been an originator of scale and category grammar and his subsequent work exploited this, though in a complementary direction to Halliday's: Sinclair builds the grammar out of the lexis, whereas Halliday builds the lexis out of the grammar. Other input has come from Labov's quantitative methodology (though not his general perspective on language and society); from the theory and practice of corpus linguistics (Quirk; Svartvik *et al.*; more recently Sinclair); from other work in functional linguistics (especially Thompson); and from poststructuralist semiotics in general.

A feature of systemic work is that it has tended to expand by moving into new spheres of activity, rather than by reworking earlier positions. This reflects an ideological perspective in which language is seen not as unique or *suigeneris* but as one aspect of the evolution of humans as sociocultural beings. Thus input often comes from outside the discipline of linguistics: from current theories in fields such as anthropology, literature, and neurology, and from developments in more distant sciences. Much systemic linguistics reflects transdisciplinary rather than disciplinary thinking in its approach to problems of language.

This orientation appears in some present trends and likely future directions.

For example:

- Systemic grammatics as model for other semiotic systems, especially forms of art: not only literature (Butt; O'Toole; Thibault; Threadgold) but also music (van Leeuwen; Steiner), visual imagery (Kress and van Leeuwen), and painting, architecture, and sculpture (O'Toole).
- Further developments of register theory to investigate the linguistic construction of knowledge and structures of power.
- Using available corpus data and programs to test hypotheses about the probabilistic properties of systems (Nesbitt and Plum; Halliday and James).
- Further development of language-based educational programs, in initial literacy, secondary 'subjects,' teacher education, language in the workplace, etc.
- Natural language processing, modeling systems of meaning (knowledge systems), and developing integrated generation and parsing programs, including multilingual ones.
- Further work in deaf sign (Johnston) and development of systemic research in neurolinguistics and the discourse of aphasia, dementia, etc.
- Greater emphasis on studies of the expression plane in a general systemic context.

Just as systemic theory is itself a variant of a broader class of theories (functional theories, perhaps with 'system-structure theories' as an intermediate term), so it itself accommodates considerable variation. Gregory's 'communication linguistics' foregrounds structures of knowledge and presents a dynamic 'phase and transition' model of discourse; Fawcett's computational modeling contrasts in various ways with that of Matthiessen and Bateman; Martin's register theory, with genre as a distinct stratum, contrasts with Hasan's view of register as functional variation realizing different values of contextual variables. This kind of variation in 'metaregister' is one of many ways in which systemic theory appears as a metaphor for language itself.

The standard introduction to systemic linguistics has been Berry (1976/77). Other introductory or

summary works are Monaghan (1979), Halliday and Martin (1981), Butler (1985), Morley (1985), and, an original work in Chinese, Hu *et al.* (1989). The work now appearing with the New South Wales Disadvantaged Schools Program is an excellent source for the systemic grammar of English, as also is Butt *et al.* (1990–); other workbooks are in the course of preparation. Three further introductory studies that are largely completed are Halliday and Matthiessen, on the history of systemic linguistics; Matthiessen and Halliday, a general account; and Thibault, on grammar and discourse. These will give an overview of theory and practice as current in the mid-1990s.

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T

Tacit Knowledge

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As Louise Antony and Norbert Hornstein (2003: 6) suggest, two of Chomsky's most significant philosophical contributions lie in his revival of mentalism in the philosophy of mind and rationalism in epistemology. Linguistics is the study of the system of knowledge possessed by speakers both innately and in the relatively steady state condition of linguistic maturity. This knowledge is a kind of tacit knowledge. The aim of this article is to clarify some of the psychological and epistemic aspects of tacit knowledge, primarily as it is relevant to Chomskyan linguistics. As a psychological attitude, tacit knowing is distinguishable both from garden-variety kinds of propositional attitudes like believing and desiring (what I call full propositional attitudes) and from nonpropositional states or skills typically classified as instances of knowing how. The epistemic role of tacit knowledge in the broader issue of knowledge of meaning is discussed, and a more positive understanding of tacit knowing, with its distinctively epistemic gloss, is tentatively offered.

The Early Debate

It was clear to both Chomsky and his early critics that the kind of knowledge of language that speakers possess, if any, is not explicitly held. Speakers do not know explicitly the general principles to which human languages conform, or the grammars of the specific languages of which they are speakers. Chomsky and his early critics differed, however, on what they took to be the implications of that straightforward idea.

Critics argued that the invocation of psychological attitudes, especially knowing, was at best misleading and at worst wrong. The general objection is that the cognitive relation involved in the explanation of linguistic capacity, if indeed there is such a cognitive relation, cannot be that of knowing, because that cognitive relation does not sustain the connections constitutive of knowledge (see, e.g., Stich, 1971: §4; Quine, 1972: 442; Devitt and Sterelny, 1999: 139; Dummett, 1991: 95–97). More specifically, early critics held that the states that underlie our ability to use language are, for most competent speakers, wholly unconscious, and when known, say by linguists, are known only indirectly through scientific theorizing. But, they contend, if one is to be ascribed a certain piece of knowledge, that knowledge should be recognizable 'from the inside' and not merely ascribable as a result of scientific theorizing. Let us says that having a full propositional attitude is constrained by a 'self-knowledge constraint,' according to which self-knowing is a distinctive, nontheoretical way of coming to know of one's attitudes and their contents.

Chomsky considers such objections (Chomsky, 1980, 1986) and replies as follows:

> I have been speaking of "knowing English" as a mental state ... [But] to avoid terminological confusion, let me introduce a technical term devised for the purpose, namely "cognize," ... In fact I don't think that "cognize" is very far from "know" ... [Cognizing] is tacit or implicit knowledge, a concept that seems to me unobjectionable ... Cognizing has the structure and character of knowledge, but may be and in the interesting cases is inaccessible to consciousness. (Chomsky, 1980: 70–71)

The thrust of Chomsky's answer, then, is that if 'knowledge' offends, a technical term can be employed whose sense lacks precisely the offending features; but, continuing the response, the theoretical concept thereby introduced ought not to be thought of as fundamentally different from knowledge: it is knowledge, but it is unconscious, or not self-known.

Tacit Knowing vs. the Full Propositional Attitudes

We can see here an oversimplification of what might be involved in an account of the nature of propositional attitudes. There seems to be room

to acknowledge both that speakers' knowledge of language does not sustain the connections constitutive of knowledge and the full propositional attitudes and that, nevertheless, tacit knowledge is unobjectionable. The debate is oversimplified in turning only on a single, blunt constraint of self-knowledge. In what follows, I will try to enrich the debate by indicating considerations for thinking of tacit knowing as a propositional attitude without construing it as a full propositional attitude.

What more might be added to the understanding of the fully propositionally attitudinal to bring out its deep constitutive differences with tacit knowing? To begin with, we may take note of a pervasive feature of cognitive psychological theorizing, namely, that it construes the mind as modular: as segmented into mental components that use systems of encapsulated information that are inaccessible to conscious thinking, that are dedicated to representing highly structured or eccentric domains, and whose deployment is fast and mandatory (cf. Fodor, 1983). For the proponent of the idea that knowledge of language is a kind of tacit knowledge, the language faculty is itself, to a first approximation, such a modular system (Chomsky, 1986: chapter 1 [especially note 10]; Higginbotham, 1987).

The general properties of modular systems stand in sharp contrast with basic properties of the full propositional attitudes. The full propositional attitudes are inferentially integrated (Stich, 1978; Evans, 1981) and so can draw upon, and can be drawn upon, by a range of other full propositional attitudes (so they are neither encapsulated nor inaccessible) without regard to subject matter (so they are not dedicated). Although belief fixation may not be voluntary, it seems not to be mandatory in the sense in which the operation of modular systems is. The latter is a compulsion by psychological law; the former is something like a compulsion by reason (more on this below). Finally, the operation of the full propositional attitudes can be painfully slow. Reasoning can take a long time. These differences show that, on its own, the self-knowledge constraint is quite incomplete as to what is distinctive about the way that the information contained in the language faculty is held.

The point about modularity concerns primarily the nature of the attitude of tacitly knowing. But consider as well what Gareth Evans (1982) has called the 'generality constraint,' which pertains to the objects of the full propositional attitudes, thoughts or propositions, and their constituents, concepts. According to the generality constraint, concepts possess an inherent generality that mandates their recombinability with appropriate concepts of other logical categories;

slightly more formally, thoughts are closed under logico-syntactic formation rules, up to conceptual incoherence or anomaly (cf. Peacocke, 1992: 42).

Now, no explanatory point seems to be served by imposing such a constraint on the representation of the information deployed in the language faculty. Speakers tacitly know the grammar that they do; knowledge of that grammar is deployed in some way or other, through the actions of mechanisms implementing algorithms that deploy the grammatical information tacitly known, so as to allow the acquisition, production, and perception of linguistic forms. Insisting that the constituents of the representation of linguistic information be subject to the generality constraint in no way illuminates the explanatory role of tacit knowing.

The reason can be clarified by thinking about the basic theoretical aims and motivations for both the full propositional attitudes and their contents. The full propositional attitudes and their contents are the fundamental theoretical entities in the conceptualization and explanation of the epistemic and practical successes and failures of agents. The explanations trace and assess the complexes of reasons for which agents believe and act, and implicitly evaluate those complexes, and agents, against an ideal of rational epistemic and practical functioning. The notions of epistemic and practical responsibility get their grip here, in the gap between actual and ideal. Since rational inference requires the interactions of attitudes and the recombination of concepts in a variety of ways, attitudes and contents must be such as to sustain the actual evaluations of epistemic status of agents in their inferential practices (Rattan, 2002: §4). The requirements that the full propositional attitudes be inferentially integrated and that concepts obey the generality constraint reflect these normative dimensions of the roles of attitudes and contents.

These ideas suggest, then, a deep point of contact with the self-knowledge constraint: that constraint will be relevant, like inferential integration and generality, insofar as it reflects fundamental features of rational practice. And surely it does. Reflecting on one's attitudes is a way of increasing the rational status of those attitudes. But if reflection plays that rational role, then it must be that our access to our attitudes is reliable and possessed of entitlement (cf. Burge, 1996); our access to our own minds must in the most basic cases be knowledge. Demanding that the attitudes and their contents be self-known, then, is part of a general account of the full propositional attitudes and their contents that construes them so that they may play their role in conceptualizing and explaining the normative statuses of agents.

Tacit Knowing vs. Knowing How

But it may be objected that for all that has been said so far, tacit knowing may not be a kind of content-bearing state at all; given the deep differences between tacit knowing and the full propositional attitudes, tacit knowing simply seems not to be a genuine mental attitude toward contents.

The objection can be elaborated by insisting that speaking a language is not a matter of knowing propositions at all. As Michael Devitt and Kim Sterelny put it:

> [C]ompetence in a language does not consist in the speaker's semantic propositional knowledge of or representation of rules. It is a set of skills or abilities … It consists in the speaker being able to do things with a language, not in his having thoughts about it. (Devitt and Sterelny, 1999: 187)

Perhaps there are no states of knowing the facts about the language – no knowing the rules or grammar of the language. A speaker no more knows the rules of the grammar than one who can ride a bike knows the laws of mechanics governing balance and maneuver. The language faculty is a faculty of knowing how to speak a language. Call the proponent of such a view the 'knowing-how theorist.'

Of course it cannot be denied that speakers do know how to speak the language; but the knowing-how theorist must justify the idea that attributions of knowing **how** are not just species of attributions of knowing **that**, as certain syntactic and semantic evidence suggests (Stanley and Williamson, 2001). Again, it looks as though the knowing-how theorist simply misses the point: although speakers know how to speak the language, that is not an explanation, but a description of what needs to be explained (cf. Higginbotham, 1994). But let us suppose that the knowing-how theorist is proposing an alternative explanation, one that does not appeal to tacit knowing. The knowing-how theorist has at least two significant hurdles to overcome.

First, suppose it is granted that tacit knowing does not have the direct role in rationalizing conceptualizations and explanations that the full propositional attitudes do. There still seems to be nothing to prevent thinking of tacit knowings as having the same attitude-content structure that the full propositional attitudes do. The attitude is not, admittedly, understood as playing a certain rational role, but it still may have a regular and lawlike causal role, and that would seem to be enough to think of there being something attitude-like – a distinctive way in which the information is held – in the picture. (Indeed this is the usual understanding of the attitudes in causal functionalism;

see, for example, Lewis, 1972.) This, for example, is what we might like to say about animals and their attitudes. They fail to have states that satisfy the normative constraints that the full propositional attitudes do, but it would be theoretically heavy handed to say that they do not have states that are very much belief- and desire-like.

Again, serving the aims of rationalizing explanations may require that contents be individuated at the level of Fregean sense rather than reference; this is the point of 'Frege's Puzzle' (Frege, 1892). But if tacit knowings fail to figure directly in these kinds of rational phenomena, then their contents may legitimately be exempted from having the general properties that the contents of attitudes that do so figure must have. The contents of tacit knowings may be Russellian, or have a limited need for cognitive difference without difference in reference. These constituents of contents, objects and properties, presumably do not obey the generality constraint, so there are ways in which contents may be involved yet fail to be like the contents of the full propositional attitudes. The issues here are complex, and I mean only to flag the general issue about the individuation of the contents of tacit knowings and how that may serve to distinguish them from the contents of the full propositional attitudes.

Second, perhaps the proponent of knowing how thinks that the explanation of linguistic ability is merely dispositional, like the explanation of the shattering of a glass by appeal to its fragility. Here, there is some categorical, microstructural, property of the glass that, simplifying tremendously, explains why in conditions of the appropriate sort, the glass shatters. In a like manner the knowing-how theorist may appeal to the categorical neurophysiological ground of linguistic dispositions as comprising a nonintentional explanatory level. This idea, however, is subject to all the general objections that favor functional explanations over neurophysiological ones. It neglects a tradition of thinking about psychological explanations as involving multiple – computational, informational, algorithmic, and implementational – levels (see Marr, 1982; Peacocke, 1986). Indeed the functional states will be realized by neurophysiological states, but the explanation will be cashed out at some level that abstracts from neurophysiological description.

What Is Tacit Knowledge?

So far tacit knowing has been negatively characterized, by being distinguished from both the full propositional attitudes and knowing how. But how are we to understand the nature of tacit knowledge in more

positive terms? Tacit knowing plays a role in the explanations of linguistic acquisition, perception, and production. The described capacities are epistemic in character. Their explanations are part of more elaborate explanations that seek to understand the general phenomenon of communication, including its substantial pragmatic elements. To keep the discussion manageable, I will ignore the more elaborate problems. As well, I will focus only on the problems of linguistic perception and linguistic production. I mean only to gesture roughly at the kinds of considerations that are involved.

According to these explanations, speakers are able to make knowledgeable sound-meaning pairings for sentences because they have information about the phonological, syntactic, and semantic – grammatical – properties of the expression-types that make up those sentences. This information is drawn on by perceptual and production mechanisms. Simplifying immensely, production mechanisms take inputs from intentions to say that p, and make available to a speaker, through the use of the grammatical information, expression types that mean that p. Perceptual mechanisms take acoustic inputs and, through the use of grammatical information, impose grammatical properties on them, eventuating in an experience of meaning, on the basis of which meaning judgments are made (cf. Fricker, 2003). A fully fleshed out epistemology of meaning would explain the epistemic differences between knowing one's own meaning in production and knowing others' meanings in perception by, for example, considering how the inputs to production and perception, respectively, allow for different kinds of mistakes in the eventuating judgments about meaning.

Let us assume that information is deployed in speakers' linguistic epistemic achievements (so these achievements are not examples of knowing how), and that this information is tacitly rather than explicitly held (so it is not an example of a full propositional attitude). Still, why must we accept that this information is known rather than just truly believed? The question is difficult and fundamental. I offer here some potential lines for understanding.

Suppose, as I have been suggesting, that tacitly held information or content is involved in the explanation of linguistic capacities. Two things are of note here about this information. First, these representations have been formed by a reliable mechanism – one that uses speakers' innate representations of Universal Grammar – that reproduces the grammatical information represented in the minds of speakers in one's community. In normal environments, acquiring these representations will equip one to come to judge knowledgeably the meanings of other speakers.

Second, once one moves away from folk conceptions of public language, it is plausible to think of the facts about which language one speaks as settled by one's grammatical representations or I-language (Chomsky, 1986: Chapter 2; Higginbotham, 1991; Barber, 2001). Judgments about what one means oneself will then be reliably produced, again as outlined above; and since the facts about one's language are determined by one's grammatical representations, they will be reliably produced by the facts that determine the language one speaks. It seems that as a phenomenon at the level of the full propositional attitudes, knowing our own meanings and knowing the meanings of others, when we do, is not an accident.

We can think of the foregoing as giving the outlines of a philosophical explanation of what might be called the success-presupposing features of the explanation of our linguistic capacities. The explanations are not success neutral (see Burge, 1986, who attributes the phrase to Bernard Kobes), in that the explanations are explanations of epistemic capacities that are generally presumed to be successful. But if that is right, we are in a position to say something about why the information tacitly held is knowledge. Unless that information were known, rather than just truly believed, it would seem to be a mystery why drawing on that information in perception and production leads in general to knowledge. So one suggestion is that the status of the information as knowledge comes from the distinctive explanatory role of the tacitly held information in explanations of our generally epistemically successful linguistic capacity.

That's one pass at vindicating the attribution of knowledge. But perhaps something deeper can be said. Here we can return to Chomsky's rationalism. Sometimes Chomsky's rationalism seems to be a genetic rationalism that emphasizes the innate character of Universal Grammar, vindicating an early modern doctrine of innate ideas. But there is another way to think of this rationalism, in which it emerges as a more full-blooded epistemic doctrine. In this way of thinking, at some point in the evolution of humankind, minds came into a cognitive relation with certain abstract structures, with very valuable combinatorial properties. These abstract structures are languages. We have already seen that the tacit is not the realm of epistemic and practical responsibility. So the status of knowledge for tacit representations will not accrue as a result of some personal-level achievement. The status of knowledge for the representations that underlie our linguistic capacity derives instead from a natural attunement of the modular structures of the human mind to the abstract combinatorial structures of language.

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One of the most prominent sociolinguists and discourse analysts, Deborah Tannen has contributed immensely to the analysis of spoken discourse by examining aspects of conversational style, gender, frames, poetic features, narratives, and argument. Her primary focus has been on social interaction, and more recently on gender and family communication. Besides her academic success, Tannen has reached out to the general public, writing linguistic books and articles that have attracted media attention and have led to her appearance on American television, radio, and cable shows.

Tannen received an M.A. in English literature from Wayne State University in 1970. However, the 1973 Summer Linguistic Institute in Michigan was pivotal in her becoming a linguist. As Tannen said in an interview, the Institute's theme of Language and Context, and especially a course taught by Robin Lakoff, captured her heart and her imagination. Tannen was further inspired to earn her Ph.D. in linguistics under Lakoff at the University of California, Berkeley. Two other Berkeley professors played a fundamental role in her development: John Gumperz, and Wallace Chafe, while another influence was Erving Goffman. Work by Gumperz and his students, Maltz and Borker, on crosscultural communication, was the fundamental block on which Tannen built her theory of gender interaction as crosscultural communication, published in her highly acclaimed book, *You just don't understand: women and men in conversation* (1990). Chafe and Goffman influenced her work on schemata, frames, and footing, theories on which she built and expanded in her publications (1993a, 1994a) that focus on social interaction. Upon her graduation in 1979, Deborah Tannen was hired at

Georgetown University, where she is one of only four professors holding the distinguished rank of University Professor. In addition, she has been a fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences in Stanford, California, and the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, New Jersey.

Tannen has been a prolific scholar and has published 19 books and over 100 academic articles. Several of her books have received numerous prestigious awards and have become *New York Times* best sellers. She has received grants from the National Science Foundation, National Endowment of the Humanities, and more recently from the Sloan Foundation for a project that examines conflict and parental identities at work and at home of middle-class, dual-career couples. In addition, she is the associate editor of *Language in Society* and serves on the editorial boards of many other linguistics journals.

In addition to her immense linguistic contributions, Tannen has published poetry, short stories, and personal essays. She has also written two plays: 'Sisters' and 'An Act of Devotion,' which was included in *The best American short plays: 1993–1994*.

Tannen exemplifies the linguist who feels that academic knowledge is not and should not be the privilege of the few. In 2005, she received the prestigious Linguistic Society of America award for 'Linguistics, language, and the public.' She has popularized many aspects of sociolinguistics and has raised the public's awareness of the importance of linguistics in personal relationships and the workplace.

See also: Cultural and Social Dimension of Spoken Discourse; Gender and Language; Interactional Sociolinguistics; Narrative: Sociolinguistic Research.

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Telephone Talk

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During its approximately 130-year lifetime, the telephone has become an indispensable element of everyday life in most parts of the world, connecting people who for social and practical reasons are not in auditory reach. Through this medium a 'distinctive and recognizable genre' (Schegloff, 1993: 4548) of talk-in-interaction has developed, namely telephone conversation. Undoubtedly, it is Conversation Analysis (CA) that is to be credited for having made telephone calls an object worthy of linguistic inquiry (*see* **Conversation Analysis**). Although there had been some

interest in telephone conversation before (see Schegl-off, 1993, for references), it was through Sacks and the subsequent conversation analytic approach that telephone calls came to feature on the linguistic stage. And yet Sacks' interest in telephone calls was sociologically guided, as indicated in his often-quoted phrase, "We can read the world out of the phone conversation as well as we can read it out of anything else we're doing" (Sacks, 1992, V. 2: 548) (*see* **Sacks, Harvey**). What, however, made telephone calls more appealing for this ethnomethodologically grounded type of sociological investigation than other sources of naturally recorded data was that telephone calls stood up to a number of fundamental (theoretical and methodological) imperatives of CA; most notably, telephone data, through their constitutive lack of visual information for the participants involved, allowed the possibility of *-emic* analyses of the interaction, i.e., the analyst had at his/her disposal the same kind and amount of information that was available to the participants themselves in the interaction. Coupled with additional features, some shared by other types of naturally data recordings (e.g., that they can be subjected to scrutiny as often and by as many analysts as one wishes), others being incidental to the specific sociohistorical setting of that research (e.g., that certain U.S. institutions, such as emergency centers, independently made recordings of incoming calls), telephone talk came to play a pivotal role in the conversational analytic approach.

In a series of very influential papers (e.g., Schegloff, 1968, 1986, Schegloff and Sacks, 1973), powerful analyses were provided and the sequential organization of talk in the opening and closing sections of telephone calls was meticulously established. Openings, it was propounded, comprise four core sequences: (a) summons-answer: the telephone rings and the person called picks up the phone and responds to the calling signal, initiating a working channel of communication and displaying availability; (b) identification/recognition: the identities of caller and answerer are ensured through self-identification or other recognition; (c) exchange of greetings; and (d) exchange of tokens of phatic communion (how-are-yous and responses). Closings, on the other hand, were shown to consist of two core sequences: (a) offering to close (preclosing) and accepting to do so; and (b) exchange of farewells, provided that the preclosing is positioned at "the analyzable end of a topic" (Schegloff and Sacks, 1973: 305). As has been variously stressed, 'canonicity' in this framework does not imply that all calls (not even most calls) unfold in the prototypical way. But variation on the basic format was handled primarily as a means toward unraveling the sequential organization of telephone conversation,

either by demonstrably showing it to be a result of structural requirements or by helping in modifying hypotheses about the underlying patterns. When the CA studies on telephone calls got gradually to be known (outside the United States or the CA community), however, variation was also approached from a different angle: to what extent are the CA findings independent of the fact that the data, i.e., American English telephone talk, come from a particular culture only?

In the first two decades after Schegloff's seminal work on openings in the late 1960s, research on telephone calls outside (as well as within) the CA paradigm was not in abundance, and the sporadic studies challenging the CA findings on openings were flawed at least in that they did not rely on recorded telephone calls. By the beginning of the 1990s at the latest, however, the topic of variation was explicitly taken up by a CA proponent, Robert Hopper, most prominently in a book devoted to telephone conversation and focusing, in particular, on openings: "A culture's telephone customs display tiny oft-repeated imprints of community ethos. Ask any traveler, immigrant, or ethnographer about telephone conversations in countries outside the USA. You will hear about differences" (Hopper, 1992: 85). Apart from the late Hopper and his associates, an increasing number of researchers, using recorded data, have been reporting differences, along with similarities, in telephone calls around the world (for references, see Luke and Pavlidou, 2002a). The lion's share of this research deals with openings, whereas to date only a small number of studies on closings is available. One of the reasons for this division of labor is presumably the complexity of closings, which have to take into account all the preceding talk in the phone call and at the same time face the risk of being redefined as yet another stretch of conversation before ultimately ending the call.

In research on telephone calls in languages other than English, a topic that has inevitably attracted attention has been the language specific options and the way that these are exploited in the accomplishment of the phone call. For example, Park (2002), in her study of Japanese and Korean openings, has demonstrated that the contrastive connectives *kedo* (Japanese) and *nuntey* (Korean), when used in self-identifications, signal that the reason for calling is of immediate concern and give the call a business-like tone. In addition to the language specific means, the particular forms in which the core sequences are realized in different linguistic communities have been explored. Houtkoop-Steenstra (1991), for example, has shown that in Dutch openings the answer to the summons is accomplished through

self-identification by name, instead of using something similar to *hello*; moreover, it has been suggested that self-identification is the preferred mode in the Netherlands over other-recognition in the United States – a preference also encountered in other Northern European countries as contrasted to, e.g., Greece. A further issue concerns the relative prominence of the individual components of the canonical opening: although the summons–answer sequence is, by its nature, an obligatory constituent of openings, the greetings or how-are-you sequences seem to get varying relevance across cultures, effecting, among other things, reductions or extensions of the opening. Greetings, for example, have been found to be an integral component of Swedish openings (Lindström, 1994) but dispensable in Greek ones (Sifianou, 2002); phatic utterances of the how-are-you type, by contrast, were shown to be prominent in Greek openings (a point also stressed for Chinese openings [Sun, 2004]), but much less so in German ones (Pavlidou, 1994). This foregrounding of the interactional aspects of communication has been multifariously highlighted, e.g., in terms of the recipients' social status as in *taarof* (ritual politeness) in Persian openings (Taleghani-Nikazm, 2002) or in terms of playfulness and humor (see, e.g., Antonopoulou and Sifianou, 2003, for Greek openings); it also has been shown to affect the organization of closings (for Ecuadorian Spanish, see Placencia, 1997; for Greek, see, e.g., Pavlidou, 1997, 2002).

In contrast to Hopper, who – retaining an intrinsic-to-message view of variation (1992: 72) – claimed that despite divergencies the canonical opening still holds across cultures, other researchers challenge such a "universalist" position. This tension may be resolved if, following ten Have's (2002) proposal, emphasis is given to a functional rather than the structural perspective, which has been more prominent in CA. Of greater consequence, however, seems to be the fact that research on telephone talk has not always been guided by the same motivations and aims as CA, some of it having been called "contrastive cultural analysis"; according to Schegloff (2002), the latter presupposes a within-culture analysis that is grounded in the details of the data and establishes its convergence with the participants' understandings. What is at stake, then, is the transfer of analytical tools developed within one paradigm to a different one without warranting the epistemological prerequisites that necessitated these tools in the first place. Even so, research on telephone talk has occasioned a growing body of naturally recorded data from different linguistic communities and spawned a number of analyses that have proven to be pertinent for areas such as, e.g., foreign language teaching,

inasmuch as telephone talk appears to be a sensitive area in intercultural encounters.

Although certain fundamental features of the phone call have basically remained the same (dyadic nature, lack of visual information), the technical apparatus involved has undergone considerable changes over the years (cordless phones, answering machines, automatic number identification, caller's categorization/identification through ringing melodies, etc.), some of which, like caller identification, have direct effects on the structure of the call. Undoubtedly, the most dramatic innovation, encompassing a number of the features just mentioned, has been mobile telephony. Whereas systematic work on the impact of this technology on society is already available, research on the structure of mobile talk based on recorded data is only beginning, so that claims about changes in the organization of conversation (not to mention variations on expectedly different canonical patterns) effected through the transformation of the medium cannot yet be substantiated. Mobile telephony has contested, at least quantitatively, the traditional mode of calling: reports on the spread of mobiles indicate a 'penetration' [*sic*] of over 80% for local markets as different as Hong Kong (cf. Bodomo, 2002) and most West European countries (The Netsize Guide, 2004). By contrast, telephony as a whole seems to have gained impetus and consolidated its place among communication technologies, a place that would otherwise have been most seriously threatened by, e.g., e-mailing.

See also: Conversation Analysis; E-mail, Internet, Chatroom Talk: Pragmatics.

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Text and Text Analysis

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Communication Through Text and Discourse

People use language to communicate. Language users communicate through discourse. Sometimes, utterances of one word ('John!' 'Okay.' 'Stop!') or one sentence ('I declare the games opened') suffice to get the message across, but usually language users communicate through a connected sequence of minimally two utterances, i.e., discourse. The importance of the discourse level for the study of language and linguistics can hardly be overestimated: "Discourse is what makes us human" (Graesser *et al.*, 1997). It is not surprising, therefore, that the study of text and discourse has become an increasingly important area over the last decades, both in linguistics and psychology.

The term 'discourse' is used as the more general term to refer to both spoken and written language. The term 'text' is generally used to refer to written language. This article focuses on text. Although spoken and written discourse have crucial characteristics in common, the linguistic traditions of the study of written and spoken discourse are very different. 'Monological texts' are traditionally studied in areas such as stylistics, text linguistics, and psycholinguistics, often based on rather specific linguistic analyses and regularly using a quantitative methodology. By contrast, 'dialogical discourse' has long been the arena of conversation analysis and sociolinguistics, often focused on qualitative interpretations of individual conversations in context. Over the last 10 years, this situation has begun to change. With the growing availability of spoken corpora and the growing insight that the study of spoken and written discourse should be related because they complement each other (Chafe, 1994), the linguistic study of discourse is becoming less and less restricted to one medium. See, for instance, the overview by Ford *et al.* (2001), who relate linguistic subdisciplines such as grammar and the study of conversation.

A text is more than a random set of utterances: it shows connectedness. A central objective of linguists working on the text level is to characterize this connectedness. Linguists have traditionally approached this problem by looking at overt linguistic elements and structures, thereby characterizing it in terms of cohesion (Halliday and Hasan, 1976). By this view, connectedness is localized in the text itself because of explicit linguistic clues, such as pronouns referring to

earlier mentioned subjects (cohesion type: *reference*), e.g., *he* refers to *bird-watcher* in (1); or conjunctions, such as *because* in (2) (cohesion type: *conjunction*), which express a causal relation.

(1) The bird-watcher had a great day. He observed a kingfisher and a group of 70 cranes.

(2) The bird-watcher had a great day because he observed a kingfisher and a group of 70 cranes.

(3) The bird-watcher had a great day. A kingfisher and a group of 70 cranes were in the area.

Influential as the cohesion approach has been, the interdisciplinary field of text linguistics and discourse studies is nowadays dominated by the 'coherence' approach: the connectedness of text is considered a characteristic of the mental representation rather than of the text itself. The main reason is probably that a sequence of sentences like (1) or (2) is still interpreted as a perfectly normal piece of text if the cohesive elements of reference and conjunction are absent, as in (3). Hence, the connectedness is not dependent on these overt markers. This does not imply, however, that the linguistic elements signaling text coherence are unimportant.

Although coherence phenomena are of a cognitive nature, their reconstruction is often based on linguistic signals in the text itself. These linguistic expressions are considered 'processing instructions' to language users. For instance, referential expressions, such as pronouns and demonstratives, are used in such a way that interpreters can systematically recover the referential coherence (*see* **Accessibility Theory** and **Discourse Anaphora**). Similarly, connectives (*because*, *however*) and (other) lexical markers of relations, such as cue phrases (*On the one hand*, *on the other hand*) and signaling phrases (*The problem is . . . A solution might be . . .*), make the meaning relations between text segments explicit. In recent years, the relationship between the linguistic surface code, on the one hand, and aspects of the text representation, on the other hand, has become a crucial research issue in the interdisciplinary field of text linguistics and discourse studies (cf. Gernsbacher and Givón, 1995; Sanders and Spooren, 2001; Graesser *et al.*, 2003).

Text

It follows from the discussion above that, in this article, we consider a text to be a monological stretch of written language that shows coherence. The term 'text' derives from the Latin verb *texere* 'to weave' (hence the resemblance between the words 'text' and 'textile'). But what is it that makes a text a text? This question has been at the center of attention of the fields of discourse studies and text linguistics, especially since the 1970s.

Meaning Rather than Form

In the area of syntax – 'sentence analysis' – the principled discussion on the question of whether syntax is an autonomous and purely formal level of representation is still going on, especially with the recent rise of cognitive linguistics (cf. Langacker, 1986; Jackendoff, 1996). At the discourse level such a discussion is nowadays absent. In the pioneering years of text linguistics, scholars like van Dijk (1972) and Petöfi and Rieser (1973) attempted to describe texts as a string of sentences within the framework of generative grammar. Analogous to the way in which sentence grammars described sentences in terms of their constituents, texts were seen as constituted by sentences. In generative grammar, a sentence is the result of rewriting rules of the form: $S \rightarrow NP + VP$.

In 'text grammars,' a text was regarded as consisting of sentences: $T \rightarrow S1 \ldots Sn$. Similarly, the top of hierarchical text representations was formed by a T (for 'text'), analogous to the S for sentence in generative sentence representations. In psychology, so-called 'story grammars' were developed in the late 1970s (Thorndyke, 1977; Rumelhart, 1977). According to such representations, a 'story' consists of a setting ("Once upon a time, there was a little girl who lived in the woods with her parents. She was called Little Red Riding Hood.") and an 'episode' ("One day, her mother asked her to bring some food to grandmother . . .") and, with the help of the same type of rewriting rules, episodes can in turn be represented as a combination of an 'event' ("Why do you have such a big mouth? she asked.") and a 'reaction' ("The wolf jumped out of bed and ate her."):

Story → setting + episode

Episode → event + reaction

Several scholars have argued that the analogy with sentence grammar is not convincing, among them Brown and Yule (1983) and Wilensky (1983):

> . . . while our intuition of 'sentencehood' is a clearly linguistic notion, our intuition of 'storiness' most certainly is not [. . .]. the notion of 'Story' refers to actions, events, goals, or other mental or conceptual objects. In other words, our intuitions about stories are closer to our intuitions about the meanings of sentences than they are about they are about sentences themselves (Wilensky, 1983: 580).

And indeed, ever since Halliday and Hasan (1976), Hobbs (1979), and van Dijk (1977), it is widely accepted that purely formal or syntactic principles play

a far smaller role at the discourse level. It is hard, for instance, to make much sense of the idea of a structurally 'well-formed' but semantically anomalous text. There is a consensus that the well-formedness of a discourse is primarily to do with its meaning – more specifically, with the question of whether the meanings of its component segments can be related together to form a coherent message.

What Makes a Text a Text?

What, then, are the crucial characteristics of text? At present, the dominant stance is that 'coherence' explains best the connectedness shown by texts. Coherence is considered a mental phenomenon; it is not an inherent property of a text under consideration. Language users establish coherence by relating the different information units in the text.

Generally speaking, there are two respects in which texts can cohere (Sanders and Spooren, 2001):

- 'Referential coherence': smaller linguistic units (often nominal groups) may relate to the same mental referent throughout the text (*see also* **Discourse Anaphora**); or
- 'Relational coherence': text segments (most often conceived of as clauses) are connected by coherence relations, such as cause-consequence, between them.

Both coherence phenomena under consideration – referential and relational – have clear linguistic indicators that can be taken as processing instructions. For referential coherence, these are anaphoric devices such as pronouns, and for relational coherence these are connectives and (other) lexical markers of relations.

Ever since the seminal work of linguists such as Chafe (1976) and Prince (1981), both functional and cognitive linguists have argued that the grammar of referential coherence can be shown to play an important role in the mental operations of connecting incoming information to the existing mental representations. For instance, referent NPs are identified as either those that will be important and topical, or as those that will be unimportant and nontopical. Hence, topical referents are persistent in the mental representation of subsequent discourse, whereas the nontopical ones are nonpersistent. In several publications, Ariel (1988, 2001) argued that regularities in grammatical coding should indeed be understood to guide processing. She studied the distribution of anaphoric devices and suggested that zero anaphora and unstressed pronouns cooccur with high 'accessibility' of referents, whereas stressed pronouns and full lexical nouns signal low accessibility. This

cooccurrence can easily be understood in terms of cognitive processes of activation: high-accessibility markers signal the **default** choice of continued activation of the current topical referent. Low-accessibility anaphoric devices, such as full NPs or indefinite articles, signal the terminated activation of the current topical referent and the activation of another topic (*see* **Accessibility Theory**).

'Centering theory' (see Walker *et al.*, 1998 for an overview) makes explicit and precise predictions about the referent that is 'in focus' at a certain moment in a discourse. It even predicts that the degree of text coherence is determined by the extent to which it conforms to 'centering constraints.' Given a clause in which referential antecedents are presented, centering theory predicts the likelihood that an antecedent will be a central referent – which is 'in focus' – in the next clause. The salience of a discourse entity is determined by a combination of syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic factors, such as grammatical role (subject or not), expression type (zero, pronoun, or NP), and discourse topic-hood. Several processing studies have demonstrated the 'psychological reality' of linguistic indicators of referential coherence (see Garrod and Sanford, 1994, and Sanford and Garrod, 1994, for an overview; *see also* **Discourse Processing**).

We now turn to (signals of) 'relational coherence.' 'Coherence relations' are often taken to account for the connectedness in readers' cognitive text representation (cf. Hobbs, 1979; Sanders *et al.*, 1992). They are also termed 'rhetorical relations' (Mann and Thompson, 1988; *see* **Rhetorical Structure Theory**) or 'clause relations'. 'Coherence relations' are meaning relations connecting, at a minimum, two text segments. A defining characteristic for these relations is that the interpretation of the related segments needs to provide more information than is provided by the sum of the segments taken in isolation (Sanders *et al.*, 1992). Examples are relations like 'cause-consequence,' 'list,' and 'problem-solution.' These relations are conceptual and they can, but need not, be made explicit by linguistic markers, so-called connectives (*because, so, however, although*) and lexical cue phrases (*for that reason, as a result, on the other hand*).

In the last decade, much research in relation semantics and pragmatics has focused on the question of how to taxonomize or classify the set of coherence relations (Hovy, 1990; Knott and Dale, 1994; Pander Maat, 1998; Redeker, 1990; Sanders, 1997). The main reason for this interest is the cognitive interpretation of coherence relations: if they are to be considered as cognitive mechanisms underlying discourse interpretation, it is attractive to find out which more general principles are involved in relation

interpretation. While work on the hierarchical classification of discourse relations goes back at least as far as Grimes (1975) and Halliday and Hasan (1976), the idea that a small number of reasonably orthogonal primitives is responsible for the differences amongst coherence relations is more recent. Sanders *et al.* (1992) defined the 'relations among the relations,' relying on the intuition that some coherence relations are more alike than others, and that the set of relations can be organized in terms of more primitive notions, such as polarity and causality. Several types of evidence in favor of such an organization were produced, varying from experiments in which text analysts judged relations (Sanders *et al.,* 1992, 1993; Sanders, 1997), to research on the acquisition order of connectives (Evers-Vermeul, 2005) and processing studies indicating how different coherence relations result in different representations (Sanders and Noordman, 2000). In such an account of coherence, connectives and other lexical signals are seen as 'processing instructors.' And indeed, experimental studies on the role of connectives and signaling phrases show that these linguistic signals affect the construction of the text representation (cf. Millis and Just, 1994; Noordman and Vonk, 1997).

In sum, it can be concluded that there is compelling evidence, from both linguistic and psycholinguistic studies, in favor of the view that referential and relational coherence are crucial principles, which make a set of sentences a text.

Text Analysis

Now that we have an idea of what a text is, we can define 'text analysis' as the systematic dissection of a textual unity in its constituent parts and the study of those parts in relation to each other. By consequence, text analysis focuses on the linguistic elements present in the text. Texts may be analyzed with different aims and from several perspectives.

A first text-analytic research goal is of a theoretical nature. It concerns the further development of linguistic theory at the discourse level: how are texts structured? There are now several well-established theories that propose mechanisms by which the meaning of individual sentences can be constructed, but the situation with entire texts is different. Text analysis is of crucial importance to the further development of text linguistics.

A second aim is to provide insight into the cognitive processes of reading and writing, or in the text representation that language users have of a text. In reading research, the role of text structure is an important research topic in which text analyses are used to model both the text structure and the representation that readers make of it (see previous paragraph). In writing research, the role of text analysis has received less attention for a long time, even though Bereiter and Scardamalia (1987) argued for the interaction between psychological models and text linguistic research. They pointed to a deficiency in studies of writing and argued that text analysis had a large role to play in discovering the implicit rules of composition.

A third aim is of a computational linguistic nature: the development of computational models of automatic summarization, text generation, and interpretation. Here, the analysis of natural texts should provide the rule system to arrive at such computational models. Although some theories and models discussed in the sections to follow were explicitly developed in the context of such a computational enterprise (such as **Rhetorical Structure Theory**), computational text analyses are not discussed here.

A fourth aim is the evaluation of text quality in the context of written composition and document design. A text analysis can provide the basis for a comparison of similar texts, enabling researchers to compare the writing ability of the authors (Cooper, 1983). In document design, text analysis can predict areas where readers may have difficulties and where revision is imperative. It is also used to investigate the relationship between text structure and the successful layout of various documents, even multimodal ones (Delin and Bateman, 2002).

From what perspectives do text analysts try to catch the 'meaning' in text? A first division is that between content-oriented and structure-oriented approaches. 'Content-oriented' approaches to text analysis uncover what an individual text is 'about,' either by starting from the smallest building blocks (propositions) or by characterizing texts on a more global level: the topics and subtopics that are covered. 'Structure-oriented' approaches uncover the meaning relations between the textual building blocks, such as causal, contrastive, and additive relations, but also referential relations. Some approaches provide analytic models that allow for a hierarchical representation representing the whole text in such terms.

Content-Oriented Approaches

Micro- and Macrostructure   In the context of a psychological model of text processing, Van Dijk and Kintsch (1983) distinguished between three aspects of text representation: 'microstructure,' 'macrostructure,' and 'superstructure'. Superstructures – representing the global structure that is characteristic of a text type – will be discussed in the section on

structure-oriented approaches. Micro- and macrostructure concern the **content** of a text. The basic building blocks of these representations are 'propositions,' i.e., a unit of meaning that consists of a predicate and connected arguments. For instance, the proposition underlying sentence (4) would be (4'), where *see* is the predicate and *he* and *kingfisher* are the arguments.

(4) he sees a kingfisher
(4') (see (he, kingfisher))

The microstructure is a network of propositions like these that represents the textual information in a bottom-up fashion, sentence by sentence. Building on earlier work, van Dijk and Kintsch (1983) presented an influential model of text comprehension, which predicted the information recalled best by readers. For the purpose of text analysis, it is important to focus on another component of the Van Dijk and Kintsch model: macrostructure. On the basis of the microstructure or 'text base,' a macrostructure can be built – an abstract representation of the global meaning structure that would reflect the gist of the text. This is achieved by applying macro-rules to the detailed meaning representation of the microstructure. 'Deletion,' 'generalization,' and 'construction' are such macrorules, which produce macropropositions: the main ideas in the text (see especially van Dijk, 1980). This idea of producing the macrostructure on the basis of the details of the microstructure is certainly appealing. The results of some experimental processing studies seem to show that macrostructures can predict recall and summarization results: Propositions present in the macrostructure are remembered better than propositions that are 'only' present in the microstructure (Graesser, 1981). Arguably, the theoretical and empirical status of this part of the van Dijk and Kintsch theory is less clear than the microstructure part. This was probably a result of the fact that macrorules were underspecified. In addition, it is not always easy to identify linguistic signals of macropropositions at the surface level of the text, even though titles, headings, abstracts, and topical sentences are mentioned as signalling macropropositional ideas. In recent years, Kintsch (1998) and others have argued that macrostructures can be derived from texts by using 'latent semantic analysis' Here, the meaning of sentences is represented by a vector in a high-dimensional semantic space. Vectors that relate most to the rest of the text can be identified as macropropositions.

Theme and Thematics   'Thematics' is the interdisciplinary study of 'about-ness' in text. The notion of 'theme' refers to the main idea or topic of the text. For instance, a text can be about a kingfisher or about an ornithologist having a great day. The study of theme has been popular in literary studies. Thanks to the involvement of text linguistics and stylistics, the study of linguistic cues that create thematic meaning has become increasingly important (Louwerse and Van Peer, 2002). For instance, formulations and stylistic figures also emphasize the thematic meaning of a text.

However, regular aspects of formulation, such as the linear order of the information in clauses and sentences, can also contribute to the identification of the theme. A typical linguistic aspect studied in more detail is the way in which the first position in a clause has a special textual status. The terminology is somewhat confusing here, because linguists refer to the information provided in this position with the term 'theme,' whereas any information following this local theme is called 'rheme'. The opening positions of clauses often contain information that guides the reader in constructing a picture of the text as a whole. In linguistics, and especially in systemic functional grammar, sequences of theme–rheme are studied, resulting in patterns of thematic development.

Structure-Oriented Approaches

Most linguistic methods of text analysis focus on the general properties of text structure, abstracting away from the specific content of individual texts. Accounts of text structure usually pay attention to

1. the meaning of the left-right relations between text segments, where the analysis is based on relational and referential coherence; and
2. the hierarchical structure of the text, which accounts for the intuition that the information that is ordered higher in a tree-like representation is more important than the lower information.

Superstructure   van Dijk and Kintsch's (1983) model included micro- and macrostructures, which resulted in a representation of the text content, as was discussed above. The third element in their model is the 'superstructure,' which "provides a kind of overall functional syntax for the semantic macrostructures" (van Dijk and Kintsch, 1983: 242). It is the conventional, hierarchical form in which the content of the macrostructure is presented. An example of such a superstructure is that of the type 'news discourse,' in which superstructural categories are distinguished, for example, *headlines, lead, context, event.* Superstructural categories are typically of a global nature

in that they organize larger chunks of text rather than consecutive sentences. In addition, a superstructure analysis proceeds top-down: it starts from the highest text level. Superstructures for several other conventional text types were developed, among them the 'Experimental article.' There seems to be a clear parallel here with text type and genre: it would seem logical to expect that stereotypical text types can be characterized in terms of a superstructure (*see* **Genre and Genre Analysis**). Therefore, a text analysis in terms of superstructures is text type-specific by definition.

Clause Relations, Coherence Relations, and Discourse Patterns   By contrast, a text analysis based on clause or coherence relations would be generally applicable, independent of text types. It proceeds bottom-up, starting from consecutive clauses. One common relation is called 'problem-solution' or 'solutionhood'. See examples (5) and (6).

(5) I'm hungry. Let's go to the Fuji Gardens.

(6) What if you're having to clean floppy drive heads too often? Ask for Syncom diskettes, with burnished Ectype coating and dust absorbing jacket liners.

Mann and Thompson (1986, 1988) treated solutionhood as simply one of the relations, where others have argued that solutionhood was more complex than that (Grimes, 1975; Hoey, 1983; Sanders *et al.*, 1993): "Both of the plots of fairy tales and the writings of scientists are built on a response pattern. The first part gives a problem and the second the solution" (Grimes, 1975: 211). On the basis of clause relations, more complex structures can be built: a 'discourse pattern' (Hoey, 1983) or a 'response pattern' (Grimes, 1975). Hoey (1983) argued that a recurrent combination of clause relations can organize a substantial text fragment, or even a whole text. See the illustrating example from Hoey (1983: 35):

(7) (i) I was on sentry duty.
   (ii) I saw the enemy approaching.
   (iii) I opened fire.
   (iv) I beat off the attack.

Hoey provided several paraphrase tests to recognize the clause relations on which the pattern is based: 'instrument-achievement' with '(iii) thereby (iv),' 'by (iii) ... ing,' and '(iii) by this means (iv)' (Hoey, 1983: 39–41); and 'cause-consequence' 'because (ii), (iii)' and '(ii) therefore (iii)' (Hoey, 1983: 41–42). Paraphrase tests like these are often a great help for inexperienced text analysts, who find it hard to determine the exact relationship expressed between text segments.

This heuristic to identify discourse patterns is an outstanding example of a text-analytic method in the field of clause and coherence relations. The research in this field discussed earlier in this section has probably been more important for the identification of coherence relations and for the theoretical issues discussed earlier (the nature of coherence, taxonomies of relations, the linguistic expression and processing of relations). However, a very important account has not been discussed so far: rhetorical structure theory.

Rhetorical Structure Theory   In the 1980s and 1990s, Mann and Thompson (see especially Mann and Thompson, 1988) presented 'rhetorical structure theory' (RST), a functional theory of text organization developed in the context of linguistics and cognitive science (*see* **Rhetorical Structure Theory**). At the heart of RST are the so-called 'rhetorical relations,' similar to clause or coherence relations, and including relations like 'cause,' 'elaboration,' and 'evidence.' The relations are defined in terms of conditions on the nucleus (the most important segment in a relation), on the satellite (which depends on the nucleus), and their combination, and in terms of the effect on the reader. Relations are identified between adjacent text segments (e.g., clauses) up to the top level of the text. The top level of an RST tree organizes the text as a whole: a relationship that dominates the total text structure.

Rhetorical structure theory has proven to be a very useful analytic tool. One of its benefits is that it allows for a complete analysis of any text type: expository, argumentative, or narrative. The system has been applied to many real-life texts, among them newspaper articles, advertisements, and fundraising letters (Mann and Thompson, 1992). As a rule, an RST analysis starts with an inspection of the **entire** text. The analysis does not proceed in a fixed way; it proceeds bottom-up (from relations between clauses to the level of the text) or top-down (the other way around) or follows both routes (Mann *et al.*, 1992). The analysis results in a hierarchical structure that encompasses the entire text and has a label attached to each of its branches.

Although RST defines rhetorical relations in a fairly exact way, the assignment of a label is ultimately based on observed 'plausibility.' Four general constraints are the guidelines: 'completedness,' 'connectedness,' 'uniqueness,' and 'adjacency' (Mann and Thompson, 1988: 248–249). How the analysis actually proceeds is left to the intuitions of the analyst and is, in the end, a matter of text interpretation. Still, it has been shown that RST can be applied with a reasonable amount of consensus by expert text

analysts (Den Ouden, 2004) and to a certain extent, RST analyses can even be produced automatically (Marcu, 2000).

Procedural Text Analysis   Rhetorical structure theory requires a fair amount of text interpretation based on the analysts' overview of the text as a whole. This overview situation may not reflect the way in which writers produce texts. Spontaneously produced texts, especially, are the result of a more incremental process. Sanders and van Wijk (1996) developed 'procedures for incremental structure analysis' (PISA), which incorporates both ideas about written text production and insights from the text analytical literature, especially with respect to hierarchical aspects of text structure. The two texts in example (8) are taken from the PISA corpus. They were written by 12-year-old boys in response to a request to explain who Saint Nicholas is to someone who knows nothing about the subject. The texts are translated from Dutch in a rather literal way, preserving the original punctuation. For the analysis, texts were divided into

segments, roughly corresponding to clauses. The hierarchical structures of the texts in (8a and 8b) are shown in **Figures 1** and **2**.

(8a) (1) Every year Saint Nicholas comes (2) that is on the 4th of December (3) That day he comes by steamboat (4a) When he arrives in the Netherlands (4) then everyone waves to him (5) At night (5a) when it is pitch-dark (5) Saint Nicholas rides over the roofs with Black Peter (6) and throws lots of presents through the chimney (7) while the children sing a song (7a) such as: Sinterklaas kapoentje … (8) Saint Nicholas gives lots of presents (9) but he always gets something in return (10) That is either a carrot for the horse or a bit of water, also for the horse (11) On the fifth of December Saint Nicholas really has his birthday (12) on that day he brings the presents (13) and then he leaves again. (14) He also looks into the red book with the cross on it. (15) There it says whether you have been naughty or not (16a) When Saint Nicholas leaves again (16) the children sing Bye bye Saint Nicholas.

Figure 1   Hierarchical structure of an explanatory text, dominated by a sequence of actions. (Reproduced from Sanders T & van Wijk C (1996). 'PISA – a procedure for analyzing the structure of explanatory texts.' *Text, 16(1)*, 91–132 with permission by Elsevier.)

Figure 2   Hierarchical structure of an explanatory text, dominated by referential coherence. (Reproduced from Sanders T & van Wijk C (1996). 'PISA – a procedure for analyzing the structure of explanatory texts.' *Text, 16(1)*, 91–132 with permission by Elsevier.)

(8b) (1) Saint Nicholas is an old man (2) He has a white-grey beard (3) He has a steamboat with a lot of little black men (4) They are called Black Peter (5a) When it is the fifth of December (5) the time has come. (6) The day of Saint Nicholas is a Big Festival. (7) The Peters have a birch. (8) A birch is a bundle of swishing branches. (9) They also have a sack (10) that is a kind of wool and a shape. (11) The children in all villages and towns got ginger-nuts. (12) And ginger nuts are four-sided blocks, with sugar. (13) That is candy (13a) that children like. (14) Well, Saint Nicholas is an old man, with white hair. (15) He wears a red robe. (16) And wears a sort of shirt. (17) He also has a whitish grey. (18) A grey is a horse. (18a) (noble animal) (19) Just now I was talking about a steamboat. (20) A steamboat is a big ship, (21) a steamboat often has got a big funnel (21a) from which the steam comes. (22) The children sing songs on the fifth of December, (23) that is because there is a big feast.

The texts in (8) illustrate two different ways of arranging information in an explanatory text. The first one follows the **temporal order** of events: first he arrives, then, at night, he rides over the roofs. On December 5, he has his birthday and the children get presents. And then he leaves and the children sing to him. By contrast, the writer of the second text solves the problem of explanation by focusing on the topic of the text. He mentions all kinds of **properties** of Saint Nicholas in a rather associative way: He is old, has a white beard, a steamboat, etc.

Clearly, these two texts differ in their global structure. The first one is dominated by an 'action-line,' a temporal sequence of actions, and the second one is dominated by a 'property-line,' a list of characteristics of the topic. Text structures like these may reflect the way in which the writer has organized the information during the production of the text. For example, the first text can be produced by running through episodic memory; the actions or events are mentioned in temporal succession and the text ends with the closing of an episode. The second text, on the other hand, is probably produced by searching semantic memory in an associative way. It resembles brainstorming; it lists information related to the topic, which is potentially relevant to explain it.

In a series of publications, it has been argued that the product of this text-analytical method is cognitively interpretable because it correlates with pause time distribution during writing (Schilperoord, 1996; Sanders and Schilperoord, 2005) and explains writing development (van der Pool, 1995), sentence-combining results, and problems during writing (van Wijk and Sanders, 1999). The generalizability of an incremental and procedural approach like this is limited; it has specifically been shown to be successful for spontaneously written explanatory texts and judicial letters that were produced without much planning.

Conclusion and Further Research

There are several interesting developments for the research agenda in the years to come. Before we go into detail, a general methodological remark seems in order. Text analyses of corpora of natural language texts have a crucial role to play in text linguistics and discourse studies, because the development of theoretical models of discourse phenomena needs to proceed in interaction with the study of the (sometimes very complex) reality of natural language in use (cf. Emmott, 1997).

Let us now focus on some specific issues that follow from our analysis of the state-of-the-art in the preceding sections. A first important issue is the linguistics/text linguistics interface. There are clear rapprochements between grammarians, (formal) semanticists, and pragmaticists on the one hand and text linguists on the other hand (Sanders and Spooren, 2007). Questions to be asked are: what is the relationship between information structuring at the sentence level and at the discourse level? How do factors such as tense, aspect, and perspective influence discourse connections (Lascarides and Asher, 1993; Oversteegen, 1997)? For instance, discourse segments denoting events that have taken place in the past (*The bird-watcher saw a small blue bird near the river. It was a kingfisher*) will typically be connected by coherence relation of the content type, whereas segments in the present/future, which contain many evaluations or other subjective elements (*Here is that small blue bird again. It must be a kingfisher*), are prototypically connected by epistemic or argumentative relations. This correlation, in turn, should be studied in connection with issues like perspective and subjectivity (Sanders and Redeker, 1996; Pander Maat and Sanders, 2001).

A second obvious issue is the relationship between the principles of relational and referential coherence. Clearly, the two types of principles both provide language users with signals during text interpretation. Theses signal are taken as instructions for how to construct coherence. Therefore, the principles will operate in parallel, and they will influence each other. The question is: How do they interact? Consider a simple example.

(9) John congratulated Pete on his excellent play.
     (a) He had scored a goal.
     (b) He scored a goal.

At least two factors are relevant for the solution of the anaphor *he* in (a/b): the aspect of the sentence, and the possible coherence relations that can be inferred between sentences. Part (9a) has perfect tense, and at the discourse level, the interpretation of one coherence relation is obvious – namely the backward causal relation 'consequence-cause.' The tense of (9b) is imperfect, and at the discourse level several coherence relations can exist, including 'temporal sequence' (of events) and 'enumeration/list' (of events in the game). Hence, the resolution of the anaphor-antecedent relation seems to be related to these two factors. In (9a) *he* must refer to Pete; in (9b), both antecedents are possible: John or Pete. How do aspect and the coherence relation interact in the process of anaphor resolution? And: Is the anaphor resolved as a consequence of the interpretation of the coherence relation? Questions like these were already addressed in the seminal work of Hobbs (1979) and recently taken up again in a challenging way by Kehler (2002). Text analysis of natural texts has a large role to play here: How often do ambiguities like these actually show up in text? What are the heuristics apparently used by language users?

A third issue is the further characterization of genres and text types in terms of their text structure. Genre and text type are both frequently used concepts (*see* **Genre and Genre Analysis**) that are often not defined in articulate text-internal characteristics (see Virtanen, 1992). Now that text-analytic models like RST are available and the theory of different types of coherence relations has matured, it is high time that structural analysis of real-life corpus texts show whether text types differ systematically in their text structure. In a first corpus study (Sanders, 1997), such a correlation was indeed found. 'Informative texts' (in which the writer's goal is to inform the reader about something) were compared to 'expressive texts' (in which the writer's goal is to express his or her feelings and attitudes) and 'persuasive texts' (in which the writer's goal is to persuade the reader of something). It was shown that persuasive texts were indeed dominated by more subjective relations, used by the writer to put forward the argument, whereas encyclopedic texts were shown to be informative because their structure was dominated by more objective relations, in which the writer simply described the content area. The realization of this type of text-analytic work on a larger scale would make notions of text type more concrete, but it also provides an example of the way in which text structural characteristics could be operationalized for the further study of language use, on a par with many stylistic text characteristics.

A fourth and final issue concerns the role of text analysis in text evaluation and document design. Many teachers believe that the best and the worst essays written in class differ in organization. The best one is structured clearly, whereas the worst one is hard to follow. Traditionally, there are few results from research to underpin observations like these. However, this situation has recently improved. For instance, children's explanatory texts showing continuity might be judged better than texts that show discontinuities (Sanders and van Wijk, 1996; van Wijk and Sanders, 1999).There are at least two cognitive reasons to link structure and judgments about text quality: texts are easier to understand without such discontinuities, and discontinuities often point to a lack of text planning during writing (Sanders and Schilperoord, 2005).

The use of text analysis in document design is particularly promising because it not only appears valuable in the study of 'classical' text structure, but it is also a useful basis to investigate the matching of text structure, content, and layout, including visual images (Delin and Bateman, 2002). This type of work shows the way to the text analysis of the 21st century: that of multimodal documents.

See also: Accessibility Theory; Discourse Anaphora; Discourse Processing; Genre and Genre Analysis; Rhetorical Structure Theory.

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Text World Theory

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'Text World Theory' is an attempt to unify a number of key ideas about human discourse processing under one analytical framework. Its structure is drawn from a range of diverse disciplines, including possible-worlds logic, discourse analysis, cognitive psychology, cognitive linguistics, and stylistics. The original text-world framework was formulated by Paul Werth during the 1990s, primarily in relation to literary fiction (e.g., Werth, 1994, 1995a, 1995b, 1999). More recently, Text World Theory has been further developed and applied to a broad range of both literary and nonliterary discourses (e.g., Gavins, 2000, 2003, 2006; Hidalgo Downing, 2000; Stockwell, 2002). The basic theoretical premise underlying Text World Theory is that human beings understand discourse by constructing mental representations, or 'text worlds', of it in their minds. The practical aim of the theory is to provide an accurate account of human communication processes, in all their cognitive and psychological complexity. This necessarily means investigating both the discourse itself and the context surrounding its production and reception.

Text World Theory approaches this considerable task by splitting human communication into three manageable levels: the 'discourse world,' the 'text world,' and the 'subworld' (Werth, 1994, 1995a, 1995b, 1999). The first of these levels, the discourse world, deals with the immediate situation surrounding at least one speaker or writer and one or more listeners or readers. These sentient beings are referred to in Text World Theory as the 'participants,' the conscious presence of whom is essential for a discourse world to exist. This is because the discourse world includes not only the participants and the objects and entities that surround them, but all the personal and cultural knowledge that the participants bring with them to a language situation. This knowledge is of central importance to our understanding of human communication, since it has the potential to impact upon both the construction and comprehension of a given discourse. The majority of preceding approaches to discourse study have fought shy of dealing with context, mainly because of the fact that its unwieldy nature at first appears incompatible with rigorous linguistic analysis. Text World Theory, on the other hand, introduces the principle of 'text-drivenness' to provide a manageable route into the systematic examination of context. This principle specifies that, from the vast store of personal knowledge and experience available to the participants, it is the **text** produced in the discourse world that determines which areas are needed to process and understand the discourse at hand. When discussing recent film releases with friends, for example, we need only

activate this area of our knowledge. Our experiences of cake decoration or crossing the road remain redundant, unless specifically referred to in the course of the conversation.

Every time a new act of communication occurs, a new and unique discourse world comes into being, the contents and structure of which will depend greatly on the nature of the communication in question. In face-to-face communication, for example, the participants share the same physical space and are able to refer directly to objects and entities in the immediate surroundings. Other nonlinguistic factors, such as body language and intonation, will also play a part in the structure of the discourse and the relative ease with which it is comprehended. There are a number of situations in which the discourse world will be split between two, or even more, spatial and temporal locations. The participants in telephone communication or internet chat room conversation, for example, normally share a temporal location (except in the case of telephone answering machine messages) but not a spatial one. The discourse worlds of written communication, on the other hand, are often split both spatially and temporally, sometimes over many thousands of miles and many hundreds of years. Some discourse worlds (the reading of a novel, for example) may continue over many months, in a variety of different locations, while others (a passing nod on a crowded train) may be fleeting and minimally detailed. In each case, however, the context surrounding the participants, whether shared or separate, is of paramount importance in the processing of the discourse. Consider, for example, the differing experiences of reading Cædmon's hymn from a projector screen in a lecture hall in New York and reading it from a carved stone crucifix on a cliff top in Whitby, England.

As the participants in the discourse world communicate with one another, they construct mental representations of the discourse in their minds, in which the language being produced can be conceptualized and understood. These mental representations are known as 'text worlds.' The deictic and referential expressions included within a text establish the spatial and temporal boundaries of the text world and specify whether any entities or objects are present. These details, known as the 'world-building' elements of the text, can be seen to form a kind of static conceptual background against which certain activities and descriptions may be played out. These activities and descriptions are known as the 'function-advancing' elements of the text world, the precise nature of which will vary depending on the type of text involved. In narrative texts, for example, actions and events are often in abundance, the function of

which is to propel the narrative forward. The function-advancing elements of an instructive text, on the other hand, are likely to include a greater number of imperatives, and so on.

Once a text world has been created, any number of departures from its initial world-building parameters may occur during the discourse process. These departures cause new worlds to be created in the minds of the participants. They constitute the third and final layer of Text World Theory and are known as 'sub-worlds.' A subworld may be created by one of the participants at the discourse-world level. In such cases, the participants are free, particularly in face-to-face communication, to question one another's statements and to clarify any aspect of the discourse they do not understand. When entities at the text world level (referred to as 'characters' in Text World Theory) communicate, however, the reliability of the worlds they create cannot be assessed according to the same criteria as those produced in the discourse world. In Text World Theory terms, worlds created by the participants are 'participant-accessible,' while worlds created by characters are only 'character-accessible.' This logical distinction is one basically drawn between the different ways the participants process worlds created at the different conceptual levels of the framework, and explains why, in some cases, judgment may be reserved on the dependability of the contents of a particular world.

Sub-worlds are created for a variety of reasons but generally fall into one of two broad categories. 'World-switches' (Gavins, 2003, 2006) occur when the temporal or spatial parameters of the text world change. The text may flash backward or forward to a different time zone, or it may switch the spatial location of the world as a concurrent scene is referred to or described. Changes in the temporal parameters of a world often occur in conjunction with a change in the spatial parameters as well. Instances of direct speech and direct thought representation may also cause a world-switch, as present-tense discourse is injected into a past-tense narrative. In each case, a new world is created appropriate to the new time or scene.

Slightly more complex are 'modal worlds' (Gavins, 2003, 2006), which occur whenever some form of modalization is used in a discourse. Modal expressions are usually separated into three categories: 'deontic,' 'boulomaic,' and 'epistemic.' In Text World Theory, the use of each of these creates a corresponding modal world. Deontic modal worlds are created whenever a degree of obligation is attached to a proposition. For example, if I say that someone '**must** keep off the grass' or that they '**should** do the washing up,' a new world is created in which

the activity of 'keeping off the grass' or 'doing the washing up' is taking place. Although a participant or character may be expressing their **attitude** to such propositions in the discourse world or the text world, the activities themselves are, as yet, unrealized. A separate, modal world must therefore be created for us to conceptualize both the activity and the world-creator's attitude toward it. Boulomaic modal worlds operate in a similar manner. Whenever a speaker or writer expresses a degree of desire, a separate modal world is created in which the proposition in question can be conceptualized. For example, if I say 'I **wish** I had more days in the week,' the boulomaic modal verb 'wish' causes a new world in which 'more days in the week' exist. This situation is, of course, unrealized and therefore remains in a mental space separate from the main discourse.

Epistemic modal worlds allow us to conceptualize expressions of remoteness in discourse and can occur for a number of different reasons. Instances of indirect speech, indirect thought, and free indirect discourse all filter a text, however fleetingly, through a new perspective. This perspective thus creates a new world in which the resulting epistemic distance from the initial speaker or writer can be fully conceptualized. Focalized narration in written discourse has a similar effect, since readers are aware throughout that their only access to the text world is through the mind of a character who may or may not be participating in the unfolding events. The character-accessibility of such modal worlds is frequently manipulated by literary authors to create disorienting or deliberately misleading narrative effects. Hypotheticals also cause modal worlds to be created, since they necessarily depict unrealized events at some epistemic distance from the text world. Finally, conditional constructions require separate worlds for us to conceptualize the remote situations they describe. In the sentence 'If you see Paul, tell him he owes me a fiver,' for example, the 'if' marker signals the construction of a remote situation in which the addressee comes into contact with Paul. The 'tell him he owes me a fiver'

section of the conditional can be seen to advance this modal world further by providing added detail of the possible future events concerned.

The main application of Text World Theory to date has been to literary discourse (e.g., Gavins, 2000, 2003; Hidalgo Downing, 2000; Stockwell, 2002; Werth, 1994, 1995a, 1995b, 1999), where it provides a systematic framework for investigation of the conceptual structures involved in the processing of certain poetic and narrative devices. Increasingly, however, Text World Theorists are finding new and fruitful ground in nonliterary discourses as diverse as family arguments, verbal directions, media discourse, and Web authoring (Gavins, 2006).

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Thetic–Categorial Distinction

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In the late 19th and early 20th century, there were two major attempts at overcoming the Aristotelian

articulation of the clause (or 'judgment') in subject and predicate: one by Gottlob Frege (*see* **Frege, Friedrich Ludwig Gottlob**), who did away with the distinction altogether, and one by Franz von Brentano and Anton Marty, who restricted the traditional subject–predicate articulation to what they called 'categorical judgments,' as opposed to 'thetic judgments,'

which do not involve an act of predication about some 'psychological subject' but attribute something to a situation as a whole.

This suggestion was later taken up by the Czech linguist Vilém Mathesius (1929), who saw the sentence as a communicative utterance by which the speaker assumes some active attitude to some fact or group of facts (1983: 124). In declarative sentences, this active attitude is assertion. An assertion can either be the simple presentation of an event or action (like in Czech *byla tma* 'it was dark'; thetic) or a predicative statement about a theme (*and the king had a beautiful daughter*; categorical).

It was not until 1972 that the U.S.-Japanese linguist Sige-Yuki Kuroda rediscovered the Brentano-Marty proposal. He argued that the much discussed difference between the Japanese 'subject' particle *ga* and the 'topic' particle *wa* actually reflected a distinction between two judgment types, viz., the categorical and the thetic. At the time of its publication, however, Kuroda's paper did not have too much impact, as another U.S.-Japanese scholar, the Harvard linguist Susumo Kuno (1972), had just proposed a different explanation of the same phenomenon in terms of information structure: the *ga*-clauses in question were 'neutral descriptions,' which contained all new information, while *wa*-clauses were about some (given or contrasted) topic. This proposal tailed in with a long-standing discussion about 'accented subjects' in English (see Bolinger, 1954; Fuchs, 1980) and similar phenomena.

A number of scholars of Romance languages (such as Vattuone (1975) on Genoese Italian and Ulrich (1985) on Romanian) maintained that the word order verb–subject (VS, in contrast to subject–verb, SV) in these languages codes thetic judgments. (Similar observations have been made for Hungarian, Russian, Bulgarian, and Modern Greek.) This claim was taken up by Hans-Jürgen Sasse in 1987. His point is that the thetic/categorical distinction (which he relates to the sentential communication perspective) is independent of the information-structure phenomena described by Kuno (which Sasse associates with discourse–pragmatic presuppositions). (*see* **Pragmatics: Overview**; **Discourse, Foucauldian Approach**.)

If thetic judgments were simply 'neutral description' sentences, they would be the appropriate answer to questions (such as '*What happened?*') that do not introduce any discourse-pragmatically presupposed material (*see* **Pragmatic Presupposition**). But while such questions are a valid diagnostic for neutral descriptions (and 'all-new' sentences), they fail as a diagnostic for thetic judgments. In answering, the speaker still has a choice between, for example, VS

and SV forms in Italian: he or she can either focus on the situation as a whole and make a statement about this, or choose a topic as a predication base and predicate something about this topic. This topic would then be new in the given situation; the resulting sentence is a categorical, all-new sentence.

Grammatical structure can be said to have two core articulations: a semantic articulation as predication and a topicality articulation as judgment. But there is also another, pragmatic articulation, that of given vs. new (Haberland and Nedergaard Thomsen, 1993: 177). Whether the thetic/categorical distinction is grammatically relevant depends on whether a language emphasizes topicality articulation (situational pragmatics) rather than information structure (discourse pragmatics). In other words, the question is whether the available syntactic means are more suited for expressing a thetic/categorical than an information structure-based distinction. So far, the following syntactic phenomena have been suggested as realizing the thetic/categorical distinction:

Noun incorporation:
Boni   (Sasse, 1984)

Verb–Subject order:
Genoese Italian   (Vattuone, 1975)
Romanian   (Ulrich, 1985)
Modern Greek   (Sasse, 1987)
Swahili   (Sasse, 1987)

Split structures:
French   (Ulrich, 1985; Sasse, 1987)

Dummy subjects:
Danish (*der*)   (Heltoft, 1993)

Intonation features ('accented subjects'):
English   (Sasse, 1987)
German   (Sasse, 1984)
Morphological marking:
Japanese: *wa* versus *ga*   (Kuroda, 1972;
                              Shibatani, 1991)

Lambrecht (1987, 1994) has proposed a more fine-grained typology of focus that aims at capturing both the phenomena analyzed by the information-structure approach (as outlined by Kuno) and the thetic/categorical approach *à la* Kuroda, Sasse, and others (for a discussion, see Van Valin, 1990). In Lambrecht's approach, thetic judgments are cases of sentence focus.

A very critical discussion of the issue can be found in Wehr (2000).

See also: Discourse; Discourse, Foucauldian Approach; Frege, Friedrich Ludwig Gottlob; Pragmatic Presupposition; Pragmatics: Overview.

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Topic and Comment

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Definitional Problems and History of the Terms

There are few terms and concepts in linguistics as problematic as Topic and Comment; few have had such a wide range of different applications that affect such fields as grammar, typology, pragmatics, and sociolinguistics. Moreover, few terms and concepts are relevant in so many different areas of application, from language instruction to professional writing (journalistic, official, legal, and political language) and from automatic text analysis to artificial intelligence. In fact, this pair of terms covers a wide range of far-reaching phenomena and properties that are found at the very center of the functioning of the linguistic system, such as referentiality, predication, the utterance-act, and information structure. The fact that definitions (and applications) were developed in different scientific spheres means that they have focused to a varying degree on these different aspects, which has at times prevented a clear view of all the problems and all the results. In addition, the general phenomena referred to above belong not only to a primarily philosophical but also to an empirical dimension, and we are still uncertain how we can reconcile these different dimensions; it is difficult to give definitive answers using individual models.

Although there are points of convergence and a level of continuity among the definitions, differences remain because their origins lie in different traditions, and the concepts have been adapted by changing scientific and cultural contexts. Attempting to superimpose terms belonging to different fields and periods is therefore problematic. The definition of Topic as 'what is being talked about' and Comment as 'what is being said about what is being talked about,' which is characteristic of American Structuralism (see Sapir, 1921; Hockett, 1958), is based on the axiom that these two parts are present in every declarative

utterance. This is expressed in regulative terms by Lambrecht (1987: 254): "Do not introduce a referent and talk about it at the same time." He affirmed that the relation Topic-of "expresses the pragmatic relation of aboutness that holds between a referent and a proposition with respect to a particular discourse" (Lambrecht, 1994: 127). For an element to be able to assume the Topic function, it has to be referential. Moreover, the relation 'Topic of' is defined in entirely semantic terms: "A referent is interpreted as a topic of a proposition if in a given discourse the proposition is construed as being about this referent, i.e. as expressing information which is relevant to and which increases the addressee's knowledge of the referent" (Lambrecht, 1994: 127 and 131).

This type of definition and the axiom referred to above have their origins in a philosophical tradition that includes the whole history of Western thought. Although terms found in classical thought require accurate philological investigation and are not easily paired up with modern terms, one can argue that the splitting of an expression (*logos*) into "two inseparable semantic and referential functions" – *onoma* and *rhema* – was established by Plato and then taken up again by Aristotle (see Lyons, 1968; Lallot, 1988; Spina, 2002). Furthermore, linking referentiality to the utterance-act has an ancient provenance. The *onoma* signals actors and experiencers, whereas the *rheme* signals actions and events. Sometimes, the *onoma* is represented as content, and the *rheme* is represented as typically having an enunciative function (Spina, 2002; for an overview of the whole tradition, see Sandmann, 1979).

An underlying opposition has also been suggested for the notions of Theme and Rheme, as is found in European functional linguistics and text linguistics (*see* **Halliday, Michael Alexander Kirkwood**). In these fields, the pair is defined according to functional principles that are based on the speaker's needs and communicative aims. Mathesius (1983: 102) maintained, "Every bipartite utterance is composed of two components, the first of which expresses something relatively new and contains what is asserted by the sentence . . . The second part of the sentence contains the basis of the utterance or theme, the psychological subject according to earlier terminology, i.e. things relatively familiar or most readily available to the speaker as the starting point." The order assigned here to the first and second parts invokes a hierarchy of importance, not some linear property of the syntagmatic structure. However, the linearization of Theme and Rheme is an area that has been investigated widely by Mathesius and other Prague School theorists (see Mathesius, 1924, 1939, 1941–1942; Daneš, 1985; Sgall *et al.,* 1986; Firbas, 1992).

The categories described by the Prague School are classical tools in discourse analysis that have precedents in philosophical thought concerning textual hermeneutics (see Schleiermacher, 1988). In actual fact, no textual analysis is possible without assuming a hierarchy of informative importance for parts of the texts with respect to the speaker or to the interlocutor. However, the Prague School and North American definitions are not as rigidly separated as one might think. Mathesius (1939: 174), for example, assimilated "that which is known in a given situation" to the "utterance's starting point . . . from where the speaker begins," defining the utterance's nucleus as "that which the speaker asserts with respect to the starting point . . . or taking it into consideration."

However, no matter how many early versions of these concepts and terms can be found, in modern linguistics, the Topic-Comment and Theme-Rheme pairs must be understood within the scientific traditions in which they were developed and in which they continue to be used (with some subsequent modifications). Even allowing for the differences between the North American and European scientific environment, both use linguistic concepts that have been influenced by schools of pragmatism. These trends have left their mark in various ways on functional approaches of the 20th century and, in certain respects, also on some fields of North American structuralism. In fact, the definition of both of these pairs assumes that the functioning of the utterance-act or of the discourse/text is a key criterion. All 20th-century models are based on the notion of functioning (the First and Second Prague Schools, Halliday, and Chafe), but the biases of each favor either the pragmatic or the semantic dimension. In the Prague tradition, the Theme and the Rheme are considered to be the units of the actual articulation of the sentence (Functional Sentence Perspective). This concerns "the way in which the sentence is inserted into the real context from which it comes" (Mathesius, 1939: 174). Indeed, "it is only the moment of actuality that creates a sentence from the words" (Mathesius, 1924: 171).

Topic and Comment, Subject and Predicate

Lack of Alignment between Pragmatic Functions and Semantic and Grammatical Functions

In many approaches, a correspondence (if not an exact correlation) is assumed between Topic-Comment and Subject-Predicate (see Sapir, 1921; Strawson, 1974; Lambrecht, 1994). In developing a "Relevance Principle," Strawson (1974: 97) observed,

"Statements or the pieces of discourse to which they belong have subjects, not only in the relatively precise sense of logic and grammar, but in a vaguer sense with which [one] shall associate the words 'topic' and 'about.'" Moreover, he noted that "stating is not a gratuitous and random human activity. We do not, except in social desperation, direct isolated and unconnected pieces of information at each other, but on the contrary intend in general to give or add information about what is a matter of standing current interest or concern" (Strawson, 1974: 97; cf. also Lambrecht, 1994).

Yet, the association of Topic-Comment and Subject-Predicate is problematic, because alongside the obvious similarities, there are also considerable differences. The first similarity lies in the actual nature of the relationship between the two parts. The question of whether the Subject is dependent on the Verb (Predicate) or whether the Predicate is dependent on the Subject has been discussed at length, and valid reasons have been proposed to support both theories (see Matthews, 1981; Graffi, 2001). However, it seems plausible to think that in each case both of the parts are necessary for the larger construction that they form (enunciation for T-C and phrase for S-P) and that they correspond and are mutually dependent (for more information on this model of interdependence or 'solidarity,' see Martinet, 1965 and 1985). There can be no Predicate without a Subject, and there can be no Subject without a Predicate; Predicate and Object, in contrast, are not linked by this kind of reciprocal relation. A second aspect that the two pairs of functions have in common concerns the canonical (or prototypical) semantico-pragmatic properties of each of the two parts: one carries reference, and the other carries the utterance-act/predication (for a philosophical account, cf. Strawson, 1974).

The differences are no less significant. Topic-Comment (T-C) or Theme-Rheme (T-R) is a representation that is anchored not at the syntactic level, but rather at a more general dimension defined as rhetorical-pragmatic (see below). In fact, it seems necessary to bring back into focus the traditional distinction among 'utterance,' 'proposition,' and 'sentence' as constructions that belong to three different dimensions; namely, the pragmatic, semantic, and syntactic. The T-C (or T-R) pair is concerned with the level of the utterance-act, and it constitutes its basic articulation. Its terms therefore need to be kept distinct from both Predicate-Arguments and Subject-Predicate, whatever similarities might exist between them. The utterance-act is defined by the speaker's communicative intention or, in other terms, by his or her desire to mean something. This type of component is not included in either the syntactic configuration or in the propositional scheme. A simple utterance such as:

(1) John loves the sea

is not represented fully by either the phrase structure of traditional constituent analysis (or any more recent version of generative grammar):

(2) [S[NP *John*] [VP[V *loves*] [NP[Det *the*] [NP *sea*]]]]

nor by the propositional scheme:

(3) p (a, b), where p = 'to love', a = 'John', b = 'sea'

but by a more complex structure that can be informally expressed as follows:

(4) as for John, I am telling you that John loves the sea

The representation in (4) demonstrates that the syntactic configuration and the propositional scheme can only be considered subparts of the whole utterance. In particular, the p component of (3) forms a lower-level predicate, the semantic representation of which is defined by three properties: bivalency, the inherent lexico-semantic features of 'to love', and the capacity to combine with arguments that have specific semantic features. In contrast, the fact that an utterance like (1) has a pragmatic representation in which a declarative statement appears does not concern the propositional predicate: It is not something that is included in the properties of the predicate 'to love,' and neither is it part of its relations with the arguments 'John' and 'sea.' The declarative statement 'I am telling' must be represented as a predicate of a higher level. The differences between the representations of the syntactic structure (2), the proposition (3), and the utterance-act (4) can be expressed in relation to the well-known distinction between 'mood' (*modus*) and the statement's content structure (*dictum*; see Bally, 1944; Graffi, 2001). The constituent that has predicative function in a sentence configuration and the predicate of the logical-semantic scheme are part of the statement's content structure. The higher predicate 'I am telling' is the mood of the utterance-act. It is not necessarily realized by phrase structure or by any other kind of segmental shape; in many languages in fact, it is normally realized by intonation. Yet, in order for an utterance-act to be formed, it must be present in any case.

Based on this schema, one can say that the division of Topic and Comment constitutes the basic structure of representations like (4). The relationship between T and C is defined by a predication at a higher level than that belonging to the predicate 'to love.' This kind of predication can be represented by the

illocutionary force of statement. The Topic function does not coincide with the Subject any more than the Comment does with the Predicate. Topic and Comment belong to an organizational level that is logically higher, and their relation is determined by the declarative mood.

Significant proof of this theory is found in a well-known empirical feature that distinguishes subordinate clauses from main clauses. Only the latter can have a Topic-Comment articulation, whereas the former do not. In fact, the illocutionary force of statement is a fundamental part of the representation of main declarative clauses, whereas subordinate clauses have only the statement's content structure in their representations. The fact that, in some approaches, like the Second Prague School (see Svoboda, 1968; Firbas, 1992), subordinate clauses have been divided into Theme and Rheme illustrates a further aspect of the conceptual difference between the two pairs of terms.

Representations like (4) can account not only for utterances like (1), where the statement's content structure is made up of a Subject – (transitive) Predicate structure but also utterances where the statement's content structure has Subject – (intransitive) Predicate structure, as in (5) with the corresponding representation of the utterance-act (6):

(5) John is coming

(6) as for John, I am telling you that John is coming

Yet, not all utterances with single-arguments in the statement's content structure have a representation like (6). So-called presentative or thetic utterances like (7):

(7) JOHN is coming

that are marked in English by a focal accent on John and in other languages by the order VS do not easily conform to the Topic-Comment split. According to a line of thought that has gained wide consensus, utterances like (7) lack the Topic-Comment articulation and the Theme-Rheme split. They can be analyzed according to two different interpretations, depending on the context. In one, *John* is in Focus (in this case, the utterance has the pragmatic presupposition that someone will come), and in the other, the whole statement's content structure is in Focus (in this case, the pragmatic presupposition can be expressed by the question "what's happening?"). In the latter interpretation, single-component structures like (7) are opposed to bipartite T-C or T-R structures. This tradition of linguistic thought was influenced by the distinction made by Kant between *a priori* 'analytic' judgments and *a posteriori* 'synthetic'

judgments, which are typically bipartite, and existential judgements that have no predicate. Marty reinterpreted the Kantian distinction by opposing "categorical" judgments that are bipartite and "thetic" judgements that are simple, having only one member (see Ulrich, 1985).

In this respect, there is an interesting difference between some Topic-Comment models that are in wide use today and the Theme-Rheme models from the Prague School. According to the first type, Topic is absent because this type of function needs to be realized by a constituent that has a high position in the referentiality hierarchy; canonically, this would be a NP. According to the second type, in contrast, the bipartite articulation is legitimate if (7) is interpreted as having only *John* in Focus: The verb 'to come' would be the Theme, and *John* would be the Rheme.

However, these analyses are problematic. The two interpretations of (7) could correspond to the representations of the utterance-act (8) and (9):

(8) I'm saying that the person who is coming is John

(9) I'm saying that what is happening is that John is coming

Yet, such representations can be considered, respectively, equivalent to the following:

(10) As for who is coming, I'm saying that the person who is coming is John

(11) As for what is happening, I'm saying that what is happening is that John is coming

The fact that the Topics of utterances like (7) are not realized in the linguistic structure does not prevent the analysis of the utterance-act from containing representations that make them explicit; the utterance-act also includes elements that are not verbally expressed but present in the context. This has at least two implications: (1) the distinction between elements that carry reference and elements that carry the predication, at the pragmatic level, might be more complicated than is often thought, and (2) the T-C and T-R models can be transcoded.

It becomes particularly obvious that we need representations of the utterance that are not limited to the canonical forms of configurational and propositional representation when we look at utterances whose syntactic structure contains constituents that do not have traditional Grammatical Functions. Utterances with various types of left dislocation and hanging topics, like (12), (13), and (14)

(12) John, I saw him yesterday

(13) John, I lent him the book

(14) John, his house is a complete mess

do not have identical functions: The Subject and Object (either direct or indirect) functions evidently belong to a level of representation different from that at which the Topic function is found. This question has recently been tackled in the so-called discourse configurational models of generative grammar (cf. Kiss, 1995). These models define two discourse semantic functions, Topic and Focus, the first "serving to foreground a specific individual that something will be predicated about" and the second "expressing identification" (Kiss, 1995: 6). Although this may seem a major departure from traditional generative models, which define the Topic function in purely configurational terms, the main orientation still remains on the study of how the two discourse functions are expressed through a structural (i.e., configurational) relation. In other terms, the discourse configurational models only account for the structural projections of a Function that itself belongs to another level of representation.

What has been said so far allows further consideration of the parallels between the Subject-Predicate and the Topic-Comment functions. The former defines the sentence and the latter the utterance. Both relations are crucial for functioning, at different levels. Through them, what were simple groups of elements become meaningful units at the sentence-level and carry indexical values at the utterance-level. It is at the latter level that they properly become communicative units.

Structural Implications of the Differences among Pragmatic, Semantic, and Grammatical Functions

The pragmatic and semantic differences discussed here have significant consequences for the structural level. They also involve different formal properties. In languages in which the Subject function is morphologically encoded (this is realized by the relevant Noun Phrases and/or by the heads of Verb phrases of which they are made), such encoding does not necessarily match the structural projection of the Topic function. For example, if the linguistic system has Case marking on the Subject, this might not be required for the Topic, or it could be realized by Case marking that is not the same as the Subject's marking. Similarly, if a language has agreement between Subject and Verb, the same might not apply to the constituents that realize the Topic and Comment functions. In general, the range of types of constituents that can have the Topic function (or the Comment function) is larger than the range of types of constituents that can have the Subject or Predicate functions.

Another group of structural properties that distinguish Subjects from Topics concerns the movement properties of the relative constituents within the sentence. In certain models, the Topic function is determined by linearity. It is associated with the first or one of the first positions of the proper domain of the sentence or with an extra-sentential position to the left of the proper domain (see Graffi, 1994; Dik, 1997). The movement of the Topic constituent to another position in the sentence, in particular toward final or extra-sentential positions to the right of the proper domain (the Tail), generally leads to the constituent losing the Topic (or Theme) function. Nevertheless, the fact that there is a significant statistical correspondence across the world's languages between the basic Subject position and the Topic function appearing in the initial position (see Comrie, 1981; Tomlin, 1986) cannot be taken as conclusive proof that Subjects and Topics should be considered to be structurally equivalent. In fact, in many languages the range of grammatical functions whose constituents can occupy the initial positions of the proper domain of the sentence is not limited to the Subject function alone. One need only think of relatively common processes, such as left dislocation of direct or indirect Objects.

Finally, there are also substantial differences in the referential endophoric properties. In many languages, the grammatical Subject constituents have control properties over anaphors that the Topic constituents do not have. All the structural differences mentioned so far have implications for both typology (cf. the Topic-prominent vs. Subject-prominent language dichotomy presented by Li and Thompson, 1976 and widely used in typology) and Universal Grammar (see the important study of Keenan, 1976).

To sum up, the set of the structural properties defined by T-C, T-R and the set of structural properties defined by Subject-Predicate intersect, but do not wholly overlap. In particular, the set of constructions that realize T-C functions is larger than the set of constructions that realize the syntactic functions Subject-Predicate.

Similarities and Differences among Various Models

The concept of Topic as an element that limits or restricts the field of the predication (Chafe, 1987) is based on structural properties (for example, the fact that the Topic needs to precede the predicate) and lexico-semantic properties (specifically, contiguity and isotopy). The definition of Theme as the 'Base' or starting point of the utterance (Mathesius), or the part that conveys the lowest level of Communicative Dynamism (Firbas, Svoboda), depends on linear

principles of functioning that are to some extent independent from the grammatical organization. To a certain extent, one can say the same for the GIVEN-NEW and for the KNOWN-UNKNOWN parameters, all of which are used widely in text linguistics. These parameters are based on the lexico-semantic and compositional properties of units in relation to larger sections of text; however, they also constitute pragmatic categories related to the functioning of the utterance-act. Similar observations can be applied to the notion of 'Focus' in Tagmemics (see Pike, 1982) and the recent versions of the Focus function (see Rebuschi and Tuller, 1999 and, which show similarities to the notions of Comment and Rheme. This is also the case for the definitions of Topic either as the center of attention (see Chafe, 1976) or as a most accessible element (see Givón, 1985; Chafe, 1994) that are based on cognitive properties.

In many models, two different pragmatic and semantic approaches are merged: one according to which the meaning and information of units depend on their referential indexes, determined by the context, and the other according to which the meaning and information of an utterance depend on the 'functioning,' or to be more precise, on the actual dynamics with which the speakers plan and perform the discourse in relation to the listeners. It is generally the case that in all the models the relationship between meaning and information remains an open question (but see the interesting proposals presented by Bar-Hillel and Carnap, 1964; Harris, 1991). However, the centrality assigned to indexical coordinates to a greater or lesser extent (see Bar-Hillel, 1954, 1970) is a criterion that appears to have been employed in a more general way than the concept of 'functioning,' albeit at different levels of theoretical development. This kind of characteristic in fact can be used as a distinctive criterion to determine the degree of pragmatic orientation of a model. Another criterion for pragmatic orientation concerns the speaker-listener dimension: Base, GIVEN, NEW, Focus, accessible element, and center of attention are all categories related to the speaker and the listener.

However, a question emerges that has so far remained unanswered: whether the categories defined according to the speaker are the same as those defined according to the listener. The fact is that the two types of categories do not necessarily coincide: what is Topic for the speaker might not be for the listener and vice versa. In fact, an important difference among the functional models concerns the bias toward production or comprehension of the utterance/text. If concepts like GIVEN and NEW or the hierarchy of communicative dynamism seem to be ambivalent, 'Base' perhaps displays a bias toward production

and 'the most accessible element' is biased toward comprehension. The bias often remains implicit, but has important consequences for the modeling itself.

Topic-Comment Articulation and Spoken Discourse

Two questions often discussed concern the hypotheses that the Topic-Comment articulation is characteristic of spoken discourse and that it has a more basic character than the Subject-Predicate articulation. Indeed, several psycholinguistic studies seem to show that in the process of language acquisition the structures that have the grammatical properties of Subject-Predicate appear after the structures that are grammatically heterogeneous and that are reducible to the general Topic-Comment articulation (cf. MacWhinney and Bates, 1978 and, for second language acquisition, Klein and Perdue, 1992). There is no question that analyses of oral corpora of languages that have grammatically articulated Subject and Predicate show numerous structures that do not conform to patterns in which the Topic is a Subject NP and the Comment is a canonical VP. Yet, the two hypotheses proposed are difficult to test empirically. One reason is that phenomena with very diverse structural characteristics are often grouped together under the label of T-C, which means that results obtained across a variety of research areas are incompatible.

Statistical calculations have been done on a range of languages through corpora in an attempt to determine the occurrence rate of structures that are traditionally considered to be examples of the T-C split, such as hanging topics, left dislocations, etc. However, it is questionable whether the results obtained in this way can definitively prove the prevalence of such structures in spoken discourse because of the great variety of linguistic and extra-linguistic conditions that can apply to both spoken texts and written texts. To sum up, without excluding the fact that certain structures like (13) and (14) are in reality characteristic of unplanned spoken discourse, in general the hypotheses discussed may have methodological rather than theoretical value. In the analysis of spoken discourse, categories, such as Topic-Comment or Theme-Rheme, may prove to be more useful than purely syntactic categories.

Cognitive, Interactional, and Textual Dimensions

The representation of Topic and Comment in cognitive terms, common in some North American functional schools, has important precedents in the history

of linguistic thought. During the second half of the 19th century, a lively debate emerged about the notion of Subject and Predicate, in which the grammatical categories were defined psychologically by some scholars (see Graffi, 2001). Paul (1920: 87) defined the Psychological Subject as "the first retrievable complex of psychological representations in the consciousness of the speaking and thinking being" and the Psychological Predicate as "the second [complex of psychological representations] that is connected to the first." Although he acknowledged that the grammatical Subject and Predicate do not always correspond to the psychological Subject and Predicate, Paul nevertheless believed that "the grammatical relations are based on the psychological relations" (1920: 111). Interest in the psychological dimension has always been present in linguistics, in particular in certain functional schools. However, in the Prague School, psychology was considered to be a discipline entirely auxiliary to linguistics (Mathesius, 1924).

In North American functional studies, topics have been defined at sentence-level (the micro-level) as constituents that have referential features or rather as 'participants' in the semantic scheme (see Foley and Van Valin, 1984; Givón, 1985; Chafe, 1994; Lambrecht, 1994). This definition has often been used in linguistic typology, particularly after Comrie (1981; see Premper, 2001). Discourse topics have been defined as "aggregate[s] of coherently related events, states, and referents that are held together in some form in the speaker's semi-active consciousness" (Chafe, 1994: 121). Givón (1985) believed that the definition of Topic as an atomistic, singular, and discrete unit at the sentence-level (the so-called micro-topic) should be replaced by a model that represents a plurality of sentence topics and the permanence or continuity of these text participants. In each case, these studies were based on a semantic assumption about the representation of ideas; namely, that events and states and the referents that participate in them make up the basic cognitive network of the speakers and the listeners (see Givón, 1985; Chafe, 1994). This model has an equivalent in the so-called ontologies in use today in artificial intelligence. The analyses of Topic continuity can in fact have numerous applications in this sector and also in computational linguistics.

Topic and Comment: Between Reference and Relationship

The property traditionally ascribed to the Topic function – namely, its capacity to contain elements that carry reference – is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for topicality. The fact that Topic has recently been reinterpreted in relation to a referential hierarchy of access to the function (Topics tend to be elements high up on the hierarchy of referentiality) shows that it is not a necessary condition. For example, there are adjectives or verb forms with no finite marking that can perform the Topic function in many languages. Moreover, not all referential elements are Topics. Referentiality simply defines a relation between an element and an exophoric context (that is to say, extra-linguistic) or an endophoric context (that is to say, intratextual). In contrast, topicality is a purely textual function, linked to the flow of information in the text: For an element to be a Topic, it must be part of an informative progression where something is being said about it or, more precisely, more information is being added about it. In other words, for an element to be a Topic, it must be true that other information will be added about it. As has been said, the models of textual Topic-continuity rely on referential characteristics, whereas sentence-oriented models are based on the relational characteristics of Topic and Comment. In the latter, the similarity with the syntactic functions of Subject and Predicate – also inherently relational – is therefore emphasized.

See also: Halliday, Michael Alexander Kirkwood; Understanding Spoken Discourse; Thetic-Categorial Distinction.

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Translation, Pragmatics

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Introduction

Pragmatics has become increasingly important in the study of translation. This is the result of a number of shifts in the way translation itself has been approached. This includes, first, the fact that we have begun to look at translation more and more as just another type of language use, indistinct from other ordinary language uses (apart from the fact that it involves two languages). Second, this shift has made it possible to consider translation as falling under the remit of verbal communication, thereby allowing us to study it within pragmatics. Finally, new developments in pragmatics have enabled us to unify the study of all types of language use, including translation, under a single pragmatic theory, thus allowing us both to simplify the study of translation and to bring it closer within the sphere of verbal communication. The end result of these shifts has been that translation now is seen as just one more instance of verbal communication and consequently, as being subject to the same principles of verbal communication that govern all utterance interpretation (both intra- and interlinguistically). (*see* **Intercultural Pragmatics and Communication**.)

The shifts in the overall approach to translation have only taken place very gradually over the last 20 years or so and in the context of an unsystematic and fragmented study of translation. This entry reviews these changes and discusses how pragmatics has come to solve earlier problems and to play an increasingly central role in the discipline. (*see* **Pragmatics: Overview**.)

The article is organized as follows. First, the gradual shift toward pragmatics within translation is discussed briefly. Then, some of the current key pragmatic concepts, as applied to translation, are introduced. Finally, the results are discussed, and some conclusions are drawn.

A Brief Overview of Approaches to Translation

The study of translation has traditionally been approached from two different points of view: one is non-theoretical, the other more theoretically oriented (for an introduction to translation studies, see, e.g., Munday, 2001).

The non-theoretical approaches to translation maintain that translation is not primarily an act of communication, but rather an art, an intuitive endeavor, and that as such is not amenable to scientific treatment. This is the stance taken by a scholar such as Steiner, who argues that in translation "what we are dealing with is not a science, but an art" (1975: 295). Similarly, Newmark (1988: 19) argues, "[i]n fact translation theory is neither a theory nor a science, but the body of knowledge that we have and have still to have about the process of translating." These non-theoretical approaches have been very influential in the study of translation, in that many scholars have seen their role as restricted to the production of lists of recommendations that could guide translators in their work. However, it has been generally acknowledged that one of the main problems with this type of approach is its inherent limitation as regards scientific enquiry and as to the type and degree of explanation achievable. In other words, from this point of view, at most we are likely to achieve a set of observations about translation; there will not be any systematic development of an underlying theory that would allow us fully to explain the phenomena involved in translation. Inevitably, as communication plays no central role in these non-theoretical approaches, the contribution of pragmatics is limited.

The more theoretically oriented approaches to translation have attempted to solve the inherent limitations of non-theoretical accounts. Broadly speaking, two types of approach can be identified: the first type is multidisciplinary and the second equivalence-based. The multidisciplinary approaches have tried to consider the various influences that can be observed in translation, with a view toward shedding some light on the processes involved. They have attempted to do this by exploring the impact on translation of diverse disciplines such as linguistics, literature, cultural studies, anthropology, etc. Multidisciplinary approaches have been influential in opening up the study of translation to many disciplines and in enabling researchers to explore a wide range of influences on the process of translation. However, one of the main problems with this type of approach has been the lack of a coherent and systematic account, giving rise instead to a highly fragmented study of the discipline and to inevitable limitations in the development of a unified theory of translation. Within this type of approach, the role of pragmatics has, at best, been one among many contributions to the field; pragmatics has not played any systematic or central part in its development.

The first major approach that allowed us to develop a more systematic and coherent account of translation was one based on the notion of equivalence (for an introduction, see Baker, 1992). This approach is part of an array of theories that are ultimately based on a structuralist view of translation and on the code model approach to communication (for an introduction to some of these theories, see Munday, 2003). The equivalence-based approach involves an important theoretical shift in that it is one of the first major attempts not only to develop a systematic and explanatory account of translation, but also to include explicitly the role of pragmatics in translation (in particular, Gricean pragmatics). (*see* **Grice, Herbert Paul; Pragmatics: Overview.**) Equivalence, in the context of translating, implies that the aim of a translation is to produce a target language text which is equivalent to the original language text. This represents an improvement on earlier approaches in that here there is a purpose and a guiding principle in the production of translations, as well as an explanation for the choices made by a translator, both in the process of translation and in the production of target texts.

The equivalence approach to translation has also been influential in that it has enabled practitioners to apply more consistent criteria to the study, practice, and evaluation of translations. From a pragmatic point of view, it has made it possible to include equivalence features at the pragmatic level (such as reference, coherence, implicatures, pragmatic maxims, etc.). (*see* **Maxims and Flouting; Implicature.**)

Even so, the equivalence approach, systematic as it may seem, lacks definitional precision. Baker herself, whose entire 1992 book is based on the notion of equivalence, acknowledges the shortcomings of this concept: "equivalence is adopted [...] for the sake of convenience – because most translators are used to it rather than because it has any theoretical status." (Baker, 1992: 5–6). The approach has also been shown to face other serious problems (see Gutt, 2000: Chap. 1), particularly as a result of the insights gained in current studies in pragmatics and human communication. What these problems have in common is the insight that equivalence is at best a descriptive concept, not an explanatory one, and that it ultimately relies on other concepts that are external to its definition (i.e., equivalence is not a sufficient criterion in and by itself). So how can these problems be addressed?

Translation, Communication, and Pragmatics

A suggested solution to the problems mentioned above places the study and practice of translation more firmly within verbal communication and pragmatics (thus making it more amenable to scientific study). As Hatim and Mason (1997: vii) state, "we look at all kinds of translating as essentially *acts of communication* in the same sense as that which applies to other kinds of verbal interaction" (my italics). Gutt (2000: 23) argues along the same lines: "Translation is indeed best handled as a matter of communication." He similarly argues that "issues of translation are at heart issues of communication" (Gutt, 2000: 198). This line of enquiry, which sees translation as an instance of verbal communication, is the main link between pragmatics and translation in current research on the subject.

The chief proponent of a consistent and systematic application of pragmatics to translation has been Gutt (2000), who has applied one of the main current pragmatic theories, viz., Relevance Theory, to the subject (for an introduction to Relevance Theory, see Blakemore, 1992; Sperber and Wilson, 1995). (*see* **Relevance Theory.**) Relevance Theory allows us to approach the study of translation as an act of communication, in a systematic and explanatory fashion. A number of key assumptions make this possible. As Blakemore (1992: 39) argues, "[t]he search for relevance is something that constrains all communication, verbal and non-verbal." (Gutt, 2000: 198) goes further and maintains that "the principles, rules and guidelines of translation are applications of the principle of relevance." He further claims that "given the general framework of relevance theory, no special, additional concepts or theoretical tools are needed to accommodate translation" (Gutt, 2000: 237). The latter claim has profound and far-reaching implications for translation, as it amounts to saying that there is no need for a theory of translation as such. Instead, translation is seen as just one more instance of verbal communication, with the particularity that it involves two languages. Thus, from this point of view, translation can be studied fully within pragmatics (which thereby becomes its proper theoretical domain).

There are a number of advantages of this approach over earlier ones. First, there is no need to construct extra theoretical machinery to account for translation. Second, all the separate and diverging claims that have been made about translation can be seen as natural applications of the principle of relevance and, therefore, can be unified under a single explanatory theory (rather than being isolated claims without internal theoretical foundation or coherence). (*see* **Communicative Principle and Communication.**) Third, translation can benefit directly from advances made in our understanding of verbal communication, pragmatics, and cognition (which contrasts with the earlier situation, when translation was

treated as an isolated discipline and had to borrow concepts from widely diverging areas of research, something that resulted in the absence of a unified account). Finally, in contrast with, e.g., equivalence approaches, an approach based on Relevance Theory provides explicit definitions for its theoretical framework, which is intended to be universal in its application and univocal in its search for intended interpretations of texts/discourses.

For a translation theory based on the notion of relevance, the challenge has been to spell out the implications for translation of all of the above claims as well as of the specific theoretical claims made within Relevance Theory proper. So far, two areas of research have been developed in this respect: one at the macro level and the other at the micro level. By far the biggest contribution in this endeavor has been achieved at the macro level (see, in particular, Gutt, 2000); here the driving interest has been the theoretical characterization of translation as an instance of verbal communication to be studied within pragmatic theory. In this respect, Gutt (2000) argues that the key notion in any account of translation is that of resemblance, both interpretive and non-interpretive. He claims that for a target text or discourse to be a translation, it has to enter into a relationship of resemblance with the original text/discourse (in which resemblance is defined as the extent to which two representations share properties such as semantic content, linguistic features, sounds, etc.). In particular, the main focus of research has been interpretive resemblance, which focuses on the resemblance of content between original and target texts (i.e., the extent to which they share analytic and synthetic implications). For a translation to be successfully communicated, so it is claimed, it must (interpretively) resemble the original in an optimally relevant way. More recently, researchers such as Almazán García (2001) have argued that the notion of interpretive resemblance must be substituted by that of metarepresentation in order to cover all possible cases of translation. However, as matters stand, there does not seem to be enough evidence to suggest that the notion of resemblance should be unable to by itself account for all translation cases (cf. Gutt, 2000: 198).

There are a number of advantages in characterizing translation as interlinguistic resemblance within the approach provided by Relevance Theory. For example, such a characterization allows us to understand why some translations are more direct than others (e.g., when issues of close resemblance are relevant, as in literary translation); or why it is sometimes necessary to include background information in the target text (e.g., when contextual assumptions would not otherwise be available to trigger the intended

contextual effects, as in translation across very different cultures). Thus, research at this macro level has been fundamental to the application of pragmatic theory to translation; it also has made its application possible at the micro-level.

At this level, the prevailing interest has been to explore in more detail the processes and products that result from seeing translation as an act of communication (see, e.g., Rosales Sequeiros, 2002). Here, a key assumption is that the translator is not only a receptor of the original text but also a communicator of the target text. This presents us with a double role for the translator in communication, which (together with the gaps that necessarily exist between what is encoded and what is communicated in linguistic communication) gives rise to an array of textual and communicative effects in translation (e.g., discrepancies between original and target texts). These effects can be seen at all pragmatic levels, including the word/concept level, the referential level, the propositional level, and the level of implicature, among others. In all these cases, we find that translations often differ from the original texts as a result of the communicative processes experienced by the translator during the interpretation of the original text and the rendering of his/her interpretation in the target text. In these cases, we find that pragmatic theory allows us to explain the discrepancies found between the two texts and, in turn, helps us in our evaluation and acceptability judgments of target texts. This insight also allows us to understand and unify, within a single theory, a wide range of translation discrepancies. For example, it allows us to determine when direct translations are not possible (e.g., when the linguistic structures of the two languages are not capable of the same degree of explicitness); or why certain discrepancies recur in translation (e.g., when the translator renders into the target language not what is encoded in the original text but, rather, what is communicated). In general, research at the micro level allows us to understand and predict the potential problems faced by translators in the process of translation, and thus alert practitioners to possible solutions.

Conclusion

Seeing translation as an instance of language use, and consequently studying it within the framework of verbal communication and pragmatics, has resulted in pragmatics playing an increasingly important and central role in the study of translation. This shift, as well as other current developments within pragmatic theory, has enabled us to unify the study of translation within a single theoretical approach, viz., that of Relevance Theory.

Relevance Theory allows us to simplify the study of translation both by doing away with the need for a separate theory of translation and by allowing us, instead, to indistinctly apply the same concepts used in other types of language use to translation. Translation is specific only inasmuch as it involves two languages and inasmuch as the target text is purported to resemble the original text. These contextual assumptions play the same role in the interpretation process as does any other contextual assumption. All the other observable and cognitive processes involved in translation can be explained and accounted for by pragmatic principles and processes covered within Relevance Theory.

Within the relevance-theoretic approach, research on translation has focused on two main areas. On the one hand, there has been an interest at the macro-level in characterizing translation as a communicative event involving interlinguistic resemblance between two texts or discourses. On the other hand, there has been an interest at the micro level in understanding the cognitive and communicative processes experienced by translators as receptors and communicators, and the effects these processes have on the products of translation.

Future pragmatic research on translation is likely to continue to focus on the two levels indicated above, as it attempts both to specify the communicative nature of translation more precisely and to understand the changes in target texts and discourses caused by the communicative process of translation.

See also: Communicative Principle and Communication; Implicature; Intercultural Pragmatics and Communication; Maxims and Flouting; Pragmatic Acts; Pragmatics: Overview; Relevance Theory.

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Traugott has conducted research on historical syntax and semantics, sociohistorical linguistics, and linguistics and literature. Her first major publication is *A history of English syntax: a transformational approach to the history of English sentence structure* (1972). This book analyzes the fundamental constructions and events of English historical syntax (changes in the verbal system, in surface case forms, in dominant word order types, in negative and interrogative sentence patterns, in complementation and relativization, among others). Traugott also examines several instances of foreign (French, Latin, Old Norse) influence on English syntax. This work excellently summarizes the research tradition in the field of historical syntax. The chapters include Modern English syntax, Old English, Middle and Early Modern English, and Modern English since 1700. While this research manifests a Chomskyan influence, it is also supplemented by performative analysis and case grammar.

Her other research contributions focus on language change, particularly grammaticalization, lexicalization of conversational inferences, and subjectification; clause combining, particularly conditionals, concessives, and causal clauses. Some of her important articles in these areas include '*And* and *But*

connectives in English' (*Studies in language*, 1986), 'On the rise of epistemic meanings in English: an example of subjectification in semantic change' (*Language*, 1989). With respect to clause combining, the investigation of the historical paths of English connectives *and* and *but* shows that there is a strong tendency for spatial and temporal meanings to give rise to logical connective meanings. In regard to the subjectification process in semantic change, it is demonstrated that "meanings tend to become increasingly situated in the speaker's subjective belief state or attitude towards the proposition." The semantic changes of modal auxiliaries (e.g., *must*), assertive speech act verbs, and modal adverbs show that epistemics develop from more root, deontic, and concrete meanings to more strongly subject epistemicity.

Her seminal book *Grammaticalization* (1993; 2nd edn. 2003, with P. Hopper) deals with historical as well as synchronic linguistics whereby "lexical items and constructions come in certain linguistic contents to serve grammatical functions, and, once grammaticalized, continue to develop new grammatical functions" (2003: xv). This change corresponds to the shift of content words to pure function words.

Traugott also co-authored *Regularity in semantic change* with R. Dasher (2001) in which cross-linguistic unidirectional tendencies in semantic change are discussed in detail. Her writings also include *Linguistics for Students of literature* (1980; with M. L. Pratt), and *On conditionals* (1986; co-edited).

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Understanding Spoken Discourse

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Introduction: the Contextual Specificity of Spoken Interaction

To characterize spoken discourse requires us to specify the very different contexts of utterance which occur in the production and reception of spoken and written discourse. These configurations largely explain the rather different properties of spoken and written discourse, even allowing for equivalence of register and formality: see the well-documented account of crosslanguage spoken syntax and discourse in Miller and Weinert (1998).

Speech prototypically involves face-to-face interaction between two or more participants who share a spatiotemporal environment. This, together with a common cultural and personal background in the case of conversationalists who know each other well, provides a rich contextual common ground, allowing the speaker to avoid having to verbalize a number of aspects of his or her message. At the same time this common ground enables the discourse participants to rely to a large extent on nonverbal signaling, in tandem with and even, on occasion, in place of, the verbal textualization of a given utterance. Planning time, as well as 'understanding' time, is naturally minimal and at a premium – and a great many features of spontaneous speech flow from this key factor. Moreover, both speech and writing are normally designed by the user so as to be readily understood by the addressee (cf. the notion of 'recipient design'). Indeed, according to Clark (1996) and other linguists, conversation and communication in general is a fundamentally joint activity, involving the active participation of the interlocutors and the coordination of their actions (verbal as well as nonverbal).

What I have just (very briefly) characterized is of course the prototypical instance of spoken interaction. There are obviously other less prototypical types of spoken discourse: for example, speaking on the telephone, where the participants share a time frame (adjusting for time zone differences when the call is international) but not a spatial one, where only two participants are involved, and where the communication is 'ear to ear' rather than face to face (no nonvocal gestures or visual percepts are possible): see Drummond and Hopper (1991) for a discussion of miscommunication over the telephone; and speaking in a formal situation (a speech, lecture, and so forth) in front of a group of people in circumstances where convention does not normally allow for verbal exchange and interaction.

In written discourse, on the other hand, there is by definition no common spatiotemporal ground between the writer and his or her reader(s). Since this is the case, and since inevitably there will be little or no opportunity to use nonverbal signals, the text used will need to be relatively explicit – since the textual input is confined to the verbal content, in conjunction with punctuation and various graphic devices. The much greater availability, in principle, of planning time allows the writer to review and to amend his or her written production.

The Context of Spoken Discourse, the Distinction between *Text* and *Discourse*, and their Roles in Understanding

It is useful in analyzing spoken (as well as written) discourse understanding to draw a three-way distinction between the dimensions of *text*, *discourse*, and *context*. Definitions which I find helpful are given below (see Cornish, 1999: §2.3 and 2003: §2 for further development and illustration of the 'text'/'discourse' distinction, and its importance for anaphora; also Edmondson, 1981: 4; Seidlhofer and Widdowson, 1999; and Werth, 1999: ch. 5 in connection with the notion 'context,' on 'Common Ground' within his 'Text Worlds' framework):

Text, discourse and context
Text: the connected sequence of verbal signs and nonverbal signals in terms of which discourse is

coconstructed by the participants in the act of communication.

> *Discourse*: the hierarchically structured, situated sequence of indexical, propositional, utterance and illocutionary acts carried out in pursuance of some communicative goal, as integrated within a given context.
>
> The *context* is subject to an ongoing process of construction and revision as the discourse unfolds. It is through the invocation of a relevant context (which is partly determined by the nature of the cotext at issue, as well as by its genre) that the hearer or reader is able to convert the connected sequence of textual cues that is *text* into *discourse*. (Extract [slightly amended with permission from Mouton de Gruyter] from Cornish, 2003: 3.)

The text is the perceptible record of at least one utterance act (whether realized in terms of a verbal, linguistic trace or of a nonverbal trace – which may be gestural, sensory-perceptual or prosodic). See especially Clark (1996), chapter 6, on nonverbal signals and their different kinds of function in discourse. Clark draws a highly relevant distinction between two simultaneously functioning textual 'tracks' which operate in spoken discourse: a primary track, where the 'official business' of the transaction at hand is conducted; and a secondary 'metadiscursive' or discourse management track, where participants make explicit the purposes and functions of the preceding and ongoing talk. The functions of either track may be realized via verbal and nonverbal signals (whether in tandem or individually). We shall be looking at examples of this dual-track structure in operation shortly.

The notion of *text* is close to what Gumperz (1992: 234) calls "contextualization cues." The discourse partners make use of this record (a dual-track one, according to Clark, 1996), in conjunction with their invocation of a relevant *context* in cognitive terms, in order to create discourse.

Discourse, on the other hand, refers to the hierarchically structured, mentally represented product of the sequences of utterance, propositional, illocutionary, and indexical acts which the participants are carrying out as the communication takes place. Such sequences have as their *raison d'être* the accomplishment of some particular overall communicative goal (see Parisi and Castelfranchi, 1977).

The crucial point about this distinction is that discourse is a (re)constructive, and therefore highly probabilistic, enterprise: from the addressee's perspective, it is by no means a question of simply directly **decoding** the text in order to arrive at the fully fledged message originally intended by the addressor. Indeed, the addressee actively contributes both to the text and to the discourse via his or her phatic signals,

indications of (mis)understanding, and other reactions to the speaker's moves. Meaning does not lie 'in' the text; it has to be constructed by the addressee (and the speaker!) via the text and an appropriate context (cf. Coupland *et al.*, 1991: 5). In any case, the text is often, if not always, both incomplete and indeterminate in relation to the discourse which may be derived from it in conjunction with a context.

Some Aspects of Understanding Spoken Discourse

Inferring Propositional Content and Illocutionary Force

In what follows, I shall be examining instances of (mis)understanding which occur, and are manifest, **within** conversations. So it is the monitoring by the discourse participants themselves of the discourse being co-constructed that is at issue here. I am adopting the principle that it is when misunderstandings, disagreements, or disruptions generally are manifest in the textual record of a conversation that the way in which discourse normally operates may be seen most clearly (cf. Coupland *et al.*, 1991). Let us analyze an initial occurrence of such a phenomenon. Here is a segment from the BBC Radio 4 cultural discussion program *Start the Week*. The previous speaker (Caroline Quinn) has been arguing that the alienation of black people in the United States is not due to a single factor, but has a variety of causes; that the situation is improving for all racial groups in the United States, and that differences in degrees of integration into U.S. society are in part due to differences in the 'cultural inheritance' which each group brings with it. Homi Bhabha is then given the floor (for a second time) by the presenter, Melvyn Bragg. Notational symbols used here are as follows: – : pause; — : double pause; upper-case letters: strongly accented syllable; [...]: simultaneous speech; = : latching; (a): elision of 'a'; .hhh = sharp intake of breath. See Cameron (2001), chapter 3 and Schiffrin (1994), Appendix 2 for details of spoken discourse transcription.

> HB: Kate Kate – Caroline – you know I'm SURE you didn't mean it but sometimes – cultural inheritance shades off into biological inheritance – in in the States you know people say .hhh – Blacks are in some – inherent way – inferior – an' there's a lot of – a lot of a lot of stuff going around now of course – American Blacks came as slaves it's not what they brought with them it was what they were not – Able to bring with them they were [snatched – no but – —]
> CQ: [it's no – it's nobody's fault] =

Idem: = no I'm not saying it's anybody's fault – but I'm just saying you know that that's the brute – historical – FACT . . .

In track 1 here, Caroline Quinn asserts that the fact that black slaves were forced to sail to America without taking any of their possessions with them was not **their** fault (this is the proposition actually intended to be conveyed by the speaker here). It is no doubt the extreme sensitivity of the issue (racism towards Blacks) that has motivated the use of the indefinite negative with wide scope, *nobody*, here. (This is also the motivation for HB's intake of breath in line 4, just before his presentation of the [racist] view of Blacks in the United States.) And in track 2, the same speaker is rejecting what she sees as Homi Bhabha's illocutionary stance in the extract – justifying and even seeming to condone the fact that black people in the United States are still not considered as 'real' Americans. Bhabha's response (in track 2) is to assert that this is not **his** view (notice his repetition of the verb *say* in "I'm (not) saying . . . "), but that the source of the way black Americans are viewed today is an objective, historical fact; and in doing so, he is clearly rejecting Caroline Quinn's implied interpretation of his illocutionary stance in his first turn.

Inferring Intended Interactional Moves and Acts

Occasionally, speakers and their addressee(s) disengage themselves from the discourse which they are creating, to establish metadiscursively what the relation is between their adjacent moves. This occurs in the 'second' track, then, in Clark's (1996) terms. When this happens, we get an explicit view of how the discourse participants are interpreting each other's utterances (see also Cameron, 2001: 116). An example occurred during a discussion about the Devil in another edition of *Start the Week* (April 22, 1996). Here, Melvyn Bragg (MB) is picking up on Peter Stanford's characterization of the use of 'the Devil' by the medieval Church as a means of social control:

MB: yes – the interesting thing is that was it already coercive an' repressive – or did it actually call out something that's in people anyway – I mean the way you put it is that this is an authorit this is a Church behaving as the Church behaved in many many diff(e)rent ways – in great ways an' in wicked ways – but this is a Church behaving in a very authoriTArian way – in saying "you will follow us – or we will er – we will – get you and we've got the man to get you – he's called 'the Devil'" – but – isn't there something else there – isn't it a rec(og)nition of what's part of human nature and it was a BRILLiant metaphor – just as Christianity is full

of brilliant metaphors as to what human nature is about so – .hhh it's more positive in a way than [what you're saying]
PS: [well – well] it wouldn't have worked would it – un un unless they were actually tapping into something that people wanted to believe – and if you think about it =
MB: = so you're agreeing =
PS: = I'm agreeing – but if you think about the – concept of evil . . .

Melvyn Bragg, in his first turn, is objecting to what he sees as a one-sided view of the status of the Devil in the medieval Church, according to Peter Stanford's earlier characterization: he is taking the view that, rather than 'imposing' the Devil on believers in an authoritarian manner, the medieval Church more intelligently used the Devil as a metaphor for something that it recognized as already being part of human nature. Given that it is the former view which Bragg understands Stanford to be adopting, he clearly expects him to disagree with his objection. Yet Stanford's response is in conformity with this 'objection,' so it cannot count as a 'disagreement.' As soon as Bragg realizes this, he interrupts Stanford's response and asks him (via a declarative request) for confirmation of this interpretation. Stanford then immediately gives it by repeating the 'agreement' statement, then moves straight on to a development of the main point he had begun making at the point of interruption. This is achieved via a repetition of the actual words of his preceding final utterance (with the conjunction *and* replaced by the adversative *but*): *. . . and if you think about it . . . .* This is clear evidence of the 'two-track' structure of textual development, as argued by Clark (1996), since the final conjunct of the preinterrupted segment by Peter Stanford is repeated virtually verbatim immediately after the interruption. This indicates that the primary, 'official business' track has not in fact been interrupted, but that it is the secondary, metadiscursive one which contained the interruption.

Conclusion

As Clark (1996) in particular emphasizes throughout his book, discourse is a joint endeavor, not the individual responsibility of the speaker, where the addressee has a merely passive role in decoding his or her utterances. The textual record (verbal content of the utterances as well as meaningful gestures, prosody, and phatic and other vocalizations) underdetermines the discourse which the participants are jointly constructing as the text unfolds in a particular context. The discourse constructed at any given point in this unfolding is a tentative, probabilistic affair, and not only is it subject to continual modification

in terms of updating as each new utterance is encountered, but the immediately preceding discourse at a given point may also be revised and reconstructed retroactively, as a function of a subsequent discourse act or move. This may occur when a participant, encountering another's reaction to what he or she is attempting to say, realizes the latter has misunderstood his or her propositional content or illocutionary stance or the nature of his or her move (see the *Start the Week* examples above). In triggering this process of updating, revision and (re)negotiation, discourse particles, vocal and visual gestures, pausing and prosody generally, all take on a crucial significance. The dual-track structure of textualization suggested by Clark (1996) makes possible this parallel management of the discharge of 'official discourse business' (track 1) on the one hand, and the signaling of discourse organization (track 2) on the other.

See also: Context and Common Ground; Context, Communicative; Conversation Analysis; Discourse Processing; Speech Acts; Spoken Discourse: Types.

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Use Theories of Meaning

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Traditional theories of meaning of the kind proposed by Frege, Russell, and the early Wittgenstein take to heart the idea that language is a system of symbols whose essential role is to **state** or to **represent** the goings on of the world and the mind. From the point of view of a traditional, or representationalist, approach to meaning, the fundamental area of inquiry about language and its significance has to do with the connection between linguistic items and the things they stand for or represent, things or facts. That is why two of the main focal points of traditional theories of meaning are the theory of reference – the exploration of the bond that ties expressions in a language to things in the world – and the theory of propositions – the discussion of the form and the constitution of what is expressed by utterances of sentences and their role in the determination of truth or falsity. So-called use theories of meaning can be best seen as reactions to the fundamental tenets of traditional theories: whereas traditional theories focus on what language represents and how it represents it, use theories search for the key to meaning in actual usage and linguistic practice.

The first strong appeal to use in the theory of meaning appeared in print in 1950, in P. F. Strawson's article 'On Referring.' Strawson's article is meant to be primarily a critical response to the analysis of sentences containing definite descriptions proposed by Bertrand Russell in his seminal paper

'On Denoting.' The merits or demerits of Strawson's specific objections to Russell's theory of descriptions will not be addressed here. The important point for our purposes is rather the positive outlook on meaning that Strawson's remarks suggest. In criticizing Russell, Strawson (1971: 9) contends that "to talk about the meaning of an expression or sentence [is to talk about] the rules, habits, conventions governing its correct use, on all occasions to refer or to assert". Although rather programmatic in character, Strawson's remarks point towards a conception of the significance of linguistic expressions that departs radically from the Frege–Russell–early Wittgenstein approach for, according to Strawson, neither the things that terms stand for, as Russell and Wittgenstein would have it, nor the conceptual material associated with expressions – the sense – that in turn determines what those expressions stand for, as Frege would have it, constitute appropriate answers to the question 'What is the meaning of X?' On the contrary: "to give the meaning of an expression is to give general directions for its use" (Strawson, 1971: 9).

Traditional theories of meaning, with their emphasis on reference and propositions, leave out of the realm of semantic inquiry a host of expressions whose significance cannot be doubted. For what does 'hello' refer to? What proposition do we express, what fragment of the world do we represent, when we say 'hello'? If we do express a proposition, under which conditions is it true or false? Unlike traditional theories, use theories of meaning would explain the meaning of 'hello' and similar expressions by appeal to the rules and conventions that indicate their appropriate use. But it is not only expressions such as 'hello,' 'ouch,' or 'pardon' that, according to use theorists, are left behind by traditional approaches. J. L. Austin argued that this is so for a class of sentences, which he characterized as 'performative,' that look grammatically like any other subject-predicate or subject-verb-object sentence that we use to represent a fragment of the world, such as 'It is raining' or 'The train is late.' We use the latter to tell the way things are and consequently when we utter them we say something true or something false. Performative utterances, on the other hand, do not state or represent the way things are. When we utter a performative, Austin argues, we certainly say something significant, yet it is neither true nor false. The uses of sentences that Austin is thinking of are utterances of, for instance, 'I name this ship *Queen Elizabeth*,' 'I do [take this man to be my husband],' 'I promise to be at the party,' 'I apologize.' According to Austin what all these sentences have in common is that by uttering one of them we do not report or describe a state of affairs, an event or an action. Uttering one

of those sentences is actually **performing** an action. Uttering a performative is a speech act. By saying 'I do,' as Austin (1961: 235) puts it, "I am not reporting on a marriage, I am indulging in it". Because utterances of performatives do not function like statements, the question of truth or falsity does not arise with regard to them. However, there are, Austin points out, ways in which performatives can succeed or fail. For instance, if the utterer does not have the authority to give a name to a ship, her utterance of 'I name this ship *Queen Elizabeth*' does not succeed in performing the intended action. For an utterance of a performative to be satisfactory some felicity conditions must be in place.

It is tempting to think that Austin is highlighting a phenomenon circumscribed to a well-delimited class of utterances, and that for the vast majority of natural language sentences the traditional representational picture applies smoothly. That is not so: what Austin is proposing is not just a specific treatment of a peculiar phenomenon but rather a different conception of meaningfulness. On Austin's view, statements, as much as performatives, are essentially speech acts and are therefore subject to similar conditions of adequacy and success. Suppose we utter a statement such as 'John's children are all very polite' and John has no children. According to Austin, the situation as regards that statement parallels a performative utterance such as 'I promise I will sell you this piece of land' when the piece of land in question does not exist. In the latter case we would say that the sale is void; and in the former case we should say that the statement is void also. Both performatives and statements are subject to the question 'Is it in order?' If the answer is negative, the performance fails. And if the answer is positive, then both performatives and statements are subject to further questions of felicity. Those questions may take different forms depending on the type of speech act: if it is a warning, the question is whether it was justified; if it is a piece of advice, the question is whether it was sound; if it is a statement, the question is whether it was true; in every case, although in different forms, those questions "can only be decided by considering how the content ... is related in some way to fact ... we do require to assess at least a great many performative utterances in a general dimension of correspondence with fact" (Austin, 1961: 250). In this way Austin (1961: 251) takes statements "off their pedestal" and offers a uniform picture of meaning that appeals essentially to our usage of expressions to do things.

Among use theorists we cannot forget Ludwig Wittgenstein, the coiner of the motto 'meaning is use.' In the first part of the *Philosophical Investigations*,

completed in 1945 although not published until 1953, Wittgenstein reacts strongly against the traditional conception of meaning. In fact, Wittgenstein is reacting against his own earlier views presented in the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. Wittgenstein's account of meaning in the *Tractatus*, with its characterization of the proposition as a picture of a fragment of the world, is the paramount example of a traditional representationalist approach. In the *Investigations*, by contrast, Wittgenstein rejects the explanatory project of Frege and Russell: neither the Fregean senses that are supposed to determine the objects expressions refer to, nor the things that on Russell's (and the *Tractatus*'s) approach are directly and conventionally associated with signs, give life and significance to language: only its use gives meaning to a sign.

To understand the kind of practice we engage in when we use a language as members of a speakers' community, Wittgenstein appeals to the metaphor of playing a game. For Wittgenstein, learning a language, like playing tennis, consists in becoming competent at a rule-governed practice. It does not consist in explicitly learning the rules, having them, so to speak, written in one's mind; being able to play tennis, or being able to speak and understand a language consists in being proficient at doing something according to the rules.

Different use-oriented approaches to meaning criticize the traditionalist stance for disregarding the fact that language is a tool that we use to do things, that speaking and understanding a language is a matter of engaging in a practice, and that, consequently, the key to meaning is to be found in the way language users employ language. But how radical the departure from the traditional stance is depends on how the motto 'meaning is use' is interpreted. On the one hand it may be interpreted as a claim about what gives expressions the meaning they have. The appeal to use is then a reminder that languages are social institutions and that it is by virtue of usage that expressions are connected to their meanings. From this point of view, it is not inappropriate to say, for instance, that by virtue of its use, the word 'dog' means a certain concept or that its meaning consists in naming a species. So interpreted, the claim that meaning is use is fundamentally presemantic, it is not a claim about what constitutes the meaning of expressions. So conceived, use theories of meaning are not opposed in essence to traditional theories, although by stressing the meaning-conferring role of use they expand the horizons of the traditional stance, for they make room in semantic theory for expressions whose meaning cannot be cashed out in terms of what and how

they represent objects or states of affairs, and they do not disregard aspects of meaning that are not truth conditional.

A more radical way of interpreting the claim that meaning is use is as a semantic claim, i.e., a claim about what constitutes the meaning of linguistic expressions. From this point of view there is nothing over and above the way an expression is used that can qualify as its meaning. Use is not just what makes an expression have a meaning: it is **all there is** to meaning. Some varieties of deflationism take this stance. Thus, for instance, in Horwich (1998: 6) we read: "The meaning property of a word reduces [to] . . . the property that every use of the word is explained in terms of the fact that we accept certain specified sentences containing it."

The radical interpretation of the claim that meaning is use faces a number of objections. Here I will focus on only two general challenges (for discussion, see Horwich, 1998). First, it may be argued that the idea that use determines the meaning of an expression puts the cart before the horse. Intuitively there is a distinction to be drawn between correct or incorrect usage. No matter how pervasive the use of 'irregardless' is, it is an incorrect expression. The very idea of incorrect, but extended, use seems to entail that it is because expressions do have a meaning, over and above the way in which they are used, that we can talk about correct or incorrect usage. Meaning determines (correct) use and not vice versa, so it seems that the claim that meaning is constituted by use has difficulties accounting for the normative aspect of meaning.

Second, the idea that all there is to the meaning of an expression is its use does not leave room for what appears to be a legitimate possibility: a speaker may be competent in the use of an expression, she may know the situations in which it is appropriate to use it and how to react to uses of it, and yet she may not know the meaning of the expression in question. The possibility is, in fact, less far fetched than it appears. Consider the case of Helen Keller: blind and deaf from an early age, she explains in her autobiography how she and her family had developed a rather good system of symbols to communicate their needs and wishes: when she wanted bread, she made a sign, when she wanted ice cream, she made another sign. Her mother had ways to tell Helen what she needed, and Helen would go and get it for her: Helen had mastered the use of a system of symbols. Nevertheless, when she was seven her teacher, Miss Sullivan, once spelled on Helen's hand the sign for water while Helen felt water with her other hand, and that was the moment that she describes as "learning the key to

all language." What could she possibly have discovered that she didn't know before? It surely was not how to use the sign 'water' but rather, and quite simply, that 'water' stands for water. Now, it may be argued that learning that 'water' can be used to refer to water is indeed learning something new about the use of 'water.' But then it would appear that even from the point of view of use theories of meaning we need to be sensitive to the fact that expressions represent things and that it is the relation between words and things that makes it possible for us to talk about the world.

See also: Austin, John L.; Reference: Psycholinguistic Approach; Reference: Semiotic Theory; Speech Acts; Wittgenstein, Ludwig Josef Johann.

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Use versus Mention

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Generally, the distinction between using something and mentioning it is completely straightforward. For instance, there is all the difference in the world between mentioning, or talking about, a lawn mower, and using it to mow the lawn. Yet the distinction can engender some confusion when it comes to mental and linguistic representations, and this is what philosophers and linguists have in mind when they talk about the use/mention distinction. The distinction between mentioning a word, picture, or mental representation, and using it to communicate or entertain a thought is best illustrated by example. Sentence (1) uses the word 'Boston,' and sentence (2) mentions it.

(1) Fred is from Boston.
(2) 'Boston' has two syllables.

Philosophers customarily put a word (or complex expression) inside quotation marks, to form its 'quote name,' if they want to mention it instead of using it, as in (2). Linguists, in contrast, typically use italics, labeled bracketing trees, or a phonetic alphabet to mention an expression, as in (3a–c).

(3a) *Boston* has two syllables.
(3b) [NP Boston] has two syllables.
(3c) bɒs tən has two syllables.

An advantage of the philosopher's convention is that we may easily form the quote name of a quote name simply by enclosing the quote name itself in quotation marks, as in (4):

(4) '"Boston"' is the name of a word, not a city.

We can also mention an expression without using any of these devices, as in (5) and (6).

(5) The first line of Gray's Elegy states a proposition.
(6) Samuel Clemens's pen name is derived from a riverboat driver's call.

Example (5) uses an expression, 'the first line of Gray's Elegy,' to mention the linguistic expression it denotes, namely, 'The curfew tolls the knell of parting day.' Similarly in (6), the expression 'Samuel Clemens's pen name' is used to mention another linguistic expression, namely 'Mark Twain.'

When we talk more systematically about a particular language, as we do in describing its syntax or semantics, we observe the related distinction between object language and metalanguage. The object language is the language under discussion, and the metalanguage is the language we use to talk about the object language. In some cases, the object language and the metalanguage are different languages, as in (7), but the object language and the metalanguage can be the very same, as in (8).

(7) 'Le chien est sur la chaise' is true if and only if the dog is on the chair.
(8) 'The dog is on the chair' is true if and only if the dog is on the chair.

Sentences (7) and (8) mention sentences of the object language (enclosed within quotation marks).

The metalanguage, in both cases English, is the language used to state the truth condition of sentences in the object language.

Sentences that mention themselves, such as (9), can give rise to paradox.

(9) This sentence is false.

Sentence (9) appears to have the paradoxical property of expressing a truth if and only if it expresses a falsehood. Many sentences that mention themselves are innocent in this respect, such as (10):

(10) This sentence contains five words.

The paradox only arises for sentences that self-ascribe semantic properties such as truth or falsehood. A central project of a theory of truth is to resolve this paradox.

So far, the use/mention distinction seems easy to keep straight: How could someone confuse the name 'Boston' with the New England city itself? Yet philosophers sometimes charge one another with confusing use and mention of linguistic expressions. Such confusion typically results in mere obscurity, as it does in this passage from Leibniz, as translated by C. I. Lewis.

> Two terms are the same if one can be substituted for the other without altering the truth of any statement. If we have A and B and A enters into some true proposition, and the substitution of B for A wherever it appears, results in a new proposition which is likewise true, and if this can be done for every such proposition, then A and B are said to be the same; and conversely, if A and B are the same, then they can be substituted for one another as I have said (Lewis, 1960: 291).

Richard Cartwright has suggested that the apparent use/mention confusion here makes it difficult to see exactly what Leibniz intended to say in this passage (Cartwright, 1971: 119). Perhaps Leibniz meant that A and B are the same if and only if **their names** can be intersubstituted into any statement without altering the truth value of the proposition that the statement expresses. If this was what he meant, then in some places he should have **mentioned** the names of A and B rather than **using** them, as he in fact did.

In other cases, however, use/mention confusions may ground substantive philosophical mistakes. One such mistake is the familiar confusion of objects with our ideas of them. This mistake arises particularly for philosophically problematic entities such as the number three and Beethoven's Ninth Symphony. It is obvious that they are not concrete objects, but less obvious what else they could be. Since we clearly have ideas of these objects, some have suggested that we identify the objects themselves with our ideas of them. Cursory reflection reveals that this suggestion cannot be correct, since these entities have properties that ideas could not have. Ideas, for instance, cannot be the cube root of 27 or played frequently by the Berlin Philharmonic. Plausibly, what lies behind this suggestion that objects like these are really ideas in our heads is a confusion of our mental representations of these objects with the objects themselves. Like the confusion of the word 'Boston' with the city of Boston, this is a straightforward confusion of use with mention.

See also: Pragmatics and Semantics; Semantics-Pragmatics Boundary.

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V

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Valentin Nikolaevich Voloshinov was born in Saint Petersburg, Russia, on June 30, 1895. Though he originally set out to study law, entering Saint Petersburg University in 1913, material circumstances forced him to leave in 1917, before finishing his degree. For the next several years, Voloshinov held a series of teaching stints, serving as a piano instructor for the People's Education Department, for instance, before meeting up with fellow teachers Bakhtin and Medvedev, who were all working in Vitebsk in 1920. The three intellectuals stayed in close contact throughout the 1920s, engaging in lively discussions about language, politics, philosophy, and literature, and forming what is today known as the Bakhtin Circle.

Determined to continue his training as a linguist, Voloshinov returned to his native Saint Petersburg (then renamed Petrograd), where he completed his studies in ethnology and linguistics, finishing his university degree in 1924. The following year, he accepted a position as a research assistant at Saint Petersburg University, in the newly formed Institute for the Comparative History of the Literatures and Languages of the West and East, where he continued as a postgraduate student in 1926, later becoming a research fellow after completing his studies in 1929. Starting in 1932, Voloshinov taught sociology and art at the Herzen Pedagogical Institute, a position he kept until 1934, when poor health forced him to end his professional life. Voloshinov succumbed to the ravages of tuberculosis in 1936, ending a brief but brilliant career that has only recently gained public recognition.

Voloshinov is best known for his sophisticated work on language ideology, a concept he initially drew from Marxist philosophy, with its strong focus on the political ramifications of public consciousness. As Voloshinov came to argue in his seminal work, *Marxism and the philosophy of language* (1929), public discourses are constructed in verbal encounters, in which speakers negotiate worldview through dialogic exchanges, often defending or even countering the dominant ideologies expressed elsewhere in a society. Of course, the whole framework is reminiscent of the dialogic approach to language that Voloshinov's friend, Bakhtin, articulated. For this reason, many scholars are inclined to attribute the writings signed by Voloshinov and published under his name solely to Bakhtin. The issue of authorship remains open, though many now entertain the possibility that the influence was mutual. In this article, the works published under Voloshinov's name are treated as his alone.

Deeply dissatisfied with the linguistics of his day, Voloshinov sought to develop a new school rooted in social interaction rather than in abstract structural characteristics, such as phonetics, lexicon, and grammar, which were increasingly being studied for their own sake. Voloshinov argued that linguists had adopted an inappropriate methodology derived from the study of dead languages, in which the utterance was, of necessity, removed from its original social setting as an isolated, monologic byproduct. Yet in a living language the utterance is central to the construction of meaning, which derives as much from the social context as it does from structural traits, such as word order or grammatical categories.

For Voloshinov, the meaning of an utterance is always based on a specific 'theme,' or a common stock of assumptions shared by participants, one that is generally rooted in the unrepeatable circumstances of the encounter. From this perspective, a word or grammatical concept takes on subtle new shades of meaning every time it is uttered. Consider the use of the pronoun 'we' in the framing of the American constitution, where the reference once excluded both women and slaves, who were systematically barred from participating in the government for some time to come. Or consider the racial use of the color terms 'black' and 'white' before the civil rights movement of the 1960s. Ordinary words can propagate powerful social ideologies for specific groups in specific times. Yet Voloshinov also maintained that linguistic concepts retain a core ideological neutality

and potential multivalence, allowing them to potentially convey any ideology or even mean different things to different groups at different times. Hence, the expression 'we the people' no longer excludes women, though it did in early America. In actual use, Voloshinov argued linguistic concepts always carry an evaluative, ideologically charged sense – meaning that they always convey specific perspectives, often with strong political overtones.

Where Saussurean linguists posited an idealized speaker–hearer with a perfect command of relatively homogeneous grammar and vocabulary, Voloshinov argued that meaning is always changing through use, and speakers differ profoundly in their knowledge, stylistic preferences, or deployment of grammatical rules. Where Saussurean linguists represented communication with arrows passing from an active speaker to a passive addressee, who merely decodes the speech by relying on the conventional meanings of linguistic concepts, Voloshinov argued that communication was in fact a two-way street or 'double-sided act,' in which the receiver also plays an active role in shaping meaning, anticipating contemporary speech act theory. For Voloshinov, the listener also plays a role in shaping the exchange, whose outcome neither party ever fully anticipates. Finally, where the Saussurean model of the invariant linguistic sign relegated the messy issue of change to the diachronic realm, where its source still remained mysterious, Voloshinov regarded change as a byproduct of dialogue, or the constant negotiation of per-spective in actual language use, where structure and meaning are always undergoing subtle revision.

Because his new school of linguistics was based on the ideologically charged utterance, Voloshinov devoted a whole section of *Marxism and the philosophy of language* to problems of 'reported speech.' For, in actual pratice, speakers spend a great deal of time quoting or repeating the words of other speakers. Also, if the linguist analyzes speech, the discipline had better develop a methodology for accurately reporting the utterance, without ignoring the author's role in shaping meaning assigned to speakers. One approach is to maintain sharp boundaries between authorial and reported speech, clearly separating the two voices with quotation marks or subordinate clauses, for instance. In contrast to this painstaking 'linear' method, Voloshinov notes the existence of the 'pictorial' approach, in which the author takes the liberty of interspersing the reported speech with commentaries and replies, as in literature. Another tendency is to capture the content, if not the style, a approach Voloshinov dubbed the 'referent analyzing' approach, as opposed to the contrasting 'texture analyzing' approach, in which the author strives to capture the tone and feel of the reported speech.

See also: Bakhtin, Mikhail Mikhailovich; Reported Speech: Pragmatic Aspects.

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Born in Byelorussia, Lev Semenovich Vygotskiĭ studied at Moscow University from 1913 to 1917, gaining experience in a wide range of disciplines from medicine to law. His most vivid interest of this time concerned art and literature, and some of the elements of his early art criticism were later incorporated into his main psychological work. Returning to Byelorussia, Vygotskiĭ worked in Gomel as teacher and lecturer in different institutions, where he tried to reform the ways of teaching according to the new postrevolutionary situation. His interest in the

process of knowledge transmission and assimilation led him more and more to the problems of psychology and symbolic interaction.

In 1924, Vygotskiǐ was invited to work at the Institute of Psychology in Moscow, where he started intensive research in different branches of psychology, psychophysiology, and related fields. His dissertation on psychology of art (1925, published only in 1965) recapitulated his early ideas of art (mainly literary) criticism, combined with new methodology of 'psychological reaction,' and tried to detect the objective principles of aesthetic function (as a specific 'aesthetic reaction') without reduction to other psychological mechanisms. After a short time, his life was overshadowed by two dangerous circumstances: mortal disease (he had tuberculosis) and growing political suppression of the Stalinist totalitarian regime transformed the last years of Vygotskiǐ's life into a race against time. He took every real opportunity to realize his ideas, working in different institutions in and outside Moscow. Vygotskiǐ prepared in 10 years almost 200 publications. On the other hand, this hectic situation of approaching different subjects in his passionate investigations caused serious hermeneutic problems for those who studied his theories later: it is clear that Vygotskiǐ's position was changing even during this short time, but there is no simple key to determine the development and general features of his varying positions.

Vygotskiǐ was one of the first people to detect the importance of aphasia for both psychology and linguistics, pointing to the connection between neurophysiology and early structuralism in linguistics (phonology as a pilot model for the study of speech disorders). These ideas were continued later by his disciple, A. R. Luria. Together with Luria and other adherents, Vygotskiǐ founded the so-called 'cultural–historical school' in psychology. The 'cultural–historical' approach tried to show the way out of a situation which Vygotskiǐ detected in the middle of the 1920s as a 'crisis in psychology.' The idea was to go beyond the physiology of I. S. Pavlov and create a more substantial and adequate base for an objective theory of the human mind, which should be a real Marxist psychology in Vygotskiǐ's opinion. The early stages of psychic development were always the main concern of Vygotskiǐ. Together with Luria, he wrote a book on the emerging mind, considering ape, 'primitive' man, and child as different aspects of early stages of psychic functions (Luria and Vygotskiǐ, 1930). Vygotskiǐ stressed the crucial role of language and other semiotic means as a specific universal instrument in human behavior, providing the basic condition for the development of the human mind and consciousness. Considering the early stages of language,

Vygotskiǐ showed that these 'primitive' forms of linguistic activity are really very rich in possibilities, required by corresponding sociocultural situations.

Vygotskiǐ's main work, *Thought and language* (1934), was published shortly after his death. This book unified different aspects of Vygotskiǐ's work around the main point of his search: the dynamic functional interconnection of language and thought. Both are considered not as static entities, but as activities in a sociocultural context. Both are complex realities with an inner history: the language in its written form is another functional realization of linguistic activity, different from the oral speech and reflecting another stage of cultural (educational) development. The most original part of Vygotskiǐ's theory was the idea of inner speech as mediating dynamic mechanism between thought and language. Considering child development, Vygotskiǐ criticized J. Piaget, stressing that even the earliest stages of linguistic behavior are a part of social interaction: children are mastering language skills during their interaction with the social environment and as a part of practical mastering of reality. Children's way to thought and language is a way from external to inner behavioral activity.

Early death interrupted Vygotskiǐ's investigations, but saved him from very probable political repressions. A few years after his death, his ideas were totally banned from the official Soviet science. Only in the post-Stalinist period were Vygotskiǐ's ideas rediscovered in the Soviet Union, and they became more and more known in the West. The publication of *Psychology of art* (1965) attracted additional interest to Vygotskiǐ, showing a lesser-known part of his work. During the following decades, Vygotskiǐ's heritage produced wide discussions in psychology and linguistics (especially psycholinguistics). His work was considered from different positions: the psycholinguists and neurolinguists considered him as a founder of their disciplines; the structuralists and representatives of semiotics found in Vygotskiǐ their forerunner; and the cognitivists classified him as a 'precognitivist.' However, his systematic and functional approach to the old problem of thought and language, his ideas about linguistic behavior remain a productive avenue for linguistic analysis.

See also: Psycholinguistics: Overview.

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W

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A self-taught linguist, who also studied American Indian linguistics under Edward Sapir at Yale, Benjamin Lee Whorf is best known for his work in developing the 'Sapir-Whorf' or 'linguistic relativity hypothesis,' the central claim of which – that the structures of language, in addition to providing a vehicle for the expression of thought, also shape thought by casting it in the mold of language-specific patternings – echoes views advanced in the early 19th century by Wilhelm von Humboldt in his writings on linguistic diversity. In Whorf's words, "... the world is presented in a kaleidoscopic flux of impressions which has to be organized by our minds – and this means largely by the linguistic systems in our minds" (Carroll, 1956: 213). Whorf's study of American Indian languages – for example Uto-Aztecan (Aztec and, in particular, Hopi) and Mayan (Maya) – convinced him that the grammatical categories of languages structure both perception and conceptualization. He developed this hypothesis principally in his papers "Grammatical categories," "Some verbal categories of Hopi," and "The relation of habitual thought and behavior to language" (1939), all of which are reprinted, along with other of Whorf's published and unpublished writings, by John Carroll (1956), who, in his introduction to this volume, provided much useful biographical information. The linguistic relativity hypothesis is notoriously difficult to corroborate or refute, with empirical evidence, involving, as it does, the calibration of linguistic with cultural and cognitive considerations. The limited evidence produced to date – for example, cross-linguistic surveys of color terminology (Berlin and Kay, 1969) – has both undermined the strong version of the hypothesis, according to which language determines and limits, as opposed to influencing, the architecture of cognition, and called attention to the influence of other factors. While the focus of the linguistic relativity hypothesis is squarely on the relation of language to thought, clearly biological constraints on perception, as well as cultural influences, are also involved. The difficulties attending ascertaining where one influence begins and the other ends have contributed to the still largely indeterminate status of the linguistic relativity hypothesis. Moreover, the sheer fact that translation from one language to another is possible diminishes the likelihood that languages differ by entire categories of thought. Last, linguistic universals, by definition, also put an upward limit on the reach of linguistic relativity.

See also: Linguistic Anthropology; Sapir, Edward.

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Anna Wierzbicka, the founder and leading exponent of natural semantic metalanguage (NSM) theory, is internationally known for her work in semantics, syntax, pragmatics, and cross-cultural linguistics. Her theory combines a radically universalist approach, that human concepts are innate, with a relativist approach, that ordinary languages have different semantic systems representing culture-specific configurations of universal semantic primitives.

Wierzbicka was born in 1938 in Warsaw, Poland. Early in her childhood she evinced a keen interest in language, playing word games with her father and writing poetry. A Polish Catholic, who lived in her homeland until 1972, she had little sympathy for Communist ideology.

Wierzbicka's academic career began at the University of Warsaw. After receiving a Ph.D. from the Polish Academy of Sciences, she continued postdoctoral studies in Moscow in 1965. In 1966, she spent a year studying and researching at MIT. In 1972, she settled in Canberra, Australia. Wierzbicka is a professor of linguistics at the Australian National University. She is a Fellow of the Australian Academy of the Humanities and Australian Academy of Social Sciences and has also been awarded the Humboldt Research Prize for Foreign Scholars in Humanities.

Her principal publications include *Semantic primitives* (1972), *Lingua mentalis: the semantics of natural language* (1980a), *The case for surface case* (1980b), *Lexicography and conceptual analysis* (1985), *English speech act verbs: a semantic dictionary* (1987), *The semantics of grammar* (1988), *Cross-cultural pragmatics: the semantics of human interaction* (1991), *Semantics, culture and cognition: universal human concepts in culture-specific configurations* (1992), *Semantics: primes and universals* (1996), *Understanding cultures through their key words: English, Russian, Polish, German, Japanese* (1997), *Emotions across languages and cultures: diversity and universals* (1999), and *What did Jesus mean? Explaining the Sermon on the Mount and the parables in simple and universal human concepts* (2001).

Wierzbicka's scholarship is characterized by the search for 'semantic primes,' a small core of irreducible universal meanings, which can be found as words, bound morphemes, or phrasemes in all languages. The theory rests on the following premises: semantic analysis must be conducted in natural language;

complex meanings can be stated in terms of simpler ones (reductive paraphrase); the NSMs of all languages are isomorphic. The NSM approach to meaning is intensional – semantic primes are conceptual but they are not abstract, they correspond to word meanings in ordinary language. Over the period of 30 years of extensive empirical, cross-linguistic investigations, Wierzbicka and her colleagues have collected a set of about 60 lexical universals (e.g., A LONG TIME, DO, GOOD, PEOPLE, etc.). This 'mini-lexicon' of semantic primes and the manner of their combination constitute a metalanguage that is supposed to have the same expressive power as any ordinary language. The metalanguage has a wide range of applications, such as intercultural communication, language acquisition and teaching, language typology, legal semantics, and lexicography. Additionally, it serves as a basis for an emergent theory of cultural scripts, considered as shared interpretive background, and used for the description of the 'verbal culture' of any society.

See also: Pragmatics: Overview.

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Ludwig Wittgenstein, one of the most influential philosophers and, in terms of general impact, thinkers of modern times, was born in Vienna on April 26, 1889. He was one of eight children in a mixed Catholic and Protestant (earlier Jewish) family, which intensively participated in the cultural and economic life of Vienna at the turn of the 19th/20th century, characterized by cosmopolitanism, by a suffocating bourgeois mentality (which also explains the rise of psychoanalytic treatments in society of that time), and by an unequalled theater and music life. Wittgenstein's father, after having been a wool merchant, had established himself in Vienna as the director of a large steel company, and the family enjoyed a luxurious life, albeit overshadowed by oppressing and depressing paternal authoritarianism. The children were all endowed with artistic, technical, and intellectual skills, but seem to have experienced problems in psychological development and social adaptation; three of Ludwig's brothers committed suicide, and Ludwig's own life was characterized by constant imbalance in developing his own personality and in adapting to life in society. Wittgenstein received his first education in his parents' palatial home in Vienna, and showed remarkable technical skills (as a young boy, for example, he constructed a sewing machine). He was sent to a Gymnasium in Linz (1903–1906), and then to the Technische Hochschule in Charlottenburg (Berlin), where he stayed for two years. In 1908 he went to study at the University of Manchester in England, where he started doing aeronautical research; he designed a jet reaction engine and a propeller. Until then his interests had been in physics and in technology, but seeing how much mathematics was involved in both, he soon became interested in the philosophical foundations of mathematics. Having heard of the existence of Russell's *Principles of mathematics* (1903), Wittgenstein established contact with Russell and, on the occasion of a trip to Germany, with Frege. In the academic year 1911–1912 he enrolled at Cambridge University in order to study with Russell, on whom he left a deep impression. While at Cambridge he laid the basis of his logical views; he also spent much time performing music and doing experiments on rhythm in music.

During World War I, Wittgenstein was an officer in the Austrian army; in November 1918 he was taken prisoner by Italian troops and was held captive for some months in Italy. During wartime he had been systematizing his ideas on logic and philosophy; the resulting manuscript was sent to Russell (who discussed it with Wittgenstein in Holland in December 1919) and was published (in German) in 1921. This *Logisch-philosophische Abhandlung* (containing 526 decimally ordered short paragraphs) was subsequently translated into English and was published in 1922 with an introduction by Russell, under the title *Tractatus logico-philosophicus*. The book, which was the only philosophical book Wittgenstein published during his lifetime (in 1926 he also published a children's dictionary for use in primary school), is an important contribution to philosophy, and more particularly to the theory of logical atomism, which Russell had been developing for some years and which holds that there are only atomic facts (the connections made through words like 'and,' 'or,' 'if … then' are only logical manipulations), and that these can be analyzed exhaustively in terms of particulars, properties, and relations. Written in the form of a list of theses or statements, the *Tractatus* proposes a 'picture theory': our sentences have meaning because (and only insofar as) they are pictures of reality. Reality consists of facts (*Tatsachen*), and facts exist by virtue of being realized states of affairs (i.e., reality, or 'the world,' is everything that is the case); states of affairs (*Sachverhalte*) are nothing else but configurations of things (*Gegenstände*; *Dinge*; *Sachen*). Our thoughts (thinking has a 'factual' content, contrary to imagination or illusion) are, in Wittgenstein's terms, logical pictures of facts; to convey our thoughts to others, we need to express them in sentences (combinations of words, generally seen as names by Wittgenstein), which can be perceived by the senses.

The world view and the philosophy of language contained in the *Tractatus* have radical consequences: if language only has meaning when it pictures reality, then the statements of logic and mathematics

(which deal with how language works/should work) have no 'meaning' (one cannot make a picture of how a picture represents reality), and so the propositions of the *Tractatus* itself are devoid of meaning, senseless (*sinnlos*). However, Wittgenstein recognized the importance, or usefulness, of these propositions: they serve as 'elucidations,' enabling us to make the distinction between what has meaning and what does not. Wittgenstein even stressed the importance of a 'mystical' dimension concerning our life, our religious beliefs, our ethical convictions, our aesthetic experiences; the crucial point for Wittgenstein is that this mystical dimension should not be presented as 'facts' (we deal here with 'problems of life'). Sentences that try to express this dimension are nonsensical (*unsinnig*): they do not picture facts, nor do they try to make explicit the way our language works. To say that the world exists is nonsensical, since its existence is not a fact in the world. But it shows itself, viz. in the existence of language. Language, indeed, is the totality of meaningful, i.e., fact-picturing sentences, and thus the limits of our language are the limits of our world. But when all has been said that can be said, we have not even touched upon the problems of life: they belong to the realm (the most important realm!) of the nonsensical, of what cannot be said but only shows itself.

Wittgenstein's views on meaning were endorsed by the members of the *Wiener Kreis* (Vienna Circle, the birthplace of neopositivism) – although Wittgenstein felt that nobody, not even Russell, had understood and grasped the contents and the (deeper, ethical) meaning of the *Tractatus*, and although the picture-theory was not adopted by the *Kreis*. The book was submitted in June 1929 as a Ph.D. dissertation at Cambridge, where Wittgenstein had returned after World War I and a few wandering years (in 1920 he was a gardener in Klosterneuberg, between 1920 and 1926 he was a schoolteacher in the Austrian villages of Trattenbach, Puchberg, and Otterthal, and after that he became again a gardener in the monastery of Hütteldorf). The years 1927 and 1928 were spent in Vienna, where he designed a mansion (which he wanted 'free from all decoration and marked by a severe exactitude in measure and proportion') for his sister Margarete, and had regular contacts with members of the *Wiener Kreis*, especially Moritz Schlick, Friedrich Waismann, and Herbert Feigl. But Wittgenstein's 'return' to philosophy seems to have been caused by a lecture given in Vienna in March 1928 by L. Brouwer on the foundations of mathematics. Brouwer's theory of intuitionism in mathematics strongly appealed to Wittgenstein, who realized that mathematics is essentially a constructive activity, and that meaning lies in the recovery of the process of construction (of a proof, of a theorem, etc.), and not in the discovery of a (*a priori*) given truth. Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* already contained a number of statements about mathematics as a method (and not as a doctrine) and about the importance of 'making clear' what is meant (= elucidation), and presented a method (viz. truth tables) for calculating the truth or falsity of a proposition that is a truth-function of other propositions, but the picture-theory of meaning and the view of language as being essentially a nomenclature (a set of names) – both central ideas of the book – were of course hardly compatible with intuitionism and constructivism. It would take Wittgenstein several years to rebuild his philosophy, and to develop a completely new (and very original) theory of meaning. This new theory constituted the core of the philosophy of the 'later Wittgenstein,' as distinct from the 'younger Wittgenstein,' author of the *Tractatus*. Whether there is a radical break or a gradual transition between the two periods is a matter of dispute among Wittgenstein scholars, with some defending the discontinuity thesis and others the continuity view; a somewhat subversive, though not inaccurate, way to reconcile both views is to say that Wittgenstein remained interested in the ideas expounded in the *Tractatus*, but (mainly) in order to show how wrong they were.

The philosophy of the 'later Wittgenstein' was elaborated at Cambridge, where Wittgenstein started to lecture in January 1930, and where he had contact with Russell, G. E. Moore, and F. P. Ramsey. Wittgenstein taught there between 1930 and 1936, then spent one year living as a solitary in Norway, and returned to Cambridge in 1937, where he later succeeded Moore in the chair of philosophy. During World War II, Wittgenstein, by then a British citizen (since 1938), took the side of the allied troops and worked at Guy's Hospital in London and subsequently in the Royal Victoria Infirmary in Newcastle. He resumed his teaching at Cambridge in 1944, but took an early retirement in 1947. He went to live in Ireland and then spent some time in the United States. In late 1949 he was diagnosed with cancer, and from that time on he prepared himself for his death. He lived briefly in Vienna and in Oxford, then went to Norway, before spending the last months of his life in Cambridge, in the home of his physician. He died on April 29, 1951, leaving behind a mass of unpublished materials (notebooks, lecture notes, unfinished book manuscripts, letters), much of which was published (and translated) by his students and friends after his death.

Wittgenstein's Cambridge years were marked by intense philosophical activity, by a considerable amount of academic teaching, and by the shift from

a dogmatic and axiomatic formulation (so typical of the *Tractatus*) to a dialogue form of philosophizing, with more questions raised than answers given. The later Wittgenstein also covered a wide variety of topics, and most prominently beyond the domains of logic and mathematics (although in the years 1937–1944 he wrote down his remarks on the foundations of mathematics): he reflected upon (ordinary) language, psychology, ethics, aesthetics, and religion, and dealt with the general problems of meaning, knowledge, belief, and social behavior. During the first years after his return to Cambridge, Wittgenstein was particularly interested in verification as the (constructivist) method of establishing the meaning of propositions (in the *Tractatus* he had not dealt with the role of verification); but as soon as the early 1930s he realized that the demand of verification should not be kept too strict, and that there is also meaning beyond (or behind) what can be verified. Wittgenstein completely abandoned the picture-theory and the concept of meaning as an (ideal) object, i.e., precisely those principles in virtue of which he could be seen as an adherent of neopositivism or of logical atomism; most of his work from the 1930s and 1940s can be seen as a criticism of the views of the *Wiener Kreis* and of Russell's philosophy (in his conversations with Schlick and Waismann of the years 1929–1932, the differences separating Wittgenstein from the *Wiener Kreis* are clearly expressed). From the early 1930s on, when he wrote the manuscript of his *Philosophical grammar* (the first part of which deals with 'meaning,' 'rules,' and 'language use') and dictated the contents of *The blue and brown books*, Wittgenstein stressed the manifold forms, functions, and uses of language. The best-known work from the later Wittgenstein's philosophical legacy, to which most often reference is made, is the *Philosophical investigations* (written, with an interruption in 1945–1947, between 1936 and 1949; this text, one of the most finished among Wittgenstein's manuscripts, was posthumously published in 1953). The philosophy – or the philosophical itinerary – formulated in this (not very systematically structured) book implies a dynamic view of language, seen not as a collection of names but as a toolkit containing 'countless' kinds of uses of words and sentences and a changing set of 'language-games' (*Sprachspiele*), such as describing, reporting, guessing, translating, thanking, greeting, and telling jokes (the 'language-games' were previously dealt with in *The blue book*). The essential question to ask then is not 'What is the meaning of sentence S?,' but 'How is S used here?' and 'How does S fit within a larger set of sentences?' Asking these questions is inquiring after the meaning of activities, and only in this way are we able to get a view of the 'grammar

rules' of each game. The answer (or multiple answers) to these questions also require(s) that we consider sentences (and the words contained in them) in their 'surroundings' (in Wittgenstein's terminology). Here we see the basic difference from the doctrine of the *Tractatus*: meaning is not shown by the sentence taken on itself, but it becomes (partly) manifest in each of the uses to which a sentence is put; also, whereas in the *Tractatus* Wittgenstein held that any proposition presupposes all other propositions (because of their 'common essence'), in his later work he emphasizes the idea that we only hit upon segments of the whole of language. A very elliptical summary of the later Wittgenstein's theory of meaning is therefore 'Meaning *is* use' (use/employment/application; the German terms are *Gebrauch/Verwendung/Anwendung*). The implications of this dynamic and 'perspectivist' view on meaning have been drawn by Wittgenstein's commentators, who have been assembling, comparing, and confronting the dispersed remarks, questions, and musings – on meaning, knowledge, belief, and (especially in the second part of the *Philosophical investigations*) emotion, sensation, remembering – found in the posthumously published materials, in view of the fact that Wittgenstein abstained from giving definitions of the key terms in his later philosophy. The 'language-games' that can be performed in using language show intricate relationships and partly overlapping, partly diverging features (in their formal aspects, their functions, their purposes): Wittgenstein spoke of 'family resemblances,' which justify the general designation 'language-game' without implying an 'essential' unity (language functions in multiple ways); the same vague conception applies to the structure of language, which Wittgenstein saw as irregularly patterned (the structure of language is compared to the plan of an old town, with irregular streets and squares, dead alleys, etc.).

The later Wittgenstein proposed a philosophy that is basically an activity of constant questioning, doubting, observing, and relativizing; it is a message of caution against doctrinarism, (hasty) generalization, speculation, one-sided approaches, and also 'bewitchment' (by language, by so-called evidence, by theories): the aim is 'to show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle' (overgeneralization and one-sidedness lead us into the bottle). It is therefore characterized by a search to determine criteria (or at least one good criterion) in order to find out something about states of the mind (belief, thought, will, hope, etc.) while avoiding the recourse to introspection (in his *Remarks on the foundations of mathematics* Wittgenstein stressed the foundational role of mathematical operations). To understand the 'grammar

rules' of the language-games, it is necessary to observe the uses of sentences that function within the various games, and this requires contextual and interpersonal observation: we cannot make abstraction of the 'surroundings' in which words and sentences are used, and language-games (and thus also language) are a social reality, i.e., language-games are (integrated as) *forms of life* (the relationship between language and experience figures prominently in Wittgenstein's *Remarks on colour*). Wittgenstein denied the possibility of 'private rules' and therefore of a private language: rules functioning within a game are necessarily shared rules (they exist only because there is agreement about them), and therefore there are no rules that would be followed by only one individual, since following a rule consists in 'doing the same.' The issue of private rules, in connection with linguistic behavior and linguistic competence, has become a main topic of post-Wittgensteinian debate between scholars holding an empiricist view of language and those holding a rationalist, innatist view of language; Wittgenstein himself rejected both flat behaviorism and unqualified mentalism, because of their one-sidedness and being out of touch with linguistic reality. The ultimate argument for such a view lies of course in a person's (linguistic) history: we have acquired language by learning how sentences are used in what types of contexts (the language games are part of 'our natural history,' as Wittgenstein put it).

In the two main phases of his philosophical career Wittgenstein exerted great influence upon contemporary philosophical conceptions: whereas his *Tractatus* was a source of inspiration for neopositivists (although Wittgenstein's 'deeper' message was radically opposed to the doctrine of logical positivism, as well as to Russell's logical atomism), his later work inspired British analytical philosophers (although the later Wittgenstein's method was not so much one of analysis, but rather one of questioning and of patiently describing, i.e., of recovering the 'uses-in-context'). A similar twofold impact on linguistic work can be observed: whereas the doctrine of the *Tractatus* has inspired work on the categorial structure of language as being, ideally, a nomenclature with syntactic rules for combining names (thus justifying a monolithic type of analysis), the ideas put forward in the *Philosophical investigations* (and in the other writings of the 1930s and 1940s) have inspired scholars favoring a pragmaticist view of meaning and an ethnographic study of language (thus justifying a multifunctional and combinatory or polythetic approach, integrating meaning, knowledge, and action; Wittgenstein's *On certainty* offers a nice illustration of such an approach). Beyond that,

Wittgenstein's life and works, also when misunderstood or indirectly known, have inspired psychologists (Wittgenstein lectured on 'philosophical psychology,' especially on the 'body-mind problem,' and had written important *Remarks on the philosophy of psychology*), anthropologists, educationists, moralists, and artists.

See also: Frege, Friedrich Ludwig Gottlob.

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Word and Image

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Since the 1970s, the analysis of written text has played an increasingly important role in applied linguistics, for instance in areas such as education, the analysis of media texts, and, more recently, Internet communication and critical discourse analysis. Gradually it has become evident that it was no longer viable to focus only on the verbal aspects of such texts, not only because they use images as an integral part of the text but also because visual composition (layout), color, and typography play an increasingly important role in structuring them, through the use of space, typography (including special typographic signs such as bullet points), and color coding. As a result, linguistic or linguistically inspired methods for integrating the analysis of the linguistic and nonlinguistic aspects of written text have begun to emerge.

Paris School Structuralism

The first linguistically inspired approach to the analysis of images and image–text relations was that of 1960s Paris School structuralist semiotics.

Using media texts such as advertisements and news photographs as his data, Roland Barthes' (1977) work in this area focused on the concepts of 'denotation' and 'connotation.' In defining these concepts, he drew on the work of Hjelmslev, who had argued that different ways of expressing the same concept can have different meanings, if only because the same concept can be expressed in different languages, and speakers therefore never simply communicate a concept but communicate their country of origin as well. Extending Hjelmslev's approach to the analysis of images, Barthes proposed to analyze images in terms of two layers of meaning, denotation, the layer of 'what, or who, is represented here' and connotation, the layer of 'what ideas and values are expressed through what is represented, and through the way in

which it is represented.' In other words, much as in John Stuart Mill's original use of the two terms, denotation was interpreted as reference to concrete people, places, and things, and connotation as reference to abstract concepts. Although this is often misunderstood, for Barthes, connotations were not subjective associations but "culturally accepted inducers of ideas" (1977: 23). In a key example (1973: 116), originally from 1959, he described an image on the cover of *Paris-Match* that showed a young black soldier saluting the French flag. The denotation is what is shown: 'a black soldier salutes the French flag.' The connotation is a more abstract concept, conveying a late colonialist ideology, "a purposeful mixture of Frenchness and militariness," as Barthes described it (1973: 116).

In a later essay, Barthes specified key signifiers of connotation: objects (e.g., the flag in the above example) and poses (e.g., the salute). There is, he wrote, an unwritten 'dictionary' of poses that "form ready-made elements of signification" (1977: 22). He added that connotation can also come about through the style of artwork or through techniques of photography such as "framing, distance, lighting, focus, speed": "An inventory needs to be made of these techniques, but only insofar as each of them has a corresponding signified of connotation sufficiently constant to allow its incorporation in a cultural lexicon of technical 'effects'" (1977: 23).

Barthes' approach to image–text relations focused on the concepts of 'anchorage' and 'relay.' In the case of 'anchorage,' words 'elucidate' pictures, selecting specific aspects from the meaning potential of the image: "[T]he text directs the reader through the signifieds of the image, causing him to avoid some and receive others" and "remote-controls him towards a meaning chosen in advance" (1977: 39). In other words, anchorage is a conjunctive relation of specification between word and image in which words specify the meaning of images that, in themselves, are 'polysemous,' open to a range of possible interpretations. In the case of 'relay,' "text and image stand in a complementary relationship." They are both "fragments of a more general syntagm" (1977: 41). As an example, he cites comic strips, in which pictures show the speaker(s) and the context, and words their speech. The two concepts are thus close to what Halliday (1994) calls 'elaboration' and 'extension,' except that 'elaboration' includes not just 'specification' but also a range of elaborative relations, including rephrasing, summarizing, exemplifying, and so on.

Barthes's concepts have been widely adopted in media studies. A well-known example of their application to political discourse is Stuart Hall's (1973) article 'The determination of news photographs,' which shows how captions can interpret relatively ambiguous shots of politicians according to newspapers' editorial policies.

Christian Metz, in his work of the 1960s, applied linguistic concepts to the study of film. Having initially attempted to find the filmic equivalents of phonological and syntactic form classes, he concluded that film shots are not "doubly articulated" and that the structure of film shots cannot be compared to the structure of sentences. Film shots simply reproduce what was in front of the camera, relaying the meanings of action, dress, and so on. Larger textual structures, however, can be studied in a linguistic spirit. In his most widely quoted paper of the period (1974) he outlined a 'syntagmatics' of film that was, in effect, a systematic overview of the conjunctive relations that can exist between the shots and scenes of a film, and that built on constructivist theories of editing by 1920s filmmakers and theorists such as Pudovkin, Eisenstein, and Timoshenko (cf. van Leeuwen, 1991). These conjunctive relations are for the most part temporal, although temporality in film involves more than simple sequentiality and includes simultaneity ('parallel editing'), flashbacks, and flash forwards. In addition, there are 'descriptive' syntagms, where a place is 'described,' not by showing it in a single shot, but through a scene showing a series of 'detail' shots, and comparative syntagms, in which shots with similar or contrasting content are edited together. This is a form of editing introduced by constructivist filmmakers to make specific political points, for example, by intercutting a scene showing workers with the slaughtering of a bull to depict the destruction of the spirit of the working class by capitalism. Metz's syntagmatics has been picked up again in linguistically inspired approaches to film (van Leeuwen, 1991; Iedema, 2001).

In the same period, Jacques Durand (1983) wrote an influential article presenting a structural classification of the rhetorical figures that had been described in the classical literature on rhetoric, and demonstrating that they can all be applied, not just to words, but also to images. His examples were taken from advertisements. Thus, a visual oxymoron might show a basket of strawberries in the snow, a visual chiasmus a picture of a father and a son wearing each other's clothes and carrying each other's newspapers, a visual metonymy a block of ice instead of a refrigerator (in an advertisement for refrigerators), and so on.

I have discussed only three examples here, but during the 1960s and early 1970s many other similar studies were published, mostly in the French journal *Communications*.

Although I will restrict myself here to approaches based on linguistics, the study of word and image has

also played a vital role in iconography, a branch of art history occupying itself with representation and meaning in works of art. Although iconographers do not develop descriptions of 'visual languages' and focus on the work of individual artists, or on specific themes or schools, their work offers important clues for the study of word and image, especially where it concerns artworks based on mythological and Biblical texts (Schapiro, 1973 is an example; Van Leeuwen, 2001 discusses iconography in more detail).

Functional Linguistics

A more recent linguistically inspired approach to the study of word and image is strongly influenced by the functional linguistics of Michael Halliday (1978, 1994).

Kress and van Leeuwen (1996) base their approach on Halliday's three metafunctions (1978): the ideational function of constructing representations of the world; the interpersonal function of creating relations between the participants in acts of communication; and the textual function of marshalling individual representations-cum-interactions into coherent texts that can be recognized as types. They also follow Halliday in linking specific systems of visual grammar to specific metafunctions. While Barthes' approach had been 'lexical,' based on the denotative and connotative meanings of the individual people, places, objects, and poses depicted in images, Kress and van Leeuwen's approach is 'grammatical,' focusing on the way visual composition creates meaningful relations between the people, places, and things in images, not only on the broader textual level, but also within individual images or 'shots.'

According to Kress and van Leeuwen, the ideational function is visually realized by a grammar of transitivity, which comprises two types of syntagm, the narrative and the conceptual. In narrative syntagms, the 'participants' are realized by 'volumes' and the 'processes' by 'vectors.' The formal terms ('volume' and 'vector') are derived from the art theorist Arnheim (1974), the functional terms ('participant' and 'process') from Halliday. In other words, word and image can realize the same semantic functions, but in different ways – in language, participants are typically realized by nominal groups, and processes by verbal groups.

To take an example, Eddie Adams's famous photograph of a summary execution on the streets of Saigon (**Figure 1**) contains two participants, Nguyen Ngoc Loan, the South Vietnamese officer who points the gun, and the Vietcong suspect who is about to die. The two participants are the main volumes, clearly demarcated against a somewhat out-of-focus

Figure 1 Execution (after Eddie Adams's photograph of 1968).

background, and Loan's arm, holding the gun, forms a vector connecting the two. In this syntagm the two participants have different functional roles. The participant from whom the vector emanates (here Loan) is the Actor; the participant at whom the vector is directed (the Vietcong suspect) is the Goal (the terms are again taken from Halliday). As there are two participants, the syntagm is transitive. An intransitive action syntagm would contain only the Actor and the vector.

The same relationship can also be realized in diagrams. The participants are then boxes with words in them, or diagrammatic pictures, while the vector is realized by an arrow. Eye lines, which connect participants through the direction of the look of one of the participants, form a different kind of vector, and hence realize a different kind of process, a 'reaction' rather than an action. Reactions, too, can either be transitive or intransitive.

Conceptual syntagms realize a process, not through vectors, but through some kind of spatial configuration. Classification syntagms, for instance, realize a 'kind of' relation between participants by means of a composition in which the participants are symmetrically arranged on the picture space, are of equal size (even when in reality they are not), and have the same distance between them and the same horizontal and vertical orientation. This suggests that they all belong to the same category. In such syntagms, the relation between the participants is represented as a stable and quasipermanent relation, rather than in terms of an action or event.

Images can also realize interpersonal meaning through (1) size of frame, which can bring depicted elements closer to the viewer or keep them at a distance; (2) angles, which can confront viewers directly with depicted participants or represent the relation as more oblique, and which can place viewers either above or below depicted participants; and (3) through the gaze of depicted participants, which can

address viewers directly and so realize a symbolic 'demand' (for sympathy, respect, sexual interest, etc, depending on the accompanying facial expressions and/or gestures) or address the viewer indirectly and so create a barrier between the represented world and the word of the viewer.

Textual meanings are visually realized by three aspects of composition: the placement of the elements of a composition in the visual space (top or bottom, left or right, center or margin); the relative salience of the elements; and the degree to which the elements are separated from each other by frame lines, empty space, or other visual devices. These aspects of visual structuring apply not only to the elements of pictures but also to the elements of layouts (e.g., headlines, pictures, blocks of text), so that analysis can reveal, for instance, the relative salience of text and image and the way they are compositionally related.

Kress and van Leeuwen's approach therefore allows an integrated analysis of the visual and linguistic aspects of written text. The analyst can ask, for instance, which participant is visually the Actor and which participant is linguistically, or discover that the image addresses the viewer directly, while the text does not.

O'Toole's theory of visual communication (1994) also takes its inspiration from the linguistics of Halliday and is in many ways complementary to Kress and van Leeuwen's approach. Like Kress and van Leeuwen, O'Toole takes Halliday's metafunctions as his point of departure and assigns specific visual systems to specific metafunctions. But unlike Kress and van Leeuwen, he also introduces rank, analyzing visual communication as building 'figures' from 'members,' 'episodes' from 'figures,' and 'pictures' from 'episodes' in the same way that language builds words from morphemes, groups from words, clauses from groups, and clause complexes from clauses. Specific systems of visual grammar realize each of the three metafunctions at each of the four ranks. 'Representational' meanings, for instance, may be realized by 'actions and events' at the rank of picture, 'groups and subactions' at the rank of episode, individual 'characters' at the rank of figure, and 'parts of the body' at the rank of member. Perspective is one of the systems that realize what O'Toole calls 'modal' meanings at the level of picture, 'relative prominence' one of the systems that realize it at the rank of episode, 'gaze' one of the systems that realize it at the rank of figure, and so on.

The functional approach to the study of word and image has been applied in a number of fields and has also been extended to film (van Leeuwen, 1996; Iedema, 2001) and new media (Lemke, 2002;

Kress, 2003). The journal *Visual Communication* regularly publishes papers by scholars working with this approach.

Ethnomethodology and Conversation Analysis

The relation between word and image (or, more broadly, the visual) has also been approached from the perspectives of ethnomethodology and conversation analysis. Charles Goodwin (e.g., 2001), Heath (e.g., 1986), and others have focused on the way professional discourses interpret images and other visual phenomena in quite specific ways that often differ markedly from commonsense interpretations. In the court proceedings following the police beating of Rodney King, for instance (Goodwin, 2001: 175–178), the crucial evidence was a videotape that actually showed police officers beating King. Yet the police officers were acquitted, at least in the first trial, because of the testimony of an expert witness who interpreted the video in terms of professional police codes for determining aggressive intent. Specific movements were interpreted as being at the start of an "aggression spectrum" (2001: 176):

> Witness: It is starting to be [aggressive]
> (pointing) This foot is laying flat
> (pointing) There's starting to be a bend
> (pointing) this leg
> (pointing) in his butt
> (pointing) the buttocks area has started to rise
> which would put us at the beginning of our
> spectrum again

Goodwin and others have also argued for the inclusion of the gaze and other visual signifiers (e.g., pointing) in conversation analysis transcripts, showing that without those signifiers it is often impossible to determine what drives the specific moves that conversation analysts are interested in (e.g., restarts, repairs). This can be of crucial importance in areas such as the study of medical interaction.

Typography

Even though typography is perhaps the most obvious visual aspect of written language, it has until recently been ignored by linguists. Crystal is an exception (1998: 7):

> The explication of printed language needs the expertise of both typographers and linguists, in order to provide a complete description of its forms and structures and a satisfactory explanation of its functions and affects.

New technologies such as the word processor have made typographic expression available to everyone, and as a result linguists also are becoming more aware of it (e.g., Graddol, 1996). Overall, however, they have not gone much beyond categories that are well established in the typographical literature, such as the difference between the classic serif and the modern sans serif and between text and display fonts, the former requiring, in the first place, legibility and clarity, the latter leaving more space for typographic expression (e.g., in relation to brand names, titles, logos, and so on). Walker's book on the subject (2001), in the series 'Language and social life,' describes many of the rules and prescriptions that govern everyday uses of typography, although not in a specifically linguistic framework. Van Leeuwen (2005) used the concepts of connotation and metaphor to discuss typographic meaning and in more recent work (in press) argued for the semiotization of the 'distinctive features' of typography, thus both adapting and extending Jakobson and Halle's 'distinctive feature theory' of phonology. He argues that the distinctive features of letter forms (e.g., weight, roundedness versus angularity, regularity versus irregularity) lend themselves more easily to metaphoric extension than whole letter forms. Roundedness, for instance, can, depending on the context, signify organic, natural, feminine, and so on. As a given font combines several distinctive features, several such metaphors may resonate in it.

Many contemporary typographers are interested in blurring the boundaries between images and letter forms by 'iconizing' either the letter forms themselves and/or the way they are arranged on lines and pages. In this way they regain a connection that had been lost in the development of the alphabet. Typography is also increasingly multimodal, using not only the elements of letter forms, bowls, stems, ascenders, descenders, serifs, and so on, but also color, texture, 3-dimensionality, and movement. Journals such as *Visible Language, Information Design Journal,* and *Visual Communication* regularly publish in the area.

Conclusion

Linguists have only recently begun to pay attention to the many forms of visual expression and structuring in written texts. As the importance of visual communication grows in many areas, including, for instance, education, science, workplace literacy, and global communication, the study of word and image is likely to undergo rapid growth in the near future. As Kress has said (2003: 168), the major task facing us now:

... is to imagine the characteristics of a theory which can account for the processes of making meaning in the environments of multimodal representation in multimediated communication .... Such a theory will represent a decisive move away from the assumptions of mainstream theories of the last century about meaning, language, and learning.

See also: Halliday, Michael Alexander Kirkwood.

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Writing and Cognition

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This article provides a brief overview of research exploring the cognitive processes associated with text production by human writers, focusing on the handwritten or keyboarded production of coherent, multi-sentence texts. Currently, written production, in this sense, is less well understood than either text comprehension or spoken production.

Text production is a skill that typically starts to develop in children at around the age of six or seven and as a result of extensive specific instruction. This contrasts with the ability to participate in spoken dialogue, which develops much earlier and largely through exposure to parents' speech. A good stepping-off point for describing the cognitive psychology of text production is to ask what mental processing is required to produce text over and above that which is required for participation in dialogue. First, in most contexts and particularly those typically studied by researchers, writers become aware of the need to write something before they have a definite message to communicate. Planning what to say is, therefore, a major feature of most writing tasks. Second, writers need to be able to maintain and develop meaning across a number of sentences. Turn taking in dialogue both allows immediate feedback on the comprehensibility of an utterance and provides a stream of cues that aid decisions about what to say next. In the absence of an interlocutor writers must find alternative strategies for maintaining coherence. Third, unlike speech, writing requires the planning and execution of letter shapes (or keystrokes) and the retrieval of word spellings. Fourth, one benefit that writing has over speech is that it is possible to review and edit output before it reaches its audience. Text production is therefore necessarily complex, requiring coordination of high-level processes for determining content and structure, and low-level processes associated with producing words on the page.

A chapter by Hayes and Flower (1980) is frequently cited as providing the first general cognitive theory of text production. Their model characterized writing as a problem-solving activity: Writers identify one or more goals for their text, described in terms of the effect that the text will have upon intended readers, and then work backwards from this to identify plans of action by which these goals might be achieved. Hayes and Flower described three processes: planning (determination of content and structure), translating (the process by which this structure is realized as full text), and revising (checking that the text does, in fact, fulfill communicative goals). Studies in which writers are asked to think aloud while producing text suggest that each of these three processes is available to the writer at any point during production. Although planning is more likely to occur near the start of a writing task, and revision towards the end, producing a document typically entails multiple plan-translate-review cycles. Hayes and Flower provided hypotheses about how planning, translating, and revision processes might function, although the problem-solving framework in which these were couched has typically not been adopted in subsequent research. Many researchers have, however, used Hayes and Flower's terminology.

Planning Content

How writers determine content (a process called 'generating' in the Hayes and Flower model) varies with task, and with writer maturity and motivation. In all cases, however, generating will entail cued retrieval from long-term memory (LTM). Writers temporarily hold relevant concepts active in working memory. These concepts act as memory probes and activation spreads from them to related concepts in LTM. Concepts retrieved in this way are then either written down in note form for later use or translated directly into text. Studies exploring the time course of the planning process suggest that propositions tend to be retrieved in repeated bursts of activity interspersed with lulls during which there is no retrieval. Activity during these lulls is thought to be associated, at least in part, with refreshing the probe.

Differences among writers, and particularly developmental differences, are likely to be associated with

the ways in which probes are constructed. Novice writers and writers with low motivation may refresh probe content more or less randomly, or simply rely on immediately available cues – exact words or phrases contained within the text of the writing assignment, for example. Content generated in this way will tend to follow a path of least resistance through a writer's existing knowledge about a topic. Bereiter and Scardamalia (1987) described this stream-of-consciousness approach to generating content as 'knowledge telling.' They contrast this with 'knowledge transforming,' an approach that is available only to more experienced writers. Knowledge transforming involves, in Bereiter and Scardamalia's terms, a dialectic between discourse space and content space: instead of probing memory with whatever cues are most readily available, probe selection is constrained by rhetorical considerations. Content is thus determined not just by a writer's knowledge of the topic but also by the effect that they wish to have on their intended readers. One result of knowledge transforming is that the first idea that occurs to a writer is unlikely to become the main focus of their text. Another is that writers may, as a direct result of writing about a topic, discover new ideas or arguments.

Planning Rhetorical Structure

Writers need not only to retrieve relevant propositions but also to tie these together into a coherent whole. Hayes and Flower identified a specific sub-process dedicated to organizing content prior to its realization as full text. This does not appear to be essential, however. Some writers, and particularly novices, add ideas into the text in more or less the order in which they are retrieved. Where writers do engage in deliberate rhetorical structuring prior to producing full text, they often then deviate from this structure during translation.

Beyond these general observations, however, the processes by which coherent structure is achieved are poorly understood. Some recent research has taken as a starting point the assumption that coherent text comprises a hierarchy of text spans linked by rhetorical relations. Using an analytic procedure called PISA (procedure for incremental structural analysis), an approach similar to rhetorical structure theory, Schilperoord and coworkers have demonstrated an association between text structure and writers' patterns of pausing: writers tend to pause for longer at rhetorically defined text span boundaries, and this effect is independent of the pausing associated with orthographic features such as sentence and paragraph boundaries. Developmentally,

more experienced writers tend to produce texts with deeper and more branched structures. This may be because as writers mature, their discourse knowledge – the range of possible rhetorical relations that they have at their command – expands. Alternatively, this effect may be due to developmental increases in short-term storage capability. Producing a highly branched rhetorical structure is likely to involve keeping a greater number of propositions active in short-term memory than is necessary when producing less complex structures.

Translating Plans into Text

A central concern of recent research has been the extent to which processing low-level tasks – developing syntax, and spelling and transcribing words – interferes with retrieving and organizing content. In a series of experiments exploring verbal memory in children, Bourdin and Fayol have demonstrated that written recall is substantially poorer than spoken recall. This effect is largely absent in adults, suggesting that as spelling and handwriting are practiced they make fewer demands on higher-level cognitive mechanisms. However, even in adults there are some contexts in which transcription and content retrieval compete for cognitive resources. Mature writers may reduce the probability of conflict by adopting two writing-specific memory management techniques. Several researchers have suggested that experienced writers construct retrieval structures that allow very rapid access to content stored in long-term memory. This strategy, termed 'long-term working memory,' liberates cognitive resources during translation by reducing the information that must be held in short-term memory. Another widely used strategy for reducing the possibility of cognitive overload involves dividing up the writing process into discrete subtasks by, for example, outlining content and structure in note form before producing full text. In experimental contexts this outlining tends to result in the production of higher-quality text. Arguably, this is because separating out planning and translation processes removes the possibility that they will compete for the same resources.

Reviewing and Revision

Most writers in most contexts spend time reading back over the text that they have written. For example, in one study 15-year-olds producing short argumentative essays spent, on average, 20% of their total writing time in some sort of reviewing activity. Reviewing, however, takes a variety of forms. Writers regularly pause and read back over the two or three

sentences they have just written. This local reviewing appears to serve more to cue in new sentences than to edit or repair existing text. Curiously, preventing competent writers from reading what they write (by, for example, turning the computer screen off while competent typists word process) does not typically affect the quality of the final text. There appears to be a trade-off between the benefits of knowing (and possibly editing) what has just been written, and the detrimental effect of the additional load that local reviewing imposes on short-term memory.

The extent to which full read-evaluate-edit cycles occur varies considerably across writers and tasks, with typically very few occurrences in novices' writing. Little is known about the cognitive processes that underlie evaluation, although there is a general assumption that editing is prompted by the writers perceiving dissonance between their intended message and the message that they infer from their text. This dissonance may occur because the writer lacks the necessary lexical or rhetorical knowledge to convert their preverbal message into text, although there is some evidence that suggests that writers are only able to detect those problems that they have the necessary knowledge to repair. Another cause of dissonance may arise because writing results not only in an external expression of a writer's existing ideas about a topic but often also in an internal realignment or development of those ideas within the writer's mind. Thus, when a writer experiences dissonance when reading back over earlier paragraphs, this may not be because at the time of writing the writer's translation of ideas into text was inaccurate. It may instead be because the writer's thinking has since moved on. Strategically, it is possible to capitalize on this dynamic interaction between text and thought by deliberately producing multiple rough drafts, allowing meaning to develop with the text. This technique is sometimes called 'free' or 'generative' writing.

See also: Rhetorical Structure Theory.

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SUBJECT INDEX

NOTES

The index is arranged in set-out style with a maximum of three levels of heading. Major discussion of a subject is indicated by bold page numbers. Page numbers suffixed by T and F refer to Tables and Figures respectively. *vs.* indicates a comparison.

Cross-reference terms in italics are general cross-references, or refer to subentry terms within the main entry (the main entry is not repeated to save space). Readers are also advised to refer to the end of each article for additional cross-references - not all of these cross-references have been included in the index cross-references.

This index is in letter-by -letter order, whereby hyphens and spaces within index headings are ignored in the alphabetization. Prefixes and terms in parentheses are excluded from the initial alphabetization.

To assist the user, specific languages have main entries in **bold.** To save space in the index, subjects specific to a language (e.g. morphology, syntax) are found as subentries under the language and not the subject. Cross references to the specific subjects (e.g. syntax, phonetics) are assumed and not explicit.

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