# The Failure of the Middle East Peace Process?

A Comparative Analysis of Peace Implementation in Israel/Palestine, Northern Ireland and South Africa

Edited by

Guy Ben-Porat

The Failure of the Middle East Peace Process?

Also by Guy Ben-Porat

GLOBAL LIBERALISM, LOCAL POPULISM: Globalization, Peace and Resistance in Israel/Palestine and Northern Ireland

ISRAEL SINCE 1980 (*Co-authored with Shlomo Mizrachi, Arye Naor, and Erez Tzfadia*)

The Failure of the Middle East Peace Process?

A Comparative Analysis of Peace Implementation in Israel/Palestine, Northern Ireland and South Africa

Edited by

Guy Ben-Porat
Department of Public Policy and Administration
Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Israel

מכון ון ליר בירושלים
THE VAN LEER JERUSALEM INSTITUTE
معهد فان لير في القدس

palgrave
macmillan

Contents

Notes on the Contributors

Heribert Adam is a political sociologist at Simon Fraser University in Vancouver and annually affiliated with the University of Cape Town. His most recent book, co-authored with Kogila Moodley, is *Seeking Mandela: Peacemaking between Israelis and Palestinians* (Temple University Press). Adam was awarded the 1998 Konrad Adenauer Prize of the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation and elected Fellow of the Royal Society of Canada.

Guy Ben-Porat is a lecturer at the department of public policy and administration, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Israel. He is the author of *Global Liberalism, Local Populism; Peace and Conflict in Israel/Palestine and Northern Ireland* (Syracuse University Press, 2006) and a co-author of *Israel Since 1980* (Cambridge University Press, 2008).

Adrian Guelke is Professor of Comparative Politics in the School of Politics, International Studies and Philosophy at Queen's University, Belfast. He is the director of the School's Centre for the Study of Ethnic Conflict. Recent publications include *Terrorism and Global Disorder* (IBTauris, 2006) and *Rethinking the Rise and Fall of Apartheid* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). He is the chair of the International Political Science Association's research committee on politics and ethnicity.

Tamar S. Hermann is a political scientist. Presently, she is the Dean of Academic Studies at the Open University of Israel and a Senior Fellow at the Israel Democracy Institute. Between 1994 and 2006 she was the Director of the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research at Tel Aviv University. Professor Herman's main academic fields of interest are grassroots politics, political protest, peace activism, public opinion and foreign policymaking, Israeli politics. Her latest book on the Israeli peace movement and the Oslo Process will be published by Cambridge University Press in 2008.

John McGarry is Professor and *Canada Research Chair in Nationalism and Democracy* in the Department of Political Studies at Queen's University (Kingston, Ontario). He has edited, co-edited, and co-authored 12 books on ethnic conflict, nationalism, and the politics of Northern Ireland,

the latest of which are *European Integration and the Nationalities Question* (Routledge, 2006); The *Future of Kurdistan in Iraq* (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005); and *The Northern Ireland Conflict: Consociational Engagements* (Oxford University Press, 2004). He is a member of the editorial board of *Ethnopolitics*, the *Journal of Conflict* Studies, *Irish Political* Studies, the *Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe (JEMIE)*, and *Peace and Conflict Studies*, and a member of the advisory board of The European Centre for Minority Issues.

Benjamin Miller is a member of the Department of International Relations, School of Political Sciences at the University of Haifa. He was the President of the Israeli Association for International Studies, 2003–7. Among his publications: *When Opponents Cooperate: Great Power Conflict and Collaboration in World Politics* (Ann Arbor, Michigan: The University of Michigan Press, 2nd edn, 2002) and *States, Nations and Great Powers: The Sources of Regional War and Peace* (Cambridge University Press, 2007).

Rafi Nets-Zehngut is a Ph.D. candidate (final year) in the Political Science Department at Tel Aviv University, last year a fellow at Yale University and currently a fellow at Columbia University. His research interests focus on conflicts: mostly collective memory of conflicts and also reconciliation and healing. He has been and is involved in various local and international activities and research projects that deal with peace and co-existence. He has authored or edited about 15 publications.

Brendan O'Leary was born in Cork, Ireland. He was brought up in Nigeria, Sudan, and Northern Ireland and educated at Oxford and the LSE, where he was a professor and chaired its Government Department. He is now Lauder Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania, where he directs the Penn Program in Ethnic Conflict (http://www.polisci.upenn.edu/ppec/PPEC.html). He is the author, co-author, editor, and co-editor of 16 books and collections, and over 100 articles and chapters in books mostly devoted to national and ethnic conflict – and its regulation. His current research is on Kurdistan in Iraq and on Nepal, as well as on a long term project with John McGarry.

Yoav Peled is Professor of Political Science at Tel Aviv University. He received his PhD in political science from UCLA in 1982. His work has dealt with citizenship and ethnic politics in Israel and with the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. His book, *Being Israeli: The Dynamics*

of Multiple Citizenship, co-authored with Gershon Shafir (Cambridge University Press, 2002), won the Albert Hourani Prize of the Middle East Studies Association of North America for the best book in Middle East studies in 2002. The book was published in Hebrew by Tel Aviv University Press in 2005 under the title *Mihu Yisraeli*.

Jonathan Rynhold is a senior lecturer in the Department of Political Studies at Bar-Ilan University and a Research Associate at the BESA Center for Strategic Studies. His recent publications include "Cultural Shift & Foreign Policy Change: Israel & the Making of the Oslo Accords" *Cooperation & Conflict* 42(4) 2007; "Ideological Change & Israel's Disengagement from Gaza" *Political Science Quarterly* 2008, with Dov Waxman; and "Israel's Fence: Can Separation Make Better Neighbours?" *Survival* 46(1) 2004. He is also co-editor of *Israel at the Polls 2006* (Routledge, 2007).

Raviv Schwartz completed his doctoral degree at Ben Gurion University, where he was a recipient of the prestigious Kreitman Fellowship. His doctoral dissertation examined the influence of identity on the ideology and organizational behavior of peace/conflict resolution organizations in Israel, Northern Ireland, and South Africa. Until recently, he was a Research Fellow at Tel Aviv University's Hartog School of Government and Policy where he conducted research on the policy implications for Israel of the philanthropic efforts emanating from both the Jewish diaspora and the Israeli business community. Raviv has also conducted a series of independent research efforts (commissioned by governmental and non-governmental sources) on NGOs engaged in peace-building between Israelis and Palestinians. His research has also included the work of philanthropic foundations, institutional Israel-Diaspora relations, and the link between Moldova and its migrant communities abroad.

Rupert Taylor is an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Studies, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. His many publications include articles in *Telos, Race and Class, Ethnic and Racial Studies, African Affairs, and The Political Quarterly*. He is currently editor of *Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations*.

Jennifer Todd, MRIA, School of Politics and International Relations, UCD, has written extensively on the Northern Ireland conflict, including Dynamics of Conflict in Northern Ireland (Cambridge University Press, with J. Ruane) and more recently on issues of ethno-national identity and identity change in conflict situations. She was Government of Ireland, IRCHSS Senior Research Fellow, 2006–7.

This page intentionally left blank

Introduction: Implementing Peace Agreements

Guy Ben-Porat

In the early 1990s, three conflicts that drew the world's attention and were deemed hopeless appeared to be heading toward resolution. In South Africa, Northern Ireland, and Israel/Palestine, conflicts previously described by scholars as "protracted" or "intractable," negotiations between the rival parties led to agreements and interim agreements that signaled a new future. While optimistic declarations of peace and bright future scenarios were quick to appear, in reality the celebration of peace was somewhat premature. In these three cases, as elsewhere, the "official" and semi-official ends of conflict were yet to facilitate a return to a normal, peaceful way of life. John Paul Lederach has reminded scholars and experts of the limits of agreements: "[W]e tend to attach to 'agreement' the idea that negotiations are over when in fact they are just beginning, and to continue they require a shift from a temporary effort to negotiate an agreement to a context-based, permanent, and dynamic platform capable of regenerating solutions to ongoing episodes of conflict" (in Borer, 2006, p. 4). Indeed, a peace agreement, as John Darby notes and many examples demonstrate, is not even a guarantee against violence (Darby, 2006).

This volume examines the gap between agreements and actual peace by focusing on the different aspects of implementation and of the causes of success or failure of peace processes. While in the early 1990s the conflicts/peace processes shared commonalities, a decade later it is all but obvious that they have followed different trajectories and reached different outcomes. In South Africa the peace process has irreversibly transformed the apartheid regime. In Northern Ireland violence was drastically reduced, but the peace process was halted by debates over decommissioning and police reform. Finally, in Israel/Palestine the peace process, after a short period of celebration, has collapsed

into unprecedented cycles of violence. What then distinguishes the relative success of South Africa and Northern Ireland from the failed Israeli/Palestinian peace process? This edited volume offers different explanations for the successes and failures of the three processes mentioned above and provides historical and comparative perspectives regarding their contemporary realities.

Peace, the theme of this volume, has different meanings and interpretations ranging from the absence of war, often gained by the "balance of power" and the threat of violence, to a more positive definition that includes justice, tolerance, and deeper transformations of perceptions. Peace studies are accordingly concerned with the movement away from war to peace along a continuum ranging from a reduction of violence to enduring peaceful relations. The building of a "positive peace" that is more enduring requires addressing the roots of the conflict in political, economic, cultural, and social structures as well as the attitudes and beliefs that institutionalize and legitimize violence (Richmond, 2005, pp. 117–18). Consequently, it takes time to overcome the structural and psychological obstacles resulting from protracted conflict locked in vicious cycles of confrontation (Jeong, 2005). A stable peace has to start with the reduction of violence, but must also involve measures of positive peace that change the perceptions of the sides to the conflict.

The history and development of every conflict are different, but the issues confronted in the peace processes are often quite similar: the end of violence and the furthering of justice, economic development, and legitimacy (Darby and MacGinty, 2000). Peace processes often create enthusiasm; however, after an initial period of euphoria, characterized by a lower level of violence and high future expectations, the mundane realities of translating early agreements into realities can lead to disagreement and disillusionment with peace. Differently stated, the dynamics and causes that underscore the signing of agreements may be insufficient for their implementation. While the consent to make initial steps toward compromise is often driven by external powers or by the stronger side, peace itself means different things between and within the parties. A weak peace, generated by external pressures on weak (and ambivalent) leaders, is unlikely to transform a conflict since both sides fear that compromises will only lead to new demands or to an appearance of weakness (Rothstein, 1999, pp. 223, 241). Accordingly, the actual implementation of a peace agreement is subject to different interpretations and is burdened by different expectations. In turbulent times, negotiated conflict settlements often lead to a "turbulent peace" that needs to be nurtured into a stable peace (Crocker *et al*., 2001).

The study of three peace processes allows us to do a comparative examination of the dynamics of post-agreement and the factors strengthening or undermining the process. The three conflicts have a scholarly history, as for a long time they have been packaged as classic examples of "protracted" ethno-national conflict involving territorial issues (Akenson, 1992; Giliomee and Gagiano, 1990; Guelke, 1990; Knox and Hughes, 1995; Lustik, 1993). Being long-term, ongoing, and permeating all aspects of society, the conflicts were often described as protracted. Protracted conflicts are characterized by a total lack of concern of the parties for one another and by a zero-sum dynamic that renders them unsusceptible to conventional conflict resolution methods (Starr, 1999). Specifically, the asymmetry of power between the powerful group in control of the territory and the weaker group denied recognition and a greater share of power within the same territory creates structural conditions that define the nature of the conflict (Rothstein, 1999, pp. 6–7). Because of their longevity, violence, and asymmetry, ethnonational protracted conflicts extend beyond a specific issue that corresponds to simple solutions. These conflicts involve not only material interests but also issues of identity and culture; therefore successful resolution must grapple with diverse issues of present, past, and future – grievances, trust and mistrust, security concerns, redistribution of resources – and, above all, must provide a formula for transforming the conflict by creating a political framework enabling coexistence and fostering reconciliation.

The early 1990s, marked by the end of the Cold War and the accelerated globalization, introduced a new context, new incentives, and new opportunities for the resolution of protracted conflicts. The end of the Cold War saw the involvement of the United States and other international actors in the resolution of different conflicts (Cox, 1998). The "unbundling of territoriality" (Ruggie, 1993) associated with globalization seemed to offer a handy solution to territorial conflicts previously considered intractable. Globalization affects national conflicts less by the elimination of differences or the transformation of identity and more by providing a context in which differences can be more effectively managed (McGarry, 2001, p. 295). One can argue that the basic rules of the political game have changed and the payoff matrix has been altered (Cerny, 1990). Consequently, peace studies began to focus on the potential of economic incentives to promote peace (Cortright, 1997; Crumm, 1995; Solingen, 1995); and "peace dividends" was the term used to describe the attempts of regional and core powers to devise and influence peace in local, off-center yet important conflicts (Chan, 1995).

The new global context described above combined with "local" initiatives to underscore the dramatic developments in South Africa, Israel/Palestine, and Northern Ireland. In South Africa, President F. W. de Klerk's initiative in early 1990s to remove the ban on the ANC and the South African Communist Party and the decision to release Nelson Mandela from prison brought the parties to genuine negotiations. In Northern Ireland, the decision of the IRA and the Protestant paramilitaries to accept the cease-fire in 1994 enabled the negotiations that culminated in the Good Friday Agreement in 1998. Finally, in Israel/Palestine the secret negotiations held between Israelis and Palestinians in Oslo led to the declaration of principles signed on the White House lawn in September 1993. The new context may have created incentives that "kick-started" peace processes and underscored the agreements or interim agreements reached. But, as these cases and others demonstrate, implementing peace agreements are a no less formidable task then their successful negotiation (Crocker and Hampson, 1996).

While we compare peace processes and discuss their success or failure, success in itself is difficult to define, as different parties to the conflict have different interests and goals and, consequently, different perceptions of success and failure. Hampson's (1996) definition of success – that includes the ending of violence and the construction of institutions and support structures that discourage the parties from taking up arms again (see also Darby and MacGinty, 2000, p. 4) – seems to capture the essence of success that distinguishes between the end of violence and stable peace. As the case studies described in this volume demonstrate, the achievement of stable peace is an arduous task.

From conflict to agreement

When do ethno-national conflicts end? William Zartman (1985) argues that conflicts become resolvable when they reach the point of "ripeness," crucial moments in which belligerents are hurt by stalemates, unilateral solutions are blocked and mutual or cooperative solutions emerge. The success or failure of the peace process, therefore, depends on the "ripeness" of the conflict itself, the shared perception of the disputants that an accord is desirable. Ripeness has been criticized as an "elusive" concept that can often be applied only in retrospect and therefore runs the risk of tautology. Ripeness, as Zartman (2001) explains, is a necessary condition, but not always sufficient for negotiation. A "hurting stalemate," when parties find themselves locked in a conflict in which neither can hope to achieve victory and both sides suffer from the deadlock

(Zartman, 2001),can lead the parties to the negotiating table; however, it does not ensure a successful outcome to the negotiations, since parties (or splinters) may decide to take up arms again. If either of the rival parties anticipates that a new conflict would have a better outcome than the previous conflict, then an incentive to renegotiate the settlement exists and a new possibility for conflict arises (Werner, 1999).

The cost–benefit analysis associated with "hurting stalemate" that underscores ripe moments is based on subjective perceptions and inter-pretations that can divide the parties to the conflicts themselves. This shifts the focus to internal politics in which not all parties perceive the "hurting stalemate" as such. Some parties might believe that victory is possible, value the conflict itself, or perceive compromise as a greater cost or risk than the continuation of the conflict. The peace processes that have emerged in recent years seem to be driven more by external pressures and top-down or elite calculations than by a deeper and wider change of perceptions about the enemy (Rothstein, 1999). Consequently, "external" peace can provoke or stimulate "internal" conflicts. Robert Putnam (1988) frames these dynamics in a "two-level game" in which policymakers have to take an account of and attempt to balance external pressures and internal demands, internal and external goals whose pursuit is not necessarily complementary and that involve the possibility of raising internal instability or external hostility. Once citizens are mobilized on a certain issue, governments have to pay attention to voter opinion in both domestic and foreign policymaking (Trumbore, 1998). Compromises in foreign policy, therefore, might strengthen the government's international position, but might raise internal opposition that would undermine its status.

Agreements are reached when policymakers believe that the benefits of peace outweigh local opposition and can gather the required momentum of domestic support. This, however, can radically change when the peace process is disrupted by violence; policymakers can be tempted to postpone the implementation of agreements if this risks their domestic position, and they often hesitate to confront militant groups that take actions intended to undermine the peace process. Accordingly, while a cease-fire that significantly diminishes violence is usually required in order to reach an agreement, in the longer run the peace process has to engage with the root causes of the conflict to build a stable peace. Peace building, as the former UN Secretary Boutros-Ghali described, is char-acterized in supporting structures "which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid relapse into conflict" (in Jeong, 2005, p. 4). The process of implementing a peace agreement, consequently, can

unravel if parties come to the conclusion that the agreement fails to address their concerns and that abiding by it no longer serves their interests (Jeong, 2005, p. 6). Peace, therefore, is a long-term process that requires support structures or "post-conflict peace building" in order to implement the agreements reached.

From agreement to implementation

Peace processes are a complex succession of transformations punctuated by long periods of inertia, sticking points, and setbacks. Even when settlements are reached, they are in danger of collapse if new life is not breathed into them by the determination of the parties, their constituencies, and external supporters to make them work. This is especially true if the euphoria that often accompanies the early stages of settlement, with promises of material betterment, turns to disillusionment when hopes, realistic or not, evaporate (Miall *et al.*, 1999, pp. 183–4). The end of the armed conflict, therefore, does not mean the end of political conflict, as the transition to peace takes place in a context of different social conflicts (Hoglund and Zartman, 2006). The ability to implement agreements and prevent the recurrence of violence depends on the "internal" and the "external" environment within which the sides to the agreement operate (Stedman, 2001).

Peace agreements provide a framework for ending hostilities but do not guarantee their end; the parties to agreement may decide to return to violence. Keeping the parties on the track of the peace process and dissuading them from returning to violence depends on the ability to transform the relations from zero-sum to cooperation, recognition, and reconciliation. While conflicts can be "managed" by various means so that violence is minimized, this falls short of their transformation – a long-term process that includes changes in attitude toward the "enemy," mutual confidence building, mutual security, and a dialogue that would stimulate the will to settle the conflict (Jamal, 2000). Kriesberg (2001) suggests that reconciliation actions are necessary for negotiating an agreement acceptable to both sides and, consequently, for the transformation of a conflict.

The implementation of peace agreements is conditioned on the ability to transform the conflict and change perceptions, agendas, and cost–benefit calculations. Implementation implies a structural change that would, at the minimum, dissuade rivals from taking up arms again or, at best, remove the option of violence from the policymakers' repertoire. The period following the agreement raises two challenges

described above: preventing a relapse into conflict and removing the structural causes of the conflict. It is a sensitive period in which the culture of violence still exists, arms are present, and the security apparatus has yet to gain credibility and legitimacy (Darby and MacGinty, 2000, pp. 12–13). In addition, new problems, ranging from policing, ex-combatants, and political prisoners to social justice and political inclusion, present multiple challenges for the implementation of the agreement.

Overcoming opposition

Negotiated settlements are usually not win-win solutions but rather "political deals" in which some people win a great deal more than others (Licklider, 2001, p. 702); thus implementation is bound to face challenges. Indeed, the negotiations of conflicts based on identity are often followed by violence (Licklider, 1995). Peace agreements do not always resolve all issues at stake: the issues in dispute may not be directly addressed or they may be decided at the expense of the weaker side. Consequently, such agreements may settle the conflict but are unlikely to resolve it (Miall, 1992; Werner, 1999). The implementation of peace agreements, therefore, brings out the different and often contrasting expectations of the parties. While the weaker group in the protracted conflict seeks to implement the agreement rapidly and ensure its new sovereign and/or equal status, the more powerful group is reluctant to give up its privileged position or insists on measures that would reduce its perceived risks. Under these terms the negotiating parties might decide to postpone critical issues to a later stage, in the hope that improved confidence between the parties and the benefits of peace might enable compromise in the future. The decision to postpone certain issues, however, may reflect the stronger party's preference to proceed slowly with the agreement and frustrate the weaker party eager to achieve its goals.

The period immediately after the signing of an agreement is a time of hope, but also of uncertainty and danger when the agreement is exposed to critics and dissatisfied factions that attempt to derail it. Stephen Stedman (1997) uses the term "spoilers" to describe leaders and parties who believe that peace threatens their power, their worldviews, or interests; they may favor a separatist agenda regardless of the economic consequences and have the power to derail the peace process by extreme actions. Total inclusion is hardly possible. So, the question is, therefore, also how spoilers (and potential spoilers) can be marginalized

so they will not have the ability to derail the peace process. Violence, even by a minority, has the potential to disrupt the peace processes, and it can affect the process differently at its different stages – pre-negotiation, negotiation, and post-settlement peace building – as new obstacles and challenges emerge at every stage (Darby, 2006, p. 4).

Spoiler actions can be contained either by large pro-peace coalitions or by incorporating them in the process. Wide coalitions committed to peace and determined to reduce violence will isolate spoilers and prevent them from achieving their aims by refusing to disrupt the process in spite of violence. It is when support for peace is tepid and legitimacy for compromise is weak, where spoilers have the capacity to derail the process by violent actions (Ben-Porat, 2006). Alternatively, the parties to peace can make efforts to actively involve those who seek to derail the agreement and threaten the process (Darby and MacGinty, 2000, pp. 254–5), thus incorporating spoilers in the peace process.

The external environment

The involvement of third parties has been identified as a major factor in the failure or success of the peace process (Hampson, 1996). Third parties can have an important impact on the peace process by providing incentives for the parties to engage in the peace process, sanctioning parties who refuse to take part in the process or do not comply with agreements, and providing mediation and facilitation throughout the process to reduce ambiguities and uncertainties. As external actors third parties can provide much needed political support and play a critical role in nurturing the conditions that lead to a negotiated settlement. Acting as mediators, they help the rival parties to reach a settlement by providing incentives and building trust between the parties. Their role, however, can be extended to the post-agreement stage during which they can help implementation by monitoring the actions of the parties, reducing the risks of compromises by providing explicit security guarantees, and by providing incentives for continuing the process or disincentives for defection.

Incentives for peace are often associated with economic betterment; this is because peace settlements, like conflicts, have a political economy that has to be taken into account. The proliferation of peace studies at the end of the Cold War indicated that economic incentives can promote peace (Cortright, 1997; see also Ben-Porat, 2005a; Crumm, 1995). The term "peace dividends," originally used to examine the effects of redirecting "unproductive" defense spending at the end of the Cold War,

was also used to describe the attempts of regional and core powers to devise and influence peace in local, off-center yet important conflicts (Chan, 1995; O'Hearn, 2000). The linkage established between peace and economic growth or prosperity allows more involvement (and influence) of business in peace processes. Concurrently, these incentives can trigger the opposition of spoilers who regard peace as a threat to their economic status, political status, or both. Moreover, peace agreements create expectations for economic improvement that are not always fulfilled. What matters is not economic growth per se, but its distribution among different constituencies. The unequal distribution of "peace dividends" could alienate significant constituencies from the peace process and leave it vulnerable to acts of "spoilers" (Ben-Porat, 2005a).

Institutions and civil society

The need to extend peace beyond the level of the elites and the limitations of economic incentives to foster peace raise the importance of civil society for conflict transformation. Non-state actors not only symbolize the elements of trust and cooperation required but can also promote these elements by bridging across the divides. Peace agreements, therefore, have to engage wider circles in order to gain support and create stability. Consequently, transformation of the conflict occurs when peace is endowed with "cognitive legitimacy," a real culture of change that takes place when populations are prepared to think in terms of peace rather than conflict, and to view the "Other" as potential partners rather than enemies (Hermann and Newman, 2000; see also Ryan, 1996).

The challenge of the peace process is to involve wide circles in the process so that it does not remain at the elite level. Thus, authentic public engagement in a peace process implies providing access to communities to engage in the process so that they feel a sense of ownership and belonging to it (Borer, 2006, p. 7). This includes the ability of the community to use the "moral imagination" to understand that former enemies now share a common destiny. Beyond the imagination new institutions and organizations must be formed that cross the lines and foster partnerships and common goals. "Peace enhancing" institutions include a fair judicial system, a just economic system, education, media, and other institutions that can promote new perceptions and initiatives that foster peace.

Reconciliation, an often used concept, is part of the process, a condition for its success and a goal in itself. It is often linked to the need to build trust between former adversaries, ensuring commitment to peace and

lowering risks of cheating and defecting. Reconciliation often involves not only engagement with the past but also with present situations and future horizons. In a sense it is about creating a climate in which parties to conflict will gradually change their perceptions of each other and will be able to implement formal agreements, thus ensuring an equitable and stable peace. (Kacowicz *et al.*, 2000). Louis Kriesberg (2001) argues that without significant and consistent reconciliation actions, transforming a protracted conflict to attain a mutually acceptable accommodation is extremely difficult. He delineates four dimensions of reconciliation that parties to peace must address: truth, justice, regard, and security. Reconciliation actions can be part of de-escalation, of negotiating a conflict settlement, or of a peace-building effort after an accommodation has been negotiated or imposed. Taking appropriate steps toward reconciliation can help transform destructive conflicts and relationships into constructive ones; the lack of reconciliation may leave peace processes vulnerable to spoilers.

Structures of agreements

The dynamics of inter-group relations set in motion by the agreements are crucial because, as argued above, their negotiation and formal signing are rarely an end-point. The design of the peace settlement itself is crucial for its implementation, specifically whether it is sufficiently comprehensive and inclusive to prevent defections from the peace process (Holsti, 1991). Thus, agreements structure present and future relations between the sides and pertain, on the one hand, to measures of cooperation and reconciliation and, on the other hand, to problem-solving methods when obstacles to implementation arise. Thus, when comparing the outcomes of peace agreements it is also important to pay attention to their purpose and initial goals.

Territoriality and sovereignty constitute the core of protracted conflict; resolution is based either on an agreed partition of the territory between the disputants or on a political framework that would allow them to share it. The formulae of peace, partition, or power-sharing are the outcome of available resources, existing structures, and political decisions. The idea of partition regained popularity in the late twentieth century as a solution for the growing number of violent intrastate civil conflicts. The partition of states engulfed in ethnic civil wars, even if accompanied by population transfers, was depicted as the lesser of two evils. But if after partition the boundaries remain disputed, the partition involves the uprooting of populations causing material and emotional damage,

inequality remains high and is attributed to past injustices, or past grievances are not addressed, the partition is likely to contain the seeds of a renewed conflict (Ben-Porat, 2005b).

In contrast to partitions, power-sharing agreements are based on the political restructuring of existing entities and an attempt to change the zero-sum nature of the conflict. Consociationalism, one formulation of power-sharing discussed in two chapters of this book, suggests an institutional framework to accommodate the needs and desires of ethnic groups within a state. The mechanisms suggested by Arend Lijphart (1979), the leading figure in Consociational theory, for "plural societies" include proportional representation, veto power for minority groups over certain issues and autonomy. Combined, these mechanisms should, on the one hand, satisfy the groups' desire to maintain their identity and, on the other hand, enable overarching democratic governance and cooperation.

Power-sharing arrangements, as critics have argued, are difficult to achieve, even more difficult to put into practice (Spears, 2002) and, somewhat like partition, they accept at face value the primacy and permanency of ethnic divisions and promote segregation instead of social contact and cooperation (Anderson and Goodman, 1998; Taylor, Chapter 10 of this volume). As such, they are also vulnerable to zero-sum dynamics, in which both sides struggle to maximize their gains at the expense of the "others." As mentioned above, power-sharing and partition are not necessarily a-la-carte choices for leaders of the rival parties. Rather, the choice is shaped by histories, political economy, third parties, and other factors beyond leaders' control. Explaining success or failure of the peace processes, therefore, must account for the context in which they developed and related advantages or disadvantages. Overall, however, the choices made have implications for the trajectories of the peace processes.

Structure of the book

The success of a peace process is measured, first, by its ability to end violence and, second, by its ability to create the institutions and support structures that would discourage the parties from taking up arms again. What then can we learn from the comparison of these three case studies? And what can we gain from a 10-year perspective of those peace processes? The comparison of these cases, as Adrian Guelke argues in the first chapter of this book, has a long history that predates the existence of some of these political entities. These

comparisons have served a multitude of purposes, used either as polemical tools by adversaries in conflict or as valuable lessons for ongoing peace processes. The lessons were not only "academic" but have influenced the peace processes themselves by providing examples for policy makers, through more direct involvement, such as the South African experts who assisted in the Northern Ireland peace process. The influence, however, worked both ways since Northern Irish loyalists and Republicans aligned their support with anti-peace forces in, respectively, Israel and the territories.

In the first part of the book contributors address theories and structural explanations to address success and failure. Benny Miller's work uses the concept of "nation-to-state imbalance" to explain the different outcomes of the peace processes: the higher the imbalance, the more difficult is the implementation of peace agreements. The extent of imbalance is affected by three factors: the relative dominance of civic vs. ethnic nationalism, the extent of internal and external national congruence, and state strength or capacity. Thus, the failure of the Israeli/Palestinian peace process in comparison to the other two cases is explained by a high level of state-to-nation imbalance.

John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary employ "consociationalism," a familiar term to students of ethnic conflicts. Consociational theory, they argue, has not sufficiently taken into account the specificity of conflicts based on national differences in "pluri-national places" that have more than one mobilized national community. In Northern Ireland, the Good Friday Agreement went beyond the basic consociational framework, attempted before, and added features that addressed the fact that Northern Ireland is divided between two national communities who want to be ruled by their respective nation-states; therefore, a purely internal consociational arrangement would have been inadequate. While consociationalism is often criticized for the entrenchment of divisions and the prevention of integration, in deeply divided societies integration is unlikely; thus consociational arrangements must deepen and extend principles of power-sharing and autonomy in a particular direction in order to accommodate nationally mobilized political communities. While consociational institutions were and remain vital to a political settlement in Northern Ireland, a settlement was reached only because traditional consociational prescriptions were supplemented by key binational institutions that squarely faced the national dimension of its conflict. Consociation, in short, was a necessary, but insufficient, requirement for a stable agreement.

Rupert Taylor is more critical of the concept of consociationalism and the way it was applied to the South African debate as a formula for constitutional reform. The appeal of consociationalism in South Africa, he argues, was partly because it was used by apartheid ideologues to defend their privileges and apartheid itself. While after 1990 consociationalism was detached from apartheid ideologies and incorporated some real power-sharing provisions, it was still ill-suited for South African society. Consociationalism's main failings, according to Taylor, were first, its primordial reading of ethnicity and accepting race as a given; and second, its consequent inability to provide a substantive moral critique of apartheid. Indeed, the 1996 liberal democratic constitution, in which individual rights are protected by a bill of rights, marked the end of the line for consociational designs.

The collapse of the Israeli/Palestinian peace process is often attributed to failure by the parties to implement the liberal model properly. Jonathan Rynhold, adopting an international relations realist framework, argues that specific structural conditions in the Israeli/Palestinian context were not appropriate for conflict resolution and the construction of a "warm" liberal peace. According to the realist approach, the conflict was not actually ripe for resolution, as the negotiations revealed large gaps between the ways that the parties defined their core interests; the result was a "destructive ambiguity" that led not to mutual trust but to distrust. Economic integration not only failed to generate support for the peace process but actually increased friction and placed additional political obstacles in the way of compromise by empowering opposition on both sides. Thus, rather than adopt a liberal model, argues Rynhold, a better alternative would have been to focus on the more modest goal of conflict management based on political and physical separation. Paradoxically, the stability generated by such a policy might just provide the kind of context under which conflict resolution might have a better chance of success in the future.

Contributors to the second part of the book engage with the dynamics of the peace processes, the role of different types of players and the transformations of perception and identities. The question of spoilers and sponsors of peace is addressed in a different context in Raviv Schwartz's paper that examines the role of diasporas in the peace processes. These parties have an impact on structuring the external environment of the conflict and its incentives/disincentives for peace. Because in all three conflict regions American intervention, diplomatic, economic or other,

has had a significant bearing on the decision-making of all the protagonists involved, "diaspora politics" is assumed to have an important role because the networks created by diasporas represent a distinctive and potentially potent triadic relationship, linking ethnic communities, their host countries, and their homelands.

Incremental micro-level changes are evidently missing in the Israeli/Palestinian peace process. Tamar Hermann's work critically examines the role of Israeli civil society in the peace process, looking at both peace activists and peace "spoilers" involved in the process, and sheds light on the circumstances under which civil society plays a significant role in ethno-national conflicts and in shaping the course of events. Civil society organizations sprang up on both sides of the political spectrum, pro- and anti-territorial compromise, and were active in the formative years of the peace process and after its collapse in 2000. Civil society, according to Hermann's finding, is not a peaceful entity "struggling against a war-mongering state or government," but rather composes various ideologies and strategies. The areas of influence of these organizations are mainly in cultivating the ground for cognitive changes, and in introducing new ideas and options to the national repertoire that, in turn, modify the national policy.

The Israeli/Palestinian peace process is largely devoid of reconciliation measures found in the other two cases; consequently a limited, if any, (positive) change of perceptions has taken place (Ben-Porat, 2005a; Jamal, 2000). Rafi Nets-Zehngut's work suggests that reconciliation is not necessarily a mediated intentional process but rather could develop "unintentionally." Specifically, the passing of time and the existence of interest-based cooperation can eventually lead to reconciliation. In the Israeli/Palestinian case, at least some of the economic and environmental cooperation formed in the early Oslo period continued through the difficult negotiations and may yield results in the future.

Jennifer Todd's work examines the role of identity change in the partial success of the Northern Ireland peace process. Cultural categorizations and identities, argues Todd, are a part of a complex causal process of coming out of conflict. Identities of binary oppositions are integrally connected to ethnic power relations; the change of power relations is likely to trigger identity shifts that vary in their extensity and their translation into practice. These changes are triggered by everyday experiences and interactions, often through civil-society organizations rather than political events. The depth and breadth of identity change is central to the evolvement of the peace process, as people negotiate their "identity package" that can sustain or undermine peace. The six

categories of identity change developed (re-affirmation, assimilation, conversion, adaptation, ritual appropriation and privatization) are used in the analysis of the interview data collected in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. The research finds that there were many cases of identity shift, but they were seldom radical and usually involved either a moderation of oppositional understandings or a partial disengagement from them. This identity shift, however, is yet to be translated into political choices and political action.

In the final part of this work success and failure are addressed again and the role of the state and its leadership is examined. The political economy of conflict and peace is explored in Yoav Peled's paper that examines two perceptions of the peace process, "peace and profits" and "privatization-occupation nexus." The former attributes the failure of Oslo, on the Israeli side, to the peace and liberalization projects adopted by the elites and the opposition of the victims of economic liberalization and privatization, who joined hands with the ideological opponents of peace and succeeded in derailing it. The latter view the settlement project as an essential buffer for liberalization itself, and therefore the proponents of liberalization, whatever their declared political preferences, were unable to give it up and continue the peace process. Both approaches, argues Peled, underestimate the potential role of the state as an autonomous actor. Ariel Sharon's visit to the Temple Mount/Holy Sanctuary on September 28, 2000, and his landslide victory in the prime ministerial election of February 6, 2001, can be explained most cogently as a Bonapartist resolution of a stalemate in the class struggle between the promoters of liberalization and its (Jewish) victims. The state, meaning the military and other security forces, argues Peled, had a clear interest in derailing the Oslo process that, potentially implying a withdrawal from the territories, would undermine its power. The social stalemate between Oslo and Camp David allowed the state not only to abandon the peace process but also to retrench the welfare state.

The Israeli/Palestinian peace process falls short of the other two in most measures suggested here and, consequently, in its outcomes. Obviously, unlike the other two peace processes that aimed at some form of power sharing, the Israeli/Palestinian process can at best be described at this stage as a failed partition attempt. Heribert Adam's chapter brings us back to comparison as it examines the uses and abuses of the South African analogy in the Israeli/Palestinian conflict and draws relevant policy lessons for the struggling Israeli/Palestinian peace process. The sides to the latter conflict have yet to overcome their prejudices and

misperceptions to reach a meaningful compromise. Negotiations on equal terms between elected leaders, not yielding negotiations to violence, conciliatory gestures, and attempts to draw all parties into the negotiations, all are lessons to be derived from the South African experience.

References

Akenson, Donald H. 1992. *God's People: Covenant and Land in South Africa, Israel and Ulster*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Anderson, James and James Goodman. 1998. "Nationalism and Transnationalism: Failures and Emancipation." In J. Goodman and J. Anderson (eds), *Dis/Agreeing Ireland*. London: Pluto.

Ben-Porat, Guy. 2005a. "Same Old Middle East? The New Middle East and the *Double* Movement," *International Relations* 19(1): 39–62.

Ben-Porat, Guy. 2005b. "Grounds for Peace: Territoriality and Conflict Resolution," *Geopolitics* 10(1): 147–66.

Ben-Porat, Guy. 2006. "Markets and Fences: Illusions of Peace," *Middle East Journal* 60(2): 311–28.

Borer, Tristan A. 2006. *Telling the Truths*. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.

Cerny, Philip G. 1990. *The Changing Architecture of Politics: Structure, Agency and the Future of the State*. London: Sage Publications.

Chan, Steve. 1995. "Grasping the Peace Dividend: Some Propositions on the Conversion of Swords into Plowshares," *International Studies Quarterly* 39(1): 53–95.

Cortright, David. 1997. "Incentive Strategies for Preventing Conflicts." In D. Cortright (ed.), *The Price of Peace*. New York: Rowman and Littlefield.

Cox, Michael. 1998. "Northern Ireland: The War that came in from the Cold," *Irish Studies in International Affairs* 9: 73–84.

Crocker, Chester A. and Fen Osler Hampson. 1996. "Making Peace Settlements Work," *Foreign Policy* 104: 54–72.

Crumm, Eileen M. 1995. "The Value of Economic Incentives in International Politics," *Journal of Peace Research* 32(3): 313–30.

Darby, John (ed.). 2006. *Violence and Reconstruction*. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.

Darby, John and Roger MacGinty. 2000. *The Management of Peace Process*. London: Routledge.

Giliomee, H. and Gagiano, J. (eds). 1990. *The Elusive Search for Peace: South Africa, Israel and Northern Ireland*. Cape Town: Oxford University Press.

Guelke, Adrian. 1990. *Northern Ireland: The International Perspective*. Dublin: Gill and Macmillan.

Hampson, Fen Osler. 1996. *Nurturing Peace: Why Peace Settlements Succeed or Fail*. Washington, DC: USIP Press.

Hermann, Tamar and David Newman. 2000. "A Path Strewn with Thorns: Along the Difficult Road of Israeli-Palestinian Peacemaking." In J. Darby and R. MacGinty (eds), *The Management of Peace Process*. London: Routledge.

Hoglund, Kristine and Zartman, William I. 2006. "Violence by the State: Official Spoilers and their Allies." In John Darby (ed.), *Violence and Reconstruction*. John Darby Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.

Holsti, Kalevi J. 1991. *Peace and War: Armed Conflict and International Order, 1648–1989*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Jamal, Amal. 2000. "The Palestinians in the Israeli Peace Discourse: A Conditional Partnership," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 30(1): 36–51.

Jeong, Ho-Won. 2005. *Peacebuilding in Postconflict Societies*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

Kacowicz, Arie M., Yaacov Bar-Siman Tov, Ole Elgstrom, and Magnus Jerneck (eds). 2000. *Stable Peace Among Nations*. Lanham/Boulder/New York/Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield.

Knox, Colin and Joanne Hughes. 1995. "Cross-Community Contact: Northern Ireland and Israel – A Comparative Perspective," *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 1(2): 205–28.

Kriesberg, Louis. 2001. "Comparing Reconciliation Actions Within and Between Countries." The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, The Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations, Conference on Reconciliation, Jerusalem, June 12–13, 2001.

Licklider, Roy. 1995. "The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945–1993," *American Political Science Review* 89(3): 681–90.

Licklider, Roy. 2001. "Obstacles to Peace Settlements." In C. Croker, F. Hampson and P. Aal (eds), *Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflicts*. Washington: USIP Press.

Lijphart, Arend. 1979. *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Lustik, Ian. 1993. *Unsettled States, Disputed Lands: Britain and Ireland, France and Algeria, Israel and the West Bank-Gaza*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

McGarry, John (ed.). 2001. *Northern Ireland and the Divided World*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Miall, Hugh. 1992. *The Peacemakers: Peaceful Settlement of Disputes Since 1945*. London: Macmillan.

Miall, Hugh, Oliver Ramsbotham, and Tom Woodhouse. 1999. *Contemporary Conflict Resolution; The Prevention, Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflicts*. London: Polity Press.

O'Hearn, Denis. 2000. "Peace Dividends, Foreign Investment, and Economic Regeneration: The Northern Irish Case," *Social Problems* 47(2): 180–201.

Putnam, Robert D. 1988. "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," *International Organization* 42(3): 427–60.

Richmond, Oliver P. 2005. *The Transformation of Peace*. New York: Palgrave.

Rothstein, Robert L. (ed.). 1999. *After the Peace: Resistance and Reconciliation*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

Ruggie, John G. 1993. "Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations," *International Organization* 47(1): 139–74.

Ryan, Stephen. 1996. "Peacebuilding Strategies and Intercommunal Conflict: Approaches to the Transformation of Divided Societies," *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 2(2): 216–31.

Solingen, Etel. 1995. "The New Multilateralism and Nonproliferation: Bringing in Domestic Politics," *Global Governance* 1(2): 205–27.

Spears, Ian S. 2002. "Africa: The Limits of Power-Sharing," *Journal of Democracy* 13(3): 123–6.

Starr, Harvey. 1999. "Introduction." In Starr (ed.), *The Understanding and Management of Global Violence*. New York, NY: St. Martin's Press.

Stedman, Stephen J. 1997. "Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes," *International Security* 22(2): 5–53.

Stedman, Stephen J. 2001. "Implementing Peace Agreements in Civil Wars: Lessons and Recommendations for Policymakers." International Peace Academy Policy Paper Series.

Trumbore, P. F. 1998. "Public Opinion as a Domestic Constraint in International Negotiations: Two-Level Games in the Anglo-Irish Peace Process," *International Studies Quarterly* 42: 545–66.

Werner, Suzanne. 1999. "The Precarious Nature of Peace: Resolving the Issues, Enforcing the Settlement, and Renegotiating the Terms," *American Journal of Political Science* 43(3): 912–34

Zartman, William. 1985. *Ripe for Resolution, Conflict and Intervention in Africa*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Zartman, William. 2001. "The Timing of Peace Initiatives: Hurting Stalemates and Ripe Moments," *The Global Review of Ethnopolitics* 1(1): 8–18.

1

Israeli Flags Flying Alongside Belfast's Apartheid Walls: A New Era of Comparisons and Connections

Adrian Guelke

Comparison is the stuff of political discourse. Pick up virtually any newspaper in the world and you will commonly find a cartoon that makes a play on the juxtaposition of two news items in the paper to make its point. It is an effective technique. However, since it is usually based on little more than temporal coincidence between the two items, the comparison may prove as ephemeral as the newspaper itself. Similarly, comparison is a central feature of the scholarly analysis of politics. While more rigorous and less opportunistic than the cartoonist's mode of comparison, scholarly comparison where it employs quantitative techniques and applies them to a wide range of cases may throw as little light on individual cases.

Sustained comparison among a small number of cases is a less common feature of political discourse. The same may be said in relation to scholarly analysis. The existence of both the sustained use of analogies among the same cases in political discourse and a focus on the same cases in scholarly analysis is even more unusual. That is what makes comparison of the cases of Israel/Palestine,[1] South Africa and Northern Ireland so interesting and multi-faceted. Of course, it may fairly be argued that the two forms of comparison can strongly influence each other. Indeed, it would be surprising if there was no connection between these two modes of comparison. That said, the criteria used to justify political comparisons and those employed to underwrite scholarly analysis are different. Further, it is not difficult to come up with examples of fruitful comparisons in the field of political analysis that have little resonance in the realm of political discourse. Taking the cases discussed in John McGarry's book, *Northern Ireland and the Divided World*,[2] the examples of

Quebec, Sri Lanka, East Timor and Lebanon stand out as having attracted rather more interest from scholars than from practitioners. In part, this is because for purposes of analysis, differences can be as interesting as similarities, given the existence of the same point of departure to justify the comparison in the first place. That is rarely so in the case of political comparisons for polemical purposes.

Comparison of the cases of Israel/Palestine, South Africa and Northern Ireland either as a trio or in pairs has a long history. Indeed, it predates the existence of not just the State of Israel but that of Northern Ireland and even that of South Africa as a single political unit (with the foundation of the Union of South Africa in 1910). Mark Suzman has written a book comparing the rise of Irish nationalism, Afrikaner nationalism and Zionism.[3] His book underscores just how far back comparison of these situations goes. It is also worth underlining another point that emerges from his study – how different the political lines of sympathy were when comparison of the three cases first began. In particular, the notion of commonality between Afrikaner nationalism and Irish nationalism was sufficiently strong that the South African politician, Jan Christian Smuts, could reasonably conclude that his warning of another Ireland had clinched the argument he put to the newly installed Liberal Prime Minister in 1906. This persuaded the British prime minister Henry Campbell-Bannerman to opt for a policy of conciliating Afrikaner opinion at the ultimate expense of the majority of the South African population. Another early mark of the potency of the Irish–Afrikaner association was that a number of Irish-American volunteers fought on the side of the Boer Republics in the war of 1899–1902 against what they saw as the common enemy, British imperialism.

Useful starting points for considering the comparison of the trio on the basis of present lines of political sympathy are two conferences that were held in West Germany during the course of the 1980s. The first of these was organized by Theo Hanf under the auspices of the European Consortium of Political Research (ECPR) in Freiburg. To be strictly accurate, four rather than three cases were studied in the special workshop. Lebanon, a particular interest of Theo Hanf along with South Africa, was the fourth society studied, and a number of scholars from Lebanon were present at the workshop explaining the complexity of the country's politics. Though the intent behind the workshop was comparative, both to explore the structural dimensions of the conflicts and to draw some policy-oriented lessons, the political situation in the four cases under consideration did not lend itself to a fruitful meeting of minds.

The South African contingent's main preoccupation was the country's newly enacted but yet to be implemented tricameral constitution, which provided for separate Houses of Parliament for Coloreds and Indians in addition to the existing House of Assembly for whites. This was denounced by a number of speakers as a sham form of consociationalism, a judgment endorsed by the originator of the model, Arend Lijphart, who was present at the workshop. The Lebanese scholars were shocked by what they perceived to be the hostility of Northern Ireland's political parties to the very idea of political accommodation between Unionism and nationalism. In the wake of the polarizing impact of the hunger strikes in the Maze prison, the papers on Northern Ireland accurately reflected the zero-sum thinking that prevailed among the main parties. From a Lebanese perspective it must have seemed that the Irish only had themselves to blame for their troubles. By contrast, the role of external parties loomed large in the Lebanese accounts of their civil war. In the case of the Israeli papers, my memory is that for the most part they belonged to the field of International Relations rather than that of Comparative Politics. The South African historian, Hermann Giliomee, wrote an account of the Freiburg conference in the South African press under the heading "Violence and conflict in divided societies."[4] His piece was accompanied by a cartoon picturing the four societies as bombs connected to lit fuses. The one difference was that the fuse connected to the South African bomb had a much longer fuse, reflecting the implication of Giliomee's piece that South Africa still had time to address its divisions before it became engulfed by violent conflict.

The second conference, held outside Bonn in September 1989, could hardly have been more different. The initiative for this conference came from South Africa. It was sponsored by the Institute for a Democratic Alternative in South Africa (IDASA), with further financial support from the Friedrich Naumann Foundation. Notwithstanding the inclusion on the program of a paper on Sri Lanka, the Bonn conference focused practically exclusively on comparison of the trio. There was a palpable sense at the conference of deep similarities among the three cases. The intifada, which had begun in December 1987, had dispelled the notion that Israeli difficulties could be conceived primarily as a question of inter-state relations. It seemed that in the interval between the two conferences there had been convergence in the problems facing the three societies. It was summed up in the concept that dominated the conference: intractability.

A distinguished British scholar, Bernard Crick, gave the keynote address at the conference. The main point made by Crick was that in

all three cases, the conflicts were "insoluble."[5] He gave two reasons for reaching this conclusion: the irreconcilability of the declared stances of the main parties, and obstacles in the way of any externally imposed solution. Crick noted the disposition in all three societies for comparison with the other two. His bleak view of the immediate prospects for political progress in all three societies was widely shared among the academics at the conference. The main dissenting voice was an Israeli sociologist and expert on ethnic conflict, Sammy Smooha. He argued that we were ignoring signs of change in all three cases. However, he did not think the prospect for a breakthrough was equally strong in each of the three cases. He was most optimistic about Israel/Palestine on the grounds that the most plausible answer to the problem of conflict there was the two-state solution. That required not a marriage between the parties, but a divorce; he argued that in politics, as in personal life, divorces are easier to arrange and tend to be more durable than marriages.

Smooha did not regard the issues at stake in the Irish conflict to be as significant as those in either the Middle East or South Africa. But he wondered whether there were sufficient incentives for the parties in Northern Ireland to settle their differences. This echoed a commonly held proposition that conditions were not sufficiently bad in Northern Ireland to bridge the gap between the parties. In the case of South Africa, he thought that the large measure of inequality between whites and blacks was too great to be overcome in the near future at least. Smooha made his points in the context of a debate on the future of Israel/Palestine with another Israeli scholar, Meron Benvenisti. The clash between Smooha's optimism and Benvenisti's pessimism was one of the highlights of the conference. For his part, Benvenisti argued that the warring communities in Israel/Palestine were too integrated and interdependent for separation into two polities to be easily achieved.

Whereas Benvenisti was a contributor to the book produced from the conference, Smooha does not have a chapter in *The Elusive Search for Peace*. The volume, edited by Hermann Giliomee and Jannie Gagiano and published by Oxford University Press in South Africa as part of a series on contemporary South African debates, was published in 1990. Benvenisti's chapter was entitled "The Peace Process and Intercommunal Strife," in which Benvenisti acknowledged that partition or power-sharing, or a combination of both, constituted means of resolving conflicts such as that between the Israelis and Palestinians. But he added the following caveat:

Such devices, however, require that the parties directly involved feel compelled to make use of them, which is not the case when the protagonists consider conflict resolution devices only through the prisms of their respective gains and losses, not as a means to resolve their differences amicably.[6]

Ironically, *The Elusive Search for Peace* was published in the wake of dramatic events in South Africa that undercut the main assumptions that had underpinned the conference – intractable conflict and a continuing political impasse. This was of course President F. W. de Klerk's initiative of 2 February 1990, in which he removed the ban on a number of organizations, including the African National Congress (ANC) and the South African Communist Party, and announced that Nelson Mandela would shortly be released from prison. In fairness to the participants in the Bonn conference, they could hardly have been expected to anticipate the major development in world politics that formed a significant backdrop to the changes in all three societies in the course of the early 1990s. This was the coming down of the Berlin Wall in November 1989.

As long as the Soviet Union posed a threat to the West, even if a rather muted one during periods of détente, Western conservatives had strategic grounds for the policy of acquiescing in the status quo in Israel/Palestine and South Africa as bulwarks against Communism. Admittedly, the counter-argument that the West's ties with Israel and its association with apartheid alienated the Arab world and black Africa respectively enjoyed a measure of support in Western capitals. Nevertheless, it did not make sense for Western governments to put intensive pressure on Israel and South Africa to carry out radical reforms when change might benefit organizations aligned to the Soviet Union. The demise of the Soviet threat deprived both the South African and the Israeli governments of the argument that they were of vital strategic value to the West, and consequently increased their uncertainty over how the West might behave in relation to any future conflict in which either was involved.

In the case of Northern Ireland, the same considerations did not apply. Unlike the ANC or the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) lacked even indirect links to the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, even in Northern Ireland, the coming down of the Berlin Wall made a significant difference. This was because of the importance that the Republican movement attached to the strategic factor in its analysis of why Britain continued to support partition. The credibility of this analysis of the British presence evaporated in the wake of the end of the Cold War. Further, it became possible for the

British government explicitly to disavow any strategic interest in the maintenance of British rule in Northern Ireland.

Before the comparison of the three cases in the era of peace processes in the early 1990s is examined, a brief description should be given of the parallel development of political comparisons in the 1980s. The primary pairing in this context was the South African–Northern Ireland one. There was considerable admiration for Israel among South African political leaders after the Six-Day War of 1967; Israel's response to threats from beyond its borders was regarded as providing a useful example to South African policymakers. However, Israeli domestic policies had little obvious relevance to South Africa in the mid-1980s when South Africa's crisis of governability gave added urgency to the search for an alternative to the failed attempt to co-opt Coloreds and Indians into supporting apartheid. The priority was for a model of governance from beyond the African continent that did not entail majority rule. This was the context of a visit to Belfast by the South African ambassador to the UK, Denis Worrall, in April 1985. It was a bizarre affair.

The only political parties willing to meet the ambassador were the Ulster Unionist Party and the Democratic Unionist Party. At the time both parties opposed power-sharing and advocated majority rule for Northern Ireland. Worrall was shunned by the two pro-power-sharing parties, the Alliance Party and the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP). Their unwillingness to meet the ambassador was criticized by the Unionists who pointed to the inconsistency of the two parties' advocating majority rule in South Africa but not in Northern Ireland. The denouement of the visit was a press conference at which Denis Worrall proclaimed – to the mortification of his Unionist hosts – that he regarded South Africa and Northern Ireland as examples of societies in which majority rule could not work. Even more upsetting to Unionists was the ambassador's revelation that he had asked for, but been refused, a meeting with Sinn Féin.[7]

At the same time, Republicans in Northern Ireland sought to use the South African analogy to underwrite their anti-colonial model of the Irish conflict and to justify "armed struggle" in pursuit of their objective of a British declaration of intent to withdraw. It is perhaps worth noting that those who sought to use the comparison for political purposes proved no more successful in either anticipating or shaping the future than their academic counterparts. The National Party ultimately failed to secure international support for a constitution based on group rights or to avert majority rule. For its part, the Republican movement failed to secure an end to partition and was forced to settle for consociational arrangements

in Northern Ireland of the sort that the National Party had wanted in South Africa.

The sequence of transitions/peace processes in the early 1990s inevitably exercised a strong influence on the use of comparisons among the three cases during this period. As the first of the three societies to embrace change, South Africa became a model for change in the other two. By contrast, as the last of the three to embark on a process of change, Northern Ireland made most use of the comparison with the other two cases in the launch of its peace process. Initially, the two nationalist parties in Northern Ireland, the SDLP and Sinn Féin, pushed the analogy to put pressure on the British and Irish governments to take up their suggestions for the launch of a fresh political initiative. Following the Joint Declaration by the British and Irish governments on 15 December 1993, the governments supplanted the parties in their enthusiasm for the comparison. A reflection of the success of their efforts was a cartoon that appeared in the French daily *Le Monde*.[8] It showed a masked member of the IRA arm in arm with the British Prime Minister John Major entering a café of peace in which Mandela and De Klerk and Rabin and Arafat were already present drinking champagne in celebration.

There was a strong belief in Northern Ireland that if the parties in South Africa could arrive at a negotiated settlement and Israelis and Palestinians could agree on the principles for a settlement, then it was incumbent on the parties in Northern Ireland to achieve no less. This was most clearly reflected in an advertisement placed in the *New York Times* by Irish-American business leaders. Under the heading, "Irish eyes are crying for peace. Now is the chance," the advertisement referred to "the backdrop of the unprecedented peace initiatives in the Middle East and South Africa."[9] At this point South Africa had still to hold its first democratic elections. There was a continuing high level of political violence in the first months of 1994, as the Inkatha Freedom Party continued to toy with the option of disrupting the polling and the destiny of two of the country's Bantustans remained unclear. This prompted Shell to draw on the Middle Eastern peace process as an inspiration to South Africans. It ran a full-page advertisement in *The Weekly Mail and Guardian*, which read: "Enough tears. Enough blood. It is time for peace. Shell working to make a difference."[10]

During the course of the 1990s, allusions were made in each of the three societies to the peace processes in the other two, either together or individually. Further, the influence of the other peace processes went across the political spectrum. In the case of Northern Ireland, the British government latched on to the language used in the Multi-Party

Negotiating Process in South Africa. It substituted the term "sufficient consensus" for "parallel consent," when insisting that any agreement would need the support of both a majority of Unionist representatives and a majority of nationalist representatives. Nonetheless, of all the various comparisons made among the three societies during this period, the use of the South African comparison by the Republican movement stands out, as does the Republican movement's reliance on the ANC to validate the comparisons it made.

Indeed, the readiness of South Africans in general to endorse the analogy was crucial to both its credibility and its durability. The Johannesburg daily, *The Star*, reported the Provisionals' cease-fire under the banner headline: "IRA takes 'SA option'."[11] Archbishop Desmond Tutu's joy at the news of the cease-fire was prominently reported in Northern Ireland. Gerry Adams visited South Africa in 1995 at the invitation of the ANC, receiving a warm welcome. An extraordinary profile of Adams appeared in the color magazine of the South African *Sunday Times* under the heading "To heal a nation."[12] Even when the peace process broke down with the IRA attack on Canary Wharf in February 1996, the contacts continued. In May 1997 the South African government invited the representatives of all the parties in Northern Ireland, including Sinn Féin, to a conference on the lessons of the South African transition.[13] The political purpose of the conference was very clearly to assist the Sinn Fein leadership in bringing about a renewal of the IRA cease-fire and the party's entry into the negotiating process at Stormont. When the Good Friday Agreement was reached in April 1998, leading members of the ANC were on hand to help the Sinn Féin leadership persuade the Republican movement to take a positive view of the deal.

This was by no means the end of the South African involvement in the Irish peace process. After the negotiations in June–July 1999, Adams thanked both Clinton and Thabo Mbeki for their assistance. When the Executive was suspended in February 2000 over the failure of the Provisional IRA to begin decommissioning, two South African intermediaries, Mac Maharaj and Leon Wessels, came to Belfast to assist in getting the process back on track. In particular, in a number of newspaper accounts, Mac Maharaj was credited with influencing the IRA Army Council to back down to the extent of permitting a number of IRA arms dumps to be inspected, an initiative that paved the way to the restoration of the Executive in June 2000.[14] And one of the two international figures chosen to carry out the inspections was the former ANC negotiator, Cyril Ramaphosa. It is a measure of the hold that the South African analogy has among Republicans that Republican dissidents, instead of dismissing the

relevance of the comparison, have put it in a different light. In 2000, one of the dissidents, Brendan Hughes, asserted: "I look at South Africa and I look at here and I see that the only change has been in appearances."[15]

Interest in the South African example was by no means confined to Republicans. A pamphlet entitled *The South African Experience – Lessons for Northern Ireland?*,[16] which examined the comparison from a liberal perspective, was published in Belfast in 1995. Further, South Africans were very well represented among outside experts who assisted the process at various times, a reflection of the influence of the South African transition in official circles. The interest in 2004 in the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) as a model for creating a similar mechanism in Northern Ireland is discussed further below. Progress in, as well as setbacks to, the Middle East peace process episodically attracted attention during the 1990s when these coincided with ups and downs in the Irish process. In particular, Netanyahu's election as prime minister in Israel in May 1996 was compared with elections to the Northern Ireland forum – seen at the time as marking a disturbing trend of polarization of opinion between the communities. From this point, concern over political polarization and the accompanying intensification of social segregation became a significant theme of commentary on conditions in Northern Ireland. From a more positive perspective, there was interest in Israel at the outset of Barak's tenure in office as to whether the mechanism of a referendum, which had played an important role in underpinning the Good Friday Agreement, might have applicability in Israel.

However, by the beginning of 2001, it was becoming hard to sustain comparisons of the three cases as a trio. This was because it was evident that the three societies had taken very different paths at the start of the new millennium. With the smooth transition of power from Nelson Mandela to Thabo Mbeki in 1999, it was clear that the South African transition to democracy had become consolidated. In contrast, by the beginning of 2001 Israel/Palestine was slipping back into violent conflict, in the wake of the onset of the al Aqsa intifada in September 2000. In Northern Ireland a power-sharing Executive was still functioning, but the dispute over decommissioning of IRA weapons continued to throw doubt on its durability. The events of 11 September, 2001, consequently had very different implications for the three societies. South African politics was barely affected. By contrast, the tactic of suicide bombing lent credibility to the Israeli equation of this terrorism with the methods of al Qaeda and strengthened the Israeli claim that the fault for the breakdown of the Middle East peace process lay primarily, if not wholly, with the

Palestinians. Nonetheless, the military action taken by Sharon against the Palestinian Authority in March 2002 remained controversial. In the case of Northern Ireland, 9/11 initially gave the peace process a boost. This was because it enabled the leadership of the Republican movement to overcome opposition to decommissioning in the ranks of the IRA, making possible the first act of decommissioning by the IRA in October 2001. However, a year later, in October 2002, the Executive was suspended over allegations of IRA spying on government, and it remained suspended until the restoration of devolution in May 2007.

After 9/11, Unionists complained bitterly that the war against terrorism was not being applied to Northern Ireland. They accused Blair of inconsistency in his approach to global terrorism and to terrorism in Northern Ireland. This was the background to the remarkable response in Belfast to Sharon's offensive against the Palestinians that began in March 2002. Henry McDonald described the scene in the strongholds of the paramilitaries in the north of the city:

> Israel has found a new ally in its war against Yasser Arafat and the Palestinian Authority – Johnny Adair's dog. Rebel, Adair's pet Alsatian, has become the latest member of the Ulster loyalist community to display support for Ariel Sharon's assault on the West Bank and Gaza. Last Monday afternoon the UDA commander's four-legged friend was seen being taken for a walk along Belfast's Shankill Road with the Star of David flag wrapped around its body. Rebel, a Zionist version of Superdog with his Israeli flag turned into a cape, was paraded along just days before his master was released from prison.
>
> In UDA redoubts such as the Lower Shankill and Tigers Bay it seems every lamppost is now festooned with the Jewish State's flag. In response Palestinian flags have been put up in large numbers across Republican strongholds. The INLA in particular has been keen to express support for the PLO and even more extreme forces in the Palestinian controlled areas. 'Victory to Jenin' and 'We support the suicide bombers' are commonplace on the walls of Duncairn Gardens, Newington and Ardoyne.[17]

These reactions need to be seen in the context of an increasing rate of street-level, non-lethal violence at Belfast's sectarian interfaces at this time. Conflict at the interfaces led to increasing segregation, with the number of "peace walls" separating communities rising from 15 in 1994 to 37 by 2003. The message that Loyalists sought to convey through the display of Israeli flags was that they preferred Sharon's war

process to Blair's peace process. On the Republican side, the message being conveyed by support for the most militant groups among the Palestinians was that the exclusion of Sinn Féin that was being demanded by Unionists would meet with an extremely aggressive response from Republicans.

However, it would be a mistake to treat the use of the analogies entirely at face value. Undoubtedly, there was an element of political opportunism in the Loyalist displays of support for Sharon. This can be illustrated by the fact that when a Loyalist neighborhood of Belfast hosted a visit by supporters of the British National Party, the slogans in support of Israel abruptly disappeared from the walls of that neighborhood.[18] What that shows is the desire of Loyalists to cultivate support within the United Kingdom from any segment of mainland opinion, no matter how marginal, willing to give it. Nevertheless, it certainly remains the case that in general Loyalists find it easier to identify with the position of Israel under siege than do the extreme right-wing groups that give them support from time to time. At the same time, the absence of any desire on the part of Israelis to identify with the Unionist cause in Northern Ireland has tended to limit the resonance of the comparison with the Middle East. This has also affected Republican identification with the Palestinian cause, since the PLO found it expedient to play down the notion that there were links of any significance between the Palestinians and Irish nationalism in its militant forms. By contrast, South Africans have been very willing to endorse the notion that their miracle has relevance for the resolution of conflict in other contexts.

South Africa's wish that the positive lessons of the country's transition should provide an inspiration to other societies still going through peace processes has been reflected in South African attempts to mediate in the Israeli/Palestinian conflict since the breakdown of 2000 by hosting workshops at the Track 2 level. However, more influential than comparison with South Africa's transition has been comparison with South Africa's past. That has been the case particularly in Israel/Palestine. Comparison of Israel's policies with the South African policy of apartheid has become a very common theme of Palestinian discourse at both an analytical and a polemical level and, it should be noted, use of the analogy is by no means confined to Palestinians. Such comparison is not new. Palestinian critics of the Oslo process commonly argued that the Israeli commitments under the terms of the 1993 Declaration of Principles fell well short of acceptance of a viable Palestinian state alongside Israel. According to such critics, what Israel envisaged was akin to the creation

of Palestinian Bantustans. The analogy was based on the assumption that Palestinian areas in the West Bank and Gaza vacated by Israel would constitute a number of separated territorial entities and, either taken separately or together, these would lack the resources necessary for effective statehood. Any political authority or authorities created in such constrained circumstances, so the critics argued, would be so dependent on Israel as to make the meaningful exercise of Palestinian self-determination impossible, yet would also spare Israel the burden of policing large numbers of Palestinians. Since the breakdown of the peace process in 2000, the use of this analogy has mushroomed. By the end of 2003, several books had been published on the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians that contained the word apartheid in their title. Examples include Marwan Bishara's *Palestine/Israel: Peace or Apartheid?* and Uri Davis's *Apartheid Israel*.[19]

Sharon's policies in a number of areas lent verisimilitude to the comparison. Writing in the *New York Review of Books* at the end of 2004, Henry Siegman contended that too sanguine a view was being taken of Sharon's plan to withdraw from Gaza. He argued that the intent behind the ongoing expansion of settlements under the Sharon government remained to create a Middle Eastern version of apartheid.

> The growth and extension of major settlements in the West Bank now being carried out help to divide it into three noncontiguous Palestinian cantons, in effect Bantustans that Palestinians could inhabit under Israeli surveillance without having a unified state of their own.[20]

The security barrier Israel has constructed has also inevitably prompted comparison with apartheid, since the purpose of the barrier is evidently to separate populations on ethnic/racial lines. The criticism is not merely of the principle of separation. In fact, in Israel's case, this has been more muted than in South Africa's case. But what has also been at issue in both cases is the unfairness of the division that was contemplated by the dominant community. In the Israeli case, the criticism has been directed particularly at the illegitimate and unlawful intention of extending Israel's permanent borders beyond the Green Line. Concerns have been expressed by members of the Israeli government itself that international perceptions of the barrier might prompt action of the kind the international community took against South Africa. In this context, the BBC quoted the Israeli justice minister as saying in 2004: "There is

a danger that we will be exposed to an international boycott as was the case before the fall of the regime in South Africa."[21]

During Northern Ireland's troubles, comparisons with apartheid were commonplace among Republicans as a way of justifying "armed struggle" against British rule. The revival of the comparison in recent years does not reflect a wish to justify a return to violence. Rather, it is simply the recognition that, despite the success of the peace process in terms of largely ending lethal political violence, the society has actually become more politically polarised and more socially segregated since the 1994 cease-fires. In short, it is the recognition that at best, what Northern Ireland has hitherto achieved through its peace process is a cold peace. A spirit of political accommodation has been lacking from the political process even when the devolved political institutions have been functioning. Doubts about the durability of devolution have affected how the parties have approached the sharing of power at the best of times. However, because the similarity of the conditions to apartheid is viewed as a problem needing to be addressed in Northern Ireland, rather than as a way of describing one side's approach to a solution as in the Israeli case, South Africa's subsequent experience has also seemed relevant to providing an answer to the province's ills.

The absence of a spirit of reconciliation in Northern Ireland has led a number of people, including clergymen, senior figures in the police and the British government, to look to the example of South Africa's TRC as a possible way forward for Northern Ireland. It became evident during the course of 2004 that the government was seriously considering setting up a Northern Ireland TRC as a way of addressing the province's divisions. At a press conference in Downing Street on 1 April 2004, Prime Minister Tony Blair explained why the government was considering this option:

> I do not know whether necessarily a truth and reconciliation commission is the right way to do it, but I think there needs to be some way of trying to both allow people to express their grief, their pain and their anger in respect of what has happened in Northern Ireland without the past continually dominating the present and the future, and that is what we will try to do.[22]

At the end of May 2004, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Paul Murphy, visited South Africa on a fact-finding mission to study how South Africa approached the issue of dealing with the past. However, in the end, a TRC did not form part of the two governments' outline of a settlement to restore the political process in December 2004 or the

subsequent efforts that culminated in the St Andrews Agreement and the restoration of devolution in May 2007. Consequently, interest in the idea of a Northern Ireland TRC waned at a governmental level, though the idea continues to be the subject of debate.[23]

At the end of 2004 and the beginning of 2005, a fresh crisis engulfed the political process in Northern Ireland as a result of two events, a bank robbery in Belfast in December 2004 and the murder of a young man, Robert McCartney, after a brawl in a bar in the city in January 2005. Members of the Provisional IRA were accused of involvement in both of these episodes. Critics of the Republican movement argued that its continuing involvement in illegal activities was evidence that the Republican movement had ultimately failed to make the transition to exclusively democratic politics, as required by the Good Friday Agreement. Much of the blame for this situation was placed on the president of Sinn Féin, Gerry Adams, who, it was argued, had been too willing to indulge hardliners in the movement to avert a split in the ranks. In this context a number of commentators compared Gerry Adams to Yasser Arafat, with the implication that Adams lacked the qualities needed to bring to a conclusion the peace process he had been instrumental in starting. However, this was not a universal view. Thus, an editorial in March 2005 in *The Independent on Sunday*, headed "No peace without Adams," declared: "Gerry Adams is no Yasser Arafat. He remains central to a solution."[24]

Subsequent political developments were to bear out this judgment. Adams played the leading role in persuading the Republican movement of the need for major changes so as to re-establish the claim of Sinn Féin to a share of power in a devolved government in Northern Ireland and to prevent a massive backlash against the party in the Republic of Ireland. Adams appealed in April 2005 to the IRA to consider how it could demonstrate its commitment to wholly democratic means so to entrench the peace process. That was followed in September 2005 by the complete decommissioning of the IRA's arsenal of weapons to the satisfaction of the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning. This step paved the way to negotiations among the parties culminating in the two governments publishing the St Andrews Agreement in October 2006, setting out the terms on which devolution could be restored. These included the requirement that the Republican movement should give its support to the Police Service of Northern Ireland, a requirement that was met in January 2007 when a special Sinn Féin conference voted by a large majority to support the reformed system of policing in Northern Ireland.

Hitherto, this chapter has discussed comparisons of the three cases without much reference to how those making the comparisons have justified them. On the whole, those making polemical or political comparisons do not expend much energy explaining the basis of their comparisons. They rely on the fact that the comparison resonates with their target audience to avoid that complication. More is required and generally delivered in the case of comparisons made by academics. In this context, by far the most common basis for comparison has been the notion that all three are (or at least were) deeply divided societies. As Jung, Lust-Okar and Shapiro point out in a piece published as a working paper in 2004, this is a persuasive framework for explaining the intractability of conflict in the three cases, but not South Africa's successful transition to democracy.[25] They propose instead treating the three cases as examples of flawed democracies. This is open to the objection that "flawed" is hardly the right adjective to use to describe a polity in which the majority of the adult population was denied the vote, as was the case in apartheid South Africa. A better formulation of their case would be to say that all three were and are constitutional states, notwithstanding the latitude often given to the executive to take extreme measures in the name of national security.

Another problem for the deeply divided societies framework that arises from South Africa's experience of majoritarian democracy is the implication that special devices are required for conflict regulation in such cases. This was, after all, the context in which Eric Nordlinger wrote about deeply divided societies in the first place in the early 1970s.[26] While, from the perspective of 2007, it does seem that Israel/Palestine and Northern Ireland require special arrangements that do not exist in ordinary liberal-democracies to achieve or to sustain any measure of political stability that evidently has not been the case in South Africa. (Admittedly, this is to disregard the opinion of those who argue that the day will eventually come when South Africans rue the day that the country adopted a straightforwardly majoritarian constitution.) In the case of Israel/Palestine, "special arrangements" would for most people include the creation of two polities. In Northern Ireland institutionalised power-sharing between the political representatives of Unionism and nationalism has long been seen as a necessary ingredient in any political settlement. By contrast, South Africa has functioned as an ordinary liberal-democracy, with only the briefest, transitional use of a diluted form of power-sharing to smooth the path to a new era. Undoubtedly, continuing domination of the economy by whites has more than compensated them for the absence of group rights within

the political system. In fact, it is arguable that the degree of inequality that still exists in South Africa would have proved politically unsustainable, had whites or, for that matter, Afrikaners also been given special political rights as a minority community.

From the perspective of political stability, South Africa is far and away the most successful case. There is no visible threat to the remarkable transition the country has made from apartheid to majority rule. Crucial to the country's peaceful political revolution was that most whites opted for constitutional continuity over attempting to secure a minority veto, a stance that might have led to a breakdown in the negotiations and civil war. Contrary to Sammy Smooha's expectations in 1989, though he at least was brave enough to predict major changes in the three cases, Israel/Palestine has been the least successful in making progress toward political stability through political accommodation between its two main communities. The breakdown of the Oslo peace process has cast a long shadow over the prospects for a negotiated political settlement of their differences. Northern Ireland presents a mixed picture. Unlike Israel/Palestine before 2000, the peace process has virtually ended lethal political violence. And May 2007 saw at last the restoration of the devolved political institutions envisaged under the Good Friday Agreement of April 1998. It remains to be seen how durable the new dispensation proves. But there is a further, significant difference between the Northern Ireland case and that of Israel/Palestine. There has been one wholly successful and enduring aspect of the Irish peace process – the establishment of cordial and cooperative relations between the British and Irish governments. In short, the regional context of the Northern Ireland problem makes any resumption of violence on a large scale unlikely and containable.

Of course, for different purposes, various points of departure may fruitfully be chosen for comparing different societies. Thus, the prisms of late decolonization, a settler-native divide, dominant and subordinate communities and an ethnic frontier for comparing these societies can all be useful when examining particular aspects of the societies. However, the divergence in the trajectories of the three societies since the early 1990s is, on the face of it, a persuasive argument for thinking that a single overarching basis for comparing the three societies will fail to capture the complexities of the three situations. At the same time, the three societies have enough in common that it seems certain that political comparisons will continue to be made among the three cases, whether people like it or not. And it is worth noting that hostility to the comparisons does exist in the three societies. In studying and charting the comparisons

and connections that people make among the three cases, we should not ignore these voices either, while pointing out that the purpose, at least of analytical comparison, is to illuminate differences as well as similarities.

Notes

1. I use this term throughout for Israel plus the occupied or administered territories, i.e., for Israel and Palestine. My assumption is not that Israel and Palestine are alternatives but that one day there will be two states in this territory.
2. John McGarry (ed.), *Northern Ireland and the Divided World*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2001.
3. Mark Suzman, *Ethnic Nationalism and State Power: The Rise of Irish Nationalism, Afrikaner Nationalism and Zionism*, Macmillan, Basingstoke 1999.
4. *Sunday Times* (Johannesburg), 17 April 1983.
5. Bernard Crick, "The High Price of Peace," in Hermann Giliomee and Jannie Gagiano (eds.), *The Elusive Search for Peace: South Africa, Israel and Northern Ireland*, Oxford University Press, Cape Town, 1990, p. 265.
6. Meron Benvenisti, "The Peace Process and Intercommunal Strife," in Hermann Giliomee and Jannie Gagiano (eds.), *The Elusive Search for Peace: South Africa, Israel and Northern Ireland*, Oxford University Press, Cape Town, 1990, p. 130.
7. For descriptions of Worrall's visit, see *The Irish Times* and *Belfast Telegraph*, 11–13 April 1985.
8. The cartoon was reproduced in *The Irish Times*, 6 January 1994.
9. *New York Times*, 27 December 1993.
10. *The Weekly Mail and Guardian* (Johannesburg), 25–30 March 1994.
11. *The Star* (Johannesburg), 1 September 1994.
12. *Sunday Times* (Johannesburg), 13 August 1995.
13. For an account of the conference, see Padraig O'Malley, *Northern Ireland and South Africa: "Hope and History at the Crossroads,"* The John McCormack Institute of Public Affairs, Boston, 2000.
14. See, for example, Henry McDonald, "ANC brokered IRA peace offer," *Observer*, 14 May 2000.
15. *Fourthwrite* (Belfast), vol. 1, Spring 2000.
16. *The South African Experience – Lessons for Northern Ireland?*, *Ad Hoc* Group on South Africa, Belfast 1995.
17. Henry McDonald, "Rebel with a Confused Cause," *Observer*, 19 May 2002.
18. Ciaran Barnes, "Israeli Flags Taken Down for Fascist Visit to the Village," *Andersonstown News*, 11 November 2002.
19. Marwan Bishara, *Palestine/Israel: Peace or Apartheid?: Prospects for Resolving the Conflict*, Zed Books, London 2001 and Uri Davis's *Apartheid Israel: Possibilities for the Struggle Within*, Zed Books, London, 2003.
20. Henry Siegman, "Sharon and the Future of Palestine," *New York Review of Books*, vol. 11, no. 19, December 3, 2004, p. 7.
21. From BBC on the web at http://news.bbc.co.uk, 1 April 2004.
22. *The Irish Times*, 6 April 2004.
23. See the pieces in *Irish Political Studies*, vol. 22, no. 3, September 2007.

24. *The Independent on Sunday*, 20 March 2005.
25. Courtney Jung, Ellen Lust-Okar, and Ian Shapiro, *Problems and Prospects for Democratic Settlements: South Africa as a Model for the Middle East and Northern Ireland?*, Working Paper YCIAS 01, Yale Center for International and Area Studies, New Haven, CT, December 8, 2004, pp. 3–4.
26. Eric A. Nordlinger, *Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies*, Harvard University Center for International Affairs, Cambridge, MA, 1972. Though the term "divided societies" was used in the title, Nordlinger referred in the text to "deeply divided societies."

Part I
Structural Explanations

This page intentionally left blank

2

The State-to-Nation Balance: A Key to Explaining Difficulties in Implementing Peace – The Israeli–Palestinian Case

Benjamin Miller

The puzzle, which my paper addresses, concerns the following variation: why was the implementation in the 1990s of the peace agreement in the Israeli–Palestine conflict much more problematic than in other conflicts such as South Africa and Northern Ireland? My argument is that the extent of what I call "the state-to-nation imbalance" determines the capacity for successful implementation of peace agreements in divided societies and deep-seated conflicts.

The higher the imbalance, the more difficult it is to agree on boundaries and on the territorial identity of the states. The state-to-nation imbalance produces powerful revisionist forces who are unwilling to implement peace agreements. Under such an imbalance some states tend to be incoherent and weak and thus are unable to carry out peace accords. This imbalance generates powerful domestic constraints against the implementation of peace when it includes territorial concessions at the expense of one's ethnic group. The imbalance tends to de-legitimize peace accords inside the political system when the accords are based on compromise of territories associated with national historic rights or settled by ethnic kin. Global or external factors can be helpful in the peace implementation but only in the sense of reducing the conflict rather than resolving the underlying problems. Moreover, the greater the state-to-nation imbalance, the more limited the ability of the external forces to ensure that the peace will be implemented.

In what follows I define the state-to-nation imbalance and elaborate on its key dimensions: ethnic nationalism, external incongruence, internal incongruence, and weak/failed states. I argue that the stronger

these elements in a certain conflict, the greater the obstacles in implementing peace. Certain external factors can mitigate the conflict but cannot ensure the implementation so long as the imbalance is high. The empirical portion of the paper focuses on the Israeli–Palestinian case, taking into account also the broader Middle East context. In the conclusions I introduce a brief comparative note on peace implementation in the three cases of divided societies discussed in this book: Israel–Palestine, Northern Ireland, and South Africa. I argue that since the imbalance is highest in the Israeli–Palestinian case, this case is the hardest to implement, followed by the Irish case. The imbalance was the lowest in the South African case, and thus, it was relatively easier to implement the peace there despite other serious problems. External factors were helpful in all cases but their effect was the weakest in the Israeli–Palestinian case because of the strength of the imbalance in this conflict. Due to lack of space, I will focus here on the Israeli–Palestinian case and leave the other cases for future studies. The Israeli–Palestinian case demonstrates most vividly the constraints imposed by the state-to-nation imbalance on the ability to implement peace.

Defining the state-to-nation imbalance[1]

It is the state-to-nation imbalance in the region that not only provides a basic motivation for violent conflict but also makes the implementation of peace agreements problematic.

Thus, it incorporates substantive issues of conflict such as territory, boundaries, state creation, and state making, as well as the motivations for war related to hypernationalist revisionist ideologies. Thus, the state-to-nation imbalance provides an explanation for the frequent occurrence of territorial conflicts among states and the failure to implement agreements to end these conflicts. The regional state-to-nation balance has two distinctive dimensions. While in practice there might be some interrelationships between the two dimensions, for analytical purposes it is useful to make a distinction between them. The first dimension refers to the balance of power between states and nations in the region, or more specifically to the prevalence of strong or weak states in the region. This is the "hardware" of state-building. The second refers to the extent of congruence or compatibility between political boundaries and national identifications in a certain region. This is the "software" of nation-building.

I. *The extent of state strength* (or the success of state-building)[2] – This variable refers to the institutions and resources available to states for governing the polity. Weak states lack effective institutions and resources to implement their policies and to fulfill key functions. Most notably, they lack effective control over the means of violence in their sovereign territory, and an effective law-enforcement system is absent. Thus they face great difficulties in maintaining law and order and providing security in their territory. This, in turn, severely handicaps the economic activity in the state. These states are unable to raise sufficient revenues and to collect enough taxes so as to be able to maintain an effective bureaucracy and provide even elementary socio-economic and other vital services to the population (mail delivery, regular water supply, road network, electricity, education, health care, etc.). Strong states control the means of violence in their sovereign territory and possess an effective set of institutions. Tilly (1975) focuses on the ability of the state to coerce, control, and extract resources as the key to state-making. Thus state strength or capacity can be measured by the ability of the state to mobilize manpower for military service and to extract financial resources from their societies.[3] Another measure is per capita income, which is a useful proxy for state strength (Fearon and Laitin, 2003, p. 80).[4]

II. *The degree of congruence* (or extent of success of nation-building) – the extent of congruence between the existing division of a given region into territorial states and the national aspirations and identities of the people in the region, namely the extent to which the current political boundaries in a certain region reflect the national affiliations of the main groups in the region and their aspirations to establish states and/or to revise existing boundaries.[5] High congruence means that there is compatibility between the regional states (as entities administering certain territories) and the national sentiments of the peoples in the region (that is, their aspirations to live as national communities in their own states).[6] In other words, there is a strong acceptance and identification of the people in the region with the existing states and their territorial boundaries. Congruent states are either ethnically homogenous or have strong civic nationalism (for example, Western European states or the immigrant societies in the New World).

Ethnic nationalism is based on blood ties, lineage, and common ancestry. *Civic nationalism* refers to an inclusive membership in the nation according to territory/citizenship. Civic nationalism focuses on

citizen identification with the nation-state at its current territorial boundaries as opposed to a loyalty based on sub-national or transborder ethnic ties which may challenge the existing boundaries.

In those cases in which ethnic nationalism is stronger than civic nationalism, there are two primary senses in which a state's geopolitical and national boundaries may be *incongruent* in relation to the ethno-national criterion of one state per one nation:

1. A single geopolitical entity may contain numerous ethno-national groups. This is the internal dimension of incongruence, which has major implications for the possibilities of civil wars, especially in weak states.
2. A single ethno-national group may reside in more than one geopolitical entity. This is the external dimension of incongruence, which has major implications for revisionist policies, especially if the *majority* ethnic group in the state lives in substantial numbers also in neighboring and other regional states, either as a majority or as a minority.

The state-to-nation imbalance constrains peace implementation

State-to-nation imbalances constrain the implementation of peace agreements for the following reasons:[7] First, this is due to the emergence of substantive issues of conflict on national grounds, most notably territories and boundaries, and also demographic issues such as refugees and settlers. As the territorial literature has shown, disputed territory is a major issue of international conflict. The question is, however, what explains the variations in the escalation of territorial conflicts to violence and in peace implementation? I argue that if the territorial issue involves state-to-nation imbalances, the implementation of peace accords based on compromise and concessions is problematic. This is because issues of nationalism and ethnicity tend to be less divisible than material issues. Nations derive their identities to a large degree from particular places and territories, and the control of these is often essential to maintaining a healthy sense of national identity.[8] Thus, state-to-nation issues arouse strong emotions and passionate ideological commitments, which make pragmatic compromise and bargaining on territorial issues more difficult. As a result, domestic politics plays an especially powerful role in constraining the maneuvering room of political leaders on these issues.

Strong commitment of domestic constituencies to ethnicity and nationalism generates pressures on and incentives for state leaders to maintain a hard line and thus makes it more difficult to make peace.

Second, a high state-to-nation imbalance provides fertile grounds for the exacerbation of impediments to the implementation of peace such as the security dilemma, power rivalries, and scapegoat/diversionary motives (i.e., externalization of domestic conflicts) in the region. For example, it is not so much anarchy itself that drives security fears, but the state-to-nation imbalance creates insecurity because the challenges to current boundaries and territories arouses a sense that the current regional order is temporary, and each actor has to constantly prepare to meet potential threats to it. This creates the conditions for the de-stabilizing effects of the security dilemma such as an arms race, and with regard to peace implementation – great difficulties for arms control, joint patrols, de-militarization of certain zones, and other security arrangements because of the lack of trust among the parties due to the state-to-nation imbalance and the derived competing territorial and demographic claims. Thus, the intensity of the regional security dilemma is affected more by the extent of the state-to-nation imbalance than by the military balance. Because a high extent of the state-to-nation imbalance produces competing territorial and demographic claims, it breeds insecurity, thus leading to an arms race.[9]

Therefore, the extent of the state-to-nation balance mediates between anarchy and the security dilemma. The extent of the balance conditions the destabilizing effects of the security dilemma and the war-proneness of different conflicts. In other words, when the extent of balance is high, the intensity of the security dilemma is lower, and it is less likely that mutual fears of being attacked and preempted will dominate the relations among the rivals and vice versa.[10] Thus, the security dilemma is less likely to lead to war between neighbors who share a high extent of state-to-nation balance. War is far more likely between adversaries that meet the criterion set by the independent variables, that is, a high extent of state-to-nation imbalance.

The presence of incongruent states in the region provides not only many substantive issues for conflict (territory, boundaries, and demography) but also a potential motivation for aggressive policy out of domestic political weakness and insecurity of the elite. This is the diversionary or scapegoat theory of externalizing domestic conflict and instability in order to strengthen the hold on power of the ruling elite.[11] It will be much easier for an insecure elite to place obstacles in the path of implementing peace agreements in a conflict in which there

is a state-to-nation incongruence than in a conflict in which there is a high level of congruence. Furthermore, elites of incoherent states, which are ethno-nationally fragmented, have incentives to endorse a scapegoat strategy of external aggression and to maintain the conflict rather than resolve it, anticipating that it will unify the state citizens against a common external threat and thus help to build a more coherent nation.[12]

Third, the presence of incoherent (weak and incongruent) or "failed" states produces insecurity through the effects of spreading transborder instability. Weak states are a source of instability. They are unreliable partners, and neighbors cannot trust that they will be able to carry out their commitments. Alternatively, the regime might change, and because of the lack of institutional continuity, the new regime would not feel obliged to honor previous agreements; thus negotiated accords are less likely to take place, and if they do, it is not probable that they endure and be carried out. There is a difference, however, if the weak states are congruent or incongruent. If states are weak and congruent, namely, they are "frontier" states, then they are unable to control their sovereign territories. Such lack of control leads to border wars and external intervention, but there is not a powerful nationalist opposition to conflict resolution. Thus, the strengthening of the state is sufficient to encourage moderation and successful peacemaking.

Under state-to-nation incongruence, however, even elites which are interested in making peace face serious domestic and external constraints in incoherent and unstable states. Nationalist/ethnic forces oppose making territorial concessions either on demographic grounds (the territories are populated by ethnic kin) or due to national-historical-religious attachments to these territories. Nationalists manipulate such causes against moderate elites who have limited maneuvering freedom in incongruent states. Weak states are also vulnerable to pressures by other states which are able to intervene in their domestic affairs and can make it difficult to pursue moderate policies. Under the pressures of secessionist movements, it is difficult to reach stable peace agreements with neighbors who may also face nationalist and ethnic pressures. Irredentist forces, for their part, fight against concessions. Ambitious politicians use the nationalist/ethnic cards in order to promote themselves and thus make it difficult to pursue moderate policies. Mobilization against external national/ethnic enemies is a major diversionary tactic in order to mobilize mass support by political leaders in incoherent states. This is especially the case in regions populated by states which are considered illegitimate by some of their neighbors or by peoples not seen as qualified

to have their own states (Israel and the Palestinians; the Kurds in Turkey, Iraq and Iran; Iraq and Kuwait; Taiwan and China; South and North Vietnam; South and North Korea; Russia and Chechnia, etc.). State-to-nation imbalance produces conflict-prone regions with deep-seated animosity among neighbors. Such neighbors with a long history of rivalry have a hard time overcoming by themselves a legacy of mutual fears and suspicion, and it will be difficult for them to resolve conflicts without external support, mediation and assurances and to agree on issues like boundaries, on which they have incompatible positions.

Post–Cold War changes in the Arab–Israeli conflict: the rise of Oslo

The end of the Cold War and especially the Iraqi defeat by the US-led coalition in the Gulf War led to a vigorous Arab–Israeli peace process which seemed to transform the region from a conflictual to a cooperative one, and at the very least to reduce the likelihood of war quite substantially. The US hegemony became more complete with the end of the Cold War and Soviet disintegration, when other Arab parties to the conflict, notably the Palestinians and Syria, lost the possibility of recourse to a rival superpower patron, who could shield them from the adverse effects and costs of opposition to US-led peacemaking efforts. The weakening of Iraq reduced the possibility of forming a radical countervailing coalition against the US-led peace coalition, which included the status-quo states in the region. Thus, the combined effect of the Soviet disintegration and US victory in the Gulf was to bring about a bandwagoning of rational actors toward the US based on realpolitik and economic considerations. One of the key manifestations of this bandwagoning was joining the US-led peace process, not so much out of a sudden desire to make peace with Israel and to recognize its legitimacy, but out of an expectation of receiving tangible security and economic benefits from the hegemon. The latter has always been interested in making peace between Israel and the Arabs, both because this is the most effective way of maximizing US influence in the region and because advancing the peace process reconciles the US dilemma between ensuring the flow of oil (which necessitates maintaining good relations with the Arabs) and its special commitment to Israel.

Thus it is no coincidence that about 8 months after the end of the Gulf War, Israel, Palestinian representatives and most of the Arab states met for the first time around the negotiation table. In October 1991, the Madrid conference, co-chaired formally by the US and the USSR, but

led by the US, initiated the peace process in the Middle East. Following the conference, multilateral working groups, composed of Israelis, Arabs, and various states outside the region started to discuss various functional issues such as security and arms control, economics, water, refugees, and the environment.

The major breakthroughs took place in 1993–5 with the interim Oslo accords between Israelis and the Palestinians and the 1994 peace treaty between Israel and Jordan. There were also active bilateral negotiations with the Syrians on Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights in exchange for normalization of relations and security arrangements.

Especially important were the Oslo accords which established a Palestinian National Authority in those parts of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip which were evacuated by Israel. Following the Hebron Agreement of 1997 and the 1998 Wye accord, most of the Palestinian population lived in the territory of the Palestinian Authority, although it lacked territorial contiguity and controlled only about 40 per cent of the territory of the West Bank and about two-thirds of the Gaza Strip. The Oslo accords conveyed a mutual recognition between the Israelis and the Palestinians and a commitment to resolve conflicts peacefully. The essential bargain was based on Israeli territorial concessions in the occupied territories, leading eventually to a Palestinian state there, in exchange for security cooperation, which would minimize terrorist threats and violent actions against Israel.

This process was severely tested by the terrorist actions committed by the radical Islamic organizations against Israel, culminating in a bus bombing campaign in spring 1996, which led to the emergence of a right-wing government in Israel that slowed down the peace process. The Palestinians, for their part, were dissatisfied with the continued expansion of the Jewish settlements in the territories and the presence of the Israeli army at checkpoints and roadblocks there.

When Ehud Barak was elected prime minister of Israel in summer 1999, negotiations were accelerated, initially with the Syrians on a bilateral peace accord, and later with the Palestinians on a final-status agreement. The negotiations seemed promising and the parties appeared to be willing to make considerable concessions.

The failure to implement Oslo and to reach peace

Since 2000, however, major negative developments took place on the various fronts of the Arab–Israeli conflict, both diplomatically and with

regard to the resort to violence. On the whole, they highlight the difficulties in reaching a comprehensive Palestinian–Israeli peace and the possibilities at best for interim agreements. These developments also point out the danger of a continuous low-intensity conflict with some danger of escalation depending on the developments in South Lebanon and in the longer-term in Iraq. The major de-stabilizing developments are violence, failure of diplomacy, and the likelihood of escalation.

Violence

Since fall 2000, and until recently, there has been protracted low-intensity violence between the Israeli army and the Palestinian militias and demonstrators in the occupied territories. The Palestinian militias have also conducted a war of attrition against Jewish settlers in the territories, and some militant groups have resorted to terrorist attacks inside Israel's major cities, most effectively by a suicide-bombing campaign.

Failure of Diplomacy

The unprecedented negotiations on a final-status accord which took place between Israel and the Palestinians under active US mediation from the Camp-David summit of summer 2000 and until the end of the Clinton presidency and the Israeli elections in February 2001, ended in failure. The Syrian–Israeli negotiations also collapsed in early 2000.

The likelihood of escalation

As recent events have shown, the lack of resolution of the outstanding state-to-nation issues is likely to lead to violence, at the very least in the form of protracted low-intensity conflict and guerrilla and terror warfare. Although much less likely for the foreseeable future, the continuation of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict could potentially also lead in the long-run to an escalation to a broader conflict, which might include additional state and non-state actors.

The Israeli–Palestinian conflict

During the summer 2000 Camp-David summit and in the subsequent months, far-reaching diplomatic negotiations took place aiming at reaching a final-status agreement between Israel and the Palestinians. For the first time, all the fundamental issues of the conflict, related to the state-to-nation problem, were addressed. The issues included were future boundaries of the Palestinian state and its territorial scope and

contiguity, future status of Jerusalem, including Arab East Jerusalem and the Old City and especially the holy places for both Jews and Muslims on Temple Mount/Haram El Sherif, the right of return of the Palestinian refugees to pre-1967 Israel, future of the Jewish settlements in the Palestinian territories and the future security arrangements between the Palestinian state and Israel.

The parties reportedly made some important concessions in relation to their previously held positions. Arafat was willing to consider that some blocs of Jewish settlements would be annexed to Israel in exchange for major Israeli concessions including the establishment of a Palestinian state – whose capital would be in Arab East Jerusalem – in the Gaza Strip and on about 95 per cent of the West Bank. Barak was also willing to compensate the Palestinians for the annexation to Israel of the 5 per cent or so from the West Bank territory by giving them some territories in the Negev part of pre-1967 Israel. The most far-reaching change in the Israeli position concerned the willingness to divide Jerusalem: the unity of the holy city under Israeli sovereignty was previously a sacred cow in Israeli domestic politics and foreign policy.

But at end of the day the gaps were too wide to be bridgeable for the time being. The key points in dispute seemed to be the future sovereignty of the holy sites in Jerusalem and the right of return of the Palestinian refugees to Israel proper. This claim of the Palestinians was rejected by Israel. The Palestinians were reluctant to accept Israels demand to station their troops in the Jordan Valley for some years, and it is unclear how many of the settlements could stay in their place as a part of peace deal.[13]

The disputes were not confined, however, to the negotiating table. Frustration with the continued Israeli control over substantial parts of the territories together with the persistent expansion of the settlements led to the eruption of violence following Ariel Sharon's visit to the Temple Mount in late September 2000. While the Palestinians claim that the violence was provoked by the visit and the killing of Palestinian demonstrators in its aftermath, Israel argues that the violence was premeditated. In the Israeli view, Arafat wanted to bring about an internationalization of the conflict following the Kosovo precedent: the greater firepower of Israel would bring about a disproportionately higher level of Palestinian casualties (especially children). This would exert pressures on the international community, through the "CNN effect" to apply pressures on Israel and even to consider military intervention which would isolate Israel and force it to make many more concessions than it had offered in the negotiations.

Another Palestinian motivation to resort to violence might be to affect the Israeli public: to bring about concessions through inflicting casualties. Here the Palestinians might have been influenced by the South Lebanon analogy: Hizballa showed that violence can presumably pay off because of the great Israeli sensitivity to casualties. Thus, because of the supposed greater Palestinian willingness to sacrifice, their advantage in the balance of motivation would compensate for disadvantages in the balance of power.

Moreover, even if these outstanding issues are resolved in a formal peace accord, which seems unlikely in the near future, two major questions in this state-to-nation conflict are, on the one hand, whether the Palestinian state will be an irredentist state with continuing territorial and demographic (the "right of return") claims vis-à-vis Israel; and, on the other hand, to what extent the Palestinians will feel that the settlement fulfills their right of self-determination in a viable, contiguous and independent state of their own or whether Israel continues to be a "neo-colonial" power controlling their life militarily, politically, and economically. Major Israeli concessions, especially in East Jerusalem and on the settlements, might lead, in turn, to Jewish irredentist-nationalist movements, which would resort to force against the Palestinians and the Israeli government. The relative strength and the democratic nature of the Israeli state as compared to the Palestinian state leads us to expect that the problem might be more serious on the Palestinian side, which at least until now has been the major revisionist/dissatisfied party.

At any rate, the Israeli public endorsed a hard-line approach to the Palestinians as a result of the combined effect of the rejection of the Clinton plan and Barak's concessions by the Palestinians and the resort by them to violence. In the eyes of most Israelis, Barak's concessions were very generous; their rejection and the escalating violence thus indicated a lack of Palestinian interest in peace. Thus, the situation now is of continued violence with great difficulties in resuming the failed security cooperation between the two parties and in returning to the peace negotiations. External assistance, especially by the US, is crucial for the two areas as well as for establishing a permanent cessation of hostilities.

The dimensions of state-to-nation imbalance

The Israeli–Palestinian conflict is an extreme example of a state-to-nation imbalance with a high intensity of imbalance on a number of interconnected dimensions, notably "illegitimate state," "illegitimate nation,"

stateless refugees, settlers, and weak state. Moreover, there are tight inter-relationships between the imbalance on the Israeli–Palestinian front and the imbalance in the broader Middle East. The overall effect was to encourage the resort to violence, to constrain peacemaking, and when a peace accord is reached – to constrain it in the form of cold peace (Israel-Egypt following the Camp David accords and the peace accord of 1979) or to place major obstacles in the way of implementing it such as following the Oslo agreements between Israel and the Palestinians.

In the Middle East there have been a number of illegitimate states due to irridentist-nationalist claims by at least some of their neighbors, such as the Arab claims vis-à-vis Israel, Iraqi claims toward Kuwait, Syria toward Lebanon, and the claims at different times of Syria, Iraq, Israel, and the Palestinians vis-à-vis Jordan. The illegitimacy of Israel in the eyes of all its Arab neighbors (at least until the 1978 Camp David accords) was an underlying source of the Arab–Israeli conflict which brought about most of the hot wars in the region. In the 1948–73 era the Arab–Israeli conflict vacillated between hot and cold war. The source of the conflict was related to state-to-nation problems affecting regional legitimacy. On the one hand, these concerned the illegitimacy of Israel in the eyes of its Arab neighbors and the opposition to Jews' right to immigrate from all over the world, settle and establish a Jewish state in what the Arabs saw as Arab Palestine. After 1967 the problem was magnified by the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, thus supposedly confirming the Arab fears about Zionist expansion. The stateless status of the Palestinians compounded Israel's illegitimacy in the eyes of the Arabs.

On the other hand, the fundamental Israeli nightmare since the establishment of the state in 1948 is that due to the continuing illegitimacy of its existence in the Middle East, a grand coalition of Arab states might initiate a surprise two-front attack, taking advantage of its asymmetrical manpower resources vis-à-vis the Israeli vulnerabilities of a lack of strategic depth and the limitations to its military manpower, composed largely of reserve soldiers. Such mutual fears on both sides produce an intense security dilemma, generate suspicions and thus make the implementation of peace accords very difficult. The key point here is that when the mere legitimacy of the actors is challenged, and not only their territorial integrity or other secondary issues, the level of mutual trust is very low. As a result, hard-line politicians can mobilize public resistance to concessions or to implementations of peace agreements claiming that the other side is not fulfilling its commitments and is not trustworthy; and indeed, in many cases domestic politics constrains the ability of policymakers to carry out peace commitments under such distrust. It is

noteworthy that only in few other conflicts, the issue at stake is the legitimacy of the political existence of the other side. That makes the Israeli–Palestinian conflict especially difficult to resolve in a comparative perspective.

Nations without states: the Palestinians

Due to the spread of the Palestinian refugees in many Arab states, especially those bordering Israel, and pan-Arab commitments to the Palestinian and the anti-Israeli cause, the Palestinian issue had major implications for Arab–Israeli wars, and terrorist and guerrilla operations against Israel. In the aftermath of the establishment of Israel during the 1948 war, the Palestinians remained without a state and thus became a revisionist-irredentist force, which did not have a stake in the stability of the regional order.[14] The 1967 war increased the number of Palestinian refugees and led to a growing Palestinian demand for an independent state of their own in the occupied territories of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The Palestinians tried to achieve their objectives through the guerrilla and terrorist actions of the PLO and other Palestinian organizations, culminating in the Intifada in the occupied territories in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and the eruption of a second round of Intifada in September 2000.

At least until the Oslo Accords of 1993 there was an intensive debate in Israel whether the Palestinians and their Arab supporters aim only at the occupied territories or also at pre-1967 Israel proper. Even following Oslo, the right wing in Israel has continued to be skeptical about the ultimate Palestinian intention. This view was reinforced in the Israeli public by the recent Intifada and the advocacy of the right of return of the Palestinian refugees to their former homes inside pre-1967 Israel. At the very least, the Hamas and Islamic Jihad continue to claim that the Palestinians have a legitimate national (and religious) right to all of Palestine including pre-1967 Israel.

The Palestinian refugees: the "right of return" of stateless refugees

The stateless Palestinian refugees raised both the level of revisionism and of incoherence, especially among Israel's Arab neighbors. By proclaiming their right to return to their homes in what they defined as occupied Palestine, the refugees constituted an irredentist-revisionist force which undermined the legitimacy of the regional order and of the

post-1949 boundaries. Since, on the whole, they maintained their separate Palestinian identity and were not allowed to integrate into the local societies in the Arab states in which they resided,[15] the refugees also jeopardized the coherence of these states, which included all of Israel's neighbors. Moreover, as the Palestinians organized themselves in political-military movements to fight Israel, they also presented a challenge to the sovereignty of the host Arab states.[16] These states tried to control the Palestinians, but they were constrained in their ability to control the Palestinian guerrillas because too tight a control would contradict the pan-Arab commitment to the Palestinians to regain their occupied homeland.

Thus, Palestinian refugees were a major burden for attempts at state-building in these states, most notably the most incoherent and weakest of Israel's neighbors – Jordan and Lebanon – where they constituted a large portion of the population. They were also a revisionist-irredentist force in Syria and Egypt (especially before the 1967 war when Egypt still controlled the Gaza Strip, which was densely populated by refugees) and in a different way, they were also a restive element in the Israeli-occupied territories after the 1967 war. The Palestinian para-military/insurgent challenge to state authorities led to a civil war in Jordan (Black September in 1970) and made a major contribution to the eruption and longevity of the protracted civil war in Lebanon (1975–91). These civil wars, in turn, brought about regional escalation, since both Israel and Syria became involved in one way or another in these wars.

The stateless Palestinians also revolted in the Intifada against the Israeli occupation between 1987 and the early 1990s. Palestinian revisionism contributed to the eruption of wars between Israel and Egypt (1956) and Syria and Egypt (1967), and to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon (1982). The escalatory dynamics involved cross-border infiltrations and raids by Palestinian guerrillas against settlements inside Israel and Israeli retaliatory actions against targets in the Arab host countries. Such action-reaction dynamics raised the level of the security dilemma between Israel and its neighbors which, in turn, contributed to large-scale violence in 1956, 1967, and 1982.[17] During the Oslo process, Israelis expected that as part of the final settlement of the conflict, the refugees were going to be resettled mostly outside Israel. Yet, in the Camp David negotiations of summer 2000, and mostly at other talks around that time, the traditional Palestinian demand for the right of return to Israel proper surfaced again. Since Israel vehemently opposed this demand, it has been a major source of the stalemate in the negotiations, which, in turn, led to the eruption of the second Intifada in September 2000.

The dominance of ethnic nationalism over civic nationalism in Israel

Israel was established as the homeland of the Jewish people, expressing its national right of self-determination. The basis for belonging to the Jewish nation is ethnicity: common descent and heritage (including religion). Thus, Israel is based on ethnic nationalism. At the same time, Israel is a democracy which grants equal political rights to all its citizens irrespective of their ethnicity. Yet, there is a great anomaly of Israel as a state of all its citizens. While the State of Israel defines itself as the transborder homeland of the Diaspora Jews who are citizens of other states, some of the Israeli citizens see themselves as part of a neighboring nation, which is in intense conflict with their state. The dominance of ethnic nationalism also reinforces the special standing of the settlers in the Israeli political system as pioneers who are advancing the pure ideology of the state and thus deserve special support by the state and definitely not abandonment by it.

In the post-Oslo 1990s, some got the impression that a post-Zionist Israel is emerging. Yet, recent years have shown that a nationalist-Zionist Israel has persisted all along even if limited circles of intellectuals challenged this notion. Some could interpret the outcome of the May 1999 victory of the moderate Barak, together with other developments such as changing textbooks, etc., as lessening the commitment in Israel to Zioinst nationalism. Yet, the victory of the nationalist Sharon in February 2001 (and again in 2003) shows the persistence of this commitment. At the very least, one can suggest that a key factor here is the inability to reach accommodation with the Palestinians on the key state-to-nation issues, which separate the two sides. In the eyes of the Israeli public, this was a result of Arafat's rejection of Barak's relatively moderate proposals in Camp David in summer 2000 and following that the eruption of Palestinian violence against Israelis. The Palestinians, for their part, did not see the proposals as moderate enough and instead focused on the continuing Jewish settlement in their territories as indicating the real intentions of Israel: persistent Zionist expansion at their expense and continuing control of their lives.

The Jewish settlers

Until the unilateral disengagement from the Gaza Strip, Israel has not appeared to be willing or able to make concessions regarding the Jewish settlers and their nationalist right to settle the occupied territories of the

West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Israeli governments, especially, though not only those led by right-wing parties, have encouraged the building of settlements partly due to security considerations, but also because of ideological beliefs in the historical-nationalist-religious right of the Jewish people to settle the Land of Israel which belongs only to them. Israeli governments, especially those on the center-left, were also unable to limit the settlement activity due to powerful domestic political power accumulated by the settlers and their allies in the Israeli political system. This aggravates the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians because it challenges the Palestinian expectation to have a coherent and viable state of their own and signals Israeli nationalist expansionism at the expense of the Palestinian right for national self-determination.

The Arab minority in Israel: between "my state" and "my nation"

A conflict between "my state" and "my nation" is the case of the Arab citizens of the state of Israel.[18] On the one hand, the overwhelming majority are law-abiding citizens of the State of Israel. On the other hand, they identify with the members of their ethno-national group, the Arab neighbors and especially their Palestinian brethren, who are in an intense conflict with their state. Indeed, many of their family members are Palestinian refugees. It is also difficult for the Arab minority in Israel to identify with a Jewish state, established as the homeland of the Jewish people, which is spread all over the world. At any rate, the Israeli Arabs claim that the Jewish state discriminates against them as second-class citizens. The state and its Jewish citizens, for their part, are suspicious of the Arab minority's loyalty to a Jewish state that fights with its neighbors who are of the same ethnic nation as the Arab minority in Israel.

Incoherent/weak states[19]

The Palestinian Authority in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip is the most recent example of the ultimately weak (emerging) state, which lacks even a monopoly over the means of violence in its territory, let alone other effective institutions. Arafat's strategy of state-building has been quite unique – rather than monopolizing the means of violence in the territory under the control of the Palestinian Authority, there is, even after Arafat's death, a multiplicity of competing armed militias in the Palestinian Authority – about a dozen or more. It is unclear whether Arafat's Authority has been able to control Palestinian violence

against Israelis even if he wanted to. However, it is also uncertain whether Arafat was interested in stopping the violence or preferred to use it to get more concessions from Israel.[20] In an acute state-to-nation imbalance, it is more difficult to maintain full control over the means of violence. Various groups have strong nationalist/irredentist aspirations, which go beyond the state authorities, although these groups might enjoy some domestic support.

Thus, even though Israel is a much stronger state than the Palestinian Authority, the Israeli government also does not maintain full control over extremist groups of Jewish settlers in the occupied territories. These groups have an irredentist nationalist/religious agenda of annexing Judea and Samaria (the West Bank) to Israel based on the nationalist (and religious) argument that these territories are the cradle of the Jewish nation and that God promised them to His chosen people. Those settlers who are highly committed to such an agenda might challenge the secular Israeli state. The disengagement from Gaza demonstrated that the State of Israel is able to mobilize an overwhelming force, if necessary, against the settlers, and it presumably will be able to do so also in case of disengagement from settlements in the West Bank. Yet, there are still concerns that it will be much more difficult to implement such a disengagement from the West Bank because this is the heart of fundamentalist Jewish religious nationalism and thus the expected resistance will probably be higher.

Impact of the imbalance in the broader Middle East

The state-to-nation imbalance in the broader Middle East has made it more difficult to resolve the Israeli–Palestinian conflict because of the following features of the Arab state-system. First, many of the Arab states and regimes have suffered problems of legitimacy. It is much more difficult for illegitimate regimes to make the concessions required for peace with a country which is seen as illegitimate by large share of their publics and by a leading ideology such as pan-Arabism; thus extremists will be able to manipulate against the regime in case of a compromise with the Jewish state. Second, the ideology of pan-Arabism has encouraged many Palestinians to persist in the conflict against Israel in the belief that they are not alone against Israel but that they enjoy the support of the whole Arab world whose resources can bring about the eventual defeat of the Jewish state. Third, on the other hand, pan-Arabism constrained Israeli willingness to make concessions to the Palestinians fearing that the conflict is not only between them and the Palestinians,

but with all the Arab states, and since 1979 also with the Islamist regime in Iran. Fourth, ethnic minorities which succeeded to control Arab states looked to enhance their legitimacy by endorsing radical pan-Arab positions including in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. And, fifth, the rise of Islamic fundamentalism since the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979 created a powerful anti-Israeli force, which also supported radical factors among the Palestinians, such as the Hamas and the Islamic Jihad. Such support made it more difficult for the relatively moderate Palestinian Authority to promote the peace process and implement agreements.

The presence of weak states is not unique to the Middle East, as numerous regimes and states in the Third World have faced domestic challenges to their legitimacy.[21] The European colonial powers exported the institutional structure of the territorial state and the idea of nationalism to the Third World, including the Middle East. Both the European state and nationalism were alien in these regions. In the Middle East, these structures and ideas were strange to those accustomed to the Islamic universalism of the Ottoman Empire.[22] While Israel and Iran, and to some extent Egypt,[23] enjoy some historical sense of identity that facilitates civic loyalty to the state, none of the other Middle Eastern states can make that claim.[24] Most states in the region, especially in the Fertile Crescent, are superficial colonial constructs, and many of their inhabitants have not identified with them and with their colonially drawn artificial boundaries.[25]

What is unique about state legitimacy in the Middle East are the powerful pressures exerted on it from both *above* the state – due to the power of pan-Arabism and more recently pan-Islam – and from *below* – by subnational, ethnic and communal forces. As Hudson argues, "Legitimate authority is hard to develop within state structures whose boundaries are inherently incompatible from those of the nation."[26] Almost all Arab regimes and states have faced the problem of low domestic legitimacy.[27] The nation-building enterprise has not been successful in most Fertile Crescent states such as Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and Syria. This is partly due to ethnic fragmentation. Moreover, the dominant ethnic groups in each state tend to exclude the other groups and to discriminate against them while controlling the state resources and privileges. The pan-Arabist loyalties of large shares of the population also pose difficulties for constructing coherent nations in each state. In addition, the presence of a large population of stateless Palestinian refugees, especially in Jordan and Lebanon, made nation-building a difficult task and led to the eruption of civil wars in Jordan (1970) and Lebanon (1975–90) and to persistent tensions in these countries.

The pan-Arabist revisionist challenge to the Arab states-system

There have been powerful relations between pan-Arabism and state weakness in the Arab world. On the one hand, pan-Arabism has challenged the autonomy of the individual Arab states and undermined their legitimacy and the state formation process. On the other hand, the weakness, permeability, and illegitimacy of the Arab states increased the appeal of pan-Arabism at the expense of territorial state identity and made it easier for a transnational ideology, and the powerful Arab states championing it, to penetrate the domestic systems of other Arab states. This appeal was both to elites, who were unable to consolidate their hold on power and were pushed in a pan-Arab direction in search of legitimacy and support,[28] as well as to minorities who saw in pan-Arabism an instrument for their integration in the larger Arab nation, and hoped that their support of pan-Arabism would demonstrate their nationalist credentials and thus facilitate their social mobility.

The challenge to the legitimacy of the regional order has been sharper in the Middle East than in other regions because the challenge has been not only from the sub-state, subnational level, as is common in the Third World, notably Africa. In the Middle East, the challenge has also been on the supranational level due to the strength of the revisionist ideology of pan-Arabism. Even if it became somewhat weaker in recent decades, it is still stronger than in other regions. Pan-Arabism saw the Arab world as one nation sharing a common identity and a feeling of belonging, a single language, a shared glorious heritage, and one culture, while the various sovereign Arab states and their boundaries were perceived as artificial colonialist constructs that only divided the culturally homogenous Arabs.[29] Accordingly, pan-Arabism posed a tough challenge to the separate existence and legitimacy of individual Arab states by underlying the unity of one Arab nation that supersedes the different Arab states.[30] Thus, the Arab agenda was full of calls for redrawing the regional political map, guided by the belief that there were too many colonially constructed states in the region. As a result, proposals for and attempts at unification of various Arab states,[31] besides the advocacy of the elimination of Israel, dominated regional politics. On the whole, the effects of pan-Arabism were both to increase the power of revisionism and to weaken the Arab states and thus to contribute to the problem of regional and domestic legitimacy in the region.[32]

Pan-Arabism has made the Palestinian issue both a constraint and an opportunity for Arab states, leading to more hard-line policies than

could be expected by rational calculation of the security and economic interests of each individual state. Pan-Arabism constrained the ability of Arab states to reach a comprehensive Arab–Israeli peace.[33] At the same time, radical policies vis-à-vis the Palestine issue provided a shield against threats to the legitimacy of the regime. Even if leaders striving for hegemony in the Arab world, like Nasser, Assad, and Saddam Hussien, manipulated the pan-Arabist cause for their own particularistic power purposes,[34] it shows that pan-Arabism has been a potent transborder political resource, which has provided incentives for radical policies. Thus, pan-Arabism exerted pressure on the individual Arab states to be loyal to the Palestine cause,[35] that is, to be hard-liners in the Arab–Israeli dispute and to adopt more intransigent positions than they would otherwise endorse,[36] including occasional (though not always) willingness to resort to military force. This led to radicalizing Arab positions in the Arab–Israeli conflict, encouraging the resort to force against Israel and thus also increasing Israel's sense of insecurity and use of force.

Despite the decline of pan-Arabism as a force for Arab unification in recent decades and despite the expectation of rising state strength, as the recent Intifada shows, the support of the Arab street for the Palestinians constrains Arab leaders and moderate states from making peace with Israel, or at least from warming the relations with it. Thus, even Jordan and Egypt, which signed peace treaties with Israel, had to return their ambassadors from Israel, and other states had to sever their relations with the Jewish state – at least until recently. A recent development is the emergence of the all-Arab El-Gazira Cable TV, widely watched across the whole Arab world. Such a creation of a pan-Arab audience strengthens the Arab nation at the expense of the particular state, which used to have a monopoly and full control over the sources of information.

Ethnic fragmentation and the endorsement of radical pan-Arab positions[37]

Members of minority groups, when in power, have sought to demonstrate their nationalist credentials by endorsing militant pan-Arab stances regarding Arab unity and the Palestinian question. Such positions were designed to have the effect of legitimacy enhancing to the regime, but their effect was a hard-line in the Arab–Israeli conflict and support for radical Palestinian groups which obstructed the peace process by their violent actions. One example refers to leading members of the Syrian Ba'ath party from the minority Alawi sect, who were opposed by

the majority Sunni public. Especially unpopular was the radical faction of the Ba'ath party, which took power in February 1966. To strengthen domestic control, the domestic tensions were externalized in a militant policy against pro-Western Jordan and Saudi-Arabia, but the main target was Israel through both rhetoric and military actions,[38] leading to the escalation culminating in the Six-Day War. The Alawites still control Syria, and their minority status continues to encourage them to adopt radical nationalist positions, including supporting anti-Israeli terrorist organizations.

Externalization of domestic conflict also played a role in the Iraqi hegemonic quest. Iraq is highly fragmented with ethnicity in the north running parallel to sectarianism elsewhere. Whereas the Kurds are separatist, the Shi'ites seek a change in the regime but not in the territorial identity of the state. Still, there is a permanent threat of partition of a state which was created 80 or so years ago by the unification of three distinct Ottoman districts and in which there has been constant interference of neighbors, especially Iran and Turkey.[39]

The prospect of Arab leadership was expected to induce the Shi'a majority to support the Sunni Arab rulers.[40] Although Iraq had no common border with Palestine before 1948 and with Israel after that, Iraq has been consistently engaged in the Arab–Israeli dispute. This can also be explained by the relationships between state incoherence and revisionist and hegemonic aspirations, related to pan-Arabism. The Sunni elite tried to legitimize its dominant position by highlighting the Arab identity of Iraqis (rather than sect or religion) as the basis for national identity. Thus, every pan-Arab issue, notably the Palestine question, has become a major domestic issue for Iraq which has been closely intertwined with the building of an Iraqi nation-state and the persistent domination of the Sunni Arab elite.

Pan religion

A more recent source of domestic illegitimacy in the Middle East is Islamic fundamentalist movements opposing secular Arab regimes, notably in Egypt, Algeria, and Jordan. These movements have been inspired and supported, most notably, by the Islamic republic of Iran since the Islamic revolution of 1979 (and later also by the Islamic regime in Sudan). Iran has challenged the legitimacy of the regimes in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Egypt, Iraq, and Jordan. Its questioning of the norm of sovereignty was not so much to redraw state boundaries in the region – as was Nasser's quest – as to change the character and sources of

legitimacy of domestic regimes in existing states.[41] The Islamic revolution, and Islamic movements throughout the Arab world, also challenge the legitimacy of Israel, support violence against it, and oppose the peace process with it. The most active of these movements in the resort to violence are located in the occupied territories and in the weak states neighboring Israel: Jordan and Lebanon.

Vulnerability of regimes and domestic constraints on implementing peace: mutual reinforcement of intransigence under a state-to-nation imbalance

The state-to-nation imbalance produces legitimacy deficits and challenges of stability for states and regimes. These domestic constraints make the implementation of peace accords very difficult. Because of the combination of the low legitimacy of Arab regimes and states and the illegitimacy of Israel in the eyes of the Arab masses and their support of the Palestinian cause the leading pan-Arab issue, fighting against Israel was used by Arab rulers to buttress the position of their regimes internally and deflect attention from domestic grievances.[42]

The maneuvering room of domestically vulnerable regimes to endorse dramatic initiatives and changes is constrained by the extent to which powerful groups in the society oppose such moves. In the case of making peace with Israel, Arab regimes faced great domestic difficulties because of opposition from the military,[43] many intellectuals and professional groups and large segments of public opinion.[44] This is especially true for the weak Palestinian Authority in the 1990s, particularly when it faced expansionist settlement steps by Israel. The Arab–Palestinian intransigence made it, in turn, more difficult for Israel to make concessions and strengthened the power of the Jewish nationalists.

In the post-1967 era the Jewish settlers in the occupied West Bank and Gaza, backed by their right-wing allies in the Israeli political system, were able to form coalitions which obstructed the Arab–Israeli peace negotiations. They claimed that the occupied territories, which they settle, are a God-given integral part of the historical national homeland of the Jewish people, and thus, Israel is not allowed to make any territorial concessions.[45] While the coalition which supported the settlers also used security reasoning, this reasoning was based on state-to-nation logic, namely that the illegitimacy of Israel by the Palestinians and the Arab world presumably created the security justifications for the settlements. The expanding settlements during all Israeli governments in the Oslo era signaled to the Palestinians that the Israelis were not serious about

making peace, that is, about making real territorial concessions, which would allow the establishment of a contiguous Palestinian state. While the continuing Israeli settlement policy reinforced the position of the radicals in the Palestinian camp, four moves (or lack of them) on the Palestinian side undermined the support in Oslo on the Israeli side:

- The insistence on the right of return of the Palestinian refugees which may erase the Jewish character of Israel; this conveys the enduring illegitimacy of the Jewish state, which means that it is impossible to reach real peace with it.
- The weakness of the Palestinian Authority (PA) manifested in the spread of armed militias and the absence of a centralized authority controlling the means of violence in the Palestinian territories. As noted, it is impossible to implement peace with such a weak or failed state.
- The growing suspicion that Arafat continues to entertain irredentist dreams and thus encourages terror actions against Israel, in order to weaken Israeli society and to encourage international intervention in the conflict to pressure Israel to make concessions.
- The failure of the Camp David talks blamed by Israelis on Arafat despite what they saw as moderate peace proposals by Barak in some of the crucial state-to-nation issues (settlements, Jerusalem). This has weakened the position of the Oslo camp in Israeli politics.

The Palestinians saw, however, the continuing settlement-building, in addition to the tough security measures enacted by Israel in the territories, as conveying a lack of flexibility regarding the building of a coherent Palestinian state, and thus weakened the support in Oslo among them. The Palestinians argue that even if a Palestinian state is established in all the occupied territories, it will not amount to more than 22 per cent of the territory of the British Mandate in Palestine; thus it is already a major concession on their part, and they should not make any more concessions on their homeland (though some blocs of Jewish settlements might potentially stay but only in exchange for land in Israel proper).

State-to-nation imbalance and the security dilemma

As noted, a state-to-nation imbalance reinforces the security dilemma between the parties; thus even steps taken for self-defense by one party are seen by the other side as posing a threat. Thus, Palestinians interpreted Israeli security moves following terrorist actions, such as closures,

house demolitions, curfews and blockades, as intended to strengthen the Israeli grip on the territories and to prevent the establishment of a Palestinian state. At the same time, Palestinian actions to resist the Israeli occupation of the territories were seen by many Israelis as part of the fight against the existence of a Jewish state in any part of Palestine. Under these conditions, of a state-to-nation imbalance and the constraints that it imposes on peace making, the role of the international community, and especially of the leading powers, notably the US, is especially crucial in advancing peace. Although because of the strength of the state-to-nation imbalance, the ability of external powers to impose peace is quite limited, their role in advancing the peace, in cooperation with the local parties, is vital.[46]

Conclusions: some brief comparative remarks

The extent of the state-to-nation imbalance is affected by a number of factors. One key factor is the relative dominance of civic vs. ethnic nationalism. The other is the extent of internal and external national incongruence. A final component is state strength or capacity. A facilitating factor can be liberal democracy under certain conditions and especially the degree of dependence of the two national movements on liberal democratic homelands which are part of regional integration.

In the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, there is a high degree of dependence on external powers, notably on the US, which is a mitigating factor. However, there are not such national relationships of both ethnic communities with an external democratic community as in the Irish case. Thus the external national incongruence is a source of conflict and makes peace implementation more difficult. This applies both to Israel and the Jewish settlers and to the Palestinian Authority and the Palestinian refugees in Arab states. Finally, in the Palestinian case we have an extremely weak (emerging) state, a factor missing in the Irish and South African cases. As I have argued, state weakness is a major obstacle for peace implementation. Indeed, even though Israel is, on the whole, a strong state, it has some weaknesses in its "stateness" which are particularly applicable to the Palestinian issue, and this factor also explains the failure of the Oslo peace process in the 1990s.

The success in South Africa might be explained – in addition to state strength – by the dominance of civic nationalism over ethnic nationalism. This has led to high state-to-nation balance in that country manifested in an agreement on the boundaries of the state and the

Table 1 Comparison between the cases: causes and outcomes

Dimensions of S/N imbalance & Impediments to Peace Implementation	Israel–Palestine	N. Ireland	S. Africa
Type of nationalism (ethnic – an impediment)	ethnic	ethnic	civic
External incongruence (high – an impediment)	High	high	low
Internal incongruence (high – an impediment)	High	high	high
State strength (low – an impediment)	high (Israel) – low (PA)	relatively high	relatively high
Peace implementation	failure	limited success	successful

territorial integrity of the state of South Africa, and thus made the implementation of the peace agreement easier than in the other two cases. In both Ireland and Palestine, in contrast, ethnic nationalism is dominant. Moreover, in both of them there is a high degree of external and internal incongruence, although the extent of incongruence in the Irish case, even if it is a source of the conflict, also has mitigating effects, because the two motherlands (Britain and Ireland) are liberal democracies integrated into the EU. Table 1 presents some of the proposed differences between the three cases with regard to the extent of the state-to-nation balance and accordingly, the variation in the success in the implementation of the peace agreements of the 1990s. An in-depth investigation of these differences should be an agenda for future research.

Notes

1. For a more comprehensive discussion of the state-to-nation imbalance and its effects on war and peace, see Miller (2005).
2. On state-building, see Tilly (1975); Ayoob (1995), and especially Rotberg (2003), ch. 1.
3. See Gause (1992), p. 457 and the references he cites.
4. See also the indicators in Rotberg (2003), esp. pp. 4–22.
5. This section draws especially on Van Evera (1994). See also Seton-Watson (1977); Mayall (1990); Buzan (1991); Brown (1993, 1996); Brown *et al.* (1997), Cederman (1997); Gottleib (1993); Holsti (1996); Kupchan (1995), and Hoffmann (1998).

 6. On the definition of state and nation, see Connor (1994), pp. 90–117 and especially Barrington (1997, pp. 712–16), who emphasizes "the belief in the right to territorial self-determination for the group" as a central part of the definition of a "nation" which is central for distinguishing nations from other collectivities. While many groups hold common myths, values, and symbols (including ethnic groups), nations are unified by a sense of purpose: controlling the territory that the members of the group believe to be theirs. Thus, nations need not even be based on a certain ethnic identity: civic nations share cultural features but are generally multiethnic in their make-up. "Nationalism" is the active pursuit of control by a national group over the territory which it defines as its homeland. Thus, every nationalist movement involves the setting of territorial boundaries (Ibid., p. 714), and national conflicts must involve disputes over territory as truly "national." Key works on nationalism include Gellner (1983); Anderson (1991); Smith (1986); and Hobsbawm (1990) cited, for example, in Suny (1999–2000, p. 145).
 7. See also Lake and Rothschild (1998), esp. pp. 30–2 and the references they cite.
 8. White (2000), p. 10.
 9. For a related logic in the context of ethnic civil war, see Posen (1993) and Kaufman (2001), pp. 10, 20.
10. For a partly related argument, see Schweller (1996).
11. See Levy (l989a, 1989b, l998).
12. This logic is related to Tilly's (1985) argument that war makes the state and the state makes war.
13. For a recent analysis by a key American participant of what happened in the 2000 Camp David summit, see Ross (2004), pp. 650–758. For a critique of this analysis, see Malley (October 7, 2004), pp. 19–23. For various competing views on what happened at Camp David and in the Oslo process, see Rubinstein *et al.* (2003).
14. Ayoob (1993), p. 42.
15. The most receptive state was Jordan which was the only one where they were granted citizenship and became involved in the Kingdom. But even there they did not dissolve their refugee identity, which they needed for getting Western and UN aid, and in order to work for promoting their political objective of returning to Palestine. Moreover, the Palestinians were discriminated against in Jordan as well. Morris (1996), p. 20.
16. Hudson (1977), pp. 295–6.
17. For a detailed study of this pattern before the 1956 war, see Morris (1996). See also Safran (1969), p. 48.
18. See Harff (1993), pp. 233–5.
19. On weak states, see Tibi (1998), esp. ch. 6, and Ibrahim (1995). On instability related to ethnic and religious minorities, see Kemp and Stein (1995), pp. 27–30. On Syria see Kemp and Pressman (1997), p. 116. On Iraq see Byman (1997). On civil wars see the list in Ibrahim in Kemp and Stein (1995), p. 46 and Maoz (1997), p. 9.
20. On the Palestinian state-building, see Robinson (1997) and Frisch (1998).
21. Buzan (1991), esp. ch. 8; David (1991a, 1991b); Ayoob (1993, 1995); Holsti (1996), esp. chs 3–5.
22. Ben-Dor (1983), p. 231. Kedourie (1987), cited in Mufti (1996), p. 9, fn. 16.

23. Yet, the boundaries of even the strongest Arab state, Egypt, were affected by the colonial powers. See Warburg cited in Ben-Dor (1983), p. 259, fn. 16.
24. Gause (1992), p. 461.
25. Sela (1998), pp. 4, 11, 14; Kelidar (1993), pp. 315, 322.
26. Hudson (1977), p. 6.
27. Hudson (1977); Ayoob (1995), pp. 34–5; Shlaim (1995).
28. Mufti (1996), fn. 54.
29. Korany and Dessouki (1991), p. 33; Sela (1998), pp. 10–11.
30. Sylvia (1962, paperback, 1976), pp. 147–53; Ben-Dor (1983), ch. 4; Gause (1992); Barnett (1995); Walt (1987); Sela (1998), pp. 6–7; Nafaa (1987), pp. 149–50; Mufti (1996), p. 3.
31. Mufti (1996), p. 40; Sela (1998); Ben-Dor (1983); Gause (1992); Porath (1986); Seale (1965, second edition 1986).
32. Ben-Dor (1983), pp. 197–8; Miller (2006).
33. Ben-Dor (1983), p. 212.
34. Ayoob (1996).
35. Barnett (1995), p. 499.
36. Safran (1969), p. 40.
37. For details on the ethnic fragmentation in the Middle East, see Ibrahim (1995), p. 48; Bengio and Ben-Dor (1999).
38. Stein (1993), pp. 62–3.
39. Salame in Kemp and Stein (1995), p. 70.
40. Baram and Rubin (1993).
41. On the Islamic challenge to Arab states, see references cite in Gause (1992), pp. 446, 449–51; Barnett (1995), p. 509, fn. 108; Lewis (1995), pp. 376–87.
42. Maoz (1995), pp. 176–89; Bar Siman-Tov (1983), p. 171; Lawson (1996); Stein (1993), pp. 62–6; Tessler and Grobschmidt (1995), pp. 144–5; Shlaim (1995).
43. Krause (1996), p. 344.
44. Hudson (1977, 1995).
45. See, for example, Shlaim (2000), esp. pp. 546–51. For a comprehensive – and critical – study of the Jewish settlements, see the recent book by Zertal and Eldar (2004).
46. See also the recent book by the former Israeli foreign minister, Shlomo Ben-Ami (2004) on his lessons from the failure of the Oslo process in the 1990s. He calls for an imposed peace by the great powers due to the inability of the regional parties to reach peace by themselves.

References

Anderson, Benedict. 1991. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism*, 2nd edn. London: Verso.

Ayoob, Mohammed. 1993. "Unraveling the Concept: 'National Security' in the Third World." In Bahgat Korany, Paul Noble, and Rex Brynen (eds) *The Many Faces of National Security in the Arab World*. London: Macmillan, pp. 31–56.

Ayoob, Mohammed. 1995. *The Third World Security Predicament*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

Ayoob, Mohammed. 1996. "State making, state breaking, and state failure." In Crocker, C., Hampson, F. and Aall, P. (eds.), *Managing Global Chaos*. Washington D.C.: USIPE, pp. 37–52.

Baram, Amatzia and Barry Rubin (eds). 1993. *Iraq's Road to War.* New York: St. Martin's Press.

Barnett, Michael. 1995. "Sovereignty and Nationalism in the Arab World," *International Organization* 49(3): 479–510.

Barrington, Lowell W. 1997. " 'Nation' and 'Nationalism': The Misuse of Key Concepts in Political Science," *PS: Political Science & Politics* 30(4): 712–16.

Bar Siman-Tov, Yaacov. 1983. *Linkage Politics in the Middle East: Syria Between Domestic and External Conflict*, *1961–1970.* Boulder: Westview Press.

Ben-Ami, Shlomo. 2004. *A Battle Front Without a Home-Front: A Journey to the Borders of the Peace Process*. Tel Aviv: Yediot Aharonot (in Hebrew).

Ben-Dor, Gabriel. 1983. *State and Conflict in the Middle East: Emergence of the Post-Colonial State*. New York: Praeger.

Bengio, Ofra and Gabriel Ben-Dor (eds). 1999. *Minorities and the State in the Arab World.* Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

Brown, Michael (ed.). 1993. *Ethnic Conflict and International Security.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Brown, Michael (ed.). 1996. *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict.* Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Brown, Michael, Cote, Owen R. Jr., Lynn-Jones, Sean M., and Miller, Steven E. (eds). 1997. *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Buzan, Barry. 1991. *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, 2nd edn. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

Byman, Daniel. 1997. "Divided They Stand: Lessons about Partition from Iraq and Lebanon," *Security Studies* 7(1): 1–32.

Cederman, Lars-Erik. 1997. *Emergent Actors in World Politics: How States and Nations Develop and Dissolve*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Connor, Walker. 1994. *Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

David, Steven R. 1991a. *Choosing Sides: Alignment and Realignment in the Third World.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

David, Steven R. 1991b. "Explaining Third World Alignment," *World Politics* 43(2): 233–56.

Fearon, James D. and Laitin, David D. 2003. "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil Wars," *American Political Science Review* 97(1): 75–90.

Frisch, Hillel. 1998. *Countdown to Statehood: Palestinian State Formation in the West Bank and Gaza*. New York: New York University Press.

Gause, Gregory F. 1992. "Sovereignty, Statecraft, and Stability in the Middle East," *Journal of International Affairs* 45(ii): 441–69.

Gellner, Ernest. 1983. *Nations and Nationalism*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Gottlieb, Gidon. 1993. *Nation Against State*. New York: Council on Foreign Relations.

Harff, Barbara. 1993. "Minorities, Rebellion, and Repression in North Africa and the Middle East." In Ted Robert Gurr (ed.), *Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts*. Washington, DC: USIPE, pp. 217–51.

Hobsbawm, Eric J. 1990. *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hoffmann, Stanley. 1998. *World Disorders: Troubled Peace in the Post-Cold War Era*. Boston: Rowman & Littlefield.

Holsti, K. J. 1996. *War, the State, and the State of War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hudson, Michael C. 1977. *Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Hudson, Michael C. 1995. "Democracy and Foreign Policy in the Arab World." In Garnham, David and Tessler, Mark (eds), *Democracy, War and Peace in the Middle East*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, pp. 195–220.

Ibrahim, Saad Eddin. 1995. "Ethnic Conflict and State Building in the Arab World." In Kemp, Geoffrey and Stein, Janice Gross (eds), *Powder Keg in the Middle East*. Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Pub, pp. 45–64.

Kaufman, Stuart J. 2001. *Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Kedourie, Elie. 1987. "The Nation-State in the Middle East," *Jerusalem Journal of International Relations* 9(3): 1–9.

Kelidar, Abbas. 1993. "States without Foundations: The Political Evolution of State and Society in the Arab East," *Journal of Contemporary History* 28(2): 315–39.

Kemp, Geoffrey and Pressman, Jeremy. 1997. *Point of No Return: The Deadly Struggle for Middle East Peace*. Washington, DC: Carnegie.

Kemp, Geoffrey and Stein, Janice Gross. 1995. "Enduring Sources of Conflict in the Persian Gulf Region: Predicting Shocks to the System." In Kemp, Geoffrey and Stein, Janice Gross (eds), *Powder Keg in the Middle East*. Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Pub.

Korany, Bahgat and Dessouki, Ali E. Hillal. 1991. "The Global System and Arab Foreign Policies." In Korany, Bahgat and Dessouki, Ali E. Hillal (eds) *The Foreign Policies of Arab States: The Challenge of Change*. Boulder: Westview Press. pp. 25–48.

Krause, Keith 1996. "Insecurity and State Formation in the Global Military Order," *European Journal of International Relations* 2(3): 319–54.

Kupchan, Charles A. (ed.). 1995. *Nationalism and Nationalities in the New Europe*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Lake, David and Rothschild, Donald (eds). 1998. *The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Lawson, Fred. H. 1996. *Why Syria Goes to War: Thirty Years of Confrontation*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Levy, Jack S. 1989a. "The Diversionary Theory of War: A Critique." In Midlarsky, Manus I. (ed.), *Handbook of War Studies*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 259–88.

Levy, Jack S. 1989b. "Domestic Politics and War." In Rotberg, Robert I. and Rabb, Theodore K. (eds), *The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 79–100.

Levy, Jack S. 1998. "The Causes of War and the Conditions of Peace," *Annual Review of Political science* 1(1): 139–65.

Lewis, Bernard. 1995. *The Middle East: 2000 Years of History from the Rise of Christianity to the Present Day*. London: Phoenix Giant.

Malley, Robert. October 2004. "Israel and the Arafat Question," *The New York Review of Books* 7: 19–23.

Maoz, Zeev. 1995. "Domestic Norms, Structural Constraints, and Enduring Rivalries in the Middle East, 1948–1988." In Garnham, David and Tessler, Mark (eds), *Democracy, War and Peace in the Middle East.* Bloomington: Indiana.

Maoz, Zeev (ed.). 1997. *Regional Security in the Middle East: Past, Present and Future.* London: Frank Cass.

Mayall, James. 1990. *Nationalism and International Society.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Miller, Benjamin. 2005 "When and How Regions Become Peaceful: Potential Pathways to Peace," *International Studies Review* 7(2): 229–67.

Miller, Benjamin. 2006. "Balance of Power or the State-to-Nation Balance: Explaining Middle East War-Propensity," *Security Studies* 15(4): 658–205.

Morris, Benny. 1996. *Israel's Border Wars, 1949–1956.* Tel Aviv: Am Oved (in Hebrew).

Mufti, Malik. 1996. *Sovereign Creations: Pan-Arabism and Political Order in Syria and Iraq.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Nafaa, Hassan. 1987. "Arab Nationalism: A Response to Ajami's Thesis on the End of Pan-Arabism." In Farah, Tawfic E. (ed.), *Pan-Arabism and Arab Nationalism.* Boulder: Westview Press, pp. 133–51.

Porath, Yehoshua. 1986. *In Search of Arab Unity, 1930–1945.* London: Frank Cass.

Posen, Barry R. 1993. "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict." In Brown, M. (ed.) *Ethnic Conflict and International Security.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 103–24.

Robinson, Glenn E. 1997. *Building a Palestinian State: The Incomplete Revolution.* Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Ross, Dennis. 2004. *The Missing Peace.* New York: Farrar, Straus and Girouz.

Rotberg, Robert I. (ed.). 2003. *State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror.* Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.

Rubinstein, Danny, Malley, Robert, Agha, Hussein, Barak, Ehud, and Morris, Benny. 2003. *Rashomon Camp David.* Tel Aviv: Yediot Aharonot (in Hebrew).

Safran, Nadav. 1969. *From War to War: The Arab–Israeli Confrontation, 1948–1967.* New York: Pegasus.

Salame, Ghassan. 1995. "Assessing Alternative Future Arrangements for Regional Security." In Kemp, Geoffrey and Stein, Janice Gross (eds), *Powder Keg in the Middle East.* Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Pub., pp. 65–86.

Schweller, Randall. 1996. "Neorealism's Status Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?," *Security Studies* 5(3): 90–121.

Seale, Patrick. 1986 [1965]. *The Struggle for Syria.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Sela, Avraham. 1998. *The Decline of the Arab–Israeli Conflict: Middle East Politics and the Quest for Regional Order.* Albany: SUNY Press.

Seton-Watson, Hugh. 1977. *Nations and States: An Enquiry into the Origins of Nations and the Politics of Nationalism.* Boulder: Westview Press.

Shlaim, Avi. 1995. *War and Peace in the Middle East: A Concise History.* New York: Penguin.

Shlaim, Avi. 2000. *The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World.* New York: W.W. Norton.

Smith, Anthony D. 1986. *The Ethnic Origin of Nations.* Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Stein, Janice G. 1993. "The Security Dilemma in the Middle East: A Prognosis for the Decade Ahead." In Korany, Bahgat, Noble, Paul, and Brynen, Rex (eds), *The Many Faces of National Security in the Arab World*. London: Macmillan. pp. 36–75.

Suny, Grigor Ronald (Winter, 1999–2000). "Provisional Stabilities: The Politics of Identities in Post-Soviet Eurasia," *International Security* 24(3): 139–78.

Sylvia, Haim G. 1976 [1962]. *Arab Nationalism: An Anthology*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Tessler, Mark and Grobschmidt, Marilyn. 1995. "Democracy in the Arab World and the Arab–Israeli Conflict." In Garnham, David and Tessler, Mark (eds), *Democracy*, *War and Peace in the Middle East*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, pp. 135–69.

Tibi, Bassam. 1998. *The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Tilly, Charles. 1975. "Reflections on the History of European State-Making." In Tilly, Charles (ed.), *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Tilly, Charles. 1985. "War Making and State Making as Organized Crime." In Evans, Peter B., Rueschemeyer, Dietrich and Skocpol, Theda (eds), *Bringing the State Back In.* New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 169–91.

Van Evera, Stephen. 1994. "Hypotheses on Nationalism and War," *International Security* 18(4): 5–39.

Walt, Stephen M. 1987. *The Origins of Alliances*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

White, George W. 2000. *Nationalism and Territory*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.

Zertal, Judith and Eldar, Akiva. 2004. *The Lords of the Land: The Settlers and the State of Israel 1967–2004*. Or Yehuda: Kinnert, Zmora-Bitan & Dvir (in Hebrew).

3

Consociational Theory and Peace Agreements in Pluri-National Places: Northern Ireland and Other Cases

*John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary**

This paper examines consociational theory, primarily as developed by Arend Lijphart,[1] and its relevance in the context of pluri-national places. A pluri-national place has more than one mobilized national community and can be a state, a place within a state, or a place that crosses state borders. Some of its people may identify with no nation, preferring, perhaps, to identify with groups that cross-cut national lines, or they may identify with more than one nation, i.e., they may possess "nested" national identities. These various identities may vary in intensity, but none of them are primordial, in the sense that they have existed since time immemorial, though they may be experienced as such. A pluri-national place is one in which the discrete national identities are politically salient – i.e., its dominant political party or parties, as well as its popular civic associations, are nationalist in character and support the classical nationalist goals of self-determination (autonomy or independence). The concept of a pluri-national place implies that the discrete national identities are durable, and not likely to assimilate, fuse or dissolve into one common identity at any foreseeable point. One can empirically test for the existence of pluri-national places, at least in democracies, by examining which parties people vote for, and what type of civic associations they participate in, and how long these patterns have existed.[2] Most of the world's current violent political disputes take

place in pluri-national places and are waged between different national communities. If there are to be viable peace agreements in these places, it is vital that we appreciate the nature of their disputes, and what distinguishes national conflict from conflicts that are based primarily on other cleavages, such as religion or class.

Consociational theory was not originally developed with pluri-national places at the forefront of Lijphart's theoretical and empirical work, and consequently consociational theory has not always specified sufficiently the institutional arrangements that pluri-national places need if they are to be stable. This line of criticism is in stark contrast to the most common and most influential criticism of consociation, viz., that it has disintegrative consequences. Integrationist critics of consociation argue that it empowers ethnic elites who have an alleged interest in maintaining division, when what is needed are institutions that facilitate the emergence of moderate elites prepared to appeal across ethnic lines. Others object to consociationalists' focus on political elites and argue instead for the mobilization of civil society organizations prepared to transform society from the bottom-up. Relatedly, critics complain that consociational institutions entrench divisions, making them permanent; and that they privilege regressive identities based on ethnicity, over more progressive, cross-cutting identities, such as class or gender. The general criticism of all these perspectives is that consociation creates barriers to "normal," programmatic politics; it stands in the way of an integrated civic nation because it is too accommodative of minority groups, whether defined as nations, or as ethnic, linguistic, or religious communities. Such criticisms appear throughout the general critical responses to consociation.[3] They are also standard fare in research on Northern Ireland, including research on the consociational institutions established by the Good Friday Agreement of 1998.[4]

Our perspective is strikingly different. We support consociations when they are appropriate, and we are admirers of Arend Lijphart's work, but we argue that consociational institutions may be seen by minority nations (nationalities) as too integrationist. This observation is obvious where and when nationalist movements seek secession because consociation is normally associated with institutional arrangements that maintain a united state. "Integrationists" usually forget that consociation may also be considered "integrationist." While Lijphart does not exclude secession or partition to resolve deep conflicts, the focus of his work is on integrating diverse groups within states through accommodating them as groups. A minority of integrationists label consociationalists as "segregationists," making the false, silly and deliberately contentious

inference that consociationalists want to impose separation on people who don't want it.[5] Though "integrationists" arguably should not be allowed to monopolize a concept with positive connotations, we shall follow here the emergent convention and identify as "integrationists" those who want to integrate states without accommodating groups *qua* groups.

Our key observation is that even when minority nationalities' aspirations fall short of independent sovereign statehood, it is not always true that consociational arrangements will be adequate to resolve their demands. Consociational theory has no intrinsic or normatively based objection to the accommodation of nationalities. Instead, their neglect in contemporary consociational theory flows from its genesis in reflections on a number of small western European democracies that were divided religiously, culturally, and socio-economically but were not (then) strongly nationally divided.

The argument developed here is in three parts. The first examines general consociational theory and suggests that in cases selected, terminology employed, and prescriptions advocated, pluri-national places were not foregrounded in its early formulations. The second shows how this orientation affected orthodox consociational analysis of conflict in Northern Ireland. While consociational institutions were and remain vital to a political settlement in Northern Ireland, a settlement was reached only because traditional consociational prescriptions were supplemented by key bi-national institutions that squarely faced the national dimension of its conflict. Consociation, in short, was a necessary, but insufficient, requirement for a stable agreement. The last part briefly examines a number of other pluri-national places where peace settlements have recently been reached, or are being negotiated, and suggests that these too have required or will require institutional arrangements that address the national dimension of their disputes.

Consociational theory and pluri-national places

Lijphart, the pioneer of contemporary consociational theory, developed his work from a study of his native Netherlands,[6] which he then extended to three other small western European democracies, namely Switzerland, Austria, and Belgium,[7] though, of course, he considered other cases. His choice of case studies has been criticised. Critics have argued that the four exemplary European democratic cases were not violently divided, or not deeply divided, at least in the immediate past, and so they questioned their relevance, and that of consociational theory, for societies

that are deeply divided. Others noted that the four were prosperous and raised doubts about their relevance for less well-off places in the developing world. Some indicated that the four were all small and argued (this time in agreement with Lijphart) that small places were advantageous for consociational institutions. But another feature of the four cases that has been less often noticed is that, with the subsequent exception of Belgium, the four were not pluri-national places, i.e., places with more than one mobilized national community, or at least they were not when Lijphart was developing his theory (Belgium has since become such a place, which is why it is now federal as well as consociational). The Netherlands, the most important case informing the development of consociational theory, Lijphart's home, and the focus of his first book[8] was divided along religious lines between Catholics and Protestants, and between Christians and the secular-minded. The main division within Belgium, when Lijphart wrote, and the one to which consociational prescriptions were applied was between Catholics and secular-minded socialists.[9] Switzerland's main historic cleavage, stemming from its nineteenth-century civil war, was between Protestants and Catholics. Language divisions have become more important recently, but these have cross-cut religious divisions and have not translated into national mobilizations. Few members of the Swiss language communities see their linguistic communities as distinct nations. Instead, virtually all see themselves as Swiss, albeit of different linguistic or religious communities. Austria, by contrast, was divided between right-wing conservatives and socialists. There was a national division between those who saw themselves as German and Austrians, but this was overcome, and it was not ethnonational.

That Lijphart's foundational work did not focus on national divisions is suggested by the *terminology* he employed and did not employ. *Nowhere*, as far as we can see, does Lijphart use the terms "nation," "stateless nation," "minority nation," "nationality," "ethnonational," or even the somewhat ambiguous "national minority," which could mean a minority within a nation, to describe the minority political communities with which he was concerned. This is surprising for a theorist whose life work has been devoted to resolving intra-state conflicts and promoting consensual democracies. Many of these conflicts have focused on national differences. The most frequent term he and other consociationalists used, though less popular now, is "segment." A "segment" is like a "fraction" or a piece of pie – i.e., it could be construed as a part of something larger. The something larger that Lijphart may have had in mind was the state, or the "society" coterminous with that

state. When Lijphart used the key term "plural society," e.g., in the title of his classic work on consociational democracy, *Democracy in Plural Societies*,[10] or the generic term "divided society," or "societal divisions," he appeared to have in mind a *single* society, which is plural or divided. We may contrast Lijphart's use of "societal divisions" with Will Kymlicka's "societal cultures."[11] The former specifies a divided society, the latter specifies multiple societies. The latter is apt for pluri-national places, though it suffers from a different problem, i.e., pluri-nationalism can exist in a place that has a broadly similar culture, e.g., Great Britain or the United Kingdom. The emphasis in pluri-nationalism is on "identity" rather than culture.

In short, consociational theory, unintentionally, historically tended to have a state-centered focus and aimed at the management of divisions within *a* society seen as congruent with *its* state. When minority nationalities, by contrast, think of themselves as "segments" or "fractions," they tend to think of *their* nation as the pie and to complain that it has been segmented (partitioned) by "international" or sovereign borders. The pie of which Kurdish nationalists in Iraq (or in Turkey, Syria, or Iran) see themselves as segments, at least aspirationally, is not Iraq (or Turkey, or Iran, or Syria) but Kurdistan (including Kirkuk in Iraq, as well as Kurdistan in Turkey, Iran, and Syria). The pie that many Basque nationalists prefer to associate with is not Spain, or even the current Basque autonomous community (Vizcaya, Guipuzcoa, and Alava), but Euskadi, which also comprises a Spanish province outside the autonomous region (Navarre) and three in France (Lapourdi, Soule, and Basse Navarre). Minority nationalist movements prefer to see the state in which they live as comprising divided or parallel *societies*, rather than *a* divided society. The focus on conflict regulation within states, of course, is not unique to consociational theory. Indeed, most other theories of conflict regulation are far more integrationist.

The other difficulty with "segment" is that it does not distinguish between national divisions and other divisions such as those based on religion or class. In more recent years, Lijphart has abandoned the use of "segment" in favor of "ethnic" group.[12] This term is more appropriate for describing mobilized minority nationalities, as these are often associated with particular ethnic communities. However, "ethnic" is a word used to describe a number of different categories, including minorities resident in their ancestral homelands who consider themselves nations and who seek self-determination; minorities resident on their ancestral homelands who are not nationally mobilized; and immigrant communities interested in integrating into their new nation-states, albeit, perhaps,

with some protection for their culture and religion. The expression "ethnic" group and its extension "multiethnic" elides the distinction between "pluri-national" and "polyethnic" or "multicultural."[13] Mobilized stateless nations are often at pains to point out that they are not mere cultural groups[14] and to distinguish their collectivity from the term "ethnic," which is sometimes used in a pejorative way or suggests that the group in question is exclusive and *ethno*centric. Minority nationalist movements are often labeled as "ethnic" nations by dominant nationalities, the supporters of such movements often like to point out that they are also civic nations, open to outsiders, in the same way that the state claims to be, and to observe and complain that the state's nationalism has been constructed around a dominant ethnic core. Such is the standard response of groups like the Kurds of Iraq, the Quebecois, or the Catalans to charges of ethnocentrism.

Given Lijphart's initial exploration of these four western European cases, which were not then regarded as pluri-national places, his avoidance of terms appropriate to national disputes, and that pluri-national conflicts were not as salient then as now, it seems fair to suggest that he did not have such disputes in the forefront of his mind. Arguably, this affected the development of his prescriptive inventory, which, particularly in the early period, looked more appropriate for divided societies (i.e., religiously, linguistically, class, or ethically divided societies in which there was a reasonably strong overarching national identity) than for pluri-national places.

In his classic work of 1977, Lijphart explained that the "primary characteristic of consociational democracy" is that segmental leaders should share power within the state's central government.[15] The primary concern of mobilized minority nationalities, on the other hand, may be on *how much* power should be exercised by the central government and, sometimes, on whether there should be more than one central government (i.e., on whether the state should be reconstituted as more than one state). Minority nationalities, that is, may value autonomy over power-sharing and may be prepared to trade power-sharing for more autonomy, though they often insist on both. The secondary consociational devices of "proportionality" and "mutual vetoes" may also suggest a focus on central power-sharing, because these are usually thought of as proportionality within the central state's public sector, and as vetoes within central institutions, though, of course, both principles are consistent with the promotion of autonomy. It is hardly surprising, then, that consociation has been understood by others to be entirely focused on power-sharing in central institutions. Berman *et al*. (2004) note that "The

key feature of consociationalism (as opposed to federalism) is power-sharing across ethnic lines at the central level."[16] The index to Jack Snyder's influential book, *From Voting to Violence*, states: "Consociational democracy, see power-sharing" (Snyder, 2000, p. 364). Indeed many people use consociation and power-sharing as synonyms.

Lijphart has recently elevated "group autonomy" to the status of one of consociation's two "primary attributes."[17] This, arguably, reflects his recognition of the increasing saliency of self-determination disputes. We agree with him. But by group autonomy, he means both *corporate* autonomy, a variety which involves "non-territorial" self-rule for a community over matters of common interest, such as schooling or religious affairs, and *territorial* autonomy. The former was the dominant form of autonomy in three of the four classic cases of consociation – Belgium, the Netherlands, and Austria – and was also present in the fourth, Switzerland.

For Lijphart, corporate autonomy is particularly useful for groups that are territorially dispersed while territorial autonomy is useful for groups that are concentrated. But this reasoning, eminently sensible, does not fully capture the relationship between nationalism and autonomy. Nationalist movements normally have a vital relationship with a homeland or "national territory" and seek self-government in *this* territory and not simply over their co-nationals. This relationship to the land is clearly evident in the discourse of indigenous people, but it is true of all minority nationalities, including Scots, Catalans, or Uighurs.[18] The types of powers that nationalist movements typically seek, including power over the economy, policing, control over population influxes, and over which language is locally dominant, are believed to require control over *national territory*. This belief is connected with the territorial nature of the modern state, and the fact that the exercise of its most important functions tends to be on a territorial basis. Many minority nationalities, by contrast, have little interest in corporate autonomy, unless they are very small and dispersed.

The emphasis on corporate autonomy in consociational theory, and the evidence from the west European consociations, may explain why some academics and political agents think that consociation need not involve any provision for territorial autonomy at all, and why consociation is often treated as an antonym of federation, which is focused on territorial autonomy.[19] Berman *et al* claim that an advantage of consociation over federation is that consociation does not give rise to fears of secession of irredentism "as groups are not given control over territory."[20] Another leading authority on ethnic conflict explains

that "consociational autonomy is not territorial, it is instead institutional, with government agreeing not to interfere in this aspect of self-management" and that "consociational systems are *explicitly* designed to manage conflicts where the distribution of ethnic populations does not allow for federal arrangements" (our italics).[21]

When discussing territorial autonomy, which clearly regards as compatible with consociational prescription, Lijphart writes that segments may have more than one federal unit, particularly if they live in a large area or non-contiguous areas.[22] This is consistent with the pattern in Switzerland, the only one of the four classic consociational democracies to practice *territorial* autonomy, and where the French and German language communities each have several federal units. There are many cases where minorities are happy with such arrangements. However, minority nationalities, mobilized *qua* nations, will generally shun the idea of such partitioned autonomy. Many of Iraq's Sunni Arab politicians, and several American policy-makers, favored a federation in Iraq that would divide the Kurdistan region, autonomous since 1991, into several federal units.[23] But Kurdistan's leading priority was to unify and *expand* its current borders to incorporate Kirkuk, which is historically and demographically majority Kurdish.[24] Minority nationalities, in short, generally seek to be *collectively* self-governing, i.e., to incorporate most if not all of their members within a single autonomous unit. In cases where it is proposed to partition minority nationalities into multiple units, and especially to partition a self-governing unit in which the nationality already enjoys collective self-government, the division is likely to require massive coercion by state-wide majorities, or military dictators. The partition of the three states of the Nigerian First Republic, dominated by Ibo, Hausa, and Yoruba, respectively, was carried out by military rulers in the late 1960s.[25]

Dividing nationalities into multiple federal units is a tactic that is often recommended by integrationists. They think that dividing a minority into different units of self-government will make it more difficult for it to secede. It also, supposedly, opens up intra-minority divisions; facilitates the construction of inter-group and cross-cutting alliances; and strengthens core or central state "nation-building." Supporters of such "integrative" federalism include Donald Horowitz (1991), Andreas Wimmer (2003), the Dawishas (2003), and Kanan Makiya (2002). The latter three writings explicitly supported such arrangements in Iraq, which would have involved breaking up Kurdistan into at least three units. Such maneuvers are clearly in breach of the spirit of consociational politics and pay scant respect to the consent of

nationalities, and it is unthinkable that Lijphart would support them. Consociationalists therefore need to make clear that, at least in particular circumstances, stateless nations will strenuously oppose integrationist partition and describe such logic as conflict-promoting rather than conflict-reducing.

Consociational theory, like other theories of conflict regulation, particularly integrationist theories, at least in its early modern forms, has focused on institutional prescriptions that coincide with a state's territory.[26] The problem with this is that pluri-national places may involve national communities that are dissected or multi-sected by state borders. It may be difficult to satisfy the desire for collective autonomy in cases like these even if a national community has territorial autonomy *within* a state, or, indeed, even if it has control of its own state. Here the mobilized fractions of the nation will typically seek links, including political institutional links, with their co-nationals across state borders. This is the case with Northern Ireland's Irish nationalist minority. It is also one reason why several national communities in eastern Europe – such as the Magyars in Hungary and the Magyar minorities in Slovakia, Serbia, and Romania – support European integration, which not only erodes the importance of state borders but builds amicable relations among states, based on respect for existing borders, and facilitates inter-state cooperation over the construction of links between partitioned elements of national communities.[27] The development of European integration, which deepened after Lijphart's seminal work on consociation has broadened the possibility of such inter-state cooperation.

In addition to placing at least as much stress on autonomy as on power-sharing, preferring territorial autonomy to corporate autonomy, seeking collective autonomy over partitioned autonomy, aspiring in some contexts to trans- and inter-state as well as intra-state institutions, nationalities may also seek to have the state officially designated as pluri-national rather than as a "nation-state." They may desire to have their peoplehood recognized constitutionally, and in the emblems, flag, and official languages of the state. Quebec federalists have traditionally insisted the Quebecois are one of Canada's two founding peoples and have sought to be recognized in the constitution as a "distinct society." Kurdistan successfully struggled to have a clause inserted in Iraq's interim constitution, the "Transitional Administrative Law," which stated that Iraq was composed of several nations and not just one, and won this recognition in the permanent constitution. Nationalities may even seek an asymmetrical form of collective territorial autonomy in which their homeland enjoys

more and distinctive autonomy and therefore possesses a distinct status compared with other regions belonging to the state's dominant national community. Traditional consociational theory has not addressed such matters.

Consociational theory and Northern Ireland's conflict and settlement

The problems that overlook the specificities of pluri-national places can be seen from Lijphart's otherwise masterly analysis of the Northern Ireland conflict.[28] Lijphart, with his background in the Catholic and Protestant divisions in the Netherlands, initially under-appreciated the fact that Northern Ireland's conflict had little to do with religion but was based squarely on rival national movements. He saw the two groups in conflict in Northern Ireland as "Catholics" and "Protestants," and the basis of the cleavage as "religious," even though he was fully aware that the groups gave virtually all of their support to "nationalist" and "unionist" parties respectively.[29] He argued that the key difficulty was the absence of support for power sharing among Protestants because they were capable of exercising hegemonic power alone, and because they were disposed to Westminster majoritarian practices rather than continental power-sharing norms.[30] This analysis was accurate, but limited. It overlooked the fundamental fact that Northern Ireland's Catholics as Irish nationalists were also opposed to internalist power-sharing within the United Kingdom. Radical Irish nationalists (republicans) wanted national self-determination and a complete withdrawal of the British state from Ireland, whereas moderate nationalists wanted any consociation to be internationalized, i.e., to have a linkage to Ireland, and a role for the Irish government. Even if unionists had proposed a consociation, then, it would have been insufficient for Irish nationalists. Moreover, a key reason why unionists opposed consociation was because they were British nationalists, profoundly concerned about Irish nationalists' insistence on links with Ireland. They also had no incentive to share power for most of the period after 1972 since the default option was direct rule from Great Britain, their preferred nation-state.

These facts principally explain why no consociational settlement was reached in Northern Ireland before 1998. An early attempt at a consociational agreement in 1974 collapsed after just 5 months, because it was attacked by both Irish nationalist and British unionist hardliners. The

former thought that it did not go far enough toward satisfying their aspirations for Irish self-determination. The latter feared that it undermined the Union with Britain and portended a united Ireland. Subsequent initiatives between 1974 and 1998 failed because they could not achieve agreement on both sides, or on either side. Any feasible agreement in Northern Ireland had to deal squarely with the disputes that had flowed from the inequitable legacies of the partition of Ireland in 1920, which had occurred without any formal respect for Irish self-determination. At least three parts of the Agreement that was reached in 1998 are relevant here, and all departed from traditional consociational accords:

(i) *The North–South Ministerial Council and the British–Irish Governmental Conference*

Had the Agreement included only traditional consociational institutions, not even moderate nationalists would have signed it. The Social Democratic and Labour Party (the SDLP) signed because the Agreement provided for a number of political institutions that joined both parts of Ireland, and maintained an oversight role for the Republic's government. The most important all-island institution was a North–South Ministerial Council (NSMC), a body nominated by the Irish Republic's government and the new Northern Ireland premiers. It was agreed that it should meet in plenary twice a year, and in smaller groups to discuss specific sectors (say, agriculture or education) on a "regular and frequent basis." In addition, the Agreement provided for a number of cross-border or all-island "implementation" bodies. These eventually turned out to be six in number, and they were given the task of cooperating over inland waterways, food, safety, trade and business development, special EU programs, the Irish language and Ulster Scots dialect, and aquaculture and marine matters. The Agreement committed both parts of Ireland to a further six functional areas of cooperation, including some aspects of transport, agriculture, education, health, the environment, and tourism. It also established the British–Irish intergovernmental conference (B–IGC), the successor to the Intergovernmental Conference established under the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985. This guarantees Ireland's government access to policy formulation on all matters not – or not yet – devolved to the Northern Ireland Assembly or the NSMC. In the event of the collapse of the Agreement, this institution will resume the all-encompassing role it had under the Anglo–Irish Agreement. It also promotes bilateral cooperation between the Irish and the British governments on all matters of mutual interest within their respective jurisdictions.

(ii) *Recognition of Irish self-determination*

Irish Republicans would not have approved the Agreement had the UK government not recognized, in a treaty, the right of the people of Ireland, meaning the whole island, to exercise their right to self-determination, albeit conjointly and severally as "North" and "South," to bring about a united Ireland if that was their wish.[31] The referendums and the British–Irish Agreement (the treaty incorporating the Agreement) endeavored to make the partition of Ireland – and its continuation – and the Agreement and its institutions dependent upon the expressed will of the people of Ireland. The consociation established by the Agreement is the first that has been endorsed in referendums that required concurrent consent in jurisdictions in different states.

(iii) *Recognition of the principle of consent and the British–Irish Council*

Unionists, who were ambivalent about the Agreement, were persuaded to ratify it because it entrenched the principle of consent. That is, Northern Ireland cannot become part of Ireland unless a majority in Northern Ireland agree. Ireland's constitution was changed, after a referendum in both jurisdictions, to reflect this principle. Unionists also secured a new east-west institution to reflect their link with Great Britain. The British–Irish Council (BIC) comprises the two governments of the United Kingdom and Ireland, along with all the devolved governments of the United Kingdom and its neighboring insular dependent territories (Scotland, Wales, the Isle of Man, Jersey, and Guernsey).[32]

In addition to these three distinct sets of provisions, a number of other key provisions in the Agreement, or which flowed from it, mark it out as a settlement between national communities rather than simply ethnic or religious communities. Ministers in the power-sharing executive have to take a "Pledge of Office," not an "Oath of Allegiance." This cements the bi-nationalism at the heart of the Agreement: nationalist ministers do not have to swear an "Oath of Allegiance" to the Crown or the Union. One of the key concerns of nationalists was that Northern Ireland's police, the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), was partisan unionist, with the primary task not of combating crime, but of defending the Union between Great Britain and Northern Ireland. The Patten Commission, mandated by the Agreement to reform the police, recognized this, explaining that the "main" problem facing policing was the political divide between unionists and nationalists and the fact that

the latter associated the "police with unionism and the British state."[33] It recommended, therefore, that the names and symbols of the police be freed from "any association with either the British or Irish states." It was proposed that the name be changed from the "Royal" Ulster Constabulary, which clearly signalled links to the British Crown, to the "Northern Ireland Police Service." When it was discovered that this gave rise to the unfortunate acronym "NIPS," the government changed it to "Police Service of Northern Ireland." The RUC's emblem, which showed a crown on top of a harp and which the RUC's defenders argued represented both of Northern Ireland's traditions, but which nationalists rejected as signalling the subjugation of nationalist Ireland to the British crown, was replaced by a new impartial badge: a Saint Patrick's Cross surrounded by six symbols – a harp, crown, shamrock, laurel leaf, torch, and scales of justice. Patten also recommended that the display of the Union flag and the portrait of the Queen in police stations should go.[34]

To operationalize consociational governance, the Agreement required that members elected to the Northern Ireland Assembly designate themselves not as Catholics and Protestants, but as "nationalists, unionists, and others." The co-premiers, who head the executive, had then to secure the support of a majority of both nationalists and unionists, as well as a majority in the Assembly as a whole. Similarly the designation rules provided legislative vetoes to both the "nationalist" and the "unionist" communities: legislation either required "parallel consent," a concurrent majority of both nationalists and unionists as well as a majority in the Assembly, or a "weighted majority," 40 per cent of both nationalists and unionists, as well as 60 per cent in the Assembly overall. These rules were unfair in that they discriminated against those who were neither nationalists nor unionists. They also, arguably, created a minor incentive for people to vote nationalist or unionist, as their votes would count more. However, they reflected the fact that the national division was the most important division in Northern Ireland and the basis of the conflict there. Of the 108 members elected to the Assembly in 1998, 100, representing 91.6 per cent of the vote, were from nationalist or unionist political parties.

Mutual recognition of national claims lay at the core of the Agreement. Ireland recognized the British political identity of unionists. The United Kingdom recognized Irish northern nationalists as a national minority, not simply as a cultural or religious minority. This was an advance from earlier agreements, such as the Government of Ireland Act 1920, which had outlawed discrimination on the basis of religion, but which had said nothing about nationality. Unionists who made the

Agreement recognized nationalists as nationalists, not simply as Catholics. Nationalists recognized unionists as unionists, and not just as Protestants.

The basic consociational framework in the Agreement is similar to the arrangements which historically have been practised in countries such as the Netherlands, once divided between Catholics and Protestants, and in Lebanon, divided among ethno-confessional blocs, and, more recently, the provisional arrangements in South Africa's interim constitution, which has been and is divided along ethnic and racial lines. The additional features are there because the British and Irish governments are aware that Northern Ireland, unlike these other societies, is nationally divided, i.e., divided between two national communities who want to be ruled by their respective nation-states. As a result, a purely internal consociational arrangement would have been inadequate. It would have addressed the minority's desire to resist majority rule, but would have done nothing to satisfy its nationalist aspirations for a united Ireland, or for institutional links between Northern Ireland and the Republic, or to remedy its complaint that the very existence of Northern Ireland as part of the UK is an injustice. As a fresh partition of Northern Ireland between the two communities would be very difficult, the two governments sensibly agreed that justice and stability required institutional arrangements which go beyond the boundaries of the United Kingdom to include the Republic of Ireland.

The instability that has affected Northern Ireland's consociational institutions since 1998 is importantly related to the fact that its dispute is based on rival self-determination claims. At the most basic level, many unionists are unwilling to embrace the Agreement because they believe it moves too far in a nationalist direction. There is a view that nationalists see the Agreement not as a "settlement," i.e., a long-term or permanent arrangement, but as a "process" aimed at hollowing out the Union and achieving Irish unification. Steps by nationalists to strengthen the North–South bodies, and to strip British symbols from police stations and court-houses, are (correctly) interpreted in this light, as were the reluctance of armed republicans to relinquish their weaponry, and speeches from the Irish prime minister and leader of Sinn Féin that envisaged a united Ireland in their lifetimes.[35] On the nationalist side, the perceived difficulty is with the unwillingness of unionists to work the political institutions, including the power-sharing executive and the North–South bodies. There are also concerns that the British government has not implemented the Agreement's self-determination provisions in a forthright manner. The UK government's initial response to the Patten

Report's recommendations was minimalist, retaining much more power for the British state than had been recommended by Patten, or wanted by nationalists. London also responded to UUP leader David Trimble's difficulties with his party and the unionist public by unilaterally suspending the Assembly on four occasions, in breach of the international treaty that had been signed with Ireland, and the agreed view that the people of Ireland (in both jurisdictions) should determine their own future. These moves in turn help explain the IRA's reluctance to decommission its weaponry, which in turn worsened the position of unionist moderates. The resolution of the impasse over decommissioning was achieved during the summer of 2005, in part because the British government agreed to address republicans' self-determination concerns by repealing its suspension power and by promising to transfer control over policing from the British Secretary of State to the Northern Ireland Assembly, as soon as there is agreement among the local parties.

Consociational theory, disputes, and settlements in other pluri-national places

Not all of the world's recent conflicts are national in nature. Many conflicts in Africa and Asia are waged by what Gurr calls "communal contenders," i.e., ethnic movements which do not see themselves as distinct nationalities and which are focused on a share of power in, and the fair distribution of resources by, the central state.[36] This is the case in Rwanda, Burundi, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Malaysia. However, many other conflicts are waged in pluri-national places between nationalist movements, led by political parties and civic associations, which stress the peoplehood of the groups they represent and which aspire explicitly to self-determination. There is a tendency in integrationist circles to dismiss the authenticity of such claims, to see them as the product of manipulation by self-interested elites rather than as an expression of deeply rooted (although not primordial) and mass-based sentiment.[37] However, the popularity of such claims, is empirically testable, at least in democracies. The argument here is that when national divisions are politically salient, as evidenced by electoral support for parties that are explicitly nationalist in their program and by opinion survey data, prescriptions will need to move beyond power-sharing within the central government.[38]

Within the past 15 years or so, there have been settlements of as well as attempts to settle a number of conflicts which are pluri-national in nature and some others which are arguably so, including

Bosnia-Hercegovina, Cyprus Macedonia, Iraq, Moldova (Gagauzia), Papua New Guinea (Bougainville), the Philippines (Mindanao), Sudan (the South), as well as Northern Ireland.[39] The key prescriptive feature in several of these cases is, arguably, not executive power-sharing but autonomy, and not corporate autonomy, but territorial autonomy. In some of them indeed – Bougainville, Gagauzia and Mindanao – there are no provisions for power-sharing at all. Although Bosnia-Hercegovina's Dayton constitution has crucial provisions for power-sharing within its central government, the emphasis until very recently has been on autonomous institutions for Serbs, Bosniaks, and Croats. The state of Bosnia-Hercegovina is a highly decentralized federation of two "entities," Republika Srpska, and the Federation of Bosnia and Hercegovina. The latter is itself radically decentralized, with most powers held at the level of its ten, relatively homogeneous, cantons. In Macedonia, there are also territorial autonomy provisions, albeit weaker than the other cases, but still crucial. The relative weakness of Macedonia's autonomy provisions, moreover, is a reflection of the Macedonian Slav majority's reluctance to concede strong territorial autonomy rather than any reluctance on the Albanian minority's part to exercise it. In Iraq's new constitution, the emphasis is on autonomy for regions, with Kurdistan recognized immediately as a region, while the provisions for power-sharing at the central level are relatively weak and informal.[40] The priority of the Kurds is a weak central state, which is hardly surprising, given the way in which they were treated by the Baathists – so they have traded *some* power-sharing for autonomy.

Ireland's inter-state institutional links are the most radical to be found in the recent peace agreements. Inter-state links have been frowned on in several other cases, including Macedonia and Kosovo. However, Bosnia-Hercegovina's two entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Hercegovina and Republika Srspka, have used powers extended to them under the Dayton Accords to conclude external confederal agreements with Croatia and Serbia respectively.[41] Bosnia-Hercegovina's central government has also signed agreements with other former Yugoslav republics, including Croatia, on cooperation in matters that are sensitive to its ethnic communities, including higher education, science, and technology.[42] Bougainville is now entitled to a permanent representative in Papua New Guinea's delegation to Bougainville's kin-state, the Solomon Islands. In the UN Plan for Cyprus (the Annan Plan), Cyprus is required under Art. 16 to maintain "special ties of friendship" with both Greece and Turkey. Its component states are permitted to conclude agreements on cultural and economic matters with other states "provided

that such agreements do not cause prejudice to Cyprus, the authority of the [common state] government, or the other [component state], and are compatible with the European Union membership of Cyprus." Even where cross-border links have not been included in initial agreements, as in Macedonia and Kosovo, there have since been proposals and exploratory steps toward establishing them.[43]

Beyond territorial autonomy and inter-state links, some of the recent agreements have other provisions that recognize, at least implicitly, the pluri-national character of the place in question. Sometimes there is legal or constitutional recognition that the minority constitutes a distinct people or nation. The preamble to the Law on the Special Legal Status of Gagauz states that the law has the aim of "satisfying the national needs and preserving the identity of the Gagauzes." Article 4 of the Bougainville Peace Agreement includes as one of the objectives of autonomy, the "expression and development of the Bougainville identity." After the Ohrid Agreement, Macedonia altered its constitution to give its "communities" the "right to establish institutions for culture, art, science and education, as well as for scholarly and other associations for the expression, fostering and development of their identity." While the autonomy provisions in the Ohrid agreement are not extensive, local authorities are permitted "to place on front of local public buildings emblems marking the identity of the community."[44] Kosovo's Rambouillet Agreement, which was superseded by conflict and NATO's military intervention in 1999, provided for its "national communities" to be able to "preserve and express their national, cultural, religious, and linguistic identities."[45] Iraq's constitution recognizes that it is a "country of multiple nationalities," requires that its flag, anthem, and emblem symbolize "the components of the Iraqi people," and declares that both Arabic and Kurdish are official languages.[46] In addition, the autonomy arrangements in Mindanao, Bougainville, Gagauzia, and Kurdistan, which are particular to these regions rather than part of a state-wide symmetrical decentralizing programme, suggest some implicit recognition that their *people* are different from those in the rest of the state.[47]

Several recent agreements, including those in Bosnia-Hercegovina, Macedonia, Iraq, and Mindanao, as well as Kosovo's provisional arrangements of 2001, take traditional positions in defence of state sovereignty and territorial integrity. However, three of them (in addition to Northern Ireland's) acknowledge the minority's right of self-determination, including its right to secede, albeit under carefully specified circumstances. In the Law on the Special Status of Gagauzia

(1994), the "people of Gagauz" were extended "the right of external self-determination" in the event of a change of status of the Republic of Moldova, i.e., its union with Romania.[48] The Bougainville Peace Agreement of 2001 provides for a "referendum on Bougainville's future political status" to be held within 10–15 years, with one of the choices "independence for Bougainville."[49] The Agreement makes the holding of the referendum dependent on "good governance" on the part of the Bougainvilleans and gives a veto on the wording of the question and final (post-referendum) decision-making authority to the National Parliament of Papua New Guinea. In Sudan's agreement, reached in December 2004, the South can secede after 6 years, although in the interim, it must make efforts to achieve a rapprochement with Khartoum.[50]

These various prescriptive arrangements – territorial autonomy; provisions for asymmetry; inter-state linkages and institutions involving sovereignty-pooling; constitutional recognition of peoplehood; and, a qualified right to secede – are specifically addressed to pluri-national places. In the cases discussed here, it is plausible to claim that these provisions were necessary to agreement or are pre-requisites for agreement.[51] No recent conflict in such places has been ended by central government power-sharing alone, although some agreements, such as Macedonia's, have been based primarily on power-sharing.

Arguably, consociationalism's lack of focus on the specificities of pluri-national places has contributed to confusion among academics about where it is appropriate. Thus, the academics whom we cited earlier as believing that consociationalism does "not involve control over territory" suggest consequently that it is relevant only in those cases where groups are not territorially concentrated and do not seek autonomy, while groups that are territorially concentrated and seek autonomy will need to use federalism instead.[52] If this claim – that consociation is appropriate only for places that are not pluri-national – was true, it would mean that it would be irrelevant for huge chunks of the globe, including most of eastern Europe, as well as all of the pluri-national places that exist in Asia and Africa.[53] It is not true. The view that consociation does not involve territorial autonomy is a misperception, but it is one which consociationalists need to counter.

Conclusion

This paper is a friendly addendum to Lijphart's work, in keeping with the spirit of his call for consociationalists to engage in constructive criticism. Its approach is different from Brian Barry's, who has argued,

in a superficially similar way, that consociational theory may be more relevant to religious or class conflicts than "ethnic" conflicts.[54] Barry's point is that consociational theory works better for religious and class groups than for ethnic groups, because the last of these are less amenable to control by their leaders, and likely to be secessionist in nature. Our position is that not all ethnic groups are secessionist (or even nationalist) and that it is not true that ethnic divisions are necessarily more intractable than class or religious disputes.[55] Unlike Barry, who rejects consociation, our argument is that pluri-national places often require consociational arrangements, including power-sharing and *territorial* autonomy, but that these may not be enough. There may also be a need for inter-state or inter-regional and trans-border institutions, and for symbolic and functional recognition of other nationalities' languages and identities in the constitution and public institutions. Whatever consociational arrangements are agreed to in pluri-national places should be liberal rather than corporate, i.e., they should accommodate the parties that win elections rather than any pre-determined demographic quota of national collectivity, and they must be accompanied by a rights-protection regime which safeguards individuals as well as national communities. Such liberal consociational arrangements are necessary precisely because national identities in pluri-national places are not fixed, not everyone adheres to them, or adheres to them equally. A liberal consociation is necessary because it treats equally those individuals who subscribe to rival national identities, to no national identity, to nested national identities, or have identities which cross-cut national lines, such as those based on gender or class.[56]

The shortcomings that exist in classical consociational theory with respect to pluri-national places are not as serious in our view as those that pervade the integrationist family of strategies. Integrationism is based on civic nationalism, the view that all individuals and groups in a state can be enticed to share a common national identity. There are circumstances where this can work, e.g., immigrant societies where individual immigrants arrive voluntarily from another country and are prepared to accept the national identity of their new homeland, or where ethnic groups are not yet nationally mobilized or are too few in number or too dispersed to sustain a nationalist project. But it is much more difficult to envisage civic integrationism working in states where communities are already organized into rival nationalist projects. Here, nationally mobilized communities and their political spokespersons normally insist on protection for

their communities and decode integrationism as biased in favor of the state's dominant community. Consociation, by contrast, is built squarely on the view that politically salient groups should be treated fairly, proportionally and with self-government, and is consistent with what is needed in pluri-national places, once we have clarified what justice mandates.

Appendix 1: Consociational democracy in pluri-national places

Extant consociational theory	Modest modifications
1. Relations between Power-sharing and Autonomy: Primary stress on power-sharing within central institutions, at least in the early Lijphart.	**1. Relations between Power-sharing and Autonomy:** More stress on autonomy. Recognition that greater autonomy may be traded for less power-sharing at the centre.
2. Nature of Autonomy: 2.1. No substantial distinction between personal, corporate, and territorial autonomy. 2.2. No explicit distinction between a territorial autonomy arrangement which allows collective autonomy to a minority and one in which the minority is divided across several units.	**2. Nature of Autonomy:** 2.1. More stress on territorial autonomy. 2.2. Emphasis on "collective" territorial autonomy for mobilized national communities, i.e., emphasis on a self-governing unit which contains all or almost all the minority. Rejection of partition of national homeland.
3. **Nature of the State and its Borders:** Focused on single states. No cross-border dimension.	3. **Nature of the State and its Borders:** More focus on "national communities." Greater awareness that cross-border dimension may need addressing where such communities intersect state frontiers.
4. Nature of Groups: Focus on religious, ethnic, and class divisions reflecting focus on W. Europe; focus on "divided *society*" or "segments" of a single pie; tendency to view national conflicts as ethnic conflicts.	**4. Nature of Groups:** More focus on relevant mobilized communities as "nations," "nationalities" or "peoples"; caution re: "ethnic" label; more focus on "parallel societies" rather than plural "society"; "divided places" or "pluri-national places" rather than "divided society."

(continued)

Extant consociational theory	Modest modifications
5. **Nature of Group Claims:** Little focus on the type of constitutional and public policy claims that are typically made by nationally-mobilized minorities.	5. **Nature of Group Claims:** More stress on symbolic recognition of minority's nationhood; in constitution; in state symbols; in military and police forces. Stress on need for official bilingualism or multilingualism for both functional and symbolic purposes.

Notes

1. Lijphart (1968, 1969, 1977, 2002, 2004).
2. O'Leary (2005a), pp. 49–50.
3. See, for example, Barry (1975a, 1975b); Brass (1991); Horowitz (2000). For summaries of such criticisms see Lijphart (1985), ch. 4, and O'Leary (2005b).
4. See, for example, Anderson and Goodman (1998); Dixon (1996, 2001); Horowitz (2001); Rooney (1998); Taylor (2001); Wilford (1992); Wilson (2003); Wilson and Wilford (2003). For summaries and responses see McGarry and O'Leary (1995), pp. 338–44; McGarry (2001a), pp. 17–18; 2001b, pp. 121–2.
5. For example, Dixon (2005), p. 357.
6. Lijphart (1968).
7. Lijphart (1977).
8. Lijphart (1968).
9. Lijphart (1977), p. 104.
10. In *Democracy in Plural Societies*, "societies" refers to multiple polities, not to multiple societies within each polity. The same is true of Nordlinger's *Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies* (Nordlinger, 1972).
11. Lijphart (2004), p. 86; Kymlicka (1995).
12. See, for example, Lijphart (1995, 2004).
13. The expression is made clear in the content of Kymlicka's work which explains the differences between minority nations and multicultural or polyethnic communities (Kymlicka, 1995), but his book's title, *Multicultural Citizenship*, does not make the distinction clear because it suggests that all minorities are "cultural."
14. In Canada, the Quebecois bristle at attempts to describe them as part of Canada's "multicultural" mosaic, arguing that this term should be restricted to immigrant groups. Other minority nations see the difference between them and majority nations as lying not so much in terms of culture, especially if that is understood as language, but in identity.
15. Lijphart (1977), p. 25.
16. Berman *et al.* (2004), p. 20, n. 39.

17. Lijphart (2004), p. 97.
18. Connor (1986), pp. 16–45.
19. Bakvis (1987).
20. Berman *et al*. (2004), p. 20.
21. Esman (2005), pp. 144, 182.
22. Lijphart (1979), p. 505.
23. See McGarry (2005), pp. 94–5.
24. O'Leary *et al*. (2005).
25. Majority, or dominant, national communities, may by contrast be *relatively* open to the idea of dividing themselves into different self-governing regions, particularly when the state is so large that it makes sense to do so. Thus in the United States, Russia, and Canada, the dominant peoples are divided into several regions, without protest. One reason for the lack of protest is that the dominant peoples see the federation itself as satisfying their desire for collective self-government, which would be our explanation for the stability of such federations, in slight contrast to the interesting claims of Henry Hale (2004, 2005).
26. Much of Lijphart's focus has been on consociational arrangements at the level of the state as a whole, although he has also written on consociation in Northern Ireland, which is a region, not a state. For an examination of consociation in regions, see Wolff (2004).
27. McGarry *et al*. (2006).
28. Lijphart (1975).
29. Lijphart (1977), p. 136.
30. Lijphart (1975), p. 100.
31. The Agreement recognized the right of "the people of Ireland alone, by agreement between the two parts respectively and without external impediment, to exercise their right of self-determination on the basis of consent, freely and concurrently given, North and South, to bring about a united Ireland, if that is their wish, accepting that this right must be achieved and exercised with and subject to the agreement and consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland" (Government of the United Kingdom (n.d.) *Constitutional Issues*, 1(ii): 2).
32. For more details of the Agreement's cross-border institutions, and the federalizing and confederalizing processes that may flow from them, see McGarry and O'Leary (2004), pp. 272–81.
33. McGarry and O'Leary (2004), p. 381.
34. For a comprehensive account of the Agreement, including the ways in which it dealt with the nationality dimension of the Northern Ireland conflict, see the chapter by O'Leary in McGarry and O'Leary (2004), pp. 260–93. Also see O'Leary (1999).
35. For Prime Minister Ahern's comments, see *Irish Times*, 27 November 1998. For Adams's, see *Irish Times*, 20 April 1998. The reasoning behind their optimism was that the Agreement would make it easier to persuade unionists of the merits of unification and would be more effective than the previous campaign of violence. More important, perhaps, was the popular understanding that the nationalist bloc's share of the population will, at some point in the foreseeable future, surpass the unionist bloc's.
36. Gurr (1993).

37. See, for example, Brass (1991); Brubaker (1996); Silber and Little (1996).
38. In conflict zones where democratic results and survey data are not readily available, a sub-optimal alternative way to test the salience of nationalism is to examine the aims of the minority combatants and to make a judgment about the nature of their popular support.
39. In the case of Northern Ireland, Iraq, Macedonia, and Bosnia-Hercegovina, the evidence from election results and survey data are clear. The main division in each case is between communities which see themselves as separate peoples, which does not mean that everyone in these cases sees themselves as such.
40. McGarry (2007); O'Leary (2007); O'Leary *et al.* (2005).
41. Dayton mandated that the use of these powers should be consistent with Bosnia-Hercegovina's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and Bosnia's international overseers have been careful to ensure that they are not abused in a way that ends up dismantling the state.
42. Palermo (2007).
43. Palermo (2007).
44. Jackson-Preece (2007).
45. Rambouillet Agreement, Art. VII, http://www.usofficepristina.usia.co.at/doc1.htm.
46. Constitution of Iraq, as approved by referendum in October 2005, Arts 3, 4, and 12.
47. In the case of Iraq, only "regions" have significant autonomy, and the only region immediately recognized in the constitution is Kurdistan. However, all governorates outside Kurdistan can become regions should they choose to, and so Iraq's constitution is formally symmetrical.
48. Art. 1(4). This article has recently been removed by the Moldovan government, acting unilaterally.
49. Art. 309–310, Bougainville Peace Agreement, http://rspas.anu.edu.au/melanesia/PDF/BougainvillePeaceAgreement29Aug01.pdf.
50. In Jackson-Preece's view, provisions like these "represent a considerable departure from previous international practice in the area of minority rights and self-determination." See Jackson-Preece (2007).
51. One possible charge against our reasoning is that, while these agreements coincided with an end to conflict, we have not *proved* that it was their pluri-national provisions that brought or facilitated peace, or even that the conflicts would not have ended had alternative arrangements been implemented. There are limits to proof in the social sciences. In the case of Northern Ireland we have shown that earlier settlements that did not include these provisions failed, and this, along with the fact that the warring parties insisted on such provisions, suggests, with a reasonable degree of plausibility, that their inclusion made a crucial difference, though there may also have been other factors promoting conflict resolution in 1998 which were absent beforehand. In Iraq there were pluri-national redlines which Kurdistan insisted on as its price for ratifying Iraq's 2005 constitutions (O'Leary 2005a, pp. 47–91). There are solid *prima facie* reasons for regarding the pluri-national nature of the agreements as a helpful or necessary condition for an end to fighting in the other cases mentioned.
52. Berman *et al.* (2004), p. 20.

53. This sort of thinking, with its focus on autonomy for territorially concentrated minorities, downplays the fact that many such minorities, if they are not secessionists, will be interested not just in autonomy but also in power-sharing within central state institutions. The stable accommodation of minorities usually involves both elements (McGarry and O'Leary, 2005).
54. Barry (1975a, 1975b).
55. See O'Leary (2005a), pp. 26–7.
56. For a discussion of liberal consociation, see McGarry and O'Leary (2004), pp. 32–6; McGarry (2007).

References

Anderson, James and James Goodman. 1998. "Nationalisms and Transnationalism: Failures and Emancipation." In James Anderson and James Goodman (eds), *Dis/Agreeing Ireland: Contexts, Obstacles, Hopes*. London: Pluto Press.

Bakvis, Herman. 1987. "Alternative Models of Governance: Federalism, Consociationalism, and Corporatism." In Herman Bakvis and William M. Chandler (eds), *Federalism and the Role of the State*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, pp. 279–305.

Barry, Brian. 1975a. "The Consociational Model and Its Dangers," *European Journal of Political Research* 3(December): 393–413.

Barry, Brian. 1975b. "Review Article: Political Accommodation and Consociational Democracy," *British Journal of Political Science* 5(October): 477–505.

Berman, Bruce, Dickson Eyoh, and Will Kymlicka. 2004. *Ethnicity and Democracy in Africa*. London: James Currey Publishers.

Brass, Paul. 1991. *Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison*. New Delhi: Sage Publications.

Brubaker, Rogers. 1996. *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Connor, Walker. 1986. "The Impact of Homelands Upon Diasporas." In Gabriel Sheffer (ed.), *Modern Diasporas in International Politics*. London: Croom Helm, pp. 16–46.

Dawisha, Adeed and Karen Dawisha. 2003. "How to Build a Democratic Iraq," *Foreign Affairs* 82(3): 36–50.

Dixon, Paul. 1996. "The Politics of Antagonism: Explaining McGarry and O'Leary," *Irish Political Studies* 11: 130–41.

Dixon, Paul. 2001. *Northern Ireland: The Politics of War and Peace*. Basingstoke: Palgrave.

Dixon, Paul. 2005. "Why the Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland Is Not Consociational," *Political Quarterly* 76(3): 357–67.

Esman, Milton. 2005. *An Introduction to Ethnic Conflict*. London: Polity Press.

Gurr, Ted Robert. 1993. *Minorities at Risk*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press.

Hale, Henry. 2004. "Divided We Stand: Institutional Sources of Ethnofederal State Survival and Collapse," *World Politics* 56(2): 165–93.

Hale, Henry. 2005. "The Makeup and Breakup of Ethnofederal States: Why Russia Survives Where the USSR Fell," *Perspectives on Politics* 3(1): 55–70.

Horowitz, Donald. 1991. *A Democratic South Africa? Constitutional Engineering in a Divided Society*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Horowitz, Donald. 2000. "Constitutional Design: An Oxymoron?" In Ian Shapiro and Stephen Macedo (eds), *Designing Democratic Institutions*. New York: New York University Press, pp. 253–84.

Horowitz, Donald. 2001. "The Agreement: Clear, Consociational and Risky." In John McGarry (ed.), *Northern Ireland in a Divided World*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 89–108.

Jackson-Preece, Jennifer. 2007. "The Role of Human and Minority Rights in Complex Power-Sharing." In Marc Weller and Barbara Metzger (eds), *Settling Self-Determination Disputes: Complex Power-sharing in Theory and Practice*. Boston and Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff (Centre for International Constitutional Studies, University of Cambridge), pp. 625–64.

Kymlicka, W. 1995. *Multicultural Citizenship*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Lijphart, Arend. 1968. *The Politics of Accommodation*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Lijphart, Arend. 1969. "Consociational Democracy," *World Politics* 21(2): 207–25.

Lijphart, Arend. 1975. "Review Article: The Northern Ireland Problem; Cases, Theories, and Solutions," *British Journal of Political Science* 5(1): 83–106.

Lijphart, Arend. 1977. *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Lijphart, Arend. 1979. "Consociation and Federation: Conceptual and Political Links," *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 12(3): 499–515.

Lijphart, Arend. 1985. *Power-Sharing in South Africa*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Lijphart, Arend. 1995. "Self-determination vs. Pre-determination of Ethnic Minorities in Power-Sharing Systems." In Will Kymlicka (ed.), *The Rights of Minority Cultures*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 275–87.

Lijphart, Arend. 2002. "The Wave of Power-Sharing Democracy." In Andrew Reynolds (ed.), *The Architecture of Democracy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 37–54.

Lijphart, Arend. 2004. "Constitutional Design for Divided Societies," *Journal of Democracy* 15(2): 96–109.

Makiya, Kanan. 2002. "A Model for Post-Saddam Iraq," 3 October, http://www.benadorassociates.com/article/140.

McGarry, John. 2001a. "The Comparable Northern Ireland." In John McGarry (ed.), *Northern Ireland and the Divided World: Post-Agreement Northern Ireland in Comparative Perspective*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 1–33.

McGarry, John. 2001b. "Northern Ireland, Civic Nationalism, and the Good Friday Agreement." In John McGarry (ed.), *Northern Ireland and the Divided World: Post-Agreement Northern Ireland in Comparative Perspective*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 109–36.

McGarry, John. 2005. "Canadian Lessons for Iraq." In Brendan O'Leary, John McGarry, and Khaled Salih (eds), *The Future of Kurdistan in Iraq*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, pp. 92–115.

McGarry, John. 2007. "Iraq and Liberal Consociation." In Ben Roswell, David Malone, and Markus Bouillon (eds), *Iraq: Preventing Another Generation of Conflict*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Press, pp. 169–88.

McGarry, John and Brendan O'Leary. 1995. *Explaining Northern Ireland: Broken Images*. Oxford: Blackwell.

McGarry, John and Brendan O'Leary. 2004. *The Northern Ireland Conflict: Consociational Engagements*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

McGarry, John and Brendan O'Leary. 2005. "Federation as a Method of Ethnic Conflict Regulation." In S. J. R. Noel (ed.), *From Power-Sharing to Democracy: Post-Conflict Institutions in Ethnically Divided Societies*. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, pp. 263–96.

McGarry, John, Michael Keating, and Margaret Moore. 2006. "Introduction: European Integration and the Nationalities Question." In John McGarry and Michael Keating (eds), *European Integration and the Nationalities Question*. London: Routledge, pp. 1–20.

Nordlinger, Eric. 1972. *Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies*. Cambridge, MA: Center for International Affairs. Harvard University.

O'Leary, Brendan. 1999. "The Nature of the Agreement," *Fordham Journal of International Law* 22(4): 1628–67.

O'Leary, Brendan. 2005a. "Power-Sharing, Pluralist Federation, and Federacy." In Brendan O'Leary, John McGarry, and Khaled Salih (eds), *The Future of Kurdistan in Iraq*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, pp. 47–91.

O'Leary, Brendan. 2005b. "Debating Consociational Politics: Normative and Explanatory Arguments." In S. J. R. Noel (ed.), *From Power Sharing to Democracy: Post-conflict Institutions in Ethnically Divided Societies*. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, pp. 3–43.

O'Leary, Brendan. 2007. "Iraq's Natural Resources." In Ben Roswell, David Malone, and Markus Bouillon (eds), *Iraq: Preventing Another Generation of Conflict*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Press, pp. 189–202.

O'Leary, Brendan, John McGarry, and Khaled Salih (eds). 2005. *The Future of Kurdistan in Iraq*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, pp. 92–115.

Palermo F. 2007. " 'Bridges' in Self-determination Disputes? External Relations and Trans-Border Cooperation." In M. Weller and B. Metzger (eds), *Settling Self-determination Disputes: Complex Power-sharing in Theory and Practice*. Boston and Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff (Centre for International Constitutional Studies, University of Cambridge), pp. 665–86.

Rooney, Kevin. 1998. "Institutionalising Division," *Fortnight* (June): 21–2.

Silber, Laura and Allan Little. 1996. *Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation*. London: Penguin.

Snyder, Jack. 2000. *From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict*. New York: W.W. Norton.

Taylor Rupert. 2001. "Northern Ireland: Consociation or Social Transformation." In John McGarry (ed.), *Northern Ireland and the Divided World*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 36–52.

Wilford, Rick. 1992. "Inverting Consociationalism? Policy, Pluralism, and the Post-Modern." In Brigid Hadfield (ed.), *Northern Ireland: Politics and the Constitution*. Buckingham: Open University Press, pp. 29–46.

Wilson, Robin. 2003. "Belfast Agreement Power-Sharing Model Can Entrench Sectarianism," *Irish Times*, 5 March.

Wilson, Robin and Wilford, Rick. 2003. "A Route to Stability?," *Democratic Dialogue*, August 2003.

Wimmer, Andreas. 2003. "Democracy and Ethno-religious Conflict in Iraq," *Survival* 45(4): 111–34.

Wolff, Stefan. 2004. "The Institutional Structure of Regional Consociations in Brussels, Northern Ireland, and South Tyrol," *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 10(3): 387–414.

4
Ending Apartheid: The Relevance of Consociationalism

Rupert Taylor *

Introduction

In South Africa, one of the most prominent political theories in comparative political science, that of consociational democracy, was increasingly held up as a formula for constitutional reform – promising a fair and just democratic alternative to apartheid. From the 1983 Constitution that, under National Party (NP) rule, widened parliamentary participation beyond purely White representation to include Coloured and Indian citizens, right through to the explicitly non-racial democratic 1996 Constitution that was secured by the now-ruling African National Congress (ANC), consociational designs have been highly influential. There are a number of reasons for this, foremost of which is that consociationalism is founded on a communitarian logic that, outwardly at least, understands the incompatibility of apartheid thinking with liberal democracy, and provides a solution as to how best this gap can be closed in political practice through finely crafted constitutional engineering.

The question that has to be posed, though, is to what extent has consociationalism actually served to deliver and promote a just society? Undoubtedly, the challenge is immense. How does one design a just democratic constitution that is practically able and theoretically equipped to counter and overcome a racialized system of exploitation

and exclusion – apartheid – which was one of the most unjust, dehumanizing, and oppressive societies the world has seen? Under apartheid, South Africa was characterized by a racially exclusive polity that denied voting and land rights to the majority of South Africans through laws bereft of any justificatory power (Mureinik, 1988); in 1968 the United Nations moved to declare apartheid "a crime against humanity." Consociationalists rose to this challenge; in the case of the leading proponent, Dutch scholar Arend Lijphart, they went so far as to maintain that they alone held the answers: that for South Africa "the consociational formula provides the only fair and viable option" (Lijphart, 1985, p. 15).

Fundamental to consociationalism is its reading in what are held to be "deeply divided" societies (such as South Africa, Northern Ireland, and Israel/Palestine) of the overriding saliency of ethnic identity. The conceptual frame of reference is one in which the preconditions for liberal justice – understood in terms of an "unencumbered self" that takes individuals as "bound only by ends and roles" they "choose for themselves" (Sandel, 1996, p. 322) – are absent, and the chances for establishing stable democratic rule are dependent on recognition of the tenacity of competing ethnic group interests. The argument is that since ethnic groups organically "define as well as identify individuals" (MacDonald, 1992, p. 713), group rather than individual interests must be foremost in crafting democracy.

Contrary to contemporary liberalism's view of how to construct a just society, consociationalists argue that justice mandates that we advocate institutional structures, both nationally and federally, that promote power-sharing with entrenched guarantees for minority inclusion that include the provision of veto rights and a commitment to proportionality in electoral processes and distributive policies (Lijphart, 1977). Most notably, consociationalists advocate that ethnic groups be politically incorporated and protected, as groups, through adopting an executive level "grand coalition" to structure elite accommodation and cooperation and through guaranteeing "segmental autonomy" through granting specific powers of self-determination (ibid.).

This might seem all well and good, but what is to be questioned is consociationalism's practical and theoretical ability to conceive of the central issues at hand and effectively address the systemic racism of apartheid – a racism that encompassed the whole polity, affecting every individual and major societal institution. To what extent, in the South African context, has consociationalism proven well equipped to end apartheid? First, we consider the fate of consociational designs, in practice, over the final years of National Party rule.

Consociational designs

For the long-ruling National Party consociationalism came to play a leading role: first, in the era of "reform apartheid" of the 1980s; and then, more so, in the constitution-making process of the early 1990s. Indeed, leading consociationalists view South Africa as a major success story for consociationalism: even critics of consociationalism have gone so far as to assert that "the NP insisted on a consociational outcome throughout the negotiations and eventually prevailed, making few concessions" (Jung and Shapiro, 1995, p. 277). Is this the case?

From the beginning, a key reason for the appeal of consociationalism was that apartheid ideologues also took ethnicity to be foundational to one's identity. Afrikaner intellectuals, from the time of Prime Minister H. F. Verwoerd onward, had sought to reconcile ethnic group rights with democratic principles: a project central to the program of "separate development" that stressed the country's ethnic diversity – from Afrikaner to Zulu, with none seen to comprise a majority of the population – and that saw the creation of ten separate ethno-national "Bantustans." Strategically, of course, this approach disguised the rather more obvious sociological fact that apartheid had long rested on taking race as foundational to minority rule. All the same, in a context in which the Bantustan program began to falter (Egan and Taylor, 2003), consociationalism offered the National Party new potential to develop an evolutionary form of democratic power-sharing that would assure continuing defense of those group rights so integral to apartheid, without having to embrace majoritarianism. In particular, plans to make democracy accommodate group identities and interests were pursued by elite level politicians, and in-system policymakers in collaboration with mainstream political scientists through a series of constitutional reform proposals relating to the 1983 Constitution, the Interim Constitution of 1993, and the final Constitution of 1996. And these are considered in turn.

Under P. W. Botha's leadership, with mounting opposition to apartheid at home and abroad, the National Party embarked upon a reform agenda by calling for proposals for constitutional change. Out of this process came two reports of the Constitutional Committee of the President's Council (1982a, 1982b) that explicitly embraced Lijphart's reasoning and laid the basis for the 1983 Constitution that established a multiracial tricameral parliament in Cape Town, comprising separate houses for statutorily defined Whites (House of Assembly), Coloureds (House of Representatives), and Indians (House of Delegates). The 1983 Constitution sought consociational legitimation and outwardly it did

provide power-sharing for Whites, Coloureds, and Indians. For the first time, Coloureds and Indians were formally incorporated into the polity.

Lijphart maintained that from a consociational perspective the 1983 Constitution "may be considered a favorable development," but that it was "at best quasi-consociational" (1985, pp. 61–3). This was because the Constitution maintained an exclusionary racist policy toward Black South Africans: it did not grant democratic representation and full citizenship. The critical objection was that the constituent groups were predetermined and statutorily imposed from above, whereas consociationalists stipulate "a system in which the segments are allowed, and even encouraged, to emerge spontaneously – and hence to define themselves" (Lijphart, 2001, p. 12). Moreover, under the 1983 Constitution there was effectively only one site of political control: the White-controlled House of Assembly, which itself was subject to strong presidential powers. Segmental bodies were more symbolic than real: they lacked "autonomy" because of "their constitutional subordinacy, their minimal powers, and the political and economic factors circumscribing those powers" (Boulle, 1984, p. 98).

Altogether, the tricameral system rested more on co-option than consensus. Indeed, the then opposition leader in the House of Assembly, Fredrik van Zyl Slabbert – whose party had earlier advocated a consociational solution (Progressive Federal Party, 1978) – declared it "a sham," that it was "the crudest bastardization imaginable of the logic of consociational democracy" (van Zyl Slabbert, 1983, p. 43) – a point of view shared by the extra-parliamentary anti-apartheid movement.

Within the country a broad inclusive oppositional alliance under the umbrella of the United Democratic Front emerged to wage a struggle against the tricameral parliament and to pressure the apartheid system to enter into negotiations with the outlawed African National Congress for a non-racial democracy. As protest escalated, a State of Emergency was declared in 1985 and thousands of activists came to be arrested and detained without due process: some were tortured, others assassinated. An uneasy "hurting stalemate" (Zartman, 2001) emerged, whereby neither the struggle nor the system could gain the upper hand. As attempts by the Department of Constitutional Development and Planning under Chris Heunis and his policyadvisers to reformulate a consociational solution failed, a few forward-thinking Afrikaner intellectuals and senior National Party politicians turned to tentatively explore initiating dialog with the ANC leadership. Then, in late 1989, F. W. de Klerk became state president.

Against the backdrop of an emerging new world order and facing immense global pressure to promote reform, De Klerk pushed the Cabinet to support his historic parliamentary speech of 2 February 1990, which announced the unbanning of the ANC and other opposition movements as well as the release of Nelson Mandela. In one fell swoop the stage was reset for the National Party to develop "an acceptable version of the failed 'consociationalism' of the 1983 Constitution" (Klug, 2000, p. 96). Ongoing debate within the inner circle of the Afrikaner Broederbond had anticipated as much (Taylor, 1990), and as the National Party entered the elite-led constitutional negotiation process at the Conference for a Democratic South Africa (Codesa) at Kempton Park, on the outskirts of Johannesburg, they endeavored to maintain the initiative by advocating a less rigid form of consociational power-sharing with participation for all. The outcome of what became a classic, if protracted, case of transactional elite bargaining (Huntington, 1992) between the NP and ANC that excluded third parties, was a joint commitment to institute democracy through the Interim Constitution of 1993.

The Interim Constitution, which came into effect after the country's first democratic election in April 1994 and remained in force until 4 February 1997, did incorporate a number of power-sharing provisions, but did not predefine or exclude groups in terms of race or ethnicity. Most notably, the Interim Constitution legally mandated a Government of National Unity (GNU) that meant that although the ANC won 63 per cent of the vote in the election, the largest opposition party was assured one of two vice-presidential posts, and parties that won at least 20 seats in the National Assembly were entitled to a Cabinet position. Hence, De Klerk became a vice-president and his party qualified for six Cabinet posts, while the avowedly pro-Zulu Inkatha Freedom Party took three. Moreover, under the Interim Constitution existing civil service personnel were guaranteed their jobs for 5 years.

This time around, without much hesitation, Lijphart proclaimed that the Constitution was consociational: "it is not only a power-sharing system but close to the optimal power-sharing system that could have been devised" (Lijphart, 1994, p. 222). In terms of key consociational principles, Lijphart maintained that: government by "grand coalition" was upheld by ensuring multi-party Cabinet representation; "group autonomy" was guaranteed by constitutional provisions with regard to educational issues; "proportionality" was respected through an electoral system tied to the party list system of proportional representation; and the "minority veto" was seen to appear in the ruling which laid down the

need for a two-thirds majority to amend the Constitution (*Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 200 of 1993*).

On closer inspection, however, this is all rather disingenuous – for none of these features were attached to the theory-laden meaning of consociationalism; they were not explicitly tied to ethnic group boundaries or divisions (Asmal, 1993). The Interim Constitution falls short of qualifying as consociational in major respects (Koelble and Reynolds, 1996). The form of "grand coalition" is very different to that found in those societies – such as Belgium and Switzerland – where no one party comes close to securing majority support, and as stated "is not the result of a deal struck between parties seeking to form a governing coalition . . . [but is] determined by the mathematics of the electoral result" (Frost, 1994, p. 21). In addition, despite the demands of National Party negotiators, no minority veto powers at Cabinet level were granted. The Interim Constitution allowed the majority party to rule should other parties opt out, as in fact happened in 1996 when the NP quit the GNU for an opposition role.

In any event, any positive consociational assessment becomes redundant with the subsequent adoption of the 1996 Constitution; the product of a Constitutional Assembly composed of all members of the two chambers of Parliament. Approved by the Constitutional Court on 4 December 1996, the final Constitution saw the removal of provisions for entrenched power-sharing and is firmly directed to the rule of law through individual – not group – rights. The 1996 Constitution – although making some provision for traditional structures of government – does not reflect collective rights of a consociational kind (*Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996*). The 1996 Constitution marked the end of the line for consociational designs, for it *is* a liberal democratic constitution in which individual rights are protected by a Bill of Rights, and it can be interpreted as representing "a transition to African majority rule" (Guelke, 1999, p. 135). Over the course of constitutional negotiations, then, what transpired was that the consociational agenda of the National Party did not prove very relevant. The promise of consociational theory, for South Africa, was far from fulfilled. Why is this?

Consociational failings

To understand the poor fate of consociationalism, it is necessary to revisit its theoretical foundations, to show that its reading of ethnicity and race is both incoherent and misplaced. The central problem is that consociationalism fails to seriously come to terms with constructivism and how

it relates to questions of ethnicity and race. While this is a general failure of mainstream international political science, it is – given its subject matter – of especial saliency to consociationalism. Basically, in consociational theory, ethnicity and race are not recognized for what they are: namely, "specific political constructions" (Smith, 2004), or put another way, *ideologies* of ethnicity and race (Taylor, 1999).

Right from the start, consociationalism does not pose the right answer to the basic question of: What is the nature of the conflict? For, under apartheid, the central political and sociological fact about South Africa was *not* that it was characterized by deep ethnic division but that it was a racially unjust society. Lacking thoughtful or critical reflection, consociationalism adopts a rather schizophrenic approach to ethnicity and race: one that is keen to affirm the centrality of ethnicity, but not of race; one that wants to uphold principles of fairness and justice for ethnic groups, but does not recognize or address systemic racism. And even then, the interpretation of ethnicity that is advanced is logically flawed, and no serious normative defense for ethnic group rights is mounted.

When first developed in the 1970s, consociational theory was tied to plural society theory and built upon a primordial reading of ethnicity in which individuals are seen to have a transhistorical ethnic identity marked by a natural "sense of common origins, of cultural origins, or of simple affinity – of 'our kind'" (Greenberg, 1980, p. 14; see also, Geertz, 1973). In this view ethnicity is a given, and cultural differences are reified as immutable; ethnicity is seen "as prior to, and pre-emptive of, other forms of identity – and indeed of any form of human individuality" (Butler, 1998, p. 133). At issue here, though, is the weight of empirical evidence to support this position. Those who have advocated consociationalism for South Africa do not sociologically demonstrate that ethnic categories correspond with people's subjective self-identification or prove that one's identity is irreducibly tied to ethnic group membership. In fact, social survey data consistently shows that South Africans have interpreted ethnicity as having only partial significance in their lives (Taylor and Orkin, 2001), whilst organizationally the African National Congress, Pan-Africanist Congress, and Black Consciousness Movement have all refused to accept or accord any political saliency to ethnic differences. Moreover, in the April 2004 election the only ethnically based party with more than 3 percent of the vote was Inkatha. So, at a most basic level, to talk of the centrality of ethnicity flies in the face of reality.

Not surprisingly, in the 1980s the primordial approach came under increasing criticism as constructivist findings indicated that ethnic

groups defy objective specification as they are fluid and endogenous to a set of social, economic, and political processes (Chandra, 2001). Furthermore, much evidence reveals that in their daily lives individuals do have multiple identities. In response, Lijphart moved, without fully displacing primordialist assumptions, toward incorporating constructivist findings within consociational theory (Lijphart, 1985, 1993) – proposing, as in his critique of the 1983 Constitution, that "because ethnic identities are very often unclear, fluid, and flexible, self-determination can always be expected to work better than pre-determination" in consociational designs (Lijphart, 2001, p. 13). Such a move, Lijphart argued, "significantly enhanced the explanatory and prescriptive value of consociational theory" (ibid.). But did it? Constructivism actually demands more than this: it dictates that one be concerned to demystify how and why ethnic groups arise in the first place, to consider how ethnic identities have been socially constructed by political processes to establish unequal relations of power and privilege (Taylor, 1994). Quite simply, by not posing such questions consociationalism fails to comprehend the basis on which, in the South African context, ethnic group politics has rested: the systemic racism of apartheid.

In fact, more than this, consociationalism avoids the meaning of race altogether. In *Power-Sharing in South Africa* Lijphart begins by acknowledging "South Africa's racially exclusive political regime" that followed "racial politics" (1985, p. 1), but thereafter sidesteps the racialization of politics that constituted the ethical void of apartheid. The book has just two index entries for "apartheid," and none at all for "race." It is one thing to state that "the official fourfold [racial] classification in South Africa is both highly controversial" and "is clearly unacceptable to most South Africans" (ibid., pp. 58, 67), but quite another to take this as the grounds for not analyzing the question of race any further.

The explanation behind this, it can be argued, is that as with ethnicity, mainstream political science has taken race as a given, thereby naturalizing it, placing it "beyond the bounds of politics" and "making its investigation seem unnecessary" – taking it to matter most in personal, social, and cultural settings (Olson, 2004, p. 1; see also, Smith, 2004; Taylor, 1999). Consequently, consociational theory as formulated by Western scholars on the basis of a select number of European "Low Countries" (that at the time were hardly noted for their domestic racial politics) is – as with much democratic theory (Mills, 1997) – oblivious to how a racial frame is embedded in its own assumptions. Consociationalism does not stop to investigate the broader context within which its theorizing about rights in South Africa occurs: the racial injustice of apartheid.

Instead, when it comes to race, consociationalism too readily accepts the norms of the dominant white perspective.

That consociationalists do not begin to understand the relationship between race and democracy is transparent when it comes to the question of how to address socioeconomic inequality. The consociationalist sense of fairness operates behind a kind of veil of racial ignorance, where the fact that different groups have – due to systemic racism – highly unequal political, economic, and social life chances is bracketed. Within the consociational universe there is no case for race conscious corrective action; there is no consideration of how race has bound, and continues to bind, an individual's opportunities to lead an autonomous life.

Consociational principles of proportionality, for instance, are not logically tied to a "perfect divisibility of what is to be shared proportionally" or a recognition that some decisional issues "only admit of 'yes–no' solutions" (Nolutshungu, 1983, p. 28). In the South African context, proportional distribution is not equivalent to a proportionate share of value, and as David Carroll Cochran has noted in the American context, "white skin has a cultural currency...that is indivisible and cannot be distributed equally" (Cochran, 1999, p. 60). Also, the principle of a mutual veto is hollowed of any significant meaning in a society in which almost all white South Africans gained power and privilege because black South Africans were exploited and excluded.

As the National Party appreciated only too well, consociational practice would protect their privileged socioeconomic position under the guise of protecting minority identities – a situation that would not result in just outcomes, but the *continuation* of racial inequalities; it would "help whites more than blacks" (MacDonald, 1992, p. 720). This is precisely why, in the constitutional negotiations, the African National Congress persuasively argued that any consociational protection for group rights would fail to advance transformation and pushed for a liberal democratic outcome (Gloppen, 1997; Sachs, 1990). Although achieved, this outcome did little in delivering on socioeconomic rights: such rights relating to the environment, housing, health, and social security are subject to judicial enforcement through the Constitutional Court, but only in so far as they follow an "administrative law model of socioeconomic rights" (Sunstein, 2001, p. 234).

In South Africa there has been, to use Joe Feagin's (2006) terms, much "unjust enrichment" and "unjust impoverishment." It is not only that there is a huge imbalance between the number of poor blacks and rich whites but that there are also enormous gaps between black and white South Africans *within* the same income groups (May, 2000). Even after

the advent of democratic rule, the income of the average white household is around five times greater than that for black households; the difference in net worth between black and white South Africans at the same income level is yet larger; and, even to point to the emergence of a black middle class or black capitalist class is somewhat premature, as the former is built on income as opposed to wealth and the latter rests more on political capital than economic capital (Randall, 1996). The point is that "wealth is more important than income in determining the likelihood of future racial equalization, since it has a cumulative effect that is passed down through intergenerational transfer, affecting life chances and opportunities for one's children" (Mills, 1997, p. 37).

Consociationalism offers no conceptual point-of-entry to start talking about this and the many other ways in which race matters, so as to effectively close the gap between the ideals of justice and the reality of continuing racial injustice. What is missing is a concern to ask the most telling questions of all, namely: *Why* was apartheid wrong? *What* gave white South Africans the right to deny others a common humanity? Consociationalism does not directly proffer a substantive moral critique of apartheid. Surely, political theorizing must engage in – rather than evade – moral judgment (Bernstein, 1978; Fay, 1975).

Conclusion

In retrospect, consociationalism did play an important pragmatic role in smoothing the transition from apartheid for National Party leaders and supporters, but beyond that it proves theoretically ill-equipped to address the question of how *best* to advance a just democratic outcome to the end of apartheid. This is because consociationalists have overly placed prime focus on ethnicity outside a fully developed constructivist frame, while understating their normative assumptions, thereby failing to offer any in-depth understanding or analysis of the racial injustice of apartheid.

This said, there are – in contemporary political theory – no easy answers to the question of how best to practically or theoretically engage racism and deliver democratic justice. Right around the world, democracy itself represents an unfinished struggle over race (Singh, 2004). Prevailing forms of democratic theory have, to date, been inadequate to the task of developing the conceptual tools to come to terms with race and secure racial justice (Mills, 1997). In South Africa, race certainly continues to matter after formal political equality for all citizens has been achieved – especially given the ANC's turn to neoliberal economic

policies (MacDonald, 2006). The central theoretical problem here is that the consociational defense of ethnic group rights does not trump the standard liberal conceptions of rights; and yet it is also the case that contemporary liberalism is itself deficient. The main motifs of liberalism – "rights as trumps, the neutral state, and the unencumbered self" (Sandel, 1996, p. 108) – do not go far enough to address racial injustice. Here, as Thomas McCarthy writes, "there are no theoretical means at hand for bridging the gap between a color-blind ideal theory [contemporary liberalism] and a color-coded political reality" (McCarthy, 2004, p. 165).

Remarkably, South Africa's constitutional negotiation process did not generate much innovative political thinking that might have advanced understanding and widened one's understanding of the relationship between democracy, race, and justice: the story of constitutional design has been, and remains, one of "incompletely theorized agreements" (Sunstein, 2001, ch. 2). From the viewpoint of a sociology of knowledge, this is not so much surprising as just one further piece of evidence regarding the grip of racialized thinking in academe and beyond. It is hard to dispute the argument that South African social scientists have been "unimaginative, limited, and ill-equipped to produce . . . theory and knowledge capable of generating new insights and social transformation" (Duncan, 2006, p. 14; see also Taylor and Orkin, 2001).

As both the theories of consociational and liberal democracy founder in coming to terms with apartheid, the challenge before us is to develop deeper – more relevant – democratic theory that goes beyond the usual liberal qualifications, incorporates a more complex multidimensional understanding of race, and places the task of overcoming racial injustice at the heart of concern (also consider Cochran, 1999; Gutmann, 1996; Mills, 1997). This would enable the crafting of more ethically virtuous constitutional designs for all those societies for which the promise of consociationalism has been held out – not just South Africa.

References

Asmal, Kader. 1993. "Making the Constitution," *Southern African Review of Books* 5(3): 3–4.
Bernstein, Richard J. 1978. *The Restructuring of Social and Political Theory*. London: Methuen.
Boulle, Laurence. 1984. *Constitutional Reform and the Apartheid State*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Butler, Anthony. 1998. *Democracy and Apartheid: Political Theory, Comparative Politics and the Modern South African State*. London: Macmillan.

Chandra, Kanchan. 2001. "Cumulative Findings in the Study of Ethnic Politics," *apsa–cp* 12(1): 7–11.

Cochran, David Carroll. 1999. *The Color of Freedom: Race and Contemporary American Liberalism*. Albany, NY: State University of New York.

Constitutional Committee of the President's Council, Republic of South Africa. 1982a. *First Report*. Cape Town: Government Printer.

Constitutional Committee of the President's Council, Republic of South Africa. 1982b. *Second Report on the Adoption of Constitutional Structures in South Africa*. Cape Town: Government Printer.

Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 200 of 1993, www.info.gov.za/documents/constitution/index.htm

Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996, www.info.gov.za/documents/constitution/93cons.htm

Duncan, Norman. 2006. " 'Race,' Racism and the University: Some Personal Observations and Reflections." Unpublished paper, Department of Psychology, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg.

Egan, Anthony and Rupert Taylor. 2003. "South Africa: The Failure of Ethno-territorial Politics." In John Coakley (ed.), *The Territorial Management of Ethnic Conflict*. London: Frank Cass, pp. 99–117.

Fay, Brian. 1975. *Social Theory and Political Practice*. London: Allen and Unwin.

Feagin, Joe R. 2006. *Systemic Racism: A Theory of Oppression*. New York: Routledge.

Frost, Mervyn. 1994. "Constitution Building and Politics in the New South Africa." IPSA World Congress conference paper, Berlin.

Geertz, Clifford. 1973. "The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Politics in the New States." In Clifford Geertz (ed.), *The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays*. New York: Basic Books, pp. 255–310.

Gloppen, Siri. 1997. *South Africa: The Battle over the Constitution*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Greenberg, Stanley. 1980. *Race and State in Capitalist Development: South Africa in Comparative Perspective*. Johannesburg: Ravan Press.

Guelke, Adrian. 1999. *South Africa in Transition: The Misunderstood Miracle*. London: I. B. Tauris.

Gutmann, Amy. 1996. "Responding to Racial Injustice." In Anthony Appiah and Amy Gutmann (eds), *Color Conscious: The Political Morality of Race*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, pp. 106–178.

Huntington, Samuel. 1992. "How Countries Democratize," *Political Science Quarterly* 106(4): 579–616.

Jung, Courtney and Ian Shapiro. 1995. "South Africa's Negotiated Transition: Democracy, Opposition, and the New Constitutional Order," *Politics & Society* 23(3): 269–308.

Klug, Heinz. 2000. *Constituting Democracy: Law, Globalism and South Africa's Political Reconstruction*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Koelble, Thomas and Andrew Reynolds. 1996. "Power-Sharing Democracy in the New South Africa," *Politics & Society* 24(3): 221–36.

Lijphart, Arend. 1977. *Democracy in Plural Societies*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Lijphart, Arend. 1985. *Power-Sharing in South Africa*. Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California.

Lijphart, Arend. 1993. "Power-Sharing, Ethnic Agnosticism, and Political Pragmatism," *Transformation* 21: 94–9.

Lijphart, Arend. 1994. "Prospects for Power-Sharing in the New South Africa." In Andrew Reynolds (ed.), *Election '94 South Africa: The Campaigns, Results and Future Prospects*. Cape Town: David Philip, pp. 221–31.

Lijphart, Arend. 2001. "Constructivism and Consociational Theory," *apsa–cp* 12(1): 11–3.

MacDonald, Michael. 1992. "The Siren's Song: The Political Logic of Power-Sharing in South Africa," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 18(4): 709–25.

MacDonald, Michael. 2006. *Why Race Matters in South Africa*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

McCarthy, Thomas A. 2004. "Political Philosophy and Racial Injustice: From Normative to Critical Theory." In Seyla Benhabib and Nancy Fraser (eds), *Pragmatism, Critique, Judgment: Essays for Richard J. Bernstein*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 149–70.

May, Julian (ed.). 2000. *Poverty and Inequality in South Africa: Meeting the Challenge*. London: Zed Books.

Mills, Charles W. 1997. *The Racial Contract*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Mureinik, Etienne. 1988. "Dworkin and Apartheid." In Hugh Corder (ed.), *Essays on Law and Social Practice in South Africa*. Cape Town: Juta, pp. 181–217.

Nolutshungu, Sam C. 1983. *Changing South Africa: Political Considerations*. Cape Town: David Philip.

Olson, Joel. 2004. "Political Theory and the Racial Order," *Polity* 36(3): 529–41.

Progressive Federal Party. 1978. *Report of the Constitutional Committee of the Progressive Federal Party*. Cape Town: Office of the Leader.

Randall, Duncan James. 1996. "Prospects for the Development of a Black Business Class in South Africa," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 34(4): 661–86.

Sachs, Albie. 1990. *Protecting Human Rights in a New South Africa*. Cape Town: Oxford University Press.

Sandel, Michael J. 1996. *Democracy's Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Singh, Nikhil Pal. 2004. *Black Is a Country: Race and the Unfinished Struggle for Democracy*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Smith, Rogers M. 2004. "The Puzzling Place of Race in American Political Science," *PS* 37(1): 41–5.

Sunstein, Cass R. 2001. *Designing Democracy: What Constitutions Do*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Taylor, Rupert. 1990. "South Africa: Consocation or Democracy?" *Telos* 85: 17–32.

Taylor, Rupert. 1994. "A Consociational Path to Peace in Northern Ireland and South Africa?" In Adrian Guelke (ed.), *New Perspectives on the Northern Ireland Conflict*. Avebury: Aldershot, pp. 161–74.

Taylor, Rupert. 1999. "Political Science Encounters 'Race' and 'Ethnicity'." In Martin Bulmer and John Solomos (eds.), *Ethnic and Racial Studies Today*. London: Routledge, pp. 115–23.

Taylor, Rupert and Mark Orkin. 2001. "The Racialization of Social Scientific Research on South Africa." In Peter Ratcliffe (ed.), *The Politics of Social Science Research: "Race," Ethnicity and Social Change*. Basingstoke: Palgrave, pp. 61–84.

van Zyl Slabbert, Frederik. 1983. "Sham Reform and Conflict Regulation in a Divided Society," *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 18(1–2): 34–48.

Zartman, William. 2001. "The Timing of Peace Initiatives: Hurting Stalemates and Ripe Moments," *Global Review of Ethnopolitics* 1(1): 8–18.

5
Realism, Liberalism, and the Collapse of the Oslo Process: Inherently Flawed or Flawed Implementation?

Jonathan Rynhold

Introduction

Much of the debate regarding what went wrong with the Oslo process has been framed in terms of the failure of Israel and the Palestinians to properly implement the Oslo Accords. For example, Dennis Ross (2004) has written that, in the interests of protecting the negotiating process, the US was not sufficiently forthright in demanding that the Israelis stop settlement activity and that the Palestinians do more to combat terrorism. These types of analysis often frame the implementation question in terms of a "blame game," the object of which is to determine which side was more culpable for the collapse of the process, Israel or Palestine. This debate suffers from three major limitations. First, it is a highly personalized and politicized debate, in part, because many of the main voices in the debate are politicians or officials who participated in the actual negotiations and who remain active in public life. Second, both sides in this debate share the assumption that the problem was the failure to implement the agreement, they only differ on whom to blame. Third, while they often give the impression of talking about the non-implementation of written agreements, they implicitly use a more expansive conceptual definition of implementation that includes various elements that were not formally part of the Oslo Accords. For example, the Oslo Accords never formally stipulated that Israel halt settlement activity, yet there is near universal agreement that Israel shoulders part of the blame for the collapse of the Oslo process because it continued to expand settlements 1993–2000.

In contrast, this chapter seeks to systematically examine the relationship between non-implementation and the collapse of the Oslo process from the perspective of two major bodies of International Relations

theory: Realism and Liberalism. Instead of assuming that mistakes by the parties – non-implementation – were responsible for Oslo's collapse, the chapter critically analyses this question from the theoretical perspectives provided by Realism and Liberalism. Aside from anything else, some of the most important Israeli initiators and supporters of Oslo, such as Shimon Peres and Yossi Beilin, adopted a Liberal approach to the conflict (Rynhold, 2003).[1] Furthermore, as will be demonstrated later on, much of the Israeli Left's explanation of the collapse of Oslo rested on the argument that the Liberal principles and mechanism underlying the Oslo process were not properly implemented (Beilin, 2001; Pundak, 2001). This failure of implementation is understood in terms of both a deficit of "will" and a deficit of "skill." As Amos Oz put it, "I don't think Oslo failed, because Oslo was never tried" (Herzog and Hai, 2004, p. 23).

In contrast, this paper argues that the Oslo process failed primarily as a result of structural factors emphasized by Realist theories of International Relations. The argument is not that the Liberal approach is wrong per se, but rather that the Realist pre-conditions needed to facilitate Liberal processes were absent in this particular case.[2] In other words, the collapse of the Oslo process should not be attributed to failed implementation, but rather to inherent flaws in the process itself. The paper begins by outlining Realist and Liberal approaches to war and peace. It then presents the Liberal approach to the Oslo process and the Liberal explanation for its collapse. Subsequently, the Liberal explanation is critiqued and a Realist explanation is provided.

Realism and liberalism:[3] preventing war or constructing peace?

In broad terms, Liberalism favors building peace through endogenous social, economic, cultural, and political processes. Neo-Liberalism's emphasis on the importance of absolute material gains inclines it toward the creation of free markets facilitated by open borders. It argues that institutional integration leads to interdependence, which in turn helps to build a mutual interest in peace (Dunne, 1997a). Within the field of Peace Research, underlying liberal axioms of a humanist-idealist nature have led to the development of approaches that view dialog and social interaction as generating mutual trust that enable parties to a conflict to overcome their mutual fears and resolve their differences peacefully (Kelman, 1987). These approaches emphasize the importance of such processes in transforming the way the parties have to conflict to define their requirements. This, in turn, makes the conflict "ripe"

for resolution by transforming the conflict from a zero-sum game to a positive-sum game. These different strands of Liberalism share the axiomatic belief that positive spillover from the psychological, social, economic, or cultural realm can transform the political/strategic realm and consequently generate conflict resolution.

On a normative level, Liberalism has traditionally supported the rights of all nations to self-determination (Tamir, 1993). It also views mutual recognition of such rights as central to conflict resolution (Fukuyama, 1992; Kelman, 1987). However, its tendency toward cosmopolitanism and individualism incline it against the idea of political separation and statehood on the basis of ethnicity. Liberals also give primacy to individual rights over collective rights. Consequently, while many Liberals have come to support cultural rights related to national identity, they tend to prefer that the political expression of such identities take place within some sort of federal or consociational context (Linklater, 2001; Smooha, 2002a, 2002b). This position is also related to a trend among Liberal theorists to view the nation-state as anachronistic (Tambini, 2001).[4]

Realism tends to focus on preventing conflict, rather than building peace. In contrast to Liberalism, it views the predominant actors as states. It views insecurity (as a result of anarchy and/or human nature) as the central dilemma of international politics, which drives states to seek relative gains and not absolute gains. Such cooperation as occurs is driven by security concerns; that is, states decide to cooperate primarily to check the power of another state or coalition of states that poses a common threat (Dunne, 1997b). Against this background, Realism tends to fear that open borders provide opportunities for instability, such as infiltration and sabotage. Realists would tend to assess economic integration not in terms of common interests, but in terms of the uneven political leverage or room for manipulation that it provides to parties.

Thus, whereas Liberal approaches seek to transcend or transform the political/strategic realm, Realism asserts the primacy of the political (Morgenthau, 1978). This does not mean that outside factors do not influence politics and diplomacy; it merely means that they cannot transcend political interests and dynamics. Given the intense difficulty in developing trust between states under anarchy, Realism inclines to prefer a clear delineation of borders that minimizes the chances of misunderstandings and opportunities for meddling, thereby contributing to stability. Until quite recently, Realism lacked a theory of ethnic conflict, due to its focus on states as the central actor in international politics. However, Realist theory has now advanced into the ethnic realm. This

theory argues that when ethnic identities become extremely hardened by conflict, the security dilemma applies to ethnic groups within a state. Once trust has completely broken down between these groups, ethnic separation, both physical and political, is necessary to prevent endemic bloody ethnic conflict and chronic instability (Downes, 2001; Kaufman, 1997, 1998; Posen, 1993).

Although both the Realist and the Liberal paradigms have structural elements, the notion of implementation is an issue for both, because elements within both paradigms allow room for human decisions to effect political and strategic consequences. However, because Liberalism places much less emphasis on the role of material constraints than Realism, Liberal theorists are much more likely to seek explanations for the success or failure of peace processes in terms of a state or government's record regarding the implementation of an agreement. As will become apparent later on, this is indeed the case regarding the Liberal explanation for the collapse of the Oslo process.

Liberalism and the Oslo process: theory and practice

In many ways, the Oslo process embodied core Liberal prescriptions for conflict resolution: mutual recognition, confidence building measures, and economic integration.

Ripeness and mutual recognition

For theorists such as Kriesberg (2001, p. 376) and Liberal Israeli politicians such as Beilin (Beilin, 1997, p. 232; Makovsky, 1996, p. 70), the agreement on mutual recognition between Israel and the PLO, signed in September 1993, signaled that the Israeli–Palestinian conflict was ripe for a negotiated resolution. Kelman (1995) argues that informal "track 2" workshops encouraged moves toward mutual recognition that this in turn fed into the Oslo process. He also argued that mutual recognition made conflict resolution possible after 1993. In the latter half of the 1990s, the Beilin-Abu Mazen draft framework for a permanent status agreement (FAPS) was held up as proof that each side's basic needs could be made to be mutually compatible and that there were important political leaders on both sides willing to stand behind such an agreement (Beilin, 1997, 2001). Again at Taba in January 2001, many claimed the two sides, this time in formal negotiations, had been on the brink of a FAPS, only to be denied by the fact that they ran out of time due to the (crushing) defeat of the Israeli left in the 2001 Prime Ministerial elections (Beilin, 2001; Malley and Agha, 2001; Pundak, 2001). For Liberals,

the draft Geneva Accords for a permanent status agreement in 2003, supported by many leading Israelis and Palestinians, demonstrates once again that the conflict is fundamentally ripe for resolution (Beilin, 2004).

Building peace

In many ways the Oslo process was driven by Liberal ideas and strategies promoted by Israeli politicians, especially Yossi Beilin and Shimon Peres. Initially, the informal negotiations that eventually led to the Oslo Accords began on the day Yossi Beilin succeeded in reversing the law that banned Israelis from talking to members of the PLO (Makovsky, 1996). Deputy Foreign Minister Beilin, supported by Foreign Minister Peres, was primarily responsible for the Accords on the Israeli side, especially the Accord on mutual recognition between Israel and the PLO. Prime Minister Rabin accepted the Accords in the end, but only after his preferred alternatives, a deal with the Syrians or with local Palestinians, appeared to have failed (Rynhold, 2007). Although, the more Realist-minded Rabin often tried to curb the Liberal approach of Peres and Beilin, much of the Liberal agenda was enacted. As the then director-general of the Israeli Foreign Ministry and Israel's chief negotiator at Oslo, Uri Savir (1998, p. 176), explained, "If, at the start of the process, Rabin had a tendency to circumvent Peres . . . as the negotiations continued, the two leaders began to treat each other with impressive respect . . . In time the military members of the forum, who were naturally closer to Rabin, expressed growing admiration for Peres as the man whose long-range strategy was the clearest – and therefore drew all the others along in its wake."

While Liberals declared mutual recognition as pivotal to "ripeness", they recognized that this was insufficient, in and of itself, to actually implement conflict resolution. Consequently, they developed a broader strategy for "building peace" based on numerous elements of Liberal theory. First, they continued informal track-two negotiations that led to the series of draft agreements referred to above (Agha *et al.*, 2004). The aim of these discussions was to continue to build up trust between political elites and to generate the necessary domestic support for implementation by demonstrating both to mainstream political leaders and to the mainstream public on both sides that conflict resolution was possible. Second, grass-roots "people to people" programs were also held with the aim of generating higher levels of social trust and understanding of the other's narrative, in order to facilitate a willingness to make the most difficult concessions (Kelman, 1987; Maoz, 2000). Third, the liberal "integrationist" model of peace-building that had been successful

in Western Europe since 1945 was applied to Israeli–Palestinian relations. Peres and Naor (1993) termed this plan the "New Middle East." Thus, in the economic sphere, the 1994 Paris Accords formalized Israel and the Palestinian territories as a single economic zone, with a single currency. In 1995, the Oslo II interim agreement led to the creation of joint Israeli–Palestinian units, mimicking the Franco–German model. In the political sphere the same agreement divided Israeli and Palestinian rule in terms of different degrees of functional authority rather than in traditional terms of territorial sovereignty. According to the Liberal strategic vision, mutual absolute economic gains would create a reservoir of support for the peace process that would both insulate it from extremist attempts at derailment and provide a basis for obtaining at least the acquiescence of public opinion for the major compromises that would be required regarding permanent status issues.[5] In other words, absolute material gains would generate political ripeness, while mutual trust would serve as a source of political capital in the negotiations.

Liberalism and the collapse of the Oslo process

> *The basis of the Oslo Accords was changed and actually never implemented*
> Mendy Orr, former Coordinator of Government Activities in the
> Territories (Herzog and Hai, 2004, p. 23)

Rather than viewing the collapse of the Oslo Process as a failure of Liberal theory, Pundak (2001) and Beilin (2001) have argued that Oslo's collapse stems primarily from a failure of implementation. They argue that the Oslo process could have worked if the political leadership on both sides had not made a number of avoidable mistakes. It was these "sins of omission" and "sins of commission" that prevented the implementation of the Liberal conflict resolution mechanisms, which could have driven the Oslo process to a successful conclusion.

Pundak explains the failure in terms of endogenous processes. First, he argues that the vital element of mutual trust between leaders – the "Oslo spirit" – broke down due to the "autistic" leadership and negotiation style of Israeli and Palestinian leaders. The Israeli leadership behavior is deemed especially culpable because they were acting from a position of strength vis-à-vis the Palestinians. He argues that Rabin damaged the Oslo spirit by replacing those who initially negotiated the deal, with IDF officers after the White House signing ceremony in September 1993. He goes on to accuse Netanyahu of deliberately seeking to undermine

mutual trust by expanding settlements and generally seeking to post-pone the fulfillment of Israeli commitments. But Pundak's real scorn is saved for Barak, whose failures are all the more potent given the higher level of Palestinian expectations. Here he argues that by allowing settlement construction to continue, Barak damaged Palestinian confidence in Israel's willingness to make sufficient territorial concessions. He also argues that Barak's tough "bazaar" negotiating style undermined Palestinian trust further, as did discourteous and condescending way in which he treated Arafat personally. Overall then, the failure to implement confidence-building measures implicit in the initial conceptualization of Oslo is said to have been partly responsible for the failure of the Camp David summit, the subsequent outbreak of violence and the overall collapse of the Oslo process.

Second, Liberals argue that mistakes by the leadership were responsible for the failure to garner a high level of public support for Oslo. In this vein, Arafat is scolded for allowing incitement to continue and for not doing enough against Palestinian terrorists. Both factors undermined Israelis' confidence in Palestinian willingness to live in peace, thereby weakening support for concessions. On the other hand, they argue that the failure to garner support for the peace process among the Palestinian public was greatly effected by Israel's policy of closures in response to terrorism. The Liberal model of peace-building counted on the generation of a "feel-good factor" in the economic sphere spilling over into the diplomatic sphere. However, Prime Minister Rabin was never an advocate of integration and when terrorism against Israelis rose in 1993–95, Israel responded with a return to the closure policy. In 1995 Israel began to plan for a separation barrier; it also began to allow an influx of foreign workers to replace Palestinians. Against this background, the economic situation of Palestinians in the Territories worsened in 1993–96, only recovering to pre-1993 levels in 1999–2000. Pundak dismisses the security utility of the closures, viewing them as a form of pandering to public opinion. In other words, the failure to properly implement the Liberal model of economic integration is viewed as a major cause for the lack of popular Palestinian support for reaching a permanent status agreement and for the outbreak of violence in 2000.

Third, Malley and Agha (2001) proffered that the US was also partly to blame for the collapse of the process. They argued that the US did not behave as an "honest broker." Instead, it closely coordinated its positions with Israel, even allowing Israel to take the lead in setting the timetable for negotiations. They also criticize the US for being insensitive to Palestinian interests by telling the Palestinians to accept Israeli

offers made at Camp David. In addition, they suggest or imply that the Administration's cultural bias toward Israel and the concurrent elections in the US prevented the US from applying sufficient pressure to secure a breakthrough before the violence broke out in September 2000. Had the US behaved differently, it is argued, a successful outcome would have been far more likely.

Finally, it has been argued (Steinberg, 2002) that reconciliation was not truly pursued by Arafat, as incitement continued in the PA against Israel. Nor were the "people to people" programs, formally institutionalized in Annex 6 of the 1995 Interim Agreement, implemented on a wide enough scale or with a broad enough base of participants for them to have stood any chance of success. Indeed, most of the annexes of the Oslo accords that dealt with civilian cooperation and civil society were not implemented (Herzog and Hai, 2004, pp. 30–4).

Overall, then, according to the Liberal approach, the Oslo process failed because the Liberal conflict resolution mechanisms that originally underwrote the process were not properly implemented.

Realism and the collapse of the Oslo process

In contradistinction to the Liberal approach, it is argued here that the collapse of the Oslo process was not due to a failure of implementation. Rather, Oslo failed because the Realist preconditions for its success were absent from the start. The argument is not that the Liberal model for "peace-building" is flawed per se rather that specific structural conditions in the Israeli–Palestinian context were not appropriate for conflict resolution and for the construction of a "warm" Liberal peace.[6]

"Ripeness" mutuality and "destructive ambiguity"

Realism is often associated with the idea that state interests are defined exclusively in terms of material power and that consequently states define their friends and enemies in terms of calculations regarding the distribution of material power. This is true of Neo-Realism, but it is not true of Realism per se, as classic, neo-classical or defensive realism adopt a different approach (Dunne, 1997a). For example, Walt (1987) argues that states balance not against material power but against perceived threat, which contains non-material factors. In addition, according to E. H. Carr (1991), Realism exists in a dialectic relationship with idealism. This means that while Carr gives material considerations the dominant role, non-material objectives also play a role in the construction of state interests. In this vein Carr notes that even Machiavelli coupled

his call for Realism with an idealistic call for Italian national unity. Against this background, it is important for Realists to ascertain whether core "idealist" interests of various actors are compatible in a practical "material" context. If they are compatible, some "defensive" Realists (Dunne, 1997b) would be inclined to accept that some of the factors emphasized by Liberals, such as institutions, would be able to ameliorate the basic security dilemma and thus contribute to stability. On this basis, some leading Israeli politicians with a Realist approach, such as former chiefs of staff Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Prime Minister Ehud Barak, supported the Oslo process, though in a far more cautious manner than Liberals such as Beilin and Peres (Rynhold, 2003). On the other hand, if practical interests are incompatible, then the actors will define each other as a threat and pursue strategies that generate a "spiral of insecurity" (Jervis, 1976, pp. 63–76). From this perspective the issue of ripeness and mutual recognition take on importance. However, for Realism the key question is not the act of recognition in and of itself but how parties translate its meaning into a practical definition of their interests.

Liberals assumed that mutual recognition, *ipso facto*, mandated a negotiated solution because the core needs of the two sides had become theoretically compatible. On this basis it was further assumed that mutual recognition nullified the zero-sum character of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, which in turn would reassure the parties regarding each other's ultimate intentions and thus help build up the mutual trust necessary to negotiate conflict resolution. In fact, the problem with mutual recognition within the Oslo process was that it contained "destructive ambiguity." This ambiguity masked large gaps in each side's conceptualization of what mutual recognition meant in practice. Rather than providing reassurance that the zero-sum game was over, "destructive ambiguity" heightened the sense of threat to the core objectives of both sides and thus contributed to the development of a spiral of insecurity based on mutual suspicion rather than mutual trust. In this vein, Steinberg (2002) criticized Liberal theorists for concentrating on abstract psychological factors such as recognition and trust, at the expense of the continued role of the political aspects of the conflict. True, Pruitt (1997) recognized the role of political factors in achieving the Oslo breakthrough – for example, the role of the intifada in generating a "hurting stalemate" as well as the role of the Gulf War and the end of the Cold War. However, while these factors certainly gave the parties a strong interest in negotiations and in developing ways of managing the conflict/changing the status quo, they did not necessarily give them a strong interest in

conflict resolution: "ripeness" for negotiations is not the same as ripeness for conflict resolution. This was the situation with regard to the Oslo Accords.

In the 1993 Oslo Accords Israel formally recognized the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and the Palestinians formally recognized the State of Israel. However, the Palestinians did not recognize Zionism as a legitimate national movement, while Israel did not commit to the principle that the Palestinians had a right to statehood. For the majority of Israelis, support for the peace process was not about Palestinian rights but about security and the need to protect Israel's identity as a Jewish and democratic state.[7] This led many Israelis to be insensitive to the fact that continued settlement led Palestinians to fear that they would not get a viable contiguous state, but rather a series of Bantustans. While this fear was justified regarding the intentions of the Israeli Right, Rabin's and Barak's inability to stop settlement construction contributed to Palestinian fears regarding what would emerge *in practice*. Meanwhile, on the Palestinian side, the dominant narrative continued to view Zionism as a colonial movement. This meant that peace, rather than being associated with justice, was associated with capitulation or at best pragmatism. It left open the legitimate option that Jews should eventually depart or lose their right to self-determination (Adler, 2004; Ben-Ami, 2004). In the meantime, political campaigns aimed at demonizing and de-judaising the State of Israel continued. When such conceptions found practical expression in the negotiating positions proposed by each side, they revealed a lack of ripeness, particularly regarding the issue of Palestinian refugees.

On the one hand, there was overwhelming Israeli opposition to a "right of return" for Palestinian refugees and the immigration of more than a few thousand Palestinian refugees in practice. On the other hand, the Palestinians continued to demand at least a "*right* of return" for refugees. Even if they were prepared to make some compromises regarding implementation, this position implied that Israel's existence as a Jewish state was subordinate to the right of Palestinian refugees to choose their ultimate place of abode. This created the impression that the long-term aim of the Palestinians remained the removal of Israel, only now in demographic terms. Long-time moderate Palestinian leader Faisel Husseini effectively endorsed this position in one of his final public statements before he died (*Al-Safir*, 21 March 2001).

In fact, in informal workshops Kelman (1995) recognized that the "right of return" issue was still unresolved, but he did not think it would prove a major obstacle given the general context of recognition and

reconciliation. The Beilin Abu-Mazen agreement appeared to provide a basis for an agreed compromise on the issue; however, Abu Mazen refused to stand behind the plan in practice. In fact, he denied for several years that the plan had anything to do with him. Meanwhile, according to Abu Ala, Abu Mazen did not actually agree with many of the compromises made in the documents by two Palestinian academics working under his auspices (Ben-Ami, 2004). This would explain his refusal to promote the document as an FAPS 1999–2000, prior to Camp David. Meanwhile, in January 2001 Arafat rejected the Clinton Parameters for a Permanent Settlement. In direct contradiction to the Framework, Arafat demanded an explicit right of return, opposed an international force in the Jordan valley and refused any compromise regarding the Temple Mount.[8] It has also been claimed that the two sides were also close to agreement at Taba in 2001; however, key participants on both sides argue that little real progress was made and that in any case, Arafat did not grant Palestinian participants the authority to make a deal (Ben-Ami, 2004; Makovsky, 2003; Sher, 2001).

The problem was not simply at the leadership level. Polls consistently demonstrated widespread Palestinian opposition to giving up on what they term a "right of return" for refugees and their descendents to Israel.[9] In this vein, when it came to the real Permanent Status negotiations in 2000–1, Palestinian negotiators were constrained by public opinion from adopting previously mentioned compromises on the refugee question (Sayigh, 2001). On the other hand, 68 per cent of Israelis are opposed to allowing any refugees whatsoever into Israel, while a further 16 per cent are only prepared to allow a few thousand into Israel. Israelis perceive the "right of return" as a serious threat to their most stable consensus political value – the existence of Israel as a Jewish (in demographic terms) state (Arian, 23; Hermann and Yaar, 2003).

Against this background, the failure to reach an FAPS during the interim period fed back into negotiations regarding the interim settlement in a way that eroded trust. The aim of the interim period was to allow time for liberal processes to generate sufficient ripeness to move to conflict resolution. However, in the absence of a permanent status agreement, the interim period generated mistrust as each side sought to maneuver itself into a better position for either the permanent-status talks or the collapse of the process. In addition, the lack of a clear resolution to Permanent Status issues provided continued legitimacy for rejectionists on both sides. This made it very difficult, in terms of domestic politics, for the respective leaderships to consistently take actions that would have built trust and support for the process, such

as a major settlement freeze and a serious crackdown against terrorist infrastructure. In other words, the lack of ripeness generated mistrust. Moreover, the attempt to negotiate compromises on the core identity/symbolic issues prior to clear signs of ripeness among the masses, allowed rejectionists to unlock the violent potential of these symbols and mobilize the public to violence. For while elites can do much to moderate ethnic conflict, the bottom line is always what the masses are willing to accept in their name. Thus, it was Sharon's visit to the Temple Mount that provided the opportunity for the initiation and incitement of violence. Not for nothing did the Palestinians name the current round of violence "The *Al Aksa* Intifada."

Thus, according to the Realist explanation, the development of mistrust was not a failure of implementation – mistakes by the parties; rather, it was a function of the inherently problematic nature of mutual recognition. The Oslo process was flawed from the outset because the practical meaning of mutual recognition as understood by the parties was too far apart to be bridged in a manner amenable to practical implementation. In other words, it was the chasm between the two sides on core permanent status issues that generated mistrust during the interim period, not the other way around.

The same type of problem seems likely to blunt current initiatives. Specifically, the model for dealing with the refugee question embodied in the Geneva Understandings lacks public support and does not appear workable.[10] The idea is to allow refugees to choose from a number of options including an option of immigration into Israel, with Israel having the final say on the number of those to immigrate into Israel. However, no Israeli government will agree to absorb all the refugees (and their family members) who wish to immigrate to Israel. According to a recent survey, 10 per cent of all refugees, 400,000 people, want to immigrate to Israel. Methodological problems with the survey almost certainly mean this figure is a substantial underestimation (Abrahms, 2003).[11] But even this figure is several times larger than Israel could be expected to agree to, as it would significantly change the demographic balance inside Israel. Consequently, if implemented it would have destabilizing consequences, especially given that more than 75 per cent of refugees were unwilling to accept coexistence with Israeli Jews under any circumstances.[12] On the other hand, if hundreds of thousands of refugees are refused permission to immigrate to Israel, it would be almost impossible for even a genuinely moderate Palestinian leadership to stand against the refugees and their hard-line supporters. Either way a violent escalation would ensue. With the respective publics' feeling

that core interests are being threatened, extremist solutions will gain greater legitimacy, and this could develop into an extremely bloody ethnic conflict, the likes of which has not been seen since 1948.

Lack of a common threat

As noted above, the lack of true ripeness heightened the parties' sense of threat to core values. It might have been possible to mitigate this situation had both sides been confronted with an overbearing external security threat, which would have forced them to put aside their differences and cooperate, as per Realist theory. For example, in Western Europe, the existence of a common threat in the form of the Soviet Union was an important factor that facilitated cooperation and integration between former adversaries (Ripsman, 2005; Rynhold, 2005). Peres and Naor (1993) thought that the threat of Islamic Fundamentalism could provide such a common enemy for Israelis and the secular Palestinian leadership. However, the Palestinians continued to define the conflict and the security threat (understandably from their point of view) primarily in terms of Israel. The PA's relationship with the Islamic opposition was ambivalent, but the preference has been for co-option, not confrontation. Thus, the lack of a common threat represented an a priori barrier to the successful implementation of the Oslo Accords.

Realism and the US role

Malley and Agha (2001) argued that the US should have been more forceful in imposing a solution and that it did not do so because of its "special relationship" with Israel – i.e., cultural bias and domestic politics. However, from a Realist perspective, there existed objective strategic reasons why the US did not attempt to impose FAPS upon the parties. According to Miller (1997), from a Realist perspective, the US cannot impose an Israeli–Palestinian peace because the balance of motivations favors the local parties. The US has a vital interest in conflict management – that is, in maintaining stability on the basis of a pro-American balance of power in the region and the prevention of regional war. While conflict resolution is obviously a US interest, it is less vital. The US can live with endemic low-intensity conflict so long as it does not escalate to regional war. In addition, the exact details of any permanent settlement are not of great concern to the US, so long as stability is achieved in the context of a pro-US balance of power in the region. In contrast, for the local protagonists vital interests are deemed to be at stake in core questions such as borders, refugees and other symbolic identity issues, such as exist with regard to Jerusalem. This means that the balance of

motivation favors the local protagonists, not the global superpower. The locals have a greater interest in the details and thus will be prepared to pay a higher price in terms of defiance than a superpower has an interest in bearing.

Nor are "positive sanctions" likely to make a difference. Aid helps to sustain a peace process, and it can facilitate an agreement by compensating the parties for material concessions they may make on practical issues – for example, US military assistance has compensated Israel in the past for the loss of strategically important territory in the Sinai in 1975 and 1979. However, when symbolic and identity issues are at stake, aid cannot play this role. Ultimately, aid is unable to replace either the basic will of the parties to come to an arrangement or the competency of domestic political structures to implement any agreement reached (Lasensky, 2004). It was for these reasons that the Clinton administration failed to get the Palestinians to accept its framework for a permanent status agreement in December 2000, despite the promise of billions of dollars in aid and assistance. Overall, then, the US failure to cajole the parties to reach a permanent status agreement was not primarily a function of botched diplomatic implementation and pro-Israel bias, but rather due to the inherent limitations of US power regarding ethnic conflict resolution.

Integration and the disintegration of support for the Oslo process

Liberal theory argued that integration would maximize economic gains on both sides, thereby producing a reservoir of support for the peace process that could be used to garner support for the major compromises required by any FAPS. Pundak (2001) argues that the failure to garner support was primarily due to mistakes by policymakers, especially Israel's policy of closures, which meant that the Palestinians did not gain economically. In contrast, in line with the Realist approach, it is argued below, the parties would have been better off following a strategy of separation rather than integration.

To begin with, integration actually intensified the security dilemma and the political conflict, thereby decreasing support for the peace process. Following the Six Day War, Israel adopted policies with regard to the Territories that led to greater ethnic integration, due to the construction of settlements and the opening of the Israeli labor market to Palestinians (Gazit, 2003). Under Israeli hegemony from 1967–87, this produced absolute economic gains for both sides. After the collapse of Israeli hegemony following the first intifada, the economic gains disappeared; simultaneously the costs of integration became more apparent,

leading to the intensification of ethnic conflict in both political and military terms (Ben-Yehuda and Sandler, 2002). The depth of this integration created important political facts that severely constrained policymakers' ability to develop the levels of trust required to construct a Liberal peace. Open borders increased the power of "spoilers" to decrease mutual trust and decreased the credibility of the peace process. Open borders allowed the settlers to build up and strengthen their position in the Territories. It made the task of removing them physically difficult as they could always return with relative ease. On the other hand, integration made the Palestinian economy a hostage of terrorism, enhancing militants' ability to attack the credibility of the peace process in Israeli eyes. Overall, then, integration served to increase friction.

Pundak argued that the Oslo process need not have been a hostage to terrorism had Israel not resorted to the unnecessary policy of closures. However, Israel's closure policy cannot be dismissed as a sop to public opinion. The idea that terrorism did not constitute a serious threat to Israel is wrong. Terrorism may not be able to threaten the state in material terms, but a state is not simply a material construct. Terrorism aims to demoralize the public, to undermine its belief that the state can defend its citizens and thus to bring about its implosion on a psychological rather than a material basis. As Israeli society has become more middle class, undergoing a process of Postmodernization, it has become more vulnerable to such a strategy, a fact recognized even by Yitzhak Rabin who had previously dismissed terrorism as a secondary matter in strategic terms (Kober, 2003). The political pressure on Rabin to respond to terrorism was thus of real strategic importance. If Rabin would have simply ignored the violence, he would have contributed to demoralization, and incidentally to the fall of his government and its replacement with a more right-wing alternative. The alternatives were thus defensive or offensive. Any offensive action would clearly lead to a direct deterioration in the peace process that leaves a defensive action, such as closure, as the only viable alternative. In addition, it is worth noting that the tactical-defensive value of separation has proven itself in the battle against terrorism, with the construction of the separation barrier (Rynhold, 2004). The problem was thus not too much separation, but too little.

In any case, the whole idea of integration was inappropriate for Israel and the Palestinians. An axiom of Neo-Liberal theory is that absolute material gains have significant positive spillover effect in the political realm. However, this is not necessarily the case. In Western Europe, integration did have positive political effects because it occurred between

states at similar levels of economic and social development. This situation was vital to the generation of social trust. For as Putnam (1993) has demonstrated, generalized social trust/social capital can only be generated across horizontal social relations. Now in the case of Oslo, Israel's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was twenty times that of the Palestinians and its overall Gross National Product (GNP) was equal to that of all its bordering Arab states combined (Rynhold, 2004). In other words, the socio-economic relationships were vertical. While these conditions can produce absolute economic gains for all, they cannot produce widespread social trust. This type of integration produces dependency, not development, which is why the World Bank now opposes full economic integration of Israel and Palestine (Roberts, 2002, 2003). In addition, this situation generates a sense of relative deprivation as the strong gain more than the weak and the social gap increases. Thus, under Middle Eastern conditions, relative material gains, emphasized by Realism, count in political terms, rather than absolute material gains, emphasized by Liberals. Consequently, in this instance, the problem was not the failure to fully implement the Liberal vision of integration, but rather the actual attempt to implement it in the first place. For even the partial implementation of the integrationist approach actually contributed to worsening the situation by empowering spoilers and institutionalizing relationships that could never generate social trust nor provide a basis for the structural development of the Palestinian economy.

A "realist" regional environment

The regional security environment also heavily constrained the idea of building and implementing a Liberal-style for Israeli–Palestinian peace through the Oslo process. The Israeli–Palestinian conflict does not exist in a regional vacuum. It is situated within the Middle East, which constitutes a region that is highly "Hobbesian" in character. This "Realist" regional environment is not simply a function of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, but of many other unrelated conflicts that challenge the legitimacy of state boundaries and that threaten the internal coherence of various states (Rubin, 2002; Miller, 2007). The cold peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors, such as Egypt, is based on a pragmatic acceptance of the "1648 rules": recognition of state sovereignty, rather than on any deep underlying cultural acceptance of Jewish national rights. By the 1990s many Arab states in the region recognized that they had a strong interest in preventing the outbreak of another Arab–Israeli war. But their commitment to conflict management did not extend to conflict

resolution. Thus Egypt actually played a negative role by discouraging the Palestinians from making compromises regarding Jerusalem prior to Camp David (Ben-Ami, 2004; Sher, 2001). Arab states feared that actively supporting compromises on symbolic permanent status issues would expose them to great domestic criticism, which could threaten their regimes' internal stability (Rubin, 2002). In addition, most Arab states viewed Shimon Peres' vision of a *New Middle East* as highly undesirable and even threatening, despite the real prospect of absolute material gains.

The problem, then, with attempting to build an Israeli–Palestinian peace along Liberal lines was that it meant that relations between Israelis and the Palestinians would have to be better than the general character of inter-state relations in the region. As a result, Liberalization lacked "strategic depth." If problems occurred for whatever reason, the parties could not be at all certain that regional actors would not try and exploit the situation to their detriment. Thus, the regional environment made mutual trust too fragile a basis for the major risk taking involved in conflict resolution. This contrasts with Northern Ireland, where the peace process was bolstered by the fact that it occurs inside a robust Liberal region, with strong norms and institutions. In other words, the problem was not in the implementation – the parties' failure to build trust – but rather in the structure – the fact that mutual trust was never likely to be a strong enough basis to overcome the general norm of mistrust that prevails in the international politics of the Middle East.

Conclusion

The sight of historic enemies shaking hands on the White House lawn in September 1993 raised great hopes that the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, one of the most intractable conflicts of the twentieth century, was on the verge of resolution. It appeared a vindication of the Liberal approach to International Relations. One of Oslo's architects, Yossi Beilin, even argued that it demonstrated that no conflict, be it in Northern Ireland or in Kashmir, was truly insoluble (author interview 1998). Liberals argued that mutual recognition between Israel and the PLO had made the conflict ripe for resolution and that this, along with the material gains generated by economic integration, would produce sufficient trust and support to actually reach a permanent settlement. In other words, they argued that all that was required was to build peace on the Liberal model implicit in the Oslo Accords and everything would turn out fine. Consequently, when the Oslo process collapsed, Liberals explained this

situation primarily as a failure of implementation – the parties lacked the necessary will and skill to bring the process to a successful conclusion.

However, according to the Realist approach adopted in this paper, the collapse of Oslo was not primarily due to faulty implementation but due to structural constraints that were inherent in the Oslo process from the start. The parties may have been able to play their cards better than they did, but that would not have fundamentally altered their inability to both agree on and implement a permanent status agreement. The Israeli–Palestinian conflict was not actually ripe for resolution. Despite progress on the psychological and formal institutional dimensions of recognition, the practical meaning of recognition revealed large gaps between the way that the parties defined their core interests. This "destructive ambiguity" led not to mutual trust but to distrust. Against this background and given the depth of antagonism between Israelis and Palestinians, economic integration failed to generate support for the peace process. Instead, it increased friction and placed additional political obstacles in the way of compromise by empowering "spoilers": terrorists and settlers. In any case, given the large socio-economic gap between Israelis and Palestinians, integration was fundamentally incapable of building trust, because social trust can only be built through a relationship between near equals.

Overall, then, under these conditions, the Liberal processes designed to secure conflict resolution were over-burdened, leading to the collapse of the Oslo process. In fact they actually exacerbated the conflict. A better alternative would have been to focus on implementing the more modest goal of conflict management, while keeping the door open for future conflict resolution. In line with Realist theory, the best way to achieve this kind of stability would be to enact political and physical separation. In practical terms, this rules out any attempt to negotiate a formal permanent status agreement in the short-to-medium term. Theoretically, implementation of the first and second parts of the Quartet's (US, UN, EU, Russia) "Road Map"[13] could provide a basis for an interim solution based on separation. However, this scenario seems unlikely, given the underlying problem of negotiating an interim agreement in the absence of an agreed destination regarding final status issues and other obstacles such as continued terrorism. Much more likely is that Israel will follow up its unilateral disengagement from Gaza with a wider unilateral withdrawal in the West Bank, which will include withdrawal from tens of settlements to the east of the separation barrier. Given that the barrier incorporates less than 10 per cent of the West Bank, such an initiative could provide the basis for a successful strategy of separation and the

consequent creation of a contiguous, viable, Palestinian state within temporary borders (as envisaged in stage two of the Road Map), though the situation in Jerusalem makes this complex (Rynhold, 2004). Paradoxically, such a Realist strategy of separation and conflict management might just provide the kind of context under which a Liberal strategy of conflict resolution might be successfully implemented in the longer run.

Notes

1. There were also "Realist" supporters of Oslo in Israel, but their support was more nuanced and equivocal, see below and Rynhold (2003).
2. For a general critique of the Liberal theories of peace, see Oliver Richmond, *The Transformation of Peace* (Palgrave 2005) and Roger Mac Ginty, *No War*, *No Peace* (Palgrave 2006).
3. The section below adopts a broad view of Realism and Liberalism. While it recognizes that each school contains various sub-theories, for the purposes of the discussion it is sufficient to highlight the main differences between the two schools. In this vein, see Dunne (1997a, 1997b). For a summary of Liberal and Realist approaches to conflict see Levy (1989, 1996).
4. For a critical discussion of this position see Smith (1990, 1995); Hutchinson and Smith (1994, pp. 289–325; 1996, pp. 348–77).
5. Peres and Eshed (1978) argued that war was not a rational option for modern states, as they had nothing to gain materially from them that could not be obtained with less risk and at a lower price by peaceful means.
6. For an extended discussion on this approach see Rynhold (2005).
7. Shamir and Shamir (1993) – only in 1998 did a majority of Israeli Jews begin to accept that the Palestinians had a legitimate right to statehood.
8. Senior US officials at the time – including the National Security Advisor Sandy Berger, his deputy, Bruce Reidel, Dennis Ross and Rob Malley – all attested to this (Sher, 2001, pp. 382–8; Ross, 2004). The official Palestinian response to the Framework appeared in *Al-Ayyam*, 2 January 2001.
9. Israel Palestine Center for Research & Information "Project Report April 2001," http://www.ipcri.org; PSR Poll, July 2003 (Palestinian Center for Policy & Survey Research) http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2003/refugees june03.html.
10. Only 19–27 per cent of the Palestinian public support the Geneva Accords. Support is lowest regarding the clauses relating to refugees, see Poll No. 118, 22 December 2003, Palestinian Center For Public Opinion (PCPO) and Poll No. 10, December 2003, Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) http://pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2003/p10b.html.
11. PSR Poll, July 2003.
12. Ibid.
13. For details of the Road Map see "A Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict," http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2003/20062.htm.

References

Abrahms, Max. 2003. "The 'Right of Return' Debate Revisited," *Middle East Intelligence Bulletin* 5: 8–9.

Adler, Emanuel. 2004. *Communitarian International Relations*. London: Routledge, Chapter 10.

Agha, Hussein, Shai, Feldman, and Zev, Schiff. 2004. *Track-II Diplomacy: Lessons from the Middle East*. Boston, MA: MIT Press.

Beilin, Yossi. 1997. *Touching Peace*. Tel Aviv: Yediot Aharonot (Hebrew).

Beilin, Yossi. 2001. *Guide for a Wounded Dove*. Tel Aviv: Yediot Aharonot (Hebrew).

Beilin, Yossi. 2004. *The Path to Geneva*. New York: RDV/Akashik.

Ben-Ami, Shlomo. 2004. *A Front Without a Rearguard*. Tel Aviv: Yediot Aharonot (Hebrew).

Ben-Yehuda, Hemda and Shmuel Sandler. 2002. *The Arab–Israeli Conflict Transformed*. Albany: SUNY Press.

Carr, E. H. 1991. *The Twenty Years Crisis*. London: MacMillan.

Downes, Alexander. 2001. "The Holy Land Divided: Defending Partition as a Solution to Ethnic Wars," *Security Studies* 10(4): 58–116.

Dunne, Tim. 1997a. "Liberalism." In John Baylis and Steve Smith (eds), *The Globalisation of World Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Dunne, Tim. 1997b. "Realism." In John Baylis and Steve Smith (eds), *The Globalisation of World Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Fukuyama, Francis. 1992. *The End of History and the Last Man*. New York: Free Press.

Gazit, Shlomo. 2003. *Trapped Fools: Thirty Years of Israeli Policy in the Territories*. London: Frank Cass.

Hermann, Tami and Efraim Yaar. 2003. "The Peace Index," August 2003, Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace, Tel Aviv University, www.tau.ac.il/peace/index.htm.

Herzog, Shira and Avivit Hai. 2004. *The Power of Possibility: The Role of People to People Programs in the Current Israeli–Palestinian Reality*. Tel Aviv: ECF/Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.

Hutchinson, John and Anthony Smith (eds). 1994. *Nationalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hutchinson, John and Anthony Smith (eds). 1996. *Ethnicity*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Jervis, Robert. 1976. *Perception and Misperception in World Politics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Kaufman, Chaim. 1997. "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Wars," *International Security* 20(4): 136–75.

Kaufman, Chaim. 1998. "When All Else Fails: Ethnic Population Transfers and Partitions in the Twentieth Century," *International Security* 23(2): 120–56.

Kelman, Herbert. 1987. "The Political Psychology of the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict: How Can We Overcome the Barriers to a Negotiated Solution," *Political Psychology* 8(3): 347–63.

Kelman, Herbert. 1995. "Contributions of an Unofficial Conflict Resolution Effort to the Israeli–Palestinian Breakthrough," *Negotiation-Journal* 11: 11–27.

Kober, Avi. 2003. "Western Democracies in Low-Intensity Conflicts: Some Post-Modern Aspects," *Review of International Affairs* 2(3): 3–20.

Kriesberg, Louis. 2001. "Mediation and the Transformation of the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict," *Journal of Peace Research* 38(3): 373–92.

Lasensky, Scott. 2004. "Paying for Peace: The Oslo Process and the Limits of American Foreign Aid," *Middle East Journal* 58(2): 210–34.

Levy, Jack. 1989. "The Causes of War: A Review of Theories and Evidence." In Phillip Tetlock *et al*. (eds), *Behavior, Society and Nuclear War*, Vol. 1. New York: Oxford University Press.

Levy, Jack. 1996. "Contending Theories of International Conflict: A Levels-of-Analysis Approach." In Chester Crocker and Fen Hampson (eds), *Managing Global Chaos*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, pp. 3–25.

Linklater, Andrew. 2001. "Globalisation and the Transformation of Political Community." In John Baylis and Steve Smith (eds), *The Globalisation of World Politics*, 2nd edn. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Malley, Rob and Hussein Agha. 2001. "Camp David: Tragedy of Errors," *New York Review of Books*, 9 August, pp. 59–64.

Makovsky, David. 1996. *Making Peace with the PLO*. Boulder: Westview Press.

Makovsky, David. 2003. "Taba Mythchief," *The National Interest*. Spring: 119–29.

Maoz, Ifat. 2000. "An Experiment in Peace: Reconciliation-Aimed Workshops of Jewish-Israeli and Palestinian Youth," *Journal of Peace Research* 37(6): 721–36.

Miller, Benjamin. 1997. "The Great Powers and Regional Peacemaking: Patterns in the Middle East and Beyond," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 20(1): 103–42.

Morgenthau, Hans. 1978. *Politics Among Nations*, 5th edn. New York: Knopf.

Miller, Benjamin. 2007. *States, Nations and the Great Powers: The Sources of Regional War and Peace*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Peres, Shimon and Haggai Eshed. 1978. *KaEt Machar* (*Tomorrow Is Now*). Jerusalem: Keter.

Peres, Shimon and Ayre Naor. 1993. *The New Middle East*. New York: Henry Holt.

Posen, Barry. 1993. "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict." In Michael Brown (ed.), *Ethnic Conflict and International Security*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 103–24.

Pruitt, Dean. 1997. "Ripeness Theory and the Oslo Talks," *International Negotiation* 2: 91–104.

Pundak, Ron. 2001. "From Oslo to Taba: What Went Wrong," *Survival* 43(3): 31–45.

Putnam, Robert. 1993. *Making Democracy Work*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Roberts, Nigel. 2002. *Long Term Policy Options for the Palestinian Economy*. World Bank.

Roberts, Nigel. 2003. "From the Drawing Board," *Ha'aretz*, 21 July.

Ripsman, Norrin. 2005. "Two Stages of Transition from a Region of War to a Region of Peace: Realist Transition and Liberal Endurance," *International Studies Quarterly* 49(4): 669–94.

Ross, Dennis. 2004. *The Missing Peace*. New York: Farrar Straus Giroux.

Rubin, Barry. 2002. *The Tragedy of the Middle East*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Rynhold, Jonathan. 2003. "Barak, the Israeli Left and the Oslo Peace Process," *Israel Studies Forum* 19(1): 9–33.

Rynhold, Jonathan. 2004. "Israel's Fence: Can Separation Make Better Neighbours," *Survival* 46(1): 55–76.

Rynhold, Jonathan. 2005. "Explaining the Success and Failure of Constructing Liberal Peace in Europe and the Middle East." Presented at *Israel International Studies Association Conference* , April.

Rynhold, Jonathan. 2007. "Cultural Shift and Foreign Policy Change: Israel and the Making of the Oslo Accords'," *Cooperation and Conflict* 42(4): 419–40.

Savir, Uri. 1998. *The Process*. New York: Random House.

Sayigh, Rosemary. 2001. "Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon," *Middle East Policy* 8(1): 94–105.

Shamir, Jacob and Michal Shamir. 1993. *The Dynamics of Israeli Public Opinion on Peace and the Territories*. Tel Aviv: Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research.

Sher, Gilad. 2001. *Within Touching Distance*. Tel Aviv: Yediot Aharonot (Hebrew).

Smith, Anthony. 1990. "The Supersession of Nationalism?" *International Journal of Sociology* 31(1–2): 1–31.

Smith, Anthony. 1995. *Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era* . Cambridge: Polity Press.

Smooha, Sammy. 2002a. "Nationalism, Multiculturalism and Democracy," *Nations and Nationalism*, Special Issue, 8(4): 432–64.

Smooha, Sammy. 2002b. "Types of Democracy and Modes of Conflict-Management in Ethnically Divided Societies," *Nations and Nationalism* 8(4): 423–31.

Steinberg, Gerald. 2002. *Unripeness and Conflict Management: Re-Examining the Oslo Process and Its Lessons*. Occasional Paper no. 4, Ramat Gan: Centre for Conflict Management, Bar Ilan University.

Tambini, Damien. 2001. "Post-National Citizenship," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 24(2): 195–217.

Tamir, Yael. 1993. *Liberal Nationalism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Walt, Stephen. 1987. *The Origins of Alliances*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Part II
The Dynamics of Peace

This page intentionally left blank

6
Sponsors or Spoilers: Diasporas and Peace Processes in the Homeland

Raviv Schwartz

Introduction

This work examines the influence of diaspora communities on the peace processes under way in their homelands. Specifically, the role of three communities in the United States (Jewish, Irish, and African Americans) is examined in fostering and/or hindering the implementation of peace processes under way in their respective homelands over the past few years. Underlying the choice of this dimension of peacemaking in each of the three conflict regions are two main assumptions. First is the premise that American intervention, be it diplomatic, economic or otherwise, has a significant bearing on the implementation of peace agreements in all three conflict regions and on the decision making of all the protagonists involved. As such, it is presumed to play a central role in any attempt to resolve the conflicts at hand. One explanation for the predominance of the US in each of these regions during the early 1990s was the end of the Cold War (Guelke, 1996b). That US involvement is pivotal to any resolution of the Israel–Palestine conflict is indisputable. And while it can be argued that a forthright American action to end apartheid in South Africa tarried and lacked consistency, it goes without saying that here, too, its role was significant. Even in Northern Ireland, which for decades had been considered a domestic concern of Britain alone, a proactive American stance during the early 1990s has been credited with stimulating significant progress in at least preserving the ceasefire in that region (Dumbrell, 2000; MacGinty, 1997).

The second assumption undergirding this analysis relates to the critical role of ethnic communities or diasporas in shaping US foreign policy. As far back as 1975, it was observed that these domestic actors in the US had become "the single most important determinant of policy"

(Glazer and Moynihan, 1975). This feature of political life in the US is reflected in the fact that Armenia and Israel have until recently been the largest per capita recipients of US foreign aid; no doubt a result of the mobilization of the local Armenian and Jewish communities (Dobbs, 2001). The Jewish, Irish, and African-American communities in the US, in their ethnically, religiously and/or racially inspired mobilization on behalf of states outside the US, may be considered non-state actors that are transnational[1] in their scope. For the purposes of this paper they are all grouped under the analytical heading of "diaspora". Indeed, the networks created by diasporas are warranting increasing attention internationally, for they represent a distinctive and potentially potent triadic relationship, linking ethnic communities, their host countries and their homelands (Sheffer, 1986a).

Only in the past decade or so has significant scholarly attention been paid to the transnational political activity of ethnic communities (Cohen, 1997; Shain, 1999; Sheffer, 1986a). However, virtually no systematic comparative analysis of diaspora communities in one host country mobilized on behalf of their homelands has thus far been undertaken. For that matter, no comparative studies exist of the political activity of diaspora communities linked to one homeland and scattered among different host countries. This presentation is a preliminary step in that direction, looking at the role of these three diaspora communities and the role they play(ed) in ending the protracted conflicts that have plagued their (actual or symbolic) homeland.

Gabriel Sheffer defines diasporas as "ethnic minority groups of migrant origins residing and acting in host countries but maintaining strong sentimental and material links to their countries of origin – their homelands" (Sheffer, 1986a). Safran, in his exhaustive essay on diasporas, identified six features that are common to most diaspora communities. These include: (1) ancestors dispersed from an original center to two or more peripheral regions; (2) retention of a collective memory, vision, or myth about their original homeland; (3) belief in their inability to be fully accepted by their host society; (4) view of ancestral homeland as their true, ideal home and as the ultimate destination of return; (5) commitment to the maintenance or restoration of their original homeland, its safety and prosperity; and (6) ongoing direct or vicarious interfacing with homeland which in turn fuels their ethno-communal consciousness and solidarity (1991). Shain reminds us that the homelands may be either claimed or independent and that no less important than the conscious association of diaspora members with their homelands is that they are so

regarded by others in host countries, homelands, and elsewhere (1999). One important distinction among diasporas refers to their status as either state-based or stateless.

Elazar maintains that diasporas appear to be an Asian phenomenon, since those diasporas that have endured over time have historically originated from that continent. By contrast, European émigrés have either tended to assimilate into their new host societies or become separate peoples in their own right (Elazar, 1986). While this may be accurate with regard to the "classic" diasporas (Jews, Greeks, and Armenians), the two other categories of diaspora, "modern" and "emerging," based on distinctions in their age and development (Sheffer, 2003), are by no means exclusively of Asian origin. Clifford posits that by the late twentieth century, all or most communities feature diasporic dimensions, which he characterizes as "moments, tactics, practices, and articulations." While diasporas may defy sharp definition, it is possible to discern a "loosely coherent, adaptive constellation of responses to dwelling-in-displacement" (Clifford, 1997). Implied here is that diaspora is both an objective and subjective concept. Marienstras argues that its reality is demonstrated in and tested by time. Accordingly, in order to ascertain whether a diaspora is real, time must pass. He concludes that diaspora is ultimately a human adventure, subject to the fortunes of history and fate (1989).

Diasporas tend to develop and maintain multilateral connections with various political, social, and cultural institutions in their host countries and homelands. In addition, they may engage a host of international organizations, governments deemed relevant to their host country or homeland for the purposes of exchanging resources and information. But the activity of diasporas is by no means limited to national and transnational politics. Typically, they engage in cultural, educational, and religious affairs and will stimulate the creation of specialized institutions to "promote and defend their linguistic, cultural, religious and economic interests in both their host countries and their homelands" (Sheffer, 1986a). In their pursuit of political aims, diasporas generally consist of three main constituencies which may be conceptualized as "core members," consisting of the elites whose involvement in diaspora affairs is central; "rear guard members," the previous generation of diaspora activists who are less prominent in day-to-day activity, but who represent a significant repository of community memory; and "silent members" that much larger reservoir of potential recruits for diasporic politics (Iwanska in Shain, 1999).

Analyzing the link between diaspora and homeland

In the literature on diaspora political mobilization, two chief "dependent variables" examined are diaspora impact on the foreign relations of both host and home countries, and diaspora influence on the domestic politics of host countries. These may be broken down further into the wide variety of forms that diaspora mobilization may assume: (1) attempts to directly influence events in the home country; (2) influencing host governments to act on behalf of the interests of the home government; (3) home governments seeking to deploy their diaspora in pursuit of their own goals; (4) diaspora may seek protection from the home government when it is threatened with mistreatment; (5) host government may seek to deploy a resident diaspora in pursuit of its external goals; (6) diaspora communities may attempt to influence international organizations on behalf of their homeland; and (7) home governments may ask the host government to enable or inhibit the activity of its diaspora (Esman, 1986). Diaspora input in the form of funding (treated at greater length later) is typically funneled through three main conduits: (1) institutions of the state; (2) political parties and related bodies; and (3) civil society organizations. "Diverse diasporic groups" strive to influence the various components of national identity and thereby create, or at least contribute toward the creation of very different visions of the homeland in accordance with their diverse worldviews (Shain and Sherman, 2001).

Among the factors presumed to condition the nature and scope of transnational diaspora mobilization are: (1) attitudes of the host societies toward the political influence of diasporas; (2) diaspora's access to host country's government and public opinion; (3) inclination of home or host governments to draw on diasporas as political resources to promote their political interests; (4) capabilities of diasporas (internal organization, duration of their residence in host country, legal status within host countries, degree of acculturation to and geographical dispersal within host countries); (5) specific objectives of diaspora mobilization; (6) sources of mobilization and activation of diasporas by home governments; and (7) activities of diasporas which affect international politics such as the collection of funds, political pressure, etc. (Sheffer, 1986a). Esman cites the importance of the material, cultural, and organizational resources available to diasporas, the opportunity structures in the host country, and their motivation and capability to maintain cohesion and exert group influence in explaining the scope and intensity of diaspora mobilization (1986). Ethnic cohesion, according to Shain, increases the

more ethnic group members interact frequently and non-conflictually in structural spheres (1999).

Connor notes that states constituting a homeland for a particular nation or nations (homeland or multi-homeland states) tend not to provide a healthy environment for the free association and political mobilization of diaspora communities residing therein. On the other hand, a state that is a homeland to no nation at all (the immigrant state) offers many more opportunities and greater freedom to diaspora communities. Underlying the immigrant society is the notion that all settlers have an equal claim upon it, regardless of their ethno-national background (Connor, 1986).

The United States is perhaps the quintessential immigrant state. Because three communities studied here operate within the US, the variables relating to the macro social, political, and ideological conditions of the host society (i.e., "opportunity structure," attitudes toward the political influence of diasporas, diasporas' access to government and public opinion) structurally speaking, may be presumed to be equal for all three. In examining the relative receptivity of the American socio-political climate to transnational diaspora mobilization, we draw from the theoretical tradition of social movements. Scholars of social movements have conceptualized the *political opportunity structure* within which social actors may undertake collective action as existing along four dimensions: (1) the relative openness or closure of the institutionalized political system; (2) the stability of that broad set of elite alignments that typically undergird a polity; (3) the presence of elite allies; and (4) the state's capacity and propensity for repression. The form and the timing of mobilization are shaped by the available political opportunity, but the specific form of mobilization undertaken is likely to be affected by the kind of opportunity presented (McAdam *et al.*, 1996).

By and large, the federal configuration of the American polity, with its liberal capitalist economic infrastructure, offers ethnic communities considerable needs along with opportunities and incentives for voluntary action and financing. Indeed, the US boasts a long tradition of absorbing successive waves of ethnic immigrant minorities and has been characterized, with a few notable exceptions during its history, by well-established norms ensuring the freedom of political lobbying and fundraising for political purposes (Sheffer, 1986b). The transnational mobilization of US-based diaspora communities is afforded by and entrenched in the nature of American party politics and the role played by constituency politics and interest groups, which typically allow small but well-organized groupings to influence elected officials and even to

impact foreign policy. In this particular political opportunity structure, it is not surprising that ethnic groups in the US are generally not deterred by fears of disloyalty (Shain, 1999).

While the macro social and political conditions of the political opportunity structure obtaining in the US theoretically afford all diaspora communities equal opportunity to mobilize, other environmental factors may affect the communities studied differentially. One such factor may take the form of counter-movements. Counter-movements and their allies seek to deprive a particular mobilized constituency of resources and political opportunities by increasing the costs of participation, undermining its strength through various means including delegitimization, and campaigning to turn the public against it (Klandermans, 1991). The diaspora communities examined here seek different objectives with respect to their homelands and are at times implicated by the nature of the homeland polity and/or regime and its actions. As a result, they may encounter domestic opposition, not from government sources, but rather from other constituencies or ethnic communities that are also affected, in one way or another, by events in the homeland or surrounding region.

How the activity of diaspora communities is brought to bear on peace processes in the homeland is, to some extent, also a function in intra-communal and inter-communal factors. Shain posits that when the diaspora communities of homelands in conflict are active, they should not be viewed merely as a domestic constituency within their host state, but also as an independent actor in the conflict resolution process. He points to four main factors that influence diasporic postures toward conflict resolution efforts in their homeland. The first is a concern to maintain their ethnic identity as they conceive of it. Because a (real or imagined) threat to the security of the homeland is a powerful mobilizing tool for diaspora communities in the funding of local communal organizations, peace itself may actually be construed as jeopardizing or undermining diasporic identity. During the Oslo process, many American-Jewish organizations feared that peace would seriously hamper efforts to recruit human and financial resources. A second factor is the competition with the homeland for leadership of the transnational community. Actively mobilized diaspora communities may actually compete with homeland elites in defining what is and what is not in the "national interest" and determining who should be entrusted with speaking on behalf of the nation. A third factor is the myriad of organizational/bureaucratic interests of diasporic organizations. The relative influence and prestige of many of these organizations are at their highest during periods of intense conflict in the homeland.

However, when the conflict nears resolution, their internal communal prestige and external influence may very well wane as a result. Furthermore, the inter-organizational struggles over homeland peace policies may in fact serve as a veneer for the broader competition among them for position and power among their ethnic constituents and within host state politics. The fourth factor identified is that of the other political interests and goals of the diaspora community in its host state. In many cases, the policies of homeland governments with respect to their ongoing violent conflicts may potentially affect the political or social status of the diaspora communities in their host society (Shain, 2002).

Another dimension of the political or social status of a given diaspora community is its relations with other ethnic/diaspora communities. If we conceive of these communities as domestic actors with a role to play and a stake in the foreign relations of the host country, then it should come as no surprise that diaspora communities often seek alliances with and must take into account the sensibilities of other communities. Understood in this way, it becomes clear that the mobilization of a diaspora community with respect to a peace process under way in the homeland is multifaceted and subject to various internal and external influences.

The main thrust of this analysis then is the role played by the Jewish, Irish, and African-American communities in the peace processes under way in their respective homelands. The role played by these diaspora communities will be examined along a number of parameters, extrapolated from the previous section. First, I will elucidate the ethnic and cultural origins and historical experiences of each community, as well as the evolution of the diaspora–homeland relationship. Second, I will examine (1) the degree of institutionalization and internal community cohesion within each diaspora community; (2) the patterns of interaction between diaspora and homeland; (3) the view of the US government toward the regime of the homeland; and (4) the tradition and patterns of diaspora involvement in the homeland peace process. In the sections to follow, these parameters will be applied to each of the three diaspora communities. The Israel–Jewish diaspora model serves as the analytical anchor of this inquiry and will therefore be explicated in greater depth. Finally, key features will be compared across diaspora–homeland relationships.

Israel and the American-Jewish community

The Jewish diaspora is regarded by many as the quintessential or "archetypal" diaspora (Safran, 1991), characterized by a high degree of communal organization (Sheffer, 1986b). Interestingly though, in the

case of this particular diaspora, it was not the status of the diaspora that was open to question, but rather that of the homeland. Indeed, it is a rare case of a homeland created by immigration from the diaspora instead of vice versa as in the cases of most diaspora–homeland relationships (Horowitz, 1986). The Jewish example then illustrates how a diaspora can serve as a state-initiator (Elazar, 1986).

Input from the diaspora during the pre-state years took the form of manpower (immigrants) and capital resources (donations), and these in turn facilitated both the political status of the Jewish community in Palestine as a state in the making and its ability to achieve a dominant economic and the political position in Palestine (Horowitz, 1986). The very establishment of the State of Israel, according to the tenets of classic Zionist ideology, rendered the continued existence of Jewish communities abroad obsolete. The persistence of the latter was interpreted as undermining the legitimacy and the vitality of the Zionist enterprise. Hence, from the outset, despite ties of kinship and the sense of common destiny, the nature of relations between Israel and the Jewish Diaspora at large were somewhat problematic. Although the American-Jewish community differed qualitatively from all other diaspora communities worldwide, it did not escape the problematic dynamic that characterized Israel–diaspora relations at large.

Hegemony or existential superiority of Israel over Jewish diaspora

The relationship until 1967 may be characterized as hegemonic, whereby Israel affirmed its existential superiority vis-à-vis the Jewish diaspora in virtually every facet of its interaction with it – this although it relied on diaspora financial largesse both prior to statehood and certainly during the early years thereafter. Israel's first Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion sought early on to neutralize any unwanted interference from diaspora communities and imposed a division of labor, according to which to the diaspora would raise funds for the imperatives of "nation-building" and the sovereign government would determine its allocation. In so doing, he was reaffirming the Zionist precept of Jewish existence in Israel as categorically superior to Jewish life abroad. This lack of parity in relations between Israel and the Jewish Diaspora was compounded by the structural asymmetry inherent in the interfacing of a sovereign state with all its trappings and the voluntary organizations and institutions of a minority community in a different host country (Liebman, 1991).

In 1950, an exchange of letters between Prime Minister Ben-Gurion and Jacob Blaustein, president of the American Jewish Committee, took place in which the former affirmed that Israel did not expect Jews to

owe it any political allegiance. Accordingly, Jews abroad may lend their support and mobilize politically on Israel's behalf strictly on a voluntary basis and only if, in so doing, they do not violate the obligations of citizenship in their host country (Medding, 1983). Implicit in this understanding was the commitment of Israel not to meddle in Diaspora affairs so as to avoid the specter of "dual loyalty," and the American-Jewish community would in turn reciprocate by refraining from meddling in the affairs of Israel, particularly its foreign affairs.

For decades to come, the spirit of this agreement would guide both the substance and the tone of Israel–diaspora interaction, ostensibly serving the interests of both. During those decades and to a large degree to this very day, the mobilization on behalf of Israel has become a principal, if not the main, expression of Jewishness in the Jewish diaspora and its fundamentally secular character has further served to diminish the religious component of Jewish identification (Elazar, 1986). The multi-faceted nature of Jewish identification in the US, which incorporates religious, ethnic, cultural, and nationalist dimensions, is accompanied by a high degree of social cohesion within the community, as manifested in the highly institutionalized and differentiated network of philanthropic, religious, fraternal, and political outlets. This high degree of community cohesion is one explanation for the relative success of the American-Jewish diaspora in committing its government to far-reaching diplomatic, economic, and military support for Israel. Based on this particular parameter of diaspora involvement, i.e., diaspora access to host country's government, it is the most prominent example of all diaspora communities in the US (Esman, 1986). Another factor that facilitated the kind of access enjoyed by this diaspora community to the US government has been the fact that US foreign policy since Israel's establishment, and certainly since the late 1960s, has been consistently supportive of the latter's right to exist within defensible borders. And in fact since the Nixon administration, the enthusiastic support of Israel – even if not all its policies – has become a bi-partisan issue for all presidential administrations since.

While American Jews have been very successful in influencing host government policy, they have for the most part adhered to the spirit of the Ben-Gurion-Blaustein agreement and endorsed (or at least acquiesced to) the policies of successive Israeli governments. The prevailing sense was that only those living in the homeland and fighting for it should have a say in determining policies related to peace, security, territory, etc. However, in its ideological and religious diversity, American Jewry very much mirrors Israeli society. Consequently, diaspora Jews have been

able to express this diversity, by essentially bypassing government institutions. Indeed, they have succeeded in impacting not only the spiritual, educational, and social welfare arenas but through this involvement have also entered areas that are expressly ideological/political. The motivation for this is derived from a liberal humanist perspective on the one hand (expressed in the funding of various organizations devoted to promoting civil and human rights, etc.) and a right-wing nationalist one on the other (expressed in the funding of Jewish settlement over the "Green Line").

Referring back to the conduits of diaspora input mentioned previously, it becomes clear that in the Jewish case, the prevalent avenues of input have been civil society and to a lesser extent political parties. The pervasive diaspora involvement at these levels have prompted some to contend that in recent years, the reliance of right-wing parties and institutions in Israel on the latter had made these diaspora donors "more significant than domestic constituencies in terms of ideological posture and accountability" (Shain, 1999).

One interesting anecdote pointedly illustrates the limits and strength of diaspora with respect to their differential degree of input at the governmental level on the one hand and civil society on the other. Diaspora leaders wield considerable influence in the governance of the Jewish Agency, the quasi-non-governmental instrumentality for harnessing and channeling diaspora dollars and volunteers into the tasks of "nation building." In fact, the Jewish Agency prior to statehood served as the embryonic Zionist government, with Ben-Gurion as its chairman. During the late 1970s, as diaspora leaders demanded increasing authority in the governance of the Agency, they secured the right of "advise and consent," essentially a veto power in the hiring of senior Agency professional personnel. Later, in the mid-1980s, they rejected for a variety of reasons the candidacy of a well-known politician for a senior post on the Agency Executive. This candidate, Ariel Sharon, who had resigned from his position as cabinet minister in Israel's government, would eventually become prime minister in 2001 and continued in that capacity until his stroke in 2006.

Because the Jewish diaspora was expected to fall in line with the policies laid down by successive Labor governments for close to 30 years, they were ill-equipped and unprepared to adapt to the decidedly more nationalist and hawkish policies of the Likud government of Menachem Begin in 1977. When voices within American Jewry publicly questioned the wisdom of Begin's policy of significantly increased Jewish settlement over the "Green Line," these were summarily quashed. Eventually,

the leadership and institutions of American Jewry internalized, at least publicly, the policies of the Begin government. The major exception to this was the emergence of a number of prominent dissenting voices in the wake of Israel's incursion into Lebanon in 1982 and the ensuing massacre of Palestinians at Sabra and Shatilla at the hand of Lebanese Christian militias operating under the umbrella of Israeli forces. Criticism of the Begin government emanating from the diaspora was not well received, to put it mildly. One exchange, however, between Prime Minister Begin and a particular diaspora critic, represented a rare exception and is worth highlighting.

Leonard Fein, the editor of a prominent American Jewish monthly at the time and one of the more outspoken liberals among Jewish leaders, sent directly to Begin a scathing critique of the war in Lebanon and other government policies as well. This single letter prompted Begin to send back to Fein a very lengthy and thoughtful response. An exchange of a few letters of this sort ensued and was fairly well publicized at the time. What distinguished Fein's diaspora criticism of the Israeli government from all others was that he penned it in flawless Hebrew, the significance of which was not lost on the prime minister. This incident underscores the importance of the symbolic dimensions of relations between diaspora and homeland. Though the harsh substance of Fein's critique was not welcomed, its form, namely in the Hebrew language, made it far more palatable to the prime minister and resulted in a meaningful exchange between the two.

As the Lebanon war subsided, American Jewry for the most part heeded the directives of Israeli governments until 1992, when Yitzhak Rabin, heading the Labor Party, was elected prime minister. His government acted quickly to enter secret negotiations with the PLO, eventually recognizing it as the sole representative of the Palestinian people (culminating in the famous handshake on the White House lawn) and entering a negotiation process, which would unmistakably lead to far-reaching territorial concessions. Rabin was shocked to discover that the American Jewish leadership, particularly the premier body entrusted with lobbying for Israel, American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), was not enthusiastically promoting his policies in Washington. This led to a highly publicized rift between his government and a significant portion of American Jewish organizational leadership.

On one level, this rift was clearly fueled by a significant substantive disagreement over policy. It is important to note that the decision of a sovereign state to relinquish its claim to a piece of historically significant territory in order to achieve peaceful relations may be interpreted

very differently by diaspora and homeland citizens. Accordingly, territorial alternations of the homeland state for the sake of peace may be more disturbing to some diaspora elements than to some segments of the homeland community. There is little doubt that this partially explained the intensity of the rift described above. And indeed, a similar controversy arose 6 years later between many American-Jewish leaders and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak over the consent of the latter to grant the Palestinians sovereignty over the Temple Mount. Some argued at the time that the ceding of Israeli control over the Temple Mount and parts of Jerusalem threatened to undermine the very identity of American Jews and rupture irreparably their relationship with Israel (Hausman, 2001).

However, the publicized rift between Rabin and the leadership of a number of American Jewish organizations was also shaped by some of the features of the diaspora–homeland link alluded to previously. For example, a number of American Jews interpreted the type of territorial concessions prescribed by the Oslo peace process as undermining their very ethnic identity. Furthermore, organizational considerations were also brought to bear on this dynamic as AIPAC, the premier American lobbying organization on behalf of Israel, evidently felt excluded and marginalized by the entire Oslo process. This likely explains the very vocal form their opposition took in relation to Prime Minister Rabin in particular and the Oslo process in general.

Structural lag

American Jewish leadership and institutions were slow in reacting to the shift in Israeli government policy initiated in 1977 by the new Likud government, after having become accustomed to and more or less aligned with the policies laid down by successive Labor governments since 1948. Again in 1992, the dramatically different policies adopted by the Rabin government in 1992 were slow in percolating down through the rungs of American Jewish communal leadership. More recently, after close to 5 years of violence, terror, and a virtual halt in the peace process, former Prime Minister Sharon embarked on a very ambitious plan to unilaterally withdraw Israeli forces and settlements from the Gaza Strip. And once again, the reaction of Jewish diaspora leadership to this plan, despite widespread support among a majority of American Jews, was sluggish and ill coordinated. So palpable was the disconnect between the Sharon government and the American Jewish leadership that Sharon actually dispatched envoys to meet with dovish American Jewish organizations (a scenario most would have thought surreal only a few years

earlier) in an effort to shore up support for the Disengagement plan among wider segments of the community (Nir, 2005).

All this would suggest the existence of a structural lag in the diaspora–homeland link with respect to the promotion of Israel's foreign policy. Part of the responsibility for this lag belongs to successive Israeli governments. A recent opinion piece in the *Ha'aretz* daily lamented this same lag and is worth quoting at length: "For more than a year now, Israel has had a hard time explaining to the Jewish community the changes in Israeli policy brought on by the adoption of the disengagement plan. Someone also forgot to tell the Jews on the other side of the ocean about the renewal of diplomatic contacts with the Palestinians ... The results of the confusion in the Jewish community over the past year could be seen in the field. The Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations had a hard time passing a resolution in support of disengagement, and ... while official Israeli representatives were speaking [to a particular US congressman] in favor of aiding Palestinians, his Jewish constituents were still asking [him] to vote against" (Guttman, 2005).

A pluralistic diaspora community

In addition to the constraints posed by the presumptive structural lag, deep ideological divisions within the American Jewish community with respect to Israeli policy (mirroring to a large degree the ideological divisions within Israel itself) make the ability of the diaspora community to act in concert with the declared goals of the homeland government a very thorny proposition. Like its counterpart in Israel, the American Jewish right wing was able to mobilize rather successfully, drawing effectively on existing (orthodox) congregational and organizational networks, imbued with an ethno-religious commitment that resonated strongly among that constituency. The more liberal or dovish elements of the American Jewish community were also mobilized, establishing a series of new organizations, some of which even engaged in lobbying on Capitol Hill for policies opposed by other Jewish lobbying groups, most notably AIPAC. However, the efforts of these groupings did seem to achieve a prominence or resonance that was commensurate with its relative share of American Jewish public opinion. The reasons for this are manifold, but the result was unmistakable. The policies of Israel's prime minister (endorsed by a majority of Israel's electorate) were not roundly embraced or effectively promoted by the world's largest Jewish diaspora community.

Normalization of the relations between Israel and the Jewish diaspora

Sheffer maintains that relations between Israel and the Jewish diaspora in recent years have lost their vestiges of uniqueness and have gradually normalized due to various factors such as: "declining anti-Semitism; disappointment in Israel's cultural attainments; its failure to follow through on its promise to avoid intervention and meddling in diaspora affairs" (2002). In this sense it has come to resemble the relationship between other state-linked diasporas and their homelands.

Northern Ireland and the Irish-American community

The Irish-American community in the US may not seem entirely consistent with the notion of diaspora as elucidated earlier. It is altogether arguable that were it not for the troubles in Northern Ireland and the ongoing unresolved constitutional status of the island, the suggestion that Irish America constitutes a diaspora would be even less compelling. Nonetheless, as Paul Arthur notes about Irish Americans: "They are integrated into American society but they remember their roots. They remember their ancestors' uprooting by economic coercion or physical compulsion. They want to right what they consider a great wrong. They do so by persevering as a culturally distinct minority in pluralistic society, as well as by contributing to the welfare of their original homeland. They are as close as we get to an Irish diaspora" (Arthur, 1991).

Among Irish Americans, no distinction is made between those of Catholic or Protestant origin or between those who came originally from what is today Northern Ireland and those who arrived from the Republic. The first major influx of Irish into North America was that of Ulster Presbyterians between 1700 and 1796, though it was reported that by the early nineteenth century, they were fully integrated into American society. Indeed, religiously and ethnically, they were similar enough to the more established settlers to allow for a relatively smooth acculturation process. The second large immigration of Irish Catholics to the US coincided with the great famine of 1845–9. During this period, 1 million immigrated (primarily to the US) and another million perished. It was this wave of Irish immigrants that set the tone of Irish-American ethnic activity. According to historian Kerby Miller, the genesis of this immigration was interpreted as a result of: exile due to forces beyond individual choice and communal control; British misgovernment; Protestant hegemony; and landlord tyranny (in Arthur, 1991).

The general influence of Irish Americans is difficult to gauge. According to a 1980 census, 43.7 million Americans identified themselves as Irish (Arthur, 1991), but as a mainly long-established immigrant group, their interest in their homeland has diminished. Perhaps only 2 million of these retain a strong Irish identity (MacGinty, 1997). The relatively small number of identifying Irish Americans is one reason why Irish America has not had the same lobbying influence for example as, for instance, Jewish America (Arthur, 1991). This points to a general lack of community cohesion.

What little interest among Irish Americans with respect to Northern Ireland has been evinced has typically sided with Irish nationalism. Irish American support for Irish nationalism reached a peak immediately after World War I with most of the important figures in the community supporting the government of the Free State following the Anglo-Irish treaty in 1921. In fact, the involvement of the Irish diaspora in the US in the political developments in Ireland dates back to the 1850s. "Fenianism," an ideology of uncompromising Irish nationalism, was actually bred in America and eventually exported to Ireland. Their notion of an independent Irish Republic was nourished by the American and French political tradition. After partition, the issue of Ireland faded from view in America and the former was regarded significantly less positively following World War II, given the neutral stance of the Irish government during that war.

Thus, for a number of decades the diaspora-homeland link between this community and Ireland was not at all a salient one. However, when the Troubles commenced in 1968, a number of Irish-American organizations were formed, drawing on the resurgence of an interest in Irish nationalism (Guelke, 1996a).

From the late 1960s to the early 1990s, diaspora involvement in the conflict primarily involved various Catholic-Irish American lobbies and congressmen who were sympathetic to the Republican cause. Through these linkages, the IRA gained funds, especially during the hunger strikes of the early 1980s, as well as weapons (Dumbrell, 2000).

US government's view of the home country's regime

The posture of the US government with respect to Northern Ireland had been informed largely by its understanding of relations with the UK as "empathetically interdependent" (Dumbrell, 2000). As a result, US presidents traditionally deferred to Britain on an issue that was interpreted anyway as an internal British concern. The mobilization in the late 1970s of the "Four Horsemen" (Senators Edward Kennedy and Pat

Moynihan, Speaker of the House Tip O'Neil, and Governor Hugh Carey) led to significant criticism of Britain's role in Northern Ireland. According to MacGinty, the Irish government and the constitutional nationalists welcomed the enlistment of such influential and respected Irish Americans and encouraged them to steer Irish-American public opinion away from support for the IRA (1997). Some therefore suggest that it was the Irish-American lobby that helped to temper the republican sentiments of Irish America at large. Guelke, however, argues that the growth in the influence of the Irish-American lobby may be traced to a moderation in Irish-American attitudes toward the conflict (1996a). Perhaps the strength and prominence of the lobbying elites of Irish America and the increased moderation of Irish-American public opinion with respect to the conflict are mutually reinforcing.

The significant episodes of Irish-American diaspora mobilization in the ensuing years reflected this gradual shift away from militant republicanism. They by and large assumed the form of diaspora involvement that engages the host government in the pursuit of its interests vis-à-vis the homeland. The Irish National Caucus (INC) scored a major victory during the early 1980s in championing fair employment practices in Northern Ireland. They succeeded in altering the Democratic Party platform in 1984 along these lines and later promoted the "MacBride principles," a code of conduct for American firms operating in the UK, based originally on the Sullivan principles, which regulated American investment in South Africa. The MacBride principles were adopted by the American labor movement and by a number of state legislatures (Guelke, 1996a).

But this variety of non-republicanist Irish diaspora mobilization did not only target the host government. In the early 1990s, a new organization – Americans for a New Irish Agency (ANIA) – came into being, bringing together "a potent configuration of well-funded, business-oriented Irish-American opinion" (Dumbrell, 2000). ANIA beseeched the US government to abandon its traditional stance of non-involvement in Northern Ireland, but also interfaced with key political figures in the Republic and in Northern Ireland (including moderate loyalists). The influence of this segment of Irish diaspora leadership on elements in the homeland was illustrated in visits of ANIA delegations to Ireland in 1993. For the duration of those visits, the Provisional IRA adhered to an unannounced ceasefire, a clear indication of the ability of Irish America to influence the Republican movement. In 1994, the Irish-American lobby succeeded in convincing President Clinton to grant Gerry Adams a 48-hour visa to visit the US in order to attend a conference, contrary to

the wishes of the State Department and in the face of fierce opposition by the British government (Guelke, 1996a). The importance of the role played by the Irish diaspora was acknowledged in a Sinn Fein publication, which noted, "President Clinton is perhaps the first US president in decades to be substantially influenced by the Irish-American lobby" (in MacGinty, 1997). In the case of the Republic, the avenue of diaspora intervention referred to above may be regarded as that between diaspora and homeland government. But given the non-sovereign status of Northern Ireland, the locus of diaspora involvement in this case would more accurately be termed civil society, within which the paramilitaries may arguably be situated.

Most observers agree that the American influence on events in Northern Ireland during the past 15 years has been profound. Two main explanations are offered for the gradual reversal in the long-standing US policy of non-engagement in Northern Ireland. One is the evolving American internationalism following the end of the Cold War role. The other, however, is traced to the mobilization of the Irish American diaspora and particularly its relationship with President Clinton (Dumbrell, 2000).

South Africa and the African-American community

The tie between African Americans and Africa is far less apparent than most other diaspora–homeland links. African Americans are not normally able to identify their precise country of origin. Because slavery deprived them of tribal solidarity and of detailed historical memories, American blacks have tended to identify with all of black Africa rather than with a particular state or territory (Esman, 1986).

Until the rise of African national movements in the 1950s, the interest of African Americans in foreign affairs was minimal. Similarly, African states tended not to take advantage of the potential support available to them within the African-American community (Shain, 1999). With the notable exception of Marcus Garvey's "back to Africa" movement in the 1950s, the notion that Africa could represent any kind of physical home did not resonate among the African-American population.

Shain astutely notes that the mobilization of the black diaspora in the US against apartheid coincided with a renewed search for black identity, as exemplified by the move to change the group label from "black" to "African-American" (1999). Black leaders succeeded in making apartheid an "American" issue, by invoking the quintessentially American values of justice, human rights and equality and, in so doing, established "a

symmetry between its own agenda and the American creed of freedom and democracy, thereby challenging the Reagan administration on its own rhetoric" (Shain, 1999).

Successful African-American mobilization on behalf of the struggle against apartheid was facilitated by the marginalization of the militant tendencies with the community in favor of more established leaders and organizations such as TransAfrica, which led the struggle, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and others. As in the case of the Irish-American diaspora, the mobilization on behalf of the homeland was the province of elite community organizations and leaders and not a phenomenon that reached deep into the community rank and file. Be that as it may, the mobilization of this community resulted in what Shain calls "one of the most effective diasporic efforts to alter world politics in recent years. Through mobilization and protest action against apartheid, they managed to bring about a historic shift in US foreign policy toward Pretoria, which helped bring about change in S. Africa toward a nonracial democratic polity" (Shain, 1999).

Conclusion

The comparison of diaspora communities, with respect to the centrality of the homeland to community identity and institutional life, suggests that for the Jewish community, homeland is most resonant, relative to the other two. The link between Irish American and Ireland appears more conditioned by history and periodic crises and is nurtured by a relatively small segment of the community. Nevertheless, as demonstrated here, this connection has resulted in some formidable political achievements. Finally, African Americans, like American Jews, have drawn on their transnational attachments in the construction of their American identity (Shain, 1999). However, for them, South Africa in particular and Africa in general tend to be more abstract and somewhat removed from the very immediate material, social and educational concerns that occupy their domestic agenda.

In comparing the mobilization of the three diaspora communities studied here with respect to the peace processes under way in each of the homelands, it would seem reasonable to posit that all three have had success influencing the host government to act in what they perceived to be in the interests of their homelands. The mobilization of African Americans was exclusively focused on the host government, while its link to a homeland was decidedly nebulous. The Jewish community has been extremely successful in its lobbying of the host government on behalf of

Israel when the latter has been under real or perceived threat. However, its ability, as a fundamentally pluralistic community, to mobilize in concert with Israeli governments pursuing policies of peace has been hampered by internal ideological divisions as well as weighty organizational considerations. The impact of the American Jewish community on Israeli civil society, and to a much lesser extent on Israeli political parties, has been pronounced and sustained over time. However, its ability to influence the Israeli government for various reasons has proven very limited. It would seem that only in a scenario in which US diplomatic involvement in the Middle East assumes a much more proactive, forceful form, would the mobilization of American Jewry be able to have a discernable effect on the Israeli government, albeit indirect. The Irish-American diaspora, while much less cohesive both in terms of ethnic identity and institutional presence, has successfully swayed the host government (most notably the Clinton administration) and has also had certain palpable effects on the policies and behavior of the paramilitary and political echelons in Northern Ireland and the Republic respectively.

Note

1. Sheffer prefers the term "trans-state" when the host country and the foreign locale around which an ethnic group is mobilized are both sovereign states (1986).

References

Arthur, Paul. 1991. "Diaspora Intervention in International Affairs: Irish America as a Case Study," *Diaspora* 1(2): 143–62.

Clifford, James. 1997. "Diaspora." In Montserrat Guibernau and John Rex (eds), *The Ethnicity Reader: Nationalism*, *Multiculturalism and Migration*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Cohen, Robin. 1997. *Global Diasporas*. London: UCL Press.

Connor, Walker. 1986. "The Impact of Homelands in Diasporas." In G. Sheffer (ed.), *Modern Diasporas in International Politics*. London: Croom Helm.

Dobbs, Michael. 2001. "Foreign Aid Shrinks but Not for All," *Washington Post*, January 24, p. 1.

Dumbrell, John. 2000. "Hope and History: The US and Peace in Northern Ireland." In Michael Cox, Adrian Guelke, and Fiona Stephen (eds), *A Farewell to Arms?* Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Elazar, D. J. 1986. "The Jewish People as the Classic Diaspora: A Political Analysis." In G. Sheffer (ed.), *Modern Diasporas in International Politics*. London: Croom Helm.

Esman, Milton. 1986. "Diasporas and International Relations." In G. Sheffer (ed.), *Modern Diasporas in International Politics*. London: Croom Helm.

Glazer, Nathan and Daniel Moynihan (eds). 1975. *Ethnicity: Theory and Experience*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Guelke, Adrian. 1996a. "The United States, Irish Americans and the Northern Ireland Peace Process," *International Affairs* 72(3): 521–36.

Guelke, Adrian. 1996b. "The Impact of the End of the Cold War on the South African Transition," *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, January: 87–100.

Guttman, Nathan. 2005. "What Sharon Forgot to Tell the Jews," *Ha'aretz*, April 13 (English edition).

Hausman, Tamar. 2001. "Sacrifice of Temple Mt. Risks Ties to U.S. Jews," *Ha'aretz Daily* (English internet edition). January 5, 2001, www.haaretz.co.il/eng.

Horowitz, Dan. 1986. "Diasporas and Communal Conflicts in Divided Societies: The Case of Palestine Under the British Mandate." In G. Sheffer (ed.), *Modern Diasporas in International Politics*. London: Croom Helm.

Klandermans, Bert. 1991. "The Peace Movement and Social Movement Theory," *International Social Movement Research* 3: 1–39.

Liebman, Charles. 1991. "Moral and Symbolic Elements in the Politics of Israel-Diaspora Relations." In Stuart Cohen and Daniel Elazar (eds), *Kinship and Consent*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.

MacGinty, Roger. 1997. "American Influences on the Northern Ireland Peace Process," *The Journal of Conflict Studies* 17(2): 31–50.

Marienstras, R. 1989. "On the Notion of Diaspora." In G. Chaliand (ed.), *Minority Peoples in the Age of Nation-States*. London: Pluto Press.

McAdam, Doug, John McCarthy, and Mayer Zald. 1996. *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Medding, Peter. 1983. "The Politics of Jewry as a Mobilized Diaspora." In W. McCready (ed.), *Culture, Ethnicity and Identity*. New York: Academic Press.

Nir, Ori. 2005. "Israel Reaching Out to Dovish Groups in Bid to Counteract Conservatives Seeks Support For Gaza Plan." *The Forward*, March 11, 2005.

Safran, William. 1991. "Diaspora in Modern Societies: Myths of Homeland and Return," *Diaspora* 1(1): 83–99.

Shain, Yossi. 1999. *Marketing the American Creed Abroad*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Shain, Yossi. 2002. "The Role of Diasporas in Conflict Perpetuation or Resolution," *SAIS Review* 22(2): 115–44.

Shain, Yossi and Martin Sherman. 2001. "Diasporic Transnational Financial Flows and Their Impact on Identity," *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 7(4): 1–36.

Sheffer, Gabriel. 1986a. "A New Field of Study: Modern Diasporas in International Politics." *Modern Diasporas in International Politics*. London: Croom Helm.

Sheffer, Gabriel. 1986b. "Political aspects of Jewish fundraising for Israel". In G. Sheffer (ed.), *Modern Diasporas in International Politics*. London: Croom Helm, pp. 258–93.

Sheffer, Gabriel. 2002. "A Nation and Its Diaspora: A Re-examination of Israel-Jewish Diaspora Relations," *Diaspora* 11(3): 331–58.

Sheffer, Gabriel. 2003. "From Diasporas to Migrants – From Migrants to Diasporas." In R. Ohliger and R. Munz (eds), *Diaspora and Ethnic Migrants: Germany, Israel and Post-Soviet Successor States in Comparative Perspective*. London: Frank Cass.

7
People's Diplomacy and People's Vigilantism: Israeli Grassroots Activism 1993–2003[*]

Tamar Hermann

Introduction

From Kashmir and Sri Lanka in the East, via the Middle East, North Africa, the Balkans, the Basque country, Northern Ireland, to Latin America on the other side of the globe, the involvement of civil society organizations in the various phases and aspects of ethnonational conflicts has become more and more visible and widely acknowledged by politicians, academics, and activists alike. Yet the theoretical as well as empirical discussion of the role of civil society organizations as such in the management of ethnonational conflicts, in their furtherance or, alternatively, resolution, is too often one-sided and simplistic. It is argued here, that although armed civil militias and peace groups are actually manifestations of the same type of sociopolitical actor – civil society, only rarely are they regarded as such, instead usually being conceptualized as sharply dissimilar entities. As a result, the body of research as well as the individual researchers dealing with the first manifestation – terrorism and guerrilla – usually turn a blind eye to the peace activism, and vice versa: those focusing on peace activism are mostly oblivious to the terror and civil violence.

Thus on the one hand, traditionally, and even more so after September 11, experts on violent actions taken by civil or nonstate organizations have been emphasizing the dangerous and violence-related aspects of extraparliamentary groups and NGOs.[1] Notions

such as the "international terror cartel" were then developed to serve this sort of discussion, putting in the same basket very different groups such as the Italian Red Brigades with the IRA, the Basque ETA with the German Bader-Meinhoff gang, the PLO with the Japanese Red Army, or Al Qaeda with the antiglobalization movement.[2] The tools and tactics used by the activists, rather than their aims, ideologies, social composition, and support bases, are used in the terrorist studies framework as the main selecting criteria.[3]

Mainstream civil society/social movement studies, on the other hand, also often use a unidimensional approach. Here civil society is basically conceptualized as the antithesis to the perceived belligerent and oppressive state apparatus,[4] which accords well with the somewhat naïve belief in the fundamentally amicable nature of the man in the street.[5] Thus the existence of grassroots groups that inflame hatred is often ignored in this literature. Too often, then, civil society experts have a "blind spot" for grassroots activities and bodies that contradict their own political preferences and opinions, which admittedly, in most cases, are on the "liberal" side of the political spectrum.

Bearing in mind this Achilles' heel of both analytical schools, the aim of this paper is to critically and realistically appraise the role of civil society in the management and maintenance of ethnonational conflict based on the Israeli case study. This will be done by closely exploring the role of Israeli civil society activities in the turbulent course of Israeli-Palestinian relations in the decade after the signing of the Oslo Declaration of Principles in 1993. In this context the paper will look at peace activism and peace organizations on the one hand, and on the other at "peace spoilers,"[6] i.e., Israeli grassroots organizations and groups that aim at preventing processes of conflict resolution from gaining momentum, for example, the Jewish settlers' militias in the occupied territories. On the more general level, the exploration of the Israeli case is expected to pinpoint the public sectors that are particularly "susceptible" to being mobilized by either pro-peace or peace-spoiling civil organizations, and the means and rhetoric that are used to pry average citizens out of their normal apathy and into political action. Last but not least, the paper will try to distinguish the relations between civil society organizations dealing with the ethnonational conflict and external players, such as national diasporas, known usually to extend moral and financial support to nationalistic fractions and organizations in the motherland, as opposed to international foundations that usually assist pro-peace civil society activities and organizations.

Citizens' activism in Israel: a brief overview

Traditionally, issues of war and peace have been among the most "protected" ones, in terms of the citizens' and civil organizations' ability to have a voice in the policymaking process.[7] The entrusting of the politicians and the generals with full authority while (self-)downplaying the citizens' role was based on the common wisdom regarding the extreme complexity and critical nature of the issues at stake, as well as citizens' low access to the highly classified information on which decisions should be based. However, in the last few decades in Israel, similar to many other countries, the voice of the public is not only better heard but also considered more legitimate.[8] This gradual yet substantial change has had much to do with the global decrease in the public's confidence in the state institutions. Traditional authorities seem to have been "relocated," with the old power centers losing their hegemonic position.[9] This process has been abetted by the present availability to the interested public of immense quantities of data on almost every possible issue, including the most confidential aspects of the state's foreign and security relations. Social actors, then, can skillfully compete with the authorized institutions in at least shaping public opinion.[10]

Citizens' activism became an integral and legitimate part of the repertoire of political modes of operation in Israel only in the 1970s.[11] The first two decades of statehood (1948 to late 1960s) were characterized by centralist and collectivist tendencies. Voluntary/civil-based political endeavors were discouraged, as they were considered to be against the state's interest. Particularly in the 1950s, the Israeli government was preoccupied with establishing and demonstrating its authority, and such efforts were looked upon as undermining this supremacy.[12] Political parties were the only channel through which the public was expected to transmit its views and demands The national structural and perceptual traits did not change much in this respect until the late 1960s. Furthermore, the improving standard of living, the rising consumerism and individualism toward the end of that decade, together with the general fatigue after years of extensive national mobilization and actual warfare, enhanced the citizens' tendency to concentrate on the private rather than the public sphere. Civil activity was then unusual.

By the end of the 1960s, the overall "political structure of opportunities" became more favorable for extraparliamentary activity. First of all, the stability of the political system and authority of the decision-makers

had, by then, solidified. Second, the security threat declined significantly following the 1967 war, enabling nonconformist attitudes and actions to be more tolerantly regarded. At the same time, new but major controversies emerged, mainly connected to the post-1967 war territorial issues. Several other factors increased the popularity of civil activity. News reports about the American civil rights movement, student revolts, and the anti-Vietnam War campaigns in the West made the notion of direct political participation of ordinary citizens in "high politics" more acceptable to both the Israeli public and its elite. Growing noncompliance and the search for alternative modes of political self-expression were also encouraged by the generational change that took place in Israel in the late 1960s. The young people just entering the political arena were politically socialized in the Israeli milieu; moreover, never having experienced such collective traumas as the Holocaust or the bloody struggle for independence, their basic sense of security and self-reliance was much higher than that of their parents' generation, as was their readiness to criticize the authorities' decisions and actions.

These developments led to a deep transformation in the Israeli repertoire of political activism in the early 1970s. The massive wave of soldiers' protest after the 1973 war contributed much to legitimizing active extra-parliamentarism and to breaking the taboo on openly criticizing the formal foreign and security policies of the government.[13] Thus, in the mid-1970s the right-wing movement – to this day, still the largest – Gush Emunim (Bloc of the Faithful) was established, and a few years later in 1978, Peace Now, the still-largest Israeli peace movement emerged.[14] Alongside those two large civil movements, numerous smaller bodies dealing with peace-related matters have emerged, becoming quite visible participants in the national security discourse. Civic political activity in this realm peaked during the Lebanon War (1982) and the first Palestinian Intifada (1987–90). Intensive peace/war-related civil activities have, then, been notable on both the Left and the Right, with the former advocating concessions so as to obtain an agreement with the Palestinians and the latter pushing to make the occupied territories an integral part of the State of Israel.

The Oslo process: a strategic shift and its effects on Israeli civil society organizations

Labor's victory in the 1992 elections marked a turning point in Israel's formal attitude to peace talks. The new government headed by Yitzhak

Rabin declared from the outset its intention to pursue the cause of peace and made the achievement of a political breakthrough its main goal. At the same time, Rabin's victory was also based on his reputation as "Mr. Security." In other words, although Israeli society had authorized him to proceed with the talks according to the Madrid framework, it also expected him to guard Israel's security interests carefully. The signing of the Oslo Declaration of Principles (DOP) in August 1993 and of the formal agreement in Washington in September were not, then, a total "surprise." Still, public opinion was not at all prepared for such a leap forward. Against the background of the traditional formal position of all past Israeli governments – Labor and Likud – which defined the Arab–Israeli conflict as zero-sum, and the longstanding delegitimization of any Palestinian claim to the land or to an independent state, the Rabin government's adoption of the above-mentioned position regarding the acceptable costs of a political solution shocked many in Israel.

How did Israeli public opinion actually react to this shift? To understand the response of the civil society organizations, it helps first to look at what could be called "unorganized" public opinion – that is, the general public perceptions as measured by opinion polls.

As Figure 1 suggests,[15] throughout the Rabin-Peres era, Israeli Jewish public opinion (marked below as the "Oslo Index") was split almost down the middle between the supporters and opponents of the Oslo process. Not once after the signing of the Oslo agreement did an absolute majority of Israeli Jews support it and believe it at the same time.[16]

Monthly means, June 1994–April 2003

Oslo index —— Support mean …… Beliefe mean - - -

Figure 1 Israeli general public opinion on the Oslo process

Monthly means, June 1994–December 2003

Figure 2   Oslo index by Left-Right voting

As expected, support for Oslo was much higher among the voters of the parties left to center (Labor and Meretz) than among the voters of the right-wing and religious parties (see Figure 2).[17]

   As both graphs show, Israeli public support for Oslo started to decline significantly – not, as the common wisdom claims, after the failed Camp David summit in the summer of 2000, but well before that, already a few months after Barak was elected in May 1999. Apparently the ongoing deadlock in the political negotiations that was not resolved after these elections, with the frequent Palestinian terror acts against civilians within and outside the Green Line, made the majority of Israeli Jews disillusioned with the process and with the Palestinian partners well before the process had been declared dead by the decisionmakers. Nevertheless, this erosion clearly accelerated after Camp David. Certainly, with the outbreak of the second Palestinian Intifada in October 2000, support for the process within Israel hit an unprecedented low, and ever since has been limited to less than 30 per cent of the Jewish population. This, at the moment, seems to constitute the rather limited reservoir for civil activities aimed at promoting a peace plan similar to the Oslo formula. At the same time, since mid-2001 the number of those who support resuming political negotiations with the Palestinian Authority, though not in the Oslo framework, has amounted to 50 per cent and higher. Furthermore, the support for a "two-state" solution came to over 70 per cent of the Jewish public. These data suggest that although Oslo per se

is not popular, its core postulates have indeed been absorbed into the Israeli Jewish national consensus.

Civil activities during the Oslo period

The political Right

The strategic shift in Israel's formal policy signaled by the launching of the Oslo process was perceived by the political Right as extremely dangerous and mistaken.[18] The Oslo narrative adopted by the right-wing parties and groups reflected many reservations about the process: the unreasonable security risks and impairment of the Zionist endeavor it entailed, and the religious transgression it implied.

Taking into consideration that the Right attributes ultimate religious and national importance to Jewish possession of the entire Land of Israel, and invested so much energy and resources since 1967 in constructing and expanding the settlement project, it is not at all surprising that the parliamentary factions and civil NGOs of this political camp joined forces in an effort to reverse the process. Organizing effective civil opposition was not easy for the Right at this rather euphoric stage, as most Israelis would have liked to "give peace a chance." Furthermore, the previously major civil organization of this political camp, Gush Emunim, had been hibernating for much of the late 1980s and early 1990s, with many of its prominent activists already absorbed into the state-sponsored settlement administration apparatus. The cooptation of this movement into the state's various agencies dealing with the settlement project, which had proved so conducive to promoting the settlers' political causes during the first Likud era, appeared in the early 1990s as a significant obstacle to organizing effective right-wing political protest against the Labor government's new policy. Yet, with the help of the political parties of the Right – and of wealthy Jewish supporters mainly from the United States and Australia – other, often more radical right-wing groups managed to organize some massive, mostly nonviolent anti-Oslo activities. Vicious pamphlets, some of them bearing a photomontage of Rabin entitled "traitor" and dressed in Nazi uniform, were distributed all over the country and raised on placards in the anti-Oslo rallies. After Rabin's assassination in 1995, many in Israel argued that those placards should have been treated as violent acts, as apparently "words do kill."

The profile of the activists in these right-wing civil activities was often that of people between the ages of 16 and 40, traditional or Orthodox in terms of religious self-definition, of average and below level of education

and average and below income. Their ethnic origin was mixed, with Mizrahi (Sephardi) and Ashkenazi acting together. Men were somewhat more numerous in the right-wing activities than women, though one of the prominent civil groups that emerged on the Right after Oslo was a vociferous women's group called "Women in Green." The settlers and their supporters played a pivotal role in the activities against Rabin's government; if the process was to progress, in due course it would have entailed an extensive evacuation of settlements in the West Bank and Gaza.

However, the most visible extraparliamentary group on the Right at that time was one called Zo Artzenu (This Is Our Land), which was established to protest what its founders saw as the settler community's betrayal of its own cause, their anti-Oslo activities allegedly being too compliant. Ironically invoking the civil disobedience model of Martin Luther King, Zo Artzenu protested the government's alleged betrayal of the religious value of settling the entire land of the forefathers, and also of vital Israeli security interests. The group used several techniques of nonviolent resistance that were relatively successful in getting its voice heard. Its leader, Moshe Feiglin, stood trial in 1997 for impairing the public order; eventually he was almost fully acquitted on the basis of the right of free speech.

Although the right-wing civil groups were careful during these years not to openly advocate violent means, at least two individuals in this political camp used them and enjoyed rather significant support from their fellows. The first act was committed against Palestinians and the second against Prime Minister Rabin. Baruch Goldstein was a Kahanist born in Brooklyn, New York. After emigrating to Israel, he served as a physician in the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). Later he worked as a physician and lived in the Kiryat Arba settlement. On 25 February 1994, in the Cave of the Patriarchs, a site in Hebron, holy to both Muslims and Jews, in a mass shooting attack, Goldstein killed 29 Muslim Palestinians during Friday prayers. After being subdued with a fire extinguisher, he was beaten to death by survivors. Rioting immediately following the massacre led to the deaths of another 26 Palestinians and two Israelis. The commission of inquiry found that Goldstein had acted on his own. His actions were immediately condemned by the Israeli government and the Israeli populace in general. However, he became a hero to some Israeli right-wing extremists, and members of the outlawed Kach organization glorify his mass murder.

The expected ceding of certain territories in the context of carrying out the interim agreements and the expected extensive evacuation of

settlements with the implementation of a final status agreement were widely condemned by some prominent figures in the Orthodox rabbinical establishment, which by and large stood behind the Right. A few rabbis even declared Rabin an offender according to Halachic (Jewish religious) law, and as deserving the death penalty. Either directly or indirectly because of such avowals, on 5 November 1995, Yitzhak Rabin was murdered by Yigal Amir, a political activist of the religious radical Right and a law student at the religious Bar-Ilan University.[19] Apparently not dispatched by a specific citizens' group, but involved in many anti-Oslo civil society activities, Amir took a step that in retrospect seems to have been rather successful in derailing the peace process. The entire Israeli society was deeply shocked by the assassination, yet there is evidence that in certain civil circles of the Right and in various settlements people actually expressed satisfaction at Amir's act.

Less than a year after the tragic event, new elections were held. The result was that the right-wing Likud Party set up a new government headed by Benjamin Netanyahu. In the ensuing years, civil activities of the Right declined considerably in volume and visibility, to some degree in response to the prevalent sense in Israel and elsewhere that Rabin's assassination was perhaps the handiwork of an individual, but basically the bitter fruit of the incitement against the peace process and its leaders by prominent figures and many citizens of the Right. Hence, in the second half of the 1990s this camp was less active in the civil sphere, though it may also be the case that there was no need for such protest, as the Likud-led government slowed the peace negotiations, let alone the withdrawal from the territories to a minimum.

The Left (peace camp)

From the late 1960s and much more conspicuously since the late 1970s, various groups and organizations, often designated by the umbrella term "Israeli peace camp" or "peace movement," have rejected the logic of power politics and promoting the notion of compromises and win-win solutions in the context of the Middle East conflict. These groups criticize the use of military means for resolving international conflicts as more costly and less effective than political means. Unlike the Israeli mainstream in the pre-Oslo era, the peace groups had already recognized the Palestinians' right to self-determination, and the PLO as their legitimate representative. They also acknowledged that significant territorial concessions by Israel, painful as they might be, are worthwhile in terms of the state's long-range security. In fact, after the Israeli Communist Party, which was always widely suspected in the country of not siding

with Israel but with the Arabs, the peace movement was the first to promote the "two states for two peoples" solution, an idea that was then widely deplored. At the same time, the larger and more visible peace organizations, principally Peace Now, have openly identified with the basic Zionist creed and have never embraced antimilitaristic or pacifist positions. In fact, the notion of justified or "no choice" wars was an integral part of most Israeli peace organizations' agendas, and most peace activists have served in the reserve forces when called upon, sometimes immediately before or after they participated in some peace protest.

Traditionally, Israeli peace activists, whose number varied from tens of thousands in certain peak periods (late 1980s to early 1990s) to much lower totals, thousands and even fewer, in "normal" times since 1993, have shown a fairly homogeneous sociodemographic profile, rather different from that of the right-wing activists and also less diversified. The peace activists were somewhat older, mostly in their thirties and forties and today, on average, even somewhat older than that. With few exceptions they were of Ashkenazi descent, secular, urban, on average highly educated, and mostly middle-class. The number of women among them was significantly high, a fact that proved problematic in terms of their ability to gain the public's trust; women usually have no combat experience and are perceived by many in Israel as unqualified to deal with security issues. Individually, the average peace activist was located in or near the Israeli sociopolitical center, with quite a number of them holding prominent academic and other professional positions. Yet, because of their nonconformist views about the conflict, as a political collective they were relegated to the margins. The mainstream and political-establishment organs and parties, from Likud to Labor, were reluctant to "buy" the peace movement's outlook – until suddenly, in 1993, almost all their postulates were adopted by the Rabin government when it "jumped into" the Oslo process.

The strategic transformation that the Oslo process entailed seemed to have been a great success from the movement's point of view, and indeed the movement at large, other than some small radical bodies, publicly applauded and supported the Labor government's move at first. However, almost immediately after the signing of the Oslo DOP, it became apparent that while significant parts of its agenda had been adopted by the government, the peace movement itself was shunned and kept far from the negotiations. Furthermore, the Israeli decisionmakers refused to give the movement any credit for its past efforts and sometimes

even scorned it in public, all in an apparently calculated effort to disassociate the peace process from the peace movement. Yet, as mentioned above, the peace activists have by and large refrained from claiming any credit for the basic "formula." In fact, they continued supporting the Labor government, even when it appeared, and already at an early stage of the negotiations claimed that the policies adopted by Rabin and his cabinet were not sufficiently flexible and forthcoming in the eyes of many peace activists.[20]

Nevertheless, in the early 1990s after years of exhausting activism, mostly in constant friction with the mainstream, before and particularly during the years of the first Palestinian intifada (1987–90), many peace activists and groups had had enough, and decided to leave peace-building in the government's hands. There were also some doubts about the need and legitimacy for such civil activism when the peace issue was being handled by the government. The level of peace activism therefore declined, and the peace movement actually hibernated for most of the first half of the 1990s. Although in later years it occasionally brought thousands to the public squares in protests against anti-peace acts by the Netanyahu and, later, Sharon governments, as well as to counter right-wing activism, these were but sporadic events and were apparently insufficient to reawaken the peace camp even when the situation called for it. Somewhat more effective in raising public awareness were projects such as the "settlement watch" operated by Peace Now, which was very important in exposing the realities of ongoing land expropriations and expansion of settlements, contrary to the agreements signed with the Palestinians and the official declarations of both the Likud and the Labor governments.

Despite the decrease in its vitality, several structural and ideological developments in Israeli peace activism since the first half of the 1990s are noteworthy. The first development was the institutionalization process that the movement has undergone. Formerly completely voluntary, grassroots-based bodies, Peace Now, for example, has changed its apparatus so that it will be at least partly composed of paid staff. With the rather generous financial assistance coming from external donors like the EU and certain international foundations such as Ford, and from Jewish sister-organizations such as American Peace Now, which were interested in supporting the peace process from below, some peace groups also rented larger offices and registered formally with the authorities to get tax benefits. The new organizations that emerged at that time – for example, the Israeli-Palestinian women's organization the Jerusalem Link (with Bat Shalom, "Daughter of Peace," being its Israeli component) – were

often not only supported by external donors rather than by Israeli activists and supporters, but their structure and mode of activity were also highly influenced by these donors' perceptions and even ideological agendas. For example, citizens' groups that opposed the Oslo formula, opting instead for the binational solution, were not granted external funding.

All pro-peace efforts were rebuffed by the breakdown of the Oslo process in July 2000 and the eruption of the second intifada that October following a prolonged stalemate in the negotiations, as well as the apparent Israeli reluctance to implement the interim agreements on the one hand and the Palestinian Authority's inability or unwillingness to prevent terrorist attacks on the other. Many peace activists practically disappeared from the streets, opting for what is referred to in the literature as "internal exit" – i.e., individual abandonment of the public sphere and restricting oneself to private matters. The "hard-core" activists, however, often reacted by radicalizing their agenda.

The collapse of the Oslo process and the outbreak of the Palestinian intifada

The failure of the Camp David summit in July 2000, the disillusionment with the other side, and the frustration at the failed elections were all the greater because they came after a period of such great hope and a promising beginning. The outbreak of the intifada and the ensuing deterioration in Israeli-Palestinian relations into waves of mutual violence that were in many ways unprecedented have pushed Israeli Jewish public opinion far from the positions of the peace camp while boosting the appeal of the Right. The civil organizations have reacted to this traumatic experience in various ways.

The Right

On the Right, the events were taken as solid proof of their original reading of the other side's basically negative intentions. The time was not right, however, for dwelling on "we told you so" tactics. The many incidents of Palestinian shootings at passing Israeli cars in the territories and the killings of civilians within the settlements prompted the organization of a number of Jewish civil militia groups that have been patrolling the roads in addition to the IDF patrols, yet without the supervision of the authorities and sometimes with their tacit consent.

These civil self-reliance initiatives did not stop at securing traffic. Members of the patrols have also entered Palestinian villages and towns and taken revenge for Palestinian acts, often targeting innocent bystanders and destroying the property of Palestinians who had nothing to do with attacks on Israelis. Some settler activists went to Palestinian villages and uprooted olive trees to demonstrate their domination of the land. In other instances they violently interfered, by shooting and rioting, with the picking of olives by neighboring Palestinian villagers.[21] Indeed, a number of Israeli peace activists came to these villages to express solidarity with the Palestinians and protect them from the settlers' wrath. But since in most cases they stayed no longer than a day or two, their activities, however symbolically important, were less effective than those of the right-wing activists, who live nearby and pose a constant physical and psychological threat to the Palestinians around them. Following some of the terrorist attacks on Israeli civilians, Palestinian passersby were attacked by right-wing activists. A few tiny underground cells of this camp who targeted Palestinian civilians to avenge suicide bombings were discovered by the security authorities, mostly before they managed to carry out their schemes but in some cases only afterward.

Another element in the civil activism of the radical Right is found among the younger generation of the settlers and is often called the Hilltop Youth (*Noar Ha'Gvaot*). These youngsters, mostly Orthodox men aged 16–25, many of them already born and raised in "old" settlements, created their own new, miniature, illegal outposts of a few people each outside the large settlements, often next to Palestinian villages. These outposts were often established in response to some terrorist event, but collectively they manifest a strategic aim: the creation of a new geopolitical reality of Jewish presence all over the West Bank, in such a way that drawing a borderline there between Jews and Palestinian would become virtually impossible. The attempts – again, not too serious – by the IDF and the police to remove these illegal outposts met fierce and often very violent resistance by these youngsters, who have been supported logistically and even more so ideologically by the adult leaders of the settler community.[22]

By and large, however, until Prime Minister Sharon declared his unilateral disengagement plan (December 2003), the Right's motivation for civil initiatives against the government was low, since the government's policies were fairly congruent with its purposes. However, with the introduction of the disengagement plan, which included the removal of all Jewish settlements in the Gaza Strip and a few in the northern West Bank,

the citizens' groups of the Right have awoken. In a rather impressive demonstration of civil activity, they convinced the majority of the Likud members and later the party's caucus to vote against the plan, inflicting two major political defeats on the not-sufficiently-right-wing government. Indeed, Sharon did not stop this trend but, by the use of machiavellian means such as firing ministers of the radical-Right parties, managed to gain majority support in his cabinet for his plan. The civil activism, however, did not end, despite the many indications that the general public was highly supportive of Sharon's move, and despite the massive opposition to conscientious objection by soldiers who opposed the plan or accepted the spiritual authority of prominent Orthodox and even some ultra-Orthodox rabbis who justified, on religious grounds, even fierce physical opposition by the settlers and their supporters to Israeli withdrawal from any part of the Land of Israel.

The Left (peace camp)

From the peace camp's point of view, the collapse of the negotiations and, much worse, the upsurge in Palestinian violence against Israeli civilians and particularly the growing number of suicide bombings, was a severe blow. Their political rationale seemed to have been discredited, and many former activists turned their backs on the option of reconciliation with the Palestinians. The external financial support dried up almost completely as many liberal Jewish donors also became disillusioned with the cause of peace. The post-September 11, 2001 international environment was also not conducive to talking peace with Arab counterparts. Needless to say, following the massive Israeli military campaigns of retaliation the situation has become unsuitable for Israeli-Palestinian dialogue, not only because travel between Israel and the territories has become practically impossible owing to the closures and checkpoints and the security risks for Israelis entering Palestinian areas, but mainly because the Palestinian participants have become antagonistic toward such interactions. At the same time, certain civil peace ventures proved quite resistant to the negative climate and continued to operate. These are usually the most "institutionalized" projects, such as the *Palestine-Israel Journal*, well-established NGOs such as Israel-Palestine Center for Research and Information (IPCRI), and perhaps most interestingly, the Bereaved Parents group, which, for the cause of promoting peace, brings together Palestinian and Israeli parents who have lost children to violent actions of the other side.

Given the shift in public opinion, peace rallies and demonstrations, which used to be a favorite means of the peace groups, have been

only minimally attended and become close to obsolete. The remaining core of peace activists and groups have had, therefore, to develop new ideological options and modes of activity. Ideologically, as in the late 1990s, the common reaction took the form of radicalization. Criticism of the Israeli government has reached new levels, including, for example, calls from various peace organizations for international intervention in the conflict, an idea that the government and public currently strongly oppose. Most peace groups intensely and vociferously oppose the building of the separation fence or wall. Beyond just opposing it at home, groups of activists have tried to block the bulldozers with their bodies and a few were even shot at by soldiers. Some peace activists went further and traveled to The Hague in February 2004 to express their opposition there, jointly with Palestinians, while the case of the wall was discussed by the international tribunal. Taking into consideration the fact that the State of Israel had decided not to take part in the discussions, not recognizing the tribunal's authority to deal with this matter, such an act by the peace activists was indeed highly contested.

Another development was the emergence of a new type of civil peace organization – the large initiatives, mainly the Ayalon-Nusseibeh (People's Voice) and Geneva initiatives. Both were based on the assumption that if a strong enough wave of public support for resuming the political negotiations was created, the decisionmakers would not be able to ignore it. In both cases, the organizers faced the question of how to create such a popular trend when the facts on the ground appeared so antithetical to peace. The idea of the People's Voice leaders – Sari Nusseibeh, a renowned academic and independent Palestinian political activist, and Ami Ayalon, a former commander of the Israeli navy and former head of the General Security Service (Shabak) – was to present the general public – not the "classical" pro-peace audience – a short document outlining the features of the final status agreement. The aim was to garner hundreds of thousands of signatures of Israelis and Palestinians, hopefully even a million and more. Collected through the Internet, public booths, telephone, mail, and the like, the signatures were to be presented to the authorized decisionmakers of both sides in the hope this would impel them to renew the negotiations and eventually reach an agreement along the above lines. Eventually, over 400,000 signatures of Israelis and Palestinians were collected. The first lists were presented to the president of Israel in a small ceremony. However, this event and the campaign in general have not attracted wide media attention, and the collection of signatures is progressed slowly, clearly not gaining enough

momentum to shake up the political establishment or change the climate of opinion.

The second, Geneva initiative was not based on signature collection but on a carefully constructed document, much longer than the Ayalon-Nusseibeh one. The Geneva document described the final status agreement in great detail (though it remained vague on some critical issues such as the Palestinian refugees' right of return). From its inception, the Geneva initiative has received wide media and public attention both in Israel and abroad. The reasons for this interest were many. First, the initiative was attacked as "subversive" by Prime Minister Sharon shortly before it was publicized and hence was considered important from day 1. Second, its leaders – including Yossi Beilin, one of the most visible leaders of the Zionist Left and a former member of Knesset, as well as other Labor politicians and even several public figures more to the Right – worked tirelessly to get the blessing of prominent world leaders for their move, including Nelson Mandela, Mikhail Gorbachev, Bill Clinton, and Kofi Annan. The Geneva document has also had wide public exposure, and copies were mailed to every home in Israel. So although most Israelis found it far too long (47 pages) and complicated to read cover-to-cover, they became aware of its existence and related to it one way or another. The reactions of the media and the political actors to this initiative were extensive but mixed. Some applauded it as courageous and effective, while many others denounced it as an unauthorized if not unlawful move by a civil organization that undermined the efforts of the Israeli government to deal effectively with the Palestinians. The fact that this initiative has been financially supported by external bodies – the Swiss and Japanese governments and the EU – in addition to the funds donated by certain Israeli businessmen, has harmed its public image, with opponents portraying the initiative as a vehicle for promoting foreign interests that do not comport with Israeli ones. In due course, this initiative also slowed down considerably, and its political effectiveness seems quite low, even though unexpected sources ascribed much importance to it. In an interview given to the Israeli newspaper *Ha'aretz* in October 2004, Sharon's closest political adviser, attorney Dov Weissglas, admitted that Sharon launched his disengagement campaign so as to contain the growing influence of the Geneva initiative.[23]

Another recent development in the civil society sphere, which seems more lasting and ultimately more significant than the two massive grassroots initiatives, is the emergence of the "refusenik" phenomenon. After the outbreak of the second intifada and the reoccupation of the

Palestinian areas by Israeli forces, the number of Israelis, whether before conscription, in active duty, or in the reserves, who have declared their refusal to serve in the occupied territories dramatically increased – from a few hundred over the first 55 years of Israel's existence to over 700 between January 2002 and January 2005. The refuseniks were not all cut of the same cloth. A small number demanded exemption from all military service based on pacifist convictions, but the larger group, many of whom operate in the framework of the new "Courage to Refuse" NGO, said they were willing to serve but not in the occupied territories. Among this group were not only "ordinary" soldiers but also some from elite units, including air force pilots and commando fighters. This, along with the activity of a new antimilitaristic group, New Profile, which calls for the demilitarization of Israeli society, apparently marked a significant change in the Israeli national ethos that in the past idolized the army and military service. This phenomenon has clearly disturbed the authorities to the extent that Chief of Staff Moshe Ya'alon went so far as to declare in January 2004 that the weakest link in national defense was the Israeli public and its "lack of stamina." Israelis, he said in a press conference, are not prepared to fight for their goals and risk their lives, and there has been no agreement on what the fighting is about since September 2000.

However, as often happens, in this case too, modes of operation have "spilled over" from one political camp to another. Thus, in 2004–5 the Israeli radical Right, which in the past has fiercely denounced refusal by left-wing soldiers as antidemocratic, antipatriotic, and immoral, encouraged massive refusal by soldiers of its own political camp to take part in the evacuation of the settlements, thereby impeding the disengagement plan.

Summary and conclusions

The discussion above has dealt with the plethora of civil activities and organizations in Israel addressing, from various angles, Israeli–Palestinian relations in the years since the signing of the Oslo DOP. As noted in the opening section of the paper, the activities and organizations, separated by the Left-Right line of division, were of various types, with the Left camp using only nonviolent though not always legal means, and the Right camp combining nonviolent with clearly violent and illegal measures. Indeed, it would have been more pleasant to present only those civil activities that do not involve violence and promote coexistence rather than antagonism. But a candid study cannot turn a blind

eye to those groups that do not look favorably on a settling of ethnonational conflict that entails a "price tag" and are therefore striving to derail the process. The empirical findings described above not only indicate that it is inaccurate to portray a peace-seeking civil society that is struggling against a war-mongering state or government, but; moreover, the facts do not support the assumption, highly popular in some circles, that if power were given to the people, war would have dissipated and peace would have prevailed.

Moreover, the Israeli case suggests that even civil groups of the same political camp may react differently to the same realities. Thus, some opt for nonviolent measures while others regard forceful means as more effective. This puts in question the assumption of a correlation between the tactics employed and the ideology that is being served by them. Such a perfect correlation might be expected only in the case of the extremist groups. For example, it is not likely that pacifist groups would use force to promote their cause, nor that ultranationalist bodies would refrain from using force as glorified in their ideology. The less radical organizations, Left and Right, are likely to choose their tactics – violent or nonviolent – based on rational considerations such as: the estimated impact of the tactics on promoting or preventing certain policies; the likelihood of forceful responses by the state security forces; the expected reaction of the relevant audiences at home or abroad; the resources available to the group; the readiness of its members to risk imprisonment if they take illegal actions; the time available for introducing the sociopolitical changes they strive for; the tactics employed by their countergroups; the level of media interest in their activities, and so on. All these can be placed under the umbrella term "structure of political opportunities," which gives us the theoretical framework for analyzing both "terrorist" and "peaceful" civil organizations in a more meaningful manner than when regarded separately.

Somewhat paradoxically, the Israeli case may suggest that confrontation with the state authorities keeps civil organizations alive and invigorates them, while more harmonious relations with the authorities may deflate the activists' efforts. Thus, when the settlement project was adopted by the Israeli government, and when the territories were reoccupied by the Israeli army following the eruption of the second intifada so that pre-Oslo conditions were in many respects reestablished, the right-wing groups' motivation for activity declined considerably. The same happened for the Left when major parts of the peace movement's agenda were adopted by the Rabin government. It proved difficult to maintain the movement's momentum when peacemaking was taken

over by the authorized bodies. The difference in the ability of the Ayalon-Nusseibeh and Geneva initiatives to attract attention seems also to sustain the inference about the advantages for a civil initiative of confrontation with the political establishment: while the first was not put on a defiant footing and hence has gone almost unnoticed, the attack by the prime minister and other politicians on the Geneva initiative apparently contributed to its greater public exposure and, perhaps, political efficacy.

This brings us to perhaps the most interesting and important question in the study of civil organizations: to what extent can they really change the political scene when it comes to "high politics" matters such as peace-making? Our case study suggests that it would be a mistake to look only for direct influences on specific policies or decisions and to evaluate such organizations' success or failure based on their ability to alter a specific government's course; mostly, that is not what civil society organizations are good at. Their abilities lie much more in cultivating the ground for cognitive changes and introducing new ideas and options to the national repertoire that, in turn, modify the national policy. Thus, in retrospect, it seems that the tireless efforts of the various peace groups to change the Israeli public's and political establishment's perceptions of the advantages of a political solution to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, or, on a smaller scale, of the usefulness of the IDF presence in South Lebanon, were much more effective than the specific protests against, for example, the construction of the separation wall or the demolition of particular houses.

At the same time, civil organizations that struggle to maintain the status quo, like those that fought against the Oslo process, tend to be more successful in their mobilization efforts than groups that strive to introduce a change in the national modus operandi, like the peace organizations that advocated a shift in the traditional perception of Israel's external relations. Furthermore, civil organizations that embrace national values and norms and emphasize their patriotic nature have a much better chance of gaining wide public support in times of conflict – which almost always prevail in the Middle East – than organizations, such as the peace organizations, that advocate universal values and seek the application of the same normative standards to their own collective and that of the "enemy." Also, at least in the Israeli context, financial and other kinds of assistance from international bodies seem to present a problem, as it puts in question, for the general public, the recipient organizations' "patriotic" nature.

Notes

1. For an unusually sensible analysis of such (Islamic) civil groups and organizations, see Metcalf, 2001.
2. Alexander and Pluchinsky, 1992; Karmon, 2005.
3. Crenshaw, 1990; Ganor, 2001. For an exceptionally observant study in this respect, see Waldman, 1992.
4. Hanagan *et al.* (1998).
5. E.g., Cortright, 1993.
6. For a discussion of this term, see Darby and McGinty, 2000; Stedman, 1997.
7. Arian, 1999; Shamir and Shamir, 2000.
8. Everts and Isernia, 2001; Hermann and Yaar, 2005.
9. Holsti, 1992.
10. Giugni, *et al.*, 1999.
11. Lehman-Wilzig, 1990, 1992; Hermann, 1996.
12. Horowitz and Lissak, 1990.
13. Hermann, 2004.
14. Hermann and Newman, 1992.
15. All survey findings presented below are taken from the Peace Index survey project, conducted by the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research, Tel Aviv University. (The data can be found at http://www.tau.ac.il, under Peace Index.)
16. Somewhat paradoxically, on average, the highest support and belief levels were registered during the Netanyahu era. This finding probably reflects the growing number of right-wing voters who expressed support for the process based on Netanyahu's affirmation of Israel's need to fulfill the commitments it had made by signing the different Oslo documents.
17. The reason that the very high support levels for Oslo among left-wing voters do not influence the results for the overall sample is their much lower and still declining percentage in the Israeli population. In other words, the Israeli-Jewish population is not split evenly between Left and Right, so that the much larger group, the Right, which by and large opposes Oslo, pulls the calculated means downward.
18. Sprinzak, 1998.
19. Peri, 2000.
20. Hermann, 2005.
21. Fichter, 2004.
22. Sasson, 2005.
23. Shavit, 2004.

References

Alexander, J. and Pluchinsky, D. 1992. *Europe's Red Terrorists*. London: Frank Cass.

Arian, A. 1999. *Security Threatened: Surveying Israeli Opinion on Peace and War*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Cortright, D. 1993. *Peace Works: The Citizen's Role in Ending the Cold War*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Crenshaw, M. 1990. "The Logic of Terrorism as the Product of Strategic Choice, and Questions to Be Answered, Research to Be Done, Knowledge to Be Applied." In W. Reich (ed.), *Origins of Terrorism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 7–24.

Darby, J. and McGinty R. (eds). 2000. *The Management of Peace Processes*. London: Macmillan.

Everts, P. and Isernia P. (eds). 2001. *When the Going Gets Tough: Public Opinion and the Use of Military Force*. London: Routledge.

Fichter, D. 2004. Extremists and Pragmatists: Israel's Far Right. *Yale Israel Journal* 3(Winter), http://www.yaleisraeljournal.com/wintr2004/fichter.php.

Ganor, B. 2001. *Terrorism: No Prohibition without Definition*. Herzliya: International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, Herzliya Interdisciplinary Center, http://www.idc,org.

Giugni, M., McAdam, D., and Tilly, C. (eds). 1999. *How Social Movements Matter*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Hanagan, M., Page, M. L., and te, B. W. 1998. "Challenging Authority: The Historical Study of Contentious Politics." In Michael Hanagan, Leslie Page Moch, and Wayne te Brake (eds), *Challenging Authority*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. ix–xxix.

Hermann, T. 1996. "Do They Have a Chance? Protest and Political Structure of Opportunities in Israel," *Israel Studies* 1(1): 144–70.

Hermann, T. 2001. "Blame or Praise: Israeli Contending Narratives of the Peace Movement's Role in the Oslo Process." In Avraham Ben Zvi and Aharon Klieman (eds), *Global Politics: Essays in Honor of Professor David Vital*. London: Frank Cass, pp. 237–66.

Hermann, T. 2004. "Citizens' Protest on Security-Related Issues in Israel: The Case of 1973–1974." In Anat Kurtz (ed.), *Thirty Years Later: Challenges to Israel Since the Yom Kippur War*. Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, pp. 65–75.

Hermann, T. 2005. *The Israeli Peace Movement Looks in the Mirror: The Oslo Process and Its Effects on the Movement*. A summary of discussions in meetings of activists (May 5, June 8, 2004). Submitted to USIP, 75 pp.

Hermann, T. and Newman, D. 1992. "Extra-Parliamentarism in Israel: A Comparative Study of Gush Emunim and Peace Now," *Middle Eastern Studies* 28(3): 509–30.

Hermann, T. and Yaar, E. 2005. "When the Policymaker and the Public Meet: Sharon, Israeli Public Opinion and the Unilateral Disengagement Plan," *Palestine-Israel Journal* 11(3–4): 93–100.

Holsti, O. 1992. "Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Challenges to the Almond-Lippmann Consensus," *International Studies Quarterly* 36: 439–66.

Horowitz, D. and Lissak, M. 1990. *Trouble in Utopia: The Overburdened Polity of Israel*. Tel Aviv: Am Oved (Hebrew).

Karmon, E. 2005. "Hizballah and the Anti-globalization Movement: A New Coalition?" PolicyWatch, No. 949, January 27, Analysis of Near East Policy, The Washington Institute.

Lehman-Wilzig, S. 1990. *Stiff-Necked People, Bottle-Necked System: The Evolution and Roots of Israeli Public Protest, 1949–1986*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Lehman-Wilzig, S. 1992. *WILDFIRE: Grassroots Revolts in Israel in the Post-Socialist Era*. Albany, NY: SUNY Press.

Metcalf, B. 2001. "Traditionalist Islamic Activism: Deoband, Tablighis and Talibs," http://www.ssrc.org/sept11/essays/metcalf.htm.

Peri, Y. 2000. *Assassination of Yitzhak Rabin*. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press.

Sasson, T. 2005. Report Concerning the Illegal Outposts. Submitted to Prime Minister Sharon on March 8, http://www.pmo.gov.il.

Shamir, Y. and Shamir, M. 2000. *The Anatomy of Public Opinion*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Shavit, A. 2004. "On Behalf of his Client [Beshem Marsho]." *Ha'aretz Weekend Supplement*, October 8 (Hebrew).

Sprinzak, E. 1998. *The Israeli Right and the Peace Process: 1992–1996*. Davis Occasional Papers, No. 59, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

Stedman, S. J. 1997. "Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes," *International Security* 22(2): 5–53.

Waldman, P. 1992. "Ethnic and Sociorevolutionary Terrorism: A Comparison of Structures," *International Social Movement Research* 4: 237–58.

Further Reading

Bell, J. B. 1993. *The Irish Troubles: A Generation of Political Violence*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Bellin, E. 1994. "Civil Society: Effective Tool of Analysis for Middle East Politics?" *PS: Political Science and Politics* 27(3): 509–10.

Claugh, M. 1994. "Grass-Roots Policymaking: Say Good-Bye to the Wise Men," *Foreign Affairs* 13(1): 2–7.

della Porta, D (ed.). 1992. *Social Movements and Violence: Participation in Underground Organizations*. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.

della Porta, D (ed.). 1995. *Social Movements, Political Violence, and the State*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Du Toit, Pierre. 2001. *Popular Responses and Symbolic Politics: South Africa's Brittle Peace*. New York: Palgrave.

Feiga, M. 2002. *Two Maps of the West Bank: The Bloc of Faithful (Gush Emunim) and Peace Now (Shalom Achshav) and the Spatial Shaping of the Land of Israel*. Jerusalem: Magnes Press.

Hermann, T. 2002. "The Sour Taste of Success: The Israeli Peace Movement, 1967–1998." In B. Gidron, S. Katz, and Y. Hasenfeld (eds), *Mobilizing for Peace: Conflict Resolution in Northern Ireland, Israel/Palestine and South Africa*. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 94–129.

Koopmans, R. and Paul, S. 1999. "Ethnic and Civil Conceptions of Nationhood and the Differential Success of the Extreme Right in Germany and Italy." In Marco G. Giugni, D. McAdam, C. Tilly (eds) *How Social Movements Matter.* Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 225–52.

Peleg, M. 1997. *Spreading the Wrath of God*. Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad (Hebrew).

Ravitzky, A. 1996. *Messianism, Zionism, and Jewish Religious Radicalism*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Rosenau, J. 1992. "The Relocation of Authority in a Shrinking World," *Comparative Politics* (April): 253–72.

Sprinzak, E. 1991. *The Ascendance of Israel's Radical Right*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Sprinzak, E. 1999. *Brother Against Brother*. New York: Free Press.

Sprinzak, E. 2000. "Rational Fanatics," *Foreign Policy* 120 (September/October).

Sprinzak, E. 2001. "The Lone Gunmen," *Foreign Policy* 127 (September/October).

Weinberg, L. 1992. *Political Parties and Terrorist Groups*. London: Frank Cass.

Wilkinson, P. 1974. *Political Terrorism*. London: Macmillan.

Winder, D. 2001. "Building Civil Society Resource Organizations in the Southern Hemisphere." In Abramson (ed.), *Mapping New Worlds: Selected Research on the Nonprofit Sector Around the Globe*. Washington, DC: The Aspen Institute, Nonprofit Sector Research Fund, pp. 67–71.

8
Passive Reconciliation in the Context of the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict

Rafi Nets-Zehngut

Protracted conflicts are a worldwide phenomenon (Coleman, 2000; Kriesberg, 2000) that inflict wide-scale and severe damage (physical, economic and psychological) on the parties involved (Coleman, 2000; Lira, 2001; Staub and Bar-Tal, 2003). A major psychological aspect of these conflicts is the formation of a psychological repertoire among the parties to a conflict, composed of three elements: a collective memory of the conflict, an ethos of the conflict and an emotional orientation toward the conflict – all of which are expressions of negative and antagonistic attitudes to the rival (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004; Bar-Tal and Teichman, 2005). Protracted conflicts at times reach a resolution phase, whereby a peace agreement is signed by the parties. But research suggests that signing a peace agreement does not ensure peace and is often the starting point of reconciliation rather than its successful conclusion.

Reconciliation requires that the psychological repertoire of the conflict be addressed and transformed in the post-conflict phase, so that its elements (i.e., memories, attitudes and emotions) will become less negative (and hopefully at least partly positive) towards the rival. Such a change can ensure proper implementation of the peace agreement and stable peace between the parties (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004; Lederach, 2000; Montville, 1993; Staub, 1998). Without a transformation of the psychological repertoire, its antagonistic elements can cause the parties to reactivate the conflicts and jolt the social climate in the national and the international arenas (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004; Kriesberg, 2000).

Scholars of conflict resolution pay great attention to an active reconciliation process which includes aspects such as engaging with the history of the conflict, an apology and reparations offered by the perpetrating party (Hayner, 1999; Montville, 1993). However, reconciliation can also be the result of another process, termed here "passive reconciliation,"

whose impact can be significant. In this latter process, the desired transformation of the psychological repertoire occurs due to the healing effect of time and cooperation between the parties on "practical" matters. This process is termed *passive* reconciliation because reconciliation is reached without a conscious and active effort of the parties. The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the passive reconciliation process and then to examine its role in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict: first, whether such reconciliation did take place; and if so, what were its characteristics and outcome?

This chapter starts with a short review of the literature dealing with the aftermath of conflicts and the active reconciliation process, followed by a theoretical construction of the passive reconciliation process. Finally, it examines whether a passive reconciliation process has been taking place between the Israelis and the Palestinians since the signing of the 1993 Oslo Agreement until the end of 2004.

Active and passive reconciliation

Protracted conflicts are long, extremely violent and related to issues of major importance to the involved parties (Bar-Tal, 1998; Kriesberg, 2000). In order to cope with the difficult reality, the parties to the conflicts develop a "psychological repertoire of the conflict." This repertoire includes three elements: (1) *A collective memory of the conflict,* which is composed of an account of the events of the conflict provided to the members of a society (Cairns and Roe, 2003; Connerton, 1989). This account is usually biased, where the rival is portrayed in a very negative manner and the injustice, harm, evil and atrocities allegedly conducted by him are highlighted (Bar-Tal, 2003). (2) *An ethos of the conflict*: a configuration of shared central societal beliefs that provide a particular dominant orientation to a society at present and for the future. These beliefs justify the group's objectives, provide self-esteem, foster patriotism and de-legitimize the enemy's goals and beliefs (Bar-Tal, 1998, 2000). (3) *A collective emotional orientation*: emotions evoked by the conflict, shared by society members and affecting them strongly – most notably fear, hatred and anger (Bar-Tal, 2001; Volkan, 1988).

Reconciliation is often regarded as the solution for protracted conflicts, causing the psychological repertoire of the society members to be less negative towards the rival. It consists of mutual recognition and acceptance, invested interests and goals in developing peaceful relations, mutual trust, positive attitudes as well as sensitivity and consideration of the other party's needs and interests (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004).

A number of required phases for a successful (active) reconciliation process have been suggested in the literature: (1) *Truth* – Determining the truth about past events of the conflict (Jamal, 2001; Shriver, 1995; Staub, 1998); (2) *Responsibility* – The perpetrating party should take responsibility for its unjust practices (Jamal, 2001; Staub, 1998); (3) *Apology* – The perpetrating party should apologize for its wrong-doing to the victimized party (Shriver, 1995); (4) *Reparations* – Reparations should be paid by the perpetrating party to the victimized party (Jamal, 2001; Staub, 1998); (5) *Forgiveness* – The victimized party should forgive the perpetrating party (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004; Jamal, 2001).

Active reconciliation was and is practiced between the parties to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. For example, the events of the conflict were negotiated in the Shared History project in order to produce shared or two separate, but at least legitimized, versions of these events (Adwan and Bar-On, 2003). Meetings of dialog groups of both parties organized by the Adam Institute in order to inform the other party about one owns emotional responses towards itself and the conflict and to learn about the parallel responses of the other party (Adam, 2007). Teachers among both parties are trained by MECA (Middle East Children Association) in order to educate their pupils for a culture of peace (Shapiro, 2004).

A *passive* reconciliation process is defined as a process in which parties to a protracted conflict passively form or restore genuine peace relations. This means that reconciliation is advanced without activities aimed at reconstructing positive relations, but stems from the mere fact that time is passing and from instrumental acts that are carried out for utilitarian purposes without any goals for advancing positive relations. In other words, while active reconciliation involves acts that are planned to actively promote the transformation of the society members' psychological repertoire that evolved during the protracted conflict, passive reconciliation does not involve any of these acts. Unlike active reconciliation, the transformation of the psychological repertoire is a by-product and not an object of the process. Thus, for example, when parties cooperate economically for financial profit, the people from both parties to the conflict who take part in this cooperation get to know each other, and slowly they transform and ameliorate their mutual psychological repertoire.

The passive reconciliation process is composed of two major components: time and cooperation. Time can passively advance reconciliation in the post-conflict phase (after a peace agreement has been signed by the parties). Among the older generation who were directly harmed by the conflict, time can have a healing effect – at least partially – with

regard to the psychological wounds caused by the conflict. This healing process usually comprises four major phases: shock – associated with denial; yearning and protest – as realization of the loss develops; despair – accompanied by somatic and emotional upset; and gradual recovery – marked by increased well-being and acceptance of the loss (Stroebe *et al.*, 1998). This process requires time, and the length of time required for healing depends, among other things, on the type of personal and collective offenses (i.e., the more severe they are, the more time for healing is needed; Ross, 2003). Thus, the passing of time may encourage the healing process of the older generation and the amelioration of their psychological repertoire towards the rival party.

Time is also "responsible" for the emergence of a younger generation not directly harmed by the conflict, in contrast with the older generations who experienced it directly. Usually, the further the generation is from the direct experience of the traumas of the conflict, the less it is harmed by them (Bar-On, 1996; Bar-On and Gilad, 1994; Sigel, 1989). Thus, as time passes, the parties to the conflict include less people who sustain deep wounds caused by the conflict, or the intensity of these people's wounds is weakening. Such a situation is a manifestation of reconciliation; it also facilitates cooperation activities that will be discussed below. Having said all this, the influence of time is slow and limited in its scope and is relevant mostly in the post-conflict period. Thus the element of time by no means excludes the need for the ensuing cooperating component of the passive process.

In some cases, countries' leaders, as well as economic or other entrepreneurs, may decide that the conflicting past should be laid aside in favor of strategic present and future interests (i.e., particular interests – of the elites; or universal ones). In such cases cooperation takes place in various areas (e.g., trade, industry, culture, tourism, environment, health, diplomacy and security) in the form of joint institutions and organizations, cooperative ventures and coordinating activities. Cooperation can cause the psychological repertoire of the conflict to be transformed and become less negative towards the rival, as it provides opportunities for establishing common goals and encounters in which past opponents can form personal relations. It allows members of both parties to get acquainted with various "un-related-to-the-conflict" neutral or positive aspects of the rivals, humanize, personalize and legitimize them and learn to trust them (Barnea and Abdeen, 2002; Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004; Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004; Chada, 1995; Kelman, 1999; Kriesberg, 2000). Cooperation, even if limited in scope, can demonstrate to the parties the benefits of peace and cooperation. The parties

can realize that it is best for their own interests and benefits to continue and even widen their cooperation (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004; Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004; Kriesberg, 2004). The desire to maintain or enlarge the benefits of cooperation creates motivation for the parties to support peace and reconciliation.

To summarize this part: (1) When passively reconciling the parties is discussed, it does not necessarily mean that a full reconciliation between the parties will be achieved. Partial promotion of reconciliation is also possible, and it is important. (2) Passive reconciliation will usually occur and be more effective in the post-conflict phase. Signing a peace agreement resolves the actual disagreements between the parties, stops the violent confrontations and removes technical and security obstacles that might inhibit the initiation and continuation of the passive reconciliation process. (3) The cooperation component of the passive reconciliation process is usually evidence of some reconciliation that already exists between the parties (e.g., if tourists visit the rival country, then probably some of their psychological repertoire towards this rival is not so negative). This component is usually also a *facilitator* of reconciliation between the parties (e.g., visiting the rival country facilitates the psychological repertoire of the tourists becoming less negative). (4) The classification of the *activities* performed by the parties – whether they are part of active or passive reconciliation processes – is not always clear-cut. The activities are situated on a continuum ranging from active reconciliation to passive reconciliation – and some combine both.

Passive reconciliation in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict

The Israeli–Palestinian conflict has been characterized as a protracted conflict (Bar-Tal, 1998; Sharvit and Bar-Tal, 2005), consequently, a negative psychological repertoire was established between the parties (Nets and Bar-Tal, 2007; Nets-Zehngut, 2007). This includes a negative collective memory of the conflict (Bar-Tal and Salomon, 2005; Firer and Adwan, 2004), a negative ethos of the conflict (Bar-Tal and Salomon, 2005; Rouhana and Bar-Tal, 1998; Sharvit and Bar-Tal, 2005), and a negative collective emotional orientation of the conflict (Bar-Tal, 2001).

This work deals with the 1993–2004 period of the relations of the parties because of the importance of the period to the relations between the sides, and because after 1994 (the establishment of the Palestinian Authority) cooperation between the parties can be discussed. The Oslo Agreements were only the starting point of negotiations that postponed central issues to a later stage and encountered significant

obstacles and internal opposition in their implementation. Between the signing of the agreements and 2004, relations between the Israelis and the Palestinians underwent three general phases: the "still partly violent" period (September 1993 to end of 1996), followed by the "relatively quiet" period (end of 1996 to September 2000), until the mostly violent "second Intifada" period (September 2000 to end of 2004) (Bar-Siman-Tov *et al.*, 2005).

The only component of the passive reconciliation process described above that could take place in the Israeli–Palestinian peace process was cooperation, as the relatively short period was insufficient for the *time* component. Moreover, the continued violence implied that neither had a new generation unharmed directly by the conflict been created; nor had there been a real opportunity for the older generation to be healed from the aftermath of the conflict. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile noting that time had some partial healing effect on wounds caused to the older Palestinian generation: the wounds suffered by the Palestinian refugees during the "Al-Nacba" (what the Israelis refer to as the 1948 War of Independence). The influence of time was one of the reasons that the refugees, partly in the 1970s but mostly since the 1990, were able to confront their trauma and relate their memories of this hard event. This was done in the framework of seminars, books, articles in journals, recorded testimony, parades, etc. (Khader, 2004; Tamari, 2004).

Cooperation evolved between Israelis and Palestinians during that period in various arenas, and its overall impact needs to be assessed. In terms of trade, Israel and the Palestinian Authority have great interest as neighboring entities in conducting close trade relations (Alyazji, 2005; Awartani, 2005; Bar, 2005; Hazboun, 2005; Huleileh, 2005; Zaif, 2005). For both parties the proximity reduces transportation costs and time (e.g., the closest country where Israel can buy cheap gas as a source of energy is the Palestinian Authority; Field, 2005) and opens up an export market. Israelis consider the Palestinian Authority as a potential gateway for Israeli exports to the Arab world, while the Palestinian have an interest in importing Israeli goods, exporting to Israel and using the sea and air ports of Israel for exporting their products to other countries.

The above discussion explains why the signing of the Oslo Agreements in 1993 raised high expectations among the Palestinians and the Israelis – businessmen as well as small-scale industrialists, service providers, farmers, etc. – with regard to the possibility of future economic prosperity and even a "New Middle East" (Alyazji, 2005; Awartani, 2005; Ben-Porat, 2005). The basis for the economic relations between the Israelis and the Palestinians was determined mainly in the Paris

Agreement signed in 1994. At that time economic prosperity seemed to be at the threshold: the Arab countries had begun to lift their boycotts, the Erez industrial zone was opened, mutual projects were discussed – of joint manufacturing, of the Palestinian Authority serving as a gateway for Israeli goods to the Arab world, of greater mutual trade relations between the two parties (and for the Israelis, with the other Arab countries and the Far East), etc. The motive for these mutual interactions was clear: expectations for gaining the economic "dividends of peace." The deterioration of the peace process due to the eruption of the second Intifada in September 2000 struck these high expectations a severe blow. The measures Israel implemented in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in response to the second Intifada, including closures, restrictions on the movements of goods and people in these areas and from them to Israel, and later the closure of the Erez industrial zone – among others – proved that such intensive cooperation is not possible at the present time (Awartani, 2005).

In practice, despite the difficulties, a cooperative attitude was prevalent during most of the three periods in various relevant Israeli government ministries (e.g., agriculture, trade and industry, finance, justice and foreign affairs) and parallel Palestinian ministries. This attitude also continued during the third period, although then it was more cautious due to security constraints. This mutual attitude of the ministries of both parties enabled the mutual trade conducted by the private sectors of the parties, which maintained some trade cooperation even during the second Intifada. About 75 per cent of the Palestinians' exports and imports during the three periods were to and from Israel (Huleileh, 2005). Israelis exported to the Palestinian Authority goods valued at NIS 6.3 billion and imported from it (mostly goods) in the value of NIS 1.3 billion (GBS, 2004). In addition, even in the midst of such a difficult political situation as the second Intifada, Palestinian businessmen were even willing to increase the level of their cooperation with their Israeli counterparts (Alyazji, 2005; Awartani, 2005; Hazboun, 2005; Huleileh, 2005; Jabar, 2005). As described earlier, they mention different reasons for this willingness – the quality of the Israeli products, reduced transportation costs and expectations of good prices for their products in the "wealthy Israeli market." A similar business-minded attitude, if to a lesser degree, was found among Israeli businesspeople (Lautman, 2005). While this economic cooperation was by no means on an equal footing, as the Palestinians have little choice because of their dependence on Israel, the practices yielded some (passive) reconciliation as the trade fostered trust (Alyazji, 2005) and many good friendships (Jabar, 2005).

During the relatively calm second period, economic cooperation extended beyond the elite levels with the emergence of "border markets" (Arieli, 2003). These were un-organized markets set up by Palestinians along main roads in the West Bank where various products were sold (e.g., food, furniture, building materials, clothing, footwear, car spare parts, garden plants and toys), and many service suppliers operated (e.g., garages, film developing shops, restaurants and dental clinics). These markets attracted a large number of Israelis (e.g., in the biggest market, Bidia market near Kesem Junction, about 70,000 Israelis arrived only on Saturdays, while many came also on the other weekdays). It was estimated that the annual scope of trade in all these markets was more than NIS 1.3 billion (Arieli, 2003). These markets stopped operating at the beginning of the third period. The Israeli consumers reported that they enjoyed visiting those markets due to the unique oriental shopping experience, the cheap prices, the conversations with the Palestinian salesmen which were more personal than the formal conversations with Israeli salesmen, the bargaining, the prices, the pleasant market atmosphere and the fact that they were open on Saturdays and thus enabled family entertainment combined with shopping (Arieli, 2003, 2005).

Tourism is another realm where cooperation has developed. In both the Israel and the Palestinian Authority there exist many sites of great religious importance, among others, to Christians. This kind of religious or pilgrimage tourism plays an important part in the tourism of both parties; for example, 76 per cent of tourists to the Palestinian Authority are pilgrims (Hazboun, 2005). Tourist pilgrim packages to the "Holy Land" include sites in Israel and the Palestinian Authority and therefore require the cooperation of both parties. That is why at least until the end of the second period (information about the consequent period was not found), there was intensive cooperation between the private sectors that deal with tourism in both parties (Abu-Dayyeh, 2000). As one senior Palestinian figure involved in such cooperation explained: "I can assure you that neither side could provide a package of the holy land – 'a religious program' – without working with the other side. . . . The Holy Land – Israel/Palestine, Palestine/Israel – is one package . . . a joint package . . . You can't get away from it . . . if we do, both sides will lose" (Abu-Dayyeh, 2000, pp. 47, 50).

Employment is another form of cooperation, if unequal. Palestinians worked in businesses owned by Israelis located in the Erez Industrial Zone – about 100 Israeli-owned factories or service suppliers operated there employing a few thousand Palestinian workers (Bar, 2005). The activity in that zone continued throughout the three periods, till it was

terminated due to security constraints in April 2004. Israeli employers reported that the atmosphere was good and that they had good (some describe it even as positively unique) working relations and even friendships, with many instances of reciprocal aid, between them and their Palestinian *workers* (Arieli, 2003; Arzi, 2005). Half of the businesses in the Erez Zone (about 100) were owned by Palestinians. Relating briefly to the relations between the *business owners* from both parties, it was reported by the Israeli owners that they were good, similar to the relations described above with their Palestinian workers (Arieli, 2003). A similar positive description of the mutual relations was also given by Palestinian business owners describing them as "special friendships" and even some of their Israeli friends as "their brothers" (Arieli, 2003; Zalah, 2005).

Before the third period, about 150,000 Palestinian workers worked in Israel; when the violence escalated (and foreign workers were imported to Israel) their number declined substantially, but still today about 50,000 of them continue to work in Israel (Shamir, 2005). Employment of these workers in Israel contributed significantly to the Palestinian economy (supplying work and income) as well as to the Israelis (by the supply of cheap labor). Research conducted at the end of the 1970s found an amelioration of the attitudes among both Israelis and Palestinians, due to the work of the Palestinians in Israel, though to a higher extent among the Israelis (Amir *et al.*, 1980). Though this research was not conducted in the period discussed (1993–2004), it nevertheless seems reasonable to assume that at least some (if not all) of this phenomenon of amelioration of the attitudes also occurred in later stages.

Israel supplies the Palestinian Authority with most of its water and all its electricity; thus infrastructure provided another venue of professional cooperation (Arlozerov, 2005; A-Sharif, 2005; Ben-Arie, 2005). Professional cooperation in water management was claimed to create "true and sincere friendships" (A-Sharif, 2005, p. 64); and in electricity "valuable...mutual trust" (Ben-Arie, 2005, p. 71). As neighboring entities, the Israelis' and the Palestinians' environment are interlinked in their ecological systems, including air, sea, drinking water, streams, flora and fauna (Kleot, 2003). This situation enforces both parties to cooperate on environmental issues (Al-Hmaidi, 1998; Sarid, 1998; Smith and Abu-Diab, 1998). Awareness of the need for such cooperation was manifest in the various agreements signed between the Israelis and the Palestinians addressing various environmental issues. This awareness led to the establishment in 1995 of the Joint Environmental Experts Committee (that never convened because of

the political situation) and the founding of the Israeli–Palestinian Joint Water Committee that convened many times, addressing issues such as water drilling, cleaning of streams, pollution of water, etc. (Kleot, 2003). Cooperation was also exercised concerning severe garbage hazards and in the event of spilling dangerous materials. Environmental cooperation also involved many NGOs and even in August 2001, 13 Palestinian environmental NGOs (established for environmental protection purposes) were still cooperating with Israeli environmental NGOs, and four bi-national NGOs have continued to operate (Obeidi, 2001; Zwirn, 2001). In addition, various municipalities cooperate even today, in protecting their mutual water resources (e.g., Zur Hadassa in Israel and the village Vadi Fookin in the West Bank, the youth village Eshel Hanasi in Israel and the Habsan village in the Gaza Strip); or in protecting their streams (e.g., the regional municipality Emek Hefer in Israel and the Tul Karem municipality in the West Bank – with regard to the Alexander stream) (Rinat, 2005).

The proximity of Israel and the Palestinian Authority forces them to cooperate in health issues, due to the possible mutual influences in the risk of epidemics on public health (e.g., polio, SARS, West Niles Virus, HIV). A vivid description of this situation can be found in the title of a book dealing with such Israeli–Palestinian cooperation, "The Virus Does Not Stop at the Checkpoint" (Barnea and Husseini, 2002). Accordingly, several agreements between the Israelis and the Palestinians that directed toward mutual health cooperation have been signed. Health cooperation between Israelis and Palestinians at the governmental level existed mainly through five joint committees dealing with: food supervision, epidemiology, medicines, ambulatory treatment and professional training (Barnea and Husseini, 2002). While in the first two periods these committees functioned intensively, in the third period, due to the deterioration of the peace process, cooperation came to an end (Barnea, 2004).

Extensive cooperation in this domain, mainly in the first two periods, took place also between NGOs. Between 1994 and 1998, 56 NGOs and 11 government institutions conducted 148 health projects involving about 4000 participants (Barnea and Abdeen, 2002), but in the third period only about 25 projects were conducted (Barnea, 2004). The main reasons attendees mentioned for their participation in these projects were improvement of professional knowledge (Palestinians – 52 per cent, Israelis – 18 per cent) and ending the conflict (Palestinians – 41 per cent, Israelis – 53 per cent; Barnea and Abdeen, 2002). A survey conducted

to study the impact of these projects found that participants of both parties reported that the projects enabled them to learn about the other party and to replace stereotypes and myths with a direct and realistic impression. They were also positively surprised by the high quality of the knowledge and work of their colleagues, their good will and enthusiasm and the easiness that developed in their mutual personal relations and professional dialogue (Barnea and Abdeen, 2002).

Media correspondents of both the Israeli and the Palestinian parties who cover the conflict are a valuable source of assistance to one another. Thus, in the context of the conflict, for example, Palestinian correspondents transferred information about events that occurred in the Palestinian Authority to their Israeli colleagues, or helped them to reach dangerous locations there; while Israeli correspondents helped their Palestinian colleagues by transferring relevant information or by helping them to cope with the closure the Israeli army imposed in various areas of the Palestinian Authority (Halabi, 2003).

Several aspects regarding the passive reconciliation process described above should be highlighted:

(1) *Difficult circumstances* – The circumstances for the initiation, progress and success of a passive reconciliation process in the context of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict in the 1993–2004 period have been very difficult, bearing in mind the three points mentioned earlier: the Oslo Agreements not being the final agreements (i.e., this is not the post-conflict phase); the wide scope of domestic resentment towards these agreements; and the partly violent first period and the most violent third period.

(2) *The continuation of the process and its scope* – Despite such difficult circumstances, a considerable passive reconciliation process took place between the parties during most of the period under discussion. The process took part in both the government-public sector and civic society (private sector and NGOs), in many and diverse domains (e.g., trade, retailer marketing, third-party tourism, banking, Palestinian employment, infrastructure, environment, health and media), and involved a very large number of people from both parties (e.g., Israeli consumers, Palestinian workers, professionals from both parties), the elites (e.g., wealthy businessmen, high-ranking officials) and the public at large.

(3) *Phases in the process* – The process was initiated mainly in the first "partly violent" period (September 1993 to end of 1996), relatively flourished in the second "relatively quiet" period (end of 1996 to

September 2000), and parts of it declined significantly in scope since the beginning of the third "second Intifada" period (September 2000 to end of 2004) (Kriesberg, 2004; Nadler and Saguy, 2004). Nevertheless, even in the midst of the difficult third period the process still continued, though, as mentioned, to a much lesser extent.

(4) *The uniqueness of the Israeli–Palestinian passive reconciliation process* – The literature usually relates to an *active* reconciliation process conducted in the post-conflict phase, after a final peace agreement is signed by the parties (and, of course, no violence prevails). A *passive* reconciliation between the Israelis and the Palestinians took place *before* a final agreement was signed. The Oslo Agreements enabled the operation of the above described passive reconciliation process already in the first and second periods (Kriesberg, 2002; Nadler and Saguy, 2004).

(5) *Evaluating the success of the process* – Bearing in mind that we are concentrating on the psychological aspect of the relations between the parties, the success of the process can be determined by the extent to which the process caused a transformation and amelioration of the psychological repertoire of the conflict. In our case, the process enabled a relatively large number of people to meet each other, cooperate and learn about various neutral or positive aspects of the other party by means of a direct impression. These encounters were by and large pleasant experiences for the parties, in which some negative attitudes towards the other party were replaced with positive ones, and personal friendships, some of them solid ones, were formed.

This process thus had a partially positive influence in ameliorating the psychological repertoire of some of the parties, thus partially *promoting* peace and reconciliation between the parties. We stress "promoting" and not "reaching" reconciliation since indeed reconciliation between the parties was only partly promoted and not reached. Nevertheless, even the partial amelioration of the psychological repertoire that did occur is of importance.

(6) *The passive nature of the process* – The reconciliation process took place mainly through activities not directly connected to the conflict and geared towards "practical" matters. As Samir Huleileh, secretary of the Palestinian Government and a senior member of the Palestinian business community, explained, the Palestinian businesspeople operate not according to political or ideological motivations, but according to "...pure economic considerations of the profitability of their investments" (Huleileh, 2005, p. 40). Thus, Palestinian and Israeli

businesspeople, consumers and professionals cooperated on practical everyday matters, not directly aiming at reconciliation.

Conclusion

Parties to protracted conflicts develop a psychological repertoire of the conflict composed of negative memories, attitudes and emotions towards their rivals. Such a psychological repertoire is a major obstacle for the parties in resolving the conflict, in a proper implementation of peace agreements and in reconciling. Thus, transforming the psychological repertoire into a more positive one towards the rival is a major aim for parties to conflicts. This chapter proposes a new process for transforming the psychological repertoire – the passive reconciliation process. Thus, in this chapter the components of this process were first introduced theoretically, and then the validity of this process was examined using the Israeli–Palestinian conflict as a case study.

Relatively wide-scale and diverse cooperation took place in this conflict, mainly in the 1993–2000 period, but also, though to a lesser extent, in the 2000–4 period. A full reconciliation would require the resolution of the conflict and the end of violence (Kriesberg, 2000; Nadler and Saguy, 2004) and would take a long time, even a few decades, or more (Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004). However, the continuation of cooperation since Oslo may indicate that some amelioration of the psychological repertoire has occurred, in spite of the escalation of violence and the difficult circumstances especially since 2000. This process of passive reconciliation can contribute, if only partly, to reaching a peace agreement between the parties, implementing it properly and, in the long run, reconciling – not only in the discussed Israeli–Palestinian conflict, but also in other conflicts around the world.

References

Abu-Dayyeh, H. 2000. "Tourism as a Test Case – An Interview," *Palestine-Israel Journal* 7(1): 45–50.

Adam, 2007. *The Adam Institute for Democracy and Peace.* Retrieved July 7, 2007 from: http://www.wzo.org.il/en/resources/view.asp?id=1908.

Adwan, S. and Bar-On, D. 2003. "Shared History Project: A PRIME Example of Peace-Building under Fire," *International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society* 17: 513–21.

Al-Hmaidi, M. S. 1998. "Palestinian Policy and Regional Environment Cooperation," *Palestine-Israel Journal* 5(1): 15–19.

Alyazji, M. 2005. "The Palestinian Business Economy." In R. Nets (ed.), *The Palestinian Economy*. Tel Aviv: Steinmetz Center, pp. 36–8 (Hebrew).

Amir, Y., A. Bizman, R. Ben Ari, and M. Rivner. 1980. "Contact between Israelis and Arabs – A Theoretical Evaluation of Effects," *Journal of Cross-Culture Psychology* 11(4): 426–43.

Arieli, T. 2003. *Cross-Borders Plan and Development*. An MA dissertation. Jerusalem: The Hebrew University (Hebrew).

Arieli, T. 2005. *Crossing Borders to Interdependence and Reconciliation*. Seminar work. Jerusalem: The Hebrew University (Hebrew).

Arlozerov, S. 2005. "Cooperation in Water Supply and Developing of Future Water Sources." In M. Sela (ed.), *Economic Cooperation Between Israel and the Palestinians: Lessons from the Past and a Look to the Future*. Tel Aviv: The University Center for Diplomacy and Regional Cooperation, pp. 63–4.

Arzi, R. 2005. "Erez as a Model for Import Substitute and Employment Generating Industry." In M. Sela (ed.), *Economic Cooperation Between Israel and the Palestinians: Lessons from the Past and a Look to the Future*. Tel Aviv: The University Center for Diplomacy and Regional Cooperation, p. 55.

A-Sharif, N. 2005. "Cooperation in Developing Water Infrastructure." In M. Sela (ed.), *Economic Cooperation Between Israel and the Palestinians: Lessons from the Past and a Look to the Future*. Tel Aviv: The University Center for Diplomacy and Regional Cooperation, pp. 64–7.

Awartani, H. 2005. "The Palestinian Economy – Overview." In R. Nets (ed.), *The Palestinian Economy*. Tel Aviv: Steinmetz Center, pp. 7–13 (Hebrew).

Bar, G. 2005. "Industrial Zones are Still the Favorable Solution." In M. Sela (ed.), *Economic Cooperation Between Israel and the Palestinians: Lessons from the Past and a Look to the Future*. Tel Aviv: The University Center for Diplomacy and Regional Cooperation, pp. 49–51.

Barnea, T. 2004. "Israeli-Palestinian Cooperation – The Israeli Side." In R. Nets (ed.), *The Palestinian Health System*. Tel Aviv: Steinmetz Center.

Barnea, T. and Z. Abdeen. 2002. "The Function of Health Professionals in Advancing Israeli-Palestinian Co-existence." In T. Barnea and R. Husseini (eds), *The Virus Does Not Stop at the Checkpoint*. Tel Aviv: Am Oved, pp. 355–72 (Hebrew).

Barnea, T. and R. Husseini (eds). 2002. *The Virus Does Not Stop at the Checkpoint*. Tel Aviv: Am Oved (Hebrew).

Bar-On, D. 1996. "Studying the Trans-Generational After Effects of the Holocaust in Israel," *Journal of Personality and Interpersonal Loss* 1(3): 215–47.

Bar-On, D. and N. Gilad. 1994. "To Rebuild Life: A Narrative Analysis of Three Generations of an Israeli Holocaust Survivor's Family." In A. Lieblich and R. Josselon (eds), *Exploring Identity and Gender*. London: Sage Publications, pp. 83–112.

Bar-Siman-Tov, Y. 2004. "Dialectics between Stable Peace and Reconciliation." In Y. Bar-Siman-Tov (ed.), *From Conflict Resolution to Reconciliation*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 61–80.

Bar-Siman-Tov, Y., E. Lavie, K. Michael, and D. Bar-Tal. 2005. *The Israeli–Palestinian Violent Conflict 2000–2004: The Transition from Conflict Resolution to Conflict Management*. Jerusalem: The Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies (Hebrew).

Bar-Tal, D. 1998. "The Rocky Road Toward Peace: Societal Beliefs Functional to Intractable Conflict in Israeli School Textbooks," *Journal of Peace Research* 35: 723–42.

Bar-Tal, D. 2000. *Shared Beliefs in a Society: Social Psychological Analysis*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Bar-Tal, D. 2001. "Why Does Fear Override Hope in Societies Engulfed by Intractable Conflict, As It Does in the Israeli Society?" *Political Psychology* 22: 601–27.

Bar-Tal, D. 2003. "Collective Memory of Physical Violence: Its Contribution to the Culture of Violence." In E. Cairns and M. D. Roe (eds), *The Role of Memory in Ethnic Conflict*. Houndmills, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 77–93.

Bar-Tal, D. and G. H. Bennink. 2004. "The Nature of Reconciliation as an Outcome and as a Process." In Y. Bar-Siman-Tov (ed.), *From Conflict Resolution to Reconciliation*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 11–38.

Bar-Tal, D. and G. Salomon. 2005. "Israeli-Jewish Narratives of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Evolvement, Contents, Functions and Consequences." In R. Rotberg (ed.), *History's Double Helix: The Intertwined Narratives of Israel and Palestine*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University.

Bar-Tal, D. and Y. Teichman. 2005. *Stereotypes and Prejudice in Conflict*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ben-Arie, I. 2005. "The Electric System – An Island of Sanity in a Stormy Environment." In M. Sela (ed.), *Economic Cooperation Between Israel and the Palestinians: Lessons from the Past and a Look to the Future*. Tel Aviv: The University Center for Diplomacy and Regional Cooperation, pp. 67–71.

Ben-Porat, G. 2005. "Business and Peace: The Rise and Fall of the New Middle East," *Encounters: Political Science in Translation* 1: 40–52.

Cairns, E. and M. D. Roe (eds). 2003. *The Role of Memory in Ethnic Conflict*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Chada, N. 1995. "Enemy Images: The Media and the Indo-Pakistani Tensions." In M. Krepon and A. Sevak (eds), *Crisis Prevention, Confidence Building and Reconciliation in South Asia*. New York: St. Martin, pp. 171–98.

Coleman, T. P. 2000. "Intractable Conflicts." In M. Deutsch and T. P. Coleman (eds), *The Handbook of Conflict Resolution – Theory and Practice*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, pp. 428–50.

Connerton, P. 1989. *How Societies Remember*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Field, J. 2005. "Palestinian Gas to Israel – A Vehicle for Tightening the Economic Ties." In M. Sela (ed.), *Economic Cooperation Between Israel and the Palestinians: Lessons from the Past and a Look to the Future*. Tel Aviv: The University Center for Diplomacy and Regional Cooperation, pp. 71–3.

Firer, R. and S. Adwan. 2004. *The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict in History and Civics Textbooks of Both Nations*. Hannover: Georg Eckert.

GBS. 2004. *Israeli General Bureau of Statistics*. 2004 Annual Report, N. 55, Table 15.3.

Halabi, Z. 2003. "The Satellite Channels and the Mode of Coverage of the Palestinian Issue." In R. Nets (ed.), *The Palestinian Media*. Tel Aviv: Steinmetz Center, pp. 27–36 (Hebrew).

Hayner, P. B. 1999. "In Pursuit of Justice and Reconciliation: Contributions of Truth Telling." In C. J. Arnson (ed.), *Comparative Peace Processes in Latin America*. Stanford: Stanford University, pp. 363–83.

Hazboun, S. 2005. "The Palestinian Trade." In R. Nets (ed.), *The Palestinian Economy*. Tel Aviv: Steinmetz Center, pp. 26–8 (Hebrew).

Huleileh, S. 2005. "The Palestinian Trade." In R. Nets (ed.), *The Palestinian Economy*. Tel Aviv: The Steinmetz Center, pp. 29–37 (Hebrew).

Jabar, A. M. 2005. "Petition to the Business Community for Cooperation in Industrial Zones." In M. Sela (ed.), *Economic Cooperation Between Israel and the Palestinians: Lessons from the Past and a Look to the Future*. Tel Aviv: The University Center for Diplomacy and Regional Cooperation, pp. 56–9.

Jamal, A. 2001. "Mutual Recognition, Reconciliation, and Transformation for Conflicts: Theoretical Perspectives," *Israeli Sociology* C(2): 313–42 (Hebrew).

Kelman, C. H. 1999. "Transforming the Relationship Between Former Enemies: A Social Psychological Analysis." In L. R. Rothstein (ed.), *After the Peace: Resistance and Reconciliation*. London: Lynne Rienner, pp. 193–206.

Khader, H. 2004. "Palestinian Literature – An Overview." In R. Nets (ed.), *Palestinian Literature and Arts Scene*. Tel Aviv: Steinmetz Center, pp. 7–13 (Hebrew).

Kleot, N. 2003. *Cross Borders Environmental Pollution and Cross Borders Cooperation in Environmental Issues: Israel, the Arab Countries and the Palestinian Authority*. Retrieved February 13, 2005 from: http://www.environment.gov.il/bin/en.jsp?enPage=BlankPage&enDisplay=view&enDispWhat=Zone&enDispWho=int_coop&enZone=int_coop.

Kriesberg, L. 2000. "Intractable Conflicts." In W. Eugene (ed.), *The Handbook of Interethnic Coexistence*. New York: An Abraham Fund Publication, pp. 332–42.

Kriesberg, L. 2002. "The Relevance of Reconciliation Actions in the Breakdown of Israeli–Palestinian Negotiations, 2000," *Peace and Change* 27: 546–71.

Kriesberg, L. 2004. "Comparing Reconciliation Actions Within and Between Countries." In Y. Bar-Siman-Tov (ed.), *From Conflict Resolution to Reconciliation*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 81–99.

Lautman, D. 2005. "The High Potential of Mutual Industrial Parks." In M. Sela (ed.), *Economic Cooperation Between Israel and the Palestinians: Lessons from the Past and a Look to the Future*. Tel Aviv: The University Center for Diplomacy and Regional Cooperation, pp. 47–9.

Lederach, P. J. 2000. "Beyond Violence: Building Sustainable Peace." In W. Eugene (ed.), *The Handbook of Interethnic Coexistence*. New York: An Abraham Fund Publication, pp. 236–47.

Lira, E. 2001. "Violence, fear, and impunity: Reflections on subjective and political obstacles for peace." *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology* 7: 109–18.

Montville, J. V. 1993. "The Healing Function in Political Conflict Resolution." In D. J. Sanole and D. M. H. Van (eds), *Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice* . Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, pp. 112–28.

Nadler, A. and T. Saguy. 2004. "Trust Building and Reconciliation between Adversarial Groups: A Social Psychological Perspective." In H. Langholtz and C. E. Stout (eds), *The Psychology of Diplomacy*. New York: Praeger.

Nets, R. and D. Bar-Tal. 2007. "The Intractable Israeli-Palestinian Conflict and Possible Pathways to Peace." In J. Kuriansky (ed.), *Beyond Bullets and Bombs: Grassroots Peacebuilding Between Palestinians and Israelis*. Westport, CT: Praeger, pp. 3–13.

Nets-Zehngut, R. 2007. "The Israeli Collective Memory of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict," *Ruah Mizrahit* 5, pp. 76–80 (Hebrew).

Obeidi, F. 2001. *The Impact of the Palestinian–Israeli Conflict on the Environment and the Role of the Palestinian Environmental NGOs in Protecting the Environment*. *PRIME*. Retrieved February 10, 2005 from: http://www.vispo.com/PRIME/enviro.htm.

Rinat, Z. 2005. "The Situation of the Water Is More Important than the 'Situation'." *Ha'aretz*, February 21 (Hebrew).

Ross, G. 2003. *Beyond the Trauma Vortex*. California: Berkeley.

Rouhana, N. and D. Bar-Tal. 1998. "Psychological Dynamics of Intractable Conflicts: The Israeli–Palestinian Case," *American Psychologist* 53: 761–70.

Sarid, Y. 1998. "Pollution and Peace – An Interview," *Palestine–Israel Journal* 5: 39–42.

Sigel, J. J. 1989. *Trauma and Rebirth: Intergenerational Effects of the Holocaust*. New York: Praeger.

Shamir, S. 2005. "The Economic Separation Is Not Possible and Not Desired." In M. Sela (ed.), *Economic Cooperation Between Israel and the Palestinians: Lessons from the Past and a Look to the Future*. Tel Aviv: The University Center for Diplomacy and Regional Cooperation, pp. 105–12.

Shapiro, A. 2004. "Exploring Areas of Professional Cooperation." In R. Nets (ed.), *The Palestinian Education System*. Tel Aviv: The Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research, pp. 52–5 (Hebrew).

Sharvit, K. and D. Bar-Tal. 2005. "Ethos of Conflict in the Israeli Media: Trends in the Past and Present." In Y. Raz and A. Zanger (eds), *Violence, Terror and Trauma in Films and Media*. Tel Aviv: Open University (Hebrew).

Shriver, W. D. 1995. *An Ethic for Enemies: Forgiveness in Politics*. New York/Oxford: Oxford University.

Staub, E. 1998. "Breaking the Cycle of Genocidal Violence: Healing and Reconciliation." In J. Harvey (ed.), *Perspectives on Loss: A Source Book*. Philadelphia: Brunner/Mazel, pp. 231–8.

Staub, E. and D. Bar-Tal. 2003. "Genocide, Mass Killing and Intractable Conflict: Roots, Evolution, Prevention and Reconciliation." In D. O. Sears, L. Huddy, and R. Jervis (eds) *Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology*. New York: Oxford University, pp. 710–51.

Stroebe, M., H. Schut, and W. Stroebe. 1998. "Trauma and Grief: A Comparative Analysis." In J. H. Harvey (ed.), *Perspectives on Loss: A Source Book*. Philadelphia: Taylor & Francis.

Smith, P. P. and T. Abu Diab. 1998. "The Environment: A Shared Interest for Palestinians and Israelis," *Palestine-Israel Journal* 5: 9–14.

Tamari, S. 2004. "The Evolvement of the Refugees Issue – Historical Overview." In R. Nets (ed.), *The Palestinian Refugees Issue and the Right of Return*. Tel Aviv: Steinmetz Center, pp. 13–17 (Hebrew).

Volkan, V. 1988. *The Need to Have Enemies and Allies*. Northdale, NJ: Jason Aronson.

Zaif, A. 2005. "The Palestinians Have No Alternative to the Israeli Partner." In M. Sela (ed.), *Economic Cooperation Between Israel and the Palestinians: Lessons from the Past and a Look to the Future*. Tel Aviv: The University Center for Diplomacy and Regional Cooperation, pp. 41–4.

Zalah, N. 2005. "No Justification for Closing Erez Industrial Zone." In M. Sela (ed.), *Economic Cooperation Between Israel and the Palestinians: Lessons from the Past and a Look to the Future*. Tel Aviv: The University Center for Diplomacy and Regional Cooperation, pp. 52–4.

Zwirn, M. J. 2001. "Promise and Failure: Environmental NGOs and Palestinian–Israeli Cooperation," *MERIA – Middle East Review of International Affairs* 5(4).

9
Identity Shift in Settlement Processes: The Northern Ireland Case

Jennifer Todd

Introduction

What role does identity shift play in settlement processes? Does it make the difference between successful and unsuccessful settlements? I will argue in this paper that it has played a role in the partial success of the settlement process in Northern Ireland. I build on recent theoretical developments in the wider social scientific literature to develop a model of identity and identity change of use in analysis of ethnic conflict and settlement processes. Using the data generated in two recent qualitative research projects, I show that there has indeed been significant identity shift in Northern Ireland although it has not all translated into political action. I identify some types of identity change in Northern Ireland and sketch possible future developments.

Settlement processes and identity shift

Settlement processes in deeply divided societies – even if largely engineered by elites – also involve changes at the mass level, in collective modes of action and interaction, in willingness to participate in new institutions or at the very least to support the political representatives who so participate. In this respect they exemplify the intersection of institutional, interactional and perceptual, cognitive and (more contentiously) identity change which has recently been the focus of much analysis (McAdam *et al.*, 2001). Agreed settlements which can call on mass public support will not be sustained while the parties' (and public's) conceptual frameworks rule out the legitimacy of such compromise or if they perceive their opponents as evil or genocidal. Identity shifts, it may be argued, make the difference between peace settlements and interim

truces, between setting out on a path to peace and a readiness to return to war. One might suggest that identity shifts make the difference between successful and failed settlement processes.

The argument sketched above, however, immediately provokes objections. Is it saying more, some ask, than that settlements require the will to reach a settlement? Is the emphasis on the mass public necessary at all, since so many settlements are elite-fashioned? Or is the whole argument misconceived? What is at issue in conflict and settlement, it may be argued, is power, not culture. People do not change their identities, they do not convert to the other side in deeply divided societies. The hope of replacing ethnic identifications with a common civic identity is an unrealistic dream (see McGarry and O'Leary, 2004, p. 21). Realists argue, further, that such change threatens to create a dangerous power instability. Settlement requires communal solidarity which sustains a leadership and gives it public backing. It requires settled communal divisions and a stable power balance, high fences – not constant boundary blurring (Kaufmann, 1996).

Even those who accept that change in public perceptual frames is a part of all major political transformations, raise the question of causality (Tilly, 2002). Does settlement lead to identity shift or does identity shift lead to settlement? Do only some sorts of settlements produce change in identity? Or is there an independent causal factor, for example a shifting power balance, which fosters both settlement and identity shift? But then does identity play an independent causal role at all? Moreover, the very concept of identity may appear too contested and too fuzzy to allow us to answer this question (Brubaker and Cooper, 2002). For example, the 1998 Agreement in Northern Ireland has been interpreted variously as succeeding because there was identity shift (Bourke, 2003) and failing because there was not (Taylor, 2001; Wilson and Wilford, 2003); it is said to have frozen identities (Taylor, 2001) and to have favored moderation (McGarry and O'Leary, 2004, pp. 344–5; Mitchell *et al.*, 2001). Where then does identity shift fit, if at all, in the causal sequences producing settlement and the uncertain and crisis-ridden sustenance of it (for different views, see Ruane and Todd, 2007)?

Developments in the wider social scientific literature provide a way to cut through some of these debates, to see cultural categorizations and identities as one part of a complex causal process of coming out of conflict, and to provide a model which allows us to investigate empirically the extent of identity change and to assess comparatively its causal role in settlement processes. I take the following theoretical claims as my starting points:

- Cultural categorizations, cognitive frames (the elements of "identity" in my view) are distinct from communal belonging (Brubaker, 2002). There is no necessary relation between acceptance or affirmation of an identity-category and strength of feeling of communal solidarity (Ruane and Todd, 2004). Indeed it is logically possible to have communal polarization with cultural relaxation or vice versa. The role of identity change in sustaining settlements can therefore be investigated separately from the distinct question of the role of communal boundaries and solidarity in sustaining settlements.

- Ethnic and national identities are cognitively complex. An ethno-national identity carries with it not just a specific category of identity (Irish, British) but also cognitive and normative content, expressed in different forms of collective and individual personal narratives, varying with its relation with other collective identity categories (religion, class, etc.) (Abdelal *et al*., 2003; Ashmore *et al*., 2004; Ruane and Todd, 2004). Identities, in this sense, should be conceived as packages of interrelated elements (values, assumptions, dispositions) affirmed as important to the self, prioritized in situations of choice, defended if attacked (Todd, 2005). For each nationality, the national-identity package varies for different classes, genders, and subgroups, and is internally contested.

- Understood in this way, identity shift is part of the everyday stuff of social life and is particularly important in times of socio-political transformation (McAdam *et al*., 2001). Ethnic entrepreneurs highlight oppositional elements of identity while peacemakers encourage change in this oppositional content, and both may broker new identity categories. Particular subgroups emphasize those aspects of the broader group-identity package on which they score highly (Lamont and Fleming, 2005; Lamont and Molnar, 2001). Ordinary individuals shift their prioritizations when circumstances make it necessary: where local schools do not provide at once the national, linguistic, religious, moral, career and educational values which they desire for their children, parents prioritize within what for them is an integrated identity package. As Laitin (1998) shows, this may have major consequences for the identity options of the next generation.

- Identity shift has a causal impact: it affects where symbolic boundaries are drawn and how the "principal enemy" is defined and thus what actions are likely to be seen as appropriate and what events taken as threats. It is at once common and true to say that "identity" per se does not cause anything. However a valued identity package carries with it dispositions to act in one set of ways rather than in others and opens

one to some sort of arguments and incentives and closes one to others. As the content of ethno-national identity shifts, so do the boundaries of the group. Depending on the way the nation is understood, sections of the population are included or excluded (Goulbourne, 1991; Todd *et al.*, 2006b); indeed, one way of finding out what content individuals give to their ethnic or national identity is to see whom they include or exclude in their ethnie or nation (Gil-White, 1999). To assert the importance of identity content to action is to take a theoretical stance against those versions of social identity theory which take groups and boundaries as given, in favor of recent developments in social psychology which emphasize context, self-categorization and shifting boundaries (Ashmore *et al.*, 2004; Muldoon *et al.*, 2007).

• Identities shift, but at a cost. Elements of the "identity package" – gender, the mother tongue – are laid down so early that they are exceedingly difficult to change. Other elements (class, nationality) are embodied in adults' ways of perceiving, interacting, judging, moving (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 86; Edensor, 2002). I will not enter debate here as to how early ethnicity is learned or how deeply embedded it is in individuals' dispositions. Even for the deepest identity categories, change in the contents and values associated with it is possible and sometimes desirable. However, it also carries with it a personal and social cost, in the effort involved in changing ingrained dispositions, in the process losing traditional linkages and supports and risking personal failure and social rejection (Todd, 2005; Todd *et al.*, 2006a).

• The broad pattern of the identity package may be "locked in" both cognitively and socially. Particular ethno-national identities are tied into cognitive frames and integral to our understanding of how the social world functions and to our sense of rationality or moral principle (in this they are parallel to class identities, see Bourdieu, 1977; Lamont, 2000). One of the corrosive aspects of ethnicity – prominent in all three of the conflicts studied in this book – is when ethnic identity carries with it a notion of civilizing values of progress and rationality as the property of one ethnie and threatened by the other. At the same time, socio-political inequalities may reproduce precisely these oppositional identity packages by providing evident confirmation of their "truth": the dominant ethnic group controls the most progressive parts of the economy, dominates in the academies, and has the power to assert *its* culture as the rational, progressive, global culture. In such circumstances, dominance is fought for – and against – not simply for its own sake but for the sake of the highest values. A feedback pattern results where power inequalities

are internalized in dispositions and identity oppositions, which then serve to reproduce the power inequalities (Bourdieu, 1977, pp. 78–9). This pattern can be broken. Radical change in power relations is likely to provoke cognitive dissonance which triggers identity shift as is modeled below.

• Change in identity patterns can themselves be long-term processes, with time-lags between cause and effect (see Pierson, 2004, pp. 79–102). Small, incremental shifts in identity content may build to thresholds which allow radical change of relationships (on thresholds, see Lustick, 2001). Individual identity shifts which of themselves do not affect politics can eventually come to do so when "tipping mechanisms" result; large sections of a population change their political stance because they expect others also to do so (Laitin, 1998, pp. 21–4). The change can also be generational, so that small changes in one generation may crucially affect the identity choices open to the next generation.

The study of identity shifts in settlement processes, from this perspective, is no more or no less problematic than the study of identity shifts in processes of social mobilization and political revolution, and open to the same forms of investigation of sequences of mechanisms which sustain agreed institutions and moderate ethnic conflict (McAdam *et al.*, 2001). The notion of identity is substantive: the claim that identity shift may sustain settlement is therefore more than tautological. It is also complex, thus allowing the clear specification of the aspects of identity which do and do not change in a particular situation. This approach bypasses many of the objections outlined above. We do not have to argue against (or for) high fences prior to looking at the role of identity change in settlements, since the two issues are distinct: one would, indeed, expect identity shift even in settlements based on separation. The claims here do not posit unrealistically radical identity changes, much less the end of ethnicity: minor shifts in identity content may be politically important. The direction of causality is to be discovered, not assumed. It tackles other potential objections head on; identity contents do shift, this does affect the precise shape of boundaries and the dispositions to act in given circumstances; an "ethnic group" may remain, but its contours and interests (as perceived by its members) have changed in subtle but important ways. The possibility of theorizing such identity and boundary shift is now accepted as a key issue in social psychology. How far, for whom and under what conditions identity shift occurs in settlement processes, and how far and under what conditions it sustains settlement

thus become empirical questions for comparative investigation. First, however, it is necessary to make more precise the possible trajectories of identity change that one might expect to find in settlement processes.

A model of identity change in settlement processes

I have developed elsewhere a model of identity change which can be used in comparative research (Todd, 2005). It works with the concept of identity outlined above and makes certain working assumptions. First, it assumes that one of the key elements of ethno-national identity that fosters conflict is a binary opposition, which opposes ethnic identities along moral and even civilizational lines (see Akenson, 1992; Memmi, 1990; Osterhammel, 1997; for the role of such binaries in class identity, see Bourdieu, 1984). In the Northern Ireland case, there is an extensive literature showing that this is one aspect of unionist British and nationalist Irish identity but that these identities are not reducible to such oppositional content (see Ruane and Todd, 1996, ch. 4). Second, it assumes that such binary oppositions are integrally connected to ethnic power relations, produced and confirmed by them, leading in turn to intense and uncompromising defence of/attack on them. Third, it follows that radical change in ethnic power relations, for example the equalization and partial stabilization of the power balance which culminated in the 1998 Agreement in Northern Ireland (see McGarry and O'Leary, 2004) is likely to trigger identity shift. The form of that shift varies along two dimensions – how extensive the change in the elements of identity (ranging from zero to total) and whether or not it translates directly into practice. This is shown in Table 1.

Reaffirmation reaffirms the existing core binary oppositions and welcomes or resists change in their name. One might hypothesize that sections of loyalists in Northern Ireland have done precisely this, *reaffirming* an older oppositional Protestant-British identity in marches,

Table 1   Typology of change in collective identity categories

	No change	Partial change	Total change
Transparence and coherence between practice and category	Reaffirmation	Assimilation	Conversion
Ambiguity and tension between practice and category	Adaptation	Ritual appropriation	Privatization

protesting against the new order, opposing what they see as Catholic-nationalist advance. These groups, like those in Glenbryn who protested against small Catholic schoolgirls walking to school, have been politic-ally marginalized but retain the capacity for violence and disruption (see McKay, 2000).

Conversion takes place when structural change renders irrelevant older categorical oppositions and actors take over a whole new identity package. The expectation that Northern Protestants would convert from a unionist British to a nationalist Irish identity once British support was removed was common among nationalists and republicans until the recent period, even though there is very little evidence that such conversion has ever taken place (Howe, 2000, pp. 173–7; Whyte, 1990, pp. 134–5).

Privatization rearranges the elements of identity, marginalizing all macro-social elements, making recessive national, political, class and status categorizations, shrinking the core of identity into the private, the familial, perhaps also the religious sphere (Mitchell, 2001). This reprior-itization may have more or less radical implications in practice: it may lead to a practical disengagement from politics, a refusal to vote, but it may also be an emotional and attitudinal detachment. This may well be a temporary phenomenon, an option taken by those for whom change is presently too painful or too dangerous. If so, this is a key group for the future, for their direction of future change will be crucial to political development.

Adaptation is where actors adapt to the practices required in the new social order without changing the core elements of their identity. They keep their own values and self-categorizations distinct from their social conformity. Plausible examples include the bulk of mainstream unionists in the Ulster Unionist Party and the Democratic Unionist Party who gave more or less grudging and partial support to the new institutions while retaining their older conceptual categorizations; on some readings, this was also the position of a section of republicans. This produced endemic crises in the implementation of the Agreement (see Ruane and Todd, 2001).

Assimilation is where actors reshuffle the elements of identity, retaining the national category of identity but reprioritizing the contents and their relation with other categories. This involves differentiating the substantive cultural meanings of ethnicity from associated oppositions based on status and power hierarchies and retaining the former while marginalizing or casting the latter out from the new identity package, finding other values and dispositions previously marginalized which

can now be prioritized as part of the new nationality package. Actors thus find in themselves the dispositions and expectations necessary to succeed in the new order, while retaining a sense of continuity with their older selves. For example, the business community strongly welcomed the Good Friday Agreement (GFA) and campaigned for it. Sections of evangelical Protestants have seen it as liberating religion from state belonging (Ganiel, 2006b). Anti-nationalist liberals have for the most part welcomed its opening of borders. Large sections of the nationalist population have seen it not primarily as a means toward another end (a united Ireland) but as a welcome development in which they can be respected as Irish within Northern Ireland.

Ritual appropriation. In this option, new practices are accepted and assimilated within old narrative forms and ritual structures which are used to legitimate, appropriate and redefine the practices, thus assuring continuity of meaning despite change in practice. Republicans might be seen as exemplifying this option, re-packaging new cooperative practices in older symbolism.

In what follows, I assess this typology in light of new qualitative research on identity shift in Northern Ireland. The results reveal more potential for change than originally suggested.

Method

I report on the results of two interdisciplinary qualitative research projects on identity and identity change in contemporary Ireland (see Muldoon *et al.*, 2007; Todd *et al.*, 2006a). In one project on intergenerational transmission and ethno-national identity in the border area, interviews were conducted in 2004–6 by three researchers in different locations.[1] The interviews followed a common "topic guide" which ranged over the understanding of national and religious identity (and changes in this) and experience of the local and wider socio-political context. The research design involved interviews with members of three-generational families. The other study involved interviews in three locations, one in the north (where 26 interviews were carried out) and two in the south between 2003–5 in an open-ended format designed to tap into all aspects of identity.[2] A set of probes to tap into the substantive content and norms associated with ethno-national identity (as discussed above) was part of the research design. In the two projects, over 80 interviews were conducted in Northern Ireland in two large border towns, a sizeable town in the eastern part of Northern Ireland, with some

interviews with mixed marriage families in Belfast. Slightly over half of the interviews were with Catholics; this seeming overrepresentation is explained by the fact that Protestants are a small minority in the parts of the border area where many interviews were carried out. There was a representative age-, generation-, and gender-spread (with the exception of the youngest generation who were underrepresented in interviews but at the center of a related school essay study (Muldoon *et al*., 2007). Active republicans were underrepresented in the Catholic sample, although significant numbers of those interviewed had republican sympathies, republican backgrounds or republican relatives.[3]

After transcription, coding was done by each interviewer in light of the topic guides. Preliminary analysis was done jointly and initial articles resulted (Muldoon *et al*., 2007; Todd *et al*., 2006a, 2006b, 2007). In what follows, I summarize the broad trends of results. I give indications of whether few (less than five), many (around a half) or most (more than three-quarters) of the interviews which could be categorized (most could be without further analysis) fell into the category in question. I do not claim that the findings are representative, simply that they reveal trajectories of identity change. To ensure transparency and comparability between publications based on this research, individuals are referred to in the text by codes.[4]

Findings

In the research, as predicted, there were many cases of identity shift, although they were seldom radical.[5] Identity is complexly constructed in Northern Ireland and our respondents freely and fluently outlined a complex multiplicity of categories and subcategories, their own precise positioning within them and how they arrived at this position (JF2PMB02; LM2NPH1; TFPA7; see also Todd *et al*., 2006a). This is typical of conflict situations where identity is socially important (Ashmore *et al*., 2004, p. 96). Significantly, our Southern respondents were often less able (and perhaps also less willing) to say much about national identity (Todd *et al*., 2006b). Individuals in Northern Ireland, in contrast, positioned their national identity not simply in a cultural but in a political and in a familial spectrum: one man in the border area defined his way of being Irish in contrast to that of his father (who was in the British army in World War II) and his brother (in the IRA); a common type of narrative characterizes the politics of the family in contrast to the individual's own way of being national: "I vote for the nationalist parties but I am from a republican family" (NM1NRC06; LF3SCY5; LM1OCY1).

National and familial identification were intertwined in many of the interviews. The related school essay studies showed that 14-year-olds believed their family to be the single most important influence on their national identification (Muldoon *et al.*, 2007). Respondents often related their sense of national belonging to their family history; they explained their identity in familial terms, described it with familial contrasts and legitimated identity shifts by rediscovering aspects of family history. They were not "naïve primordialists" who saw ethnicity as fully determined by descent (Gil-White, 1999; Todd *et al.*, 2006a). They differentiated themselves from their family and they negotiated their nation, reinterpreting both national and familial narratives. So, for example, individuals who undertook processes of radical identity shift related those processes to aspects of their family background: constant cross-border movement in previous generations, or the recently discovered residence of an ancestor in Dublin (JF2PMB01, NF1FWP01). Other interviews showed how change in the present highlights change in the familial past allowing alternative family traditions to re-emerge (JM2CMB01).

Few respondents related their discussions of national identity and identity shift explicitly to the Good Friday Agreement of 1998 or indeed to any other major political event. The triggers of identity shift most frequently mentioned were local and personal: a neighbor being shot dead; attack by local paramilitaries; divorce from a strongly loyalist husband; the birth of a child; moving house; leaving the family home; going to university (for examples, JF2PMB01; LM2NPH1; LM2EPY1; NF1FWP01; TWPA6; JF2PMB03; JF2PMB02; JF2CMB01; TFPA7; NM3NTC10; NM3NTC01). Sometimes particular incidents took on a symbolic power for individuals even if they had not personally been involved: in our study, these were typically incidents of violence and suffering (TMPA16). The discussions of processes of identity shift showed clearly their indirect dependence on high politics both in their stimuli and in the resources which sustained the process of change: some respondents situated their discussion in the context of the peace process; others focused on EU and government funded cross-community venues, demilitarization, the de-stigmatization of Sinn Féin, the official recognition of nationalist identity (see the examples above). In the interviews, macro-level political change did not of itself produce the sharp cognitive dissonance which leads to identity change, unless it also affected the interactional and experiential level (see also Todd *et al.*, 2006b). When political change impacted on their everyday interactions, either indirectly (in the creation of venues and resources for interaction) or directly

(in demilitarization, or the de-stigmatization of ex-paramilitaries), then it might foster identity shift (cf. Hargie and Dickson, 2003).

Indeed for many of these respondents, their community organizations – locality, church, local party – were more important to them than major political events. For these people the dominant social norms were those of their immediate community, not those of the institutions of the Good Friday Agreement. They negotiated their own identity package between communal and official norms, continuing explicitly to conform to community behavior while thinking in quite unconventional ways (for such DUP supporters, see Mitchell and Todd, 2007). The typology sketched above is too simple because it treats the official, state norms as the dominant ones and insufficiently recognizes the contestation of norms in the process of settlement. For some of our respondents, what was to be dominant was still in the process of contestation. Such respondents continued to act in old ways while privately thinking anew.

There was one important difference between Catholics and Protestants. The recent changes in Northern Ireland did not cause any of the Catholics whom we interviewed cognitive dissonance.[6] The nationalist parties took the new order to be fair, as did the mass Catholic population who voted overwhelmingly for it. Far from requiring a change of identification, it allowed them to affirm a once-stigmatized identification. For one of the respondents: "I think people are becoming more confident . . . even for me . . . I hated, you know, like, saying it at the end of the Troubles, but now I'm much more confident about saying I'm Irish and I'm proud to say I'm Irish because it seems to be . . . less attack on that notion of Irishness" (NM3NTC01). Political change did not leave that Irish national identity untouched, but identity shift tended to be gradual, reported as "moderation" rather than qualitative category or value shifts. The most radical identity shifts in the recent period recounted to us by Catholics tended to be triggered not in their relations with Protestants or indeed with the British state but in their interaction with the Irish state and their experience of Southern norms and attitudes (Todd *et al.*, 2006a, 2006b). This had for some Catholics the same potential for cognitive dissonance as the integration of nationalists on an equal footing in Northern Ireland had for many Protestants.

The interviews are of particular use in refining the typology of identity change suggested above – in particular the categories of *assimilation*, *adaptation*, *and privatization*. There were very few examples of the other trajectories of change. There were no obvious *conversions* from one identity package to another although there were certainly cases of radical identity change. Where identity categories were changed (in two cases

from British to Irish, in two from Irish to British and in several from British or Irish to Northern Irish), this was typically accompanied by symbolic trade-offs whereby the change in category was accompanied by a strong re-affirmation of religious or familial or moral content. I include these cases in the category of *assimilation*. There was very little *reaffirmation* of oppositional categories, with only a few cases and even among these individuals, there was the beginning of movement toward moderation and/or privatization (Todd *et al.*, 2007). Much more typical of traditionalist respondents was occasional affirmation of an explicit or implicit oppositional content together with strong claims of moderation and tolerance. These I discuss under *adaptation*. *Ritual appropriation* was not a response which could easily be discerned on the basis of interviews.

Assimilation occurred among a minority of our respondents (I note nine clear cases below, although there are also other more ambiguous ones in our sample). Some of the most explicit examples were among Protestants, who over a period of time – and typically through intense if short-lived personal crises – reassessed many of the oppositional contents of their identity categories and dispensed with them. These individuals reported a helter-skelter of change, with initial movement (typically within cross-community institutions) leading to new levels of cognitive dissonance (for example, encounters with republicans requiring a revision of accepted binaries – "I had been brought up with a stereotype of a Sinn Féin person as an absolute monster, you know, and then on the other hand I had X who was a very friendly, amicable woman and . . . I had an awful time trying to reconcile the two . . .") and further change (JF2PMB01; JF2PMB03; JF2PMB02; NF1FWP01; TFPA7). It is not difficult to explain why this type of identity change is infrequent. The changes are cumulative and radical, involving renegotiation of relations with family and friends. They happen through periods of crisis and involve a number of choice-points, at each of which the process could have stopped. In short, this sort of identity shift requires considerable work. The individuals who undertook these paths had particularly strong incentives to continue in them (in two cases mixed marriages, in one a job in cross-community work). Among Catholics, assimilation took a somewhat different form: sometimes identity categories were reshuffled in response to being perceived as "different" in Dublin; others attempted to find a way of overcoming oppositional categories for the sake of their children; other interviewees saw their own movement away from opposition in the context of their cross-community or political work (NM3NTC10; LF3OCY1; LM2OC01; LM1OCY1). In all of these cases,

the individuals' resources (safety, intellectual motivation, space to reassess their identity package, lack of intense peer pressure) were strong.

Assimilation radically changes the identity package such as to open the individual to new modes of interaction and new forms of politics. If it were widespread in Northern Ireland, it would most certainly produce a plural and participatory, rather than a deeply divided, society. However it does not appear realistic to imagine such a level and intensity of change being generalized among an entire population.

Adaptation was a more common response to change which could sometimes result in more significant change than outlined in the model above. An "adaptive" mode of response is part of the traditional Catholic/nationalist repertoire in Northern Ireland.[7] It was common among Catholics in a large border town. Significant numbers of respondents in that town asserted a discourse of moderation and pluralism, of acceptance of the other, a desire not to offend Protestants, at the same time as asserting uncriticized religious and national categories of identity (Muldoon *et al*., 2007). This could be interpreted as a "politically correct" adaptive discourse, covering an older oppositional consciousness. However, a similar discourse of moderation and gradualist change was common to respondents who showed abundant evidence in the interviews that they had opened to radical difference, and come to relativize the moral contents of their own identity to recognise the validity of the different constructions of nationality, political obligation and identity (JF2CB01; JM2CB01). Some told of journeys from a highly oppositional consciousness to a recognition of the other's viewpoint (NF2NMC07; TMPA16). Some found their pluralist principles challenged when they first met Protestants, although they were later deepened (NM3NTC01). Such gradual adaptation, when it relativizes the moral content of national identity and permits a truly liberal nationalism, is of major political import. Even when it does not go so far, it can encourage political compromise although the compromise remains prone to crisis: as one respondent eloquently put it, referring to memories of injustice and repression "The ceasefire is very important . . . it's the biggest thing you know, its so important that that's sustained, but when wee things happen you know that that memory is still somewhere buried in your brain" (NF2NMC07).

Privatization was another common response. On the one hand, there was a significant minority (from both Protestant and Catholic backgrounds) who avoided oppositional identities and wanted above all to live outside the Protestant/Catholic and unionist/nationalist categories which they saw as essentially oppositional. One man defined himself

only as "a plumber" and tried to steer a way through a sectarian society while according the least possible recognition to its core categories (LM2EPY1). Others avoided opposition by seeing all national identities as just official labels, "something to tick in a box" (TFPA6). Some individuals, both Catholic and Protestant in origin, had come to see themselves as Northern Irish. Where they said little about the new identity, taking it as a thin identity which had little content (cf. Trew, 1998), I have characterized it as privatization; where they gave it a definite content which was moving away from opposition, I characterized it as assimilation.

Privatization could also take the form of detachment from *communal* norms and practices while *privately* espousing new modes of thinking.[8] Some of O'Keefe's working class interviewees, for example, had very unexpected identity configurations even while living in tightly knit areas with a paramilitary presence. One woman retained a self-declared identity as British ("It's a number stamped on my passport and that's about it") even though she would have "loved there to be an identity of Northern Irish," and also spoke of her liking for Irish culture. It is as if the elements of her identity had changed while the category of identity remained British, uncomfortably and emptily so (TFPA9). Similar unexpected configurations have appeared in other qualitative research with evangelical Protestants where Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) voters have, for example, quite radically changed their perspectives on the Irish state (Ganiel, 2006a; Mitchell and Todd, 2007). While this phenomenon has always existed in Northern Ireland, it was once presented as an exceptional, even eccentric, position; now it appears more common and taken for granted.

Conclusion

Identity shift exists in Northern Ireland and it is spoken of freely. It takes very many forms. The model sketched above allows us to see an order in this variety and flux and to begin to classify the causal sequences involved. The categories of assimilation, adaptation, and privatization capture well the different sorts of change recounted in interviews, although the potential for change is even greater than originally suggested. However, the research also suggests the need to refine the model by building into analysis the complex processual character of settlements, and in particular the contestation of dominant norms. The respondents defined themselves with respect to competing sets of norms, not just one new dominant set of norms.

Identity shift was common in the interviews but it was seldom radical. Typically it involved either a moderation of oppositional understandings or a partial disengagement from them, a privatisation. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to give a detailed analysis of the survey evidence, there are indications that these shifts are typical of much wider sections of the population. There are signs of Protestant moderation: well over two-thirds of Protestants could live with a united Ireland even if they would not like it (www.ark.ac.uk/nilt) although in the 1980s well over half predicted violence should there be a united Ireland (Smith and Chambers, 1991, p. 96). A significant minority of young Protestants are now moving toward a Northern Ireland identity (Muldoon *et al.*, 2007). There are also indications of Protestant privatization since 1998: now one-fifth of the Protestant working class say that they would not vote in another referendum on the Agreement (www.ark.ac.uk/nilt). After 1998, Catholics, in particular young Catholics, became more likely to assert an Irish identity. At the same time, Catholic constitutional preferences became more volatile, with an immediate increase in uncertainty about the constitutional issue, and an increase in those preferring other options than a united Ireland or a United Kingdom (www.ark.ac.uk/nilt). Meanwhile, there is continued opposition on key issues and a reaffirmationist section of the population who were not interviewed in our study.[9]

How far have subtle shifts of the type reported above had a political effect? It is highly likely that they have been significant in sustaining support for the Agreement, and in significantly moderating the attitudes of its opponents, notably the Democratic Unionist Party. This, however, is simply to hypothesize that identity shift played a facilitative part in a complex causal sequence which led from conflict to (crisis-ridden) agreement (Ruane and Todd, 2007). To assess the precise character of that role requires a comparison of degrees of identity shift in the three cases studied in this book. If identity shift plays a role, it may be in conjunction with other variables. It may well be, for example, that the sort of identity shifts discussed here are easily reversed, so we may see beginnings of them in Israel later to be reversed as the Oslo settlement collapsed, while similar identity shifts in South Africa were given additional momentum by the successful transition. Or perhaps there are different types of identity shift in each situation: more assimilation in South Africa, less in Israel. Or, it may be that identity shift does not play a significant causal role. that the same types of shift occur among roughly the same percentage of the populations in all three conflict areas, independent of the relative success or failure in sustaining the settlement.

This chapter is conceived as providing a model for such a comparative study.

The assimilative type of identity shift has been rare in Northern Ireland. It is, however, politically important when it occurs among the political and economic elite (Ben-Porat, 2006). Could it increase in extent and effect? This is the conflict transformation vision. The factors that favor assimilation include strong cross-community linkages, safety, space, and incentives for change. Since all of these are slowly increasing, one might expect more examples of this form of change over the middle term. However, there is no reason to believe that assimilative change is likely on a widespread basis at least while communal opposition remains strong. The individual and social costs of the process and the limited incentives and resources available to most of the public make it a difficult option, and one which has many potential points of reversal. Even more important, this type of identity shift involves individuals breaking with community solidarity and common wisdom and pursuing a new course. Most people in Northern Ireland are unwilling thus to step out alone: peer pressure, the sense that there is safety in numbers, together with an at-homeness in communal linkages and networks are all good reasons for them to maintain a level of communal solidarity. If radical change is to occur, it is unlikely to be by this means in this generation.

There is another way in which radical identity shift could be translated into politics. Privatization is a relatively common, and a potentially radical, mode of identity shift. Those who have privatized, however, have typically changed their thoughts more than their communal linkages or their political loyalties. If this new thinking stays in the realm of private thought, it becomes little more than self-image. Is there a way of translating it into collective political action which could influence, or change, the policies of the main political parties? It could form the basis of a "tipping" movement whereby very many individuals – in the expectation that others too are about to change – suddenly opt for quite radical changes in their political preferences and practices (Laitin, 1998). For this to occur, individuals have to have clear public choices to make, incentives for change and good reason to believe that others too are likely to opt for change. The riskier the outcomes, the more assurances they will need that they will not opt alone. To date, the politics of settlement in Northern Ireland has been elite centred; after the 1998 referendum, occasions of public choice have been confined to elections. To date, tipping movements have moved to conservatism rather than change – for example, the most recent such movement at elections has been toward

the more extreme unionist party, the DUP. The DUP's entering of the devolved executive with Sinn Féin in March 2007, however, provides a safer arena for individuals to change their practice as well as their perspectives. Frequent and small occasions for public choice, focused on civil society as much as on politics, will encourage still more privatizers to test the water.

Change may also occur gradually, through a movement beginning with minimalist adaptation. As nationalists and unionists, even unwillingly, opt for one compromise and, finding it acceptable, become willing to opt for another, they gradually wear away what is left of their oppositional consciousness. This incremental moderation can also lay the basis for further movement in the next generation who are socialized with the success of moderately cooperative political relationships, and see the prospect of much fuller cooperation. These hopes may underlie the governments' cautious approach to implementing the 1998 Agreement, their attempt to get as many as possible supporters on board at each stage. There is, however, a danger to this approach. Incremental identity shift depends on a continued momentum of settlement although the oppositional aspects of identity work against such a momentum (cf. Ruane and Todd, 2001). If the momentum of settlement fails, the likelihood is that each group will react negatively to the others' negative reaction to their demands, marking a destruction of the moderation already achieved and a confirmation of the oppositional aspects of identity. The decimation of moderation and the dashing of incremental hopes is a much more striking feature of the history of Northern Ireland than is any gradual increase in moderate politics: examples include the failure of the middle ground to hold in the late 1960s, the success of the Ulster Workers Council Strike of 1974 in winning Protestant support away from the first power sharing executive, and the petering out of the mass mobilization of the Peace People.

What conclusions follow from this analysis? As outlined above, there has already been considerable identity shift among the respondents in the two studies. What prevented this being translated into political action was not primarily a cultural logic, nor was it an effect of power-equalization, both of these favored identity shift. Rather it was a communal logic, a tendency for individuals to conform to their community norms even while their own identifications and dispositions are shifting. To the extent that change for most of these individuals has to be collective and communal, the formation of the 2007 executive bodes well for the future. It remains, however, for the governments to provide for them opportunities and incentives to shift the collective stance in

both small and large ways. To develop Lederach's metaphor (2003), it is important to see identity shifts as part of a process of cultivation and to ensure that possibilities of further change are encouraged. A strategy premised on rewarding the adaptors among the political elites, without at the same time providing incentives for assimilators and privatizers in the wider public, runs the risk of collapse.

What factors encourage identity shift away from opposition? Three conclusions can be drawn from this paper. First, identity change is triggered by experiences and interactions, not directly by political events. Second, cross-community civil society organisations are key venues where such change is triggered and provide resources for further change. Third, what is important is not simply the existence of these organizations, but the impact of wider political settlement, and in particular of changing power relations, on interactions within them: it is the participation of republicans (or loyalists) on an equal basis that shifts entrenched categories. If these conclusions are more generally true, they have major consequences for sustaining public support for peace agreements in deeply divided societies. Either the agreements have to be translated into on-the-ground initiatives which touch large sections of the population, for example institutionalized within civil society, or states have to be ready to enforce them, and they cannot presume to attain strong public support. These conclusions are tentative, requiring comparative and quantitative testing. I hope, however, to have shown that the role of identity shifts in settlement processes is an important question, and one open to empirical and comparative analysis.

Acknowledgements

Notes

1. Intergenerational Transmission and Ethno National Identity in the Border Area, funded by the EU Programme for Peace and Reconciliation through the Higher Education Authority, North South Programmes Strand Two and conducted from the Geary Institute, University College Dublin and School of Psychology, Queens University Belfast. See www.ucd.ie/euiteniba. The author was lead investigator. Interviewers were Drs. Lorenzo Cañás Bottos, Nathalie Rougier, and Jennifer Todd.
2. Identity, Diversity, and Citizenship, funded by the Irish government Higher Education Authority's Programme for Research in Third Level Institutions, PRTLI 3. The author was co-lead investigator, the interviewer was Dr Theresa O'Keefe.
3. The original research design involved interviews in what is perceived to be a republican area of the border. Lorenzo Cañás Bottos spent 3 months in a town on the Southern side of the border but, despite trying several routes, was not granted access to a neighboring town on the Northern side. Eventually under project time-constraints, he relocated to a different part of the border where he interviewed across the political spectrum in Northern Ireland.
4. Respondents in the ITENIBA project are identified as JM2PWB1, with the letters signifying the interviewer; the gender of the interviewee; the generation; the religion; the broad category of work; the place; and the number of the interview. Interviews in the IDC project are labeled here TMPA15 TFCA10 to indicate interviewer, gender, religion, place, and the number of the interview (in the archive, at time of writing, they are labeled A15, A10).
5. Analysis is still under way, and more cases may well be identified.
6. It is possible that committed republicans had more difficulty with the new order.
7. As a minority in a situation which they disliked and which they could not change, adaptation to state norms while keeping their traditional identity and values was one rational mode of response.
8. I define this as privatization (rather than adaptation) because of the trajectory: one privatizes when one moves away privately from old (communal, family, locality) norms, even while one publicly conforms to them; one adapts when one conforms to new norms, while privately and informally (in community, family, and locality) keeping old identities and values.
9. This is despite the fact that O'Keefe's interviews took place in an area which would have been predicted to be reaffirmationist. Michael Anderson's recent research (2006) in another such local area suggests that loyalists, at least those outside the interface areas, are not affirming older oppositions but rather are nostalgic for the order and certainty of the past.

References

Abdelal, R., Y. M. Jerrera, A. I. Johnston, and R. McDermott. 2003. "Identity as a Variable" (10 May 2003 version), Weatherhead Initiative in International Affairs, Harvard University Press, http://www.wcfia.harvard.edu/misc/initiative/identity/papers/index.htm.

Akenson, D. H. 1992. *God's Peoples. Covenant and Land in South Africa, Israel and Ulster*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Anderson, M. 2006. "Attitudes to Loyalist Paramilitary Groups and Motivation for Enrolment Among Young People in Working-Class Areas of East Antrim," unpublished MA thesis, School of Politics and International Relations, University College, Dublin.

Ashmore, R. D., K. Deaux, and T. McLaughlin-Volpe. 2004. "An Organizing Framework for Collective Identity: Articulation and Significance of Multidimensionality," *Psychological Bulletin* 130(1): 80–114.

Ben-Porat, G. 2006. *Global Liberalism, Local Populism. Peace and Conflict in Israel/Palestine and Northern Ireland*. Syracuse: University of Syracuse Press.

Bourdieu, P. 1977. *Outline of a Theory of Practice* (trans. R. Nice). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bourdieu, P. 1984. *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste* (trans. R. Nice). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Bourke, R. 2003. *Peace in Ireland: The War of Ideas*. London: Pimlico.

Brubaker, R. 2002. "Ethnicity Without groups," *Archives Européennes de Sociologie* 43(2): 163–89.

Brubaker, R. and F. Cooper. 2002. "Beyond 'Identity'," *Theory and Society* 29: 1–47.

Edensor, T. 2002. *National Identity, Popular Culture and Everyday Life*. Oxford: Berg.

Ganiel, G. 2006a. "Ulster Says Maybe: The Restructuring of Evangelical Politics in Northern Ireland," *Irish Political Studies* 21(2): 137–55.

Ganiel, G. 2006b "Emerging from the Evangelical Subculture in Northern Ireland: A Case Study of the Zero28 and Ikon Community," *International Journal for the Study of the Christian Church* 6(1): 38–48.

Gil-White, F. J. 1999. "How Thick Is Blood? The Plot Thickens . . . : If Ethnic Actors Are Primordialists, What Remains of the Circumstantialist/Primordialist Controversy?" *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 22(5).

Goulbourne, H. 1991. *Ethnicity and Nationalism in Post-Imperial Britain*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hargie, O. and D. Dickson. 2003. *Researching the Troubles: Social Science Perspectives on the Northern Ireland Conflict*. Edinburgh: Mainstream Publishers.

Howe, S. 2000. *Ireland and Empire, Colonial Legacies in Irish History and Culture*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kaufmann, C. 1996. "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars," *International Security* 20(4): 136–75.

Laitin, D. D. 1998. *Identity in Formation: The Russian-Speaking Populations in the Near Abroad*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.

Lamont, M. 2000. *The Dignity of Working Men: Morality and the Boundaries of Race, Class, and Immigration*. Harvard: Harvard University Press.

Lamont M. and C. Fleming. 2005. "Everyday Antiracism: Competence and Religion in the Cultural Repertoire of the African American Elite," *Du Bois Review* 2(1): 29–43.

Lamont, M. and V. Molnar. 2001. "How Blacks Use Consumption to Shape Their Collective Identity: Evidence from African-American Marketing Specialists," *Journal of Consumer Culture* 1(1): 31–45.

Lederach, J. P. 2003. "Cultivating Peace. A Practitioner's View of Deadly Conflict and Negotiation." In John Darby and Roger MacGinty (eds), *Contemporary Peacemaking: Conflict, Violence and Peace Processes*. Houndsmills: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 30–7.

Lustick, I. S. 2001. "Thresholds of Opportunity and Barriers to Change in the Right-Sizing of States." In B. O'Leary, I. S. Lustick, and T. Callaghy (eds), *Right-Sizing the State: The Politics of Moving Borders*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 74–102.

McAdam, D., S. Tarrow, and C. Tilly. 2001. *Dynamics of Contention. Cambridge Studies in Contentious Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

McGarry, J. and B. O'Leary. 2004. *The Northern Ireland Conflict: Consociational Engagements*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

McKay, S. 2000. *Northern Protestants: An Unsettled People*. Belfast: Blackstaff Press.

Memmi, A. 1990. *The Colonizer and the Colonized*. London: Earthscan.

Mitchell, C. 2001. "Protestant Identification and Political Change in Northern Ireland," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 26(4): 612–31.

Mitchell, C. and J. Todd. 2007. "Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: Nationality, Power and Symbolic Trade-Offs Among Evangelical Protestants in Contemporary Northern Ireland," *Nations and Nationalism*, 13(4): 637–55.

Mitchell, P., B. O'Leary, and G. Evans. 2001. "Northern Ireland: Flanking Extremists Bite the Moderates and Emerge in Their Clothes," *Parliamentary Affairs* 54(4): 725–43.

Muldoon, O., K. Trew, J. Todd, N. Rougier, and K. McLaughlin. 2007. "Identity Change in Northern Ireland after the Good Friday Agreement," *Political Psychology* 28(1): 89–103.

Osterhammel, J. 1997. *Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview*. Princeton: Marcus Wiener Publishers.

Pierson, P. 2004. *Politics in Time: History, Institutions and Social Analysis*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Ruane, J. and J. Todd. 1996. *The Dynamics of Conflict in Northern Ireland: Power, Conflict, and Emancipation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ruane, J. and J. Todd. 2001. "The Politics of Transition? Explaining Political Crises in the Implementation of the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement," *Political Studies* 49: 923–40.

Ruane, J. and J. Todd. 2004. "The Roots of Intense Ethnic Conflict May Not Themselves Be Ethnic: Categories, Communities and Path Dependence," *Archives Européennes de Sociologie* 45(2): 209–32.

Ruane, J. and J. Todd. 2007. "Path Dependence in Settlement Processes: Explaining Settlement in Northern Ireland," *Political Studies* 55(2): 442–58.

Smith, D. J. and G. Chambers. 1991. *Inequality in Northern Ireland*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Taylor, R. 2001. "Consociation or Social Transformation." In J. McGarry (ed.), *Northern Ireland and the Divided World*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 36–52.

Tilly, C. 2002. *Stories, Identities and Political Change*. Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield.

Todd, J. 2005. "Social Transformation, Collective Categories and Identity Change," *Theory and Society* 34(4): 429–63.

Todd, J., T. O'Keefe, N. Rougier, and L. Cañás Bottos. 2006a. "Fluid or Frozen? Choice and Change in Ethno-National Identification in Contemporary Northern Ireland," *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 12(3–4): 323–46.

Todd, J., O. Muldoon, K. Trew, L. Cañás Bottos, N. Rougier, and K. McLaughlin. 2006b. "The Moral Boundaries of the Nation: The Constitution of National Identity in the South Eastern Border Counties of Ireland," *Ethnopolitics* 5(4): 365–82.

Todd, J., N. Rougier, T. O'Keefe, and L. Cañás Bottos. 2007. "Protestant Minorities, Minority Protestants and Ordinary Individuals in Ireland, North and South," unpublished paper, School of Politics and International Relations, University College, Dublin.

Trew, K. 1998. "The Northern Irish Identity." In A. Kershan (ed.), *A Question of Identity*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Whyte, J. 1990. *Interpreting Northern Ireland*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Wilson, R. and R. Wilford. 2003. "A Route to Stability: The Review of the Belfast Agreement." Democratic Dialogue discussion paper, Belfast: Democratic Dialogue, http://www.democraticdialogue.org/working/agreview_files/agreview.pdf.

Part III
Success and Failure

This page intentionally left blank

10
Who Was Afraid of Decolonization?

Yoav Peled

Introduction

This paper explores the theoretical implications of two sociological understandings of the Oslo peace process and its failure. One understanding, that might be named the "peace and profits" approach, argues that, for reasons that can be easily identified, the emergent Israeli business class concluded that peace with the Palestinians, to be accomplished through partial decolonization of the occupied territories, was conducive to its interests, as part and parcel of a broader liberalization project. This liberalization project was designed to enable the Israeli economy to find its place among the winners in the process of economic globalization. It entailed, here as elsewhere, major transformations in the ownership structure of the means of production, loosening up of the labor and capital markets, deregulation of economic activity, the removal of administrative and fiscal barriers to international trade and investment, and the recommodification of social services. This massive transfer of resources from the state to the market required major budget cuts, primarily in the defense budget, and achieving peace was a precondition for that. The Oslo process failed, according to this analysis, because, on the Israeli side, the victims of economic liberalization and privatization joined hands with the ideological opponents of peace and succeeded in derailing it.

The other sociological understanding that might be named the "privatization-occupation nexus" identifies a built-in contradiction between the policies of peace and privatization that doomed the Oslo process from the very beginning. According to this understanding, the settlement project in the occupied territories functioned as a surrogate welfare state, alleviating some of the material difficulties encountered by

the victims of economic liberalization. Because it played that role, the settlement project (which doubled in size during the Oslo years) was an essential buffer for liberalization itself, and therefore the proponents of liberalization, whatever their declared political preferences, were unable to give it up. The continuation, and even acceleration, of the liberalization project while the occupation continues and intensifies should therefore come as no surprise.[1]

These two understandings differ in their conceptions of society: The former accords greater agency to non-dominant classes, while the latter focuses on the contradictory interests, in this particular case, of the dominant class itself. They both agree that a more equitable distribution of the "peace dividends," in the form of greater income equality and more generous social services, would have helped the Oslo process gain legitimacy in Israeli society. They also agree that this kind of largesse ran counter to the immediate interests of the business class. The "peace and profits" approach, however, is more optimistic, in that it believes that in principle the business class, and the state acting in its name, could have acted more rationally and been more generous toward the victims of privatization. (The year 2000 was supposed to have ended with an NIS 15 billion surplus in the state budget, which the state was desperately trying to hide.) The "privatization-occupation nexus" approach must conclude that the business class is paralyzed by its own internal contradictions, so that in the current situation the failure of the peace efforts is preordained, unless a major social transformation takes place in Israel first or an outside force imposes peace on the two sides to the conflict.

The historical trajectory: liberalization and the pursuit of bourgeois peace

Until the mid-1980s, the Israeli state, forged in the context of a colonial frontier struggle with the Palestinians, was a highly intrusive but formally democratic state, engaged in intensive mobilization and control of societal resources, both directly and through the *Histadrut*. Aside from being an umbrella labor organization, the *Histadrut*, a pillar of pre-statehood Zionist colonization, possessed an economic empire encompassing, at its height, agricultural, manufacturing, construction, marketing, transportation, and financial concerns, as well as a whole network of social service organizations. Until the 1990s this conglomerate controlled about 25 per cent of the economy and employed about 25 per cent of the labor force. About an equal share of the economy, plus virtually all land, was owned directly by the state. As long as the Labor party was in

power (1933–77), this political-economic structure played a crucial role in maintaining the political and cultural hegemony of the Labor Zionist movement, thus ensuring the privileged position of a large segment of the veteran *Ashkenazi* (European Jewish) community.

Ironically, it was this privileged sector of the population that began pressuring the state to liberalize the economy, beginning in the mid-1960s. This signified the transformation of this social sector from essentially a rentier bureaucratic class, living off its control of the largely unilateral capital transfers into the economy, to a bourgeois class in a truer sense, engaged in a relatively fast and successful process of capital accumulation (Shalev, 1992). It was a political party formed by this new middle class in 1976, the Democratic Movement for Change, that brought Labor down and enabled Likud to take power in 1977.

As soon as Likud assumed control of the government, it launched an economic liberalization program designed to dismantle the political-economic structure that was the mainstay of Labor's power. However, since it failed to capture the *Histadrut*, which refused to cooperate with it in imposing wage cuts and massive layoffs in the public sector, Likud's economic policy brought the economy to the brink of hyper-inflation (450 per cent a year in 1985). As an unintended consequence, perhaps, the high inflation rates contributed to the weakening of Labor's economic institutions and in this way hastened the downfall of the *Histadrut*. Be that as it may, in 1985 a national unity government, in which Labor and Likud shared power, instituted an Emergency Economic Stabilization Plan (EESP) that halted the inflation and laid the groundwork for successful liberalization of the economy.

When Labor returned to power on its own, in 1992, a momentous struggle developed between its neo-liberal wing (aided by Labor's smaller, more clearly liberal sister party, Meretz) and its welfarist wing, whose power base was in the *Histadrut*. The aim of the neo-liberal Laborites, headed by Yossi Beilin[2] and Haim Ramon, was to dismantle the *Histadrut* and the public-sector economy in general, and to undermine the welfare state, in order to enable the economy to be thoroughly liberalized. The major issue over which this clash between the two wings of the party took place was the *Histadrut*'s extensive health care system, which was nationalized in 1994, causing the *Histadrut* membership to decline by two-thirds and opening the way for a private health-care industry to develop (Shafir and Peled, 2002, pp. 227–9, 296–302).

Naturally, liberalization was not limited to the economic sphere alone. Important political changes were also introduced, all designed to weaken the political power of non-dominant social classes and groups. These

changes can be grouped under three headings: electoral reform, human rights legislation, and the strengthening of professional, non-elective institutions at the expense of democratically elected ones. In the electoral system, two important changes were instituted: intra-party primary elections and personal election of the prime minister by the entire electorate (making the prime minister a semi-president, US style). The effect of these changes was to weaken the major political parties and, paradoxically, the prime minister as well, and to increase the influence of large donors who could help finance electoral campaigns.[3] By the end of the 1990s, these reforms were largely undone, as part of the anti-liberal reaction that had swept the country, politically and culturally (but not economically).

In the human rights field, two important Basic Laws (enjoying constitutional status) were enacted: "Human Dignity and Freedom" and "Freedom of Occupation." By some interpretations, these two laws together amounted to no less than a "constitutional revolution," in that they allowed, for the first time, for judicial review of primary legislation. However, the rights guaranteed by these laws have to be interpreted, according to Israel's Supreme Court, in light of the country's values as a "Jewish and democratic state." This has limited their applicability in the areas of religious freedom and the rights of Israel's Palestinian citizens, not to mention those of non-citizen Palestinians. No less significantly, the rights guaranteed by these two laws are civil and political rights only, including the right to property, but not social rights. Thus these laws could be used to undermine Israel's relatively progressive labor relations and social welfare legislation that have come under attack in the process of economic liberalization.

The introduction of judicial review of primary legislation, or, more accurately, the assumption by the Supreme Court of that right, signified a major power shift from the elected legislative branch to the non-elected judiciary. This was one manifestation of the trend, in Israel as elsewhere, of political power shifting from majoritarian to elite institutions, as an aspect of liberalization. Another major institution that became much more powerful in that period was the Bank of Israel, whose authority to determine interest rates, in the context of the evolution, for the first time, of a capital market, made it a powerful actor in the determination of economic policy (Hirschl, 2000a, 2000b). Economic and political liberalization was not sufficient, however, to ensure that the Israeli bourgeoisie would benefit from the process of economic globalization. The international opportunities open to Israeli businesses, both in terms of their own operations abroad and in terms of foreign investments in Israel, had been

limited because of the Arab–Israeli conflict. The secondary Arab boycott and general considerations of economic and political expediency made cooperation with Israeli firms risky for many foreign companies. For 20 years the occupied territories provided a partial substitute for the international market and a clandestine trade outlet to the Arab world. But the economic benefits of the occupation – a cheap and reliable labor force and a captive market – were sharply reduced already by the first *intifada*, which broke out in 1987. By the late 1980s the costs of the occupation to the Israeli economy had come to overshadow its benefits.

For these reasons, settling the Israeli–Palestinian conflict – meaning, in effect, reaching some accommodation with the PLO – became an economic necessity for the Israeli bourgeoisie. The intimate connection between economic liberalization and political actions designed to reduce the intensity of the Arab–Israeli conflict had already been established: In 1977, while launching its liberalization program, the first Likud government also launched the peace process with Egypt; in 1985, the same national unity government that launched the EESP also withdrew Israel's forces from much of Lebanon. And indeed, after the Oslo agreement, many foreign markets that had been closed to Israeli firms, in the Middle East and beyond, had opened up, leading to unprecedented economic prosperity in the country. By the same token, foreign direct investment in the Israeli economy, that was non-existent before, had reached $1.5–2 billion a year (Shalev, 1999). The support granted the Oslo process by the majority of the Israeli business class was motivated, then, by two principal considerations: their interest in the downsizing of the state, and their desire to integrate into the international economy.

Peace and profits

Adherents of the peace and profits approach subscribe to one form or another of what Ben-Porat, following Polanyi, has termed the "double movement" argument (Ben-Porat, 2005a; see also Shafir and Peled, 2000, 2002). According to this argument, both liberalization in general and decolonization in particular generated powerful opposing forces in Israeli society. Visible, often violent, opposition to the peace process per se came primarily from the Jewish settlers in the occupied territories and their supporters. It resulted, already in 1995, in two major tragedies: the Goldstein massacre in Hebron, which triggered Hamas's terror campaign, and the assassination of Prime Minister Rabin, who had signed the Oslo Accords.

Liberalization in general aroused opposition among large segments of the Jewish working class that were not necessarily committed to Israel's continuing control of the occupied territories. This opposition was motivated by both economic and cultural reasons. Economically, the effects of liberalization on this sector of society could be seen most clearly in the rapidly increasing inequality in the distribution of income that has characterized the Israeli economy since the mid-1980s. While the effects of economic inequality were mitigated somewhat by taxes and transfer payments, these payments and social services in general, came under attack from the acolytes of liberalization. Education and health care, in particular, had deteriorated significantly for those who could not afford to supplement through private means the declining services provided by the state.

The opposition to economic liberalization was not articulated in economic terms, however, but rather in cultural and political ones (cf. Ben-Porat, 2005a, p. 44). This concerned three primary factors: (1) the lack of an appropriate language in which to express socio-economic grievances; (2) the significant overlap of class and ethnicity, with *Ashkenazim* comprising the bulk of the middle and upper classes, while *Mizrahim* (Jews originating in Moslem countries) and Palestinians constituting most of the working class; and (3) the fact that liberalization indeed had cultural consequences that were viewed as a threat to traditional Jewish values.

(1) Economic liberalization has not been an issue of contention between the major political parties in Israel at least since Likud's coming to power in 1977. As mentioned above, the first serious and successful liberalization program was launched in 1985, by a national unity government in which power was shared equally between Labor and Likud. Moreover, it was Labor itself that succeeded in breaking the back of the *Histadrut* in 1994. With no major political, social, or intellectual force in society offering an alternative economic analysis, the opposition to neo-liberal economics could be expressed in a moral register only. This meant, almost inevitably, that the opposition would be couched in terms that relied on ethnonational Jewish solidarity.

(2) While *Mizrahim* have clearly been marginalized in Jewish Israeli society, economically, socially, politically, and culturally, in Israeli society as a whole they have not formed a peripheral, but rather a *semi-peripheral* group: they are located between the *Ashkenazi* Jews at the top, and the Palestinians, both citizens and non-citizens, at

the bottom. Being in this intermediary position, the *Mizrahim* have naturally sought to ally themselves with the Jewish state and with the *Ashkenazim* who control it, rather than with the Palestinians, with whom they share many economic and cultural characteristics. Generally speaking, *Mizrahim* have therefore not conceptualized their marginalization in class terms, but rather in cultural ethnic terms, and have asserted their Jewishness, the one quality that is common to them and to the *Ashkenazim*, as the basis for their claims of social and economic equality.

(3) On the cultural front, liberalization entailed, first and foremost, secularization of Jewish Israeli society. All three elements of the *status quo* that had traditionally prevailed in the relations between the state and religious Jews in Israel – the monopoly of Rabbinic courts in matters of family law, observance of the Sabbath and of *kashrut* (Jewish dietary law) in the public sphere, and the exemption of *yeshivah* (Rabbinic seminary) students from military service – had been challenged by liberal, secular Jews. These challengers had found important allies in the Supreme Court and in the one million immigrants from the former USSR, many of whom are not Jewish by the orthodox religious definition. In addition, women's rights, tolerance for diverse sexual lifestyles, cultural Americanization and the growing political assertiveness of Israel's Palestinian citizens, have all contributed to the anxiety of the more traditional elements in the society, many of them working-class *Mizrahim*.

Thus, for major segments of the Jewish working- and lower-middle class, comprised largely of religiously traditional *Mizrahim*, liberalization meant not only economic decline in both relative and absolute terms, and the diminution of social services, but also contraction of the privileges accruing to them from their identity as Jews, as well as a frontal attack on their cultural values. The (Jewish) state, that has traditionally treated them as secondary to *Ashkenazim*, has assumed ever-growing importance for them now, as their only protection against the ravishing effects of the market and as an affirmation of their privileged status as Jews. They have therefore clung ever more strongly to their ethnonational identity, increasingly infusing it with religious content and using it as a platform from which to demand the protection and extension of their social citizenship rights. Since they correctly identified the Oslo process as the capstone of liberalization, they came to view it with greater and greater hostility:

Oslo and the New Middle East are in our eyes a conspiracy of the rich for the rich; a window of opportunities to the wealthy who are always at the table of the Laborite prime ministers. A window that is still closed to us, the 'irrational'... for us your peace ceremonies are a mockery, a celebration that the white elite organizes for itself. An academic experiment at the cost of our blood... the rich and the bourgeoisies open new markets and make money while we are blown apart in buses.

(Janet Shamla, cited in Ben-Porat, 2005a, pp. 58–9)

Shas versus Meretz

The only successful attempt to organize *Mizrahim* politically coincided with the onset of economic liberalization, but was couched in cultural, i.e., religious terms. Shas, established in 1984, appealed to its constituency of lower class *Mizrahim* with a message of Jewish solidarity and the restoration of traditional Jewish values that had allegedly been defiled by the secular, *Ashkenazi*, Zionist revolution. Shas has accompanied this message with a rhetoric of social justice and with the creation of an impressive array of social service institutions of its own. It presented no alternative economic vision, however, and has consistently voted, after some bargaining, for every neo-liberal economic measure passed by the government. Still, until it was disciplined by Sharon, and later on excluded from his government altogether, Shas served as an effective buffer against radical welfare state retrenchment, thus frustrating one of the major political goals of the bourgeoisie.[4]

For the first 15 years of its existence, Shas assumed a relatively moderate position with regard to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. It was specifically credited with helping to pass the Oslo Accords in the Knesset. This attitude reflected the political preferences of much of the party elite, most importantly its spiritual and political leaders, respectively, Rabbi Ovadia Yosef and Arie Deri. It was, however, almost diametrically opposed to the views of the vast majority of the party voters, most of them working- and lower-middle-class *Mizrahim*. Since 1999, with the Oslo process reaching its moment of truth and then collapsing, and with the change of leadership from Arie Deri (who had been hounded from office through judicial persecution) to Eli Yishai, the party's attitude toward the Palestinians, both citizens and non-citizens, has been aligned with that of its voters.

An illustration of the way in which the double movement played itself out politically during the Oslo period is the story of the relations between Shas and Meretz in Ehud Barak's coalition government (1999–2001). In class, ethnic and ideological terms Meretz is a mirror image of Shas: its constituency is made up of secular middle- and upper-middle-class *Ashkenazim*, and it has been the primary promoter of peace with the Palestinians. Meretz's position on economic liberalization is inconsistent, if not dishonest. Its rhetoric is social-democratic, and in public opinion polls its voters indicate a stronger preference for "socialism" over "capitalism" than the voters of any other party. However, when in power, Meretz's cabinet ministers had worked assiduously to privatize every public service they could lay their hands on, primarily the telecommunications and educational systems. Ironically, both Meretz and Shas had joined with the neo-liberal Laborites in their takeover of the *Histadrut* in 1994.

Both Shas and Meretz participated in Prime Minister Ehud Barak's coalition, and Barak, true to his obsession to divide and rule (or else because he wanted to generate a stalemate), made Meretz's leader, Yossi Sarid, Minister of Education and appointed a Shas politician, Meshulam Nahari, as his deputy. As a result, during the most crucial years of the Oslo process Meretz spent all of its energy and political capital in an endless struggle between Sarid and Nahari over jurisdictional and budgetary matters relating to Shas's autonomous educational system and the Ministry of Education's efforts to take control over it. In other words, when the two political parties most clearly representative of the two contending classes in (Jewish) Israeli society were placed in the same arena, what they fought over were neither economic issues nor the issue of peace, but the cultural-political issue of control over education. Due to this struggle, Meretz, which had ten Members of Knesset (MKs) at the time, was forced out of the Barak government in May 2000. Subsequently, Shas, with its 17 MKs, bolted out of the coalition right on the eve of Barak's departure for Camp David in July 2000, leaving him with a minority government just as the Oslo process was reaching its moment of truth.

Privatization and occupation

This approach has been articulated in Israel primarily by the historian Daniel Gutwein (2004). His key argument is that far from their being in opposition to each other, there is a *causal* relation between economic liberalization and the continued occupation and colonization of the

West Bank and Gaza. The "double movement," he argues, is not an inter-class clash of interests, but rather a clash between two interests of the bourgeois class itself.

As economic liberalization has further impoverished Israel's lower socio-economic strata, the settlements in the occupied territories, where a surrogate welfare state has been developed for the Jewish settlers, have provided both an economic solution for many poor Israeli Jews and a political outlet for their anger and frustration. While Likud came into power as a champion of the (Jewish) downtrodden, its economic policy only worsened their predicament. However, the massive settlement drive, that began with Likud's second government in 1981, provided a way out of this predicament for many people and a vision of a possible way out for many more. This, in addition to the nation-alist fervor generated by the settlement and escalating conflict with the Palestinians, cemented the poorer strata's political attachment to Likud (and later on to Shas as well). Since both Labor and Likud (and their smaller affiliates) represent the interests of Israel's upper classes, that have benefited greatly from liberalization, both parties have favored the continuation of the occupation and colonization. Its rhetorical protestations notwithstanding, Labor never developed an effective strategy for decolonizing the occupied territories, and the settlement drive continued apace under its rule throughout the Oslo period.

Furthermore, Gutwein argues, the rhetorical opposition to the occupa-tion, articulated in the slogan "peace now," and especially the assertion that the diversion of resources to the settlements was the primary reason for the neglect of the poor within Israel itself, served to draw attention away from the real cause of poverty and immiseration: economic liberal-ization. Moreover, this assertion was not only false, it was also politically counter-productive for the interests of the Israeli "left" (Labor and its smaller affiliates). The Jewish poor interpreted the attack on the settle-ments not only as unpatriotic but as an assault on their relatives and friends who reside there and on their own prospects of improving their economic lot by moving there in the future.

These sentiments were manifested in the internal Likud referendum on the planned disengagement from Gaza, held in May 2004. In none of the "development towns," those euphemistically named pockets of poverty and underdevelopment, where the population is overwhelm-ingly *Mizrahi*, did the disengagement proposal gain a majority of the vote. The disengagement proposal was also defeated very badly (70:30) in Jerusalem, Israel's poorest (and most religious) major city. (Overall,

the disengagement idea was defeated [60:40] in that referendum) (http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-2910838,00.html#n).

Gutwein's argument has a labor market aspect as well. The introduction of non-citizen Palestinian workers into the Israeli economy in 1967 (and their subsequent replacement with international labor migrants) created an added value that accrued to Jewish Israeli workers for being Jewish. In a labor market that was being restructured in the context of liberalization, this added value was significant in providing some Jewish workers with access to higher wages, more secure employment, better working conditions, etc. The New Middle East envisioned by the promoters of the Oslo process would have enabled capital and labor to move freely across state borders, greatly diminishing the value of the Israeli workers' Jewishness. Even with the Oslo process as it was, several labor-intensive industries left Israel and relocated to neighboring Arab countries and beyond, aggravating the unemployment situation in many "development towns."

The fear of downward mobility as a result of the future decolonization of the occupied territories (although for different reasons than those envisioned by Gutwein) was captured in novelist Amos Oz's report of a conversation he had with a *Mizrahi* resident of Beit Shemesh, a development town, in 1982:

> If they give back the territories, the Arabs will stop coming to work, and then and there you'll put us back into the dead-end jobs, like before. If for no other reason, we won't let you give back those territories . . . Look at my daughter: she works in a bank now, and every evening an Arab comes to clean the building. All you want is to dump her from the bank into some textile factory, or have her wash the floors instead of the Arab, the way my mother used to clean for you. That's why we hate you here. As long as Begin's in power, my daughter's secure at the bank. If you guys come back, you'll pull her down first thing.
>
> (Oz, 1984, p. 36; cf. Ben-Porat, 2005a, p. 57)

Gutwein's argument is buttressed by the fact that until Sharon's rise to power and the resumption of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, the project of dismantling the welfare state had been stymied, primarily by the opposition of Shas. According to political economist Michael Shalev,

> the welfare state remained broadly unharmed by the liberalizing reforms that have been the leitmotif of Israel's political economy

since the successful deflation of the mid-1980s . . . It is only in the new millennium that, against the backdrop of resurgence of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and a halt to economic growth, the Ministry of Finance and its supporters have gathered the political strength to undertake substantial welfare state retrenchment.

(Shalev, 2003, p. 20, n. 14)

The latter part of this statement stands in sharp contrast to the conventional wisdom shared by all students of Israeli society, Shalev (and the present writer) among them, until Sharon's transformation of the society began to become apparent. In a 1999 article assessing the changes that had occurred in Israel's political economy since the mid-1980s, Shalev noted that "the collectivist economy that was the historical legacy of Jewish settlement and Arab–Jewish conflict in the pre-state period is difficult to dismantle precisely because conflict and settlement continue to shape state commitments" (Shalev, 1999). Little did he, or anybody, expect that renewed conflict and settlement would be the very factors that would enable the resurgent state, under Sharon, to reshape the country's political economy and truly retrench the welfare state.

The combination of aggressive foreign policy and harsh neo-liberal economic policy is, of course, the hallmark of neo-conservatism. Ben-Porat (2005b) has attributed the resurgence of neo-conservatism under Sharon to the influence of Benjamin Netanyahu, Finance Minister in Sharon's second government (2003–5). However, Sharon instituted the neo-conservative policy as soon as he was elected prime minister, in the special elections held in 2001, and under a "social" (i.e., *Mizrahi*) finance minister – Sylvan Shalom. This is clearly evident in what happened to the welfare state's most basic transfer payments during Sharon's two first full years in office, 2002–3 (that is, before Netanyahu could have any direct effect on economic policy). In these 2 years, old age allowances lost 10 per cent of their value, guaranteed income allowances paid to the poorest of the poor lost 20 per cent, and allowances to single-parent families lost 28 per cent. The universally-paid child allowances lost an average of 20 per cent of their value for families with two children, while the insurance-based unemployment benefits lost 23 per cent. While unemployment rose from slightly over 8.5 per cent, when Sharon took office, to nearly 11 percent in 2004, in 2003 only 23 per cent of the unemployed received unemployment benefits, compared to 39 per cent in 2001.[5]

Discussion

Both the "peace and profits" and the "privatization-occupation nexus" approaches have mastered compelling arguments and much factual evidence in support of their respective explanations of the Oslo process and, particularly, of its failure. Both approaches, however, have kept their analyses at the level of broad societal forces and neglected to study the actual political dynamic that led from the Oslo process to the resumption of violence in October 2000. This lacuna points to a major theoretical problem shared by the two approaches – their disregard for the state as a potentially autonomous political actor.

The turning point from Oslo to the second *intifada* cannot be explained without assigning an active, autonomous role to the state. This turning point may have occurred at two different junctions: the Camp David summit of July 2000 or Sharon's visit to the Temple Mount/Holy Sanctuary in September of that year. The Camp David summit is still shrouded in mystery, in that it is not yet clear whether its outcome signified success or failure for Prime Minister Barak. If Barak intended the Camp David summit, and the Oslo process with it, to fail, he did it in defiance of the business community, which at that time still supported the New Middle East, at least rhetorically, and in disregard of his own electoral prospects. The question then arises: What interests was he serving in bringing about this failure? If Barak wanted the summit to succeed, but failed to achieve his goal, this can be explained by the "double movement" argument, since when Barak went to Camp David he had already lost his Knesset majority. But in this case the question is shifted to Sharon's provocation of September 2000 and to the Israeli state's response to the Palestinian protest that ensued.

As I have argued in greater detail elsewhere (Peled, 2004), the period between Sharon's visit to the Temple Mount/Holy Sanctuary on 28 September 2000, and his landslide victory in the prime ministerial election of 6 February 2001, can be explained most cogently as a Bonapartist resolution of a stalemate in the class struggle (or the "double movement") between the promoters of liberalization and its (Jewish) victims. As Marx argued in *The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, a stalemate in the class struggle allows the state to act independently, in pursuit of its own institutional interests and the personal interests of the political figure that comes to embody it. The economic interests of the capitalist state correspond, naturally, to those of the bourgeoisie. Its political and cultural interests, however, may be anti-liberal, and in that sense be opposed to the bourgeois interest in the non-economic aspects of liberalization.

While it is true that, as Gutwein has argued, the Israeli bourgeoisie has by and large benefited from the resumption of violence, which allowed it to achieve its long-sought-after goal of welfare state retrenchment, the cost of the surrogate welfare state in the occupied territories is much higher than the cost of maintaining a "normal" welfare state in the State of Israel alone. Thus, strict economic rationality would not have led the bourgeoisie to support the continued occupation and colonization of the West Bank and Gaza. The dissipation of the business community as a peace lobby after October 2000 did not stem, therefore, from its preference for continued occupation and colonization but rather from the redistributional policies actually pursued by the state under Sharon in the context of the renewed conflict.

The state, on the other hand – meaning the military and other security forces, as well as the settlers (who should also be viewed as an arm of the state) – had a clear interest in derailing the Oslo process. Since 1967, the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) has been, formally and effectively, the sovereign power in the occupied territories, which have not been formally annexed to Israel to this day and are still considered to be under belligerent occupation. Managing these territories, with their millions of Palestinian residents, required, in addition to intelligence and operational forces, a large civil affairs bureaucracy, sustained by huge budgets, where many military careers have been made. Relinquishing control over these territories, in a sense "privatizing" them, would have meant a great diminution of the military, even in strict numerical terms. Moreover, every advance toward peace, beginning with peace with Egypt, had meant a reduction of military spending relative to Gross National Product (GNP), loss of military contracts, and contraction of the standing army. During the Oslo period there was talk of abolishing the draft and turning to a professional force, and even the idea of privatizing major military functions was raised. Finally, the prestige of the military, and the motivation to serve in it, experienced a marked decline during that period (Peri, 2001).

The IDF and the settlers have always had a symbiotic relationship, with the settlers having a say in the appointment and dismissal of senior military officers, and many of them becoming senior officers themselves. The question whether the IDF would actually remove the settlers from their settlements if ordered to do so by the government was an important facet of the debate over the planned disengagement from Gaza in 2005. Sharon had to replace the heads of all three security services – IDF, Mossad, and Shabak – in order to ensure their compliance with the disengagement plan, and by the time of writing, at least three generals who

had been involved with the disengagement publicly expressed strong misgivings about it.

Throughout the Oslo period no effort was made to remove even one settlement, and the settler population had actually doubled during that period. Still, as long as decolonization, at least as a declared policy, was being promoted by the Israeli bourgeoisie as part of its liberalization efforts, the settlers and the IDF were powerless to stop it; they could only stall it. Even after Rabin had been assassinated by a settlers' sympathizer, and Netanyahu was elected Prime Minister, the Oslo process continued. In fact, Netanyahu had ceded more territory to the Palestinians than Barak ever did. Only when political and cultural liberalization had been checked by the "double movement" was the state able to abandon the decolonization project and reassert its institutional interest in continuing the occupation. In doing that, the state was aided, of course, by the behavior of the Palestinians, who had a "double movement" of their own, but that aspect of the process requires a separate discussion.

Conclusion

During the 1990s Israeli society underwent profound economic restructuring, widespread political and cultural liberalization, and a process of accommodation with Palestinian nationalism. The latter process collapsed at the very end of the decade, and of the millennium, leading to a period of unprecedented violence, brutality, and oppression. Deciphering the reasons for this collapse is therefore of paramount importance if a better future is to be visualized for the country and the region.

Two theoretical approaches have been proposed for understanding the relationships between economic liberalization and the collapse of the Oslo peace process: the "peace and profits" approach that focuses on the momentous class struggle generated by liberalization, and the "privatization-occupation nexus" approach that stresses the contradiction inherent in the liberalization process itself under conditions of occupation and colonization. Both of these approaches have impressive explanatory powers but both, I have argued, share the same blindspot: a neglect of the role of the state in mediating between societal interests and concrete political outcomes.

The important role played by the state becomes apparent if we ask not only *why* the Oslo process collapsed, but *how* it collapsed as well. To answer the latter question we need to examine carefully the events that took place in the fateful summer of 2000, from the Camp David II

summit in July to the outbreak of the second intifada in October. The constellation of societal forces did not change during this 3-month period; what did change was the willingness of the state, personified by Barak, Sharon, and the military high command, to step in and scuttle the peace process. Following Marx's analysis in the *18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, I have argued that this bold action by the state became possible because of the social stalemate, whether that stalemate had been generated by an inter-class or an intra-class contradiction.

According to Marx, Bonapartist regimes, like the social stalemates that undergird them, are inherently unstable. In our particular case, the Sharon regime had gained stability and legitimacy from the unconditional support it received from the US after 11 September 2001, but it collapsed with the man himself nonetheless. In an optimistic interpretation, informed by the "peace and profits" approach, the disengagement from Gaza, that enjoyed widespread support among the Israeli middle class, could have been a move to re-anchor the regime in the interests of that class, as well as a move necessitated by the imperial interests of the US in the region. However, the disengagement, that Sharon, before his incapacitation, had intended to extend to parts of the West Bank as well, did not mean the end of Israel's control over the territories affected, only its continuation in a more efficient form. The resistance to Israel's ongoing siege of the Gaza Strip, and the subsequent war in Lebanon in the summer of 2006, have thrown the plan for further disengagement in the West Bank into the historical dustbin and have raised the possibility of a re-occupation of Gaza by Israel.

In spite of the war in Lebanon and the unprecedented levels of repression in Gaza and the West Bank, Israel's international standing, economically and politically, has never been better. If this situation continues, and if personal security remains at the level achieved by the Sharon government after mid-2002, no difference of opinion is likely to develop between the state and the Jewish bourgeoisie regarding Israel's policy toward the Palestinians. If the economic or security situations deteriorate, from Israel's point of view, then the dilemmas of the summer of 2000 are likely to reemerge.

Notes

1. Markus E. Bouillon (2004) has taken a midway position between these two approaches, arguing that the Israeli business class was not interested in peace per se but only in the lifting of the Arab boycott. Once this was achieved, already in 1994, it lost interest in the continuation of the peace process.

2. In March 2004 Beilin, architect of both the Oslo Accords and the Geneva understanding (2003), was elected leader of Meretz.
3. All three prime ministers elected under that system, Netanyahu, Barak, and Sharon, became involved in campaign contribution scandals.
4. For a general discussion of Shas see Yoav Peled. 1998. "Towards a Redefinition of Jewish Nationalism in Israel? The Enigma of Shas," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 21: 703–27; Yoav Peled (ed.). 2001. *Shas: The Challenge of Israeliness*. Tel Aviv (Hebrew).
5. Ruthy Sinai. 2004. "More than 5% Increase in Poverty," *Ha'aretz*, 11 May 2004, accessed at http://news.walla.co.il; Bank Hapoalim. 2004. *Economic and Financial Survey*, 30 March 2004, p. 1 (both in Hebrew).

References

Ben-Porat, Guy. 2005a. "A New Middle East? Globalization, Peace and the 'Double Movement'," *International Relations* 19(1): 39–62.

Ben-Porat, Guy. 2005b. "Netanyahu's Second Coming: A Neoconservative Policy Paradigm?" *Israel Studies* 10(3): 225–46.

Bouillon, Markus E. 2004. *The Peace Business: Money and Power in the Palestine-Israel Conflict*. London: I. B. Tauris.

Gutwein, Daniel. 2004. "Class Aspects of the Occupation: Some Remarks," *Theory and Criticism* 24: 203–11 (Hebrew).

Hirschl, Ran. 2000a. "The Great Economic-Juridical Shift: The Legal Arena and the Transformation of Israel's Economic Order." In Gershon Shafir and Yoav Peled (eds), *The New Israel: Peacemaking and Liberalization*. Boulder: Westview, pp. 189–215.

Hirschl, Ran. 2000b. "The Political Origins of Judicial Empowerment Through Constitutionalization: Lessons from Four Constitutional Revolutions," *Law and Social Inquiry* 25(1): 91–149.

Oz, Amos. 1984. *In the Land of Israel* (trans. Maurice Goldberg-Bartura). New York: Vintage.

Peled, Yoav. 2004. "Glory or Profit? The 28th Elul of Arik Sharon," *New Left Review* 29: 47–70.

Peri, Yoram. 2001. "Civil-Military Relations in Israel in Crisis." In Daniel Maman, Eyal Ben-Ari, and Zeev Rosenhek (eds), *Military, State, and Society in Israel*. New Brunswick, pp. 107–36.

Shafir, Gershon and Yoav Peled (eds). 2000. *The New Israel: Peacemaking and Liberalization*. Boulder.

Shafir, Gershon and Yoav Peled (eds). 2002. *Being Israeli: The Dynamics of Multiple Citizenship*. Cambridge.

Shalev, Michael. 1992. *Labour and the Political Economy in Israel*. Oxford.

Shalev, Michael. 1999. "Have Globalization and Liberalization 'Normalized' Israel's Political Economy?" *Israel Affairs* 5(2–3): 121–55.

Shalev, Michael. 2003. "Placing Class Politics in Context: Why is Israel's Welfare State So Consensual?" Paper presented at the conference "Changing European Societies – the Role for Social Policy," Copenhagen, 13–15 November.

11
Mandela in Palestine: Peacemaking in Divided Societies*

Heribert Adam

Paradoxes and Contradictions from an outsider's perspective

Had Mandela been the Palestinian leader, the conflict would have long been resolved, US policymakers assert. This analysis questions such personalized magic in the absence of other South African preconditions for a negotiated settlement. Looking at the Israeli/Palestinian conflict from the outside and through South African lenses, one is puzzled by several paradoxes and contradictions. Five such unresolved questions would seem to be relevant for a better understanding of the vexed Middle East peace process.

First, the contradiction between support for a Palestinian state and the confiscation of more Palestinian land and expansion of settlements; second, uncritical ethnic solidarity, regardless of detrimental consequences; third, the refusal to cultivate Palestinians as potential allies, given other threats to Israel's existence; fourth, rhetorical support for a peace process, but its abandoning in reality; fifth, the physical destruction of an authentic Palestinian Authority, while maintaining that no negotiating partner exists.

A majority of the Israeli-Jewish electorate supports the establishment of a Palestinian state in the abstract. However, an even bigger majority also endorses the separation barrier and the major settlement blocs on Palestinian land.[1] Both policies preclude each other. No Palestinian

leadership could survive without a return to the 1967 borders, save some minor equitable land swaps for 22 per cent of original Palestine. However, maintaining the large settlement blocs of Ariel and Maale Adumim and fencing off Jerusalem will make a mockery of a contiguous Palestinian state. Probably no Israeli leadership would also survive, if it were to agree to substantial settlement evacuation on the West Bank. While everybody hails a two-state solution, hardly anybody faces the contradiction in the mutually exclusive goals.

Is uncritical ethnic solidarity appropriate for dealing with what Mandela calls "the greatest moral issue of the age"? Many Jewish academics are troubled about Israeli policies. Yet these highly principled colleagues remain silent and will not criticize Israeli government policy publicly, particularly abroad. Elie Wiesel, who rightly assailed the initial silence of the world about the Holocaust, personifies this contradiction best: "As a Jew I see my role as a defender of Israel. I defend even her mistakes. Yes, I feel that as a Jew who resides outside Israel I must identify with whatever Israel does – even with her errors. That is the least Jews in the Diaspora can do for Israel: either speak up in praise or keep silent."[2] Such uncritical solidarity elevates fallible policies into the realm of the sacred. Learning from the Holocaust implies concern for human rights everywhere. As Uri Avnery has pointed out: The struggle against anti-Semitism must become part of the fight against all kinds of racism, whether directed against Muslims in Europe or Afro-Americans in the US or Palestinians in Israel. Taking this wise admonition seriously, presupposes a readiness to criticize Israel. Why should breaking ranks on Israel amount to a betrayal of identity? On the contrary, it reaffirms a cherished Jewish tradition of rational argumentation that risks being lost by an unquestioning loyalty. The several hundred conscientious objectors who refuse military service in the occupied territories (but would defend Israel proper) bravely uphold this tradition of autonomous reasoning. Yet they are ostracized as betraying fellow Jews. Persons who rightly celebrate the Jewish overrepresentation in the anti-apartheid struggle avoid merely discussing the accusation of Israeli apartheid. In the North American mainstream media, Mahmood Mamdani observes, "there is not even a trace of a public debate when it comes to Israel."[3] Mamdani also notes: "It is easier to criticize the (US) government than it is to criticize Israel." Yet Israel constantly complains about a hostile press in the West. Fortunately, Israeli newspapers are far more outspoken than American, including Canadian dailies dare to be.

Despite the explicit official 1988 recognition of Israel by the PLO and the 1993 Oslo Accord, Israel's very existence is still challenged

by some neighboring states and anti-Semitic jihadists, regardless of a potential peace agreement. Given that constant threat, it would be in Israel's interest to cultivate Palestinian allegiance, rather than alienate a potential ally through collective punishment, closure policies, and daily humiliation at checkpoints. After all, Palestinians are the best educated, most secularized, and ideologically the most diverse and cosmopolitan of Israel's Arab neighbors. The overwhelming identification of the 1 million Israeli Palestinians with their state, despite their status as second-class citizens in an ethnic state, proves that such peaceful co-existence should also be possible with their stateless kin in the occupied territories.

It was always assumed that integration in a divided society (South Africa) is more difficult to engineer than partition. History has proven this assumption wrong in the ME. However, unlike the open-ended South African transition process, ironically there is already widespread consensus on what a final compromise must look like in the Middle East. The Camp David/Taba negotiations, the Geneva Accord or the Nusseibeh-Ayalon document spell out the basic agreements on the three most contentious issues: (1) Equitable land swaps for some continuing Jewish settlements behind the Green Line, (2) recognition by Israel of the right of refugee return in principle, but limited to a symbolic number in practice, with relocation assistance and compensation for others, and (3) East Jerusalem as the capital of a Palestinian state with each state exercising sovereignty over its holy sites. Yet a substantial and well-organized minority in Israel does not even want a Palestinian state. In the shadow of the Gaza withdrawal, the West Bank settlements are consolidated and at most a truncated, discontiguous Palestinian entity that serves Israeli interests is envisaged. In the words of the senior advisor of Sharon, Dov Weisglass: "The significance of the disengagement plan is the freezing of the peace process. And when you freeze that process, you prevent the establishment of a Palestinian state."[4]

While settlement expansion on the West Bank is rationalized with "security," it actually exacerbates Israeli insecurity. It locks Palestinians up in walled in enclaves, surrounded by more than 150 Jewish settlements, without open borders to neighboring countries and under total control of Israel. A third intifada will be the inevitable result of ever increasing rage of people who are worse off than Bantustan inhabitants. The apartheid Bantustan fictions of "independent states" were not fenced in or criss-crossed by exclusive roads for whites only and with different laws applying to residents of the same territory. The Pretoria regime even financed its pseudo-states generously, while Israeli forces vandalized the nascent institutions of a fledgling state. In their history

of the Palestinian People, Baruch Kimmerling and Joel Migdal speak of "politicide." They define the term as "renewed attempts to wipe out (Palestinian) political autonomy."[5] The ongoing land grab by the barrier, destruction and gradual displacement (nishul) of an indigenous population, resembles the ethnic cleansing of the South Africa Group Areas Act in the 1960s. Is then expropriation, perhaps even expulsion, the ultimate goal of Zionism, as its critics have always asserted? In contrast, apartheid primarily aimed at exploitation of a disenfranchised majority with which the minority was inextricably linked economically. While keeping such important differences in sight, is it nevertheless valid to draw analogies between domestic colonialism in South Africa and Israel?

Uses and abuses of the South African analogy

Emphasizing the similarities between apartheid and Israeli forms of domination has the effect of de-legitimizing Israeli governance. After fascism and African decolonization, the apartheid regime constituted an international pariah state, and equating the Jewish treatment of Palestinians with Bantustans and the suppression of national liberation casts the Jewish state in a similar pariah role. Already in the 1980s, prominent Israelis such as Shlomo Avineri warned that continued control over the West Bank and Gaza "means continued oppression of a million-and-a-half Palestinians and a slow 'South Africanization' of Israel."[6] Ian Buruma who doubts the validity of the comparison, nevertheless diagnoses that "Israel, in many respects, has become . . . the litmus test of one's progressive credentials," similar to the Spanish Civil War in the 1930s, Vietnam in the 1960s, Chile in the 1970s, and apartheid in the 1980s.[7] One of Israel's mainstream journalists and leading political commentators, Nahum Barnea, judged that in the eyes of a large part of the world "Israel has become a pariah country. It is not yet the South Africa of apartheid, but definitely from the same family."[8]

Various political actors also use the South African analogy self-servingly in their exhortations and rationalizations. Ehud Olmert says: "I shudder to think that liberal Jewish organizations that shouldered the burden of the struggle against apartheid in South Africa will lead the struggle against us."[9] Similarly, Ehud Barak warns of broad international support, if the Palestinians turn away from the two-state option and demand a single state "in the spirit of the twenty-first century" as long as there is no acceptable Israeli plan on the table. South African civic democracy haunts the Zionist left and right as a nightmare. In Barak's reasoning: " 'One man one vote'? Remind you of something?

Yes, South Africa. And that's no accident. It's precisely their intention. And that's their long-term plan. So, we have to say honestly today: the strategic blindness of the Israeli Right and the Sharon government's effort to grab more than it can hold, indeed endanger the future of the Zionist enterprise."[10]

The intra-Jewish debate testifies to two different strategic visions of Zionism: a defensive one that aims at creating firm boundaries to secure a Jewish majority, represented by Labor and Kadima, and an expanding vision with flexible, undefined borders in the hope to enlist more territory for the Jewish state as conditions permit, represented by Likud and other far-right parties. In the 1970s, a similar debate among Afrikaners about who constituted the nation resulted in the racialized notion that all "whites," regardless of ethnicity, belonged to the "nasie" (nation), while the Afrikaner far right-wing insisted on a homogeneous, ethnicized "volk," constituting with other non-Afrikaners separate nations with separate spaces as far as possible. Many left-liberal activists, including Desmond Tutu, advocate similar anti-apartheid strategies (divestment, boycott) against "Apartheid Israel" and assume that strong pressure would produce similar outcomes. Such idealistic optimism may foster illusions. The underlying assumption that the SA model of conflict resolution readily lends itself to export ignores unique historical circumstances of two disparate situations. It may actually retard imaginative new solutions by clinging to visions or processes of negotiation that may not work in another context. Above all, in South Africa an entire regime had to be changed while in Israel the occupation and the status of the territories is the main contentious issue. Therefore, a more nuanced understanding of differences and similarities may enhance new approaches. Furthermore, just as the apartheid equals fascism slogan distorted political strategies in favor of illusionary military solutions, so the Israel equals apartheid slogan serves more propagandistic than analytical functions.

Differences and similarities between South Africa and Israel/Palestine

Despite apartheid-like features of Israeli domination, the focus on differences yields more insights for appropriate strategies of equality and peacemaking. Six crucial realms stand out for comparison in both contexts: economic interdependence, religious divisions, third party intervention, leadership, political culture, and violence.

1. Economic interdependence and the emergence of a politicized union movement since the mid-1970s socialized South Africa in negotiation politics and trade-offs. The Israeli economy depends minimally on Palestinian labor, but economically Palestinians depend largely on Israel. Israel uses closure as collective punishment. Palestinians are deprived of industrial action (strikes, consumer boycotts) that was heavily used by black South Africans to combat apartheid.

2. Religion in South Africa served as a common bond to assail and delegitimize apartheid, while Judaism and Islam compete for sovereignty in Jerusalem. Religiously motivated settlers and ultra-orthodox believers may not be as easily marginalized as Afrikaner extremists, merely interested in territorial autonomy. Despite being a microcosm of most major world religions, South Africa has no holy places and sacred monuments that rival religions claim as their own. Although the Middle East conflict cannot be reduced to a religious one, the problem arises with opposing religious doctrines and zealotry among a minority in each camp. These groups (ultra-orthodox Jews, religious settlers, Hamas, jihadists) invoke providentially ordained missions as guardians of their faith. When settlers "redeem" the land as a fulfillment of biblical prophecy and Islamic holy warriors inveigh against infidels, they apply a logic of divinely ordained destiny, crusades against evil, and collective redemption that is foreign to secular truth-seeking. Habermas' communicative reasoning presupposes an acceptance of common assumptions of an Enlightenment rationality that is missing among adherents of religious mysticism. Anthony Smith whose life-long study of nationalism highlights the sacred perceptions of ethnic communities, writes: "Myths of ethnic chosenness not only underpin peoples and cultures, they also provide charters and title deeds of sacred homelands."[11] Sanctified land and holy places are not easily given up or even shared in a spirit of historical justice or expedient compromise. Necessary pragmatic compromises hardly affect the believer if it contradicts doctrine.

3. Both the ANC and the NP eschewed third party intervention in their negotiations. An Israeli/Palestinian settlement depends heavily on US policy that strongly supports Israel. Sanctions (divestment and trade boycotts) are generally overrated in triggering South Africa change. Only loan refusals and, to a lesser extent, moral ostracism impacted significantly on the apartheid government. Such action against Israel by the US is inconceivable at present. Unlike Afrikaners, Israelis enjoy a supportive diaspora. White South Africa finally negotiated

when the rising costs of apartheid outweighed the benefits. In Israel, the costs of occupation and conflict are largely compensated from outside.

4. The South Africa negotiations were facilitated by a cohesive and credible leadership with a widely endorsed open mandate available to both sides. Leaders could sell a controversial compromise to a skeptical constituency. Both the Israeli and Palestinian leadership is fragmented, with militant outbidding a frequent tool of populist mobilization. Israel exacerbates the difficult role of a Palestinian leadership by assigning them the role of security subcontractor. The Palestinian constituency on the other hand expects national liberation leaders. Palestinian leaders must balance both roles which frequently clash. Israeli leaders are also more dependent on their prejudiced electorate than South African counterparts previously. The apartheid Westminster electoral system rewarded majority parties, in contrast to the minority influence in the proportional representation in Israel.

5. Much more personal interaction in a vertical status hierarchy shaped SA race relations, compared with the more horizontal social distance between Jews and Palestinians. Paternalism characterized Afrikaner attitudes. Moral erosion of the apartheid stance among the ruling elite in SA contrasts with moral myopia in Israel, a few hundred military objectors and noble peace activists notwithstanding. Both sides in the Middle East display a collective sense of victimhood. The competing discourse of victimhood traps the two people as prisoners of their own history. The cultivated victimology and cult of self-pity proves dangerous when it defines the "other" as Nazis and intrinsically "evil". This mutual demonization does not allow for compromises and negotiations, since "evil" cannot be converted and only be eliminated. In the name of legitimate self-defense, each side can relieve itself of moral restraints and adherence to international law. Such collective perceptions of a mutual mortal threat did not exist in the feudal racial order of South Africa. Apartheid clearly privileged beneficiaries and disenfranchised a majority in a global pariah state. In contrast, Israel enjoys legitimacy outside the Arab and Muslim world.

6. During the anti-apartheid armed struggle, suicide was never used as a weapon and martyrdom never celebrated. Resulting from the huge power imbalance and the imagined Israeli defeat by Hezbollah in Lebanon, the tactics of the second intifada are not only immoral but also counterproductive: the attacks on civilians unify Israeli public opinion on security and also destroy the social fabric of Palestinian society. Instead of adopting Gandhian strategies of non-violent

resistance and civil disobedience, Palestinians allowed themselves to be stereotyped collectively as potential terrorists and local bin Ladens. In contrast, the ANC captured the moral highground with its policy of non-racialism, despite its ineffectual armed struggle. However, successful Gandhian tactics of non-violent resistance also presuppose a shared moral standard of shaming, that is absent when brute force is used against unarmed protest.

In summary, on most counts, the differences between apartheid South Africa and Israel outweigh the similarities that could facilitate transferable conditions for a negotiated compromise. Above all, opponents in South Africa finally realized that neither side could comprehensively defeat the other, short of the destruction of the country. This perception of stalemate, as a precondition for negotiating in good faith, is missing in the Middle East.

Such a different trajectory suggests itself because South Africa, arguably, constitutes merely a multi-ethnic society with many cross-cutting bonds between the legislated artificial racial groups. The most important South African bond is economic interdependence. Whites depended on black labor for their lifestyle, and blacks depended on white capital and skills for survival. In Israel/Palestine, on the other hand, a truly divided society exists. The two Semitic people may look alike and even enjoy the same food. They are however divided by religion, language and above all, by history and the mythologies that the "burden of history" imprints on the self-concept and collective identity of the two groups. Jews and Palestinians constitute groups which are competing for meaning, security, and scarce resources in a small space.

Israel/Palestine in the international context

While the Bush administration was initially split on how much Israel should be pressured on negotiations, 9/11 and the Iraq war cemented the alliance between the US and Israel. Bush's anti-terrorist mobilization encountered the strongest support among evangelical Republicans. The underestimated US Christian right, numbering 40 million in one of the most avowedly religious countries, resembles Islamist fundamentalists in its dogmatism and fervour. As the late Edward Said has written:

A peculiar alliance between Israel's influential neo-conservative American supporters and the Christian extremists is that the latter support Zionism as a way of bringing all the Jews to the Holy Land to

> prepare the way for the Messiah's Second Coming; at which point Jews will either have to convert to Christianity or be annihilated. The bloody and rabidly anti-Semitic teleologies are rarely referred to, certainly not by the pro-Israeli Jewish phalanx.[12]

Massive lobbying campaigns by Christian Zionists like Gary Bauer, Robertson and the Rev Jerry Falwell warned the US administration that any attempt to be "even-handed" would be "morally reprehensible."[13] In the face of such pressure, the US government subcontracted its policy to a hard-line Israeli government. "Unconditional support for Sharon", writes NYT columnist Paul Krugman, "has squandered post-9/11 sympathy and brought relations with the Muslim world to a new low."[14] The convergence of Bush and Olmert, of course, does not signal a genuine break with previous US policy. Washington always permitted Israel significant latitude and funded its expansionism, regardless of the government in power. However, the open abandonment of the pretence of the US acting as an "honest broker" and the defiance of international obligations in regard to the Palestinians represents a departure from all previous US policies since the foundation of Israel. The Democratic Party leadership does not differ from its Republican rival on Israel. Both parties studiously court the Jewish vote and avoid alienating influential pro-Israel lobby groups, particularly AIPEC.[15]

The Western-Israeli alliance was further cemented by Iranian threats and nuclear ambitions together with the reckless provocations by the Iranian ally Hizbullah that triggered the second war on Lebanon in August 2006. At the same time Israel has suffered unintended consequences. The Hizbullah experience has destroyed the already flimsy credibility of barriers and walls as guarantees of greater security. No buffer zone can prevent ever more sophisticated rockets crossing it. With this simple military logic the cherished Kadima policy of unilateralism has died. Unilaterally dictating borders never provided legitimacy or security in the first place. Only a mutually agreed upon political solution can bring about peace. The Second Lebanon war has also shattered the image of Israeli invincibility. Deterrence aims at preventing war. If deterrence has to be established through war, it has failed.

Internationally, the Lebanese civilian casualties caused proved a global public relations disaster for Israel in Europe and in the Third World. The crimes of Hizbullah rockets against Israeli civilians were matched with the criminal unexploded cluster bombs with which Israel's "most moral army" (Olmert) mined Lebanese areas for years to come. Despite the overwhelming support for the war among the Israeli public, including the left

peace camp, its fallout at home has deepened the cleavages within Israeli society and likely put addressing the urgent Palestinian issue further on the backburner. Sadly, the Israel debate is about how efficiently the war was executed, not whether it should have been started in the first place.

On the Palestinian side, Hizbullah's successful holdout against Israeli bombardments has strengthened the Palestinian advocates of armed resistance to the detriment of the partisans of negotiations. The continued boycott of Hamas by the West and the refusal by Israel to transfer taxes due to the PA also drives Palestinians to seek other sponsors. The intentional dismemberment of the Palestinian Authority through arrests of half of the elected Hamas officials and administrative destruction facilitates anarchy, in which nobody controls ever more radical militias. The collapse of the PA means the "Somaliasation" of Gaza and the Westbank. It reinforces the Israeli myth of "no partner to negotiate with" precisely at the moment when the mainstream sections of Hamas and Fatah attempted to forge a strategic unity (based on the "Prisoners Document") to negotiate a viable Palestinian state.

Several declarations of ceasefires by Hamas were scuttled in the past by Israeli assassinations of targeted leaders. Israel has neither reciprocated Hamas' offer of an indefinite truce, nor the 2002 Beirut offer by the Arab League of normalization of relations in return for withdrawal to the 67 borders. Extremists on both sides goaded each other on. Israel claimed in vain that its military measures could successfully deal with an enraged population. Although it is not official policy to harm Palestinian civilians, Israel has killed many more civilians (at a ratio of 3:1) than combatants by using disproportional force to liquidate armed activists who are frequently embedded in the civilian population. Unlike the more nominal South African "armed struggle," this has reinforced the notion of a "people's war" on both sides, where the distinction between civilians and combatants is blurred. Furthermore, the South African domestic conflict lacked the simultaneous involvement of international antagonists in the Middle East.

The author of a book on the IRA, Kevin Toolis, points out that the Provisional IRA twice tried to decapitate the British Cabinet. The British army could have easily assassinated the entire IRA leadership in Ulster. Since this action, according to Toolis "would not have destroyed violent Irish republicanism or weakened the Provisional IRA", it was instead decided to establish a relationship with the leader Martin McGuiness, which ultimately led to the 1998 Good Friday agreement. The author

rightly advises: "If a peace process is serious, each side must accept the other as they find it rather than remould their enemies into a more compliant state by assassination and political diktat."[16]

The security agents of the apartheid regime also targeted ANC supporters, particularly white intellectuals at home and abroad (i.e., Rick Turner, Ruth First, Albie Sachs, David Webster) but acted with restraint toward the top ANC leadership, who responded likewise. Not one apartheid leader was assassinated and most prominent ANC leaders in exile survived the clandestine war against them. Even so-called leading collaborators, such as Zulu Chief Buthelezi, were informally protected by the ANC in exile against local militants.

Just as most South African homeland leaders were perceived as typical collaborators in the service of anti-liberation forces, so the attempts by Palestinian Authority (PA) reformists to pacify a radicalized street are likely to fail, as long as the PA lacks domestic legitimacy, despite the integrity or noble intentions of some individuals involved. The more the US, EU or Egypt support and welcome such forces, the more they are weakened as perceived stooges of outside powers. Only if the reformed PA were able to deliver on easing high unemployment and travel restrictions, and improve general living conditions, could a moderate Palestinian leadership prevail. Neither Israel, nor the US did strengthen the domestic legitimacy of Palestinian pragmatists, by making substantial concessions. No Palestinian leader can heed the US/Israeli demand "to destroy the terrorist infrastructure" without provoking a civil war. Just as the Ian Smith regime in Rhodesia deceived itself by trying to cut a deal with Bishop Muzorewa, or the Vorster/Botha government attempted in vain to have their Bantustan clients exercise legitimate authority, so the Palestinian administration is destined to fail under Israeli/US tutelage as security subcontractor. While there has to be some security collaboration between neighbors, the warmer a Palestinian representative is embraced by the Israeli establishment, the faster his home support melts away.

After further polarization and more failed attempts to reach a final status agreement, a "Mandela solution" may emerge. Only an untainted individual with the moral authority to negotiate a controversial compromise on behalf of a fragmented constituency may be able to turn things around. Fatah leader Marwan Barghouti, still in prison, who already forged a strategic unity together with Hamas inmates and other factions, may point to such a turn in the future. If Israel were wise, it would welcome its Palestinian Mandela rather than anointing its own negotiating partners. However, James Ron quotes a senior official that

"Israel's greatest nightmare is that one day there will appear a Palestinian Nelson Mandela in the West Bank who will demand 'one man, one vote'."[17]

South African lessons for peacemaking

The South African lessons from the negotiated settlement directly contradict current Israeli policy in several respects. Nine obvious lessons stand out:

1. It is still Israeli government doctrine that the enemy has to be subdued first, before the government will negotiate. In the SA stalemate the negotiations took place between undefeated rivals, equal in their inability to defeat the other. In contrast, Likud's policy dictates terms of surrender. Such supremacist talk ensures rejection, because it does not allow the opponent even the face saving dignity of respect. Peace by ultimatum does not work. The SA negotiations started in earnest when a mutual perception of stalemate prevailed, unlike the continuing power asymmetry in the Middle East. Here each side anticipates victory by wearing the other side down. Peacemaking requires a mutual basic respect for the adversary. As long as the stronger power persists in humiliating an opponent, sullen quests for revenge result. The weaker party softens its hard-line stance not when it experiences defeat, but when it tastes victory. Even if the victory is merely imagined, dramatic attitude shifts toward reconciliation presuppose a perceived reversal of previous humiliation. One example may suffice. In 1977 President Sadat signed a controversial peace agreement with Israel and visited the hitherto unrecognized "enemy entity." He could do so only, because Egypt had convinced itself that by unexpectedly crossing the fortified Suez Canal in the 1973 October War, it had defeated the invincible Israeli army, liberated its territory and extinguished its previous defeat in 1967. The popular jubilation about the short-lived victory was visible in the elevated mood in the crowded Cairo streets. Many shops depicted the "heroic advance" in handmade posters. Egyptians celebrated their newfound equality, if not their imagined superiority. In short, without recognizing the dignity of an opponent, no outstretched hand can be expected.

    Yet the Israeli approach to peacemaking asserts the very opposite. When the former Israeli Minister of Defence, Shaul Mofaz, visited Israeli troops in Gaza in August 2003, he revealed in one sentence the fallacy of a supremacist strategy. "With our enemies, it seems,

no shortcuts are possible. Egypt made peace with Israel only after it was defeated in the Yom Kippur War. That will happen with the Palestinians, too."[18] However, contempt and humiliation breeds more militancy.

2. Israel insists that before negotiations violence must stop first. This condition hands veto power to any individual with a gun or explosives. Nobody is able to enforce such demands. Trust is the outcome, not a precondition of negotiations. Enemies, not friends, need to negotiate. Negotiations do not depend on a ceasefire, but have to be unconditional. The ANC continued with the "armed struggle" long after negotiations had started and so did the white government's violence to enforce its laws. In fact the escalation of mutual violence during the transition period (1990–94, Bhoipatong, Bishu, Hani assassination) spurred the efforts of both sides to succeed with the negotiations.

3. Negotiators have to be freely chosen by each side. One side cannot dictate to the other who should be their leader. Had the then-President de Klerk insisted that he would only talk to the nationalist wing of the ANC and exclude communists (as some had advocated), negotiations would not have started. Likewise, if the Palestinian negotiators are considered unrepresentative stooges, their agreements are unlikely to be acceptable to a radicalized constituency. Free elections can best produce this legitimacy of controversial negotiators. Freely elected Hamas leaders need to be included.

4. If controversial compromises are to be accepted by an indoctrinated constituency on both sides, a prudent leadership must educate its following in political literacy. Yet, giving up dreams and master-narratives is painful for activists. The ANC had to shed the socialist dream of capturing the commanding heights of the economy and whites had to give up state power in return for peace. In such situations, the danger of populist outbidding looms for pragmatic compromisers. This necessitates organization and strengthening of civil society institutions on both sides. The Canadian columnist Shira Herzog has rightly identified that for South African leaders "involving their own people was essential for negotiations to succeed."[19] This transparency of leadership-deal-making, complementing the top-down process with bottom-up information, is missing on both sides of the Middle Eastern conflict.

5. Israel asserts that Arafat rejected a "generous offer" at Camp David in favor of violence, and therefore, there is "no partner to negotiate with." This assertion was problematic while Arafat was alive, but is

even more questionable now after successful Palestinian elections. However, the argument is correct in the sense that the Palestinians did not provide a collaborating partner who would sign on a US/Israel dictated package. Many knowledgeable observers agree that the failure of the Clinton-sponsored Camp David talks were not caused by Arafat's psychological makeup, but by the content of the offer. The Oxford historian Avi Shlaim writes: "Israelis like to demonize Arafat, but no Palestinian leader, however moderate, could accept the offer on package at Camp David."[20] P.W. Botha and de Klerk and their negotiators also frequently attempted to dictate to the ANC. Rebuffed, they did not adopt unilateralism, but tried out new compromise formulas.

6. Encouraging strife and internal conflict among an opponent back-fires. This happened when shadowy "third-force-elements" instig-ated large-scale intra-black violence during the first years of the South African transition in order to destabilize and discredit the new order. A brutalized youth and a continuous high crime rate resulted from this disruptive strategy. In a similar vein some pundits gleefully editorialize: "If Palestinian factions are fighting amongst themselves, they will have less time to conduct terrorists attacks."[21] South Africa's Bantustan policy represented a "divide and rule" policy toward the black South African majority. With the fragmentation of the PA, the emerging autonomous fiefdoms in Gaza and the West Bank enclaves also counteract nation-building. However, just as the imposed Bantustan divisions proved unworkable, so the personal rivalries, cronyism, and illegitimacy of Palestinian warlords under-mine potential settlements. If Israel aims at a settlement, it has an interest in a cohesive Palestinian partner.

7. The Israeli/Palestinian peace camp can learn a lot from Mandela's conciliatory gestures and the African ubuntu philosophy. It starts with the language of persuasion and condemnation. The apartheid and racism invective, though true in many respects, nevertheless blocks access to the Israeli public mind. The intended shaming and delegitimation fails. It therefore disregards Edward Said's recommend-ation "to capture the imagination not just of our people, but of our oppressors."[22] Mandela's and ANC insistence on the "common humanity" of black and white achieved this unifying vision. Majority Jewish quests for peace and security have not only not been captured, but progressively hardened by an inept Fatah leadership and some minority Islamist rhetoric and suicidal martyrdom. Yet even with an

unlikely outside intervention by the US, the support of the Jewish public is a precondition for any lasting peace agreement.

8. It is rightly argued that there cannot be peace without justice, but the reverse is not necessarily true. Principles of justice and inherent rights of peoples should be upheld even without peace. Initially, Arafat was considered the main cause for stalled peace negotiations. After Arafat's death, Palestinian recognition was made dependent on democracy and internal reform. However, the universal right of national self-determination cannot hinge on the system of government. In as much as one party cannot dictate to its adversary who its representatives should be, so peace cannot be made contingent on how democratically Palestinians behave. If that were the case, Israel should never have signed peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan, and the SA National Party should never have negotiated with a Stalinist Communist Party. As Hanan Ashrawi has argued: "You don't use democracy for justifying the existence of states. You would then have to remove many states."[23]

9. Efforts must be made to draw the most extreme factions on both sides into the negotiation process. Both in Palestine and in South Africa, some groups boycotted elections and branded participants as sellouts. This proved less of a problem in South Africa, since the ANC represented the overwhelming majority of the disenfranchised. Smaller radical factions could be ignored or sidelined without jeopardizing the main compromise. This is not the case in the fragmented Palestinian and Israeli politics where extremist sections command considerable support, if only for the social services they provide or the religious doctrines they espouse. The delegitimation of contested compromises is preempted and the perception of a fair deal increased, if the likely challengers are included or at least voluntary self-exclusion is clearly demonstrated. On the part of the dominant power Israel, that means shedding notions of "no negotiations under duress" or "not giving the enemy the impression that their violence has succeeded." As the veteran SA journalist Allister Sparks has wisely commented: "Those who vow never to talk to 'terrorists' are doomed to fight them forever."[24]

Parallel Israeli and Palestinian Truth Commissions

Preparing an indoctrinated public for a painful transition through a South African-type Truth Commission remains perhaps the most important lesson. The unexpected collapse of the 1993 Oslo agreement

shows that a formal settlement is not the end but at best the beginning of a peace process. Oslo was South Africa in 1990: the return of exiles, delineated areas of exclusive and joint jurisdiction, with the goal of a final status settlement later. While the first South African democratic elections under an agreed-upon constitution achieved this goal, Israel/Palestine reverted to an ever-escalating civil war. The many reasons for these contrasting developments need not be enumerated here, except to draw one conclusion: Unless a negotiated settlement is underwritten by other efforts to bring two antagonists together, it may not last. Engaging with the past in the form of some truth-seeking effort has come to be widely regarded as a crucial precondition for peaceful coexistence. A parallel Israeli and Palestinian Truth and Reconciliation Commission (IPTRC) would have the tasks of narrowing the wide cognitive disconnects between the two sides, clarify the historical record of crimes and combat mutual dehumanization and demonization through political education. A few examples for the importance of each task may suffice.

In the aftermath of Arafat's death, a representative survey revealed vast discrepancies in the attitudes toward the Palestinian leader: 92 per cent of Israeli Palestinians viewed Arafat as a "good leader," while an overwhelming majority of Jewish Israelis judged him to have caused more harm than good.[25] In stark contrast, after the death of Mandela, a consensus will exist among black and white South Africans that he was an outstanding leader and statesman, although blacks and whites can hardly be called "reconciled." While the South African TRC showed many flaws in its design and execution of its task, at least it held out a less divided "truth" about the past. Victims were affirmed and some perpetrators exposed, although beneficiaries were left unchallenged. Denial of past crimes became impossible, although interpretations of causes, guilt and blame continue to differ.

Vast disagreements about central historical crimes exists even between Jewish academics. Thus the sociologist Eliezer Ben-Rafael writes that in 1948 as a result of the war by the Arab League against the newly established Jewish state "450,000 Arab inhabitants of Israel's territory left. There was no organized mass expulsion of Arabs."[26] Yet the historian Benny Morris, who now thinks that Ben Gurion should have evicted all Palestinians, concludes: "About 700,000 Arabs . . . fled or were ejected from the areas that became the Jewish state."[27] The same leading "new historian" answers the question of how many acts of Israeli massacre were perpetrated in 1948, honestly and precisely, in contrast to the Zionist founding myth of voluntary exit: "Twenty-four. In some cases four or

five people were executed, in others 70, 80, 100. There was also a great deal of arbitrary killing. Two old men are spotted walking in a field – they are shot. A woman is found in an abandoned village – she is shot. There are cases such as the village of Dawayima, in which a column entered the village with all guns blazing and killed anything that moved. . . . In Operation Hiram there was an unusually high concentration of executions of people against a wall or next to a well in an orderly fashion . . . ." Yet as if Deir Yassin never occurred, Ben-Rafael asserts: "In any case what happened on the ground cannot be called 'ethnic cleansing' in the sense of the massacres, rape and destruction that the concept denoted in Yugoslavia." Against such widespread denialism, could an Israeli TRC at least set the historical record straight? Is such shared historical consensus a precondition for reconciliation?

Reconciliation requires an admission of past wrongs. Such an acknowledgment of moral failure even the South African TRC did not achieve with most apartheid instigators. The most they would concede was an apology for unintentional harm or expressions of regret. Apartheid was presented by its chief architects as a well-meaning policy, implemented under unfavorable circumstances, and destined for failure not because of its inhuman assumptions, but human mistakes and insurmountable external circumstances. Abuses were attributed to a few misguided policemen, rather than to systemic policy features.

Before even such an admission can be expected in the Middle East, the mutual demonization has to be addressed. In Israel, that means deconstructing an Orientalism that views the other as culturally deficient or even subhuman. In former Prime Minister Barak's assessment, Palestinians "don't suffer from the problem of telling lies that exists in Judeo-Christian culture. Truth is seen as an irrelevant category . . . . There is no such thing as 'the truth'." If the other habitually cannot tell the difference between truth and lies, he cannot be trusted to honor any agreement and therefore it is not worth even trying to reach a settlement. Barak's predecessor Menachem Begin called Palestinians "beasts walking on two legs." Yitzak Shamir in 1988 equated Palestinians with locusts, to be "crushed like grasshoppers . . . heads smashed against the boulders and walls."[28] Therefore, the educational task of an Israeli TRC consists foremost in clarifying the human equality of an adversary in the minds of the public when even the political leaders of all stripes engage in collective denigration. Likewise, on the Palestinian side, a TRC would have to delegitimize a similar popular dehumanization of Jews. Palestinian cleric Sheik Ibrahim Mahdi calls Jews "the brethren of apes and pigs" and another preacher on PA TV, Sheik Isma'il Al-Radhwan, pronounces

that "they are doomed to annihilation."[29] When the Iranian president questions the Holocaust and repeatedly threatens "to wipe Israel off the map," he merely reinforces Israeli militarism and the now massive electoral shift to the right. Not refuting him publicly, makes Palestinian spokespersons appear like endorsing such irresponsible grandstanding.

While most truth commissions around the world were established after a regime change or as part of a negotiated truce, in the Middle East a truth commission could pave the way toward negotiations. In fact, narrowing the opposing historical narratives of the two hostile groups may be a precondition for a formal settlement. It has often been noted that both sides cultivate contrasting meta-narratives on what the conflict is all about, who the aggressor is, and who acts in self-defense, and why a "generous offer" by one side is rejected by the other as an insult. Unless such meta-questions are clarified, they block each side from dealing with the other.

Peace between Israelis and Palestinians therefore requires an introspective investigation into own abuses rather than a lament about own victimhood in each group. Andrew Rigby has stressed: "It is vital that people learn to acknowledge the validity of other people's truths."[30] A parallel Israeli and Palestinian Truth Commission (IPTC) could attempt this shared narrative by undermining the sectarian stranglehold on history.

The effort would have to originate from a civil society initiative, since neither official authority is likely to support a critical scrutiny of its record. In order to get the IPTCs off the ground at all, the initial goal of the IPTCs would have to be modest, neither aiming at ascertaining guilt, punishment, redress, forgiveness or healing, but merely establishing a common historical record. What Mahmood Mamdani has argued for post-genocide Rwanda applies equally to Israel/Palestine: "It is not possible to think of reconciliation between Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda without prior conciliation with history."[31] While all other TRCs have focused on post-conflict reconstruction after the violence has ceased or a regime has changed, the unique role of an IPTRC would lay the essential groundwork for bringing this end about in the future. Only when the "cognitive maps" of both publics resemble each other by similar acknowledgements of past traumatic events, will the peace accords of elites resonate among their constituencies. A pre-accord TRC would enable the compromise as well as facilitate its adherence afterward, unlike the failed Oslo deal.

The Cape Town academic Andre du Toit introduced an illuminating distinction between two kinds of truth: "hidden truth" and "disputed

truth." The first kind concerns disappearances, secret police hit squads, informers and other disguised abuses of state-power. Exposing those secrets was the main target of the South African TRC and also the Latin American and East European predecessors of the SA institution. The South African TRC hardly dealt with the second kind of "disputed truth": why apartheid was established, who benefited, and who is to blame for perpetuating the system of human rights abuses.

Unlike in the SA case, in Israel/Palestine, there seems no need for investigating a "hidden truth." Both sides commit their atrocities in the open and proudly display their success. The Palestinian suicide bombers prepare a video in advance of their terrorist acts. The shahids smile before their death and are openly celebrated for their sacrifice. Likewise, the Israeli state-terrorism of extra-judicial assassinations and collective punishment is described in detail and praised in the country's news-papers as deterrent and justified revenge. However, both camps lack a moral assessment of the "disputed truth": why factual historical events are interpreted contradictorily or even denied altogether.

Yet there should also be no illusions about the widespread hostility toward such introspective soul-searching that undermines comforting notions of moral victory in each community. Israeli and Palestinian academics have not exactly clamored for such in-group conscienticiza-tion. The historian Mottie Tamarkin and director of the Steinmetz Center for Peace Research at Tel Aviv University expresses this reluctance force-fully: "Any attempt to reeducate the Israeli and Palestinian societies to change their disposition towards one another as a means to facilitate the peace process is a non-starter. The most ridiculous idea is that of an Israeli-Palestinian Truth and Reconciliation Commission."[32] Without offering more than the hope that "the passage of time" will result in "the return of both nations to sobriety and normalcy within their respective states," Tamarkin advocates passive bystanding: "Any attempt to heal the wounds through ethnomoral dialogue and collective reeducation while the conflict rages is bound to be counterproductive."

Such advice not to interfere with ongoing confrontations flies in the face of a vast literature on the need to prepare a public for recog-nizing unpleasant realities. In his magisterial tome about two decades of failed diplomatic efforts at peacemaking in the Middle East, the chief US envoy Dennis Ross singles out as the crucial lesson learned, that "peace-making can never succeed in an environment dominated by mythologies and untruths."[33] He self-critically deplores that past efforts were mainly construed as top-down processes. Ross recommends "people-to-people programs that break down barriers" (770) and faults both the Palestinian

and the Israeli leadership for never leveling with its own public about the necessary compromise. An IPTRC, mainly based on civil society initiatives, would be a credible instrument to create this political literacy. Risk-adverse, embattled leaders propagate only their biased versions of truth, if they address the sensitive issues at all.

The two-state versus the one-state debate

The more an authentic two-state option is undermined by permanent settlements and separation barriers, the more the single state option may be embraced by Palestinians in the long run. In 2003, a bare majority (52 per cent) of Palestinians prefer a two-state solution, while there is overwhelming support for "open borders between two states" (82 per cent), "joint economic ventures" (65 per cent), and "reconciliation of two peoples."[34] Currently no Palestinian party and only a few intellectuals as well as a few Jewish post-Zionists and anti-Zionists advocate a common state. However, the logic of Zionist expansionism may ultimately destroy the very idea of an exclusive Jewish state. Even sophisticated friends of Israel, such as Thomas Friedman, recognize that the two-state option is being discredited as people would simply be caged into apartheid ghettoes. "Rather than create the outlines of a two-state solution, this wall," warns Friedman, "will kill that idea for Palestinians, and drive them, over time, to demand instead a one-state solution – where they and the Jews would have equal rights in one state."[35] The dialectic of uncompromising Zionist exclusivism would have produced its own destruction. Like the long anti-apartheid struggle, this South African solution of equal citizenship would resonate abroad much more than creating another undemocratic, corrupt Arab state. Friedman senses this danger: "If American Jews think it's hard to defend Israel to-day on college campuses, imagine what it will be like when their kids have to argue against the principle of one man, one vote."

In short, unlike Gaza with its 8000 commercial settlers, the major fortified Jewish settlements on the West Bank are unlikely ever to be evacuated. Therefore, some Palestinian intellectuals consider the settlers "the vanguard of a common state." In any case, permanent occupation by settler militias and the Israeli regular army already creates a de facto common entity. In a single Israeli control system Palestinian resistance is likely to change from national liberation to a civil rights struggle. In theory, a common state amounts to the economically most rational and politically most democratic solution, since there are no minority second-class citizens in an official ethnic state or "ethnocracy." It would also

solve the refugee problem, when the law of return applies to both Jews and Palestinians equally. Furthermore, settler evacuation would become a non-issue; they could stay where they are and a court would settle claims for compensation, as happened in South Africa for land confiscations under the Group Areas Act. However, there is no chance of even the Israeli left supporting such a South African solution, perceived as a threat to the Jewish character of the state, "demographic suicide," as it is almost unanimously perceived in Israel. The strong communal identity on both sides in Israel/Palestine supersedes the individual identity on which the South African constitutional system is based. Therefore, unlike South Africa, a feasible "one state solution"[36] would have to rely on group rights in a binational and strongly federal constitution in Israel/Palestine.

A redefinition of Israel from an ethnic state with a guaranteed Jewish majority to a pluralist, multicultural democracy requires a reciprocal Arab revision of an anti-Zionist identity that frequently flows into anti-Semitic stereotyping of the worst kind. Israel's moral legitimacy has yet to be accepted by its neighbors. As long as anti-Semitic stereotypes, such as the Czarist forgeries of the "Protocol of the Elders of Zion" or even Holocaust denial is peddled among Islamists, the South African solution of an inclusive, tolerant common state remains a utopian vision indeed. Yet why should the Shoa and historical suffering of the Jewish people not be part of the Palestinian curriculum? Why should the "nakba," the historical facts of the dispossession of the Palestinians since 1948 not be part of the Jewish curriculum? Why does nobody in Israel/Palestine, apart from a few marginalized historians and post-Zionist writers, demand a Truth and Reconciliation Commission?

Conclusion

Compared with the moral, legal, and political complexity of the Middle East conflict, apartheid amorality proved an easy target for analysis and condemnation. Mandela's vision succeeded because it evoked a universal morality. Common ideological and economic bonds existed between the antagonists inside South Africa. An outdated racial hierarchy eventually clashed with economic imperatives when the costs exceeded the benefits of racial minority rule in a global pariah state. In the Israeli case, outside support sustains intransigence. Only when the colonial policies of occupation embarrass and threaten their stronger patrons abroad or can no longer be so easily contained inside – as apartheid racial capitalism did in the Cold War competition – can outside pressure on Israel be expected. This turning of the tables will impact on the Israeli public as much as

the outside perception is effected by visionary local leaders and events. Despite gains in global empathy, Palestinians are still at the mercy of a superior adversary in every respect, which even a Mandela would not have been able to overcome. In this impasse hope is offered by Israeli progressive moral dissent on the Left as well as opportunistic calculations on the Right that the occupation also harms the occupier. Israel has the capacity, but has yet to prove its willingness to reach a meaningful compromise. The Palestinian mainstream has the willingness, but lacks the capacity to initiate a fair settlement.

Notes

1. Steinmetz Center Peace Index, March 2005.
2. Mark Chmiel, *Elie Wiesel and the Politics of Moral Leadership*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2001, p. 97.
3. Mahmood Mamdani, *Good Muslim, Bad Muslim*. New York: Pantheon, 2004, p. 241. The self-censorship extends to reputable human rights organizations. For example, the New York-based "International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ)" describes its mission as working "in societies emerging from repressive rule or armed conflict, as well as in established democracies where historical injustices or systematic abuse remain unresolved." Indeed, the ICTJ under its far-sighted presidents Alex Boraine and Juan Mendez performed sterling work in facilitating reconciliation in two dozen countries around the world. Israel/Palestine is the surprising exception. Among the 25 fellows selected world-wide annually since 2002 to study in Cape Town, only one ever came from Israel, none from Palestine.
4. Interview with Ari Shavit in *Haaretz Magazine*, October 8, 2004.
5. Baruch Kimmerling and Joel Migdal, "*The Palestinian People*." Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003.
6. Shlomo Avineri, *Jerusalem Post*. December 16, 1988.
7. Ian Buruma, *The Guardian*. July 23, 2002.
8. Cited in Henry Siegman, "*Sharon and the Future of Palestine." New York Review of Books*, LI, 19, December 2, 2004, p. 12.
9. Ehud Olmert, Quoted in James Bennett, "Sharon Dismisses Worries of Loss of Jewish Identity," *New York Times*, January 12, 2004.
10. Ehud Barak, "I Did Not Give Away a Thing," *Journal of Palestine Studies* XXXIII(1), 2003, 84–87.
11. Anthony D. Smith, *Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996, p. 450.
12. Edward Said, webmail, March 2003.
13. Craig Nelson, "Christian Zionists," *Atlanta Journal-Constitution*, December 25, 2003.
14. *New York Times*, October 21, 2003.
15. See the controversial essay by John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, in the London Review of Books, March 23, 2006 and the fierce reactions, summarized by Michael Massing, "*The Storm over the Israeli Lobby*," *New York Review of Books*, June 8, 2006, 64–73.

16. Kevin Toolis, "You Can't Make a Deal with the Dead," *The Guardian*, September 10, 2003.
17. James Ron, Frontiers and Ghettoes. *State Violence in Israel and Serbia*, Berkeley: UCP, 2003, 201.
18. Shaul Mofaz, *Haaretz*, August 27, 2003.
19. Shira Herzog, "Follow South Africa's Lead," *Globe & Mail*, June 24, 2003, sec. A15.
20. "The Lost Steps," *The Nation*, August 30/September 6, 2004, 31–38.
21. *National Post editorial*, July 22, 2004, A15.
22. Edward Said, *From Oslo to Iraq*, New York: Pantheon, 2004, p. 51.
23. Interview with Ruthie Blum, *Jerusalem Post*, December 18, 2004
24. *Cape Times*, November 30, 2004.
25. E. Yaar and T. Hermann, "Post-mortem: Arafat's Collective Image among the Palestinian and Israeli Publics," *Steinmetz Center Peace Index*, December 22, 2004.
26. Eliezer Ben-Rafael, "Where Stands Israel?" *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 27(2), 310–316.
27. Benny Morris, "Survival of the Fittest," Interview with Ari Shavit, *Haaretz Magazine*, January 9, 2004.
28. All the above quotes cited in Richard Ben Cramer, *How Israel Lost*, New York: Simon Schuster, 2004, 236.
29. MEMRI, 9/12/2004, Clip 258.
30. Andrew Rigby, *Justice and Reconciliation. After the Violence*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2001, p. 190.
31. Mahmood Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*, Princeton University Press, 2001, p. 267.
32. "Conflict Resolution in Israel/Palestine," Paper presented at the SFU International Conference "Negotiating Compromises in Divided Societies," Vancouver, October 15, 2004.
33. Dennis Ross, *The Missing Peace*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2004, p. 773.
34. JMCC and PSR Public Opinion Polls, 2003. Quoted in Alan Dowty and Michelle Gawerc, "The Intifada: Revealing the Chasm," *Meria* 5(3).
35. Thomas Friedman, "One Wall, One Man, One Vote," *New York Times*, September 14, 2003.
36. The title of a book by Virginia Tilley (Princeton University Press, 2005), the most comprehensive advocacy of a common state so far.

Conclusion: Implementing Peace Agreements

Guy Ben-Porat

The success of a peace process is measured, first, by its ability to end violence and, second, by its ability to create the institutions and support structures that would discourage the parties from taking up arms again. By these measures the Israel–Palestinian peace process is far behind Northern Ireland and South Africa. While South Africa was transformed from an apartheid system to a working democracy, and Northern Ireland has made important strides toward stable peace, recently led by parties formerly opposed to the agreement, the Israeli–Palestinian conflict is no where near resolution. Thus, contrary to the relative stability achieved in the other two cases, the Israeli–Palestinian process since shortly after its inception has shifted between negotiations and violent outbursts that erased most if not all achievements. While the differences are obvious, the reasons for success and failure are far from obvious and the lessons significant.

The three conflicts engaged in this volume were often compared for "political" purposes (see Guelke's chapter), tainting the adversary or justifying the struggle. But, the comparison of the peace processes has also significant analytical value, theoretical and practical, as the work of practitioners and academics, including in this volume, demonstrates. The divergence in the trajectories of the three societies since the early 1990s, as Guelke concludes, is a persuasive argument for thinking that a single overarching basis for comparing the three societies will fail to capture the complexities of the three situations. Yet, the three societies have enough in common that it seems certain that political comparisons will continue to be made. These comparisons are especially valuable if we are to understand what separates a successful from a failed peace process.

Issues confronted in the peace processes are often quite similar: the end of violence and the furthering of justice, economic development, and

legitimacy (Darby and MacGinty, 2000). However, as discussed before in this volume, peace processes stretch beyond the signing of agreements and their outcome depends on the ability to address the political, economic, cultural, psychological, and social roots of the conflict and to transform attitudes and beliefs that foster animosity and violence. The changes of the global context in the 1990s created new incentives to resolve protracted conflicts but simultaneously created new challenges and tensions. Thus, the new global context combined with "local" initiatives to underscore the dramatic developments in South Africa, Israel/Palestine, and Northern Ireland. But, as the events unfolded the difficulties of implementing peace agreements became clear and the peace processes took different trajectories. Looking back at the history of comparisons (see Guelke's chapter), this trajectory is by no means inevitable as the Israeli–Palestinian conflict was perceived in the past by scholars more resolvable than the other two. In the early 1990s, the Northern Irish peace process was the latecomer among the three, hoping to follow what was described as the success in the Middle East and South Africa. A decade later, the South African process seemed safely in place, Northern Ireland was making efforts to implement the agreement signed in 1998, and in Israel–Palestine the conflict derailed into violent cycles.

What then explains the different outcomes? Contributors to this volume have pointed to different explanations of the success or failure of the peace process, from macro-structural explanations that highlight regional advantages to microstudies of pacification and negotiation. Structural explanations point to the disadvantages of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict that, different from some expectations, demonstrates that partition is far from simple. While partitions carry an illusion of finality, they are often a temporary solution that fails to engage the deep roots of the conflict. Partition is problematic, as the Israeli–Palestinian conflict demonstrates, if boundaries are disputed, uprooting of populations with material, and emotional damage is involved, if inequality remains high and attributed to past injustices and when past grievances are not addressed (Ben-Porat, 2005a).

Partition was all the more difficult to achieve under regional and internal unfavourable conditions, described by Miller (Chapter 2) as state-to-nation imbalance. In Israel, this imbalance, underscores the difficulties to achieve peace as borders and boundaries remain disputed and leaders encounter difficulties reaching agreements and even more so implementing them. Thus, national incongruence on both sides, a Palestinian weak state, and other imbalances across the region have compounded to make compromise and implementation difficult. The

partition option that was previously considered an advantage of the Israeli–Palestinian unfolds as a problematic path for peace when the issues of Palestinian citizens of Israel, Palestinian refugees, and Jewish settlers have made partitions difficult, if not impossible.

In Northern Ireland and South Africa the peace processes were differently structured: consociationalism in Northern Ireland and a liberal democratic constitution in South Africa. Pluri-national places, as McGarry and O'leary argue, based on the Northern Ireland experience, often require consociational arrangements, including powersharing and *territorial* autonomy. These arrangements, however, have to be supported by inter-state or inter-regional and transborder institutions and by a symbolic and functional recognition of other nationalities' languages and identities in the constitution and public institutions. In South Africa, according to Taylor, critical of consociationalism, it could not be used to fight the systemic racism of Apartheid. Rather, consociationalism was used by apartheid ideologues that saw in it potential to develop a democratic power-sharing system that would essentially sustain apartheid. Namely, consociational arrangements would protect privileged socioeconomic position under the guise of protecting minority identities that in practice would mean the continuation of racial inequalities. The 1996 Constitution marked the end of the line for consociational designs, in favor of a liberal democratic constitution in which individual rights are protected by a Bill of Rights.

The partition agreement negotiated in Oslo was supposedly ameliorated by a liberal approach of would-be economic interdependence. The *New Middle East* written by Shimon Peres (1993) shortly before the Oslo agreements intended to provide a blueprint for the future of the region based on economic rationality, peace, democracy, cooperation, mutual gain, and general prosperity, and some explanations of the collapse of the agreement rested on the argument that the Liberal principles and mechanism underlying the Oslo process were not properly implemented. From a structural-realist explanation Rynhold argues that specific structural realist pre-conditions needed to facilitate liberal processes were absent in the Israeli–Palestinian context. Specifically, according to this interpretation, the process was flawed from the outset because the practical meaning of mutual recognition as understood by the parties was too far apart to be bridged in a manner amenable to practical implementation. In the limbo between the absence of a permanent status agreement and the difficulty to implement interim agreements, mistrust has grown as each side sought to maneuver itself into a better position for either permanent-status talks or the collapse of the process.

Neither a peace supportive diaspora (see Chapter 3), nor internal factors like influential pro-peace civil organizations (see Chapter 4) existed to significantly change the disadvantages of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. The ability of the Jewish-American fundamentally pluralistic community to mobilize in concert with Israeli governments pursuing policies of peace has been hampered by internal ideological divisions as well as weighty organizational considerations and, in any case, its ability to influence the Israeli government for various reasons has proven very limited. Conversely, the Irish-American diaspora, while much less cohesive both in terms of ethnic identity and institutional presence, has successfully influenced the American government and has also had certain palpable effects on the policies and behavior of the paramilitary and political echelons in Northern Ireland and the Republic respectively. Rather, one can claim like Adam (Chapter 11) that unlike Afrikaners, Israelis enjoy a supportive diaspora. White South Africa finally negotiated when the rising costs of apartheid outweighed the benefits. In Israel, the costs of occupation and conflict are largely compensated from outside, namely by the continued support of the United States.

The focus on partition in Israel/Palestine and the zero-sum dynamic in which each side struggled to maximize its gains at the expense of the "other" has left limited room for peace groups to operate and for cooperative initiatives that crossed the divide. Peace groups in Israel, as Hermann demonstrates, were successful in changing the Israeli public's and political establishment's perceptions of the advantages of a political solution to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. But, they were much less successful in their attempts to change the "national modus operandi," a shift in the traditional perception of Israel's external relations. Thus, identity shifts have not occurred in Israel like in Northern Ireland (see Todd's chapter) as the changed perceptions were rather "pragmatic" seeking an end to the conflict without changing the perception of the enemy.

If the peace process was to transform the relations between Israelis and the Palestinians, it had to change the terms of engagement that would enable Israelis and Palestinians were to meet as equals. But, reconciliation was mostly "passive" (see Netz-Zenguht's chapter), reached without a conscious and active effort of the parties, through time and pragmatic cooperation. Businesspeople, professionals, academics, and bureaucrats have found ways to cooperate, and some of this cooperation was sustained even during crises periods and violence. While passive reconciliation might have some influence in the longer run

as of now it had limited impact. First, cooperation between Israelis and Palestinians (and across the region) was usually constrained by the developments of the peace process. And, second, the encounters involved relatively small numbers of people, manly Palestinian and Israeli elites. Indeed, even in periods where economic cooperation was relatively high, the dividends of peace were unevenly distributed and significant sectors across the region remained indifferent or hostile to peace and the promise of prosperity (Ben-Porat, 2006b).

In Northern Ireland and in South Africa, the peace process has redefined the relationship between, respectively, Protestants and Catholics, and white, colored, and Indian citizens. In Israel/Palestine, conversely, the terms of engagement have not significantly changed. Prior to the peace process the majority of encounters between Israelis and Palestinians were between soldiers and occupied or employers and low-wage laborers. Overall, encounters between Israelis and Palestinians during the peace process have not changed quantitatively or qualitatively, as they remained limited in number and highly unequal in nature.

Changes in Northern Ireland were seldom radical and typically involved either a moderation of oppositional understandings or a partial disengagement from them. Yet, it is highly likely as Todd argues that they have been significant in sustaining support for the Agreement, and in significantly moderating the attitudes of its opponents. Her tentative conclusions clearly demarcate the different dynamics of the processes. First, if identity change is triggered by experiences and interactions, not directly by political events, ordinary people's experiences and interactions have not significantly changed after Oslo. Second, cross-community civil society organizations that played a key role in Northern Ireland were almost non-existent in Israel. And, third, wider political settlement and changing power relations that change the political atmosphere and enable these organizations to operate have not occurred.

With limited public support, determined opposition and indecisive leadership peace processes are prey to "spoilers" (Stedman, 1997), extremists seeking to derail the process and to institutions and groups that oppose compromise. In the accounts of the failure of the peace process in the Middle East, according to Peled, the role of the state has often been missing and the elements within it who sought to derail the process they perceived to be against their interests: the military and the settlers. When political and economic liberalization that underscored

the initiation of the process were checked by a "double movement" (Ben-Porat, 2005a; Polanyi, 1957), Israeli and Palestinian, the state and the (supposedly) pro-peace business class were quick to abandon their commitment to process.

Structures and agents are hard to separate when studying peace processes. Agents, political leaders that seek to promote peace, are limited by structural constraints, local and regional, but have some degree of freedom. This is especially true concerning the political leadership that has to create a virtuous cycle where incentives for peace introduced change perceptions, and changed perceptions in turn foster peace. Comparing the Israeli–Palestinian to the Northern Irish and South-African peace process, the difference not only in the structural constraints but also in the commitment of political leaders to peace and their ability to create substantive public support is obvious. Whereas in South Africa and Northern Ireland the peace process had enough support to allow leaders to operate, in Israel/Palestine leaders fought an uphill battle and were more ready to jump of the wagon when the process encountered difficulties. Both the Israeli and Palestinian leadership, as Adam (Chapter 11) notes, is fragmented, with militant outbidding a frequent tool of populist mobilization, "the warmer a Palestinian representative is embraced by the Israeli establishment, the faster his home support melts away."

The peace process between Israel and Palestinians was proven early on at a significant disadvantage in comparison to the Northern Irish and South African processes. Leaders and third parties involved have constrained themselves to partition, all but impossible to implement, and plans for economic cooperation that were quickly marginalized as the peace process faltered (Ben-Porat, 2005b). Reality calls for, at least in the near future, an agreed upon border between Israel and the Palestine. But, borders and the peace agreements that set them up are a starting rather then an end point. If peace is to become a reality, new alternatives will have to be explored, conflict resolution measures to transcend the zero-sum nature of the current process must be found, and lessons from elsewhere adopted. Comparison allows the understanding of the reasons for failure but also the terms of success.

Israelis and Palestinians are at a different starting point then South Africans and Northern Irish but several lessons are valid. First, grass-root civic cooperation that changes the terms of engagement is necessary to sustain the process. Second, non-territorial institutions have to be devised to transcend the limitations of partition. Third, the benefits of peace must be evenly distributed between and across societies. And,

fourth, the leadership on both sides would have to commit itself to peace and implementation, in spite of the expected difficulties. Even if not entirely comparable, the peace processes that transformed the previously thought of as intractable conflicts of Northern Ireland and South Africa may offer a ray of hope to the seemingly hopeless Middle East.

References

Guy Ben-Porat. 2005a. "Grounds for Peace: Territoriality and Conflict Resolution," *Geopolitics* 10(1): 147–66.

Guy Ben-Porat. 2005b. "Same Old Middle East? The New Middle East and the *Double* Movement," *International Relations* 19(1): 39–62.

John Darby and Roger MacGinty (eds). 2000. *The Management of Peace Processes*. London: Macmillan.

Shimon Peres. 1993. *The New Middle East*. New York: Holt.

Karl Polanyi. 1957. *The Great Transformation*. Boston: Polanyi.

Stephen John Stedman. 1997. "Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes," *International Security* 22(2): 5–53.

Author Index

Subject Index

In this index tables, figures, tables, appendices and notes are indicated in italics, enclosed in parenthesis, following the page number. E.g. asymmetry, 91(*n.28*). Notes are indicated by *n*. Tables by tab. Figures by fig. Works are entered in italics.