# The Routledge Handbook of Civil–Military Relations

Edited by Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei

# THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF CIVIL–MILITARY RELATIONS

This new Handbook offers a wide-ranging, internationally focused overview of the field of civil–military relations.

The armed forces are central actors in most societies and are involved in many different roles. Among other activities, they engage in peace operations, support the police in fighting crime, support civilian authorities in dealing with natural disasters, and fight terrorists and in internal conflicts. The existing literature on this subject is limited in its discussion of war-fighting and thus does not do justice to this variety of roles.

*The Routledge Handbook of Civil–Military Relations* not only fills this important lacuna, but offers an up-to-date comparative analysis which identifies three essential components in civil–military relations: (1) democratic civilian control; (2) operational effectiveness; and (3) the efficiency of the security institutions. Amalgamating ideas from key thinkers in the field, the book is organized into three main parts:

- Part I: Development of the Field of Study;
- Part II: Civil–Military Relations in Non-Democratic or Nominally Democratic Countries;
- Part III: Civil–Military Relations in Democratic and Democratizing States: Issues and Institutions.

This new Handbook will be essential reading for students and practitioners in the fields of civil–military relations, defense studies, war and conflict studies, international security, and IR in general.

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# ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

# LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

| | |
|---|---|
| AFSPA | Armed Forces Special Powers Act |
| ANC | African National Congress |
| ANSSI | Agence nationale de la sécurité des systèmes d'information |
| APLA | Azanian People's Liberation Army |
| AR | Assembly of the Republic |
| AU | African Union |
| C&AG | Comptroller and Auditor General |
| CAECOPAZ | Argentine Peace Support Training Center |
| CBRN | chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear |
| CCMR | Center for Civil–Military Relations |
| CDE | civilian defense education |
| CECOPAC | Joint Center for Peace Operations |
| CFSP | Common Foreign and Security Policy |
| CICDE | Centre interarmées de concepts, de doctrines et d'expérimentations |
| CIE | Commandement Interarmées de l'Espace |
| CIGI | Centre for International Governance Innovation |
| CJCS | Chairman of the JCS |
| CMR | Civil–Military Relations |
| CPA | Coalition Provisional Authority |
| CR | Revolutionary Council |
| CRPF | Central Reserve Police Force |
| CTB | Central Training Base |
| CTFP | Counter-Terrorism Fellowship Program |
| CTV | Venezuelan labor confederation |
| DCAF | Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces |
| DDETC | Doctrine, Development, Education and Training Command |
| DFID | Department for International Development |
| DPA | Movement in Support of the Army |
| DPKO | UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations |
| DPRK | Democratic People's Republic of Korea |
| DRC | Democratic Republic of Congo |

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|---|---|
| DSA | Defense Support Agency |
| DSP | defense strategy and policy |
| EC | European Community |
| ETA | Euskadi ta Askatasuna (Basque Homeland and Freedom) Group |
| EU | European Union |
| FAR | Federal Acquisition Regulations |
| FDP | Fundamental Development Programs |
| FEDECAMARAS | Venezuelan chamber of commerce |
| FLACSO | Latin American Faculty of Social Science |
| FRG | Federal Republic of Germany |
| FRY | Federal Republic of Yugoslavia |
| FSB | Federal Security Service |
| G–N | Goldwater–Nichols Defense Reorganization Act |
| GAGAS | Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards |
| GAO | Government Accountability Office |
| HSWP | Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party |
| IAS | Indian Administrative Services |
| IEEI | Institute for Strategic and International Studies |
| IMET | International Military Education and Training |
| IMF | International Monetary Fund |
| INTOSAI | International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions |
| IPAP | Individual Partnership Action Plan |
| IPI | International Peace Institute |
| IPP | Individual Partnership Program |
| IR | international relations |
| ISAF | International Security Assistance Force |
| JCS | Joint Chiefs of Staff |
| JCSD | Joint Standing Committee on Defence |
| JPME | joint professional military education |
| JUJEM | Joint Chiefs of Staff |
| KPA | General Political Bureau of the Korean People's Army |
| KRG | Kurdistan Regional Government |
| KWP | Korean Workers Party |
| LAF | Lebanese Armed Forces |
| LOFANB | Venezuelan law |
| LPM | Loi de Programmation Militaire |
| MAP | Membership Action Plan |
| MENA | Middle East and North Africa |
| MFA | Armed Forces Movement |
| MK | *Umkhonto we Sizwe* ("the spear of the nation") |
| MoD | Ministry of Defense |
| NAO | National Audit Office |
| NATO | North Atlantic Treaty Organization |
| NCA | Nuclear Command Authority |
| NCO | Non-Commissioned Officer |
| NCOVS | NCO Vocational School |
| NGO | non-governmental organization |
| NP | National Party |

| | |
|---|---|
| NSA | National Security Agency |
| NSAB | National Security Advisory Board |
| NSC | National Security Concept |
| NSC | National Security Council |
| NSS | National Security Strategy |
| ODC | Office for Defense Cooperation |
| OMB | Office of Management and Budget |
| OMLT | Operational Mentor and Liaison Team |
| OSCE | Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe |
| ÖVP | Austrian People's Party |
| PAC | Pan Africanist Congress |
| PARP | Planning and Review Process |
| PCD | Portfolio Committee on Defence |
| PCR | Romanian Communist Party |
| PfP | Partnership for Peace |
| PME | professional military education |
| PROVOJ | Professional Army, Supplemented with Contractual Reserves |
| PRT | Provincial Reconstruction Team |
| PSO | peace support operations |
| PSOE | Spanish Socialist Workers' Party |
| QDR | Quadrennial Defense Review |
| RAW | Research and Analysis Wing |
| RGPP | Revue Générale des Politiques Publiques |
| ROTC | Reserve Officer Training Corps |
| RS TD | Territorial Defense of the Republic of Slovenia |
| SADF | South African Defence Force |
| SAF | Slovenian Armed Forces |
| SAIs | supreme audit institutions |
| SANDF | South African National Defence Force |
| SAPS | South African Police Services |
| SCAF | Supreme Council of the Armed Forces |
| SDR | Strategic Defense Review |
| SESA | Symantec Enterprise Security Architecture |
| SFDP | Secretariat for Foreign and Defense Policy |
| SFRY | Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia |
| SGDSN | Secrétariat général de la défense et de la sécurité nationale |
| SIPRI | Stockholm International Peace Research Institute |
| SOPC | Sub-Oficiales Profesionales de Carrera |
| SPÖ | Social Democratic Party of Austria |
| SSI | State Security Investigations |
| SSR | security sector reform |
| SVOP | Council on Foreign Relation |
| SWAT | special weapons and tactics |
| TAL | Transitional Administrative Law |
| TD | Territorial Defense |
| UDF | United Democratic Front |
| ULFA | United Liberation Front of Asom |
| UN | United Nations |

| UNDPKO | UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations |
| UNMOVIC | UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspections Commission |
| WEU | Western European Union |
| YPA | Yugoslav National Army |
| ZMNDU | Zrínyi Miklós Military Academy |

# INTRODUCTION

*Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei*

There are several reasons for our decision to produce this *Routledge Handbook on Civil–Military Relations*. First, there is currently no handbook on this topic, although there are a few edited volumes of case studies, which are very dated.[1] Second, there is no up-to-date comparative analysis utilizing a common framework to characterize civil–military relations. We are proposing such a framework here in Chapters 2 and 3, which views civil–military relations in terms of three essential components: (1) democratic civilian control; (2) operational effectiveness; and (3) the efficiency of the security institutions (i.e., the armed forces, the intelligence community, and police) in their use of resources.[2] Third, there are serious impediments to research and writing on the topic of civil–military relations, especially in non-democratic regimes or developing democracies, which we attempt to overcome in this Handbook. It is with these general lacunae in mind that we established our list of topics and commissioned the chapters from country and area experts.

Considering several key factors that influence geopolitics in the contemporary world, one would anticipate a deep and comprehensive literature on the topic of civil–military relations. First, in all countries, the relationship between the state and the armed forces is often crucial for the survival of the state against foreign and domestic enemies. It is not surprising that there is a rich literature in military history, but there is minimal literature on contemporary topics such as civil–military relations in democratic transitions. Second, fairly large percentages of national budgets go to national defense and security in most, if not all, countries. The global average is 2.2 percent, with a range from 0.1–11.2 percent.[3] Third, in most newer democracies, the armed forces and security services were key components of the previous, non-democratic regimes, and their treatment is central to later democratic consolidation, should it take place. In addition, various international security and defense cooperation organizations, such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union (EU), the Organization of American States, the series of Western Hemisphere Defense Ministerial meetings (the latest in November 2010 in Bolivia), and the African Union, have urged new democracies to reform their security forces and democratize their civil–military relations as a condition of integration. There are other security and defense cooperation organizations, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and its Regional Forum, that emphasize defense transparency and cooperation in non-traditional security arenas. The Russia- and China-led Collective Security Treaty Organization,

and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (comprising China and several Central Asian nations) are actively promoting defense and security cooperation activities, but presumably democratization of civil–military relations is not on their agenda. Fourth, in contemporary non-democratic regimes, the armed forces and security sector are key to the stability of the state, which is not based on free elections and democratic legitimacy. Fifth, in countries beginning a transition from authoritarianism, such as Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, the armed forces are a key player, for better or for worse. And sixth, virtually everywhere, militaries and other security instruments are taking on new roles and missions, in lieu of their traditional role of national territorial defense. The chapters in this Handbook attempt to address, in one way or another, all of these topics, based on the comparative framework presented in Part I.

While the paucity of useful literature on civil–military relations is obvious, the explanation for it is complicated; and as with any important phenomenon, there are several reasons. The most basic probable reason is the weak conceptual or theoretical basis underlying the field. This issue is dealt with in Chapter 1 by Dr. Thomas Bruneau, who has researched and written on the topic of civil–military relations for more than 20 years. He analyzes the classic US literature in the field, which is mainly based on Samuel Huntington's *The Soldier and the State*, published in 1957.[4] There is an update on this same general topic in Chapter 6 by José A. Olmeda, who analyzes the premier journal in the subfield in the United States, *Armed Forces & Society*, in comparison to the more general literature in the field of comparative politics. Olmeda concludes that the conceptual, and even the methodological, bases of the field are very problematic. Another reason has to do with the lack of quantitative data on the issues surrounding civil–military relations. In the general field of social science, including comparative politics, researchers have access to quantitative data collected by a variety of international organizations, including international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank. Due to restrictions in the charters of these institutions, however, they cannot collect information on issues related to national security and defense. There are, then, no time-series analyses, or even basic quantitative data on the topics that are central to civil–military relations: efficiency and effectiveness. Even the data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) is problematic because it comes from the countries themselves and is very rudimentary, and is thus insufficient for anything more than rough analysis.[5] Finally, and similar to the last point, not only have eminent scholars in the field of democratic transitions and consolidation barely touched upon the military and security dimension,[6] but the indices on different dimensions and degrees of democratization developed by Freedom House and the Economist Intelligence Unit, among others, exclude the armed forces and security.[7] While the very thorough and comprehensive questionnaire by the Bertelsmann Foundation does include three items on the general topic, despite the author's efforts to have them reformulated, they are very problematic.[8] In short, neither the scholars working on transitions nor the indices and compilations of available data deal with the central topics of civil–military relations.

While these factors are the main ones we have identified that limit the development of the subfield, and are the focus of two chapters in this Handbook, there are three others that should be noted. First, much of the effectiveness of national security and defense can be characterized as "the dog that didn't bark." That is, how can we prove a negative, such as whether secret military intelligence did or did not produce a desired outcome, or the role deterrence played in preventing attack precisely because a country was viewed by a potential aggressor as strong? How should we evaluate the importance of peace operations or military support in natural disasters? The point is, it is close to impossible to assign a value to these negative or very ambiguous inputs. Another factor that limits this field of study is the very wide spectrum of contemporary roles and missions in which many armed forces, police forces, and even

intelligence agencies are engaged. Some 115 countries are currently engaged in peace operations. Forty-eight countries had forces in Afghanistan in mid-2011, in most cases despite vocal domestic opposition and political division. All militaries support their governments in responding to natural disasters. Many militaries help the police deal with street gangs and organized crime. Intelligence agencies support both the police and the armed forces to fulfill their roles and missions. Yet the models for civil–military relations that we have available for analysis focus almost exclusively on territorial defense and state-on-state conflict, which are increasingly rare for most countries. Finally, national security and defense institutions offer at best limited access to outside researchers. Even in well-established democracies, and certainly after September 11, 2001, access to military bases, reliable sources of information, and data is very limited. In general, as the saying goes, "Those who say don't know, and those who know don't say."

The result of these many limiting factors is that there is little literature on the topic that is the focus of this Handbook, and that which is available is generally not very useful. We have therefore found it necessary to develop our own approach, which we continue to refine as we explore different countries and different processes, and as whole regions shift politically, as is happening in North Africa and the Middle East. The Handbook is organized to describe the development of our framework, and then illustrate it by reviewing a broad range of case studies, which also contribute to the development of the field by providing concepts and empirical information. All of the chapters for the Handbook were commissioned by the co-editors in order to organize relevant information, normally for the first time, that can be evaluated using the framework. In all cases the chapter authors are regional or country experts who, although not necessarily working in civil–military relations or defense policy, have extensive experience in the country or region they are writing about, know the language, have access to scholars and policy-makers, and have honed their ideas with these local experts and decision-makers.

Part I deals with the development of the field of study. Chapter 1, by Thomas Bruneau, highlights in particular the overwhelming focus on issues of control in the traditional literature on civil–military relations, mainly popularized by Samuel Huntington in *The Soldier and the State* (1981), originally published in 1957. Buttressed by critiques from other scholars, Bruneau concludes that Huntington's work, which is really an excellent example of normative (vs. empirical) theory, provides a poor basis for later analysis and research, due to several logical and methodological weaknesses. It remains, unfortunately, the touchstone for the study of civil–military relations down to the present.

As Bruneau was working with civilians and officers in the armed forces and other security organizations throughout the world over the past two decades, he began to develop a new approach. An exchange between Bruneau and one of the leaders in the field of civil–military relations in Latin America, David Pion-Berlin, highlights the stages of their thinking on the most relevant issues. This debate is presented as Chapter 2 in this volume. Based on their work with civilians and officers throughout the world, and their unhappiness with the analytical frameworks they found in the scholarly literature, Bruneau and his colleague Cris Matei subsequently published an article (updated and revised by Matei as Chapter 3) in which they further developed their ideas, and explicitly included effectiveness and efficiency along with control, in what they termed a "new conceptualization" of civil–military relations.

As Bruneau and Matei found, the concept of efficiency is hard to evaluate in most countries aside from the United States and other Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development members, which have robust systems of oversight and accountability. In Chapter 4 they therefore looked beyond standard measures of efficiency to another source that might provide oversight. Supreme audit institutions (SAIs) exist in virtually all countries in the world, and are

cooperating to some degree in the International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions, which was founded in 1953 and currently has a membership of 190 SAIs.[9] In some countries, these offices are robust, and able to deal with the national security and defense sectors. Unlike legislatures, which too often fail to conduct proper oversight, SAIs are not totally dependent on domestic politics and thus have the support of external actors such as the World Bank. Bruneau and Matei have therefore replaced the flawed concept of efficiency, which is all but impossible to evaluate in the context of national security and defense, with the suggestion that a SAI may provide sufficient oversight to maximize the probability that resources will be used in accordance with a government's policies and goals.

In their work, Bruneau and Matei critically assess a major contribution to the field of defense reform and civil–military relations known as security sector reform (SSR). They asked Timothy Edmunds, an important founder and early proponent of SSR in Britain, to describe the concept and update his understanding of SSR, which he does in Chapter 5. As mentioned earlier, to better understand the conceptual and methodological issues in the field of civil–military relations, José Olmeda, dean of the Faculty of Political Science and Sociology at the Spanish Distance Learning University in Madrid, Spain, has contributed Chapter 6, comparing and contrasting the leading US journal in the subfield, *Armed Forces & Society*, with publications in the larger field of comparative politics. His findings highlight the problems of developing the subfield, and help us to understand why it not only has failed to develop further, but has even stagnated.

Part II deals with civil–military relations in non-democratic regimes and regimes that are regressing from real functioning democracy. According to Freedom House, 59 percent of the countries in the contemporary world are at least *de jure* electoral democracies.[10] But several *de facto* non-democratic countries, such as China and Russia, are extremely important actors in geopolitics. By selecting different types of these non-democratic regimes and focusing on the relationship between the armed forces and other security instruments in them, the co-editors hope to contribute something to our understanding of the dynamics of these regimes. In all of them, the armed forces and the larger security sector (which will be explained in each chapter) are crucial to the maintenance of the non-democratic regime.

One of these, North Korea, is probably the most repressive regime in the world today. It must, of necessity, rely on the armed forces and other internal security agencies to maintain itself in power. In Chapter 7, "Civil–Military Relations in a Dictatorship," Jargalsaikhan Mendee, who is one of the few foreigners to have had contact with members of the North Korean armed forces both within and outside North Korea, analyzes this intricate relationship between the government and the security forces. Similar to other one-party totalitarian regimes, the North Korean armed forces have little independent role in society and politics.

In Chapter 8, on Egypt, Robert Springborg analyzes the very different situation of an authoritarian regime that annually received a huge amount of aid ($1.3 billion, primarily from the United States) for security assistance, but rather than evolving toward a more democratic society utilized the funds to consolidate power. How this was done in Egypt can help us to better understand how civil–military relations are structured in a country where the elite intends to remain in power. Springborg then updates his chapter to discuss the current situation following the "Arab Spring," in which Egypt's armed forces, after allowing the regime to fall, have emerged as the single locus of power, and the target of opposition.

In Chapter 9, Mikhail Tsypkin examines another important case, Russia, which has regressed over the past decade from tentative democracy back toward single-party authoritarianism. Russia still maintains a huge military, structured and sized for the Cold War, but in suggesting

there now seems to be some glimmering of much-needed reform, Tsypkin highlights an interesting paradox. President Boris Yeltsin (1991–99) could not implement military reform because he lacked sufficient authority, and needed the loyalty of the military to control political and social instability. His successor, former intelligence officer Vladimir Putin (President 2000–2008, Prime Minister 2008–12, and re-elected President for a six-year term in 2012), has vastly strengthened the power of the presidency, a change that has allowed the Kremlin to embark on military reform. Thus, civilian control has been strengthened, but only by eroding democratic institutions, including those that oversaw the armed services. Moscow also still wields enormous leverage over the military and intelligence services of the former Soviet republics, and may be contributing to a troubling de-democratization process in the former Soviet sphere of influence.

Yet another case of regression from a democratic regime is that of Venezuela, described by Harold Trinkunas in Chapter 10. Here the leader, Hugo Chavez, came directly from the armed forces, and has utilized them to assert, and then consolidate, his personal power. Finally in this Part, we have a case study of Iraq. Abbas Khadim focuses in Chapter 11 on the state of civil–military relations in a country that has no history of democracy. Former President Saddam Hussein used the armed forces and other security instruments to remain in power for more than 30 years. Since Iraq was invaded by the United States in 2003 and dissolved into something close to civil war for several years, civil–military relations there have remained very much in flux despite attempts to set up democratic institutions.

Part III deals with civil–military relations in democracies, particularly the institutions created to exercise control. The focus of control in these countries is very different from the five cases above, as becomes clear from a quick glance at these chapters. Unlike for civil–military relations, there is a rich and extensive literature on democratic transitions and consolidation. For democratic transitions in particular, we must acknowledge that Sam Huntington's *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (1991) is, in our view, as good as anything available. This is because, in contrast to many others, including his own earlier work, he does not make broad theoretical claims, but demonstrates that democratic transitions occur for a great many reasons, and all such transitions are unique. In many cases, of course, particularly those in which the military itself constituted the government, the armed forces were involved as central actors in the processes of democratic transition. From looking at the experiences of Portugal, Spain, Brazil, and Argentina, we can predict that any attempt to force broad generalizations from specific cases is bound to fail.

This is not the case, however, in the literature on democratic consolidation. Indeed, several notable authors, including Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Adam Przeworski, and Phillipe Schmitter have made convincing arguments on the possibility of generalizing from cases of democratic consolidation, because democracies share a number of important characteristics.[11] What does stand out in the analytical literature and in official government programs, however, is the lack of attention to issues relating to civil–military relations as countries throughout the world become consolidated democracies.[12] The one author who focuses explicitly on this issue is Felipe Agüero, whose work is included in most of the books dealing with consolidation. Even so, Agüero has only recently expanded his perspective beyond control to include effectiveness, and has done so only in a very preliminary fashion.[13]

It is toward addressing this deficiency that Part III, which deals with issues and institutions in functioning democracies, is oriented. Part III is divided into three major sections. Section A consists of case studies in institutionalizing democratic civilian control in new, and not so new, democracies. Argentina (Chapter 12, by Bruneau and Matei) presents an object lesson in how the obsession with civilian control can undermine the effectiveness of the armed forces. Latin America

does not have the benefits of NATO, EU, OSCE, or other supranational oversight, so domestic politics are free to exert an almost unrestrained influence on civil–military relations. A history of horrendous human rights abuses by military juntas, combined with the ill-fated invasion of the Malvinas/Falklands Islands in 1982, has made punishment of the military a popular political theme in recent years. Furthermore, the lack of any external threat has made national defense a low priority. As a result, civil–military relations in Argentina deal almost exclusively with control, yet bureaucratic inertia and other problems mean not only that effectiveness is compromised, but even control is tentative. In Chapter 13, Cris Matei discusses how democratically elected civilians in Slovenia have institutionalized their control of national security and defense, and how they exercise this control. She also points out how their limited expertise in defense matters, such as why recent changes in the security environment call for a redefinition of roles and missions for the armed forces, has limited the effectiveness of democratic civilian control in that country.

One of the most polemical issues in newer democracies, particularly but not exclusively in Latin America, is the presumed danger to democratic civilian control posed by militaries that assume a role in internal security. Some of this attention arises from the scholarly literature, particularly the work of Michael Desch, who argues that a domestic, versus external, role is corrosive to democratic civilian control.[14] Again, this assumption is painted with too broad a stroke. Our example is India, a well-established democracy that, since its independence in 1947, has experienced only two years of authoritarian rule, under Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. Yet, as Anshu Chatterjee demonstrates in Chapter 14, the Indian military is very heavily engaged in domestic missions such as counter-insurgency, border security, and disaster relief. Chatterjee describes how democratic civilian control is institutionalized and exercised in India, as well as some of the downsides of the current arrangement.

A case that exposes more explicitly the downside of civilian control is that of Spain (Chapter 15) authored by Matei and Olmeda. Unlike Portugal, which has strong links to the United States and NATO (see Chapter 22), in Spain, the attempt to institutionalize civil–military relations, particularly under PSOE (Spanish Socialist Workers' Party) governments (Prime Minister Felipe Gonzales, 1982–96, and Prime Minister Zapatero, 2004–11), has focused mainly on control. The PSOE governments have developed extensive mechanisms, centered on the Prime Minister's office and the Ministry of Defense, to exercise control, but with insufficient attention to how well the armed forces actually fulfill their assigned roles.

In Section B, the next group of cases focuses on the effectiveness of the military in implementing a wide spectrum of roles and missions. As Matei postulates in Chapter 3, effectiveness requires an explicit strategy, functioning institutions, and adequate, reliable resources. Taken individually, each of these fits the logic category of "necessary but not sufficient"; only in tandem will they improve military effectiveness. While, as previously noted, there is no logically or empirically credible way to prove the effectiveness of security instruments, in most cases, we can specify what is *necessary* for a country to be effective in one or more areas of national security and defense. In the six chapters in Section B, the authors focus on specific elements of these countries' deliberate efforts to increase military effectiveness.

In Chapter 16, Bruneau describes the long and difficult experience of the United States in its efforts to reform professional military education (PME). This is relevant to a broader audience because there is interest in many parts of the world today in reforming PME. In retrospect, virtually all observers agree that reform, particularly as it related to joint professional military education, or JPME, was very important, but the problems, past and present, can yield insights that might be relevant to other countries' reform programs.

The other five chapters in this section deal with the roles of security institutions in a changing strategic environment. Today some 115 countries provide personnel (military, gendarmerie, and

police) for United Nations (UN) and non–UN peacekeeping missions. In early 2011, there were 14 peace operations under UN authority and 36 non–UN peacekeeping operations.[15] There are training programs in 52 countries, including the United States, under the Global Peace Operations Initiative, which supports training in peacekeeping to UN standards. Peace-keeping, in short, is now recognized as a legitimate role for militaries, and is the primary function for the armed forces of a great many countries.[16] Coalition operations are becoming an important aspect of peacekeeping deployments, a fact that is having a direct political and economic impact on contributing nations. For instance, nations were providing various kinds of support to the US mission in Iraq, including political and economic support; access to their territory and air space for cross-border operations into Iraq; water; and troops (from staff officers to infantry) at each stage of the invasion and occupation, from combat to stability and reconstruction. Cur-rently EU and NATO nations are outsourcing troops from non-member nations for ongoing missions in the Balkans and Afghanistan, and future contingency commitments such as the European Standby Force.

In Chapter 17 on Mongolia, Thomas C. Bruneau and Jargalsaikhan Mendee demonstrate how Mongolia explicitly reoriented its military from territorial defense alone to peacekeeping under UN authority. The chapter deals not only with the decision to reorient the military, which is important and relevant to other countries, but also the requirements for effectiveness. Cris Matei then, in Chapter 18, analyzes how the influence of NATO and EU support and oversight has helped increase the effectiveness of the Hungarian armed forces, with particular attention to professional military education and the formulation of Hungary's defense policy and strategy.

One of the three requirements we posit for effectiveness is an explicit military strategy. There is a very high quality literature on strategy, especially military strategy.[17] With very few exceptions (among them Colombia, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands), however, official declarations of strategy are generally too vague to have any real impact on military planning.[18] Probably the worst possible culprit in this regard is the United States. There are two telling points that support this negative assessment. First, a snapshot of the National Defense University Library's digital collection of US strategy documents lists a remarkable 64 for the eight years of the George W. Bush Administration alone, 13 for the Clinton Administration, and 16 for the first two-and-a-half years of the Obama Administration (to mid-2011).[19] Such a plethora of documents suggests that a national defense strategy remains an elusive concept for the US military rather than a useful roadmap. Second, virtually all of these strategy documents are congressionally mandated, rather than coming from a deliberative process within the Pen-tagon's civilian and military leadership. The one that is probably most significant, as it is a reg-ularly required assessment of both strategy *and* priorities, is the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The 2010 QDR was released by the Department of Defense on February 1, 2010. It was followed by a congressionally mandated Government Accountability Office evaluation of the report, entitled "Subject: Quadrennial Defense Review: 2010 Report Addressed Many but Not All Required Items," dated April 30, 2010; and the Congressional Research Service's "Quadrennial Defense Review 2010: Overview and Implications for National Security Strategy," dated May 17, 2010. In addition, an independent panel composed of 20 highly respected defense intellectuals and professionals prepared and published "The QDR in Perspective; Meeting America's National Security Needs in the 21st Century: The Final Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel" (Hadley and Perry 2010). In short, the most significant document regarding US national security and defense is reviewed and embellished repeatedly immediately after publication. From this perspective, the US strategy documents are largely *pro-forma*.[20]

Hélène Dieck demonstrates in Chapter 19 how France, under the supervision of President Nicolas Sarkozy (May 2007–12), developed and published a new Strategy for National Defense and Security, in June 2008. She highlights the context in which this serious effort took place, and analyzes some of the outcomes. What emerges clearly in Dieck's analysis are two critical factors. First is the political will of President Sarkozy to develop a process and produce a document; second is the opposition of the leadership of the French Armed Forces to the process. In the vast majority of countries there is no political will to undertake this task, due in no small part to the expectation that the leadership of the armed forces will be opposed.

The next two chapters, by Anne Marie Baylouny on Lebanon and Jessica Piombo on South Africa, deal with a topic of particular resonance in several multi-cultural countries: how to make the transition from a military dominated by one ethnic, religious, or racial group to a more integrated, representative force. Equally important was the acceptance by the existing military leadership that such integration was necessary, coupled with the forces' insulation from politics. Ironically, the Syrian occupation of Lebanon (1976–2006) played such a role, by allowing the military hierarchy to remain relatively free from the pressure of sectarian politics. While the challenge of meeting these requirements is most obvious in Africa and the Middle East, the lessons from the relatively successful transitions in Lebanon and South Africa are relevant in other regions, including Southern and Eastern Europe and South-East Asia.

The final section of Part III, Section C, presents some case studies of countries whose leaders have achieved that rare combination of democratic civilian control *and* effectiveness. Even so, the scope of success varies tremendously in different countries and different regions of the world. The United States, for example, with a defense budget of some $800 billion—equal that of the next 14 countries combined—has global responsibilities unlike any other country in the world, with commensurately high expectations for results.[21] Thus, the conclusions in this section must be understood in view of the unique history and responsibilities of the countries analyzed.

In Chapter 22, Bruneau describes and analyzes recent efforts in Portugal, the harbinger of the Third Wave of democratization, to update its civil–military relations some 37 years after the democratic transition, and 17 years after the first efforts to institutionalize democratic civilian control and maximize effectiveness. The chapter highlights the importance of NATO, the EU, and other common European institutions in assuring the effectiveness and subordination of the military. The Portuguese, however, are particularly attuned to security issues and the armed forces, given the military's role in ending 50 years of authoritarian rule and instituting democratic civilian control. Effectiveness is vital across a large spectrum of roles and missions, due to Portugal's continuing eagerness to maintain close links with the United States, via NATO and base access in the Azores.

Despite negative assessments in most of the academic literature of civil–military relations in Chile, Chapter 23 by Matei and Marcos Robledo demonstrates that democratic civilian control has been achieved in that country. Furthermore, in terms of the requirements for effectiveness—a plan, institutions, and resources—Chile has also been successful. This case study is extremely important because Chile is clearly exceptional, not only in the region, but in most of the world. In contrast with Colombia, which has received a huge infusion of US dollars and expertise to fight its drug wars over the past three decades, Chile's progress in these two areas is virtually autonomous. Chile demonstrates what can be done, providing there is the political will to do it.

A very different case is Austria (Chapter 24), as described by Donald Abenheim and Carolyn Halladay. It is relevant as a case study for achieving democratic civilian control and effectiveness, while also seeking to remain neutral from alliances, including NATO. It is equally relevant because other European countries, including Moldova, must for geopolitical reasons also

attempt to remain neutral. Austria does not fall under the constraints or requirements of NATO, other than its commitments under the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, which Austria joined in 1995; for this reason, its experiences are relevant to other cases, including Hungary and Romania. Germany is also useful as a case study due in large part to the traumatic wartime history of that country in the late nineteenth and early twenieth centuries. Abenheim and Halladay demonstrate how after World War II, the Allies, in partnership with the leaders of the Federal Republic of Germany, crafted the institutions to achieve both democratic civilian control and effective armed forces. Having these institutions in place made the re-unification of Germany in 1990 much smoother than it otherwise might have been.

Cris Matei, in Chapter 26 on Romania, makes explicit the strong influence of external actors, such as NATO's PfP and the EU, in all aspects of Romania's national security and defense policy, thereby ensuring democratic civilian control and effectiveness. She documents the nature of their influence, and gives explicit attention to the three requirements for control and the three for effectiveness. While she provides evidence that positive results are indeed being achieved, she also notes some post–integration inertia and a troubling lack of "objective" or political will to continue to transform. Finally, Diana Molodilo and Valeriu Mija, in their case study of Moldova in Chapter 27, a tiny landlocked country between Romania and Ukraine, assess the impact of PfP on Moldova's modern defense structures and processes.

In the Conclusion (Chapter 28), Bruneau and Matei review the findings from the case studies, which focus on how different countries have achieved control, or control and effectiveness, in civil–military relations. They seek to develop explanations for the different patterns described and analyzed in the chapters, and pay particular attention to the incentives promoting what is loosely termed "political will." They find that these incentives are not only the obvious ones created by membership in alliances such as the Partnership for Peace and NATO, but have also been generated internally by political elites who perceive the opportunity to utilize national security and defense policy and instruments for either domestic or international goals.

## Notes

1 Among these, see Andrew Cottey, Timothy Edmunds, and Anthony Forster, eds., *Democratic Control of the Military in Postcommunist Europe: Guarding the Guards* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002); Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, *Civil-Military Relations and Democracy* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996); Natalie Mychajlyszyn and Harald von Riekhoff, eds., *The Evolution of Civil-Military Relations in East-Central Europe and the Former Soviet Union* (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2004); Philipp H. Fluri, Gustav E. Gustenau, and Plamen I. Pantev, eds., *The Evolution of Civil-Military Relations in South East Europe: Continuing Democratic Reform and Adapting to the Needs of Fighting Terrorism* (Heidelberg: Physica-Verlag HD, 2005); Hans Born, Marina Caparini, Karl W. Haltiner, and Jürgen Kuhlmann, eds., *Civil-Military Relations in Europe: Learning from Crisis and Institutional Change* (New York: Routledge, 2006); David Pion-Berlin, ed., *Civil-Military Relations in Latin America: New Analytical Perspectives* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2000); and Timothy Edmunds, Andrew Cottey, and Anthony Forster, eds., *Civil-Military Relations in Post-Communist Europe: Reviewing the Transition* (New York: Routledge, 2006).
2 In this book, we will focus only on the armed forces component of the security institutions.
3 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) "Military Expenditure 2010." Global military spending in 2010 was aproximately US \$1.6 trillion, with a minimum of \$4.6 million and a maximum of \$698 billion (for the United States). See the SIPRI Military Expenditure Database: www.sipri.org/databases/milex/milex (accessed August 6, 2012); and "World military spending reached \$1.6 trillion in 2010, biggest increase in South America, fall in Europe according to new SIPRI data," SIPRI, April 11, 2011, available at: www.sipri.org/media/pressreleases/milex (accessed August 6, 2012).
4 Samuel Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1957, reprinted 1981).

5 SIPRI describes its data collection method as follows: "SIPRI military expenditure data is based on open sources only, including a SIPRI questionnaires which is sent out annually to all countries included in the database." See Note 3.

6 Eminent scholars of democratic transitions and consolidation highlight the importance of these issues, but do not go into them in any detail. See, for example, Adam Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); and Philippe Schmitter, "The Consolidation of Political Democracies: Processes, Rhythms, Sequences, and Type," in G. Pridham, ed., *Transitions to Democracy* (Dartmouth: Aldershot, 1995). The authors salute Narcis Serra's endeavor to address these issues in his recent book dealing with democratic reform of the armed forces in post-Franco Spain. See Narcis Serra, *The Military Transition: Democratic Reform of the Armed Forces* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

7 See "Freedom in the World," Freedom House, available at: www.freedomhouse.org (accessed August 6, 2012); and, "Democracy index 2010: Democracy in retreat," the Economist Intelligence Unit, available at: http://graphics.eiu.com/PDF/Democracy_Index_2010_web.pdf (accessed August 9, 2012; note most content requires a subscription).

8 See Bertelsmann Foundation, *Sustainable Governance Indicators 2011: Policy Performance and Governance Capacities in the OECD*, Gütersloh: Verlag Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2011, p. 273.

9 According to the World Bank, SAIs provide "the highest level of external audit of government bodies in a country. In most of the World Bank's borrowing countries, constitutional or legal arrangements provide for an SAI to report independently on the use of public resources." See Financial Institutions at the World Bank website, available at: http://web.worldbank.org/ (accessed August 6, 2012).

10 See the table, "Freedom in the world:electoral democracies," by Freedomhouse.org, available at: www.freedomhouse.org (accessed August 9, 2012); and the list, Electoral Democracies (currently standing at 115), by Freedomhouse.org, available at: www.freedomhouse.org (accessed August 9, 2012).

11 Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996); Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market*; Schmitter, "The Consolidation of Political Democracies"; and Alfred Stepan, *Democracies in Danger* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009).

12 Linz and Stepan, in *Problems of Democratic Transition*, indirectly address civil–military relations and military reform in the prerequisite five arenas—free civil society, political society, rule of law, state bureaucracy, and economic society—as necessary to democratic consolidation; the same applies to Schmitter, who uses civil–military relations in his analysis. See Schmitter, "The Consolidation of Political Democracies."

13 See Felipe Agüero, "The New 'Double Challenge': Democratic Control and Efficacy of Military, Police, and Intelligence," in Alfred Stepan, ed., *Democracies in Danger* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009) for his latest contribution.

14 Michael Desch, *Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Threat Environment* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001).

15 UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO), available at: www.un.org/en/peace-keeping/ (accessed August 6, 2012).

16 There are about 50 ongoing missions, which vary dramatically in terms of size and numbers. There are six *ad hoc* missions (if we include Iraq, seven). Others include the African Union—two (one of which is a hybrid mission of the UN and the AU); the Commonwealth of Independent States—one (Moldova); the Economic Community of Central African States—one; the European Union—nine (seven of which concern police and rule of law); the Organization of American States—one (Haiti); and the OSCE—seven. All from SIPRI data, available at: www.sipri.org/databases/milex/milex (accessed August 6, 2012).

17 See, for example, Hew Strachan, "The Lost Meaning of Strategy," *Survival* 47: 3 (2005): 33–54.

18 On the United Kingdom and Holland, see Sharon L. Caudle and Stephan de Spiegeleire, "A New Generation of National Security Strategies: Early Findings from the Netherlands and the United Kingdom," *Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management* 7(1) (2010): 1–22.

19 The Homeland Security Digital Library at the Naval Postgraduate School also collects US national security documents. Available at: www.hsdl.org/?collection/stratpol&id=4 (accessed August 6, 2012).

20 See Chapter 3 of Thomas C. Bruneau, *Patriots for Profit: Contractors and the Military in U.S. National Security* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011).

21 Bruneau finds the US military lacking in terms of effectiveness, despite its huge expenditures. See ibid.

# PART I

# Development of the field of study

# 1

# IMPEDIMENTS TO THE ACCURATE CONCEPTUALIZATION OF CIVIL–MILITARY RELATIONS

*Thomas C. Bruneau*

In retrospect, the catalyst that led me to write this chapter was an epiphany I had while participating in a Center for Civil–Military Relations (CCMR) workshop in Katmandu, Nepal, in May 2007. Nepal was in the midst of yet another turbulent political upheaval, characterized by general strikes and street violence incited by Communist youth groups. The conservative, self-immolating monarchy was at its end; a tentative peace process had put the Maoist insurgent forces, which had been waging a nine-year civil war against the government, into UN-supervised cantonments; and the Royal Nepal Army was confined to barracks. The parliament was deeply divided among extremely heterogeneous and antagonistic political parties that were attempting to reach agreement on a date for general elections, with the Communist Party of Nepal–Maoist playing the spoiler. In short, Nepal's institutions and traditions were swiftly being relegated to the past, but there was no consensus on the future, and violence was pervasive.[1] The Royal Nepal Army (now the Nepalese Army), for its part, has remained remarkably cohesive throughout these upheavals, and continues to hold a monopoly on the legal means of violence.

CCMR had been invited by the South Asian Centre for Policy Studies, a Nepali policy research center, to hold a series of workshops under the sponsorship of the U.S. Embassy. The aim was to assist military officers and civilian politicians to find possible ways to create a stable system of civil–military relations for a future—ideally fully democratic—Nepal. In the public conferences preceding the workshops, during which I presented a framework for analysis that is the precursor to the method discussed by Cris Matei in Chapter 2, a young Nepali anthropologist named Dr. Saubhagya Shah, who had earned his PhD from Harvard University, treated the audience to a long exposition on Samuel P. Huntington's approach to civil–military relations, which explores the difference between what Huntington termed objective and subjective civilian control.[2] I was deeply disturbed to see this vital discussion on how to assist a country facing extremely serious political and military problems, along with high levels of violence, being hijacked by abstract theoretical discursions. It became clear to me that Huntington's formulation could possibly be useful for discussing civil–military relations in stable democracies, but it provides little help to those still in the process of reaching this state. I was thus further

inspired in my attempt to formulate an approach to analysis that would be useful not only for new democracies that are struggling to engage and prepare civilians for leadership of the military, but would be relevant to all democracies, new and old, including the United States.

In co-editing this *Routledge Handbook on Civil–Military Relations*, I had hoped to mine what I assumed would be an established literature applicable at least to older democracies, even if it was not particularly useful for the new democracies that work with CCMR. I wanted to frame the analysis in civil–military terms, with a particular focus on the interaction between civilians and the military as they confront national security challenges. Unfortunately, I found that the civil–military relations field has not yet crystallized; there has been not only little accumulation of useful knowledge but also minimal conceptual development. So far, researchers continue to exchange disparate factual information without analyzing it according to any rigorous theoretical framework, with the result that a broader body of knowledge does not accumulate. More than ten years ago, Peter Feaver identified what he termed "an American renaissance" in the study of civil–military relations.[3] I am not so optimistic that such is actually the case. Instead of developing a conceptual base of comparative and empirical studies that could be built on by encompassing other disciplines, the field of civil–military relations remains amorphously delineated and heavily anecdotal. Those scholars who might have worked within a developing and coherent field of study have made important contributions to areas such as military effectiveness from the perspective of historical or sociological development and strategic assessments, but, in my view, these contributions are not building the field of civil–military relations.[4]

One might also have hoped that current scholars are contributing to a larger analysis of the implications of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Instead, the main contributions have been from journalists such as Thomas Ricks and Bob Woodward, former government officials such as Richard N. Haass and James Stephenson, and RAND Corporation analysts led by Nora Bensahel.[5] They are writing very useful, factual, books on war and reconstruction that nevertheless lack an analytical foundation. Thus, only a minimal amount of applicable knowledge has accumulated from these extremely important events that have serious implications for civil–military relations. Scholars who have defined themselves in terms of their contributions to the study of civil–military relations have made virtually no contributions to our understanding of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. To explain why this is the case, I will begin with a discussion of the recognized leader in the field, Samuel Huntington; and, by drawing on the work of other scholars, I will attempt to understand where things went wrong. In Chapter 6 in this Handbook, José Olmeda deals with the absence of reliable data as a further contributing element to the lack of development of the field of civil–military relations.

It is amazing to me that virtually all scholars who research and write on civil–military relations begin with Huntington, review his argument, and then reject it to a greater or lesser extent. In my view the main problem is that Huntington was proposing a normative theory about civil–military relations, but somehow this normative theory became what Huntington's student, Eliot Cohen, termed the "normal theory of civil military relations."[6] That is, it took on an almost iconic status, and some authors confused a normative approach, which is not intended to be empirically-based and tested, for an empirical theory. It should be kept in mind that, like the Nepali scholar, students in other parts of the world continue to look to the United States for conceptual bases to their studies.

When I was a graduate student at the University of California at Berkeley back in the 1960s, we were exposed to Huntington's approach in *The Soldier and the State*, but we didn't take it for anything more than normative theory. At that time there was a large gap between those who studied normative, or political, theory, and those of us who did empirical work. Most of the latter were influenced by a more "structural approach," such as José Nun's "A Latin American

Phenomenon: The Middle Class Military Coup."[7] We were also influenced by Samuel E. Finer's *The Man on Horseback*, which we considered a definitive and credible rebuttal to Huntington's emphasis on "professionalism."[8] It was thus with great incredulity that, once I began to work consistently on civil–military relations, I found Huntington's flawed classic at every turn.

In 1995, Paul Bracken wrote, "Theoretical treatments of civil–military relations have changed little in the past 40 years, even though the context in which these frameworks were devised has changed enormously."[9] He went on to suggest:

> One very real problem with the study of civil–military relations as it has developed in the United States is that it has petrified into a sort of dogma, so that conceptual innovation and new problem identification earn the reproach of not having applied the theory correctly. The resulting situation has tended to recycle the same problems in a way that exaggerates their significance.[10]

It is with authority that Peter Feaver, maybe the leading scholar and expert on U.S. civil–military relations, writes:

> Why bother with a model [Huntington's] that is over forty years old? The answer is that Huntington's theory, outlined in *The Soldier and the State*, remains the dominant theoretical paradigm in civil-military relations, especially the study of American civil-military relations ... Huntington's model is widely recognized as the most elegant, ambitious, and important statement on civil-military relations theory to date. Moreover, Huntington's prescriptions for how best to structure civil-military relations continue to find a very receptive ear within one very important audience, the American officer corps itself, and this contributes to his prominence in the field.[11]

Another recognized authority in the field, John Allen Williams, concurs: "*The Soldier and the State* remains one of the two standard reference points for discussions of military professionalism, civil–military relations and civilian control of the military."[12] Given the comments of these two widely recognized experts in the field of U.S. civil–military relations, and the remarks of the Nepali scholar I mentioned earlier, it is clear that Huntington's conception still carries enormous weight. In his magisterial *Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime*, Cohen, as noted above, refers to Huntington's book as the "normal" theory of civil–military relations, "the accepted standard by which the current reality is to be judged."[13] Indeed, the 2007 Senior Conference at West Point took as its theme "American Civil-Military Relations: Fifty Years after *The Soldier and the State*," and the most recent book included extensive references to Huntington's work in all five chapters.[14]

In my view, there are three main problems with Huntington's work that have impeded development of the field. The first, the tautological nature of his argument, is one that has been recognized by many scholars; second is his use of selective data; and third is his exclusive focus on civilian control of the armed forces. The second problem is recognized by some scholars, but none has related it to the directed effort to change the culture of the profession in the Goldwater–Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. The third, the preoccupation with control, had not been recognized as a problem by anybody until very recently. Together, these methodological weaknesses have become major obstacles to original scholarship, which, although they have been acknowledged again and again by leading scholars, have not been overcome.

First, at its core, Huntington's approach is based on a tautology—it cannot be proved or disproved. Huntington focuses on what he terms "professionalism" in the officer corps, and he bases his argument on the distinction between what he terms "subjective" and "objective" control. Subjective control maximizes the power of civilian groups in relation to the military, through government institutions, social class, or constitutional form; objective civilian control emphasizes military professionalism, that distribution of power between military and civilian groups which is most conducive to the emergence of professional attitudes and behavior among the members of the officer corps. For Huntington, the principal interdependent components of civil–military relations are the structural position of military institutions within the government, the informal role and influence of military groups in politics and society at large, and the nature of the ideologies of military and non-military groups. However, the complex equilibrium of the authority, influence, and ideology of the military and non-military groups is measured against a particular abstract type, objective civilian control, which maximizes military security.[15] As Bengt Abrahamsson wrote in the early 1970s:

> Essentially, a "professional" officer corps is one which exhibits expertise, responsibility, and corporateness. "Professionalism," however, to Huntington also involves political neutrality; as a result, "professionalism" and "objective control" are inseparable as theoretical concepts. The immediate consequence of this is to rule out the empirical possibility of establishing the relationship between the *degree* of professionalism and the *degree* of political neutrality. Huntington's thesis becomes, in Carl Hempel's words, "a covert definitional truth." In other words, professional officers never intervene, because if they do, they are not true professionals.[16]

Peter Feaver attempted to use Huntington's theory to explain how the United States prevailed in the Cold War and concluded, "The lack of fit strongly suggests that Huntington's theory does not adequately capture American civil-military relations."[17] Earlier in this same book, Feaver, more diplomatically than Abrahamsson, analyzed the theory of causation proposed by Huntington, which, in his words, has bedeviled the field from the beginning:

> The causal chain for Huntington's prescriptive theory runs as follows: autonomy leads to professionalization, which leads to political neutrality and voluntary subordination, which leads to secure civilian control. The heart of his concept is the putative link between professionalism and voluntary subordination. For Huntington, *this was not so much a relationship of cause and effect as it was a definition*: "A highly professional officer corps stands ready to carry out the wishes of any civilian group which secures legitimate authority within the state" (Huntington 1957, pp. 74, 83–84). A professional military obeyed civilian authority. A military that did not obey was not professional.
>
> *(Emphasis added)*[18]

Empirical research built on the foundation of a false premise forfeits its validity.

A second telling problem with Huntington's approach is his selective choice of data to support his conceptualization of the military as a profession, as the explanatory variable for democratic civilian control. "Professionalism," similar to "culture," is not a fixed or solid concept. The qualities that make up professionalism, just like culture, are subjective, dynamic, and changing. Indeed, in the experience of the United States, a fundamental goal of the Goldwater–Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 was to *promote* joint professional military education, a goal that has generally been achieved across the U.S. armed forces, but only long after

Huntington wrote his book. The U.S. Congress forced the military services to educate and utilize their officers jointly and thereby changed the culture of the U.S. armed forces, something that Huntington assumed to be largely static. Other countries, including Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Spain, are currently seeking to change their professional military education. In short, the meaning of "military professionalism" is not something static; it can be changed through intentional programs of incentivized education.

In 1962, five years after Huntington published *The Soldier and the State*, Samuel E. Finer, in his book *The Man on Horseback*, questioned Huntington's approach by arguing that "professionalism" in and of itself has little meaning, and "in fact often thrusts the military into collision with the civil authorities."[19] One has to dissect and analyze "professionalism" to determine its relevance. This is what Alfred Stepan did a decade after Finer, in his classic research on the Brazilian military and the coup of 1964. Stepan coined the term "The New Professionalism," which he described as a new paradigm based on internal security and national development, in contrast with the "old professionalism" of external defense.[20] In complete contradiction to Huntington's theory, Stepan demonstrated that, rather than keeping the military out of politics and under civilian control, the new professionalism politicizes the military and contributes to what Stepan called military–political managerialism and role expansion.[21]

More recently, in his 2007 book on the history of the U.S. Army, *The Echo of Battle: The Army's Way of War,* Brian M. Linn raises serious and fundamental questions about the way that Huntington simplifies and glosses over major variations regarding the U.S. military profession.[22] What for Huntington was a unified officer corps becomes, for Linn, three main schools competing for ascendancy within the army. In contradicting Huntington, Linn states: "But as a historical explanation for the evolution of American military thought between 1865 and 1898, the thesis [of Huntington] imposes a false coherence upon an era of confusion and disagreement, of many wrong turns and mistaken assumptions."[23] The key point here is that Huntington found largely static and readily identifiable a quality that is in fact dynamic and nebulous. Professionalism is definitely not a solid basis on which to build an argument about democratic civilian control of the armed forces.

A third problem in Huntington's approach is his exclusive focus on control, to the detriment of all other aspects of civil–military relations. This emphasis has been a serious impediment to broader analysis, not only in the United States, but in other parts of the world as well. In the introduction to *The Soldier and the State*, Huntington notes:

> Previously the primary question was: what pattern of civil–military relations is most compatible with American liberal democratic values? Now this has been supplanted by the more important issue: what pattern of civil–military relations will best maintain the security of the American nation?[24]

Nowhere in the rest of the long book, however, does Huntington return to this issue of military effectiveness. By contrast, he devotes an entire chapter to the topic of control, where he posits his objective and subjective models of civilian control of the armed forces.

Following Huntington's lead, control is the primary focus in the vast majority of literature on U.S. civil–military relations. Peter Feaver focuses on control in some of his publications; in the second sentence of his 1999 review article, he noted that:

> Although *civil-military relations* is a very broad subject, encompassing the entire range of relationships between the military and civilian society at every level, the field largely focuses on the control or direction of the military by the highest civilian authorities in nation-states.[25]

More recently, Dale R. Herspring has commented:

> As I surveyed the literature on civil-military relations in the United States, I was struck by the constant emphasis on "control." A common theme was that the United States had to guard against any effort by the American military to assert its will on the rest of the country.[26]

This is not to say that democratic civilian control is irrelevant, particularly in newer democracies, but the intense focus on it in the United States is misplaced and distracts from the other dimensions.[27]

The posited "civil–military gap" in the United States still holds the attention of many. Not surprisingly, the 1990s saw a plethora of conferences, op-ed pieces, and publications on the "civil–military gap" during the tumultuous presidency of Bill Clinton, but it is a surprise that they have continued down to the present. In 2002, one of the main authors in this line of research, historian Richard H. Kohn, published an article entitled, "The Erosion of Civilian Control of the Military in the United States Today," in the *Naval War College Review*.[28] The Foreign Policy Research Institute held a conference in 2007 on the theme, "Mind the Gap: Post-Iraq Civil Military Relations in America," which found that "American civil-military relations were troubled even before the Iraq war, which conflict has only exacerbated frictions."[29] A 2007 report published by the RAND Corporation, "The Civil-Military Gap in the United States: Does It Exist, Why, and Does It Matter?" refreshingly concluded that the military and civilian leadership do not differ greatly on the questions that are of most concern to the army, despite the fact that the report used data collected during the Clinton administration, prior to the terrorist attacks of September 2001.[30] According to the RAND report, both civilians and the military view transnational terrorism as the primary security threat; nor is there any major threat to the principle of civilian control in the United States.

The question remains: Why do scholars continue to fret about a supposed "gap" at all? Any empirical support for this idea is fundamentally a matter of methodology, starting with a choice of historical case studies that support the thesis and including select questions in public opinion surveys. Bracken suggests:

> The resulting situation [a prevailing dogma in the study of U.S. civil-military relations] has tended to recycle the same problems in a way that exaggerates their significance. Is it worrisome, for example, that current civil-military relations seem strained? Is *strain* itself something to worry about at all, or can it be useful in the relationship between institutions?[31]

In my view, the U.S. system of separation of powers generates strain, not only between the military and civilians, but also between and among civilians themselves. The premise of a "gap" that causes strain arises once again directly from Huntington's concept of objective and subjective civilian control, rather than from an analysis of the significance this concept might have for the United States and its armed forces in light of the threat of international terrorism and the country's engagement in two wars. It also fits into the principal–agent approach, which posits certain relationships that are put into question by a "gap."[32] In short, this preoccupation with "the gap" is indicative of a larger, and in my view less-than-optimal, approach to the study of civil–military relations, one that has not been amenable to comparative

testing and development, and has diverted attention to less-than-fundamental issues in civil–military relations. Despite the serious shortcomings already noted, drawing on scholars from various social science disciplines, Huntington's *The Soldier and the State* still has some currency, as indicated by the Nepali PhD. I believe this has two main reasons: First, as noted by Feaver, the U. S. armed forces welcomed Huntington's notion of "objective control" as a rationalization for them to manage their own affairs; it is no accident that the 2009 publication *American Civil-Military Relations* came out of a conference at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point. Second, Huntington's book is iconic in the sense that it resonates more as normative political theory, an early effort to conceptualize the topic, than as an empirical study whose findings can be replicated. Unfortunately, the field has remained somewhat aloof to developments in the social sciences.

In Chapter 2, I describe the process whereby we are developing a new approach to the study of civil–military relations, embodied in a debate between David Pion-Berlin and myself that took place in the pages of several journals between 2005 and 2006. The approach is then described in detail in Chapter 3 by Cris Matei. In line with a New Institutionalism approach to conceptualization, the analysis must be grounded in a study of institutions that includes the formal and informal procedures, routines, norms, and conventions embedded in their organizational structures. This approach then largely informs the case studies in this Handbook.

## Acknowledgments

## Notes

1 Things are no more stable today, in mid-2012. The International Crisis Group still regularly tracks Nepal, along with other nations facing intractable political situations, but finds recent political developments at least encouraging. See www.crisisgroup.org (accessed August 9, 2012).

2 The best-known of Huntington's works on civil–military relations is *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1981; originally published 1957).

3 Peter D. Feaver, "Civil-Military Relations," *Annual Review of Political Science* 2 (1999): 211–41; on the renaissance, see pp. 236–8.

4 The contributions I have in mind include the following: Risa A. Brooks and Elizabeth A. Stanley, eds., *Creating Military Power: The Sources of Military Effectiveness* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007); Michael C. Desch, *Power and Military Effectiveness: The Fallacy of Democratic Triumphalism* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008); Stephen Biddle and Stephen Long, "Democracy and Military Effectiveness," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 489(4) (2004): 525–46; and Risa A. Brooks, *Shaping Strategy: The Civil–Military Politics of Strategic Assessment* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008).

5 Nora Bensahel, "Mission Not Accomplished: What Went Wrong with Iraqi Reconstruction," *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 29(3) (2006): 453–73; Thomas Ricks, *The Gamble: General David Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2006–2008* (New York: Penguin Press, 2009); James Stephenson, *Losing the Golden Hour: An Insider's View of Iraq's Reconstruction* (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2007); Bob Woodward, *Obama's Wars* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010).

6 Eliot Cohen, *Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime* (New York: The Free Press, 2002).

7 José Nun, "A Latin American Phenomenon: The Middle Class Military Coup," in *Trends in Social Science Research*, conference report, Institute of International Relations, March 1965, pp. 55–100.

8 Samuel E. Finer, *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2002; originally published 1962).

9 Paul Bracken, "Reconsidering Civil–Military Relations," in Don M. Snider and Miranda A. Carlton-Carew, eds., *U.S. Civil–Military Relations in Crisis or Transition?* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic & International Studies, 1995), p. 145.

10 Ibid.

11 Peter D. Feaver, *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), p. 7.

12 John Allen Williams, "Political Science Perspectives on the Military and Civil–Military Relations," in Giuseppe Caforio, ed., *Social Sciences and the Military: An Interdisciplinary Overview* (London and New York: Routledge, 2007), p. 93.

13 Cohen, *Supreme Command*, p. 226.

14 The annual Senior Conference, U.S. Military Academy at West Point, May 31–June 2, 2007. The book from the conference was published in late 2009. See Suzanne C. Nielsen and Don M. Snider, eds., *American Civil–Military Relations: The Soldier and the State in a New Era* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009). The most recent book that mentions Huntington in all five chapters is Mackubin Thomas Owens, *US Civil-Military Relations After 9/11: Renegotiating the Civil-Military Bargain* (New York: Continuum, 2011).

15 Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, p. viii.

16 Bengt Abrahamsson, *Military Professionalization and Political Power* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1972), p. 159.

17 Feaver, *Armed Servants*, p. 38.

18 Ibid., p. 18.

19 Finer, *The Man on Horseback*, pp. 25–30.

20 Alfred Stepan, "The New Professionalism," in Alfred Stepan, ed., *Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies, and Future* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1973), see the table on p. 52.

21 Ibid., pp. 47–65. See also Alfred Stepan, *The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1971).

22 Brian McAllister Linn, *The Echo of Battle: The Army's Way of War* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007).

23 Ibid., p. 41.

24 Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, p. 3.

25 Feaver, "Civil-Military Relations," p. 211.

26 Dale R. Herspring, *The Pentagon and the Presidency: Civil-Military Relations from FDR to George W. Bush* (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 2005), p. xii.

27 Bracken states this issue well:

> The central role that civilian control has played in civil–military relations is understandable. But in its raw form it is a trivial problem because under nearly any conceivable set of arrangements civilian control is assured. To over-concentrate on it when it is inappropriate to do so will only elevate a host of ordinary misunderstandings and differences into a high political arena where they do not belong. Moreover, it will distract attention from other important dimensions that characterize the relationship of the military to the state.
>
> (Bracken, "Reconsidering Civil-Military Relations," p. 163)

28 Richard H. Kohn, "The Erosion of Civilian Control of the Military in the United States today," *Naval War College Review* 55(3) (2002): 9–59.

29 Several of those papers have been posted on the Foreign Policy Research Institute website: www.fpri.org/ (accessed August 6, 2012). Papers from the conference can also be found in *Orbis* 52(2) (Spring 2008).

30 Thomas S. Szayna, Kevin F. McCarthy, Jerry M. Sollinger, Linda J. Demaine, Jefferson P. Marquis, and Brett Steele, "The Civil-Military Gap in the United States: Does It Exist, Why, and Does It Matter?" No. MG–379-A (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2007), pp. xvi–xvii.

31 "Reconsidering Civil-Military Relations," p. 146. For further analysis of this issue, see the very useful article by Deborah Avant, "Conflicting Indicators of 'Crisis' in American Civil-Military Relations," *Armed Forces & Society*, 24(3) (Spring 1998): 375–88.

32 See the special issue of *Armed Forces & Society* 27(2) (Winter 2001), on the problem of "a cultural gap between the military and American society."

# 2

# DEVELOPMENT OF AN APPROACH THROUGH DEBATE

*Thomas C. Bruneau*

My colleagues and I in the Center for Civil–Military Relations (CCMR) have followed the time-honored social scientific method by refining our approach to the analysis of civil–military relations through debate with other recognized experts in the field. All those involved in the debate have empirical bases for their ideas, which are further honed through submitting them in writing for evaluation, critique, and finally publication. The main developments in our thinking, which, as this volume documents, continues to evolve, are captured in the two articles listed in Notes 2 and 3 to this chapter. There are also another three articles that document the evolution of our thinking, and they are listed in Notes 4, 5, and 6 to this chapter.[1]

David Pion-Berlin has published extensively on his studies and experiences with regard to Latin America's civil wars, military rulers, and democratic transitions. I have had similar experience in Latin America, but through CCMR programs I also have worked in several countries in Asia (Cambodia, Mongolia, and Nepal) Western and South-East Europe (Armenia, Bulgaria, Romania, Moldova, Montenegro, Portugal, and Spain), and Africa (Angola, Mali, and Mozambique). Upon reading Pion-Berlin's article, "Political Management of the Military in Latin America," in 2005, I took the opportunity to organize and put into writing my own evolving approach to the analysis of civil–military relations, based on years of firsthand observation and participation in CCMR programs.[2] To ensure this article, "Civil-Military Relations in Latin America: The Hedgehog and the Fox Revisited," would be read in Latin America, I submitted it to *Revista Fuerzas Armadas y Sociedad*, a widely respected publication of the Latin American Faculty of Social Science (FLACSO), Chile.[3] Pion-Berlin responded to this article in the same journal, in what was probably the last issue before it folded.[4] Since that time, we have continued to study and comment on each other's scholarly work in academic journals, books, and conferences. My colleague at CCMR, noted Latin America scholar Harold Trinkunas, and I have also collaborated on several research projects and publications on democratic civil–military relations. Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas occasionally join forces as well; of special note is their article, "Attention Deficits: Why Politicians Neglect Defense Policy in Latin America," for which I was the final outside reviewer.[5]

We have chosen to summarize the debate here to document the evolution of our thinking on these topics, which continues to develop in this Handbook.[6] I will refer to these two articles

to highlight some of the key points in the intellectual development of the field, which the case study chapters in this Handbook will further document and elaborate.

## Outline of the debate

By my reading of David Pion-Berlin's "Political Management of the Military in Latin America" I understand him to be arguing that a lack of subject-matter knowledge among those civilians responsible for controlling the armed forces in Latin America, which he refers to as the "information deficit," really doesn't matter. Instead of mastering all the details of what armed forces do and how they do it, the policy-making civilians need only to "manage" the armed forces, which, Pion-Berlin argues, requires little specific defense-related knowledge. He documents the almost universal lack of expertise among civilians in the defense sector of Latin American countries, and reviews the historical and contemporary factors that inhibit the development of such expertise. Pion-Berlin questions Samuel Huntington's conceptualization of "objective" and "subjective" civilian control, and gives extensive, and, in my view, valid, criticism of the so-called "white books on defense." His basic argument is that civilian politicians have minimal incentives to develop expertise in areas of defense, because they are satisfied with "subduing military rebellions, calming civil-military tensions," and allowing the military itself to guide policy, aside from the actual decision of when to deploy. This situation is reinforced by the fact that militaries in Latin America are not facing any external threats. Thus, while the balance of competence lies with the armed forces, the balance of power lies with the civilians, and this is felt to be sufficient.

Reading Pion-Berlin's intentionally polemic article stimulated my thinking, which had been enriched through CCMR programs throughout Central America and the Andes region. In addition, I wrote my article while becoming engaged by the very different geographical and political-military context of Mongolia, where I did a program in mid-2005. (An 18-hour flight delay gave me an opportunity for enforced concentration, while I was held in a detention facility at the Moscow airport, en route between Ulaan Bataar and Bucharest, Romania, where I was headed to do another CCMR program.) At that time, the Mongolian military was being reoriented from territorial defense against China, which was its primary function as an ally of the USSR during the Cold War, to international peacekeeping under United Nations auspices. The Mongolians were developing this capacity as part of their "Third Neighbor Policy" to link with countries beyond their two immediate neighbors, either one of which could conceivably move in and end Mongolia's status as an independent state. Although I agreed with Pion-Berlin on the irrelevance of Huntington's approach and of the defense white books, I felt that he had simplified too much by focusing only on the armed forces as war fighters and on the single dimension of civilian control. In my critique of his article, I therefore argued that the field of civil–military relations must be expanded beyond civilian control to a "trinity" that includes operational effectiveness and efficiency in the use of resources. I further maintained that to fairly evaluate these dimensions, scholars must consider the other roles and missions the armed forces engage in beyond preparing for, and possibly fighting in, armed combat against peer adversaries.

I expanded on the metaphor of the hedgehog and the fox first used by Sir Isaiah Berlin, to highlight that while the civilian foxes will never have the depth of knowledge the military hedgehogs possess, they must have some modicum of understanding, and at least know what they do not know.[7] I based my argument on several contemporary situations. One was the challenge to control posed by the militaries in Colombia, Ecuador, and Nicaragua, where sectors in the armed forces defied their civilian overseers, alleging a lack of expertise. I followed this with a short survey of what Latin American militaries were doing in the areas of peacekeeping, crime fighting, and countering international terrorism through cooperation and

intelligence sharing. My aim was to demonstrate that civilians must have a certain basic knowledge of military matters, not only because traditional tensions in civil–military relations still trouble these new, sometimes unstable, democracies, but because new roles and missions, such as international peacekeeping under UN auspices, put far more responsibilities on civilian leaders to know what the armed forces can do and at what cost. I highlighted my argument with evidence from Colombia and Central America, to show that civilians must in fact know quite a lot, beyond just "managing" the armed forces, if they are to meet current domestic and international demands and opportunities for military engagement in the region.

David Pion-Berlin responded to my article with "The Defense Wisdom Deficit in Latin America: A Response to Thomas C. Bruneau," in which he maintained that civilians do not pay attention to effectiveness or efficiency criteria. They in fact have little incentive to learn about defense because their countries face few security challenges, and they themselves will reap few electoral benefits for doing so. Pion-Berlin states, "They [the civilian leaders] have ignored the trinity, and have not paid a price for doing so."[8] In sum, Pion-Berlin's argument is based on a very hard-headed view of political incentives: Defense is simply not a priority in countries faced with so many other difficulties and demands.

Pion-Berlin and Harold Trinkunas later published "Attention Deficits: Why Politicians Ignore Defense in Latin America," which basically reiterates, with data and examples, Pion-Berlin's earlier argument on why it is rational for civilian politicians to ignore defense in the region.[9] They do, however, describe some possibilities that could change the perception of incentives, with the result that politicians might become interested in military matters. In a negative sense these could be military involvement in domestic threats such as terrorism and organized crime. Externally, in a more positive light, they may be the opportunities provided by participation in international peacekeeping.

At a more global level, we need to consider different contexts. In his response, Pion-Berlin refers to the different situation in East and Central Europe. Harold Trinkunas and I wrote "Democratization as a Global Phenomenon and its Impact on Civil-Military Relations" because we appreciated that both democratization and efforts to reform civil–military relations were taking place around the globe, yet there was virtually no literature on this topic.[10] We then published our co-edited book, *Global Politics of Defense Reform*, which included chapters on general topics, such as globalization and threat perception, as well as case studies of seven countries.[11] Unfortunately, that book did not initiate a series of other books by serious scholars, as we had hoped it would, and we can only surmise that there are very few scholars who are willing and able to link domestic variables with international trends, or publish ground-breaking material. Indeed, the gulf between the largely domestic focus of comparative politics and the global scope of international relations has yet to be bridged.

Trinkunas and I attempted to establish a conceptual path whereby a nation's civil–military relations could be linked to global politics. We pointed out that it is common knowledge that the West, and increasingly other parts of the world, are engaged in the export and promotion of not only political democracy – seen mainly as "free and fair elections," with all of the requisite structures and processes including political parties, pressure groups, and a free media – but also democratic civil–military relations. To us, this exemplifies a certain "Western" or "liberal" approach that implies democratic civilian control. This finding is ironic, in that the first successful change of government in modern times, from a military regime to democracy and democratic civil–military relations, was in Portugal, beginning on April 25, 1974. NATO and leading NATO allies, including Germany and the United States, took the lead, helping Portugal develop not only democratic civil–military relations but also military effectiveness (in the context of the Cold War, this included very important issues of base access in the Azores), and efficiency in the use

of resources. We found that only in those countries where the Partnership for Peace (PfP) was implemented, in some cases as a stage on the path to NATO membership or in others as an end in itself (such as Moldova), did the conceptualization of civil–military relations extend beyond democratic civilian control to effectiveness and efficiency.[12] In virtually all other programs, in all other parts of the world, civil–military relations meant only democratic civilian control.

In terms of the programs being promoted by the United States and other donor countries, then, Pion-Berlin is accurate when he says civilian control, or in his term, "management," is regarded to be sufficient. Yet, this was not the case for the countries NATO engaged with, including Portugal and Spain, and later the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, etc. In this Handbook we present case studies of several of these NATO members. What we also present, however, are case studies of countries, including some Latin American countries such as Chile, which more recently have expanded their understanding of civil–military relations to include effectiveness and efficiency. Not only the military leadership but also civilians in these countries have become aware of the unpredictability and transnational dimension of the twenty-first century's security challenges, the need to maintain capable security forces, and the "internationalization" of military roles and missions in peace and stability operations. It must be noted, however, that Pion-Berlin is correct in the case of Argentina, the country he has written about the most, where, for reasons that are analyzed Chapter 12 on Argentina in this Handbook, civil–military relations begins and ends with civilian control over the armed forces – yet even so, control is precarious.

## Notes

1 I think it is worth noting that the debate's value has been recognized by a highly regarded practitioner-scholar on civil–military relations, Narcís Serra. Serra was the Spanish Minister of Defense between 1982 and 1991, the critical period for the consolidation of Spanish democracy, in which democratic civil–military relations was a key element. See Narcís Serra, *The Military Transition: Democratic Reform of the Armed Forces*, trans. Peter Bush (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 30–3.

2 David Pion-Berlin, "Political Management of the Military in Latin America," *Military Review* 85(1) (January–February 2005): 19–31.

3 Thomas Bruneau, "Civil-Military Relations in Latin America: The Hedgehog and the Fox Revisited," *Revista Fuerzas Armadas y Sociedad* (Latin American Faculty of Social Science [FLACSO], Chile) 19(1–2) (2005): 111–31.

4 David Pion-Berlin, "The Defense Wisdom Deficit in Latin America: A Response to Thomas C. Bruneau," *Revista Fuerzas Armadas y Sociedad* 20(2) (2005): 52–62.

5 David Pion-Berlin and Harold Trinkunas "Attention Deficits: Why Politicians Neglect Defense Policy in Latin America," *Latin America Research Review* 42(3) (October 2007): 76–100.

6 Cris Matei joined the discussion in 2008, with "Towards a New Conceptualization of Civil-Military Relations," published in *Democratization* 15(5) (2008): 909–29.

7 "The fox knows many things, but the hedgehog knows one big thing." Sir Isaiah Berlin, *The Hedgehog and the Fox* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1953). Quoted in Bruneau, "Civil-Military Relations in Latin America," p. 112.

8 Pion-Berlin, "The Defense Wisdom Deficit," p. 54.

9 Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas, "Attention Deficits."

10 Thomas Bruneau and Harold Trinkunas,"Democratization as a Global Phenomenon," *Democratization* 13(5) (2006): 776–90.

11 Thomas Bruneau and Harold Trinkunas, *Global Politics of Defense Reform* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). This book focuses on all three dimensions of CMR: control, effectiveness, and efficiency. It should be noted that all three scholars continue to collaborate on a number of projects.

12 NATO's Partnership for Peace program was initiated in 1994, in large part as a means to help the newly independent states of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union reform their militaries and make the transition to democracy. Several other European countries that are not members of NATO but wish to cooperate or at least confer with it, including Russia, joined as well. Twenty-two countries are PfP members at present.

# 3

# A NEW CONCEPTUALIZATION OF CIVIL–MILITARY RELATIONS

*Florina Cristiana Matei*

## Introduction

In an attempt to complement the available but deficient conceptualization of civil–military relations (CMR), I propose, in this chapter, a new, more relevant framework with equal applicability to both developing and consolidated democracies. The prevalent concept of civil–military relations is concerned primarily with the armed forces, and narrowly with issues of *praetorianism* and military intrusion in domestic politics through *coups d'état,* as well as with asserting civilian control of the military. I expand these ideas into a framework that better captures the priorities and requirements of both democratic consolidation and contemporary security challenges. It consists of a trinity: (1) Democratic civilian control of the security forces;[1] (2) the effectiveness of the security forces in fulfilling their assigned roles;[2] and (3) their efficiency, that is, fulfilling the assigned roles and missions at a minimum cost.[3] (The concept of efficiency, however, is only touched on briefly in this chapter. See Chapter 4 by Tom Bruneau for a more in-depth discussion of efficiency as an aspect of civil–military relations.)

Control of the armed forces remains a central part of the civil–military relations framework proposed here, especially with regard to all new democracies, but most importantly those that emerge from military dictatorships. Nevertheless, it is not sufficient to describe civil–military relations in the twenty-first century in terms of control alone. Today when the overall security context has changed, national security is no longer the military's sole business. Due to the network-centricity and network-like traits of new security threats and challenges (such as terrorism and organized crime), and, as a consequence, the blurring of boundaries between domestic and external security threats, military forces (focused primarily on external threats), police forces (focused primarily on domestic threats), and intelligence agencies (focused on both) are increasingly compelled to support each other, share roles, and cooperate, sometimes at the international level. Under these circumstances, not only is control of the military insufficient to define civil–military relations, but even extending control to include police and intelligence remains unsatisfactory. From the perspective of making effective security decisions and policies, which requires "functioning" security forces, civil–military relations must involve more than control. The concept should, then, include the effectiveness of all security forces in doing their jobs, at the optimum cost possible—that is, efficiently.

This new conceptualization is the outcome of continuing teamwork, teaching, and research within the Center for Civil–Military Relations (CCMR). Since 2003, when I joined CCMR, I have worked closely with Thomas Bruneau on developing this framework, while preparing and conducting one-week programs in new democracies throughout the world, or two-week resident courses at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. I used these courses, along with graduate resident courses in the school's National Security Affairs Department, as opportunities to discuss challenges and prospects for democratic consolidation, defense institution building, and reform of the security forces with military officers and their civilian counterparts from five continents. Dr. Bruneau and I have turned these seminars into research opportunities, in addition to the planned coursework on national security issues, defense institution building, civil–military relations, and other seminar topics. What we have learned from civilians and officers regarding the current global security environment, requirements for democratic consolidation, and the interchangeable roles and missions of the security forces in their countries or regions have led us to depart from the traditional Huntingtonian view of CMR and formulate a new concept, which we have then tested in different contexts on diverse audiences.[4]

## The need for a new conception of civil–military relations

Tom Bruneau and José Olmeda, in Chapters 1 and 6 in this Handbook, discuss in detail the problems the field of civil–military relations has faced in trying to move beyond Huntington. While there is no need for me to repeat those discussions here, I will address a few of the problems with the current literature below, as it relates to our framework.

First, while there is relatively abundant literature on the role of the armed forces in democratic transitions, there is much less on the armed forces in democratic consolidation.[5]

Second, most of the literature on both democratic transition and consolidation focuses myopically on how well civilians exercise democratic control over the military and/or intelligence agencies. This analytical tunnel vision has not changed since the beginning of the Third Wave of Democracy, which started on 25 April 1974 in Lisbon, with the military coup that became a revolution and gradually evolved into democracy.[6] This is explained at least in part by the fact that the security sector has played a prominent role, for better or for worse, during the transition and in some cases the consolidation. For instance, even though neither Portugal nor Spain, whose transition began on the death of Francisco Franco in late 1975, were military dictatorships, their militaries played a key part in the transition to democracy.[7] This was even more the case as the third wave spread to include explicitly military regimes in Latin America, Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa. Even the transitional governments of the former Marxist-dominated states, although never under military rule, had to learn to deal with their armed forces once the Berlin Wall came down and a new political environment developed. In Romania, for example, the armed forces were a central actor in the transition to democracy from the dictatorship of Nicolae Ceausescu and his nefarious Securitate (secret police).

Under these circumstances, many analyses of democratic transitions and consolidation since 1974 include, of necessity, a discussion of the role of the military, including in some cases the intelligence services, in democratic consolidation. Some of these authors also take into account the institutions involved in CMR. The major contribution by Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan on Southern Europe, South America, and post-Communist Europe includes a focus on different military groups as a central variable under the category of "actors."[8] Adam Przeworski and Philippe Schmitter call explicit attention to the "military variable."[9] There also are some excellent case studies of CMR in the context of transitions and consolidation, or, in the case of Venezuela, what some see as democratic "deconsolidation."[10] Essentially, these authors express

two main concerns: (1) The threat a large standing army poses to democracy; and (2) the need to keep it subordinate—that is, under civilian control;[11] and the implications of a trade-off between security and liberty, especially with regard to intelligence. Overall, what these works demonstrate is that, in contrast to their authoritarian pasts, whether military- or civilian-dominated, the emerging democracies of South America, post-communist Europe, Sub-Saharan Africa, and elsewhere emphasize democratic security over national security. In other words, these new regimes focus on control of the armed forces as more important than the ability of the armed forces to defend the country. While the danger of military coups admittedly has not totally disappeared in many parts of the world, even the literature on civil–military relations in consolidated democracies does not go beyond achieving and maintaining democratic civilian control.[12]

Third, the conceptual literature on other security instruments and democracy is also problematic. Most of the studies that do exist are not analytical but rather are about tradecraft or intelligence failures, or they advocate policy positions.[13] In addition, normally little attention is paid to the police, which in most of the newer democracies are national police forces that at times undertake military-like roles (these will be discussed later in this chapter). There is also minimal discussion in the literature about what security forces, including police and intelligence agencies, do beyond national defense, or the implications of their roles and missions for democracy.[14] This is surprising in that today very few militaries are trained, resourced, and prepared primarily to combat other armed forces; armed combat is in fact probably the least likely role among the six common roles that militaries, and other security forces currently fill. In March 2011, there were 99,210 military and police personnel from 114 countries engaged in peace support operations in 14 countries experiencing conflicts.[15] In Afghanistan, in 2011, 132,203 troops from 48 nations were divided into 28 provincial reconstruction teams, including 90,000 from the United States.[16] Some of these troops and police in Afghanistan were fighting the Taliban, but most were engaged in "nation building." In early 2007, international peacekeeping forces in Haiti were fighting street gangs, which is more typically a police function, as well as doing humanitarian relief after the earthquake of early 2010.[17] In many regions, on the one hand, military forces either support or, currently in the case of Mexico, supplant police forces in operations to combat drug trafficking and street crime. On the other hand, in countries such as Bolivia, Colombia, Pakistan, and the Philippines, the police fulfill military functions. Because threats span a spectrum from global terrorism to national and international drug cartels to street gangs, militaries and police forces rely heavily on intelligence agencies to identify threats and plan missions. There is, in short, a great variety of activities that incorporate different instruments of state security to deal with contemporary threats, opportunities, and challenges in both national and international environments. This combination of activities, and the resulting mixing of armed forces, police, and intelligence agencies, are the issues that democratically elected policy-makers must deal with to meet domestic and, increasingly, global expectations and standards. Nevertheless, none of this literature deals with what the militaries or other instruments of security are expected and able to do in terms of roles and missions.[18]

Unfortunately, the existing literature still influences not only scholarly works on democratic transition and consolidation, but also policy-makers' decisions with regard to defense and security institution building and reform. An exclusive focus on control to the detriment of effectiveness, and even efficiency, can endanger national security. Argentina, which is analyzed in Chapter 12 by Tom Bruneau and myself, provides an example of precisely this obsession and its negative impacts. Two incidents, the 1992 terrorist attacks on the Embassy of Israel in Buenos Aires, and on the Asociación Mutual Israelita Argentina, a Jewish community center building, in 1994 (with a total death toll of 114), took both security forces and policy-makers

by surprise, and serve as a painful support of this argument. Unfortunately, while these attacks awoke the political elites to post-Cold War security challenges, those in power have still maintained their single focus on strengthening civilian control.

Considering the preceding discussions, my argument in this chapter is twofold. On the one hand, the exclusive focus on civilian control is a significant impediment to understanding the larger and more complex relationships concerning democracy, elected policy-makers, and security forces. In a democracy, policy-makers craft and implement security decisions and policies that are in the service of safeguarding democratic values, national interests, and the citizens themselves; successful policies, however, go hand in hand with effective security forces. We must remember that even when civilian control is unquestioned, as in the United States, civilian control by itself is no guarantee that the policy-makers will make good decisions, or implement policy in such a way as to result in military success.[19] On the other hand, the exclusive focus on the military *versus* the other security forces is detrimental to understanding the larger and more complex relationships concerning democracy and security forces, particularly when we consider the very wide spectrum of interchangeable roles and missions. I therefore argue that there is need for a new concept of civil–military relations.

## A new conceptualization: the trinity of control, effectiveness, and efficiency

Even though virtually all recent, and some not-so-recent, scholarship rejects Huntington's model, nobody has yet come up with a new basis for what is essentially a contribution to normative political theory rather than empirical theory. I have found from my experience working with civilians and officers in both developed and developing democracies that the analytical focus exclusively on civilian control is neither empirically adequate nor, for the purpose of developing comparisons, conceptually adequate. In fact, as previously mentioned, militaries have long been engaged in humanitarian assistance, such as disaster relief, or to back up the police in domestic upheavals and riots. Peace support operations (PSO) became increasingly critical in the former Yugoslavia, parts of Africa, Lebanon, and elsewhere, and more and more countries have opted to furnish military, police, or gendarmerie forces for this purpose. New global threats such as pandemic terrorism require governments everywhere to reevaluate their military capabilities in terms of both control and outcomes. In this context, attacks by international terrorists in Bali, Nairobi, New York, Washington, Madrid, London, Amman, Mumbai, Moscow, and elsewhere, have compelled militaries everywhere to become involved in fighting terrorism to a greater or lesser extent, a job usually performed by intelligence and police forces. Thus leaders must pay attention to matters both of control and outcomes, using instruments beyond the armed forces. They must provide for security that today is both domestic and international, such as providing troops to NATO for PSO in Afghanistan, and cooperation in intelligence and law enforcement to counter the threat of international terrorism. In short, the challenge in the contemporary world is not only to assert and maintain civilian control over the military but also to develop *effective* militaries, police forces, and intelligence agencies that are able to implement a broad variety of roles and missions. Therefore, while the conceptualization presented here includes civilian control as a fundamental aspect of democratic consolidation and does not assume it exists in any particular case, control is only one aspect of the overall analysis.[20] A clear picture of how effective security forces are and at what cost is also necessary to understand the contemporary importance for democracy of the relationship between elected leaders and the security forces. That is, to understand what armed forces, police forces, and intelligence agencies actually do in the twenty-first century, how well they do it, and at

what cost in personnel and treasure, requires a comprehensive analysis of CMR that encompasses the three dimensions of control, effectiveness, and efficiency. That is the goal of the framework described below.

### *Democratic civilian control*

The question of why leaders and scholars focus so narrowly on democratic control of armed forces is captured in the classic dilemma, "Who guards the guardians?" Any armed force strong enough to defend a country is also strong enough to take it over. This is, of course, the assumption behind most analyses of civil–military relations, leading not only into military governments but also out of them.[21] The issue is all the more important in those states where the military *was* the government and still enjoys prerogatives it negotiated for itself during the transition from authoritarian rule. Control is the fundamental concern as well with regard to the intelligence apparatus, which paradoxically works in secrecy while the very foundation of democracy rests on accountability and transparency. This becomes clearer in the case of most non-democratic regimes, military governments, or former Soviet bloc countries, where the intelligence sector enforced state security, protecting the authoritarian regime against its own citizens. Control is also important with regard to police forces, which in many countries are corrupt and even involved in organized crime activities (e.g., in countries from the former communist bloc in Central and Eastern Europe).

The next question is, how are these three main instruments of state security controlled by democratically elected leaders? There is a wide spectrum of possible control mechanisms, which will be described below. Most countries, and especially newer democracies, however, are characterized by the paucity in the number and robustness of these controls. Nor does a narrow focus on the mechanisms for democratic control encompass most of the contemporary roles and missions in which security forces are engaged. Rather, democracies should consider control over all three instruments of security in implementing the contemporary spectrum of six roles and their myriad missions. While at the local level these may be easily conceptualized, at a more global level, things are much more complicated. Any discussion of multinational efforts such as countering terrorism and organized crime, or supporting peace operations, must include the umbrella organizations that are charged with carrying out specific missions. These include, for example, NATO, the United Nations, the European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the African Union. While each of these organizations has its own policies and bureaucracy, national executive branches maintain control in coalition operations through mandates with further caveats.[22]

My main argument, building on research and work within CCMR, is to conceptualize control in terms of authority over the following: Institutional control mechanisms, oversight, and the inculcation of professional norms (although professional norms can also contribute to effectiveness). Institutional control mechanisms involve providing direction and guidance for the security forces, exercised through institutions that range from organic laws and other regulations that empower the civilian leadership, to civilian-led organizations with professional staffs. These latter can include a ministry of defense for the military, a ministry of the interior for national police, and a civilian-led intelligence agency; one or more committees in the legislature that deal with policies and budgets; and a well-defined chain of authority for civilians to determine roles and missions, such as a National Security Council-type organization.[23] Oversight is exercised on a regular legal basis by the civilian leadership to keep track of what the security forces do, and to ensure they are in fact following the direction and guidance they have received from the civilian chain of command. In a functioning democracy, oversight is exercised not only by

*Table 3.1* Authorities and levels of control over security actors in six major roles

| Instrument of control<br><br>Roles and agencies | Institutional control mechanisms | | Oversight | | Professional norms | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | National | International | National | International | National | International |
| Wars:<br>armed forces, military intelligence | High | Low | High | High | High | N/A or low |
| Internal wars:<br>special forces, police, intelligence | High | Low or N/A | High | Low or N/A | High | Low |
| Terrorism:<br>intelligence, police, armed forces, special forces | High | Low | High | High | High | Low |
| Crime:<br>police, police intelligence, back-up support from the military | Low | N/A | Low | N/A | High | N/A |
| Humanitarian assistance:<br>military, police back-up support from intelligence | N/A or low | Low | N/A | Low | Low | High |
| Peace operations:<br>military, police, intelligence | High | Low | High | Low | High | High |

formal agencies within the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, but also by the independent media, NGOs, think tanks, and even international organizations, such as Human Rights Courts.[24] Professional norms are institutionalized through legally approved and transparent policies for recruitment, education, training, and promotion, in accordance with the goals of the democratically elected civilian leadership, thus internalizing the previous two control mechanisms.[25]

Table 3.1 illustrates the level of control national and international authorities exercise over security instruments as those instruments fulfill the six major security roles. As can be seen, institutional control, oversight, and professional norms are defined and exercised mainly at the national level. Professional norms are an important facet of democratic control in all six of the roles shown in Table 3.1. Oversight and professional norms on the international level apply primarily to four roles: Wars, terrorism, humanitarian assistance, and peace operations. Table 3.1 also suggests that there are many potential control mechanisms that remain under-utilized.

These three sets of mechanisms are, in the best of circumstances, utilized by democratically elected civilians to exercise control over security forces. But there is much more involved in security and democracy. We must also consider effectiveness and efficiency.

## Effectiveness in fulfilling roles and missions

While there are cases in which the effectiveness of the security sector in fulfilling roles and missions can be demonstrated, effectiveness generally is best determined by whether or not the security institutions are prepared to fulfill any or all of the previously-introduced six roles assigned to them.[26] Generally, however, effectiveness is very difficult to measure. War fighting is the one role that tends to have obvious benchmarks of success, and for which preparedness can be empirically evaluated through tactical and larger-scale exercises. Finding realistic measures of success for the other roles is more difficult. For instance, while the United States was successful during the initial wars against the Taliban and Saddam Hussein's regime in Afghanistan and Iraq

respectively, it was not successful at the post-conflict stages.[27] When countries prepare to defend themselves or their allies against external enemies, the greatest indicator of success will be the avoidance of armed combat, whether it is due to the perception that the defenders possess overwhelming force, success in the use of diplomatic tools, or the integration of an aggressor into an alliance that mitigates ambitions or grievances. The best recent example is probably the Cold War, which never became hot directly between the United States and the Soviet Union thanks to the mutual deterrence imposed by the two sides' nuclear arsenals. Internal wars, including such recent cases as Colombia, Nepal, and the Philippines, have deep economic, political, and social causes that cannot be resolved by force of arms alone. Fighting tends to drag on, and it is all but impossible for either side to ever declare "victory." The fight against global terrorism, which differs from civil conflict in that terrorism is a tactic, not a cause, and has no finite locale such as a state to defend, can be considered successful when no attack occurs. It is impossible to know, however, whether there was no attack due to effective security measures, or because the terrorists simply chose not to attack. Nor is there a clear moment when it will be safe to say, "Terrorism is defeated." Fighting crime is ongoing, as is the provision of humanitarian assistance. Neither criminals nor natural disasters such as floods, earthquakes, or hurricanes are ever going to disappear. These are a matter of anticipation, preparation, and mitigation, with the goal of keeping the level of crime or loss of life and property within acceptable limits (leaving aside the question, acceptable to whom?). With regard to peace support operations, the issue is similar. If conflicts between parties arise due to religious, ethnic, or political differences, and require intervention by foreign security forces, the troops' presence in itself will not resolve the fundamental causes behind the fighting. Rather, they may provide some stability, separate the antagonists, and allow space for negotiations. While there may be much to say about what is required for security measures to be effective, we must nevertheless be realistic about our ability to measure it, let alone explain success.

Under these circumstances, based on our research and studies of what is necessary, yet not necessarily sufficient, for the security forces to be effective in fulfilling any of the six roles and missions, I suggest three basic requirements. First, there must be a plan in place, which may take the form of a strategy or even a doctrine. Examples include national security strategies, national military strategies, White Papers on security and defense, strategies for disaster relief, strategies on organized crime, doctrines on intelligence, counterterrorism doctrines, and the like. Second, there must be structures and processes to both formulate the plans and implement them. These include ministries of defense, ministries of interior, national security councils, or other means that facilitate jointness and/or inter-agency coordination, as well as international cooperation. Third, a country must commit resources, in the form of political capital, money, and personnel, to ensure it has sufficient equipment, trained forces, and other assets needed to implement the assigned roles and missions. Lacking any one of these three components, it is difficult to imagine how any state would effectively implement any of these roles and missions.[28]

Table 3.2 presents requirements for ensuring the effectiveness of security forces. As can be seen, the three requirements are high when it comes to external wars, terrorism, and to a certain extent, peace operations, and low when it comes to internal wars, crime, and humanitarian assistance. Table 3.2 also suggests that there are many potential control mechanisms that remain under-utilized.

## *Efficiency in the use of resources*

Efficiency in the use of resources refers to the ability to fulfill assigned roles and missions at the optimum cost. Although efficiency in the security sector is a necessary dimension of the CMR

*Table 3.2* Requirements for effectiveness in fulfilling the six roles and missions

| Roles and missions | *Requirements for the effectiveness of security forces* Plans | Structures (interagency coordination/cooperation) | Resources |
|---|---|---|---|
| Wars | High | High | High |
| Internal wars | Low–medium | Medium | Low–medium |
| Terrorism | High | High | High |
| Crime | Low–medium | Medium | Low–medium |
| Humanitarian assistance | N/A or low | N/A or low | N/A or low |
| Peace operations | Medium–high | Medium–high | Medium–high |

framework, it is complicated by a variety of issues, including the multiple potential roles and missions; the difficulty of establishing measures of efficiency for any one function, let alone a combination of them; and the methodological challenges inherent in and measuring efficiency. Efficiency, thus, represents a "red herring" in the field of security, in that its use, mainly in the field of defense economics, includes a great many undefined assumptions. Notwithstanding these challenges, I found there is still a need for a set of institutions to allocate and oversee the application of resources as part and parcel of democratic accountability and transparency. This Handbook therefore includes a separate chapter (Chapter 4) by Tom Bruneau on efficiency, and the challenges and institutions involved in ensuring efficiency in the security sector.

## The interdependency and tradeoffs between control, effectiveness, and efficiency

The three elements of CMR must be assessed as interdependent parts of a whole in a democratic context. Each of the three is necessary, and individually none is sufficient to ensure stable, democratic civil–military relations. Civilian control is basic and fundamental, but it is irrelevant unless the instruments for achieving security can effectively fulfill their roles and missions. Furthermore, both control and effectiveness must be implemented at an affordable cost or they will vitiate other national priorities. While the focus by the scholars working in CMR has been exclusively on control, the other two sides of the triangle must be included as well to assess the wider impact of roles and missions, and the instruments of security, on democracy. Democracy is not only about institutions; the legitimacy of those institutions is also a vital factor. How effectively and efficiently the government handles defense and security issues can influence its legitimacy. The debates in Canada and several Western European countries during 2007–11 on sending troops to serve with NATO's International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan no doubt influenced how citizens view the responsiveness and credibility of their governments. Despite initial resistance by segments of the populations in Argentina, Brazil and Chile, sending security forces (military, police, and carabineers) for PSO in Haiti has generated pride in and increased support for the governments and security forces.[29] The main intellectual and policy challenge seems to be to recognize that of the six possible roles and missions, external defense against a peer adversary is the least prevalent today, yet it is the one most militaries and civilians prefer to focus on, possibly because its unlikelihood means there is no need to provide many resources for the security sector.

### Democratic control and effectiveness

Although it may seem counterintuitive, increased democratic control can improve the effectiveness of military, intelligence, and police forces. Based on historical research, Deborah Avant concludes, "Having more civilians in control of the army made it easier, not harder, for the army to maintain its focus."[30] While too much direction and oversight obviously can hamper the security services' capabilities or compromise sources and methods in intelligence, implementing "good" control, i.e., instituting control and oversight in a way that provides top-level direction and general oversight guidance as opposed to malfeasance or cronyism, leads to improved effectiveness. For example, one of the few acknowledged successes in U.S. civil–military relations, the 1986 Goldwater–Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act, both reinforced democratic civilian control and mandated jointness for the military services of the United States. Although some interoperability issues certainly remain, U.S. forces have been more effective at fulfilling their various roles and missions since this level of democratic control was enacted. Operation Desert Storm, operations in the former Yugoslavia and Afghanistan, and the initial combat success in Iraq bear witness to these improvements.

Colombia under President Alvaro Uribe (2002–10) is an interesting case of how democratic control can improve the effectiveness of the security forces. President Uribe took strong personal control of the armed forces, police, and intelligence organizations, and compelled them to confront the insurgent forces, especially the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia. The result was generally improved security.

### Democratic control and efficiency

While, admittedly, improved democratic control generally improves effectiveness, efficiency is not always a byproduct of increased democratic control. In most countries, there are several different branches of the military, along with various police and intelligence organizations. This diversity fosters better democratic control in that no single security apparatus monopolizes all government knowledge or power; yet it often leads to duplication of effort and bureaucratic competition among various entities vying for government resources. The reality is that direction and oversight are costly. If security services never had to testify before legislative committees, provide data to oversight organizations, reform their institutions when problems are uncovered, undergo time-consuming audits, or improve professional standards, then all resources might be used to obtain the best military equipment, provide the most intelligence product, or increase the number of police on the streets. Despite this, it is not always the case that increased democratic control will reduce efficiency. Police reform, in particular, has improved efficiency when a comprehensive approach to democratic control is adopted. In the Chilean and Brazilian cases, community policing efforts, while initially difficult and costly, have helped create efficient policing in the long term because citizens worked to support their own security. Probably most important is for democratically-elected decision-makers to have a realistic understanding of efficiency in the roles and missions of security forces. Applying a simplified business model to this area is inappropriate and can lead to disaster. An example is Guatemalan president Óscar Berger's decision upon taking office in 2004, to cut the military by some 50 percent, down to 15,000 men. The result was a wave of violence by street gangs and organized crime, which forced his successor, President Álvaro Colom, to double the size of the military in early 2008 to counter the violence.

### Effectiveness and efficiency

Improvements in management and leadership that increase effectiveness may yield positive results in efficiency as fewer resources are consumed. But it is more often the case that an operation may

be effective while being quite inefficient. Launching numerous expensive missiles at a single target and destroying it "multiple times" is clearly effective but not an efficient use of resources. Similarly, a "just in time" supply chain works well for profit-making companies like Costco and Target, but not for a warship at sea or a brigade in combat, which may face dire consequences if they fall even temporarily short of vital stocks. They require redundancy and self-sufficiency for effectiveness, but this is not efficient in the normal use of the term. Further, allocating a large police force in response to a spate of crime in a certain area may cause crime to go down, but costs may disproportionately go up. Where the balance lies is something each society needs to determine for itself, based on its own circumstances, goals, and resources.

## Conclusion

I propose, in this chapter, a new, more relevant framework for the analysis of civil–military relations in the contemporary world, based on research and work I have conducted over the past decade, together with Tom Bruneau, at the Center for Civil–Military Relations. Because the current framework, focused as it is only on democratic civilian control, is both practically and analytically insufficient for dealing with the real issues facing contemporary military and political leaders, I expanded my analysis to account for the six contemporary security roles, and included not only the armed forces, but also police and intelligence agencies. This led me to define the three factors that I believe constitute contemporary civil–military relations: Control, effectiveness, and efficiency. Democratic civilian control is necessary and remains a cardinal component of this revised framework. But in a democracy, which requires broad legitimacy, governments, including the security sector, should also be both effective and efficient. Increasingly, populations are aware that their security forces must not only be under control, but must also be able to implement the assigned tasks at a reasonable cost. If the only role of the military was to fight and win wars, this point would be moot, since a loss would mean the government collapses or is replaced in any case. But citizens have a right to expect the security forces to be effective in fighting organized crime, participating in PSO with other respected states, and providing humanitarian assistance when disasters occur.

To achieve its purpose in the framework proposed here, each of the three aspects requires particular institutions responsible for control and implementation. A realistic appreciation of national security and defense, however, begs for caution when coming to conclusions on how to improve effectiveness, and especially efficiency.

## Notes

1 There are three main instruments that governments use to achieve security: The military, police, and intelligence services. Each of these in turn can be subdivided. Militaries are divided into services, typically army, navy, marines, and air force; then further into communities such as infantry, artillery, aviators, surface warfare, etc.; and into active or reserve branches. Police forces can be organized at the national (Colombia, El Salvador, Romania), state (Brazil, the United States), and municipal levels; and may include specialized units, such as paramilitary carabinieri, gendarmerie, or so-called S.W.A.T. (special weapons and tactics) teams. Intelligence agencies can be divided into military, civilian national and police intelligence, to name just a few.

2 From a review of the literature and conducting our CCMR programs globally, I found that the current roles and missions of most security forces fall into six major categories: (1) Fight, and be prepared to fight, external wars; (2) fight, and be prepared to fight, internal wars or insurgencies; (3) fight global terrorism; (4) fight crime; (5) provide support for humanitarian assistance; and (6) prepare for and execute peace support operations. For a discussion on roles and missions, and the mixes in different countries, see Paul Shemella, "The Spectrum of Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces," in Thomas

Bruneau and Scott Tollefson, eds., *Who Guards the Guardians and How: Democratic Civil-Military Relations* (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2006).

3  The framework proposed here can also include the concept of Security Sector Reform (SSR), which Timothy Edmunds addresses in Chapter 5 in this Handbook.

4  I am of course referring to Samuel Huntington's seminal work, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957). For more on Huntington's theories, see Chapters 1 and 6 in this volume.

5  Several prominent scholars have highlighted the importance of this issue. See Adam Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Philippe Schmitter, "The Consolidation of Political Democracies: Processes, Rhythms, Sequences, and Types," in Geoffrey Pridham, ed., *Transitions to Democracy* (Dartmouth: Aldershot, 1995). One highly qualified expert, Felipe Agüero, normally contributes the most significant chapter on civil–military relations in edited books. See, for example, Felipe Agüero, "Democratic Consolidation and the Military in Southern Europe and South America," in Richard Gunther, Nikiforos Diamandouros, and H. Pulhe, eds., *The Politics of Democratic Consolidations in Southern Europe* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995); and Felipe Agüero, "Toward Civilian Supremacy in South America," in Larry Diamond, Marc Plattner, Yun–han Chu, and Hung–mao Tien, eds., *Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997).

6  Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).

7  Thomas Bruneau and Alex MacLeod, *Politics in Contemporary Portugal: Parties and the Consolidation of Democracy* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1986); Agüero, "Democratic Consolidation and the Military."

8  Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).

9  Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market*; Schmitter, "The Consolidation of Political Democracies."

10  Agüero, "Democratic Consolidation and the Military;" Andrew Cottey, Timothy Edmunds and Anthony Forster, eds., *Democratic Control of the Military in Postcommunist Europe: Guarding the Guards* (New York: Palgrave, 2002); David Pion-Berlin, *Through Corridors of Power: Institutions and Civil-Military Relations in Argentina* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997); David Pion-Berlin, ed., *Civil-Military Relations in Latin America: New Analytical Perspectives* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2001); Alfred Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988); Harold A. Trinkunas, *Crafting Civilian Control of the Armed Forces in Venezuela: A Comparative Perspective* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2006); Marybeth Ulrich, *Democratizing Communist Militaries: The Cases of the Czech and Russian Armed Forces* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1999).

11  Richard H. Kohn, ed., *The United States Military under the Constitution of the United States, 1789–1989* (New York: New York University Press, 1991), pp. 61–94.

12  A bloodless coup by the military took place in Honduras in 2009, and Ecuador's military and police attempted a coup in 2010.

13  Some of the few exceptions are David Bayley, *Patterns of Policing* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1986); John Bailey and Lucia Dammert, eds., *Public Security and Police Reform in the Americas* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005); Otwin Marenin, "The Goal of Democracy in International Police Assistance Programs," *Policing* 21(1) (1998): 159–77; and Hugo Frühling and Joseph S. Tulchin, with Heather Golding, eds., *Crime and Violence in Latin America: Citizen Security, Democracy and the State* (Washington, DC and Baltimore, MD: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003).

14  The important exceptions include the following: Gavin Cawthra and Robin Luckham, eds., *Governing Insecurity: Democratic Control of the Military and Security Establishments in Transitional Democracies* (London: Zed Books, 2003); Andrew Cottey, Timothy Edmunds, and Anthony Forster, eds., *Soldiers and Societies in Post-Communist Europe: Legitimacy and Change* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003); Felipe Agüero, "The New 'Double Challenge': Democratic Control and Efficacy of Military, Police, and Intelligence," in Alfred Stepan, ed., *Democracies in Danger* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009), pp. 59–74.

15  "Monthly Summary of Military and Police Contribution to United Nations Operations," United Nations, New York, 2011, available at: www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/documents/Yearly 06.pdf (accessed August 6, 2012).

16 Claire Taylor, "Afghanistan: The Timetable for Security Transition," International Affairs and Defence Section, House of Commons Library, London, 11 May 2011.

17 United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti 2007, available at: www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minustah/ (accessed August 6, 2012); "U.N. Peacekeepers Fight Gangs in Haiti, One Street at a Time," *New York Times*, February 10, 2007, p. 1.

18 A working paper by one of the leading analysts in the "military in the political transition" literature offers a glimmer of interest in effectiveness as a topic of research. See Agüero, "The New 'Double Challenge.'"

19 See, for example, Thomas Ricks, *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq* (New York: Penguin Press, 2006), for a well-researched account of the poor planning and implementation of U.S. security in Iraq with serious consequences for the administration of George W. Bush and indeed for the global prestige of the United States.

20 I am encouraged to see that the importance of effectiveness is forcefully advocated in a recent article by the eminent British scholar of strategy, Hew Strachan. See Strachan, "Making Strategy: Civil–Military Relations after Iraq," *Survival* 48(3) (Autumn 2006): 59–82, especially p. 66.

21 As Samuel E. Finer states, in *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2002; first published in 1962):

> Instead of asking why the military engage in politics, we ought surely ask why they ever do otherwise. For at first sight the political advantages of the military vis-à-vis other and civilian groups are overwhelming. The military possess vastly superior organization. And, they possess arms.
>
> (ibid., p. 5)

22 The most useful sources we have found on "mandates" are: William J. Durch, *UN Peace Operations and the "Brahimi" Report* (Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2001) October 2001 revision; and Victoria K. Holt and Tobias C. Herkman, *The Impossible Mandate? Military Preparedness, the Responsibility to Protect and Modern Peace Operations* (Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, 2006), especially Chapter 5, "From the Council to the Field: Navigating Mandates and Rules of Engagement." The most concrete and current discussion of "caveats" is found in Paul Gallis, "NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance," Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2008), updated May, 2008.

23 See Bruneau and Tollefson, *Who Guards the Guardians*; and Thomas C. Bruneau and Steven C. Boraz, eds., *Reforming Intelligence: Obstacles to Democratic Control and Effectiveness* (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2007). CCMR has recently analyzed the role of national security councils in improving the effectiveness of the security sector. See Thomas C. Bruneau, Florina Cristiana Matei, and Sak Sakoda, "National Security Councils: Their Potential Functions in Democratic Civil-Military Relations," *Defense & Security Analysis* 25(3) (September 2009): 255–69.

24 On different formal oversight mechanisms, see, for example, Peter D. Feaver, *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), pp. 2, 86: Table 3.1, "Summary of oversight mechanisms in ascending order of intrusiveness." For a comprehensive listing of all imaginable legislative oversight mechanisms, see Frederick Kaiser, Walter Oleszek, T.J. Halstead, Morton Rosenberg, and Todd Tatelman, "Congressional Oversight Manual," CRS Report for Congress (Washington, DC: CRS, 2007), updated January 2.

25 Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*; Bengt Abrahamsson, *Military Professionalization and Political Power* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1972); Alfred Stepan, *The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1971); Nina M. Serafino, "The Global Peace Operations Initiative: Background and Issues for Congress," CRS Report for Congress (Washington, DC: CRS, 2008), updated January 31.

26 Some cases of success include: The Goldwater–Nichols Defense Reform Act of 1986, which compelled U.S. military forces to work more jointly and thus more effectively; Colombian President Alvaro Uribe's Democratic Security Strategy, which began in 2003, and has resulted in increased security through a wide variety of measures; Romania's successful transition to a smaller, more professional force, now operating in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere, and its effective reform of the intelligence system; and Mongolia's transition from a territorial defense strategy during the Cold War to deploying effective peacekeeping forces in Iraq and Sierra Leone.

27 Thomas C. Bruneau, *Patriots for Profit: Contractors and the Military in U.S. National Security* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011).

28 Although it is rather difficult to assess effectiveness, what comes out clearly from the preceding discussion is the importance of such institutions as a ministry of defense and a national security council. That is, they are critical to how well the security forces work. There is evidence from new, and not so new, NATO countries that they created robust institutions, which are staffed by certain numbers of civilians who offer some level of expertise, and who can count on some career stability within the ministries, security councils, or other security-related institutions. Nevertheless, these countries were more or less compelled from outside (by NATO membership requirements) to recruit civilians and give them stable positions. Conversely, countries in Latin America lack such institutions. At a minimum, they have recruited civilians (and provided them with stable careers), but only for administrative jobs (Argentina, Chile). In those cases where subject matter experts are brought in, their positions are not stable (Argentina).

29 Elsa E. Llenderrozas, "Argentina, Brasil y Chile en la reconstrucción de Haiti: intereses y motivaciones de la participación conjunta," paper delivered at the 2006 Meeting of the Latin American Studies Association, San Juan, Puerto Rico, March 15–18, 2006.

30 Deborah Avant, "Political Institutions and Military Effectiveness: Contemporary United States and United Kingdom," in Risa A. Brooks and Elizabeth S. Stanley, eds., *Creating Military Power: The Sources of Military Effectiveness* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007), p. 87.

# 4

# EFFICIENCY IN THE USE OF RESOURCES

*Thomas C. Bruneau*

In the framework for analysis of civil–military relations presented by Cris Matei in Chapter 3, we posit three necessary but not sufficient requirements for effectiveness. They are: (1) A plan or strategy; (2) some type of institutional mechanism for coordination and implementation; and (3) sufficient resources to meet the plan's objectives. The last requirement, resources, leads us into the topic of efficiency in the use of resources, which is the topic of this chapter.

Before addressing how to measure efficiency, there is first the need to clarify the conceptual distinctions between effectiveness and efficiency, as we often find the terms used interchangeably, and a review of the literature on organization theory, political transitions and defense economics shows that the terms effectiveness, efficiency, efficacy, cost-effectiveness, and the like are usually conflated and hence not used in a consistent manner. While there is general agreement that effectiveness "is the capacity actually to implement the policies formulated, with the desired results," efficiency, a concept that is strongly associated with physics, economics, and organizational theory, refers to "getting the most out of a given input."[1] In other words, efficiency in the use of resources refers to the ability to fulfill the assigned roles and missions at the optimum cost.

## Understanding the concept of efficiency

There are several challenges in both logic and methodology in attempting to assess or measure efficiency in the areas of national security, defense, and civil–military relations. First, measuring the efficiency of the security forces is complicated by the wide variety of potential roles and missions as well as the difficulty in establishing measures of effectiveness for any one, let alone a combination of them. Second, because security is a public good or activity, where the so-called bottom line does not apply, there is no market mechanism to assign a value to whether an activity is being done efficiently, that is, making a profit or not. Third, competition, in the form of a peer government within the same territorial boundaries, is not at work. There is, then, no objective criterion for efficiency; nor, for that matter, are there incentives to achieve it. Thus, the literature on private enterprises and their efficiency measures does not apply.[2] Related to this third point, there are further considerations that must be highlighted. As anybody who works in government is aware, public agencies and funds can be utilized as a "jobs program" to employ specific categories of people. This can range from keeping people off the dole to ensuring congressional or personal prerogatives are satisfied, to outright nepotism. Along the same lines, government

agencies are required to buy from certain suppliers, where neither cost nor quality is the major consideration.[3] Such acquisitions range from purchasing furniture made by prison inmates to contracting for technical support from organizations that provide money for election campaigns.

There is no conceptualization of efficiency that we have seen that can adequately account for national security and defense objectives. In some sectors of the public realm, education or transportation, for example, efficiency can be measured to some degree by kilometers of roads laid, numbers of bridges or schools built, or percentage of students who graduate, per tax dollar spent. In security, with regard to the six roles, these rudimentary measures of efficiency do not apply. How, for example, can we measure the deterrent value of the armed forces, of a nuclear capability, of submarines versus aircraft carriers versus squadrons or divisions? How should we assess the value of a "hearts and minds campaign" over "military force" in an internal war? Or how, in fighting terrorism, should we rate the efficiency of intelligence when success means nothing happens? What is the best way to determine whether engaging in PSO is the efficient use of resources for a country such as Brazil, or is useful mainly to demonstrate to the global community that the country has assumed its international responsibilities? Is it efficient to use the armed forces to fight street gangs, the *pandillas*, as is done in Central America? Or, as is currently the case in Brazil, is it efficient to send the armed forces into the slums around Rio de Janeiro to root out the drug lords?

Obviously, the conceptualization and measurement of efficiency in the area of security are extremely problematic. What *can* be measured are the so-called hard data, such as numbers of tanks or airplanes produced, or number of troops trained or equipped, for a given cost. What these indicators tell us generally in terms of the efficiency of security, however, is at the very least limited and probably even misleading; policy-makers nevertheless may refer to them to make, or in most cases rationalize, decisions. Virtually all imaginable issues in national security and defense require a broader, more strategic view than simple cost analysis. The field of defense economics, in which the book by Charles Hitch and Ronald McKean is still the main reference after more than half a century, makes some contributions, but only at the margins: On issues that can be quantified, which are not normally as important as issues of politics or strategy.[4] All of the material that I have discovered in researching on measures of efficiency in the areas of national security and defense is based upon certain assumptions. Maybe economists are willing to make these assumptions, but I am not.

From my experience on four continents (Asia, South America, Africa, and Western and South-Eastern Europe), as well as in the United States, the important decisions are made on the basis of political calculations, even though policy-makers might embellish them with some kind of pseudo-scientific bow to efficiency. This is stated authoritatively by the late Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., who, among other positions, was the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff between 1985 and 1989, in a long section in his book entitled "Congress and Defense":

> Those decisions [regarding the top line for funding national security and defense] were arrived at by a process that appeared mysterious and intangible. It had to do with instincts and intuitions, and with an immensely complicated calculus that percolated through the Congress and incorporated all the geographical areas and ethnic constituencies and income distinctions, and all the partisan and bipartisan and nonpartisan views of the members. Congressmen working this calculus were searching for a number: What number would generally fit in with the nation's geopolitical prospects and economic health and at the same time would not jeopardize my reelection by hurting projects dear to my district?[5]

The more I travel, and ask civilian decision-makers how they come up with a figure, either a percentage of the national budget or a percentage of gross domestic product, the more I am convinced that virtually all countries determine the actual (versus the rhetorical) budget based on essentially political, but from time-to-time including strategic, calculations. Examples in which the strategic seem to play a part include Colombia under President Uribe between 2002 and 2010, and possibly France under President Sarkozy between 2007 and 2012.

Having rejected pseudo-sophisticated methodologies for arriving at some precise figure for national security and defense, I must clearly acknowledge that the use of public funds in a democracy demands that government agencies carry out systematic assessments of program results and their costs. From my research in the United States I found that there are extremely extensive and elaborate institutional mechanisms to do precisely this.[6] In the United States these include, on the congressional side, the Government Accountability Office, the Congressional Budget Office, the Congressional Research Office, special investigatory bodies such as the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction, and congressional hearings in general and via the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform; on the executive side, various inspectors general and the all-powerful Office of Management and Budget. That is, there is a very extensive spectrum of oversight mechanisms to assess not only the use of public funds, but also the success of government in achieving goals.

## Supreme Audit Institutions: the U.S. Government Accountability Office

In the United States the Government Accountability Office (GAO) is a "supreme audit institution (SAI)." As there is so little known, at least by those interested in civil–military relations, about SAIs, I will go into some detail here on the GAO and similar investigatory and oversight bodies elsewhere. The GAO, formerly known as the General Accounting Office, was created after World War I by the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, when the national debt increased drastically, and Congress wanted more control over expenditures. The Act also allowed the GAO to gather information, and required the president to submit an annual budget to Congress.[7] The name change was made to reflect the new functions that the organization performs, including research and policy analysis, and it officially established independence from the federal government by removing itself from the federal employee payment system. These changes took effect under the GAO Human Capital Reform Act of 2004.[8]

The GAO's main purpose is to support the congressional oversight function, and it takes on various types of work to fulfill its mission. The GAO conducts audits to determine if federal funds are being spent efficiently. It investigates allegations of illegal or improper activities. The GAO reports on whether and how well government programs and policies are meeting their objectives; for us, in this book, this means effectiveness. It performs policy analyses and outlines options for congressional consideration. Finally, it issues legal decisions and opinions on items such as bid protest rulings and agency rules. The GAO uses its research to advise Congress and the heads of executive agencies on how to "make the government more efficient, effective, ethical, equitable, and responsive." According to the GAO, this work leads to laws and Acts that improve government operations and saves the government and taxpayers billions of dollars.[9]

In accord with the GAO's Strategic Plan Framework, the GAO's duties specifically include addressing current and emerging challenges and threats to the well-being and financial security of the United States, responding to changing security threats and the complications of global interdependence, and helping transform the government's role and how it conducts business to meet the needs of the twenty-first century.[10]

The head of the GAO is the Comptroller General of the United States, who is appointed by the president. Because the GAO is independent of the executive branch, and to ensure its continued independence, the Comptroller General can only be removed by Congress, and his term of office is 15 years. The Comptroller General is responsible for overseeing GAO's operations and maintaining quality, professionalism, ethical behavior, and integrity in its work. The Comptroller General oversees the Chief Operation Officer, General Counsel, and the Chief Administrative Officer, and all of these individuals combined compose the GAO Executive Committee. Self-initiated research is also conducted under the authority of the Comptroller General.

The GAO follows the Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards (GAGAS), also known as the Yellow Book. GAGAS is used for financial audits, attestation engagements, and performance audits. The purpose of a financial audit is

> [to] provide an independent assessment of and reasonable assurance about whether an entity's reported financial condition, results, and use of resources are presented fairly in accordance with recognized criteria. Reporting on financial audits performed in accordance with GAGAS also includes reports on internal control, compliance with laws and regulations, and provisions of contracts and grant agreements as they relate to financial transactions, systems, and processes.[11]

Financial audits can include financial statement audits, special reports, reviewing financial information from a specified time, reporting on the controls over financial transactions, and auditing compliance with federal award expenditures and federal assistance.[12]

Attestation engagements

> cover a broad range of financial or nonfinancial objectives and may provide different levels of assurance about the subject matter or assertion depending on the users' needs. Attestation engagements result in an examination, a review, or an agreed-upon procedures report on a subject matter or on an assertion about a subject matter that is the responsibility of another party.[13]

The subjects can range from prospective financial information and internal control over finance reporting to compliance and performance information and the accuracy and reliability of reported performance measures.

Performance audits are evaluations of the processes used or how the audits were conducted. They "provide reasonable assurance that the auditors have obtained sufficient, appropriate evidence to support the conclusions reached … and may vary widely and include assessments of program effectiveness, economy, and efficiency; internal control; compliance; and prospective analyses."[14] GAGAS works with other organizations and incorporates their standards for financial audits and attestation engagements. Specifically, GAGAS uses the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants standards and the Statements on Standards for Attestation Engagements. The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board and the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board also have established standards that can be used in conjunction with GAGAS.[15]

Other recognized professional standards for performance audits can also be used in addition to GAGAS. These organizations include the Institute of Internal Auditors, the American Evaluation Association, the Joint Committee on Standards for Education Evaluation, and the American Psychological Association. GAGAS also defines the ethical principles used in auditing

and their importance in ensuring independent, high-quality work. These principles are: The public interest, integrity, objectivity, proper use of government information, and professional behavior.

Chapter 3 of the Yellow Book lays out the general standards of auditing: Independence, professional judgment, competence, technical knowledge and competence, continuing professional education, quality control and assurance, and external peer review. Independence is categorized into personal, external, and organizational independence. A personal impairment to independence can be any personal relationships, beliefs, financial interests, or biases that could "weaken or slant" the audit in any way. An external impairment could range from time restrictions to lack of access to records or individuals; organizational impairments can result from an auditor being assigned to an area that will affect the operations of the organization being audited.[16] The Government Auditing Standards contain further information on fieldwork standards, reporting standards, and additional guidance for conducting financial audits, attestation engagements, and performance audits.

Every three years, in accordance with GAGAS, independent organizations conduct a peer review of the GAO's system of quality control using generally accepted government auditing standards to determine if it is properly designed and operating effectively. The peer review process is a performance audit, which includes auditing documentation, testing functional areas, and conducting staff interviews. The peer reviewers then report their conclusions to the Executive Committee, management, and staff members.[17] The independent organization is an international team (consisting of members from several countries) from a Strategic Auditing Institutions organization. An international certified public accounting firm conducts the review of financial audit engagements. The team reviews quality control policies and procedures, analyzes the internal monitoring procedures; reviews audit reports and attestation engagements, assesses compliance with GAGAS standards, and interviews staff at all levels to assess their understanding of GAGAS. The peer review is conducted every three years.[18]

It is extremely important to note that the GAO deals with issues in national security and defense. For example, in the National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 1997, the U.S. Department of Defense is required to review its strategy and priorities:

> The Secretary of Defense shall every four years … conduct a comprehensive examination (to be known as a "quadrennial defense review" or QDR) of the national defense strategy, force structure, force modernization plans, infrastructure, budget plan, and other elements of the defense program and policies of the United States and with a view toward determining and expressing the defense strategy of the United States and establishing a defense program for the next 20 years.[19]

Under the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Section 1051, the GAO is required to review the Defense Department's QDR and submit its findings no later than 90 days after the QDR report was released to the congressional defense committees and Secretary of Defense. The Defense Department is required to address any items the GAO concludes is not directly addressed in the QDR. This report must be submitted to the congressional defense committees no later than 30 days after the release of GAO's review.[20]

In my book on U.S. civil–military relations and the private security contractors, I rely heavily on GAO documents and one very important interview with GAO professional staff, in which I obtained credible information on all aspects of U.S. national security and defense policy and performance, including the private security contractors. Further, Chapter 16 on professional military education (PME) in the U.S. in this Handbook makes clear that GAO reports are an

important, if not the main, source of data for both of the primary reports on PME: The Cheney Report of 1997 and the Report of the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee of the House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services of April 2010. In short, the GAO in the United States has a very extensive role in overseeing the use of public resources in the areas of national security and defense, including how effective different institutions and processes are.

Through interviews at the GAO I discovered that the organization has a number of accountability partners, and it is a member of the largest global accountability organization: The International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions (INTOSAI).[21] INTOSAI is an autonomous, independent, non-political, and non-governmental organization. It retains a special consultative status within the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. The president of the SAI of Cuba founded it in 1953, and it currently has 189 members and four associate members.[22]

INTOSAI is the umbrella organization for the external government auditing community. It provides an institutionalized framework for SAIs to promote the development and transfer of auditing standards and information, improve governmental auditing globally, and enhance their professional capabilities, reputation, and influence within their own countries and abroad. This organization facilitates INTOSAI members to exchange experiences, findings, and insights, which guarantees that governmental auditing will continuously progress and improve.

INTOSAI's Strategic Plan describes independence and democratic values as the basis for its philosophical and conceptual approach to its work. Its vision is

> to promote good governance by enabling SAIs to help their governments improve performance, enhance transparency, ensure accountability, maintain credibility, fight corruption, promote public trust, and foster the efficient and effective receipt and use of public resources for the benefit of their people.[23]

INTOSAI's strategic goals are: Accountability and professional standards, institutional capacity building, knowledge sharing and knowledge services, and model international organization.

Its members audit government accounts and operations, promote sound financial management, and provide an overall accountability in government. To this end, its strategic plan includes international guidelines for financial management, develops methodologies for conducting audits, provides training to member SAIs, and promotes the exchange of information and practices among its member SAIs. It is made up of a Congress, Governing Board, General Secretariat, Regional Working Groups, committees, and task forces, which operate democratically through consultation and consensus. Regional Working Groups meet annually and work continually throughout the year.[24]

Regional Working Groups promote INTOSAI's strategic goals regionally, and the groups encourage cooperation and information sharing at a regional level. There are seven recognized regional groups: The Organization of Latin American and Caribbean Supreme Audit Institutions, the Africa Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions, the Arab Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions, the Asian Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions, the Pacific Association of Supreme Audit Institutions, the Caribbean Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions, and the European Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions.

INTOSAI also publishes the *International Journal of Government Auditing* and runs the INTOSAI Development Initiative (IDI), both of which are aimed at supporting its members and the overall mission of INTOSAI. In the United States, the GAO publishes the journal. The *International Journal of Government Auditing* is also a teaching tool containing aspects of the public sector auditing and case studies as well as a tool to advance auditing procedures and techniques. The journal is published quarterly. The IDI supports the enhancement of audit capabilities of its

members. It includes long-term regional training programs, regional satellite programs, and partnership programs. The IDI holds training seminars and workshops in key areas of government auditing.[25]

Through interviews at GAO, and further elaborated by interviews in Argentina, Brazil, Mongolia, and Romania, as well as communications with SAIs in at least six Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) members, I discovered that the performance of the SAIs in general, and specifically with regard to issues in national security and defense, is very mixed. In such OECD countries as Austria, Denmark, Germany, Norway, Sweden, and the UK, the SAIs are very active and deal with a huge variety of issues in national security and defense. To give a sense of these issues, and the countries involved, I will cite some of the information from e-mails I received from some of these officials:[26]

- *Austria*: "According to the Federal Constitutional Act, the ACA [the SAI in Austria] audits the financial affairs of all state sectors including the areas of national security and defence." Then follows a list that includes acquisitions by the MOD, deployment of the Austrian Armed Forces, policing, and surveillance.
- *Denmark*: The official sent me a report by the Public Accounts Committee, in response to a request by the Auditor General (the Danish SAI) on defense procurement and equipment.
- *Germany*: In the annual report of the Bundesrechnungshof (German SAI) of 2007, by the Federal Ministry of Defense, there are extensive sections on acquisitions, military personnel and training issues, and a huge variety of issues which affect combat readiness of the German Armed Forces.
- *Norway*: The response from the official is: "Yes, the Office of the Auditor of Norway [the Norwegian SAI] does deal with national security and defense issues, both regarding financial and performance audit."
- *Sweden*: The official responded as follows: "The Swedish National Audit Office [SAI] is currently undertaking a few audits within military/defense related areas. One ongoing performance audit concerns the role of the Swedish National Defense's protection of the society in times of peace, and another audit deals with the Swedish National Defense's international material cooperation."
- *The United Kingdom*: The official from the National Audit Office (SAI) responded as follows to my inquiry:

  [T]he National Audit Office (NAO), which is headed by the Comptroller and Auditor General (C&AG), are exactly the same as the other parts of the UK government which we audit. We audit the accounts (the financial statements) of these bodies each year and we also report to Parliament on the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness with which they have used their resources. In the case of defence and national security, we produce, on average, about four reports a year.

## Conclusion

The concept of efficiency in the use of resources for national security and defense is at best misleading, a "red herring." What governments require, at a minimum, is some kind of oversight mechanism to monitor the budget and spending. In leading OECD countries the SAIs fulfill this function. In others, such as Brazil and Romania, the SAI equivalents, the Courts of Audits or Courts of Accounts, are also capable of performing such a function. In many countries, such oversight bodies probably do not function at the present time, but through INTOSAI and with

World Bank support, they could. If, and this is a very big if, civilian decision-makers really wanted to have oversight, they could feasibly achieve it through the SAIs.

In the United States, and at least six other OECD countries, the SAIs provide a critically important oversight function, including in national security and defense. I also know from my interviews in Brazil, Portugal, and Romania that their SAIs fulfill a similar function. In other countries, including those I have investigated personally, which includes Argentina and Mongolia, the SAIs' effectiveness and the scope of the areas they cover are not so broad. However, I believe that the focus on the SAIs is worth pursuing as an institution that *can* actually fulfill an important role in the oversight of funds and effectiveness in the areas of national security and defense, and civil–military relations in general. This is the case for two main reasons. First, it is the case in the major OECD countries including the six, plus the United States, as noted above. Through INTOSAI these leaders—OECD countries and others including India and South Africa—seek to influence other SAIs to expand their capabilities and scope of activities.[27] Second, the World Bank, mainly due to the desire that countries receiving loans from the World Bank manage the funds properly and honestly, offers extensive programs to increase the capabilities of the SAIs throughout the world. I became aware of this priority of the World Bank through phone conversations and emails. In addition to several World Bank publications, there is also the website that provides a great deal of information on making SAIs more capable and robust.[28]

## Notes

1 Juan J. Linz, *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown, and Reequilibration* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978); Arthur M. Okun, *Equality and Efficiency: The Big Tradeoff* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1975).
2 Due to the absence of the market and the political monopoly status of a government in a given territory, in the field of defense economics, the term used is "cost-effectiveness."
3 The Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) include various preferences: Prisoners (FAR 8.6), the blind and severely handicapped (FAR 8.7), and "small disadvantaged businesses, and women-owned small business concerns" (FAR 19.7), available at: www.acquisition.gov/far/ (accessed August 6, 2012).
4 Charles J. Hitch and Roland N. McKean, *The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age* (New York: Atheneum, 1978). First published in 1960 by the RAND Corporation.
5 Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr. with David Chanoff, *The Line of Fire: From Washington to the Gulf, the Politics and Battles of the New Military* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993), pp. 232–3.
6 Thomas C. Bruneau, *Patriots for Profit: Contractors and the Military in U.S. National Security* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011).
7 For information on the creation of the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), go to The History of GAO—GAO's Start, available at: www.gao.gov/about/history/ (accessed August 6, 2012).
8 GAO Human Capital Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. 108–271, 118 Stat. 811.
9 See About GAO, available at: www.gao.gov/about (accessed August 6, 2012).
10 See GAO's Strategic Plan Framework, available at: www.gao.gov/sp.html (accessed August 6, 2012).
11 The GAGAS Yellow Book can be found at: www.gao.gov/govaud/govaudhtml/index.html (accessed August 6, 2012).
12 GAO, Government Auditing Standards: Chapter 1 "Use and Application of GAGAS," 1.22 a and b, available at: www.gao.gov/govaud/govaudhtml/ (accessed August 6, 2012).
13 Ibid.: Chapter 1, "Attestation Engagements," 1.23.
14 Ibid.: Chapter 1, "Performance Audits," 1.25–1.28.
15 See "Relationship between GAGAS and Other Professional Standards," in the GAGAS Yellow Book.
16 GAO, Government Auditing Standards: Chapter 3, "General Standards;" available at: www.gao.gov/govaud/govaudhtml/ (accessed August 6, 2012).
17 From About GAO.
18 The 2010 team was composed of representatives from Norway, Canada, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the UK. See GAO, Peer Review: 2010 Results, available at: www.gao.gov/about/review.html (accessed August 6, 2012).

19  Quadrennial Defense Review Fact Sheet, February 2010, available at: www.defense.gov/qdr/ (accessed August 6, 2012).
20  "Quadrennial Defense Review: 2010 Report Addressed Many but Not All Required Items," GAO-10-575R, available at: www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-575R (accessed August 6, 2012). The QDR legislative requirements are in Enclosure II of this report.
21  For information on the International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions (INTOSAI), go to www.intosai.org (accessed August 6, 2012); and author interview with Helen H. Hsing in Washington, DC on 7 September 2010. Ms. Hsing is responsible for international liaison at GAO.
22  INTOSAI website.
23  To learn more about INTOSAI's strategic goals, core values, and mission, the reader may wish to consult INTOSAI's Strategic Plan in its *International Journal of Government Auditing*: www.intosaijournal.org/ (accessed August 6, 2012).
24  Ibid.
25  Ibid.
26  All of the following citations were provided to the author through email by government representatives, from September 24, 2010 through February 7, 2011.
27  Hsing interview.
28  For examples of the type of support the World Bank provides to strengthen Supreme Audit Institutions, go to Projects–Financial Management–FM at Country Level on the World Bank website at: www.worldbank.org (accessed August 6, 2012; note the website can be a little difficult to navigate.)

# 5

# SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

*Timothy Edmunds*

The concept of security sector reform (SSR) has come to increasing prominence since the late 1990s. SSR aims to reform security institutions to make them better at creating a secure environment for individuals and communities, in a way that is consistent with democratic norms and principles of good governance.[1] It differs from earlier approaches in that it attempts to understand the "security sector" holistically, as a linked institutional complex rather than a series of distinct organizational domains. It is also explicit in its ambition to link security provision to good governance and human rights, in particular to emphasize the security of individuals in any reform process that does take place rather than simply that of the state itself. It has been promoted as a new mechanism for addressing the problems of insecurity, development, and democratization in states undergoing processes of political transformation, and is an increasingly important component of a range of different activities by Western states and international organizations, from development assistance, to democracy promotion, to stabilization operations, peacekeeping, and even counter-insurgency.

This chapter examines the concept and practice of security sector reform and the extent to which it represents a workable and useful policy innovation. It argues that SSR has an important contribution to make as a mechanism for shaping, prioritizing, and coordinating the reform of security provision in transforming societies. It has the potential to join up policy, maintain coherence of effort, highlight connections and tensions where they exist and avoid stove-piping, both in relation to donor policies that aim to promote SSR, and to the actual implementation of these reforms within a country. However, it also points out that there remain a number of fault-lines and unresolved problems within the SSR project. These include questions of the scope of security sector reform in theory and practice, its goals, and the environment in which it takes place. It also suggests that to be successful, the actual practice of SSR must disaggregate down to focused policy activities and organizational specificities that are sensitive to local context and flexible in the manner in which they are implemented.

## Origins and scope

There has long been a recognition of the importance of the security sector to wider processes of political and economic transformation. The field of civil–military relations has always been concerned with the relationship between armed forces and governance and particularly the

question of civilian control over the military.[2] There is a similar, though less extensive, literature which considers the role of the police and intelligence agencies in politics and society.[3] There is also a long history of military and security assistance from Western actors to states in the developing world, whether as a legacy of postcolonial transition or as a component of strategic alliance building during the Cold War.[4] Even so, it was not until 1999 that security sector reform began to emerge as a distinct policy agenda. The term was first used by the UK's Department for International Development in the late 1990s.[5] However, its roots lay in three conceptual and geopolitical developments that came out of the immediate post-Cold War period.

The first of these was a new emphasis within the development community on the importance of security issues and actors to traditional development goals such as poverty reduction.[6] In part, this reflected a wider reassessment of the role of the state and so-called "good governance" in encouraging development.[7] However, it also emerged from new assumptions about the relationship between security and development more generally. These held that the provision of effective security should be seen as a laudable and necessary development goal in and of itself.[8] According to this view, societies and individuals will be unwilling or unable to engage in normal political or economic activity if their own security is precarious or threatened, and that this in turn undermines wider development goals.[9] In this context, security sector reform is a mechanism through which development actors can address the problem of insecurity and in so doing facilitate wider development goals.

Second, the role of the military and other security actors in society received new attention due to developments in the wider discipline of security studies, and particularly the emergence of the human security concept. Proponents of human security challenged the traditional primacy of the security of the state in the discipline, calling instead for a new focus on the security (and insecurity) of the individuals and communities within states.[10] Using this framework of analysis, scholars such as Ken Booth observed that the major threat to the security of the individual in many parts of the world was often actually the state itself, through the medium of its own repressive security forces.[11] This in turn implied that security sector reform within the state may at least be part of a solution to some human security dilemmas. If dysfunctional or predatory security forces were detrimental to security at the individual level, then reforming those forces to, for example, incorporate a better respect for human rights, could be a key strategy for ameliorating these problems.[12]

Finally, this period also saw a reinvigoration of the civil–military relations field in response to the multiple post-authoritarian transitions in Central and Eastern Europe following the collapse of communism. This refocused attention on the democratic control of armed forces and military reform in the post-communist region and later the Western Balkans.[13] Many of these states had politicized and militarized police and security forces in addition to their armed forces proper, which led to an increasing embrace of the wider concept of the "security sector"—rather than the more restrictive defense or military sector—to explain the role of "armed forces" in post-communist transitions.[14]

Against this background, security sector reform has emerged as an increasingly prominent policy tool for development, security, and foreign policy actors in states including the United States, the United Kingdom, Sweden, and Norway, and by organizations including the United Nations (UN), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union (EU), the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).[15] SSR activities have taken place in a wide range of different political and geographical contexts. These include transitional environments of various types, such as Central and Eastern Europe, the Western Balkans, South Africa, and more recently the Middle East and North Africa (MENA); weak state and post-conflict environments

such as Sierra Leone, Timor Leste, Bosnia, and Kosovo; and conflict-afflicted states such as Iraq and Afghanistan.

Yet there remain a number of ambiguities, tensions, and differentiations of practice within the security sector reform agenda as it currently stands. Perhaps the thorniest and most persistent of these is the question of scope: What *is* the security sector? Which international organizations and institutions fall under its remit? How ambitious or constrained should security sector reform aim to be? And what does this mean for the practical application of policy? As Mark Sedra has suggested, perhaps the main innovation of SSR is its focus on the governance of security within the state as a whole.[16] Such approaches emphasize human security over regime or even state security, and suggest the need for a holistic rather than a narrow understanding of security sector reform. This is reflected in what has emerged as perhaps the most authoritative and widely used definition of SSR, provided by the *OSCE/DAC Handbook on Security System Reform* (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe/Development Assistance Committee), which states:

> Security system reform is another term used to describe the transformation of the security system—which includes all the actors, their roles, responsibilities and actions—working together to manage and operate the system in a manner that is more consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance, and this contributes to a well-functioning security framework.[17]

This definition is notable because of its use of the term "system" rather than sector, indicating the continuing lack of consensus on even basic terminology within the SSR field, and also because it is exceptionally broad and ambitious in scale. At a minimum, it incorporates the full variety of different state security organizations under its remit, including the military, police, intelligence agencies, and so on. However, it also potentially brings in a wide spectrum of other state competencies, including issues of parliamentary oversight, judicial practice, and civil–society engagement. Indeed, its remit is potentially even wider, including institutions such as courts and prisons as well as informal security providers such as neighborhood defense groups, private security guards, or even warlord groups or rebel forces.

There is much to be welcomed about such an approach. It is a recognition of the sheer variety of different institutions and actors that contribute to security provision in many states. In many post-authoritarian or post-conflict environments, for example, there is considerable proliferation, overlap, and competition between different institutions of security, be these armed forces, police, intelligence agencies, or other actors. So, for example, in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) after the fall of Slobodan Milosevic, the "security sector" comprised the federal armed forces, two heavily militarized, republic-level police forces (those of Serbia and Montenegro), a proliferation of military and police special units within these, and at least five different intelligence agencies.[18] All of these groups represented autonomous or semi-autonomous actors in the FRY's transition to democracy, and most had the potential to influence or even veto the transition in various ways. In conflict or post-conflict environments such as Afghanistan or the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the picture is likely to be even more complex and fragmented.[19]

The concept of the security sector is helpful under these circumstances because it encourages a focus on the common character of the problems that such institutions and actors present, rather than what can sometimes be rather notional organizational and institutional distinctions imposed from outside. So, for example, in the case of the FRY, the question of civilian control over the armed forces during the country's democratic transition after 2000 could not simply concern the military on their own. In fact, the Ministry of the Interior and the police forces had

been heavily militarized and politicized by Milosevic over the previous decade, and special units within these had functioned as the main line of defense for the regime.[20] Similar inter-penetration of the military and police spheres is common in many parts of the world. Alice Hills, for example, argues that paramilitarism is a "defining characteristic" of many police, while conversely, the military themselves often have important internal security and policing roles.[21]

A second advantage of the holistic approach is that it explicitly recognizes the relationship between security institutions and governance. This has not always been the case in earlier Western defense and security assistance efforts, which were often framed in terms of development assistance but in practice amounted to little more than narrow "train and equip" programs focused on specific security institutions.[22] The impact of such initiatives was not always positive. In Latin America, for example, Cold War-era military assistance programs that aimed at professionalizing armed forces and improving their counterinsurgency capacities, in practice, contributed to widespread human rights abuses and arguably to the consolidation of military regimes across the continent.[23] Even in cases where such initiatives did incorporate explicitly normative elements, such as the UK police assistance to Nigeria and Zimbabwe in the 1980s and 1990s, these often foundered because they took place in isolation from the wider political and societal context in which these organizations were located.[24] In contrast, SSR makes an explicit link between what happens to security institutions themselves and the wider political environment in which these changes take place. It recognizes that security sector organizations do not exist in isolation from the wider polity of which they are a part; they are nested within it, influenced by it, and they themselves exert an influence on it.[25]

The security sector reform agenda is thus both a reflection of and response to the institutional complexities and linkages that are inherent to security provision in many contemporary societies. At the level of strategic policy planning, it is an encouragement to think about security reform in a joint way; to make connections where they exist and to avoid actions in one area that may be counterproductive in others. However, translating such ambition into practice is easier said than done. Indeed, the very institutional complexity security sector reform attempts to accommodate presents considerable challenges of policy implementation in practice. It potentially incorporates a huge range of different actors, activities and policy spheres and political environments. Additionally, while there have certainly been a number of security sector reform "success stories," in post-Communist Europe particularly, elsewhere its track record has been rather mixed.

## Goals

Security sector reform is self-consciously normative. It is about a particular *type* of reform in the security sector; one that is democratic in orientation and consistent with human security goals. This normativity is expressed through two main spheres of activity in most SSR programs: The political level and the organizational level. Security sector reform at the political level addresses issues associated with the governance of security, and specifically of the security sector. It is concerned primarily with the establishment and consolidation of mechanisms for civilian and democratic control over the security sector, including issues of oversight, transparency, and accountability.[26] It thus incorporates not just the instruments of security—the army, police, intelligence agencies, and so on—but also the wider institutional complex in which they sit, including the bureaucracies through which they are administered, the legislative framework through which they are regulated, and the mechanisms through which they are overseen and held accountable.

Security sector reform at the organizational level addresses reform within the security sector itself. It is often bound up with questions of effectiveness, efficiency, and affordability, including

professionalization and the reorientation of security sector organizations from authoritarian or conflict-era roles to ones more appropriate to normative standards of good governance and democracy.[27] In weak states or those emerging from conflict, the principal aim of organizational level SSR is often to establish or consolidate the capacity of the state to provide physical security to its citizens in the first place, while SSR may also be interlinked with issues of the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants.[28] All security sector reform also generally includes an important international dimension, by showing how donor states can encourage and promote SSR through activities such as technical assistance programs or conditionality.[29]

A variety of normative and operational frameworks detail standards by which to evaluate security sector reform.[30] All share certain broad normative benchmarks for success, which in principle are relevant to all circumstances where they are applied. These are perhaps best encapsulated by the most widely recognized common standard for security sector reform, the OECD/DAC Guidelines and the *OECD/DAC Handbook*.[31] The benchmarks are built on four main pillars:

1  Develop a clear and effective institutional framework for providing security that includes all relevant actors and focuses on the vulnerable.
2  Strengthen the governance and oversight of security institutions.
3  Build capable and professional security forces that are accountable to civil authorities and open to dialogue with civil society organizations.
4  Promote the sustainable delivery of justice and security.[32]

The details of what these pillars mean in practice is likely to be determined by an individual country's circumstances and the organizational and institutional specificities of the security sector in any given case. Even so, they are likely to include initiatives aimed at establishing civilian and democratic control of the security sector, strengthening bureaucratic capacity for its management and administration, and the professionalization of security sector organizations in ways that encourage not only their effectiveness but also their respect for human rights and the rule of law.

Despite a general consensus on these broad goals, security sector reform has yet to establish itself as a universally agreed policy agenda, and retains within it a number of points of tension and even contradiction. Perhaps the most prominent of these concerns the character of the environment in which it is conducted. On the one hand, there has been a series of SSR programs targeted at states that can broadly be considered to be "post-authoritarian" or "transitional" in nature. These include the countries of post-communist Europe and the Western Balkans, South Africa, and more recently several from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, such as Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya. These cases share a number of features. For the most part, they represent coherent state entities, with formal and broadly legitimate security sector organizations—armed forces, police, and so on—established bureaucratic and institutional mechanisms for governing their activities, and active civil societies that can participate in the political process.[33]

Security sector reform in such environments is rarely without challenge. The security sector itself, or elements of it, will generally have played a key role in supporting and upholding the authority of the previous regime. Its interests and influence may have been bound to the regime in various ways, whether through generous budgetary allocations, privileges for its members, or implication in abuses the regime may have carried out. Reforms aimed at bringing the security sector under civilian control, professionalizing its activities and seeking redress for past activities may directly threaten its institutional interests, or that of powerful individuals within it.[34] Security sector actors may be tempted to intervene directly in the political process in order to

either veto or otherwise influence the nature of the changes that are taking place.[35] Conversely, civilian actors themselves may try to draw elements of the security sector into domestic politics in order to support their own partisan interests or political struggles.[36] At the organizational level, groups such as the police and security services will often face a fundamental change in their roles, from ones centered around the defense of the regime to one more consistent with norms of democratic policing.[37]

Even so, security sector reform has had some notable successes. The post-communist states of Central Europe established civilian and democratic control over their armed forces early on and were able to fundamentally transform communist-era police and internal security practices.[38] In the Western Balkans, states such as Serbia and Croatia have followed a similar path, albeit one which was complicated by the experience of conflict and atrocity during the regional wars of the 1990s.[39] In South Africa, security sector reform was a key element of that country's processes of post-apartheid democratization and reconciliation.[40] These experiences suggest a benchmark against which such reforms may be premised, and an example of the kinds of activities that may be possible where a political process, functioning state, and security apparatus are in place.

The outlook for security sector reform is considerably more opaque and difficult in environments where the state itself is weak or fragmented. This is obviously the case in conflict or post-conflict environments such as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) or Afghanistan, where the authority and legitimacy of the government may be weak; openly (and violently) contested; dependent on an external military presence; and/or have little writ beyond the environs of the capital city.[41] Even where the state is at least notionally present, patterns of governance, authority, and civil society may not follow the model of the modern Western state. In many African nations, for example, the state does not represent any pre-existing or extant political community or any coherent notion of civil society. Under such circumstances, there is no guarantee or even likelihood that public institutions will function in the interest of the state, or that the security sector will act to enforce collective order.[42] Instead, its elements can often serve as vehicles for individual or sectional interests, while security on the ground may be delivered through a variety of different informal or non-statutory mechanisms such as militias or vigilante groups.[43]

Of course, it was exactly in response to the problems of development presented by various kinds of states that some of the main drivers of the SSR agenda first emerged. The experience of Sierra Leone, which shared many of these problems, but has enjoyed relative success in security sector reform since the end of its civil war in 2002, demonstrates that this is not a wholly hopeless endeavor.[44] However, the ambition and character of SSR in such fragmented polities is of a different scale to the more straightforward post-authoritarian cases discussed above. Part of the rationale for the security sector reform agenda in the first place is that the provision of effective and legitimate security will help to facilitate other aspects of development.[45] If, however, there *is* no state monopoly on collective force in the first place, or if state security institutions are themselves primarily tools for private interests, then the goals of the SSR agenda become inextricably linked to foundational issues of governance and state-building.

These are tasks which are likely to lie beyond the remit of even the most holistic interpretations of the security sector reform agenda, and on which it is, in many ways, dependent. Certainly in South Africa, post-communist Europe, and the Western Balkans, security sector reform took place in the context of wider political changes that were broadly in line with the normative goals of the SSR agenda. While SSR in Sierra Leone took place under considerably more challenging circumstances, even here, the commitment to democratic SSR was present at the highest political level from 1998 onwards.[46] In all cases, there were moments where security

sector actors could have played a decisive role in influencing or obstructing change if they had chosen or been allowed to, particularly at the immediate point of political transition. However, in most other respects SSR complemented and facilitated pre-existing processes of democratization and political change, rather than causing or catalyzing them in and of itself.

In many weak or fragmented state environments, these basic normative synergies may be completely absent or even contradictory. At the political level, for example, mechanisms for the democratic control of armed forces or the sound management of the defense budgets are likely to have little impact in states where democratic politics has little purchase or where public institutions struggle to function. At the organizational level, on the one hand, reforms aimed at making security sector actors more effective and efficient in, for example, enforcing the rule of law or stamping out corruption, may run directly counter to the interests of key political elites and local power structures.[47] On the other hand, reforms aimed at improving or strengthening state security institutions may actually aggravate the insecurities of many ordinary people if those same institutions go on to behave in a repressive or predatory manner.[48]

The risk in all these cases is that the goals and prescriptions of the security sector reform agenda are so at odds with extant practices of governance that they become irrelevant to local circumstances, counterproductive for improving basic security, or undermined to such a degree that the foundational principles of the SSR agenda are destroyed or coopted.[49] In response, donors have tended to fall back on more modest interpretations of what the security sector reform agenda means in practice. In cases such as the DRC or Nepal, this has taken the form of limited DDR initiatives rather than SSR proper. In Iraq, Afghanistan, or Sri Lanka, it has, in effect, meant a return to the more limited "train and equip" habits of the past.[50] Such approaches have largely been a consequence of the constraints and difficulties that donors have faced in implementing holistic security sector reforms in environments that are not obviously conducive to their success. As Mark Sedra observes, they reflect an understandable tendency for donors "[to] revert to what they know, what is easier and what they have the capacity to accomplish in short time frames when faced with major challenges."[51] Even so, the absence of a governance component from such activities means they often have more in common with their security assistance predecessors than with security sector reform as originally envisaged, and indeed share many of the problems characteristic of such programs.

## Towards a problem–driven approach to SSR

In the light of these difficulties, it seems reasonable to ask what the future for security sector reform might be, particularly in those weak state environments for which it was, at least in part, originally conceived. It has been argued here that, on one level, SSR can act as a kind of strategic placeholder to conceptualize and join up the role of security actors in wider processes of development and political change. However, the very breadth and ambition of security sector reform, its normativity, and the diversity of environments in which it might be applied can make it a poor guide to practical policy-making. The final section of this chapter suggests that these problems are surmountable. However, they require a reorientation of the SSR agenda from one dominated by top-down conceptual prescription to a more context-sensitive, bottom–up approach.

The first element of this is to take a problem-driven approach to the question of what SSR actually is and what it entails. While the holistic definition of security sector reform captures the complexity and interdependence of security provision in many transforming societies, it is a poor guide to specific SSR policy initiatives. Part of the reason for this is due to the sheer diversity of actors, roles, and functions that fall within the remit of security sector reform. Most

obviously, there are the main institutional distinctions between the armed forces, police, and security services. However, there are also important differentiations and linkages to be made within and between these groups. For example, special units in the police and army that may have played particularly politicized roles in the past may require a different lens from conscript forces, traffic police, criminal investigation branches, and so on.[52] In fragmented state environments, the range of different security actors is likely to be even wider. Each of these groups may have different interests and agendas in—and pose different problems for—security sector reform. They may also have different levels of significance at different points in the reform process. The police, for example, may have a less dramatic influence on the immediate point of change, but may be of central importance to democratic consolidation and good governance later on.[53]

Security sector reform is ill-served by trying to impose some kind of homogeneous or homogenizing external framework on such complexity. Where SSR programs have been successful, they have been able to combine a strategic conception of the challenges faced by the security sector in any given case, with a much narrower series of often institutionally specific reform initiatives in practice. Thus, in most Central and East European and Western Balkans cases, the strategic agenda of security sector reform was holistic and coherent, incorporating democratic, civilian control of the security sector and organizational reform of the military, police, and security services, in line with NATO and EU standards and norms.[54] The actual practice of making and supporting these reforms, however, devolved down to specific initiatives tailored to particular institutions and problems, whether those were training programs for parliamentarians tasked with oversight of the defense budget, redrafting of legislation governing the security services, or the demilitarization of the police. Each of these activities formed part of an overall process of security sector reform, yet each was also operationally specific in practice and content, and ultimately problem-driven in nature. Security sector reform in these cases did not function as a monolithic mega-project, but as a strategic umbrella under which a series of discrete, though interconnected, reform activities could be prioritized and coordinated. Similar patterns were visible in both South Africa and Sierra Leone.[55]

Sensitivity to context is also important when it comes to the goals and ambition of the SSR agenda. The question of "local ownership" is recognized in most security sector reform programs in one way or another.[56] This often raises tensions in practice, however, particularly given the overtly normative goals of the SSR agenda. As discussed above, security sector reform may directly threaten elite interests or challenge local governance structures. Even in countries undergoing an overtly democratic process of political change, local actors face their own constraints and priorities, which may prevent them from implementing reforms as fully or swiftly as they might otherwise like, often particularly in relation to the security sector.[57] These might include the need to manage volatile political coalitions, to respond to the domestic electorate, or to tread carefully with nascent interventionist security sector actors.[58] There is also the question of whose ownership should be prioritized, particularly in fragmented political environments with multiple different actors, interests, and constituencies.[59] This can be a particular problem with train-and-equip type programs, whose result may simply be to improve the capacity of repressive, praetorian, or predatory institutions to continue with those behaviors. In this context, what may be in the interest of one set of local owners (the regime) might not be in the interest of others (individuals within it).

In some cases, taking local ownership seriously may simply be a case of recognizing that the time for security sector reform has not yet come. This obviously applies to openly authoritarian societies such as Zimbabwe today or Serbia under Slobodan Milosevic. However, it may also be the case in states such as Pakistan, where the security sector's influence (in this case, the military and intelligence apparatus) in politics is so entrenched that it abrogates any moves toward

practical change. Under these circumstances, donors may still have options to influence and incentivize actors within the security sector, but real reform in the sense that it is widely understood and has been discussed above is not likely to be feasible.[60]

Even where countries *are* undergoing political changes in line with the democratizing agenda of security sector reform, successful SSR promotion policies are often less about imposing models of best practice from outside, and more about thinking creatively of ways to engage with domestic circumstance to incentivize reformers—and indeed recidivists—to invest political capital in pushing through change. In Central and Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans, for example, the twin carrots of NATO and EU integration played a key role in focusing the attention of local political actors on SSR issues.[61] While the potency of these particular incentives are probably specific to a particular geopolitical moment in Europe and unlikely to be widely repeatable, there may be others that can be offered to encourage local buy-in to security sector reform. Examples may include the kinds of security assistance packages and cooperation agreements that have characterized Western engagement with MENA countries such as Libya, Egypt, and Tunisia since the political upheavals of 2011. In and of themselves, such initiatives are unlikely to be able to change the political ground rules of civil-security sector activities in these countries or create the motivation for security sector reform in the first place. However, where such processes are already nascent or ongoing, they may assist in shaping the direction of change and motivating local actors to engage with them.

Elsewhere, government authority may be fragmented or contested to such a degree that basic questions of state formation, conflict termination, or DDR precede any realistic prospect of security sector reform, certainly in relation to its grander aspirations towards state capacity building and democratization.[62] Even so, there may be elements of the SSR agenda that can find purchase without losing sight entirely of its good governance aspirations. Context is important here, as too is sensitivity to local security circumstances and governance patterns. As Eric Scheye and Gordon Peake observe, for many people living in insecure environments, the public demand for safety and order can override concerns over issues of accountability or human rights, even where these exist or are well understood.[63] Indeed, local priorities in relation to the security sector, and the notion of "good governance" more generally, can often be more limited and pragmatic than the elaborate normative frameworks that characterize some SSR programs and activities.[64] At the same time, it may simply be the case that state institutions will not realistically be in any position to deliver security and order to large parts of their populations in the near term.[65]

Under these circumstances, recognizing and working within such local conditions may provide better opportunities for external actors to support local efforts towards security building, even if such activities are limited and depart from common Western norms and practices.[66] Examples might include UNDP initiatives in Haiti and Southern Sudan to strengthen non-statutory or informal security mechanisms such as community security funds or violence reduction committees, or various gang violence reduction programs in El Salvador and Brazil.[67] In Sierra Leone, security sector reform was successful at "normalizing" the provision of security and order in the country, even if it was not able to transform it completely. As Alice Hills describes it, by 2007, Sierra Leone's security apparatus was "again shaped by pervasive petty corruption, patronage, mismanagement, social exclusion and the military's questionable loyalty to the government. It was, however, minimal compared to what had gone before."[68] Such initiatives depart from orthodox SSR in that they engage with illiberal and ultimately normatively undesirable patterns of local security provision. However, they help to address the real problems experienced by ordinary people on the ground, and work with, rather than against, the grain of resilient local realities of social order.

# Conclusion

It would be wrong to conceive of security sector reform as representing a new dawn for the field of civil–military relations, or indeed for development and security policy more widely. As a holistic policy agenda, its track record of success is mixed, and to date limited to states undergoing pre-existing and complementary processes of democratization and political change. Where it has been successful, it has consisted of a series of interconnected, though organizationally discrete, activities that address issues in which there has been a long-established interest within the more traditional fields of civil–military relations, police studies, and intelligence studies. Yet it would also be a mistake to dismiss security sector reform as simply being old wine in new bottles. Indeed, there is much about the SSR agenda that is novel and to be welcomed. Perhaps most significantly, it is both a response to and a reflection of the challenges of implementing democratic security reforms in environments that do not reflect the ideal institutional distinctions visible in the security sectors of many Western states, or in which political fragmentation and complexity necessitate a multifaceted approach to security provision and security actors. Security sector reform is also an encouragement to consider the governance implications of security assistance programs, and a reminder that outcomes can rarely be divorced from the wider political context in which they take place.

   Security sector reform does not work best when understood as an operational policy in and of itself. It is too broad in conception and too unwieldy in practice to act as a policy guide for specific and distinct organizational reforms. Neither is it well served by a top-down, "cookie cutter"-style approach,which aims to impose externally derived models of best practice on diverse and complex local environments. Instead, it is best conceived as a strategic framework within which to understand and plan specific security reforms appropriate to any given context, in ways that are not counterproductive to good governance and human security goals. SSR in this sense should function as a mechanism to prioritize, sequence, and coordinate reforms in the security sector broadly defined, while leaving the specifics of what those reforms actually consist of, and what they entail in practice, to be determined by the nature of the problem on the ground and the institutional specificities of relevant actors, groups, and organizations. This then is a vision of security sector reform that is strategic (and holistic) in conception but narrow (and institutionally specific) in operationalization. It is also one that incorporates, builds on, and complements existing practice and experience in civil–military relations, police studies, and other relevant fields, rather than one that attempts to reinvent the wheel.

# Notes

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# 6

# ESCAPE FROM HUNTINGTON'S LABYRINTH

## Civil–military relations and comparative politics

*José A. Olmeda*

This chapter contributes to ongoing debates about the direction of research in civil–military relations, through an analysis of the components of the field of study, its key concept of civilian control, and new data on the scope, objectives, and methods of research. It will do so through an analysis of the field's most characteristic journal, *Armed Forces & Society*. The chapter will show that some problematic methodological practices are widespread and thus pose serious obstacles to the production and accumulation of knowledge in the subfield.

How are civil–military relations conceptualized and operationalized? What does civilian control mean as a concept in social science? How can we measure it? Are there ever acceptable military interventions in democratic politics? Is civilian micromanagement acceptable in the professional military sphere? Is there a scholarly consensus on these matters? In sum, we are trying to move beyond the simple formula, "No coup, no problem," which is one of the greatest obstacles to serious thinking about the subject.[1] A clear and consistent conceptualization is essential when answering the above questions, in order to assess whether there has been any process to refine definitions, which could be used to make sense of the diverse literature on the military in politics, both from a general and historical perspective and from that of a specialist. What is needed is a concept of civilian control valid for all seasons, from peacetime to war, from peacekeeping to the maximum use of force by democratic regimes in different parts of the globe, if such a generalization is valid for the phenomena under study.

We need to define civilian control and its possible indicators to determine which social facts are being observed, and their relationship to one another. This step is extremely important because sometimes highly developed theoretical concepts become empirically vague. Without a set of clear criteria by which to judge the value of the indicators that lead one to classify a regime of civilian control as weak or strong, it is simply impossible to ascertain whether or not civilian control, as envisioned in the Western cases, truly applies to regimes in Brazil, Chile, or Uruguay, or further afield in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia.

The chapter proceeds in the following fashion. First, it examines the structure of civil–military relations as a field of study. Second, it surveys a sample of the literature on civilian control of armed forces. Third, the chapter assesses the different uses of these concepts and the direction of

civil–military relations research, as derived from an analysis of contributions to the journal *Armed Forces & Society*.

## Defining the field of study: From civil–military relations to *Armed Forces & Society*

Is there any distinction between civil–military relations and civilian control? The subtitle of Samuel Huntington's classic book *The Soldier and the State* is *The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*, and here begin some of the misunderstandings. It has been more than 50 years since Huntington published his seminal book on civilian control (in 1957), soon followed by leading sociologist Morris Janowitz's book on the professional soldier, and later by political scientist Samuel E. Finer's volume on military intervention in politics (published in 1962).[2] The three of them are ritually invoked in the theory section of innumerable papers, articles, and books on this topic. In Chapter 1, Tom Bruneau discussed in depth the basic conceptual flaws in Huntington's theory and the pervasive nature of his legacy for the development of the field. There is no need to repeat that discussion here, but only to give the reader some background, as an introduction to the empirical analysis of *Armed Forces & Society* which is the main body of this chapter.

The publication of Huntington's book brought an onslaught of academic trouble and criticism. In later interviews, he explained that he became interested in the topic because "Truman had fired MacArthur, and so [it] seemed important." Huntington was denied tenure at Harvard on grounds of having published "an argument for authoritarianism," in the words of Carl Friedrich.[3] He received acerbic reviews in academic journals and general publications. Yet, he considered the arguments of his first book to be among his best ideas because they "are still being debated, questioned, and used," but he considered too that the book "has been misinterpreted." Regarding methodological tools, he confessed he doesn't "think much about method. I don't consciously try to pursue or define a method." Finally, Huntington openly recognized that his book "certainly had implicit – in fact, fairly explicit – ideas on how civil–military relations should be ordered."[4] The academic reviewers were no less critical, with the exception of one military commentator.[5]

Huntington points out that "civil-military relations is the principal institutional component of military security policy," and it is the result of the interaction of two forces: "a functional imperative stemming from the threats to the society's security, and a societal imperative arising from the social forces, ideologies, and institutions dominant within the society." The principal focus of civil–military relations is the relation of the officer corps to the state. The emergence of a professional officer corps created the modern problem of civil–military relations in Europe and North America: the relation of the expert to the politician. These relations have two levels:

> On the power level, the key issue is the power of the officer corps relative to civilian groups within society; on the ideological level, the key issue is the compatibility of the professional military ethic with the political ideologies prevailing in society.

However, later on, he adds a third dimension, professionalism, to power and ideology, when elaborating a typology of civil–military relations.[6]

Huntington defines civil–military relations as a field of study in a very broad manner, but in the end, all that counts is whether there is objective civilian control or not. As Bruneau explained in Chapter 1, Huntington defines this concept with a tautology: "A professional military obeyed civilian authority. A military that did not obey was not professional."[7] It is

interesting to note that Huntington did not use civilian control in his analysis of political modernization and development, but chose praetorianism instead. In fact, when he studied the sources of military intervention during political modernization, he dismissed Janowitz for pointing to the characteristics of military establishments (e.g., their ethos of public service, their skill structure, their internal cohesion) as reasons for this intervention.[8] But are not these traits necessary components of military professionalism?

A change of perspective could give us perhaps a better insight. From a methodological point of view, this area of study has mainly been divided into two disciplinary streams since its inception, one belonging to political science (Huntington, Finer), which restricts the field just to civil–military relations, and the other to sociology (Janowitz, and his main intellectual heir in sociology, Charles C. Moskos), which enlarges the area of study to include related matters. These two disciplinary approaches differ in terms of the breadth of the subject to research and the methods to do it, as will become apparent in the analysis of contributions to *Armed Forces & Society*.

Though both sociologists and political scientists (Janowitz, Finer, and Raymond Aron) were among the founders of the emblematic journal of the field in 1974, the name of *Armed Forces & Society*, echoing Max Weber, is clearly a sociological designation. According to Janowitz, the journal was going to focus on an interdisciplinary and international approach to the topics of armed forces and society, war, revolution, arms control, and peacekeeping. Its objects of research would be military institutions and their relationships with other socio-political phenomena.[9] In fact, before and since then there has been some intent to build a unifying discipline devoted to "military sociology," but this attempt again served to divide its adherents.[10]

Gwyn Harries-Jenkins, the British sociologist, and Moskos tried to map this putative area of study in a bibliographic essay in the journal *Current Sociology* in 1981. They organized the classification of the existing literature under three headings: First, the military professional and the military organization; second, civil–military relations; and third, the sociology of war and armed group conflict.[11] In fact, even as they stopped resurrecting the old paradigm of civil–military relations, the heading they used for their article was the subtitle of Huntington's book, "The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations," thus they had to wrap up the different segments again under the old umbrella of armed forces and society, broadening the field in different disciplinary directions but dividing it again with new methodological boundaries. In practice, there has been a division of labor between political scientists devoted to the narrow concept of civil–military relations as civilian control, and sociologists devoting themselves to the rest of the field.

## Concepts of civilian control: A sample of the literature

As a result of this cross-fertilization of political science and sociology, there has been a rich and diverse literature on military intervention in politics and *coups d'état*, the military as a political actor, and military regimes. But the mainstream field of political science and comparative politics had not included the military dimension in its analysis of democratic settings until very recently. For example, one of the most important theorists of democracy, Robert Dahl, did not include civilian control of the military in his original scholarship on polyarchy, although he did so later, if only briefly.[12] Adam Przeworski and Philippe Schmitter, two of the leading scholars on democratic consolidation, though they mentioned civilian control as an important condition for democratization, did not go into any detail about the issues, actors, and institutions involved.[13] There were nevertheless some exceptions in this literature on democratic consolidation, now perhaps a bit dated, and some excellent contributions on the role of the military in the transitional

and early consolidation phases of the new democracies.[14] It also should be noted that, as Larry Diamond, a leading contemporary scholar in the field of democracy studies, points out, civilian supremacy in civil–military relations is one of the most important attributes of democracy.[15] In their analysis of comparative politics journals, however, Munck and Snyder found only 2.5 percent of articles devoted to the military and police.[16] Thus, civil–military relations and civilian control have been incorporated by mainstream political science rarely and only lately, mainly because the third wave of democratization that began in 1974 demanded a more cogent approach.

In addition to these obstacles, some of the definitions for civilian control used in comparative research are a bit fuzzy and/or extremely difficult to test empirically. For example, in a comparative case study of developed and non-developed countries, co-authored by one of the former editors of *Armed Forces & Society* (*AF&S*), is the definition:

> Civilian control is not a matter of levels of social and economic development, nor of maximizing the professionalism of the military, nor even of a distribution of political power overwhelmingly favorable to civilian groups. Civilian control exist if the officer corps has internalized the value of civilian supremacy as part of its ethical makeup.[17]

In an edited volume by the same author:

> Civilian control, however, is more a *set of relationships* than an individual *event* [Emphasis in the original.] Civilian control is a matter of degree. All armed forces participate in politics in various fashions. They cannot be precluded from the political arena, given their organizational identity, autonomy, and functional specialization … The key issue in civilian control is one of setting limits within which members of the armed forces, and the military as an institution, accept the government's definition of appropriate areas of responsibility. Put in this perspective, civilian control means that the military lobbies as do other parts of the government; seeks to carry out a relatively specific set of policy objectives; and employs channels of decision-making within the military that do not breach its integrity as an institution, or, alternatively, ensures that this organizational integrity is subordinated to political institutions such as parties. The armed forces thereby accept subordinate roles in the political system … A continuum of relationships exists between the power of the military and the power of civilian institutions relative to the enunciation, development, and implementation of policy.[18]

But how can we measure the internalization of civilian supremacy in the officer corps? Can the military collectively lobby in the enunciation, development, and implementation of policy without trespassing the limits of civilian control? If so, how? With this brief review of the literature on civil–military relations, we can see how the field has evolved narrowly around civilian control and little else. One might add that there is also a lack of conceptual communication among the different streams of the literature on both sides of the Atlantic. Only very recently have several comparative works sought to fill different gaps in the literature on civil–military relations in democratic polities.[19]

Part of the classic comparative literature on military intervention or extrication from politics in developing countries has used a simple continuum to describe the spectrum of its involvement: From a situation of military influence under civilian control at one end to military control of government at the other end. But the conditions that lead the military to intervene in politics or to disengage from power are extremely varied, sometimes uncontrollable, and even

contradictory. In addition, there are not explicit criteria for case selection, nor have clear hypotheses testing the framework been adopted.[20]

Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a revival of interest in civil–military relations as a topic of research, especially in the exceptional case of the United States, for many reasons. David Pion-Berlin, a leading scholar on Latin America, has usefully adapted the paradigms and analytical perspectives of research communities in comparative politics developed by Mark Lichbach: Rationalist (strategic action); structuralist (institutions); and culturalist (ideas, beliefs, and interpretations).[21] Using these labels, it is worth taking a moment to look briefly at recent contributions to the study of the United States, in order of publication.

Michael Desch, the leading scholar in the structural approach to civil–military relations, was the first to address theory building and testing in the recent renaissance of civil–military relations literature. His dependent variable is civilian control, which is defined by the extent to which civilian policy preferences prevail over military preferences when the two diverge. To explain variations in this variable, Desch develops a structural realist model based on the nature and intensity of the external and internal threats facing the state, to generate a two-by-two table. The direction of the threat determines the orientation of military organizations. The best civilian control is to be found when there is a high external threat and low internal threat. The worst scenario appears with a low external threat and high internal threat. The other two threat configurations are indeterminate. Desch tested his model with case studies of twentieth-century civil–military relations in eight countries.[22]

Eliot Cohen, one of the leading strategic studies professors and a former advisor in the U.S. Departments of State and of Defense, has a very convincing argument, though it is not clear whether he would agree to being labeled as belonging to the culturalist paradigm. Based upon four well-researched case studies (Lincoln, Clemenceau, Churchill, and Ben Gurion), he contends that the great war leaders do not accept an artificial separation between civilian and military spheres of decision-making. Cohen writes, "Politics pervades all of war: the notion that politicians step aside during it is empirically untrue and theoretically undesirable."[23] Since war is a ruthless and cruel business, successful wartime leaders must combine strategic vision with tactical flexibility and understand that wars have to be fought with a view beyond the next battle to the peace that will follow. These leaders communicate their vision not only to the public and their allies, but also to their generals, and if the latter cannot or will not find an appropriate military way to the goal, the leaders replace them with others who can and will. Civilian leaders must be intensely involved in an unequal dialogue with military advisors, intimately involved in planning and supervising, always "querying, prodding, suggesting, arbitrating," and occasionally overruling their military advisors. Cohen recommends that policy-makers

> immerse themselves in the conduct of their wars no less than in their great projects of domestic legislation; that they must master their military briefs as thoroughly as they do their civilian ones; that they must demand and expect from their military subordinates a candor as bruising as is necessary; that both groups must expect a running conversation in which although civilian opinion will not usually dictate, it must dominate; and that conversation will cover not only ends and policies, but ways and means.[24]

If professionalism is a marker of the sociological influence in political science, Peter Feaver belongs to the rationalist paradigm, and he exemplifies very well the importation of ideas from economics: Principal–agent theory in this case. Feaver's agency theory marks a great advance in the conceptualization of civilian control. He has provided us with an attractively parsimonious theoretical framework to develop a rich descriptive and prescriptive theory of civil–military

relations.[25] The question for Feaver is how civilians monitor the military, and what sorts of expectations they have about how faithfully the military will do what civilians want. In the vocabulary of principal–agent theory, will the military "work or shirk?" Civilians may monitor, intrusively or not, to ensure that the military works the way they intend. The military, for its part, decides whether to work or to shirk (that is, do something other than what the civilians want) on the basis of its preferences about whether its shirking will be detected and, if so, whether it will be punished. Shirking is defined as anything short of full obedience, including overestimating potential costs and casualties, constraining options, or leaking details to political allies and the media to undercut elected officials. Feaver reduces the unequal dialogue between soldiers and statesmen about policy aims and means to tacit examinations of oversight and possible punishments. However, evidence to document the values of his variables is not always easy to find or, once found, conclusive. Civilian authorities and military professionals do not act solely as rational and self-interested, or as unitary actors. It is difficult to measure the influence of normative commitments or effects stemming from multiple-principal or multiple-agent problems. Surely military subordination to civilian officials is a necessary condition for democracy (as it may be for authoritarian regimes as well). Yet democracy requires more from civil–military relations than military obedience.[26]

Dale Herspring, a well-regarded professor of political science, belongs explicitly to the culturalist paradigm, which takes a military culture perspective. He analyzes the three parties most closely engaged in U.S. national security issues: The president and his office, the Pentagon (the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs), and Congress, from the 1940s through this century's first decade. Respect for the military culture and understanding of that culture by a president and his civilian cabinet members fostered trust and understanding, in spite of some tough policy, operational, or budget decisions that were made contrary to the Chiefs' desires or plans. Lack of trust and understanding in most cases leads to disrespect and distrust, and hence dysfunction.[27]

Tom Bruneau is leading an effort to expand comparative civil–military relations literature beyond the narrow focus on civilian control to include the effectiveness and efficiency with which militaries fulfill their roles and missions in the twenty-first century.[28] For him, democratic control depends less on the roles and missions that are assigned, such as the armed forces doing police work, than on a government's mix of security instruments (e.g., military services, intelligence apparatus, and police) and how the oversight and control mechanisms, including oversight and professionalization, are institutionalized. While there are some cases in which effectiveness in implementing roles and missions can be demonstrated, he believes that effectiveness is best determined by whether or not a state is prepared to fulfill any or all of six major roles: (1) fight, and be prepared to fight, external wars; (2) fight, and be prepared to fight, internal wars or insurgencies; (3) fight global terrorism; (4) fight internal or external crime; (5) provide support for humanitarian assistance; and (6) prepare for and execute peace support operations.[29] In sum, civilian control is fundamental, but it can become irrelevant if the instruments for achieving security cannot effectively fulfill their roles and missions. Finally, Bruneau contends that both control and effectiveness must be implemented at an affordable cost (efficiency), or they will vitiate other national priorities.

Finally, it is important to mention Christopher Gibson, a leading soldier scholar. Gibson builds on his previously developed concept of the "civil-military nexus, the top civilian and military advisers to the President and Congress who offer strategic analysis, develop options, and convey recommendations," to criticize both objective and subjective concepts of civilian control.[30] The former, he observes, fails to provide insights into the preponderance of civil–military interactions, while the latter micromanages a profession using political appointees who generally

have lesser practical experience—implying reduced effectiveness. As the civil–military nexus consists of structures and norms, such as civilian and military professional preparation, self-conceptions, and norms regulating national security decision-making, Gibson draws on new institutionalism to lay the methodological foundation of his approach.

Gibson briefly summarizes the military argument to explain the failures in civil–military relations during the Vietnam War and the subsequent "Vietnam syndrome," which would permeate U.S. politics until the 1991 Gulf War. He describes the conflicts in civil–military relations during the Clinton years to explain the political climate around Donald Rumsfeld's appointment as Secretary of Defense by President George W. Bush. Rumsfeld's controversial management style, though formally supported by the Goldwater–Nichols Act, ignited conflict with the top brass during his tenure as secretary.[31] This was the case particularly during planning for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. He marginalized the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and ignored their advisory role, to the point that the president approved the war plan for Iraq before receiving input from the JCS.[32] Two examples illustrate this conflict: The early retirement of Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki, and what has become known as "The Revolt of the Generals," when several senior flag officers, all retired, spoke out publicly in 2006 against both the military policies being pursued in Iraq and the civilian leaders who were most responsible for them.[33]

Gibson is in good company in his analysis of this last case. As Hew Strachan, the British military historian, has pointed out, strategy is the product of dialogue between politicians and soldiers, and its essence is the harmonization of the two elements, not the subordination of one to the other.[34] Strategy in war is a process. The issue for the U.S. armed forces is no longer that of overall political direction, but of coherence among policy, military capabilities, and the events on the ground. The National Security Council exists to make strategy—to align policy with operational capabilities. But in the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq, it did not do so. The clashes and competition between the State Department and the Department of Defense, like those between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and U.S. Central Command (the military command responsible for conducting the Middle East wars), were not reconciled, with the result that strategy fell through the cracks and operations suffered. The conduct of these wars illustrates why effectiveness is a vital, albeit neglected, dimension of civil–military relations.

Anthony Forster, one of the leading British scholars on this subject, has recently encouraged a reconceptualization of civil–military relations, to move scholars away from the old set of issues and toward a new research agenda.[35] He points out that despite the exciting times in which analysts, scholars, and practitioners are living, in the last decade of the twentieth century the subfield of civil–military relations has been remarkably stagnant, and few authors have ventured beyond the framework set out by Huntington, Finer, and Janowitz, the founding fathers of the field in modern times. Forster rightly notes several failures. First, the old paradigm has made a virtue of making explicit theoretical assumptions, preferring an empirical and often theory-free approach which merely describes events and processes and, on the basis of deduction, offers general-izations and insights. Second, this approach is implicitly rooted in analytical realism, in which states are conceptualized as cohesive unitary actors that monopolize relations with the outside world and define the national interest. Third, the study of civil–military relations has endured a sort of ghettoization due to the intellectual canonization of the field, which is typical of much of the research. One consequence has been to restrict the subject of the studies to the armed forces, which excludes paramilitaries, security forces, and intelligence services. Though Forster's belief in the fruitfulness of post-modern and feminist approaches is perhaps premature, his advice to develop a new research agenda along epistemological, ontological, and policy lines must be supported.

## The direction of research: An analysis of *Armed Forces & Society, 1989–2007*

To highlight the need for a comparative framework, this section draws on an empirical study by the author. In an effort to describe the field of civil–military relations based on the works of its students and practitioners, I analyzed articles in the premier journal of the subfield, *Armed Forces & Society*, between 1989 and 2007 (volume 15(2) to volume 34(1)).[36] This is, admittedly, a limited sample of the universe of work on civil–military relations, but *AF&S* is, in the words of Feaver, "the subfield's indispensable journal."[37]

Contributions to *AF&S* offer a remarkably comprehensive universe of available material on civil–military relations.[38] Our goal was to apply an analytical framework as similar as possible to that used by Geraldo L. Munck and Richard Snyder in their methodology study, "Debating the Direction of Comparative Politics," which is an analysis of existing research in comparative politics.[39] I hoped to emulate their contribution to the ongoing discussion on the disciplinary direction of comparative politics by applying it to the field of civil–military relations. Using their example, I sought to map the content of civil–military relations studies, by considering how authors in the field handle three broad elements of the research process: (1) The scope of research; (2) the objectives, as demonstrated in the kinds of information produced; and (3) the methods used, distinguishing between methods of theory generation and those of empirical analysis.[40]

The serious theoretical flaws in the analytical literature have impeded the accumulation of information and insight, as well as the refining of concepts, which in turn has trapped analysts on a conceptual treadmill, with a lot of activity but little gain. This applies equally to the U.S. case and other parts of the world, where there has been very little cross-fertilization because the literature on the United States has proven not to be amenable to comparative analysis.[41] Yet it need not be this way. As has been demonstrated over and over again by a number of researchers and scholars, comparative studies of the spread of democracies after the beginning of the Third Wave in 1974 brought a wealth of useful insight into the creation of democratic institutions.[42] By contrast, while the field of civil–military relations is replete with case studies, there have been very few comparative analyses.[43]

In their analysis of comparative politics, Munck and Snyder list 25 subject matters under five general rubrics.[44] For this study, we drew on 103 articles on the general topic of civil–military relations, out of the approximately 530 articles published over those 19 years of *AF&S*.[45] The sample breaks down into the following divisions as shown in Tables 6.1 and 6.2.

The data in Table 6.2 shows that the regions of the world tend to fall into two groups that receive unequal scrutiny from the researchers who contributed to *AF&S* during the study period. The first set of regions receives a roughly equal level of attention: North America (in this case, the United States and Canada, without Mexico) is studied in 18.9 percent of the

*Table 6.1* The substantive scope of civil–military relations, 1989–2007

| Subject matter | Articles (%) |
| --- | --- |
| Civil–military relations and/or civilian control | 70.8 |
| Coups | 12.6 |
| Military regimes/military rule | 6.8 |
| Military participation in or extrication from politics | 9.7 |
| Total | 100 |
| (N) | (103) |

*Source*: *Armed Forces & Society* data set (1989–2007).

*Table 6.2* Comparative attention to the regions of the world (%)

| Region | Comparative politics (CP) | Armed Forces & Society (AF&S) | Difference (CP-AF&S) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Western Europe | 41 | 10.5 | 30.5 |
| Latin America | 27.2 | 13.7 | 13.5 |
| East Asia | 20.3 | 10.5 | 9.8 |
| North America (Canada and the U.S.) | 17.0 | 18.9 | –1.9 |
| Soviet Union or post-Soviet republics | 11.8 | 9.5 | 2.3 |
| Middle East and North Africa | 11.5 | 6.3 | 5.2 |
| Eastern Europe | 10.8 | 10.5 | 0.3 |
| Oceania | 8.2 | – | 8.2 |
| South-East Asia | 6.9 | 2.1 | 4.8 |
| South Asia | 5.9 | 3.2 | 2.7 |
| Caribbean | 5.5 | 1.1 | 4.4 |
| Global | – | 2.1 | –2.1 |
| (N) | (319) | (95) | |

*Source*: Munck and Snyder, "Debating the Direction," p. 10; *Armed Forces & Society* data set (1989–2007).

articles; Latin America and the Caribbean (including Mexico) in 14.8 percent; sub-Saharan Africa in 11.6 percent; East Asia, Eastern Europe, and Western Europe equally in 10.5 percent; and the Soviet Union or post-Soviet republics in 9.5 percent. The second group garners strikingly fewer articles, considering that these areas are extremely important political and military conflict zones: The Middle East and North Africa are the focus of attention in 6.3 percent of the study's sample, South Asia in 3.2 percent, and South-East Asia in 2.1 percent of the articles. As opposed to *AF&S*, the field of comparative politics, which tends to concentrate on Western Europe, nevertheless studies the world's regions with a more even distribution of articles. Munck and Snyder raise a relevant point: "Comparativists thus do a good job providing broad coverage of the world's regions and have also made important strides to incorporate the study of the United States as part of comparative politics."[46] As noted previously however, the approach to analyzing civil–military relations in the United States, by contrast, has not been amenable to comparative work.

With regard to the temporal range of research, 43.1 percent of articles in *AF&S* adopt a short-term perspective, with a time span between one and five years, 31.6 percent between five and 20 years, and only 25.2 percent adopt a long-term perspective of more than 20 years.[47] In contrast, the majority of articles in comparative politics analyze a time span of more than 20 years.[48] This suggests that *AF&S* is more topical and more devoted to current affairs than is comparative politics in general.

The field of civil–military relations is strongly oriented toward empirical analysis, as is comparative politics, though the former gives more attention (9.7 percent) to theory generation than the latter (4.4 percent), as is shown in Table 6.3.[49]

The field nevertheless is much more oriented toward descriptive studies, *what* the state of the world is, rather than causal analysis, that is, accounts that seek to explain *why* the world is as it is. In comparative politics, the two types of study are more balanced, with 52 percent of publications being mainly descriptive (vs. 96.1 percent for civil–military relations), and 48 percent being mainly causal in orientation (vs. 3.9 percent).[50]

Concerning methodology, or *how* the research is carried out, we follow also the minimalist approach from Munck and Snyder, in the sense of "research that relies on words as opposed to

*Table 6.3* The objectives of research from *AF&S*

| Objectives | Options | Articles (%) | Aggregate options | Articles (%) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Theory and empirics | Theory generation | 9.7 | Theory generation | 49.5 |
| | Theory generation and empirical analysis | 39.8 | | |
| | Empirical analysis | 50.5 | Empirical analysis | 90.3 |
| | Total | 100.0 | | |
| Description and causation | Descriptive | 76.7 | Mainly descriptive | 96.1 |
| | Descriptive and causal, but primarily descriptive | 19.4 | | |
| | Descriptive and causal, but primarily causal | 3.9 | | |
| | Causal/mainly causal | 3.9 | | |
| | Total | 100.0 | | |

*Source*: *Armed Forces & Society* data set (1989–2007).

numbers." The prevailing method of theorizing in *AF&S* is inductive and the prevailing method of empirical research is qualitative (see Table 6.3). In comparative politics, 36.9 percent of research is deductive (vs. 2 percent for civil–military relations in *AF&S*), and 63.3 percent is qualitative (vs. 96.9 percent in *AF&S*). Concerning the issues of methodology, articles in *AF&S* strongly emphasize qualitative methods for both empirical analysis and theorizing (see Table 6.4). But Munck and Snyder rightly point out, "a considerable number of studies seem not to distinguish clearly between theory generation and empirical analysis as two distinct steps in the research process; they thus offer illustrations of theory or plausibility problems rather than real tests of theory."[51] This is as true of civil–military relations as they find it is of comparative politics.

A broad variety of data collection methods are used in qualitative studies. The most frequent are secondary sources, primary-source interviews, and newspapers and news sources (see Table 6.5). There are striking contrasts, however, between comparative politics and civil–military relations studies regarding the use of interviews (23.4 percent for the former vs. 10.5 percent in *AF&S*), and government sources and official documents (58 percent vs. 2.1 percent). The lack of government sources and official documents in the *AF&S* studies suggests a lack of attention to ongoing institutional developments. It is problematic to think one can study the armed forces and

*Table 6.4* The methods of research in *AF&S*

| Aim of method | Options | Articles (%) | Aggregate options | Articles (%) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Methods of theorizing | Inductive, qualitative | 90.2 | Inductive | 98.0 |
| | Inductive, quantitative | 7.8 | | |
| | Deductive, formal | 2.0 | Deductive | 2.0 |
| | Total | 100 | | |
| Methods of empirical research | Mixed method, dominantly qualitative | 3.2 | Qualitative | 3.2 |
| | Mixed method, dominantly quantitative | 3.2 | | |
| | Quantitative | 2.1 | Quantitative | 5.3 |
| | Total | 100 | | |

*Source*: *Armed Forces & Society* data set (1989–2007).

*Table 6.5* Issues of method (articles using each method of empirical analysis) in *AF&S* (%)

| Objective and methods | Methods of empirical analysis | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Qualitative | Mixed method, dominantly qualitative | Mixed method, dominantly quantitative | Quantitative | Total |
| Theory and empirics | | | | | |
| Theory generation and empirical analysis | 95.1 | – | – | 4.9 | 100 |
| Empirical analysis | 96.2 | 1.9 | 1.9 | – | 100 |
| Methods of theorizing | | | | | |
| Inductive, qualitative | 94.9 | 50 | – | – | |
| Inductive, quantitative | 2.6 | 50 | – | 100 | |
| Deductive, formal | 2.6 | – | – | – | |
| Total | 100 | 100 | – | 100 | |

*Source*: *Armed Forces & Society* data set (1989–2007).

security issues without using government sources, or understand complicated relationships involving civilians and military officers without conducting primary-source interviews.

It is critical to address hypothesis formulation and data collection, which are central aspects of the research process, in a formalized manner so that information is transparent and open to assessment by the scholarly community, as Munk and Snyder emphasize.[52] Yet the deficiencies in the field of civil–military relations in this regard, and of comparative research in general, are obvious. Only 17.1 percent of the studies devoted to theory generation and empirical analysis formulate and use a rigorously testable hypothesis, that is, one that explicitly specifies the variables and the relationship among the variables used in a causal model. The figure for comparative politics is 28.1 percent. This percentage, however, rises to 100% in studies with mixed or quantitative methods (see Table 6.6). Regarding analytical methods, in the overwhelming majority of *AF&S* articles (95.5 percent) using qualitative methods of empirical analysis, it is either not possible to readily understand the values assigned to the variables, or the data presented consist only of values on select units and variables (see Table 6.7). In comparative

*Table 6.6* Issues of data (articles using each method of empirical analysis) in *AF&S* (%)

| Method of data collection | Methods of empirical analysis | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Qualitative | Mixed method, dominantly qualitative | Mixed method, dominantly quantitative | Quantitative | Total |
| Analysis of secondary sources | 73.0 | 66.7 | – | 50 | 71.6 |
| Analysis of newspapers and news sources | 10.1 | 33.3 | – | – | 10.5 |
| Analysis of government sources and official documents | 2.2 | – | – | – | 2.1 |
| Interviews | 11.2 | – | – | – | 10.5 |
| Targeted surveys and questionnaires | 2.2 | – | 100 | 50 | 4.2 |
| Mass surveys and questionnaires | 1.1 | – | – | – | 1.1 |
| Totals | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |

*Source*: *Armed Forces & Society* data set (1989–2007).

*Table 6.7* Hypothesis formulation and methods (articles with a given objective and using each method of empirical analysis) in *AF&S* (%)

| Objectives and methods | Formulation and use of a testable hypothesis | | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| | Yes | Partial | No | Total |
| Theory and empirics | | | | |
| Theory generation | 30 | 20 | 50 | 100 |
| Theory generation and empirical analysis | 17.1 | 39 | 43.9 | 100 |
| Methods of empirical analysis | | | | |
| Qualitative | 12.8 | 41 | 46.2 | 100 |
| Mixed method, dominantly qualitative | 100 | – | – | 100 |
| Quantitative | 100 | – | – | 100 |

*Source*: *Armed Forces & Society* data set (1989–2007).

politics, the percentage of these kinds of problem is much less (74.1 percent) with 39.7 percent for the category of mixed method, dominantly qualitative (vs. 0 percent in the *AF&S* data).[53]

When Morris Janowitz launched *Armed Forces & Society* in the fall of 1974, he used that first issue to advocate that the contributors engage with real-world political issues, and he committed the journal to devoting a section to this. There is minimal evidence, however, that contributors have aimed to produce knowledge of direct relevance to policy-makers in the field of civil–military relations.[54] For their part, Munck and Snyder noted: "[D]espite the advocacy by some scholars of an engagement with real-world political issues, there is little evidence that comparativists aim to produce knowledge of direct relevance to policy decisions."[55] This seems to be even more the case in the field of civil–military relations, as demonstrated by the articles published in *AF&S*.

The results of this analysis show that students of civil–military relations have focused mainly on matters of civilian control and general civil–military relations in different countries. Unlike comparative politics, the field is much more oriented toward descriptive studies than causal analysis, and contributors tend not to produce research that is directly relevant to policy-makers. They also concentrate on qualitative rather than quantitative methods for both empirical analysis and theorizing. A broad variety of methods is used for data collection, but primary sources such as interviews, government resources, and official documents are often missing. Finally, only 17.1 percent of the studies devoted to theory generation and empirical analysis formulate and use a testable hypothesis, at least in a robust manner; that is, use hypotheses that explicate the variables and the relationship among the variables used in a causal model. Table 6.8 shows the data collection and methods used in *AF&S*.

*Table 6.8* Data collection and methods (articles using each method of empirical analysis) in *AF&S* (%)

| Method of empirical analysis | New data | | | Formal data | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| | Yes | No | Total | Yes | No | Total |
| Qualitative | 92 | 7.9 | 100 | 4.5 | 95.5 | 100 |
| Mixed method, dominantly qualitative | 100 | – | 100 | 100 | – | 100 |
| Mixed method, dominantly quantitative | 100 | – | 100 | 100 | – | 100 |
| Quantitative | 50 | 50 | 100 | 100 | – | 100 |

*Source*: *Armed Forces & Society* data set (1989–2007).

In the last line of their article on comparative politics, Munck and Snyder suggest that "[a]ddressing methodological challenges such as these [they list five desiderata] will provide a far stronger foundation for producing knowledge about politics around the world."[56] The same advice would surely apply to the field of civil–military relations. Based on the preceding review of articles in the journal *AF&S*, it is evident that the field is methodologically challenged.

# Notes

1  Andrew J. Bacevich, "The Paradox of Professionalism: Eisenhower, Ridgway, and the Challenge to Civilian Control, 1953–55," *The Journal of Military History* 61(2) (April 1997): 303–33; Eliot A. Cohen, *Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime* (New York: Free Press, 2002), p. 226.

2  Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957); Samuel E. Finer, *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2002; originally published 1962).

3  The quotes in this paragraph come from an interview with Huntington in Gerardo L. Munck and Richard Snyder, *Passion, Craft, and Method in Comparative Politics* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press), pp. 210–33.

4  A reviewer for *The Nation* compared Huntington unfavorably to Mussolini, as Huntington tells his interviewer Robert D. Kaplan in Kaplan, "Looking the World in the Eye," *The Atlantic Monthly* 288 (5) (December 2001): 68–82. Walter Millis, writing for *The New York Times Review of Books*, described the book as an "arresting contribution to the New Conservatism." See Walter Millis, "Conflicting Forces, Military Mind," *New York Times Review of Books*, April 28, 1957: 6, 39.

5  Gordon A. Craig, "Review [Untitled]," *American Historical Review* 63(2) (January 1958): 368–70; Arthur A. Ekirch, "Review [Untitled]," *American Quarterly* 10(1) (Spring 1958): 90; Roger Hilsman, "Review [Untitled]," *American Political Science Review* 51(4) (December 1957): 1091–94; David L.Martineau, "Review [Untitled]," *Military Affairs* 21(2) (Summer 1957): 85–6; W. H. Morris Jones, "Armed Forces and the State," *Public Administration* 35 (1957): 411–16; Albert Norman, "Review [Untitled]," *Political Science Quarterly* 72(3) (September 1957): 472–4; Laurence I. Radway, "Review [Untitled]," *Administrative Science Quarterly* 2(3), December 1957: 390–2; John C. Wahlke, "Review [Untitled]," *The Journal of Politics* 20(2) (May 1958): 398–400. Writing years later, some of the historical shortcomings of Huntington's portrait of the U.S. military have been underscored by Edward M. Coffman in "The Long Shadow of *The Soldier and the State*," *The Journal of Military History* 55(1) (January1991): 69–82.

6  Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, pp. 1–3, 19–20, 96.

7  Peter D. Feaver, *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), p. 18.

8  Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 193–4.

9  Morris Janowitz, "Armed Forces & Society. An Interdisciplinary Journal," *Armed Forces & Society* 1(1) (November 1974): 3.

10  Kurt Lang, "Military Sociology," *Current Sociology* 16(3) (December 1968): 7–18. Lang defined the field as comprising the profession of arms, military organization as social structure, the military system, civil–military relations, and war and warfare. He would develop this initial contribution using the same five subdivisions in Lang, *Military Institutions and the Sociology of War* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1972).

11  Gwyn Harries-Jenkins and Charles C. Moskos, "Introduction," *Current Sociology* 29(3) (December 1981): 1–10.

12  Robert A. Dahl, *Polyarchy* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1971); and Dahl, *Democracy and Its Critics* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989), pp. 244–51.

13  Adam Przeworski states: "Obviously, the institutional framework of civilian control over the military constitutes the neuralgic point of democratic consolidation," in A. Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 29. Przeworski fails, however, to address this point in the rest of his book. Later Phillipe Schmitter asserts that "the submission of the military to civilian control" is one of the four necessary processes of democratization, in P. Schmitter, "The Consolidation of Political Democracies:

Processes, Rhythms, Sequences, and Types," in Geoffrey Pridham, ed., *Transitions to Democracy* (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1995), p. 562, and illustrated in Figures 1 and 3; but like Przeworski, he does not pursue the issue in that chapter or in later work.

14 Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996); Alfred Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988); Felipe Agüero, *Soldiers, Civilians, and Democracy: Post-Franco Spain in Comparative Perspective* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995).

15 Larry Diamond, *Developing Democracy Toward Consolidation* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), p. 11.

16 Gerardo L. Munck and Richard Snyder, "Debating the Direction of Comparative Politics: An Analysis of Leading Journals," *Comparative Political Studies* 40(1) (January 2007): 9.

17 Claude E. Welch and Arthur K. Smith, *Military Role and Rule: Perspectives on Civil-Military Relations* (North Scituate, MA: Duxbury Press, 1974), p. 6.

18 Claude E. Welch, ed., *Civilian Control of the Military* (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1976), pp. 1, 2–3.

19 For instance, see David Pion-Berlin, ed., *Civil-Military Relations in Latin-America: New Analytical Perspectives* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2001); Thomas C. Bruneau and Scott D. Tollefson, eds., *Who Guard the Guardians and How: Democratic Civil-Military Relations* (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2006); Thomas C. Bruneau and Steven C. Boraz, eds., *Reforming Intelligence. Obstacles to Democratic Control and Effectiveness* (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2007); and Anthony Forster, *Armed Forces and Society in Europe* (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2006).

20 The literature is immense; an example is Claude E. Welch, *No Farewell to Arms?* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1987).

21 See Mark I. Lichbach, "Social Theory and Comparative Politics," in Mark Irving Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman, eds., *Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 245; and Pion-Berlin, *Civil-Military Relations in Latin America*, p. 17.

22 Michael C. Desch, *Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999).

23 Cohen, *Supreme Command*, p. 84.

24 Ibid., p. 206. Adding at least one case of failure in war leadership, like the military misfortunes he has studied in another book, would have protected Cohen's excellent book and convincing argument against criticism from an orthodox methodologist worried about his selection bias.

25 See Peter D. Feaver, *Armed Servants*.

26 It is notable that Peter D. Feaver does not utilize the principal–agent concepts in his most recent publication. See Peter D. Feaver, "The Right to Be Right: Civil–Military Relations and the Iraq Surge Decision," *International Security* 35(4) (Spring 2011): 87–125.

27 Dale R. Herspring, *The Pentagon and the Presidency: Civil-Military Relations From FDR to George W. Bush* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2005).

28 See Bruneau and Tollefson, *Who Guards the Guardians?*; Bruneau and Boraz, *Reforming Intelligence*; and Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei, "Towards a New Conceptualization of Democratization and Civil-Military Relations," *Democratization* 15(5) (December 2008): 909–29.

29 For his most recent elaboration of this approach, see Thomas C. Bruneau, *Patriots for Profit: Contractors and the Military in U.S. National Security* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011), pp. 34–8.

30 Christopher P. Gibson and Don M. Snider, "Civil–Military Relations and the Potential to Influence: A Look at the National Security Decision-making Process," *Armed Forces & Society* 25(2) (Winter 1999): 193–218; Christopher P. Gibson, *Securing the State: Reforming the National Security Decisionmaking Process at the Civil-Military Nexus* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008), p. 1.

31 The Goldwater–Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 aimed to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the armed forces by reducing inter-service rivalries and promoting jointness, streamlining the chain of command, and enhancing the advisory role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, among many other reforms.

32 Gibson, *Securing the State*, p. 12, n. 35.

33 Don N. Snider, "Dissent and Strategic Leadership of the Military Professions," *Orbis* 52(2) (Spring 2008): 256–77.

34 Hew Strachan, "Making Strategy: Civil–Military Relations after Iraq," *Survival* 48(3) (Autumn 2006): 59–82.

35 Anthony Forster, "New Civil–Military Relations and its Research Agendas," *Connections* 1(2) (April 2002): 71–87; and also Forster, *Armed Forces and Society in Europe*, pp. 12–15.

36 For another meta-analysis of a smaller sample from *AF&S*, see Arjana Olldashi, "Civil-Military Relations in Emerging Democracies as Found in the Articles of *Armed Forces & Society*," an applied research project for the Political Science Department, Texas State University-San Marcos, 2002, available at: http://ecommons.txstate.edu/arp/54/ (accessed 6 August 2012). I thank Professor Patricia Shields, current editor of *AF&S*, for this reference.

37 Peter F. Feaver, "Civil-Military Relations," *Annual Review of Political Science* 2 (1999): 211.

38 Ibid.

39 Gerardo L. Munck and Richard Snyder, "Debating the Direction of Comparative Politics: An Analysis of Leading Journals," *Comparative Political Studies* 40(1) (January 2007): 5–31. Their data set codes 319 articles from three journals: *Comparative Political Studies*, *Comparative Politics*, and *World Politics* (only articles relevant to comparative politics), from several years between 1989 and 2004. The analysis was based on 29 variables, a description of which can be found at: http://brown.edu/polisci/people/snyder/ (accessed 6 August 2012).

40 Our *Armed Forces & Society* Data Set codes 103 articles on civil–military relations from *AF&S* published between 1989 and 2007, using 20 variables selected from the Munck and Snyder data set. The author of this chapter did the coding, determining which articles belonged to the civil–military relations subfield.

41 Feaver, *Armed Servants*, p. 292. Feaver suggests the relevance of his approach to the analysis of other countries, but does not actually carry out such an analysis in any publications that I am aware of.

42 The Third Wave of democracy, as Sam Huntington termed it in his book with the same title, began on 25 April 1974, when a small group of junior officers in Portugal overthrew the country's dictatorship in a remarkably peaceful coup known as the "Carnation Revolution," and instituted democratic rule. Some 60 countries across the globe followed suit in relatively short order, although the quality of their democracy in some cases remains debatable.

43 For more on these points, see Bruneau and Tollefson, *Who Guards the Guardians*, especially the Introduction; and Bruneau and Matei, "Towards a New Conceptualization," pp. 909–13. For a strong appeal to improve theoretical approaches to civil–military relations, see Pion-Berlin, *Civil-Military Relations in Latin America*, pp. 1–35.

44 Munck and Snyder, "Debating the Direction of Comparative Politics," pp. 8–10.

45 The other 400-plus articles in the sample time frame deal with a variety of issues, particularly concerning the military profession.

46 Munck and Snyder, "Debating the Direction of Comparative Politics," p. 10.

47 The data are drawn from the variable "time" subset of the *Armed Forces & Society* data set.

48 Munck and Snyder, "Debating the Direction of Comparative Politics," p. 10.

49 This is based on the definitions by Munck and Snyder:

> A theory is understood to consist of a proposition or set of propositions about how or why the world is as it is. An empirical analysis is understood to consist of an inquiry based on observable manifestations of a concept or concepts. Thus, empirical analysis is not restricted to causal hypothesis testing. In turn, the term descriptive is not used, as is common, in a critical fashion, as when a work is characterized as being merely descriptive. Here, the term is used in a positive manner, as referring to accounts about what the state of the world is, that are differentiated from causal accounts that seek to explain why the state of the world is as it is.
>
> (Ibid., p. 11)

50 Ibid.

51 Ibid., pp. 18–19.

52 Ibid., p. 21.

53 Ibid., p. 22.

54 In his introduction to the journal, Janowitz wrote:

> Its contents should, at the same time, be of interest to political and administrative leaders, persons concerned with public affairs, and journalists among others … Therefore, a special section on policy papers will endeavor to explore the implications of scholarly research for public policy.
>
> (Janowitz, "Armed Forces & Society," pp. 3–4)

55 Munck and Snyder, "Debating the Direction of Comparative Politics," p. 12. Theda Skocpol, "Doubly Engaged Social Science: The Promise of Comparative Historical Analysis," in J. Mahoney and D. Rueschemeyer, eds., *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 407–28.

56 Munck and Snyder, "Debating the Direction of Comparative Politics," p. 26.

## PART II

# Civil–military relations in non-democratic or nominally democratic countries

# 7

# CIVIL–MILITARY RELATIONS IN A DICTATORSHIP
## North Korea

*Jargalsaikhan Mendee*

## Introduction

Comprehending the nature and dynamics of civil–military relations in a dictatorship is a daunting task. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea) presents the unique combination of a one-man dictatorship and a one-party state. Naturally, a dictatorship is concerned with regime security and controls all aspects of life in the country. The single-party state indoctrinates its entire population and keeps everyone immersed in the party-led political society. In addition, the external security environment of North Korea is complicated, in many ways comparable to Israel, as the regime faces real threats from the neighborhood.[1] While this chapter will not directly discuss the external security environment, which is beyond the focus of the Handbook, the presence of external threats enables dictatorship, and allows the party to impose stricter control over the daily lives of its citizens, as well as to justify defense priorities. The nature of the regime poses major challenges to research, by limiting accessibility to and the reliability of data and other information.

Although scholars consider North Korea to be "isolated," it maintains cordial relations with many countries, including members of the Non-Aligned Movement and former ideological partners like Mongolia. Mongolia has maintained relations with the DPRK since Mongolian independence, and has kept bilateral channels open in all spheres of cooperation, including military.[2] It is important nevertheless to emphasize that Mongolians do not have an affinity for the repressive regime, but look to North Koreans as distant, cordial friends who need understanding and support for economic and political reforms.[3] Based on available studies, reviews, and research in Mongolian, Russian, and English, as well as frequent interactions with North Korean military personnel, diplomats, and scholars (especially in 2007–10), this chapter seeks to advance a new perspective on and understanding of North Korean civil–military relations.[4]

The most conventional view of the North Korean military is that it is repressive and exercises total control over national politics and economics. Analogies are often drawn with other military dictatorships and autocracies in the Middle East and Africa.[5] In reality, the North Korean military's influence is limited and constrained by the repressive surveillance of the intelligence institutions, and the ideological control of the Korean Workers Party (KWP). The effectiveness

of civilian control in North Korea is best measured by the degree of intimidation. Therefore, it is important to distinguish the role of the intelligence institutions from the military when looking at the communist-style dictatorship and the one-party state. Otherwise, the numbers of military personnel, and images of uniformed personnel surrounding the leadership, may lead to a further misunderstanding of the nature and dynamics of North Korean civil–military relations.

This chapter has two main aims. The first is to explain distinctive features of communist-style civil–military relations, and then put forward three explanations: (1) Soviet-style defense institutions; (2) Party control; and (3) secret police surveillance, in regard to North Korean civil–military relations. The second aim is to discuss current socio-economic changes, and their implications for the military and broader civil–military relations, based on recent empirical observations.

Despite scant media coverage beyond the topics of succession, nuclear issues, and tensions with South Korea, North Korea is undergoing enormous socio-economic changes. Similarly, civil–military relations in North Korea will encounter new challenges, which will require scholarly attention to ascertain the direction of reform from all available standpoints. Mongolia can provide a strategic and insightful perspective because its own geo-strategic culture parallels the geo-strategic environment of North Korea, earlier civil–military relations were institutionalized by Soviet influence and assistance, and Mongolians were themselves terrorized by totalitarian dictatorship between 1924 and 1952.

## Communist civil–military relations in North Korea

In a seminal work on Asian civil–military relations, Muthiah Alagappa stated that "there has not been a military coup d'état" in four countries that experienced Communist Party control of the military: China, Vietnam, Taiwan, and North Korea.[6] The majority of militaries in the post-communist states of East-Central Europe and the former Soviet republics did not threaten their civilian governments. Numerous hypotheses about military domination in Communist Party politics, and potential tensions between every new Communist Party successor and senior military leaders in China and Vietnam were, in retrospect, implausible. Such misconceptions would emerge as researchers, such as Alagappa and his colleagues, enfolded all security institutions, including intelligence services and police, under the broad term "military" for their studies of civil–military relations.[7] This broader term will not work for the study of communist-style civil–military relations in general, or in North Korea in particular. Although the military is considered an important pillar of the party-state, the military is controlled by the intelligence services and the Party, and hedged by the paramilitary forces, which are subordinate to the intelligence services. Therefore, it is essential to separate the intelligence, police, and paramilitaries from the military to examine civil–military relations in the party-state. Military intelligence in the Communist Party-state is tasked with external intelligence duties, but it does not have counterintelligence functions. The intelligence institutions maintain supreme authority in both the party-state and the communist dictatorship;[8] thus, the military wields far less actual power than the intelligence services and the secret police. Besides, paramilitary forces such as interior troops and border troops (the official names vary) were established separately from the military to protect the state facilities and key infrastructures. Basically, this policy intends to keep military units out of town in a communist state.

Another salient feature, which is often overlooked by Western scholars, is the intrinsic relationship between citizens and the military. People under a communist regime are attached to the military in several ways. First, older generations took part in the revolutionary armies, which fought for independence or in major global conflicts. Second, all males are required to complete

military service and remain in the reserve up to a certain age. Third, all citizens are obliged to take part in civil defense training, which usually starts in high school. Fourth, militaries are deployed to participate in major infrastructure projects, to assist labor-intensive works in rural areas, and to provide manpower during natural disasters. As a result of the major militarization of the society, the military, naturally, has been seen as a protector and helper. In many cases, youth are attracted to the military, and at the same time wish to complete their military requirements earlier rather than later. This is similar to smaller nations with a total defense concept like Switzerland, Singapore, Israel, and Taiwan. The Communist Party uses the mass media, arts, and educational system to depict positive images of the military. Linking to the earlier point, the Communists have avoided employing the military for domestic security operations; intelligence, police, and paramilitary forces were exclusively created for such missions.

In contrast, these two features do not apply to militaries with strong colonial legacies. Following the colonial tradition, the military became a dominant institution in both external and internal security affairs. The institutional separation between the military, intelligence, police, and paramilitary forces is blurred, and military participation in domestic law enforcement operations was accepted by the public because the colonial authorities, especially those in Asia, used the military to control society. A closer example to our study is the South Korean military. Initially, the South Korean military was modeled after the Japanese Imperial Army because U.S. influence and assistance was limited.[9] As a result, the South Korean military ruled the nation until the late 1980s, and its influence in domestic politics and economics waned slowly. A military dictatorship is fundamentally different from a communist-style totalitarian dictatorship, in which the military is controlled and repressed by the intelligence institutions of the Party and the dictatorship. North Korea might be slightly different from other former Communist states, but it is still run by a party and not a junta.

The other distinct features of communist regimes include prerequisites for recognition and constant fear of repression. In a communist regime, and especially in a totalitarian regime, conscription and various types of party organizations are designed to implement mass indoctrination, control society, and mobilize for nation-wide projects (e.g., construction or agriculture).[10] To be accepted in this society, people must forego individualism, complete military service, and join the party organizations. Party membership in turn depends on family background, criminal record, and military service. Thus, military conscription is seen by many as a way to find opportunities and to improve social status.[11] All organizations resemble the party structure, which is in some ways identical with military organization. The lowest level of organization starts at the first-grade level, and the highest level is the Party itself. These organizations aim to do the following: (1) Indoctrinate people on ideology (mythos, outlook, and self-justification) and Party history; (2) keep people morally encouraged to participate in mass mobilization; and (3) evaluate people's political and ideological orientation. Personal records of participation serve as a basis for advancement in society. Failure to complete compulsory service or party duties could be interpreted as anti-Party and could lead to negative consequences.

The Party dictatorship employs the harshest methods to eliminate dissenters. Reprisals will fall on a dissenter's entire immediate family, other relatives, friends, and even people who have worked for him or her, and *their* families. These massive punishments predictably marginalize these people from the wider society. As a result, all members of the society become intimidated and fabricate lies to protect themselves and their families, which erodes the effectiveness and efficiency of the communist regime. The system perpetuates lying, spying, and fear. Fear compels people to live with the brutality and repression of the dictatorship. The Party also provides benefits to those who conform with Party ideology, however, and general or high-ranking military officers do not want to lose their privileges. Effectiveness of control in such a case is

measured by the degree of intimidation and ideological conformity, not professional meritocracy. These prerequisites and constant anxiety pervade North Korean society.

Considering these specific features of the communist regime, it becomes apparent that the military is not a dominant actor in North Korean politics, for which there are three possible explanations. First, defense institution building in North Korea followed the Soviet model. Second, the KWP controls the military through its political officers, who are embedded at each level of the military hierarchy. Third, the State Security Department and the Ministry of Public Security have consolidated formal and informal surveillance networks within the military. The Border Troops and Internal Troops, which are under the Ministry of Public Security, were established to limit the military's presence in the capital city and its participation in domestic security operations. These three explanations are examined in detail below.

## The Soviet military model

North Korean defense institution building was heavily influenced by the Soviet military. From 1945–56, Soviet advisors laid the foundation of North Korea's political and economic structures through military assistance in the form of military advisors, education and training for the North Korean military in the Soviet Union, and the provision of military hardware.[12] The North Korean military also adapted elements of Communist civil–military relations such as Party control, the political officer system, and mass mobilization, as well as military doctrine, tactics, structure, training, and culture. Soviet Koreans (ethnic Koreans who had been living in various parts of the Soviet Union) and North Korean officers who graduated from the Soviet military schools also played crucial roles in localizing these Soviet norms. Although bilateral relations between North Korea and the Soviet Union suffered in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, the Soviet Union was still regarded as a vital source of military training and assistance.[13]

Another important ally of North Korea was the People's Republic of China, whose defense institution-building process was also aided by the Soviets, and thus absorbed Communist-style civil–military relations.[14] Eventually, the North Korean military developed defense industrial capabilities with Soviet assistance in the 1970s; thus, North Korea became the transmitter of communist norms to pro-communist forces in other developing nations, and an exporter of small arms.[15] One might assume that Soviet military influence would wane as the North Korean dictatorship eliminated Soviet Koreans in the early 1950s, along with senior military officers who had graduated from Soviet military schools in the 1950s, and from the 1970s to 1990s. However, this assumption is implausible for two reasons. First, the purges and margin-alization of Soviet-educated military elites were politically motivated to constrain their ability to challenge the dictatorship (or regime security). Second, the North Korean military did not have opportunities to interact with or learn from any non-communist militaries. Because the external and internal security environment of North Korea has not changed for the ruling elites since the Korean War, the *juche* (self-reliance) and *songun* (military first) policies simply consolidated Soviet-style civil–military relations and defense institutions in North Korea more firmly than in any other remaining communist states. This is consistent with Andrew Scobell's conclusion that "the DPRK appears to meet the basic criteria for an orthodox communist regime."[16] Far from weakening, Soviet influence remained institutionalized throughout the communist regime, but in fact it was the military's power that waned because the ruling party wanted to ensure regime survival. Regarding the framework of this book and the nature of civil–military relations in North Korea, the military's power has decreased over time, and there is no doubt that the regime is in control.

## Party control

The ruling KWP has consolidated its political control over the military through the departments of the Central Committee of the Party, the General Political Bureau of the Korean People's Army (KPA), and the political organizations of the KWP. The Central Military Committee, the Organization and Guidance Department, and the Propaganda and Agitation Department of the Central Committee, exercise direct control over military affairs.[17] Similar to other communist states, the delineation between party and government institutions is impossible to discern in North Korea, because all government officials are Party members and hold several positions in the Party as well as in the government apparatus. In particular, the Guidance Department is believed to have considerable authority in human resource management (senior military posting, promotion, and demotion) and inspections in military institutions. Prior to 1998, the Central Military Committee of the Central Committee of the KWP was the most powerful Party institution with regard to military affairs. Although its role was weakened when the National Defence Commission became the highest decision-making organ in national security and defense matters, the Central Military Committee and other two departments still exercise control over the military.[18] The political officer system was introduced at the inception of the KPA, and strengthened around 1959, following lessons learned from the Korean War.[19] Chung-in Moon and Hideshi Takesada examined Party control in more detail in 2001, and concluded that "at present, the KWP still retains institutional mechanisms through which it controls the military."[20]

Political officers are embedded in all military hierarchical structures and are responsible for political indoctrination training, the morale of military personnel, organizing cultural and sports events, and supporting the professional military commanders, to whom they are subordinated. Western scholars often overlook the fact that political officers play such a supporting role for professional military commanders, who have the authority to command the political officers. Therefore, the political officer reports to both the military command chain and the Party chain, if the issue is related to Party political affairs.

In principle, political officers receive two kinds of training: (1) Training similar to military commanding officers, because they serve as deputy commanding officers; and (2) introductory training in various military specialities, because they may be assigned to all types of military units. Political officers, on the one hand, are considered an indispensable part of the command team of any military unit, not so much controlling the commanding officer as helping the commander to be politically and ideologically correct. On the other hand, political officers are in charge of the managing branches of the political Party organizations and answer to the Party leadership via the Party chain-of-command; therefore, they play a more influential role in the military organization than do military commanders. The North Korean system generally follows these principles. According to North Korean military officers, all military officers are Party members, while non-commissioned officers (different from the Western sense) and conscripts are members of the youth organization, the Socialist Youth League.[21] As a result, all military personnel belong to political organizations, which are run by political officers under the direct control of the General Political Bureau and the KWP. In the party-state, one's career and thus fate are dependent on one's political activeness, positive responses to political indoctrination, education, and active participation in Party-run campaigns. Ideological compatibility is the most salient characteristic in a communist society. Any dissenting views or individuals are marginalized and eradicated. This concept is still alive in North Korea. Although it appears that the military's role is elevated with the "military-first" policy, the Central Committee of the KWP still maintains control over the military through its relevant committees and departments, which are led by civilian Party officials, the political officer system, and political Party organizations in

the military. The KWP also has similarly institutionalized control in the intelligence, police, and paramilitary institutions.

## Secret police surveillance

Similar to defense institutionalization, the North Korean intelligence services are also based on the Soviet model. The dictatorship relies heavily on intelligence, especially the secret police, to protect regime security by marginalizing potential political challengers and maintaining domestic stability. As a result, the intelligence services are the most powerful state institutions, with total control over the activities of Party officials, the military, and the public.

The State Security Department, which is the equivalent of the Soviet-style KGB, implements repressive ideological control over the society, including Party officials and military personnel. It runs formal and informal networks of informants. In addition to its spider-web-like networks, the State Security Department is aided by the Ministry of Public Security, one of the Cabinet Ministries, which reports directly to the State Security Department and National Defence Commission. The Border Troops, Internal Troops, and police are subordinate to the Ministry of Public Security; therefore, the State Security Department has a direct control over these institutions and also the Guard Command.[22] The military is under the control of the State Security Department and the Ministry of Public Security, a fact which supports the main argument of this chapter. One rationale for maintaining the Ministry of Public Security and its military assets, the Border Troops and Internal Troops, separate from the military is to keep the military units externally focused, and to avoid using them for internal security and law enforcement missions. Also, the Border Troops and Internal Troops have an identical political control system.

It is widely misperceived that the Ministry of Public Safety and paramilitaries are subordinate to the Ministry of People's Armed Forces. Being under the repressive control of the State Security Department, military personnel, especially those with moderate views, are often purged, perhaps intentionally at times to create fear within the military as well as the general public. Although purges and intimidations are prevalent in the North Korean military, three massive purges need to be highlighted. Both DPRK founder Kim Il-Sung and his son Kim Jong-Il were suspicious of military personnel who graduated from foreign schools. Immediately after the Korean War, Kim Il-Sung purged Soviet Korean military officers, who held higher military posts in the new defense establishment.[23] Kim Il-Sung then purged a second group of military officers who had graduated from Soviet military schools in the 1950s, and had criticized his rule after witnessing "de-Stalinization" in the Soviet Union and other communist states.[24] The third group of officers criticized the brutality of the Kim Jong-Il dictatorship after studying in formerly Soviet military schools in the early 1990s and learning about democratization, and were purged in the mid-1990s.[25] Many sources reported these officers were planning to stage a coup against the dictatorship. Limited sources suggest many of these officers were executed or banished from the society. Although the KWP departments exercise control over the intelligence institutions, the ultimate control of the State Security Department lies with Kim Jong-Il and his inner circle of elites.

On the basis of these three propositions, the Korean People's Army is not a dominant actor in the decision-making process. First, these repressive control systems have been used to intimidate senior and junior military officers so that they will not challenge the ruling elites, and, second, the military is externally focused in the presence of external threats. The next section will discuss ongoing socio-economic changes and their implications for the military as well as civil–military relations, based on recent empirical observations.

## The implications of socio-economic changes for civil–military relations

Generally, most academic literature and news media highlight the North Korean economic collapse, but ongoing socio-economic changes in North Korea attract almost no scholarly attention.[26] The regime has been struggling to revive the economy since 1984, and it started "legitimizing the market-driven rules and norms" in 2002 by adopting what it calls Economic Improvement Measures.[27] After assessing North Korea's economic institutional changes, Jae-Chon Lim concluded that: "North Korean economic institutions will continue to develop through competition between the socialist and the market-driven rules and norms."[28] Indeed, this competition is ongoing and causing dramatic socio-economic changes in North Korea.

It appears that the macro-economic situation has not changed much since the "military-first" policy was pursued in the mid-1990s. Annually, the regime spends about 25–30 percent of its Gross Domestic Product on defense, but most of this fund apparently goes into the nuclear and satellite (including ballistic missile) development programs. North Korea launched the campaign to build a "great, prosperous and powerful nation" by 2012, which marks the birth centennial of Kim Il-Sung. Of course, this was an attempt to create some hope for people, who are in desperate poverty and have faced shortages of food and services for over a decade. The regime is unlikely to achieve the goals of this campaign, however, due to UN-imposed sanctions, obsolete technology, and a lack of foreign direct investment.

The only way out of this economic quagmire is for the regime to introduce economic liberalization and to rely on Chinese investment and technology, since its efforts to normalize relations with the United States and Japan have not succeeded. The United States and its allies still maintain aggressive policies to remove the communist regime by force. Kim Jong-Il's frequent trips to China recently and the substantial increase in Chinese investment in North Korea's mining and infrastructure sectors are clear indicators of the DPRK's need for Chinese investment and technology. At the same time, the Chinese government encourages its companies to invest in North Korea, proposing the development of an economic belt area linking China's north-eastern provinces with North Korean ports (especially the ice-free Rajin port), and to tap North Korean mineral deposits. Scholars argue that Chinese investment and energy assistance to North Korea are strategic and politically driven.[29] Logically, the U.S.–South Korean strategy is gradually forcing the North Korean regime to adopt the Chinese model of economic transition, even though North Korea is historically wary of China. Although it is quite early to examine the effects of Chinese investment and economic assistance on North Korea at the macro level, bilateral relations with China have caused visible changes in Pyongyang and other major cities such as Nampo and Kaesong, at the individual level.

As a result of increased "shuttle" trade between North Korea and China, all types of goods are now available in stores, and especially in the street markets.[30] The numbers of cars and *Koryolink* mobile phones, and internet access in Pyongyang, are noticeably rising. Also, remittances to North Korea generate hard currency, which in turn increases internal demand for Chinese goods. This view of shuttle trade appears very similar to periods of economic liberalization between Mongolia, Russia, the Central Asian states, and China in the 1990s following the collapse of the Communist trading bloc. During this period, shuttle trade followed market supply and demand, besides creating a new group of independent entrepreneurs and business networks that operate under free market principles. Apparently, the North Korean regime's control and bureaucracy hinder the free flow of shuttle traders, but many have managed to bypass and overcome these government controls (albeit mainly through bribery and patronage).

In spite of their limited scale, remittances and shuttle traders have contributed more economic benefit than the regime's slow, cautious measures of economic reform and various production

campaigns. To intensify its efforts toward a "great, prosperous and powerful nation," the KWP encouraged Soviet-style 100-, 150-, and 200-day "battles of production" in 2009, but they were fruitless in the absence of monetary incentives and technology, except in the nuclear programs.[31]

The growth of informal market activity, burgeoning Chinese trade and investment, and cooperation with European partners indicate that economic development has become the key concern for the dictatorship and ruling elites. Although the current succession is following family kinship, the ruler is evidently concerned with weakening control over regime politics, the aging of the Party leadership, and potential domestic instability if the regime continues to fail to provide basic goods and services. In a totalitarian regime, people's faith in the leadership gradually wanes from one succession to another. Though they wear badges commemorating their great leaders and memorize Party slogans, their worship is shallow. As people receive more information beyond the Party-censored news, through interactions with foreigners, the shuttle traders, and expatriates, the regime's ability to indoctrinate and impose strict control over society will certainly wane. At the same time, if the regime longs for more foreign direct investment and access to the global market, such changes will increase the costs of coercion against the population. After nearly two full decades of economic failure, the regime has no other options; thus, it has begun to accept Chinese advice concerning economic liberalization and open the economy to Chinese investment and technology.

North Korea is likely to follow the paths of economic liberalization paved by China or Vietnam, a development that will certainly have implications for its military institutions as well as civil–military relations. On the one hand, the regime will sustain its military-first policy based on the present justification of external military threats, and the military will receive more funding. On the other hand, the growing informal economy may begin to lure military personnel into the business sector, and discourage youths from completing their compulsory military service, especially if the regime loses its justification for excessive defense spending. Without a doubt, however, the military will receive abundant attention from the regime as long as the regime perceives an external military threat.

## The military

North Korea is a militarized state not ruled by the military. Given the external security environment for the regime, a "total defense" posture similar to Israel's appears to be the only viable option. Building on this option, the North Korean regime institutionalized the entire society to deter potential aggression. If we include active, reserve, and paramilitary personnel in North Korea, 39 percent of the population is involved in military affairs; therefore, the military is the salient network of North Korean society;[32] many Western scholars describe North Korea as the world's most militarized state and society.[33] To understand North Korean civil–military relations, it is important to distinguish conscripts and reserves from the active duty personnel, since conscripts and reserves are simply citizens fulfilling their national defense obligations.

Despite an intensive nuclear program, the North Korean military has faced a multitude of challenges during the economic collapse. The production and research and defense sectors of the defense industrial complex have gradually weakened due to a loss of market, aging machinery, and a series of UN sanctions. It has become more complicated for North Korea to revive its military technical cooperation with Russia and China. Both nations experienced economic turbulence in the 1980s and became reluctant or unable to provide technical assistance to North Korea's military. As Russia transitioned into a market economy after 1990, its military technical assistance program for non-former Soviet republics upheld market principles;

therefore, many cash-strapped economies like Mongolia, North Korea, and others lost their military training assistance. China slowly started filling this military training need in the new millennium, and increased annual intakes of personnel from developing nations, including North Korea. Faced with frequent fuel shortages and a lack of funding to modernize its military equipment, the North Korean military focused on show-of-force displays, including military parades, naval exercises, and special forces. This may explain why the regime was so determined to develop nuclear weapon capabilities, which support its defense strategy by increasing the threat credibility, and strengthens its negotiating stance for political and economic gains.

Nonetheless, it is extremely difficult to assess North Korea's military capability and the effects of socio-economic changes directly on the military. Based on recent interactions, there are several observable changes in the regime's military attitude, but even these observations will not reveal patterns and dynamics of changes that are likely occurring in this massive military.

Despite its hostile stance against the United States and its allies in the Pacific, the North Korean military has been noticeably interested in reviving its international ties, especially with post-communist states like Mongolia, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, and others since 2000. The Ministry of the People's Armed Forces intensified its engagements with foreign militaries through its defense attachés in Beijing and Moscow and the country's embassies.[34] It encourages accredited defense attachés to attend the annual spring festival, and to exchange military delegates at all levels. This change in the North Korean military should be treated as a part of the global phenomenon of increased defense diplomacy. It coincided with a period when many post-authoritarian states in Europe and Asia became interested in reviving their military cooperation, because their militaries had overcome many of the difficulties of transition, and were seeking ways to integrate into the new regional post-Cold War security architecture.

In addition, there are some other specific rationales behind this North Korean move. First, all its major military equipment from the Soviet era had became obsolete, and North Korea needed to modernize its weapons systems. The only nations that would help were Russia, China, and others who manufactured or upgraded the Soviet-style equipment (for instance, India, Ukraine, and Belarus). As a result, the North Korean military intensified its military engagements with these nations.

Second, it was inevitable that the North Korean military would be interested in learning about the effects of transitions on other armed forces, especially in post-communist states with similar political, economic, and social backgrounds. It was important for the DPRK's military leaders to learn from the experiences of others in adjusting to a free-market economy and its likely political accommodations, and they are, in fact, quite knowledgeable of the changes occurring in China, Vietnam, and Cuba. It has also not been surprising to hear North Korean delegates repeatedly reiterate their respect for Mongolia's remarkably smooth transition to democracy.

Third, North Korea needs friends who understand the society's mentality, have undergone similar social experiences, and overcome externally imposed isolation. Since the North Koreans are aware of the difficulties of developing military–technical cooperation with many of these nations, they have prioritized high-level dialogues and all types of military exchanges, including educational, sport, and cultural. North Korea's main goal appears to be sustainable and symbiotic relationships.

Fourth, another potential cause for this increase in defense diplomacy efforts is the desire of senior military leaders to travel, which provides simultaneous sightseeing and learning opportunities for them and their staff. Senior military leaders are on frequent learning trips to China, Vietnam, Russia, and other former communist states. Similar tendencies may be observed among state officials and academics. Therefore, the Ministry of People's Armed Forces might

start receiving more resources and attention as its missions are elevated relative to other government institutions.

These observations deserve further scrutiny and critical review. The socio-economic changes are having an impact on military thinking, and creating uncertainty concerning the inevitable shift to a market economy. At the same time, North Korea's increased defense diplomacy efforts, apart from its attempts to revitalize military–technical cooperation with Russia, would seem to indicate its desire to learn about (if not to be part of) new security structures, and to build confidence with foreign militaries. However, these efforts appear to be integrated the KWP's foreign policy objectives.

## Civil–military relations

The socio-economic changes in North Korea apparently have had a less noticeable impact on civil–military relations. Even if there are changes, it is difficult to capture and measure them. But this does not preclude certain assumptions based on interactions with North Koreans and observations from transitional experiences in the former communist regimes of Europe and Asia.

Until his sudden death in December 2011, Kim Jong-Il maintained ultimate control over the security institutions, and continued to consolidate his power base by promoting the most reliable comrades, family members, and relatives to key national security decision-making bodies such as the National Defense Commission, the Central Military Commission of the Central Committee of the KWP, and the Political Bureau of the KWP. Kim Jong-un, Kim Jong-Il's son and chosen successor, in his mid-twenties, became the youngest member of the Party Central Committee, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, and the youngest general of the Korean People's Army in September 2010. This nepotism itself provides a few insights. First, Kim Jong-Il was increasingly aware of deteriorating regime security and churning public discontent, even within his inner circles. The average age of ruling elites and Party leaders is between 60 and 70. Second, the dictatorship continues to hold a tight grip on security institutions, including the military, but before his death it was thought likely Kim Jong-Il would transfer more authority to the Party, especially on economic matters, to supply a "scapegoat" for disastrous economic policy. This move to activate the KWP institutions, if followed through, will certainly increase the Party's role over the security institutions.

The promotion of young Kim to general's rank captured international media attention. In fact, awarding military rank to Party leaders, despite their not having a military career, is a well-known practice in all communist regimes. This is a superficial communist ritual to advance the image of the new leader by linking to the most trusted institutions (specifically referring to the military, but not the intelligence sector) among the public. Palpably, these civilians hold the highest decision-making authority over national security and defense matters with the support of seasoned Party officials, who have been in charge of defense issues for decades. Moreover, the leaders control the military with the assistance of the intelligence (secret police) and Party apparatuses. Therefore, it is plausible that the North Korean military will remain under Party (civilian) and intelligence control. The logic behind the assumption of the commander-in-chief title by the highest executive leadership in democracies might be similar despite institutional differences. It is plausible to assume that any military would be disgruntled when a civilian with no military experience is awarded power and authority over defense affairs. The difference is that the military has official and unofficial channels of protest available in a democracy.

In defense of this chapter's main claim that North Korea is not ruled by the military, it is important to highlight some recent observable changes in North Korea's bureaucracy. There are only two ministries—the Ministry of Public Security and the Ministry of People's Armed

Forces—that are manned by active duty military personnel, while the rest of the government ministries and provincial governments are manned by civilians. From discussions with three different sets of people who are career military, diplomats, and scholars, it is clear that North Korea has a strong state administration (bureaucracy) with a clear division of labor. Foreign policy is handled by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, military and civil defense matters by the Ministry of People's Armed Forces, and academic matters by Party academic institutions. These officials are trained for a career in their respective fields. The only difference here is ideological. To retain their social status and advance in their careers, they must become members of the KWP and demonstrate their worship for the Kim family. Their allegiances are undoubtedly monitored by the Party and intelligence services.

The bureaucracy appears to be similar to many former communist nations in that only the Political Bureau and Central Committee of the KWP and the secret police have both horizontal and vertical communication, something lacking in other government institutions. In other words, interagency communication is deliberately limited. Generational continuity is maintained in the North Korean bureaucracy. Military officers, diplomats, and academics, either in Pyongyang or abroad, consist of elder/senior officials in their sixties, mid-ranking officials in their forties and fifties, and junior staff in their twenties and thirties. Because their careers are not affected by frequent elections or political shifts, these specialists appear to provide generational continuity for all levels of bureaucracy. As in democracies, competition for political and financial approval seems to exist among North Korean bureaucrats. The Ministry of Internal Security and the Ministry of People's Armed Forces apparently receive more funding than the other ministries due to the "military-first" policy and the regime's concerns for both internal and external security. Internal financial struggles and limitations on budgets nevertheless are openly debated by officials.[35] This could be interpreted as a shift in North Korean attitudes as a result of the ongoing socio-economic changes.

Although it is difficult to apply the analytical framework of civil–military relations to the North Korean case, it is quite plausible to conclude that the North Korean military is under the control of the KWP and secret police, and that it would probably remain under civilian control as North Korea moved into any scenario of transition. Because the communist economic system has proven neither effective nor efficient, it is difficult to assess the effectiveness and efficiency of the North Korean policies of massive defense spending and militarization of the society at any particular moment. Despite the predominant ideological indoctrination, North Korea does have professional military education and training institutions for its officer corps that are comparable to the Soviet-style military educational institutions. Because of the increased vulnerability of the dictatorship and regime, interoperability and jointness among the military services and security forces might be lacking.

## Conclusion

It is difficult to conduct a comprehensive case study of civil–military relations in North Korea, a state with a unique combination of hereditary dictatorship and a communist-style single-party system. Based on interviews and observation, this chapter advances two major speculations concerning North Korea's civil–military relations. First, the North Korean military is not a salient player in national politics because it is subordinated to the ideological control of the Party and repressive surveillance by the intelligence institutions. The intelligence services, especially the secret police and paramilitary forces, wield more power than the military and are closer to the ruling elites. Therefore, any study of civil–military relations in North Korea needs to distinguish the intelligence institutions from the military, and obligated citizen-soldiers from career military

personnel. Second, although North Korea is undergoing rapid socio-economic changes, civil–military relations are not likely to be affected dramatically if the regime's perceived external security threats remain unchanged. If the regime succeeds in transitioning along the paths laid by China and Vietnam, the military will still enjoy its privileged status. If, however, the regime fails to negotiate deepening socio-economic upheavals, it may slide into turmoil.

There are several possible scenarios for North Korea in the upcoming years: a gradual economic liberalization following the Chinese and Vietnamese models; the collapse of the regime (either from a power struggle among party elites and intelligence leaders or public protests); or, a normalization of bilateral relations with the United States and its allies. Civil–military relations in North Korea are not likely to be affected if economic liberalization is intensified in the presence of external military threats, but civil–military relations will be dramatically affected by the other scenarios. A collapse will test the military's allegiance to its people, while normalization will lead to a sudden drawdown of military forces, and impose changes similar to those that affected former communist militaries in Europe and Asia. All three scenarios have the potential to unfold, because North Korea stands at a crossroads.

Presently, socio-economic change is not driving major alterations in the regime's "military-first policy" and the military's most-privileged status in society. Nor is it likely that there will be a major shift in relations between the public sector and the North Korean military. The regime will continue to utilize the presence of a military threat from the United States and its allies in North-East Asia to divert public attention from daily socio-economic challenges, and to keep the people indoctrinated and organized through mandatory conscription, large reserve forces, and civil defense obligations. The Party's extensive propaganda on the revolutionary military, media, foreign delegates, Kim Jong-un's visits to military units in the footsteps of his father, and annual military rituals such as parades, celebrations, and awards, will continue to contribute to the positive image of the military in North Korean society. Avoidance of military service will probably increase, however, as socio-economic changes deepen and more people seek opportunities to work abroad. As it is, the external military threat both justifies the regime's repressive control over society, and serves as a rationale for large defense spending and the imposition of military and civil defense duties on North Korean citizens.

The communist style of civil–military relations certainly deserves another round of investigation to reveal the interplay between political and economic transitions and the institutional legacy of the past. A careful examination will help further explain the role of the military and other security forces as variables in the transitions that took place in the post-communist world, and how they may affect remaining cases like North Korea.

## Notes

1 It seems, from the North Korean perspective, that the U.S. military presence in North-East Asia, along with occasional statements by the U.S. administration (e.g., pre-emptive strike, axis of evil) and military exercises, are easily perceived as a real military threat. For their part, the United States, South Korea, and Japan perceive North Korea as a serious threat to regional security.
2 Migeddorj Batchimeg, "Mongolia's DPRK Policy: Engaging North Korea," *Asian Survey* 46 (2006): 275–97.
3 Dorjjugder Munkh-Ochir, "Mongolia's 'Third Neighbor' Doctrine and North Korea," The Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, January 28, 2011.
4 The author traveled to Pyongyang in May, November 2008, and had discussions with visiting North Korean military, diplomats, and social scientists between 2008 and 2009 in Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia.
5 Daniel Byman and Jennifer Lind, "Pyongyang's Survival Strategy," *International Security* 35(1) (Summer 2010): 44–74; Muthia Alagappa, *Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001).

 6 Alagappa, *Coercion and Governance*, p. 436.

 7 Ibid., p. 4.

 8 Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei, "Intelligence in the Developing Democracies: The Quest for Transparency and Effectiveness," in Loch K. Johnson, *The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence* (Oxford: Oxford Handbooks, 2010), pp. 757–73.

 9 Jinsok Jun, "South Korea: Consolidating Democratic Civilian Control," in Muthia Alagappa, *Coercion and Governance* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), pp. 123–5.

10 There are other hidden purposes in the conscription system: (1) To inculcate discipline, eradicate illiteracy, and provide vocational training; (2) to utilize able-bodied personnel as a cheap workforce for nation-building projects and periodic labor-intensive events such as disaster-relief, planting, and harvesting; and (3) to keep youths politically inactive.

11 There are numerous accounts from defectors on these prerequisites. See, for instance, Bradley K. Martin, *Under the Loving Care of the Fatherly Leader: North Korea and the Kim Dynasty* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2004).

12 Martin, *Under the Loving Care*; Joseph C. Kun, "North Korea: Between Moscow and Peking," *China Quarterly* 31 (1967): 48–58; Joungwon A. Kim, "Soviet Policy in North Korea," *World Politics* 22 (1970): 237–54; Taik-Young Hamm, *Arming the Two Koreas: State, Capital and Military Power* (London: Routledge, 1999).

13 Joungwon Kim, "Soviet Policy in North Korea"; Alexander Zhebin, "Russia and North Korea: An Emerging, Uneasy Partnership," *Asian Survey* 35(8) (1995): 726–39.

14 Yufan Hao, "China and the Korean Peninsula," in Yufan Hao and Guocang Huan, *The Chinese View of the World* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1989), pp. 177–200; Raymond Garthoff, "Sino-Soviet Military Relations," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 349 (1963): 81–93.

15 N. An and A. Rose, "North Korean Military Assistance," in Joseph F. Copper and Daniel S. Papp, *Communist Nations' Military Assistance* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983), pp. 169–77.

16 Andrew Scobell, "Making Sense of North Korea: Pyongyang and Comparative Communism," *Asian Security* 1(3) (2005): 246.

17 Joseph Bermudez, *The Armed Forces of North Korea* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2001), pp. 23–7.

18 This fact was discerned from the author's interactions with KPA officers in 2008.

19 Kiwon Chung, "The North Korean People's Army and the Party," *The China Quarterly* 14 (1963): 116; Bermudez, *The Armed Forces of North Korea,* pp. 28–33.

20 Chung-in Moon and Hideshi Takesada, "North Korea: Institutionalized Military Intervention," in Muthia Alagappa, *Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), pp. 368–73.

21 North Korean, military and diplomats explain the Party and military structure by describing the DPRK's general institutionalization as quite similar to that of Mongolia and other former communist states.

22 There are about 190,000 personnel in the Internal Troops, according to anonymous Russian sources; the Internal Troops are also in charge of control of population movements and the operation of various checkpoints in urban and rural areas.

23 Martin, *Under the Loving Care*, p. 94; Joungwon Kim, "Soviet Policy in North Korea."

24 Martin, *Under the Loving Care*, p. 110; Chung, "The North Korean People's Army".

25 Martin, *Under the Loving Care*, pp. 548–9; Bill Gertz, *Betrayal: How the Clinton Administration Undermined American Security* (Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, Inc., 1999), pp. 255–64.

26 These observations were based on the author's interviews with Mongolian experts and other sources.

27 Jae-Chon Lim, "Institutional Change in North Korean Economic Development Since 1984: The Competition between Hegemonic and Non-Hegemonic Rules and Norms," *Pacific Affairs* 82(1) (2009): 9–27.

28 Ibid., p. 27.

29 Jae Cheol Kim, "The Political Economy of Chinese Investment in North Korea: A Preliminary Assessment," *Asian Survey* 46(6) (Nov.–Dec. 2006): 898–916; Joo-A J. Lee, "To Fuel or Not to Fuel: China's Energy Assistance to North Korea," *Asian Security* 5(1) (2009): 45–72.

30 "Shuttle trade refers to the activity in which individual entrepreneurs buy goods abroad and import them for resale in street markets or small shops. Often the goods are imported without full declaration in order to avoid import duties." From the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) *Glossary of Statistical Terms*: available at: http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/ (accessed August 6, 2012); and Paul Holtom, "Shuttle Trade and New Border Regimes," *Russian Regional Perspectives*

*Journal* 1(3) (2006), available at: www.iiss.org/programmes/russia-and-eurasia/russian-regional-perspectives-journal/rrp-volume-1-issue-3/shuttle-trade-and-new-border-regimes/ (accessed August 6, 2012); John Everard, "The Markets of Pyongyang," Academic Paper Series vol. 6, no. 1, Korea Economic Institute of America, Washington, DC, January 2011.

31 Siegfried S. Hecker, "North Korea's Yongbyon Nuclear Complex," report for the Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford, CA, 20 November 2010.

32 "The Military Balance 2010," report for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, pp. 411–13; available at: www.iiss.org/publications/military-balance/ (accessed August 6, 2012).

33 Robert A. Scalapino, *North Korea at a Crossroads* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997); Kongdan Oh and Ralph C. Hassig, *North Korea Through the Looking Glass* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution Press, 2000); Jonathan D. Pollack, "The United States, North Korea, and the End of the Agreed Framework," *Naval War College Review* 56(3) (2003): 11–49; Marcus Noland, "Famine and Reform in North Korea," *Asian Economic Papers* 3(2) (2004): 1–40.

34 While only a handful of nations—Russia, China, Cuba, Iran, and Vietnam—maintained permanent defense attaché offices in Pyongyang, a number of post-communist states and a few others (most consistently Switzerland) have accredited their defense attachés to Pyongyang and revived their contacts with the DPRK's defense attaché offices in Beijing. This same trend might have revived in Moscow, where the DPRK maintains a defense attaché office.

35 In comparison with previous discussions with North Korean officials, they have become increasingly open to discussing any issues, and strive to provide rational reasons for their responses. They are aware of their political (ideological) indoctrination, but they need to speak in line with with Party policy because somebody is watching them. Many Mongolians remember how Chinese military, diplomats, and scholars in the mid-1990s, although aware of all the changes and party scrutiny, still needed to comply. Today, their Chinese counterparts speak freely; it seems they have already overcome the fear of ideological control. Most Westerners who dealt with former communist regimes in the early stage of transition probably recall similar images of those communist militaries.

# 8

# LEARNING FROM FAILURE
## Egypt

*Robert Springborg*

## Introduction

Militaries reacted to the "Arab Spring" uprisings of 2011 in a variety of ways: By stepping aside to facilitate a transition to democracy, as in Tunisia; by attempting, with greater or lesser success and degrees of fragmentation, to defend the incumbent regime, as in Libya, Yemen, Syria, and Bahrain; or, as in the case of Egypt, by seizing power, at least temporarily, in what may be termed a "coup-volution"—a preemptive coup intended to abort the further intensification of conflict and at least preserve, if not upgrade, the military's privileged political and economic position.[1] As the hyphenated term suggests, the Egyptian military's intervention did not appear to be a traditional coup, in that military leaders declared they were acting on behalf of the protesters and pledged to facilitate a speedy transition to civilian democracy. Unique, at least for the Middle East, this "coup-volution" provides novel evidence for the study of civil–military relations in a region in which militaries have been described as "ruling but not governing."[2]

Ten months after the dramatic events of January–February 2011 in Cairo's Midan al Tahrir (Liberation Square), the military's intentions remained unclear. Would it indeed honor its pledge to exit politics and hand over power to a truly sovereign civilian government? Might it seek to return to some form of the *status quo ante* of "ruling but not governing," or could it even seek to perpetuate into the indefinite future its roles of both ruling and governing? The evidence thus far suggests, at a minimum, that the military will not cede power until it is absolutely certain that any successor civilian government will not only forswear efforts to subject the military to its control, but will continue to permit the military leadership to dictate the formation and implementation of national security policy, broadly defined. To that end, the Egyptian military has sought to weaken and divide civilian political actors, as part of a process of constructing a new political order in which it may agree to neither rule nor to govern, but in which it in turn is neither ruled nor governed.[3] While the military's leaders have encountered considerable resistance in their attempts to achieve the objective of an ironclad guarantee protecting the services' privileged status, and have demonstrated a conspicuous lack of political skill while maneuvering to undermine opponents, they continue to exercise direct power long after the six-month transition period to which they had initially committed.

By protracting the schedule for parliamentary and presidential elections and the drafting of a new constitution for as long as two years, it appears that Egypt's military may be seeking to

convert the coup-volution into a slow-motion *de facto* coup, whereby it decides, maybe retrospectively, that the safest course of action for the preservation of its power is indeed to both rule and govern. While this choice may not consciously have been made as of this writing, the military has retained its upper hand in post-Husni Mubarak Egypt, and looks set to perpetuate what at a minimum can be described as a modified praetorian state, albeit one that ultimately has a heavier cloak of civilian window dressing than existed prior to 2011.[4] This perpetuation of the military's power in the wake of a civilian-led popular uprising results not from its political skills, which grew rusty while it ruled from the background for more than 30 years but did not govern on a daily basis, but from the relative weakness and fragmentation of civilian political actors long subdued by authoritarianism. It is also a product of the strength provided by the military's own legacy, based as it is on its longstanding centrality in the historiography of modern Egypt, as well as on its rich endowment of political and economic resources.[5] But, as will be discussed below, the military's centrality has come at a steep price to its effectiveness, to say nothing of impeding the development of Egypt's political economy. What is thus now at issue in Egypt are two interrelated matters: (1) Whether civilian authority can be asserted over the military; and (2), if so, whether the military can finally be transformed, after decades of stagnation following the 1973 Yom Kippur War, into a modernized, effective institution that exerts less influence on the nation's economy.

## Centrality of the military

The military, historically dominated by the army, has played a central role in building the modern Egyptian nation and state. The founders of modern and republican Egypt, Muhammad Ali and Gamal Abd al Nasser, respectively, were both army officers, as was Ahmad Orabi, the nationalist leader who fought bravely but unsuccessfully to prevent the British from colonizing Egypt. The defining events of Egypt's liberation from colonial rule were the 1948 and 1956 wars, between which times the country engaged heroically in guerrilla warfare against British troops. The liberation of the Sinai Peninsula from Israel came when the Egyptian military successfully crossed the Suez Canal in October 1973. The industrialization of Egypt commenced with the construction of factories in the 1820s to produce weaponry and army uniforms. It recommenced in earnest after 1952, under the auspices of President Nasser and his officer colleagues. Universal conscription for military service dates to the early nineteenth century. It has continued intermittently to this day, so that a substantial percentage of males of successive generations has served in the military. The institution in turn has served as a major channel of vocational upward mobility for the millions of conscripts to whom it has taught skills. The three presidents of republican Egypt were all former officers. Paradoxically, the military further burnished its reputation as the embodiment of the nation's spirit and defender of its interests by removing one-time air force general Husni Mubarak from power in February 2011. Instead of blaming the military for having foisted Mubarak upon them, Egyptians overwhelmingly thanked it for ridding them of him.

The military's centrality to both the narrative and the historical reality of the emergence of contemporary Egypt is a message underscored by an impressive array of military museums, through curricula for the teaching of Egyptian history, and in the media, which until very recently have only lionized the past and present roles of the military. Prior to the 2011 uprising, no opposition political party or grouping was openly critical of the military, because such criticism crossed an informal "red line" drawn rigidly by the government, but also because such criticism did not strike a chord with most Egyptians. The encroachment of the military into civilian domains, such as sports, was scarcely noticed and apparently not resented, as the much cheered

victory of the Border Guards' football (soccer) team in the 2010 Egyptian Cup attested.[6] The military under Mubarak assumed responsibility for organizing the national youth football competition and commenced a stadium building program that produced new venues in Burg al Arab, Suez, and Alexandria. For its part the public seemed to accept uncritically the ever-broadening role of the military and indeed, to be grateful for it and respectful of the institution, views that were further reinforced by the military's refusal to shoot to kill to defend the Mubarak regime. A poll conducted some two months after he was overthrown revealed that among public figures, military leaders had the greatest impact on the public's opinions. Some 64 percent of respondents reported that their views "on current events and politics" were influenced by military leaders, in comparison to scores for religious, union, and political party leaders of 42 percent, 21 percent, and 28 percent, respectively.[7]

Tangible economic and political interests underpin the military's popularity. Egypt's armed forces command a sprawling economic empire that produces a vast array of military and civilian goods and services, none of which appears in the national budget. The military's economy is divided into what are essentially three separate holding companies: (1) The Ministry of Military Production; (2) the Arab Organization for Industrialization; and (3) the National Service Products Organization, each with its own factories and personnel within their own career structures. In the mid-1980s, the World Bank urged that military companies be sold to civilian interests as part of the broader privatization program, advice that was rejected out of hand.[8] Since that time the military economy has continued to expand. Paradoxically the military has itself benefited from the privatization program, which handed over former state-owned civilian enterprises to it, including a particularly large batch under the government of Prime Minister Ahmad Nazif (2004–11).[9] Dependent upon the military economy are hundreds of thousands of former conscripts, whose last six months in service are devoted to "skill enhancement" in its factories and other companies; officers who retire to management positions within it; businesspersons with commercial links to the military economy; the civilian poor who intermittently are provided their subsidized staples, such as bread, from the military or companies it owns; and politicians, whom the military can reward or punish through its choices of constituencies in which to locate its economic enterprises.[10] Foreign military professionals who have interacted with the Egyptian military liken its head, Field Marshal Muhammad Hussein Tantawi, to the CEO of the largest corporate conglomerate in Egypt, in that his primary concern is the economic well-being of the military, not the performance of its nominal tasks and duties.[11] Tantawi personally took charge of the nation on February 10, 2011 by suspending the constitution and assuming the chairmanship of the newly empowered Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), which consisted of the top 20 or so commanders of the various forces. He also ensured that the military economy would remain under his overall control by retaining as Minister of State for Military Production his long-time client, General Sayid Mashal, in the cabinets formed under the Supreme Council. By not appointing a new Minister of Defense, the Field Marshal solidified his continued personal control of the military.

Not subject under Mubarak to domestic political pressure to reform, nor as yet by the protest movement, and with only passive pressure coming from external actors including the United States, the incentive structure within the military itself favors the status quo. It is the largest employer at a time of chronic unemployment, which afflicts at least a quarter of all males aged 15–29. With some 700,000 potential new entrants to the workforce every year, the military's absorption of 200,000 conscripts and an additional quarter of a million males of working age into its economic enterprises constitutes the greatest single annual contribution to domestic employment. Moreover, because civilian technical training is inadequate, by default the military is the country's most important provider of technical education and training. It is also the only

sector whose graduates feed directly into the economy, by way of the military-controlled pro-
duction and service companies. The sprawling military economy generates revenues that sustain
the oversized military and provide the patronage to ensure the loyalty of the officer corps, and
now facilitate direct involvement in the political system if its leaders so choose.

By virtue of its historical legitimacy, its skillful public relations, its patronage, and veiling of its
true power, the military, despite being the backbone of the unpopular Mubarak regime, was
not initially a target of the public's wrath in early 2011. Discontent with the government
focused far more on the regime's main political watchdog, the Ministry of Interior's security and
intelligence services, the most prominent of which was the feared State Security Investigations
(SSI). Responding to overwhelming popular demand, in March 2011, the newly appointed
Minister of the Interior, General Mansur al Aissawy (a former assistant Minister of the Interior
who was elevated to the ministerial post by the military leadership) announced the abolition of
SSI and the creation of a new National Security Agency (NSA). One observer likened this
restructuring process to a "game of musical chairs," whereby SSI officers were simply shuffled
around within the newly created body.[12] But SSI was never the most important security force,
so presumably neither will be the NSA. Lurking behind all of the Ministry of Interior's agencies
was General Intelligence, controlled directly by the military and better equipped and more
professional than any of its Ministry of Interior counterparts. Thus the military had its cake and
ate it too, basking in popularity and general support for its reforms while other elements of the
regime that were in fact subordinate to it absorbed popular anger.

General Intelligence presumably has become yet more powerful since February 11, 2011, as a
result of the downgrading and repackaging of the SSI, the dismissal of some 650 SSI officers,
including 505 generals, and referral to trial of 27 of those generals.[13] Military police have taken
over many of the former duties of the security and intelligence forces, including guarding vital
institutions, while military courts, prosecutors, and prisons have displaced the SSI's equivalent
system of "justice" that formally served as the principal means of containing oppositionists.[14]
The consequences of the subordination of the Ministry of Interior to the military appeared to
be the cause of a strike by some 3,000 low-ranking police in October 2011. They demanded
that Minister al Aissawy be replaced, claiming that he was still protecting high-ranking
Mubarak-era police generals. They also asserted that he was acting as an instrument of the
power of the military by re-imposing military trials for police officers, from which they had
been exempted under the previous minister, Habib al Adly.[15] Calls for the removal of Minister al
Aisssawy were renewed with yet greater vigor in protests that shook Cairo in late November 2011.

The protest movement ultimately gained limited representation in the cabinet led by Prime
Minister Issam Sharaf, who replaced the military's initial choice, a confidant of Mubarak, Gen-
eral Ahmad Shafiq, in February 2011. But Sharaf and his ministers were far more beholden to
the SCAF than to the amorphous protest movement, as reflected in the precipitous decline in the
Prime Minister's popularity as it became ever clearer he and his ministers took their orders
directly from the SCAF.[16] Sharaf's favorable rating of 74 percent in June had been reduced by
more than half by August.[17] The decline in the popularity of the cabinet did not, however,
undermine the general public's still comparatively favorable view of the military, despite souring
relations between it and many of the organized political forces, both secular and Islamist.[18]

Underpinning and supplementing the military's political resource of popularity is its unsur-
passed ability to dispense patronage, as reflected in the budget it handed down in June 2011,
which ratcheted up subsidies, government employment, and wages. It also has taken steps to
directly distribute patronage to citizens, such as by having military-controlled companies build
low-income housing.[19] The only autonomous civilian political organization with any substantial
resources, the Muslim Brotherhood, underwent a sustained attack on its financial base by the

Mubarak regime over some two decades. As a result, neither it nor any other non-governmental organization is sufficiently well endowed to attract large followings through patronage. The sole businessman with ample resources to enter the political fray after the upheaval, Naguib Sawiris, is hobbled by virtue of being a Christian and because he lacks political skills. His Free Egyptians political party immediately foundered, attracting less than 5 percent support in polls of voters' intentions, and there were no indications that Sawiris was distributing largesse elsewhere. Muhammad al Baradei, the Nobel Prize-winning former head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, who attracted widespread support on his return to Egypt in the waning months of the Mubarak presidency, was similarly unable to convert his name recognition into a viable candidacy for the presidency in 2011. He lacked both personal and institutional resources, and immediately set himself and his camp against the military's efforts to retain power, thereby ensuring that the SCAF would do all in their power to undermine him.

The precipitous decline in the country's economic well-being since Mubarak's overthrow may paradoxically be enhancing the military's political standing. Citizens manifest increased concern with personal material circumstances, and declining interest in political processes generally, and in democracy specifically. In March 2011, for example, 35 percent of respondents to the International Peace Institute's (IPI) poll reported that the biggest national problem was the economy. Five months later that percentage had risen to 62 percent. Over the same period those who reported that lack of democracy was the biggest national problem dropped from 5 to 1 percent.[20] This is consistent with other polling data. The "biggest problem facing Egypt as a whole" was identified as "democracy" by only 3 percent of respondents in the April 2011 IPI poll, compared to almost two-thirds who identified economic issues as the biggest problem.[21] Political and economic uncertainty thus seems to be rebounding, at least in the short term, more in favor of the military than of civilian political actors, even though the SCAF bears primary responsibility for economic mismanagement. Its residual popularity and its willingness to enhance entitlements and distribute patronage, combined with the fractiousness of the civilian opposition, make it unlikely that criticism of the military's role in politics can gain sufficient traction to derail the SCAF's self-serving transition "roadmap."

## Military relations with the executive, legislature, and civil society

The military was less subject to civilian control under Mubarak than it was during the Anwar Sadat era, as Sadat was more distrustful than his successor of a military he did not completely control. He therefore tried to create a quasi-pluralistic political order as a counterbalance, although in reality that order remained a less important means to control the military than the exercise of presidential power bolstered by security and intelligence forces. The constitution that President Sadat promulgated, the relevant articles of which were never amended, established presidential supremacy over the military. Article 143 awards him the power "to appoint the civil and military officials and the diplomatic representatives and to dismiss them." Established practice under Sadat's designated successor Husni Mubarak was for the president to approve all promotions to senior officer grades, and he increasingly drew upon the Republican Guard, the unit charged with protecting the president himself, rather than combat units, for the highest-level appointments. Article 150 states that "the President shall be the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces." Possibly the most revealing article is 182, which mandates that "a council shall be established, the National Defense Council, over which the President of the Republic shall preside, and which shall undertake the examination of matters pertaining to the methods of ensuring the safety and security of the country." This article is a dead letter. The constitutionally mandated National Defense Council was called into existence by President Sadat, but at its first

meeting General Muhammad Sadiq, then Minister of Defense, is reported to have objected vehemently to this manifestation of external control of the military, even if under presidential authority. The Council never met again.

Executive control over the military, mandated in the constitution that was unilaterally abrogated by the military in March 2011 included the presidential power to determine the composition of the officer corps and select the cabinet, including the minister of defense and minister of military production, the latter of whom manages the military economy. These posts are held by active military officers. Field Marshal Tantawi intermittently held both portfolios over the last decade and a half of the Mubarak era, suggesting the degree to which the military and its economic empire are intertwined, with control over them centralized and, under Mubarak, ultimately subordinated to the president. The only civilian employees in the Ministry of Defense are said—only somewhat jokingly—to be those who serve tea and coffee. The key instrument of executive control over the military under Mubarak was General Intelligence, which was headed by former army officer General Omar Sulaiman, a close confidant of the president who was nominated by him to be vice president days before Mubarak stepped down on February 11. That Field Marshal Tantawi and other high-ranking officers resented Sulaiman and his supervision of them through General Intelligence is reflected by the fact that immediately after Mubarak's departure, Sulaiman was removed from the vice presidency and placed under house arrest.[22] Given the expansive power over the military vested in the president under the now-defunct constitution, it is not surprising that the military is seeking to control the rewriting of that document, presumably to reduce that power and/or to ensure that the military leadership determines who the next president will be. By the fall of 2011 it was apparent that the military would prefer one of its own to succeed Mubarak, with the choice seeming to be either Field Marshal Tantawi, Chief of Staff General Sami Enan, or retired General Ahmad Shafiq, whose star was again rising following his brief and disastrous performance as prime minister in the immediate wake of Mubarak's departure. The delay of the presidential election until as late as mid-2012 was widely interpreted as a tactic by the military to provide time for itself to prepare its candidate, or at a minimum to ensure the subordination to its will of any civilian contender it might countenance, such as former foreign minister and Arab League secretary General Amr Moussa.

Other executive agencies, including the two principal bodies charged with auditing and investigating governmental authorities, have no jurisdiction over the military. The Ministry of Finance is explicitly prohibited from releasing what data it has on military expenditures. The economist appointed to that portfolio in February 2011 was in fact elevated to the cabinet before the appointment of Issam Sharaf as prime minister, suggesting that he was beholden directly to the military, not the prime minister. The Ministry of Defense directly provides figures for the national budget, which it takes from the non-profit-making Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) database and passes on to the Ministry of Finance. The SIPRI data is itself based on questionnaires sent to the Ministry of Defense. It is therefore reasonable to assume that the official figures are intended primarily for public domestic and international consumption, and that they substantially understate the true magnitude of the military budget.[23] The now defunct constitution empowered the president to sign treaties, a provision upon which legislation was based that passed regularly every three years, granting to the president the sole right to determine military procurement.[24] By this legalistic device parliamentary oversight of the economically vital area of procurement was sidestepped. The military also has its own court system, as called for in Article 183 of the constitution. Those courts were increasingly used by Mubarak to try civilians for alleged offenses, many of which were of a directly political nature. Following the disbandment of SSI in early March 2011, the military itself began to

round up protesters, trying them in its own courts, sentencing them to extended prison terms, and locking them up in its own facilities.[25] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, once a relatively autonomous actor in the executive branch, was gradually subordinated during the Mubarak era to the presidency, military, and security services. Numerous ambassadors, even those in key postings, were recruited through these channels, thereby further securitizing Egypt's foreign policies and bilateral relations.

Neither the legislature nor civil society in republican Egypt has exerted any meaningful control over the military. For more than half a century, the regime's political party has dominated parliament. Since the first republican parliament was seated in 1957, those relatively few members elected as independents or representing opposition political parties have never sought to utilize the legislature to oversee the military. Constitutional amendments passed in 2007 in fact reduced what little opportunity there was for parliamentarians to even question the minister of defense. After that time he was not compelled to appear annually before parliament, a task that was assumed by the prime minister. Of the 2005–10 parliament's Defense and National Security Committee, which numbered slightly more than 40 members, some 15 were former military and 25 former police officers. The chairman was a former police general. That few if any civilians sought membership on this committee, in which parliament's responsibility to oversee the military is nominally vested, was due to their awareness that true oversight was impossible, and that they could gain no political benefit from serving on the committee. The committee never filed an interpellation to which the Minister of Defense or Minister of Interior would have to respond. Nor did the committee have access to the Ministry of Defense's confidential budget figures. Twenty-three former police officers were elected to parliament in 2005, whereas 50 won seats in the following election in 2010, lifting their ratio of elected deputies to a record high 10 percent. The parliament itself was prorogued by the military in February 2011. The SCAF called for new elections to be held within six months, but then delayed the elections until late November 2011.[26] In the meantime it issued a new electoral law and redistricted the country, the apparent purpose of both measures being to ensure that elections would produce a fragmented parliament, divided between representatives of the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamists, secular political activists, and the so-called *fulul*, or "remnants" of the *ancien régime*, especially the once-dominant National Democratic Party. A further step taken by the military to ensure that the newly created and elected legislature would not challenge its authority was to delay the writing of the constitution. In the absence of constitutional powers, the legislature would have no legal basis upon which to attempt to subordinate the military.

Civil society has traditionally been similarly passive in the face of the military's autonomy. It has had no access to relevant information, as attested by Egypt's rank at the very bottom of Global Integrity's ranking of citizens' legal and practical access to governmental information, with scores of zero on both dimensions.[27] The asymmetry of information flow between the military and civil society has steadily tilted more in the former's favor over the past three decades. The media reported more information on defense and military matters in the 1980s than subsequently. Following the purge of Field Marshal and Minister of Defense Abd al Halim Abu Ghazala in 1989, censorship of the media's reporting on defense and national security issues intensified. It was common knowledge among journalists that the only absolute red lines over which their work could not cross without retribution were the military and the finances of the presidential family.[28] Academic investigation and research into military and security issues were also curtailed. A mature student employed in a cabinet minister's office, for example, was warned by his academic supervisors not to include Egypt in his PhD dissertation on the comparative role of parliaments in national defense and security policies. A former army general associated with one of Egypt's leading government-controlled think tanks was informed by the

Ministry of Interior that the title of a planned seminar, "Security Sector Reform in Egypt," was unacceptable. It was changed with mutual agreement to "Security and Development."[29]

Although Egypt never had a truly robust array of think tanks focused on foreign policy matters, the number and level of activity of the remaining ones declined as the Mubarak era proceeded. They steered ever further away from defense and national security issues. A European defense attaché's lament that he learned more from the internet about the Egyptian military than he did locally during his three-year posting in Egypt reflects the information blackout that its leaders successfully imposed.[30] Civil society, whether in the form of the media, academia, or public policy-related institutions, to say nothing of individual citizens, was rendered incapable of gathering the information or acquiring the knowledge that would have enabled it to even attempt to oversee the military. Not only has national security policy not been a subject of public debate, there has been no official, publicly available statement of national security policy, or a defense White Paper that might clarify the military's role in implementing that policy. Although elements of civil society have spoken out against the military since January 2011, there is little evidence that these criticisms have sparked general interest in enhancing oversight over the military, or that civil society has itself begun to develop the capacities to do so. Indeed, as 2011 progressed, the SCAF took increasingly severe measures to curtail the activities of civil society organizations, including those that had so recently demonstrated for change. In September, it expanded provisions of the infamous emergency law so that, among other things, this already draconian set of restrictions would henceforth also apply to "efforts to spread rumors and lies."[31] It also sent a growing number of civil society activists, including bloggers, to military courts and prisons. Its sensitivity to information flow was further indicated by its assertion of control over the state media, which by the Fall had become as much a mouthpiece of the SCAF as they had been of the Mubarak regime.[32]

## Effectiveness

A national military's effectiveness can be measured against three benchmarks: (1) Objectives set for itself and/or by the nation's responsible authorities (which in Egypt presently are identical); (2) objectives inherent in democratic defense institution building, which entail professionalizing the armed forces and placing them under civilian control; and (3) the still broader objectives implied in the term "security sector reform," which are founded on such principles as being "people-centered, locally owned and based on democratic norms, human rights principles and the rule of law." Such reforms require the state's security institutions, including the military, to provide their citizens "freedom from fear and measurable reductions in armed violence and crime," and to involve them in making and overseeing national security strategy.[33]

As for the roles Egypt assigns to its military, they remain ambiguous, as there is no official national security policy, nor any documents or official proceedings that specify them. This presumably purposeful ambiguity conceals what has been the institution's primary objective, which is to guarantee regime incumbency, and thus its own power base. When queried regarding more manifestly military objectives, the Egyptian high command refers to territorial defense and possible threats arising from various quarters. The reply will describe Egypt's area of some one million square kilometers and its 5,000 kilometers of land and sea borders, thereby implying the magnitude of the task. The primary threats, according to the high command, are those arising from neighboring and regional states, such as Israel, Libya, and Sudan, as well as Islamist extremism, which they increasingly connect to Iran.[34] A reasonable surmise then is that the primary military objective of the armed forces has been to deter an all-out attack on the homeland by another sovereign state, while the secondary objective has been to counter threats posed by

Islamist extremism, including linkages between external supporters and internal activists. A range of third-order dangers, such as those to the Nile waters from other riparian states, especially Ethiopia, and to Egyptian citizens living in the Gulf, Libya, Sudan, and elsewhere in the region, also must have concerned military decision-makers. How effective, then, has the Egyptian military been in preparing to counter these threats?

If judged simply by results, Egypt's military has been quite effective in its primary role, as the country has not been attacked since 1967 and various Islamist threats have been contained in greater or lesser measure. If judged by the sophistication of its procedures, readiness, and its capacity to meet sudden or diverse threats, however, the Egyptian military is less impressive. The operative deterrence principle is sheer bulk. Some 4,000 tanks and 600 combat aircraft, an army in excess of 300,000 soldiers (for a population of some 82 million), and the largest navy in the region, would clearly give pause to any potential regional aggressor. But if such aggression did occur, how effective is the military response likely to be? One authoritative source on comparative military strength, *Jane's*, expresses reservations. It notes that:

> The armed forces have yet to complete the transition from quantity to quality … one of its biggest problems is that its military infrastructure remains too unwieldy, sacrificing funds that could be used to improve training and combat effectiveness on systems acquisition … The armed forces are largely staffed by conscripts, feature a pampered officer class and there is no oversight from civilian institutions … [T]hey still have far to go to overcome their qualitative differences with the Israeli military.[35]

*Jane's* further notes that "there are no significant instances of the armed forces operating on a joint basis," and that the "military has reserve forces attached to the army and navy but it is not clear how well they are trained or prepared for warfare or integration into regular units."[36]

*Jane's* and other sources identify several interrelated factors that negatively affect the military's effectiveness, including poor communications and an associated lack of even internal interoperability, inadequate training, and poor maintenance. These issues are not easily addressed because they have underlying causes. A major, if not definitive, function of the Ministry of Defense, the key intersection between the power of the president and that of the military, has been to ensure executive control of the armed forces. It has discharged this task through Military Intelligence, backed up by General Intelligence, which until early 2011 reported to the Office of the President, and subsequently to the SCAF.[37] Whether pervasive surveillance by these intelligence agencies undermines the military's effectiveness is unknown, although it is clear that the military high command resented the oversight role and direct presidential connections of General Intelligence. It is also clear that effectiveness has been substantially reduced by other control mechanisms of the Ministry of Defense, which include rigid structural separation of the entire security and military structure, combined with tight restrictions on lateral communications, and by the regime more generally.

The Ministry of Interior has official responsibility for internal security, a reason given by the military command for not developing humanitarian assistance capabilities to assist in domestic emergencies. Since the Ministry of Interior has virtually no capabilities to discharge this function, disaster relief is basically not provided to Egyptians, as numerous cases attest, although in emergency situations the Ministry of Defense sometimes provides untrained troops to lend a hand. The military, as the final guarantor of national security, looks over the shoulder of the Ministry of Interior, intervening as required to deal with threats. The army, for example, took control of combating the Islamist insurgency in Upper Egypt in the early and mid-1990s, after the Ministry of Interior failed in that task. When, in 1986, conscripts of the Ministry's Central

Security Force based in and around Cairo rebelled, the military called in helicopters, tanks, and troops to subdue them.[38] These two ministries, in short, have guarded their own turf and do not cooperate in addressing threats, with the consequence that integrated approaches to search and rescue, disaster relief, and humanitarian assistance have not been possible. Problems in dealing with the Bedouin quasi-insurgency in the Sinai may also have stemmed from this lack of effective coordination. The underlying cause of this discord was the Mubarak regime's interest in reinforcing the independence of both so that they served as counterbalances to one another. While this cause is irrelevant for the moment, as the military now dominates the Ministry of Interior, institutional rivalries could reassert themselves under a new president, especially if, like his predecessor, he finds it expedient to exacerbate them. Alternatively, the military could retain more direct, overall control than it exercised under Mubarak, but integration of all the state's intelligence and armed forces under the military high command would have ominous implications for their accountability, hence for the potential transition to democracy.

The various military services, and even commands within services, are rigidly stove-piped, a situation deliberately exacerbated by Mubarak as a means to maintain control. The air force and air defense command are entirely separate services. Presidential security is provided by the autonomous National Guard, a force of some 60,000 that is nominally under the Ministry of Defense but is not part of the army. The army itself is divided into several regional commands. The navy consists of two fleets, one in the Mediterranean and the other in the Gulf of Suez and Red Sea, with little interoperability between them. Each of the services and its units has its own residential compounds, resorts, clubs, and other facilities, so that in some areas, such as that of Heliopolis, sprawling resort hotel facilities line the roads, with those belonging to the artillery next to those belonging to the infantry, and so on. Manpower is tethered to equipment in a manner that impedes overall flexibility and interaction between units. So, for example, mechanics and technicians who serve for 20 years or more may spend their entire careers working on a single weapon system, such as an F4 or MiG 21. That repair and maintenance have not been adequately upgraded is reflected by the fact that U.S. Technical Assistance Field Teams, intended some 30 years ago to assist Egypt for two to three years in developing these capacities, still comprise the backbone of the repair and maintenance capacity for Egypt's modern U.S. weapon systems. Multi-tasking is notable for its absence, as evidenced by the unwillingness to reassign helicopters from one role, say, combat support, to another, say, search and rescue. Since the major biennial joint training exercise, Operation Bright Star, commenced some 30 years ago, the Egyptian military has resisted efforts by the United States and others to broaden its focus from static national defense into other areas, such as maritime search and rescue.[39] The excessive degree of institutional proliferation and sequestration no doubt has several rationales, but its *raison d'être* is to ensure that a power base sufficiently strong and unified to challenge the regime—and especially its leader—could not coalesce.

Technological and behavioral controls imposed by the Ministry of Defense augment the inherent institutional impediments to lateral communications posed by this vertically segmented military/security structure. The revolution in military affairs is based on enhanced electronic and communication capacities, an example of which is Blue Force Tracker, which provides live-time battlefield information. The transfer of these technologies from the United States to other countries requires the recipient to agree to terms as specified in a Communications Interoperability Security Memorandum of Agreement or its successor SESA (Symantec Enterprise Security Architecture), essentially memoranda of understanding regulating the technology's use and transfer to third parties. Minister of Defense Tantawi steadfastly refused to sign such agreements, unlike his counterparts in, for example, various Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia. Egypt therefore does not have access to encrypted electronic communications, which in turn precludes

the use of guided munitions and advanced avionics, to say nothing of impeding interoperability with friendly forces. Radio transmissions remain the principal means of communication in the Egyptian armed forces. One of the reasons why Operation Bright Star has declined in size from 100,000 to 10,000 troops and in the number of participating countries, is that Egyptian forces are steadily less capable of interoperations with other participants. The Egyptian air force's state-of-the-art F-16 jet fighters, including the batch of 20 F-16 block 52s currently on order, are "dumbed down," retrofitted with custom-made outdated avionics and communications systems, at a greater expense than the more advanced models. Egypt's MIAI tanks, F-16 aircraft, and other modern equipment are thus in vital ways more akin to the equipment theoretically made obsolete by these new systems than they are to analogous weapons systems in the armories of the United States and even other Middle East countries.

As for human communications, the Ministry of Defense imposes a host of constraints on them. Even for Egyptian officers themselves the use of email is limited and regulated, while its use with foreign military and diplomatic personnel is prohibited altogether. Requests for communications and other interactions outside of units require approval by the Ministry of Defense. Egyptian officers' social and professional interactions with foreign military personnel, including technical advisers from the United States and other countries, are more severely constrained and monitored than equivalent interactions in other Middle Eastern countries.[40]

Just as regime security concerns have dictated segmentation of the overall security sector and its military core, preoccupation with business and finance has undermined operational capacities. The overgrown, costly military is constantly in need of what might be thought of as *off*-off–budget revenues, or those it can obtain through its various business ventures in addition to those it derives directly from the treasury, which already are in excess of what is officially reported. Thus Field Marshal Tantawi's pre-eminent responsibility has been to stimulate revenue flows, a responsibility he has discharged with alacrity. A generalized desire to reduce costs affects training and maintenance, both of which are neglected. An Egyptian F-16 pilot has, at a *maximum*, one-quarter of the flight training hours of pilots in the United States or even other regional air forces, with the predictably negative effect on skills. A sizeable chunk of even up-to-date hardware is not operable. Some 400 of the army's 2,000 MIAI tanks are in long-term storage. In the meantime, scarce resources go to maintaining old Soviet battle tanks and American F4s, essentially to provide employment. With procurement absorbing virtually all of the annual U.S.-provided largesse of $1.3 billion, the Egyptian military scrambles to reduce operation and training expenses while trying to maximize returns from its far-flung business empire, which has to serve the additional purpose of being a labor sponge, especially for males in the politically sensitive 18–29-year-old age cohort.

Multiple roles for the military that include the performance of essentially non-military functions impede attention to effectiveness as it is understood in defense institution building. Regime support, large-scale employment, and the generation of resources are the primary functional obligations of the Ministry of Defense. In this context, adding new military duties, such as providing humanitarian assistance, upgrading search-and-rescue capacities, or preparing to meet a broader range of security threats such as those posed by asymmetric warfare, is not likely to be welcomed. The *raison d'être* of the Egyptian military is to sustain itself, and by so doing, any regime that rests upon it. This is the only duty it can be said without reservation to have effectively discharged, even in the crisis of 2011, when the military preserved the regime by severing its head.

At the level of ideas and beliefs, were the military to proclaim an end to the era of large-scale land battles and act accordingly, it would call into question its very existence. Defense of the nation against mortal threats and peer enemies is a convenient fig leaf behind which to hide its

inability to change and adapt. The inadequate delivery of disaster relief and search-and-rescue services; the ineffective handling of discontent in the Sinai; the failure to contribute to anti-piracy activities in shipping lanes leading to the Suez Canal; and a general deterioration of combat capacities due to inadequate interoperability, maintenance, and training, are deficiencies of which the military presumably believes the public is still unaware, or, if they do draw criticism, are simply the price that has to be paid to maintain the potentially vulnerable *status quo* of praetorianism.

If the comparatively demanding, human-centered criteria implied by security sector reform are utilized to assess the effectiveness of the Egyptian military, then without reservation it can be said to be profoundly ineffective. Even—or especially—after the 2011 uprising, it is not subject to civilian control, does not support the rule of law or the enforcement of human rights, and does not provide security for citizens, other than in the very narrowest conception of that term, which is to deter attack by another state. Such deterrence could in any case be provided by other, less expensive means. Security sector reform also mandates a joint approach for the provision of overall security, so that the military, intelligence services, police, and legal/judicial system operate systemically, under civilian control and responding to human security needs. As just discussed, the Egyptian security sector is purposefully segmented and fragmented so that no challenge to the regime arises from it. Now that the military is in direct control of the state it will presumably try to ensure that the ostensibly democratic but subordinate civilian regime it is seeking to fashion will not even contemplate oversight of the military economy, formation of national security policy, nor implementation of any type of security sector reform. It is also possible that the military, having exercised power directly, will be reluctant to cede it back to others. It may, for example, seek to broaden its control over the economy by seizing assets previously held by cronies of Mubarak and his family, possibly accompanied with a populist economic nationalism. It was just these sorts of appeals that Nasser and his colleagues made back in the 1950s and 1960s to justify pushing civilian government and private enterprise aside. Public opinion polls suggest that such appeals would fall on fertile ground. More than three-quarters of respondents to the poll conducted by the International Peace Institute in August 2011 said they would prefer "to protect jobs through state control, reversing privatization and maintaining current subsidies," whereas only about one in five said they would prefer "free markets and foreign investment."[41]

## Conclusion

The Egyptian case suggests that civilian control of the military is not necessarily high on the agenda of political opposition groups even in cases of military dictatorship and, surprisingly enough, even after the dictators themselves are chased out of power. A military such as that of Egypt can become so embedded in the polity, economy, society, and popular narratives of state- and nation-building that there is little if any demand for its subordination to external control. Global trends in civil–military relations, including demands for security sector reform, do not, therefore, necessarily have strong echoes within the populace in those settings where such reforms are most needed. Indeed, those global trends and awareness of them may well cause entrenched militaries to seek to preempt demands for change, such as by increasing their role in economies so as to enhance dependence upon their institution, or by cultivating popularity, such as by sports sponsorship.

These may be holding actions, however, for when the military becomes as bloated and non-responsive as it is in Egypt, demands for change may ultimately arise internally or within political society. The status quo is thus both explicable and precarious. This apparent paradox is

mirrored by the passivity of Egyptians in the face of hardships, punctuated by intermittent popular explosions, the most dramatic of which occurred in early 2011. The forces generated by that uprising have political energy, however, and, entirely frustrated by the military's continuing control and blatant attempts to enshrine its immunity and privilege in the new constitution, are starting to challenge it directly.[42] For instance, following a "million man march" on Friday, November 18, 2011, mass demonstrations, centered in Cairo's Tahrir Square but echoed in various other Egyptian cities, featured such slogans as "Down with the SCAF!" and "Tantawi is the enemy of God!"[43] Under this renewed pressure, the cohesiveness of the military could come under threat, for the Mubarak high command is still in charge and known by younger officers to be corrupt and self-indulgent. Professional military education may have created a component of the officer corps willing to coalesce with civilians to oust the military remnants of the *ancien régime* and implement at least some reforms to civil–military relations. The status quo of transitional military rule, in which the high command envisions a subordinate civilian polity, may not be as stable or inevitable as it appears.[44]

The Egyptian case also illustrates that direct engagement between the United States and foreign militaries does not necessarily result in defense institution building. In this case, it might be argued that such engagement has in fact worked against such a development, despite the best intentions of U.S. officers and civilians directly involved in the relationship. The structure of U.S. military assistance, in which procurement has prevailed over other aspects of defense institution building, combined with the recalcitrance of the Egyptian regime and military, on the one hand, and U.S. unwillingness to sacrifice other interests in pursuit of defense institution building, on the other, have obstructed reform. The United States has inadvertently helped to strengthen the military's control over the polity, society, and economy, rather than to create a more effective, efficient military subject to civilian control. This is reflected in the U.S. Agency for International Development's multi-year, cross-national empirical study of the effects of democracy promotion, which finds that U.S. military assistance has actually worked at cross-purposes to assistance from the United States intended to improve Egypt's governance and promote democracy.[45] In the wake of the SCAF's assumption of power in 2011, Washington assured it that the US$1.3 billion annual military assistance would continue unchanged. When the SCAF, acting through Fayza Abud Nega, the Minister for International Cooperation, then demanded that USAID suspend its US$65 million program of support for civil society organizations, it complied. The USAID Mission Director apparently resigned in protest and returned to Washington.[46]

The question of whether or not civilian control has to precede the development of military effectiveness has not been directly addressed by the Egyptian case, as neither objective has been realized. This should not be read as evidence that the normal sequencing commencing with control is the sole path to defense institution building, because effectiveness has not been the driving concern of either external assistance or internal policy-making. It remains possible that civilian control could be enhanced in an incremental, gradual fashion, accompanying and made possible by improved effectiveness. Given the likely continuation of military supremacy over the civilian political order, the hope is that this reversal of the normal sequencing is indeed possible, and made more imperative by the new restiveness of civilian political activists. The changing nature of threats to Egypt's national security could also facilitate this process. As the military gradually adjusts to those threats by upgrading and changing its professional military education, by becoming more interoperable both domestically and externally, and possibly by seeking to address civilian grievances, it could slowly pave the way for more direct civilian engagement in the formation and implementation of national security policies. This, at any rate, seems at present the more likely, if indirect, path to reforming civil–military relations in Egypt, than the high and direct road of democratization paving the way for decisive civilian control.

That the military may well weather the dramatic political storms of early 2011 attests to the profound degree to which it has been embedded in the country's political economy, and the difficulty of digging it out.

# Notes

1 This term was coined by Nathan W. Toronto in "Egypt's Coup-volution," *Middle East Insight* (Middle East Institute, National University of Singapore): 6, February 16, 2011, available at: http://blog.nus.edu.sg/middleeastinstitute/2011/02/16/egypts-coup-volution (accessed August 7, 2012).

2 Stephen A. Cook, *Ruling but Not Governing: The Military and Political Development in Egypt, Algeria and Turkey* (New York: The Council on Foreign Relations, 2007).

3 To rule is to wield ultimate authority, while to govern is to be concerned with the day-to-day functions of a society. In a representative democracy, the people—at least theoretically—rule, while the elected representatives govern.

4 The Praetorian Guards of imperial Rome were the famously dedicated personal bodyguards of the emperor. The modern meaning is equivalent to the Spanish word *junta*: A government run by the military.

5 For an assessment of the bases of support for the Egyptian and other Arab militaries, and a review of the relevant literature, see Robert Springborg, "Arab Militaries," in Lisa Anderson and Marc Lynch, eds., *The Arab Spring*, forthcoming.

6 Never before in the history of the Egyptian football league, which formerly was entirely civilian, has a military-associated team achieved such prominence.

7 The same poll revealed that 94 percent of respondents strongly approved (84 percent) or approved (10 percent) of Mubarak's "resignation." "Egyptian Public Opinion Survey," April 14–27, 2011, and an analysis of the findings, IRI Egypt Index, are available as PDF files from the International Republican Institute (IRI): www.iri.org/news-events-press-center/news/iri-releases-egypt-poll (accessed August 6, 2012).

8 On the Egyptian military economy at that time, see Robert Springborg, *Mubarak's Egypt: Fragmentation of the Political Order* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982).

9 The military was highly critical of the privatization program. Field Marshal and Minister of Defense Muhammad Hussein Tantawi is reported by well-informed sources to have steadfastly objected in cabinet meetings to proposals for further privatizations. In what presumably was an effort to mollify Tantawi, the Minister of Investment, Mahmud Muhyi al Din, who was responsible for the privatization portfolio, ensured that several state-owned enterprises were transferred to military control.

10 At least one such enterprise was located in the constituency of the Minister of Investment.

11 This and other observations about the relative professionalism of the Egyptian military are based primarily on interviews conducted by the author with Western military officers in Egypt in May and June, 2009.

12 Yahia Shawkat, "Reform Security, Secure Reform," *al masry al youm*, March 23, 2011, available at: www.almasryalyoum.com/en/print/371098 (accessed August 6, 2012).

13 "Egypt: Politics and Security," report by MENAS Associates, London, July 14, 2011, p. 4; and Sherine Tadros, "Egypt Resumes Trials of Former Officials," *al Jazeera.net*, August 4, 2011, available at: english.aljazeera.net/news/iddleeast/2011/08/20118473733821119.html (accessed August 6, 2012).

14 Assuming more direct responsibility for security has been a two-edged sword for the military. On the one hand, it has succeeded in subordinating the once competitive security and intelligence forces, but on the other hand it has eroded its popular support as a result of the military police's confrontations with civilian opposition forces. The killing by military police of 27 protesters, most of whom were Coptic Christians, in front of the radio and television building on October 9, 2011, was interpreted by many commentators as the final breach of trust between the military and the civilian protest movement. See, for example, Eric Trager, "Crossed," *The Tablet*, October 12, 2011. The standard estimate of civilians being held in military prisons was some 10,000 by the summer of 2011. See, for example, Amirah Ibrahim, "More Civilians Appear before Military Courts," *al Ahram Weekly*, August 18–24, 2011. The military also assumed responsibility for censorship, another cause of irritation in its relations with civilian political activists. See Abdel-Rahman Hussein, "Military's Evolving Media Strategy Shows Who's Boss," *al masry al youm*, August 17, 2011.

15 Rana Khazbak, "Police Begin Open-Ended Strike, Call for Interior Minister to Resign," *al masry al youm*, October 24, 2011, available at: www.almasryalyoum.com/en/print/508194 (accessed August 6, 2012).

16 A noted Egyptian economist, Hanaa Kheir al Din, observed in the press, for example, that "The SCAF interferes in all aspects of governance, but … their interference, in fact, paralyzes the ability of experts to do their jobs." Nadine Marroushi, "Is the Military Council Leading Egypt toward an Economic Crisis?" *al masry al youm*, October 3, 2011, available at: www.almasryalyoum.com/en/node/501682 (accessed August 6, 2012).

17 International Peace Institute (IPI), "Public Opinion in Egypt," New York, September 19, 2011, available at: www.ipacademy.org/news/general-announcement/226-ipi-polls-new-mood-in-egypt.html (accessed August 6, 2012).

18 The IPI poll, conducted in late summer 2011, reported, for example, that the three persons for whom Egyptians were most likely to vote for president were Amr Moussa, known to be close to the military, Issam Sharaf, its handpicked Prime Minister, and the head of the SCAF itself, Field Marshal Tantawi, who together attracted almost half the "votes." No other candidate was chosen by more than 3 percent of respondents. Widespread political disaffection appeared to affect civilians and their institutions much more than the military, as reflected in the poll's finding that between March and August 2011, support for Islamic and secular parties combined dropped from 55 percent of respondents to 22 percent in August. See ibid.

19 Wafaa Bakry, "Egypt's Military to Begin Building Low-Income Housing," *al masry al youm*, July 22, 2011.

20 Ibid.

21 IPI, "Public Opinion in Egypt."

22 It has been reported subsequently that Omar Sulaiman's expertise on the Palestinian issue and his close relationship with Washington caused the military to rescind the house arrest and to invite Suleiman to resume his diplomatic work on an unofficial basis.

23 That the Ministry of Defense presents the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) data as the official figures for the budget was described to the author by a diplomat who worked closely with that Ministry. SIPRI describes its data collection method as follows: "SIPRI military expenditure data is based on open sources only, including a SIPRI questionnaire which is sent out annually to all countries included in the database." SIPRI database, available at: http://www.sipri.org/databases/milex/milex (accessed August 6, 2012). One calculation of Egypt's defense expenditures, based on estimates of observed costs, concludes that they are some five times greater than the published figures, or about US\$14 billion. See Shawn Pine, "Egypt's Defence Expenditures: \$2.7 billion or \$14 billion?" *NATIV Online*: *A Journal of Politics and the Arts* 1 (2003), available at: http://www.acpr.org.ll/English-Nativ/issue1/pine-1.htm (accessed August 6, 2012).

24 Foreign procurement, from the United States, for example, requires legal agreements with the supplier countries, which are considered for this purpose to be the equivalent of treaties.

25 "Egypt: End Torture, Military Trials of Civilians," Human Rights Watch, March 11, 2011, available at: www.hrw.org/en/news/2011/03/11/egypt-end-torture-military-trials-civilians (accessed August 6, 2012).

26 As of this writing, the SCAF is meeting with increasing resistance, and some opposition parties apparently are boycotting the November 28 elections. Some are seeking to form a democratic coalition that can oppose the SCAF. See Jack Shenker, "Egyptian Elections in Doubt After Violent Clashes in Central Cairo," the *Guardian*, November 20, 2011.

27 Global Integrity Report, Egypt, available at: http://report.globalintegrity.org/Egypt/2008/ (accessed August 6, 2012).

28 Interviews with Egyptian journalists over the period 1986–2010.

29 Interviews with knowledgeable sources, Cairo, June 2011.

30 Interview with knowledgeable source, Cairo, June 11, 2011.

31 Khaled Dawoud, "Tahrir Fatigue," *al Ahram Weekly* (September 22–28, 2011), available at: http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2011/1065/eg08.htm (accessed August 6, 2012).

32 This was made painfully evident by the reporting of state-owned television, radio, and newspapers on the Coptic demonstrations of October 9, which met with deadly violence at the hands of the military police. See Trager, "Crossed."

33 Quotes in this paragraph are from Hans Born, "Security Sector Reform in Challenging Environments: Insights from Comparative Analysis," in Hans Born and Albrecht Schnabel, eds., *Security Sector Reform in Challenging Environments* (Geneva: Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2009), pp. 241–66. For an insightful discussion of the prospects for security sector reform in Egypt and elsewhere in the Arab world, see Bassma Kodmani and Mai Chartouni-Dubarry, "The Security Sector in Arab Countries: Can it be Reformed?" *IDS Bulletin* 40(2) (March 2009): 96–104.

34 Interviews with Egyptian officers, Cairo, June 2010.

35 *Jane's* Sentinel Country Risk Assessments: Egypt (note access to material on this site requires a subscription), available at: www4.janes.com.

36 Ibid. Other published and unpublished assessments of the effectiveness of Egypt's military are similarly negative. See, for example, Norvell B. De Atkine, "Why Arabs Lose Wars," *Middle East Quarterly* (December 1999), available at: www.meforum.org/441/why-arabs-lose-wars; Michael Eisenstadt and Kenneth M. Pollack, "Armies of Snow and Armies of Sand: The Impact of Soviet Military Doctrine on Arab Militaries," *Middle East Journal* 55(4) (Autumn 2001): 549–78; Matthew Robert Fomby, "Military Development: Twenty-Five Years of U.S. Military Aid to Egypt, 1980–2005," unpublished Master's thesis, American University in Cairo, May 2006, available by permission from the university library; and Nathan W. Toronto, "Funding Our Way: The Promise of Security Assistance to Egypt," unpublished paper, U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies, 2010.

37 On the historical development and contemporary roles of the various intelligence agencies in Egypt, see Owen L. Sirrs, *The Egyptian Intelligence Service: A History of the Mukhabarat, 1910–2009* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).

38 The paramilitary Central Security Force was first created by Nasser in the wake of the 1967 war to contain popular dissent and counterbalance the military. It was rapidly expanded by Sadat and then further enlarged by Mubarak, totaling some 400,000 officers and men by the end of his presidency. Among other internal security responsibilities, it acts as the main enforcer for the highly oppressive state of emergency enacted after President Sadat's assassination, sustained throughout Mubarak's regime, and then extended by the SCAF until after the elections in mid-2012.

39 Operation Bright Star is a biennial, multinational exercise intended to improve interoperability of forces for regional security, conducted in Egypt since 1980 and co-hosted by Egypt and the United States. For further information, see Global Security.org, available at: www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/bright-star.htm (accessed August 6, 2012).

40 This assessment of operational capacities is based on reports from Western military personnel interviewed in Cairo, May and June, 2009; and on the sources cited in Note 35.

41 IPI, "Public Opinion in Egypt."

42 David D. Kirkpatrick and Liam Stack, "Violence Erupts in Cairo, Even as Military Cedes Political Ground," *New York Times*, November 19, 2011.

43 "Sunday Updates: Tear Gas Fired in Tahrir Square, Police Beat and Arrest Protesters," *al masy al youm* (November 21, 2011), available at: www.almasryalyoum.com/en/node/516564 (accessed August 6, 2012); and David D. Kirkpatrick, "Egypt Military, Focus of Rage, Battles Protests," *New York Times*, November 21, 2011, pp. 1, 8.

44 Some indication of division within the military is heard in the outspoken criticism of the SCAF by the popular former Chief of Staff of the Army, General Magdi Hatata. In an interview in July 2011, he noted that the SCAF had been "slow" in all its actions and decisions, and had interfered in the cabinet's decisions. He noted that the military should not act as "the protector of the civil state," because "The Egyptian people can protect themselves by themselves." Cited in "Former Army Chief of Staff Criticizes Ruling Military' Council's Performance," *al masry al youm*, July 31, 2011, available at: www.almasryalyoum.com/node/482154 (accessed August 6, 2012). During the 18-day uprising, one group of soldiers defected from the army, which they saw as being insufficiently supportive of the protesters. The attention devoted to their desertion by the high command and the harshness of their treatment when apprehended bespeaks a profound concern with any threat to the military's coherence. See Wendell Steavenson, "Who Owns the Revolution?" *The New Yorker*, August 1, 2011, available at: www.newyorker.com/reporting/2011/08/01/110801fa_fact_steavenson (accessed August 6, 2012).

45 Steven E. Finkel, Aníbal Pérez-Liñán, Mitchell A. Seligson, and C. Neal Tate, *Deepening our Understanding of the Effects of US Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building: Final Report* (Washington, DC: U.S. Agency for International Development, January 28, 2008), p. 5.

46 "Egypt's Military Doing 'Exactly what Mubarak did' to Stifle Democrats," *Democracy Digest*, August 19, 2011, available at: www.demdigest.net/blog/2011/08/egypts-military-doing-exactly-what-mubarak-did-to-stifle-democrats/ (accessed August 6, 2012); Mohamed Abdel-Baky, "Reiterating the Differences," *al Ahram Weekly*, August 18–24, 2011, available at: http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2011/1061/eg1.htm (accessed August 6, 2012). The spokesperson for the Secretary of State, Mark Toner, stated in a press conference in the presence of the new head of Egyptian Intelligence, General Murad Muwafy, that "the Egyptian armed forces have exercised self-restraint and professionalism in dealing with demonstrations and protesters." Basant Zain-eddine, "Intelligence Chief Meets with Hillary Clinton in

Washington," *al masry al youm*, July 29, 2011, available at: www.almasryalyoum.com/node/481479 (accessed August 6, 2012). In September, the U.S. Senate took up consideration of legislation to suspend all military aid until Egypt holds elections and guarantees civil liberties. Secretary of State Hillary R. Clinton immediately assured Mohamed Kamel Amr, the Egyptian foreign minister and protégé of the SCAF, that "We will be working very hard to convince the Congress that this is not the best approach to take." Cited in "Egypt Warns US of Conditioning Military Aid on Democracy," *al masry al youm*, September 30, 2011, available at: almasryalyoum.com/node/500704 (accessed August 6, 2012).

# 9

# LESSONS NOT TO LEARN

## Post-communist Russia

*Mikhail Tsypkin*

### Introduction

The evolution of civil–military relations in post-communist Russia has important lessons for many countries caught in or resisting the third wave of democratization. Today it is only too easy to forget that throughout much of the twentieth century the Soviet Union was a major geo-political and ideological influence in the world. Its model of a one-party state (together with its defense institutions) was exported to or willingly copied by dozens of nations, from its Warsaw Pact allies to Egypt, Syria, and Iraq in the Middle East; China, North Korea, and Vietnam in Asia; as well as Ethiopia, Somalia, Angola, and others in Africa; and Cuba in the Caribbean. The road out of the communist system has turned out to be twisted, and developing new approaches to civil–military relations, has been difficult. Russian reformers, who came to power in the end of 1991, started out with new ideas borrowed primarily from the American experience, only to discover that they were weighed down by the Soviet heritage of civil–military relations, and hampered by the instability of the new regime. This chapter will focus on civil–military relations in Russia and on the issue of military reform. It will consider the organization of civilian control within the executive branch, the parliamentary oversight of the military, and the role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in civil–military relations.

To understand the state of civil–military relations in Russia today, one needs to be aware of its historical and political context. The two most important aspects of this context are the Soviet inheritance and the political turbulence after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

### The Soviet inheritance

The ultimate control over military policy and strategy in the USSR was in the hands of the civilian authority, i.e., the apex of the Communist Party bureaucracy. This control was never taken for granted: it was enforced by careful monitoring of the officer corps through the system of political officers directly responsible to the Communist Party, and counterintelligence within the military run by the KGB. During the "mature" stage of the Soviet system (i.e., from the beginning of Leonid Brezhnev's rule in 1964 and until Gorbachev's perestroika in the second half of the 1980s), the loyalty of the officer corps was also assured through a certain tradeoff: the civilian authority under Brezhnev gave the military much more leeway in deciding the major and

minor issues of military strategy and defense acquisition than under Brezhnev's predecessors. The military had a near monopoly (shared, to a certain degree, with the captains of the defense industry) on the information pertaining to military affairs, as the Soviet Union lacked civilian institutions possessing relevant expertise. A partial exception was the work by several research institutes of the Academy of Science that studied defense industries, militaries of foreign countries, and arms control. These institutes, however, did not work on the problems of the Soviet military. Since the Soviet government was not divided in fact into executive, legislative and judiciary branches, no external oversight of military affairs was possible. The result, by the early 1980s, was a military establishment too expensive for the Soviet economy, and organized to deal with a non-existent threat of an attack by NATO by fighting and winning an unwinnable nuclear war.

Mikhail Gorbachev (the Soviet leader from 1985 to 1991) saw the Soviet defense posture as ineffective: the Soviet military might was so great that instead of just deterring an attack on the Soviet Union, it frightened the economically superior opponents of the USSR into an armed race which the Soviets could not win. This is why Gorbachev proclaimed his goal to be "defensive sufficiency," i.e., a military posture that would deter attack but would not be viewed as provocative by other nations. As for efficiency, the Soviets simply lacked mechanisms (parliamentary inquiries, audit agencies, etc.) that could measure such a category. The model for military reform, promoted primarily by civilian academics close to Gorbachev, was based mostly on the US experience: a smaller force, combat ready, without the mass mobilization of conscript reservists, manned by volunteers, and with a flexible command structure. Gorbachev reduced the size of the armed forces, but he never had a chance to begin genuine military reform—both because it caused such fierce opposition among senior officers and civilian defenders of the status quo, and because he was preoccupied with the chaos into which the USSR descended by the end of his short tenure in office.

## The turbulent 1990s

Gorbachev's reforms of the Soviet political system unhinged the apparatus of civilian control over the military. The armed forces played a key role in the attempted coup against Gorbachev in August 1991, and the military's sudden withdrawal from the coup doomed this last gasp of the Communist Party and KGB hardliners. The subsequent disintegration of the Soviet empire, state, and economy left the officer corps disoriented and alienated from the new Russian president and his team, which many of them deemed responsible for the breakup of the country to which they had sworn allegiance (the USSR), the loss of the Soviet Empire in Central Europe, and the desperate economic condition of the military. In 1992 and 1993, President Yeltsin was engaged in a power struggle with the legislature, which resulted in his order to dissolve the legislative branch in September 1993. The legislature refused to comply, replaced Yeltsin with his Vice President, the Afghanistan war hero Major General Rutskoi (who took the side of the legislature) and demanded that the military take orders from Rutskoi and a new Minister of Defense appointed by the legislature. Armed militants supporting the legislature started an open mutiny on 3 October 1993: they seized the Moscow mayor's office, arrested police officers, and came close to seizing the main TV studios and broadcasting center. It took considerable pressure on the part of Yeltsin to convince his own Minister of Defense General Grachev and the top brass to step forward on his side, bring troops into Moscow, and use lethal force to suppress the mutiny.

This episode helps us understand the difficulties inherent in imposing civilian control on the military in a society where the new form of government suffered from a shortage of legitimacy. One of the consequences of the 1993 confrontation was that the constitution, drafted by

Yeltsin's supporters and adopted in December 1993, has severely limited the power of parliament and turned the Russian Federation into a presidential republic in its most extreme form. The President gained control over the military (as well as security agencies), while the parliament was not even granted a meaningful right to conduct inquiries.

The subsequent events of the 1990s did not make it any easier to establish democratic civilian control over the military. In 1995–96, the military conducted a largely unsuccessful campaign against separatists in Chechnya. And in 1998, economic default by the Russian government torpedoed the plans for modernization of the military and turned officers into paupers once again. These circumstances limited the ability of the civilian authorities to conduct all-encompassing military reform. As mentioned earlier, the team of the first president of the Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin, initially wanted an American model for the Russian military: an all-volunteer military, fully combat-ready without mobilization of reservists, much smaller than the Soviet military, with a flexible command structure (corps—brigade—battalion), transparent and robust civilian control of the military, and a modernized professional military education system. They were less interested in the issue of parliamentary control over the military, because the pro-reform forces congregated around President Yeltsin, while the parliament in the 1990s was the platform for anti-reform forces.

## Civilian control in the executive branch

The Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation was established on 16 March 1992, and initially President Yeltsin served as the acting Minister of Defense.[1] After keeping the defense portfolio in his own hands for several weeks, Yeltsin appointed a paratroop officer, General Pavel Grachev, as the Minister of Defense. This was contrary to the hopes of the supporters of civilian control along Western lines. As a concession to the idea of reform, a civilian expert on arms control and military technology, Dr. Andrei Kokoshin, was appointed as the first Deputy Minister of Defense. Kokoshin's portfolio was weapons acquisition, and his job consisted primarily in dealing with defense industry managers infuriated by the drastic cuts in procurement.[2] The critically important job of withdrawing the Russian military from Central Europe and former Soviet republics, and resettling the officers and their families without having housing ready for them, fell on the shoulders of General Grachev. The ministry's organization was inherited from the Soviet days: in fact, the uniformed officers of the General Staff did all of the work for the Minister of Defense. No attempt was made to organize a truly civilian ministry of defense where the staff work for the Minister would be performed, along the lines of the US Office of the Secretary of Defense, by civilian experts relatively immune to pressure from the uniformed military.

The General Staff was a uniquely outdated institution: one of its most astute critics, Dr. Vitaly Shlykov (a retired colonel of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff) observed that while all other major military powers had moved away from the model of the World War I German General Staff in the course of the twentieth century, the Soviet and then Russian General Staffs continued to copy the practices of their erstwhile enemies all the way into the twenty-first century. Just like its German model and the Soviet General Staff, the Russian successor continued to exercise operational command of the armed forces, collect intelligence, and in fact was in charge practically of all aspects of military policy.[3] The Minister of Defense, whether a civilian or a military officer, continued to depend for information, plans, ideas, etc., on the General Staff. Nothing along the lines of the civilian Office of the Secretary of Defense was created.

Rather than making a Minister of Defense less dependent on the General Staff or creating a system of civilian control involving the country's legislature, President Yeltsin built a system of

checks and balances within the executive branch along the lines of the Soviet system of civilian control. Beginning with Yeltsin, all the three Presidents of the Russian Federation have practiced tight control over promotions and appointments of military officers. All such decisions, while recommended by the military, are verified and presented for the President's signature by the Department of Personnel and Government Service of the Presidential Administration.[4] (The Presidential Administration is the organization providing direct staff support to the President of Russia.) It appears that all appointments and promotions down to the rank of a colonel and position of a division commander have to be confirmed by the Kremlin. This is quite reminiscent of the Soviet practice where the Central Committee of the Communist Party exercised complete control over promotions and appointments of military officers.

On 5 March 1992, Yeltsin signed the Law on Security, which included a section on a new body, the Security Council of the Russian Federation, apparently modeled on the US National Security Council. That body came into action by presidential order on 3 June 1992.[5] The Security Council is chaired by the President, and includes the Prime Minister, cabinet level officials and their deputies, as well as other officials; it is run on a day-to-day basis by its secretary, appointed by the President without parliamentary confirmation. The Security Council has its own staff (which is a part of the Presidential Administration), subdivided into functional departments, at least one of which deals with military affairs.[6] The Security Council provides staff support for presidential decision-making. Experience has shown that the influence of the Security Council fluctuates depending on the personal relationship between the President and the Council's Secretary. In some cases, Russian Presidents appointed an important official as the Secretary, and the work of the Council's staff would become important. The prime examples are the appointment of Vladimir Putin to this job in 1999, and the tenure of Sergei Ivanov (who was at the time very close to the newly minted President Putin) as the Secretary of the Security Council in 2000–02. In other cases, Presidents filled this job with officials out of favor who needed to be placed somewhere, and then the Council's importance would decline.

The influence of the Security Council staff, who in theory are supposed to coordinate the interagency work on the most important documents on the actual operations of the government, is often relatively weak. For instance, work on the latest iteration of military doctrine (adopted in 2010) was coordinated by Army General Yuri Baluevskiy, who had to leave his job as the chief of General Staff in 2009 because of disagreements with Minister of Defense Anatoly Serdyukov over military reform. Not surprisingly, the new military doctrine turned out to have little in common with the policies implemented by the Minister of Defense. While, in theory, the military doctrine is the guiding document for military policy, Serdyukov, who had the support both of former President Dmitri Medvedev and Vladimir Putin, has simply ignored the doctrine and continued with the reform.

Boris Yeltsin made one of the most important decisions in the sphere of civilian control on 19 February 1993, when he chose to continue the Soviet practice of ensuring the military's loyalty by assigning the mission of military counterintelligence to the political police.[7] Vladimir Putin updated the status of military security organs on 7 February 2000.[8] (It was apparently Putin's first publicized decision on the armed forces.) The Federal Security Service (FSB) has its departments within the armed forces, which are directly subordinate to the FSB; these departments are responsible for all aspects of security in the military.[9] Under Yeltsin, the size of the internal security troops (237,000 by 1998) began to approach that of the ground forces (420,000 in 1998).[10] By 2011, the size of the ground forces was estimated to be 205,000, while that of the internal security troops was 200,000.[11]

On several occasions, President Yeltsin created additional bodies within the executive branch in order to balance the influence of the military. On 25 July 1996, he ordered the

creation of the Defense Council of the Russian Federation.[12] That body was to oversee all the major issues of defense policy, was chaired by the President, and included (as the chair's deputy) the Prime Minister of the Russian Federation. It was run by the Secretary of Defense, appointed by the President. Of its 18 members, only two (the Minister of Defense and the chief of the General Staff) were active duty military officers, and three more had previously served in the military. The Defense Council had its own staff, which was part of the Presidential Administration, and could, when necessary, give assignments to the General Staff. The job of the Council Secretary was given to a civilian, Dr. Yury Baturin, who had previously served as President Yeltsin's advisor on national security.[13]

The Defense Council was apparently to provide a check on any possible alliance between the new Minister of Defense, General Igor Rodionov, and the new Secretary of the Security Council, the recently retired General Aleksandr Lebed.[14] Rodionov, unlike General Grachev, was not beholden to Yeltsin. He owed his appointment to Aleksandr Lebed: a charismatic figure and one of Yeltsin's opponents in the presidential elections of 1996. In the second round of elections, Lebed had thrown his support behind Yeltsin and helped him defeat the Communist leader Gennady Zyuganov. In return, Lebed received the post of Secretary of the Security Council, and the replacement of his old enemy General Grachev as the Minister of Defense by Lebed's choice, General Rodionov.

The Defense Council served its role as a restraint on Lebed for a short time: President Yeltsin fired Lebed from all his government posts on 17 October 1996. The Defense Council, however, not only remained, but was given a special role in implementing military reform, according to an order by Yeltsin on 25 November 1996. Dr. Baturin, as the Secretary of the Defense Council, was put in charge.[15] Minister Rodionov resisted the plans for reform coming from Baturin and the Defense Council, since these involved dramatic reductions in conventional forces, while Rodionov, supported by top military officers, wanted to preserve a somewhat smaller version of the Soviet military designed for fighting a global war against NATO. The confrontation between Baturin and Rodionov became public, and Yeltsin replaced Rodionov with his personal choice, General Igor Sergeev, on 23 May 1997.

Institution building in Russia has been often been subordinated to clashes of personalities: institutions have been created and disbanded in response to short-term political exigencies, without even an attempt to explain to the public the reasons for the Kremlin's actions. Dr. Baturin, who had been a useful counterweight to Rodionov, apparently was no longer necessary after Rodionov's dismissal. On 27 August 1997, Yeltsin ordered the establishment of the Main Military Inspectorate, to be headed by the Main Military Inspector—a brand new job created for Dr. Kokoshin, who had just left the Ministry of Defense reportedly because of the mutual dislike he had with the new minister, General Sergeev.[16] Kokoshin also was given Dr. Baturin's job as the Secretary of the Defense Council. The Main Military Inspectorate was to function as the arm of the Presidential Administration in the military, with its own inspectors ensuring that the presidential priorities were enforced.[17]

The rise of Andrei Kokoshin seemed unstoppable. On 3 March 1998, Andrei Kokoshin was made Secretary of the Security Council. On the same day the Defense Council and its various interagency commissions were disbanded by Yeltsin's executive order. Its staff was merged with the staff of the Main Military Inspector in order to augment the staff of the Security Council.[18] Kokoshin had well thought-out plans for military reform, but his political career was cut short by the economic meltdown of August 1998, when his active involvement in the search for a new prime minister aroused Yeltsin's suspicions. Kokoshin was fired on 14 September 1998,[19] and the weakened Boris Yeltsin abandoned any attempts to strengthen civilian control of the military by means other than patronage of favored generals and the FSB presence in the armed

forces. Kokoshin's replacement as the Secretary of the Security Council was a veteran of the security services, Nikolai Bordyuzha. He lasted in that job only until 29 March 1999, when he was replaced by Vladimir Putin, who also kept his job as the Director of the FSB. The staff of the Security Council as of March 1999 had a department of armed forces development and the department of military inspection; it appears, however, that after Kokoshin's departure, these departments had simply hunkered down.[20]

With the arrival of Vladimir Putin in the Kremlin in 2000, the era of institutional experimentation was over. One of Putin's first measures regarding civilian control of the military (which he understood as *his* control of the military), was to update (on 7 February 2000, while Putin was still acting President before winning the election) Yeltsin's executive order of 1993, strengthening the role of the FSB within the military.[21] Without going into a detailed comparative analysis of the two documents, suffice it to say that Putin increased presidential control over the activities of the FSB at the expense of the parliament and broadened the scope of its activities. At the same time he made sure that officers were paid on time—something that Yeltsin's government often neglected to do during the economic turmoil of the 1990s. On 28 March 2001, Putin appointed Sergei Ivanov, at the time considered his confidante and possible successor, as the Minister of Defense.

Ivanov had been a general in the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, but he retired from it in order to be a truly civilian Minister of Defense. One of the few steps toward civilianization of the Ministry of Defense was the appointment (on the same day as Ivanov's appointment) of the first civilian—and a woman at that—Lyubov' Kudelina, as the Deputy Minister in charge of finance. Ivanov, however, did not go beyond these steps, and his tenure did not result in any change in the nature of civilian control. Nor did it result in any significant change in the condition of the military.

Ivanov's successor was probably the most unorthodox appointment made by Vladimir Putin: on 15 February 2007, the post of the Minister of Defense was occupied by 45-year-old Anatoly Serdyukov, whose military experience had been one year of service as a conscript in the 1980s. From the late 1980s through the 1990s he had worked in the furniture business. His government career began when Putin, upon becoming President in 2000, promoted a whole patronage network from his hometown of St. Petersburg. By 2007, Serdyukov was the director of Russia's tax collection agency.[22] The new Minister started out modestly by proclaiming that there was no need for wide-ranging military reform, and that he was focusing on issues of financial management in the Ministry of Defense, raising officers' standards of living, and improving the system of military education.[23] Serdyukov even took a short course of studies in the Academy of General Staff.[24]

The new Minister's preoccupation with financial matters was probably due to the concern in the upper echelons of the Kremlin about the efficiency of the Russian military establishment. Whenever confronted with criticism over the poor condition of the armed forces in the 1990s, the military brass responded by pointing to the declining financing of the armed forces. Under Putin, defense spending began a steady climb (Tables 9.1, 9.2, and 9.3).

Nevertheless, the payoff in terms of combat ability was minimal, as demonstrated by the lackluster prosecution of the second war in Chechnya, which began in 1999. By the beginning of 2008, Serdyukov had carried out several structural changes in the Ministry of Defense, which mostly affected the issues of finance, legal guidance, and property rights.[25] The pace of change accelerated as a result of the war with Georgia in August 2008, which Russia won after a much more difficult struggle than had been anticipated by the Kremlin. In the aftermath of the war, Serdyukov began to populate the higher echelons of the Ministry of Defense with civilians. At the time of this writing (April 2011), of the nine Deputy Ministers of Defense, five are

*Table 9.1* Defense expenditures of the Russian Federation: the Yeltsin years

| Year | Expenditure (in millions of constant 2009 US dollars) |
| --- | --- |
| 1992 | 57,716 |
| 1993 | 50,987 |
| 1994 | 49,690 |
| 1995 | 29,427 |
| 1996 | 25,987 |
| 1998 | 18,400 |

*Source*: The SIPRI Military Expenditure Database.

*Table 9.2* Defense expenditures of the Russian Federation: the Putin years

| Year | Expenditure (in millions of constant 2009 US dollars) |
| --- | --- |
| 2000 | 25,977 |
| 2001 | 28,833 |
| 2002 | 32,035 |
| 2003 | 34,080 |
| 2004 | 35,454 |
| 2005 | 38,669 |
| 2006 | 42,317 |
| 2007 | 45,908 |

*Source*: The SIPRI Military Expenditure Database.

*Table 9.3* Defense expenditures of the Russian Federation: the Medvedev years

| Year | Expenditure (in millions of constant 2009 US dollars) |
| --- | --- |
| 2008 | 50,937 |
| 2009 | 53,330 |
| 2010 | 52,586 |

*Source*: The SIPRI Military Expenditure Database.

civilians, two are retired generals, and only two are active duty officers.[26] The Chief of Staff of the Minister is a civilian, whom Serdyukov brought along from the Tax Collection Service. Civilians also occupy a number of other executive positions. The newly found role for civilians, however, has not been formalized and enshrined in law. This is not surprising in view of the declining role of the legislature in Russian politics.

## The legislative branch and civilian control

As mentioned earlier, the armed confrontation between the parliament and President Yeltsin in 1993 resulted in the 1993 Constitution, which limited the power of the legislative branch. The armed forces were declared to be part of the so-called "presidential block," the group of agencies (those pertaining to the field of national security) directly supervised by the President, and not the Prime Minister—who has been left in charge of the economy and social welfare. If Yeltsin needed any additional reasons to be wary of the legislature's involvement with the military, he got it very soon. In the course of the 1995 election to the lower house (the Duma) of

the legislature (the Federal Assembly), Lieutenant General Lev Rokhlin, one of the few com-manders who had demonstrated competence during the first war in Chechnya (1994–96), won a seat in that body, became the chairman of the Duma Committee on Defense and Security, and quickly turned out to be a thorn in the side of the Yeltsin administration.

Rokhlin began by accusing Yeltsin of personal responsibility for the terrible condition of the military; in June 1997, he created the Movement in Support of the Army (DPA), which entered into a *de facto* alliance with the main opposition force, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation. Rokhlin's rhetoric escalated as the Minister of Defense, General (later Marshal) Sergeev began deep cuts of the officer corps. In August 1997, Rokhlin, still an active duty officer (by Russian law, when military officers are elected to legislative bodies, they leave their jobs, but stay on active duty), called for Yeltsin's resignation and threatened street protests. The authorities were quite worried that Rokhlin might attempt a *coup d'etat*.[27] Rokhlin was shot dead at his country home during the night of 3 July 1998; his wife initially confessed to the crime, but later retracted the confession. After a seven-year-long judicial process, she was found guilty.[28] With his death, the DPA went into a decline. Since then, the Kremlin has ensured that no potentially charismatic military officer would find a bully pulpit in the legislature.

Parliamentary oversight of the military is hampered by the following factors:

- the further waning of the parliament under Vladimir Putin's presidency (2000–08), which was not reversed by his chosen successor Dmitri Medvedev;
- the weakness of parliamentary inquiry;
- the secrecy surrounding the military.

The weakness of the Russian parliament has been discussed at length in several scholarly studies.[29] Putin achieved complete domination of the parliament by his control of United Russia—mocked as the party of bureaucrats. The speaker of the Duma, Boris Gryzlov, described the situation in the body he chairs when he said in all seriousness, that the parliament was "not a place for political battles."[30]

The parliament has approved a number of laws pertaining to defense. These laws were mostly drafted within the executive branch and approved with minimum changes by the leg-islature. The more important lower house of the parliament, the Duma (the upper house, the Council of the Federation, in effect is made up of presidential appointees), is not only con-trolled by the Kremlin, but also does not have sufficient resources to deal with the highly complex and numerous issues of defense. The Committee on Defense of the State Duma has 12 members and 15 staffers.[31] Beginning in January 2010 and ending in April 2011, the Committee on Defense considered 19 draft bills: two of them have been approved so far, the rest remained mired in the parliamentary bureaucracy.[32] Draft bills that become laws are usually the ones promoted by the executive branch or deputies closely associated with it.[33]

The 1993 Constitution has given the upper and lower chambers of the Federal Assembly a rather imprecisely formulated right to conduct "hearings" on subjects of interest, but apparently not formal investigations.[34] No law on parliamentary inquiries was passed until December 2005. The law, drafted by Putin's staff, imposed very stringent limits on parliamentary inquiries. Inquiries can be conducted only in cases of "flagrant" or "massive" violations of individual rights guaranteed by the Constitution of the Russian Federation; large-scale disasters caused by "technology" failures; and "negative consequences" of man-made and natural disasters.[35] The law does not explain who is entitled to determine whether the necessary circumstances for a parliamentary inquiry exist. If this were not enough, to conduct an inquiry, both chambers of the Federal Assembly have to approve it. Given that the upper chamber's members are in fact

presidential appointees, the Kremlin has veto power over this question. And, just in case, no inquiries can be conducted into the activities of a sitting President.[36] Since the President is the commander-in-chief, the military is not likely to be subject to a parliamentary inquiry. No parliamentary inquiries have been held in the six years since the adoption of this law. Recently several members of the Federal Assembly have expressed concern about their inability to conduct inquiries, but no moves have been made so far to change the existing law.[37]

The Accounting Chamber (a semi-independent body attached to the legislature) was supposed to serve as its investigating arm. Since the Chairman of the Accounting Chamber, however, is only confirmed by the parliament while the President selects his candidacy, the Accounting Chamber has ended up under the thumb of the executive branch.[38] The Accounting Chamber does undertake audits of the military and attempts to provide estimates of efficiency of some defense expenditures. According to the published documents, the majority of audits of the military are focused on expenditures on morale, recreation, and welfare—an important subject which, however, is much narrower than the efficiency of defense spending in making the armed forces ready for their mission. In recent years, there have been some exceptions. In June 2009, the Accounting Chamber harshly criticized the program for the transition to a partially volunteer military as a failure because it was never adequately funded.[39] In 2010, the Accounting Chamber audited weapons acquisition programs and concluded that the Ministry of Defense had mismanaged a number of programs and had often overpaid the contractors.[40] There is no indication that these audits, which had uncovered very important inefficiencies, ever led to any action by the legislature, not a particularly surprising outcome given the powerlessness of the Federal Assembly. Despite these occasional forays into the defense sphere, the number of audits of the military has sharply declined after 2004.[41]

The secrecy surrounding the defense budget is also an impediment to parliamentary control. A study by the respected non-governmental Gaydar Institute for Economic Policy demonstrated that by 2005–06, the Russian budget increased the secrecy of defense and security expenditures; thus, in 2003, 36.2 percent of the defense budget was classified, while, in 2006, secrecy enveloped 50.6 percent of the budget. The study observed that the type of data that had disappeared from open publications is precisely the kind that is necessary to evaluate the efficiency of defense spending.[42] It is apparent that the Russian government encourages secrecy, since civil servants and military officers receive substantial bonuses for working with classified documents. The former get 50–75 percent, and the latter 25 percent monthly bonuses for working with top secret/exceptionally important documents, 30—50/20 percent for top secret, and 10—15/10 for secret.[43] Needless to say, one can hardly find a more effective stimulus for increasing the number of classified documents!

The secrecy is even more of an obstacle for the involvement of the public via NGOs (non-governmental organizations), which are not numerous; very few of them have an interest and expertise in national security and defense issues. Nevertheless, one particular NGO has played an important role in the military reform currently conducted under Anatoly Serdyukov. When the new Minister of Defense, apparently tasked to improve the situation in the armed forces, began to look for new ideas, he quickly discovered that none were forthcoming from inside the military. In the process, Serdyukov discovered a plan for military reform submitted to his predecessor in 2003 and rejected by the General Staff as an attempt to force NATO's ideas upon the Russian armed forces.[44] The plan was produced by the Council on Foreign and Defense Policies, a Russian version of the Council on Foreign Relation, known by its Russian acronym, SVOP. One of its founding members, retired General Staff Colonel Vitaly Shlykov, has spent more than two decades promoting the idea of all-embracing military reform: a relatively small standing military, ready for combat without mobilizing millions of reservists, relying on volunteers

instead of conscripts, efficient and effective in protecting Russian national interests. Shlykov's ideas formed the foundation of the report by SVOP, *Military Policy and Modernization of the Russian Armed Forces*, published in 2004. The report was submitted to the General Staff and angrily rejected in 2003.[45] This is the same plan that Serdyukov would adopt several years later.

SVOP was not the only NGO studying the military. The Gaydar Institute of Economic Policy has a small division that studies defense, focusing on budgetary (including the issues of secrecy) and personnel problems.[46] While definitely useful, the studies by the Gaydar Institute have not confronted the large issues of efficiency and effectiveness of the armed forces, because they have not concerned themselves with the national interests that the military may need to defend, and with military strategy. The plan of military reform produced by SVOP has a truly broad scope, and, while Vitaly Shlykov served as its primary author, the working group included a number of widely respected experts on military affairs and national security. The SVOP plan argued for joint commands (along the lines of US joint commands), a corps of highly trained NCOs, a reduction in the size of the officer corps, volunteer enlisted men (called contract soldiers in Russia) instead of conscripts, a civilian ministry of defense, etc.[47] These ideas were subsequently adopted by Anatoly Serdyukov. The obvious weakness of the reform plan proposed by SVOP was the lack of "hard" data on the defense budget and the composition of the armed forces, due to the secrecy which still envelopes the defense establishment.

The Union of the Committees of Soldiers' Mothers is an NGO of a very different kind focused on the armed forces. It has been a thorn in the side of the military for years over the single issue of treatment (or, rather, mistreatment) of conscripts. Brutal hazing, beatings, and poor living conditions for conscripts have resulted in numerous suicides and desertions. The Union of the Committees of Soldiers' Mothers have publicized such transgressions and have offered help to deserters and those who are being conscripted despite having draft exemptions. The relationship between the military and the Union of the Committees of Soldiers' Mothers has fluctuated. Sergei Ivanov, during his tenure as the Minister of Defense, questioned the sources of funding for the Committees, the obvious implication being that the NGO was supported by foreign "subversive" organizations.[48] Under President Dmitri Medvedev, the Union of the Committees of Soldiers' Mothers is represented on the Council for the Development of Civil Society and Human Rights, advising the President.[49] Minister Serdyukov met with representatives of the Union of the Committees of Soldiers' Mothers, promised to address their complaints, and has indeed tried to make the conditions of conscript service less harsh.[50]

NGOs, whenever given an opportunity, can contribute to military effectiveness and efficiency by promoting public debate, introducing new ideas, and making the military bureaucracy responsible to the taxpayers. Such an opportunity, however, is not firmly rooted in Russia's political system and its laws. Indeed, in 2005, Putin introduced and approved a law that forces NGOs to justify their existence time and again and waste considerable efforts satisfying various bureaucratic requirements. President Medvedev has somewhat relaxed these constraints, but there is little doubt that Putin's return to power in 2012 (when Medvedev's presidential terms ended) could make NGOs' operations more difficult again and will likely mean further repression of civil society.

## Civilian control, effectiveness, and efficiency

Under the current conditions it is close to impossible to measure either the effectiveness or the efficiency of the Russian military, because of the character of civil–military relations. The military is still viewed as an instrument of the executive branch, one of the guarantors of the semi-authoritarian regime's hold on power. Thus, it is hardly surprising that the Kremlin denies the

public the tools necessary to evaluate the state of the military: meaningful parliamentary inquiries and the data necessary for informed public debate. The current military reform, for instance, has been conducted in a manner that makes it difficult to evaluate its possible impact on the armed forces' effectiveness and efficiency. As mentioned earlier, Minister Serdyukov borrowed a number of ideas for military reform from a study by an NGO. These ideas and the plan for military reform, however, have never been publicly debated. Moreover, the government has not presented any plan for military reform to the public, or even to the parliament in a classified format. The plan for military reform—a very important and very expensive undertaking—was articulated in two speeches by President Medvedev, but he did not address such crucial questions as what missions the reformed Russian military should fulfill and what capabilities it should have.[51] The parliament has never debated the plan. Serdyukov briefed the defense committees of the Duma and the Federation Council behind closed doors several times, but this appears to be the extent of the parliament's involvement. It is not surprising that without a public discussion, the reform plan has suffered reversals and sharp changes of direction. It had begun in 2008 with a drive for mostly volunteer enlisted corps, then in spring 2010 that aim was abandoned in favor of returning to conscription as the main source of enlisted manpower (only to return to the plan of a mostly volunteer military later that year). Similar drastic turnarounds have affected other aspects of military reform, such as the system of military education, the number of commissioned officers to be discharged, and so on.

There is an interesting paradox here. Boris Yeltsin presided over a political system that was chaotic and weak, but had elements of a democracy, such as unfettered civil society, and political parties that could challenge the executive branch. He could not embark on military reform, because (among other reasons) civilian authority over the military was insufficient: he needed the loyalty of the military because of the grave instability in Russia. His successor Vladimir Putin has created a political system in which it is much more difficult to challenge the power of the President (the power he, as the Prime Minister, shared with his hand-picked successor as President, Dmitri Medvedev). This change (together with improved state finances) has allowed the Kremlin to embark on military reform. Civilian control has been strengthened, but in a narrow way, excluding representative institutions and civil society. The role played by civil society (the use of the reform plan produced by the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy) was important but in a somewhat accidental fashion; the plan just happened to "be there," while no suggestions from the expert community (admittedly, quite a small one) were invited. As long as the Russian political system does not become more participatory, the Russia public will not know what kind of a military capability it is buying and what kind of a bargain it is getting.

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# 10

# THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE BOLIVARIAN ARMED FORCE

## Venezuela

*Harold A. Trinkunas*

### Introduction

The expansion of the Venezuelan Bolivarian Armed Force's roles and missions during the Hugo Chávez administration has been unprecedented. Military officers play a role in executing domestic policy by staffing key positions across almost every ministry and agency in the government. As President Chávez has created a diverse set of international alliances with like-minded governments in Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Iran, Venezuelan officers have played a role in implementing international policy, especially in the security dimension. The level of military involvement in the government also exceeds that of every other country in the Western hemisphere at the present time, with the possible exception of Cuba.

Has the expansion of the military's role in Venezuela translated into greater political power? Traditional analyses of the role of Latin American armed forces in politics would lead us to believe that the answer is yes. After all, these new roles give the armed forces in Venezuela influence over a wide range of government policy and access to many new resources. The participation of military officers at every level of government could easily be interpreted as confirming evidence for this view. In fact, opposition politicians in Venezuela have tended to argue that the armed forces are becoming too powerful and too politicized. Similar arguments have been expressed in Venezuelan academic circles.[1]

However, this chapter will argue that the Venezuelan military as an institution has never been *less* autonomous or politically independent in its history.[2] President Chávez has reformulated doctrine, education and training, acquisitions, and military promotion. He has created new parallel military structures that fall outside the traditional military chain-of-command. He has redefined the military services' *raison d'être* and even renamed them in the service of a new popular, patriotic, and anti-imperialist national defense structure.[3] This level of political intervention in core military issues is unprecedented both in modern Venezuelan history and in comparison to other countries across the region.

President Hugo Chávez experienced resistance to his defense agenda during his first two terms in office (1999–2006), but after his victory in the 2004 presidential recall referendum, the military accepted his reform proposals with very little opposition. This despite the fact that the

proposed changes to the defense structure are more profound than anything President Chávez sought to accomplish between 1999 and 2004. The absence of most signs of institutional resistance, even the normal bureaucratic politics that accompany governmental debates about defense policy in most states, is unusual and deserves explanation. The key question regarding Venezuelan civil–military relations is still one of who has political power: "Who decides what issues?" The answer today is that President Chávez decides, and this chapter seeks to explain how this came about in the area of defense policy-making.

Hugo Chávez's objective in the area of civil–military relations has been to establish direct and unmediated personal control over the military so as to wed it to his larger purpose of achieving a revolutionary transformation in Venezuela. This personal control has been reinforced by each successive military reform the President has carried out. Instances of open military discontent have provided the government with opportunities to remove recalcitrant officers from power and set an example of civilian authority to those who remained. Bureaucratic autonomy is not inherent in an institution; it is produced by the institution's members when they defend its prerogatives. Purges of Venezuelan officers have allowed the President to select and promote officers more amenable to his vision of the military and less willing to defend military traditions.

Simultaneously, the President has pursued a strategy to win over the personal loyalty of new generations of officers to his political agenda. Some of these strategies are strikingly similar to those used by politicians of the *ancien régime* in Venezuela, such as the use of increased professional and material rewards. However, more than any President of the Punto Fijo (1958–98) democratic period, President Chávez actually offers certain sectors of the armed forces an opportunity to fulfill their historic vision of themselves as protagonists in national life.

This chapter will examine military subordination to political authority in Venezuela in four sections. First, it will establish the historical pattern of civilian control of the armed forces prior to the beginning of the Chávez administration's defense reforms. Second, it will examine the reform process as it occurred during the first seven years of the Chávez administration prior to his re-election in 2006. Then it will analyze the reforms to the defense structures taking place during the third period of the Chávez administration, including those embodied in the 2008 organic law of the armed forces. It will conclude by examining the implications of the new role of the armed forces in Venezuela for its civil–military relations.

## Venezuelan civil–military relations in their historical context

The literature on civil–military relations associated with the Third Wave of democratization has a great deal to say about institutionalizing civilian control of the military. It ranges from approaches that focus on the nature of the transition to democracy, to those that look at institutionalization of new democratic practices and procedures in civil–military relations, to those that look at the changing organizational culture within militaries.[4] In addition, Brian Taylor reminds us that we should not forget how changes within the civilian polity and state in which the military functions, including variables such as state strength and civilian political capacity, affect civil–military relations.[5] In the past, I have approached this question by focusing on who decides what issues and how. In particular, I have argued that shifts in the jurisdictional boundaries between civilian and military authority often parallel and signal the relative power of each actor within the state. In turn, the outcome of contestation over boundaries sets precedents and institutionalizes new practices and procedures.[6]

Unlike many other Latin American states during the 1960s and 1970s, Venezuela did not suffer a reversal of democracy by military intervention. The literature on the Venezuelan armed forces has always focused on this puzzle because the contrast with the rest of the continent is so

striking. Early scholars of Venezuelan civil–military relations, such as Burggraaff, told a story of how skilled civilian politicians arrived at an accommodation with the armed forces, lubricated liberally with oil money, that provided for a permanent military retreat to the barracks. This narrative fit in well with the early scholarship on Venezuelan democratization, whose arguments could be crudely summed up as "petroleum ergo democracy."[7] The 1992 coup attempt, led by then Lt. Col. Hugo Chávez, sparked a new wave of interest in the Venezuelan military, and scholars such as Agüero, Millett, and Norden found sufficient elements of institutional autonomy to suggest that civilian control of the military was questionable. This critique parallels the larger debate about Venezuelan democracy that noted the institutional deficiencies and paralysis inherent in the system, and suggested that this made the regime vulnerable to decay and collapse.[8] Some Venezuelan scholars, such as Domingo Irwin, have gone as far as to say that the Venezuelan military has never submitted to civilian authority during the democratic period.[9]

As I have argued in other forums, democratizers in Venezuela benefited from an unusually broad opportunity structure in 1958 to construct civilian control of the armed forces for the first time in their country's history. Democratizers in Venezuela took advantage of the 1958 transition moment to craft an institutional arrangement to reshape civil–military relations to favor civilian control. These institutions essentially confined the armed forces to relatively narrow jurisdictional boundaries, which focused officers on external defense and rural counter-insurgency missions. The process of confining the military to their core duties was considerably aided by the pacted nature of the transition that ensured that major democratic parties mutually supported each other, sharing both the responsibility and the rewards of government.[10] In addition, the democratic governments of the period institutionalized a "divide and conquer" strategy within the armed forces that prevented any service or faction from becoming too powerful, too dominant, or too threatening to civilian rule.[11]

However, the pattern of civilian control that developed after 1958 had major weaknesses. It did not provide for true civilian oversight, but rather, it operated by containment of military endeavors to a narrow range of missions and civilian vigilance over the boundaries of the military sphere. The armed forces configured themselves for defense-of-sovereignty missions during the 1970s, although their national security doctrine called for a more prominent role in economic development—one that was frustrated by civilian politicians who considered this beyond the scope of military responsibilities. The result was a military with some latent autonomy but also frustration over their restricted role in national life.

Two attempted *coups d'état* by junior officers in 1992, the first led by then Lt. Col. Hugo Chávez, showcased how far civilian control had deteriorated by the 1990s. The armed forces were riven by internal military politics and marked radicalization in the officer corps over failed government economic policies. The coup attempts were a tremendous shock to the political system. Austerity measures had already led to civilian disaffection from the Carlos Andrés Pérez administration, and this laid the groundwork for popular support for the coup attempts.[12] Chávez and his now-ousted supporters in the military formed the nucleus of the group that would eventually help him take power in the 1998 elections.[13]

## Politics and civil–military relations in the first Chávez administrations (1999–2006)

Hugo Chávez's victory in the 1998 presidential elections led to an explosion in military activity during his new administration. Among the first actions of his government was his announcement of the civic action plan entitled "Plan Bolívar 2000" that expanded the role of the armed forces in domestic policy implementation. The new president called for military participation in this plan

as part of a revolutionary civil–military alliance. The Plan Bolívar brought military units into direct contact with the population to provide medical, dental, and other services. Military units participated in the MERCAL subsidized food distribution network. Each garrison commander, the senior officer in each state of the republic, received substantial funds to administer public assistance programs in his area of responsibility. Military officers also were brought in to staff key government positions in the public administration in large numbers, including positions that had never been previously held by the military. The new government included many former military officers who had been cashiered for their participation in the 1992 coup attempts, but who now occupied highly political positions at the top of the state's administrative structure.[14]

The first Chávez administration also proposed considerable changes to the structure of the armed forces and their relationship to the state. A new Constitution in 1999 redefined the military as an armed force (singular rather than plural) to emphasize a move towards jointness. This included a redefinition of roles and missions to highlight the importance of military participation in economic development and internal security, including the possibility of assuming police functions. The Constitution increased the number of official military roles from six to 18, although some of these are simply elaborations on the original six roles. It also removed the possibility of legislative oversight of promotions and restored the vote to military officers. The latter would prove to be very important because the President simultaneously assumed sole responsibility for approving military promotions (the key to reshaping the officer corps) and gained influence over a new voting constituency.[15]

The larger political context that the armed forces acted within quickly became highly polarized, and this was consequently reflected in the officer corps. President Chávez's policies and political style generated opposition among a significant proportion of the general population. He convened a Constitutional Assembly to write a new Constitution, and he moved quickly to disband the institutions of the *ancien régime*, including the Supreme Court and the Congress. President Chávez's initial reform proposals were approved by popular referendum, culminating in his election as President under the new Constitution in 2000. Despite his apparent popularity with a substantial proportion of the population, Chávez's populism, his admiration for Fidel Castro and Cuba, his aggressive verbal attacks on his adversaries, and his statist economic policies were rejected by the middle and upper classes. Since this segment of the population was the one with which mid-ranking and senior military officers traditionally identified, it is not surprising that some officers shared these views.[16]

Within the military itself, a number of problems developed that included the (now) civilian president's penchant for wearing military uniforms, his interference in the promotion and assignment process, and his verbal encouragement to senior officers to link the military to the cause of his revolution. These all went far beyond what any previous civilian presidents had attempted, and it consequently appeared to break the norms and conventions of democratic civil–military relations. The conflict sharpened during the 2000 campaign for the presidency under the new Constitution, the first during the democratic period when military officers were able to vote. Given that Hugo Chávez's opponent during that presidential campaign was another former coup leader, Lt. Col. Francisco Arias Cardenas, political polarization among officers was inevitable.[17]

In addition, President Chávez's anti-American and pro-Cuban foreign policy also added friction to the civil–military relationship. Prior to Chávez's assumption of office in 1999, the Venezuelan armed forces were among the most pro-US in the Southern hemisphere, and many officers had trained or been educated in the United States, or used US equipment in their professional careers. The new link to Cuba meant the introduction of thousands of Cuban doctors, trainers, educational specialists, and military and intelligence advisors to Venezuela, something that did not sit

well with some Venezuelan officers, particularly retired officers who recalled combating Cuban-sponsored insurgents in the 1960s.[18]

President Chávez's political plans were met by progressively larger anti-government demonstrations, uniquely backed by both the national chamber of commerce and the largest labor union confederation in the country. Internal security came to the fore as an issue for the armed forces as the opposition rallies were often met with pro-government counter-demonstrators. Violent clashes erupted on a number of occasions, including most famously on 11 April 2002, when a large anti-government march veered off its official route and towards the government center in downtown Caracas, where substantial numbers of pro-government sympathizers awaited. Police and National Guard units were unable to contain the demonstrators, and open gunfire erupted.

In the face of the violent outcome of the march, President Chávez's order to the military to implement a repressive internal security program in Caracas, known as Plan Avila, provided the opening to attempt a military coup. This movement, which had been in the planning stages for some time, was initially led by the most senior army commanders and led to Chávez's arrest and resignation on 11 April. However, several key supporters of President Chávez, including his Vice-President, escaped during the initial moments of the coup, and they organized a counter-coup effort. Civilian supporters of the president were mobilized to take back control of the area around the palace, while General Raul Baduel, one of the most influential generals in the army, coordinated a rescue mission from his command in Western Venezuela to bring President Chávez back to power.[19]

The collapse of the coup attempt by 14 April gave President Chávez a new opportunity to reshape the military and the officer corps. On the one hand, he was able to purge officers mostly likely to oppose him openly, gingerly at first and with a surer hand as he assumed a firmer grip on power in late 2002. Some of the officers purged had connections to the opposition, as was revealed by the military "sit-down strike" that several dozen military officers carried out in Plaza Altamira, which drew support from sections of the Caracas middle class and elite. In addition, numerous generals and admirals whose loyalties were suspect were denied command and staff assignments, and were sent home, albeit on full pay. This effectively cut them off from the armed forces' power structure.[20] The results of this targeting of suspected military-opposition links was to accentuate the mutual suspicion between the two sides. On the one hand, the longer that the military refused to move against the regime, especially after 2004, the more that the civilian opposition saw the military as compromised and suspect by their passive and sometimes active support for Chávez. On the other hand, for military officers, suspicion of association with the opposition could possibly lead to the end of their careers, which lessened their interest in developing contacts with civilians. In addition, for the vast majority of military officers who were "institutionalists," it was instructive to observe the fate of their colleagues who chose to reveal their anti-Chávez preferences—cashiered, refused assignments, or even imprisoned.

In addition to manipulating personnel processes, President Chávez made it more difficult to organize any new coups by accelerating his plans to create a national reserve military force. This structure was based on existing reservists, but was greatly augmented by civilian loyalists who received military and political training during weekend reserve stints. The goal of enrolling a million reservists was initially announced, and while this goal had not been met by 2008, thousands of Chavistas received additional military training, allowing them to possibly act as a counterweight to any future military uprising, much in the way they had played a key role in restoring Chávez to power in April 2002. Their role as a parallel military structure is confirmed by their chain-of-command, which depends administratively and operationally on the Presidency,

not the Ministry of Defense.[21] This alternative to the traditional command structure can be understood as an attempt to counterbalance the existing armed force and offer the President other instruments of military power when the loyalty of the traditional force is in doubt.[22]

The legislature finally approved a new Ley Orgánica de la Fuerza Armada in 2005, the military's constitutive law that had been under discussion since the beginning of the Chávez period. This new law codified the new reserve and territorial guard components of the armed forces, confirmed the bifurcation of the chain-of-command between the active and reserve components, and reiterated the armed forces' obligation to participate in economic development and internal security at the commander-in-chief's discretion. In fact, the law emphasizes that the Minister of Defense is only in charge of administrative functions within the defense establishment while the President commands the armed forces directly. The former Comando Unificado de la Fuerza Armada Nacional was also replaced with a Comando Estratégico Operacional to oversee joint operations and conduct joint planning.[23]

To sweeten the bitter pill of the purges in the office corps and the creation of the parallel reserve structure, President Chávez began to invest much more seriously in Venezuela's military. This investment included sustained pay raises and bonuses for military officers and other personnel over several years, with the 30 percent pay rise in 2008 falling within the norm.[24] He also began an all-out campaign to re-equip his armed forces with modern assault rifles, aircraft, missile systems, and even a new Cuban-style uniform. As a result, Venezuela is one of the leading consumers of modern weaponry in Latin America. Chávez justified the restructuring of the defense forces and the new investment by pointing to the threat of invasion from the United States. As codified in the Ley Orgánica de la Fuerza Armada Nacional in 2005, asymmetric warfare became the basis for a new official military doctrine based on joint operations between active, reserve, and territorial guard components. This new concept was taken so seriously that Venezuela's war colleges were shut down for six months to redesign their curricula to begin to focus on teaching a new doctrine developed to incorporate Vietnamese and Cuban concepts of prolonged popular war.[25]

Between the 2002 coup attempt and his re-election as President in 2006, Chávez also consolidated his political power in the civilian sphere, making it even less likely that a gun-shy military would try to work with the opposition to resist Chavista policies. The first victory for the President was overcoming a general strike led by the managers and workers of the national oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela. The general strike, which included a number of actions interpreted by the military as sabotage by strikers, led the Venezuelan officer corps to choose sides, and many chose to side with the government. The second key trend reinforcing Chávez's ascendancy in the civilian sphere was his repeated electoral victories over the opposition, beating back a recall referendum in 2004, orchestrating an overwhelming victory for his political followers in legislative elections in 2005, and finally, winning re-election as President in December 2006.[26] The disorder and poor leadership of the opposition during this period did nothing to redeem it, either to their potential allies in the international community or with the Venezuelan armed forces. Witnessing the chaotic nature of the very diverse opposition to Chávez during this period, it should not be surprising that many military officers decided to avoid politics altogether.

## Deepening revolutionary control over the Fuerza Armada Bolivariana (2007–9)

With another re-election victory in hand, President Chávez spent the year 2007 outlining his vision for deepening his Bolivarian revolution, with an open focus on achieving twenty-first-century

socialism. At the beginning of his third term, it was no longer possible to speak of jurisdictional boundaries between civilian and military responsibilities in the strictest sense because these had become too permeable. Rhetorically, the central goal of the civic–military alliance that President Chávez advocated was to erase the differences between military and civilian members of society. The armed forces lost what little control over their own institutional destiny that they might have once had, nor were they able to shape defense policy, apparently not even through the mechanism of ordinary bureaucratic politics.

As a key part of his defense reform efforts, Hugo Chávez has provided the armed forces with the first new conflict hypothesis in 30 years. In the mid-1970s, the Venezuelan armed forces transformed themselves into a conventional military with sophisticated air and naval forces loosely structured to deal with a confrontation with their traditional peer-competitor, Colombia. President Chávez clearly determined that the armed forces should prepare themselves to resist a US invasion, and ordered the revision of military education and training to emphasize asymmetric conflict. He increased the number of joint exercises in which regular and reserve forces combine to resist invaders. Training programs for reservists and territorial guards, known as the Misión Miranda, also include a lot of theoretical material on conducting prolonged popular war.[27]

This new doctrine and conflict hypothesis are somewhat at odds with the procurement and acquisitions program that President Chávez has pushed forward for the armed forces. The Venezuelan armed forces concluded the 1990s with serious deficiencies at all levels, from serviceable fighter aircraft to uniforms and boots. Chávez quickly decided to break the existing dependence of his military on US supplies, equipment, and training. His initial attempts to re-equip his armed forces with non-US suppliers faced obstacles because most manufacturers outside the former Communist bloc use some US technology under license, the terms of which prohibit re-export of this technology without prior US approval. US suspicion of Chávez's intentions made it nearly impossible to acquire any equipment not manufactured in Russia or China.[28] Accordingly, Chávez has spent billions of dollars on Sukhoi fighter aircraft, AK-103 rifles, and new helicopters and missiles. In 2008, this procurement program expanded to include a focus on acquiring submarines and air defense systems.[29] This equipment, barring the assault rifles, is not particularly useful for a "prolonged popular war" strategy. However, its intent may be to retain some conventional capabilities to deal with his neighbors while pursuing a parallel deterrence strategy of building a large reserve/irregular defense force to resist a major power. The reported attempt to install a manufacturing facility for the assault rifles may be a step in this direction. In addition, the new equipment also has the advantage of silencing professional grumblings in the armed forces while at the same time breaking the links between the Venezuelan and US officer corps.[30]

The role of the reserve and militia forces, which during his third term Hugo Chávez proposed growing from a one million member national reserve (a number never achieved) to a 15 million member popular militia (an impossible number to achieve), has continued to evolve. The importance of the militia forces to the Chávez administration can be seen not only in their entirely separate chain-of-command, but also in the creation of a separate administrative structure, initially called the Comando General de la Reserva Nacional y la Movilización Nacional and later renamed Comando General de la Milicia Nacional Bolivariana in 2009.[31] In addition, the Consejos Comunales (local community councils governing territorial areas covering a few thousand people) are increasingly being used as recruitment vehicles for the Milicia Nacional Bolivariana through their sub-committees on security and defense (mesas de seguridad y defensa).[32] One indicator of the value that the President places on the effort to build the militia is that he named their first commander general, General Gustavo Rangel Briceño, his Minister of Popular Power for Defense in 2007.

President Chavez proposed deep constitutional reforms in 2007, including changes that affected civil–military relations, that eventually led to an explicit codification of what kind of military doctrine the armed forces should employ.[33] The proposal redefined the armed forces as a patriotic, popular, and anti-imperialist force with the role of conducting internal and external defense missions using a Bolivarian Military Doctrine of popular resistance warfare. It also restated that the armed forces should contribute to economic development.[34] The military services were renamed by adding the adjective Bolivarian to each of their names, and the militia forces were given a status akin to that of a second armed force. Further statements by former pro-government military officers suggested that the militia would be used to perform territorial defense, internal security, and civic action functions, thus de-emphasizing the role of professional military officers in the internal defense structure.[35]

Many of the transformations proposed in 2007 were in fact enacted in a new organic law in 2008 (known as LOFANB) by the National Assembly. In addition to emphasizing the Bolivarian and revolutionary dimensions of the armed forces, the LOFANB completes certain key transformations in Venezuela's defense sector: increasing the status of militia forces, transforming the political–military organization of territorial defense, and emphasizing that the Ministry of Defense is a purely administrative entity. The new organic law reiterates the creation of militia forces as a second armed component in Venezuela that reports directly to the President rather than through the Ministry of Defense, and it emphasizes the separation of the Milicia Nacional Bolivariana from the traditional armed forces by returning responsibility for the military reserves to their original components. The law replaces the previous military territorial structure with new regions, zones, and areas of integral defense that emphasize civil–military integration (i.e., popular mobilization and resistance). The Ministry of Popular Power for Defense is "normalized" within the overall government by subjecting it to the organic law governing the public administration and removing it from the military chain of command. The depth of the transformation of the military career enacted as part of this law includes the transformation of the technical non-commissioned officer corps (SOPC or Sub-Oficiales Profesionales de Carrera) into a technical commissioned officer corps with the possibility of being promoted as high as brigadier general or rear admiral. This increase in status of the SOPC rewards their reputedly greater support for the Bolivarian Revolution and creates a new cleavage in the armed forces that can be exploited by the President to maintain control over the defense sector.[36]

## Conclusions: expanding roles while losing autonomy

The changes in the Bolivarian Armed Force go beyond the theater of military power, with its changes in uniforms, the universal use of "Bolivarian" to modify anything related to the armed forces, and the new military salute, "patria, socialismo, o muerte" ("fatherland, socialism, or death"). Military officers have been quietly providing bureaucratic oversight of government programs since the beginning of the Chávez period. They also conduct internal security missions and promote economic activity, including playing a major internal role in the state oil company, PDV. The Bolivarian armed force also plays a major role in achieving President Chávez's foreign policy objectives, particularly in the area of building alliances with like-minded countries such as Bolivia. It has also provided disaster relief assistance in Central America and discounted shipping of commercial goods and oil supplies for small island states in the Caribbean. These services have often been accompanied by none-too-subtle proselytizing in favor of the Revolution. If President Chávez is able to successfully complete the revolution in defense policy that he has proposed, the Venezuelan military will look radically different in terms of its missions and organizations from the professional military he inherited from the Fourth Republic.

Nevertheless, this chapter seeks to answer a narrower question: who decides what aspects of defense and military policy in the Chávez administration? In part, this can be answered by examining the jurisdictional boundaries between civilian and military actors in the state, focusing on those boundaries that are most contested. Since the end of the 2004 presidential recall referendum, it appears that the armed forces have contested very little despite a rapid erosion of their institutional autonomy. Fundamental aspects of what makes a military institution, including doctrine, education, training, and personnel systems, have been altered at the whim of the commander-in-chief. This is often obscured because they remain in the hands of military officers, but the general absence of contestation over these very radical changes is a telling indicator. While there is not a system of institutionalized civilian control along the lines of the traditional Western liberal model, there is a high degree of personal involvement by President Chávez in making decisions about what the armed forces should and should not do.

One might argue that the contemporary changes are aligned with military corporate interests, and so there is no reason for military contestation. Viewed from this perspective, the increases in budgets and salaries along with new equipment should satisfy the corporate interests of the armed forces. We should view this argument with some skepticism. The level of dissent in the officer corps at all levels during the first five years of the Chávez regime was enough to suggest that the alterations in the civil–military system were not particularly welcome, and this was at a time when Chávez had not yet touched the core prerogatives that most militaries will fight for. Most academic research in civil–military relations suggests that armed forces that are not under civilian control will reject efforts by civilians to dictate their structure, organization, doctrine, education and training, procurement, and personnel policies, which is precisely what Chávez focused on between 2002 and 2009. That the Venezuelan military has accepted President Chávez's program with little demur since 2004 because the reforms were suddenly in their corporate interest is not credible, particularly since the alterations to military structures struck at core institutional interests.

## Implications for the future of Venezuelan civil–military relations

The story of Hugo Chávez's ability to lead the armed forces to accept his revolutionary model, for both the military and the country, speaks to some larger issues in the literature on civil–military relations. As it affects the debate on the Venezuelan military, I would argue that the habits and institutions of civilian control and military subordination established during the first four decades after 1958 have served President Chávez well. The number of officers who have openly resisted his quite radical changes to the armed forces has been relatively small, and once they were purged from the ranks, the rest of the military has gone along quite willingly with his plans. This would have been more difficult if the armed forces had had a historical pattern of resisting civilian authority, as was the case in other neighboring countries such as Colombia, Ecuador, and Chile, even during periods of democratic rule. However, this does not mean that the institutions of civilian control have survived, but rather that 40 years of democratic norms have eased President Chávez's task of ridding himself of the legacy of civil–military institutions that stood in the way of his personal control over the defense establishment.

Contributing to military subordination to the Chávez administration is the civilian side of the civil–military equation. Since the beginning of Chávez's third term in 2007, the civilian opposition has stepped up its criticism of the military's role in supporting the Chávez administration. It has also attacked the administration of military reform efforts, criticizing everything from the new military motto to military doctrine, the new military command structure, and excessive arms acquisitions. However, the civilian opposition has not been able to speak with a unified

voice on military issues, even since the December 2007 constitutional referendum victory. The opposition is divided between those who are highly critical of the military as an institution for supporting the government and those who have sought the military's support to end President Chávez's rule. The strategy of civilian opposition politicians has gone from appealing, sometimes not too subtly, for the military to step in, as was the case in 2002 and 2003, to now expressing growing concern about the military becoming a repressive institution.[37] Such divisions are not conducive to a cohesive or comprehensive critique of the government's military policy or to reassuring the officer corps of the opposition's intentions or trustworthiness.

In addition, there are almost no institutionalized opportunities for civilian checks on the President's military policy, which also means that the military cannot engage in 'normal' bureaucratic politics to affect government defense policies. Between President Chávez's drive to eliminate horizontal accountability within the state and the civilian opposition's inability to use the legislature to check the President, there are no institutional channels for dissent—civilian or military. This means that military officers cannot convince sympathetic legislators aligned with the opposition to take up their cause or raise their arguments in the legislature as a way to modify executive proposals on military issues. The only way the armed forces can modify policy is by appealing directly to the President, which reinforces his role as the central figure in the civil–military relationship.[38]

# Notes

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2 For the purposes of clarity, this chapter defines membership in Venezuelan military institutions as limited to active duty officers, non-commissioned officers, and enlisted personnel. It deliberately excludes retired military personnel (pro-government or opposition) from the discussion of the military institution, although I am well aware that retired personnel are often considered part of the armed forces in many Latin American countries. Including retired personnel, some of whom play very active roles in the Venezuelan political system, only clouds discussions of who decides: politicians (or retired military officers engaged in new careers as politicians), or the military as an institution.

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Richard Millett, "More than Failed Coups: The Crisis in Venezuelan Civil–Military Relations," in Johanna Mendelson FormanGoodman, Moises Naim, and Joseph S. Tulchin, eds., *Lessons of the Venezuelan Experience* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995, pp. 54–78). Deborah L. Norden, "Democracy and Military Control in Venezuela: From Subordination to Insurrection," *Latin American Research Review* 33(2) (1998): 143. For more general critiques of Venezuela's democracy, see Terry Lynn Karl, "Petroleum and Political Pacts: The Transition to Democracy in Venezuela," *Latin American Research Review* 22(1) (1987): 63–94.

 9 Domingo Irwin, *Relaciones civiles-militares en el siglo XX* (Caracas, Venezuela: Centauro, 2000).

10 Karl, "Petroleum and Political Pacts."

11 Trinkunas, *Crafting Civilian Control.*

12 Ibid.

13 Norden, "Democracy and Military Control in Venezuela"; Trinkunas, *Crafting Civilian Contro*l.

14 Edgar Cordova Jaimes, "Administración y Gestión Pública en Venezuela: Aproximaciones a los cambios y transformaciones," paper prepared for VII Congreso Español de Ciencia Política y Administración 2007. Alredo Angulo Rivas, "Civiles, Militares, y Política en Venezuela," *Fermentum* 11(3) (April 2001): 135–7. Harold A. Trinkunas, "The Crisis in Venezuelan Civil–Military Relations: From Punto Fijo to the Fifth Republic," *Latin American Research Review* 37(1) (2002): 41.

15 Trinkunas, *Crafting Civilian Control.*

16 Ibid.

17 Ibid.

18 Harold Trinkunas, "Defining Venezuela's 'Bolivarian Revolution,'" *Military Review* July–August (2005): 39–44.

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30 Trinkunas, "Defining Venezuela's 'Bolivarian Revolution.'"

31 The reserves and militia have theoretically different functions, in that the reserves are to provide replacements to regular forces in times of war, while militia are supposed to act locally to resist invading forces. According to media reports, the number of reserve battalions has grown from nine to 42, although some analysts suggest that the reserves are a largely hollow force, and the level of personnel required to staff 42 battalions would be considerably less than the reportedly 100,000 trained reservists. See Patricia Clarembeaux, "Los hombres se multiplican," *Tal Cual*, 12 September 2007; Domingo Irwin, presentation at IPSA RC 24 conference in Santiago, Chile, July 2008; and "Reserva Militar pasó a ser milicia bolivariana," *El Nacional*, 14 April 2009.

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La Fuerza Armada Bolivariana constituye un cuerpo esencialmente patriótico popular y antimperialista, organizada por el Estado para garantizar la independencia y soberanía de la nación, preservarla de cualquier ataque externo o interno y asegurar la integridad del espacio geográfico, mediante el estudio, planificación y ejecución de la doctrina militar bolivariana, la aplicación de los principios de la defensa militar integral y la guerra popular de resistencia, la participación permanente en tareas de mantenimiento de la seguridad ciudadana, y conservación del orden interno, así como la participación activa en planes para el desarrollo económico, social, científico y tecnológico de la nación, de acuerdo con esta Constitución y la ley. En el cumplimiento de su función, estará siempre al servicio del pueblo venezolano en defensa de sus sagrados intereses y en ningún caso al de oligarquía alguna o poder imperial extranjero. La Fuerza Armada Bolivariana tendrá un régimen de seguridad social integral propio, según lo establezca su respectiva Ley Orgánica. Sus pilares fundamentales son esta constitución y las leyes, así como la disciplina, la obediencia y la subordinación. Sus pilares históricos están en el mandato de Bolívar: "Libertar a la patria, empuñar la espada en defensa de las garantías sociales y merecer las bendiciones del pueblo."

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# 11

# REBUILDING THE MILITARY UNDER DEMOCRATIC CONTROL

## Iraq

*Abbas Kadhim*

## Introduction

The Iraqi Armed Forces suffered a devastating defeat during the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Because of the collapse of Saddam Hussein's regime and the lack of interest on the part of the following administrations to compile an accurate account of Iraqi casualties during the invasion or afterwards, it is impossible to account for the number of officers and soldiers who died in the hostilities and the ensuing civil conflict. The remainder of those forces melted away immediately after the invasion. Soldiers and officers dropped their weapons and abandoned their units in a mass desertion similar to that of 1991, following Iraq's defeat in Kuwait. But this time, no call was made upon them to return to their units. The country remained without any native security force for the balance of 2003 and well into the following year, except for the hastily formed militias. The foreign troops, mostly US and British forces, played a very minimal role in keeping any order in a country whose size is similar to that of California, with a population of approximately 30 million. The one exception is the northern region, which has been autonomously governed by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) since 1991. The KRG maintains a sizeable security force, the *Peshmerga*, which ensures law and order in the three northern governorates: Dahok, Arbil, and Sulaymaniya.

The mass desertion was turned into an official dismissal of all Iraqi security forces shortly thereafter. On 23 May 2003, L. Paul Bremer, Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), signed Order No. 2, which dismissed 23 military and paramilitary entities, including the entire personnel of the Ministry of Defense, the Army, the Air Force, the Navy, the Air Defense Force, the Republican Guard, and other regular military services, effective 16 April 2003. The Order also suspended conscription, which was legislated in the 1930s and practiced by all Iraqi governments, released conscripts, and cancelled every "military or other rank, title or status granted to a former employee or functionary of a Dissolved Entity by the former regime."[1] The Order also announced:

> The CPA plans to create in the near future a New Iraqi Corps, as the first step in forming a national self-defense capability for a free Iraq. Under civilian control, that Corps will be professional, non–political, militarily effective and representative of all Iraqis.[2]

After the passage of three more months, the CPA Administrator signed Order No. 22 on 18 August 2003, entitled "Creation of a New Iraqi Army." The Order suspended all existing relevant laws from 1940 to 1984.[3] The new army was created for "the period of the CPA's authority," and its existence beyond that period was left for the "future internationally recognized, representative government, established by the people of Iraq."[4] Although the command positions in the new army were exclusively reserved for Iraqis, Bremer became "the civilian Commander-in-Chief" while the CPA was in charge.[5] He, or a CPA official designated by him, held the authority to commission the new Iraqi officers and assign them to their units, because there was no Iraqi Ministry of Defense or a civilian authority with the capacity to perform these tasks. Furthermore, the Iraqi commanding officers were commanders in name only. Not only were they obligated to carry out the orders of the CPA, but the operational and tactical command of their units, when "operating with coalition forces"—they always did— "may be vested in an officer of Coalition forces of rank superior to that of [the Iraqi officer]."[6]

Having suspended the military penal codes of 1972 and 1984, the new army fell under the jurisdiction of the civilian criminal codes in accordance with the Criminal Procedures Code No. 23 of 1977, the Penal Code No. 111 of 1969, and their subsequent amendments. A CPA Code of Military Discipline was also to be issued subsequently. Entry into the new army was open to all eligible Iraqis, 18 years or older, with or without prior military experience. The assignment of ranks was the prerogative of the CPA Administrator or a CPA official he designated in writing. Other than age and physical capability, eligibility included not being affiliated with any "Extremist Organizations," any past involvement in human rights violations, and any past affiliation with the "security and political control organs of the former regime."[7]

The CPA followed Order No. 22 with Order No. 23, "Creation of a Code of Military Discipline for the New Iraqi Army," on 20 August 2003. As stated in Order No. 22, serious offences were initially assigned to military courts, which were actually civilian courts designated by the CPA to serve as military courts until the creation of the Code of Military Discipline on 20 August 2003.[8] In the case of a trial by a military court, judges were instructed to "deal with the allegation of the Military Offense … in the manner of civil Offenses laid down in the Iraqi Law of Criminal Procedure 1971 as amended by Iraqi law and by CPA Orders."[9] Additionally, the Order created a structure of small punishments for smaller offenses, when penalty was administrative, such as detention, reprimand, extra duties or reduction of rank, or punishments involving a small fine. Such cases were to be administered by designated Iraqi "disciplinary officers" with the rank of captain or higher.[10]

In order to put more Iraqi faces in the military administration, the CPA issued Order No. 42, "Creation of the Defense Support Agency" (DSA), which was meant to help the CPA by providing management and logistical support, finance and accounting, training support, recruitment, medical support, legal affairs, and so on for the new Iraqi Army. Here too, the ultimate authority was vested in Bremer, and the DSA was headed by the CPA Director of Security Affairs. The staff consisted of Iraqi civilians and former military personnel. The function of the DSA was only administrative; it was not authorized to exercise any military command or to set policy for the Iraqi Army.[11]

This order was cancelled on 21 March 2004, when Order No. 67 was issued, creating a new Ministry of Defense (MoD) for Iraq. The new Order clearly stated that the newly created MoD was not related to the old MoD, which had been dissolved by Order No. 2 of 2003. It also stated in non-equivocal terms that the newly created "MoD will operate under the authority, direction and control of the Administrator of the CPA," and the Minister of Defense will be appointed by CPA Administrator Bremer. Furthermore, he "shall report directly to the Administrator"—not the Iraqi Governing Council.[12]

Following the transfer of authority to the Iraqis in 2004, the CPA ceased to exist. The Iraqi Governing Council, appointed by Administrator Bremer, approved the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) on 8 March 2004, shortly before the transfer of power. The TAL remained in effect until the ratification of the permanent constitution on 15 October 2005. Meanwhile, all CPA directives concerning the Armed Forces remained in effect. The TAL only addressed certain principles, such as the subordination of the Armed Forces to civilian authority (both the Minister of Defense and the Commander-in-Chief, the Prime Minister, must be civilians), and their ineligibility to seek office or interfere in politics and electoral activities (with the exception of casting votes and the prohibition of using the Armed Forces to oppress the Iraqi people). These issues were also included in the permanent Constitution and will be discussed further in the next section.

## The legal and constitutional framework for CMR

Iraqi Armed Forces are addressed in six different articles in the Constitution. Article No. 9 of the Constitution deals exclusively with Iraq's national defense and security, focusing on the roles and composition of the Armed Forces and National Intelligence. Section A of the Article recalls the past practices of previous governments in creating a sectarian military, which became with the passing of time the power broker in the country. Therefore, this section mandated a balanced recruitment of the Armed Forces from all components of the Iraqi population. It further prohibited the military from becoming an instrument for oppression of the Iraqi people. It also prohibited the Armed Forces from interfering in the country's political affairs or having a role in the transfer of political authority. Section C of the Article further forbade the Armed Forces and all personnel of the MoD from seeking elected office or participating in any electoral activities, in either their official or personal capacity, whether for themselves or on behalf of others. However, as Iraqi citizens, their right to cast their votes in every election is guaranteed.

Article 58 of the Iraqi Constitution gives the parliament the authority to confirm the appointment of the "Army Chief of Staff, his assistants and those of the rank of division commanders and above and the director of the intelligence service based on a proposal from the Cabinet." The role of the Cabinet in nominating candidates for these positions is addressed in Article 77, Section 5. However, the Constitution is silent on whether parliamentary approval is necessary for the removal of military officers from these positions.

Finally, Article 70, Section 9 of the Constitution, designates the President of the country as the ceremonial commander-in-chief. However, Article 75 designates the Prime Minister as the actual commander-in-chief, while Article 107, Section 2, grants the federal government of Iraq the exclusive authority to "[formulate and execute] national security policy, including creating and managing Armed Forces to secure the protection, and to guarantee the security of Iraq's borders and to defend Iraq."[13]

In 2009, the parliament passed the Law of Military Service and Retirement, but it was vetoed by the Presidential Council and returned to parliament for revision. The parliament accepted certain presidential suggestions and rejected others. On 26 January 2010, the law was approved and signed to replace the last law passed in Iraq in 1975, which was repealed according to Article 97 of the new law. Also repealed was CPA Directive No. 22. There was no need to repeal other CPA directives because they were set to be effective only while the CPA remained in charge of Iraq's affairs, while many parts of Directive No. 22 were designed to remain in effect until repealed by an internationally recognized Iraqi government.

Many of these provisions have been tested in the short period since the ratification of the Constitution. In all elections, the military has exercised no role other than providing a safe

environment on election days. It was not accused of partisanship by any Iraqi political group or any independent election monitoring entity. However, there is still a heated debate on the past and, potentially, future role of the Armed Forces in oppressing the Iraqi people. The current volatile security situation in Iraq has diverted all military activities into providing domestic security and maintaining a clear military presence in many Iraqi cities. This daily contact with average Iraqis has inevitably resulted in daily combat engagements and occasional violations of the rules of engagement. Also, because they were trained during the pre-democratic era, many Iraqi officers and soldiers have yet to accept the new doctrine of maximum restraint and utmost respect for human rights, despite continued training on such doctrines. Most importantly, the nature of the challenge before the Iraqi Armed Forces is unique. They are mainly engaged in counterterrorism efforts against some of the most vicious and murderous groups, such as al-Qa'ida and sectarian militias. It is not a secret that these groups enjoy the support of certain Iraqi political groups, inside and outside of the government, and the support of neighboring countries, and therefore receive more than financial and logistical aid. Terrorists are extremely media savvy and distribute print materials, videos, and cassettes depicting the Iraqi Armed Forces committing human rights violations and oppression; most groups also maintain websites and run their own television and radio stations to maximize their impact. Sympathizers of these groups are also very active in providing logistics and informing groups of every move by the Iraqi Armed Forces.

One of the points of dispute is the creation of several military units and other forces that work outside of the normal framework of the Iraqi Armed Forces, such as the Anti-Terrorism Force and the Baghdad Operations Force, and report to the Prime Minister directly. The political opponents of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki claim that he does not have any constitutional authority to create Special Forces not subject to parliamentary oversight. However, Iraqi legal experts, such as Tariq Harb, a leading constitutional expert, argue that "the task of forming the Armed Forces and Special Forces is an exclusive prerogative of the Commander-in-Chief, while the parliament has no authority in this regard, except the authority to disband such forces."[14]

## Democratic civilian control

Iraq's Armed Forces have a long history of meddling in politics. Indeed, the first military *coup d'état* in the Arab world since the creation of the Arab nation-states took place in Iraq in 1936.[15] In addition to numerous attempts, Iraq witnessed military, or military-assisted, coups in 1941, 1958, and 1963. Furthermore, there was no defining line between military and civilian authority in Iraq between 1958 and 2003, and Iraq never had a democratic transfer of political authority. Therefore, Iraqis reacted positively to the concept of civilian control of the Armed Forces, which was imposed by the CPA and further enshrined in the TAL and in the permanent constitution of October, 2004. According to Article 9, Section A of the Iraqi Constitution, "The Iraqi Armed Forces … shall be subject to the control of the civilian authority." The civilian control is exercised by the Minister of Defense, the Prime Minister, and, ceremonially, the President of Iraq—all of whom must be civilians. The Armed Forces are also subject to parliamentary oversight and legislative powers.

Legislative control and oversight, which is exercised by the Iraqi parliament, include debating and passing military-related legislation, approving budget and other spending requests, conducting hearings on military conduct and, according to the Constitution, approving the appointment of higher commanding officers (at the level of Division Commander and above). Military-related legislation and oversight are exercised by the Defense and Security Committee,

one of the most powerful committees in the Iraqi Parliament. The Committee invites top military commanders, as well as the civilian commanders of the Armed Forces (Minister of Defense and others), to discuss security and other military affairs. The Defense and Security Committee also is involved in Iraq's international relations, including hosting foreign ambassadors and foreign legislative and executive delegations.[16]

## Effectiveness and efficiency

The effectiveness and efficiency of the Armed Forces are measured not only by their ability to successfully perform their duties and carry out the missions assigned to them by the Commander-in-Chief and the Ministry of Defense, which involve mainly defending the country against external threats, but also to perform missions to ensure domestic security. In this regard we need to consider not only training and doctrine, but also the equipment needed to perform such missions, the logistics and other forms of support to the combat units, and the ability of various units to coordinate their roles in a large-scale conflict.

So far, the new Iraqi Armed Forces have mostly been involved in police work and counter-terrorism, where the enemies are small groups armed with light weapons; fighting can occur in one or many sections of a city simultaneously; and there is urban as well as rural combat. That few citywide engagements, since the 2008 conflict with the Mahdi Army militia in Basra, have occurred has proved that the Iraqi Armed Forces could not win a fight without the logistical support of coalition forces. However, sources in the Pentagon and the Iraqi MoD affirmed that, when fighting in partnership with coalition forces, Iraqi Armed Forces exhibited distinct courage and readiness to take the lead in counterterrorism operations. Also, Iraqi forces are making important strides toward achieving successful interoperability in counterterrorism. For instance, on 12 January 2011, Iraqi Aviation Command Squadron 15 conducted what was described as "a historic joint counterterrorism training session" with a unit from the Iraqi counterterrorism forces. This was the first time these two entities worked together on a single mission.[17]

Iraqi forces have been effective in providing protection for major events in Iraq, with many cities becoming an area of responsibility, for example, countrywide election days and the religious rituals that take place in several southern cities, where millions of Iraqis and foreigners gather to commemorate the martyrdom of historic Shi'a imams.

On the external front, Iraqi Armed Forces are very far from being ready. After being a cause of concern for all Middle Eastern countries, the Iraqi Armed Forces are not in a position to hold their ground against any of their neighbors. According to the Chief of Staff of the Iraqi Armed Forces, General Babakir Zibari, "the U.S. army must stay until the Iraqi army is fully ready in 2020."[18] General Zibari was not referring to the Iraqi Army alone, but the entire Iraqi Armed Forces, including the essential branches that would not be fully formed and equipped by the end of 2011—the scheduled date of the US withdrawal from Iraq. According to sources in the US State Department, there is no unclassified plan to fill the gap between the US troop withdrawal and the closest date of full Iraqi military readiness in 2020. Similarly, sources at the Iraqi MoD predicted that the plan could be an Iraqi request for an extension of the US military mission in Iraq, despite the problems such a request will cause for both governments.

## Professional military education, training, and equipment

Prior to the 2003 regime change, the Iraqi Armed Forces were equipped with Soviet and Eastern European arms. With the exception of the Chinese T-55 tanks used in a few units, most of the

Armed Forces were using T-62 and T-72 Russian tanks. Iraq also imported arms and ammunition from other sources, such as Brazil, France, Germany, and Austria. The Iraqi Air Force was flying Russian MiG and French Mirage jets. Naturally, specialized training abroad for any type of military equipment was done in the country of origin or by hosting training teams in Iraq for the necessary period of time. However, Iraq took every measure to prepare highly qualified Iraqi instructors to train the soldiers and officers. Schools of training with an exclusively Iraqi cadre trained soldiers for the Armored Forces, including artillery units, infantry, technical and mechanical support units, and the Army Corps of Engineers.

Since their establishment during the first half of the twentieth century, Iraqi military colleges have accepted high school graduates, who would graduate with a Baccalaureate degree and the rank of Second Lieutenant in the Army, the Air Force, or the Navy. Civilian medical students were recruited by the military after graduation, and soldiers were eligible to train in medical school while receiving a full military salary and benefits. These positions were not normally available for all Iraqis because of the special attention the regime paid to the composition and allegiance of the officer corps in the Armed Forces. Shi'a and Kurds were rarely accepted unless their allegiance to the regime was proven beyond any doubt.

Conscription provided all other talent needed in the military; all college graduates were required to serve a minimum period of two years immediately after graduation. Shortage of officers was normally compensated for by preparing civilian college graduates to become "reserve officers" after spending six months at a military college, followed by special training on the specific type of arms their prospective units use. However, most civilian college graduates ended up serving in administrative jobs or in units that needed soldiers with advanced literacy or special education, such as the Armored Forces, Artillery, and Engineering.

The current Iraqi Armed Forces are still dependent on foreign trainers, with the training mostly done with the use of interpreters. Three problems stand out from this practice: (1) There is a psychological distance between the trainers and the trainees; (2) the interpreters are not very well qualified almost all the time; and (3) the time consumed—or perhaps, wasted—in this process is not justifiable, and could be reduced significantly by the use of Iraqi trainers. Now let us examine each problem.

From the very beginning, building the new Iraqi military has been difficult for foreign trainers, who have problems trusting their Iraqi trainees and often believe that they are lazy, disloyal, and incompetent. In a *Washington Post* report on trainer–trainee relations in 2005, Anthony Shadid and Steve Fainaru quoted Maj. Gen. Joseph J. Taluto, then-Commander of the 42nd Infantry Division in charge of training Iraqi Army units, as saying, "We're not trying to make the 82nd Airborne here."[19] By the time this attitude traveled down to Sergeant Rick McGovern, it translated as follows: "We like to refer to the Iraqi Army as preschoolers with guns." McGovern continues, "We can't tell these guys about a lot of this stuff, because we're not really sure who's good and who isn't." The trainees are not oblivious to this. Corporal Ahmed Zwayid told Shadid and Fainaru, "We trust the Americans. We go everywhere with them, we do what they ask … But they don't trust us."[20]

The lack of trust is not completely groundless. Since Iraqi Armed Forces began receiving training from the US Forces, American trainers have become targets for deadly attacks by the Iraqi trainees; a partial list includes incidents that were recorded in January 2008, November 2008, May 2009, September 2009, September 2010, November 2010, and January 2011.[21]

The use of interpreters is another problem altogether. Interpreters are normally recruited in the United States through contracting companies that pay them very high salaries—more than $100,000 per year in most cases—and charge the military untold amounts for the services. Anyone with basic standard Arabic is picked for the position, including those from other Arab countries,

who are otherwise completely incompetent when it comes to communicating in the Iraqi dialect; many of them do not know English well enough either, making them unable to understand either side. Sometimes even this defective means of communication is not available, as Shadid and Fainaru observed in one "after-mission" moment:

> An hour later, the men returned to Forward Operating Base Summerall, a sandy expanse behind concrete barricades and concertina wire a few miles outside town. They followed U.S. military protocol: Each soldier dismounted from the vehicle and cleared his weapon. Zwayid stayed in the truck, handed his gun to a friend and asked him to clear it.
> "Get down and clear your own weapon!" Cpl. William Kozlowski shouted to Zwayid in English.
> Zwayid answered in Arabic. "That's my weapon," he explained, pointing to his friend.
> "Corporal, you're a leader!" Kozlowski shouted back. "Take charge!"
> Zwayid smiled at him. "What's he saying to me?" he whispered.[22]

To be sure, trainers receive some linguistic, cultural, and social education prior to their deployment. However, it is often not enough for two reasons: first, it is a small part of their pre-deployment training and preparation, and, second, because some trainers report to the 60-day program late, they miss much of the training. Also, the overall preparation is a very dense program and it is often hard to stay on schedule. In this case, the time reserved for social and cultural training is often used for other forms of training considered "mandatory," such as survival skills and personal security and protection on the field. In other words, the language, social, and cultural training is often achieved on paper only.[23]

Although significant improvements have been reported by both Iraqi and US military sources who were contacted during the course of this research project, some of the inherent problems in the use of foreign trainers still persist and the cumbersome process of building trust is often shattered by the occurrence of shooting incidents, as discussed above.

Speaking of the contracting practices at the Iraqi MoD, it is impossible to avoid mentioning the high level of corruption, fraud, and waste. For instance, Judge Radhi al-Radhi, former head of the Iraqi Commission on Public Integrity, stated that former Iraqi Defense Minister "Hazim Shaalan and his ministry were responsible for [what] is possibly the largest robbery in the world," estimating the amount at between $1.3 billion to $2.3 billion. Hazim Shaalan was minister for less than a year. It is frightening to estimate the whole amount of financial corruption between 2003 and now. Despite the many anti-corruption measures and mechanisms, it is obvious that parliamentary oversight and that of independent agencies, such as the Iraqi Commission on Public Integrity, are not sufficient to curb the existing corruption in the ministries because every minister is fully supported and protected by a major political group. Until there is a consensus across the Iraqi political spectrum to end corruption, oversight will remain a theoretical concept without actual application.

The current military equipment of the Iraqi Armed Forces is another point of dispute. Following the 2003 invasion, not only were the Iraqi Armed Forces disbanded, but Iraq's huge arsenal of weapons and ammunition was either destroyed or sold as scrap in neighboring countries. According to the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspections Commission spokesman Ewen Buchanan:

> Some of it we do know has been exported from Iraq and melted down as scrap, because we—last year our inspectors found some missile engines in a scrap yard in Rotterdam, in the Netherlands, and other items have shown up in Jordan.[24]

Also, according to *Asia Times*:

> Huge consignments of looted machinery, shattered tanks, mangled building material, chopped-up railroad boxcars, machinery components, copper and aluminum ingots and bars, steel rods and water pipes [were] increasingly imported by India from Iraq. For Indian businesses, Iraqi scrap is a prime catch because it's dirt-cheap.[25]

This "dirt-cheap" scrap was imported by Iraq at a cost of billions of dollars and was perfectly functioning until March 2003.[26] It is hard to defend the "wisdom" of destroying it by explosives, or selling it as scrap for a small fraction of its value—a ton of scrap was worth $250 in 2004—often by the use of smuggling tactics, such as selling it to dealers in Dubai or Iran and then reselling it in India and other countries to avoid the laws against imports from war-ravaged countries.

Following the formation of the new Armed Forces, Iraq began to purchase new weapons to equip the newly formed units; it also received donations from NATO members like Hungary, which donated 77 rebuilt T-72 Soviet-designed tanks that were deactivated by the Hungarian Army in the 1990s. Iraq also signed several arms deals with countries, such as the 2009 deal with Ukraine, which

> involved 420 BTR-4 armored personnel carriers, six Antonov AN-32B transport aircraft and other equipment. The contract is the largest arms deal concluded by Ukraine and will likely boost its ranking for arms sales for 2009 from 14th to 4th or 5th.[27]

The United States also became a main source of weapons for Iraq, which is a departure from the era prior to 2003. The Iraqi Armored Forces will be using M1A1 Abrams tanks and M88A2 tracked recovery vehicles. After comparing their options, Iraqi officials also chose to purchase F-16 strike aircrafts. However, the government decided to postpone the deal and divert the money to the food ration program under pressure from the Arab uprising movements, which caused the collapse of several Arab dictatorships. Given Iraq's excellent financial standing and rising oil prices, this move to delay the formation of the Air Force merely ten months before the scheduled US military withdrawal was very hard to explain.

## Lessons learned

The Iraqi case is unique regarding the rebuilding of the Armed Forces. After existing as a well-established and stable state for more than eight decades, the 2003 regime change ended this legacy and transformed the country by completely disbanding the Armed Forces and dissolving all military institutions. Therefore, the attempts to rebuild the Armed Forces were similar to the efforts of newly formed and transitioning states, like the former Yugoslavia, to build new military institutions. But, in the case of Iraq, the symbolism and national sentiments were more confusing: unlike the former Yugoslavia, Iraq did not disintegrate into several independent units with mutual animosities and a rejection of the past unity. Iraqis of the present day still consider the Armed Forces a national institution, despite its long history of serving as a tool of government oppression. Although the new military was formed on 18 August 2003, Iraq's government, people and Armed Forces still commemorate their Armed Forces Day on 6 January,

the anniversary of Iraq's first army unit in 1921; no celebration takes place on 18 August. It was just impossible to erase the memories of the Armed Forces that conducted six *coups d'état*, participated in six major nationalist wars, and, meanwhile, found the time to wage internal wars on its own people using both conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction.

The lessons we learn from post-2003 civil–military relations and the rebuilding of the Armed Forces are not only applicable to new and transitioning states, but also those states with a history of military oppression and autocracy. The lesson for these states, like the emerging regimes in the aftermath of "the Arab Spring," is never to punish the Armed Forces for the oppressive regimes that turned them into instruments of oppression. The collective punishment of the Iraqi Armed Forces did not distinguish between those officers and soldiers who committed crimes and those who did not, but saw that their years of national service went unnoticed. Learning this lesson well may help such nations hold the individual criminals accountable, while rewarding the good soldiers and officers. They will also avoid the catastrophic consequence of collective punishment of a highly trained corps that turned them into lethal domestic enemies of the new regime. Another lesson in this regard has to do with the lack of wisdom in a policy of dismissing the security forces in the middle of a complete collapse of the state, without having an alternative plan for maintaining security or finding a decent alternative form of employment for those who were dismissed.

It is also important to understand the Iraqi experience of inventing a civilian command for the new military, because this concept was not known in Iraq before—not to mention the corruption among the political elite. This is still one of the points of weakness in Iraqi civil–military relations. Between April 2005 and December 2010, the Ministers of Defense were officers of the former Iraqi Armed Forces. In his second term, Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki could not select a candidate for the position, so he just added the Ministry of Defense to his portfolio. The lesson in this regard, obviously, has to do with ensuring the efficiency and accountability of the leadership of the Armed Forces. The importance of the soldier's confidence in the competence and integrity of the civilian leadership is equal to, if not more than, his confidence in the competence and integrity of his commanding officers. Without this confidence we cannot expect good morale within the ranks and file of the Armed Forces, nor can we expect the existence of good civil–military relations.

One of the chronic problems concerning the composition of the Iraqi Armed Forces has always been the ethnic and religious composition, especially that of the officer corps. In the era prior to 2003, the composition of the officer corps significantly favored the Sunni Arabs. This situation was reversed, rather than corrected, in the post-2003 years. The reluctance of Sunnis to join the new Iraqi Armed Forces and the lack of interest among the Kurds to serve outside their geographical areas caused the new military to be obviously lopsided in favor of the Shi'a. Countries with ethnic and sectarian diversity certainly have a lot to learn from the Iraqi experience, both before and after 2003, in terms of what not to do while building a military: They must not respond to the exclusionary policies of the past by the retaliatory exclusion of the dominant group, or groups, under the previous regime. The lesson from Iraq, in this regard, is that the previously dominant group will not surrender its powers without a fight, much less accept any marginalization in policies.

## Conclusion

The past decades have left a legacy of oppression, ethnic conflict, and mistrust among Iraqis. Iraqi Armed Forces have always played a role in shaping the country's political fate, either by sup-

porting the oppressive policies of the government or by pursuing their own political adventures through numerous *coups d'état*. In all cases, Iraqi civil–military relations have mimicked the country's political relations in taking the shape of a perpetual sectarian and ethnic conflict.

The best chance to reverse this eight-decade trend was missed in 2003, mainly because of the imprudent policies of the CPA, as explained in this chapter, and the subsequent mistakes of the successive Iraqi governments. While Iraqis generally support the Armed Forces, two aspects often undermine this support and reflect negatively on the country's civil–military relations: first, there are many complaints about the conduct of the Armed Forces as they exercise their daily tasks of policing the cities, especially in the regions of lingering lack of security; and second, Iraqis are still having justified doubts about the readiness and efficiency of the Armed Forces in case of an external threat. Until these two issues are solved to the satisfaction of the average Iraqi citizens, the country's civil–military relations will remain weak.

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# Civil–military relations in democratic and democratizing states

Issues and institutions

# SECTION A

# Control

Four case studies

# 12

# ASSERTING CIVILIAN CONTROL
## Argentina

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### Introduction

This chapter focuses mainly on Argentina's civil–military relations after the transition to democracy in 1983. Argentina is an important case study in civil–military relations for several reasons. First, the military dictatorship in Argentina, especially during the period between 1976 and 1983, was arguably the most repressive and brutal of several military dictatorships in the region, with 5,000 deaths at the hands of the regime as well as 30,000 disappeared. The military regime not only terrorized Argentine society, but it ultimately proved itself totally incompetent not only in economic policy but also in military strategy in entering into a war with Great Britain in 1982 over the Malvinas/Falklands, which they lost. For these reasons, as in the case of Spain and Chile, for decades the military carried the stigma of the non-democratic regime's abuses. In Argentina today, mainly for political reasons, the stigma continues to be rekindled by the civilian political elite. Under these historical circumstances, much of the political energy and efforts of the democratic transition period between 1983 and 1990 were to deal with the military, mainly in preventing the success of several attempted military coups. Second, serious efforts to build robust defense institutions under democratic control dragged on for a very long time, and they were heavily dependent on political party dynamics. Again, for mainly political reasons, serious reform of civil–military relations only began in 2003 when Nestor Kirchner became president, and he never made significant accomplishments in anything beyond asserting civilian control of the armed forces. Third, once it began, and similar to other countries that have undertaken reform, an elaborate legal basis was established, the civilian-led Ministry of Defense was strengthened, and gradually the civilians assumed control over central areas of national security and defense policy. Fourth, however, the institutions that are supposed to control the military remain weak and civilian expertise is limited—mostly because civilians in the MOD are not hired on a permanent basis, and they are therefore unable to acquire and consolidate defense and security knowledge. And, fifth, while democratic civilian control over the armed forces has been implemented and, to a certain extent, consolidated, military effectiveness is an extremely low priority. Indeed, by legally limiting the armed forces exclusively to external defense—and only against state actors— the potential roles and missions of the armed forces are *a priori* severely circumscribed. Only in the areas of peace support operations (PSO) and possibly military support to civilian authorities in natural disasters can the military be used to take action.

## Background to the non–democratic regime

Argentina has a long and violent history of military involvement in politics with coups dating from 1930; subsequent military coups resulted in military governments in 1943, 1955, 1966, and finally in 1976, with the military regime ending in late 1983 after the ignominious defeat in the Malvinas War of 1982.[1] The paradox of Argentina, highly developed in economic and social terms, but with extremely repressive military governments, became the focus for at least a generation of Argentine and foreign observers—resulting in huge amounts of academic literature. This literature tended to inform the analysis of other non-democratic countries in the region, since the diaspora of Argentine social scientists throughout the region, to North America, and to Western Europe was, and continues to be, a notable characteristic of the Argentine "brain drain." Probably most famous in the wide spectrum of would–be and comprehensive "explanations" is that of *bureaucratic-authoritarianism* elaborated and popularized by Argentine social scientist Guillermo O'Donnell.[2] The analysis and the literature extended also to the topic of civil–military relations, which, while based on the experience of Argentina, was generalized beyond that country to the region as a whole. In this vein we would cite the Argentine José Nun's "A Latin American Phenomenon: The Middle Class Military Coup," and Lisa North's monograph on *Civil-Military Relations in Argentina, Chile, and Peru*.[3] And, not surprisingly, in this highly modern and mobilized society, military repression led to violent opposition that was both a result of the repression and a justification for further repression. The spiral of violence, especially between the overthrow of Isabel Peron in March 1976 and the collapse of the military regime in 1982, was simply horrendous.[4]

More recently, the Argentine experience, and approach to analysis, continue to exert influence beyond Argentina itself. Very prestigious Argentine social scientists, such as Rut Diamint, publish books on the topic of civil–military relations that have a broad impact. North American scholars such as David Pion-Berlin publish on the Argentine experience and beyond. And, the very influential Red de Seguridad y Defensa de America Latina, based in the NGO SER in 2000 in Buenos Aires, has now published three editions—2005, 2007, and 2010—of the extremely useful *A Comparative Atlas of Defence in Latin America* (and, in the 2010 edition) *and the Caribbean* in Spanish, English, and (in 2007) French.[5]

The experience of Argentina, then, is important not only for itself, but also as a prism for understanding the analysis of other countries of Latin America. All aspects of civil–military relations in Argentina must be understood in the historical context of the armed forces being the government, extremely violent suppression of all resistance and grass roots organizing in the period of 1976–82, and the collapse of the military regime after the defeat by the British military in the Malvinas war. The current use of the term "military autonomy" is potentially misleading in Argentina, when we recall that the military occupied and totally controlled the state.

## The transition to democracy

Political initiatives after the transition to democracy in 1983 of necessity must be seen in the perspective of countering a long history of military predominance in politics and the economy.[6] Nor surprisingly, there is a huge literature on the democratic transition and civil–military relations in Argentina, and it cannot be summarized here. At a minimum, we must highlight a few of the central points so that the current situation of civil–military relations can be understood, with implications for understanding the experience of other countries. First, the legacy of the military regimes, and especially the regime between 1976 and 1983, was both an economic and diplomatic disaster. The former element was a key reason for the invasion of the Malvinas/Falklands

that firmly sealed the latter element. Not even the United States, under the presidency of Ronald Reagan, would stand by Argentina, which found itself isolated. Second, political party politics emerged as dynamic and divisive following the military regimes. Between the transition in 1982–83 and today, essentially all of state and society became politicized. Third, despite analyses that seek to explain different political transitions on the basis of the strength or weakness of the military at the beginning of the transition, the Argentine armed forces demonstrated more negotiating power than one would have expected.[7] This is due to two main factors. On one hand was the political dynamics of the era, characterized by a very high level of military involvement historically in Argentina, meaning military politics as well. Between late 1983 and 1990, there were four military uprisings (1987, January of 1988, December of 1988, and December of 1990), by the "carapintadas," which, while not classic military coups seeking to take power, kept the entire political–military scene in a state of turbulence. This factor was recognized by President Carlos Menem, 1989–99, who worked out an agreement with the armed forces resulting in a general amnesty, which remains a politically polemic issue. On the other hand, it must be remembered, as the armed forces emphasized again and again: the military was founded in 1860; it is a classical bureaucratic organization with extensive links to society, sources of income, property, etc.; and the Ministry of Defense was, and remains, a small ministry with possibly a maximum of 700 personnel.[8]

## After the transition: asserting civilian control while avoiding effectiveness

The long and tortuous road to the tentative establishment of democratic civil–military relations is marked at the formal-legal level by three fundamental laws, all of which seek in some way to counter the dominant legacy of military predominance. They are associated with three different presidential administrations, which are those of Raul Alfonsin (1983–89), Carlos Menem (1989–99), and Fernado De la Rua (1999–2001). The laws are those on Defense (1988), Domestic Security (1992), and National Intelligence (2001). Still, in reviewing more closely the 20-year period between the transition to democracy in 1983, and the presidency of Nestor Kirchner in 2003, what stands out is the lack of change in civil–military relations for most of the period. Most analysts view the decade between 1990 and 2003 as one of lost opportunities. The Defense Law of 1988 was not implemented in that the efforts to strengthen the Joint General Staff (*Estado Mayor Conjunto*), under a civilian-led MOD, was never implemented; the MOD was neither strengthened nor was power taken away from the chiefs of the three individual military services. The three military commanders made what defense policy there was.[9] Argentine observers attribute the lack of progress to a lack of political will to take on the armed forces, which was not surprisingly overwhelmingly resistant to the structural change. But, what did emerge from these three laws was a widening sense that the armed forces should not be allowed to engage in domestic activities. That is, the military could never again be allowed to enter a person's house in Argentina. It was only with the coming into office of Nestor Kirchner in May of 2003, following the economic meltdown of late 2001 and with the 22 percent of the vote he received in a field of 19 candidates, that he saw and grasped the political opportunity to forcefully implement these laws, and thereby initiate real civilian control over the armed forces. That is, the evolving political—mainly but not only, political party—context is critical in understanding the subsequent initiatives in civil–military relations and defense institution-building.

### President Kirchner's attempts to strengthen democratic civilian control

From the very beginning of his polemic mandate, Nestor Kirchner took on the armed forces— and particularly the army. He immediately forced into retirement a dozen generals and put into

key positions officers loyal to him; he had President (1976–81) and General Jorge Rafael Videla's photo removed from military institutions, and he forced into retirement junior officers who disagreed with his policies.

Although the Law on National Defense had been passed in 1988, it was never implemented. President Kirchner saw to its implementation in June of 2006 in Law 727/2006. This law established the powers of the joint staff, strengthened the civilian-led Ministry of Defense in that it enabled the Minister of Defense to define defense policies, make appointments, promote military personnel, and open the doors to civilians, and took power away from the chiefs of the services.[10]

## New defense policies, and new roles and missions for the military

In the strengthened MOD itself there have been major increases in their responsibilities in several critical areas of the organization. These tend to follow closely those suggested by one of the authors (Bruneau) in his work on roles and functions of ministries of defense.[11] The civilian-led MOD has taken more initiatives, including the following: defining military roles and strategies, with a new White Book that they have been working on during 2011; control over budgets (as elaborated in Law 1729/2007) and implementation of a logistics control system; management of personnel including taking control over military promotions; military justices; limiting military intelligence exclusively to external roles; and several processes limiting the role of the armed forces. For example, the air force has lost control over the military police, meteorology, and air traffic control. In view of these laws, the increased demands on the MOD, and its initiatives, the question arises as to the ability of the MOD to fulfill these tremendously expanded competencies. What we found in our interviews in Argentina over several years, however, is that there is no stability for civilians in positions of authority. There is instead a veritable revolving door with all but a very few civilians having any stability—let alone able to develop their expertise and exercise their authority.[12]

## Institutional and personnel challenges in the MOD: an unfinished business

Despite President Nestor Kirschner's efforts to strengthen the MOD and consolidate democratic civilian control of the armed forces, institutional and personnel changes have been surprisingly ineffective. Through interviews with those currently working in the MOD, periodic participant observation, and interviews with officials who have since departed, it became obvious to the authors that the MOD is not equipped to adequately fulfill all of the responsibilities it has taken on, first, under President Nestor and, then, President Cristina Kirchner. The problems that restrict its capability are threefold. First, the Argentine state, in relationship to political parties, unions, and civil society in general, is weak. The state lacks the autonomy and means to implement many policies. Second, the MOD, with some 700 employees, is the smallest of the ministries in Argentina. And it is in charge of dealing with some 75,000 personnel in the armed forces. Third, despite efforts by past and present civilian leaders in the MOD, there is no specialization whereby civilians can develop their expertise in issues of national security and defense and make a career out of it.[13] This is a totally different situation from that in aspiring-NATO and NATO member countries, where civilians have a stable and attractive career, with promotions based on merit, knowledge, and education, and which enable them to develop and consolidate defense and security expertise (e.g., Romania, Hungary, Slovenia, and France, among the countries studied in this Handbook).

In short, while it became politically useful for the two Kirchner presidents to focus on the armed forces, and to have passed a robust set of laws to strengthen the civilian-led MOD, this does not mean that the MOD can in fact implement all of the responsibilities accruing to it. Some interviewees argue that Nilda Garre, Minister of Defense between 2005 and 2011, cast the net too wide and the institutions and the personnel working there should have focused on fewer issues.

## Military effectiveness: challenges, obstacles, and malfunctions

While one might debate the accuracy of our point above regarding capabilities of the MOD, there can be no argument at all regarding the low level of effectiveness of the armed forces. In law, specifically Law 727/2006, the armed forces' mission is limited to external defense and specifically against state actors. Specifically, Article 23 states:

> In virtue of what is established in article 1 of this regulation [which defines their role in responding to external aggression by other states], the primary and fundamental mission of the Military Instrument consists in securing national defense in the face of situations of external aggression perpetrated by armed forces of another state or states.

The distinction is made between defense, which is the responsibility of the armed forces, and security, which is the responsibility of the Secretariat for Domestic Security under the Ministry of Interior. Consequently, the armed forces cannot deal with the so-called new threats including terrorism, counter-drugs, and organized crime, which many of the militaries in other developing democracies, including Argentina's neighboring countries such as Brazil, have undertaken lately—especially after 9/11. It is also relevant that Minister Garre took over as head of the newly-created Ministry of Security in early 2011. Its likely role is much greater than the Ministry of Defense, and admittedly, so is its budget. What the armed forces can do is external peace-keeping missions, and this is a positive area in the overall fairly bleak panorama of the Argentine armed forces. Argentina's armed forces have contributed to various naval operations in the Gulf War, in the Gulf of Fonseca off El Salvador and Haiti. Its armed forces also contributed to the humanitarian support operations in Mozambique, the Gulf War, Kosovo, and supported operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Cyprus.[14]

It is not surprising that the budget for the armed forces is very limited, and becoming more so. In 2009, it was 2.5 percent of the national budget and in 2010 was planned to be 2.6 percent of this same budget. The data we have available on defense as a percentage of GDP shows a continuing decrease from 1.66 percent in 1993 to 0.92 percent in 2006.[15] The reports the authors received about equipment, operations, and maintenance are consistent with these very small sums spent on resources.

Professional military education and international cooperation, which have boosted the effectiveness of the armed forces in other countries that lacked adequate plans, institutions, and resources, do not seem to help Argentina much either. While joint structures have been created, the recently created *Escuela Superior de Guerra Conjunto* (Higher Joint War College) is still in the process of implementation. Peace operations-related education and training, on the other hand, have been effectively developed under the 1995-funded Argentine Peace Support Training Center (CAECOPAZ), similar to the Joint Center for Peace Operations (CECOPAC) in Chile. CAECOPAZ provides education and training on issues related to civil–military relations, civil–military cooperation, logistics, etc.[16] An interesting fact is that CAECOPAZ, besides providing education at home, is also supporting its counterparts abroad with subject matter expertise, for

example, it has supported the Peace Support Training Center in Canada by sending instructors who have expertise as UN Military Observers.[17]

## Lessons (not to be) learned

This chapter has looked at Argentina's civil–military relations after the transition to democracy in the early 1980s. Obviously, one has to keep foremost in mind the horrible situation of military repression and human rights abuses for much of the post–World War II period. Then, there are three main lessons (maybe not to be) learned from the Argentine case. First, reforming civil–military relations became possible only when it was of interest politically, due to the dynamics of the larger political party scene, to take action. Until then, as was the case in other countries, politicians were unwilling to "take on" the armed forces—even as the armed forces lacked credibility and prestige (due to the "dirty war," the economic morass, and the Malvinas fiasco). Second, even though the Ministry of Defense has accumulated extensive legal bases and policy initiatives, it is as an institution and, in terms of personnel, is unable to exercise many of these powers. Third, artificially, due to the distinction between defense and security, with the armed forces limited to the former, the issue of effectiveness is intentionally restricted. And, the miniscule budget, of at most 2.6 percent of the national budget in 2010, is consistent with these limited roles. In short, Argentina is an example of sporadically strong civilian control over a purposely weak military.

## Notes

1 On the military regimes and political parties, see Marcelo Cavarozzi, "Political Cycles in Argentina since 1955," in Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds., *Transitions from Authoritarian: Latin America* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), pp. 19–48.

2 See Guillermo O'Donnell, *El Estado Burocratico Autoritario, 1966–1973: Triunfos, Derrotas, Crisis* (Buenos Aires: Emece, 1981). For a critical discussion, see David Collier, "Industrial Modernization and Political Change: A Latin American Perspective," *World Politics* 30(4) (1978): 593–614; and, David Collier, ed., *The New Authoritarianism in Latin America* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980).

3 Jose Nun's "A Latin American Phenomenon: The Middle Class Military Coup," in *Trends in Social Science Research: Conference Report, Institute of International Relations*, University of California at Berkeley, March 1965, pp. 55–100; Lisa North, *Civil-Military Relations in Argentina, Chile, and Peru* (Berkeley, CA: Institute of International Studies, 1966).

4 For an excellent analysis of the spiral of violence, see Maria Jose Moyano, *Argentina's Lost Patrol: Armed Struggle 1969–1979* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995).

5 See Rut Diamant, ed., *Control Civil y Fuerzas Armadas en las nuevas democracias lationamericanas* (Buenos Aires: Nuevohacer, 1999); David Pion-Berlin, *Through Corridors of Power: Institutions and Civil-Military Relations in Argentina* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997); and *A Comparative Atlas of Defense in Latin America and the Caribbean* (Buenos Aires: Red Seguridad y Defensa de America Latina (RESDAL), 2010).

6 For the transition, and a sober assessment on the likelihood of democratic consolidation, see Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), pp. 190–204.

7 For an excellent analysis of this type of assessment, see Felipe Agüero, "Democratic Consolidation and the Military in Southern Europe and South America," in Richard Gunther, P. Nikiforos Diamandouros, and Hans-Jürgen Puhle, eds. *The Politics of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), pp. 124–65.

8 These points were emphasized to me by German Montenegro, who had been Vice Minister of Defense between 2006 and 2010, in a meeting in April 2010.

9 We think the title of the chapter on the definitive book on the topic is telling. See David Pion-Berlin, Chapter 6, "Forgoing Change: The Failure of Defense Reform Under Democratic Rule," in his book, *Through Corridors of Power*, pp. 141–78.

10 Law 727/2006 was followed by *directivas* which further circumscribe the roles and missions of the armed forces: 1691/2006; 1714/2009.

11 On the experience of Argentina in reforming the Ministry of Defense, see Elsa Llenderrozas and Andrea Chiappini, "Methodologia para el Analísis de los Ministerios de Defensa: El caso Argentina," RESDAL, Buenos Aires, November 2008. See also the chapter by Thomas Bruneau and Richard Goetze, "Ministries of Defense and Democratic Control," in Thomas C. Bruneau and Scott D. Tollefson, eds., *Who Guards the Guardians and How: Democratic Civil-Military Relations* (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2006), pp. 71–100.

12 This point is highlighted in the very thorough study comparing the Chilean to the Argentine Ministry of Defense. See Michael Radseck, "From *Casa Militar* to an Instrument of Political Control: A Functional Analysis of the Defense Ministries in Argentina and Chile," *Defense & Security Analysis* 21(2) (2005): 179–98.

13 As Radseck states: "As everywhere in Latin America, Argentina lacks a career path for civil servants in the Defense Ministry such as would be important for establishing continuity of civilian expertise." Ibid., p. 190.

14 For more information, see Trackpads: Thread: Caecopaz (Argentine Peace Support Training Center), 2006, available at: www.trackpads.com/forum/grapevine/605050-caecopaz-argentine-peace-support-training-center.html (accessed August 6, 2012).

15 Compendio Fiscal 1993–2006, Ministerio de Economico y Producción, Secretaria de Hacienda.

16 See Trackpads.

17 Ibid.

# 13

# CIVILIAN INFLUENCE IN DEFENSE

## Slovenia

*Florina Cristiana Matei*

## Introduction

This chapter discusses Slovenia's efforts to develop democratic civil–military relations (CMR), in particular, democratic civilian control of the armed forces, after the transition to democracy in 1989 and the proclamation of independence in 1991. Slovenia is a particularly relevant case study of civil–military relations. It is a newly-established democracy (as are many others in Central and Eastern Europe), which also gained its independence from the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1991. Slovenia's democratic consolidation has essentially involved readjusting more or less existing state institutions. The armed forces were inherited from the previous non-democratic regime and carried the stigma of their non-democratic past, mainly associated with clashes between former Yugoslav military and Slovenian civil society in the early 1980s.[1] And oddly, 20 years after the fall of the Iron Curtain, the Slovenian military, one of the new effective contributors to NATO, does not enjoy much popular support (although NATO/EU integration were considerably supported by the citizenry), in particular with regard to operating an expeditionary force. Under these circumstances, building democratic CMR in Slovenia has been a rather onerous process; at a minimum, it meant wiping out the shame of the communist past and installing a state of integrity within the Slovenian Armed Forces (SAF). At the maximum, it involved de-politicization, respect for human rights and civil liberties by the security system, democratic civilian control of the military, accountability, transparency of budget, and both effectiveness and efficiency in fulfilling security-related roles and missions.

Slovenia has thus been undergoing a major review and reform of the central institutions involved in national security and defense, and in professional military education (which is a unique case), it has been seeking to achieve all three dimensions of our expanded framework of democratic civil–military relations.[2] Security and defense reforms sought a smaller and more flexible security and defense system in order to better respond to the new security changes after the end of the Cold War, 9/11, and NATO/EU integration. This included a transition from national to collective defense; a transition to defense against multiple and asymmetrical threats; and the transformation of the military from conscripts to a professional armed forces based on voluntary entrance and reserves, a process that is still ongoing.[3] As was the case for many

Central and Eastern European countries, NATO and EU were the major drivers of these reforms. The Slovenian case embodies the democratic civilian control component of the civil–military relations framework, and to a lesser extent effectiveness.

## Background to the communist regime and transition to democracy

Since the end of World War II in 1945 to its proclamation of independence in 1991, Slovenia had been one of the six republics of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY): Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia. Between 1945 and 1980, Slovenia was a single party Communist regime[4] under the rule of Josip Broz Tito, and, after Tito's death in 1980, under a collective presidency of the Communist Party leaders from each SFRY republic. During the Tito regime, the president of SFRY was the leader of the ruling Communist Party as well as the Commander-in-Chief of the overall Yugoslav armed forces.[5] Slovenia's armed forces were part of the overall Yugoslav military, established on the basis of a total national defense doctrine, which consisted of a federal component—the Yugoslav National Army (YPA),[6] as well as various militia units, functioning within the six Yugoslav republics—the Territorial Defense (TD) organizations.[7] Under Tito, civil–military relations in SFRY basically involved the President's personal control of the armed forces, yet allowing a certain degree of autonomy of the military. Roles and missions of the armed forces included, among others, controlling the borders and air space, conducting surveillance on key civilian institutions, communications, media, and opponents of the regime.[8] With Tito's death in 1980, civilian authority over the military decreased, while armed forces gained more power and autonomy.[9]

Under Tito's rule, SFRY was a nation-state; he held the country together despite opposing views due to the different nations, languages, religions, and different cultures.[10] Nevertheless, Tito's death in 1980 along with Central and Eastern Europe's transition to democracy in 1989 elicited various changes within the geopolitics of SFRY—from the proclamation of independence in Slovenia and Croatia in the early 1990s, to the conflicts in Bosnia—Herzegovina, and Kosovo, in the mid- and late 1990s respectively. In 1991, when Slovenia declared independence, the YPA was ordered by the Yugoslav government to occupy the Slovenian borders in order to isolate Slovenia from the rest of the world, as well as to disarm the Territorial Defense of the Republic of Slovenia (RS TD), and therefore prevent the secession of Slovenia from the Yugoslav Federation.[11] Despite clashes that lasted for ten days between Slovenia's Territorial Defense Force, police forces, and unarmed civilians, on the one hand, and the Yugoslav National Army on the other, the Slovenian forces ultimately won, and a peace declaration ensued, with the last JNA soldier leaving Slovenia in October of 1991.[12]

## Democratization of Slovenia's defense system

As previously mentioned, in 1991, Slovenia gained its independence from the former Yugoslavia after an initial referendum supported by high political will and the victory of the Territorial Defense of the Republic of Slovenia over the Yugoslav People's Army. The armed forces' reform has been threefold: (1) establishment and development (1991–94) of the national defense forces (including a new legal basis for defense, security, and democratic civil–military relations); (2) consolidation and transformation of the national defense forces (1994–2002) to better fulfill the EU/NATO membership requirements (transformation, professionalization, and interoperability); and (3) ongoing transformation, modernization, and adaptability to better

fight the new security challenges and keep up with NATO/EU membership roles and missions (2004–present).

## Civil–military relations: incremental progress

Slovenia's legal framework for defense, an outcome of intense debates among political parties, civil society, the public, the media, and members of the academia, encompasses: the 1991 Constitution, the 1991 Defense and Protection Act, the 1994 Defense Act (amended several times), the Act on Military Duty, the 1993 Resolution on the Principles of National Security of the Republic of Slovenia, the 1994 Law on Fundamental Development Programs (FDP), the 2001 National Security Strategy (NSS), and others. These documents provide for a new defense system (based initially on conscription but changed in 2004 to voluntary enrollment); new roles and missions for the military in accordance with the new types of security threats and challenges; differentiation between civil and military sectors; professionalization of the armed forces; prevention of politicization; civil defense; interagency coordination and cooperation; leadership of the armed forces and other security institutions; and executive and legislative control of the military and the rest of the security forces. 1994 was an important year for the SAF, in that Slovenia joined NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP), which sped up the military reform and professionalization in pursuit of NATO integration.

Two additional documents directly involving military and defense reform were enacted in 1995 and 1998: the Doctrine of Military Defense and the Military Defense Strategy, respectively. Relevant to the defense and military reform was also the adoption in 1998 by the Slovenian parliament of the government's decision to apply for full NATO membership.[13] Another important turning point in the military reform in Slovenia was the Membership Action Plan (MAP) adopted by NATO in 1999, which led to increased defense expenditures, better personnel policies, improved defense procurement and acquisitions, and modern, NATO-interoperable armed forces. A direct result was the three-year program on military transformation toward meeting NATO standards, approved in 2001, which aimed at the development of expeditionary forces.[14] In line with the legal framework and NATO requirements, Slovenia ended conscription in 2004 and compulsory reserve service in 2010.[15] In 2003, Slovenia adopted the "Professional Army, Supplemented with Contractual Reserves" (PROVOJ) defense reform plan, for transition to a professional army. In 2007, the Law on the Military Service in the Slovenian Armed Forces, was passed to help strengthen military professionalism. It resulted in higher salaries for the soldiers, some modestly[16] better prospects and avenues that helped prepare retiring military officers for civilian employment, and regulations regarding the pensions of the military personnel.[17]

All these endeavors paved the way for the Slovenian national security system to move away from the traditional total territorial defense and change into a professional army, which is grounded on cooperation with its foreign counterparts and is involved in peace support operations—even if for some years after the end of the Cold War, SAF were still under UN Arms embargo. Currently, the SAF comprises reaction forces, main defense forces, and supplementary forces.[18] Officers are selected/recruited from the young graduates from civilian universities (to become an officer one needs a Bachelor of Art or Science degree), while Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) are selected from the soldiers who are high school graduates (to become an NCO, one needs a High School Diploma). SAF may also recruit students immediately after their enrollment and acceptance in civilian universities by having them sign a mutually beneficial contract, whereby the student engages to enroll in the SAF after graduation in return for full university scholarship paid by MOD/SAF.

*Democratic civilian control: the fundamental principle of the overall defense reform*

Institutional control mechanisms, oversight, and professional norms

Institutionalizing democratic civilian control (executive, legislative, and external) of the Slovenian Armed Forces was the underlying principle of the overall defense reform. Executive control involves direction, guidance, and interagency coordination/cooperation by the Government, the President (who is the Commander-in-Chief of the military forces but without executive powers), the Prime Minister (who presides over the National Security Council and the Strategic Council), and the civilian Minister of Defense. A unique fact about SAF is that the MOD is mainly staffed by civilians, while the relatively reduced number of military officers are heavily controlled by the MOD civilians (as a countermeasure to the military support for the political regime in the former Yugoslavia).[19] Legislative control and oversight, which is exercised by Slovenia's Parliament, involve establishing legislation, roles and missions, budgets, hearings, and supervision etc. over the SAF. (The Parliament includes the Defense Committee, the Committee on Budget and Finance, the Committee for Control of the Intelligence Services, and the Committee for Control of the Realization of the National Security Resolution.)[20] Basically, in Slovenia, defense and military decision-making and policy-making are heavily established by civilians, while the military has a rather consultative role. According to sources from the MOD, legislators are not preoccupied with the effectiveness of the SAF, and the SAF officers know they need to get military effectiveness onto the legislators' agenda. The Slovenian media has exercised an informal control over the armed forces by pointing out every mistake and problem with military reform, as well as forcing the hand of the legislative committees to deal with these problems.[21]

With regard to professional norms, the previously mentioned 2003 PROVOJ defense reform plan, together with the 2007 Law on the Military Service in the Slovenian Armed Forces, SAF's continuous contribution to UN, NATO missions, as well as PME/CDE (which will be addressed later in this chapter) have paved the way toward more professional armed forces.[22]

## Effectiveness: a work in progress supported by NATO membership

*Plans, institutions, resources*

As in the case of Hungary, boosting effectiveness of the Slovenian armed forces has been a rather slow and challenging process. According to *Jane's Sentinel Country Risk Assessments* experts, despite Slovenia's 10 years of military reform, SAF largely remain more a "spatially-orientated, territorial defence organisation than a modern and mobile military force."[23] Primarily, Slovenia's military effectiveness has been negatively affected by limited resources. Nevertheless, in pursuit of NATO membership, the Slovenian Armed Forces is progressively becoming a small and flexible force. The Strategic Defense Reviews (SDR) issued in 2004,[24] which represent road maps for more rigorous reforms of the armed forces until 2015, are playing an important role in strengthening military effectiveness.[25] Based on the SDR, Slovenia's main defense forces will include two army brigades, air and air defense units, as well as support units.[26] In line with the SDR, by 2015, the SAF will have finalized various modernization programs and processes, including: the setting up of a battalion combat group with a high level of readiness for permanent rotation in international operations, by 2012; and the establishment of two "combined tactical defense units," by 2015, which will serve in the formation of future defense units.[27]

Efforts to achieve interoperability and compatibility with NATO have been complemented by defense and security cooperation and coordination at the international level. These, too, have played a key role in increasing Slovenian armed forces' effectiveness. Since 1997, SAF has participated in various Peace Operations under the umbrella of the United Nations, NATO/ EU, and with other partners and allies (e.g., Albania, Cyprus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Lebanon, Syria, Afghanistan).[28] In terms of regional security and cooperation, the SAF has also been effective. Slovenia has contributed to the above-mentioned operations with a Battalion for International Cooperation in 1994—renamed the "10 Motorized Battalion" in 2000 and fully NATO interoperable in 2004.[29] An example of SAF effectiveness (also recognized by NATO) is the SAF contribution, since 2010, with its own Operational Mentor and Liaison Team (OMLT) to the ISAF Force in Afghanistan; in OMLT, Slovenia (along with other 26 countries) provides training and mentorship to the Afghan Army, according to the Slovenian Armed Forces Ministry of Defense. By the end of 2009, the SAF had completed the five-year integration program into the NATO Force Structure. Certified units that are affiliated to NATO's Corps are examples of successful fulfillment of capability and interoperability objectives. Effectiveness of the Slovenian military, therefore, remains a work in progress.

## Professional military education: paving the way to better civilian control and oversight of the military and increased effectiveness

Defense education for military officers is important to Slovenia's Armed Forces in order to improve not only democratic control, which was the main purpose of the CMR in Slovenia after the end of the Cold War, but also effectiveness of the military; it is a fundamental requirement for the qualitative performance of the military activities, for management, and especially for successful engagement in missions and operations, as well as for professional promotion. PME is also important for joint/coalition operations and missions. PME is regulated by various documents including: the Defense Act, the SAF Military Service Act, the Directive on Separation of Authority between the General Staff of the SAF, the Force Command and the Doctrine, Development, Education and Training Command (DDETC), and the Slovenian Armed Forces job law. Nevertheless, as of today, Slovenia lacks an integrative document that regulates professional military education (PME): the decision-makers are working now on a Military Education and Training Doctrine to be finished by 2011.

Slovenia is an interesting PME case study. Unlike other countries (including former Yugoslavia components), which inherited a military education system from the previous regime, Slovenia had only a small educational component: a military high school that was closed immediately after the regime change and independence declaration. Therefore, it basically started from ground zero with PME. Since Slovenia lacks a military academy, SAF education depends very much on the civilian system of education. After recruitment from the university and/or high school, the officer/NCO candidates enroll in the SAF where they attend 12-month preparatory courses (covering theories of war, conflict, military, and combat as well as practicing tactics, etc.) in the Officer Candidate School at the Training and Doctrine Center, which is the first step in professional military education. Upon graduation, the candidate officers become lieutenants, while the candidate NCOs become sergeants. The civilian universities initially lacked generic education on security and military issues, which therefore required the MOD to wait four or five years (including the 12-month training period) until it could effectively use the new recruits, and was not too advantageous for a new democracy and a new military seeking to professionalize. The civilian universities established modules on security/military issues, such as: introduction in military affairs, theory of tactics, defense and security system, theory of civil

defense, modern armored systems, military history, modern terrorism and systemic counter-measures, military practices, military logistics, intelligence, security systems, international security cooperation, intelligence security services, and parliamentary supervision. These modules teach military subjects not only for anyone interested in either pursuing the military career or already signed up to serve in the SAF, but also for civilians with no strings attached (they are not obligated to become officers). Civilians can enrich their spectrum of expertise with defense/security matters for their own pleasure and also become involved later in the military/security sphere through NGOs or Civilian SMEs in MOD. Military education also includes ethics, morality, and the code of conduct for the military. These efforts are useful for strengthening CMR, in that they may get outsiders to learn about the military and defense.

Officers' career path and promotion are determined by the PME, along with performance (promotion of civilians does not depend on these forms of education). Further into their career, officers attend staff courses (to be promoted to the rank of major), and, later, senior staff education (to be promoted to the rank of lieutenant colonel). With regard to the latter, this type of education is conducted at a military center (DDETC) as well as at a civilian institution. In addition to military training, participants earn their master's degrees at one of the civilian faculties (Faculty of Defense Studies, Faculty of Logistics, and Faculty of Management). The officers can also obtain a postgraduate degree from a military university abroad (for example, the National Defense University in the United States, the Army War College; the Royal College in the United Kingdom, and others), which will need further accreditation from the University of Ljubljana. Attending foreign military/defense education institutions has helped improved the PME in Slovenia, in that lessons learned and best practices from other military schools, along with experiences from military operations abroad, are shared with colleagues in Slovenia and help to improve PME curricula and make the Slovenian military more effective. However, sending more military officers abroad is still desired, especially for education and training on tactics, armor and NBC units, and military intelligence. The highest level of officer training in Slovenia is the General Staff military education and training, which can be attended by SAF officers with the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. There is no further education for officers with the rank of general, but there are plans to introduce training for the highest military leaders and senior civilians from the MOD and Ministry of Interior, some time in 2010.

Since Slovenia has a single branch armed forces (with the Army as the main component), there is no Joint Professional Military Education (JPME). Nevertheless, according to sources in the Slovenian General Staff, Slovenian military officers do educate and train together with their police and intelligence counterparts. In addition, Slovenian officers attend Staff Courses and General Staff Military Training and Education abroad. Foreign PME assistance includes International Military Education and Training (IMET) and Counter-Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP) programs for senior officers and civilian officials, for example, at NATO Defense College, the European Security and Defense College, the National Security Affairs (NSA) and Defense Analysis (DA) Departments, as well as the Center for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR) in the United States Naval Postgraduate School, and the like.[30] In addition, the participation of civilians in PME in Slovenia is limited (mainly to some lecturers from civilian faculties and sometimes to politicians), although there is legal basis for civilian participation in military education/training. As mentioned before, when the education for generals is implemented, senior civilian officials will also be included. On the other hand, although some politicians have attended PME programs and have become more aware of the bigger picture of security (to include both soft and hard responses), many refuse to attend because they have different priorities. From this standpoint, it is not very clear whether or not PME leads to better

understanding among defense officials and other civilian decision-makers of the importance of an effective military in a democracy; at the minimum, there may be better awareness. Nor is it clear if PME has a role or impact on Slovenia's national security and decision-making process; at the minimum, during recent years considerable thought has been given to relating PME to defense and security decision-making. On another note, and with regard to both effectiveness and efficiency, the economic crisis put pressure on military and defense education. Although the budget cuts have been minimal and have not brought about a significant change in the existing programs and/or quality of education, additional resources are always welcome.

Civilian faculty is incorporated in education at all levels—from the Officer Candidate School to the General Staff Military Education and Training. Lecturers from civilian faculties teach mostly at higher levels of staff courses, where they represent one-third of the teaching staff. Except for one retired officer (a former Chief of Staff of Slovenian Armed Forces) who is a lecturer in the Faculty of Logistics, there are no military lecturers in Slovenian faculties. At times, civilian universities do invite SAF officers to lecture on a particular military subject. However, there are military lecturers in the Slovenian military schools inside of MOD (yet, according to some SAF sources, they do not seem to fulfill the criteria as lecturers in the civilian education system). Lecturers from civilian institutions help raise the quality of education, and ultimately the effectiveness of the SAF; they also help broaden officers' general knowledge on security and social studies issues—not solely defense tradecraft.

The Minister of Defense is in charge of any changes with regard to PME in Slovenia: the Minister designs programs on military education, signs documents and directives on the PME development, and has to coordinate with the Ministry of Education (civilian). The SAF can also participate in the "change" process, but to date it is not very clear how much the participation can affect PME effectiveness.

## Conclusion: lessons learned and best practices

This chapter looked at Slovenia's attempts to reform its defense system and develop democratic civil–military relations after the fall of the communist regime in December 1989 and on gaining independence in 1991. It finds that democratization of the Slovenian military has been a taxing process, especially during the first years since the end of the communist regime, due to a host of problems and challenges. To begin with, the UN embargo in the early 1990s, hampered military reform, modernization, and effectiveness, as well as international cooperation and NATO integration. A second challenge comes from the legacy of the past (some infrastructure and personnel trained in the former Yugoslav military system); this has changed, however, since 1994, when Slovenia started to create a modern military with new infrastructure and staff and sought NATO membership. A third challenge arises from the lack of expertise on the part of civilians. Almost all of the civilian Ministers of Defense had limited knowledge of defense matters, and therefore their attempts to implement military reform were erratic or ineffective.[31] A corrective in this context was the approval of a new doctrine of civil defense that bans erratic and constantly changing policies and decisions related to defense.[32] In addition to the lack of expertise, the political arena has been corrupt and involved in blackmail, scandals, etc. A fourth challenge is due to the fact that decision-makers and the public do not understand that security nowadays means more than purely defense against an external enemy, and therefore they question the purpose of the military in the absence of an external threat. For example, they do not understand why the military has to manage the crisis (Slovenia is in NATO/EU but does not get the European security strategy that says EU will manage any crises), or, if they understand the role of SAF in the PSO in Bosnia-Herzegovina, a country Slovenia has ties with, they do not

understand why SAF needs to contribute to a similar mission in Afghanistan. The MOD, especially the current Minister, who is a former member of the faculty of the University of Ljubljana, has strived to educate the public on security issues, but it appears that his efforts are not enough. Another related issue is that politicians consider that their duties are only to classically supervise the military, and thus they do nothing to improve its effectiveness.

Yet, the lessons learned from the case of Slovenia are both relevant to other countries and unique at the same time. That is because even a small country like Slovenia, which had to revolutionize its military institutions, could become a valuable partner in PSOs while under democratic civilian control. Reforming defense and security has been possible due to political will, input from outsiders (e.g., academia and the media), and a desire to join European and Euro-Atlantic cooperative organizations. What distinguishes Slovenia from other countries is the constant preoccupation with strengthening democratic control of the military and with balancing military input with civilian contribution to national security, reflected in the functioning of the MOD as well as PME. As has been the case for many other developing democracies, defense reform and civil–military relations remain a work in progress. Even today, 20 years after independence, the SAF *raison d'être* is still questioned by politicians and citizens. Yet, the SAF is doing a great job in UN or NATO-led peace operations (e.g., in Kosovo/ Bosnia-Herzegovina missions, SAF are respected and considered to be very effective because of the ties they have with the people, including a shared culture and language), and continue to improve their effectiveness. From this perspective, and that of being a new NATO member, the MOD should do more in the public relations department and PME to educate the public on why a democracy needs to have an effective military—even when the traditional external adversary is absent. Nevertheless, in Anton Grizold's view, "Slovenia is on the right path toward construction of an effective national defense system capable of dealing with the risks and dangers of the twenty-first century."[33]

Slovenia may serve as a model of democratizing civil–military relations to other countries that transition to democracy from a one-party communist regime and also gain their independence from a multinational state, and which strive to maintain an effective military under strong civilian influence.

## Notes

1 Marjan Malesic and Ljubica Jelusic, "Towards Civilian Supremacy: Civil-Military Relations in Slovenia", in Philipp H. Fluri, Gustav E. Gustneau, and Plamen I. Pantev, eds., *The Evolution of Civil-Military Relations in South East Europe: Continuing Democratic Reforms, and Adapting to the Needs of Fighting Terrorism* (Heidelberg: Physica-Verlag, 2005), pp. 211–27.

2 Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei, "Towards a New Conceptualization of Democratization and Civil-Military Relations," *Democratization* 15(5) (2008): 909–29.

3 Anton Grizold, "Slovenia's Defense Policy in a Euro–Atlantic Reality," *Mediterranean Quarterly* 19(3) (2008): 115–22; Tomaz Kadnik, *Slovenian Armed Forces in the Service of Slovenia* (Ljubljana: Defensor d.o.o., 2007, 2nd supplemental edition).

4 It should be noted that unlike other communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe which involved high centralization and zero liberalization (e.g., Romania), the communist regime in Slovenia allowed some liberalization, as well as a semi-market (although still a socialist) economy. See Anton Bebler, "Slovenia's Smooth Transition," *Journal of Democracy* 13(1) (2002): 127–40.

5 Anton Bebler, "Democratic Control of Armed Forces in Slovenia," in Andrew Cotty, Timothy Edmunds, and Anthony Forster, eds., *Democratic Control of the Military in Postcommunist Europe: Guarding the Guards* (New York: Palgrave, 2002), pp. 159–74.

6 Also known as the Yugoslav People's Army.

7 Bebler, "Democratic Control of Armed Forces in Slovenia"; Irena Cufar, "International Military Education and Training Program: The Slovenia Experience," *The DISAM Journal* Fall (2001): 5–15;

Ljubica Jelusic, "Security Sector Reforms in Slovenia: Waging Success and Failure before the End of Transition," Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) Working Paper No. 99, Geneva, October 2002, pp. 1–18.

8  Bebler, "Democratic Control of Armed Forces in Slovenia."

9  Ibid.

10  Martin Bell, "The Legacy of Yugoslavia's Marshal Tito," *BBC News*, April 26, 2010, available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8636034.stm (accessed August 6, 2012).

11  Bebler, "Democratic Control of Armed Forces in Slovenia"; Cufar, "International Military Education;" Jelusic, "Security Sector Reforms in Slovenia."

12  Ibid.

13  Grizold, "Slovenia's Defense Policy," pp. 115–22.

14  Ibid.

15  Charles M. Perry and Dimitris Keridis, eds., *Defense Reform, Modernization and Military Cooperation in Southeastern Europe* (Dulles: Brassey's Inc., 2004), pp. 1–39.

16  According to sources from the Slovenian MOD, this is still a work in progress.

17  *Jane's Sentinel Country Risk Assessments*, "Armed Forces (Slovenia)," November 12, 2010; available at: www.janes.com/articles/Janes-Sentinel-Security-Assessment-The-Balkans/Armed-forces-Slovenia.html (accessed August 6, 2012).

18  Perry and Keridis, *Defense Reform, Modernization and Military Cooperation*.

19  Jelusic, "Security Sector Reforms in Slovenia."

20  Ibid.

21  Ibid.

22  This information comes from *Jane's Sentinel Country Risk Assessments* (2010); discussions of the author with civilians and military officers from the SAF in 2010 and 2011.

23  *Jane's Sentinel Country Risk Assessments*.

24  Another SDR was issued in 2009 (Discussion with Civilians from the Defense Policy Department of the Slovenian Ministry of Defense, 2011); However, *Jane's Sentinel Country Risk Assessments* (2010) strictly refers to the 2004 SDR.

25  Ibid.

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27  Ibid.

28  Ryan C. Hendrickson and Michael Rudy, "Transforming Slovenia's Military: Moving Toward NATO Membership," *Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 16(4): 46–57.

29  Jelusic, "Security Sector Reforms in Slovenia."

30  Cufar, "International Military Education."

31  Jelusic, "Security Sector Reforms in Slovenia"; Perry and Keridis, *Defense Reform, Modernization and Military Cooperation*.

32  Jelusic, "Security Sector Reforms in Slovenia."

33  Grizold, "Slovenia's Defense Policy," p. 122.

# 14

# SHIFTING LINES OF GOVERNANCE IN INSURGENCIES

## India

*Anshu N. Chatterjee*

## Introduction

The Indian military is an active military force. In addition to fighting five wars since 1947 and ongoing skirmishes at its borders, it participates in UN-initiated peacekeeping operations, diplomacy-related military exercises, and disaster relief, and significantly aids the civilian authorities in controlling insurgencies. The Indian military's manifest presence in Kashmir and the north-east is well recognized, along with its presence in Punjab in the 1980s, and its current increasing presence in the Maoist-affected areas of Central and Eastern India.[1] While most of its activities come under the expected norms for a military in a democratic setting, its role in insurgencies is the most controversial, and surprisingly, the most understudied one, given that civil–military interactions in democracies are frequently shaped by the notion that militaries are not suited for internal operations. What form of institutional arrangement allows the central civil authorities to assert control over the military and, at the same time, legitimize its long-term participation in home affairs?

Scholarly interest in India's civil–military relations assumes civilian control over the military; a significant body of literature focuses on the institutional relationship that developed in the country's post-independence phase, which enabled the exercise of civilian authority over the military.[2] By focusing on the British institutional legacy and the Jawaharlal Nehru administration's development of a civil defense ministry, such literature explained why the military authorities did not seek to control the Indian polity, as their counterparts with the same institutional legacy did in Pakistan. In explaining the military's participation in internal "disturbed areas," such works also assumed that the military generally played a constabulary function in aid to civilian authorities, since the control instruments were well instituted. Civilian control, as dynamic as it can be, might not concern some observers due to the continued apparent civilian hold over control mechanisms at the national level. For instance, the 2011 defense budget suggests that the civilian authority still exercises independent decision-making despite pressure from the military elite.[3]

Yet, the nature of India's civil–military relations is unique in the so-called "disturbed areas" where insurgencies persist, and its effect on governance remains a relatively unexamined aspect of this institutional relationship. I illustrate here that in special cases involving these disturbed areas, the Indian military participates in some of the governing functions normally meant for civil authorities. It plays a brokering role with various political groups, aids in the distribution of public goods, and is involved in the implementation of negotiated projects that are usually the domain of political authorities and the bureaucracy. The central government's treatment of certain insurgencies as a special law-and-order problem influenced by external players leads to the use of the military as an aid to the police in border areas, but the emergence of a distinct form of civil–military relations in insurgency areas has implications for governance, which may have spill-over effects at the national level.

## Framework of analysis: civil–military relations in post–colonial democracies

India presents a successful model of control by civil authorities. The combination of inherited British institutional structures and control mechanisms established by the Nehru administration ensured civil control over the military in post-colonial India. Through control of the budget, an accommodative system, and the separation of military institutions from the governance structure, the civilian state ensured a military organization that would rely upon the political authority for resources and direction. The success of such control mechanisms is what leads to assumptions that the military's presence ensures a secure atmosphere for civil authorities to operate in the disturbed areas, and that its presence in internal affairs will not undermine civil control at the national level.

India's civil–military relations fit well into the category of Huntington's objective model, which involves civilian leaders identifying political and strategic objectives, but deferring to the military in the development and execution of operations to achieve those objectives.[4] The separation of the armed forces from political decision-making also promotes professionalism, which keeps the military out of political negotiations, the realm of the representative bodies. After the 1962 war with China, the central authorities further enhanced the military leadership's control over operations because India's losses were predominantly seen as due to both lack of communication and interference by the civil authorities.[5] More recently, such a separation of the two institutions came under the microscope due to its probable impact on modernization of the Indian armed forces, which in turn affects its military operations.[6]

A framework for civil–military relations that focuses on control mechanisms at the national level, however, overlooks the variation of this relationship that exists in the insurgency-affected areas of the country. There is a widespread recognition that military involvement in internal operations is dangerous to cohesion and professionalism, for various reasons. Most importantly, insurgencies are political movements that involve citizens on either side of the conflict. The disturbed areas are home as well for some of the servicemen who are required to operate there. Therefore, the danger of servicemen losing their professional perspective during counter-insurgency operations is high. The desertion of over 2,000 Sikh soldiers from the army during the Punjab insurgency in the 1980s, after Operation Bluestar, provided evidence to justify such concerns, and underscored the need to keep the military out of insurgency areas.[7] Limiting the use of armed forces to external operations is preferable because the given objective is well defined, internationally accepted, and usually supported by the population, which provides the foundation of civil control over the armed forces. Following the experiences of the Punjab insurgency, in the 1990s the military formed a dedicated counter-insurgency branch, the Rashtriya Rifles, to deal with disturbances in Kashmir.

Despite the promotion of professionalism, the fact that the military is a political entity that controls a legitimate means of coercion is well understood, as is the notion that civil–military relations are dynamic. Michael Desch presents an agency-based framework in his argument that the use of the military in insurgencies negatively affects the civil authority only if the military's cohesion is threatened.[8] If the conflict is between the state and a segment of society, not the central government and the military itself, then control is not necessarily an issue. For instance, an insurgency aimed at the central government is not necessarily a threat to the relationship between the civil authorities and the military, whereas a military-led coup seeks to change the balance of that relationship. Such a framework may explain how civil authorities maintain authority over the armed forces during long-lasting internal operations. Military involvement in an internal operation, then, is an exercise in cooperation between the two agencies, where the armed forces act as an instrument of the central government, and then themselves become a target of the insurgency.

Muthiah Alagappa suggests, however, that frequent use of the military in internal matters is problematic because the status of civil authority rests on maintaining a balance between coercion and public support.[9] The military's presence in internal matters increases its importance, and its success in stabilization operations creates an alternative framework of governance that may undermine local civil authority. The counter-insurgency operations also create an alternative form of economy, which then can hinder normalization in the post-insurgency period. The civil authorities confront the challenge of decreasing the presence of the military in the region, when the public has adjusted to an alternative model of governance and economy based on the military presence. There is also the worst-case scenario, in which the military is unable to stabilize the region and the civil authorities seek to bring the forces back into the barracks against the will of both the military elite and the members of the public who feel secure with its presence.

Noticeably, arrangements of control remain central to such discussions in internal operations. Although the importance of control mechanisms cannot be overemphasized, the study of a long-lasting military presence in some disturbed areas in India implies a need for a broader framework that also takes into account the character of its presence as well as the state's effectiveness. Evidence demonstrates that in the Indian context, relations between the two institutions in stable and consolidated areas of the nation-state vary from their relationship in insurgency areas. While the military aids in disasters, participates in ceremonies, and, on occasion, acts as a vigilant institution in the more stable areas of the country, it is participating in governing functions in insurgency areas. What then are the implications of this variation for the effectiveness of central authorities in insurgency areas?

## Evolving relations in insurgent situations: Kashmir and Assam

The histories of the two long-lasting insurgencies in the states of Kashmir and Assam illustrate an evolving relationship between the civil authority and the armed forces. The military entered the two states under the aid-to-civil authority measure in the Indian Constitution. Its activities involve subduing the insurgencies and engaging in trust-building measures with the populations. The fact that the two unstable states lie on sensitive borders (Kashmir with Pakistan and Assam with Bangladesh) adds further complexities to the conflict. Two more recent practices illustrate that rather than solely playing a policing role, the military is increasingly involved in other activities that entail aspects of governance. First, the appointment of retired generals as governors in insurgency areas has shifted governance away from civilian toward military authority. Second is the military's role as an agent of development in support of a bureaucracy that is unable to adequately perform its functions in insurgency areas. The combination of these practices, which

are essential responses to the long-term violence in the insurgency areas, places the military in the center of the civilian decision-making space.

In the late 1980s, the President's office started the practice of appointing generals as governors in insurgency areas. Although such an appointment of a retired military officer may be linked to a reward system for the retired military elite, a cursory comparison between the stable and unstable states reveals that military officers are more frequently appointed as governors to insurgency areas than they are to other states, apparently because of security concerns.[10] Presumably, an armed forces background provides the governor with the capacity to link his political office with professional oversight of security operations in the state.

According to the Indian Constitution, the state-level government mirrors that of the national level, with the governor taking the position of the president. The governor appoints the chief minister depending on the results of state elections, and other state ministers based on the recommendation of the chief minister. The governor also holds the power to dismiss them. The governor cannot make laws for the state, but has the power to veto or hold bills for further consideration. His powers also include appointing members of the state Public Services Commission and the Advocate-General's office, who direct the state's bureaucracy and its legal system, respectively.[11] The governor also links the national authorities to the state, and is a critical channel in center–state communications.

While this is an important position at the state level, the governor is appointed by India's President instead of by the state legislature. According to some scholars, on the one hand, the national Constituent Assembly wanted a representative of the central government at the state level. For this, they vested in the governor the discretionary power to recommend the dismissal of the state government to the President. In cases of dismissal, the governor then rules the state on behalf of the president. On the other hand, the laws of the state apply to the governor's office as much as they do to the other national government-associated offices located in the state. The final check on the governor's powers comes from the President, who may reverse the appointment.

In practice, such powers do not mean much if the state is peaceful and stable. But in areas disrupted by insurgency, the governor plays a powerful role. He becomes a conduit for political negotiations between the state, the central government, and at times, the insurgents. He also exercises a supervisory capacity over the state's justice system and the bureaucracy that manages the central government's resources. By appointing a retired military leader, whose expertise lies in defense rather than politics, to the position of governor, the civilian center links the security apparatus to aspects of political negotiation. While a civilian governor can fill the same role, the fact that the President appoints someone with a military background is an acknowledgment that some security expertise is required in the position. Such an appointment implicitly elevates military solutions over political ones, and shifts negotiations, supervision, and decision-making to the security experts.

In Kashmir, for instance, the rising insurgency in the 1990s led to the appointment of retired military officers as governors, along with an increase in the military presence. The Indian Army initially entered Kashmir in 1948 in order to prevent Pakistan's take-over of the state, which had declared independence in 1947 during the partitioning of the country. Following the first Indo-Pakistani war, Kashmir, a Muslim-majority state, became part of India and remains central to the friction between the two countries.[12] The partitioning of India into two originated in the two-nation theory proposed by Mohammad Ali Jinnah of the Muslim League during the national independence movement. According to him, the Muslims of South Asia constituted a separate nation; this idea clashed with the nationally unifying notions of secularism promoted by Nehru's faction. However, the dominant Kashmiri nationalist movement at the time rejected

both of these conceptions and sought to create an independent ethno-nationalist state.[13] Kashmir became part of India in 1948, under a special status of autonomy provided by Article 370 of the Constitution.

Since then, the central administration and the Kashmiri Muslim elite have utilized their resources to alternately intimidate and accommodate each other, thereby causing the radicalization and polarization of the "other" communities, including some Muslims.[14] Ethno-nationalism continues to ferment in this competitive political setting, complicated by the presence of pro-India and pro-Pakistan groups. While center–state relations are at the heart of the current insurgency, which emerged in the late 1980s, the influx of Soviet–Afghan war veterans coming in from Pakistan, such as Lashkar-e-Taiba, bolstered the secessionist movements.[15] Currently, the state of Jammu and Kashmir contains over half a million security personnel, including various special-operations paramilitary groups.

Despite the historical tensions in the region, the first governor with a military background was not appointed until 1989. The three governors in the period from 1990 to 2008 were retired army or police professionals (General (ret'd.) Krishna Rao and Girish Chandra Saxena each served twice). The increase in incursions from Pakistan in the 1990s impelled New Delhi to link the central authority in Kashmir to the security apparatus through the governorship. Although low-level incursions had occurred prior to the 1990s, and India and Pakistan had already engaged in two wars over Kashmir, the decision to appoint a retired security expert to a political position was a response to the increasing insurgency.

The national government's objectives behind such security-oriented appointments were reflected in a request by the Ministry of Home Affairs to have Girish C. Saxena, the governor of Kashmir in 1998, become involved in anti-terrorist activities.[16] Although Saxena did not have a military background *per se*, he had spent his career in the Indian Police Service, and was director of the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), the Indian external intelligence agency, from 1983 to 1986. His successor, Lt. General (ret'd.) Srinivas K. Sinha was appointed because of his previous experience as the governor of Assam, where he launched a "three-prong strategy" involving a unified command to deal with the Naxalite insurgents there. As governor of Kashmir, he often challenged Jammu and Kashmir Chief Minister Mufti Sayeed's views on the security apparatus in the state.[17] These retired generals did not hesitate to exercise their political role as well. Examples include Governor Saxena's decision not to include the Chief Minister in anti-terrorist activities in the state, as well as Governor Sinha's decision to establish a board for the Amarnath Hindu shrine, become its chair, and grant land for the annual Amarnath pilgrimage, despite the state government's opposition to such moves.[18]

The military–security background of these governors raises critical issues of separation, balance, and linkages appropriate to the needs of the region and the civilian authority. The decision to appoint *retired* military leaders who directly link the governing and security sectors, it must be noted, remains within the constitutional framework that keeps authority in the hands of civilians. Yet, going back to the notion of a balancing act between the civil authorities and the military in insurgency areas, such appointments tend to blur responsibilities between the civil and military institutions in the eyes of not only the public, but of the armed forces themselves. Such shifting of civil political responsibility to security institutions does not occur in non-insurgency areas, where the public sees the military mainly in the cantonment areas, as a separate institution from the governing bodies in the state.

Since the majority of the stable states do not have any military presence in their governing institutions, the military's participation in governance in insurgency areas produces a sense of political discrimination among citizens in a democratic setting, which undermines attempts at development and negotiations led by the military. The state's claim that the military's presence

is necessary to prevent cross-border intrusions is also questioned when the military is perceived as a political agent of the central government, a phenomenon starkly missing in the more stable states. Although the constitutional burden is met by appointing a *retired* general to the civil position, the public's perception is that of increasing militarization. At this point, this divergent form of democratic civil–military relations hinders real political solutions. Furthermore, the military's long-term presence embeds it in the region's economy, as well as in the security structure for certain communities, making it increasingly difficult to withdraw when necessary.

Ironically, the reasons for relinquishing some civilian functions in the insurgency areas may lie in the institutional framework that keeps the military on the periphery of political decision-making. As described earlier, in the post-independence phase, the military institutions were handed considerable operational independence as part of a bargain struck between the two institutions. Once the elected authorities make the decision to engage the armed forces in a conflict zone, the military hierarchy decides how and when this will take place, for the sake of operational efficiency. The military services also specify the resources they need, subject to funding approval by Parliament. The rationale for this division lies in an understanding that military expertise is needed for operations, while civilian political expertise is needed for negotiations and diplomacy. But the line between the operational aspects and political aspects of conflict is not as clear as this arrangement would suggest. Srinath Raghavan points to the problematic nature of this division, because certain operational decisions are political, such as the continuing debate on removing armed forces from Siachen Glacier, a move the military opposes.[19]

## Security and ethnic pressures

In Assam, where the insurgency has a long history, a similar pattern of connecting political responsibility with the coordinating security apparatus is detectable as well. The state of Assam has been under pressure from its Hindu and Muslim neighbors since the turn of the twentieth century, when East Bengal was briefly merged with Assam by the British Indian government. The source of the current insurgencies lies in the development of Assamese ethnic exclusivism in the post-1947 phase, in response to extensive migrations from East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) during and after Partition, and a steady influx of Bangladeshi Muslims seeking economic opportunity since then. According to Dan Ronan and others, the foundations of ethno-nationalism lie in the perceptions of "others" intruding into one's space, or of being oppressed.[20] Writing in 1998, then-Governor Sinha warned that the influx of immigrants threatened a shift in the state's demography, and marginalization of the indigenous Assamese.[21] As Assam was inundated with immigrants coming from the East, pre-independence insecurities about Bengali domination under the British resurfaced and fed into ethnic violence directed at both the new migrants and government officials who were unable to stem the tide. The Indo-Pakistan war of 1971, also known as the Bangladeshi war of independence, increased migration into the state, and exacerbated discontent.

Jyotindra Dasgupta points out that, as Assamese radicals pushed for increased Assamese ethno-linguistic identity in state institutions in order to maintain their cultural majority, they marginalized the linguistically distinct tribal groups in the state, leading those groups to seek their own independent political structures.[22] In response, Nagaland was carved out of Assam in 1963, Meghalaya in 1972 and Mizoram in 1987, as tribal-dominated regions. In addition, the Bodo tribal population, numbering some five million, launched a secessionist movement in the 1990s to gain autonomy from the Assamese state. Underlying such movements are various Assamese factions, some of whom seek secession from the Union, while others, in a more "moderate" form, seek to promote the autonomy of specific groups within Assam.

The consequence of this ethnic splintering has been persistent insurgencies within the state, consisting of various radical organizations with their own agendas. Some oppose the central authorities for not containing immigration, while others oppose the various political parties for playing the numbers game with migrants during elections. According to Sanjib Baruah, by 2002, there were approximately 34 militant organizations in Assam; the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), which is based on Assamese ethnic-nationalism, is the most prominent of them.[23] The complexities of these socio-political realities are enhanced by the fact that Assam is a border state. Insurgents often establish sanctuaries in the neighboring states, making it difficult for the Indian security forces to pursue them. In recent years, radical Islamist organizations also began targeting Muslim economic migrants from Bangladesh who seek employment in India.[24] The migrant population's marginal existence in border area ghettos leaves them susceptible to radicalism and vulnerable to violence. The central government often justifies the military's presence by citing such multiple factors.

Although the roots of Assamese insurgency lie in the pre-independence period, the appointment of former generals as governors was initiated only in the latter half of the 1990s. The fact that these appointments have become a trend since then may support the assertion that the Indian state is increasingly becoming militarized in its responses to unrest, but again this is only in insurgency areas like Assam, where violence has been increasing.[25] The President first appointed a retired general as governor in Assam in 1962. However, a civilian governor was soon restored, and the next general to attain the governor's position in the state was Lt. General (ret'd) Sinha, in 1997; in 2003, he was appointed governor of Kashmir. For the next decade, governors with a security background dominated the position in Assam. Arvind Dave from RAW followed General Sinha, and was followed in turn by Lt. General (ret'd) Ajai Singh. General Singh's previous experience included the command of Operation Rhino in Assam in 1991.[26] While the President connected these appointments to security needs in the region, the position of state governor technically remained a political one, as the constitutional responsibilities of the governorship remained unchanged. Yet, the preference for removing security threats through a military solution rather than a political one was apparent under such governors, as illustrated in 2005 by the assassinations of ULFA leaders, who were preparing for peace talks.[27]

## Development and responsive linkages

The apparent overlap of governance with counter-insurgency operations is also reflected by the increasing participation of the Indian army in development projects. As stated earlier, contemporary militaries play diverse roles, in addition to the traditional one of securing the state from external and internal threats. While the army's engagement in development projects may be intended to gain the trust of the population, in insurgency areas such activities supplement the central authorities' efforts to accommodate the population's interests, as well as to increase the effectiveness of the security infrastructure. Negotiations over resources for developmental programs, for example, remain a major aspect of center–state relations. Historically, states have often attempted to mollify or weaken insurgencies through political accommodation and promises to channel central funding for public goods and services. Local bureaucracies typically lead the charge in implementing the promised public goods, but because of political and security concerns in insurgency areas, the military will frequently take on some aspects of these development projects.[28]

Some specific aspects of both the post-colonial Indian bureaucracy and the areas of active insurgency mandate an increased role for the military in development. Most obvious is the fact that the bureaucratic institutions in India, specifically, the Indian Administrative Services (IAS),

operate ineffectively in insurgency areas. The colonial British government instituted a rotational system for its chief provincial administrative posts, to ensure that the centrally-controlled bureaucracy connected the various parts of the empire. The idea behind creating an educated bureaucracy of political generalists, whose members transferred every three years, was to impose a social distance between them as project administrators, and the engineers, doctors, and other specialists who were hired to implement the projects.[29] Another effect, however, is that institutional knowledge and area expertise are lost. The IAS continues to perform through the same institutional structure. Its responsibilities include ensuring proper use of central funds for development in the states. In insurgency areas, the state typically deems its development projects as essential to deal with the economic and opportunity disparities that spur radicalization; to accommodate the demands of the opposition; and to support the functions of the security apparatus. The members of the State Public Commission Office, appointed by the state's governor, are in charge of hiring for and implementing these state-initiated development projects.

A cursory examination of the government's implementation of development projects in Kashmir and Assam highlights severe inadequacies. The two states in question are developmentally behind in various sectors, compared to other states. Kashmir, for instance, lags behinds in industrial development relative to other northern states, while Assam has the highest rates of poverty in the country.[30] The issue may be that the bureaucracy in these areas requires a different form of expertise associated with the political realities of insurgencies. Such regions provide insecure and politically complex settings for bureaucrats who are not trained to deal with various radicalized political factions, frightened and often displaced populations, and in some areas, shadow states created by the insurgents.[31] For instance, Anindita Dasgupta points to the high levels of small arms infiltration in Assam, despite the heightened presence of the armed forces, which has created a new kind of localized warfare and large-scale human insecurity in the conflict zones.[32] According to Sanjib Baruah, the state's inability to provide security to civilians gives the insurgents the opportunity to exchange "security," in the form of promises not to attack, for illegally imposed taxes, access to homes and other resources, and loyalty. The insurgents often operate by forming clandestine links with sympathetic or corrupt local officials, and are able to gain state resources through such channels.[33] The administrative bureaucracies in charge of establishing schools, supervising construction projects, and collecting taxes in such settings are unable to function in their full capacities without security. In some cases, they respond as the local civilians do, by providing the insurgents with access to the state's resources in exchange for safety.

In addition to inadequate security, the bloated nature of the Indian bureaucracy enhances the inefficiencies of the system. According to Satya Deva, in several states, employment in the bureaucracy, directed by the Public Service Commission's Office, is a way to gain patronage for the political party in power. In insurgency areas, this problem is made worse because a significant part of the funding is used to provide employment in underdeveloped areas, where large chunks go to salaries instead of projects, and end up in the pockets of radicals and the opposition, who are often left out of the established patronage system.[34] For instance, in 2007, the central administration promised to allocate five billion dollars for development programs in Jammu and Kashmir.[35] Kashmir has India's lowest poverty rate at only four percent; paradoxically, it is also the least industrially developed state in North India.[36] As Amy Waldman points out, two-thirds of the state's budget goes into its payroll: one out of every 17 citizens is an employee of the state in Kashmir.[37] This can only mean that a large chunk of the state's budget is used for patronage, leaving insufficient funds for the actual development projects.

As a consequence of such multiple problems, the military, as a relatively disciplined branch of the central government, increasingly participates in developmental activities as part of its "trust and nurture" strategy. In one instance of this strategy, the Indian military launched Operation

Sadhbavana in Kashmir after the 1999 Kargil War, to demonstrate a constructive side to its presence.[38] The operation initially focused on providing Kashmiri children with more educational opportunities. In addition, the army built bridges, mini-power plants in remote hill hamlets, women's centers, and orphanages, especially important after the earthquake in 2006.[39] Major General (ret'd) Dhruv Katoch of the Center of Land Warfare Studies, who participated in some of these projects, confirmed that because the civilian bureaucracy was unable to operate in remote regions due to the lack of security, the army performed some of its functions.[40]

In Assam, similarly, 80 percent of the budget is spent on the salaries of state employees. What little remains for development is often under-utilized due to mismanagement. Such a cycle relegates the state to being one of the poorest in the country, with a poverty rate of over 35 percent. Paradoxically, Guwahati, the state capital of Assam, is one of the fastest growing cities in the country, but, according to Monirul Hussain, this growth is due to the public's perception of the capital as a safe haven from the insurgency-ridden countryside.[41] In 2000, the army launched Operation Samaritan in the state, to build bridges, roads, and bus shelters as a way to both improve security and promote its own image as a benevolent presence. Local villagers were also hired to participate in these developmental projects. The funding of Operation Samaritan by the Ministry of Home Affairs, which sanctioned the military to engage in infrastructural projects, points to the critical merging of governance with the defense sector in insurgency areas.[42] It may be questionable in the end whether development programs enable security or eventually hinder it, since some development projects lead to the displacement of populations and cause disparities in living standards between recipients and non-recipients, which can exacerbate perceived grievances and increase radicalization.

Long-lasting insurgency operations raise concerns about the nature of India's civil–military relations and its effectiveness. Central to such concerns are complaints by the citizens of these regions that they are under military occupation. The military's apparent presence in the governing aspects of the state, albeit perceived as essential for security reasons, provides evidence for such claims. In such areas, the armed forces not only perform a policing function guided by the central civil authorities but are involved in political negotiations and development projects that are the domain of the civilian government. Interestingly, such activities are backed by emergency legal measures such as the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) of 1958, which was implemented first in the north-east, and then in Kashmir in 1990. The Act gives the military the right to enter homes, arrest people without warrants, and use force on persons who appear to be engaged in illegal activities.

While the Act is strongly and understandably contested in the regions where it is enacted, its implications for civil–military relations may also explain why some political leaders at the center are interested in rescinding it. Since the military is involved in governance and development, as well as operations, civilian oversight at the ground level becomes questionable. In 2010, Union Home Minister Palaniappan Chidambaram suggested replacing the emergency law with a more humane one, and the Supreme Court agreed to reexamine its constitutionality.[43] However, the military and the Ministry of Defense opposed any changes or its removal from the regions where the military is operating. The central authorities responded in a predictable fashion by agreeing to examine the situation further and possibly remove AFSPA only from the more stable districts of the insurgency-ridden states.

## Military authority over paramilitary forces

The command of paramilitary forces is another aspect of civilian authority that has fallen under the armed forces' control in disturbed areas. Constitutionally, the first level of a state's internal

security is provided by its police. The Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), a force headed by the Indian Police Service under the authority of the Ministry of Home Affairs, provides the second level of security by assisting the state police in various ways, from providing security during elections to helping with law enforcement. Currently, there are approximately a quarter of a million CRPF cadres deployed across the country.[44] In addition, in the north-eastern region of the country, a dedicated paramilitary force called the Assam Rifles, created by the British in 1835, assists the state police and CRPF with law enforcement. After independence, the Rifles were inducted into the Ministry of Home Affairs. In border states, such as Kashmir, Assam, and Punjab, the Border Security Forces are another prominent paramilitary organization, created in 1965 after the war with Pakistan. If these organizations prove unable to control the "law and order" situation in their region, the regular armed forces are asked to aid the civil authorities.

The first level of response from the armed forces is usually to send in a division trained for counter-insurgency operations. The Rashtriya Rifles is one such division. Currently, the Rashtriya Rifles employs over 40,000 troops recruited from the regular military, and operates under the authority of the army. The recruits serve two to three years in the Rifles and then rejoin their original units. If necessary, additional forces are sent to aid the Rifles and the civil apparatus. At the height of the insurgencies in Kashmir and Assam, there were approximately 500,000 security personnel in Srinigar and surrounding areas, and over 100,000 in Assam.

In insurgency areas where the military serves as an aid to civil authority, the Rifles operate under the military chain of command, which coordinates with the Unified Command, a state-level body established to bring the various security apparatuses together for planning purposes. The command integrates state-level government and the center-appointed governor, as well as the various security forces operating in the area. The operational head of the regional Unified Command structure is usually a military officer, who is responsible for all counter-insurgency operations in an area, including the police, paramilitary forces, and the army. At times, a military officer heads the Unified Command as well, as did General Mohammad Ahmed Zaki when the Command was established in Kashmir in 1993. In other words, while most of the paramilitary groups come under the authority of the Ministry of Home Affairs, as Rajiv Basrur points out, they are part of the military for all operational purposes.[45] Although such measures appear to be rational adaptive responses to what is perceived as the need to cope with challenges to national stability in insurgency areas, they appear to shift control of civilian aspects from the civil authority to the military.

## Conclusion and implications

The Indian military's supplemental civil role in insurgency areas implies the existence of two spheres of civil–military relations. First, in the larger national context, the relationship between the civil government and the military leadership is guided by control mechanisms that are reliably in the hands of the civil authorities. The second sphere, consisting of internal security operations in disturbed areas, illustrates a differentiated relationship that may have implications for civil–military relations at the national institutional level.

Some scholars suggest that the Indian armed forces have gained more political space in recent decades due to the accession of a more hawkish Indian elite at the national level. After the 1998 testing of a nuclear device, the second such test after a hiatus of more than twenty years, the central government made an apparent attempt to involve the military in decision-making. In January 2003, New Delhi announced the development of a formal Nuclear Command Authority (NCA), which involved the military in the country's nuclear matters for the first time.[46] According to Harsh V. Pant, prior to 2003, there was no clear understanding of what

the nuclear command structure was, but the military had no role in the nuclear development process or the command structure.[47] The post-2003 NCA is guided by an executive council that includes the Chairman of the Chief of Staff Committee, and consists of the Strategic Forces Command, which is in charge of operations. In addition, new defense think tanks and advisory institutions such as the National Security Council, the National Security Advisor, and the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) also provide some informal channels for the military elite to voice their perspectives. The civilian and military members of the NSAB designed the current NCA structure.

   Interestingly, institutional division in roles and responsibilities between civilian authorities and the military may be why the former agreed to step out of the military's way in insurgency areas, despite the fact that insurgencies are political movements that involve citizens. Jammu and Kashmir and Assam may be conflict zones, but their insurgencies are taking place in a democratic setting, albeit with the involvement of external players. The roots of these insurgencies lie in center–state relations. Therefore, solutions require accommodation and negotiations at different junctures, which are rightly the civilian authority's domain in a democratic setting. In appointing a governor with military training who serves as a nexus between the two structures, the civil authorities shift some of their political decision-making role to the military. This transfer of responsibilities implies a two-tiered understanding of civil–military relations in India. As this chapter has shown, the military is performing some functions of the civil authorities in disturbed areas, but it operates mainly through a security framework. This has varied implications for political outcomes, which need to be considered in studying the effectiveness of civil–military relations at the state level.

## Appendix: List of interviewees

 1 General S. K. Sinha (ret'd.), former governor of Assam and governor of Jammu and Kashmir, in New Delhi: March 25, 2010.
 2 Air Commodore Jasjit Singh (ret'd.), Director, Center for Air Power Studies, New Delhi: March 25, 2010.
 3 Lt. General Gurmeet Kanwal (ret'd.), Center for Land Warfare Studies (CLAW), New Delhi: March 25, 2010.
 4 Narendra Sisodia, Director, Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis (IDSA), New Delhi: March 26, 2010.
 5 Shri Jagmohan, former governor of Jammu and Kashmir, at India International Center, New Delhi: March 26, 2010.
 6 Lt. General K. M. Sheth, former governor of Tripura, in New Delhi: March 26, 2010.
 7 K. Subhramanyam, in Noida: March 27, 2010.
 8 General Yogendra Bammi, in Noida: March 27, 2010.
 9 General Vijay Oberoi, in Panchkula: March 29, 2010.
10 General Ved Malik, in Panchkula: March 29, 2010.
11 Dr. Pramod Kumar, Institute of Development and Communication, in Chandigarh: March 29, 2010.
12 Lt. General Tej Sapru (ret'd.), in Panchkula: March 30, 2010.
13 General J. F. R. Jacob (ret'd.), former Governor of Punjab, in New Delhi: March 31, 2010.
14 Lt. General Satish Nambiar (ret'd.), at United Services Institute, New Delhi: April 1, 2010.
15 Inder Malhotra, journalist, in New Delhi: April 2, 2010.
16 Roundtable discussion headed by Lt. General P. K. Singh, director, at the United Service Institution, New Delhi: April 6, 2010.

17 Arvind Gupta, Joint Secretary, National Security Council, 1999–2008, at IDSA, New Delhi: April 2, 2010.
18 Major General Dhruv C. Katoch (ret'd.), at CLAW, New Delhi: October 18, 2010.
19 Sanjoy Hazarika, journalist, at Jamia-Millia-Islamia, New Delhi: November 15, 2010.

## Notes

 1 Indian Maoists, also known as Naxalites due to their origin in the West Bengali village of Naxalbari, are members of the Communist Party of India (Maoist), or at least followers of this militant populist ideology. Rooted in the example of Mao Zedong's peasant revolution, these ideas promote rural empowerment through armed insurrection against the perceived neglect, corruption, and iniquities of the local and/or central government. The Indian Maoist movement is notable for its violence and rejection of democratic-political solutions.
 2 Stephen Cohen, *India's Army* (Berkeley, CA: University of California, 1971); P. R. Chari, "Civil-Military Relations in India," *Armed Forces and Society* 4(1) (1977): 3–27; Apurba Kundu, *Militarism in India* (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 1998).
 3 See Gurmeet Kanwal, "Rising Challenge, Declining Resources," *Deccan Herald*, 2011, available at: www.deccanherald.com/content/144834/rising-challenges-declining-resources.html (accessed August 6, 2012) to understand the ongoing struggle between the civilian authorities and the military elite over the budget.
 4 Samuel Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957), pp. 83–5.
 5 Srinath Raghavan, "Civil-Military Relations in India: The China Crisis and After," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 32(1) (2009): 149–75.
 6 Stephen Cohen and Sunil Dasgupta, *Arming without Aiming* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2010).
 7 Sanjoy Hazarika, "India Commander is Killed as Sikhs Desert the Army," *New York Times*, June 11, 1984, Section A: 1; Paul Wallace, "Countering Terrorist Movements in India," in Robert Art and Louise Richardson, eds., *Democracy and Counterterrorism in Democracies* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2007), pp. 381–427. Operation Bluestar was launched by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's government in June 1984, against a Sikh insurgent group in Punjab. The attack caused heavy damage to the revered Golden Temple, took many civilian lives, and contributed to Gandhi's assassination several months later.
 8 Michael Desch, *Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001).
 9 Muthiah Alagappa, *Coercion and Governance* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002), p. 7.
10 In the four more stable southern states, only Andhra Pradesh saw a retired general as a governor, back in the 1960s. Other larger states, such as Gujarat, Bihar, and Madhya Pradesh have never had a retired military officer as governor. Even Rajasthan, Maharashtra, and West Bengal each received such an appointment only once in the post-1980s phase, and none prior to that. In contrast, retired military officers often serve as governors in areas with ongoing internal disturbances, such as Chhattisgarh, Punjab, Kashmir, and Assam.
11 Durgadas Basu, *Introduction to the Constitution of India,* 19th edition (New Delhi: Wadhwa Nagpur, 2007), pp. 229–32.
12 Sumit Ganguly, *Conflict Unending* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002).
13 Reeta Chowdhari Trembley, "Nation, Identity and the Intervening Role of the State: A Study of the Secessionist Movement in Kashmir," *Pacific Affairs* 69(4) (1997): 471–97.
14 Ibid.
15 Wallace "Countering Terrorist Movements in India," pp. 392–95.
16 "Saxena Squeezes Farooq out of the Terror Think-Tank," *The Statesman* (India), January 11, 2000.
17 "New Indian Kashmir Governor to Modify 'Tactics' of Healing Touch Policy," *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts,* May 31, 2003; "Mufti-Sinha Rift Reaches 10 Janpath," *The Statesman* (India), July 15, 2005.
18 *The Statesman*, "Saxena Squeezes Farooq"; "Mufti, Governor Differ over Amarnath Yatra," *The Statesman* (India)*,* May 26, 2005.

19 Srinath Raghavan, "Siachen and Civil Military Relations," *Economic and Political Weekly* 42(35) (2007): 3531–3.

20 Stanley Hoffman, "The Passion of Modernity – Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity," *The Atlantic Monthly* 272(2) (1993): 107; Don Ronan, *The Quest for Self-determination* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1979), p. 95.

21 See Lt. General (ret'd) S.K. Sinha, "Report on Illegal Immigration into Assam," submitted to the President of India by the Governor of Assam, November 8, 1998, at *South Asia Terrorism Portal*, available at: www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/assam/documents/papers/illegal_migration_in_assam. htm (accessed August 6, 2012).

22 Jyotindra Dasgupta, "Community, Authenticity, and Autonomy: Insurgence and Institutional Development in India's Northeast," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 56(2) (1997): 345–70, 365.

23 Sanjib Baruah, "Gulliver's Travels: State and Militants in India's Northeast," *Economic and Political Weekly* 37(41) (2002): 4178–82.

24 Rahul Karmakar, "N-E Border Militants Trouble Delhi; India Says Unregistered Madrasahs and Mosques Near Bangladesh Border Could Be Breeding Grounds for Islamic Radicals," *The Straits Times,* January 29, 2002.

25 Rajesh Basrur, "India: Imbalance Under Civilian Control," in Thomas Bruneau and Harold Trinkunas, eds., *Global Politics of Defense Reforms* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008); Sunil Dasgupta, "India: The New Militaries," in Muthiah Alagappa, ed., *Coercion and Governance* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001).

26 The original Operation Rhino (1991–92) was an anti-insurgency operation by the army, police, and paramilitary forces against the United Liberation Front of Asom. It was suspended when the two sides entered into talks.

27 "Declare a Truce," *The Statesman* (India), September 25, 2005.

28 The information on the army's involvement in such projects is based on 16 interviews conducted by the author in New Delhi in 2010, with officers associated with the Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis and the United Services Institute. See Appendix with the list of interviews on pp. 177–8.

29 Satya Deva "Bureaucracy and Development," *Economic and Political Weekly* 21(48) (1986): M149-M155, M-150.

30 Mathew Joseph, "Performance of the Northern States," *Economic and Political Weekly* 39(6) (2004): 564–79, 566; Baruah, "Gulliver's Travels."

31 Baruah, "Gulliver's Travels."

32 Anindita Dasgupta, "Civilians and Localization of Conflict in Assam," *Economic and Political Weekly* 39 (40) (2004): 4461–70.

33 Baruah, "Gulliver's Travels."

34 Deva, "Bureaucracy and Development."

35 Balraj Puri, "Third Round Table of Jammu and Kashmir," *Economic and Political Weekly* 42(20) (2007): 8–11.

36 Joseph, "Performance of the Northern States."

37 Amy Waldman, "Border Tension a Growth Industry for Kashmir," *The New York Times,* October 18, 2002: Section A, 3.

38 Namrata Goswami, "India's Counter-Insurgency Experience: The 'Trust and Nurture' Strategy," *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 20(1) (2009): 66.

39 "Widows and Orphans of the Disaster," *The Statesman* (India), December 8, 2006.

40 Interview with Major General Dhruv C. Katoch at the Center for Land Warfare Studies in New Delhi on October 18, 2010.

41 Mongrel Hussain, "Governance and Electoral Processes in India's North-East," *Economic and Political Weekly* 38(10) (2003): 981–90, 985.

42 Wasbir Hussain, "Multiforce Operations in Counterterrorism: A View from Assam Theater," *Faultlines* (New Delhi) 9 (2005); available through the *South Asia Terrorism Portal*: www.satp.org (accessed August 6, 2012). The Ministry of Home Affairs administers, among other things, center–state relations, the national police, internal security, and border management, as well as the Department of J & K Affairs.

43 "Decision of AFPSA soon," *Times of India,* April 3, 2010, available at: http://articles.timesofindia. indiatimes.com/2010-04-03/india/28124723_1_afspa-humane-law-special–powers (accessed August 6, 2012).

44 *The Indian Express*, "Saxena Squeezes Farooq."

45 Basrur, "India: Imbalance Under Civilian Control."

46 Harsh V. Pant, "India's Nuclear Doctrine and Command Structure: Implications for Civil Military Relations," *Armed Forces and Society* 33 (2007): 238. Details of the structure and chain of command within the new Nuclear Command Authority (NCA) are still not public, but authority to launch nuclear weapons remains in the Prime Minister's hands. The Strategic Forces Command, a component of the NCA, administers the nuclear forces program under the command of a military flag officer. Some analysts are concerned that the strict sequestration of India's military leadership behind a decision-making firewall gives the military *too little* input into nuclear policy and planning. See Ali Ahmed, "Re-visioning the Nuclear Command Authority," IDSA Comment, Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis, September 9, 2009, available at: www.idsa.in/strategiccomments/Revisioningthe Nuclear CommandAuthority_AliAhmed_090909 (accessed August 6, 2012).

47 Pant, "India's Nuclear Doctrine and Command," p. 249.

# 15

# EXECUTIVE CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE MILITARY

## Spain

*Florina Cristiana Matei and José A. Olmeda*

## Introduction

This chapter discusses Spain's efforts to develop democratic civil–military relations (CMR), in particular, democratic civilian control, after the transition to democracy in 1975. Spain provides an example of effective institutionalization and consolidation of democratic executive civilian control of the armed forces. Since Francisco Franco's death in 1975, Spain has incrementally strengthened democratic civil–military relations by changing and improving the legal framework related to security and defense, establishing new democratic institutions (including military structures, with new roles and missions, and democratic control bodies), designing new defense policies, institutionalizing professional military education, and other methods. Some of these efforts have been effective, while some have yet to prove their effectiveness. Nevertheless, as previously mentioned, there is something relevant to study about civil–military relations in Spain, at least with regard to establishing democratic control of the military and professional military education. It is worth remembering that Spain (alongside Portugal and Greece) marked the beginning of the Third Wave of democratization (per Samuel Huntington), and, admittedly, as compared to many other newer democracies, had no available previous model of CMR or defense reform to follow.[1]

## Background to Spain's authoritarian regime

Spain had one of the longest dictatorships in the world, lasting from 1936 to 1975 under the command of General Francisco Franco. It was an authoritarian regime characterized by extreme violence in the aftermath of the Civil War (1936–39), abuses, suppression, censorship, and other crimes against "ideological enemies" of the regime—half the Spanish population. General Franco earned his authority from his victory in Spain's Civil War, garnered his legitimacy from the Roman Catholic Church and the National Movement (the only acknowledged political party), and ensured the security of his regime with the support of the armed forces. The General was both Spain's head of state (for life, from 1947) as well as head of government. During his rule, the military held positions in the cabinet, had tremendous law enforcement powers, and exercised

great authority in enforcing justice. There was no democratic civilian control of the military, but rather Franco personally supervised the armed forces, in conjunction with three different ministries—one for each service: Army, Navy, and Air Force—all staffed with military personnel only. Despite that, promotion was not based on military professionalism, but rather on criteria such as seniority or political activity. There was no serious military education either, except for the more technical branches.[2]

During his nearly 40-year rule, Franco banned political parties, abolished free elections, and curtailed freedoms of expression and association. Like Nicolae Ceausescu in communist Romania (1965–89), Franco ruthlessly prevented the creation of an opposition power base by any group or individual, in order to consolidate his authority and rule.[3] Franco isolated both Spain and its military from the then-developing *Zeitgeist* of democratization in post–World War II Europe, which left NATO membership or European Community (EC) integration out of the question. Scattered efforts toward integration into Europe and the rest of the world, however, included the 1953 agreements on military bases and installations with the United States, followed by the 1953 Concordat with the Catholic Church, accession to the United Nations in 1955 (although Spain continued to be viewed as an outcast by many nations until the 1970s), and the signature of a preferential agreement with the EC in 1970 (although still a dictatorship).[4]

## Spain's transition to democracy

The death of Franco in November 1975 ended the fascist dictatorship, enabled the return of the monarchy under King Juan Carlos, and paved the way for democracy. Transition to democracy was *reforma pactada, ruptura pactada,* in the terms of Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, in that the old regime and opposition moderates initially crafted a pacted reform of government, and their negotiations ultimately led to a pacted rupture with the past, the weeding out of the non–democratic elements of the Franco dictatorship, and the establishment of new democratic structures.[5]

## Democratic civilian control of the armed forces: a successful business

Spain started its journey toward democratization with a big gap between its civilian and military "worlds." The transition was a negotiated pact between civilians (including politicians, bureaucrats, academics, and others known as the "Sanhedrin group," who taught themselves about national security and civil–military relations) and a small group of military officers, in which the armed forces received certain guarantees (including, among others, the territorial integrity of Spain, consolidation of the monarchy, respect for legality throughout the political change, strengthening professionalism and modernization of the military, and increasing the budget of the armed forces), yet the inherited gap between the civilian and military sectors lingered for many years after Franco's death. The overall process was difficult, but the upcoming democratic governments (either of the Union of the Democratic Center or of the Spanish Socialist Workers Party) strove to reform and modernize the military while also strengthening civilian control.

Reform of the military began with ensuring interagency coordination. Since all three services functioned independently during Franco's rule (the General being the only source of centralized control), after the dictator's death, Spain lacked a legal mechanism to enable the executive to direct and control the armed forces. To correct this, a Ministry of Defense (MOD) was created by 1977, based on the example of other democracies and rooted in modernization projects that had been envisioned during Franco's rule. The MOD served to unite all three military branches and establish a Joint Chiefs of Staff (the acronym in Spanish is JUJEM), with the ultimate goal

of separating the military from the political and administrative arenas. The first Minister of Defense was, notwithstanding, a general, while the Joint Chiefs of Staff acted as a command, rather than consultative, body with regard to defense policy, with broad powers and large budgets. Although interagency coordination was at the top of the agenda at the beginning of the transition, democratic civilian control was not, due to more pressing issues such as creating a new Constitution, on the one hand, and lack of will on the other. Control was less important than the need to secure the loyalty of the armed forces, whose willingness to relinquish their central role in government and enable the transition to go forward came in return for a *quid pro quo* of guarantees.[6]

The establishment of institutions was followed by changes in the legal framework. The new Constitution adopted in 1978 delineated a new set of roles and missions for the armed forces, such as safeguarding Spain's sovereignty and independence, as well as protecting its territorial integrity and the constitutional order, consonant with the rule of law and protection of human rights and liberties. This Constitution specifically subordinated the military to the civilian government. Furthermore, an Organic Law of Defense was enacted in 1978, which granted the president of the government (i.e., the Prime Minister) personal responsibility for the command and control of the military, under the supreme command of the King. Although the MOD's powers were limited in the beginning, over time the Ministry has gradually assumed greater authority and responsibilities, including budgets, personnel, and policy.[7] The first civilian Minister of Defense, Rodríguez Sahagún, was appointed in 1979, but he remained the only civilian employed in the MOD for a long time. One of his signature accomplishments as minister was the enactment in 1980 of a law to regulate the organization and functioning of the military; it stipulates, *inter alia*, the separate roles for civilians and military officers within the MOD.[8] A Code of Military Justice was enacted in 1980, which eliminated the prerogatives the armed forces enjoyed during the dictatorship, such as being in charge of censorship and the control of regime opponents.[9] All these changes paved the way toward removing the military from political life and consolidating democratic civilian control of the military.[10]

Yet, the incremental institutionalization of civilian supremacy, along with political instability and infighting during the transition, antagonized the military leadership. A number of other developments during the transitional period helped perpetuate hostility toward democracy throughout the military, such as legalization of the Communist Party, economic problems, the granting of autonomy to some regions, the emergence of nationalistic journalism, and the escalation of terrorist activities by the nationalist and separatist Euskadi ta Askatasuna (Basque Homeland and Freedom [ETA]) Group, which often targeted the military and the Civil Guard.[11] This hostility led to an attempted coup by the military on February 23, 1981, when some 288 armed Civil Guard troops under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Antonio Tejero Molina seized the Chamber of Deputies within the Palace of Congress. They held the deputies, as well as the Prime Minister and cabinet members, who were inside the Chamber to vote for the second president of the government of Spain (Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo), hostage for several hours. Simultaneously, the head of the III Military Region, Lieutenant General Jaime Milans del Bosch, seized power, releasing a decree that militarized all the civilian officials, imposing military jurisdiction and martial law, and banning strikes and political activities. The ultimate goal of the coup was to have General Alfonso Armada become president of the new government.[12] The entire operation failed within 24 hours, but only after King Juan Carlos, as commander-in-chief of the armed forces, condemned the coup and clearly supported democracy.[13] Consequently, for many years, Spain's military carried a stigma associated not only with the dictatorial past but also with the 1981 attempted coup. According to many scholars, it took over ten years, and the Spanish armed forces' participation in an effective, internationally-led

humanitarian and peacekeeping operation, to wipe out the stigma and reinstate public trust in the military.[14]

The failed coup triggered a more robust institutionalization and consolidation of democratic civilian control of the military. The first step was the ousting of military officers from the succeeding government. To this end, a new military penal code was immediately enacted to preclude the military's involvement in politics, through such measures as granting the civil courts jurisdiction to try cases of military rebellion against the Constitution.[15] Sticks, never-theless, were followed by carrots. For example, the "Law for the Defense of the Constitution" enacted in 1981, granted the military a role in fighting Basque terrorism.[16] The second step was to allow the coup organizers to be tried first in military courts, then in civilian courts following a government appeal, which led to the imprisonment of the key hard-liners. The military eventually understood that Spain's path to democracy, and civilian supremacy over the military, were irrevocable, and started to contemplate ways and means to be part of the new system.[17] Civilians began to be hired within the MOD, yet because many of them have been either political appointees acting as advisors, or civil servants recruited in the general corps, neither type has tended to stay long in the MOD, a trend that undermines the continuity of civilian expertise.

More thorough reforms were implemented by Narcis Serra, who was appointed as the second civilian Minister of Defense in 1982. For example, Serra established a single chain of command, starting symbolically with King Juan Carlos, followed by the President of the gov-ernment, the Minister of Defense, and the Chief of the Defense General Staff (JEMAD). He also took the JUJEM out of the chain of command and transformed them into a consultative body, took control of the military budget, and instituted a new procedure for program budgeting.[18]

Additional important defense and security reforms were implemented by the Popular Party government of Prime Minister José María Aznar (1996–2004), not only regarding domestic issues, as in the ongoing battle against ETA terrorism, but also in Spain's close collaboration with the United States and Great Britain in the invasion and subsequent war in Iraq. These internal and external demands, among others, led to proposals to create a National Security Council and general interagency system to inform and advise the executive, coordinate policy, fuse and coordinate intelligence, oversee policy implementation, and enhance foreign security relations.[19] Aznar's policies aimed not only at strengthening democratic control but also at increasing the effectiveness of the military. Due to his party's loss in the elections of March 14, 2004, however, and the coming to power of the Socialist Party of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero (re-elected in 2008, until 2011), who did not have the same interest in national security and defense issues, these efforts lapsed.[20]

Another important player in democratic control of the armed forces is King Juan Carlos, who has both a strong personal and professional relationship with the military as the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. The King's great legitimacy and popularity among many citizens (both military and civilian) and his closeness to the military have increased the armed forces' legitimacy among the public.[21] EC and NATO accession (1986 and 1982 respectively) were also very important catalysts for Spain's democratic reform of the military in general, and civilian control and oversight in particular. The requirements for membership in these two bodies compelled the civilian government to learn about security and defense issues, including how to relate to, direct, monitor, and supervise the military, while the military accepted civilian control as a fundamental trait of democracy.

If the control exercised by the executive can be accounted as a "success," too little infor-mation is available on the other types of control (legislative, judiciary, internal) to effectively quantify their performance. For example, the parliament has a committee on defense involved

in adopting laws, interpellations, and inquiries, but its powers and political autonomy are limited because of the executive's preeminence in the Spanish political system. Informal control by academia, civil society, and the media seems to work, however. Numerous academic articles and media coverage have drawn attention to public opinion regarding various faulty policies undertaken by Spain's civilian governments (especially during the transition and more recently by Zapatero's government), or wrongdoing within the militarized intelligence service.

## Achieving military effectiveness: not a linear process

The executive branch has strived, although lately at a slower pace, to increase the effectiveness of the Spanish armed forces. These efforts encompassed changes to defense policy and planning, the command structure, human resources management, force strength and structure, and budget and acquisitions.[22]

Changes with regard to defense strategy and policy have occurred with the adoption of several National Defense Directives (in 1980, 1984, 1986, 1992, 1996, 2000, and 2004); Laws on National Defense (1980 and 2005); a Defense White Paper in 2000; and a Strategic Defense Revision in 2003. These regulations have provided for strengthening the role and responsibility of the Ministry of Defense, and the modernization of the armed forces, especially with regard to size, strength, structure and operational capabilities (in particular for international missions), and the combined nature of military operations.[23] Nevertheless, skeptics argue that, especially in recent years, there has been a lack of strategic thought in general, including within the armed forces.

Changes in the command structure included, among others, severe downsizing of the officer corps and reshaping the MOD into three major blocks, each under the control of the minister. Within the restructured MOD, the first block (under JEMAD jurisdiction) deals with purely military issues (e.g., operations, joint planning and doctrine, and the like); the second block (under the command of the civilian Secretary of State for Defense) deals with the management, finance, procurement, and infrastructure aspects of defense; and the third block (under the jurisdiction of the civilian Undersecretary of Defense) designs, implements and oversees personnel policy and management as well as defense education and training.[24] Within the JUJEM, leadership rotates among the army, navy, and air force to prevent the concentration of power in the hands of one service. An additional important change was the abolishment in 1998 of military service based on conscription, and the adoption of a professional military based on voluntary enrollment. Personnel management included a new, more selective recruitment process; a limit to an individual's overall service (32 years); specific promotion requirements based on merit and professional qualifications, including military education; and a maximum retirement age of 55 years. The Military Function Law of 1990 was very significant as well, not only because it changed the promotion system, but also because it augmented the powers of the Minister of Defense over the selection of general and flag officers, and it provided for a new system of professional military education to be included in the civilian education system.[25] The Spanish military career has been well designed since 2007. Changes in the force strength and orientation involved reducing the military from a huge, domestically-oriented force to a smaller, but more effective, externally-oriented military.

Changes in budget and acquisitions involved more allocation to the military (especially from 1977 to the 1990s), enacting legislation on funding appropriations for investment in the armed forces, and even using savings arising from position cuts toward acquisition of modern combat equipment.[26]

What contributed most visibly to Spain's military's effectiveness, however, was the country's accession to NATO, on the one hand, and the military's participation in external missions, on

the other hand. NATO meetings, exercises, and various kinds of collaboration enabled Spain's military (along with government civilians) to become more professional and more interoperable with the armed forces of its NATO allies and other democracies. The post-Cold War security environment has also contributed to strengthening the Spanish military's professionalism, in that Spain, alongside NATO and other allies, has been an active contributor to various military operations, including wars, peace operations, and stability and reconstruction efforts. Spain's armed forces have participated in the first Gulf War (1990–91), the Balkan wars of the 1990s, and the post-9/11 Iraq and Afghanistan wars, among others. The Gulf War specifically was a great opportunity for the Spanish to garner legitimacy and the confidence of the citizenry.[27] All these missions have also strengthened the world's perception of Spain as a reliable ally.

However, these efforts to strengthen Spain's military credibility and effectiveness seemed to lose momentum with the election of Prime Minister José Zapatero, who came to office after the horrific attacks by Al Qaeda on Madrid's train system on March 1, 2004, caused many Spaniards to lose confidence in the ruling conservative Popular Party. Zapatero's military reform policies focused on keeping the military under control, and emphasized humanitarian missions.[28] After running for office on the slogan "No to war," Zapatero's first decision as Prime Minister was to announce the withdrawal from Iraq of 1,300 Spanish troops, who had been deployed by the previous government of José Maria Aznar. At the time, the majority of Spain's population opposed the Iraq War. Then, in Spring 2009, Minister of Defense Carmen Chacón told the 600 Spanish peacekeeping troops in Kosovo, while she was on a visit there, that Spain's mission in support of the NATO-led Kosovo Force was over. This sudden decision came as a surprise not only for Spain's NATO allies and partners, who reacted with dismay, but to members of the Spanish government as well.[29] For example, the Spanish ambassador in Washington, Jorge Dezcallar, was unable to explain what had happened when he was summoned to the White House to shed some light on the decision. A quick turnaround by the Zapatero government and subsequent negotiations with the United States and NATO led to the development of a timetable for withdrawal over about 18 months, but critics inside and outside Spain lamented the government's loss of credibility over the incident.[30]

In contrast with these previous decisions, in 2010, Zapatero's government increased Spain's military presence in Afghanistan to help monitor elections, a move that critics complained would raise the cost of deployments considerably at a time when Spain's faltering economy could not afford it.[31] Even so, Spain's military receives the lowest level of funding as a percentage of GDP among all NATO members. As a result of the Zapatero government's sometimes erratic foreign and defense policies, some observers worry that Spain and its military have lost prestige in the international arena. Since elections in late 2011 brought the center–right Popular Party back into power, it will now be up to the new prime minister, Mariano Rajoy, to set priorities in defense and security, amidst the new reality of economic hardship.

## Professional military education: a work in progress to improve democratic control and effectiveness

Professional military education (PME) had not been a main concern of civilians in Spain for a long time. Before the regime change in 1975, PME was purely a military domain, taught by military officers (who were not required to have any teaching credentials, only a certain military rank) to military officers. After the transition, the military education system struggled to more closely resemble civilian education, but changes did not happen overnight. It took time, willingness, and considerable political effort to modernize military education, and important reforms continue up to the present.[32] PME is similar to civilian education: it incorporates education and training for

officers, NCOs, and civilians. To fulfill PME requirements, officers must now have a university degree, and NCOs a professional diploma.[33] The recently enacted law on military careers provides for a university education model (combining military education and training for officers with civilian education), based on the Bologna Process. In line with the new model, which was first implemented during the academic year 2010–11, the aspiring officers of the general corps and Navy infantry will be educated for five years in military academies or military naval school, and in the Defense University Centers that are functioning within public universities. Specifically, the Defense University Center of the General Military Academy functions within the University of Zaragoza, the Center of the Military Naval School functions within the University of Vigo, and that of the General Air Force Academy functions within the Polytechnic University of Cartagena. After graduation, the aspiring officers will obtain two degrees: along with their rank (e.g., ship of the line lieutenant or second lieutenant), they will also get a university degree from the general education system (e.g., bachelor of science, master of science, PhD). The aspiring officers of the Specific Army and Navy Corps (including the Army Corps of Engineers) will be educated and trained at the General Military Academy, in Zaragoza, but the latter will also have to graduate from the Polytechnic Institute, in Madrid. The Navy Corps (including Corps of Engineers) will be educated and trained at the Military Naval School of Marín, in Pontevedra. Air Force Corps (including Air Force Engineers) will be educated and trained at the General Air Force Academy, in San Javier. They will receive Industrial Organization Engineering degrees (Army and Air Force), as well as Industrial Engineering and Mechanical degrees (Navy). Aspiring officers of the Common Corps of the armed forces (Military Legal, Military Audit, Military Health, and Military Music Corps) will be educated and trained in the General Academies and Naval School, followed by specialized training in military schools, located in the Group of Schools of the Defense, in Madrid. The enrolled aspiring NCOs will obtain, along with their rank, the advanced technician diploma from the general education system.[34]

There is also a Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) system in Spain within the Joint Staff, which is beneficial for each service in that it allows officers from one service to know and understand the culture of the other two. There is very limited available information about common education and/or training among police, intelligence, and the military in Spain. One estimates, however, that it exists, because Spain's security is a joint endeavor of the Armed Forces, civil guard, police, and intelligence (including armed forces' intelligence), and to be able to provide security effectively they have to act jointly (which more likely involves some regular common training, exercises, etc. related to crises responses and consequence management). On the other hand, Spain is a member of NATO, the OSCE, the EU, and the UN, and, in general, these organizations have common exercises and training among all security forces. Also, the military has good relations with the Civil Guard, which is also deployed in external missions, and that most probably involves an initial, pre-deployment common education and training with the military. PME also includes common education for civilians (professors, journalists, politicians) and military officers, especially in the format of short courses; interestingly, private companies related to the military can also participate in education and training. Besides security and defense-related issues, PME involves ethics, morality, and a code of conduct: one of the main changes after transition through a royal ordinance.

Foreign assistance has also been welcomed by Spain's PME programs. For example, NATO has a strong influence on Spain's military education: NATO commanders come to Spain and help with PME interoperability and other compatibility requirements for joint external missions (e.g., Afghanistan). The United States is also a major supporter of Spain's education and training of the armed forces. Through the US Embassy, specifically the Office for Defense Cooperation (ODC), whose mission is to strengthen the long-term bilateral defense relationship between

Spain and the US via security assistance programs, bilateral exercises, personnel exchange programs, and others, the United States has contributed to Professional Military Education, pilot training, management training, technical courses, and English-language training, under International Military Education and Training, until the 1980s, and Foreign Military Sales since then. Currently, US support to PME involves sending exchange students to various US academies, especially the Naval Postgraduate School (usually in the Defense Resources Management Institute and CCMR programs, but also in the Operations Research and Mathematics departments), and the Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management on acquisitions, among others. According to ODC representatives, Spain's military is very interested in capitalizing on US education and training. Exchanges of officers are mutually beneficial for both countries, in that the exchange students share new (national) visions and approaches to defense and security with their foreign colleagues, which is very important in today's unpredictable security environment.

PME is taught by both civilian and military faculty (domestic and foreign). This new education model (whereby officers are taught in civilian universities) will not only facilitate critical thinking and bring civilian perspectives into a security- and military-dominated field, but will also be important, along with the expertise acquired during the military function, after retirement, when the retired military officers seek employment in civilian life. Thus, PME can determine a military vocation as well as a post-retirement career. Although PME is not a critical element for participating in international coalitions (rather, the main incentive is money), it is important to interoperability before joining international security coalitions. The English-language training provided by the US assistance programs, for example, is taken into account when Spanish military officers are candidates for various NATO positions, or other functions within international security alliances. Any changes within PME come under the jurisdiction of both the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Education, but the MOD has the biggest input. This differs from the past when each service controlled its own education and training, which was biased heavily towards the military. Now, it is more a civil–military relations decision. Nevertheless, there is no available information on whether or not the legislative body has any input with regard to PME and PME changes.

## Lessons learned

This chapter looked at Spain's attempts to develop democratic civil–military relations and defense institutions after the end of Franco's dictatorship in 1975. Spain has successfully made the transition from military rule to democratic civil–military relations, and can offer some lessons, in terms of democratic civilian control and, to a lesser extent, effectiveness. First, Spain could be considered a model in establishing gradual yet robust democratic civilian control of the armed forces (despite, or perhaps galvanized, by the 1981 coup), in particular by the executive branch. The Spanish armed forces ultimately understood Spain's path to democracy was irreversible (including civilian authority over the military) and strove to become part of it, under civilian supremacy.

Executive control and oversight in Spain have included strengthening the role of the Ministry of Defense (and of the civilian Minister of Defense), bringing about jointness and improving interagency cooperation and coordination (through JUJEM), as well as bringing in civilians to the MOD and armed forces. Although legislative oversight has also been institutionalized through parliamentary committees, it has been weak. In addition, informal oversight by academia, civil society, and the media has complemented formal democratic civilian control and oversight mechanisms, by helping expose the successes and failures of Spain's civilian governments to domestic and foreign audiences.

The second lesson concerns effectiveness: although it took time and meant overcoming some obstacles, Spain's military has ultimately been transformed from a very large force, whose main purpose was to ensure Franco's power and whose main enemy was the Spanish citizenry, into a much smaller, volunteer-based, apolitical, professional, and internationally-oriented force under civilian guidance. The Spanish military has thus sought to become more professional and effective, in order to better fulfill its new roles and missions of serving the country and citizens' security interests. Spain is now a member of the UN, the OSCE, NATO, and the EU, and a partner in other international collective security efforts, which contributes with military troops to many operations. In this context, Professional Military Education has been given special attention during the past three or four years, and is now undergoing a thorough modernization process. These two lessons could be relevant to many new (or even older) democracies, in which the military played (or continues to play) a significant role in the political realm, and in which civilians are endeavoring to consolidate their supremacy (for example, Tunisia and Egypt). One study in fact suggests that Turkey could benefit from Spain's model of institutionalizing civilian control of the armed forces.[35] Spain can also be a very relevant case study for other countries seeking to reform their defense education-related institutions.

The third lesson concerns what not to do. The Zapatero government, elected on an anti-war platform, seemed to lack interest in security and defense issues, and made some hasty decisions regarding Spain's military contribution to international peace operations. These were seen to have a negative effect on perceptions of Spain's military credibility and effectiveness. Spain, thus, shows that CMR is never a linear and definitive process, and unexpected challenges in balancing democratic control with military effectiveness can arise any time, even if democracy is consolidated.

# Notes

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8 José A. Olmeda, "Security Sector Reform in Spain: From Transition to Consolidation of Democracy," in Vanessa Shields and Nicholas Baldwin, eds., *Beyond Settlement*, Volume II: *Making Peace Last after Civil Conflict* (Madison, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University, 2005), pp. 303–17; José Garcia Caneiro and Eduardo Arranz Bueso, "The Military Transition to Democracy in Spain: Looking for a New Democratic Soldier," *Spanish Case* 1/1–2007, Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, Frankfurt, Germany, 2007.

9 McMillan, "Armies in Transition".

10 For a detailed account and analysis of the legislation pertaining to democratization of the military in post-Franco Spain, as well as defense-related institutional changes, see Narcis Serra, *The Military Transition: Democratic Reform of the Armed Forces* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 1–259.

11 Olmeda, "Process from Authoritarianism"; Bruneau, "Spanish Case Study"; Caneiro and Bueso, "The Military Transition to Democracy in Spain".

12  Olmeda, "Process from Authoritarianism."

13  Bruneau, "Spanish Case Study."

14  Olmeda, "Process from Authoritarianism."

15  McMillan, "Armies in Transition"; Serra, *The Military Transition*.

16  Olmeda, "Process from Authoritarianism"; Olmeda, "Security Sector Reform in Spain."

17  Olmeda, "Security Sector Reform in Spain."

18  McMillan, "Armies in Transition".

19  Thomas C. Bruneau, Florina Cristiana Matei, and Sak Sakoda, "National Security Councils: Their Potential Functions in Democratic Civil–Military Relations," *Defense and Security Analysis* 25(3) (September 2009): 255–69.

20  Ibid.

21  McMillan, "Armies in Transition".

22  For a detailed account and analysis of plans, policies, institutions, resources, see Serra, *The Military Transition*.

23  National Defense Directive 1/2004, December 30, 2004, available at: http://merln.ndu.edu/white-papers/Spain_English2004.pdf (accessed August 6, 2012).

24  McMillan, "Armies in Transition".

25  Ibid.

26  Olmeda, "Security Sector Reform in Spain"; Bruneau, "Spanish Case Study"; McMillan, "Armies in Transition".

27  Bruneau, "Spanish Case Study."

28  Ignacio Cosidó, "Fuerzas Armadas: La escopeta de Madera," *Libertad Digital*, Madrid, May 24, 2010, available at: www.libertaddigital.com/opinion/ignacio-cosido/la-escopeta-de-madera-54932/ (accessed August 6, 2012); Ignacio Cosidó, "Afganistán. Zapatero cogió su fusil," *Libertad Digital*, Madrid, February 21, 2010, available at: www.libertaddigital.com/opinion/ignacio-cosido/zapatero-cogio-su-fusil-53399/ (accessed August 6, 2012).

29  See Lisa Abend, "Spain's Withdrawal from Kosovo Angers Allies," *Time*, March 24, 2009, available at: www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1887304,00.html (accessed August 6, 2012).

30  Spain did not recognize Kosovo's independence, a reason cited for the decision, but one that does not explain its precipitate timing. Elizabeth Nash, "Spain's Defence Minister Shot Down over Nato Gaffe," *The Independent*, March 23, 2009, available at: www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/spains-defence-minister-shot-down-over-nato-gaffe-1651734.html (accessed August 6, 2012).

31  Natalia Junquera, "Defensa paga las misiones de paz con un fondo para imprevistos," *El País*, June 12, 2010.

32  PME is regulated by Law 39/2007 on the Military Career; Royal Decree 1892/2008 on conditions for access to universities; Defense Order 792/2010; National Defense Directive 1/2004; and the MOD Law of 2005.

33  "El Nuevo Sistema de Enseñanza Militar," available at: www.mde.es/en/Galerias/fichero/Presentacion_WEB.pdf (accessed August 6, 2012).

34  Instruction of Officers, Ministerio de Defensa de España: available at: www.mde.es (accessed August 7, 2012); Instruction of NCOs, Ministerio de Defensa de España, available at: www.mde.es (accessed August 7, 2012).

35  Lale Kemal, "Lessons to Be Learned from Spanish Democracy," *Today's Zaman*, March 30, 2010, available at: www.todayszaman.com/columnist-205824-lessons-to-be-learned-from-spanish-democracy.html (accessed August 6, 2012).

# SECTION B

# Effectiveness

## Six case studies

# 16

# REFORMS IN PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION

## The United States

*Thomas C. Bruneau*

## Introduction

In this chapter I argue that the challenge in the United States is not democratic civilian control, but rather effectiveness. In the first part of the chapter I will show that control is not an issue in the US, with the exception of the possible beliefs of a few academics. Effectiveness, however, is an issue, and the last major successful reform effort to increase military effectiveness was the Goldwater–Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (G–N). In addition to very seriously transforming the command structures to increase combat effectiveness, G–N also led to substantial changes in professional military education (PME) resulting in Joint PME or JPME. It should be noted that the context of G–N was the Cold War. Between G–N and 2008 there were 21 attempts to reform the national security system.[1] None so far has been successful, and the current major effort, the Project on National Security Reform, faces major hurdles.[2] The experience of the US in achieving jointness, which came out of G–N, is relevant for other countries that are also seeking to reform their PME. In my opinion, the successful experience in reforming PME is the only relevant example from the US that other countries may benefit from since this country is so huge and unique. There are at least five reasons for my opinion.

First, the United States is a well-established democracy, and it has been for most of its history. This is not the case with most of the world, including the vast majority of countries included in this Handbook. Second, the US, with a defense budget of almost $700 billion in 2010 and 4 percent of GDP, commits a sum equal to the next 14 countries in the ranking for national security and defense, combined. The sum of funds available for defense is simply out of scale with virtually all of the rest of the world. Third, the US is a global power and the defense system is highly bureaucratized, with an enormous Department of Defense that consists of 1,421,731 active duty members within the four services, 2,646,658 civilian personnel, and 463,084 in the Army and Air Force National Guard.[3] Besides the four armed services, and eight reserve components, which compete with each other for resources, there are 16 separate intelligence agencies, plus the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (with a staff of 1,000, not including contractors); and the Department of Homeland Security, which now encompasses 21 previously separate organizations with approximately 216,000 personnel.[4] This behemoth bureaucracy is controlled, funded,

and regulated, to one degree or another, by the three separate branches of government, and its facilities are spread among all 50 states and the several territories. The United States has no national police force, but each of the 50 states, plus Puerto Rico, the US Virgin Islands, and Guam have their own militia under the control of the governor, in the form of the National Guard. Fourth, given the system of congressional representation, virtually all members of the US Congress have real and concrete electoral incentives to be involved in or conversant with national security and defense. Fifth, with a huge defense industrial base, even those members of Congress without military bases in their districts have electoral interests to be involved in issues of national security and defense.

US civil–military relations are far too complex to be described in this one chapter. Luckily, those seeking to reform the institutions of national security generally agree on the overall issues and challenges.[5] Not surprisingly, the basis for US civil–military relations, like the rest of the US political system, is the Constitution of the United States. This document is the first historical example of institutional engineering. The geopolitical context in which the Constitution was framed strongly influenced how the framers dealt with national security and defense, and the allocation of powers—that is, including civil–military relations. The United States had just won its struggle for independence from Great Britain, a contest that pitched the colonies against the military forces of a powerful sea-borne empire. The new nation had a clear need to defend itself. The Constitution's framers sought to guarantee that the new system they were devising would not devolve into a dictatorship imposed by military force. Their concern in this regard is probably best captured in *The Federalist*, No. 51: "The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments," published in 1788:

> Ambition must be made to counteract ambition … If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.[6]

The author describes the importance of a separation of powers between the executive and legislative branches at the federal level, and between the federal and state governments. "Hence, a double security arises to the rights of the people. The different governments will control each other, at the same time that each will be controlled by itself."[7]

The centrality of national security and defense in the US Constitution has been extremely well analyzed by historians. Probably most comprehensive on this topic is the book edited by Richard H. Kohn, *The United States Military under the Constitution of the United States, 1789–1989*.[8] In the chapter "The Constitution and National Security: The Intent of the Framers," Kohn does an excellent job of describing the contemporary dynamics of national security, defense, and politics, which resulted in a federal form of government that could defend the nation and its interests, but avoid the temptation of dictatorship. Of the 18 items in the final document specifying the powers of Congress, Kohn notes that "fully eleven related explicitly to security."[9] He sums up the framers' intent:

> The framers of the Constitution thus succeeded in their first and primary task, that of empowering the new government to defend itself: to create and continue military forces in peacetime as well as in war; to control the state militias and thereby to possess

a potential monopoly of military force in American society; to govern these forces, and purchase and maintain installations and stores of equipment; to make rules and laws for the operations of these forces; and, finally, to be able to use them in foreign and domestic conflict.[10]

But, the framers also created a strong presidency. As "'Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States and of the Military of the several States, when called into actual Service of the United States,' they granted to the executive the power to conduct war."[11] An equally strong bicameral Congress, however, holds the power to declare war and controls the purse; "the rest," as they say, "is history." The institutional bases for contemporary US civil–military relations reside in this separation of powers.[12] Notwithstanding the many extremely serious conflicts and challenges the country has faced in the intervening 220 years, there isn't any reason to believe that there is a problem with the mechanisms of civilian control over those whose profession is the use of arms.

## Institutional control mechanisms

These mechanisms include the specific structure of the Department of Defense (DoD), which is headed by a civilian secretary nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate. The same is true in the various lower echelons, to the assistant secretary level, and each of the military services, which also are led by civilians. While there is a mix of military and non-military personnel throughout DoD, political appointees are clearly and unquestionably in charge. While the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) are active duty military and the Joint Staff itself is overwhelmingly military, the chairman of the JCS (CJCS), in accord with G–N, is not in the chain-of-command. Rather, the *National Command Authority* is constituted by the President and the Secretary of Defense. Directives pass from the President and/or the Secretary to the combatant commanders (formerly CINCs), who are directly responsible for fighting America's wars. As a matter of practice, but not required in G–N, these directives are transmitted through the CJCS, who also serves as top military advisor to the President. Through the Executive Office of the President, and especially the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the White House influences funding for the entire defense establishment. Congress has extensive control over the nuts and bolts of defense, through its responsibilities for the budget process, force levels, promotions, and major legislation like G–N.[13]

## Non-institutional control mechanisms

The next section of this chapter begins with a look at the proliferation of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and think tanks that exert influence over the US military. In the United States, the close relationship between civil society and the armed forces is hardly remarked upon. It is only by contrast with other governments, especially but not only the newer democracies, that we can appreciate the powerful influence of US society and politics on the control of the armed forces. Without a comparative perspective, and a framework for analysis that applies such a perspective, much of what is unique in the US experience, particularly but not exclusively regarding democratic civilian control of the armed forces, is lost to view.

Whereas in most countries there are no more than a handful of individuals and groups in civil society concerned with issues of national security and defense, the United States has an incredible variety of them. A large and ever-growing number of think tanks, located mainly but not only in Washington, DC, focus closely on these issues, conducting studies and issuing

reports on a broad range of themes within the area. For example, one quick survey of websites that posted studies and reports on national security and defense during one week, compiled by the NPS research librarian, yielded upward of 70 such organizations.[14]

These are not sporadic or ad hoc operations, but rather organized efforts to influence government actors, the armed services themselves, funders, or other groups. There are, in addition, NGOs, such as the Federation of American Scientists, the American Civil Liberties Union, the Washington Office on Latin America, and Amnesty International, to name a very few, along with academic area experts and specialist journalists, that also seek to influence the debate on issues of national security and defense. The so-called blogosphere has become another major forum for both national media outlets and individual journalists to publish both investigative research and opinion pieces on these topics.[15] In fact, it is possible to write with confidence that by far larger sectors of US civil society and the media follow, investigate, and seek to influence policy on issues of national security and defense, than in any other country in the world. It goes without saying that these individuals and organizations are motivated by very different motives that are best captured by Max Weber's division of incentives into *material* and *ideal*.[16]

## Military education

By contrast, the narrow topic of military education is one that few Americans think much about unless they have contact with militaries in other countries. In most of the countries that I am familiar with, in Latin America, Africa, and South-East Asia, the militaries themselves control the content of their forces' education. That is changing in some countries, most dramatically in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. As will be seen later in this chapter, through the G–N and subsequent legislation, elected civilians exerted their congressional authority to force the military services to develop and offer courses in "joint professional military education," or JPME, specifically to increase combat effectiveness. The incentive for officers to take these courses is that they cannot be promoted to the senior ranks unless they have done so and served in joint billets. All of this process is monitored very closely by the Department of Defense and the Congress.[17]

As Arch Barrett, who served as lead House staffer on preparation and passage of G–N, emphasized in a personal interview, all US education, from the primary level on up, assumes a civilian-led democratic government, including civilian control of the armed forces.[18] But there are other additional elements of civilian control in the US military education system. Most officers in the US services do not attend the service academies (the US Military Academy at West Point, the Naval Academy at Annapolis, the Coast Guard Academy at New London, Connecticut, and the Air Force Academy at Colorado Springs); rather, most of them attend civilian universities on Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) scholarships, or join the services after graduation.[19] They are thus fully involved in a civilian milieu before entering the armed forces. But even the service academies operate under strong civilian control. First of all, virtually all candidates to the service academies, except those to the Coast Guard Academy, must be nominated by a Member of Congress.[20] The nomination process ensures not only regional diversity, but also civilian involvement in decisions regarding who becomes a military officer. All of the service academies have Boards of Visitors (an oversight body similar to a board of governors) in which civilians are in a clear majority. For example, at Annapolis, the Board of Visitors consists of six members appointed by the President of the United States, three appointed by the Vice-President, four appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, one designated by the Senate Armed Services Committee and one designated by the House Armed Services Committee.[21]

Besides oversight, however, all US service academies, along with Department of Defense (DoD)-funded universities such as the Naval Postgraduate School also have to undergo the same rigorous process of periodic accreditation by regional civilian accreditation bodies that non-military colleges and universities do. The accreditation process ensures not only that the quality of military education meets particular standards, as measured by the competence of the teaching staff, course content, academic requirements, and the quality of facilities, but also that the school upholds expected standards of professionalism, for example, not tolerating implicit or explicit arrogance toward civilian control, and ensuring strict adherence to human rights norms. The importance of this arrangement becomes dramatically clear when one compares the US experience with that of other countries where these relationships do not exist. As noted above, this situation is changing in some countries like Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, as civilian leaders come to recognize that the way to change the culture of the armed forces, which, in the three cases above had previously imposed authoritarian juntas on their countries, is through civilian control over the institutions and content of military education. The next section is a review of the major legislative initiative related to civilian control of the armed forces, which exemplifies two main themes of US civil–military relations: (1) The unquestioned dominance of civilian leadership over the armed forces; and (2) the historic and ongoing struggle between the executive and legislative branches over the locus of control. Again, the tension is built into the system through the nature of the founding political system as defined in the Constitution, and is inherent to the separation of powers.

## The Goldwater–Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986

As Amy Zegart, a highly regarded academic expert on US national security and defense, including intelligence, and an Associate Professor of Public Policy at the University of California at Los Angeles, wrote in 1999, the National Security Act of 1947 was flawed in several ways. Among other flaws was the allocation of powers to the Joint Chiefs of Staff vis-à-vis the services, and the relationship between the Secretary of Defense and the military.[22]

My analysis here puts forward three main points: First, the chief motivation for passing Goldwater–Nichols was not to increase democratic civilian control, which was addressed in terms of the civilian Secretary of Defense's authorities, but rather to increase effectiveness.[23] In their 1998 study of the Act's effects, Peter Roman and David Tarr noted: "The act clarified the chain of command by stating that operational authority ran from the President to the Secretary of Defense and then directly to the CINCs [commanders in chief of the combatant commands]."[24] G–N also increased the capacity of the civilian defense authorities, which logically would increase their power over the armed forces. Roman and Tarr continued:

> Goldwater–Nichols altered the advisory process between civilians and the military in two important ways. It affected the advisory process directly by establishing the chairman as the principal military adviser and making him responsible for formulating advice on a number of specific issues. It affected the process indirectly by decreasing the authority of the chiefs and their services over operational matters and increasing the power of the CINCs. By changing how the senior military leadership interacted with each other, Goldwater–Nichols changed how they would relate to civilians in the policy process.[25]

At the time the Act was written in the mid-1980s, the defense system that had been so battered and demoralized by the Vietnam War was seen to be seriously flawed and ineffective. The

proponents of the reforms identified the weaknesses in the system in terms of unclear relationships between the Joint Staff, the CINCs (now called combatant commanders), and the services, and the inability or unwillingness of the services to cooperate with one another—to work "jointly."

Locher, who was the lead staff member in the US Senate leading the reform effort, and Barrett both detail the resistance within the services from a bureaucratic perspective. It must be noted that top-level civilians such as Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger and Secretary of the Navy John Lehman, along with the top-level uniformed officers in the Navy and Marine Corps, vehemently opposed the reforms, while the Army and Air Force were less adamant in their opposition. The services, according to Locher, feared they would experience a "loss of power and influence to joint officials and organizations," a concern he describes in largely institutional terms. "The Pentagon's change-resistant culture represents its greatest organizational weakness. Because of the Pentagon's immense success in wars cold and hot, it suffers from the 'failure of success.' It is an invincible giant who has fallen asleep."[26] Therefore, this was not an issue of civilians vs. military, but also of civilians vs. civilians and military vs. military, in which the individual services fought to maintain their autonomy even though the overall defense system suffered in terms of effectiveness. All observers agree that the reform was positive. As Roman and Tarr stated 12 years after the Act was passed: "The Goldwater–Nichols reforms have had their intended effect: a tremendous change is underway within the military." They further note: "Civilian decision makers, virtually unanimously, have told us that the military now provides higher quality and more timely advice as a result of the Goldwater–Nichols reforms."[27] This, the most important defense reform between 1947 and the present, was not about reinforcing democratic civilian control, although it did just that when it was initiated by Congress, passed despite the opposition of the highest-level civilian in the Department of Defense, and diminished the powers of the individual services.

## PME reform: Beyond control to effectiveness

The reformers behind the G–N reform explicitly saw PME as a way to change the profession in order to increase the combat effectiveness of the armed forces and to reinforce the authority of civilians in decision-making in national security and defense. That is, not only did they change the structures at all levels of the defense system, but they also sought to change the culture of the US armed forces. Relating back to a central argument in my chapter on "The Conceptualization of CMR," the PME reforms, and their impact, prove that the profession in the US, in contrast to the assumption of a culture, including the culture of the American Armed Forces, being static in Samuel Huntington's *The Soldier and the State*, can be changed. Huntington's classic book is clearly wrong regarding the unchanging nature of military professionalism in the US.[28] If, through PME, the culture of the military profession can be changed in the US, there would appear to be little reason why it cannot be changed elsewhere, given political will. I would go further and state that if other countries want to reform their national defense and security structures, they, as did the reformers in the US such as Arch Barrett and Jim Locher, will discover that they also must reform PME.

It is necessary to understand that the reform of PME was part of, and integral to, the overall effort at reform in the 1986 law. The G–N Act's primary method to strengthen the joint elements of the military was to change organizations and their responsibilities. PME, however, was expected to play a central role:

> In order to benefit fully from these organizational changes, Congress believed it had to improve the performance of officers assigned to joint elements. The required

personnel changes are contained in title IV of the Act, "Joint Officer Personnel Policy." These personnel changes are designed to ensure quality and two related factors— experience and education … Education is important both for learning facts and for affecting attitudes and values. Specifically, joint education can broaden an officer's knowledge beyond his own military service to joint, multi-service matters and can help the officer develop a joint perspective. The Goldwater–Nichols Act would enhance joint education both to meet the increased responsibilities of the joint elements and provide officers with joint perspectives. Education on joint matters is a basic link between a service competent officer and a joint competent officer. Further, joint education is a major way to change the professional military culture so that officers accept and support the strengthened joint elements.[29]

Or, as Arch Barrett communicated personally to me, the staff of the Panel saw changes in education as the means to change the culture of the organization of the US armed forces.[30] However, as Arch Barrett also pointed out to me, legislation is not self-implementing. Despite the item on "establishes a joint officer personnel system" in the G–N law in 1986, it became obvious to Arch Barrett and others that the services were not seriously establishing a joint officer personnel system nor providing the education to support it. Thus, two years after G–N was enacted, the House Armed Services Committee created the Panel on Military Education of the One Hundredth Congress to investigate PME and to make recommendations. At the suggestion of Congressman Les Aspin, Chairman of the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives, Congressman Ike Skelton became the PME Panel Chairman.

The Skelton Panel was the first systematic study of PME in 200 years. Through extensive hearings and visits to the main higher-level military educational institutions, the Panel arrived at a number of conclusions that resulted in nine recommendations. All of these led in the direction of a higher quality, more intensive and robust, system of PME, including Joint PME.[31]

Subsequent high-level studies have generally found that the PME goals of Goldwater–Nichols are being achieved. The Cheney Report, carried out for the Center for International and Strategic Studies, notes a 1991 General Accounting Office study indicating that 90 percent of the Skelton Panel's recommendations had been achieved.[32] Most recently, the Report of the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee of the US House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services, of April 2010 concluded that "Today's PME system is basically sound."[33] They cite, in note 22 of their study, a very large number of Government Accountability Office (GAO) studies that buttress their report.[34] The reformers of the institutions of US national security and defense realized that the institutions would not work as intended without educational change. They thus invested a huge amount of political capital, energy, and time in reforming the US military educational system. It should be noted that the US Department of Defense "presides over the largest and most expensive educational system in the world."[35] The reformers, and this was reiterated in later studies, including the 1997 Cheney study and the 2010 Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee, realized that education was key to all aspects of control and effectiveness in national security and defense. It must also be noted, however, that it has been difficult to reform PME. It was for this reason that the Congress assigned specific responsibility to the Secretary of Defense, and there is a requirement for an annual report to Congress on implementation.

Today there is absolutely no doubt but that all officers who hope to achieve the rank of brigadier general or rear admiral must do JPME. Despite the resistance of the military services, and particularly the US Navy, all of the educational institutions in the far-flung DoD have

| Environ Educ Level | Precommissioning | Primary | Intermediate | Senior | General/Flag |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Education Institution & Courses | Svc Academies ROTC OCS/OTS | Branch, Warfare Specialty Schools Primary-Level PME | Svc Cmd & Staff Colleges, JFSC/JAWS | Svc Senior Level Colleges, NDU/JFSC | CAPSTONE JFOWC/JFCCC Pinnacle |
| Levels of War Emphasized | Conceptual Awareness of all Levels | Tactical | Operational | Strategic | |
| Focus of Military Education | Intro to Service Missions | Assigned Branch, Warfare or Specialty | • Operational Art<br>• Theater Strategy Plans<br>• NMS<br>• NSS | • Strategic<br>• Leadership<br>• NMS<br>• NSS | • Joint Matters & National Security<br>• Interagency<br>• Multinational Operations |
| Joint Emphasis | Joint Intro<br><br>• National Military Capabilities & Organization<br><br>• Foundation of Joint Warfare | Joint Awareness<br><br>• Joint Warfare Fundamentals<br><br>• Joint Campaigning | Joint Ops<br><br>• National Military Capabilities and Cmd Structure<br><br>• Joint Doctrine & Concepts<br><br>• Joint/Multinational Forces<br><br>• Joint Planning<br><br>• IO and C4ISR | Joint Strategy<br>• NSS<br>• National Planning Sys<br>• NMS & Org<br>• Theater Strategy<br>• IO & C4ISR | Jt Leadership |

*Figure 16.1* Officer Professional Military Education Continuum

incorporated JPME into their curricula. Figure 16.1 illustrates how JPME is integrated into all levels of US PME.

The responsibility to ensure the implementation of JPME was assigned to the Secretary of Defense who then delegated it to the CJCS. There is a specific office in the JCS, J-7, which sees to the compliance with the laws.[36] To ensure compliance, the Joint Education and Doctrine Division of J-7 sends out an accreditation team—a PAJE team—every five years to inspect and review the programs which have been accredited for JPME. The JCS, as well as those DoD schools which have been accredited for JPME, invest a huge amount of time and energy to ensure that JPME is indeed being taught in accord with the doctrine and in the proper mix of students.[37]

With this background, one has to wonder if other countries, lacking a powerful and concerned congress as in the US, can take the initiative in passing a law similar to Goldwater–Nichols, creating the Skelton Panel, or requiring annual reports to Congress on implementation. Then too, the catalyst for reform were operational failures of the armed services. If other countries are not engaged in combat, this catalyst would not apply. I think that generally the model, or lessons, of the US are not applicable. However, in our current research on education we find that there are ongoing reforms in PME in Canada, Romania, and Spain, which are all members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which has fairly specific and standard requirements in defense. There are also some recent innovations in several countries in South America as noted above. Each PME reform initiative is specific, and thus unique, but worthy of further study and possible expansion to other countries.

## Conclusion

In the US, there is no issue or concern about democratic control of the armed forces. There is, however, much concern about the effectiveness of the national security system, including the armed forces. During the Cold War, the US Congress, over the fervent opposition of the DoD and the services, imposed a new, joint structure on the armed forces. A key element of the reform initiative was *joint* professional military education. It was specifically designed to increase the combat effectiveness of the forces, and by all accounts it has been successful. Since G–N in 1986 no other reform initiative of the national security system in the US has been as successful, despite the 21 initiatives between G–N and 2008. The current effort, the Project on National Security Reform, seeks to promote just such a reform, and it remains to be seen how successful it will be.[38]

## Notes

1 For a list of the "notable defense reform efforts," see Kathleen H. Hicks, "Invigorating Defense Governance: A Beyond Goldwater–Nichols Phase 4 Report," Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Washington, DC, March 2008, pp. 67–8.

2 See the Project on National Security Reform website, available at: www.pnsr.org (accessed August 6, 2012).

3 Specifically, there are 552,425 personnel in the Army; 330,703 in the Navy; 204,261 in the Marines; and 334,342 in the Air Force. The source for the armed forces' data is the Department of Defense (DoD) Personnel and Procurement Statistics: Personnel and Procurement Reports and Data Files (as of August 2009), available at: http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/MILITARY/miltop.htm (accessed August 6, 2012); for the data on civilians, the Defense Manpower Data Center in Monterey, California (as of September 2009), available at: http://wiadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/civilian/civtop.html; for the National Guard, see Michael Waterhouse and JoAnne O'Bryant "National Guard Personnel and Deployments: Fact Sheet," Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report for Congress, updated May 1, 2008. For further data on the armed services, see "Population Representation in the Military Services," Office of the Undersecretary of Defense, Personnel and Readiness, Fiscal Year 2005, available at: http://prhome.defense.gov/poprep2005/index.html (accessed August 6, 2012).

4 Information on the executive structure of the federal government is available on the Whitehouse website at: www.whitehouse.gov/our_government/executive_branch/ (accessed August 6, 2012).

5 In my book, *Patriots for Profit: Contractors and the Military in U.S. National Security* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011), Chapter 4 analyzes the major national security reform initiatives from G–N in 1986 down to the PNSR today. There is broad agreement on the nature of the problem, which centers on effectiveness rather than control.

6 Attributed to James Madison, *The Federalist*, No. 51: "The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments," originally published in the *Independent Journal*, Wednesday, February 6, 1788, available at: www.constitution.org/fed/federa51.htm (accessed August 6, 2012).

7 Ibid.

8 Richard H. Kohn, ed., *The United States Military under the Constitution of the United States, 1789–1989* (New York: New York University Press, 1991). See also Joseph E. Goldberg, "Executive Prerogatives, The Constitution, and National Security," in Howard E. Shuman and Walter R. Thomas, eds., *The Constitution and National Security: A Bicentennial View* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1990).

9 Kohn, *The United States Military*, p. 71.

10 Ibid., p. 77.

11 Ibid., p. 80.

12 The continuing relevance of this observation was highlighted to me in a review article by Walter Isaacson in the *New York Times* on Sunday January 24, 2010, in which he reviews the contrasting perspectives on executive vs. legislative powers in John Yoo, *Crisis and Command: The History of Executive Power From George Washington to George W. Bush* (New York: Kaplan Publishing, 2010); and Garry Wills, *Bomb Power: The Modern Presidency and the National Security State* (New York: Penguin Press, 2010). For the ongoing struggle over the meaning of the Constitution, see Richard F. Grimmett, "War Powers Resolution: Presidential Compliance," Congressional Research Service (CRS) February 23, 2011, RL 33532.

13 For details, see, for example, the chapters on Ministries of Defense, Legislatures, and Budgets in Thomas C. Bruneau and Scott D. Tollefson, eds, *Who Guards the Guardians and How: Democratic Civil-Military Relations* (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2006).

14 See a comparison of the remarkable number of think tanks in the United States vs. the rest of the world at the Foreign Policy Research Institute website, available at: http://fpri.org/ (accessed August 7, 2012).

15 See, for example, Thomas E. Ricks, a contributor to *Foreign Policy* online: http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com (accessed August 6, 2012). See also the blog post The Will and the Wallet, from another Washington, DC think tank, the Stimson Center, available at: http://thewillandthewallet.org/ (accessed August 6, 2012), where Gordon Adams is very active. Adams is a prominent voice in the national news, including the *New York Times*, in the ongoing debate on cutting the DoD budget.

16 Max Weber, "[M]en in society act with and against each other on the basis of their material and ideal interest," in Reinhard Bendix, *Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait* (New York: Anchor Books, 1962), p. 80.

17 On joint education, see, for example, Representative Ike Skelton, *Whispers of Warriors: Essays on the New Joint Era* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2004) for comments by the leading Congressional advocate for the armed services, and chairman of the House Armed Services Committee between January 2007 and 2011, on the importance and implications of "jointness."

18 Arch Barrett, interview with author in Austin, Texas, December 8–9, 2008.

19 ROTC graduates constitute 56.6 percent of the Army, 11.7 percent of the Marine Corps, 20.7 percent of the Navy, and 41.6 percent of Air Force officers, a combined 39 percent of all active-duty officers in DoD. Those who attend the three service academies make up 15.9 percent of Army, 12.6 percent of Marine, 19.4 percent of Navy, and 19.3 percent of Air Force officers, a combined 17.7 percent of all active duty officers in DoD. "Population Representation in the Military Services: Active Component Officers," Office of the Undersecretary of Defense, Personnel and Readiness, Washington, DC, available at: www.defenselink.mil/prhome/poprep2004/officers/commission.html (accessed August 6, 2012).

20 R. Eric Petersen, "Congressional Nominations to U.S. Service Academies: An Overview and Resources for Outreach and Management," CRS Report for Congress, December 29, 2005.

21 Rep. Robert Wittman, press release on appointment to the US Naval Academy Board of Visitors, US Naval Academy, Washington, DC, July 27, 2009.

22 See Amy Zegart, *Flawed by Design: The Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NSC* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999), esp. Chapters 2–5 regarding the National Security Council and Joint Chiefs of Staff. This section on Goldwater–Nichols draws from the prominent literature on the topic, including Peter J. Roman and David W. Tarr, "The Joint Chiefs of Staff: From Service Parochialism to Jointness," *Political Science Quarterly* 113(1) (1998): 91–111; Dennis J. Quinn, ed., *The Goldwater–Nichols DOD Reorganization Act: A Ten-Year Retrospective* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1999); and James R. Locher, III, *Victory on the Potomac: The Goldwater Nichols Act Unifies the Pentagon* (Austin, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2004). Thanks also to Arch Barrett for providing me with copies of the bills and other materials relating to the Goldwater–Nichols legislation.

23 James Locher affirmed in one of our interviews that the purpose of Goldwater–Nichols was to improve effectiveness rather than control. Interview with James R. Locher III, Arlington, Virginia, February 23, 2009. Regarding the goals of Goldwater–Nichols and how they will be met, Locher wrote, "First, to

leave no doubt as to the defense secretary's authority, report language declares, 'The secretary has sole and ultimate power within the Department of Defense on any matter on which the secretary chooses to act.'" Locher, *Victory on the Potomac*, p. 438.

24 Roman and Tarr, "The Joint Chiefs of Staff," p. 101.

25 Ibid., p. 102.

26 Locher, *Victory on the Potomac*, p. 448.

27 Roman and Tarr, "The Joint Chiefs of Staff," pp. 102, 109.

28 In *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations,* Huntington traces the development of US military professionalism up to the Cold War. He then allows no possibility for future evolution. Rather, he focused on how American culture might change to match the military professionalism. His most famous student, Peter Feaver, recognizes the tautology of Huntington's central argument:

> The heart of his concept is the putative link between professionalism and voluntary subordination. For Huntington, this was not so much a relationship of cause and effect as it was a definition: "A highly professional officer corps stands ready to carry out the wishes of any civilian group which secures legitimate authority within the state." A professional military obeyed civilian authority. A military that did not obey was not professional.
>
> (Feaver, 2003, p. 18)

29 Report of the Panel on Military Education, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, 101st Congress, 1st session, Washington, DC, April 21, 1989: 11–12.

30 Arch Barrett, e-mail communication to author, November 28, 2001.

31 Report of the Panel on Military Education, particularly pages 2–7 for the nine recommendations.

32 Richard B. Cheney and Bill Taylor, "Professional Military Education: An Asset For Peace and Progress," report of the CSIS Study Group on Professional Military Education, Washington, DC, 1997. For an 87-page bibliography on PME, see also Greta E. Marlatt, ed., *A Bibliography of Professional Military Education (PME)*, Naval Postgraduate School, revised October 2007, available at: http://edocs.nps.edu/ npspubs/scholarly/biblio/Oct07-PME_biblio.pdf (accessed August 6, 2012).

33 "Another Crossroads? Professional Military Education Two Decades After the Goldwater–Nichols Act and the Skelton Panel," Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Armed Services, US House of Representatives, 111th Congress, 2nd session, Washington, DC, April 2010: 24, note 22 for GAO reports.

34 Ibid.

35 Cheney and Taylor, "Professional Military Education," p. vii.

36 The very extensive legislation, and policy, can be accessed at the Defense Technical Information Center: www.dtic.mil/doctrine/ (accessed August 6, 2012).

37 Marlatt, *A Bibliography of Professional Military Education*.

38 See the Project on National Security Reform website, available at: www.pnsr.org (accessed August 6, 2012).

# 17

# DISCOVERING PEACEKEEPING AS A NEW MISSION

## Mongolia

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## Introduction

This chapter examines Mongolia's explicit reorientation of its military from territorial defense, although that is formally still a purpose of the armed forces, to peacekeeping operations. Although Mongolia is known today as a troop-contributing nation for UN peacekeeping and non-UN coalition operations, the dynamics of civil–military interactions related to its reorientation towards peacekeeping has never been examined. Despite the size of the military, the assignment of any new military mission causes friction among political and military elites and elicits public reactions. This chapter specifically focuses on the dimension of civil–military relations in connection with the embracement of peacekeeping as a new mission for the military.

The Mongolian case is interesting because it matches three out of six reasons for adopting new missions, that the authors highlighted in the Introduction of this Handbook. First, it has faced common challenges of contemporary civil–military relations of new democracies, many of which are small, developing, and not experiencing armed conflicts. Second, the military and security were key elements in the past and their treatment was crucial for democratic consolidation in Mongolia. Third, the Mongolian military has been taking on new roles and missions, departing from the traditional fighting of external wars. Important for our scholarly search for effectiveness in contemporary civil–military relations are the noticeable results in the Mongolian case: it institutionalized its peacekeeping efforts; its participation in the international peacekeeping operations is visible and recognized by the UN, NATO, and its members, and its peacekeeping participation contributed to the development of healthy civil–military relations in Mongolia. In fact, today Mongolia is one of 115 countries that provide personnel for UN peacekeeping missions, and it has deployed its military to coalition operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Kosovo as well as aiding in disaster relief missions to Japan.[1]

To understand the dynamics of civil–military relations behind adopting peacekeeping as a new mission, this chapter introduces a brief overview of Mongolian civil–military relations, examines the process of Mongolian involvement in peacekeeping operations, and analyzes the effects of this reorientation process for key actors in civil–military relations.

## A brief overview of Mongolian civil–military relations

It is more appropriate to study the Mongolian civil–military relations in two periods: communist civil–military relations (1921–89); and democratic civil–military relations (1990–present).

Following the Soviet-assisted revolution in 1921, communist-style civil–military relations were consolidated in Mongolia. The Party and the secret police maintained strict control over the military through extensive political indoctrination, training, and education for military personnel. The primary roles of the military were territorial defense, civil defense, and assistance for major national construction projects, but the military was never employed for domestic law enforcement missions. Only intelligence agencies and para-military forces such as the Internal Troops and Border Troops were in charge of domestic law enforcement operations. The size of the Mongolian military was changed due to its external security environment, more specifically, Soviet–Japanese and Sino–Soviet relations. Tensions in these relations caused a major buildup of the Mongolian military and deployment of the Soviet military forces into Mongolian territory three times (1921, 1936, and 1960s), while normalization of Sino-Soviet and Sino-Mongolian relations resulted in withdrawal of the Soviet military in 1925, 1945, and 1989 and a substantial reduction in the Mongolian defense budget, manpower, and overall security posture.

The last military buildup in this period occurred in 1966–89 following the Sino-Soviet tensions. Mongolia, like contemporary North Korea, became a heavily militarized nation in East Asia. All male citizens, 18–25 years old, were required to complete a three-year compulsory military service and to remain in the reserve until the age of 45.[2] The military departments and personnel were embedded in the government bureaucracies at the national as well as provincial levels, all educational organizations, and voluntary organizations. In addition, over 82,000 Soviet military personnel were stationed in Mongolia.[3] Inevitably, the military became the most salient organization in the 1970s and 1980s, and civil–military relations were lopsided heavily to favor the military.

Signs of democratic civil–military relations emerged in late 1980s when de-militarization in Mongolia started following the Soviet military withdrawal from Mongolia between 1986 and 1992. Some politicians were questioning the existence of the military in the absence of an external military threat. The military institution was criticized harshly by the public as highlighted by the article, "Hazers Needed Discipline," in the party central newspaper, *Unen,* in 1988.[4] People were expressing their concerns about military conscription and many started finding ways to dodge the compulsory military service. The drastic defense budget cuts caused a drawdown of manpower, cancellation of military exercises, abandonment of remote military facilities, and negligence of maintenance for major weapon systems. The only critical civil–military issue for political and military elites at that time was to abolish political party systems in the military. The military's requests for an increased budget were simply ignored by politicians, who rather favored increases in the police force as protests and demonstrations rose in urban areas.

The debate over the existence of the military was resolved in the 1992 Constitution, which legalized the maintenance of the armed forces and the national military service.[5] Democratic civilian control over the military was institutionalized by defining roles and responsibilities of key government institutions and the establishment of the civilian defense minister. Under the 1992 Constitution, the President becomes the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and also Head of the National Security Council (NSC), the parliament becomes responsible for policy and budgetary oversight, and the civilian Defense Minister oversees the Ministry of Defense and General Staff of the Armed Forces on a daily basis. The creation of the civilian Defense Minister's post and separation of the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff was implemented in 1996. All defense-related legalization and policies, which defined missions,

roles, structure, and organization of the military, were approved by the parliament between 1992–2002. Although it was clear that the Mongolian military is not capable of providing effective territorial defense against external military aggression by its armed, nuclear, and populous neighbors, territorial defense has remained the most important mission for the Mongolian military in these new defense legislation and policy documents. But peacekeeping was not included in these policy documents until 1998 because peacekeeping was unknown to the majority of politicians, military, and the public. When the term peacekeeping was introduced into academic discourse in the early 1990s, the idea of military deployment for peacekeeping was rejected immediately by senior military officers because they all felt that peacekeeping was detrimental to the military's readiness.[6] Moreover, political and military leaders were not convinced that the military could be deployed as a foreign policy tool for peacekeeping missions because of Soviet-style education and training, obsolete equipment, and lack of English- and French-speaking personnel. Thus, the term peacekeeping remained little known to the military and public until 2002, when Mongolia deployed its first batch of military observers to a UN peacekeeping mission in Congo.

## Mongolian participation in peacekeeping

Although there are many other factors that have contributed to Mongolia's successful addition of peacekeeping as a new mission for the military, we would argue that US military assistance played an important role in persuading Mongolian political and military leaders, preparing the Mongolian military for peacekeeping operations, and finally, providing an opportunity to participate in coalition operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Since the establishment of military-to-military relations with the United States in 1992, Mongolia has benefited from US military assistance in several different ways. First, Mongolian military personnel have participated in educational and training programs at the US military schools. The wide range of training opportunities, from English-language courses to professional military education and training programs, including various tactical officer courses, service Command Staff Colleges, and graduate degree programs at the Naval Postgraduate School, enabled Mongolian military officers to learn more about multinational operations, including peacekeeping, and to serve as experts at the Ministry of Defense and General Staff upon their graduation. Second, Mongolian civilian leaders and military personnel started participating in US-sponsored multilateral events ranging from workshops to residence courses at regional centers like the Asia Pacific Centre for Security Studies and the George Marshall Centre. These regional forums facilitated opportunities for Mongolian civilian and military personnel to understand the common challenges of defense re-institutionalization, and to discover new missions such as peacekeeping, which has been one of the major topics for these multilateral events.[7] Third, the US-sponsored in-country seminars on civil–military relations and multifaceted aspects of peacekeeping operations have served as pivotal forums for interactions among civilian and military agencies in Mongolia.[8] Besides learning from US experts, these in-country events helped civilian and military actors diffuse new ideas such as peacekeeping in the Mongolian context, and to identify ways to overcome challenges for Mongolian participation in peacekeeping operations. For instance, legal aspects of peacekeeping and the importance of interagency coordination were realized in the seminars in 2000–2. As a result, practical solutions, which were thought out during these seminars, were reflected in Mongolia's first legislation on peacekeeping deployment in 2002. Fourth, the US sponsorship for Mongolia's participation in the multinational staff and tactical exercises in the Asia-Pacific region helped to develop its operational and tactical capacity to participate in peacekeeping operations as well as to host

multinational training events in Mongolia.[9] As a result of US military assistance, especially in education and training, from 1992–2002, Mongolian military leaders gained in-depth understanding of peacekeeping experiences in South and South-East Asian nations, a handful of military officers and non-commissioned officers were trained in the US military schools, all personnel of the peacekeeping-designated battalion participated in multinational peacekeeping exercises both abroad and in Mongolia, and peacekeeping support facilities such as an English-language training center and National Peacekeeping Training Center (known as Five Hills Training Center) were established.

Along with this learning process assisted by the United States, the term peacekeeping resurfaced in policy discourses, and institutionalization of peacekeeping as a mission began in Mongolia. In 1996, the first civilian Defense Minister advocated peacekeeping further by officially designating the first infantry battalion for peacekeeping operations, and including the goal of developing a capacity for peacekeeping operations in the Government Action Plan in 1996–2000. Since then, peacekeeping has remained one of the key goals of the defense sector in all succeeding governments' action plans. Also, the main defense policy document, "Fundamentals of the State Military Policy" (1998), endorsed peacekeeping as the political-diplomatic means of national security.[10] A year later, two important decisions regarding peacekeeping were made by the President and the Secretary of the National Security Council of Mongolia. First, the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and the General Staff agreed to set up a small office in charge of preparing for peacekeeping operations. Second, the government officially declared its desire to deploy military personnel to UN peacekeeping missions by concluding a memorandum of understanding with the UN. These developments led to approval of the "Law on Deployment of Military and Police Personnel for UN Peacekeeping and other Operations" (2002) by the parliament.[11] This legislation was regarded as a key legal framework for the military to participate in peacekeeping operations. However, it is important to consider these positive domestic developments, especially at the policy level, with US military assistance as two sides of the same coin. Without US military assistance, Mongolia's participation in peacekeeping was unlikely for a few reasons. First, both Russia and China were unable to provide such assistance. The Russian military was wrestling with its own political and economic challenges while the Chinese were not always keen to develop any military capability in Mongolia. Second, Mongolia's offer to participate in the UN peacekeeping operations was not supported immediately by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) because the Mongolian military capability was unknown to UN experts and also there was strong competition among troop-contributing nations. Third, the training of military personnel in peacekeeping operations and provision of necessary equipment were costly for Mongolia's small economy, which was facing transitional challenges in the 1990s.

As a result of this bilateral cooperation between Mongolia and the US in the area of peacekeeping, Mongolia responded positively to the US request to contribute to coalition operations in Iraq and Afghanistan while the US provided all necessary logistical arrangements for Mongolian military participation. Mongolia deployed 1,195 personnel to Iraq between 2003 and 2008, and has supplied an artillery mobile training team (137 trainers) to Afghanistan since 2003. As Mongolian participation in Iraq ended in 2008, the Mongolian government increased its participation in Afghanistan by re-deploying an infantry company (130 personnel) to Kabul in October 2009, and it dispatched a helicopter training team in addition to artillery trainers. Although Mongolia's contribution seems small in quantity, it is substantial if one compares these contributions with the population, the economy (e.g., GDP), and the size of the military. Mongolia's participation in the US-led military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan clearly indicates the effectiveness of US military assistance to Mongolia in 1992–2002. This mission

played an important role of advancing peacekeeping as a new mission for the Mongolian military in several ways.

First, the idea of using the military as a foreign policy instrument was received widely by Mongolian politicians, including the President, the Prime Minister, parliament, and other government officials. As Mongolia's participation in Iraq and Afghanistan brought US–Mongolia relations closer, politicians used military deployments to Kosovo and Afghanistan to deepen relations with Belgium, Germany, and international organizations like the EU, the OSCE, and NATO. Mongolia deployed two platoons to Kosovo with Belgium in 2005–6 and started its deployment of a platoon with a German military contingent in Feyzabad, Afghanistan, in December 2009.

Second, Mongolia's participation in coalition operations has provided more justification for the US government to increase military training assistance to Mongolia, to establish a regional peacekeeping training center in Mongolia, and to provide the necessary equipment for Mongolian peacekeeping deployment.[12] For instance, the US helped Mongolia establish a level II medical capability, and now this level II medical hospital has been deployed to Sudan since December 2010.

Third, Mongolian military participation in Iraq increased Mongolia's visibility in the international arena. The UN DPKO employed over 3,000 Mongolian military personnel for its peacekeeping operations: UNMIL in Sierra Leone and MINURCAT in Chad since 2006 and 2009 respectively. Also, NATO members like Germany, Canada, Turkey, France, Belgium, and Luxemburg expressed interest in employing a Mongolian military contingent in their area of responsibilities in Afghanistan and Lebanon.

Fourth, senior military leaders and military personnel gained more confidence from their participation in coalition operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Based on operational and tactical experiences, all lessons learned were reflected immediately in the Mongolian military. For example, field operating and training manuals were updated, headquarters were restructured following the NATO structure, necessary equipment and gear for peacekeeping units and individuals were procured, and peacekeeping experience started to serve as a professional meritocracy. As the need for non-commissioned officers rises, the role of the Non-Commissioned Officer Academy increases, and more responsibilities have been delegated to senior non-commissioned officers.

In the Mongolian case, US military assistance played an important role in persuading political and military elites to accept peacekeeping as a new mission for the military. Also, Mongolia's desire to deepen its relations with the US provided a timely opportunity for its military to participate in the coalition operation, which enabled the Mongolian military to attract the attention of the UN DPKO and other major contributors in the coalition operations. If one recalls the widespread rejection of peacekeeping as a new mission for the military in the early 1990s, it is notable that the term peacekeeping became known to all key actors in civil–military relations in the newly democratic society. The next section will examine the effects of peacekeeping participation on the recently institutionalized civil–military relations.

## Effects on civil–military relations

The re-orientation of the Mongolian military from territorial defense to peacekeeping operations reveals an interesting dynamic of contemporary civil–military relations in a new democracy. It occurred in a relatively short period of time after substantial changes in Mongolian external and internal politics and its economy. The heavily militarized and ideological civil–military relations were replaced by democratic civil–military relations, characterized by civilian control over the

military and increased military professionalism. As a result of these changes, the military lost its salient status in the society while politicians and the public eventually lost their interest in military affairs until 2003, when the Mongolian military re-appeared in political discourse and the media because of its deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan. On the positive side, the Mongolian military did not challenge civilian leadership by staging a military coup, rather, it subordinated itself to democratic civilian control and sought ways to re-institutionalize and survive in a new type of political, economic, and social environment. Although it declared territorial defense to be a key mission and humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and assistance to Border Troops and Internal Troops as new missions, these were perceived to be irrational claims by politicians and the public to justify the existence of the military. First, it is impossible to arm its small military to face the Russian or Chinese militaries. Second, the newly established National Emergency Management Agency was in charge of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions. Third, the Border Troops and Internal Troops were not overwhelmed with their tasks to protect the frontier and to guard critical infrastructure. Based on these general assumptions, both politicians and the public looked at the military as a waste of resources; therefore, the military budget was cut to 1.2 percent of the GDP of the small economy. However, Mongolia's deployment of its military to peacekeeping operations changed the assumptions of key actors—political, military, and public—in democratic civil–military relations.

## Effective tool of diplomacy and reform

Since 2003, Mongolian politicians, including the President, the Prime Minister, and members of the government and parliament have begun to consider the military as a foreign policy instrument, and peacekeeping as a way to reform and increase interoperability among the security services of Mongolia.

Mongolia's participation in the US-led coalition operations brought bilateral relations closer, particularly with the George W. Bush administration, and Mongolia benefited from various types of US assistance programs, including the Millennium Challenge Account.[13] At the same time, US military assistance enabled Mongolia: (1) to participate in multilateral military events in the Asia-Pacific region; and (2) to develop the capacity to participate in UN and non–UN peacekeeping missions. This helped politicians to realize the potential use of the military as a foreign policy tool to advance Mongolia's multilateral foreign policy as well as its "third neighbor" concept.

The increase of UN peacekeeping deployments by the Mongolian military added more content to Mongolian multilateral foreign policy, which aimed to raise Mongolia's profile within multilateral organizations such as the United Nations and the ASEAN Regional Forum. At the same time, the government supports the military's efforts to host multilateral peacekeeping exercises in Mongolia, to project these exercises as a contribution to military confidence building in East Asia. Since 2002, Mongolia has deployed over 6,000 military personnel for peacekeeping operations, and hosted a series of multinational peacekeeping exercises at the Five Hills Peacekeeping Training Center.

As alluded to earlier, Mongolia employed peacekeeping as a complementary means to operationalize the "third neighbor" concept, which was coined in the early 1990s to increase support and recognition for its democracy and security from Western and other developed nations. Landlocked between two authoritarian regimes, it is impossible for Mongolia to join any Western-led multilateral organizations or to enlist a security umbrella from other liberal democracies. But, peacekeeping serves as an entry point for Mongolia to develop bilateral military-to-military cooperation, to engage with multilateral security organizations such as NATO and OSCE, and to garner military assistance with the aim of developing its peacekeeping capability.

Following its collaboration with the US in Iraq and Afghanistan, Mongolia deployed an infantry platoon with the German military in Afghanistan and another one with the Belgian military in Kosovo. However, its deployment with the French military in Kosovo was cancelled due to Russian pressure. As Mongolia's military interactions with the West increase, Russia and China became more cautious about these developments and agreed to develop bilateral military-to-military cooperation in areas of peacekeeping with Mongolia. For instance, both militaries began conducting bilateral peacekeeping exercises with the Mongolian military in 2008 and 2009 respectively.[14]

Politicians also witnessed the military's reform with the assistance of Western nations, particularly the US, Germany, France, Canada, and even Turkey. With its extensive defense diplomacy with over 20 nations and increased peacekeeping deployments, the Mongolia military became the most-reformed security institution in Mongolia. Since 1992, the military has benefited from training and educational assistance from ten nations by sending over 120 personnel for different types of training on an annual basis. On the other hand, other security organizations such as intelligence agencies, Border Troops, Internal Troops, the National Emergency Management Service, and the police have not received international training and educational opportunities with the exception of limited training with Russia, China, and a few other countries. While the Mongolian military's performances have been applauded by the UN and NATO as well as the US, Germany, Belgium, and Poland (with whom Mongolians served in Iraq), other security organizations have been scrutinized in the domestic media for inefficiencies and failures. The July 1 riot in 2008 is a good example. Security organizations in Ulaanbaatar failed to respond effectively to a riot following the disputed parliamentary election. This failure stemmed from another problem in Mongolian civil–military relations in the 1990s. Because the parliament did not have the capacity to legally re-structure its security institutions, all security institutions designed their own legal framework and secured parliamentary approval through lobbying. This resulted in fragmented security institutions, which deliver public goods in the most ineffective way. The military was called in after the declaration of a national emergency following the riot. Although peacekeeping units were trained in riot control tasks as one of the UN peacekeeping training requirements, other security organizations were not trained and equipped for riot control missions. Now peacekeeping deployments and exercises are realized to be a venue for the integrated training of personnel in security organizations at the operational and tactical levels. The revised law on Peace Support Operations Deployment (2010) permits military units and personnel from other security organizations to participate in peacekeeping exercises and deployments.[15] Since this law was drafted by the government and approved by the parliament, it indicates the general acceptance of peacekeeping as a way to reform other security organizations and to improve interoperability among security organizations.

From 2002, Mongolian politicians recognized the importance of the military as a foreign policy instrument and a way to reform security organizations. In comparison with the period of 1990–2002, peacekeeping is firmly established as a key mission for the military by politicians; this resulted in the prioritization of peacekeeping capacity-building programs in the government action plans, unanimous approval of military deployments to peacekeeping missions, providing funds to acquire the necessary equipment for peacekeeping units, and the operation of peacekeeping exercises in Mongolia.

## Gateway to resources and support

In the early 1990s, the Mongolian military faced an existential threat, and it lost the majority of its funding, Soviet military assistance, highly trained officers, and specialists. The military was no

longer considered an important sector by politicians nor a career opportunity by youth. In these circumstances, military leaders faced enormous challenges in re-institutionalizing the defense establishment and maintaining the social welfare of military and civilian personnel. It is important to highlight that the military was not the only institution to suffer. All government institutions encountered similar challenges to adapt to a new democratic political system and economic transitions. Peacekeeping provided at least three opportunities for the military: (1) to intensify its reform; (2) to increase military readiness; and (3) to solve the social issues of its personnel.

Although military reform commenced at the same time as the democratization process, it stagnated as the military faced consequent defense budget cuts. This was the first time that Mongolia had outlined its defense strategy and policy, and reorganized its national defense without the Russian security umbrella. The easiest part of the military reform was to formulate a new defense strategy, to create a legal framework for the military, and to restructure the Ministry of Defense and General Staff, but the hardest part was to operationalize this strategy on the ground and to modernize its aging weapons systems and equipment. Peacekeeping provided an opportunity to develop defense diplomacy with Western and developed nations to educate and train its military personnel. This intellectual investment created a pool of capable military officers to implement the military reform, especially at the policy and operational levels. As politicians realized the usefulness of the military to raise Mongolia's international profile and to advance bilateral relations, for the first time since 1990, a major developmental plan, the *Armed Forces Development Plan to 2015,* which required substantial funding to modernize armaments and equipments, was approved by the parliament in 2007. Since 2003, the military has begun to gain more support from Western nations to develop peacekeeping capabilities, and it also gained increased funding from the government to establish the second and third peacekeeping battalions, as well as three engineering units for potential deployments for humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and post-conflict reconstruction missions. One explanation for this increased support is that both the Mongolian politicians and Western governments have witnessed successful deployments for peacekeeping operations.

The increased capability also helped the military to improve its readiness to a certain extent. It was difficult for military units to maintain a high degree of readiness in the absence of immediate missions; therefore, most of the military units remain understaffed and not adequately equipped. As the number of peacekeeping deployments has increased since 2003, the military needs to maintain sufficient personnel and equipment that it can rapidly deploy for peacekeeping missions. At the height of its deployments in 2009, when Mongolia deployed 200 personnel to Afghanistan and 400 to two separate UN missions in Africa on the basis of a six-month rotation, the military needed to maintain 1,800 deployable military personnel: it required second and third rotations ready for subsequent deployments. And each contingent is required to complete a month-long pre-deployment training course at the Five Hills Peacekeeping Training Center, in addition to a six–nine-month deployment. Therefore, peacekeeping deployments provided an opportunity for the military to improve its combat readiness by manning peacekeeping units with an adequate number of personnel, providing necessary equipment in accordance with the UN Table of Equipment Standards, and maintaining intensive training and practical regimes for the personnel.

Finally, peacekeeping assisted the military in addressing social welfare issues. This was lacking in the early 1990s when the military was barely securing the pay and benefits of its personnel; therefore, the military was not able to recruit good candidates for officer candidate and non-commissioned officer schools. Nor was it able to retain personnel. The increased deployments to peacekeeping operations served as good justifications for the military to request additional funding to solve social welfare challenges such as military housing, pay raises, insurance, and so

forth. After participating in the Iraq mission, the government approved funding for the establishment of recreational facilities, and a number of resolutions related to military pay, insurance, and pensions were adopted. In 2010, the parliament allocated additional funding to assist military housing projects and to increase financial incentives for military personnel.[16]

In contrast to the 1990s, the military is now using peacekeeping as a way to intensify its prolonged military reform, to increase the number of rapidly deployable infantry, engineering, and medical units, and to improve the social welfare of military personnel.

## Re-emergence of public interest in the military

Unlike the widespread protests in Europe and Asia, there was no explicit public demonstration or outrage against the government's decision to deploy its military personnel to Iraq in 2003.[17] Although, through the media, the public was aware of a decision-making process about deployment, war images in Iraq and Afghanistan, and anti-war demonstrations around the world, no demonstration was organized even during President Bush's visit in 2005. Mongolians, unlike the Japanese or Koreans, welcomed him with overwhelmingly positive coverage. Why did the public favor the Mongolian deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan? First, the Mongolian contingent was small: totaling 1,195 personnel over ten rotations. Second, only a small segment of the population cared about military issues since the military had been marginalized. While acknowledging these obvious assumptions, we would propose the following reasons for these positive public reactions.

First, military preparation for peacekeeping operations had been shown in the media since 2002. Military participation in exercises in Kazakhstan, Bangladesh, as well as in-country exercises with foreign militaries, had created some public awareness about peacekeeping operations and its military's preparation. Also, some people may have perceived that the military would earn hard currency from peacekeeping operations.

Second, the request of the US government played a crucial role. All statements of government officials stressed that the Mongolian military was participating at the request of the US government. Since many Mongolians see the US as a potential protector of Mongolian democracy, they supported this request. This created pride and a positive public sentiment regarding their country's new partnership with the US and the UK.

Finally, the most concerned people were military families and relatives. The General Staff developed ways to connect military families with deployed personnel and welcomed their participation in the farewell as well as receiving ceremonies for each rotation. The media played a constructive role in disseminating news about the military contingent in Iraq, and military journalists assigned to each rotation handled public relations with major newspapers and TV channels. A limited media crew accompanied defense ministers and chiefs of the General Staff to Iraq and Afghanistan and delivered stories and images of soldiers to the public. There were rumors about casualties in tabloids. For each case, the MOD and the General Staff responded with an immediate press conference.

After the military's deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan, the public viewed the military very positively in comparison with other security organizations such as the police and the Border Troops. This would have been hardly imaginable in the 1990s. As the military presents its new image as a global peacekeeping force, public interest in a military is changing in a more positive way. In 1997, only 10.9 percent of respondents to a public opinion survey thought that peacekeeping should be the primary peacetime mission of the armed forces, while 30.7 percent believed the military's role was to be ready to defend against external threats, 34.2 percent to protect the state frontiers, and 22.0 percent to protect the population from natural disasters.[18] There was a 1.4 percent increase (12.3 percent) in the number of peacekeeping

supporters in 2000.[19] Public opinion in 2010 was different: 67.7 percent supported participation in peacekeeping operations, and only 3.4 percent objected. With regards to knowledge of Mongolia's military participation in peacekeeping operations, 32.8 percent know it very well, 46.5 percent know it, and 15.7 percent know a little bit.[20] Though it is not appropriate to conclude that the public supports military participation in peacekeeping in the absence of public outrage and criticism in the media, it is safe to conclude that the military's participation in peacekeeping is not a contentious issue.

Changes in Mongolian civil–military relations have occurred relatively quickly. In October 2010, a TV soap opera, *Special Platoon,* became a hit movie, attracting Mongolian viewers of South Korean soap operas. The movie depicted the life of a soldier at the special military unit, and it introduced the military's involvement in all types of missions, including peacekeeping, to the public. Also, in 2010, the Defense Minister created a Civilian Advisory Council, which consists of civil society members, to help the military connect with the public. The first annual award for civilians who have contributed to strengthening civil–military relations was created by the Defense Ministry.

Peacekeeping has regenerated public interest in military affairs since 2003. According to recruiting officers for the Defense University and the Non-Commissioned Officer Academy, the military was not an attractive career in the 1990s, but now the number of applicants has increased both in terms of quantity and quality; therefore, both schools no longer face recruiting challenges as other security organizations do.[21] In a relatively short period of time, all the key actors of contemporary Mongolian civil–military relations have realized the importance of peacekeeping operations, but no one knows the sustainability of this positive trend. Nonetheless, the Mongolian case study will enable us to make some generalization, which could be helpful for many other new democracies.

## Observable implications

The reorientation process of the military from traditional territorial defense to peacekeeping operations implies that civilian supremacy in civil–military relations is firmly established in Mongolia. First, the rule of law principle for the use of the military is inherent in the decision-making process as well as the minds of both civilian and military leadership. Parliamentary approval, as some analysts argue, can be vitally important to ensure the democratic legitimacy of military operations by helping increase public consent for the executive's use of force. Mongolia deployed its military for peacekeeping after the legal framework was established in 2002. Second, the military did not volunteer to take on peacekeeping as a new mission, rather this was tasked by the civilian authority in 1998. The military's role in the decision-making process is limited to an advisory role for the President and the civilian Defense Minister. The military has not initiated any peacekeeping deployments on its own so far. Third, civilian supremacy over the peacekeeping deployments has been maintained following the approval of the National Security Council, Parliament, and the Prime Minister's cabinet respectively. The President and the civilian Defense Minister maintain control over the execution of peacekeeping deployments and even direct review processes after each mission. For example, the President and the Defense Minister introduced changes in the 2002 legislation related to peacekeeping deployment to the parliament after a major review of peacekeeping operations from 2002 through 2009. The parliament approved the revised legislation in 2010.

Foreign military assistance from Western nations, particularly from the United States, was the key factor in Mongolia's successful reorientation to peacekeeping operations. But it is not the only factor because the US and NATO members have provided substantial assistance to other

developing nations in Africa, Asia, and Europe. Even the former Soviet republics in Central Asia and the Caucuses received more military assistance in the development of peacekeeping capabilities than Mongolia; yet, their militaries are still not fully deployed to peacekeeping operations. There are three possible explanations for Mongolia's success. First, Mongolia kept its national government and military, which were separate but closely linked, interoperable with the Soviet ones. On the other hand, the former Soviet republics needed to re-establish and separate their governments and militaries after the collapse of the Soviet Empire. Second, the political orientation was different. To escape from the centuries-long geo-political quagmire between Russia and China, political elites were committed to democracy and to developing closer ties with the West and other developed nations in the Asia-Pacific region. Finally, the military used foreign military assistance effectively in order to escape from the circumstances in the 1990s and present itself as a useful tool for foreign policy. So, orientation of political leadership and the military's desire for effective utilization of foreign military assistance were indeed crucial for Mongolia's successful reorientation to peacekeeping operations.

In addition to its role as a foreign policy instrument, peacekeeping is seen by civilian and military leaders as a tool to reform other security organizations and to improve their interoperability. The Mongolian military has benefitted greatly from Western military assistance; this resulted in acceptance of democratic civil–military relations principles, a Western-type of military professionalization, peacekeeping, and English-language training. On the other hand, other security organizations like the intelligence sector, the police, Border Troops, and Internal Troops have not received systematic exposure to the values of liberal democracy and similar institutions of the West. Therefore, they lacked opportunities to learn from Western democracies and to compare themselves with other developing nations; rather, they still relied on their former counterparts in Russia and their newer partner China. Through exchanges with these authoritarian regimes, they only could compare and learn from their counterparts, who are still predominantly occupied with their past legacy. In the Mongolian case, all security organizations have dissolved not because of the results of comprehensive reviews, but because of corporate parochial interests for funding and legitimacy. As a result, the military is now seen as the most reformed security institution while others remain ineffective even at providing public goods. The integrated deployment of the security organizations for peacekeeping missions is only a short-term, ineffective fix for the current challenges of interoperability and ineffective reforms in other security organizations. If the frequency and size of deployments decrease, then it will create another problem for political and military leadership. Competition for deployments could lead to institutional rivalry. Therefore, reform of other security organizations and interoperability among these organizations, including the military, should be approached in a more comprehensive manner.

Although the Mongolian case appears to be a success story, there are numerous hidden problems, which deserve more careful analysis and solutions. To elaborate this point, we discuss three challenges.

## Lack of research and education

From the start of this reorientation process, the Defense University, which is the main source of research and education for the Mongolian military, was excluded from overall defense reform policies and projects for peacekeeping capability development. Most policy documents focused only on operational and tactical capacity building (i.e., peacekeeping department, peacekeeping units, training centers, English language). The Institute of Defense Analysis, a research arm of the Defense University, was still providing linear warfare and historical analysis up to 2010, but it lacks expertise in peacekeeping. It is doubtful whether Mongolia has the analytical capability to formulate a long-term defense reform policy. Rather Mongolian defense reform, especially the

reorientation toward peacekeeping, was led by political party agendas, which is reflected in the government action plans and reform-minded individuals at the National Security Council Office, the Defense Ministry, and the General Staff. The roles of the research institutes were hardly visible in the formulation of major defense reform plans. Second, peacekeeping operations were not reflected in the professional military education and training program until 2007, which was six years later than its first peacekeeping deployments. Because the Defense University is not disseminating the knowledge and expertise of the peacekeeping operations, a limited number of officers and non-commissioned officers who were exposed to peacekeeping operations and possessed language skills, started to tire due to repeated missions. Although the Defense University adopted a developmental master plan in 2010, the impact of this plan on these problems is too early to predict.

## Politicization of the military

In comparison to the period of the first civilian Defense Minister in 1996, the civilian Defense Minister is now a legitimate and widely accepted norm by the military and public. However, it presents a new challenge to the military, especially those working at the Ministry of Defense. Each civilian Defense Minister brings his own team of experts, and eventually posts them to the higher posts in the Defense Ministry, and even facilitates their entrance and re-entrance to military service (as commissioned officers).[22] As political party-affiliated personnel commissioned or re-commissioned in the military, they are undermining military professionalism and causing further politicization of the military beyond the political posts at the Ministry of Defense. Since there are no career development programs (i.e., educational programs for civilian defense experts, career advancement incentives) for civilians who work in the military, they consider themselves disadvantaged in comparison with their military counterparts in terms of financial incentives, educational opportunities, and career advancement. This logically leads civilian employees in the military to seek ways to get a commission through a short-term officer candidate course or re-commission if he/she has served in the military previously. Although this looks like a small problem, this will gradually lead to cronyism and nepotism, and will undermine respect for civilian control. For instance, Mongolia has had eight civilian Defense Ministers since 1996, and it is now being recognized as a problem: the President highlighted this increasing politicization among flag officers during his address on March 2011. But a careful examination will help to understand these negative consequences of neglect of civilian defense expertise and education.

## Corruption

Another challenge for the Mongolian military is whether the military can maintain its reputation as the least-corrupt security organization in Mongolia. Mongolia's corruption index regressed from 43 in 1999 to 120 in 2009, although there was slight progress noted in 2010 (Table 17.1). Foreign aid, privatization, and natural resource extraction are identified as important drivers of corruption.[23]

In the 1990s, the military was the least attractive sector of the government because it faced drastic budget cuts and was considered the least needed institution in the absence of external military threats. Now the military is perceived differently. The increased peacekeeping will attract external assistance. Besides the US, the military has received assistance from the Chinese People's Liberation Army to develop a resort facility for the military, and from Qatar to refurbish parts of some peacekeeping training facilities. The increased peacekeeping deployments to UN missions will generate additional funds through reimbursement for the use of Mongolia's military equipment and personnel. As the economy grows compared to the 1990s,

*Table 17.1* Corruption indices in Mongolia

| Year | Corruption index |
| --- | --- |
| 1999 | 43 |
| 2005 | 85 |
| 2006 | 99 |
| 2007 | 99 |
| 2008 | 102 |
| 2009 | 120 |
| 2010 | 116 |

*Source*: Transparency International (www.transparency.org).

the government is now able to allocate more funding to purchase equipment and services, and to construct facilities for new peacekeeping units, thus increasing defense contracting for Mongolian companies. Proposals to employ military units for economic projects, especially in the mining sector and infrastructure development, are supported by the parliament. These will create additional opportunities for the military to generate funding.

Mongolia is not the only nation encountering all these new challenges of civil–military relations. But the management of these challenges will affect the nature of democratic civil–military relations dramatically. While Mongolia started fixing the first challenge by implementing a defense educational reform plan through 2020 to bring the Defense University up to the standards of the Western military, nothing has been done in regard to the other two challenges. Whether the military will lead the national anti-corruption campaign is an important question, which deserves care from the academic and policy communities.

## Conclusion

The Mongolian case demonstrated that peacekeeping could reveal interesting dynamics of civil–military relations in a new democracy. First, in a delicate geo-strategic environment, Mongolian political leaders projected peacekeeping as a way to advance their foreign policy goals of achieving bilateral relations with the West and increasing Mongolia's international profile. Second, peacekeeping was perceived by military leaders to justify the existence of a small military and to consolidate civil–military relations. Third, foreign military training assistance and increased engagements with Western militaries have consolidated a new identity for the Mongolian military, which respects democratic civilian control and stands out as the most reformed security institution, while many other institutions are wrestling with their past legacies and new challenges of corruption.

Despite raising concerns in Moscow and Beijing, Mongolia's military engagement with the West was necessary for the military to overcome transitional challenges and to adopt new Western military standards and ideas. Mongolia's current prestige as a forthcoming troop contributor for peacekeeping missions would be impossible without US military assistance. Without deployments to Iraq, Mongolia's peacekeeping commitment would have waned in early 2000. The deployments to Iraq gave momentum to Mongolian peacekeeping efforts and introduced Mongolia's military to the UN DPKO and other institutions. While militaries are withdrawing from Afghanistan, Mongolia is increasing its contribution to both the UN and Afghanistan.

Over two decades, Mongolia has transformed its Soviet-style military into a modern, deployable peacekeeping military. A potential road map could be developed based on

Mongolia's experience. Since many militaries in Asia look at peacekeeping as a way to keep the military externally-focused, Mongolia's lessons would help Western and developing nations avoid similar challenges. In the absence of external and internal conflicts, peacekeeping would be an important policy tool to re-orient militaries of developing nations into cooperative security tasks. At the same time, peacekeeping is an analytical tool to understand the nature, dynamics, and effectiveness of civilian control and civil–military relations. The Mongolian case could be applicable to many other smaller nations with similar legacies of the past, like Cambodia, Vietnam, Laos, North Korea (if an opening occurs), the Central Asian states, and Afghanistan— despite enormous difference. The comparative case studies of peacekeeping and defense diplomacy of small states could be a new angle to examine the effectiveness of civil–military relations.

## Notes

1 The Government of Mongolia offered to send military teams to Japan (250–300 personnel) to participate in disaster relief operations after the March 12, 2011 earthquake and tsunami. This is the first time Mongolia has declared its intentions to deploy its military for disaster relief missions abroad.

2 Constitution of the Mongolian People's Republic, 1962.

3 Монгол цэргийн түүхийн товчоон – Дэд дэвтэр [*A Concise History of the Mongolian Military*]*, vol. 2: 1911–1990* (Ulaanbaatar: Institute for Defense Studies Press, 1996), p. 496.

4 A. Davaasambuu and B. Bazarragchaa, "Дэглэгчдэд дэг хэрэгтэй" (Hazers Needed Discipline), *Unen* (Party Central Newspaper), 1988.

5 Constitution of Mongolia, Government Publishing Office, Ulaanbaatar, 1992, available at: www. embassyofmongolia.be/sites/default/files/THE%20CONSTITUTION%20OF%20MONGOLIA.pdf (accessed August 7, 2012).

6 The first article on peacekeeping was published in the *Journal of Strategic Studies, Soyombo,* Purevdorj 1994.

7 In 1992, the US Pacific Command sponsored Mongolia's first participation in the Pacific Armies Management Seminar (PAMS), the longest-running multinational military seminar, which allows ground forces and senior officers to exchange views and promote confidence building. Participating in PAMS forums in New Delhi ("UN Peacekeeping Operations") and Dhaka ("Training and Operations in Support of UN Peacekeeping Efforts"), Mongolian senior military officers mingled with 100 military delegates from over 26 Asia-Pacific nations, and were exposed to regional discourses on peacekeeping operations for the first time. See the archive Material of the Ministry of Defense of Mongolia and official website of the Pacific Armies Management Seminar (2010), available at: www.army.mil/article/43243/Pacific_Armies_Management_Seminar_XXXIV/ (accessed August 7, 2012).

8 Interagency seminars between 1998 and 2002, with US institutes like the Center for Civil-Military Relations, the Defense Institute for International Legal Studies, and the Defense Resource Management Institute, exposed the Mongolian policy community to many aspects of peacekeeping operations.

9 The US Pacific Command facilitated Mongolia's participation in major multinational exercises such as Cobra Gold, Balikatan and other smaller-scale peacekeeping exercises in Central Asia, South and South-East Asia, and co-sponsored an annual peacekeeping exercise, Khan Quest, and other multilateral events in Mongolia.

10 "Fundamentals of the State Military Policy," Article 13.5, Law of the President, 1998. The President submitted the defense policy concept to the Parliament in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and Head of the National Security Council (Article 13.5, Law of the President, 1993).

11 "Law on Deployment of Military and Police Personnel for UN Peacekeeping and Other Operations," 2002.

12 In the past, Mongolia had held limited operational value for the US military, but since 2003, the US Congress has increased its military assistance programs (e.g., International Military Education and Training, FMF, and GPOI) for Mongolia in order to encourage Mongolian military reform towards peacekeeping and to "develop a friendly and capable coalition partner, fully interoperable with US forces." See Congressional Budget Justifications for Foreign Operations (FY 2003–7), Office of US Foreign Assistance, US Department of State, Washington, DC, available at: www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/cbj/index.htm (accessed August 7, 2012).

13 US President George W. Bush, Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert visited Mongolia in 2005, and Mongolian

Presidents Natsaglin Bagabandi and Nambaryn Enkhbayar visited Washington in 2004 and 2007 respectively; these trips and the conclusion of the Millennium Challenge Compact were noticeable indicators of increased cooperation. Alan M. Wachman, "Mongolia's Geopolitical Gambit: Preserving a Precarious Independence While Resisting 'Soft Colonialism,'" East Asia Institute (EAI) Fellows Program Working Paper 18, Seoul, May 2009. In October 2007, the US government concluded a five-year, $285 million Millennium Challenge Compact with the Government of Mongolia to implement four projects to assist Mongolia to reduce poverty and to promote sustainable economic development. See Millennium Challenge Corporation, available at: www.mcc.gov/pages/countries/program/mongolia-compact (accessed August 7, 2012).

14 Mongolia's military cooperation with the United States and Turkey has brought reaction from Russia, while Indian and US military activities in Mongolia frequently upset China.

15 Law on Participation in Peace Support Operations, State Bulletin [Төрийн мэдээлэл] 22, 2010: 730–39.

16 Author's interview with former Chief of the General Staff, officials of the Ministry of Defense, and National Security Council Office in June, 2009, and interview with Defense Minister Luvsanvandan Bold, Өдрийн сонин [*Daily News*], January 21, 2011.

17 D. Gankhuyag, a well-known sociologist, asked a valid question in his op-ed in 2003, "Who will be responsible for loss of lives?" If one accounts this as a negative media publication, there was no other noticeable article or op-ed in major newspapers since 2003.

18 Defense White Paper, Institute for Strategic Studies (ISS), Ulaanbaatar, 1998.

19 Defense White Paper, ISS, Ulaanbaatar, 2000.

20 Center for Civil–Military Relations, Institute for Defense Studies, Ulaanbaatar, June–July 2010. This was the biggest public opinion poll conducted by the Institute for Defense Studies' Center for Civil–Military Relations. Its purpose was to discern public reactions to the military's deployment for peace-keeping operations. Interview by author with sociologists of the Institute for Defense Studies.

21 Interview by author in June, 2010.

22 Because there is a limited number of civilian defense experts, the newly appointed Defense Minister often invites his former colleagues or party-affiliated individuals, who have previous military background or experience, to serve in the ministry.

23 Verena Fritz, "Mongolia: The Rise and Travails of a Deviant Democracy," *Democratization* 15(4) (2008): 766–88.

# 18

# THE IMPACT OF NATO MEMBERSHIP ON MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS

## Hungary

*Florina Cristiana Matei*

## Introduction

This chapter discusses Hungary's efforts to develop democratic civil–military relations (CMR) after the transition to democracy in 1989, focusing on attempts that triggered progress in institutionalizing military effectiveness (in parallel with democratic civilian control), including the impact of NATO membership on Hungary's achieving a certain level of military effectiveness.

As was the case for the majority of the Central and South-Eastern European countries, Hungary embarked on the path to democracy in 1989. It had one of the smoothest transitions among the former Communist bloc: a roundtable-like transition among the Communist Party, opposition, and intellectuals, which opted, among others, for a free market economy, political pluralism, free and fair elections, freedom of speech and association, and a new Constitution. Since then, Hungary has strived to consolidate its democracy by strengthening democratic civil–military relations, particularly military effectiveness. The process has been long—Hungary's first and so far only Military Strategy was not adopted until the late 2000s—and sometimes challenging, especially regarding institutionalizing a robust democratic civilian control and increasing resources to the military to effectively fulfill their roles and missions. But despite all these challenges, Hungary has effective armed forces, especially when contributing to stability, reconstruction, and peace operations. NATO membership has greatly impacted the CMR development, in that it forced the Hungarian government to implement relevant reforms. The Hungarian CMR process has sought to achieve the control and effectiveness dimensions of our expanded framework (admittedly, with more progress in the area of effectiveness).[1] Lessons learned from the Hungarian CMR can prove relevant for other, newer, democracies that transition from authoritarian regimes to democracies and focus on developing an effective military, even if plans and resources, the requirements for achieving effectiveness, are relatively low.[2]

## Background to the Hungarian non–democratic regime

Between 1945 and the early 1980s, Hungary was a totalitarian Communist state, which started a process of self-detotalitarianization in 1982 and remained a mature post-totalitarian regime until

1988.[3] During the Communist regime, the Hungarian armed forces were organized based on the Soviet model, were part of the Warsaw Pact, and followed the orders given by the USSR. Although, as in many other Communist countries, the Hungarian Communist Party controlled the military through the Politburo and Central Committee, a few things distinguished the Cold War civilian control of the Hungarian military from that of its neighbors: first, Hungary was the only Communist country in which the highest-level military commander was not necessarily a member of the Political Bureau,[4] which allowed some room for a limited professionalism ethos to develop in the armed forces; and, second, despite the Soviet push toward the equipment modernization of the Hungarian military, the Communists did not comply with Moscow's pressure (as they considered Hungary had no strategic importance).[5]

## Hungary's transition to democracy

Hungary transitioned to democracy in 1989 via a negotiated pact between the reformist factions within the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (HSWP) elites, and the pro-democratic opposition movements and parties. The roundtable discussions involved, among others, bringing about free and fair elections, amending the 1949 Constitution, setting up a free market economy, and institutionalizing military reform (aimed, at that time, in particular to insulate the armed forces from politics).

### Civil–military relations in the democratization of the defense sector

Defense reform has known three different phases since 1989: (1) initial reforms (1989–94); (2) reforms toward NATO integration (1994–7); and (3) transformation as a NATO member (1997–present). The first stage (1989–94) was dominated by legislative and institutional efforts. It started in 1989 with the writing of the Constitution and the adoption of a National Defense Law, which had the following effects: it redefined the chain of command within the military; established new roles, missions, and responsibilities for the armed forces (e.g., homeland defense, counterterrorism, disaster relief) and the Ministry of Defense (policy setting, civilian control, linkage with the legislature); stipulated executive control (through the President and the Prime Minister) and legislative control (through a permanent National Defense Committee within the Parliament) and oversight of the military; and granted the executive authority (through the Defense Council) to deploy the military domestically or internationally (which effectively terminated Moscow's direct access to the Hungarian military, which was further emphasized by the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in July 1991).[6] It is worth mentioning the support of the first democratic government of József Antall for NATO membership.[7] The first civilian Minister of Defense was appointed in 1990 (Lajos Für), yet he had limited authority over the military due to ceaseless infighting with the President and the Prime Minister over who had the prerogative to control the military. A new set of reforms were initiated in 1992 to deal with military restructuring and increase the executive (including the MOD) role in CMR (including opening the doors of the MOD to civilians). In 1993, the "Basic Principles of National Defense of the Republic of Hungary," also known as the "Defense Concept," was adopted by the parliament, which set out exclusively defensive roles and missions for the Hungarian military and made NATO membership a national security objective for Hungary.[8] The Defense Concept was followed by the adoption of the Defense Act later that year, which shed new light on the civilian control of the military during peace and wartime, and provided a code of conduct for the military.[9]

The second phase (1994–7) was dominated by sluggish yet increased structural and organizational changes toward NATO integration and interoperability. The Socialist-Liberal Gyula

Horn Government (1994–8) focused more on economic reforms and settling foreign policy issues than on military reform. However, as the Horn government "started out from the mistaken assumption that NATO accession would not occur any time soon,"[10] policy-makers "supported as much of the military reform as it was necessary to achieve the invitation of NATO."[11] Defense reform basically involved budgetary cuts for defense, personnel downsizing (including civilian), as well as the slow development of a host of military reform plans (but with virtually zero chance and time for implementation).[12] The pace of the reform, however, changed after Hungary received an accession invitation from NATO in 1997[13] (although due to the up-and-coming elections, the administration delayed the development of any major reforms).[14]

The third phase (1998–present) involved accelerated and more comprehensive defense reforms toward developing an expeditionary force that would contribute to NATO. Viktor Orbán's Cabinet's (1998–2002) contribution to defense reforms involved: Hungary's accession into NATO (1999); Hungary's participation, alongside NATO allies, in the war in Kosovo with its Kosovo Forces (KFOR) (1999); and the development of a robust long-term defense transformation plan.[15] The Government of Prime Minister Péter Medgyessy (2002–6) undertook a review of Hungary's defense capabilities, set up plans to abolish conscription in 2005, and implemented a new bottom-up system of resource planning.[16] The Medgyessy Government also developed a new three-phase defense reform plan, as follows: reforming personnel and training; decreasing the number of officers; interoperability of units to be assigned to NATO; disposing of redundant armament and equipment (2002–6); further modernization and procurement (e.g., new vehicles, armaments, such as Gripen JAS 39 fighter planes, Harris and Kongsberg tactical radios, new transport vehicles); closing down more military facilities (2006–10); improving living and working conditions for Hungarian armed forces personnel (comparable with their NATO counterparts); developing attractive career paths in the military; and increasing the number of NCOs (2010–13).[17] In 2004, Péter Medgyessy resigned due to coalition issues and was succeeded by Ferenc Gyurcsány (2004–9), who also resigned in 2009 due to economic problems, and was followed by Gordon Bajnai. The contribution to defense reform of the governments of Ferenc Gyurcsány and Gordon Bajnai was to continue the reform of the armed forces to increase their professionalism and capability to fight the new security threats and challenges (i.e., become an effective expeditionary and deployable force), focusing on modernization, procurement, and strengthened international cooperation.[18] The size of the armed forces was reduced from 125,000 in 1989 to 24,950 in 2010.

## Democratic civilian control: slow progress

Since Hungary's armed forces had experienced civilian control (albeit non-democratic) before 1989 and had not enjoyed many prerogatives during the Communist regime (as compared, for example, with the armed forces in Southern Europe or Latin America), changes in the system in 1989 occurred with no resistance on the part of the military; therefore, setting up a new type of control of the military (i.e., democratic) was embraced by the military with no difficulty. Democratic control and oversight involve executive, legislative, and external bodies. Executive control and oversight reside with the Ministry of Defense (headed by a civilian minister), the National Security Council (NSC) (presided over, among others, by the President as chair, the Prime Minister, and the Chief of Defense), and the Secretariat for Foreign and Defense Policy (SFDP). The MOD (Ministry of Defense) has the authority to endorse the Armed Forces' command structure and operating measures, provide guidance with regard to military expenditure and acquisitions, establish suitable standards for human resources' management, and oversee

military education institutions.[19] The NSC acts as an advisory and decision-making body, while the SFDP oversees the activity of all security-related state agencies and also assists the NSC.[20] Legislative control and oversight of the armed forces are carried out by a permanent Parliamentary Defense Committee (bringing together representatives of all parties in parliament), which has the authority to adopt defense-related laws, scrutinize the performance of the armed forces, and monitor resources and expenditures. Its powers include access to various defense-related information and data, hearings, and screenings, as well as providing recommendations on the appropriateness of potential candidates for high-level military positions, among other duties.[21] In addition, the ombudsman, a position created in 1993, as well as the Parliamentary Commissioner for Human Rights and the State Audit Office, created in 1995, provides support to legislative control of the military.[22] Judicial review is exercised by the Constitutional Court, which assesses the constitutionality of defense and security-related laws.[23] External informal input with regard to the military by the NGOs, think tanks, academia, and the media completes the democratic civilian control of the armed forces in Hungary.[24]

Once could argue, based on the preceding discussion, that Hungary, on paper, has all the requirements for democratic civilian control described in Chapter 3 of this Handbook (institutional control mechanisms, oversight, professional norms). Nevertheless, democratic civilian control has been less than perfect in Hungary. First, there has been tension between the military and civilian worlds. To begin with, the separation for years of the MOD and the General Staff had negative CMR effects in that it led to parallelism, duplication, and the overlapping of responsibilities and functions between these two bureaucracies, which further generated competition between them, a refusal to cooperate and share information, and a lack of transparency (especially toward the MOD but also toward the parliament).[25] Tensions also existed between the military and civilians within the MOD, as the latter attempted to dilute military autonomy even in areas where they lacked competence (e.g., military–technical matters), while the former attempted to maintain supremacy in a wide spectrum of defense-related areas. According to scholars, these tensions have sporadically led to either a "re-militarization" of the armed forces (due to occasional increased influence of the military) or a "civilianization" of the armed forces (due to occasional increased civilian influence).[26] On the other hand, tension existed between the legislative branch and the military, especially due to the aloof attitude of the military (including the Minister of Defense) when legally requested by the legislature to make information available.[27] In addition, the legislature's "over-regulation" of the military sometimes inhibited swift decision-making within the armed forces.[28] Tensions also arose from the issue of military deployments abroad, which, until June 2000 (when a partial compromise was reached), fell under the jurisdiction of the parliament versus the executive. Not only was this procedure ineffective (for example, if the decision was to be made during the parliamentary vacation), but it also encouraged the politicization of foreign deployment.[29] Third, effective civilian control of the military in Hungary has been plagued by a lack of competence and expertise, as well as limited interest in defense matters, within the MOD and the oversight bodies. As previously mentioned, after 1989, the armed forces created positions for civilian subject matter experts; yet this opening did not immediately herald defense-related knowledge and culture among the newly employed civilians. It took time, sustained defense and security-related education, and training (even if for many years educational programs focused on military personnel to the detriment of the civilians) to build a pool of civilian expertise. Yet, according to sources from the military education institutions, even now, 20 years after the regime change, Hungary still faces expertise problems in that young graduates from universities (with BSc/BA degrees) are not mature and knowledgeable enough to be entrusted to develop documents of high security and defense importance.[30] On the other hand, during the first decade since the fall of Communism,

ministers of defense with limited expertise and/or interest in defense matters were appointed, based on political grounds and as a reward or part of a political deal, which not only weakened civilian control, but also military effectiveness by not allocating sufficient resources to the armed forces.[31]

The situation has changed lately: the new Minister of Defense is a former colonel who knows security and defense issues and challenges; his deputy (Parliamentary State Secretary) is a former vice-president of the Parliamentary Defense Committee, who can better build linkages between the legislature and the military to enrich civil–military relations. Lack of interest and especially expertise also applies to the Defense Committee within the legislature—despite the fact that many members have served for a long time on the Committee. According to sources from the Hungarian military, many members of the Committee did not get to be there based on their expertise or desire, but rather because they were either not good enough for anything else or they were "thrown" in there as a last resort. In addition, although many are invited to learn about defense (e.g., by attending courses and exercises sponsored by the MOD), they usually refuse to capitalize on these opportunities. Their lack of interest and expertise is mirrored in their inability to ask the right questions at the right time. Lack of expertise is further worsened by meager resources for defense-related research.[32] It took time (and it is still unfinished business) to create a political elite interested in and knowledgeable about defense and security issues. From the "expertise" standpoint, for example, the Deputy Chairman of the Committee is an NDU graduate and a General Staff course student. From the "interest" standpoint, members of the committee have become keener to oversee defense issues. In addition, the MOD has a liaison representative to the parliament; although this institution is not very powerful (e.g., it moves whatever legislation is drafted in the MOD to parliament), at least in the long run it could be beneficial to democratic control of the military by bringing the armed forces on to the parliamentarians' agenda. Furthermore, whenever deemed necessary, the committee holds meetings with other legislative committees to address pressing defense issues, while the monitoring authority has expanded with time.[33] In addition, Hungary's increasing involvement in international military operations has brought defense back on to the legislators' agenda.[34] Here, Hungary's legislative control faces a paradox in that the politicians think peace support operations (PSO) is good for anything, including prestige, but they do not know what is required (e.g., resources). For example, while 16 percent of the military's budget goes to military operations, a very limited percentage is allocated to procurement and modernization, which not only negatively impacts effectiveness of the armed forces in general, but also their effectiveness with regard to PSO, at the minimum, from the perspective of interoperability and compatibility. According to sources within the armed forces, the military budget is a "leftover," and is not (properly) debated by the Defense Committee. Moreover, civilians commit to many things without prior consultation with the military or prior knowledge of what is involved in achieving effectiveness in such missions (e.g., adequate resources).

The effectiveness of the external control and oversight is also questionable. Despite having numerous NGOs, think tanks, etc., Hungarian civil society is not very strong.[35] First is the lack of tradition in non-governmental defense and security research and education. Despite the abundance of NGOs and think tanks after 1989, research on defense and security happened mostly within the military or was conducted by retired military personnel in state institutions, such as the Zrinyi Miklos National Defense University and the Institute for Strategic and Defense Studies. Making the civil society learn and research about defense, therefore, has taken some time. Second is the dependence[36] (especially after 2000) of various NGOs on government support, in return for loyalty and total agreement with the MOD.[37] The media is two-faced: when everything goes well with regard to defense and the MOD, they provide balanced coverage; when something goes wrong concerning the armed forces, the media tends to dig for dirt and

become sensationalist. Nevertheless, some NGOs and think tanks have improved their ability to exercise external civilian control and to contribute to defense education and research—in particular after Hungary was integrated into NATO.[38]

## Effectiveness of the armed forces: a difficult yet not impossible aim

Although the Communist Party had issued some non-specific resolutions on defense, before 1989 there had been no written defense or military strategy (i.e., a single document). After 1989, defense and security policy (DSP) developed at a slow pace due to lack of experience and expertise (e.g., on what to do with the military, how to prepare the military for future roles and missions, what relations to build with different factions, including political arenas and civil society), as well as other priorities (e.g., economic reform). It was not until 1993, when the parliament issued the "Basic Principles of Security Policy," that the first document that dealt with security and defense was written; it was followed by the "Basic Principles of National Defense" later that year. These two documents set out roles and missions of the armed forces (e.g., to defend the country), as well as the basis of the Hungary's DSP, including the National Security Strategy (NSS) and the National Military Strategy (NMS).[39] Nevertheless, before 1997 (the year when Hungary was invited to accede to NATO) and 1999 (the year of actual accession into NATO), and even after NATO membership, Hungary had no NSS, or NMS. It has been a long-awaited process. In the Spring of 2001, the newly appointed Secretary Bali with his colleagues from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) designed and developed the first NSS (MFA is in charge of the coordination of the development of the NSS), which was approved by the Parliament in 2002. The process was integrative in that the MOD and MFA invited outsiders (including civil society, parliament members) to discuss and debate the Strategy. The National Security Strategy sets the stage for the development of ministerial strategies, such as Military, Foreign Relations, Law Enforcement, Finance, Information Systems, and the like (Hungary's NSS). Until now, however, only the Foreign Relations and Military Strategies have been developed. NMS was developed in 2008 by the Minister of Defense. He invited representatives of the General Staff and the Ministry of Justice to assist in developing it. In addition, civilian experts (e.g., the former Deputy Secretary of Defense Policy, think tanks, researchers, and others) were invited to debate it. Interestingly, the Ministry of Defense also invited the representatives of the Ministry of Finance so that the latter could learn and understand what is required to ensure effectiveness of the armed forces' roles and missions (especially budget-related issues), with the ultimate goal of increasing funding for the military. The NMS was adopted in 2009. Today, DSP in Hungary consists of a hierarchy of different documents, including the Constitution (which is being rewritten as we speak, and will be approved later), the Law on Hungary Defense Forces, Resolution No. 94/1998 of the 1998 Hungarian National Assembly on "The Basic Principles of the Security and Defense Policy of the Republic of Hungary," NATO's Strategic Concept and all other related documents, as well as the EU Common Security and Defense Policy.

## Meager resources

In general, Hungary's military has suffered from a reduced budget. Until 1997, the military did not represent a priority for reform,[40] and elected civilians focused on ensuring that the armed forces were "not too great a drain on the state finances," which basically meant ensuring the military got paid, but increasingly cutting military budgets for any reform programs.[41] The lack of financial resources held back military restructuring and modernization programs (including procurement,

as well as research and development),[42] stalled domestic and international education and training (including PfP-conducted exercises, which are very important for interoperability with international allies and partners), made recruitment difficult (as well as retaining volunteers), and reduced the morale within the armed forces (due to relatively low pay and poor housing conditions).[43] It was not until NATO integration that Hungary saw an increase in the defense budget. Yet, since then, the defense budget has been decreasing continuously. Moreover, 9/11 was an eye opener for reconstructing the Hungarian armed forces, especially from the perspective of increasing interoperability with NATO. Hungary has contributed troops to Afghanistan, and although Al Qaeda is not a major direct threat to Hungary's national security, it has been a threat to its military in Afghanistan (i.e., "withdraw or suffer more casualties"). Decision-makers seem to pay little attention to this.

## Interagency coordination and cooperation, and NATO membership

The preceding discussion reveals that Hungary's military has been constantly struggling to achieve effectiveness, due to insufficient resources and even precarious plans and policies. Nevertheless, Hungary provides an example of how, despite these difficulties, a military can achieve effectiveness— through sub-regional/regional cooperation, NATO membership, as well as participation in international missions led by the UN, NATO, the OSCE, etc. Even if the traditional external threat has virtually disappeared (which, however, Hungary's military does not totally exclude), which has minimized the armed forces' focus on territorial defense (or fighting external wars), participation in regional and international peace operations, humanitarian relief, and counterterrorism efforts are a few of Hungary's military current roles and missions. Hungary's contribution to regional cooperation has encompassed participation in the Visegrad group, the Central European Initiative, the Southeast European Cooperative Initiative, and the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe. NATO/EU membership requirements and accession programs such as PfP, the Individual Partnership Program (IPP), and the Planning and Review Process (PARP) have helped strengthen Hungary's armed forces' interoperability and compatibility with its Western counterparts. Effective contribution to UN, NATO, EU, and OSCE operations has included the following: strategic airlift capabilities; a deployable command, control, communications, and computer information system module; a deployable communication module for operation theaters; and military medicine capabilities, such as the Operational Military Liaison Teams (OMLT) and Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in theater. Regional cooperation has encompassed participation in the Hungarian–Romanian Peacekeeping Battalion, the Multilateral Land Force with Italy's Julia Alpine Brigade, Slovenia, and Croatia (since 2010), and the Tisa Multinational Engineer Battalion with Romania, Ukraine, and Slovakia. Hungary is currently contributing some 1,000 personnel to international operations and missions, including Iraq (3), KFOR (245), EU/UN/OSCE-led operations (290), Afghanistan (564)—a very significant number for the overall 25,000 military force. Hungary's capabilities and professionalism have been praised on numerous occasions by its foreign counterparts.[44] As recognition of Hungary's effective contribution to international missions (especially in the field of military medicine), in 2009, NATO established in Hungary a NATO Centre of Excellence for Military Medicine as the primary source of military medicine expertise for NATO and to provide subject matter expertise in medical training and evaluation. Its main task is to create doctrines, concepts, and strategies. Another case of effectiveness while lacking resources is Hungary and another 11 countries' joint procurement of C-17 aircraft in the Strategic Airlift Capability Project in 2008/2009 to compensate for a deficiency in strategic airlift capabilities in NATO;[45] the 12 countries operate together and share the aircraft flight hours, etc. According to sources in the MOD, Hungary may

be a bad partner with regard to defense planning (e.g., constantly changing the goals of the armed forces), but it is a great partner in other aspects of defense coalitions.

## Professional military education (PME): a good pool for civilian expertise

Professional military education (PME) in Hungary comes under the authority of the Zrínyi Miklós Military Academy (ZMNDU), which was set up on September 1, 1996, by the Act on Higher Education, by fusing three former higher military education institutions: Bolyai János Military Technical College, Kossuth Lajos Military College, and Szolnok Air Force College. ZMNDU is the sole institute of higher military education in Hungary for both military officers and civilian experts. The Academy features two faculties: Kossuth Lajos Military Science Faculty, which prepares military and civilian experts in the field of national defense and military, and Bolyai János Military Technical Faculty, which prepares officers in the field of military and security technology. ZMNDU follows the Bologna Process, aimed at the establishment of a unified European Framework of Higher Education, which includes the following: higher military/national defense leadership training and professional training through a three-year basic education (Bachelor BSc/BA), followed, after some years of service, by a two-year advanced education (Masters, MSc/MA degree), as well as PhD education, further general and professional training courses, and other short courses (including language training). The Academy has very thorough admission requirements and procedures to secure the enrollment of highly qualified and competent students.[46] PME (alongside job performance) is very important for the officers' career paths: a BSc/BA degree and a basic military training for 3 months at the Hungarian Defense Forces Central Training Base (CTB) (which will be addressed below) are required for Lieutenant rank; specific courses are required for promotion to Captain and Major; additional training and an MA/MSc degree are required for promotion to Lieutenant Colonel; a General Staff Training Course is required for promotion to COL; and a War College course is required for promotion to General. Curricula cover security and defense policy, national security, military leadership, civil–military relations, civil–military cooperation, mechanical engineering, defense administration, financing and accounting, military and security technology, military logistics, disaster relief, defense leadership, forces' operational theory (army, air), defense information technology, military history and geography, military psychology and sociology, human resource management, intelligence, chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) weapons protection, defense law, military technology, environmental security and disaster relief, ethics, morality and code of conduct, foreign languages, etc. The Military Academy also conducts research in the realm of military sciences and military technical sciences. PME includes joint education and training with other national security forces and institutions (e.g., the police, intelligence agencies, correctional prison services, disaster relief, fire fighters, civil defense organizations, as well as local governments). To ensure a better "jointness" of the security forces' education and training, Hungary is now working on a project to combine three educational institutions in one: the Public Administration University, the Police Academy, and the National Defense Academy.

Apart from educating and training military officers, the NDU also educates civilians and future subject matter experts who will work for the security agencies and defense committee in the fields of defense, law enforcement, and national security. Journalists, marketing directors, and diplomats interested in security can also enroll in the NDU. NDU helps inculcate civilians with a high level of awareness and responsibility for defense programs as well as a wide understanding of war and politics. Civilian students also benefit from short-term internships at the Defense Committee, intelligence agencies, the MOD, and internships in NATO/EU premises

(e.g., Germany for the EU and Brussels for NATO). Such a broad opening of the NDU to civilians is two-fold. On the one hand, it is the outcome of a 1995-conducted British Transillumination Study (by the UK MOD), which urged Hungary to establish education for those civilians who work with security to ensure better civil–military relations and civilian expertise in defense matters. On the other hand, civilians represent a considerable (and increasing)[47] source of income for the NDU (for example, of the approximately 2.7 billion Forint NDU budget, 800 million Forint come from civilians).[48] Although the politicians do seem to accept NDU's use of civilians as a source of income and are looking into ways of reducing the number of civilians, their "plan" to cut back on civilians may be postponed for a while as Hungary is to hold the EU presidency during the first half of 2011. Hence, the government and other institutions will need more civilian expertise (including students from NDU). In addition, ZMNDU cooperates with its foreign counterparts by involving faculty and students in international scientific cooperative endeavors (such as the NATO Research and Technology Organization, the NASA Goddard Space Flight Center, and the Technikon Pretoria University of Technology), exchanging students, faculty, and administrative staff, and educating foreign students (e.g., a course for Algerian officers, or the General Staff Courses which had two foreigners from Germany and Ukraine). Since 2007, Hungary has been implementing the "military Erasmus" project to provide comparable diplomas to Europe and offer transfer credits among European military education institutions, based on the harmonized curricula. Of the 261 faculty members, 94 are officers, six are NCOs and 161 civilians. Having a greater number of civilian faculty has no correlation with the quality of academic instruction; it is the expertise, skills, and competence that matter. A civilian faculty helps broaden the perspectives and expertise of their military students. An important sign of the wide range of training and education is the large variety of students, including cadets, in-service officers, as well as civilian students.

The University's activity and performance are overseen by the Minister of Defense through the Chief of the Cabinet and the Human Resources Management Directorate. The curricula are developed and changed by the MoD (e.g., the Human Resources Management Directorate, the Operations and Training Dept. of the General Staff). Exams are "governed" by civilians (through the civilian legal framework). In addition, the Hungarian Accreditation Committee of Higher Education has the lawful right to authorize and assess the quality of education and scientific activities of the Academy. Every eight years the Committee assesses the ZMNDU accreditation requirements as well as the adequacy of the programs, including the institutional program curricula, the fulfillment of program and graduation requirements, the adequacy of the faculty qualifications, and the quality of the infrastructure in respect to the given program.

NCOs (as well as officers who graduated from civilian universities and did not have basic military training) are educated and trained at the Hungarian Defense Forces Central Training Base (CTB) (created to ensure standardized basic training for all Hungary's military personnel, and subordinated to the Ministry of Defense, more precisely the Operations and Training Department), and the NCO Vocational School (NCOVS) (to ensure training and follow-on courses for Hungarian NCOs).[49] The career path for non-commissioned officers consists of 18 months to two years of education at the NCO Vocational School to become a Sergeant, while promotion is based on additional advanced internal training. To become a Warrant Officer, a higher level of education (e.g., vocational training, including English language, based on NATO STANAG 1 and 2) is required, which is ensured by the NCOVS. CTB has been able to standardize military basic training for the incoming approximately 600 contracting soldiers and 54 NCO students a year. The value of CTB is that it is state-recognized (civilian-registered), which allows NCOs, after serving in the military, to work in civilian institutions in the field in which they were educated. NCO education and training follow EU norms based on module

training. According to sources in the General Staff, following the EU model is very useful as the NCOs can interrupt their education and training if required and complete a mission but continue after their return (or even change from one specialty to another). It should also be noted that civilians can also benefit from the CTB training (e.g., engineers). Likewise, based on bilateral agreements, the CTB also trains fire fighters for basic military-type skills but without English training. And the Center also works with its foreign counterparts. It is worth mentioning the 2008 Train the Trainers course conducted with Australian and New Zealand participants. A recent success is the Counter Improvised Explosive Devices tailored course conducted in residence at CTB in August 2010, in cooperation with the NATO School in Oberammergau (which provided administrative and operational support), for 27 Iraqi officers (including generals), which received excellent feedback from the participants (and may hence become a regular among resident courses). In addition, the CTB provides out-of-country training (e.g., for officers in Afghanistan). The Center is also opening up toward society to "bring civilians in military life" by stimulating interest, understanding, and knowledge in defense, and also ensuring recruitment. For example, December 1 is the "open gate" day when prospective students are invited to learn about defense. On "Aviation Day" (July 7), the school puts on an air show.

The Peacekeeping Forces Training Centre, created in 1993, also contributes to the PME by providing education and training in the fields of peace, stability and reconstruction operations, arms control, and democratic civilian control of the military. The Centre works closely with NATO and has links to several countries, including Norway, Sweden, Austria, the Netherlands, France, the United States, and Germany.[50] In addition, a civilian university was established in 1997 that teaches defense and security issues, while civilian high schools have recently introduced defense/military subjects into their curricula and grant students extra points if they attend the courses and pass the exams. Other educational programs and training with NATO partners and allies occur under the umbrella of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, the Individual Partnership Program (IPP), and the Planning and Review Process (PARP).

PME's aim is to achieve the three levels of interoperability with NATO in terms of education and training: (1) language (through STANAGS); (2) human/structure interoperability (e.g., knowledge of the procedures, ROEs); and (3) operational (to prevent jeopardizing the mission and endangering peers' lives). Although the university is on the right track in this context, faculty representatives identified a few challenges to effectively fulfilling these objectives, including limited command of foreign languages within the university's faculty (e.g., ZMNDU has only a few professors who can provide presentations in English, French, etc.); difficulty in keeping up to date with changes in the fields of study; and virtually limited faculty with mission experience (which is very important when teaching not only cadets but also officers). Sources within the GS agree there is a need to develop a new concept for educational assessment, for example, since there were already two graduate classes in the Bologna program, they deemed it necessary to develop an assessment of whether or not the Bologna system was beneficial to the PME. The GS also believe that a new language policy and software are needed.

## Conclusion: lessons learned and best practices

This chapter looked at Hungary's attempts to develop democratic civil–military relations after the fall of the Communist regime in December 1989. There is a lesson learned here. Hungary is an example of the successful development of effective armed forces. The road to effectiveness, however, has been long and hampered by several obstacles. To begin with, in the aftermath of the regime change, security and defense reform (including strategy and policy) in Hungary has not been a top priority on the political agenda. As in many other countries that transitioned from

non-democratic regimes to democracies, economic reforms received the most attention from the political elites. As indicated by Pál Dunay, Hungary shows that "in a benign regional security environment, defense remains a vulnerable policy sector, especially in comparison to those areas which have a more direct bearing upon the economic competitiveness."[51] For many years, military "reform" involved merely downsizing personnel and military units, as well as heavy budgetary cuts for the armed forces. In addition, for many years, civil–military relations in Hungary were characterized by a lack of interest and limited expertise by the new political elites in the military and security realm, as well as limited allocation of money to modernization of the armed forces. As Ferenc Molnar puts it: "Hungarian armed forces wasted significant material and human resources due to mismanaged transformation of the military."[52]

But despite insufficient resources and even precarious plans and policies, Hungary managed to develop an effective military. Of late, Hungary has incrementally strengthened democratic civil–military relations (e.g., improvement of the legal framework related to security and defense, attempts to build new democratic institutions, including developing an expeditionary force, establishing international cooperation units, institutionalizing democratic control bodies, bringing about new security and defense policies, consolidating professional military education and education of civilians in the military field, and others), a process that was accepted without resistance from the military. PME, whose objective is achieving the three levels of interoperability with NATO in terms of education and training, has also contributed to improved military effectiveness. These led to a better understanding on the civilian[53] side of the need for an effective military (especially due to Hungary's NATO/EU membership duties and obligations) in a security environment that lacks the threat of a traditional adversary. To this end, NATO membership itself (more than NATO membership requirements) has greatly impacted the democratization of civil–military relations, in that it forced the Hungarian government to implement relevant reforms. Under the NATO/EU/OSCE/UN umbrella, Hungary has become an important and effective contributor to military operations in the Balkans, the Middle East, and Africa. Although a NATO member for years, Hungary does not show a laissez-faire attitude toward CMR, as compared, for example, to Romania. On the contrary, it continues to improve CMR, in particular with regard to developing DSP and improving PME. Thus, Hungary can be a relevant CMR case study in terms of developing an effective force through NATO integration, international cooperation, and PME.

## Acknowledgments

## Notes

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12 Takacs, "Reform of Civil–Military Relations in Hungary."

13 A different situation from other countries which sped up reform prior to NATO integration but under-went a "relaxation" period after accession (e.g., Romania).

14 Dunay, "The Half-Hearted Transformation."

15 Including the long-awaited merger between the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff in 2000, the establishment of the National Security Cabinet (NSC) (an advisory and decision-making body in defense-related issues) and of the Secretariat for Foreign and Defense Policy (which monitors the policies and activities of all the security-related ministries and supports the work of the NSC). Takacs, "Reform of Civil–Military Relations in Hungary"; Hitrov, "Civil–Military Relations in Post-Communist Countries."

16 Dunay, "The Half-Hearted Transformation"; Hitrov, "Civil–Military Relations in Post-Communist Countries."

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28 Yaniszewski, "Post-Communist Civil-Military Reform."

29 Ibid.

30 The problem with finding jobs rests within the Ministry of Public Administration and Justice as those in need of experts require experienced people (who are old) and thus old people are accepted rather than young graduates.

31 Dunay, "The Half-Hearted Transformation."

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36 The NGOs, by virtue of their name, should be out of the state influence and support, to be able to exercise unbiased civilian control.
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39 Tibor Bozo, "Hungary a Member of NATO: The Road to Membership of NATO 1990–99", US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013, Strategy Research Project, April 2003.
40 Civilians thought transformation meant only downsizing the military.
41 Except for a minor increase in 1993. Dunay, "The Half-Hearted Transformation,"
42 Instead of buying new equipment, Hungary improved old Russian equipment (minor modernization in air defense), and cut back an various infantry unit numbers, while C4I, reconnaissance, and ISTAR capabilities remained very limited.
43 RESDAL, "Central European Civil–Military Relations", available at: www.resdal.org/cgi-bin/resdal/ice/ice2-for?KEYWORDS=poland (accessed August 9, 2012); Yaniszewski, "Post-Communist Civil–Military Reform"; "Breakthrough of Civil–Military Relations"; Takacs, "Reform of Civil–Military Relations in Hungary."
44 Bozo, "Hungary a Member of NATO."
45 The MoU was signed on September 23, 2008 and the inauguration happened on July 27, 2009.
46 I.e., a combination of annual high school GPA, required admission exams, foreign language proficiency (especially English), and/or sporting activity skills, or science.
47 The number of students increased each year; there are now 5,000 students, of which only 1,200 are military.
48 Sources from the NDU.
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50 Sebestyen Gorka, "Hungarian Military Reform and Peacekeeping Efforts," *NATO Review* 6(43) (November 1995): 26–9.
51 Dunay, "The Half-Hearted Transformation," p. 29.
52 Molnar, "Military Reforms in Hungary."
53 This means including the society. The military is the second most highly regarded state institution, after the fire brigade. The majority of the population supports the military, but if the number of casualties increases, they may no longer support it.

# 19

# REDEFINING DEFENSE STRATEGY

## France

*Hélène Dieck*

## Introduction

In a context of strategic uncertainty and with its relative power declining, France must constantly redefine and adapt the missions of its armed forces. Even if the delineation of these missions is the responsibility of the political leadership, the process, more often than not, necessitates the development of equipment and training programs spanning longer than a single electoral cycle. When thinking about the next 15 years, choices are constrained by current programs and institutions. In the words of the former Chief of Defense: "The Ministry of Defense is an enormous ocean liner that one can't easily maneuver."[1] In this context, to what extent can the President of France have an impact on the armed forces? How can one nation define its defense policy and strategy for the next 15 years and ensure it will be effectively and efficiently implemented? How does it assess the subsequent need for troops, equipment, and training?

A few months after being elected, French President Nicolas Sarkozy responded to this challenge by mandating a commission, headed by State Councilor Jean-Claude Mallet, to develop recommendations for a White Paper on defense and national security.[2] This Commission received its mandate on July 26, 2007, and it published the White Paper in June 2008.[3] On June 17, 2008, Nicolas Sarkozy presented his major defense and security policy decisions in a press conference.[4] At the time of the elaboration on the White Paper, several major strategic decisions were already in the making, including the return to NATO's integrated military command and the creation of a new permanent military base in the United Arab Emirates.[5] The Commission for the White Paper helped develop recommendations for the implementation of those decisions, while also advancing new concepts, missions, institutions, and priorities that are still debated today.

The White Paper intends to define a comprehensive concept for defense and security for the next 10–15 years. This entails an overarching reappraisal of the strategic context as well as military capabilities, institutions, and missions. Writing a White Paper is not a generalized exercise among democracies. In France, White Paper commission members such as François Heisbourg believe the French process can successfully be implemented in other countries.[6] It was indeed well received by France's allies such as the United Kingdom and Germany.[7] But

why was this White Paper considered of quality? How do you ensure that a White Paper is more than the result of bureaucratic interests? This chapter answers these questions primarily based on interviews with White Paper commission members from the Ministry of Defense and from civil society, as well as defense experts.

## Delimiting the scope of the French White Paper

Instead of updating the 1994 White Paper, the Commission chose to start from scratch and recommended major changes in very broad realms, including the strategic context, missions, alliances, capabilities, and institutions. According to some members of the commission, this all-encompassing mandate was too broad.

### *Major decisions*

The previous French White Paper was released in 1994. Work on a new White Paper was ordered by the Edouard Balladur government in 1993. At the time, the head of the government and the President belonged to opposite political parties. Once the presidential prerogatives regarding defense, nuclear dissuasion, and NATO were maintained and the final draft reviewed, the President officially signed off the White Paper.[8] Despite the cohabitation government, both sides agreed on the main issue at stake: maintaining a combination of a professional and a conscription army. The election of President Jacques Chirac the following year and his willingness to push for reform to end conscription in 1996 made this part of the White Paper obsolete.[9] The transition to a professional army called for a new relationship between French society and its armed forces. Another major change unaccounted for in the 1994 White Paper is France's involvement in post-Cold War, post-9/11 conflicts such as Kosovo and Afghanistan.

According to François Heisbourg, the last White Paper was a good paper and dealt with all the relevant threat types, apart maybe from cyber warfare. But what has changed was how those threats interact with each other and with the effects of globalization.[10] Particularly since 9/11, the perception of rising threats calls for new capabilities. The new White Paper recommends new equipment and methods to fight against terrorism, cyber threats, and failing states, while coping with natural disasters and climate change.

These new threats necessitate a new approach. The White Paper defines for the first time a strategy for both defense and security, recognizing both that today's threats require a comprehensive response and that the military does not suffice alone.[11] These types of threats also led to the definition of a fifth strategic function: knowledge and anticipation now complement the functions of prevention, nuclear deterrence, protection of the territory, and intervention abroad. The White Paper calls for the development of intelligence capabilities, from space to the field of prospective studies. As an illustration of this new priority, the National Agency for the Security of Information Systems (Agence nationale de la sécurité des systèmes d'information, ANSSI) was established in 2009 under the auspices of the General Secretariat for Defense and National Security (Secrétariat général de la défense et de la sécurité nationale, SGDSN). Apart from securing the government's information systems, the new agency also advises and supports other administrations and vital sectors, in addition to researching and development security technology.[12]

Moreover, the French White Paper recognizes its strategic interest as situated in an axis stretching from the Atlantic to the Mediterranean, the Gulf, and the Indian Ocean. As a consequence, France intends to reduce its level of involvement on the African continent, stepping down from defense agreements signed following decolonization to bilateral "partnerships."

These "partnerships" have already been negotiated and are intended to be approved by the parliament and made public.[13] However, recent developments in Tunisia, the Ivory Coast, and Libya have demonstrated the difficulty of implementing this new defense policy.[14]

Furthermore, the White Paper states French ambitions for a European defense, while at the same time advocating a close relationship with NATO.

Based on the new definitions of these missions and on budget constraints, the White Paper recommends a new format for the armies, including an operational ground force of 88,000 men: 30,000 soldiers ready to be deployed on six months notice, 5,000 on permanent alert, and 10,000 dedicated to homeland protection. The Navy will be composed of 18 frigates, six SSNs, one aircraft carrier, and 300 combat aircraft shared with the Air Force. Nuclear capabilities are maintained and will continue to be shared by the Air Force and the Navy. Finally, defense procurement will be determined by two priorities. First, the necessary modernization of the frequently used equipment calls for additional resources for force protection, maintenance, armored vehicles, and anti-air and anti-cruise missile protection for Navy ships. Second, new intelligence capabilities will focus on detection and early warning systems, cyber-intelligence, observation, and knowledge-based security.[15] Funding for military satellites will be doubled and a Joint Space Command (Commandement Interarmées de l'Espace, CIE) was established in 2010. Finally, the position of national defense coordinator was created. He or she answers directly to the President, helps develop intelligence objectives and assets, and prepares national intelligence councils.

## Did the White Paper on defense and national security go too far?

While some commentators and allies praised the level of detail and precision of the White Paper, the main criticism emanating from the Chief of Defense, General Jean-Louis Georgelin, was that the White Paper overstepped its powers and dealt with organizational issues and particular capabilities and processes.[16] He argued that those items should have been decided during a defense and security council meeting, with permanent members only. Indeed, decisions such as the creation of new institutions were debated with all the commission members, including representatives from think tanks. Institutions recommended by the White Paper such as an MoD Finance Committee, which is not considered useful by the military branch, seem, according to him, unlikely to become effective.

According to the former Chief of Defense, Jean-Louis Georgelin, those who are not required to bear the consequences of their decisions should not be part of the decision-making process.[17] Members of think tanks and other military thinkers who have never been and never will be on the frontlines of a combat zone, referred to pejoratively as the "*colloqueux*," (meaning civilians attending many conferences, thinking theoretically but without operational experience and responsibilities) provide a valuable contribution to the discussion on the strategic context, but they lack the authority to decide on such things as procurement priorities, procurement procedures, or the number of tanks the Army should have. For instance, even if a second aircraft carrier makes sense strategically, it would have burdened the budget to the point of damaging other important programs. In the general's view, the White Paper should have been limited to the strategic context, the analysis of the different threats to defense and national security, and the delineation between defense and domestic security. Instead, "the chief of defense ended up with the White Paper's bill." Nonetheless, the full weight of effort of the Joint Staff contributed to overcome this problem.[18] The debate on the scope of the White Paper is the consequence of the inclusive process sought by the President.

## Ensuring an effective yet inclusive process

The President's leadership was important to ensure the effectiveness of the process. For the first time, non-governmental representatives were part of the commission for the White Paper. They were able to challenge the status quo and promote reforms.

### *Political leadership*

President Sarkozy was under no obligation to undertake this review. He chose to do so as a way for a newly-elected president to get an overview of the current defense framework and to develop and implement his own guidelines.[19] The process chosen for this commission was modeled on previous presidential reviews such as the Balladur Commission for Constitutional Reform in 2007 and 2008 or the Attali Commission on Economic Growth in 2007 and 2010.[20] The 35 members of the Commission were chosen by the President and placed under the aegis of an interagency secretariat under the responsibility of the Prime Minister.[21] This interagency secretariat facilitated the participation of every ministry linked to defense and national security: defense, foreign affairs, interior, budget, finance, and education.[22] Other members included two deputies and two senators representing the majority and the opposition,[23] lawyers, researchers, economists, and representatives from defense industries. Two-thirds of the commission were civilian and military officials, while one-third were non-governmental.

Including the participation of non-governmental officials in the discussions runs the risk of creating a paper so different from bureaucratic interests that it is rejected, as the German White Paper was in 1998.[24] But in the case of the French White Paper, according to the Chief of Defense, the collaboration from the joint staffs helped keep the propositions realistic.[25] In addition to the participation of non-governmental representatives, the commission also heard from 52 individuals from 14 different countries. Heading this Commission, Jean-Claude Mallet was a high-ranking, non-partisan official, reporting back to the President in case arbitration was necessary. He consulted with ministers, labor unions, and local representatives.[26] The President of the Republic also guaranteed that all Commission members would have access and adequate security clearance to review all relevant information.

Eight members of the Commission participated in closed-door sessions with the directors of the intelligence agencies.[27] The same precautions were needed for financial data from the Budget Ministry, which traditionally does not easily share information. In order to ensure that this process would have a real impact, it was also important not to allow "substitutes to the principals," and to include the heads of the major military branches in the discussions since they are responsible for implementing the decisions.[28]

### *A clear mandate*

Before the Commission's review, the President set some boundaries and criteria for the Commission's discussions. First of all, he forbade the Commission from discussing ending France's nuclear deterrence capabilities. Even though this program represents 20 percent of the defense budget, dismantling it would only yield savings in the ten-year timeframe, being of no benefit to a sitting president. Nuclear deterrence also represents one of the hallmarks of the President's political party since General de Gaulle first outlined France's nuclear strategy.

Second, in his mission letter, he announced his intention to maintain the defense budget at 2 percent of French GDP.[29] Thanks to this knowledge, the Commission was able to fully affect the military spending bill (Loi de Programmation Militaire, LPM) and to coordinate with the

general review of public policies (Revue Générale des Politiques Publiques, RGPP) as well.[30] This general review aimed to deliver a more effective administration of government, including the defense sector.

Finally, as noted earlier, the President decided to reintegrate France into the military command of NATO, finalizing a process initiated in the 1990s.

## Defense Council meetings

Throughout the process, the President convened the Defense Council[31] on four separate occasions in order to arbitrate between several options presented by Commission members. These meetings facilitated the President's ownership of the process.[32]

This interaction with the Commission's work had several advantages; the council's decisions had executive power and ensured the ownership of the President and his major advisors: the Prime Minister, Chief of Defense, the Defense Minister, the Interior Minister, the Foreign Affairs Minister, the Treasury Minister, the Budget Minister, and the Finance Minister. According to researcher and member of the French White Paper Commission François Heisbourg, this process is crucial to the effectiveness of a White Paper and partly explains why the German White Paper in 1998 failed to be implemented.[33]

One of the points of tension that was debated in a Defense Council meeting was the balance between intelligence capabilities and traditional military hardware. On one hand, because "knowledge without power is an illusion," the Chief of Defense (CHOD) denounced the idea of "an army of satellites," when "a fight is always won on the battlefield."[34] On the other hand, the military was seen as always privileging "the shooters and not the sensors."[35] However, both sides agreed that the mission "anticipation and knowledge" had to be raised as a strategic function along with new investments in intelligence gathering capabilities. Finally, a new intelligence coordinator position was created and is directly attached to the President's office.

## Broad representation

Outside experts were consulted for the White Papers of 1972 and 1994 on an "as needed" basis, whereas these experts were permanent members of this White Paper Commission, playing a key and integrated role within the Commission. Outside experts had the same voice in the discussions as their military counterparts. Not only were they able to question the assumptions entrenched in the military organizational culture and bring a fresh perspective on defense issues, but they also influenced the final decisions. This broad representation contributed to improving the quality of the White Paper and prevented it from being the result only of bureaucratic interests.[36]

Nevertheless, the broad participation of researchers, sometimes lacking basic knowledge about defense issues, alienated part of the military inside and outside of the Commission. In effect, the military sometimes felt that those Commissioners were neither competent nor legitimate to take part in the discussions. Efforts were made to improve some Commissioners' understanding of the military by embedding them in current operations in Afghanistan or Lebanon, where they were able to talk to military officers on the ground. But like the representatives from the military interviewed in public sessions, these soldiers were representing the military and could not easily voice their real concerns. One way to overcome this problem would have been to organize closed sessions or to interview reserve members or retired officers who could speak more freely. Another problem with the representation of the military personnel was the absence of a low-ranking military commissioner or any hearing of an officer

below the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel, while high-ranking military members of the Commission for the most part deferred their opinions to those of the CHOD, a five-star general.

In addition to the Commission's plenary sessions, representation was broadened by seven workshops focusing exclusively on the following issues: strategic context, alliances, defense and security policy, defense research and industries, defense and society, institutions, and human resources.[37] The aim was to think about the details that the Commissioners did not have the time to go into. Each workshop included more than 30 participants, bringing to the surface tension points that the Commission was going to have to deal with. Each workshop was headed by a Commission member and had its own ways of working.[38]

Finally, the Commission sought the views of the public. If the Commission's deliberations were secret to preserve sensitive information, hearings were videotaped and broadcast on an official website dedicated to the development of the White Paper.[39] This website encouraged everyone to submit comments and ideas, which were then read by the members of the Commission, including Jean-Claude Mallet.[40] The relationship between a nation and its armed forces was discussed with the public in a fruitful debate organized by the Senate. The final published White Paper is available to the public free of charge on this same website and is conveniently translated into English.

## Implementation

Once the President had made his decisions, the White Paper was debated in the parliament, which also voted subsequent changes to the defense law.[41] Despite the presidential and legislative backing, the White Paper still is not always used as an official point of reference by the different actors in France's defense and national security. The problem of legitimate representation of military interests within the Commission is one of the reasons for the difficulties regarding the implementation of the White Paper.

### *The problem of ownership and its consequences*

As mentioned above, opening the Commission to members from outside the government, some of whom were not particularly familiar with defense issues and were sometimes ridiculed by the CHOD, alienated the French military community.[42] In addition, merging the defense sector into a broader defense and security continuum was sometimes perceived as ignoring the specificity of the military. This White Paper Commission was headed by civilians,[43] and the military personnel often confuse even today the decisions made by the White Paper and the reduction in the size of the armed forces decided by the RGPP.[44] The military, having no labor unions to represent their interests, voiced their concerns in an anonymous piece in the daily newspaper, *Le Figaro*.[45] All these problems did not facilitate the process of ownership in the military, and as a consequence the White Paper is not always considered a point of reference inside and outside the Ministry of Defense.[46] For example, military doctrine should use the White Paper as the primary reference, but doctrine centers such as the joint concepts and doctrine center (Centre interarmées de concepts, de doctrines et d'expérimentations, CICDE) do not feel obliged to refer to the document.[47] One way to overcome the lack of ownership and the need for specific knowledge would have been to better integrate into the discussion defense research and doctrine centers from the MoD. However, the Chief of Defense sought to be the sole representative of the armed forces.[48]

Nonetheless, according to a representative from the MoD who worked closely with Jean-Claude Mallet on the White Paper, the military has not realized how much the final document

serves their interests by rethinking the notion of national security, or matching their missions with their actions.[49] Moreover, as pointed out by the Chief of Defense at the time, the major impact of the White Paper was its translation into the *Loi de Programmation Militaire* (LPM, Military Spending Bill), a defense spending plan voted on in parliament every five to six years.[50] According to the former CHOD, because of the existence of this LPM, there is no need to refer to the White Paper directly and the utility of ownership within the Ministry of Defense is limited.

This lack of ownership is also visible among the other actors involved in France's national security, such as the Interior, Health, and Finance Ministries.[51] Concerning the European and Foreign Affairs Ministry, the White Paper recommended the creation of an "Operational Center for External Crisis Management" in charge of advance planning, execution, and termination of military interventions. However, foreign affairs officials do not feel obliged to follow the recommendations of the White Paper. One cell was created, but it is solely responsible for humanitarian or consulate crises (for example, if an embassy needs to be evacuated), and only provides financial resources. This cell is headed by a civilian from the Interior Ministry. Another interagency task force deals with crisis management, but it can only provide experts to deal with the crisis. The financial crisis did not help the deepening of the interagency process wanted by the White Paper, as each Ministry seeks to defend its interests more vigorously than ever.[52] As a consequence, even though this White Paper was meant to innovate by covering a large spectrum of ministries involved in security matters, the only ministry that seemed to feel partly constrained by its conclusions remains the Ministry of Defense.

## Longevity

This White Paper is likely to be in use at least through 2012, as the newly elected President, François Hollande, settles in. The new President might arbitrate in favor of other procurement priorities, for instance, or might prefer another school of thought in international relations than the one adopted by the commission.

Apart from the next elections, a question might arise as to whether the financial crisis will impact the decisions taken in terms of budget. According to some members of the commission, the impact of the White Paper should not be affected by this crisis.[53] The crisis started a few months after the Commission finalized the White Paper, which avoided a White Paper focused on finding ways to save money. Unlike the British process in 2010, this crisis will unlikely affect the concepts and doctrines in the White Paper. According to Commissioners, the analysis of the strategic context is unlikely to need updates in the next few years.[54] It might only impact some of the hypotheses for the predictions of costs: if the crisis discourages potential buyers from investing in the Rafale aircraft, for example, the cost of production will increase.[55]

So far, some adaptations have been made to the LPM. The LPM was voted on July 31, 2009 and covers the years 2009–14.[56] Following the recommendations of the White Paper and the RGPP, the budget reflected the decisions of trimming the personnel while improving their equipment. Out of the €185 billion budget, €101 billion will be allocated to equipment. Due to the financial crisis, the remaining €95 billion for the years 2011–13 was cut by 3.7 percent.[57] Even so, the defense budget will increase by 3 percent from 2011 to 2013. For the year 2011 only, the budget cut is compensated for by exceptional receipts (the Ministry of Defense sold properties and radio frequencies). As a consequence, the difference between the 2011 defense budget and the budget approved by the LPM is only €40 million. With the British government cutting its budget by 15–20 percent, the Sarkozy presidency felt it was essential to maintain European capacities independent of US influence.[58]

Apart from the issue of budget sustainability, the question of ownership by a renewed military leadership could affect the longevity of the White Paper. However, the current CHOD was the military adviser to the President at the time of the drafting of the White Paper. As such, he was able to sit in on the Commission's discussions in order to report back to the President and ensure today's relevancy of this document.[59]

## Conclusion

Many reforms were undertaken by the newly-elected President Nicolas Sarkozy following the White Paper Commission's recommendations. The effectiveness of this process is primarily due to the iteration between the President's will and the work of the Commissioners, and to the opening of the Commission's membership to the civil society. But part of the military felt that their interests were not well represented, especially because some members of the Commission knew very little about the military, and because the CHOD sought to be their only representative. Outside of the military, there was no effort to promote the White Paper. As a result, other ministries involved in security either do not know that the White Paper is also addressed to them or do not feel constrained by it. In particular, interagency institutions necessary for a comprehensive approach to security threats have yet to be created. Without a strong leadership to implement this White Paper's recommendations, bureaucratic interests will prevent their creation. A book compiling decisions does not suffice; continuing political pressures are needed to move the bureaucracy.

However, despite some problems with implementation, this White Paper was considered a success for several reasons. First, it effectively redefined the missions of the armed forces, adapting them to today's threats and constrains. Furthermore, unlike some previous attempts in other countries, it was endorsed by the President, the Parliament, and the leadership of the military. Along with the general review of public policies, it served as the main blueprints for the current military spending bill.

The development of a White Paper for defense and security in France provides valuable lessons for nations willing to reform their defense policy and strategy. Writing a defense-based White Paper requires one to find an appropriate balance between opposing tensions. On the one hand, the Commission needs to include representatives from the military. On the other, outside experts bring a different view and do not represent the bureaucracy's interests. The Commission needs to make sure capabilities match the missions being chosen, yet it also needs the legitimacy to go into the details of procurement priorities and processes. It must consult with the representatives who will be left to implement the resulting decisions, yet it cannot afford to be paralyzed by powerful members. Finally, at a time when no vital threat seems imminent, a White Paper must define a widely accepted defense and national security policy in realistic terms.

## Notes

1 Jean-Louis Georgelin, interview by author, Paris, October 8, 2010.
2 Nicolas Sarkozy, "The president of the Republic: Letter to Jean-Claude Mallet," July 26, 2007.
3 Jean-Claude Mallet, *Défense et Sécurité nationale: le Livre Blanc* (Paris: Odile Jacob/La Documentation Française, 2008).
4 Nicolas Sarkozy, "Discours de M. le Président de la République sur la Défense et la Sécurité Nationale," Paris, June 17, 2008, available at: www.livreblancdefenseetsecurite.gouv.fr/information/les_dossiers_actualites_19/livre_blanc_sur_defense_875/livre_blanc_1337/discours_president_republique_1338/index.html (accessed August 7, 2012).

5 Bruno Tertrais, interview by author, Paris, August 17, 2010. The last decision to establish a permanent base dates back to the 1960s, in a context of decolonization.

6 François Heisbourg, interview by author, Paris, August 27, 2010.

7 Georgelin, interview.

8 Bastien Irondelle, *La réforme des armées en France* (Paris: Les Presses Sciences Po, 2011), pp. 77–109.

9 Ibid.

10 Heisbourg, interview.

11 Linking defense and security was influenced by reforms in this direction in the United Kingdom a decade ago.

12 See the Agence nationale de la sécurité des systèmes d'information (ANSSI), available at: www.ssi.gouv.fr (accessed August 7, 2012).

13 "Partnership" agreements have already been signed with Gabon, Togo, Cameroon, and Central Africa, and are likely to be adopted by the Parliament this year. In Hervé Morin, *Audition de la Commission des Affaires Etrangères de l'Assemblée Nationale*, July 7, 2010, Compte-rendu no. 88; Assemblée Nationale, *Rapport fait au nom de la commission des affaires étrangères sur le projet de loi, adopté par le Sénat, autorisant l'approbation de l'accord entre le Gouvernement de la République française et le Gouvernement de la République du Cameroun instituant un partenariat de défense; le projet de loi, adopté par le Sénat, autorisant l'approbation de l'accord entre le Gouvernement de la République française et le Gouvernement de la République togolaise instituant un partenariat de défense; et le projet de loi, adopté par le Sénat, autorisant l'approbation de l'accord entre le Gouvernement de la République française et le Gouvernement de la République centrafricaine instituant un partenariat de défense, par M. Michel Terrot*, Reports No. 3308, No. 3309 and No. 3310, April 5, 2011. An agreement was signed with the Republic of Comoros but is not yet confirmed by the parliament. The negotiations with the Ivory Coast have been postponed due to the civil war. Talks with Senegal and Djibouti are underway.

14 The recent violent outbreaks in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and the Ivory Coast demonstrate how difficult it can be to radically change one's defense policy. At first, President Sarkozy and his government were criticized for not taking a stronger stance against the Tunisian dictatorship. Even though the President tried to justify the non-intervention in the political affairs of a former French colony, he was forced to fire the newly appointed Interior Minister Michèle Alliot-Marie after she offered police support to President Ben Ali. When the events in Libya occurred, it was the occasion to remember the controversy regarding Colonel Qaddafi's visit to President Sarkozy in 2007, when he requested and obtained the right to plant his tent in the gardens of the Elysées Palace. The French President was quick to ask for a multinational coalition to protect the Libyan rebels. In the former colony of the Ivory Coast, the French troops were essential in the fight against former President Laurent Gbagbo and his supporters, who refused to acknowledge Alassane Ouattara's victory in the presidential elections. But France emphasized that the French soldiers were acting as part of the UN operation and upon the UN Secretary General's request.

15 The armies are still implementing these directives. For an example, see the latest report regarding the ground force: Assemblée Nationale, *Avis présenté au nom de la commission de la défense nationale et des forces armées, sur le projet de loi de finances pour 2011* (no. 2824), TOME IV, Défense, préparation et emploi des forces terrestres, par M. Jean-Louis Bernard, October 14, 2010.

16 The information in this paragraph is from the author's interview with Georgelin.

17 Ibid.

18 Ibid.

19 Ibid.

20 Stéphanie Daniel-Genc, interview by author, Paris, September 16 and 19, 2010.

21 Georgelin, interview.

22 Daniel-Genc, interview.

23 The Left soon felt that its presence was purely formal and left the Commission. Patricia Adam, for example, thought like others that the Commission should mandate to make decisions, when it was just making recommendations. She felt such decisions had to be discussed in Parliament and not decided by the President only: Assemblée nationale, XIIIe législature, Session ordinaire de 2007–8, Compte-rendu intégral, Deuxième séance du jeudi 26 juin 2008.

24 Heisbourg, interview.

25 Georgelin, interview.

26 Daniel-Genc, interview.

27 Heisbourg, interview.

28 Ibid.

29 Sarkozy, "Letter to Jean-Claude Mallet."

30 Heisbourg, interview.

31 This Council was replaced by "the Defense and National Security Council" as recommended by the White Paper Commission, in order to reflect the need for a comprehensive response to security threats and the continuum between defense and security. The same logic is applied to the Secrétariat général de la défense et de la sécurité nationale.

32 Tertrais, interview.

33 Learning from this mistake, the new German Strategic Defense Review was preceded by a Green Paper in 2010 in order to give the opportunity to the executive power to arbitrate options. Heisbourg, interview.

34 Georgelin, interview.

35 Heisbourg, interview.

36 Ibid.

37 Ibid.

38 Daniel-Genc, interview.

39 "Livre blanc sur la défense et la sécurité nationale," available at: www.livreblancdefenseetsecurite.gouv. fr/information/les_dossiers_actualites_19/livre_blanc_sur_defense_875/index.html (accessed August 7, 2012).

40 Daniel-Genc, interview.

41 Assemblée nationale, XIIIe législature, Session ordinaire de 2007–8, *Compte rendu integral*, Deuxième séance du jeudi 26 juin 2008.

42 Daniel-Genc, interview.

43 Ibid.

44 In the speech announcing his decisions, President Sarkozy talked about trimming the armed forces to 54,000 men; this figure is the total of the 36,000 recommended by the RGPP and the 18,000 recommended by the White Paper Commission. Jean-Pierre Maulny, interview by author, Paris, August 11, 2010; Sarkozy, "Discours de M. le Président de la République"; Georgelin, interview.

45 Surcouf, "Livre blanc sur la défense: une espérance déçue," *Le Figaro*, June 18, 2008.

46 Daniel-Genc, interview. Surcouf is a nickname created by a group of military officers who wanted to stay anonymous.

47 Ibid.

48 Georgelin, inerview; Daniel-Genc, interview.

49 Daniel-Genc, interview.

50 Georgelin, interview.

51 Daniel-Genc, interview.

52 Ibid.

53 Ibid.; Heisbourg, interview.

54 Tertrais, interview; Heisbourg, interview.

55 Georgelin, interview. Indeed, in order to compensate the lack of exports for the Rafale aircraft, the MoD was forced in 2011 to buy 11 more in order to maintain the capacity to build the aircraft. In Hervé Morin, Audition de M. Hervé Morin, ministre de la défense, sur le projet de loi de finances pour 2011 (no. 2824), Commission de la défense nationale et des forces armées, Mardi 5 octobre 2010, Séance de 16 heures 30, Compte rendu no. 2, available at: www.assemblee-nationale.fr/13/cr-cdef/ 10–11/c1011002.asp (accessed August 7, 2012).

56 Assemblée nationale, Loi no. 2009–2928 du 29 juillet 2009 relative à la programmation militaire pour les années 2009 à 2014 et portant diverses dispositions concernant la défense publiée au *Journal Officiel* du 31 juillet 2009, available at: www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEX T00002 0915137&dateTexte= (accessed August 7, 2012).

57 In Hervé Morin, Audition de M. Hervé Morin, ministre de la défense, sur le projet de loi de finances pour 2011 (no. 2824), Commission de la défense nationale et des forces armées, Mardi 5 octobre 2010, Séance de 16 heures 30, Compte rendu no. 2.

58 Ibid.

59 Heisbourg, interview.

# 20

# BUILDING AN INTEGRATED MILITARY IN POST-CONFLICT SOCIETIES

## Lebanon

*Anne Marie Baylouny*

### Introduction

Militaries are often viewed as crucial instruments in post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction. Yet throughout much of the developing world—particularly in conflict-ridden societies—these militaries are crippled by fractionalization. The multiple ethnicities, religions, regional and identity affiliations that make up the state have not been integrated into the military. Instead, further inhibiting post-conflict reconciliation, the armed forces were often dominated by one or another group, crippling the ability of the military to play a positive role in society.

Lebanon is a case of an extremely divided society and military, one whose military prior to the end of the long civil war was viewed as representative of one religious group. While Lebanon is a country with deep-seated cleavages and a political system based on religious confession, it succeeded in forming a military that is now popularly accepted as national—not the purview of any one group. The military is now the one institution in Lebanon that is respected across all sects, while the state and its other institutions are viewed with disdain or as sectarian preserves.[1] Building a national, representative military in Lebanon did not occur either by accident or by gradual demographic changes, but was the result of a conscious but little-noticed overhaul undertaken by the military during the Syrian occupation. The new policies were the result of institutional learning by the military, particularly through lessons learned when the military disintegrated during the long civil war (1975–90). Yet effective reorganization could only be implemented while the military was politically insulated from sectarian politicians.

As a case of post-conflict military reconstruction, Lebanon challenges common assumptions of civil–military relations. While the major paradigm in civil–military relations holds that civilian control is an unqualified good, here positive integration of the military took place against the will of civilian politicians and separate from them. Lebanon also highlights the problems of control in multi-ethnic societies, where both the military and the civilian authority are divided. With numerous and overlapping conflicting actors, it is not clear who the civilian authority is

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that is entitled to issue orders to the military. For most of Lebanon's history, the military was not a unified actor, but composed of separate groups with diverse goals, often answering to differing authorities.

This chapter describes the process of integration that Lebanon's military went through successfully beginning in 1991. I first provide background on Lebanon and the Lebanese military. I then delve into attempts to transform the army.[2] Attempts at reorganization were present during the civil war,[3] but none bore fruit until after the conflict ended. The military then took the lead and implemented a plan against the will of civilian politicians. The key element, I argue, was the buffer provided by Syria between the military and sectarian-oriented politicians. Such insulation was necessary to avoid political influence from the diverse sects on the military. Political influence can lead to appointments and promotions motivated not by merit but by favoritism, which in turn would make allegiance to such influential persons rational on the part of soldiers. This thwarts the goal of a military oriented to the nation and loyal to the chain of command, not individuals outside the military. I then review the performance of the military since its reorganization. In conclusion, I draw the implications of the Lebanon case for democratic civil–military relations theory and note continuing problems that could halt the continuance of unity in the Lebanese military.

## The Lebanese domestic political structure

A brief outline of the Lebanese domestic political structure is necessary in order to understand the context within which the military operates. Lebanon is a multi-confessional society, with numerous ethnic or religious (confessional) groups, often called sects, formally recognized by the state. The country's democracy and all its political institutions were based on such confessions or religious identities. Each major group has veto power over state decisions. The diverse groups are all allotted specific proportions of state positions, divided according to a complicated formula based on the country's only census in 1932. This type of government is called consociational.[4] The main effect of this structure is to maintain the status quo, since it is difficult to achieve agreement on how to change decisions, and this solidifies the role of religious identity in daily life.

Lebanon is based on a compromise between the two major groups: Christians and Muslims. The major groups reached an informal understanding at independence that Lebanon would not lean either Eastward or Westward: it would not bind itself to the West as the Christians wanted, nor to the Arab world as the Muslims wanted. The communities agreed to disagree. Electoral rules return politicians to office who are elected on the strength of their religious ties and identity, and many political posts are inherited.

Two main trends arose from the divisions embodied at independence in 1943. Out of the Christian, pro-Western side, the trend of "Lebanists" emerged, those wishing to side openly with the West and eschewing their Arab heritage and connections. They insisted on Christian domination of Lebanese politics. The early institutional manifestation of this political trend was the right-wing Phalange or Kata'ib political party, later a militia, inspired by the fascist parties of Europe in the 1930s. This trend became identified as separatist, wanting to split a portion of Lebanon off from the Muslim rest of the country.

The second, looser grouping has been more typical of the Muslims and often pro-Arab, siding with the Palestinians and Arab nationalists at different times. Despite the apparent religious nature of the divisions, these political trends were not divided along religious lines but cut across them. The Phalange with its overtly Christian philosophy was overwhelmingly Christian, but Christians were present in large numbers in other anti-Phalange political and military groups. Lebanon's conflicts were not about religious dogmas or hostility toward other religions *per se*,

but were battles for control of the country that largely fell along the differing perspectives of the religious groups. The sides are more aptly described as rightist versus leftist. As the conflicts progressed, polarization along religious identity did occur, and massacres and ethnic cleansing were directed at religious and ethnic groups in themselves. The result was the long civil war (1975–90) pitting first the two sides against each other, then numerous other militias, with both sides fighting major battles against their own supposed side at points during the war.

Israel invaded twice during the war, and Syria began occupying parts of the country in 1976. The Syrian presence was extended and legitimized by the treaty ending the civil war (the Ta'if Accords), which instituted the Arab Deterrent Force to disarm the militias. This force was mainly Syrian. Israeli occupation of Lebanon mainly ended in 2000 following continued battles with Hizbullah, although Lebanon argues that Israel still occupies a strip of land called Sheba'a Farms. Syrian occupation ended in 2005 after massive peaceful demonstrations against Syria.

The end of the Lebanese civil war began with the Ta'if Accords signed in Saudi Arabia in 1989, as the sides accepted a somewhat modified government formula. The agreement changed the system slightly, decreasing the balance of Christians to Muslims from six to five, to equal numbers of both in parliament. Syria was a strong player in this accord, and led the new peacekeeping body in Lebanon, the Arab Deterrent Force. The accord did not give a final date to Syria's military role in Lebanon. The head of the Lebanese army, General Michel Aoun, vehemently disagreed with this treaty and waged a "war of liberation" against Syrian occupation. In 1990, when Syria agreed to take part in the first Gulf War against the Iraqi Saddam Hussein's invasion and occupation of Kuwait, the US remained silent on Syria's actions in Lebanon.[5] Syria dispensed with Aoun's war and extended its forces throughout Lebanon with the exception of the border area occupied by Israel and the South Lebanon Army, a private army supported by Israel, until 2000.

## History and structure of Lebanese Armed Forces

The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) both reflect the societal divisions of Lebanon and attempts to transcend them for the sake of an (ideally) unified nation. In the name of this Lebanese nation, encompassing the diverse sects, the Lebanese military has at times played the role of a political actor, defying the orders of some civilian authorities, including the Lebanese President. The positions it takes are consistent with the Lebanese military's view of itself as the peacemaker, as representing a nation above sectarian divisions. Its actions follow the country's majority opinion, even if civilian policy-makers do not agree with this view.

The Lebanese military was perceived for most of its history as a Christian stronghold, aligned with the dominant Christian political power. Following the division of government positions by sect, the LAF was also divided as half-Christian and half-Muslim. The commander of the LAF would be a Maronite, and partly due to the history of the military, most officers were Christian.[6] Brigades were religiously and geographically uniform: Christians from a particular region served in the same brigade, as did Shi'a from the south and Sunni from the north. This crippled any power of the army to thwart the influence of sectarian notables and politicians. Such influence, impeding the development of the rule of law, is an ongoing problem in Lebanon.

The LAF's relation to civilian control is complicated. Formally, the LAF's role was to serve the Constitution, that is to be subordinate to civilian authorities and uphold the power of the president.[7] But focusing on the question of civilian control misses the crucial problem. Briefly, problems with civilian control over the military in Lebanon include the rivalry between the Commander of the LAF and the President, a divided government that only functions by consensus, the lack of civilian national security priorities (the military has set its own priorities

for national security), the rival influence of neighbors and international actors, and a sectarian system that pervades all Lebanese institutions. The LAF and the President of Lebanon are rivals, as the commander of the LAF has often been elected president, and the military is called to step in when civilian leaders are unable to form a new government. Lebanon's military has technically been under civilian control, yet often refused to act at the behest of a government. The LAF functions only when there is national agreement for it to act, but civilian orders are not clear-cut.[8] Although the military is by law subordinate to the President, the President's authority to use the military is subject to the Council of Ministers, which includes competing leaders. In effect, instead of a single boss of the army commander, there are at least three: the President, the Prime Minister, and the Speaker of the House, each representing a major sect. The military council, an advisory board composed of six sectarian representatives, further complicates the question of who has the power to order the LAF.

There is no current threat of a military coup against the government, but the LAF has not always supported individual governments against their oppositions either. Numerous times in its history the LAF has refused to follow civilian orders. Prior to its reorganization, this occurred most starkly in 1952 and 1958. Both times the commander of the military (General Fu'ad Shehab, also spelled Chehab) refused to use the army to support the President against opposition demonstrators, causing the fall of the government. The country was split, with a significant portion opposing the sitting government.[9] At the end of the 1980s, the military envisioned itself as the solution to the civil war and outlined a plan to take over temporarily.[10]

Composed of multiple ethnicities, the military more often than not stayed on the sidelines. The mixed nature of the military meant that commanders feared that soldiers would flee or refuse to follow orders that contradicted their own politics and the political stance of their ethnic group. Indeed, during the country's long civil war (1975–90), a large portion of the military disbanded or fought on the side of rival militias. Rebellious soldiers created new armies, and soldiers left to serve with their ethnic group's militia, often taking their supplies with them (depending on their position in the chain of command). Among the armies created were the Arab Army of Lebanon, the Army of Lebanon, and the Army for the Defense of South Lebanon.[11] Disbanding in favor of a militia was facilitated by the ethnic homogeneity of entire brigades. The Sixth Brigade, entirely Shi'a, left the LAF wholesale to serve with the militia Amal, for example. Many Christian forces also served with their militia. In 1990, the army split and one faction created its own rival government, joined with a leading militia, and then fought both a foreign country and that militia.[12]

The military's desire to avoid disintegrating into competing ethnic and religious groups is only one facet of the LAF's history of inaction. The military sees its role as acting above the diverse sects and representing the national good, or, as one observer puts it, enforcing the least worst outcome for all the communities. The military considers itself the institutional embodiment of consensus—the super-peacemaker—and therefore acts only when cross-sectarian agreement exists.[13] This came about in part through institutional learning, for when the LAF attempted to do otherwise, it fell apart or risked rebellion in the ranks. The LAF came to regard its mission as domestic peace: not as upholding the Constitution or civilian orders, if one or more community disputed those orders. Despite the consociational nature of Lebanese government, which should theoretically entail power-sharing and veto power for all the communities, some orders to the LAF have not had the support of all the communities but only the President, the Prime Minister, or a faction of the ministers. In these situations the LAF does not act.

Complicating the military's role are the changing demographics in Lebanon, decreasing the number of Christians relative to Muslims, and diminishing the number of Christians interested in joining the LAF. Precise numbers are not known; no census has been held since 1932 due to

the political sensitivity of demographics. However, the numerical dominance of Muslims (combining the sects, both Shi'a and Sunni) over Christians is not seriously disputed. The Central Intelligence Agency put the figures at about 60 percent Muslim and 39 percent Christian.[14] Christians emigrate more, intermarry with Muslims, and have slightly fewer children. Due to their generally higher economic status than many Muslims, they choose careers other than the military. Demographic pressures decreasing the number of Christians certainly affected the potential for the LAF to be balanced, but it did not dictate the wholesale reorganization of the military to mix religions and regions. By themselves, demographic changes could not transform the LAF into an integrated institution.

The military's relationship to the various militias or private armies in the country follows the same formula as its peacemaker role.[15] Lebanon can be classified as a quasi-sovereign state, in that it does not have the monopoly of armed force in the country. Rather, private armies (regionally referred to as militias, even though they are not attached to the state) exist. Unless there is unanimous agreement (from all sects) on disbanding the militia, the LAF will not move against it. With the exception of militias that fought the LAF itself at the end of the civil war, other private armies are allowed to exist.

## Post–war reorganization

The post-war reorganization and integration of the LAF were initiated and completed by the military itself, against the will of many if not most civilian politicians. The state was absent during this initiative, except to register protests against the reorganization with the occupying Syrian army. The specific actions reflected institutional learning, and in some cases, trial and error. They were enacted by a group of high-ranking officers and generals close to the commander of the LAF, who had the backing of the Syrians. While state officials did not wish the military to be weak and prone to disbanding, each had their own separate ideas of the LAF's proper role. These diverse opinions on the LAF's role stemmed both from sectarian perspectives—differences of opinion on the proper role of the state toward external and internal actors—and from individual political incentives. Having friends in the LAF in important positions aids politicians, while weakening the LAF and its chain of command.

The LAF learned through the experience of splitting during the civil war that it must remain united and strong in order to keep order, and further, it learned that to remain united, it must be integrated. By the early 1980s, numerous proposals, laws, and measures attempting to reform the military had taken place, some heavily supported by the US. Support from the United States included advice, funding, and equipment to bolster the power of the LAF. One part of this US support that continues is training of Lebanese officers, since in the United States' estimation, lack of leadership was a significant problem with the Lebanese military.[16] There was broad national support for strengthening the military and turning it into a national, government-supporting institution. Reform efforts did not succeed and the army split again in the early 1980s and in 1990.

During the reorganization attempts in the 1970s and 1980s, significant changes occurred. The army commander was replaced, and older officers were retired. The traditional sectarian appointment for some commanding posts was altered, and it became possible to appoint a Sunni commander in a Christian area, for example. The army itself increased in size, and a military draft was instituted. The conscription law or the Service to the Flag Law was passed in 1982, mandating one year of service for young males, but it would have to wait until the war's end to be implemented. The New National Defense Law was promulgated in 1979, creating the Supreme Defense Council and the Military Council. The latter is an institution in Lebanese

politics that comes and goes, and it embodies representatives from the various sects from the military to implement security decisions.

Reorganization during the civil war was unsuccessful for several reasons. First and foremost, the new policies were attempted during ongoing hostilities, when political power was still unstable and contested. Second, the attempts did not reorganize the military at the individual level, as the final successful reorganization after the war finally did. Third, the military was still subject to sectarian politicians and their influence; the isolation that the Syrian occupation after the war provided was absent, and thus any efforts to remove local and sectarian politics from the military failed.[17]

What did successfully, and permanently, change was the sectarian breakdown of the military. Recognizing the disparity between demography and the impression of Christian control over the military, leaders attempted to bring the military in line with social reality. Christians dominated the officer corps, although retirements, deliberate appointments, and demographic realities succeeded in leveling the proportion of Christians to Muslims in the officer corps in the years of the war.[18]

After the long civil war, the task before the Lebanese Armed Forces was huge: militias had to be dismantled, their weapons confiscated, and the military had to be re-unified. In the long term, General Emil Lahoud, the army commander, would completely change the sectarian and geographic structure of the LAF. In the short term, the challenge of disarming the militias was substantial, since some had more arms, soldiers, and money than the LAF.[19] The LAF would have to fight the Lebanese Forces, a Christian militia, and then deal with a rebellious faction of the LAF under the command of General Michel Aoun. Syrian military participation was necessary to route General Aoun.[20] Lahoud had to wait for Aoun to be defeated before initiating his reunification program.

The Ta'if Accords of Fall 1989 signaled the willingness of most parties to end the war, although fighting would not cease for another year or so. The accords legitimized continued Syrian influence in Lebanon through the Arab Deterrent Force, an Arab League initiative dating from the beginning of the civil war. The Ta'if Accords incrementally made the proportion of Muslims equal to those of Christians in parliament, and decreased the power of the presidency while elevating the Prime Minister (a Sunni). The power of parliament and the Council of Ministers was similarly increased. Overall, the Christians lost power relative to the pre-war period. Ta'if began defining the mission of the LAF, specifying that the military was to protect against external aggression by Israel. If carried out, this provision would re-orient the LAF from a primarily internal role to an external focus; however, that has not been the LAF's experience for most of the post-war period. Several confrontations with Israel have occurred, and these are problematic for Lebanon internationally.

Top officers in the LAF around General Lahoud shared a vision of the military. The LAF should be integrated and not confessional. Lahoud believed that an army that is not mixed cannot keep order.[21] This army, the officers felt, must be prevented from becoming a military of political parties or of local powers. The effort would entail a re-education campaign to create nationalistic solidarities within the military. A good officer was a national officer, not limited by sect, village, or party. Trainees were taught the benefits of a national military.[22] Ultimately, the LAF was to be the bulwark of the state that would prevent political antagonisms escalating into institutional collapse or war.[23]

Initial attempts to integrate the military failed because they only involved moving companies, and a small number of companies at that. Effective reorganization necessitated breaking up the company level with its attendant long-standing loyalties.[24] Those first attempts were also not accompanied by the intense information campaign that would aid the later integration policies.

Operation Global Integration began effectively in 1992, and occurred in three stages during the next two years. It was accompanied by a public relations campaign explaining to the populace the necessity of what the military was doing. Resistance came from political elites and the militias, both of whom saw their privileges about to wane due to a strong military insulated from the effect of influence and clout.[25] Complaints were waged with Syria, the *de facto* power broker and ruler in Lebanon, but Syria did not heed the complaints and continued to allow Lahoud free rein.

The military had to be gathered under a single, united leadership, and the militias disbanded. The battalions were then mixed confessionally, where previously one sect or another had dominated the battalions. Lastly, the battalions were moved from their local, home regions to regions in distant parts of the country. Divorcing the LAF from the regions of their origin ensured that the LAF was no longer subject to the local power holders with whom the soldiers shared an ethnicity and common networks. This moving of battalions helped to decrease the regional identification and separatism of some communities. Since hiring and promotion had been linked to confessional influence, the files of existing officers were reviewed. Some were demoted and others were promoted. Having served in a militia that fought the LAF did not prohibit promotion, as Lahoud stuck to the Lebanese formula of "no victor, no vanquished."[26] Information and re-education programs implementing a new educational system in the military academies backed up these moves. The education program introduced the nation as the primary allegiance over religion or political ideology.[27] The program aimed at creating a new Lebanese soldier attached to the nation and a national army that was above sectarian differences. A new curriculum was developed specifically for this purpose.[28] Another facet of Lahoud's program was to reward top officers—generals—handsomely in their severance package as an incentive to stay clear of corruption and confessional politics, which are even more financially rewarding.[29]

Militiamen who were interested in joining the LAF were integrated into the military. It is estimated that about 6,000 were integrated, some into civil service jobs. About 1,000 militia leaders were put through the academy, but some did not make it; those most strident in their ideological beliefs usually did not enroll. A few were fired from the academy, including some with influential relatives. Many of the Lebanese Forces (Christian) did not join the military because they insisted on serving in separate, all-Christian battalions. When they learned the specifics of the new policy, many militiamen decided not to join and remained in the private sector (private security was a popular employment).[30]

The size of the military was increased through the 1990s to balance the number of soldiers coming from the former militias, and the draft was implemented in 1993 to obtain the confessional balance necessary. The draft period declined first from one year to six months, then was terminated entirely in 2007, apparently due to the problem of brain drain in Lebanon: faced with the draft, young talented men left the country. Currently the LAF is about 56,000 men, having decreased from over 70,000 after the end of the draft.[31] This number represents a large increase from the LAF's numbers prior to the civil war, which were about 20,000. Equal numbers of Muslims and Christians could not be achieved due to demographics and the lack of willing Christians, so the distribution of Muslims to Christians varied. Overall, about one-third of the army is Christian. Most brigades are about 70 percent Muslim to 30 percent Christian (a few are close to 50–50), and the special forces units and the military police are 50–50.[32] Parity among the upper ranks is maintained.[33]

Reorganization and reeducation were the means to reorient soldiers from divisive political allegiances to hierarchical discipline in a national military. Integrating the military thoroughly by mixing regions and religions has increased the homogeneity of thought and action in the ranks. Preliminary analysis suggests that the numerical composition of the LAF by the different

religious groups is less important than their placement within the military and the degree of their homogeneity in the military as an institution. Overall percentages of Christians and Muslims seem to matter less than whether Muslims and Christians serve together in areas other than their home regions, and that both groups have faith that the military will include them. The specific percentages of each religion do not need to be precise or uniform throughout. A public education campaign greatly adds to the ability to integrate the military and achieve popular recognition for these efforts.

For the sake of maintaining an image of the military as national, above sectarian politics, this rocky episode of reorganization and unifying the military is referred to by former LAF commanders as relatively simple. They state that the populace saw the necessity of it and wanted an integrated military. In reality, the process was difficult and politically charged. Some refused to serve in areas where the majority ethnic group had fought and killed members of their family during the war, for example.

## Performance since Syria's departure

The change to a positive popular opinion of the LAF occurred during military occupation, when the Syrians ruled. While Lebanese ire at the Syrians was apparent, culminating in a 2005 "independence intifada" forcing the Syrians to leave, the LAF continued to be held in high regard. The success of the military's integration is demonstrated by both its status as the one respected state institution in Lebanon and its continued unity through difficult circumstances. Some scholars claim that only through the LAF's presence as a multi-sectarian force was Lebanon able to withstand the rocky times after the Syrian departure without a return to civil war.[34] The LAF continues to be seen as non-sectarian. Lebanese citizens have confidence in their military, believe it should be deployed throughout the country, and in general have little faith in state institutions (differences among communities exist in the latter opinion).[35] Arguably, the military is the one truly national institution in Lebanon.

The LAF remained united through external and internal confrontations including protests against the Syrians in 2005; a wave of assassinations that targeted military personnel and civil society leaders; moving into the south to take over territory traditionally held by Hizbullah in 2006; a battle against a terrorist group in the north in 2007 (Fatah al-Islam in Nahr al-Barid refugee camp); and a battle between rival non-state militias in 2008 (Hizbullah versus the pro-government "Future" movement and Druze forces), among others. The LAF was deployed at hot spots during local and national elections to keep the peace. Finally, the LAF exchanged fire with the Israelis in 2010, which brought the ire of the US and suspended US financing of the LAF.

Despite having been under Syrian occupation for 15 years, with Syria controlling top appointments, the LAF established its Lebanese credentials by refusing to act against demonstrators who were protesting the Syrian occupation in 2005, against the orders of the Prime Minister.[36] This action belied the denigration of the LAF as Syrian-controlled, and at the same time it affirmed the LAF's tradition of remaining neutral through non-action when the country is deeply divided. This position furthered the public image of the LAF, to which it is sensitive, as a national institution unmarred by sectarian politics.

The end of the 2006 war between Israel and Hizbullah saw the LAF expand its domain into the south, into lands traditionally occupied by Hizbullah's militia. The LAF was not a consideration for Hizbullah's militia during that war, and the Lebanese military did not participate in it, but the ceasefire agreement entailed Hizbullah ceding military jurisdiction on the ground to the Lebanese military. The transfer of power occurred without incident, again demonstrating the LAF's increased prestige.

In 2007, the Lebanese Army acted against a small group of Islamist terrorists called Fatah al-Islam operating out of a Palestinian refugee camp in Northern Lebanon. The action had wide public support, even from Hizbullah, as the target of military action was viewed as foreign, not Lebanese, and not affiliated with the Palestinian cause or the residents of the refugee camps. Yet the military action was itself difficult, as the LAF lacks sophisticated weapons. The US, afraid the weapons would be passed to a non-state actor (Hizbullah) or worse, used directly by the LAF against Israel, refused such weapons to the LAF.[37]

During the Hizbullah–Sunni militia clashes in May 2008, the LAF remained absent from the fighting, refusing to support the government. Sunni and Druze militias filled that role instead. Hizbullah easily trounced these militias, then pulled back and allowed the Lebanese army to take over. For its part, the army reversed the governmental decrees that sparked the conflict.

The only confrontations on Lebanon's borders have been with Israel. The LAF was engaged in a border clash with Israel most recently in 2010, although there are reports of the LAF involved in actions performed by militias during the Syrian occupation and at least one border clash after it. In the beginning of August 2010, the LAF and Israeli forces exchanged fire. The incident involved the Israeli army cutting a tree that overhung and was mostly on the Lebanese side of the border, save its roots. Two Lebanese soldiers and one Israeli were killed. The response was for the US to suspend aid to the LAF and threaten to end aid altogether. Congress protested that its aid should not be used against Israel. The Lebanese, even politicians the US would consider allied to the West, responded defensively. A fund was established to finance the LAF from alternative sources, and Lebanese officials stated they would not accept aid with the condition that the LAF not fight Israel.[38] Aid was resumed three months later, in part justified by the threat of the non-state actor Hizbullah.[39]

## National security policy and the LAF

The LAF's major confrontations after the Syrian occupation highlight the question of LAF capabilities and its mission. Both a formal national security policy and the ability of the LAF to fulfill its own stated national security priorities are lacking. There are no formal national security policy directives from the civilian government. There is no consensus in the government as to what the LAF's role is or should be, either in the abstract or in particular situations.[40] This absence of consensus among government leaders translates into an inability to fix a national security policy among civilian leaders. In that absence, the LAF has identified its own priorities. Yet the LAF is ill-equipped to fulfill these goals, which would also risk it running afoul of the international community.

The LAF's stated mission is:

- Facing the Israeli occupation and its perpetual aggression in South Lebanon and West Bekaa, and supporting the steadfastness of Lebanese citizens to ensure the complete withdrawal of the Israeli forces to internationally recognized borders.
- Defending the country and its citizens against all aggression.
- Confronting all threats against the country's vital interests.
- Coordinating with Arab armies in accordance with ratified treaties and agreements.
- Maintaining internal security and stability.
- Engaging in social and development activities according to national interests.
- Undertaking relief operations in coordination with other public and humanitarian institutions.[41]

This prioritization of the LAF's mission is the result of the Ta'if Accords and the LAF's own past and continuing confrontations.

The LAF is a defensive military, unable and unequipped to act against foreign countries, hostile neighbors, or even powerful non-state actors within Lebanon. With few lethal weapons, the LAF is capable only of acting against domestic actors. Generals complain that the militias have more and better arms than the LAF, and weapons from the West are non-lethal and incapable of matching either their needs or the weapons of non-state actors. Moveover, responding to external aggression can lead to international problems for the LAF, as the 2010 exchange of gunfire with Israel suggests. Following this incident, the US Congress withheld aid for the Lebanese military on the basis that the LAF could be a threat to Israel.

The role of non-state militias is also a problem for the LAF. Although asked by international actors to disband Hizbullah, doing so would be unthinkable given the LAF's image of itself as a consensus institution. The LAF is able to maintain order, but it is not capable of fighting a major faction in Lebanon, according to observers and participants. This is due not only to a lack of combat capacity, but also because the LAF depends upon consensus and the agreement of all major parties in Lebanon; only then does it act. Hizbullah has a good working relationship with the LAF, although the LAF has in the past both acted against Hizbullah and sided with them.

It appears that the relevant actors are not willing to actively support a strong Lebanese military for their own individual reasons, and the LAF lacks both funding and training. The Lebanese government has not apportioned significant funding for the LAF, and some state that a strong military would thwart the existing political system of traditional influence and patronage.[42] The US has aided the LAF and continues to do so, although primarily with nonlethal equipment for fear that lethal weapons would fall into the hands of private militias or be used against the Israelis.[43] This has led to complaints by generals that even during the Nahr al-Barid campaign against the Islamists, the US did not provide lethal weapons and the LAF was working with makeshift weaponry.[44] The LAF's heavy equipment is mainly provided by Syria.[45]

## Lessons learned

It can be argued that a national military, viewed as representing the nation and not one facet of it, is a prerequisite for effective action by the military and the prevention of internal conflict. An integrated military may not by itself create national unity or build a state; however, state-building and national unity are hampered without a respected and representative military. As one retired general stated, "If the Lebanese army is divided along sectarian lines, this will allow sectarian strife or a new civil war. A national army constitutes a safety valve for the country."[46] A national military can be an instrument of national reconciliation after domestic hostilities and can aid in state-building. The experience of Iraq demonstrates that when state security forces are viewed as controlled by a sect in a contentious ethnic, conflict-ridden society, democracy and the functioning of that military across all segments of the state are compromised. The dangers of a divided military encompass the potential disintegration of the army, with the possibility of passing the weapons, training, and organization of the army to sectarian or sub-national militias.

Traditional civil–military theory is ill-suited for deeply divided societies emerging from war or building state institutions anew, where strong networks of political influence and patronage pervade society and the state. The Lebanon case challenges not only civil–military relations theory, but democratic theory also. It demonstrates that in this case, post-conflict Lebanon, political control over the military would have led to greater conflict. More research is needed to determine the circumstances that would cause such a conclusion to hold. In what situations are political peace and stability aided by a military that is separate from politics and civilian control? Post-conflict reorganization may be a special case, or, at the extreme, deeply divided societies may spur a reevaluation of some key aspects of civil–military theory.

Civilian control of the military must be qualified by analysis of the content of the civilian and democratic command structures.[47] In this quasi-democratic country, the military leads the country in reconciliation politics, refusing civilian orders that would threaten the country's precarious stability. This refusal of civilian authority has generated stability and avoided a return to civil war.

This study has shown that reorganization and integration can be accomplished, with the necessary cost being the insulation of the military from political influence. Despite its ongoing and significant limitations, the LAF has shed its long-standing image as a bastion of Christian minority power and is viewed as truly Lebanese and representative of the country in its entirety. The implementation and success of reorganization policies were contingent on the military's removal from sectarian politics and the influence of politicians and notables pushing for politically motivated appointments. Syria provided this insulation, as it was concerned crucially with security and high-level foreign policy; internal sectarian matters were not as important to the Syrians. In Lebanon's case, occupation ironically played a positive role for its military.

Indeed, how can the LAF stay united and non-sectarian withour an occupying force? The LAF's high reputation is due to its non-sectarian composition and consensus actions, yet sectarian politicians are actively chipping away at these characteristics. Indications exist that sectarian influences have already begun affecting the LAF as brigades become more local than the previous rotating system would have allowed. The current commander is no longer insulated from sectarian pressures as the previous one was, and thus sectarian pressures have infiltrated the military and military appointments. By the 2007 confrontation with Fatah al-Islam in Northern Lebanon, it was apparent that the policy of not allowing soldiers to serve in their home regions was being abrogated, and a disproportional number of Sunni soldiers from the north died in that confrontation. The successful integration of the LAF could be threatened if this policy continues. Whether the new military education can thwart sectarianism and inculcate a national, Lebanese identity to the soldiers over the long term is unclear. Observers argue that the LAF must still function in a sectarian society, where all institutions and social participation are conditional upon sectarian identity; thus necessarily the LAF must function accordingly.[48]

While the military must be separate from sectarian or sub-national political groups, that does not mean that ignoring sect and group is a viable method of reorganizing the military in divided societies. The LAF deliberately integrated by paying attention to sect. A formula guided the leaders, guaranteeing to all sects that balance would be achieved. This experience indicates that turning a blind eye to sect and religion when constituting a military will be counterproductive. Given prior realities, where often one group held more power than another, it is unlikely that all groups will be equally interested in joining the new military. Military domination by one group would result, without a formula to guide recruitment and posts. However, this poses a long-term problem. Will instituting specific group proportions in the military merely solidify societal divisions? Solidifying group divisions is a distinct possibility, yet ignoring those groups will not result in long-term peace.

## Acknowledgments

## Notes

1 This does not mean that Lebanon's military is effective in its internal or external security tasks, or that it has resolved its complicated relationship to civilian politicians.
2 The Lebanese military is mainly composed of the army, with an extremely minimal navy and air force. In common parlance, army and military are used interchangeably to signify the Lebanese Armed Forces.
3 The "civil war" in this chapter refers to the 1975–90 conflict.

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# 21

# CIVIL–MILITARY RELATIONS IN AN EMERGING DEMOCRACY

## South Africa

*Jessica Piombo*

## Introduction

The transition from apartheid to democracy in 1994 spurred a fundamental reorganization of the South African defense structure, during which South Africans redrew the contours of relations between civil and military actors, between the civilian and military defense institutions, fundamentally adjusted the size and composition of the defense forces, and infused the military with new roles and missions. South Africa established these new defense sector institutions and processes while also pursuing multiple other social and economic transformations. Because of the nature of the transition, the social and economic issues were accorded much higher importance than the defense sector. This situation created both policy and fiscal constraints that fundamentally shaped the transformation of the structure of civil–military relations in South Africa. There were also significant political considerations involved in the defense transformation related to both the roles of the military and the process of creating a new military organization out of a mix of statutory and non-statutory forces.

Following five decades of semi-authoritarian minority rule and a two-decade insurgency, in the early 1990s, South Africa began a negotiated transition. Reforming the security sector was one of the main priorities in this process, because during the apartheid era, the security forces had operated a shadowy intelligence and military apparatus that functioned independently from most civilian authorities. The "securocrats," as they were known, ran the military, police, and intelligence services, reporting only to the Prime Minister and the Cabinet. They had colonized the Ministry of Defence, subordinated civilian to military authority, and worked with a seemingly limitless budget.[1] The defense sector employed the security forces externally and internally to combat opposition to apartheid, earning the distrust of not only the domestic population, but of regional neighbors as well. The South African Defence Force (SADF), police, and intelligence services were populated mainly by white Afrikaners, and had little positive interaction with the population at large.[2]

When the political transformation of South Africa began in earnest, therefore, it was necessary not only to reform the missions and composition of the security forces, but also to reverse the relationship between civilian and military actors. During and after the transition, the new

government created defense institutions and a parliamentary oversight structure designed to rein in the military. The principle of democratic civilian control was enshrined in the Constitution and multiple policy documents, affirming not only that civilians would be in charge, but that they would do this in a consultative fashion with public participation. While they eventually succeeded, the South Africans initially struggled with the task of establishing credible civilian institutions, populated by civilian actors who had sufficient knowledge to make appropriate decisions and who could create a positive relationship between these new institutions and the evolving military.

The post-transition military, the South African National Defence Force (SANDF), found itself deployed in support of new missions and roles, responding to the changed situation in which South Africa faced no external military threats. Civilian actors, particularly the politicians within the ruling African National Congress (ANC), wanted to create a military that could serve as a force for regional stability while also helping to secure the peace within the country— a complete about-face from the posture of the apartheid-era military. Thus, the SANDF moved into peacekeeping, disaster response, and support to other government agencies, particularly the South African Police Services (SAPS). The SANDF adopted this increased range of missions while simultaneously integrating personnel from seven armed groups, decreasing the overall size of the force, and navigating sharp budget cuts.

As they negotiated the many challenges of these transitions, the South African experience is likely to reflect dynamics that will manifest in many other post-conflict situations.

In South Africa, the defense forces dealt with challenges of integrating multiple fighting forces into one post-conflict military, while also being sensitive to the needs of achieving racial representation (in other countries, this would take the form of ethnic or religious balancing). South Africa's experience crafting new roles and missions of the SANDF, along with the government's desire to use the SANDF as a tool for foreign policy and domestic security, informs debates about the use of military forces in pursuit of domestic goals, such as crime prevention or border security.

Traditional civil–military relations theories predict that this sort of role expansion undermines military professionalism. But in South Africa, as in other countries that do not face traditional (external) security threats, civilian authorities have argued that military resources should be used to combat the very real threats to state security such as crime, cross-border trafficking, and illegal migration, and provide support to the domestic security services at critical junctures like elections. By their actions and rhetoric, they purposely expand the notion of what helping to protect "national security" entails, particularly in a context where national security encompasses many problems not traditionally military, such as high levels of crime and poverty. Thus, in South Africa, we see an example of a military whose existence is justified through operations to support both international and internal stability, rather than solely through the traditional defense of national borders and territory.

The South African case also demonstrates the tensions faced by militaries in transitional contexts. As the SANDF adapted to the new dispensation, it faced many obstacles. First, it had to work with civilians in the government and defense institutions, whom many military actors felt had little existing knowledge of, or desire to learn about, military issues. Tensions arose when politicians pledged support from the SANDF without consulting with military advisors about the force's capabilities, resources, and ability to deploy within a projected timeframe.

This related to a second set of concerns, in which the SANDF was deployed for a wider range of missions, yet received lower prioritization in government budget planning. In 1989, defense spending had constituted 4.5 percent of GDP, while by 1999 it took up just 1.4 percent of GDP.[3] The SANDF was being asked to do more with less, and often could not win support to upgrade military facilities and material resources. Large-scale procurements that did occur

tended to be in traditional military platforms—warships and fighter jets—which many in the SANDF and the broader public considered wasteful, given the missions in which the SANDF engaged and the degraded state of military facilities in which personnel were living. By the late 1990s this dichotomy was significantly affecting morale and tipped off a decades-long controversy over weapons procurement.

A third challenge related to the process of integration. The post-apartheid SANDF was created by merging seven distinct military forces into a single organization, yet one was significantly stronger than all the others, the SADF. The ex-freedom fighters had to be incorporated, or else the new military would have remained minority-dominated. The imbalances in training and experience had to be addressed, as well as an integration program for those who were demobilized. The military sought to evolve its corporate identity to match the new imperatives without sacrificing operational readiness. These tensions never became unmanageable or threatened the new dispensation, but they have influenced relations between the civilian Defence Secretariat and the Department of Defence, as well as the relationship between the Minister of Defence and parliament.

This is a common situation in countries transitioning from authoritarian and repressive rule. The evolution in mission sets reflects similar changes witnessed in Latin America, South Asia, and other places where inter-state rivalries have been on the decline, and most threats to states stem from internal instability. Thus, it is not uncommon in many states for military missions to change when the country no longer faces a threatening environment that calls for aggressive defense of national territory. In these situations, the military and national government find alternate ways to justify maintaining large militaries (peacekeeping, internal stability, etc.), or they fundamentally alter the nature and posture of their defense forces (more expeditionary or civil-affairs oriented). In the early years of the "new" South Africa, political actors, civil society, and the security forces therefore fiercely debated the roles, functions, composition, and funding of the security apparatus in this post-apartheid society.

## Securitization in apartheid–era South Africa

From 1910 to 1994, South Africa was ruled by a series of white-minority governments, disenfranchising and forcibly denying citizenship to upwards of 75 percent of the population. Soon after coming to power in 1948, the National Party (NP) expanded on the "native reserve system" that the British had initiated, creating an entire political, economic, and moral philosophy based on racial categorization.[4] This *apartheid* system reserved political, social/cultural, and economic rights and privileges, first for the Afrikaner people, then others of European ancestry, and from there in a descending order based on racial categorization: Indian/Asian, coloured (mixed race), and lastly Black/African.[5] In the process, 75 percent of the population was subjected to geographic relocations and political, social, economic, and physical oppression.

To resist these policies, the dispossessed organized into liberation movements, the most well-known of which were the African National Congress and Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), complemented by a host of other organizations. Resistance to apartheid evolved over time, with the most intense phases of the liberation struggle occurring periodically between 1956 and 1989. The Nationalist government created an extremely strong security apparatus to combat these movements. These institutions included the South African Defence Force, with specialized commando units to target the townships into which many black South Africans had been relocated; the South African Police, which operated numerous counterinsurgency units such as the paramilitary hit squad Vlakplaas; and an intelligence wing of the SADF that ran elaborate systems of informants.[6] All of these operated with little civilian oversight.

Between its establishment in 1957 and reorganization in 1994, the SADF reported directly to the President, bypassing both the Minister and Ministry of Defence.[7] All security issues were handled secretly, so that there was little public scrutiny of or knowledge about defense operations and budgets. The military was also very separate from the society at large, as its personnel were incorporated from the pool of conscripted adult white males. Those who remained beyond the minimum service tended to be Afrikaners, especially in the highest officer ranks.

In terms of roles and missions, the SADF and police forces operated internally to suppress dissent and resistance to apartheid, to arrest and harass political organizers and persons whom the government had banned, and to enforce the government's draconian laws against public assembly and political organizations. They were particularly active in the townships where political dissent centered, and in enforcing involuntary population relocations. Regarding external defense, the SADF and affiliated commando units invaded neighboring countries to attack insurgent bases, and they assisted anti-Communist rebel movements in both Angola and Mozambique.

Arrayed against the security forces was a range of opposition organizations. Both the ANC and the PAC maintained armed wings, *Umkhonto we Sizwe* (MK, "the spear of the nation"), and the Azanian People's Liberation Army (APLA), respectively.[8] MK and APLA operated from bases outside South African territory, headquartered in Lusaka and Harare, respectively. They each maintained operational bases in locations closer to the borders with South Africa, from where they launched cross-border attacks. As both the ANC and PAC had been banned within the country since the 1960s, the internal struggle was waged by the United Democratic Front (UDF), an umbrella organization that comprised local civic organizations and other groups. The UDF, along with trade unions and civic associations, organized the mass-action campaigns that destabilized South Africa throughout the mid-to late-1980s. Additionally, throughout the country there were self-defense units, grassroots militia groups that had formed in most of the townships to defend against the SADF and SAP, as well as to enforce some form of order in these locations.

## Security sector reform in the transition era

By the time the transition unfolded in the early 1990s, South Africa had been locked in a decades-long struggle between the minority-dominated government and these various liberation forces. By the end of the 1980s, the government and opposition had seemed to be at a political stalemate domestically, while international pressure to end apartheid and transform the conflict had escalated to sanctions and international isolation. South Africa emerged from this impasse not through military victory or external intervention, but through internally-driven negotiations among leaders who recognized that transformation was preferable to full-scale civil war.[9] The historic founding elections were held in April 1994, and in May the new government assumed power under the ANC.

While the speed and relative smoothness of the transition took most observers by surprise, secret meetings between senior members of the ANC and the National Party had been taking place from as early as 1984.[10] In this process, discussions about disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of the fighting forces and the future of the security forces in South Africa were handled separately from the negotiations about the political settlement. Reconfiguring the military structure and establishing new institutions of civilian authority in the security sector were tackled even later, during Constituent Assembly deliberations to draft the Final Constitution (1994–96).

The Interim and Final Constitutions both focused on general principles for the roles, missions, and conduct of the SANDF. The Interim Constitution outlined the basic structure and organization, functions, and lines of accountability for both the police and defense force. The

document was silent on the integration process; instead, this was determined in direct talks between the statutory and non-statutory forces (i.e., the SADF and the liberation armies). The new structures of civil–military relations were spelled out in general concepts in the 1996 Final Constitution, and elaborated in a set of official documents developed and published by the new Ministry of Defence in 1996 and 1998.

## Structural reform: civil–military relations

The new system established civilian supremacy and democratic governance of the security apparatus as the core principles of civil–military relations in a democratic South Africa. Security institutions were to be made compliant with this democratic system and repurposed to serve the polity rather than the regime. The goal, as Philip Frankel phrased it, was to "civilianize defence" by subordinating the military to the state, and disengaging it from politics.[11] In this new dispensation, the military would act within a constitutional framework and parliament would perform as an informal agent of control.

Within the military, the former SADF was disbanded and the new SANDF began to integrate combatants from both the liberation forces and the standing army, while the racial composition of the forces also began to more accurately reflect societal demographics. The Chief of the SANDF was separated from policy decisions, and the position that was created officially carried out operational orders and maintained the operational readiness of the force. The Minister of Defence was granted all responsibility for developing policy, transitioning that policy into strategy, planning operations, and for the functions of administration, training, and looking after the morale of the forces.

### *Structures of civilian control*

The 1996 Constitution established several civilian bodies responsible for the governance and oversight of the security apparatus, divided between the executive and legislative branches. In particular, it created a Ministry for Defence and Ministry for Police, separating the two and placing both under Cabinet-level control. Oversight and reporting functions were assigned to parliamentary committees.[12] Two additional core documents delineated the functions of these bodies: the 1996 White Paper on Defence and the 1998 Defence Review. Both were created through consultative processes, with inputs from key civic organizations. From these documents emerged a complex and well-defined structure of civilian agencies to administer and direct the operations of the defense sector. On paper, the system is as elaborate as any found in a long-standing democracy, reflecting extensive study of many countries' civil–military institutional arrangements.[13] In practice, the civilian institutions encountered growing pains as they sought to institutionalize themselves and begin operating, particularly because of a dearth of civilians with knowledge of defense issues. Complicating the issue, functional equivalence between military and civilian actors was an alien concept to the former SADF, most of whom still controlled the SANDF in its early years.[14]

In late 2010, the Ministry of Defence initiated a comprehensive review of the civilian defense institutions, generating proposals for reform intended to streamline civil–military relations, reporting, and responsibilities (the results had not yet been released at the time of writing). Since 1994, more civilians have become familiar with defense issues and are better able to engage with the military establishment, so this situation has improved. As politicians have matured and their expertise has increased, they have gained the capacity, but often not the political will, to exert autonomy and independence in the face of ruling party opposition (from

1994 to the time of writing, the African National Congress controlled both houses of parliament). The dominance of the ANC has meant that the full oversight functions of parliament remain untested, as aside from a few individual members from opposition parties, the body corporate of the parliamentary committees have rarely actively debated policy or budgetary issues with the executive branch.[15]

## Executive branch

After the political transition, the new government moved to reinvigorate the civilian defense institutions that had been eviscerated under apartheid. As a part of the democratization process, the ANC government attempted to build a strong Ministry of Defence with well-defined roles and budgetary, policy, and doctrinal control over the new SANDF. Control over military deployments was centralized to the presidency and the Defence Minister's office. The South African President bears the responsibility to authorize all external deployments of the defense force. Either the President or the Minister of Defence may authorize deployments within the Republic or within international waters, in order to: (1) preserve life, health or property in emergency or humanitarian relief operations; (2) ensure the provision of essential services; (3) support any department of state, including for purposes of "socioeconomic upliftment;" and (4) effect national border control.[16]

In the reorganization the Minister of Defence became the sole official conduit to the President of South Africa on all issues pertaining to the defense forces. The Minister is the Cabinet-level civilian authority on military matters, and because the defense sector institutions report to the minister, rather than directly to the President, the position is much more powerful than during the apartheid era. Informally, the government has ensured that the Minister would be in alignment with the ruling party by appointing only members of the party to serve in the chief positions within the MoD and, once integration was complete, the SANDF. For example, the first Minister, Joe Modise, had been the commander of the MK, the ANC's armed wing, while the first Deputy Minister, Ronnie Kasrils, was the former MK intelligence chief. To provide for continuity, the first appointed Chief of the Defence Force was General Georg Meiring, who had been the Chief of the SADF at the time of the transition. When his term expired in 1999, he was succeeded by General Siphiwe Nyanda, formerly the MK Chief of Staff, then the SANDF Chief of Staff between 1994 and 1999.

The new system also reversed the colonization of the MoD by the DoD that had occurred under apartheid. The new structures created separate civilian and military bodies within the MoD: the Defence Secretariat and the SANDF. The director of each is a four-star general or equivalent in rank. The Defence Secretariat included five divisions, while the SANDF divided into the various armed services, military intelligence, military health, and several joint divisions (see Figures 21.1, 21.2, and 21.3).

The Secretary of Defence chairs the Secretariat and serves as the primary policy and strategic advisor to the Minister of the Defence, and is responsible for performing duties and functions to enhance the democratic and civilian management of the defense forces. The Secretary also serves as the administrative head and chief accounting officer in the DoD. A final duty of the Secretary is to monitor the Chief of the SANDF's compliance with presidential or ministerial directives.

With this division of power, the Secretary of Defence technically has more responsibility than the Defence Chief, yet they rank as co-equals in the DoD and are co-chairs on the advisory Defence Staff Council. The relationship between the Secretary and the Chief has not always been harmonious. Some of this has been personality based, and some of it stems from the set-up

*Figure 21.1* South African Ministry of Defence
*Source*: Air Force Strategy, South African Air Force, Department of Defence.



*Figure 21.2* The Defence Secretariat
*Source*: Defence Secretariat Office, Department of Defence.

of the institutions. For example, there have been instances where the specified chain of com-
mand for a military operation bypasses the Secretary of Defence altogether, as happened in 1998
when South Africa sent troops to Lesotho to help prevent a *coup d'état*. In this instance, the
President ordered intervention to protect the Lesotho regime, but did not inform the Secretary
of Defence.[17] As currently detailed, the chain of command bypassed the Secretary, as the
President could and did go directly to the Chief of the Defence Force to order the operation.

*Figure 21.3* The SANDF
*Source*: Air Force Strategy.

The SANDF Chief at the time could have chosen to inform the Secretary, but for various reasons chose not to, since he was not required to report the order. As a result, Secretary Pierre Steyn discovered the military operation from the newspaper.[18] In the absence of a new defense review, this chain of command issue could still occur.

The Defence Secretariat was envisaged as a body that would set policy, develop the defense budget, monitor financial outlays, write doctrine, and create and implement defense and military policies and programs. The structures within the Defence Secretariat include the policy and planning division, the finance division, the equal opportunities Chief Directorate, the departmental acquisition and procurement division, and the Defence Inspectorate. During the early phases of the transition, the military plan for the Secretariat had been to populate the body with retired military personnel, ensuring that the civilian structure would be knowledgeable about military matters. Once the ANC assumed power, however, it moved political appointees into the civilian structures. Some of these came from the ranks of the non-statutory forces (the liberation armies), which meant they lacked needed familiarity with formal military processes, and many others were Party civilians with no background in military matters at all.

On the military side of the defense institutions in the executive branch, the Chief of the SANDF (alternatively called the Chief of the Defence Force or the Defence Chief) commands the SANDF and is the chief military adviser for the Minister of Defence on operational matters. Thus the Defence Chief operates as the principal executive agent of the DoD. The Chief administers the force and determines the best execution of directives, programs, and policies established by civilian authorities (the President, parliament, the Minister of Defence, and the Defence Secretariat). This represents a significant change from the apartheid era, when the Chief of the SADF was accountable only to the President. The SANDF was granted control over the process of integration, executing operations, and conducting training. Logistics, procurement and financial control rest with the Secretariat.

## Legislative branch

Complementing the drive to exert civilian control in the executive branch, the new government quickly moved to assert "democratic" (i.e., legislative) control over the military. Parliament established two committees to directly oversee the defense budget and review defense issues. Working with both the National Council of Provinces and the National Assembly (the upper and lower houses in parliament) is the Joint Standing Committee on Defence (JSCD), while the parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Defence (after April 2011 renamed the Portfolio Committee on Defence and Military Veterans) operates within the National Assembly. These committees have been most active in terms of budgetary oversight and less so in terms of policy.[19] Between these two committees, the Portfolio Committee has been far more active than the Joint

Standing Committee on Defence. The Portfolio Committee has more opposition party members in its ranks, which helps it to operate more robustly and to question the government. On its part, while it was active during the integration phase, in the past decade the Joint Standing Committee has been relatively quiescent. The ANC Whip in the committee enforces strict party discipline when it meets, but meetings have also been few as it often fails to meet the quorum to convene. It is the largest committee in parliament and requires a minimum of 37 members to meet.[20]

Parliament exerted most influence over defense reform from the beginning, during the processes of creating the SANDF and determining its roles and missions. According to former Minister of Defence Thandi Modise, the pattern of legislative involvement was set early on when the parliamentary committees involved themselves in debating the role of the military in the post-apartheid era:

> The role of Parliament … in co-designing the defence "blueprint" is important. In 1994 two committees were established to oversee and monitor the defence function. The JSCD had a constitutional mandate to oversee the integration process of the SANDF. At the time the JSCD was composed of very determined activists-turned-politicians who were resolute that if South Africa were to continue to have a defence force it would be one of the people's choosing—fashioned and approved and owned by them much in the fashion they "owned" MK. This shifted the political and policy debate more into parliament and therefore more into the public domain. The JSDC was very clear that no defence policies or programmes of procurement would be approved unless they were endorsed by the committee. This effectively shifted the locus of decisionmaking away from the military elite within the SANDF towards the Ministry and parliament.[21]

In this quote, we can see the realization of the democratic and participatory ideal for the new defense sector. Since this time, however, most of the involvement of parliament has been in oversight of budgets, with annual reviews of the defense budget, during which they request appearances by the Minister, the Secretary, and the Defence Chief.

## Civil–military relations in practice

The principles of civilian supremacy have become well respected and enshrined in the South African defense sector. The military may not always like what the civilians ask them to do, and in the past have often felt that civilians have over-extended the military, yet most officers firmly believe that the military profession must and should be subordinate to civilian leadership.[22] In practice, the execution of functions and the institutionalization of the new system have resulted in practices that function differently than envisaged in the guiding documents. The nature of the transformation/integration process and the nature of the new political dispensation have sharply influenced the system. One cannot separate out the functioning of the system from the crucible of the transition or the realities of ANC dominance in South African politics.

First of all, the process of creating the new structures sparked off bureaucratic turf wars and clashes between the civilian and military institutions. As previously noted, the core of the SANDF was drawn from the structures of the prior SADF. As such, the officers were unfamiliar with the practice of equivalence between military and civilian actors. Many times the SANDF would create a plan or policy paper that the Secretariat should have created, only to be surprised

that the Secretariat negatively reacted to what the SANDF considered responsible proactive behavior. As the Defence Secretariat became more assertive in defending its new powers, the civilian body clashed with the SANDF.[23]

A second issue in the institutionalization of the new bureaucratic structures was that as it assumed its functions, the Secretariat experienced capacity constraints. The primary problem was that the Secretariat was understaffed. From 1995 to 1998, the Secretariat existed almost in name only. Despite public recruitment campaigns, the great majority of its strategic and managerial positions were still vacant two years after its establishment. By 1996, for example, only 99 posts (of some 600) had been formally approved, and only ten had been filled on a permanent basis.[24] Minister Modise appointed personnel to the Secretariat in significant numbers only after the completion of the Defence Review in 1998. As late as 2010, there were still far fewer civilians within the MoD than had been initially planned: the entire policy section contained just 30 civilians, and only six in the national defense policy division.[25] In part, this lack of personnel was due to a societal distrust of the military and lack of interest in security careers, and in part because the reduced budget of the defense sector reduced the number of hires the MoD could make.[26] Regardless of the reasons, the result was that for the first five years, genuine decision-making still rested in the hands of the white generals who formed the core leadership in the SANDF.[27]

Capacity was further compromised because the few civilians who were hired tended to lack familiarity with military systems and processes. Soon after the transition, few South Africans were knowledgeable about security and defense issues, and most civilians who were knowledgeable about defense or security matters were white males. The imperatives of transformation required that the Secretariat had to recruit a racially and gender representative workforce, so few of those with appropriate backgrounds could be hired. Throughout the first decade of the transition, South Africa experienced fierce competition across all government bureaucracies for the few non-whites who had enough education to be effective public sector employees, and the defense sector attracted few of these. The ANC also desired to populate the Secretariat with those loyal to the party, further limiting the pool of candidates.[28]

The result was a clash between the SANDF and the Secretariat. The SANDF often resisted following imperatives from those whom they considered ignorant about the systems they were overseeing. In an attempt to rectify the knowledge gaps, the SANDF tried to fill the civilian billets with military actors, or to use military actors to carry out the duties of the civilians who were either not hired, or considered incompetent. As a result, the SANDF consistently overstepped its roles in the new dispensation, earning the ire of the civilians in the Secretariat, and generally clashed with the new institutions.[29] For example, the SANDF initiated the process of creating a White Paper on Defence before parliament had required it; then-Colonel Rocky Williams conducted 36,000 interviews before parliament had mandated that a review process begin.[30] At the same time, while eager to defend its powers, the Secretariat was neither forceful nor knowledgeable enough to actually assert this control over political and policy matters. Once he retired and affiliated with a prominent nongovernmental organization, Williams became one of the chief architects of defense reform, anyway.

Despite these challenges, the Secretariat did have early success in guiding and shaping policy, and in asserting civilian influence. Members of the Secretariat became active in providing advice on defense policy to the Minister, while also chairing the National Committee on Conventional Arms Control, interacting with parliament through the "chief Directorate of Efficiency Services," helping to shape social policy, and contributing to the drafting of the national Crime Prevention Strategy in the mid-1990s. The crowning achievement in the early years, however, was that the Secretariat conducted the 1998 Defence Review, established and coordinated its working groups, and produced the influential policy document. They did this even though the national

government only funded parts of the process.[31] As the Secretariat increased its personnel, bringing on more people with military backgrounds, relations between the civilian and military bodies also improved.

The significant detraction is that neither the minister nor the Secretariat has been able to generate enough political will in the ruling party to create a National Security Strategy. The national government has been too preoccupied with other issues to devote resources to either developing a national security strategy, or to conduct a less-frequent defense review like the Quadrennial Defense Review conducted by the US government. The defense review of 1998 is the last review that the South African MoD has had the mandate or resources to undertake. As late as the end of 2011, the South African government had not developed a comprehensive statement of its national security concerns, priorities, and strategies. Without such a document, the military finds it difficult to fight budget battles, a theme that will be explored in the next section of this chapter.

Some have argued that by the end of 2010, the Secretariat had become too powerful, to the point where it undermined the military's ability to control its finances and direct purchases towards what military officers felt they needed. The extension of civilian control was so successful that it affected operations at the unit level. For example, the financial accounting officer at the unit level reports to the Secretary of Defence via the Secretariat, not to his or her own unit commander in the SANDF. Logistics and acquisitions officers also report to the Secretary of Defence, rather than through SANDF channels.[32] The Secretary of Defence makes decisions about what the services could purchase, from basic operations and maintenance items to major defense system acquisitions, which in the past has led to fights between the Secretary and the Defence Chief.[33]

The final set of civil–military challenges arose from the influence and dominance of the ANC. Here, there were impacts both within the SANDF and on the ability of parliament to execute its oversight functions. Within the SANDF, ANC alignment and MK credentials became important influences on the process of military integration and the early composition of the SANDF officer corps. The need to transform the SANDF, especially the officer corps, meant that political affiliation and racial membership helped individuals from the non-white groups to advance through the ranks faster than their field experience and time in grade should have warranted.

The early years were traumatic, for while the forces were integrating, the overall size of the SANDF was being drawn down by half: from over 100,000 just after integration to a target of 65,000 (the SANDF actually settled closer to 75,000 members). The initial goal set by parliament was for the SANDF to achieve racial and gender parity in five years, which necessitated the fast tracking of non-white soldiers and officers through the ranks and the defense colleges. When the SANDF attempted to resist this rapid timeline, the ANC-dominated parliament insisted that they meet it, so the SANDF had no choice but to do this quickly.[34]

Those from the SADF felt the process was very disruptive to the system. Initially the government tried to fire all the old generals, but the retention clauses in the Constitution prevented this.[35] Therefore, when the government found they could not expel the old Afrikaners, they retained the officers on the payroll but stripped them of official duties. In their places were installed non-white, politically-connected officers who had advanced through the various defense colleges much more rapidly than time-in-grade should have warranted, and with a near-zero failing rate. Some observers were concerned both about the capability of the new leadership and their political ties.[36] This affected morale in the senior corps, and while some retired, others stuck it out.

In the mind of the new government, fast-tracking was a political imperative. It darkened the complexion of the defense force, showed that the SANDF was different from the SADF, and

enabled them to reward allies from the struggle. The promoted SANDF officers deeply resented the implication that they were less well qualified than their predecessors, and also believed that fast-tracking served an important goal, one different from those of the ANC. Among this group, fast-tracking was considered both a way to more quickly transform the SANDF and to circumvent the standards that the SADF had imposed during the integration process. The SADF had set standards that emphasized formal training over field experience, and this had led to the elimination of many personnel from the liberation armies who had sought integration into the new force.[37] Regardless of which interpretation is accurate, the political influence over the new systems was marked.

In terms of parliamentary oversight, the ANC's dominance in the political sphere has meant that the two parliamentary committees have not been vigorous in asserting their budgetary or policy oversight functions. The Portfolio Committee on Defence (PCD) has eclipsed the Joint Standing Committee on Defence (JCSD) in terms of activity. This is not negative in itself, for the JCSD completed its transitional duties long ago, and many of its functions are held concurrently with the PCD. The Portfolio Committee on Defence has been successful in establishing regular operations, and suffers less absenteeism than the JCSD.

The defense committees were not unusual in this respect, as few committees in the South African parliament have exhibited true independence.[38] Parliamentarians often lack experience and the committees suffer from poor institutional support. Over time, capability has improved, but the electoral system also creates a situation in which ANC committee members cannot question the government without risking their seats. Compounded with the fact that the ANC regularly holds over 60 percent of the seats in parliament, few committees have questioned executive decisions. Nevertheless, the Portfolio Committee has become more active since the arms procurement scandals that first broke in 1999.[39] The most vocal and active members are from the ranks of the opposition, particularly David Maynier of the Democratic Alliance. Even so, while the parliamentary committees have rarely been assertive with the Ministers of Defence, they have been known to dismiss the Secretary of Defence if he or she is unprepared when called to testify.[40]

The end result is that while on paper the systems of civil–military relations emulate those found in many advanced industrial countries, in operation they function rather differently. Informal power relations affect the independence of the civilian institutions, particularly those in parliament. The realities of government priorities in the post-conflict era affected not only military integration, but also threatened to undermine the integrity of the civilian institutions the government had created. The Secretariat has slowly gained capability, independence, and respect.

## Functional reform: roles and missions

As South Africa moved out of the apartheid era, it also entered into a fundamentally changed security environment, thanks to both improved relations with regional post-colonial governments and the end of Cold War-inspired insurgencies. No longer at war with its neighbors, the new government ought to reform South Africa's image in the Southern African region and broader international community. As part of this process, the ANC-led government mandated that the military change its orientation away from external aggression and interference in its neighbors' affairs, and instead become a force for regional peace, to help support domestic security services, and to assist the government wherever it deemed necessary.

After 1994, there remained few militarized security threats on the country's borders: the freedom movements (insurgencies, in the eyes of the apartheid regime) had laid down their arms and were either demobilizing their fighters or integrating them into the new military force; the fight

in newly independent Namibia (formerly South-West Africa) had ended in 1989; the Cubans had withdrawn from Angola so there was no more Communist threat; and since the Mozambican civil war had ended (1992), there was no longer an insurgency force to support. Therefore, not only had the domestic mission of fighting the liberation movement ceased, but the external fronts of the conflict had ended as well. Furthermore, none of the regional militaries was strong enough to mount a militarized challenge to the "new" South Africa, nor were they interested in doing so. As Jakkie Cilliers and Lindy Heinecken put it, after 1994, the SANDF became "a military in search of a mission."[41]

## Guiding documents

Three key documents outline the roles and missions of the SANDF. These are Chapter 11 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996), the White Paper on Defence, and the Defence Review. Besides national defense, they outlined a set of secondary missions intended to defend and protect the country's people in accordance with the Constitution and international law. In the new dispensation, therefore, one of the fundamental shifts would be not only in terms of who controlled the military, but also how it was utilized in the defense of the country.

In the early 1990s the Sub-Council on Foreign Affairs of the transitional government had anticipated that deteriorating regional relations stemming from refugee migration, drug trafficking, arms transfers, and cross-border ethnic, nationalist, and extremist activities could threaten South Africa's internal stability.[42] Accordingly, in addition to its more traditional national defense role, the government set priorities that focused on conflict prevention, peacekeeping, and domestic stabilization functions. The Interim and Final Constitutions affirmed that the SANDF would provide services in protection of the nation while also fulfilling international obligations; assisting in the preservation of life, health, and property; helping the government with the provision of essential services; upholding the law; and assisting where necessary, in "social upliftment."[43] This last principle is a far cry from traditional, state-based notions of security and proper military missions.

The 1996 White Paper provided a conceptual overview and general guidance for the posture, roles, missions, and orientation of the future military, while leaving the details of how to enact these to a subsequent process (the Defence Review of 1998). The process of creating the White Paper was an interesting microcosm of the larger civil–military processes at the time. Initially, the SANDF developed the White Paper without Secretariat input or parliament's decree. South African military historian Len le Roux argues that because the civilian institutions were just standing up in this period, the military staff at Defence headquarters took the initiative and completed the first draft White Paper by 1994. The problem, he argued, was that

> [the] draft concentrated on defence strategy and force structure and paid little attention to other important normative policy matters such as civil–military relations, democratic control, the racial and gender composition of the force, language and religious policy and arms control amongst others.[44]

Because it had not been developed consultatively and ignored the social issues that were important to the new regime, the White Paper was downgraded to a "Green Paper" discussion document, and then withdrawn altogether. In 1995, the MoD initiated a new process, this time headed by an ANC-aligned civilian from a prestigious Cape Town-based nongovernmental organization.[45]

The final White Paper focused on the positions of the Department of Defence and the SANDF in the new South Africa, centering more on civil–military relations and normative matters than the practicalities of how objectives were to be achieved. The primary roles of

the SANDF would be to protect South Africa's territory *and the South African people*. It re-defined the very concept of national security, which in the future "shall be sought primarily through efforts to meet the political, economic, social and cultural rights and needs of South Africa's people, and through efforts to promote and maintain regional security."[46] These are seminal re-orientations of the concept of national security: not territorial defense, defense of the nation but the protection of political, economic, social, and cultural rights of the people, rather than the state administration. With this document the South Africans became one of the first countries to define population security—human security—as a national security objective.

In addition to the primary role, the White Paper also specified a set of non-traditional secondary roles that have become core missions of the SANDF. Here again, the South Africans have codified what has become common practice in many non-Western countries: missions in support of the South African Police Service in crime prevention, border security, and rural security; the provision of humanitarian and other support to various government departments as needed; a duty to counter internal threats to the constitutional order; to provide assistance in disaster relief; and contribute to regional peacekeeping.[47] Once again, state and people-centric security were identified as the core missions for the defense force.

The White Paper also elaborated external roles for the new military. As with the internal functions, the SANDF would be utilized to promote the political aspirations of the new regime. In the international arena, the military would be harnessed to generate international goodwill and to help serve as a model for conflict resolution and peacekeeping, and thus as a vehicle to rehabilitate the image of South Africa. Particularly, the White Paper argued that South Africa should take a leading role with regard to peace and security in Africa, and particularly Southern Africa.[48] The White Paper specifically acknowledged that South Africa was not in danger of an immediate conventional threat in the short-to-medium-term period.

Two years later, a Defence Review further extended the concept of these broader roles and missions, while also tackling the harder questions of how the forces should be equipped, what capabilities were needed to fulfill these roles, the size and shape of the SANDF, the future of the defense budget, and critical issues of human resources.[49] The Defence Review was initiated by the Ministry of Defence in order to help anticipate South Africa's defense needs into the next decade, while also attempting to operationalize the principles in the other key documents. Signaling the more positive state of civil–military relations at this point, the review was conducted in a consultative fashion, incorporating actors previously excluded from the defense decision-making process, notably elements of civil society. As such, "it heralded the creation of a new culture within the Department of Defence that sought to incorporate a diversity of opinion and critiques on national defence matters rather than formulating policy based on 'expert' opinions alone."[50]

One key component of the Defence Review was procurement. The Review focused on the absolute necessity of replacing "outdated and obsolete" defense force equipment that was rapidly becoming inoperative and undermining the force's abilities to fulfill any of its stated roles, whether primary or secondary. This situation speaks directly to the effectiveness aspect of this volume's analytical framework for civil–military relations. Without a clear mandate to fulfill its primary role, and in the absence of a guiding national security strategy, the defense sector found it difficult to argue for increased budgetary allocations. This has remained a consistent problem for the South African military from the late 1990s to the present. In the 2011 budget, for example, the government allocated three times as much revenue to social spending as to defense spending.[51]

### The impact of new roles and constraints on effectiveness

At first, focusing on the new mission sets was not the main priority of the military. Structural issues dominated the early years as the military focused on transformation and integration.[52] The

SANDF soon began to worry about a growing imbalance between capital equipment and manpower. Inflated personnel levels resulting from force integration without rapid demobilization threatened combat efficiency and compounded the problems created by deep budget cuts. In 2000, Philip Frankel argued that "the current force design is neither doctrine sustainable nor affordable given that the military has less than half the finances it enjoyed in the last days of apartheid."[53] The SANDF soon found itself over-extended in its secondary missions, particularly in the realm of peacekeeping, especially since peacekeeping commitments have exceeded anything that the military had envisaged.[54]

Once it began to engage in military operations, the SANDF quickly found that all of its missions were in its "secondary" role of support to society. By the early 2000s, the majority of military activity was focused toward supporting the police in domestic issues.[55] Politically, it was understood that this was necessary to maintain domestic law, order, and stability through the period of South Africa's transformation, and also that of the police force.

Early in its existence, for example, the SANDF was deployed to help the police provide security in rural areas and along the borders, because the SAPS, which had primary responsibility for both, had neither the personnel nor material resources to meet the missions' requirements. By the early 2000s this utilization came under criticism, and in 2003 the Ministry of Defence announced a planned phasing-out of military involvement in border security functions and other internal security activities. The SANDF completed the phased turnover of all border control services to the SAPS by 2007. By 2009, however, the still under-resourced SAPS had proven unable to contain and reduce cross-border trafficking and migration, leading the President to order the SANDF back to the borders. In 2011 the SANDF was designated the lead department for border security.[56]

According to the South African DoD, "Operation Corona" subsequently deployed over four SANDF companies to South Africa's borders with Mozambique and Zimbabwe in 2011, and for the first time placed personnel within Kruger National Park to assist with anti-poaching activities. This last role is an entirely new one for the SANDF, introducing activities which, according to Defence Minister Lindiwe Sisulu, "we had not previously regarded as our domain."[57] SANDF is now providing security for the country's land, maritime, and air borders, and through 2015 will expand its mandate to include the borders with Lesotho, Botswana, and Namibia.[58] In adding anti-poaching to its list of activities, the SANDF joins with the Botswana Defence Force, which has made protecting the country's national parks one of its primary roles since the early 1990s.

The SANDF has also been heavily engaged in electoral support, post-conflict reconstruction, search and rescue, and disaster response. These missions have been prioritized by the latest Minister of Defence, Lindiwe Sisulu, who assumed the post in 2009. South African forces have been active on the continent in African Union peacekeeping operations (Burundi, Comoros, and the DRC, among others); they have contributed forces to the AU-UN hybrid force in Darfur (UNAMID); they have helped provide security during elections in Comoros, DRC, Lesotho, and Madagascar; aided disaster response in Mozambique; and engaged in post-conflict reconstruction operations in Burundi, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan, and the Ivory Coast.[59] As the 2006/7 annual report phrased it, "The accolades that we received from the international community convinced us that we are playing our rightful role in our region, the Southern African Development Community."[60] To date, the SANDF has engaged in kinetic operations only in the form of external peacekeeping.

Many outsiders would label the SANDF one of the most capable and well-trained militaries in Africa, while among South Africans the SANDF is now held in high regard. Furthermore, the SANDF has institutionalized a sophisticated set of structures, agencies, and service branches,

as well as developed detailed planning processes in the Defence Review. Nevertheless, the SANDF leadership, especially the Minsters of Defence, would argue that the SANDF is not as effective a force as it appears from the outside. They point to the fact that the military has never received the resources necessary to effectively carry out all the missions with which it was tasked. Budget constraints and a misalignment of physical resources with the diverse mission sets have negatively affected force readiness and the ability to carry out the mandates the SANDF has been given.

## Conclusion

The South African case represents a hybrid between the increasingly common post-conflict scenario in Africa, in which governments and their security apparatuses have almost completely disintegrated or become privatized, and the earlier global model of the "Third Wave" transitions, where some form of the incumbent regime remained strong through the period of transition. South Africa had elements of each of these situations. Many of the recent post-conflict countries in Africa have had to engage in security sector reform and establish new systems of civil military engagement in the wake of internal wars that caused severe or total state breakdown, de-institutionalization, and the fragmentation of security forces. The Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone, and Liberia are the prototypical cases here. In contrast, throughout its transition South Africa maintained a very strong state and a cohesive security apparatus, making its process more similar to transitions in Ethiopia (1991), Nigeria (1999), and South Sudan (2011); many post–communist states; and the negotiated transitions that occurred across Latin America in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

This is not to say that South Africans did not have to deal with difficult legacies and compromises that continued to influence the post-transition environment as a result of the peace negotiations process. Re-orienting civil–military relations after the South African transition nevertheless was more of a reform process than the wholesale creation of a new security sector, although it did demand a new pattern of relations between the armed forces and the civilian regime. The process has been highly political, so much that no analyst can discuss the functioning of the civil–military relations in South Africa without referring to the context of transition or the nature of ANC dominance.

In both South Africa and the post-Communist world, a very strong security apparatus persisted throughout these processes. This fact influenced the nature of the recast civil–military relations and the nature of security sector reform in significant ways, especially with the intelligence and policing services. Few other transitional countries in Africa had such strong security forces when the countries initiated post-conflict (or post-transition) security sector and civil–military reform. There is also an important distinction to draw between countries that transitioned without conflict as opposed to those emerging from civil war: South Africa resembles the former rather than the latter, as do Nigeria and Ethiopia. Because a growing insurgency was combating the apartheid South African regime, however, the new leadership did have to deal with many of the challenges of reforming security institutions that had been used to violently oppress citizens and fight insurgents.

South Africa and the post-Communist world also were characterized by having one very strong political party that dominated government throughout the early periods of reform. There is a critical difference, however, in that unlike the countries of the former Soviet Union, in South Africa, the ruling party was not the former regime, but the organization that had fought the former regime. Therefore, when the new government sought to reform the police, military and intelligence services, it understood these institutions from the point of view of former

victims. The core role of the military thus was deliberately shifted to protecting human security, instead of protecting a particular regime, as had been its primary function during the apartheid era. This shift may be one of the most enduring legacies of the South African security sector reform process, as the country leads the way in re-defining notions of security and appropriate roles and missions for national military forces.

# Acknowledgments

# Notes

1 For continuity's sake with the rest of the volume, American English spellings will be used in this chapter. South Africa utilizes British English spelling, however, so when referencing specific institutions and positions, the British spelling will be used (e.g., Minister of Defence, Defence Secretariat).

2 For a comprehensive overview of the security forces during the apartheid era, see the chapters in Jacklyn Cock and Laurie Nathan, eds., *War and Society: The Militarisation of South Africa* (Cape Town, South Africa: David Philip, 1989). Also Philip Frankel, *Pretoria's Praetorians: Civil-Military Relations in South Africa* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984, reprinted 2009) is one of the most authoritative of the early works on the SADF.

3 Joe Modise, "Realising our Hopes: Address by the Minister of Defence on the Defence Budget Vote," The Arms Deal Virtual Press Office, March 9, 1999, 2, available at: www.armsdeal-vpo.co.za/articles 03/defence budget vote.html (accessed August 7, 2012).

4 For a history of the National Party, see Dan O'Meara, *Forty Lost Years: The Apartheid State and the Politics of the National Party, 1948–1994* (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1996).

5 During the apartheid era, the government established official racial categories that had profound political, social and economic effects. In common usage, the term *whites* refers to those of European descent. Within this, *English* connotes descendants of British settlers who speak English as a primary language, and *Afrikaner* refers to those descendants of the Dutch for whom Afrikaans is the first language. The terms *non-whites* and *blacks* (lowercase) are often used interchangeably; this group is also referred to as "the formerly oppressed" and "previously disadvantaged." Within this category, *Africans* (or Blacks) refers to those belonging to indigenous tribes; *Coloureds* refers to those of mixed race; and *Indians* or *Asians* refer to descendants of settlers from those areas.

6 Vlakplaas was the name of a farm a few miles west of Pretoria, where one particularly notorious counterinsurgency squad was headquartered. It eventually became the name of the unit itself.

7 Frankel, *Pretoria's Praetorians*; Lindy Heinecken, "Civil Military Relations and the Emergence of a Civil-Military Gap in South Africa," *Conflict Management, Peace Economics and Development* 4 (2007): 293–300.

8 Established in 1961, *Umkhonto we Sizwe* (MK) was the ANC's military wing and operated with a separate organizational structure, based mainly outside of the country. From outposts in Angola, Mozambique, and Zambia, MK launched attacks on South African military targets within South-West Africa (Namibia) and South Africa. The ANC and MK strategy attempted to inflict losses on civilian infrastructure to force the Nationalist government to change its tactics by threatening its stability at home.

9 For a selection of the many comprehensive accounts of the transition, see Adrian Guelke, *Rethinking the Rise and Fall of Apartheid* (New York and Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); Martin Murray, *The Revolution Deferred: The Painful Birth of Post-apartheid South Africa* (New York and London: Verso, 1994); and Timothy Sisk, *Democratization in South Africa: The Elusive Social Contract* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995).

10 Nelson Mandela, *Long Walk to Freedom: The Autobiography of Nelson Mandela* (Boston: Back Bay Books, 1994); Allister Sparks, *Tomorrow is Another Country: The Inside Story of South Africa's Road to Change*

(New York: Hill and Wang, 1995); I. William Zartman, "Negotiating the South African Conflict," in I.W. Zartman, ed., *Elusive Peace: Negotiating an End to Civil Wars* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1995).

11 Philip Frankel, *Soldiers in a Storm: The Armed Forces in South Africa's Democratic Transition* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press 2000), p. 107.

12 In April 2009, the government merged the Department of Military Veterans with the Ministry of Defence, and created a Ministry of Defence and Military Veterans. For continuity's sake, unless directly referring to a particular Minister, this chapter will use the phrases "Ministry of Defence" and "Minister of Defence."

13 Author interview with Nick Sendall, Chief Director of Defence Policy, Strategy and Planning Division of the Department of Defence, Pretoria, September 28, 2010.

14 Frankel, *Soldiers in a Storm*, p. 109.

15 Author interviews with Sendall and David Maynier, DA member of Parliament, in Cape Town, September 2010.

16 New Defence Act 42 of 2002, Republic of South Africa, date of commencement May 23, 2003, available at: www.dod.mil.za/documents/documents.htm (accessed August 7, 2012).

17 In this instance, Home Affairs Minister Jacob Zuma was the acting President as both President Nelson Mandela and Deputy President Thabo Mbeki were out of the country. When Mandela returned from his travels, he endorsed the action.

18 Author interview with Captain (ret'd.) Johan Potgeiter, SA Navy, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, September 23, 2011.

19 Frankel, *Soldiers in a Storm*.

20 Peter Daniels, "The Role and Function of the Joint Standing Committee on Defence," discussion document distributed at the Joint Standing Committee on Defence: Committee Workshop on mandate, role and functions, Cape Town, February 4, 2011; available from the Parliamentary Monitoring Group: www.pmg.org.za (accessed August 7, 2012).

21 Thandi Modise, "The South African National Defence Force Integration," presentation at the workshop, "The South African Transitional Process–Perspectives from Key Roleplayers," organized by the Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, and delivered at the United Nations Development Programme in Brazzaville, Congo, April 25, 2006, available at: www.iss.co.za/AF/profiles/SouthAfrica/satpaxcdrom/files/Modise.pdf (accessed August 7, 2012).

22 Lindy Heinecken, Richard Gueli, and Ariane Neethling, "Defence, Democracy and South Africa's Civil Military Gap," *Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies* 33(1) (2005): 135.

23 Frankel, *Soldiers in a Storm*, p. 109.

24 Ibid., p. 110.

25 Sendall, interview.

26 Sendall, interview; Frankel, *Soldiers in a Storm*, p. 110.

27 Author interview with Abel Esterhuyse, South African Military Academy at Stellenbosch University, Saldanha, September 2010.

28 Author interview with Hussein Solomon, University of Pretoria, September 22, 2010.

29 Sendall, interview.

30 Potgeiter, interview.

31 Author interview with Tsepe Motumi, Acting Secretary of Defence, Pretoria, South Africa, September 29, 2010.

32 Potgeiter, interview; Sendall, interview.

33 Potgeiter, interview.

34 Ibid.

35 These "sunset clauses" were part of the negotiated settlement: as stipulated in the peace agreements and Interim Constitution of 1994, no civil servants from the apartheid era could be fired by the new government. They could be replaced on retirement, or balanced by an increase in the overall size public service.

36 Potgeiter, interview; author interviews with Waldemar Vrey, former Chief of Staff for the 46th Battalion, SANDF, in Centurion Park on September 22, 2010; and with Hussein Solomon, University of Pretoria, September 22, 2010.

37 Motumi, interview. Sasha Gear has written about the creation of the SANDF as an absorption of the non-statutory forces by the SADF, rather than as a true integration. Author interview with

Gear, Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, Johannesburg, September 28, 2010. See also Gear, "Wishing Us Away: Challenges Facing Ex-combatants in the 'New' South Africa," Violence and Transition Series, Center for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, South Africa, 2002: 8.

38 Lia Nijzink and Jessica Piombo, "Parliament and the Electoral System: How Are South Africans Being Represented?" in L. Piombo and J. Nijzink, eds., *Electoral Politics in South Africa: Assessing the First Democratic Decade* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).

39 For more on the arms deal scandal, see Terry Crawford-Browne, "The Arms Deal Scandal," *Review of African Political Economy* 100 (2004): 329–42. The saga began in 1999 with allegations over corruption and bribery in the procurement of multi-billion Rand weapons systems that did not seem appropriate to South Africa's threat environment. It involved high-level members of the ANC both in and outside the government, their business associates, the parastatal ARMSCOR (the South African defense procurement agency) and several international arms companies and governments. Various investigations into the contracts have been instituted, several of which were still ongoing at the time of writing (December 2011).

40 Interview with Maynier, as well as mentioned by several other interviewees. In February 2010, for example, the Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA) dismissed Acting Secretary of Defence Tsepe Motumi and his assistants when he failed to answer questions about DoD finances during a routine audit hearing. Nkululeko Ncana, "Sisulu Backs Bumbling Motume after Scopa Grilling Fiasco," *Times Live*, February 9, 2010, available at: http://www.timeslive.co.za/news/2010/02/09/sisulu-backs-bumbling-motumi-after-scopa-grilling-fiasco (accessed August 7, 2012).

41 This was a common refrain echoed by those interviewed for this chapter. Jakkie Cilliers and Lindy Heinecken, "South Africa: Emerging from a Time Warp," in Charles C. Moskos, John Allen Williams, and David R. Segal, eds., *The Postmodern Military* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 244.

42 James A. Higgs, "Creating the South African National Defence Force," *Joint Forces Quarterly* Summer (2000): 45–6.

43 Ibid. p. 46.

44 Len le Roux, "The South African National Defence Force and its Involvement in the Defence Review Process," in Rocky Williams, Gavin Cawthra, and Diana Abrams, eds., *Ourselves to Know: Civil Military Relations and Defence Transformation in Southern Africa* (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2003), p. 156.

45 For a description of this process, see ibid.

46 White Paper on Defence, Republic of South Africa Department of Defence (DoD), Pretoria, 1996: Section 2.11.1.

47 Ibid.; see also Heinecken, "Civil Military Relations and the Emergence," pp. 293–300.

48 DoD, White Paper on Defence: Section 2.11.1.

49 Rocky Williams, "Defence in a Democracy: The South African Defense Review and the Redefinition of the Parameters of the National Defence Debate," in Rocky Williams, Gavin Cawthra, and Diana Abrams, eds., *Ourselves to Know: Civil Military Relations and Defence Transformation in Southern Africa* (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2003).

50 Williams, "Defence in a Democracy," p. 205.

51 Estimates of National Expenditure 2011: Vote 22, Defence and Military Veterans, Republic of South Africa DoD, Pretoria, 2011: xvi, available at: www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/2011/enebooklets/ (accessed August 7, 2012).

52 Abel Esterhuyse, "Educating for Professionalism: A New Military for a New South Africa." *Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies* 34(2). Edited version of a paper that was read at the 2005 Annual Meeting of the Society of Military History on "The Rise of the Military Profession," Charleston, South Carolina, February 24–27, 2005 (posted in 2006): 26.

53 Frankel, *Soldiers in a Storm*, p. 102.

54 Motumi, interview.

55 Abel Esterhuyse "The Death of Six Soldiers in the DRC: The SANDF on the Domestic Political Agenda," Electronic Briefing Paper No. 19, Center for International Political Studies, 2004: 4.

56 "Speech by Acting Chief of the South African National Defence Force During a Media Briefing Held at Joint Operations Division Regarding SANDF Deployment on the Borders," Republic of South Africa DoD, April 26, 2011, available at: www.dod.mil.za/news/news%202011/April%2011/Borders%2026%20Apr11%20.htm (accessed August 7, 2012).

57  Lindiwe Sisulu, Minister of Defence and Military Veterans, speech on the occasion of the Department of Defence Budget Vote, April 13, 2011.
58  Republic of South Africa DoD, "Speech by Acting Chief."
59  Republic of South Africa DoD, Estimates of National Expenditure: 584.
60  "Renewing our Pledge: A National Partnership to Build a Better Life for All, FY 2006–7," Annual Report, Republic of South Africa DoD, 2007: xiv.

# SECTION C

# Control and effectiveness

## Six case studies

# 22

# DEVELOPING A ROBUST MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND A JOINT STAFF

## Portugal

*Thomas C. Bruneau*

## Introduction

Portugal is an excellent case study of a country creating from scratch the institutions for democratic civilian control of the armed forces, adapting them in line with changes in the domestic and international environment, and establishing joint command structures and education to increase effectiveness. Portugal is a new democracy, having initiated the Third Wave of Democratization on 25 April 1974. The authoritarian regime of 1928–74 was not a military dictatorship, although the military supported it, and in fighting three separate counter-insurgency wars in Africa between 1961 and 1974, the armed forces grew to 200,000 men and absorbed one-half of the national budget. With the military coup of 25 April 1974, and ensuing two years of military rule under a split but overall leftist military movement, the armed forces assumed extensive prerogatives both legally and in fact, which were gradually pared down over the next 20 years of civilian-led governments. A civilian-led Ministry of Defense was empowered in the early 1990s, and civilian control ultimately pervaded all aspects of national defense and security policy. Most recently, from 2008, in law and increasingly in fact, the civilian-led Ministry of Defense has been further strengthened and a joint operational command has been created. Increasingly, joint education has also been established. The causal factors that allow us to best understand these major reforms are found in historical memory, domestic politics, and external inputs from NATO and the European Union. The experience of Portugal, looking back for a generation, demonstrates distinct phases in which this small and relatively poor country has periodically reformed the defense sector within the perspective of a larger strategic environment.

## Beginning the Third Wave

The Third Wave of Democratization began on 25 April 1974, when the Armed Forces Movement (MFA), composed of some 200 junior- and mid-level officers, overthrew the civilian-led authoritarian regime that had been founded almost 50 years before.[1] In the ensuing struggle

for political power between different political and military factions over the next two years, a transition to democracy finally and problematically did occur, but it was one in which the armed forces would legally and in fact play a very large role. The Constitution of 1976 grew out of a political pact between the MFA and the four main political parties, and it enshrined in law a continuing role for the military in a non-elected, exclusively military, Revolutionary Council (CR), which held the ultimate authority regarding the armed forces and defense policy. Additionally, it served as a constitutional court. In its capacity as a constitutional court, the CR found unconstitutional several laws that had been passed by the democratically-elected parliament, the Assembly of the Republic (AR). In short, while Portugal was never a military regime during the long period of authoritarian rule, the nature of its transition to democracy inserted the armed forces as a central and highly respected (especially by the Left) element of political power. The military also enjoyed powers and privileges because the cabinet of civilian governments after 1976 included military officers. Further, the popularly-elected President, first elected in 1976 and re-elected in 1981, was General Ramalho Eanes who combined the role of head of state with Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces. In short, the newly-democratic Portugal initiated the Third Wave of Democratization with a very large military component: a situation very different from other, later, democratic transitions in that it was the MFA that initiated the transition rather than civilian opposition elements, which was the case in most other transitions. From the first parliamentary elections, in 1976, until 1987 no single political party received a majority of the vote, and there were ten governments and five general elections during this 11-year period. As a semi-parliamentary system, with a relatively powerful and popularly-elected President, overall stability was maintained even while governments came and went. And, while the governments were temporary and unstable, the military remained mainly stable as an institution during this time.

## Initial reforms in the early 1980s

In the context of negotiations for accession to the European Community (EC), which were initiated in 1978, and the creation of a Ministry of Defense in 1982 under the leadership of a very strong politician, Diogo Freitas do Amaral, of the Democratic and Social Center (CDS), there were some initial reforms to sort out the "understandings" arising from the military coup and the initial years of political radicalism and instability. These reforms dealt extensively with civil–military relations. Following a complicated and tense political process, the 1976 Constitution was revised in 1982 and the Revolutionary Council abolished, and other aspects of the Constitution were modified to allow for Portuguese entry into the EC. In that same year the *Lei de Defesa Nacional e das Forças Armadas,* elaborated by then Minister of Defense Diogo Freitas do Amaral (who at one time was Prime Minister and later the President of the General Assembly of the United Nations) redefined the structure of the armed forces and began to redefine its relationship to the elected civilian government. The 1982 law, which consisted of 74 articles, included all imaginable aspects of civilian control and structures of the armed forces.[2] In sum, it took six years, and the commitment of a great deal of political energy and resources, before the armed forces were tentatively brought under formal democratic civilian control.[3] The process of the democratic transition in Portugal was unique, as indeed all such transitions are, but what was particularly special or unique in Portugal was the reverse situation regarding the armed forces assuming power with the coup of 25 April 1974, and then gradually relinquishing it over the next ten years or so.

## Consolidating democratic civilian control through the MOD

It would be another decade, beginning in approximately 1992, and a stable government under one political party (in this case the Social Democratic Party, PSD) before the control was

consolidated. Starting in 1990 under Minister of Defense Fernando Nogueira, the second most powerful figure in the PSD government who developed a broad public campaign involving a series of meetings and publications, the democratically-elected civilians finally consolidated their control over the armed forces. It was only in February 1993 that the organic laws defining the powers of the MOD in relationship to the three services and the Chiefs of the General Staff were passed by the parliament. The several and extremely detailed laws transferred powers from the armed forces to the civilian-led MOD, greatly enhanced the ability of the MOD to control the armed forces, and strengthened the services to the detriment of the general staff (EMGFA). By 1994, then, some 20 years after the coup that had led to democracy, civil–military relations assumed the model similar to other, NATO, and EC countries.

It is important to begin to raise the issue of motivation for the reforms of defense institutions and the direction they took and are currently taking. This is an extremely important point because the challenge of reforming defense institutions in the vast majority of countries is simply not an issue; the political elites are not interested and neither are the armed forces as an institution. This is not the case in Portugal. I began to get a sense of this while doing interviews in Lisbon in 1992 and 1993.[4] At that time I was studying "Iberian Defense Policies," which turned out to be a study of civil–military relations as I had to determine who, or what, was in fact developing and implementing such policies. Whereas in Portugal there was a wide and active debate on the future of defense and defense and security institutions, there was nothing similar in neighboring Spain. Very briefly, in summarizing a great deal of interviews, speeches, and written material, the Portuguese are extremely apprehensive of being thrown together with Spain in a large spectrum of institutions and processes in a larger Europe. It must be kept in mind that Portugal is the only part of the Iberian Peninsula that was not absorbed into a Castile-dominated single country, Spain. Historically the Portuguese have utilized all imaginable instruments to diversify their options, with particular emphasis on national defense and security institutions. Historically, the colonies, first global, including Brazil, and then those in Africa (Angola, Guinea-Bissau, and Mozambique) were a key link for Portugal with the rest of the world. After 1975 and the decolonization process, Portugal could no longer rely on the colonies for this link. In this context, then, NATO is more than an alliance: it is their main link to North America to resist Europe. The "Strategic Triangle" of mainland Portugal, the Azores, and Madeira, is a key element for Portugal's engagement with the United States. The base access issue in the Azores for the United States was and is more than just a way to make some money (rent for access) and keep people employed: it is a key element involving the United States in Portugal, again to diversify their options. Their institutional reforms, and indeed the configuration of their forces in maintaining a wide spectrum of roles and missions, must be seen in this context of being similar to other democratic countries in order to more easily relate and maintain close contact.[5] It should be noted that the Portuguese seek to maintain, with a force of 44,000 officers, enlisted, and contractors, capabilities across the full spectrum of military capabilities. These relationships involve territorial defense (with F-16s, for example), peace support operations (PSO) in the Balkans and beyond, active engagement in NATO and EU forces and initiatives, and relations with the so-called PALOP (African Countries Speaking the Portuguese Language). This is obviously very difficult for a small and relatively poor country to maintain, but the Portuguese have made major efforts to do so in order to maintain the most diversified external relations imaginable.

In this context it is worth noting that the *Instituto da Defesa Nacional* (National Defense Institute), with the financial support of the MOD, contracted at least two public opinion surveys to gauge the extent of support of the population for the armed forces, different roles and missions, and popular attitudes towards different levels of the national security and defense

institutions. I do not know of any similar surveys conducted in other countries—at least by a MOD. The significance for me of these surveys, and the fact that they were conducted at all and funded by the MOD, is that there is wide-spread support in Portugal for the armed forces and their role in keeping Portugal a sovereign nation, within the very limited autonomy a small and relatively poor nation can in fact expect. (Mongolia is included in this Handbook for a similar reason; that is, to understand civil–military relations and national security and defense in general as a central instrument of a poorer and weaker nation to maintain sovereignty.) The MOD, in supporting these public opinion surveys, wants to ensure that the institutional innovations are popularly supported. In short, at least one of the motivations for the ongoing innovation, which will be reviewed in the next section, is to maintain popular support for the national security and defense institutions.[6] The surveys provide the services, the MOD, and other national security and defense institutions the ability to gauge where they stand in public opinion.

## The post-9/11 context and comparative assessments of MODs: Portuguese priorities

Between the major reforms of 1994 and the most recent reforms beginning in 2006, there was no major change in the legal bases or the institutions. It should be noted, however, that in seeking to analyze different options, the MOD contracted with the *Instituto de Estudos Estrategicos e Internacionais* (IEEI, Institute for Strategic and International Studies) in Lisbon to do a comparative analysis of the Ministry of Defense structures, responsibilities, and relations with other government entities for five European countries (Holland, Britain, Spain, Belgium, and France). I interviewed the researchers involved in the study, and I was informed the goal was to see how Portugal's MOD compared to other MODs in Europe, with an eye to adapting the Portuguese institutions to the changing global environment, particularly in Europe.[7]

This comparative analysis of MOD structures and responsibilities brings up the key point to understand the motivations behind the recent changes in Portugal's national security and defense institutions. I think these can be summarized in terms of three points: first, the Portuguese see national security and defense institutions, roles, and missions as instruments to maximize their sovereignty. This is a historic priority, and figures large in any discussion with the Portuguese over national security and defense. Second, the Portuguese population is widely supportive of this historic priority, and the fact that the MFA made the coup that ended the authoritarian regime, and supported the transition to democracy, increases popular support for the armed forces. And, third, the Portuguese are keenly attuned to developments elsewhere, particularly in Europe, and want to ensure that their national security and defense institutions are as similar as possible to those in other European countries. In short, the explanation for a high degree of innovation and adaptation in Portuguese institutions is not just the models, influence, and incentives from NATO, OSCE, and the EU, but also their perception, given their historical background going very far back as well as more recently to the coup and the revolution, of the centrality of these national security and defense institutions.

## Recent efforts to strengthen the MOD and implement joint operational command

It was another 12 years, beginning in 2006, when the operational structure of the armed forces and joint professional military education would begin to be fully implemented. Under the leadership of Minister of Defense Nuno Severiano Teixeira, between July of 2006 and July 2009,

the Ministry was modernized and further strengthened in terms of control and oversight, and a joint operational command structure (EMGFA) elaborated. The parliament passed three basic laws on the new structures of the MOD and the EMGFA. In our meeting on 11 March 2010, Nuno Severiano Teixeira explained to me in his terms the reasons for the new package of laws. First, with the post-9/11 threats and challenges, different roles and missions were required of the armed forces. Second, Portugal, now a member of the whole European economic, political, and security and defense architecture, needed changes in the domestic legal framework to adjust to these external, which reach internally, realities.[8] The most important changes, following from these two reasons, are also two in number: first, to provide the legal basis whereby the armed forces can legally cooperate with domestic security actors, including the Guardia Nacional Republicana (GNR, or gendarmerie) and the Policia Judiciaria (or judicial system police); and, second, to clarify in clear and explicit detail the precise powers of the different elements of government-parliament, government, and the presidency—in terms of national security and defense. In the process, the powers of the MOD were increased.

Beyond clarifying the legal–political bases of control, as in the MOD laws, the new laws also further defined and specified the powers of the CHOD, or Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces. The previous MOD "organic," or basic, law of 1993, took power away from the CHOD and limited his operational role to situations of war and states of siege or emergency. These cases are few and far between, but what are fairly common are decisions on sending troops abroad, usually for PSO missions. Thus, in the new law the CHOD has explicit powers in both war and peace. Currently, the joint operational structure is being implemented. On 6 April 2010, RADM Pereira da Cunha was nominated to be the first Chief of the Joint Operational Command.

In addition, professional military education was transformed, with the reduction from three separate schools for each of the three services to one academy for each of the services and a senior joint school. The reform of professional military education (PME) is part of a Europe-wide reform of education driven by the so-called "Bologna process" making PME equivalent to civilian education. The results, in Portugal in any case, were to eliminate a level of education between the academies, of which there are still three, and the war college. There used to be a technical level, with three separate schools, and that level is now gone. Thus, instead of nine separate PME institutions there are now four, with the *Instituto de Estudos Superiores Militares* (IESM, Portuguese Joint War College), founded in September 2005, assuming the role at the pinnacle of the PME system with a large variety of courses for officers at all ranks. It is worth noting that the IESM has cooperating agreements not only with European and North American PME institutions, but also with those in Angola and Mozambique.[9]

In my interview with Nuno Severiano Teixeira on 11 March 2010, he specifically emphasized that these major reforms, in the MOD and the creation of the joint operational command, were necessary to increase the effectiveness of the armed forces in the contemporary global, European, NATO, and domestic context. That is, he highlighted consistent themes that had been obvious since the first legal basis, in 1982, with the *Lei da Defesa Nacional de das Forcas Armadas*.

## Conclusion

The conclusions from this case study of Portugal are both directly relevant for other countries and somewhat unique. They are relevant in general in that it took a very long time—20 years—in terms of consolidating democratic civilian control through a strong and well-staffed MOD, and another ten years passed before the joint operational command structure was created and JPME initiated. They are also relevant in that the reforms were only possible when the political

environment, mainly political stability under one political party in government, was supportive. They are unique, for much of the world, but not Partnership for Peace, NATO, and EU countries, in that in addition to the domestic political stability, the Portuguese military and the civilians are directly influenced by external actors, but the reforms are implemented based upon the perception and the priorities of the Portuguese themselves. In each of the major reforms the direct involvement of these external actors is obvious through training, sales and grants, educational reforms, and the like. There is no doubt but that the democratically-elected civilians are in charge of the armed forces through the MOD. The joint operational command and JPME are still in the process of implementation. Today, the overall situation of civil–military relations in Portugal is extremely positive, although the country is suffering a very serious economic crisis.

## Notes

1 Samuel Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).

2 For the details, see Diogo Freitas do Amaral, *A Lei de Defesa Nacional e das Forças Armadas* (Coimbra: Coimbra Editora, Limitada, 1983).

3 For an analysis of the process, see Thomas Bruneau and Alex Macleod, *Politics in Contemporary Portugal: Parties and the Consolidation of Democracy* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1986), pp. 12–25.

4 In addition to learning this through interviews, I found a very telling article in one of the war college journals: Colonel João Manuel de Melo Mariz Fernandes, "A Instabilidade e as Ameaças a Segurança da Europa; Organizações de Defesa Colectiva e Implicações para Portugal," *Boletim do Instituto de Altos Estudos Militares* 28, 21 November (1992): 29–63.

5 My research on the debate and negotiations in the early 1990s on the status of CINCIBERLANT within the NATO structure helped me to better understand the strategic vision behind Portugal's role in NATO. I summarized my findings in "Portugal's Defense Structures and NATO," in Thomas-Durell Young, ed., *Command in NATO after the Cold War: Alliance, National, and Multinational Considerations* (Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, Army War College, 1997), pp. 171–88.

6 "A Nação e as Questões de Segurança e Defesa: Inquerito a Opinião Publica," Nação e Defesa, Instituto da Defesa Nacional, Lisbon, 1992; Luis Salgado de Matos and Mario Bacalhau, *As Forças Armadas em Tempo de Mudança: Uma sondagem a opinião public nas vesperas do seculo XXI* (Lisbon: Edicoes Cosmos, 2001).

7 See Maria do Rosario de Moraes Vaz, "Adaptação e mudança nos ministerios de defesa europeus: Aspectos organicos, politicos e institucionais" (Lisbon: Instituto de Estudos Estrategicos, ND, but probably 2003).

8 In addition to my interview with him, Nuno Severiano Teixeira also gave me a copy of his book, which includes speeches, laws, and more. See Severiano Teixeira, *Contribuição para uma Politica de Defesa: Julho de 2006 a Julho de 2009* (Lisbon: Ministry of Defense, August 2009).

9 I visited the *Instituto de Estudos Superiores Militares* on 8 March 2010, where I was briefed on their programs and given written material.

# 23

# DEMOCRATIC CIVILIAN CONTROL AND MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS

## Chile

*Florina Cristiana Matei and Marcos Robledo*

## Introduction

This chapter discusses Chile's efforts to develop democratic civil–military relations (CMR) after the transition to democracy in 1990, focusing on endeavors that triggered successful institutionalization of democratic civilian control and military effectiveness.

Chile re-embarked on the path to democracy after army general and Chilean President Augusto Pinochet relinquished the presidency as a result of the 1989 democratic election of a new president. Since then, Chile has strived to consolidate its democracy, including strengthening democratic civil–military relations. The process has been long and challenging: for many years not only did Chile's military carry a stigma associated with their Pinochet-era human rights violations, but they emerged from the dictatorship with the highest prerogatives among all Latin American neighbors, which raised doubts the country would democratize. Yet after more than two decades, the civilian government has come to understand the need for an effective military, and the military has understood that democracy is the "only game in town" in Chile and therefore civilian guidance and oversight are part of the game. Currently, Chile is undergoing a major review and reform of the central institutions involved in national security and defense, seeking to achieve the control and effectiveness dimensions of our expanded framework of democratic CMR.[1] These include: in the legislative field, the enactment in 2010 of the first ever Law on the Organization and Functioning of the Ministry of Defense (MOD) (which is expected to pave the way toward better defense strategy and policy and a more effective Ministry and Minister of Defense); and, at the institutional level, ample reorganization of the Armed Forces (e.g., structures, personnel, organization). The new MOD Law allows the Ministry to formulate public policy over all spectrums of defense policy as well as strategic planning, force structure, military policy, and professional military education. In addition, it is worth mentioning the efforts by the Bachelet and Piñera administrations to amend the Copper Law, which ensures the military gets 10 percent of all copper exports of the state-owned copper company, CODELCO (which will be addressed later in this chapter).

## Background to the non-democratic regime

Between 1973 and 1990, Chile was a military dictatorship under President Pinochet, similar to the bureaucratic–authoritarian regimes that plagued Latin America during the 1970s. Pinochet's rule was characterized by grave human rights violations against regime opponents, including: serious limitations of the right of association and organization (e.g., banning political parties on grounds of ideology); lack of freedom of information and opinion and severe censorship; and repression (e.g., illegal detention, torture, killings, disappearances, expelling citizens from Chile, and/or prohibiting their departure from or entry into Chile). The 1980 Constitution in particular granted very strong prerogatives to the Armed Forces and the National Police (the Carabineros). Among the most important prerogatives the Constitution created was the National Security Council (NSC), where the chiefs of the military and the police had permanent veto power over the executive, the legislative, and the judiciary branches of the state. The Constitution also established immunity from presidential dismissal to the chiefs of the military and the police during their four-year, nonrenewable terms; high budgetary resources (through the 1989 Organic Law of the Armed Forces that stipulates that the defense budget may not fall below the absolute amount of 1989 and that the Armed Forces are also entitled to 10 percent of all exports of the state-owned copper company, CODELCO, with a minimum of US $180 million through the "Copper Law" enacted in 1973); as well as extremely difficult conditions for amending the Constitution, especially if impacting any of the existing military prerogatives.[2]

## Transition to democracy

Chile started its transition to democracy in 1988 when a coalition of the main parties opposing Pinochet's rule (Christian Democrats, Socialists, Radicals, and the Party for Democracy [PPD]), known as the Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia, defeated the dictator in a constitutionally authorized plebiscite on whether or not Pinochet should continue to be president for another eight years.[3] The plebiscite ended the ruthless dictatorship and paved the way toward democracy. In this context, the first elections took place in December 1989. The Concertación backed civilian candidate Patricio Aylwin, leader of the Christian Democrats, who won a majority of votes against the candidate supporting the military regime, and took office in March 1990. Since 1989, Chile's hierarchical military has continued to enjoy high prerogatives for a long time. For example, while Pinochet accepted the defeat and started negotiations with the Concertación regarding the incoming democratic government (prior to the established elections of December 1989), the still-in-power military regime enacted last-minute legislation to ensure the military would still have a say in the future government (e.g., budgetary guarantees, involvement in politics, and professional autonomy).[4] Also, Pinochet remained Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces until 1998 and, after retirement, was entitled by law to a life-long Senate seat in the Congress. Some scholars argue that, by trying to secure high prerogatives after the regime change, the Chilean military aimed to avoid the CMR situation in post-transition Spain whereby the civilians took control of the military at a relatively fast pace.[5] Gregory Weeks, for one, a scholar of CMR in Latin America, particularly states that the Chilean military "looked to the example of Spain and internalized lessons about what type of transition not to allow."[6] Notwithstanding such challenges, the efforts of the interim government of Aylwin and all other presidents endeavored to ensure Chile's path to democracy.

## Democratization of Chile's defense sector: civil–military relations

Chile thus started its journey to democratization with a big gap between two worlds: an emerging civilian government and a strong, independent, and influential military. Reducing the

gap between the two worlds (e.g., by strengthening civilian interest, expertise, and authority over the military while decreasing the influence of the Armed Forces in the politics and government and focusing on professional issues) has therefore been rather protracted and cumbersome, but not without achieving the desired effect, after 20 years or so. Although some challenges still remain, fortunately, Chile has incrementally developed and strengthened democratic CMR.

Since the transition to democracy in 1990, Chile's defense and CMR reform have undergone three stages: 1990–94; 1995–March 2010; and March 2010–present, which will be addressed below. Throughout all these stages there have been specific triggers and opportunities for civilians to strengthen civil–military relations, in particular democratic civilian control. Nevertheless, civilians have also focused on military effectiveness.

The first stage, 1990–94, included the initial efforts to reduce the power of the Chilean military and increase civilian supremacy by the Administration of President Patricio Aylwin (1990–94). This stage was dominated by sporadic confrontation and conflict between military and civilian leaders on CMR issues deriving from: the need to change constitutional provisions, especially with regard to the strong military prerogatives inherited from the Pinochet regime; attempts to bring changes into the structure of the Armed Forces and Ministry of Defense; the necessity to address the human rights abuses committed by the military, police, and intelligence during the military dictatorship (the Concertación being keen to reveal and reprimand such violations); and institutionalizing military and defense transparency and accountability by increasing the authority of the President, the civilian Minister of Defense, the legislative and judicial branches over the military, etc. The military strongly opposed these attempts. Regardless of the scarcity of constitutional reforms and Pinochet's continued presence in the Armed Forces, the Aylwin administration incrementally increased the civilian supremacy over the Chilean military, through a process of "Learning by Doing."[7] To begin with, the Aylwin administration considered the Armed Forces' reaction to their reform attempts more like tactical bargaining to preserve the military status quo within the new democratic regime, and not as final ultimatums, therefore, the President did not rush to "surrender" to the officers' opposition.[8] For example, the President asserted his constitutional prerogatives as Commander-in-Chief of the military and declined, on grounds of financial transgressions, Pinochet's proposals regarding the promotion of several Army officers; although Pinochet did not give up and involved the Supreme Court, the Court ruled in favor of the President—a success in Chilean CMR because it changed the balance of power between the military elites and the President in favor of the latter.[9] Also, by bypassing the military, President Aylwin successfully established a Commission on Truth and Reconciliation (or the "Rettig Commission," after its chair, Raúl Rettig), which conducted a thorough investigation into the human rights offenses and violations as well as crimes committed during the military dictatorship. It ultimately issued a comprehensive public report in 1991 revealing victims and circumstances of their deaths (yet without names of those responsible for these crimes) and putting forward various recommendations (yet without any suggestion regarding the prosecution of perpetrators). The report revealed that the Pinochet regime was responsible for the murder or disappearance of roughly 3,000 Chileans, with Carabineros being accountable for over 50 percent of the human rights abuses that resulted in deaths. Oppressive acts and crimes committed before 1978 were supposed to be covered by an Amnesty Law enacted by Pinochet that year, while those committed after 1978 could be worked out in courts (provided that victims' families initiated trials) with information exposed by the commission used as evidence.[10] Additional steps toward strengthening civilian authority over the military included efforts to strip the military's role in internal security: not only by trying to bring the Carabineros back into the Interior Ministry, but also by subordinating

military intelligence to a new legislation and civilian-led intelligence community; and attempting to institutionalize a "dialogue" and "interaction" with the military.[11]

The second stage lasted throughout the administrations of Eduardo Frei Ruiz Tagle (1995–2000), Ricardo Lagos (2000–06), and Michelle Bachelet (2006–10). This period was characterized by continued and more effective democratic reforms of the armed forces and consolidation of democratic civilian control of the armed forces.

President Frei had a "carrots-and-sticks" approach related to CMR: attempts to balance strengthening democratic civilian control (thus decreasing military prerogatives) while supporting military effectiveness and professionalism. Tensions, however, continued to arise from human rights trials. A telling example is the May 1995 decision of the Supreme Court to convict both former Intelligence Chief, Retired General Manuel Contreras (given seven years), and his deputy, General Pedro Espinoza (given six years) for directing the 1976 assassination of Orlando Letelier in Washington, DC, the Ambassador to the United States and Foreign and Defense Minister under Salvador Allende's government. As Contreras initially did not want to serve the sentence and, backed by unruly Army and Navy units, he succeeded in avoiding imprisonment for months. He eventually agreed to go to jail together (and so did Espinoza), but not without heated negotiations between the military and the Frei Administration, resulting in compromise on the part of the Presidency. Yet, despite tensions and compromise, the Court decision was tremendously significant with regard to CMR as the first-ever sentence, after the regime change, of high-ranking officers,[12] for human rights repressions, and it also represented substantial progress in CMR by bypassing the existing amnesty law (the crime took place between 1973 and 1978). Determined to go on with his plan of incrementally strengthening executive authority over the military, President Frei put forward a reform package to Congress (on restoring presidential authority over officers' appointments, dismissal, and transfer, and reducing the authority of the Constitutional Tribunal and NSC), but to no avail. Also, Minister of Defense Edmundo Pérez Yoma took a keen role in developing defense policy. He initiated several civilian and military debates among officers from the Ministries and the Armed Forces, civilians from the Congress, think tanks, academic institutions, and other non-military organizations. Defense-related reform happened as a roundtable discussion, whereby both sides left the legacy of rivalry behind and united to openly express their opinions and even reach consensus. An important turning point in Chilean CMR and the assertion of civilian supremacy over the military during this stage was Pinochet's arrest in London in October 1998. His arrest led to a weakening of the political power of the military and the military prerogatives, acknowledgment by a wider political spectrum (i.e., the Right) of the abuses committed by the military dictatorship, and an increase in pressure on finalizing the trials. After the arrest, President Frei appointed General Ricardo Izurieta (an officer who had no involvement in human rights violations during the dictatorship) as head of the Armed Forces. Izurieta sought to bridge the gap between the military and the civilian worlds by bringing the human rights issues to an end and focusing on modernization and professionalization of the armed forces. Not only did he make available for the Courts the names of all army officers working in the Pinochet-era intelligence agency, but he also accepted Perez Yoma's proposal to create a roundtable (known as *Mesa de Diálogo*) comprised of military officers, human rights lawyers, and other personalities that would reveal relevant information on the fate of the disappeared. The roundtable (1999–2000) issued a joint statement on the circumstances leading to the human rights violations, with the military agreeing to corroborate information on the disappeared while keeping the sources secret. The roundtable statement has an additional important feature: in this text, the military explicitly, formally, and institutionally recognized that there was no ethical justification for the use of illegitimate violence in democratic politics, and there was and remains no circumstance under

which human rights violations may be justified. In this sense, this is the point of departure for the military from their authoritarian ideology toward their integration toward a liberal democratic doctrine. Also, the roundtable sparked a new phase in military behavior. After the statement, the military ended their political contestation of the human rights trials opened by the judiciary in the past few years, thus consolidating the rule of law in Chile.

It is worth mentioning the role of the Advisory Committee of the MOD Cabinet, created by the Defense Minister under the Frei Administration to compensate for the lack of civilian expertise on military, security, and defense. This group, comprised of four to five people from academia, media, NGOs etc., served until 2010 as an executive staff to the Minister. Although not allowed to make decisions, it was charged with assisting in or drafting security and defense analyses, projects, and laws, as well as providing a last look and revision of documents which the MOD has to sign or make a decision on. Its creation did not please the military at all, but at the same time they understood that the situation had changed since the 1990s, and they had to accept the civilian "right" to conduct defense policy, a natural prerogative in a consolidated democracy.

President Ricardo Lagos (2000–5) sought to bring CMR from tensions to a state of "normalcy" by continuing efforts to minimize the political prerogatives of the military and focusing on their effectiveness (e.g., avoiding tampering with any human rights trials, but seeking to give the military a *raison d'être* in a time of peace and in a time when the traditional enemy had virtually disappeared), which brought about positive changes (and even acceptance) in the Armed Forces' attitudes toward constitutional reforms, civilian decisions, democracy, and human rights. On the other hand, the military elites sought to create stronger linkages with the Executive, and with society. President Lagos appointed General Juan Emilio Cheyre as head of the Army (2002), and Mario Fernández (2000) and Michelle Bachelet (2002) as Ministers of Defense (Michelle Bachelet being the first-ever Defense Minister woman in Chilean and Latin American history, and first socialist Minister since Letelier), who would continue the dialogue on effectiveness and modernization of the Armed Forces. Additionally, a new package of reforms was sent to Congress. In doing so, the then-Minister of Defense Mario Fernández ended the military's veto on constitutional reforms: he insisted that the Senate avoid directly soliciting the opinion from the heads of the Armed Forces and rather let the MOD convey their opinions to the Senate in public hearings—more or less forcing the commanders to accept the Congress' final resolution on the reform package.[13] The legislative reforms were agreed upon in 2004 with no public rejection by the Armed Forces. The new Constitution adopted in 2005 provided a clearly external orientation for the armed forces (while still having limited domestic roles, such as in emergency situations), reduced the role of the NSC, and terminated the involvement of the military in politics. By 2006, the reforms had also eliminated the Senate seats held by the officers as well as former presidents appointed for life. President Lagos also sent the first MOD reform packages to Congress in 2005. A National Commission on Political Imprisonment and Torture was created in 2003, which released a Report in 2004 acknowledging that the Pinochet regime had practiced institutionalized and massive torture against political opposition leaders and citizens. In an ensuing official document the Army assumed responsibility for these abuses; thus, the "institution" recognized its involvement in such actions which the armed forces had previously linked only to particular individuals, a "diametrically" opposing attitude compared to the total disagreement with the Rettig Report in 1991.[14] Institutional improvements also took place under the Lagos Administration, comprising changes in recruitment (including the draft and the acceptance of women in the Army and the Navy), overhauling the structure of the force, strengthening joint structures and operations; reforming acquisitions; and introducing joint doctrines and military education and training.[15]

Michelle Bachelet (2006–10) continued to address human rights issues related to the military: the deceased Augusto Pinochet and his family were indicted by the judiciary for government funds' embezzlement (2007), which led to the trial of the whole family. The already-imprisoned General Manuel Contreras was again convicted (2008) to two life-prison terms (this time for mentoring the 1974 double assassination of General Carlos Prats and his wife in Argentina); Sergio Arellano Stark, the commander of the "Caravan of Death" (that executed political prisoners of the dictatorship shortly after the coup in 1973) was sentenced in 2008 to six years in prison; arrest warrants for 129 former military personnel allegedly involved in abuses during the dictatorship were issued in 2009; and six suspects were arrested in 2009, alleged to have assassinated former President Eduardo Frei Montalva (1964–70) in 1982 (yet whose death was initially considered to have been caused by complications from stomach surgery).[16]

By the end of the second stage of reform, all the chiefs of the secret police of the Pinochet regime were in jail, and all the officers and NCOs who had participated directly in the repression between 1973 and 1990 were under trial or in jail.

President Bachelet's additional step of increasing civilian supremacy of the military involved the attempt, in September 2009, to endorse a bill aimed at abolishing the Copper Law.[17] The ultimate goal of the bill was to end the secret, special allocation from the state-owned copper enterprise, and to include it in the ordinary budget, while also ensuring the defense spending would undergo annual congressional approval and review (based on a 12-year plan, broken down into four-year periods.[18] Nevertheless, since the administration ended in March 2010, the legislation has not been enacted.

The second stage has been marked by some important legislative changes, which triggered a series of institutional, organizational, and structural transformations. After procrastination for five years, the Law on the Organization and Functioning of the Ministry of Defense (the MOD Law) was approved in February 2010, at the end of the Bachelet tenure, which left the task of implementation to the new Government of President José Piñera. The MOD Law is expected to bring "big" changes to both democratic control and effectiveness (and, to some extent efficiency) of the Armed Forces and MOD, with an emphasis on better defense policies, increased civilian roles in designing and developing defense planning and strategic thinking, and increased effectiveness of the Chilean military while deployed in international missions. There was no previous law on the MOD—just a law on the creation of the Ministry. In addition, within the MOD there was no structure to produce defense policy. Furthermore, what Chile lacked since transition to democracy was civilian expertise and the capability to produce such policies and documents. Before the creation of the Advisory Committee in the MoD, the civilians who were employed in bureaucratic levels were rather administrative with few civilian subject matter experts. Considering all these, the law led to the creation of a series of new structures within the MOD. First, a single Undersecretary of Defense was created by combining the already existing, yet redundant, three departments of the armed forces (for War, Navy, and respectively Air Forces), which were focused on rather administrative duties for each institution (e.g., retirement, salaries, promotion). The new structure performs administrative and advisory duties for the Minister, related to human resources management, personnel policy, and budget. Second, a Joint Chiefs of Staff was created, which has an operational function, related to the joint preparation and utilization of the Armed Forces. It also commands and conducts strategic operations at the strategic level (including international crises management operations, and external wars). Third, a new Undersecretary for Defense Policy Office was created to develop defense and military policy and conduct the main defense planning (e.g., war plans, joint planning), while also being responsible for IR within the defense sector, for defense industry related issues, research and development. The head of the office is General (Ret) Óscar Izurieta Ferrer, former Army

Commander-in-Chief. MOD civil society representatives are confident that this law, and the office will effectively support civilian policy makers to decide what Armed Forces are needed in the future and for what purposes, establish a relationship between the decision to develop forces with the decision to deploy them (e.g., for external defense, peace and stability operations, or even internally to take care during disasters, etc,), how much to spend on defense and how efficiency can be ensured and measured, how joint systems will work, what to keep and what to dispense with in the military, etc. Sources within the MOD expect that the defense/security sector will work as a "system" in which different actors are doing different things but also communicate. According to sources in the Chilean MOD, the law has also paved the way toward bringing more civilian experts (either military officers who studied in civilian universities or civilians from outside) into the MOD, where they will have a stable career.

The third stage corresponds to President Sebastián Piñera's tenure (2010–present) and to the implementation of the MoD reform. Chilean authorities expect all the desired outcomes of the MOD Law to be implemented/fulfilled within the next four to five years. Whether or not this is a realistic deadline remains to be seen, but important steps have been taken. In July 2011, and as a consequence of the MoD reform and after the enactment of new legislation regulating the Ministry of Interior, the government subordinated the police institutions to the reformed Ministry of Interior and Public Security, ending a police prerogative introduced by the Military Junta after the 1973 coup.

Like his predecessor, President Piñera has also endeavored to remove the Copper Law. In May 2011, Piñera signed a bill which, if passed by the Chilean Congress, would abolish the Copper Law and ensure the military would be funded by the state fund.[19] Whether or not this will become reality remains to be seen, since it differs in important aspects from President's Bachelet's 2009 project.[20]

## Legislative and external civilian control: not very robust

Admittedly, the democratic civilian control exercised by the Executive has become increasingly powerful, not only vis-à-vis dealing with past human rights abuses but also in relation to the willingness to maintain an effective military. While executive control is strong (as stipulated by the 2005 amended Constitution), one cannot say the same about legislative control and oversight or the informal control by the civil society. Legislative control and oversight reside under the two permanent Defense Committees functioning in the Chilean Congress' Chamber of Deputies, and respectively, the Senate, which has a low capability—legally and technically—to exercise effective control of the Armed Forces (e.g., influence defense policy, intervene in issues related to Ministry of Defense, discuss White Books on Defense). It is due to the strong presidentialism of the Chilean political system, which has weakened the powers of the legislative since 1990. The consequences have been limited congressional expertise (although the committees do have a professional staff, i.e., two or three advisers) and interest or political will (as defense reform does not bring the Congress members votes). First, lack of knowledge among committee members has created "inertia and a hands-off approach" vis-à-vis the Copper Law.[21] Second, the Congress is located in Valparaiso, around 70 miles from the capital—a Pinochet-era hangover— which delays and weakens congressional interference with the Executive. Third, in Chile it is more convenient for the Executive to involve the legislature in defense-related issues, such as debating legislation; in other words, it is the Executive that dictates the urgency on what the Congress should discuss. While the Minister of Defense has the right to change or reject defense policy and other documents, the Congress could be informed about this and even asked to make observations, but only if the Minister wants to do so. Even if the committees undertake hearings and *ad hoc*

investigations (which result in the creation of a temporary committee), they cannot, however, suspend arms procurement. If the investigations find irregularities, they can take the case to court; thus the judiciary branch comes into play and can sanction the appropriate entities (e.g., investigation on arms transfer to Croatia in 1991). Fourth, Congress members do not have security clearance to access classified information. Fifth, accountability is more of an individual approach by a few legislators who are interested and seek help from academia, NGOs, and others for expertise etc. It therefore appears that Congressional control happens more *ex post facto*, more like a "fire alarm" instead of a "police patrol." In addition, Congress has the power to approve or veto foreign military operations, which until 2008 was the prerogative of Executive. Although during the past five years, the legislative branch has increased its accountability powers, especially proactively (e.g., has increased the number of hearings of the Minister of Defense, summoning him, etc.), the two committees are still not very powerful.

External and informal control and oversight of security and defense issues have also been fairly anodyne in Chile, due to a lack of in-depth research and analysis of overall Armed Forces reform (and focused only on MOD) and a lack of experience (especially by young journalists who are preferred by the newspapers as they accept to work for lower salaries as compared to experienced journalists). Lately, however, some NGOs and think tanks have published a lot on defense reform, increased the number of comparison studies, including military, police, intelligence, and military justice, and while journals are covering issues related to defense (in special cases of bribery in military acquisitions), the Congress has adopted new legislation institutionalizing new levels of mandatory transparency for the public services, including the military. On another note, even environmental groups have become more interested in how the armed forces are protecting the environment while modernizing their equipment (air planes, submarines, etc.) and doing simulation exercises and training. In the context of external oversight, and under-standing of the Armed Forces of the role of civil society in a democracy, it should be noted that the 2000–1 period marked an opening by the Armed Forces toward the civil society through, besides public relations, education, and training, a campaign of "Know the Armed Forces" whereby the Army/Navy embeds the academics, businessmen, journalists, legislators, etc., for one full week at their bases/ships. This has led to increased civilian knowledge about the Armed Forces and the need for an effective military in a democracy and especially in Chile. In addition, three defense books released by Chile (1997, 2003, 2010) have been published throughout a two-year process of consultation and workshop with civil society. Yet, the informal oversight mechanisms' power to sway policy has been rather moderate—a situation far different from that in Romania, or even Spain.

## Progress in achieving effectiveness of the armed forces

Achieving military effectiveness[22] by the Chilean military has involved institutions (i.e., the presidency, the Ministry of Defense), plans (e.g., the Defense Strategy and Policy) and resources (i.e., the Copper Law still in place), as well as participation in international operations and professional military education.

As previously mentioned, in 1995, the Frei Administration developed the first-ever public policy agenda whereby it asserted the democratic rights of elected civilian governments to institutionalize defense and security policy (DSP). These documents underscored the roles and missions stipulated in the 2005 Constitution, yet included the internationalization of the Chilean military through participation in peace, stability, and reconstruction operations, as well as strengthening neighborly and regional cooperation. Additional efforts included the first stra-tegic assessment since 1990 (1997), the first national strategic plan (2002), and the first strategic

defense plan (2003), as well as the commencement of the development by the Minister of Defense of the first joint doctrine for the armed forces (2004).[23] The new MOD Law and DSP also led to the development by the Joint Chief of Staff and the adoption by the Minister of Defense (September 2010) of the first Book of Joint Doctrine. It is based on NATO's and Spain's doctrines (following discussions with the Joint Chief of Staff from Spain who showed MOD officials their doctrine) yet adapted to Chile's peculiar security and defense-related realities and needs. Chile is not the only country whose Joint Doctrine follows NATO doctrine; Argentina did the same. That is because the two countries want to participate in international forces, which brings to the agenda interoperability and the effectiveness. Chile, thus, provides an example of how a non-aspirant NATO country can use a NATO model to undertake military reform (thus, showing that NATO can have an indirect effect on the military reform in countries that do not necessarily seek to or cannot become members).

## International operations and implications for effectiveness (and civilian control) of the military

Participation in peace operations is part and parcel of all of the above-mentioned endeavors to boost the Chilean armed forces' effectiveness. Chile contributes to international peace operations with some 500 personnel in UN peace operations around the world (of which, more than 96 percent are a part of MINUSTAH in Haiti). It has also participated in Bosnia (with the United Kingdom), Cyprus, East Timor, Central America, Cambodia, and Iraq (in 1991), and established a combined Argentine–Chilean PSO unit to be deployed in UN and other security organization operations (an equal outcome of military and diplomatic/foreign policy). Chile aims to strengthen current cooperative security policies. All these endeavors have resulted in a more effective and interoperable force.

The expertise and experience acquired by Chile's military during international operations were tested during the events during and following the devastating February 2010 earthquake. As the police alone could not handle the unrest that broke out in some of the regions affected by the earthquake, after 48 hours, in order to involve the military, President Bachelet ultimately announced a state of disaster in those regions, and the Minister of Defense immediately involved the military to reinstate order in the regions in cooperation with the Ministry of the Interior. The military succeeded in 12 hours, to take control of situation (9,000 soldiers took control of two million people), without the use of force against the population.[24] According to sources from the MOD, for the armed forces, this resembled a humanitarian/stabilization operation only this time in a different, domestic, environment. The earthquake experience demonstrated the maturity of Chilean CMR, in terms of both democratic control (e.g., *de facto* and *de jure* compliance of the armed forces to the civilian rule) and effectiveness (e.g., PSOs taught the armed forces how to deal with civilians when reinstating order due to previous engagement and interaction with NGO representatives and others in PSO, stability and reconstruction operations via internationally-established Rules of Engagement, a perhaps different outcome to 20 years ago when the Chilean military was not involved in PSO). The armed forces are now trusted by a high number of the population and have the support of society (96 percent trusted by the people), after the police and the radio.

## Professional military education and civilian defense education: a good pool for civilian expertise

What also contributes to democratic civilian control and effectiveness of the armed forces is professional military education (PME) and civilian defense education (CDE). During the 20 years

of "re-democratization", Chilean civil–military relations have also been reinforced by the strengthening PME and CDE, based on the premise that security is everyone's business (civilians need to know—and want to know—about defense and security, while both civilians and military understand defense is not solely a military task).

Chile has a long tradition of military professionalism since the Prussianization of the Army in the late nineteenth century. The standard venues for PME in Chile are: the Military Academies (Army, Navy, Air Force), for officers and NCOs, the General Staff Academies (Army, Navy and Air Force War Academies, and the polytechnic equivalents). There is also the National Academy of Political and Strategic Studies, but it is not part of the military career. Officer candidates, after high school, can apply to Military Academies (application consisting of interviews, rigorous exams, physical tests, psychiatric examination, etc.). After four years of study and fulfillment of all requirements to acquire a BSc degree in military science, the candidates go to combat units, and upon fulfillment of military professional courses, they become officers (e.g., four months to become a lieutenant, and another four months to become captain). To be promoted to higher ranks, the officers with the rank of captain have the possibility of applying to one of the different academies (i.e., a polytechnic, to become engineers, after five years of study, or the War Academy, to become Commanders and Staff Officers, such as colonels, after three years of study). Further, for General Corps, candidates need to graduate from the War College (after studying for two years) within each War Academy. After graduation from the War College, they can pursue either a Masters degree or a PhD. Future NCOs have a separate, parallel career. They go to NCOs' military academies after finishing high school; after graduation, they are assigned to specific units for a few months, but will return to academies to fulfill the requirements for promotion to Sergeant and Sergeant Major. The National Academy of Political and Strategic Studies (ANEPE) is also an institution that provides PME and CDE. The Military Academies and ANEPE educate civilians, whether or not directly involved in national security (e.g., from the MOD, who have priority, parliamentarians, civilians from various ministries, journalists) on defense/security matters in MA courses, or short courses. Civilians who acquire a PhD/MA can either fill MOD positions, and help the Defense Minister take decisions, but also teach in military schools and academies. Former President Michelle Bachelet studied at the War Academy and graduated at the ANEPE. These institutions also educate and train other security forces (e.g., police officers), as well as foreign officers and civilians (from Latin America, the United States, Europe, Asia). In addition, the Minister of Defense created the Joint Center for Peace Operations (CECOPAC) in 2002, to provide education and training, equally to civilians and military personnel, on civil–military relations, civil–military cooperation etc., in an international environment (including courses on the United Nations, human rights, rules of engagement, cultural awareness).[25]

The PME/CDE curricula is vast, encompassing military sociology, political science, defense policy and planning, human rights, intelligence (including open source), democracy and democratic governance (e.g., why a coup is not acceptable), and foreign language training. Civilians and military officers are integrated, providing a "blend" of views, a mutually benefic experience; this blend of education gives officers/soldiers the ability to understand the need and to respond to society's demands, while the civilians understand they need an effective military not only during wartime, but also during peace (e.g., in disasters). PME is important to career progression along with job performance, physical training, and language proficiency; based on a completely new study on military career; there is a new army plan of military education, in line with developing an effective military in the twenty-first-century security environment, including among other issues critical thinking, strategic thinking, enhancing language capacity (English, but to a lesser extent, German and Chinese). PME is also very important for interoperability

and international missions. English-language proficiency, for example, is good to have for international positions or operations. Interoperability with NATO is also important and the joint chief of staff is looking into creating a "virtual" academy for all Chilean forces and international forces (working with the US, NATO). The faculty is both civilian and military (from Chile and abroad). Any changes with regard to PME in Chile rest with the MOD. The Ministry of Education and/or the Defense Committees within the Congress can have a say in PME (as, besides the Organic Law of the Armed Forces, the General Law on Education, promoted by the Ministry of Education early in the 1990s, regulates PME in Chile).

## Lessons learned and best practices

This chapter looked at Chile's attempts to develop democratic civil–military relations after the fall of the authoritarian regime in March 1990. In terms of lessons learned, Chile is a case of mutual willingness by the civilians and the military institutions to accept and undertake democratic reforms, not only in terms of control (possible especially due to various opportunities for the civilians to push for more supremacy over the military, including, but not limited to, the arrest of Contreras and Pinochet) but also effectiveness (due to perceived threats, and in relation to the international security cooperation that the country supports). Thus, despite past and current challenges (e.g., high military prerogatives and high budget, legislative control weaknesses, limited civilian expertise), CMR in Chile has come a long way, disproving skeptics' pessimism. Today, 20 years after the transition, the gap between the military and civilian worlds has been reduced. The civilians are now in charge of defense reform and policy, while the military are no longer involved in politics or internal affairs. A very reformed Constitution has been enacted, which delineated the roles and missions of the armed forces, with high emphasis on the traditional, modern military role. The military participation in international and regional peace operations has been mutually beneficial to both the civilian and military elites: for the former, involvement in PSO is part and parcel of the civilian government's extended foreign/diplomatic and economic policy agendas (as the Chileans acknowledge that globalization not only brings free trade and diplomatic ties but also security challenges and threats which imply shared security responsibilities); for the latter, it ensures the preservation of an institutional *raison d'être* (with all financial and moral benefits) in a security environment that moves away from the traditional inter-state conflict and in an overall global context of economic hardship, as well as a great opportunity to boost professional experience and effectiveness; to both parties, such participation helps maintain the already established normality, stability, dialogue, and transparency in civil–military relations. The new MOD Law is expected to balance democratic control of the military with effectiveness of the armed forces, by increasing the civilian expertise within the MOD to design defense policy, which the military will use to fulfill their responsibilities.

The Chilean MOD, NGO, civilian, and military representatives emphasized the "national" approach and focus of the Chilean CMR changes. At a first glance, therefore, Chile may appear not to be very relevant to other newer democracies. However, and despite many, important and pending shortcomings and problems, one could argue it could be, for at least two reasons. On the one hand, as previously mentioned, Chile is an example of mutual willingness by the civilians and the military institutions to accept and undergo democratic reforms, as part of a process of political learning after a highly traumatic historical period. This experience created the incentives for the former "enemies," to avoid unnecessary confrontation and to develop a democratic style of accommodation with consensus making. On the other hand, Chile is a case in which the civilian leadership was able to take advantage of this post-1990s *Zeitgeist*, and to institutionalize the advances, delivering the most important defense reform since

the professionalization of the military at the end of the nineteenth century. However, there is a long way to go to reach the highest standards of defense management. In the short term, a very sensitive issue in the Chilean CMR remains the Copper Law which ensures the military procures modern equipment. Toward this end, the ongoing reform of the Copper Law will be a crucial test of the consolidation of the Chilean democratic civilian control of the military. Depending on its final features, it may or may not increase military effectiveness and efficiency.

Nevertheless, lessons learned from Chile can prove relevant for other newer democracies that transition from military dictatorships to democracies, that seek to update and reform their national security and defense institutions and education (while adapting and adjusting according to their own national political, economic, security, and defense background).

## Acknowledgments

## Notes

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23 Robledo, "Democratic Consolidation."

24 There were few reports of military abuse against civilians after the earthquake. The most serious was the killing of David Riquelme, beaten by Navy personnel in Talcahuano. Five members of the institution were submitted to trial.

25 Flammia, "Copper Soldiers."

# 24

# ACHIEVING NEUTRALITY AND EFFECTIVENESS

## Austria

### *Donald Abenheim and Carolyn Halladay*

### Introduction

In its transition from a statecraft of neutralism (beyond United Nations missions) to active international engagement within mutually reinforcing security organizations, Austria presents a case study for security and defense transformation that may resonate, particularly in states that wish to increase their international presence and profile while retaining their nonalignment.[1] This transition also entails significant security, defense, and military reform intended to preserve Austria's standing as an international power by ensuring that its defense institutions can fulfill the obligations of these new associations without sacrificing capacity for domestic assignments (notably disaster relief) that Austrian society expects from its armed forces. This reform process of the past two decades, particularly the questions of retaining conscription and a militia component of the forces as the democratic basis of the Austrian defense structure, has elicited much public and political debate especially in 2011, culminating in rumblings that the issue would rupture the ruling conservative–socialist grand coalition government, and a clash among top defense and military officials that was almost without precedent in post-war Austria. As contentious as these civil–military developments became, however, they also showcase Austria's democratic civil–military relations at work and reflect their relative political effectiveness, notably when compared to the nation's unhappy civil–military experience in the First Republic in the years 1919 until 1938.

### The security and defense context

A federal constitutional law of 26 October 1955 established Austria as a permanently neutral power, which status was key to the restoration of Austrian sovereignty from four-power occupation a decade after World War II. While preserving its neutrality and embracing a socialist-inflected model of state, Austria oriented itself more or less toward the West during the Cold War. Like their Swiss neighbors, the Austrians maintained an armed neutrality and, thus, a national military, the Bundesheer. Unlike Switzerland, Austria pursued full membership in selected international organizations, most significantly the United Nations and more recently the European Union.

The Austrian armed forces also have participated in UN-mandated peacekeeping operations, starting with the Congo Mission in 1960, when the Austrians contributed medical units.[2]

As enshrined in the Constitution of 1955, neutrality remains central to the Austrian national self-image, its roots in public opinion and the political system, even though the international legal status of the Second Republic has changed through the diplomatic revolution that has followed EU membership since 1995.[3] In its official self-representations, Austria compares itself with the other traditionally neutral states in Europe, especially Switzerland, Sweden, and Finland, with which it has also long maintained close multilateral defense relations. Nonetheless, with the end of the bipolar division of Europe, Austria sought increased and more current engagement in European and world affairs as its central European neighbors joined NATO and the EU during 1999–2004.

This process began formally in 1995, when Austria acceded to the European Union. With its entry into the EU, Austria was obliged to participate in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which has evolved rapidly in the past decade. Since 1999, Austria has provided security-building Bundesheer troops for UN-mandated *peacemaking* or *peace enforcement* missions,[4] in accordance with the so-called Petersberg tasks of the EU and the former Western European Union (WEU). Austria also has moved to deepen and broaden its participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) within the framework of the Partnership for Peace (PfP). As a PfP partner, Austria took part in the NATO-led multinational peace-support operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina (IFOR/SFOR) between 1995 and 2001. Since autumn 1999, Austria has participated in the security-building/post-conflict operation in Kosovo.[5] Austrian troops have supported EU missions in Africa, as well.

This increased engagement with international organizations, as well as the changing global security environment since the end of the Cold War, has necessitated thoroughgoing military reform in Austria. In 2002, the Ministry of National Defense and Sport (a title and concept imported from Switzerland) completed a major round of reforms, resulting in significant consolidations of personnel and offices. A further restructuring, with a particular eye toward improving Austria's international deployment capabilities and interoperability in light of increasing economic constraints after the market crash of 2007–8, took effect in 2010. This later reform effort accompanied an escalation of public debate on this issue in the first weeks of 2011, with the Chief of Defense staff publicly opposing the abolition of conscription and the downgrading of the militia in favor of an all-professional force.

Budgetary reality hardly symbolizes the leading limitation on the Bundesheer's planning and force development. In fact, the larger political and social context of the military in the Austrian state and society shapes much of any discussion of defense issues as functions of the self-image of the nation-state and its citizens. For example, noting the relatively low esteem that the armed forces enjoy in public opinion—due, in part, to the legacy of first Austrian Republic, World War II, and the Third Reich—the 2010 Reform Commission specifically rejected the Swiss model of defense planning, which calls for the absolute capability of national defense, that is, without any assistance from any other power whatever against the source of attack. Austrian society demands that Austrian defense and security remain firmly embedded in a multinational framework—a demand that has thrown up new challenges to adjust the tradition of neutrality in policy to the rigors of an integrated multilateral defense and security capability.

## The need for reform

On the one hand, Austria finds itself on a plateau of domestic and European stability that contrasts with its unhappy past of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Indeed, the enlargement of such

organizations as NATO and the EU have all but obviated Austrian concerns that its former Eastern bloc neighbors (the former USSR, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Yugoslavia/Slovenia) might struggle with poverty, political upheaval, or social unrest that would spill over to Austria.[6] The end to the wars of Yugoslav succession at the end of the 1990s reinforced this trend. Meanwhile, the Austrian political and military leadership foresees no real chance of home-grown terrorism arising to destabilize the country, in contrast to the experiences of the inter-war period as well as the episode of Palestinian terrorism in the 1970s or the problem of irredentism with Italy (South Tirol) in the first decades after World War II.[7] In other words, of the six major roles-and-missions categories, Austrian policy-makers and security planners have all but ruled out fighting an internal war or insurgency, and the likelihood of an external war, at least with or among Austria's neighbors, is vanishing.[8]

On the other hand, Austria recognizes that, along with the rest of the European Union, it faces such further-flung and diffuse threats to its security as international terrorism, arms and drug trafficking, human smuggling, illegal migration, environmental disasters, and economic and financial crises on a regional and worldwide scale.[9] In part to deal with these threats, Austria also wishes to expand further its peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance missions, which have a long tradition in the roles and missions of the Bundesheer and in Austria's role in collective security under the UN flag.

In this security climate—and presumably in recognition that neutrality has acquired a different global-political relevance after the Cold War—the government of Austria has undertaken more international–organizational involvement. In connection with national defense, the Commission charged with designing Austria's 2010 reforms wrote:

> [I]n the current security-political conditions, the armed national defense means, in essence, the guarantee of full state sovereignty…[In addition,] rendering assistance at the request of the civil authorities, on the basis of the changed threat situation, could encompass assistance in response to a terror attack, in addition to [the established eventualities of] assistance in the event of a natural or man-made disaster.[10]

In other words, accession to the EU, as well as joining PfP, and the rise of the EU Common Foreign and Security policy, have shaped Austria's current defense strategy and policy—and significantly expanded the range of its involvement in conflicts of various kinds the world over (in contrast to its former role of territorial defense of Eastern or Southern Austria in the face of the Warsaw Pact).

At the same time, the requirement to provide multiple troop companies at high readiness for EU "battle groups" has proven challenging with shrunken budgets, while the ongoing collective security and peace-building operations even at a relatively small scale nonetheless tax personnel and resources. Rectifying this shortfall in forces, equipment, and organization—in a funding context shaped by the recent euro crisis and the general global economic downturn, and while balancing the demands of Austria's social policy, as well as the entrenched popular attachment to the ideal of neutrality, whatever the country's international-legal status today—motivates the current security and defense reform effort in Austria.[11] Success, or effectiveness, to the Austrians means a military capable of fulfilling the country's international obligations and, thus, securing Austria's capacity for cooperation and its full range of political options. Failure or ineffectiveness would cost Austria international prestige and perhaps status in the global system of state—and imperil the values established as central to the Austrian mission of state.[12]

More pointedly, in its own estimation, the Austrian military "in its current state has only a limited capacity to meet the increasing demands of international operations,"[13] hence the

sweeping reform efforts of the past decade in the name of a smaller "army of quality." The well-publicized 2010 reform documentation both explained this plan and exemplified the structures and processes by which the Austrians intended to implement, staff, and fund this reform.

Austrian defense expenditures currently account for just less than 1 percent of the gross national product, among the lowest-spending European states (proportionately speaking).[14] No popular consensus exists for a higher level of defense spending in a political culture in which the armed forces are viewed with enduring skepticism because of the legacy of the twentieth century and the guns-versus-butter calculus, which has only worsened since the economic crisis of the previous decade. The 2010 Reform Commission appears to have taken this overall level of defense spending as a given in the face of political, social, and economic realities that now affect all Western democracies no matter their size and relative power. The Commission did recommend, among other things, the establishment of a constitutional-level legal basis for a binding, multi-year spending plan that also would include capital investment. This measure results in part from the vitriolic exchanges in the past two decades over the obsolescence of equipment that occurred in the ex-Yugoslav wars and in natural disasters, where aged aircraft became an object of national scandal when they failed in a moment of acute need. In the meantime, the architects of reform proposed to pursue public–private partnerships and other such alternative finance arrangements as have worked to some degree in the Federal Republic of Germany with the slimmed-down Bundeswehr.[15]

To realize its new security and defense goals on a territorial and international scale, the Austrians, among other things, must reduce the number of military commands, consolidate operational functions, and close bases as part of the general reduction of forces that began 20 years ago.[16] The process, including criteria for base closure, was publicized widely in the Reform Commission's final report. This issue also undergirded the outburst of public uniformed military doubt about the abolition of conscription in early 2011.

In addition to purely security-specific considerations (for example, the reduction of armor battalions now that Austria's eastern borders are no longer the front line between Cold War blocs), this process also calculated the societal ramifications of various options—dislocated personnel, effects on local retail and employment in localities that depend on garrisons and facilities. In the first instance, these calculations sought to ensure that the burdens of base closure and other consolidation measures were spread more or less equitably across the country. Austrian defense planners remain acutely aware of the democratic civil–military aspect or local party political impact of such decisions, in addition to the regional-political considerations that loom large in the delicately balanced nature of the national grand coalition governments, and in the outsized role of the public sector in the national political economy and local politics.

In the same vein, the Reform Commission called for improvement in the "social services" attendant to the military—for example, child-care opportunities and housing/relocation assistance for full-time personnel—and improvements in training opportunities and job specialties to make career military service more attractive to young people seeking professional development.

## Security policy, conscription, the army of the future, and domestic coalition politics

Until the beginning of 2011, the existing defense reform plan had foreseen that once the 2010 reforms had been finalized, the Austrian military would stand at a strength of about 45,000 active-duty personnel[17] (counting militia or national guard troops); more than half of this number—about 24,000—would be conscripts. At the time, Austria had a six-month compulsory military service requirement for all males over the age of 18. The final 2010 report of the Reform Commission

called for these conscripts to fill out the ranks around the "cadres" of fully ready regular personnel and militia/national guard.[18] (Conscripts will only be deployed in international operations outside of Austria on a volunteer basis.)

The ideal of the citizen in uniform as the basis of the military of (and integrated within) the Austrian democracy has informed the compulsory service requirement since 1955. While compulsory male military service was instituted in the reforms of 1868 in the wake of the 1866 war, proponents trace conscription to the bourgeois/national revolution of 1848. They view it as the antidote to the undemocratic or Praetorian impulses of a professionalized military state-within-a-state, especially as operated from the late 1920s until 1938 in the civil war atmosphere of the First Republic, which gave way to the Dollfuss dictatorship before Hitler's annexation of Austria. The Austrian experience of National Socialism also gives a particular charge to the popular unease about security and defense institutions without sufficient grounding in democratic society. As such, as recently as mid-2010, the Social Democratic Minister of Defense, Norbert Darabos, proclaimed conscription to be "etched in stone."

Compulsory service has once again become controversial, however, in a manner that underscores the challenges of defense reform versus national legacies in strategic culture and society. In January 2011, Minister of Defense Darabos refuted his position on conscription amid protest from senior ranks of soldiers and his conservative coalition partners about the rupture with tradition. Critics of the Austrian draft charge that most conscripts end up performing desultory "system maintenance" rather than acquiring proper soldierly skills, as a result of dwindling service times and budgets. No meaningful reform will ride on the conscripts' shoulders, detractors say, because, whatever connection they may provide between the civilian and military realms, they do not (and cannot) generate any force for institutional change. Instead, genuine military reform—especially cost-cutting without diminishing force effectiveness—must come in the form of an all-volunteer Bundesheer. Even the 2010 Reform Commission acknowledged that the expected increase in foreign deployments poses particular problems to a draft-based military.[19] Austrian defense policy makers realize that compulsory service in the armed forces remains generally unpopular; an Austrian newsmagazine survey in January 2011 found only about 36 percent of Austrians in favor of retaining the draft—though, tellingly, about 75 percent of respondents expressed their interest in having the question put to a popular vote.[20] (Such use of plebiscites is common in neighboring Switzerland on security and defense matters.) The debate over conscription is not unique to Austria in the second decade of the new century, of course. The Germans and the Swedes, among others, have recently abandoned their compulsory military service systems based on the tradition of the citizen in uniform, and these examples figure prominently in the Austrian discourse.

At home, the Austrian Green Party has called consistently for the abolition of conscription in the name of a more "genuine" neutrality, including a big step back from collective defense and security building through the EU and PfP. More surprisingly, the Social Democratic Party of Austria (SPÖ) has parted company with its grand coalition partner, the center-right Austrian People's Party (ÖVP), on the draft. Both parties have tried to downplay any potential rift in the governing coalition,[21] but the fact persists that the SPÖ now calls for the end of conscription. (The ÖVP continues to support compulsory military service, not only as a source of comparatively inexpensive military "labor," but also as a general service-to-the-nation proposition and as part of national tradition in the Second Republic.)[22]

The Social Democrats' change of view corresponded to the evolution of Defense Minister Dabaros's opinion of defense reform and conscription, which became public in late 2010 and early 2011. Dabaros had proposed a five-step reform process, which included presentations from foreign experts and practitioners on seven "models" of force structure and recruitment for a

reformed Bundesheer.[23] In the course of these presentations, Dabaros said, he had come to embrace a "mixed system" of volunteers, professional soldiers, and militia/national guard on the Swedish example, but without conscription. He went on to champion exactly this model as the centerpiece of his reform proposals in early 2011.

Not all Social Democrats agree with the all-volunteer model; notable among the SPÖ members who continue to support conscription was General Edmund Entacher, chief of Austria's general staff and the seniormost officer in the Bundesheer. (Federal President Heinz Fischer, the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, also prefers to retain compulsory military service; Fischer suspended his membership of the SPÖ for the duration of his presidency.) Entacher's sustained, public disagreement with Dabaros over conscription included an interview in mid-January 2011 with the newsmagazine *profil*. In the article, Entacher restated his concerns about the numbers that Dabaros and others impute to the all-volunteer model and about the effects on manpower, readiness, and international deployability that the end of conscription would entail. He also questioned the political will to see such a profound reform through to fruition. Perhaps most provocatively, the general archly noted that "no rational person" would support such indelible measures as the end of conscription.[24]

The interview appeared on newsstands on Saturday, 22 January 2011. On the following Monday, Dabaros removed Entacher as Chief of the General Staff, citing his "loss of confidence" in the general.[25] This move marked the first time in the history of the Second Republic that the Defense Minister has fired his seniormost military officer—and further complicated the question of conscription and defense reform with renewed and reenergized controversy.[26] (The closest precedent in Austrian history was a barely remembered civil–military scandal in 1970, sparked by a reduction in the period of compulsory military service.)

Amid the turmoil, though, one sees a functional democratic civil–military process sorting through difficult options. Much of the criticism in the coalition, the opposition, and the association of army officers immediately after Entacher's sacking concerned the legality of Dabaros's move. In other words, despite the political problems associated with defense reform, the essential soundness of the military's civilian oversight in Austria has withstood a noteworthy test, all of which highlights the crisis-laden fundamentals of policy and government that are usually associated with defense reform.

## Lessons learned/best practices

The Austrian military has undergone and, in fact, continues to undergo a process of defense reform no less far-reaching and significant than those of its former Warsaw Pact/new NATO neighbors. This fact, in conjunction with the reorganization and transformation of such armies as the Czech, Hungarian, and Slovak, to say nothing of the Finns and Swedes, renders the case of the Austrian forces especially interesting in the context of defense institution building in central Europe. The case at hand also underlines how, even in a prosperous nation at peace, without either domestic strife or an external threat, defense reform and the modernization of military structures have an important impact on domestic politics and political culture. This case also reveals the decisive manner in which this essentially political—and by no means solely technocratic—process of national life and state is often seized by the role of personality and tradition in such instances of reform and response.

## Notes

1 "Sicherheits-und Verteidigungsdoktrin," 12 December 2001, pp. 7–8, presents Austria as moving from "neutrality to solidarity," but neither term translates exactly to the intended meaning. The refinements to the Austrian understanding of its international status as a neutral or nonaligned state appear in the next section.

 2 The "Security and Defence Doctrine: General Considerations," (12 December 2001, p. 4), places the number of Austrian troops who have participated in such operations at about 60,000 since 1960.

 3 The statement in "Sicherheits-und Verteidigungsdoktrin" pp. 7–8, notes that, until 1990, Austrian leaders operated on the assumption that the United Nations was obliged to observe the permanent neutrality that Austria had declared for itself. With the advent of the first Gulf War, however, the prevailing view came to hold that UN obligations took precedence over neutrality, which stance essentially ended Austria's "classical" neutrality. After joining the European Union, which entails additional security obligations, Austria all but obviated its international-legal neutrality. However the social-democratic half of the ruling coalition as well as the Austrian Green Party insist that neutrality, perhaps with an updated definition, remains in effect—and effective.

 4 In UN practice, there exists a distinction between peace *keeping*, in which UN forces, in the wake of conflict, demarcate an armistice line without shooting; and peace *enforcement* or peace *making* in the sense of collective security, where possible combat to enforce a truce is necessary, for example, in Bosnia in the 1990s. The latter has been prominent in the past 20 years and highly controversial in Austria and elsewhere.

 5 "Security and Defense Doctrine," p. 5.

 6 "Sicherheits-und Verteidigungsdoktrin: Allgemeine Erwägungen," (Annex), 12 December 2001, p. 4.

 7 Ibid.

 8 See Chapter 3, "A New Conceptualization of Civil–Military Relations," in this volume.

 9 "Sicherheits-und Verteidigungsdoktrin," p. 5. Strikingly, this list echoes the remaining roles-and-missions categories in Bruneau and Matei, whose framework also concurs with the Austrian de-emphasis of "classical" armed conflict. See Chapter 3 in this volume.

10 "Bericht der Bundesheerreformkommission," 2010, p. 47. Available at: www.bmlv.gv.at/facts/man agement_2010/pdf/endbericht.pdf (accessed 7 August 2012).

11 See "ÖBH 2010 – Die Realisierung," 2010, available at: www.bmlv.gv.at/facts/management_2010/ pdf/dierealisierung.pdf.

> Die Zielstruktur des ÖBH 2010 war, unter Berücksichtigung der (internationalen) Verfügbarkeitskriterien und der geänderten Bedrohungslage, auf die Erfüllung der Einsatzaufgaben im Rahmen des Souveränitätsschutzes sowie im Rahmen der internationalen Souveränität weitgehend aus dem Präsenzstand auszurichten.
>
> (2010, p. 71).

12 "Bericht der Bundesheerreformkommission," p. 10.

13 Ibid.

14 The often-cited figure of 0.9 percent held steady from the late 1990s through at least 2004. The official website of the Austrian armed forces suggests that the percentage of the national budget dedicated to defense has dropped slightly in recent years. See: www.bmlv.gv.at (accessed 7 August 2012).

15 "Bericht der Bundesheerreformkommission," pp. 56–7. The so-called fulfillment report, "ÖBH 2010 – Die Realisierung," does not mention either measure, but, of course, both would be rather longer in the making. See p. 44.

16 Details appear at "ÖBH 2010 – Die Realisierung," p. 79 ff.

17 The reform program also calls for increased outreach and opportunities for volunteers, especially women.

18 See, for example, "ÖBH 2010 – Die Realisierung," pp. 54–5.

19 See the analysis in "Bericht der Bundesheerreformkommission," pp. 90–1. The service of Austrian troops along with NATO forces in PfP on a professional basis forms a point of contrast. Austrian troops who serve in such missions partake of the ethos, doctrine, and organization of the career soldiers in NATO nations. These veterans of security-building missions beyond the national borders thereby nourish the ideal of the imperial constabulary soldier, which somehow does not coincide with the tradition of the citizen in uniform in its Alpine/Danubian variation.

20 "Umfrage: 62% gegen Wehrpflicht," *Profil onlline*, 15 January 2011, available at: www.profil.at/arti cles/1102/560/287050_s2/umfrage-62-wehrpflicht (accessed 7 August 2012).

21 At least some of the party-political dudgeon arose when Social Democratic Defense Minister Dabaros announced in the media his preference for an all-volunteer force without first consulting with his partners in the People's Party.

22 Indeed, in late December 2010, Interior Minister Maria Fekter (ÖVP) spoke out in favor of conscription as a means by which the children of immigrants, especially Turks, could learn to identify with

Austria as their homeland. See, for example, Hans Rauscher's column (Einserkastl Rau), "Wehr-Populismus," in *Der Standard*, 28 December 2010 (the online version appeared 27 December 2010, at: http://derstandard.at/1293369566294/Einserkastl-RAU-Wehr-Populismus (accessed 7 August 2012)).

23 In the event, the ministry released seven competing models of force structure and costs, ranging from an all-professional force to a kind of domestic emergency-response organization that relies mostly on the national guard. See "Wehrsystem-Modelle (2): Die sieben Varianten von Minister Darabos," Presseaussendung vom 17. Jänner (17 January) 2011, available at: www.bmlv.gv.at/journalist/pa_body. php?id=2411&timeline= (accessed 7 August 2012).

24 "'Wir stehen vor der Klippe': Generalstabschef Edmund Entacher im Interview," 22 January 2011, available at: http://www.profil.at/articles/1103/560/287050/wir-klippe-general-edmund-entacher-interview (accessed 7 August 2012).

25 According to Austrian civil service law, Dabaros could not (and did not) remove Entacher from all military service but only from his position as Chief of the General Staff. The rules require that Entacher be reassigned within two months, though he also is eligible to retire.

26 This event came in the wake of the German Minister of Defense Heinz Karl zu Guttenberg having recently fired the German Chief of Defense, General Schneiderhan, a year earlier and as a series of military discipline issues struck the German armed forces in early 2011.

# 25

# STABILITY IN FLUX

## Policy, strategy, and institutions in Germany

*Donald Abenheim and Carolyn Halladay*

### Introduction

There are two ways to interpret German defense institution building in the past and present. The dominant discourse, as it were, from critical, if not entirely versed, quarters in various Western capitals posits German defense institutions as insufficient in size and resources for a nation of Germany's strength and world role. This misconception rests on a narrowly quantitative—and at times arbitrary—measure of defense effectiveness at the operational and tactical level. Such a bottom-line assessment ignores the looming presence of the German past and the civil–military lessons that the Germans derived from it, and it does injustice to the political process by which the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) established and maintains its democratic defense institutions since 1945. This view also pays little or no heed to the transformation of defense structures since 1990, which is to say, it misses the whole point of German defense institutional reform since the end of the Cold War, the rise of the European Union (EU), and the advent of global alliance/coalitional warfare and crisis intervention.

The present analysis takes an alternate track, that is, to treat German defense reform on its own terms, as an expression of an organic development of German political and strategic culture in the second half of the twentieth century and the early twenty-first century. Here, the role of domestic politics and an altered view of German national interest in the international system loom as an ever more powerful force worthy of careful analysis in its own right.[1] Understood in this manner, the FRG's defense institutions exemplify precisely what the Federal German democracy requires of them. The German national interest of continental peace and prosperity dominates all questions of force and statecraft, and it assigns a secondary or tertiary role to force as the measure of national and international power.

As a further expression of these national priorities and interests, the German military (the Bundeswehr) has endured a steady—if not constant—reduction in force since German unity in late 1990 (a process imposed by the great powers as the price of national unity), and chronic underfunding for decades.[2] This budgetary constraint has been made more acute by the NATO/ ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) operation in Afghanistan, which since 2009 or so has become far more of a combat role for the Germans, though without earning this name because of the specific character of German domestic politics and strategic culture as regards "war" and "combat" in constitutional practice and public memory.

At the end of 2010, this issue assumed particular meaning because of a process of further national defense reform that, in the wake of the world economic crisis of 2008, will shrink the size of the Bundeswehr—from its current roster of 327,500 souls (of whom 252,500 serve in uniform and 75,000 are civilians)—by 40,000 persons, with particular weight falling on the abolition of compulsory military service and radical cuts of defense civilians.[3] The highly contentious process, which has been subject to significant public debate that has gone well beyond the confines of security policy and military posture, may have contributed to the scandal that cost the dynamic young defense minister, Karl-Theodor Freiherr zu Guttenberg, his job and perhaps his political career in early 2011.

Of particular interest in connection with the 2010 reforms are measures that would have been unthinkable even 20 years ago—notably the curtailment of conscription and the expansion of the office and authority of the seniormost military officer in the Ministry of Defense. While both measures actually make German defense institutions more like those of their neighbors and partners, both developments also represent significant departures from earlier articles of faith, as the Germans conceive of their democracy and the limited role of their military in it. Thus the current German case shows, first, that successful defense institutions must be measured in their proper context of historical experience, political culture, and domestic politics; and, second, that even well-established defense institutions in a democratic state require consistent attention from civilian officials, the government, and forces in society—to say nothing of those in uniform.

## Sources of misperception and national interest as the setting for change in German defense institutions

Defense institutions in the FRG stand in the shadow of the nation's commercial power, amid the structures of the European Union and the cross-currents of a globalized capitalist economy. The Bendlerblock in Berlin, the history-laden seat of the German Minister of Defense, occupies far less prominence in the public mind than the cupola of parliament in Berlin or the towers of the European Central Bank in Frankfurt. The Bundeswehr of the FRG signifies in political and civil–military terms something radically different as an institution of power and state from the Weimar Reichswehr or the Hitler-era Wehrmacht; specifically, the Bundeswehr represents an army in a democracy, in turn integrated within international security and defense organizations—most prominently the United Nations (UN) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).[4] This dual integration is closely tied to the character of the international system of states and especially to the cosmos of German domestic politics, as well as multilateral relations among the leading European nations within the EU—a constellation of forces that have formed part of the basis of peace on the continent for more than half a century.

Moreover, granted the record of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the political culture of Germany does not celebrate high defense spending, nor does it harbor great enthusiasm for martial adventure far from home. Rather, political culture and strategic culture in Germany remain deeply skeptical of the necessity of armies, and Germans embrace a foreign policy of national interest—specifically pluralism, democratic values, trade, and ecological improvement through more or less civilian institutions and international organizations.[5] While German power in the past might have been measured in an array of armor and aircraft on the march, this phenomenon in political and strategic culture expired in 1945 and has not been resurrected since national unity.

The particular character of German defense structures is poorly understood in NATO nations, and institutional reform and the transformation of state and arms in Germany—as a test of the rubrics of effectiveness and efficiency in defense reform and defense and military institutions—have

met with similar misunderstanding, often out of a surprising ignorance and lack of interest. This misperception is mostly connected with (and certainly exacerbated by) the German security-building role in the Afghan campaign since 2001–2 and its NATO dimension. The general argument has been that the national caveats of the Germans (and other NATO allies) have left the NATO ISAF combat and security-building operation in Afghanistan neither effective nor efficient.[6] When the Germans opted out of direct participation in allied airstrikes to protect Libyan rebels in March 2011, detractors derided the decision as more of the sorry same.[7]

This line of argument continues a Cold War prejudice that continental European allies were "freeriders" in NATO's collective defense to the detriment of the United States and its taxpayers. Indeed, this dispute about burdens of defense effort traces its roots to the mid-1950s and the alternating fear of a new West German army, on the one hand, and, on the other, an impatience with the tardiness of its creation in the decades after World War II.[8] Especially in the United States and the United Kingdom, these living memories of old NATO fights blinds many to the outstanding role of domestic politics as a guiding factor in German security, defense, and military policies.

The perception of Germany as an international power and partner suffers mostly in comparison then—to other times as well as other states. On the level of grand strategy and policy, German contemporary domestic politics as a force in security policy stands sharply at odds with political and strategic culture in other European and North American countries—a contrast to the earliest years of NATO, when West German security interests and defense institutions more or less automatically aligned with US and alliance positions.[9] In Central Europe generally, with its more tragic experience with war and military institutions, popular revulsion to war and armies—compounded in Germany today by the perception that global warming rather than Islamic jihadism forms the single greatest threat to the nation—also differ from the prevailing view among Germany's allies, partners, and neighbors. Armies and combat enjoy a greater pride of place in the UK and France than they do in Germany—or Poland or Slovakia, for that matter.[10]

In the united Germany, further, little popular or elite enthusiasm exists for overseas operations, and no domestic political interest group operates in favor of military spending as is the case in the United States or even in France.[11] This generalization hardly suggests that the German parliament and majority political parties are heedless of defense or the military, but the FRG scarcely knows, even at the back-room level, the more expected constellation of a bellicose political culture and a defense–industrial interest group plus other military-oriented interest groups.[12] Those few military-inclined groupings that do exist have little or none of the influence on policy that their counterparts enjoy in France, the United Kingdom, or the United States.

There is a significant segment of German national politics that asserts that the FRG has become a "civilian power,"[13] with a statecraft meant to contrast the past—and the US approach—through its emphasis on the mechanisms of commercial influence, culture, development, and ecological reforms. Such a view deserves a skeptical reception, in the opinion of these authors, as Germany has become anything but a wholly demilitarized nation, and the Bundeswehr surely continues to exist, performing missions that are at odds with the semi-pacifist and often anti-American ideals of some in the realm of a civil or civilian security policy. The civil power face of German diplomacy belies the fact that Germany still disposes of a not inconsiderable, albeit smaller, army and there remains a comprehension of the needs of force and statecraft in German security policy.

In this same connection, the German military, when seen in such narrow and comfortably tangible terms as battle and combat readiness, has surely grown less efficient in the tactical and operational levels of combat compared to the force structure of the mid-1980s, that is, before unification.[14] But is such a rather unstrategic comparison realistic in today's setting? While the German armed forces of today no longer boast the armory that might have existed in 1985,

the political effectiveness and relative overall efficiency of security, defense, and military policies more or less coincide with the dictates of Germany's national interests in Europe and the international system as a reflection of its domestic politics.

In reality, the reform of German security policy and defense institutions—a fairly breath-taking reduction in force and a reorientation in missions outside of Central Europe over the past two decades—has been politically effective in the most fundamental sense of what has come to be a dominant line of policy of national interests within international organizations in the domestic and international politics of the FRG since unification in 1990. This reform has addressed *the* salient German national interest in a changing international order: that is, the imperative for a multilateral re-ordering of Germany's role in the European system of states, a *raison d'état* that mirrors the imperative of domestic politics since 1989 to defuse the Cold War nuclear powder keg on the world's ideological fault line. German statecraft has greatly fashioned a transformed security order of what has generally been a more peaceful Europe, if not a more peaceful world. Indeed, the German experience of integrating the military of the Communist former East Germany[15] marked the beginning of NATO enlargement, itself an instance of defense institution building of breathtaking scale.

## The organizational context: sources of foreign and security policy

German security policy adopts a comprehensive approach to statecraft and policy; it comprises such arenas as the political, economic, ecological, social, and cultural that delimit security in its widest sense in the twenty-first century. That is to say, the Germans understand that security cannot be assured solely by the use of arms in combat or by preparation for combat in the traditional sense.[16] At the same time, however, in order to secure freedom, human rights, stability, and security, Germans must be prepared to use armed force as well as to maintain such forces within the limits and constraints of domestic and European policy and economies. The willingness to employ military means for the demands of statecraft in a multinational setting remains an essential prerequisite of German security policy. But such a goal of policy faces hurdles in the domestic political realm as well as in the international system of states.

The German pursuit of security and defense operates in concert with a variety of international organizations, including the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the European Union, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.[17] German security policy relies on the UN as the sole political institution with worldwide membership for the goals of collective security as well as political, social, and economic progress for the nations of the world.[18] NATO links the security and defense of Europe to that of North America—and with that, the principle of collective defense that has long established itself as the bedrock of German security. The European Union has assured Europe, and Germany within it, of stability, security, and prosperity, while recently having advanced to the role of crisis manager with an ever greater mission of foreign and security policy.[19] The Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU, as well as international security-building missions in the past decade, are linked to military structures that aspire to complement those of NATO without duplication.

The sum of these institutions forms the foundation and parameters for German security, defense, and military institutions; in other words, these institutions in Germany cannot be understood solely in national terms. No wonder, then, that as these international entities have changed so dramatically in the past two decades amid the transformation of European security, German national institutions have adjusted in turn, in a manner that requires greater attention to German defense structures and their reform. Whereas the original mission of the armed forces set down in the German Basic Law of the Cold War focused on the forward defense of West

Germany and its allies with conventional and nuclear means,[20] this mission has broadened in the past 20 years to enable the German nation with "the capacity for action in the field of foreign policy."[21]

Amid a transformed concept of collective security as it has formed in the recent past, twenty-first-century Germany also aims to make a contribution to European and world stability and security; to maintain national security and the provision of aid to Germany's many allies; and finally, to field armed forces that "foster multinational cooperation and integration." Needless to say, such a mission now operates across a far larger geographical area than in the previous era and includes roles and missions in combat on a limited scale, even though public opinion disapproves of them.

The dimension of multinational cooperation and integration has a pride of place in Germany unlike other leading armies of the world. Before 1990, political resistance to the use of West German forces outside of Central Europe formed the core of consensus about the fundamentals of the German security and military posture. By 1994, however, the Federal Constitutional Court had reinterpreted Article 24 of the Basic Law to enable security-building operations in concert with a variety of international security and defense organizations. The mission of national defense in Article 87a has been reinterpreted in a more generous manner to support, first, the Balkan, and later Afghan operations, while Article 35 governs the role of military support to civil authority in natural disasters within Germany's federal system.[22] This process began in the early 1990s with UN operations, followed by NATO missions in the mid-1990s, and more recently those of the EU in the present decade, including:

- IFOR in Bosnia/Herzogovina;
- the Macedonian Essential Harvest/Amber Fox;
- SFOR also in BiH;
- EU missions in Aceh, Macedonia, Democratic Republic of Congo;
- UNAMIC, UNAMIR, UNMEE, UNOMIG, UNOSOMII, UNSCOM, and UNTAC;
- missions in support of the Organizations for Security and Cooperation in Europe;
- support of Operational Enduring Freedom in Kuwait.

Present operations comprise NATO's ISAF and KFOR, the EU missions in Bosnia/Herzogovina, the counter-piracy EU mission off the coast of Somalia, as well as the EU mission in the Congo; other current operations include UN missions supporting the African Union in Darfur, as well as the operation off the coast of Lebanon, and in Sudan. Further operations include those connected with Operation Enduring Freedom in Djibouti and Active Endeavor in the Mediterranean Sea.

The constitutional character of the German armed forces as a branch of the executive that answers to parliament manifests itself in *Innere Führung*, that is, the principles of leadership, command, obedience, morale, education, and training in the ranks of the forces that balance the requirements of citizenship with constitutional rights in an "army in a democracy."[23] *Innere Führung* represents the successful answer of German defense and military institutions to the abuses of command and obedience in the German past and the requirement to adjust the self-image of the soldier and the institutions of command, leadership, and morale to an ever-changing security and defense environment.[24] *Innere Führung* sets out the ethical, legal, and even political limits of command and obedience in military service in a manner that is more or less unknown in other established NATO powers. It is a feature that has found many emulators in Central and Eastern European states that emerged from the wreckage of the Warsaw Pact.

Founded on constitutional principles of citizenship reconciled to military hierarchy and the realities of soldierly existence, *Innere Führung* takes as its core ideal the "citizen in uniform." The

practice of *Innere Führung* aims to integrate the armed forces in a pluralist state and society, rather than allow the forces to form a caste, clique, or junta mentality. The ideal and reality of *Innere Führung* rely on ethical, legal, and social fundamentals of the soldier's profession and the mission of the armed forces that are in alignment with those in the Constitution, public service, and professional excellence in state and society at large.

*Innere Führung* also nourishes the style of command of mission-oriented orders, that is, a freedom in obedience in tactical and operational roles and missions in which the creative realm operates without a crushing micro-management of service that extinguishes initiative and denies the soldier the professional essentials necessary for success in service and combat. This ideal also preserves the constitutional rights of association and affiliation, as well as civil rights that remain essential to citizenship at all times and need no restriction even in military service, i.e., rule of law, right to vote, even the right to join a political party, so long as the soldier does not abuse this right to politicize his/her comrades or pursue a partisan goal while in uniform.

Parliament oversees its constitutional duties through its Defense Committee and the Parliamentary Commissioner: a kind of watchdog who combines the influence of many US congressional committees into one office based on Scandinavian antecedents of civilian control.[25] In the past ten years, amid chronic under-spending, this Parliamentary Commissioner has become the voice of service interests in matters of operational effectiveness regarding the Bundeswehr on operations of the past decade and more. His office represents an important defense institution in its own right, whose changing character is noteworthy and significant. No similar person or institution exists in the English-speaking security and defense realm with this concentrated role and mission within the democratic civil–military structures of a major NATO nation.

The German Ministry of Defense plays the double function of being a civilian ministry in the Cabinet as a whole as well as having direct command of the forces. How this dual role has evolved since the end of the Cold War forms an important theme in itself, as Germany has in the past 20 years fashioned national entities for the command of operations that had heretofore been in the realm of NATO echelons. Article 65a of the Basic Law delineates the parameters of supreme command of the force in peacetime and in times of tension. According to Article 115a, in a "state of defense" as determined by the federal parliament, whereby federal territory is under attack by force of arms (the word "war" is more or less completely taboo in constitutional usage), such supreme command passes to the Chancellor.

The Minister of Defense is a member of the Chancellor's Cabinet in a parliamentary system of government, together with such figures as the Foreign Minister, the Minister of the Interior, and the Minister of Finance. The Minister of Defense acts as the peacetime commander-in-chief of the armed forces, an office that passes to the federal Chancellor in crisis and war. The minister is also head of the civilian Bundeswehr administration, which is organized differently within its own autonomous spheres of control and operations. The Ministry of Defense (located in Bonn and Berlin) includes some 3,230 personnel, of whom 1,210 are in uniform and the rest are civilians. This number is also set to undergo a sharp revision, announced in late 2010, with the Bonn branch of the MoD likely to be degraded to a subordinate echelon of command, and it will likely be consolidated with the command and support staffs of the three armed services and joint services of support through the elimination and concentration of existing staff sections in a smaller entity.

The Minister of Defense is supported in turn by two Undersecretaries of Defense drawn from parliament, which underscores the fact that the real sovereign of the German armed forces is the Bundestag. These figures are augmented in turn by two career civil servant Undersecretaries of Defense. The Office of the Minister of Defense itself is further organized into a so-called

*Leitungsstab*, prominent in which is the ministerial planning staff, with ancillary echelons devoted to public and press affairs, organization, and financial and budgetary analysis.[26]

The Chief of Defense (CHOD or *Generalinspekteur der Bundeswehr*), the highest-ranking soldier in the Bundeswehr, acts as senior military advisor to the Minister and to the Cabinet.[27] The CHOD disposes of his own joint staff (*Führungsstab der Streitkräfte*). This joint command staff develops the general plans for the Bundeswehr, formulates the basics of military policy, directs plans for operations and their realization in the field, and also conceives and directs the command, education, and training of the soldier in service. The respective chiefs of the three services have subordinate staffs: *Führungsstab des Heeres, Führungsstab der Luftwaffe, Führungsstab der Marine*. These service-specific staffs have double functions, i.e., the role within the ministry as well as the command and control of the land, air, or maritime forces. The army staff, for instance, is supported in turn by a German army command center (HFüKdo), and the army office (HA), somewhat akin to the Department of the Army staff. The same principle applies to the aerospace and maritime forces.

Personnel matters are spread throughout the echelons of supreme and high command from the ministry downwards. But the decisive concentration of this crucial issue lies in the civilian realm of the ministry. Administration of personnel in uniform and mufti operates as a means of protecting democratic civilian control of the military, but it has long been a source of friction and confusion among soldiers, especially since the foundation of the Bundeswehr. The joint staff has a personnel staff section, as well, as do the services of the three branches of the armed forces.

The budget section within the MoD is responsible for national defense by military means in the Chancellor's budget, the so-called Einzelplan 14. The defense budget for the year 2010 included €31,11 billion, and remained steady from 2009.[28] Fully half of the budget pays for personnel. Procurement comprises some €2,28 billion. Some €317 million euros pay for armored fighting vehicles, whereas €580 million purchase ships and maritime equipment, and €555 million for aircraft. Such spending fails to reach the level of such nations as the United Kingdom, France, or Turkey as a percentage of GDP, but the policy accords with priorities that have remained for the past 20 years in the wake of national unification and its unprecedented demands on public finances.

## The defense reform of 2010

In 2010, an expert panel convened to revamp the structure of the armed forces: the culmination of the budget crises of the last years, the changes in the German defense and security realm, and additional domestic pressures to reconceive Germany's international profile. (The last such Bundeswehr structure commission met in 2000 under former Federal President Richard von Weizsäcker in the wake of the revolution in the Bundeswehr effected by national unity in 1990 and the undertaking of missions outside of Federal German territory as unfolded in the early and mid-1990s.) The 2010 panel was led by the head of the German Federal Labor Agency, Dr. Frank-Jürgen Weise, a colonel of the reserves, augmented in turn by prominent figures from industry and government. The process was attended by considerable public interest and discussion. In all, the panel called for a reduction in the size of the Ministry of Defense by 50 percent; all ministry functions should be concentrated now in Berlin. The number of career and period-of–service soldiers at arms will increase, bringing the Germans more into line with the British and French forces.[29]

The reduction in the overall size of the Bundeswehr is supposed to abet a new emphasis on operational forces, which are to be doubled in size to some 14,000–15,000 in number. Civilian personnel are to be reduced to 50,000 posts. The service staffs are destined to be sharply

reduced or abolished altogether, their functions likely to be compressed into the operations and service support staff in the effort to reduce overhead in personnel and thereby to reduce ministerial pay bonuses that are coveted among senior officers who advance to such high responsibilities.[30]

The excess command, training, and rear-area force structure that has endured from the Cold War Bundeswehr, as well as the military's role in the ex-East Germany, will be eliminated to create a leaner force, focused on overseas military operations. Ideally, these economies are to create greater depth of security-building, deployable forces versus the classical organization, oriented to the defense of German territory from a conventional foe.

The levels of command and management are to be compressed and simplified in the spirit of twenty-first-century business practices, especially in the realm of procurement and acquisitions—this is a requirement derived from the Afghan operation, where shortfalls of equipment were blamed on bloated civilian material bureaucracy, as is typical elsewhere in NATO defense procurement and acquisitions. Specifically, the civilian-run procurement organization is to be reduced in force and concentrated in favor of the rapid introduction of equipment and material suited for the needs of current operations, in response to criticism that German troops have not been as well equipped as their NATO allies or even the Austrians.

Perhaps most conspicuously, the panel called for the suspension of conscription. Especially in Germany, compulsory military service is seen as a democratic institution, which assures that no military caste can form, aloof from pluralistic society as was the case with the 100,000-man army of the inter-war period that became the breeding ground for the Wehrmacht in National Socialism. That is, in light of Germany's unhappy experience with militarism in state and society during and between the World Wars, universal conscription has been the bedrock under the "citizen in uniform" since the 1950s. To scrap this feature of service, as has been done by the other leading NATO allies, cuts deeply to the core values in the political and strategic culture. On the other hand, compulsory service in practice—both military and civilian—remains unpopular in Germany as an irrelevant burden on those young people who must serve. (Indeed, the term for both military and civilian service had been fixed at just six months for some years. Even then, the Bundeswehr frequently met its conscription targets without calling up an entire cohort, which meant that compulsory military service had become an uneven social requirement, as well.) More urgently from the panel's perspective, conscription simply did not comport with Germany's defense and military focus on foreign deployments within coalitions. Only professional soldiers or those draftees who volunteered could be deployed overseas, hence the reform model of an all-volunteer and professional force. In the event, German political leaders have suspended universal military service in Germany, with the last conscripts having been mustered under the old system in early 2011.[31]

This package of plans was poised to become policy in late 2010, announced with great flourish by then-Defense Minister Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg. A photogenic Franconian and scion of an aristocratic family that had sided with the 20 July 1944 conspirators against Hitler, Guttenberg brought his considerable charisma and all the hopes of the otherwise rather grey and dowdy center-right party to the project of reforming the force. Before he assumed the Defense Minister's portfolio in 2010, he had been Economics Minister with a forthright style in the midst of the world economic crisis, which quickly made him a media celebrity. From the apex of the Ministry of Defense in Berlin's Bendlerblock, he provided the smiling sound-bite assurances that an all-volunteer Bundeswehr would meet its recruitment needs *and* its reduced budget while enhancing Germany's cachet as an alliance partner and international power. Then in early 2011, as his political fortunes reached their zenith, he ran afoul of a series of scandals connected with command and control as well as military operations and discipline in the forces. These problems gave way to devastating revelations in February 2011 about his doctoral dissertation;[32]

extensive passages were proved to have been plagiarized from various sources and, worse, much of the research had been done by the German equivalent of the Congressional Research Service while the young politician worked his way through the requisite ranks and offices. After several days, while critics from all parties grew louder in their claims that such antics endangered public faith in the democratic process,[33] Guttenberg resigned his post and his government duties on 1 March 2011. He was replaced by Thomas de Maizière, a staid career civil servant and the son of one of the Bundeswehr's founding fathers.[34]

On the one hand, Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg owes his precipitous fall to circumstances unrelated to his role as Defense Minister. The scandal appears to have begun when a northern German law professor ran the dissertation through some anti-plagiarism software, so perhaps the issue was, at heart, an intellectual or disciplinary dispute. (To be sure, other scandals, more directly related to German defense but less damaging to Guttenberg's career, had arisen in his tenure at the MoD, including a mutiny on a German Navy tall ship in the aftermath of a female crewmember's death.) On the other hand, his abrupt and seemingly final departure under a cloud of suspicion will allow for a further rethinking of the reform process, from the data to support Guttenberg's cost-savings claims to the social and political efficacy of an all-volunteer force. One hesitates to impute any kind of conspiracy to these developments. Rather, the custom, as it were, in the 60 years of the FRG has been for Ministers of Defense to leave office in scandal. German political observers refer to the position as an "ejection seat;" 8 of the 15 men who have served as Federal German Defense Minister have left office before their term expired.[35] Guttenberg himself got the job after his predecessor changed ministerial portfolios in the wake of the Kunduz command and control/friendly-fire incident in 2009.[36] Popular and political sensitivities to defense and military matters in Germany impart a particular charge to the office of defense minister, which attracts special scrutiny and distinct standards and expectations. In these much less forgiving circumstances, a high turnover of defense ministers is hardly surprising. It also tends to brake radical reform, which well comports with the German emphasis on gradual change as the key to political and social stability.

### What does the German case mean for defense institution building?

Quite apart from the flashy advent and uncertain course of the German defense reforms of 2010, the current re-conception of German security and defense institutions has some important ramifications for Germany and for its partners as concerns the character of defense institution building in a mature democracy with armed forces of long-standing success in democratic civil–military relations. Central to the reform effort is the suspension of conscription as well as the drastic reorganization of the Ministry of Defense and subordinate echelons in favor of the efficient command of operations with more traditional military echelons of command and control. Thus, the Germans would bring their defense institutions more clearly in line with other NATO forces, or what other NATO forces purport to be in theory if not always in the practice of lean command organizations. As part of the same effort, the office of the CHOD is to be expanded in its power; in a kind of revolution, the Generalinspekteur der Bundeswehr is to assume the command and control of the forces in a manner unknown in the history of the Federal Republic.

General officers never have occupied a prominent place in the political culture of the Federal Republic, especially not in the halls of power in government. Only in rare circumstances do former generals reappear either as elected officials or public figures in the format of, say, the UK or the United States. If this reform of a beefed-up CHOD is fully carried out by Thomas de Maizière, the relative increase of the power of this office versus the civilian branches of the German MoD would embody a significant, far-reaching, and unprecedented shift in this key

officer's role. (In a very loose comparison, this reform might be compared somewhat to the Goldwater–Nichols legislative reform of the mid-1980s, which increased the power of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs in the United States. At the same time, this change resonates an unhappy past in which German generals in the Weimar Republic aided Hitler's rise to power and later willingly aided Nazi crimes on a staggering scale.) While no one seriously doubts the civil and constitutional ethos of the Bundeswehr today, the augmentation of what would be more of a classical general staff in the customary sense is an extraordinary development for Germany, even if such a step more or less accords with developments in other NATO nations.

While these proposals might well be long overdue and much needed to streamline the management and decision-making of operations as they have unfolded in the past 15 or so years, particularly in light of the goal of expeditionary operations of security building on a sound organizational and budgetary basis, the abandonment of conscription, and the reduction of the civilian component of the Ministry of Defense with a simultaneous increase in power of the CHOD brings the Bundeswehr into uncharted territory with implications for political effectiveness, even if tactical and operational efficiency might be presumed to profit. The sum of these two measures represents a radical change with custom and tradition on a variety of aspects of how German defense institutions have worked with great democratic political effectiveness and reasonable fiscal and operational efficiency for decades. In view of the conservative and consensual nature of German politics, society, and government, the proposed sweeping reor-ganization and reform of the brains, brawn, and limbs of the German forces must clear its hurdles in national and local politics.

By dint of its history, its relative power, and its assumption of a more assertive role in an international system in the midst of change in the twenty-first century, Germany is always something apart from its European neighbors. This quality of uniqueness expresses itself in terms of the success of its form of government and its assertion of national interest within international organizations, which has taken on a more power-oriented and less reticent cast in the past decade. Taken in this context, German defense institutions since the 1950s so far have upheld and advanced German democracy admirably. Signally, in the face of new threats, new missions, and ever smaller budgets, the German military has upheld its salutary constitutional role within the structure of dual integration in the domestic realm and the international system. The extent to which the 2010 reforms have been seized of domestic politics reflects the German way of democracy, as, in fact, they should. But at the same time, in the course of 2010 and 2011, a cloud no larger than a man's hand has appeared on the horizon of Berlin, above the glass cupola of the parliament and the red brick roofs of the Bendlerblock, with the abrupt end of the Defense Minister's political career amid reforms, and the rupture of solidarity in collective security and collective direct action with European and trans-Atlantic allies in the UN/EU/ NATO Libyan operation. These events will surely further shape the character of defense insti-tutions in Germany, which bears careful examination and reflection in a manner that is not suffocated by backward-looking NATO burden-sharing and burden-shifting rhetoric.

The example of Germany as a case study in successful transition to democracy in the decades after World War II has been a beacon of defense institution building with wide implications for the academic and practical study of this neglected and misunderstood phenomenon. Centrifugal forces in Germany's political culture that have become more profound at the end of the decade will express themselves in institutions of the state, particularly. The Bundeswehr faces a combat role with diminishing resources and a kind of political malaise in the highest echelons of government, amid a popular backlash against political elites and fundamentals of political culture. The authors are confident that the defense institutions of Germany have a tradition of constitutional surety to withstand this trial.

## Acknowledgments

## Notes

1 The most recent statement on German security and defense policy is the "White Paper 2006 on German Security Policy, and the Future of the Bundeswehr" (Berlin: Bundesministerium der Verteidigung (BMVg – German Ministry of Defense), 2006). For an overview of the German Ministry of Defense, see Mönch Verlagsgesellschaft, eds., *Handbuch der Bundeswehr und der Verteidigungsindustrie, 2009–2010* (Bonn: Bernard & Graefe, 2009). For works on the post-1990 transformation of German security and defense institutions and policy, as well as the adaptation of the Bundeswehr to roles and missions outside of Central Europe, see Peter Goebel, ed., *Von Kambodscha bis Kosovo: Auslandseinsätze der Bundeswehr* (Frankfurt/Main, Bonn: Report, 2000); Sabine Jaberg, Heiko Biehl, Günther Mohrmann and Maren Tomforde, eds., *Auslandseinsätze der Bundeswehr: Sozialwissenschaftliche Analysen, Diagnosen, und Perspektiven* (Berlin: Düncker & Humboldt, 2009). Two official works on this profound change in German defense policy and institutions are: *The Bundeswehr on Operations* (Berlin: Federal Ministry of Defense, 2009); Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (MGFA), ed. *Wegweiser zur Geschichte: Auslandseinsätze der Bundeswehr* (Paderborn: Schoenigh, 2010). Further works of interest on this theme include: Wilfried von Bredow, *Militär und Demokratie in Deutschland* (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2008); Tom Dyson, *The Politics of German Defense and Security: Policy Leadership and Military Reform in the Post Cold War Era* (Oxford: Berghan, 2007); Gerhard Kümmel, Giuseppe Caforio and Christopher Dandeker, *Armed Forces, Soldiers and Civil-Military Relations* (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2009); Karl Heinz Lutz, *Reform—Reorganisation—Transformation: Zum Wandel in deutschen Streitkräften von den preussischen Heeresreformen bis zur Transformation der Bundeswehr* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2010); Berthold Meyer, *Von der Entgrenzung nationaler deutscher Interessen: Die politische Legitimation weltweiter Militäreinsätze* (Frankfurt: Hessische Stiftung Friedens-und Konfliktforschung, 2007); Klaus Naumann, *Einsatz ohne Ziel? Die Politikbedürftigkeit des Militärischen* (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung, 2010); Philipp Scherrer, *Das Parlament und sein Heer: Das Parlamentsbeteiligungsgesetz* (Berlin: Duncker & Humboldt, 2010); Elmar Wiesendahl, *Eliten in der Transformation von Gesellschaft und Bundeswehr* (Paderborn: Schoeningh, 2007). Also see sources in Note 6.

2 "White Paper on the Security of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Situation and Future of the Bundeswehr" (Bonn: BMVg, 1994); BMVg, "White Paper 2006" (Bonn: BMVg, 1996).

3 Details on the defense budget for the period 2010–13 are given in Mönch, *Handbuch der Bundeswehr*, pp. 101–2. See also, ed., "Bericht der Strukturkommission der Bundeswehr Oktober 2010—vom Einsatz herdenken: Konzentration, Flexibilität, Effizienz" (Berlin: Strukturkommission der Bundeswehr, 2010), esp. pp. 10–12 and the detailed annexes; "Bericht des Generalinspekteurs der Bundeswehr zum Prüfauftrag aus der Kabinettsklausur vom 7. Juni 2010."

4 For the details of the process by which the young Federal Republic formed this military in the aftermath of the Third Reich, the Wehrmacht in National Socialism and World War II, see Donald Abenheim, *Reforging the Iron Cross: The Search for Tradition in the West German Armed Forces* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988); or for example, MGFA, ed., *Verteidigung im Bündnis: Planung, Aufbau und Bewährung der Bundeswehr, 1950–1972* (Munich: Bernard & Graefe, 1975); Detlef Bald, *Die Bundeswehr: eine kritische Geschichte 1955–2005* (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2005), esp. pp. 7–60. See also such text books on the topic as MGFA, ed., *Die Zeit nach 1945: Armeen im Wandel*, vol. 3 of *Grundkurs deutsche Militärgeschichte* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2008).

5 Introductory works on German foreign, security, and defense policy with useful bibliographies include: Sven Bernhard Gareis, *Deutschlands Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik,* 2nd edn. (Opladen/Farmington Hills: Budrich, 2006); Stephan Bierling, *Die Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Normen, Akteure, Entscheidungen*, 2nd edn. (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2005); and Stephan Böckenförde *et al.*, eds., *Deutsche Sicherheitspolitik: Herausforderungen, Akteure, Prozesse,* (Opladen/Farmington Hills: Budrich, 2009). The classic works on German foreign policy are: Christian Hacke, *Die Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Weltmacht wider Willen* (Berlin: Ullstein, 1997); Helga Haftendorn, *Deutsche Außenpolitik zwischen Selbstbeschränkung und Selbstbehauptung* (Stuttgart/Munich: DVA, 2001); Wolfram Hanrieder,

*Deutschland, Amerika, Europa: Die Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1949–1994* (Paderborn: Schoenigh, 1995). For works on foreign policy since 1989, see Gregor Schöllgen, *Die Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart,* 2nd edn. (Munich: Beck, 2001); Sebastian Harnisch and Hanns W. Maull, eds., *Germany as a Civilian Power: The Foreign Policy of the Berlin Republic* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001); Gareis, *Deutschlands Außen-und Sicherheitspolitik*, pp. 65–78; and Bierling, *Die Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, pp. 253–306. The following websites are of use: the German Parliament, www.bundestag.de/htdocs_e/bundestag/international/index.html (here in English and specifically the pages relating to international relations, though much of the site is useful in this connection); the German Foreign Ministry, www.auswaertiges-amt.de/EN/Startseite_node.html (here in English); the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, http://en.dgap.org/ (here in English); the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, www.swp-berlin.org/en/about-swp.html (here in English); and the German Marshall Fund, www.gmfus.org/ (all accessed 7 August 2012).

6 Among a wide and venerable literature on Germany, NATO, and alliance policy and strategy in the past and present, see, Bruno Thoss, *NATO Strategie und nationale Verteidigunsplanung: Planung und Aufbau der Bundeswehr unter den Bedingungen einer massiven atomaren Vergeltungsstrategie, 1952–1960* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2006); Johannes Varwick, *Die NATO: vom Verteidigungsbündnis zur Weltpolizei* (Munich: Beck, 2008), esp. pp. 139ff; Olaf Thieler, "Deutschland und die NATO," in Böckenförde and Gareis, eds., *Deutsche Sicherheitspolitik*, pp. 287–327, especially the bibliography, pp. 323–7.

7 See, e.g., Constanze Stelzenmüller, "Germany's Unhappy Abstention from Leadership," published 28 March 2011 in the *Financial Times* online, available at: www.ft.com/ (accessed 7 August 2012).

8 See, for example, Helmut Hammerich, ed. *Jeder für sich und Amerika gegen alle?: Die Lastenteilung der NATO am Beispiel der Temporary Council Committee, 1949 bis 1954* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2003).

9 For an introduction to German strategic culture in the past and present, see Donald Abenheim, "Germany and the United States in the Age of Terror: Ideas, Domestic Politics, and the International System of States—the New Strategic Environment," in Donald Abenheim, *Soldier and Politics Transformed*: *German-American Reflections on Civil-Military Relations in a New Strategic Environment* (Berlin: Miles, 2007), pp. 111ff. For an overview of the political culture and political institutions in the Federal Republic of Germany, see Frank Pilz *et al.*, *Das politische System Deutschlands: Prinzipien, Institutionen und Politikfelder* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2000); on public opinion and defense in Germany, Heiko Biehl and Jörg Jacobs, "Öffentliche Meinung und Sicherheitspolitik," in Böckenförde and Gareis, *Deutsche Sicherheitspolitik,* pp. 233–54; on the comparative European views of politics, defense policies, and armed forces, see Alexandra Jonas *et al.*, *Chancen und Hindernisse für die Europäische Streikräfteintegration* (Wiesbaden: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2010).

10 At some level, the Germans seem to have embraced this image of the Bundeswehr as a less-than-martial military force. Popular films like 2007's *Kein Bund fürs Leben*—the title itself is a pun on a Bundeswehr recruiting slogan—infuse their slapstick with significance, if not poignancy, by juxtaposing the highly equipped and disciplined US Army with the goofy but human Bundeswehr.

11 The cases of German statecraft in the 1990–91 Kuwait/Iraqi war, that of the 2002–3 US coalition assault on Iraq, and in the face of a possible EU intervention in Libya in 2011 (in which the Germans abstained in the UN Security Council) represent three examples in the past two decades of this generalization that arises from the primacy of domestic politics in strategic culture and the character of defense institutions.

12 Biehl and Jacobs, "Öffentliche Meinung und Sicherheitspolitik."

13 For example, Stephan Böckenförde, "Die Veränderung des Sicherheitsverständnisses," in Böckenförde and Gareis, eds., *Deutsche Sicherheitspolitik*, pp. 32–6.

14 At the same time, more German soldiers than in the mid-1980s have direct experience of military operations in post-conflict, security building, and counter-terrorism operations than in 1985, but the size of the force and its respective equipment are lacking compared to the 495,000-odd troops of the last phase of the Cold War.

15 On the unification of the German armed forces after 1990 as a noteworthy case of defense institution building, for which the scope of this article has allowed little analysis, see Abenheim, "The German Soldier and National Unity," in *Soldier and Politics Transformed*, pp. 17ff. See also Jörg Schönbohm, *Zwei Armeen und ein Vaterland: das Ende der Nationalen Volksarmee* (Berlin: Siedler Verlag, 1992); Hans-Peter von Kirchbach, *et al.*, *Abenteuer Einheit: Zum Aufbau der Bundeswehr in den neuen Ländern* (Frankfurt: Report, 1992); MGFA, ed., *Vom Kalten Krieg zur deutschen Einheit: Analysen und Zeitzeugenberichten zur deutschen Militärgeschichte* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1995); Dieter Farwick, ed., *Ein Staat—eine Armee: von der NVA zur Bundeswehr* (Frankfurt: Report, 1992); Detlef Bald, ed., *Die Nationale Volksarmee: Beiträge*

*zu Selbstverständnis und Geschichte des deutschen Militärs* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1992); Frithjof Knabe, *Unter der Flagge des Gegners* (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1994); Udo Baron, *Die Wehrideologie der Nationalen Volksarmee der DDR* (Bochum: Universitätsverlage Dr. Brockmeyer, 1993); Volker Koop, *Abgewickelt: Auf den Spurren der Nationalen Volksarmee* (Bonn: Bouvier, 1995). Hans Ehlert, ed., *Armee ohne Zukunft: Das Ende der NVA und die deutsche Einheit* (Berlin: Ch. Links, 2002). Also of note are four further works in English: Hans-Peter von Kirchbach, *Reflections on the Growing Together of the German Armed Forces* (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, 1992); Mark Victorson, *Mission in the East: Building an Army in a Democracy in the New German States* (Newport, RI: Naval War College, 1994); Fred Zilian, *From Confrontation to Collaboration: The Takeover of the NVA by the Bundeswehr* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999); Dale Herpspring, *Requiem for an Army: The Demise of the NVA* (Boulder, CO: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998).

16 BMVg, "White Paper, 2006," pp. 29–33; Gareis, *Deutschlands Außen-und Sicherheitspolitik*, pp. 201–4.

17 BMVg, "White Paper, 2006," pp. 20–2, 33–62; Gareis, *Deutschlands Außen-und Sicherheitspolitik*, p. 97ff.

18 BMVg, "White Paper, 2006," pp. 57–9; Gareis, *Deutschlands Außen-und Sicherheitspolitik*, 151–72; Uta Kuchenbuch, *Deutschland und die Vereinten Nationen: Die Entwicklung Deutschlands vom hegemonialen Aggressor zum verantwortlichen Mitglied der internationalen Staatengemeinschaft* (Opladen: Dr Kovacs, 2004).

19 Franco Algiere, *Die Gemeinsame Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik der EU* (Vienna: Facultas, 2010).

20 Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (MGFA), eds., *Vom kalten Krieg zur deutschen Einheit: Analysen und Zeitzeugenberichte* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1995); Helmut R. Hammerich, Dieter H. Kollmer, Martin Fink and Rudolf J. Schlaffer, *Das Heer: 1950 bis 1970: Konzeption, Organisation, Aufstellung* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2006).

21 These extracts are taken from BMVg, "White Paper, 2006," pp. 70–7. Citations from the German Basic Law as pertain to the mission of the armed forces within international organizations and constitutional limits as interpreted above are from ibid., pp.76–7. An account of the change in political and strategic application of these clauses in the era 1989–present is in Sven Bernhard Gareis, "Militärische Beiträge zur Sicherheit," in Böckenförde and Gareis, *Deutsche Sicherheitspolitik,* pp. 99–129. Also see works in Note 2, above.

22 BMVg, "White Paper 2006," pp. 75–7.

23 Abenheim, *Reforging the Iron Cross*; Frank Nägler, *Der gewollte Soldat und sein Wandel: Personelle Rüstung und Innere Führung in den Aufbaujahren der Bundeswehr, 1956–1964/5* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2010); Frank Pauli, *Wehrmachtoffiziere in der Bundeswehr: Das kriegsgediente Offizierkorps der Bundeswehr und die Innere Führung, 1955–1970* (Munich: Schoeningh, 2010). Helmut R. Hammerich, Uwe Hartmann, and Claus von Rosen, eds., *Jahrbuch Innere Führung, 2010: Die Grenzen des Militärischen,* (Berlin: Miles, 2010); Michael G. Lux, *Innere Führung: A Superior Concept of Leadership?* (Berlin: Miles, 2009).

24 The analysis of *Innere Führung* is taken from ZDv 10/1 of 2008, the service regulation on *Innere Führung* (in German), available at: www.innerefuehrung.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/zinfue (accessed 7 August 2012).

25 For more on this office, see Rudolf J. Schlaffer, *Der Wehrbeauftragte 1951 bis 1985* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2006). See also the yearly reports that the parliamentary commissioner releases; the most recent one (in German) is available from the German parliament: available at: dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/17/044/1704400.pdf (accessed 7 August 2012).

26 "Bundesministerium der Verteidigung," available (in German) at: www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/ (accessed 7 August 2012).

27 Ibid.

28 German Federal Ministry of Finance, 2011.

29 Strukturkomission der Bundeswehr, "Bericht der Strukturkommission der Bundeswehr."

30 These statistics are from ibid.

31 See Strukturkomission der Bundeswehr, "Bericht der Strukturkommission"; "Bericht des General-inspekteurs der Bundeswehr." "Suspended" is the correct term for the current German position on conscription. Technically, the provision for obligatory military service remains in the German Constitution; it simply will not be enforced. Interestingly, even as the recommendations leading to this measure circulated through the media, a corresponding nostalgia for the draft manifested, by which popular news magazines and talk shows offered features in which people reminisced about their military service days. These accounts were almost exclusively fond memories of camaraderie, though few of them involved the martial aspects of military service.

32 In the German education system, a juris doctor (JD) degree entails a work of original research and, thus, is regarded as a doctorate, entitling the holder to use the "doctor title."

33 In addition to the expected rumblings from the left-wing parties in opposition, Parliamentary President Norbert Lammert of the Christian Democratic Union, the sister party to Guttenberg's Christian Social Union, was widely quoted as deeming the Guttenberg affair to be "the nail in the coffin of our faith in democracy." See, e.g., http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,748330,00.html (accessed 7 August 2012).

34 Abenheim, *Soldier and Politics Transformed*. Ulrich de Maizière was chief of staff of the Bundeswehr from 1966 until 1972; he also was a founding member of the Dienststelle Blank in 1951, the predecessor of the German Ministry of Defense established in 1955/56.

35 The statistic was widely reported during the so-called Guttenberg affair. See, e.g., "Verteidigungsminister— ein Schleudersitz," *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 2 March 2011, available at: www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/ nach-guttenberg-ruecktritt-verteidigungsminister-ein-schleudersitz-1.1066722 (accessed 7 August 2012).

36 The incident in Kunduz, Afghanistan, in 2009 involved the command sequence for close air support and led to a significant incident of civil–military friction amid allegations of a cover-up of civilian casualties. Ultimately, the CHOD at the time, General Wolfgang Schneiderhahn, took early retirement; eventually then-Minister of Defense Franz Josef Jung, who had by then moved his portfolio elsewhere in the cabinet, left the government altogether.

# 26

# NATO, THE DEMAND FOR DEMOCRATIC CONTROL, AND MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS

## Romania

*Florina Cristiana Matei*

## Introduction

This chapter discusses Romania's efforts to develop democratic civil–military relations (CMR) after the transition to democracy in 1989, focusing on specific attempts that triggered progress in the institutionalization of both democratic civilian control and military effectiveness (in particular, NATO membership requirements).

Romania is a relatively new democracy, which violently transitioned from one of the most oppressive authoritarian regimes in Central and Eastern Europe to a functioning democratic society in December 1989. It is now a full member of OSCE, NATO, and the EU, as well as a reliable security partner to many other countries and organizations. Its path to a free society has been long and difficult, but, despite a series of limitations and even temporary failures, Romania has built up from ground zero basic democratic institutions. Romania's commitment to democracy has effected a comprehensive reform of its security and military forces (army, navy, air) to make them smaller, more agile and flexible, and interoperable with their Western counterparts in order to better respond to the new security challenges and changes after the end of the Cold War, 9/11, and NATO/EU integration (e.g., transition from national to collective defense; transition to defense against multiple, asymmetrical, and hybrid threats; and transformation of the military from conscription to a professional armed forces based on voluntary entrance and reserves). Institutionalizing democratic civil–military relations was a key component of the overall reform process. To this end, Romania has been undergoing a major review and reform of the central institutions involved in national security and defense and in professional military education, seeking to achieve the two dimensions of our expanded framework of democratic civil–military relations: democratic civilian control and effectiveness.[1]

Romania is an extremely relevant case study of defense reform and democratic civil–military relations for at least two reasons. First, as was the case for many other Central and Eastern European countries, NATO and the EU were the major drivers of these reforms. All these endeavors and developments have disproved the skepticism of some experts (e.g., Samuel

Huntington and Mary Ellen Fischer) on democratization, who claimed Romania had infinitesimal chances for democratic consolidation.[2] Romania's Freedom House rating for 2009 was 3.36 for democratization, on a 1–7 scale, with 1 being the highest and 7 the lowest.[3] Second, it is precisely the lack of "carrots and sticks" that has, since Romania's integration in NATO and EU, led to decreased interest on the part of decision-makers (especially from the legislature) to continue democratic reform, particularly regarding proper oversight. The economic crisis (which affected Romania as well) has also been negatively impacting civil–military relations in Romania. As *The Economist* contends:

> In promoting democracy, the EU has less influence on members than on applicants. As one diplomat says: "To join the EU you have to smell of roses. But if you are a member and you start to reek, there is nobody to make you take a bath."[4]

All these prove that democratic civil–military relations is not a linear process, and past accomplishments do not guarantee enduring success.

## Background to the non–democratic regime

Between 1947 and 1989 Romania was a Communist regime (totalitarian under Gheorghe Ghiorghiu Dej (1947–65) and a totalitarian-cum-sultanistic[5] under Nicolae Ceausescu (1965–89)), characterized by one-party rule (the Romanian Communist Party (PCR)), extreme centralization, the cult of personality (exacerbated during the Ceausescu regime), and infringement of human rights, including severe social and economic conditions, such as starvation, lack of medicines and other basic amenities, regular power blackouts, and lack of adequate heating during the winter,[6] as well as interdiction of any contraceptive measures.[7] All of these under the ubiquitous watch of the Securitate, the political police of the regime.

Although at the beginning of the Dej administration, Romania's foreign, economic, and military policies had been heavily influenced by and oriented toward cooperation with the Soviets, later in the Dej regime, and even more during the Ceausescu's dictatorship, Romania underwent a "separation" from the USSR (although Romania's security and military strategies were rooted exclusively on its membership in the Warsaw Pact), as a mean to minimize as much as possible the Russian influence in Romania's affairs. Under these circumstances, Dej succeeded in convincing Khrushchev to withdraw Soviet troops from the Romanian territory in 1957, and issued a "declaration of Independence" from the USSR in 1964, while Ceausescu enacted a Constitution in 1965, which removed any reference to Russia, and had a division within the Securitate that spied on KGB and Romanian Russophiles, but most importantly, Ceausescu opposed and blatantly criticized Moscow's interference in the Prague Spring in 1968.[8] Moreover, both leaders established relationships with not only non-democratic but also democratic countries (in particular with the US), as long as these countries showed respect of Romania sovereignty (and vice versa).[9] Ceausescu especially sought partnerships with the West in order to secure economic benefits to help support Romania's domestic industrialization, and the West welcomed his diplomatic moves, especially in the aftermath of the Prague Spring, viewing him as a very liberal leader and praised his distance from USSR, yet without envisaging he would soon become a tyrant.

Communist Romania maintained a fairly large military (350,000 active military, with a capability of 850,000 war establishment, in 1989), in an attempt to "deter" the Soviet Union from interfering in Romania's internal affairs. Nevertheless, despite being part of the Warsaw Pact, and basing its defense and military strategy on conscription, the Romanian armed forces were

far from a professional military. That is because, under Ceausescu's rule, soldiers and officers worked in agriculture, while promotion was heavily based on favoritism, nepotism, and loyalty to the regime (including commitment to the Communist Party), rather than on merit. In addition, while the nefarious Securitate was the chief prop of the regime, and its personnel enjoyed many benefits in salaries and travel, and had considerable power and authority, the armed forces did not have a major regime support role. Nor did they enjoy much authority and autonomy.

## The transition to democracy

It all ended in December 1989 when a mass revolt against Ceausescu's draconian rule abolished the Communist regime. Ceausescu and his wife were killed while the Securitate was dismantled, and placed under the armed forces, which gained the population's trust during the revolt.[10] A new chapter for Romania began—democracy. Since then, Romania has been endeavoring to ensure free and fair elections and democratic electoral shift, drawing up and implementing policies, as well as developing and consolidating the civil society, free market economy, and, most importantly, civil—military relations.

Democratizing CMR was a long endeavor, yet not as cumbersome as in other countries that were either military dictatorships (e.g., Chile) or where the military had played a major role in supporting the regime (e.g., Indonesia); that is because the Romanian military did not have high prerogatives (and therefore did not have to defend them), did not intervene in politics, and did not contest the civilians' efforts to democratize and professionalize them. On another note, there has always been "awareness" on the part of the civilian elected officials of Romania's geos-trategic position, the country's not-so-peaceful neighbors (which include the former Yugoslavia and the former USSR), and the impact of globalization on national security and defense, which has prompted the civilians to "invest" in defense and security reform. In addition, Romania, which unanimously expressed its desire, willingness, and commitment to join the European and Euro-Atlantic collective security organizations (once these institutions had announced their willingness to accept new members), has worked hard to comply with these organizations' membership demands (with regard to democratic consolidation and democratization of CMR), which it joined in 2004 and 2007 respectively. All these efforts have ultimately successfully brought about democratic control and effectiveness of the military in Romania.

## Democratization of Romania's defense sector: civil–military relations

Romania started its road toward democratization with a fairly non-professional military.[11] Democratizing Romania's armed forces has been a rather long process, aimed mostly at pro-fessionalizing the military. Institutional and organizational democratic reform of the armed forces has involved five phases, more or less, which included an overhaul of the legal framework on defense and security, coupled with systematic changes in structure, organization, recruitment, personnel, promotion, management, accountability, and transparency: all in all to make the armed forces better prepared for post-Cold War security risks.

The first phase (December 1989–February 1990) was mostly dominated by *ad hoc* measures involving attempts to de-politicize the military, hasty promotions to higher ranks of the per-sonnel who had been frozen in rank during the Communist regime (in an attempt to eliminate injustices and not necessarily based on merit or as a corrective to existing systemic dysfunctions), as well as reactivation and appointments in strategic positions of several generals fired by Ceausescu, including the brief appointment (for three months) of General Nicolae Militaru

(allegedly involved in contradictory activities to generate chaos during the revolution) as Minister of Defense.[12]

The second phase lasted from February 1990 to 1993. During this period, Romania established several institutions, such as the National Defense Supreme Council in 1991 as the main national security and defense coordinator; the National Defense College (NDC) in 1992 to provide military and defense education not only for military personnel but also for civilians within the military system and outsiders; and establishing legal bases for these policies (e.g., drafting and adopting several laws and government resolutions on defense matters, including the Constitution in 1991, the National Security Law in 1991, the first draft of the Military Doctrine and National Defense Strategy). Romania continued shoddy attempts to reform and modernize the military, including preliminary stages of modernization and acquisition programs.[13]

The third phase (1993–97) involved an acceleration of the implementation of democratic military reforms, especially in pursuit of and dictated by full NATO membership requirements. This phase started with a breakthrough in the emergent democratic civil–military relations in Romania—the appointment, in 1993, by the then-Minister of Defense, General Nicolae Spiroiu, of the first two civilians in command positions within the military system: the Deputy Director of the National Defense College, and the Deputy Minister of Defense, respectively.[14] Minister Spiroiu also worked with the US Embassy to bring International Military Education and Training (IMET) funding, a US security assistance program, to the Romanian military and defense education. Another important step in the democratization of the military and institutionalization of democratic civilian control was the appointment of the first civilian as Minister of Defense in 1994. On the same note, it is worth mentioning Romania's adoption in 1994 of the OSCE's Code of Conduct, which included a chapter dealing with the civilian control of the military. During the same year, Romania became the first East European country to join NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP), membership of which involved a host of reform plans and interoperability programs (e.g., Planning and Review Process, PARP), which helped NATO identify and evaluate potential candidates' forces and capabilities for training, exercises, and operations conducted in cooperation and collaboration with the Atlantic Alliance. Nevertheless, Romania's pace of reform was sluggish and therefore halted (together with other challenges resulting from interoperability and CMR issues) Romania's accession in the first wave of enlargement of the Atlantic Alliance in 1997.

The fourth phase (1997–2004) involved more sustained and comprehensive reforms, including reducing the size of the Romanian armed forces; increasing the number of civilians in the armed forces and the Ministry of Defense; institutionalizing defense planning, policy and strategy; improving human resource management; strengthening education and training for both military and civilian personnel; speeding up professionalization; improving the budgeting system and the acquisition and modernizing of equipment; fostering interagency coordination and cooperation; consolidating democratic civilian control; ensuring regional and international cooperation; and other efforts to ensure integration into the second wave of NATO enlargement. During this period, an important catalyst was the NATO Membership Action Plans (MAP), adopted in 1999. In 1998, Romania had issued the Government Ordinance on Romania's National Defense Planning, which set up the legal framework for defense planning. The 9/11 event triggered accelerated and effective defense (and security) reform in Romania, and together with Romania's involvement in the war in Afghanistan, led it to receive an invitation to join NATO in 2002. In 2002, a ministerial guidance stipulated new tasks for the armed forces to include collective defense, crisis management, counterterrorism, defense diplomacy, and the like.[15] In 2002, at the Prague Summit, NATO invited Romania to join the Alliance. This phase culminated in 2004, when Romania became a full NATO member.

The fifth phase (2004–present) involved the transformation of Romania's military to full NATO and EU (in 2007) membership. A relevant step was the shift from conscription to professional armed forces in 2007. A setback, however, is the current diminutive political will to consolidate and strengthen defense and security institution building due to the lack of "carrots" and to a certain extent "sticks" on one hand (e.g., although Romania is a EU member, it is not part of the Schengen Agreement, the EU is coercing Romanian policymakers to undertake very serious reforms, including eradication of corruption and penetration of organized crime in the government, in order to join the Agreement), and, on the other hand, the economic crisis (which affected Romania badly and forces budgetary cuts in government salaries, including decreasing several salary incentives of military personnel), as well as political unsteadiness. In addition, both the MOD and the General Staff have been involved in corruption, bribery, and favoritism acts. A recent case revealed that high-ranking officers from the Ministry of Defense Human Resources Management Directorate and General Staff Doctrine and Instruction Directorate used their "ranks" and "positions" to influence, in return for money (allegedly 70,000 Euros plus 1,800 RON), various promotion processes.[16]

It should be noted that citizens (including representatives of the media and civil society) highly regard (and hence are supportive of) the Romanian armed forces (polls have constantly placed the armed forces in secondary position, after the Church, in people's trust and confidence after 1989).[17] Whether an outcome of a robust MOD Public Relations campaign or an informed media, or even self-interest by the citizenry to know about their military, or all of the above, citizens in Romania are aware of the armed forces' contribution to international operations (and appreciate their endeavors to effectively fight security challenges), understand that such a contribution goes beyond military operations (in that it puts Romania on the map of international relations and policies), but they also recognize the risks surrounding the armed forces' involvement in such operations (e.g., loss of lives). Therefore, citizens and several media outfits have critized the current presidential administration (2004–9; 2010–present) as well as the Prime Minister and his Cabinet for the budgetary cuts involving the military on both salaries and modernization, which will be addressed later in this chapter.

## Democratic civilian control: institutional control mechanisms, oversight, professional norms

The preceding discussions have shown that institutionalizing democratic civilian control (executive, legislative, as well as external) of the Romanian armed forces has been a key component of the defense reform. Executive control involves direction, guidance, and interagency coordination/cooperation by the National Defense Supreme Council (which includes, among others, the President, as chair, who is also the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, the Prime Minister as vice-president, the Minister of Defense, and the Chief of General Staff). Legislative control and oversight involve establishing legislation, roles and missions, budgets, investigations, interpellations, hearings, supervisions, motions, etc., which are then exercised by Romania's bicameral parliament (through permanent and *ad hoc* committees). Admittedly, legislative control and oversight were more rigorous and effective before 2004, when Romania's accession into NATO and EU and these institutions' accession requirements became the "only game in town" for the Romanians, and any political divergences were put aside for the sake of NATO/EU integration. During that time legislators attached greater importance to both transparency and the effectiveness of the Romanian armed forces. Yet, a study conducted in 2001 revealed that democratic control of the military was unfinished business.[18] Judicial control and oversight of the armed forces consist of the verification by the Constitutional Court of the constitutionality

of the normative documents related to defense.[19] The Romanian civil society and media, the ombudsman (the advocate of the people), as well as the European Court of Human Rights have exercised informal control over the armed forces and intelligence agencies. In this context, although often sensationalist and profit-oriented, the Romanian media, by revealing actions and inaction related to military reform, including military intelligence, to both domestic and international audiences, including NATO and EU, which could block or postpone Romania's accession, and hence forcing the hand of the executive and legislative bodies to deal with these problems in order to join the two organizations, has proved to be a more effective oversight mechanism than the formal bodies.[20] Hopefully, now that the NATO/EU incentives have vanished, the media will continue to watch the armed forces and other security agencies to ensure a balance between security and transparency is maintained in Romania. As previously mentioned, after NATO/EU integration, a *laissez-faire* attitude toward defense and security reform, coupled with political infighting and instability, impeachment of the President, etc., and especially the recent economic crisis, sent security and defense to the bottom of civilians' (in particular legislators') agenda. A relevant example is the procrastination for more than five years of the adoption of a draft national security law package, which is required by Romania's NATO and EU member status and critical to the current security environment, as well as the failure of the parliament to approve the 2010 Defense Strategy, which will be addressed below. With no interest or incentive for military reform on the one hand, and no "veto" from the EU or NATO on the other, it is rather difficult to predict whether or not democratic control and oversight of the armed forces will become more robust in the foreseeable future, or if it will improve military effectiveness.

Professional norms have involved new standards for recruitment, education, training, and promotion, aimed at increasing the expertise, corporateness, and responsibility of the military. All these efforts were complemented by the abolishment of conscription in 2007.

## Effectiveness of the armed forces: plans, institutions, resources

The fall of Communism and advent of democracy in 1989 brought changes in Romania's security policy. Since 1989, Romania has based its three National Security Strategies (NSS: 1999, 2001, and 2007) on the post-Cold War security risks and threats, including global security trends that emerged with and after the terrorist attacks of 9/11. The NSS grants Romania's military a cardinal role and responsibility in ensuring national security based on a comprehensive Defense Strategy and Policy process. In line with the NSS and additional legislation (the Constitution, the Law on Defense Planning, the Law on the Organization and Functioning of the Ministry of Defense, the Governance Program, the Defense Planning Guidance, the Forces' operational employment plans, NATO's Comprehensive Political Guidance, EU Security Strategy, etc.), Defense Strategy and Policy (DSP) in Romania requires the development and implementation of a defense strategy (by the President), which is the underlying document for the overall DSP, a White Paper on defense (by the Ministry of Defense), a military strategy (by the General Staff), as well as institutionalizing appropriate defense planning, programming, budgeting, procurement, and defense management measures. So far Romania has developed only one defense strategy (2008), one White Paper (2004), and one military strategy (2000). A new National Defense Strategy was drafted in the summer of 2010, which was immediately heavily debated in the media but still awaits approval by the parliament,[21] together with other security and defense-related laws pending approval since the mid-2000s. The wide time difference between the adoption of these three documents, the failure of President Traian Basescu to adopt a defense strategy within six months since his inauguration (as the legal basis requires), as well as the anachronistic military strategy (issued before 9/11 and Romania's accession into NATO, which led to a more sustained force

transformation) have made DSP a rather erratic and not yet consolidated process. The DSP's short- and medium-term objectives are the adoption of a new White Paper (already drafted), of a new national defense strategy, military strategy, and the improvement of the overall defense planning, among others. Since the executive and legislative bodies are more preoccupied with the current economic crisis and budgetary cuts, it may take some time until these projects become reality. The DSP process is overseen by the executive and to a certain extent the parliament (the legislature plays a minimal, consultative role). Civil society does not seem to have a big say in the planning and implementation of the DSP. At the minimum, they are invited to discuss the National Security and the Defense Strategies. In addition, perhaps, fire alarms set by the media and NGOs, as well as seminars and meetings on defense and security issues, indirectly sway policy.

## Resources: problematic yet a work in progress

Institutionalizing and further improving military effectiveness have also been challenged by precarious resource allocation for military modernization and bureaucratic obstacles. In the late 2000s, the Romanian MOD had received modest budgetary allocations. A most recent example is the 1.3 percent of GDP received by the MOD in 2010, which is far less than the budget Romania stipulated in its agreement with NATO (2.38 percent).[22] Under these circumstances, the six programs of strategic procurement (i.e., procurement of first-class technical equipment needed in combat), adopted by the CSAT in 2006, have been slow and not entirely implemented.[23] A serious consequence for Romania's military effectiveness is the sluggish procurement of modern aircraft. Romania still uses Russian-made MIG 21 fighter jets, an obsolete aircraft whose technical capabilities expire in 2012. Although Romania, with Israel's support, has attempted to upgrade the aircraft, frequent MIG 21 crashes, which led to the deaths of several air force pilots,[24] question the effectiveness of the modernization endeavors.[25] As a corrective, in 2010, CSAT approved the acquisition of 24 second-hand F16 aircraft from the US Government, which Romania will upgrade in order to reach international (including NATO) interoperability.[26]

## Institutions, interagency coordination, and international cooperation: a boost for effectiveness

Despite the above-mentioned problems, strengthening military effectiveness has not been impossible for Romania. To begin with, the DSP (through the National Security Strategy, the National Military Strategy, and the White Book) determines the roles and missions, guiding lines, objectives, and courses of actions for the military forces. Today, Romania's military, in compliance with the legal framework and DSP, can fulfill all six roles and missions identified in Chapter 3 of this Handbook. A relevant step for Romanian armed forces' effectiveness was the switch from conscription to a professional military in 2007. Despite certain recruitment problems in the beginning (e.g., reluctance to join the military due to meager resources available), today Romania has been progressing toward developing a professional military based on voluntary enrollment (as a result of the economic crisis, more people have joined). In their efforts to join NATO, Romania's armed forces have become a small and flexible yet effective force: to date, the overall strength of the Romanian armed forces is approximately 85,000, down from 350,000 active military (with a capability of 850,000 war establishment) in 1989. Interagency processes have also helped improve effectiveness. Under CSAT coordination (and SRI in terrorism issues), Romania's armed forces collaborate with other security institutions to provide overall Romania's national security and defense, a case of such as successful collaboration being the common effort,

under CSAT, in 2005 to free three Romanian journalists kidnapped in Iraq, where the armed forces (mainly the military intelligence) brought in relevant and timely information, which helped free the journalists.[27]

Furthermore, as in the case of Chile, Mongolia, Hungary, and Slovenia (of the case studies discussed in this Handbook), international cooperation (regional and global) has played a key role in the effectiveness of Romanian military. Through participation in common training and exercises, or direct involvement in operations, the armed forces have become more professional, agile, deployable, and interoperable with Western and NATO counterparts. Since 1991, Romania's armed forces have contributed troops and intelligence personnel to various subregional and regional cooperation initiatives (such as the Central European Initiative (CEI), the Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI), and the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe), as well as Stability and Reconstruction Operations under the umbrella of the United Nations, NATO/EU, and with other partners and allies (including Iraq-Kuwait, Somalia, Angola, Congo, East Timor, Ethiopia-Eritrea, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq). Today, Western counterparts regard Romania's military (including, and especially, military intelligence) as a reliable, capable, and professional force. As an acknowledgement of Romania's excellent military intelligence HUMINT capabilities (proven in the operations in Afghanistan, Kosovo, Iraq, etc.), NATO established in 2009 a NATO HUMINT Center of Excellence in Oradea, Romania. In addition, the Romanian Special Forces' professionalism and effectiveness in theaters of operations have brought accolades by allies and partners, including the decoration on February 24, 2011, by the French ambassador in Bucharest, of 11 Romanian special operations military personnel, as recognition of their effective contribution to the "Task Force Lafayette" mission in Afghanistan (focused on protecting the population and providing assistance to the region's economic development via routine patrols).[28] Also, it is worth mentioning the presence of US rotating military training bases in Romania, as well as US plans to deploy a missile shield in Romania as part of the US anti-missile defense system in Europe, Project START, which will probably contribute to strengthening military effectiveness.

## Professional military education and civilian defense education

Romania views professional military education (PME) and civilian defense education (CDE) as instrumental for strengthening both democratic control and effectiveness of the security and defense forces. PME and CDE are fundamental for the professionalization of military personnel as well as the development of the defense and security expertise of the civilians. PME is a requirement of Romania's national defense strategic joint planning. It helps develop and strengthen officers' and noncommissioned officers' capacity to fulfill specific national defense and security roles and missions. CDE helps develop a culture of security and defense in the civilians within the MOD, in the parliamentary defense committees, among the members of the academia, civil society, and the press, which is beneficial to the overall defense and security decision-making process. In accordance with the legal framework for PME/CDE (including the Romanian Constitution; the Military Career Guide; the Statutory Law on the Military Cadres; the Law on the Organization and Functioning of the Ministry of Defense; the Military Training Doctrine; the Romanian National Defense Law; the Law of Military Education; the Law of National Education; the Law on Defense Planning; Romania's Defense Strategy; the Transformation Strategy of the Romanian Armed Forces; etc.), PME in Romania involves initial education and training, as well as continuous professional development. PME incorporates the following: undergraduate education, which is taught in two military high schools, five Service Application Schools, and NCO training schools; graduate education, which is taught in three Service Academies

(BSc/BA degree programs); and postgraduate studies, which are taught in the Military Technical Academy (BSc, MSc, PhD) and the National Defense University (MA/MSc, PhD). Romanian military education also comprises officers and NCO medical military education provided by the Medical Military Institute, as well as musical military education provided by the Musical Military School.

A number of these institutions educate and train civilians involved in national security and defense. Of these, however, the National Defense University (NDU) "Carol I," which features one Faculty (the Faculty of Command and Staff) and six colleges (the National Defense College, the War College, the College for Defense Intelligence, the Center for Management of the Defense Resources and Education, the Center for Strategic Studies of Defense and Security, the Advanced Distributed Learning Department) provide the most comprehensive and inclusive PME and CDE for military officers and their civilian counterparts involved with national defense and security, as well as for civilians from outside of the security and defense sector (providing they pay for their education). NDU programs are designed to educate and train military and civilian personnel for high-level command positions, commandants and general staff officers for the command of military operations, and officers for joint and multinational operations. NDU's wide-ranging PME and CDE curricula include military art, science, and history, international relations, political science, national security and defense, contemporary military phenomena, strategic leadership and good governance, religion, defense logistics, planning and budgeting, public communications and public relations, counterterrorism, peace and stability operations, defense diplomacy, defense decision-making, law, philosophy, geopolitics, information science and information security, military/defense intelligence, languages, crisis management, human resources management, ethics, morality and code of conduct. NDU also undertakes relevant defense and security research. NDU's National Defense College and War College act as joint schools: their Joint Staff Officer Courses ensure inter-branch education and training (e.g., for army, navy, air force), interagency education and training (e.g., for armed forces, police, coast guard, intelligence), and civilian defense education for civilians involved with national defense and security (e.g., for academics, diplomats, politicians, economists, journalists). Thus, NDU's curricula and research capabilities enable each service, and respectively each security-responsible agency, to learn the "culture" of the others. They also help inculcate in the civilians' awareness and responsibility for defense and security, as well as a better understanding of the relationship between the military and politics (including war and politics). The NDU in general, and the National Defense College (which is a partner of the European Union Security and Defense College), in particular, establish links not only between the Romanian military and the social, political, and economic arenas, but also between the Romanian military and their counterparts from NATO, EU, and the partner countries. In addition, Romania supports other troops' PME, especially from the Caucasus.

PME and CDE are vital career paths both for military officers and defense civilians within the national defense system. Appointment, promotion, and rewards for military and civilian personnel for internal MOD positions depend upon professional performance as well as education and training. According to the career guide, for example, promotion to general involves postgraduate education, completion of the Strategic Command Course within the Defense College, and proof of exceptional military conduit and performance. For MOD positions abroad, PME does not count. The PME faculty has a relatively balanced civilian–military ratio in most of the schools and academies, yet the uniformed personnel slightly prevails (40–60). According to sources within the PME system, the higher percentage of military faculty is due to the strong military-oriented curricula in some academies/schools, but it is also a legacy of the previous system which required only military faculty. The 40–60 balance, however, helps

complement military viewpoints with non-military perspectives to defense and security issues and decision-making. Nevertheless, whether increasing the number of civilian faculty improves PME or not, is difficult to assess. PME and CDE in Romania have capitalized on military education and training assistance programs (NATO and European Union programs, US MIL-to-MIL, IMET, FMF, FMS, CTFP). PME is overseen by the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Education, the Romanian Agency for Standing Quality for University Education (for officers), and by the Romanian Agency for Standing Quality for Undergraduate Education (for warrant officers and NCOs). The last two agencies are also empowered to accredit and shut down education programs, as well as fire military and civilian faculty. Thus, democratic civilian control does exist over military education in Romania. The Romanian armed forces, the MOD, and the education institutions themselves have the power to change the military education and curricula in accordance with feedback from participants, ongoing security changes, and military needs. According to sources from the MOD, so far Romania's decision-makers have allocated sufficient funds toward PME and CDE to strengthen its effectiveness and also the effectiveness of the armed forces.

## Conclusion: lessons learned and best/worst practices

This chapter looked at Romania's endeavors to develop democratic civil–military relations after the fall of the Communist regime in December 1989. It finds that democratization of the Romanian military has been a taxing process, especially during the first years since the end of the Communist regime, due to a host of problems, including hasty, erratic and inadequate de-politicization processes (e.g., "exceptional" promotion of officers to a higher rank continued until 2001, and the reactivation of the old guard of generals in the aftermath of the revolution); the continuation of "antiquated" conservative conceptions and conducts; a lack of understanding of the requirements for maintaining an effective military in a democracy; a lackadaisical willingness to undertake military reform and institutionalize democratic civil–military relations; poor economic conditions and scant resource allocation; political infighting; differences between the Ministry of Defense and General Staff; and setting unrealistic deadlines for reform and transformation (which resulted in NATO's refusal to accept Romania in the first wave of enlargement).[29] The post-NATO accession period has also been plagued by increased bureaucratic tensions and turf battles between the General Staff and the Ministry of Defense, a global economic crisis, and austere budgetary measures (applicable to the armed forces' active duty and civilian personnel, as well as retired military officers), corruption, bribery, and favoritism. The lessons learned, however, from Romania are that despite these challenges, balancing civilian control with effectiveness of the armed forces was not impossible. The Romanians' unanimous desire and willingness to join NATO and the EU, as well as the two organizations' membership demands (which acted as incentives for political will), can take the credit for the military reform in terms of democratic control and effectiveness. From this standpoint, decision-makers tried to set aside differences and bring about changes in the armed forces. The Ministry of Defense opened its gates to civilians (educating and promoting them), parliamentarians strived to undertake more effective control and oversight, and the military force strived to fulfill interoperability and capability goals set by NATO, in order to increase their effectiveness. As a result, Romania's military has incrementally transitioned from a big military force focused on total war against a traditional state adversary, to a small, expeditionary one, and it is interoperable with NATO troops at many levels, with a more comprehensive legal framework, new missions and roles, and modern education and training capabilities for both military and civilian personnel. PME and CDE have also played a part in the improvement of democratic civilian control and

effectiveness: on the one hand, PME and CDE have familiarized and prepared civilians for defense and security issues, including practices of democratic civilian control and oversight, and awareness of the need for effective military in a security environment that virtually lacks traditional adversaries; on the other hand, they have contributed to the military professionalism, including the ability to effectively act and operate jointly and internationally. International cooperation and collaboration have also been central to increasing military effectiveness in Romania in that it enabled the Romanian armed forces to build up interoperability and compatibility with their international counterparts (especially from the West) in the global fight against current security challenges. Although unfinished, the new Defense Policy and Strategy may also lead to strengthened effectiveness of the armed forces, at the minimum—when the Defense Strategy is approved by the parliament—by setting up the roles and missions, objectives, and directions for the military forces in the current security environment. Romania's strategic position, its efforts to balance effectiveness with transparency of the military, as well as the global security developments post-9/11, have secured Romania a position in the Atlantic Alliance and the European Union. Today, Romania's military is a capable contributor to international security; its "outstanding cooperation in the defense field over the last few years, and particularly since the terrible events of September 11, 2001" is often recognized by foreign military forces.[30] Under these circumstances, Romania can be a useful model of defense institution building for other NATO/EU aspirant countries.

Notwithstanding these developments, Romania's defense reform and CMR remain a work in progress. The lack of "carrots and sticks" manifested after Romania's integration into NATO and the EU led to decreased interest on the part of decision-makers (especially in the legislature) to continue democratic reform, in particular as concerns exercising proper oversight, e.g., by allocating sufficient resources to modernization, improving the legal framework for defense and security, and consolidating DSP. The global economic crisis, which also affected Romania, has been negatively impacting civil–military relations in Romania, in particular, military effectiveness, due to limited resource allocation to modernization and the acquisition of advanced equipment, techniques, and capabilities. These prove that democratic civil–military relations and defense institution building are not a linear process. Much is needed to consolidate DSP and its harmonization with NATO/EU, as well as to strengthen resources and have the potential to contribute to NATO missions and operations. There are a couple of lessons to be learned here. First, although so far Romania has not been a burden to the Atlantic Alliance, but rather a reliable new member,[31] Bucharest's lukewarm political will (coupled with insufficient resources) to continue to boost control and effectiveness of the Romanian military after accession into NATO can be a "lesson learned" more for NATO than other new democracies. This lack of political will may diminish Romania's credibility as security provider worldwide due to the lessened capability to contribute to national, regional, and global security, and admittedly, in the long run, affect even NATO's effectiveness. In this context, the Atlantic Alliance should no longer contemplate granting membership to future aspirant countries, but rather strengthen pre-accession ties and collaboration with the aspirants, via enhanced tools, such as the existing enhanced PfP, IPPs, etc. or other avenues. Atrophied democratic control and limited effectiveness not only could diminish Romania's credibility to safeguard global security but could also negatively impact democratic consolidation.[32] All of this could be a "warning" for civilian elites in all democracies (both old and new) that political will and interest should remain cardinal in maintaining a continuum of democratic civilian control and effectiveness of the military. One hopes things will get better in Romania, when the economic crisis alleviates and when the government changes. Or, perhaps, the need to preserve Romania's prestige as a regional and global security contributor will act as an incentive for both the military and civilian elites to

keep the reform going. Romania thus represents both the best and worst practices of civil–military relations.

## Acknowledgments

## Notes

1 See Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei, "Towards a New Conceptualization of Democratization and Civil-Military Relations," *Democratization* 15(5): (2008): 909–29.
2 Melanie Ram, "Romania's Reform through European Integration: The Domestic Effects of European Law", available at www.ksg.harvard.edu/kokkalis/GSW1/GSW1/20%20Ram.pdf.
3 Freedom House, www.freedomhouse.org.
4 "Hungary's Other Deficit: The European Union Has Few Legal Means to Stop Hungary's Leaders from Eroding Democracy," *The Economist*, January 8, 2011: 53.
5 Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).
6 All this in an attempt to pay off Romania's national debt, which Ceausescu actually succeeded in doing by 1989, yet at the expense of the population, and without trying to improve living conditions after the full pay.
7 This is one of the most tragic consequences of Ceausescu's dictatorship. Far from actually raising the number of Romanians, Ceausescu's idea of increasing the number of population led to numerous sad consequences, such as an increase of illegal abortions (performed in non-hygienic conditions, sometimes by amateurs versus professional medical personnel) correlated with deaths of women, as well as births of lots of unwanted children, many of whom ended up in orphanages (as their parents were incapable of raising them, or because their mothers had died from illegal abortions).
8 Mark Sanborne, "Nations in Transit: Romania," 2nd edn, Facts on File, Library of Congress, January 2004, 49–68; Grigore Cartianu, "Sfarsitul Ceausestilor. Sa mori impuscat ca un animal salbatic," Adevarul Holding, Bucuresti, 2010.
9 Sanborne, "Nations in Transit: Romania."
10 That is because first, the armed forces were not seen as an instrument of oppression, and, second, because although the military shot at the population during the initial days of popular revolt, they eventually refused to fire and fraternized with the population.
11 Liviu Muresan and Marian Zulean, "'From National, through Regional, to Universal…' Security and Defense Reform in Romania," in Thomas Bruneau and Harold Trinkunas, *Global Politics of Defense Reform* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).
12 Liviu Muresan, "Defense Reform in Romania: An Ongoing Process," Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), 2001; George Christian Maior and Sebastian Huluban, "From Hardware to Software Reforms in Romania's Civil-Military Relations: The Policies of Personnel Management," *Baltic Defense Review* 8 (February 2002).
13 Iulian Berdila, Major, Romanian Army, "Romania's NATO Membership," School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2005, available at: www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA 437456&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf (accessed August 7, 2012); Muresan, "Defense Reform In Romania."
14 Muresan, "Defense Reform In Romania"; Muresan and Zulean, "'From National, through Regional….'"
15 Mihaela Matei, "Transformation of the Romanian Armed Forces in the Post-September 11 Environment: New Principles, New Missions, and New Capabilities for a New NATO," Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), 2005.
16 L. Nastase and Ionel Stoica, "Generali MApN săltați de DNA pentru luare de mită," *Adevarul*, December 14, 2010; L. Nastase and Ionel Stoica, "Generalii MApN și cele 174 de șpăgi," *Adevarul*, December 16, 2010; Ionel Stoica, "Corupția de la MApN, descoperită prin SMS," *Adevarul*, December 21, 2010.
17 Unlike the Romanian intelligence agencies, or armed forces of countries that transitioned to democracies from military dictatorships (e.g., in Latin America), the Romanian armed forces did not have to carry

the stigma of being associated with the Communist dictatorship, despite (allegations of) opening fire against the population during the initial days of the revolution.

18  Larry L. Watts, "Democratic Civil Control of the Military in Romania: An Assessment as of October 2001," Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, December 2001.

19  Muresan and Zulean, "'From National, through Regional….'"

20  Cristiana Matei, "Romania's Transition to Democracy and the Role of the Press in Intelligence Reform", in Thomas Bruneau and Steven Boraz (eds), *Reforming Intelligence: Obstacles to Democratic Control and Effectiveness* (Austin, University of Texas Press, 2007).

21  Although the Strategy was approved (with amendments) by the Defense Committees in August 2010, it was not approved by the Plenary Session of the Parliament. See "Parlament: Aviz favorabil la comisii pentru Strategia Nationala de Aparare," *The Epoch Time*, August 23, 2010.

22  "MApN nu a avut destui bani pentru inzestrarea strategica a Armatei," *Ziare.com*, March 23, 2010.

23  Ibid.; Radu Tudor, "Înzestrarea armatei, un faliment garantat," *Săptămâna Financiară,* February 16, 2009; "Drept la replică," *Săptămâna Financiară,* February 23, 2009.

24  Statistics reveal that 27 crashes have taken place during the past 20 years, which led to the destruction of 28 aircraft (including some 17 MiGs) and the death of 61 military personnel.

25  Vlad Stoicescu, "România își torpilează elita aeriană. Cum se transformă MiG-urile în sicrie," *Evenimentul Zilei*, November 1, 2010; Craig Hoyle, "Romania Halts Mig-21 Training Flights After Fatal Crash," November 2, 2010, available at: www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/2619630/post; LiveLeaks Forum 2010; "Prabusirea unui MiG 21, al 18-lea in ultimele doua decenii, deschide Cutia Pandorei Multirol," *Financiarul, Actualitate*, November 2, 2010, available at: www.financiarul.com/ (accessed August 7, 2012).

26  "Militarii romani vor zbura cu avioane americane F16, la mana a doua," *Pro Tv*, March 24, 2010.

27  Florina Cristiana Matei, "Romania's Intelligence Community: From an Instrument of Dictatorship to Serving Democracy," *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence,* 20(4) (2007): 629–60; Florina Cristiana Matei, "Challenges of Intelligence Sharing in Romania," *Intelligence and National Security* 24(4) (August 2009): 574–85.

28  Alin Preda, "Militari români medaliati de ambasadorul Republicii Franceze în România", *Observatorul Militar* 8 (March 2–8, 2011); International Security Assistance Force Afghanistan, available at: www.isaf. nato.int/images/stories/File/Embed%20webpage,%20ISAF%20Media%20Menu.doc (accessed August 7, 2012).

29  Maior and Huluban, "From Hardware to Software Reforms"; Muresan, "Defense Reform In Romania"; Watts, "Democratic Civil Control of the Military."

30  "Wolfowitz Meets with Romanian Defense Minister. Deputy Defense Secretary Discusses Romanian and Iraqi Transformation," *America.gov Archive*, May 21, 2003, available at: www.defense.gov/ (accessed August 7, 2012).

31  The NATO Supreme Allied Commander, General Brandtz Craddock, argued in 2008 that new NATO members were "carrying their weight, although they have limited capabilities. Some good examples are … Romania." See Joel R. Hillison, "New NAO Members: Security Consumers or Producers?" Strategic Studies Institute, April 2009.

32  Many prominent scholars of democratic consolidation have linked the military to the democratic consolidation process, including Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, and Phillipe Schmitter. For example, as mentioned in the Introduction, Linz and Stepan indirectly address CMR and the military reform as prerequisite for consolidation (via institutionalizing five arenas and the existence of state). See Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition*; Schmitter also links CMR (more specifically, civilian control) to democratic consolidation. See Phillipe Schmitter, "The Consolidation of Political Democracies: Processes, Rhythms, Sequences, and Types," in Geoffrey Pridham, ed., *Transitions to Democracy* (Dartmouth: Aldershot, 1995).

# 27

# THE IMPACT OF THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE ON CIVIL–MILITARY RELATIONS

## Moldova

*Diana Molodilo and Valeriu Mija*

## Introduction

The Republic of Moldova is a developing democracy in South-East Europe with a history and legacy of authoritarian rule. It is situated at the western edge of the former Soviet Union, located between Romania and Ukraine. Nowadays, Moldova has become the neighbor of the enlarged Euro-Atlantic Alliance. In the current geo-strategic situation, Moldova's foreign and security goals include potential European Union (EU) membership, neutrality in international security and defense affairs, and effective contribution within national capacities to international peace and stability. After the proclamation of its independence (1991), Moldova was hesitant about its foreign policy—that is whether to intensify its relations with the Russian Federation (the former center of gravity) or to follow a policy of Euro-Atlantic integration. Eventually, however, the Republic of Moldova oriented its foreign policy toward the West, aiming to develop close relationships with the two major European and Euro Atlantic security players: the EU and NATO. Toward this end, and from the perspective that it is now bordering both NATO and the EU (hence it is of geostrategic importance), Moldova has strengthened cooperation with the EU through the EU-Moldova Action Plan (signed in 2005), the EU Eastern Partnership Policy (2009), and intensified cooperation with NATO in the framework of the Partnership for Peace Program (PfP) by agreeing upon an Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) in 2006.

By signing the EU-Moldova Action Plan, the EU expressed its intention "to encourage and support Moldova's objective of further integration into the European economic and social structure," also to "strengthen the stability and effectiveness of institutions guaranteeing democracy and the rule of law."[1] Likewise, NATO has seen in strengthening ties with Moldova a way to gain an effective partner and thus ensure stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic region and beyond.

As previously mentioned, with NATO, the Republic of Moldova is linked through the Euro-Atlantic Partnership and PfP. From the perspective of the Moldovan state, the PfP program is an important initiative for Euro-Atlantic security, especially for the countries of South-Eastern Europe that found themselves in a vacuum of security in the early 1990s. PfP facilitates transparency

in national defense planning and budgeting processes, and helps promote democratic control of defense forces. It introduces a defense planning and review process which involves an extensive exchange of information and allows for the forward planning of Partner and Allied resources devoted to PfP. Therefore, the Republic of Moldova without hesitation signed the PfP Framework Document on 16 March 1994. PfP is an important mechanism for political dialogue and political–military cooperation, which has the potential to strengthen Moldova as well as Euro-Atlantic security.[2] By launching IPAP, Moldova aimed to move closer to Euro-Atlantic democratic and operational standards and institutions, and it sought to transform the entire national security system according to Western security standards, in order to be a reliable and effective contributor to international peace missions.[3] Through its involvement in the PfP program, Moldova wishes to improve its national capabilities to adequately respond to the new types of international threats and challenges as well as contribute to international peace and stability.

As a part of the PfP program and EU integration objective, the Republic of Moldova has engaged, with particular success, in a process of defense reform. The aims of such reforms are

> to establish efficient mechanisms of civilian democratic control over the armed forces and the entire national security sector of the country, broaden the interoperability of the armed forces and other national security institutions of Moldova with those of Euro-Atlantic states, and creation of adequate budgeting mechanisms for the national security sector.[4]

Also, the reforms sought to transform the National Army into a lighter, deployable force capable of NATO and PfP support operations. This chapter addresses all these endeavors with particular focus on PfP. It starts with the historical background on the democratic consolidation and reform, followed by an elaborated discussion on defense institution building, civil–military relations efforts, and the contribution of the PfP. Then an analysis of the lessons learned is presented in terms of all these aspects.

## Democratic reform of the military

### *The Soviet legacy*

Democratic consolidation of the Republic of Moldova, including civil–military relations and defense reform, is still plagued by the Soviet legacy. The past decade has witnessed the ongoing ambiguous and non–uniform transition from authoritarian governments and centrally-planned economies to pluralist democracies and a free-market economy.

From its Soviet past, Moldova inherited an over-centralized political power, corruption, and a weak political culture. As Mangum and Craven have stated:

> The Soviet military system was long on directives and short on detailed planning, long on establishing accountability and short on giving authority, long on checks and balances and short on encouraging ingenuity—in short, a system that strangles itself and kills the enthusiasm of its inhabitants.[5]

In his work on security sector reform, Pop notes some additional democratization challenges that include

> bureaucratic resistance against change, especially from General Staff; lack of experience among the military in planning, programming and budgeting; shortage of expertise

among civilians within the defense establishment and security agencies; little interest in security and defense matters; the lack of an appropriate legislative framework for carrying out reform; etcetera.[6]

In this realm, the Republic of Moldova had to start from scratch in defense institution building and faced the problems of downsizing before reform could start. It has therefore been the main goal of reformers in Moldova to develop professional and effective armed forces, which remain neutral, apolitical servants of a democratic, civilian leadership, while at the same time capable of implementing the policy choices of that leadership rather than engage in domestic politics or counter the defense policy. Yet the road to this has been rather difficult.

## The phases of defense reform

Defense institution building is a relatively new concept for the Republic of Moldova. Initiatives to build the new Moldovan National Army were taken in 1991, immediately after the declaration of independence. However, it was formed not by a classical evolutionary approach to respond to national security threats, risks, and challenges, but rather on an ad hoc basis to respond to military threats—particularly those from the "Transnistrian" region of Moldova. Transnistria is the Moldovan name for the breakaway territory on the left bank of the River Nistru, also known as Trans-Dniester or Transdniestria. The official name of the self-proclaimed republic is "Pridnestrovskaya Moldavskaya Respublika."[7]

Transnistrian separatists fought a brief war with Moldovan forces in 1992, and a contingent of approximately 1,500 Russian soldiers continues to serve in Transnistria, ostensibly as peacekeepers and guardians of an estimated 20,000 tons of Soviet-era weapons and ammunition. In 1999, Russia pledged to remove this equipment, but withdrawals ceased in 2004. Although tensions remain, little political violence has ensued since the conflict, and residents of Transnistria and Moldova proper experience relative ethnic homogeneity and regularized contact compared to other frozen conflicts. Nonetheless, Transnistria overtly seeks integration with Russia, and formal status negotiations (the "Five plus Two" talks) held under the auspices of the OSCE have been stalled since 2006.[8]

Currently, the Armed Forces of the Republic of Moldova consist of the National Army, the Border Guard Troops, and the Carabineer Troops. The national defense system was established in accordance with the principle of defensive sufficiency. Moldova has largely a conscript army; due to financial constraints, national political leadership does not have plans to shift to a professional army, although the number of contract servicemen has been slowly increasing.

Overall, the defense reform in Moldova, which started in 1991, has had three phases. The first phase was from 1991 to 1997. As mentioned above, the Moldovan Armed Forces (AF) were formed on the ruins of the former Soviet Army: a highly political power with a Soviet military mentality, which has proved to be incompatible with new international and national security realities. As a result, the AF quickly became a reflection of the former Soviet Army. A series of reforms were initiated to change the military, but without a previous methodological and detailed assessment of the existing state of the military security system or security needs, and without sufficient civilian expertise. At that stage of the reform process, Moldova did not possess the necessary civilian expertise to replace the dominance of the armed forces in the defense process. As Pintea stated: "Military reform was rather an internal MOD initiative."[9]

In 1992, when the Ministry of Defense was established and the first Moldovan Minister of Defense was appointed, new defense legislation was passed (the Law on Defense, the Law on the Armed Forces, and the Law on Military Obligation and Military Service by the Citizens of

the Republic of Moldova). These laws established new roles and missions for the Moldovan Armed Forces, the organization and activity of the Moldovan defense sector, and the rights of the bodies of state power and state administration.

The Moldovan Constitution, adopted in 1994, set out the basic principles governing civilian and democratic control and oversight of the armed forces.[10] This led to the adoption by the Moldovan Parliament of the key normative acts that regulated the system (the system includes institutions, responsibilities, and chain of command) of national security. In this framework, the National Security Concept and Military Doctrine were adopted in 1995. Also, cooperation with the military political structures of NATO through the PfP program was launched, while in 1995 an Individual Partnership Plan (IPP) was signed between Moldova and NATO. In this framework, in the summer of 1996, Moldovan military contingents participated for the first time in PfP exercises in Ukraine and in Bulgaria.

Civil–military relations, particularly civilian control, were emerging, yet they were far from being effective. For example, although at that time President Mircea Snegur, in his capacity as a Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, issued a decree removing Division General Pavel Creanga from his position on grounds of incompetence and corruption, the Constitutional Court ruled against the presidential decree.[11] That political case revealed the fragility of political control over the armed forces as well as the weakness of democratic control and oversight of the defense sector.

The second phase was 1997–2004. During this stage, the appointment in 1997 of the first civilian Minister of Defense, Valeriu Pasat, was a positive breakthrough in democratic civil–military relations in Moldova. In addition, the concepts of civilian control of the armed forces and democratic military reform were introduced to Moldovan society by the elected leaders. In this context, in 1997, the National Army joined the PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP). After having joined this process, Moldova issued a series of interoperability goals related to identifying forces and means to be made available for multinational peacekeeping operations. This period saw, also, the approval by the parliament, in 2002, of the reform plan "Military Reform Concept," which recognized that the armed forces were in poor condition due to the lack of practical experience in the area of military construction and management, mistakes made, and insufficient funding. The Reform Plan thus provided significant changes in the structure of defense planning, funding, administration, and organization. This concept stated also that "democratic command and control of the armed forces" would be a key area of cooperation with other armed forces.

Also during this period (May 2004) the Supreme Security Council of Moldova approved "The Concept of Restructuring and the Modernization of the National Army till 2014," which was developed in the framework of the Defense Reform Concept. The 2004 document established a conceptual basis for the development and implementation of state defense programs and plans. However, it should be mentioned that at that time, both reforms have been very difficult to implement fully due to a structural lack of funds, the low priority of the defense sector, and a lack of strategic expertise among many politicians regarding the complexity of defense reform in a democratic and free-market economy country.

The third phase was from 2005 to the present. This period is characterized by the creation of a civilian and military command structure of the armed forces, with a detailed description of its attributes in the political, administrative, and military command spheres. During this stage, Moldova began implementing more security sector reform initiatives, but it is still awaiting success. These included: the ratification of an Action Plan with the EU (2005) and an Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) with NATO (2006). These tools led Moldova into a serious dialogue with Euro-Atlantic institutions regarding cooperation and defense sector reform. In fact, a comprehensive

plan for security sector reform was developed in the framework of the Individual Partnership Action Plan. This set out a plan for the renewal and reform of national security institutions. However, the political elite did not realize at that time the seriousness, the complexity, and the difficulty of implementing these plans. As a result, in the opinion of many national security experts, these reforms were led in the wrong direction, adopting only "cosmetic democratic elements." Furthermore, the reforms were not completed in accordance with the commitments declared.[12]

Luckily, during this period, the Republic of Moldova has benefited and continues to benefit from effective international expertise. Experts from the Naval Postgraduate School Center for Civil–Military Relations (CCMR) in Monterey, California, as well as civilian and military advisors from NATO and its partner states have been assisting Moldova in its reform efforts. With the assistance of UK experts (Security Sector and Defense Assistance Team, SSDAT) and representatives of CCMR, the first Strategic Defense Review (SDR) was launched in 2007. The State Commission for Strategic Defense Review was created for this purpose by the Moldovan government. For the first time, representatives from civil society were invited to participate at the meetings of this Commission. The SDR aim has been to conduct a detailed inventory of the entire defense system, which will assist the Moldovan political leadership to realistically identify the strengths and weaknesses of the system in regard to threats and challenges facing its national security. In the final results of SDR, conceptual and organizational changes in the development of a defense institutional framework and capabilities will be proposed that would meet the security needs of the state. At the current stage, based on SDR methodologies, the Commission, with the assistance of international experts, has developed two interim reports: one on the current capabilities of the armed forces and another on the legal framework and regulation of defense.[13] The final document is in a national approval process.

Beyond assisting Moldova in its reform process, another key objective of the PfP program has been to develop the ability and capability of the 22nd Peacekeeping Battalion to operate with forces from NATO and other partner countries, especially in international crisis management and peacekeeping operations, and develop a new training program for the armed forces. According to the Moldovan Chief of the Land Forces Command, the 22nd Peacekeeping Battalion is going to be reorganized in the following two years and "the National Army will get a force always ready to intervene, trained in compliance with Western requirements, and to contribute to different peacekeeping missions."[14]

Unfortunately, this period witnessed public disorder in April 2009 that significantly affected the defense reform process and delayed the implementation process. The victory of the ruling Communist Party in the April 2009 parliamentary elections ignited protests against alleged electoral fraud. Some demonstrators set on fire and looted the parliament and the presidential buildings. A stalemate ensued when the Communists lacked the supermajority in parliament needed to elect a new president.[15] As Mija states:

> This event … revealed the existence of unclear accountability within the chain of command of the national security institutions as well as [the] weakness of democratic control and oversight over the national security sector. Furthermore, the current defense and security system proved [unable] to quickly find efficient solutions in crisis management situations and [were unable] to implement effective security policies, since most of them have been outdated for a long time.[16]

As a result, the issue of defense reform was once again pushed into the shadows. This resulted in delays of the acutely necessary reforms. Nowadays, the new government has taken this issue up again and is trying to make headway with Moldova's reform efforts.

In conclusion, it is obvious that the defense reform in Moldova, despite scattered initiatives of interested leaders and foreign involvement and support (including PfP), has to date proved to be very difficult to implement because of several factors: insufficient funding (currently a high percentage of the defense budget goes to salary and entitlements, leaving very little discretionary resources for maintenance and modernization), poor governance, the inertia of old approaches, lack of political will, and conservative tendencies that still remain very visible.

## Civil–military relations

### The defense strategy and policy

After the proclamation of its independence (1991), Moldova had no Constitution and consequently no policy documents on defense and security. However, since 1991, Moldova has basically put in place most of the laws and institutions needed for democratic governance in the security sector. Even with them in place, democratic governance of this sector has been relatively weak since those rules and structures have not been fully employed.

The defense strategy and policy of the Republic of Moldova, as an organic part of the policy of the state, is currently based on the provisions of the 1994 Constitution (including the constitutionally-declared status of permanent neutrality), the 2008 National Security Concept (this is the second one, the first was adopted in 1995), and the 1995 Military Doctrine. These regulations have ultimately established a system with three major centers of power: the Presidency, the parliament and the Constitutional Court. The democratically-elected President was appointed as commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces to control the entire defense and security sector, while parliament was responsible for oversight of the defense and security sector. The Constitutional Court had the function to judicially oversee the implementation of legal constitutional acts that affect the national security sector.

Initially, the political and national security efforts of the country at the external level were stipulated in the Foreign Policy Concept of the Republic of Moldova (at the present moment outdated, an inapplicable document), which defined priorities, principles, primary directions, and strategic objectives.[17] In 1995, the National Security Concept was adopted, a document which clearly stated parliament's sovereignty in security affairs. Based on this concept, a Military Doctrine was also developed and adopted, which stipulated the tasks and roles of the defense sector. The legal and technical framework for the Republic of Moldova defense sector is provided by the Law on National Defense.[18] In 2007, as a result of IPAP commitments, a Moldovan National Commission that included representatives from the government and from civil society drafted a new National Security Concept (NSC), which was approved by the government and adopted by the Moldovan parliament on 22 May 2008, setting a completely new framework for the Moldovan national security sector. The new conceptual document stated that a National Security Strategy would be consequently elaborated and approved, providing guidance to develop a National Military Strategy and other documents technically regulating the defense and security sector.[19] However, apart from the approval of the NSC and development of a draft of the National Security Strategy, no progress has been made; as a result, no other necessary documents were approved or implemented. To date, parliamentary approval of the National Security Strategy has been pending, while the National Military Strategy has yet to be developed. The main reasons for such delay have been a political and constitutional crisis, which caused the Republic of Moldova to be preoccupied with elections for more than a year (2009–10). Moldovan politicians have been engaged mostly in electoral preparations and

campaigning. As a result, the authorities were focused on priorities other than the national security sector, such as social and economic issues, in order not to lose voters' sympathy.

In that situation, security and defense sector reforms regretfully were not promoted at all. It appeared for most national security experts that only cosmetic democratic elements in these sectors were adopted, and the approval of strategic documents that should in fact regulate these sectors was postponed. Also, it is important to mention that the existing legal and conceptual basis for security and defense does not have a mechanism or a procedure to establish defense and security force structures with effective capabilities to accomplish the tasks and missions assigned by the national political leadership.

### Democratic civilian control and oversight and effectiveness

Within the overall process of Moldova's democratization, European integration, and Euro-Atlantic cooperation, the implementation of civilian and democratic control of the military and defense sectors has become a national priority. In terms of civil–military relations, the principle of democratic civilian control over the armed forces has been fully recognized and to a certain extent institutionalized in the Republic of Moldova. According to the Law on National Defense, in war and peacetime, the command of the Armed Forces is executed by the Supreme Command and led by the President of the Republic of Moldova as Commander-in-Chief. The Supreme Command also includes the Minister of Defense, the Chief of General Staff, the Commanders of the Border Guards and Carabineer Troops. Overall command of the National Army is exercised by the President of the Republic of Moldova. Direct command and control are exercised by a civilian Minister of Defense (political appointee), and operational command is exercised by the Chief of the General Staff of the National Army.

In order to manage the national security sector, the President of Moldova is assisted by the Supreme Security Council (SSC), which consists of representatives of the executive branch and of the parliament. The SSC is a "consultative body which analyses the activity of ministries and departments in the sphere of national security and accordingly formulates and presents recommendations concerning the state's internal and external policy issues to the President of the Republic of Moldova."[20] According to the presidential decree of 23 October 2009, the SSC members are as follows: the President of the Republic of Moldova as Chairperson of the Council, the Prime Minister as Deputy Chair of the Council, the Vice-Speaker of the Parliament, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and European Integration, the Minister of Defense, the Minister of the Interior, the Minister of Finance, the Director of Information and Security Services, as well as other officials appointed by the Head of State. In fact, the daily practice has demonstrated that the overall activity of the SSC, as well as its membership and agenda, are totally subject to the President's will and his agenda.

According to the estimations and conclusions of national security experts, "the Supreme Security Council in the current form, has proved to be an inefficient and inert one. One of the main reasons is the fact that members of the SSC will always tend to reflect their parties' positions toward governance."[21] Also, the SSC lacks adequate resources to play the active role it should play; furthermore, the security sector has not been a high priority for the governing majority compared to stabilization of the economic and social situation of the country.

The legislative control of the armed forces in Moldova is exercised by the Parliament. Parliamentary control of the armed forces and military institutions is exercised in line with the Constitution, which establishes Parliament's role in overseeing the government.[22] The Moldovan Parliament is responsible for analyzing, adopting, and monitoring the Republic of Moldova's defense and security policy. In March 1992, the Moldovan Parliament adopted three

documents that laid the foundations for national military policy: the Law on Defense, the Law on the Armed Forces, and the Law on Military Obligation and Military Service by the Citizens of the Republic of Moldova. The parliamentary control and oversight over the security institutions is exercised by a parliamentary committee: the Committee for National Security, Defense and Public Order. This committee is responsible for overseeing the activities of security institutions.[23] It should be noted that during the last complete legislature (2005–9) the relationship between this parliamentary committee and the MOD was a rather cooperative one.

Meanwhile, the problem with parliamentary oversight over the Armed Forces has remained; there is a lack of trained civilian personnel with experience in the national security and defense sectors and national security institution building. As a consequence, democratic oversight has been understood in a very simplistic manner, as a top-down process. In this process, the Moldovan Parliament's role is considered purely law-making. Previous experience has revealed that once a law has been approved by the parliament, it has not been brought back for assessment and revision. Furthermore, the parliament has not exercised the power to control implementation of such legislation.[24]

Moldovan civil society's and media's control and oversight over the armed forces is very modest and occasional. These institutions hardly monitor or understand government policy in the field of security. Yet, some positive changes have occurred, and Moldovan authorities started involving civil society in the identification and discussion of major issues of national security. For example, in 2010, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration of Moldova in partnership with the Information and Documentation Centre of NATO (CID NATO) organized a public debate on the National Security Strategy draft,[25] and more recently, a representative from an NGO was invited to participate at the meetings of the State Commission for Strategic Defense Review. There is still a need, however, for civil society to demonstrate more interest in all activities of the defense sector.

Another instrument to establish democratic control over military forces is through the participation of Moldova in the PfP programs. These programs support the process of democratic, institutional, and juridical reform, which is now in progress in Moldova. After consulting NATO, the Republic of Moldova has issued strategic documents regarding reform in the defense and security sector, which offered the necessary guidelines for developing the Strategic Defense Review.

Essentially, democratic control of the national security sector has not yet become an issue of major concern in the Republic of Moldova, either for the executive or legislative branches of the state, or even for civil society.

Despite all these constitutional, legislative, and institutional endeavors, Moldova still lacks the following elements required for effective democratic civilian control:

- an executive office, which has first to learn about transparent planning cycles and gain self-confidence in the implementation;
- a legislative power, which needs to learn about guidance and oversight mechanisms;
- a national media and institutions of civil society which need to change their expectations from commenting on the successes of authoritarian leadership to the assumption of the responsibility for public oversight.[26]

## Effectiveness

The Republic of Moldova's "Western course," which has focused on establishing a closer relationship with the EU and NATO, especially joining the Euro-Atlantic Partnership and launching

IPAP, has played a key role in the defense reform process. This has included overhauling the National Army to become a more professional, well-trained, efficient, flexible, compatible, and interoperable force able to interact with NATO and its other allies in international peace support operations by 2015. However, budget constraints and minimal interest in defense matters by civilian elites are challenging this process. Even so, the Republic of Moldova has been continuing to undertake reforms that would bring its armed forces up to NATO democratic and operational standards. By being involved in the PfP program, Moldova's armed forces have benefited from Western standards, education, and training, which enabled their participation in peacekeeping operations. For example, the assistance provided by partners in the PfP Program has enabled a certain level of interoperability between Moldova's armed forces and European and Euro-Atlantic armed forces, which led to Moldova's contribution to UN and OSCE missions.[27]

Thus, like other small countries' armed forces (e.g., Hungary) which have also been struggling with insufficient budgets (especially for modernization), Moldova's military has capitalized on developing and increasing effectiveness through international cooperation, strengthening ties with NATO and the EU, and participating in international peace support missions.

Of great importance for developing effective armed forces has been professional military education (PME). PME has been a serious challenge for the developing Moldavian Army since the country had no military schools prior to independence. A large number of Moldovan officers studied abroad; in particular, they received their education in France, Germany, Romania, Russia, the UK, and the US. Meanwhile, since 1993, officers have been trained at the Military College in Chisinau. In 2002, the Military College was reorganized into the "Alexandru cel Bun" Military Institute of the Armed Forces (MMI).[28] MMI's goal was to become the main military training and academic institute of the Moldovan Armed Forces (MAF). The MMI currently provides training and education for MAF junior officers and non-commissioned officers. As part of the Republic of Moldova's defense transformation efforts, the Moldovan leadership appealed in 2007 to NATO and other partners to assist the Military Institute in revising its professional military education curriculum. In this regard, in February 2010, the United States Army War College conducted a visit to assist the development of MMI's model for a professional development curriculum. The main objective of this visit was to provide the MMI with assistance on the development of a professional military education curriculum as well as expertise in the area of civil–military relations. The new curriculum will include a new module on "Leadership and Ethics," and the incoming cadets will complete the four-year program, graduating with a bachelor's degree in public administration.[29] The goal of such transformation is to assist the Military Academy (according to Moldovan Government Decision No. 980, 2010, the Alexandru cel Bun, Military Institute of Armed Forces was transformed into the Military Academy) to become an academic center of security and defense studies in the Republic of Moldova. Yet this goal requires time and huge amounts of resources to develop the capabilities of analysis and scientific investigation in the defense area.[30]

Finally, it is important to note the effects of the US-sponsored International Military Education and Training (IMET) program on the armed forces. Training of National Army officers in foreign military institutions has been a vital need of the complex military reform process. Up until now, Moldovan officers benefited from different military educations within the IMET program, which is designed to educate, train, and improve the skills of military staff from different states' armies. As of 2010, a total of about 300 National Army servicemen had graduated from different IMET program training courses, including PME. They had the opportunity to study at the National and Army War College, the Naval Postgraduate School, the Land Force Command and Staff College, and the Air Command and Staff College.

## Conclusion

This chapter looked at the influence of PfP on Moldova's civil military relations and defense institution building. The authors found that defense reform in the Republic of Moldova has been slow and less than effective, partly because of a lack of understanding of the complexity and objectives of such reforms by political leadership. However, despite the existing difficulties and problems in the national security sector, the Republic of Moldova has made significant progress in establishing democratic control of the Armed Forces and national security sector. The Moldovan executive managed to establish a national security framework similar to NATO, paving the road for establishing effective democratic control over the armed forces and finalizing democratic reform in the national security sector.

The parliament has taken a more assertive role in civil–military relations and defense reform, particularly regarding the formulation and implementation of defense policy and planning, commensurate with Moldova's strategic interests and in line with new challenges and international commitments, which will hopefully lead to better resource allocation for the armed forces. Informal control and oversight by the media, NGOs, and think tanks, however, remain occasional, and they do not have enough power to sway policy.

Being a neutral state in a quite stable geo-strategic zone, the Moldovan military institutions should be oriented less toward external threats and more toward international security building. Within this new regional paradigm, roles and missions of national security institutions should be reviewed and prepared for new forms of military tasks and interactions such as crisis management and peace support operations.

The NATO Partnership for Peace Program impacted the perception not only of the military elite but also of politicians about new approaches in civil military relations. Despite the PfP's moderate impact on institutional changes, it established an effective base in the form of mentality, ideology, new reforms, and new ideas/desires to produce structural change and attain full democratic effectiveness in the national and defense security sectors. Vitally, the PfP's opportunities on training and education, including PME, increased the effectiveness of the defense and security reforms as well as establishing democratic civilian control.

In conclusion, the core of Moldova's defense reform is the restructuring of the armed forces in order to have modern and efficient armed forces, which are able to perform both peacetime and crisis missions with appropriate funding. This would allow the participation of Moldova in international peace support operations, including joint NATO/PfP peace support missions. In addition, stronger civilian control and oversight of defense and defense reform are needed. Civilian interest and expertise, as well as political stability, remain cardinal. PfP should continue to "invest" in Moldova, at the minimum, to help boost the effectiveness of the Moldovan Armed Forces, while, at a maximum, as a way to strengthen security ties between Moldova, NATO, and its neighbors.

## Acknowledgments

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# 28

# CONCLUSION

*Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei*

In this Handbook, we have developed and proposed a framework which we believe captures what is significant in twenty-first-century civil–military relations more accurately than other familiar models. This framework looks beyond its predecessors to embrace a trinity of dimensions that include democratic civilian control, the effectiveness of the military in doing its job, and the efficiency of the security institutions (i.e., the armed forces, the intelligence community, and police) in using state resources to accomplish their jobs.[1] The case studies that make up the greater part of this volume are analyzed according to this framework.

The chapters in Part I describe the gradual evolution of the study of civil–military relations and some of the major figures associated with its development. Chapters 1 and 6 (Bruneau and Olmeda) highlight the lacunae in the field, which we see as an inadvertent result of the impact of Samuel Huntington's seminal work. We then describe how our three-part framework was developed through a dialogue with other scholars in the field of civil–military relations (Bruneau and Pion-Berlin in Chapter 2), and present the resulting framework in detail (Matei, Chapter 3). Security sector reform (SSR) emerged in the 1990s as a reaction to the-then limited field of civil–military relations studies, and our framework bears certain similarities to the conceptualization of SSR. Chapter 5 (Edmunds) therefore reviews SSR critically in terms of its content and chief assumptions, as a point of comparison. Our own thinking has undergone a change since we first proposed our analytical framework, as well. Whereas we included the concept of efficiency in national security and defense in earlier versions of our work, here we have jettisoned it, because, in our view, it includes too many assumptions on content and methodology (Chapter 4, Bruneau). We propose instead to incorporate the analysis of supreme audit institutions, such as the US Government Accountability Office, which attempt to track not only the allocation of resources in several countries, but also the achievement of goals vis-à-vis costs.

The case study chapters are based on research in most of the world's geographic regions, including North America (the United States), South America (Argentina, Venezuela, and Chile), Europe (Portugal, Spain, France, Germany, Austria, Slovenia, Hungary, Romania, Russia, and Moldova), the Middle East (Lebanon and Iraq), Africa (Egypt and South Africa), and Asia (India, Mongolia, and North Korea). We directed our accomplished group of researchers to prepare their case studies by detailing some important recent change or reform, with a concrete focus on defense institutions, policy and strategy, and professional military education (PME). These themes allowed the authors to analyze progress in these countries with regard to both

democratic civilian control and the requirements for effectiveness. The case studies are also intended to serve, if not as templates, then at least as starting points for other countries interested in developing or reforming defense institutions and civil–military relations, with the idea that if a case study country was able to make serious changes, so can other countries *provided there is the political will to make such changes*.

Although the main focus of the Handbook is on democratic countries, the case studies include a country that has never been a democracy (North Korea), others that were, however briefly, but have reverted to some degree of authoritarianism (Russia and Venezuela), and the tentative case of Iraq, which the United States invaded allegedly in part to install democracy, but for which the future remains very problematic. Another case study, Egypt, was until February 2011 a non-democratic regime, but is currently undergoing an extremely precarious transition in which the military is a central actor. Whether or not it is going to democratize in more than form remains to be seen. Thus, the case studies range from non-democratic and nominally democratic to functionally democratic, with the latter category divided according to our model of civil–military relations, by different emphases: on control, on effectiveness, and on both. In each we examine one or more particular element of what the framework suggests is most important or relevant. We do not claim that we represent or illustrate all possible cases (e.g., Turkey, which is undergoing important changes in terms of its civil–military relations), due to lack of space or access to reliable information. Rather, we intend to highlight some key points for comparative analysis, and thus explanation.

## Common trends, patterns, and lessons learned

As stated in the Introduction to this Handbook, the framework of civil–military relations highlights several "necessary but not sufficient" elements for developing the two dimensions of democratic civilian control and effectiveness. Accordingly, the case study chapters in the book focus specific attention on one central element or theme that the co-editors believe to be essential to reforming civil–military relations. At a minimum, the requirements for democratic civilian control are institutional control mechanisms, oversight, and professional norms; for effectiveness they are plans, structures/institutions (including interagency ones), and resources. The focus on these real and concrete institutions and processes, whether they are present or absent, and their illustration in the country case studies, contrasts this book from virtually all other studies of civil–military relations. The only analysis that approaches ours is that by Narcís Serra's on Spain, where he served as Minister of Defense for nine years.[2]

Based on developments in civil–military relations revealed by these selected case studies, we can summarize a number of key ideas that directly bear on the two dimensions of control and effectiveness of the armed forces. (A summary of these findings is displayed in Table 28.1).[3]

### *Group 1: control and effectiveness*

Of the 20 countries studied, six are included in this section. Of these, only five (Germany, Austria, Portugal, Romania, Chile) fulfill the three requirements for control and the three for effectiveness to a nearly equal degree. These countries have not only more or less robust mechanisms of democratic civilian control, but also armed forces that are capable of fulfilling the roles and missions assigned by their civilian leadership. The United States fulfills the requirements for both control and effectiveness, as well.[4] Although Moldova is included in this "control and effectiveness" section, it is far from successful in developing the two dimensions, partly because its political leadership lack understanding of the complexity and objectives of such reforms. Despite

*Table 28.1*  Requirements for achieving democratic civilian control and effectiveness

| Country | Civil–military relations | Three requirements for civilian control | | | Three requirements for effectiveness | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| | | Institutional control mechanisms | Oversight | Professional norms | Plan | Institutions/structures (including interagency) | Resources |
| Argentina | | High | Medium/low | Medium | Low | Medium | Low |
| Chile | | Medium/high | Medium | High | Medium/high | Medium/high | High |
| Portugal | | Medium/high | Medium/high | High | Medium/high | Medium | Medium/high |
| Spain | | High | Medium | Medium | Medium | Medium | Medium |
| France | | High | Medium | High | High | High | High |
| Germany | | High | High | High | Medium | High | Medium |
| Austria | | High | High | High | Medium | High | Medium |
| Slovenia | | High | Medium | High | Medium | Medium | Medium |
| Hungary | | Medium/high | Medium | High | Medium | Medium/high | Low/medium |
| Romania | | High | Medium/low | High | Medium/high | High | Medium |
| Lebanon | | Low | Low | Low | Low | Low | Low |
| Iraq | | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| Egypt | | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| Moldova | | Low/medium | Low | Low/medium | Low/medium | Low | Low |
| South Africa | | Medium | Medium | High | Medium | Low | Medium |
| North Korea | | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| United States | | High | High | High | High | High | High |
| Mongolia | | Low/medium | Low/medium | Low/medium | Medium | Medium | Low/medium |
| India | | High | High | High | Low | Medium | Medium |
| Russia | | High | Medium | Low | Low | Low | Low |

this lack of understanding, Moldova has made some progress in establishing democratic control of the armed forces and its wider national security sector.

## Group 2: control

Four countries (Argentina, Spain, Slovenia, India) are included in the "control" section. Of these, only three (Spain, Slovenia, India) have equally fulfilled the three requirements for democratic control. On the one hand, Slovenia, which attempted to "civilianize" the armed forces, in our opinion went in the direction of *too much* civilian control. Spain, on the other hand, is an example of intensive democratic civilian control by the executive, more recently weakened by the erratic defense- and civil–military-related decision-making of Prime Minister José Zapatero. For its part, India's strong centralized government in certain circumstances willingly blurs the lines between the civilian and military spheres. Included in this section is Argentina, where the civilian elites seem intent on achieving democratic civilian control, yet have gone about it in an incoherent manner.

## Group 3: effectiveness

Six countries (the United States, France, Mongolia, Hungary, Lebanon, South Africa) fall into this section. Of these, only two (the United States and France) have managed to meet all three requirements for effectiveness. The United States has done so primarily through PME programs, while France developed a plan in the form of a White Book. Lebanon, South Africa, Mongolia, and Hungary suffer from limited resources, which has led them to capitalize on plans and structures (including coordination and cooperation) to achieve real effectiveness.

It is important to realize that time was a crucial factor for the countries that were able to develop one or both of the dimensions of democratic civilian control and effectiveness. It took years or decades for these countries to achieve the two dimensions; nothing in the field of civil–military relations happens overnight.

## Incentives for reforming civil–military relations

One lesson the cases in this book make abundantly clear is that political will and interest are vital to institutionalizing civil–military relations. In non-democratic regimes, the absence of change in civil–military relations over time clearly reflects the interest of the elites in ensuring that the security forces continue to support the regime.

In countries that transition to democracy, the incentive to reform civil–military relations can come from an interest in developing democratic institutions on practical grounds, such as to punish the earlier non-democratic regime's abuses and prevent these practices from infecting the new democracy. The cases of Chile, Spain, and Slovenia, which deliberately invested in democratic reform of the armed forces, are relevant examples. (As mentioned earlier, Argentina's investments, while better than nothing, have been erratic, and the results therefore have been minimal compared to the others in this group.) The outcomes in these countries primarily concern democratic civilian control, but also influence effectiveness. The armed forces of all three are transformed, with more flexible and rapid reaction capabilities; better guidance, direction, and coordination from the civilian decision-makers; more rational budgeting policies; and new personnel (not involved in the human rights violations and abuses of the previous regime), who benefit from more attractive career paths and access to professional military and civilian education (both in-country and abroad).

Direct interest in developing democratic institutions, including democratic armed forces, can be enhanced by specific opportunities and circumstances in each country. Chile's civilian elites, for one telling example, incrementally diminished the supremacy of the military and asserted civilian control by taking advantage of clearly identifiable turning points, such as the arrests of Generals Manuel Contreras and Augusto Pinochet, who were relics of Chile's oppressive past and who tried to undermine reform after the transition to democracy. In other cases, the rise of post–Cold War global security challenges and threats (e.g., intrastate conflict, failed states, terrorism, and organized crime), has prompted some elected civilians to adjust and redefine the roles and missions of the armed forces, often toward external peace support and stability operations, or in the case of India toward increased internal security, in order to ensure their armed forces become more effective and professional. Chile, Portugal, Spain, France, Germany, Austria, Slovenia, Hungary, Romania, and Mongolia stand out in this regard. These countries are now effective regional security providers, and/or contributors to international operations under the auspices of such groups as the UN, NATO, and the OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe). This leads to an additional but related incentive: prestige and credibility at both the domestic and international levels, which, to a certain extent, are a factor for most old and new democracies. Furthermore, civilians may acknowledge that the armed forces are more than a "security" or "defense" tool, and consider military deployments to be part and parcel of their country's foreign policy and even economic well-being. They thus become motivated to learn about defense and security, and will invest time and other resources in reform of the armed forces to fill these larger roles. Mongolia, Romania, Chile, Portugal, and Hungary are examples of this kind of transformation.

Political will and interest can also have an external motivator such as potential membership in specific collective security organizations. Moldova, which would like to join NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP), is one example of this. Although Moldova is not aspiring to become a NATO member, its participation in the PfP alongside NATO members requires military modernization and interoperability. Moldova does aspire to EU membership, which also conditions acceptance in part on effective and interoperable militaries under civilian control. Together, the requirements of these two organizations have been catalysts for defense sector reform to improve both control and effectiveness in a number of European states, including Portugal, Spain, France, Slovenia, Hungary, and Romania, as well as Moldova. Incentives to transform civil–military relations can also come from a crisis or failure within the security or intelligence sectors, such as a terrorist attack or a breakdown in domestic security. Most of the European countries studied here have assigned specific counter-terrorism roles to their military and military intelligence apparatus, while India undertook more rigorous reforms in the wake of political and military crises. Incentives for civil–military reform obviously could arise from any combination of the circumstances described here.

Based on the research summarized in this book, we can conclude that interest alone does not ensure effective reform. The leaders of Argentina have shown an interest in civil–military relations, mostly to keep the military under control in light of its past human rights abuses, but so far reform has been ineffective, which leads us to the second issue: expertise. In most of the countries studied, at least at the beginning of their transition, policy-makers lacked knowledge about how to deal with institution building, including relations between civilians and the military. The ones who succeeded were willing to devote the time and resources to educate themselves and their staffs, and develop the needed infrastructure. We also observed that reform initiatives may disappear with a change of government (Spain), in which the leader with the political will to push reforms through is replaced by another lacking such will. In other cases, such as Romania, a lack of external incentives undermines the will to reform. This demonstrates again that reform

of civil–military relations is not a linear process, while past experience is no guarantee of continued success.

Countries with an externally driven incentive for reform have been better off than the others. NATO member countries like Portugal, Spain, Slovenia, Hungary, and Romania have created robust institutions staffed at least in part by civilians with some level of expertise, who can count on a stable career path through ministries and other defense-related institutions. The regions where there is no supra-national pressure to professionalize the military, recruit civilians, provide career stability, and foster expertise, have seen much less progress in institutional reform. Thus reform in Europe overall is more developed than in Latin America, the Middle East, Africa, or Asia, although the quality of civil–military relations across Europe's old and newer democracies is by no means uniform. Nevertheless, where the political will exists to create democratic institutions, the model that NATO and the Partnership for Peace provide can be useful to non-European countries when undertaking reform. There remains a danger, however, that once the goal, of integration, for instance, is achieved, reform tends to atrophy or stagnate in the absence of further motivation.

Civil–military relations should be a dynamic aspect of democracy, especially in transitional governments, but also in the older democracies. The stresses of the decade-long wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, along with a swiftly evolving geopolitical environment that is putting alliances to the test, have tested civil–military relations even in the United States, one of the world's oldest and most stable democracies.[5] The question is whether the institutions designed to deal with civil–military relations, and the people who are responsible for them, can absorb the strain and use it to strengthen these relations and further the transformation process. Therefore, it is in the interests of reform-minded organizations, governments, and their partners to foster democratic institution-building, professional military education at home and abroad, and partnerships that help members meet the highest democratic and professional standards.

# Notes

1 The focus in this Handbook is only on the armed forces' component of the security institutions.

2 Narcís Serra, *The Military Transition: Democratic Reform of the Armed Forces*, trans. Peter Bush (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

3 We assigned values ranging from low to high per each requirement for achieving the two dimensions, based on the chapters' analyses. We also included N/A if there is no reliable information on the respective requirement, or if the country is not a democracy.

4 Although the United States is studied in this book only with regard to effectiveness, democratic civilian control is also high. See Thomas Bruneau, *Patriots for Profit: Contractors and the Military in U.S. National Security* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011) for information on this.

5 For an insider's insights on this issue, see Dov S. Zakheim, *A Vulcan's Tale: How the Bush Administration Mismanaged the Reconstruction of Afghanistan* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2011), where he emphasizes implementation. As the armed forces are the final implementers, and, at least during the George W. Bush Administration, policy-makers were removed from implementation, "tests" are inherent in the system.

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