TRANSLATING VALUES

EVALUATIVE CONCEPTS IN TRANSLATION

EDITED BY PIOTR BLUMCZYNSKI
AND JOHN GILLESPIE

Palgrave Studies in Translating and Interpreting

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Evaluative Concepts in Translation

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Michèle Milan specializes in the area of translation history. She is currently working on a monograph focusing on nineteenth-century translation and translators in Ireland. Her doctoral thesis (Dublin City University, 2013) explores Franco-Irish translation relationships in nineteenth-century Ireland. Her publications include two book chapters: 'For the People, the Republic and the Nation: Translating Béranger in Nineteenth-Century Ireland', in B. Keatinge and M. Pierse (eds.) *France and Ireland in the Public Imagination* (2014); and 'A Path to Perfection: Translations from French by Catholic Women Religious in Nineteenth-Century Ireland', in D. Raftery and E. Smith (eds.), *Education, Identity and Women Religious* (2015).

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Introduction

Piotr Blumczynski and John Gillespie

This book has emerged from an international collaborative research project that ran from 2012 to 2015, bringing together scholars from the UK and Ireland, as well as Austria, France, India, Italy, Jordan, Poland, Spain, and the USA. Funded by the Arts and Humanities Research Council's theme 'Translating Cultures', the theme itself provided our overarching research problem. What does it mean to translate cultures?

'Culture is one of the two or three most complicated words in the English language', observes Raymond Williams in his classic *Keywords. A vocabulary of culture and society* (1976: 87). For such a complicated word and complex concept, it is notable how many of its definitions stress

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the centrality of values. Kroeber and Parson (1958: 583) identify culture with 'transmitted and created content and patterns of values, ideas, and other symbolic-meaningful systems'. Clyde Kluckhohn writes that 'the essential core of culture consists of traditional ideas and especially their attached values' (1962: 73). Kluckhohn, who led a Harvard research group investigating values in several distinct cultural groups, acknowledged in the group's concluding symposium that 'the study of values seemed to merge with the study of culture, and to engage with the same problems' (Powers 2000: 27). In short, culture revolves around values. They hold the cultural community together and underpin mutual interests. Indeed, it is impossible to conceive of a cultural community whose members hold opposite or otherwise incompatible values, so central are shared values to the very concept of culture. Translating cultures, therefore, above all involves engaging with their values.

Now, values can be understood as 'conceptions, explicit or implicit, distinctive of an individual or characteristic of a group, of the desirable which influence the selection from available modes, means and ends of action' (Kluckhohn 1951: 395) or simply as 'core conceptions of the desirable' (Rokeach 1979: 2). But the fact that they are core also means that they are often 'invisible' (Hofstede 2001: 11), wrapped in thick layers of cultural material. In his onion diagram representing the manifestation of culture at different levels, Hofstede places values at the core, surrounded by the successive layers of rituals, heroes, and symbols. But if values are 'broad tendencies to prefer certain states of affairs over others' (Hofstede 2001: 5), what happens when we encounter some other states of affairs, emanating from and supported by alternative sets of values? It is precisely here that translation—in its broadest sense—comes into the picture.

The aim of our project was to explore how values are translated: firstly, from tendencies and preferences into specific evaluative concepts—often expressed through key terms that underpin language-specific worldviews—and subsequently, in a process of negotiation within as well as between different communities. We started from a consideration of the role of English evaluative concepts (such as clarity, decency, fairness, or humility) in translating religious and devotional texts in a range of languages and cultures in the context of understanding this centrality of values to culture. We set ourselves the following questions: how is evalua-

tion related to conceptualisation? How do values change and evolve over time? How are they embedded in linguistic, literary, cultural, and social contexts? What role does translation play in propagating or contesting certain values? What is the value of translation itself?

As the network grew and our research progressed, while keeping a broadly religious focus, the scope of the project widened out to other cultural areas. The study of evaluative concepts has proved fruitful—as the contributors to this volume, from diverse linguistic and cultural backgrounds, as well as bringing a broad range of research expertise, clearly demonstrate—and has resulted in remarkably rich insights, as a brief overview of the key research findings of each chapter makes clear.

Studying the role of cultural translation has meant raising awareness of the presence and power of values. James Underhill examines cultural barriers of meaning by looking at walls as barriers and boundaries from a multilingual ethnolinguistic perspective. He begins by exploring the symbolic value of walls, and then, their breaking down in the wake of the breaching of the Berlin Wall, demonstrating how its destruction has been recuperated by ideological, religious, and other cultural discourses. His subsequent corpus-based analysis provides a rich imagery of walls and their evaluative ambiguity: they may also be perceived as necessary and protective, contrasting with the dominant discourse of the need to bring walls down. Underhill argues that translators, acting as gateways set within the boundaries that nations and peoples build up around themselves, must apprehend, understand, and negotiate three spheres of values: the values of the source culture, of the target culture, and the space between, the space of encounter, where they can meet if they are willing to make the effort to transcend their inherent ethnocentrism, and strive to understand one another. This awareness can lead to positive cultural relations.

Elżbieta Tabakowska, in her discussion of the interplay between values and emotions in the complicated context of interlingual translation, continues a linguistic line of analysis and underscores the importance of increasing awareness of the role of values in the translation, in this case the emotions and values of the translator. Drawing attention to intercultural differences, she distinguishes between feeling emotions, emotional valuation, and speaking of values and emotions. She observes that, in (literary) narrative, emotional valuations are presented as either coming from the

narrator or from her/his characters; they are either explicitly reported on or merely implied, and thus, left open to the reader's interpretation. In the second part of her chapter, Tabakowska offers various examples demonstrating how the power and range of the original message may be distorted by the intervening presence of the translator, who brings to the translation process her/his own system of values and experience.

Worldviews and their underpinning values are perhaps most clearly articulated in religious systems. Accordingly, a significant number of further contributions focus on religious, devotional and ecclesiastic texts. Here, the emphasis is often on a transmission of meaning that preserves the truth of doctrinal concepts. In the context of Bible translation, James Maxey critiques three evaluative concepts of the act of translation, emanating from an equivalence paradigm—accuracy, naturalness, and clarity—and advances alternative criteria inspired by a proposed paradigm of hospitality: carefulness, authenticity, and transparency. He argues that this alternative triad is not only more defendable from a Translation Studies perspective, but also offers sufficient space to consider translation for non print-based media—specifically biblical performance translation. Maxey's theory draws upon decades of research from performance translation in one particular community in central Africa, so it remains constantly sensitive to the practicalities involved. He highlights the value of translation experience as releasing translators who are no longer faced with a stable unchanging text, but rather who carefully translate a tradition that has become their authentic experience of previous authentic experiences, while remaining transparent to the otherness of the earlier traditions. This hospitable openness to the transmission of meaning to diverse cultures is based on the key value of respect for the culture of the other.

In the two following contributions, dealing with the translation of specific evaluative concepts found in the sacred texts of the world's largest religions, the emphasis is on the avoidance of distortion in the transmission of religious values, where the mistranslation of terms and concepts can misrepresent religious truth. David Bell offers an analysis of the New Testament term *hypotasso*, which, in many English translations and in general reception, becomes synonymous with obedience and submission, specifically of women to men in marriage. However, the context of the

Greek term seems to indicate it refers to an attitude towards authority more related to values like mutual respect and honour than mindless obedience or subservience. Similarly, Aladdin Al-Tarawneh discusses three Islamic concepts, often (mis)translated into English as *friendship*, *justice*, and *retaliation*. Relying on linguistic analyses and the exegesis of the Quran, he re-examines the semantic and evaluative profiles of these concepts, suggesting much richer images that, to a very significant extent, dispel some popular misconceptions about the values propounded by Islam. Both studies suggest very strongly that a better understanding of the contextual implications of key evaluative concepts in both source and target languages would help the translator minimize textual misunderstandings, as well as find ways of successfully improving the flows of communication and understanding between different religious traditions.

Shifts of meaning in religious translation can have negative consequences that an awareness of evaluative concepts can avoid. However, on occasion such translation can enhance the message of the original. Aleksander Gomola offers the analysis of an English translation of a contemporary Polish mystical text: *Dzienniczek* ('Diary') by Faustyna Kowalska. He discusses how the translation process affects the representation of evaluative concepts like *homeland* or *morality*, as well as a number of conceptual metaphors found in the original, concluding that the resulting lexical and stylistic differences between source and target texts result in an English translation of *Dzienniczek* that is in some respects more convincing as a mystical text than the original. Importantly, Gomola's essay suggests that devotional texts continue to play a significant part in culture, shaping the worldviews of millions of people and offering them evaluative concepts that often guide them in their lives.

Two chapters offer a particular focus on nineteenth-century Ireland, exploring the interplay between the various historical, moral, religious, and sociocultural forces that shaped translations in that time and place. They show that translations can have far-reaching social and cultural consequences, influencing behaviour and belief over many years. Michèle Milan studies the many shades of meaning behind the concept and value of simplicity, examining the poetics of simplicity within the framework of translation history. Her twofold investigation builds, firstly, upon a broad range of literary, translation and sociocultural studies, with special

attention to classic simplicity, and then draws on a survey of nineteenth-century translation in Ireland. Milan demonstrates the inter-relation of the concept not only with ideas of plainness, soberness, clarity, chastity, and purity, but also both with romantic notions of naturalness and authenticity, and with democratic ideals of access and equality. Anne O'Connor assesses how translation was used to promote certain religious worldviews and values in nineteenth-century Ireland. Drawing on the private correspondence of Cardinal Paul Cullen (1803–1878) as a case study, she shows how his translation efforts were an effective means of advancing a religious view, and how private letters had a public function in promoting ultramontane Catholic ideologies. The stream of translation present in private letters shows its important role in the multilingual world of the Catholic Church, and how essential it was for communication, self-promotion, and influence at this time.

Two further contributions investigate the translational handling of evaluative concepts in missionary endeavours in Asia, underscoring the tension between the delivery of a universal Christian message, the specific cultural background of the missionaries who proclaim it, and the religious and cultural context into which it is proclaimed. Hephzibah Israel discusses the term 'Protestant', which rose out of the specific religious and political contexts of Reformation Europe, and considers how it travelled to South Asia. In particular, she explores the range of meanings, sacred and secular, inherent in the untranslated term 'Protestant' in nineteenth-century Tamil-speaking South India and Sri Lanka. Focusing on a bilingual (Tamil and English) journal *Utaya Tārakai*/*Morning Star*, published in Jaffna from 1841, she argues that the enterprise to shape a 'rational' and improved public opinion was possible by equating 'Protestant' with 'rationality', where the 'Protestant' position is the only 'reasonable' one. Similarly, Gerda Wielander provides a succinct analysis of the translation and expression of Christian values in the modern Chinese context. Starting with an historical overview of translational encounter during the nineteenth century, she explains the particular significance of the Chinese Union Version (1919) within the broad attraction of Christianity at this moment in Chinese history. She goes on to examine Bishop K.H. Ting's (1915–2012) attempts to create a 'theology rooted in the Chinese soil', an example of how core Christian values have been negotiated in this process of translation into a very specific

Chinese cultural context. Wielander provides two fascinating contemporary examples of the tension between localization and the retention of the universality of the Christian faith: calls for a Chinese language theology, and the official expectation of a Sinification of Protestant Christianity.

Three contributions shift focus onto the translation of literary texts. David Johnston demonstrates how the interplay between private desire and ingrained codes of a public morality centred on honour, shame, and retribution lay at the heart of how Spanish Golden Age theatre performed community to itself. Using as an example Calderón's play *Painter of Dishonour*, he shows that translation, in terms of its activities as an historicizing mode, is well placed to trace the development of the coercive components of this morality across time and space. But, as a re-creative mode, translation also enables audiences today both to understand the moral weight that such terms exercised in their own context, and to relate them to the different moral observance of our contemporary moment. In that way, Johnston proposes a theory of translation for the stage that refuses to bifurcate between past and present, one that is both historicizing and re-historicizing.

John Gillespie considers Samuel Beckett's bilingual *oeuvre* and examines how he translates his works, sometimes originally written in French, sometimes in English, into the other language—or rather recreates them in the other language. Gillespie shows that the meanings of the author, who is also his own translator, necessarily shift between cultural contexts. By considering specific references to God, the Bible and Christianity, which pervade Beckett's work, looking in particular at *En attendant Godot*, Gillespie demonstrates that there is a marked difference of tone and cultural resonance in English when it comes to dealing with matters of belief, indicating the emotional legacy of Beckett's experience and evaluation of religion in Ireland, as well as his profound frustration with it.

Adam Głaz's contribution takes the discussion one stage further; values become especially cherished when they are perceived to be most vulnerable: for example, house and home are particularly vulnerable in times of war and its immediate aftermath. Based on a close analysis of the English renderings of the Polish *dom* ('house/home') in three post–World War II novels, Głaz considers the valuation inherent in the Polish (con)texts on several interwoven levels: the lexical systems of the two languages and

the symbolism they activate, the properties of the texts being translated, and the broad cultural background underpinning the interpretation of the novels. Using Jordan Zlatev's (2009: 179) cognitive semiotic framework, Głaz argues that values come before meaning and that they actually define our world into existence.

Staying with deeply embedded values, Paulina Drewniak draws upon a variety of disciplines (especially translation studies, media and fan studies) to offer a close look at fan culture as a community united around certain key values. She shows how the pursuit of knowledge, fondness for intense communal activities and embracing of grassroots activism helped spread the genres of speculative fiction across the world, and how avid fans facilitate the emergence of culturally hybrid texts through which they reshape and re-imagine their cultural surroundings. Drewniak's study indicates that translators, in a powerful way, 'take part in the creation of values and the circulation of certain aesthetic and intellectual options' (Gouanvic 1995: 223).

In the final contribution, Piotr Blumczynski examines the remarkable career of the concept of translation itself over the last few decades from the axiological point of view. Testing the hypothesis that translation is evaluative rather than merely descriptive, he analyses its increasingly popular use in three areas: political discourse, life writing, and biomedical publications, arguing that translation as evaluative concept is concerned with the vital rather than the trivial, and with profound rather than superficial issues. It can make a difference between triumph and humiliation, sanity and madness, health and disease. To translate something is to assert its significance and value. At the same time, translation brings to the surface real and authentic things, producing its therapeutic value: it makes us more visible to ourselves, breaks pretences, and thus brings relief. Finally, translation delivers on its own ethical imperative by breaking the spell of proverbial good intentions and bringing things to completion (although it is rarely complete in itself).

This collection highlights the central importance of values and evaluative concepts in cross-cultural translational encounters. Translation can be sympathetic and open to the positive transmission of values to (and in) the target culture; it can creatively enhance the original by interaction with new values in the target culture—but it can also be a form of political manipulation, or a distortion of orthodox religious truth. By

being aware of the values and the evaluative principles we bring to the translation process, and of the values of the cultures between which we are translating, we can enhance intercultural understanding, opening up opportunities to learn from the unique perspectives of each culture. But understanding others and their values does not necessarily imply disillusionment with our own. As Hans-Georg Gadamer (2004: 445) remarks, 'If, by entering foreign language-worlds, we overcome the prejudices and limitations of our previous experience of the world, this does not mean that we leave and negate our own world. Like travellers we return home with new experiences'. It is our hope that the essays gathered here will provide a rich spectrum of such new experiences.

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Who Wants Walls? An Ethnolinguistics of Insides and Outsides

James W. Underhill

Translating Values

Are values universal or culture-specific? Do human beings at different times, in different places, cherish and promote different ideals, or do we, as human beings, living in society, all feel a common need to found our societies upon shared universal values, and manage our workaday relations within the scope of the boundaries they set up? Surely a case could be made for either universal values or for culture-specific values, since, ultimately, a case for ethics being subject to eras and cultures or universal and transcendental can be made. On the one hand, the French Revolution and the American Declaration of Independence staunchly defend universal ideals. The United Nations, the European Union, UNESCO, and The Geneva Convention, and charities such as Médecins Sans Frontières and Oxfam, tend to espouse

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a similar conception of inalienable universal human rights. On the other hand, modern anthropologists and sociologists, as well as historians—from the very beginning of the discipline, from Heredotus onwards—tend to lead us to the conclusion that values, rights, and responsibilities change over time, from milieu to milieu, and even with respect to age and gender. The world religions of Protestant and Catholic Christianity, and the Muslim religion, affirm that we are all 'brothers' and owe one another respect as such. But feminists remind us that 'sisters' are not always taken into account by 'brothers'. There are first-class, second-class, and probably, third-class citizens: and all sorts of values within values enable powerful groups to exclude, alienate, exploit, and enslave other groups, based on gender, class, education, background, and ethnicity.

Where is Translation Studies to take its stand in these shifting sands? International Law, religions, nation states, and federations such as the USA and the European Union must take their own stand. But how are translators, who have always acted as bridges between cultures, to take their stance in this moral dilemma? Acting as gateways in the boundaries that nations and peoples build up for themselves, translators must apprehend, understand, and negotiate three spheres of values: the values of the source culture, the values of the target culture, and the space between, the space of encounter, where the two can hope to meet, if—and this often proves a BIG IF—those cultures are willing to make the effort to transcend their inherent ethnocentrism, and strive to understand one another.

The concern for values in Translation Studies will inevitably focus upon the values espoused and promoted by the major religions: truth, charity, integrity, honesty, faith, among others. International institutions are currently defining the ideals of 'transparency', 'accountability', 'democratic representation', 'equality', and 'empowerment'. But this chapter will try to get beyond and beneath these values to apprehend a more fundamental truth related to linguistic communities and worldviews. Values are spatially defined, just as they tend to define us in spatial relations. Ultimately, as Georges Matoré (1962) argued, all of human society is a 'verbal space': all of our perspectives are situated and value-entrenched. We cannot 'look into' the question of the status of womankind without objectifying the subjects (individual women).

We cannot reach 'down' to lend a 'helping hand' to help elevate the poor, without parading a condescending patronizing attitude. The subject inevitably objectifies the 'object'. Those above reach down to those below. Values, it would seem, cannot exist in a vacuum, outside of space. We situate others, and we situate ourselves, whenever we speak of them. We cannot help educate the poor and encourage the unemployed to learn new skills without implying they are ignorant and ill-adapted to the lifestyles that states would have them live. Our desire to see them 'fit in' and 'find their place' inevitably entails forcing them 'out' of their present state, their routines and habits and lifestyles.

Values tend to absorb and integrate everyday spaces into the dominant verbal space. Frontiers and barriers form part of this process. 'Lower' and 'higher' are the coordinates of value-entrenched hierarchies. 'Forwards' and 'backwards' become ideological bearings in a logic that makes sense in our cultural mindset. But will the positions and the journeys those aims and starting points entail be comprehensible to future generations? This is far from clear. Yesteryear's ideals and ideologies appear absurd to us. Nowadays, phrases like 'the road to socialism', and 'walking hand in hand with the people' make people smile, though they were, of course, key phrases in Cold War Communism (Fidelius 1998; Underhill 2011). For tourists to Eastern Europe, such phrases appear like quaint ideals of another era. They are the ideals of foreign people living in foreign times: an era that now tends to be shrouded in an atmosphere the film *Goodbye Lenin* (made in 2002, directed by Wolfgang Becker) captured all too poignantly.

Goodbye Lenin was about life before and after the fall of the Berlin Wall, and this article will focus upon the way walls—specific walls, and walls in general—are harnessed by discourse strategies, and the way they become ideological stakes in political debates and everyday speech. Rather than making a contribution to the pragmatics of Translation Studies, a legitimate and noble endeavour, this article invites translators to pause to contemplate the dangers of hastily translating nouns, prepositions, and symbolic images related to walls and the insides and outsides they set up. Rather than setting translating as the aim and objective, this chapter will posit the act of translating as the starting point for a unique form of cultural criticism.

How Do We Feel about Walls?

For many people, most of the time, it seems, walls mean boundaries or barriers. And do we like barriers? Not in the imagination it would seem. A contemporary French rock band is called *Au-dela des murs*: beyond the walls. This is a cry for liberty: aesthetic liberty, freedom of expression. *Beyond the walls* (2012), curiously enough, is also the original title of a French film directed by David Lambert, exploring bisexuality. In the film, gender divisions are represented as being arbitrary. Although the film ends tragically with the imprisonment of one of the lovers, there is a very clearly affirmed moral to the tale. The State is, predictably enough, shown to be cold, impersonal, and indifferent. The world doesn't care about building barriers and crushing love, homosexual love. This is a pretty standard expression of politically correct gender politics in the film industry in France today. And walls are part of this ideological gender-oriented stance. Without walls we cannot 'read' the film. We need to enter into, apprehend, and espouse the coordinates that are being set up: barriers are bad. Walls keep us apart.

 Certainly, it is easy enough to find examples of walls as constraining influences that prevent freedom of movement, freedom of speech, freedom of feeling. On 19 November 2013, *The Guardian* published a well-informed article jointly with a very pedagogical website entitled 'Our Walled World.'[1] The subtitle read: 'Why are we building new walls to divide us?'

> Almost a quarter of a century after the Iron Curtain came down, the walls are going up again. In steel and concrete, with watchtowers and barbed wire, mankind is building separation barriers at a rate perhaps unequalled in history – at least 6,000 miles in the last decade alone, according to a Guardian analysis.
>
> Now, in a unique project, Guardian journalists have visited 10 of the most controversial, striking, contested and extraordinary walls, from the US-Mexican border to the West Bank, and from Europe's eastern and southern frontiers to the divided cities of Homs and Belfast. We have tried

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[1] http://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2013/nov/walls#intro [accessed on 6 August 2015].

to establish why these new divisions are going up now, in an age when globalisation was supposed to tear the barriers down – particularly when, as history shows, walls rarely did what they set out to do.

Walls are a question of nations and cultures. They spell despair, segregation, and trauma. And, somewhat naively, *The Guardian*'s journalists nostalgically evoked the promises of globalization, and the hopes and dreams of a barrier-free world community with its deregulated economy. So much for global values.

But what happens if we turn to our more immediate environments and take a look at the city? How are walls and barriers represented? And how are they changing? David Harvey (2000), the radical thinker specializing in inequality in geographical development, noted with dismay the rising statistics of gated societies. Rather than believing the hype promoting these idyllic residential projects, Harvey considers them to be 'privatopias' in which the inhabitants voluntarily imprison themselves (2000: 148). But a sizeable amount of Americans are buying into them, if we consider that the number of gated communities, bourgeois utopias, was one million in 1990, but had risen to six million by 2000 (ibid.: 150).

And if you look around yourselves? If you walk from one end to the other of the town or city in which you dwell, you will clearly perceive what is happening. Three strategies are consolidating themselves, and all manifest the desire to live in or live off the city, but to protect ourselves from its dangers and from its inhabitants. The rich downtown and suburbs increasingly look like Fort Knox, with spiky iron barriers, intercoms, and uniformed sentries. In areas of gentrification, we see similar quarters cordoned off and symbolically set apart from the rest of the neighbourhood. And many families are fleeing the city for commuter towns, or as the French call them *villes dortoires*, cut off both geographically and financially from the cities on which their inhabitants depend for making a living. These various forms of flight within and without the city boundaries, Harvey has also baptized *Bourgeois Utopias*. They are forms of urban behaviour which implicitly manifest a negation or rejection of the city as a form of lifestyle. For modern urbanites, the human project of the city is coming to seem 'inhuman'. This may seem a very Western experience, but Eastern European cities, from Prague to Kraków, from Lublin to

Leipzig, do not seem to be resisting the three forms of flight from the city that Harvey speaks of.

Are we walling ourselves within a new form of isolation and alienation then? At any rate, it would seem that walls are going up: in the neighbourhood, in the cities, and in the nation. And sentries are being reinforced along the borders between states, and at the fringes of federations. Are we doomed to this spirit of division?

Many would like to believe we are not. And so, the joy with which the Germans hacked into the Berlin Wall and brought it tumbling down in 1989 is not only the expression of a desire for the reunification of the two German States, it has become a joyous cry for universal love and togetherness, free of political, class-based, or gender-segregated boundaries. The Berlin wall coming crumbling down became a symbolic cry of joy that spread to other debates on how we live together.

This explains why quite violent photos of people smashing down walls with sledge hammers are frequently taken up by Christian blogs. Such blogs invariably celebrate Christ drinking and eating with all the people he met irrespective of whether they were considered 'respectable' or not. Often personal blogs fuse the Berlin wall with barriers to exchanges between people. In one such blog, *OnfireForJesus* (posted on 19 August 2014)[2] a member of the Salvation Army uses a picture of the wall to make his point. The blogger considers walls to belong to false belief systems that prevent us from being 'who we are in Christ'. 'The walls that we build in our lives'—the blogger goes on to argue—'can actually hinder not only our relationship with others but more importantly our relationship with God.'

These arguments must be understood within the framework of the architectural spatial dynamics of the Christian faith: a church building has meaning (faith in God), and the Berlin Wall is a symbol of atheism that counters that faith. For Christians, the Berlin Wall and atheistic communism crumbled as a result of the prayers of Pope John Paul II, and President Reagan.[3] Indeed, any Google search of 'beyond walls' or 'break-

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[2] http://matt2028.blogspot.fr [accessed on 6 August 2015].

[3] See http://www.liferunners.org/john-217-berlin-wall/

ing down walls' will generate a vast array of examples of sites quoting Scripture and celebrating love and charity with images inviting us into a world beyond boundaries.

Walls as Complex Filters for Values

In the following pages, I will try to demonstrate that things are more complicated. But one thing appears to be clear: the ambivalence we feel about walls does not prevent them from constituting major stakes in moral, ethical, and ideological debates. Walls form part of our socio-cultural bearings. They are fundamental for helping us understand the way we live together, the values we hold, and they play a part when we begin negotiating and fighting over those values within the social sphere.

Are walls values in themselves? Perhaps, walls are filters, spaces that welcome or announce values. Are we talking of real walls, or the symbolic force of walls both imaginary and real? I shall make the case that walls-as-values become the focal point of multiple and paradoxical value-loaded representations: They prove to be simultaneously:

- Real and symbolic
- Held values or appropriated values
- Private and political values
- Conceptual and perceived values.

If this is so, then it would follow that walls-as-filters-for-values are inseparable from the way we understand the relations we have with others, with other groups, and with other cultures, and other states.

Ultimately, then, are walls inevitable or expendable? Are they hateful or desirable? These are real questions. For despite the Guardian's and Harvey's words with which I entered the question with a somewhat gloomy introduction, further study forces to ask questions. Do we all hate walls? Are walls a negative value? And is their elimination a universal value? Is breaking down walls, as the Christian blogs would seem to have us believe, the ultimate destiny of humanity and the way towards universal understanding?

Ethnolinguistics and Methodology

This is an ethnolinguistic study, one which hopes to demonstrate the importance of ethnolinguistics as an approach for understanding the act of translating, and the importance of translating for ethnolinguistic research. Ethnolinguistics has various schools, each with their own methodologies (see Humboldt 1999; Bartmiński 2009; Wierzbicka 1997; and Underhill 2009, 2011, 2012). One approach advocates investigating cross-cultural symbolic representations and involves six phases of research and reflection:

1. Corpus-based study
2. Textual analysis
3. Comparative analysis
4. Discerning emerging patterns of convergence and divergence
5. Discussion with colleagues, students, and friends.
6. Enlarging the study of texts on their advice concerning key texts and topical news stories.

In the present study, more than a thousand occurrences of 'walls' were taken into consideration. The corpora relied upon were mainly English, since the intention was to discern a shared Anglo representation of walls: a representation that could be considered a prototypical basis from which the diverse forms of regional and national Englishes conformed or departed from to varying degrees. The texts consulted were of a literary, philosophical nature or were taken from the printed and online press. Once a general impression was ascertained through empirical research, a similar study was made in other languages (mainly in French, German, and Czech) in order to engage in comparative analysis that would enable me to discern the patterns that emerged and the distinctions and contrasts that affirmed themselves in cross-lingual comparison.

When we begin looking though corpora, and comparing languages, things appear much more ambiguous than the celebration of breaking down walls leads us to believe. Our feelings appear to be far more ambivalent than the few examples quoted at the beginning.

In Defence of Walls

The French phenomenologist philosopher, Gaston Bachelard (1957), suggests our relationship with walls is much more intimate than the Berlin Wall examples suggest. Believing we seek our home in the universe by harkening back to our first home, the house we were born into, Bachelard feels that walls are not always ominous, oppressive, and threatening. Walls can offer us shelter and comfort, after all. As he puts it (Bachelard [1957] 1998: 5):

> [A]ll really inhabited space bears the essence of the notion of home. […] we shall see that the imagination functions in this direction whenever the human being has found the slightest shelter, we shall see the imagination build 'walls' of impalpable shadows, to comfort itself with the illusion of protection.

The desire for comfort is natural, universal, and healthy. For Bachelard, all shelters become homes: houses, with imaginary walls. And real walls remain symbolic in that they remind the dweller of the first home, the cradle. This is no nostalgic fairytale. The shelter may prove illusionary. But the impulse to re-erect the walls of our first home proves irrepressible.

Bachelard is not denying the dark side walls entail. He reminds us that we might also, 'tremble behind thick walls, mistrust the staunchest ramparts' (1998: 5). But even here, the wall proves our ally: the primary function of ramparts, moats, castle walls, and city walls is, after all, to protect us. Walled towns from Tabora, in the Czech Republic, to Krosno, and Kraków, in Poland, from Avignon, in Southern France, to Monteriggoni, in Tuscany, all celebrate the histories that were protected by their walls. It was their walls that enabled them to ensure the blossoming of culture and industry, and traditions of those settlements.

At a more down-to-earth, everyday level, beer-gardens are walled-in intimate and inviting public spaces. Walled gardens are places tourists flock to. Private parks, such as the one in Edzell Castle in Angus, Scotland, are famous tourist attractions, and the gardens of Clères, in Normandy, surrounded by walls, invite people to visit a wide array of exotic animals,

from peacocks and gibbons to storks and wallabies. Walls are part of our heritage, the National Trust, and its European equivalents remind us.

Walls, a Part of Our Heritage?

Different cultures have different wall-building traditions. In Scotland the ancient skill of dry-stone dyking is not yet dead. This technique is a pre-Roman tradition of building walls without cement by carefully selecting stones whose shapes and forms allow them to weigh down upon each other using gravity as a means of cohesion. It may be dying out in Scotland, but it is still being taught in the Borders of Scotland. And Scotland as a nation has a long history of walls. The Scottish Borders were first cut off from the rest of Britain by a famous wall, Hadrian's Wall. And a later wall, Antonine's Wall, was erected to fulfil a similar function, along the narrow breadth of Scotland just north of Glasgow and Edinburgh.

Hadrian's Wall is now celebrated as an awe-inspiring, spectacular feat of engineering. Nobody would think of calling Hadrian's Wall, 'The Wall of Shame' as Western countries dubbed the Berlin Wall during the Cold War: just as the French called it *le mur de la honte*, and as the Germans called it the *Schandmaur*. History, of course, is written by the victors, and we are all content to enter into the narratives of Latin history. Hadrian's Wall is never depicted as cutting families and communities in two. What was its function, as it is understood in our history books? It kept the barbarians out. It preserved peace, the *Pax Romana*, according to Roman sources, and Roman stories.

This shows to what extent we inherit the bias of historical records. We become the readers of a situated history, sympathizing with one side, and fearing, or disparaging, or simply ignoring the other. And we are invited to consume places in packaged tours of symbolic heritage spots. For the tourist industry tends to appropriate spaces, cultivate a sense of place, and sell it as a consumer product by inserting it into the geography of a people's imagination. The Lake District in England, and the coasts of Wales, and Cornwall, Brittany and Galicia's Finisterre, are all parcelled up in poetic myths and anecdotes. And in the same way, we can visit the Hadrian's Wall museum in Carlisle, or take the bus trip along the Berlin

Wall. The troubles of Belfast are carefully rekindled and retold to tourists who are invited to visit the unionist and IRA murals in the respective neighbourhoods of the once divided city.

These experiences bear no relation to the visits to Dachau and Auschwitz, but they do have a sombre side. We are reminded of darker times. And it is because such trips invite us to travel to historical sites associated with death and tragedy that they have come to be called 'Dark Tourism' in recent years. The ambivalence we feel about walls is made palpable in the Hadrian's Wall museum in Carlisle when we are invited to contemplate the walls that are being built around the world, the walls of the Israel-Gaza barrier. These testimonies to walls are of an entirely different tone. They are full of photos and video documentaries of crying mothers, and frightened children. This contrasts with the proud show of strength of centurions looking down on the imitation green felt banks supposed to evoke the rolling Scottish hills of the Borderland. That image is not moving or traumatic; it is almost colonial. And indeed the desire to assimilate Roman history into English history as analogous chapters of stern but fair and square rule is still in evidence in the way we package and peddle history in the UK to visitors and school children on guided daytrips with their history teachers.

Ostalgia and Rebuilding the Berlin Wall

Ironically, East Germans by 2000 had started to question the wisdom of reunification. *Ostalgia* set in. Many people were nostalgic for the lifestyle and the comforts that communism had provided, in terms of housing and full employment. Faced with competition from foreign labour, a common joke in Germany of those years was: 'Why are the Chinese better off than the Germans? Because they still have their wall.'

And indeed there has been no real attempt to eradicate the *Schandmaur*. On the contrary, it is regularly re-erected and celebrated, as we shall see. And all of East European history has come to be seen through the prism of the fall of the wall. So in a French tourist blog, www.lagazetteduvoyage.com, we are invited to Prague, and we are told:

la ville a connu un boom depuis la chute du mur de Berlin et la Révolution de velours qui a libéré la ville du joug communiste ('the city has known a great resurgence since the fall of the Berlin wall and the Velvet revolution that liberated the city from the yoke of communism').

This example bears witness to the power of symbolism. For the Czechs had no wall. Nonetheless, in the stereotyped Western post-communist conception of Eastern Europe, the wall and its fall has been inserted into the history of the Czech nation. Or rather, the Czech nation has been absorbed by the wall. It would certainly seem that walls are fundamental. Someone seems to want walls. Even if it is only to keep knocking them down, and asserting our right to cast to one side unwanted barriers. But how can ethnolinguistics approach the conceptualization of walls?

The Ethnolinguistics of Walls

For ethnolinguists the question is to try to understand how different cultures attribute different values to walls. This involves seeing them as a universal with various specific forms, or as culturally specific phenomena which gravitate towards a shared archetype. It should be possible to demonstrate that there is indeed a universal dimension to walls. Nonetheless, at the most fundamental level, walls are always private and political, real and symbolic. For this reason we cannot take the universal for granted and start with a dictionary definition. Ethnolinguistics cannot simply content itself with juxtaposing terms, and concepts in different languages. It is not sufficient to map the different concepts of walls throughout the linguistic communities of the planet. To understand the complex symbolism of walls, we need real individual experiences of walls. Only by understanding walls as they are perceived, can we hope to hold onto their ambiguous and paradoxical meanings. This is why literature is important. Poems, novels, plays, and films explore paradoxes and ambiguity. Philology worked with texts, with poetry, and with founding myths and narratives. But in the course of the twentieth century, mainstream linguistics tended to play down the cultural in favour of the structural. Ethnolinguistics, though, cannot content itself with asserting that a given

exotic culture has a certain concept of walls, far different from 'our' own, whoever 'we' are. Because, inevitably walls do not simply divide different cultures, they exist within cultures.

This should not exclude the possibility of attempting to define a prototypical conceptual notion of 'walls', but ethnolinguistics should start with speech and written texts and then move onto the dictionary, since dictionaries are not directives for speech but rather the records of speech in usage, which is constantly changing, as corpora and literary texts or other media so clearly demonstrate.

Walls in English and American English

So what do we find in corpora? First of all, that American and English conceptions of space diverge. We cannot therefore, be content to contrast English conceptions of walls with French or German or Polish conceptions. For, there are, of course, manifest differences between the ways Americans and British speakers perceive walls, boundaries, borders, and frontiers. Likewise, coastlines and cosmological dimensions of space are often at odds in American and English conceptions of space. The frontier is an American concept. English as a united kingdom is more concerned with borders, coastlines, and the domination of the waves of its Empire upon which the sun never set once upon a time. America is currently engaged in 'nation building' 'exporting democracy', and 'pushing back the frontiers of Democracy': in a word, and not a particularly popular word, 'colonialism'. For that reason, ensuring the 'security' of territories it is engaged in becomes essential. Walls, frontiers, and borders all play a role in this.

COCA

If we look at the 450 million word COCA corpus of Contemporary Colloquial American English what do we find for walls? We find the term is somewhat more abstract and figurative than its English equivalent as represented by the British National Corpus. COCA provides 67,245

references to 'wall', but already 14,561—and that is just under one quarter—refer to 'Wall Street'. What is Wall Street? The question seems naive, but it is legitimate. Wall Street means the financial centre of the USA. It means *The Wall Street Journal*. But it also means the *Occupy Wall Street Movement*. In one reference (Associated Press 2012, quoted by COCA), Obama was denounced by demonstrators as being a Wall Street puppet, 'a Wall Street Stooge'.

Other figurative walls refer to

- Failure: 'hitting a wall'
- Tables: 'wall charts'
- Cellular or organic walls: 'uterine walls', 'artery walls'.

Nonetheless, despite these examples, in both English and American English, walls preserve a very physical, concrete tangibility. Real walls remain. This can be seen clearly if we consider the collocations that are generated by the COCA electronic corpus, which provides the following collocates for walls in the order of frequency.

1. Street
2. Against
3. Journal
4. Behind
5. Berlin
6. Brick
7. Stone
8. Wall (as in wall-to-wall carpets)
9. Opposite
10. Hanging
11. Glass
12. Leaned

For at least half of the time, if not more, we walk along walls, lean against walls, crash into walls, build walls, and bring them crashing down. Berlin remained a major preoccupation of the USA, even in 2012, when the

COCA was last updated, coming in as the fifth related term in the search for collocates for 'wall'.

BNC

The British National Corpus (BNC) differs from the COCA in two important respects. Its sources are largely written rather than the mixture of magazines and media programmes from which the COCA's sources are drawn. And it was last updated in the early 1990s. The BNC invites us back into a Cold War worldview, while the COCA portrays for us rather the worldview of Conquering Capitalism, Fukuyama's dream of the End of History, and the expansion of liberal democracy.

The first two conclusions that must be drawn are that 'walls' are somewhat rarer in British English, with 11,214 references for a 100 million word corpus. Although my impression, based upon the first hundred randomly listed uses led me to believe that figurative usages were as common as non-figurative usages, this proved not to be the case. Upon further investigation, the concrete nature of real walls became more and more manifest. Sources referred to 'external walls', '6ft high walls', 'castle walls', 'bullets against a wall', things falling 'six inches from the wall', and 'plaster [falling] off the wall'. Other references were made to 'stone wall', 'asbestos wall', 'other side of the wall', 'on the wall around the flowerbed', and the 'court yard wall'.

True, the figurative references made themselves felt with 'writing on the wall', 'Wall street', and references such as '30,000 small firms went to the wall'. There were also some curiously mixed figurative-concrete examples in which experiences were compared to 'hitting a wall', such as one reference to the Newbury to York races, in which jockeys being thrown from their horses was said to be 'like being in a car and hitting a brick wall'.

References to the Berlin Wall and to Hadrian's Wall were commonplace. And other palpably physical references to 'cavity wall insulation', 'wall cladding system', and 'wall panel' were also common. These are interesting because like 'Wall Street' they bear witness to the importance of 'wall' as an adjective in a noun phrase.

If we consider the list of collocates for 'wall' in English, using the Bingham University Website with its improved selection possibilities, we find the following list of words in order of frequency.

1. Against
2. Street
3. Behind
4. Brick
5. Along
6. Stone
7. Wall
8. Berlin
9. Journal
10. Opposite
11. Built
12. Garden

The list is clearly more physical than the one generated by our American corpus. The *Wall Street Journal* is still among the top ten, but it comes ninth in the BNC whereas it was third in the COCA. Ironically, Berlin is eighth for the corpus ending in 1990, whereas it was fifth for texts dating from that time until 2012, suggesting the unrelenting or even increasing interest in the Berlin Wall as a turning point in geopolitical relations. There were a total of 139 references in the British corpus to the Berlin Wall, whereas there were 71 references to Hadrian's Wall. Hadrian Wall references often revolved around tourism, heritage and history, testifying to the desire to recuperate the wall and integrate it into a marketing strategy whilst claiming that it formed part of British identity and must be treasured, preserved, and promoted as such. The periods and the politics of the Berlin and Hadrian's walls are miles apart, but the arguments follow the same logic: walls form part of history and part of our identity. In the Post–Cold War World, divisions are still essential for identity. Positions, blocks, oppositions, and antagonisms once denounced, are now almost cherished. They are handled with care. They become a part of us that must be preserved. And this means preserving oppositions. Walls separated us, but they held us together in opposition, and that opposition, it

is felt, is meaningful, full of sense: walls, barriers, and boundaries give us a sense of identity, even at times a sense of belonging.

The Berlin Wall for the Germans

The same nostalgia for Cold War barriers can be seen if we consult the 500 million-word Leipzig Corpus.[4] If we look for the 'fall of the wall', *Mauerfall* we find among the first 24 most frequent collocations 'since' (*nachdem*), comes first. 'After' (*nach*) comes fifth, but the 20th-year anniversary celebration of reunification and the wall coming down comes second in the list. Mikhail Gorbatchev and Helmut Kohl, major actors in the reunification process, are relegated to 16th and 14th places in the list respectively. Even 'reunification' (*Wiedervereinigung*) only comes eighth in the list. 'Unity' (*Einheit*) comes 12th.

What does this suggest? That the actual state of unity and the process of reunifying as a real historical process is secondary. What is celebrated is smashing the wall down. And what brings the wall crushing down? Freedom. Liberty is rhyming with Liberalism in this chant to the *Mauerfall*. Liberalism, or Neoliberalism, is singing its own praises. And the chorus of this chant is? Capitalism brings people together. The Market keeps us together.

This is not only a discourse, a logic, an implicit argument. It is also the editorial practice of newspapers. Ours is clearly an age of Infotainment. Advertising pays for information. News is slotted into the spaces between products being marketed. This became clear in the *Bild's* 9 November 2009 presentation of the 20th anniversary of the *Mauerfall*. Page one related the story of Angela Merkel's love life back in the years of the Deutsche Demokratische Republik. Page four told a story celebrating the Wall's fall and the reunification of families and one people. All of this, however, was only the build up to the colour centrefold ad for the T-Mobile telephone company: The implicit argument in the whole narrative was made patently clear in the slogan on the centrefold: *Erleben, was verbindet* ('Experience what brings us together', pp. 6–7). The market reigns: the walls are coming down. The promise is for unlimited con-

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sumption. And we are all invited to share in the benefits of free speech thanks to Satellite, and to T-mobile phones.

Ethnolinguistics and Worldviews

This is only a start: ethnolinguistics should investigate the various ways walls, boundaries, frontiers, enclosures, and exclusion are translated from language to language, and the roles they play in the lexicons of each language. How do they reflect and how do they engender the worldview of a people? How do they show the way walls work within the various co-existing, contrasting, and colliding worldviews that can be found in any given linguistic community.

This would involve trying to establish how walls function as parts of our worldview at various levels. At the levels of:

1. World-perceiving
2. World-conceiving
3. Cultural Mindset
4. Personal World
5. Perspective (see Underhill 2009, 2011, 2012).

This is a big challenge, one which it would be impossible to undertake in this chapter. Nevertheless, it should prove interesting to compare and contrast three religious representations of walls, as they are made manifest, firstly in the King James Version of the Old and the New Testaments, and in the poems of two of America's most celebrated poets, Walt Whitman and Emily Dickinson. This is a small gesture, but it should enable us to move beyond corpus analysis to consider the way world-conceiving and cultural mindsets are negotiated at an individual level and the way they operate within personal worlds.

Biblical Walls

The Bible is a unique as a cultural phenomenon and as the centre of the canon for Translation Studies. It is the one text that has become a founding stone for most of the European languages and many others

besides. A touchstone for European cultures and other cultures around the world, it has always been a source of inspiration for literary writers. So what do walls mean in the Bible?

Moving swiftly through the Old and New Testaments, it is possible to briefly summarize Biblical representations of walls by making ten fundamental points. Readers will have to forgive me if I sacrifice detail to that objective.

1. Firstly, with just over 200 references, walls prove relatively rare in the Old and New Testaments.
2. They do exist, however, and there are physical walls. In Genesis 49:22 Joseph comes across a fruit tree 'whose branches run over the wall'.[5]
3. But on the whole in the early examples from Exodus, we are dealing with the adjective 'walled' and this refers to walled cities, and walled gardens. We are perceiving walls from within the protective walls of our self-constructed security. These are the comforting walls that Bachelard spoke about.
4. Walls from part of war. As we move from the nomadic phase to the sedentary stage, armies invade territories, ravage crops, and lay siege to cities. In these times, the walls we speak of are city walls. In the Book of Joshua (6:5), we can read: 'And it shall come to pass, that when they make a long blast with the ram's horn, and when ye hear the sound of the trumpet, all the people shall shout with a great shout; and the wall of the city shall fall down flat, and the people shall ascend up every man straight before him.' King David lays siege to such walled cities, and he looks for protection within the walls of caves.
5. From almost the beginning, walls are figurative, symbolic. *Exodus* means escaping from the slavery of Egypt and the Pharaoh. But the Red Sea must be carved in two: two walls rise up. In Exodus KJV, 14:22, we can read 'And the children of Israel went into the midst of the sea upon the dry ground: and the waters were a wall unto them on their right hand, and on their left.' Symbolism is not secondary, even reaching back to the first books of the Bible.
6. Only the Book of Nehemiah celebrates the building of walls, when it recounts the rebuilding Jerusalem and uniting one people under God.

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[5] www.gutenberg.org, for this and the following references to both the Old and New Testaments.

7. Often there are no walls in the Bible. And this is crucial. Division comes with creation. The Lord carves day from night, and the seas from the land. But He does not set walls around Eden. Eden has no walls (despite the paintings of the Middle Ages). And even when Adam and Eve are expelled, cherubim must stand guard with swords to keep them out. Until then, no walls were necessary. This is the era in which God's creations lived in harmony with one another, and walked with God Himself. Walls were inconceivable in such times.

8. Likewise, in the New Testament, there are no walls in the Gospels of Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John. The New Testament brings news of a new beginning, and walls have no place in that beginning. This is the period of Christ who will break down barriers.

9. It is not until Ephesians that walls return. In 2:14, Paul celebrates Christ's capacity to break down walls between people. As Paul puts it (2:13–15) 'now in Christ Jesus ye who sometimes were far off are made nigh by the blood of Christ. For he is our peace, who hath made both one, and hath **broken down the middle wall of partition** between us; Having abolished in his flesh the enmity'.

    Like the Berlin Wall, for Paul, walls mean enmity. And Christ is the enemy of enmity. Christ hates hatred. This is no longer the phase of fusion with God. It is no longer the phase of warring peoples that Saul, David, and Joshua were forced to contend with, seeking out God's support in striving to crush the infidels. This is the universal cosmopolitan message of Christ spreading his Word to foreign peoples in foreign parts. Paul is reaching out, beyond his culture to other cultures with a shared faith.

10. Revelation will introduce a new phase in walls. But Revelation always looks backwards, harkening back to the construction of heaven and the celebration of the prophets of the City of God. That city, like the Temple of Solomon, is sung for its grandeur, its solidity and the preciousness of its materials. God's Mansion has awe-inspiring wondrous walls. In Revelation 21:18, we can read 'the building of the wall of it was of jasper: and the city was pure gold, like unto clear glass.'

Walls define and transform our relations with one another. And walls themselves, over time, are transformed, as these Biblical examples show. Walls are either present or absent, and they are often conspicuous by their absence. Erecting them and pulling them down are questions of survival and questions of identity and the unity of peoples.

Whitman and Dickinson: a Personal Poetics of Walls

The examples of Dickinson's and Whitman's walls are drawn from my own corpus of American texts, used as a counterpoint to the COCA and BNC corpora. They have the advantage of referring me back to texts that I know well rather than to an arbitrary selection of unfamiliar sources.

Walt Whitman, the great exalted democratic voice of the American people, sings of the creation of the bricks and mortar of the nation. This is the enthusiastic chant of the settlers, who are building walls. In *Song of the Broad Axe*, Whitman chants a hymn to strong walls constructed by strong men. This is a hymn to the protestant work ethic, to ardent labour:

> The crowded line of masons with trowels in their right hands, rapidly laying the long side-wall, two hundred feet from front to rear, The flexible rise and fall of backs, the continual click of the trowels striking the bricks […] (www.gutenberg.org)

This echoes the words in texts about the settlers found in my American corpus (*MyAmericanEnglishCorpus*, texts downloaded from www.gutenberg.org). In those texts, walls are the walls of the Church, and the walls of the city. They are part of the strategic defensive structures of outposts in a savage land. They uphold havens of hope and faith, places of worship, in which the Word of Christ resounds within the Church's walls. Like the writers of a whole host of texts, Whitman is outside looking in. He is in the street looking on, as walls are constructed. This is the song of walls going up, and cities affirming themselves through honest individual and collective labour. Walls are being built by people striving for the good

of society as a whole. For the settlers, walls are on the side of hope, on the side of 'America'.

In Emily Dickinson's verse, we find a very different perception of walls. Walls mean reclusion, and withdrawing into oneself. Is the positive upbeat bard poet being countered by a negative, introverted sensibility? Not quite. For at this point, the dynamics of insides and outsides become profoundly paradoxical: by turning into the contemplation of the soul, we open up to God. And this proves doubly perplexing.

Initially, we would like to consider walls as divisions, equally dividing one side from another. But walls are often circular, tracing insides and outsides. At this stage, it is tempting to think of the inside as finite and the outside as infinite. This suggests that walls create insides and outsides which are anything but symmetrical.

But contemplation, prayer, and withdrawal into the soul will further complicate things, because the finite proves more infinite than the outside, which becomes pallid, tasteless, and limited by comparison to the encounter with the Divine, and reaching into the depths of one's own being. This can be a wonderful rapturous experience, or it can be a source of terror and horror. What we find may comfort or haunt us, but what haunts us or enchants us is an infinite limitless divine dimension, whether we have a heavenly encounter or whether we plunge into the depths of despair. All of the expressions we use to give a voice to this interior space—vertigo, falling, grasping, and losing ourselves—are spatial.

In her untitled poem that begins *To my quick ear*, Emily Dickinson suggests that there is no privacy outside, or inside. Everything reminds us we are watched by the Divine Gaze. Even the walls of a cave will speak to us, telling us that all Creation makes us incapable of hiding from God, just as Jonah could not hide even in the belly of the Whale, when he tried to flee from the Face of the Lord. Dickinson's short poem reads:

> To my quick ear the leaves conferred;
> The bushes they were bells;
> I could not find a privacy
> From Nature's sentinels.

In cave if I presumed to hide,
The walls began to tell;
Creation seemed a mighty crack
To make me visible. (Dickinson, *The Collected Poems*, 2004: 138, www.gutenberg.org)

Conclusion

It would be tempting to conclude with these evocative words, but to do justice to Translation Studies we have yet to put some order in the various quotations and examples derived from corpora and texts. In French dictionaries (Le Robert, and Le Grand Robert), in the *Oxford English Dictionary*, and in *Merriam-Webster's Dictionary*, for American English, it is difficult to establish a clear-cut conceptual definition for walls. Nevertheless, after careful study, there appear to be three functions to walls, and these will generate different terms throughout languages. German distinguishes between the interior wall of apartments (*Wand*), and battlements or barriers (*Mauer*). French distinguishes between *mur* and *muraille*, just as we distinguish between 'wall' and 'ramparts'. But French will use *mur* for both, just as we speak of the 'walls of the flat' and the 'city walls'.

The three functions that walls serve as are:

1. Protection
2. Division, defence, exclusion
3. Support.

And these functions are clearly values of some form or another. All languages, and all dictionaries (or at least the English, French, German, Spanish, and Czech ones I have consulted) bear witness to a vast array of structured forms of metaphorical walls. But these metaphors allow us to express feelings related to the three different functions of walls. Some walls protect us from the outside, and keep us warm and safe inside. This is the intimate space; a room, a house, a city, or a nation. Nationalist

parties focus on the nation as a personal space that must keep the evil out. Those nationalist discourses do indeed pervert our perception of the world and our relationship to it and to others. But it would be unfair to say that they force the political into the personal world, when they speak about the nation as a friendly space in a hostile world: 'our place', in English, *chez nous*, in French, *u nás*, in Czech.

For the personal and the political prove inseparable, just as the inside and the outside interact as much as they separate one from the other: because we constantly project our centres of security into the world, outside. As Bachelard puts it, we seek our home in the intimate immensity, we seek our cradle in the cosmos ([1957] 2008: 23–25, 168–171). And in the same way, the intimate space inside is always political. As the Marxists knew, the home is the place of socialization: it is an ideological space, where we learn to become individuals, citizens, loving people capable of sharing and reaching out, or tortured selfish souls turning in on ourselves, excluded from love and incapable of loving. For believers, these are the walls of hell, the walls some people set up to cut themselves off from others, and which ultimately cut them off from themselves. But they are also the walls of the nationalist movements so popular in Europe, The UK Independence Party in Britain, and le Front National in France. This is the spirit of turning in on ourselves. These walls are like the spiralling walls that shellfish and snails spiral into, withdrawing from the world into the safe interior of protective walls.

But, ultimately, can those walls protect us? Those walls of mistrust, those gated communities, and this walled world we are setting up. And protect us from what? Ethnolinguistics cannot answer these questions. But it can help us reformulate our questions more lucidly and establish to what extent we are defending the same values in different linguistic communities.

Ethnolinguistics goes through corpora, dictionaries, literary texts, and other media to seek out what kind of walls we are building at what times, to separate which people within which societies. Ethnolinguists are not against tearing walls down, but our short study has forced us to admit that if walls are not in themselves 'values', they are 'valuable' at various times for various reasons. And ethnolinguists ask: What walls we are tearing down? And why?

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3

Emotional Valuation: Values and Emotions in Translation

Elżbieta Tabakowska

Preliminaries

Much has been written about emotions: by poets and writers, but also by psychologists, sociologists, and—last but not least—by theorists of literature and language. Works written by literary scholars covering the vast fields of comparative studies are legion; in contemporary linguistics, one of the most important names to mention is that of Anna Wierzbicka, who devoted an impressive bulk of her texts to 'emotions across languages and cultures' (1999, and the extensive bibliography given there; cf. also Athanasiadou and Tabakowska 1998; Niemeier and Dirven 1997). Even more has been written about values; sociology and ethics show a long tradition of investigating ideals, institutions, customs, and social norms pertaining to different epochs and different cultures. It is generally assumed that for human communities, their culture-constitutive values are an object of affective regard: positive or negative valuation, often strongly

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emotional. The awareness and acknowledgement of interconnections between human emotions and human values is one of the cornerstones of the fast-developing discipline of ethnosyntax which has been attracting scholars of cognitivist and pragmatic persuasion.[1]

Looking at valuation within the context of different cultures (and thus, generally, of different languages) necessarily involves translation—as when attempts are made to differentiate between meanings of 'universal' and 'culture-bound' words used as labels of emotions (cf. Wierzbicka 1999: 8) and values (cf. Bartmiński 2009: 38ff), or when the art of translation is discussed as a way of exposing the 'languages of emotions' (for example, Dziechcińska 2013). But studies devoted entirely—or primarily—to problems involved in translating texts and discourses as exponents of emotional valuation are rather difficult to find. As can be seen from works which resort to translation as a means of comparing conceptualizations and expressions of emotions and values across languages, de-contextualised analyses prove counterproductive, very much like discussions on translation per se: the transfer of 'emotion words' (or 'words for feeling', as Hans-Jürgen Diller 2014 prefers to call them) has to be investigated within the framework of language-specific discourse, set in a broad context of a specific culture. Or, as the case may be, the research can involve a (literary) text seen as a product of a given culture. This in turn requires adopting an interdisciplinary perspective in which description becomes the result of an analysis carried out in terms of both 'literary' interpretation and 'linguistic' analysis. As the inverted commas are meant to suggest, both approaches tend to overlap and merge.

Definitions

In psychology and in linguistics alike, a principled distinction has traditionally been made between cognition—or 'cool reason'—on the one hand and emotion—or feeling, or affect—on the other. In the normal functioning of the human body and mind, reason and affect intertwine

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[1] For a canonical work in the field, see the collection of articles in Enfield 2002; see also Bartmiński 2009.

in a complicated and many-faceted manner and, prototypically, the two are externalized in different ways. Languages reflect this distinction. For instance, while the English words 'feeling' and 'emotion' are commonly used interchangeably, when a semantic distinction is made between them, it usually involves the basic—and rather controversial— relationship between the physical and the mental, the Body and the Mind, nature and nurture: 'emotions' are conventionally considered to have biological foundations, with the realm of thought being left to 'feelings'. 'Emotions' are defined as short-lived and intense affects, strongly evaluative, having definite causes and directed at definite targets. They imply (bodily) actions and interactions, as opposed to more passive and more lasting 'feelings'. Feelings reflect conscious attitudes of people to surrounding reality (Damasio 1994). They come as a result of their intellectual interpretation of emotions, and are based upon, and inspired by, ingrained cultural patterns. On the other hand, clearly there are emotions that are culture-bound (see for example Athanasiadou and Tabakowska 1998; Wierzbicka 1991; Diller 2014), and people naturally talk about such 'emotional feelings' as a 'feeling of hunger' or a 'feeling of pain' (cf. Dirven 1997: 60). Some terminological confusion is thus inevitable. In what follows, I will use the (English) term *emotion* in the sense argued for by Wierzbicka (1999: 2): as a combination of 'thoughts, feelings, and bodily effects'. The general Body-or-Mind dichotomy seems to underlie the distinction that is often made between 'emotional' and 'intellectual' valuation. While the former is considered to constitute 'a significant feature of everyday behaviour and colloquial language', the latter is seen as a property of 'official, scientific or formal contexts' (Bartmiński 2009: 40). It is the first type that will concern us here.

Obviously, words that express emotional valuation, like 'emotion words' themselves, mean different things at different times and in different cultures. The non-universal 'interpretive grid' (term from Wierzbicka 1999: 26) imposed upon the domain by different languages and language varieties is relative to time and space. In recent years, this subject has been gaining much scholarly interest. In view of the scope of the present chapter, just two examples must suffice. A comprehensive linguistic corpus study of diachronic shifts within the semantic field of the English emotion lexicon can be found in Diller's (2014) ground-breaking monograph.

On the literary side, linguistic changes resulting from new developments in culture are discussed by Hanna Dziechcińska (2013) within the context of Polish novel of the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries. Interestingly, although both works deal chiefly with the intra-cultural and intra-linguistic dimension, the contrastive perspective, most interesting from the point of view of Translation Studies, is clearly implied. Like many other authors, Diller demonstrates how 'each race of man [has] found names for some shade of feeling which other races have left undiscriminated' (James 1980: 485, cited in Wierzbicka 1999: 26). Talking about 'clumsy [Polish] translators' of the sixteenth century, Dziechcińska (2013: 69ff) argues that the clumsiness resulted from the absence, in the Polish culture, of some emotional situations that were a matter of course in the culture of sixteenth-century France, which necessarily resulted in the translators' frustration in their search for adequate words in Polish. By pointing to the practice (dictated by pragmatic needs) of creating new words, Dziechcińska emphasizes what, in the contemporary parlance of Translation Studies, goes by the name of the 'culture-forming role of the translator': she claims that among the literary texts translated into Polish in Old Poland there are 'some which on the level of translation took part in the creation of the language of emotions, confessions and feelings' (ibid.: 81). And, obviously, of the language of emotional valuation too.

Feeling Emotional (About Values), Expressing Emotional Valuation, Speaking of Values and Emotions

Some further distinctions have to be made: 'feeling emotions' (with values as their object in particular) is not the same as 'expressing emotions' (or emotional valuation), and 'expressing emotions' (in particular, emotions concerning values) is not the same as 'speaking of emotions' (in particular, of emotions which concern values). The psycho-physiological phenomenon of 'feeling emotional' falls within the domain belonging to philosophers, psychologists, or sociologists (consider, for instance, the collective feeling of 'genetic patriotism' as recently proclaimed by representatives of one of the many sides of the contemporary Polish political

scene). The 'expression of emotions', which most linguists have largely limited to non-verbal or paralinguistic symptoms (rate and pitch of delivery, gestures, and so on), has been convincingly shown to pertain also to such purely linguistic phenomena as rhetorical questions, clippings, ellipsis, repetition, and so on (Grzesiuk 1995). Finally, 'speaking of emotions' involves the communication of emotional states through linguistic means, and as such, it could be legitimately considered as one type of Jakobson's inter-semiotic translation.

It is banal to say that emotions and emotional valuations are directed at a target. They can be reflexive, with the experiencer feeling emotional about himself/herself or relating his/her own emotions to others. But emotions can also be directed at either the interlocutor or some third party: the experiencer can feel emotional about somebody else and that emotional state is expressed or communicated. Finally, people can report the emotions of other people, either observed or inferred. As will be seen, these distinctions are directly significant for the process of translation. In every narrative—and in narrating emotions and emotional valuations in particular—the storyteller has to make inferences about his/her characters' systems of values, emotions, and valuations via the particular presentation of particular states and events. With the exception of omniscient narrators, this is the situation that translators have to face: rendering the original perspective constitutes a crucial parameter of their work.

In literary research, it is poetry, and lyrical poetry in particular, that has been traditionally considered to be the domain for both expressing emotions and speaking of emotions. But recent developments in the study of language provide arguments which corroborate the thesis that what is defined as literature differs from non-literary uses of language only in that the creators of the former—poets and prose writers—consciously employ the means that speakers use intuitively in everyday communication (for a discussion, see Balcerzan 2013, esp. ch. VI). Both in literature and in everyday situations, writers/speakers express their emotions—and the emotions of others—as well as speak of emotions, either their own or those experienced by others. And just as frequently, these emotions come as the result of valuation. Every narrator—be it a writer or a little boy relating his day at school—can express emotions, that is, either by translating non-verbal symptoms into non-verbal signs and using direct speech, or relating

them to the readers/listeners by using indirect speech. Finally, people can bring about the other party's understanding of an emotional situation by making an appeal to another situation, considered as prototypical (and therefore generally known) for the state in question ('I feel as if…'; for discussion, see, Wierzbicka 1999: 13). This also holds true for 'reported emotions' described by people who had not experienced them themselves.

The Medium Is the Message

Apart from the prototypical 'emotion' or 'value' lexicon, consisting of labels for individual emotions (*fear*, or *shame*, or *anger*) or values (*patriotism, politeness*, or *blasphemy*), theorists of language and literature list and describe various linguistic or paralinguistic markers of emotions and valuation—exponents of Jakobson's expressive function of language. Most obvious of those are prosodic features, specified for various languages: intonation contours, the lengthening of vowels in languages that do not employ phonemic length oppositions, and so on. Less obviously perhaps, on the level of morphology, languages are shown to employ specific derivational forms, a case in point being the use of diminutives in languages like Polish, with diminutive forms potentially carrying both positively and negatively loaded emotions (for example, semantic extensions from 'small is beautiful' to 'small is contemptible'; for a discussion, see for example Wierzbicka 1997). In languages like English or Polish, emotional valuation can be signalled by using either proxemic or distal demonstrative pronouns, as in the 'engaged' *What's this?* as opposed to the 'disengaged' *What's that?* (cf. Foolen 1997: 25). Some interesting observations concerning the relationship of the speaker's selection of prepositions in nominal phrases and the expressive value of resulting utterances can be found, for instance, in Osmond (1997) and Dirven (1997). The rapid development of corpus linguistics made analyses of data less tedious and the results more valid (cf. for example Oster 2012; Diller 2014). The literature on various aspects of the 'language of emotions' is too vast to make possible quoting more than a few representative works here. In view of the direct aims at hand, it must suffice to emphasize only the gist of these findings: the fairly non-controversial

conclusion that linguistic means used by speakers to either express or describe emotions and emotional valuation, although largely stemming from universal biological foundations, vary considerably across cultures and languages. Most practising translators would agree: translating the 'language of emotions' can be a nightmare.

Who Feels Emotional About What?

Unlike values, and cultural values in particular, emotions are largely a private matter. As such, they need not be (or become, or be made) apparent to outside observers; as evidenced by common phraseology, people can constrain them, hide them, or even pretend that they do not feel emotional at all. Moreover, in people's descriptions of emotions and emotional valuations—their own or belonging to others—emotion words, or words for feelings, need not actually appear. It is therefore important to emphasize the role of interpretation in identifying such emotional states as are only signalled covertly. Or, in other words, one needs to ask the question familiar to all secondary school pupils and to all translators: 'What did the author intend to say?'

The description of emotions in a literary narrative requires accepting the presence on the stage of a number of *dramatis personae*: apart from the author playing the part of the subject of literary creation, there is a narrator, and there are the characters. Each of them can *feel* any number of emotions, and *describe* any number of emotions. And of course, their voices need not speak in unison. Last but not least, there is the reader (virtual, projected or real), who can also feel—or intentionally be made to feel—emotional about what s/he reads. In pragmatics, this last aspect is known under the name of illocutionary force; in the case of emotional talk, a particular emotional impact on the reader, or an emotion evoked, need not be identical with the emotion really intended by any of the *personae.* From the translator, as indeed from the reader of the original, coping with (or feeling?) emotions evoked by the creator of the narrative requires taking the narrator's perspective. Twice removed, the emotions felt by the reader (or the translator) may also be evoked by the behaviour and the feelings of the (fictitious) characters.

Conceptualizing someone else's (or, to some extent, one's own) emotions means interpreting physiological or mental symptoms that can be either overt and observed or covert and inferred. Speaking of emotions (one's own or somebody else's) requires rendering the interpretation into words, and thus, creates a (literary) narrative. Finally, translating emotional talk into another (literary) narrative requires inferring emotions conceptualized by the original author as manifested or felt either by his characters or by the narrator, and rendering them into another language. In a literary text, an omniscient narrator can be equipped with unlimited direct access to all characters' minds, but the author can also merely allow them either limited access, or no access at all. To make the network more complicated, characters brought into (virtual) existence in a literary work have their own potential for inferring and describing their own or other characters' emotions. To make things more complex still, the transmission takes place in the context of a strange culture, as reflected in a strange language. In short, the work of the translator can be compared to a hurdle race, with conceptual, linguistic, and cultural barriers obstructing the run at every stage.

Translating Emotions and Emotional Valuations

Contemporary Translation Studies has long ago given up the idea of building its foundations upon the notion of translational equivalence. Other well-known criteria have been suggested, with various proposals tacitly assuming the existence of a *tertium comparationis* (for a discussion, see for example Piotrowski 2011). In the case of emotional talk, the *tertium comparationis* should be defined as the emotion or valuation itself: a psycho-physiological state, stripped of its linguistic guise. Obviously, we do value things and express or describe emotions differently in different languages. Obviously, causes and results differ across cultures, but are we all capable of *feeling* in the same—or at least a comparable—way? The qualitative and quantitative parameters are subject to psychological or neurological investigation; although pertinent, the question cannot be answered by either a linguist or a Translation Studies scholar, although both notions—'language' and 'translation'—are crucial.

Last but not least, there are emotions and emotional valuations felt by the translator and directed either at the original author, at the original text, or at the translator's own work. This aspect has probably not been extensively dealt with in a systematic way, but its echoes may be found, for instance, in discussions on political correctness. At this point, just two fairly obvious examples must suffice.

In the Polish text the translator and/or editor of Carl Bernstein and Marco Politi's study of the papacy of John Paul II omitted those elements that, in their opinion, might destroy the due decorum of the narration:

> (1) (a) On December 25, 1995, viewers around the world were **shocked** when on live TV from the Vatican **an ashen** Karol Wojtyła had to interrupt his Christmas sermon from the window of his study, **shaken by a sudden fit of retching** (Bernstein and Politi 1996: 21; emphasis added)[2]
>
> (b) 25 grudnia 1995 roku musiał przerwać błogosławieństwo udzielane miastu i światu z okna pałacu (Bernstein and Politi 1997: 22)
>
> [On Dec 25 1995 [he] had to interrupt the *orbi et urbi* blessing given from the palace window].

What the original authors described as an empathy evoking a physiological state, the Polish translator valued (emotionally) as not being becoming for the Pope, not to say being blasphemous. As a consequence of this self-censorship, the 'shock of viewers around the world', signalling the emotions of love and empathy of believers towards their ailing Pope, had to disappear too. But 'collective feelings' can also become offended when the translator does not take upon himself/herself the role of a censor. A case in point is an example discussed at some length in another place (Tabakowska 2003: 119–120). In one of the 'capsules' scattered over the text of Norman Davies' monumental history of Europe, the author describes what he calls 'Lithuania's "Last Supper"'. Hinting at *the* Last Supper, he paraphrases a scene from the much-revered Polish national epic, Adam Mickiewicz's *Pan Tadeusz*, in which a group of Polish noblemen, elated by the hope of the approaching liberation of their home country by Napoleon's troops, gather in a castle in Lithuania:

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[2] Quoted after Szymańska 2010.

(2) (…) the local nobles gathered for a dazzling banquet. Lords and ladies danced the *polonez*. They were **entertained on the cymbals** by Jankiel the Jew, 'who loved his country like a Pole' (Davies 1996: 745, emphasis added)

What caused a problem, and ultimately resulted in protests from readers of the Polish translation, was the use by the translator of the Polish counterpart of (2) of the verb 'entertain' (*przygrywać*). Although the meaning of 'playing a concert' can be found among its attested dictionary meanings, it suggests casual accompaniment, possibly a klezmer performance given in a posh restaurant. But to Polish readers the famous *koncert Jankiela* ('the concert given by Jankiel') was nothing of the kind: it was a solemn performance by a supreme musician, with celebratory patriotic overtones. The translator's emotions directed at the original author or the characters and situations that the author has brought into existence can give the 'clear pane of glass' an identity-revealing tint. For instance, the Polish writer Jarosław Iwaszkiewicz confessed that he had approached the task of translating Shakespeare's *Romeo and Juliet* with 'zeal and sentiment'. The former he revealed when he described his feelings towards the task undertaken, the latter—towards the playwright who inspired it. The result can be seen, for instance, in the speech of the 'moved prince' Escalus:

(3) (a) Three civil brawls, bred of an airy word,/By thee, old Capulet, and Montague,/Have thrice **disturbed the quiet of our streets** (1.1.80–82; emphasis added)

(b) Już po raz trzeci tumulty, powstałe/Z głupich wyrazów, wzniecacie wy obaj,/Stary Montagu i ty, Kapulecie/I **szczękiem broni gwałcicie ulice**/Naszej Werony[3]

[It is for the third time already that you two, Old Montagu and you, Kapulet, incite tumults out of silly words and with the clash of arms violate/rape the streets of our Verona]

The image of 'disturbed streets' (NB occurring twice in Escalus' soliloquy) compared to a scene of violence and rape, suggests that Iwaszkiewicz's Escalus is more strongly moved by the violation of the precious 'quiet

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[3] Quoted, in a different context, by Romanowska 2015.

of our streets' than the prince from Shakespeare.[4] Who was the 'zealous and emotional' translator siding with in his emotional evaluation of the brawl?

Feeling Emotional About Translating Emotions: A Case Study

The problem that a Translation Studies scholar inevitably faces at the beginning of his/her analysis is always the same: in the context of translation, texts—even long ones—have to be analysed in their entirety. How can one achieve this and at the same time take account of restrictions of printing space and show consideration for the readers' time, patience and endurance? A summary becomes a lame but necessary compromise.

The case to be discussed below is a scene taken from Ian McEwan's short novel *The Comfort of Strangers*. The two principal characters, Mary and Colin, are two lovers on holiday in a Mediterranean city—unnamed, but easily identified as Venice. The city is shown as an unfriendly place—a mesh of entangled streets and canals, with no understandable street signs and no legible street maps. Mary and Colin are intimate and close, but getting a bit bored with their seven years' relationship. Having become lost among the canals one night, they meet a strange and sinister native called Robert, who later takes them to his palace and introduces them to his wife, Caroline. The diseased sado-masochistic disposition of Robert and Caroline leads to a tragic end: Mary is drugged by Caroline and has to watch helplessly as Colin is murdered by the deviant couple. The narrator's voice is 'a combination of the external narrator's observations and thoughts, and statements and perceptions that are focalized via Colin and Mary' (Forceville 2002: 132). After a night spent in the street, confused by their meeting with Robert and exhausted by having wandered through the maze of narrow streets and canals, they arrive at 'one of the great tourist attractions of the world' (St. Mark's Place?), desperate for a drink:

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[4] However, Internet notes *to Romeo and Juliet* give as 'modern text' the phrase 'three times now have **riots** broken in this city (…)', http://nfs.sparknotes.com/romeojuliet/page_14.html [accessed on 5 August 2015].

(4) (…) Colin and Mary walked with difficulty from the boat (…) Mary took a succession of deep breaths, and over the din suggested that they find a drink of water here. (…) Finally they were able to sit, and then it was obvious that the table was on a remote flank of their waiter's territory. (…) Mary gazed at Colin with narrowing bloodshot eyes and muttered something through cracked lips. (…)

Colin walked quickly round the tables towards the arcade. But the group of waiters who lounged in deep shade at the entrance to the bar shooed him away. 'No water', said one, and indicated the bright sea of paying customers framed by the dark curves of the arches.(…) 'They're bringing something, I think', Colin said uneasily.

Colin raised his hand tentatively as a waiter whirled towards him bearing a tray of empty bottles; but the man had passed them and was several feet away before the gesture was half-complete. (…)

Mary (…) looked round at the hundreds of feet of repeating arches and columns. Colin also looked round. There were no waiters in sight and everyone appeared to have a full glass. (…) Mary folded her arms and let her head drop.

Colin stood up and waved both arms at a waiter who nodded and began to move towards them, collecting orders and empty glasses as he came. 'I can't believe it', Colin cried exultantly.

'We should have brought them with us,' Mary said to her lap.

Colin was still on his feet. 'He's actually coming!' He sat down and tugged at her wrist. 'What would you like?'

'It was mean of us to leave them behind.'

'I think it was rather considerate.'

The waiter, a large, affluent-looking man with a thick, greying beard and gold-rimmed glasses, was suddenly at their table inclining towards them, eyebrows slightly cocked.

'What do you want, Mary?', Colin whispered urgently.

Mary folded her hands in her lap and said, 'A glass of water, without ice'.

'Yes, *two* of those', Colin said eagerly, 'and…'

The waiter straightened and a short hiss escaped his nostrils. 'Water?' he said distantly. His eyes moved between them, appraising their dishevelment. He took a step backward and nodded towards a corner of the square. 'Is a tap'.

As he began to move away, Colin span round in his chair and caught his sleeve.'No, but waiter', he pleaded. 'We also wanted some coffee and some…'

The waiter shook his arm free. 'Coffee!' he repeated, his nostrils flared in derision. 'Two coffee?'

'Yes, yes!'

The [waiter] shook his head and was gone (McEwan 1981: 47–51).

Mere facts seem obvious enough: the British couple on holiday in Venice get to the central square swarming with tourists; they want a drink of water, but cannot find a free table in the crowded café, they do not get service for a long while, and when a waiter finally arrives, he is rude and condescending. But on the emotional plane the scene is heavily loaded. Colin and Mary are physically exhausted; Mary's physical tiredness is intensified by her feeling of remorse at having left her two children behind with their father. Colin is worried about Mary's state and eager to get her the drink she seems to need so much. The waiter gets annoyed by the couple, who want just 'a glass of water' while 'the bright sea of paying customers' (presumably) place proper orders.

The narrator describes the physical symptoms of the emotions (that he assumes are) *felt* by his three characters: Mary is exhausted—physically and emotionally: she gazes at Colin, mutters through cracked lips, speaks 'to her lap', folds her arms, and lets her head droop. When the waiter finally arrives, she 'folds her hands in her lap'. Although Colin is tired too (they both had walked 'with difficulty from the boat'), his chief emotion is that of anxiety: above all, he wants to help quench Mary's thirst; he walks quickly to the bar, raises his hand beckoning the waiter, stands up and waves both arms, tugs at Mary's wrist to elicit her order, and then spins round in his chair to catch the waiter's sleeve. He speaks 'uneasily', 'cries exultantly', 'whispers urgently', 'talks eagerly' and, finally, he 'pleads'. The waiter inclines towards the couple with his eyebrows cocked, hisses through the nose, and flares his nostrils. He speaks 'distantly'.

The characters also *express* their emotions verbally. Saving her breath, Mary places her order in the shortest form possible (no conventional 'please'), and the 'without ice' only comes as an afterthought, after a pause marked in the text by a comma. Seeing the waiter approach, Colin expresses his joy with 'I can't believe it' and then announces his coming with an exultant exclamation (mark), which he also uses with his repeated final 'yes'. The waiter's curt direction at a water tap is made even shorter

by the bad English which accompanies the gesture. Having accepted the order, he shakes his head and goes away.

When the emotions of the waiter are spoken about, the narrator, who seems to have access to Mary and Colin's—but not the waiter's—minds, takes their perspective. The surprise at the suddenness of the waiter's appearance at their table is the impression of Colin and Mary, as is the interpretation of his facial expression. The 'short hiss' that escapes the man's nostrils may be just the physiological effect of his quick straightening up; objectively, he need not actually make valuations by 'appraising their dishevelment' (their state of which only they themselves are fully aware). He flares his nostrils, which Colin and Mary interpret as a sign of derision, even though it might perhaps be only a symptom of physical exertion. It can be noticed that 'derision' is the only emotionally evaluative word actually used in the passage.

Colin and Mary are shocked at what they evaluate, negatively and emotionally, as rudeness and condescension—maybe also because it contrasts sharply with the respect and courtesy that they had been experiencing at their hotel. Yet what seems to actually happen is their running headlong into a cultural barrier: as testified by standard tourist guides, in Venice guests are expected to order *bottled* water rather than the free-of-charge *acqua dal rubinetto*, or tap water (now commonly served in British restaurants). Asking for a glass of water might be even considered somewhat rude, which explains the waiter flaring his nostrils.

Although seemingly marginal, Mary and Colin's valuation of their experience in the St Mark Place café are crucial in that they set the pace for further developments of the story; distorting the picture in translation actually impoverishes the narrative. But this is exactly what happens in the Polish translation of the book (McEwan 2008: 71–77). In order to support this statement, it seems necessary to use the admittedly dubious method of retranslation; although it is inevitable in the context of case studies involving lesser ethnic languages, its limitations are known well enough. Hopefully, in what follows, potential problems are reduced by focusing upon several clear-cut instances.

The Polish Mary does not 'gaze'—she just 'took a look' (*spojrzała*) at Colin and then at the never-ending arcades lining the place. Feeling guilty about having left her children behind (in terms of social values, this

is not done), she 'talks to herself' (*powiedziała do siebie*, rather than talking 'to her lap', that is, lowering her head in fatigue and remorse). When the waiter comes, she puts in her order in a conventionally polite and precise way: 'A glass of water without ice, please'. The Polish reader can easily interpret this as an objective reason for the waiter's rudeness: his emotional valuation of a combination of a proper form and an improper request. While in the Polish translation Mary is simply less tired than she is in the English original, Colin's emotions are rather inconsistent: he 'raised and set off in a quick pace' (*poderwał się i szybkim krokiem, ruszył*), but then he spoke 'hesitatingly' (*niepewnie*); he 'raised his palm' (*wzniósł dłoń*; no hesitation this time), and 'cried with joy' (*wykrzyknął z radością*), but afterwards he just 'went on standing' (*wciąż stał*); he 'whispered urgently' (*szepnął nagląco*), but then doubled Mary's order, asking for two glasses of water by 'backing Mary up vividly' (*poparł ją żywo*). He just 'turned' (*odwrócił się*) instead of spinning round in his chair, and did not 'plead' at all: he just ordered their coffee.

The Polish Colin and the Polish Mary actually *see* the waiter suddenly 'appear at their table' (*nagle[…]zjawił się kelner*) and 'cock his eyebrows slightly' (*lekko unosząc brwi*), so they have good reason to assume that his facial expression reflects disgust at their dishevelled looks. Yet rather than appraising their dishevelment, he appraises their 'unkempt figures' (*zaniedbane sylwetki*), which, once again, explains the 'coldness' in his voice (*odparł zimno*), rather than the original wariness. 'A short hiss that escaped his nostrils' becomes in the Polish version a scornful snort (*parsknął z pogardą*)—an expression of strong emotional valuation. Finally, he shook his head (*pokręcił głową*: turned his head from one side to another and back)—unambiguously signalling negation. Had he nodded his head (*pokiwał głową*: moved his head up and down), the gesture would have signalled acceptance. Yet it is the ambiguity of the gesture that, in the English original, explains the reversal of the couple's emotional attitudes:

(5) Colin slumped in his chair, closed his eyes and shook his head slowly; Mary struggled to sit up straight. (…) As Colin's chin sank towards his chest, so Mary became more animated (McEwan 1981: 51)

and Mary's comment:

(6) Mary pursed her lips and then said, 'He's probably bringing the coffee anyway. When people shake their heads here, it can mean all sorts of things' (ibid.: 51).

As was said, the only emotion word used in the original passage is 'derision'; it actually sums up the couple's valuation of the emotion felt—and expressed—by the waiter. Situated within the semantic sub-field of *contempt*, *derision* describes the feeling of dislike and superiority, but unlike its synonyms, additionally 'involve[s] laughter at the victim' (Diller 2014: 127). In the original, the waiter 'flares his nostrils in derision', so the facial signal is that of jest rather than anger or exertion (cf. Reiman 2008, ch.2). Yet the Polish waiter *drwi* ('sneers') at his customers, and, since the description of his facial expression is omitted by the translator, Mary and Colin presumably make the inference merely from the tone of his voice or, possibly, his foreign accent.

To sum up: while the original couple feel disregarded by the disrespectful and condescending waiter and interpret his final gesture as either an impolite refusal (Colin) or a disrespectful acceptance (Mary) of their order of 'two coffee', the Polish couple have every reason to feel downright offended by the waiter's obvious disrespect of their social values. And yet they do not behave in the way that might be expected: Colin becomes apathetic, and Mary's 'animation' is directed at her lover rather than at the offender. They seem meek, and therefore more susceptible to the following fascination with the couple of deviants, which 'turns out to be [a] lethal hypnosis' (Ricks 1982: 13). So, in a way, they might be seen to deserve their fate. Yet, to quote the critic again, 'the cutting force of the story' is in its showing that horrors befall those who do not invite them in any way.

Concluding Remarks

As seen from the examples given above, in the narrative—and the literary narrative in particular—the interplay between values, emotions, and emotive valuation involves a variety of factors which account for its complexity. In interlingual translation, the intervening influence of the translator's system of values and emotional setup adds to the intricacy. In

(1) above, the valuation comes from the translator alone, as the result of her own emotional attitude to the intimacy of physical suffering and its visible symptoms, whose explicit description, especially in the case of a person of a very high standing and esteem, is culturally unacceptable. The concepts that were removed by the translator, like their verbal expression, are axiologically neutral; it is the context that gives them the evaluative undertones. In (2) the translator attempts to be faithful to the original text, and it is her readers that feel emotional about the rendering or find the text downright offensive. Once again, although no overtly evaluative concepts or terms are used, the cultural context accounts for their valuation. In (3) the translator's emotional valuation of the event related by one of the characters in Shakespeare's drama makes him interpret the valuation made by the speaker as being more strongly negative than the original might imply. Finally, in (4), (5), and (6) the emotions, the values and the emotional valuations are those of McEwan's characters. Except for a single word ('derision') no evaluative concepts are used, and the reader is invited to interpret (and evaluate) the characters' interpretation (and evaluation) of other characters' words, gestures, facial expressions. And the invitation is extended to the translator. Inadequate intercultural competence makes her miss the subtle cues given in the original and, in consequence, distort the meaning of the text.

What the examples were meant to demonstrate is that the way in which people—and narrators in literary texts in particular—narrate events that happen in the world (either real or virtual) allow various interpretations, or inferences, about values, emotions, and emotional valuation. Conversely,

> [a]ssumptions about the world, what happened and why it happened, are inferred from the way the speaker designed the emotions and motivations of the actors. Thus, event construal and the construal of characters' 'inner psychologies' are closely orchestrated with regard to one another. Accounting for one—at least to a large degree—stands as an index for the other (Bamberg 1997: 219–220).

Deriving such inferences by the hearer/reader from an original narrative is never easy, because the process is conditioned by many factors,

psychological, sociological, and cultural. Deriving inferences for the purposes of translation is more difficult still, because of additional restrictions imposed by cultural differences, systemic discrepancies between languages and, last but not least, the system of values adhered to by the translator. Values and emotional valuations—the author's, the narrator's, the characters', the translator's, the reader's—are most important but at the same time, most difficult of all; indeed, they can make some confess that translation can appear to be 'the art of failure'.[5]

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[5] Umberto Eco, http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/u/umbertoeco136873.html [accessed on 5 August 2015].

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4

Alternative Evaluative Concepts to the Trinity of Bible Translation

James A. Maxey

Introduction

Translation Studies (TS) has questioned the validity and value of equivalence as a goal and measure of translation for several decades. I argue that equivalence is related to a set of criteria for translation assessment: accuracy, naturalness, and clarity; and that these too should be questioned. Nevertheless, these criteria remain the mainstay of quality assessment for much of the world of Bible translation (BT). Beyond their relationship to equivalence, these assessment criteria reflect a bias towards print translation that is inadequate for translation beyond print. Initially BT was restricted to the print medium. However, over the past decades, various

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types of non-print translations of the Bible have been produced, but they continue to be evaluated according to the same concepts as those of print translation that follow from a paradigm of equivalence. This essay explores these relations and looks more deeply at alternative evaluative concepts that anticipate multiple media from the perspective of the metaphor of hospitality: carefulness, authenticity, and transparency. These assertions are explored from the perspective of biblical performance translation.

Beyond Equivalence and Back

Anthony Pym (2010: 6) describes TS's relationship to equivalence in this way:

> In the course of the 1980s …, the equivalence paradigm came to be regarded as naïve or limited in scope. Mary Snell-Hornby, for example, jettisoned equivalence as presenting 'an illusion of symmetry between languages which hardly exists beyond the level of vague approximations and which distorts the basic problems of translation'[1]

In TS the move away from equivalence included an understanding of translation as manipulation and rewriting (see for example Hermans 1985; Lefevere 1992). Equivalence was unattainable and, in fact, was no longer a goal of translators who sought to demonstrate their agency through their translational choices. Translations were viewed as valid literary contributions outside of their relations to source texts. Even the concept of the original was put into question:

> [O]nce we start to consider the way in which both the terminology of translation and the idea of an authentic 'original' that exists somewhere beyond the text in front of us are used by writers, then the question of when a translation is or is not taking place becomes increasingly difficult to answer (Bassnett and Lefevere 1996: 39).

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[1] Anthony Pym, along with others such as Mona Baker, continues to use the term 'equivalence' (see Kenny 2002: 77–80).

These paradigmatic shifts in TS called into question the evaluative concepts of accuracy, naturalness, and clarity.[2] Natural domesticated translations were accused of hiding translators' identities and their colonial agendas. In addition, the assumption that translations were to be clear—disambiguating the options for readers—demonstrated a modern view of monovalent meaning. As for clarity, a singular authorial intention and readers' capacities to decipher this text-bound meaning was assumed. Each of these assertions about accuracy, naturalness, and clarity was not tenable from a TS perspective.

At the same time, these evaluative concepts became reinforced in BT as is evident from the marketing of Bibles that assured consumers of faithfully accurate translations from the original texts, translated in clear and natural contemporary language. For example, the Common English Bible's preface states, 'The CEB translators balance rigorous accuracy in the rendition of ancient texts with an equally passionate commitment to clarity of expression in the target language' (CEB 2011: XIII). The ideologies held to maintain these evaluative concepts promote the unchangeablity of the Bible and at the same time assert the 'infinitely translatable' nature of the Bible (Walls 1996: 22).

BT and Quality Assessment

Since the middle of the twentieth century there has been an historic increase in the number of language communities hosting the translation of the Christian Bible (Noss 2007). This increase coincides with institutional developments in BT with commonly held goals, strategies, and methods.[3] Eugene A. Nida's sea change in BT in the mid-twentieth century by suggesting dynamic/functional equivalence instead of

[2] Descriptive Translation Studies and especially Polysystem Theory as presented by Itamar Even-Zohar and Gideon Toury opened the way to explore translational norms that did not think in terms of absolutes or limiting comparisons to source and target in translation. Adequacy and acceptability were terms proposed in such contexts along with proposals for norms in translation (see for example Toury 2012).

[3] See for example the statements of basic translation principles from the Forum of Bible Agencies International: http://www.forum-intl.org/resources [accessed on 14 August 2015].

identity of form (Nida and Taber 1969) eventually came under scrutiny by TS scholars. Although Nida's functional equivalence was primarily interested in modern audiences having equivalent responses to the Bible's message as those of antiquity, Nida did open the door to meaning equivalence when he stated: 'meaning must be given priority, for it is the content of the message which is of prime importance for Bible translating' (Nida and Taber 1969: 13). In addition, this type of equivalence was supported by Nida's componential analysis and the so-called conduit model of communication, following generative linguistics' notion of the kernel (Nida 1975). Other Bible translators latched on to the notion of equivalent meaning and, once they did, the criteria for assessing translations became entrenched as accuracy, naturalness, and clarity (see for example Beekman and Callow [1974] 1984; Barnwell 2002; Larson [1984] 1997). The resultant epistemological assertion along with subsequent meaning-based strategies has been critiqued not only by TS but also by cognitive linguistics and alternative inference-based communication models of translation such as relevance theory (see for example Gutt 2000; Wilt 2003).

A prime and influential example of this canonized trinity of BT comes from a BT manual first published in 1975, subsequently translated into French and Spanish, and used by thousands of BT practitioners (Barnwell [1975] 2002: 24, emphasis in original):

> A good translation should be:
>   **ACCURATE** The translator must re-express the meaning of the original message **as exactly as possible** in the language into which he is translating.
>   **CLEAR** The translation should be **clear and understandable**. The translator aims to communicate the message in a way that people can readily understand.
>   **NATURAL** A translation should not sound 'foreign'. It should not sound like a translation at all, but like someone speaking in the natural, everyday way.

The archives of the journal *The Bible Translator* have scores of articles that assert and assume these criteria. Take for example the 1977 article on 'The Good News Bible Translation Principles' (TBT 1977: 410):

Accuracy, which is the first and central aim of the translation, is measured by the degree to which the reader of the translation understands the meaning of the text in the same way as the reader of the original text did. The following principles are to be applied in the structuring of the English text:

    1. The language is to be clear and natural, according to the canons of good American English usage.

Such criteria were used not only to guide translators, but also to review translations (Newman 1980: 325, emphasis in original).[4]

The two basic criteria for evaluating any translation of the Scriptures are *reliability* and *readability.* A translation must first of all be reliable in that it faithfully and accurately represents the meaning of the original text as found in the best manuscripts available. But a translation must also be readable. It must reflect the natural idiom of the intended audience, and it must be within the range of their expectation and comprehension.

With multiple other BT publications over the years having assumed and asserted the trinity of BT quality assessment with accuracy, naturalness, and clarity, numerous consequences of such evaluative concepts can be noted. Meaning is singular and located in the text and can be discovered and transferred without changing. Translation's influence is viewed as unilateral—from source to target/host language. Translation is viewed primarily as comparing a target text to a source text to determine what is lost; gains in translation are seldom discussed and often only as critiques. Translations and translators are viewed as neutral and their work objective—thus, having the goal of not influencing the translation process. All such assertions correspond to claims of equivalence and a modernist view of meaning. These claims and views are routinely questioned (and condemned) in TS today. For example, Edwin Gentzler and Lawrence Venuti are highly critical of BT and its theoretical assumptions (Gentzler 2001: 44–48; Venuti 2008: 16–18). Poststructuralism addresses much of this in terms of questioning author intent and proposing receptionalism, whereby gaps of indeterminacy are interpreted

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[4] Elsewhere from the same author: 'But no matter how miserably we may fail in any other aspect of our task, we must above all else be faithful to the meaning of the original' (Newman 1987: 411).

by readers/audiences. However, even when notions of meaning, descriptions of translation, models of communication, and the objectivity of translators are problematized, often the same criteria of quality assessment are promulgated in BT: accuracy, naturalness, and clarity.[5]

Evaluative Concepts Beyond Print

Despite its historical roots in orality, the Bible in the modern era is often synonymous with the printed book. Theories, principles, and methods of translation were developed with the assumption of the print medium. This assumption reinforced the criteria for the evaluation of translations. Non-print translations of the Bible (into song, theatre, and film, for example) were designated 'adaptations' and not considered 'faithful translations', Take for example the following explanation to the question, 'Is the rock opera *Jesus Christ Superstar* biblical?'[6]

> Upon closer inspection, however, the biblical failings of *Jesus Christ Superstar* become apparent. When a story is retold, a certain amount of interpretation is required. The author's ideas, presuppositions, and opinions are injected. In this retelling of Jesus' passion, the character and motivations of both Jesus and Judas are re-imagined and reinterpreted.

The critic's assessment of such retelling and interpretation is generally negative with a cumulative summary: the opera/film is not a faithful translation. Indeed the question of fidelity or faithfulness of non-print biblical material became more prominent towards the end of the twentieth century in BT circles. Two important volumes demonstrate the issues and ways to respond to such issues from a variety of perspectives (Hodgson and Soukup 1997; Soukup and Hodgson 1997). One of the chapters' titles addresses this issue head on: 'Faithfulness: A Wider Perspective'. Yet, this approach seems to be a reiteration of Nida's theory a generation earlier (McFry 1999: 7):

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[5] Although not supported universally in TS, these criteria can be looked to for particular purposes from the perspective of *Skopostheorie* (Nord 1997: 31–33).

[6] http://www.gotquestions.org/Jesus-Christ-Superstar.html [accessed on 6 August 2015].

> In the field of [Bible] translation we define 'accuracy' and make judgments about it in terms of our understanding of the principles of functional equivalence. We say that a translation is accurate, and therefore faithful, if the present-day receptor in his situation responds to it in the same way as the original receptor did in his situation, in terms of his understanding of the meaning and his feeling about the message.

Research for BT beyond print has continued in recent years by framing the issue in terms of inter-semiotic translation (IST).[7] To date, four IST seminars have been held, and as the name suggests, a primary theoretical underpinning has been that of semiotics. As a result, accuracy has been understood differently: 'Beyond a print-definition of accuracy, fidelity can be understood as faithful to a genre, or medium' (ISTS 2012: 6). One of the IST seminars focused on the work of John Miles Foley, a classicist and oral tradition scholar. One of Foley's contribution to the discussion of evaluative concepts of translation comes from his Pathways Project, a website that models the similarities of oral traditions with the internet. Foley's distinguishes three types of communicative environments: Oral (oAgora), Textual (tAgora), and Electronic (eAgora), comparing them to Greek classical marketplaces—*agora*. He indicates the following with regard to accuracy:

> A tricky concept, *accuracy*. And very often a code-word summoned to praise tAgora activities while denigrating transactions in the oAgora and eAgora. We're told that oral traditions can't preserve history accurately, for example, or that the web is far too subject to change or multiplicity to be a really dependable medium. We're asked to subscribe to (literally, to 'under-write') the credo that text is the only possible vehicle for safely and faithfully conveying the immutable data we need to run our cultures. Beware the oral and the virtual; fidelity lies solely in brick-and-mortar. Or so goes the widespread and enduring myth of Textual Accuracy. … At root, accuracy simply means 'taking care of.' It may come as a surprise, but there is nothing fundamental in the term itself that mandates textual definition.

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[7] Although coined by Roman Jakobson (1959: 232–239), the term is used here to differentiate translation other than print and suggests that semiotics (in all its approaches and perspectives) is a helpful way to address these types of translation.

The English word derives from Latin *accuratus*, with the meaning taken care of, exact.[8]

 Foley's premise is that one should take into consideration the medium when defining accuracy:

In regard to media, then, there are no perfect and complete—no universally accurate—representations. There is only a selection of lenses, each of which offers a particular kind of accuracy, an idiosyncratic take on reality. From this principle it follows that a lack of [textual] accuracy in the oAgora or eAgora should be not necessarily be interpreted as an error or shortcoming, but, at least potentially, as its own, agora-specific brand of accuracy.[9]

 These discussions of media's influence on translation and evaluative concepts for translation call into question the viability of the equivalence paradigm's evaluation criteria of accuracy, naturalness, and clarity. Rather than working from a paradigm of equivalence, I suggest that an assessment of translation could be better articulated from a metaphor of hospitality. Below I sketch out evaluative concepts based on this paradigm.

Hospitality's Evaluative Concepts

The metaphor of hospitality asks us to consider the other. For Derrida, hospitality evokes distinctions of the other as invited or a visitor. And the host cannot only be viewed as one who freely welcomes but also due to laws of hospitality can in a real sense become the hostage. Obliged hospitality can make for a hostile host. Derrida suggests this ambivalence with the French expression *pas d'hospitalité* (which can mean 'a step of hospitality' or 'no hospitality'). He (2000: 123–125) suggests the role reversals of hospitality:

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[8] http://www.pathwaysproject.org/pathways/show/Accuracy [accessed on 6 August 2015], emphasis in original. There is also a book publication that parallels the website (Foley 2012).
[9] Ibid.

> So it is indeed the master, the one who invites, the inviting host, who becomes the hostage – and who really always has been. And the guest, the invited hostage, becomes the one who invites the one who invites, the master of the host. The guest becomes the host's host. The guest (hôte) becomes the host (hôte) of the host (hôte).

Ricoeur (2006) is the one who suggests 'linguistic hospitality' as a way to talk about how the other is received in translation. In TS, the concept is profoundly discussed by many—from Friedrich Schleiermacher ([2000] 2012: 49) to Antoine Berman (1984) to Lawrence Venuti (2008) who talks about domestication and foreignization, or as Bella Brodzki (2007: 8) puts it, estrangement.

With regards to BT, hospitality entered discussions with the term 'acceptability' (see for example Nida 1988).[10] Rather than comparing with the source text or the target/host language, acceptability extends beyond a linguistic category of evaluation. In many ways it is a marketing question. Translations that are deemed accurate, natural, and clear could be rejected by the host community. The reasons vary. At times it's the materiality of the translation—the quality or colour of the cover or of the print or paper. Sometimes it's due to the orthography used. Sometimes there are ideological reasons: a term is deemed to belong to a certain sector of the community. For example, in the Vuté NT translation project in Cameroon there was a discussion between the Protestant and Catholic translators as to which word should be used for Jesus's relatives—cousins or siblings. Whereas the trinity of BT—accuracy, naturalness, and clarity—comes from a paradigm of equivalence, acceptability seems to belong elsewhere. I would suggest that it belongs to a paradigm of hospitality. I am quick to pre-empt those who may think I consider hospitality unequivocally benevolent. As Derrida suggests above, hosts can be taken hostage by their guests. In the BT context, there has often been such an insidious reversal. Foreign guests have often become the ones to demand and determine the type of evaluation necessary for translation (see for example Rafael 1993; Comaroff and Comaroff 1991).

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[10] Acceptability was a discussion much earlier in TS, with Gideon Toury's work on translational norm (see for example Toury 1978).

What does a paradigm of hospitality consist of for BT? I would propose the following: carefulness, authenticity, and transparency. Borrowing from Foley's Pathways Project, we learn that the word accuracy has etymological roots in carefulness. Care needs to be given to the oral traditions as they are brought into new circumstances. As suggested above, Foley asserts that the term 'accuracy' needs to be problematized according to the social interaction sites in which humans communicate and conduct business (Foley's *agora*) of each particular tradition. Therefore, textual accuracy has different features and values from that of oral or electronic accuracy. From a paradigm of hospitality, carefulness becomes something significantly different than print-based accuracy.

Using a term like 'carefulness' has some drawbacks. One might think that this is a type of warning to 'keep hands off' the tradition or text. Such an attitude is due to a fear of damaging the object of care. But this is far from what is meant here. Carefulness should not make a translator hesitant or afraid to 'touch the text'; rather, it is motived by engagement in manipulating it with care. Another misunderstanding of carefulness might be related to the idea of caregiving in a context of caring for the elderly. The aim with such caregiving would be to maintain the identity and wellbeing of those in a care facility. However, the carefulness proposed here does not aim at keeping things the same but at anticipating change. This type of change is done with care as traditions encounter newness. This encounter does not disregard the past as it looks to the future. Yet it does seek newness from the past into the present, a type of Bhabhaian hybridity (Bhabha 1994).

Authenticity underscores the fact that the host community, its language, its medium, and its mediator remain self-differentiated in translation. Discussions of world literature raise the issue of a community's identity when their minority culture is swept up with a world language translation (see for example Apter 2013). Likewise, global canons of literature can threaten a minority community's identity (see for example Bailey and Pippen 1996). Both threats come from a type of colonization. Authenticity, therefore, is a question of power relations and ideologies. Such threats have been addressed by translation strategies (see for example Venuti 2008: 32–34; Gentzler 2008: 1–7). From a cultural identity perspective, a translation is judged by how the host community's

authenticity remains intact. This is not an attempt at an unchangeability of identity; change is inevitable, but to remain authentic is the aim.

Authenticity also has to do with the language used in translation. This is similar to the classical concept of 'naturalness'. The aim here is not to create an unnatural 'translationese,' whereby the use of such language, style, and discourse is not found elsewhere in the community's literary polysystem. More will be said on this under transparency, but I limit the discussion here to the posture of the host language in relation to the foreign language. While respecting the foreign, the host must not lose self-respect, or put otherwise, authenticity.

Authenticity also addresses the issue of medium. In fact, the renewed interest in performativity and the suggestion of a performance turn in TS underscores the need to look beyond equivalence and its quality control criteria to concepts that support translation beyond print (see for example Bermann 2014). A translation intended for print must be dramatically changed for another medium. Authenticity in this case of medium suggests remaining true to itself. Each medium has its own set of internal parameters to communicate not only naturally but also authentically. We have all experienced what is often called a 'poor adaptation' of a book into a film. The IST was not authentic to its new medium. A translation's assessment must include an appraisal of the use of a medium's parameters to demonstrate its authenticity.

Finally, the authenticity of the mediator/translator is of great value in a paradigm of hospitality. This value has been spoken about differently by several TS scholars. Generally, the assertion is for the agency of translator. The translator's agency is evident by her translation choices that result in the translation. It begins with the decision to translate and continues with the selection of what to translate. From there, agency is demonstrated through the interpretive nature of a translator's mediation and negotiation. To lose oneself as a translator (or to become invisible à la Venuti) is to become inauthentic. The BT industry is notorious for not giving credit to the translators—except when a translation is done by one individual.[11] With modern-day committee translations of the Bible,

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[11] Twentieth-century counterexamples would be Kenneth Taylor of *The Living Bible* and Eugene Peterson of *The Message*, along with historic examples of Martin Luther.

recognition of translators is fleeting. Consider the projects of the revised New International Version and the Common English Bible. Both projects make clear (on their websites) who is involved in translating the Bible.[12] In this case, the translators' visibility as theologically conservative biblical scholars is meant to assure accuracy to a source text. Although this demonstrates a certain authenticity, it seems to me that the argument from both of these projects' websites is to demonstrate to stakeholders how the translators are not altering the biblical text. In other words, the translators' visibility is ephemeral in only becoming visible long enough to declare that the translators are ultimately invisible in the translation.

To speak of transparency from a paradigm of hospitality is suggestive of translating alterity. A paradigm of hospitality suggests that alterity must be recognized and visible in some way through the translation. A translation of material that is so utterly foreign to an audience today (such as the Bible) has to decide how it is going to treat such alterity. Domesticating the Bible would remove traces of its alterity. A host that does not recognize/reflect the otherness of the guest but seeks for her to be identical with him is one that is disrespectful and ultimately not hospitable. This is not a return to a dichotomy of foreign vs domesticated, but an acknowledgment that although a translation is a re-creation, it is nevertheless a translation of something other.

Timothy Beal (2013), in his paper on translating alterity in relation to Emmanuel Levinas, assesses the situation for BT in this way:

> Indeed, throughout most of the history of Bible translation, and especially in the equivalency-based common-language approaches that have dominated the field for over half a century, 'translating alterity' has meant reducing the text's otherness to sameness, familiarity, fully present and available meaning. Such approaches to translation recall Levinas' critique of western philosophy's 'insurmountable allergy' to 'the other that remains other.'

Following Levinas's distinction between 'saying' (*le dire*) and 'the said' (*le dit*), Beal suggests the following (see for example Levinas 1969, 1985, 1998):

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[12] http://www.thenivbible.com/about-the-niv/meet-the-translators/; http://www.commonenglish-bible.com/explore/our-scholars [accessed on 10 August 2015].

In the same way the pre-ontological saying, as openness to the other, is present but not accounted for within the said, can we conceive of a translating within the translated, that is, as a presence that destabilizes and unsettles any pretense of closure or total equivalence in the translation? Translation as a hosting of a new saying in the said, leaving room for what is excluded, the presence of an absence, recollecting the unassimilable remainder that unsays what's being said?

Philip Towner argues in favour of alterity with regard to BT ('Hearing voices' 2–3; see also 'Resonance, Dissonance, Resistance' and 'Translating Alterity'):

> Fluency itself is not the problem; rather to be lamented is the erasure of all traces of foreignness in the text or dialogue, and along with them the voice of the foreign Other, with its potential to communicate something new, even if jarringly strange, to a receiving cultural discourse …The exciting hazard to be faced in this process of transfer in the case of literature is that the Other voice, upon entering the polysystem, would alter the systemic chemistry, dislocating and relocating preexisting voices in the new discursive environment as it claims its space.

Linguistic, cultural, and temporal distance from the composition of the biblical texts and their translation in today's world presents many challenges. These challenges are generally understood as resolved when we can tame this foreignness by making it sound familiar. The troubling result could be that hearers and readers project their contemporary cognitive maps onto completely dissimilar situations. Transparency does not have this goal. Again Towner: 'The foreign voice emits a discernible "difference" that colloquialization and domestication can suppress or censor altogether' ('Hearing Voices', 22). Transparency as an evaluative concept to (Bible) translation does not require a uniform strategy or *skopos* for translation. It does, however, require that one address the issue of the alterity of the source text. The degree to which alterity is ignored is the degree to which the quality of the translation is diminished.

This proposal of a paradigm of hospitality is the result of thinking about translation beyond a print perspective. Previous evaluative concepts such as accuracy, clarity, naturalness—all coming from a paradigm

of equivalence—were not broad enough for non-print translation. Thinking beyond print pushes us to think beyond text-bound parameters for translation. As Bassnett and others have remarked, embodied performances can be helpful in stretching our ideas about what translation is and how to evaluate it (Bassnett 2014: 153–157).

Bible Translation Performance

Above we looked at Foley's research on oral tradition along with how semiotics has contributed significantly to the IST seminars. These seminars have in particular looked at the issue of performance and translation. Translating performance problematizes the goal of recuperating the past in translation. If it is accepted that certain biblical material was performed in antiquity, there is an acknowledgment that what remains—a written text—is only part of this ephemeral performance (see Maxey 2009). The performance itself cannot be recuperated. Therefore, for practical purposes, one limits oneself to recuperating the written text as much as possible. This has been the historic goal of BT—especially since the Protestant Reformation.

But what if the goal for BT was not that of recuperation? What if the goal of BT was re-creation? What if the translator's glance was not retrospective but rather prospective? What if the measurements of quality were not the trinity of BT emanating from a paradigm of equivalence: accuracy, naturalness, clarity? I suggest that performance translation helps us imagine other ways of viewing translation. As André Lefevere (1992) and others since him have suggested, translation should be viewed as rewriting, as a creative act.

Such reposturing of the translator to look forward rather than backward changes many things. But in some ways, this reposturing is what is required when a translator takes her audience into consideration. As much respect as a translator might have for the source text and language of yesterday, translation by its very nature is intended for audiences of today and tomorrow. Taking into consideration the audience requires that translators create or re-create something new. And the question is

not so much of fidelity to the past but rather is the translation acceptable or welcome in the present?[13]

In the 1990s and early 2000s, at the invitation of a national church, I was involved in BT in Cameroon. As a trained linguist I was involved in the linguistic research and documentation of one of the 270+ languages of Cameroon—Vuté. I worked on developing with the community a writing system for this predominantly oral language. I worked with local communities on the translation of a variety of materials, including health brochures, traditional folktales, literacy curricula, and religious material—including the Christian New Testament (NT).

As in many BT projects in communities with a newly developed writing system, literacy was a difficult challenge. The reasons are many, ranging from the dominance of French in the region to the complicated tone-marking system of the Vuté orthography. These challenges reflect the history of the Bible and media. My particular area of interest begins with orality studies and expands to performance. I am interested in the historic realities of how media and Bible inform translation in terms of legitimation, goals, and methods. In particular, I am interested in how performance challenges our assumptions about the Bible and translation.

A decade ago I did field research on the relationship of translation done for print, translation done for performance, and performance as translation. This took place primarily in Cameroon where I worked with experienced Bible translators from the Vuté community. The research was comparative in nature. I first took sections of the pre-published Vuté NT. This was done with a print medium in mind where the audience was envisaged as individuals silently reading the printed biblical text. I compared this translation with a translation of the same passages that were completed by the same translators—however, the translation was intended as a script for performers. Oral features of the original Greek text were discussed along with rhetorical devices of antiquity. The verbal art of the Vuté language, culture, and register were explored. Thirdly, I examined transcripts of audio-visual recordings of live performances of these same biblical passages. The performances were diverse in setting

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[13] Admittedly, this is a progressive theological posture. It does not, however, dismiss the historical value of the Bible.

and performers. These three 'texts' were the subject of my comparative research: (1) pre-publication NT; (2) performance script; (3) performance transcript. Results of the research described the differences in the three texts. Beyond the details of these differences, some comments about orality and Bible as well as observations on how one conceives of translation and performance can be made (see Maxey 2009: 167–192).

Oral tradition has always been under discussion with biblical studies—especially since the European Enlightenment (see for example Kelber 1983). However, it is only within the past thirty years that orality studies have had a noticeable impact on biblical studies.[14] Such studies have been extended by performance with an eclectic approach called biblical performance criticism (BPC). This approach 'Reframes the biblical materials in the context of oral/scribal cultures of Judaism and early Christianity, aspects of which include the performance event, performer, audience, context, and text'.[15] The claim of BPC is that initial biblical compositions were performed—performance in the sense of an embodied presentation that interacts with a communal audience. Such a claim dramatically challenges many of the assumptions of biblical studies that has oftentimes anachronistically projected a modern view of communication onto antiquity. In addition, BPC challenges biblical scholars' thoughts about translation. For most involved in biblical studies, they view translation in a similar way as do many classicists— a philological exercise in which knowing the source language(s) is sufficient to doing translation. However, BPC suggests that this view of translation is inadequate. Given that several researchers of BPC are also performers for modern-day audiences, their view of translation is more audience oriented. Nevertheless, their view of translation remains in general a linguistic exercise. Interlingual translation is done for performance. Generally speaking, non-verbal communication (gestures, proximity, setting, etc.) is decided upon in an ad hoc fashion and is not considered a part of translation proper (contrary to Poyatos 1997).

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[14] Bibliographical information available at https://www.zotero.org/groups/biblical_performance_criticism [accessed on 14 August 2015].

[15] http://biblicalperformancecriticism.org/index.php/12-newsflashes/newsflash/12-what-is-performance-criticism [accessed on 14 August 2015].

My own research in this area has benefitted greatly from orality studies, ethnopoetics, and performance studies as well as several aspects of translation studies (see for example Ong 1982; Havelock 1986; Hymes 2003; Schechner 2002; Carlson 1996). I have two general assertions with regard to BT and performance: (1) performance is translation; (2) what we translate is experience. The first assertion leans heavily upon semiotics. The second assertion is related to the first in that performances are experienced. In turn, when we translate performance, we are translating an experience.

As I have stated elsewhere (Maxey 2012: 14):

> The strongest link between biblical performance criticism and intersemiotic translation is this: biblical performance criticism does not simply involve textual translation from one language to another. Biblical performance criticism understands that performance itself *is* translation. And the theoretical support for such an assertion resides with semiotics. Therefore, when Bible translation is discussed in a biblical performance criticism framework, it is important not to fall into the trap of thinking that the translation aspect only involves an exercise from biblical languages to some other language. Translation takes place in the performance, through sound, silence, gestures, and interactions with the audience.

One of my early memories of a performance of biblical material is the *experience* that I had. Subsequent performances provided for more experiences. And when I became a performer myself, my experiences expanded. Having an experience is not limited to participating in an embodied performance. We experience things as we read silently and alone. We experience films, recorded music, and social events. This has led me to think about what we actually translate. As much as we would want to say that we are translating a text, many, if not most of us, understand that we are translating our experience of a text. Even when we do background research on the socio-cultural contexts of when that text was produced, we nevertheless 'read' the text from our social locations.

With BT, we often see the source text—constructed texts that are the result of sophisticated scholarly research—as what we are translating. But even the manuscripts examined by text critics are the result of the scribes'

experience with previous manuscripts. And at some historical point when the first manuscripts were written, they were done so as a result of some performative experience. The technology of writing informed the intersemiotic translation of these experiences. This reflects the ongoing semiosis triangle (see for example Stecconi 1999; Hodgson 2007). Likewise today, when biblical material is performed, we can understand that these performances are intersemiotic translation of previous experiences. Thinking in these terms, I think, frees up translators who are no longer translating a stable unchanging text, but rather are translating carefully a tradition that has become their authentic experiences of previous authentic experiences, while remaining transparent to the otherness of the earlier traditions.

None of this is done in a vacuum. Experiences are not all equal when located in asymmetric relations; nor are they all beneficial. The ethics of translation, or more specifically of translators, becomes crucial. The history of BT underscores this. This is what we see when well-intentioned missionaries colluded with colonial conquerors over the past two to three centuries. We see similar ethical questions in play with World Literature today where national literatures can be colonized by world languages. Such questions do not call for a moratorium on translation. However, they do make us more aware of the ethical issues at play in what is translated, by whom, for whom, in which medium and so on (see for example Pym 2012). Perhaps the notion of hospitality can help us think through these issues.

Hospitality's Evaluation of Biblical Performance Translation

How might hospitality's evaluation criteria of carefulness, authenticity, and transparency assess performance translation? This question merits a response with more space than is available here. Rather than speaking about this in vague scenarios, I assess briefly below the experience of performance translation in the Vuté community with passages from the NT.

Carefulness to the tradition was demonstrated by determining that the point of departure for such translation was with the canonical written

text of the NT. However, this text was qualified by understanding that this written text was a translation of several experiences. In antiquity stories were told and received by audiences who in turn performed them for other audiences. Such performances were eventually selectively written down. Once written, others experienced these texts, making copies and additions (and revisions) through the centuries until textual critics made available in the twentieth century the source text for the Vuté translators—generally mediated through several printed French translations. Such a process was understood by the translators, who comprehended that both care and human mediation are a part of the source texts.

The Vuté performance translation was careful to carry on this tradition while asserting its own authenticity.[16] Ideophones were added to the translation script (while not a part of the printed translation) (see Noss 1985, 2001). For example, when it comes to the action of the paralytic rolling up his mat as he stands and walks out in front of everyone, the performance translation script uses this expression: *hɔ̀ɔr hɔ̀ɔr hɔ̀ɔr* for the sound of rolling up the mat. The performers added interactive aspects to the translation to assure that the audience was following and engaged in the performance. For example, they would ask the audience a question to be sure that they were following the story up to that point: 'You understand, don't you?'. These are authentic parts to any Vuté oral performance. The performers' language, gestures, and very presence (both proximity and settings) demonstrated the cultural authenticity of these performances as they were juxtaposed with Vuté oral traditions and folktales. For example, when the paralytic was healed this occurred 'in their eyes' (meaning in front of the whole crowd). This phrase was accompanied by the performer pointing with his index fingers to his own eyes. In fact, such juxtaposition helped the audiences assess how aspects of the performances reinforced or challenged the audiences' identity.

Although authentic, it was clear that these performances were something other for the Vuté people. Performers reflected this by their creation of oral 'footnotes'—socio-cultural parenthetic statements that were not

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[16] Each of the following examples is taken from the passage of the NT of Mark 2.1–12 where four friends carry their paralytic friend to Jesus to be healed.

in the earlier translation scripts.[17] Foreignness was evident throughout the performances, but it was accessible to the audiences by the mediation of the performers. Indeed the performers were translating not only by the language used but in the sense of helping the audience understand the foreign customs and concepts. Alterity was not domesticated, but was approached through descriptions and metaphors.

It would appear that the Vuté performance translations were hospitable. Asking if they were equivalent is nonsensical. The equivalence criteria simply were not established to handle something like performance translation.

Conclusion

It is too early to determine how influential this research will be on the BT industry, but uniform allegiance to equivalence and its print-based criteria of quality assessment has been severely questioned. The use of such terms as accuracy, naturalness, and clarity continues to create a confusion of goals and evaluative concepts. For this reason, alternative criteria—carefulness, authenticity, transparency—from the metaphor of hospitality have been proposed. The next step in this project will be to assess various genres and media of translations—both from the sacred text and other types. The utility of such alternative evaluative concepts will become evident. What is clear at this point is that hospitality is significantly different from equivalence. Hospitality anticipates the agency and creativity of translators while negotiating source texts with host audiences. This generative metaphor offers space for consideration beyond assessment criteria to other ways of thinking about translation. What are the motivations for (Bible) translation? What is the relationship of the foreign guest with the host? How do media interact with the making of meaning? Such are the types of question still to address from a paradigm of hospitality.

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[17] For example, during one episode, several people climbed up on the roof of a house and dug a hole in the roof. This could not happen with a typical Vuté house. The performer explained the type of house construction in antiquity that made such behaviour feasible.

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5

Submission and Its Conflicting Value Systems: A Case Study

David B. Bell

Introduction

If translation theory has proved anything throughout its long and distinguished history, it is that translation is far from a simple process (Grammenidis and Nenopoulou 2007: 300). The days when translators looked for the 'correct' word which was the 'same' in the target language as in the source text are past. Even the thought of finding corresponding surface structures in different languages which share the same deep structure (Nida and Taber 1969: 33), is somewhat *passé*. What is more, research indicates that it was naïve to assume that words had meanings or messages encoded in them (Webber 2005: 37). While we are still far from understanding just how meaning works exactly, we know that it is much more complex than anyone had imagined before, for words subtly change meanings and take on different colours based on the way they are used in specific contexts (Tuggy 2003). In fact, one word can set off a huge

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explosion of meaning based on multiple shared connections with other concepts. Thus, those who seek to translate any given linguistic expression often struggle to find words and expressions which will in some way elicit similar semantic connections in the target language as the original utterance did in the source language. They work between two cultures or systems of values to negotiate successful communication. But the real complication comes because no two cultures share exactly the same sets of values (Pauwels 1995: 11), and thus, no communication act is completely equivalent to another that happens in a different moment of time, in a different cultural context, and especially, in a different language. This is not to say that translation is impossible, but rather, that there is no one 'correct' translation that perfectly represents the original. Rather, every translation negotiates meaning with a series of gains and losses (Bassnett-McGuire 1980: 29–30), hopefully minute enough so that the final result will still retain some degree of identity with the source text.

One of the situations in which translations often experience notable gain or loss is in the treatment of evaluative concepts. As opposed to descriptive concepts which are relatively straightforward, evaluative terms become much more complex to break down (Kirchin 2013: 11). Speakers in a given context add to the associations and implications of the term in question, thus creating an incredibly powerful communication device. For example, the Spanish adjective *majo/a* refers to some sort of agreeable characteristic, roughly related to beauty (*Diccionario de la Real Academia de la Lengua* 2014). But the term awakens many more favourable connections, such as those who go out of their way to help others. Quite simply, it refers to just the kind of person that you would want to run into and get to know better. And every time you meet a person like this, the adjective *majo/a* takes on a new face and fills itself out in your memory. It is precisely a term like this that becomes extremely difficult to translate, for no one English term seems to do justice to the network of meanings extending out from the Spanish term. Thus, unfortunately, translators often find it difficult to be satisfied with their own work, for they are aware of those holes which seem to evade any simple solution.

If, in modern languages, such terms make translation challenging, one can only imagine what happens when the translation deals with an ancient text, proceeding from a culture which is foreign both to the

translator and the target audience. In this chapter, I will discuss one such evaluative concept taken from the pages of the New Testament (NT), which presents its own special challenge to translators and readers of the Bible. But, unlike the example above, this term does not tend to awaken positive feeling. This is most certainly the case for the target audience, and one can suspect that it must also have been similar for the original audience, and for that reason it appears repeated so often throughout the NT. It involves the concept of Biblical submission connected to the Greek term ὑποτάσσω (*hypotasso*).

The purpose of this chapter is not so much to critique specific Bible translations, although some comments will certainly head in that direction. Rather, I hope to notice how this concept has slowly lost its 'original' baggage from the first century, and in many cases, takes on new target language baggage, to the point that the modern reader reacts to the Biblical concept much in the same way one would to a very different English evaluative concept, without ever realizing that the two may very well be extremely different concepts.

The English Translations for *Hypotasso*

The Background of the English Translations

The Greek verb in question appears in 31 verses of the NT.[1] Traditionally, it has most frequently been translated with the English verb *submit* or the construction *be subject to*.[2]

These translations fall in line linguistically with the Vulgate's normal treatment of the term, *subjicio, subjecta*. In fact, etymologically speaking, the English terms, as well as the Latin ones for that matter, seem to match up nicely with the etymology of the Greek term. They all indicate

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[1] There is also a related noun form that appears in four more verses. Later on in the chapter I will mention some of these noun uses as well.

[2] In a sampling of common English Bibles, *hypotasso* is translated as 'be subject to' or 'submit' in 90 % of the occurrences. The Bibles consulted were the *King James Version*, the *New American Standard Bible*, the *New International Version*, the *English Standard Version,* and the *Holman Christian Standard Bible*.

a position which is below something else as well as an action—to send or put or command. As far as etymology is concerned, it would seem that the English translations are a perfect fit for the Greek term. But, as is often the case, this tends to be almost more deceptive than when words are completely unrelated to each other. It works the same way as borrowed terms between modern languages, which often take on a much more specific usage than the original term had in its language. To return once again to Spanish, the borrowing of the English *meeting* (*mitin*) ends up referring to a political rally, and the English term 'plaza', no longer limited to an open area in a city like its Spanish homograph, may even refer to a shopping centre along a busy highway! So it is that the similarity between English translations and the Greek term *hypotasso* does not guarantee successful translation.

Definitions for the English Translations

Before looking further at the Biblical examples of the Greek term, it is important to establish good working definitions of the English terms in question. Both *submit* and *to be subject to* work in a context with an authority. *The Oxford English Dictionary* states that the word *submit* is used reflexively to refer to 'plac[ing] oneself under the control of a person in authority or power; to become subject, surrender oneself or yield to a person or his rule, etc.' (1989: 36). The definition of *subject* is very similar in that it states the following: 'that is under the dominion or rule of a sovereign, or a conquering or ruling power; owing allegiance or obedience to a sovereign ruler or state. […] Submissive; obedient' (1989: 23). One important element in both of these definitions is the idea that both words involve an action. It is to 'place oneself under the control' of another or 'obedience'. The context suggests that these words are associated with one who rules or exercises dominion over another; thus, one must yield or surrender (having been defeated). In the context of modern twenty-first-century language, these terms carry a lot of emotional baggage, awakening historical images and connections which tend to be very negative. If we then begin to see them in the context of a wife submitting to her husband (Ephesians 5:22), in the minds of most people it sounds

as if the Bible treats a wife like a prisoner of war under the dominion of a master, with no right to think for herself!

The Use of the English Translations

But in case this initial analysis seems to exaggerate the case, let us go back and analyse the different contexts where this word appears but was not translated as *submit* or *be subject to*. As it turns out, these verses back up the initial evaluation of the English definitions, for the term is often translated directly as 'obedience'. The Authorized Version of 1611 translates this word as 'obey' on three different occasions (I Corinthians 14:34, Titus 2:5, Titus 2:9), dealing with wives and servants. The *New International Version* and the *Holman Christian Standard Bible* both translate the word as 'obey' in the description of Jesus's relationship with his parents (Luke 2:51), and the *Good News Bible* treats it as 'obedience' in six different verses (Luke 2:51, Luke 10:17, 20; Romans 8:7; Romans 13:1, 5), with reference to child–parent, creature-Creator, and citizen-government relationships. The *Good News Bible* goes on to use other translations elsewhere such as *to be under control* (I Corinthians 14:32), *to be in charge* (I Corinthians 14:34), *to be under rule* (I Corinthians 15:28; Philippians 3:21), *to follow leadership* (I Corinthians 16:16), *to make or place as ruler* (Hebrews 2:5, 8), or *to rule over* (I Peter 3:22). The definite impression that these translations give is that the Biblical concept translated deals with an action which is, to all practical effects, the same as obedience and control.

In fact, many of the commentaries back up this initial impression with their interpretation of the texts. One of the earliest, most widespread Bible commentaries in English was the *Geneva Bible* with its interpretive notes. The note for I Peter 2:13 jumps from *hypotasso* straight to obedience: 'First, he speaks of the obedience that is due both to the laws, and also to the magistrates both higher and lower' (Geneva Bible Notes 1557: 1 Peter 2:13). The same is true in the comment on Romans 13:1–5: 'Now he distinctly shows what subjects owe to their magistrates, that is, obedience' (Geneva Bible Notes 1557: Romans 13:1). In 1 Peter 3:1 it once again directly links *hypotasso* to obedience: '[Peter] sets forth the wives'

duties to their husbands, commanding them to be obedient' (Geneva Bible Notes 1557: 1 Peter 3:1). In every case, the note suggests that the text commands obedience, when in reality, there is another Greek term used in other texts to refer more specifically to concrete obedience. John Calvin's commentaries demonstrate the same tendency. In his commentary on Romans 13:1–5, he speaks of 'the common duty of obedience' and 'the rendering of obedience to magistrates, […] that we ought to obey them' (1540). When he comments on Titus 2:9, he states that 'they who are under the authority of others shall be obedient and submissive' (1550). In I Peter 2:13 he continues: 'As obedience with regard to magistrates is a part of honest or good conversation, he draws this inference as to their duty' (1551). Later in the same passage he writes: 'the obedience of servants to masters, and of wives also to their husbands, forms a part of civil or social subjection.' He suggests that I Peter 5:5 'bids every one that is inferior in age to obey the counsels of the elders' (ibid.).

It would be a mistake to think that Calvin never saw any distinction between *hypotasso* and 'obedience', for he comments as much in James 4:7: 'The submission which he recommends is that of humility; for he does not exhort us generally to obey God, but requires submission' (1551). And yet, in each of the passages mentioned above, he jumps directly to obedience as if it were the meaning of *hypotasso*.

This tendency to relate *hypotasso* directly to 'obedience' is by no means limited to the sixteenth century. Michael and Debi Pearl in their book *Created to Be His Helpmeet* (2004) state the following: 'Just as we are to obey government in every ordinance, and servants are to obey their masters, even the ones who are abusive and surly, "likewise, ye wives, be in subjection to your own husbands"' (2004: 264). Earlier, it is stated in even clearer terms: 'A husband has the authority to tell his wife what to wear, where to go, whom to talk to, how to spend her time, when to speak and when not to, even if he is unreasonable and insensitive…. Wives are to obey an unreasonable and surly husband, unless he were to command his wife to lie to the Holy Ghost' (ibid.: 260). Supposedly based upon the teaching of the NT, this book states that women are required to obey their husbands, even when they may be abusive. It is no wonder that so many people react so violently to what they perceive to be the Biblical concept of submission.

The NT Greek Concept of *Hypotasso*

Up to this point, the discussion has been limited to the semantic connections involved in the English words used to translate the Biblical passages in which the term in question appears, and the conclusions drawn are that the word in question deals with a behaviour—obedience to or compliance with specific types of authority. However, when one looks at the actual Greek term used in all of these verses, a very different concept begins to appear. It is not that it is a neutral term, for, as stated earlier, it seems that the fact that this concept is repeated as often as it is suggests that it is not a naturally positive concept or even a concept easy to adopt. The Greek term had picked up its own culture 'baggage' throughout the history of *koine* Greek, and so it should be no surprise that the cultural connections or values which the term elicited are different from those of the English words used to translated it. The biggest clue that the Greek term does not match up neatly with the English translations is found in two specific passages.

The first of these appears in Ephesians 5. Just before dealing with the relationship between husband and wife, the apostle gives a series of participial phrases which are the practical results of being filled with the Spirit (5:18). The last of these states: 'submitting to one another out of reverence for Christ' (Ephesians 5:21, *English Standard Version*). The fact that this verb appears with a reciprocal pronoun is very significant. The same construction is repeated in I Peter 5:5 (*Textus Receptus*)[3]: 'Yea, all of you be subject one to another' (*King James Version*). The function of the reciprocal pronoun seems to clash with the concept behind the English terms of submission or subjection, for if indeed submission in Paul's mind is an action which implies being under the control of another individual, mutual submission is almost absurd. Two people could take turns submitting to each other, but they could never really submit to each other at the same time and in the same way.

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[3] The repeated verb 'submitting' is missing in some manuscripts. The critical text reads as follows: 'μοίως νεώτεροι **ὑποτάγητε** πρεσβυτέροις, πάντες δὲ ἀλλήλοις [υποτασσομενοι TR textus receptus]] τὴν ταπεινοφροσύνην ἐγκομβώσασθε' Likewise, young men submit yourselves to the elders. And all to one another [submitting TR] clothe yourselves in humility.

Determining Meaning

When we started talking about the English translations for *hypotasso*, we looked at the word's etymology. But when we talk about meaning, we must bear in mind that etymology does not determine meaning (Padgett 2011). As stated earlier, the etymology of the common English translations is very similar to the Greek etymology. But that does not guarantee that its meaning is the same. In fact, we find that the Greek term is a compound word made up of a verb which appears frequently in a military context (see Luke 7:8). But this does not mean that the present term is therefore a military term! 'Usage determines the meaning of a word, both for a community of speakers and for an individual author. The origin of a term and its historical development do not determine the meaning a word may have in a particular passage. At best they can provide some illumination and a range of possible uses, but etymology is never decisive in establishing meaning' (Padgett 2011: 61). Since meaning is determined by use, it is necessary to survey the specific contexts in which this term appears throughout the NT to gain an understanding of the way in which this term is used.[4] But before looking at those different uses, it is important to establish the nature of the term itself. We have already seen that the English translations imply that the term is some sort of action which relates to an authority, but the context of the Biblical term suggests a slightly different idea. In this matter, the Jewish translation of the *Torah* into Greek (the *Septuagint* or LXX) is very informative, for it is was done by Greek-speaking Jews who were very well versed in the Hebrew Scriptures. In other words, it was an ideal translation situation, because it was carried out by people who were experts in both languages involved. It is also informative, because one can see what Hebrew word they rendered with the Greek translation chosen. In Haggai 2:18 the Hebrew text reads as follows: 'Place, now, upon-your-hearts from this day and onwards, from the twenty-fourth day of the ninth month, since the day when the-foundation-was-laid of

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[4] An exhaustive list of all of the contexts in which *hypotasso* appears in Biblical texts appears in the appendix. The list is broken down into categories to reflect the different uses of the term.

the LORD's temple; place upon-your-hearts'.[5] The LXX translates the first command[6] (place upon your hearts) as 'may therefore your heart *submit* itself.'[7] This indicates that the Jews understood and used the concept of *hypotasso* primarily in the cognitive domain, rather than as an action. Unlike the English definitions given above, the Greek term seems to focus on the sphere of the mind. This does not mean, however, that *hypotasso* does not manifest itself in actions, a fact which will be explored below; rather, it is primarily an attitude rather than an action.

Technical Clues to Distinguish Use

Greek grammar affords further technical details that help clarify the use of this term. The Greek verbal system, unlike Latin, has three types of voices: active, middle, and passive. Although English lacks this middle voice, it is still fairly simple to illustrate the force of the middle voice in English by using reflexive pronouns, for this is one of the simplest uses of the Greek middle voice. To illustrate, we can use the verb 'to buy' in the sense of all three voices. In the active sense, one might say: *He bought a new car*. By switching to the passive voice, one can focus on the result: *That car was bought just last week*. Finally, by adding a reflexive pronoun, one highlights the personal result of the action, similar to the effect of the Greek middle voice: *He bought himself a new car*. In the case of the Biblical term often translated as submission, the active and passive versus the middle voice end up creating two very clear, distinct uses of the term.[8] As can be seen in the appendix, the active and passive voices are more characteristic of, although not limited to, the Old Testament use and refer

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[5] שׂימו־נא לבבכם מן־היום הזה ומעלה מיום עשׂרים וארבעה לתשׁיעי למן־היום אשׁר־יסד היכל־יהוה שׂימו לבבכם: (literal translation mine).

[6] Even though the repeated commands are identical in Hebrew, the translators decided to treat them with two different Greek structures.

[7] Orig. ὑποτάξατε δὴ τάς καρδίας ὑμῶν… The second of the two commands translates the Hebrew phrase in a much more literal way: θέσθε ἐν ταῖς καρδίαις ὑμῶν: *Place upon your hearts*.

[8] While there are some of the middle forms which can be distinguished from the passive voice forms, in general there tend to be dominant forms which serve both for middle and passive voice; thus in the specific case of the term in question, context is required to determine between a true passive and the middle voice. But the context is sufficient in the case of this term to distinguish very clearly between the middle from the passive voice.

Table 5.1 Usage comparison between OT and NT		Old Testament	New Testament
	Active/passive	9	7
	Middle	8	27

to imposed submission or an enforced recognition of authority. One of the clearest contexts of this use refers to the results of war: the losing army is required to recognize the authority of the victors (I Chronicles 22:18; Psalm 18:47; Psalm 47:3; Psalm 144:2; Psalm 60:8 and 108:9).[9] This idea also frequently appears in reference to spiritual forces. The disciples rejoiced because the demons were in submission to them (Luke 10:17, 20) and God demonstrated His authority over His creation by subjecting it to futility (Romans 8:20), a passage which seems to echo the thoughts of Ecclesiastes. The most common use of the term in this sense comes from Psalm 8:6, which accounts for the majority of the active/passive uses in the NT, since it is quoted frequently throughout (I Corinthians 15:27–28; Ephesians 1:22; Philippians 3:2; Hebrews 2:5, 8). Here the LXX adds the explicit reference of the subjection with the Hebrew phrase 'put under his feet.'[10] In all of these cases, the recognition of authority over another, whether spiritually or militarily, is enforced. But this is not the dominant use of the term *hypotaso* in the NT (Table 5.1).

Common Contexts in Which the Term Appears

In the NT, the use of the middle voice is much more prevalent, thus referring to voluntary reverence. As can be seen in the appendix below, the vast majority of the NT uses fall into this category. As stated above, one of the principal uses of the middle voice highlights the relation of the verb to the actor, and thus, in the case of *hypotaso*, it is best reflected in English with a reflexive pronoun. The fact that the construction is

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[9] In I Kings 10:15 and 2 Chronicles 9:14 the Hebrew term *tur*, *explorers*, was rendered by the LXX translators as ὑποτεταγμένων, subjugators, ones who make others submit.

[10] This is an interesting case study because the NT authors—or author, depending on one's theory about the authorship of Hebrews—sometimes quote the LXX text and other times follow the Hebrew text.

Table 5.2 Contexts for NT hypotasso

	Percentage of the verses
Family	29 %
God	26 %
Church	16 %
Civic	23 %
Work	6 %

reflexive in this case highlights the concept that it is therefore voluntary. The NT concept of *hypotasso* is not something which is enforced by power,[11] but rather encouraged and commanded. This voluntary sense appears clearly in an example from Romans 8. The Apostle here states that the carnal mind is at enmity with God, and therefore, does not 'submit itself' to the law of God (Romans 8:7). The fact that one can resist God in this fashion is clearly an indication that *hypotasso* is the choice of the one who is commanded to do so.[12] So building upon what has already been stated, *hypotasso* , when used in the middle voice, refers to an attitude which voluntarily recognizes and respects or honours an authority. The categories of middle voice usage in the appendix show that this attitude appears in the believer's relationship to God (Ephesians 5:24; Hebrews 12:9; James 4:7), to authority in the family (Ephesians 5:24; Colossians 3:18; I Peter 3:1, 5; Titus 2:5), to civil authorities (Romans 13:1, 5; Titus 3:1; I Peter 2:13), to authority in the church (I Corinthians 14:34, 16:16; I Peter 5:5), and to authority in the work-place (Titus 2:9; I Peter 2:18) (Table 5.2).

Related Concepts

But an attitude is impossible to see. The only way one can judge an attitude is by the actions it produces. This is where the Greek term comes with its own cultural 'baggage', even though it is still different from the 'baggage' of the English term. The texts which mention *hypotasso* suggest that this attitude towards authority flows out of humility (I Peter 5:5)

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[11] The Bible never commands authority figures to 'subjugate' those who resist them (active usage). Rather, the command comes to people to 'submit themselves' to their authorities.

[12] See Romans 10:3 as well in this regard: 'For, being ignorant of the righteousness that comes from God, and seeking to establish their own, they did not submit to God's righteousness' (ESV).

and a fear of God (Ephesians 5:21 and I Peter 2:18), and is related to respect and honour (Hebrews 12:9 and Ephesians 5:33), a lack of criticism (Titus 2:9; I Corinthians 14:34 and I Timothy 2:11; cf. Ps. 37:7, Ps. 62:1, 5),[13] and even obedience (Titus 3:1). While *hypotasso* is not obedience, it is logical that in a normal situation it would lead to obedience. This does not mean, however, that, in the end, it is not worthwhile to distinguish between *hypotasso* and obedience. To take a much simpler example, it could be compared to the difference between hunger and eating. All have had the experience of feeling hunger but not eating, perhaps due to the desire to lose weight or because we did not have anything to eat at that moment. We have perhaps also experienced the rather unpleasant phenomenon of eating even when we were not hungry. Perhaps we were invited to an important meal, and we felt the pressure to eat out of politeness. But all would agree that the normal order of life is that hunger generally will lead to eating, even though there are cases in which the feeling may be divorced from the action. In a similar way, *hypotasso* may often lead to obedience, but there is an implicit danger in connecting the two and thus making it sound as if the Bible commands mindless obedience to authorities. There are specific, clear Biblical passages which state that this is not the case (Acts 5:29).

Conclusion

The Biblical evaluative concept of *hypotasso* involves a voluntary attitude towards those who legitimately exercise authority over, or responsibility for, an individual and generally results in a predisposition to obey or cooperate. This is significantly different from the cultural baggage of the English term *submit*, which seems to suggest the surrender of oneself directly to the control of another. It is not hard to see how translating *hypotasso* as the English concept of submission can create a plethora of negative reactions in target audiences. Without even realizing it, read-

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[13] The translation of the term from the LXX, 'wait in silence' sheds some light on the NT use of the term in 1 Timothy 2:11–12. It seems that the respect implied by the term should not lead to criticism of legitimate authority. Rather than a literal command for women not to speak, it seems to indicate the public attitude of women towards church leadership.

ers interpret the text they are reading with their own concepts of the importance of freedom and independence. A better understanding of the contextual implications of evaluative concepts in both the source and the target language will certainly help the translator to minimize misunderstandings of a text and potentially to find ways of successfully navigating the communication barrier and thus improving the communication of a translation. The example dealt with in this paper is just one of many evaluative concepts which appear throughout the Bible, and the implications drawn here could be further applied in many other situations.

The case of *hypotasso* demonstrates nicely the imperative of careful treatment of evaluative language in translation. It is normal for readers to draw conclusions about the translated text based on their own culture and connections associated with a given term in the target language without realizing that their conclusions may or may not be valid for the original communication act in question. It is impossible for a translator to avoid all problems of this nature, but, at the very minimum, translators should be especially aware of evaluative concepts and look for ways to communicate the correct implications without slanting the readers' understanding of an evaluative concept by using translations which lead the target audience down the wrong path of false associations.

Appendix: LXX and NT Use of the Term ὑποτάσσω[14]

I. **Imposed submission (Active/Passive) (mainly LXX and NT quotations)**: recognition of authority independent of the will
   A. Imposed submission in a military/war context; enforced authority over another people
      i. I Kings 10:15 (c.f. II Chronicles 9:14) 'besides that which came from **the explorers** and from the business of the merchants, and from all the kings of the west and from the governors of the land. **LXX 'the ones who subjugate.'*

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[14] All NT and OT quotations taken from ESV; LXX translations are literal renderings of the Greek text.

ii. I Chronicles 22:18 'Is not the Lord your God with you? And has he not given you peace on every side? For he has delivered the inhabitants of the land into my hand, and the land **is subdued** before the Lord and his people'.

iii. Psalm 18:47 'the God who gave me vengeance and **subdued** peoples under me'

   a) Psalm 47:3 'He **subdued** peoples under us, and nations under our feet'.
   b) Psalm 144:2 'he is my steadfast love and my fortress, my stronghold and my deliverer, my shield and he in whom I take refuge, who **subdues** peoples under me'.

iv. Psalm 60:8 (Psalm 108:9) 'Moab is my washbasin; upon Edom I cast my shoe; over Philistia **I shout in triumph**'. *LXX 'to me the other nations were subdued'*

B. Imposed submission in the spiritual realm:

   i. Psalm 8:6 'You have given him dominion over the works of your hands; you have **put** all things under his feet' *LXX 'submitted all things under his feet'*

   a) I Corinthians 15:27–28 'For "God has **put** all things **in subjection** under his feet". But when it says, "all things are **put in subjection**", it is plain that he is excepted who **put** all things **in subjection** under him. When all things **are subjected** to him, then the Son himself will also **be subjected** to him who put all things **in subjection** under him, that God may be all in all'. *quotation from LXX*
   b) Ephesians 1:22 'And he **put** all things under his feet and gave him as head over all things to the church' *quotation from Hebrew text*
   c) Philippians 3:21 'who will transform our lowly body to be like his glorious body, by the power that enables him even **to subject** all things to himself'.

      d) Hebrews 2:5, 8 'Now it was not to angels that God **subjected** the world to come, of which we are speaking. […] "**putting** everything **in subjection** under his feet."' Now in **putting** everything **in subjection** to him, he left nothing outside his control. At present, we do not yet see everything **in subjection** to him'.

  ii. Luke 10:17, 20 'The seventy-two returned with joy, saying, 'Lord, even the demons **are subject** to us in your name!' […] Nevertheless, do not rejoice in this, that the spirits **are subject** to you, but rejoice that your names are written in heaven'.

  iii. I Peter 3:22 'who has gone into heaven and is at the right hand of God, with angels, authorities, and powers **having been subjected** to him'.

  iv. Romans 8:20 'For the creation **was subjected** to futility, not willingly, but because of him who subjected it, in hope.'

II. **Voluntary Submission (Middle Voice)**: a voluntary recognition of authority in attitude

  A. General concept behind submission: quiet contemplative attitude. Haggai 2:18 '**Consider** from this day onward, from the twenty-fourth day of the ninth month. Since the day that the foundation of the Lord's temple was laid, consider:' *LXX 'Submit, therefore, your hearts c.f. 'submit a proposal'*

  B. Submission to God
    i. Positive examples:
      a) Psalm 37:7 '**Be still** before the Lord and wait patiently for him; fret not yourself over the one who prospers in his way, over the man who carries out evil devices!' *Hebrew 'Be quiet'; LXX 'Be submitted before the Lord'*
      b) Psalm 62:1, 5 'For God alone my soul **waits in silence**; from him comes my salvation. […] For God alone, O my soul, wait in silence, for my hope is from him'. *LXX 'my soul is submitted to God'*

      c) Hebrews 12:9 'Besides this, we have had earthly fathers who disciplined us and we respected them. Shall we not much more **be subject** to the Father of spirits and live?'

      d) James 4:7 '**Submit** yourselves therefore to God. Resist the devil, and he will flee from you'.

      e) [See Ephesians 5:24 'church **submits** to Christ']

      f) II Corinthians 9:13 'By their approval of this service, they will glorify God because of **your submission** flowing from your confession of the gospel of Christ, and the generosity of your contribution for them and for all others' *noun*

    ii. Negative examples:

      a) Romans 8:7 'For the mind that is set on the flesh is hostile to God, for it **does not submit** to God's law; indeed, it cannot'.

      b) Romans 10:3 'For, being ignorant of the righteousness that comes from God, and seeking to establish their own, they **did not submit** to God's righteousness'.

C. Submission in the family relationships

    i. Children to parents

      a) Luke 2:51 'And he went down with them and came to Nazareth and **was submissive** to them. And his mother treasured up all these things in her heart'.

      b) I Timothy 3:4 'He must manage his own household well, with all dignity keeping his children **submissive**' *noun; lit. 'in submission'*

      c) [see Hebrews 12:9 'Besides this, we have had earthly fathers who disciplined us and we respected them. Shall we not much more **be subject** to the Father of spirits and live?']

    ii. Wives and husbands

      a) Ephesians 5:21 '**submitting** to one another out of reverence for Christ'.

      b) Ephesians 5:24 'Now as the church submits to Christ, so also wives **should submit** in everything to their husbands'.

  c) Colossians 3:18 'Wives, **submit** to your husbands, as is fitting in the Lord'.

  d) Titus 2:5 'to be self-controlled, pure, working at home, kind, and **submissive** to their own husbands, that the word of God may not be reviled'.

  e) I Peter 3:1, 5 'Likewise, wives, **be subject** to your own husbands, so that even if some do not obey the word, they may be won without a word by the conduct of their wives […] For this is how the holy women who hoped in God used to adorn themselves, by **submitting** to their husbands',

D. Submission in the church relationships

  i. I Corinthians 14:32 'and the spirits of prophets **are subject** to prophets'.

  ii. I Corinthians 14:34 'the women should keep silent in the churches. For they are not permitted to speak, but should **be in submission**, as the Law also says'.

  iii. I Corinthians 16:16 '**be subject** to such as these, and to every fellow worker and labourer'.

  iv. I Peter 5:5 'Likewise, you who are younger, **be subject** to the elders. Clothe yourselves, all of you, with humility [**being submissive**, TR] toward one another, for '"God opposes the proud but gives grace to the humble."'

  v. I Timothy 2:11 'Let a woman learn quietly with all **submissiveness**'. **noun*

E. Submission in civic relationships

  i. I Chronicles 29:24 'All the leaders and the mighty men, and also all the sons of King David, **pledged their allegiance** to King Solomon'. **LXX 'submitted to him'*

  ii. Daniel 6:13 'Then they answered and said before the king, "Daniel, who is one of the exiles from Judah, **pays no attention** to you, O king, or the injunction you have signed, but makes his petition three times a day"'. **LXX 'does not submit'*

  iii. Daniel 11:39 'He shall deal with the strongest fortresses with the help of a foreign god. Those who **acknowledge** him he shall load with honour. He shall make them rulers over many

and shall divide the land for a price'. *LXX 'those who submit to him'*

iv. Romans 13:1, 5 'Let every person **be subject** to the governing authorities. For there is no authority except from God, and those that exist have been instituted by God. […] Therefore one must **be in subjection**, not only to avoid God's wrath but also for the sake of conscience'.

v. Titus 3:1 'Remind them to **be submissive** to rulers and authorities, to be obedient, to be ready for every good work',

vi. I Peter 2:13 '**Be subject** for the Lord's sake to every human institution, whether it be to the emperor as supreme',

vii. Negative example: not a legitimate authority. Galatians 2:5 'to them we did not yield in **submission** even for a moment, so that the truth of the gospel might be preserved for you'. *noun*

F. Submission in the workplace

i. Titus 2:9 'Slaves are to **be submissive** to their own masters in everything; they are to be well-pleasing, not argumentative', I Peter 2:18 'Servants, **be subject** to your masters with all respect, not only to the good and gentle but also to the unjust'.

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6

Re-examining Islamic Evaluative Concepts in English Translations of the Quran: Friendship, Justice and Retaliation

Aladdin Al-Tarawneh

Introduction to the Quran

From an etymological point of view, the word Quran, out of its religious context, may be defined as a recitation rehearsed from something saved in the heart or preserved in book form. Indeed, the word *Quran* is derived from the Arabic root *qar'a* which means 'to recite'. From an Islamic theological perspective, it is considered the literal word of God (Allah) in the Arabic language, revealed gradually, over the period of 23 years, through the Archangel Gabriel to the Prophet Muhammad. As the sacred text of Islam, the Quran is deemed to be protected from any corruption, distortion or human intervention, and is not open to imitation—so much so that the Quranic Arabic has come to be recognised as a genre in its own right, classified as neither prose nor poetry, but a combination of both. It is considered to be characterised by a unique structure and syntax, and a

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perfect choice of vocabulary in terms of both connotation and denotation. The morphological system of Arabic helps achieve elegance and brevity; often a single word in the Quran may stand for a whole sentence in English (for example, one word may be translated as 'We [God] have given you drink from it [rain].'). Moreover, the pronunciation of the words within specific verses is carefully differentiated to match the context: words of aesthetic appeal and of melodious effect—words full of voiceless sounds— are used in verses giving glad tidings, whereas striking words of great impact aimed at triggering fear in the hearts of believers—words full of voiced sounds and relatively hard to be articulated—are used in verses talking about the Judgement Day and torment in Hell (Ubaydat 1990: 224). A broad range of poetic devices—including assonance, cadence, rhyme, and rhythm—is employed to create a music-like effect on the listener. Indeed, starting the revelation of the Quran with the word 'recite' emphasises that the sacred text is meant primarily to be read and rehearsed out loud, not written down or preserved in book form. The oral nature of the sacred text follows directly from the profoundly oral culture of the Prophet's people. The Quran is intended to be preserved in the hearts of believers, and the only reason for having it recorded in written form is to secure an additional measure of preservation.

Based on both linguistic and theological considerations, the language of the Quran is believed to be unique and inimitable. At the same time, Islam is meant to be universal, and consequently, the message of the Quran needs to be proclaimed and propagated. This means that there are only two options available: either have everyone learn the Arabic language to have access to the Quran in its original form, or—perhaps more realistically—deliver the message of the Quran to people in their own languages. This brings us to the question of the translatability of the Quran.

The (Un)translatability of the Quran

The Quran may be considered translatable only in terms of its message. In one sense, it is already available in 'intra-lingual' translation—to use Roman Jakobson's (2012: 114) term—from Quranic Arabic into standard Arabic, based on exegetical interpretation. In fact, Muslim scholars

encourage the translation of the Quran's exegesis because it communicates the real teaching of the sacred text, devoid of any misunderstanding or misinterpretation that usually results from using the blunt instrument of literal translation. Such exegetical comments are available in standard Arabic: they clarify each verse in terms of its content and historical background, and are thus the best source for anyone interested in seeking detailed and specialised information. In this regard, Campanini (2007: 120) makes the following distinction: 'the Qur'an as a simple text is scarcely translatable; the Qur'an as discourse(s) is translatable in order to be made available in different civilisation and political circumstances'. However, exegetical translation, that is, translating the exegesis of the Quran rather than conveying its exact wording, is not considered practicable if the target audience are not specialists; it would require producing multiple volumes in order to cover the whole Quran. Besides, such a highly detailed and often technical style is not likely to appeal to a layperson who is not a Muslim. Such exegetical translation aims at reconstructing the contextual meaning of the text without any attempt to mirror its form, which is inseparable from its inimitable language. This means that, on another level, the Quran remains untranslatable.

The untranslatability of the Quran can be approached from two positions: first, that the target text, unlike the original, cannot be considered sacred (it is here that theological arguments are advanced); and second, that Quranic Arabic cannot be reproduced in the target language (TL) with the exact style and equivalent effect (which is supported by linguistic arguments). Let us consider these two aspects in some detail.

Regarding the potentially sacred status of any translation of the Quran, there are many verses in the Quran itself that emphasise its thoroughly Arabic nature: quite simply, the Quran cannot be regarded as the Quran unless it is in Arabic. 'We have made it [the Quran] an Arabic Quran that you may understand' (Ali 2010: 610). Furthermore, Muslims are not allowed to recite the Quran in any language but Arabic while performing the Salah (the physical ritual performed five times a day, which includes bows, prostration, and reciting the Quran). It is narrated in Islamic literature that a man who had difficulty memorising verses from the Quran in Arabic wanted to perform the prayer by reciting the Quran in his mother tongue. He turned to the Prophet for his consent but he did not receive it. Instead,

the Prophet told him to do supplication to God (Allah) in his prayers until he had learned short verses from the Quran in Arabic (Abu Dawud and Ash'ath 2008: 490). Even today, Muslim scholars fear that if a translation of the Quran into another language were to be recognised as sacred, this might lead non-Arab Muslims to rely on these translations rather than on the original Arabic text. Furthermore, this reliance on various translations of the Quran might lead to different interpretations—especially if the translations were commissioned to serve certain ideological views—leading to a division within the Muslim community. Finally, the existence of translations could decrease interest in learning Arabic—a factor that is considered key in unifying Muslims (Almula 1989: 55–56). Therefore a *fatwa*, or a formal ruling, was issued on 16 April 1936 by Al-Azhar (a regulatory Islamic body based in Egypt) to the effect that any translation of the Quran should not be considered the Quran itself—in other words, it is devoid of sacred status—and consequently must be called 'a translation of an interpretation of the Quran', 'an interpretation of the Quran', or 'a translation of the meaning of the Quran' (Pickthall 1931: 422).

Apart from the question of the non-sacred position of any translation of the Quran, there are a number of linguistic reasons making its translation into another language, including English, an uphill task. A translation can hardly provide an equivalent and effective impact on native readers of the TL in terms of the original text's poetic features because they are mostly inimitable in English. There is a range of Quran-specific words whose exact semantic import cannot be reproduced without major change. Consider, for example, the word *tartiel* which can only be rendered in English using a descriptive phrase (for example, 'the slow, meditative recitation of the Quran'). Moreover, the Quran sometimes uses different words to refer to the same thing, but stresses different qualities or connotative meanings. For example, the word *wife* in English stands for two words in the Quran whose connotative meanings are radically different. If the relationship between husband and wife is based on harmony and compatibility, the word *zawjah* is used; if the opposite is true, then the word *imra'a* is used (Al-Jumayli 1986: 99). One more linguistic reason is the employment of a syntactic feature called *iltifat*, which is used in the Arabic language in general and in the Quran in particular. In this technique a sudden shift occurs on many levels: it could be on the level of grammatical categories such

as number, gender, or person; or voice. Consider the following example: 'Allah is He Who sends the winds, so they raise a cloud, then We drive it on to a dead land, and with it We give life to the earth after its death. Even so is the rising' (Ali 2010: 544). The reference to God (Allah) is initially by the third person singular, whereas the subsequent reference in the same verse is by the first person plural, the 'royal we'.

In this regard, it can be seen how the language of the Quran and its oral nature are carefully employed to serve specific functions and achieve certain objectives perceived by its original target audience: for example, the use of different tones in recitation to convey a certain touch, or the use of particular words to denote unequivocal senses. This being the case, translation is this context needs to take account of the complexity of the Quran's nature and the meaning intended to be conveyed in the TL. Among many aspects dealt with in the process of translation are the evaluative concepts that express certain key values that Islam is built around. These values are deemed to be an important component of any culture, and they are crucial in translation, whose function is to mediate intercultural transactions. This mediation is observed by conveying values from their original environment to the target audience in order to facilitate intercultural communication and to build trust between the two cultures in the context of sacred text translation. Most translations of the Quran fail to express those concepts in the TL as they are apprehended in the source language (SL), but rather reduce them to their basic dictionary meanings. Consequently, the core sense is no longer preserved in translation, which leads to frequent misinterpretation and misjudgement in the eyes of the receptors. The translator's role in this case is to ensure that such concepts are understood in the TL as they are in the SL by using whatever technique serves the preservation of the core meaning. In fact, the Quran engages with many concepts reflecting Islamic values whose representation in translation is not always accurate and sometimes indeed misleading. To illustrate how certain Islamic evaluative concepts are mistranslated, I will analyse three of them in detail in the following pages. These concepts are frequently quoted by both Muslims and non-Muslims in many contexts without due consideration of their genuine teaching. The analysis will be followed by suggestions of what I consider more felicitous renditions.

Selected Islamic Evaluative Concepts: Friendship, Justice, and Retaliation

Before analysing the translational handling of selected evaluative concepts, let us first consider their embedding in the source culture.

Friendship

Friendship is present on a daily basis in both the cultural and religious domains; indeed, it is a natural need for a human being living within a community of diverse faiths and backgrounds. Friendship is, of course, a universal human phenomenon, with great impact on both individual and communal life, but it occupies a special place in the Arabic language and culture which consider it from two major perspectives, the social and the religious. Much attention is devoted by Muslim scholars, poets, writers, and novelists to showing how good friendship can be characterised, attained, and maintained. According to Arabic dictionaries, the word for friendship *sadaqa*, is linked to honesty as opposed to lying. It is about befriending people on the basis of delivering honest advice to them and maintaining intimacy; therefore, the strength of a friendship is directly related to the level of honesty (Ibn Mandhour 1980: 2417–2418). Arabic literature abounds in books tackling the issue of friendship on many levels, the most famous being *Friendship and Friends* by Abi-Hayan Al-Tawhidi (Abu Saree 1993: 22). This clearly demonstrates that friendship is a key cultural value.

Friendship is also strongly connected to the concept of brotherhood—so much so that it is not always easy to differentiate between these two. In Arabic, the use of the word *akh* ('brother') is not necessary to denote brotherhood in blood, but actually to indicate friendship. Consider this famous proverb: 'The best brother one ever has is sometimes not from one's bloodline'. Indeed, the concept of friendship in Arabic culture, before the advent of Islam, used to carry a specific implication; however, the concept evolved into compatibility with Islam. For example, there is a catchphrase in Arabic translated as 'Support your brother as an oppressor and as (being) oppressed.' This has two interpretations,

according to the time of use. Before the rise of Islam, it was believed that a man should support his friend all the way, whether this meant wronging others or being wronged as his defender. This was based on the belief that one should always believe in one's friend and watch his back in all situations. However, after the advent of Islam, the interpretation changed to mean that you should not only support your friend when he is being wronged but also prevent him from wronging others, by delivering advice, and sometimes taking action to stop him. This was elaborated by the Prophet Muhammad himself when he stated 'help your brother whether he is an oppressor or an oppressed', [to which] a man said, 'O Allah's Messenger! I will help him if he is oppressed, but if he is an oppressor, how shall I help him?' [and] the Prophet said, 'by preventing him from oppressing (others), for that is how to help him' (Al-Bukhari 1997b: 362).

It is worth highlighting here that friendship in the Arabic language, and more broadly in Islam, does not depend on religion or race, but is simply based on mutual intimacy, respect, and, most importantly, honesty. In fact, the Prophet himself maintained good relationships with non-Muslims—both monotheists, that is, Jews and Christians, and also polytheists—and on many occasions warned Muslims not to mistreat them. Many believers who had non-Muslim friends and relatives used to ask the Prophet about the right course of action towards them. In response, the Prophet instructed them to treat them kindly and keep good relations with them (Al-Bukhari 1997c: 259). The story is also told that the Prophet had a Jewish boy working as a servant; one day, when the Jewish boy was sick, the Prophet paid him a visit, which is an indication for all Muslims to do the same to non-Muslims (Al-Bukhari 1997a: 252). The Quran states clearly that Muslims should be kind in dealing with non-Muslims as long as they do not harm believers: 'Allah does not forbid you, with regard to those who do not fight you for religion, nor drive you forth from your homes, that you show them kindness and deal with them justly. Surely Allah loves the doers of justice' (Ali 2010: 691). All in all, the two main sources of authority in Islam, the Quran and the teaching of the Prophet, do not endorse showing enmity to non-Muslims, whether monotheists or polytheists, as long as they are not hostile.

Justice

The concept of justice *al-adel*—and the value of fairness on which it draws—may be discussed in a similar manner, namely, in terms of how it was tackled before and after the institution of Islam. Indeed, before Islam, justice was exclusively linked to power: the more powerful one was, the stronger one's rights were exercised and claimed. Those who were vulnerable used to struggle to claim their rights: a practically unattainable task unless they were supported by a powerful person. Islam brought with it the recognition that justice should be granted to anyone, no matter how weak or powerful. In fact, the command to exercise justice is noticeably recurrent in the Quran, in which God (Allah) frequently says that 'Surely Allah commands (the doing of) justice and the doing of good (to others) and the giving to the near of kin, and He forbids indecency and evil and rebellion. He instructs you that you may be mindful' (Ali 2010: 333). Moreover, the Prophet accentuated the importance of justice even if exercising it would place someone's life in jeopardy, as, for instance, when he said that the highest level of faith that any Muslim could attain is when s/he says a word of justice to an unjust ruler (Ibn Majah 2007: 217). The concept of justice, of course, is very broad in terms of its domain and even its definition, because what is right or wrong is largely governed by the cultural norms, ethics, and religion of a community. Therefore, the concept of justice in this chapter will be discussed from one specific perspective: that of women.

Women in Arab culture before Islam were merely a commodity, mainly used for sex, or service in general. They were a source of shame and were discriminated against (Khan 2003: 223). A boy was considered superior to hundreds of women. This was due to the fact that the community, back then, was always at war, so there was a heavy reliance on men for military tasks. Therefore, a birth of a son was hugely celebrated, though the same cannot be said of the birth of a daughter. Indeed, female babies often used to face infanticide. On the contrary, with the advent of Islam, around 1430 years ago, this situation changed radically when the Quran and the Prophet extended many rights to women on different levels. Those included the right to choose their husbands, rights in marriage through a dowry system

and divorce, rights of inheritance, rights to good treatment, equality with men, rights of education, and many other rights, all enshrined in Islam. This reflects a fundamental re-evaluation of the place and role of women and, consequently, the concept of justice pertaining to them.

Retaliation

Regarding the concept of retaliation, the word *al-intikam* in Arabic is derived from the literal meaning of 'eruption'. This word represents the state of a person in his/her utmost anger over the loss of a loved one, or an injury caused to someone who is very dear. Retaliation occurs, primarily, as a physical and largely instinctive reaction. The concept of retaliation was highly entrenched in the Arab system of tribal practices widespread before Islam. According to that custom, when a noble person of a strong and influential tribe was killed, it was not enough to kill the perpetrator, especially if he had not been of equal rank; therefore, many innocent members of the other tribe used to be killed (Watt 2013: 22). This was based on a belief that the soul of the victim does not go to heaven but roams around saying: 'quench my thirst by blood' and only when this is achieved, namely, when the value of the victim is paid for by enough killings, may the soul go to heaven. Otherwise, the family of the victim would live in shame, and the adult males would have to abandon wine, sex, perfume, and fancy food until they avenged themselves on the killer and their tribe. With the dawn of Islam, this practice was outlawed and the process of achieving justice was put into the hands of the authorities rather than individuals, on the fair basis that the innocent relatives of the killer must not be held accountable. The Quran states on many occasions that it is forbidden to kill anyone without a legal basis: 'nor kill the soul which Allah has made sacred except in the course of justice. This He enjoins upon you that you may understand' (Ali 2010: 187). Furthermore, the Prophet stated that there are certain types of people who are most hated by God (Allah), the Almighty; one of them is the one who kills anyone in revenge as in times of *jahiliyah* (that is, pre-Islamic times) (Numani et al. 2003: 224). In other words, the process of achieving justice, by the advent of Islam, has been changed and legalised.

This was reflected in a linguistic and conceptual change: the word retaliation *al-Intikam* or revenge *atha'r* is replaced by the Arabic word *qisas* which implies equality and governance of law. Indeed, Islam has eliminated a number of former practices and behaviours, making a transition from a community governed by the law of the fist, paying no attention to the weak, to a community applying justice on an equal basis regardless of the power held. Unfortunately, this does not mean that these unjust practices have been abandoned completely, or that some of them do not linger even today. That is why Islamic law is prescribed to correct these wrongful practices and to punish wrongdoers.

This is a broad outline of how these three evaluative concepts used to be perceived before and after the introduction of Islam's message. They do not seem problematic in their original context and language; however, when they are translated into other linguistic and cultural contexts, particularly by means of formal translation, which pays more attention to wording than to sense, many of them become prone to misunderstanding, both in their denotative and—perhaps more importantly—evaluative dimensions. The problem gets even worse when incorrect translations representing these concepts are used to speak for Islam in a way that distorts its real message. Such attempts can be undertaken intentionally or not. There have been many cases of the use of Quran translations to support hostile claims against Islam, especially in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. The surge of Islamophobia which started to spread more than a decade ago was in no small measure aided by the questionable quality of the Quran translations referred to in the debate.

It could be argued that the problem of the inaccurate handling of certain evaluative Islamic concepts in translation is behind much of the negative image of Islam. Certain verses of the Quran, translated literally, are often taken out of their context to support claims against Islam. One example of this tendency is the recent debate on Fox News channel (27 August 2014) between Sean Hannity and the controversial Muslim cleric Anjem Choudary. In this debate, Hannity relied on a verse translated literally from the Quran that claims that Muslims are not allowed to befriend Jews and Christians, effectively portraying Islam as a racist religion showing antipathy to non-Muslims. Quite a few books quote the same verse in support of this thesis; for example, in Bibi Samaroo's

book *Jesus or Jihad*, the writer, using this mistranslated verse banning Muslims from befriending Jews and Christians, depicts Islam as a religion full of jealousy and prejudice passed down from Abraham's son Ishmael who himself felt jealous of his brother Isaac. This jealousy is drawn from the fact that they are from different mothers. Thereupon, Islam, as a religion revealed to Ishmael's posterity—Arabs—hates the lineage of Isaac's descendants, that is, Moses (the Jews) and Jesus (the Christians) and prohibits its followers from befriending the Jews and the Christians (2005:14).

Values Lost in Translation

In the second part of this chapter, I will examine how, in a bid to correct a false understanding of Islam in the present climate which is often characterised by conflict, translation could help dispel any ambiguities supported by many of the literal translations of the Quran currently in use. This conflict is fuelled by different factors of a religious and political (broadly speaking, ideological) nature. The resulting mistrust between Muslims and those in the West who often justify their positions by quoting from Quran translations needs to be eliminated (Baker 2006: 2). This could be achieved in much the same way as it originated, that is, by replacing one kind of understanding with another: in this case, by replacing the misleading literal translation by one based on a more accurate conceptualization and evaluation. In other words, any new attempt to handle the process of the translation of the Quran must go beyond a purely literal approach. 'Faithfulness to the text' can sometimes be misleading, and indeed dangerous, if it is assumed that it can be obtained by excessive adherence to the forms of the original text; it may lead to creating a text in the TL devoid of the contextual elements clearly discernible in the SL. Certainly, the translation of the Quran in this context involves two parties: those who honour the Quran and understand its teachings in the SL, and those who receive a translation of the Quran in the TL which has negative meanings, mostly resulting from translators who espouse an inaccurate approach. Everyone tries to frame what s/he reads as the authorised version because they view the situation from their own

perspective which is known as *frame ambiguity* (Goffman 1986: 302). However, it is the role of the translator to convey the texts into the TL without paying unnecessary attention to the exact wording of the Quran in Arabic. This is recommended, especially when dealing with verses which come from different chapters but tackle a common theme. Indeed, the translator needs to demonstrate structural coherence in presenting such verses (Fisher 1997: 315 in Baker 2006:144). This structural coherence for Muslims who claim that the Quran is devoid of contradiction is an essential part of their presentation. It is inconceivable that the Quran on one occasion should praise the people of the Scriptures ('they recite Allah's messages in the night-time and they adore [Him]. They believe in Allah and the Last Day, and they enjoin good and forbid evil and hasten in [doing] good deeds. And those are among the righteous' [Ali 2010: 91]) and on another occasion ban Muslims from befriending them ('O you who believe [Muslims], do not take the Jews and the Christians for friends' [ibid.: 150]). The reason for this contradiction is the wrong translation of the latter verse, which we will discuss later.

Re-evaluating Friendship

Friendship is one of many Islamic concepts that is misinterpreted and misconceived in the West because of inaccurate translations. The theme of friendship is noticeably recurrent in the Quran. Over forty references are made to this concept, using six different Arabic words to portray it (Ali 2004 in Harré and Moghaddam 2013: 114). One of these words, *wali*, singular form, or *awliya*, plural form, can be very misleading when it is translated by resorting to its dictionary match in English, based on its generic meaning, 'friend'. The Quranic verse in which this word occurs (5:51) is among the passages commonly—and wrongly—quoted against Islam and Muslims, despite being based on a serious translational mishandling, since it suggests that Islam prohibits friendship with non-Muslims and declares open enmity to them (Dukes 2011: 5:51). This can be seen in the following examples:

- O ye who believe! Take not the Jews and the Christians for <u>friends</u> (Pickthall);
- O believers, take not Jews and Christians as <u>friends</u> (Arberry);
- Believers, do not consider the Jews and Christians as your <u>intimate friends</u> (Sarwar).

The underlined words represent overly literal translations of the plural word *awliya* which, in the singular or plural form, is used 47 times throughout the Quran with different contextual meanings. In view of this highly diversified use, one must be careful not to translate it by its superficial or generic meaning. Instead, the translator needs to establish the contextual meaning conveyed in the SL and attempt to reproduce it in the TL. The contextual meaning must be analysed through identifying the sets of semantic features and deciding on their contextual salience.

A careful semantic analysis is particularly useful—and indeed necessary—when dealing with a language such as Arabic which employs a significant number of polysemous words whose meanings are not only determined by the orthographic form of the words but also by the way they are pronounced, in writing indicated by diacritical marks placed over or under words. This polysemous feature, that is, carrying either literal or figurative sense, is usually determined by the semotactic environment or co-text, that is, by identifying the meaning by the words occurring around the word in question. Disambiguation is introduced to make use of the context in determining the sense expressed in the SL and translating it accordingly into the TL (Hatim and Munday 2004: 35). It does not mean that this technique (or any other) is perfect, but it is quite useful when it comes to Quranic discourse. The concern here is to analyse the surface or referential meaning in 'a process which begins with the ST, analyses this text into semantic structure, and then restructures this semantic structure into appropriate receptor language forms in order to create an equivalent receptor language text' (Larson 1984/1998: 519 in Hatim and Munday 2004: 152). In the same vein, *Semantic Structure Analysis*, introduced by Beekman and Callow (1974), investigates the basic semantic constituent parts within a text through comparing words in terms of their senses corresponding between two languages (Broad 2013: 15). Put succinctly, a word has to be analysed in

the SL contextually, which then leads to the identification of the closest possible sense component in the TL. Full semantic correlations between languages are not easily established, because linguistic systems are highly incommensurable; however, the technique of semantic structure analysis may help achieve a better correlation.

Let us adopt this technique by first looking up dictionary definitions for all the possible shades of meaning of 'friendship', and then considering the closest contextual approximations in the TL. According to Arabic dictionaries, the word *awliya* in isolation, that is, without a context, refers to friendship in its generic sense, and could be highlighting any of the following semantic components: guardian, caretaker, crown prince, ally, supporter, saint, protector, follower, honest person, righteous person, or close friend (Al-Afriki 2010: 193–196). Now the specific meaning or lexical feature has to be determined by the contextual meaning of the word in the Quranic verse. It is worth mentioning here that the verses of the Quran may be divided into two types: context-dependent and context-independent. The revelation of the former was triggered by a specific event, incident, or query posed to the Prophet; such verses cannot, of course, be read in isolation and without reference to the particular situation. By contrast, context-independent verses represent general unambiguous injunctions valid not only at the time of the Prophet but applicable to any time. The verse where the word in question occurs is a context-dependent one which is regarded as being specifically revealed to warn Muslims at that time to cease practising the habit of relying on non-Muslims for protection, support, and reassurance, especially in bad times or during wars. The meaning of this word in this verse, therefore, should be related to the political or social context (Al-Wahidy 1991: 200). Consequently, in translation, the generic meaning of friendship has to be substituted with a more context-sensitive option, because using *friend* will be very misleading. 'Friend' in English means 'a person with whom one has a bond of mutual affection, typically one exclusive of sexual or family relations' (Oxford Dictionary), whereas the salient semantic components in the Quranic verse highlight the role of protector or ally. In recognition of this, we could suggest the following translation: 'O believers! Do not take Jews and Christians as protectors'. Even though much of the misconception has now been eliminated, a commentary on the

context of this verse could still helpfully be added to dispel any remaining ambiguity.

Re-evaluating Justice

The concept of justice is expressed in the Quran by a number of words, amongst which the most generic one is *adel*. Other words denoting justice convey various shades of meaning. The most common of these are: *qist*, 'justice and equity', *bir*, 'justice and righteousness', *sidiq*, 'justice and truthfulness', *ihsan*, 'justice and excellence', and *mizzan*, 'justice and equilibrium'. Their semantic diversity demonstrates the complexity of the concept of justice. The word on which we will focus here is *ma'roof*, which occurs 39 times in the Quran. This word, as well as many others, is usually translated into English simply as 'justice' or 'just [manner]', which is neither fully accurate nor fully inaccurate. To shed more light on it, let us consider the following translations of verse 2:228:

- and they have rights similar to those against them in a <u>just manner</u> (Dukes 2011);
- women shall with <u>justice</u> have rights similar to those exercised against them (Dawood 2006: 33);
- And women have rights similar to those against them in a <u>just manner</u> (Aziz 2011: 54).

The verse in the original sums up all the instructions and procedures related to separation and divorce. It refers to the rights and obligations of men and women as husbands and wives; more precisely, it shows how women have rights in return for their obligations in this regard. Indeed, this verse is connected to the next one, which refers to a habit that used to be practised against women as a punishment. Back then, there was a custom according to which a man, as a kind of punishment, divorced his wife but returned to her before the waiting period[1] was over. Women, in light of this practice, were punished by not being allowed to get divorced and

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[1] It is a fixed amount of time starting when a man divorces his wife. It is to let the couple think about the situation before making the final decision about consummating divorce or not. When the period ends without reaching reconciliation, then the divorce is considered confirmed.

married to another man; at the same time, they were abandoned by their husbands (Al-Wahidy 1991:81). Therefore, these verses were revealed to ban this practice and to give women rights in order to improve their position by regulating the process of divorce.

This being established, the underlined words in these translations are considered to be the equivalents of *ma'roof*. These translations do not represent the meaning of the word in the original context because, if a back-translation is applied to them, the word in Arabic will be *adel*, which is justice in its general meaning. However, though *adel* and *ma'roof* are related to each other, they are not identical in meaning. If a semantic analysis were to be applied to *ma'roof*, it would disclose a combination of justice and kindness. Therefore, the function of this verse is not properly established by neglecting to stress kindness to women as a priority more than being merely just to them. Indeed, this verse is meant to elevate the status of women and to empower them in a kind way. So, a suggested translation in this instance could read: 'and women shall have rights similar to those of men exercised justly in kindness.'

Re-evaluating Retaliation

Another frequently mistranslated and therefore wrongly interpreted concept is linked to the generic meaning of retaliation. Contrary to a widespread belief in the West, Islam prohibits retaliation. Arabs before the advent of Islam used to have both good and bad practices; retaliation was definitely among the latter ones. When the Prophet was sent to the people he said that Islam came to complement all the good practices and abolish all the bad ones; however, based on certain Quran translations, many non-Muslims—and even non-Arab Muslims—may presume that the Quran endorses retaliation as a law prescribed by God (Allah). Making such a claim is only possible by using grossly inaccurate translations and doing so out of context. Again, the blunt instrument of literal translation misrepresents the real essence of the Quran in Arabic, even if the translator justifies using it by saying it follows the original wording as closely as possible. The word at stake here is *qisas*, which

occurs in the Quran four times. Indeed, this word is so unique in form and substance that it does not have any equivalent in English; therefore, a literal rendering will not easily convey its sense. The following mistranslated verses reveal how this word is rendered in several popular translations (Dukes 2011: 2:179):

- And there is life for you in <u>retaliation</u>, O men of understanding, that ye may ward off (evil) (Pickthall);
- And there is life for you in (the law of) <u>retaliation</u>, O men of understanding, that you may guard yourselves (Shakir);
- People of understanding, the law of the death penalty as <u>retaliation</u> grants you life so that perhaps you will have fear of God (Sarwar).

As seen from the underlined words, 'retaliation' is considered the equivalent for the word *qisas* in Arabic. According to the English definition, retaliation is 'the action of harming someone because they have harmed oneself' (Oxford Dictionary). In other words, it is like-for-like punishment to get revenge. Importantly, the definition of *qisas* in Arabic is completely different. It means returning like-for-like, but only in case of intentional homicide and injury. According to Islamic law, administering like-for-like punishment to a deliberate murderer or offender acts as a deterrent: no one would dare to commit such offences because of the inevitable consequences. In other cases, such as unintentional injury or crime, only monetary compensation can be exacted without the need for the same action if the victim or the family of the victim accepts that. They also may waive the application of *qisas*; still, the perpetrator's family is responsible for the payment of compensation (Wasti 2009: 300). Besides, *qisas* is prescribed as a law to be administered by the authority of a Muslim ruler, and not by the injured person or his/her family, in order to maintain law and order in the community, whereas retaliation is carried out at individual level. Indeed, to validate any verdict of *qisas*, there needs to be the issuing of a claim at court, the drawing up of charges and the consideration of appeals until the final verdict is reached and executed. *qisas*, therefore, is not meant to be a punishment, but rather a preventative measure exercised against the perpetrator to make him/her an example for anyone who might think of committing a premedi-

tated offence or dispensing justice on his/her own account. Finally, one more important point in this regard, which has to do with evaluation, is that the word word *qisas* in Arabic has a strongly positive sense and connotation; it implies justice and equality. However, the word *retaliation* in English conveys negative meanings and a connotation that implies revenge and, effectively, injustice. The disparity in the evaluative dimension between these two words is obvious.

In view of the above, sound translation theory and practice indicates that, when translating the Quran, one should make use of different methods and techniques in order to communicate its message (the Quran's form in Islam, as we have previously established, is not open to imitation even by native speakers of Arabic). Therefore, in the case of a concept such as *qisas*, its special religious usage and the lack of an English equivalent should be recognised. Consequently, *qisas* should be transliterated in English rather than translated as *retaliation,* and then a footnote supplied, providing all the necessary information on its original use. What makes one culture different from another is the set of values or beliefs embedded, often invisibly, within it. Such values should be conveyed, in the context of the translation of sacred texts, according to their role and place in their original environment. Otherwise the translator risks being accused of falsifying the complex network of values that are, for many, the key component of any sacred text and the bedrock of their religious culture.

Conclusion

The first engagement of Muslim translators in the translation of the Quran started in the belief that they were best placed to convey the real meaning of the Quran's message in response to the many translations commissioned, for missionary purposes, by orientalists and some Christian clergymen. Expressing this real meaning is not confined to a literal approach which is often insufficient and problematic, especially when applied to ambiguous terms. Therefore, there is an urgent need to credit Islam in the eyes of non-Muslims by producing a translation that would reflect the original not only in terms of form, but also content.

However, although these Muslim translators are aware of the fact that the source text is sacred and the product in the TL is not, they are still influenced by the idea that the original is the literal word of God (Allah). Therefore, literal translation methods are heavily used. Yet formal or literal translation is largely problematic between Arabic and English in its ability to produce language whose effect is the same as that of the original. Comparing meanings on the basis of a dictionary match between languages that are linguistically and culturally remote is very misleading. That is the reason why translations of the Quran are often misunderstood when read in English. Translators of the Quran should thus adopt different approaches and techniques, even against their conviction that the Quran is the literal word of God (Allah), in order to convey the meaning of its message, which is the only thing that ought to be reproduced in the TL. Instead of rendering words by their generic and superficial meanings, they need to be carefully analysed in terms of their different semantic shades, and then examined in light of the context; only then can an authentic translation be undertaken. Sometimes translators may encounter concepts that are completely foreign in the TL, since they are strongly embedded in the SL and its culture. Such concepts are unique to the SL either in terms of their implication or wording, and cannot be easily mapped onto TL equivalents. These concepts usually carry values and beliefs expressing the distinctiveness of the original culture. So any attempt to compromise the communication of such concepts would end by a misperception of the values embedded. Therefore it is crucial that their distinctiveness be maintained. To render such words by offering a generic and superficial translation does not do them justice and misleads the TL readers. Indeed, translators need to leave such concepts intact, and convey them in the TL by transliteration accompanied by commentary in order to avoid any misconceptions. Moreover, in the case of the Quran, it could be suggested that a list of the most problematic concepts should be made available for translators in order to provide detailed information that can be used before any Quran translation is undertaken. This measure would help translators maintain consistency and accuracy in any project within a unified reference source. Through this process, it is assumed that the proper intended meaning and the distinctiveness of some concepts can be maintained when translated into any TL. This,

in turn, will help convey the message of the Quran in its real sense and close any door of misunderstanding resulting from improper handling of evaluative concepts. Such concepts are indeed like icebergs floating in Quranic discourse, of which only a small part may appear above the waterline. In this context, the translator is the captain of ship seeking to sail, carrying the meaning of the language in its cultural context, from the SL port to the TL one. As long as the captain is aware of the dangers that such icebergs carry with them, there is no fear that the ship will not arrive safely at the TL port. However, failing to respect such icebergs may lead to a collision which leaves the meaning far from its target destination. Or, to use another illustration, we can think of evaluative concepts as reflecting the set of beliefs and values of the culture in which they function. If this mirror is broken, the original vivid image will no longer be clear, and a distorted reflection of reality is projected instead.

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7

English Evaluative Concepts in a Contemporary Devotional Christian Text. A Comparative Study of *Dzienniczek* by Faustyna Kowalska and Its English Translation

Aleksander Gomola

Devotional Texts as Sources and Vehicles of Evaluative Concepts

Devotional texts are by their nature imbued with conceptualisations characteristic of the culture and religion they were born into, and since their subject matter concerns abstract ideas such as God, the human relationship with the divine, morality, or the afterlife, they abound with conceptual metaphors by means of which their authors seek to depict these ideas. Such texts may also be regarded as 'Jurassic Parks' of age-old conceptualizations—species that once populated the world of imagination of a given culture for centuries but no longer exist in the disenchanted, secular world: angels, demons, souls, graces, and so forth. Nonetheless, this fact is not necessarily a weakness of such texts, but may

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be their strength. Quoting Santayana, cited by Clifford Geertz (1973: 87), we may say that the 'power [of religion] consists in its special and surprising message and in the bias which that revelation gives to life. The vistas it opens and the mysteries it propounds are another world to live in'. This 'surprising message' is expressed in devotional texts through an intricate network of concepts forming a specific worldview, since every true religion encompasses all dimensions of human life.

A mystical text as a subgenre of devotional literature illustrates well language use in culture for yet another reason, as it frequently shares aesthetic ambitions with literary language, appealing not so much to the mind as to the emotions of a reader, and at the same time, it seems to have a great deal in common, at least for believers, with the language of informative texts, presenting esoteric knowledge reserved for the chosen ones.

All this amounts to saying that devotional texts are a promising field of exploration both for cognitive linguists and translation studies scholars. Linguists may find there are various instances corroborating the link between language, thought, and embodiment,[1] while researchers interested in the translation process may examine to what extent concepts present in such texts—many of them language or culture-specific—may be transferred into other languages or cultures. Modifications of these concepts resulting from facing the various obstacles accompanying the process of translation are unavoidable, and have long been known, especially in the case of Bible, as is attested very early, for instance, in the Septuagint, where an anonymous translator of the Wisdom of Sirach informs readers, in his prologue, of the difficulties in the translation from Hebrew into Greek (Hengel 2004: 85). Needless to say, not only the Bible but also other religious texts may be a challenge to a translator, and devotional Christian texts undoubtedly belong to this category. Since such texts are sometimes read more widely than the Bible, the question as to how the translation process affects them is even more significant.

As a matter of fact, the Bible and other religious works in the Judaeo-Christian tradition have been seminal texts through which conceptualizations and ideas have been spreading for centuries among the cultures

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[1] For cognitive linguistic explorations of religious texts, see, for example, Barcelona (2003), Jäkel (2003), Kövecses (2008) Sweetser (2005) or DesCamp and Sweetser (2005).

and languages of Western civilization and beyond its borders. In the very beginning of the Common Era, the Septuagint enabled Greek-speaking Jews such as Aristobulus or Philo, as well as early Christian writers, to merge Jewish and Platonic ontological concepts, especially ideas of creation in both traditions (Pelikan 1975: 33). Augustine of Hippo's works, such as *Confessions* or *De Civitate Dei*, when translated into various European languages, infused the target cultures with early concepts of time, mind, memory, or political ideas (Bloom 2006; Matthews 2006). Both those who today praise the USA as the beacon of democracy and freedom and those who accuse it of being the gendarme of the world will agree that these roles are grounded to some extent in the religious concept of 'a city upon a hill' (Matthew 5: 14) popularized through the King James Bible. Through another devotional text, namely the catechism written by the Italian Jesuit Roberto Bellarmino, 'translated into no fewer than 40 languages, seventeen of them from outside Europe' (Burke 2005: 13), Western religious and philosophical concepts reached the New World. Sometimes translations of religious texts were censored to prevent certain concepts from spreading; this was the case with the ideas of political and social freedom promoted by the Apocryphal Books of Maccabees that were removed from the King James Bible versions sent to the West Indies in the nineteenth century (Tidemann 2009).

Devotional texts continue to play a significant part in culture, shaping the worldviews of millions of people and offering them evaluative concepts that often guide them in their lives. A brief analysis presented below shows how such concepts manifest themselves in a contemporary devotional text and its translation.

Preliminary Remarks

In this chapter, I compare arguably one of the most popular contemporary Catholic devotional texts, *Dzienniczek; Miłosierdzie Boże w duszy mojej* written by the Polish nun Maria Faustyna Kowalska (1905–1938) with its English translation entitled *Diary; Divine Mercy in My Soul*. The aim of my analysis is twofold: (1) to demonstrate the role of an individual in creating and propagating specific evaluative religious concepts

and (2) to examine how the dynamics of translation affect the transfer of such concepts from one language to another. *Dzienniczek* and the evaluative concepts contained within it (especially the concept of Divine Mercy), reveal, in a sense, a 'surprising message' opening 'new vistas' for millions of its readers. Although the idea of Divine Mercy may be found in the Bible and various texts of the past in the Christian tradition, it only gained enormous popularity in the Roman Catholic Church—both in its official preaching and popular piety—in the late twentieth century, largely thanks to Kowalska and her *Dzienniczek*. Pope John Paul II, himself a Pole, was a great proponent of Divine Mercy and established its official cult, which meant that this new form of devotion found its way into prayers, preaching practice and Church documents including a papal encyclical *Divine Mercy* promulgated in 1980. The rapidly growing popularity of this cult among Catholics all over the world gave rise to translations of *Dzienniczek* into numerous languages, including English.

The significance of *Dzienniczek* in the contemporary Catholic world and the fact the Church canonized its author, turn our attention to the role of an individual in creating and propagating a specific set of evaluative concepts, as well as to the role of a subjective perspective in communicating them. The idea of subjectivity in human communication is one of the core tenets of cognitive linguistics (Langacker 1985); seen broadly, subjectivity concerns not only a speaker's mental or physical vantage point, so often referred to in cognitive linguistics (and actually discussed as early as the thirteenth century by Thomas Aquinas [S. T. I, q. 13, a. 7]), but will also include the worldview and conceptualizations of an individual. If such subjective conceptualizations spread by translations into other languages, they may shape the worldviews of whole communities, as in the case of Buddha, Jesus of Nazareth, or Muhammad, whose conceptualizations gave rise to new world religions. This process often repeats itself within a specific religious community. Two examples will suffice here. Paul of Tarsus' imagery underlies the overwhelming majority of Christian theological concepts, among them a notion of human nature corrupted by sin, an idea of bodily resurrection or a metaphor of the Church as Christ's body, while the ideas of Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, a sixth-century monk, regarding the world of angels and presented in his *Celestial Hierarchy*, became a standard element of the conceptualizations

of God and His court for most Christians in the following centuries. Similarly, the popularity of Kowalska's *Dzienniczek* testifies to the strength of the worldview of an individual, as her individual network of evaluative concepts (particularly the idea of Divine Mercy) was adopted—through *Dzienniczek* and its translations—by millions of believers.

Before we start exploring the source text and its translation, an important methodological remark is necessary here concerning the epistemological aspects of the study. Researchers, including cognitive linguists, sometimes seem to extrapolate their findings and conclusions onto the ground of epistemology too easily, which may result in a reductionist judgement of certain concepts, especially religious ones, if they do not correspond with the so-called scientific vision of the world.[2] Leszek Kołakowski, among other modern thinkers, warns against such attitudes, arguing that 'what people mean in religious discourse is what they ostensibly mean' (1982: 16). This is also the perspective adopted in this analysis, which signifies that we will not concern ourselves with the truth-value of Sister Faustyna's statements, but take them at face value.

Sister Maria Kowalska and Her *Dzienniczek/ Diary*

Sister Maria Faustyna Kowalska, born Helena Kowalska, joined the Congregation of the Sisters of Our Lady of Mercy a convent in Warsaw at the age of twenty and due to her humble social background and very rudimentary education (she attended school for only three years), she was assigned menial jobs in the bakery or the kitchen (Kowalska 2005: 15). During her prayers and meditations she experienced mystical visions; urged by her confessor, she started to write them down in a form of a diary of a total volume of around 230,000 words.

Surprisingly, the manuscript of the diary has never been published. The text in its original handwritten form is kept in Kraków, Poland. It was copied for the first time in the 1950s by Sister Ksawera Olszamowska,

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[2] Janda writes that, according to some cognitive linguists (including George Lakoff), their discipline can be taken as a proof that God does not exist (2010: 8).

but the copy, intended for publication, contained a great deal of mistakes and omissions; some words and phrases were also added. It was soon translated into Italian to gain the Vatican's approval for the cult of Divine Mercy, yet the Church's *Magisterium* forbade it then. The decision was attributed to the faulty Polish copy of the manuscript and the poor translation into Italian (Górny and Rosikoń 2014: 235–236). This illustrates rather well the possible consequences of distortions in the translation of religious texts.

The manuscript of *Dzienniczek* was copied for the second time in 1965. It was then that it was also edited and annotated. Once again, the copying and editorial works were carried out by clergymen and nuns, and the original manuscript has never been made available to independent researchers or scholars. This copy of the manuscript became its 'original' version, and a source text for translations into other languages (Kowalska 1981). Still, the lack of access to Kowalska's original manuscript means that the discussion concerning the details of the text is difficult, if not impossible in some cases. We therefore have to keep in mind that the examination of evaluative concepts in *Dzienniczek/Diary* is based on its form as the Catholic Church wishes to present it, which may not be identical with the original manuscript.

As we learn from the preface to the English translation published officially by the Catholic Church, the process of rendering the source text into English was a tedious one. The Polish text was translated into English by two native speakers of Polish and 'this first, literal translation' (Kowalska 2005: 3) was reviewed by native English speakers, most of them Catholic priests. We also learn from the preface that 'the diary was subjected to a complete editing, re-typing, and proofing process for clarity of expression and readability according to current English grammar and usage' (ibid.) and the team of translators and editors 'carefully reviewed the translation, often referring back to the original Polish to ensure exactness of expression' (ibid.). The team approached its task very seriously, confessing that it 'dealt with the same kind of challenge that faces the translators of Sacred Scripture' and adding that 'some terms allow for a variety of expressions even though the meanings are the same, and the final translation thus becomes a personal choice of style and expression on the part of the translator' (ibid.). As we shall see in further sections, despite this

great effort on the part of the English team of translators, the source text and the target text of the *Diary* reveal remarkable differences concerning evaluative concepts in both languages.

Broadly speaking, genologically Kowalska's *Dzienniczek* belongs to the long tradition of mystical Christian literature. Yet at the same time it is different from other mystical texts of the past, because, most probably, its author was not familiar with the great Christian mystical tradition, and therefore, could not draw on its plentiful works. She did not have any solid theological education and her language and visions are simple, not to say naïve, and do not stand comparison with many classic texts of Christian mysticism. The imagery, including the visions of hell, [3] and the theological concepts found in *Dzienniczek* reflect to a great extent the traditional and popular Catholic theology prior to the Second Vatican Council.

Comparing the source and the target texts we can distinguish two sets of evaluative concepts. The first one includes conceptual metaphors common in Polish and English and probably other Indo-European languages that are practically identical in *Dzienniczek* and *Diary*. The other comprises evaluative concepts expressed differently in the original and its translation, revealing shifts in meaning, which in turn, leads to possible different receptions of the Polish and the English versions, respectively.

Conceptual Metaphors Shared by *Dzienniczek* and *Diary*

Among conceptualizations shared by *Dzienniczek* and *Diary* which corroborate the cognitive linguistic theory of the embodied mind, at least three conceptual metaphors are worth mentioning: (1) KNOWLEDGE IS

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[3] When Kowalska writes: 'Let the sinner know that he will be tortured throughout all eternity in those senses which he made use of to sin' (741), she is closer to Dante's *Divine Comedy* than to twentieth-century Christian theology. The same may be said of her depicting a demon as a cat (412), which is in line with even earlier medieval imagery and goes back to the *Vox Rama* papal bull from the thirteenth century. Besides, Kowalska—like John Milton—cannot dispose of the problem of visual communication in her conceptualization of hell and although there are no references in her text to 'darkness visible', still she writes that 'despite the darkness, the devils and the souls of the damned see each other' (741).

LIGHT; (2) EMOTION IS HEAT; (3) MENTAL PLEASURE/A SPIRITUAL POSITIVE VALUE IS SWEET.[4]

The KNOWLEDGE IS LIGHT conceptual metaphor was examined by Sweetser as part of her study of perception verbs and their metaphorical meaning (Sweetser 1991: 32–48). This metaphor is also present in the Bible (cf. Isaiah 9: 1; Matthew 4: 16; Luke 1: 78, and so on) and appears frequently in Christian theological discourse and devotional literature.[5] We may find numerous examples of this metaphor in *Dzienniczek/Diary*. Kowalska writes (the numbers in brackets refer to sections of *Dzienniczek/Diary*): 'God filled [her] soul with the interior light of a deeper knowledge of Him' (16); 'This flash of the knowledge of God draws the soul and enkindles its love for Him' (95); 'How grave is the malady of the eyes of the soul which, struck by divine light, claims that there is no light, whereas, it is so intense that it blinds her' (109). 'Illuminated by light from on high, the soul can better know what pleases God and what does not' (112).

All these quotations are faithful renderings of identical conceptual metaphors employed by Sister Faustyna in Polish, and illustrate the concept of light as possessing a definitely positive value, although paradoxically, too much light may cause the reverse effect by blinding an individual.

Another popular conceptual metaphor discussed by researchers (for example Kövecses 2000: 41, 2002: 131) and present in *Dzienniczek/Diary* is EMOTION IS HEAT/FIRE. That such conceptualization is employed in an account of an intimate relationship with the divine is hardly surprising; that is why Kowalska speaks very often of 'the fire enkindled in her soul/heart' (371, 439, 459, 867, *passim*). These expressions are equivalents of the same conceptual metaphor in the original, albeit in one case we notice a slight shift within the source domain, when the author writes

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[4] Other conceptualizations like metaphors with water as a source domain have been analyzed by Borkowski (2001). Actually, various linguistic aspects of *Dzienniczek* have already been analyzed by Polish researchers (they were not, however, compared with their English translation, which we are doing here for the first time). Unfortunately, most of these analyses are not in English.

[5] Without this and other conceptual metaphors using verbs of perception in the source domains, most of Christian mystical literature is inconceivable. For the most recent study of Christian mystical language employing verbs of perception, see Gavrilyuk (2014). The KNOWLEDGE IS LIGHT metaphor is extremely popular in English devotional texts, and can be found in John Henry Newman's poem *Lead, kindly light* as well as in John Newton's *Amazing Grace*.

that her love of Jesus 'zawrzała', (literally 'boiled up'), which was also rendered as 'enkindled' (1538). Still, this conceptual metaphor exemplifies another evaluative concept common for Polish and English, and presumably understandable to all readers of the target text who are not native speakers of English, as it is the result of our embodied experience. As in the previous case, heat/fire has a positive value here, indicating the intensity of emotion/love towards God. Yet at the same time (and this is what makes many religious texts so remarkable), *Dzienniczek/Diary* contains examples of an opposite conceptualization where fire is presented as a negative element, namely in visions of hell.[6]

The conceptual metaphor MENTAL PLEASURE/A POSITIVE SPIRITUAL VALUE IS SWEET is very common in Christian devotional literature. It may be found, for example, in two popular Latin hymns: *Pange Lingua* by Venantius Fortunatus and *Ave verum corpus*.[7] The omnipresence of this metaphor in devotional literature has made 'sweet' in such texts almost a cliché. No wonder then that we can encounter the following phrases in *Dzienniczek/Diary*: 'Sweet Jesus' (1), 'Sweetest Heart of My Lord/Jesus' (72, 281), 'sweetness of inner silence' (118), 'Mary, My sweet Mother' (161), 'O my God, how sweet it is to suffer for You' (351), and many others. These are faithful translations of the Polish phrases with the *słodki* ('sweet') lexeme. Sweetser points out that physical taste is the source domain for mental states in Indo-European languages (1991: 36–37); therefore, we may safely presume that this conceptual metaphor is universal, at least in this language family, and understood easily by both Polish and English speakers, and probably speakers of other languages. Scattered throughout the source text are also various other conceptualizations belonging to the common worldview of the West (and probably

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[6] Such opposite polarity, namely, presenting a concept or direction both as positive and negative, depending on the context, appears also in the pre-Copernican Christian vision of the universe, taken over from Aristotle and Ptolemy. On the one hand the Ptolemaic world represents an UP-DOWN image schema in which positive value is ascribed to the celestial sphere where God resides and negative value to the sublunary sphere inhabited by people. Yet if we look at the Ptolemaic world through the prism of the CENTRE-PERIPHERY image schema, then the celestial sphere receives a negative value and positive value is associated with the very centre of the universe, the very middle of the Earth, where, as we learn from the *Divine Comedy*, Satan lives.

[7] *Pange Lingua* speaks of *dulce lignum, dulce clavo, dulce pondus* ('sweet wood, sweet nail, sweet weight') of the cross while *Ave verum corpus* addresses Christ with the words *O Iesu dulcis* ('O sweet Jesus').

other cultures), for example the LIFE IS A JOURNEY metaphor is present in a simple poem by Kowalska in which she depicts human life as like navigating a boat across rough seas with God as a helmsman (1322).[8]

Conceptual Metaphors Affected by the Translation Process

A close examination of *Dzienniczek* and *Diary* reveals numerous examples of lexical and stylistic differences between both texts. The existence of such differences is part and parcel of the translation process tolerated in informative texts and hotly debated in literary texts. In *Dzienniczek/Diary* these differences affect evaluative religious concepts and may lead to different interpretations of the original and its translation. The differences presented below comprise the following aspects and/or themes of the source text: (1) the MORALITY IS ACCOUNTING conceptual metaphor; (2) Poland as a chosen nation; (3) Diminutives; (4) Patterns of devotional stylistics.

Morality is Accounting

The most important evaluative concept permeating the whole text of *Dzienniczek* is the idea of Divine Mercy, the ultimate act of God's forgiveness offered to those who trust him. Millions of readers of *Dzienniczek* and its translations have found this idea compelling and reoriented their lives according to it, which is the most vivid example of the influence of this devotional text. Yet paradoxically, although the Polish nun again and again praises God's Mercy, she at the same time underscores a more basic and broader framework underlying it—that of morality seen as accounting, with people as God's debtors. The concept of morality as accounting is well known in religion and anthropology, and plays a central role in

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[8] Quite a few symbolic elements of Kowalska's simple poem resemble Tennyson's poem *Crossing the Bar*. It might be interesting to examine whether English readers of the *Diary* notice this undoubtedly accidental correspondence, and to what extent this may affect their reception and interpretation of Kowalska's text; however, such examination goes beyond the scope of this chapter.

the Christian doctrine. It is closely tied to the concept of original sin, the problem of free will and God's grace. Morality as accounting is an integral part of the satisfaction theory of the atonement, one of the classic theological doctrines of Christianity, going back to Augustine of Hippo and developed in the eleventh century by Anselm of Canterbury.[9] This concept has also been an object of interest for cognitive linguists. Lakoff discusses the Moral Accounting metaphor and its role in American politics (1996), while Sweetser presents the teaching of Jesus recorded in the Gospel of Matthew as a radical break with morality seen as accounting, and with a vision of God as a scrupulous bookkeeper to whom humans owe repayments for their debts (sins). Since *Dzienniczek* promotes the idea of Divine Mercy, it may seem that its message will correspond to the idea of 'Father in heaven [who] causes his sun to rise on the evil and the good, and sends rain on the righteous and the unrighteous' (Matthew 5: 45), yet this is misleading, as two different evaluative concepts of God are intertwined in *Dzienniczek*. On the one hand, Sister Faustyna writes of God as the Merciful Father, and on the other, she presents him as a strict ruler who is easily offended by humans and expects amends, indeed a scrupulous bookkeeper.[10] The latter concept of God is noticeable whenever Kowalska uses *wynagradzać* ('to make amends') or *zadośćuczynienie* ('reparation'). The first lexeme, used much more often, appears whenever Sister Faustyna writes that, through her prayers, adoration or sufferings she wishes to make amends to God (*wynagrodzić*) for the sins or the lack of faith or love demonstrated by other people. *Wynagradzać* is derived from *nagroda* ('a reward'), and hence, corresponds closely to morality as an accounting for, and giving back of, what we owe God. The consistent use of this term in the Polish text strengthens this conceptualization and the vision of God accompanying it. *Zadośćuczynienie* ('reparation') reflects the same conceptualization, for example when Sister Faustyna quotes Jesus' words: 'make reparation to My justice' (873). The target text lacks such consistency, as the translators replace the two Polish lexemes with various equivalents. These are: 'reparation' (44, 927); 'make up for'

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[9] The vitality of this conceptualization is confirmed by the title of one of Kołakowski's books *God owes us nothing* (1996) devoted to Augustine of Hippo and his theology of grace.

[10] We can jokingly say that Sister Faustyna has managed to unite two, clearly different, visions of God as a Strict Father and a Nurturing Parent that George Lakoff discusses in his *Moral Politics* (1996).

(57, 505, 1385); 'make amends' (160, 309, 319, 481); 'atone for/atonement' (81, 320, 325 1280, 1451, 1489); 'expiation' (355). As a result, the conceptualization of morality and of human relations with God in terms of accounting is less prominent in *Diary*. While 'make amends' reflects to some extent the same conceptualization that is present in the Polish text, 'atonement' suggests another, yet also very typical conceptualization of harmony and reconciliation between God and human beings; 'expiation' is a very technical, theological term that fits well in *Dzienniczek*; however, the conceptualization underlying it is probably not transparent to most English speakers.[11] In sum, the target text loses something of the clarity of the original conceptualization of morality as accounting and, due to the variety of terms used in *Diary*, the concept of God as a bookkeeper is less articulated than in *Dzienniczek*. This in turn suggests that the idea of Divine Mercy as a positive evaluative concept is paradoxically more convincing in the target text than in the original, where an attentive reader gets the impression that God may show mercy only after He settles his scores with humans.

Poland as a Chosen Country in *Dzienniczek*

The concept of Poland as a chosen country is another good example of subtle shifts in the evaluative dimensions of certain concepts transferred from one language to another. According to Egan, Kowalska 'is an example of those mystics […] who receive divine revelations and assurance of a mission to the universal Church' (1996: 563). It is not entirely true, since what distinguishes *Dzienniczek* is the fact that some of its visions concern not the whole Church, but specifically Poland. Christianity, although a global religion, has witnessed Christian nations that regarded themselves as chosen by God (Llywelyn 2010: 63–129)

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[11] 'Reparation', from Old French *reparacion* and directly from Late Latin *reparatio* 'act of repairing, restoration', a noun of action from the past participle stem of the Latin *reparare* 'restore, repair'; amends: 'restitution', from Old French *amendes* 'fine, penalty'; 'atone' from adverbial phrase 'atonen' (c. 1300) 'in accord,' literally 'at one', a contraction of 'at' and 'one'; 'expiation' via Middle French *expiation* or directly from Latin *expiationem* 'satisfaction, atonement' (Online Etymological Dictionary, http://www.etymonline.com [accessed on 20 August 2015]).

and such a 'theology of election' is also characteristic of certain aspects of Polish national identity. When Poland lost its political sovereignty in the early nineteenth century, Polish Romantic literature presented the country, partitioned between Russia, Prussia, and the Austro-Hungarian Empire, as the 'Christ' of European nations. The political collapse of Poland was conceptualized in Christian terms as the death of Christ. Poland died for the sins of other European nations, and its political resurrection, eagerly awaited by Poles, was seen as a new era of political stability and happiness for individuals. It is possible to say that the Polish Romantic poets, following the early Wordsworth, Shelley, or some representatives of German Romanticism, were also preoccupied with new revolutionary ideas of Europe after the French Revolution, yet unlike their English or German counterparts, transferred them onto the religious ground of Christianity. This perception of Poland did not disappear when the country regained its independence in 1918; what is more, when the Polish army defeated the Red Army at the Battle of Warsaw in 1920 and stopped the Bolsheviks pushing westwards, this event refreshed the role and status of Poland as the *antemurale Christianitatis* in the memory of Poles. This may explain why we find in *Dzienniczek* more than thirty references to *ojczyzna* ('homeland'), depicting Poland as a chosen country with a special role in God's scenario for the world. The concept of Poland as homeland has a clearly positive value for Kowalska, and although this axiological orientation is preserved in the target text, a significant part of the connotative value of the concept is lost. It is not so much the result of the obvious fact that the target readers are non-Poles, but rather a consequence of the unique position of the concept of *ojczyzna* in the worldview of native speakers of Polish. Sister Faustyna's text illustrates well what Anna Wierzbicka writes on *ojczyzna* as one of keywords of Polish culture, incomparable with its semantic equivalents in other languages in terms of its connotative value (1997: 176–190).[12] This means that whenever the term is used in *Dzienniczek*, its connotations come into play. Another difference is the fact that *ojczyzna* is the only single term for 'homeland' in the contemporary Polish language. Semantically and

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[12]Zwierzyńska goes as far as to doubt whether there is a single, general concept in English corresponding to the Polish *ojczyzna* (1993: 275–286).

morphologically, its closest English counterpart is 'fatherland' (*ojczyzna* is derived from *ojciec*['father']), yet because Polish nouns are inflected for gender, and *ojczyzna* is a feminine noun, it evokes motherlike feelings as well, so 'motherland' may also be a good choice. Where the original text reads *Ojczyzna* (always capitalized[13]) the translators use various English equivalents, rendering it as 'motherland', 'native land' 'homeland' or 'my country' (Kowalska 2005: 32, 96, 221, 269, *passim*).[14] As a result, the Polish readers of *Dzienniczek* will see Poland (referred to as *Ojczyzna*) and its role in God's plans as a clear and strong motif in the text, whereas the readers of *Diary* may not notice it at all. What is more, *Dzienniczek* may be interpreted by Poles as a devotional text directed to them as Christians and Poles, rather than just to Christians in general. The current preaching patterns of many members of the Polish clergy, including bishops, corroborates this hypothesis. Excerpts from *Dzienniczek* referring to Poland feature in sermons in many Polish churches today as the basis for proclaiming a specific political-ideological stance, according to which contemporary Poland, as a member of the European Union, is predestined by God to be a counterweight for the godless ideologies of the 'libertine West'. In this way *Ojczyzna*, as a consistent term visible in *Dzienniczek* and related to an important evaluative concept, has political consequences. Conversely, the fact that the translators of *Diary* use many various terms for *Ojczyzna* that are never capitalized,[15] means that the concept so strongly highlighted in the source text becomes rather diluted in the target text, and may be ignored by English readers. This, in turn, affects the overall tone of each text. While *Ojczyzna* is an integral part of *Dzienniczek*, 'homeland' (and its synonyms) are quite incidental elements of *Diary*. The former text is more nation-orientated, the latter is more global in character.

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[13] Following Blumczynski (2010), who discusses the role of capitalization in translations of religious texts, we may say that the capitalization of *Ojczyzna* in the source text situates the term in the close vicinity of terms like Jesus or God in terms of its sacredness. Such a process does not take place in the target text.

[14] The strategy adopted by translators seems to confirm the observations made by Zwierzyńska (cf. n. 12).

[15] With one exception: 'Motherland' (Kowalska 2005: 32).

There is one more element of the source text connected with Poland, less noticeable in the target text: the two rays emanating from Jesus' breast, one red, the other pale (Kowalska 2005: 37). Although they symbolize first of all water and blood from Jesus' heart pierced by a spear, some Polish readers, including the clergy, very often see in them the national colours.

Diminutives in *Dzienniczek* and Their Counterparts in *Diary*

Another lexical difference between *Dzienniczek* and *Diary* is the presence of diminutives in the source text and their absence in the target text. While English is regarded by many linguists as a language with hardly any diminutives (Schneider 2003: 75 in Sicherl 2012: 55), they abound in the Polish lexis. What is more, in the case of Polish diminutives, their connotative meanings are more important than their denotative ones (Biały 2013). According to Tabakowska (2002: 27), diminutives may be regarded as an example of a cultural barrier made of grammar whenever a Polish text is translated into a language lacking in diminutives, like English. Diminutives may signal a childlike or naïve (authentic or feigned) attitude of an author and such childlike attitudes may be ascribed to Kowalska in her mystical encounters with Jesus or Mary. 'Being a child' is a popular attitude for a Christian believer, grounded in the Gospels (Matthew 18: 3), and presumably for Sister Faustyna, diminutives characterize a 'proper' way of speaking of a good, humble Christian. Thus, in her text we frequently encounter such terms as *duszyczka* (dim. *dusza*/'soul') *kościółek* (dim. *kościół*/'church') *pokoik* (dim. *pokój*/'room'), *szafeczka* (a double dim. *szafa*/'wardrobe' in the sense of 'night table') or *gronko* (dim. *grono*/'grape'). Each of these diminutive forms might have been replaced in the original text with their non-diminutive counterparts with no loss to the denotation of the text. But what matters here is the connotation. The great number of diminutives makes the text look and sound more affectionate (to some readers, naïve), more childlike (to some readers, childish). The English translation does not produce such an

impression as it ignores Polish diminutives altogether.[16] The presence and lack of diminutives in the Polish and English texts respectively affects the perception and interpretation of each of them. Let us take into account *duszyczka* (dim. 'soul') used several times with reference to souls in purgatory that Sister Faustyna sees or learns of in her visions, or employed to describe an intimate relationship between an individual and God. In both cases the context is very serious: the afterlife or the heights of mysticism. The Christian tradition and iconography, while dealing with these issues, never use diminutive forms or depictions (think of *The Last Judgment* by Michelangelo where sinners are being hoisted clutching a rosary, or of *The Interior Castle* by Teresa of Ávila, in which a human soul is conceptualized as a solid castle with seven mansions). All this means that Polish readers familiar with Christian mysticism and iconography will immediately notice the discrepancy between *Dzienniczek* and other works of the Christian tradition, perceiving the former as a text of much lower gravity and importance due to the presence of these diminutives.

While *dusza* ('soul') has an English counterpart, *duszyczka* (dim. 'soul') is difficult to render into English.[17] Yet ignoring the diminutive forms of the source text, and especially employing 'soul' as an equivalent of both *dusza* and *duszyczka*, the translators 'gentrify' the source text, heightening its status as a mystical genre.[18] The affectionate character of the source text disappears, the discrepancy between *Diary* and texts by great authors of the Christian mysticism is no longer visible, and Sister Faustyna's stylistic solutions may be seen as a smooth continuation of the Christian tradition, with her standing in line with the earlier giants of mysticism. Such an interpretation is less probable when one reads *Dzienniczek*; readers of the English version are simply not aware that its Polish original,

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[16] Sicherl, discussing translating diminutives from Slovene (also a Slavic language) into English, points out that 'expressing diminutiveness in English often demands going beyond the borders of a lexeme and […] stretches over an entire syntactic structure or even sentence' (2012: 55). Presumably the translators of *Diary* wished to avoid such radical solutions and decided to ignore this stylistic feature of *Dzienniczek*.

[17] T.S. Eliot entitled one of his poems 'Animula', yet this Latin diminutive is, of course, not a part of standard English.

[18] The German translation of *Dzienniczek* also ignores at least some diminutive forms of the original text. The German language has a diminutive form of *Seele* ('soul') namely *Seelchen*, but it does not appear even once in translation.

unlike *Diary*, is sometimes linguistically naïve or childlike, perhaps even childish.

Another important difference between *dusza* and soul is the fact that it is a feminine noun, while 'soul' in English is referred to using the neuter pronoun. As a result, *dusza* is conceptualized as a feminine entity, and whenever *Dzienniczek* describes the intimate relationship between the soul and Jesus, this mystical union is grounded in a more basic conceptualization of a female–male relationship, often used figuratively in Christian mysticism. This conceptualization is less visible in *Diary* where 'soul' is on many occasions replaced with 'it', which obscures the female–male relationship between the soul and God.

Patterns of Devotional Stylistics

Another feature of the source text that practically disappears in the English translation is the various stylistic solutions thanks to which *Dzienniczek* is immediately perceived by readers as a non-typical text. These include: obsolete and religious terms, word order in noun phrases, and forms of address.

There are a great number of obsolete terms in *Dzienniczek*, and these were obsolete already in the 1930s, when Sister Faustyna was writing her spiritual diary. One of them is a Polish adverb *jako* ('as') employed by her where another adverb (*jak*) would be more proper. *Jako* is preserved in the Polish religious register in the Catholic version of the Lord's Prayer or in the *Gloria Patri* doxology, and it is quite possible that Kowalska imitates this usage in *Dzienniczek. Diary* renders these archaic Polish forms with standard modern English adverbs or adverbial phrases, though not always consistently. Let us look at the sentence in which Sister Faustyna describes her mental visions concerning her confessor, Fr Sopoćko: 'These two visions bolstered up my spirit, all the more when I found him to be *just as* I had seen him in the visions, *once* at Warsaw during my third probation, and a second time at Cracow' (Kowalska 2005: 40). Or note the sentence describing her mystical union with God: 'I feel that I am in Him and that I am dissolved in Him *like* a drop of water in the ocean'. The three italicized elements of the sentences above are equivalents of the

same archaic Polish *jako* and an English reader encountering these stylistically standard sentences is unaware that their original Polish versions differ significantly when it comes to style.

An even more essential religious term of *Dzienniczek* whose significance is not visible in its English translation is *kapłan* ('priest'). The English term 'priest' may be denoted in Polish by two synonyms: *kapłan* or *ksiądz*. As it is often the case, these synonyms have different connotative values, with *kapłan* presupposing religious dignity and the elevation of its referent in comparison with members of the laity, and *ksiądz* being closer to the English 'minister' used in a religious context and associated more with function and a social role. Kowalska definitely prefers *kapłan* to *ksiądz*, and in this way *Dzienniczek* fits well with the hierarchical vision of the Catholic Church in which clergymen, or generally religious people, enjoy higher status than lay people. In one of the most disturbing passages of her text, Sister Faustyna shares with her readers what Jesus told her on the status of the saved in heaven:

> And when I looked at the sky I saw the stars and the moon shining. Then the child [Jesus] asked me, Do you see this moon and these stars? […] These stars are the souls of faithful Christians, and the moon is the souls of religious. Do you see how great the difference is between the light of the moon and the light of the stars? Such is the difference in heaven between the soul of a religious and the soul of a faithful Christian (424; Kowalska 2005: 129).

This vision of heaven where certain saved souls 'are more equal than others' is subtly reinforced throughout *Dzienniczek* whenever Sister Faustyna decides to use *kapłan* instead of *ksiądz*. In *Diary*, where both terms are rendered with one equivalent, namely 'priest', such reinforcement is not visible. This 'value added' inherent in the Polish *kapłan* is a good example of an evaluative concept lost in translation.

A peculiar word order in noun phrases noticeable throughout *Dzienniczek* is yet another factor that convinces a reader that this is not a typical Polish text.[19] Although adjectives in Polish noun phrases may

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[19] On word order in the translation of religious texts see also Blumczynski (2010).

appear both in prenominal and postnominal positions, the prenominal occurrence of an adjective in a noun phrase is the most typical distribution, while the postnominal one is non-typical and may be associated with poetry or an elevated style, but also with a pretentious language. Sister Faustyna frequently uses noun phrases with adjectives in postnominal positions that are rendered into English with the standard English word order, that is, with an adjective in a prenominal position. Once again English readers of *Diary* receive a typical form of language, while better-educated Polish readers of *Dzienniczek* may get the impression that its language sounds sometimes bombastic. This results in a greater credibility of the text for English readers, while Polish readers, especially those well-versed in the various styles of Polish, may feel confused, or even suspicious of *Dzienniczek* due to its poor style.

Sister Faustyna frequently records in her *Dzienniczek* what Jesus or Mary said to her, using often, on those occasions, the specific Polish addressative form *tyś* that is more or less equivalent to the 'thou art' in English. Like 'thou art', *tyś* is a non-typical form of modern Polish, reserved today for an elevated or pompous style. Reading *Dzienniczek*, it is hard to avoid an impression that Jesus, Mary and Sister Faustyna speak in a very solemn or even pompous way. The English readers of *Diary* read a text in which conversations between Sister Faustyna and Jesus are conducted in standard language.

Another peculiar archaic form noticeable in conversations between Sister Faustyna and Jesus in *Dzienniczek* is *dzieci*ę (arch. 'child'). Jesus often addressed Sister Faustyna as *moje dzieci*ę, which is rendered in the target text as 'my child', yet this translation does not reflect the archaic and solemn character of the original Polish phrase that to some may sound false and inauthentic. English readers do not get this impression and because the peculiarity connected with *tyś* and *moje dzieci*ę is not visible in *Diary*, the target text may be more acceptable to them.

Conclusions

Dzienniczek—a contemporary Christian devotional text—is a good example of both the universal and the language-specific character of certain evaluative religious concepts, and how they may be affected by

translation process. Its English counterpart seems to be a stylistically ameliorated version of the text that for many Polish readers is an example of rather poor devotional literature. We cannot say, however, that this amelioration was intended by translators; more probably it was the effect of their unconscious tendency to meet the expectations of English readers—an example of the 'translation language' examined by Nord (2005: 73). At the same time, specific evaluative concepts of the original that did not correspond to English evaluative concepts were suppressed or ignored in the target text. Nonetheless, the popularity of *Diary* among English-speaking readers indicates that fundamental evaluative religious concepts such as a vision of God as both just and merciful, or concepts related to emotions, are shared by both Polish and English native speakers as members of the same Western culture.

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8

Clarity, Soberness, Chastity: Politics of Simplicity in Nineteenth-Century Translation

Michèle Milan

Looking at various discourses and practices through which the value or concept of *simplicity* has taken shape, there appears to exist a yearning for simplicity that seems to transcend the boundaries of times, cultures, and languages. Yet the motif of simplicity also takes on many forms and meanings. Consider the following two quotes. The first one, 'Oui, je fus Grec – Pythagore a raison' (Yes, I was Greek, Pythagoras is right) (1867: 122), is from Pierre-Jean de Béranger, a nineteenth-century French song-writer, known in his time for his simple lifestyle and direct poetic style. The line, taken from the song, 'Le voyage imaginaire', invites us to ponder how Béranger could find himself so closely aligned with Pythagoras, the sixth-century Greek philosopher. The second quote is from the early Christian theologian and philosopher, St Augustine of Hippo, whose famous statement 'So Abundance became laborious' (1953: 244) warns about the threat posed to the soul by multiplicity and excess. The sheer pithiness of these two quotes, moreover, speaks volumes.

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Derived from extensive surveys of English-language translations in nineteenth-century Ireland,[1] this chapter looks at one of the many trends that characterize translation at the time, namely, what we might venture to term the 'politics of simplicity'. The frequent recurrence of terms and expressions connected with ideas of simplicity, plainness, soberness, chastity, or purity in a variety of discourses merits special attention. While the focus of this study is on nineteenth-century Ireland, it seeks relevance to, and beyond nineteenth-century translation. The subject is principally approached through a historical and sociocultural study of the motif of simplicity on the one hand, and on the other, an examination of paratextual and metatextual devices. The texts around and about translations are crucial in many ways. They play a role in shaping the reading experience, framing the act of interpretation, determining literary meaning, and ultimately provide us with critical insights that can help us probe into the motives behind the text and the ways in which it is rendered.

While the preoccupation with simplicity in the nineteenth century was often expressed in texts of a religious nature, it was, however, not untypical of other genres such as poetry. What follows is an attempt to dissect and explore the various strands and fractions of meaning behind the very *concept* of simplicity, in an effort to understand what I refer to as the politics, or indeed poetics, of simplicity. Furthermore, this chapter takes up the ideas and patterns of simplicity as a means of investigating the production, circulation, and reception of translations in nineteenth-century Ireland. It approaches this task mainly from a descriptive, target-based perspective. Calls for textual simplicity, plainness, and soberness may be linked with general concerns for clarity, with ideas of chastity and purity in religious texts, with romantic notions of the natural and with democratic ideas of access and equality. At first thought, the term *simplicity* appears as a rather straightforward concept; in other words, a self-evident notion that requires no questioning. Yet, the term becomes particularly challenging when we attempt to define it, and even more

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[1] These surveys were initially and principally carried out as part of my doctoral research on nineteenth-century translation under the supervision of Prof. Michael Cronin (DCU). Owing to the sheer number of items (to date, 4,000 books, and numerous periodicals), my surveys of nineteenth-century translation in Ireland, and corresponding bio-bibliographical work, are still ongoing.

so in relation to translation—simplicity suddenly becomes complex. As Lorand notes, 'ironically, the notion "simple" is not simple at all' (2000: 211).

To begin with, this chapter outlines some existing approaches to the idea of simplicity in the areas of literary and art criticism and, to a certain degree, in translation studies. It appears that the 'concept of simplicity' has also been a subject of investigations in other fields such as statistical science, econometrics, and the philosophy of science, which this chapter will not examine. That said, this analysis incorporates, throughout, insights from a number of religious and philosophical sources in an attempt to fathom the subject further. Next, a selection of paratexts and metatexts—loosely bracketed under the three parameters of *clarity*, *soberness*, and *chastity*—illustrate the politics of simplicity in nineteenth-century Ireland, and help us make a step towards a better understanding of a concept more slippery than it may seem. Purity is an additional theme which, while not assigned a separate section, nevertheless emerges as one of great importance. Rather than tackling directly the question of translatability, the value of simplicity in translation is here principally approached from a contextual angle. Within the scope of this chapter, translations are not analysed. Rather, this chapter singles out a value seemingly shared and endorsed by many translators, authors, and critics, and explores its meaning, or meanings, from a socio-historical perspective. It is hoped that, by helping us achieve greater understanding of that value, this approach will ultimately shed light on the task of translation.

What Is Simplicity?

From the outset, the question that begs to be asked is what precisely defines simplicity in texts, and by extension, in translations? Is it a quantitative or a qualitative matter? Is there a criterion or a coefficient for simplicity? Is it some minimalist notion of textual expression? Is it to do with appearance or is it an intrinsic quality? Discussions on simplicity have taken place in various fields such as literary or art history and criticism. Such discussions are perhaps less prominent in translation studies, though translation is never too far from literary debates—simply

because translation is often at stake in literary work and literary criticism. The following is an outline of some of these discussions.

Classic Simplicity

To begin with, perhaps the largest debate on simplicity in literature and translation is that which relates to 'Classic simplicity', namely, a value traditionally associated with the classic poets of antiquity. Parker (2008: 229) notes that, in eighteenth-century discourses on classical literature, the value that was at the centre of interest was the value of simplicity, a quality held to be pre-eminent in the Greek writers, and above all, Homer—'the most ancient author in the heathen world' (Pope 1796: xix). This was not any kind of simplicity, at least not 'a bald and sordid one', argues Alexander Pope in the preface to his translation of the *Iliad*. It was a 'pure and noble simplicity' (1796: xxv). Parker points out that 'noble simplicity – a fusion of qualities which present themselves as opposites to the modern consciousness – became the hallmark of classic value' (2008: 229).

At times, this dignified simplicity was correlated with a state of natural, authentic primitiveness. Thomas Blackwell underlines the 'natural and simple Manners', which have a positive effect on language because they 'are ingenuous and good' ([1735] cited in Parker 2008: 229). Simple manners had a symbiotic relationship with language, because they were given 'fit Words to express them' ([1735] cited in Parker 2008: 229). The discourse on classic simplicity employed an array of terms such as 'natural', 'sincere', 'sound', 'genuine', and even 'truth'. Textually, it was about 'artless Phrase and unaffected Stile*'*, where passions were 'not adulterated or disguised' (Blackwell [1735] cited in Parker 2008: 229). Modernity, in contrast, was associated with doubleness and artifice. According to Parker, classic simplicity, 'an elevating conception', served as a means to access a 'world of value otherwise inaccessible and lost' (2008: 230).

But to translate classic simplicity would become itself a serious matter for debate. For Pope, Homeric simplicity is 'a quality almost impossibly difficult to preserve in translation' (Parker 2008: 230). Rather than being spare in words, Pope occasionally advocates circumlocution and

periphrasis. As a result, a number of critics argued that classic simplicity had been compromised in his translations from Homer, deemed too sophisticated. For instance, Cowper contrasts the use of twelve lines in Pope's version to convey five of Homer's verse lines. He argues: 'I may be told, perhaps, that the translation is nevertheless beautiful, and I do not deny it; but I must beg leave to think that it would have been more beautiful, had it been more compressed' (cited in Parker: 233). Cowper thus evaluates the translation of classic simplicity using a quantitative criterion. Yet Parker argues that Cowper's own corrective translation from Homer illustrates what he believes is the impossibility of translating classic simplicity using 'ultra-plain English', which results in 'flatness or pseudo-primitive archaism or a general effect of simple-mindedness' (2008: 233).

The debate on classic simplicity proceeded unabated through to the nineteenth century, and it is worth citing, as an example, 'A Gossip about the Country and its Poets. By a Cantab' in the *Cork Magazine*, an article illustrating that this debate was also played out in Ireland. Here the author of the essay argues that 'to express for instance, the majestic simplicity of Homer, we should adopt very nearly the English style of James the First' and this is so because 'The cadences and mannerism of our modern rhymed hexameters would seem rather unsuited to such an original' (1848: 289). It therefore appears that the choice of either an archaic or a modern idiom in translation of classic simplicity was an important feature of this debate. Another example, this time in England, can be found in Elton's *Specimens of the Classic Poets*. According to Elton, Anacreon's style 'is a model of classic simplicity: elegant, not florid; without studied ornaments, or ambitious figures; natural in sentiment, and pure from witty conceit' (1814: 135). Here again, simplicity is associated with the plain, the natural, and the pure, yet it also has to be elegant—otherwise it would not be classic simplicity.

Simplicity from Aesthetics to Translation Studies

Simplicity is a value which is sometimes promoted, not only in letters, but in arts too. Lorand asks, 'What exactly is it that we cherish by favouring

simplicity?' She then suggests an answer: 'It is not that complexity is being denounced; rather it is *non-redundancy* that is being praised' (2000: 211; original emphasis). In other words, what is rejected is the use of extra components deemed unnecessary. Yet, in art, as in literature and translation, the notion of the *superfluous* has implications: it requires a process of evaluation. This approach ultimately forces us to investigate the purpose of the cultural product in question. Lorand (2000: 11, 211) understands simplicity as a *relational* and *flexible* notion rather than a value in itself, where *relational* means 'a mutual product of object and observer' (2000: 26n). Furthermore, she argues that '"Simple" in many cases is not a mere description but a praise; in others, it is a renunciation' (2000: 211). It may be worth asking if, rather than being either a means to an end or an end itself, simplicity may be both.

From this perspective, the poetics of simplicity can be a challenging line of enquiry. There is no universal, single set of criteria allowing us to evaluate simplicity. Accordingly, there is no straightforward evaluation of simplicity in translation either, because we are dealing with multiple sets of objects and observers. There may be no definitive and objective way of classifying simplicity; thus, *redundancy* is as difficult to assess, since this perspective also makes redundancy relational. In addition to linguistic differences and factors, what may be deemed necessary to one individual or a group in one culture at a particular historical time may not be the same to another at a different time and in a different culture or society.[2] Therefore, as Lorand argues, the concept of *simplicity* 'is loaded with contrasting meanings and implications; in fact one can decide only by context whether "simple" is desirable or not' (2000: 211). Clyde Kluckhohn's often-quoted definition seems pertinent at this point of the discussion: 'A value is a conception, explicit or implicit, distinctive of an individual or characteristic of a group, of the desirable which influences the selection from available modes, means, and ends of action' ([1951] 1962: 395). From this, we recognize that simplicity entails a relational factor, a hierarchy of values and a notion of desirability and preferential treatment.

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[2] Kluckhohn believes that 'In some measure, the universe of value discourse of one individual or of one culture is probably never fully translatable into that of another' ([1951] 1962: 409).

Moving on to translation studies, Nida and Taber invoke the idea of simplicity in their examination of Bible translation. In particular, *simplicity* may be important to achieve *efficiency*, that is, 'the maximum understanding by the receptor at the cost of the least effort' (1982: 200). Efficiency can be obtained through various formal and lexical features of language, for example, with a 'simple discourse structure' (1982: 146), in other words, a discourse in which there is only one series of events and only one participant (or set of participants); 'short sentences' (1982: 147), providing they logically relate to the rest of the text; or 'sentences with simple structures', which relate to the number of dependent relationships within one sentence. Additionally, they underline 'lexical features designed for efficiency' (1982: 149), such as 'well-known words' or 'familiar combinations of words'. Formal and lexical features combine to produce certain styles, and while efficiency and simplicity are connected here, they are not interchangeable. Efficiency is a value in the communicative act, a performance value; simplicity here facilitates comprehension and enables efficiency.[3]

Newmark touches upon the notion of simplicity and its associated values in terms of translation criticism. From a prescriptive perspective, he believes that 'translation is important as an exercise in accuracy, economy and elegance in manipulating a variety of L2 registers in a first degree' (1991: 62). For Newmark, translators should be able to write 'plain' language, and argues that '"Plain" – honest, direct, clear, unadorned, sincere, smooth, simple – can hardly be translated one-to-one into any other language' (1991: 62). In this perspective, simplicity is a feature of plainness, as are clarity and honesty. Taking up the notion of *economy* in translation, Newmark argues that 'a translation has to be as accurate as possible, as economical as possible, in denotation and in connotation, referentially and pragmatically' (1991: 111). However, he finds fault with translations in which speech rhythms are sacrificed when they are deemed too long, whereby the translator 'imposes a personal idea of good style – the three glorious sisters: brevity, clarity, simplicity – on to the original' (1991: 110).

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[3] The performative and relational value of language and translation, and by extension, the view of translation as an event, inevitably comes to mind here. See in particular Robinson (2003).

To some extent, the above considerations and debates on the poetics of simplicity suggest a need to explore further the ways in which the concept of simplicity is relational, and more precisely, what it *relates* to. While building upon the above for their relevance and useful insights, the following discussion on the *politics of simplicity* in nineteenth-century Ireland takes the subject to another level, and approaches it from a different angle.

The Politics of Simplicity in Nineteenth-Century Translation

The following is a series of such examples of nineteenth-century discourses as may throw light upon the poetics and the politics of simplicity in nineteenth-century Ireland, with a focus on English language translations.[4] Some of these examples are also drawn from the source authors' own introductions, but in English translation, and by Irish translators.

One of the main areas of translation in which simplicity was particularly favoured is religious translation, especially texts dealing with religious life. *The Perfect Religious* (1845) is a translation from the French of Michel-Ange Marin, published anonymously by Sister Mary Vincent Deasy from County Cork. Deasy was a member of the Order of Mercy, founded in Dublin in 1831. Often veiling their identity under a generic pen name, for instance 'A Sister of Mercy' or 'A Member of the Ursuline Community', women religious translators such as Deasy contributed to the construction of a Catholic literature for an English-language readership.[5] In the translated preface to *The Perfect Religious*, the author argues that 'It would be vain to seek florid ornaments in subjects of piety', advocating 'simplicity of style' (1845: 4) in relation to such subjects.

Sister Deasy was also the translator of *A Series of Exhortations on the Nature and Duties of the Religious Life* (1843) from Abbé Asselin (1843).

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[4] For various reasons, literacy in nineteenth-century Ireland was mostly acquired in English rather than in Irish. Accordingly, print culture was overwhelmingly an English-language culture. On the question, see Ó Ciosáin (1997).

[5] See Milan (2015). The subject is also discussed in Milan (2013).

Speaking about Deasy's translation, Sister Austin Carroll, another Sister of Mercy and translator, claims that 'the elegant French of Monsieur Asselin' is rendered by Deasy into a 'clear, concise, and vigorous English', also referring to the work's 'chaste beauty' (1881: 240). Simplicity is therefore articulated not only in terms of *clarity* and *conciseness* but also in terms of *chastity*. Furthermore, the statement that 'It would be vain to seek florid ornaments in subjects of piety' suggests *soberness* of style. Accordingly, what follows is an examination of simplicity through three of its associated values: clarity, soberness, and chastity, with a good deal of overlap between them.

Clarity

Various translators advocated simplicity in terms of *clarity* and *conciseness*. Conciseness, it appears, serves the purpose of clarity. For example, Sister Carroll, in the preface to her translation from Abbé de Saint Jure, *The Spiritual Man*, tells her readers that she chose to adopt 'a concise style in rendering into English the quaint, verbose French of the original, written in the earlier half of the seventeenth century'(1878: v). Here, the task of the translator is not to convey the simplicity of the original; rather, it is to create simplicity. In effect, not only did Carroll adopt a concise style but she also 'compressed' the work, to echo Cowper's expression above. She announces in her introduction that she 'reduced its size about one-fourth, by omitting the Latin text of quotations and Scripture references, avoiding the frequent repetitions common with the writers of Father Saint Jure's time' (1878: v). Conciseness, by way of retrenchments, was therefore chosen as a textual strategy for simplicity. Ultimately, the translator's strategy is deeply connected with the purpose of the translation: 'To place so useful a work within the reach of a greater number' (1878: v). Carroll's strategy should thus be seen as part of a wider project set on making religious literature more accessible to a growing readership in English.[6] Accordingly, it is worth noting that simplicity does not necessarily entail 'fidelity'; these are two different values indeed.

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[6] On the growth of the conventual movement in nineteenth-century Ireland, see for example Clear (1987). It is worth noting, particularly for contextual insights, that Sister Austin Carroll migrated to North America and published some of her translations from there.

Reviews of translations often carried a similar discourse. For instance, the *Irish Monthly* stresses that the incidents recorded in the *Life of the Ven. Father Perboyre*[7] were set forth 'with a clearness and simplicity that lose nothing in the English version'.[8] Occasionally, we may notice a likeness between nineteenth-century discourse on religious translation and discussions about classic simplicity. For instance, in the preface to his translation of Massillon's *Conférences ecclésiastiques*, Rev. Christopher H. Boylan, of Maynooth College, speaks of 'limpid waters in tranquil and stately majesty' (1825: xiv).[9] While the term 'limpid' brings to mind a sense of *clarity*, indeed *purity*, its association with 'stately majesty' immediately evokes Alexander Pope's dignified, 'pure and noble simplicity'. To this, 'tranquil' adds a meditative sense of peace and harmony.

Soberness

A predilection for soberness, or sobriety, of style can easily be inferred from a number of quotations above. The stance against florid ornaments, verbosity, frequent repetitions, denotes a movement towards a more sedate and sober texture. The objective is to keep the text clear from what is perceived as redundant and superfluous—even if this means curtailing the text. In order to shed further light on this particular trend in nineteenth-century Ireland, it may be useful to move this discussion onto a wider plane. In particular, a preference for sobriety in texts and translations may be correlated with the advocacy of moderation in real life. Promoting the virtue of temperance and moderation—abstinence from drink in particular—the Temperance movement was one of the most conspicuous projects of moral reform in nineteenth-century Ireland. Particularly vigorous from 1838–49, it was also closely linked to the Young Ireland nationalist movement. Moral regeneration was regarded as a necessary step towards political freedom. The Repeal reading rooms promoted

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[7] Anon (1875) *Life of the Ven. Father Perboyre, Priest of the Congregation of the Mission, translated by A Sister of Mercy*, Dublin: McGlashan and Gill.

[8] *Irish Monthly*, 3 (1875): 177.

[9] In his dedication to Rev. John MacHale, Boylan refers to his translation as his 'first public effort in the cause of religion' (1825), iii.

moral and political reform as well as instruction and self-improvement (Mulvey 2003: 99; Legg 2011).

Furthermore, the idea of *soberness* may be seen as related to that of *plainness*. As we have seen, plain language, supposedly free from ornaments and wordiness, is advocated because it facilitates clarity of speech for productive, effective communication.[10] Yet the promotion of plainness in the nineteenth century may also be linked to a fascination with 'ordinary language', and by extension, with the vernacular. A discourse on plain, simple language was not necessarily confined to religious translation either, and many commentators on poetry or reviewers of literary translations were emphatic in their praise of simplicity of style.

A prime example is the fascination exerted by Pierre-Jean de Béranger on the Irish imagination at the time. Béranger, now largely forgotten, was a very popular French patriotic and republican songwriter. His use of popular airs and of simple, ordinary language generated a great deal of enthusiasm in Ireland, capturing the imagination of numerous translators and commentators (Milan 2014). In the *Dublin University Magazine,* journalist and literary critic John Frazer Corkran notes that one of the main reasons behind the French poet's popularity and success was 'his thorough appreciation of the value of language, and the necessity of speaking to the age in the language of the time itself – a total rejection of everything that is false, stilted, and affected' (1858: 447). William Dowe, possibly the most prolific amongst Béranger's Irish translators, offered equally profuse praise for the simple, demotic language of Béranger's poetry: 'The thought of Beranger is bare, and has a definite aim, and is launched against it with a direct and muscular vigorousness which is unequivocal, and brings itself and the object of its hostility to immediate issue' (1844: 205). Here, the terms *bare*, *definite*, *direct*, *unequivocal*, *immediate* all tend to produce a sense of clear, plain, and effective language. Sydney Owenson [Lady Morgan] contributes a similar, and indeed a political statement on the subject, arguing that in Béranger's songs, an enhanced force is derived

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[10] This has also been an important motif amongst the Quakers (Society of Friends).

(…) from the unaffected ease and simplicity of the language. It has no inversions, no gaudy imagery, no inflated metaphor; but as it echoes the rich melody of joy, or breathes the plaintive accents of compassion or regret, it kindles the fancy, and goes directly to the heart. The muse of Beranger is the muse of liberalism; and his poetry is in the mouths of all Frenchmen, who are not the slaves of the court, nor the protectors of abuse (1831: 256–257).

In 'A Night with Béranger' Dowe argues that the French lyricist is 'in his life and verse, the truest poet of our time',[11] only 'rivalled in simplicity of life' by William Wordsworth (1850: 218). Commentators frequently underscore Béranger's simple mode of life as much as his simple writing style. They praised above all his aptitude to express the feelings of the popular masses, thus deserving to be called 'the poet of the people'. They exalted what they perceived as a successful combination of democratic and demotic poetry. The 'people' was a recurring theme in a variety of discourses, in original and translated literary writings as well as in broader sociocultural projects, from the People's Library in Belfast to the publication of 'People's Editions' of various religious, historical, or political works.

The simple, popular, and demotic element may be sometimes correlated with the *universal*. For example, *The Celt*, an Irish nationalist paper, argues that Béranger was the 'universal melodist of emotion'.[12] In other words, there appeared to be a sense of universal truth, and the demotic and simple nature of Béranger's poetry was a sign of that universality of emotion. Significantly, he was often compared to classic poets, particularly Horace and Anacreon—and in terms of classic simplicity too. Dowe writes that 'In his simple habits, and his poverty, Béranger seems formed on the antique models of Greek or Roman character' (1850: 218). For Thomas Caulfield Irwin, aka 'Dr Pentagram', there is grace and chastity in artful simplicity. In an article on 'Greek and Eastern Art', he claims that 'beauty in writing depends on grandeur in simplicity, chastity in

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[11] Significantly, William Dowe (1815–1891) exalts Béranger above Hugo in the ranking of French poets, yet, the latter became one of the most renowned French literary figures of the nineteenth century, whereas the former fell into oblivion.

[12] *The Celt,* 14 (1857), 211.

grace, ideality in harmony' and grace in writing depends on 'simplicity, purity, unity in variety'. He then distinguishes 'natural grace', a feature in some of Anacreon's and Catullus's verse, from 'naïve grace', found in 'several of the shorter pieces of the French poets, such as Marot, Malherbe, Alfred de Vigny, and not a few of Beranger's songs – a respect in which they differ from those of Moore, which are too antithetical in structure' (1863: 321).

The fascination with Béranger fits into a wider pattern of European cultural nationalism in the nineteenth century, with its focus on folk songs and folk culture. While, arguably, Béranger's poetry belongs more to the realm of popular culture than folk songs proper, it nevertheless fed a strain of European cultural nationalism which sought out, and drew on, the demotic roots of culture. It resonates with a romantic interest in the vernacular, the folk, and the natural. From a cultural nationalist perspective, song and poetry represent the national soul in its essence. George Sigerson (1836–1925), aka 'Erionnach', is known rather as a translator from Irish and for his influence on the development of Irish cultural nationalism (Cronin 1996: 120; Welch 1988: 163–169). He also produced a number of translations from continental languages, particularly French and German.

Interspersed with translations, Sigerson's *Poets and Poetry of Munster* (1860) offers additional insights into the value and meaning of *simplicity* in nineteenth-century Ireland. Following the rendering of an original Irish-language poem and his version in English, Sigerson comments: 'Surely no poet has ever expressed more delicately or poetically so beautiful praise! Yet the Irish seems to have been the out-gushing of an unlearned mind – not, remember, that it is at all ungrammatical, the peasantry speak with wonderful purity – but because of its simple construction' (1860: xxii). Introducing the next poems, Sigerson notes, 'The following are clearly the productions of more educated men, they have not the gushing simplicity of the above quoted' (p.xxii). One of these verses, he argues, contains the 'unblushing mask of hyperbole' which he sets in contrast to the foregoing poems. In other words, simplicity does not necessarily mean that it is unremarkable, unattractive, and indistinctive. On the contrary, Sigerson finds delicacy and beauty in this poetry. The 'unlearned mind', namely the peasantry in Sigerson's study, is not

portrayed in a negative light; it is not uncivilized. We are again touching on *authentic simplicity*, since they 'speak with wonderful purity'. The phrase 'gushing simplicity', which conjures up a feeling of outpouring honesty, constructs a forthright and natural, even organic image of Irish country speech. This is set in opposition to the educated but 'unblushing mask of hyperbole', which implies deceit and excess. It may be worth noting that John O'Daly, bookseller, editor, and publisher of *Poets and Poetry of Munster*, shares a similar discourse when he adds in a footnote that the Irish song referred to 'is characterized by that simplicity of style and language peculiar to the humbler classes of the Irish peasantry' (1860: 72).[13]

Chastity

Earlier an example was given in which the term 'chaste' appears in relation to text and translation. Additionally, in her preface to François de Ligny's text, *The history of the life of our Lord Jesus Christ*, Mary Anne Sadlier[14] argues that the style of the translation has to respect the soberness of the original, which she refers to as 'chaste simplicity':

> I am only sorry that this most valuable production of the learned and pious De Ligny has not fallen into better hands; but as the task has devolved on me, I have endeavored to perform it in what I considered the most suitable manner – that is to say, without any of those meretricious ornaments of style which might infringe on the chaste simplicity of the learned author (1853: 4).

When she takes to task those stylistic 'ornaments' that endure or emerge in one's translation, Sadlier goes one step further in using the adjective *meretricious*. This is an interestingly equivocal term, primarily referring to something that is apparently attractive but having no real value. Therefore above all, it stresses the superfluous nature of ornaments.

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[13] J. O'Daly, footnote to the poem titled here 'Tiocfaidh an Bás ar cuaird chugad' in G. Sigerson (1860) *The Poets and Poetry of Munster: A Selection of Irish songs by the Poets of the Last Century, with Metrical Translations*, Dublin: John O'Daly.

[14] Mary Anne Sadlier, née Madden (1820–1903); she emigrated from Ireland to America in 1844 and is mostly known as an author of Catholic and patriotic novels.

Yet the archaic meaning of *meretricious* may be of particular interest too, that is, a sense of befitting or having the character of a prostitute.[15] If we take into account that this expression is used in direct opposition to textual chastity, and that Mary Anne Sadlier had strong religious and moral values, it would not be unreasonable to regard the choice of such a two-edged term as not entirely uncalculated. From this perspective, it sounds as if war was waged against 'textual sensuality'. One of the most prolific Irish translators of French Catholic writings in the nineteenth century, Mary Anne Sadlier also occasionally edited translations. Describing one of her editorial tasks, on a translation entitled *The Year of Mary; or the True Servant of the Blessed Virgin*, she criticizes the translator's work, and notes that she had to correct, among other things, some 'slight interpolations' introduced by the translator, 'which would have marred the simplicity proper to a work of the kind, and to the grandeur of the subject' (1866: 22). It appears, then, that the subject content calls for formal simplicity, and it is greatness in the subject that requires textual simplicity. Simplicity, in this case, would be 'marred' through the use of extraneous elements, and greatness—if not perfection—would not be achievable. Perhaps owing to the religious context of Sadlier's preface, and the various intertextual and historical forces that shape writing and reading, the terms *simplicity* and *marred* together create new meaning. In particular, they evoke the idea of purity—the idea of form and phraseology that is untarnished and unadulterated. Chaste simplicity is also a good fit for a work on the Virgin Mary.

Promoting chastity and soberness was nothing new. Cronin notes that post-Reformation translation in Ireland already promoted a plainness of dress, which was the true expression of 'a direct and honest relationship with God and the Word' (1996: 72). Similarly, in nineteenth-century translation, texts reflected in form and content the moral and religious aims of authors, translators and other actors in the process. Mary Anne Sadlier's work as a translator and editor is enlightening because it is illustrative of a wider trend in nineteenth-century translation. The prime purpose in the translation of Catholic writings, in particular, was to

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[15] Based on the definition provided in the *Oxford English Dictionary* [Online], Oxford: Oxford University Press, available at: http://www.oed.com [accessed on 15 June 2015].

foster piety and virtue, indeed religious renewal. Within the Irish context, this pattern needs to be seen in relation to the renewal of religious life and education, as well as the growth of a Catholic middle-class and the strengthening of the Catholic Church in Ireland after the relaxation of the penal laws.[16] The recurring use of the term *chastity* in paratextual and metatextual comments appears connected to this purpose. It also finds particular resonance in the second half of the nineteenth century, which saw Pope Pius IX officially declaring the Immaculate Conception a Roman Catholic dogma (1854).[17] Moreover, notions of textual chastity and sobriety naturally fit in with religious observance and the vows of poverty and chastity. The modesty of the translation can be seen as a reflection of the simplicity and sobriety of the religious habit.[18]

Conclusions: After Pythagoras and Augustine

The poetics and politics of simplicity would certainly merit further elaboration. Indeed there are many avenues by which to approach these questions. This chapter has sought to explore one of those avenues, taking a sociohistorical view of nineteenth-century translation, and bringing one particular manifold feature into focus. The poetics and politics of simplicity in nineteenth-century translation invite us to tease out the concept of simplicity by identifying and lifting off its rich and interwoven layers of meaning.

A Sense of Abstinence

Firstly, there is a sense of abstinence—chastity and soberness. Abstinence from redundancy and superfluity in language can be correlated with

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[16] These are only some of the important contextual and historical dimensions that should be taken into account for a greater understanding of translation patterns in nineteenth-century Ireland.

[17] One of Sadlier's works includes a translation of the 'Letters Apostolic' written in 1854 by Pope Pius IX on the 'Dogmatic Definition of the Immaculate Conception of the Virgin Mother of God'.

[18] Although an investigation of gender and chastity could not be reasonably conducted within the scope of this chapter, it would nevertheless make a positive addition to the present study.

abstinence in life, especially if the text has direct relevance to religious and pious living. Simplicity can further be seen as a form of renunciation, such as renunciation of personal wealth and property. A preference for textual sobriety and simplicity may be regarded as fitting both a moral and a religious agenda, a current of moral reformism or an aspiration to spiritual and religious perfection.

The Language of Authenticity

Secondly, the stress on simplicity can also be about clarity, which concerns communicability and reaching an audience. It can be correlated with increased literacy—in nineteenth-century Ireland, this would be literacy in English—and the means to widen a readership. This can also be linked, to some extent, with democratic notions of access and equality, which can be used for political aims, as well as, as we have seen, for the dissemination of religious texts and religious principles.

Not unrelated to the above is the promotion of plain, vernacular language that would represent the essence of a people, which can thus be related to romantic notions of the *natural* and the *pure*, indeed the idea of *truth* and *authenticity*. On that specific point, let us return to the concept of classic simplicity for a moment. One particular element at the heart of the discourse on classic simplicity was the pastoral ideal, the shepherd's sensibility, the country life (Parker 2008: 234–235). It may be related to the idea of a Golden Age, and by extension, a notion of authentic living and writing. The pastoral ideal is also particularly notable in Fénelon's *Aventures de Télémaque* (1699). *Télémaque* (*Telemachus*) was not only a hymn to classical literature and 'noble simplicity'. Its pastoralism demonstrates, in Parker's words, 'a genuine reforming intention' (2008: 235). Significantly, Fénelon's work was still quite popular in nineteenth-century Ireland, both in the original French and in English translation. In nineteenth-century Ireland, there were images being constructed of a Golden Age corresponding to either pre- or Early Christian Ireland. In cultural nationalist discourses, an 'authentic Ireland' was also stereotypically represented by the Celtic, westernmost fringes, invoking remote and idyllic images of Gaelic peasantry (Leerssen 1996: 10–11; 188). From

classic simplicity to cultural nationalism, there is often a sense of remoteness and antiquity, sometimes an opposition to modernity and the idea of a lost simplicity. Additionally, the triumph of Béranger in the ranking of French poets, if not just poets in general at the time, demonstrates a fascination with direct, honest popular expression and with 'simple living'.

The ultimate but implied and unvoiced question about the translatability, if not the universality of simplicity, particularly in its textual and linguistic expression, thus will undoubtedly remain unanswered at this point in time. This chapter did not seek to determine whether *simplicity* in one language, culture, or time is the same notion as *simplicity* in another, even though the question frequently begins to appear at the surface. At textual level, and in translation, simplicity becomes a challenging notion, inevitably difficult to circumscribe. In the light of differing customs, languages, habitual practices and world-views, this task would require at least some cross-linguistic and cross-cultural investigations. In translation, differentiating the local from the foreign may not be such a straightforward task either. There are interactions between the source and target traditions, and, as pointed out in Lambert (2006: 91), we may be dealing with a much more complex system of international and multicultural interactions, with mutual and multiple influences between the various value systems.

This chapter has sought to approach translation from a wide angle, using mostly commentaries around and about the subject, and examine the wider sociocultural narratives which frame the key cultural, social and intellectual debates in nineteenth-century Ireland. This approach sometimes requires the teasing out of ideas from a wealth of traditions, philosophies, and religions of past and present times. There is a matrix of traditional and conventional values and attitudes behind the poetics and politics of simplicity. The value of simplicity exposes a complex set of underlying social, linguistic, and literary dynamics. As Tomasi puts it, 'A value is subordinated to the existential context, and it is always verified by social events. It is the sphere of existence that founds and circumscribes that of values' (1998: 537). In this regard, it is worth stressing the social role of translators. As various scholars have pointed out, translators are not only cultural mediators; they are also social agents (Lefevere 1992; Zlateva: 1993; Simeoni 1995; Wolf et al. 2007). This

chapter has sought to tap into the sociocultural dimension of translation in an historical setting, and illustrate its socio-communicative value and the social-constructivist power of language.

Simplicity in Classical Antiquity

Perhaps one further observation would not go amiss at this point concerning the rich and long-standing history of the value of simplicity. This requires us to step back in time for another moment. For centuries, simplicity has been regarded as a way of living in various cultures and communities, so it must have a bearing on the poetics of simplicity as a way of writing and translating in any given century. According to Gentry (1989: 4), the commitment to a simple, 'plain life', and its associated typology, may be traced back to the classical antiquity, in the writings of Euripides, Aristophanes, Theocritus of Syracuse, Virgil, Tibullus, and, other well-known classical poets such as Horace indeed. Literary and travel descriptions of real societies shaped the image of these societies in terms of idyllic worlds and times.[19] One of the most crucial features of simplicity was, and has been, its association with inner life and spirituality. Gentry traces a line of development from the ancient philosophers, Plato, the Stoics and the Church Fathers, through Christian asceticism in the Middle Ages, St Bernard de Clairvaux and the Cistercians in the twelfth century, and of course St Francis, as well as Early Middle High German literature, down to modern-day ideas of simple living. There are some common threads, in particular: 'Simplicity is the opposite of diffusiveness, and by freeing oneself of desires not essential to the maintaining of life, the individual is thus able to focus on the search for truth and justice' (Gentry 1989: 5).

One of the earliest philosophers of the simple life was Pythagoras, whose spiritual community flourished in the sixth and fifth centuries B.C. It was Plato's *Republic* that made Pythagoras famous, and Plato's work also constructed a philosophy—indeed a politics of simplicity. For Plato, notes Gentry, 'simplicity in all forms of life leads to justice' (1989: 5).

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[19] For instance, Gentry (1989: 4) refers to Polybius's descriptions of the Gauls in his *Histories*.

St Augustine warned of the dangers posed by excess to the soul, and traced the root of greed and cupidity to the Fall. Once unity with God was broken, multiplicity and profusion in the world led to a plurality of wants: 'So abundance became laborious, and his [man's] needs, if one may say so, became abundant, for he pursues one thing after another, and nothing remains permanently with him' (St Augustine 1953: 244).[20] Simplicity enabled a form of return to Oneness and the Eternal.[21] In many modern-day societies, the motif of the simple life is often seen as a remedy against the fast life, profusion and consumerism, particularly in urban settings. The value of simplicity is certainly not strange to many of us today; there is no shortage of terms and expressions such as *less is more*, *keep it simple*, *downshifting*,[22] which serve as guiding thoughts and exhort to worldly simplicity.

The Purpose of the Politics of Simplicity

To conclude about the politics of simplicity in nineteenth-century Ireland, it appears that there is a purpose to it, be it for a purification of life-style or a commitment to certain democratic values. That purpose may be aesthetic, religious, moral, political, social or cultural, and possibly tap into several of these areas. Simplicity as a textual value is bound in social and historical contexts. The poetics of simplicity show that there are aesthetic and cultural values at play, and a fascination with lofty, classic simplicity. There are various strands of meaning conflated in the term *simplicity*. The politics and poetics of simplicity in nineteenth-century translation advance a model, an exemplary narrative. It is a form of aesthetic and sociocultural policy that encourages us to look beyond the text. The politics of simplicity shape texts and lives—and this, for now, is a simplified conclusion. Simplicity seems to strive towards laying bare something at the core, which is perhaps the next step for this discussion.

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[20] See also Dyson (2005: 90ff).

[21] Kierkegaard also comes to mind here, particularly his idea that 'purity of the heart is to will one thing', and the need 'to let go of the things-of-this-world'; see Come (1995: 193–194).

[22] The motif of downshifting versus materialism is in fact one of the modern uses of the phrase 'politics of simplicity'.

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9

Letters to Italy: Translation and Religion in Nineteenth-Century Ireland

Anne O'Connor

The analysis of translation activity, in particular, societies and contexts, can often focus on published texts and literary works. In nineteenth-century Ireland, such an approach would only capture a proportion of translation activity since, in this period, religious translations greatly outnumbered literary works, and influential elements of translation were contained not just in publications but also in private correspondence. Indeed, religion was a forceful propeller behind translation activity in Ireland in the nineteenth century and constituted the major translation output for the country. Recent research has shown the dominance of religious translation in Ireland in the French context (Milan 2013), and it is thus important to study the function of translation and its effect on religious and societal developments in Ireland. Nineteenth-century Ireland experienced huge religious upheavals, including increasingly bitter divisions between Protestants and Catholics and the 'Romanisation' of the Irish Catholic Church. It was a period of religious fervour that has been dubbed the 'devotional revolu-

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tion', and the seeds were sown at this time for many subsequent years of sectarian tensions (Larkin 1972, 1980, 1987). This paper examines how translation was used to promote certain religious worldviews in Ireland in the nineteenth century, and in particular, it will look at how an ultramontane form of Catholicism was progressed by means of translation.

Although books, articles, and pamphlets are generally studied as translation outputs, this study will instead use private correspondence to demonstrate that important translation activity can also take place in that realm. It will use, as its case study, the private correspondence of Cardinal Paul Cullen (1803–1878) to demonstrate, through close textual analysis, how his translation efforts could be an effective means of advancing a religious point of view and how private letters could have a public function in promoting ideologies. Cullen, like many of his nineteenth-century contemporaries, was a prodigious letter writer, and his letters constitute his major output (more than any published pamphlets or sermons). The study of religion and translation is often dominated by biblical study, and in fact, Cullen himself was involved in biblical translation during his time in Rome. However, the main translation activity that dominated his life was in the contemporary realm, and demonstrates how translation was a very actual and necessary activity for an ambitious nineteenth-century cleric. Cullen was not the only Irish cleric to be deeply involved in translation. His major rival, John MacHale, Archbishop of Tuam, was a noted translator, and many Catholic priests who trained in Europe subsequently used their language skills for translation. Nuns were also active in the field, and their translation of devotional texts was hugely important in the entrenchment of Catholicism in Ireland in the nineteenth century (Milan 2013). The translation activity present in the nineteenth century in the religious domain in Ireland is therefore a very important aspect of Irish society at the time, and moulded the type of Catholic religion that was to emerge and have such an impact in subsequent years.

Paul Cullen and Religious Translation

Paul Cullen was sent from Ireland to Rome for religious training at the age of seventeen, and spent almost thirty years at the heart of Roman Catholicism, fulfilling such roles as Professor at the College of

the Sacred Congregations of *Propaganda Fide* and Rector of the Irish College. In 1849 he returned to Ireland as Archbishop of Armagh, and soon afterwards became Archbishop of Dublin; in 1866 he became Ireland's first Cardinal. While in Rome, Cullen acted as a mediator between the English-speaking world and the Vatican, regularly translating documents and facilitating communication (O'Connor 2014; Korten 2012; Barr 2008a). On his return to Ireland, he continued this role and used translation to spread Roman doctrine in Ireland, to further his worldviews, and to drive home his importance in influencing Vatican decisions. As Apostolic Delegate in Ireland, he was given the responsibility of liaising between Ireland and the Vatican. Much of this work involved the translation of requests and letters which were forwarded to Rome. He used his translation skills to further his distinct view of the nature and values of Irish Catholicism. Imbued with the values of Vatican Rome, Cullen's translation activities served to entrench Irish Catholicism in an ultramontane worldview and create further religious division between Catholics and Protestants in Ireland. Against a backdrop of religious tension in nineteenth-century Ireland, Cullen's use of language and translation can be viewed as a central element of his conceptual religious value system. The strategies that he employed in his translations advanced his abilities to impose his worldview on those around him.

An examination of Cullen's translations reveals the strategies he used and the effects that could be produced through omission, condensation, and addition. In some cases, both the source text and Cullen's translation have survived, so it is possible through close textual analysis to highlight the varying approaches he used. In this paper, I shall examine some of these letters in order to demonstrate Cullen's translation *modus operandi*. Although the letters are quite different in themselves, it is important to highlight at the outset that all those under consideration were born out of conflictual situations. The causes of conflict were many and varied, and included religion and education in Ireland; disputes over ecclesiastical leadership roles in Jamaica and India; and personal disputes amongst nuns. In these conflicts, recourse was made to Cullen to represent the interests of the letter writer to the Vatican authorities, who could then decide the outcome of the disputes. In entrusting their letters to Cullen to translate, the letter writers were thus hoping that he would represent

their concerns in the best possible light and that his translations would result in a favourable outcome.

The first of these translations is of a letter from the Prioress, Sub Prioress, and council of St. Mary's Convent, Cabra, dated 23 July 1839.[1] The nuns were at loggerheads with a former Prioress who had left their convent to set up a rival convent which was attracting nuns, novices, and funding away from her former home. The rival convent had made an appeal to Rome for the resolution of the situation, and the letter which Cullen translated was an attempt by the Cabra nuns to make their side of the story heard. In 1839 Cullen was the Rector of the Irish College in Rome, and as such was acting as an ambassador for Irish interests in *Propaganda*.[2] He translated the letter in an efficient, literal manner, which allowed for the nuns to have recourse to the Roman authorities in the settlement of the dispute. The translation which has survived bears many marks of revision, and certain words and phrases have been struck through in favour of alternative expressions. Cullen's attention to linguistic subtleties is clear in this process, as is the precision of his word selection in Italian. In contrast to later letters, his own worldview does not impose itself forcefully in this translation; this dispute centred, it seems, on interpersonal rivalries between nuns, and did not concern some of the more ideological battles which Cullen would fight in later years. In this early example of Cullen's translation activity, he did not take many liberties with the source text during the translation process. His interventions in the Cabra letter were minimal: at times he removed a repetition in the original, and at other times, he elided sentences, but the overall translation was a close textual rendering of the source text. Its function was to communicate the nuns' concerns and for Cullen to use his language skills to put forward their side of the argument to the Roman authorities.

In sharp contrast to this literal translation from 1839 is Cullen's translation of a letter from Fr. James Glynn Killanine to Archbishop

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[1] Pontifical Irish College Rome (PICR), CUL/NC/4/1839/8 (1).

[2] *Propaganda Fide* was responsible for the formation of clerics and also the governance, promotion, and co-ordination of the Catholic Church in non-Catholic countries (including Ireland). The Sacred Congregation *de Propaganda Fide*, whose official title is 'sacra congregatio christiano nomini propagando' is the department of the pontifical administration charged with the spread of Catholicism and with the regulation of ecclesiastical affairs in non-Catholic countries.

MacHale (17 June 1848) outlining the events and developments in a parish neighbouring his own.[3] The parish priest of the adjacent parish of Oughterard, Dr. Kirwin, had controversially accepted the role of President of the newly founded Queen's College Galway. The College was a non-denominational institution, and in the eyes of many Catholics, an 'infidel college'; Kirwin's acceptance of the role of President was thus an extremely controversial move, and provoked much outrage and dissent at the time (Mitchell 1999). In his English letter, Glynn outlines how the parish of Oughterard has seen much proselytism and many conversions to Protestantism. He asserts that Kirwin has done nothing to combat this development and that he is happy to receive money (in his role as President) from 'a Government hostile to our faith'. He further accuses Kirwin of providing himself 'with a splendid carriage' during the famine 'to the scandal of thousands'. Cullen's translation of this letter for the Vatican shows extreme condensation of the original. Whereas Glynn's letter contained 278 words, Cullen's translation numbers only 159. This was quite unusual, especially in the passage from English to Italian, as the latter language tends to be more verbose. Cullen's strategy was therefore one of condensation, but his abbreviated translation still maintained the essential elements of Glynn's letter, namely, the conversion of Catholics in Kirwin's parish and the denunciation of Kirwin's behaviour.

Cullen's worldview certainly influenced his strategy in bringing to the fore the worries about proselytism, and his translation highlights the points that were important to him. He omits Glynn's personal pronouncements on the situation, phrases such as 'I have often felt the greatest uneasiness and anxiety of mind'. Similarly, where Glynn says that Kirwin is 'almost continually absent from where he ought to be, in his own Parish', Cullen translates this simply as Kirwin 'è continuamente assente dalla sua parrochia' [is constantly absent from his Parish]. He omits Glynn's opinion that Kirwin should be in his Parish, but he has also omitted the word 'almost' from before 'continually', thus rendering the statement more forceful and Kirwin's actions more blatant. Such changes, sometimes subtle, sometimes not, make this a translation imbued with Cullen's worldview. His translation becomes a very pointed attack on a

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[3] PICR, CUL/NC/4/1848/13.

person whose worldview did not tally with his own. The last paragraph of the letter is an example of character assassination through translation. Cullen truncates the translation in order to finish with an abbreviated but powerful image of contrast of Kirwin, parading in finery during the famine, oblivious to the suffering of his parishioners. His translation reads:

> Durante la carestia il Sigr Kirwan non fece quasi niente per ajutare i suoi parrochiani, che pene soffrivano stenti incredibili, anzi in quel tempo comprò una splendida carozza, e comparve in mezzo alla affamata multitudine con un nobile treno.
>
> [During the famine Kirwin did almost nothing to help his parishioners who suffered huge trials, in fact in that time he bought a splendid carriage and appeared in the midst of the starving multitude with a patrician convoy.]

Cullen has omitted the many sentences from Glynn's original letter which followed this description; Glynn had said:

> The Doctor is no doubt a great favourite with the bitter enemies of the faith in so much so, that the great body of the people have a great distaste for his ministry and a violent suspicion of this orthodoxy so much so indeed that the common people were ready some time ago to lay violent hands upon him not his own Parishioners, but the inhabitants of a neighbouring Parish you may judge of the estimation in which he is held by the enemies of the Catholic religion from the number of those vipers that have signed the address to him on the occasion of his being appointed President.

Instead of translating this wordy and slightly incoherent sentence, Cullen eliminates it completely and, possibly appreciating the effect of the juxtaposition of famine and finery, finishes his translation with the description of Kirwin in his splendid carriage. Cullen's exclusion of the personal opinions of Glynn means that the translated letter reads more like a report than an opinion piece.

One may well ask why Cullen chose to condense the original letter in such as dramatic fashion. Was he working under time constraints? Did he need to simplify the message to suit the audience? Did he feel that the message would be more effective if expressed in such a direct manner?

Certainly at times we can see that he is attempting to help the Italian reader, and is aware of any areas that might cause confusion. So, for example, where Glynn talks about the 'great defection from the faith' in Oughterard, Cullen translates this as 'si sono fatte molte perversioni de' poveri cattolici' [there have been many perversions of poor Catholics]. His use of the word 'perversion' to express a move away from Catholicism is significant and will be discussed in more detail later. Suffice it to say that in this phrase we have both a Cullen-biased choice of words which influence the message and also an additional clarification that it is Catholics who are being lost to the faith.

Whereas the Glynn letter provides an example of reduction, of expressing the most important points in a succinct fashion by removing the personal comments of the original author, other letters show considerably greater expansion of the original. An example of this can be seen in a letter Cullen translated from a certain L.D.S. in Jamaica, who wrote to detail the poor state of the Catholic religion on the island.[4] Cullen's interest in the promotion of Catholicism in the English-speaking world emerges as an influential factor in the translation choices taken in this letter. In his translation, Cullen adds information to help change the course of events and, like the previous example, he uses an elegant and sophisticated translation in order to forcefully but subtly communicate his opinions. From the very outset, the translation states that:

> La S. Congregazione considera tanto importante la missione di questa isola, che già s'era proposta di nominarvi un vescovo alla morte del presente ordinario
>
> [The Sacred Congregation, deeming the mission on this island to be so important, had already determined to nominate a Bishop to the post on the death of the present incumbent]

whereas the original merely states that 'Several years ago the S. Cong. De Prop. Fide determined to appoint a Bishop to this post on the demise of the present incumbent'. This addition represents Cullen's own worldview where *he* deems Jamaica to be an important mission. This attitude

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[4] PICR, CUL/NC/3/1/9(1) Circa 1847.

informs the rest of the translation, where both the original and the translated texts detail the challenges facing Catholicism on the island. Cullen also omits the phrase 'several years ago' from the opening sentence, thus adding immediacy to his initial Italian phrase.

Cullen helps the Italian reader in his translation: whereas the source text mentions that the Bishop was 'little skilled in the language of the greater part of his flock', the translator says that the Bishop had little skill in 'English, which is the language of the greater part of his flock'. This supplementation of information for the Italian reader shows that Cullen is making sure that the Italian reader will have all of the relevant information about the context. The original letter was written in order to complain about the incumbent Bishop of Jamaica and to detail his unsuitability for the post; Cullen (who obviously agreed with the sentiments of the letter writer) drove home this message in his translation by adding and repeating elements. Thus this original sentence in English which stated:

> From the reasons above stated which certainly have not become weakened by time, and others, he is wholly inadequate, altho' an excellent ecclesiastic, to the arduous duties of his post.

is translated by Cullen:

> La poca pratica della lingua Inglese, la vecchiaja, ed altre ragioni rendono questo vicario, benché uomo di merito, poco atto alla situazione che occupa.
> [Lack of knowledge of the English language, old age, and other reasons make this ecclesiastic, even though a man of merit, little suited to the post he occupies]

Here Cullen has added at the start of the sentence two reasons why the Bishop is not suited to the post—these reasons had been stated in the first paragraph of the letter, but Cullen felt the need to repeat them in order to drive home the point. The repetition of the notion that the Bishop was lacking the requisite language skills in English created a sharp contrast with Cullen, who was putting himself forward as an expert in both the

language and the Catholic Church in the English-speaking world, even in far-flung Jamaica. Cullen regularly sought to influence ecclesiastical appointments in the British colonies, where a network of Irish priests and bishops was to emerge as a powerful force in the nineteenth century. From Australia to Canada and from Jamaica to Scotland, Cullen was determined to influence appointments to ecclesiastical roles (Barr 2008a, b). In studying these trends, most historians would look at his direct interventions in decision-making such as letters written on behalf of candidates, and representations made directly to *Propaganda Fide* in Rome. However, in this example, it can be seen that Cullen also possessed subtle strategies which he used in translation to influence the perception of situations in the English-speaking colonies. Firstly, by translating selected letters, he enabled the flow of communication between the centre and the periphery, and secondly, his translation strategies ensured that a favoured message was driven home. Therefore, we can see in his translation, subtle, and at times, overt interventions which alter the perception of the situation in the English-speaking colonies. For example, when describing the position of the Bishop in Jamaica, the original letter writer referred to the 'arduous' nature of the post. Cullen omitted this adjective in his translation, thereby diminishing any sympathy that might be present for a bishop occupying a 'difficult' post.

Apart from the manipulation of the original text, Cullen also shows skill in translation by writing in an elegant Italian, eliding sentences in order to create more verbose and Italianate constructions. He also adopts the appropriate religious terminology, So, while the original letter says, 'If a Bishop and a younger man was deemed by the S. Cong, to be required for the spiritual government of Jamaica many years ago, it certainly cannot be said that the need is less now', Cullen is much more precise in his Italian translation:

> Se molti anni sono, si credette necessario di dargli un coadjutore, e s'era proposto anche di nominarvi un vescovo, certamente le ragioni per tali passi non si sono diminuiti col tempo.
>
> [If many years ago, it was deemed necessary to give him a coadjutor, and it was also proposed to nominate a bishop, the needs for such measures have certainly not diminished with time].

Cullen shows similar skill in translating governmental ranks in the British administration into understandable and appropriate terms in Italian. The elegance of the translation helps to communicate the ideological message in a very persuasive manner: the original English letter mentions that the incumbent Bishop could be given a retiring pension, and Cullen renders this into a well-constructed hypothetical sentence in Italian, with an elegant use of the conditional tense and the subjunctive:

> Se fosse necessario, la chiesa dell'isola potrebbe dare una pensione al Sigr.
> D. Benito Fernandez, quando egli deporrebbe la sua carica.
>   [If it were necessary, the church on the island could give a pension to Mr.
> D. Benito Fernandez when he relinquishes his duties].

Apart from elegance in the linguistic transfer, the translator also helps the Italian reader of the text by making sure that there is no room for ambiguities; therefore, when the source text mentions missionaries, the translated text renders this as 'missionarj cattolici' [Catholic missionaries]. Cullen always favours precision in his translation, and thus, when the original mentions that if nuns could be sent to Jamaica, there is a good house in the 'best situation in Kingston where they may live'; lest there be any doubt about the arrangements, Cullen says that there is a good house in one of the best locations in Kingston which they can rent. He does not leave it to chance that the Italian authorities might assume that the house is being offered for free to the church. Although I have highlighted interventions by Cullen in the translation, it must be acknowledged that much of this letter is a literal translation from English into Italian and so the changes documented above can be considered deliberate interventions by him. Cullen's choice of Italian words, phrases and insertions all suit the occasion of the translation; it is alternately informative and persuasive. He fulfils the function of an intermediary in facilitating the circulation of information about Catholicism in Jamaica, but through his translation he also becomes an active actor in the transfer process, manipulating the source material as he deems fit.

The final translated letter to be analysed shows similar traits to the other letters discussed, and provides further indications of Cullen's *modus operandi* in his translations. This letter was written in Bombay on 17

February 1849 by Rev. Whelan, who was in dispute with a Carmelite missionary in Bombay, a certain Fr. Michael.[5] The dispute between the two men centred on the use of a Church in the city. Fr. Michael and his associates were currently using it, and Rev. Whelan wanted to have it as the Episcopal Church for the diocese. Whelan wrote to Cullen saying that he was giving him a brief statement of the facts in the hope that he 'may be able to convey accurately all that is true in the case to the Superiors of the S. Congregation.' Cullen takes this sentence and in his translation of the letter it becomes:

> Vi prego di tradurre i cenni che ora ve ne scrivo e di sottometterli o di mandarli a' medesimi.
>
> [I ask you to translate the details which I am now writing to you about and to present them or to send them to the aforementioned people].

The original notion of 'accurately conveying' in Whelan's letter is transformed by Cullen into 'translation' and this transfer of concepts gives us an excellent insight into Cullen's notion of translation. For him, it is interchangeable with the idea of accurately conveying. Accurately conveying could, for Cullen, involve omission, and in the first clause of the sentence mentioned above, he omits personal statements by Whelan relating to Fr. Michael. For example, Cullen does not include Whelan's description of Fr. Michael as 'an overbearing and disappointed man'. Similar, very personal invective in the letter is excluded. Here Cullen's translation choice can be interpreted as an attempt to be balanced and to appear objective. As in the Glynn letter from Ireland, Cullen plays down the letter writer's rancour towards the objectionable person, and prefers instead to let the situation tell its own story. He never omits sections where the original letter writer worries about the effects on religion in his local area if action is not taken to support him. Whether the letter originates in Ireland or from distant Bombay or Jamaica, Cullen's concern for the propagation of Roman Catholicism (with the emphasis on Roman), induces the translator to intervene in order to aid the conveyance of the message to the Vatican authorities. He omits the direct appeals that the

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[5] PICR, CUL/1716 (2).

letter writers make to him to act on their behalf and instead presents himself as a linguistic mediator. In the Bombay letter, Whelan appealed to Cullen to 'make known the contents of this short letter to the authorities,' and he then expressed sympathies with the Pope for his 'present afflictions' and said that these have prevented him from 'addressing himself on the subject and at some length too'. Cullen maintains the sympathies expressed for the Pope in his translation, but he adds the detail, which is nowhere mentioned in the original, that Whelan is writing to Cullen rather than directly to *Propaganda* as the news from Rome 'mi hanno persuaso che le lettere potrebbero andare smarrite [has convinced me that the letters could get lost]'. By adding this detail, Cullen justifies his role as an intermediary, and why the letters are going to him rather than directly to *Propaganda*. He does not mention that Whelan hopes that Cullen will act on his behalf. These strategies present Cullen as a facilitator and a communicator for *Propaganda,* whereas in fact, as his translations show, he could be defined by the modern term 'lobbyist', representing vested interests and influencing outcomes through his communication skills.

To create an air of neutral moderation, Cullen eliminates personal connections discussed in the letters. For example, Whelan mentions nuns from Rathfarnham in Dublin who are working in Bombay. In Cullen's translation, the reference to their Irishness is eliminated and they become a neutral 'piccola colonia di monache' [small group of nuns]. References to common acquaintances are also omitted. The omission of these details and the direct appeals to Cullen from the translated text give the translations a more moderate tone, which is also aided by the exclusion of very personal invective. Although it is recognised that all human translations are imbued with ideology and personal strategies, Cullen downplays this aspect in his translations and presents texts that purport to be simple linguistic transfers.

It is interesting that all of the translations discussed here originate from letters that detail situations of conflict and discord. In the Bombay case, Rev. Whelan's enemies have made representations to Rome to gain favour and support for their position. He now finds himself doing the same thing and attempting to put across his side of the story in the most forceful manner possible. A similar situation had arisen in the Cabra letter where the nuns were reacting to what they deemed to be the

unwarrantable influence of their opponent in making her view heard. Cullen's translation activity intervenes directly in the dispute and aids one side in putting forward its views to the appropriate authorities in the appropriate terms. In the case of Whelan's letter, Cullen frames the translation as a defence of organised religion in the colonies against rebellious individuals. Some of Cullen's most elegant Italian is used to express the gravity of the situation, and the measured and refined tone of the translation forcibly aids the letter's message. Cullen's translation reads:

> Devo però mentovare che finalmente l'ho trovato necessario d'asserire i miei diritti, e nel fare questo passo, benche fossi pubblicamente insultato dagli amici di Fra Michele nella di lui presenza (come testificano molti signori Inglesi) pure m'astenni da ogni parola dura, e gli scrissi solamente che lo dichiaravo libero dai doveri temporali e spirituali connessi coll'amministrazione della chiesa di Bombay essendo determinato di tenerla come chiesa episcopale del Vicario Apostolico.
>
> [I must however mention that I have eventually found it necessary to assert my rights, and in making this move, even though I was publicly insulted by Fr. Michael's friends in his presence (as many English gentlemen can testify) I nonetheless abstained from any harsh words, and I merely wrote to declare him free from temporal and spiritual duties relating to the administration of the church in Bombay, as it had been determined to use it as the Episcopal church of the Apostolic Vicar.]

Cullen was willing in his translations to wax lyrically or to cut ruthlessly whenever necessary. In pleas from distant Bombay or Jamaica he intervened, through translation, to advance the reach and influence of Irish and Roman Catholicism in the British colonies. It must also be observed that he generally achieved his aim, and thus became one of the pivotal figures in the international Catholic Church in the nineteenth century (Barr 2008a; Barr & Carey 2015). Those writing to him understood his position of authority and influence, and their letters display high levels of trust in his abilities and his methods. Monsignor Whelan's letter from Bombay says to Cullen, 'I do not know how to present to Propaganda the details of a dispute between Fr. Michael and me, I am asking you to translate the account which I am now writing to you and

to present them to Propaganda'. The letter writers had no knowledge of how their words would be manipulated and used, but they entrusted their complaints and entreaties into the hands of an experienced operator who had been active in the field of translation since his early days in Rome. In his diary, John Thomas Hynes (future Bishop of Leros and later Vicar Apostolic of British Guiana), recounts how in 1843 he showed documents relating to Demerara to Cullen who 'offered to translate the articles immediately and lay them before Cardinal Fransoni'.[6] A few days later he showed Cullen a letter, and again Cullen 'offered to translate the address and lay it before the Prefect of Propaganda'. Either proactively or reactively, Cullen resorted to translation as a key tool in his communication network, one which would influence the flow of information throughout the English-speaking Catholic world.

Translation in a Transnational World

Cullen's strategies of using translation to further his own religious worldview and ideology did not go unnoticed by his contemporaries; indeed, he was upbraided in the press for directly bringing disputes to the attention of the Vatican and for translating important documents which would present his side of the discussion. The importance of translation in the world of religion can be clearly seen in the following statement published in the *Nation* newspaper in 1856:

> Every scrap of news or document that can be turned to account to further those who advocate a certain policy, to damage those who do not, is regularly translated, edited, and sent forward. It is industriously circulated at Rome so that, under the Delegation of Doctor Cullen, the Church of Ireland has become far more closely bound to the Holy See (9 August 1856 'Roman Politics in Ireland').

Cullen was the conduit for information flowing from Ireland to Italy and back again, and it was through translation that he regularly

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[6] Brian Condon: Diary of John Thomas Hynes, 1843–1868. http://www.library.unisa.edu.au/condon/Hynes/July1843.htm [accessed on 27 August 2015].

influenced developments in a manner in which he desired. The above statement encapsulates strategies in nineteenth-century Ireland: translation was used to 'advocate a certain policy', and in this case the policy advocated was the ultramontane agenda in Ireland, that is, the closer alignment of Irish Catholicism with the orthodoxies of the Roman Catholic Church. The title of the article, 'Roman politics in Ireland', suggests the levels of interference through the work of dissemination and circulation carried out by Cullen. The division within Irish Catholicism is also apparent, as the translation activity is deemed to damage those who do not support a 'certain policy'. The result for the author is clear: Ireland is more closely linked to Rome and Cullen has been successful in his dissemination activities. In the nineteenth century, the improved networks of communication through the post and the travel system meant that information could flow easily between countries. The only impediment to such flows was linguistic incomprehension, and here translation played a crucial role in facilitating the movement of information across borders in a rapid and influential manner. This translation activity had a controlling function, whereby information was selectively chosen and did not always represent a balanced picture of a dispute. The article cited above, when discussing the material sent to Rome from Ireland and translated, continued by saying that:

> But two facts have been studiously kept back, which are as notorious as the daylight in Ireland. The First is simply this, That no Bishop or other Ecclesiastic within the memory of man, has so rapidly become so deeply unpopular in every part of the kingdom as his Grace. And the Second is, That a feeling of distrust and uneasiness against the Roman Tribunals has grown up in the country within the last few years such as was never known here before. With deep sincerity, we hope and pray that measures may be taken of a nature to rectify these evils, and the greater evils and scandals to which they are likely to lead (*Nation,* 9 August 1856).

This statement provides an important contextualisation for Cullen's translation activity, as it demonstrates how his desire to circulate information and influence its flow was born out of conflictual situations, but

also contributed to deep divisions within Irish Catholicism. Gearóid Ó Tuathaigh has referred to Cullen as 'the gatekeeper, the arbiter of virtually all aspects of Irish Catholic development' (Ó Tuathaigh 2011: 437), and the prelate's translation activity allowed him to determine what passed through those gates on the way to Rome and back again. Translation always involves choice, and Cullen's choices were often ones of omission where the other side in a dispute was not given a voice; for Cullen this would have been an obvious choice, such was his unswerving conviction in his ideology. He would never even have countenanced the validity of representing opposing views in any dispute.

Knowledge of Cullen's transnational activities was widespread: in the Dublin Young Men's Society, they could joke about translations being 'ultramontane', 'one of Dr. Cullen's Italian importations' (*Nation*, 17 June 1854). Cullen's efforts to bring the Irish Church more in line with Roman practices, more ultramontane, resulted in extreme division in the Irish Catholic Church (Larkin 2011; Rafferty 2011). His translation activities were viewed with suspicion and dislike—those in the opposing camp to the Archbishop of Dublin realised that his worldview was being propagated through these translations. During the Maynooth controversy, the following report appeared in the *Nation*:

> It appeared, however, that Dr. Cullen took the evidence with him to Rome without the knowledge of the commissioners, and without any permission on their part he had a portion of the evidence translated into Italian, and published in Rome (*Nation* 3 March 1855 'The Maynooth Report').

Cullen's cross-national activities were mistrusted, and the subject of discontent amongst those who held differing views. Recourse to Rome was made in all of Cullen's disputes in Ireland and his linguistic skills in the field of translation aided him greatly in achieving his aims. From the establishment of the Catholic University to disputes with rebel priests, Cullen turned to Rome, made representations, and translated important documents in order to convince Rome to intervene in resolving Irish conflicts (Barr 2003; Keogh and McDonnell 2011). It was a continuous feature of the prelate's activities, and one which repeatedly drew the attention of his contemporaries. In 1855, during heated debates and

political and religious wrangling over the direction of the Catholic training seminary at Maynooth College, Cullen's activities were mentioned in the House of Lords, and subsequently reported in the *Nation*. The accusation returned that Cullen had used translation to interfere in internal Irish disputes:

> [The Earl of Harroway] received a protest from several of the professors of the College of Maynooth, stating that it had come to their knowledge that a copy of the evidence had been put into the hands of Dr. Cullen, and that Dr. Cullen had communicated it to Rome, having translated certain passages for the purposes of placing before the Irish Secretary to the Propaganda how far the teaching at Maynooth was at variance with the interests of the Roman Church. (*Nation,* 19 May 1855 'Maynooth')

Controlling and circulating information was thus a transnational enterprise, one at which Cullen was particularly adept, especially since his time in Rome, when he regularly translated correspondence and placed it before *Propaganda*. Cullen, of course, was not the only person acting in this manner at the time. For example the *Nation* also reported how a pamphlet containing charges of political violence and intemperance, illustrated by extracts from the speeches of Irish Catholic clergymen and translated into Italian, was compiled and circulated by the British Government amongst the Roman authorities (23 June 1855). In the flow of information between countries in the nineteenth century, vested interests attempted to make their side of the argument known through the translation of information and documents.

Textual Choices

The translation of these documents, as we have seen in the analysis of Cullen's translation of letters, was not a simple linguistic transfer, but rather was layered with many hues of ideology and personal agendas. As previously mentioned, Cullen wrote a letter in Italian to *Propaganda Fide* on almost a weekly basis from 1850 until his death in 1878. In these letters he translated an Irish context into Italian for Vatican officials, and

sought to influence their perceptions and subsequent interventions in Irish affairs. The use of Italian in these letters and the careful choice of words to describe Irish situations demonstrate Cullen's linguistic abilities and his sensitivity to cultural transfer. The manner in which he transformed and transposed Ireland into Italian letters was an exercise in linguistic precision and manipulation. A selection of examples from these letters illustrates how he translated Ireland for the Vatican and how his choice of words was influenced by his distinct ideology and worldview.

The first example relates to proselytism and the evangelical efforts of members of the Protestant community to convert Catholics in mid-nineteenth-century Ireland. The Irish Church Missions had been set up by the evangelical Anglican minister Alexander Dallas in 1849 to convert Catholics in Ireland. The controversial Mission, which enjoyed substantial financial support from England, was particularly active in Connaught, and garnered widespread publicity in both the Catholic and Protestant press in Ireland in the early 1850s for the alleged success of its programme (Bowen 1978; Moffitt 2011; Murphy 2005). The object of the evangelisers was to demonstrate the dangers and wrongs of Papal authority and to tempt Roman Catholics away from their Church by a variety of means. Proselytism in Ireland was, of course, a hugely contentious issue. Paul Cullen saw it as a serious threat to the Catholic Church and directed much of his energies in the 1850s towards combating the evangelists' efforts. He was outraged by their attempts to tempt Catholics from their religion and appalled at any hint of their success. So how did this translate into his letters to Italy? When writing to Rome in Italian, Cullen described conversions to Catholicism as 'conversioni' while conversions to Protestantism were 'perversioni'. The value system behind the choice of words is specific to Cullen's Roman Catholic outlook:

> Grazie a Dio qui abbiamo non poche **conversioni** principalmente fra la povera gente. Una grande signora la figlia del conte di Wicklow fu convertita l'anno scorso, ed ella mena una vita da santa così si può sperare che ella convertirà tutta la sua famiglia, che è potentissima in questa parte dell'Irlanda. Mi dispiace però di soggiungere che le **perversioni** accadano ancora nella provincia di Tuam. Monsigr McHale lo nega, ma molti ottimi laici e preti di Dublino che hanno visitato quelle parti recentemente,

m'assicurano che le scuole de' protestanti sono piene di fanciulli e che questi s'educano nella religione protestante.[7]

[Thanks be to God, we have had no small number of **conversions** here, chiefly among the poor people. A great lady, the daughter of the Count of Wicklow, was converted last year, and she leads such a saintly life, that it is to be hoped that she will convert her entire family, which is very powerful in this part of Ireland. I regret to add, however, that **perversions** are still taking place in the province of Tuam. Monsignor McHale denies it, but many fine laymen and priests from Dublin who have visited those parts recently assure me that the Protestants' schools are full of children, and that these are being educated in the Protestant religion] [emphasis added].

The second example relates to the field of education, where Cullen was particularly active in advocating Catholic education for Catholics. He opposed mixed education at all levels from primary to third level, and the legacy of his success in opposing mixed education can be seen throughout Ireland even today. In his time he opposed the Queen's Universities, and one of his pet targets was the Model Schools, the teacher-training institutions which were set up under the auspices of the Commissioners of the Board of National Education. Cullen vehemently opposed these schools, as they provided for both the training of teachers and the teaching of pupils in a mixed religious context. He worried about the effect that such training would have on teachers and on the pupils. When expressing his concerns about these institutions to the Vatican, he termed the institutions 'Scuole Normali', which was the term used for teacher training institutes in Italy at the time. His ability to find a culturally specific translation for the Irish educational institution of Model Schools was crucial in enabling his superiors to understand the Irish cultural context. Cullen regularly translated culturally specific items like this into Italian in order to make them comprehensible to Italian clerics based in the Vatican. For example, when discussing money and finances (a favoured topic of the Irish prelate), he translated pounds into *scudi* and expressed monetary values in Italian terms so as to be clear in the Vatican.

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[7] Cullen to Fransoni, 4 October 1852, Archives of *Propaganda Fide*, SC, Irlanda, vol. 31, ff. 252–253.

Conclusion

In 1853 Cullen commented on a sonnet that he had received:

> Il sonetto dell'Ab. Mogliazzi è bellissimo, ma disgraziamente non sono poeta per tradurlo.
>
> [The sonnet by Ab. Mogliazzi is really beautiful, but unfortunately, I am not poet enough to translate it.][8]

Cullen certainly had the linguistic skills to translate the poem, but these skills were used for practical rather than poetical functions. He therefore rejected the possibility that he could translate the sonnet, as he did not possess the requisite poetical skills. His abilities lay instead in the religious and political domains where, for five decades of the nineteenth century, he used language and translation to influence the course of religion in Ireland. Whereas many studies of translation in Ireland have focused on literature, Cullen's statement above tells us that, in his case, and in the case of many other religious in the nineteenth century, we need to look elsewhere in order to understand the impact and reach of their translational activity. The stream of translation present in personal correspondence and in religious documents demonstrates how translation was an important element of the multilingual world of the Catholic Church and how it was essential for communication, self-promotion, and influence in this period.

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10

Improving the Public: Translating Protestant Values through Nineteenth-Century Bilingual Print Journalism in South Asia

Hephzibah Israel

The term 'Protestant' is one that rose out of the very specific religious and political contexts of Reformation Europe, but how has it travelled to cultures outside Europe? And in what ways has the term functioned and resonated in societies beyond Europe? Whether translated or transliterated, the term comes packed with a range of meanings, some echoing the schisms and rivalries of European Christianity and others, developing nuances that stretch the term in response to new geographical and cultural terrains. Here, I wish to examine the travel of the term 'Protestant' to South Asia, and its use and circulation from the eighteenth century onwards: on the one hand, ostensibly used to refer to a specific branch of Christianity originating in Europe while, on the other, simultaneously codifying implicit values referencing a wider set of ideas beyond the sacred. My argument is that, by the nineteenth century, this term displays both 'sacred' and 'secular' connotations in its use in English and in several Indian languages, making it available as a convenient evaluative category

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in response to a whole range of expanding intellectual, social, and political practices. In pointing out the relationship of the term 'Protestant' to the categories 'sacred' and 'secular,' I do not seek to reiterate the customary binary, but instead show how the same term was used in relation to both categories in nineteenth-century South Asia, where the one extended, qualified, or served to evaluate the Other.

The term 'Protestant' travelled to India and only began to circulate with any significance after the arrival in 1709 of German Lutheran missionaries in South India. But these early missionaries presented themselves as 'Evangelicals' preferring to use the term 'Evangelische' to describe their denomination and mission in South India. However, with the decline of the German Lutherans and increasing numbers of British Anglicans towards the end of the eighteenth century, it is the term 'Protestant' that predominantly comes into use. Tamil is one of the earliest Indian languages to acquire this new term as a result of its encounter with the first Lutheran missionaries in South India, who self-consciously presented themselves as distinct from the several religious communities they encountered in India, including their rival Roman Catholic missionaries and their converts. Over the centuries, it has come to function as a generic term to collectively represent, amongst Indian Christian denominations, all those who do not see themselves as in any way affiliated to Roman Catholicism.

Entering Indian language dictionaries from the nineteenth century onwards, this transliterated term has formally been ascribed the meaning of a branch of Christianity disagreeing with or 'protesting' against the Roman Catholic Church. However, Robert Frykenberg (2008: xi) in his *Christianity in India: From Beginnings to the Present* argues that the use of the term 'Protestant' is entirely inappropriate in the Indian context: 'Viewed from an Indian rather than a European or "colonial" perspective, the term "Protestant" is Anglocentric and Eurocentric'. After all, '[a]gainst whom were non-Catholic Indian Christians "protesting"?'—he asks, and suggests the use of 'Evangelical' as more conceptually 'accurate' to the Indian context. But is this really the case? Frykenberg is offering a rather contradictory argument here: while suggesting that the term 'Protestant' has a valid conceptual meaning only in the European context, he believes that the term 'Evangelical', equally rooted in European, especially German, Reformation, does not carry with it 'European' conceptual

ideas. My argument is that while both these terms, as well as a third related one, 'Roman Catholic', all conceptually convey one aspect of European Christianity or other, they attract further layers of conceptual meaning when circulating in the South Asian context.

In order to explore the ways in which this untranslated term, 'Protestant,' was used in the nineteenth century, acquired valency and was deployed in situations of religious competition, I will focus on its use in one of the Indian languages, Tamil, a language that spans large parts of South India and the northern tip of Sri Lanka. Religious rivalry between the four main religious players in the Tamil-speaking areas, Hinduism, Islam, Roman Catholicism, and Protestant Christianity, which had been building up through the previous century, intensified in the first half of the nineteenth century. Religious polemics between the Roman Catholics, Protestant Christians and Tamil Saivites (a dominant sect amongst Tamil Hindus) was particularly fierce, with a view to establishing the 'true' religion. From the early nineteenth century, competitive apologetic exchanges also found a new course through the print journalism burgeoning in Tamil and English. I wish to focus on this emerging writing practice where one can see how the term 'Protestant', in the context of religious rivalry and one-upmanship, acquires a range of sacred and secular conceptual values.

Journals in Tamil print had begun circulating in South India from 1831[1] largely founded and circulated by European missionaries. In 1841, however, for the first time in the hundred-odd years of Tamil print history, two Tamil men began editing a new journal. The *Utaya Tārakai/Morning Star* was a bilingual, bi-monthly journal published from Jaffna (a northern town in present day Sri Lanka) at the American Missionary Press. Some significant features of this publication are worth mentioning at the outset: its first editors were two Protestant Tamils; it was to function as a means to 'educate' its readers; it included articles from both Tamils and Europeans from a range of religious and political persuasions; and it was bilingual. The journal displays a self-consciousness regarding its role in the public sphere, which, in the conceptualization of the journal, was a *Protestant* public. Moreover, it did not simply address a 'public' that already existed out there, but actively sought to create a 'public' that was in the making.

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[1] According to Murdoch (1865: 234), 'the first periodical issued in India seems to have been the *Tamil Magazine*,' published by the Madras Tract Society.

The first Tamil editors of the journal were Henry Martyn (d. ?) and Seth Payson (d. 1907), two Jaffna Tamils. Seth Payson was a licensed preacher of the American Mission, subsequently better known as 'Payson Udaiyar' (Martyn 1923: 206). Henry Martyn, the more prominent editor, was appointed teacher at the Batticotta Seminary in 1831; a landowner and resident of Jaffna, he was apparently well-known as scholar, tutor, artist, preacher, journalist, and Government storekeeper (ibid.: 302). Martyn and Payson's names are printed as the journal's editors on the last page of each issue of volume 1.

The two editors address their readers in editorials in the first and last issues of each volume, state their aims and objectives for the journal, review its successes or failures annually, enumerate plans for the following year, and often include a plea for greater support from their readers in the form of committed subscriptions. Amongst a range of articles and addresses to readers, these editorials are a fascinating indicator of the public function that the editors envisaged for the journal. My intention is to examine these editorials and letters to editors from a few key journal issues from the early life of the *Morning Star* in order to examine in what terms they articulated an awareness of a Tamil 'Protestant public' and how this journal in particular could play a part in developing it.

Focusing on the first fifteen years of this journal's life, I investigate three strategies deployed by the periodical's editors to fashion a 'rational' and 'Protestant' (and thereby, 'improved'?) public space: bilingualism and translation, developing a notion of 'useful knowledge' for dissemination, and lastly, an emphasis on reason and rationalism. First, by maintaining the bilingual nature of the periodical, with items translated between Tamil and English, the journal was envisaged as a forum for debate between European and Tamil intellectuals. Second, by keeping the journal open to all spheres of knowledge, historical and contemporary—establishing, thereby, a link between the past and present—the editors indicate how they view Tamil intellectual culture fitting within a scheme of progressive 'rationality' and 'modernity,' however nebulously defined. Third, by actively inviting critiques of opinions and practices current in the Tamil-speaking world, the editors offer a public space, to both Europeans and Tamils, where differences in perspective could apparently be aired in a democratic manner. This seemingly open invita-

tion to participate in 'rational-critical debate' however, is not as entirely egalitarian as it would seem, as we shall see later.

I am interested in how the adoption of this new medium of communication of print journalism in the early nineteenth century, mediates 'Protestant' values and beliefs for a colonial public. The *Morning Star* offers a new arena in which hitherto unconnected Europeans and Tamils can be linked through acts of writing, reading, and advertising. This is, however, not a 'secular' space as argued in the classic formulation of the public sphere by Jürgen Habermas (1962; English trans. 1989) but an increasingly distinct and unapologetic Protestant space as the journal progresses through the 1840s. In the context of colonial Sri Lanka and Tamil-speaking South India, where the significant religions present were Sinhalese Buddhism, Tamil Saivism, Islam and Catholic and Protestant Christianity alongside the worship of a range of local and regional deities, the journal's offer of a space to all for airing differing opinions is certainly remarkable. The journal becomes a physical embodiment of the public sphere through this public service and the space that it offers to all interested parties. However, as we shall see, several of its fundamental assumptions are premised on Protestant ideals and concepts, such that, without explicitly stating it, the editorial voice begins to imagine and represent Protestant interests as universally relevant and for the common good of the 'public'. Loaded terms such as 'improvement' and 'reason,' calibrated to Protestant ideals (or wishful-thinking, depending on where one's sympathies lie) are the basis for the selection of articles and their imagined effect on their readers.

The Bilingual *Morning Star*: Language and Translation in the Public Space

The *Morning Star* is one of the earliest and longest-running bilingual journals published in nineteenth-century South Asia.[2] The bilingual nature of the journal widens public collaboration by inviting participation from

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[2] Single language journals (in Bengali and Marathi) began to be published from before the 1840s. There was also a bilingual (Bengali and English) Protestant journal published in Calcutta, *The Gospel Magazine*, in 1819, but from January 1820, it changed to a Bengali magazine.

those functioning in at least two of the three languages in the nineteenth century, Tamil, Sanskrit, or English. Tamil and Sanskrit had for long commanded status as languages of devotion and literary production, each vying for dominance. The journal's disregard for Sanskrit in the 1840s indicates its response to two significant developments in recent decades: on the one hand it follows the keen interest in Tamil publishing shown by Tamil pundits from the 1820s onwards from their location at the College of Fort St. George in Madras (Blackburn 2003; Trautmann 2009; Venkatachalapathy 2012); and on the other, the Protestant missionary decision to adopt Tamil rather than Sanskrit to write, translate, and publish Protestant materials. While Sanskrit continued to be used as a language of devotion and literature, the more recent attention to editing, authenticating, and printing Tamil classics provided added impetus to the use of Tamil as a language of public discourse in print. English, on the other hand, being the language of the British East India Company, was simultaneously beginning to be perceived as essential for the upwardly mobile Tamil wanting to progress within its administrative system. The journal's choice of translating between Tamil and English signals the rise of these two languages as the languages of public and political discourse in early nineteenth-century Tamil perception, emphasized further by its frequent recommendation to readers that they can 'improve' their knowledge and use of either language by reading its articles.

Despite its apparently democratic inclusion of Tamils and Europeans through translation, and a remarkable early effort in bringing these two groups in conversation in a colonial context, it is useful to remember that this was a conversation limited to elite and literate Tamil castes. The journal effectively keeps out larger portions of the population who are literate in none of the languages above. This caveat notwithstanding, I am interested not only in the use of two languages for the journal but the role of translation in creating the effects of a democratic space. For the bilingual significance of the journal lies not so much in the use of two languages with two separate sets of materials published in each, but that all items ascribed any importance are *translated* from one language to another.

The role that translation plays in the life of the journal is not insignificant. While translation between Indian languages had been part of

established literary traditions, translations rarely circulated alongside their 'originals' for readers to choose between them. Besides, the simultaneous appearance of the two textual versions, in two scripts, on the same printed page was unusual this early in the nineteenth century, and when similar attempts were made in other Indian languages, they did not retain their bilingual character for fourteen years as the *Morning Star* did.[3] The journal was in circulation in Sri Lanka and Tamil-speaking South India from 1841 to 1855 in more or less one format, after which its presentation was changed. The most significant change pertinent to this essay is the change from a bilingual to a monolingual journal, when, from 1856, it began to be published solely in Tamil. Until 1845, the journal was printed in two columns, with Tamil and English often appearing in sequence, one below the other. But from 1845, when the editors switch to a three-column format, the English text is presented in the central column with the Tamil on either side, or at times, in reverse. Such translated (and/or 'transliterated') texts were available to some limited extent in the missionary context from the sixteenth century onwards, in Catholic and Protestant texts, for example, where catechisms in Portuguese and in Tamil translation (but with the Tamil in Roman transliteration) were printed for missionaries serving Tamil Catholic and Protestant congregations (Zupanov 2005). But such interlinear translations were restricted to missionary use and their literate confessants and would not have circulated widely. The *Morning Star*, on the other hand, was meant for a general readership spread across northern Sri Lanka and Tamil-speaking South India, to whom this bilingual offering was made. Moreover, where previously the translation traditions in Indian languages were concerned with creative renderings of originals rather than literal versions in the target language, the appearance of both texts had been unnecessary. Now, however, the journal offered both versions, in most cases, with no editorial indication of which article was the 'original' and which its translation, but nevertheless inviting comparison of terminology, style, idiom, and even length of articles between the two languages.

The journal echoed this new sense of translation as *accurate* rendering of terms from one language to another, a concept not intrinsic to Indian

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[3] See note 1 on *The Gospel Magazine*.

aesthetics, where accuracy of the 'repetition'[4] in another language was not the point as much as creating a new text that contained reference to a previous text but had a distinct textual identity. Instead, the attitude to translation and the translations undertaken for the journal showed a preoccupation with accuracy. This accuracy is in turn linked with usefulness; what is accurate alone can be useful. The emphasis on accuracy, clarity, and perspicuity, proving that there is nothing hidden, missing, or mysterious in the conversion from one language to another perhaps functions as a metaphor for the supposed transparency that underlies the Protestant faith.

Let us examine in more detail the link between translation, bilingual publishing and Protestant claims. From the earliest records of Protestant missionaries in India and continuing into the twentieth century, whether German, British or American, a conceptual link was made between *being* Protestant and translating scripture. For instance, Bartholomäus Ziegenbalg (1682–1719), the first Protestant missionary in India, focuses his attention primarily on Bible translation as key to the conversion of the 'heathen' very soon after his arrival.[5] Through the combined efforts and complex network of royal patronage and funding from the Danish King, the donation of a printing press from the British Society for the Promotion of Christian Knowledge in 1712, and the expertise of metalworkers in Halle who forged the first Tamil fonts for print, the first translation of the New Testament in any Asian language was printed in 1714–15. This emphasis on translating scripture is what distinguished them from all other religious traditions, including the Roman Catholic: an opinion that was ironically shared by Catholic missionaries in South India, except that they believed that this is exactly what made Protestant claims dangerous and unsustainable. In the dominant Protestant discourse in India, being Protestant equated with translating the Bible into all known human languages for circulation. Here, engaging with the act of translation was taken to be proof of a complex syllogism: one, that it was possible to translate the Bible into any human language, hence it alone was the message of the true God; and two, because Protestants

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[4] In several Indian languages, the term for translation (*anuvad*) means 'repetition' rather than carrying across.

[5] Ziegenbalg (1709)

alone emphasized the translation of the Bible and actively promoted it, Protestant Christianity alone was the true faith that held the key to that true God.

In the multi-religious setting of South India and northern Sri Lanka, not only Protestant missionaries, but Protestant Tamils too began to deploy the idea that attitudes to translation, support for or rejection of translation, illuminated most clearly the veracity of each religious claim. Challenges posed by these Protestant Tamil editors in India and Sri Lanka, intrinsically equating translation, Protestantism, and 'Truth',[6] set the terms of the debate, and understandably compelled others to address and respond within these parameters. The Catholics were repeatedly drawn into the debate,[7] as are Tamil Saivites and Muslims. For instance, when the editors of the *Morning Star* decided to publish George Sale's English translation of the Qur'an (1734) in their columns, it attracted an angry letter of protest dated 17 February 1843 from a Sri Lankan Tamil Muslim:

> (…) Truly, there is no reason whatever to believe that the Koran translated by Mr. Sale is the true one. As you entice the poor Sivas through your crafty and deceitful words, so you try to entice us also (…) (*Morning Star*, 25 May 1843, III (10): 113–114).

Significantly, this letter is not only published in the original Tamil, but its translation in English is given below to widen the debate on scripture translation beyond its Tamil-speaking readership. An editorial defence of the journal's Protestant strategies follows the letter:

> Has not God endowed all men with understandings that they may consider, and choose what is good, and reject what is evil? Why then is this desire on the part of Catholics, Sivas, and Moslems, to keep their sacred

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[6] See for example, *Morning Star* 1843, the editors' response to a letter: 'We ask our readers to account for this difference between Protestants, the Catholics, Sivas, and Mohammedans. Since there are many religions in the world, all claiming to be true; and since, if either one is true, the others must be essentially false, it is an object of the highest importance to every man, to learn which is the *true* religion; for this knowledge is as essential to man's happiness in the next world, … We cannot obtain this knowledge, if the books from which the different religions are derived, are forbidden to be generally circulated.' (*Morning Star*, 25 May 1843, III [10]: 115).

[7] For more details please see Israel (2011), ch. 4.

books in the hands of a few priests or religious teachers? (*Morning Star*, 25 May 1843, III (10): 115)

They expand on this to develop a wider challenge addressing all their other significant religious 'others'[8]:

> The Catholics pretend that the common version of the Bible is not correct, but they do not make any efforts to give the people what they esteem the true version. The Sivas do not publish their sacred books—the Mohammedans do not publish the Koran—and neither the Catholics—Sivas—nor Moslems—wish to have made known extensively the books from which they derive their doctrines. The conduct of the Protestants, in this particular, is totally different from that of Catholics, Sivas and Moslems. The Protestant freely distributes the Bible, because he believes it is from God (…) (Editors, ibid.)

What purpose does translation serve in and for the journal then? Its function on the one hand is utilitarian. It is integral to the journal's strategy to reach a wider audience, linking missionaries, administrators, judges, teachers, traders, school and university students, and a host of traditional and colonial professional men (and presumably women, although the journal functions primarily as a masculine space with women featuring as subjects of discussion rather than as interlocutors themselves). Translation allows a debate between Tamil-speaking and English-speaking individuals and groups, with the intention of promoting the Protestant point of view not only through the contents of what was translated but through a new means of bilingual communication and visual representation. Translation serves as a tool to create a public by maintaining communication links between these various sections. But equally, there is a strong conceptual link between translation and Protestantism. The ability, and indeed the willingness, to translate scriptures is increasingly implied in the use of the term 'Protestant' in the nineteenth century: thus, in this context,

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[8] There are several examples of such linking of scripture translation to the Protestant faith and opposition to scripture translation as representing the Catholic position. For example, the article, 'Opposition of the Papacy to the Circulation of the Bible,' March 1845, contrasts the 'benevolent efforts of the Protestants to circulate the word of God' to the 'deep rooted abhorrence' of 'Popery' to the Bible, listing their persecution of Bible translators as evidence.

the 'translatability' of Protestant claims and scriptures is conceptually used to evaluate these several religious traditions, including Protestant Christianity, as 'true' or 'false'.

The Rational *Morning Star*: Catholics, 'Popery', and Superstition

The term 'Protestant' enters circulation in most Indian languages untranslated, but mostly transliterated according to the grammatical rules of specific languages: so for instance, mostly as *puroṭesṭaṇṭu* or *Pirāṭṭasṭaṉṭu* in Tamil. Similarly other Indian languages too acquire transliterations. The Bengali develops *protistnt*. In Hindi 'Protestant', is transliterated as just that, and Protestantism is partially transliterated into *protestantpanth*.[9] In Malayalam, *protestanth christiani* and *prothesthanthanaya* and in Kannada *proṭesṭāṇṭa* are used. Despite the existence in most Indian languages of words that denoted the verb 'to protest,' or the noun 'protester' (for example, in Hindi, *virodh* or *prativad*, in Malayalam *apekshikyunnavan,* or in Bengali, *apottikari*) these are mostly not used to develop terminology to describe 'Protestantism'. The Sanskrit is an exception, in that it gives a Sanskrit term for 'Protestant' as one who protests as well as the term *romiyamatavirodhi*, that is, one who is against the Roman religion. This is not surprising since, from the nineteenth century onwards, European scholar linguists in South Asia made an effort to develop precise terminological equivalents in Sanskrit across the range of disciplinary knowledges on the grounds that, as a 'classical' language at the foundation of all other Indian languages, establishing correct terminology in Sanskrit would ensure the same in other languages. As we have seen from the above examples, however, the Sanskrit term does not seem to have percolated to other languages in the case of 'Protestant.'

The Tamil case adds a twist to this history. Significantly, one of the first Tamil-English dictionaries compiled using a European format for

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[9] The Hindi term *panth* denotes denomination, sect, religion, church, or creed.

compiling dictionaries[10] by the German scholar-translator, J.P. Fabricius, and printed in 1779 gives the term: *etir maruppavar, Protestants* (*christ.*) under the entry for the Tamil verb *etir* which means 'to oppose' or 'to be placed in front of.' The root *maru* means refusal or objection. Fabricius, who was a significant translator of the Bible into Tamil, always took care to mark terms that had been developed within the Christian context, which he does here as well. But while the sense of opposition is clear in the phrase, he does not explain what or who is being opposed. Eventually, this phrase disappears from Tamil dictionaries, and by 1862, when the next significant dictionary is compiled and published by Miron Winslow, another Tamil scholar and missionary, this term is not included. As a result, *etir maruppavar* is not used as the standard Tamil term for Protestant during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and neither does it make its way back into the standard Tamil dictionary still in use, the *Tamil Lexicon*, compiled by the University of Madras between 1924 and 1936. This brief appearance of a *translation* of 'Protestant' that is never effectively used in communication to be replaced by a *transliteration* of the term, which becomes the main carrier of conceptual ideas is a history worth further examination also across other Indian languages.

The term 'Protestant' appears repeatedly in the journal's discourse as part of a wider self-conscious religious rivalry with Tamil Saivites and Tamil and missionary Catholics. I wish to focus specifically on the Protestant-Catholic polemics here,[11] an intra-religious contest that exemplifies what purpose the term 'Protestant' serves in the religious context. While Christianity in general is referred to in Tamil as *kiristu markam*, that is, 'the way of Christ,' 'Protestant' is always transliterated as *purotestantu*. Catholics/ism usually features in English as 'the Romanists' or 'Popery' and in Tamil as *poppar* when referring to people and practices, and *kattolikku* when referring to places or objects. 'Christian' and 'Protestant' are also often used interchangeably, where the reader is meant to understand from the context of the entire text that by implication, one stands for the other, effectively excluding Catholicism. In other cases, it is in translation

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[10] Tamil has a long history of 'dictionary' compilation (called *nikantukal*) resembling the modern Thesaurus in style but with metrical glosses.

[11] I have written about the Tamil Protestant and Saivite rivalry elsewhere (see Israel 2011, 2012).

that we see how the two terms are linked: a letter to the editor by 'persecuted Protestants' in English appears as 'persecuted Christians' in the Tamil version (11 May 1843, III (9): 104).

Apart from the several 'digs' at Catholics scattered throughout the fourteen years, and bolstered by the triumphal recording of Catholic conversions to Protestantism, there are three interesting confrontations that stand out: the journal's reporting of a 'fracas' at a Catholic mass celebrated in northern Sri Lanka on 1 January 1845, the Catholic claim that St. Francis Zavier's body had survived in a state of 'non-putrification' in Goa in Western India,[12] and finally, the Catholic response to Protestant print journalism in the form of a counter-journal titled *The Touchstone* launched in 1845 from the Sri Lankan city, Colombo. In the case of the first two above, there is a public exchange of opinions published in the *Morning Star* through letters written by Tamil Catholics and Protestant editorials and letters, each side battling for its right to assert its claims as 'truth,' vindicating its own brand of Christianity and denigrating the other's. The Protestant strategy is to use both as occasions to display the 'superstition,' irrationality, and unhealthy dependence of the Catholics on their priests: 'The argument in defence of the Catholic Priesthood in Para 2 is worthy of the dark ages, when the word of a priest was received as the word of God. It will not answer however for these days' (January 1845, V(1): 14).

With the third case, *The Touchstone*, like the *Morning Star*, has a Tamil title, *uraikallu* (a literal translation of the English) and comprises articles in both Tamil and English. The item in the *Morning Star* that announces the appearance of *The Touchstone* clearly presents this as a direct Catholic challenge, but reassures its readers that it is in no way disconcerted by this rival: 'It appears from the religious articles in the present No. that it is to be devoted to the promotion of the religious views of the Roman Catholics, and we as Protestants must therefore expect no small share of attention in its columns. (…) We (…) hail its appearance with pleasure, as we have nothing to fear, and much to hope for, from any examination of Protestantism or exposition of Romanism that may be given to the public through such a medium' (8 May 1845, V (9): 65–72). The

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[12] Goa, currently a small state in Western India, came under Portuguese Catholic influence in the early sixteenth century and has since been predominantly Catholic.

journal's 1845 volume reveals several items of news on *The Touchstone*, includes excerpts from the rival journal with critical comment appended and usually uses these as a launching point from which to attack Catholic beliefs, practices, or reputation.

In parallel with such polemical exchanges with Catholics in South Asia, there is a shift in the editorial voice. While the early editorials emphasized the improving of 'minds and hearts' through a range of 'secular' topics in history, science, philosophy, languages, and literature, as the years progress, there are increasing numbers of articles with greater reference to religion and morality and to the Bible as the main point of rational reference for judging issues of truth, ethics, and morality. The editorials progressively hint at the moral, even Protestant principles, underlying this journalistic enterprise. Plans for 1842 for instance, promise not only a 'full and varied intellectual repast' but also 'aim to explode prejudice and superstition, and to take truth and experience alone as guides.' They plan to 'make the Morning Star worthy of the confidence of the native community, by bringing to their notice, and urging upon their attention, through its columns – such facts and considerations as will lead them to *think, investigate,* and *form their own opinions* of things on the grounds of truth and reason [original emphasis].' The editorial ends with the 'standard of truth' against which all its contents will be measured: 'We need not tell our Readers, that our standard of truth on these subjects is THE BIBLE, and we shall hope, in the spirit of benevolence which the Bible inculcates, to advocate according to our ability, as time and occasion shall allow, the great principles of truth and righteousness which it reveals' (16 December 1841: 238–240). Although this is not explicitly stated as a Protestant measure here, there are plenty of other occasions in the journal where a contrast between Protestant active reliance on the Bible and the misguided passive Catholic reliance on Church tradition and authority is drawn.

The Useful *Morning Star*: Creating a Protestant Public

As an emerging journalistic Protestant voice in Tamil-speaking areas in mid-nineteenth century India and Sri Lanka, the *Morning Star* also

moves beyond the immediacy of religious polemics to comment on 'secular' aspects of social and cultural life. One such dominant strand is its preoccupation with offering 'useful' knowledge to its readers who made up the 'public' with which the journal desired to engage. By presenting what they term 'useful' knowledge in both Tamil and English, the editors seem to want to bridge existing gaps between these various social groups through translation. As a result, translation not only facilitates the process of making useful knowledge more useful, but is itself a 'useful' tool for the furtherance of knowledge.

The first issue of *The Morning Star*, dated 7 January 1841 enumerates a set of 'terms' for the reader, of which the first is its subject matter: 'The MORNING STAR will be devoted to Education, Science, and general Literature, and to the dissemination of articles on Agriculture, Government, and Religion, with a brief summary of important News' (p. 1). This tag line is repeated in all subsequent issues, advertising its intention to provide information on an eclectic mix of subject areas. This is not an empty promise: the editorials, letters received from readers, and the breadth of topics addressed in the articles do display a wealth of knowledge. The very first editorial tackles the question of what 'knowledge' is with a new emphasis on '*useful* knowledge' that 'improves' the mind, a unifying theme, in fact, across the several editorial addresses of this journal, which suggests the increasing value placed on kinds of knowledge that make one 'wealthy, powerful and renowned' in a world experiencing rapid political and economic changes. Tamil poetry (valued traditionally) may no longer be 'useful' by itself, but serves to validate new forms of knowledge. These two competing forms of knowledge, however, are invigorated by a third kind, one that better prepares the reader for 'the next world'. 'Spiritual' knowledge is presented as a further dimension of useful knowledge that supports and validates the secular useful, so that the two (sacred and secular) work in conjunction rather than in opposition. As we shall see, it is the Protestant perspective that ultimately obtains as the journal's recommended sacred and most 'useful' knowledge.

The editors' preoccupation with useful knowledge is evident throughout in the sheer range of subject materials covered by the *Morning Star*: articles on geology, astronomy, mathematics, world history, languages,

social customs in India, geographical features of the Indian sub-continent and on animals wild and domestic (the camel, leopard, tiger, bear, monkey, for instance, with illustrations), rub shoulders with articles that address social issues such as education, caste, gender, toddy-drinking, religious conversion, and a comparison of Christian, Hindu, or Jewish beliefs and practices. Thrown in the mix are puzzles and problems (mathematical, algebraic, geometrical, and even religious) posed as challenges to the enterprising reader. Perusal of subsequent issues shows that many readers did respond with solutions, thus showing their willingness to engage in this public one-upmanship. News is another significant feature, starting from the local—Jaffna, Colombo, Madras, Madurai—to the regional (Afghanistan, Burmah, India, China, for instance) and international (Europe, the Americas, Asia, and Africa). The regular column 'Summary of news' thus creates an expanding awareness of the contemporary world. Clearly, the *Morning Star* seeks to keep its readers informed on current affairs as well as current debates worldwide. This range of articles has two effects. First, it locates readers within a global spatial grid, where individual readers are placed both geographically and conceptually in global space and time but one that is filtered through universal Protestant lenses. Although physically located in one of several Tamil towns named in the journal, Jaffna, Madura, or Madras for instance, each reader is linked to a wider community, a 'public' comprising not just the Tamil-speaking world but a 'Protestant public': spanning several continents but nonetheless sharing certain basic assumptions.

Second, such disparate topics juxtaposed spatially on the pages of this journal and linked together by editorial comments invite its readers to a critical engagement with the contents of the journal. Readers all at once are offered the opportunity to compare and contrast different pieces of information, whether 'factual' or 'opinion' pieces, and judge for themselves the veracity and usefulness of the information. There is an effort to carefully categorize different disciplines of knowledge. For instance, the introduction to a series of history articles published in 1845 draws a distinction between history and chronology in both languages (January 1845: 1). The articles are designed not only to widen the remit of knowledge, but demand a more critical and participatory involvement with the journal's efforts to inform its readers and elicit a response.

Having outlined the range of materials and information addressed by the journal, I want to bring us back to the Protestant function of the journal's contents. At several points in the editorials between 1841 and 1855 the editors chart a clear link between their journalistic endeavours and the Protestant lens through which these are presented:

> We have among our readers heathens, Mohemmedans, Roman Catholics and Protestants, besides a considerable number, who, we suppose have a sort of deistical faith. We wish to adapt the matter in our columns to the edification of all these;--not to encourage them in adhering to an erroneous faith, or to cater to their vitiated appetites, but to give them that kind of reading which we consider best adapted to arouse their minds to thought and inquiry on practical and religious subjects ('Prospectus of the Morning Star for 1844,' 28 December 1843, III [24]: 264–265).

The implication here, and the journal's self-appointed task, is that the best way forward for those unquestioningly following 'erroneous faiths' (i.e. heathens, Mohammedans, Roman Catholics, and those of deistical faiths) is to arouse their 'minds to thought and inquiry on practical and religious subjects'.

The repeated commitment to providing 'useful knowledge' through the medium of the journal, echoed at times in readers' letters to the editors, however, comes at a price. The editors expect a reciprocal obligation from the reader by way of contribution to content and finances. They indicate at several points that the journal is not financially self-sufficient and depends on the goodwill of its readers and that of the American Mission to pay off its debts. Despite doubts as to whether it should do so, the American Mission's imputed rationale directly highlights the public role of the journal: 'This loss was patiently borne by the American Mission from a conviction of the public utility of the publication' (25 December 1851: 101). The journal's life continues somewhat precariously, depending on the favours of the missionaries and a public largely unaccustomed to paying for the pleasure of reading a bi-monthly. The issue comes to a head in 1846, when they are faced with serious threat of closure after the American Mission voices its reluctance to carry on funding an activity that is not 'consistent with its obligations to its patrons'

(31 December 1846: 185). This is prevented due to '[T]he firm belief however, that the paper has proved a useful publication, together with the representations received from various quarters that its discontinuance would be felt by many as a public loss' (31 December 1846: 185). In subsequent years, contributing to the life of the journal was equated to contributing to their faith: 'Will not our friends, help us in this matter, and thus subserve the interests of truth, civilization and Christianity?' (28 December 1854: 109).

What is pertinent to our discussion here is that the editors are evidently faced with a public that has not yet learnt to pay for the privilege of participating in this Protestant public. An 1846 editorial ends with a reminder to readers of the important social role that the journal is seen as playing in the nineteenth-century Tamil world as well as offering individuals the space and means by which to communicate with a 'public':

> Shall it [*Morning Star*] live to do good or shall it die and its influence cease? If it dies when will another Paper be offered for public patronage on terms so favourable? Before you decide to withhold your support, consider well the advantages it affords for supplying you with important intelligence, for furnishing a medium by which you may communicate your individual thoughts to the public and make known your wants for the consideration of government authorities (31 December 1846: 189).

The 'public' referred to in the editorials is different from previous kinship relationships that individuals held with family, caste and religious community, since it supposedly cuts across these traditional groupings to link 'literate' Tamils from across the social spectrum. This ability to speak simultaneously to various groups is clearly still relatively new enough for the editorials to make this point repeatedly. With Europeans included in this public—missionaries, catechists, teachers, colonial government officers—this appears to be a democratic space where missionary and confessant, teacher and pupil, government officers and individuals can debate issues of common interest. The question that begs to be asked is what *are* the issues of common interest for such a mixed public? And how are these points of commonality to be created? The range of articles, as I argue above, placing readers within local, regional, and international networks,

suggests that shared concerns, whether social, intellectual, or political, needed to be first created before individuals could feel part of a public to a degree that they felt able to participate in it. This journal sought to set up a shared concern shaped by a Protestant perspective on what was 'useful,' 'reasonable' and could be subjected to rational inquiry. That is, every claim had to be scrutinized, categorized, then accepted or rejected based on this process of inquiry set up with a strong Protestant bias.

Conclusions

In practical terms, the term 'Protestant' circulated through this journal not only as a term demarcating individuals as belonging to a particular Christian tradition, but it began to serve as an evaluative category beyond the Christian context to assess ideas that were more frequently associated with the secular. Publishing contributions from Tamils and Europeans from across the religious spectrum, the journal displayed a certain self-consciousness regarding its 'Protestant' role in the public space. There were several appeals to and on behalf of the 'public', but despite an awareness of the eclectic mix in categories of participants in this public, this was not predominantly a secular space in the conceptualization of this Protestant journal. Instead, this was an attempt to fashion a Tamil-speaking 'public' in South India and Sri Lanka calibrated to Protestant conceptions of an ideal social and civic polity. The journal made the Protestant faith both a matter of private conviction and evaluative category for constructing a public concerned with a range of broad issues such as the education of young people, the status of 'native women', government and administration, issues of rights and liberties, and so forth. Although not always explicitly stated, the enterprise to engage with and shape a 'rational' public opinion was made possible by equating 'Protestant' with 'rationality' where the 'Protestant' position *is* and functions *as* the only 'reasonable' one.

Let us consider the bilingual nature of the journal and the shifts in reading practices that characterized this century. The translation of all significant content is used to emphasize the underlying characteristic of transparency as a fundamentally Protestant one. In this line of thinking,

Protestants, unlike all other religious groups in South India, do not fear translation because they have nothing to hide. This linking of translation to transparency and truth is convenient, as it serves the Protestant purpose of representing itself as unique and invincible in religious polemics. Ultimately, by not choosing to translate the term 'Protestant' into Tamil and most Indian languages, it allows the term to acquire much wider valency than simply 'one who opposes Roman Catholicism'. To follow the Protestant path best equips one for a conceptualization of the world and self as based on reason and rational enquiry. This encourages the journal's readers to represent themselves in abstract terms: most Protestant correspondents to the journal sign themselves off as 'a native Protestant' or 'a Protestant native', whereas those of other faiths predominantly use their names. Since personal names represented a range of very specific data regarding individuals and their place in nineteenth-century South India (caste, religion, gender, and language, for instance), could using the Protestant 'brand name' signify an alternative range of attributes that were meant to challenge and qualify traditional modes of self-representation?

The untranslated term 'Protestant' circulated in the nineteenth-century Tamil intellectual and religious spheres loaded with values that were presented as particular to Protestant Christianity and unavailable to any of its rivals. Evaluations of 'usefulness' (i.e. what was to be considered useful and how best to acquire it), 'rationality' and importantly, the construction of the 'public,' and its improvement, were offered as the fruits of the Protestant labour of 'translation'. The term 'Protestant' in such usage meant much more than a Christian denomination (or doctrinal in-fighting) but instead displayed a range of values drawn from mutually imbricated sacred and secular contexts to effect social and political re-organization.

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11

Translating Protestant Christianity into China—Questions of Indigenization and Sinification in a Globalised World

Gerda Wielander

Introduction

Growing up in Catholic Austria, one of my earliest memories is attending Mass in a tiny rural church close to the Czech border. The elderly priest, his back turned to the congregation, performed the Mass in Latin, while the small congregation spent the hour in a semi-meditative state looking out for the familiar cues that ordered them to kneel, sing, or come forward for Holy Communion. What was said—the message of the gospel—was entirely secondary to the ritual that was being performed. This religious experience stands in stark contrast to the type of Mass I attended in China in recent years, where the word of the Bible takes centre stage be it at the enthusiastic big meetings in Haidian Church or the contemplative 'sharing and caring' atmosphere in small private churches in Sichuan.

As far as Christianity is concerned, the Chinese Communist party considers Catholicism and Protestantism to be two different faiths. They are

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two of the five officially recognized religions in Communist China; the other three are Buddhism, Taoism, and Islam. Of the five, only Taoism is considered to be an indigenous religion. Christianity, and in particular, Protestantism, is closely associated with Western imperialism, primarily because Protestant missionary efforts benefitted immensely from the various concessions granted in the so-called unequal treaties China was forced to sign with a number of European nations in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The role of the Protestant missionary has been controversial, and ambivalent. While the foreign missionary was the incarnation of evil for the rebels of the Boxer Rebellion in 1900, Protestant missionary endeavours undeniably contributed both directly and indirectly to China's modernization process in the fields of education, healthcare, women's liberation, and political reform. Both Sun Yat-sen, the founder of the Republic of China in 1911, and Chiang Kai-shek were Christians (Bieler and Hamrin 2009).

Crucially, Christian missionaries were also translators and proponents of intercultural dialogue. The translational encounter was always the product of interaction between Chinese and Western belief and influenced on each side by the debates of the time. Both missionaries and Chinese scholars in the nineteenth and twentieth century brought their own cultural heritages, their faith and their desire to modernize China to the reading and interpretation of the scriptures (Starr 2008: 3–4). Of all these factors, the denomination an individual belonged to, the social context of the times, and the political viewpoint he/she held, have all impacted and continue to impact the way the Christian faith is translated into the Chinese language and cultural context today.

Long before the 'discovery' of the cultural turn in translation studies, the transaction between the Christian missionaries and their Chinese collaborators was much more than a 'transaction between two languages, or a somewhat mechanical sounding act of linguistic "substitution" […] but rather a more complex negotiation between two cultures' (Trivedi 2005). The translation of the Bible into Chinese, and the subsequent and continuous interpretation of this text, provides one of the best examples of where the unit of translation goes well beyond word and text, but consists of 'the whole language and culture in which that text was constituted', to use again Trivedi's (2005) words.

This chapter provides a brief historical overview of the translational encounter and the various translational difficulties encountered during the nineteenth century, which resulted in the publication of the Chinese Union Version in 1919. It will spend some time exploring the key attraction of Christianity at this particular moment in history as well as the emerging points of contention and disagreement between different Chinese Christian leaders. It then focuses on Bishop K.H. Ting's (Ding Guangxun, 1915–2012) attempts to create a 'theology rooted in the Chinese soil', an example of how core Christian values have been negotiated in this process of translation into a very specific Chinese cultural context. Ting's theology illustrates the tension between localization and the retention of the universality of the Christian faith. Most recently, this tension has given rise to two different paradigms: the idea of *hanyu shenxue*, a Chinese language theology, and the expectation of *zhongguohua*, or 'China-fication', of Protestant Christianity.

The Significance of the Union Version

The first full translation of the Protestant Bible printed in Chinese appeared in 1820, only a few years after the arrival of the first Protestant missionary in China (the first Catholic Bible, on the other hand, did not appear until 1961, 700 years after a Catholic missionary first set foot in China). Its name was translated into Chinese as *shengjing*, literally 'Holy Classic', which by the 1840s was the most commonly used term for the Bible. *Jing*, classic, implies authority and canonical status, in line with the *wujing* (five classics) of Chinese traditional learning; it also implied how it should be read, that is, recited by heart and ingrained in the educated mind (Starr 2008: 3). The translation relied heavily on collaboration with mostly unnamed Chinese translators. They were also highly dependent on the efforts of other translators, notably earlier Catholic translational efforts.

In the process of translating the Bible into Chinese, both Western missionary translators and their Chinese collaborators broke new ground, not only by questioning established paradigms on the purpose of a translated text but also through the choices they made in relation to the style of Chinese into which they translated. In the nineteenth century, they

could choose between Classical Chinese (high classical or easy classical), the language of the *literati* and court elite, which had no resemblance to the spoken language of the people, or '*guanhua*', literally the 'language of government officials' or 'Mandarin', which served as a lingua franca for the administration of an empire, in which countless different dialects and languages existed. The Bible was also translated into dialects and minority languages.

The choices they took were influenced by new principles of translation, which became central to the translation project in the middle of the nineteenth century. At a time when there was only one authorized English version of the Bible and when there existed a belief in the literally unchangeable word of God in the Bible, missionary translation teams decided that the translation should no longer be determined by strict fidelity to the source text but also by the language into which it was to be translated and the cultural situation of the reader (Zetzsche 1999: 74). In this context, a gap opened between British and American missionaries and translators. While the British trusted in the Chinese culture's ability to receive the Christian message with its own terminology, the American position was that Chinese culture could only receive the Christian message with a new terminology. In other words, the British team of translators tried to build Christianity on a Chinese foundation, whereas the American team believed in installing something entirely different and new. This led to an ever-deepening division in the missionary community, which was further fragmented along denominational lines, including the China Inland Mission, Presbyterians, Seventh Day Adventists, and Baptists, to give but a few examples.

Paradoxically, these divisions led to the most successful Bible translation in the form of the Union Version, published in 1919. Following the deepening conflict mentioned above, the 1890 General Mission Conference focused on the demand for a common effort towards a Chinese translation of the Bible. As a result, massive compromises were reached in relation to the most controversial issues, including the choice of styles in Chinese and an agreement on the Greek base text (which served as the source text for the English Revised Version of the Bible). Perhaps the most important decision in terms of translation principles was the employment of a colloquial style of Mandarin—considered not grave enough for the Bible in earlier translation projects—which included

the abolition of set literary phrases and a greater fidelity to the Greek text (for a detailed analysis of the process, see Zetzsche 1999).

In the context of the early twentieth century Chinese mission, the need for a Bible, which could be understood by the common people, was urgently felt. Protestant missionaries of the nineteenth century, who had gained permission to build churches on Chinese soil, often penetrated deep into the Chinese heartland, proselytizing the common people. Their efforts also coincided with China's modernization efforts, which saw major works of Western literature as well as science and technology translated into Chinese, often via Japanese. The importance of a new form of written language, which reflected the syntax and lexis of the spoken Chinese language of the time, took centre stage. The many translations also meant that Chinese lexis was greatly expanded, introducing new words and concepts into the language.

The translation of the Bible into China therefore took place during a high point of translational activity, which must be added to the three distinct 'moments' Trivedi (2005) identifies over the span of the twentieth century. Even more than the translations of Latin American and East European literatures into English, these translations of European literature and canonical texts of all kinds helped to transform Chinese expectations of what literature looks like or should look like but also what the future might look like. These translations not only opened up new worlds of concepts and ideas but also created a new language.

A reform of the written language to eliminate the gap between the spoken and the written word—which by 1900 was as wide as the gap between the Austrian priest's Latin and the German vernacular of his congregation—was a key element of the May Fourth Movement, which takes its name from a protest movement on May Fourth 1919, but which is generally understood to span a number of years around this date. It was an iconoclastic movement calling for a rational, scientific approach to China's crisis and for political reform. The Chinese Union Bible was one of the first works written in the vernacular, or *baihua,* and thus enjoyed popularity far beyond the Christian Church. Even though not considered final at the time, the Union Version was left unchanged and ended up gaining the status of a 'classic'. It is now the one authorized Bible of the Chinese-speaking world. The Union Version—*heheben* in Chinese,

which evokes a spectrum of meanings around harmony, togetherness, collaboration, and unity—is of key symbolic significance for the official Chinese church that sees itself as representing the non-denominational character of Chinese Protestantism.

Due to the significance of the historical moment in which the Union Version was published, the Bible's readership and influence went far beyond the Christian community. As Chen Jianming (2008) points out, the Chinese Bible was read in many different ways and not necessarily as a religious text. Many, who were initially attracted by it, found some of the core Christian tenets 'nonsense', such as the divine nature of Jesus, or the concept of the virgin birth, which continues to be a challenge for the pragmatic Chinese mind. Others read it as a guide to revolution, or as a moral norm to help with the spiritual renewal of the Chinese national character. Perhaps most interestingly, the Bible was also read as a literary work—both during the May Fourth Period and again during the 1980s. Many writers of the May Fourth period were familiar with the Union version of the Bible, which served as a source of inspiration for those whose main concern was to cast a new national language and literature. Some argued that a new literature for a new China also required new spiritual foundations; others considered the Bible as the earliest example of Europeanized literary vernacular Chinese, and hence, an excellent reference for the creation of a national language. The popularity of the Bible also greatly expanded the lexicon of modern Chinese in terms of vocabulary, literary quotations, and phrases (Chen 2008: 24–26).

Some scholars go even further. Yuan Jin (2006) proposes a strong link between missionary publications and the development of the Chinese language itself. The fact that Chinese Christian scriptures—as well as many translations of Western books into Chinese—had appeared in *guanhua* (Mandarin) as early as the 1850s, and therefore, introduced the vernacular in both literary and religious texts, must have at least contributed to the reception of spoken Chinese as a norm for literature (Strandenaes 2008: 71; also Yuan 2006). Add to this the importance of missionary projects in the development of a modern Chinese press and one begins to understand the complex ways in which Christian missionary activity—including the translation of the Bible—contributed to China's modernization.

The Moral Character of Jesus Will Save the Nation

The Chinese Union Version appeared at a time when Chinese intellectuals were preoccupied with the 'salvation of the Chinese nation'; for many, the Bible, and in particular, the character of Jesus Christ, provided a possible answer to the plight of China with all its failures. For non-Christians, the Bible provided inspiration and an insight into the spiritual foundation of the West's 'success'. Christian believers and theologians, however, were confronted with a major quandary, which in many ways continues to this day: how to subscribe to the demands of nationalism and national salvation (of particular importance in the 1920s and 1930s) while remaining true to their faith? At the same time, all Chinese intellectuals, including Christians and theologians, were exposed to new and competing ideologies and '-isms' introduced to China, including socialism, which quickly became one of the most influential theories of modernization. Socialism's appeal to modernisers lay in the fact that it was a Western, but as yet unrealized, vision of a fairer society; it thus provided an alternative pathway to the capitalist modernization model of the West. It pointed the way for many Chinese intellectuals, including Christians, in whose (missionary) publications the ideas of socialism were first discussed (Wielander 2016).

One important organization which provided a bridge between socialist and Christian values was the YMCA. It was also the one organization which most actively promoted the 'social gospel', that is, the belief in the importance of addressing social problems as part of missionary work. The Chinese YMCA was founded in 1895 as a direct result of the growth of American missions in Asia during the nineteenth century. The social gospel was conceived in the United States as a solution to the problems arising from the transformation of the agricultural economy, including rampant corruption at all levels of government, unemployment, poverty and working class discontent. Proponents of the social gospel wanted to build a new society based on religious liberalism, humanitarianism and 'social science', marking an adaptation of Christianity to a more modern, scientific world (Keller 1996: 33–35). An important goal of the YMCA's

programme was to imbue its members with an 'ethic of community' that would result in voluntary social service and a sense of national identity. It was also the largest institution in China practising 'social reconstruction theology'.

Social reconstruction theology held that Chinese modernization depended upon the reformation of society to include progressive Chinese values by rectifying the character of individuals and that a social vanguard with a Christian value system could actualize the 'spirit of Jesus'. Some Chinese adopted this idea as an alternative to revolutionary Marxism. Two of the main leading figures in the establishment of the official Protestant organization after the Communist victory in 1949, T.C. Chao (Zhao Zichen) and Y.T. Wu (Wu Yaozong), were proponents of the social gospel and the importance of a social foundation to evangelism. Generally speaking, the figure of Jesus Christ played a central role in the adaptation of Christian faith to the Chinese political context in the two decades following the publication of the Union Version.

For some intellectuals, Jesus was the prototypical Christian socialist; his character was one of the most important topics in the early twentieth century Church in China. In this context, the historical Jesus was at least as important—and seen as somewhat separate—from the Christ of faith. Chinese culture, built on rational, pragmatic and this-worldly Confucianism, meant that miracles like the virgin birth, Christ's bodily resurrection, and the ascension were met with great scepticism. The life of Jesus, on the other hand, exemplified virtues like purity, self-denial, service, and love, which chimed with Confucian ethics, and seemed to integrate the religious experience into ethical behaviour. Jesus' salvific work was of less importance to Christian believers. It fell to theologians like T.C. Chao and later K.H. Ting to put equal emphasis on Jesus as a moral example and as the means through which to discover communion with God (Wan 1999: 358–359).

In a society built on the Confucian belief in self-perfection and the moral imperative to get involved in the improvement of society, emulating the personal character of Jesus was the starting point for a socialist revolution in the eyes of Wu Leichuan, for example. This was a view by no means shared by all. The debates of the time reveal a deep chasm over soteriology, namely, over the question what salvation meant to the

Chinese Christian. As Wan Sze-Kar puts it in his study of Wu Leichuan and T.C. Chao, the appropriation of the narrative of Jesus was caught in the throes of a national crisis; soteriology meant national salvation. But the debate also revealed a more general debate: how could one reconcile the Confucian obligation of transforming society through self-cultivation with a Protestant soteriology that was based on appropriating Christ's death through grace (Wan 1999: 351)?

T.C. Chao argued that the greatest problem for China was the Chinese people—a view shared by many reform intellectuals. Not dissimilar to other intellectuals like Liang Qichao and Lu Xun, Chao argued that the Chinese people needed to change from the inside out if the nation was to achieve political unity and social stability. He believed that the danger to China and its weakness lay in the rejection of moral character or *renge*, a concern that many intellectuals in contemporary China also continue to share. To Chao, universal love and moral excellence were the two central principles of Christianity, love being the starting point. He saw the love of God as the only tenable meaning of life. To him, Christianity and Chinese culture were complementary; encouraging the spiritual transformation in the individual would have a direct impact on social reconstruction (Lin 2010: 128–135).

Towards a Chinese Christianity

The debates in the first half of the twentieth century revolved around issues that remain divisive and unresolved in Chinese theology today. They include different understandings of the mythical and the ethical; the immanent and the transcendent; the intellectual and the spiritual; the historical, fleshly Christ and the Christ of the spirit, which continue to be represented through very different religious practices—for example, in rural and urban churches—and through different and contending theological positions. Following the actual translation of the Bible in the form of the Union Version, and despite its canonical status from the start, Christianity was interpreted and adapted into a very particular Chinese context of competing ideologies.

To understand the context of the early twentieth century as Confucian is too simplistic. It was a Confucianism—itself the result of many changes over the centuries—which was in the process of being questioned, reformed, and even rejected outright. In this landscape, Christianity was competing with other, 'rational' and atheist voices from the West, like anarchism, socialism, and the newest psychological theories, which exerted an influence in China, and which also shaped the way in which Christianity was 'translated' to fit the new environment. It was also in this context that Chinese Christianity was trying to find its own identity, prompted in some ways in the 1920s, by an anti-Christian campaign made up of the dual forces of anti-foreignism and scientism, two of the main tenets of the May Fourth Movement.

In response, Chinese Christians developed an indigenous strategy which relied on the historical Jesus to construct an indigenized theology. The assumption was that Jesus represented the pristine religiosity of Christianity before it was institutionalized and encrusted with Western cultural by-products. This strategy had two benefits, as Wan Sze-Kar points out: it loosened the Chinese church from the grips of tradition, both western theological and ecclesiastical, but also tradition more generally, against which May Fourth railed. It also gave Chinese apologists the freedom to reconceive their Christian project within the context of modern China. This context had to do with national salvation and was dominated by concerns about warlordism, corruption, the collapse of culture, foreign domination and militarism (Wan 1999: 375).

Discussions over the role of the foreign mission in China and movements towards more independence long predated the May Fourth Movement however. English missionaries of the nineteenth century saw their main aim in helping to create an independent Chinese church, a church in which foreign missionaries were no longer important. The establishment of 'The Church of Christ in China' in 1910 signalled this desire to create a new church organization which would be a non-denominational, single Chinese church. Instrumental in the debates over Chinese or foreign leadership of the churches was a group which Daniel Bays (2012: 100–102) calls the 'Sino-Foreign Protestant Establishment', a group of men who constituted an elite policy-making and decision-making 'establishment' among the great variety of missionaries and missionary organizations in China at the time.

These well-educated and well-connected intellectuals did not represent the entire scene of foreign missionaries in China at the time. There was a great influx of missionaries of a variety of different creeds and often not part of any wider missionary organization, but driven by their own personal vision and zeal. The 1920s also saw the first beginnings of indigenous Christian groups which grew out of orthodox Christian belief and Chinese popular religion. Daniel Bays reckons that by 1929 as many as a quarter of all Chinese Christians fell into these independent groups (Bays 2012: 115). Finally, the 1920s also saw the creation of the National Christian Council (1922) and the Church of Christ in China (1927), further attempts at establishing a Chinese organization across denominations.

Over the next two decades China was wrapped up in war, and it was only after the end of the Second World War that these efforts at a unified Chinese church were taken up again, this time in a very different political landscape. The 'Chinese Christian Movement' was set up by the National Christian Council, and constituting a link between university centres and the YMCAs and YWCAs. Members were students who were liberal and sympathetic to the Communists and who loosely identified themselves as Christians; one of the movement's main proponents was Wu Yaozong. Following the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949, this group became the launching pad for the so-called Three Self Patriotic Movement (TSPM), which was created in the summer of 1950. At its core was a 'Christian Manifesto', which signalled the end of foreign missions in China and articulated the link between foreign missions and imperialism.

The TSPM was (and is) not a church. It was placed under the direct supervision of the Religious Affairs Bureau (RAB, a state agency under the State Council), which in turn came under the authority of the United Front Work Department, which supervised and directed all relations with non-party groups. The RAB has been renamed the State Administration of Religious Affairs (SARA), but otherwise the structure has remained the same to this day. 'Three Self' refers to 'self-governing, self-supporting and self-propagating', a concept first mooted in the nineteenth century and not a Communist invention; but from 1950 'Three Self' signalled a clear stand in relation to the 'foreign element' in the Chinese church and resulted in the expulsion of all foreign missionaries still in China.

No constructive thinking—and certainly no writing or publishing—went into what this Chinese church, free from 'foreign elements', should really constitute beyond a somewhat vague notion of an all encompassing, non-denominational structure. Many Chinese who had received theological training in the decades before 1949 and who could have contributed to the formation of a Chinese theology were lost, together with millions of other Chinese, in the political struggles during the years from 1958–1976 (Wielander 2013: 5–6). It was only in the 1980s that a systematic effort went into the formulation of a Chinese theology.

K.H. Ting's Theology—God is Love

Love is a central aspect of all Christianity, but in contemporary Chinese Christianity, it is of even greater importance. This particular emphasis on love in Chinese Christian theology is largely due to the efforts of one man, K.H. Ting, born to a Protestant mother in Shanghai in 1915, and a student of English and theology; he was trained and ordained in the Anglican Church. Like so many of his contemporaries, he wanted to use his belief to save Chinese society and the Chinese nation. His work for the YMCA, where he also met Wu Yaozong, the founder of the TSPM, had a huge influence on him; so did his work as pastor in the non-denominational, international church in Shanghai. He spent the years of 1946–1951 abroad to work and further advance his theological studies. But, like many Chinese intellectuals abroad at this time, he returned to Shanghai in 1951 to heed the call of the new communist government, which for many held great promise. In 1952 he became the Dean of the newly established Nanjing Jingling Theological Seminary and was ordained Bishop in 1955. Little tends to be mentioned about Ting's fate during The Great Leap Forward (1958) and the Cultural Revolution (1966–76). Like all intellectuals, he was subject to criticism and experienced hardship, but to his detractors, the fact that he did not suffer the same fate as other Christian leaders is reason enough to question his true piety and to wonder about the extent of his collaboration with the regime during this time. In keeping with the biographical pattern of all intellectuals who lived through twentieth-century China, Ting

was reinstated to his previous position in 1980, four years after the end of the Cultural Revolution. In 1980 he was elected Chair of the TSPM Committee, making him the most important Protestant leader in China, which remained the case until his death in 2012 (compare Tang 2015 and, in more detail, Wickeri 2007).

From 1980 the TSPM, under Ting's leadership, stepped up its work on the development of a Chinese Christian theology 'rooted in the Chinese soil'. Contrary to the general tenor of reports by Western media and Christian interest groups, the official Protestant church is very popular with believers. While many criticize the official Church for 'selling out', for being too secular and too accommodating of party policy, its success and appeal to all strata of society is undeniable, if not all-encompassing.

Love is the central tenet of the 'Reconstruction of Theological Thinking' in China and is built upon K.H. Ting's theology that stresses love as the supreme attribute of God. It is translated as the monosyllabic *ai* to set itself apart from bi-syllabic terms like *aiqing* (romantic love), but also traditional philosophical terms like *jian'ai* (a Mohist term) or the Confucian *bo'ai*, both usually translated as 'universal love' In Ting's (2004: 57) words: 'Only by acquiring a Chinese selfhood, a Chinese identity, can the Church of Jesus Christ in China live down its colonial past history and its image as something Western' (Ting 2004: 57). The central tenet of his theology was the move to a non-denominational Chinese church built on the core message that God is Love:

'To know God as love is to say that the supreme attribute of God is not his power and might, nor his omniscience, nor his deity, nor his majesty and dominion and righteousness. Transcendence signifies the inexhaustibility of the cosmic love and immanence, the unfailing presence of that love in the whole creation.' (Ting 2004: 88)

Hand in hand with the importance of God's immanence in Ting's formulation goes his emphasis on the Christ-like God. The (official) Chinese Christian God is the God of the New Testament as embodied in Christ's attributes; it is the 'Cosmic Christ'. By emphasizing God's immanence in all creation and by focusing on his physical embodiment through Jesus Christ, Ting is emphasizing an immanence (over transcendence) that

was also central to historical communism and which continues to be a central element of contemporary communist philosophy as articulated by Michael Hardt (2007) and Alain Badiou (2012), for example. It also builds on the significance of Jesus' historical life and 'good deeds' as evident in earlier theological debates on Christianity. Most importantly, it stands in contrast to the evangelical notion of God as transcendent source of all values, emphasized so strongly by Christian intellectuals and church leaders of a younger generation, like Yu Jie (1973–) or Wang Yi (1960s–).

Ting's focus on the Christ-like nature of God and the universal extent of God's work, which is not limited to those who declare faith in God, allowed him to interpret socialist morality and ethics as a manifestation of Christ's nature. The cosmic Christ as drawn by Ting shows God as the cosmic lover, not as the cosmic tyrant or punisher. He works by education and persuasion rather than coercion and forced obedience, rejecting the standard metaphor of God as a father as unhelpful in the Chinese context. (The father figure in traditional Chinese culture is not associated with love and kindness.) His theology also puts less emphasis on the original sin than orthodox Christian theology does. This conception of God not only makes it possible to co-exist with or even embrace the ideals of communism, but is also sensitive to traditional Chinese culture, in particular Mencius, who posits that human nature is essentially good.

A Chinese Language Theology—Hanyu Shenxue

Supporters of Ting's theology claim that the exponential growth of Protestantism from the 1980s onwards is proof of its success and popularity with Chinese Christians. However, one could also argue that Ting's efforts at 'theological reconstruction', which really took off in the mid 1990s, were in fact a reaction to the growth of Protestant Christianity and the proliferation of different denominations and widely differing religious practices in China of the reform era. What aided the growth of Protestant churches in the 1980s was not so much the return to formal institutionalized religion through the reaffirmation of the TSPM, but a combination of the following: the popularity of indigenous Christian groups founded by local Christian leaders; the re-appearance

of the foreign missionary (usually in the form of the English teacher on campus); and the emergence, in the 1980s, of 'Cultural Christians', who studied the Bible as a the cultural foundation of the West rather than as a religious text. These studies laid an important foundation for the acceptance of and respect for Christian thought and values among non-believers, notably intellectuals and university students, in contemporary China. Their rational, humanistic studies of the Bible were a gateway into the Christian faith for many, including, in subsequent years, often the authors of these studies themselves (see for example Fallman 2004).

Out of these studies also emerged the call for a Sino-Christian theology, or a theology of the Chinese language, *hanyu shenxue*. At its heart lies the rejection of the very concept of 'indigenization' and the need for a 'translation' of Christian thinking.

As one of its main proponents, Liu Xiaofeng, argues, Christian theology is a confessional and rational reflection and discourse on the Christ-event that presents itself as the Word of God. It is closely linked to the geographical, historical, and linguistic context within which it is articulated. As such, Sino-Christian theology is juxtaposed with other historical forms of theology. Therefore, in the construction of Sino-Christian theology, the so-called issue of Sinification does not exist, as it is grounded in the thesis that Christian theology is Western theology. As for the development of Sino-Christian theology, the foremost question to be considered is how the linguistic experiences of Chinese thinking receive, and discourse upon, the Christ-event and reflect on Christian confession. Therefore, Sino-Christian theology has to break away from the mind-set of indigenization or sinicization and face the Christ-event directly (Liu 2006: 74–75).

Liu argues further that Sino-Christian theology will develop from within its existing systems of thought and concepts of discourse and from within existing life experiences and linguistic expression. He refers to the type of Sino-Christian theology which expressed its Christian confession through a syncretism of Confucian, Taoist and Buddhist systems of thought. But he argues that it can also be expressed through the extraction of intellectual resources from Chinese classical poems and prose. In any case the understanding of the Christ-event should be rooted in the immediate and original life experiences of individuals rather than ethnic

world-views. The basic direction of the construction of a Sino-Christian theology should therefore not be built on syncretism on the basis of existing ontological theories, be they Jewish, ancient Greek, Confucian, or Buddhist, but on the encounter with the original individual life experiences in the ethno-geographical linguistic fabric (Liu 2006: 77–78).

He Guanghu (2006: 108) echoes this when he says that one of the gravest mistakes in Chinese theology has been its over-dependence on ancient Confucian, Buddhist, and Taoist scriptures at the expense of the resources of modern cultures since the twentieth century. He Guanghu also rejects the idea of an indigenized theology, preferring contextualized theology instead, as it does not lose the universality and generality of the faith. Furthermore, it sets out from the actual life experiences of human beings and seeks to provide answers to real-life questions (He 2006: 110). Here He makes the important point that the life experiences of Chinese speakers far exceed the 'indigenous context'. Sino-Christian theology therefore also must exceed the indigenous context of China and must include Chinese theologies outside the People's Republic. They should, however, all reach a consensus in their embrace of historical Chinese theology of the periods from the Nestorians to the religion of Erkeun (during the Yuan dynasty), the periods between Matteo Ricci and T.C. Chao, and the theological works written by Chinese in subsequent periods (He 2006: 110–111). In short, while He recognises the diversity of the Chinese experience across the globe, he also proposes a shared historical theological foundation for all of it.

In concrete terms, He Guanghu proposes three specific approaches to a Sino-Christian theology. First, it needs to be an 'inside out' approach, which sets out from the life experiences and cultural resources of Chinese speakers, focusing on the issues and struggles of their lives instead of providing ready-made dogmatic answers. In his view, this approach can only be adopted by Chinese theologians who have been brought up in their mother tongue and share the life experiences of Chinese people. However, the 'inside out' approach refers primarily to a certain mentality and hence does not rule out 'outside in' translation, that is, the translation of Western theological works into Chinese (He 2006: 113–114).

Another important point in He's Sino-Christian theological approach is the order of argumentation. In He's view, the doctrine of God must

come before Christology. Seeing how important the figure of Christ, and in particular the historical Jesus was in the 'translation' of Christianity into the Chinese context of the early twentieth century, and how important Christ is in K.H. Ting's theology, this is a significant point of difference. He Guanghu argues that 'the Christology of Sino-Christian theology can only acquire its presupposition after Sino-Christian theology's doctrine of God has been established on the grounds of Chinese speakers' belief in God (the terms used include 'God', 'Heaven', etc.)' (He 2006: 115).

Here we may encounter what Marian Galik has described as a 'cosmological gap between the Chinese and to a great extent, the Far Eastern world and the Western world […] so wide that to bridge it seems almost impossible where religious belief is concerned' (2004: 1). Zha Changping—a classical scholar and house church leader– also cautions that comparisons between Chinese and Western culture, primarily Confucianism and the Bible, tend to overemphasize correlations and ignore essential differences. For example, the Chinese term for heaven (one of the terms on which to build a Sino-Christian theology according to He), *tian*, can refer to four different things: material *tian* as opposed to earth; ethical *tian* as the highest truth in the cosmos; personal *tian*, which rules the cosmos; and the *tian* which controls man's faith (Zha 2008: 86). Zha also cautions that Logos is not the same as *dao*, the Chinese term chosen in the Chinese Bible to translate the former. While Logos is God becoming flesh and thus linking creation and salvation, *dao* in Chinese is an impersonal principle and law of the cosmos, a Confucian product of human moral thinking, which creates, but does not save (Zha 2008: 87).

Chinese Christianity in an Interconnected World

Zha Changping, born in the 1960s, belongs to the younger generation of theologians and church leaders, who found Christianity as a body of thinking through the works of 'Cultural Christians', but who have themselves converted to Christianity, often following ideological disillusionment after 1989. For this generation, who grew up in a very different

socio-historical context to K.H. Ting and 'Cultural Christians' like He Guanghu, the previous generations' emphasis on Christ's immanence and the ethical aspect of Christianity are far less important than God's transcendent nature. In a society characterized by scandal and corruption, where social trust and general levels of happiness have fallen, but where a sizable part of the population can now be described as middle-class, Christianity has become a very popular faith. Its main attraction lies in the provision of an all-encompassing belief system and in the powerful figure of a loving, transcendent God as a source of values, including, for some, political values (compare Wielander 2013: 130–150). K.H. Ting's immanent 'Cosmic Christ' has lost currency in this context. Even official church congregations have a strong evangelical character and appeals for Christian ethics to contribute to the state project by engaging in social work and charities tend to be dismissed as attempts to bring the Christian religion more firmly under government control.

This is partly the result of the increasing importance of global networks of ethnically Chinese missionaries, who play a key role in church planting and in theological training. This new 'Sino-Foreign elite' is the product of a global, interconnected world, in which the migrant plays an increasingly important role in translation. These (mostly) men, are not the type of 'cultural translators' Trivedi (2005) critiques as essentially disconnected from the cultures—and languages—they choose or are asked to 'translate' for the Western mind. They are also not Homi Bhaba's post-colonial 'translational transnationals' adding to the West's multiculturalism through Third World migration (Bhabha 1994: 173 in Trivedi 2005). They are mostly post-1989, white-collar intellectual migrants, who frequently move between China and their adopted new homes in the West (mostly the USA) and are equally assimilated in both linguistic and cultural environments. They are joined by Chinese students and businessmen abroad, who bring their own understanding of Christianity into the world, lending a very different meaning to He Guanghu's 'inside out' approach. He Guanghu acknowledges their existence when he concedes that the life experiences of the Chinese far exceed the context of Mainland China, resulting in different Chinese theologies. What his approach does not provide is an answer to how these different Chinese

theologies are meant to relate to one another beyond the recognition of their shared historical roots.

The official viewpoint in the face of this increasing diversity of Chinese theologies is unequivocal. Three years after K.H. Ting's death and two years into a new Chinese leadership under Xi Jinping (and nearly a hundred years after the publication of the Union Version), the new key term in Chinese official discourse on religion is *zhongguohua*, or 'China-fication'. The Chinese term *zhongguohua* implies an irrevocable change into something of China. *Zhongguo* indicates China as a country (although it is not the official name of the PRC); for people outside China it is now often synonymous with the PRC (and hence excludes Taiwan, Hong Kong and diasporic China). But the term also has a cultural and historical dimension, which is not confined to the boundaries or historical period of the PRC. The syllable *hua*, used as a suffix, implies irreversible change; *huaxue* is the Chinese term for chemistry. The term carries strong nationalist elements, which the English translation 'to sinify' does not convey. It was first mooted in 2012 by a Confucian scholar and has since been used in a programmatic sense in official discourse on Protestant Christianity in particular (Fiedler 2015).

In the foreword to the volume *Christianity and the Construction of a Harmonious Society* (Zhuo and Cai 2015), the vice-chair of China's Religious Affairs Bureau, Jiang Jianyong, lists all the requirements of the Protestant Christian faith when serving the Chinese dream, which include submitting oneself to the nation's benefit, safeguarding social stability, strengthening ethnic unity, and promoting the unity of the motherland. Jiang also insists on improving and strengthening unity within the faith. This is a clear theological directive, reaffirming the non-denominational and united character of the Protestant faith in China, which has always been an aspiration rather than a reality. Jiang's list of exhortations is followed by a stern reminder of the excellent tradition of social service which Christians are called to carry out. Christians are also exhorted to deepen reform and to enthusiastically open up to international communication while at the same time 'resolutely resisting infiltration' (Zhuo and Cai 2015: 8–10).

Conclusion

The publication of the Chinese translation of the Protestant Bible in the form of the Union Version in 1919 occurred at a high point of translational activity in China. From a Chinese perspective it was but one of many key texts of Western culture, science, and technology introduced to a Chinese audience at the time. Then and now it was received as much more than just a religious text; for many its true revelation lay in the (spiritual) secret of the West's success. Sceptical of many core tenets of the faith, reform-minded, left-leaning intellectuals and theologians saw hope for China's salvation in actualizing the spirit of Jesus, thus focusing on the more rational, this-worldly aspect of the Christian faith. But the Union Version not only introduced the Protestant faith to a wider Chinese audience than ever before, but, as one of the first texts written in the new vernacular Chinese, it also contributed to the creation of this new written language, thus extending its influence on Chinese language and culture far beyond the original intentions of the translators.

These translators and cultural mediators had broken new ground in the translation process, questioning established paradigms and setting aside denominational differences in order to reach their aim of one universally accepted Chinese Bible, possibly as a basis for a united, non-denominational Chinese Church. This vision was both a hopeful projection onto China of what the Protestant Church in the West never achieved and a somewhat Orientalist approach denying the 'other' the possibility of diversity and multiplicity. They did not perhaps, at the time, wonder how this hypothetically unified Chinese Christian Church would communicate with a Christian faith and its organizations that is so decidedly diverse and dis-united in the rest of the world. Their vision was formulated at a time when the interconnectedness of today's world was not yet technologically anticipated, and, during later periods of the twentieth century, also politically inconceivable.

Today Chinese Christians aim for new linguistic expressions of their faith, which emanate directly from Chinese lived experience rather than 'outside-in' translations requiring cultural sensitivity and mediation. They deny the need for 'Sinification' and indigenization at the same moment

as the official discourse in China insists on 'China-fication' based on a strong nationalist and protectionist agenda. The Chinese example confirms that in the cross-cultural encounter, the intentions of the translators and those of the many individuals, organizations and interest groups who read, interpret and adapt the translated text, rarely coincide. And yet the significance of the translated work far surpasses the realm of the religious context from which it emanated.

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12

Translating the Past: The Moral Universe of Calderón's *Painter of Dishonour*

David Johnston

The Task of the Translator (i): What Remains

To translate theatre for performance is to strike some sort of balance between what the translator might consider the play's core, and what surrounds and emerges from that core as immediately shifting and contingent, necessarily to be adapted if the play is to excite the complicity of new audiences in the here and now of the performance event.

Admittedly of course, in postmodern times, when the centre famously does not hold, 'core' is a problematic term. In unfriendly characterizations, it suggests an ongoing and unchanging textual essence, unsustainable in every way because it presupposes a timeless invariance of meaning. That is not what I mean here. By 'core' I am referring, in part, to what

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Walter Benjamin (2008: 8)[1] calls 'aura', and, in part, to at least some of the mechanics of storyline and narrative devices without which the new text would bear little resemblance to the original ('original' in the merely chronological sense of the preceding text from which the translation has been fashioned). Within this conception of the core as 'what remains', these two attributions are intimately connected. The text's aura, in that sense, resides in the prestige that shapes the depth of that text's call upon our contemporary attention, a prestige that is in turn inextricably bound up with the relationship between what the work has to say about the complex business of being human, and how it goes about saying it. The nature of that contemporary attention is, of course, no less interpretative than the process through which the individual reader ascribes meaning to any text, although whatever the collective interpretants are that configure consensual meaning and condition broad audience response alike, they are, in David Hare's (1991: 24) phrase, 'in the air', shaped and suggested by the useful shorthand term 'Zeitgeist'.

It is in its ability to connect with this spirit or moral compass of the times that the play's translatability lies, and in this connection, in turn, that its current usefulness (in the sense of its capacity to excite spectator complicity rather than its immediate stage-worthiness) resides. In other words, even the aura of the play—if we paraphrase Pound ('What thou lovest well remains/the rest is dross', *Canto LXXXI*), that dimension of the play that the putative translator surely loves well—is itself subject to processes of understanding and perceptions of relevance that are themselves deeply rooted in the more slowly shifting ground of the history of ideas and of value systems. There is still a contingency here, in the sense of responsiveness to changing contexts but, no matter how that responsiveness manifests itself, it is on a much broader canvas than the fleeting correspondences that, like synaptic flashes within the broad transmission of messages, fringe the deeper created relatedness that the translator seeks to establish between the core of the historical play and the specificity of different audiences. Following Pound, it is not that these immediate

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[1] Benjamin discusses aura in the context of the inevitability of interaction between the work of art and technologies and processes of reproduction—of which, translation may be considered a part. The aura of a text, in that sense, may only be achieved through illusion, as any encounter with that text inevitably takes place through conditions of difference.

potentials for connection are somehow 'dross', simply floating accidentals driven by the energy of the play's core; rather they offer the translator opportunities to write forward so that the core, in terms of its dramatic actions and their impact upon characters, may be experienced as real and truthful within the more or less specific coordinates of new audiences.

That is why translation for performance tends to be considered an acutely targeted activity—because the encounter between the world of the new audience, its universe of knowledge and assumptions, and that of the text is at its most immediate in the emotionally charged, highly signifying world of the theatre. But if the spectator is to experience himself or herself as other, which is, following on from Ricoeur (1991: 454), the principal enrichment that translation has to offer, then the augmentative processes of the new text can only begin at the point where the perceived Zeitgeist of the spectating self is acknowledged. We are inevitably products of a history that is different to the one that the original text is written to reflect, indeed, very often, to contest—different, but still connected. If the translation effect of augmenting the reality of the spectator through patterns of created relatedness is to be achieved, then the translator must, in the first instance, target his or her spectator in terms of their difference from the text under translation, not through the prism of any spurious sense of sameness or universality. In this regard, in the context of the retelling purpose of the Hogarth Shakespeare project, novelist Howard Jacobson refers pointedly to the forces pushing his intralingual translation of *The Merchant of Venice* into new interpretative zones:

> Mr Shakespeare probably never met a Jew, the Holocaust had not yet happened, and anti-Semitism did not have a name. Can one tell the same story today where every reference carries a different charge? (Dutta 2013).

The implications of this recall Borges's (1998) 'Pierre Menard, Author of the *Quixote*', where Menard's reverential rewriting of Cervantes's classic produces nothing more than a slavishly literal transcription of the original. And yet, such textual sameness is inhabited by interpretative difference, because the new *Quixote* cannot be read in isolation from the historical events that have taken place between the then of Cervantes and the now of Menard, events that in the process, of course, have changed

the world. It is this co-habitation of sameness and difference that allows Borges (1973: 84) to shape one of his most telling paradoxes: 'the original is unfaithful to the translation'.

It is a paradox that holds true of any interpretative process. At the heart of how we think about texts from the past, or indeed the past itself, there is a core of understanding, which at any given moment will sustain some sort of broad consensus of interpretation. It is consensus that is constructed upon the thinking processes that across time have emanated from these texts or events, and have in turn returned to them as narratives of understanding. But the fact that there is such consensus does not bestow on its conclusions or vision any greater likelihood of being 'correct', somehow closely aligned to the apparent facts. English philosopher and historian R.G. Collingwood argues persuasively in respect of history that 'the historian's picture of the past is […] in every detail an imaginary picture' (1994: 245), evoking a sense that the past comes to us refracted through translational processes rather than a limpid reflection of what has been. In this, he echoes a perception that runs through much twentieth-century historiography and philosophy of history—beginning with Miguel de Unamuno's ([1895] 2005) much underrated *En torno al casticismo* (*On National Essence*) and coalescing in E.H. Carr's (1961) seminal *What is History*—that the past is remote and disconnected in terms of events and agents, but still present and connected through the shaping continuities and re-creative strategies of our cognitive and affective processing.

The Task of the Translator (ii): The Pleasure of Recognition

It is a conception of historiography that illuminates, and is illuminated by, translation. For the translator, it is this same interplay between the slowly shifting continuities of the core of the work and the readily identifiable ruptures of feeling, thought, expression, or practice that presents the most significant challenges, as well as the most creative opportunities of texts that are distant to us in time as well as space. Sifting between patterns of continuity and instances of rupture, the stage translator inevitably situates the spectator in what we might think of as the 'translational

moment'. Such a moment may be manipulated or imagined by the translator in a number of ways, but three particular evocations of time stand out. In the first of these imaginings of past and present, the here and now of performance is bulwarked by a translational moment that is aloof from these patterns of continuity, a translational moment that develops from a sense of the isolation of the past, its radical alterity. As a consequence, the translator's process becomes suffused with anxiety as to relevance. The values of the past are felt to be too radically different from our own for the contemporary spectator to become engaged with the human realities of the drama. Playwright Martin Crimp, for instance, writing in *The Guardian* about his decision to update *The Misanthrope* to the contemporary moment, projects this anxiety into a resurrected Molière's apprehension as to how his own play can possibly 'have any purchase on a world of such egalitarian transparency? Where is the cultural space for his hero's disaffection, if the twenty-first century is a sunny playground of consumer choice?' (Crimp 2009). In one way, it is this flattening of time into the relentless present that responds most closely to the commercial theatre's imperatives of novelty and relevance. Here also, of course, the activist translator might see in the play the opportunity for heightened purchase on the contemporary moment. Brecht's adaptation of *Antigone*, for instance, shifts the moral axis of Sophocles's play from the defence of the public space to a stirring revolutionary struggle for justice. In his history of ethics, Kenan Malik notes that the disconnect between Sophocles's version of the story and Brecht's is 'the chasm between the ancient world and the modern, between the ancient concept of the primacy of the polis and the modern view of individual liberty' (Malik 2014, ch. 11). Three decades later, the Northern Irish poet, Tom Paulin (1985), re-adapted *Antigone* as *The Riot Act*. His declared intention to 'make it now', punning on Pound's exhortation to translators to 'make it new', announces that Sophocles's deontological moral universe has been translated into the moral relativism that inhabits a time of political conflict and social unrest, the Northern Irish troubles (quoted in Carvalho Homem 2009: 8). The axis of the play's interpretative line has been shifted radically.

It would be wrong to deny the power of the versions created by Crimp, Brecht, and Paulin, respectively. These are plays that possess and communicate their own powerful energy in performance. But it is an energy that

is self-contained—absent is any fulfilment of the promise that translation potentially holds out in terms of establishing connections, of augmenting both the space occupied by the original and that of the new spectator or reader to the point where they meet, and where some sort of relatedness is generated. But at least Crimp, Brecht, Paulin, and many others who create translations aloof from the past, demonstrate the extent to which translators, in the process of drawing out the meanings and potential for performance of foreign-language plays, turn the apparent constraints of time and space into tools of their own creative imagination. One intuitively appreciates that these writer-translators are working against the much more damaging grain of philological translators, who maintain themselves and the product of their work wholly subject to the past, producing translations that are anchored to the formal, thematic, and expressive properties of the original. But by performing a clear strategy of a different sort of subjection, in this case to the present, these new writerly translations, albeit good plays in their own right, inflict a schism that is no less restrictive. Both strategies of aloofness and subjection derive from a sense of the relationship between past and present as a schism—or chasm, in Malik's characterization—and, in doing so, inflict a static temporal location on the works they translate. Translations of historical plays that are wholly aloof from the past inevitably masquerade as new writing, effectively functioning on stage as ventriloquized accounts of a barely visible history, while those that are entirely subject to the past function like museological artefacts, imprisoned within the static contours of a notionally isolated past moment.

What both approaches have in common is their working assumption that such plays are inevitably marooned in value-systems no longer translatable. It is this assumption that explains why the vivid, complex, and sprawling theatre of the Spanish Golden Age, written between 1580 and 1680, remains largely unknown on the English-speaking stage today. It is not that these playwrights—Calderón primary among them—are unrecognized, but the recognition accorded to them has been either notional or academic in that their plays were seen as problematic and, consequently, have remained largely unperformed (see Johnston 2015). In the late 1950s, in order to account for this absence from the English-speaking stage, distinguished Hispanist critic Arnold Reichenberger (1959) put forward his theory that the uniqueness of Golden Age plays foreclosed any meaningful

possibility of them speaking to audiences outside the Spanish-speaking world. These were plays, in other words, so embedded in their moment that their moral universe, inhabited and negotiated by their characters and intuitively understood by their audiences, would prove uninhabitable and intransitable to spectators whose cultural DNA apparently carried no trace of that moment. That, in essence, is the narrative of untranslatability. A rejoinder came from Eric Bentley (1970), critic, writer and, notably, Brecht's first translator into English, who argued that, far from being marooned within its own cultural time and place, Spanish Golden Age plays were universal because the conflicts they dramatized were rooted not in the specificities of an esoteric honour code, which was central to Reichenberger's case against translation, but at the heart of the human experience itself. This narrative of translatability, evident, of course, in Brecht's own reworking of *Antigone*, derives from the Terentian notion of the universal human, embodied in his sententious *humani nihil a me alienum puto*. Bentley's vision is, in this regard at least, more immediately appealing than that of Reichenberger, whose characterization of the unique, we may suspect, rests upon a lingering sense of ownership and protectionism, whether a jealous guarding of the appetite for secrecy that Steiner (1975, esp. ch. 6) sees as a bulwark of cultural isolation, or simply a self-interested attempt to maintain the power of interpretation vested within the academy, as Gentzler (1993) might argue. That sense of the universal human that enabled Crimp, Brecht, and Paulin to adapt Molière and Sophocles, however, is located by effectively eviscerating the social, moral, and cultural core of the original. Whatever the spectator recognizes in performance, it will be stripped of the materiality of movement, devoid of the pleasure of recognition that comes from the long gaze back through time and space to something that we can acknowledge as still substantially reflecting who we are.

The Translational Moment (i): The Man of No Name

Reichenberger and Bentley are both, in that sense at least, wrong. Or, to put it less contentiously, both are partially right. Absent from their accounts of subjection and aloofness alike is any sense of the prerogative

of translation, the enabling of the synaptic connections that allow specta-
tors to engage meaningfully with what the translator thinks of as the core
of the play. To put it succinctly, the translational moment in performance
may be marked by both aloofness and subjection. This is the third broad
way of re-conceiving the temporal engagements of the translated play. In
its capacity to frame and re-frame moments of action and dialogue from
different perspectives, this method can create an object that is not wholly
of then or now, but that is characterized by simultaneity of interpreta-
tion. It is not that the new translation somehow resides in a third space,
surely now one of the most essentialised of notions within translation
theory, but rather that it is alive to the processes through which the text
has passed, to its existence in history. Translation, in this guise, offers a
word encased in time and in space, made multidimensional through its
ability to capture different facets of the journey of the text, encouraging
the spectator, in terms of his or her cognitive processing, to blend in and
out of the different temporal engagements that such a translation process
might offer in the same way that he or she blends in and out of the per-
formance itself (see Fauconnier and Turner 2002).

The translational moment of the play, in that way, seeks to avoid bifur-
cation between past and present; undeniably, of course, any play can
acquire new potentials for performance and meaning as it travels across
time and space, but if translation for performance is to be accepted as a
mode of writing in its own terms rather than as an instrumental means to
an end, whether commercial or academic, then the dynamic of that exis-
tence in time and space must also be evoked in the stage moment. There
is a double hermeneutics embedded here. On one hand, the translation
is hermeneutically driven—attempting to represent the object of trans-
lation as completely as possible within the experience of the recipient,
as an antidote to Reichenberger's isolationism; on the other, the process
through which the translation comes about is also hermeneutically
interventionist, in that it seeks to disrupt that same experience through
preserving something of the linguistic and existential configurations of
the original text—not in echo of Bentley's Terentian universalism, but
as a function of the recognition that what remains of the original is a
continuum between then and now. Theatre translation, in this concept,
offers a reflective representation of the core of the original, of what makes

the play other to us; but it also refracts some of the meanings of that core, its capacities for new connections, into and across different zones of time and space, with a range of consequences across all of its contexts of performance.

The translator is, therefore, an agent of connection as well as an arbiter of translatability. Deciding which texts are translatable, that is, which texts offer possibilities of connection with new audiences, is only a small part of this—in any event, the translator is rarely a programmer. More germane to the translator's task is his or her assessment of exactly what remains of the chosen play and, in response to that, what requires to be written forward so as to establish moments of synaptic connection with that core. In the case of the theatre of the Spanish Golden Age, there is much that is idiosyncratic. It is intricately structured and highly codified, both in terms of the different poetic forms in which it is written, and of the underlying assumptions of a time when Neo-Platonism and feudalism impose rigid codes dictating, officially at least, how men and women relate both to each other, and to God in his heaven and to the King on his throne. The result is that the dramas are acted out in a hothouse society in which the complicating factors of human life—desire, greed, ambition, illicit love, jealousy—crash like waves against the will to control, to stifle, and ultimately to punish—an oppressive system that rests upon a code of honour that is, in this case, literally cosmic in its reach. In that way, the real challenge for the translator of these plays—indeed of much theatre from the classical or early modern periods—is to take a moral system that is other-directed, that is conceived to preserve the public space and the body politic, and develop from it concerns and values whose scope stretches into the life of twenty-first-century individuals who are inevitably more locked into private concerns. Or else, there is a real danger that spectators will see and experience these characters as mere puppets of convention rather than individuals who suffer and feel pain from the consequences of their own and other people's actions. It is this awareness that likely lies at the heart of Reichenberger's protectionism, prompted in turn by the anxiety that the characters of these plays may appear—to the untutored eye, of course—to be little more than the embodiments of a storm within the enclosed world of a public morality constrained, in turn, within a deeply embedded honour code. Value, however, is not a single

proposition, and the parameters of honour and shame, the socially good and the socially unacceptable, are continually codified and re-codified by power elites, effectively floating concepts within codes that are developed to assert and maintain a hegemony of vice and virtues based on shared assumption. The task of the translator, now paraphrasing Benjamin, is to develop meta-codes, and embody them in the moral universe of the translated play, a universe that offers the new spectator points of access to what we imagine (for imaginative empathy is probably the best we have) are the traces of the human experience of the original codes and of the oppressive power exercised by their hegemony.

On the surface, there are particular historical circumstances that would seem to have uniquely shaped the moral universe of the Spanish Golden Age, in the process hardening the shared assumptions that its theatre addressed. Nearly eight centuries of dominant Muslim presence in Spain had been brought (more or less) to an end only in 1492, just seventy years before the Golden Age began, so that it was still considered painful recent history, And as the new nation sought to extend its military power and the prestige of its language, there was a residual fear of the enemy within. The result is what anthropologists would characterize as a society that was resolutely other-directed, concerned with the maintenance of image and reputation above all else—the root meaning of 'honour' at that time. The Inquisition was established to prevent contagion from this enemy within, but as fear of the Inquisition itself began to take wider hold, the ability to demonstrate purity of blood, clarity of family line, became paramount, so that family honour, held through the male, was crucially dependent upon female virtue. This sense of honour, much more akin to preserving reputation than doing the right thing, in the rather more English conception of the word, provides the principal dramatic axis along which most Golden Age plays are constructed. Audiences developed a taste for honour-based stories, just we have for detective fiction today. And like the commonplace of detective fiction, Golden Age theatre is eminently theatrical in that it deals with sin and retribution, ingenious resolution and, frequently, brutal punishment. Moreover, like the detective dramas of our time, it responds to a real-world anxiety by nurturing the reassuring sense that order will be restored in the face of growing unease as to the chaos in which life seems to be increasingly encased. In all likelihood,

the need for this reassurance, as well as the desire to save face, are pretty close to being universals of human experience. But there are still times when the translator may feel the need to write aspects of the experience forward into the horizon of spectators today.

El pintor de su deshonra/The Painter of Dishonour is a fine example of a play that presents the most significant features of what we might very loosely think of as Golden Age world vision. Dating from around 1648, this is one of Calderón's most mature reflections on a decadent and brutalizing society in which truths and untruths lie confused under the shielding aesthetic of courtesy. Don Juan de Roca (Don Juan Rock, a name resonant with contradiction and tension) is the eponymous gentleman painter, whose honour has been irredeemably stained by the kidnapping of his much younger wife. He wanders through Italy, now a man of no name, in hapless search of stolen wife and lost honour, but like Shakespeare's 'man of no mark' or Agamben's (1998) *homo sacer,* he is now cast adrift from society, stripped of rights, bereft of protection. Calling at the house of Prince Ursino in order to fulfil a commission, he asks the Prince's servant when his master will return:

> DON JUAN: ¿Vendrá presto? (Will he be back soon?)
> CELIO: No lo sé. (I don't know) (Calderón 1991: 166)

In the context of the elaborately formulaic expressions of courtesy with which the play has opened, and the series of framing devices used throughout by Calderón to evoke a society in which any direct or open approach is an affront to a deeply ingrained sense of personal inviolability, this reply is abusive in its directness. No servant would have dared address a gentleman in such naked terms. It confirms Don Juan's brutal loss of status in the eyes of others, and serves as a linguistically sharp and socially crude catalyst for one of the most memorable speeches in the whole of Spanish Golden Age theatre—Don Juan's raging complaint that begins: 'By such and such is honour broken' and climaxes with the bitter questioning:

> What madness dreamt up laws like these,
> these shameful rites the world accepts,

> where another's shameless intent
> visits such punishment on me?

The 'shameless intent' Don Juan refers to is the kidnapping of his wife, so that the elaborate forty-seven-line speech becomes a powerful indictment of any power, moral, legal, or cultural, that reduces the vulnerable subject to bare life. It is the fulcrum upon which the translator seeks to balance the moral universe in the original against the one evoked from that in the translation.

By now the Spanish Golden Age was moving towards its close, its crowning moment of moral and intellectual sophistication enshrined in Calderón's baroque love of ambiguity. Don Juan Roca queries, in the most modern way, how public morality is allowed to impact so brutally on the private realm. How might the translator deal with this brief exchange so as to allow spectators to engage with the socially and morally oppressive reality in which these characters live, to appreciate the personal pain of Don Juan's loss of social standing? Certainly its literal meaning did not satisfy actors John Carlisle and Zubin Varla (Don Juan and Celio respectively in the Royal Shakespeare Company 1995 première of the play); it lacked the edge that was to push simple discourtesy into the realm of sheer tragedy for one and schadenfreude-driven brutality for the other. A.K.G. Paterson's published translation, describing itself as 'agreeable to read and to perform', has Celio retort 'No idea', the curtness of which goes some way towards communicating the marginalization enforced upon the former gentleman now become man-of-no name. But this is an instance where the translator has to think more of synapsis than equivalence. In my translation, accordingly, I chose a reply 'the colour of shock', to borrow a formula from surrealism. 'How the holy fuck should I know?' restores impact to a moment of intense and far-reaching humiliation. Moreover, by occupying the full-length of the four-beat line in which the translation is encased, it is an utterance that automatically instigates its own resonant silence, made even more resonant in the context of a fully costumed Stratford production. This particular translation is an act of writing forward in order to project the impact of a core moment into the emotional landscape of the new audience, potentially generating thereby

a sort of temporal interface, a crossing point between core experiences lost and re-created.

The Translational Moment (ii): The Honour Code

The speech, referred to above as providing the fulcrum moment of the play, is central to all of this. The translator must inevitably use this speech as a keystone of his or her presentation to the new audience of the play's moral universe—keystone in that it is the central block of thought that supports Don Juan's character arc, marking both the moment in which his social and cultural disaffection (as an artist) coalesces into modern revolt, as well as the moment at which he recognizes his imprisonment (as a man of honour) within the very code he finds intolerable. In that way, the speech sets out the moral dictates that direct Don Juan's actions from the moment that his young wife has been stolen away, actions that will have much less to do with righting an apparent wrong than with remaining faithful to honour's insistence on bloodshed. Calderón's audience would have immediately understood the implications of this in terms of the code: what is suffered in private is dealt with in private, but what is done publicly must be seen to be publicly avenged. In that regard, Don Juan's speech can be translated as enshrining the readily intelligible dilemma of an unwanted duty, but this is to miss the dreadful realization that he, in the words of Paterson's translation (given below), is under a complex 'sentence' to kill as an outraged husband and to die as a man in love (the original Spanish is understated as *pena*, meaning 'pain', as in both 'suffering' and 'under pain of death'):

> What has now become of me,
> oh, poor and broken fortune mine?
> But no, do not proceed;
> I'll not pay, not even you, the slightest heed,
> for doing so would be a sign
> that I am ready to disown

> the sentence passed on me; for fortune saved
> a life upon the crime's commission, but gave
> no mercy once the crime was known.
> God help me! Just think how much
> there must be in reality
> that comes to pass quite readily
> yet beggars all belief as such!
> For who'll believe of me, that though,
> alas, I am a man of reputation,
> I am reduced to such a situation?

Convolutions of style aside—the consequence of infelicitous verse translation—Paterson's assertion that his translation is 'close enough […] to offer the reader of limited ability in Spanish a reliable key to the Spanish text' is justified, in great part because it is published in a bilingual edition, geared, in Paterson's telling phrase, to a reader rather than spectator, with the different qualities and conditions of reception implied in these two very different end-users. Evident is a strong strategy of subjection to the past, not just in the use of archaisms ('alas, I am a man of reputation') and dated poeticisms ('oh, poor and broken fortune mine?'), but also in the elided thought processes that reproduce the silences and implicatures of the original, devices designed to evoke and capture the complicity of Calderón's contemporary audience. The upshot is that we can conclude that this is a translation carried out at the level of discourse, devoid of the interpretative processing that is part and parcel of the double hermeneutic model.

Kwame Anthony Appiah (2000: 418) notes, with apparent simplicity, that 'getting the meaning […] right is hardly even a first step towards understanding'. In the case of the moral universe of Calderón, which this speech evokes in its intricate baroque interplay of the surface complexity of the honour code set against the hidden depths of emotional response, the level of understanding at which the translator needs to work is not that of discourse, but value. The alternative translation offered below, of the same section of the speech, differs radically from Paterson's in that the discoursal choices derive from the double hermeneutics of explanation and intervention, writing forwards and backwards respectively:

> By such and such is fortune broken
> but I'll not question that fortune
> nor call into doubt my destiny
> for such grief locked in privacy
> could never be cleansed in public,
> and now I must turn my heart to stone.
> How often we think our lives secure
> when some circumstance intervenes…
> when the trivial suddenly takes root
> and tears through and shreds our certain ground.
> That my honour should be at stake,
> when I am innocent of all wrong,
> that such laws so cruel and severe
> should enslave me to evil tongues
> and judge me as the guilty one!

In other words, the discoursal decisions in this version serve to meld the private angst of now with the public imperative of then (doubt/destiny, grief/cleansed in public, heart/stone, innocent/honour, and so on), and, through that projection, to interpret the arcane code of honour-inspired revenge for a contemporary audience. These are values that have not wholly evaporated across time—the contradiction between the dictates of ingrained moral codes and the imperatives of the emotional self is, of course, intelligible today. But this translation is more centrally concerned to highlight connections between what remains of those public dictates as well as the dilemmas that they might provoke within our own contemporary sense of publicly sanctioned values in crisis.

The Translational Moment (iii): The Man of Honour

The translator's interrogation of the core of this, like any other Golden Age play, may well lead him or her to conclude that the ultimate translatability of these plays lies precisely in their moral intricacy. The moral uncertainty that infects the whole period, despite (or perhaps because

of) the absolutism of its manifold religious, political, and philosophical pretensions, not only pervades the art of the period, but also marks an incipient stirring of a modernity that still connects with us today. In this respect, Calderón's *The Painter of Dishonour* provides a fascinating map of the complex moral universe of Golden Age Spain. Don Juan, who has railed to heaven against the inhuman certainties of the honour code after being grievously slighted by a servant in direct consequence of the outworkings of that code, eventually gains admittance to Prince Ursino's house to paint the commissioned portrait. But, to his horror, he has found his kidnapped wife there, in the company of his best friend's young son. Misreading the situation—we know that she has faithfully and consistently resisted her captor's amorous attentions— Don Juan shoots them both. Having voiced his powerful denunciation of the obsession with appearances, he now becomes its ultimate puppet. The play in that way offers a profound meditation on the forces for freedom and non-freedom in human life, infusing that meditation with the ultimate baroque irony, that we are free and simultaneously unfree. In the final scene, Don Juan, now a double killer, explains his actions to the distraught fathers of the young couple, as well as to the Prince, upon whose house he has visited an act of bloody and vengeful murder:

> DON JUAN   Behold this portrait
> of the painter of dishonour.
> My name is Don Juan de Roca
> and all of this is my doing.
> I am guilty of all that has happened.
> You, Don Pedro, gave her to me
> and I give her back to you, dead.
> To you, Don Luis, my oldest friend,
> I give the body of your son.
> And to you, my Prince, no portrait,
> but instead an image of blood.
> Each of you must extract your price.
> I beg you and you…all of you,
> it is your turn now to take a life.

PRINCE URSINO   Let him go…no one will touch him.
　　　　　　　　　I'll defend him myself, if needs be.
　　　　　　　　　(BELARDO unlocks the door. To DON JUAN.)
BELARDO   There's a horse outside. Go, quickly.
DON PEDRO   Go quickly… ride away from here,
　　　　　　　For though he spilt blood of my blood,
　　　　　　　he has left me not offended,
　　　　　　　but indebted; I must protect him.
DON LUIS   Revenge taken in honour's name
　　　　　　cannot offend; though my son lies dead
　　　　　　I am bound to serve him as before.
DON JUAN   I value such nobility,
　　　　　　but I shall not test your anger.
　　　　　　I shall go at once from this place.
PRINCE URSINO   You are clearly men of honour,
　　　　　　　　high-minded men that I admire,
　　　　　　　　and to prove my worth amongst you
　　　　　　　　I turn to you, good Don Luis,
　　　　　　　　to request Porcia for my wife.
PORCIA   I beg you Father to say yes,
　　　　　　and I'll give thanks to God for it.
JUANETE   The Painter of Dishonour ends
　　　　　　here in death and marriage vows.
　　　　　　Forgive its many flaws, my friends.

The actors involved in the RSC production, seasoned performers all of them, hotly debated the moral ambiguity of this scene amongst themselves. For some it evoked the ultimate sense of an important principle of restorative justice freely recognized by these men as protecting society from moral chaos and breakdown (which it is and does); for others it was run through with the bitterest of ironies as an innocent young woman is needlessly slaughtered, two guiltless fathers lose their children, and Porcia gladly accepts the hand of a man we know doesn't love her, while the gentlemen, like members of a worthy club, have no choice but to close ranks and protect their reputations (which is no less true). Calderón himself, as both moralist and artist, may well have been torn between both interpretations; his audiences would, in all likelihood, have been similarly

torn. But we can only view plays from the past through our own accumulated history, and today's audiences will surely be alive to the bitter ironies embedded in the ways in which public morality polices itself in the private life.

The Translational Moment (iv): The Shameless Woman

In the mid 1660s a young Mexican girl entered a convent as a novitiate, driven not by any sense of religious vocation but rather in search of a space, literal and metaphorical, where she could write. Described by Octavio Paz (1988) in his biography *Sor Juana, Or, The Traps of Faith* as the greatest American writer of the colonial period, it was the death of Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz in 1695 that finally rang down the curtain on this Golden Age of writing in the Spanish language. Her extraordinary plays are very much in the mould of Calderón's tightly structured and ingeniously witty comedies, but in the case of Sor Juana their barbs are more directed at the double standards of the male-sanctioned honour code. A nascent but readily discernible feminism infuses her writing. One of her best-known poems begins:

> You foolish men, you who accuse
> Women with no good reason,
> Yours is the blame, it's you who abuse
> Women's trust, yours is the treason.

Just as Jacobson's re-historicisation of *The Merchant of Venice* is predicated on an awareness of the subsequent history of the Jews, so potential translations may well choose to instantiate feminism as a legitimate frame for retelling the plays of the Golden Age.[2] Indeed, it is highly probably that Sor Juana, in her address to the 'foolish men' of her time was thinking of the puffed-up protagonists of Lope, Tirso,

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[2] Kierkegaard's 'Life may only be understood backwards, but it must be lived forwards' perfectly captures translation's deeply rooted hostility to fixity of interpretation (see Cappelorn 2002).

and, of course, Calderón, as much as of those few men she would have had occasion to meet in her life of enclosure. A feminist treatment would certainly provide contemporary audiences with a clear focus on the nexus of oppressive circumstances in which the strong female protagonists of these plays live. But missing from this focus would be the moral intricacy of women who, like Sor Juana Inés herself, find that the resorts of intelligence and artifice are the only way of making sense of lives driven by desire and ambition, but hemmed in by circumstances. In keeping with the aesthetic of the age, these are women who take refuge in intricacy of argument in order to keep themselves morally intact, to isolate themselves from the oppressive male-dominated structures in which their lives are conditioned and controlled, especially by the honour code in which male reputation is so savagely vested. In other words, what might interest the translator is the cleverness of their strategy for survival every bit as much as the correctness of their ideological choices. The strong female leads in these plays are strategists of their own survival within the world carved out for them by the honour codes of men.

In *The Painter of Dishonour*, Serafina is such a female antagonist. In the excerpt that follows, we see her in her first conversation with Don Alvaro, now returned from being presumed lost at sea. He is her first love, but she has now accepted Don Juan in good faith. To be faithful to herself she must remain faithful to that choice. In Paterson's version she reasons with Alvaro thus:

> SERAPHINE What I said was quite correct
>   about my being married as your widow,
>   when your reappearance leaves me so upset
>   that having then excused myself of blame,
>   leaves me now excused of doing so again.
> ALVARO   Thus, in your good opinion,
>   my being dead today would be better in the main
>   than my being alive.
> SERAPHINE I do not know.
>   I could secure in my new identity,
>   mourn you dead; but mourn you alive,
>   that would be insanity,

> for what was then a proper feeling of affliction
> would turn out now quite improper,
> were my reputation, August beyond suspicion
> to trade a sorrow which was a virtue
> for a pleasure that merits blame.

The translation is verbally unwieldy, on this occasion as a consequence of extending metre so as to secure rhyme. More significantly, Serafina's moral discourse is now flattened to a peculiar register of refined and effetely middle-class banality—'quite correct', 'upset', 'blame', 'excused', 'proper feeling of affliction', 'quite improper', 'August beyond suspicion', 'sorrow', 'pleasure that merits blame'. The tone is that of a moralizer rather than that of a woman who must find the strongest of reasons within herself in order to avoid the snare of shamelessness. My version reads as follows:

SERAFINA	What I said before,
	that I married as your widow,
	was true, and seeing you like this
	has wounded me to my heart's core,
	but my reason then's my reason now.
DON ALVARO	And so you wish I was still dead?
SERAFINA	How can I tell? If you were dead,
	then I could mourn you, secure
	in who and in what I am,
	but to mourn you when you're alive
	would be madness; proper grief then
	would become an insane love now.
	Grief would have been a virtue;
	and I'll not trade it in for shame.

The discourse here is more direct, less delicate, and more viscerally torn—'reason', 'true', 'heart's core', 'madness', 'insane love', 'grief', 'virtue', 'shame'. It is not that these choices are somehow more accurate versions of the original than the key words that Paterson selects; put simply, that is not in the gift of any translator. Rather they refract a reading of the agony of Serafina's situation, her vulnerability to coercive codes of behaviour that, in turn, draw upon and respond to the discursive universe of decency and honour, shame and shamelessness. These

are binary values rooted in the paradigms of coercion operated by power structures whose pretensions to self-sufficiency depend on the ascribing of universal weight and axiomatic truth to what is in reality merely the discourse of passing judgement—always the same and always evolving.

The Imperative of Performance

This discussion has developed from the idea that the original work presents the translator with a compositional core (what Dennis Kennedy [1996] refers to, in the context of his work on the 'foreign Shakespeare', as 'Shakespeare without his language'), a core that is embedded within and represented by a set of performative possibilities. Such possibilities will, of course, be linguistically and figuratively encoded; but in the specific context of translating the universe of writers whose work, like that of Calderón, derives from and reflects the workings of a deeply rooted moral philosophy, the choices made by translators cannot be made solely at the level of discourse. More importantly, translators must also understand and represent the ethical dilemmas, the moral imperatives and the moments of revolt that are the consequences within the individual life of the coercive forces of that universe. In the case of the Spanish Golden Age these forces develop from a set of binaries—honour/dishonour, virtue/shame, name/namelessness—that masquerade as the anxieties of religious purity, but that, in the final analysis, are the ideological supports of a particular status quo. In that sense, the keywords of these binaries are in themselves performative cyphers that may be written forward to connect with different audiences in different places, not in keeping with any claim to the universal, but rather through the bilateral engineering implicit in the act of translation.

Context frames performance and inflects it. And performance, to be successful, depends on engagement. If the translated play is to work in performance it must convince spectators that what they are watching concerns them too. It is here that theatre and theatre translation may well stoop to conquer, but the act of writing forward, of prompting immediacy of reception, need not necessarily imply abandoning the human concerns and contexts of the original. Theatre is also about discovery, about filtering the unfamiliar through the optic of the familiar. Taken individually,

none of the keywords that together constitute the baroque moral universe of Calderón are remote from us: it is the interaction between them, their impact on the lives of characters and, through that, on the experience of the spectator that is of concern to the translator for performance. None of this implies any degree of homogeneity of understanding or interpretation, either then or now. That should never be the goal of translation anyway. But the real possibility that translation does offer is the creation of a relatedness that aligns, as far as possible, our understanding of the terms of the original with those of the spectator, in as much as we can tell what those terms may be. The process remains freighted with anxiety, mired in contingency, but that is exactly what it has in common with the processes of interpretation and understanding that help to keep the past alive, in some form anyway.

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13

Beckett as Translator of Beckett: The Transmission of (Anti-?) Religious Concepts

John Gillespie

Samuel Beckett's reputation as a leading figure of twentieth-century literature rests in part on his capacity to depict the absurdity of the human situation in all its desolation and bleakness in his novels and plays. His work is highly original. It has changed the way we view both the theatre and theatrical performance and his prose was influential in the development of the French new novel movement in mid-century. That originality, and Beckett's capacity to characterise the human condition in his writings, earned him the recognition of the Nobel Prize in 1969.

Beckett as Self-translator

One unique feature of his works is that they were first created, some in English and some in French, and then, in most cases, translated by him into French, or into English. In consequence, he is recognised as both

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a French writer and an Irish writer and is honoured in both cultures. Unlike other bilingual writers, this process of writing in his second language was undertaken voluntarily (Beer 1994: 214), and indeed he wrote in French rather than English without necessarily knowing that he would be translating the work concerned.

His serious involvement with France and things French began with his study of French and Italian at Trinity College, Dublin, and a period of two years at the *Ecole normale supérieure* in Paris as a *lecteur d'anglais*, during which time he acted as a secretary for James Joyce. From 1935 he moved to France and remained resident there for the rest of his life. His early works from 1930 on were written in English, and his success as a writer remained modest until 1945, when a quasi-religious burst of inspiration transformed his life and he had a vision of a number of works that he should write. He began to compose in French and wrote some of his major works during the period 1947–50 (his *anni mirabiles*): the novel trilogy *Molloy*, *Malone meurt* (*Malone Dies*), and *L'Innommable* (*The Unnameable)* as well as *En attendant Godot* (*Waiting for* Godot).

Of course, though the language was French, many of the names were Irish, as were the contexts. This is one indication of the fact that Beckett stands at the intersection of two major linguistic cultures, although perhaps it would be more accurate to say that his work transcends those cultures and has a universal appeal.

From the 1950s onwards he translated these French works into English, or should we say recreated or rewrote them in English. Later works, *Krapp's Last Tape* (*La dernière bande*), *All That Fall* (*Tout ceux qui tombent),* and *Happy Days* (*O les beaux jours*), were written in English and then translated into French, in the case of the radio play *All That Fall* by the novelist Robert Pinget.

The theme of Beckett as that rare phenomenon of a truly bilingual writer and self-translator has received significant critical attention already and is helpful for the focus of this chapter.[1] When Beckett produces his work written in French in English, or written in English in French, the creative element involved in translation becomes more significant and revealing.

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[1] See Edwards (1992) on 'Beckett's French' and Beer (1994) on 'Beckett's Bilingualism'.

Our examination of Beckett is fruitful for our consideration of the use of evaluative concepts in translation, and specifically as they are linked to religious concepts. His status as a self-translating creative writer, translating both ways, provides an opportunity to ask the key question: does the act of translating back into English from French or from English into French reveal the influence of evaluative concepts? Given the focus of this project, the large range of his writings, and the extensive volume of criticism they have engendered, it is appropriate for us to limit our consideration to Beckett's references to the theme of God, the Bible, Christianity, and religious life in his works and study how he approaches their translation and see whether the variations between the versions in the two languages have any significance as far as evaluative concepts are concerned.

Beckett and God

Despite Beckett's reputation as the creator of a bleak tragicomic world where the focus is on the absurd, despair, death, and suffering, it is broadly acknowledged by critics that God, and references to Him, are ever present in his work at all stages. Beckett often refers to Christian theological concepts and values, quotes from the King James Bible, or uses language that is heavily influenced by its vocabulary and cadences.[2] Although we will be identifying biblical and religious references, our purpose is not to list them, given the extensive work that has already been done, but rather to gauge their significance in relation to evaluative concepts in translation.

In this regard, his religious background is significant. Brought up as an Anglican in a predominantly Catholic country, his religious experience was influenced by his strictly religious mother, who attended the Moravian school in Ballymena, Co Antrim. She was from a Quaker background, and had an oppressive influence on him.[3] At church he received a traditional

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[2] Many Beckett scholars allude to the pervasive influence of the King James Bible in his work to the extent that such a point is regarded as common knowledge in Beckett criticism. Particularly helpful is the excellently detailed study by Mary Bryden (1998), which has a broader focus, and Iain Bailey's (2014) thorough and insightful treatment of the topic.

[3] See Deirdre Bair (1990).

Protestant religious upbringing, and was subjected to the religious education transmitted to him at Portora Royal School, an Anglican foundation in Fermanagh founded by James the First at the time of the plantation. This education was still, at this time, based on the King James Bible, which resonates throughout his work, as do the traditional hymns of the church services he attended. However, as John Calder succinctly describes it,

> '(…) he lost his faith early, probably at about sixteen, but the mythology of Christianity remained with him all his life, and he was always interested, in a general sense, in comparative religion and metaphysics. Those who described him as 'God-haunted' were right, but the haunting had a mystical haunting to it, not a devotional one' (2001: 106).

Indeed he referred to Christianity as 'a mythology with which I am perfectly familiar, so naturally I use it' (see Butler 1992: 169). So in looking at references to God, the Bible, and Christianity in his work, we know that we are not dealing with a believer.

Waiting for Godot

Beckett is renowned for his ambiguously atheological unbelief.[4] In order to examine evaluative concepts that influence the process of his self-translation and assess their significance in helping us to properly understand Beckett's thinking, we will focus in depth on one key example, *En attendant Godot*, and particularly, one key passage from it. We will then refer more briefly to his other works and their translations, including *Fin de partie* (1957), *Krapp's Last Tape* (1958), and *Happy Days* (1962).

One of the most striking, and at first sight, most incongruous scenes in *En attendant Godot* (published first in French in 1952 and translated into English in 1954), is Vladimir and Estragon's dialogue, early in Act I, about Christ's crucifixion and the behaviour of the two thieves who were crucified alongside Him. A detailed analysis of this comparatively lengthy excerpt (82 lines, including stage directions in the Duckworth edition)

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[4] As Lance St John Butler so aptly says 'About religion Beckett is unambiguously ambiguous' (1992: 169).

is revealing. As we comment on the passage, both versions will be given, and the variations and their significance considered.

The play begins. The scene is an unidentified country road, beside a tree, in the evening. Estragon, a tramp, is sitting on a low mound having problems taking off one of his boots. He gives up in frustration, saying 'Rien à faire' (EAG 3) 'Nothing to be done' (CDW 11),[5] a sentiment echoed by Vladimir, the other tramp, when he enters, as he is tempted to agree. Their early exchanges focus on their mutual suffering, Estragon's physical problems with his feet, and Vladimir's spiritual problems, not least with the temptation of suicide. In this atmosphere of gloom and despair, Vladimir suddenly remarks, out of the blue, 'Un des larrons fut sauvé' (EAG 6), 'One of the thieves was saved' (CDW 13), thus introducing what turns out to be a prolonged exchange on one of the finer points of New Testament Higher Criticism. Much of this scene is translated into English accurately with many similarities, but there are some significant differences which alter the tone. The scene presupposes that the audience will know the story well enough to fill in the gaps, an assumption understandable in the 1950s in both cultures, but less likely today. Vladimir's initial remark indicates that he takes the matter lightly: 'C'est un pourcentage honnête' (EAG 6), 'it's a reasonable percentage' (CDW 13), meaning that one out of two being saved would not be a bad result given their situation.

Vladimir then refers to the repentance of the thief who was saved: 'Si on se repentait?' (EAG 5), 'Suppose we repented' (CDW 13). Following his earlier attitude, he says this perhaps just to be on the safe side. It hardly demonstrates any sense of spiritual contrition. This is a reference to the thief who rebuked another thief who was insulting Jesus and calling in question his status as the Christ (Luke 23: 39–43). However, in the Bible passage the thief defending Jesus admits that they have been justly punished, and that Christ has not done any wrong, and asks to

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[5] Page references in *En attendant Godot* are to Colin Duckworth's edition (1966) and are marked EAG and the number in the text; those in English are taken from *The Complete Dramatic Works* (1990) and marked CDW and the number. The equivalent parts of each speech are shown in inverted commas with the appropriate reference. The words that are not present in the other language are placed within parentheses. Translations into English without page numbers are my own. Stage directions are written in italics and placed within square brackets.

be remembered when He comes into his kingdom. And Jesus says: 'I tell you the truth, today you will be with me in paradise' (verse 43, *New International Version*). There is no direct repentance. At best it is implied, and the word 'salvation' is not mentioned.

The remark, and such knowledge, is above Estragon's head: 'De quoi?' (EAG 5), 'Repented what?' (CDW 13). The transitive construction is less direct in English. They cannot think of anything to repent of apart from being born, focusing the play for the first time fully on the theme of the human condition which pervades it throughout. In the face of this spiritual bewilderment Vladimir says, 'Enfin' (EAG 5), a term of resigned but vague dismissal. But the English version adds a Beckettian phrase that recurs throughout the play 'Nothing to be done.' (CDW 13), and echoes Estragon's first words in his frustration with taking off his boot. This statement of hopelessness could well refer to the possibility or reality of repentance, to the difficulty of understanding what one might repent of, to the impossibility of salvation, or indeed to the bleakness of the human condition. It is a much stronger statement and reaction than that implied by 'Enfin'.

Then Vladimir, logically enough if one is thinking about the thieves on their crosses, turns their dialogue towards the Bible: 'Tu as lu la Bible?' (EAG 6), 'Did you ever read the Bible?' (CDW 13). The word 'ever' increases the expectation of the unlikelihood of such an action. Estragon's dismissive response: 'La Bible… J'ai dû y jeter un coup d'oeil' (EAG 6), 'The Bible … I must have taken a look at it' (CDP 13), is similar to the English version, but then there is a variation. In French Vladimir replies in astonishment: 'A l'école sans Dieu?' (EAG 6)—literally (at school without God?) This is a reference to the secular nature of French education, which, being the norm, should hardly be a surprise to Vladimir. In French, Estragon's reply about the Bible and school is vague: 'Sais pas si elle était sans ou avec' (EAG 6), (I don't know if it was with or without). Vladimir's reply 'Tu dois confondre avec la Roquette' (EAG 6) (you must be confusing it with La Roquette [a young offender's institution in Paris, Beckett 1966: 92–93]) continues the bantering tone between the two tramps. The English version does not mention school, perhaps because of the different educational context (although Vladimir's surprise would be appropriate in Ireland), but rather enables Vladimir to continue to

pursue the religious theme more relentlessly by asking in English 'Do you remember the Gospels?' (CDW 13). This elicits Estragon's response about maps of Holy Land, how pretty they were, making him feel thirsty and think about the pale blue of the Dead Sea where he would like to go on honeymoon, swim, and be happy, a response that emphasises his spiritually uncomprehending attitude that persists throughout the scene. The Bible is seen as just another book, not a special one. Banality and serious conversation are mixed together, as in the original, but the removal of the references to education gives the exchange more momentum in English.

After a short ironic digression about Estragon's poetic skills, his penniless poet's past and the state of his swelling foot: 'Il enfle' (EAG 6), 'Swelling visibly' (CDW 14)—much more amusing in English—and therefore contrasting more strongly in tone with Vladimir's seriousness, the latter, who has absent-mindedly forgotten what he has been going on about, insists on telling Estragon the two story of the two thieves. Estragon remembers nothing about them, and says he doesn't want to hear the story, but Vladimir justifies it as a means of passing the time, a key feature of Beckettian drama. The tone is alternately dismissive, casual, farcical, and serious, an interplay between Vladimir's knowledge and Estragon's ignorance and lack of interest, in other words, dealing with a serious religious topic from a subversive point of view. At this point, the concept of salvation is introduced and resonates through the rest of the play.

VLADIMIR	'C'étaient deux voleurs, crucifiés en même temps que le Sauveur' (EAG 6), 'Two thieves, crucified at the same time as our Saviour' (CDW 14).
ESTRAGON	'Le quoi?' (EAG 6) (Our what?) (CDW 14)
VLADIMIR	'On dit que l'un fut sauvé et l'autre … damné' (EAG 6), 'Our Saviour. One is supposed to have been saved and the other damned' (CDW 14).
ESTRAGON	'Sauvé de quoi?' (EAG 6), 'Saved from what?' (CDW 14).
VLADIMIR	'De l'enfer.' (EAG 6), 'Hell' (CDW 14).

The fact that 'Our' is used instead of 'Le' could be seen as marginally more personal, but otherwise, there is little variation. The use of 'supposed to' adds a note of scepticism about the biblical account. The passage, however, highlights the opposing destinies of salvation and damnation.

Estragon says he is going, but does not move. Then Vladimir apologetically starts to explain: 'Je ne t'ennuie pas, j'espère '(EAG 6), 'how is it—this is not boring you I hope' (CDW 14). In the original Estragon replies 'Je n'écoute pas' (EAG 6), ('I'm not listening'), which is not in the English version. Again, the English version is more focused and preserves the momentum of Vladimir's account. Vladimir is not interrupted by Estragon's response and launches into a long speech on the treatment of the incident in the four Gospels.

> Comment se fait-il que des quatre évangélistes un seul présente les faits de cette façon? Ils étaient cependant là tous les quatre – enfin, pas loin. Et un seul parle d'un larron de sauvé. … Voyons, Gogo, il faut me renvoyer la balle de temps en temps. (EAG 7)
> – how is it that of the four Evangelists only one speaks of a thief being saved? The four of them were there – or thereabouts – and only one speaks of a thief being saved. Come on, Gogo, return the ball, can't you, once in a way? (CDW 14).

It is significant that the English version talks again about being saved, once again emphasising the theme of salvation, whereas the French says 'un seul présente les faits de cette façon' ('only one presents the facts that way'), which is much less emphatic. In response, in French, Estragon says 'J'écoute' (EAG 7), (I'm listening), beginning to return the ball again. However, this is approached differently, and given much more prominence in English: Estragon '[*With exaggerated enthusiasm*]' I find this really most extraordinarily interesting' (CDW 14), changing register and showing his exasperation and dissatisfaction with extreme sarcasm. This contrasts with the seriousness of the question of salvation.

Vladimir is not deflected from his lecturing tone: 'Un sur quatre. Des trois autres, deux n'en parlent pas du tout et le troisième dit qu'ils l'ont engueulé tous les deux' (EAG 7), and that tone remains similar in the translation: 'One out of four. Of the other three two don't mention any thieves at all and the third says that both of them abused him' (CDW 14).

This whole section, and these last few speeches in particular make reference, indirectly, to the four Gospels, to Matthew 27: 44; Mark 15: 27–32; Luke 23: 32–3; 39–43; and John 19: 18, 32. It gives the appearance of accuracy and erudition, and presupposes the interest of the audience and a certain degree of biblical knowledge. However, it is not as accurate or erudite as it appears. First of all, only two of the Gospel writers could be assumed to have been there (Matthew and John). And the word 'saved' is not used in Luke: 'I tell you the truth, today you will be with me in paradise.' All four Gospels mention thieves. Mark and John specify that there were two thieves, but say little else. The third is Matthew, but he says nothing about how many were hurling insults. The full story is told in Luke, who does not specify the number of thieves.

Estragon is bewildered: 'Je ne comprends rien… Engueulé qui?' (EAG 7), 'What's this all about? Abused who?' (CDW14). When Vladimir responds, as before, 'Le Sauveur' (EAG 7) this time, 'The Saviour' (CDW 14), by asking why, Vladimir's answer 'Parce qu'il n'a pas voulu les sauver' (EAG 7), 'Because he wouldn't save them' (CDW 14), distances itself further from the full story told in Luke without any evidence of such a statement from the other three Gospels. Still struggling with the concept of salvation, but remembering what had been said earlier, Estragon asks: 'De l'enfer?' (EAG 7) 'From hell?' Vladimir's answer in French 'Mais non, voyons! De la mort' (EAG 7) is translated much more viciously into English: 'Imbecile! From death' (CDW 15). Estragon's answer 'Et alors?' (EAG 7) is dismissive, but in English confused: 'I thought you said hell' (CDW 15). And then in English two lines are added. Vladimir responds by repeating 'From death, from death' and Estragon retorts 'Well, what of it?,' more dismissive still (CDW 15). Then it reverts to the original. Vladimir says 'Alors ils ont dû être damnés tous les deux' (EAG 7), 'Then the two of them must have been damned' (CDW 15). Estragon's French response 'Et après?' (EAG 7) could be translated 'So what?', but in fact it is rendered as the much stronger 'And why not?' (CDW 15).

Vladimir's reply shows his biblical confusion: 'Mais l'autre dit qu'il y en a eu un de sauvé' (EAG 7) 'But one of the four says that one of the two was saved'. His anguish is not shared by Estragon: 'Eh bien? Ils ne sont pas d'accord, un point c'est tout' (EAG 7), 'Well? They don't agree, and that's all there is to it' (CDW 15). He doesn't really care.

But Vladimir's problem is one of hermeneutics and of belief, with the implicit sense that something as important as salvation can't even be understood with certainty by looking at the Bible. 'Ils étaient là tous les quatre. Et un seul parle d'un larron de sauvé. Pourquoi le croire pluôt que les autres?' (EAG 7), 'But all four were there. And only one speaks of a thief being saved. Why believe him rather than the others?' (CDW 15). Of course, as Mary Bryden (1998: 110) points out, this is a false dilemma, since the narrative in the other three gospels simply doesn't deal with that part of the story. Of course, the emphasis of this exchange is on doubt, since no other plausible explanations are sought or advanced.

Estragon finds the idea of belief in such a thing unlikely: 'Qui le croit?' (EAG 7), 'Who believes him?' (CDW 15), Vladimir: 'Mais tout le monde. On ne connaît que cette version-là.' (EAG 7), 'Everybody. It's the only version they know' (CDW 15), a dubious statement in itself. Estragon's rude response 'Les gens sont des cons' (EAG 7) is even more forceful in English: 'People are bloody ignorant apes' (CDW15). This closes down the question by implying that it is ridiculous that they believe such things and that Vladimir's anguish is misplaced. Their talk then moves on and they remind themselves that they are meant to be waiting for Godot.

Evaluative Concepts in *En attendant Godot*

If we look at the overall effect of this passage we can see that it clearly focuses on Christian belief. And it is a broader engagement with biblical and theological issues than it at first appears. While specifically referring to the question of the thieves on the cross, it raises a number of other questions indirectly: the divinity of Christ, the question of salvation and its polar opposite, damnation, the nature of divine justice, the reliability, authority, and trustworthiness of the Bible and the value or likelihood of Christianity being true.

The interplay of Estragon's ignorance and Vladimir's apparently knowledgeable pedantry leads to the whole discussion vacillating from the comic to the mildly serious and to a general sense of questioning of and scepticism towards Christian belief, not least because of the incongruity of such a 'higher critical' exchange between the two tramps. And

of course, because of the inaccuracies of Vladimir's accounts, the deck is stacked against an orthodox interpretation or presentation of the issue. The ideological position that the audience confronts, in both languages, is that of a lack of trust in Scripture, and indeed an undermining of such a trust, and an unwillingness to accept Christ and a Christian worldview as the norm.

Iain Bailey agrees, seeing this exchange as being 'partly about the problem of canon as it pertains to the existence of four different gospel accounts, and suggests the instability of "the Bible" in that source-critical and hermeneutic sense' (2014: 19). Instead of being seen, as orthodox believers would have it, as a coherent source of religious truth, the Bible is seen as a source of doubt. This impression is intensified if one considers the knowledge of the Bible that Vladimir displays, which has merely the appearance of accuracy. His apparent grasp of detail is, as we have seen, deceptive. The particular perspective he takes on the synoptic problem,[6] however, shows a fundamentally sceptical approach to Scripture. Overall the passage can be seen as expressing at the very least a negative attitude towards belief throughout. Coming right at the beginning of the play this sets its ideological tone.

But as we have already pointed out, there are a number of differences between the French and the English versions. Some things are omitted, some things added and some things said differently. According to my analysis, there are at least twelve significant additions or variations. From the point of view of values, and evaluative concepts, what significance do these differences have?

When we look at them together, we can see that the volume of the differences follows a pattern. Vladimir's rejoinder 'Nothing to be done' instead of 'Enfin', echoing Estragon's first words in the play ('Rien à faire' in the original) further emphasises the sense of hopelessness of the tramps' position. This feeling continues to build throughout the rest of the play as that phrase recurs. The addition of 'ever' in 'Did you ever read the Bible?' stresses the openness and relatively unlikelihood of that eventual-

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[6] This refers to the fact that 'a comparative study of Matthew, Mark and Luke leads to the recognition that there is a considerable body of material common to all three, or to two out of the three' (Atkinson and Field 1996: 428) which has often been a source of controversy in biblical criticism.

ity, downplaying its significance; the omission of the reference to school, and the mention of La Roquette, the young offenders' institution, is not only a domestication of the exchange, but also a sharpening of the focus of Vladimir's preoccupation with his Bible problem. This is intensified by the addition of the question 'Do you remember the Gospels?' as if knowing them was something peripheral and easily forgotten and not part of normal experience. Estragon's toe 'Swelling visibly' heightens the comedic tone of their exchange in contrast to Vladimir's serious agonising.

The use of 'Our Saviour' instead of 'Le' could be seen as making the reference more personal in the interchange on hell, with the omission of 'je n'écoute pas' ('I'm not listening'), giving this passage more bite and momentum, placing the accent on the biblical problem and not on Estragon's response. The contrast between Vladimir's dogged determination to continue with this theme, and Estragon's rebellious disinterest stands out even more clearly with the extension of his response 'I find this really most extraordinarily interesting'—instead of just indicating that he is listening—at the end of this speech, bringing in a tone of heavy irony and sarcasm and showing an unexpectedly sophisticated opposition.

Vladimir's impatience with Estragon's perfectly sensible question about Christ saving the thieves from hell is shown in the ferocity of his reply in English, and the confusion of his answer: 'Imbecile, from death'. Estragon's added, and accurate, retort 'I thought you said hell', leads to Vladimir's further exasperation: 'From death, from death', which increases the emotional intensity. Moreover this whole exchange emphasises on the fact of death in the middle of a discussion about salvation.

Estragon's indifference in French to the number of thieves saved enlists a more aggressive 'And why not?' The attitude expressed in Estragon's final remark 'People are bloody ignorant apes', in its greater intensity in English underlines the fact that the pattern of these additions and variations are more passionate and suggest more bitterness than in French. Taken together these variations show that the English version gives greater weight to undermining any credence that might be attached to the Bible and Christianity.

The number of structural and verbal variations and their vigour, directness, and intensity are evidence of a pattern that shows that Beckett's negative evaluation of Christian belief in the original French is much

clearer and less emotionally charged than in English. Beckett translates this undoubtedly unbelieving situation in French into an attack in English. I would suggest that it is not only because English was his first language, but because his early experience of religion, his encounters with Christianity in home, in church and at school, and his decisive youthful disaffection with it took place within an English-speaking cultural environment. In English the greater vigour and emotional depth of the exchanges suggests a more personal engagement with the issues being dramatised.

Michael Edwards' discussion of the effect of Beckett's writing in French on him is helpful for our analysis: 'Beckett's voice is removed from him … by the simple fact of his writing in French. He enters, as it were, language' and again 'the voice of the trilogy, the voice of *En attendant Godot*, is not exactly the voice of Beckett, (1992: 74). In French, his creativity is freed. Beckett, by writing in French, distances himself from himself (Edwards 1992: 77). It is as if he becomes less of himself, purer. Specifically, the emotional intensity of his writing is lessened, and it becomes less personal. The corollary of this is that, when Beckett translates the works he has written in French back into English, various elements of his full identity re-emerge in his language and his treatment of his work. We have already spoken of his attitude to religion: his disaffection with it, his scepticism of it, and his strong opposition to its effects. Translated into English this disaffection becomes more prominent and more passionate. That is what we have seen in the case of *Waiting for Godot*. His translation reveals his values in relation to religion—and his evaluation of religion itself—more clearly. His translation conveys a stronger message. In terms of evaluative concepts his translation is guided by a heightened disrespect, by an emotional lack of sympathy; by a directness of opposition and a humorous trivialisation of religious and specifically Christian belief.

The scene of the thieves is only one example of the presentation of the concept of salvation in the play. Right at the end Vladimir and Estragon feel that if Godot comes 'Nous serons sauvés' (EAG 88) 'We'll be saved' (CDW 88), but the impression given is that it is hopeless. This shows how central religion is to the play.

Aside from the concept of salvation, other references to Christianity continue to be made throughout *Godot*. Vladimir uses the words of

a well-known hymn in a remark to Pozzo at the end of Act 2: 'Night is drawing nigh' (CDW 80), a quote from the hymn 'Now the day is over', which is not a direct translation of the French, where there is no equivalent. It is the purely descriptive and flat 'nous sommes arrivés au soir' (EAG 78). This kind of resonance is an example of a less aggressive, more wistful translation, possibly a reminder of childhood experience. Similarly, at the beginning of the play, just before the passage we have studied, Estragon criticises Vladimir for always being last-minute. Vladimir's answer is 'C'est long, mais ce sera bon. Qui disait ça?, (literally it's long but it will be good, that is it'll take time but it will be alright) (EAG 4). In English his response is a partial quote from the King James Bible of his education instead: 'Hope deferred maketh the something sick, who said that' (CDW 12), a reference to Proverbs 13:12. This underlines Bailey's point about the role of the Bible in English literature being greater than that in French (2014: 115ff) where Biblical quotations are fewer. Both references exemplify the positive evaluative use of religious discourse to talk about the world, again suggesting his personal experience and underlining its absence from the original French.

It is not our purpose to list a range of allusions to Christianity and religion in *Godot* or indeed his other works, but to make the point that they are treated differently in either language because of his personal experience and his deeply held, but problematic unbelief. A close reading of further texts is beyond the scope of this chapter, but if we take the principles adduced from our analysis of *En attendant Godot*, we can see other instances that show that this kind of translation is not confined to *En attendant Godot* if we look briefly at some other texts.

Beyond Godot

We can see another example of a passionate rejection of God and belief in *Fin de partie* (*Endgame*), written originally in French. Hamm and Clov, Nagg and Nell, are trying to cope with their prison-like incarceration after a world-changing disaster. As they contemplate their situation, Hamm suddenly suggests that they pray. This suggestion is met with a commotion about a rat, so that Hamm has to insist: 'Dieu d'abord!' Vous

y êtes? (FR 75), 'God first! Are you right?' (CDW 119). They reluctantly start to pray the Paternoster, but Hamm shuts them up. They start to pray silently and wait for something to happen, but soon give up.

> CLOV: '(rouvrant les yeux) – Je t'en fous! Et toi?' (FD 76) CLOV: '[Abandoning his attitude.] What a hope! And you?' (CDW 119)
>
>   HAMM: – 'Bernique! (A Nagg) Et toi?' (FP 76) HAMM: 'Sweet damn all! [To NAGG.] And you?' (CDW 119)
>
>   NAGG: – 'Attends. (Un temps rouvrant les yeux.) Macache!' (FP 76) NAGG: 'Wait! [Pause. Abandoning his attitude.] Nothing doing!' (CDW 119)
>
>   HAMM:. – Le salaud! Il n'existe pas! (FP 76) HAMM: The bastard! He doesn't exist! (CDW 119).

As a piece of spiritual searching it is, of course, somewhat farcical, which is the point. And the emotional vigour of the expressions about the absence of God, albeit blasphemous, are ambiguous. However, as in *Godot*, the English version has more emotional bite and ferocity: the use of 'What a hope!' and of 'Bernique', for instance, as an expression of disappointment (it is a type of sea shell), is hardly as strong as 'Sweet damn all', and in an English context the use of the word *bastard*, although close in meaning, has more resonance than in French. This is another example of the evaluative principle of disrespect.

If we turn to those plays written first in English we can see that the process is reversed. Take the example of another reference to the hymn 'Now the day is over' in *Krapp's Last Tape*. As he looks back over the last year and seeks to record its highlights he drifts into a wistful memory of his childhood, when he went to Vespers. He sings, the age in his voice:

> 'Now the day is over,
> Night is drawing nigh-igh,
> Shadows – [coughing then almost inaudible] – of the evening
> Steal across the sky' (CDW 222).

This passage is a further link to Beckett's own experience and identity and has an element of positive nostalgia. That element cannot be captured in the same way in French, which is unable to convey those

personal resonances, although it too is nostalgic: 'L'ombre descend de nos montagnes, L'azur du ciel va se ternir' (DB 30).

Another example of this kind can be found in *Happy Days*. Winnie, in the first act buried up to her waist in a mound of scorched grass and in the second act up to her neck, conducts a constant monologue, occasionally turning to her seldom visible husband Willie, in which she constantly emphasises, from her doggedly religious point of view, her many blessings, despite her dire situation. Her language resonates with the kind of words that Beckett would have heard spoken in the everyday speech of devout, orthodox Protestant Christians: for instance 'so much to be thankful for … many mercies… great mercies … prayers perhaps not for naught' (CDW 140) reiterated throughout the play as things get worse, and which cannot be transferred fully into French. Even her repetition of the phrase 'happy day' (CDW 142, 146, 155 and so on) is a reminiscent of the famous hymn, popular at that time of the century in church circles, 'O Happy Day'. The title in French 'O les beaux jours' is taken from Verlaine, and therefore does not have the personal religious resonances of the hymn.

Evaluative Concepts and Religion in Beckett

Having looked at *En attendant Godot* in detail and considered the issues raised by Beckett's self-translation, and then considered some of his other texts, it is clear that, when he is writing in English he conveys more of his personal identity in relation to questions of God, Christianity, and religion in general and that that is also the case for the other works we have briefly considered. That personal identity does not merely project scepticism, unbelief, and derision regarding religious matters, but also conveys the imprint of the religious discourses to which he was exposed in his life in Ireland. Whether it be Bible quotations, excerpts from hymns, conversational gambits of the faithful or erudite theological discussions, this discourse in English works in a way that is not fully rendered in French. Therefore when he is translating into English, his strongly held personal attitudes become accentuated, while when translating into French, it is not possible to convey all the resonances of that world and that identity.

It would be valuable to extend a detailed analysis to the range of Beckett's work, but that is obviously beyond the scope of this chapter. However, what we can say is that Beckett's values and identity matter when he is self-translating, whether his identity is more strongly present, as it is in English, or whether it is more stripped out, as it is in French. The evaluative concepts that come into play in his translations into English as far as religion is concerned are much stronger: emotional intensity, disrespect, a lack of sympathy, and the trivialisation of his subject matter on the one hand, and a sense of nostalgia for and familiarity with religious discourse on the other. Beckett's example demonstrates that evaluative concepts are at the heart of translation.

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14

Vulnerable Values: The Polish *Dom* ('House, Home') in English Translation

Adam Głaz

What and Where Are Values?

If values are 'broad tendenc[ies] to prefer certain states of affairs over others' (Hofstede 2001: 5), one cannot help but ask who does the preferring, what is the range of the 'other' states available, why the preferences are such and such, and what it all means for whoever gets to choose. In Jordan Zlatev's (2009: 179) cognitive semiotic framework, the meaning of a given phenomenon for a given subject (any living organism) is determined by the 'type of world' in which both are embedded, as well as the *value*, or *importance*, of the phenomenon for that subject. If the phenomenon falls outside the boundaries of the subject's world or its value for the subject is nil, the phenomenon will be meaningless for that subject. Thus, values come before meaning; they actually define our world into existence.

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'Our world' is a nature-*cum*-culture continuum, hence Zlatev's (2009) *Semiotic Hierarchy* extends from life, through consciousness and signs, to language. With the human being in the centre, the human understanding of nature is cultural—so there is nothing *un*natural about culture's avenues. I will therefore consider language to be a natural-cultural phenomenon, and will assume that the ever-baffling relationship between language and culture is best captured as a 'paradox of reciprocal dependence' (Bartmiński 2001: 17). Culture, in turn, is not only the sense we make of the world, what we perceive and conceive it to be, but also what we prefer it to be.

Thus, a value is (i) that which is considered good/preferred rather than something else or (ii) the degree to which it is good/preferred. A common thread runs through the understanding of value in axiology, mathematics, logic, economics, and colour studies, detectable in its etymology: the English word comes from Latin *valēre* 'be strong, be well' and was borrowed into Middle English from the Old French nominal use of the feminine past participle of *valoir* 'be worth'[1]—compare the English *valiant* 'brave, heroic, worthy, excellent' or the rather rare *valuta* 'the value of a currency expressed in terms of its rate of exchange with another currency' (dictionary.com).[2] A value, therefore, is that which renders something desirable.

Values are subjectivized, changeable, and contextualized: they are values *for someone*, an individual or a community. They are also systemic, and the systems are structured and hierarchical. Because systems, structures, and hierarchies are communal matters, *cultural values* are of special interest as emergent constructs. Emergent cultural cognition (Sharifian 2014) arises through the impact of the individual on the collective and the collective on the individual. In this approach, cognitive models of what the world appears to be like, as well as patterns for what we would like it to be, are said to emanate from shared, communal experiences—although not necessarily shared by every member of the community. Words carry cultural meanings (Goddard 2015), and these

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[1] All etymologies come from *Online Etymology Dictionary*.
[2] Compare the words for 'currency' in other languages: Croatian *valuta*, Italian *valuta*, Lithuanian *valiuta*, Polish *waluta*, Romanian *valută*, Swedish *valuta*, Ukrainian *валюта*, or even Hungarian *valuta* and Finnish *valuutta*, borrowings from their Indo-European neighbours.

are permeated with cultural values. In fact, some theoreticians (e.g. Krzeszowski 1997) consider valuation an indispensable aspect of conceptualization. The methodology adopted here is to inquire, not into language as a part of culture (since this is obvious), but into culture and its values in language (as in Bartmiński 2009/2012: 10), and specifically in the use of lexis.

In this light, what are some English evaluative concepts and cultural values? Do they inhere in the English language or in the cultures of the various English-speaking peoples? A seasoned translator and translation theorist, such as Lawrence Venuti, evidently struggles with a precise wording for the phenomenon, but at the same time makes a distinction (an implicit one?) between the more cultural and the more linguistic orientation of axiology (Table 14.1).

Far from being a trivial divagation, each of these two positions has a direct bearing on what happens to cultural values in translation. Are they translated (in the sense of 'carried over') along with the language regardless of the culture that is using the language, or do they remain (relatively) unaffected by the process, being inherent in extra-linguistic culture? Moreover, would an inquiry into English cultural values only involve translation *out of* or also *into* English? The former seems unquestionable, the latter perhaps requires some justification. This is what the present study aims to provide.

Table 14.1 Cultural values in Venuti (1995)

Values in culture	Values in language
*English **cultural** values* (p. 132)	*English-**language** values* (pp. 6, 15, 21, 30, 200, 213)
***English** values* (p. 86, three times p. 204)	*Dominant cultural values **in English*** (p. 225)
*Values that prevail/dominate (in) contemporary Anglo-American **culture*** (pp. 36, 118)	
*The academic cultural values that … achieved canonical status in **Anglo-American** literary **culture*** (p. 140)	
*Contemporary **British** values* (p. 34)	
*Values in post-war **American culture*** (p. 225)	

Towards the Translation of *Dom*

To this end, this study brings together: texts, (cultural) values, and evaluative concepts, or vehicles for values.[3] In the present case study, the Polish *dom*, as well as its two most readily used English counterparts, *house* and *home*, can be both values themselves and vehicles for other values. People want (prefer) to have houses and homes—but as much for their own sake as for the sake of the values these stand for: PROTECTION, SECURITY, WARMTH, LOVE, FAMILY, KINSHIP, FEELING AT HOME, IDENTITY, and others, to various degrees and in various configurations.[4]

What happens to *dom* in translation? To see translation as a reconstruction of concepts is a specious idea, for concept X in language A cannot be 'the same' X in language B: it can only be a Y-in-B, that is, relativized to B's conceptual universe. Is, then, translation a transfer of cultures, with texts being, *par excellence*, cultural entities? Certainly not in the simple sense of *trans + ferre*, a carry-over, from A to B, rather, in the sense of Espagne and Werner's (1985) *Kulturtransfer* as *Akkulturation*, a reciprocal influence on and adaptation to cultures. The translator is not a passive participant in the process, a lone sailor unable to navigate a new route amidst the ever powerful ocean currents. On the contrary, just as a sailor subdued into humility in the face of the elements is still able to capitalize on the latter's forces, the translator can be a creative agent exploiting the robust conceptual potential of language(s).

With a fair dose of simplification, the conceptual content activated by the Polish word *dom* (from Latin *domus* 'house', Proto-Indo-European **domo-/*domu-* 'house, household') is activated by two lexemes in the lexical system of English: *house* (usually a building, but sometimes also 'household', from Old English *hūs*, Proto-Germanic **husan*, of unknown

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[3] I prefer the term *vehicle* to Scheler's (1992) *bearer*, if only to avoid operating within specifically Schelerian model.

[4] A case can be made here for a distinction, à la Scheler (1992), between higher spiritual values (HOME and what it stands for) and lower material values (HOUSE). This is a distinction but not a separation: houses are material, but they make up homes, and homes both *are* and *stand for* values—thus arises a chain of 'states of affairs that we prefer', which can only be broken in an arbitrary fashion.

origin) and *home* (usually the place one lives in, my 'own' place on earth, from Old English *hām*, Proto-Germanic **haimaz*, from the Proto-Indo-European root **tkei-* 'settle, dwell, be home').[5] To view the relationship, however, as that between the Polish concept DOM and the English concept HOUSE/HOME, 'split' into two lexemes, would be etic, biased, and ethnocentric. Instead, consider a lesson from Humboldt:

> By the same act whereby he [man] spins language out of himself, he spins himself into it, and every language draws about the people that possess it a circle whence it is possible to exit only by stepping over at once into the circle of another one. (Humboldt 1999 [1836]: 60)

In other words, 'there is no outside to language' (Underhill 2009: 99). The Polish DOM is not the English HOUSE + HOME, but each of the concepts DOM, HOUSE, HOME (as well as FLAT, APARTMENT, SHELTER, MANSION, COTTAGE, HUT, HOMELAND, etc.) is a uniquely and loosely demarcated region of conceptual space. Their 'equivalence', interlingual 'contiguity', or 'contingence' can only be partial by definition.[6]

We thus proceed to consider what happens to values when we 'exit the circle' of one language (Polish, with its DOM) and 'step over', through translation, into that of another (English, with HOUSE and HOME). What values transpire in the English texts under the pressure of the English lexical system, its network of associations, and its cultural underpinnings? A particularly fertile ground for investigation in this respect is when houses and homes are the most vulnerable, when political upheavals lead to social precariousness, emotional insecurity, and identity crises. Here, this context is the post–World War II Poland, as portrayed in three books: Jerzy Andrzejewski's *Ashes and Diamonds* (Pol. *Popiół i diament*), Olga Tokarczuk's *House of Day, House of Night* (Pol. *Dom dzienny, dom nocny*), and Paweł Huelle's *Moving House. Stories* (Pol. *Opowiadania na czas przeprowadzki*).

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[5] A relatively recent tendency for *home* to mean 'a private house or residence considered merely as a building' (*Oxford English Dictionary* 2015) is puzzling. The slogan *homes for sale* can be a marketing strategy encouraging prospective buyers to purchase something more and better than a 'mere' building.

[6] This also happens across varieties of English; compare *homely* 'simple in a way that makes you feel comfortable' in British English (American English *homey*) versus the same word meaning 'not very attractive' in American English (*LDOCE* 2005).

Andrzejewski's *Ashes and Diamonds* was first published in 1948 and with revisions several times afterwards (the 1974 edition is used here). It was translated into English by D.J. Welsh and first appeared in London in 1962 (here: Andrzejewski 1991, henceforth *A&D*). This heavily ideological novel is set in the provincial Polish town of Ostrowiec and deals with communists who introduce the new political system, with anti-communist freedom-fighters, with petty, opportunistic political activists, and with survivors of concentration camps, trying to come to terms with their past. Above all, the book involves people on the threshold of adulthood, torn between loyalty to their ideals (freedom, political independence), earthly needs, emotions, and desires (love, family, education), and their private ambitions (of power, authority, and dominance). The book was criticized for contradictory reasons: its first 1948 edition for the allegedly insufficient tribute it paid to the communist authorities (hence, it was revised for subsequent editions), and later, in the 1980s and 1990s, for omitting to mention the violence and abuse perpetrated by the communists. Despite these shortcomings, the book's symbolism of DOM is both subtle and sophisticated: after World War II the Polish DOM is in ruins (i) as the seriously damaged house of the main protagonists (the Kossecki family); (ii) in terms of an ideological rift between the family members: Antony Kossecki, his wife, Alicja, their sons Alek and Andrew; (iii) as the ruined city of Ostrowiec, struggling to bounce back to life; and (iv) as the homeland, suffering from war-inflicted wounds.

Tokarczuk's *House of Day, House of Night* appeared in 1998 (here: 2nd edn, Tokarczuk 2005). It was translated into English by Antonia Lloyd-Jones, the first English edition appearing in 2002 (here: Tokarczuk 2003, henceforth *HD-HN*). The book is set in the hilly region of the Polish-Czech borderland. After 1945, when the Polish borders moved westwards, '[m]any Polish citizens were transported from the land … lost to the east (annexed by the USSR) and resettled … to the west, where they were given the homes and property of evacuated Germans' (*HD-HN*, front matter). The book is an intricate manifold of memories, recollections, and visions from various epochs, with the actual area and its landscape as the uniting factor. The first-person female narrator shares her life with and listens to stories told by her neighbour, Marta the wigmaker. Violence, depression, alcoholism, personal degradation, and death are interwoven with love, passion, devotion, sacrifice, and attention

to detail in a peculiar patchwork of images. We are taken on journeys inside houses, a pretext for delving into one's imagination and innermost anxieties. The eternal and timeless meet with the painfully authentic and actual. Day and night, darkness and light, life and death all contribute to a metaphorical portrayal of human existence in the face of history's decrees. As a whole, the book is a peculiar affirmation of life, in its multifarious vicissitudes, as well as of houses and homes, and the impact they have on individuals and whole communities.

The third book, Paweł Huelle's *Moving House. Stories*, was first released in Polish in 1991 (Huelle 1991). Its English translation by Michael Kandel appeared in 1995 (Huelle 1995, henceforth *MH*). Somewhat similarly to Tokarczuk's *HD-HN*, it is set in an area where, with some simplification, post-war migrations involved Germans moving out of their homes and Poles moving in, the two sides being as much enemies as victims of political forces beyond their control. This time, however, it is the northern Polish city of Gdańsk and the neighbouring region of Kashubia. The first-person narrator, first a boy, then a teenager, finally a young adult, recalls the events of his life that had set him in potent and emotionally disquieting relationships with his family, cousins, or neighbours. Throughout the book, the rational and the mysterious are never strictly separated. Houses, homes, people, their hopes, feelings, and beliefs are all in a state of flux.

In all three books, the Polish DOM activates meanings and carries values at various levels, concentrically extending from the physical location (a house), through one's family, region, or town, to the whole country—and those can also be found in the books' English translations (Fig. 14.1).

This figure[7] does not pretend to be a portrayal of the Polish concept as such but to show the various elements identifiable, to various degrees, in the translations of three novels. For example, the outmost layer (HOMELAND) is rather conspicuous in Andrzejewski's *A&D*, detectable in Huelle's *MH*, and at best only implied in Tokarczuk's *HD-HN*. In contrast, despite its mystical aura, the latter book is very much focused on the innermost layer, the physicality of houses.

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[7] The concentric arrangement presented here is hardly original; compare Danaher (2015, chapter 4) for a discussion of Václav Havel's conception of the Czech *domov* 'home' in terms of circles (*kruhy/vrstvy domova*), a notion Havel borrowed from the philosopher Jan Patočka.

BUILDING, HOUSE

FAMILY

TOWN / REGION (*HEIMAT*)

HOMELAND

Fig. 14.1 The Polish DOM and its English renderings in Andrzejewski's A&D, Tokarczuk's HD-HN, and Huelle's MH

The analysis will proceed through certain conceptual-evaluative areas associated with the English HOUSE and HOME. First, HOUSE as a value will be considered (as a place to live and as a place that is 'in' vs. the 'out' of the world). Then, HOUSE and HOME will be focused on as identity-shapers, through two kinds of opposition: 'in-out' and 'me-others'/'us-them'. Next, attention will be devoted to HOME as a vehicle for values and to HOME as homeland. The final section of the analysis will deal with gaps and omissions in the translations of the three books.

The Polish *Dom* in English Translation: An Analysis

HOUSE as a Value

On a basic level, a *house* is a building, a physical shelter—and as such it is a 'preferred state'. When the translator follows this logic, the actual noun *shelter* can be used as a textual equivalent of *dom*:

(1) *Before they could reach the nearest* **shelter** [Pol. *dom*], *they had been thoroughly soaked.* (*A&D*: 100)

But people want to own houses for reasons more complex than this.

HOUSE as a Place to Live

People's desire to own houses, their readiness to make sacrifices to this end, is indisputable. But surprisingly, the value of being a house owner seems sometimes to influence the translator's decision in unexpected ways:

> (2) *Those who couldn't afford a **house** [dom] of their own rented **one** [miesz-kanie 'flat']. There they could live in a **house**, admittedly more expensive than those in the town, but at least modern and in a better neighbourhood than the crowded, dusty, ugly streets of Ostrowiec itself.* (A&D: 15)

and

> (3) *Swallowed up in Warsaw, Andrew reappeared in the former Jewish **house** [mieszkanie 'flat'].* (A&D: 21)

It is not clear why *flat* in the English translation is rendered as *house*. Even if Polish post–World War II reality may be somewhat exotic to American readers (but not really to English ones), the decision seems to be dictated by houses ranking higher than flats among the category of 'objects desired'—a mere hypothesis perhaps, but as good as any other. Through this decision, the translator has become not a mediator of cultures but a protector of the target-language culture in its shape familiar to the translation's readership.

HOUSE as a Place 'in' Versus the World 'out'

Houses, homes, hometowns, and homelands all need boundaries.[8] Houses, even nomadic tents, need walls to exist: it is the walls that institute a contrast between the 'in' of the house and the 'out' of beyond:

> (4) *Frost had corroded the walls of the house, which were now sweating like a sick man. That day Marta went **outside** [przed dom 'in front of the house'] as well.* (HD-HN: 281)

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[8] Chapter 2 by Underhill in this volume offers more on boundaries, borders, and barriers.

(5) *He went* ***outside*** [*przed dom* 'in front of the house']. (*HD-HN*: 180)
(6) *Marta went back* ***inside*** [*do domu* 'into the house'] *because the cold had returned back to her body.* (*HD-HN*: 282)

In (4) to (6) the 'in-out'/'inside-outside' contrast is sufficient; in some others direct reference to the house is made:

(7) *During the heat wave Marta sat* ***outside her house*** [*przed domem* 'in front of her house'] *in the sun all afternoon.* (*HD-HN*: 175)

This is the house-as-the-centre perspective, with the person being 'outside', but the same person-to-house configuration can be construed from an external perspective through a more literal rendering of the Polish into English:

(8) *Mr. Gorzki often slept on a rickety bench* ***in front of his house*** [*przed domem*]*, and that happened on Sundays, the people coming back from church would point their fingers at him and call him a Freemason.* (*MH*: 13–14)

This opposition suggests a positive evaluation of house (home?) and a negative evaluation of 'the rest' (cf. *my house/home is my castle*). The reverse, however, is by no means unthinkable: the home may be overwhelming and boring, the outside world is exciting. Houses and homes can in fact be prisons (cf. *house/home arrest*), spaces that confine a person from the fullness of life 'out' and 'away'.[9] And what if the place of one's forced confinement is a backyard shed, especially if one has lived there for the first five years of one's life, as in Emma Donoghue's (2010) novel *Room*? The 'in', 'out', and 'away' of the confinement-as-home and confinement-as-prison are then overlaid with a multitude of poignant emotions and distinctively personal reactions.

The boundaries, however, need not be dividing lines, but may function as transition zones between the 'in' and 'out', the familiar and the unknown, the home as our internal world and the world that we domesticate:

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[9] For some elaboration, see Underhill (2015).

(9) *‘enough of this staying **indoors** [w domu* “at home/in the house”]. *I need a bit of fresh air’.* (*A&D*: 229)

And a little further:

(10) *Meanwhile Kossecki opened the front door and **went out** [przed dom* ‘in front of the house’]. (*A&D*: 229)

The basic ‘in-out’/‘inside-outside’ contrast here is literal but also symbolic—compare the reference to fresh air. As the story develops, the text’s conceptual structure grows richer:

(11) *He had stood in front of a mirror **before leaving home** [przed wyjściem z domu* ‘before going out/outside’] *in his hat and overcoat and had seen himself for the first time as he had been before the camp.* (*A&D*: 231)

‘Leaving home’ is a more serious matter than ‘going out’. In (10), it may foreshadow the protagonist’s fate: Judge Kossecki is turned in to the security service for cooperation with the Nazis at the Gross-Rosen concentration camp and never returns home. It is open to speculation whether the translator’s decision would have been different had he used the first 1948 edition of the novel, in which Kossecki is let go and walks back home, stopping for a coffee on the way.

The next example illustrates the same contrast:

(12) *‘You don’t have to **leave home** [wychodzić z domu* “go out/outside”] *to know the world,’ said Marta suddenly, as we were shelling peas on the steps **in front of her house.** [przed jej domem].* (*HD-HN*: 42)

‘Leave home’ is vague here, but is likely a major move contrasted with mundane everyday activities that take place ‘in front of the house’.

Interestingly, the two need not be contrasted but coordinated:

(13) *He left **the family home** [dom rodzinny] – a damp and gloomy **house** [kamieniczka* ‘tenement house’] *with a garden and bee-hives at the back – at the age of thirteen.* (*A&D*: 16–17)

The use of dashes for the embedded phrase harmonizes *home* and *house* into a complex but coherent 'home leaving' image, with its physical and social aspects.[10]

HOUSE and HOME as Identity-Shapers

Identity Through the 'in-out' Contrast

The 'in-out' physical contrast obviously translates into more abstract, psychological, and social domains, on which translators often capitalize by using *home* rather than *house*, even if the latter is suggested through references to the building's physical features:

(14) *There are some tangential connections between religion and* **roofs** [*dach domu* 'the roof of the house']. ... *[A] roof, like a religion, is the crowning point that closes off an area, dividing it from the rest of space, from the sky, from the height and soaring immensity of the world. Thanks to religion we can live normally and not get upset by any kind of infinity, which otherwise would be beyond endurance; while thanks to roofs we can hide safely* **at home** [*w domu*] *from the wind, rain and cosmic radiation. It's something like ... dividing yourself off, escaping into a safe and familiar area.* (*HD-HN*: 206–207)

The inside of the house stands for the protected and the familiar, while the outside is ominous and hostile. The house-and-home is thus the place where a person's identity is born, unfolds, and matures, but only if undisturbed by external pressures, only if one does not need to adapt to the circumstances that can lead to insincerity in thinking or behaviour:

(15) *When you're travelling you have to take care of yourself in order to get by, you have to keep an eye on yourself and your place in the world. ... When you're* **at home** [*we własnym domu* 'at one's own place'] *you simply are, you don't have to struggle with anything or achieve anything. You don't have to worry about railway connections and timetables, you don't need to experience any*

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[10] On leaving home compare Part VI of Rowles and Chaudhury (2005), esp. Chap. 19 by the editors.

thrills or disappointments. You can put yourself to one side – and that's when you see the most. (*HD-HN*: 43)

But if homes can be cradles of identity, they can also be limiting spaces detrimental to one's true self:

(16) **At home** [*w swoim domu* 'at her place'] *Krysia was quite important; she earned money and did the shopping, carrying it home in bags her mother had made. She had her own room in the attic, with a sofa bed and a wardrobe. But only at the bank did she really start to come into her own.* (*HD-HN*: 30)

And more dramatically:

(17) *The **house** [dom] was dark, silent and chilly. The office was bright, heated and full of people. There he buzzed with energy, spoke fast and loud, walked with a spring in his step and knew what he wanted. **At home** [w domu] he slowed down, and everything else with it; there his belly sagged, his feet froze and his voice died down. There was no one to talk to or give instructions to. The **border between home and office** [między domem a biurem] ran somewhere across the marketplace, along the lines between the flagstones, and each day he had to cross it twice.* (*HD-HN*: 266–267)

As the passage develops, the initial house versus office opposition gives way to one between home and office. The virtuality of the border across the market place does not nullify its very real emotional and psychological consequences.

Which is thus one's 'real' identity-shaper? The 'in' region (home, house, home-*cum*-house) or the 'out' region (office)? Which of these is the true vehicle for ONE'S REAL SELF? The same novel offers alternative ways of construing this aspect and the English partitioning of conceptual and evaluative space with its *house* versus *home* distinction allows for nuances such as those to be made more explicit.

Identity Through the 'Me-Others'/'Us-Them' Contrasts

Yet, the 'in-out' contrast seems to derive from the more fundamental oppositions of 'me' versus 'others' (individualistic) or 'us' versus 'them'

(collective). 'In' is not a 'preferred state' for its own sake but because it implies 'where I am and want to be' (individualistic) or 'together with my folk' (collective). By analogy, 'out' reduces, respectively, to 'where I am not and don't want to be' or 'away from my folk'. Prototypically, the 'in' of the house and home is friendly, familiar, and accepted, the 'out' is foreign, hostile, and ominous—but as we have seen, the reverse is hardly preposterous. The 'topography' of the opposition is thus secondary; it is the social and emotional aspects that produce the valuations (Fig. 14.2).

In (18) below, the first element of the 'us-them' opposition translates into 'in' (inside the house, at home), while in (19) the configuration is reversed: the 'me' in 'me/us' translates into 'outside'. In (18), a married couple discuss the man's sister, recently returned from a concentration camp, whom they have temporarily put up:

(18) *'You ought to talk it over sensibly with Irena and persuade her to go into hospital. It'd be better for her and for us too.'*

'For us perhaps, but not for her. She's only been back a week from the camp, she hasn't anyone but us… Don't you realize what it's like nowadays in hospitals?'

…

*'What about our **house** [u nas 'at our place']. What's it like at **home** [u nas]?'*
'At least it's not a hospital'. (*A&D*: 101)

Both the Polish original and the English translation evoke associations with (i) living conditions and (ii) security and family warmth—but they do it differently. There is no *dom* in the Polish, but only *u nas*, 'at our place', which activates the more basic 'us-them' opposition—thanks to

individualistic   ME-OTHERS

                                    } IN-OUT / OUT-IN

collective   US-THEM

Fig. 14.2 The 'in-out' and 'out-in' of HOUSE and HOME derived from the (ME-OTHERS and US-THEM) oppositions

its repetition, the translator can use both *house* and *home* and thus grant us access to a complex conceptual network that extends over both areas.[11]

Contrast this with (19) below, which shows a couple that make up a family and a 'home between them', regardless of the absence of a confined and defined space that they could consider 'home' (the Polish original has *dom* in every instance):

> (19) *When he returned to his city after the war and found a fiancée, he bought her a small bunch of roses with the last of his money and said, "Marry me–but first I'll build a **house**." … That very afternoon the great New York crash began.… A week before his wedding Grandpa Antoni had nothing left but five suitcases stuffed with paper money. … [A]nd on his wedding day Grandpa Antoni was left with no consignment warehouse, no **house**, and no new furniture. … So he took the money to a gardener, asked him to make a fine bouquet of roses in exchange for the lot of it, and after hurriedly jotting down a farewell note, he sent them by courier to his fiancée. Then he went for one last time to the **house** that had never been their **home**. … As he was putting the barrel to his temple, sliding his fore-finger across the cold trigger, he suddenly heard a voice. "Antoni, for the fear of God! Is your life worth less then paper money?" It was his fiancée. … And although they never had their own **home** or warehouse again, from then on … every year on the anniversary of that day, in remembrance of his wedding and his rescue, … he bought his wife a bouquet of roses.* (*MH*: 169–171)

What defines the lives of the couple in the story is a relationship between them in the 'out', even in the absence of an 'in'. Despite never having a home, they can hardly be described as truly *homeless*—they do achieve the fullness of life, defined relative to the 'out', rather than 'in'.

Home as a Vehicle for Values

Homes are 'preferred states' because they stand for so many other values: FAMILY, WARMTH, SECURITY, EMOTIONAL/PSYCHOLOGICAL STABILITY, LOVE, BEING AT ONE'S OWN PLACE, and others. We view houses as homes only inasmuch as these

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[11] Compare Rapoport (2005) on the use of *home* and *place* in late life.

allow us to manoeuvre between the purely physical and the psychological, emotional, and evaluative. For instance, example (20) is the final paragraph of Tokarczuk's poetic passage about 'a mansion inside me', largely a description of the physical features of the imaginary mansion within her body (in the Polish, *dom* in both instances):

(20) *I told Marta that each of us has two **homes** – one actual **home** with a fixed location in time and space, and a second that is infinite, with no address and no chance of being immortalized in architectural plans – and that we live in both of them simultaneously.* (*HD-HN*: 204)

The protagonist of another story in Tokarczuk's idiosyncratic medley, after a series of particularly dramatic experiences, can finally enjoy, in his apartment building flat, the home he had hardly had:

(21) *What luxury, what bliss, to be sitting in his nice cool **home** [dom], drinking tea, nibbling fruit tart and reading.* (*HD-HN*: 184)

It is a description of physical space (*cool*) with its material attributes (food and drink), but it is the ambiance of the place that counts. That ambiance evolves from the physicalities but does not reduce to them.

Similarly in (22), a single use of *home* stands out against the backdrop of a few instances of *house* (in the Polish, *dom* in each instance):

(22) *They came here just after the war, as evacuees from the east. They fell in love – amid empty **houses** and empty streets, their empty hearts were ready for love.*

*They got married two months after meeting and were allocated a **house**, into which they moved furniture from some abandoned flats near the market place – a mahogany sideboard decorated with little turrets, huge still-lifes in heavy frames, a desk full of papers and photographs that she used to light the fire, and some leather chairs with worn, shiny arms. Both of them had always dreamed of such a **home**; it had a narrow stairwell lit by colourful stained-glass panels in the front door, a solid staircase with a handrail, a hall full of mirrors too huge to have been looted, a living room with a veranda and sliding doors, and a large cool kitchen with tiled walls.*

> *In the afternoons they went to neglected gardens and dug up flowers they couldn't name. They planted them in borders around their **house** like fortifications.* (*HD-HN*: 249–250)

This is a well-defined space (cf. the last sentence), and it is the physical items that define it: flowers, furniture, a staircase, a handrail. But it only acquires its fullness when it becomes a *home* of the couple's dreams.

HOME may carry values even if it remains unmentioned, through mere juxtaposition with HOUSE. In Andrzejewski's *A&D*, a rather irritated Antony Kossecki says to his wife, Alicja:

(23) *'We're all alive, we've got our **house** [*dom*] back,' and he added with a touch of irony: 'What more do you want?'* (*A&D*: 34)

What more can Alicja want? Clearly, she can want a *home*! The use of *house* rather than *home* allows for an interpretation that is missing from the original Polish: what is it that we've got back? A mere house maybe, but not a home. The family only have a place to live but have not regained their 'feeling-at-home' ambiance; their homeland is falling apart, being first ripped in two by the Nazis and the Stalinists, now being turned into a satellite state dependent on the Soviet Union. Judge Kossecki's own life is headed for collapse too—very soon he will be handed over to the security services (cf. e.g. [11] above). His materialism and his camp experience have stripped him of home: he has become a soulless being, unable to engage in intimate relationships and actually evading the home that his wife seeks and attempts to make. Kossecki is being rational, his wife is emotional and spiritual, and—as Max Scheler persuasively argued (e.g. Chap. 10 of Scheler 1992)—values are 'felt'.

Here is another fragment that capitalizes on the contrast between HOUSE and unmentioned HOME:

(24) *Because the world … wasn't perfect, her father condemned it all; wherever he looked, what he saw was dusty, grimy, and full of cracks like the ones in the walls of **the house they lived in*** [*ściana ich domu* 'the wall of their house'] *before they moved to the new housing development. Mina could remember watching a bulldozer smash walls and red roof.* (*MH*: 230–231)

It is a case of intentional estrangement, not only through the use of (cold and aloof) *house* versus (warm and familiar) *home*—for indeed, cracks in the walls do suggest a house rather than a home—but also through the use of the relative clause in *the house they lived in*, instead of the possessive adjective *their* (Pol. *ich*).

HOME as Homeland

DOM as homeland is the outermost layer in Fig. 14.1, although certainly it is not the broadest imaginable: *dom* can be Europe, the world, or possibly the universe, and one wonders if, given its scope, it would unequivocally match with *home*.[12] In the example below, what in Polish is expressed as the common home (*wspólny dom*) is rendered in English as *common homeland*:

(25) *Adenauer, Bismarck, Frederick–they all shared the same dream, the dream of German unification. And every time that dream became a reality, every time the Germans woke up* **in a common homeland** [*we wspólnym domu* 'in a common home/house']*, it was always too late.* (*MH*: 122–123)

Associations with the Czech national anthem *Kde domov můj?* ('Where is my home/homeland?') are irresistible.

The outward advance from the innermost to the outermost layer of DOM/HOME can sometimes be implicit, indirectly coded, and symbolic. Consider the following:

(26) *Mrs. Kossecki knew the mutilations of* **her home** [*dom*] *by heart. The water-pipes had burst during the heaviest frost, there was no glass for the win-*

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[12] The English HOME does extend onto the planet Earth—as a precious and fragile ball, with no racial, social, or political boundaries, in a huge and potentially dangerous universe. The feeling is called 'the overview effect' and has often been experienced by astronauts (White 1987). The English translation of Pope Francis' recent encyclical (Francis 2015) contains the frequently used phrase *our common home* (i.e. the planet Earth jeopardized by the irresponsible exploitation by humans). HOME can also be heaven; compare John 14,2, which for the Greek *οἰκία* uses *house* in a great majority of translations, but also *home* in a handful, for example 'There is more than enough room in my Father's home' (New Living Translation).

*dows, the unheated walls were spongy with damp and a number of little repairs needed attention. The roof leaked and two upstairs rooms were quite spoiled. This once carefully-tended **house** [dom] looked deplorable with its shell scars, its plank-covered windows and its gaping roof.*

…

*She walked to the back of the **house** [dom] and knocked at the kitchen door. … Mrs. Kossecki kept meaning to have more front-door keys made; there were only two and the boys had both. (A&D: 23)*

In the last two instances, *dom* is rendered as the unsurprising *house*, but in the first it is rendered as *home*, despite references to the wartime destruction of the building! This is in fact an informed choice: the building is personified, *mutilated* (but recall example [4]: *Frost had corroded the walls of the house, which were now sweating like a sick man*; *HD-HN*: 281). Moreover, in the context of the whole novel, we know that the mutilations also affect the home as the family, the protagonists' hometown, as well as their homeland. Note the subtle symbolic play at the end that contributes to and corroborates this interpretation: the house keys are in the control of the Kosseckis' sons, but metaphorically these are also keys to their home, as well as to the lives of the people around them. The decisions of Alek, Andrzej, and their peers in the post-war period are decisive for the future of their household, their hometown, and their homeland.

Gaps, Omissions, and Other Mismatches

Two other phenomena worthy of attention are: (i) when *house/home* appears in the English translation without *dom* in the Polish original, (ii) when the Polish *dom* is not rendered in English in any specific way or when the relevant fragment of the Polish text is omitted.

As for (i), recall example (18), with the intricate conceptual-axiological play involved. Another instance is the very title of Huelle's *Opowiadania na czas przeprowadzki* (note the absence of *dom*), rendered as *Moving House. Stories*. This, however, results from the nature of the lexical systems of the two languages and whatever differences arise in the respective linguistic worldviews, they operate at the level of Humboldt's *Weltansicht*, rather than resulting from the translator's idiosyncratic decisions.

Examples of (ii), in turn, have very much to do with the translator's decision. Says Alicja Kossecka in Andrzejewski's *A&D*:

(27) *I know women who don't worry are better off* [omission: *Ani mężem, ani dziećmi, ani **domem**.* 'Neither about their husband, nor children, nor houses/homes.']*, but I couldn't be like that.* (*A&D*: 77)

Alicja worries about everything: her husband, her home (the people in it), as well as their ruined house. However, the use of either *house* or *home* would automatically bar the other from entering the stage, while the use of both would be stylistically awkward. For Alicja, the whole of the household is a value or a set of values; therefore, it is perhaps preferable to impoverish the English translation by omitting *dom* altogether than to produce a misinterpreted, skewed version.[13]

A rather different effect arises in (28):

(28) *There was a scene … where the hero finds the other guy's toiletries in the bathroom cupboard* [omission: *jej **domu** (bo **dom** był jej)* 'in her house (for the house was hers)'] *… and in the end he starts brushing his teeth with the other man's brush, spraying himself with his aftershave, and putting on his pyjamas, and the wife urges him to make love to her the same way as the other man did.* (*HD-HN*: 161)

What is lost through the omission is not only the notion of possession or ownership of the house; more important is the notion of the house as the woman's dominion, her desire to control it to the extent of demanding sexual submission from her husband. The Polish text gives the translator an opportunity to link HOUSE, HOME, OWNERSHIP, POWER, and DOMINANCE in an intermeshed network of crisscrossing dependencies—an opportunity largely lost.

Equally baffling is the translator's (editor's?) decision to omit a rather longish passage in the following:

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[13] A somewhat different case of the translator falling victim to the unscrupulous requirements of the target-language's lexical system is the Czech *svědomí* as understood by Havel versus its English counterpart *conscience* (Danaher 2013).

(29) *it's hard to think about anything properly in Marta's **house** [dom]; it's like a sponge that absorbs a thought before it has a chance to emerge.* (*HD-HN*: 291) [omission: *It offers nothing in return, no promises, no deceptions, it holds no future within itself and turns the past into objects. Marta's **house** [dom] is like her: it knows nothing, not God, not its creation, not even itself; it doesn't want to know anything about the world. It only contains one moment, one 'now', huge, drawn-out in all directions, overwhelming, unbearable.* (Tokarczuk 2005: 388, transl. A.G.)]

The house here is a physical structure but portrayed as parallel to a human being. In this sense, the passage (one of the final pages of the book) is a synthetic encapsulation of Tokarczuk's highways and byways: the world of houses that do or do not double as homes, that subjugate humans to their invisible but potent forces, that illuminate people's lives or enshroud them with histories and enigmas. In doing so, Tokarczuk seems to evolve Elizabeth Bowen's notion of *unheimliche* houses (cf. Lytovka 2014); it is only regrettable that the English reader is not given the full chance to invoke and entertain this comparison.

Conclusion

Values, language, and communities interconnect in intricate ways: we share values because we live and work together and we want to live and work with those whose values we endorse. Words, concepts, and texts (all of them cultural entities) operate in concert in order to bring these values out.

When houses and homes are at their most vulnerable, so are the values they accommodate. English translators of three Polish novels set in a disquieted, harsh post–World War II context, are forced to interpret the Polish DOM with reference to an array of factors: the structure of the actual text, the cultural background and its textual manifestations, and the symbolism invoked by the Polish originals. Text structure may involve the use of synonyms (example [13]) or repetition (e.g. [18]), which allows the translator to use both *house* and *home* for a richer rendering. Cultural background may result in rendering the Polish *dom* as

homeland, as in example (25). Finally, examples of symbolism include the physical but also the social 'in-out'/'inside-outside' contrast (in [9]–[11]), or the portrayal of a building as both a house and the lives of its people (e.g. [26]). The emergence of values from the English translations is thus a consequence of an interplay of the lexical systems of the two languages, textual tensions, as well as cultural and symbolic conceptualizations. But obviously, the contexts analysed in this chapter are mere scratches on the conceptual, cultural, and axiological surface of language use.

In many cases, the English lexical system forces the translator to make interpretive decisions absent from the Polish original, to profile the emergent conceptualizations and valuations with greater precision. Such is the case with the five instances of *dom* in example (19), three of which are rendered as *house*, two as *home*, or the four instances in (22), with the *house*-to-*home* proportion being three-to-one. The translator has at his/her disposal a set of fine-tuned instruments, perhaps more accurate than those available to the Polish author, and so the English carvings in conceptual space can as a result be more discriminating.

At the same time, however, values inherent in the Polish DOM hardly disappear, not only because the Polish and English value systems are not radically different, but because—and this is an obvious observation—values inhere not only in lexis but also in texts, in the time and space of the original, and in the broad thematic domain that the original frames for both its readers and translators.

Probably all values are vulnerable (which is one of the reasons why they are cherished), and in some contexts they are especially vulnerable. Houses and homes, as values, and along with the values they stand for, are jeopardized and destroyed whenever war machinery trundles through a territory, leaving it scarred and unbalanced. The three Polish books portray, in different ways, the efforts of those affected to restore balance to their houses, homes, and lives. The Polish authors and the English translators steer their readers through the emerging networks of crisscrossing relationships and nonobvious connotations, to different, even if not radically different, axiologically loaded linguistic worldviews. By and large, the authors and translators may be navigating a common sea and descrying the same shores, but they definitely mark up distinct seaways and moor their boats at different axiological harbours.

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15

Smart Dreamers: Translation and the Culture of Speculative Fiction

Paulina Drewniak

Research Questions

This chapter offers a look at translation-centric exploration of fan culture. Using both translation studies sources and the findings of contemporary media and fan studies (themselves originating from the study of fantasy and science fiction), I will show how the worship of knowledge, a fondness for intense communal activities, and embracing grassroots activism have helped spread the genres across the world. I will also look at how fan values intersect with other aspects of modernity, particularly scientism, technocracy, and meritocracy. Finally, following Even-Zohar's observation that transfer brings transformation, I will examine the transformations occurring when Western genre formulae meet local identities. Does the spread of American popular culture also mean the imposition of American or Western values?

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The Topic of the Conversation

My first experience with speculative fiction came in the form of a little book on my father's shelf. The book was pocket sized, with a black end cover and a cheerful picture on the front: a red, bulky shell of a spaceship overgrown by the jungle, and a small, weird, cat-like creature sitting on top of it, looking at me with curious eyes. The picture looked both arcane and inviting in a way that fuels the imagination. Naturally, I devoured the book, and though my perception of the story changed over the years, it has nevertheless remained a fond memory.

It wasn't until years later that I learned that the existence of this little book was the result of a value-driven, missionary effort of certain people who called themselves 'the fandom'. The book had been translated from English and published in *Biblioteka Fantastyki* (The Library of the Fantastic), a series devoted to promoting science fiction and fantasy— that is, variants of what is now called speculative fiction—in the Polish cultural space.

Even later, doing research in translation studies, I dug a little deeper into translations of this kind of literature, and made a curious discovery. Nearly everywhere I looked, I found the same pattern: in non-English-speaking countries speculative fiction always appeared as a clearly Anglophone phenomenon, suddenly, in bulk, and most importantly thanks to the conscious effort of dedicated fans. Translations of texts were also usually accompanied by what Jean-Marc Gouanvic calls 'the translation of institutional structures' of the fandom, most notably dedicated magazines, publishing houses and series, fan clubs and societies, and the convention movement (1997: 125). People involved in those enterprises tended to display an unusual level of dedication. Through personal engagement and volunteer work, they brought the genres they loved into the cultural spaces they inhabited, often leaving a lasting imprint.

This chapter seeks to explore the complex relationship between the fan cultures of speculative genres, and the translation of these genres around the world. I will approach fandom as a community united around shared values, and show how these values manifest themselves in translation

understood in threefold fashion: (1) sociologically, as a process of cultural importation; (2) textually, as choices translators make; and (3) culturally, as transformations occurring thanks to the presence of a new content in a given space, sometimes resulting in the appearance of hybrid works in which a foreign genre's formula is employed to re-imagine a community. My tentative proposition is that the values of fan culture are predominantly KNOWLEDGE and IMAGINATION, with an admixture of certain specifically American concepts and attitudes such as the frontier mentality, democracy, and meritocracy.

Recently, fan cultures have attracted more and more scholarly attention, especially in reception and media studies. However, since we are dealing with a community that is very much alive, I will focus less on academic sources and more on first-hand testimony coming from magazines, authors, bloggers, and various fan gurus. My point of departure will be the phenomena occurring between Polish and English, and the relationship between Polish and Anglo-American fandom as manifested in translation. However, I will also make excursions into other cultural spaces where similar mechanisms can be found.

A Brief History of the Fan Movement

'Speculative fiction' is an umbrella term for modern genres of the fantastic spectrum, most notably science fiction, fantasy, and horror. By now, these genres and their various offshoots have become household names, especially in popular culture. Few people, however, have been aware of the accompanying subculture calling itself *the fandom*. In the narrow sense of the word, the fandom is an organized network of dedicated science fiction and fantasy societies, publishing houses, online portals, and the convention movement. In the broad sense, it is the entirety of the modern *geek/nerd culture*, encompassing not only the oldest 'core' of volunteer-based fantasy and science fiction (F&SF) fan organizations, but also a number of sub-fandoms and communities (both offline and online) that have grown from it, including media fans (interested predominantly in the fantastic in

film and television), gamers (video games, tabletop RPGs, battle games, board games), cosplayers,[1] LARPers,[2] mediaeval re-enactment groups, or indeed any combination of these. Most importantly, the roots of this fan culture rest firmly in American soil; the community has formed organically in American society, around American works of fiction.

The origins of the (SF) fandom are usually traced back to Hugo Gernsback and his *Amazing Stories* (a print magazine since 1926). Fascinated with the works of Verne, Poe, and Wells, Gernsback started the first magazine in America devoted to what he dubbed 'scientifiction':

> He encouraged readers to send in letters, and published the extensive commentary of devoted readers in the 'Letter Columns'. The printed letters included mailing addresses, and fans began to communicate directly with each other, to meet, to create fan clubs and their own magazines (fan magazines, or fanzines, usually abbreviated as zines), and to organize conventions (cons). (Reid 2010: 211)

The first worldwide meeting of fans, later called Worldcon, was held in New York in 1939. With the establishment of the World Science Fiction Society, the fandom became more than a group of enthusiasts. It became an *institution*.

Subsequent decades brought further milestones. In the late 1950s American science fiction fandom discovered Tolkien. The 1960s brought a widespread recognition of his works as well as those of Lewis, Le Guin, and others, and saw the 'explosion of genre fantasy' (James 2012), along with science fiction-themed television and film, both of a cerebral kind (Kubrick's *2001: A Space Odyssey* in 1968) and a popular, 'space opera' format (*Star Trek: The Original Series* 1966–1969). In the 1970s, the trend culminated in *Star Wars* (1977). In each medium, offshoots and variants emerged, leading to the formation of new genres and subgenres of popular fantastic fiction. What is more, the fantastic crossed into performative spaces. In 1974, Gary Gygax published the game manual for arguably the first tabletop role-playing game, called *Dungeons & Dragons*

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[1] Costume play—dressing up as one's favourite fictional character.

[2] Live Action Roleplay.

(D&D). Developed from miniature war games, D&D in turn led to the development of tabletop games—an addictive mixture of storytelling, board games, and improvised theatre—and later to the computerized variant, the computer role-playing games. With the arrival of PCs and console gaming systems in the 1980s, a pathway to fully immersive virtual worlds was opened.

The fandom went all the way from ghettoization to globalization. Initially a niche subculture, it grew over the years, and eventually took over global popular culture. Today the community is vast, so much so that the affinity between its subsets is not always obvious. Nevertheless, there is still a huge overlap between certain groups (e.g. tabletop and computer gamers, fantasy and sci-fi readers, etc.), and their members migrate freely between various related forms of entertainment. In short, it is still one extended geek family. There are also family resemblances: fans of speculative fiction do share a certain mindset or a worldview, the most important part of which is the belief that genres or media they enjoy are exceptional and worthy of special attention. Overall, this has created a whole culture of speculative fiction. I argue that, like any other culture, fan culture is value-driven. And, as it turns out, this has a huge impact on translation—both the process and the product.

American Values and the Translation of American Science Fiction

Since speculative fiction is a worldwide phenomenon today, spanning dozens of countries, languages, and media platforms, it is obvious that translation has somehow been involved. But the relationship between these phenomena is far from clear. Although a sizeable body of literature on speculative fiction exists within translation studies, most of it is narrowly focused case studies analysing renderings of individual elements of imaginary worlds, typically in a comparative perspective.[3] A classic

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[3] I am referring to research into the dynamics of translations of speculative fiction. However, there are also several papers going in the opposite direction, namely looking at how speculative fiction represents translation (Mossop 1996; Washbourne 2014).

example is a ten-page paper on the proper names in *Harry Potter* or *The Lord of the Rings* in language X. Though diligent, such works are necessarily fragmentary, and their findings can rarely be extrapolated. Not much help comes from literary studies, either. Most literary scholars working with fantasy or science fiction are aware of the existence of the fandom; indeed, many of them are or have been its active members. This phenomenon of fan scholars, or *aca-fans* as Henry Jenkins dubbed them, is certainly becoming more prominent. But the awareness of translation in such works is often limited, and overshadowed by prescriptivist attitudes. Polish literary scholars dealing with fantasy, for instance, seem unsure as to how to handle Polish speculative fiction. In addition, their critical apparatus is borrowed wholesale from English, including genre names, subcategorizations, and the like. The discussion in Chung (2014: 51) provides evidence for a similar phenomenon in Taiwan: prior to the arrival of translations from English, the category of 'fantasy' was not applied to classic works in Taiwanese literary criticism. Overall, what is visible first and foremost to the academic public are texts of culture belonging to the speculative genres. The key mechanisms that carried these texts into spaces other than English appear to be slipping under the academic radar. They are only beginning to be detected.

However, in the several wider-scope studies of translations of speculative fiction that are available in English, one thing stands out: they tend to approach the subject from a social angle, accentuating the role of dedicated individuals—'missionaries'—in the translation, publication, and reception of speculative genres. Anikó Sohár (1999) studies the importation of science fiction and fantasy into Hungarian after 1989. She traces authors, translators, and publishers and eventually concludes (ibid., 250–251, emphasis mine):

> It seems to me that the new publishers could be divided into two types: the majority who do not care about the genre, consider it merely a means to achieve profit, and **a small minority who are devoted to science fiction** and make attempts to combine business enterprise with their personal literary interest … This is where we find the interlinked role of publisher, manager, editor, writer, translator, and pseudotranslator. **These people have played an extraordinarily important role in introducing and**

promoting science fiction and fantasy in Hungary … **These people may form the minority of publishers but their influence in science fiction and fantasy is enormous**.

A similar study of Polish-English translations of fantasy and science fiction has been undertaken by Dorota Guttfeld (2012). Nearly one-third of her book is devoted to the analysis of the fandom as a target audience for translations, mostly through surveys. Though she never states that openly, working within a descriptive paradigm, hers is, in fact, an analysis of fan values. She also observes that translators are often members of the fan community, which would suggest they share the fan worldview. In the non-European context, Yu-Ling Chung's recent study of fantasy literature in Taiwan (2013) proves both the relatedness of various fan interests (as it was the audience of gamers that precipitated the 'sudden upsurge' of fantasy translations in that country) and the role of individual fans who utilize their social networks to act as agents of cultural change.

But the fullest and most insightful account of the mechanisms that govern the translations of speculative fiction comes from the French-Canadian scholar Jean-Marc Gouanvic (1997), who studies the importation of American science fiction into post-war France. Gouanvic takes a Bourdieusian approach to the topic (which Chung will later adopt as well). He argues that the importation was so quick and successful because of the presence in 1950s French society of the social structures 'homologous' to mid-war America. He recognizes the key role of three luminaries—Queneau, Vian, and Pilotin—in carrying out the importation process. Moreover, he points out that the transfer entailed the 'naturalization of the American subcultural model', namely organized fandom. Most importantly, he places significant emphasis on values. In his view, American SF was attractive because it offered a challenge to the established values of French society at the time (1997: 136). In the end, he declares powerfully that 'the transmission of American values then was undoubtedly the main function of the translation of American science fiction in France' (1997: 146).

Now, the pattern described by Gouanvic with respect to SF in France seems to repeat itself in other countries and languages, sometimes with other genres on the modern fantastic spectrum—though SF often paves

the way. The evidence of these genres behaving in a similar manner outside English is provided by the joint label for them formed in Eastern European languages but absent in English. Polish *fantastyka* means prototypically 'science fiction *or* fantasy', or any narrative with fantastic or supernatural elements, without necessarily specifying the medium. Sohár reports that Hungarian has a similar phrase, *fantasztikus irodalom* (1999: 27–28). In English the expression 'speculative fiction' tries to convey the same meaning, but both its history[4] and ambiguity make it problematic, and it is only due to the urgent need for such a joint label that the expression is used more widely. Overall, the pattern seems to be as follows: in non-English-speaking spaces, speculative fiction tends to appear suddenly (it is 'imported' [Sohár], 'parachuted' [Gouanvic], in an 'upsurge' [Chung]), as a clearly American or Anglo-Saxon phenomenon, through the conscious effort of certain fans—missionaries—and tends to dominate the field for years to come (Gouanvic, Sohár, and Guttfeld all report that speculative fiction translated from English enjoys much higher prestige—symbolic capital in Bourdieusian terms—than native works in these genres). Does this mean that the transmission of American values plays a part in all these phenomena? And if so, what values are these? In other words, what kind of gospel do these missionaries proclaim?

In Search of the Values of Speculative Fiction

That is a difficult question. It is my impression that values are elusive: a lot of academics point to them but few actually explain what they are. Lawrence Venuti, for instance, in his much-quoted passage in *The Translator's Invisibility* (2008: 12), speaks of

> the violence that resides in the very purpose and activity of translation: the reconstitution of the foreign text in accordance with values, beliefs, and representations that pre-exist it in the translating language and culture,

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[4] The term was originally used in the 1940s by the science fiction writer Robert E. Heinlein, with reference to science fiction only.

always configured in hierarchies of dominance and marginality, always determining the production, circulation, and reception of texts.

He also states that the inscription of British and American values in translations into English leads to homogenization, and ultimately a failure in cultural exchange:

The consequences of this trade imbalance are diverse and far-reaching. By routinely translating large numbers of the most varied English-language books, foreign publishers have exploited the global drift towards American political and economic hegemony since World War II, actively supporting the international expansion of British and American cultures. **British and American publishers, in turn, have reaped the financial benefits of successfully imposing English language cultural values on a vast foreign readership**, while producing cultures in the United Kingdom and the United States that are aggressively monolingual, unreceptive to foreign literatures, accustomed to fluent translations that **invisibly inscribe foreign texts with British and American values** and provide readers with the narcissistic experience of recognizing their own culture in a cultural other. (2008: 13, emphasis mine)

This description of a trade imbalance certainly fits the patterns of translating speculative fiction. But again, what are these cultural values? It does not help that often our own cultural determinants can remain transparent to us; we only become aware of our values when they collide head-on with the Other.

Gouanvic tries to name the specifically American values of SF that made it attractive to 1950s France. He identifies the message in the stories themselves, linking it to the social positioning of readers; in other words, he looks for social groups for which the message of technocracy was the most promising:

The United States was divided by conflicting ideological tendencies … Science fiction came in both conservative and liberal flavours, with the balance between the two varying according to the period. Nevertheless, spurred on by Gernsback, science fiction emerged in the 1920s and 1930s as a genre in its own right, offering the American middle class something

they could not find in other literature: the construction of a new world order based on the primacy of science and technology. This was a world in which research no longer involved the pursuit of pure knowledge of natural phenomena but the direct industrial application of that knowledge to meet the needs of government, military, business and academic sponsors (Stover 1972). This was the dawn of R&D, the cornerstone of American social progress and the basis of 'people's capitalism'. **American science fiction transmitted all these values**. … On the negative side, there was a claim to represent universal values and a tendency to see the future in terms of American destiny alone, in line with the founding myth of the American nation. (1995: 191–225, emphasis mine)

However, the process of importing speculative fiction seems less of an imposition and more of a willing acceptance, or active imitation of American values, texts, and way of life. What is more, the pattern of translating through the missionary outposts of organized fandom is, as I have already said, applicable to fantasy, horror, or detective fiction as well. This suggests that we need to look for these key values not only in the speculative stories, but also in the community itself. If it is fans that carry out the transfer, we need to look at fans themselves: at what they believe in. In line with the definition of values as 'the core conceptions of the desirable', I will try to determine what fans consider desirable in the stories, and in their surroundings. To me, the central notions of the speculative fan culture are KNOWLEDGE and IMAGINATION, sometimes paired with other elements. While I believe these are generally the values of modernity, in fan culture they are amplified.

Who Is a Fan? A Value-Driven Characterization

So, who is a fan? You may have noticed the disappearance of the Norman genitive. At some point—I believe that it might have happened very early in the movement—what exactly you were a fan *of* ceased to matter. What mattered was whether you were 'one of us', an acculturated member of the community. The central part of that acculturation is the shared sense of both exclusion and superiority, stemming from the fact that one enjoys

a specific kind or form of entertainment so much it becomes a matter of one's identity. It is an almost uncanny mixture of missionary enthusiasm and under-siege mentality—or, as Michał Błażejewski put it—'a mild case of sectarianism' (in Tkacz 2012: 8–9, translation mine).

This metaphor is not accidental. The fandom is a very tightly woven community, with a strong rhetoric of insides and outsides and a resulting tribal loyalty. It brings to mind religious groups, particularly of the American Evangelical variety.[5] Like Christian communities (and unlike nationalists), the fandom is missionary. It maintains a pretence of egalitarianism, and yet cultivates complex hierarchies: it has its saints and gurus, its own gospel, certain judgements passed as universal truths to be accepted without question, initiation rites, ceremonies, places of worship, a range of accepted content (writing, music, art), as well as resulting schisms and heresies in the shape of violent debates of who is a 'true' fan and who is not.

Interestingly, the words denoting the subculture are evaluative; the vector changes depending on perspective. This is especially visible in the words 'fan', 'fandom', 'nerd', and 'geek'. The first two started as neutral and descriptive, but over time evolved into specific, tribal identifiers. As I already noted, today the noun 'fan' is enough to identify a member of the (sub)culture, without specifying what exactly this person enjoys. Many translators and academics working with speculative fiction are described as 'active fans' or just 'fans'.[6] Henry Jenkins even coined the handy label 'aca-fan'. This is only natural, as the modern fans are 'both voracious and migratory in search of the kind of entertainment experiences they want' (Jenkins 2006; independently, Gouanvic describes Pilotin as a 'voracious' reader of American science fiction [1997: 134]). Again, in a way it is less about *what* the fans enjoy, but rather *how* they enjoy it: immersively and unapologetically. 'Fandom', which in English is a generic noun, in Polish fanspeak is a shorthand for the more dedicated core of the fantasy/sci-fi community. The popular labels 'nerd' and 'geek' are even more emotively charged. The blogger Tegiminis writes:

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[5] A Polish blogger uses exactly the metaphor of the Catholic Church structure to explain different degrees of 'belonging' to the fandom: http://rzutkrytyczny.blogspot.co.uk/2015/06/fandom-rpg-czy-scena-rpg-moze-brac-rpg.html.

[6] Farah Mendlesohn, Paweł Ziemkiewicz, and the like.

Nerd, as a word, originated as an alternative to other words which described people who were shy, bookish, and obsessive. It was used by predominantly social people to put down introverts and the studious, usually in order to appear stronger with the overall social hierarchy. It was an insult.[7]

But today many people wear it as a badge of honour, especially outside English, where the word arrived with its new meaning. Fans are proud of their 'nerdy', obsessive investment in what is essentially works of fiction. Again, though in English dictionaries the negative connotation lingers on (the first listed meaning is often 'a socially awkward person'), online usage switched strongly to the positive. In Polish the word is borrowed directly as a proud self-reference and is widely used across the fan blogosphere.[8]

The criteria of belonging to fandom would be mostly performative, and not exactly binary. An active fan is someone who goes to conventions, wears a costume occasionally, does historical re-enactment, writes fan fiction, reviews a thematic blog, and maintains relationships with other people with similar interests—not necessarily all at the same time. However, there are two more facts here. First, there are people who do not do much in terms of fan activities, but nevertheless share the fandom worldview: the belief in the intellectual superiority and greater imaginativeness of people who read fantasy or SF, the feeling of being shunned by 'serious' literature and culture, the complementary disregard for the said culture as being shallow, mainstream, unimaginative, and most of all the 'normalization of the idea of a secondary world' (James and Mendlesohn 2009: 72). These are often people who were active fans at some point of their life but later became disillusioned with the fan movement, or simply moved on. Secondly, there are core fandom members and more accidental, peripheral ones. How close one is to the centre depends mostly on one's level of dedication, measured in the hours of time one is ready to devote to the often non-profit, indeed costly fan activity.

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[7] http://simplikation.com/the-self-aggrandizing-nerd-and-gamer-entitlement/

[8] For example blogs: Geekozaur (Geekosaurus) run by two Polish game publishers/fandom gurus http://www.geekozaur.pl/, or NerdKobieta (NerdWoman) on postapocalyptic fiction http://nerd-kobieta.blog.pl/. Interestingly, the latter suggests that the default 'nerd' is a man. Another blogger explains the difference between the Polish and the English usage of 'geek' http://zpopk.pl/geek-czyli-kto-czyli-o-krotkiej-karierze-pewnego-pojecia.html#axzz3fw3mswQB

Internal Evaluations

A strong valuation is always present in any discussion of fandom and fan stuff. As George R.R. Martin puts it:

> Fans don't whisper. Fans are loud-mouthed and opinionated. And yeah, sometimes rude. 'Have you read that new novel by X?' 'Yeah, I tried it, but Z is better.' 'Z? You're kidding. Z is ***.' And so on, and so forth. Sometimes they tone it down if X and Z are in the room, but not always.[9]

This attitude of black-and-white judgement shines through every discussion, regardless of the topic. Usually such discussions lead to establishing walls of some sort. The line may be drawn in many different ways, but of course the first one is the wall between readers of the fantastic and 'the rest'. Andrzej Sapkowski, a popular Polish fantasy author and fandom guru, likes to declare in his public appearances that readers of the fantastic are the smartest, the most imaginative, the *crème de la crème* of society. Clearly disgruntled, Tegiminis echoes that sentiment, but with the opposite emotive value:

> Unfortunately, the self-promotion didn't stop there. While nerds became mainstream through the popularization of traditionally nerdy things, their victim complex and hubris continued to grow. Now, associating with certain fandoms, like science-fiction or games, makes you inherently smarter, or at least better than the people around you. This expresses itself through the often-claimed 'rationality' that nerds like to throw around, as though they understand the methods of critical thought or reasoning.[10]

The ridge between 'regular' and 'speculative' literature, or in more literary terms between mimetic and non-mimetic literatures, is deeply etched in the fan mindset. The presence of the fantastic in a story is a touchstone against which a value of the said story is measured. Fans choose stories specifically because of this, just as much as the 'mainstream' rejects them for the same reason. This thinking probably goes as far back as Tolkien's

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[9] http://grrm.livejournal.com/420090.html/ [accessed on 14 April 2015]

[10] http://simplikation.com/the-self-aggrandizing-nerd-and-gamer-entitlement/

critical manifesto *On Fairy Stories* in which he defended the literature of the fantastic from accusations of childishness, and proudly embraced escapism. In the fan mindset, the presence of the fantastic opens up possibilities far greater than those present in 'regular', mimetic fiction. To appreciate this—fans argue—greater imagination, sensitivity, or intellectual capacity are required to comprehend the dramatizations of modern scientific concepts. A speculative, imaginative, but also escapist potential is best embodied in the idea that a story can take place in a fully fledged secondary world. Fans of speculative fiction spend a lot of time in other worlds. They love exploring imaginary universes, the immersion and totality of the experience, and the potential of such stories to fulfil many desires, including the subversive ones. Notably, years later Rosemary Jackson famously described fantasy as 'literature of subversion' and of 'desire' (1988: 3).

This is echoed in the translation dynamics described by Gouanvic: certain genres are seen as inherently more worthy than others, and hence 'consciously chosen for translation' (1995: 217). This happens precisely because of the shared sense of uniqueness present in the thinking of fans, which leads to the formation of interpersonal fan networks maintained through meetings, conventions, and the Internet (note Chung's description of Taiwanese fantasy translators as 'social networkers'). These networks allow fans to build in their native space structures analogous to the 'American subcultural models', as Gouanvic calls them, through which carefully selected works are then introduced. That is why we find analogous models of importation: the French publishing series *Rayon Fantastique* is very similar to the Polish *Biblioteka Fantastyki*. Of course certain classics can bypass this track: the first editions of Tolkien or Lewis in Polish went through 'regular' industry channels. But the difference becomes obvious over time: while the first Polish translator of Tolkien, Maria Skibniewska, worked with 'literature in general', the output of later translators such as Paulina Brajter is almost exclusively in speculative genres.

So far I have been mixing fantasy and science fiction, on the grounds that their poetics of the unreal, and the response it incites from the audience, are indistinguishable. But the line of evaluation may also be an internal tension between readers of one variety of the fantastic over

another. Since very early on, for instance, there have been strongly evaluative assessments of fantasy literature coming from some 'hard' science fiction fans. They have dismissed it as an esoteric aberration within an otherwise intellectually challenging genre. Interestingly, this sentiment found its way into Gouanvic's paper (1997). In Polish, this is exemplified in the work of another SF titan, Stanisław Lem. This author of some of the most cerebral, philosophical sci-fi has also written a long critical essay *Fantastyka i futurologia* [Futurology and the literature of the fantastic] in which he compared the poetics of the two genres and eventually dismissed fantasy as a lower form. This anathema hampered the development of fantasy in the language (Kaczor 2014: 183)—all this despite the fact that trappings alone do not constitute the quality or imaginative potential of a story, of which Lem himself was well aware. His long-standing friendship with Ursula K. Le Guin is enough of a testimony, but he even expressed it openly. In the afterword to the Polish edition of one of Le Guin's books, he wrote ironically that American critics tend to sharply distinguish fantasy from science fiction based on the 'realia' employed in a given plot, whereas in reality, whether the hero flies on a magic carpet or in a flying saucer does not make much poetic difference. Ironically, in both groups more traditionally minded fans reject any affinity with the anime and manga crowd in exactly the same manner, despite a significant overlap between the communities.

Finally, valuation may come in the form of a religious purge of who is the 'true' fan. With the diversification of the fandom beyond the 'young, white, male technophile' demographics[11] came arguments about social, racial, and gender justice. Calls for a more diversified world and character designs intensified. People want to see themselves represented in secondary worlds they enjoy: the presence of characters of colour, less sexualized representation of women, the recognition of homosexual sensitivities. This may be seen as an illustration of a change in values, but in my opinion there is more to it than that. The need to see oneself represented is the realization of the same primal sentiment as the one the fandom is built

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[11] Reid (2010) states that this was the makeup of the subculture for quite a long time. Guttfeld's (2012) surveys show that the demographic in the Polish fandom is still pretty similar. This may explain why the largest gender-related controversy in the Polish fandom (an outrage over an arguably sexist commercial for the largest convention in the country) happened as late as 2014.

upon: you want to find someone like you. Even fantasy illustrators form separate networks (e.g. the Muddy Colors collective). All the symbols, artefacts, jewellery present in the fan culture are like tribal dress or face paint, or mediaeval coats of arms. It is primal: a way of telling the familiar from the Other, the dangerous and hostile outside world.

Binary Oppositions

On the surface, the fandom is democratic and inclusive. This is also its self-perception. The 2015 Sad Puppies affair (an attempt by conservative fans to hijack the Hugo awards through exploiting a weakness of the voting system) prompted some to voice it openly. In his *Not a Blog*, George R.R. Martin (of *Game of Thrones* fame) declared: 'The fandom I joined in 1971, the fandom I love, is open and friendly and welcoming, and has room for every shade of political opinion and literary taste. Those are values worth defending, a culture worth fighting for'.[12] His friend, the journalist Laura J. Mixon, worded it even more strongly: 'Here's the thing. Our community doesn't kick people out. Ever.' This inclusivity is manifested in fandom behavioural patterns at every step. At conventions, all formal, traditional status markers are dropped ostentatiously. The standard way of addressing people is by their first name, or even better, by their fandom nickname—often a name of a character from their favourite book, a name of a mythological creature, or an obscure in-joke. You can treat a famous author like an old friend, even if you two just met in the hallway. This is even more pronounced in a language which employs a system of honorifics. In standard Polish, as in German or French, you would address someone by *Pan/Pani* (Mr/Ms), especially if this person is older or more accomplished. In the Polish fandom the standard is to use the first name/nickname only. The full form of address can actually be deeply offensive. This creates the image of a very egalitarian community.

But if we dig deeper, we find the opposite, an almost desperate need for authority. Despite its apparent egalitarianism, there are clear ranks in the fan community. Fan hierarchies are built on KNOWLEDGE. Henry

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[12] http://grrm.livejournal.com/418643.html

Jenkins's essay on 'Spoiling the Survivor' provides ample evidence of this. Perceptions are often highly polarized (zero or hero, rarely in between). At the top of fandom hierarchies are powerful individuals: long-term editors of prestigious fan magazines, translators, publishers. These are, most often, people who had a deep, personal fascination with some kind of fantastic literature and took upon themselves a personal quest to popularize it, often imposing their personal values through their selection of texts to be translated and/or published (see Sohár 1999). The pattern of Gernsback and *Amazing Stories* often repeats itself. In France the influence of luminaries such as Queneau and Vian is obvious, and the influence of their personal taste on French SF impossible to overestimate. In Poland, the names of accomplished editors like Maciej Parowski (editor-in-chief of *Nowa Fantastyka*[13] monthly for many years) and critics like Andrzej Niewiadowski (author of pioneering critical essays and bibliographies reconceptualizing Polish national classics as writers of the fantastic) are well known. Such people often have multiple roles of editors, publishers, translators, and literary agents. They are missionaries of speculative fiction, carrying the light to distant lands, establishing the institutions and forms of worship, and though some disciples may later rebel against their vision, the names of the founding fathers remain widely known: without them, we wouldn't be here at all. Hence, through translation, fans effectively colonize and transform their surrounding cultural space.

Visionaries and Renaissance Men

Fans centre around such visionaries. Fandom awards are often named after people considered important for the community: *Hugo* after Hugo Gernsback, *Zajdel* after Janusz Zajdel. But the greatest admiration by far goes to original creators. This has everything to do with the ideal of a modern Renaissance man which the speculative culture loves. Boris Vian described this ideal as an ideal reader of science fiction: 'the mathematician,

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[13] *Nowa Fantastyka* (1991–present) is a continuation of *Fantastyka* (1982–90), the first dedicated F&SF magazine in Poland, whose impact on the production and reception of speculative genres in Poland was immense.

the physicist or educated people like Raymond Queneau, who know what is being done in literature, mathematics and physics. These are people who do not cut themselves off from whole areas of KNOWLEDGE' (quoted in Gouanvic 1995: 219; emphasis mine). Gouanvic continues in this vein: 'American science fiction gave a nonspecialized image of modern man, an image that Vian boldly associated with Renaissance man' (1995: 219).

Vian writes of readers—fans—but this image can be actually applied much more broadly, as an ideal author. We can easily see how Stanisław Lem actually embodied it: combining a thorough knowledge of the sciences with a deep humanist background and philosophical leanings that led him to formulate profound humanist questions. This may have contributed to his success in finding a way into French. This strong focus in fan culture on individual genius and the visionary goes together very well with the typically Western worship of individual authors as gurus. As Lawrence Venuti (2008: 6) succinctly pointed out:

> The translator's invisibility is also partly determined by the individualistic conception of authorship that continues to prevail in British and American cultures. According to this conception, the author freely expresses his thoughts and feelings in writing, which is thus viewed as an original and transparent self-representation, unmediated by transindividual determinants (linguistic, cultural, social) that might complicate authorial originality.

In translation, this ideal of a modern Renaissance man as a guru author manifests itself in the prioritization of the authorial voice when it comes to the interpretation or handling of the text, and the resulting bias towards the norm of faithfulness,[14] clearly seen in Guttfeld's (2012) findings. The Polish translations of Tolkien are a classic example. The founding father of mythopoeic fantasy guarded his world like a dragon guards his treasure: fiercely and in an uncompromising manner. When consulted by the Dutch translator on the renderings of maps and proper names, he answered with a long list of recommendations, most of which

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[14] Piotr W. Cholewa, a highly revered Polish translator of Terry Pratchett, and an active fan, has a fandom nickname 'Wierny' [Piotr 'The Faithful' Cholewa].

boiled down to 'leave as much as you can unchanged'. The earliest Polish version, published in 1961–63, conformed to that expectation. He was also consulted about the text, and opted for a faithful rendition. When a new one was published in 1996, trying some domestication for a change, fans reacted with a virtual outrage. One of the two main dedicated F&SF magazines existing at the time devoted an entire issue to reviews, most of them highly vitriolic (1997). The translator ended up vilified across the fan community, despite the fact that his elevated style matched the original better than the 1960s 'children's tale' language adopted by the first translator, and despite the fact that the canonical version had a number of mistakes. The most common argument against the domestication was Tolkien's open rejection of it, even though it was formulated with regard to Germanic languages, and that his knowledge of Slavic languages was arguably rudimentary. This is a recurring theme in the fan community: if the author speaks about the meanings of his or her work, it is treated as if God himself made a statement on how to translate (or interpret) a problematic passage in Scripture.

However, fans want unmediated access to the fictional worlds they love for one more reason. An argument often raised against domestication is that it hampers their exploration of the world 'as the Author created it'. Agnieszka Sylwanowicz, a translator, fan, and critic specializing in Tolkien, was very serious when she wrote in the review: 'A translator must not lead the reader astray' (1997). If a fan's re-enactment turns out to be based on a translator's choice rather than authorial creation, he or she will feel cheated. In the everlasting pursuit of knowledge and competence, fans relying on translations want to have a fighting chance at least equal to that of the readers of the original language.

Hybrid Texts

As I mentioned, the privileging of KNOWLEDGE concerns not only elements of the imaginary world in translation ('irrealia' in Mika Loponen's terminology—2009), but also elements of the source culture. Guttfeld's (2012) survey results provide a valuable insight. The respondents were asked to rate various translational interventions regarding cultural items

(footnotes, forewords, and afterwords, additions, glosses, substitution with a TL/TC element) as to their acceptability. Their responses reveal two things: firstly, that they want such interventions to be clearly identified as non-authorial; and secondly, that they prefer to be challenged rather than carefully taken care of. One respondent, for instance, said that if a translator adds 'king' to the name Edward for better identification, he or she is actually insulting his readers' intelligence. In line with the *crème de la crème* theory, fans believe themselves to be smart, and new knowledge to be worth the effort. But interestingly, they also show a clear bias towards Anglophone 'irrealia': someone expressly declared that names and toponyms other than English simply do not belong in this kind of fiction. This is very consistent with Gouanvic's findings (1997), and Sohár's (1999) discovery of pseudotranslations published under English-sounding names. In speculative fiction, to be English/American is a value in itself.

This leads us to one more form of translation. Coming from a prestigious cultural circle, the speculative genres possess a lot of symbolic capital. This capital can be used by non-English authors to various ends, including making their own culture 'cool'—raising its position—through retelling native motifs, stories, and heritage through the lens of a foreign genre. This form of cultural translation can be done either top-down, through 'corporate convergence', or 'bottom-up', through grassroots author initiatives. An example of the former would be Marvel's Indian Spider-Man: the comics were redesigned (translated, or 'transcreated') for the Indian market, with Indian realities: the protagonist was re-imagined as a Hindu man, living in Mumbai (Jenkins 2006). An example of the latter can be found in Eastern European genre fantasy books (e.g. The Witcher series by A. Sapkowski: a fantasy saga saturated with Slavic mythology), or indie games (e.g. 'Never Alone', utilizing Inuit culture). While both these forms of creating hybridity can be obviously money-driven, both also play heavily on identity narratives of various communities.

Summary and Conclusions

The existence of the fan culture—both the organized fandom and the surrounding media phenomena popularly dubbed 'convergence culture'—

undoubtedly influences translation. Through its social networks and shared practices, it has carried American/Anglophone works of fiction, expressing very Anglo-Saxon values, into the far corners of the world. However, to say that this means a simple 'imposition' of American values would be, in my opinion, a simplification.

Gouanvic suggests the central question should be: when a new genre appears on the radar, which social groups are likely to pick it up (1997: 125)? This suggests a willing acceptance from the target culture. But he also mentions detective novels which exhibit the same pattern in French translation (in that they were chosen because of generic characteristics). Let us turn to that for a second. From other sources we know that Conan Doyle's novels inspired a cult very similar to modern fan cultures. When Sherlock Holmes died, fans held a memorial service in London, and later the pressure from fans forced the author to bring the character back to life. On the surface it seems mysterious: what do sci-fi and detective stories have in common? Well, some genealogy is shared: Poe, for instance, dealt with both the fantastic and the detective story. But I believe there is a much more important factor which has to do with the central character, the staple of crime fiction: the detective. The detective is nearly always the smartest one in the story, often socially inept, but the only one capable of solving the crisis, the one others look to in admiration. It's a nerd power fantasy come true. From Sherlock through Poirot to Dexter, Lisbeth Salander and Dr. House, it's the same character: the genius sociopath, a perfect mixture of individualism and knowledge, a modern Renaissance man.

Knowledge and individual genius can be found throughout speculative fiction. The powerful wizard, the skilled warrior, the perfect assassin, the genius scientist, the young hacker, the uniquely talented witch. Note that even if this is by virtue of birth, the hero still has to train, even if he is Luke Skywalker. Of course, if not executed properly, the story with such characters easily falls flat due to a lack of the narrative tension, a lack of challenge. *The Lord of the Rings* would not have worked if told from the perspective of Gandalf: we needed a Frodo. Interestingly, though Frodo is relatable to the reader, he also exceeds his peers; the depths of elven knowledge are attainable to him. Therefore Boris Vian's characterization of science fiction—that it 'combines emotional excitement with a very

special kind of intellectual intoxication'—can be occasionally applied to other genres of the fantastic spectrum (Gouanvic 1995: 219). Fantasy can be equally capable of realizing that ideal, through extensive research (e.g. into history, mythology, occultism) and/or intertextuality. Here we have both: KNOWLEDGE and IMAGINATION, the genius and the visionary, thorough research and speculative potential, allowing for informed—but also full—escapism. These are the values of the speculative culture, embodied in its stories, in the dreams and lives of its fans.

Even more broadly speaking, I believe speculative fiction culture is built around values with a scope broader than America. The idea that hierarchies can and should be merit-based is a humanist utopia dating at least as far back as the Enlightenment. Paired with scientism and empiricism, it is shared by some other technophile movements, such as the Open Source programming community (who believe knowledge should be free, as the case of Aaron Swartz has shown). It's a culture of smart dreamers, of a rationality so utopian it occasionally becomes irrational. Therefore, there is nothing weird about science fiction fans being infatuated with Tolkien. And those who, like Queneau, Vian, and Pilotin, take to translating this kind of fiction, are in fact exercising the power of translation to exert influence on the world around them. This would indicate once again that 'translators are not merely importers. They take part in the creation of values and the circulation of certain aesthetic and intellectual options. Whether immediate or delayed, the effects of translation are undeniable' (Gouanvic 1995: 223).

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16

Translation as an Evaluative Concept

Piotr Blumczynski

In this final chapter of the volume *Translating Values*, I turn to the value carried by translation itself. I examine the remarkable career of this concept over the last several decades from the point of view of its axiology. The hypothesis I have put to the test is that translation—understood very broadly, not just as a textual operation between two languages—is an evaluative rather than a merely descriptive concept. In other words, it not only does show us something, but also tells us about how we ought to view it and feel about it. If it is true that 'when you pick up a word, you drag with it a whole scene' (Fillmore 1975: 114 in Palmer 1996: 5), what sort of evaluative scene does translation drag with it?

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Translating Values

The interdisciplinary research centre 'Values in Action' at Cardiff University formulates the focus of its study and the question around which it revolves thus:

> People around the world cherish diverse social values. Examples are plentiful. We may strive for equality, preach forgiveness, advocate for freedom, or try to protect our environment. These abstract aims are shaped by our personal and cultural histories (…) But how do values get translated into action?[1]

I must admit that this description provokes a curious reaction in me. As I move through this list of values, preferences, aspirations, and aims—even as short as it is—a sense of impatience starts to stir. There is something annoying about abstraction in the context of values, something that makes expressions such as 'striving for equality' and 'advocating for freedom' dangerously close to empty slogans. Only with the final question does some relief set in. It is translation that makes this difference. Perhaps it is not an overstatement that the test of a value—how genuine it is—is in its translation.

This is by no means an isolated example. We increasingly speak and hear about the need and pressure to translate various—mostly abstract—things: ambitions, theories, discoveries, reactions, even ourselves. When we have had enough, we feel we must translate our anger into some sort of action. This very book has emerged from research funded under the theme 'Translating Cultures' by the Arts and Humanities Research Council. Evidently, translation is something worth encouraging, stimulating, and funding.

Those who are still sceptical about it could say that referring to all things translational is just an expression of a certain trend or fashion, but that only takes us to another, more fundamental level, because trends themselves are value-driven. Clearly, translation must be a powerful and appealing idea if it is used so broadly—and increasingly so—to

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[1] http://sites.cardiff.ac.uk/values-in-action/ [accessed on 27 August 2015].

conceptualize a range of phenomena. What is behind this success? What is the value of translation that makes it so attractive as a central concept across a spectrum of unrelated disciplines?

In addressing these questions, I will first consider foundational notions such as concept, conceptualization, and evaluation. Having established this foundation, I will proceed to examine the evaluative use of the translation concept in three broad areas: political speeches, life writing, and biomedical publications. Finally, on the basis of this analysis I will revisit the question of the value of translation which underpins its use as an evaluative concept.

Conceptualization and Evaluation

To explain what I mean by concept and conceptualization let me turn to cognitive linguistics. Language does not reflect the extralinguistic world, either material or mental. Words and utterances are not simply labels for elements of an objective reality that exists independently of them. Instead, ideas as units of thought are expressed through concepts—in fact, George Lakoff (2002: 4) calls them 'components of thoughts'. Now, concept is a highly abstract and a strongly intuitive notion but also quite convenient for both of these reasons. It is perhaps one of those notions that are often best left undefined—much like the so-called primitive terms in mathematics—because attempts at defining them only lead to more complexity and confusion, which of course undercuts the entire enterprise. Still, because of its methodological centrality, we could offer the following simple and intuitive definition of concept, drawn from a well-known course book of cognitive linguistics (Dirven and Verspoor 2004: 13): 'a person's idea of what something in the world is like'. Note that this definition is very general and imprecise—which is its very strength because it is not reductive. Instead, it refers us to other concepts, such as 'idea', 'person', 'world', and 'being like', which we combine to construct meaning which, as cognitive linguistics insists, 'resides in conceptualization' (Langacker 2008: 31). But what does that mean and how does that relate to the subject of our discussion: the value of translation?

Here is how I see the link. The value of the cognitive theory of language is that it is profoundly translational. It translates the unfamiliar into the familiar, the abstract mental experience into a more concrete mental imagery that can easily be related to our sensory perception. According to cognitivism, conceptual structure is imagistic in character: the relation between language and the world is through a process of mental imagery construction. We can only understand conceptualization if we look at how it is rooted in and abstracted from 'everyday bodily experience, especially pertaining to vision, space, motion and force' (Langacker 2008: 32).

A simple example will illustrate a few important points for our subsequent discussion. In English, comprehension is conventionally conceptualized in terms of visual perception: knowing is seeing[2] (*See what I mean? I can't really see your point*). But seeing itself is a complex physiological and psychological experience which we normally conceptualize as VISUAL ACCESS.[3] For things to be understood, that is, seen, that is accessed visually, some conditions have to be met, which include the appropriate distance, lack of obstacles, sufficient lighting, focusing the eye, and so on. This leads to the emergence of a network of systematically related concepts—for example, CLARITY, TRANSPARENCY, LUCIDITY, FOCUS—which all pertain to the ease of comprehension (*That's* clear. *That's totally* transparent. *Could you* focus *your argument and* elucidate *your last point?*). Consequently, lack of comprehension is conceptualized as difficulty in visual access, either because of insufficient light (*I'm completely in the* dark) or a lack of transparency (*His point was* obscured *by irrelevant details. This is where your argument loses* focus *and becomes* unclear**/**cloudy). Three points deserve a mention here.

First, most concepts refer to the phenomenological and not the material domain. 'Things such as friendship, love, mathematics, tragedy, motherhood, and a host of others, including values themselves'—and we could easily add translation to the list—'do not exist outside human experience as entities independent of human conceptualisation. In fact,

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[2] Cf. etymology of the Polish verbs *wiedzieć* ('to know') and *widzieć* ('to see'), and the Sanskrit word *veda* ('knowledge') from the root: *vid-* ('to know').

[3] For a fascinating account of the KNOWING AS SEEING metaphor across a number of languages as well as into the past, see Sweetser 1990: 32–34 in Underhill 2009: 107.

they are results of human cognitive processes and specifically the process of conceptualisation' (Krzeszowski 1997: 23–24). Translation, both as a process and product, is a result of our conceptualization—but at the same time, as we will see soon enough, it is used to conceptualize other phenomena. That is why it matters what and how we think about translation.

Secondly, conceptualisation involves valuation, which is sometimes its most salient aspect. CLARITY is not only a descriptive concept, rooted in visual perception, but also an evaluative one (as several chapters in this volume demonstrate). In most circumstances, light is better than darkness and clarity better than obscurity—and understanding better than the lack thereof. Cognitive linguists stress that 'the process of concept formation necessarily involves an epistemic and axiological set-up: the conceptualizer's constant commitment to a particular system of beliefs and values' (Tabakowska 1993: 59; cf. Krzeszowski 1997: 37). Here is how it works:

> The process of both epistemic and axiological evaluation is based upon the concept of a qualitative scale: from 'true' to 'false', from 'good' to 'bad' (…) Qualitative scales mesh with quantitative ones: judgments involve establishing degrees of values and levels of possibility (…) The proportion of this 'admixture' is conditioned by cultural, sociological and psychological factors, thus making up what is traditionally referred to as 'connotative' meaning. (Tabakowska 1993: 60)

Now, where does the concept of translation sit on these scales? What is its connotative meaning in its various cultural and field-specific uses? If concepts are typically accompanied by an 'axiological charge' (Krzeszowski 1997: 49), what is the charge carried by translation in each one of these contexts? Is translation viewed as expendable or indispensable? It is a necessary evil or does it have 'ontologically positive significance', to use Gadamer's (2004: 269) term?

Thirdly, abstract concepts are metaphorical in nature. In our example, comprehension is metaphorically construed in terms of visual perception, which is in turn metaphorically construed in terms of movement, and therefore can be enabled, hindered, or blocked altogether. But a metaphor involves only partial mapping between the two domains. This

means that a metaphorical concept highlights only certain aspects while hiding others. In our example, the conceptual metaphor UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING highlights several facts: that understanding can be facilitated (by providing more clarity, transparency, elucidation, etc.) and that it is related to the effort invested in it (if you fix your gaze on something you can see it more clearly). But in the material world clarity and transparency are also characteristics of the entity itself, or the viewing apparatus, and do not depend on individual perception, which hides the fact that understanding is a highly contextual and subjective experience—something highlighted by other conceptual metaphors, such as for example UNDERSTANDING IS RECEPTION (*Oh, I get it*) or UNDERSTANDING IS FOLLOWING (*Everyone still with me? I don't really follow*).

Translation is one such metaphorical concept drawing on mental images rooted in sensory perception. Often, the underlying image is that of transfer (*traduction* in French, *Übersetzung* in German, *perevod* in Russian) or 'turning over' (*překlad* in Czech, *fanyi* in Chinese); at other times the image is slightly more complex and has to do with explanation (*tłumaczenie* in Polish) or temporal succession (*anuvad* in Sanskrit, means something like 'say later'). But my point here is not so much to debunk the dominant Western concept of translation based on a conduit model of communication (for that purpose, see e.g., Tymoczko 2007: 68–77, 2010b and the references there) but provide a reminder that each one of these conceptual metaphors highlights some aspects of translation while concealing others, and therefore may be either helpful or deceptive (sometimes both) in our attempts to understand translation and its value. Even in English, which is our focus here, translation is not simply equated with substitution or transfer: the image of entities ('meanings') being ferried from one place to another does not really capture the crucial element of what happens when things are translated. Translation is also a hermeneutic activity: it involves interpretation. It is also a representational and semiotic act: it communicates something, stands for something else. As Michael Cronin (2009: 218) puts it, '[t]ranslation is, above all, an introduction into unsuspected complexity'—and this is something we need to bear in mind as we examine how it is used is conceptualizing and evaluating other phenomena. So, let us turn to several areas in which translation is used as an evaluative concept.

Translation in Political Discourse

The concept of translation has been conspicuously present in the political discourse of the last several decades. Here are several examples coming from world leaders.

Back in 1984, Ronald Reagan, speaking in the Irish National Parliament, declared: 'We must *translate the idea into actions* which build effective barriers against the use of force in Europe.'[4] José Manuel Barroso in his 2008 speech 'Europe: a force of initiative and proposition in a changing world' said: 'Now we must *translate the principles* of coordination into concrete and concerted *actions*'. After a 2009 regional summit, the Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and a group of European leaders released a statement in which they asserted: 'Now we must *translate that commitment* (…) into *actions* which will prevent the terrorist organization, Hamas, from rearmament.'[5] In 2011 Barrack Obama, declaring the start of National Hurricane Preparedness Week, stressed that 'awareness of the threat is not enough—we must *translate this knowledge* into *action*, and work together to develop prepared and resilient communities'.[6] Translation clearly goes beyond awareness, which is best illustrated by the fact that in 2004, National Hurricane *Preparedness* Week replaced the previous observance of National Hurricane *Awareness* Week.

In all these examples, and many more like them, translation carries a strong positive valuation as something desirable and indeed necessary. Note that the things which need translation—ideas, principles, commitment, and knowledge—are all essentially good, but at the same time somehow not good enough. Only when translated into action do they become useful, beneficial, and fit for purpose. So, the value of translation is its power to transform abstraction into concrete forms, theory into practice, and intention into action. But this is not just a question of pragmatism. There is something fundamentally ethical about this process.

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[4] http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1984/60484a.htm [accessed on 27 August 2015].

[5] http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/PressRoom/2009/Pages/Statements_PM_Olmert_European_leaders_18-Jan-2009.aspx [accessed on 27 August 2015].

[6] http://beforeitsnews.com/obama/2011/05/presidential-proclamation-national-hurricane-preparedness-week-651836.html [accessed on 27 August 2015].

Untranslated commitment and untranslated knowledge are ethically suspect and dangerously close to empty (i.e., effectively broken) promises. Translation fulfils the ethical task of delivering promises, going beyond lip service, and making actual change. No matter what exactly is translated, the end result is action. That is something broadly recognized in Translation Studies. For over two decades Lawrence Venuti has been calling translators to become involved in cultural and ideological struggles (for his 'call to action', see 1995: 307–313). In a similar vein, in her introduction to a recent collection of essays entitled *Translation, Resistance, Activism*, Maria Tymoczko stresses that 'translation always has a potentially radical and an activist edge, that it is driven by ethical and ideological concerns, and that it participates in shaping societies, nations, and global culture in primary ways' (2010a: 19–20). It seems that action—perhaps even activism—is a central element of the concept of translation. Translation *does* something important and ethically desirable. Its value is in that it responds to a vital need, which makes it indispensible.

But there is more to translation, as used in the political discourse, especially in the USA. Charles ('Chas') W. Freeman, Jr. is a former officer of the US Foreign Service who at some point served as US Ambassador to Saudi Arabia. In his remarks presented to the Institute for Defense Analyses in 2004, entitled 'The American Way of War: Objectives and End-Games in the Middle East,' he repeatedly referred to the concept of translation:

> I will open with some thoughts about why the United States perennially fails to *translate military triumph into political victory* (…) It is the political results of war that *translate battlefield successes into victory* (…) The sad fact is that Saddam's *military defeat was never translated into his political humiliation.* Thus, our *military triumph was never translated into a political victory* over Iraq. Instead, we showed once again that one can win every battle and prevail in every military contest of strength and still lose politically (emphasis added).[7]

In these remarks, translation takes on another and rather sinister aspect. It is still an evaluative concept but one strongly connected to

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[7] http://chasfreeman.net/814/[assessed on 27 August 2015].

power and warfare. There is an expectation that military performance should have political consequences. When it does not—when military triumphs and defeats remain untranslated into, respectively, political gains and losses—a sense of failure creeps in. Action on the battlefield needs to be translated to run its full course. In this way, the concept of translation becomes weaponized and therefore ambiguous in terms of its valuation. No doubt it is the victors who have the right to expect translation that would allow them to enjoy the full extent of their triumph. But the enemy's defeat should also be translated into something that would act as a deterrent. In the examples discussed earlier, in non-military uses, translation was always ontologically positive. Here, as a weapon, it is rather like the proverbial double-edged sword. Whether we appreciate it depends on whether we wield it—if someone else does in an effort to harm us, we will try to avoid or resist it. The value of translation is in its use which makes it relative and contextual.

This observation is confirmed when we consider the practice of interlingual translation and interpreting. Its axiological ambiguity is highlighted in situations of conflict, when the evaluation depends on whether translation advances or hinders our case. In the war zone, acts of translation no longer serve benevolent mediation between parties; they are always viewed from a particular perspective and therefore evaluated as either 'intelligence material' or 'treason'. Recent research in Translation Studies provides ample evidence of this partisan character of translation in conflicted contexts. 'The role of interpreters and translators in violent conflicts is a complex, dynamic and multi-faceted one (…) because of the physical, cultural or linguistic proximity to one side or the other of in a given conflict' (Inghilleri and Harding 2010: 165). Vicente Rafael (2009, 2015a, b, 2016) explores the weaponization of language and translation in a range of geographical and historical contexts, from Habsburg Spain to the Philippines and the modern USA. But it is Mona Baker who puts it in the bluntest of terms when she states that 'translation and interpreting are part of the *institution of war*' (2006: 1–2; emphasis in original). If this is so, then the question of translation's axiological charge cannot be considered in universalist terms. When US military commentators say: 'We must translate this message into reality on the ground in Kabul' (Mack and Kelly 2004: 67), that is either a pledge or a threat. Translation

is nothing short of a weapon that can offer protection but also bring about danger.

No wonder that the concept of translation is visibly present in the realm of ideological clashes and political debates in English—which conventionally draws on the language and imagery of military conflicts (remember that Lakoff and Johnson's 1980 staple metaphor was ARGU-MENT IS WAR). A commentator frustrated at the Republican government in 2006 militantly declared: 'The anger with the present situation can only be fought one way (…) We must *translate the anger into votes*. That can only be done if every one of us joins the Democratic Army in deed as well as thought'.[8] Several years later, a disillusioned blogger insisted that 'we must *translate Hope into action*',[9] alluding to the iconic poster used in Barrack Obama's second campaign. And then on 25 April 2015, Obama himself, during his speech at the White House Correspondents' Dinner, brought to the podium 'Luther, *my anger translator*' (played by the comedian Keegan-Michael Key) to accompany him. At first, Luther simply held his folded hands at his chest and stared at the camera threateningly. But then the contrast between the two began to intensify. The president, with an admirably straight face, continued to address his audience in calm, politically correct, and relatively short phrases (apparently to make them manageable for consecutive interpreting), while Luther every time 'translated' the president's inner anger in an extremely expressive way, running around and yelling things like: 'This is ridiculous! I have a birth certificate! I have a birth certificate! I have a hot, diggity, dangity, mama-say mama-sa mama-ko-sa birth certificate, you dumb *** crackers!'[10] Of course, the clip on YouTube went viral.[11]

The comic effect aside, there is something very powerful about translation (and interpreting) in this image. Translation gives expression to the *real* thoughts and feelings hidden behind the official, politically correct façade. Not only is it true and authentic but it also provides the necessary psychological relief by channelling the anger that is simmering under-

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[8] http://www.westondemocrats.org/2006_05_01_archive.html [accessed 27 August 2015].

[9] http://metanoia-films.org/u-s-dictatorship-propaganda-and-hope/ [accessed 27 August 2015].

[10] http://www.usatoday.com/story/life/people/2015/04/27/obama-anger-translator/26444257/ [accessed on 27 August 2015].

[11] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HkAK9QRe4ds [accessed on 27 August 2015].

neath the surface. In this way, translation is healthy and desirable, if a little embarrassing at times (but, of course, in a 'cute' way: Obama would not have used his 'anger translator' if this had not been to his political advantage).

Translating Oneself

The potent value of the translation concept is also found in a growing body of autobiographies which we could call 'identity narratives'. Individuals confronted with an 'identity crisis' by a radical change in their linguistic or sociocultural environment often choose to conceptualize the complex process of their identity (trans)formation in translational terms and 'describe having to translate behaviour, values, thoughts, beliefs, even emotions' (Pas 2013: 64). It is remarkable that this conceptualization characterizes not only the experience of immigrants (cf. Robin Suleiman 1998) but also bilinguals (cf. Besemeres 2002; Besemeres and Wierzbicka 2007; Cutter 2005) and even learners of a second language (cf. Pavlenko 1998), all of whom speak of 'translating themselves', 'translating [their] lives', and so on. One of the first and best-known examples of such a translational autobiography is Eva Hoffman's *Lost in Translation* ([1989] 1998), a 'highly self-conscious study in living on borderlines' (Bartkowski 1995: 109). Hoffman embodies all three categories mentioned above: having left her native Poland for Canada at age 13, she first found herself uprooted in an unfamiliar linguistic and cultural environment, and then gradually negotiated her new (hybrid?) identity in the course of her study and work in the USA, to the point of becoming an editor for the *New York Times* and an author of numerous books—a sort of culmination of the process of acquiring a new language and sociocultural prestige. To Hoffman, translation is a very rich and multifaceted concept used not merely to indicate an interlingual act, but also the whole process of redefining herself.

In this sense, her whole autobiographical project is translational in nature: it is a translation of experience into text in an attempt to tell the story of her bilingual life in one language. Her main goal is to achieve 'a mending of fractured linguistic identities' in a process that 'requires a fun-

damental translation of what one understands as identity' (Pas 2013: 65). This translation is indeed fundamental and involves 'transformation of her own self-image (realignment of values, new character traits, or even revision of the aesthetic criteria of beauty)' (Karpinski 1996: 130). But despite the turbulence of this translation process, it is invaluable in its integrating and therefore soothing effect: it finally allows Hoffman to achieve 'a form of therapeutic healing of the anxieties connected with living between two cultures' (Karpinski 1996: 127). To quote her own words:

> [I]f I'm not to risk a mild cultural schizophrenia, I have to make a shift in the innermost ways. *I have to translate myself.* But if I'm to achieve this without being assimilated – that is, absorbed – by my new world, *the translation needs to be careful*, the turns of the psyche unforced. (…) *A true translation proceeds by the motions of understanding and sympathy*; it happens by small increments, sentence by sentence, phrase by phrase (Hoffman [1989] 1998: 211; emphasis added).

The value of translation is in its therapeutic power: it allows one to avoid 'cultural schizophrenia', retain sanity, and achieve a sense of internal integrity. But this is not accomplished by simply eliminating strangeness and discomfort. Translation is not about assimilation or domestication; it is not about replacing or overriding one identity with another. Rather, it involves the paradoxical experience of remaining yourself and yet undergoing a profound ('innermost') change. In Hoffman's view, translation is the only way to experience and preserve one's integrity while acquiring a new cultural identity, and its value is the integration it brings about. Translation makes her whole again. At the same time, a true translation is delicate, gradual, and incremental—the best description would perhaps be 'processual,' in Albert North Whitehead's (1968) understanding of the term—something that unravels the convoluted psyche without rupturing it. Translation is powerful but subtle; voluntary but irresistible; radical but soothing. It is a way to understanding yourself, thus leading to a new sense of wholeness:

> For me, therapy is partially *translation therapy*, the talking cure a second-language cure. My going to a shrink is, among other things, a rite of initiation: initiation (…) a way of *explaining myself to myself*. But gradually, it becomes a

project of *translating backward* (…) It's only when I retell my whole story, back to the beginning, and from the beginning onward, in one language, that I can reconcile the voices within me with each other; it is only then that the person who judges the voices and tells the stories begins to emerge (…) [I]n my *translation therapy*, I keep going back and forth over the rifts, not to heal them but to see that I – one person, first-person singular – have been on both sides' (Hoffman [1989] 1998: 271, 273; emphasis added).

Translation is about 'explaining yourself to yourself'; it brings self-knowledge, self-understanding, and therefore self-transformation. 'Translating backward' means understanding your past and becoming reconciled to it. Its value lies in the fact that in order to be yourself you do not have to give up your old identity and uncritically embrace your new one (something that many immigrants are forced or tempted to do). Translation tolerates—indeed, encourages—discontinuities, tensions, and paradoxes.

For Hoffman, this heuristic role and value of translation extends into the realm of interpersonal relationships. In order to be known and understood, you have to translate yourself for the other person. Intimacy is built through translation. This is how Hoffman describes the development of her romantic relationship with a certain Texan:

We keep talking strenuously, attentively, hoping that we can *translate ourselves for each other*, and a tenderness grows up between us in the very effort of the enterprise … *But the strangeness remains*, and it's not just the strangeness of discovering another person's ineradicable separateness. It is, ironically, in the smallest, quietest phrases, when we're nearest those soft and vulnerable crevices where intimacy is lodged, that my Texan and I know most poignantly that we don't speak exactly the same language (Hoffman [1989] 1998: 189–190; emphasis added).

Translation is a two-way movement. When you translate yourself for others, you invite them to your world and become vulnerable as your 'soft crevices' are exposed; but you also enter their world and try to relate to it—and experience both intimate understanding and 'ineradicable separateness'. When we are translated—for ourselves and for others—we do not just live happily ever after. Hoffman writes ([1989] 1998: 273): 'the fissures [between my two languages] sometimes cause me pain, but

in a way, they're how I know that I'm alive'. Translation is never total and complete; it stirs up at least as much as it settles down. In and through translation, we discover something about others, but above all, something about ourselves. Perhaps, then, the task—and value—of translation is not very far from the job of ethnography, which Clifford Geertz (2000: 84) sees in providing 'narratives and scenarios to refocus our attention'—

> (…) not, however, ones that render us acceptable to ourselves by representing others as gathered into worlds we don't want and can't arrive at, but ones which *make us visible to ourselves* by representing us and everyone else as cast into the midst of a world full of irremovable strangenesses we can't keep clear of (emphasis added).

Paradoxically and contrary to popular views, the value of translation lies not so much in allowing us to see others—though it does that too, of course—but rather in making us visible to ourselves. If it were not for an encounter with someone who is unlike us and therefore requires translation—both from us and for us—our self-perceptiveness would be seriously impaired. Translation reminds us that we are full of 'irremovable strangenesses' and therefore remain strangers even to ourselves. But there is also a strange comfort in this realization, once we admit openly something that we have felt all along. Once again, translation brings relief.

Translational Medicine, Translational Research

The recognition of the therapeutic value of translation brings us directly to another wide-spread evaluative use of this concept in relation to human health and well-being. The emergence of translational medicine—more broadly, translational science—can probably be traced back to 2003 which saw the establishment of the *Journal of Translational Medicine*. Though the use of the verb *to translate* in medical contexts can be attested earlier,[12] data from the Corpus of Contemporary American English suggests that

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[12] See for example the November 1997 editorial of the *Canadian Journal of Psychiatry* 42 (2) which insists that 'we must translate current psychiatric treatments and concepts to make them relevant to the culture and needs of primary care' (p. 914).

in previous decades the adjective *translational* was rarely used by medics. But that was to change radically and very soon. The new concept was immediately picked up by the medical community and gained enormous currency; its appeal was such one does not even have to go beyond the realm of academic publishing to prove it. In 2006, the title of the venerable *Journal of Laboratory and Clinical Medicine* (est. 1915) was relegated to the subtitle and replaced with the new name: *Translational Research*. New journals soon started to spawn, including the *American Journal of Translational Research* (est. 2006), *Science Translational Medicine* (est. 2009), and *Translational Psychiatry* (est. 2011), to name just a few. Editors of yet another medical journal (though not explicitly 'translational' in its title) admit that 'although there is no universal agreement on what the word "translational" really means (…), there is no denying that translational research is the buzzword of the moment' (Fang and Casadevall 2010: 563). Surely behind this dazzling career of all things translational in the biomedical sciences is an element of fashion (who is immune to it?) but that is not all. Translation is proving to be an attractive and powerful concept which brings with it a radical axiological reorientation.

But what exactly is translational research? In his article 'The Meaning of Translational Research and Why It Matters', Steven Woolf (2008) observes that the term has acquired two quite distinct meanings, corresponding to two kinds or stages of translation. It may refer to (1) 'the "bench-to-bedside" enterprise of harnessing knowledge from basic science to produce new drugs, devices and treatment options for patients', and (2) to the process of ensuring 'that the new treatments and research knowledge actually reach the patients and populations for whom they are intended' (Woolf 2008: 211). These two processes are sequential: an end point of the first kind of translational research (e.g. the production of a new medicine) is only the starting point for the second one (using the medicine in practice). The former 'struggles more with biological and technological mysteries', the latter more with 'human behaviour and organizational inertia' (ibid.: 212). The first kind of translation has a predominantly utilitarian value; the value of the second kind is mostly moral and ethical. However, as we could expect from a translational phenomenon, this binary classification does not do justice to the complexity of the problem. In fact, the 'steps of translation' may be broken down into

finer taxonomies including: '(i) fundamental discovery, (ii) bench to bed-side, (iii) bedside to clinical applications (clinical trials), (iv) translation to policy and health care guidelines, (v) assessment of health policy and usage, and (vi) global health'.[13] But translation is only worthy of its name when it has run its full course. That is why in discussing the imperatives of translational science many authors do not make such fine distinctions but 'view translation broadly as the full spectrum of work that marks the pathway from discovery to global health, inclusive'.[14]

This insistence on the complete cycle of translation has been clearly discernible since the early days of the concept of translational science. Let us turn to the 13 October 2005 issue of the *New England Journal of Medicine*. Stacked among a long procession of papers relating to Hurricane Katrina, was the two-page text entitled 'Translational and Clinical Science—Time for a New Vision' by Elias A. Zerhouni, then Director of the National Institutes of Health in the USA. In the opening lines of what soon became a sort of manifesto for the new vision and its underpinning values,[15] Zerhouni (2005: 1621) declared: 'It is the responsibility of those of us involved in today's biomedical research enterprise *to translate the remarkable scientific innovations* we are witnessing *into health gains for the nation*' (emphasis added). A few years later, in the editorial to the inaugural issue of the journal *Science Translational Medicine*, Zerhouni (2009: 1) reiterated this manifesto: 'Scientists must devise new ways to (…) achieve a higher level of understanding of integrated human biology, in an effort to *translate basic biological knowledge into tangible advances for individuals and societies around the world*' (emphasis added).

Let us briefly dissect these statements along conceptual and axiological lines. First and foremost, translation is not really an option but an obligation; it is viewed in ethical terms as a responsibility. This recalls the idea of translation as the fulfilment of an unspoken promise. Untranslated research—like untranslated plans and aspirations discussed in the earlier part of this chapter—is morally suspect. The value of translation is in its

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[13] http://www.nature.com/tp/about/index.html [accessed on 27 August 2015].

[14] Ibid.

[15] According to Tufts Clinical and Translational Science Institute, http://www.tuftsctsi.org/About-Us/What-is-Translational-Science.aspx [accessed on 27 August 2015].

ability to deliver as it seeks 'to close the gap between what's happening in our universities and what gets taken up by companies—the translational gap'.[16]

This takes us to the second point. The 'translational gap' between science and care is frequently depicted in another poignant image that has become a staple of the translational rhetoric. The author of a 2008 article published in *Nature* and entitled 'Translational research: Crossing the valley of death' writes about 'a chasm [that] has opened between biomedical researchers and the patients who need their discoveries' (Butler 2008: 840). Another author is wondering whether 'this "valley of death" between basic science and clinical care is about to be bridged' (Insel 2011). The intertextual reference to Psalm 23 is unmissable: 'Even though I walk through the valley of the shadow of death, I will fear no evil, for you are with me' (ESV). Translation is no trivial thing. It can make a difference—this time quite literally—between life and death. Translational research (especially of the second kind, focussed on ensuring access to treatment) is about saving lives (cf. Woolf 2008: 212). Translation has a life-saving, redemptive power.

By the same token, if translation is indispensable for life and wellbeing, a lack of it will result in death and suffering. This is precisely what is asserted across the field. Here is just one example: the description of the aims and scope of the journal *Translational Psychiatry* starts with the assertion that 'psychiatry has suffered tremendously by the limited translational pipeline'.[17] The way to alleviate this suffering is through translation. This has a familiar ring in Translation Studies. Andrew Chesterman's (1997: 186) idea of translation (understood in quite traditional, interlingual terms) as aimed at avoiding or reducing 'communicative suffering' not only expresses a strong evaluative position but also speaks of the 'preventive action in translation'. More recently, the role of audiovisual translation in ensuring media accessibility for people with disabilities has been increasingly highlighted (see e.g. Eardley-Weaver

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[16] The round table 'Is prevention the cure?', *New Statesman*, 7–13 November 2012, available at http://www.newstatesman.com/sites/default/files/files/20121210novartissupp.pdf [accessed on 27 August 2015].

[17] http://www.nature.com/tp/about/index.html [accessed on 27 August 2015].

2013, 2015). No wonder that the concept of translation is so appropriate in medical contexts where both prevention and treatment are at stake.

Thirdly, translation is clearly directed and purpose-driven—here's a salute to *skopos* theory—towards generating tangible benefits ('gains') at a collective level ('for the nation', 'global health', 'societies around the world'). Although 'the key characteristic of translational science is its bi-directionality' (Clay 2011: 26)—for example, the results of clinical tests will inform the course of research activities—there is no doubt that 'the real test of translation will be its impact on public health more than its impact on science' (Insel 2011). In conceptual terms, this makes perfect sense. There is a reason why we never speak of 'translating practice into theory'; indeed, the conceptual incongruence of this image jars our ears. Translation by its very nature defies symmetry, commensurability, and reversibility. Surely translation is not unidirectional (the target paradoxically affects the source, which once again demonstrates the limitations of metaphorical concepts) but it is not symmetrically bi-directional either. It is oriented towards improving the well-being of groups and communities—not just individuals—and this orientation makes it socially significant and valuable.

Most of the images underlying the concept of translational research have to do with building bridges and bridging gaps (more specifically, 'the translational gap'), overcoming obstacles and optimizing communication (between basic and clinical science): in short, with following the 'translational pathway' (between research and novel treatments). This would suggest a traditional and in many ways limiting conceptualization based on linear movement. But when we look closer, the concept of translational science goes far beyond that simplistic image. Discoveries and findings are not to be merely 'brought to' or 'applied in' clinical practice in an essentialist, one-size-fits-all fashion. Rather, they need to be truly *translated* in a process which involves struggling with scientific mysteries and with human behaviour, and therefore requires transformation, contextualization, consideration of fitness for purpose, dynamic adjustment, negotiation, overcoming resistance, obtaining feedback and acting on it, and so on. There are increasingly frequent mentions of a whole 'translational area' which draws on a much richer image. Translation defines a space around itself in which vital change occurs.

Among the chief ethical challenges of anthropological fieldwork, Clifford Geertz mentions 'the imbalance between the ability to uncover problems and the power to solve them' (2000: 37). Although articulated in a different discipline, this realization is increasingly shared in biomedical sciences—and the panacea for this ailment is translation. It has value written all over it.

The Value of Translation

It is time to pull together our findings and see what conceptual framework emerges from the three broad areas that we scouted for translation. In almost every case, the evaluative dimension has proven to be its most salient aspect.

The main undeniable value of translation as a concept is its underdetermination (which is precisely what enables it to function as a meta-concept). Nobody really knows what translation exactly involves or how it proceeds—but, clearly, that does not seem to be a problem. It is simply taken for granted that translation is desirable and that its lack is harmful. There is little evidence of debates over the quality of translation as the determinant of its value. It is indisputable that aspirations and anger need translation; that fragmented identities are made whole through translation; that innovations must be translated. Any translation is better than none.

This inherent value is due to several interconnected factors which can be summed up in the following statement: *translation does something true, important, and right.* Let us briefly focus on each key word here. (1) Translation actually *does* something; a mere recognition of possibility or need is not yet translation. If values are 'broad tendencies to prefer certain states of affairs over others' (Hofstede 2001: 5), then translation as an evaluative concept expresses a basic and strong preference for action over contemplation, and practice over theory. It is what makes the difference between being aware and being prepared (think of hurricanes again). (2) Translation does something *true*. It cannot be used to feign anything or put up false appearances; in fact, to translate is to bring to the surface real and authentic things, even if this means exposing fractures and discontinuities

(the 'translational gap'). Here is the source of translation's therapeutic value: it makes us more visible to ourselves, breaks pretences and thus brings relief. (3) Translation does something *important*. It is concerned with the vital rather than trivial, and with profound rather than superficial issues. It can make a difference between triumph and humiliation, sanity and madness, health and disease. To translate something is to assert its significance and value. (4) Translation does something *right*. It breaks the spell of the proverbial good intentions and brings things to completion (though it is rarely complete itself). Indeed, translation may never be full, finished, or perfect, but there is definitely something wrong—both in the utilitarian and ethical sense—with *untranslated* victories, selves, and discoveries. Only when translated do they reach the full extent of their value.

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The translational waves and ripples spread much further and in many other directions than those we have been able to discuss here. The translation concept has been appropriated by a range of other disciplines, including physics ('translational momentum of the molecule'), biology ('translational termination' and 'translational misincorporation'), computing ('translational freedoms' and 'translational motion'), or aviation ('translational lift').[18] It is fascinating to see how translation is linked to motion, energy, force, impact, embodiment, freedom, inevitability, and so on. Much more research is needed to explore the conceptual implications of these usages and how they could enlarge and enrich the notion of translation. One major aspect that I was only able to touch on very lightly is the complicated relationship between translation and power, hence its potential weaponization and the evaluative implications that follow: translation may have a dark side to it as well. An important question that requires further investigation—and here is an open invitation to ethnolinguists working in various language combinations—is the extent to which this broad concept of translation is translatable itself or perhaps remains mostly confined to the conceptual fabric of English.

But one thing is clear. If we ever wonder whether and why translation matters—which is really a question about its value—all we need to do

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[18] All these collocations are drawn from the online British National Corpus [accessed on 27 August 2015].

is listen to those who have translated this concept into their own areas. They are championing our cause.

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Note: Page numbers with 'n' denote notes.