KURDS OF MODERN TURKEY

MIGRATION, NEOLIBERALISM AND EXCLUSION IN TURKISH SOCIETY

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CONTENTS

LIST OF ABBREVATIONS

AKP   Justice and Development Party

ANAP   Motherland Party

CKMP   Republican Peasants People Party

CUP   Committee of Union and Progress

DSP   Democratic Left Party

DTP   Democratic Society Party

GAP   South East Anatolia Development Project

HEP   People's Labour Party

HÜNEE   Institute of Population Studies at Hacettepe University

IMF   International Monetary Fund

KDP   Kurdistan Democratic Party

MHP   Nationalist Action Party

PKK   Kurdistan Workers Party

PUK   Patriotic Union of Kurdistan

SHP   Social Democratic People's Party

TÜİK   Turkish Statistical Institute

LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

FOREWORD

It was not until the convoy of the Democratic Society Party, the major Kurdish nationalist party in Turkey, was stoned in İzmir in November 2009 that the increasing anti-Kurdish sentiments in Turkey were openly discussed in Turkish media and academia. This incident happened when the ruling AKP party (Justice and Development Party) was in the process of initiating a reform package that intended to expand the political and cultural rights of Kurds. This intention of the government, also known as the 'Kurdish initiative', sparked deep political controversies in Turkey, as both the opposition parties and large sections of Turkish society took a dim view of it. In this context, the incident in İzmir was typically interpreted as proof of the fact that the AKP government's reform package was leading to the development and popularisation of hitherto absent (or marginal) anti-Kurdish sentiments.

The general subject of this book is the recent increase in popular anti-Kurdish sentiments in Turkey, but it does not contextualise the issue within the Kurdish initiative of the AKP government. It is rather based on a field study in İzmir that was conducted in 2006 and 2007; that is, three years before the AKP declared its Kurdish initiative. Therefore, it does not (and cannot) have the intention of investigating the effects of the recent reforms on the popular perception of the Kurds in Turkish society. Yet, its findings and arguments, I believe, are still significant in understanding the current state and future of the Kurdish question in Turkey and are useful in shedding light on the recent debates over increasing anti-Kurdish sentiments. The contention that the anti-Kurdish sentiments seen among the middle-class population of İzmir represent a rupture with the image of Kurds in mainstream Turkish nationalism alludes to the necessity of examining these sentiments with some new concepts and analytical tools. To reduce

these sentiments to the arousal of a submerged Turkish nationalism would fail to capture their historical specificity. The book's focus on the urban social life as the locus and origins of these sentiments implies that they cannot be seen simply as a sudden political reaction to certain macro-level political developments in Turkey. The attempt to examine the transformation of urban social life in İzmir within the context of forced migration and neoliberal economic transformation, and consequent social exclusion of the Kurdish migrants, also suggests that the exclusionary anti-Kurdish discourses are not necessarily unique to the middle-class population of İzmir; rather they may be observed in any western Turkish city where urban social life has been drastically restructured.

The increasing anti-Kurdish sentiments in western Turkish cities are an indication that the Kurdish question has gone beyond an armed conflict between the PKK and the Turkish state in Eastern and South Eastern Anatolia; it has turned out to be problem that also involves the social relationships of the Kurdish migrants in western cities. This book will, I hope, contribute to the recognition of these new dimensions of the Kurdish question and to the development of new political strategies for the resolution of the Kurdish question in its new form.

1

INTRODUCTION

When Turkey is discussed in the international media and academia it is generally portrayed as a cluster of contradictions: 'a secular state versus a religious society'; 'a conservative government versus the secularist military-bureaucratic elite'; 'a democratic political system versus an authoritarian state tradition'; 'EU candidate versus inadequate democracy'. These statements are generally used to qualify Turkey as a distinct and unique country. They are so deeply entrenched in the public mind that any significant political development in Turkey is commonly situated within the context of one of these putative contradictions. For example, the intention of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) to lift the restrictions on the wearing of the headscarf in universities has by and large been understood in relation to the conflict between the 'conservative government' and 'secularist military elite'. Likewise, the ceaseless tensions between the military and the AKP government have also been seen as the symptoms of the contradiction between the 'democratic political system and the authoritarian state tradition'.

These presumed dualities may be useful in coming to terms with the fundamentals of *some* social issues and political developments in Turkey. Nevertheless, they give rise to an oversimplified understanding of social phenomena that demand a more complex analysis. An approach that relies solely on these dualities without a historical and sociological analysis cannot go beyond partial and superficial explanations. This tendency to present Turkish society in simple and a-historical terms is also epitomised by discussions of the 'Kurdish question' in Turkey.

'The Kurdish question', here, refers to the controversies concerning the status of the Kurds[1] in the social and political life of Turkey. The

Kurds in Turkey form a large community which comprises between 12 per cent and 17 per cent (9 to 13 million) of Turkey's total population.[2] In international academic, political and media circles, the situation of the Kurds in Turkey has typically been discussed in the context of two of the above-mentioned contradictions: the contradiction between 'the democratic political system and authoritarian state tradition' and the contradiction between 'Turkey's candidateship to European Union (EU) and the problems in its democracy'. In the former framework, the Kurdish question is seen as one of the longstanding non-democratic elements in the Turkish political system, based on the fact that the state long denied the presence of the Kurds in Turkey as a distinct ethnic group and limited their ethnicity-based political and cultural rights. Accordingly, the resolution of 'the Kurdish question' has been thought to depend on the full democratisation of the Turkish political and legal system. In the latter framework, which complements the former, the Kurdish question is seen as one of the most important obstacles to Turkey's integration in the EU. From this perspective, Turkey can gain entrance to the EU only if the Turkish state changes its non-democratic treatment of the Kurds. A quick glance at the academic and press literature on the Kurdish question reveals numerous works with this theme. By 'narrowing the perspectives to the political dimension of the Kurdish "ethnic" problem', these academic studies and political commentaries have generally limited their focus to the possible political and legal reforms that would regulate the rights and freedoms of the Kurds (İçduygu *et al.*, 1999: 992). In this light, the Kurdish question is reduced to a problematic political relationship between the rights of the Kurds and the Turkish state. This tendency reached its peak in late 2009 when the AKP government launched an initiative (known as the 'Kurdish initiative') to propose a comprehensive plan for resolving the Kurdish question by enlarging the cultural and political rights of the Kurds in Turkey. The fact the phrases 'Kurdish initiative' and 'democratic initiative' are used interchangeably in Turkish public life to refer to this project indicates that the problem of 'democratisation' and the Kurdish question in Turkey are considered to be the two sides of the same coin.

Needless to say, the status of the Kurds *vis-à-vis* the Turkish state is an integral component of the Kurdish question in Turkey, and therefore the academic and political discussions concerning the political and legal rights of the Kurds are very important. However, the problem with these discussions is that they have failed to comprehend some important new dimensions of the Kurdish question in recent decades. Certain

recent tendencies in Turkish society, such as sporadic and short-lived lynching attempts against Kurdish seasonal workers in some Turkish towns (Gambetti, 2007), and evident manifestations of an anti-Kurdish discourse in some marginal media and the internet, indicate that the Kurdish question is more than simply a problem between the state and the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). The anti-Kurdish discourses on the internet and in other media portray the Kurds as culturally inferior, intrinsically incapable of adapting to 'modern city life', naturally criminal, violent and separatist people (Bora, 2006). It is quite ironic but meaningful to observe that at a time when the Turkish state is taking some 'historical' steps towards recognising certain political and cultural rights of the Kurds, we witness indications of a rising antagonist discourse towards the Kurds in Turkish society. The prevalent approaches that focus merely on the relationship between the state and the cultural rights of the Kurds lack the necessary analytical tools for examining such novel social-relational dimension of the Kurdish question.

I am not the first person to point to the increasing anti-Kurdish sentiments in Turkish society. Several recent articles have dealt with manifestations of this attitude on the internet and in marginal nationalist printed media. While these analyses drew attention to an emerging (or rising) anti-Kurdish sentiment, almost all of them reveal the limitations and problems of focusing solely on the anti-Kurdish narratives revealed on the internet and in marginal media (see Aktan, 2007; Esen, 2007; Saç, 2007). In these media sources, the social positions of the subjects who utter these anti-Kurdish discourses, the context in which the discourses emerged and the justifications behind the prejudices towards Kurds are generally obscure. Therefore, it is difficult to develop a complex examination of the historical and social sources of these sentiments based only on the analysis of media content. Another problem with these studies is that they typically exaggerate the importance and social influence of marginal websites and racist political magazines that in reality are hardly known to the majority of people. In fact, it was necessary to investigate the perceptions of the 'common people' in order to come to grips with the social sources of this novel dimension of the Kurdish question.

Bearing these limitations and problems in mind, I conducted an extensive one-year field study with the main objective of producing a preliminary framework for the analysis of the social sources of recent anti-Kurdish sentiments in Turkish society. This field study, conducted in İzmir between June 2006 and June 2007, involved close observations of the urban social life and in-depth interviews with 90 middle-class peo-

ple who openly expressed anti-Kurdish sentiments. Neither the city of fieldwork nor the people who were interviewed were chosen arbitrarily. İzmir is a city that has received Kurdish migrants at an unprecedented rate since the late 1980s, and most of the Kurdish migrants that came to this city have constituted segregated communities in slums areas or shanty towns. Poverty, unemployment or unstable and insecure informal jobs[3] are endemic among these migrants. In other words, they constitute one of the poorest segments of İzmir's population. As for the individuals interviewed, they were chosen from middle-class people who live in apartments and houses relatively close to the neighbourhoods where Kurdish migrants are concentrated. The primary reason for choosing middle-class research participants for the interviews was that, in the initial stages of the fieldwork, I observed recurrent and illuminating patterns and commonalities in the perceptions of the Kurds among this group. My objective was to draw a typology of *a specific form* of anti-Kurdish sentiments among these middle-class people through these commonalities, treat this specific typology as a coherent social fact and trace the social and historical processes through which this specific form of anti-Kurdish perspective has been formed. Besides enabling me to draw this typology, choosing middle-class people was also critical in order to challenge the socially established notion that racist and xenophobic sentiments in society are a marginal and hence negligible phenomenon because they are seen only in the 'lumpen', 'rabble' and 'uneducated' segments of the youth population in Turkey.

The in-depth interviews that I conducted in İzmir have yielded some significant results that helped me to propose arguments about the social and historical sources of the anti-Kurdish perspectives of middle-class people in İzmir. These interviews enabled me to draw a typology of these anti-Kurdish sentiments among middle-class people in İzmir and identify this typology with the concept of 'exclusive recognition'. I have constructed the concept of 'exclusive recognition' based on four common features of the anti-Kurdish discourses revealed in the in-depth interviews: firstly, in contrast to the conventional assimilationist discourse of the Turkish state, the recent anti-Kurdish discourse *recognises* the 'Kurds' as a distinct group of people. Secondly, these middle-class residents of İzmir *recognise* the Kurdishness of these Kurdish migrants when they see them in their urban encounters and observations. Thirdly, this recognition necessarily involves discursive exclusion of these Kurdish migrants through certain stereotypes and labels. In other words, the recognition or identification of the 'Kurd' in everyday life is

expressed in the middle-class discourse by means of certain stereotypes. Fourthly, these people use such negative stereotypes *exclusively* against Kurdish migrants, and not towards other 'ethnically' non-Turkish Muslim communities living in Turkish cities such as Bosnians, Lazs, Georgians and Circassians.

Throughout this study, I use 'exclusive recognition'[4] as an operational concept that can help me to examine the social sources of the anti-Kurdish sentiments in the western Turkish cities that have been influenced by Kurdish migration since the late 1980s. This concept is functional in three respects: Firstly, as shown above, it conveys the most common and important characteristics of the anti-Kurdish discourses of the middle-class people living in İzmir, and helps me to draw the typology of their anti-Kurdish sentiments. Secondly, exclusive recognition is qualitatively different from the positions of the state or the existing nationalist parties, which are based on 'non-recognition' and 'assimilation'. In this sense, this concept denotes the historical specificity of recent anti-Kurdish expressions in Turkish cities. Thirdly, by emphasising the historical specificity of anti-Kurdish sentiments seen among middle-class segments of society, this concept helps me organise and expose my thoughts concerning the complex maze of social relations and dynamics that have led to the emergence of these anti-Kurdish sentiments.

Besides helping me to develop the concept of exclusive recognition, the in-depth interviews are also important in shedding some light on the social context in which they emerge. One of the most important findings of this fieldwork is that the perspective of research participants *cannot* be seen as an extension or manifestation of the traditional mainstream nationalist ideologies in Turkey. The way these middle-class people construct and perceive Kurdish migrants in the city is fundamentally different from the way the Turkish state and some other ultra-nationalist parties construct the 'Kurds'. This indicates that the sources of the stereotypes and labels used by interviewees to construct their perspective of 'Kurdish' cannot be sought primarily in the traditional nationalist discourses of the state or in any other discourse produced by a nationalist political actor in Turkey. In other words, what I call exclusive recognition cannot be seen as the ideological manipulation or inculcation of an organised political institution.

This leads me to turn my attention to some other areas of social life in order to trace the origins of these sentiments. A close analysis of the narratives of the interviewees indicate that middle-class İzmirlis (people

from İzmir) develop and reinforce their perception of 'Kurdishness' through their interactions with and observations of Kurdish migrants in the urban social life of İzmir. The locus and source of these sentiments is not the state or any nationalist political organisation but the social life of the city and urban everyday life erlations between Kurdish migrants and middle-class people in İzmir. However, this is not to imply that these urban everyday life encounters lead inevitably to such sentiments. These encounters take place in a specific social setting and, in order to capture the fundamental social sources of these sentiments, it is necessary to unravel the social processes through which this social setting is formed. This encourages me to examine the ways in which a) the neoliberalisation of the Turkish economy; b) the armed conflict between the PKK and the Turkish state; and c) the consequent exodus from Eastern Anatolia contributed to the formation of the social context in which these sentiments were shaped. These dynamics have profoundly altered the social life of Turkish cities. Therefore, an adequate examination of the construction of Kurdish migrants as negatively viewed 'ethnic others' should be coupled with an analysis of the resonances of these three national-level dynamics within the urban life of İzmir. Hence, when analysing the research findings of my fieldwork I endeavour to ensure a constant dialogue between macro- and micro-level processes. It is this constant dialogue that enables me to use these sentiments as a vantage point for shedding some light on the socio-economic structure of Turkey. More importantly, it is through such an analysis of anti-Kurdish sentiments that I could invite researchers to rethink the Kurdish question in light of its novel dimensions and to develop some new perspectives that would transcend the dominant academic tendency to see the issue merely as a problem of the democratisation of the political and legal systems. In this sense, this book endeavours to go beyond a micro-level examination of the case of İzmir.

The book is organised in such a way as to reflect this interaction between macro- and micro-level processes.

Chapter 2 clarifies the research object and scope of this study, and presents the basic theoretical premises that guide my research and analysis. In this chapter, I introduce the concept of 'exclusive recognition' that I use to identify the anti-migrant sentiments of the middle-class people living in İzmir.

Chapter 3 includes some background information about the fieldwork that I undertook in İzmir in general and the in-depth interviews I conducted with middle-class research participants in particular.

Chapter 4 aims to show the historical specificity of exclusive recognition by juxtaposing it with the state's conventional nationalist and assimilationist policy towards the Kurds. Following a detailed historical examination of official and mainstream nationalism in Turkey, this chapter points out that exclusive recognition is a novel and historically specific sentiment, and that its origins should be sought outside the traditional discourses of the state.

The fifth chapter points to the necessity of tracing the origins of exclusive recognition in the urban social life of İzmir. It also presents a succinct conceptualisation of 'urban everyday life' and situates it within the general analytical framework of the entire study. This chapter also includes brief background information on the historical transformation of social life in İzmir.

The sixth chapter brings into focus the neoliberal transformation of the Turkish economy, the armed conflict between the PKK and the Turkish state, and Kurdish immigration into the western cities of Turkey. These are three national-level dynamics that have shaped urban everyday social in İzmir. Therefore, an analysis of their structural effects on Turkish cities is critical for grasping the social processes through which exclusive recognition is formed in the urban space.

The seventh chapter deals extensively with the social processes through which Kurdish migrants have been recognised as a distinctive and homogeneous ethnic group in İzmir. It analyses the ways in which the three national dynamics mentioned above have facilitated the socio-economic and spatial segregation of Kurdish migrants, thereby preparing a convenient urban milieu for the recognition of these migrants as ethnic others.

Building on the analysis presented in the seventh chapter, the eighth chapter examines the processes whereby Kurdish migrants have been discursively excluded through certain stereotypes and labels that are attached to 'Kurdishness'. By scrutinising the ways in which middle-class people justify and rationalise these stereotypes and labels, this chapter unravels the 'logic' behind exclusive recognition.

In the ninth chapter I look at the processes through which exclusive recognition has been reinforced and reproduced by some factors that are outside the urban life of İzmir. Accordingly I explicate how recent political developments in the Middle East have played important roles in the reinforcement and perpetuation of exclusive recognition.

In the tenth chapter I engage in a theoretical discussion of exclusive recognition around the concept of ideology, and, by doing so, I try to

summarise and also deepen the fundamental arguments of the whole book. Also, in this chapter, I show the ideological character of exclusive recognition and specifically identify it as a form of cultural racist ideology.

In the eleventh, concluding, chapter I point to the importance of developing theoretically rich and empirically grounded perspectives on the Kurdish question in order to examine its new dimensions in the urban space.

2

CLARIFYING THE OBJECT OF ANALYSIS: EXCLUSIVE RECOGNITION

An academic study examining the Kurds as a research object is typically expected to take the Kurds as a homogeneous ethnic group, and then explain who they are and present a brief history of them. This study will not fulfil these expectations because its main research object is not the Kurds an as objectively defined ethnic group. Rather, this study will examine the processes through which middle-class people in İzmir construct the migrants from Eastern Anatolia as 'Kurds' and as 'ethnic others'. In other words, this work will not attempt to bring into focus the so-called 'characteristics of Kurdish ethnicity', but the *ethnicisation* of Kurds under a specific social and historical context.

More concretely, this study seeks to analyse how middle-class people in İzmir construct and perceive 'the migrants' as a distinct and homogeneous group, designate them as 'Kurds' and identify their 'Kurdishness' through certain stereotypes and labels. The analysis is based largely on data that was gathered in 90 in-depth interviews conducted as a part of an ethnographic field study in İzmir. These interviews were conducted with middle-class people who had developed exclusionary and antagonistic attitudes towards Kurdish migrants in İzmir. The narratives in these interviews discursively construct these migrants as 'Kurds' or 'ethnic others' and associate this 'Kurdishness' with a number of common pejorative stereotypes. The main objective of this study is to trace the social roots of this specific form of *ethnicisation*.

These discourses[1] that are used to 'ethnicise' the migrants from Eastern Anatolia under the category of Kurdishness do not occur in a vacuum; rather, they are historically specific to the extent that they

reflect the material and historical conditions of the people who use such stereotypes and labels. In this sense, an analysis of this specific form of ethnicisation will, in the end, provide us with some significant insights about the historical and social context within which this ethnicisation has occurred.

In order to better clarify the research problematic of this study, the remainder of this chapter explores those components of the ethnicisation process which I find to be most significant. Accordingly, three main considerations will be presented in order to define and qualify the problematic that is to be analysed in the following chapters: namely, the subject of ethnicisation (who uses such stereotypes and labels to identify the Kurds?); the object of the ethnicisation (who is exposed to the process of ethnicisation?); and the content of the process of ethnicisation (what are the common discursive configurations deployed?). The answers to these three questions will constitute the research object as a whole.

The Subjects of the Ethnicisation: Middle-class İzmirlis

In order to unravel the social origins of the ethnicisation of migrants from Eastern Anatolia, it is first necessary to specify the subjects who construct the migrants in İzmir as 'Kurdish'. Defining the subjects is necessary because the nature and content of the process of ethnicisation is bound up with the positions of the subjects of ethnicisation in a specific historical and social context. The task of specifying the subjects of ethnicisation cannot be fulfilled by simply listing all the common attributes of those people who used derogatory language towards Kurds in the interviews. Indeed, the interviewees have many common characteristics, but not all of these characteristics are relevant to the process of ethnicisation under consideration. It is necessary to select those common characteristics and tendencies which seem to be integrally implicated in the formation of their ethnicising discourse.

Can we regard 'Turkishness' as one of these relevant qualifications? In sociology, the construction of people as inferior outsiders has typically been assessed under the framework of 'ethnic/racial tensions' or 'ethnic/racial conflicts' (Miles, 1982: 44-71). In this literature, the 'ethnicisation' and 'racialisation' processes are seen as aspects of the conflictual relations between different 'ethnic and racial groups'. The concepts and assumptions of this dominant 'ethnic tensions' literature may be, to different extents, relevant to some other contexts, but they would fail to explain the sources of the ethnicisation of Kurdish migrants.[2] If

the perception and construction of the Kurds was viewed as an aspect of ethnic tension between the Turks and Kurds, the subjects of the 'ethnicisation' of migrant Kurds would be regarded as the 'Turks', a homogeneous ethnic group engaged in a conflict of interest with the 'Kurds'. In such a misleading formulation, the 'Kurdish minority' would be regarded as the victim of derogatory discourses employed by the 'Turkish majority'.

Indeed, any attempt to formulate the issue within the framework of 'ethnic conflict' necessarily produces a serious distortion of the existing social reality under consideration. This is because throughout the history of modern Turkey, there has never emerged an open war, tension or an organised conflict between the 'ethnic' Turks and 'ethnic' Kurds.[3] Unlike the cases of Northern Ireland, the former Yugoslavia or Rwanda, the 'Kurdish question' in Turkey has never taken the form of ethnic conflict or an ethnic war. While it is true that the Kurdish question goes back at least to the early 1920s, until recently it has been examined as a problem between Kurdish identity and the Turkish state rather than one of ethnic conflict and tension. As the latest and longest standing branch of the Kurdish nationalist movement, the PKK has undertaken violent attacks against civilian targets in Turkish cities; however, this has never ignited a civil war, or even a great deal of tension, between communities. Even in the early 1990s when the war between the PKK and the Turkish military forces was at its most intense, the confrontations between the Turks and Kurds were even less than sporadic. This means that in Turkey we cannot talk about a 'social memory' of ethnic conflict between the ethnic Kurds and Turks, from which the 'Turkish' people derived a coherent hostile image of the 'Kurdish' people. Therefore, the derogatory discourse targeting the migrant Kurds in the urban space cannot be situated within the context of conflictual ethnic relations between the Turks and Kurds.

The same is not true for the construction of 'Armenian' in Turkey (or for the Turks in Armenia). Because the social memory of the tragic confrontation between the Muslims of Anatolia and Armenians in the first quarter of the twentieth century is still strong, the commonplace negative image of Armenians in Turkish society persists. Here, the Turkish state's longstanding policies and strategies were also important in the development of a coherent negative image of 'Armenian' in Turkish society. The category of 'Kurdishness' as a commonplace in Turkish society, however, has not been built on the basis of tragic historical experiences of ethnic conflict. Neither was there a systematic

state attempt to recognise the Kurds as a separate ethnic group or to construct Kurdishness through specific negative stereotypes (see Chapter 4). Indeed, we cannot talk about an established common 'Turkish' view of the Kurds, in the same way that we can point to a coherent perception of Armenians by the Turkish public. In view of this, the image of 'Kurdishness' in İzmir's urban space is not an extension of the attitude of 'Turkish' people in general. It does not represent the standpoint of a 'Turkish' public. Accordingly, when the subjects of anti-Kurdish sentiments reveal their prejudice, they do not speak from a coherent 'Turkish' standpoint. In other words, the subjects of ethnicisation under consideration cannot simply be defined through their ethnic origins.

In fact, there are also some empirical reasons for not using 'Turkishness' as one of the qualifications of the subjects of ethnicisation. Not all of the interviewees regarded themselves as ethnically Turk; some identified themselves with other ethnic groups in Anatolia such as Circassians, Lazs, Arabs and Albanians. Interestingly, two of the interviewees were of Kurdish origin and they identified themselves as Turkish citizens rather than as ethnically Turkish or Kurdish. This shows that being an 'ethnic Turk' is neither a necessary nor a sufficient characteristic for being a subject of the ethnicisation of Kurdish migrants. In view of this, we need to determine those common characteristics that influence the way interviewees construct Kurdishness.[4]

The first defining characteristic of the subjects of ethnicisation in this study is that they have been living in İzmir for at least 20 years. This means they are familiar with the socio-economic transformations that have occurred in the city over time. All of the subjects in this study, regardless of where they were born, witnessed these transformations at varying levels. Based on this common characteristic it is possible to qualify the subjects as 'İzmirli',[5] a Turkish word that refers to the state of 'being from İzmir'. The significance of being İzmirli; that is, experiencing the socio-economic transformation since the early 1980s will be explained in later chapters, but for now it is sufficient to highlight that this standpoint perspective of being İzmirli is so influential on how the subjects situate the 'migrants' in their minds that it should be taken as one of the defining characteristics of the subjects of ethnicisation.

The position of the subjects in the layers of social stratification is the second defining characteristic. In this study, the subjects of ethnicisation are almost identical in this sense: on the one hand, all of them work in or are retired from 'formal'[6] occupations such as civil servant, teacher

and nurse. They are eligible for certain benefits from the social security system of the state and they own the apartment in which they live. On the other hand, they are dependent on the wages they get from their work, their monthly household revenue is between US$1000 and US$1500 (which is slightly over the poverty line in Turkey), they avoid luxurious consumption, they live in relatively cheap apartments that are spatially close to settlements where migrant families live, and they do not have the economic resources to afford to live in one of the wealthy gated communities of the city. Thus the subjects in this study enjoy the advantages of a better wage (or salary) and more social security than lower sections of the working class, while they continue to face certain economic limitations to the extent that they are dependent on their labour power. Based on these observations, we need a conceptualisation that reflects this ambivalent position of the subjects.

The classical Marxist framework defines 'class position' according to the role men and women take in the social relations of production. In this perspective, capitalism, as a historically specific mode of production, is based fundamentally on the contradictory relationship between the 'working class', which is constituted by those who can sell nothing but their labour power for survival, and the 'capitalist class', which is formed by those who own the means of production and hence have economic and social power to exploit the labour power of workers (Marx, 1977: 272). Based on this framework, the classical Marxist interpretation would be that the subjects in this study can be considered 'labourers', since all of them make their living not by exploiting the labour of others but by selling their labour power to a 'powerful' agent such as government, municipal institution, or capitalist. This means that the subjects of ethnicising discourse in this study share a common position in the structure of capitalist relations of production with anyone who sells labour power in order to make a living. Indeed, it is important to keep this in mind, since the classical Marxist framework implies that in their relationship to 'capitalists', the subjects of the ethnicisation experience the condition of exploitation like many other 'working people', regardless of the differences in their incomes and lifestyles. Moreover, understanding the 'working class' in this broad sense is also significant to see how and why all working people, including those interviewed here, have encountered similar kinds of problems (and opportunities) as other 'labourers' in periods of large-scale structural economic transformations.

Nevertheless, despite sharing similar positions in the relations of

production, 'labourers' do not always exhibit homogeneous characteristics in terms of the income they earn, the level of education they have, the work processes in which they take part and the way they organise their everyday lives. I do intend to analyse internal divisions within the working class, as these are too critical to disregard in the formation of anti-Kurdish sentiments. In terms of having the aforementioned opportunities such as a relatively higher and more stable income, working in a formal job, and being entitled to state benefits, the life conditions of the subjects of the ethnicising discourse are quite different from those of migrants, who are deprived of some of these economic opportunities. Although both the migrants from Eastern Anatolia and the subjects who ethnicise them have nothing but their labour power to make their living, they do not share similar types of dwellings, lifestyles, consumption patterns and general life concerns.

On the one hand, there are those ethnicising subjects who have the 'advantage' of receiving regular pay from a governmental institution or a private company, experience the 'comfort' of living in an apartment they own and meeting the educational expenditures of their children. On the other hand, there are those migrants who typically work in unsecured and unstable informal jobs without any social security, pay rent for the slums in which they live and rely on the income of their working children for the survival of the family. As I detail in the following chapters, it is these significant differences of income, education and work process that made it possible for the subjects of ethnicisation to see themselves as culturally and socially different from the migrants who have become the object of ethnicisation. In this sense, the discourse at work bears the traces of the material differences between the former and the latter. It seems clear that the broad definition of working class crafted in Marx's classical works will remain too general to identify these specific material differences. Any tendency to define the subjects *solely* as 'workers' will therefore fail to capture and identify the divergent positions in the social stratification which are implicated in the process of ethnicisation. It is, therefore, necessary to identify them as a specific stratum within the working (labouring) class at large, and to conceptualise such a specific position.

The relatively advantageous socio-economic circumstances of the subjects by no means imply that they speak from the perspective of the 'bourgeoisie' while revealing their ethnicising discourse. Indeed, as I stated earlier, while having some material socio-economic advantages *vis-à-vis* the poorer labourers, the subjects of ethnicisation have insuffi-

cient economic resources to reach the living standards of the wealthy, propertied segments of society. A few concrete examples clarify this point: it is true that they own their apartments, but these are not located in secure and comfortable gated communities; indeed it would be economically impossible for them ever to move into one of these communities. They can afford to send their children to state schools or universities, but the tuition fees of the private schools and universities exceed their capacities. They can meet their basic daily needs for survival, but their wages are not always sufficient for regular engagement in cultural activities such as going to the cinema or theatre, travelling abroad, or visiting a distant city for a vacation or for shopping in upscale stores. They might have their own car but to save petrol they typically use public transport or just drive for short distances within the city. These limited socio-economic opportunities and the relatively disadvantaged position of the subjects in comparison with wealthy, propertied members of the community also play a very important role in the formation of their specific perception of migrants from Eastern Anatolia.

The subjects of the ethnicisation are well off enough to maintain their existing life conditions but lack the economic power to change their lifestyle along the lines that many aspire to. In fact, they speak from the position of being in the 'middle'. They derive both the logic and the symbolic elements of their perspective of 'Kurdishness' from their urban social lives, and their social experiences in the city are shaped by the material conditions of being in the 'middle'. In other words, their perspective gains its specificity from the material conditions determined by this specific position. Considering that they are significantly different in terms of socio-economic conditions from the lower category of 'labourers' on the one hand, and from the propertied, wealthy category on the other hand, this study conceptualises the position of the subjects of ethnicisation as 'middle class'. The term 'middle class', here, is designed only to identify this relatively well-off stratum of the working class, as described above, in its wider sense.

The category of 'middle class' has been used in multiple ways by different social thinkers, and sometimes the same thinker offers various and even contradictory understandings of the term. For example, in Marx's work, the concept of 'middle class' acquired plural referents because it stood for different things in different writings (Ollman, 1968). In *The Communist Manifesto* (1848), for instance, the middle class is a broad, amorphous category that includes 'the small tradespeople,

shopkeepers, and retired tradesmen generally, the handicraftsmen and peasants', all of which, according to Marx, are destined to 'sink into proletariat' as capitalism grows (Marx and Engels, 1945: 27; Marx, 1977: 964). Here, what leads Marx to include all these sections of society under the designation of 'middle class' was his expectation that these social groups would gradually and inevitably disappear as capitalism matured. In some of his works Marx used the concept of petty-bourgeoisie to convey the same meaning.

In contradistinction to the tendency of defining the 'middle class' as a gradually vanishing class, Marx elsewhere characterises the middle class as a 'constantly growing' group that involves 'those who stand between the workman on the one hand and the capitalist and landlord on the other'. According to Marx, this class plays a role in reinforcing the domination of the bourgeoisie. He adds that 'the middle classes maintain themselves to an ever-increasing extent directly out of revenue, they are a burden weighing heavily on the working base and increase the social security and power of the upper ten thousand' (Marx, 1968: 573). Here, Marx does not specify the logic behind viewing the middle class as a 'social class' *per se* separate from workers and capitalists, but it can be deduced that he designs this category to recognise the considerably 'better off' sections of the labouring class.

The concrete referent of the 'middle class' in Marx's works is so vague that it would be problematic to use his understanding of the 'middle class' without any revision as an operational concept to define the subjects in this study. However, to the extent that Marx's latter sense of the term conveys that state of being in the middle, it might be a convenient point of departure for the development of a conceptualisation which adequately captures the specific position of subjects in this study. We then need to look at more contemporary social thinkers to trace an elaborated version of this formulation.

With the increasing fragmentation of the working class in terms of income, education and standards of living in the twentieth century, the concept of 'middle class' has become commonly used in the sociological literature and popular language to signify 'better off' sections of labourers (Clement and Myles, 1994: 6). However, there has never been agreement on what criterion to select for defining the borderline between 'workers' and 'middle class'. For example, Giddens defines the 'middle class' as those 'better off' workers who enjoy the benefits of the welfare state (1994: 149). Elsewhere, he tends to infer that middle class refers to white collar workers that include a 'broad spectrum of people

working in many different occupations, from the people in the service industry to school teachers to medical professionals' (2006: 313-14). Similarly, Boris Kagarlitsky sees the 'middle class' as the product of the 'welfare state' and the 'reconciliation' between workers and capitalists in the twentieth century (2006: 3). He uses the concept again to refer to the 'labourers' who benefit from the social security system of the welfare state policies in force in some capitalist societies. There are many additional references that could be drawn upon; however the important tendency to highlight is that of historicising the emergence of middle class within the welfare state. When the welfare state is taken as the point of departure, the main criterion for drawing the scope of the 'middle class' is neither a fixed threshold of income level nor occupational status (blue collar or white collar), but the extent to which an individual or a group of individuals is positively differentiated from other sections of labourers in terms of access to the advantages of welfare policies. In this sense of 'middle class', the income level, educational status or occupational configuration of the middle class can vary from one society to another. But, regardless of all these factors, what locates all of these citizens in the 'middle' is their socio-economically advantageous position *vis-à-vis* other labourers because of their ability to make use of the benefits of the social state. Moving from this point to a more abstract level, it can be said that the 'middle class' is constituted by those citizens who, in terms of selling labour power in the market, share the same position as all 'workers' or 'labourers' with regard to the relations of production. However, this middle-class group is also differentiated from other labourers because they have better economic conditions and opportunities owing to the greater share that they have in terms of the 'relations of distribution'. In this sense, as stated before, in this study 'middle class' will refer to a specific 'stratum' of the larger working class in its Marxian sense.

It is true that a 'welfare state' in its Western European and Canadian sense has never existed in Turkey. However, some important 'social state policies' such as the provision of free/universal education and health care, preservation of wages and salaries at a certain minimum level, subsidies for agrarian producers, and state ownership of some industries gained an institutionalised character in Turkey between the mid-1950s and late 1970s. During this period the state adopted a developmentalist socio-economic model and implemented the strategy of import substitution industrialisation. Such 'social state policies' mainly exhibited a corporatist character as they covered citizens employed in

formal work processes, especially those working in the state sector (Buğra, 2008: 158).

For these reasons, in this study, 'middle class' will refer to those citizens in Turkey who are or were employed in a formal job and thereby have better access to those 'social state' services compared to other sections of the labouring class who are deprived of some of these advantages. These particular advantages make it possible for these 'middle-class' people to enjoy much better socio-economic conditions compared with Kurdish migrants they ethnicise. This also implies that this is a relational conception of middle class; that is, the scope of middle class here is defined with respect to the research participants' position *vis-à-vis* lower sections of labourers and especially Kurdish migrants. As I will demonstrate in the following chapters, their specific middle-class position resonates with the ethnicising discourse of the subjects. In other words, the subjects in this study speak from this 'middle-class' position.

While drawing the typology of the subjects of the ethnicising discourse in this study, I will privilege two of the components I discussed above: namely, the duration of time one has lived in İzmir, and one's class position, thereby articulating this group as 'middle-class İzmirlis'.

The Object of the Ethnicisation:
Kurdish Migrants of the post-1980s

The second component of the research object of this study involves the 'objects of ethnicising discourse'; namely, those whom middle-class İzmirlis 'otherise' under the category of 'Kurdishness'. As previously discussed, if this issue was taken up within the framework of the ethnic relations between the Turkish majority and the Kurdish minority, the object of the ethnicising discourse would simply be identified as 'the Kurds'. It is true that the subjects of ethnicisation develop their perspective of 'Kurds' based on their relationships with the Kurdish-speaking migrants in the urban social life of İzmir. And it is undeniable that ethno-linguistic difference here plays an important role in the middle-class İzmirlis' construction of Kurdish migrants as ethnically other. Nonetheless, it remains misleading to argue that migrants' Kurdish origins make the ethnicisation inevitable. The reason for this is that ethnic difference cannot be sustained as a sufficient condition for the ethnicisation to occur; being ethnically, culturally or linguistically different from the majority does not guarantee being discursively grouped under an ethnic category (Miles, 1989; Brubaker, 2004).

A few concrete examples clarify this point: the Kurds are not the only 'ethno-linguistic' group in Turkey. Rather, İzmir and indeed virtually all other Turkish cities exhibit a culturally and ethnically amorphous demographic composition which includes Circassians, Albanians, Bosnians, Arabs and Lazs. However, in the Turkish urban context not all of these ethnically differentiated groups are exposed to an exclusionary or pejorative discourse. In most cases, rather than being a target of exclusion, tension or political confrontation, these so-called ethnic differences have been rendered almost 'invisible' in daily urban life.. Therefore, the ethnicisation of the migrant Kurds in Turkish cities cannot be interpreted as the automatic result of the ethnic difference between the Kurds and the rest of the people living in these cities. The 'Kurdishness' of migrants is not a sufficient condition for their construction and perception as a distinct and homogeneous group of people. In view of this, it is necessary to turn our attention also to some other characteristics of the migrants from Eastern Anatolia that made them amenable to be grouped or categorised under the designation 'Kurds'.

The Kurdish presence in İzmir is not new. Throughout the history of the Turkish Republic, İzmir has consistently received migrants from different parts of Anatolia, especially from Kurdish-populated regions. However, the ethnicisation of Kurdish migrants who have settled in the city since the mid-1980s is a relatively novel phenomenon. This situation is related to the living conditions that the more recent Kurdish migrants encountered. As discussed in the following chapters, many Kurdish migrants to the city in the period under consideration lacked access to employment in regularly paid jobs in the formal sector. Rather, most of them have attempted to make their living through involvement in informal job circles, where they take on a variety of roles, ranging from selling mussels in the streets of İzmir to running a stall in an open bazaar.

These social and economic conditions of Kurdish migrants became important in shaping the perceptions of the middle-class İzmirlis, as the subjects of the ethnicising discourse. The middle-class İzmirlis construct the category of 'Kurds' with some pejorative labels that they derive from their social relationships with Kurdish migrants in urban life. Their discourse is based primarily on immediate daily-life observations about the lives of the Kurdish migrants who live near them. Despite their spatial proximity to each other, there is a striking discrepancy between middle-class inhabitants and Kurdish migrants, in terms

of socio-economic conditions. As opposed to the middle-class İzmirlis, who work in formal jobs, receive regular pay and benefit from the social security system of the state owing to their formal jobs, Kurdish migrants are employed in the informal economy of the city, deprived of a regular wage as well as most of the social security benefits of the state.

As I will examine in the following chapters, most of the Kurdish migrants who came to İzmir after the mid-1980s live in slums that are concentrated in specific inner city areas. Migrants living in these neighbourhoods are quite separated from the rest of the city, but they can also find occasions to interact with people outside their neighbourhood. They have frequent contact with the middle-class İzmirlis in public spaces such as the cheap vegetable and fruit bazaars, discount supermarkets, and public transport vehicles. In these common spaces, Kurdish migrants typically work as drivers and cashiers, and they also come to shop. It is primarily through these interactions that the middle-class İzmirlis make their observations and begin to construct a subjective understanding of what they deem to be 'Kurd'.

Thus, it is socio-economic conditions, rather than their 'ethnic origin' *per se* which make it possible for Kurdish migrants and middle-class İzmirlis to share these public spaces. Migrant Kurds come to these public spaces not because they are Kurds but because they are typically a part of the work processes there. Likewise, the middle-class İzmirlis enter these public spaces as customers not because they are Turks but because their limited economic resources make it impossible for them go to other, more expensive, shops or use taxis instead of public transport. This indicates that the social relationship between the migrant Kurds and the middle-class İzmirlis is a dialectical one in that these relationships involve both 'identity' and 'difference'. Their unequal socio-economic opportunities separate middle-class İzmirlis from Kurdish migrants in terms of life-standards, spaces of living and consumption patterns, yet their common economic limitations and concerns force them to come together in some common public spaces, which makes the interaction possible. This situation, as a whole, tells us that the process of ethnicisation under consideration originates from the specific relationship between the class positions of migrant Kurds and middle-class İzmirlis, rather than being the necessary result of the encounter of two ethnic groups. In this sense, defining the 'objects' of ethnicisation *only* through their ethnic identities would have the effect of concealing the underlying social dynamics that underpin this ethnicising discourse. Hence it is necessary to define the objects of the eth-

nicising discourse based on those characteristics that make them a part of this specific relationship.

The time period in which Kurdish migrants settled in İzmir is an important factor to take into consideration here. It is necessary to distinguish those Kurdish migrants who settled in İzmir after the mid-1980s from those who moved to the city earlier. It is important to note that the Kurdish migrants of the 1960s and 1970s were in a different position from those who migrated from the 1980s onwards. Those migrating during the earlier period had greater chances of obtaining formal employment and receiving regular wages and were generally more integrated into city life. The concentration of Kurdish migrants in some specific gecekondu areas (shanty towns) in Turkey is a phenomenon that arose largely after the mid-1980s (see chapters 6 and 7 for a detailed discussion of this). This situation is related to the rapid social transformation of both the regions that Kurdish migrants left and the cities in which they settled. A detailed analysis of these rapidly changing social conditions will constitute the focus of the following chapters. At this point, it is sufficient to note that the objects of the ethnicising discourse in İzmir are not all the 'Kurds', but rather those Kurdish migrants who came to the city since the mid-1980s. It is on the basis of relationships formed with this group that middle-class İzmirlis construct the category of 'Kurd'.

The Content of the Ethnicisation

The third component of the research object of this study includes the ideas, stereotypes, labels and symbols that the middle-class İzmirlis draw upon in the ethnicising process. Here I will briefly discuss those elements which commonly emerged within the interviews with middle-class İzmirlis. I will abstract out those individual points of view that would not represent the perception of the 90 interviewees as a whole. From the common stereotypes revealed in the interviews, I will try to draw a typology of the way these middle-class people ethnicise Kurdish migrants in İzmir. These common stereotypes that are used to identify 'Kurd' will be analysed in much greater detail in Chapter 8.

1. 'Ignorant and Cultureless'

The word 'ignorant' (*cahil* in Turkish) is one of the most common expressions used to describe the 'Kurd' in the urban space. The middle-class İzmirlis use this pejorative word to connote two interrelated meanings. On the one hand, it implies that Kurds are undereducated,

and this explains why they rarely obtain good jobs or integrate success-fully into the city. According to this reasoning, it is the Kurds' ignorance that has caused their poverty, unemployment and other social prob-lems. The word 'ignorant' also signifies the Kurds' alleged inability to comply with the basic rules of 'good manners' and etiquette in the city. In this sense, Kurdish migrants are conceived as lacking the cultural capital necessary for full incorporation into city life. According to mid-dle-class İzmirlis, this lack manifests itself on various occasions in everyday life, for example being disturbed by a Kurdish teenager while walking downtown at night, hearing swearing or noisy talk on public transport, or coming across a migrant throwing garbage into the street. These particular daily experiences of 'Kurds' play a vital role in the con-struction or reinforcement of the notion that 'all Kurds are ignorant'.

It is also important to note here that in some cases hearing Kurdish or Turkish spoken with an accent is considered to be a further indica-tion of the Kurd's ignorance. This detail, which is a significant point of departure for understanding the social complexities and background of the Kurdish question in Turkey, is elaborated in later chapters. Here I simply want to highlight the fact that the middle-class İzmirlis, as the subjects of the ethnicising discourse, consider the above-mentioned interactions with migrants as evidence of the Kurds' ignorance in gen-eral.

2. 'Benefit Scroungers'

The difficult conditions experienced by Kurdish migrants living in the *gecekondus* of Turkish cities are evidenced in their housing conditions and work environment. However, despite these apparent indicators of economic deprivation and social exclusion,[7] middle-class İzmirlis typi-cally complain that it is not Kurdish migrants but themselves who are the real 'victims' in the city. In the interviews, they justified this senti-ment by referring to the differences in the ways the Kurds earn a living. From their standpoint, their own property, savings or better living con-ditions were deserved because they have worked hard in 'formal' or 'legal' work, paid regular taxes to the state, and respected the law for many years. In contrast, and according to this perception, Kurdish migrants possess unfair benefits: the gecekondus where they live were created through occupation of state land; they steal electricity and water from the municipality; and more importantly, they work in informal sectors and do not pay taxes to the state. From their perspective, the Kurds could get rich very quickly through 'ill-gotten' money acquired

through informal work processes. According to middle-class İzmirlis, the Kurds came to İzmir with the aim of making money fast without expending any kind of sustained labour or effort. For them, the people living in the gecekondus and slums of the city represent not the urban poor suffering from increasing poverty and exclusion, but the 'Kurds' who make their living by unfair benefits. This is how the image of Kurdish migrants as 'benefit scroungers' has been constructed.

3. 'Disrupters of Urban Life'
İzmir is known to be a relatively safe and peaceful city especially in comparison with İstanbul; the latter, being the largest city in Turkey, is identified with crowds, chaos and disorder (Tümer, 2001: 52). Interviews with middle-class İzmirlis show that this perception seems to be vanishing, since, in their view, İzmir has also begun to exhibit the characteristics attributed to İstanbul as a result of the increasing crime rates and insecurity. Indeed, these concerns were very well founded, as many statistics also point to increasing crime rates in almost all Turkish cities; so-called 'peaceful' İzmir has not been an exception to this trend.

Dwellers in the cities can easily feel the influence of increasing insecurity in their everyday lives by directly experiencing, witnessing or hearing of frequent incidences of apartment thefts, robberies in public places, and sexual assault. According to interviewees the reason for the sharp increase in insecurity is not the Kurdish migrants themselves. Most of them identify the neighbourhoods where Kurdish migrants live as centres of crime and violence and believe that they are the real source of threats to order and peace in the city. What we see here is the ethnicisation of the 'allegedly' high crime rates among Kurdish migrants, since the subjects of the ethnicising discourse consider a social fact (high crime rates) to be one of the essential elements of what is meant to be 'Kurd'.

4. 'Invaders'
As a result of the huge waves of migration since the early 1980s, Turkish cities such as İstanbul, Adana, İzmir, Antalya, Mersin and Bursa have undergone rapid demographic and socio-cultural transformations. As one of the primary centres of the Kurdish migration, İzmir's demographic and socio-cultural transformations have been rapid. It is also true that the Kurdish population in the city has been growing rapidly due to higher birth rates. The dynamics and consequences of this transformation will be analysed in detail in the following chapters, but it is

important to note here the interviewees' perceptions regarding these changes. Many simply interpreted the rapid increase in the population of Kurds as part of a long-term contrived plan for the 'Kurdification' of the city. Accordingly, they regarded the higher birth rates among Kurdish migrants as an indication of their hidden desire to eventually comprise the majority in the city and rule it. Here, the myth of 'Kurdification' ethnicises the phenomenon of demographic change in İzmir by perceiving the increasing migrant population in İzmir as an increase in the number of 'Kurdish' people and, more importantly, as an extension of the Kurds' strategy of occupying the city.

5. 'Separatists'

The armed conflict between the PKK and the Turkish army has been going on since the mid-1980s. This conflict has had tragic consequences for Turkish society: as many as 30,000 people have died, and nearly one million were forced to emigrate from the region because of the conflict. Despite these conditions, the armed conflict between the PKK and the state never took the form of ethnic tension between ordinary Kurds and Turks. Throughout the 1990s, in the media and state discourse, the PKK was pictured as a separatist organisation that was supported primarily by international forces and actually lacked the support of people living in the region (Kirişçi, 2004: 290). In the 1990s, this tendency of differentiating the Kurds from the 'separatist' PKK seemed to be so internalised by the Turkish public that even at the height of the conflict, the Kurds living in the Turkish cities were not subjected to collective violence or widespread racist reaction.

The field study I conducted in İzmir shows that the mentality that distinguishes the Kurds from the PKK is currently losing its influence, while a new logic identifying every Kurdish citizen as a 'separatist' PKK sympathiser is gaining ground. Most interviewees expressed the view that whereas in the 1990s the PKK received its support not from the Kurds but from specific European countries, the Kurds themselves now aspire to establishing an independent Kurdistan. This represents an abrupt shift from an extreme position of seeing the Kurds as completely unaffiliated with the PKK to another extreme position of seeing all Kurds as loyal sympathisers. The interviewees justified this move from one extreme to another with the claim that the Kurds have been provoked and deceived by the Western powers (especially the US), which would like to divide and rule the territories of Turkey as they have done in Iraq.

The Research Object in Its Full Sense: 'Exclusive Recognition'
After dividing the research object into its three constituent parts and examining each part in detail, it is now possible to paint a more comprehensive picture of the main subject of this study. Until this point, I highlighted that like all other 'ethnic' categories, 'Kurdishness' is not an objectively defined and self-evident ethnic entity; rather, it is a historically and socially constructed category. In taking this position, I have stated that this study will examine not the 'Kurds' as an ethnic group but the ethnicisation of the Kurds within a specific social context.

I added that the nature of any ethnicisation process is shaped by a) the subjects of ethnicisation; b) the people who are the target of ethnicisation; and c) the discourses that are employed throughout this ethnicisation process. I have shown that, in this study, the subject of ethnicisation is the middle-class İzmirlis, and the object of ethnicisation is the group of Kurds who have settled in the city since the mid-1980s. The content of this process consists of the stereotypes and labels that are used to identify 'Kurd' in İzmir. Combining the subject, object and content of the ethnicising discourse, I can conclude that *the research object of this book is the particular way in which the middle-class İzmirlis construct the category of 'Kurd' (or ethnicise Kurdish migrants) based on their social relationships with the Kurds who migrated to the city after the mid-1980s.*

Rather than being a phenomenon concerning only the local dynamics of İzmir, however, the ethnicisation of Kurdish migrants by middle-class İzmirlis is a significant vantage point for deriving some insights into the general structure of contemporary Turkish society as well as reaching some theoretical conclusions pertaining to ethnicity, migration, and the city more generally. The following chapters establish some links between this particular micro-level social reality (how the migrant Kurds have been viewed in İzmir) and macro-level realities such as the social structure in Turkey, migration and the socio-economic transformation of Turkish cities. However, one needs to be very careful in trying to establish connections between micro and macro levels of social reality as well as moving from concrete realities to theoretical abstractions. This is because analytical movements of this kind always carry the risk of falling into the traps of either reductionism or overgeneralisation. Therefore, it is necessary to develop some robust analytical tools to guard against falling into these traps, and enable us to bridge these different facets (or levels) of social reality properly.

The main analytical tool used throughout this study is the concept of *exclusive recognition*. This is an abstraction that refers to the research

object of this study; that is, the particular ways in which the middle-class İzmirlis ethnicise Kurdish migrants in İzmir. I constructed this abstraction by concentrating on four features of the anti-Kurdish discourse used by the middle-class İzmirlis: first, in contrast to the conventional assimilationist ideology of the state, which sees the 'Kurds' as a part of the Turkish nation, the recent anti-Kurdish discourse *recognises* the 'Kurds' as a distinct and homogeneous group of people. Second, this recognition accompanies a logic that *excludes* the Kurds, because in the cognitive world of middle-class İzmirlis, the Kurds have been distinguished by negative traits such as being ignorant, culturally backward and separatist. Third, the agents of anti-Kurdish discourse construct negative stereotypes primarily from immediate contact with and observations of Kurdish migrants in the everyday life of Turkish cities. In other words, only after they *recognise* the Kurds in the urban space do these people develop their own conception of what it means to be 'Kurd'. The word *recognition* here implies that Kurds refer to an 'experienced Other' rather than an 'imagined Other' in the cognitive world of middle class İzmirlis (Miles, 1982: 11-40). Fourth, the people who use such negative labels to identify the Kurds do not necessarily exhibit an antagonistic attitude towards other ethnic groups. In other words, these pejorative labels are generally used *exclusively* against Kurdish migrants. Indeed, cities such as İstanbul, İzmir, Mersin and Antalya include many people with other non-Turkish ethnic origins such as Bosnians, Albanians, Circassians, Georgians and Lazs, but most people are almost indifferent to their ethnic origins and generally do not tend to 'group' and categorise them on this basis. In other words, the discourse under consideration targets Kurdish migrants *exclusively*. Regardless of the divergences in form and intensity, the manifestations of anti-Kurdish discourses in the interviews necessarily exhibit these four characteristics. Here, the concept of 'exclusive recognition' is key to conveying and highlighting what I deem to be the key elements of anti-Kurdish sentiments among middle-class İzmirlis. Throughout this study, I will use this concept to refer to the specific ways in which middle-class İzmirlis construct Kurdish migrants as 'ethnic others'. In other words, 'exclusive recognition' is an abstraction which defines the specific form of ethnicisation analysed here; in this sense, 'exclusive recognition' becomes the research object of this study.

3

RESEARCHING MIDDLE CLASS, MIGRATION AND KURDS IN İZMİR

The main arguments of this study build on ethnographic fieldwork research conducted in İzmir between June 2006 and July 2007. This chapter includes brief background information about this fieldwork. During my fieldwork, I made several visits to the neighbourhoods where, since the mid-1980s, Kurdish migrants have become concentrated, such as Kuruçeşme, Kadifekale and Yalı Mahallesi. I visited Kadifekale more frequently than the other neighbourhoods, because it is inhabited almost exclusively by Kurdish migrants. During these visits, I became familiar with the lives and conditions of Kurdish migrants who were exposed to anti-Kurdish sentiments in the city. I had the opportunity to conduct informal interviews with Kurdish migrants and locally elected heads (*muhtars*) of these neighbourhoods. I also visited two home-town associations (*hemşehri dernekleri*) of migrants from Eastern Anatolia[1] and talked to some members of these associations. I did not use these interviews for a systematic analysis; rather, they provided me with further insight into the spatial and socio-economic segregation of Kurdish migrants in İzmir from about the mid-1980s on. Chapters 6, 7 and 8 give an account of some of these insights.

Meanwhile, I was already conducting interviews with people in İzmir in order to gain some understanding about their views of Kurdish migrants. The primary reason for choosing middle-class research participants for the interviews was that, in the exploratory stages of the fieldwork, I observed recurrent and illuminating patterns in the ways these people perceive Kurdish migrants. All of the middle-class people interviewed recognised Kurdish migrants as 'Kurds', i.e. as a distinct ethnic group, and identified their Kurdishness with such pejorative stereotypes

as 'benefit scrounger', 'ignorant', 'invader' and 'separatist'. In other words, these middle-class interviewees tend to 'ethnicise' Kurdish migrants by using the category of 'Kurd', which has been constructed on the basis of these aforementioned stereotypes and labels. (As mentioned in the previous chapter I refer to this phenomenon as 'ethnicisation of Kurdish migrants'.) I selected middle-class interviewees through references given to me by friends, colleagues and relatives who live in İzmir.[2] The interviews were semi-structured and conversational. I began each interview with a few general questions that were designed prior to the interview, and continued with many others that were developed during the interview depending on the particular narrative trajectory of the subject. I recorded all interviews, but transcribed only those with anti-Kurdish ideas and sentiments, as this was my main object of research.

In the end, I collected 90 interviews in total of the middle-class individuals holding anti-Kurdish sentiments. These 90 interviewees, between the ages of 30 and 70, were selected from people who have been living continuously in İzmir for at least 20 years. I did not select people younger than 30, reasoning that they had no experience of the social life in İzmir prior to the Kurdish immigration, and therefore it would be difficult to learn how their perception had been influenced by the rapid Kurdish inflow in the city. 53 of these interviewees were women and 37 were men. The slight over-representation of women was not based on an epistemological purpose; it occurred spontaneously during the fieldwork. Since I focused on the common modes of thinking adopted by both men and women,[3] I did not see this as a serious problem for the research. This would be a problem only if the number of men was very small, but this is not the case.

I began all interviews with a standard 'ground tour' question that asked interviewees to compare today's İzmir with the İzmir of 30 years ago (Miller and Crabtree, 2004: 135). This introductory question had four purposes: firstly, it prevented a possible initial negative reaction from the interviewees. Starting with a direct question about the Kurds in the city might unsettle interviewees because of the topic's politically sensitive nature. Second, this question provided me with the opportunity to become familiar with the interviewees' backgrounds, as most of them tended to give examples from their own lives when comparing today's İzmir with the past. Third, this question enabled most of the interviewees to get on to the Kurdish issue by themselves before I asked direct questions about this topic. Most of the interviewees tended to

also touch on the role of Kurdish migration when explaining their ideas and feelings about changes in İzmir in the past few decades. Fourth, the answers to this question helped me decide whether or not to continue the interview with the respondent. In other words, the answer to this question worked as a selective criterion for distinguishing the interviewees with anti-Kurdish feelings from others. Most of the time it became obvious rather quickly whether an interviewee held an anti-Kurdish perspective, from the way they compared today's İzmir with the city of 20-odd years ago. The people with intense anti-Kurdish feelings were mostly discontented with the quality of life in contemporary İzmir and openly stated that Kurdish migrants were one of the culprits for the deterioration of living conditions in the city. The people with no antagonistic sentiments towards Kurdish migrants tended to not to talk about the Kurds in their answers to this question. Nevertheless, in order to be sure about this, I asked a second question that directly interrogated their feelings and ideas about the 'migrants from Eastern Anatolia'. In a few cases interviewees began to reveal their anti-Kurdish feelings when answering this second question; but most of the time, those who did not mention the Kurds in the first question did not exhibit any kind of anti-Kurdish sentiment in this second question as well. I did not continue formal interviews with the people who did not show any evident sign of anti-Kurdish feelings, but in some cases I continued to talk to them informally in order to learn their feelings about people who think negatively of the Kurds in the city. Although they did not become a part of the 90 anti-Kurdish middle-class people who were interviewed formally, these informal conversations were still useful for generating some insights about the topic.

The answers to these standard introductory questions shaped the open-ended questions that were designed in the later stages of the interviews. Based on the narratives of interviewees in the initial stages of the conversation, I directed many other questions that invited them to express the logic behind their negative feelings about Kurdish migrants in the city. These open-ended questions in an unstructured interview format were quite useful, as they made it possible for the interviewees to express freely how they perceive and construct Kurdish migrants in the city. Their elaborate explanations about Kurdish migrants in İzmir made it possible for me to reflect on the social origins of their common modes of thinking. This would not be possible with a questionnaire or highly structured interview, because these techniques would not give enough space for the interviewees to expose and justify their ways of

thinking (Fontana and Frey, 2003: 61-107).

In the analysis and interpretation of the in-depth interviews, I paid special attention to three things a) common stereotypes and labels that were used to identify 'Kurd'; b) the ways in which these stereotypes and labels are rationalised and justified; and c) the descriptions of the social interactions with Kurdish migrants in the city.

In terms of deriving a few important concepts and research questions from the fieldwork data, this study involves *some* elements from grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Charmaz, 1983). The narratives that were collected in these 90 in-depth interviews served as a point of departure from which I constructed some operational concepts and abstractions to be used in the analysis of anti-Kurdish sentiments. Rather than using these narratives for testing a comprehensive hypothesis that existed prior to the research, I saw them as a guide for developing some of my initial research questions.

In this study, the elements of grounded theory are evident in the method through which I created the concept of exclusive recognition. As the most fundamental concept in this study, I constructed exclusive recognition on the basis of the commonalities and patterns that emerged from the narratives of these 90 interviewees. As indicated earlier, I use this concept to identify the concrete form that anti-Kurdish sentiments take among the middle-class people in İzmir. I proceeded to take exclusive recognition as a social reality that needs to be explained and examined.

Nevertheless, it is critical to note here that while I apply a grounded theory method in constructing the concept of exclusive recognition from the fieldwork data, I do not use this method to formulate substantive and formal theories about the social roots of exclusive recognition. This is because 'exclusive recognition', as a form of consciousness and a social reality, cannot be grasped adequately by relying *solely* on the fieldwork data. Its 'relations' with other social facts and its real history (how it develops) is a part of what it is (Ollman, 2003: 63-69). Because immediately observable manifestations of reality cannot directly provide the knowledge of these relations and processes (i.e. the structure and history), the *interpretation* of these manifestations through some abstractions is necessary (Bhaskar, 1997). The 'objective sense' of this particular form of social consciousness, that is of exclusive recognition as a form of consciousness, can be better understood when we abstract it in such a way as to 'make how it happens a part of what it is' (Marx and Engels, 1964: 57). According to this 'genetic structuralist' theoreti-

cal outlook[4] and a complementary critical realist (and materialist) epistemology,[5] the social sources of exclusive recognition (or any other specific form of anti-Kurdish sentiments) cannot be captured based only on their concrete manifestations in the in-depth interviews. Exclusive recognition, including its 'relations' and 'development', can only be examined when it is situated within a historical and structural context in which its development (how it becomes) as well as its connections with other realities can be analysed. Only with such an analysis and interpretation can the 'objective sense' of exclusive recognition be captured and exposed (Mayrl, 1978: 21). And this interpretation entails some theories, abstractions and concepts from existing sociological and philosophical traditions that help us to proceed from the observable manifestations of exclusive recognition to its 'latent' structural and historical roots. In doing this, I use grounded theory under the guidance of the ontological and epistemological premises of critical realism as suggested by some scholars, and to avoid falling into the trap of positivist empiricism on the one hand, and relativism or postmodernism, on the other (Yeung, 1997: 61-63). In short, this study recognises the existence of an objective reality to be studied and asserts that our knowledge of this reality has to be theory-laden and concept-dependent, as well as empirically grounded. This can be seen also as an attempt to comply with Pierre Bourdieu's famous conviction that 'theory without empirical research is empty, empirical research without theory is blind' (Bourdieu, 1988: 774-75).

I proceeded to examine the observable manifestations of anti-Kurdish sentiments and their latent (not immediately observable) historical and structural sources in various ways. The narratives derived from the in-depth interviews (immediately observable aspects of reality) helped me to figure out the point of departure for examining the social roots of 'exclusive recognition'. They led me to begin my analysis with a close examination of the everyday life encounters and interactions between Kurdish migrants and middle-class people living in İzmir, because it was by reference to these relations that middle-class people were constructing and justifying a negative image of 'Kurdishness'.

This does not mean that I consider the social relationships in urban everyday life to be the cause of exclusive recognition. Rather, I regard everyday life as the locus (site) of exclusive recognition, the actual place where it takes its form. Therefore, focusing solely on these everyday life relationships cannot move us beyond describing the locus of exclusive

recognition. A more complete analysis of exclusive recognition makes it necessary to ask which relations and processes in urban social life facilitate the emergence of exclusive recognition and how these relations and processes have been historically formed. In my quest for the answers to these questions, I am guided by a historical materialist epistemology, which directs me to interrogate how the structural transformation of the capitalism in Turkey resonates with the urban social life of İzmir and prepares the ground for the emergence of exclusive recognition. This enables me to observe the role of the transition to a neoliberal form of capital accumulation in the development of the urban processes through which exclusive recognition emerges. However, it would be crudely reductive to see exclusive recognition as a necessary outcome of the neoliberal transition. The armed conflict between the PKK and the Turkish state and the consequent Kurdish immigration into western Turkish cities are two additional structural dynamics that shaped the urban social processes in İzmir. Thus, in this book, I also bring into focus the social consequences of these two dynamics in the context of the historical development of capitalism in Turkey. In the end, I provide an analysis of how a) the neoliberal transformation of Turkish economy; b) the armed conflict between the PKK and the Turkish state; and c) Kurdish immigration into western Turkish cities work in unison to form and 'overdetermine' the social context in which exclusive recognition arises.

This demonstrates that fieldwork data became very useful for combining micro and macro levels of analysis. The research first takes narratives and the micro-level social processes that these narratives recount as a vantage point for shedding some light on certain macro-level national dynamics. After unravelling the roles that macro-level national dynamics play in the formation of micro-level processes, I then reinterpret the narratives and micro-level processes in light of these macro-level dynamics. Within this constant dialectical relationship between macro and micro levels lies Henri Lefebvre's materialist conception of everyday life as an area where the 'whole' (macro) and 'local' (micro) interplay (1991). Through such an examination of the interaction between macro and micro levels, I endeavour to combine my own operational abstractions derived from fieldwork (i.e. exclusive recognition) with already existing concepts in the social sciences.

The insights that I derived from my in-depth interviews are embedded in almost all arguments presented in the following chapters. Nevertheless, I do not scrutinise the lives and narratives of individual

interviewees in detail. This is because the arguments of this study are based more on the *general* insights that were drawn from the 90 in-depth interviews as a whole than on the *individual* narrative of each interviewee. I use the individual narratives only to exemplify and clarify the general arguments that were drawn from the ethnographic fieldwork as a whole (see chapters 7 and 8). Because of this, I was interested more in the content of the narratives rather than on their linguistic form and structure. Instead of simply describing the symbolic elements that each individual interviewee used in their narratives, I turn my attention to unravel the common modes of thinking and ways of reasoning among all interviewees. As mentioned above, my primary goal in this study was to decipher the social and historical context in which such common modes of thinking could flourish. In view of this, exposing the discourses of the research participants was not an end in itself, as is the case for many descriptive discourse analyses (Thompson, 1984: 101). Rather, discourses[6] revealed in these narratives were the object of analysis and interpretation; and the interpretation and analysis of these discourses aimed to capture the social and historical setting within which exclusive recognition arises. For this reason, I do not present a detailed textual analysis of my interviews, but rather use them as part of a larger ethnographic project.

This book fulfils the objective of drawing attention to novel social-relational dimensions of the 'Kurdish question' and highlighting the roles of certain macro-level dynamics in the increasing anti-Kurdish sentiments in Turkish society. Nevertheless, it is not exempt from certain limitations that stem from focusing solely on the narratives of middle-class people in İzmir. The in-depth interviews yielded very important insights about the ways in which middle-class people view Kurdish migrants in İzmir, but they would not suffice to explain some other important dimensions of the issue. For instance, it could be illuminating to compare the anti-Kurdish sentiments of middle-class people with the sentiments of those in the upper classes who live in the inner areas of the city. It could be also important to interview Kurdish migrants in order to find out how they experience exclusive recognition, and how they feel about it. The differences in the discourses between middle-class men and women could also provide important insights into the role that gender structures play in shaping the construction of Kurdish migrants. However, I have remained silent about these important subjects, because of my intention to choose the perspectives of middle-class people in general as a main 'vantage point' for shedding light on

anti-Kurdish sentiments. In future research, other vantage points may be selected, and the results of this study may be enriched. Rather than undermining the coherent originality of the arguments here, these limitations indicate directions for future research.

A comparison between the construction of Kurdish migrants in İzmir and in other cities such as Adana, Bursa, Mersin and Antalya could also produce important results. At this point, I surmise that it is very likely one would find exclusive recognition in these cities as well, as they have been exposed to similar social and economic processes since the mid-1980s. Nevertheless, certain contextually specific micro-level dynamics in these cities could also invalidate this anticipation. Whether or not exclusive recognition exists in Bursa, Adana, Mersin and Antalya can be ascertained only through further research conducted in these cities. This book can provide a preliminary framework for these future studies.

4

THE HISTORICAL SPECIFICITY OF 'EXCLUSIVE RECOGNITION'

This study aims to shed light on the larger social context in which the construction of Kurdish migrants as ethnic others (exclusive recognition) takes place. It is true that exclusive recognition reflects the cognitive world of individuals who ethnicise Kurdish migrants, but it cannot be reduced to an 'individual cognition' shaped predominantly by personal motivations or concerns. Exclusive recognition is a social phenomenon; it expresses a judgement about the social world, it is shared by many people in similar social settings, and it shapes the social practice of individuals. Exclusive recognition is neither a natural antipathy of individuals to 'strangers' nor an individual illusion stemming from exceptional experiences throughout the life course. Rather, it entails the responses of social actors to an assemblage of social structures and social changes, and hence it is always mediated by historical and social factors. In view of this, it is imperative to draw attention to the social mechanisms through which 'exclusive recognition' pervades the cognitive world of its subjects, as well the forms in which it has been expressed in social life. Only when this is done can the analysis of 'exclusive recognition' shed light on the larger social and historical context within which it is formed.

If this is the most fundamental objective of this study, we need to find a suitable point of departure for examining the social roots of exclusive recognition. In analysing this seemingly complicated social phenomenon, it is critical to determine the specific facet or dimension of social life in which the 'exclusive recognition' arises. At this point, it is important to ask whether the middle-class İzmirlis, as the agents of exclusive recognition, borrow these stereotypes primarily from 'outside

sources'. In other words, we need to know whether such images of Kurdishness are indeed longstanding 'ready made' constructions that are systematically imposed 'from above' (Brubaker, 2004: 13); that is, from organised political institutions that would like to inculcate a specific image of 'Kurd' in Turkish society. If exclusive recognition is indeed the product of deliberate manipulation by organised institutions, we will need to focus on those agents, their underlying goals, and the mechanisms through which they influence the perceptions of middle-class İzmirlis.

As many historical examples indicate, nation-states have played important roles in producing and disseminating images about 'other' peoples, cultures and nations (Breuilly, 1993). This has been especially the case in those social formations where the state has taken an important part in constructing and reproducing the idea of the 'nation' and corresponding nationalist ideologies. In order to build a coherent image of 'nation', nationalist states have endeavoured to shape their citizens' perceptions of 'outsider' ethnic groups and nations. These 'outsiders' have been minority groups that live within the borders of the nation-state, as well as other 'rival' nations that are perceived to be enemies (Alonso, 1994: 228). Nationalist state projects of creating a 'national consciousness' among citizens involve attempts to identify and exclude other societies, because the distinctiveness of 'we' can only be constructed by emphasising the 'difference' of 'others' (Eriksen, 1993: 6).

In view of this, we need to know whether the labels, images and stereotypes embedded in 'exclusive recognition' have originated primarily from the nationalist discourses and practices of the Turkish state. It is important to interrogate this, especially given the fact that the Turkish state has historically undertaken a major role in the production of nationalist discourses, symbols, rituals and practices. Therefore, at first glance it may seem logical to assume that because the Turkish state has been the main agent in the orchestration of a national identity, it should also be the major power behind the production and dissemination of the negative representations of 'Kurdishness' which constitute such a significant component of exclusive recognition.

This logic is certainly relevant for the case of 'Armenian' and 'Greek' representations within Turkish society because the state has historically played the pioneering role in the production and reproduction of labels and stereotypes associated with these ethnic groups. Indeed, Armenians and Greeks are no longer a significant part of the social life in Turkey; there has not been any consistent contact or conflict between the

Muslim population and these peoples in the daily life of Turkish cities or towns for half a century. Despite this situation, the categories 'Greek' and 'Armenian' are still imbued with negative stereotypes in the cognitive worlds of many Turkish citizens. This is largely due to the Turkish state's persistent and deliberate attempts either to reproduce and accentuate these images or to create new ones in different spheres of social life in order to promote Turkish nationalism.[1] The otherisation of both Greeks and Armenians has served the purpose of exhibiting the distinctiveness and glory of the Turkish nation (Akçam, 1995; Göl, 2005). This tendency has been so central in public discourse that it even shapes the curriculum of the education system in Turkey (Copeaux, 2006).[2] In view of this, when seeking to uncover the roots of these negative images of Armenians and Greeks, it seems necessary to place the nationalist ideology of the state at the centre of analysis.

With this in mind, we can ask: is it possible to see exclusive recognition, too, as a discourse emanating *primarily and directly* from the Turkish nationalist state? To ask the question differently, is the Kurdishness represented in the discourse of exclusive recognition an extension of mainstream Turkish nationalism's perception of the Kurds? The answers to these questions will serve as the point of departure and will guide the direction of this study in its endeavour to unravel the social and historical context of exclusive recognition. More concretely, the answer to these queries will make it clear to what extent we need to see exclusive recognition as an ideological tool of the Turkish state and the degree to which it therefore makes sense to place the political structure of the state at the centre of this analysis.

This chapter is devoted to providing clear answers to these questions. To this end, I will explore how the Kurds have been conceived in the discourses of the state and of other political agents throughout Turkey's history. I will argue that exclusive recognition does not accord with either the state's official ideology or the discourse of any political organisation and institution within the spectrum of Turkish politics. On the contrary, exclusive recognition seems to be a historically specific phenomenon that develops rather autonomously from the direct involvement of these agents. Thus, one is prompted to look for alternative explanatory social and political processes rather than treating it as an extension of the state discourse. To give some background, this chapter includes a brief summary of the historical development of Turkish society, from the vantage point of the state's Turkish nationalist discourse and representations of the Kurds.

Representation of the Kurds in the Discourse of the Ottoman State

Before examining the view of the state towards the Kurds throughout the history of the Turkish Republic, a brief elaboration on the status of the Kurds under the Ottoman Empire is necessary. This is for two reasons: first, the legacy of Ottoman society determined, to a large extent, the nature of the social and historical context in which the modern Turkish state was established. That is, the state's perception of the Kurds in modern Turkey cannot be grasped adequately without an analysis of the circumstances that were transmitted from the Ottoman period. Second, the foundation of the modern Turkish state, in certain respects, marked a rupture with the political and ideological structures of the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, the analysis of the circumstances in the Ottoman Empire is also significant to indicate the historical unprecedentedness of certain discursive elements of the modern Turkish state.

The Ottoman Empire, which had grown from a small chiefdom to a pre-eminent European power by fifteenth century, had a highly centralised state structure, unlike its contemporaries in feudal Europe. Until the early nineteenth century, the Empire managed to preserve this centralised structure by orchestrating the ideological, political, military and economic affairs in the territories it ruled.

Ottoman society exhibited the typical characteristics of a pre-capitalist social formation in which the relations of production and economic transactions were shaped primarily by efficient exploitation of the land (Berktay, 1989; Quataert, 2000: 28). In the Ottoman social organisation, termed the *millet* system, there was no ethno-linguistic and racial hierarchy. However, a religion-based stratification was an essential part of the imperial system (Yeğen, 1999b: 557). In this hierarchy, Sunni Muslims could occupy a place in the Ottoman bureaucracy regardless of their ethnic background. Being a Sunni Muslim in the Ottoman Empire functioned as a unifying identity that involved Circassians, Bosnians, Turks, Slavs, Arabs and Kurds. As long as different ethnic groups belonged to the Muslim community, they were treated equally as the 'subjects' of the Sultan. As such, Muslims could be recruited to any political and social institution except the Sultanate, which was a hereditary position. In this structure the Kurds, like other Sunni Muslim groups such as the Turks and Arabs, 'were simply called *ra'yat* (subjects), without any ethnic label attached' (Bruinessen, 1992: 46).

When the Ottoman Sultans gained the status of Caliphate (the religious leader of the Islamic world) in the late sixteenth century, the religious bond between the Ottoman administration and the Sunni Muslim population deepened and the ethnic or cultural differences within the Sunni population were further overshadowed by common religious ties. This means that as long as the classical land-based, pre-capitalist social establishment of the Empire persisted, the notions of Kurdishness and the Kurds did not possess any political meaning in the eyes of the Ottoman rulers, since the *modus operandi* of the system was shaped mainly by religious affiliation. This is to say that Kurdishness and even Turkishness were not politicised issues in the classical Ottoman social structure, because neither the Ottoman rulers nor the Kurds themselves viewed Kurdishness as a basis for political and social organisation.[3]

Nevertheless, this classical Ottoman political system was shattered completely in the early nineteenth century; the empire's classical fiefdom-based pre-capitalist social structures started to disintegrate as a result of the penetration of economic, political and social influences of emergent Western European capitalism. The gradually intensifying inflows of European capital destroyed the small producers in the Empire and dragged the domestic economy into an unending cycle of debt (İslamoğlu, 1987). This was coupled with the growing military superiority of the European states, which did not leave any room for the Ottoman state to develop independent international policies. This situation forced the Ottoman state to adopt a 'policy of balancing'; that is, playing one great international power off against another (Jelavich and Jelavich, 1986: 25). These problems went hand in hand with the rapidly rising nationalist independence movements of Christian populations such as the Serbians, Greeks, Bulgarians and Armenians. The combination of all these difficulties prompted the Ottoman state to modernise its political, economic and military structure radically.

Under these circumstances, towards the end of the nineteenth century the Young Turks (Jeune Turks), a political coalition formed by a group of reformist officials in the army and urban intellectuals, gradually increased its political influence *vis-à-vis* the authority of the Sultanate and proceeded to pioneer radical constitutionalist reforms that limited the power of the Ottoman dynasty. These reforms involved the opening of the first Ottoman parliament, which comprised freely elected civil politicians. All of these transformations affected the status of Kurdishness in the discourse of the state as well.

This narrative indicates that nineteenth-century Ottoman history

was marked by the state's diverse political manoeuvres to save the Ottoman social establishment from final dissolution (Deringil, 1993: 166; Zürcher, 2000: 152). Three consecutive strategies or 'modes of policy' came to dominate the agenda: Ottomanism (in the first half of the ninteenth century); Islamism (in the second half of the ninteenth century) and Turkish nationalism (the very end of the ninteenth century and early twentieth century) (Akçura, 1987; Zürcher, 2000: 153).[4] It is important to examine whether the way the Ottoman state identified the Kurds and Kurdishness altered along with these policy changes.

Ottomanism was designed to keep Christian minorities integrated into the existing system, with its emphasis on the equality of all 'Ottoman citizens' (Zürcher, 2000: 153). Having been concerned with the intensification and dissemination of already existing secessionist sentiments among Christian minorities, the state introduced the 'Ottoman' identity as an umbrella category that would encompass all peoples inside the Empire. In particular, the political and social reforms completed in the aftermath of Greek independence in 1829 can be seen as the seeds of the Ottomanist ideological project. It was under this Ottomanist project that the idea of equality before the law was adopted.

Rather than being successful in keeping the Christian minorities loyal to the Empire, Ottomanism stoked existing nationalist currents, because it was interpreted by the non-Muslim nationalists as a 'plot to keep them subjugated to the Sultan' (Karpat, 2001: 317). The international balance of power was also another obstacle to full realisation of the Ottomanist project, as Britain and Russia, the great powers of that century, were supporting these nationalist movements in order to enlarge their spheres of influence in the Ottoman territories. Indeed, despite Ottomanist efforts, almost all Orthodox ethnic groups in the Balkan Peninsula declared their independence, and a strong Armenian nationalist movement was brewing in Eastern Anatolia by the early twentieth century. Despite these obvious signs of its failure, Ottomanism continued to be a 'policy keystone', a central point of reference until the end of Empire (Quataert, 2000: 68). The reasons for this should be sought in the effectiveness of the Ottomanist project in providing the Muslim peoples of the Ottoman Empire with a common identity.

Towards the end of the nineteenth century the Ottoman administration officially recognised that Ottomanism was failing to keep the non-Muslim minorities in the Empire, although it was still effective in pre-

serving the common identity of Muslims. By deploying Ottomanist ide-
ology, the administration could continue to treat different Muslim eth-
nic groups as a unified whole.[5] Kemal Karpat references the 1880 cen-
sus as an example of this point: 'the census previously had categorised
the population solely on the basis of faith as Muslim, Christian, Jew,
Gypsy but after 1880 a new system classified the Christians according
to their ethno-linguistic affiliation and Muslims solely on the basis of
their faith' (2000: 9).

This indicates that the state's view of the Kurds and Kurdishness
did not undergo a radical change under the Ottomanist project. As the
census shows, while the ethnic differences of the Christian minorities
were recognised in state discourse, the Kurds, as a Sunni Muslim group,
were not identified by their ethnic origins but rather continued to be
regarded as loyal Muslim subjects of the Ottoman monarchy. This is
not to suggest that the state denied the presence of Kurds in the
Ottoman Empire or prevented the expression of Kurdish culture and
language in social life. On the contrary, Kurds were free to express their
own culture and speak their own language. Yet the Ottoman state
grouped the Kurds under the larger category of 'Muslimhood', even as
their Kurdishness was recognised. In other words, the Kurdishness of
the Kurds did not have political significance under the Ottomanist proj-
ect.

The second mode of politics that was proposed as a blueprint for
saving the Ottoman Empire was Islamism. This strategy aimed to
'maintain the unity of remaining Muslim elements on Ottoman territo-
ry' with its emphasis on the leadership of the Caliphate and the notion
of Muslim brotherhood (Yeğen, 1996: 220). Islamism became an effec-
tive state ideology between 1876 and 1908 under the reign of
Abdulhamid II. In this period, and especially after the independence of
Serbia, Montenegro and Romania in 1878, the Ottoman state bureau-
cracy felt that it was no longer realistic to hope to keep the non-Muslim
Balkan nations inside the Empire (Zürcher, 2000: 155). Instead, it
seemed more imperative to prevent the nascent nationalisms of Muslim
ethnic groups, such as Kurds and Arabs, from turning into strong seces-
sionist movements, which could conceivably deliver the last blow to the
Empire. This strategy was also designed to weaken the social and polit-
ical influence of a (still embryonic) Turkish nationalism, which would
aim to build a Turkish nation-state in the territories dominated by the
Empire.

In those historical periods when Islamism became one of the pre-

dominant official modes of policy, the representation of the Kurds as loyal Muslim subjects of the Empire remained intact. However, the Islamist discourses of the state excluded non-Muslim 'infidel' subjects, proposing a 'cross-cutting' identity only for the Sunni Muslim groups. Under Islamism, because the common Islamic identity was superimposed over the different national or ethnic identities, the Kurds were not subject to special treatment. This policy preserved and even reinforced the existing 'patron-client' relationship between the Kurdish tribe leaders and the Ottoman state to such an extent that the former fought against the Armenian nationalist organisations in the region towards the end of the nineteenth century (White, 2000: 60-75).

Turkish nationalism, the third policy mode, was based on the strategy of reconstructing the Ottoman state according to the imagined interests of the Turkish nation. In the early twentieth century, nationalist ideals and movements were spreading rapidly amongst the Albanian, Arab and (to a lesser extent) Kurdish Muslim communities (Berkes, 1964: 319; Poulton, 1997: 86). This situation provoked the emergence of strong Turkish nationalist sentiments that gained strength through the political activities of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) (Okyar, 1984: 47). This was a secret political organisation that saw the ideals of Turkish nationalism as the last resort to protect at least the Anatolian territories where Turkish Muslims constitute the majority. This organisation and its nationalism received some support from reformist intellectuals, military officials, bureaucrats, civil servants and urban artisans (Ahmad, 1993: 34). The support of the latter (being the primary economic victims of the inflow of European capital and commodities) was particularly important for the rise of the CUP as a mass movement (Berkes, 1964: 329).

The increasing political power and public legitimacy of the CUP culminated in the demise of the autocratic regime of the Islamist Sultan Abdulhamid II and the establishment of a more democratic constitutional monarchy in 1908. In the aftermath of the 1908 Revolution, the CUP cadres managed to obtain the most significant positions in the Ottoman bureaucracy, government, parliament and military. In 1913, on the eve of the World War I, they seized absolute control of the Ottoman government and dragged the country into the war as a German ally.

Unlike Ottomanism and Islamism, Turkish nationalist ideology is based on the prioritisation of the Turkish national identity. In this respect, it did not offer any cross-cutting identity that would embrace

the non-Turkish Sunni Muslim peoples. Therefore, it might be reasonable to expect that the Turkish nationalist project of the CUP would exclude the Kurds or modify representations of Kurdishness in the discourse of the state. However, in spite of this reasonable expectation, one cannot find solid signs of a radical change in the image of Kurds; this is true even just before and during the World War I (1913-1915), when the CUP fully controlled the political, military and ideological apparatus of the state.

This situation is related to the fact that the CUP cadres could not formulate and practise a coherent Turkish nationalist political programme in which the status of the Kurds could be clearly defined. This was due largely to the extremely weak social and historical roots of Turkish nationalism at the time, which was neither a longstanding world-view of Turkish intellectuals[6] in the Ottoman Empire nor the ideology of a mass nationalist social movement. It was rather a delayed reaction to the dissolution of the Empire and to the secessionist nationalisms of the non-Turkish people groups (and especially Armenians) in the Ottoman Empire (Berkes, 1964: 318-24). In the absence of a clear understanding of Turkishness or any solid discourse determining the position of the Kurds *vis-à-vis* the 'Turkish nation', the classical Ottomanist or Islamist Kurdish policy remained in effect. In other words, the policy of seeing the Kurds as a Sunni Muslim group loyal to the Ottoman throne did not change significantly under the CUP administration.

Another significant reason for the continuation of the traditional status of the Kurds under the project of Turkish nationalism resides in CUP's realpolitik concerns and strategic calculations before and during the World War I. The support of the Kurds, like that of all other Muslim communities, was important for ensuring popular mobilisation against the Allied powers in the War. The support of the Kurds was especially important as 'they were the dominant community in lands cohabited by Armenians, which the central Ottoman government had seen for decades as a region that was susceptible to domestic and foreign intrigues' (Klein, 2007: 145).[7]

Accordingly, it is possible to contend that rather than introducing pejorative and antagonistic discourses excluding the Kurds, Turkish nationalist cadres, in the closing years of the Ottoman Empire, continued to see them as a peripheral Muslim population. This view was not very different from the classical Ottomanist and Islamist visions of the Ottoman state. This might explain why many Kurdish nationalists of

the era remained committed to the idea of 'Ottoman citizenship' until after the World War I (Klein, 2007: 145-7; Özoğlu, 2004: 80).[8]

The Kurds in the Eyes of the Resistance Movement

The defeat of the Ottoman Empire in the World War I ruined the CUP's long-term plans of transforming the decaying Ottoman Empire into a strong national state. The Mudros Armistice Treaty signed with the Allied Powers on 30 October 1918 involved extremely harsh terms and sanctions that opened the Ottoman territories to occupation by the Allies and marked the onset of foreign control over Anatolia. While the existing Ottoman government did not resist the occupation of the Ottoman territories, an independent resistance movement and armed struggle emerged under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, an Ottoman army officer. The resistance movement was a reaction especially to the Greek invasion of Western Anatolia and the possibility of an Armenian state in Eastern Anatolia (Berkes, 1964: 432).

Accordingly, several congresses were organised in which notables from different provinces in Anatolia came together and debated the strategies of the independence movement. The outcome of these congresses was the establishment of the Grand National Assembly, on 23 April 1920. Mustafa Kemal and his associates, the leadership of the resistance movement, proclaimed that since the Ottoman government had collaborated with the Allied powers, thereby failing to represent the interests of Muslims in Anatolia, the Grand National Assembly should be seen as the only legitimate representative of the 'nation'. The divide between the Ottoman administration and the resistance movement was deepened further when the former signed the Sevres Peace Treaty in August 1920, which officially turned over specific territories in Anatolia to France, Greece, Italy and Britain. This treaty also drew the borders of the new Armenian state that was to be established in Eastern Anatolia. The Sevres Treaty made the collaborative character of the existing Ottoman administration and Sultanate more explicit. Under these circumstances, the resistance movement embarked on a war on two fronts: one against the Ottoman Sultanate and the other against the Allied powers (Berkes, 1964: 433-34).

As a result, the movement had to carry out both a military and political programme throughout its resistance. The movement declared that its military objective was to save the fatherland (*vatan*) from the foreign occupiers, while its most fundamental political goal was to impose the national will upon the liberated territories. Undoubtedly, the tendency

to highlight the notions of 'national will', 'national sovereignty' and 'fatherland' indicates that, despite the failure of its political projects in the World War I, the CUP continued to have an ideological influence on the resistance movement (Zürcher, 1984: 104). Indeed, Mustafa Kemal, as the leader of this resistance movement, is known to have been linked to the CUP (Deringil, 1993: 171).

Noting the historical link between the CUP and the resistance movement is not intended to imply that Mustafa Kemal and his associates employed a radical Turkish nationalist and irredentist discourse throughout their struggle against the Allied powers and the Ottoman Sultanate. Indeed, the main objective of Mustafa Kemal's movement was to build the greatest unity possible among an ethnically mixed Muslim population in Anatolia and to mobilise them against the Allied powers under the umbrella of the resistance movement (Ahmad, 1993: 48). In order to form the largest bloc possible, the leadership of the movement tended to deploy the concept of 'national will' (*milli irade*) to promote the independence and sovereignty of Muslims in territories where they constituted the majority (Zürcher, 2000: 167; Ahmad, 1993: 48). In this way, the resistance movement aimed to be the only representative of Muslims in Anatolia at the expense of the existing Ottoman administration and Sultanate. Mirroring the situation of the CUP during the World War I, an ethnicity-based nationalist discourse was not taken up, as this was likely to alienate large sections of the population and therefore weaken the influence of the resistance movement. In this sense, 'Turkish identity' continued to be overshadowed by 'Muslimhood' in the aftermath of the World War I as well. Therefore, as Erik Zürcher suggests, it is reasonable to define the ideology of the movement as 'Muslim nationalism' instead of 'Turkish nationalism' (2000: 161).

However, it is important to note one important difference between Islamism in the Ottoman Empire and 'Muslim nationalism' in the resistance movement: while the former sought the unification of all Sunni Muslims in the Empire, the latter aimed to mobilise only the Muslims of the Anatolian Peninsula. This meant that the Arabian Peninsula was excluded from the resistance movement's conception of the 'national' borders.[9] In so doing, the leadership of the resistance movement was designating 'territory' as one of the defining characteristics of the 'nation'. From the perspective of 'Muslim nationalism,' the national territories were those that were 'controlled and defended by the Ottoman army on the day of armistice' (Zürcher, 2000: 169). It was

within this specifically defined territory, including Kurdish-populated Eastern Anatolia, that the 'national will' was to be exercised.

This position was clearly reflected in the national and local congresses of the resistance movement. Such phrases as 'the Muslims who form one nation (*millet*), consisting of Turks and Kurds' and 'the Muslim majority consisting of Turks and Kurds who for centuries have mixed their blood in an intimate relationship and who form the community (*ümmet*) of one prophet' clearly indicates the religious basis of the conception of nation in the discourse of the resistance (Zürcher, 2000: 164-65).

However, closer examination of these statements shows that the Kurds were at the same time articulated as part of the Muslim community and recognised by the resistance movement as a separate ethnic group entitled to certain cultural and political rights and freedoms (Zürcher, 2000: 166). This was probably the first time in Ottoman history that the Kurds were considered a political ally and promised certain rights and freedoms *on the basis of their ethnic or 'racial' distinctiveness*. The following words of Mustafa Kemal indicate this point explicitly:

> there are Turks and Kurds. We do not separate them. But while we are busy to defend and protect, of course, the nation is not one element. There are various bonded Muslim elements. Every Muslim element which makes this entity are citizens. They respect each other, they have every kind of right, racial, social and geographical. We repeated this over and over again. We admit this honestly. However our interests are together. The unity we are trying to create is not only Turkish or Circassian. It is a mixture of one element. (quoted in McDowall, 2000: 188)

In the later stages of the resistance, Mustafa Kemal went so far as to talk about the possibility of granting local autonomy to the Kurds, by stating that 'whichever provinces are predominantly Kurd will administer themselves autonomously' (quoted in McDowall, 2000: 189). In 1922, the same issue came to the agenda of the Grand National Assembly (Kutlay, 1997: 139).[10]

The resistance movement's strategy of embracing the Muslims of Anatolia and mobilising them against the occupiers seemed to be effective; besides the Kurds and the Turks, other Muslim communities in Anatolia gave considerable support to the struggle of the resistance movement.[11] Owing to this support, Mustafa Kemal and his associates

managed to form a standing army against the occupiers by 1922 in spite of many difficulties. The surprising victory of the army in blocking the advance of Greek forces in Western Anatolia increased the resistance movement's power and legitimacy in Anatolia and in the international context, thereby enabling its leadership to raise demands more confidently.

The victory of the Turkish resistance movement against the Greeks forced the European powers to revise the conditions of the Sevres Treaty. In order to negotiate more favourable terms for the Turkish side, the leadership of the resistance movement was invited to the Lausanne Peace Conference in October 1922. This marked the resistance movement as a legitimate representative of Muslims in Anatolia. However, because the existing Ottoman administration was also invited to this conference, the Turkish side was represented by two opposing parties: the Ottoman government on the one side and the resistance movement on the other. It was understood that the ongoing rift between these two parties would conceivably weaken the Turkish voice at the conference. More importantly, this situation was at odds with the resistance movement's ultimate objective of becoming the only legitimate authority representing Muslims in Anatolia. This situation was interpreted by the Turkish resistance movement as an opportunity to remove the Ottoman administration completely. They declared the abolition of the Sultanate and the end of the Ottoman state on 1 November 1922, just before the Lausanne Conference. Such a radical move indicated that the leadership of the resistance movement had accumulated enough political power to launch the process of a political revolution in Anatolia. In the end, the leadership movement took part in the Lausanne Conference as the only representative of the Turkish side. After a series of meetings that lasted until 24 July 1923, most of the territorial, economic and military demands of the national resistance movement were met. It was through the Lausanne Conference that a sovereign Turkish state emerged and the national borders of modern Turkey were articulated.

The tendency of the resistance movement to see the Kurds as both an integral component of the (Muslim) nation in Anatolia, and a separate ethnic group with certain political and cultural rights, was reflected in its declarations at the Lausanne Conference. As a response to British delegates at the conference who raised the question of Kurdish autonomy in the newly emerging independent Turkish state, the representative of the resistance movement, İsmet İnönü, highlighted the 'brother-

hood of the Kurds and Turks'. İnönü emphasised that the Kurds were not a minority, but an integral part of the nation entitled to state-guaranteed cultural rights and freedoms (Kutlay, 1997: 160; Özcan, 2006: 78). This was the official view adopted at the local and national congresses held in 1919. However, soon after the foundation of the Turkish Republic this view was to be abandoned completely.

The Kurds in the Discourse of the Modern Turkish State

Just three months after the Lausanne Treaty, on 29 October 1923, Mustafa Kemal and his associates declared at the Grand National Assembly that the new state would be a Republic. Mustafa Kemal, whose legitimacy and reputation increased remarkably in both domestic and international context due to his leadership of the Turkish resistance movement after the World War I, was elected the first president of the 'Republic of Turkey'. This new state was founded on the ruins left by the World War I. The immigration of Muslims escaping from the massacres in the Balkan and Caucasus regions, forced mass deportations of Armenians and the emigration of Greeks had made Anatolia the homeland of an overwhelmingly Muslim population. Non-Muslims comprised only 2,64 per cent of the total population in 1927, down from 20 per cent in 1912. This shows the magnitude of the demographic change that took place throughout and soon after the World War I (Çağaptay, 2006b: 88). Indeed, demographic shifts created the necessary socio-cultural and demographic conditions for a transition from a multi-ethnic Empire to a nation-state.

The foundation of the Republic of Turkey marked the onset of a significant change in the state's practice and discourse regarding the Kurds. In the discourse of the new Turkish state, the Kurds were neither the loyal Muslim subjects of the Sultanate nor a component of the Muslim nation with ethnic and racial distinctiveness. Rather, the Kurds became 'prospective Turks'; a community that could be assimilated into the 'Turkish nation' (Yeğen, 2006). The reasons for this shift have their roots in the historical conditions of the early Turkish Republic.

In the early years of the Republic, the new Turkish state initiated what would become a rapid modernisation of economic, political and ideological structures. This process, lasting from the 1920s to the 1950s, was later referred to as Kemalism, because of the leadership role that Mustafa Kemal and his loyal associate İsmet İnönü played in this period (Aydın, 2005: 96).

The Kemalist power instigated a radical transformation in the polit-

ical sphere. And yet, the modernisation of political structures started long before the foundation of Turkey. The promulgation of the first constitution, the opening of a national parliament in 1876, and the introduction of a free election system with multiple parties in 1908 were already achieved before the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. The underlying objective of all these radical reforms was to save the multi-ethnic structure of the Ottoman state from final dissolution. However, the rationale behind the political transformation in the early years of the Turkish Republic was qualitatively different; Kemalist elites aimed to abolish all remnants of the Ottoman political system and to replace it with a new secular national state. The abolition of the Caliphate in 1924 and the subsequent radical secularist reforms, such as the closure of religious schools and dervish lodges, and the ratification of a secular civil code, indicated that the modern state elite was determined to replace the Islamic character of the state with a secular national identity (Çağaptay, 2006a: 13-14).

The transformation of the 'political' in the early Republican Period represented a nation and state-building process rather than the reformation of the existing state structure. Therefore, it is misleading to envision the political reforms in the Republic period as a simple continuation of the modernisation process that started in the nieteenth-century Ottoman Empire. Nation-state building in Turkey was rather a radical process whereby the basis of the state's legitimacy was redefined through the emergence of novel norms and principles. Most significantly, the idea of national interest became articulated in a secular sense and the concept of nation was no longer based *solely* on Muslimhood; it was redefined along ethnic, cultural and citizenship lines.

In accordance with transformations at the political level, the ideological realm underwent deep changes during the Kemalist period. The early years of the Turkish Republic witnessed the rise of Turkish nationalism as the main official ideology of the state. This entailed the restructuring of official symbols, values, institutions and discourses along nationalist lines. It is true that the ideational and political roots of Turkish nationalism extend back to the intellectual and political climate of the nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire, but Turkish nationalism of the Kemalist period differed in two interrelated respects. Firstly, Turkish nationalism was articulated as the *only* official nationalist ideology in the period of Kemalism, while Turkish nationalism coexisted with Ottomanist and Islamist ideologies right until the demise of the Empire. Secondly, it was only with the formation of the Turkish

Republic that the state elite could designate 'Turkishness' as the identity of both the state and society (Özdoğan, 2001: 55). As opposed to ideological formations in the last years of the Ottoman Empire, Turkish nationalism was no longer based on the common interests and unity of Sunni Muslims. The 'Turk' was no longer conceptualised as one of the equal components of the Sunni Muslim population in Anatolia; rather, it functioned as a demarcation that distinguished nation, state and society from 'others'. From the perspective of Turkish nationalism, it was the 'Turkish nation' that had sovereignty over the specified territories of the Republic of Turkey, and the 'Turkish state' that was responsible for the protection and fulfilment of national interests. This logic has persisted throughout the history of modern Turkey.

Ironically, the Turkish state elite was able to construct a 'secular' notion of nationality owing to the fact that Anatolia had become a religiously homogeneous province by 1923 due to the deportation of Christians during the World War I. The state elite expected that the multi-ethnic population in Anatolia would be assimilated gradually through identification with 'Turkishness' because of shared cultural elements stemming from Sunni Muslimhood. In other words, although the conception of nation was distanced from its 'religious' elements, it was the presence of an overwhelmingly Muslim majority in Anatolia that encouraged the Turkish state elite to construct Turkishness as a secular national identity (Gülalp, 2006: 25).

This striking shift in what is meant by 'Turkish' mirrored changing representations of Kurds. The image of Kurdishness cannot be considered in isolation from Turkishness. The category of 'Turk' gained multiple meanings in the official discourse of modern Turkey. Today, the meaning of Turkishness remains unclear, as does the designation of who is to be included or excluded from the 'Turkish nation'. Indeed, the ambiguous content of Turkish nationalism can be seen as a sign of its weak social and intellectual basis. It was primarily the Turkish state, rather than a mass movement or class dynamic, that constructed the main assumptions, symbols and values of Turkish nationalism. Having control over the mechanisms of ideological production in the early years of the Republic, the state could manipulate the category of 'Turkishness' and 'Turkish nationalism' in accordance with its needs and interests in both national and international contexts (Özdoğan, 2001). The result was the emergence of different official interpretations of what constitutes a 'Turk'.

These different conceptions of 'Turk' can be categorised under

three headings: civic, cultural and ethnic (Çağaptay, 2006b: 110; Bora, 2006: 85-86). These discourses have coexisted throughout the history of Turkey, but the weight of any of these nationalisms in the official discourse of the state has varied depending on social and historical circumstances (Bora, 2006). State articulations of the Kurds also varied in relation to these different forms of Turkish nationalism. However, the common element in all of these forms of nationalism is that they all refused to recognise the Kurds as a separate ethnic group; assimilation of the Kurds into the larger 'Turkish nation' was emphasised instead. This indicates that the mainstream Turkish nationalism of the state, except some sporadic statements from some of political elite, did not involve a discourse like 'exclusive recognition', which recognises and excludes the Kurds through certain pejorative labels and stereotypes. A closer examination of these different forms of Turkish nationalism will show, more clearly, the logical incompatibility between the nationalist state discourse and that of 'exclusive recognition'.

The civic sense of Turkish nationalism defines 'Turkish' on the basis of citizenship, and promotes the idea that every citizen of the Republic of Turkey is considered 'Turkish' regardless of racial and ethnic difference. According to this formulation Turkishness is constructed as a broad category that seems to involve not only the Kurds and other Muslim groups, but also the non-Muslim minorities such as Greeks, Jews and Armenians, as long as they are citizens of the Turkish Republic. However, this notion of Turkishness could not go beyond an abstract principle in the Turkish Constitution, because, in practice, ethnic or cultural forms of Turkish nationalism have shaped the practices and discourses of the Turkish state.

Mesut Yeğen, a prominent scholar of the Kurdish question in Turkey, argues that this precariousness *vis-à-vis* the conception of 'Turkishness' is embedded even in those constitutional texts which, at first glance, seem to be based on a civic nationalism (Yeğen, 2007b: 8). On the one hand, the 1924 constitution proclaims that 'the people of Turkey, regardless of their religion and race will, *in terms of citizenship*, be called Turkish'. On the other hand, the 1960 constitution simply says: 'Everyone who is tied to the Turkish State through citizenship ties is Turkish'. The difference that Yeğen detects between these statements is the expression, 'in terms of citizenship', that existed in 1924 but not in 1961. This extra phrase indicates that in the 1920s the state officially accepted in its Constitution that there are some other conceptions of 'Turkish' that are not based only on citizenship. Soner Çağaptay, anoth-

er Turkish researcher examining citizenship practices in Turkey, high-lights the same point when he asserts that the 1924 Constitution 'need-ed to recognise Armenians, Jews and other non-Muslims as Turks-by-citizenship and not as Turks-by-nationality' (Çağaptay, 2006a: 15).

This was not only the case for the 1924 Constitution; similar kinds of ambiguities can be found in the 1961 and 1982 constitutions as well. Therefore, by relying only on the civic form of Turkish nationalism as manifested in these constitutions, one cannot fully grasp what is meant by 'Turk' and 'Kurd' in the discourse of the state. This makes it neces-sary to consider the cultural and ethnic conceptions of Turkish nation-alism.

The ideational roots of cultural nationalism can be traced in the intellectual works of Ziya Gökalp, an early twentieth-century Ottoman intellectual, who proposed that 'Turkishness' should be defined accord-ing to the common cultural features of *people living in Anatolia*. This implies that being a 'Turk', for Gökalp, should be based on two things: first, living inside the territories of Turkey; and second, sharing the cul-ture typical to these territories (Ünüvar, 2002: 28-37). Gökalp saw the roots of this common culture in the ways in which people in Anatolia practised Islam. In this line of reasoning, Islam represented more the 'routines of daily life and socialisation for the Muslims' than a universal belief system (Çağaptay, 2006a: 15). The cultural variant of Turkish nationalism thus views common Islamic values and beliefs as the basic ingredients of national identity.

In this formulation, non-Muslim minorities of Anatolia could not share a common culture with the Muslim population of Anatolia, and were therefore excluded from the category of 'Turk' and inscribed as 'outsiders'. On the other hand, because they shared the same religion, the Kurds and all other Muslim peoples of Anatolia were considered 'prospective Turks', as they exhibited similar cultural features with the latter. This cultural conception of 'Turkish' permeated the lives of ordi-nary people much more easily than its ethnic or civic variants. This is expressed in the fact that Muslim communities in Turkey such as Bosnians, Arabs, Georgians and Circassians have been typically per-cieved as a part of Turkish nation, while non-Muslims have been thought of as minorities even though they could speak Turkish (Çağaptay, 2006a: 1). This cultural nationalist discourse became a pre-dominant element of official ideology after the 1950s and was used par-ticularly by right-wing conservative governments which were critical of the radical secularist policies of the Kemalist period.

However, cultural nationalism was present in the discourse of Kemalists as well. In fact, the official documents of the Republican People's Party (the ruling party headed by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk) provide many overt examples of the culture-based conception of 'Turkish'. In 1927, the party administration declared that only those citizens who 'have accepted the Turkish culture and the Party's principles' were eligible for membership of the RPP. This indicated that the state saw the collective values and shared beliefs (mostly of a religious nature in those times) as the constituent elements of Turkishness (Çağaptay, 2006a: 15).

As the third form of Turkish nationalism, ethnic nationalism defined 'Turk' as an ethnic or racial category. It traced the origins of the 'Turks' to the Central Asian plateaus in ancient times, from where Turkish ethnicity was believed to have spread all over the world. This variant of Turkish nationalism identified Turkish ethnicity with the 'Turkish nation', and denied the existence of other ethnicities in Anatolia. This ethnicist nationalism glorified the Turkish race by identifying it with certain superior traits, such as competence at fighting, building states, and being intelligent and innovative (Poulton, 1997: 106). Accordingly, the Turks are believed to have established many states throughout history, starting from the Hun dynasties 2000 years ago and extending to the current Republic of Turkey. It was this conception of history, for instance, that left its stamp on the course books and curriculum in public schools between the 1930s and 1960s (Poulton, 1997: 102-3). From this perspective, neither citizenship nor cultural features determine whether somebody is Turkish or not; rather, it is 'racial roots' which are of significance.

The ethnicist version of nationalism has been an integral component of official Turkish nationalism, but its level of importance has changed from one period to another. It became most prominent during the 1930s, when the rise of fascist regimes in Europe inspired the discourses and practices of the regime in Turkey (Zürcher, 1993: 194; Maksudyan, 2005). In this period, the foundation of the Society for the Study of Turkish History (*Türk Tarihini Tetkik Cemiyeti*) and Society for the Study of the Turkish Language (*Türk Dili Tetkik Cemiyeti*) in 1931 are the best examples of attempts to institutionalise ethnic Turkish nationalism. These institutions were established on the order of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, and were entrusted with conducting pseudo-scientific research seeking to prove that the Turks are one of the oldest civilisations in Anatolia and that all Muslim ethnic groups in Turkey are descendants of Turks (Çağaptay, 2006a: 50; Poulton, 1997: 103). The

'researches' carried out at these institutions put forward two theses with regard to the Turkishness of all peoples in Anatolia: the first was the Sun Language Thesis (*Gunes Dil Teorisi*) in which it was argued that all indigenous languages in Anatolia were derived from old Turkish, and therefore all ethnic groups in Anatolia were descended from Turks (Hirschler, 2001: 2; Zürcher, 1993: 199). The second was the Turkish History Thesis (*Türk Tarih Tezi*) that complemented the first thesis as it claimed, with distorted historical evidence, that Turks were the ancestors of ancient civilizations of Anatolia such as Sumerians and Hittites. These pseudo-scientific explanations were officially accepted by the Turkish state and underpinned the history curriculum in public schools (Poulton, 1997: 104).

In this ethnicist understanding, it is clear that non-Muslim minorities have been excluded from the 'circle of Turkish', considered to be lacking in the superior characteristics that the Turks have possessed (Yeğen, 2007b: 2). When this ethnicist Turkish nationalism gained prominence in the 1930s and 1940s, the Christian minorities were targeted by discriminatory state policies such as the Capital Tax Law of 1942, by which they were forced to pay taxes ten times higher than Muslims (Aktar, 1996). However, the Kurds and other Muslim communities, such as Circassians and Lazs were not exposed to such systematic exclusion in the periods when ethnic nationalism became predominant. The reason for this is that even in some crude forms of ethnic nationalism, it was typically claimed that the Kurds and other Muslim ethnic groups were indeed ethnically Turkish in origin. The ethnicist Turkish nationalism of the state did not recognise the Kurds as a distinct group for derogatory purposes, except in some rare and sporadic cases. Rather, the Kurds were considered one of the oldest Turkish clans in Anatolia, who lost their consciousness of Turkishness as they were assimilated by the Persians and Arabs. Accordingly, it was claimed that the Kurdish language is in fact a dialect of Turkish, which was distorted as a result of the influence of Arabic and Persian in Eastern Anatolia (Çağaptay, 2006a: 21) Even though this thesis contradicted the reality that Kurdish and Turkish belong to different language families, the state continued to defend this 'thesis' up until the 1990s. These ideological efforts went hand in hand with repressive political and military measures that prevented the expression of any Kurdish challenge to the existing system, and facilitated the cooption of the Kurds into the Turkish nation. The replacement of Kurdish names of small villages and towns with Turkish names was an example of these policies.

The aftermath of the 1980 military coup was another period in which the ethnicist forms of Turkish nationalism became the predominant ideology of the state. With regard to the situation of the Kurds, the coup administration's ethnic nationalism was as crude as it was in the 1930s. Any expression of the Kurdish language and culture in any sphere of social life was strictly banned and anybody talking about the existence of the Kurds as a distinct group was arrested (Kirişçi and Winrow, 1997: 111).

At first glance, civic or cultural forms of nationalism might seem to contradict or be in competition with the ethnic variant of nationalism. However, given the decades-long 'peaceful coexistence' of all three forms of nationalism in the official ideology of the state, this would be a misleading interpretation. Ethnic nationalism was not a sporadic phenomenon that existed only in extraordinary periods of modern Turkish history; rather, as stated earlier, it was always coexistent with the civic and cultural forms of Turkish nationalism, although its weight and power varied from one period to another. And their coexistence has been quite harmonious in two senses: first, cultural and civic nationalisms were used to parry any counter-hegemonic ethnic nationalist movements that might arise among non-Turkish groups in Turkey. When people from other ethnic groups, particularly the Kurds, have asserted their ethnic-based cultural and political demands in opposition to the glorification and prioritisation of Turkish ethnicity, Turkish authorities have used the language of civic and cultural nationalism to ward off these demands. In these situations, they typically put forward the idea that the category of 'Turkish', in essence, does not connate a particular ethnicity, but the common identity of all peoples living in Anatolia regardless of their origins. As a response to an ethnic nationalist challenge, the state elite typically take refuge in the idea that 'everyone living within the borders of the Turkish Republic who considers themselves Turkish is Turkish' (Robbins, 1993: 661). Accordingly, the ethnic nationalist demands of the Kurds were deemed to be a separatist challenge to the unity of the Turkish nation. In short, this unique and contradictory coexistence of civic, cultural and ethnic modes of Turkish nationalism enabled the Turkish state to proclaim the illegitimacy of non-Turkish ethnic nationalist movements and ideas, while continuing to promote Turkish ethnic nationalism. Secondly, and more importantly, the coexistence of these three forms of nationalism aimed to facilitate the assimilation of the Kurds into the category of 'Turkish'. A state ideology which consists solely of ethnic nationalist themes and symbols

would have alienated the non-Turkish Muslim groups from the existing political system and created friction between the Turks and other ethnic groups in society. It was the cultural and civic forms of Turkish nationalism that made it possible, at least to a certain extent, for the Kurds and other peoples of Anatolia to identify themselves with the 'Turkish nation'. Accordingly, it can be argued that the coexistence of these seemingly contradictory variants of Turkish nationalism helped the state extend its 'margin of political and ideological manoeuvring', especially in the case of the assimilation and integration of the Kurds (Bora, 2003: 437).

The coexistence of these three forms of Turkish nationalism made it at least possible for the Kurds of Turkey to obtain equal rights and opportunities as long as they did not express their Kurdishness. This was how some Kurds were able to reach important positions in political and business circles. In the final analysis, such a harmonious coexistence of these forms of Turkish nationalism did not aim to exclude the Kurds from Turkish society systematically, on an ethnic or racial basis; rather, it aimed to assimilate and integrate the Kurds into a glorified 'Turkish' nation (Aydın S, 2005; Çağaptay, 2006a: 63).[12]

This assimilationist strategy was a success story *par excellence* for the non-Kurdish Muslim groups in Anatolia, such as the Circassians, Lazs, Georgians, Bosnians and Albanians, in that a great majority of people from these relatively small communities identified themselves as a part of Turkish nation. Today, most of these groups are so assimilated into the 'Turkish nation' that one can barely distinguish their ethnicity in daily life.

However, this strategy was not as effective in the case of the Kurds. Even though the state managed to assimilate a great many Kurds into the Turkish nation, it has faced resistance from the Kurdish population since its foundation. This is related to the demographic features of the Kurdish population. According to the 1927 census, the Kurds constituted the largest non-Turkish ethnic group, with a population of 1,184,446 in a country that hosted 13,542,795 people in total. Their numbers rendered them much larger than any other non-Turkish community in Turkey. In addition, unlike other non-Turkish ethnic groups who were spread across Turkey, the Kurds were concentrated specifically in Eastern Anatolia and constituted an overwhelming majority in this region (Çağaptay, 2006a: 19). These factors made the assimilation of the Kurds more difficult than that of other Muslim communities. We should also highlight the significance of a strong Kurdish nationalist

movement which emerged in Northern Iraq in the 1920s; this functioned as an impediment to assimilation to the extent that the Kurds' ethnic consciousness was kept alive (Saraçoğlu, 2005).

The Kurdish resistance to integration manifested itself in the nationalist rebellions that occurred in the early years of the Turkish Republic. Of the 18 rebellions that took place between 1924 and 1928, the 1925 Sheikh Said Rebellion (Şeyh Said İsyanı) was the first large-scale Kurdish nationalist uprising (Kirisci and Winrow, 1997: 100). This rebellion was instituted by Kurdish religious leaders who were discontented with the Turkish state's radical secularist reforms. It obtained the support of a considerable number of Kurds in the region. Although the rebellion was predicated on a nationalist objective, the establishment of an independent Kurdistan, 'its mobilisation, propaganda, and symbols were those of a religious rebellion' (Olson, 1989: 153). Indeed, the religious themes of the rebellion complemented its nationalist cause. This was because it was the secular character of the Turkish state that abolished the traditional status that the Kurds had maintained in the Ottoman Empire. The Islamic character of the Ottoman state previously ensured the equality of the Kurds *vis-à-vis* other Muslim ethnic groups on the basis of sharing the same religion. This religion-based 'tacit contract' between the peripheral Kurdish population and the state was dismantled with the foundation of the Turkish Republic (Bozarslan, 2003: 186).

The predominance of religious themes in the rebellion created a justification for the Turkish state to suppress it by strict coercive measures (Poulton, 1997: 96). The Turkish state denied and obscured the ethnic nationalist character of the rebellion by treating it as a primitive religious rebellion that threatened the progressive modernist reforms in the country (Tunçay, 1981: 29; Kutlay, 1997: 178). The Kurdish uprisings, of varying strengths, did not stop until the late 1930s. Despite receiving some support from the Kurdish people in the region, these rebellions were not strong enough to force the Turkish state to change its established nationalist line. On the contrary, from the 1920s to the 1950s, ethnic nationalist components of Turkish nationalism gradually gained ground in the official ideology of the state and denial of the Kurdish identity continued unabated.[13]

The Turkish state did not face a serious challenge to its traditional policy on the Kurds until the rise of the PKK in the early 1980s. The PKK was one of the Marxist and Kurdish nationalist organisations that appeared in the ideological and political climate of the late 1970s

(Natali, 2005: 112; Özoğlu, 2004: 127). It started as a small, urban-based clandestine guerrilla organisation that aimed to establish a socialist state in the eastern regions of Turkey. In the 1980s, the PKK's military power and political influence strengthened to the extent that it began to stage almost daily attacks on Turkish military forces in Eastern Anatolia. Since then, the PKK and the Kurdish question have remained significant political problems in Turkey (see Chapter 6 for more information on the rise of the PKK movement).

The Turkish state continued to employ its traditional assimilationist strategy when dealing with the PKK in the 1980s and 1990s. In accordance with its traditional discourse, the state denied the 'Kurdish' dimension of the PKK problem and reduced it to a problem of 'terrorism' and 'economic underdevelopment'. With the help of the mainstream media, the PKK was portrayed as an 'externally incited' organisation that conspired against the Turkish state by making propagandistic use of the economic grievances of the people living in Eastern Anatolia. In order to conceal the ethno-political dimensions of the PKK, some politicians even claimed that the PKK militants were not Kurds or Turks but foreigners who wanted to weaken and divide Turkey. The most outrageous statement came from the former interior minister, Meral Akşener, in 1996, when he described Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of PKK, as 'Armenian seed'. Rather than dismissing this extreme example as a slip of the tongue, we can view it as a typical expression of the logic behind Turkish nationalism: the Muslim minorities, including Kurds, were thought to be 'prospective Turks', whereas the non-Muslim minorities were outside the category of 'Turkish' and hence susceptible to otherisation through pejorative labels. It is this logic that encouraged Meral Akşener to deny the 'Kurdishness' of Abdullah Öcalan (as a popular figure of hatred) and to identify him with the Armenians, the primary 'other' of Turkish nationalism since the early twentieth century.

In 1999, Turkey started to relax its longstanding assimilationist strategy when it became a candidate country for EU membership. It is true that even before the EU integration process, some statesmen, such as Mesut Yılmaz, Süleyman Demirel, Tansu Çiller and Erdal İnönü, had attempted to 'recognise' the Kurdish reality and presented some alternative approaches and projects aimed at the resolution of the Kurdish question. But it was the EU integration process that forced the Turkish state to reform its constitutional and political system (Natali, 2005: 172; Smith, 2003). For instance, within this process the Kurds were allowed

to open private institutions for teaching Kurdish as well as broadcasting in the Kurdish language under state control. These reforms were followed by some controversial statements by the current prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who on many occasions recognised the fact there were different ethnic sub-identities in Turkey and the common bond between different ethnic groups is to be a 'citizen of Turkey'. This new project of citizenship is seen as not only a fulfilment of one of the requirements of integration into the EU, but also as a rational strategy to break the influence of the PKK over the Kurdish public. This is because the PKK legitimised itself through reference to the idea that they struggled for the cultural rights and freedoms of the Kurds in Turkey.

This historical analysis of the Turkish state's perception of the Kurds should make it clear that the state in Turkey never developed a systematic discourse similar to that of 'exclusive recognition'. The traditional assimilationist perspective perceived the Kurds as an assimilable community or as prospective 'Turks' and did not recognise or exclude them systematically *on a racial or ethnic basis*. The conventional policy of the Turkish state and official Turkish nationalism was rather based on denial of the presence of the Kurdish identity in Turkey. This provides an answer to the question posed at the beginning of this chapter: we cannot see exclusive recognition as an extension or as a manifestation of the Turkish state's nationalist ideology. Therefore, it is necessary to turn our attention to some other areas of social life to trace its origins.

Exclusive Recognition: Is it the Discourse of a Mass Political Organisation?

The Turkish state is not the only actor that produces and propagates Turkish nationalism. There are several non-governmental political organisations, parties and movements that embrace the values of Turkish nationalism. Therefore, it is also necessary to interrogate whether middle-class İzmirlis could have appropriated 'exclusive recognition' from these nationalist organisations in Turkey. The Nationalist Action Party (MHP; Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi), as one of Turkey's oldest and strongest ultra-nationalist organisations, should be the very first organisation that comes to mind when thinking of an effective nationalist political entity in Turkey. The history of MHP began when Alparslan Türkeş, a former army officer, won the presidency of the Republican Peasants Nation Party (CKMP; Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet

Partisi) in 1965. Türkeş reconstructed this small nationalist and conservative party along ultra-nationalist and anti-communist lines, and renamed it the 'Nationalist Action Party' in 1969 (Çalık, 1995: 93). Until the 1980s, the MHP movement portrayed the alleged dangers of communism as its *raison d'être*, and used this anti-communism to mobilise its supporters. The party managed to gain considerable popular support, especially from conservative cities in central Anatolia. However, votes in the party's favour never exceeded 10 per cent and fell below 5 per cent in the national elections held between 1965 and 1995. After the death of Türkeş in 1997, the party leadership was held by Devlet Bahçeli, who, to a large extent, followed Türkeş's policies and ideas.[14]

From its foundation, the MHP movement endorsed and reproduced the Turkish state's official assimilationist idea that the Kurds were not a separate ethnic group but actually a part of the Turkish nation. While defending this position, the party oscillated between an ethnic nationalism and cultural nationalism. From an ethnic nationalist position, the party claimed that the Kurds are indeed racially and ethnically 'Turk'. On certain occasions, and based on a cultural nationalist perspective, the party argued that both the Turks and Kurds were equally Turkish, as they both share similar cultural (religious) features and the same territory (if not the same language). As evident from the recent political declarations of the party, the leadership of MHP continues to strictly oppose any political and legal reform that would recognise the presence of the Kurds as a distinct ethnic group. The party contends that 'Turkish' is not an ethnic but an overarching cultural category that ties together all people in Anatolia. In this sense, it is understood that the political recognition of ethnic groups in Turkey would harm the political and territorial integrity of the Turkish nation.

Despite this rigid attitude, the official leadership of the party has never employed an explicit anti-Kurdish discourse; it has instead highlighted the theme of national unity. According to some Turkish specialists on nationalism, anti-Kurdish racist sentiments are gaining rapid popularity, especially among the young members of theMHP movement. But we should note that this anti-Kurdish feeling has never represented the official line of the party, which has instead reproduced the official denialist and assimilationist view (Bora and Can, 2004: 402). In view of this, it would be difficult to support the claim that exclusive recognition arises first in MHP and then permeates the cognitive world of ordinary citizens.

This is not to say that anti-Kurdish sentiments remained complete

anathema in Turkey before the large-scale migration of the Kurds after the mid-1980s. It is possible to see some of its manifestations in the writings of certain Turkish 'intellectuals' in the 1960s and 1970s. Nihal Atsız, a fascist Turkish novelist writing before the 1980s, can be considered a prominent racist figure who continues to influence Turkish nationalists, especially those in the MHP (Saraçoğlu, 2004). However, it is important to note that 'exclusive recognition' seems to be qualitatively different also from the racist intolerance exhibited by Nihal Atsız. There are two reasons for this: firstly, the racism of such marginal writers as Atsız has never gained popular support and has remained limited to some intellectual circles and to the marginal Turkist wing of the MHP movement (Bora and Can, 2004; Özdoğan, 2001). Secondly, and more importantly, the logic of Atsız's racism was completely different from that of exclusive recognition, in the sense that the former was based on hostility towards all non-Turkish components of Turkish society as well as a glorification of the Turkish race, whereas the latter employed an elitist reaction directed *exclusively* at the Kurds (Saraçoğlu, 2004: 100-118). In fact, in the interviews I conducted in İzmir I came across some individuals who regard Jews and Greeks in İzmir with a kind of nostalgia, while revealing a crude antagonistic and exclusive discourse against the Kurds in the city.

This discussion has shown that the middle-class İzmirlis could not receive exclusive recognition *directly* from the state or any other entity within the Turkish political spectrum. The nature and the content of exclusive recognition are so specific that it cannot be understood as an extension of a longstanding nationalist ideology in Turkish society. This is not to deny that the middle-class İzmirlis borrow some motives and symbols from mainstream Turkish nationalism. However, they situate these symbols and motives within a completely different framework, which is indeed at odds with the basic premises of conventional nationalist approaches. In this sense, as I will show in the following chapters, the policies of the state play a noteworthy role in facilitating the formation and perpetuation of exclusive recognition. Nevertheless, the very specific content of exclusive recognition was not the product of the intended and systematic policies of the Turkish state or of any other nationalist political organisation. This is why the realm of the conventional Turkish nationalist discourses is not an appropriate *point of departure* for an analysis of the ways in which exclusive recognition has been generated. In view of this, it seems necessary to turn our attention to some other areas of social life in order to discover the origins of and the

factors behind exclusive recognition. This will be the essential goal of
the following chapters.

URBAN SOCIAL LIFE: THE LOCUS OF EXCLUSIVE RECOGNITION

The previous chapter indicated that it would be misleading to view exclusive recognition as a sentiment constructed and imposed 'from above'. Exclusive recognition is not a product of ideological manipulation by the state or by a non-governmental nationalist political organisation in Turkey. Hence we need look for an alternative point of departure to unravel the social processes through which negative stereotypes and images about Kurdish migrants have been formed and reproduced. The in-depth interviews I conducted provide useful insights in doing this, as they suggest that urban social life plays a significant role in the formation of exclusive recognition among middle-class İzmirlis, and that exclusive recognition is reproduced and rationalised through the experiences of the middle class in urban social life. This assertion points to the necessity of starting the investigation of exclusive recognition from the structure of urban social life in İzmir and everyday life relations as a part of it.

Urban Social Life and Exclusive Recognition

The relationship between urban social life and exclusive recognition is twofold: first, as a historically specific phenomenon, exclusive recognition could arise by virtue of the transformation of urban social life since the mid-1980s. This transformation involves dramatic changes in the socio-economic, class structure and spatial organisation of the city, which have created a convenient context for the rise of exclusive recognition. Second, urban everyday life, as a component of urban social life in İzmir, has become the means through which the content of exclusive recognition has been shaped. Urban social life involves 'everyday spaces

of the city, the place of the encounter with diversity, strangers, the over-lapping world of multiple allegiances, networks, and identities' (Tajbaksh, 2001: 16). It is through urban everyday life encounters and relations with Kurdish migrants that middle-class İzmirlis rationalise and justify their perception of the Kurds and thereby develop the symbolic and discursive elements of exclusive recognition. Underlying this second point is David Harvey's emphasis on the role of social relations in the modern capitalist city in the formation of various forms of consciousness:

> Increasing urbanisation makes the urban the primary level at which individuals now experience, live out and react to the total-ity of transformations and structures in the world around them… It is out of the complexities and perplexities of this experience that we build an elementary consciousness of space and time, of social power and its legitimations, of forms of dom-ination and social interaction, of the relations to the nature through production and consumption, and of human nature, civil society and political life (1985: 251).

Such an incisive formulation of the relationship between 'conscious-ness' and 'urban life' also enables us to combine the aforementioned two points. Exclusive recognition, as a form of consciousness, can be seen as a reaction of middle-class İzmirlis to the totality of transforma-tions that İzmir has undergone since the 1980s, and such a reaction takes its specific shape through their experiences of this transformation in urban everyday life relations.

Urban Everyday Life as an Aspect of Urban Social Life

By 'urban everyday life' I mean those areas of social life 'where women and men live, work, consume, relate to others, forge identities, cope with or challenge routine, habit and established codes of conduct' (Voiou and Lykogianni, 2006: 732). The spaces of these practices could be homes, workplaces, public buses, parks, etc. (Tajbakh, 2001: 16). These are the places and contexts where people from different social positions encounter one another, interact and develop a social relation-ship. The space and nature of encounters in urban everyday life are bound up with the objective conditions of the urban social life (how it is structured and how it is transformed) and class relations that corre-late well with these objective conditions. With this conceptualisation in

mind, the urban everyday life in the context of this study will refer to those *repetitive* material social relationships and encounters in the city through which the middle-class İzmirlis recognise Kurdish migrants as a distinct ethnic group, and develop and reproduce certain pejorative stereotypes about them. The encounters of the middle-class İzmirlis with Kurdish migrants, as such, are endowed with the objective conditions of İzmir and class positions of both groups *vis-à-vis* these objective conditions. This tentative conceptualisation is sufficient for the purpose of defining and qualifying the locus of exclusive recognition; that is, the place in which it takes its concrete form. That said, I will not plunge into the rich ontological discussions regarding the notion of 'everyday life' in general (Heller, 1984; Gardiner, 2000).

Urban everyday social life involves individuals' relationships with the urban space, as well as their daily interactions with other people in the city. As the structure of urban space shapes the routine social activities of people in daily life, the (collective) activities of people, in turn, reproduce or, in certain cases, transform the ways in which space is structured in cities (Lefebvre, 1991; 2003). Here it is important to note that 'the content and structure of everyday life are not necessarily the same for all individuals in society' (Lefebvre, 1991: 47). Individuals develop patterns of behaviour as a response to the concrete conditions associated with their objective conditions in city. In this study, I will focus on the ways in which middle-class people experience urban social relationships. I will specifically treat those patterns of middle-class experiences that contribute to the emergence of exclusive recognition as a form of consciousness.

Some scholars studying the fields of migration and ethnicity have underscored the role of everyday life practices in the emergence of xenophobic, ethnicist and racist sentiments (Finzch, 1998; Chen, 2004). In most of these studies, however, urban everyday life is interpreted as a social space where previously existing and institutionalised exclusionary practices are perpetuated and reproduced. In the literature, only a few researchers have analysed the ways in which urban social dynamics have *generated* stereotypes attached to certain groups of people (Jean and Feagin, 1999). In exploring black women's experiences with racism in Western societies, Philomena Essed (1991) treats everyday life as one of the sites for the construction of racial and ethnic categories and contends that there are dynamics at this level that operate quite autonomously from the direct manipulation by organised political institutions. I will treat the urban social life of İzmir in a similar manner, as

a site where exclusive recognition, as a form of consciousness, is produced and reproduced.

The Formation of Exclusive Recognition in Urban Social Life

Exclusive recognition is a form of consciousness that I argue *originates* in the social life of İzmir as a metropolis, rather than being a perception that has emerged from an already constructed ideology. This does not mean that individuals are free from external influence while developing the constitutive discourses of exclusive recognition. Rather, the aforementioned stereotypes such as 'ignorant', 'invaders', 'benefit scroungers', 'separatists' and 'disrupters of urban life' have long existed as independent discourses used to 'otherise' and exclude certain groups in society. (This point is discussed further in Chapter 8.) In the case of exclusive recognition, what is new is that all these discourses have been used in a combined manner to identify what it means to be Kurdish and hence to construe the distinction between the Kurds and the rest. It is this ethnicisation of already existing stereotypes and labels that takes place in the context of the urban social life of İzmir. The point is that the pejorative labels and stereotypes that constitute exclusive recognition are so rooted in urban social relations that the middle-class individuals can easily 'test', 'interpret' and 'enrich' these negative impressions through their own direct experiences. The urban social life provides the middle class with certain lived experiences and observations through which they form and rationalise a negative image of the 'Kurd'. Exclusive recognition is thus a perception that is open to active production and reproduction in the urban social life of İzmir.

Of course, exclusive recognition is not the first pejorative sentiment that has been directed towards the Kurds. Throughout the history of Turkish society there have been some rarely used but longstanding pejorative labels attached to the Kurds, but these labels were qualitatively different from those that characterise exclusive recognition. The 'Kurd with a tail' (kuyruklu Kürt), for instance, is one of these labels which imply that the Kurds are degraded human beings. It is hard to trace the exact historical origins of this stereotype, but it is likely that it was used in those social contexts in which the 'Kurd' was unseen and hence deemed to be mysterious. In terms of this kind of mystification and dehumanisation, the trope of 'Kurds with a tail' resembles Western Europe's Orientalist portrayal of Muslims, especially the Ottomans during the seventeenth century. The image was so 'unreal' and unfounded that it could only be a part of social life as long as the Kurds were not

encountered or observed in everyday life. This is nicely articulated in
the poetry of Nazım Hikmet, in an ironic way:

> We travelled everywhere
> in the Black Sea, among the Laz
> in the East, among the Kurds
> It was said that the Kurds have a tail
> This is a lie; they do not have a tail
> However, very disobedient, very destitute
> People they are.
> There are some rich ones among them
> But few.[1]

In other words, unlike, for instance, the notion that 'the Kurds have a
lot of children in order to invade İzmir', the image of the 'Kurds with a
tail' was not constructed or supported on the basis of observation but
precisely through an imaginary trope which came to stand for the invis-
ibility of the 'Kurds'. In contrast, the stereotypes that constitute exclu-
sive recognition emanate from the regular observations of and experi-
ences with the Kurds in an urban social context.[2] Using the concepts
proposed by Robert Miles, it is possible to posit that in the case of those
deeply rooted pejorative labels emerging outside of direct experience,
the Kurds are inscribed as an 'imagined other'. However, in exclusive
recognition, the Kurds represent the 'experienced other' insofar as
recognition and exclusion of the Kurds are generated from real contacts
with the Kurds in urban everyday life processes (Miles, 1989: 15).

   The fact that exclusive recognition takes concrete form within urban
social processes and urban everyday life should not imply that it is the
'accurate' representation of migrant Kurds. The repetitive experiences
and observations do not guarantee accurate knowledge about objective
realities, because reality does not consist solely of its superficial and
immediate manifestations in social life. That is, what we call reality is
always mediated by its own history, on the one hand, and relations with
other social realities, on the other. Marx notes that 'how things change'
(their history) is an integral part of 'what they are' (Marx and Engels,
1964: 57). Furthermore, if 'anything only takes place in and through a
complex interaction between closely related elements, treating change
as intrinsic to what anything is requires that we treat the interaction
through which it occurs in the same way' (Ollman, 2003: 55). The prob-
lem is that these relational and historical aspects of objective reality are

not always directly observable through individuals' experiences in urban social life. Therefore, everyday life practices do not always provide people with a thorough and accurate representation of reality. Harvey, who in the above quote attributed a primary role to capitalist urban life in the formation of consciousness, also concedes that such a consciousness could be 'fetishistic' and 'obscured' despite the fact that it has real material basis in daily urban life:

> Curious kinds of consciousness arise out of the confusions of that experience. The modes of thinking and acting cannot be captured directly by appeal to polarized or even complex class structures. With a real material basis in daily urban life, the modes of consciousness cannot be dismissed as false, although I shall insist that they are necessarily fetishistic. The replication in thought of the intricate materal patternings of surface experience obscure the inner meanings, but the surface appearance is real enough (1985: 251).

The comprehension of a social reality can be 'unobscured' to the extent that its relations and history (its 'inner meanings') are unravelled and then treated as constitutive of what this reality is. (A detailed discussion of this is provided in Chapter 10).

In the example above, this individual arrives at the notion that 'Kurds want to invade İzmir' by observing that the number of children that migrant Kurds have in İzmir is higher than 'normal', that some of the migrant Kurds take part in the Newroz festivities, and that the number of migrants living in the city's Kurdish-populated areas is gradually increasing. These observations might indeed be true, but the conclusion derived from them is not necessarily 'true'. Here, rather than interpreting 'having a lot of children' in the context of the Kurds' history, with respect to their lives before they came to the city, or their current structural conditions, this individual ends up viewing this 'fact' as a peculiarity that distinguishes the Kurds from the rest of the population.

It is important to note that exclusive recognition is not a process that occurs as a result of the 'logical fallacies' or the 'ignorance' of *individuals*. As Karl Mannheim contends, 'the modes of thought cannot be understood as long as their *social* origins are obscured' (1968: 2). Individuals' lack of historical and relational thinking and their tendency to ethnicise the social conditions of the migrant Kurds are themselves

social phenomena conditioned by certain objective features of urban social life. Therefore, their sources should be and will be sought not in the mental and cognitive particularities of each individual, but in the structural factors that shape the social lives of all individuals who endorse the discourses of exclusive recognition.

With these remarks I do not intend to state that urban social life is the 'cause' of exclusive recognition. What I claim, rather, is that urban social life is the 'site' or 'locus' where ethnicisation of the migrant Kurds takes place and is reproduced. The formation of this 'locus' is related largely to certain structural social processes that transcend daily life and social relations. By 'structural processes', I mean the economi, political and social dynamics that operate at national or global levels, and shape aspects of social life in Turkish cities in general, and in İzmir in particular.

The examination of these processes is possible only if we avoid seeing urban everyday life as a completely autonomous or self-evident area that has its own independent dynamics. As David Harvey puts it, the city is also a point of departure for understanding the 'salient features in the social processes operating in a society as a whole – it becomes, as it were, a mirror in which other aspects of society can be reflected' (1973: 16). This does not mean, of course, that the social processes that operate in a social formation manifest their characteristics in a particular city context immediately and directly. The specific form that urban social life takes at a certain space and time reflects, in the last analysis, an interlocking of the structural-historical factors that operate at the national and global level and the dynamics and characteristics that are specific to the city context (Lefebvre, 1991). The impacts of the structural and historical social processes that belong to a social formation are mediated by the specific characteristics of a particular city. Thus, we need to rather conceptualise urban everyday life as a 'locus' or a 'site' in which these interpenetrated structural processes are reproduced in their historically and contextually specific forms. The dialectical relation between the macro and micro levels is nicely summarised by Lefebvre:

> For everything (the whole) weighs down on the lower or 'micro' level, on the local, the localizable – in short in the sphere of everyday life. Everything (the 'whole' also depends on this level: exploitation and domination, protection and – inseparably repression) (1991: 366).

Accordingly, an incisive analysis of the social roots of exclusive recognition is possible only when İzmir's urban everyday life is seen as a site which is constituted by the interpenetration of macro-level, structural/historical processes that transcend İzmir and micro-level dynamics that are specific to İzmir.

In the following chapters, I will draw a framework in which this complex maze of relations between macro and micro dynamics can be analysed. The next chapter presents a macro-level analysis of three national-level dynamics (neoliberalism, armed conflict in Eastern Anatolia, and Kurdish immigration) that have deeply transformed the social relationships in Turkish cities since the early 1980s. Exclusive recognition has arisen in an urban context that has been shaped by these three national-level dynamics over the period in question. In other words, without the combination of these three dynamics exclusive recognition could not take its particular form in İzmir. Exclusive recognition, as a form of consciousness, embodies in itself the experiences and encounters of the middle class in an urban social life that has been under the influence of aforementioned three national-level dynamics. Hence, after I outline the ways in which these dynamics have shaped the urban everyday life of İzmir, I will examine how exclusive recognition arises from the specific relationship between middle-class İzmirlis and Kurdish migrants in urban life.

The Historical Transformation of Urban Social Life in İzmir

To argue that İzmir's urban social life is the *locus* of exclusive recognition and to contextualise the rise of exclusive recognition within the city's transformation since the mid-1980s, it is necessary to provide background information about the historical development of İzmir. This enables a clearer focus on the transformations that occurred in the city in the last two decades and on the ways in which this transformation has permitted the emergence of exclusive recognition.

In 2008 the population of the metropolitan municipality of İzmir was 3,795,000, making it the third biggest city of Turkey. Almost 2,670,000 of these inhabitants are concentrated in the urban zone of İzmir (in the metropolis), while the rest live in the towns and villages that are linked to the main city in administrative terms.

İzmir is located on İzmir Bay in the Aegean Sea. Its favourable geographical location means the city has the largest trade port in Turkey after İstanbul. İzmir Port has long fulfilled the function of linking the city's large and fertile agricultural hinterland to domestic and interna-

tional markets. It is thanks to this port that İzmir has functioned as a 'commercial centre' in the Mediterranean since the sixteenth century.

İzmir (formerly known as Smyrna) started to rise as a trade centre in the Eastern Mediterranean in the early seventeenth century when the Ottoman administration allowed European merchants to engage in commercial activities on the Ottoman shores. Its advantageous geographical location *vis-à-vis* new international maritime routes and its huge fertile agricultural hinterland in the interior of Western Anatolia set İzmir apart from many other port cities in the Ottoman Empire. Unlike İstanbul, İzmir's growth owed 'little to an Ottoman consciousness of the city's lore' (Goffman, 1999: 83). Rather, the city's development was contingent upon international commercial activities. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries İzmir's port played a critical role in sending cotton, silk, mohair yarn and wool to the major European markets of the time (Frangakis-Syrett, 2007: 3). By the end of the eighteenth century, the volume of commercial activities in İzmir even exceeded that of the ports of İstanbul and Alexandria, which had long been the primary commercial centres of the Mediterranean basin (Frangakis-Syrett, 2007: 2).

These geographical advantages of the city attracted Dutch, French and British merchants, who had managed to gain control of Mediterranean trade by the early seventeenth century. The increasing international trade in the city was also a catalyst for the emergence of such finance-related intermediary occupations as servants, brokers, money-changers, middlemen, interpreters and translators (Goffman, 1999: 99). Generally, these positions were filled especially by people from non-Muslim communities, who were capable of arranging and organising economic connections between the Ottoman Muslims and foreign merchants, thanks to their ability to speak both European languages and Ottoman Turkish.

The increasing number of foreign merchants in the city coincided with the arrival of Ottoman Armenian silk traders who had fled from Aleppo, where commercial activities began to stagnate after the discovery of new trade routes. The Greek merchants, who established large trading colonies, formed a new group of settlers in this period. As a result of such ongoing waves of migration, the Greeks became the largest non-Muslim minority in İzmir by the end of the seventeenth century (Gürsoy, 1993: 135). Moreover, in the mid-seventeenth century a considerable number of Sephardic Jews[3] from Western Anatolia moved into İzmir in order to open up new textile workshops under

more profitable conditions and to benefit from the city's increasingly cosmopolitan and libertarian social atmosphere (Goffman, 1999: 99; Barnai, 2002: 37). The inflow of non-Muslim communities was accompanied by the arrival of a large number of Muslim people from different regions of Anatolia, who wanted to enjoy the new economic opportunities in the city. As a result of the combination of these developments, İzmir 'developed into one of the most important centres of international trade in the Eastern Mediterranean' by the end of the seventeenth century (Boogert, 2007: ix). The constant growth of trade and continuous immigration culminated in a rapid population increase and a deep transformation of the socio-cultural landscape of İzmir. Between 1580 and 1650, a space of just 70 years, İzmir was transformed from a small 'smugglers' paradise' with around 5,000 people (Olnon, 2007: 49) into a relatively large and cosmopolitan trade centre with a population of almost 40,000 (Goffman, 1999: 89).

İzmir retained its critical position in world trade throughout the 18th and 19th centuries. But its economy gained new momentum in the 1850s when the city was connected to its hinterland, interior Western Anatolia, through a railway network constructed by British capitalists. The construction of the railway system made the city not only an important port in terms of international trade, but also the centre of regional domestic markets (Kıray, 1972: 16; Baykara, 2001: 133-39; Baran, 2003: 17).

Paralleling the continuous growth of the commercial and financial activities of the European merchants in the Ottoman territories, the population and the ethnic/religious heterogeneity in İzmir continued to expand. The Ottoman census conducted in the early 1880s showed that the population of the city was 208,000, with 80,000 Muslims, 54,000 Greeks, 15,000 Jews, 7,000 Armenians and 52,000 foreigners (Karpat, 1985).

Immigration into İzmir continued unabated in the early twentieth century. In this period, the exodus of Greeks from the islands of the Aegean Sea, mainland Greece and different Anatolian cities triggered important changes in the demographic and socio-cultural make-up of the city (Baran, 2003: 25). Unable to find employment in their places of origin (especially in Aegean islands), these Greek migrants aspired to take part in the continuously growing economy of İzmir. The privileges granted to the non-Muslim population in the nineteenth century, such as low taxes and exemption from military service, constituted another important reason for the rapid increase in the Greek population as

opposed to the proportionally shrinking Muslims (1985: 47). The scale of this population movement was so large that the number of ethnic Greeks in the city almost equalled the number of Muslims by the early twentieth century (Millas, 2001: 137; Kıray, 1972: 22; Baykara, 2001: 81). Based on the information provided by the Ottoman census conducted in 1914, some other sources claim that during the World War I the number of Muslims living in İzmir was around 100,000, comprising almost one-third of the city's population and only slightly more than the number of Greeks in the city (Karpat, 1985: 174).[4]

This ethno-religious heterogeneity manifested itself clearly in the cultural vibrancy of the city (Schmidt, 2007: 140). Besides its cosmopolitan structure, the city's geographical distance from the government in İstanbul and hence from its possible repression was an important catalyst for the emergence of a lively and free intellectual life (Huyugüzel, 2004: 23). It would not be an exaggeration to say that, in terms of its vibrant, cosmopolitan and liberal everyday life, İzmir stood apart from any other city not only in Anatolia, but also in all of Eastern Europe and the Middle East (Baran, 2003: 29). The cosmopolitanism and a relatively liberal lifestyle was so ingrained in city life that some conservative Muslims in Anatolia have used the expression 'infidel İzmir' (*Gavur İzmir*) for the city. This is still a very well known and widely used label in Turkey, but today it used to refer to İzmir's relatively secular social and cultural life rather than its cosmopolitan structure.

In the early twentieth century it was possible to observe *some* association between ethno-religious and class divisions in İzmir. International trade was under the control of a select group of Dutch, Italian, French and British merchants or capitalists called Levantens. The intermediary agents between the agricultural producers in Anatolia and the Levantens were typically from Greek and Jewish backgrounds. The majority of shopkeepers and tradesman in the city were also from Greek, Jewish or Armenian groups (Baykara, 2001: 85). The wealthy residents, especially Levantens, lived either in the districts close to financial and commercial centres around the coastline or in manor houses distant from the city centre. In contrast, most of the Muslims were employed as labourers in the companies, workshops or state institutions or as independent artisans (Kıray, 1972: 46-47).

When the World War I ended with the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in 1914, the Allied powers allowed Greek forces to occupy İzmir and unify it with mainland Greece. The Greek occupation in 1919 ignited a deep popular resentment among Anatolian Muslims. This

popular reaction was an important impetus for the formation of the resistance movement under Kemal Atatürk. The war between Greek and Turkish forces lasted for three years, and the instability and uncertainty brought by the occupation led to the partial interruption of trade activities in the city.

The Greek occupation came to an end when the Turkish nationalist resistance movement entered the city on 9 September 1922 to capture 'most valuable prize of their difficult campaign against the Greeks' (Kasaba, 2002: 204). The withdrawal of Greek forces from İzmir had a very high symbolic value for the Turkish nationalists. While the occupation of İzmir in 1919 was seen as an accursed day when the Turkish nation's captivity reached its zenith, its liberation was interpreted as the rise of a city or nation from its ashes.

Only two days after the liberation of the city from Greek forces, the people of İzmir witnessed a great fire which lasted four days and destroyed or extensively damaged almost three-quarters of the city. Most of the historical records have confirmed that this event (known as the Great Fire of Smyrna) was not an accident but a result of a wilful and systematic act. However, the causes and the culprits have always been disputed among historians. While some Turkish-based sources have blamed the Greeks and Armenians for burning their buildings before they departed from İzmir (Kaygusuz, 1956: 225-26), most researchers outside Turkey have blamed the Turkish side for orchestrating the fire in order to eradicate the traces of non-Muslim presence in the city (Housepian, 1971).

The foundation of the Turkish Republic by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in 1923 was a turning point for İzmir. The main objective of the new nationalist elite was to establish a nation-state and hence to eradicate the social and economic traces of the multi-national and Islamic elements transmitted from the Ottoman Empire. In accordance with this objective, the socio-economic and demographic structure of İzmir underwent a profound change in the early Republican period.

The nationalist elites viewed the economic independence and the creation of a national bourgeoisie as the *sine qua non* of the establishment of a new nation-state. It was on the basis of this vision that, during the international negotiations at the Lausanne Peace Conference, the Turkish side insisted on the abolition of contracts that granted economic privileges to foreign merchants. The end of such contracts paved the way for the departure of many non-Muslim merchants from the city (Aktar, 2000: 24-25). In addition to these economic changes, the fear of

'revenge' and anti-Christian feelings among the Muslims, which stemmed from assaults that had been experienced under the Greek occupation, prompted many Greeks and Armenians to flee (Kasaba, 2002: 204; Umar, 1974: 332).[5]

As a result, in the early years of the Republic, İzmir's population was, to a large extent, Muslimised, and the city's ethnically heterogeneous fabric was seriously undermined (Kasaba, 2002: 208). The 1927 census showed that the total population of İzmir was 184,254, 88 per cent of whom were Muslims. In spite of the mass Greek and Armenian emigration, İzmir retained at least some of its non-Muslim population in the early Republican period, and therefore it was still more multi-ethnic than today's İzmir, as well as some other Anatolian cities of that time. It was still possible to observe the cosmopolitan social structure inherited from the Ottoman period at least in the rich districts of Alsancak, Konak and Karşıyaka (Karaosmanoğlu, 2005: 17).

The Muslimisation (or Turkification) in the early years of the Republic manifested itself in the social life of İzmir as well. In compliance with the Kemalists' project of 'denying the Ottoman past' and 'building a new nation-state', the centuries-old Greek, Jewish and Arabic names of the streets, boulevards and neighbourhoods were changed to 'pure' Turkish names (Serçe, 2000: 172). The 'westernist' and secularist agenda of the state was reflected in the city life as well. The nationalist elite gave special emphasis to the vivification of cultural and intellectual activities in so far as these activities supported and reproduced its nationalist and modernist ideology.

In İzmir, economic growth gained a new momentum in the late 1950s as a result of the implementation of national developmentalist strategies that encouraged the growth of industry. This strategy was based on providing the 'infant industries' of the Turkish capitalists with certain economic incentives and protecting them against more competitive international companies in the national market. This project also involved providing new incentives for private landowners. In this process, some of the wealthy landowners and merchants in İzmir used their accumulated capital to build medium sized or large-scale industrial plants. This created new employment opportunities in the city and led to the formation of a large working-class population (Tekeli, 2002: 9). The advent of industrialisation, especially between 1960 and 1980, was a remarkable development for a city whose economy had hitherto been almost exclusively reliant upon commercial activities. By the end of the 1960s, there were 220 large companies in İzmir and the majority of

them were privately owned (Gürsoy, 1993: 190). Food and textiles became the leading industrial sectors in this period.

The rise of industrial production and the increase in agricultural exports brought about the revival of commercial activities in İzmir Port. The consequent employment opportunities triggered large-scale migration to İzmir in the 1960s and 1970s, making it one of the biggest cities in Turkey by the early 1970s. Migration played the major role in the increase of the population from 359,000 in 1950 to 1,050,000 in 1980 (Gürsoy, 1993).

Unable to buy or rent a house, labourers constructed large *gecekondus* (illegal settlements) in the state-owned zones of the city (Mutluer, 2000: 60). Most of these neighbourhoods were built close to the industrial plants. Because these industrial plants were not far from downtown İzmir, shanty towns began to surround the very centre of the city. By the end of the 1970s, there were 240,000 unauthorised housing units in İzmir and they were hosting almost 40 per cent of the total population (Ünverdi, 2002: 182-83). Between 1960 and 1980, the number of Kurds who settled in the city rose gradually due to emigration from Eastern Anatolia. During that period, there was no clear class and spatial division between the Kurds and the rest of the labouring population.[6]

From the 1980s onwards the Turkish economy began to be shaped predominantly by a neoliberal strategy of promoting the free market. The growth of the economy was no longer based on investments and incentives provided by the state but was rather contingent upon foreign direct investments, speculative financial flows and exports from the domestic private sectors. This led to the relinquishment of economic policies and institutional structures associated with the Keynesian developmentalism of the 1960s and 1970s. The neoliberal economic policies opened the domestic market to commodities imported from companies in advanced capitalist countries, which had a clear competitive advantage over many domestic industries. This situation led to either closure or downsizing of many domestic companies and industrial plants in Turkey, and impeded investment in the industrial sectors.

The effects of this new trend impacted İzmir's social and economic life. Between 1980 and 2000, the pace of industrialisation stagnated (Ataay, 2001); some important industrial plants in the city were even closed down or moved out of the city (Ünverdi, 2002: 187; Gürsoy, 1993). This reduced employment opportunities, increasing inequality and unemployment rates. However, shrinking economic opportunities did not stop migrants from choosing İzmir as a destination. The popu-

lation in the city centre continued to increase and reached 2,500,000 by the end of 2000. Despite the shrinkage of İzmir's economy, most Kurdish migrants continued to view İzmir as a city that would provide better opportunities than Eastern Anatolia. The migration cannot, however, be reduced to the level of economic opportunities in İzmir. It was also the result of the continuous armed struggle between the Turkish military and the Kurdish separatist PKK. Due to the combined effect of economic and political concerns, the number and proportion of Kurds coming from Eastern Anatolia between 1980 and 2000 was considerably higher than between 1960 and 1980 (Ünverdi, 2002: 195).

With a stagnating economy after the 1980s, İzmir failed to offer sufficient employment opportunities to newcomers. Most migrants came from poor rural regions of Eastern Anatolia and a clear majority of them lacked the education and skills necessary to be competitive in the job market. As a result, newly migrated Kurds fell into poverty and unemployment, and most of them were pushed into selling their labour power in the informal market. These difficult conditions forced most Kurdish migrants of the post-1980s period to concentrate in the worst gecekondu zones (Karayiğit, 2005; HÜNEE, 2006). This brought about a clear spatial and socio-economic separation between Kurdish migrants and the rest of the population. Limited economic opportunities, abysmally low standards of living and the exploitative and insecure labour processes separated and isolated these Kurdish migrants not only from the wealthy segments of the city population, but also from the rest of the working population. Today, Kurdish migrants who settled in the city since the mid-1980s constitute a major segment of the urban poor in İzmir.

6

NEOLIBERALISM, MIGRATION AND URBAN SOCIAL LIFE

This chapter focuses on three national-level structural dynamics that have deeply influenced the urban social life of İzmir since the 1980s: a) the neoliberal transformation of the Turkish economy; b) the political conflict in Eastern Anatolia; and c) the migration flow from Eastern Anatolia to western Turkish cities. It was mainly through these dynamics that the urban social life of İzmir was transformed into a context or locus where exclusive recognition could be engendered. This chapter includes general background information relevant to the social outcomes of these three dynamics. The following chapters reveal how they play an important role in the recognition of Kurdish migrants as a distinct and homogeneous group and their exclusion through certain stereotypes.

It should be made clear from the outset that between these three national-level dynamics there is a *hierarchical* relationship: the first two dynamics, namely neoliberalism and political conflict between the PKK and the state, determined to a large extent both the nature and scale of the migration from Eastern Anatolia to western Turkish cities. In other words, the internal migration since the early 1980s has been shaped mainly by the neoliberalisation of the Turkish economy and the political conflict in Eastern Anatolia. In this sense, it is not migration *per se*, but internal migration within the context of neoliberalism and political conflict, which contributed to the emergence of exclusive recognition in the everyday life of western Turkish cities.

Turkey's Experiment with Neoliberalism

Before discussing the details of the neoliberal transformation of Turkey it is necessary to touch on the nature of the neoliberal project in gener-

al. I use the concept of neoliberalism in order to address the ongoing social and economic processes through which the free market economy has been promoted and the internationalisation of capital has been facilitated at the expense of state intervention and protectionism in national economic relations. The project of neoliberalism has been implemented in many advanced and less developed capitalist countries (or so-called developing countries) since the early 1980s. This process materialised through the dissolution of institutions, policies and regulations associated with the welfare state in the West and national developmentalist programmes in 'developing' societies. This shift from Keynesianism, where the state took an active role in regulating economics, to free market economy almost completely open to global economic dynamics has had significant ramifications for politics, culture and ideology. In view of this, the concept of neoliberalism in this study will be used in its broad sense to connote not only the liberalisation of the realm of economics but also the impacts on social and political life (Saad-Filho and Johnston, 2005: 2).

As with many other countries, Turkey's transition to a neoliberal economy became possible by dismantling the institutions, policies and practices that were associated with national developmentalist policies. Therefore, a brief elaboration of the main characteristics and historical formations of the Keynesian/national developmentalist strategy will be helpful in understanding the social effects of neoliberal transition.

The fundamental objective of the economic strategies implemented in Turkey after the World War II (especially in the 1960s and 1970s) was to accelerate industrial growth and strengthen the position of an industrial capitalist class. It was thought that a national capitalist class would ensure the maintenance of national capital accumulation, economic growth and employment. Because Turkey entered the global capitalist system much later than countries in Western Europe and North America, there were two obstacles to this objective: first, the Turkish industrialists were unable to compete with those in advanced capitalist countries, as the latter's advanced technology produced higher quality goods at lower costs. Second, the relatively low consumption power of workers in Turkish cities weakened demand in the domestic market, lowered profits, and hence impeded capital accumulation.

The emergence of a national developmentalist strategy[2] in Turkey was the result of the state's attempts to overcome these obstacles. To address the first obstacle, the state put in place protective barriers such as high quota and tariff rates, in order to prevent international compa-

nies from occupying the national market at the expense of domestic companies (Yeldan, 2001: 38; Köymen, 2007: 111-12). Financial credit was also granted to national industrialists under very favourable conditions. This was another instrument used to permit capitalist companies to monopolise the domestic market. The state response to the second obstacle was to keep wages *relatively* high and provide workers in the formal sector with some social security assistance in the form of free health care and education. This assistance kept workers' purchasing power at a level that would ensure growth in the domestic market and enable the national capitalists to generate higher profits so that that they could continue to invest in industrial production (Boratav, 2003: 124; Işık and Pınarcıoğlu, 2001: 101). Through these policies, the state not only aimed to maintain economic growth and industrialisation, but also to establish a 'consent-based political hegemony' over workers (Gramsci, 1979). It was thought that these social benefits and employment opportunities would reduce the workers' militancy, and help to integrate them into the system (Yalman, 2002: 14). This strategy of building a 'tacit' contract between capital and labour in order to advance industrialisation was not something unique to Turkey; rather, it was a prominent economic model used in many other 'developing' countries, where the primary objective was to construct a smoothly functioning capitalist economy. It is worth remarking here that the hegemony corresponding with this model was extremely fragile; any reduction in the economic benefits provided to workers could trigger a mass and organised opposition to the existing social establishment (Tünay, 1993; Yalman, 2002: 15). Accordingly, the economic crisis which occurred in those countries that relied on the developmentalist strategy typically ignited militant resistance from workers, leading to deep political crises.

The implementation of the developmentalist model accelerated urbanisation, as employment opportunities in industrialised cities prompted many unemployed peasants to leave rural areas. The expansion of the industrial and service sector in the 1960s and 1970s in such cities as İstanbul, İzmir, Kocaeli and Ankara generated new employment opportunities that attracted rural migrants to these cities. Between 1960 and 1980, the urban population in Turkey increased from 31.9 per cent to 45 per cent of the total, which indicates the magnitude of rural–urban migration in this period.[3]

Before industrialisation, Turkish cities were typically the centres of bureaucratic and commercial activities. With the developmentalist policies implemented in the 1960s such cities as İstanbul, Kocaeli and İzmir

also became the centres of capital accumulation and industrial production (Şengül, 2003). It was in this period that workers came to constitute the majority population in these cities (Şengül, 2001: 77). Because of their low incomes and limited purchasing power, most of them resided in *gecekondu* settlements, where they could survive on their meagre resources. Inevitably, these changes influenced the social life of these cities, which was now restructured in accordance with the requirements of industry and the reproduction of labour power. The legalisation of many *gecekondus* and the reorganisation of some municipal services to accommodate labourers' working schedules were some of the changes that emerged as a result of the concentration of labour in these cities (Doğan, 2001: 149). These changes were necessary from the point of view of capital, because the maintenance and expansion of industrial production depended as much on the reproduction of the labour force as the provision of incentives for capitalist investment.

Nevertheless, the social security benefits provided by the state were limited since they did not involve comprehensive and systematic solutions for the problem of providing adequate housing for workers. Moreover, as mentioned in previous chapters, such social security benefits were also 'corporatist' and 'exclusionary' in the sense that they did not cover citizens who were unemployed or worked in the 'informal' sector (Buğra, 2008: 158). Existing financial resources (capital) accumulated inside the borders of the country were used more to expand industrial investments than to enhance social services and living conditions in industrial cities (Danielson and Keleş, 1980: 302). The state's incapacity to safeguard essential services for its citizens gave birth to informal economic activities and also informal ways of sustaining housing and transportation in the big cities (Işık and Pınarcıoğlu, 2001: 196). The construction of *gecekondu* settlements, for instance, was a reaction to the state's inability to provide workers with affordable housing (Karpat, 1976; Danielson and Keleş, 1980: 300-313). The phenomenon of *dolmuş* (taxis and minibuses that only leave when they are filled with passengers in order to cut the cost of transportation) emerged as a result of the state's failure to build an efficient public transportation system.

The *gecekondu* settlements created a paradoxical situation for the state. On the one hand, according to Turkish law these settlements had to be demolished because they had been built illegally on state-owned land. On the other hand, their demolition could create resentment among the millions of workers living in these settlements, possibly

strengthening working-class discontent and opposition in the country. More importantly, without these workers, the continuation of industrial production and the provision of services in the city would have been impossible (Danielson and Keleş, 1980: 344).

Unable to prevent the *gecekondu* 'problem', the state adopted a the policy of ad hoc leniency towards these settlements, which further encouraged the flow of migrants and hence led to a tremendous increase in the number of *gecekondus* in cities (Buğra, 1998: 307). Between 1955 and 1980, the number of people living in *gecekondus* increased from 1,200,000 to 8,750,000 (İçduygu *et al.*, 2001: 223). As in the cities of almost all capitalist developing countries, the concentration of poor workers in *gecekondu* settlements led to the formation of a dual residential structure in İstanbul, Ankara, İzmit and İzmir, whereby poor workers were spatially segregated from better-off groups in the city (Demirtaş and Şen, 2007).

The national developmentalist model faced a deep and irresolvable structural crisis in the late 1970s. The crisis had both political and economic aspects; indeed these two dimensions were intricately linked in the developmentalist model, as stated earlier. On the economic side, warnings of the crisis came with the tremendous rise in oil prices in 1973. The major industries in Turkey were dependent on imported oil, and therefore the abrupt change in oil prices triggered a sharp increase in the cost of domestic production, a considerable decline in profits and hence a huge balance of payments deficit. One of the ways of keeping profits at the same level despite increasing oil prices was to reduce the cost of labour. However, this option posed the risk of triggering political opposition in the form of strong labour resistance and an organised socialist/leftist movement. Under these conditions, in order to maintain economic growth and industrial production, Turkey, like many other countries, borrowed heavily from the banks and financial institutions of the advanced capitalist countries (Aydın, 2005: 39). Until the end of the 1970s, the Turkish state adopted extremely tight economic measures to accumulate enough savings to repay these loans. These measures impacted urban labourers disproportionately, as they could not meet the skyrocketing costs of their basic daily needs such as fuel, electricity and gas.

This situation undermined the hegemony of the dominant classes, which had been established upon an extremely delicate balance between labour and capital. The endless strikes in various economic sectors and intensifying tensions and armed struggles between the revolutionary

left-wing political groups and the paramilitary ultra-right forces were signs of an unravelling hegemony (Topal, 2002: 72). By the early 1980s, it was clearly understood that under the existing developmentalist model it would be impossible to repay foreign debts, stimulate economic growth, prevent the level of profits from falling and re-establish hegemony. Under these circumstances, the transition to a neoliberal economy under the auspices of the structural adjustment policies of the IMF appeared to be a way of overcoming the crisis. This transition was declared in 1980.

The economic package adopted on 24 January 1980 involved a series of typical neoliberal policies. Measures such as the 'opening of the economy, the restructuring of public expenditure priorities, the liberalisation of the financial sector, privatisation, deregulation and the provision of an enabling environment for the private sector' were the key instruments of this transition (Aydın, 2005: 44). These reforms signified a shift in the regime of capital accumulation. In the neoliberal period, economic growth was based predominantly on the exports of domestic private companies, the privatisation of public sector enterprises, and the increased flow of foreign direct investment and international finance into the Turkish domestic market. The IMF and World Bank played a key role in supervising this process and preventing the Turkish government from deviating from the transition to neoliberalism. In fact, of the 14 different cabinets that ruled Turkey from 1980 to the present, none hesitated to implement the neoliberal structural adjustment policies that had been imposed by the IMF and World Bank. Between 1983 and 1990, under the auspices of the IMF, these governments tried to sustain economic growth by increasing exports of labour-intensive products and raw materials. When this policy failed, successive governments throughout the 1990s concentrated their efforts on liberalising Turkey's financial system and bringing about economic growth by attracting international finance to Turkish markets (Yeldan, 2001: 38-39).

By the end of the 1990s, Turkey had become dependent mostly on international capital and financial flows and hence vulnerable to the fluctuations of global capitalism (Yeldan, 2001: 25). Turkey's integration into the global market was completed between 1990 and 2000. Today, the economic policy of the conservative government, represented by the Justice and Development Party (AKP) (which came to power in 2002), is an extension or continuation of the neoliberal project that was adopted and implemented throughout the 1980s and 1990s (Bağımsız Sosyal Bilimciler, 2007).

Inevitably, the shift from national developmentalism to a neoliberal economy precipitated a drastic change in the way the political hegemony functioned. The reason for this is that in an economic model where the state refrains from intervening in the market, it was no longer possible for public institutions to provide workers with some material benefits in order to win their consent. More concretely, in a society where the working class was quite organised and socialist politics had a strong hold, the implementation of the anti-labour policies of neoliberal transition was not easy.

In fact, soon after the neoliberal package was implemented, previously existing political tensions and divides in Turkish society were deepened further. In the wake of uncontrollable political violence in cities, Turkish military forces held a coup on 12 September 1980, and proceeded to abolish parliament, ban all political parties and arrest their leaders. The coup also immediately closed down all labour unions and political associations in the country. Thousands of people who had been actively engaged in leftist political activity were arrested. The extremely violent measures employed by the military administration marked the obliteration of any kind of labour-oriented organisation in society and hence the removal of the Turkish left from the political spectrum through coercive measures (Savran, 2002: 15-16). This explains how favourable conditions were prepared for the implementation of neoliberal policies (Boratav, 2003: 148; Ercan 2002: 26). This means that in the absence of political hegemony that had been based previously on the 'populist' policies of the developmentalist model, the use of extreme violence against any kind of leftist opposition became the instrument of restoring order and stability (Yalman, 2002: 41).

After removing these political obstacles, the Turkish state managed to accelerate the transition to neoliberalism under the auspices of the IMF and the World Bank. In a country where the socio-economic structure had been organised along the lines of a national developmentalist model for 20 years, any slight modification in the established norms and procedures would trigger an abrupt and radical change in the social system at large (Buğra, 2007: 143). For instance, since the early 1980s the state has had a tendency to keep the interest rates much higher than they were between 1960 and 1980.[4] This situation had dramatic implications for manufacturing industry (Aydın, 2005: 45-46).[5]

In the neoliberal period, in order to leave the way free for private companies and entrepreneurs, the Turkish state abstained from making any further investment in industrial sectors such as steel, iron and petro-

leum, and eventually attempted to privatise these industries. The liberal ideologues of the time were over-optimistically expecting that private capital owners would fill the gap left by the state in these large-scale industrial sectors, and undertake the mission of maintaining industrial growth and creating employment. However, most private companies were reluctant to do so due to high interest rates (Ataay, 2001: 69).

In fact, in addition to tourism and housing, private investors in Turkey invested their accumulated capital in the 'now-liberalised' financial sector, which turned out to be a much more profitable sector because of the increase in interest rates. This was the case especially in the 1990s, when Turkey went through a financial liberalisation process. This facilitated the transformation of industrial capital in Turkey into financial or commercial capital (Ercan, 2002: 27; Aydın, 2005: 46; Köymen, 2007: 144).

The continuous stagnation of industrial investments and industrial growth has had some negative long-term social effects. Because the growth of the economy was no longer reliant primarily on industrialisation, but rather contingent upon unproductive sectors such as tourism, construction and more importantly speculative financial flows, unemployment continued to be a chronic problem for Turkish society. Indeed, the official unemployment rate has not fallen under 10 per cent since AKP came to power in 2002 (Bağımsız Sosyal Bilimciler, 2007: 42).

In the 1980s, a steady reduction in the real wages of workers was another negative social effect of the neoliberal project. As the growth of the economy in the 1980s was contingent upon exports, a decline in wages was seen as necessary to bolster Turkey's competitive position in the international market relative to other countries exporting the same commodities (Balkan and Yeldan, 2002: 40). Lower wages were also considered necessary for attracting foreign direct investments. While providing a favourable context for owners of capital, the wage policy of neoliberalism led to a decline in the living standards of the majority of workers. Between 1980 and 1986, the first six years of the neoliberal transition, real wages in the manufacturing sector declined by 32 per cent (Boratav, 2003: 164) and the share of labourers' wages in the gross national product dropped from 30 per cent to 15 per cent (Kaygalak, 2001: 138; Yeldan, 2001: 26). Alongside increasing unemployment the contraction of the wages of working people have deepened existing social inequalities, especially in big cities (Doğan, 2002: 170). We should note here that thanks to a militant working-class struggle, there was a

temporary upward trend in real wages in the early 1990s (Boratav, 2003: 176; Odekon, 2005: 46). During these years wages almost recovered to the levels seen in the period before 1980. Nevertheless, it was not the owners of capital but the state itself that took the responsibility of funding the wage increases, for the sake of preserving the profitability of the investments of private capitalists. Because it was impossible to achieve this with its own limited financial sources, the state borrowed from national and international financial institutions, thereby liberalising the financial system further in order to encourage international finance to flow into Turkey. This situation threw the state into an unending debt cycle and, as stated earlier, forced it to retreat from its public responsibilities. In the long run, this process precipitated an overall decline in the living standards of workers. More importantly, the policy of encouraging international financial flows into the domestic economy to create resources resulted in huge budget deficits, and increased the vulnerability of the whole economy to any fluctuation in the global economy.

Budget deficits and dependence on international financial flows became one of the main reasons for the deep and recurrent economic crises that hit Turkish society in 1994 and 2001. It would not be an exaggeration to claim that these crises took away much more than workers had gained in the early 1990s (Yeldan, 2001: 71; 2002: 10-11). And the overall decline in wages hit not only industrial workers but all workers and civil servants employed by the state, whose real wages have fallen significantly since the early 1980s (Boratav, 2003: 151).[6] The contraction in expenditures for public health care and education led to a considerable drop in the quality of services provided by the state (Köymen, 2007: 139). Wealthy families were, however, not affected by this situation because in the same period private hospitals, universities, and colleges flourished. This led to differential access to quality health and education services and deepened social inequality (Zucconi, 1999: 11-12).

In the crises of 1994 and 2001, devaluation[7] led to a sharp decline in the purchasing power of workers and a further contraction in their wages, with the effect of shrinking the total economic transactions in the domestic market (Aydın, 2005: 129-30). This situation also triggered a reduction in employment opportunities and led to the dismissal of thousands of workers in various economic sectors. The economic crisis in 2001 was one of the most significant reasons for the spectacular electoral defeat in 2002 of the coalition government formed by the centre-right Motherland Party (ANAP), centre-left Democratic Left Party

(DSP) and ultra-nationalist Nationalist Action Party (MHP). This defeat consequently carried the conservative Justice and Development Party (AKP) to power (Çarkoğlu, 2002).

From 2002 to 2010, under Tayyip Erdoğan's AKP government, the abolition of national developmentalist policies and the promotion of the free market economy continued unabated. It should be noted that although the economic policies implemented recently have not been different from the policies of previous governments, there have been some changes in the ways neoliberal policies have been justified. In other words, the ideological elements of Turkey's neoliberal project have been articulated differently under the AKP. In a manner reminiscent of neo-conservative governments in the USA, this party attempts to use its cultural/religious conservatism and pragmatism to justify such neoliberal values as entrepreneurship and efficiency (İnsel, 2003: 301). More importantly, unlike previous governments during the neoliberal period, the AKP became relatively active in developing certain 'social policies' for alleviating the poverty and destitution of the poorest segments of society. The provision of free coal and food aid to the urban poor, especially on days of religious significance, has been enacted during this period (Öniş, 2004). Nevertheless, these policies cannot go beyond providing a kind of temporary relief for the poorest segments of society, since the very structural roots of economic inequality and poverty persist as a result of neoliberal macro-economic strategies. Indeed, AKP appears to use so-called 'social policies' for the alleviation of poverty and destitution that it nonetheless perpetuates. But, still, what differentiates AKP from other neoliberal governments is that they have at least been using these social assistance programmes to garner the support of the urban poor, despite their 'genuine commitment to neoliberal orthodoxy' (Keyder, 2004: 71).

The effects of the neoliberal project have resonated in the social life of big cities in Turkey such as Ankara, İstanbul and İzmir. The formation of exclusive recognition in İzmir has a lot to do with the effects of neoliberalism on urban everyday life. The following chapters trace the intricate relationship between exclusive recognition and the neoliberal transformation of Turkish cities.

The Political and Military Conflict in Eastern Anatolia

The ongoing conflict between the PKK and the Turkish state has deeply influenced the social life of western Turkish cities, even though the actual site of the armed conflict is Eastern Anatolia. The conflict

came to a head in 1984 when the PKK began to engage in a series of armed attacks against Turkish military forces in various parts of Eastern Anatolia. The PKK was established as a Marxist-Leninist organisation led by Abdullah Öcalan. Under the influence of leftist socialist movements in Turkey in the 1970s, the PKK blended the idea of socialist revolution with the national independence of the Kurds and aimed to establish a socialist Kurdistan in the Middle East. The socialist elements in the movement's ideology were evident from the outset, and this was one of the characteristics that differentiated the PKK from other major Kurdish nationalist organisations in Iraq, such as the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) under Jalal Talabani, and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) under Massoud Barzani. While the leadership of the PUK and KDP largely comprised influential landowners living in Northern Iraq, the PKK leadership in Turkey considered the landlord class to be the biggest obstacle to Kurdish independence, because they had historically collaborated with the Turkish state against the Kurdish uprising (Morad, 1992: 121; Saraçoğlu, 2005).[8]

As a result of its continuous attacks against the Turkish security forces, by the mid-1980s the Turkish state recognised the PKK as one of its most serious domestic problems. However, this did not prevent the PKK from garnering support from the local people in the region. Between 1980 and 1990, when the Turkish state responded to the PKK attacks with extreme military measures, the level of conflict in the region escalated dramatically. In this period, thousands of soldiers and PKK militants died in the armed conflict and millions of people in the region had to flee from the region due to security concerns.

The military measures of the state did not prevent the PKK from gaining a high level of support from people in Eastern Anatolia. Despite the fact that PKK's Marxist-Leninist ideology was antithetical to the traditional and conservative social structure in Eastern Anatolia, many – but not all – Kurds saw this organisation as a legitimate representative of the Kurdish nation in the Middle East. The crude assimilationist policies of the state and the extreme poverty in the region alienated the Kurds from the existing system. The declining influence of the landlords, which was due to both the economic transformation in the region and the PKK challenges to the tribal structure, presented another difficulty to the state in its attempt to establish ideological hegemony over the Kurds.

In the 1990s, some state officials and politicians saw the economic backwardness of Eastern Anatolia and the profound inequality between

eastern and western regions of Turkey as the most important explana-
tions for the support provided to the PKK. This rationale led Turgut
Özal and his Motherland Party (ANAP) government to launch the
South East Anatolia Development Project (GAP) in the mid-1980s.
The project entailed the construction of great dams on the Tigris and
Euphrates rivers that would be used to produce hydro-electricity, there-
by facilitating industrial growth in the region. The dams were also an
attempt to solve the longstanding irrigation problem in South Eastern
Anatolia and to encourage growth in agricultural production. The
ANAP government expected that the combination of the agricultural
and industrial growth would enhance the economic conditions of the
people living in this region, thereby diminishing regional inequality.
Considering the current impoverishment and shrinking economic
opportunities in Eastern Anatolia, it is difficult to say whether the proj-
ect was successful in closing the economic gap between the east and
west (Sönmez, 1998; Mutlu, 2002; Gezici and Hewings, 2007).

The early 1990s witnessed four important changes in the political
conflict between the PKK and the Turkish army. First of all, the
Kurdish nationalist forces opened another front against the state in the
legal and political spheres when they established the People's Labour
Party (HEP) as a legal party within the national political spectrum. In
the 1991 general elections, the HEP made a temporary electoral alliance
with the centre-left Social Democratic People's Party (SHP) in Eastern
Anatolia so that they would meet the 10 per cent national threshold
provision for parliamentary representation.[9] The 1991 elections result-
ed in a remarkable victory for Kurdish movement in South Eastern
Anatolia, where the HEP gained the majority vote in many provinces,
enabling 22 candidates from the HEP lists to get into the Turkish par-
liament. However, those people who considered this situation a great
opportunity for developing a peaceful solution to the conflict were dis-
appointed on the very first day of the new parliament, when two of the
new Kurdish deputies took their parliamentary oath in the Kurdish lan-
guage. This move in the parliament triggered fierce reactions from both
the Turkish public and politicians from other parties, leading to the
arrest of the four Kurdish deputies from the HEP. As a result of this
incident, the HEP came to be perceived as the PKK's extension in the
sphere of legal politics, and the hope of resolving the Kurdish question
through democratic means vanished.

The second important change that occurred in the 1990s was the
striking transformation in the political discourses and strategies of the

PKK. The demise of the Soviet Union, on the one hand, and the dissolution of a socialist and working-class movement in Turkey, on the other, was registered in the ideology of the PKK. As a hardcore Marxist organisation which had aspired for an independent Kurdish state throughout the 1980s, the PKK started to prioritise, in the 1990s, such liberal demands as political and cultural rights for the Kurds, democratisation of the political system in Turkey, and amnesty for political prisoners. The project of establishing an independent state for the Kurds seemed to have been shelved. The official representatives of the organisation began to advocate some kind of federalist solution, which did not necessarily foresee secession from Turkey (McDowall, 2000: 430).

The third surprising change in the early 1990s was the notably softer discourse deployed by statesmen when approaching the Kurdish issue. In 1999 the president of Turkey, Turgut Ozal, suggested openly that the problem would be solved by sitting at the negotiating table with the Kurdish nationalists and even with the PKK. Similarly, Süleyman Demirel, the prime minister of Turkey in the early 1990s, declared in 1991 that 'Turkey has recognised the Kurdish reality'. Two years after this statement, Tansu Çiller, the prime minister who replaced Demirel, proposed the Basque model of Spain as a possible solution to the Kurdish question. However, these statements by representatives of the state did not result in even a slight change in the otherwise assimilationist attitude of the Turkish state (Gunter, 1997: 66).

The fourth change pertaining to the conflict in Eastern Anatolia was the progressive internationalisation of the Kurdish question. The US-led UN operation against Iraq in 1991 was one of the turning points that contributed to international recognition of the Kurdish question in the Middle East. The war created a human catastrophe for the Kurds in Northern Iraq, as hundreds of thousands fled their homelands due to the threat of possible aggression by Saddam Hussein. Most of the Kurds took refuge and sought asylum in Turkey, and their conditions soon drew the attention of the international community. The debates on the situation of these Kurdish refugees also intensified ongoing discussions on the status of the Kurds of Turkey (Bozarslan, 1992: 107).

Turkey's quest for EU membership was another factor that contributed to the internationalisation of the Kurdish question in the 1990s. It was clear that those non-democratic aspects of the political structure of Turkey in general and its denialist attitude towards the Kurds in particular did not comply with the EU's political criteria, and hence posed a serious obstacle to the accession of Turkey to the EU.

This situation rendered the Kurdish question a component of EU-Turkey relations.

One would expect that the combination of these four changes in the Kurdish question that occurred in the early 1990s would compel the Turkish state to change its traditional manner of dealing with the Kurdish question, and hence open the way for some non-militaristic approach to ending the conflict. Contrary to these optimistic expectations, however, the armed conflict between the PKK and the state reached its zenith in the mid-1990s. By the end of that decade, more than 30,000 people had died, thousands of villages were evacuated and millions of people were forced to flee from their home towns to either the nearest major province or the western Turkish cities, where employment opportunities and conditions of living were somewhat better. As mentioned before, many of the thousands of soldiers who died in this conflict were young people between the ages of 18 and 24 who had been carrying out their compulsory military service in the region.

Throughout the 1990s, the conflict between the PKK and the state had enormous economic consequences as well. The extremely high military expenditures led to further reductions in public spending, and thus the deterioration of living standards of people in the country at large. In other words, the conflict between the PKK and the state continued throughout the 1990s and its negative effects were not confined to the people of Eastern Anatolia. The whole country, including people living in the western cities, felt the effects of the war profoundly.

The capture of Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK in November 1998, as a result of a joint operation by Turkish and American agents, was a path-breaking development. PKK sympathisers in Turkey and in some other countries organised angry demonstrations to protest against Öcalan's capture and blamed the Turkish state for repressing the Kurdish people by imprisoning their leader. However, when Öcalan appeared in court to defend himself, his attitude was unexpectedly at odds with the mood of these demonstrations. In his mild and apologetic defence, Öcalan partly blamed PKK militancy for the escalation of the conflict in the region and urged PKK militants to halt their attacks against Turkish security forces. This attitude was so perplexing for the supporters of the PKK that they did not take Öcalan's statements literally, preferring to interpret them either as a part of a hidden tactic of their leader or as a conspiracy of the Turkish state.

Öcalan's surprising attitude did not prevent him from receiving the death sentence. However, the execution was not carried out because the

Turkish state abolished the death penalty shortly after he was sentenced, in order to comply with the norms of the EU. Instead, Öcalan was imprisoned on İmrali, a small island ten kilometers from İstanbul, and continued to promote the idea of 'peaceful and democratic resolution of the Kurdish question'. This new discourse was also adopted by the PKK administration, indicating the continuation of Öcalan's cult of leadership in the Kurdish nationalist movement. As a result, in the late 1990s the PKK declared that it was willing to abandon the military struggle against the Turkish state and struggle for the democratisation of the Turkish Republic through peaceful means.

In the aftermath of the capture of Öcalan, the state responded quickly to the situation by recognising some cultural and political rights of the Kurds, instead of escalating the military conflict. As a result of these reforms, there emerged a relatively free political space to debate the Kurdish question in Turkey. However, such a radical change in the political structure cannot be fully interpreted as the result of the state's positive response to Öcalan's proposals. Rather, these reforms were prompted by the Turkish state's need to comply with the political norms of the EU. Regardless of the true purpose behind the liberalisation of the state's attitude towards the Kurds, the people in Eastern Anatolia finally enjoyed peace after 20 years of incessant armed conflict. On the eve of the new millennium, the hopes of resolving the Kurdish question through democratic means reached their peak.

However, this aura of optimism would disappear soon after the US forces occupied Iraq in 2003. The American occupation changed the political balance in Iraq radically and had significant ramifications for Kurdish nationalism in the region. The Kurdish nationalist groups in Iraq found their status shift in the aftermath of US occupation, because they had fought against the Saddam regimes since the early 1980s. As a reward for their ceaseless support for the US forces in the region, these groups were given some important political concessions and privileges. The KDP, under the leadership of Massoud Barzani, took almost full political and military control of Northern Iraq and gained an important share of the country's oil resources. This situation also increased the power of the PKK, which could station most of its military forces in Northern Iraq thanks to the indifference – if not sympathy – of the KDP towards the PKK presence in the region. The PKK established a military base in this region to launch attacks against the Turkish army and hence to force the Turkish state to meet the demands of the PKK. These involved the release of Abdullah Öcalan and other PKK mili-

tants as well as full recognition of the political and cultural rights of the Kurds. Faced with this challenge, the Turkish state was willing to employ its classical tactic of using extensive military force against the PKK bases in Iraq. However, the US government prevented the Turkish state from entering Iraqi territory, as it did not want to risk the stability and order in Northern Iraq (the only region that remained stable in the aftermath of the occupation). This situation jeopardised the longstanding strategic alliance between the United States and Turkey. By early 2008, however, the Bush administration finally permitted Turkish military forces to carry out extensive air strikes against PKK bases in Northern Iraq and, in doing so, tried to prove that the USA supported the Turkish state in its struggle against the PKK. With the start of the cross-border operations of the Turkish security forces, the peaceful and democratic resolution of the Kurdish question was delayed once again. The current AKP government is in the process of initiating a project referred to in the media as the 'Kurdish initiative' or 'democratic initiative', which is declared to involve some radical political reforms that would meet the cultural and political demands of the Kurds in Turkey and hence pave the way for the cessation of military activities by the PKK.

The 25 years of political conflict in Eastern Anatolia had a significant effect on urban everyday life in the western cities in general and İzmir in particular. As a form of consciousness that arose in the urban social life of İzmir, exclusive recognition is therefore also influenced by the course of the Kurdish question as a political conflict. The relationship between this political conflict and exclusive recognition should not be interpreted as one in which the terrorist attacks of the PKK simply ignited racist indignation against the Kurds (as some researchers have argued without adequate evidence). Accordingly, it would not be true to state that exclusive recognition was merely a reaction of middle-class İzmirlis to the PKK aggression. This might seem to be true at first glance, but it is too simple and hence insufficient to depict the complex relations and processes through which exclusive recognition has been formed. There are two reasons for this: firstly, the PKK attacks have never been a sufficient condition for the anti-Kurdish sentiments to arise (see chapter 8 for an extensive discussion on this). This is one of the misjudgements that have been made by some researchers who regard the conflict between the PKK and the state as an ethnic confrontation between the Turks and Kurds.[10] Secondly, the political conflict in Eastern Anatolia has not directly *determined* or *caused* exclusive

recognition; rather, its effects on the perception of 'Kurdishness' by middle-class İzmirlis have been mediated by the changing urban social life in İzmir. Moreover, as the locus of exclusive recognition, urban social life has been shaped by social processes associated with neoliberalism. Therefore, the political conflict in Eastern Anatolia by itself can never be considered a *cause* of exclusive recognition; rather, it must be understood as one of a few structural, macro-level phenomena that have become embedded in the social life of Turkish cities. The nature of the relationship between exclusive recognition and the political conflict in Eastern Anatolia will be explored more concretely in the following chapters.

The Exodus from Eastern Anatolia

Migration from Eastern Anatolia into western Turkish cities from the early 1980s became another national-level, structural dynamic that shaped urban social life in İzmir. As stated at the beginning of this chapter, the phenomenon of internal migration cannot be taken up as an independent factor that created exclusive recognition. It is not simply the case that internal migration brought the Kurds into the city where they have been negatively received by the Turks. Internal migration is not a sufficient condition for the emergence of exclusive recognition. Rather, the fact remains that internal migration, as it takes place within the context of neoliberalism and the conflict between the PKK and the state, has fostered an urban social milieu which is generative of exclusive recognition.

While concentrating more on migration since 1980, I do not mean to underestimate the scale of migration in the 1960s and 1970s. In fact, the migration from Eastern Anatolia into the western cities in this period was too large in scale to be neglected. However, I would like to highlight that the migration waves of these two periods were different in nature. Two interrelated but specific characteristics differentiated the flow that started in the mid-1980s from the earlier migration of the 1960s and 1970s. Firstly, migration before 1980 took place within a social and economic context in which the national developmentalist model prevailed. As shown in the first part of this chapter, this strategy created surplus labour in the rural areas because of the mechanisation of agriculture and a demand for labour in the western cities (due to rapid industrialisation). The result of this 'modernisation' process was a large-scale internal migration from rural to urban areas (Karpat, 1976; Beeley, 2002: 45-46). In this sense, the emigration of the Kurds in the

1960s and 1970s was rather a part of a general trend that took place in all 'underdeveloped' regions of Turkey, where employment opportunities were limited.

In contrast, the large-scale Kurdish migration since the 1980s has taken place in a socio-economic context marked by neoliberal policies, and therefore its dynamics and outcomes were qualitatively different. Since the 1980s, the exodus of Kurds from their regions of origin has not been *necessarily* related to certain emerging advantages or opportunities in the cities. Unlike the case in the 1960s and 1970s, Kurdish migration in this period has not been motivated by rapid industrialisation of the western Turkish cities. Instead, it has taken place at a historical juncture when most of these cities were being reshaped in accordance with neoliberal policies, in which industrialisation was not a significant factor in economic growth. In this sense, the skyrocketing unemployment rates and worsening standards of living in Eastern Anatolia played a greater role in migration than did the presence of attractive opportunities in the western cities. An extensive research project undertaken in South Eastern Anatolia has shown that since the early 1980s 'a substantial portion of those who migrated did so not because they had employment opportunities or a network of contacts, consisting of relatives or earlier migrants from the same region, that awaited them at their destinations, but simply because they were forced to go because their security and livelihood were threatened' (TESEV, 2006: 2).

The second relevant characteristic of migration from the 1980s onwards is that it was triggered by security concerns of the people in the region. The continuous conflict between the PKK and the state, a factor that was absent in the 1960s and 1970s, stands as an independent dynamic that contributed to the exodus from Eastern Anatolia (HÜNEE, 2006). Therefore, it is possible to say that since the early 1980s, the dynamics and patterns of emigration from Eastern Anatolia have differed from those in other regions of Turkey where there was no armed conflict. The causes and outcomes of the more recent wave of Kurdish migration is examined below within the context of its two specific characteristics: deteriorating economic conditions and rising insecurity in Eastern Anatolia.

Poverty and unemployment have been constant problems in Eastern Anatolia throughout the history of the Turkish Republic. Indeed, there has long been a deep economic inequality between Eastern Anatolia and the rest of the country, and this has been one of the major reasons for the incessant flow of Kurds into western Turkish

cities (Danielson and Keleş, 1980: 338). In 1935, the per capita income in the South Eastern Anatolian region was 72.71 per cent of the national average. In 1985 this percentage dropped to 49.03 per cent (Mutlu, 2002: 19). This shows that, in 50 years, the gap between Eastern Anatolia and the rest of the country widened progressively. And the first 20 years of the neoliberal project, from 1980 to 2000, witnessed the persistence and even further deepening of this regional inequality (Sönmez, 1998). As Mario Zucconi notes, as of 1997, 'with 14.2 per cent of the Turkish population below the poverty line, the percentage of the poor in the Aegean and Marmara regions (the most developed) is 1.4 per cent, while for the Eastern and Southeastern provinces it is 30 per cent' (1999: 10). This grave inequality has resonated with many other aspects of social and economic life as well.[11] Since 1997 there has been no significant improvement in this longstanding regional inequality. To explain why this is, it is necessary to consider the historical origins of this situation, and then examine how neoliberal economic policies have led to its perpetuation and reinforcement.

The origins of these problems in Eastern Anatolia and the huge economic gap between the eastern and western regions of Turkey can be traced back to the early seventeenth century, the period in which European commercial capital penetrated Ottoman lands. Due to the increasing European commercial activities in Anatolia, western port cities such as İzmir, Mersin and İstanbul and their agricultural hinterland became prominent centres of trade and capital accumulation, because these places had an advantageous geographical location *vis-à-vis* changing global trade routes. In contrast, the same process led to the gradual economic decline of the rest of Anatolia and laid the ground for its isolation from commercial activities in the western port cities. The eastern part of Anatolia was disproportionately impacted; it lost its economic importance as a result of the increasing value of maritime trade in the western cities. The lack of any transportation network that could ensure the region's connection with the west perpetuated this disadvantage. As a result, there emerged a great economic gap between the western trade centres and Eastern Anatolia, which continued to grow in the following centuries as Western commercial and industrial activities progressively intensified and concentrated in the western Turkish port cities. For this reason, one can say that the early seventeenth century marked the beginning of the economic peripheralisation of Eastern Anatolia.

The inequality between the international trade centres and the rest

of Anatolia continued to be a major issue after the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923. However, Eastern Anatolia (especially South Eastern Anatolia) experienced economic underdevelopment more intensely than other regions because of many other factors, such as unfavourable topographical and climate conditions, continuous political conflicts in the region and instability in neighbouring countries (Mutlu, 2002: 484).

Therefore, at the root of the problem of regional inequality lies the concentration of the capital accumulation in western regions. Since the 1980s the concentration of capital in western regions of Turkey has continued unabated as a result of neoliberal policies, which led to a sharp reduction in state investments in industry as well as the encouragement of domestic and international capitalists to invest their capital in the most profitable western trade centres, especially İstanbul (Ataay, 2001).

The neoliberal project aggravated existing economic difficulties in Eastern Anatolia in particular through undermining agricultural and stockbreeding activities, which are the prevailing methods of subsistence in the region. In fact, the gradual decline of agriculture as an economic sector in Eastern Anatolia is an extension of a general trend of 'de-agriculturalisation' in Turkey as a whole:

> The dramatic drop in the share of agriculture in the GNP is the most telling evidence of the extent of the de-agriculturalization Turkey has experienced… the share of agriculture in GNP has… rapidly declined in the 1980s. The decrease slowed in the 1990s, but by 1997 the share of agriculture had already been reduced to 12.7 percent. The decrease would not have been alarming if productivity in agriculture had increased (Odekon, 2005: 78).

This de-agriculturalisation can be seen as one of the by-products of neoliberal agrarian policies. In the neoliberal period, the peasants faced reductions in state subsidies and the abolition of customs measures. These policies represent the state's gradual turning away from protection of local agricultural and stockbreeding sectors (Odekon, 2005: 98). This was in compliance with the long-term objectives of transnational agri-food companies which, since the early 1980s, have endeavoured to 'control the world food chains and force less economically developed countries' governments to restructure their agriculture so that suitable

conditions would be in place for these companies' activities' (Aydın, 2005: 156). In Eastern Anatolia in particular, these policies significantly impacted small producers who make their living out of farming or stockbreeding (Doğan, 2001: 113). Aggravating already existing unfavourable social and economic conditions in the region, the neoliberal agrarian transformation has plunged millions of agrarian labourers into an unending cycle of unemployment and poverty (Boratav, 1991: 53; Doğan, 2002: 166).

These socio-economic conditions have played a major role in the huge exodus from Eastern Anatolia since the mid-1980s. The other important reason for the exodus from Eastern Anatolia was the military conflict between the PKK and the Turkish state, which led to ongoing insecurity in the region. The situation prompted a great many people to leave and seek safety in western Turkish cities. But 'leaving' has not always been the sole initiative of individuals themselves. Some academic researchers and even some reports prepared by Turkish parliamentarians show that the state or the PKK forced many people to evacuate their homes (McDowall, 2000: 440-41; Yıldız, 2005; Ayata and Yükseker, 2007; Jongerden, 2007). Therefore, unlike the migration in the 1960s and 1970s, the outflow from Eastern Anatolia since the early 1980s has involved many instances of 'forced migration' (HÜNEE, 2006).

In 2006, the Institute of Population Studies at Hacettepe University (HÜNEE) in Ankara completed a major project dealing with the reasons and outcomes of migration from Eastern Anatolia to certain western Turkish cities. The project concentrated on migration from the 14 eastern provinces with the highest out-migration rates, into those ten provinces that received the highest number of immigrants from Eastern Anatolia. In the map in Figure 6.1, which was adapted from the report of this project, 14 eastern provinces that had the highest rates of out-migration are shown in white, and the ten cities with the highest rates of in-migration are shown in black.

Based on the interviews and surveys conducted with a large sample of immigrants from these 14 cities, this research has shown that 19.3 per cent of these immigrants had to leave their villages or cities for 'security reasons' (HÜNEE, 2006: 57).[12] According to the estimates of HÜNEE, the 19.3 per cent represents between 953,680 and 1,201,200 migrants (HÜNEE, 2006: 61). Between 1991 and 1995, when the armed conflict reached its peak, the share of security-based migration reached 47.2 per cent, which demonstrates the extraordinary nature of

this migration flow (HÜNEE, 2006: 57). The same research also indicates that almost 50 per cent of these involuntary migrants live in one of those ten western cities.

Figure 6.1 The cities with highest in-migration and out-migration rates

(Source: HÜNEE, 2006)

In short, the combination of the deterioration of economic conditions and the rising insecurity in Eastern Anatolia triggered mass migration from Eastern Anatolia into certain western Turkish from the early 1980s. In fact, it is difficult to distinguish the forced migrants from those who emigrated for economic reasons, since the provinces that have been exposed to the conflict have also been the ones which have the lowest score in the human development index; namely in adjusted income, education and life expectancy (Zucconi, 1999: 22; İçduygu *et al.*, 1999: 997). In other words, most of the immigrants from the region have been the victims of both extreme economic deprivation and high insecurity.

Due to migration, the ten Turkish cities (shown in black on the map) with the largest numbers of immigrants have undergone a conspicuous demographic and the socio-cultural transformation.[13] Two specific characteristics of these ten cities rendered them amenable to the deep structural influences of this migration. Firstly, unlike some other small cities in Anatolia, in the mid-1980s and throughout the 1990s, these cities offered greater employment opportunities in such

sectors as tourism, finance and construction (Ataay, 2002: 78). This situation led many Kurdish migrants to choose these cities as their destination. Secondly, these cities (with the exception of İstanbul) did not have a large Kurdish population before the 1980s (Mutlu, 1996: 539-40). Because of these two specific characteristics, the people living in these cities witnessed profound social effects due to a rapid increase in the number of Kurdish migrants in their everyday lives (Beeley, 2002: 48). Table 6.1 shows an approximate number of 'Kurdish' migrants in ten cities as of 2008. Because there is no ethnic-based census in Turkey, I had to derive these estimates indirectly by using two sources. The first is the 2008 national census of the Turkish Statistical Institute (TÜİK), which provides information about the 'province of origin' (*nüfusa kayıtlı olunan il*) of the people living in each city and town of Turkey. By using this data, I provide the total number of individuals living in western cities whose origin is registered as any of the aforementioned 14 provinces in Eastern Anatolia. I am aware that not all people who were born in one of these 14 provinces are of Kurdish origin. If I had assumed so, I would have risked overstating the number of Kurdish migrants in western Turkish cities. In order to minimise this bias, I consulted Servet Mutlu's article 'Ethnic Kurds in Turkey: A Demographic Study', in which the ratio of ethnic Kurds in these 14 provinces *as of 1990* is estimated (1996).[14] It was simply assumed that the aggregate of those people whose origin of province is in any of the 14 eastern provinces and who currently live in these western cities have the same ethnic mix as the province of their origin. Hence, in order to reach a more precise estimate of the number of Kurdish migrants in the western provinces, I multiplied the total population of those 'originally' from 14 provinces by the estimated ratio of the Kurds in the province of origin. To give a concrete example: in order to estimate the number of Kurdish migrants in İzmir whose province of origin is Diyarbakır (one of these 14 provinces in Eastern Anatolia), I carried out the following steps:

a) From the 2008 census, I take 59,024 as the number of people whose province of origin is in Diyarbakır but are currently living in İzmir.

b) From the estimates of Servet Mutlu, I used 72.78 per cent as the ratio of the Kurds living in Diyarbakır.

c) In order to estimate the number of those Kurdish migrants in İzmir who were born in Diyarbakır, I multiply 59,024 by 72.78 per cent and reach the number 42,957.

d) Then I do the same calculation for each of the 14 provinces of origin, add them together and reach an estimated number of Kurdish migrants in İzmir.

Table 6.1 Estimated Number of Kurdish migrants in western cities

Province	Population (as of 2008)	Number of Kurdish migrants	Migrant/Population
İstanbul	12,697,164	1,048,958	8.2%
Ankara	4,548,939	92,824	2.0%
İzmir	3,795,978	291,474	7.6%
Bursa	2,507,963	120,040	4.7%
Adana	2,026,319	233,793	11.5%
Mersin	1,602,908	187,516	11.6%
Antalya	1,859,275	83,861	4.5%
Manisa	1,316,750	60,478	4.6%
Kocaeli	1,490,358	77,518	5.2%
Malatya	733,789	51,383	7.0%
TOTAL	32,579,443	2,247,845	6.9%

It should be stated that these estimates do not aim to present an exact number of 'ethnic Kurds' in these cities. Rather, this exercise provides an estimate of the size of the 'Kurdish migrant' community in these provinces in order to make sense of the relative effects of the migration in these ten western provinces. It also enables us to compare different western cities in terms of the size of Kurdish migrant community they involve. The number of 'ethnic Kurds' in the city should be higher than presented here because I did not add those people whose province of origin is not one of the 14 eastern cities but still identify themselves as Kurds. Since I am not interested in the entire Kurdish population but in those Kurdish migrants whose origin is Eastern Anatolia, the following table provides at least an idea about the size of the Kurdish *migrant* population in the city. Given that the Turkish state has not collected data by mother tongue or ethnicity since the 1965 census, this remains one of the most reasonable, albeit indirect, methods of estimating the number of Kurdish migrants in the following ten destinations, as of 2008.

In order to provide more prudent background information on the social effect of Kurdish immigration on urban social life of these ten cities, I also derived a second table indicating the estimated number of

Kurdish migrants on the urban zone of these cities by excluding the estimated number of migrants in towns officially within the provincial borders of these cities. Moreover, in order to reach more accurate estimate of the number of Kurdish migrants in the urban zone of these cities, the population of those small villages that are officially linked to the urban centers but spatially distant to the center were deducted by the population of each city.

Table 6.2 Estimated Number of Kurdish migrants in the urban zone[15] of western cities

Province	Population (as of 2008)	Number of Kurdish migrants	Migrant/Population
İstanbul	12,481,653	1,041,253	8.3%
Ankara	3,988,455	86,374	2.1%
İzmir	2,672,126	227,392	8.5%
Bursa	1,685,463	93,538	5.5%
Adana	1,539,721	216,082	14%
Mersin	807,694	144,176	17.8%
Antalya	927,553	63,668	6.8%
Manisa	278,967	25,306	9%
Kocaeli	1,392,733	77,518	5.6%
Malatya	411,181	33,266	8.0%
TOTAL	26,185,546	2,008,573	7.7%

As Table 6.1 shows, İstanbul, as the most populous city in Turkey, harbours the largest Kurdish migrant community. Nevertheless, in terms of the proportion of Kurdish migrants to the total population, which presents a better indicator of the level of influence that Kurdish migrants might have in the ethnic landscape of a city, Mersin, Adana and Manisa occupy the first three positions, İzmir being the fourth following these cities.[16] The increase in the number of Kurdish migrants in western Turkish cities has paved the way for some profound changes in their socio-cultural structure and everyday life. The details of this phenomenon will be discussed in the following chapters within the specific context of İzmir.

The three national-level structural dynamics I have discussed throughout this chapter (namely, the neoliberal transformation of the Turkish economy, the political conflict between the PKK and the Turkish state, and the huge exodus of migrants from Eastern Anatolia),

have deeply transformed the social structure and urban social life of Turkey's western cities. It is possible to say that these structural dynamics are embedded in the urban everyday life processes whereby exclusive recognition arises. The concrete effects of these processes will be elaborated in detail in the following chapters within the context of the production and reproduction of exclusive recognition in the social life of İzmir.

Conclusion: Three Sets of Processes in Light of Three National Dynamics

The following three chapters examine the formation of exclusive recognition in the social life of İzmir in relation to three interrelated sets of processes. The first set concerns the 'recognition' of the 'ethnic difference' of Kurdish migrants in urban social life. The second set of processes refers to the use of certain pejorative labels and stereotypes that have been attached to this recognised 'Kurdishness'. The last set of processes includes those through which recognition and exclusion of the 'Kurds' as a distinct group is reinforced and strengthened. The effects of the above three national-level dynamics are embedded in these three processes. Accordingly, I will try to unravel how these three national-level (macro) dynamics weigh down on the three micro-level processes that take place in urban social life of İzmir (micro).

It is important to note here that these three sets of processes are internally related to one another, and it is through their interrelation that 'exclusive recognition' comes into being. I divided the whole process into these three constitutive parts for analytical reasons; that is, in order to better understand and expose the complex relations in which exclusive recognition is produced and reproduced. In the real world, these processes act in unison to co-constitute exclusive recognition. The following three chapters discuss the ways in which neoliberalism, political conflict in Eastern Anatolia and Kurdish immigration prepared the context for these three integral processes of exclusive recognition.

7

THE RECOGNITION
OF MIGRANTS AS 'KURDS'

At the end of Chapter 6, I pointed out that exclusive recognition consists of three interconnected but analytically separable social processes: a) recognition of Kurdish migrants as a distinctive and homogeneous group; b) the exclusion of this 'recognised' group based on some pejorative labels; and c) reinforcement of this exclusionary construction in urban social life. In this chapter I will scrutinise the first of these micro-level processes within the context of the three macro-level process that were examined in the previous chapter. Until this point I have argued that exclusive recognition cannot be seen as an extension of a Kurdish-Turkish conflict or the reproduction of pre-existing negative images of the Kurds in urban social life. The middle-class İzmirlis do not develop their own notion of Kurdishness through self-evident and ready-made conceptions of Kurdishness; rather, they recognise and actively construct the 'Kurdishness' of migrants in the urban social life. In this chapter, I will bring into focus the aspects of urban social life that contribute to the recognition of migrants as a distinct ethnic group.

'Recognition' refers here not only to the process through which the middle-class İzmirlis become aware of the 'Kurdishness' of migrants; it also addresses the tendency of this group to perceive Kurdishness as the migrants' primary identification and the basis upon which the latter can be demarcated from the rest of the population. As such, recognition, in this context, goes beyond 'knowing' that these migrants belong to a different ethnic group, for it also involves identifying the Kurds in urban space when they are seen and experienced in urban social life and treating them as a distinct group with a set of homogeneous characteristics. In fact, people living in Turkey might be aware of the ethnic iden-

tities of groups such as Circassians, Bosnians or Lazs. However, in these cases the awareness of the ethnic identities of individuals does not necessarily place them as members of a unified and homogeneous group that is different from the rest of the population. However, in the case of Kurdish migrants, recognition of their ethnic identity also involves perceiving their Kurdishness as an expression and, in some cases, 'explanation' of the differences between these migrants and the rest of the population. Through exclusive recognition, Kurdish migrants are thus identified as 'the Kurds' in urban social life and regarded as a separate, unified, and homogeneous group.

Interviews conducted during the field study indicate that the locus of such 'recognition' is the urban social life of the city. Participants who have been living in İzmir for many years stated that it was not until they saw these recently settled migrants that they had any sense of what it meant to be a Kurd. One of them, Celal (57, M),[1] expresses this lack of familiarity in this way:

> I have never been in Eastern Anatolia in my entire life. The fur-
> thest east I have seen in my life is Sivas;[2] I went there for work
> reasons and there were no Kurds. So I have seen the Kurds here.
> They are everywhere now.

Those middle-class individuals who were not born in İzmir but see themselves as İzmirlis also recall that their first contacts and experiences with the Kurds occurred in this city. Şerife (54, F), who has lived in İzmir since the 1970s states:

> While I was living in Amasya,[3] I did not have any idea about the
> Kurds. The only thing I knew about the Kurds was that they
> were living in the East and were living under difficult conditions
> and were having some problems with the state. In those years,
> nothing was coming to my mind when I heard the word 'Kurd'.
> Now I can see many of them here. To be honest, I do not have
> a high opinion of them.

Other respondents stated that they had known or been in contact with Kurds before they saw them in İzmir but at that time their Kurdishness did not mean anything to them. The narrative of Ayşe (58, F) is exemplary of this situation:

When I was in Tokat, there were some Kurdish villages around the city. I have never been in these villages… We knew that they were Kurds but we did not see any difference between them and us; we did not even mind their Kurdishness. In those times, the biggest issue was 'Alevis'.[4] That was the only thing that we considered. But now, we no longer even talk about Alevis; I do not care who is Alevi, who is not. The Kurds have become a more important issue nowadays…

At the later stages of the interview she added:

Now, willingly or unwillingly, we, and many people, started to investigate where this person comes from; whether he is Kurd or not.

This interviewee's 'recognition' of the Kurds in the urban social life of İzmir is different from her previous 'awareness' of the Kurdishness of some people in Tokat. In the former case, Kurdishness is viewed as the primary identity of migrants, whereas in the latter case it is considered one of the trivial characteristics of a group that is distant from this person's immediate and everyday life. 'Kurdishness' has become a primary criterion that the interviewee uses to demarcate the Kurds from herself.

The Recognition and Separation in Urban Social Life

The process of recognition of Kurdish migrants, i.e. constructing Kurdish migrants as homogeneous 'outsiders' and as 'ethnic others', is associated with the deep material divisions and physical separation between Kurdish migrants and the rest of the population. This separation manifests itself in the social life of İzmir in two ways: *socio-economic separation* refers to the differentiation of the Kurdish migrants' labour processes and standards of living from those of the middle-class İzmirlis. *Spatial separation* refers to the residential concentration of Kurdish migrants in specific quarters of the city, and the segregation and differentiation of these quarters from the neighbourhoods of the middle-class İzmirlis. These two dimensions of separation in the urban life of İzmir prepare a social milieu for the recognition of Kurdish migrants as a distinct and homogeneous group. In other words, socio-economic and spatial separation of Kurdish migrants enables the middle-class İzmirlis to group the former under the category of 'Kurds'. In the remaining sections of this chapter, the processes through which the

combination of neoliberalism, political conflict and internal migration contributed to the formation of socio-economic and spatial separation in İzmir will be examined. These structural dynamics, which were presented extensively in the previous chapter, are conceptualised here as the necessary conditions for the emergence of socio-economic and spatial separation between Kurdish migrants and the middle-class İzmirlis.

Socio-Economic Separation

As stated before, the label 'middle-class İzmirlis' refers to those workers who are employed in a formal job, have a modest but stable wage, and benefit from the social security system of the state. Kurdish migrants who emigrated from one of the 14 Eastern Anatolian provinces in question since the early 1980s live under quite different socio-economic conditions, however. It is possible to say that they exhibit the characteristics of the urban poor: a great majority of them are either unemployed or employed in very poorly paid informal jobs. Most of them do not receive regular wages and live in poor housing conditions. According to research conducted in Kadifekale, a big shanty town with 30,000 Kurdish migrants, only 9 per cent of employable individuals held a formal job as a factory worker or civil servant as of 2005. The rest of the population was either unemployed or working in an informal job without any social security (Karayiğit, 2005: 11). Moreover, in Kadifekale, both the literacy rate and the proportion of people who obtain post-secondary education are strikingly lower than the city's average. Most of the people living in this district have limited access to health care benefits and public education (Karayiğit, 2005: 16). It is true that under a system called 'green card' the state issues health care to those 'who are not covered by any social insurance schemes and whose monthly income is less than one third of the minimum wage' (Arın, 2002: 86). However, a recent study showed that despite the green card system, 30 per cent of Turkish citizens do not have any kind of health insurance (Buğra, 2007: 154-56). Another study indicated that in 1998, 34.8 per cent of the people living in the *gecekondu* areas of İzmir did not have any form of social security (Ünverdi, 2002: 223).

An external observer can easily note the concrete forms of this socio-economic separation in urban social life processes. The people who sell mussels in every vibrant street of İzmir are almost exclusively Kurdish men who came from Mardin, a city in South Eastern Anatolia. The small children who polish shoes from early morning to late at night in various corners of the city are typically from migrant Kurdish fami-

lies. Boys and girls selling tissues on the streets, beggars, or street kids are also almost exclusively from Kurdish families (*Yerel Gündem* 21, 1998: 123).

The findings of an extensive demographic research conducted by Hacettepe University[5] demonstrates that the low socio-economic profile of Kurdish migrants is not something peculiar to Kadifekale, but is the case for all western Turkish cities with high rates of Kurdish immigration. According to this research, 55 per cent of the male and 88 per cent of the female migrants from Eastern Anatolia residing in western cities do not hold a formal job with social security (HÜNEE, 2006: 47-48). This research also points to the extremely low level of education and insufficient housing conditions of migrants from Eastern Anatolia. One other study provides some statistics regarding the 'relative deprivation' of the Kurdish migrant families in terms of their housing conditions (İçduygu *et al.*, 1999: 1003-4). Other research on Demirtaş Mahallesi in Mersin, a shanty town with a clear majority of Kurdish migrants, provides additional evidence of the socio-economic deprivation of migrants from Eastern Anatolia (Kaygalak, 2001). Research conducted by Deniz Yükseker points to the apparent socio-economic separation of Kurdish migrants in İstanbul as well (2006: 121-32). The following is a succinct summary of the socio-economic conditions encountered by Kurdish migrants:

> Urban internally displaced populations suffer from a host of interrelated problems, including poverty and joblessness; inadequate access to education for school-age children; use of child labour as a coping strategy; poor housing; and insufficient access to health and psychosocial care. Coming from agricultural backgrounds and hence lacking skills for urban employment, the majority of displaced adult men and women are unemployed. Household demands on their labour, inability to speak Turkish and cultural barriers often keep displaced women away from the labour market. The available types of work for both men (such as construction and street vending) and women (for example childcare and piecework at home) are sporadic, informal and therefore lack social security benefits. Adult unemployment forces displaced families to send their children to work, either on the street as peddlers or in sweatshops (such as small, informal garment workshops in Istanbul). Having to contribute to household income keeps many children away from school, although

some of them have been enrolled in the past few years, partly as a result of… conditional cash transfers… Working on streets and in sweatshops also puts children's health and safety at risk and hampers their physical and psychological development (Kurban *et al.* 2006: 26).

Before examining some structural reasons for the socio-economic separation of Kurdish migrants from the rest of city in general and middle-class İzmirlis in particular, it is necessary to clarify the historical specificity of this situation. It was not until the late 1980s that Turkish cities harboured a *marginalised* migrant community that constitutes the poorest sections of the city's population. What is novel about contemporary Turkish cities after the late 1980s is not the economic and social polarisation between poor and rich *per se*, which was already inherent in the structure of capitalism itself; rather, it is the socio-economic separation of Kurdish migrants, not only from the richer segments of the city population, but also from the other groups of labourers. This indicates that under neoliberalism western Turkish cities are marked by a sharp fragmentation within the working class.

The concentration of migrant labourers in the informal sector began as early as the 1950s and drew the attention of the sociologists of the 1960s and 1970s (Kıray, 1972; Karpat, 1976; Danielson and Keleş, 1980; Aral, 1980). As discussed in the previous chapter, the main reason for the rise of the informal sector was the state's inability to provide the city's population with certain basic social services, and the consequent attempt of some private entrepreneurs to fill this gap through informal economic activities. The growing informal sector was concretised in squatter settlements that were built 'illegally' in both the outer and inner areas of large cities, an 'unregistered' transportation sector, and hawking as a non-taxed commercial activity. Nevertheless, this reality should not lead us to conflate the Kurdish migrants' recent concentration in the informal sector with the rise of informal economic activities in the 1960s and 1970s. In the latter case, the economy was shaped by policies of the national developmentalist model. The rise of the informal sector in the 1960s and 1970s coincided with the rapid industrialisation of Turkish cities, and the consequent proletarianisation of millions of migrants from all across Turkey. This was the period in which 'labour-power was urbanized' in Turkey (Şengül, 2003: 156).

İzmir was by no means an exception to the process of the 'urbanisation of labour-power' in the 1960s and 1970s. Following İstanbul and

Kocaeli, İzmir ranked third in scale of manufacturing industry, and became one of the most important destinations for migration from the early 1950s onwards (Ataay, 2001: 78). The expansion of chemical, food and textile industries in the city offered many employment opportunities in this period (Ünverdi, 2002: 165). Therefore, finding a job in the formal industrial sector was relatively easy for a newcomer to İzmir in the 1960s and 1970s. In those years, the informal sector served either as a 'springboard' for quicker upward social mobility, or as temporary employment until a better job could be found in the formal sector (Ünverdi, 2002: 169). For some workers, the informal sector also served as a source of additional income.

In contrast, from the late 1980s onwards, the informal sector became a primary means of subsistence for Kurdish migrants. Even finding a job with very low pay, no social security and no stability, became possible only through having contacts within the established social network that dominates informal economic activities (Buğra and Keyder, 2003: 18). Informal jobs were no longer a transient or temporary type of employment that was relied upon during the initial days of arrival or extraordinary periods of economic crisis (Buğra and Keyder, 2003: 17). Additionally, it was no longer considered a tool for accumulating money for the purchase of properties, enhancing one's living conditions, or setting up a small business. Rather, informal work for a Kurdish migrant became the primary means of subsistence in the neoliberal period.

Here it is important to clarify that it is not involvement in the informal sector *per se*, but the persistent concentration in the worst informal jobs that differentiates Kurdish migrants from other segments of the population. Undoubtedly, engaging in the informal economy of the city is not something unique to Kurdish migrants since the 1980s. The socio-economic separation between Kurdish migrants and middle-class İzmirlis does *not* overlap the division between informal and formal economies of the city. Indeed, conceptualising informal and formal economic activities as mutually exclusively is in itself problematic; even in advanced capitalist countries these two forms of generating surplus value are interconnected. This is also true in the case of Turkey, where both small companies and large corporations benefit from the illegal use of state land, have a strong record of not paying taxes to the state, and acquire electricity and water from municipalities without paying for them (Işık and Pınarcıoğlu, 2001: 66). In this sense, it would not be an exaggeration to say that rather than being limited to Kurdish migrants,

the informal economy is an inherent component of Turkish capitalism today.

Therefore, what differentiates Kurdish migrants from middle-class İzmirlis and the richer segments of society is not their involvement in the informal economy *per se* but the fact that they disproportionately work in the worst informal jobs and face the drastic consequences of unemployment. I am not suggesting that all *ethnic Kurds* are poor, unemployed and forced to work in informal sectors. What I mean by socio-economic separation is that a clear majority of *Kurdish migrants since the mid-1980s* have held the worst jobs of the informal sector or no job at all, and as a result, have been segregated from the formal work processes in western Turkish cities (Ayata and Yükseker, 2007: 54). This is to suggest that the present socio-economic situation of Kurdish migrants is not an individual matter; rather, it is as a group that they are socio-economically separated in İzmir.

The nature of informal work processes, the position of a Kurdish migrant within these work processes, and their organisation of urban everyday life are important factors in the deep socio-economic separation between Kurdish migrants and the rest of the city population (Erder, 1997: 37; Buğra and Keyder, 2003: 10-11). It is true that Kurdish migrants are *poorer* than middle-class İzmirlis, but their poverty is not manifested solely by lower income. Here, the socio-economic deprivation of Kurdish migrants can be better understood in light of what Jamie Gough *et al.* refer to as 'hybrid' or 'overall' poverty.

> According to the 'hybrid' or 'overall' approach to poverty, aspects of deprivation such as housing, nutrition or education cannot be read off from low income although they correlate to a considerable extent. The causation can be both ways: poor health, education and mobility are a result of low income but in turn harm participation in the waged work… The poor tend to live in the worst housing in a given locality… The poor spend a much higher than average proportion of their income. Hunger is still common and poor people's diet is inferior… Public services such as schools, health and social services, nurseries, and care of the elderly and disabled tend to achieve the worst outcomes for the poorest people… At a time when wealthier groups are becoming 'superincluded' by financial institutions, the poor are systematically denied access… The communication of the poor is restricted. Few poor households have cars, and for those who

require one – for example in rural areas – the expense can make them poor… People living in poor neighbourhoods suffer from higher crime rates… The aspects of poverty so far considered often *compound* one another, and tend to perpetuate low income in vicious circles. All the processes together tend to transmit poverty and deprivation from one generation to the next (Gough *et al.*, 2006: 55-56).

It is this 'hybrid poverty' of Kurdish migrants that differentiates them from middle-class İzmirlis in socio-economic terms. Where should we look for the origins of this socio-economic separation? If the socio-economic impoverishment of Kurdish migrants is the case not only for İzmir but also many other western Turkish cities with high levels of Kurdish influx, greater weight should be attached to national-level structural dynamics. The neoliberalisation of the Turkish economy, political conflict in Eastern Anatolia and migration from Eastern Anatolia – processes which were examined in detail in the previous chapter – are of utmost importance in this respect.

As with other societies that have undergone neoliberalism (Mingione, 1996: 13), unemployment and social inequality have increased dramatically in Turkey since the 1980s. This is due largely to a decline or stagnation in state or private investments in industry, and a reduction in wages in the already limited formal work sectors. It is true that İzmir continues to offer employment opportunities in the food, textile, automobile, and tobacco industries (İzmir Büyükşehir Belediyesi, 1998: 85). However, compared to the 1960s and 1970s, the city's economy has weakened in its capacity to provide sufficient means of subsistence for its growing population (İzmir Ticaret Odası, 2004: 114).[7] The paradox of Turkish cities in the neoliberal period is that despite shrinking employment opportunities in industry and worsening conditions for most of urban workers, they continued to receive high volumes of migrants from Eastern Anatolia. Based on the demographic statistics provided in the previous chapter, in terms of the estimated total number of *Kurdish migrants* (not ethnic Kurds), İzmir holds the third position among other western Turkish cities.

The acceleration of emigration from Eastern Anatolia in the neoliberal period emerged as a combined effect of de-agriculturalisation and ongoing insecurity in the region (Sönmez, 1998: 143). İzmir's mild Mediterranean climate, which reduces the cost of living in the city, as well as *relatively* good employment opportunities, made it one of the

favoured destinations of migration for the people from Eastern Anatolia (İzmir Büyükşehir Belediyesi, 1998: 21).[8]

However, the downsizing of the manufacturing industry in the city made it increasingly difficult for Kurdish newcomers to obtain factory work. It was also unthinkable for them to find employment opportunities in expanding white collar and service occupations, because, as the people who fled from the most impoverished region of Turkey, they lacked the necessary education and qualifications for these jobs (Içduygu *et al.*, 1999: 997; Zucconi, 1999: 23). Under these circumstances, a clear majority of Kurdish migrants faced unemployment, or were compelled to work under extremely exploitative conditions. As in some other countries that have undergone neoliberal transformation, harsh living conditions in the city made many of these migrants 'accept whatever ways out of their misery they could find' (Castells and Portes, 1989: 29; Bhalla and Lapeyre, 2004: 81). In the end, in Zucconi's words they were transformed from 'rural poor to rootless destitute city dwellers' (1999: 27).

The 'commodification' of the 'urban land' in the neoliberal period was an equally important factor that contributed to the socio-economic separation of Kurdish migrants. Comparing the status of urban land in the neoliberal period with that in the national developmentalist period illuminates this point. It is true that before 1980, migrants also experienced poverty and social exclusion in the first few years after their arrival. Nevertheless, most of them managed to gain access to certain economic and social instruments which allowed them to overcome their initial marginalisation (Kaygalak, 2001: 127). Some of them were able to to accumulate capital, overcame the traps of poverty, and managed to start their own businesses in the formal or informal sectors of the city. It was probably the state's leniency over the construction of *gecekondus* that played the most important role in facilitating the upward social mobility of migrants.

As stated in the previous chapter, in the 1960s and 1970s, since the state failed to provide the labourers with cheap housing opportunities in the city, most migrants built their own houses and apartments 'illegally' on state-owned land. During the 1970s the state had to tolerate and, in the long run, legalise these 'unregistered' buildings (*gecekondus*), because they facilitated the developmentalist strategy of capitalism in Turkey. This was a period when capital accumulation was based, to a large extent, upon the surplus value created through labour-intensive industrial production. Therefore, the continuation of industrial produc-

tion and the provision of industrial labour-power were essential to the continuation of capitalist production. *Gecekondus* played two vital roles in this respect: firstly by resolving the problem of housing for workers, and ensuring the reproduction of labour power without procuring a financial burden for capitalists or the state (Şengül, 2003: 166). Secondly, by serving as rent-free housing they ensured that workers had more money to spend on commodities produced in the domestic industry. In turn, the consumption power of workers in the domestic market increased the profitability of industrial production, thereby attracting capitalists to invest further.

Apart from serving an economic function for capitalists, *gecekondus* also played an important 'political' role in the continuation of the developmentalist model in the 1960s and 1970s. By minimising the costs of housing they provided important economic relief for workers, and somewhat alleviated their economic grievances. This was critical for appeasing their discontent in the city and manufacturing their consent for the existing social establishment. The promise made by politicians before national elections to legalise *gecekondu* houses was a political tactic to garner the support of millions of workers in the Turkish metropolises (Boratav, 1991: 120-21; Buğra, 1998: 310; Aydın, 2005: 57). Overall, despite the socio-economic polarisation between the migrant labourers and the rich segments of society, the *ad hoc* leniency towards *gecekondus* increased the chance of upward social mobility for migrant labourers, especially in the early 1980s and, in this way, prevented the emergence of sharp socio-economic divisions within the working class itself. Owing to this tacit agreement between state and newcomers on the issue of *gecekondus*, the migrants became capable of resisting socioeconomic marginalization.

This has not been the case for Kurdish migrants who settled in the city from the mid-1980s, however. The reasons why they could not get rid of the traps of poverty and exclusion have a lot to do with the neoliberal restructuring of urban space. While, in the presence of a national developmentalist model, the capitalists typically saw the space as an *instrument* to facilitate and sustain industrial production, the land itself has been transformed into a complete commodity in the neoliberal period:

> One of the dramatic impacts of the increasing importance of the cities in capital accumulation processes was that various groups which had not been previously involved in urbanisation started

> to turn their eyes to the cities. The big construction companies,
> both national and international, became involved in big con-
> struction projects such as underground railways, mass housing,
> and infrastructure. The flow of big-scale capital was not limited
> to state contracts. Once the cities became central to capital accu-
> mulation and urban rents became an important source of capital
> accumulation, private capital also started to invest in the built
> environment. Shopping malls, five star hotels, and business cen-
> tres started to cover the horizons of the large cities at an
> unprecedented speed (Şengül, 2003: 164).

As a result, the land was no longer an instrument for accumulating prof-
it out of industrial production. Rather, while interest in industrial pro-
duction was declining, the ownership of this land itself turned out to be
a profit-generating economic investment and an alternative way of
accumulating capital. Tarık Şengül refers to this trend in Turkey as the
'urbanisation of capital' and interprets it as a rupture with the period of
'urbanisation of labour' that became predominant in the 1960s and
1970s (2003: 160).

Under such logic of capital accumulation, the *gecekondu* districts
began to be conceived as areas that could be used for generating profit
and rent. Therefore, in the early 1990s the state shifted its discourse
with regard to the construction of *new* illegal houses on state-owned
land, prioritising capital interests in the land (Demirtaş and Şen, 2007:
99). Indeed, since capital accumulation was no longer predominantly
based on industrial production, the provision of 'free' and 'illegal' hous-
ing opportunities for migrant labourers was not seen to be as significant
as it was in the 1960s and 1970s. İzmir has been affected by this trend
of 'urbanisation of capital' as well. Many researchers point to the
increasing importance of the use of İzmir's urban space in generating
profit and accumulating capital (Ünverdi, 2002: 187-89; Çilingir, 2001:
54-61; İzmir Ticaret Odası, 2004: iii).

This situation affected those Kurdish migrants who moved to the
city after the mid-1980s most severely, as it was no longer possible for
them to build and own their *gecekondus* upon arrival (Buğra and Keyder,
2003: 18). Most rented *gecekondus* which had been built by migrants in
the previous period. In the neoliberal period these migrants from the
earlier periods started to use their *gecekondu* houses for their 'exchange
value', that is, as a means of gaining wealth, rather than for their 'use
value', as a strategy of surviving in the city (Şengül, 2003: 166; Beeley,

2002: 51). As of 2002, in the Kadifekale region of İzmir more than half of Kurdish migrants paid rent to settled migrants (Sönmez, 2007: 333). Ironically, in the neoliberal period, upward mobility of the migrants who came to the city before 1980 has been achieved by taking advantage of newcomers' desperation and poverty. Some researchers designate this transmission of poverty from one generation of migrants to the other as 'poverty in turns' (Işık and Pınarcıoğlu, 2000: 77).

However, tenants of the *gecekondus* are not exclusively Kurdish migrants. Some *gecekondu* owners gained enormous wealth by selling or renting their previously legalised *gecekondus* to capitalists or to the state for profit-generating investments such as shopping malls, high-rise apartment blocks or tourist hotels. As a result, these people, who had constituted relatively poor sections of the city population before the 1980s, managed to get rich very quickly; in this sense, they became the 'winners' of neoliberalism through the sharing of 'urban rent' with capitalists (Boratav, 1991: 119; Şengül, 2003; Demirtaş and Şen, 2007: 93). Without a doubt, the latter obtained the lion's share of profit in this process by using the urban land for their aforementioned profitable investments. In contrast, Kurdish migrants who had arrived in the city since the 1980s typically became the 'losers' of this situation, as their already terrible socio-economic conditions were further aggravated by the increasing costs of housing. The changing structure of the cities forced them to concentrate in those jerry-built slums where the rents were relatively cheap, but the living conditions were miserable. Thus the socio-economic separation between the 'marginalised' Kurdish migrants and middle-class İzmirlis was perpetuated.

Kurdish migrants are not the only victims of the neoliberal transformation of the cities. Workers in general,[9] including the middle-class İzmirlis, were negatively affected by this process, with the decline in the real wages (or salaries) and the reduction in the social policies of the state (Aydın, 2005: 130; Ünverdi, 2002: 223).[10] However, their previous accumulation and savings, as well as the relative advantage of holding a formal job, social security and health coverage, prevented the middle-class İzmirlis from falling into the position of Kurdish migrants who are either unemployed or work permanently in the informal sector. Indeed, members of this group have typically owned their own flats and cars, and managed to maintain modest but decent living conditions when compared with Kurdish migrants (Boratav, 1991: 109-10). Hence, despite the deterioration in the conditions of middle-class Turkish citizens, some of the advantages they gained in the previous periods have

continued to separate them from Kurdish migrants in terms of socio-economic conditions.

The political conflict in Eastern Anatolia also promoted socio-economic separation between Kurdish migrants and middle-class İzmirlis. The socio-economic conditions of migrants who fled from their villages or towns for security reasons were particularly troublesome, since they had to escape from their places of origin without being prepared in advance for the harsh conditions of the western cities (Jongerden, 2007: 220-21; Çelik, 2002: 114; Yıldız, 2005: 89-102). 78 per cent of these forced migrants were from the extremely impoverished rural areas of Eastern Anatolia (HÜNEE, 2006: 60). Most of them had to spend their already limited life-savings on the cost of the migration process itself and had to leave their animals and farms without making any legal claims over them (HÜNEE, 2006: 78-79). In contrast, among the migrants whose place of origin was outside Eastern Anatolia, the proportion of people from urban areas has been remarkably higher in the neoliberal period (Doğan, 2001: 113, HÜNEE, 2006). Migrants from outside Eastern Anatolia were exclusively voluntary migrants, who had arranged their employment and housing prior to their immigration (HÜNEE, 2006: 60). Therefore, most of them did not experience the problems and difficulties that Kurdish migrants had in the post-migration process. The abrupt escape from the region of conflict put the Kurds in an extremely disadvantageous position compared to other migrants. Therefore, since the mid-1980s the dynamics of out-migration from Eastern Anatolia have been qualitatively different from those of emigration from other regions, as the latter was not triggered by the armed conflict between the PKK and the Turkish army.

This was not the case before the 1980s, however. In the 1960s and 1970s the voluntary rural–urban migration was a nationwide phenomenon that led to the proletarianisation of millions of peasants from across Anatolia, regardless of their place of origin and ethnicity. The differential experience of conflict between migrants from Eastern Anatolia and migrants from other regions in the neoliberal period is one of the factors that explains why the former were more vulnerable to the deteriorating social and economic conditions in the city, and why they formed a component of the urban poor upon their arrival (Işık and Pınarcıoğlu, 2001: 172-73; Kurban *et al*, 2006: 26). In short, the transformation of economic poverty into 'acute, progressive and unstoppable forms of social exclusion' in the neoliberal period (Mingione, 1996: 13) hit the Kurdish migrants most in the Turkish context because

of the deprivations that stemmed from their experience of forced migration or internal displacement. Therefore, their socio-economic separation should be explained in relation to the combined effects of neoliberalism and forced migration.

Spatial Separation

Spatial separation, in this study, refers to the concentration of Kurdish migrants' residences in specific zones of İzmir, and the consequent segregation of their living spaces from middle-class settlements. As stated above, the zones where Kurdish migrants live are typically the poorest *gecekondu* zones of the city with the worst living and housing conditions. Indeed, the spatial concentration of the migrants from rural Anatolia in the poorer housing areas of İzmir was already obvious in the 1960s and 1970s.[11] The fact that in 1986 44.7 per cent of the city's population lived in *gecekondu* houses is evidence of the presence of spatial segregation prior to the neoliberal period (Sevgi, 1988: 129). Indeed, spatial divisions along class lines are an inherent feature of capitalism (Gough *et al.*, 2006: 38) and it is therefore not surprising to observe this reality in İzmir in the early stages of capitalist development. Hence, what is specific about the period since the 1980s is not the emergence of a 'spatially divided city structure'. Rather what differentiates the post-1980 era from earlier periods is the emergence of a *Kurdish migrant community* that is concentrated almost exclusively in the poorest *gecekondu* zones and slums of İzmir.

The spatial separation of Kurdish migrants in İzmir is also found in some other cities in western Turkey. Sevilay Kaygalak's (2001) study on Demirtaş Mahallesi in Mersin, and Bediz Yılmaz's (2003) research on Tarlabaşı in İstanbul show that this spatial separation is not a 'local' phenomenon that is unique to İzmir. Rather, the combination of the neoliberal transformation of cities and the huge exodus from Eastern Anatolia has produced a similar landscape in other urban contexts.[12] These examples show that it is no longer possible to grasp the nature of the neoliberal city in Turkey by using a simplistic 'dual city model', which simply focuses on the division between 'rich' and 'poor' sections of the city. The spatial separation of Kurdish migrants, not only from a small group of upper class 'bourgeois' people, but also from other workers, signifies the emergence of a 'polycentric' city structure in the post-1980 period (Şengül, 2003: 163).

The spatial separation of Kurdish migrants is linked intricately to the aforementioned socio-economic conditions. Kurdish migrants settle in

these zones mostly because they cannot afford to live in other places. The desire to live close to solidarity networks and informal or largely inaccessible formal employment opportunities is another reason why they live in these districts. However, the relationship between urban space and socio-economic conditions is not a one-sided, deterministic one, because the characteristics of the space where Kurdish migrants live, in turn, reproduces and perpetuates their existing socio-economic conditions and segregation.

In İzmir, Kurdish concentrated slums have been located at the inner as well as outer areas of the city. The migrant settlements in the inner areas are generally surrounded by the apartments of other sections of labourers including middle-class İzmirlis. There can be found more luxurious apartments in rich quarters such as Alsancak, Göztepe, Karşıyaka and Güzelyalı, which are located alongside the seashore and are quite close to the crowded consumption centres of the city. Some other rich groups form gated communities in the outer areas of the city. Mavişehir, for instance, with a population of approximately 20,000 people, exhibits the typical characteristics of a gated community, 'a bourgeois suburbia' (Fishman, 1996: 24), in terms of being quite segregated from the centre of the city, being protected by private security personnel, and including its own facilities such as post office, malls, and sport centre.

In contrast to this 'bourgeois suburbia', Kadifekale exhibits the typical characteristics of an urban slum. This large slum area with a population of almost 30,000 (most of whom are Kurdish migrants from Eastern Anatolia), is located within walking distance or at most a 15-minute bus ride from Konak, the very centre of the city. Kadifekale is the oldest *gecekondu* area in İzmir. The first squatter settlements were built in this area in as early as 1950 and then spread rapidly across other vacant state land in the city (Mutluer, 2000: 60). Before the influx of the Kurds, it harboured migrants from different cities of Turkey, particularly those from Central Anatolia. The concentration of migrant Kurds started in the early 1980s and, by the early 1990s, the Kurds comprised an overwhelming majority in the area, with the gradual outflow of migrants that settled there before 1980. As stated above, a clear majority of Kurdish migrants living in this district are either unemployed or work in the informal sector. The most prevalent informal means of subsistence is selling mussels in crowded city streets, and selling vegetables and fruits in the discount bazaars or markets.

There are various reasons for the tendency of Kurdish migrants to

settle in Kadifekale. First of all, the housing costs are relatively low here, mainly because most of the houses are in poor condition and are located in a dangerous landslide zone (Örs, 2001: 117). The potential for landslides in this area has threatened the lives of the people living here for decades. Secondly, the Kurds comprise the majority of the people living in this district; this provides newcomers with the benefits of solidarity networks and patronage relations. Thirdly, the proximity of Kadifekale to the very centre of the city reduces the cost of transportation for the migrants and facilitates their participation in informal work in the centre of the city.[13] Recently, however, the İzmir Metropolitan Municipality has articulated an interest in an urban transformation project that would destroy the squatter settlements in Kadifekale and move Kurdish migrants to newly built high-rise apartments in Uzundere, which is quite far from the city centre. Many people living in Kadifekale are unwilling to move to Uzundere, partly because their present proximity to Konak and Alsancak, the consumption centres of the city, facilitates access to informal jobs such as selling mussels and flowers, and polishing shoes.[14] In Uzundere, they will be deprived of this advantage.

Despite its proximity to the city centre, Kadifekale is regarded as 'inaccessible' by most of the people in the city including middle-class İzmirlis, since it is thought that this district is prone to insecurity, robbery and Kurdish separatist sentiments. Indeed, with the exception of a few state officials who have their offices here, it is hard to find middle-class people or other workers in the streets of Kadifekale. Nevertheless, the people who live in Kadifekale can be seen in Konak and Alsancak, the centres of administration, business, consumption and entertainment (i.e. those common spaces of consumption for people from different classes). This is what makes Kadifekale special: its proximity to the very centre of the city renders Kurdish migrants visible in the everyday life of the city, and enables them to have some daily encounters with the rest of the population.

The middle-class İzmirlis come into contact with and gather observations about Kurdish migrants, not only in the consumption centres of Konak and Alsancak but also in their residential areas, such as Eşrefpaşa, Manavkuyu and Hatay, which are relatively close to Kadifekale. Therefore, middle-class İzmirlis experience more intense and frequent encounters with Kurdish migrants compared to richer segments of the city, as the latter are typically isolated from Kurdish migrants in terms of their residential area. The encounters between middle-class İzmirlis and Kurdish migrants are not limited to the dis-

tricts that surround Kadifekale. In some other quarters, such as Buca and Karşıyaka, Kurdish migrants and middle-class İzmirlis can have occasional encounters in everyday life as well. In Buca some middle-class residential areas are quite close to Kuruçeşme, a shanty town where Kurdish migrants concentrated after 1980. Likewise, in Karşıyaka, those middle-class people whose apartments are close to Yalı Mahallesi, another slum area that is inhabited mostly by migrants from Eastern Anatolia, can easily experience encounters with the Kurdish migrants.[15]

Apart from the relative spatial proximity of their residences to the shanty towns of Kurdish migrants, some everyday life routines of middle-class İzmirlis ensure encounters with Kurdish migrants. Shopping in discount supermarkets, for instance, provides an occasion to see, observe and come into contact with Kurdish migrants. Using public transport is another daily routine that makes contact possible. Moreover, encounter is likely between a Kurdish migrant working in the informal economy and a middle-class İzmirli who buys services or products from informal markets. It is primarily through these activities in common life-spaces that middle-class İzmirlis observe and interact with Kurdish migrants, and thereby produce and reproduce negative perceptions of 'Kurdishness'.

This analysis shows that it would be misleading to interpret the spatial separation between Kurdish migrants and middle-class İzmirlis as an absolute isolation. While the homes of Kurdish migrants are concentrated in specific zones of the city and are separated from the apartments of the middle-class İzmirlis, everyday life contacts and encounters are frequent. As stated in previous chapters, this specific social relationship between Kurdish migrants and middle-class İzmirlis is related to the class relationship between these two groups. On the one hand, the higher socio-economic status of the middle-class İzmirlis enables them to live in apartments that are in relatively good condition while Kurdish migrants are concentrated in the *gecekondu* neighborhoods. On the other hand, what makes it possible for middle-class İzmirlis and Kurdish migrants to encounter one another regularly are their common economic limitations. Although middle-class salaries are higher than those of Kurdish migrants, relying only on the wages acquired by selling their labour puts certain limitations on the middle classes' consumption capacity as well, and thereby encourages them to look for more economical ways of sustaining life. It is these common limitations that induce Kurdish migrants and middle-class İzmirlis to visit discount

supermarkets and bazaars, and use public transportation instead of private cars and taxis.[16] The severity of these limitations has increased in the neoliberal period as a result of the progressive decline in the real wages of labourers from all sectors[17] (World Bank, 2005: 25-40).

The Recognition of the 'Kurd' in the Urban Social Life

Having been inspired by David Harvey, who attempted to decipher the intricate relationships between the reorganisation of space in cities and the emergence of new modes of consciousness in late nineteenth-century Paris (1985), this study is now in a position to investigate the role of socio-economic and spatial reorganisation of İzmir since the 1980s in the emergence of exclusive recognition as a mode of consciousness. First, I will examine how such reorganisation made possible the 'recognition' of Kurdish migrants as a homogeneous ethnic group and then in later chapters I will elaborate on the ways in which it also prepared the ground for the discursive 'exclusion' of Kurdish migrants. At the beginning of this chapter, I argued that 'recognition' consists of the perception and construction of the migrants from Eastern Anatolia as 'Kurdish', and as a distinct and homogeneous ethnic group. It is not difficult to establish the 'Kurdishness' of a migrant in Turkey, since the Kurds from Eastern Anatolia generally speak Kurdish among themselves or speak Turkish with a so-called 'Easterner' accent. That is why it has been common to identify the 'Kurds' as 'Easterners' in Turkish society. Nevertheless, as stated at the beginning of this chapter, 'recognition' goes beyond *knowing* the 'Kurdishness' of Kurdish migrants or *identifying* them as people from the 'East': it involves identifying them as 'Kurds' with certain distinctive features; that is, regarding this 'Kurdishness' as their primary identity and constructing them as part of a different, distinct and homogeneous ethnic group. In this sense, recognition implies a process of otherisation. Moreover, recognition becomes possible in İzmir through the spatial and socio-economic separation of Kurdish migrants from the middle-class İzmirlis. In view of this, it is necessary to examine the ways in which this socio-economic and spatial separation has supported the appearance of Kurdish migrants as a homogeneous ethnic group in the urban social life of the city.

In fact, the tendency to see the migrants as a 'homogeneous group' is not a novel phenomenon. It is true that in the 1960s and 1970s, when the richer sections of the urban population expressed discontent with the increasing number of migrants from rural Anatolia, labels such as

'peasants', 'rural people' and 'Easterners' were deployed (Erder, 1996: 11-22; Beeley, 2002: 51). Migrants from rural Anatolia were perceived as transmitting their 'backward' culture to the city and therefore posed a risk to established civic values (Bali, 2002; Demirtaş and Şen, 2007). This elitist discourse persisted in the post-1980 period and reveals itself in the writings of some well-known columnists (Bali, 2002: 138; Arat-Koç, 2007; Sümer, 2003: 113).

The 'recognition' of the migrants in 'exclusive recognition' is qualitatively different from the construction of migrants as 'rural others' or 'Easterners'. It is true that both is based on the homogenisation and otherisation of the 'migrant' population and involves grouping people under certain categories. Nevertheless, the discourse of the 'rural other', for instance, does not necessarily involve the 'ethnicisation' of the perceived homogeneous group, whereas exclusive recognition proceeds through the identification of migrants on the basis of their ethnic identity; that is, their 'Kurdishness'. The discourse of 'rural other' in the 1960s targeted all migrant populations that, it was assumed, produce a 'rural culture'. In contrast, exclusive recognition is directed towards a particular section of the migrant population: namely, the Kurdish migrants of the post-1980 period. Likewise, the label 'Easterners' has long been used to identify the people who came from the eastern provinces of Turkey. However, it is a broad 'category' that is used to refer to not only the 'Kurds' from Eastern Anatolia, but also ethnically non-Kurds that migrated from eastern provinces. The category of 'Kurdish' is qualitatively different from 'Easterner' in two senses: that the former signifies (and ethnicises) particularly the Kurdish migrants that came to the city since the 1980s, and it identifies the migrants with 'ethnicity' rather than with space or region. Identifying rural migrants as 'Easterners' did not necessarily connote an ethnicisation since the category of easterners was used in a sense that involves the 'rural' in the East of 'İzmir' or 'İstanbul', two presumably 'European' or 'Western' cities of Turkey. Therefore, 'Easterner' is rather used in an 'internal orientalist' logic that homogenises and otherises 'non-Western' from the point of view of the 'West'. This means that exclusive recognition is different in that it involves feeling, experiencing and recognising the 'distinctiveness' of a particular segment of migrant workers in western Turkish cities and identifying this distinctiveness with an ethnic label.

I argue that it is the socio-economic and spatial separation of Kurdish migrants that causes them to appear as a 'distinctive ethnic

group' in the urban social life. The common socio-economic conditions of Kurdish migrants have compelled them to develop shared strategies of surviving in the cities and to organise their everyday life similarly in accordance with their needs. Requiring children to work in informal jobs to increase the revenue of the household, and consuming the cheapest articles for basic daily needs are among the commonly observed strategies employed by Kurdish migrants. These practices are not generally evident among the middle-class İzmirlis. Indications of poverty such as dressing in dirty and ragged clothes, for instance, are also used by middle-class İzmirlis to recognise 'the Kurd' in the urban space. In the interviews, phrases such as 'I know them by how they look and what they wear' were quite prevalent. Using Bourdieu's terminology, Kurdish migrants' particular position in the relations of production and of distribution, and their concomitant 'objective conditions' have differentiated their *habitus*[18] from that of the rest of the city population in general and the middle-class İzmirlis in particular (Bourdieu, 1977: 84-85). This striking difference in *habitus* contributes to the perception and construction of Kurdish migrants as a distinctive and homogeneous group of people. It is through an emphasis on these sharp differences in *habitus* that the middle-class İzmirlis can envision Kurdish migrants as a separate community with particular modes of living, dressing and working. In this sense, the socio-economic conditions of the most marginalised segment of society (or, the conditions of the 'urban poor') regarded by middle-class İzmirlis as one of the markers of 'Kurdishness' in the urban space. The critical point here is that despite these sharp differences in the ways of living, dressing and acting in urban social life, middle-class İzmirlis get the chance to encounter Kurdish migrants in some common public places such as bazaars and public buses. And it is also through these encounters that middle-class İzmirlis notice and recognise the distinctiveness of Kurdish migrants as a separate community. As mentioned before, what make these encounters possible and likely in urban social life are the socio-economic concerns and constraints associated with the objective conditions of being middle class in the city. To put it another way, if middle-class İzmirlis, compared with upper-class and rich segments of urban population, are more likely to use public transport and therefore see, encounter and interact with Kurdish migrants on a public bus, this is due to the fact that they are more concerned with the high cost of travelling in the city, reflecting the socio-economic constraints associated with their class position. This would not be the case for wealthier

segments of city population, who would use their own cars or private taxis to get around and hence would live their everyday lives having few or no encounters with Kurdish migrants. This explains why 'recognition' of Kurdish migrants manifests itself more clearly in the discourse of the middle class.

The concentration of Kurdish migrants in certain informal jobs and their consequent socio-economic marginalisation also plays an important role in their articulation as a separate 'ethnic' community. In İzmir, it is known that most of the mussel sellers in the streets are Kurdish migrants from Mardin, a city in South Eastern Anatolia with a clear Kurdish majority. Likewise, most of the stallholders in the open bazaars are also Kurdish migrants from Eastern Anatolia. Interviewees reported that in their everyday lives they encounter the 'Kurds' who make a living doing these jobs. When I asked them how they really know that these people are 'Kurdish', they simply told me that these jobs are exclusively held by the Kurds. This shows that the middle-class İzmirlis identify the people who perform this work as 'Kurds' even though they do not *immediately* exhibit any other markers of Kurdishness. This suggests that the 'ethnicisation' of certain informal jobs can bring about the ethnicisation of Kurdish migrants themselves.

This socio-economic and spatial segregation has also provided Kurdish migrants with fertile conditions for the reproduction of values and customs characteristic of rural Eastern Anatolia. As soon as they come to İzmir, most Kurdish migrants find themselves living in one of the spatially segregated districts and become ensconced in an established Kurdish community. On many occasions, retaining and reproducing the values of rural Eastern Anatolia becomes not only a possible way of organising life, but also a necessary condition for joining the existing Kurdish social networks and circles. Under these circumstances, social practices that are prevalent in entire rural Anatolia such as having many children[19] or imposing patriarchal control over women, could persist in the urban contex (Erman, 2001). This situation reinforces the notion of the 'difference' and 'homogeneity' of Kurdish migrants.

The socio-economic and spatial separation of Kurdish migrants has also facilitated the divulgence of the Kurdish language in the everyday life of İzmir. In spatially segregated communities, Kurds find it easier to retain their own language and transmit it to younger generations. The number of Kurdish migrants has been far higher since the early 1980s than in the earlier periods, and this has also facilitated the reproduction

of Kurdish identity in the urban context. Therefore, unlike the situation in the 1960s and 1970s, the city under neoliberalism did not involve the conditions for gradual assimilation of the Kurdish identity. More importantly, since these migrants develop social relations particularly with people from their own community, Kurdish becomes their main language in those everyday life spaces they share with both middle-class İzmirlis as well as in their segregated districts. Today in İzmir, for instance, it is no longer unusual to see groups of people talking in Kurdish on the buses or two stallholders arguing in Kurdish in an open bazaar attended mostly by middle-class İzmirlis. Such occasions make it easier for the middle-class İzmirlis to recognise the 'difference' and 'distinctiveness' of Kurdish migrants and to envisage them as a homogeneous ethnic group.

It is also important to note that when Kurdish migrants were concentrated in specific *gecekondu* areas, the middle-class İzmirlis began to identify certain zones in the city as the places of 'Kurds'. During my interviews, most of my respondents identified Kadifekale, for instance, as the 'nest of the Kurds' and 'zone of the Kurds'. The tendency to identify the Kurds with a specific place makes it easier for the middle-class İzmirlis to construct the 'difference' of Kurdish migrants. The spatial segregation of Kurdish migrants, in other words, makes it possible for the middle-class İzmirlis to imagine them as a separate community with(in) a different space. This contributes greatly to the construction of Kurdish migrants as a separate group with different ways of living, dressing and speaking. In other words, spatial segregation makes the boundaries between Kurdish migrants and the middle-class İzmirlis clearer and bolder in the cognitive world of the latter. One can deduce that this idea of 'difference' is more apparent in the cognitive world of middle-class İzmirlis than in the upper class or bourgeois segments of the city. As stated before, this is because the former have more opportunities and occasions for observing, feeling and experiencing the 'distinctiveness' of Kurdish migrants in everyday life because of their relative proximity of their residences to the Kurdish neighbourhoods and also the fact that they share some common public spaces with Kurdish migrants due to their socio-economic constraints. This reflects the aforementioned specific class and space relationship between Kurdish migrants and middle-class İzmirlis.

Here it is important to point out the role of the urbanisation of Kurdish nationalism from 1990s onwards in the processes of separation and recognition of Kurdish migrants. The Kurdish identity in western

cities, including İzmir, instituionalized itself through two channels: home twon associations and Kurdish nationalist parties. Since the mid-1980s, Kurdish migrants, who have needed solidarity networks and patronage relations to gain access to informal work processes and to meet some basic daily needs. Home-town migrant associations have played a major role in this respect. These associations have not only reinforced the ties of solidarity and a sense of community among Kurdish migrants but they have also revived Kurdishness in the city by organising cultural and political activities (Çelik, 2002: 123-24). These associations, without a doubt, contributed to the emergence of Kurdish migrants as a separate community in the city.

The 'mission' undertaken by Kurdish nationalist political organisations is more significant still. The pro-Kurdish parties, latest example of which is Democratic Society Party (DTP), and their affiliated organisations have garnered remarkable support from Kurdish migrants and managed to organise and mobilise them under a Kurdish nationalist political project. Kurdish nationalism has been particularly effective in obtaining the endorsement of forced migrants, who had been exposed to mistreatment in their home towns or villages during the conflict between the PKK and the state (Erder, 1997: 184-85). The powerful impact of Kurdish nationalism in western Turkish cities is evidenced by the mass participation of Kurdish migrants in demonstrations or protests organised by the pro-Kurdish political parties. The big demonstrations on Newroz day (21 March), which is considered an important 'national' day by the Kurdish nationalist movement in Turkey, has been particularly significant in constructing the image of a 'united' Kurdish community in western Turkish cities.

Conclusion

The neoliberal transformation of the Turkish economy, political conflict in Eastern Anatolia and the Kurdish inflow into western Turkish cities laid the ground for the socio-economic and spatial separation between Kurdish migrants and middle-class İzmirlis. This 'separation' prepared a milieu appropriate for the 'recognition' of Kurdish migrants in urban social life. As stated before, recognising Kurdish migrants as comprising a 'distinctive' and 'homogeneous' ethnic group is only one of the components of 'exclusive recognition'. As a form of ethnicisation, exclusive recognition also involves the exclusion of the recognised 'other' through some pejorative labels and stereotypes. In other words, exclusive recognition consists of the construction of the category of

'Kurdish' based on some negative traits and characteristics. This second component of exclusive recognition will be the subject of the next chapter.

8

EXCLUDING THE RECOGNISED

Identifying the 'Kurdish' with certain pejorative labels and stereotypes is another integral component of 'exclusive recognition'. Having elaborated on the urban social life processes that prepared the ground for the recognition of Kurdish migrants as a distinct and homogeneous ethnic group, in this chapter I will examine how this 'Kurdishness' is articulated through certain pejorative labels and stereotypes. I already touched briefly on some of these stereotypes in Chapter 2, with the objective of clarifying the object of this study. Here, I will trace their sources in the urban social life.

All labels and stereotypes used in exclusive recognition are indeed notions that middle-class İzmirlis produce through their social relationships in social life of İzmir. As stated earlier, these relationships have been shaped by three national-level structural dynamics: namely, neoliberalism, political conflict in Eastern Anatolia and migration to western Turkish cities. In this respect, at a certain level of abstraction, the exclusionary labels that middle-class İzmirlis use to identify the 'Kurds' in the city can be seen as a reaction to the visible effects of these national-level structural dynamics on urban life. In other words, this negative image of Kurdish migrants is part of how the middle-class İzmirlis construe and interpret the profound transformation of western Turkish cities since the 1980s.

This means that these stereotypes are not free-floating and self-evident discourses received passively by middle-class İzmirlis, nor are they reflections of an ineffable and primordial sentiment that is ingrained in the make-up of Turkish identity. Rather, exclusive recognition has an 'objective' and 'material' basis. What Brubaker notes for stereotypes in

general holds true for those used in exclusive recognition:

> Because they are not the products of individual pathology but of cognitive regularities and shared culture, stereotypes – like social categories more generally – are not individual attitudinal predilections, but deeply embedded, and shared mental representations of social objects. As a consequence, macro- and meso-level research cannot dismiss research on stereotypes as 'individualistic' or 'psychologically reductionist' (Brubaker, 2004: 73).

This is not to say that these labels and stereotypes provide 'accurate' interpretations of the existing social reality in western Turkish cities. Because exclusive recognition emerges from a logic that disregards the historical and structural backdrop of immediate observations and experiences in urban life, we can say that it is based on false theorisations of the rapid transformations in İzmir.

This does not mean that these stereotypes were first invented by middle-class İzmirlis within the context or urban social life. They have been in use for a long time as the tools of labelling and exclusion. What is specific in exclusive recognition is that these already existing stereotypes have taken an ethnicised form; that is, they have been deployed against Kurdish migrants and utilised in such a way as to construct Kurdishness as a distinct and homogeneous ethnic group. In other words, middle-class İzmirlis use them to draw a boundary between the Kurdish migrants and the rest of the urban community. 'Living by ill-gotten gains' (*haksız kazançla geçinme*), for example, is an expression that has often been used to condemn the urban poor for seeking 'informal' ways of susbsistence; in the middle-class İzmirli discourse the same discourse is used to identify particularly the Kurds in the city. 'Ignorant and cultureless' (*cahil ve kültürsüz*) have also been prevalent stereotypes deployed by both state officials and ordinary people to identify the inhabitants of rural Anatolia; in exclusive recognition they are construed as essential characteristics of Kurdishness. 'Invasion' (*işgalci*) has been another trope used by the urban elite and mainstream media to depict the intensification of migration into big cities of Turkey; in middle-class İzmirlis' cognitive world 'invader' is constructed as one of the characteristics of Kurdish migrants in particular. 'Separatist' (*bölücü*) is an expression used repetitively by the Turkish state to label PKK, its activities and its affiliated organisations; but it takes an ethnicised character

in the middle-class discourse when it is used to describe the Kurds in general. 'Disrupters of urban life' (*kent hayatını mahvetme*) has been a very widespread statement used by the urban elite to express their discontent with the increasing number of rural migrants in big cities; but the same statement is now used by middle-class İzmirlis to declare their discontent with the Kurds particularly.

What is at stake here is not the origins of these stereotypes and expressions *per se* but the origins of their ethnicisation. It will be argued that underlying such ethnicisation is the transformation of urban social life in İzmir since the mid-1980s. As this transformation is related to neoliberalism and internal displacement of the Kurdish migrants, the following analysis of the formation of these stereotypes rests on the framework created in previous chapters where I analysed the impacts of neoliberalism and internal migration on the social life of İzmir.

They Live by 'Ill Gotten Gains' (*Haksız Kazançla Geçiniyorlar*)

On the basis of in-depth interviews, I observed that most middle-class İzmirlis present themselves as 'victims' of the changing social and economic conditions in Turkey. They also fear that their children face a precarious and uncertain future because of the increasing unemployment rate. As indicated in the previous chapters, it is indeed true that as a result of the neoliberal economic policies implemented since the 1980s, the people who make a living by selling their labour power, including middle-class İzmirlis, faced a decline in salaries/wages and rising unemployment. In this sense, social inequality has been perpetuated and deepened among workers in Turkey. Clearly, such 'material insecurity' has an objective basis in the country.[1]

In the interviews, when expressing their discontent with such economic insecurity most of the middle-class İzmirlis complained about certain business circles and politicians that have presumably benefited from the recent economic transformation in Turkey. However, their discourse also revealed an apparent tendency to regard the Kurdish migrants as partly responsible for their economic complaints. Despite the fact that the Kurdish migrants who have arrived since the 1980s have occupied the poorest sections of İzmir's population, the middle-class İzmirlis regard them as the 'beneficiaries of unfair privileges' and as people living by 'ill-gotten gains'. This sentiment arises from the way in which middle-class İzmirlis perceive the life of Kurdish migrants in the city of İzmir. They assume that they themselves represent ideal citizens because they hold jobs in the formal sector, pay taxes regularly

and respect the authority of the state, while they consider the life of a 'Kurd' in İzmir to be in opposition to that of an 'ideal citizen'. From the middle-class perspective, the people living in the slums or shanty towns of the city do not represent the urban poor suffering from increasing poverty and exclusion; rather, they are articulated as the 'Kurds', who make their living by benefits obtained unfairly.

This mentality takes different forms in the discourse of middle-class *İzmirlis*. It is perhaps most apparent in how they interpret the moral worth of Kurdish migrants living in the *gecekondus*. From the middle-class perspective, the apartments they themselves live in represent the modest reward for life-long hard work in a formal job, whereas the *gecekondus* of Kurdish migrants are perceived as being obtained illicitly or by plundering state land. Because middle-class İzmirlis perceive state land to be the common property of all citizens, they view *gecekondu* dwellers as people who steal their share from the resources of the country or who violate their own economic rights. The following words of Zekiye (54-F), a primary school teacher, are representative of this sentiment:

> Of course, I feel that I am exposed to injustice. Maybe the state will issue a new 'amnesty' for the *gecekondu* houses where these Kurds are living in. Then I would think that I have been serving this state and country for 27 years and still could not buy a flat with the money that I saved in 27 years. These people, however, come here, enclose a *gecekondu* area and then after some time, build and possess a new and a big apartment. Isn't this a big injustice imposed on us?

Some respondents who are aware of the municipal proposals to move Kurdish migrants from Kadifekale to the apartment blocks of Uzundere, consider this another example of inequity because, in their eyes, Kurds would own a house before expending the labour to deserve it. Mehmet (41-M), a worker in the Municipality of İzmir, stated that:

> I know what poverty means. I experienced it when I first started to work in the municipality. But in those years, despite many difficulties, I never considered obtaining wealth through short-cuts. I never deceived and harmed any person in my life. I never attempted what these people are doing now. Now the state is offering some good apartment flats to these Kurds. We are com-

ing up the hard way to earn our living, but they are looking for
ways to get rich quickly.

The construction of the *gecekondu* dwellers as people living by ill-gotten
gains prevailed throughout the 1980s as well without any ethnic label
being attached to the *gecekondu* owners (Demirtaş and Şen, 2007). In
those years, the numerous legalisations of *gecekondus* and the use of
gecekondu houses for their exchange value, that is the commercialisation
of gecekondu settlements, triggered antipathy among the upper classes
towards migrants from rural Anatolia. The legalisation and commercial-
isation of *gecekondu* houses also involved the transformation of the phys-
ical appearance of these settlements, as 'they were transformed from
slum-like constructions to, in many cases, concrete apartment blocks
which are often indistinguishable from equally unpleasant looking mid-
dle-class dwellings' (Buğra, 1998: 310). This transformation gave the
impression that the *gecekondu* settlements are not the reflection of the
socio-economic deprivation of rural migrants, but an extension of their
intention to get wealthier through immoral means. This visible change
in physical conditions of the *gecekondu* settlements further escalated the
urban public reaction against the migrants. Such antipathy was coupled
with the tendency to construct the migrant labourers as 'rural others'
(Bali, 2002; Demirtaş and Şen, 2007). In the eyes of the people using
this discourse, it was the 'peasants or people from rural Anatolia' who
built these *gecekondus*, somehow stole state land and made money out of
it. In exclusive recognition, however, we see that the tendency of 'steal-
ing land belonging to the state' is identified as one of the characteristics
not only of 'peasants' or 'rural people' at large, but also of the Kurds in
particular. Without a doubt, this is related to the spatial concentration
of Kurdish migrants in specific shanty towns of the city. In other words,
the middle-class İzmirlis reformulate such longstanding upper class dis-
course through an apparent 'ethnicising' logic.

Such a shift in the discourse is related to the spatial concentration of
Kurdish migrants in specific *gecekondu* zones of the city; that is,
Kurdification of slums in certain Turkish cites. Since the mid-1980s the
great majority of Kurdish migrants have concentrated in the *gecekondu*
neighbourhoods. Only after the Kurds began to constitute a spatially
segregated *gecekondu* community and to appear in urban life as *gecekondu*
dwellers did middle-class İzmirlis start to express their antagonism
towards the *gecekondu* phenomenon in ethnic terms. As the middle-class
İzmirlis lacked sufficient economic resources to move to the 'gated

communities' and luxurious apartments and houses that are isolated from the slums of Kurdish migrants, they could easily observe and experience such Kurdification of some *gecekondu* zones in the inner areas of İzmir. This is evidenced conspicuously by the Kurdification of Kadifekale in İzmir, which has been an inner-city *gecekondu* area for more than 40 years and is identified by the public as a '*gecekondu* neighborhood'. The concentration of Kurdish migrants in this well-known *gecekondu* zone has brought about the identification of Kurdishness with the *gecekondu* phenomenon and hence with all negative labels attached to the *gecekondu* population. This indicates that the ethnicisation of the discourse of 'benefiting from ill-gotten gains' goes hand-in-hand with the ethnicisation of the *gecekondu* phenomenon itself. To express it on a more abstract level, ethnicisation of already existing exclusionary discourses deployed against migrants is inextricably linked to the ethnicisation of the material world urban space.

In this sense, there is a material and objective basis for identifying Kurdish migrants with *gecekondus*. Nevertheless, presenting this fact as evidence of unfair gains seems to be the product of a 'false' interpretation and overgeneralisation of the superficial manifestations of the conditions of Kurdish migrants in İzmir. Such interpretation does not situate the concentration of Kurdish migrants in *gecekondus* within its historical and structural context; rather it simply takes it as an indication of 'living by ill-gotten gains' and a permanent negative trait of Kurdishness.

Contrary to the 'common sense' discourse of the middle-class İzmirlis, the Kurdish migrants who have arrived in the city in recent years were not able to build their own *gecekondu* houses on state land (Demirtaş and Şen, 2007: 99). Most of them had to rent their dwellings from migrants who had settled previously in the city and had their *gecekondus* legalised by the state. As shown in the previous chapter, in the neoliberal period (or in the era of the 'urbanisation of capital'), the state became more intolerant of migrants' attempts to build new *gecekondus* on vacant state land, as this was opened to the profit-generating activities of capital.

The inflow of Kurdish migrants into western Turkish cities was driven by rising insecurity in Eastern Anatolia due to political conflict between the PKK and the state, on the one hand, and by grave economic impoverishment due to the neoliberalisation of the Turkish economy, on the other. In other words migration was not a deliberate attempt by Kurdish migrants to gain the advantage of occupying state

land. In addition, in the post-migration process, it was again the limited economic resources and opportunities in the city that forced Kurdish migrants to seek housing in the slum areas. Therefore, the tendency of Kurdish migrants to concentrate in the *gecekondu* areas is necessitated by the socio-economic conditions that they face in İzmir (Çırak and Yörür, 2006: 87).

More importantly, acquiring state land through 'illegal' means is not specific to poor Kurdish migrants. It is known that even the buildings of the most prestigious companies, universities and media conglomerates do not comply with the legal rules and procedures of urban land use. There are also many businessmen who have been sued for building luxurious residences and big apartment blocks in the forest lands of the state. In the neoliberal period when the improper (or illegal) use of urban territory has been an integral component of capital accumulation for many upper-class groups in Turkey, it is simply a kind of 'scapegoating' to blame the Kurds as a whole for plundering public land.

The image of the Kurds as people relying on 'ill-gotten gains' is also evident in the way the middle-class İzmirlis perceive the informal jobs that Kurdish migrants do. From the middle-class perspective, working in these informal jobs without paying taxes to the state proves that Kurds are trying to get rich quickly without expending the necessary effort and labour. In contrast, the middle-class İzmirlis see themselves as having been employed in legal and labour-intensive jobs for many years, but still facing economic constraints and difficulties. In other words, interviewees express a sense of 'injustice' by comparing their own situation with that of a 'stereotypical Kurd'. This includes references to small Kurdish children who sell tissues on the streets of İzmir. Hatice (38-F), a civil servant working in a state-owned telecommunication company puts it this way:

> We were born in İzmir. I love İzmir and especially Alsancak. Maybe you saw those little girls from Eastern Anatolia in Alsancak. They sell tissues and some other stuff. Some of them beg coins from people. One day, I talked to one of them. She showed me the money in her pocket. Maybe you won't believe but it was more than I earn in a week. These guys earn so much money on the streets.

Most of the middle-class interviewees drew also on the phenomenon of the 'Kurdish mafia' to justify the image of the 'Kurdish' as 'living by ill-

gotten gains'. It is known that by using their strong social networks and kinship ties, some sections of migrants from Eastern Anatolia have established monopolies in certain formal and informal businesses and have developed some mafia-like structures in the cities to preserve or enlarge these monopolies. This situation has given an 'ethnic' connotation to existing economic struggles, and has triggered the discontent of those people who have a conflict of interest with Kurds in the informal market (Bora, 2004: 331-32). The narratives of these people circulate in everyday life and may become popular topics of discussion in coffee houses, during family visits or in *güns*[2] (women's gatherings). Therefore, even though middle-class İzmirlis have never competed with Kurdish migrants for the control of informal markets, through their exposure to the everyday life of other people they indirectly hear and witness the complaints of people whose interests have been damaged by the so-called Kurdish mafia. This situation justifies and reinforces the image of the Kurds as 'living by ill-gotten gains'.

It is true that the working population of Kurdish migrants is generally concentrated in the informal sector, and that some informal jobs are almost monopolised by Kurds. Therefore, the idea that 'Kurds obtain ill-gotten-gains through informal jobs' has some objective and material basis. However, this does not change the fact that it is a false theorisation and overgeneralisation in several respects. Firstly, not all Kurds are employed in the informal sector. As stated in the last chapter, among the Kurds living in Kadifekale, for instance, there are more unemployed Kurdish migrants than Kurds holding informal jobs. Secondly, for the majority of Kurdish migrants, working in the informal sector is not a strategic choice to jump from one class to another, but the only alternative to unemployment in the western cities. For this reason, most of them were forced to take the worst jobs in the informal sector. Thirdly, engaging in informal activities is not something unique to the Kurds in the city. As demonstrated in the previous chapter, the informal economy is endemic to capitalist social formations in Turkey. Even the biggest companies and firms make use of informal economic activities to maximise their capital, and some well-known businessmen owe their wealth partly to these informal networks (Boratav, 1991: 97). In this respect, it is hard to separate the formal and informal economies from one another (Işık and Pınarcıoğlu, 2001: 66). Thus, in a society where the informal economy is an integral component of the whole social structure, blaming only the 'Kurds' for obtaining wealth from informal economic activities is obviously an expression of partiality.[3] As for the phenomenon of

a so-called 'Kurdish mafia', it would again be an overgeneralisation to identify the 'Kurds' with mafia networks in the city, since only a small number actually engage in the mafia in İzmir. Moreover, using the mafia[4] as a coercive instrument for obtaining wealth is not something exclusive to Kurdish migrants. It is known that certain ultra-nationalist Turkish groups have also taken part in this kind of mafia-type criminal activities in some Turkish cities (Çınar and Arıkan, 2002: 33).

The personal experiences of middle-class individuals can play an important role in strengthening the image of the Kurds as benefit scroungers. Most of the respondents incorporated their own personal experiences with certain Kurdish individuals into discussions about such general phenomena as the Kurds' concentration in *gecekondu* houses and their engagement in informal work processes. For example, one respondent narrated her experience of being overcharged by a 'Kurd' in a bazaar, as evidence of the Kurds' tendency to live by ill-gotten gains.

In some cases, this negative prejudice towards the Kurds might also lead middle-class İzmirlis to 'reinterpret' and 'reconstruct' their past experiences. In other words, their current perception of the Kurds influences how they interpret not only the present but also the past. The following narrative of Hasan (57-M), a retired worker, is a good example of this tendency:

> 20 years ago, I was a gaoler in Buca Prison, here, in İzmir. I had a colleague whose name was Şükrü. He was from Mardin. He was older than me. One night, I got very sick while doing my guard duty. I told my colleague that I had to go home immediately; please forgive me and do not tell this to the head of the prison. Next day when I was back to work, the head called me to his office. In the office he asked me why I left the prison the other night. I explained my situation and he forgave me. Anyways, then, I learned from my friends that it was this Şükrü, from Mardin, who reported me to the head of prison. By doing this, he was trying to ingratiate himself with the higher authorities and to get promotion. Now I can understand why he did this to me. The Kurds can even sell their father down the river for their small benefits and interest. He was from Mardin, a Kurd. They are like this.

Through everyday life experiences, middle-class İzmirlis begin to articulate 'living by ill-gotten gains' as a component of Kurdishness; that is,

as one of the features that distinguish Kurds from themselves. In other words, when claiming that 'the Kurds increase their wealth by ill-gotten gains' middle-class İzmirlis engage in an 'ethnicisation process'. They perceive the 'material' (socio-economic conditions of Kurdish migrants in the neoliberal period) as 'ethnic' (Kurdishness), and they build a 'universal' (Kurdish) out of the 'particular' (Kurdish migrants who have arrived in the city since the 1980s). This logical mechanism also holds true for the other stereotypes that middle-class İzmirlis attach to Kurdish migrants.

'Ignorant and Cultureless'[5] (*Cahil ve Kültürsüzler*)

In the middle-class discourse, the words 'ignorant' (*cahil* in Turkish) and 'cultureless' are commonly used to identify Kurds. The interviewees use the word 'ignorant' in two interrelated senses: first, it implies that the education level of the Kurds is generally insufficient and this is why they find it hard to obtain good jobs and become integrated with the rest of the city. According to this reasoning, it is the Kurds' ignorance that caused their poverty, unemployment and other social problems. Second, 'ignorance' or 'cultureless' refers to the Kurdish migrants' alleged inability to stick to the general social manners required to get along with others in the 'big city'. In other words, in this second meaning, the low 'cultural capital' of the Kurds is highlighted.

The middle-class tendency of identifying the Kurds with the first sense of 'ignorance' clearly has a material and objective basis. Many statistics show that the level of education among the Kurdish migrants concentrated in the shanty towns of İzmir is considerably lower than the rest of the city's population (HÜNEE, 2006;; Karayiğit, 2005). This is also the case in other western Turkish cities that have received relatively high numbers of Kurdish migrants in the past few decades. Kurdish migrants' low level of education is related to their social conditions both before and after migration (Yükseker, 2006: 230-32). Prior to their migration to İzmir, Kurdish migrants had typically lived in the rural areas of Eastern Anatolia (the most impoverished region of the country) and were deprived of social channels and institutions for obtaining a decent formal education. This problem was aggravated by the fact that Kurdish migrants spoke a language that was different from the official language of instruction. Today, a considerable number of Kurds in Eastern Anatolia cannot speak or write fluently in Turkish even though they have obtained eight years of compulsory primary school education. This situation creates an inevitable educational gap

between Kurdish migrants and the rest of the city's population. The problem is that this gap could not be bridged in the western Turkish cities, since Kurdish migrants continue to face the problem of creating necessary socio-economic resources to obtain education for themselves as well as for their children after they settle in these cities. In the wake of the neoliberal transition that increased poverty and unemployment, the primary concern of Kurdish migrants is the provision of conditions necessary for survival in the city. In most of the migrant families, especially those who were exposed to forced migration, children are forced to work in the informal sectors during their school-age years (Aker *et al.*, 2005: 13; Yükseker, 2006: 227-30). This contributes to the perpetuation of a low level of education among Kurdish migrants and their children.

It is important to note here that in Turkey all citizens are subject to eight years' compulsory education and there are state schools as well as private ones to provide it. Nevertheless, even though the children of the Kurdish migrants spend these eight years in state schools, most of them cannot continue further because of the socio-economic concerns of their families. More importantly, the so-called 'ignorance' and 'culture-lessness' is also related to the structure of this primary education itself in the sense that the children of the Kurdish migrants enter these state schools in a conspicuously disadvantaged position, despite the fact that the free education provided by the state creates an illusory sense of equality between all pupils. Underlying this 'latent' disadvantage and inequality is the fact that children of the Kurdish migrants are less familiar with the pedagogic process than pupils from richer families, whose socialisation process prior to and during their primary school education fits in better with the content of education provided in the state schools. This different and unequal position *vis-à-vis* the substance of school education is strongly related to the socio-economic and spatial separation of the Kurdish migration, which is the product of the objective social conditions they experience in their post-migration processes as well as their deprivations prior to migration. These special objective conditions of Kurdish migrants make it almost impossible for them to ensure an in-home preparation for the 'dominant' cultural values and practices that are inculcated and reproduced in state schools. By contrast, the families of the richer segments of society, including middle-class İzmirlis, possess such a 'cultural capital' to be transferred to their children thanks to their educational credentials, economic opportunities and integration with the urban life, and hence have a much higher chance of rendering their children amenable to the values and knowl-

edge taught in the schools. Such a privilege could be easily transferred to merit and success in the school and thereby create a huge gap between the performance of the pupils from the Kurdish migrant families and the rest. As Bourdieu noted several years ago for the French context, this means that school education contributes to the perpetuation and reproduction of existing inequalities in society, although it purports to provide equal opportunities for every individual whatever their class (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1977: 204-5). This is one of the mechanisms through which the so-called 'ignorance' of the Kurdish migrants has been perpetuated, their 'separation' and 'distinction' has been further reinforced, and the boundaries between them and the rest of İzmir's population have been further demarcated.

The word ignorant (*cahil*) is endowed with pejorative and insulting connotations in the Turkish language. The 'ignorance' (*cahillik*) does not solely refer to the objective educational credentials of an individual; it also involves a condemnation of the individual for being 'uneducated'. The word 'ignorance', therefore, is also used to reference a negative personality trait[6] and as an accusatory expression in the Turkish language. When used in relation to an 'ethnic group', this discourse blames all Kurds as a whole for being ignorant. When the Kurds themselves are considered responsible for their 'ignorance', the social and economic conditions that produce and reproduce their low level of education go unaddressed.

Another meaning of the words 'ignorant' and 'cultureless' concerns the Kurds' presupposed inability to observe the good manners that are allegedly characteristic of life in İzmir. For a thorough understanding of the material basis of this particular sense of 'ignorant', it is necessary first to examine how middle-class İzmirlis construe the meaning of 'living in İzmir'. As explained in detail in Chapter 3, İzmir has been historically constructed as the 'most enlightened and progressive city of Turkey' and as the 'Turkey's gate opening to the Western world' (Örs, 2001: viii). It is indeed true that since the early years of the Turkish state, the majority of people living in İzmir have embraced modernist and secularist values of the republican era and endorsed political parties and movements that uphold these values. This situation has played an important role in the creation of a relatively tolerant everyday life that distinguishes İzmir from other Turkish towns.

Interviewees embraced this construction of İzmir, and claimed that the Kurds are ignorant of the modern etiquette of the city. In their discourse, the Kurdish lifestyle is simply so 'backward' that it constantly

clashes with the 'civic' and 'modern' values of İzmir. The following words of Hülya (35-F), a psychological counsellor in a primary school in İzmir, reflects this mentality:

> They are simply ignorant… I think they have no culture at all. I mean they do not have any kind of accumulation in life. There is an Ottoman culture, for instance. It is the legacy of an accumulation of hundreds of years. But, there is no Kurdish culture in this particular sense. They just live and then leave; live and then leave. They are not different from hunting-gathering societies in my opinion…

Such a judgement is typically based on the immediate observation and experience of the living conditions of Kurdish migrants in urban social life. These experiences might include being disturbed by a Kurdish teenager while walking downtown at night, hearing swearing or or noisy talk on a public bus, coming across a poor Kurdish migrant throwing garbage into the streets, or witnessing a Kurdish husband mistreating his wife in the streets of the city. Şükran (59-F), a retired bank officer, explains how she identifies the 'ignorant Kurd' in the context of urban everyday life:

> They do not know the proper manners of talking in a public bus or in a *dolmuş*.[7] I know there may be some other people from other stratum doing the same thing. I do not say that they are all Kurds. But they are mostly Kurds. You can easily identify them from their strong accent (*şive*) or from their clothes (*kılık kıyafet).*

In the discourse of middle-class İzmirlis, the notion that 'the Kurds are ignorant and cultureless' is used not only for stigmatising Kurdish migrants with an exclusionary stereotype, but also to 'explain' some general social and economic conditions and cultural features of the Kurds in İzmir. During my field study, it was quite common to come across people who believed that Kurds live in insecure slums because they are ignorant. Many people stated that this ignorance also explains the Kurds' tendency to have large families. Some also regarded Kurdish migrants' sympathy towards the PKK, their participation in the annual Newroz meetings, their speaking Kurdish (and not speaking 'good Turkish') and their religiosity as manifestations of their ignorance. One of the interviewees talked about a Kurdish boy trying to sell a tooth-

brush that had been given to him by the municipality as part of an economic aid programme, identifying this as an indication of the ignorance of the Kurds. Other examples similarly point to the fact that when subjected to such reductionist logic, the 'ignorance of the Kurds' goes beyond constituting an exclusionary interpretation of the 'low education of the Kurds' or 'their unfamiliarity with the urban life'. It becomes an instrument for blaming the Kurds for their living conditions in urban life, for their political tendencies and for revealing their ethnic identity in the city. This is how 'ignorance' and 'Kurdishness' have been strongly associated in the cognitive world of middle-class İzmirlis.

Interviewees' claim that 'education' was the primary solution to the problem of Kurds in western Turkish cities is an extension of this logic. Accordingly, most of them frequently repeated the phrase 'education is necessary' (*Eğitim şart!*), a cliché that is repeatedly presented by politicians, journalists and academics as a 'magical solution' to all social problems in Turkey. In this perspective, since the Kurds are themselves responsible for remaining ignorant and being incapable of developing themselves, their education should be provided from 'above', that is, from 'us' who are more educated and more enlightened. Only after they receive education from the 'enlightened', can Kurds overcome their problems and become an equal part of society.

When scrutinised closely, the narratives of middle-class İzmirlis show that this whole discourse of education, in the last analysis, suggests the need to assimilate Kurds into the Turkish nation. Sermet (54-M), a civil servant working in the provincial administration, stated:

> I believe in education. After you educate them [Kurds], these things would never happen again. If I saw a person from that region with clean clothes and with combed hair, I would never ask 'where do you come from? Who are your mother and father?' But, when you see these men with miserable clothes and with broken Turkish, then you start to inquire about their origin.

This is the point where exclusive recognition seems to overlap with the official Turkish nationalism of the state. Without a doubt, the Turkish state's longstanding discourse of 'carrying Turkish education to the *people of Eastern Anatolia*' could have inspired the middle-class İzmirlis' way of thinking. However, there is still a striking difference between the discourses of the state and those of middle-class İzmirlis. While exclusive recognition *recognises* and *excludes* the 'Kurds' with the label 'ignorant',

the official nationalism of the Turkish state categorically denied the existence of the Kurds for a long time, and suggested that education was necessary for integrating the 'people of Eastern Anatolia' into the Turkish nation (Yeğen, 1999a). In other words, in the official ideology of the Turkish state the 'Kurds' were not a separate ethnic group, but an impoverished segment of Turkish society who needed education. Therefore, even though exclusive recognition and the discourse of the Turkish state seem to overlap on this particular point, they are in fact based on a qualitatively different reasoning.

'Invaders' (*İşgal Ediyorlar*)

As showed in the last two chapters, some western cities in Turkey have undergone a rapid demographic change since the 1980s as a result of the inflow of Kurdish migrants from Eastern Anatolia. When the high rate of migration is coupled with a high birth rate among the Kurdish migrant population, one can see that the number of Kurds living in these cities has grown at an unprecedented rate during this period (Koç *et al.*, 2008). As one of the primary destinations of Kurdish migration, İzmir has been greatly influenced by this demographic change and its associated social effects. As evidenced in Chapter 6, in terms of the proportion of Kurdish migrants vis-à-vis the total population, İzmir, following Adana and Mersin, ranks third among other western Turkish metropolises with the highest rates of Kurdish immigration. With this rapid increase in the number of migrants, 'Kurdishness' has become more visible and identifiable in the city. Nevertheless, as explained in the previous chapter, the spatial and socio-economic separation of these migrants, which prevents their 'assimilation' and 'integration' into the rest of the city's population, has played the key role in the emergence of Kurdish migrants as a separate and growing community in İzmir.

Owing to the spatial proximity of their homes in relation to the Kurdish settlements, as well as their daily encounters with Kurds in the city space, middle-class İzmirlis witness the increasing visibility of Kurdish migrants in the inner city. They can also experience this phenomenon in the holiday towns close to İzmir, where there has been a considerable increase in the number of Kurdish workers in the tourism sector (Beeley, 2002: 43).[8] The interviews indicated that some middle-class İzmirlis perceive this rapid growth of the Kurdish population as a threat to their presence in the city. From this perspective, the Kurds have a 'secret' plan to invade and dominate the entire country.

Therefore, they deliberately have as many children as possible in order to form the majority of the population in western cities. Nihan (57) narrates this perspective in her following words:

> For me the Kurds' having too many children is the accumulation of many years… From my point of view Kurds multiply deliberately. Twenty years ago, when I first came to İzmir, a colleague of mine told me that 'friends, look, these Kurds are multiplying very rapidly; they started to invade this city; some time later, we will be minority; they will be majority'. I think we are going in that direction now.

The image of the migrants as the 'Kurdish invaders' is not simply a baseless fabrication. The construction of such an image can be seen as the reaction of the middle-class İzmirlis to the changes that have taken place in urban social life as a result of the rapid increase in the Kurdish population. Middle-class İzmirlis interpret the increase in the number of people speaking Kurdish in public buses, and more frequent encounters with Kurdish music, Kurdish dress and other Kurdish cultural elements in everyday life as the harbingers of an imagined Kurdish invasion.

Undoubtedly, without the ongoing armed conflict between the PKK and the Turkish state, the middle-class İzmirli reactions to such changes would not have taken this particular form. As stated in previous chapters, in the early 1990s the PKK began to organise in the western Turkish cities and garnered considerable support from Kurdish migrants. This led to the emergence of Kurdish nationalism as a mass movement not only in Eastern Anatolia but also in such western cities as İstanbul, İzmir, Mersin and Adana. The popular base of the PKK in western cities manifested itself in the confrontation between Kurdish migrants and the Turkish military during the Kurdish nationalist demonstrations, especially at the annual Newroz celebrations in which Kurdish nationalist symbols and slogans were openly displayed. This overt association between Kurdish migrants and Kurdish nationalism, and its periodic manifestations in urban life, plays an important role in the construction and popularisation of the idea that the Kurds want to 'invade' İzmir.

The image of the Kurds as the 'invaders' of western Turkish cities is also produced quite openly in certain racist websites and magazines in Turkey. This raises the question as to whether the middle-class İzmirlis receive their discourse from these racist media rather than produce it

from within their urban social relations in the city. The in-depth interviews I conducted suggest that these media did not play any significant role in manipulating the opinion of the middle-class İzmirlis about Kurdish migrants. These media organisations typically reach only a very small segment of society and therefore their impact should not be overstressed.[9] This is evidenced by the fact that none of the study participants reported reading any of these racist journals and websites. The interviewees also reported that they typically follow the news in the mainstream newspapers and TV channels, in which any kind of *open* and *systematic* anti-Kurdish discourse is absent, notwithstanding the ideological bombardment of conventional Turkish nationalism of the state.[10] Therefore, it would be ill-founded to claim that the image of the migrants as 'Kurdish invaders' first appeared in the racist journals and websites and then permeated the cognitive world of the middle-class İzmirlis.

This is not to imply that media plays no role in relation to exclusive recognition. On the contrary, some symbolic and discursive elements used in mainstream media are very important for the *facilitation* and *perpetuation* of exclusive recognition. Importantly, the mainstream media shows its effect at the moment of reproduction and reinforcement of exclusive recognition, rather than at the moment of its production. I will clarify this point further in the next chapter.

As is the case with the other stereotypes, the construction of Kurdish migrants as the 'Kurdish invaders' is undoubtedly based on a disregard of the historical and structural reasons for the Kurdish population increase in western Turkish cities. Both Kurdish migration into western cities and high fertility rates among Kurds (the two main factors that have led to the rapid growth of the Kurdish population), are associated with the social and economic conditions of the Kurds since the early 1980s. As shown in Chapter 6, the Kurdish exodus from Eastern Anatolia resulted from the deterioration of economic conditions in the region with the introduction of neoliberal agricultural policies on the one hand, and the rising insecurity due to the intensification of the armed conflict between the PKK and the state, on the other. Therefore, the Kurdish migratory flow was driven by the necessity to seek safety from a turbulent political and economic environment, rather than by the desire to 'Kurdify' the Turkish cities (HÜNEE, 2006; Ayata and Yükseker, 2007).

It is true that since the 1980s people from Eastern Anatolia have made up an ever-increasing segment of the migrant population in İzmir

(Sevgi, 1988: 44; Ünverdi, 2002). Nevertheless, the Kurds by no means constitute the majority of the migrant population in the city. On the contrary, the number of migrants from adjacent cities in the Aegean region has long been higher than the number of Kurdish migrants (Mutluer, 2000: 55).[11] In fact, since the sixteenth century İzmir has been one of the most important destinations for internal migration, receiving many people from all over Turkey. It has never been a monolithic city inhabited overwhelmingly by people who were born in İzmir. Therefore, if we were to use 'invasion' as a synonym for 'immigration', we would need to talk about an 'invasion' of those 'Turks' who were born outside İzmir as well as the 'invasion' of the Kurds from Eastern Anatolia.

Here, the trope of 'Kurdish invasion' is something more than a reaction to the migration from 'outside'. As explained in the previous chapter, the migrants from the provinces outside Eastern Anatolia had the economic and cultural capital that was necessary to become integrated into urban life without forming isolated and segregated communities. As a result, their migration remained relatively 'invisible' in urban space. However, this was not the case for the migrants from Eastern Anatolia. Kurdish migrants who came to İzmir from the early 1980s on typically settled in specific *gecekondu* zones in the city. Accordingly, the rate of annual population growth in Kadifekale,[12] for instance, is 10 per cent, while the rate is 0.028 per cent for Turkey as a whole (Karayiğit, 2005: 8). Therefore, it is also the appearance of Kurdish migrants in recent years, as a spatially and socio-economically marginalised community, that induces middle-class İzmirlis to perceive the migration from Eastern Anatolia as a 'Kurdish invasion'. This means that the discourse of 'Kurdish invasion' is not a reaction to 'migration from outside' *per se* but a reaction to the migration of a marginalised Kurdish community and the consequent increasing visibility of their 'Kurdishness' in urban space.

The high birth rate among Kurdish migrants is another fact that is cited as evidence of a 'Kurdish invasion'. Blaming the 'poor' for creating their own poverty by having a lot of children has long been a widespread tendency seen mostly among the wealthier segments of Turkish society (Buğra, 2008: 15). In exclusive recognition, we again observe the ethnicisation of this longstanding 'logic', as middle-class İzmirlis see 'having a lot of children' as one of the distinct characteristics of Kurdish migrants and one of the indications of their 'invasion'. As with the other stereotypes, middle-class İzmirlis build this prejudice on a 'fact': for var-

ious reasons it is true that birth rates among Kurdish migrants are significantly higher than in the rest of the urban population. In middle-class discourse this fact is constructed as a distinctive characteristic of 'Kurdishness' and used as the justification of the stereotype 'Kurds as invaders'.

'Separatists' (*Bölücü*)

The other common stereotype used by the middle-class İzmirlis to identify the 'Kurd' in the urban social life is 'separatist' (*bölücü*). Although 'separatist' is the closest English word to *bölücü* in Turkish, the English version does not come close to reflecting the pejorative and exclusionary connotations of this word. In the discourse of the middle-class İzmirlis, the word *bölücü* is used to signify a person who wants to divide a hitherto united country and society into different parts. *Bölücü* refers also to a hate-monger who excites discord and provokes enmity between members of Turkish society.

While tracing the origins of the construction of the Kurds as separatists, one should avoid falling into the trap of suggesting a direct cause and effect relationship between the onset of the PKK uprising and the rise of this exclusionary discourse in Turkish society. The interviews I conducted indicate that the emergence of the discourse of 'separatist Kurds' is not necessarily the result of the armed conflict in Eastern Anatolia. As explained in Chapter 6, the armed conflict between the PKK and the Turkish state started in the early 1980s and continued throughout the 1990s, leading to the death of approximately 30,000 people. This conflict affected the people not only in Eastern Anatolia but throughout the entire country, since the thousands of soldiers who lost their lives in the war against the PKK were young conscripts from all over Turkey. By the early 1990s, this situation ignited widespread discontent with the PKK and its leader, Abdullah Öcalan, who was seen as the real culprit in this war. Without a doubt, the agitations of the state and private media played an integral role in intensifying the people's rage against the PKK and its leader. Their black-and-white mentality conceived and presented this armed conflict as the struggle of the whole country against an externally supported terrorist organisation that wanted to divide the country (Kirişçi, 2004: 290). In this nationalist campaign, the PKK and Abdullah Öcalan were given extremely pejorative labels including 'baby-killer', 'rogue', 'satan', 'blood-sucker', 'betrayer', etc. (İbrahim and Gürbey, 2000: 8). Among all these labels, 'separatist' (*bölücü*) was the most prevalent and popular. In the state and

media discourse, the word 'PKK' was rarely used without the preceding phrase 'separatist terrorist organisation' (*bölücü terör örgütü*).

This mentality did not involve a direct anti-Kurdish discourse, since it denied any necessary link between the PKK and the Kurds in Turkey. The PKK was depicted as a creation of certain international actors that aimed to weaken Turkey by trying to provoke people in Eastern Anatolia. As stated before, by addressing the historically established and popularly adopted hostility towards Armenians, the state and media went so far as to proclaim that the leader and even all militants of the PKK were Armenian rather than Kurdish. In this sense, the PKK and the Kurds were not conflated. In accordance with this mentality, the popular rage against the PKK was never transformed into an ethnic conflict between the Kurds and the Turks more broadly, even in the most critical days of conflict. Likewise, at the funerals of the soldiers who were killed in the armed conflict ('martyrs' in popular discourse), the collective reaction of the people targeted the PKK and its leader Abdullah Öcalan rather than the Kurds as a separate ethnic group.

Therefore, it cannot be claimed that the middle-class İzmirlis' tendency to label the Kurds as 'separatists' is an extension or the necessary result of the armed conflict between the PKK and the state. It is not that middle-class İzmirlis have been influenced passively by a popular anti-Kurdish discourse that is coupled with the conflict between the PKK and the Turkish army. As with the other stereotypes attached to the Kurds, middle-class İzmirlis derive the image of the 'separatist Kurd' from their social relationships with the Kurdish migrants. This is not to say, of course, that the conflict in Eastern Anatolia did not play any role in the emergence of the discourse of the 'separatist Kurd'. Rather, I would like to argue that without the dynamics of urban social life, the conflict between the PKK and the state would not be sufficient to yield such an exclusionary discourse.

In view of this, it is necessary to turn our attention to those aspects of urban social life that prepares the ground for the construction of the discourse of 'separatist Kurd'. The interviews pointed to two aspects of social life in İzmir in this respect: the manifestations of the political activities of Kurdish migrants in İzmir and the concrete reflections of the Kurdish migrants' social solidarity relations in the urban social life of the city.

The Kurdish immigration into western Turkish cities and the consequent emergence of a spatially and socio-economically separate Kurdish community created a convenient social milieu for the mobilisation of

Kurdish nationalism in these cities. In the 1990s, Kurdish nationalism became an important political force both in the cities of western Turkey and in Eastern Anatolia. Since the 1980s İzmir has also witnessed an intensification of Kurdish nationalist actions, in which Kurdish migrants have taken an active part. This situation manifested itself clearly in the sporadic clashes between the police and Kurdish protestors, either in the central zones of the city, or in the districts where Kurdish migrants are concentrated. The annual Newroz celebrations, organised in the city centre, are another occasion to observe the engagement of migrants in Kurdish nationalist activities.

The symbols, motifs, flags, slogans and political discourses that are used in these protests and celebrations prove that PKK has considerable influence over the Kurdish migrants who take part in Kurdish nationalist mobilisation in the western cities. This is also something easily visible to a middle-class İzmirli. The mainstream visual media documents the use of the PKK's symbols and discourses in these demonstrations to provide 'evidence' for the presence of a popular base of Kurdish nationalism in the western cities.[13] Moreover, since most of these nationalist activities take place at the very heart of the city, there is ample opportunity for a middle-class İzmirli to witness the link between the ordinary Kurds and the PKK.[14]

These manifestations of Kurdish nationalist activities (which were absent before the 1990s), have made it clear to the middle-class İzmirlis that the PKK is not solely a marginal group that owes its existence only to the support of international actors, but an organisation that is supported by a considerable number of Kurds in İzmir. The death of the illusion that the PKK is a marginal, illegal organisation empowered by international actors has, however, given rise to another 'illusion' among middle-class İzmirlis: that of seeing *all* Kurds as PKK sympathisers. It would be an overgeneralisation to suggest that *all* ethnic Kurds support the PKK even though there is a popular sympathy towards the PKK among the Kurds in the western Turkish cities. The election results since the 1980s point to the fact that a great many ethnic Kurds in the western cities support mainstream political parties rather than Kurdish nationalist parties. This is to say that the Kurds, as a whole, do not form a politically monolithic community.

The 'illusion' of seeing all the Kurds as PKK sympathisers is revealed clearly in the interviews. Most of the interviewees mentioned that while they believed in the 1990s that the PKK was supported by European countries, rather than the Kurds, they now believe that the

Kurds themselves aspire to an independent Kurdistan, and that they are either openly or passively sympathetic to the PKK *en bloc*. It was in this sense that middle-class İzmirlis use the word 'separatist', which has long been used for the PKK and Abdullah Öcalan, to identify the Kurds. Ahmet's (46-M) following statement is an example of this tendency:

> Now, I can see that most of the Kurds who came to İzmir are supporting the PKK. Maybe not all of them, but most of them are separatists. Every year you see what they are doing in Newroz. They want their own flag and their own country. They are trying to say that 'we do not want to live under the Turkish state'. This is also why they have a lot of children.

These words point to an abrupt shift from an extreme position of seeing the Kurds as completely unaffiliated with the PKK to another extreme position of seeing all of them as PKK sympathisers.

As stated above, the official ideology in Turkey understands the political conflict in Eastern Anatolia from a rigid 'black-and-white' perspective. This mentality views the PKK as a separatist (*bölücü*) organisation that seeks to divide the country, and considers the state to be the defender of the security of all its citizens. This rigid approach has never attempted to question the historical and social conditions that led to the popularisation of the PKK among the Kurds in Eastern Anatolia. Middle-class İzmirlis transfer this 'black-and-white' logic to their approach to the 'Kurds'. Based on a superficial observation of the nationalist activities of Kurdish migrants in the urban life of İzmir, they identify all Kurds with such a pejorative label as separatist, but without considering the possible social and historical conditions that prompted Kurdish migrants to feel affinity with the PKK and Kurdish nationalism.

The second important factor in the construction and justification of the discourse of the 'separatist Kurd' involves the relations of solidarity among Kurdish migrants in the social life of İzmir. Having been spatially and socio-economically separated in urban space, Kurdish migrants established their own social networks in order to help them get jobs, to solve certain social and economic problems, and also to organise and negotiate their relations with the Turkish authorities (Çelik, 2002). In addition, as a reaction to the difficult and insecure social and economic conditions in the city they developed a culture of 'self protecting' and supporting one another when they perceive an

external threat. This tendency of acting together as a community manifests itself in urban spaces in which middle-class İzmirlis and Kurdish migrants come into contact with one another. This practice among the Kurds of supporting one another could also take more antagonistic forms, and be transformed into collective 'aggression' against 'outsiders'. Middle-class İzmirlis use the discourse of the 'separatist Kurd' as a reaction to their observation and experience of these aggressive forms of solidarity in urban social life. Halil (50-M), a civil servant in a state office, expresses his ideas as follows:

> This separatism started recently. There was no such thing as Kurdism in the past. Before knowing them here, I used to think that the people from Eastern Anatolia were brave and trustworthy (*mert ve güvenilir*). However, today, for example, Yamanlar, Güzeltepe and Kadifekale are under the control of these people. They are dominant in these districts. Today, I no longer feel safe when I go to a pub to drink a glass of beer. Whenever I go to these places, I always see some fights. And usually the people from Eastern Anatolia create these fights. Once a Kurd has a problem with a person in the pub, his other Kurdish friends immediately come to the place to support him.

Zeynep (56-F), a retired primary school teacher, expresses similar sentiments in the following words:

> I do not think this migration is normal. And I really do not find the behaviours of these migrants acceptable. They behave very aggressively… When I go to a bazaar I see that all stallholders are Kurdish. One day I bought something from one of these stallholders. I realised that he put dirty and rotten goods into my shopping bag. When I threw them back to him with anger he started to yell at me. When I attempted to respond, I realised that I was suddenly circled by many other people… If I had challenged and fought with them maybe they would have killed me with a knife. Who knows? In these kinds of situations, we have no choice but cowering in fear. We cannot say any word to them. Recently, barbarous, graceless and ignorant people have been flowing into this city. The blockade that they created in this city is so strong that when you have a conflict of interest with one of them, all others come together and back up this one person.

Maybe this is because they are ignorant. But secondly, this is because they are Kurds. They back each other up as Kurds. They think that 'I am Kurd; he is Kurd; so we need to support each other'. They believe that 'when we support each other the others cannot impose power on us; they cannot even open their mouth'. This is the biggest separatism in my eyes.

The discourse of the 'separatist Kurds', which is revealed in the above statements, also enables middle-class İzmirlis to present their general exclusionary attitude as a defensive reaction to the perceived aggression and separatism of the Kurds. The notion that 'they first started to exclude us' was very prevalent in the interviews. Some of the interviewees were conscious of their exclusionary discourse and stated that the Kurds, given their aggressive attitudes, left no option but to exclude them.

It is of vital importance to add that the fact of Kurdish migrants' speaking Kurdish among themselves in urban social life is interpreted by middle-class İzmirlis as an aspect of solidarity among the Kurds, and hence as an indication of their separatism. Interestingly, other languages spoken in İzmir seem to be exempt from this antipathy. The interviewees reported that they would be indifferent to the use of Circassian, Laz, Georgian and Albanian in everyday life. They would see the use of these languages as a 'natural' phenomenon, as long as the people who use them can also speak Turkish perfectly. Some stated that rather than being disturbed by the use of these languages, they actually enjoy listening to music in these languages.[16] Therefore, the middle-class İzmirlis perceive only the use of Kurdish as a form of separatism, not other ethnic languages.

They justify this sentiment with the claim that the Kurds use the Kurdish language deliberately in everyday life to demonstrate to non-Kurdish people that they are 'Kurdish' and that they are united. From this perspective, the use of Kurdish on a public bus, in a shop or at the bazaar is not a natural thing, but a political statement of Kurdish nationalism, and a challenge to the existing system. Halime (35-F), a nurse working in a public hospital, provides a good example of this view:

In a public minibus (*dolmuş*) for example, I sometimes hear people, mostly young people, speaking in Kurdish among themselves. This is so disturbing for me. People in Canada want you to speak in English when you are in their country, don't they? I

am disturbed by Kurdish in the presence of this chaotic political environment in Turkey. How can I know what they are speaking about? If there was not any political turmoil in this country and if the PKK did not exist, maybe I would not be disturbed by Kurdish. But the PKK uses Kurdish language as its emblem and as its flag.

At this point, it is important to note that the conventional assimilationist policies of the Turkish state, which has repressed expressions of Kurdish language and culture in social life, albeit indirectly, played an important role in the emergence of such a discourse. In the aftermath of the 1980 coup, the Turkish state abolished the use of the Kurdish language in different spheres of social life, proclaiming that the free use of ethnic languages could harm national unity. As a response to this prohibition, throughout the 1980s and 1990s the PKK and other Kurdish nationalist organisations used, in the international and domestic political context, the repression of the Kurdish language as clear evidence of the oppression of the Kurds in Turkey and as the justification for their movement. Likewise, legal Kurdish nationalist parties, such as the DTP and its predecessors, have attempted to bring the prohibition of the Kurdish language in media, in schools and in the public sphere to the agenda of Turkish politics. This situation made the use of the Kurdish language one of the most controversial political issues in Turkish politics. Therefore, even though there are no longer legal barriers against the use of Kurdish language in everyday life, the previous restrictions make the fact of Kurds' everyday use of their mother tongue a controversial political issue and a divisive threat in the eyes of middle-class İzmirlis.

'Disrupters of Urban Life' (*Gelip Buraları Mahvediyorlar*)
Another perception of the Kurdish migrants held by the middle-class İzmirlis is that they disrupt the smooth functioning and social order of the city. They attempt to rationalise this idea mainly by reference to the increasing crime rates in İzmir. In the interviews, almost all of the respondents complained about the fact that criminal activities such as snatching purses (*kapkaç*), robbing houses and cars, sexual harassment, rape and murder are on the rise in İzmir. They also complained of verbal harassment by people in everyday life. Women respondents seemed to be more vocal than men about the rise of insecurity in the city, as they were more vulnerable to such disturbing incidents. In the general

perspective of the middle-class İzmirlis, the increase in such criminal activities and the rise of insecurity in the city is related to the inflow of Kurds into İzmir. In their accounts, the migrant neighbourhoods, especially Kadifekale, are regarded as a source of crime and hence a no-go zone. In the interviews, Güler (40-F), a research assistant in a public university stated that:

> In the past, I used to take a walk in Konak at night without any concern and fear. Now, I cannot walk there. You know those people we call 'kıro',[17] the people from the East. They fill these places. They follow us; make a pass at us. They are Kurds. When you hear the way they speak, you can easily realise who they are. Or you can immediately get this from their face and appearance (*Tipine bakıp anlayabiliyorsun hemen*). There is a good way of dressing and bad way of dressing. We can distinguish these two.

Another respondent, Fatma (61-F), a retired civil servant, expressed the following thoughts:

> We can no longer go out at night because of this migration. You know something: when I was young, I was identifying myself as an 'Easterner', even though my parents were born in Central Anatolia. In those times, people from East were brave and honest. They were wresting their living from the soil (*ekmeklerini taştan çıkarıyorlardı*). They were perfect men indeed (*sapına kadar adamlardı*)! Now these people are gone. They all changed. Look at İzmir now: The mafia is full of Kurdish people; the pimps are all Kurds. Snatchers are all Kurds.

From this perspective, İzmir has long been regarded as a quiet, safe and ordered city when compared to İstanbul, which is always identified with chaos, crowds and insecurity (Tümer, 2001: 52). This perspective also suggests that it is the civilised people of İzmir themselves who make it a favourable place to live. In this sense, the image of İzmir as a peaceful and tranquil place complements its aforementioned image of being the 'most enlightened and civilised' city of Turkey. Middle-class İzmirlis typically address this comparison between İstanbul and İzmir, while interpreting the relationship between the increasing crime and the Kurds negatively. From their perspective, the onset of Kurdish immigration signifies the starting point of the progressive erosion of the

peaceful and safe nature of the city. They state that the arrival of the Kurds in İzmir marked the 'İstanbulisation' (*İstanbullaşma*) of İzmir. Sümer (55-M), a primary school teacher, exemplified this tendency with the following words:

> For me, İzmir always became the centre of progressive move-ments in the history of Turkey. For example, the idea of Republic first started in İzmir. Progress is in the structure, or in the makeup of this city (*yapısında, mayasında var*). Istanbul is not like here. There are 72 different kinds of people there.[18] The peo-ple living in İstanbul only think about money; they think about nothing but money. But here people used to go to movie the-atres. For example, in the 1970s, there were no outdoor cinemas in İstanbul. In those years, we used to go to these cinemas every summer; men and women together. We used to go to concerts of *Ruhi Su*.[19] We used to know and recognise one another. But now, you can see that İzmir starts to look like İstanbul in all respects.

This discontent with the erosion of İzmir goes hand in hand with a romanticised view of the social life in the city before 1980. This is espe-cially the case among elderly respondents who were born in İzmir and hence have enough knowledge and memories to compare the current state of İzmir with its past.[20] It was striking to see that this romanticised discourse typically involved a comparison between Kurdish migrants in contemporary, decaying, İzmir and the non-Muslim minorities of the 'good old days'. In this comparison, the non-Muslim minorities of the old days are depicted as respectable, intellectual and 'harmless'[21] people as opposed to the wild and ignorant Kurds who are currently disrupt-ing the social order in the city.[22] For some of my interviewees, these minorities were emblematic features of the 'old İzmir' and therefore their departure from the city marked the gradual vanishing of the 'true İzmir'. This romantic exaltation of these minorities reveals the specifici-ty of the discourse of exclusive recognition. First of all, it points to the fact that middle-class İzmirlis' exclusionary discourse towards the Kurds does not necessarily target other non-Turkish or non-Muslim groups. Secondly, the exaltation of the minorities corroborates the idea that exclusive recognition cannot be regarded as the extension of the state's conventional Turkish nationalism, which has long viewed the non-Muslim minorities in the country as the 'negative other'. Thirdly

and more importantly, this phenomenon also provides some insights into how the class position of a recognised and 'otherised' community is critical in shaping the way in which they are constructed by the middle-class İzmirlis. As shown in Chapter 3, in contrast with Kurdish migrants, the non-Muslim minorities in İzmir comprised the wealthier segments of the city's population. Rather than being socio-economically marginalised, they played an active role in commercial and industrial activities in İzmir. Thanks to their ample economic resources and opportunities, most of them were well educated and familiar with the manners of a 'bourgeois' lifestyle. Without a doubt, it was largely these characteristics of the non-Muslim minorities, that is, their cultural and economic capital, that lead the middle-class İzmirlis to commemorate them in an empathetic tone, and associate them with such words as 'intellectual', 'respectable' and 'harmless'. Ahmet (54-M), a worker of the municipality, states that:

> In the past, there were Jews and Greeks in İzmir. There were particularly a lot of Jews. They were in a minority too. But unlike the Kurds now, they were rich. They were helping the people they liked. They were providing employment for the poor. Until the 1980s, they had their own community here. But they were useful and hardworking people. They were employing people and paying them exactly what they deserved. But now, they are all gone. Where are they now? Who knows?

Likewise, the construction of the 'Kurds' based on stereotypes that are opposed to the ones attached to the non-Muslim minorities, has a lot to do with the particular class position of Kurdish migrants and their consequent socio-economic and spatial marginalisation since the mid-1980s. In order to support this point, during my interviews I asked some of the interviewees what they thought about the fact that a similar exclusionary language to the one they use against the Kurds is used by some people in Western Europe against the Turks themselves. It was interesting to observe that rather than resenting Europeans for insulting the Turks, most of them reported that they found these attitudes of Western Europeans understandable. They stated that, just like the Kurds in İzmir, most of the Turks living in Europe are ignorant; and they disrupt the lifestyle of Europeans when they go there. Some of them also said that they would react in the same way to the Turks, if they lived in Europe.

This shows that that the construction of the Kurds as people who disrupt the life in the city should be situated within the context of the specific class relationship between Kurdish migrants and middle-class İzmirlis. The number of people engaged in criminal and deviant activity is relatively high in the districts where the Kurdish migrants who arrived since the 1980s are concentrated (İzmir Yerel Gündem 21, 1998: 191; Hancı *et al.*, 1996). Even the locally elected official chiefs (*muhtars*) of the Kurdish neighbourhoods in Kadifekale recognised this fact in my exploratory interviews with them. The criminal and so-called 'deviant' activities are related to the socio-economic conditions of Kurdish migrants in the post-migration processes. In the absence of regular and stable formal jobs, robbery and snatching seemed to these Kurdish migrants to be one way of surviving, and perhaps of overcoming poverty. Some researchers point out that the children of Kurdish migrants are particularly forced to play an active role in these crimes (Erdilek, 2004). For some of Kurdish migrants, the involvement in mafia-like networks and their illegal and criminal activities was a way of obtaining more power and wealth in the increasingly difficult social and economic conditions of the city. This holds true for the urban poor of other social contexts. The rise in crime due to poverty, social exclusion and relative deprivation is indeed a typical characteristic of the neoliberal city (Gough *et al.*, 2006: 124; Özkazanç, 2007: 25). In the big cities of other countries as well, the poor are 'seen to be the cause of society's problems rather than their problems being caused by society' (Young, 1999: 113).[23]

The middle-class İzmirlis, who construct the Kurds as the people who disrupt the peace in the city, do not take into account the historical and structural conditions that shape the social world of Kurdish migrants in İzmir. They think that the 'Kurds' chose their deviance and crime in order either to get rich quickly by 'ill-gotten gains' or to create turmoil in society and to divide it. They build this discourse on the experiences, observations and awareness of the criminal activities and so called 'deviant' behaviours in which Kurdish migrants are involved. As with the other stereotypes and labels that are attached to the Kurds, these negative encounters in urban social life bear the imprints of specific space/class relationship between Kurdish migrants and middle-class İzmirlis. Despite the profound socio-economic differences between Kurdish migrants and middle-class İzmirlis, these two groups come into contact in some common everyday life spaces. It was through encounters in these places that middle-class İzmirlis observed

and experienced the criminal and deviant activities that they complain about. More importantly, as stated in the previous chapter, although the middle-class İzmirlis, owing to their better socio-economic conditions, typically live in apartments outside the *gecekondu* zones where Kurdish migrants are concentrated, their class position forces them to live near to these slums. Their shrinking budget and deteriorating economic conditions in the neoliberal period make it more difficult for them to afford to move to upper-class gated communities, which are free of the criminal incidents that are seen in the inner city areas. In other words, while the upper-class sections of society gained protection from the rise in crime by distancing themselves from the centre of the city, middle-class İzmirlis became more vulnerable to the worsening security in the inner city. Under such conditions of increasing economic and urban insecurity, middle-class İzmirlis see the Kurds as the main source of problems in the city.[24]

When middle-class İzmirlis interpret their increasing vulnerability to insecurity as a product of the Kurdish inflow, they use a logic that 'ethnicises' the actual objective conditions that prepare the ground for more criminal acts. They identify the high crime and deviance rates among Kurdish migrants as one of the markers of their *Kurdishness* rather than the product of certain historical and structural factors. In this sense, the reasoning behind the construction of the 'Kurd' as the people who disrupt the social life in the city is similar to the reasoning behind the other stereotypes and labels that I have examined so far.

Conclusion

The previous chapter dealt with the social dynamics that lead to the *recognition* of Kurdish migrants as a separate community in urban social life. In this chapter, I analysed the social processes through which Kurdish migrants, who are recognised as a separate community, are *excluded* through some stereotypes. The close examination of some of these stereotypes indicated that exclusive recognition rests on the ethnicisation of the manifestations of the structural and historical conditions of Kurdish migrants in İzmir. Therefore, exclusive recognition is, in essence, a reaction of the middle-class İzmirlis to the rapidly changing urban social life. This means that it is founded in and fostered by material and objective changes in urban life rather than being a mere extension of a longstanding 'ethnic' antagonism between the Kurds and the Turks. Because the urban social life is an area where such structural/national dynamics as neoliberalism, political conflict in Eastern Anatolia

and migration from Eastern Anatolia interact, 'exclusive recognition' can also be seen, at a higher level of abstraction, as one of the reactions to the combination of these structural transformations.

9

THE REINFORCEMENT
OF EXCLUSIVE RECOGNITION

In the last two chapters I established an analytical framework that furthers our understanding of how exclusive recognition arises in the dynamics of urban life. In this chapter I will elaborate on how exclusive recognition is reinforced by particular social processes that do not necessarily pertain to the social contacts and interactions between the middle-class İzmirlis and Kurdish migrants in urban social life. This 'reinforcement' concerns the processes through which exclusive recognition is being reproduced and strengthened. It is important to note that the processes of reinforcement cannot by themselves produce exclusive recognition; they only foster and facilitate the perpetuation of exclusive recognition, the substance of which is formed primarily within urban social life. In this respect, there is a hierarchical relationship between the processes of 'recognition' and 'exclusion' on the one hand, and the process of 'reinforcement', on the other. Only in the presence of processes of recognition and exclusion can the factors of reinforcement have an influence on the image of the 'Kurd' that is constructed by middle-class İzmirlis. Nevertheless, the processes of recognition and exclusion can play a role in the formation of exclusive recognition independently of processes of reinforcement. In other words, the processes of reinforcement gain relevance for 'exclusive recognition' only in relation to the processes of recognition and exclusion.

This hierarchical relationship should not be interpreted as if the processes of recognition and exclusion temporally precede the process of reinforcement in the construction of exclusive recognition. These three processes may operate and interplay simultaneously. While the processes of exclusion and recognition enable exclusive recognition to

take its very particular form, the processes of reinforcement contribute to the emergence of exclusive recognition as a stronger and established sentiment. Accordingly, the boundaries between these three processes are drawn analytically, based on the nature of the role they play rather than on the temporal order of their occurrence.

This chapter will shed light on the role of the media in the reinforcement of exclusive recognition. With its overt and crude nationalist language and discourse, the mainstream media has always played an important role in the perpetuation and provocation of popular nationalist sentiments in Turkey. In the case of exclusive recognition, however, one cannot argue that the anti-Kurdish sentiments of middle-class İzmirlis are simply the product of nationalist media manipulation. The reason for this is that, despite its repetitive nationalist jargon, the mainstream media in Turkey have always been wary of deploying a direct and systematic racist discourse against the Kurds, with a few exceptions of course. Nevertheless, the way the media present the facts has been influential in the reinforcement and perpetuation of exclusive recognition, if not in its actual formation. In order to exemplify such reinforcing role of media discourse in Turkey, I would like to discuss the ways in which the media discourse pertaining to Middle Eastern affairs contributes to the reinforcement of exclusive recognition. Several other examples could be given; but this one, I believe, would suffice to illustrate how media plays a significant role in the reinforcement of exclusive recognition.

Media Representations of the Political Turmoil in Iraq

'The Kurds and Arabs came to an agreement in Kirkuk',[1] 'The Kurdish-Arab War is inevitable',[2] 'The Kurds and the Shiites formed an alliance',[3] 'Would the USA sell out us or the Kurds?',[4] 'Iraq in Crisis: The Sunnis and the Kurds Dismissed All the Offers',[5] 'The Kurds came together for the Independent State'.[6] These are some of the headlines that two mainstream newspapers in Turkey, *Hürriyet* and *Sabah*, used in connection with developments in Iraq in the aftermath of the American occupation. What is actually meant by the 'Kurds' in these titles is not the ordinary Kurds at large but the leaders and the elites of the Kurdish nationalist groups in Iraq, and particularly Massoud Barzani, the president of Iraq's autonomous Kurdish region. Nonetheless, if the title 'The Kurds came together for the Independent State' was taken literally, for instance, it would mean that the ordinary Kurds, as a homogeneous ethnic group, came together and negotiated to make certain deci-

sions regarding their political future. In other words, by designating the Kurdish nationalist political leaders in Iraq as the 'Kurds', these newspapers present the political power struggles in Iraq as the conflict between externally bounded ethnic groups with homogeneous interests.

Despite what this 'ethnicisation' implies, however, ethnicity and ethnic groups are not the agents of political action in the Iraqi affair. Rather, they are the categories within which political action is conducted and legitimised. In this sense, these mainstream newspapers conflate the 'categories of political action' with the 'agents of political action' (Brubaker and Laitin, 1998: 446). There are numerous other examples of the use of this 'ethnicised' language by the mainstream media in Turkey when covering political developments in Iraq.

This analysis does not imply that the Turkish media engage in this ethnicisation deliberately in order to manipulate public opinion for the sake of certain political interests. Indeed, this way of presenting the situation in Iraq is by no means unique to the Turkish media. A quick glance at the BBC, the CBC, the *Guardian* and the *New York Times* would reveal even more explicit examples of this 'ethnicisation'. In this respect, the ethnicised language that the mainstream Turkish media use to present developments in Iraq is no different from the hegemonic language that is used in the international media. Rogers Brubaker calls this hegemonic language 'groupism':

> This is what I call 'groupism', by which I mean the tendency to take discrete, bounded groups as basic constituents of social life, chief protagonists of social conflicts, and fundamental units of social analysis. I mean the tendency to treat ethnic groups, nations, and race as substantial entities to which interests and agency can be attributed. I mean the tendency to reify such groups, speaking of Serbs, Croats, Muslims, and Albanians in the Former Yugoslavia, of Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland, of Jews and Palestinians in Israel and the occupied territories… of Turks and Kurds in Turkey… as if they were internally homogenous, externally bounded groups, even unitary collective actors with common purposes (2004: 8).

This hegemonic ethno-political language or 'groupism', in Brubaker's words, has intensified with the penetration of the US's foreign policy vision into the Middle East. In the aftermath of the occupation, US policies are shaped largely by the assumption that the Shiites, Sunnis

and the Kurds, as the three 'homogeneous' ethnic groups in Iraq, have their own power and interests, and that their leaders or elites represent these ethnic groups as a whole. Behind most of the recent concrete US policies in the region lies such an ethnicised realpolitik perspective.

The origins of such 'groupist' language in Middle Eastern politics is a complicated issue and beyond the scope of this chapter. It is more relevant to shed some light on the relationship between the groupist language that is used in the mainstream media and exclusive recognition. It is not, of course, the case that the middle-class İzmirlis start to perceive Kurdish migrants as a distinctive ethnic group immediately after reading these titles in the mainstream newspapers. As indicated in Chapter 7, the recognition of Kurdish migrants as an 'other' ethnic group takes place *originally* in the social processes of the urban life. By presenting the 'Kurds' as an externally bounded entity with certain common interests, the mainstream media representations of the political struggles in the Middle East *contribute* to the perception of the Kurds as a separate ethnic group, and hence reinforce exclusive recognition.

Similarly, by presenting the 'Kurds' as a political actor in the Middle East, the groupist (ethnicised) language in the mainstream media facilitates the construction of Kurdish migrants as a 'large ethnic group' which has political projects and interests that go beyond the confines of daily life in İzmir. This makes it easier for the middle-class İzmirlis to link stereotypes that they gather from their encounters with Kurdish migrants in urban life to the putative 'common political interests' of the Kurds as a whole. For instance, the notion that 'the Kurds want to take over İzmir by having large families' is strengthened when the mainstream media depict the recent political controversy over Kirkuk in Iraq as a struggle between the 'ethnic Kurds' and 'ethnic Arabs'. Such media headlines as 'Kurds want to dominate some cities in the Middle East' are used by the middle-class İzmirlis as a justification for the idea that 'the same Kurds' here in Turkey want to dominate İzmir. The discourse of 'what they (the Kurds) have been doing in Iraq is the same as what they have been doing here in Turkey' was quite prevalent in the interviews.

The notion that 'the Kurds are separatists' is reinforced through a similar process. When the mainstream media, with its groupist language, does not differentiate between the 'ordinary Kurds' and the 'Kurdish political elites', and also between the 'Kurds in Iraq' and 'the 'Kurds in Turkey', it reinforces, albeit unintentionally, the image of the Kurds as separatists. Such 'groupist' statements in the media as 'the Kurds are

aiming for independence' and 'the Kurds are having their own state', for instance, are seen by middle-class İzmirlis as extensions and manifestations of the separatist objectives of the Kurds. When middle-class İzmirlis see that some of their notions are 'evidenced', if not directly reproduced, in the mainstream media, they became more convinced about the negative Kurdish image that they have developed during their daily urban encounters.

Although the mainstream media employ an extreme nationalist language when covering most social and political issues in Turkey, they are generally wary of using direct anti-Kurdish statements that would provoke Turkish society at large. One may posit that, on the issue of the Kurds, a kind of 'political correctness' has long been the norm in Turkey. This has not been the case for the media representations of Armenians and Greeks, however. On many occasions, the mainstream media as well as politicians have not hesitated to reveal their racist sentiments towards these groups. The historical reasons for this situation were examined extensively in Chapter 4. In contrast, even during the most intense phase of the conflict between the PKK and the state, the mainstream media, rather than employing an anti-Kurdish rhetoric, contributed to the reproduction of the state's conventional tendency of portraying the PKK as an externally supported organisation that was not affiliated with the Kurds in Turkey (Bulut, 2005). The recent groupist language of the mainstream media is not an exception to this longstanding cautiousness. Despite situating the political developments in Iraq within the context of ethnic relations and conflicts in Iraq, the language of the mainstream media does not necessarily involve the *direct* use of pejorative labels and stereotypes for the Kurds as an ethnic group. What is rather new about their recent discourse after the occupation in Iraq is the overt recognition (and construction) of the 'Kurds' as an ethno-political actor in the Middle East. Even though this recognition does not necessarily involve racist depictions, it still reinforces antagonism against the Kurds, in the presence of the social and political processes that pave the way for the formation of exclusive recognition.

This is not to deny that there are some exceptions to the mainstream media's general avoidance of employing direct racist and exclusionary discourse towards the Kurds. In sporadic instances, one may observe the use of direct anti-Kurdish discourses in some popular newspapers and magazines. For example, 'when the election of the governor of Kirkuk in May 2003 was won by the Kurdish candidate, Abd al-Rahman

Mustafa, the report in the Turkish newspaper *Star* on 29 May 2003 was headed "Kerkürt", which in Kurdish means "donkey-Kurd"' (Yeğen, 2007b: 3). There are further examples of this kind of discourse. However, the significance of these direct anti-Kurdish statements in the mainstream media should not be overrated, because they remain sporadic and, as such, are unrepresentative. The narratives of middle-class İzmirlis show that it is more illuminating to concentrate on the unintended social effects of the more commonly used 'groupist' and ethnopolitical language of the mainstream media than to put too much emphasis on these isolated examples.

As opposed to the mainstream media, some marginal magazines and web pages include systematic and explicit use of racist statements about the Kurds. *Türksolu*, a magazine published by a small group of extreme ultra-nationalists, is the best-known example of these. Some websites and internet forums also feature vulgar expressions of anti-Kurdish racism. In fact, among students and researchers of Turkish nationalism, there is a growing interest in conducting content analyses of these racist websites and magazines (Esen, 2007; Aktan, 2007; Saç, 2007). Without a doubt, the descriptive content analysis of these websites and magazines is important for understanding the state of mind of *their authors and readers*. The problem is that most of this research interprets the findings gathered by these content analyses as evidence of the general state of nationalism and racism in Turkey.

Drawing some 'big' conclusions from these media sources would be misleading in several respects. First of all, the readers and authors of these websites constitute only a very small group in Turkish society, which means that they have a minimal effect on shaping perceptions of the Kurds in Turkish society. None of the interviewees in my fieldwork, for instance, reported being aware of such journals and websites, let alone reading them regularly. Secondly, putting too much emphasis on marginal media and exaggerating their influence in the construction of anti-Kurdish sentiments in Turkish society would involve the risk of disregarding or neglecting the primary role of actual social processes in urban space. The pejorative stereotypes and labels that have been attributed to the Kurds by middle-class İzmirlis do not originate from these websites and magazines. Rather, they are produced and reproduced through real social processes in urban life. This is to say that it is first necessary to examine the 'real' and 'common' forms of anti-Kurdish sentiments in Turkish society before examining their 'marginal' and 'cyber' manifestations. Thirdly, content analyses of crude and vulgar

anti-Kurdish discourses in these marginal media would not shed much light on the structural and historical conditions that have prepared the ground for the formation of anti-Kurdish sentiments. The interrogation of the real-life experiences of those people who direct negative stereotypes towards the Kurds is a more appropriate point of departure for such an analysis, since the structural and historical conditions of society manifest themselves more clearly in the 'real' lived experiences of these 'real' people.

This study concentrates on the social processes, structures and institutions that are present in the actual lives of Turkish citizens and shape their perception of what is meant to be 'Kurdish'. Middle-class İzmirlis, as Turkish citizens who are not involved in any marginal racist or ultranationalist political group, have been exposed more to the mainstream media than to those marginal racist websites and magazines. This is why, in its analysis of the reinforcement of exclusive recognition, this study attributes more significance to the groupist and ethno-political language that has been used in the mainstream media than to the open and vulgar expressions of racism in some marginal websites and magazines.

Conclusion

The form and substance of exclusive recognition are produced largely within the interactions between middle-class İzmirlis and Kurdish migrants in the urban social life of İzmir. In chapters 7 and 8, I focused on the processes through which the social context of these interactions has been formed. Accordingly, I examined extensively the ways in which the neoliberal transition, the political conflict in Eastern Anatolia and the migration of Kurds into western Turkish cities have transformed urban social life in İzmir and thereby prepared the ground for the formation of exclusive recognition. In this chapter I have shifted my attention to those social factors that have contributed to the perpetuation and reinforcement of exclusive recognition. These factors do not have a major impact on shaping the content of exclusive recognition, but they do play a significant role in increasing its strength and durability. The increase in Kurdish nationalism in the aftermath of the US occupation of Iraq makes it possible for the middle-class İzmirlis to confirm and justify, in the realm of international politics, the images they have derived from the urban life of İzmir. The ethno-political or 'groupist' language that the mainstream media has used increasingly since the US occupation of Iraq, reinforces the tendency of the middle-

class İzmirlis to perceive and construct their social world through eth-
nic categories.

10

EXCLUSIVE RECOGNITION: AN IDEOLOGY

Having examined the structural and historical development of exclusive recognition, in this chapter I will show exclusive recognition to be an 'ideological' form of consciousness. The attempt to discuss exclusive recognition in relation to the Marxist sense of ideology and to demonstrate that it is indeed ideological will serve three purposes: first, it will enable us to treat exclusive recognition as a coherent and systematic 'mode of thinking'. Until now, I have clarified 'what exclusive recognition is' and 'how it occurs' by situating it within a particular structural and historical context. Discussing exclusive recognition in relation to the concept of ideology will enable us to rethink this social phenomenon and deepen our understanding. This discussion will also disclose the 'specificity' of exclusive recognition by differentiating it from non-ideological ways of thinking. In addition, considering exclusive recognition in terms of such a general sociological concept as ideology will allow us to reconstruct it as a particular form of a *general* way of thinking, and hence to render it comparable to other 'ideological' forms of thinking that arise in other societies.

The reason for choosing the Marxist meaning of 'ideology' to deepen the discussion of exclusive recognition is that it reflects two of the critical features of exclusive recognition: a) the materiality of exclusive recognition, which implies that exclusive recognition is bound up with certain material conditions in Turkish society; and b) the partiality and falsity of exclusive recognition, which means that exclusive recognition is the product of false conceptualisations based on a partial view of the social world.

The Materiality of Exclusive Recognition as an Ideology

Ideology, in general terms, refers to general ways of thinking that human subjects deploy to interpret the social world. It also shapes the social practices of human subjects by guiding their actions. In this sense, ideology might seem to be an independent phenomenon that pertains to individual life. Nevertheless, an ideology cannot be grasped as an autonomous social force, and it cannot be thought of in isolation from the material conditions of the social and historical context in which it arises. An ideology necessarily reflects the specific conditions of the historical period in which it occurs, and bears the imprints of the social structure under which it takes place. Marx and Engels first under-scored the material nature of ideology in this way:

> In direct contrast to German philosophy which descends from heaven to earth, here we ascend from earth to heaven. We set out real, active men, and on the basis of their real life-process we demonstrate the development of the ideological reflexes and echoes of this life-process. The phantoms formed in the human brain are also, necessarily, sublimates of their material life-process, which is empirically verifiable and bound to material premises. Morality, religion, metaphysics, all the rest of ideology and their corresponding forms of consciousness, thus no longer retain the semblance of independence… Life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life (Marx and Engels, 1964: 47).

These words could be interpreted as an expression of the crude reduc-tionist and determinist logic of Marxist materialism since they seem to suggest that 'ideology' is nothing more than the simple reflection of material life processes. However, it is important to note that this was written by Marx and Engels as a polemic against the conventional German idealist philosophy that privileged ideas over material condi-tions. Despite its reductionism, the importance of this quote lies in the epistemological rupture it creates with the philosophical tendency to isolate ideas from the influence of material conditions. In other words, here Marx invites us to turn our attention to objective social relations in order to understand the formation and evolution of ideologies. I see this as an important caution against the tendency to dehistoricise ideol-ogy, because 'to conceive of forms of consciousness as autonomous, magically absolved from social determinants, is to decouple them from

history and so convert them into a natural phenomenon' (Eagleton, 1991: 59).

Marx's quest for a materialist understanding of ideology is critical; but it is also important to rethink this materialist understanding in a non-reductionist way. The way an individual thinks about the social world is contingent upon many different factors, and cannot be deduced simply from his/her immediate social relations. Moreover, the objective or material conditions in a society do not directly inject into the minds of people specific ways of thinking and reasoning. They only constitute and determine the *range of possible ideologies or forms of consciousness* that could take place in a given society at a particular time (Lukacs, 1971: 28). In this sense, the realm of ideologies is in constant transformation, because the objective conditions in a society are always subject to change. Indeed, of concern to a sociologist is not why *one* individual thinks differently from another, but why particular ideologies arise in some social and historical contexts but not in others.

Exclusive recognition exhibits materiality precisely in the manner that characterises ideology. Exclusive recognition is 'ideological' because it reflects the material conditions of the social and historical context within which it has arisen. Throughout this study, I have shown that exclusive recognition is a historically specific phenomenon that could emerge only under certain social conditions. Rather than an ineffable antipathy that has long been ingrained in the cognitive world of Turkish people, exclusive recognition is a reaction of the middle-class İzmirlis to the rapid transformation of the urban life of İzmir following the 1980s. As previously stated, this transformation was triggered by three national-level structural factors; namely, the transition to neoliberal capital accumulation, the conflict between the PKK and the Turkish army, and the inflow of Kurds into western Turkish cities. I argue that these three material structural processes are constitutive of exclusive recognition.

Exclusive recognition is material (and hence ideological) also in the sense that its content is shaped largely by the class position of its subjects. In chapters 7 and 8, it was argued that exclusive recognition is generated largely from the space and class relations between middle-class İzmirlis and Kurdish migrants. I argued that it is unlikely that this ideology first *originated* in upper-class or bourgeois gated communities. This is because the isolated space of residence and the specific urban life of these upper-class people mean their encounters with Kurdish migrants in the city are extremely rare or nonexistent. By contrast, fre-

quent contact with Kurds provides the basis for middle-class İzmirlis' inclination to 'recognise' the Kurdishness of migrants and to exclude them through some 'ethnicised' stereotypes and labels. In other words, the difference in the objective conditions of middle-class and upper-class people are reflected in their different constructions of Kurdish migrants.

It is important to avoid the trap of reductionism when interpreting the relationship between exclusive recognition and the class position of the subjects who employ this ideology. As stated above, there is no 'one to one' correspondence between the class location of an individual and the ideology that he/she deploys when negotiating the material world. Accordingly, not all middle-class people in İzmir embrace exclusive recognition. In fact, during my field study, I came across many people who were critical of xenophobic attitudes towards Kurdish migrants and empathised with the latter's past experiences as well as current living conditions in İzmir. Thus, being a middle-class İzmirli is not a sufficient condition for adherence to the ideology of exclusive recognition. Rather, the original content of exclusive recognition as an ideology is generated from the social experiences and interactions of the middle-class people living in İzmir. To the extent that exclusive recognition bears the imprints of the material conditions of the middle class in İzmir, there exists a *tendency and possibility* (rather than a necessity) among middle-class İzmirlis to produce and embrace this ideology.

While I argued that exclusive recognition arises first among the middle-class İzmirlis, it is not limited to middle-class circles. Once constructed, it may be communicated, negotiated and disseminated in urban social life; thereby reaching even those people who do not engage in daily interactions with Kurdish migrants. This is especially the case in a social context where both the state and the mainstream media have historically avoided promoting and propagating an explicitly anti-Kurdish ideology. The longstanding assimilationist state tradition and the consequent non-recognition of the 'Kurd' as a separate ethnic group, render social relations and interactions in urban social life as the predominant producer and reproducer of exclusive recognition. Put differently, in the absence of any 'external' institution such as the state, party or media that impose the ideology of exclusive recognition systematically from the outside, the lived experiences and interactions of people in the city become the major source for constructing and also disseminating exclusive recognition. Accordingly, it is possible to infer that the lack of such an external 'ideological apparatus' that promote

exclusive recognition increases the significance of class location for the propensity of embracing exclusive recognition. If we accept the idea that class location predominantly shapes the practices of individuals, as well as the claim for the primacy of urban social life in the construction of exclusive recognition, we are closer to capturing the class roots of this ideology. It would be much more difficult, for instance, to demonstrate a relationship between the class location of an individual and his/her anti-Armenian or anti-Greek sentiments, because these attitudes are no longer constructed and shaped by social interactions between the 'ordinary people' and Greeks/Armenians. Rather, the Turkish media and state promote and disseminate an overtly anti-Armenian and anti-Greek discourse.

The Partiality and Falsity of Exclusive Recognition as an Ideology

In the longstanding Marxist discussions centred on the concept of ideology, a deep divide has emerged between those who use the concept in a 'pejorative' sense (example: Eagleton, 1991) and those who abandon its pejorative meaning completely and offer a 'neutral' conceptualisation instead (example: Therborn, 1999). The pejorative sense of the concept refers to 'false (distorted, deceptive) thinking', whereas the neutral meaning corresponds basically to the 'justification or promotion of a political system (including all its economic, social and structural aspects)' (Rossi-Landi, 1990: 8-9).

Here, I will contend that the 'falsity' and 'partiality' that are embedded in some Marxist definitions of ideology are helpful for understanding certain fundamental aspects of exclusive recognition. However, the relationship between 'falsity' and 'ideology' should be contemplated carefully. A fruitful analysis of exclusive recognition through the concept of ideology could be possible when the falsity in ideology is seen as something rooted in the material practices of human subjects under certain structural and historical circumstances (Eagleton, 1991: 15). In this sense, ideology is not baseless illusions that emerge autonomously in the cognitive world of individuals. Ideology is something more than 'an epiphenomenal illusion in which idea was a distorted representation of some real "thing"' (McLellan, 1986: 14). In other words, falsity of ideology lies not in an inherent defect in consciousness, but in the objective conditions.

Gyorgy Lukács was an emblematic example of those thinkers who attempted to go beyond the conception of ideology as 'false illusions' in

human consciousness. Lukács looks for the sources of ideological thinking in commodity fetishism, which is one of the historically specific effects of capitalism (1971: 84). Commodity fetishism is a central theme in Marx's *Capital*. Lukács extended Marx's analysis of this phenomenon by placing it in relation to human consciousness. He underscored the idea that because the commodity form pervades every aspect of social life in capitalism, the relations between people start to appear as relations between things. This leads to the fragmentation of the 'wholeness' of the social and material world 'into so many discrete, specialized, technical operations' and prevents people from comprehending the totality of human processes behind the relations between things. Lukács refers to this process as 'reification':

> But in the minds of people in bourgeois society they [commodities] constitute the pure, authentic, unadulterated forms of capital. In them the relations between men that lie hidden in the immediate commodity relation, as well as the relations between men and the objects that should really gratify their needs, have faded to the point where they can be neither recognised nor even perceived. For that very reason the reified mind has come to regard them as the true representatives of his societal existence. The commodity character of the commodity, the abstract, quantitative mode of calculability shows itself here in its purest form: the reified mind necessarily sees it as the form in which its own authentic immediacy becomes manifest and – as reified consciousness – does not even attempt to transcend it. On the contrary, it is concerned to make it permanent by 'scientifically deepening' the laws at work. Just as the capitalist system continuously produces and reproduces itself economically on higher and higher levels, the structure of reification progressively sinks more deeply, more fatefully and more definitively into the consciousness of man (Lukács, 1971: 93).

Therefore, if the consciousness of the human being is endowed with partiality and falsity, the sources of this should be sought in social relationships rather than in a self-evident 'false consciousness' that is ingrained in human subjects itself.

Accordingly, when it is claimed here that exclusive recognition is an ideological position, I intend to imply neither that it is simply a distorting imagery that emerges naturally in the consciousness of middle-class

İzmirlis, nor that it is imposed systematically from an external agent. Throughout the study, I try to show that exclusive recognition arises in the dynamics of urban social life. Exclusive recognition is ideological in the sense that it involves a falsity and partiality that emanates from the social relationships of middle-class İzmirlis. This is to say that the middle-class İzmirlis construct a 'false' image of the 'Kurd' based on their immediate experiences and observations of Kurdish migrants in İzmir.

Exclusive recognition rests on actually existing and real social facts even though it implies 'false' conclusions. This contention is not at odds with the 'pejorative' sense of ideology. An ideological discourse might be 'true in its empirical content but deceptive in its force, or true in its surface meaning but false in its underlying assumptions' (Eagleton, 1991: 17). Therefore, we cannot see 'ideology' in general and exclusive recognition in particular as a collection of false ideas; ideologies can emerge as an amorphous composition of 'true' and 'false' statements. In most cases, the falsity in ideology lies in the 'false theorization' of these 'true' observations and statements. The following example provided by David Hawkes may be useful to clarify this point:

> Today in the USA, statistics show that a disproportionate amount of crime is committed by young black men. This is a 'fact'. Taken in isolation, this fact might well be interpreted as indicating that young black men are predatory and dangerous people, in need of supervision and restraint. This is what Adorno and Horkheimer would regard as 'ideological' thinking. But if this fact is mediated through the totality, if it is interpreted in the context of slavery and segregation, policing tactics and media representation, the education and welfare systems, then one might well read this 'fact' as leading to the opposite conclusion: that young black men are oppressed and victimized people, in need of assistance and opportunity (1996: 139).

As Hawkes points out in the above quote, the accuracy of the information about the immediate manifestations of a social fact does not necessarily prevent falsity and partiality in thinking. When these factual realities are not situated within their structural and historical context; that is, when they are not 'mediated through the totality' they may constitute the basis for false theorisations and obscured forms of consciousness about the social world (Harvey, 1985: 251).

Accordingly, the discursive components of exclusive recognition are

built on certain factual realities that are observed by middle-class İzmirlis: the discourse of 'ignorant Kurds', for instance, rests on the 'true' observation of Kurdish migrants' apparent low level of education and cultural capital. Likewise, the discourse of 'invader Kurds' is grounded in the undeniable increase in the population of 'ethnic Kurds' in the city. The 'falsity' and 'partiality' of exclusive recognition arises when the agents of exclusive recognition do not situate these empirically 'true' observations within their 'structural' and 'historical' context, but interpret them as the distinctive and inherent characteristics of 'Kurdishness'. Echoing Lukács' above-mentioned reference to the relationship between fragmentation of totality in social life and ideology, exclusive recognition arises when middle-class İzmirlis take their observations and experiences of Kurdish migrants in isolation from 'totality'.

This also means that a middle-class person in İzmir can maintain a critical distance from exclusive recognition to the extent that he/she situates the conditions of Kurdish migrants within their historical and structural context. Rather, through various social channels and experiences, they became aware of some parts of social totality that permit them to refuse and criticise exclusive recognition. There might be countless individual reasons for not adopting exclusive recognition, such as living in Eastern Anatolia for a certain period of time, or getting to know a person who would influence their perception of 'Kurd'. Obviously, the examination of these processes and channels would be irrelevant here, because this study does not problematise and analyse the reasons for 'not adopting exclusive recognition', but it brings into focus the social processes whereby some middle-class İzmirlis *tend* to construct and embrace exclusive recognition as an ideology.

11

CONCLUSION: EXCLUSIVE RECOGNITION AS A FORM OF RACISM

'Nationalist', 'fascist', and 'racist' are the predominant concepts used in sociology to designate and qualify the sentiments and processes that construct and qualify ethnic others. In this study, I have avoided the use of such general and 'universal' terms to qualify the anti-Kurdish sentiments of middle-class İzmirlis, for three reasons: firstly, it was necessary to unravel both the social basis and discursive components of exclusive recognition before qualifying and designating it with appropriate terms. This eliminated the risk of using some inappropriate *a priori* concepts that could pave the way for a misleading interpretation of my research findings. Secondly, using such general and universal terms to define the anti-Kurdish sentiments of the middle-class İzmirlis would not be useful for demonstrating the lines of connection between these sentiments and the social conditions that are specific to Turkey. Instead, I preferred to adhere closely to the concept of 'exclusive recognition', which was specific enough to indicate analytically that the anti-Kurdish sentiments of middle-class İzmirlis emerged in the context of the recent socio-economic and political transformation of Turkish society. Thirdly, the primary objective of this research is not to present a conceptual discussion, whereby an appropriate term is found to define anti-Kurdish sentiments of middle-class people in İzmir; rather, it was to shed light on the social context and processes within which Kurdish migrants have been ethnicised. Having fulfilled this objective, it is useful at this stage to briefly discuss exclusive recognition vis-à-vis such general concepts in order to further clarify the characteristics of exclusive recognition. By discerning those abstract and general features of anti-Kurdish sentiments that are evident in other processes of ethnicisation, it is possible

to move to a higher level of abstraction in which exclusive recognition can be compared with some other processes of ethnicisation in other social contexts. These comparisons are, however, beyond the scope of this study. This concluding discussion will be content to provide a preliminary conceptual framework for future comparative studies.

I would first like to focus on the question of whether exclusive recognition is a form of nationalist ideology. It is necessary to briefly examine definitions of nationalism in the sociological literature before considering this issue. The term 'nationalism' is derived from the word 'nation'. Like ethnicity, nation is a social category through which members of a social group construct a sense of 'we-ness' and define the non-members as outsiders. Also, like ethnic identities, national identities can be constructed on the basis of any social commonality that is reproduced continuously in social practices. However, the essential character of the nation, which distinguishes it from the category of ethnicity, is that nations can only be defined according to their relationship to an existing state or a state to be imagined by the members of that nation. Accordingly, nationalism can be defined as an ideology that is based on the following premises: a) people belonging to a nation share a common territory and also some common interests that override the particular interests of individuals belonging to that nation; and b) the state is supposed to represent this nation, engaging in political actions and projects that would protect the sovereignty of the nation and enhance the nation's interests. These two elements appear in various (and sometimes conflicting) definitions of nationalism in the sociological literature. For example, Ernest Gellner states in his seminal work *Nations and Nationalism* that 'nationalism is primarily a political principle that holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent' (1983: 1). Eric Hobsbawm also uses the term in this sense (1992: 9). In the same vein, John Breuilly, another important name in nationalism studies, points out that the protection of national interests and political sovereignty are the most fundamental elements of the ideology of nationalism (1993: 3).

In accordance with these definitions of nationalism, it is possible to contend that exclusive recognition is not *necessarily* a nationalist ideology. The middle-class İzmirlis could 'recognise' and 'exclude' Kurdish migrants as a separate group without addressing the necessity of protecting the interests of the Turkish nation vis-à-vis other nations. This is reaffirmed by the ideas of some interviewees about racism directed towards Turkish immigrants in Germany. Towards the end of the inter-

views I asked study participants for their views on Turkish immigrants living in Germany, who have been exposed to exclusionary discourses that are similar to those in exclusive recognition. While some took a nationalist point of view, expressing an attachment to the Turks living there, and condemning German racists, a considerable number of study participants tended to empathise with the German people and excuse their racist attitudes. The following remarks made by Aysel (57-F) are representative of the latter tendency:

> Germans are right, I think. The people that are going there from here are mostly ignorant and cultureless people. They are going there and they are doing all kinds of dirty things. These people [Germans] have established an order there over many years. Our people are disrupting this order. I would feel in the same way if I were a German.

A nostalgic sympathy towards, and praise of, Jews and Greeks who had lived in İzmir, is another indication of the fact that exclusive recognition is not necessarily coupled with a coherent Turkish nationalism. This shows that there is an 'external and contingent relationship' between nationalism and exclusive recognition. Echoing Margaret Archer's formulation with regard to the 'external and contingent' relationship between social phenomena, it could be said that exclusive recognition and nationalism 'can exist without one another and it is thus neither necessary nor impossible that they stand in particular relation to one another, for the nature of either does not depend on this' (1995: 173).

Externality and contingency also characterise the relationship between exclusive recognition and the ideology of fascism. Fascism, as a political system and an ideology, took its first concrete forms in Germany under Hitler, and in Italy under Mussolini, before the World War II. Therefore, the classical definitions of fascism were crafted in reference to the distinctive features of these two experiments in Western Europe. Since then, fascism has been endowed with various meanings, largely in response to the tendency of left-wing political circles to use these historically tainted concepts to attack their right-wing political adversaries (who were not necessarily fascist in the concept's original sense). This has created ambiguity around the concrete referent of fascism (Griffiths, 2005: 4-7). However, it is still possible to discern some agreed-upon peculiarities of fascist ideology. Like nationalism,

fascist ideology is based on the notion of a homogeneous nation, the interests of which are to be protected by a strong nation-state. However, fascism is more specific than nationalism. It is known that German and Italian fascisms also promote authoritarianism, anti-communism, irredentism, sexism and anti-intellectualism. As I stated in my discussion on nationalism above, exclusive recognition is not necessarily based on the idea of a homogeneous and strong nation whose interests are to be protected by the state. In addition to this, the above-mentioned characteristics of fascism are also not necessary for exclusive recognition to emerge. Stated more clearly, exclusive recognition is not necessarily a form of fascist ideology.

The question of whether exclusive recognition is a form of racism is a more complex one. In its classical sense, racism refers to the theory or practice of excluding and dominating certain groups of people by labelling specific physical and phenotypical traits as indications of biological inferiority. The biological references of classical racism do not exist in exclusive recognition, since it excludes and ethnicises Kurdish migrants based largely on their conditions of living and visible practices in the city without *necessarily* identifying their biological and phenotypical differences. It is true that certain urban elites have recently begun to racialise their hostility towards the migrants by identifying them with specific (and mostly imagined) physical characteristics. It is possible to see manifestations of this tendency in mainstream newspapers and magazines (Sümer, 2003). Nevertheless, this racialised hatred, referred to as 'white Turk discourse' (Arat-Koç, 2007) does not necessarily target the Kurdish migrants who have settled in the large Turkish cities since the mid-1980s. It is also important to note that the racialised discourse of urban elites was not evidenced in the middle-class İzmirlis who I interviewed. This means that the ethnicisation of Kurdish migrants through the ideology of exclusive recognition does not necessarily employ the language of a crude biological racism.

Having said this, it is important to note that racism is always undergoing transformation and that it has developed new forms with the emergence of novel contradictions and struggles in society (Miles, 1989: 41-68). Along with the dissolution of the classical period of colonial rule (as a result of decolonisation movements), and with the subsequent immigration waves from previously colonised regions to the metropolises of advanced capitalist countries, crude biological and scientific racism was transformed into cultural racism, which is also called 'new racism' (Barker, 1981). Cultural racism involves the construction of

immigrant communities as 'inferior others' by identifying them with certain pejorative stereotypes and stigmas that are thought to be their inherent cultural features (Balibar, 1992 24). In terms of substituting 'race' with 'culture' the discourse of cultural racism seems to be different from that of 'scientific' and biological racism of the colonial era (Gilroy, 1987: 60). Exclusive recognition could be seen as a specific form of this 'cultural racist' ideology, in the sense that it also involves the ethnicisation and exclusion of Kurdish migrants on the basis of their imputed fixed differences from the rest of the population. Echoing what is said for cultural racism in general, as the middle class engage in more interactions with Kurdish migrants, they do not 'become necessarily less conscious of group differences but they are far more likely to ascribe group differences to upbringing, customs, forms of socialisation and self-identity than to biological heredity' (Modood, 2001: 40).

Formulating exclusive recognition as a kind of cultural racism invites us to compare it with similar discourses and to interrogate its transnational aspects and dynamics. For example, juxtaposing exclusive recognition with Islamophobia (a recently growing cultural racist ideology in Western European countries), could be meaningful for discerning the common patterns and dynamics of these two discourses that are not unique to the particular social context in which they first arise. In the end, this will provide some insights into possible internationalist strategies for struggling against these different forms of cultural racist ideologies.

The hostility towards *migrants* is neither novel or unique in Turkish society. On the contrary, starting with the large rural–urban migration waves in the 1950s, migrants from various parts of Anatolia have been exposed to several exclusionary and elitist discourses once in the western cities of Turkey. However, 'exclusive recognition' is qualitatively different from these longstanding anti-migrant sentiments. Unlike the previous anti-migrant sentiments, exclusive recognition involves the *ethnicisation* of migrants from Eastern Anatolia on the basis of certain stereotypes and labels. In other words, in exclusive recognition, middle-class İzmirlis identify the migrants as a distinct and homogeneous group, identify them as 'Kurdish' and construct their 'Kurdishness' on the basis of specific pejorative stereotypes. In these respects, exclusive recognition can be seen as a form of cultural racism.

This is not to say that anti-Kurdish sentiments in Turkey are only seen among middle-class people. Nor are they confined only to İzmir.

As stated throughout this book, anti-Kurdish sentiments take different forms in Turkish society, having been exposed in various social contexts such as internet forums, racist magazines, football stadiums, etc. Exclusive recognition is only a specific form of anti-Kurdish sentiment that has recently been on the rise in Turkish society. The reason for choosing this particular form of anti-Kurdish sentiment as an object of inquiry is that it serves as a very convenient vantage point for illuminating some novel dynamics of the Kurdish question as well as the social transformation of Turkish cities since the 1980s. The insights gathered from the close analysis of exclusive recognition would also be useful for grasping the social roots of other forms of anti-Kurdish sentiments and practices, and hence for developing a general perspective towards the increasing popular antagonism towards the Kurds.

Throughout this study, the concept of exclusive recognition has enabled me to indicate the historically specific characteristics of the increasing anti-Kurdish sentiments and to situate these sentiments in the context of the socio-economic and political transformation of Turkish society since the early 1980s. Accordingly, the analysis of exclusive recognition also functions as a vantage point for shedding some light on the general social effects of the transition to a neoliberal economy, the armed conflict in Eastern Anatolia and the consequent migration movement to western Turkish cities.

The examination of exclusive recognition has also provided important insights into the current state of the 'Kurdish question'. In Turkish political and academic discourses the Kurdish question refers to the ongoing political tensions that stem from the problem of the status and political/cultural rights of the Kurds. Until the turn of the twenty first century the conventional academic literature and political discourses typically failed to see the 'Kurdish question' as an ethno-political problem, and reduced it to either a general problem of economic development or an issue of military security. In the late 1990s, however, when Turkey's integration process with the EU gained a new momentum, a liberal approach emerged as a vigorous alternative to the traditional, and official, perception of the Kurds. According to this liberal perspective, it is neither PKK terrorism nor economic underdevelopment but the longstanding assimilationist tradition by the state that is the underlying source of the problem.

This recently strengthening liberal approach seems to fulfil significant missions in terms of challenging the hegemony of the nationalist perception of the Kurdish question. Yet, it fails to recognise and grap-

ple with some new dimensions of this problem. Today the Kurdish question concerns not only the relations between the state and the Kurds, but also the social relationships and living conditions of Kurdish migrants in the cities of western Turkey. The socio-economic and spatial segregation of Kurdish migrants in the urban space, their housing problems and their social exclusion are some of these new dimensions. These new aspects of the problem point to the fact that the Kurdish question has recently gone beyond being merely an extension of the defects in the Turkish political and legal systems. The recognition of the political and cultural rights of the Kurds under a more democratic structure would not necessarily provide an absolute solution to these social and economic problems, even though it could alleviate those existing grievances that stem from the denial of the Kurdish identity in Turkey. The reason for this is that the aforementioned problems that occur in post-migration processes have been constantly reproduced in the dynamics of urban life independent of the political and legal status of 'Kurdish ethnicity' in Turkey.

Today, exclusive recognition can be seen as one of the urban-based new dimensions of the Kurdish question. Rather than being a direct product of the longstanding assimiliationist and authoritarian policies and discourses of the state, it emanates from the social relationships between Kurdish migrants and middle-class İzmirlis in the urban space. These specific social relationships take place in an urban context that has been shaped by a) the neoliberalisation of the Turkish economy; b) the political conflict in Eastern Anatolia; and c) the subsequent Kurdish exodus to Turkish cities. In other words, these three national- and macro-level processes have played a significant role in the formation of a convenient social milieu that has paved the way for the rise of exclusive recognition.

The analysis of exclusive recognition shows that a comprehensive perspective on the Kurdish question also entails the examination of the social impacts of these three national processes on Turkey's western metropolises. Before attempting to present effective solutions to the Kurdish question and proposing policies to encourage fraternity among the peoples living in Turkey, more extensive research and analysis of the social relations of Kurdish migrants is necessary. Such analysis may detect, and conceptualise as problematic, the inequalities of the urban space – because it is the socio-economic and spatial segregation of Kurdish migrants that prepared the ground for the emergence of exclusive recognition. Accordingly, exclusive recognition will continue to be

reproduced in the urban space insofar as such socio-economic conditions and concomitant urban structures persist.

This situation encourages us to envisage and design certain social and political projects to combat the increasing inequalities and social exclusion in Turkish cities. These projects should be designed at the national level and should aim to transform the socio-economic structure of Turkish society in a radical way, because the problem of social inequality and social exclusion in the urban space is bound up with the structural transformations that have taken place since the 1980s. In view of this, short-term and local measures will not adequately address the underlying social dynamics that aggravate these emergent problems. More concretely, any project that would attempt to eliminate increasing exclusionary and antagonistic attitudes towards migrants in Turkish cities needs to take into account and problematise the deep social impacts of neoliberalism, the armed conflict in Eastern Anatolia and involuntary emigration from this region. It seems that the permanent resolution to the Kurdish question, with its new dimensions, would be unthinkable without the development of long-term and radical strategies that would aim to eradicate inequality and exclusion in the urban space.

ENDNOTES

Chapter 1

1   As background information for readers who are not very familiar with the ethnic composition of Turkish society, it is necessary to state that despite having considerably different dialects across Anatolia, Kurds have a common language and this is the most significant characteristic that has enabled them to develop a common and distinct ethnic identity. However, in terms of religion and appearance they cannot be readily distinguished from Turks and other non-Turkish Muslim groups in Turkey.

2   Because the Turkish state does not collect data on ethnicity, it is impossible to provide an up-to-date, reliable figure of the total number of Kurds in Turkey. The approximate numbers provided here are based on the estimates of some sociologists and demographers (Mutlu, 1996; İçduygu *et al.*, 1999; Sirkeci, 2000; Koç *et al.*, 2008).

3   In this book the informal economy refers to 'a process of income generation that is unregulated by the institutions of society, in a legal and social environment in which similiar activities are regulated' (Castells and Portes, 1989: 12).

4   In my Turkish articles I use the term "tanıyarak dışlama" to refer to exclusive recognition (Saraçoğlu, 2007; 2009).

Chapter 2

1   The word 'discourse', here, refers to symbolic and linguistic elements that are used to identify and construct the 'Kurds' in İzmir. More concretely, it refers to the unity of all those stereotypes and labels that were used to distinguish the 'Kurds'.

2   It should be noted here that even though I recognise that literature of 'ethnic and racial studies' may be more *relevant* for some other contexts, I am also

aware of some epistemological and theoretical fallacies that could arise out of these approaches. For example 'reification' of ethnic groups, constructing them as static and homogeneous entities and attributing to them the status of 'categories of analysis' are some problematic tendencies that are likely to emerge when the processes of ethnicisation and racialization are treated as relations between monolithic ethnic and racial groups (Brubaker, 2004). In this book, in the interest of clarifying the subject matter and in order not to lose focus, I would emphasise the *irrelevance* of such an approach to the issue under consideration rather than engaging in a discussion of its epistemological *soundness*.

3   Despite this situation, it is still possible to come across some misleading academic works that situate Kurdish-Turkish relations in Turkey within the framework of so-called 'ethnic conflict between the Turks and the Kurds' (Saatçi, 2002; Moustakis and Chaudhuri, 2005). A study goes so far as to distort the armed conflict between the PKK and the Turkish state as an ethnic war between the 'Kurds' and 'Turks' (Ötücü, 2004).

4   This means that the task of defining the subject of ethnicisation in our case will be fulfilled through 'abstraction'. What I mean by 'abstraction' is the mental process of extracting the most relevant pieces of a complex social whole and, for the sake of analysis, temporarily perceiving them 'as standing apart' (Ollman, 2003: 61). Accordingly, by consciously extracting and highlighting a set of specific characteristics from the narratives offered by interviewees I will reach an 'abstraction' of the subject of ethnicisation.

5   The word 'İzmirli' in Turkish is also used to refer particularly to people who were born in İzmir. But in this context I use the word to denote the people who have lived in the city for a considerable time regardless of their place of birth.

6   These are 'formal' jobs in the sense of being legally recognised and registered.

7   There is a huge literature especially in Western Europe on the conceptualisation of 'social exclusion' (Silver, 1996: p. 106). This term was developed as an alternative to the concept of 'underclass', which has been criticised for carrying certain pejorative connotations (Morris, 1994) and for not conveying the meaning that these sections are indeed excluded by certain structural conditions. Here, I use the term 'social exclusion' in both 'distributional' and 'relational' senses, which means that the term refers to the extreme poverty of the Kurdish migrants as well as their socio-economic exclusion from formal, stable and secure work processes. For the use of this concept in this particular way see (Bhalla and Lapeyre, 2004).

Chapter 3

1   I do not provide the name of these associations here in order to respect the

interviewees' right to privacy.

2 I also tried to find some interviewees through my personal contacts, but this was very difficult as people proved unwilling to talk about this topic to a person that they do not really know.

3 This is not to deny that the perspectives of women and men towards Kurdish migrants differed in certain respects. However, I do not discuss these differences here because I am interested in focusing on the commonalities in their reasoning and discourses for the sake of constructing a typology of anti-Kurdish sentiments among middle-class people in general. The role of gender relations in these differences will be examined in another study and is beyond the scope of this book.

4 As an approach developed by Marxist scholar Lucien Goldmann, genetic structuralism emphasises the necessity of inserting the history and structure of a social reality and of a particular form of social consciousness into its scientific analysis. Accordingly, it asserts that 'the historical aspect of the totality involves the methodological mandate that, in addition to being grasped in its structural context, a phenomenon must be understood as the totality of its moments of change and development, i.e. as 'structuralization' and 'de-structuralization' (Mayrl, 1978: 20).

5 Critical realism and Marxism have many epistemological and ontological principles in common (Ollman, 2003: 173-82). This study uses methods that reflect these common principles.

6 Here 'discourse' refers to symbolic and linguistic expressions of opinions. I do not use the concept in its post-structuralist sense.

Chapter 4

1 It is true that the tensions between these non-Muslim communities and Muslims in Anatolia precede the foundation of the Turkish state. Therefore, it may seem that the negative images of Armenians and Greeks had already existed before the nationalist projects of the Turkish state. However, the history of actual conflict cannot, by itself, explain why such a prejudice still persists today in Turkish society.

2 These systematic attempts by the Turkish state have been assisted largely by the popular media, which plays an integral role in the reproduction and reinforcement of derogatory representations of Greeks and Armenians (Kuyucu, 2005).

3 One can object to these observations by arguing that, during the Ottoman era, the Eastern Anatolian region, where the majority of the Kurds lived, was governed by autonomous political structures headed by 'Kurdish' leaders. It is indeed true that until the sixteenth century the Kurds living in Eastern Anatolia had been subject to the authority of certain principalities (emirates). These

principalities wielded an almost independent political power over these territories thanks to the power vacuum created by the ongoing conflicts between the Ottoman and Iranian Empires (Yeğen, 1996: 217). When the Ottoman Empire managed to reduce the influence of Iranian power in Eastern Anatolia, the rulers of these principalities had to agree to integration with Ottoman rule (Kutlu, 1997: 25). Even after this, the leaders of these principalities enjoyed a certain degree of political autonomy until the early 19th century (Özoğlu, 2004: 59). However, it is important to note that the Ottoman Empire granted autonomy to these emirates not because of the region's ethnic composition, but because of its geographical distance from the capital of the Empire (İstanbul). Indeed, the mountainous nature of the region made centralised control impossible. The functionality of the 'patron-client relation' between the emirates and the imperial power in the Ottomans' struggle against the Iranian challenge was another reason for the special status of the region (Klein, 2007: 147). Moreover, the autonomous emirates in these regions never claimed that they were exercising political power on behalf of the Kurds. Therefore, the relative independence of the Sunni emirates in the region cannot be interpreted as autonomy granted specifically to the Kurdish nation. This was, rather, the consequence of the Ottoman state's strategy of transferring some of its central political power to the local or regional leaders in those regions where the imposition of absolute control was impossible in those years. Indeed, similar strategies, though in different forms, were also employed in such regions as the Balkans, Arabian Peninsula and Egypt. Bearing this in mind, it is misleading to formulate the autonomy of the emirates in the region as an expression of the 'autonomy of the Kurds' or as an extension of the 'Ottoman state's Kurdish policy'. Assessing the issue within the framework of the relationship between the Imperial centre and its peripheral populations seems to better reflect the historical conditions in the region (Somel, 2001: 234).

4   I have to note here that while the *emergence* of these ideological projects occurred in these historical periods, it is not the case that when the one was introduced, the others were abandoned completely. Indeed, it is quite possible to find some historical eras in which all three of these 'patriotic' strategies were in effect, and competing with (or otherwise complementing) one another. Until the end of the Empire, the Ottoman state continued to make use of all these policy modes in varying degrees and emphases (Ahmad, 1993: 39)

5   Ottomanism was not designed specifically to win the consent of different Muslim ethnic groups in the Empire, because at the time there were no *effectively* organised nationalist movements that would act on behalf of any of these groups. However, the unintended (or probably planned) long-term consequence of this project was that it provided the Sunni Muslim ethnic groups of

the Ottoman Empire with a common identity to stand against the seceding Christian minorities. It was true the Muslim intellectual and religious circles were concerned that the idea of 'equality before the law' as proclaimed by Ottomanism might gradually erode the Islamic basis of the Ottoman social establishment (Altunışık and Tür, 2004: 10). Their concerns were to a certain extent alleviated by the idea that Ottomanism was indeed a necessary strategy for revitalising the 'golden years' of the Empire. In the end, Ottomanism turned out to be an overarching identity for Muslim groups including Kurds, Arabs, Albanians, Bosnians and Turks (Klein, 2007: 145).

6   Among the leading intellectuals of the era were Ömer Seyfettin, Ziya Gökalp and Yusuf Akçura, who produced many sociological and artistic works that laid the ideational underpinnings of the Turkish nationalist world-view (Arai, 1992). Although their debates did not reach general public of Anatolia, they played a critical role in forming the fundamental ideological premises of Turkish nationalism and in the flowering of a solid nationalist culture at least in the intellectual and bureaucratic circles (Canefe, 2007: 144). The legacy of this nationalist culture constituted the intellectual basis of the Turkish nationalism of in modern Turkey, as will be shown in the following sections.

7   Despite the persistence of an Islamic discourse used to mobilise the masses in the World War I, the CUP cadres attempted to pursue certain radical reforms that would encourage ethnic consciousness among Turks, and gradually narrow the gap between the world-view of the masses and Turkish nationalist ideals. For example, they established 'the National Library, the National Archive, the National Cinema, the National Music Organization; sports/youth organizations such as the Turkish Force, cultural organizations such as the Turkish Hearth' (Yeğen, 2007a: 124). In the early years of the World War I they also revealed their nationalism, especially with the further centralisation of the government and nationalisation of the domestic economy (Zürcher, 2000: 158; Ahmad, 1993: 44). However, all of these policies were interrupted by the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in the World War I.

8   It is important to note that the Turkish nationalist tendencies of the CUP in the early twentieth century served the purpose of further sharpening and aggravating an already rising hostility towards Armenians, since all Turkish nationalists were clear that Armenians, being neither Muslim nor Turkish, were not a part of 'Turkish nation'. In this sense, in the early twentieth century anti-Armenian sentiments became the common dominator and the *raison d'être* of all Turkish nationalists of the era. The anti-Armenian campaign of the CUP dovetailed with the religious sensitivities of ordinary Muslim people and was perceived by them as a religious, rather than a national, cause (Çağaptay, 2006: 8-9). This is why a great number of Kurds in the eastern zones of Anatolia played an active

role in the Armenian catastrophe in 1915 (Bozarslan, 2003: 171).

9   The exclusion of the Arab territories was related to the fact that most of the Arab sheikhs and emirates opted to support British and French forces against the Ottoman Empire throughout the World War I.

10   Indeed, this situation was related to the strengthening Kurdish nationalist movements in the Middle East. The increasing influence of a Kurdish nationalist organisation called The Society for the Rise of Kurdistan (*Kürdistan Teali Cemiyeti*), during and after the World War I, posed an obstacle to the resistance movement's plans of mobilising the Kurds against the occupation forces (Kutlay, 1997: 149; McDowall, 2000: 123). That the Allied powers, especially Britain, promised political and economic privileges for the Kurds was another factor making it difficult to incorporate the Kurds into the resistance movement (McDowall, 2000: 130). In order to overcome such difficulties and to win the Kurds over to their side, the leadership of the resistance movement not only highlighted the necessity of forming a Muslim front against the 'infidel occupiers', but also reassured the Kurds that their special political and cultural rights would be respected under an independent Muslim administration (Kutlay, 1997: 140).

11   The mass support of the Muslims who emigrated from Balkan and Caucasian regions was particularly important in establishing widespread resistance against the Allied powers. These Muslim communities had a sense of anger and revenge stemming from the mass assaults and deportations they had experienced after the Ottomans had lost the Balkans and Caucasus to 'Christian' powers. With the fresh memories of these bitter experiences, they aspired to an independent Muslim state and embraced the Muslim nationalist cause of the resistance movement.

12   The project of assimilation also involved some state-orchestrated efforts to change the socio-economic and demographic nature of Anatolia so as to create a homogeneous nation-state. The resettlement laws of 1934, which placed some limitations on voluntary migration within the territories of Turkey, can be presented as one of the most striking examples of these attempts (Çağaptay, 2006b: 88). Another tool for accomplishing the 'national cohesion' of Turkey was the implementation of developmentalist economic programmes in Eastern Anatolia that aimed to reduce the economic and social isolation of the Kurdish population. These policies were intended to integrate Eastern Anatolia into the national capitalist economy, and hence facilitate the incorporation of the Kurds into the Turkish nation. This strategy became predominant first in the 1950s (Yeğen, 1999a: 159-61) and reached its zenith in the late 1980s when the Turgut Özal government launched large-scale state-sponsored projects in the region. Besides their economic consequences, these projects also carried the hidden

ideological message that the Turkish state represents and take cares of all regions regardless of their ethnic composition (Çolak, 2005: 138).

13 After a long period of silence since the early 1940s, the Kurdish reaction to the existing regime re-emerged as a secular and left-wing political movement in the mid-1960s (Bozarslan, 2003: 31). These secular and left-wing themes also predominated in the PKK movement in the 1980s and 1990s. The historical reasons for this ideological transformation of Kurdish nationalism are beyond the scope of this study.

14 In the 1999 national elections, MHP surprisingly won 18 per cent of the national vote, and this won the party a place in the coalition government established after the elections. This victory was due largely to the intensification of popular nationalist sentiments with the capture of Abdullah Öcalan (the leader of the PKK) three months before the elections. The performance of the party in its three years in power was extremely disappointing for its supporters because Abdullah Öcalan was not executed as promised before the elections and because the party was seen to be responsible for a severe economic crisis that hit the country in 2001. In the 2002 elections, the party's votes dropped to 8.4per cent and hence it could not pass the 10 per cent threshold necessary to enter the parliament. In the 2007 elections, the MHP, still under the leadership of Devlet Bahçeli, regained a place in the parliament – but this time as an opposition party, when they gained 14.2 per cent of the national vote in the wake of increasing PKK activities and speculation about a cross-border operation in Iraq to destroy the PKK bases.

Chapter 5

1 Original Turkish verses are as follows: '*kalmadı gezmediğimiz yer; Karadeniz'de içinde Lazların; Şarkta Kürtlerin arasında; Kürtlere kuyruklu derler, yalan; Kuyrukları yok; Yalnız çok asi, çok fakir insanlar; zenginleri de var; ama az*'.

2 A detailed examination of these experiences in urban everyday life and their role in the formation of exclusive recognition will be presented in chapters 7 and 8.

3 The community that had been formed originally by the Jews who were expelled from Spain in 1492.

4 In fact, in the literature there are conflicting estimates about the number of Greeks and Muslims in the early twentieth century. This can be seen as a manifestation of the never-ending political debates on the 'historical character' of İzmir (Baykara, 2001: 78). It was the Greek occupation of İzmir in 1919 that first ignited debates about the demographic structure of the city. When Greek forces occupied İzmir after the World War I, the nationalist government in mainland Greece tried to legitimise this move in the international arena with

the claim that İzmir was 'Greek land', with its ancient Greek past as well as its current Greek majority (Karpat, 1985: 5). According to this perspective, it was the Greeks who had the right to determine the destiny of 'their' own city, as they constituted the majority in the city (Housepian, 1971: 37). In contrast, the Turkish nationalist forces in Anatolia tried to prove that İzmir had been an overwhelmingly Turkish/Muslim city and the Greek occupation of İzmir was nothing but the violation of Turkish Muslims' right to self-determination. This issue remained a bone of contention between Greek and Turkish nationalist researchers throughout the 20th century (Umar, 1974: 64-68; Marcus, 1999: 11-29). While the Greek nationalists have viewed the capture by Turkish forces as a massacre committed against Greeks in İzmir, Turkish nationalists have portrayed the same event as 'the liberation day for Izmir, the crowning event' in the resistance movement's 'successful war of deliverance from the occupying Greek and Allied forces' (Kasaba, 2002: 209).

5   Indeed, the Muslimisation of Turkish cities had already been institutionalised with a special protocol signed by the Greek and Turkish governments at the Lausanne Conference of 1923, which authorised the exchange of remaining Greeks living in Turkey for the Muslims living inside the borders of Greece. This protocol led to the expulsion of thousands of Greeks from Turkey and the arrival of numerous Muslim migrants from Greece. İzmir, which still had a relatively large Greek community, was radically altered by this process. In a short period a substantial proportion of İzmir's Orthodox Greek population was replaced by Turkish Muslims. Most newcomers were accommodated in the houses evacuated by the Greeks.

6   Chapter 7 includes a more detailed discussion of the social and economic life of İzmir in the 1960s and 1970s.

Chapter 6

1   The phrase 'Eastern Anatolia', in this study, consists of 14 eastern provinces with the highest rates of out-migration to western Turkish cities (HÜNEE, 2005). These 14 provinces are Hakkari, Şırnak, Mardin, Diyarbakır, Van, Batman, Siirt, Bitlis, Adıyaman, Elazığ, Bingöl, Muş, Ağrı and Tunceli. These are also the cities where the Kurds comprise a clear majority of the population, with the only exceptions being Adıyaman and Elazığ (where the Kurds make up almost half of the population) (Mutlu, 1996: 526-27). Figure 6.1 shows the geographical location of these provinces.

2   This strategy of economic development is also known as 'import substitution industrialisation' or 'inward oriented capital accumulation'. Indeed, this project was first adopted in the mid-1930s but never adequately implemented until the early 1960s (Aydın, 2005: 35).

3   Indeed, internal migration took place throughout the 1950s as well. However, the migration wave in the 1950s was due to the mechanisation of agriculture and consequent unemployment in rural areas rather than to increasing job opportunities in cities (Doğan, 2002: 139).

4   The logic behind this policy was that the higher interest rates would encourage workers to save their money in banks, which could then lend it out to private capital for further investment. By encouraging workers to keep their money in the banks, the higher interest rates would also reduce internal demand and hence encourage private capital owners to export their products. As a result, it was expected that the economy would grow on the basis of exports made by private companies. One can easily see that the logic behind the circuit of capital accumulation here is the exact opposite of that had adopted under the ISI model of the 1960s and 1970s, in which economic growth was accomplished through investing, producing and marketing inside the borders of the country (Ercan, 2002: 24).

5   Zülküf Aydın explains the connection between the decline in manufacture industry and high interest rates as follows: 'Additionally, the impact of high interest rates has been very negative on manufacturing industry, as the price of capital borrowings increased to unmanageable proportions. A number of small firms went bankrupt and the tendency towards monopolisation speeded up. Some measures were introduced to offset the negative consequences of high interest rates and they included tax exemptions and encouragement premiums offered to business people. The reaction of industry to high interest rates is very interesting. Instead of investing in new technology, which would have improved the competitiveness of industry, the manufacturing sector preferred to invest in order to improve their unused capacity. In the period since 1980, most investments have been made in tourism, housing and small-scale manufacturing industry. Consequently, investments in industries with a capacity to compete in the world market have been extremely limited' (Aydın, 2005: 45).

6   Another dimension of this issue is that while wages and employment rates have either declined or stagnated in many sectors, the productivity of labour increased continuously because of advancements in production techniques over the same period, as well as the extension of working hours. Between 2000 and 2005, for instance, the real wages of a worker in private manufacturing dropped by 11.6per cent, whereas the average productivity per worker increased by 30per cent (Bağımsız Sosyal Bilimciler, 2007: 52). This means that the surplus value or the profits appropriated by the owners of capital in the processes of production have grown and the overall rate of exploitation has increased tremendously. This is another element of neoliberalism that exacerbates existing economic inequalities.

7 As a result of the devaluation of the Turkish lira in the fluctuating exchange rates, US$1 was equal to 1,161,000 Turkish liras in April 2001, while it had been around 650,000 in January 2001 (Kepenek and Yentürk, 2007: 586-87).

8 Indeed it is true that in contrast with Iraq the Kurdish landlords in Turkey had since the early years of the Turkish Republic fulfilled important roles in establishing and restoring authority in the region and, in this respect, functioned as the intermediaries of the Turkish state. Insofar as they helped the state to control the region, these landlords were rewarded with important positions in Turkish politics and bureaucracy (Bruinessen, 2005: 23).

9 The 10per cent country-level threshold is still compulsory for political parties in Turkey. The details of this rule and the tactics that small parties have followed to overcome it can be explained as follows: 'the Turkish electoral system has a 10per cent national threshold provision. The additional district-level thresholds were ruled unconstitutional by the Turkish Constitutional Court in 1995. The electoral system favors the higher vote getter at the expense of the lower. The Political Parties Law, on the other hand, does not allow for political parties to form electoral alliances. These constraints have led parties to look for ways of getting around them to place their representatives in the parliament. One way that has been found for a party that has some support but is not expected to achieve the threshold, is to negotiate with a more promising ideological relative (even if distant) for a number of eligible positions in return for instructing their voters to support the latter during the elections. If an agreement is reached, then the individuals who the small party wants to offer as candidates resign from their party and become members of the party with whom the agreement has been made. It is expected that the votes such a formula brings will not only generate some seats for the small party which otherwise would not have had anyone elected under its own name, but it will also bring in additional seats for the bigger party. After the elections, the members of the small party will return to their home base, but having achieved parliamentary representation. This formula was first tried in the 1991 elections by the SHP when it cooperated with HEP (People's Labour Party), representing Kurdish ethnic nationalism' (Turan et al., 2005: para 33).

10 For an extreme example of these misleading interpretation see Ötücü, 2004.

11 Zucconi presents a detailed examination of different aspects of economic impoverishment in Eastern Anatolia as follows: 'Data from the mid-1990s indicate a ratio of people to health staff-person double in the Southeast with respect to the rest of the country (and triple when compared with the Marmara region). In the same period, literacy rates were 84.6 per cent in the Aegean and Marmara regions and 58.3 per cent in the Southeast. The combined enrollment (ratio of students in primary, secondary and tertiary school to the population

between ages 7 and 21) was respectively 61.6 and 38.8 per cent. In the United Nations Development Project's grading, based on a 'human development index' (HDI, the arithmetic average of three indexes, namely life expectancy, literacy rate plus combined enrollment ratios, and adjusted income), nine of the ten provinces with a majority of Kurdish population are among the last eleven positions of Turkey's 76 provinces . The province of Diyarbakir occupies a better position (56th) because it includes the largest urban centre in the entire region' (1999: 11).

12 The category of 'security reasons' involve '(a) people leaving their villages because of the collapse of animal husbandry and agriculture as a result of the ban on the use of pastures and as a result of PKK pressure, intensifying military operations and armed clashes; (b) the PKK's eviction of people from certain villages and hamlets who agreed to become 'village guards', locally-recruited civilians armed and paid by the state to oppose the PKK; (c) the security forces' eviction of villagers who refused to become village guards or who were thought to aid the PKK, and evacuation of villages where security could not be provided' (Kurban et al., 2006: 13).

13 Ankara can be considered an exception to this since the rate of Kurdish migrants to the total population has remained far lower in this city than that in other nine cities. See Table 6.1 for more information.

14 Given the fact that the 14 eastern provinces under consideration have not been exposed to an inflow of non-Kurdish immigrants throughout the history of the Turkish Republic, I have assumed that the ratio that Servet Mutlu determines for these 14 provinces has remained constant in the last 20 years. In fact, this assumption is also verified by Servet Mutlu's estimates, which show that the ratios of the Kurds in these provinces were relatively stable from 1965 to 1990.

15 By urban zone I mean the metroopolitan area of these cities. Accordingly towns and viilages that do not belong to the metropolitan area are excluded.

16 Based on the fact that these cities (especially Mersin and İzmir) did not have large Kurdish-speaking populations before 1980 (Mutlu, 1996), one can surmise that a great majority of Kurdish migrants in these cities arrived after 1980. However, Adana may be seen as an exception to this situation, because this city also received a significant influx of Kurdish migrants between 1950 and 1980. Nevertheless, with the limited data in hand, it is difficult to present exact numbers in regard to the migrants that came to these cities since the early 1980s.

Chapter 7

1 The true identity of the interviewees is not revealed in order to respect their rights to privacy. Celal, in this example, indicates the pseudonym attached to this interviewee, 57 is his age and 'M' refers to 'Male' (for 'Female', I will use

'F').

2   A city in Central Anatolia that is populated mostly by Turks.

3   A city in the Black Sea region of Turkey.

4   A heterodox and liberal interpretation of Islam and a belief system that is typical to Anatolia. Its followers are estimated to comprise 15-25 per cent of the Turkish population.

5   See Chapter 6 for a discussion on some demographic findings of this research.

6   See previous chapter for a detailed discussion of the reasons for the de-industrialisation of Turkish cities and the decline in wages.

7   As stated in the previous chapter, with the transition to a neoliberal economy in Turkey, the integration with the global markets and the inflow of foreign capital and investment have been the predominant instruments of capital accumulation used at the expense of state-sponsored domestic industrial production. In this process, İstanbul, which has provided the most profitable opportunities for both national and international capital, became a magnet for financial investments (Sönmez, 1998: 79). Therefore, the onset of the neoliberal period in Turkey marked the further concentration of capital and investments in İstanbul and a progressive decline in İzmir's share in the gross national product.

8   The employment opportunities in the tourism sector were particularly important in encouraging Kurdish migrants to choose İzmir as a destination of migration (Beeley, 2002: 43).

9   Except for those who shared the urban rent with capitalists thanks to the location of their gecekondu houses.

10 For a discussion on the reasons for this see the previous chapter.

11 As explained in Chapter 5, the history of the spatial separation between the rich and poor sections of İzmir's population can be traced back to the 16th century, when the city began to be transformed into an important trade centre in the Mediterranean.

12 The 'spatial segregation' of Kurdish migrants in various western Turkish cities contrasts with the expectations of some 'liberal' commentators who naively predicted that migration into 'modern' western cities would integrate the Kurds with the larger Turkish population (Akyol, 2006: 217).

13 In fact, settling in the central city areas in an attempt to reduce the cost of obtaining access to jobs has been a ubiquitous strategy of the poor in all other capitalist social contexts (Harvey, 1973: 61).

14 I obtained this information from the interviews that I conducted with the muhtars (locally elected heads) of Kadifekale and İmariye neighbourhoods.

15 The middle-class respondents in my interviews were selected from people living in Konak, Karşıyaka and Buca, because these districts have been exposed

to the highest rates of immigration in the past 20 years (Ünverdi, 2001: 184).

16   The price of petrol in Turkey is considerably higher than in many other coun-
tries and therefore using private cars for travelling within or across cities places
a serious economic burden on workers.

17   The reasons for this decline were discussed in the previous chapter.

18   By using the concept of habitus, I do not mean that all Kurdish migrants organ-
ise their everyday lives in the exactly same manner. Here, I would like to rather
underscore the difference between the social life of Kurdish migrants and that
of middle-class İzmirlis. In fact, it seems that Bourdieu already uses this con-
cept to highlight the 'difference' across socio-economic groups rather than
'similarity' within the same class. The following quote indicates this point clear-
ly: 'Therefore sociology treats as identical all biological individuals, who being
the product of the same objective conditions are the supports of the same habi-
tus: social class, understood as a system of objective determinations, must be
brought into relation not with the individual or with the "class" as a popula-
tion, i.e. as an aggregate of enumerable measurable, biological individuals, but
with the class habitus, the system of dispositions (partially) common to all
products of the same structures. Though it is impossible for all members of the
same class (or even two of them) to have had the same experiences, in the same
order, it is certain that each member of the same class is more likely than any
member of another class to have been confronted with the situations most fre-
quent for the members of that class' (Bourdieu, 1977: 85).

19   It is important to note here that 'having a lot of children' is not only an aspect
of the reproduction of rural family life but also a strategy of increasing the rev-
enues of a household. This will be discussed in the next chapter.

Chapter 8

1   The decline in the socio-economic status of the middle classes and the intensi-
fication of their concerns about the precarious future of their children is also
found in other countries that have gone through neoliberal transformation
(Body-Gendrot, 2008: 6). The consequent discontent of these middle classes
has taken different political forms depending on the specific conditions of each
social context (Kagarlitski, 2006: 6-7).

2   In English 'gün' literally means 'day'. But here it refers to a specific form of
gatherings and meetings that are typically organised by middle-class women's
peer groups.

3   See Chapter 10 for some theoretical elaborations on the notion of 'partiality' of
knowledge and idea.

4   Mafia here refers to a 'complex web including the underground economy, drug
and weapon trafficking, as well as a widespread praxis of racketeering, requir-

ing blacklisting and killings' (Bozarslan, 2004: 87).

5   In the discourse of middle-class İzmirlis the word 'ignorant' (cahil) and the word 'cultureless' (kültürsüz) are generally used together and interchangeably. In Turkish these two words are also closely related.

6   There are some commonly used proverbs and sayings in Turkish that reflect the nature of the word. Some of them are 'Do not travel with ignorant, or get ready for a lot of troubles' ('Cahil ile çıkma yola, getirir başına bir sürü bela'); 'the one who talks to ignorant turns out to be ignorant in the end' ('Cahil ile konuşan cahil olur'); 'The enmity of the erudite is preferable to the friendship of ignorant' ('Alimin düşmanlığı cahilin dostluğuna yeğdir'). The exclusionary and pejorative meaning of the word 'ignorant' can be seen in these commonly used sayings.

7   The private minibuses that provide cheap transport in the city.

8   These Kurdish tourism workers generally work in the summer season without any social security and receive very low wages – even lower than the minimum wage. In the absence of industrial growth, tourism became one of the most important sectors of capital accumulation and economic growth in the neoliberal period in Turkey. In order to ensure the growth and profitability of this sector, the authorities generally overlook the legal rules and regulations pertaining to the use of labour, and pass over the informalisation of the work process, the use of child labour and extremely high rates of exploitation. It is through the use of cheap labour that the tourism companies in Turkey can provide cheap prices to foreign tourists and encourage them to visit Turkey.

9   Some recent research and articles on Turkish nationalism and racism underscore the importance of these marginal institutions in the emergence of an anti-Kurdish discourse. For some examples of these works, see Esen, 2007; Aktan, 2007; Saç, 2007. I do not deny the importance of conducting a content analysis of the racism revealed in these journals and websites. Nevertheless, seeing these media as the sole research object and exaggerating their importance prevents these researchers from seeing the primacy and significance of urban social life processes in the production of many stereotypes and labels that are attached to the Kurds. Everyday life processes in western Turkish cities have been influenced by national-level structural dynamics in the past two decades or so, and their effects need to be examined with regard to the emergence of anti-Kurdish sentiments in Turkish society.

10   The idea that the Kurds want to invade western Turkish cities has also been propagated openly by some racist associations in İzmir. In 2006, the 'Association of Turkist-Socialist Nation' (Türkçü Toplumcu Budun Derneği) launched a petition campaign under the slogan 'Stop Kurdish Population Increase', and asked for signatures from people in Alsancak, one of the central

areas of İzmir. The following was written in the pamphlet they prepared for this campaign: 'Turkish man and woman! Have one more child for Turkishness. This is necessary because you are shrinking in number, while the betrayers, robbers and drug dealers are growing. We are Turkish Socialist Nationalists who will give to the Kurdish and Gypsy gangs the response that they deserve.' The campaign of this racist association did not last long because the Association of Contemporary Lawyers in İzmir, a progressive civil-society organisation, filed a lawsuit against the association for inciting hatred against a particular segment of society. The association was unable to gain significant support from the people of İzmir and remained a marginalised racist association. This is also evidenced by the fact that none of the respondents in my in-depth interviews reported any awareness of this association or its activities.

11 According to Servet Mutlu's estimates, in 1990 the 'ethnic Kurds' in İzmir constituted only 6.91 per cent of the total population. In Chapter 6 I showed that in 2000 'Kurdish migrants' made up 5.6per cent of the total population of İzmir (Mutlu, 2002: 527). These numbers point to the fact that although the Kurdish population has increased significantly in the last two decades or so, the middle-class concern that the Kurds will soon comprise the majority in the western cities is a gross exaggeration.

12 A district in İzmir where the Kurdish migrants were concentrated.

13 The media portrayal of the Newroz demonstrations in some other western Turkish cities as well as in İzmir also played some role in the reinforcement of the notion that the Kurds are separatists. The interviews showed that the incidents that occurred after the Newroz celebrations in Mersin in 2005 had a great influence in shaping the middle-class İzmirlis' perception of the Kurds. That year two Kurdish children of 11 or 12 attempted to burn a Turkish flag just after the celebrations. The mainstream Turkish media repeatedly presented this incident as an act of defiance to the Turkish flag, which has always been sanctified and exalted by conventional Turkish nationalism. The repeated display of the images of this incident in the mainstream media ignited widespread anger among Turkish people against the PKK and the DTP. In the interviews, when justifying their construction of the Kurds as separatists, most of the middle-class İzmirlis mentioned this incident as well as their own experiences in the everyday life of İzmir.

14 It is important to note here that the PKK is not the only political organisation that mobilises Kurdish nationalism in western Turkish cities. I do not deny the active role that the legal pro-Kurdish party, Democratic Society Party (DTP) has played in the mobilisation of the Kurds in these cities. On the contrary, DTP has been the main legal political instrument that the Kurds use to raise their political and social demands in western cities in general and in İzmir in

particular. However, because the DTP has functioned, until recently, as a polit-ical organisation that has transmitted the discourses and policies of the PKK to the legal political sphere and has not hesitated to show its respect to the per-sonality cult of Abdullah Öcalan, it has been perceived by the Turkish public as the legal extension of the PKK.

15   These are the districts where Kurdish migrants are concentrated.

16   Kazım Koyuncu, a famous pop and rock singer who composed songs in Laz, Georgian and Megrel and died of cancer in 2005 at the age of 34, is used by some respondents as an example of how they enjoy the songs of other ethnic languages.

17   The counterpart of this word in English is 'macho'. In fact this is a Kurdish word and its literal meaning in Kurdish is 'boy'. When using this word, the peo-ple in Turkey are generally unconscious or unaware of the fact that it is a Kurdish word.

18   This is an idiom used in Turkish to emphasise the cosmopolitan and heteroge-neous nature of a place.

19   A socialist folk singer who was very popular in the 1960s and 1970s.

20   This does not mean that the younger respondents are exempt from this dis-course. It seems likely that the younger interviewees constructed this romanti-cism upon what they heard from their older relatives.

21   A romanticised view of the non-Muslim people who used to live in İzmir can also be detected in some journalistic as well as academic texts (Örs, 2001: 110). For a comprehensive analysis of journalistic expressions of this tendency see Bali, 2002: 142.

22   Some of my respondents tended to present their sympathy towards the non-Muslim minorities as proof of the fact they are not racist. They stated that their reaction to the Kurds does not make them racist because they can have sym-pathy towards other ethnic groups. They were implying that as their reaction concerns the Kurds exclusively, the problem was not their discourse but the Kurds themselves.

23   At this point it is critical to note that, in addition to these general objective con-ditions that are endemic in all neoliberal social contexts, some factors that are specific to Turkey should be taken into consideration for a comprehensive understanding of the higher crime rates among Kurdish migrants vis-à-vis other segments of İzmir's population. For example, the traumatic experiences of the armed conflict between the PKK and the Turkish security are of critical importance for understanding the socio-psychological environment that gives rise to crime. The historical experiences and current conditions of Kurdish migrants who suffered from forced migration are particularly important. There is no comprehensive sociological study on urban crime among the Kurdish

migrants and this makes it difficult to obtain details of the social, historical and psychological dimensions of this issue.

24   A similar exclusionary discourse that stigmatises poor immigrants and minorities as the source of crime is on the rise in the cities of some other countries that underwent a neoliberal transformation (Gough et al., 2006; Wilson, 1996: 191).

Chapter 9

1   *Hürriyet*, 4 December 2007.
2   *Hürriyet*, 20 September 2007.
3   *Hürriyet*, 15 August 2007.
4   *Hürriyet*, Ertuğrul Özkök, 15 November 2006.
5   *Sabah*, 29 July 2007.
6   *Sabah*, 23 November 2005

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INDEX