PALGRAVE STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

Protest, Popular Culture and Tradition in Modern and Contemporary Western Europe

Edited by
Ilaria Favretto, Xabier Itçaina

Palgrave Studies in the History of Social Movements

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Around the world, social movements have become legitimate, yet contested, actors in local, national and global politics and civil society, yet we still know relatively little about their longer histories and the trajectories of their development. This series seeks to promote innovative historical research on the history of social movements in the modern period since around 1750. We bring together conceptually-informed studies that analyse labour movements, new social movements and other forms of protest from early modernity to the present. We conceive of 'social movements' in the broadest possible sense, encompassing social formations that lie between formal organisations and mere protest events. We also offer a home for studies that systematically explore the political, social, economic and cultural conditions in which social movements can emerge. We are especially interested in transnational and global perspectives on the history of social movements, and in studies that engage critically and creatively with political, social and sociological theories in order to make historically grounded arguments about social movements. This new series seeks to offer innovative historical work on social movements, while also helping to historicise the concept of 'social movement'. It hopes to revitalise the conversation between historians and historical sociologists in analysing what Charles Tilly has called the 'dynamics of contention'.

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Protest, Popular Culture and Tradition in Modern and Contemporary Western Europe

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"This sparkling volume renews our understanding of the character of popular protest, from left to right, across modern Europe. The carnivalesque, charivari, and other performative genres are drawn from the local past to try to overturn present injustice. Kudos to Ilaria Favretto and Xabier Itçaina for bringing together these essays, whose drama deepens our vision of political movements and their possibilities, even in our own day."

—Natalie Zemon Davis, University of Toronto, Canada

"This finely crafted and very important edited volume by Ilaria Favretto and Xabier Itçaina returns to the classic concerns of the New Social History of the middle and late twentieth century but with the advantage of employing the insights gained by a half century of New Social Movement theory, practice and studies. Thus the charivari and other so-called early modern and early industrial social phenomena never died. They are present in the industrial struggles of 1970s of Italy and indeed in the Alter-Globalisation, Occupy and Square movements of the early twenty-first century. In a series of invigorating chapters, this volume proclaims that the division between the pre-modern, modern and contemporary supply too much heat but not much light. Read and enjoy."

—Professor Carl Levy, Goldsmiths, University of London, UK

"The history of social movements has taught us how in the nineteenth century trade unions and progressive parties, wanting to rationalize and impose order on popular dissent, waged war on the insults, satire, rowdiness and carnivalesque behaviours that had been rooted in popular tradition. These practices seemed relegated to the margins of protest action. However, the contributors to this volume describe the reinvention of an armoury of sedition, placing great emphasis on ridicule. This nuanced and rigorous enquiry into the resurgence of burlesque forms of protest makes for enthralling reading."

—François Ploux, Université de Bretagne-Sud, France

Series Editors' Preface

Around the world, social movements have become legitimate, yet contested, actors in local, national and global politics and civil society, yet we still know relatively little about their longer histories and the trajectories of their development. Our series reacts to what can be described as a recent boom in the history of social movements. We can observe a development from the crisis of labour history in the 1980s to the boom in research on social movements in the 2000s. The rise of historical interests in the development of civil society and the role of strong civil societies as well as non-governmental organizations in stabilizing democratically constituted polities has strengthened the interest in social movements as a constituent element of civil societies.

In different parts of the world, social movements continue to have a strong influence on contemporary politics. In Latin America, trade unions, labour parties and various left-of-centre civil society organizations have succeeded in supporting left-of-centre governments. In Europe, peace movements, ecological movements and alliances intent on campaigning against poverty and racial discrimination and discrimination on the basis of gender and sexual orientation have been able to set important political agendas for decades. In other parts of the world, including Africa, India and South East Asia, social movements have played a significant role in various forms of community building and community politics. The contemporary political relevance of social movements has undoubtedly contributed to a growing historical interest in the topic.

Contemporary historians are not only beginning to historicize these relatively recent political developments; they are also trying to relate them

to a longer history of social movements, including traditional labour organizations, such as working-class parties and trade unions. In the *longue durée*, we recognise that social movements are by no means a recent phenomenon and are not even an exclusively modern phenomenon, although we realize that the onset of modernity emanating from Europe and North America across the wider world from the eighteenth century onwards marks an important departure point for the development of civil societies and social movements.

In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the dominance of national history over all other forms of history writing led to a thorough nationalization of the historical sciences. Hence social movements have been examined traditionally within the framework of the nation-state. Only during the last two decades have historians begun to question the validity of such methodological nationalism and to explore the development of social movements in comparative, connective and transnational perspective, taking into account processes of transfer, reception and adaptation. Whilst our book series does not preclude work that is still being carried out within national frameworks (for, clearly, there is a place for such studies, given the historical importance of the nation-state in history), it hopes to encourage comparative and transnational histories on social movements.

At the same time as historians have begun to research the history of those movements, a range of social theorists, from Jürgen Habermas to Pierre Bourdieu and from Slavoj Žižek to Alain Badiou as well as Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe to Miguel Abensour, to name but a few, have attempted to provide philosophical-cum-theoretical frameworks in which to place and contextualize the development of social movements. History has arguably been the most empirical of all the social and human sciences, but it will be necessary for historians to explore further to what extent these social theories can be helpful in guiding and framing the empirical work of the historian in making sense of the historical development of social movements. Hence the current series is also hoping to make a contribution to the ongoing dialogue between social theory and the history of social movements.

This series seeks to promote innovative historical research on the history of social movements in the modern period since around 1750. We bring together conceptually informed studies that analyse labour movements, new social movements and other forms of protest from early modernity to the present. With this series, we seek to revive, within the context of historiographical developments since the 1970s, a conversation between

historians on the one hand and sociologists, anthropologists and political scientists on the other.

Unlike most of the concepts and theories developed by social scientists, we do not see social movements as directly linked, a priori, to processes of social and cultural change and therefore do not adhere to a view that distinguishes between old (labour) and new (middle-class) social movements. Instead, we want to establish the concept 'social movement' as a heuristic device that allows historians of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to investigate social and political protests in novel settings. Our aim is to historicize notions of social and political activism in order to highlight different notions of political and social protest on both left and right.

Hence, we conceive of 'social movements' in the broadest possible sense, encompassing social formations that lie between formal organizations and mere protest events. But we also include processes of social and cultural change more generally in our understanding of social movements: this goes back to nineteenth-century understandings of 'social movement' as processes of social and cultural change more generally. We also offer a home for studies that systematically explore the political, social, economic and cultural conditions in which social movements can emerge. We are especially interested in transnational and global perspectives on the history of social movements, and in studies that engage critically and creatively with political, social and sociological theories in order to make historically grounded arguments about social movements. In short, this series seeks to offer innovative historical work on social movements, while also helping to historicize the concept of 'social movement'. It also hopes to revitalize the conversation between historians and historical sociologists in analysing what Charles Tilly has called the 'dynamics of contention'.

Protest, Popular Culture and Tradition in Modern and Contemporary Western Europe, edited by Ilaria Favretto and Xabier Itçaina, examines the varying uses of popular culture in a diverse range of protest cultures of West European social movements in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It thereby continues an older tradition associated with the works of pioneering social and cultural historians of the 1960s and 1970s, such as E.P. Thompson, Jacques LeGoff and Robert Darnton as well as, more recently, Sid Tarrow, Charles Tilly and Donatella della Porta. The contributions in this current volume underline the strong continuities between older repertoires of protests around popular cultures and more recent ones, thereby throwing into doubt a stark distinction between pre-modern and modern repertoires of protest. Modern industrial and urban protests

often drew on pre-modern forms of protest based on popular culture. Traditional rituals and folk culture inspired many forms of modern protest, be it during strikes, parliamentary protests or full-blown revolutions.

In the current volume we learn about popular protests in the German Lander during the first half of the nineteenth century and their reliance on forms of popular culture setting patterns that continued well into the period of the First World War. We also hear about the presence of the older charivari traditions in the Italian 1876 elections, and indeed, in the twentieth century, in the left-wing protests of the 1960s and 1970s. Italy was by no means the only country where an older charivari and carnival tradition of protest survived, as is shown here in relation to Basque social protests in France during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as well as in relation to the Global Justice Movement of the twenty-first century and its protracted use of carnivalesque elements in their social protest repertoires. Furthermore the volume examines the presence of older peasant traditions of popular protests in the Irish war of independence between 1918 and 1921, the importance of fairground rioting against the Swedish state's temperance policy in the nineteenth century, and the intimate relationship of Italian anarchists to popular culture and their successful mobilization of aspects thereof in their political campaigns. Continuities between older and newer forms of using popular culture in social protests are examined vis-à-vis the Portuguese tax riots of the nineteenth century and the anti-Communist riots of 1975.

The politicization of rituals and folk culture was often an important precondition of turning popular culture into an important element of in modern protest cultures. The strategy of using popular culture was most effective where the state tended to be weak, for here mobilization through political culture proved an important push factor for political demands. Identities of protest groups could be forged through popular culture which showed a particular penchant for providing emotional support and thereby tying members of the same protest group firmly together. Yet protesters tended to use popular culture in a selective and tactical fashion and rarely bought into existing repertoires of popular culture tout court. Instead they used sanitized and rationalized versions of popular culture that fitted their particular identity building or other strategic aims. The search for respectability often militated against the wholesale endorsement of the rougher edges of popular culture.

As the editors of this volume rightly point out, popular protest repertoires can be adopted by different protest movements, even opposing

ones at times. The multidirectionality of using popular culture for social protest also means that it can and has been mobilized by both the political right and the political left. Popular culture is indeed often a resource for the subaltern classes that is directed against those in power, but whether this turn against the powerful happens in the name of the political right or the political left (and, with some populist movements in history it has indeed been difficult to locate them squarely on a left–right dichotomy) depends on specific space and time constellations. Overall, the contributions in this volume are a powerful reminder of how fruitful it is for social movement scholars to explore the multi-faceted interaction between social movements and popular culture. A cultural history of social protest is certainly still, to a large extent, underexplored.

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This volume has its origins in a workshop entitled *Popular Culture and Protest Repertoires in Twentieth-Century Europe* that we organized on 27–28 May 2013 at the European University Institute (EUI) in Florence. At that point we had both been immersed for some time in research projects examining popular culture and protest, and felt the need to bring together scholars who shared our appetite for a better understanding of the persisting use within modern collective action of rituals and practices deemed 'pre-industrial'. We would like to thank the EUI and the Centre on Social Movement Studies (COSMOS) for hosting this event. Although their contributions could not be included here, this volume greatly benefitted from the research work and contributions of Lionel Arnaud, Lorenzo Bosi, Helge Hiram Jensen, Aitzpea Leizaola, Arkaitz Letamendia, Gary Marx, Nikos Vafeas, Tuomas Ylä-Anttila and Dorothy Zinn. Our special thanks go to Donatella della Porta, Director of COSMOS, both for her continued support for this project and for her insightful contributions during the workshop, which she later kindly agreed to put in writing in

her afterword to this volume. We are also grateful to Adele Battistini for helping us with the organization of the seminar.

Stuart Oglethorpe played a decisive role in improving the style and the clarity of most of the chapters written by non-native English speakers. Armelle Jézéquel of the Centre Emile Durkheim-Sciences Po Bordeaux helped us to bring the final manuscript together. Special thanks also go to Enrico Scuro, Matthew Dutton and Gaizka Iroz for generously giving us permission to publish some of their photographic work, on youth protest in 1970s Italy, the G8 Summit protests in July 2005 and Basque cavalcades respectively.

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Ilaria Favretto and Xabier Itçaina

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Donatella della Porta is Professor of Political Science and Dean of the Institute of Humanities and Social Sciences at the Scuola Normale Superiore (Florence), where she directs the Center on Social Movement Studies (Cosmos). She directs a major ERC project Mobilizing for Democracy, on civil society participation in democratization processes in Europe, the Middle East, Asia and Latin America. Among her very recent publications are: *Social Movements in Times of Austerity* (2014); *Methodological Practices in Social Movement Research* (2014); *Spreading Protest* (2014, with A. Mattoni); *Participatory Democracy in Southern Europe* (2014, with J. Font and Y. Sintomer); *Mobilizing for Democracy* (2014); *Can Democracy be Saved?* (2013); *Clandestine Political Violence* (ed. with D. Snow, B. Klandermans and D. McAdam, 2013); *Blackwell Encyclopedia on Social and Political Movements* (2013); *Mobilizing on the Extreme Right* (2012, with M. Caiani and C. Wagemann); *Meeting Democracy* (with D. Rucht, 2012); *The Hidden Order of Corruption* (with A. Vannucci, 2012). In 2011, she was the recipient of the Mattei Dogan Prize for distinguished achievements in the field of political sociology and PhD honoris causa from the universities of Lausanne and Bucharest.

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Marco Fincardi obtained a DEA in "Histoire et civilisation" at EHESS, Paris, in 1993, and in 1994 a PhD on 'Crisis and Transformation of Society in the Contemporary Age' at Turin University. He is Associate Professor at the History Department of the University of Venice. He has published extensively on issues related to popular culture in twentieth-century Italy. On the subject of charivari and folk culture his publications include *Derisioni notturne. Racconti di serenate alla rovescia* (2005); and *Il rito della derisione. La satira notturna delle battarelle in Veneto, Trentino, Friuli Venezia Giulia* (2009).

Xabier Itçaina is a CNRS Senior Research fellow-HDR at the Centre Émile Durkheim (Sciences Po Bordeaux) and a former Marie Curie Fellow (2012–2013) at the European University Institute, Florence. His research interests are: Catholicism and politics in Southern Europe; the territorial dynamics of social economy; cultural and identity politics in the Basque Country. His main publications include: *Changing European Wine. The Politics of Institutions, Fields and Markets* (with Antoine Roger and Andy Smith, 2016); 'Les politiques territoriales du religieux : médiations catholiques en Europe du Sud' (Unpublished HDR thesis, Sciences po Bordeaux 2015); 'The crisis as a constrained opportunity? Catholic organizations and territorial welfare in the Basque Country and Emilia-Romagna', *Religion, State and Society*; *Politics of Religion in Western Europe: Modernities in Conflict?* (co-edited with François Foret, 2011); *Les virtuoses de l'identité: religion et politique en Pays Basque* (2007).

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction: Looking Backward to Move Forward—Why Appreciating Tradition Can Improve Our Understanding of Modern Protest

Ilaria Favretto

The purpose of this volume is to reflect, through selected case studies, on the influence of folk traditions and popular culture on modern and contemporary protest in Western Europe. The book examines the influence of Carnival, popular religious imagery and May customs and traditions on modern forms of contention, as well as the revival of the use of folk songs by a variety of modern protest actors. It also looks at the reactivation and adaptation within nineteenth-, twentieth- and twenty-first-century collective action of elements from a wide range of typically pre-modern repertoires, such as riots, arson, besieging and ransacking buildings, anonymous letter-writing, charivari and 'rough music' rituals of communitarian justice. Dating from the Middle Ages, charivaris were deeply rooted rituals of folk justice which small communities in Europe

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used to denounce and sanction people who had breached commonly accepted customs: for example, adulterous wives, or widows and widowers whose new marriage partners were far younger than themselves. Charivari rituals were also used against people who were perceived as harming the community, such as petty thieves, hoarders and speculators (especially at times of famine), unpopular officials, informers, and disliked preachers. E.P. Thompson found evidence within early industrial conflict of charivari practices against blacklegs, and journeymen who worked for pay below agreed rates (Thompson 1992, 16–17). 'Justice' would be enforced by the community's unmarried male youth using a range of forms of symbolic punishment, which had striking similarities across Europe and included the enactment of various forms of rough music, accompanied by drums, cowbells and the banging of tins and kitchen utensils. Charivaris could also consist of the parading of wrongdoers facing backwards on a horse or mule, the dirtying of offenders' doorsteps with manure or garbage, and shaving their heads. They thus included a wide range of rituals of inversion and humiliation, which were staged either in combination or separately (Davis 1978; Le Goff and Schmitt 1981).

Taking their cue from seminal works on popular culture and protest by E.P. Thompson and Natalie Zemon Davis, social and cultural historians have documented the survival of rituals of folk justice in later periods, mostly in the context of nineteenth-century liberal revolutions (Sperber 1991, 86–88, 180, 220–222, 243, 285, 316, 335; Brophy 2007, 138–45; Forbes 2010) and peasant protest (Sahlins 1994; Frank 1999; Ramella 1984, 230; Brunello 1981, 11; Fincardi 1990, 294–295, 299, 305). Several scholars have also looked at the enduring use of the charivari in the early twentieth century, a time when in most European countries the transition from rural to industrial societies was accelerating. Eugen Weber and Raymond Jonas both analysed the persistence of folk justice practices in France in the period between 1870 and 1914 (Weber 1979; Jonas 1994). Giancorrado Barozzi noted how during the Italian *La Boje* movement—the wave of peasant protests that hit the Po valley in the period 1882–85, widely regarded as the beginning of Italy's modern agricultural workers' movement—peasant protest action against landowners mostly consisted of improvised and harmless 'little Carnivals' (1983, 248).

In countries characterized by late modernization, such as Italy and Russia, seemingly archaic forms of action continued to be used as vehicles of political expression well after the growth of the organized labour movement, in combination with new forms of action such as strikes and ral-

lies. As recent scholarship has highlighted, during the Italian 'red week' (*settimana rossa*) of June 1914 protesters drew extensively on pre-industrial protest repertoires. In the Romagna area, a socialist bastion, local government buildings and churches were looted, destroyed and occasionally set on fire. Charivari-like rites of inversion were staged against parish priests, symbols of conservatism who traditionally had protected the establishment's interests (Baroncini 2012; Martini 1989, 540–541). During the '*biennio rosso*' (1919–20), the peasants of Ribera, a small Sicilian community, managed to drive the Duke of Bivona out of the village amidst ridicule (Bianchi 2006, 65–66). As Steve Smith and Mark Steinberg have pointed out in their work on pre-revolutionary Russia, the removal of tyrannical foremen from factories in a wheelbarrow, a practice that drew on old peasant shaming traditions, was one of the most distinctive features of factory protests during the 1905 and 1917 revolutions (Smith 1983, 55; 1993, 150; Steinberg 1994, 80).

Work by cultural historians on Fascist violence has shown how the charivari was not a repertoire solely for 'progressive' causes. The symbolic violence enacted by Fascists towards political opponents during the interwar period was also significantly influenced by popular charivari-like traditions and a taste for humiliation and role reversal (Fincardi 1988; Luzzatto 1998; Dondi 2004, 122). In her analysis of Italian Fascism's symbolism and rituals, Luisa Passerini has shown how forcing political opponents to consume castor oil enacted a 'stock joke of comic narrative', namely uncontrollable defecation, and was, indeed, a practice which referred 'to a system of images still alive in the popular comic tradition' (Passerini 1987, 98). Filippo Colombara (2009; 135) and Mimmo Franzinelli (2004, 78) have documented how Fascists shaved the hair (or beards) of political opponents in the early 1920s and later, in the years 1944–45, of women accused of supporting the Resistance. Colombara's book, in particular, contributes to a better understanding of the symbolism and origins of this practice, which was later used by partisans in their turn against women blamed for collaborating or simply sleeping with Nazi or Fascist cadres in several European countries (including France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway and Greece) that had been under Nazi occupation (Colombara 2009, 134; Virgili 2002). Employing the explanatory framework put forward by Alain Brossat in his work on the French Resistance and '*les tondues*' (1992), Colombara also interprets shaving as a rite of public shaming with its origins in charivari-like traditions of community punishment.

Research on the persistence and reactivation of charivari traditions in the period after 1945 is very limited. However, the work by Kostis Kornetis on student resistance to the dictatorship of the 'Colonels' in Greece shows that shaving heads was still used as a shaming ritual in the 1960s by Greek police against teddy boys and young rebels, who would then be marched through the streets carrying humiliating placards (Kornetis 2013, 16). Clara Gallini, an anthropologist who has written extensively on Sardinian traditions such as the *sonazza* and *corredda* (the local version of the charivari), has documented the successful adaptation of charivari repertoires to new political needs well into the 1970s (Gallini 1977). In a recently published article I have cast new light on the widespread use of rituals of communitarian justice by Italian factory workers during the labour struggles of the 1960s and 1970s (Favretto 2015). Xavier Vigna (2007) studied the use of similar repertoires in the context of French industrial conflict. As has been shown by Xabier Itçaina, the Basque nationalist movement in south-west France has since the 1970s drawn heavily on folk traditions, particularly the theatrical tools of the charivari, to voice their political claims and strengthen community identity (Itçaina 2012). Lastly, we know that tarring and feathering, a charivari variant, was practised by the IRA in Northern Ireland as late as 2007 (Jeffries 2007). Rachel Monaghan (2002, 41–56) has provided useful insights on the practice and culture of informal justice in the Northern Irish context.

Research on the influence of Carnival culture and traditions on protest has also been on the rise. Scholarship includes valuable and perceptive work on the skilful use by the Communist Party of Carnival repertoires to convey propaganda, both in interwar France (Hastings 1991, 394–402) and in 1950s Italy (Bertolotti 1991). There has also been exploration of the use and meanings of carnivalesque street theatre in riots (Lombardi Satriani 1979) and demonstrations of the modern era (Corbin et al. 1994; Marchetti 1982; Dimitrov 2007, 231–254). With regard to the most recent decades, a number of works have been published on the Global Justice Movement and the use of carnivalesque imagery and language in its protest performances (Juris 2008; Boyle 2011; Shepard 2011; Bogad 2012); on environmental and anti-nuclear protest (Zinn 2007); and on the role played by ludic and festive routines in the revolutions of 1989 in Central and Eastern Europe (Kenney 2002).

Our volume both builds on this literature and addresses several gaps that have persisted in our knowledge and understanding of popular culture and protest and the continued adaptation and reuse of seemingly

obsolete forms of contention within modern collective action. The further away one moves from the Second World War, the sparser and more limited the literature on folk traditions and mobilization becomes. Folk songs and iconic figures representing popular dissent have long played a key role in the way that modern protest movements construct their identity and external image. In 2002 the French radical farmer Jose Bovè and other anti-globalization activists famously turned up at a trial in white gowns. This was to echo the 'War of Demoiselles', that is the struggle that French Pyrenean peasants, dressed up as women and drawing upon old folk rituals of peasant resistance, put up against authorities in the years 1829–30 to oppose restrictions of forest use-rights (Sahlins 1994; Soulet 2001).[1] Although there has been research on these themes (Bermani 1997; Kornetis 2013, 196–202; Watson 2015; Peddie 2006), this dimension of protest remains on the whole underinvestigated. The smearing and dirtying of symbolic buildings or unpopular politicians, mock funerals, mock executions and the parading of effigies have been regular features of twentieth- and twenty-first-century protests, but have received surprisingly little attention in the academic debate. As we will argue later, noise-making and pot-banging, for example, have been defining features of the anti-austerity protest triggered by the 2008 financial crisis, but there have only been isolated attempts (Stern and Davis 2012) to use an anthropological or historical lens to analyse these practices and their origins and meaning. In addition, ransacking buildings and arson have been used regularly since 1945 during violent disorders, but research on these forms of action has so far focused predominantly on the nineteenth century, and mostly on rural contexts (Frank 1999; Viola 1996; Schulte 1994; Bellamy et al. 1993; Archer 1990). Riots remain an integral element of the repertoire of European protesters today, but scholars' interest in decoding the symbolic language and actions of rioters has not shifted its focus to events since the Second World War. The urban riots in large European capitals such as Paris and London in more recent times have yet to be analysed with the rigour and anthropological perspective of research produced on earlier violent disorders, such as the food riots after the First World War (Bianchi 2006; Vrints 2015) or peasant unrest and resistance to collectivization in the Soviet Union of the 1930s (Viola 1996).

A number of factors explain scholarship's lack of attention to the influence of popular culture and folk traditions on modern and contemporary protest politics. We will start with sources. As Carlo Ginzburg has observed (1976), the culture of the lower classes is mostly oral. His comment arose

from his investigation of Menocchio's sixteenth-century world, but to a large extent it also applies to the modern era. Particularly in relation to the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, a range of written sources traditionally used by historians and social movement scholars to research protest-related issues, such as government papers, judicial and criminal records and the press, are of limited help in making sense of the influence of folk customs and their underpinning symbolism and meanings on modern collective action. State authorities pay limited attention to non-violent symbolic action such as noise-making, parading effigies, mock funerals and executions, and smearing. Police accounts of marches have traditionally focused on size, numbers, disorder and violence, with no time for what is often regarded as 'harmless' carnivalesque mockery. Even when these practices are reported, their deepest meanings and symbolism are generally 'lost in translation'. As Stephen Frank commented (1987, 242) in his work on popular practices of extrajudicial retribution in late nineteenth-century Russia, judicial and criminal sources inevitably translate popular practices and folk costumes into a language that draws on the 'criminal legal codes of the time' and is hardly attentive to the needs of later generations of cultural historians. During the research for the chapter that I co-wrote with Marco Fincardi on Italian protest in the 1960s and 1970s, I myself came across a similar instance of the imperviousness of written sources to folk culture and its meanings. At the peak of industrial conflict in 1969, during the 'Hot Autumn', factory workers occasionally smeared and dirtied strikebreakers, hated foremen or moderate union officials as a way of publicly shaming them. This smearing and dirtying used a range of demeaning substances, from ripe fruit and vegetables to spit and excrement (Favretto 2015, 218–221). In August 1969 Giulia Vitali, an official of the moderate UIL (Unione italiana del lavoro), was covered from head to toe with ink and ripe tomatoes when she rushed to help a Pirelli white-collar worker who had been pelted with tomatoes during a strike. The hand-written account given after the assault by the factory security guard, who was very probably of working-class origins and therefore more familiar with workers' codes and symbolic language, described the workers' action as a 'chiassata': a word now almost out of use but one which in the 1960s described popular rowdiness and carnivalesque uproar. However, the event was then summarized much more concisely in a Personnel Department report and 'translated' into an 'episode of violence'.

Contributors to this volume (in particular, Baroncini, Palacios Cerezales and Nyzell) have used sources such as the local and national press in their

analysis. In the second half of the twentieth century and the early years of the twenty-first, however, the media's coverage of popular practices and ability to decode their symbolism have significantly declined, which makes this type of source of limited help. The scorn of the educated elites for popular culture—in the eyes of many a byword for rowdiness, disorder, backwardness and irrationality—has long acted in accounts of modern protest as an effective filter for any features and practices that do not fit with the dominant notions of legitimate and rational political behaviour. A similarly dismissive and censorious approach has also characterized the attitude of the leadership of most modern mainstream political movements. The use of, and reliance on, folk customs and traditions by grassroots militants to voice grievances has been either ignored by union and party leaders as unimportant, or deliberately censored due to image-related concerns and fears of ridicule. Such attitudes explain why sources within organizations such as political parties or trade unions are also of little value in investigating the relationship between popular culture and protest.

Finally, as a result of the expansion of mass education the lower social strata have had a growing ability to make their voices heard through diaries and memoirs. However, these sources also have limitations in responding to the needs of historical and anthropological enquiry, as the meanings and symbolism of everyday life's actions and practices are generally taken for granted by those who perform them, and therefore rarely discussed and explained in writing (Burke 2009, 268).

However, it is not just the scarcity of sources that explains scholars' limited interest in the relationship between popular culture and protest in modern times. As has been recently observed, folklore remains 'anthropology's neglected sibling' (Pooley 2015, 1). Although it is some time since the relationship between folklorists and historians entered a new phase of gradual 'rapprochement' (Burke 2004, 135), the dialogue between folklore and history is still marred by suspicion and limited cooperation. Folklore scholars have generally been more interested in folk cultures and traditions in the advanced capitalist world than have anthropologists, whose ethnographic work has predominantly focused on former colonies and countries outside Europe. There is, in fact, no shortage of research by folklorists on folk beliefs, customs and rituals in modern and contemporary Europe, but historians, and indeed sociologists and political scientists who write about contemporary protest, have tended to make limited use of this; this has significantly impaired their ability to decode

languages and practices that despite perhaps belonging to a disappearing world are still occasionally made use of, and have meaning.

Scholarship on protest has for a long time been characterized by a generally derogatory and dismissive approach to folk culture, not dissimilar to that of the elites and commentators of the time. Scholars of labour history and industrial conflict have, for example, traditionally paid little attention to popular culture and traditions. Marxist scholarship in particular, as Eric Hobsbawm noted, for a long time tended to focus on groups and forces identified with perceived progress, in the belief 'that the history of movements and organizations which led the workers' struggle, and therefore in a real sense "represented" the workers, could replace the history of the common people themselves' (1998, 269). Labour historians have occasionally noted popular practices, but mostly as comic and unimportant anecdotes with no need of in-depth analysis. It has been assumed that forms of pre-industrial protest and their underlying culture did not survive processes of urbanization and modernization to any significant degree. What matters, in the standard narratives of labour history, is that such forms of action disappeared, opening the way to modern politics and modern industrial relations.

A similar interpretative paradigm has been a long-standing influence on social movement scholarship. More recently, scholars of social movements have grown increasingly critical of rationalist and modernist narratives. Having initially subscribed to the 'modernization of protest' model, Charles Tilly abandoned this in the mid-1990s, writing that the labelling of forms of collective action as 'reactionary' and 'primitive' entails an 'unjustified and unverified teleology' (Tilly 2005, 47–48). Similarly, the value of explanatory tools such as Eric Hobsbawm's influential notion of 'primitive rebels' (Hobsbawm 1998) has also been questioned. As James Scott wrote, it would be wrong to dismiss 'primitive' forms of resistance as backward: 'at times of crisis or momentous political change, they may be complemented by other forms of struggle that are more opportune. They are unlikely, however, to disappear altogether' (Scott 1985, 273). Nevertheless, the distinction between pre- and post-industrial forms of collective action continues to operate as a powerful dichotomy in the historical understanding of protest. This particularly applies to the study of protest in Europe and North America. Except for the works mentioned earlier on the Global Justice Movement and its use of carnivalesque forms of action (Bogad 2012; Shepard 2011; Boyle 2011), not enough attention is yet being paid to popular culture and older protest traditions and

their influence on modern forms of struggle. Especially as regards the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, forms of actions such as incendiarism and rituals such as mock executions, mock funerals and smearing have been overlooked and poorly understood. The symbolism and rituals of popular religion, and their uses and meanings, have also been largely neglected. This is all the more surprising given the 'cultural turn' experienced by social movement studies during recent decades and the growing prominence awarded to emotions and rituals in the analysis of collective action (Goodwin et al. 2007).

This volume breaks away from the limitations of a one-dimensional approach to studying forms of collective action. Many, if not most rituals and symbols used in today's protest action can be traced back to pre-modern times, and their historical origins and symbolic dimension need to be better understood. How and why have older repertoires of contention and traditional protest cultures survived industrialization and urbanization? How and why have pre-modern practices been absorbed into modern protest tactics? How have their functions and meanings changed? What social groups have made use of these practices? Have these groups only come from the lower social strata, or are there instances of the appropriation of popular protest practices by educated middle-class elites? If so, how and why? Lastly, does the long-established paradigm, which has identified popular culture and protest with progressive radicalism, still hold? Is it only progressive forces who have resorted to popular means of actions to voice their grievances, or should we instead examine the wider political spectrum if we want a more comprehensive, and possibly less romanticized, picture of the adaptation and enduring use of folk traditions and rituals in modern and contemporary protest?

The book addresses these questions and we believe it makes an original and innovative contribution to the field of protest studies by casting light on rituals and symbolic performances that despite being poorly deciphered and understood are still integral to our protest repertoires. The case studies consider an extensive range of popular traditions and aspects of popular culture (Carnival, May customs, folk songs and popular religion) and analyse the use in modern protest of a wide variety of forms of struggle that go back to pre-modern times, such as rituals of communitarian justice, ransacking buildings and incendiarism, animal maiming, anonymous letter-writing and riots. The volume is truly interdisciplinary, in that it brings together historians, political scientists and sociologists; it has a wide chronological scope; and it looks at protest actors and collectivities

with a diversity of social and ideological backgrounds, including peasants, nineteenth-century liberal movements, nationalist and separatist parties, anarchists, workers, students, right-wing groupings and the Global Justice Movement. Our selection of case studies has a Western European focus: our attempts to include research on Central and Eastern Europe were on this occasion unsuccessful, and we hope that future publications on the subject will widen the perspective.

The key assumption underlying the book is that repertoires of contention are sets of tools, which are continually 'recast to serve new needs' (Forbes 2010, 216–217). We know that symbols and rituals play a crucial role in protest. They create solidarity and 'emotional energy' (Collins 2001, 27), and contribute to identity-construction. They are also a powerful 'medium of communication' (Douglas 2003, 2003). However, not all symbols are equally potent (Gamson 1992, 135). As Robert Darnton has pointed out, some symbols possess 'special powers' (Darnton 1986, 223). The charivari repertoire is a case in point. Its rituals and symbolism are particularly rich in meaning and for a long time have provided protesters and political actors of all colours, and of diverse social backgrounds in relation to the modern period, with highly expressive tools of protest and political communication. This might well explain why, despite the appalling nature of their most brutal variations, these routines have proved so exceptionally time-resistant. Shaming rituals act as a form of empowerment and are very effective in symbolically challenging authority and power relationships. They continued to play a role in a wide range of protests, as we see in the chapters by Baroncini on the Italian elections of 1876, Brophy on nineteenth-century Germany, Borgonovo on nineteenth-century Irish peasant resistance and, later, the Irish Revolution in 1918–21, Manfredi on Italian anarchists, Favretto and Fincardi on Italy in the 1960s and 1970s, and Itçaina on nineteenth- and twentieth-century France. As these contributions show, charivari-like rituals of communitarian justice coexisted and interacted with modern forms of protest, such as strikes and rallies, in pursuit of a wide range of goals, both pre-modern and modern in kind: resistance to demands or practices deemed non-customary, claims to rights of liberty and justice, holding political elites accountable, and, as several contributors to this volume point out, ostracism of an out-group in violent and cruel ways. We are very grateful to one of this book's anonymous reviewers for an observation which has helped us to see more clearly how the time periods covered in the essays suggest a definite relationship between the evolution of democracy in modern

Europe and the ways that discontent has been voiced during the ups and downs of this process. Before mass democracies had been established, folk routines provided valuable tools with which the disenfranchised masses could censure political elites and express themselves. After democratic processes were in place, there were still moments when people would resort to pre-political practices that drew on popular culture and traditions in order to make their voice heard and condemn the deficiencies of political parties: at times of crisis, political instability, and diminished legitimacy and ability of the conventional political parties to represent fringe interests (for example the inter-war years and the late 1960s and 1970s). It is therefore not surprising that the book's essays give very limited attention to the 1950s and the first half of the 1960s, a period marked by unprecedented political stability which signalled the apex of institutional politics, with mass political parties and trade unions establishing an uncontested monopoly on the channels of political participation. The figures for electoral turnout and political party membership during those years make the present world seem a different planet. Levels of trust in traditional political parties and conventional politics are now at their lowest ebb. Particularly in southern Europe, which has been more dramatically hit by the financial crisis of 2008, national governments and political elites have had their images badly damaged and are increasingly identified with incompetence, powerlessness and corruption (Kaldor and Selchow 2012, 12). It is surely no coincidence that in this context carnivalesque and folk routines have been regaining prominence and visibility in the political arena.

The anti-austerity protest movements in Greece, Spain, Portugal and Italy, triggered by the financial turmoil of 2008 and the policies since pursued by most EU countries, have drawn widely on informal means of social sanctioning and elements from repertoires of folk justice such as noise-making, mock executions, smearing and dirtying. In May 2011 Greek protesters stationed a set of gallows in front of the parliament building, demanding that those responsible for the crisis should be brought to justice. Pot-clanging, alongside the use of encampments, was one of the defining features of the *Indignados* movement in Spain, whose anti-austerity protesters took their inspiration from the Argentinian *cacerolazos* (Castaneda 2012, 8). The latter had taken to the streets in December 2001 and banged pots and pans to protest against the Argentinian government's economic policies, enacting practices of communitarian justice that had traditionally been used in South America to censure political abuses and draw attention to scandalous behaviour. *Cacerolas* (pots and

pans) had been banged in the Plaza de Mayo twenty years earlier by the mothers of *desaparecidos* protesting against the military dictatorship, and before that by anti-Allende protesters in Chile in 1973 (Fincardi 2009, 162, 8–9). However, this volume shows that noise-making has a long history in Europe, which might help to explain the widespread use of pot-banging by anti-austerity protesters in Greece, Italy and Portugal as well as in Spain. In 2009 protesters in Iceland also noisily and angrily banged pots and pans, to call for the resignation of their government. Their mobilization was dubbed the 'kitchenware' or 'pots and pans revolution' by the media (England 2015).

Using action that included pot-banging, effigy-parading and the staging of highly theatrical mock funerals and mock executions, anti-austerity protesters denounced the conduct of elites: their corruption and connivance with corporate interests, the infringement of people's trust and moral double standards, and also their failure, as della Porta notes in her afterword, to respond to citizens' demands and secure minimum living standards for the population. Equally, if not even more importantly, such action was intended to assert symbolically alternative forms of justice and order. As Jonathan Sterne and Natalie Zemon Davis (2012) commented in an article on Quebec's '*manifs casseroles*', the thousands of marchers who in 2012 banged pots and pans to protest against the government's decision to raise university tuition fees, 'noisy disorder' has traditionally been used 'to bring about a just order'.

Tactical innovation was facilitated both by the limited role played in these protests by political parties and trade unions and by the fluid and horizontal nature of the anti-austerity movements. This included the reactivation of a wide range of folk customs and rituals that more hierarchically structured political groups would have been less likely and more reluctant to use in their actions. We should also remember how the anti-austerity and anti-capitalist movements have criticized, if not rejected, representative democracy in favour of direct democracy and the active participation of ordinary citizens in politics. As was the case with encampments, a form of protest which allowed protesters to try out their vision of direct democracy, rituals of communitarian justice such as pot-banging or mock executions also contributed to the anticipation of a world where ordinary people were back in control of order and justice. Moreover, these rituals created a space for people to re-engage with politics in a less mediated and possibly more entertaining style.

As has been widely noted, one of the most beneficial effects of the recent radical protests has been the reconnection with politics of large segments of the population who had long stopped participating in the electoral process. Movements such as 'Occupy' and the Spanish *Indignados* have achieved this by giving a voice to a wide range of demands that had for a long time been relegated from the political agenda of mainstream parties, and equally importantly by employing protest styles and actions that facilitated and encouraged forms of political engagement outside party politics. This brings me to an important factor that has contributed to the increasing number of gallows and coffins featuring in protest today: the growth of populist politics.

Populism of all political colours, in more and less benign forms, has been on the rise across Europe. Practices of denunciation, scorn and mockery of professional politicians are integral to populist parties' visions of direct democracy, or—as critics would argue—their delusions about this. The technological revolution and the rise of social media have given an immense boost to ordinary people's unmediated and direct involvement in the political arena, and also, to use Jon Ronson's words, to 'the democratization of justice' and 'great renaissance of public shaming' (Ronson 2016). The virtuous 'people', who, due to the decline of class politics, have increasingly become the main reference of today's political discourse, are regularly encouraged to monitor, denounce and punish the behaviour of their maleficent and immoral political elites not only by using their vote but also, if not especially, by acts of public accusation and embarrassment. The leaders of populist parties are second to none in this, and their attacks on mainstream political parties have drawn heavily on the very same repertoires that historically have been used by lower social groups, operating at the periphery of mainstream politics, to challenge, resist and delegitimize authority, namely the charivari and Carnival. As has been noted, the attacks against political adversaries by Beppe Grillo, the former comedian who founded the Five Star Movement in Italy in 2009, and by Nigel Farage, of the United Kingdom Independence Party, have been distinguished by the use of carnivalesque practices such as inversion, ridicule and the application of degrading imagery to opponents (Macmillan 2015; Bordignon and Ceccarini 2013).

Several contributions to this volume discuss the key functions performed by Carnival repertoires, language and imagery in modern politics and protest. As Brophy points out in his chapter, because neither absolutist nor modern bureaucratic states have ever been able to fully control

folk culture, 'the relative social freedom of carnival revelry, parish festivals, and other village customs' have for a long time provided outlets that have cut across both formal and informal spheres of political activity. Palacios Cerezales argues in his contribution that during Portugal's dictatorship years the popular carnival of the small northern town of Ovar was used as a space for free expression, empowerment and liberation. Similarly, Favretto and Fincardi show how the use of carnivalesque street theatre by factory workers during the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s played a liberating and empowering role in relation to the hierarchical order and discipline of the workplace. Carnivalesque rituals were powerful theatrical tools with which workers, after more than ten years of silence and acquiescence, could deride and intimidate strikebreakers, defy their political opponents, and symbolically disempower employers and government figures. In the same period, ludic and festive forms of action were used by young Italian protesters to playfully resist or perhaps undermine bourgeois seriousness, and to demystify the prevailing moral and social order.

Situationism was an important influence. However, as Favretto and Fincardi note, the adaptation and reactivation of Carnival repertoires by Italian youth, largely middle-class and highly educated, as well as by their European equivalents, also originated in the 'Carnival syndrome' (Clemente 1983, 11) to which the New Left, and particularly its intellectual fringes, fell victim in the 1970s. The traditional Left had for a long time marginalized irony and playfulness in its practice and political ethos (Horn 2007, 40; Vigorelli 1983, 60). However, Bakhtin's work and the historiographical and literary scholarship it inspired, which thrived during the 1970s, taught that in previous times popular humour and Carnival had long been employed by the lower social strata as means of empowerment, subversion and liberation. This was a powerful message, and students and radical Left groupings were quick to rediscover the language of irreverence and its revolutionary potential. Larry Bogad's chapter on tactical carnival and the Global Justice Movement illustrates the enduring legacy of Bakhtin's ideas within radical protest movements today. Bogad's contribution reflects on the reasons why anti-capitalist protesters have 'carnivalized' their actions: the use of flamboyant costumes, dance and puppets ridicules opponents and undermines their authority, whilst defusing tension with the police. Equally importantly, it symbolically and powerfully prefigures an alternative anti-hierarchical world and provides protesters with 'fun'. Last but not least, it contributes to the movement's

positive and good-humoured public image, in contrast to negative images of global justice protesters as violent and deviant.

The use by protesters of folk songs and iconic figures, as well as symbols drawing on popular religiosity, is often also a consequence of the need for communication and projection of an external image that resonates with the public imagination. The political manipulation of folk culture is commonly identified with right-wing and nationalist movements (Baycroft and Hopkin 2012; Cavazza 2003). However, our book provides examples from both sides of the political spectrum. Manfredi shows in his chapter how the appropriation of folk songs and religious imagery by Italian anarchists provided their movement with an effective propaganda tool and a conduit to increased legitimacy. Palacios Cerezales discusses how in Portugal anti-communist protesters deliberately used protest tactics and symbols that evoked past episodes of popular resistance and revolt. The 1975 anti-communist mobilization related closely to Maria da Fonte, the folk heroine who in 1846 had initiated a rural revolt against the taxes and administrative measures of the new liberal state. By embedding popular tradition in their practices and discourse, anti-communist militants sought to project the image of an authentic, spontaneous and grassroots movement. Maria da Fonte was also evoked as a peasant revolutionary by Maoist far-left activists, who interpreted the 1975 demonstrations as a rejection of the pro-Moscow Portuguese Communist Party. As I discuss in the chapter co-written with Fincardi, in the 1970s Italian far-left organizations too began to romanticize and revive popular culture and folk rituals of rebellion to resist—as they would argue—the institutional Left's attempt to domesticate protest and dissent.

The chapters by Nyzell, Brophy, Borgonovo and Palacios Cerezales discuss extensively the use of besieging and ransacking buildings, arson and rioting; they provide illuminating insights on the persistence of these types of action within modern protest, and on their many strategic and symbolic functions. Close attention is also paid to the influence that political circumstances exert on how protesters choose their tactics. As Palacios Cerezales suggests, the state's ability or disposition to suppress violence encourages and facilitates the re-activation of protest routines, which in normal circumstances would entail much too high a cost to protesters in terms of repression.

To conclude, our hope is that this volume will give rise to a more rounded analysis of forms of protest, and will be a spur to new reflections

and research both on old routines and repertoires of protest and on their uses, meanings and functions in the modern era. After 2008, collective action has re-emerged in ways that are new and also old. Appreciating tradition can encourage innovation in how we analyse protest, past, present and future.

Note

1. I am grateful to Francois Ploux for drawing my attention to this fact. Photos of the trial are available on http://pictures.reuters.com/archive/FRANCE-RP3DRIEFACAA.html (last accessed 17 May 2016).

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CHAPTER 2

"The Modernity of Tradition": Popular Culture and Protest in Nineteenth-Century Germany

James M. Brophy

In the years 1831–34, the villagers and townspeople of western Germany refashioned May trees to express their sympathy for constitutional rights. Similar to the maypole, the springtime rite of the *Maibaum*, which involved erecting a decorated tree in the centre of town to signify vernal symbols of renewal, fertility, and courtship, now entwined itself with the revolutionary tradition of the liberty tree (*Freiheitsbaum*). Spring ritual or revolutionary protest? State officials registered their apparent confusion, as did others. In Zweibrücken, for example, soldiers and civilians clashed at a parish festival in 1832 because "one could not agree whether the erected pole was a May or a liberty tree".[1] For most, though, there was little doubt that many of the May tree plantings carried overtly political overtones. Following the July Revolution of 1830, liberty trees appeared in Switzerland, Belgium, the Bavarian Palatinate, and the Prussian Rhineland. In the following spring, the hybridized rite appeared

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in Baden and elsewhere.[2] In May 1832, the same month that witnessed the Hambach Festival, Germany's first mass political demonstration for constitutional unity and the freedom of the press, at least fifty different locales in the Rhineland erected trees that celebrated both springtime and freedom (Schieder 1978; Sperber 1989). Many of these plantings were modest affairs carried out covertly in the night; others took place at festivals accompanied by speeches, music, drinking and parades of the civic guard. Still others, reports Kurt Baumann, occurred on the same site where Rhenish Jacobins had planted liberty trees in the 1790s, denoting a collective memory of the revolutionary epoch (Baumann 1964, 3). The commitment to these symbols was also impressive. In the Palatinate town of Annweiler, 3000 residents blocked two companies of soldiers from entering the town to dismantle the May-liberty tree, which residents had provocatively erected in front of the Mayor's town (Haasis 1984, 184). In similar fashion, in the Duchy of Lichtenberg, the residents of St Wendel prevented their mayor and two gendarmes from dismantling their tree in May 1832, provoking the governor to request military assistance from Prussia, whose 28th Regiment removed the tree. The outside interference aroused more local indignation, prompting "exalted liberals" to erect a second liberty tree in July. Circulating flysheets and smashing the governor's house windows accompanied the rite. In an ostentatious display of power, the Prussian government dispatched 600 infantry soldiers and 120 hussars to occupy the town of 1500 residents, which resulted in Prussia's absorption of the duchy in May 1834.[3]

If the heightened political activity in 1830–33 was exceptional in its broad and demonstrative popular support of liberal constitutionalism, the convention of adapting traditional customs to articulate political viewpoints over the long nineteenth century was not. That ordinary Germans turned to traditional rites and customs to articulate both grievances and aspirations should not surprise historians. On the contrary, adapting time-honoured practices to fit new circumstances made common sense, and such plasticity offers an important conceptual insight to explain how modern participatory politics took hold in village and town life. Later in the century, the May Tree ceremonies, when combined with the customary moving day of workers and servants on 1 May, produced the proletarian holiday of the "red May Day", whose powerful displays of worker solidarity announced another political springtime (Korff 1979, 1984, 1993). Indeed, the hybridity that one sees with May trees throughout the nineteenth century should serve as a general metaphor for recognizing the

"modernity of tradition," a term that Lloyd and Suzanne Rudolf coined decades ago to show how India's traditional structures could serve a modern democracy (Rudolf and Hoeber 1967). Similarly, European popular traditions accommodated the changing demands of political protest and, in doing so, evinced their multidimensional character. If customs and rituals reaffirmed identity and strengthened social bonds, they also awakened antagonisms with state authorities, triggered new political sensibilities and gave voice to new and old animosities. Because neither absolutist nor modern bureaucratic states fully controlled this domain of folk culture, the relative social freedom of carnival revelry, parish festivals and other village customs provided outlets that enmeshed formal and informal spheres of political activity.

Accordingly, this essay surveys various rites and customs that provided the social space and cultural practices for ordinary Germans to express their grievances and needs as political citizens. It concentrates on the first half of the century, when many popular traditions served as a vehicle for political expression, but it also examines the enduring influences of folk traditions into the First World War. In making such claims, three premises qualify and frame this discussion. First, it acknowledges that the patterns of kinship, work, honour and community life are not easily synchronized with larger political dynamics at state and national levels (Sabean 1990, 1998; Medick 1996; Kaschuba 1988, 1990; Gailus 1990). Arson, wood theft and poaching frequently operated within a localized context of honour and property, and, because such localized forms of political protest defy easy assimilation into broader storylines, grand narratives continue to ignore these arenas of contest (Schulte 1984). Put another way, the gaze of the modernizing nation provides a poor vantage point to grasp the patterns and meanings of life in towns and villages, whose denizens negotiated modernity on their own terms and with their own local political logics. Oliver Zimmer's recent work on three cities in the late nineteenth century is a striking and timely reminder that national and local "rhythms of life" are not always in tack and, further, that the creative activity of townspeople is poorly characterized with such terms as modern, traditional or reactionary (Zimmer 2013, 299). The texture and definition of local political culture needs a richer vocabulary.

One must also acknowledge the mutually constitutive relationship of culture and economy. Although this essay does not discuss the gradual dissolution of guilds and apprentice systems, the gradual encroachment of market economies on local agriculture and handicrafts, and the abolition

of serfdom and its consequences for internal migration and work conditions, the material dimensions that shaped the transition from corporatist to a class society remain critical. To be sure, there are many elements of autonomy in culture and communication that undo any determinative claims, yet these analytical categories are rarely discrete. The unmoored socioeconomic status of ordinary Germans, who belonged to "neither estate nor class" at the onset of the nineteenth century, certainly affected the cultural of protest (Kocka 1990).

Finally, the numerous setbacks for representative politics after 1815 are paramount to grasp popular culture's prominent role in political protest. Following a quarter-century of revolution and Napoleonic rule, which exposed millions of ordinary Germans to both the virtues and flaws of the new political epoch, the Congress of Vienna of 1814–15 restored traditional rulers to their thrones and altars, thereby striving to contain the rights-bearing ideals of the revolutionary age. Austria and Prussia, the neoabsolutist powers of Central Europe, reasserted a conservative social order for the 39 states of the German Confederation. Three examples suffice to illustrate the repressive political climate in the first half of the nineteenth century. First, the Karlsbad Decrees of 1819 dissolved student fraternities, forbade political assemblies and throttled political communication with new censorship regulations. Second, the Confederation passed the "Final Act of Vienna" in 1820, a codicil that barred states from introducing amendments to their individual constitutions that were inconsistent with the Confederation's principles. Because Austria and Prussia dominated the Confederation's legislature, this act effectively blocked constitutional development in reform-minded states such as Baden, Württemberg, Bavaria, Nassau and Hanover. Finally, the Six Articles of June 1832 warrant mention. This set of laws responded to the success of the Fatherland and Press Club, a nationwide network of liberal clubs that advocated national unity and freedom of the press. It organized the Hambach Festival in May 1832, a well-attended political demonstration that reignited the liberal movement. These laws strengthened the Confederation's right to censor, proscribe and even monitor political activity with a separate police apparatus. Together, these laws set the repressive tone of public life. Unwittingly, this intensified control on formal political life exerted pressure on other cultural spheres to serve as arenas of political deliberation.

Carnival

Within this framework of the Restoration's sociopolitical order, the politicization of carnival seems almost inevitable. Since medieval times, the pre-Lenten days of revelry had always possessed subversive traditions, whose saturnalian reversals of social order had invited unruly speech and critical reflection. The fool's right to hold up a mirror to society and speak the truth was an esteemed motif that modern carnivalists fully embraced. In the 1820s, bourgeois elites took control of public carnival events, creating associations and clubs that organized the parades, balls, processions and charity events as a Romantic spectacle. In this way, carnival culture, guided by the voluntary association's principle of autonomous self-regulation, became an integral sphere of civil society. Such an organizational structure was, obviously, not synonymous with popular carnival, yet the two elements of the festival intersected through shared public space and customs. For example, both popular and bourgeois associational carnival embraced unfettered oratory by reviving the tradition of so-called washtub speeches (*Büttenrede*). The washtub as a podium signified the freedom to speak the truth: a speaker held up the "dirty linen" of society and "scrubbed it clean". Traditionally, the washtub was a community instrument of moral and social censure, but this popular custom now included political criticism at the local, regional and national levels (Brophy 1997). By the end of the 1820s, the political verse of washtub speeches became a hallmark of carnival in the Rhineland and elsewhere. Of course, carnival still stood under the strictures of Restoration politics. Speakers were required to submit their speeches either to the club's executive committee or to state-appointed censors, but the innuendos, allusions and thinly veiled political criticisms nonetheless became standard practice. As Gottfried Kinkel, a Bonn carnivalist during the 1840s, noted: "I knew how to circumvent the conventional censor. I wrote nothing in advance, because I was at ease with rhetoric, familiar with the current times, and furthermore exploited every intermezzo, interruption, and applause to add impromptu remarks" (Sander 1931, 194). Carnival societies in Cologne and Mainz were particularly adept at mocking censorship and associating the rule of fools with constitutional freedom.

Popular carnival absorbed many of these critical dimensions. Non-elite residents of towns and cities came into close contact with carnival's political themes, not only as spectators of the organized parades, whose floats projected an array of satirical allusions, but also as readers of the

festival's special newspapers and flysheets, which coursed through the streets. Moreover, the members of carnival societies became socially heterogeneous over time. The principal society in Mainz lowered its dues in the 1840s, and a second carnival society in Cologne explicitly invited more democratic-minded carnivalists to take part in the winter-long festivities. In Trier, Koblenz, Cologne, Düsseldorf and Mainz, state officials reported egregious breaches of acceptable speech, using oratory, print matter, songs and parade costumes and themes to mock political authority (Schütz 1980; Brophy 1997, 2007; Frohn 2000). Officials furthermore noted a widespread inclination of ordinary villagers and townspeople to indulge in subversive tavern talk during carnival days and hold illegal parades. Because many clubs met in taverns and inns, the closed space of a voluntary association became, in effect, open to the general public, thus transforming carnival oratory into a popular channel of critical exchange. Similarly, the street performances and the puppet theatres that catered to popular audiences during carnival week delivered an array of skits and speeches that encouraged political deliberation (Brophy 2007). Entwining popular and associational carnival, the festival bridged communicative arenas of partisan politics.

Never was carnival revolutionary to the degree of exhorting upheaval or political insurrection. As Hermann Bausinger, Jeremy DeWaal and others have noted, carnival tradition did not necessarily strive to undo existing social orders; rather, it "provided a space to engage in dialogue with them" (Bausinger 1980, 13–27; DeWaal 2013, 513). And although Rhenish carnival became politically staid in the second half of the century, it still possessed the potential to unsettle. Amidst the conservative national themes and the newer carnival clubs that now emulated Prussian militarism, there were also splinter carnival associations that catered to numerous constituencies, which, in turn, nourished the festival's oppositional spirit. As Jeremy DeWaal argues, the political function of carnival evolved throughout the twentieth century and, in spite of its culpability with National Socialism, played a signal role after the Second World War in reconstructing a civic, egalitarian identity for Rhinelanders. It fashioned the myth of the Rhineland's long history for openness, thus claiming a tradition for tolerance and democracy. Simply put, carnival did not remain a fossil of another era but, instead, repeatedly reinvented itself (DeWaal 2013, 528).

Charivaris

As with the rest of Europe, local German communities ritually scolded their reprobates, and the rite of charivaris persisted well into the twentieth century. The convention was rife in Catholic Bavaria, Swabia, Baden, the Rhineland and the Hunsrück and Eifel regions (carnival season and charivaris, it should be noted, went hand in glove), but the mixed confessional areas of Hessen, Franconia and Hannover also practiced this custom (Hinrichs 1991, 435–436). The rite acquired many names along the way but *Katzenmusik*, or cat-music, is the most common term, describing as it does the caterwauling and "rough music" of villagers and townspeople, who typically gathered at night to censure alleged miscreants. Thumping tubs, clanging pots, shouting taunts, singing derisive ditties, and throwing stones, mud or excrement often accompanied such shaming rituals. Infidelity, promiscuity, out-of-wedlock pregnancy, husband-beating, marrying men outside the villlage, and the remarriage of widows mostly provoked such charivaris, but theft, avarice and perjury could also prompt this mechanism of controlling village life. In Bavaria, the *Haberfeldtreiben* featured ridiculing verse conducted by masked judges (the *Haberer*) who hunted down (*treiben*) and ritually condemned the miscreant at their door or in in the village fields. By the 1890s, such rituals took on spectacular form. In the areas around Darmstadt in Hessen, as well as in the Eifel Region, so-called donkey rides (*Eselritt* or *Strafesel*) punished married couples whose households violated traditions of domestic order. In Swabia, similar forms of denunciation were known as "hen rides" (*Hennenreiten*). In western Germany, *Rappeln* or *Rappelfahrten* (roughly, "rattle rides") referred to an old form of folk justice, whereby villagers assembled outside the accused's house and rattled its windows, shutters and roofs to register communal censure. Destruction of houses and property was not uncommon. To be sure, one should not romanticize this ritual. Community judgement could be brutal, if not also unfair, and the stigma of such ordeals endured (Zipperer 1938; Hinrichs 1991; Scharfe 1991).

If charivaris primarily enforced social norms, the rite also came to express new kinds of political discontent. After 1815, for example, the contested claims of forest ownership and wood use in the Bavarian Palatinate and the Prussian Rhineland frequently produced charivaris against state officials. The Bavarian and Prussian states deprived villages of forest usufruct to concentrate on maximizing the revenues of state-owned forests. Central

to this aim was replacing deciduous trees with fast-growing conifers for the lumber market. Because spruce trees provided inferior secondary uses for villagers, who depended on acorns and fallen hardwoods for fodder and fuel, they viewed the new forestry regulations as illegitimate and therefore condoned wood theft (Sperber 1991). By the 1830s, forestry officials consequently needed armed assistance to conduct business in the Moselle valley, but villagers also resorted to traditional customs to protest. In 1831, the villagers of Waldfeucht demolished the house of a forest warden with stones in a vicious charivari, because of the warden's vigilance against poaching and wood theft.[4] In March 1833, villagers of Niedeggen in the Eifel hills similarly staged a cat-music outside a local jail, in which unrepentant wood thieves sat for trial. The gathered crowd passed liquor to the prisoners, physically abused the jailor, and carried on their noisy protest through the night.[5] The demonstrators did not attempt to free the prisoners, an option open to them; rather, they censured the state for transgressing the moral economy of its destitute communities, thereby exonerating the prisoners of their putative crimes.

But setting "traditional" farmers squarely against the "modern" state also raises interpretive problems. As Jonathan Sperber has cautioned us, the socioeconomic and legal struggles over wood use do not cleanly fit this interpretive template. Palatinate villagers invoked tradition to justify their claims to communal woods, but they consistently adapted their legal positions to accommodate new law codes, just as their livelihoods became increasingly capitalistic over the second half of the nineteenth century. Similarly, when German jurists incorporated the principles of the Historical School of Law, a new legal direction that strove to incorporate "ancient" legal customs into modern law codes, they enacted laws that had never existed. Jurists thus imposed the invented tradition of an ostensible custom onto legal science to justify the state's rationalization of forest use. Both parties, then, invoked tradition for different purposes, but both sides exhibited modern qualities in negotiating their best settlement. Such nuanced analysis stresses the constructed history of "traditional" juridical norms by actors who invoked the past for decidedly modern needs (Sperber 2010, 700).

In the era of early industrialization, cat-musics also manifested their malleable qualities by allowing workers to adapt the charivari to criticize new conditions. In November 1828, the silk weavers of Krefeld responded to steep wage cuts with organized protest. After posting threatening notices and meeting in taverns, the weavers articulated their grievance

by gathering 2000 workers and marching the streets with plaintive noise. They broke the windows of 16 merchants' comptoirs and chose one house to enter and destroy.[6] Insofar as this was a workers' community rebuking their elites for immoral behaviour, the act's structure resembled a charivari. A similar situation in Aachen produced a violent riot on 30 August 1830. Nine workers protesting their 16 per cent wage cuts swelled into an angry crowd, whose anger and sense of moral outrage turned into a machine-breaking riot. Barred from entering a factory by soldiers and officials, the crowd proceeded to the house of James Cockerill, a former factory owner who, by first introducing machinery to the city's weaving industry, had become the reviled figurehead of mechanization. After attacking this house, they ransacked another, and then attempted to raid the jailhouse to free those who had been arrested from the disturbances. For three additional hours, workers occupied the city's streets, demonstrating their scorn and contempt of the city's manufacturing class.[7] State officials viewed the tumult as mob rule, but the protest's process also reveal the righteous protest of a charivari. Finally, Elberfeld provides another instance of a charivari serving the needs of worker protest. When new machinery came to the city's factories in August 1834, workers marched through the streets, howled ridiculing songs outside the houses of factory owners and broke their windows (Brophy 2007, 143). Such processional protests of censure and claims of a moral economy arose again in the Silesian Weavers' Riots in Langenbielau and Peterswaldau in June 1844, which began with a sorrowful march to merchants' houses to implore them for better wages, an event that escalated into a riot between soldiers and weavers. The ensuing pattern of destruction and plunder showed the guiding logic of a moral scold whose victims had transgressed a communal code.

In the years leading up to the Revolution of 1848–49, charivaris became explicitly political. By the 1830s, officials used the phrase "political charivari" as a referent to signify popular grievance to economic and political conditions. This term referred to such episodes in Homburg, where residents harangued their local state commissioners in a nocturnal caterwaul; two months later, they humiliated a state official with the singing of democratic songs (*Freiheitslieder*) and with such taunts as "the king will hang" and "the princes will burn" (Brophy 2007, 143). On another political front, Catholic Rhinelanders threatened their Landtag deputies in 1841 with the prospect of cat-musics if they did not press for the release of their beloved spiritual leader, Archbishop Clemens August von Droste zu Vischering, whom the Prussians had arrested in 1837 (Brophy

2007). Although the ultimatum to pelt houses with filth and excrement rang viciously pre-modern, this cat-music was now a lever to hold political deputies accountable to the wishes of their constituents. Cat-musics furthermore provided a social space for women to participate in public protests (Lipp 1998). Overall, political charivaris arose dozens of times in the 1840s and became a central component of the revolution's repertoire of contention (Gailus 1990). A Berlin flysheet in 1848, although critical of the folk rite and wishing its disappearance during parliamentary deliberations, nonetheless acknowledged its legitimacy:

> Cat musics can be important when they openly proceed from those who have an irrefutable influence among the people and whose voice more or less annunciates theirs; and when they are directed against those who have brought about a general and legitimate political disapproval.[8]

Differentiating between legitimate uses from those "ridiculous and contemptible" instances by "immature boys and the rabble", the flier recognized the contribution of charivaris to integrate common publics into political dialogue. Indeed, the initial communal tumults in March 1848 in Cologne, Aachen, Elberfeld, Krefeld, Frankfurt, Breslau, Hamburg, Lübeck, Dresden and Vienna took the structural form of charivaris. Urban protestors instinctually modified traditional rites to articulate the political needs of "revolutionary communication" (Scharfe 1976).

But was this rite merely a transitional phase towards modern politics? The hybrid protest form of machine- and window-breaking charivaris continued among workers into the 1860s, as with protests in Iserlohn in 1865 and in Hamburg in 1869. For this reason, Ferdinand Lassalle's General German Workers Association strove to break the workers' use of this traditional type of local protest, a policy that union organizers and the Social Democratic Party of Germany (founded in 1875) only endorsed (Herzig 1988, 110). All viewed charivaris as the undisciplined response of "inexperienced" and "immature" constituencies, which time and organization would cure. But this viewpoint overlooks the recurring necessity of mature polities to embrace their symbolic gestures to galvanize a community's moral outrage. The need to perform collective political unruliness remains. In recent decades, pot-clanging protests in Argentina, Quebec and Ukraine attest the ongoing need of rough music for contemporary political expression. Whether it be the oppositional street politics of 1968, the carnivalesque elements to the 1989 revolutions in Central

and Eastern Europe or the performativity of popular protests against G8 summits and other symbols of malevolent globalization, the larger cultural pattern of activists imagining to act in a longer popular tradition merits our attention. As Belinda Davis astutely notes, such contemporary grassroots protesters "did not start anew every time they acted"; rather, "they reinforced, strengthened, and legitimated traditions, creating patterns of change" (Davis 2008, 368). The compulsion to gather as a public and censure political leaders with symbolic forms of moral condemnation has hardly left the repertoire of modern popular politics.

Parish Festivals

If popular culture offered vehicles for verbal and symbolic forms of protest, it also provided public space for physical violence. In the first half of the nineteenth century, for example, parish festivals became the frequent site of clashes between soldiers and civilians. The issue of state control and its authority to impose greater degrees of constraint and discipline was perhaps the prime mover for the violence (Rummel 2002, 2003; Volkmann and Bergmann 1984). Dozens of such incidents of violence occurred in western and southern Germany, pointing to a general anti-statist mindset abroad in villages and towns; one study on the Prussian Rhineland for the years 1830–46 included 56 incidents (Wirtz 1997; Sperber 1991; Brophy 2004). The dissatisfaction and resentment of locals towards their governors stemmed from a range of factors: economic grievances (excise taxes), military obligations (billeting and conscription), confessional differences (Protestants ruling Catholics), and the modern state's attempt, first begun under Napoleon, to penetrate village administration. The state reduced festivals and holidays, banned local pilgrimages and processions, and enforced drinking restrictions with new rigour. During the early nineteenth century, this social disciplining refashioned the relationship of rural Germans to their respective governments. Consequently, although the parish festival was not a political space per se, it nonetheless became a flashpoint for a number of resentments that took on a complexion of oppositional politics.

The politicization of festive space is most dramatically documented for the city of Cologne. Between 1834 and 1846, refractory crowds at numerous parish festivals taunted and disobeyed police, gendarmes and soldiers. In June 1834, Cologne residents at fairs were arrested because of fights with police, and this trend of violence resurfaced again in 1836,

1838 and 1843. In 1844, soldiers inflicted sabre wounds on four civilians, producing a civic outcry, especially when the soldiers went unpunished (Schauz 2003). In 1845 and 1846, uncontrollable fights broke out at the Mauritius and St Pantaleon parish festivals between labourers and soldiers. Against this background, the violent events at the St Martin's parish festival in August 1846 unfolded. On the second day of its festival, 210 soldiers tried to close off the fairground because of earlier infractions regarding the use of fireworks, whose illegality had long been tolerated at this particular festival. When the cordon didn't work, the commanding lieutenant ordered a dragoon unit to ride through the crowd and clear the area. This military solution left a wake of carnage: the death of a cooper apprentice, seven residents badly wounded from sabre slashes, scores of wounded from rifle butts, and a level of destroyed private property that attested wanton violence. The event galvanized political sensibilities in both bourgeois and popular classes. Following the highly politicized burial of the apprentice, which doubled as a protest march, two petitions circulated among artisan and lower-middle-class circles (Schauz 2003). The incident transformed civilian–military violence into an episode of political mobilization, whose central issues centred on the civic rights of ordinary subjects. Looking forward, the event anticipated the Revolution of 1848's ideal of civic governance; looking back, it encapsulated decades of tension brought about by a neo-absolutist state uncomfortable with the cultural autonomy of civil society (Brophy 2004).

The issue of contested public space continued with urban street politics in the late nineteenth century. Although the Social Democratic Party stridently discouraged autonomous street protests against police and property, the self-will or stubbornness (*Eigensinn*) of working-class neighbourhoods persisted. Their mistrust of authority produced a range of confrontations that fall outside the conventional categories of strike or demonstration. Thomas Lindenberger's critical study of Berlin's street politics, for example, compiled 405 heterogeneous incidents that not only illuminate the logic of such refractory behaviour as vandalism and disorderly conduct but also highlight the political implications of the urban underclasses, whose animus toward the police presented the state with an intractable problem: that the police incited the very violence that it strove to prevent (Lindenberger 1995, 107–169). Such street confrontations also spilled over into lockouts and strikes, endowing the abstraction of class conflict with a local, concrete autonomy that ran counter to the SPD's call for party discipline and civic respectability. Although institutional labour his-

tory routinely ignores such street politics, they are significant for German history. They provided male and female Berliners with a collective memory of local protest to demonstrate about their extensive grievances during the First World War, from food riots to strikes to peace demonstrations (Davis 2000). These contests for street authority endowed working-class neighborhoods with a palpable claim for control of city life, which undoubtedly empowered the Berlin populace in the Revolution of 1918–19, whose ability to mobilize tens of thousands for the newly created Communist (KPD) and Independent Socialist (USPD) parties radicalized the city's political culture (Lindenberger 1995).

Religion

In the last two decades, spurning earlier paradigms of modernization, scholars have re-centred religion's relationship to modernity, illuminating how religion informed the ideals of civil society, nation building and social identity. Indeed, the "politicization of religious consciousness" is a critical component of nineteenth-century political history (Graf 1978). Such events as the tercentenary of Lutheran Reformation of 1817, the contested Church of the Prussian and Protestant Union of 1817–18, the Bavarian kneeling crisis of 1838, the parliamentary debates over Jewish emancipation in the 1840s, the Holy Robe pilgrimage of 1844, and the creation of German Catholicism in Baden, Rhine-Hessen, the Palatinate, and Saxony (1844–47) illustrate well the intersection of confessional identity with politics. In the second half of the century, the role of religion was no less central. The revival of popular piety after 1850; Pope Pius IX's encyclical of 1864 and its perceived Ultramontanism; the anti-Catholic legislation of the Cultural Struggle (*Kulturkampf*); and, finally, the reemergence of popular antisemitism after 1870 all intertwined religious practice with political identity. Some brief remarks on Catholic piety, anti-Catholicism, and popular antisemitism must suffice for this complex subject.

Among the forms of popular piety, the procession and pilgrimage offer important models for political mobilization and protest. Whether it was an annual Corpus Christi procession, an overnight pilgrimage to a venerated site or the unauthorized "wild" pilgrimages of sodalities or local parishes, the large number of instances in which Catholics mobilized themselves for their faith impressed many contemporaries. In 1844, the pilgrimage to see the Holy Robe in Trier, a relic unveiled every fifty years, demonstrated the extraordinary capacity of the Church to organize its laity: over six weeks,

500,000 Catholics trekked to Trier, drawing 10,000 visitors a day in a city of 20,000. "Free-thinking" sceptics heaped abuse on the renewed tradition as reactionary superstition, indulging in a level of anti-clericalism that anticipated the sensational and unrestrained excesses of the 1870s. Liberals criticized the motives of Church prelates to mobilize their faithful and, likewise, the sheep-like docility of Catholics to heed the call. Research on the attitudes of the pilgrims themselves is still too scant to assess individual motives and views, but the technical feat of organizing such a mammoth pilgrimage highlights the modernity of this old tradition.

But the smaller processions and pilgrimages of the 1830s and the 1840s characterize a commingling of piety and politics that contributed to the long-term creation of a Catholic milieu for the remainder of the century. As noted above, the arrest of the archbishop in 1837 for his refusal to recognize Prussian laws on mixed marriages over Canon law awoke Catholics as a political faction. The failure of the Prussian government to give the archbishop a civil trial was, for many Catholics, glaring proof of the state's arbitrary tendencies, validating the view that Catholics lacked sufficient legal protection in Prussia. Unsurprisingly, Catholics embraced their religion with a defiant fervour, thereby using Catholic rites as a performative statement of their oppositional stance towards the Prussian state. Participation in Corpus Christi processions, local pilgrimages and the public displays of relics, such as Aachen's *Heiligtumsfahrt*, increased in numbers following the arrest of Cologne's archbishop. Describing the Corpus Christi processions in Trier and Düsseldorf, one prefect noted: "with its many participants and splendor, it acted as a demonstration against our government".[9] Another prefect maintained that Catholics used pilgrimages and processions to circulate fraudulent communiqués, discuss politics and exchange literature.[10] In these same years, Rhenish Catholics organized torch processions and illuminated neighbourhoods on 23 October, the name day of the incarcerated archbishop.[11] Such symbolic politics reemerged in the 1870s, when anti-Catholic laws in Prussia offered a similar environment for identity politics. For example, following the Marian vision in the Saarland village of Marpingen in July 1876, the Prussian government ineptly occupied the town with police and soldiers, who brusquely handled local Catholics as refractory liars. Such behaviour invited passive resistance, thus allowing such emblems of the apparition as candles, flowers or Marian hymns to serve as "potent symbols of noncompliance with the state" (Blackbourn 1994, 241).

The Marpingen apparition was but one manifestation of Catholic piety in the years in 1850–80. The growth of missionary societies, convents, monasteries and numerous cultural associations stimulated, in turn, the efflorescence of pilgrimages, processions and festivals, and it is the sum of these parts that formed a Catholic milieu during this critical era of nation building. The thicket of clubs, fraternities, sodalities and brotherhoods moulded a social environment whose daily patterns, gestures, idioms and modes of communication provided Catholics with a self-evident sense of community. Encasing such quotidian practices was the cycle of feasts and festivals that suffused linear time with the rhythms of a religious community. Such a *habitus* carried political implications. As Margaret L. Anderson has argued, the freedom of an individual to vote without coercion is paramount for defining a democratic society. But this fundamental point does not address the power of a community to *persuade* individual voters. When mobilizing a community within the Catholic milieu, she writes, the distinction between persuading or coercing a voter, "became as elusive as the distinction between the sacred and the profane" (Anderson 2000, 148–149). The seamless blend of religious outlook and political practices speaks to the amorphous but potent power of culture.

With the creation of the Catholic Center Party in 1870, the Church mobilized its millions to become a formidable voting bloc in the Kaiserreich, second only to the Social Democrats. Although the Center Party was a constitutional party that pursued modern material interests and exhibited independence from Rome, the success of the Catholic revival threatened liberals and Protestant conservatives alike. Since Luther's tercentenary in 1817, Protestant writers commonly attacked Catholics as obscurantist, reactionary and out of step with the progressive nineteenth century. The creation of the North German Bund in 1866 and the German Empire in 1870 further amplified this rhetoric, for Austria's exclusion from the nation-state reasserted the cultural dominance of Protestantism. Mixing opportunism with the biased conviction of an East Elbian pietist, Otto von Bismarck, the minister-president of Prussia and the imperial chancellor of Germany, introduced a series of laws between 1871 and 1878 in Prussia that became known as the Cultural Struggle. By castigating Catholics as "enemies of the Reich", Bismarck invited liberals to join a majority coalition to enact laws that forbade political remarks from the pulpit, banned Jesuits and other orders from Prussia, and enforced state supervision of parochial schools and the education of the clergy. Liberals embraced the programme with a deep-seated ideological fervour, averring that their

enmity of Catholicism and their belief in progress were two sides of the same coin. But, as Michael Gross has argued, the pronounced strains of misogyny, prurient slander and xenophobia found in the philippics, caricatures and scabrous cartoons of liberal print matter reveal a darker side to the liberal imagination (Gross 2004).

Did such print matter affect popular attitudes? The "Storm on the Moabit Monastery" offers one measure of popular anti-Catholicism in Berlin. In August 1869, following months of anti-monastic rhetoric in the popular press regarding the deleterious influence of monks and nuns on German society, a crowd of 3000 gathered outside a Franciscan orphanage in Berlin's industrial quarter of Moabit. In addition to four Franciscans who ran the orphanage, two Dominican priests were in residence, attending to local workers. Labelled by the press as a "monastery", in which "dozens" of monks (invariably cast as lazy and lascivious) lived, this orphanage underwent the ordeal of a vicious cat-music. This throng of thousands execrated fleeing priests and used axes and threshes to break into the grounds, smash windows and destroy property. Eighty mounted police eventually restored order (Gross 2004, 170–184). Here traditional protest entwined itself with a print-driven political discourse. On the eve of forging a new nation-state, this savage charivari acted as a grim reminder that the press and parliament, modern spheres of representative politics, did not supplant or curb confessional violence. On the contrary, they amplified it.

Antisemitism

The popular violence in Moabit is a critical reminder that popular protest is value-neutral and can tip as easily towards hate and intolerance as it can towards justice or civic reform. Popular acts of violence against Jews also bear this out, as dramatically illustrated with the Hep-Hep Riots of 1819. These anti-Judaic riots were visceral responses to economic crisis and political reform. Bad harvests and an economic slump hit the handicrafts hard, thus providing a climate of scarcity. But newly promulgated laws on Jewish emancipation also rankled Christians, for they enabled Jews to live in new neighbourhoods and pursue new occupations. The civic freedoms triggered a wave of violent reprisal. The riots usually took the form of a communal charivari. Ranging across Bavaria, Baden, Hessen, Prussia and the free cities of Frankfurt, Hamburg, Bremen and Lübeck, the rioting crowds shouted at Jews "hep", a derogatory phrase of uncertain origin. In

small villages, Christians focused on simple Jewish tradesmen and artisans, while in cities, such as Würzburg, they attacked the house of a wealthy banker (Rohrbacher 2002). In Heidelberg, reports Stefan Rohrbacher, rioters pillaged a Jewish lane for hours; the police stood by and only university students put a stop to it (Rohrbacher 2002, 24).

Anti-Judaic violence continued sporadically throughout the century. During the revolutions of 1830 and 1848, popular protests and demonstrations, which were ostensibly liberal and democratic in character, also took on anti-Semitic tones. In protests for justice and rights, ordinary Germans also vented their resentment towards Jews, whose wealth or social status angered them. During the hunger years of 1846–47 and the revolutionary years of 1848–49, lower classes mixed social rebellion with violence against Jews. Farmers around Karlsruhe, for example, blamed Jewish bankers for their debts stemming from the bad harvests of 1845 and 1846 as well as from the complex devolution of tithe payments and other feudal dues (Stude 1990, 82). During the food shortages of 1846–47, farmers in Prussia, Hessen and Baden attacked hoarders or profiteers but focused on Jewish merchants and landowners with particular ferocity. In northern Baden, notes Manfred Gailus, anti-Jewish conflicts "appeared for a short time as the dominant form of violence". During the Revolution of 1848–49, over 180 localities throughout Germany recorded attacks on Jews, documenting the ongoing contention over Jewish emancipation (Gailus 1990, 2002, 45–50).

But the most disturbing form of popular violence against Jews coalesced around the Christian superstition of blood-libel: the medieval myth, first documented in 1150, that Jews captured Christian children and used their blood to make matzah at Passover. Blood-libel incidents occurred sporadically throughout the nineteenth century, with an alarming spike in the century's last decades. In the Lower Rhine, missing children in 1819, 1834 and 1840 produced the climate of fear that blamed Jewish communities. In 1834, a crowd in Neuenhoven razed the houses of two Jews and furthermore destroyed a nearby synagogue (Smith 2002, 114). In these instances, as in others during the nineteenth century, the state staunchly protected Jews and defended their rights, but the "century of progress" could not dispel the blood-libel myth. On the contrary, with increased rates of literacy, the rise of yellow journalism and the manoeuvres of anti-Semitic parties, the last third of the century saw a marked increase in claims about blood-libel. In Europe, some 79 cases were reported, with 15 of them occurring in Germany and 36 in Austria (Smith 2002, 123).

Helmut Walser Smith's account of anti-Semitic violence in a West Prussian town in 1900 trenchantly illustrates the amalgam of superstition, prejudice, political ideology and unscrupulous journalism that shaped a pattern of violence during the Kaiserreich. When Ernst Winter, an 18-year-old Gymnasium student, was found dead and dismembered in a nearby lake, the crime sensationalized the nation after witnesses came forward to blame Adolph Lewy, a Jewish butcher, of committing a ritual murder. After a lynching mob in the thousands took control of Konitz's street in May, demanding death to the Jews, a Prussian army regiment was summoned to secure control. The readiness of witnesses to perjure themselves for reward money was hardly novel, nor was the alacrity with which the press exploited the case to peddle anti-Semitic screed. But the 400 separate testimonies to incriminate Lewy of ritual murder perhaps speak to a deeper wellspring of motivation about community, transgression and the problems of Jewish assimilation (Smith 2002, 78, 83–85). The interwoven and mutually reinforcing influence of oral and print culture worked its pervasive power to frame an anti-Semitic narrative that many Germans were predisposed to accept. As Smith incisively notes, the case manifested "larger antagonisms" at play and conformed to a "preexisting pattern of political and religious beliefs". The collective acceptance of the myth as explanation and the capacity of anti-Semites to "believe in the objective truth to their own lies" are troubling features with wider application (Smith 2002, 22). When we add the hundreds of pogroms after 1881, some of which involved blood-libel charges, the proclivity of Christian crowds to justify their prejudice and violence through pseudo-religious myths offer a salient reminder about the persistence of irrational and reactionary elements of popular culture. Moreover, such popular violence (and the cultural attitudes that prompt it) is not restricted to the nineteenth century; this form of antisemitism, for example, helps explain the popular reception of Nazi genocidal practices during the Second World War. Even though modern racial antisemitism stamped Nazi ideology, just as the Nazi racial state claimed modern science to envision its genocidal policies in the East, the persistence of older hatred is equally important to understand why German and Eastern European communities accommodated the Nazi dystopia (Smith 2008).

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Popular contention changed over the course of the modern era. With the gradual expansion of manhood suffrage after 1860 and the accompanying development of unions, parties, and the political press, the ability of

ordinary Europeans to express their views became part of the formal public sphere. But if modernization theory once relegated traditional repertoires of protest to the status of a residual, superannuated folk culture, more recent interpretations of popular politics underscore hybridity and adaptation to explain why such protest persisted throughout the nineteenth century—and beyond. Traditional protest offered a cultural framework within which ordinary Germans shaped political activism. Indeed, customs and rites enabled face-to-face communities to build consensus and legitimize their discontent through practices valorized by historical convention. The informality of carnivalesque unruliness and the humour of its satire endures for its ability to disarm authority (Davis 2008). Historians have rightly pointed to democratic qualities in these kinds of protest, but one must avoid romanticizing populist action and acknowledge its multidirectional nature. If pot-clanging protests against political corruption offer an inspiriting transnational example of enlightened populism, lynch mobs and blood-libel violence strike a chilling equipoise. Whether invoking rights of liberty and justice or violently excluding an out-group, modern politics has deployed popular rites to engage political participation and mobilize publics. At issue, then, is not denying the historical force of political modernity, whose formal institutions and fissured ideologies have stamped world history in the last three centuries, but, rather, assessing the degree to which traditional forms of popular culture have shaped the evolution of participatory politics in the modern era. The history of popular politics evinces a wide variety of expression, and the creativity of communities to rework tradition for effective contestation and political reform continues into the present day. The history of nineteenth-century popular culture sharpens this balanced perspective.

Notes

1. 5 September 1832, Geheimes Staatsarchiv preußischer Kulturbezitz [Berlin] (GStAPK), Rep. 77, Tit. 505, Nr. 5, Bd. I, p. 218.
2. General Landesarchiv [Karlsruhe] (GLA), Best. 236, Nr. 8166, p. 27.
3. GStAPK, Rep. 77, Tit. 505, Nr. 5, Bd. 1, pp. 179–181, 205–212.
4. 28 July 1831, Hauptstaatsarchiv Düsseldorf (HStAD), Reg. Aachen, Nr. 237, unpag.

5. 19 March 1833, HStAD, Reg. Aachen, Nr. 227, unpag; Landeshauptarchiv Koblenz (LHAK), Best. 441, Nr. 12929, unpag.
6. 6 November 1828, LHAK, Best. 403, Nr. 2430, pp. 3–4.
7. 4 September 1830, HStAD, Reg. Aachen, Nr. 204; GStAPK, Rep. 77, Tit. 505, Nr. 6, Bd. III.
8. "An die Bürger und Einwohner Berlins. Wozu dienen und wozu führen die Katzen-Musiken?" Rare Books and Special Collections, Princeton University, Revolution of 1848–49, Ex Oversize 1580, 763e, no. 95.
9. LR Schnabel, 5 July 1838, GStAPK, I Rep. 77, Tit. 505, Nr. 1, Bd. 1, p. 293.
10. 13 December, HStaD, RDPr, Nr. 856, pp. 84, 121.
11. HStaD, RAPr, Nr. 2235, pp. 148–149.

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CHAPTER 3

Charivari and the 1876 Italian Elections

Enrico Baroncini

After the "parliamentary revolution" of March 1876, the November elections definitely closed the period of power of the Historical Right (destra storica) parliamentary group. The voting process was managed by the left-wing government by using public offices, especially prefects, as a means of influencing the results (Cammarano 1999, 141–142; Carocci 1956, 71–73; Ghisalberti 1991, 169; Mascilli Migliorini 1979, 45–46). This method of conducting the electoral campaign, despite not being too unusual if we consider the laws and the habits of the period (Ballini 2002, 4, 8), was harshly criticized. Another widely debated issue during the campaign regarded a series of episodes of public hostility directed towards right-wing politicians. Such incidents were extensively reported by the conservative press, which denounced the serious threat posed by these acts to the freedom to vote and the left-wing government's unacceptable tolerance of this behaviour. As the conservative *Gazzetta di Mantova*[1] lamented, it was impossible to prevent these episodes "if it is the government itself, or rather the progressive committee, that promotes public demonstrations!". The *Fanfulla*,[2]

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another newspaper belonging to the conservative front, laid the responsibility directly on the Prime Minister, Depretis.

> Honourable Depretis! Faced with the stones thrown in Vergato, the disorders in Dolo, the pharmaceutical-republican wrecking in Rimini, and so many street demonstrations, can you still retain the contented calm of the Stradella grape harvest, where you talked about the honesty of the elections?

A common feature to all of the demonstrations reported is the presence of elements of mockery and derision typical of charivari, used both as a weapon against the election of the candidates and as a satire directed at those who had lost the elections.

When we approach the study of charivari in nineteenth-century Italy, we must consider at least three phenomena: the popular ritual, the studies of the folklorists and the satirical journals. During the nineteenth century, the forms and functions of the practices of hostility changed, and these rituals became less common, while occurring more frequently in moments of political or social tension (Fincardi 2004, 2009, 2014). In the second half of the century, the charivari became a subject of study for Italian folklorists, who considered it essentially as a form of interference in the marital choices of widowers and widows. Their studies, which were mainly based on erudition and not at all interested in direct observation, were aimed more at stigmatizing this practice than to analysis and, at the same time, they revealed a need to educate a population that was considered as savage (De Gubernatis 1869; Vayra 1876; Del Vecchio 1885; see also Castelli 2004). The same lack of sensitivity and understanding towards this kind of ritual was also present in contemporary Italian narrative (Fincardi 2005). During the same time, various Italian satirical journals began exploiting—albeit in a cultural elitist context—the derisive language of the charivari, following the French and British models.

In the context of Italian historiography on nineteenth-century Italy, the study of traditional practices of hostility, although still at an early stage, has found a place within the description of social conflict (Barozzi 1983; Brunello 2011; Ramella 1984, 227–237; see also Torre 2004). Electoral periods, on the other hand, remain mostly unexplored territory, with only a few exceptions (Della Sala 1987; Fincardi 1990). In the following pages I will try to examine two examples of this practice, which took place in the electoral constituencies of Vergato and Ravenna (both in the northern Emilia Romagna region) during the elections of 1876. In the first case I

will analyze the representation of charivari in the press and the strategies that were used to make it acceptable to the readers. In the second case I will analyze the use of the practices of hostility in the electoral context and the different elements that composed this kind of derisive language. My analysis will be mainly based on newspaper articles, since the press was one of the most important media for political communication, both at the local and national levels. Moreover, during the course of the elections, newspapers were also an effective means of propaganda. Through the study of the final phase of the electoral campaign in the electoral constituencies of Vergato and Ravenna, I will see how the campaign—while still being conducted by the rules of bourgeois culture—used the pre-modern symbolic languages of the protest.

The Case of Vergato

One of the most frequently exploited incidents by the conservative press, especially because of the prestige of the personality involved, occurred to Count Guglielmo Capitelli. After holding office in various positions, Capitelli was elected mayor of Naples in 1868. In 1873 he was nominated prefect of Bologna by the right-wing Minghetti government, therefore contributing, in 1874, in determining the electoral success of the "ministerial" candidates of the province (Barbagallo 1975). In the wake of the defeat of the right, Capitelli resigned from office, and moved on to take an important role in the difficult organization of conservatives in southern Italy for the upcoming electoral race. In the meantime, the conservatives enlisted him as a candidate in the electoral constituency of Vergato, in the hope of holding back the probable success of the left wing. However, his candidacy presented some risks, since, as Ludovico Berti—a conservative member of Parliament and close to Minghetti—wrote in a letter to Capitelli, "undoubtedly the Prefect will go to any length […] to exclude you" (Quazza 1925, 243). The new prefect of Bologna Luigi Gravina, appointed in April by the left-wing Depretis government, played in fact a very active role in the electoral campaign.[3]

At the first round, Capitelli came in second, although with only a few votes separating him from the candidate of the left, Cesare Lugli.[4] Therefore, he resolved to visit the electoral constituency and organized a series of public speeches to be held before the run-off voting. The *Gazzetta dell'Emilia*, newspaper of the Bologna conservatives, recounted that

> Capitelli arrived in Porretta [province of Bologna] on Wednesday evening, and while he was sleeping at his hotel, at 2 AM he heard a funeral march playing and then yelling, whistling and shouting from the street. The protest continued from 2 until five in the morning with more screams, curses and threats as well as a powerful hail of stones against the hotel's windows. Is this the new means to gain electoral triumphs?[5]

On the same day, *Il nuovo Alfiere*, recently passed to the progressive front,[6] offers another account of the incident. As well as whistling, the crowd purportedly shouted "Death to Capitelli, long live Lugli, death to the conservatives, long live the Depretis ministry". Furthermore, the town's two local brass bands played "funeral marches in honour of Capitelli's political death, and cheerful music in support of Lugli". After such a reception, the conservative candidate had to flee back to Bologna to the satisfaction of the progressive newspaper, which had already extensively ridiculed Capitelli's electoral results during the first round.[7] However, the article also expressed a certain degree of concern about the possible disorientation of the progressive electorate, and the incident was therefore defined as "ugly, horrible preludes to a triumph of the conservatives in Vergato".[8] *La Patria*, a renowned progressive newspaper from Bologna, added to its account a detail regarding the mayor of Porretta, who had been less than happy to meet Capitelli, but refrained from further comment.[9] It appears, then, that the progressive press was satisfied with the demonstration, but at the same time aware that the excesses of popular satire could become intolerable for the electorate to the point of threatening the election of a progressive candidate.

Even the correspondent in Rome of the influential *Journal des Débats* implicitly described the incident, observing that

> In some places, people have found clever ways of staging charivaris according to the harmony's rules. The band assembles below the candidates' windows and there they play a funeral march, so that the meaning of the demonstration cannot be misinterpreted. The piece ends with a concert of whistles.[10]

The article reveals an interest in the new forms that charivari could assume, while already recognising it as a common practice during electoral periods. Such point of view is not surprising, considering that French journalism had been forced to develop a particular sensitivity to the phenomenon from the end of the *ancien régime* to the Second Empire (Agulhon 1970;

Bercé 1976; Bonnain-Moerdyk and Moerdyk 1977; Forbes 2010; Gheno 2010; Ozouf 1976; Sahlins 1994; Tilly 1980, 1986; Vovelle 1976; Weber 1976; see also Docteur Calybariat 1833).

However, Italian newspapers were also beginning to associate explicitly this and other episodes to the practice of charivari. The *Fanfulla*, for example, described the "progressive educational serenades"[11] dedicated to right-wing candidates, a definition which emphasized the exploitation of popular customs for electoral purposes. Of course, one should not overstate the editors' awareness of the refunctionalization of traditional practices of hostility, although they did register an unusual and, at times, effective, relation between popular expressivity and support of the outgoing government. Within the progressive front, *La Patria*—responding to the *Gazzetta dell'Emilia*—defined the demonstration for Capitelli a charivari and tried to downplay the incident by comparing it to the "jeering and heckling that candidates have to face during English electoral meetings".[12]

In the electoral constituency of Vergato, the Capitelli episode provided both sides of the political dispute with plenty of arguments. While conservatives linked the incident to the general atmosphere of intimidation directed at their candidates, progressives could not agree on a common course of action. *La Patria* chose to tone down the controversy, concentrating instead on bolstering the progressive front for the upcoming runoff vote.[13] Meanwhile, *Il nuovo Alfiere* continued to cover the episode, pursuing a press campaign in order to prove that Lugli had not been directly involved in the protest. In fact, the newspaper went as far as to publish a letter from the progressive candidate where he denied the allegation, made by *Gazzetta dell'Emilia*, "of having suggested, inspired and almost paid for" the demonstration against Capitelli.[14] For the progressive press it was, in fact, important to show the spontaneity of the demonstration. In other words, for the charivari to be effective, and therefore to publicly discredit the conservative candidate, it had to appear as if it represented the judgement of the community and not as a clash between political candidates.

However, there was also another problem to solve for the political-journalistic progressive front. The aggressiveness of the demonstration to Capitelli, which had not been triggered by any specific provocation, was perceived as too violent and at risk of scaring away potential electors. In fact, because of the extremely restricted suffrage, the right to vote was still limited to a very narrow segment of the population—mainly belonging

to the upper classes and the aristocracy—who was unlikely to tolerate the intimidation of candidates through the excesses of popular satire.

In order to legitimate the demonstration in the eye of the public opinion, *Il nuovo Alfiere* eventually devised a brilliant, albeit creative solution. The newspaper reported that Capitelli, "just arrived at the hotel Cavour, drew out two guns in an attempt to intimidate the owner, whom he saw as a political enemy". This episode caused the "irritation" of the town, which did not lead—as previously reported—to a hail of stones, but to the throwing of a "fiasco[15] […] as a facetious allusion to Capitelli's triumph".[16] With this version of the facts, undoubtedly exaggerated, if not completely fabricated, part of the progressive press was trying to redefine the popular demonstration as an excessive but legitimate reaction to a senseless provocation. The conservative candidate was consequently depicted as a dangerous criminal, an image which was well suited to alienate the bourgeois electorate. The timing of the operation was also very significant: the story was published on the day of the run-off vote, therefore making it impossible to confute before the polls were closed.

The short and disastrous "electoral journey" helped Capitelli to gain support, although still not enough to be elected. On Sunday night, after the results of the election had been made public,

> A crowd of voters and non-voters led by the mayor, mr. Corazza, walked from Porretta to Vergato, where it was met with lights, cheering, shouts of long live Lugli, death to the moderates, death to Capitelli.

Reports also signalled that "subprefect Flori was at the station, greeting and applauding the demonstrators". This presence was met with a dry comment from the *Gazzetta dell'Emilia*: "we wish we didn't have to believe this".[17]

Many years after the facts, Vittorio Bersezio, a leading writer and political commentator, recounted the "debauchery, not lacking insults and curses aimed at the losers" that greeted the rise to power of the left in March 1876 (Bersezio 1895, 463). It is an image which can be easily compared to the description of the celebrations held in Vergato as well as in other Italian cities. In Pisa, winners were celebrated with dances, bonfires in the main square of the city and ovations to the prefect.[18] The city of Mantova witnessed similar celebrations, with demonstrators shouting "Hurrah for Democracy! […] moderate party go to bed".[19] In Perugia, the local brass band improvised a concert in order to "celebrate Professor

Fabbretti and in the main time to mock the major's defeat". Once again, a small crowd marched to the prefect's office shouting "Hurrah to the republic".[20] In each place where campaigns were conducted in the midst of harsh conflicts, the celebration of the winners incorporated elements of mockery of the losers. Generally, however, the local authorities were more likely to be passively involved in the festivities rather than being active participants. In Vergato, on the contrary, public officials seemed to be the main organizers of the post-electoral festivities, or at least to take active part instead of being mere spectators, to the point of sending a large delegation in honour of Lugli.[21]

Il nuovo Alfiere, foreseeing the criticism that such behaviour could attract, created a story in order to justify it. According to their report, the former prefect had made threats to the local administrators in an attempt of having conservatives elected in parliament.[22] Therefore, the victims of his intimidations seized the first available opportunity to have their revenge. Nevertheless, as we have seen, these demonstrations were also attended by non-voters, a fact which is noted on other occasions and which became the object of journalistic disputes.[23] For non-voters, this represented one of the rare chances to have an influence, albeit indirectly, on political decision-making.

Throughout the episode, we can identify specific triggering facts: a newspaper that had recently passed into the control of the progressive front, and therefore in search of legitimation from its readers; civil servants who took the opportunity to retaliate for a past offence; a large group of non-voters who was probably protesting against the strict fiscal policy of the former government, which Capitelli represented at a local level. The electoral period and the government's permissiveness became an occasion to express a latent hostility, which, amplified by the press, crossed the local boundaries where it had developed and acquired national relevance.

The Case of Ravenna

During the 1870s, the first electoral constituency of Ravenna saw a heated battle between progressives and conservatives. In 1873, a progressive member of parliament, Gioacchino Rasponi, tendered his resignation and, at Minghetti's request, became prefect of Palermo. New elections were held to fill the vacant seat, and on three consecutive occasions the winner was Alfredo Baccarini, progressive candidate and a functionary of the Ministry of Public Works. However, the elections were declared invalid

because of the electoral law, which allowed only a limited number of members of parliament coming from the public administration. The seat then passed on to another member of the Rasponi family, Cesare, who won for the conservatives both at the supplementary elections of May 1874 and at the general elections held in November of the same year. This second election was harshly contested, however, because of the prefect's active support of the conservative candidates, apparently inspired directly by the minister of the Interior, Girolamo Cantelli (Bertondini 1966, 320–322; besides Depretis and Farini, Cavallotti also opposed the election: see Cavallotti 1888, 29–42). In the 1876 elections, the first electoral constituency eventually elected Baccarini, who managed to beat Cesare Rasponi at the first round (on Baccarini's electoral history, see Varni 1983).

As soon as the conservatives' defeat was made public, the walls of the houses of several members of the party were "smeared with offensive inscriptions and drawings of enormous fiascos and obscene figures traced in charcoal".[24] *Il Ravennate*, a conservative newspaper, denounced the episode and demanded the support of the local press. The following day, sympathetic articles appeared everywhere,[25] with the exception of *Il Romagnolo*, the official progressive newspaper, which tried to minimize the incident.[26] The ambiguous defence was strongly criticized by a reply in *Il Ravennate*, which also reported that the offensive demonstrations had not ended: we learn that "the other night more houses were littered" with the usual drawings and "insulting words (like thief and coward)".[27] Nevertheless, five days after the announcement of the electoral results, these night-time episodes of derision were repeated on a daily basis, despite the local conservative press, who marked them as uncivil in an attempt to discredit and isolate the perpetrators.[28] When this strategy eventually failed, the only remaining solution was to call for intervention by the police force, who had up to that point remained mostly indifferent to the demonstrations. This led to the arrest of two suspects, accused of having attached satires to the house of a conservative politician.[29] In this case, I will examine especially the refunctionalization of folkloric language, which was used to discredit the defeated party in the face of local public opinion. There are three main elements to be analyzed here: the images of the *fiasco*; the obscene drawings; and the period of the year in which the episode took place.

In Romagna, the use of the symbol of the *fiasco* to mock electoral defeats was quite common, and can often be found throughout the harsh political conflict of the 1890s. The conservative journal of Cesena, *Il Cittadino*,

commenting on the "radicals'" victory at the supplementary elections of 1891, reported that "fiascos and insulting words have appeared on the walls of some houses", and that conservative voters also received "several postcards" asking for supplies of *fiascos*.[30] In 1892, the victory of Alfredo Comandini—a former republican turned conservative—was not followed by the usual mocking. Almost surprised, *Il Cittadino* noted the absence of "shouting, writing, fiascos, or other insulting drawings on walls; there have been no balloons with puppets and symbols of scorn".[31] For the 1895 elections, the republican newspaper of Lugo, *La Vedetta*, while not actually condoning this behaviour, recognized it nonetheless as a traditional practice that had often attacked the defeated republicans, and also as a way to "mark, through a satire, those defeated candidates who have struggled too hard for a victory".[32] In the course of the same elections, in Cesena, the progressives' victory was celebrated by "insulting the opponents" with "true charivaris" and, during the night, with the "usual fiascos, some of which quite elegant and traced with prepared moulds, others primitively scribbled by the future *Giottos* of the future social republic".[33] Considering their widespread use, we could hypothesize that we are observing the formation of a repertoire of mocking practices, specific of the electoral period, where this symbol played a central role.

This language, however, was not only typical of urban lower classes, but, at least since 1848, was also cleverly employed by the press, and especially by satirical publications, to describe political failures. Although this issue is certainly worth further investigation, here it will be sufficient to mention a few significant examples. The proclamation of the Roman republic was celebrated by the Roman satirical newspaper *Il Don Pirlone* with an image of a train loaded with *fiascos* traveling to Gaeta, where Pio IX had taken refuge.[34] Another example was the caricature of the resignations of General Gabriele de Launay, the reactionary prime minister of the kingdom of Sardinia, offered by the satirical journal of Turin, *Il Fischietto*: the cartoon portrayed him followed by a porter carrying an enormous *fiasco*.[35] This explicit criticism was not accidental, but chimed in with the support of the newspaper to Cavour's liberal-moderate politics (Della Peruta 2011, 205).

However, this symbolism used, in particular, to comment on electoral results. In 1876, the conservative newspaper *Fanfulla* ridiculed the failure of its own political front, announcing that "The moderates' cellar is full. To the *fiascos* of the 5th we have added the *fiascos* of the 12th".[36] In the third electoral constituency of Milan, the former minister of Foreign

Affairs, Emilio Visconti-Venosta, ran against Cesare Correnti—one of the most prominent members of the dissident right wing and an ally of the left wing—eventually losing the election. The resounding defeat was presented by *Lo Spirito Folletto*, one of the most influential satirical magazines of the time, with the image of a *fiasco* bearing the looks of the former minister.[37] In politics, *fiascos* are not employed to represent a simple defeat, but a humiliating failure that will hardly be forgotten, especially by the opponents.

The origin of the idiomatic expression and of the iconic language attached to it is, as is often the case, is actually quite difficult to determine here. In the case of "*fare fiasco*", in particular, many have given inaccurate interpretations often based on questionable evidence (Vidossi 1953). Moreover, for a considerable time this symbolism has been mostly associated with an elite context because of its circulation in theatrical jargon (Rosenfeld 1952, 1953). Only recently, linguist Ottavio Lurati has proposed the hypothesis that, in fact, Italian and European traditional cultures constitute the environment where this expression and the habits and uses associated with it have originated and developed (Lurati 2002, 25–56). Regarding the derisive symbolism of *fiascos* it is relevant to note that during the second half of the nineteenth century, both the bourgeoisie and the urban lower classes have adopted elements of the same derisive language.

In the episode I have presented, in addition to a widespread use of symbolism, we can observe practices that were instead typical of a more restricted area. The first round of elections took place on 5 November, while the mocking began on the same night and ended six days later, on the 11th. In Romagna, as well as in other places (Finamore 1890, 184–188; Zanazzo 1908, 117–118), this time of the year was dedicated to the festivities in honour of San Martino. On this occasion, a seasonal variation of the charivari was usually staged to mock betrayed husbands (Baldini 1986, 153–177, 1987; Sobrero 1994). During the second half of the nineteenth century, this practice was still very much alive and frequent references to it can be found on the pages of newspapers, especially on those frequent occasions when the police force was called to intervene.[38] Generally, the practice involved the counter-music typical of the charivari and obscene drawings—traced on the walls of the houses where the victims of the mockery lived—of horns (Spallicci 1911) or crutches (Pratella 1974, 156).

This episode shows a clear intention to extend the mockery of the electoral defeat until the day of San Martino, in order to protract the effect of ridicule. If *fiascos* served to remind the conservative party of its electoral failure, the obscene drawings represented an explicit comment on the family life of right-wing politicians. The graffiti, which, as we have seen, insulted them with words like "thief and coward", probably referred to the banking occupations of some of the major exponents of the right wing, who had built part of their consensus through the control of credit institutions (Ridolfi 1996, 244). Therefore, the post-electoral mockery of Ravenna attacked every aspect of the lives of the members of the defeated party, seriously compromising their public reputation.

The language of the practices of hostility used in San Martino, on the other hand, was particularly flexible and easily adapted to new needs and non-traditional symbolic systems. Almost two weeks before the announcement of the electoral results of 1882, drawings of "phrygian caps bearing republican *fasci*", of a guillotine and slogans in support of members of Parliament Andrea Costa and Agostino Bertani appeared in a number of towns.[39] The unexpected election of the candidates of the extreme left in the electoral constituency of Ravenna was celebrated by exploiting the day of San Martino and sending a threatening message to the opposing parties. In this case, however, the imagery was typical of the extreme left-wing parties of the period, and the only traditional element was represented by the occasion, a circumstance that can be read as an evidence of the use of this practice in non-popular contexts.

Conclusion

In the press, the 1876 electoral campaign was punctuated, in some cases, by the announcement of demonstrations against the conservatives, where protesters employed the languages of the traditional practices of hostility, especially in the northern regions, where the support for the conservatives had deeper roots. Therefore, while it became easier for the conservatives to centre their press campaign on the condemnation of these episodes, the situation appeared to be more complicated for the progressives. The bourgeois culture, to which both parties belonged, tended to be hostile towards these kinds of actions, seen as a demonstration of incivility and therefore opposed on the grounds of the new individualistic moral. On the other hand, these actions still had the power to discredit political opponents, especially at the local level, and could hardly be fought with

the usual forms of propaganda. In the case of the small town of Porretta, we can clearly detect the presence of these two opposing needs: on the one hand, the refusal to appear compliant to vulgar demonstrations, but, on the other, the wish to exploit a humiliating mockery. In Porretta, a section of the progressives of Bologna tried to exploit the effect of ridicule coming from the idea of a former prefect being heavily mocked in his own province, and therefore spread a justifying version of the facts. In the transition from the actual public action to its narrative offered by the press, charivari had to be presented in an acceptable form for bourgeois public opinion in order to become at least partially tolerable within the electoral struggle.

The Ravenna episode shows another instance of popular expressivity in electoral periods. Post-electoral mockery was not a relatively common occurrence during this consultation. However, in the case of Ravenna, significantly, it was staged by using the flexible forms of a local version of the charivari, which, on this occasion, involved both a traditional symbolic language and elements common in the culture of the élites. Furthermore, coherent with an idea of politics as conflict between individuals rather than ideas, satire was directed not only at electoral failures, but also at every aspect of the professional and personal life of the defeated. Therefore, we can safely assume that the language of the practices of hostility was still considered a powerful instrument for those who were capable of exploiting it through their clienteles and traditional relations of subordination.

Although during electoral campaigns practices of hostility were part of the demonstrations in support of the progressives, even the conservatives could show a certain degree of approval, especially if there were relevant policy issues at stake. Approximately a month before the episodes mentioned here, the Third Catholic Congress took place in Bologna, but it was quickly interrupted by the prefect after a few animated anti-clerical demonstrations (Candeloro 1974, 153). Among these, the *Gazzetta dell'Emilia* reported "a charivari below the windows of the cardinal archbishop and of several [clerical] citizens". The conservative newspaper, while disapproving of the demonstration, does not fail to notice how the nocturnal mocking was one of the many reactions caused by the attempt to "challenge […] with pompous ornaments and provocative meetings a city of patriotic feelings such as Bologna".[40] In the face of a Catholic congress which questioned the right to exist of the nation-state, the conservatives of Bologna can even justify an aggressive expressivity that would have otherwise been judged intolerable.

Notes

1. *Gazzetta di Mantova* (1876) 'Nostra corrispondenza', 13 November.
2. Io Fanfulla (1876) 'Giorno per giorno', *Fanfulla*, 12 November.
3. *Gazzetta dell'Emilia* (1876) 'Cronaca e fatti vari', 17 October; 'Cronaca elettorale. Crevalcore', 23 October.
4. *Gazzetta dell'Emilia* (1876) 'Cronaca e fatti vari', 7 November; on Lugli see: Bignardi (1956); Piretti and Guidi (1992, 170–175).
5. *Gazzetta dell'Emilia* (1876) 'Ultime notizie', 10 November.
6. La direzione (1876) 'Ai lettori', *Il nuovo Alfiere*, 1 November.
7. *Il nuovo Alfiere* (1876) 'La candidatura Capitelli a Vergato', 7 November.
8. *Il nuovo Alfiere* (1876) 'Una serenata all'ex prefetto Capitelli', 10 November; the article was also published, with a few significant omissions, in *La Nazione* (1876) 'Notizie Italiane. Bologna', 11 November.
9. *La Patria* (1876) 'Nostre informazioni', 10 November.
10. H.-G. Montferrier (1876) 'On nous écrit de Rome', *Journal des Débats*, 15 November; the article was partially quoted in *Gazzetta di Mantova* (1876) 'Dai giornali esteri d'oggi. La musica e le elezioni', 16 November.
11. Jacopo (1876) 'Note torinesi', *Fanfulla*, 17 November.
12. *La Patria* (1876) 'Cronaca bolognese e fatti vari. Stampa cittadina', 10 November.
13. *La Patria* (1876) 'Ultime cartucce', 11 November.
14. *Il nuovo Alfiere* (1876) 'Dichiarazione', 11 November.
15. A "flask", symbolizing the electoral defeat.
16. *Il nuovo Alfiere* (1876) 'Note elettorali', 12 November; this version of the story was contradicted in *Gazzetta dell'Emilia* (1876) 'Cronaca e fatti vari', 14 November.
17. *Gazzetta dell'Emilia* (1876) 'Cronaca e fatti vari', 14 November; the subprefect of Vergato, Carlo Flori, was subordinated to prefect Gravina; see Frezzini (1909).
18. *La Provincia di Pisa* (1876) 'Cronaca elettorale', 16 November.
19. *Gazzetta di Mantova* (1876) 'Cronaca cittadina e provinciale. Luna di miele', 13 November.
20. *Il Progresso. Giornale dell'Associazione monarchico-costituzionale* (1876) 'Piccolo Corriere perugino', 14 November.

21. *Il nuovo Alfiere* (1876) 'Dopo le elezioni', 14 November.
22. *Il nuovo Alfiere* (1876) 'Statistica elettorale', 15 November.
23. *La Nazione* (1876) 'A proposito di dimostrazioni', 15 November; Don Peppino (1876) 'Di qua e di là dai monti. La piazza', *Fanfulla*, 11 November.
24. *Il Ravennate* (1876) 'Cronaca', 7 November.
25. *Il Ravennate* (1876) 'Cronaca', 8 November.
26. *Il Romagnolo* (1876) 'Un po' di Tutto', 8 November.
27. *Il Ravennate* (1876) 'Cronaca', 9 November.
28. *Il Ravennate* (1876) 'Cronaca', 10 November.
29. *Il Ravennate* (1876) 'Cronaca', 13 November.
30. *Il Cittadino* (1891) 'Cesena. Cronaca elettorale retrospettiva', 26 April.
31. *Il Cittadino* (1892) 'Cesena. Cronaca elettorale', 13 November.
32. *La Vedetta* (1895) 'Ai nostri avversari. I fiaschi', 2 June; see also *Gazzetta di Lugo* (1897) 'In giro per Lugo. Cronaca. Troppo presto!', 27 March.
33. *Il Cittadino* (1895) 'Cesena. Cronaca elettorale', 2 June.
34. *Il Don Pirlone* (1849) 'Spedizione per Gaeta', CXXVIII, 8 February.
35. *Il Fischietto* (1849) 'La ritirata di un ministro co' suoi soli e colle sue stelle, produrrà necessariamente un eclisse al ministero', LVI, 12 May.
36. Io Fanfulla (1876) 'Giorno per giorno', *Fanfulla*, 14 November.
37. Sancio (1876) 'Le occupazioni d'Europa secondo i consorti. L'Europa che guarda il III Collegio', *Lo Spirito Folletto*, 16 November.
38. *Il Ravennate* (1865) 'Cronaca Locale. Canti notturni', 15 November ; (1875) 'Corriere di Ravenna', November 12; (1877) 'Cronaca', 13 November; (1880) 'Cronaca', 12 November.
39. *Il Ravennate* (1882) 'Cronaca', 15 November.
40. *Gazzetta dell'Emilia* (1876) 'Cronaca e fatti vari', 10 October.

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CHAPTER 4

Peasant Resistance Traditions and the Irish War of Independence, 1918–21

John Borgonovo

Persistent and sophisticated peasant agitation brought about major political and social change in Ireland during the so-called long nineteenth century. Different modes of agrarian resistance provided precedents for the later Irish independence movement in the early twentieth century. This chapter will outline and contextualize aspects of Ireland's nineteenth-century peasant resistance repertoires, and link them to later anti-state activity during the Irish Revolutionary period of 1918–21. It will be argued that resistance techniques from earlier generations were called upon by Irish republicans as needed during their pioneering campaign of civil disobedience and guerrilla warfare.

Writing about Irish agrarian agitation during the early twentieth century, historian Fergus Campbell has argued, "While historians have considered the impact of social and economic change on Irish agrarian class structure, and described the ideas of national and local nationalist elites, they have not—by and large—reconstructed the systems of thought and behaviour

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of ordinary peasants or workers" (Campbell 2008, 293). The methods of popular resistance described below have been recognized by scholars of the Irish Revolutionary period, but they generally have not been studied as their own phenomenon. It is hoped this chapter will deepen our understanding of resistance repertoires not only in the 1918–21 period, but also both before and after the Irish Revolution.

Irish Rural Resistance: 'Agrarianism' During the Long Nineteenth Century

As a case study, Ireland does not fit neatly into a colonial framework. The British conquest of Gaelic Ireland was begun by the Normans in the twelfth century and completed roughly four hundred years later. About 90 per cent of land owned by Catholics was ultimately redistributed into massive estates held by the Anglo-Protestant gentry, who financed lavish lifestyles from rental income paid largely by impoverished Catholic tenant farmers. The 1803 Act of Union brought Ireland into the United Kingdom alongside England, Scotland and Wales. Ireland received representation in the British parliament, but was still largely governed by an unelected executive, mixing parliamentary democracy with colonial administration. Ireland's population was about 75 per cent Catholic, with a majority of the Protestants residing in the northeast province of Ulster. In the rest of Ireland, however, the political and economic elite was strongly Protestant and retained an Anglo cultural identity that differentiated it from the peasant population, which was Catholic by religion and Gaelic by cultural tradition and language (the Irish language fell into rapid decline in the second half of the nineteenth century). Much of the Catholic population supported Irish self-government, despite decisive British defeats of nationalist uprisings, such as the bloody 1798 Rebellion. Recognising the futility of further armed conflict against a powerful state, a new generation of Irish nationalist and land reformers sought alternative modes of resistance in the nineteenth century.

Collective action by peasant communities against government representatives, landlords and their agents was relatively common. Studying the early nineteenth century, Michael Huggins found within the Catholic peasantry, "a pervasive sense of solidarity against cooperation with the state when it acted against those perceived as defending the rural poor" (Huggins 2007). The highly organized and well-armed state police (the

Royal Irish Constabulary) enjoyed only limited legitimacy, while one historian describing the Irish judiciary as "isolated representatives of law and government among people who seemed to recognise neither" (Crossman 1996, 15, see also Malcolm 2006).

Irish historiography uses the term "agrarianism" to denote various forms of rural resistance and intimidation in disputes surrounding land possession or rural employment. Agrarian secret societies operated during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Using such names as "Whiteboys", "Rightboys", Oakboys", and "Ribbonmen", these covert, oath-bound organizations protected members' social and economic interests through a variety of direct action tactics, many of them violent (Beames 1983; Bric 1983, 100–123; Donnelly 1975; Lee 1973a, 26–35; Wall 1973, 13–25). Handbills or posters announced to the community transgressions against acceptable conduct. Repeat offenders faced threats and various forms of violence, including beatings, arson attacks and assaults on livestock. "These were not attacks on 'landlordism', nor were they 'nationalist' in interpretation," Thomas Bartlett has argued. "Rather they were protests against the introduction into certain areas of rural Ireland of demands or practices that were held to be non-customary, or excessive, or both" (Bartlett 1987, 192–193). Violent agrarian resistance methods punished certain offences against has been described as "subversive" law or "unwritten law" (Laird 2005, 25–27). For example, "land jumping" (taking over a landholding from an evicted tenant) often triggered retribution. Land agents, middlemen leaseholders and bail servers all faced brutal assaults on occasion, with the latter sometimes requiring police or military escorts to perform their duties.

Irish historians have debated the role of political allegiance in such rural unrest. It might be said that opposition to British governance in Ireland was one of many social, political and economic undercurrents in these peasant mobilizations (Cronin 2012; Dooley 2004; Lee 1973b; Garvin 1982, 133–155; Vaughan 1994). At the same time, the French Revolution raised political awareness among the Irish peasantry. During the early nineteenth century, the Irish rural economy also transitioned to a more distinct market model, which raised communal tensions. Common areas were enclosed, rent arrears were more aggressively pursued, and tenant evictions became more common (Bartlett 1987, 204). Peasant life was irretrievably changed by the "Great Famine" of 1845–52, which struck the most vulnerable members of rural society. Ireland lost roughly a quarter of its population during the upheaval, including an estimated one mil-

lion people dead (from starvation and illness) and another one million who emigrated (Gray 1995; Kinealy 1994; Ó Gráda 1999). The utter failure of the government and Irish landlords during that extended crisis sustained peasant hostility in the decades that followed.

Catholic Emancipation and Repeal Agitation, "The Tithe War" and Land Wars

During the nineteenth century, Irish nationalism acted as a catalyst during three distinct mass mobilizations: (1) Daniel O'Connell's campaigns for Catholic Emancipation and Repeal; (2) the "Tithe War"; and (3) the "Land War". The first wave involved the nationalist leader Daniel O'Connell, who formed peasant mass movements around the issues of "Catholic Emancipation" in the 1820s (the right of Catholics to take seats in the British parliament), and "Repeal" in the 1840s (overturning the 1801 Act of Union, and bringing about a limited Irish parliament, a form of legislative autonomy called, "Home Rule"). O'Connell's peasant political parties created parish-by-parish structures to enable mass mobilization. They raised funds via one-penny membership fees (dubbed "the Catholic rent"), affordable to impoverished labourers and tenant farmers. This enabled the O'Connell organizations to contest elections, generate propaganda, stage elaborate rallies and processions, open reading rooms, and produce a party newspaper. The Catholic Association won a series of spectacular electoral victories against landlord parliamentarians, who could no longer control their tenant voters with eviction threats or rent increases (O'Hanrahan 1990, 481–495). Having secured Catholic civil rights in 1829, O'Connell attempted to achieve Irish legislative autonomy during the 1840s. To demonstrate his party's power and capacity for responsible governance, O'Connell organized enormous "Monster Meetings" that sometimes attracted hundreds of thousands of participants. The gatherings were essentially elaborate processions of different communal elements expressing nationalistic, Catholic and agrarian affiliations. Mass meeting spectacles demonstrated communal solidarity with the movement, while also implying physical resistance should the agitation fail (Owens 1994, 35–40, 1999b, 32–36). Though the Repeal campaign ultimately collapsed under the weight of concerted government repression, internal divisions and O'Connell's fading health, the Irish peasantry had been conditioned to participating in popular politics and mass action.

During this period, Irish farmers paid a heavy levy on agricultural goods to support the (Anglican) Church of Ireland, the official state church. These tithes were highly unpopular among Catholic peasants, who engaged in a refusal to pay campaign in the early 1830s (O'Hanrahan 1990, 481–495). The government compelled compliance through the confiscation of livestock in lieu of payment, with the seizures carried out by police, often supported by troops. Many rural communities resisted livestock confiscations; scouts watched roads for the approaching police force, and summoned supporters by blowing horns or ringing church bells. Highways were blocked with felled trees, boulder barricades and dismantled bridges. The cattle of the targeted farmer were hidden, while neighbours jeered and stoned the police. If the authorities managed to confiscate livestock, they had difficulty selling them at market. Campaigners published details of where and when the seized tithe cattle would be sold. At the market, crowds of sympathizers intimidated potential buyers with boos and threats. Anyone breaking the ban could be "shunned" by the community, a process later known as "boycotting" (Laird 2005, 69–71; Burtchaell and Dowlin 1990, 251–272; O'Hanrahan 1990, 481–495; O'Donoghue 1965, 7–28, 1966, 69–98, 1972, 77–108).

A separate peasant mobilization occurred during the "Land War" of the 1880s. A new political movement, the Irish Land League, demanded the introduction of fixed leases for tenant farmers and compensation should they be evicted from their holding. Affiliated to the Irish Home Rule Party in the British House of Commons (led by Charles Stuart Parnell), the Land League ultimately sought to transfer land ownership from gentry landlords to peasant tenants. Drawing together constitutional, physical force, and socialist strands of Irish nationalism, the Land League created a powerful mass movement that ultimately broke Irish landlords through the use of the boycott. This tactic had been commonly deployed in prior agrarian agitation, though not on such a systematic level. It punished the offending landlords by isolating their estate and businesses, mainly by denying labour and services (Bew 1978; Curtis 2003, 134–138; Jones 1995; Jordan 1994; Moody 1981).

The term "boycott" was coined during the Land League's first notable deployment of the tactic in 1880, against a land agent called Captain Charles Boycott (Boyle 1983). Those who broke the boycott were themselves ostracized by their community, sometimes in a visible manner. For example, the offender might be followed through the streets by a booing crowd; if they entered a church, the entire congregation might

depart. The Land League also organized rent strikes to deprive estates of revenue. Evictions of tenants for non-payment often generated mass resistance from the community. Again road cutting was common, and crowds often assembled to voice their displeasure or stone landlord agents and police (Ball 2000; Curtis 2007, 207–248; Geary 1986; King 2009). More imaginative techniques were sometimes used, such as the stringing of cats heads across the road to spook horses (Laird 2005, 69).

The Irish Land League undermined the state judicial system by creating its own parallel league system, which followed similar undertakings during the anti-tithe agitation and Daniel O'Connell's Emancipation and Repeal campaigns (Jordan 1998, 146–171; Crossman 1996, 60–62, 73–74, 139–142). Land League courts were binding arbitration hearings (legal under British Common Law), adjudicated by Land League officials. Hearings were not intended to satirize state court proceedings, but rather to demonstrate the movement's strength and commitment to orderly governance, even while it subverted landlords and the state.

Ensuing rounds of land agitation in the 1890s and early 1900s saw elaborate opposition to home evictions (Curtis 2011). Male and female activists fortified homes, and offered violent, but non-lethal physical resistance. The house "garrison" barricaded doors and windows, and defended itself with stones, boiled water and steaming foul stews. Estate agents and police (often accompanied by troops) stormed the home with battering rams, ladders and assorted siege machines, using clubs but not firearms, and thereby reducing the danger of fatalities which would be politically damaging to the government. These highly ritualized events often drew hundreds of spectators to show communal solidarity. House sieges usually lasted hours (and occasionally days); brass bands frequently played nationalist airs to inspire the garrison; and stone throwing from the gathered crowds was common (Borgonovo 2015).

Another mode of peasant protest in this period disrupted the fox hunt, a form of social recreation for the Irish gentry (Curtis 1987; Laird 2005, 78–102). Much of the landlord lifestyle revolved around the hunt, a devotion recognized by the lower orders. In areas that saw an intensification of land agitation and state repression, activists disrupted hunts. Hundreds of peasants might appear on the hunting route and beat pots and pans, to scare off the game. Sometimes they staged their own hunt to kill the foxes before the hunt began, which caused its cancellation. Such "people's hunts" sometimes resembled a political charivari, with the peasants openly mocking the practices of their social superiors. More commonly, peas-

ant agitators simply entered riding routes to cause riders to swerve or miss jumps, or attacked mounts with stones and sticks. Covert activities included the poisoning of dog packs or culverts where foxes took shelter.

The trial and imprisonment of political prisoners in this period also became ritualized, with nationalists leveraging the country's rich brass brand tradition (Borgonovo 2015). At legal hearings, large crowds and brass bands gathered outside the courthouse, playing tunes, singing, and cheering to drown out the court proceedings. Convicted prisoners beginning their sentences sometimes were accompanied from their homes to the jail gates by crowds of sympathizers. On Sundays, local bands might play concerts outside the jail to raise the morale of those incarcerated. When the prisoner completed his or her sentence, crowds and bands processed them back to their home. For evening events, burning tar barrels marked the walking route, and sometimes were hoisted and carried on planks to add colour to the festive procession. In the countryside, bonfires were lit on hillsides, another traditional expression of popular celebration.

Under concerted pressure, the government eventually ended the Irish "Land War" by breaking up large Irish estates and funding purchases for smallholders and tenant farmers.[1] Maura Cronin states that prolonged agrarian agitation helped to win "successive land acts that by the early twentieth century amounted to a constitutional revolution in land ownership" (Cronin 2012, 58). This victory was built on decades of non-violent agrarian resistance techniques, which remained available to a new generation of agitators in Ireland's next bout of conflict.

The Irish Revolution, Boycotts and the Boundaries of Popular Resistance

From 1917 to 1921, Irish separatists (known as "republicans") rebelled against British governance in the country.[2] Though local government was now controlled largely by moderate Catholic nationalists and land ownership was in the process of being passed from large estates to small farmers, much of nationalist Ireland was frustrated by continued failure to achieve a "Home Rule" autonomous parliament. Amid the political and social instability of the First World War, republicans launched a militant campaign to win sovereign independence. After an unsuccessful, violent republican insurrection in 1916 (called "The Easter Rising"), the separatist Sinn Féin political party formed its own underground revolutionary parliament, Dáil

Éireann, and declared an independent Irish Republic in 1919, for which it sought international recognition. The republicans built a mass movement modelled on the parish-by-parish structures used by nineteenth-century Irish nationalists; they sought consensus on the question of independence and generally avoided policies that heighted class or religious divisions. From 1919 through 1921, the independence movement waged a national campaign of non-recognition of state authority, which found a degree of success.[3] In 1920, the republican paramilitary organization, the Irish Republican Army (IRA), acting in support of Dáil Éireann, initiated violent resistance against the British state. The enormous military superiority of the British forces made open warfare a poor option for republican leaders. Instead, they combined guerrilla warfare with mass civil disobedience, mobilizing diverse elements of Irish society in the process. The movement had at its disposal an arsenal of subversive resistance weapons forged in the previous century.

Perhaps the republicans' most notable achievement involved the popular rejection of the state judicial system. This occurred through the boycott of the Irish police and British military, and the creation of a revolutionary judicial system under the auspices of Dáil Éireann, commonly called "republican" or "Dáil" courts (Kotsonouris 1994; Casey 1970, 329; Davitt 1968, 112–130; Campbell 2003, 155–200; Borgonovo 2012, 49–65). The Dáil court system followed nineteenth-century alternative justice precedents from Daniel O'Connell, anti-tithe activists, and especially the Irish Land League. The "Dáil" courts emerged initially as ad hoc republican efforts to contain localized outbreaks of land conflict and ordinary crime, which had followed the near-collapse of the Irish police force in mid-1920 (see below). Dáil Éireann's "Department of Home Affairs" then systematically organized a national judicial system, appointing judges, forming regional and local courts, and creating a republican police force. The initiative occurred at a time when Dáil Éireann was attempting to win international recognition of the Irish republic, and thus supported arguments that the revolutionary state was both de facto and de jure.

The Dáil courts did not attempt to affect radical social change, which explains their quick acceptance by much of the populace. Initially, spectators crowded hearings held in public venues that replicated state authority, such as town halls, local government offices, and even municipal courthouses. In the wake of government repression, the courts moved to covert locales, such as private homes, office buildings, rural cottages, and barns. The collapse of the state judiciary became complete when

most of the public stopped participating in the government court system. Civil cases were redirected to the Dáil courts, local magistrates resigned, and citizens refused to appear for state jury service, which resulted in the cancellation of court sessions at all levels.[4] While IRA coercion featured in this boycott, its success would have been impossible without strong popular support, which helped legitimate the Dáil Éireann underground state. Though the British government suppressed the courts in late 1920, the public did not return to the state judicial system. In their absence, the British Army was forced to administer justice in Ireland, which fatally compromised British attempts to normalize governance (Campbell 1994). Internationally, the Dáil courts also gave the independence movement an important propaganda victory, as they demonstrated republicans' capacity for orderly self-government in a manner that caught the imagination of foreign correspondents (Kotsonouris 1994, 19–50; Townshend 2013, 124–130).

A second (related) tactic was the republican boycott of the Irish police and the British military. In 1919, Eamon De Valera, president of Dáil Éireann, announced a boycott of the indigenous, Royal Irish Constabulary police force. Speaking in Dáil Éireann, De Valera remarked of the police:

> These men must not be tolerated socially as if they were clean healthy members of our organised life. They must be shown and made feel how base are the functions they perform and how vile is the position they occupy. To shun them, to refuse to talk or have any social intercourse with them, or to treat them as equals, will give them vividly to understand how utterly the people of Ireland loathe both themselves and their calling, and may prevent young Irishmen from dishonouring both themselves and their country by entering that calling.[5]

De Valera echoed the boycott rhetoric used in previous nationalist mobilizations. In 1829, Daniel O'Connell told his followers to spurn those who sold or bought goods seized from Tithe opponents, instructing, "[…] have nothing to do with him. Neither buy from him, nor sell to him. Do not even give to him one hour of your labour for love or money. He is an enemy to his country…" (O'Donoghue 1966, 73). During 1880, Irish Land League leader Charles Stewart Parnell had ordered supporters to ostracize "land jumpers":

> you must shun him on the roadside when you meet him—you must shun him in the shop—you must shun him in the fair-green and in the market place, and even in the place of worship, by leaving him alone, by putting him into a moral Coventry, by isolating him from the rest of the country as if he were a leper of old. (Altholz 2000, 98)

The Irish independence movement had thus appropriated the established boycott tactic and applied it systematically to the police, military and state judiciary. On a practical level, the boycott undermined state security forces attempting to repress the independence movement. It also mobilized large segments of the public, which demonstrated broad support for Irish independence demands. Finally, the boycott linked the contemporary independence movement to earlier nineteenth-century resistance campaigns that enjoyed popular legitimacy within the Irish nationalist tradition.

The republican boycott of 1919–21 was ambitious, as it also applied to the families of police constables, the British military, and members of the community who interacted with those under boycott.[6] IRA headquarters instructed units to record those who broke the boycott, and to make their transgression, "public in every way possible".[7] This social dimension was not ritualized, but was rather intended to announce to the community the offender's transgression and the reason for the boycott sanction. This dynamics is illustrated in the testimony of an IRA officer from County Cork:

> It was decided … to boycott Michael R. Walsh, who had driven members of the RIC to the races. Notices regarding the boycott were posted up throughout the area, and within a matter of twenty-four hours Michael R. Walsh was without any customers. After two months, Mr Walsh decided to apologise for having co-operated with the enemy forces. He apologised in public at the church gate one Sunday after Mass, and the boycott was lifted.[8]

The social ostracization of the Royal Irish Constabulary and its supporters lowered police morale, leading to the force's partial collapse in the spring of 1920 (Hopkinson 2002, 70–71; Leeson 2011, 209–210; Hart 2002, 65–66). Large numbers of constables resigned and the police stopped functioning in some areas, creating a power vacuum that was partially filled by the IRA. Replacements could not be found in Ireland, forcing the government to hire demobilized ex-servicemen from England, Scotland and Wales. Known as "Black and Tans", these police replacements lacked

local knowledge, were unpopular with the public and became infamous for their brutality. Their arrival marked a turning point in the Irish War of Independence.

The IRA enforced boycotts of the Crown forces and other republican edicts via intimidation mechanisms such as public posters, threatening letters and covert physical assaults. Boycotts were often announced on posters placed in strategic locales in the neighbourhood, a tactic that had been common in the nineteenth century.[9] Residents who broke republican instructions typically received an anonymous letter listing their offence and warning of retribution.[10] Threatening letters had a long tradition in Irish agrarian conflict, and also featured in largely apolitical economic and social conflict in this same period (see below).[11] The republican letters differed from those issued in agrarian disputes, in that the authors frequently identified themselves as (anonymous) members of the IRA or agents of the republican movement.[12] This added weight to their threat, and clarified that it came from a republican authority rather than a participant in an agrarian dispute. If the transgression did not end, sanction occurred in a number of ways, such as killing the offender's horse or other livestock.[13] Non-lethal violent punishment often arrived in the form of tarring of men and hair-cropping of women.[14] (The latter punishment was usually reserved for women who socialized with members of the Crown forces.) The IRA punished non-political criminal offences (like larceny) with fines and temporary exile, retributions that broke with nineteenth-century agrarian precedents. Sometimes the organization preferred public humiliations, such as tying the offender to rails outside the parish church, with a placard indicating their supposed crime.[15] The IRA almost never executed civilians for crimes other than suspicion of providing information to the Crown forces. The corpses of such victims were left in public areas, with attached placards explaining the offence and warning against similar transgressions (Borgonovo 2007). Despite this public dimension, it can be said that most IRA retribution occurred covertly and lacked performative characteristics.

IRA members frequently wore disguises while engaged in such attacks. Historian Peter Hart directly linked these IRA perpetrators to their nineteenth-century peasant predecessors, noting that nocturnal raiders in 1918–23 sometimes sported "wren boy" or "straw boy" costumes worn at various mumming holidays on the agrarian calendar (Hart 1998, 180–181). Similar traditional cultural garb occasionally appeared during certain agrarian attacks in the 1880s (Lucey 2011, 178–179). In the later

period, though, it is important to differentiate between nocturnal visits by members of the IRA, on the one hand, and largely apolitical agrarian activists, on the other. Some IRA raiders disguised themselves in a manner associated with nineteenth-century agrarian secret societies, such as by blackening their faces, wearing masks, and reversing their coats. However, these disguises seem to have been primarily utilitarian; the more exotic wren and secret society costumes described by Hart were rarely used by IRA members, who typically projected themselves as agents of a legal and legitimate government. The traditional costumes were sometimes donned by those involved in land disputes which erupted across the country in early 1918, mid-1920, and early 1922 (Borgonovo 2013, 168–185; Campbell 2008, 246–252; Clark 2014, 254–297; Dooley 2004, 33–39; Fitzpatrick 1998, 62, 130–132; O'Connor, 1988, 38; Varley, 1988, 54–75; 2003, 127–150). Hart seems to have not clearly distinguished between IRA activity and agrarian unrest, which is understandable owing the confused and covert nature of the activity, and occasional overlap between participants.[16] Beyond disguises, traditional peasant resistance techniques manifested themselves during rural disputes over land usage. These modes included: the issuing of threatening letters or notices;[17] the digging of "warning graves" outside a target's home (sometimes with a mock headstone);[18] the maiming of cattle (usually slashing the animal's stomach and/or removing their tails) ;[19] and the burning of haystacks (commonly called "ricks").[20]

Brutal and often anarchic agrarian unrest embarrassed republican leaders trying to convince international observers of the Irish people's capacity for self-government. It reinforced British stereotypes of the Irish as being primitive and predisposed to violence (Perry 1971; Brantlinger 2011, 136–156). It was therefore imperative for the republicans to show, in the words of one government supporter, that in Ireland, "profound dissatisfaction with the origin of the law, not with law and order, is the cause of the trouble" (Kotsonouris 1994, 22). As a result, republicans suppressed agrarian outbreaks, and sought to carry out their own land reform under the authority of the alternative government, Dáil Éireann (Borgonovo 2012, 51–56; Campbell 2008, 254–257; Townshend 2013, 127–129; Varley 2003, 138–139).

Similar republican unease can be detected in attitudes towards the illicit distilling of alcohol. In Ireland, peasants had traditionally consumed poitín (also spelled poteen), a strong, alcoholic drink made from anything from malt and grain, to molasses, sugar, potatoes, and apples. Produced

secretly in the rural hinterland, poitín was much more affordable than government-taxed whiskey (Connell 1996, 1–50). In the nineteenth century, illegal distillers vigorously resisted suppression from revenue officers and the Royal Irish Constabulary, by stoning approaching agents, blocking roads, and creating elaborate warning systems with whistles, horns, or torches (Connell 1996, 8–11). However, in the late nineteenth century alcohol abstinence and hostility towards drunkenness became a feature of Irish nationalist discourse, especially within the metropolitan elite (Malcolm 1986). By the War of Independence period, historian Gavin Foster argues, "poitín was also associated with the unrespectable aspects of rural society—a culture of poverty that was seen as breeding not only excessive drinking, but other vices like disrespect for the law, avoidance of civic duties like paying rates, opportunistic criminality, and agrarian disaffection" (Foster 2014, 135). Dáil Éireann and the IRA attempted to suppress poitín production, with only limited success (Townshend 2013, 131; Hopkinson 2002, 144). In the ensuing Irish Civil War of 1922–23, the Irish Free State government often associated its republican opponents with poitín, thereby linking their cause with a degenerate, primitive and generally lawless culture (Foster 2014, 42, 117, 121, 131–135). Certainly not all peasant resistance traditions were celebrated in the early twentieth century.

Such attitudes illustrated reoccurring tensions within an Irish republican movement engaged in political subversion, but opposed to conflicts and patterns of behaviour which threatened support from "respectable" national and international opinion (Townshend 2013, 127–130, 266–270). For a discussion of this dynamic in the ensuing Irish Civil War, see Foster (2014, 117–141).

Collective Disobedience

Much republican agitation revolved around non-violent protests in country crossroads, town centres and city streets around Ireland. During 1918 and 1919, republicans organized mass demonstrations and other public protests, despite attempted suppression by the government. These demonstrations exploited long-standing Irish political traditions involving public space (Owens 1999a, 242–269; Hoppen 1984, 388–407, 423–435; Cronin 1994, 146, 151–153, 167, 195; Lane 1999, 17–31; McGrath 2010, 131–137; Malcolm 1986, 132–133; Borgonovo 2015). Election victories, the release of political prisoners, and visits by republican digni-

taries generated celebratory bonfires on hillsides or burning tar barrels in towns and cities.[21] Brass bands added a processional element, most notably during courthouse demonstrations and parades for released political prisoners.[22] Prior to the outbreak of open fighting in 1920, many IRA units fielded their own brass, fife or pipe bands. One exasperated guerrilla chief later dismissed those republicans who "believed in the effectiveness of demonstration, mass meetings, oratory, and torchlight processions", as opposed to physical resistance. These "older men" sometimes bought instruments instead of arms and preferred musical band practice to military drill. He complained, "If the vibration of drums could have disintegrated an Empire, imperialism as a political theory would now be defunct."[23] Ultimately state repression drove the IRA and its marching bands underground.

Facing popular unrest in the summer of 1918, the government banned all public assemblies held without a police permit, including sporting and cultural gatherings. Republicans organized open defiance of the ban. The Gaelic Athletic Association, a sporting body closely linked to the independence movement, prohibited its clubs from applying for police permits. When police and troops broke up matches, players and spectators often relocated to alternative venues to play fixtures in secret. The Gaelic Athletic Association subsequently organized "Gaelic Sunday", in which 1500 matches of hurling, Gaelic football and camogie (a form of women's hurling) were played simultaneously around the country (Borgonovo 2013, 203–208). Tens of thousands of players participated, watched by a much larger number of spectators. Widespread agitation forced the government to retreat from its public assembly restrictions on sporting events.

The government also applied the 1918 assembly ban to the Gaelic League, an Irish language and cultural organization associated with the independence movement (Borgonovo 2013, 207–209).[24] The Gaelic League refused to apply for police permits for its summer outdoor events, which combined picnics, dances, sporting contests and cultural performance competitions. Police and military authorities broke up these gatherings, often occupying the event's venue prior to its start. To elude the Crown forces, organizers advertised Gaelic League events at "decoy" venues, which were decorated with stages, banners and bunting. Constables and soldiers took possession of the decoy venue, while thousands gathered elsewhere, having been informed of the alternative event location by word of mouth. One foreign observer noted that such creative civil disobedi-

ence, "gives a rather comic touch to the effort to government order suppressing public meetings."[25]

Government interference with sporting and cultural events in 1918 inspired a republican counter-offensive against fox-hunting, which remained the preferred outdoor activity among elite government supporters in Ireland. In early 1919, the Sinn Féin Executive banned fox-hunting until political prisoners were released. Fox hunts that proceeded were disrupted by republicans who replicated tactics from the previous century, primarily by setting upon riders, horses, and hounds with clubs and stones (Murphy 2014, 125).[26] This wave of anti-hunt agitation, though, aroused internal opposition in communities that lost jobs associated with the hunt. Republican leaders also seemed uneasy with the campaign's overt class divisions and outbreaks of mob violence. Anti-hunt agitation eventually faded, no doubt to the relief of those republicans concerned that the independence movement might appear disreputable.[27]

Popular Resistance and the IRA Campaign

The onset of guerrilla warfare in early 1920 militarized the Anglo-Irish conflict, which made public protests increasingly dangerous. The Crown forces frequently dispersed unarmed civilians by baton and bayonet charges, and occasionally by gunfire (Leeson 2003, 43–67).[28] Republican leaders feared placing their followers in perilous situations, yet were reluctant to abandon public demonstrations against the government.

During prison hunger strikes, vigils prior to the execution of captured IRA fighters, and the funerals of fallen republicans, the independence movement engaged in public prayers as a form of protest.[29] Led by the republican women's organization Cumann na mBan, crowds gathered in public spaces outside jail gates, military barracks and/or urban thoroughfares. They kneeled and recited rosary prayers (usually in the Irish language) and other prayers of intercession. Speakers embedded political messages within spiritual language, often comparing the prisoners' trials to the suffering of Jesus Christ or martyred saints. In this way the prayer gatherings expressed subversive ideas, made public statements of communal solidarity, and conveyed a subtext of respectable Catholicism at a time when the government portrayed the independence movement as dangerous and communist-inspired.

Funerals had become more common as a result of the IRA's escalation of guerrilla warfare in mid-1920. By that time, armed guerrilla bands

sought sanctuary in remote parts of the country, and protected themselves with the same kind of road-blocking techniques used by peasants to resist tithe seizures and tenant evictions the previous century (Kautt 2010, 58, 141–142; McCarthy 2010, 99, 168–169). Local people often assisted nocturnal IRA road-cutting efforts (sometimes being pressed into service). IRA parties dug trenches or felled trees across roadways, and removed pavement section from bridges. British lorries and armoured cars had difficulty bypassing such blockages, with their problems compounded by a lack of paved roads and persistent wet weather. Like the tithe cattle seizures of the 1830s, the IRA developed early-warning systems to signal the Crown forces' approach. Sentries blew horns and glass tubes with their bottom removed (making a horn sound), while the ringing of church bells was also used in certain locales.[30] Despite the presence of steel-helmeted troops accompanied by noisy motorized vehicles and the occasional military airplane, these scenes evoked nineteenth century clashes between Irish peasants and the forces of their landlords and the state.

Conclusions

The Irish independence movement effectively blended civil disobedience with guerrilla warfare. Imaginative republican military and propaganda strategists often adopted the latest technologies in their campaign for sovereign independence. At the same time, their modes of resistance echoed those used by much less modern peasant agitators during numerous nationalist and agrarian conflicts in the nineteenth century. During 1918–21, republicans recycled earlier peasant protest repertoires, especially those which depended on popular support. For a movement that was heavily outgunned, people power often proved more effective than fire power. Boycotts were only the most obvious of a host of tried-and-trusted resistance techniques that had been in use for over a century. These tactics connected republicans to long-standing popular traditions of subversion against state and economic elites, sending clear messages to members of rural society about their expected conduct and loyalties.

At the same time, the republican leadership displayed ambivalence towards its peasant roots. The independence movement repeatedly repressed agrarian conflict, and did not adopt all the trappings and practices of nineteenth-century rural resistance. Certain agrarian behaviours worked at cross-purposes to republican efforts to convince the British

public and international opinion that an independent Ireland was fit to take her rightful place among the 'civilized' nations of the earth.

In Irish nationalist tradition, the term 'the pike in the thatch' refers to arms covertly stored for future use in the next rebellion. Among Irish republicans in the early twentieth century, peasant protest repertoires resembled the pike in the thatch. In times of trouble, they could be accessed, sharpened, and effectively redeployed against powerful enemies. These practices also symbolized a continuation of multigenerational resistance to state authority. However, republicans ultimately wanted to govern Ireland themselves. The legitimacy and power of their imagined state depended on maintaining control of all weapons, whichever way they were pointed.

Notes

1. Owing to space limitations, this chapter will not discuss agrarian agitation during the "Ranch War" of 1907–09, which saw "cattle driving" against graziers, a tactic that reappeared during the Irish Revolutionary period (for details, see Campbell 2008, 85–123; Cosgrove 2012).
2. For comprehensive surveys of the conflict, see Hopkinson (2002) and Townshend (2013).
3. The movement's ideological underpinnings were based on a creative reading of the Hungarian independence 'passive resistance' campaign of the 1850s. See Griffith (2003) and Laffan (1999, 17–19).
4. Royal Irish Constabulary Inspector-General's reports for June and July 1920, Public Records Office (PRO), CO 904/111, Kew National Archives (London).
5. *Dáil Éireann Debate*, vol. F, no. 6, 10 April 1919, pp. 5, 67–68.
6. For some select examples from County Cork, see the Irish Grant Committee files, PRO CO 762/310, George Bryan, Dunmanway; CO 762/10/3, Henry Alcock, Skibbereen; CO 762/13/5, James McCarthy, Dunmanway; CO 762/13/16, Henry Hayes, Youghal; CO 762/20/2, Clifford Reynolds, Fermoy; CO 762/30/7, and Isaac Savage, Kinsale, Kew National Archives.
7. IRA General Orders No. 6, 4 June 1920, Bureau of Military History (BMH) Witness Statement (WS) 883, John McCarthy, National Archives, Dublin.

8. BMH WS 1720, John Manning.
9. For historical precedents, see O'Donoghue (1966, 72); Burtchaell and Dowling (1990, 270); O'Hanrahan (1990, 489); Huggins (2007, 129); Bric (1983, 175). For examples in 1920, see, *Connaught Tribune*, 22 May 1920; *Freeman's Journal*, 31 March 1920; *Irish Independent*, 19 April, 23 August 1920; *Kerry Weekly Reporter*, 22 May 1920; *Killarney Echo*, 26 June 1920; *Limerick Leader*, 24 April 1920. For select testimony from those targeted in this manner from County Cork, see the Irish Grants Committee files PRO CO 762/74/2, William J. O'Sullivan, Cork; CO 762/119/12, Henry Wood, Enniskeane; and CO 762/152/3 Elizabeth Bradfield, Bandon, Kew National Archives.
10. For some examples, see the Royal Irish Constabulary Weekly Summary of Outrages Against Police, 7/1/21, 20/2/21, 2/23/21, 4/3/21, 9/4/21, 22/4/21, 18/5/21, PRO CO 904/150, Kew National Archives.
11. For historical precedents, see: Huggins (2007, 118), Bric (1983, 175–177), Burtchaell and Dowling (1990, 270), O'Hanrahan (1990, 489) and Cronin (2012, 13). For examples, see *Connaught Tribune*, 3 April 1920; *Freeman's Journal*, 4, 22 March 1920; *Irish Independent*, 19 January, 19 March 1920; *The Kerryman*, 17 January 1920; *Leitrim Observer*, 6 March 1920.
12. For some examples see McCarthy (2010, 38–40).
13. For examples, see: *Cork Examiner*, 12 December 1918; *Connaught Tribune*, 2 July 1919, 10 January 1920; *Freeman's Journal*, 9 March 1920, 11 March 1921; *Irish Independent*, 5 June 1919; *Leinster Express*, 25 January 1919, 12 March 1921; *Leitrim Observer*, 29 March 1919; *Skibbereen Eagle*, 19 October 1918, 16 April 1921.
14. See Eichenberg (2010, 231–48). I question her suggestion that women were subjected to hair-cropping attacks for crossing sectarian social boundaries. For some examples of hair-shearing, see *Anglo-Celt*, 24 July 1920; *Connaught Tribune*, 22 May 1920; *Cork Examiner*, 27 July 1920; *Irish Independent*, 6 July, 20 September 1920; *The Kerryman*, 20 March 1920; *Leitrim Observer*, 4 September 1920; *Skibbereen Eagle*, 30 April 1921; *Strabane Chronicle*, 14 May 1921. For some examples of tarring (with and without "feathering") see: *Anglo-Celt*, 24 July 1920;

Cork Examiner, 21 February, 12, 25 June, 11, 13 August 1920; *Freeman's Journal*, 12 June, 17 September 1920.

15. *Cork Examiner*, 29 November 1921; *Freeman's Journal*, 25 April, 26 August 1921; *Irish Independent*, 30 November 1921; *Irish Times*, 23 October 1920, 21 June, 12 July 1921; *Nenagh Guardian*, 1 October 1921; *Nenagh News*, 20 August 1921; *Skibbereen Eagle*, 29 October 1921; *Southern Star*, 6 August 1921.
16. For a discussion of Irish mumming traditions, see Santino (1999). For some examples of such costumes in the revolutionary period, see Hart (2002, 181) and the *Cork Examiner*, 5 January 1918; *Connaught Tribune*, 13 March, 3 April, 3 July 1920; *Irish Independent*, 6 June 1919; *Freeman's Journal*, 27 February 1918, 31 December 1919.
17. *Anglo-Celt*, 5 October 1918, 11 June 1921; *Connaught Tribune*, 3 April 1920; *Freeman's Journal*, 4, 22 March 1920; *Irish Independent*, 19 January, 19 March 1920; *The Kerryman*, 17 January, 15 May 1920; *Leitrim Observer*, 6 March 1920.
18. *Connaught Tribune*, 27 March, 30 December 1920, 17 April, 11 June, 31 December 1920; *Freeman's Journal*, 13, 25 February 1918, 8 April, 3 May 1920; *Leitrim Express*, 16 March 1918; *Leitrim Observer*, 8 February 1919; *Meath Chronicle*, 13 March, 27 May 1918, 26 November 1921; *Tuam Herald*, 25 December 1920.
19. *Cork Examiner*, 12 December 1918, 28 July 1919; *Connaught Tribune*, 26 July 1919, 10 July 1920; *Freeman's Journal*, 9 March 1920, 11 March 1921; *Leinster Express*, 12 March 1921; *Leitrim Observer*, 29 March 1919. See also Clark (2014, 120–125).
20. For a sample of such events, see *Anglo-Celt*, 5 January 1918, 15 February 1919; *Cork Examiner*, 11 January, 22 February 1918, 11, 21 January, 6, 7 February 1919; *Irish Independent*, 20 May 1919; *Leinster Express*, 4 January 1919; *Leitrim Observer*, 2 February 1918, 8 February 1919; *Meath Chronicle*, 12 January, 23 February 1918, 3, 10 May 1919; *Nenagh News*, 11, 25 January 1919; and *Ulster Herald*, 8 March 1919.
21. For election victories, see *Irish Independent*, 15 August 1917, 26 June, 30 December 1918; *The Kerryman*, 17 February 1917, 14 December 1918; *Kildare Observer*, 21 July 1917. For released prisoners, see the *Irish Independent*, 18, 20 June 1917, 19 February, 11 May 1918, 3 May 1920. For hunger strikers, see the

Anglo-Celt, 8 May 1920; *Donegal News*, 15 March 1919; *Freeman's Journal*, 14 September 1920; *Nenagh Guardian*, 25 October 1919, 22 May 1920. For visiting dignitaries see *Anglo-Celt*, 14 August 1920, *Connaught Tribune*, 10 May 1919, *Cork Examiner*, 12 May 1919, *Freeman's Journal*, 1 January 1918.

22. *Anglo-Celt*, 20 April 1918; *Cork Examiner*, 23 June, 6 July, 16, 27 November 1917, 2 August 1919, 22 April, 12 June 1920; *Freeman's Journal*, 27 April 1918; *Irish Independent*, 12 July 1917, 5 June 1918; *Westmeath Examiner*, 25 October 1918.
23. BMH WS 838, Sean Moylan.
24. *Anglo-Celt*, 24 August 1918; *Freeman's Journal*, 24, 31 July, 1 August 1918; *Nenagh Guardian*, 3 August 1918.
25. *Freeman's Journal*, 16 August 1918; quoted in Borgonovo (2013, 207).
26. *Cork Examiner*, 14, 15, 22, 25, 27 January, 1, 3, 5, 7, 8, 13, 17, 19 February, 7, 28 March, 5 November, 19 December 1919; *Freeman's Journal*, 20, 23 January, 8 February, 15 December 1919; *Irish Independent*, 11, 21, 24, 28 February, 6 March 1919; BMH WS 789, Denny Mullane; WS 1147, Alphonsus Sweeny; WS 1151, Patrick Luddy; WS 1166, Michael Kelly; WS 1457, Dan McCarthy; WS 1525, James Moloney.
27. For a discussion of respectability in the ensuing Civil War, see Foster (2014, 16–19, 23, 50–51, 53, 60, 68, 76–77, 81, 83, 107).
28. *Cork Examiner*, 6 April, 1 May, 9 August 1920; *Freeman's Journal*, 3 February, 3 May, 15 October 1920; *Kilkenny People*, 15 January 1921; *Western People*, 30 October 1920.
29. For examples, see *Connaught Telegraph*, 1 May, 6 November 1920; *Cork Examiner*, 31 August, 20, 30 October 1920; *Freeman's Journal*, 14 April, 21 June 1920, 1, 15 March 1921; *Irish Independent* 12, 15 April, 26 August, 27 September, 19 October 1920.
30. BMH WS 966, John Walsh; WS 1079, Patrick Fitzgerald; WS 1130, Edmond Power; WS 1383, Patrick McCannon; WS 1444, John O'Connell.

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CHAPTER 5

A Fight for the Right to Get Drunk: The Autumn Fair Riot in Eskilstuna, 1937

Stefan Nyzell

As custom dictated, the Autumn Fair of 1937 in the Swedish city of Eskilstuna took place on the first weekend of October. Many of the city's inhabitants gathered at the fair for all kinds of popular amusement, including shows, dances and fairground rides. Drinking alcohol had always been a popular activity among the working-class population; this remained true even during this period, when the Swedish authorities at both national and local levels were deeply committed to a policy of reducing the public's access to alcohol. As Lennart Johansson points out in his overview of Swedish alcohol culture and policies, the inter-war years were in policy terms the most restrictive period of all (2008, 129–287). While temperance was an important element among the dominant respectable working-class cultural outlook in Sweden in that era, there was at the same time another aspect of working-class culture in which the consumption of alcohol was seen as a customary right (Nyzell 2009, 31–47; Horgby 1986, 129–164, 1993; 29–42; Magnusson 1988, 11–56). After a somewhat try-

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ing first day for the Eskilstuna police, with several arrests for disorderly drunkenness at the fairground, a statement appeared on 2 October in the three local newspapers—the conservative *Sörmlandsposten*, the liberal *Eskilstuna-Kuriren* and the social democratic *Folket*—announcing that the city authorities would act firmly from then onwards in order to put an end to public drunkenness at the Autumn Fair.[1]

According to the official reports on these events, the authorities held true to their word: the police acted firmly and took several drunken people into custody early on during the fair's second day.[2] As a result, the police station's arrest facilities began to fill up with drunken detainees. Later in the day a brawl broke out at a merry-go-round, due to a drunken young worker refusing to leave his seat after using up all his tickets. When the person in charge of the ride used physical force to try to eject the young man, the latter resisted violently. Alerted to the ensuing fight between them, a police patrol arrived at the scene. The policemen handcuffed the troublemaker and prepared to take him into custody, while he maintained his violent resistance throughout. By this time a large crowd had gathered, and now reacted to the arrest: there were shouts demanding the young man's immediate release. The policemen responded, in turn, by drawing their sabres, in an attempt to force the crowd to back down. As part of the crowd made a determined attempt to free the young worker by force, there was a violent struggle. Despite being attacked, the policemen were able to get their detainee to a waiting police vehicle; and although the crowd attempted to turn this over, they managed to leave the scene, taking the drunken young man towards the police station and its arrest facilities in the central city square, Fristadstorget.

A large crowd left the fairground almost immediately in pursuit of the police car. On the way towards the city centre several policemen on foot were assaulted by members of the crowd. Stones were thrown at them, some had items of clothing torn apart, and one was almost thrown into the Eskilstuna River as he crossed a bridge. Arriving in the city square, the crowd made straight for the police station, located on the ground floor of the City Hall. Angry shouts called for all prisoners to be immediately set free; these were to be repeated again and again during the evening and night, becoming the crowd's fundamental demand. Part of the crowd surged forward towards the police station, and there was then a determined attempt to force entry. The policemen gathered there resisted this and, after a short struggle, managed to push the crowd back into the square. The crowd and the police then faced each other for some time,

with the former angrily demanding the release of all those in custody and the latter forming a line in front of the City Hall. When the police commissioner arrived on the scene and took command, he immediately took steps to calm the situation down. Some men were withdrawn from the line holding the crowd back and sent inside the police station to act as a reserve, while those still forming the line were ordered to keep their sabres in their scabbards. The police commissioner then left the line of policemen and walked into the crowd, talking, joking and offering cigarettes to people. He was not met with any violence, but with shouts, hoots of laughter and a chorus of whistling from the crowd surrounding him. The atmosphere was almost festive as the crowd interacted with him.

At the same time, according to the official account, a policeman further down the square found himself in difficulty. Isolated within the crowd, he was surrounded by a group of laughing young men who started pushing him backwards and forwards amongst them. Someone struck his uniform cap, sending it flying; someone else started loudly singing the *Internationale*, and many others soon joined in with this. The police commissioner became aware of this incident and moved through the crowd towards the scene. As he did this, he was surrounded in much the same manner as the other policeman had been. He was pushed, stumbled on something, and fell to the ground, where he received kicks and blows before being rescued by a group of police. While the commissioner was being removed he gave the order for the square to be cleared of people. As the men held in reserve ran from the police station to join those in the line in front of the City Hall, the order came to draw their sabres and charge the crowd to clear the square. After only a brief moment of resistance the crowd gave way. The Autumn Fair Riot was over; the debate over what had happened, and why, then began.

Protest, Popular Culture and Tradition in Eskilstuna, 1800–1950

For many days to follow, the riot in Eskilstuna was the main topic in both local and national newspapers. As regards the local press, the three main newspapers in Eskilstuna naturally took standpoints that were determined by their different ideological positions. What is surprising, therefore, is how much these publications, the conservative *Sörmlandsposten*, the liberal *Eskilstuna-Kuriren* and the social democratic *Folket*, actually agreed

upon in spite of their ideological differences. First, they all expressed surprise that such an event could have occurred in their orderly city with its respectable working-class population. Second, they held that if the blame were to be put somewhere, it must be on the bad influence of alcohol. Third, they were all in agreement that there was a problem of juvenile delinquency which was closely connected to the question of alcohol: it was simply far too easy for young people to get their hands on spirits. Fourth, the city had experienced a steady influx of workers from rural areas during the economic boom of the mid-1930s; these new arrivals were perceived as far less refined and much more prone to drinking and rough behaviour than the working-class population in general. In sum, the city's three newspapers were in broad agreement. They all blamed the events on access to alcohol being far too easy, in combination with juvenile delinquents visiting the city and a rougher segment of the working class not yet being accustomed to the respectable life of the established working-class population.[3]

The city authorities agreed with these conclusions in their own outraged statements to the newspapers. The political elite in Eskilstuna in 1937 consisted, first and foremost, of representatives of the Social Democratic Party (SAP), which in the late 1930s was firmly in power both locally in Eskilstuna and nationally. The SAP had come to power at the national level for the first time in the autumn of 1917, in a coalition with the Liberal Party. Prior to that point there had been much internal ideological conflict, with socialists of the radical left and reformist right arguing over whether the party should pursue socialism through revolution or reformism. In the spring of 1917, this conflict had led to an open split as the main body of SAP membership opted for reformism, while a smaller group departed and formed its own socialist party of the revolutionary left. After that point, the SAP became a reformist party that strongly advocated political consensus. This concept of "consensus politics", later to be labelled "the Swedish model", was to become an integral aspect of the modern Swedish political system (Nyzell 2009, 14–47, 350–397; Hilson 2006, 28–57; Thullberg and Östberg 1994, 5–6; Molin 1989, 312–329; Esping-Andersen 1989).

It has been argued that the origin of this "politics of consensus" was a cultural shift within the Swedish working class in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Nyzell 2009; Horgby 1993; Ambjörnsson 1988; Horgby 1986, 237–248). Björn Horgby, in his study of the transition from a "rough artisan culture" to a "respectable working-class cul-

ture" in Sweden, describes a process of self-directed development in which members of the working class came to adopt a "culture of respectability" as a means of opposing the dominant middle-class culture.[4] There were close links between the labour movement, the temperance movement, the educational movement and the independent church movement, all of which contributed to this "culture of respectability" (Ambjörnsson 1988). Together, these popular movements formed an influential core within the SAP in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century. Allegiance to more than one at the same time was the rule rather than the exception for leading SAP members. When the Social Democrats came to power in the interwar years, this "culture of respectability"—with consensus, temperance and learning as cultural reference points—was to become the central component of the social democratic polity launched in this period. In 1928 the SAP party leader Per Albin Hansson called this polity "the people's home", which in modern Swedish political history has been one of the key concepts of the social democratic welfare state (Nyzell 2009, 14–47, 350–397; Thullberg and Östberg 1994, 5–6). Closely linked to the developing social democratic welfare state was the idea of social engineering as a means of building a better society for all. While this modern society was being constructed, some aspects of the old structure were seen as being badly in need of demolition, including traditional expressions of popular working-class culture such as the consumption of alcohol. From this perspective, "the people's home" can be seen as a social democratic project intended to mould and discipline the working class (Nyzell 2009, 14–47; Horgby 1986, 129–164, 237–248; 1993, 59–70, 361–397; Johansson 2008, 129–287).

Eskilstuna's Autumn Fair had its origins in the period when artisans dominated the city's popular culture. In the late nineteenth century, Eskilstuna became subject to the industrializing process that was to take Sweden from an agricultural to an industrial society in the first half of the twentieth century; by the interwar years it was an important industrial city. Its population had grown from 5000 in the 1860s to 36,800 in 1937. Heavy industry predominated; this was a legacy from the past, the town having gained city privileges in the seventeenth century as a state-sponsored location for proto-industrial manufacturing (Ohlsson et al. 2001; Magnusson 1987, 1988; Öhngren 1974; Nilsson 1937). As a result, Eskilstuna's popular public life in the nineteenth century was dominated by the artisans and their culture; this has been described by Lars Magnusson as characteristically "rough", in contrast to the characteristi-

cally "genteel" culture of the middle class. Eskilstuna was a city divided between the artisan neighbourhood of Fristaden, where the factories that needed powered machinery were located along the Eskilstuna River, and the Old Town, where the houses of the middle-class white-collar population could be found. As Magnusson notes, the nineteenth century saw deep tensions between the middle-class culture of the city's elite and the rough culture among the artisans. Important among the artisans' cultural practices was the consumption of alcohol as part of their public social life. This culture was masculine, ritualistic, and often violent. Both apprentices and journeymen often and readily took to the many taverns in the city to participate in the social performances of their culture (Magnusson 1988, 11–56, 312–345). Drinking with fellow workers was a part of social life that was not taken lightly. As Karin Sennefelt has written, "hearty drunkenness was an important part of a man's social life and hard drinking a rite of passage into mature manhood" (2014, 283).

From a middle-class perspective the artisans and their popular entertainments were often seen as a nuisance that had to be strictly monitored and disciplined. However, if the police went too far in their interference with the artisans' public practices, the latter were ready to resist in order to defend what they perceived as their customary rights. These encroachments often led to violent confrontations between the city authorities and the artisan community. Episodes of violent contention are documented as occurring in 1820, 1845, 1848, 1857, 1859, 1873, 1887 and 1888 (Magnusson 1988, 11–56), and likely to have happened at other times. Each of these was a direct result of the authorities attempting to impose limitations on the cultural practices of the artisan community, and some were direct results of the police trying to enforce regulations on alcohol restriction issued by the city authorities. Crowds of artisans often used collective violence to free arrested apprentices and journeymen from the police on the street or from the city jail. Several instances started with the police arresting people for drunkenness. The artisans' collective violence was often directed at police officers perceived as having been especially brutal in the performance of their duties. Although the violence within these episodes was often very real, at the same time a high level of symbolic value characterized the nineteenth-century repertoire of contention. There was often an atmosphere of buffoonery and merriment; the festive was never far away in these contentious episodes. The targets of this sort of symbolic violence were most often those in authority. The aim was to ridicule people in positions of power, but also to send a message to them.

Through performances such as shouting, heckling, threatening, cheering and singing, those in authority could easily be made to hear the opinions of those on whom they were attempting to impose their will. Artisan culture was unrestrained, with those taking action never far from using collective violence as a means to an end (Horgby 1993, 29–42; Magnusson 1988, 11–56).

While there were clearly similarities between the contentious performances of artisans during the mid-nineteenth century and workers in the early twentieth, there were also differences. In the case of the Autumn Fair Riot, there were performances in the violent confrontations between the crowd and the police that would not have appeared in the nineteenth century. Members of the crowd singing the *Internationale* as they attacked the police officer in the city square is one very telling example of the way that the repertoire of contention was influenced by the culture of industrial society. In the late nineteenth century the labour dispute—with its strikes, lockouts, blockades, boycotts and strikebreaking—had become an integral part of the contentious repertoire within an industrializing society (Nyzell 2009, 78–98). The nineteenth-century artisans could certainly put down their tools and take to the streets. However, this kind of repertoire, in the words of Charles Tilly, was "parochial, bifurcated, and particular" in its outlook:

> It was *parochial* because most often the interests and interaction involved were concentrated in a single community. It was *bifurcated* because when ordinary people addressed local issues and nearby objects they took impressively direct action to achieve their ends […]. [It] was *particular* because the detailed routines of action varied greatly from group to group, issue to issue, locality to locality. (1995, 45)[5]

In the 1937 episode there were several moments during confrontations when individual members of the crowd shouted that they had been present when labour conflicts had turned into violent confrontations with the authorities, and they therefore knew how best to fight the police. National traumas such as the Ådalen incident in 1931, where military troops opened fire and killed several people taking part in a protest march against strikebreaking, were instanced; these references clearly place these events of 1937 in a wider context of class struggle, as well as in their local context.

Tilly describes the emerging forms of the repertoire of contention in an industrializing society as "cosmopolitan, modular, and autonomous":

> They were *cosmopolitan* in often referring to interests and issues that spanned many localities or affected centers of powers whose actions touched many localities. They were *modular* in being easily transferable from one setting or circumstance to another instead of being shaped tightly to particular uses. They were *autonomous* in beginning on the claimants' own initiative and establishing direct communication between claimants and nationally significant centers of power. (1995, 46)

Interestingly, the events in Eskilstuna in 1937 do not seem to relate very well to this repertoire. At least at first sight, the issue in question during the Autumn Fair appears to have been a local one. The direct actions of the crowd appear more like performances by nineteenth-century artisans than actions by workers in an industrialized society. The demands of the crowd were limited to the release of those taken into custody, and directed towards the local authorities for an immediate response. Furthermore, the symbolic violence carried out by the crowd in 1937 was very similar to performances carried out by nineteenth-century artisans in the same city. As with the direct action of the artisans, the symbolic content of the violence performed in 1937 was essentially aimed at ridiculing its police targets. At several moments during the Autumn Fair Riot, individual policemen were exposed to such symbolic violence: officers both in uniform and in plain clothes had their clothes ripped, they were pushed backwards and forwards among the crowd, and their headgear was knocked off their heads. Meanwhile, the crowd surrounding them cheered and laughed.

It should be emphasized that Tilly meant his two distinct repertoires to be analytical typologies for use in discussions of the transformation of repertoires of contention over time. As the performances of the crowd in 1937 do not seem to correspond to the typology, this discrepancy can be used to analyse key aspects of these events.

In the media coverage of the Autumn Fair Riot, Eskilstuna's three leading newspapers all argued that the perpetrators of this episode were not respectable workers from the city itself, but were instead rough workers or juvenile delinquents.[6] The former had only recently arrived in the city, due to the economic boom, and had not yet had time to acquire a respectable working-class lifestyle. The latter, it was said, generally only visited the city for the Autumn Fair: the police commissioner even talked about hardened

juvenile delinquents from the capital arriving in Eskilstuna to instigate the violence at the fairground and cause as much harm as possible, just for their own amusement. Both these groups were seen as being under the influence of alcohol, which was all too easy to acquire on the black market. However, this interpretation expressed in the local newspapers, reinforced by statements from figures of authority such as the police commissioner and the Social Democrat mayor, has a weakness: it is not confirmed by any of the evidence presented regarding the riot. Twenty individuals later stood trial for the Autumn Fair Riots, and we know, from the very thorough background checks that the police made on all those charged, that with only one exception, a young clerk from a provincial town visiting the city for the Autumn Fair, none of them were newly arrived members of Eskilstuna's working-class community. All the defendants were over 21 years of age, and seven were over 31; 19 were men and just one was a woman. Admittedly, they included some persistent offenders who were well known to both the police and social services, but most of the accused seem to have been young or middle-aged workers from the city with respectable trades. Furthermore, neither the police report nor the court proceedings at any time mentioned juvenile delinquents from outside the city; instead, the focus was on the issue of alcohol.[7] It is quite clear, however, that the idea that the rioters had had no agenda during the events other than freeing the drunken detainees from custody was, to the newspapers and the authorities alike, a provocative thought.

The journalists, bureaucrats and politicians in Eskilstuna all seem to have felt very frustrated that they simply could not understand why the rioters had acted as they did. These actions did not at all fit with the notion held by those in authority of a political culture built on consensus.

The conception of Swedish history as steeped in a political culture of consensual harmony is essentially a nationalistic one established in the nineteenth century. However, as the Social Democrats moved from being revolutionary outsiders in the late nineteenth century to being reformists within the Swedish political system in the early twentieth, this notion of a long tradition of political consensus also started to fit very well with the party's own changing view of Swedish history. The argument here is that the SAP has been very active in writing its own history as the success story of the modern welfare state, and has also been very influential in shaping the dominant conception of the history of nineteenth- and twentieth-century Sweden (Brink Pinto et al. 2015, 93, 104–106; Nyzell 2009, 350–397; Edgren and Olofsson 2009; Berggren 2003; Linderborg

2001, 13, 329–396). While this Swedish story, time and time again, has stressed the importance of consensus, it has also tended to avoid taking instances of confrontation into account, and has thus neglected to give sufficient weight to episodes of popular contention. As a result, it has come to seem that there was not that much violent contention in Swedish society after the Social Democrats took over in the early 1930s as the dominant actors in the political system. Any episodes of this have regularly been either downplayed in their importance or altogether disregarded, as they do not seem to fit with the overall picture of societal harmony (Nyzell 2009, 350–397; Edgren and Olofsson 2009, 1–3; Berggren 2003, 195–196; Linderborg 2001, 13, 329–396). Furthermore, the dominant notion of modern Swedish political culture seems to fit neatly within Tilly's typology. A cosmopolitan, modular and autonomous repertoire of contention relates very well to the idea of the rise of social movements such as the labour movement to the status of primary actors in the political struggle. Industrial action taken by workers as part of labour's struggle against capitalism would conform to both the Social Democratic self-image and Tilly's typology'.

The late interwar years in Sweden, and indeed its post-war period too, have often been depicted as an era of political consensus, harmony in the labour market, and an ever-expanding welfare state. Sweden experienced rapid economic growth and an almost total absence of strikes in this period, which lasted until the late 1960s. If we take a closer look, however, the economic growth did not really start before the 1950s. The late interwar and early post-war years were, in reality, certainly not characterized by harmony and consensus, and the people alive at the time had no knowledge of what was to come; they were a time of confrontations, although these instances of contention have only recently been the subject of any more systematic historical research, and much remains to be done. These confrontations in many ways related to older repertoires of contention, but in other ways were new and different. It was a time of ambiguities, uncertainties, turmoil and change, and does not fit comfortably with the widely held understanding of modern Sweden as a social democratic welfare state free of class struggle. However, the notion of a consensual society was already taking root in the mid-1930s (Ericsson and Nyzell forthcoming); this made it difficult for the authorities to explain what had really happened, and why. These kinds of contentious episode were not "political" in the same sense as demonstrations for general suffrage or against strikebreaking, which were part of repertoires of contention that

the authorities were used to, understood, and knew how to combat. These were different. They were riots without any obvious cause: it was not that they lacked a rationale, or that political and social conflicts were unimportant as background factors, but the participants expressed no straightforward ideological positions and made no general claims. For those in authority, this was baffling. How were they to explain that workers who were living in a political democracy and a developing welfare state could choose to participate in violent confrontations with the police for the right to get drunk? Their solution was to interpret the disorderly behaviour as the actions of "rough" workers and "juvenile delinquents", thus at the same time delegitimizing the demands of those involved in the riots.

When discussing protest, popular culture and tradition in the context of late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Sweden, there are a number of important implications of the Eskilstuna episode in 1937. First, the fact that episodes such as the Autumn Fair Riot did not easily fit with the authorities' understanding of the contemporary contentious repertoire made them dismiss the whole affair as an aberration: something to dismiss and delegitimize, which could be made understandable only by blaming the influence of alcohol and relating the events to the need to build a new society. Second, this approach to contentious episodes has led to them being viewed as unimportant within the overall picture that twentieth-century historians have constructed of the development of the modern welfare society. Research on contention within modern Swedish society has tended to focus on social movements as part of the consensual polity, and this has had consequences. As Lars Berggren has pointed out, it has led to a tendency among researchers to stress consensual episodes and downplay violently contentious episodes that do not conform to expectations (2003, 195–196). In his introduction to *The Making of the English Working Class*, E.P. Thompson stressed the importance of critically examining teleological history: "[o]nly the successful […] are remembered. The blind alleys, the lost causes, and the losers themselves are forgotten" (1980, 14).

Thompson's view was that there exists a "field of force" in societies, between those in authority and those who are subject to that authority, and that this is a two-way communication: no matter how powerful those in authority are, there is always some room for people to react against them (Thompson 1991). From this perspective, the study of popular protest is important, and can lead to significant insights regarding popular culture. We neglect at our peril the contention that does not conform to

our understanding of the established repertoire. In the Eskilstuna episode we can discern what the anthropologist James Scott has described as a "hidden transcript" within the working-class culture (1990, 1–16). It is important not to neglect this, as it tells us things that otherwise would join all the other lost and forgotten causes in history. If the Autumn Fair Riot in Eskilstuna in 1937 is seen from this perspective, it makes more sense: it can be understood as popular protest against the socially engineered project of a modern welfare society, within which traditional popular culture was seen as something to be uprooted. Protest against the attempts of those in authority to shape society was not, in the end, so very different in the twentieth century from such protest in the nineteenth. Thus while respectability had become a dominant cultural reference point, there continued to exist a cultural undercurrent within which it was legitimate to fight for the right to get drunk.

Notes

1. These newspapers can be consulted at Lund University Library and other Swedish universities.
2. Landsfogden i Södermanlands län, Handlingar i stadsåklagarens mål, *Rapport angående oroligheterna i Eskilstuna den 2 oktober 1937*, Uppsala landsarkiv (DIII:3). The account in this paragraph and those that follow draws directly on the police reports held in Uppsala Landsarkiv, a regional branch of the state archives.
3. *Sörmlandsposten*, 4 October 1937; *Eskilstuna-Kuriren*, 4 October 1937; *Folket*, 4 October 1937.
4. The distinction has been made in the English-language historiography of labour between "rough" and "respectable" cultures within the lower or working classes, and equivalent terms are used within Swedish historiography (Nyzell 2009; Horgby 1993; Ambjörnsson 1988; Magnusson 1988). Broadly, this distinction can characterize changes over time, but is also often made between the less-qualified and lower-status workers in a trade or industry, including apprentices and journeymen (temporary or less experienced artisans and craftsmen), whose behaviour is more disorderly, and the more established and experienced higher-status workers, who aspire to respectability and behave with more decorum. In this particular case, the rural origin of some workers was perceived as a contributory factor.

5. Tilly specifically talks about the eighteenth-century repertoire changing in the nineteenth century (1995, 1–54). However, his case study concerns industrialization in England, a process that began in the mid-eighteenth century. The same processes began in Sweden over one hundred years later, leading to a similar change in repertoire in the mid-nineteenth century.
6. *Sörmlandsposten*, 4 October 1937; *Eskilstuna-Kuriren*, 4 October 1937; *Folket*, 4 October 1937.
7. *Landsfogden i Södermanlands län, Handlingar i stadsåklagarens mål, Rapport angående oroligheterna i Eskilstuna den 2 oktober 1937*, Uppsala landsarkiv (DIII: 3).

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CHAPTER 6

Italian Anarchism and Popular Culture: History of a Close Relationship

Marco Manfredi

The subject of this chapter is the special relationship between the emerging anarchist political movement in Italy (from the late nineteenth to early twentieth century) and the popular culture of the time. Italian anarchism, compared to all other political movements connected to the lower classes, was particularly adept at channelling pre-industrial forms and expressions of popular culture and traditional methods of social protest. Very few political traditions have managed to embed in their language, forms of communication and models of political action popular culture, but anarchism did so, to a remarkable and persisting degree. There were specific reasons that brought about this special and prolonged relationship with popular culture.

First, due to their emphasis on individual liberty and their consequent distrust of hierarchical organizations, anarchists were more open and permeable to exchanges with grassroot militants' "low" culture and artistic and literary popular idioms. In contrast to institutional Marxism, anar-

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chists were better able to appreciate the political and social role of the arts, including musical and theatrical expressions of folklore. In the socialist sphere, the propensity to absorb such influences, while not absent (Ridolfi 1992, 181–223), seemed to encounter more ideological friction and resistance. Popular culture and folklore were accused of slowing the linear march of Socialism. Local party officials' inclination to employ in their propaganda forms of popular culture would regularly conflict with party elites' determination to enforce the use of modern political tools. In areas where the Italian socialist movement was historically well entrenched, like the northern province of Reggio Emilia (Fincardi 2008, 143–160), between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries one finds repeated attempts to suppress folk culture, in the conviction that spontaneous manifestations of a popular culture should be domesticated and brought back under the necessary guidance of the party and its upper echelons. Instead, as we will show in the first part of this chapter, the expressive tools used by various anarchist leaders significantly drew on popular forms of communication and traditions. Some Italian anarchist leaders, as in the emblematic case of Pietro Gori, who would become an iconic model (Contini 1997, 180) for many prominent libertarian activists, were folk singers themselves and played a crucial role in blending popular traditions and songs with early twentieth-century political and labour struggles.

Another significant point is that, compared to the leaders of the orthodox socialist movement, who were strongly tied to unionized and urban contexts, the anarchists tended to be less exclusive. For example, at the time anarchism was more authentically internationalist than the socialist movement (which was extremely Eurocentric and domestic in its focus); Italian anarchism was, moreover, strongly linked to the experience of exile and of the new transatlantic migrations. Figures like Errico Malatesta or Pietro Gori spent almost half of their lives abroad, a fact which would have been inconceivable for any important leader of the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) (at the time, the best-organized socialist party in the world). Gori spent long periods abroad to escape repression and persecution, living in various parts of Europe from 1894 to 1895, then until the summer of 1896 in the United States—where he gave some 300 lectures, repeated in various languages—and in Latin America from mid-1898 to 1902. To the uprooted immigrant masses who were widely discriminated against (when not expressly persecuted) by local authorities, the anarchist movement, with its anti-authoritarian spontaneity and its methods of struggle, offered more immediate answers than the state-

centred scientific socialism that counted on gradual, orderly integration into institutions. This explained the popularity of anarchism between the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in places with large-scale immigration such as Argentina. The work of Gori, Malatesta and other libertarian leaders led to some of the first attempts to regionally organize all Italian and European workers on the American continent, like the Federazione Socialista-Anarchica dei Lavoratori Italiani nel Nord-America, and the Federación Obrera Regional in Argentina. Among radical leftist movements, it was the Italian anarchist press that levelled the most systematic criticism against the spread of racism in the United States. When anarchist militants and activists like the ones who published the newspaper *La Questione Sociale* in Paterson (New Jersey)—launched in part as a result of Gori's pilgrimage—came into contact with the multicultural American scene, they developed a remarkable sensitivity towards the national and ethnic stereotypes that were so deeply rooted even in working-class culture, and towards the need to combat them. They came more generally to link the question of the emancipation of the lower classes with that of minorities like the Native Americans and African-Americans, in speeches that also included references to the rights of colonized peoples living under European dominion (Salerno 2005, 611–625). With this tendency to assume the standpoint of the proletariat in the broadest of senses, all the way down to its lowest, most distant levels, the dynamics of intermingling also seemed to have a more direct influence on the specific sphere of political practices and customs. Genres that were already widely popular in Italy seemed much more tangibly pervasive in American communities, and were fuelled by initiatives like the organization of libertarian amateur theatricals, choral groups and picnic sing-alongs. Some sustain that the construction of anarchist identity through channels that are not strictly political, like theatre and song, first caught on precisely in emigrant circles (Catanuto and Schirone 2011, 240–241); and, indeed, there are plenty of indirect signs to this effect. Gori's songs and sketches often followed a path of initially gaining fame and popularity in America and then spreading to Europe (Antonioli 1996, 104–105; Testi 2011), while in the memories of various Italian-American anarchists, their embrace of the ideal often came about through primarily "emotional" paths. According to one female worker who emigrated from a small town in Sicily to the area of Paterson she was drawn to anarchic ideals because in her words, being an anarchist meant taking part in "social singing events", "picnics, amateur theatricals, and other activities" capable of speaking "directly to my heart"

(Guglielmo 2010, 144[1]). In all likelihood, the need to overcome homesickness and loneliness and the desire to reknit severed social and community ties contributed to the central role and success among immigrant workers of informal, highly recreation-based organizational networks; moreover, classic studies like those of the new labour history scholars in the USA, taking a broader perspective on the study of the American working class, pointed this out as one of the core elements of class-identity building and experience in the United States (Gutman 1976).

As a third point, in this context, the anarchists' approach to the subaltern classes was more flexible than the rigid nature of Marxist doctrine, with its strong working-class and industrialist background. Because of their mobility, social extraction and more flexible ideology, anarchists had no ideological prejudices against the uprooted immigrant working classes, nor were they prejudiced against the old, traditional popular cultures of their country, their "internal exotic". In a country like Italy, the partial nature of industrialization generated uneven levels of development, many subregional areas, and marginal, multiform, unstable professional figures and forms of work, characterized by a considerable element of "informality", to which the category of "proto-industry" seemed particularly well suited; they were therefore able to cross over into popular worlds which were anthropologically "other": from the countryside to the urban and artisan underclasses, all the way to cohesive, archaic groups of craftsmen like the marble quarry workers' community of the Apuan region, in the north of Tuscany, or that of the Valdarno miners. All these "worlds" were characterized by being far removed from the uprooted condition of the more recent industrial proletariat and thus less prone to a politicization envisaged by people unrelated to their culture. Conversely, they were steeped in deep and stratified traditions, later to be denominated "popular culture" by historiography and the social sciences. Anarchists managed to become the voice of the radical political culture of "otherness" in Liberal Italy. As we will see in the second part of this chapter, they were successful in combining the older and richer rural cultures or corporative traditions and the old habits of proud, skilled classes of labourers with the cultures of modern urban life and politics.

A Canon for the Italian Anarchist Movement: Pietro Gori and Popular Culture

Pietro Gori (1865–1911) may have been the best-loved, if not the most politically important, of all Italian anarchist political leaders. He was a powerful popular figure, though mostly forgotten today, and this popularity extended beyond the circles of libertarian militants.[2] He was born in 1865 into a middle-class Tuscan family with strong ties to the Risorgimento—that is, the process of Italian Unification. After completing school in Livorno, he enrolled on the Law programme at the University of Pisa, graduating in 1889 with a thesis in criminal sociology significantly titled *La miseria e i delitti* (Poverty and crime), in which he argued that crime is a purely social disorder that derives from poverty.[3] While at university, he began to embrace libertarian ideas and after just a few years he became a leader within the new generation of anarchists that was entering the scene alongside historic figures of the First International like Francesco Saverio Merlino and Errico Malatesta. A rapid shift to active political commitment in 1891 led him to take part in the Congress of Capolago, where the Anarchist Revolutionary Socialist Party was formed, and the following year he was among the anarchist delegates to the Congress of Genoa where the Socialist Workers' Party was founded and the definitive split took place between the legalitarian socialists led by Filippo Turati and the libertarian currents of the Italian workers' movement. Meanwhile, after his arrest and imprisonment for several months in Livorno and Lucca for having attempted, along with several factory workers, to organize a strike for May Day in 1890, serving the first in a series of prison sentences that would mark his entire life, he began to establish himself as a skilful criminal lawyer in major trials of anarchist militants and political prisoners; his law career allowed him to develop and hone compelling oratorical talents due to the eloquence required by this profession, which made criminal trials one of the greatest spectacles of the late nineteenth century (Minuto 2011), and which he often transferred into the political speeches he addressed directly to ordinary workers.[4] According to many illustrious sources, including Luigi Fabbri, his friend and collaborator on important journalistic undertakings, this quality ended up making him "above all an orator" in the eyes of the general public, despite his diverse range of activities. As another demonstration of his versatility, however, "his eloquence was of course, lofty and elegant, […] but its fine form remained accessible to the hearts and minds of all workers, even the less educated" and would

"stir the crowds of common people whom he loved so well".[5] This detail led Fabbri to believe that, more than anything else, "he spoke well, but spoke the language of the people", who, in return, "would come flocking when his name was announced for a rally or lecture". Moreover, since the outset of his political career, his aim, by his own admission, was to speak not as much to the people—an obvious goal for anyone who made the emerging social question the focus of his work—as *for* the people. And so, in some autobiographical reflections that reconstructed how he arrived, during his first incarceration, at the idea of trying his hand at verse and the career of an extemporaneous poet, he jestingly said he was spurred to attempt those "first crimes" (Gori 1910, 41–47) by the desire to speak and give a voice to the "conventional idiom" of those oppressed and ostracized by society. And in one of his first social sketches for the theatre (*Senza Patria*, 1893), he has the narrator confess in an intermezzo given in verse that he does not want to fight "battles for art" but rather show scenes "from the life of the common man", "torn from real life" (Gori 1968, 345). Gori's determined ambition to achieve such a profound level of empathy with ordinary people translated into an evangelizing attitude that was not unheard of for early socialism, but was particularly pronounced in his own individual case; a characteristic so distinctive that upon his death, a political antagonist like the reformist socialist from Livorno, Giuseppe Emanuele Modigliani, vividly commemorated the "countryside he travelled through so many years ago, on a cart that has become legendary, from Cecina to Viareggio, and from Livorno to Santa Croce". As Modigliani put it, Gori stirred up "anarchist ferment" and used "a form of propaganda" that, while not the "the best-suited for organizing forces", was unparalleled in its "skill at rousing sentiments", to the degree that it made those areas "even today resistant to the ties of organization, but with a spirit open to all claims" (Foresi 1948, 92–93). Furthermore, Gori's passion for preaching did not abandon him in the city where "the humblest pariahs were dear to him" and where he was in the habit of "going to wait for workers at the factory gates, to spread our theories with his bewitching eloquence" (Mazzoni 1921, 27). Even in his earliest written work, a booklet printed in 1889 that contained the text of some of his public speeches, he presented his credentials to his readers in the following terms: "My friends and comrades […] I who have lived long among you and always amid the people, even in the city, have tried to make you better aware of the injustice of your condition […]" (Gori 1920, 19). His relentless missionary zeal, which led him to personally approach

the lowliest workers and try to find a key into their world, is precisely what earned him the sobriquet of "apostle", perhaps the best-known of his nicknames, its meaning effectively conveyed by the words of a subversive paper of the time: "He was not a man of a party […] but the apostle […] of an idea. Men who latch onto a party can sometimes be scorned, apostles never… And Pietro Gori was an apostle in the noblest sense of the word. […] In Gori, wandering from land to land […] and living with the humble and the unassuming" one could see "the Christ of Anarchism", a "modern-day Christ" in whose actions one could glimpse "something divine".[6] Echoes of the recurring Christological facet directly associated with this figure also seem to be interwoven into his poetics, which is brimming with religious symbols and references that paint a positive vision of the early Church and "the little proletarian of Nazareth".[7] This rhetorical device, that is the use of redeeming figures and symbols rooted in popular culture and now infused with new political content, was not an exception, but in Gori it extended beyond the religious realm to the Risorgimento's secular popular heroes, particularly Garibaldi.[8] The best-loved popular figures of the Risorgimento, in Gori's writing, took on markedly anarchist qualities; like many libertarian militants of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, with his "plebeian greatness" and his image as a "roaming paladin", Garibaldi thus became the first of the persecuted wanderers, forced to sail under any flag and defy all dangers in the name of the mere "right to exist" (P. Gori, *Sulla tomba di Garibaldi* 1948, 5–6). The tactic of refunctionalizing a new libertarian meaning to popular traditions that were already familiar can also explain the special attention that all of Gori's poetic work dedicated, for instance, to May Day, a celebration that he was at the forefront of promoting in Italy (Antonioli 1996, 103–109). A flood of works on the theme, of various kinds (in poetry, theatre, and music) with a wide range of titles (*Primo maggio, Maggio ribelle, Maggio redentore, Maggio carceriere, Maggiolata classica, Tempesta di maggio, La leggenda del Primo Maggio, Calendimaggio*), cropped up throughout his oeuvre, drawing largely on the tradition of the ancient May festivities that were particularly widespread in areas like his own region of Tuscany and always connected in peasant societies to issues and images of renewal and rebirth (Prosperi 1990, 211–230). In the construction of his discourse, one can also note the attempt, even in the works of his youth (from the first poem that came out in a local paper, to his first collection of poetry[9]), to employ images, like the ones used to portray the upper classes (described as "greedy", "crass", "lazy", "thieving", "loafing", etc., and worthy

targets of bloody, ferocious acts of "revenge"), which were well-rooted in the popular imagination and pre-industrial "plebeian" cultures (Thompson 1974). Despite Gori's middle-class background, his language echoed the vocabulary typical of the lowest classes' shaky and unrefined Italian.[10] For instance, a threatening letter sent during that same period to the leading owner of marble quarries in Carrara by a group of Apuan quarrymen, accused of internationalism by the authorities, shows a similar linguistic morphology, with epithets such as "tyrant" and "thief" followed by the threat of taking "revenge" with a cut "to the throat" (Bernieri 1961, 127). An analogous pattern and lexicon crops up again in the written threats and nocturnal shouts of mockery attributed to the Secchiari brothers, leaders of the well-known Lunigiana revolt in 1894 and anarchist agitators in the village of Gragnana (Archivio di Stato di Massa, *Corte d'Assise di Massa*, b. 91, f. 1). Finally, in a series of anonymous letters and placards Venetian peasants fighting the "privatization" of commons and communal resources labelled the local elites as "rogues", "dunces, or "thieves" and promised them a bloody fate, with threats such as "We'll cut you to pieces", or "We'll butcher you like hens" (Brunello 1981). As has been noted, "in late nineteenth-century Italy there was an intense linguistic exchange at work between the anti-institutional political culture and the languages of the marginalized: a circulation of cultures that for a long time was embraced only by anarchist circles, and rejected by Socialists" (Fincardi 2008, 39).

Bringing it all full circle, Gori's determination to spread the new anarchist faith led the "apostle" to sift through the realm of communication for the forms of expression that would most closely mirror the tastes of the Italian lower classes, turning genres already widespread at the popular level to political ends. One emblematic example is his use of folksongs, which, like his extemporaneous poems, would be spontaneously composed, particularly in some areas in central Italy. Gori, who, in a letter written on his way to America, referred to the guitar as his "inseparable" companion,[11] can well be considered the father of anarchist songwriting and, more generally, one of the founders of the late nineteenth-century tradition of political songwriting (Catanuto and Schirone 2009). His songs drew heavily and intentionally on popular folk traditions; not only in their content, which included references to the daily experience of work (arms and hands, hard labour, the fields, emigration), but often in their tunes too. His songs were inspired by musical models which had existed for some time in the musical culture of labourers: Risorgimento songs, opera,

stornelli (a form of Italian extemporaneous folk singing), worksongs. For "Inno del Primo Maggio", a choral intermezzo contained in the theatrical sketch *Primo Maggio*, which would accompany labour demonstrations for several decades, Gori opted, for instance, to use the notes of Verdi's famous *Nabucco* (Fig. 6.1). For the song "Stornelli d'esilio", which appeared for the first time in America in 1898 and became a symbol of libertarian internationalism, he directly borrowed the musical base of the Tuscan folksong "Figlia campagnola".

The revival and appropriation of tradition that Gori carried out on many different levels could sometimes be disorienting. His poems, plays and songs are marked by a jarring contrast between a style that is often conventional and a political message of radical change. This aspect was noted by Gramsci who, in his *Prison Notebooks*, rebuked Gori's poetics and language as "a mode of thought and expression that smacks of the sacristy and of cardboard heroism". Nevertheless, as Gramsci accepted, "these modes and forms […] have sunk very deeply into the people's imagination". One could not otherwise explain their success (Gramsci 1964, 155). Gori's focus on simple, traditional models was motivated by his search for maximum spontaneity and accessibility, which helped grant legitimacy to a bard who sang directly for the masses. The body of images and evocations conveyed by a figure like Gori took on a very definite configuration, however, and often, through his poetics, the qualities attributed to his person were directly transferred to the identity of the movement, thereby becoming a shared legacy. He epitomized a decidedly popular form of anarchism. References to him from the time expound on his charisma and popularity, but very rarely is there any mention of his political stance. The many letters of tribute and mourning written by common militants to anarchist journals upon his death in 1911 (in a colloquial Italian, full of grammatical mistakes, that points to their spontaneous sincerity) reflect ordinary people's perception of Gori as a preacher, missionary and romantic literary personage with a unique gift for performance. His main contribution to the anarchist movement lies in his verse, theatrical sketches, and popular songs, many of which have been inherited by popular Italian culture. For those unfamiliar with his political activism, it would be difficult to see that the man behind this work was an important political leader. Although he took part in ideological debates and even set up trade union leagues and federations, the general public's perception of him was not as a politician. And in these terms his figure became an almost iconic one for the anarchist movement and also for many of its propagandists, to the point that many

Fig. 6.1 Pietro Gori's *Inno del Primo maggio* propaganda poster (*Archivio del Lavoro, Sesto San Giovanni*). Sung on Verdi's *Nabucco* tune, this folk song featured in the theatrical sketch *Primo Maggio* and would be chanted in labour demonstrations for several decades

in the libertarian world forgot that Gori encapsulated a far more widespread phenomenon in anarchist circles. The movement had many Goris. Other local and national political leaders less famous than him also wrote novels, sketches and dramas, popular verses and songs,[12] favouring forms and methods of communication that were not directly political, but rather adopted a literary, aesthetic format aimed at appealing to people's emotions. In contrast to socialist and republican leaders, who were middle class and highly educated, several anarchist leaders had a bluntly proletarian background and came directly from artisan and working-class professions (Antonioli et al. 2003–2004, XIV). Examples of this type of figure include Pasquale Binazzi, dock worker and founder of one of the most popular and enduring Italian anarchist journals, *Il Libertario* (1903–22), who was in the habit of reciting popular verse during political propaganda sessions, or Alberto Meschi, stone-cutter and renowned secretary of the Carrara Chamber of Labour (Camera del Lavoro). Their genuinely working-class background made them more sympathetic with their culture of origin. The social and cultural gap between the professors, who were the public face of the Italian Socialist Party, and these "subversive" leaders was a very wide one. As we noted earlier, popular songs and poems were not lacking in other working-class organizations. However, no matter how popular they were with the base (Fincardi 1990, 191–207), such products ran up against the diffidence of the party leaders, first and foremost Turati himself (Ridolfi 1992, 181–200). As a result, given the anarchists' ability to mix new political content with old genres and expressions of popular protest, their repertoire expanded to such an extent that it drew interest from other political groups such as the Socialist Party (Ridolfi 1992, 236; Fincardi 2008, 160–163). Gori's songs and verse became the shared heritage of the Italian working classes, regardless of their political culture and their membership in organizations. Anarchist songs were, for example, a new *koiné* that was "much more prevalent than the anarchist movement would actually account for" (De Martino 1951, 251–254). These interminglings contributed to the spread of subversive currents and anarchists' appeal and numerical strength. The Italian anarchists' appropriation of many aspects of popular culture and traditions was thus a way to attain a valuable external and internal legitimacy. One should note here that socialists' hold on the Italian working class has often been exaggerated, as has the notion, strongly entrenched in the historical and political lexicon, that it was a mass party. In 1914, the PSI had 54,000 members, with strong regional discrepancies (being deeply rooted in northern cities and in some areas

of the Po Valley, but almost absent in many other regions). In the same period, there were about 150,000 members of the USI (Unione Sindacale Italiana), and in 1914, in a period of decline for the Confederazione Generale del Lavoro, there was a considerable upsurge in numbers that put the syndicalists on a footing of near-equality with the confederalists (Scirocco 2015; Antonioli 1990, 210–211; Osti Guerrazzi 2001).

The great success of popular expressive codes in anarchist political propaganda was noted by some of the early surveys of the movement, which were written during this time, and which were linked o the rise of nineteenth-century anthropology and criminal sociology. These surveys were marred by a pseudo-scientific approach and were overtly hostile to the anarchist movement. However, they are a useful source for studying anarchist militants and propagandists' habits and culture. Cesare Lombroso, for example, in a famous essay entitled *The Anarchists*, stressed how anarchism differed substantially from other political movements in its propaganda methods. Its politics was still quite primitive and it was "predominantly conveyed by oral rather than written means". Lombroso dwelt, in particular, on anarchists' preference and "excessive use" of songs and verse (1894, 25–28). A reformist socialist, Ettore Zoccoli, whose work was also informed by scientific positivism (1907, 365), noted too anarchists' inclination for "sentimental revolutionary literature" whose "rhapsodic character" was more conducive to "emotional rebellion" rather than "doctrinaire writings and political journals". Anarchists' language, "generally more free and violent", also accounted for their propaganda's "greater circulation". Stressing the popular, emotional bent of anarchist politics, the literature discussed above often made reference to anarchists' use of the folksong tradition. Songbooks, a genre midway between oral and written culture, were put out by all the libertarian publishers of the time in continuously new or updated editions that were in great demand among militants (Manfredi 2009, 175–201). They had a specific place in anarchist publishers' catalogues; and in this field, anarchist presses outpublished those of every other political tradition, including the much more professional and better resourced Socialist Party. At country festivals and libertarian picnics organized by anarchist groups, "revolutionary songs" were specifically advertised on the programme as the main attraction. The element of singing, often featured with other similar forms and genres of communication and entertainment (social theatre, for example), thus became a way of introducing and spreading the idea of anarchism. An effective propaganda machine. As we saw above, when we discussed

the experiences of immigrants in America, many ordinary militants were driven to anarchism not because they patiently read theoretical tracts or the political writings of Bakunin and the anarchist ideologists, or the broadsheets of the movement, but because other, simpler vehicles of communication were used. Anarchists' recourse to popular culture coexisted with more modern, innovative forms of political propaganda which were abundantly available at the time. However, on the whole anarchists favoured oral means of communication. The speeches given on lecture tours, in which Gori was unsurpassed, seemed, for instance, to be another favourite amongst militants. Almost every association, including those devoted to "social studies" whose founding goals were presumably to teach and learn through the written word, as soon as it was founded preferred spending money to bring in one or more speakers, rather than to purchase books or periodicals.[13] The emphasis that newspapers gave to lecture tours, with a crescendo of announcements in specific columns, speaks volumes about the deeply rooted nature of this practice. Its importance was later clearly shown by the resistance posed to attempts to correct this imbalance, and render this very emotional aspect of propaganda less decisive compared to the more prosaic written word and reading-based practices. The discussion that took place during the 5th Conference of Tuscan Anarchists in 1914 on whether the role of the press should be strengthened and prioritized over the use of lecture tours, is quite emblematic of how lectures and speeches were cherished within the movement well up to the years before the First World War (Sacchetti 1983, 175–176).

Anarchists and Folk Protest

As Charles Tilly states in his work on the change in forms of collective action over time, across Europe modernization and urbanization led to the gradual demise of pre-industrial forms of protest. As he put it, the latter were characterized by a "parochial" nature, because most often the interests and interaction involved were concentrated in a single community and varied from place to place (Tilly 1995). Unlike the example of later nineteenth-century France studied by Tilly or especially by Weber (1976), Italy, at the beginning of the twentieth century, was still a very regionalized country, where many different areas and many different communities coexisted with one another. This complex human and territorial geography favoured the preservation and persistence of subversive subcultures deeply connected to rich, stratified protoindustrial worlds (Levy

2000). This was particularly true in Central Italy; in Tuscany, the Ligurian coast up to Genoa, Emilia Romagna and the Marche, especially in areas which were marked by a high presence of ancient and less uprooted artisanal groups and communities of labourers and where anarchists had their strongholds.

In the Apuan region (Tuscany), workers made ample use of old forms of protest. The latter were severely condemned and opposed by the Socialist Party and the confederal and reformist unions, but met the indulgence, if not the active support of the anarcho-syndicalist trade union USI (to which the Apuan Chamber of Labour belonged and of which Meschi was one of the national leaders, as well as a founder). Anarchists approved of actions such as boycott or sabotage and praised the "ancient wisdom" underpinning traditional forms of protest.[14] This led to an encounter and intense cultural exchange between modern political customs on the one hand and folkloric language of tradition on the other. Even when organized by bodies such as the Chambers of Labour or political clubs, demonstrations and other such initiatives still predominantly featured the language and symbolism of folk protest. Anonymous threats, mockery of adversaries and damage to the means of production were among the most widespread forms of conflict, showing a clear continuity with the past. Baroncini (2012), in a recent study on the *Settimana rossa* (red week) in 1914 in Romagna—a region very receptive to anarchical and subversive ideals, but also very rich in folkloric traditions, has shown how protesters made widespread use during the revolt of mockery and hostility rituals against local elites and landowners, and of acts of sabotage. This led the pro-government press to associate anarchism with banditry and primitive rebellion.

Similar rituals and practices (and similar opinions from moderate journals) are encountered in the Apuan region, where workers relied heavily in their protest on acts of Luddism, sabotage, the ransacking of marble quarries, anonymous threats, acts of derision and violence. These traditional forms of resistance were widely practised in spite of the condemnation and opposition of socialist and trade union organizations and heavy state repression (Manfredi 2013). As Angelo De Gubernatis, who, after a Bakunian youth, became a leading liberal intellectual, wrote against "customs and […] beliefs left by traditions" of the "violent Carrara workers", "there seemed to be just one solution: bullets" (Cirese 1976, 128–131). Sabotage acts were often triggered by processes of modernization. Between 1876 and 1892, a long private railway was built for the transport of marble

extracted from Carrara's many quarries. For that time this represented a complex engineering feat. However, the railway harmed some traditional categories of workers like independent teams of expert *lizzatori*[15] and *carrettieri* or *bovari* (cattle herders or carters), who transported blocks of marble to the town in big oxcarts along uneven dirt roads. The documents conserved at the Ferrovia Marmifera archive testify to the remarkable frequency of nocturnal acts of sabotage against the railway's units (Bianchi and Ricci 2001). One of the pillars of the "Vara" bridges, an important junction along this railway (and even today a historic symbol of Carrara around the world), was bombed with dynamite—most likely by *bovari*.[16] Thanks to the widespread support and complicity of the local community, the authorities never discovered the true culprits. Both the *lizzatori* and *carratori*, like many other professional categories in the Apuan quarries, were independent workers. They were proud of their autonomy and had no desire to end up under a boss and become mere wage-earners, giving up, in Thompson's words, the work pattern "of alternate bouts of intense labour and of idleness" that prevailed where "men were in control of their own working lives" (Thompson 1967).

As in other contexts where forms of autonomous and independent labour resisted industrialization, the ancient practice of Saint Monday (failing to show up for work after one's day off), which was locally known as *lunidiana*, also seemed deeply rooted in the region. Unlike England, where by the second half of the nineteenth century the practice of Saint Monday had almost disappeared,[17] *lunidiana* showed significant endurance in the Apuan area and continued to be practiced well up to the early twentieth century (Vatteroni 2006, 231–232). At the turn of the century, state authorities and some new business owners, committed to impose the demands of industry and the modern political economy on a culture of labour that was still, to a great extent, proto-industrial, clashed in their disciplinary effort with the stubborn resistance of the "fractious class of day labourers (commonly called *spartans*)" (Manfredi 2013, 66–67). These were traditional figures of workers who balked at any form of discipline, whose jobs by nature were intermittent and did not contemplate a specific workplace, shifts, or a fixed schedule: the *spartani* added to the varied, composite mosaic of the economy that revolved around marble production and at the same time represented a sort of indeterminate, exponential expansion of the concepts behind practices like Saint Monday, enjoying widespread complicity, and sometimes admiration, in the working-class communities of the marble villages.

The lasting consensus and conditioning power of community structures and rules were also demonstrated by phenomena like the *piazzolata*, a local variant of "rough music" (Vatteroni 2006, 113–114) which consisted in publicly shaming and deriding community wrongdoers through a wide range of charivari-like rituals, and the widespread use of anonymous or open threats, physical violence and acts of aggression against trespassers such as scabs or bosses who violated rules that were observed semi-tacitly. In a case that exemplifies the close connection between these community codes and local anarchism, during an endless dispute that began at the end of 1913 and dragged on for months, pitting strikers against the quarry owners who had responded with a lockout, Meschi, as the secretary of the Chamber of Labour that controlled most of the craft unions of the marble workers and whose influence extended through most of Versilia, explicitly invited those in attendance at a public rally "not […] to continue in the present calm". Interestingly, Meschi interweaved his economic argument with moral considerations: as he put it, "tired and hungry" workers had been "outraged by some magnate's son who would dare to say one could now more easily take advantage of the daughters of the people, willing to sell themselves for a few pennies". These claims justified "the right to respond now with all sorts of violence", with the protesters taking "bold action outside of the law", "nor […] would it be criminal for them to destroy the machines meant for the creation of wealth" or even greet "some industrialist with a shower of blows". Threatening to "reveal the names of those who had offended the working masses", the anarchist leader concluded by "warning adversaries that they [would be] overwhelmed by the violent reaction of workers, as soon as the armed forces, whose presence was holding them back for the moment, [moved] away from Carrara" and explicitly repeating an invitation to avenge themselves in blood, "raining down blows on the factory owners".[18] In the prefect's opinion, it was precisely this violent language of Meschi's that channelled popular sentiment and ensured him a "great influence" over the masses, and it may not be beside the point to note that Meschi himself got his political training as a youth in the Fedéracion Obrera Argentina, in close contact with a rebellious, unorganized proletariat made up of recent immigrants. According to local sources, marble workers' protest lasted for several months and was significantly marked by injuries, ambushes, acts of intimidation and threats, often accompanied by noisy ritual manifestations of hostility, and a poisonous aftermath that swelled into an out-and-out

feud between socialists, hostile to syndicalist excesses, and subversive militants.[19]

Therefore, in the early twentieth century, the rituals and languages of folk culture had anything but disappeared as an expression of political and social protest in large areas of Italy and indeed in the Apuan region in Tuscany, up to the point that they would later become an integral part of post-1945 collective memories of pre-fascist labour struggles (Contini 1999). Anarchists' support and encouragement of these practices provided these repertoires with legitimacy and no doubt contributed to their adaptation to new needs and exceptional persistence.

Notes

1. But for other stories of this kind, see also Avrich (1995).
2. On his figure in the popular imagination of the time, see Antonioli (1996).
3. Gori (2001); and see Antonioli and Bertolucci (2001) for an exhaustive picture of Gori's life story.
4. As the prime minister Francesco Crispi wrote in a confidential note to prefects: "For some months now Mr. Pietro Gori […] has been travelling through the provinces of Northern and Central Italy giving speeches, especially in the smaller country towns, often benefitting in these impromptu forays from the exercise of his profession as legal defender of his comrades in every incidence of criminal proceedings being brought against them" quoted in Antonioli and Bertolucci (2001, 54).
5. L. Fabbri, foreword to Gori (1948, 3–5). Another close comrade, Pisan propagandist Virgilio Mazzoni, would remember him as "the most elegant, hearkened-to and admired orator of his time" (1921, 11).
6. Foresi (1948, 87). The paper in question was the socialist-leaning, Pontremoli-based periodical *La Terra*, which played a hand in shaping figures such as the De Ambris brothers and Luigi Campolonghi, who would form the leadership of revolutionary syndacalism and its union, the Unione Sindacale Italiana (USI), to which the anarchists also belonged.
7. *In terra pax* in Foresi (1948, 32); for other passages from his writings that reveal the attempt to turn Jesus into history's first anarchist, see Antonioli (2011, 22–23).

8. On the process of cultural construction that turned Garibaldi into a widespread popular hero treated with almost religious reverence, see especially Riall (2007).
9. For the poem *Sempre Avanti* written in 1887 to celebrate the Livorno-based periodical by this name, see Mazzoni (1921, 15–17). The collection of poems written in the Palazzo dei Domenicani prison was published in three volumes in Gori (1891).
10. On the problems posed by the history of the language of the lower classes, see Joyce (1991).
11. To Eduardo Milano, 6 August 1895 in Bertolucci (2011, 310). The instrument indeed saw heavy use on the legs of his long American tour (Contini 1997, 180).
12. Naturally there has been no comprehensive investigation of this phenomenon, though it would be interesting. A recent bibliography regarding the specific case of social theater seems indicative, however, showing the vast extent of the link between the theatrical world and the anarchist movement (Catanuto 2013), which lets one imagine that an analogous, systematic examination applied to other genres like poetry or political song would offer similar results.
13. See for instance the Veronese social studies group in *Il Libertario*, 26 October 1905.
14. See as a fine example the report by Corridoni (1912) approved by a vast majority at the USI first national congress. But for other documents of the kind that, among other things, offered concrete examples of worker sabotage, justifying or encouraging initiatives such as setting fire to haylofts, losing harvests or intentionally causing the death of livestock, see Osti Guerrazzi (2001).
15. These highly skilled teams of workers, usually consisting of eight or ten men, would carry marble blocks down the steep slopes using a wooden sled called a *lizza* and ropes to control its descent; they considered themselves to be out-and-out working class aristocrats with their own rules of work and life.
16. *L'attentato al viadotto di Vara* (2005) (Carrara: Avenzagrafica).
17. The reference is to the widely studied case of the English-speaking world. In addition to Thompson's pioneering essays, see Reid (1976, 1996); for the second half of the nineteenth century as a decisive juncture, see the essays in Cross (1988).
18. See the January 1914 report of the prefect of Massa to the department of public security of the Ministry of the Interior in Archivio

centrale dello Stato, MI, DGPS, DAGR, 1914, C1 Ordine Pubblico, b. 17, f. Massa-Carrara.

19. Among the many articles on the subject in the local press in that period, see as an example "Arresti", *Lo Svegliarino*, 19 September 1914.

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CHAPTER 7

Persistent Repertoires of Contention in Portugal: From Tax Riots to Anti-communist Violence (1840–1975)

Diego Palacios Cerezales

During the summer of 1975, a year after the Carnation Revolution, thousands of Portuguese men and women took to the streets in order to prevent what they feared could be a Communist takeover. The revolution had put an end to 48 years of right-wing dictatorship, but now the military officers who headed the provisional government were clearly lurching to the left, advocating a Portuguese path to socialism. Across the country there were anti-communist demonstrations and rallies. Those who attended displayed their support for democracy and the Catholic hierarchy, their opposition to land reform and their dislike for the bearded military officers who symbolized the revolution. In more than forty locations, while church bells rang, angry crowds ransacked the local offices of the Portuguese Communist Party and other left-wing organizations. Most of the violent episodes took place in small towns in the northern half of the country; the predominant agricultural unit here was the smallholding, the

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population voted for right-wing candidates, and church attendance was high (Coelho 1980).

Both the regional distribution of anti-communist violence and some of its features bore a strong resemblance to those of the tax riots in the nineteenth century. Among the many popular movements that had resisted the construction of the liberal state, the most iconic was the Maria da Fonte revolt of 1846, named after a woman of near-legendary status who had initiated the insurrection. In 1846, the government was defeated in what oral tradition and literature would later enshrine as the only truly popular revolution in Portuguese history. In 1975, some anti-communist activists evoked Maria da Fonte in order to frame the meaning of the anti-communist movement. Others, having witnessed the violence, thought that Portugal was going through its own version of France's Vendée revolt of 1793 (Abreu 1984; Rorick 1984, 2).

The aim of this chapter is to explore, by comparing the anti-communist violence of 1975 with the tax riots of the nineteenth century, the persistence in modern Portugal of forms of action such as siege, attack, ransacking premises and burning property. To do this I will be looking at the long-term social cleavages underpinning political behaviour, and analysing the influence of political opportunity structures on the choice of tactics by protesters in both periods. In the final part of the chapter I will explore the strategic and symbolic functions of these repertoires during the nineteenth-century tax riots and the 1975 anti-communist mobilization, which is crucial to an understanding of their widespread use in nineteenth- and twentieth-century protest politics.

Interest in popular protest cultures and practices became central to Portuguese historiography in the late 1980s. By then, the research agenda influenced by French historiography, mainly the *Annales* School and the works of Labrousse, Lefebvre and Vilar, had almost been worked through. Building on works such as Eric Hobsbawm's *Primitive Rebels* (1959), George Rudé's *The Crowd in History* (1964) and E.P. Thompson's "The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century" (1971), scholars of nineteenth-century Portugal, began to shift their attention to forms of popular resistance to liberalism. They were also influenced by events such as the counter-revolutionary mobilization of 1975 (Ferreira 1982; Palacios Cerezales et al. 2013).

Some recurrent actions, such as anti-cemetery riots (the resistance to the public health decrees which determined that people had to be buried in cemeteries rather than parish church ground, which dragged on from

the 1820s to the 1910s), had often been used to depict rural populations as backward and superstitious, but Ferreira (1996) analyses these riots using an approach that pays heed to the processes by which the state clashed with forms of communal sociability and popular religiosity. She also carried out a comprehensive study of popular protest between 1834 and 1844, the period after the civil war between the forces of liberalism and absolutism, bringing to light the actions of absolutist guerrilla bands which prolonged the civil war, cases of popular resistance to "liberal" priests and officials, and recurrent tax and subsistence riots. Ferreira argues that in the rural north, while allegiance to the absolutist King Miguel receded with the passage of time, communal resistance to state-building remained strong (Ferreira 2002). The analysis of community dynamics and acts of collective resistance is also central to Miranda's research on the 1869 tax riots in the Azores (1996), which is particularly innovative in its analysis of the role played by women in the riots. Furthermore, her work provides interesting insights into the charivari-like noise-making rituals of denunciation and shaming that rioters directed at officials whilst besieging their homes. Finally, Carvalho's study (2011) of the resistance to policies of secularization between 1910 and 1917, after the 1910 republican revolution, shows that at the beginning of the twentieth century many northern rural communities still rejected cemeteries and other state interference. Carvalho uses the term "*repertório tradicional*" ("traditional repertoire"), but in using these words he stresses the issue at stake—resistance to state-sponsored modernity—rather than the form popular action took. There therefore remains much work to be done on the symbolic and ritual aspects of these protests.

In recent years there has been an increased amount of research into the history of popular protest in Portugal. This can be seen in the very productive conferences on social movements and working-class history organized by the New University of Lisbon in 2011, 2013 and 2015. However, a number of key aspects regarding the relationship between popular culture and protest, such as the persistence and adaptation of charivari and carnival rituals in Portuguese nineteenth- and twentieth-century politics, are still significantly underresearched (Palacios Cerezales et al. 2013). This applies, in particular, to the study of protest and dissent during the dictatorship years and the period after 1974. Portuguese historians, anthropologists and political scientists have drawn heavily on social movement scholarship, including Charles Tilly's theoretical framework and reflections on repertoires of contention (1986, 2008), but they

have focused mainly on how protest adapted to repressive conditions during the Salazar years (Godinho 2001) and on the adoption during the last two centuries of a modern repertoire that has included public meetings, petition drives, demonstrations and letter-writing (Palacios Cerezales 2014; Silva 2013). As regards the wave of mobilization that followed the 1974 Carnation Revolution, workers' strikes and the occupation of land, factories and housing have been thoroughly investigated (Chilcote 1987; Hammond 1988), but hardly any research has been done on the 1975 anti-communist protest and, in particular, on the forms of protest action and its origins, functions, symbolism and meanings.

The "Hot Summer" of 1975

On the morning of 25 April 1974 the *Movimento das Forças Armadas* (MFA—Armed Forces Movement) overthrew a four-year-old right-wing dictatorship in what became known as the Carnation Revolution. The MFA, a loose-knit league of middle-ranking military officers, sought to bring an end to the colonial wars the Portuguese army had been fighting for 13 years in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau. In their initial manifesto the rebel officers outlined a programme of decolonization, democratization, and economic and social development.

In the month after the revolution, the coup was celebrated in both urban and rural Portugal as a liberation. Thousands of Portuguese took to the streets and fraternized with the military. The formerly clandestine opposition to the dictatorship, most visibly the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP), the Socialist Party (PS) and the militant student-led far left, began to operate in the open, while new centre and centre-right parties began to form. Across the country, there was a wave of mobilization: workers struck for better wages and occupied factories; the newly legalized political parties called for open council meetings all over the country which carried out purges of the "fascist" local authorities; students rejected "fascist" teachers in schools and universities; slum dwellers organized and occupied empty housing; and left-wing organizations demonstrated against colonial war. Countless men and women took advantage of the political opportunities presented by the breakdown of the dictatorship in order to foster their own economic interests and political preferences (Downs 1988; Hammond 1988; Bermeo 1986; Pinto 2008). To use Zolberg's conceptualization of the spurts of creativity during revolution-

ary situations, Portugal experienced a "moment of madness" (Zolberg 1971; Abril em Maio 2001).

The MFA had promised elections, and these were held in April 1975, one year after the coup. By then, however, the political situation had changed. After a series of political crises and manoeuvres within the military, the radical faction of the MFA, led by Colonel Vasco Gonçalves and supported mainly by the PCP, had increased its share of power. The political balance swung to the left: military stewardship of the political process became institutionalized through the Council of the Revolution, trade unions were forcibly federated within a single national structure, all of the Portuguese banks were nationalized, and land reform was introduced. In March 1975, the MFA announced that "socialism" was a goal to be enshrined in the future constitution, and political parties were made to agree with this in order to take part in the 1975 election (Maxwell 1995). Worried about the turn of events, the network of local Catholic newspapers began publishing warnings about the sufferings of the church in Communist Europe. The situation became so charged that in the small northern town of Ovar, for example, the popular carnival, which drew on international models of urban carnivals and was famous for the freedom of expression it had achieved during the dictatorship, was suspended in order to avoid the potential explosion of tension into violence (*Notícias de Ovar*, 9 January 1975: 1).

The April 1975 election for the Constituent Assembly made it clear that a Western-style pluralist democracy was the preferred choice of most Portuguese. Between them, the PCP and the far left were unable to capture 20 per cent of the national ballot. Despite this result, the MFA's radical faction retained its hold on power and pushed on with its programme: swift decolonization, agrarian reform and further nationalization.

On 10 July 1975 the PS, led by Mario Soares and the recipient of the greatest number of votes, claimed that the chances of a true democratization were being jeopardized by the government of Vasco Gonçalves and by the PCP, and declared that they were now in opposition to the MFA. Democracy had to be defended, they said, and they appealed to the people to mobilize. During the weeks that followed, massive anti-communist demonstrations were held in Lisbon and across the country. These were organized by the Catholic Church, landowners' associations and a wide range of political parties, from the PS to the far right, all of which agreed on the need to fight the government. The PCP called for vigilance against "reactionaries". Some progressive Catholics sided with

the "revolution" against the forces of "reaction", but they were unable to mobilize much support on the streets (Rezola 1992). There were huge anti-communist demonstrations in Lisbon, Porto and the rural north, the regions where the electorate had displayed moderate and conservative preferences. By contrast, in industrial areas and the rural south, where a large proportion of the landless peasants had voted for the PCP, the radical military and the "revolution" were supported by their own large rallies and demonstrations (Palacios Cerezales 2003) (Table 7.1).

The church-led rallies and demonstrations were attended by both men and women. Many participants waved banners and carried placards, some indicating the parish where they came from, some expressing their rejection of communism, and many others supporting the church's right to resume control of *Radio Renascença*. This was the main church-owned radio station, which leftist workers had occupied in May and turned into the mouthpiece of the far left (Santos 2005). On some demonstrations the presence of nuns was conspicuous, and the traditional sound of tolling church bells was used in some places to call the populations of rural parishes to gather in local towns and take part in the demonstrations (Santo 1980). However, protesters gave their demonstrations a modern and secular feel, possibly to attract support and sympathy from the non-religious anti-communist segments of society. Participants abstained from using explicitly religious images, such as virgins and saints, and there is no evidence of them singing hymns. Instead, marchers carried banners,

Table 7.1 Votes for the main parties (% of total votes cast) by region, Constituent Assembly elections, April 1975

Region	*CDS + PPD (centre-right)*	*PS (centre-left)*	*PCP + MDP (radical left)*
Rural north	49.2	30.1	7.5
Urban north	37.2	41.6	11.0
Rural south	11.0	41.5	34.9
Urban south	16.9	45.1	27.0
Continental Portugal	32.4	38.6	17.3

Key: *CDS* Centro Democratico e Social, *MDP* Movimento Democratico Portugues, *PCP* Partido Comunista Portugues, *PS* Partido Socialista, *PPD* Partido Popular Democratico. Urban councils are those containing a district capital or city with a population greater than 10,000. The south comprises the Algarve, the Alentejo, urban councils of the Lisbon district and councils of the Lisbon, Castelo Branco and Santarem districts affected by land reform. The islands are not included.

Source: Based on Hammond (1984, 263).

sang secular songs and chanted slogans, appealing to secular values such as freedom of expression and democracy. In Braga, the participants chanted "Christian people are not reactionary". In Viseu, they sang *Canta amigo canta*, a protest song from the 1960s that said "alone you are nothing, together we hold the world in our hands", and chanted "bishop, our friend, the people are with you", "Radio Renascença is ours", and "the will of the people must be respected" (*Jornal Novo*, 21 July 1975: 2).

During July and August, violence erupted in 45 municipalities and more than 80 offices belonging to the PCP and other left-wing organizations were damaged. Most of the rioting took place in the later stages of anti-communist demonstrations that had started out as peaceful. For example, in Aveiro, a town of 20,700 inhabitants that was the centre of a mainly rural district, the Church called for a silent march, but clandestine anti-communist groups distributed leaflets calling for violence, rang the church bells as an alarm, removed communist posters from the streets and encouraged the crowd to take action.

Most violence followed a similar script. Chanting "We are the people" and denouncing the communists and Moscow, some of the demonstrators converged on and surrounded local PCP offices, and the bolder among them began throwing stones and attacking the buildings. Pictures show some rioters wielding farm tools (*Paris Match*, 23 August 1975: 48); others armed themselves with heavy sticks. One left-leaning journalist was surprised to discover that most rioters did not support a return to "fascism", but instead used slogans associated with the Carnation Revolution, such as "The people rule" and "Yes to democracy, no to dictatorship" (*Diário de Lisboa*, 26 August 1975: 1, 20). Cries of "Down with the communists" and "Burn them", and insults like "thieves", "assassins" and "liars" were also heard (MDP 1975, 5).

In most cases, the PCP militants had fled even before the protesters arrived. When rioters entered the building they pulled down the communist flags and placards with the party name, threw furniture and paperwork out of the windows, and burned everything on bonfires in the street. On several occasions the anti-communist crowds remained on the streets for two or even three full days. In these cases of sustained protest, some people organized pickets and attacked the offices of other left-wing parties, trade unions, and politically committed lawyers and doctors. When identified as belonging to communist militants or sympathisers, cars were set alight and the front windows of cafés and businesses were stoned. Some groups simply wandered excitedly around town, shouting, exchanging news, and

running to wherever something seemed to be happening (*Jornal Novo*, 21 July 1975: 2). In Famalicão, two communists were forced to flee their home when it was invaded by an angry crowd; the same happened to leftist lawyers in Leiria, Sever do Vouga and elsewhere. During the night, vans carrying left-leaning newspapers from Lisbon, which condemned the anti-communist demonstrations and violence as "reactionary" and "fascist", were stopped and their contents burned (Burguete 1978).

Militant groups also invaded some town council buildings, chanting "Let the people rule". They demanded the removal of the MFA-appointed local councillors, who were left-wingers and not at all representative of local preferences. Clerks in local banks were another favourite target. Even before the nationalization of the banks, the unions in the banking sector had frozen accounts to prevent capital leaving the country, and emigrants had stopped sending their remittances, which represented essential income for many families in the north (Noronha 2013). Now the rioters shouted "Sack the communists" and picketed the banks to ensure that trade unionists could not return to work (*Jornal Novo*, 21 July 1975: 10; 7 August 1975: 2). Pickets guarded roads, council buildings and bank branches, sleeping at night around campfires. As for most of the violence, those involved in these night watches were exclusively men. According to one journalist, they spent the night talking about targets for the following day (*Diário de Lisboa*, 26 August 1975: 20).

During these episodes, dozens of presumed communists experienced harassment, had their cars vandalized, or were beaten up, but their lives were usually spared. Communists were expected to resign from their posts and to flee the area in fear. Most of them fled; there were only beatings when they defended their rights and resisted. The four men who actually died during this period of violence were either participants in the rioting or onlookers, caught in gunfire from either the troops or the PCP militants who were trying to contain the attacks. Clandestine far-right groups only made direct attempts on the lives of their opponents in 1976, when pluralist democracy seemed safe and popular mobilization had died down (Palacios Cerezales, forthcoming) (Fig. 7.1).

The Long-Term Perspective

Besieging, attacking and ransacking a rival's office share traits with actions commonly ascribed in social movement scholarship to the "traditional repertoire" (Tilly 1986). As Tarrow notes, "in the 1780s, people certainly knew how to seize shipments of grain, attack tax gatherers, burn tax registers,



Fig 7.1 Anti-communist group violence, per week, June-September 1975. Key: 'violent place-days' indicates the number of council districts that witnessed violence in any one day; 'offices' are those of the PCP, other radical left-wing parties and trade union'. *Sources*: Avante! (1978) and the newspaper collections of *Jornal Novo*, 1975, *Diário de Lisboa*, 1975, and *Comércio do Porto*, 1975

and take revenge on wrongdoers and people who had violated community norms" (2011, 38). Rallies and demonstrations, however, which were also part of the anti-communist campaign, were what Tarrow would call "cosmopolitan" and "modular" forms of action: actions directed at a non-locally-based power holder, which could be used for a variety of purposes and by different combinations of social actors (Tarrow 2011; Tilly 2008). Taken as a whole, the anti-communist demonstrations of 1975 displayed the traits of modern modular politics. Nevertheless, the form of the violent attacks, which became the most iconic and distinctive aspect of the anti-communist movement, bore a strong resemblance to previous violent revolts, particularly the nineteenth-century tax riots.

Resistance to the penetration of the state and the market has been highlighted as a recurrent situation in which traditional repertoires had to adapt to new conditions and react to national developments during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Food riots took place not only when food was expensive or scarce, but when the connection with national markets undermined local supply traditions. The imposition of new taxes and new ways of assessing taxable wealth was a further traditional trigger of rebellion (Tilly 1975; Tarrow 2011).

In Portugal, where taxes on rural wealth had been comparatively light before 1800, direct action against taxation was used to resist the state throughout the nineteenth century. In 1846, 1861–62 and 1867–70, there were major waves of anti-tax riots. As late as 1900, the assessment of

rural wealth for taxation was halted to prevent a much-feared outbreak of rioting (Sousa 2007). As was the case with the anti-communist mobilization in 1975, churchmen also played an important role in the nineteenth-century riots. After 1850, when the church reached an agreement with the liberal state, it no longer campaigned openly against taxation. However, when there were waves of tax riots liberal politicians denounced sermons by ultramontane priests, who preached that taxes should not be paid to the "irreligious government" (Palacios Cerezales 2008, 192). In the typical tax riot, when church bells rang people gathered in rural parishes and marched *en masse* to town. If no troops stopped them, they attacked tax offices and burned the records of taxation owing. Furniture was also frequently burned, and the crowd then turned its attention elsewhere. The homes of government officials were often besieged, and even attacked, and people marched to the town hall to destroy the records pertaining to military service; during the 1860s and 1870s they also destroyed the official weights and measures standards. Sometimes rioters also tried to control communications, including cutting the telegraph wire in places where this had already arrived. The crowd often shouted death threats at officials, but as these had generally already fled, or been granted personal protection by local bosses, actual killings were rare. These riots often happened in waves on a regional basis; the authorities noted that news of successful tax riots in one location was an important trigger for new riots everywhere else (Miranda 1996; Ferreira 2002; Palacios Cerezales 2014).

Interestingly, a map of anti-communist violence in the summer of 1975 roughly coincides with that of the nineteenth-century tax riots: in both cases violence was mostly concentrated in the centre and the north of the country, and the mountains of the Algarve (Fig. 7.2). This reflects the long-term persistence of political cleavages in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Portugal. A first cleavage separates urban from rural Portugal, in a country where, until the 1970s, most of the population lived in the countryside. A second and even more significant social division follows the distribution of property. This separates the political and religious allegiances of the more populated, religious and conservative smallholding regions north of the River Tagus and in the mountains of Algarve from the regions of the Alentejo, where landless peasants worked on big estates (Cabral 1974; Rutledge 1977; Coelho 1980; Martins 1998). Rights attached to property were crucial both in the nineteenth century and in 1975. The land tax was the issue at stake during the nineteenth century, while the main polarizing issue mobilizing smallholders during the sum-



Fig 7.2 Geographical distribution of rioting, 1861–70 and 1975.
Key: dots indicate locations with one or more episodes of collective violence. Council boundaries are those of 1975. Sources: Arquivo do Ministério do Reino, Arquivos Nacionais daTorre da Torre do Tombo, documents L13 149, L13 1093, L13 1095, L18 n54, L19 1195, L20 258; L20 457, and L20 449. Avante! (1978); Dâmaso (1999); Diário de Lisboa, 1975; Jornal Novo, 1975; Comércio do Porto, 1975

mer of 1975 was the land reform taking place in the south of the country, which flagged the revolutionary's disregard for property rights.

During the nineteenth century, officials generally described those who rebelled as "*os povos*" (the people), which indicated that they saw the crowds as consisting of an undifferentiated rural community (Ferreira 2007). Tax officials were wont to blame the riots on the rural rich, who, it was alleged, manipulated the poorer smallholders (Palacios Cerezales 2008, 193). For 1975, the ethnologist Espírito Santo studied the poor peasants in the hinterland of Batalha who had taken part in the anti-communist demonstrations and violence. Church bells rallied the people, while leadership was assumed by middlemen of poor origins who rented machinery and "successful peasants" in whom the rest had confidence (Santo 1980). John Hammond suggests that in the events of 1975 the majority of participants were also peasants; several violent episodes "occurred on market days when the towns were filled with people from the surrounding farm villages" (1984, 279). Market days were also propitious for tax rioting during the nineteenth century.

Actions such as besieging, ransacking premises and burning paperwork and furniture were thus deeply embedded in the protest culture and practices of rural north Portugal. Anti-communist militants in 1975 explicitly related to this past in their actions and how these were framed. As noted above, they named their network "Maria da Fonte" after the folk heroine who had, in 1846, initiated the rural revolt against the taxes and administrative measures of the new liberal state (Dâmaso 1999; Abreu 1984). In contrast with other waves of protest, mostly forgotten, the memory of Maria da Fonte had been perpetuated in both popular poem and song (Braga 1911, vol. 2, 442). As the romantic writer and folklorist Almeida Garrett argued in the aftermath of the events, the participation of women in the revolt was a sign of its "authenticity", enshrining it in history books with the particular status of being the only "truly popular revolution" in Portuguese history (quoted by Rorick 1984, 2). For the intellectual right wing, this mark of "authenticity" assisted the dismissal of the rest of the many revolutionary episodes in Portuguese history, which were depicted as conspiracies led by urban intellectuals (Trindade 2013). Interestingly, in 1975 some voices on the Maoist far left also used Maria da Fonte as an icon of peasant revolt and welcomed the anti-communist demonstrations as a form of popular resistance to the "social-fascism" of the pro-Moscow PCP (Silva 1978).

Possibly because of the iconic status the nineteenth-century tax riots acquired in the public imagination, in the first half of the twentieth century the action of attacking and ransacking rivals' premises began to be practised in urban contexts too. In 1909, radical republicains and anarchists

extolled that year's tax riots in the northern district of Vila Real as a model for popular action (Pereira 1982). During the period of the Republic (1910–26), republican crowds repeatedly ransacked the offices of conservative and Catholic newspapers in Lisbon, Oporto and Coimbra (Valente 1992). Throughout the right-wing dictatorship (1926–74), the opposition had few opportunities to organize, but when it did, far-right militants often ransacked its offices untouched by the police. In May 1965 the Writers' Association was ransacked by a crowd of 50 people after it awarded a literary prize to the anti-colonialist African writer, Luandino Vieira. There were similar events in 1969 when the phoney elections the dictatorship organized allowed the opposition to open some offices (Madeira 2007).

In the immediate aftermath of the Carnation Revolution, much of the popular participation in events across the country took the form of attacks on the premises of the political police (PIDE) and the regime's political organizations. Crowds laying siege to the PIDE headquarters in Lisbon, from which PIDE agents fired, killing two demonstrators, was one of the iconic images in the transformation of the military coup into a popular revolution. Over the following days, invasions by the people of local PIDE, party and militia offices across Portugal, with military approval and no significant resistance, symbolized the arrival of the revolution. Later, when right-wing coups were foiled on 28 September 1974 and 11 March 1975, left-wing militants ransacked the offices of the newly-organized right-wing parties in the Lisbon and Porto areas (Brinca and Baia 2000; Rodrigues 1999).

Thus, in July 1975 the occupation and ransacking of political opponents' offices was a well-known and well-rehearsed form of collective action. The fact that a repertoire was available, however, is not sufficient to explain why people used it. In the sections that follow I will be exploring the factors that encouraged and facilitated the use of direct action and, in particular, of actions such as ransacking premises and burning property (Fig. 7.2).

Popular Violence and the State

One way to make sense of the different repertoires is to relate them to the general organization of political and administrative institutions and to changes in opportunity structures. When violent collective action is at issue, an important factor to examine is the ability and disposition of the state to suppress private violence (Della Porta 1996). Durán Muñoz (2000), in his work on Portuguese workers in the years after the 1974

Carnation Revolution, has convincingly argued that the reason they used forms of action that were far more radical than those used by their Spanish counterparts during the transition to democracy lies in the specific political context in which they operated and the opportunities open to them. His insights and explanatory framework are crucial to an explanation of the anti-communist riots of the summer of 1975 (Palacios Cerezales 2003).

The Portuguese nineteenth-century liberal state was comparatively weak. The kind of tax riots common in Portugal during the second half of the nineteenth century had almost disappeared in the major European states by the 1840s. Unequal taxation was a common focus for complaint in Southern Europe, but in Spain, while riots against excise duties were commonplace (Vallejo Pousada 1996), the state was stronger and levies on agrarian wealth did not provoke the waves of rioting seen in Portugal. In Italy, the early state-building efforts in the 1860s had to overcome fierce resistance, but the consolidation of the new state came hand in hand with the imposition of a viable taxation system (Davis 1988, 187–190). In Portugal, rioting was successful in keeping taxation lower than elsewhere (see Table 7.2).

Some reformers believed the problem to be the particular weakness of the Portuguese state. This may well have been true: while other European countries policed the countryside with a national constabulary, Portugal did not have one. Gendarmeries were a common feature of nineteenth-century rural Europe, but the Portuguese police system was purely urban. Direct action was a more appealing option in rural Portugal, with a state deterrent absent, than in places with stronger governments. The army was used for crowd control, but its network of barracks was unsuited to internal policing. While most European gendarmeries were created between

Table 7.2. Fiscal burden in Europe (1851–1913): fiscal revenue as share of GDP (%)

	Portugal	*Spain*	*Italy*	*France*	*Britain*
1851–59	3.5	7.8	n.a.	8.4	9.4
1860–69	3.6	10.6	7.9	8.4	7.5
1870–79	4.0	9.5	10.6	9.8	6.3
1880–89	4.4	8.6	13.3	13.1	7.0
1890–99	4.9	8.9	13.7	11.8	7.3
1900–13	5.5	9.3	11.8	10.8	8.2

Source: Esteves (2005, 325).

1812 and 1848, the first truly national constabulary in Portugal, the National Republican Guard (GNR), was only formed after 1911 (Emsley 1999; Palacios Cerezales 2013).

State weakness may explain direct action during the nineteenth century, but after 1900 the Portuguese police system developed fully. The GNR was gradually deployed between 1911 and 1919, projecting the power of the state throughout the country. It patrolled the countryside and brought the state to even the most remote mountain parishes at least once a fortnight. From the 1930s, in addition, the political police (PIDE) were a central tool for social control. In contrast to the liberal state, the dictatorship of Salazar and Caetano (1926–74) was a strong government supported by fully developed police forces.

The Carnation Revolution shattered the policing system. To explain the repertoire of contention of 1974 and 1975, it is important to stress that the police were paralysed after being blamed for the repressive policies of the dictatorship. The PIDE and the riot brigade were dissolved, while the urban police and the rural constabulary were partially disarmed and removed from duties involving social conflict (Palacios Cerezales 2007).

The army took responsibility for policing protest. However, it faced a new challenge in playing this role: the high political costs of repression. How could the "liberators", who had brought "freedom", shoot "the people"? Moreover, there were numerous cases of breakdowns in discipline and the fraternization of the troops with protesters. For the popular movements that occupied factories and empty housing in urban Portugal, or the large estates in the south, the absence of repressive policing created a wonderful opportunity for direct action (Durán Muñoz 2000). During 1974, this also meant that far-left groups often disrupted right-wing meetings. In the summer of 1975, it was the turn of the anti-communists to take advantage of the weakness of the state and use direct action against their rivals.

A line of soldiers would sometimes attempt to defend the PCP offices but, as everybody knew they would not shoot, this proved an ineffective deterrent. As the situation escalated, the commanding officer evacuated the offices to protect PCP militants, while allowing the demonstrators to ransack the property. MFA hardliners sent marines to the north in early August 1975 to try a more forceful approach. After their killing of two demonstrators, the government realized that repression had an unacceptably high cost and withdrew the marines, permitting anti-communist violence to proceed unhindered (Palacios Cerezales 2003, 165–169).

It can be argued, therefore, that the weakness of the state facilitated the use of violent repertoires in both the nineteenth century and 1975: in the former because of the weak state infrastructure, and in the latter because of the political conjuncture that impeded the legitimate use of force. If we put aside the periodization issue of determining what is "traditional" and what is "modern", and we relate the repertoires of action to the choices made available by the configuration of the political situation, as Charles Tilly did, we may find that the option of direct action and collective violence did not depend on the degree of modernity of those who rebelled, but on conjunctures in which the state was not able to monopolize violence.

Functions and Symbolism of Siege, Ransacking and Burning

While state weakness may explain the protesters' widespread use of violence during the 1975 anti-communist mobilization, it does not account for the specific form that the violence took. Why did protesters ransack offices and burn furniture and documentation? Why was there comparatively little bloodshed? What symbolic and strategic functions did actions such as siege, ransacking and burning have in the 1975 anti-communist mobilization? Were they the same as those underpinning the mid-nineteenth-century tax riot violence?

As was the case with the nineteenth-century tax riots, whose key goal was the destruction of government fiscal records, the violence against property and acts of intimidation by anti-communist protesters had a clear strategic and operational function inasmuch as their actions were designed to undermine the PCP's organizational structure and power, and eventually succeeded in this. By June 1975 the party had opened 481 local offices across the country; after the attacks, it almost disappeared from public life in some districts. As the civil governor of Braganza said, "the PCP has been driven back into clandestine activity" (*Mensageiro de Bragança*, 21 November 1975: 3). In December 1975, the communists acknowledged that they had fewer than 200 offices, most of them in the larger cities and the south of the country (Lisi 2007).

However, weakening the PCP's organizational structure and national outreach was not the sole aim of the protesters' choice of tactics. A number of other issues have to be considered in explaining their actions. As

argued earlier, the practice of besieging, attacking and ransacking a rival's office was by the 1970s a well-known form of collective action. The use of familiar scripts made it easier to mobilize big crowds quickly and effectively. While it is true that the anti-communist demonstrations of 1975 did not lack co-ordination, as evidenced by the clandestine propaganda inciting violence distributed by rightist groups and the presence of a handful of activists in several attacks (Avante! 1978), these militants were surprised by the enthusiastic participation of hundreds of ordinary citizens. As one leading activist of the Maria da Fonte anti-communist network recalled, "the ordinary people were a gunpowder barrel, ready to explode as soon as we lit a matchstick" (Abreu 1984, 146). The raids on opposing party offices often served as a rallying point for anti-communist protesters. The utilization of heavily ritualized scripts was also crucial in containing people's violence within the limits of acceptability.

We know that public support and a sense of legitimacy are key factors in successful mobilization. As noted earlier, when discussing the iconization of figures such as Maria da Fonte, these repertoires could rely on a high degree of social acceptance among the population. Moreover, throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries these forms of action had been used by both the Right and the Left: this undermined the government's attempt to frame and delegitimize the violence of 1975 anti-communist protesters as "fascist". It is revealing that a number of ransacked PCP offices were adorned with placards that symbolically turned them into "homes for the Angolan refugees", referring to the men and women expelled during the fast-paced and chaotic decolonization of Portuguese Africa after the revolution (*Jornal Novo*, 21 August 1975). This mimicked the actions, and their underlying subversive intent, of the left-wing groups that in the aftermath of the Carnation Revolution had occupied the former dictatorship's party offices to transform them into nurseries, medical centres or social clubs.

The occupation and ransacking of political opponents' offices was widely perceived as an "act of popular justice" and was intentionally framed and enacted by the protesters as legitimate community resistance. A leaflet produced in the summer of 1975 by the clandestine right-wing Democratic Movement for the Liberation of Portugal (MDLP) called for "self-defence" and for "a local council representative of local preferences"; "as soon as you hear your church bell sounding the alarm, come onto the streets with any weapons you may have—hunting gun, spade, scythe […]

to fight for a government that respects the popular will" (MDP Leaflet 1975).

The street bonfires of PCP documents and furniture staged by the anti-communist crowd, in turn, were highly symbolic and indeed self-legitimizing mock executions of their political enemies. As we know, rituals of mock execution featured strongly in pre-modern traditions of community justice and were still widely used in nineteenth-century Portugal. They had also long been central to the Carnival theatre of inversion. Two particular rituals had often been adopted and appropriated to symbolically try and execute political rivals: the *Queima do Judas*, the Easter Saturday burning of the effigy of Judas (Dias 1948), and the "burial of the sardine", the mock execution of a sardine, by burying or burning, which has traditionally signalled the end of Carnival celebrations in Portugal and Spain. The figures of Judas and the sardine were now replaced by effigies representing enemies or contentious issues. Straw dolls personifying *Dona Constituição* ["Mrs Constitution"] were buried in Lisbon and elsewhere during the pro-absolutist mobilizations of 1826 and 1828 (Cardoso 2007, 161). In 1867, the press lamented the widespread and common use of the burning in effigy of ministers and other notables during the Easter Saturday processions in Lisbon and Oporto (*O Nacional*, 21 April 1867: 1). Burnings in effigy and mock funerals are, in fact, still practised in contemporary Portuguese protest.

Mock executions of the effigies of political opponents are highly empowering, identity-forging and bonding rituals. The expulsion of PCP staff from their offices and the occupation of this enemy space had similarly empowering effects and implications.

Finally, the attacks had a significant effect on the political process. They were bold acts of aggression that indicated a strong commitment to persevere in the struggle, which is a very powerful signal in any strategic interaction. Mass attendance at anti-communist demonstrations in tandem with the use of violence made it clear to the radicals in the MFA that, in order to govern, they would have to resort to repression. This made many military officers step back from their previous revolutionary commitment, strengthening the moderate faction of the MFA which wanted to respect the election results. In mid-September the moderates ousted Vasco Gonçalves and began managing the end of the revolution.

Conclusions

Collective attacks on PCP offices across northern Portugal in 1975 bear a strong resemblance to the nineteenth-century tax riots. The forms of action of the traditional repertoire are commonly depicted as local and rigid, but, as this case study shows, throughout nineteenth- and twentieth-century Portugal forms of popular direct action such as ransacking, siege and burning property were continually turned to different political needs and widely used in combination with modern tools of action in a diverse range of contexts, both rural and urban. From the beginning of the twentieth century, attacks and ransacking became integral components of political struggle in urban contexts. For protesters in both the 1974 Carnation Revolution and the 1975 anti-communist mobilization, ransacking the offices of political rivals was an obvious-option.

As we have seen, the regional distributions of anti-communist attacks and tax riots reflected the long-standing persistence of cleavages in agrarian structures, church attendance and political attitudes that divided Portugal, and still divide it. However, social divisions explain political preferences and not repertoires of action. The resort to popular violence was possible due to the weakness of the state: a structural weakness in the nineteenth century, but evident again in 1975 due to the revolutionary crisis. As regards the forms of violence that protesters used during the riots, this study demonstrates that they followed well-known scripts and had key material, expressive and symbolic functions in both periods of protest. The use of siege, ransacking and burning property reflected strategic political considerations, but also the identity needs of protesters and their quest for legitimacy. Memories of the 1846 Maria da Fonte revolt enhanced the symbolic power of the 1975 anti-communist rioting, making the participation of northern peasants in the anti-communist mobilization appear to re-enact history: a history central to the popular imaginary and dear to large sections of the general public.

Many studies of the 1974–75 wave of popular mobilization in Portugal stress the surprise generated by the sudden eruption of social and political protest. This explosion in participation was striking, as the Portuguese citizenry had generally been depicted as passive and demobilized. The Brazilian photographer Sebastião Salgado, who had visited Lisbon in 1970, returned after the revolution to find that Portugal seemed "another country" (*Portugal, outro país* 1999). While there was something new in the air, tradition provided an important framework for the forms much

of the collective action took. Confronted with acute political conflict and state weakness, the Portuguese discovered new possibilities, and many citizens experienced their collective power for the first time. However, they also resorted to a repertoire embedded in history. They followed a script of well-known gestures and rituals that enabled the rapid mobilization of unconnected groups and aided the legitimation of their actions. An inherited knowledge on how to mobilize determined the path taken, both providing meaning and setting limits to the violence employed. The revolution brought numerous innovations to Portuguese popular protest, but in order to take action together individuals needed meaningful reference points: many of these were provided by a well-rehearsed repertoire that had been adapted to different contexts since the nineteenth century.

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CHAPTER 8

Carnivalesque and Charivari Repertoires in 1960s and 1970s Italian Protest

Ilaria Favretto and Marco Fincardi

Introduction

The 1960s and 1970s were marked by widespread social upheaval in Italian politics and society. In the context of unprecedented economic growth and almost full employment, and after a long period of acquiescence that lasted until the early 1960s, factory workers regained their collective strength and once again took to the streets. Worker protest peaked in 1968 and 1969 and continued unabated until the late 1970s. In the mid-1960s secondary schools and universities also entered a period of turmoil. The Italian student movement fostered a wave of youth unrest which extended right through the 1970s, well beyond other European "1968s".

Worker action and youth protest were both marked by notable tactical creativity. Using the civil rights movement and unrest in US universities as models, Italian students experimented with forms of civil disobedience

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such as sit-ins and teach-ins. On the production line, factory workers experimented with new forms of action, such as "scioperi a scacchiera" and "a singhiozzo" (literally, "chessboard" and "hiccup" strikes, meaning rolling strikes and on–off stoppages), and made wide use of illegal and unconventional forms of protest such as aggressive picketing, wildcat strikes, factory occupation, production go-slows and sabotage (Tarrow 1989, 186–189). Worker and student protest also had distinctively carnivalesque and festive traits. As commentators noted at the time, workers banged tins together and deliberately made lots of noise during marches, and staged carnival-like street theatre such as mock funerals and the parading of effigies. Such a festive mood signalled a significant departure from the unions' accustomed earnest approach and ordered military marching style. Mockery, ridicule, colour and rowdiness were also essential features of protest action by Italian youth.

The carnivalesque and ludic aspects of Italy's phase of protest across the 1960s and 1970s have received scant attention in the literature. In the 1980s, in line with studies on carnival rituals and protest generated by the new French and Anglo-American cultural history, scholars such as Aldo Marchetti (1982), Marco Revelli and Alessandra Tarpino (1983) undertook innovative investigations into the ludic dimension of workers' marches. However, they looked almost entirely at street marches and ignored factory-based protest, which had similarly festive features. Moreover, their approach had a minimal impact on later scholarship. Scholars of Italian labour history and industrial conflict have generally paid little attention to popular culture and tradition; one of the few exceptions is Maurizio Bertolotti's analysis of the skilful use of carnival traditions and repertoires by local Communist Party activists in 1950 in the rural area around Mantua (Lombardy, northern Italy), to convey Communist propaganda. The assumption has been that forms of pre-industrial protest and their cultural context did not survive processes of urbanization and modernization to any significant extent.[1] The use by workers of carnivalesque forms of protest does feature in some accounts of labour struggles in the 1960s (Lumley 1990, 223; Tarrow 1989, 76), but no attempt has been made to produce a comprehensive and detailed analysis either of the symbolic and strategic functions of these repertoires, or of their origins. It is common to find the new festive style of worker protest dismissed as an attempt to mimic the defiance and satire that were employed in student protest in the same period (Horn 2007).

Greater attention has been paid to the humorous and expressive features of youth protest in the 1960s and 1970s (Bechelloni 1973; Cartosio 1992; Flores and De Bernardi 1998; Ortoleva 1998; Marino 2008; De Luna 2009; Benci 2011; Ventrone 2012; Tolomelli 2015). However, as Patrick Gun Cuninghame notes, particularly as regards the post-1977 phase, research has primarily focused on the protesters' widespread use of violence and has paid less attention to its more creative elements (2007). Moreover, when it comes to explaining the meaning and purpose of ludic forms of student activism, it has been common to examine the influence of Situationism. This study acknowledges the impact of Situationist ideas, discussed later, but also considers a wide range of other factors that contributed to the festive atmosphere of youth protest.

The Revival of Carnivalesque Rituals and Repertoires in Factory Protest of the 1960s and 1970s

After the early 1960s, marches by workers went through significant changes; the military style that had long characterized them was abandoned, and they became increasingly creative, disorderly, rowdy and carnivalesque (Ganapini 1997, 36; Sangiovanni 2006, 190). Whistles, banged implements and drums became standard features of street demonstrations (Bonvini and Petrillo 1977, 65).[2] During marches, participants also staged diverse forms of carnival-like street theatre. On the streets of large northern industrial cities like Milan, workers would join union-organized marches with donkeys carrying derisive placards attacking strikebreakers and "recalcitrant" bosses (Favretto 2015, 241). Managers or government figures were paraded in effigy, and some highly theatrical mock executions and funerals were staged (Marchetti 1982, 238). Dummies representing employers and strikebreakers were burnt or hanged at factory gates. At a demonstration on 15 October 1969 in Milan, against the high cost of living, a rag doll in a suit was hanged. Attached to his "bourgeois" coat and the gallows structure were placards—"deductions", "rent", "low wages" and "high prices"—that indicated a multiple execution: factory bosses, landlords and retailers, all equally responsible for the high cost of living.[3] Smearing and dirtying with various substances, other elements typical of carnivalesque ritual, were also occasionally used against strike-breakers and sites symbolic of power (Favretto 2015, 219–221).

Workers' placards and slogans, which became increasingly personalized and unrestrained, also added to the atmosphere of carnival and the theatre of inversion: typical slogans of the time included "Agnelli in fonderia" ("Agnelli to the foundry") (Marchetti 1997, 111), and "un modo nuovo di fare la produzione/sotto le presse mettiamoci il padrone!" ("a new method of production/put the boss under the presses") (Marchetti 1997, 111; 1982, 253). Employers became a habitual target of mockery, ridicule and humiliation. In November 1970, after a very well-attended march in the centre of Milan, the workers from Falck (an important Italian iron and steel works located in Sesto San Giovanni on the city's outskirts) paid a visit to the company's headquarters in the city centre. According to the account by the press office of CISL (the Catholic union federation which from the early 1960s onwards became increasingly combative), workers gathered at the entrance door and then "as had already been done at Assolombarda, they put down the lay-off notices they had been wearing round their necks. After a moment of silence the traditional trumpeter played the now-famous tune, followed by the chorus of demonstrators: with words flowing from worker simplicity, and over patchy music, they chanted, 'Bosses, arsehole bosses, go fuck yourselves, go fuck yourselves…'".[4]

Worker marches increasingly came to resemble the festive, creative and spontaneous strikes described by Michelle Perrot in her study of nineteenth-century France (1987, 145–147), before protest was standardized and, as Charles Tilly puts it, "the strike surrendered its popular spontaneity and creativity to the demands of bureaucrats and organisers" (1982, 74). Factory strikes and occupations also acquired an increasingly festive feeling. On 29 March 1973 the Fiat Mirafiori plant was occupied for three days. According to a detailed account of the occupation produced by Lotta Continua, an organization on the far left that had tried to radicalize the protest, FIAT workers felt like "padroni" ("bosses") for one day. In a carnivalesque inversion of hierarchies, the occupiers decided who could or could not enter the factory; strikebreakers and hated foremen were tried and publicly punished, mostly by rituals of humiliation, disparagement and ridicule (Lotta Continua 1973, 35–47). The factory space, which would normally have been a site of alienation, exploitation and repression, was turned into a village fair: in clear breach of factory regulations, workers walked leisurely, arm in arm, between the production sections (pp. 35, 46–47). When they met workers from other sections, one witness recalled, they would ask them, "'Where are you from?'… we'd

greet each other, and call on friends […] it became a nice place to be" (pp. 46–47). Workers sunbathed, chatted, or played cards, and couples turned half-finished cars into corners for intimate encounters: "Well, it was great, something communist. An idyllic atmosphere, of brotherhood" (p. 47). To add to the festive air, several workers strolled about accompanied by their wives and children: "there were so many comrades walking around Fiat with their families that time, I've never seen so many children. When the struggle becomes yours, it's a proletarian festival, when everybody gets their real identity back, and you aren't cogs any more" (p. 35).[5]

We should, of course, question the extent to which this idyllic and festive description of the Fiat occupation corresponded to reality. Following the principal tenets of workerism, organizations such as Lotta Continua believed in revolution from below, harshly criticized the cautious strategy of the unions and their disciplined "processions" ("Offensiva operaia" 1969), as they called the demonstrations organized by union activists, and tended to extol and possibly exaggerate forms and cultures of spontaneous rebellion. However, workers' memories and contemporaneous accounts of struggle also evidence this festive transformation of protest. A worker from Campobasso, capital of the Southern region of Molise, recalled that on 22 October 1972 he had decided to join a friend who worked at the Fiat plant in Termoli, also in Molise, on a trip to Reggio Calabria to take part in an FLM (metalworkers' union) demonstration. They went on the union coach and arrived in Reggio early, at 7 a.m. They had a short stroll, he wrote, and by the time they arrived at the main square:

> the piazza was almost full: people from Bari and Calabria with drums, Neapolitans shouting, it seemed that the people were southern gypsies, half civilized and half in rags; […] all we needed were whips and horses to have everything: a fair in the piazza. (Colafato 1978, 150)

Moving to northern Italy and the Crescenzago site of Magneti Marelli, one of the most important electromechanical plants in Milan, one could now sense "a carnival atmosphere" in the factories, as one member of the highly combative factory council put it in 1975 ("Magneti Marelli" 1975).[6] In the words of a worker from Falck, "the meetings, parades, red flags, banners, tin drums, cowbells, marches on Milan" created a new atmosphere: "sometimes it even seems like a festival" (Manzini 1977, 138).

The carnivalization of worker protest was also noted by its opponents and factory security guards. In August 1969 Giulia Vitali, an official of the moderate UIL (Unione italiana del lavoro), was covered from head to toe with ink and ripe tomatoes when she rushed to help a Pirelli white-collar worker who had been pelted with tomatoes during a strike. The event was later described in a Personnel Department report as an "episode of violence".[7] However, the hand-written account given after the assault by the factory security guard, who was very probably of working-class origins and therefore more familiar with workers' codes and symbolic language, described the workers' action as a "chiassata": a word now almost out of use that in the 1960s described popular rowdiness and carnivalesque joking.[8] The moderate and respectable *Corriere della Sera*, a leading Italian newspaper, viewed the new ludic and unruly features of the workers' marches with growing discomfort. As the *Corriere* journalist Turco Torri wrote in April 1966, in response to a letter about their noisy marching style:

> Our reader Francesco Riva complains about the whistles used by the strikers, because of the annoyance they cause. They are in fact disturbing, but what is even more disturbing and distressing is the spectacle: while a strike should be a serious and dignified matter, everything is being done to turn it into a spectacle worthy of the old Carnival of time past, in such contrast with the real dignity of the workers. I myself saw three factory workers on a march: a bar with a big bell threaded through it was being carried by two of them on their shoulders, while the third was striking it with a metal rod, creating a deafening sound. If they had seen themselves in a mirror they would have realized the contrast between what people rightly want to gain and the way of asking for it: between the genuine nobility of the worker consciously creating production and wealth, and his behaviour in public like a schoolboy playing the fool. (1966)

Such a rebuke should not come as a surprise. As early modern historians have noted, from the seventeenth century onwards the elites, influenced by modernity and rationalism, had striven to civilize and discipline the behaviour of the lower orders (Burke 2009, 10). Unruly and rowdy popular festive practices such as Carnival were at odds with the bourgeois ethos of individualism and norms of sobriety, and regularly incurred reprimands as "residual manifestations of barbarism" and "baseness" (Fincardi 2005, 32, 38, 57). It was no coincidence that when Fiat white-collar workers, including middle-ranking and senior executives, decided to take to the

street in 1980 to claim their right to return to work after thirty-five days of occupation, they did so in silence. Their dignified manner was intended to contrast with the workers' rowdy marches. Luigi Arisio, one of the protest leaders, recalled that these white-collar staff "were serious and composed, silent and calm, walking in jackets and ties […]. On the flanks of the march volunteers, almost afraid of causing annoyance, were distributing leaflets" (1990, 198). For most of those taking part in the protest just the idea of marching, a practice traditionally associated with blue-collar workers, made them uneasy (Isnenghi 2004, 439–440). It was crucial to do this in a way that they could reconcile with their self-image of serious and respectable middle-class employees, and, equally importantly, in a way that did not alienate moderate public opinion. Significantly, the protest was deliberately described by its organizers as a "Marcia" ("march") (Arisio 1990, 199) rather than a "corteo" ("demonstration"); the former had less threatening connotations in Italian, and had mostly been used in that era to describe action by Catholic-inspired peace groups (Tosi and Vitale 2009). The moderate (and sympathetic) press also obsessively emphasized the marchers' good behaviour, courtesy and dignified silence as the most distinctive aspects of the protest. This image was to dominate later accounts; in the public imagination and history books this protest has been remembered as "the silent march".

Explaining the Carnivalization of Worker Protest

In the letter headed "Fischietti", which triggered the *Corriere*'s condemnation of workers' lack of seriousness and dignity, the reader Francesco Riva, whose office was unfortunately in the centre of Milan where workers marching from different industrial areas further out converged in one single demonstration, decried the unbearable "effect on the nerves by the shouting and whistling groups", and questioned the usefulness and effectiveness of the workers' disordered cacophony.[9] As he wrote, "[i]f it served a purpose, never mind, we would willingly tolerate it […]. I wonder, however, what additional effectiveness the organizers of these strikes hope to obtain from upsetting their fellow citizens, who have done nothing to deserve this punishment and can do nothing to avoid it?" However, a number of factors explain the workers' rowdiness and carnival-like marching style.

Carnival celebrations have traditionally functioned as a rite of passage between the old and the new, with the symbolic destruction of the past

and celebration of what is to come: a time of liberation and regeneration (Ozouf 1988, 97; Vovelle 1986, 310). As a result, as Mullett noted, "[w]hether or not they actually took place at carnival time, all popular revolts had something of carnival about them", and drew heavily on festive rituals of desecration and aggression (1987, 96–97). When workers took to the streets in the early 1960s, after more than ten years of restraint from protest, they did so in numbers and with unprecedented bargaining leverage. The economic miracle was in full swing and full employment had almost been achieved, giving workers exceptional strength and negotiating power, particularly in dynamic and highly profitable sectors such as the electronics and car industries. Workers were also emboldened by the growing collaboration between union federations. The Italian unions had split in 1948 along ideological lines but now, thanks to the softening of the Cold War, seemed increasingly committed to joint action. It has been observed that the 1960s were times of "riscossa" ("counter-attack") (Accornero 1968, 80–83) and "liberation" for factory workers.[10] The carnival theatre of inversion and mockery provided Italian workers with a highly expressive and comfortably familiar language in which they could forcefully and graphically communicate their desire for change: to put this in the language of carnival, "turn the world upside down".

It should be remembered that in the struggles of the 1960s and 1970s what was at stake was not only better wages, but power. Undisputed importance was acquired by issues such as the abolition of the highly repressive and authoritarian regulations that had, until then, governed the internal operation of factories. Moreover, under the influence of workerist ideology, workers demanded greater control over the production process. Carnival practices such as mock trials, parading effigies and mock funerals, which took place during marches with employers and government figures as targets, acted out a figurative reversal of power relationships and effectively served the purpose of symbolically challenging authority both within the factories and in society (Tronti 1966).

It can also be argued that for some workers actions such as generating noise, parading and hanging effigies, mock funerals and smearing with various substances went beyond carnival merrymaking and functioned as a re-enactment of charivari-style community justice. The charivari, in Italy most frequently known as "scampanata", had traditionally encompassed a wide range of forms of symbolic punishment which in turn drew heavily on the carnival tradition. These included the loud banging of metal containers, drums, cowbells and kitchen utensils, the parading of wrongdoers

facing backwards on a horse or mule, tipping manure or rubbish onto the offender's doorstep, forcible shaving of the head, parading effigies, mock funerals and mock executions, and a further extensive set of rituals of disparagement and humiliation that could be staged in combination or separately. Rituals of folk justice still had some resonance in rural Italy after 1945 and were widely revived during the labour struggles of the 1960s and 1970s, mostly by new workers who had recently migrated from less developed and largely agricultural areas of Italy, such as the north-east and south, to work in Italy's fast-expanding industrial sector in large cities like Milan or Turin (Favretto 2015, 224–225). On internal marches, which took place within the factory space during wildcat strikes and intensified dramatically between 1968 and 1972, notorious strikebreakers and unpopular foremen, or their effigies, were punished using a wide range of acts of belittlement, inversion, shaming and humiliation that drew heavily on the charivari repertoire. For obvious reasons street protesters had to make do with effigies rather than real people in their theatre of punishment. However, Italy's family-based brand of capitalism made the production of highly identifiable effigies a relatively easy task. As mentioned earlier, from the mid-1960s dummies representing major industrialists such as Umberto Agnelli and Leopoldo Pirelli started appearing on worker marches, and would occasionally be publicly executed by burning or hanging at the end of protest (Favretto 2015, 217).[11]

Carnival irreverence and charivari theatrical tools therefore played a liberating and empowering role in relation to the factory's hierarchical order and discipline. Disorderly marching by workers, the ostentatious display of untidy and messy workwear (Barile 2007, 434), the replacement of standardized (and sanitized) union imagery and banners with more creative placards, the staging of iconoclastic carnival street theatre (parading effigies, mock funerals and executions, for example) and the cacophony which accompanied worker demonstrations: all these also stood in symbolic and intentional contrast to the military and orderly style that had traditionally characterized the disciplined and strictly-marshalled union-led marches (Ganapini 1997, 36–37).

When labour protest revived in the early 1960s, the unions endorsed and encouraged the workers' use of whistles and beaten tins. Giuseppe Sacchi, the leader of FIOM (the CGIL metalworkers' union) from 1956 to 1964, pointed out when interviewed years later that this behaviour and the workers' rowdiness played a crucial role in attracting media attention at a time when factory protest was consistently underreported in the press

and on the state-run RAI television channel (RAI started broadcasting television coverage in 1954).[12] "Aumenta la pasta aumenta tutto e loro ci fanno vedere rischiatutto" ("Pasta's going up, so is everything, and they're making us watch [the quiz show] Rischiatutto") and "Per la rai tv gli operai sono tabù" ("For RAI TV the workers are taboo") were two well-known slogans of the period. Moreover, faced with the challenge of encouraging and sustaining the involvement of thousands of new workers with no political experience, the unions were very aware that they needed to make concessions over the workers' use of unconventional repertoires and forms of protest. Carnival-like commotion, mocking the opposition, festive enjoyment and transgression were all ways of celebrating and flaunting their strength relative to their adversaries, and challenging the status quo. Carnival forms were empowering and highly enjoyable, and created an atmosphere of charged excitement that helped the unions sustain and expand participation.

As time passed, however, the unions were increasingly uncomfortable about the carnivalesque turn, if not overtly hostile to it. The violent message inherent in some carnivalesque actions, such as hanging or burning effigies and staging mock funerals, created unease. It was also the case that the new ludic atmosphere of worker marches and protest conflicted with Communists' conception of protest as a display of fortitude, endurance and moral superiority. As one worker recalled years later, frivolity and levity have always been at odds with Communist culture; for militants, "enjoyment, laughter … was almost a weakness", and not something to exhibit in public (Bigazzi and Garigali 1995, 136–137). Marches were always staged in a way that projected an image of gravitas and solemnity, and reminded opponents of the workers' unflinching commitment to class struggle (Boarelli 2007, 175–177). CISL officials also struggled with the workers' festive attitude to protest and felt more at ease with a model of collective action imbued with a spirit of sacrifice, orderliness and solemnity; as one of these, Palma Plini, put it, "[i]n the public's view, striking is having a revolution or rebellion. For us it's certainly not a party, but a financial and psychological sacrifice … when there is industrial action it's like being at war" (1974, 171).

Unions were also wary of the risks to their image implicit in carnivalesque theatre. From the second half of the nineteenth century, when workers began to organize collectively, labour organizations of all political colours had staged their marches, which in the pre-television era were the only opportunity for workers to achieve public visibility, in a style that

satisfied bourgeois norms of sobriety, respectability and order. Peasants and factory workers endured a rather poor image in the eyes of moderate public opinion, and were commonly and conveniently portrayed as an unruly, fragmented and unworthy mob. For workers' claims to be taken seriously, their marches had to display a united, trustworthy and dignified working class (Martini 2007, 22). As Perrot observes, the unions' "disciplined processions" were consistently staged with "a kind of pomp which drew on both religious and military models" (1987, 158).

As discussed above, bourgeois notions of decency and order still largely informed judgements and perceptions of how protest should look in Italy in the 1960s. The new carnival features of workers' marches made it easier for their opponents to discredit their protest in public perception. As an article in *Corriere della Sera* put it, the workers' noisy protesting style constituted an unacceptable disruption of public order (Torri 1966). Most importantly, it demonstrated the workers' lack of dignity and "otherness" in relation to respectable public opinion (Fincardi 2005, 24), the equation of protest groups with an alien "other" being a commonly used strategy of delegitimation. The unions therefore often enforced silence during marches.[13] This, they hoped, would seal the mouths of radical protestors and conveniently prevent the chanting of unwanted and unapproved slogans. Crucially, it would contribute to restoring respectability and solemnity to worker protest.[14] In addition, the periodic imposition of silence and order would show the public and, most importantly, the government and employers that the unions were still in control of worker protest, at a point when—as we will see below—the new radical youth groups proliferating in the wake of the 1968 student movement seemed to be increasingly attracting factory workers.

In spite of their middle-class and student-based leadership, organizations such as Lotta Continua and Potere Operaio were quite successful in their attempts to recruit angry young non-unionized male migrants from the Italian south and north-east. Groups on the extreme left, such as the Comitato Unitario di Base (Joint Base Committee), the radical independent rank-and-file union created in 1968, also strongly appealed to these new workers and were important in stimulating their involvement. The widespread participation of a younger generation of workers in the protest that marks the 1960s and 1970s, both in the unions and in extreme-left organizations, is undoubtedly another important factor to be considered in explaining the new, ebullient and cheerful style that came to characterize protest and marches during those years (Manzini 1977, 140–141).

The exuberance of younger workers also played a key role in bridging the gap in protest practices and cultures that had traditionally existed between the labour movement and students. Their use of unconventional carnival-like forms of action, mockery and defiance infused the workers' protest styles with festive elements that the student movement had also been experimenting with, and that resonated widely with the self-image and ethos of young Italian "rebels".

"La rivoluzione è una festa": Youth Protest After 1968

At the same time as Italy's experience of industrial unrest in the 1960s and 1970s, there was an overlapping wave of youth unrest that was almost unique in its extent and duration. As Gerd-Rainer Horn explains (2007, 112), unlike in France, "1968" in Italy lasted until 1976, covering roughly eight years. During this time students—as a well-known slogan of the time put it—"danno l'assalto al cielo" ("besiege the skies"): they demanded better canteens and residence halls, but also protested about the lack of democracy in university life and society; they objected to the apathy, materialism and existential alienation of "contented" capitalist societies; and they denounced the repressiveness of traditional family structures and bourgeois moral norms. They also demonstrated vociferously against American foreign policy and involvement in Vietnam. The all-encompassing iconoclasm and anger of youth activism later fed into what is commonly known as "the 1977 movement", a far more radical and socially diverse phase of Italian youth protest, marked by a substantial and unprecedented engagement of young people of working-class origins: students, people in insecure jobs and the unemployed (Cuninghame 2007, 154).

Both phases of youth mobilization, and particularly the 1977 movement, tend to be associated in the public imagination and the literature with violence, and not without reason (Cuninghame 2007). However, throughout the 1960s and 1970s youth protest also included peaceful forms of action such as marches and acts of civil disobedience, including sit-ins and occupations. It was also infused by a great amount of playfulness, irony and an enthusiasm for inversion (Passerini 1996, 76–80). During protests students would commonly belittle and ridicule their school and university teachers, mocking them and addressing them with the unconventional

and informal "tu" as a way of undermining their authority (De Luna 2009, 186). Student encounters with the police were also marked by defiance and mockery. Famously, in March 1968, at the height of protests in Milan, the Catholic student leader Mario Capanna shouted from the occupied university site to warn the police encircling the building that they had five minutes to disband and leave (Balestrini and Moroni 1988, 247). As regards student marches, the participants' colourful and unconventional clothing, casual marching style and chanting of ironic slogans gave their demonstrations a distinctively ludic feel, which was to be further developed and ritualized in subsequent years. The Metropolitan Indians, one of several groups that formed within the creative and peaceful wing of the 1977 youth movement, would typically march with headdresses and painted faces in a playful and carnivalesque style; they also often formed human chains during demonstrations (Balestrini and Moroni 1988, 496).

Youth protest's mockery, defiance and festive flavour drew heavily on Situationism and its celebration of irony and ridicule (Horn 2007, 5). The Situationists "recognized that mechanisms of alienation existed not just in labor, but in the ins and outs of everyday life" (Shepard 2011, 29), and expounded theories of the liberating function of humour. The use of irony, pranks and ridicule "was thought to be the vehicle for a new type of society" (ibid.). Situationist groups such as the Dutch Provos aimed to create "situations, brief moments in time and space, which pointed out to anyone willing to look and listen the absurdity of life as currently organized and the possibility of a radical shake-up" (Horn 2007, 11).

Situationist ideas played a crucial role in rejuvenating protest in the late 1960s all over Europe (Teune 2007, 131), and had a significant influence on Italian underground activism (Balestrini and Moroni 1988, 107), particularly on the creative wing of the 1977 movement and groups like the Metropolitan Indians. The movement used languages that had become established within the artistic avant-garde earlier in the century, which it often explicitly referred to, but boldly injected those expressive formulae into ordinary street life rather than dadaist or futurist cabaret evenings. People used them to talk to their peers, or to provoke conventional thinkers, with slogans on walls and roughly printed leaflets (Di Nallo 1977; Salaris 1997; Grispigni 2006). Provocative and bewildering nonsense became the form of expression most often used.

From February 1977 onwards, after a student was wounded in a neofascist raid at the University of Rome, and then as a protest against government proposals for reform of the university system, many faculties were

occupied right across Italy. This unexpected spread of radical conflict in the universities, and in some secondary schools, boosted the new creative trends, but also encouraged an escalation of violence which was responded to by Francesco Cossiga, Minister of the Interior, with tough police action that bordered on the provocative. On 17 February Luciano Lama, the CGIL General Secretary, attempted to confront the student movement at Rome's La Sapienza University, in the belief that he could prevail by addressing them and expounding his own views on the need for severe austerity and economic sacrifices. For this occasion the Metropolitan Indians constructed a float on which they positioned a dummy of Lama surrounded by balloons and hearts. A placard underneath read "L'ama o non Lama. Non Lama nessuno" ("She loves him or she loves him not. Nobody loves him", incorporating a pun on the CGIL leader's name) (Cuninghame 2007, 159). When Lama arrived, the group chanted ironic slogans such as "Sacrifices, sacrifices. We want sacrifices" (referring to the government's austerity policies, which the Communist Party supported), "Build us more churches and fewer houses" (alluding to the PCI's "historic compromise" strategy aimed at entering a coalition government with the Christian Democrats), "We demand to work harder and earn less" (ibid.), "Now, now, poverty for workers", and "I beg you Lama don't go away, we still want lots of police" (Casilio 2005, 226–227). The throwing of balloons, filled with water and paint, then triggered a reaction from Lama's supporters and bodyguards, who clashed with the more violent student factions.

By chanting sarcastic slogans and staging ludic events, young people aimed at playfully resisting or perhaps undermining bourgeois seriousness and self-discipline (Fig. 8.1). As a well-known slogan of the time put it, "imagination will destroy authority and laughter will bury it": existing power relationships were to be subverted (Lombardi Satriani 1979, 51). It should be noted that in this period satire became a weapon much used by the arts world that connected with the movements, with great destructive and demystifying strength. Dario Fo and Franca Rame, creating theatrical circuits that differed from the established ones, championed a style of performance that revived the knockabout humour of the *commedia dell'arte*.

The ridicule and theatricality of street demonstrations were further strengthened by the vivid and unconventional outbreak of the feminist movement on marches. This involved a large number of young women from the cities and also the provinces, on the increase from the period of

Fig. 8.1 Students from Bologna mocking in April 1977 the 'Historic Compromise', that is the PCI leader Berlinguer's strategy of alliance with the Christian Democratic Party. The banner at the centre of the image says 'Today Married' (Oggi sposi). The dummy on the left with the placard hanging from his neck saying 'scemo' (dumb), features Enrico Berlinguer; the dummy on the right with a placard saying 'boia' (executioner) features Giulio Andreotti, a leading figure of the Italian Christian Democratic party who from July 1976 to March 1978 led the so-called government of national solidarity. Andreotti's government was externally supported, via abstention, by the Italian Communists
Source: Photo no. 269, series 'Andreotti e Berlinguer Oggi Sposi, Bologna 28 Aprile 1977', courtesy of Enrico Scuro archive (www.enricoscuro.it)

debate on the referendum on divorce during 1973 and 1974 ("Il movimento femminista…" 1987; Bertilotti and Scattigno 2005). Humour and a festive approach were to play a key role in young people's assault on the existing moral and social order (Calabrese 1988). As one reads in *On the Poverty of Student Life […] and a Modest Proposal for its Remedy*, which nicely represents the agenda of Situationism and its hopes for a better world, "[p]roletarian revolutions will be festivals or nothing, for festivity is the very keynote of the life they announce" (Horn 2007, 12–14).

And so it was. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, marches and rallies became "happenings" where people played music, danced, sang lullabies, declaimed and created theatre. Through the practice of celebratory protest, radical youth groups, as one slogan put it, "reclaimed their lives" (Balestrini and Moroni 1988, 469), and a "use of free time liberated from the logic of consumer society" (Ambrosi 1977, 29). Youth happenings and play were also intended to function as locations for both personal and collective liberation from the bourgeois work ethic and emotional self-restraint (Echaurren and Salaris 1999; Balestrini and Moroni 1988; Billi 2001; Casilio and Paolucci 2005; Casilio and Guerrieri 2009; Ambrosi 1977, 11). Finally, festive protest was a 'scream' against the dullness, seriousness and self-importance of the traditional left, and a demand for more participatory forms of political activism (Cuninghame 2007, 154).

Naturally, not all militants of the far left shared this festive mood. Organizations like Avanguardia Operaia and Potere Operaio saw themselves as military guerrilla groups with neither time nor interest for what they regarded as a frivolous and unacceptable attitude to politics and revolution. This contrast is evident in the graffiti that appeared at the time in large cities. Slogans such as "Revolution is a festival" would occasionally be countermanded by others, for example "Revolution is not a gala lunch. Proletarian discipline!" and "Revolution is not Carnival" (Lombardi Satriani 1979, 33). However, significant segments of countercultural youth activism, across both decades but particularly in the second half of the 1970s, were pervaded by a wish to celebrate that quickly became a genuine "ideologia della festa" ("ideology of the festival") (Casilio 2005, 175). Zenoni has pointed out that the rediscovery in the late 1960s of Georges Bataille's work and theories also played a role in the 1968 generation's reconceptualization of revolution as a festival (Zenoni 2003, 118).

The years after 1975 saw the spread of "Circoli del proletariato giovanile" ("Groups of the young proletariat") in cities like Milan, Rome and Bologna. These fringe groups, which were generally located on occupied building sites and recruited both from marginalized social strata and from disillusioned militants in Communist and Socialist youth organizations, were very active in organizing what they called *feste del proletariato giovanile* ("festivals of the young proletariat"). Some of these happenings, notoriously the one held in the summer of 1976 in Milan's Parco Lambro, generated an atmosphere of chaos and anarchy that was far from festive and joyous. However, following the Woodstock model, these *feste* were intended to provide young people with opportunities for socialization

outside commercial settings, and to prefigure an alternative society. As the flyer for the Spring Festival held in Milan in March 1976 read, it was against "bourgeois barbarism": capitalism "bends everything to profit, […] it has killed the swallows, devastated nature, and is destroying the enjoyment of living". The festival was to celebrate "the growth of our power in factories, neighbourhoods and society", and to hope for:

> a declaration of the possibility of deciding how our lives are, of changing our personal relationships at work and outside: in brief, of living better. To experience our work relationships with solidarity between workers and without competition, without bosses who command us; with the power to decide ourselves how to work and what to do, to work less but all together and equal. Outside work, not to live alone and marginalized in dormitory suburbs.

This festival was intended to be a time when ordinary people would free themselves from the restrictions imposed on their daily life by the "Christian Democrats and the bosses", be themselves and act as they pleased: "It's the festival of our body: […] of our senses, creativity and emotions; of love between proletarians and hate for the bourgeoisie" (Ambrosi 1977, 30–33).[15]

Youth happenings and their festive rituals drew heavily in their spirit and format on folk culture and festival traditions. As the March 1976 Spring Festival flyer continued, the celebration of Spring was an ancient popular and pagan tradition that had celebrated "the rebirth of life, the new, and the hope for fulfilment of our needs and desires", and had regrettably been disappearing. The festival organizers promised pop but also folk music. Participants were asked to bring their "creativity" with them: "musical instruments, drums, scents, colours and flags, beautiful things, masks, kites, puppets, photos, food and drink … southern and Milanese customs and traditions" (Casilio 2005, 180).

Italian Underground Activism and the Revival of Folk Culture

As Carlo Ginzburg noted in his introduction to the Italian edition of Peter Burke's *Popular Culture in Early Modern Europe* (1978), the 1960s and 1970s were marked by revived interest in popular culture all over Europe, including Italy. Popular culture and folk traditions had long been

perceived as a "dying world" and, if anything, obstacles to modernization and progress (Gallini 1977, 133). However, the 1968 revolution and its critique of capitalism encouraged a nostalgic re-evaluation of subordinate cultures and practices. From the post-war period onwards, Italy in particular had been scoured by a succession of internationally recognized scholars of popular culture; with the piazza and the tavern as their main sites of interest, they put their ethnographic research into partnership with the militant usage of new forms of communication by the worker movement (De Martino 1962; Bosio 1975, 1981; Montaldi 1961).[16] The group of historians, ethnographers and anthropologists who in 1966 founded the Istituto de Martino had since the mid-1950s been working on the revival of traditional protest songs as a re-emergence of what they called "l'altra Italia" ("the other Italy").

However, what had long been a niche interest now became a mass phenomenon (Gallini 1977, 134; Bermani 1997, 51). As Clara Gallini put it, during those years the middle class, particularly its younger generation, began "to play peasant": they salvaged long-forgotten folk ballads and dances from the past, and filled their homes with old rural objects and furniture and their wardrobes with peasant-style clothing (1977, 134, 137). In Italy, an important section of intellectual circles and ethnographic research reassessed popular modes of expression as forms of resistance to the mentality and values of bourgeois consumer society, and it became common to attribute a possible subversive nature to traditional forms of popular irreverence (Lombardi Satriani 1971; Altan 1972).

Popular culture also crept into young people's vocabulary and language, with young activists eagerly and ostentatiously appropriating the earthy language and swearing traditionally associated with the peasantry and the working class. For middle-class rebels to be taken seriously it was crucial to adopt a "proletarian" style both in their clothing and also, perhaps most importantly, in the way they spoke (Balestrini and Moroni 1988, 248). Swearing, the use of taboo words and the rejection of established norms of courtesy bridged the gap with the lower classes, and like their adoption of unconventional clothing was a way of distancing themselves from their bourgeois background.

Crude and non-standard language also played an important role in the 'siege of the skies' by Italian youth. The flyers and articles produced by groups such as Lotta Continua, which more than any other far-left organization tried very hard to adopt a folksy linguistic register (Balestrini and Moroni 1988, 230), were full of disparaging insults and epithets such as

"pigs", "swine", "dogs" and "cockroaches" that drew on a carnivalesque vocabulary. When expressing conflict, in its lexical stereotypes and put-downs of an opponent the standardized language of an industrial society can still adopt recurrent expressive modes in the traditional forms of symbolic aggression from the pre-industrial era (Violi 1977; Cortelazzo 1979). Carnivalesque vocabulary has functioned for a long time as a powerful instrument of inversion, disparagement, derision and humiliation, as have carnival rituals and practices. Lotta Continua's use of a ludic and carnivalesque language to address strikebreakers, shop foremen and government figures was integral to their strategy of dethroning and desacralizing factory and state authority. A very similar repertoire of disparaging images and expressions, also drawing on the early-modern popular comic tradition, was used by Turin workers during the inter-war period as a strategy of resistance against Fascism (Passerini 1987, 95–96), and continued to be used as a very effective "weapon of the weak" throughout the 1950s before full employment and the relaxation of the Cold War made organized collective action possible again.[17]

As was the case with the adoption of unconventional clothing, long hair, beards and an informal manner, embracing popular tradition became an indicative feature of rebellion in this period. Popular culture and traditions came to stand for spontaneity, simplicity, unselfishness and community-oriented relationships. As Gallini observed, such a romanticized image of popular culture and rural life, "of a 'people' always ready to dance, sing and intone weird incantations", was, of course, illusory (1977, 136). However, what matters here is not what life in rural settings was really like, but how it was imagined in the minds of the younger generation. By the late 1960s, popular culture and folk traditions such as Carnival had become important reference points in the quest of young activists for an alternative lifestyle and value system, and also for new forms of communication and political participation (Lombardi Satriani 1979, 32–33; Lusebrink 1993, 221–222).

On Bologna's DAMS (Performing Arts) degree programme, Giuliano Scabia was teaching drama from 1972. Abandoning conventional performance locations, he promoted the participatory travelling theatre, in which he led his students in creating street parades that followed giant puppets. He used these objects to stir up collective hopes and fears, realizing visionary projects that recalled the repertoires of popular tradition, without trying to anachronistically resurrect cultures that had already passed; at the same time, however, he was immersed in the pressing social issues of the

day. He created theatre that was simultaneously shamanistic and political, in which the older and younger generations were both engaged and thus in communication. In 1972 Scabia was asked to work with drama in the Trieste mental hospital by Franco Basaglia, its director, and with the inmates built a sort of Trojan horse that operated as a symbolic pathway from madness to normality. This large blue representation, "Marco Cavallo", led patients and workers, along with artists and students, out of the hospital and on a march all around the city, where a lively festival was held (Scabia 1976). The following year, Scabia and his students started to organize impromptu events on the streets of Bologna that offered alternative information on the Watergate case. He was sometimes joined by Gianni Celati, also a lecturer on the DAMS programme, who was involved in using theatre to revitalize festival, play and comedy: shared moments of great communicative potential in which to have visions, to escape the frustrating alienation of the everyday, to give shape and space to one's desires, and to acknowledge—without reference to political actualities—possible alternative worlds, as in *Alice in Wonderland* (Belpoliti 2001, 306–325). Both Scabia and Celati emphasized Carnival as the model for languages that would allow people to attain these festive visions that could eclipse the ordinary. The stunned PCI, which ruled Bologna and its region, was unable to work out how to relate to the abundant creativity of its radical students, but the city was nevertheless often transformed into the theatrical setting for a sociopolitical carnival, whose protagonists came from among those young people destined for insecure jobs or unemployment. This activity became a sort of workshop for a diverse collection of students who came to conceive of their political demonstrations as dramatized revolts ("jacqueries", in their words) (Lombardi Satriani 1979, 56). They experimented with ironic language based on symbolic inversion, sometimes to comic effect and sometimes highlighting the absurdity of establishment politics. Improvised street theatre included mime, clowning, parody, masked marches, parades following musicians or with puppets, such as the multi-coloured dragon that from the 1977 carnival onwards was the symbol of Bologna's opposition movement: this picturesque creation in part symbolically replaced the aggressive militant activists within the extra-parliamentary groups (Fig. 8.2). When Bologna was convulsed by days of guerrilla warfare on its streets the following March, after a student had been killed by a policeman, for weeks the students responded to the ban on demonstrations with mass theatrical events; in May, Scabia and his students entered a piazza that was still being guarded by police

armoured vehicles to launch hot-air balloons, thereby attempting to dissipate tension and restart a dialogue with the still frightened city.

Bakhtin's *Rabelais and his World* (1968) was only translated into Italian in 1979, but his ideas and his notion of carnival as an instrument of subversion started circulating much earlier (Clemente 1983, 11). It is significant that at the same time that Scabia and Celati were rediscovering carnival language and its expressive forms, Piero Camporesi, a leading scholar of seventeenth-century Italian literature also based at the University of Bologna, wrote *La maschera di Bertoldo* (1976). This provided a reinterpretation, along Bakhtinian lines, of the well-known character in the popular tales written by Giovanni Cesare Croce. For Camporesi, Croce's work embodied the height of carnival culture and its world before it gave way to the Counter-Reformation; he saw *La Maschera di Bertoldo* as the swansong of carnival's transgressive world. However, his description of early-modern carnival and its celebration of the vulgar captured the imagination

Fig 8.2 The multi-coloured dragon that from the 1977 carnival onwards was the symbol of Bologna's opposition movement (Photo no. 99, series 'Esce il drago, Bologna 20 Febbraio 1977', courtesy of Enrico Scuro archive (www.enricoscuro.it)

of young students, and quickly became "a little carnival handbook, going well beyond the intentions of its author" (Belpoliti 2001, 295).[18]

It has been observed that the Italian New Left, and particularly its intellectual fringes, fell victim in the 1970s to a "carnival syndrome" (Clemente 1983, 11). For a long time the traditional Left had marginalized irony and playfulness in its practice and political ethos (Horn 2007, 40; Vigorelli 1983, 60). However, Bakhtin's work, as well as the historiographical and literary scholarship it inspired which thrived throughout the 1970s, taught that popular humour and carnival had been employed in the past by the lower social strata as a means of empowerment, subversion and liberation. Ludic behaviour and individual transgressions, it was argued, could play a central role in the quest for an alternative society (Clemente 1983, 11–13). Not surprisingly, far-left groups such as the *Circoli del proletariato giovanile* regularly staged vociferous protests against the sanitized commercial carnivals which were now being staged annually in large cities, in the wake of widespread renewed interest in popular culture (Lombardi Satriani 1979, 33–35). In 1976, shortly before the Spring Festival, the Milan *Circoli* tried to disrupt the carnival celebrations organized by the city. As they later explained, in truly Bakhtinian terms:

> The celebration, to really be a celebration, has to be a movement from below, characterized by improvisation, spontaneity and freedom. Above all, "it carries on"; it should be "a permanent state of being" […] By contrast, at the bosses' carnival people laugh, but within the limits and terms established 'by the system', and for one day only.
>
> Let's take this day of celebration, but it's not enough for us. The bosses exploit us, the police and authority repress us for 364 days a year, and then for one day, the Saturday before Lent, they let us enjoy ourselves. At Carnival "any joke goes", and they allow us to let off steam, even a bit noisily and crudely, because when "the party's over" we go quietly back to letting ourselves be repressed and exploited. However, we don't accept this logic: we want to enjoy ourselves today, but we don't want to start Lent tomorrow because we do this all year. We want to live and enjoy our lives for 365 days per year […] Let's make the bosses and authority, and their sad servants [the Catholic movement] Communion and Liberation, practise Lent. (Lombardi Satriani 1979, 35)

Carnival, they stated, was not meant to be a profit-oriented business nor a time-limited entertainment event, but a state of mind and a "traditional model of protest, of popular struggle and of the masses in power" (ibid.).

Folk traditions came to be regarded as a precious storehouse of radical protest cultures and practices that the parliamentary Left had intentionally and conveniently ignored in their pursuit of the parliamentary road to socialism (Grimaldi 1997). In 1975 the far-left magazine *Classe* published a special issue with the title "Culture subalterne e dominio di classe" ("Subordinate cultures and class rule"), guest-edited by the anthropologist Lombardi Satriani who since the late 1960s had been involved in research on the "autonomy and subversive potential of the culture of folk traditions" (Scafoglio 1985). As its introduction explained, this issue was responding to the growing interest that young people had been showing in folk traditions and customary law and their "revolutionary potential" (Lombardi Satriani 1975, 20). It included essays on topics such as peasant revolts and the rituals of community or summary justice, and southern Italian customary law (Paparazzo 1975; Meligrana 1975). One of the authors wrote that "the class nature of bourgeois law" and its "rotation within property law" had long served the interests of the bourgeoisie well, and had been used as an effective tool of repression of the subordinate classes. Acts such as banditry and theft had traditionally been accepted within the customary laws of the Italian South, and their criminalization needed to be reconsidered (Meligrana 1975). Interestingly, a small group within the creative element of the 1977 movement called themselves "briganti calabresi" (Lombardi Satriani 1979, 56). We should also mention the spread of practices in the second half of the 1970s such as unilateral decisions to pay lower rates and prices and "proletarian expropriation", as it was called, with group attacks on shops where in extreme cases goods and services were taken without payment, and also the occupation of empty houses. As regards the factories, from the late 1960s onwards workers used several illegal forms of protest such as production blockages and go-slows (Avanguardia Operaia 1972), which aimed to challenge the legitimacy of bourgeois national law and symbolically establish the alternative authority and justice of the workers. These forms of protest were all material expressions of the type of "anti-judicial struggle" that intellectuals such as Michel Foucault were advocating in the same period,[19] which had been central to pre-capitalist societies and peasant strategies of resistance against their oppressors; young activists became increasingly aware of these ideas through radical publications such as *Classe*.

From 1969 onwards, New Left groups such as Lotta Continua became increasingly interested in cultures and experiences that the traditional Left had customarily associated with "backward" struggles and movements.

Their magazine reported extensively on peasant struggles such as those in Avola (2 December 1968) and Battipaglia (9 April 1969), which featured traditional elements of pre-modern rural protest (De Luna 2009, 106–107), and subsequently on the Reggio revolt in the south: the wave of protest and violent riots which lasted from July 1970 to February 1971 in the city of Reggio Calabria, due to its rejection by the government as the regional capital of Calabria in favour of Catanzaro. During this revolt the Reggio protesters made substantial use of pre-industrial repertoires of popular justice, such as burning or hanging effigies and staging highly theatrical mock funerals.[20] In relation to the factories, Lotta Continua regularly featured glorifying and excited accounts of workers' "boss-hunts", trials and expulsions of shop foremen from factories, the shaming of strikebreakers, effigy-hanging and mock funerals staged during internal marches or factory occupations. As we saw earlier, these practices drew heavily on charivari-like repertoires (Favretto 2015). Lotta Continua's comic-strip character Gasparazzo (named by his inventor Renato Zamarin after the leader of the 1860 Bronte revolt) (Zamarin 1972), a metalworker with southern peasant origins who would often urinate on strikebreakers and show defiance towards shop foremen and bosses, illustrates well the fascination radical political groups had for folksy wit and the irreverent culture of direct confrontation and unconventional protest practices brought by the new workers (Pizzolato 2007).

The active search by radical left-wing groups such as Lotta Continua for models of unconventional politics and spontaneous disorder explains the wide and enthusiastic coverage in their publications of the belittling actions of China's Red Guards, which included university professors being forced to wear dunce's caps or heavy derogatory placards hung round their necks (Badiou 2005, 52–55; Balestrini and Moroni 1988, 155, 160, 169). The Red Guards' repertoire of symbolic violence, which also included smearing people with ink and shaving heads, reflected acts of violence by peasants towards landowners during the 1920s struggles, famously described in Mao's *Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan* (1927) and celebrated as evidence of the strength of peasant unrest and its revolutionary potential (Favretto 2015).

The films released by directors who were close to the radical Left provide a further clear reflection of its bewitchment by traditional protest cultures and methods. In Marco Bellocchio's *La Cina è vicina*, winner of the Silver Lion at the Venice Film Festival in 1967, a group of young students playing Red Guards force a morally corrupt lawyer-turned-politician to

end his electoral speech abruptly and run off in disarray chased by barking dogs. Spaghetti Westerns, a popular genre that emphasized regenerative and redemptive violence, also feature many acts of mockery and disparagement performed by outsider characters against those in power (Fisher 2011, 73). Interestingly, Sergio Leone's 1971 film *Giu' la testa* (*Duck, You Sucker*), an irreverent and disillusioned depiction of revolution in Mexico in 1913 and the struggle for independence in Ireland, starts with a well-known quotation from Mao—"[a] revolution is not a dinner party, or writing an essay, or painting a picture, or doing embroidery; it cannot be so refined, so leisurely and gentle, so temperate, kind, courteous, restrained and magnanimous. A revolution is an act of violence"—before the opening shots show the flow of urine from a barefoot and sweaty rural outlaw (Fisher 2011). The Bronte revolt, including gory details of the peasants' massacre of landowning elites, was the subject of a film directed by Florestano Vancini in 1972 entitled *Bronte: cronaca di un massacro che i libri di storia non hanno raccontato* (Riall 2013, 196–198). Three years later, in 1975, Bertolucci's widely acclaimed *Novecento* ended with a powerful series of images of peasants and partisans publicly trying their exploitative bourgeois landowners and taking revenge on them using both pure violence and symbolic humiliation.

Conclusion

In an article on youth protest language published in *L'Espresso* in April 1977, Umberto Eco established a sharp contrast between the irony and playfulness of students and the pragmatic styles of mobilization and communication of workers:

> In a recent public demonstration the students chanted: "Gui and Tanassi are innocent, the students are delinquent".[21] This was a provocative exhibition of irony. To show their solidarity, a group of workers immediately took up the slogan, but translating it into their own models of intelligibility: "Gui and Tanassi are delinquent, the students are innocent". The workers meant the same thing but could not accommodate the ironic play, and reworked the slogan into concrete terms. This was not because they did not understand the irony, but because they did not recognize it as a means of political expression. (Eco 1983, 66)

Eco's emphasis on the seriousness of the workers is a good example of the dominant representation of worker protest practices during the phase of protest in the 1960s and 1970s, as unimaginative and strongly influenced by the traditional union conception of protest as a spectacle of fortitude, sacrifice and dignified resistance: an ordered performance with no room for mockery or playfulness. This description does capture the unions' prevalent protest styles. However, as this chapter has shown, throughout the 1960s and 1970s workers in large industrial cities also experimented widely with celebratory and mocking forms of protest and unconventional linguistic styles. We have argued that this was not an attempt to mimic the students' attractive and media-friendly protest styles, as the literature often suggests, but instead drew on popular traditions like Carnival that most workers, particularly those who had recently migrated from north-eastern and southern rural areas, were familiar with; these had important symbolic and strategic functions in worker protest in the 1960s and 1970s. The workers' rowdy carnivalesque theatre served to attract public attention at a point when labour struggles were invariably ignored in the press and broadcast media, and it played a crucial role in infusing protest with buoyancy and enthusiasm after more than ten years of silence and acquiescence. Carnivalesque rituals were also highly empowering theatrical tools with which workers could deride and intimidate strikebreakers, defiantly show their strength to political opponents, and symbolically disempower employers and government figures during a period when workers "wanted it all", as a well-known slogan of the time put it ("Vogliamo tutto"). Furthermore, the ludic and festive style of worker marches provided enjoyable political spaces for workers new to industry, most of whom were not unionized and politically inexperienced, to become involved. The 1950s and 1960s were marked by a significant increase in female factory workers. While this is an aspect of our study that merits further research, carnivalesque routines may have made marches less intimidating and more inviting to the thousands of women who engaged in protest politics in this period.

This study also contributes to a better understanding of the ludic activism of Italian youth, exploring its origins, ideological underpinnings and strategic role in 1960s and 1970s engagement. As we have argued, Situationism was an important influence on student protest practices of mockery and ridicule and on their language. However, young people's festive protest styles and their many variations were also influenced by the New Left's revival and celebration of folk culture and traditions,

particularly in the mid-1970s; in that period these came to represent a mythical world of subversion and site of resistance to bourgeois values and capitalistic order. Carnival in particular, in its Bakhtinian interpretation as a weapon of subversion and liberation, had a widespread fascination for left-wing intellectuals and students. As Calvino wrote in a review of the Italian translation of Bakhtin's work:

> It comes to us, like a message in a bottle, from the banks of a "monolithically serious and frowning" civilization of our times; it is extremely relevant in a world like ours which is at the same time moved by anti-authoritarian, anti-repressive and anti-automating pressures, and pushed towards subordinating all values to the needs of production. (1980, 209)

The use by young people of festive and carnivalesque repertoires and language acted as a highly empowering and symbolic inversion of the existing order, as well as an anticipation of a new society. It also made protest more enjoyable and resonated with the libertarian and hedonistic ethos of militants of the New Left, and also with their search for alternative and more participatory forms of participation in contrast to the top-down and hierarchical politics of the traditional Left. Finally, it played a role in containing violence and making youth protest less threatening in the eyes of the public. There are often attempts to present the brutal attacks of the 1970s as complemented by demonstrations of tenderness: these can, on the one hand, serve as a device to soften their violent image, while still asserting this to have been essential; on the other, references to tenderheartedness prove effective in mitigating the widespread aggression and helping it not to be taken too seriously, not even by those who were its individual or collective protagonists.

In this period Italian youth discovered and experimented with the advantages and effectiveness of carnivalesque routines in protest. A further illustration of this repertoire's power is its survival and continued use by other movements since the demise of youth protest in the early 1980s: first environmentalism, and more recently the global justice movement. This is the focus of the chapter in this volume by Lawrence Bogad.

Notes

1. For a summary and a critique of this approach, see Baroncini (2012, 140); Barozzi (1983, 248); Bertolotti (1991, xiii).

2. See also the interview with Emilio Guglielmino in Tatò (1981, 17–55, 39) and Lanzardo (1979, 86).
3. This can be seen in a photograph with the title "15 Ottobre 1969, Arena di Milano: sciopero generale contro il carovita" ("general strike against the high cost of living"), in a special issue of *Il Nuovo Canzoniere Italiano* (Bellamio 1975, 46).
4. Bibliolavoro Archive, Milan, Pietro Roncato papers, press release from the press office of the provincial branch of CISL, 25 November 1970: "Fermi oggi 100.000 metalmeccanici e 20.000 gommai. 35.000 lavoratori alla manifestazione in Piazza Duomo. Un grande monito al padrone".
5. See also "La lotta alla Autobianchi" (1971).
6. The article in *Senza Tregua* includes extracts from a surveillance file obtained by workers during a raid on the Personnel Office with the title "Oggetto: introduzione di chitarra in reparto", dated 14 February 1975. The file quotes the description, by a member of the factory council, of the "carnival atmosphere" in the section.
7. Pirelli Archive, Milan, Folder press cuttings, "Vertenza Premio di Produzione Pirelli, SPA" (22/9/1969); this document provides a summary of the incident and also includes a hand-written report headed "A Direzione del Personale—Sciopero 27/8/69, ore 8–10", produced by one of the security guards on duty on the day of the incident.
8. Ibid.
9. Bibliolavoro Archive, Milan, FIM Archive, folder "Articoli di giornale 1964–1970", letter from the reader Francesco Riva (Milan), entitled "Fischietti", *Corriere della Sera*, 28 April 1966. The article by Torri, "Fischietti e campanacci", quoted earlier, was a reply to this letter.
10. See the interview with Emilio Guglielmino in Tatò (1981, 39).
11. See also Pirelli Archive, Milan, Folder "Press cuttings", "Il linguaggio dei cartelli", *ABC*, 7 November 1969.
12. See the interview of Giuseppe Sacchi on the DVD directed by Ferranti (2011).
13. See the interview of Giuseppe Sacchi on the DVD directed by Ferranti (2011). See also Sangiovanni (2006, 192).
14. Pirelli Archive, Milan, folder "Press cuttings", 'In corteo notturno con le fiaccole migliaia di lavoratori della Pirelli', *L'Unità*, 20 September 1969.

15. See also Lombardi Satriani (1979, 34–35).
16. For overviews of this season of militant studies, see Merli (1977) and Bermani (1975).
17. On workers' deliberate use of red clothing in factories in the 1950s as an act of defiance, see Montaldi (1971, 300); for examples of the use of graffiti and derogatory nicknames for employers and foremen, see, respectively, Bolzon (1981, 25) and Mietto and Ruggerini (1988, 70).
18. During the same period Carlo Ginzburg's innovative books *I Benandanti* (1966) and *Il formaggio e i vermi* (1976) examined the subversive potential of popular culture. The Italian debate was also influenced by the work of E.P. Thompson and books such as Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie's *Le carnaval de Romans* (1979), Maurice Agulhon's *La République au village* (1979), Yves-Marie Bercé's *Fête et révolte* (1976), published in Italian in 1985, Julio Caro Baroja's *El carnaval: analisis historico-cultural* (1965), and Natalie Zemon Davis' *Society and Culture in Early Modern France* (1975), published in Italian in 1980. All these books drew attention to the lower orders' political use of folk traditions, including the use of carnival imagery and symbolism in early modern Europe's politics and revolts. See Clemente (1983, 11) and Scafoglio (1985).
19. As Michel Foucault put it in an interview with Pierre Victor published in 1972 in *Les Temps Modernes*, unmediated acts of popular justice were highly symbolic forms of "anti-judicial struggle" that effectively undermined the very legitimacy of the "state apparatus" and its oppressive mechanisms. As he observed, "when Renault workers grab a foreman and stick him underneath a car and tell him 'you're going to have to tighten the bolts yourself', this is fine. They are actually exercising alternative power…" (Foucault 1980, 33, 35).
20. See for example the article "Reggio Calabria: il capoluogo, la Madonna o qualcos'altro?", *Lotta Continua*, 2 September 1970, 4–5.
21. Luigi Gui and Mario Tanassi, of the Christian Democratic party and the Social Democrats respectively, both held a number of cabinet positions during the 1970s, and during this period were both the subjects of scandals and accusations of corruption.

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CHAPTER 9

Popular Justice and Informal Politics: The Charivari in Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century France

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In France, as elsewhere, the charivari—a raucous public protest staged in order to punish various forms of perceived marital impropriety—had been at the heart of the traditional repertoire of contention, which was characterized by its "parochial, segmented, and particular" features (Tarrow 2011, 40–45; Tilly 1982, 1995). The forms taken by collective action began to change in the nineteenth century, when the old parochial repertoire was replaced by a national one that was "cosmopolitan, modular, and autonomous" (Tarrow 2011, 41). However, forms inherited from the past, including the charivari, never completely disappeared but "were infused with more general meaning and were combined with newer ones" (Tarrow 2011, 47). This chapter investigates the slow death of the charivari with regard to both its traditional and political functions. The transfer of repertoires of protest from charivari to "modern" forms was very gradual. While explicit reference to the charivari model was to disappear as tradi-

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tional charivaris fell into disuse, some charivari and carnival elements continued to find their way into protest repertoires. In addition, despite the supposed uniformity of nation-state construction in France, there were differences from one region to another with regard to how these changes occurred. In some outlying regions the charivari continued to be used and underwent renewal in the twentieth century, due to the increasingly political nature of the grievances that charivari-like repertoires addressed. Developments in the Basque Country, in the south-west of France, well illustrate this capacity for the reinvention of a custom which in this case may have owed its survival to an inversion of its original function.

This chapter is divided into two sections. The first starts with a discussion of previous work, and looks anew at the transformation of political charivaris in France across the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The second, based on primary sources, focuses on the French Basque province of Labourd which provides an example of the survival of political charivaris in France's outer regions.

The Waning and Transformation of the Political Charivari in France in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries

Political Charivaris and the Road Towards Republicanism

The charivari and carnival were frequently associated with the forms of festive rebellion characteristic of the *ancien régime* (Bercé 2006; Le Roy Ladurie 1979; Davis 1981; Beik 2007) and the French Revolution (Ozouf 1976), and their adaptation for political purposes continued well after 1789. Political charivaris experienced a renewal in France during the first half of the nineteenth century, a period that witnessed much protest due to the frequent changes of regime. Restoration France saw the development of a hybrid form of representative government: the regime was based on the pre-eminence of the monarch, moderated by parliament when it was able to legislate. At this time the exercise of political rights was restricted to an elite, although liberals called for broader popular support. In the 1830s the instability of the regime (the "July monarchy"), which failed to construct any enduring compromise between republicans and monarchists, opened up a space for political satire (Forbes 2010).

Tilly, in his history of protest in five French regions between 1598 and 1914, examines the influence of state formation and the expansion of capitalism on repertoires of collective action, and highlights developments of the charivari in the Burgundy region (1986, 40–47). While in the eighteenth century charivaris, organized by groups of young people, had preserved their traditional ritual functions, the beginning of the nineteenth century saw them sometimes being used for exclusively political ends. This did not mean that one manifestation was replaced by another: the charivari retained its characteristic functions, but in specific circumstances it could become politicized. In September 1833, in Dijon, a charivari brought more than 300 republicans onto the streets to protest against the conservative *député* M. Delachaume who was passing through the city. The police report referred to the protest as a "charivari" in view of the large gathering of workers and the use of mockery, disguise and noise. This charivari retained the external form of the rite, but was aimed at a political enemy and was organized by a republican association (Tilly 1986, 43). Interestingly, ten days after this event, a "serenade'" (songs to honour the subject) or "charivari d'honneur" was staged for a public prosecutor who had resigned after refusing to carry out a search of the newspaper *Le Patriote* (Tilly 1986, 44). However, charivaris completely disappeared from Dijon police files after 1848.

Between 1820 and 1848 there developed in urban areas a ritualized repertoire of protest, which articulated the interests of divergent groups and gave rise to transitory moments of popular sovereignty (Fureix 2012, 47). Political change contributed to this partial modernization of the protest repertoire: some formal elements of the old charivari were retained (songs, commotion, mockery and disguise), but the content tended to address political issues. Ambiguities regarding representation under the constitutional monarchy gave birth to a specific liberal repertoire of protest. Developed by liberal elites, this repertoire was nevertheless relatively egalitarian in its manifestation. The protesters claimed to represent all social classes by using the popular mechanism of the charivari (Fureix 2012, 47).

In this context, the urban, politicized charivari of the 1820–1830 period ceased to punish violations of custom, instead castigating political betrayal by monarchists and conservatives (Tilly 1982). Anti-clerical charivaris increased greatly in number, in reaction to religious proselytism and missionary activities. Liberal charivaris also targeted prominent *ultras* (extreme conservatives and monarchists), for example in Perpignan in

the spring of 1830 at the time of the Address of the 221[1] (Tilly 1982). In 1832, a comprehensive national campaign was organized: between April and October no less than 81 political charivaris were staged within France, of which 47 were aimed at parliamentary representatives and 19 at prefects or subprefects (Fureix 2012). The repertoire used by liberals and subsequently by "patriots" or republicans changed under the constitutional monarchies between 1815 and 1848, when only the wealthiest citizens had the right to vote (suffrage by census): while the refocusing of traditional rites continued, their politicization became more explicit, their composition became less community-based, and their scope became national.

Satire helped to shape the critical mentality which led to 1848. The bourgeois newspapers *Le Charivari* and *La Caricature* appropriated the language and ideas of the traditional charivari in order to express political opposition (Forbes 2010). The language of the charivari could be used to enable satire to reach out beyond Parisian bourgeois circles to the working classes and a provincial public. From 1830 onwards, the opponents of the regime made use of these rituals to voice their demands for greater democracy, distancing themselves from the initial limited ambitions of liberal movements (Fureix 2012). In June 1848, once the revolutionary phase had passed, restrictions on public liberties gave rise to new forms of the political charivari, this time directed against conservative forces and personalities in the Party of Order. The political function of these charivaris was to be modified by the experiment of universal male suffrage after 1848 and the right to freedom of assembly after 1868.

The Rural Charivari and Political Dissent

The politicization of charivaris took on particular characteristics in rural areas throughout the nineteenth century. At the beginning of the century, new types of protest, concerned with the increasing ascendancy of the market economy as well as levies by the state, took the place of the rural revolts of the *ancien régime*. A shift in protest repertoires took place at national level during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Bourguinat 2012). Trade union and political bodies played a mediating role, physical violence, derision and provocation became less essential, and protest was above all concentrated in cities and factories.

The 1830–1880 period presents a transition between two eras in popular protest. It was in fact not until the 1907 wine growers' crisis in the Midi

that a change towards the modern repertoire of protest could be clearly identified. Protests by peasants, which from the early nineteenth century had been significantly influenced by the charivari tradition, were generated by unrest over various issues: living standards; taxation; common land, property and forests. By enacting the Forestry Code of 1827, the state removed forestry management from municipalities in order to promote forms of administration that were more rational and that favoured the interests of private bodies exploiting the forests. This rationalization was perceived as restricting peasants' rights to use forests for agricultural purposes. The reform gave rise to a number of protests; among these, the War of the Demoiselles, which affected the Pyrenean department of Ariège between 1827 and 1832, and to a lesser extent until 1872, made greatest use of the symbolic apparatus of the charivari and carnival: villagers daubed their faces and disguised themselves as women in order to harass and scare off forest rangers, charcoal burners and gendarmes. This gender inversion was intended not only to turn state officials into figures of derision, but also, by evoking carnival, to lend a ritualized aspect to the affirmation of the collective rights of villagers and opposition to the appropriation of the forest by private interests.

Sahlins' analysis (1994) of the War of the Demoiselles traces the reuse for political purposes of repertoires of protest taken from popular culture. At the heart of his argument is the adaptation of peasant vehicles of moral protest, such as the charivari, and of symbols linked to the annual agrarian cycle. Thus, the fact that the first revolts broke out in May 1829 can be seen as a new twist to the traditional May rites. In Sahlins' view, the protesters started by appropriating symbols of female sexuality for the defence of their community. Their appearance as "demoiselles" (young women) related to the female identity of the forest; revolt was intended to defend the forest against a "bad marriage". Cutting down the May Tree was an expression of one of the community's rights, challenged by the new Forestry Code. In related action, the traditional planting of crosses on 3 May was transformed into death threats against forest rangers and gendarmes. The repertoire of the May rites, carnival and the charivari was redirected towards challenging administrative rationalization. Young people, to whom the community had delegated its control of sexual and abnormal behaviour, diverted this prerogative towards an affirmation of the community's hold over the female forest. Far from being exceptional, use of the language of the charivari and carnival was frequent in those

locally generated and issue-specific revolts which occurred in the Pyrenees in the first half of the nineteenth century (Soulet 2004, 714, 731).

Decline of the Political Charivari

While rural protest movements became increasingly politicized at the national scale towards the middle of the nineteenth century, there was also a decline in the charivari-like protest rituals after 1848. Nevertheless, mock ritual executions at Carnival time, such as that at Vidauban in February 1850, continued to alarm the conservative political class. In this Provençal village, despite a ban by the mayor, a group consisting of members of a republican association ("la chambrée") danced through the streets. Once they had arrived in a public square, they tried and then beheaded a dummy. The Party of Order perceived this traditional ritual as a demonstration directed against them, an apologia for the guillotine and the Terror, and an incitement to rebellion (Agulhon 1979, 407–419).

The major reasons for peasant revolt were gradually addressed. Crises of subsistence disappeared after the Second Republic, and, with a few exceptions, taxation issues ceased to generate violent protest. Under the Second Empire (1852–1870), rights to common land were re-established. In the Pyrenees the number of incidents diminished as the 1860s wore on. At the end of this period traditional protest gave way to modern and collective methods of protest and lobbying, led by pressure groups. In this environment, where violence was discouraged, political uses of the charivari became rarer, as did any sort of charivari. Under the Second Empire, the repression of ordinary charivaris, seen as challenges to the imperial peace, had in fact become frequent (Lignereux 2008, 259). The retreat of the charivari was part and parcel of the creation of a new bourgeois and individualist order, intolerant of any intrusion by community-based justice into the private sphere (Bonnain-Moerdyk and Moerdyk 1977). This trend gained strength under the Third Republic. Weber (1976) refers to the decline of the charivari as an illustration of his thesis that peasants were turned into Frenchmen during the modernization of rural France between 1870 and 1914: political charivaris were very rare after 1849, and largely limited to towns and cities where there was a politicized public (Weber 1976, 403). He notes, however, that the religious struggles of the Third Republic provided a pretext for some politicized charivaris.

The charivari was broadly in decline as a result of state repression and schooling, socioeconomic change, industrialization and changes in out-

look. In most regions, it had disappeared before the First World War: "[t]he carcass of charivaris remained. But it was disembowelled" (Weber 1976, 406). The style and form of a model of contention may outlast its traditional content and motivation (Desplat 1982, 23). We should certainly qualify, in this respect, Tilly's assertion that demonstrations by workers and peasants under the Third Republic retained no trace of the charivari model, in either its moral or its political version (1986, 44). Even after the Third Republic the political charivari may in fact have re-emerged in other forms, not necessarily designated charivaris, but with symbolism that took on many of its aspects anew.

Charivari by Another Name? New Forms of Politicization in the Twentieth Century

The symbolism and practices of the charivari still occasionally featured in twentieth-century French politics. Research by Hastings (1991) into "Halluin la rouge" ("Halluin the Red"), a communist municipality in the Nord (North) department in the interwar period, provides an illustration of this phenomenon. In order to penetrate local society, communism espoused the traditional forms of local culture through which *Halluinois* identity was vibrantly expressed. The Communist Party adapted itself to local religiosity and to Flemish modes of social interaction in order to exploit the ritual practices through which attitudes and political messages had traditionally been transmitted. Anti-clerical masquerades were performed in Halluin at Carnival, but not exclusively then. On 10 August 1924, communist activists performed a satirical version of the procession of the Virgin Mary by carrying around a pig's head on a stretcher. A political and festive repertoire was adopted, with songs, music, theatre and parade floats. By doing this the party met the community's need for spectacle, filling the festive vacuum resulting from the weakening of Flemish Catholicism.

Charivari rituals were also staged during workers' struggles. In 1923 Désiré Ley, the head of a textile consortium, had decided to close the factories for two days a week in order to end a strike (Hastings 1991, 403). However, the employers were divided. One of the principal members of the factory owners' Industrial Union capitulated and accepted wage increases demanded by the strikers. This defection put an end to the solidarity among employers, and the Industrial Union was dissolved on 14 February 1924. In order to deride Ley's loss of power, Communist

activists then organized his mock funeral on 19 March. A straw dummy representing him was mounted on the back of a donkey, paraded through the town, and eventually burned. Capitalism was bestialized: the animal metaphor was used to debase the victim. A donkey with a hat was used to carry the dummy, making a clear reference to the charivari and an implicit comparison between Ley and a wronged husband.

In some cases, political factions organized their festivals as counter-rituals. Lalouette (1994) analysed a corpus of 114 banquets held on Good Friday in different French regions between 1868 and 1939 by freemasons and freethinkers. Sacrilegious rituals were observed during these events, ranging from a satirical menu to the crucifixion of a pig. Symbolic inversion, typical of the charivari, was politicized in an anti-religious sense.

In villages in the Loire, the traditional charivari was still in use in the 1930s (Weber 1976). Arguably, traces of the charivari can also be seen in the punishments meted out during the Second World War, and particularly during 1944 and 1945 (Olivier 2001), to women who had had relationships with members of the occupying forces (Virgili 2000). Brossat's study (1992) of these women, who had their heads shaved, emphasizes the links between this form of popular justice and the rites which stigmatized deviants under the *ancien régime*. This "ugly carnival" (Brossat 1992) and the mock executions brought back to life earlier forms of public condemnation by the mob, at a time when the state's monopoly over violence had not yet been re-established. These episodes clearly present us with extreme cases of a violent political transformation of the charivari.

The post-war years in France were marked by considerable socioeconomic change, the extension of the universal welfare state, industrialization, and the modernization of agriculture. There was less harking back to traditional festivals: carnivals became something of a rarity, and charivaris even more so. However, the struggles of the 1960s and 1970s signalled the revival of popular protest cultures and traditions by various activists, as seen in the 1970s protest against the expansion of a military camp in Larzac (Ariès 1994), and also in festivals put on by the Trotskyist party *Lutte ouvrière*, which adopted the symbols of the traditional May rites (Gérôme 1994). Analysing the 1967 strikes in the Dassault plants in Bordeaux, Gérome (1986) sees the strikers' use of percussion and song as a resurgence of the charivari repertoire. Noisy protest was accompanied in this case by a political use of silence, with a silent "guard of dishonour" surrounding non-strikers. In order to legitimize the workers' struggles, old repertoires of protest borrowed from popular culture were revived,

consciously or not, by reference to the culture of the 'people' against that of the ruling class.

The second half of the twentieth century thus saw two contrasting developments in France at the national level. On the one hand, ordinary charivaris gradually disappeared from view (Le Goff and Schmitt 1981), even if some enduring traces could be observed late on, especially in the Pyrenees and Gascony (Clergue 1984; Fabre and Traimond 1981). On the other, a shift in the focus of the charivari and carnival towards political protest continued to take place in various areas, although, in general, the reference to the original cultural model was no longer obvious to the protagonists themselves. It was at the edges of the national territory that these links remained most evident.

Survival at the Edges: Politicization of the Charivari in the Basque Country

While over the long term the Basque case reproduces the general French trend whereby the ordinary charivari has gradually faded away, it differs in the vigour, even to the present day, of its political forms. My purpose in this section is to examine its transformations from the nineteenth to the twenty-first centuries in districts within the province of Labourd. I will provide both a descriptive account of the ritual and an analysis of its social and political inspiration, using a combination of judicial sources, observers' accounts, and media coverage. I registered 169 court cases resulting from night-time charivaris between 1800 and 1923,[2] and 75 daytime charivari parades and donkey rides between 1792 and 2012 in the districts of Saint-Jean-de-Luz, Ustaritz, Espelette and Hasparren. As elsewhere (Agulhon 1979, 160), there were many more charivaris than those that left a formal record. This corpus is nevertheless large enough to permit a diachronic analysis of the role played by politics in these practices. Informal political expression took place at the margins of legitimate politics, at the same time being at the core of a symbolic staging of social and power relationships and, on occasion, of ideologies. Only in the recent past, however, did the political dimension become central. This new centrality was only in fact possible due to the waning importance of the custom's original function.

Traditional Sanctions

In the Basque Country traditional charivaris have taken several forms, varying in the severity of the sanction imposed (Hérelle 1925; Guilcher 1984). *Toberak, tutak* or *galarrotsak* (night-time charivaris) consisted of creating an uproar for several nights in a row in front of the victims' home, and usually castigated a widower or widow for their remarriage. *Asto lasterrak* (donkey rides) paraded an effigy of the victim, or even the victim himself, on a donkey around the village, and customarily ridiculed a husband beaten by his wife. In the early twentieth century they increasingly targeted, instead, the husband who beat his wife. *Asto lasterrak* started to take the form of charivari parades, and the authentic donkey ride tended to disappear. The *berdura* consisted of scattering ferns, hay or other foliage between one house and another, and was essentially aimed at adultery. Finally, a *tobera mustra* (charivari parade or cavalcade) was—and continues to be—a day-time celebration with a mock trial, dances and *bertsu* (improvised songs).[3]

The procedure was as follows: whenever a particular event became the talk of the community and merited a charivari, the village youth met to make arrangements. The local cohort of unmarried young men was responsible for the organization of the charivari, and also for the year's entire festive cycle. Very few charivaris involved exclusively female participation: within this study there were cases at Espelette in 1828 and 1863, and at Bidart in 1860. Even rarer was the type of event seen at Ossès in 1900, when married men prepared a *tobera mustra* to match one staged by the unmarried men the year before. Preceding the charivari itself, a delegation of young people would pay a visit to the victim. At this stage, the "subject" could still avoid the sanction by making a monetary offering to the young people. Some church weddings of widowers took place very early in the morning, or in a distant chapel, in order to avoid a charivari. By refusing an agreement, the victim exposed himself or herself to the charivari. Night-time charivaris were the next stage. These took the form of alternating charivari elements: *bertsu*, and *irrintzina* shouting. One song answered another. Occasionally, the victims of the charivari answered their detractors, also in verse. The victim of a *tobera mustra* in Espelette in 1899 went so far as to publish in the republican press a response to each of the verses the charivari performers had addressed to him. Instruments frequently used were bull horns, various drums, bells and cowbells, *tutak*

loudhailers, pots and pans, cauldrons, and *eltzaurrea* tambourines. Shots were fired to punctuate the verses.

Tobera mustrak represented the ultimate sanction inflicted on the victims of a night-time charivari who still refused to negotiate with their detractors, and were also public performances. A *tobera mustra* is based on a ceremonial programme. It follows a set pattern and may involve over 100 participants (before the 1970s all male): a group of horse-riders including messengers, officers, *bolantak* and *kaxkarot* dancers; another group on foot consisting of *zapurrak* (dancing soldiers), flag-carriers, musicians, *kaxkarot* dancers, *basandereak* (wild women), and *andere xuriak* (white ladies); a bench of mock magistrates; the *bertsulariak* (versifiers); and a parallel pageant of *zirtzilak* (outlandish characters) which parodies the 'official' cortège. Before the show there is a long street parade. The trial, which consists of a dialogue between *bertsulari*, mocks the subjects. As the trial progresses, the comic and satiric dimensions usually prevail over the substance of the case. In several instances the bailiff was eventually sentenced instead of the accused, and symbolically beheaded or shot. He was then resurrected, bringing the festival to an end. Beyond its social aspects, the ceremony thus conjures up symbolic aspects that have long since become obscure even to the performers themselves: allusions to local mythology, and the use of the carnival motifs of death and resurrection as purifying rites.

Community Control or "Pre-political" Motivation?

The consultation of historical sources provides the basis for a discussion of the two major theses related to the motivation for charivaris. The first approach emphasizes the non-political anthropological basis of the custom, seeing it principally as a remembrance of rituals meant to protect the community against those who might jeopardize its balance by disrupting the rules of the matrimonial market (Lévi-Strauss 1964, 343–344). Through the charivari, a specific age cohort practises social control: the remarriage of a widower or widow to a much younger person is perceived as a disturbance of the social equilibrium. This dimension was crucial in a territory subject to common law such as the Basque Country, where primogeniture, but with men and women on an equal footing, prevailed in the inheritance system. Those born second were particularly sensitive to questions of marriage regulation. In the second interpretation, which emerged in the 1970s, charivaris had a distinctive sociopolitical dimension:

the sanctions imposed by youth were seen as being aimed at local elites, thus denouncing practices of social domination. From this perspective the charivari became a pre-political, or informally political, form of protest (Fabre and Traimond 1981).

The charivaris identified here provide support for both theses. The motives for night-time charivaris tend to support the thesis relating to community control over matrimonial strategies (with remarriage being involved in 20 per cent of the proceedings; "disgrace to a family" in 18 per cent; liaisons with women of ill repute or adultery in 7.7 per cent; opposition to the religious or civilian authorities in 7 per cent; inn-keeping in 3.5 per cent; and 45 per cent of cases had unspecified causes, the most probable being remarriage). First to be punished were those who broke the implicit rules of the "marriage market" within age groups before marriage, and those who upset the established order through adultery and other misdemeanours. The grounds for day-time *tobera mustrak* seem to have been more varied. The remarriage of a widower or widow clearly remained a primary reason: examples are found at Sare in 1830, Hasparren in 1851, 1874 and 1891, and at Cambo-Paxkaleku in 1909. Adultery was also a recurring cause, as at Louhossoa in 1900 and 1922, and Macaye in 1901. In Espelette, in 1882, the *tobera mustra* targeted a man who had fathered seven children with women other than his wife. Domestic quarrels, leading to *asto lasterrak,* were also present at Itxassou in 1892, Macaye in 1906, and Saint-Pée in 1906.

The parade could also have a more socioeconomic dimension. Several parades in the second half of the nineteenth century, when Basque emigration had reached a significant volume, targeted those returning from the Americas. In Cambo in 1853, a parade mocked an emigrant who had returned from Montevideo and wed a local girl, although he had previously married in Uruguay. At Itxassou in 1883, the ceremony derided an "American" who had married a village heiress for her wealth and then beaten her. Community sanctions were aimed at the seduction strategies of heiresses, who preferred to marry wealthy "Americans" at the expense of younger men from the village. They also poured scorn on those returning from America with a degree of wealth. Those responsible for the charivari belonged broadly to the lower social classes: day labourers, cobblers, craftsmen and farmhands. This part of the youthful population would undoubtedly have been sensitive to the emergence locally of a new lower-middle class, returning from America with more money and exhibiting more liberal and individualistic behaviour. One of the last night-time chari-

varis at Itxassou, in the 1940s, saw young people of the Gerasto district castigating a widower and a widow, the heads of their respective houses, for marrying and thus denying opportunities to the unmarried without inheritances to become property owners by marrying an heir. They particularly resented the widower's abandonment of his own farmhouse by joining his wife at hers. Defence of common law on property transmission mingled with the charivari.

According to Frank (1989), the primary function of the "fictionalization" of social and family conflict that the charivari involves was to provide mediation within the community, enabling local people to avoid any intrusion by official legal forms of intervention. Singing contests between *bertsulari* were the central features of an ancient technique for resolving conflict. That said, the resentment caused by this traditional procedure was far from being resolved by the ritual performance.

The Rarity of Political Charivaris

Study of the reasons for each charivari identifies only a few that had a distinctive political dimension. As Desplat (1982) showed in Gascony, most charivaris remained focused on traditional issues. However, some significant exceptions, particularly those concerning religious and political matters, merit discussion. The revolutionary period generated some instances, including a case at Espelette in 1792, when verses sung to a traditional dance tune were directed at a parish priest who had accepted the Civil Constitution of the Clergy enforced by the revolutionaries in 1790. At Espelette again, in 1828, the marriage of a local Catholic girl to a Protestant judge led to a lengthy charivari (Hérelle 1924). However, it was particularly during the Third Republic that charivari rites were revived, on both sides of the conflict between republicans and supporters of the clergy. At Espelette in 1893, the local elections on 20 August gave rise, on the republican side, to 'night-time disturbances', "carnival staging" and "songs of derision". By contrast, a night-time charivari was organized against the schoolmistress of the state school in Itxassou in 1885. In the same village, in 1889, the "Whites" (the clerical faction) were forbidden to organize a *tobera mustra* by the mayor, supposedly for the sake of decency. In Itxassou again, the elderly people that I interviewed recalled the charivari features (masks, shrieking and yelling) of the violent protest against the 1906 inventory of Church properties that followed the 1905 law on the Separation of Churches and State.[4]

There is no evidence that clearly supports Tilly's thesis in the context of rural Labourd. Based on urban observations, Tilly sees within the political adaptation of the charivari a pre-political form heralding the emergence of a new kind of collective action. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Labourd charivari reflected events at the level of the village, and was not well suited to appropriation by militants wishing to politicize the masses. The age of tax rebellions, such as the women's uprising of 1784 at Hasparren, was over, despite occasional recurrences between 1816 and 1833. The politicization of the charivari was more apparent in coastal towns. In Bayonne, in 1832, a major charivari targeted Marshal Harispe, then a member of parliament for the Basses-Pyrénées (1831–1835), with shouts of "Down with moderation!" (*à bas le juste milieu!*) and "Long live the Republic!" Some charivaris that took place in troubled political times became unruly and violent and were severely repressed in small towns, like that in Saint-Jean-Pied-de-Port (Lower-Navarre) in 1832, which combined a traditional justification (the remarriage of a widow) with animosity towards 'foreigners' and internal social tensions (the new husband was from Béarn, and was a lowly cobbler). The moderate mayor of the same town was subjected to a political charivari in February 1848. In Saint-Jean-de-Luz, during the Third Republic, both Reds and Whites resorted to electoral charivaris (Itçaina 2012).

Repression and Weakening of the Charivari

From the 1830s onwards, and particularly under the Second Empire, the legal authorities increasingly cracked down on charivaris. The cantonal justice of the peace and the prosecutor in Bayonne were the main protagonists in this gradual penetration of the state and the law into a reputedly rebellious territory. It would take time for the liberal discourse, based on the recognition of individual rights, to penetrate the complex web of community solidarities, as well as family-based principles and practices. The mayors often played the part of go-between, mitigating a justice which could be too arbitrary; the fear that charivaris might target them instead probably partly accounts for this stance. The clergy as a rule disapproved of charivari practices. Charivaris may have been based on positions that were socially conservative, but they were highly subversive when it came to their repertoire of action. On this the Church was in unaccustomed agreement with the state, although in the name of a different normative argument. While the priest condemned charivaris, he did so not on behalf

of a liberal and individualistic conception of citizenship, but instead on the basis of his rejection of a moral norm determined by self-referencing groups of young people, and distinct from the religious one. Charivaris revived the traditional tension between the parish priest and young people, each asserting their authority over ritual procedures.

Under the Third Republic, the charivari's condemnation by the Church was accompanied by its politicization. This was external to the charivari itself: it related more to an interpretation of the custom by politicized circles than to the actual custom, which kept to a traditional pattern. Thus the *tobera mustra* which took place at Hasparren on Easter Monday 1891 generated conflict between the clerical and Republican newspapers, *Eskualduna* and *le Réveil Basque*. The former deplored the fact that the Catholic lenten mission had been cancelled because of preparations for the charivari parade, involving both married and young unmarried men, and the support of the Republican mayor.

Death and Revival of the Custom: Towards Formal Politicization?

Institutional hostilities and social change led to a decline of the traditional charivari in Labourd. Varying by village, the last great night-time charivaris took place between the 1930s and the 1960s. They were particularly violent, as if the victims were reacting more resolutely to what was perceived as an intrusion into their privacy. At Itxassou, the final nocturnal *toberak* took place under the Occupation and in the immediate post-war period. One of these saw the young men of Cambo confronting those of Itxassou about a liaison between a young man and the fiancée of a prisoner in Germany. An informant leaked news of the planned charivari and a fight took place, with one of the participants left for dead. In the Soule area the *berdura* was revived in the vengeful atmosphere of the Liberation (Ott 2006). In Hasparren, the last charivari was performed in 1950 in the Elizaberri district, on the remarrying of a widower, and ended in one death, one wounding and one suicide (Alford 1959). In the mid-1950s, in northern Labourd, a night-time charivari targeted a priest suspected of having an affair with his maid. At Arrauntz, a charivari took place at the beginning of the 1960s. In rural Labourd a few isolated *berdurak* took place in the 1960s and the 1970s, but as a rule this custom gradually died out, with few regrets.

Daytime charivari parades (*tobera mustrak*) had rather different fortunes. In the early twentieth century the Basque cultural movement

adopted an increasingly positive view of *tobera mustrak* and popular culture in general. Unlike the *abertzale* (Basque nationalist) political movement, which had limited impact on the French Basque side, the cultural movement had some resonance within the local political, social and religious elites. As early as 1911, a small number of Basque cultural activists considered improvements to what essentially remained a show featuring dances, songs, *bertsu* and acting; once rid of its traditional charivari justification, this might provide a firm base for new meanings. In June 1911 the doctor and writer Jean Etchepare suggested in *Eskualduna* that the parade be improved, with more emphasis on the dances and *bertsu* and less prominence for the *zirtzilak*, now considered superfluous and crude. Etchepare reiterated his criticisms in 1933, following a charivari parade performed at Arrossa. Although he wanted to maintain the *tobera mustrak*, as the authentic theatre of the lowest social strata, he decried their length and vulgarity. Thereafter, cultural activists pleaded for a less elaborate version of the ritual proceedings, which would more accurately reflect Basque identity. Meanwhile the Floral Games (poetry, singing and dancing contests), organized both by Church supporters and by Republicans in rivalry since the mid-nineteenth century, set about taming the *bertsulari* (versifier) character by extracting him from his traditional context, the charivari in particular, and locating him in the controlled arena of improvisation contests (Laborde 2005).

Some pre-war *tobera mustrak* heralded this change. In its announcement of the Hasparren cavalcade performed in 1927, *Eskualduna* wrote about "a *tobera mustra*, or rather a Basque festival". The "comedy" showed how a Basque man would throw an Englishman or American out of his home if they wanted to buy it. The shift in meaning was considerable: it was no longer a question of denouncing individual impropriety, but of bringing matters of common interest into the public domain while affirming a proactive Basque identity. The form remained identical: dancing, acting and improvisation. In the same period, however, neighbouring villages were still staging the traditional charivari themes. The last great parade with a traditional theme took place at Irissary, in nearby Lower Navarre, in May 1937. At Itxassou, a smaller-scale *tobera mustra*, still dealing with matrimonial matters, took place in the mountain district of Gerasto around 1937. These were the final manifestations of the custom's traditional concerns.

These developments accelerated after the war. In Lower Navarre the number of parades diminished, and cavalcades with no theme became more frequent in the area of Saint-Jean-Pied-de-Port. In Labourd, on 29 June 1947, the youth of Hasparren organized a *tobera mustra* on a fictional topic written by the vicar Piarres Larzabal, who later became a major Basque playwright. This play mingled references to the government of Labourd under the *ancien régime* with allusions to the contemporary situation. Larzabal wished to retain old customs "dispensing with their shortcomings and replacing them with the staging of elements and adornments better suited to our time".[5] After the Hasparren experiment, the most popular area for *tobera mustrak* centred on two villages, Macaye and Louhossoa. In the former, famed for its dancers, the romanticized story of Ganix de Macaye, a smuggler involved in the nineteenth-century Carlist Wars, replaced the earlier charivari. The show was periodically performed in Macaye between 1949 and 1980. In Louhossoa *tobera mustrak* were staged again after the war (in 1948, 1952, 1957 and 1958); they presented mock trials, but on fictional topics, with local allusions woven into the shows (Itçaina 2012).

Against all odds the 1970s witnessed a revival of the *tobera mustrak*, encouraged by the Basque nationalist movement, initially in Lower Navarre. In the early 1970s, Basque nationalism evolved from an autonomist type of Christian democracy into a more left-wing struggle for independence (Jacob 1994). Cultural forms became prized objects for a movement that wanted Basque culture to be much more than quaint folklore. Theatre now became a propaganda tool for promoting a cause at village level. Activists who were close to *abertzale* circles looked into the *toberak*, and suggested a reinterpretation that emphasized their subversive dimension; they focussed on a portrayal of dominated identities, within which Basque identity and class identity were to merge. The representation minimized the moralizing features of the earlier *tobera mustrak* in favour of a new political message. This theatrical form thus gained new strength, presenting issues whose more political nature was this time an articulation of local concerns. In 1974, *toberak* were organized in the village of Iholdy to support a miller facing eviction, due to the municipality's project for a lake intended for tourism. The festival degenerated into a confrontation between the actors, the police and the villagers (Etchecopar-Etchart 2001). Several other representations of a similar kind followed in Lower Navarre, expressing

sociopolitical preoccupations: deploring high land taxation, opposing the "everything for tourism" attitude, attacking the impenetrable circle of the local political elite, defending the Basque language and, during the 2013 Carnival cavalcade in Saint-Palais, criticizing a Basque farming cooperative involved in a food scandal for drifting towards deregulated capitalism. In the early 1990s, this revival of charivari parades reached eastern Labourd. Within a few years, Mendionde, Itxassou, Louhossoa and their Lower Navarre neighbours had revived the half-forgotten custom (Figs. 9.1 and 9.2). The movement even reached the urbanized coast. This resurgence took place without any resurrection of pre-war charivari topics. It expressed contemporary preoccupations: land taxation, the transformation of a production-based economy into a residential one, the future of the Basque language. This latest generation of *tobera mustrak* illustrated the capacity that this ancient custom has had for adaptation.

Fig. 9.1 Traditional dancers during a charivari-cavalcade in Itxassou, French Basque Country, 2007 (courtesy of Gaizka Iroz)

Fig. 9.2 Mocking neo-liberal globalization. A mock trial during a charivari-cavalcade in Itxassou, French Basque Country, 2007 (courtesy of Gaizka Iroz)

Conclusions

Located in the French context, the history of the Basque charivari provides an example of the renewed, partial and multidimensional politicization of a form of traditional social interaction. Perhaps surprisingly, the most marked forms of politicization of the charivari appeared when its original social function had lost relevance. The Basque charivari thus appears as a modernized pre-modern element of the repertoire of contention. The profile of concerns expressed has radically evolved, from transgressive individual behaviour to socio-political issues. However, the process of public denunciation remains identical, and thus has meaning to both the actors and their targets. As Tarrow reminds us:

> The repertoire involves not only what people *do* when they are engaged in conflict with others but *what they know how to do* and what others expect them to do. Had sit-ins been tried by challengers in eighteenth century France, their targets would not have known how to respond to them, any more than the victim of a *charivari* today would know what it meant. (Tarrow 2011, 39)

This is certainly true for France in general terms, but in the Basque case the shared and explicit meaning of the charivari has continued until the present day. There is, however, no way of foretelling the future of these traditional forms, periodically reinvented and in play in a constant redefining of the boundaries of politics.

Notes

1. The Address of the 221 was an address to King Charles X of France by the *Chambre des députés* at the opening of the French Parliament on 18 March 1830. It expressed the defiance of the Chamber's liberal majority of 221 deputies to the ministry and helped lead to the July Revolution ("Address of the 221", https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Address_of_the_221, date accessed 18 November 2015).
2. These cases were heard in county courts. To them should be added the cases of 39 charivaris heard by the Bayonne "Tribunal d'instance" (a higher district court) between 1816 and 1906.
3. I refer here to the *tobera mustrak* that are particular to the south of Lower Navarre and to Labourd. The Mixe valley and the Soule had their own satirical theatre. In Labourd, I did not find any reference to *tobera mustrak* west of Saint-Pée-sur-Nivelle. The cavalcade performed by the seamen of Guéthary in 1881 was a charivari, but did not reproduce the model of the *tobera mustrak*.
4. Interview of Mme Anchordoquy by the author, Arcangues, 1998.
5. "Hazparneko ikusgarriaz", *Herria*, 19 June 1947 translated from Basque.

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CHAPTER 10

Tactical Carnival and the Global Justice Movement: The Clown Army and Clownfrontational Protest

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Run Away From the Circus—Join the CIRCA!
(Clandestine Insurgent Rebel Clown Army [CIRCA] recruiting slogan)
CIRCA is the only army in the world in which General Strike outranks Private Property.

—Colonel Oftruth, CIRCA

Edinburgh, Scotland, Carnival for Full Enjoyment, 4 July 2005. Police in black riot gear stand shoulder to shoulder. Their body-length plastic shields form a wall across the city street. They have just used those shields to shove people down the road and assert control of the space. Visors are

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down. Heavy boots and hulking full-body armor add to their imposing appearance. They are poised to preserve public order.

The police are confronted by a disorderly gaggle of men and women in chaotic face paint, second-hand military gear, and clownish, garish pink and green frills. These are the tricksters of the Clandestine Insurgent Rebel Clown Army (CIRCA). Far from being intimidated, the CIRCA folk seem overjoyed to see them, and hail them as friends and playmates. The clowns scrub the policemen's boots with their feather dusters, they breathe on the shields to fog them up and then polish them.

Althusser wrote that interpellation is key to the articulation of power; when the policeman hails you with a "Hey, you!" and you acknowledge the hailing—"Who? Me?"—you are already caught in the power relationship (Althusser 1971). This applies to any standard response to policing—fight, flight or freak out. CIRCA clowns resist interpellation. They neither flee nor fight, they stay and play. The rebel clowns jump about, following each other in an agreeable "yes, and" ethos of improvisational frolicking in front of the police line. They simply refuse to acknowledge the very clear and stark NO of the police cordon, asserting their own ridiculous and enthusiastic YES, AND over and over with each moment. Finally, one trickster, aptly named Trixie, kisses one of the police shields. Her kiss is so enthusiastic and vigorous that she smears her clown make-up and lipstick all over it. She then goes from shield to shield, all the way up the phalanx-line, kissing and leaving a smeary mark on each one. The police stay in formation. Some are disturbed, some impassive, and some amused by these paradigm-shifting kisses. One says "Step away from the shield, please", while another can clearly be seen to be smiling.[1]

Trixie draws smiley faces on the shields with her lipstick while cheering, "Yay!!" Soon she is writing "Yey!!"[2] on some of the riot shields, while the other clowns cheer. Images of her kisses and lipstick happy faces are broadcast and printed all over the world the next day.

Soon the clowns form a line facing the police, and begin a motion-sound performance in unison. Bending at the hip with arms and hands extended, they utter "Shhhhh", and then make a "Whooo" sound while standing straight. Through group improv, they are acting out an absurd gesture, simultaneously kowtowing to and shooing away the police. After five or six repetitions of this movement, the clowns began jumping up and down, yelling "Yippie!"

At that precise moment, the police line broke. They pulled away, formed two files, and jogged away down the road at double time. The

clowns briefly ran alongside them, and a great cheer rose from the watching non-clown protesters and bystanders. Once the police were gone, a celebration broke out on the street.[3]

It is prudent at this point to note that the police line may not have been broken by clown magic. A few blocks away, a gaggle of clowns, including Colonel Oftruth, dancing in a more strategic intersection, were baton charged and driven away, twice. However, in this happier example, one can imagine the rear-rank conversation between the officers, or by walkie talkie with headquarters: "Look, we've become sucked into some kind of performance art here, and we'd really like to go elsewhere so we can fight crime […] well, look to be fair, our training doesn't include improv theatre […] requesting permission to withdraw."

The improvisation of the clowns made such a poetic moment possible, where it appeared that fearless silliness and serious play could dispel the intimidating power of the state. As one clown said, "They loved us so much, we asked them to go away, and they did." This was not "street theatre" per se, but a form of improvisatory and creative direct action. The clowns immediately began to fill the authority gap created by the policemen's withdrawal—power abhors a vacuum, after all—by directing traffic, including police wagons, with feather dusters, and giving passing vehicles the CIRCA Clown Salute, the thumbing of one's nose with a big smile. Eventually, after several weeks, police were seen giving us this salute.

This absurd face-off between two groups of masked uniformed performers occurred during the "Carnival for Full Enjoyment" of 4 July 2005. It was an example of a hybrid form which I refer to as *tactical carnival*; a form of protest that evokes and invokes the mythos, imagery and attitude of medieval carnival, and the theory of Bakhtin, embracing its irreverent, egalitarian, "world-turned-upside-down" agenda (Bakhtin 1968). The social movements of the global justice movements of the 1990s and 2000s embraced the idea of Bakhtinian carnival as a sort of paleoanarchist antecedent; a major literary figure whose ideas mapped roughly onto their approach to protest: playful, unpredictable, horizontalist, and joyfully defiant.

However, as a writer/performer/activist and scholar in and of those movements, I found through years of praxis that Bakhtin, and his analysis of Rabelais, did not always clearly map onto what we were doing. Our movements drew some inspiration from Rabelaisian outrageousness, true; but they were also inspired by the disciplined, calculated, and beautiful troublemaking of ACT-UP; the wild effrontery and symbolic mindfuck-

ing of the Yippies and the Provos, the poetics of the Zapatistas, the grim subvertisements and detournements of the Situationists, and many other such powerful influences (we have even referred to ourselves as Harpo- or Groucho-Marxists in deference to the inspiration of those masters of slapstick and wordplay). If "carnival" was a major influence, we had certainly adjusted it into a more ideological, oppositional, mediagenic, tactically targeted and calculated form. This is what I mean by "tactical carnival." Tactical carnival does not purely follow the narrative of Rabelais or Bakhtin, nor is it a state-sanctioned ritual, a cultural steam-valve occurring like *Mardi Gras* within recognized temporal bounds based on the agrarian calendar. Rather, it is declared by members of the Global Justice Movement as a festive and defiant event on a time and place of its own choosing.

The example of tactical carnival in Edinburgh, described above, was a response to the G8 Summit happening a few miles away at the fortified, remote country resort, Gleneagles. However, this carnival was not purely negative and reactive in character. Rather, it was an attempt to open up a space for anti-authoritarian, egalitarian and participatory celebration without state permits or sanction. With slogans such as "No Wage Slavery", "No Benefits Slavery", "No Army Slavery", and "No Debt Slavery", the Carnival for Full Employment, as its organizers called it, claimed to represent workers of all descriptions—"Flex, temp, full-time, part-time, casual and contortionist workers, migrants, students, benefit claimers, New Dealers, work refusers, pensioners, dreamers, duckers & divers." In a press release, protestors urged workers to "Phone in Sick and Join the Carnival":

> Bring drums, music, banners, and imagination for action against the G8 that expresses our resistance in work, out of work and wherever we live. Assert our desires for FULL ENJOYMENT with fun in the city and begin to make capitalism & wage slavery history […] On 4 July we can take action and experience—if only temporarily—what life could be like if we got the bosses off our backs.

The announcement then described its official mandate with a pointed anti-corporate twist that Bakhtin may not have found sufficiently ideologically ambivalent:

> The Carnival for Full Enjoyment involves both local people and people from round Britain and beyond. We are making it a carnival because life should be more fun for those of us who labour in underpaid insecure jobs, in casual and agency work, or on "New Deal" schemes. There should be more joy for the unemployed trying to survive on a few quid a week and for those of us juggling childcare and debt [...] Get together with friends and set your sights. Bring what you'd want to find, and most of all bring imagination and passion. Diversity and creativity is our strength [...] Our purpose is to oppose those who devastate our communities through economic exploitation. We will make clear our resistance to organisations which thrive on the poverty and debt in which many of us find ourselves. Because our society is mainly based on using people to make money for others, there are many such organisations to choose from.
>
> We are in favour of direct action because marching around with placards can be safely ignored by those who control exploitation. We advocate direct action against the institutions which exploit the majority [...] We invite workers from Standard Life and all other corporations to join the Carnival. Take an extended lunch-break, phone in sick! Join us in opposing casualisation, the intensification of work, attacks on pensions and conditions...
>
> *The carnival is a celebration of how good life can be, and at the same time a statement against those who spoil it for the majority.* (Carnival for Full Enjoyment 2005, my italics)

The organizers explicitly presented the Carnival as an anti-capitalist, anti-authoritarian event with links between local workers and activists, and a larger global movement. The Carnival was to be a rejection of state authority (significantly, no permit was requested for this event), an affirmation of the joy of unified resistance (particularly resistance to the regulation of everyday behavior in a privatized and controlled public space) and an alternative to the staid tactic of "marching around with placards." I argue that these two elements are key distinctions between Bakhtinian carnival and tactical carnival; a connection to a progressive or radical global movement organized horizontally to create pressure for positive social change; and a canny rejection of conventional and hackneyed protest methods.

The Carnival for Full Enjoyment was also seen as an opportunity for direct action to disrupt the proceedings of corporations and "business as usual" in the city. Authorities mobilized a massive police force in Edinburgh to protect banks and corporate offices from vandalism or non-violent disruption such as sit-ins, and to prevent the revelling, disorderly crowds from blocking the streets. The government trucked in

10,000 uniformed officers from across the UK to respond to this threat to security and public order. Police filled the streets, blocking intersections, surrounding, searching, arresting, chasing and breaking up large groups of protestors, and keeping them separated. Among protestors, there was a great deal of game playing, samba bands, festive costumes, dancing, and revelry, and even a huge anarchist black cat-puppet that spooked police horses. There was plenty of fleeing, regrouping, cat-and-mouse tactics, and on one street a scuffle between protestors and police.

Tactical carnival is partly a response to more conventional and institutionalized models of social movement protest. The goal here is to open up public space with "do-it-yourself" group and individual creativity, rather than to merely occupy it with uniform marching and chanting while holding signs. This opening of public space for a freer and more festive direct action is one of the main goals of CIRCA.

CIRCA: The Clandestine Insurgent Rebel Clown Army

CIRCA was formed in London in the fall of 2003 when co-founder John Jordan proclaimed the existence of an army of "rebel clowns" whose orders were to storm Buckingham Palace during a state visit by President George W. Bush. To meet this challenge, several of us responded to the call, bringing training, inspiration, and creative agendas to the assignment. We were armed with feather dusters, helmed with colanders, and motivated by a clownish call for action, upon which the whole day of improvised foolery would hang. This would serve as the model for CIRCA actions in the future—beginning with a central premise that would motivate a loose plan. Our first premise: CIRCA was dismayed that, after so many centuries of fools being banned in the Royal Court, the Queen was inviting the wrong kind of fool. So we mobilized (Bogad, NPR interview, as Colonel Oftruth). As the *Scotsman* reported:

> They had the unmistakable air of clowns with a purpose. They were, it turned out, the Clandestine Insurgent Rebel Clown Army, protesting at what they called the "auspicious news that, for the first time in 500 years, a fool is being allowed back into the Palace on official business." […] But [Bush], was "a false fool" whose "desire to spread global misery" had disqualified him from the job.

> Their demands were simple. If the Royal household did not rescind his invitation, they would "muster forces and prepare an assault on the palace"—custard pies at the ready. And with that, they set off, drumming loudly, across the square and towards the Palace.[4]

CIRCA was seen all over the city, marching with surprising military precision, turning on a dime and responding to Colonel Oftruth's calls: "Right-Sneer!" or "Left-spit!" The militarized slapstick-right column obediently spitting on the left column's shoulder, then apologies all around, entertained crowds as we marched through major train stations. We dragged behind us our huge cardboard clown cannon, and a caisson filled with hundreds of lovingly painted pink pretzels. We set up the cannon, aiming it at targets like the Esso building—the UK version of Exxon. Shaking our fists in warning at the security guards and riot police protecting the target, we set up the *lazzo* or clownish routine. As tension grew and a crowd gathered, we gloated about the devastation the cannon would cause as we laboriously loaded it and trembled with excitement, covering our ears. Once enough spectators had gathered, we pulled the pin! A pink pretzel shot out of the muzzle, sailed through the air about four inches, and fell to the pavement. We cheered in triumph! Then we reassembled in ranks and marched off, spitting and sneering on command.[5]

We marched behind Beefeaters for an admittedly easy visual joke. We attracted a great deal of attention from the international media, fielding questions on the street from reporters and, more importantly, from protesters and passers-by. There was something about our ridiculous intensity and quality, and our attention to detail in costumes, routines, and shtick, that earned appreciation. "At least someone put in some effort!" was a typical comment we heard.

When we finally reached the park across from Buckingham Palace, we spontaneously went into faux-commando mode. We hit the ground, wriggling forward silently in the autumn leaves. We gave each other hand signals to stop or move forward. I should mention at this point that our uniforms were festooned with neon-bright pink and lime fuzz and fluff. As crowds gathered to watch our pseudo-sneaking, Colonel Oftruth stood up and began to hide behind a single leaf in his hand. His comrades followed on point. A police helicopter swooped above us. Oftruth held the leaf over his head for cover. We marched toward the palace, delivered our manifesto about the true nature of the wise fool, denouncing the

destructive false fools inside, cheered rousingly and withdrew back to the streets. The first day of action of the Clown Army was complete.

Our training methods, which developed over time, drew on the diverse repertoire of our individual members: games from clowning and *bouffon* traditions, improv theatre, and performance art exercises from the Viola Spolin method and other traditions, exercises in nonviolent civil disobedience, and horizontalist organization and communication. I modified some exercises from the Theatre of the Oppressed, the radical dialogical system developed by Augusto Boal, to add to the mix (1985).

As we practiced and drilled in the parks of London, and gathered for costume sewing parties, our group ethic, aesthetic, and sense of comradeship grew. We worked out some comedic routines, but also created war-related deformities that our clowns became grotesquely proud of. In response to expected searches by police, we stuffed our pockets with ridiculous things—flower petals (great for throwing in the air), toy soldiers, gum balls, bubble blowers, etc.

Later that autumn of 2003, CIRCA marched on the "Greet the Buyers" event in London, a meeting between corporations and the US-installed interim regime in Iraq, at which the privatization of Iraq's assets would be negotiated. The weather stormed and hail fell from the sky. The streets were no less turbulent. Colonel Klepto, Jordan's clown identity, was arrested. When his pockets were searched and the contents itemized, the police had to go through the whole list of absurd objects, culminating in a wind-up toy of a wanking bobby. The clowns marched to Klepto's rescue, arriving at the police station and doing strange clownish group movements in the lobby. Oftruth's costume had disintegrated in the hail, but he stayed in formation in clown mode as best he could. When kicked out of the police headquarters, we began to decorate the precinct with festive ribbons. Matt Trevelyan, a brilliant Rabelaisian clown and free spirit, lost his trousers as most clowns eventually do. The police came outside with large video cameras and spotlights, usually an intimidating move. Unfazed, the clowns posed for the cameras as if shooting a grotesque, *bouffon* music video. One policeman demanded that Trevelyan put his trousers back on.

In a classic, performed example of the value of overobedience and overidentification with hierarchy, Trevelyan slavishly agreed with the officer. The officer was right, he pleaded. It was shocking, SHOCKING that his trousers were in the wrong place. He then held his pants out at full arm's length, shoulder height, and attempted to leap into his own pants. He

continued to attempt this impossible feat, apologizing profusely the entire time, while the police watched. Again and again, he jumped; again and again, he failed to land in his own trousers. The key to such clowning is overexertion. Trevelyan had found a way to follow this guideline while mocking authority. It was a beautiful moment. When he finally pulled on his pants, the clowns roared with victorious joy.

Of Western Gnomes and Eastern Dwarves

As Padraic Kenney describes, this kind of overobedience in the face of oppression has been used under more dire circumstances like Communist rule in Poland. Tricksters of the Orange Alternative would stage laughably absurd events in celebration of Lenin—everyone wearing red, eating only red foods, and cheering wildly while an orator read a particularly staid and dated Lenin speech. They wore red peaked hats and referred to themselves as "Dwarves." The events were so absurd, the secret police were unsure exactly what to do. The Orange Alternative, in turn, picked up some of their "Pixie" symbolism and prankster moves from the "Orange Free State" of the "Gnomes" of the Netherlands.

The Kabouters, or "Gnomes," drew on the friendly Dutch folkloric symbol of the gnome and converted it into an eco-anarcho-pacifist symbol that was legible to the general populace. Through sustained, ludic, but fierce direct action they grew into a popular movement. In 1970, they ran for public office across the Netherlands, refusing to engage in conventional political discourse—they made not one campaign promise nor speech. To the dismay of the state, they won five seats on the Amsterdam City Council, and much merry mayhem ensued (Bogad 2016).[6] The Gnomes on the Western side of the Iron Curtain, with their irreverent and carnivalesque disruptive and disarming tactics, helped to inspire the Dwarves on the Eastern side, but of course those Dwarves adroitly adjusted the tactics to their local, and far harsher, terrain.

CIRCA has since been seen occupying the city of Leeds, attempting to attend the "Republican National Clown Convention" in New York as members of the Big Top Delegation, and disrupting daily operations at US and UK military recruitment centres by attempting to enlist, then setting up Clown Army recruitment centers on the sidewalks outside (Fig. 10.1).

CIRCA often moves in tight-knit gaggles of around 10–12, marching in tight pseudo-military formation. Then suddenly they break off into

total clownarchy, engaging in antics and improvisation with passers-by. Suddenly, and with no apparent cue, the rebel clowns travel like a tightly clustered school of fish, all making the same sound and gesture, then changing direction simultaneously and making an entirely different sound and gesture (this is called fishing). CIRCA's unpredictability and constant, collective shape-shifting come from hours of group practice and training. In their huddled and cuddled group movements, CIRCA evokes the carnivalesque mass as opposed to the idealized, individualistic, and discreet bourgeois body. CIRCA collectively embodies the neo-Bakhtinian concepts espoused by the activist collective *Notes From Nowhere*,[7] whose very name evokes "Utopia", aka "No Where," and who were the editors and authors of We Are Everywhere:

> The pleasures of the body have been banished from the public sphere of politics and the excitement of the erotic pushed into the narrow private confines of the sexual realm. But carnival brings the body back to public space, not the perfect smooth bodies that promote consumption on billboards and magazines, not the manipulated plastic bodies of MTV and party political broadcasts, but the body of warm flesh, of blood and guts, organs and orifices.
>
> During carnival the body sticks its tongue out as far as it can, it laughs uncontrollably, sweats and farts as it dances in the heat of other bodies. It's a body that refuses the static images of itself developed by capital, frozen in immortal youthfulness, aloof from natural cycles of eating and shitting, being born and decomposing. In carnival the body is always changing, constantly becoming, eternally unfinished. Inseparable from nature and fused to other bodies around it, the body remembers that it is not a detached, atomized being, as it allows its erotic impulse to jump from body to body, sound to sound, mask to mask, to swirl across the streets, filling every nook and cranny, every fold of flesh. During carnival the body, with its pleasures and desires, can be found everywhere, luxuriating in its freedom and inverting the everyday. (Notes From Nowhere 2003, 175–6)

While CIRCA members rarely excrete on the street, they do move in groups and in ways that celebrate the group (mass body) over the individual, and earthiness and silliness over commercial standards of beauty and respectability:

> We see innovative forms of action as key for building dynamic social movements, but realize that the psyche is as important a site for struggle as the



Fig 10.1 Recruiting card (courtesy of the Laboratory of Insurrectionary Imagination)

> street. CIRCA believes that a self-destructive tendency within many social movements is forgetting the inner work of personal liberation and transformation. This is an area our rebel clown trainings work on deeply, while also providing creative tools to confuse and befuddle authority. (CIRCA 2005)

CIRCA aims to open up the spaces that they move in, to shift the paradigm or change the rules of behaviour and engagement. They hope to bring the tactical carnival with them wherever they go, transforming an event into a symphony I refer to as the "key of clown" though absurdist cues and gestures. The spirit of playfulness can often be infectious, and civilians may be induced to play improvised games in the street (for example, several dozen clowns happen upon a speed bump and treat it as a unsurpassable obstacle, drawing on passers-by to help them to climb over this bump). CIRCA hopes their open vulnerability and fearlessness will prove infectious in the carnival spaces they create as they navigate the city. As the clowns greet police as "friends" and fail either to melt away in fear or raise tension with anger, a paradigm shift in confrontation ensues. The true challenge is to stay "in clown" even when conventional power relationships assert themselves. To reflect our egalitarian ideology and disrupt police procedures of hailing, interpellation and command, when cops approached and demanded "Who's in charge here?" we would respond: "HE IS!" while pointing at a dog, a tree, a man watching us from a balcony above, or the sun.

Attitudes about Bakhtinian carnival differed among CIRCA activists. Matthew Trevelyan, at some group meetings, read quotes directly from Rabelais' *Gargantua*, which he found particularly inspiring and relevant. On the other hand, Jennifer Verson refused to accept the term carnival to describe CIRCA's efforts, denouncing its connotation as an escape valve for societal dissent. Our tactical carnival was in tension with more traditional ideas of Bakhtinian carnival.

Shortly before the G8 protests began, CIRCA experimented with interactions with the mainstream media, organizing a bizarre press conference to announce our aims. The press reported on this with some choice quotes and an accounting of police mobilization that seemed extreme in juxtaposition to the descriptions of CIRCA. From the *Daily Mail*:

> Protesters rallying against the G8 summit this summer are planning to cause chaos—by sending in an army of anarchist circus clowns.

> Anti-capitalists hatched the bizarre plan to antagonize police during the Gleneagles summit […]. The Clandestine Insurgent Rebel Clown Army said it planned to "help" keep law and order. A spokesman said, "We are launching Operation HAHAHAA—Helping Authorities House Arrest Half-witted Authoritarian Androids—during which we will help the security forces keep the G8 under indefinite house arrest." CIRCA, which has been involved in a number of protests in the past, will use props such as tickling sticks and custard pies to harass police officers. The move is part of a concerted plan being co-ordinated by anarchists from Dissent Network, which will include disrupting transport[8]. ("G8 Anarchists," *Daily Mail*, 26 May 2005)

The Sun chimed in:

> […] They have vowed to travel from across Britain to the event between July 6 and 8 and put world leaders "under house arrest." CIRCA has invaded buildings like army recruitment centers, harassed police and tried to recruit people for "civil disobedience training" in recent years. And a spokesman last night urged other demonstrators to clown around. He said: "you could be part of a fighting force armed with ruthless love and fully trained in the ancient art of clowning and non-violent direct action. You could learn ingeniously stupid tactics that baffle the powerful. You could uncover your inner clown and discover the subversive freedom of fooling." The clowns face a battle to even get near world leaders as 10,000 police will be on duty and a five mile fence is going up around the famous hotel where the event is being held…[9] (Herbert 2005)

This typical CIRCA action premise used clown logic, assuming the best of the worst, by offering help to the lovely security forces gathered at Gleneagles, grateful that they too realized how dangerous the G8 was to the future of the world.

The next day, several papers, including the *Daily Record*, *Daily Express*, and *Daily Star*, quoted the CIRCA communiqué, which enunciated, amid a great deal of ironic silliness, a serious critique of the G8's actual policies and responsibility for the debt of the Global South, along with the disarming CIRCA claim that they would "amuse, bemuse, but never bruise." Colonel Oftruth was often responsible for providing the kernel of truth within the clownish madness, writing and orating CIRCA's communiqués to the press. In this case, it was good to see policy points quoted along with madcappery. The *Daily Star* of 2 July noted, "as thousands of protesters set up camp in the capital, clown leader Colonel Oftruth said:

'The only real way to end poverty, in the global south or in the suburbs of Edinburgh, is to stop the great eight's amusingly anti-social habits'".[10] The *Daily Express* of 2 July 2005 drew a longer quote:

> The Clandestine Insurgent Rebel Clown Army took to the streets to brand Gordon Brown and International Development Secretary Hillary Benn "dangerous extremists". (2002)
>
> The army's spokesman, who identified himself only as "Colonel Oftruth," said: "The only real way to end poverty is to stop the great eight's amusingly anti-social habits, their rather nasty slapstick routines of kicking the poorer nations with war, arms sales and bullying trade policies, manipulating their markets and plundering their resources while dangling the crumbs of debt forgiveness."

Our intent was to change the hegemonic discourse around the impending global justice demonstrations, reversing the rhetoric of criminalization and "anti-social elements" to where we felt it better applied, and making points about troubling policy issues while wearing the red nose. The red nose was an ambivalent tool here—it both amplified our voice by attracting attention and made us more absurd. Getting the balance just right was the challenge. Our mandate was to attract attention as a bizarre novelty item and then to flip the tone of the performance at just the right time to make the point. We did not always succeed, but we had our moments.

Press coverage of CIRCA served to disrupt the hegemonologue that depicted protesters as violent and dangerous. Even in right-wing newspapers that were hostile to the movement's agenda, quotes and photographs of CIRCA members provided a cognitive dissonance to the reactionary storyline. On one such page of the *Daily Mirror*, under the huge headline "RIOT POLICE … 1 ANARCHISTS … 0: G-Hate Aggro Kicks-off as Cops Crush Violent Protesters," and next to a photograph of a beaten protestor, is the image of Trixie kissing the shield of a smiling policeman, with the subtitle of "KISS AND MAKEUP: Member of the Rebel Clowns plants smacker on cop riot shield." The *Daily Mail* also showed a picture of Trixie's kiss next to a photograph of a female protestor being arrested by heavily armored police, and this image was reproduced in American newspapers as well (Johnson 2005).[11] These images may have disrupted the constant barrage of dehumanizing rhetoric about protestors, if only from the jarring juxtaposition of the visuals above the denunciatory text. A reader might have wondered, if only for a split second: if these protesters

appeared to be clowning around and kissing shields, why were they being beaten and arrested?

The image of Trixie kissing the riot shield is an example of what I refer to as an *irresistible image*, an image so compelling or strange or surprising that even one's ideological opponents will reproduce it—even if it undermines their own narrative (and even if only because they know all of their competitors will be publishing it). The value of an irresistible image should not be overstated; it is just one tool in the activist toolbox, and a tricky one to use, but it can be a useful one in the cultural "air war" aspect of social movement struggle.

CIRCA's years-long tradition of stuffing our pockets with silly things to create a spectacle mocking the search-and-seizure surveillance state paid off during this carnival. A reporter for the *Scotsman* noted:

> Earlier in the day, and on a lighter note, the Rebel Clown Army had been detained while putting on their makeup and red noses. Police found an artillery of weapons including a feather duster, water pistols and soapy bubbles. About 30 of the clowns—who wore an unusual combination of army combats, neon pink wigs, colanders on their heads and other fluffy accessories—were surrounded by police in Teviot Place. Some clowns ran away giggling but others were forced to wait while they were searched by police. All the clowns insisted on speaking in high-pitched voices, dancing around and making jokes […].[12] (Brown et al. 2005)

Despite very real clashes between police and citizens during the Carnival, such press coverage undermined the rhetoric from the state about the threat of violent protestors.

Like the Gnomes, the Pixies, and other ludic-carnivalesque protesters, CIRCA also used fraternization as a tactical-carnivalesque technique for subverting the dominant paradigm of both policing and protest. On the highway approaching Gleneagles, a group of rebel clowns came upon four patrolmen guarding a bridge. The clowns asked them if they wanted to play a game, and they agreed. After an explanation of the rules to "Giants, Wizards and Goblins", the two sides huddled to choose a strategy, then grinningly lined up facing each other. On the count of three, both lines simultaneously aimed their outstretched arms at each other and wiggled their fingers as if casting a spell. The bobbies and the clowns had both chosen the "Wizard" option. They immediately obeyed the hallowed rule of the game: if both sides choose the same creature, they have to

hug. Which they dutifully did. The embrace between police-wizards and clown-wizards after days of conflict was a hopeful, if bizarre sight.[13] While the occasional softening of relations may have been denounced by more hardcore anarchists, others such as founding CIRCA member Jennifer Verson saw it as a historically-proven and essential element in destabilizing power, and making real social change. Activists had established a human connection with rank-and-file police, eroding anger and stereotyping, and experimenting with new methods of interaction.[14] The value of this kind of fraternization had been suggested in older sources such as the 1964 *Manual for Direct Action* (Oppenheimer and Lakey 1965, 75). This is another way to creatively break cliché; in this case, the cliché of automatic behavior in a confrontation that suspends thought and original, contingent action.

CIRCA confronts power by playing with it, resisting as much as possible the interpellation of conventional power relations at the immediate point of articulation of that power in public space. CIRCA attempts to create a temporary, evanescent, improvised carnival space where the rules are destabilized, and new possible relations are suggested and experimented with (Bey 1985). CIRCA's original members have moved on to other projects, but the concept has continued to manifest around the world. A well-organized Clown Army took part in the G8 in Germany a few years later, and in the US, when the paramilitary Minutemen were at the height of their armed patrols on the border with Mexico, a trained CIRCA-inspired gaggle calling itself the Boredom Patrol mobilized to play with, distract, and confuse them. Perhaps most inspiringly, masses of clowns mobilized to confront, mock and deflate the atmosphere of terror and fear at demonstrations by neo-Nazis and Ku Klux Klansmen in Tennesse, North Carolina, and Tampere, Finland.[15]

It is politically more costly to club a clown on camera than it would be to do the same thing to a demonstrator. Or a masked Black Bloc anar-kid. Incidentally, CIRCA training includes how to respond to police shoving or poking with clubs: (a) respond as if being tickled; (b) when shoved, give way, but spin round and round like multicolored tops down the street.

These carnival-inspired power plays can be problematic. While the experience of training and playing with CIRCA, or with carnivalesque protest in general, can be liberating for individual participants, these actions in and of themselves only hint at a better, possible world. Tactical carnival does not change the fundamental relations of production or distribution in the greater society. The liberatory spaces it creates are quickly dispersed,

either by the force of the state or by the inevitable need of its participants to eventually get back to work.

Indeed, these spaces, while embracing a carnivalesque egalitarianism, are not equally open to all. The cost of participation is more easily faced by those with the resources to be able to endure arrest. Race or class privilege lessens the risks and penalties of confrontation with the state. For an account of the community-sustaining clowning among working-class African-American youth in Los Angeles, see the movie *RIZE*[16] (Shepard 2005). The clowns of CIRCA wore white face paint, but most were also white beneath the paint.

While rebel clowning is a joyful way to find courage and to play with power, there is a necessary element of sorrow or even despair mixed into these performances. It should be used sparingly as its outrageous tone does not fit every confrontation. However, no single tactic can solve the problems that the global justice movement confronts, and clowning is only one tactic among many in the ongoing experiment of resistance. Indeed, the danger of becoming predictable demands that tactical carnival create a space for constant experimentation with new ideas and non-violent tactics. It may not be what Bakhtin had in mind, but tactical carnival is a permanent addition to the ever-evolving repertoire of contention for social movements to draw upon.

Notes

1. Young, Z. (aka Private Individual, CIRCA). (2005). Personal video footage of CIRCA actions.
2. Authentic rebel clown spelling of "Yay".
3. 10,000 officers had been brought up from England to police the city. For historical reasons, many local Scotts resented this intrusion from the south more than they did the bizarre protests.
4. N.a. (2003). Clandestine clowns. *Scotsman*, 20 November. See also Colonel Oftruth's description of the action at http://www.redpepper.org.uk/Keeping-alive-this-historic/ (accessed 18 October 2015).
5. The ammunition was a reference to the recent incident when President Bush had choked on a pretzel. Harsh and ridiculous, the humor was in tone with the event and the tradition of the *bouffon* or grotesque clown.

6. Bogad, L. M. (2016). *Electoral Guerrilla Theatre* (2nd ed.). New York: Routledge.
7. This collective was composed of highly active and engaged artist-activist-organizers, especially John Jordan and Katharine Ainger, who are still engaged on the forefront of praxis in creative direct action, and in radical research and investigative journalism, respectively (Ainger 2004).
8. N.a. (2005). "G8 anarchists planning to send in the clowns". *Daily Mail*, 26 May.
9. Herbert, D. (2005). "Militants send in the clowns". *The Sun*, 26 May.
10. N.a. (2005). "Fears of a clown". *Daily Star*, 2 July.
11. Moore, R., & McGregor, R. (2005). "Riot police...1 anarchists...0: G-hate agro kicks-off as cops crush violent protestors". *Daily Mirror*, 5 July, p. 4; Madeley G., Macaskill, G. Tait, G., & Graham, G. (2005). "The carnival that turned sour". *Daily Mail*, 5 July, p. 2.
12. Brown, A., Gray, L., Howie, M., & McGinty, S. (2005). "The carnival turns into anarchy". *Scotsman*, 5 July, pp. 4–5.
13. Young, Z. (2005). Op. cit.
14. Jennifer Verson, in conversation with author, 3 July 2005.
15. Rivas, J. (2014). "Neo Nazi immigration protest met with clown counter-protest". *Huffington Post*, 12 December. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/12/neo-nazi-protest-immigration-clown_n_2118945.html (accessed 18 October 2015). Santos, A. (2014). Clowns attack KKK rally in Charlotte, NC with humor. *ColorLines*, 12 December. http://colorlines.com/archives/2012/11/clowns_use_humor_to_protest_kkk_rally_in_charlotte_nc.html (accessed 18 October 2015). N.a. (2007). Clowns kicked KKK asses. *Neatorama*, 3 September. http://www.neatorama.com/2007/09/03/clowns-kicked-kkk-asses/ (accessed 18 October 2015). Xenakis, J. (2016) "Clown protestors mock Finland's xenophobic Soldiers of Odin," Breitbart.com, 22 January, http://www.breitbart.com/national-security/2016/01/22/22-jan-16-world-view-clown-protesters-mock-finlands-xenophobic-soldiers-of-odin/; accessed 13 November 2016
16. Shepard, B. (2005, August 16). "The new model army of clowns: From Rize to the G8 Zaps, clowning asserts a radical imagination of resistance. *Monthly Review* online". Retrieved 17 September 2005 from http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/shepard160805.html (accessed 18 October 2015).

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CHAPTER 11

Conclusion: Popular Culture, Folk Traditions and Protest—A Research Agenda

Xabier Itçaina

This is not the first time that the role of popular or folk cultures in the construction of protest repertoires has been examined. In the French academic context, for example, research on the charivari—one of the protest repertoires frequently considered in this volume—is generally associated with the 1970s and 1980s. The volume that emerged from the major conference held at the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales in April 1977 (Le Goff and Schmitt 1981) is generally considered a landmark in this respect; *Le Charivari* brought together the perspectives of anthropologists, historians and sociologists, and included contributions from eminent figures such as E.P. Thompson and Claude Lévi-Strauss. This key work offered a new reading of the charivari, abandoning the classical approaches to folk traditions for a reassessment of this phenomenon in the light of the major debates current in the social sciences. The contributors analysed the symbolic and ritual dimensions of the charivari, as well as the social positions of its instigators, victims and would-be eradicators, in

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Europe and beyond; it was subjected to structuralist and Marxist interpretations, and to readings from cultural history. For many observers, the last word had been said. In the French context, after this turn, studies on the charivari, carnival and folk culture in general gradually lost their legitimacy in the social sciences, and became peripheral topics.

This volume demonstrates that this impression is misconceived. The changing uses of popular cultures, whether transmitted by workers, peasants or others, are a recurring theme here. Social movement scholars have sought to develop an interdisciplinary dialogue between political science and history on the concept of repertoires of contention, in the sense intended by Charles Tilly. As the introduction to this volume reminds us, Tilly and, in his wake, Sydney Tarrow, Donatella della Porta and other leading social movement scholars have highlighted the historical evolution from a traditional or pre-modern repertoire of contention, described as parochial, segmented and particularist, to a modern one, characterized by the new national nature of the issues that determine mobilization, and by indirect, flexible and modular repertoires of action. The French Revolution was a turning point in this respect. Tilly (1983) relocated this structural change within the longer term and indicated the role of traditional festivities as opportunities for protest. However, these authors, starting with Tilly himself, argued that the modernization of repertoires of contention should not be understood as a simple replacement of one repertoire by another. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, "inherited forms of the past […] did not disappear with the invention of the new repertoire. […] [T]hese older forms were infused with more general meaning and were combined with newer ones" (Tarrow 2011, 47–48). Some traditional repertoires were even rediscovered and rejuvenated when the current repertoire was being challenged by the appearance of new elements, relating to the rise of sub- and supranational entities and the media (della Porta and Diani 1999, 172). This collection of essays particularly illustrates this recurrent rediscovery of inherited repertoires of contention.

Each case study collected here had to respond to the same questions. To what extent, why and in what contexts did traditional pre-industrial repertoires continue to be practised in the modern period, the nineteenth and twentieth centuries? To what extent did the old repertoires and cultures of contention survive or adapt to industrialization and urbanization? To what extent did the old protest repertoires blend into "modern" protest repertoires? The case studies range across a wide time frame, from the forest protest in the early nineteenth century to the Global Justice Movement in

the 2000s, and all over Western Europe, from Portugal to Sweden, taking in France, Italy, Germany and Ireland. This variety militates against any definitive conclusions. However, a reading of all the chapters generates a number of cross-cutting observations. I am going to single out five main points arising from the empirical chapters, which also constitute avenues for future research.

From Festival to Rebellion, and Vice Versa

A first critical point should be made regarding the relationships between the festival, rebellion and folk culture. On the one hand, a series of tools, instruments and techniques from traditional rituals (charivari or carnival, but also May rites or religious rituals) can be appropriated for protest repertoires. Workers on strike will, for instance, perch a dummy on a donkey in order to mock their plant managers. This process needs to be distinguished from, on the other hand, the introduction of elements of political condemnation into traditional rituals, be they carnivals, charivaris or religious festivals. Tellingly, the traditional sermon that sentences the dummy to ritual execution at the end of Carnival is charged with political allusions. French historian Yves-Marie Bercé distinguishes between these situations in his major study on the *ancien régime* celebrations, with numerous cases of festivals transformed into revolts and revolts taking the appearance of festivals (Bercé 2006, 8).

The essays collected here are inspired by both perspectives, although biased towards the first. Protest elements borrowed from folk culture can be found in the popular riot against anti-alcohol regulation in Eskilstuna (Sweden) in 1937 (Chap. 5); in the reuse of carnival codes in the protest against new forest regulations in France (Chap. 9), and in Germany in the early nineteenth century (Chap. 2); and in the transfer of cultural codes from peasant protest by Irish nationalists in the early twentieth century (Chap. 4). The chapter examining the transformations of the charivari in France (Chap. 9) starts instead with a longitudinal analysis of the festival in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in order to observe its politicization, albeit limited and localized. The contribution on Germany (Chap. 2) employs a similar approach but from a wider range of events: parish festivals and religious rituals, as well as carnivals and charivaris. In some cases, however, the distinction drawn above is far from being clear. “Rather than clear or likely transitions from the feast to the revolt”, Bercé says, “it would be more correct to talk about exchanges, because the ambiguity of

the narratives prevents determination of the direction of transition, and prevents indication of what, from the feast or the revolt, came first in the event" (2006, 55). Attention must be given, in other words, to the relationships between folk rituals, events and political life. The effectiveness of protest repertoires will be determined by the subtle interaction between structure and event (Sewell 1996).

An Extended Range of Protest Repertoires Inherited from Folk Culture

The case studies reveal a wide spectrum of inherited cultural repertoires which foster the unconventional repertoires of politics. I am just going to mention their main manifestations.

Carnival, first, provides an ideal "popular channel of critical exchange", as emphasized by James Brophy's discussion of Germany in the early nineteenth century; this does not necessarily mean that carnival has been "revolutionary to the degree of exhorting upheaval or political insurrection". The absence of an exclusive link between Carnival and any specific ideology (a point I return to later) gives this festival its extraordinary versatility and creativity. As Brophy says, in post-1945 Rhineland carnival thus played a role in the construction of a post-Nazi democratic identity. In nineteenth-century Portugal, the carnivalesque rituals of the burial of the sardine and the *queima do Judas* (cremation of Judas) on Easter Saturday were used to symbolically condemn political rivals, at least in urban contexts (Chap. 7). Italian workers also used carnivalesque elements during industrial action in the 1960s and 1970s (Chap. 8).

The second ritual that has been frequently reinterpreted in a political way is the charivari, which as a community moral sanction should not be confused with Carnival in its strict sense.[1] Marco Manfredi explains (Chap. 6) how the *piazzolata*, a local variant of the charivari, was used by workers in the marble quarries of the Apuan Alps at the end of the nineteenth century. Charivari-type forms of mockery, such as mock funerals, whistling and shouting, were also used against moderate candidates during the 1876 Italian elections, notably in northern Italy (Chap. 3), and at election time in France in the 1830s and 1840s (Forbes 2010). In the Rhineland regions of Hunsrück and Eifel after 1815, just as in Catholic Bavaria, the reasons for charivaris (known there as "cat-music") shifted from the classic explanations—infidelity, promiscuity, unmarried pregnancy, husband-

beating and exogenous marriage—towards the expression of new political debates (Chap. 2). The forestry issue, first of all, generated politicized charivaris when the states of Bavaria and Prussia deprived villagers of the right to use the forest, in order to maximize income from this state-owned asset. Peter Sahlins (1994) has shown how carnivalesque and charivari-like rites, and also May rites, were used in a very similar fashion during the revolt against the new forestry code (The "War of the Demoiselles") in Ariège, in the French Pyrénées, between 1829 and 1872. Politicization of the charivari was not limited to peasant cultures: in 1828, the protest of the silk weavers of Krefeld also took a charivari form (Chap. 2). In Germany as in France, however, it was especially at the time of the revolutions of 1848–49 that charivaris became explicitly political, in the narrow sense of being focused on issues relating to the organization of political power. The protagonists then worked on adapting the inherited cultural codes to the new political necessities.

In addition to carnivals and charivaris, the case studies reveal other forms of mediation between protest and folk culture. Manfredi shows how the establishment of May the First as a celebration of the labour movement was fostered in Italy by the symbolism of traditional May festivals and the theme of renewal. The political and poetic work of the anarchist leader Pietro Gori (1865–1911) provides good testimony for this trend. While originally linked to the rites of May, the ritual planting of "May trees" or "maypoles" had various meanings, ranging from celebration to denunciation, both in Germany in the early nineteenth century (Chap. 2) and in Ariège during the War of the Demoiselles (Sahlins 1994, and Chap. 9). In France, the revolutionaries of 1789 attempted to restore the symbolism of the May trees to their advantage. The official planting of Liberty Trees was a fleeting attempt to formally adopt the seditious maypoles that had previously been planted during the rural uprisings in the early months of the Revolution (Ozouf 1988, 217–261).

Other traditional feasts were exposed to politicization. In nineteenth-century Germany, parish festivals were often arenas for violent conflict between local youths and garrisoned soldiers. Religious processions, usually presented as festivals reinforcing authority, could also turn into protest in a specific historical context. Brophy shows how Catholic processions for Corpus Christi turned into demonstrations against the Prussian government and Protestant domination in the 1830s and 1840s, and again in the 1870s.

Many contributors emphasize the role of music and popular song as vehicles for protest. In Ireland during the Civil War, brass bands played in front of the prisons where Republican activists were held. In Tuscany, anarchists drew on the traditional Tuscan singing style of the *stornelli* when composing politicized verses. In Portugal, the anti-communist riots of 1975 also used songs to validate their cause. In relation to Greece, Kornetis (2013) has shown how during the dictatorship of the Colonels (1967–74) student activists appropriated indigenous folk traditions for their own purposes. On the same lines, several contributions, notably those on Ireland and Portugal, highlight the ringing of church bells and purifying bonfires. Some repertoires were directly inherited from the peasant protests of the preceding centuries. In Ireland in 1918, the Republicans resurrected an old method of protest in their disruption of the fox-hunting practised by the aristocratic and essentially pro-British elite. Road blocks, boycotts and ostracism were also components of older repertoires that were reactivated during the nationalist struggle.

Having recourse to these elements borrowed from folk culture was no bar to the use of more modern and innovative repertoires of contention, but the use of popular repertoires favoured what Manfredi calls the "the 'warm' codes of communication": those closer to the language learned in spaces other than the printed page (Chap. 6).

These protest-oriented uses of folk culture are *localized* in response to local cultures and political subcultures. This process can sometimes be related to the existence of a particular industry or labour movement. In late nineteenth-century Italy, anarchism had a strong presence in Tuscany, on the Ligurian coast, in parts of Emilia-Romagna and in the Marche. Specific work-related subcultures, such as that of the workers in Carrara's marble quarries, generated specific behavioural codes (Chap. 6). When political subcultures developed in a context rich in folk traditions, some folk repertoires underwent politicization, as can be seen in the charivari-like episodes of mockery and rituals expressing hostility that took place during the Italian 1876 elections (Chap. 3) and the *Settimana rossa* (Red Week) of 1914 in Romagna (Baroncini 2012). In Portugal, Diego Palacios Cerezales (Chap. 7) shows the striking correspondence of North–South cleavages in the peasant revolts of the mid-nineteenth century and in the anti-Communist Party riots of 1975. This geographical cleavage corresponded to the cleavages in agrarian structures, church attendance and political attitudes.

The localization of repertoires of contention did not prevent their circulation. Anarchist ideas and their use of song crossed the Atlantic with the Italian emigration to the United States (Chap. 6). In Italy, Ilaria Favretto (2015) observes how the repertoires of folk justice circulated with internal migrants: coming from rural areas where the charivari, although weakened, was still in use, workers who went on strike in the 1960s and 1970s in the factories of the centre and north of Italy brought with them their inherent understanding of repertoires of contention. In other words, the very local dimension of the protest-oriented uses of folk traditions does not prevent these repertoires of action from circulating. In the historical cases reported here, the geographical circulation of repertoires was generally related to economic or political immigration, when internal or transnational migrants, either consciously or unconsciously, conveyed culturally sensitive "ways to protest" into new contexts and new contentions. In more recent times, the transnational circulation of repertoires and ideas has been enabled and accelerated by the internet, the social media and the globalization of protest (Bogad, Chap. 10 in this volume). Processes of mutual learning are being reinforced, especially between social movement cultures that share some common roots, as in the case of anti-austerity movements (della Porta and Mattoni 2014, 8). In some instances, similar protest repertoires, including those directly or indirectly emanating from folk culture, can be transferred towards very different issues and mobilizations. Tellingly, the charivari-like "*escrache*", which was originally a technique of public shaming used in Argentina in the 1990s to denounce unpunished criminals of the "Dirty War" was transferred to the Spanish anti-austerity protest following the 2008 Global Financial Crisis and, in particular, to the Right to Decent Housing movement (Flesher Fominaya and Montañez Jimenéz 2014, 19). Such a transfer raises analytical concerns about the effective translation of a protest repertoire across different geographical and historical contexts and sets of demands (ibid., 20). The implicit reference to the charivari, however, proves the effectiveness of a rejuvenated version of a very traditional repertoire of contention.

Speaking for the People: Repertoires of Contention Chosen for Symbolic Effectiveness

Social actors turn to these protest repertoires because they are believed to be effective. This is particularly the case in historical contexts marked by weakness of the state, which favour unconventional forms of political participation; these are illustrated here by the Portuguese experience in the mid-nineteenth century, but also in the aftermath of its Carnation Revolution. An appeal to popular culture gave legitimacy to the leaders of the mobilization: using the cultural codes of "the people" allowed them to speak on their behalf. Italian anarchists at the end of the nineteenth century understood this effect perfectly, as illustrated by their singing of political verses to traditional tunes.

Social movement scholars have stressed the role of emotions in protest, and the importance of activists' claims to be the true representatives of the people in order to legitimate any mobilization. Polletta and Jasper stress that this semantic use of "the people" and "popular" is crucial when protest is directed against a political regime that itself claims to be "popular", as was the case in East Germany during the Communist era:

> For East German challengers to the Honecker regime in 1989, calling themselves "the people" not only inspired greater participation than if they had used some other label but prevented a regime that also associated itself with 'the people' from attacking them as outsiders. It may also have discouraged police repression (Pfaff 1996). In this case, insurgents' public construction of their identity limited the actions that their opponents could take. (Polletta and Jasper 2001, 294)

Recourse to the notion of folk culture has been an essential element of the identity-building process undertaken by activists, to the extent of sometimes exploiting the parallel between contemporary mobilization and that of the past. In Portugal, the memory of the Maria da Fonte rebellion of 1846, both popular and institutionalized, was reactivated during the anti-Communist riots of 1975, as if the northern peasants were re-enacting historical events. Similarly, when in the 1970s left-wing French Basque *abertzale* (Basque nationalists) used the charivari as a repertoire of contention, they were reflecting a broader trend of politicization of popular culture—in this case folk theatre—aiming at confronting cultural and class-based oppression (Chap. 9; Itçaina 2012). In Italy, in the late 1960s

and 1970s, the far-left movement Lotta Continua resorted to the charivari and to other traditional forms of folk justice in order to re-establish a form of popular justice, which was also based on the memory of the Second World War Resistance (Chap. 8; Favretto 2015, 235).

The main challenge for research into the politicized use of traditional repertoires is therefore to distinguish what falls within a formalized ideology, as conveyed by a political apparatus, from what is part of an internalized and implicit understanding conveyed, for instance, by individual migrant workers. These dimensions can be related: a reconstruction of the individual trajectories of union or party leaders could help to link them together. Favretto sets out very clearly the methodological problem that pervades all the contributions to our volume:

> to what extent were these repertoires consciously re-enacted, and by whom? And how exactly did these acts that originated in the Middle Ages resurface in the context of the industrial struggles of the 1960s and 1970s? (Favretto 2015, 222)

This exercise becomes more complex when we acknowledge that the reuse of the "culture of the people" is not monopolized by one social category, as a simplistic reading of the marked contrast between legitimate culture and popular culture might suggest. Baroncini (Chap. 3) shows that in 1876, in Vergato and Ravenna, it was the bourgeois elites who used the charivari for political purposes. The use of a repertoire commonly perceived as "popular" is thus a tool for legitimating mobilization, whoever the instigators are.

A Selective and Tactical Use of Inherited Repertoires

Over and above the construction of legitimacy by reference to the people and popular culture, campaigners, or "moral entrepreneurs" to use the term coined by Howard Becker (1963), operate a selective and tactical use of the repertoires inherited from folk culture.

The selective reinterpretation of "good" and "bad" aspects of folk culture is undertaken by dominant elites as well as by leaders of protest movements. In the former case, the Swedish Social Democratic Party attempted to impose moral standards on folk culture by discouraging alcohol consumption, as seen in Eskilstuna in 1937 (Chap. 5). The new approach

provoked a strong protest, which degenerated into a riot. By objecting to the "culture of consensus" and the image of a respectable working class that the party wanted to impose, the protest revitalized forms of violence inherited from the nineteenth century. This Swedish case study recalls the attempt to rationalize folk culture undertaken by the dominant elites in late nineteenth-century Russia (Frank 1994). This attempt to sanitize and rationalize peasant cultures by reformist elites, with the support of the Orthodox Church, was at its height at that point. The ruling elites wished to eradicate the alcoholism, violence and excesses related to traditional festivals by encouraging reading, theatre, temperance, sober weddings, choirs to rejuvenate old folk songs, and the invention of new rites such as tree-planting. These developments in Sweden and Russia could both be seen as cases of the restraint of popular culture, discussed by Norbert Elias (1969 [1939]). Cultural elites were ambivalent towards popular culture. On the one hand, peasant cultures represented an ideal of harmony for romantic elites; this particular interpretation was taken up by European nationalist movements as early as the eighteenth century (Thiesse 1999). On the other, popular cultures were also carriers of violence, turning the workers into the "dangerous classes".

The selective interpretation of folk culture has not been monopolized by dominant elites; protest leaders wishing to mobilize and channel popular protest have behaved in much the same way. Borgonovo (Chap. 4) demonstrates how the repertoires of peasant resistance were reactivated during the Irish Civil War in 1918–1921: while using inherited non-violent forms of protest, such as the boycott or ostracizing informers, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) distanced itself from this repertoire. Republican activists were critical of the use of traditional "Wren Boy" or "Straw Boy" masks in political protest. In anticipation of the outcome of this conflict, they saw themselves as the representatives of a legal and legitimate government, and sought respectability. Members of the Republican movement also committed themselves to the fight against alcoholism and to the use of public prayers in front of prisons and in public spaces, especially by women members of the nationalist movement *Cumann na mBan*. Borgonovo concludes by discussing the ambivalence of the Republican movement towards its peasant roots. Similarly, Fincardi and Favretto emphasize the mistrust of Italian unions for the use of carnivalesque repertoires of protest by workers taking action in the 1970s. Such repertoires, the unions said, challenged the image of the sacrificial worker and activist who was totally dedicated to the class struggle (Chap. 8). Institutions, even revolutionary

ones, are scarcely able to tolerate the excesses of the festival. In her seminal work *Festivals and the French Revolution* (*La Fête révolutionnaire*), Mona Ozouf found that the French revolutionaries of 1789 had to control the emergence, alongside the official festival, of "another festival", where violence and ridicule were intrinsically mixed and evoked the ritual forms of Carnival (Ozouf 1988, 86). On a more contemporary front, Dorothy Zinn (2007) reports the use of public prayers and reference to veneration for the Madonna of Loreto, alongside more carnivalesque elements, as "civil" forms of anti-nuclear protest in Scanzano (Basilicata, southern Italy) in 2003.

In the same vein, Manfredi (Chap. 6) points out that the Italian Socialist Party (Partito Socialista Italiano, PSI), which concentrated on developing its organizational framework in order to permeate local society, had little or no recourse to protest repertoires drawn from folk culture, in contrast to the Italian anarchists. Many anarchist leaders, with Pietro Gori at the forefront, were also folk singers or playwrights who knew how to employ local cultural codes to reinforce their message. Unlike the PSI, which concentrated on managing its local organization through, for example, cooperatives, clubs and other bodies for political socialization, the anarchists made more use of inherited cultural repertoires such as song and theatre. As a consequence, the PSI did not maintain a hegemonic control over either "the masses" or left-wing political organizations. Manfredi's emphasis on the "evangelical" role of Pietro Gori highlights the role of individual actors and leaders in the politicization of folk culture, thus avoiding any structuralist or deterministic explanations of the spontaneous politicization of folk culture by the "people".

Using a case study from the recent past, Lawrence Bogad (Chap. 10; Bogad 2012) writes about "tactical carnival" at the anti-G8 protests in Edinburgh in July 2005, and notably at the "Carnival for Full Enjoyment" that took place there, expanding on the earlier political use of "carnival", in the Bakhtinian sense, as a forerunner of anarchism. In the 1990s and 2000s the Global Justice Movement had adopted the idea of carnival for its protests. Activists, however, determined a more strategic approach by turning the Bakhtinian model of carnival "into a more ideological, oppositional, mediagenic, tactically targeted and calculated form". Tactical carnival could be distinguished from Bakhtinian carnival by its connection to a progressive or radical global movement organized horizontally to create pressure for positive social change, and by its rejection of conventional and overused protest methods; it was in part a response to more conventional

and institutionalized models of social movement protest. Tactical carnival has also been present in other types of mobilization. In his longitudinal approach to the changing forms of social protest in the Basque Country between 1980 and 2013, Arkaitz Letamendia (2015) distinguishes two protest phases. Between 1980 and 2010, protest action was primarily related to Basque nationalism, workers' issues and the "new social movements" (for example the women's movement and the environment). This followed the classic rules of collective protest, the logic of which usually concluded in open confrontation with state security forces. After 2010, with the reduced use of violence in the Basque conflict and the economic crisis in Spain, new issues came to prominence, such as the struggle for secure employment. New repertoires of contention emerged, with a decrease in direct confrontation with the security forces and an increased use of repertoires of contention employing drama. Based on humour and parody, these new repertoires drew some of their inspiration from traditional forms of satirical theatre, but added the sophisticated use of new technologies for communication. Carnivals and charivaris became tactical tools that were components of a protest-oriented repertoire, whereas they had originally functioned as moral sanctions inflicted by local communities on the perpetrators of deviant behaviour (Itçaina 2012).

The Multidirectional Political Uses of Folk Culture

The uses of repertoires inherited from folk culture have been far from monopolized by one particular political block. A similar protest repertoire can be used by political movements with opposing orientations. In an article that puts forward a research agenda for the study of politics in carnivals, Denis-Constant Martin argues that:

> Cultural practices and products do not by nature carry any political orientation: they are not inherently either submissive or resistant, or rather, just like human beings, they are both at once; they are not necessarily either right or left wing, conservative or progressive, or more precisely they can be both. (Martin 2000, 178)

As discussed earlier, contemporary movements such as the Global Justice Movement have been able to adapt the mechanisms of charivaris and carnival for their own political purposes (Chap. 10). A wider historical

approach, however, also reveals some very different, if not entirely opposite, political uses of similar repertoires. In his chapter, Brophy notes that we must avoid romanticizing populist action and acknowledge its multidirectional nature. He makes a useful distinction between "enlightened populism" and political rituals of exclusion (such as the persecution of Jews in a charivari style in Germany). Along the same lines, Alain Brossat (1992) has stressed the dual meaning of the ritual violence directed at the "*tondues*" (the women who had their heads shaved due to their relationships with men of the occupying forces) during the French Liberation. In Portugal, Diego Palacios Cerezales (Chap. 7) demonstrates how collective attacks on the offices of the Portuguese Communist Party in many areas of northern Portugal in 1975, like the nineteenth-century riots against taxation, were acts of local resistance to a change in national policy. The 1975 protest, however, had a strongly conservative dimension, fostered by the anti-communism of the Catholic Church.

Carnival has lent itself to a particularly wide variety of political usage. As well as having a well-known protest function, carnivals in European and Mediterranean countries have, in some situations, contributed to reinforcing stigma and prejudice, especially towards vulnerable minorities, as illustrated by the representation of Italian migrants and Roma people at a recent carnival in Switzerland (Salzbrunn 2014, 245). Such political uses can be even more effective because they rely on the traditional and ritualized representation of "otherness" in carnivals, whether this relates to the figure of the Gipsy, the Moor, the Jew, the Turk, the Saracen, the Foreigner, or others. In this way carnival can also redefine local identity in a negative way, not necessarily conforming to the virtuous model of tolerant identities promoted by progressive social movements (della Porta 2005). Debates have inevitably been generated in recent years by the continuing presence in some traditional festivals of the figure of "the other", frequently functioning as a scapegoat: the "Jew" in some masquerades in Poland (Mallé 2014, 196), "Moors and Christians" in festivals in Spain (Albert-Llorca and Gonzalez 2003), the "Gipsy" in many European masquerades, and so on. Because of the lack of understanding of carnival's original significance as a ritual of inversion (Fabre 1992), the representation of "the other" sometimes seems like the residue of previous times, or even profoundly shocking in the light of recent events and the current politicization of otherness. It would, of course, be simplistic to judge the original intention of these masquerades, usually forgotten and obscure, using contemporary concepts such as racism and xenophobia; however,

the persistence of particular satirical forms and repertoires into the current era inevitably raises issues.[2]

Now that carnival is experiencing a new form of institutionalization as cultural heritage—something that only very rarely concerns the charivari, whose original ritual function has faded—matters become more problematic. Having long been ignored by establishment regulators, many carnivals have now been awarded higher status as part of the "intangible heritage of humanity". But what happens when in 2013 a Flemish carnival, validated by UNESCO, includes a satirical representation of the local and national policies of the Flemish nationalist party N-VA (*Nieuw Vlaamse Alliantie*), in which politicians are portrayed as Nazi police organizing the deportation of the French-speaking population (De Mey 2014)? The creativity of carnival, whether used to good or ill effect, completely evades management by public institutions whose intention, under the postmodern formula of cultural heritage, is still to retain some control over the unpredictable channels of folk culture's expression. As a counterweight to the negative and excluding uses of collective identity, other carnivals, notably some that have recently been created, of course promote multiculturalism and the greater appreciation of subaltern identities, as demonstrated by the Notting Hill Carnival in London (Arnaud 2010).

On the wider front, Martin's response to the debate on the political orientation of popular cultures is his conclusion that "culture, even 'popular' culture, is not always oppositional or just contentious, but expresses two fundamental values in concrete political situations: dignity and justice" (Martin 2000, 178). The collective production of songs, theatre or dance generates a quest for quality which, in turn, strengthens the dignity and self-esteem of the group engaged in this. Behind the wish for dignity to be acknowledged lies a conception of justice. In other words, some ritual practices, although they may not convey an openly protest-oriented message, nonetheless express in their content and forms the identity of a group and its social skills.

This volume covers events in the recent past and from the previous two centuries. This combination suggests that we should exercise great caution when interpreting the political effects of festivals of inversion such as Carnival and charivaris. Bercé (2006, 11) notes that the *ancien régime* festival was initially conceived in order to present two main features of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century societies: insecurity and rigid hierarchies. Rituals and ceremonies of protection were intended to ward off the phenomena that threatened the people, such as war, disease, winter and

famine. Most festivals reinforced the established authority (*fêtes attestataires*) in presenting hierarchies of social categories as corresponding to an order established by God; these were not fundamentally challenged by the transient excesses related to Carnival (Bercé 1976, 12).

In his analysis of contemporary carnivals, Martin, following Michel Agier (2000), argues that overall they rarely initiate political change:

> [A]lthough they contain elements of inversion rites, carnivals do not imply an upsetting of social orders and power systems. They simultaneously allow for the display of social hierarchies and their temporary abolition; they usher in times and they open spaces for social and political commentary, some of which can be quite caustic and openly directed at rulers; but in the end, social and political orders are almost always restored. (Martin 2001, 5–6)[3]

Carnival is fundamentally a rite of rebirth, where opposition and a subtle combination of order and disorder are in play (Fabre 1992). Employing these forms might foster forms of resistance, but might not. Martin challenges James Scott's concept of "hidden transcripts" or "dissident subcultures" (Scott 1990), which allow the dominated to express defiance towards their subordination, protected by anonymity and ambiguity of meaning. He argues that it is not clear in Scott's work how dissidence might spill over into rebellion: it is one thing to make formerly hidden resentment public, but quite another to organize rebellion and overturn dominance-based relationships. Furthermore, Martin believes that Scott concentrates too much on a stark contrast between domination and resistance: "this opposition ignores important problems raised by the ambiguity of power and the ambivalence of the attitudes it arouses, and avoids the issue of the way that culture is used in politics" (2000, 176). The issue is further complicated by the fact that popular culture refers not only to a social identity but also necessarily to territorial and political identities and to institutional allegiances, as Michel Hastings' work (1991) on municipal Communism in northern France has illustrated.

The issues raised by Martin relate to the broader debate regarding sociological approaches to popular culture. In this regard, Denys Cuche (1996, 70) argues that two one-sided—and opposing—approaches to popular culture should be abandoned. The first, minimalist and deprivation-oriented, states that popular culture has no real dynamism or creativity: it is only a pale copy of the legitimate culture of the elite. By contrast, the maximalist approach holds that popular culture should be considered at

least equal to elite culture. A populist rhetoric would embrace the belief that the former is actually superior to the latter because its vitality derives from the creativity of the "people", seen as greater than that of the elite.

The reality appears to be far more complex than these two extreme positions suggest:

> When analysed, popular cultures appear to be neither entirely dependent nor entirely autonomous; neither pure imitation nor pure creation. In this, they only confirm that any specific culture is a mixture of original and imported elements: ones they have themselves invented, and ones they have borrowed. As for any culture, they are thus not homogeneous, just as they are not incoherent. (Cuche 1996, 71)

Popular culture, from this perspective, can be seen as expressing an attitude of resistance from the subaltern classes which face domination on the cultural front as elsewhere. For sociologists taking their lead from Pierre Bourdieu, those who are dominated react to cultural prescription by using derision, provocation, and, in some cases, a knowingly adopted "bad taste". Popular culture becomes the expression of these processes of inversion and ironic manipulation of cultural impositions. Popular cultures, in this sense, are cultures of contention. Cuche, however, prefers to think of popular culture as a collection of "ways to cope with" (*manières de faire avec*) situations of domination, rather than a systematic method of resistance (1996, 71). Michel de Certeau (1980), in this regard, defines popular culture as the ordinary culture of the ordinary people: a culture constructed on a daily basis through the constant repetition of everyday activity. Moreover, Cuche follows Grignon and Passeron (1989) in observing that popular groups are not confronted by the dominant group at all times and in all places: when they are on their own social and symbolic domination can be temporarily forgotten, permitting independent creative activity (Cuche 1996, 74), for example in original art production. The essays collected in this volume provide a good illustration of this nuanced position regarding the relationship between popular culture and political protest. Reintroducing the historical reality of involvement in protest action helps us to avoid the twin traps of minimalist "deprivation-oriented" and maximalist understandings of popular culture, recognizing the capacity for creative expression by subaltern social categories, but also their relative autonomy despite the inevitability of domination.

Notes

1. This is not the place to discuss the different understandings of the notion of moral economy in the literature on folk culture and protest, in which the concept has been used in ways that are sometimes very different from its initial use by E.P. Thompson. On this theoretical controversy, see Fassin (2009) and Siméant (2010).
2. I had personal experience of this sort of debate in the 2000s in the Spanish Basque village of Antzuola, when the residents invited researchers to help them reconsider the local tradition of the *Alarde del Moro* (Parade of the Moor).
3. Martin's analysis of the political content of carnival starts with his own research into the carnivals in Port of Spain (Trinidad) and Cape Town. He addresses the semiotics of carnival in his description of its characters, its relation to space, temporality and local identity, its styles and performances, and its forms of transgression.

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CHAPTER 12

Afterwords: Old and New Repertoires of Contention

Donatella della Porta

This volume can be read as an homage to Charles Tilly, building upon his very influential analysis of repertoires of contention, defined as what people know they can do when they want to oppose a public decision they consider unjust or threatening—so including the "whole set of means [a group] has for making claims of different types on different individuals" (1986, 2). Rooted in the shared subculture of the activists, repertoires contain the options considered practicable, while excluding others. The various chapters confirm Tilly's vision of repertoires of contention as "claims making routines that apply to the same claimant–object pairs: bosses and workers, peasants and landlords, rival nationalist factions, and many more" (Tilly and Tarrow 2006, 16).

Moreover, they follow Tilly's quest for broadening the conceptualization of repertoires of protest. In fact, while the first conceptualization of repertoires of action has been criticized for focusing only on public display of disruptive action, in most recent work he talked of broader contentious

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performances, stressing the constant innovation in the various forms of contentious politics (Tilly 2008).

The essays collected in this volume also stress the dynamic connotation of repertoires. As a musical one, a repertoire of contention is constrained in both time and space, as in any given place and moment, the knowledge available on "what is to be done" in order to protest is limited. In fact, again in Tilly's words, "far from the image we sometimes hold of mindless crowds, people tend to act within known limits, to innovate at the margins of the existing forms, and to miss many opportunities available to them in principle" (Tilly 1986, 390). This volume confirms however that repertoires are not static, but rather always needs some creativity—in fact, "the theatrical metaphore calls attention to the clustered, learned, yet improvisational character of people's interactions as they make and receive each other's claim" (Tilly and Tarrow 2006, 16). Like in the repertoire of *commedia dell'arte* or jazz the general rules of performance are constantly varied, with some space for improvisation (Tilly 1986, 390).

This collection of essays is especially innovative in pointing at the return of old forms. As Xabier Itçaina summarizes in his concluding chapter, the authors address the questions of to what extent, why and in what kind of contexts traditional pre-industrial repertoires continued to be practiced in the modern period in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries?

Tilly has studied how, in the nineteenth century, a new repertoire of protests started to develop, including actions such as strikes, electoral rallies, public meetings, petitions, marches, insurrection and the invasion of legislative bodies. In sum, according to him, the old repertoire "was *parochial* because most often the interests and interaction involved were concentrated in a single community. It was *bifurcated* because when ordinary people addressed local issues and nearby objects they took impressively direct action to achieve their end" and it "was *particular* because detailed routines of action varied greatly from group to group, issue to issue, locality to locality". It also relied on *patronage* "appealing to immediately available powerholders to convey grievances or settle disputes, temporarily acting in the place of unworthy or inactive powerholders only to abandon power after the action" (Tilly 1986, 392).

Differently from the previous one, the modern repertoire is *national*, addressing seats and symbols of the national public power, and *autonomous*, as "instead of staying in the shadow of existing powerholders and adapting routines sanctioned by them, people using the new repertoire tends to initiate their own statements of grievances and demands" (Tilly

1986, 391–392). Also, rather than organizing episodically at the local level, as members of already existing communities, challengers built permanent, national associations in charge of representing their particular interests. While the older repertoire tended to rely upon the same type of action as the authorities, taking advantage of official celebrations or occasions, using forms of caricature or temporary substitution, the new one invented autonomous forms, with the deliberate organisation of assemblies and occasions for action. In sum, modern forms of contention

> were *cosmopolitan* in often referring to interests and issues that spanned many localities or affected centers of powers whose actions touched many localities. They were *modular* in being easily transferable from one setting or circumstance to another instead of being shaped tightly to particular uses. They were *autonomous* in beginning on the claimants' own initiative and establishing direct communication between claimants and nationally significant centers of power. (ibid., 46)

This new repertoire was considered in fact as resonant with a new situation in which politics was increasingly national in character, and industrial development reduced the role of communities (Tilly 1986, 309). While instrumental to a certain extent, repertoires of action, however, have high symbolic value and normative content (Taylor and van Dyke 2004). The return of old repertoire can also be read as at the same time adapting to external conditions, but also resonating with some normative turns.

The return of old repertoires is also linked to the mobilization of groups that are particularly powerless. As Baroncini noted, elements of mockery and derision typical of *charivari* were used in nineteenth-century Italy against the election of some candidates as well as targeting those who had lost the elections. Indeed, derision and mockery provided non voters with a channel through which they could participate in the political process and express their opposition. Old repertoires of protests are in fact particularly fit to empower subaltern groups. As Favretto and Fincardi observe about the Italian workers' struggle, the irreverence of the Carnival-like forms of collective action

> played a liberating and empowering role in relation to the factory's hierarchical order and discipline of the workplace. Disorderly marching by workers, the ostentatious display of untidy and messy workwear (Barile 2007, 434), the replacement of Unions' standardised (and sanitised) imagery and banners with more creative placards, the enactment of iconoclastic carnival street

> theatre (effigy parading, mock funerals, mock executions) and the cacophony which accompanied workers' demos, all these stood also symbolically and intentionally contrasted with the military and orderly style that had traditionally characterised the disciplined and strictly marshalled union-led marches.

Old repertoires can indeed be very helpful in times of intense repression, as they can play with popular traditions. For instance, James M. Brophy stresses that in nineteenth-century Germany previous repertoires were used in order to carve some free space for expressing support for constitutional rights exploiting their ambivalence, between springtime rites and revolutionary protest. As he noted,

> Traditional protest offered a cultural framework within which ordinary Germans shaped political activism. Indeed, customs and rites enabled face-to-face communities to build consensus and legitimize their discontent through practices valorized by historical convention. The informality of carnivalesque unruliness and the humor of its satire endures for its ability to disarm authority.

A return of old repertoires also reflect some normative transformation that expand their capacity to find resonance in specific groups of the population. The enactment of communitarian rituals by migrant workers in Italy is pointed at by Favretto and Fincardi who recalled that "actions such as noise-making, effigy parading and hanging, mock funerals and smearing went beyond Carnival merrymaking and functioned as a re-enactment of charivari-like communitarian justice. Charivari, which in Italy was most commonly named as *scampanata*, had traditionally encompassed a wide range of forms of symbolic punishment, that in turn drew heavily on the Carnival tradition, such as the loud banging of tins, drums, cowbells, kitchen utensils, the parading of wrongdoers placed backward on a horse or a mule, the dirtying of the offender's doorstep with manure or garbage, enforced shaving of the hair or the beard, effigy parading, mock funerals and mock executions as well as a wide range of rites of debasement, humiliation and degradation which, could be staged in combination or separately. Rituals of folk justice still had some resonance in post-1945 rural Italy and were widely re-activated during the 1960s and 1970s labour struggles mostly by new workers who had recently migrated from backward and largely agricultural areas such as the North-East and Southern

Italy to big cities such as Milan or Turin to enter Italy's fast expanding industrial sector."

Old repertoires are also particularly resonant with more horizontal political cultures. In this sense, Marco Manfredi pointed to the particular role that anarchists played in channelling pre-industrial forms of popular culture and protest, given their emphasis on individual liberty, rooting in the community, and distrust of hierarchical organizations as well as their interest for the subaltern, while socialists tended rather to despise popular culture and folklore.

Old forms of protests emerge therefore as powerful instruments to restore a broken moral order. So, peasants burnt down mills in order to oppose increases in the price of bread; assemblies converged on the private residences of the crowd's enemies; funerals were turned into the occasion for denunciations of injustice. In fact, again in Favretto and Fincardi's words,

> The carnival theatre of reversal and mockery provided Italian workers with a highly expressive and comfortably familiar language in which they could forcefully and graphically communicate their desire for change: to put it in carnivalesque language, 'turn the world upside down'… Carnival practices such as mock trials, effigy parading or mock funerals which took place during marches with employers and government figures as targets acted out a figurative reversal of power relationships and served well the purpose of symbolically challenging authority within both factories and society.

The re-emergence of old tactics is also a way to symbolically build a bridge between different generations. As Borgonovo observed, "resistance techniques from earlier generations were called upon by Irish Republicans as needed during their pioneering campaign of civil disobedience and guerrilla warfare". Previous research had already indicated that narratives and memories trigger powerful mechanisms in transferring repertoires from one movement to the next. Traditional forms of action are so handed down from old to new generations of activists, that tend to adapt them to changing conditions. This makes for long-lasting practices. The public march developed centuries ago out of the practice of electoral banqueting, and survived until today, with an adaptation of rituals and structures (such as the closing rally and the stewarding of marches) (Favre 1990). Strikes and occupations contributed for centuries to the creation of class-consciousness (Fantasia 1988). It has also been often noted that forms

of action emerge as by-product of everyday experiences: for instance, the barricades derive from the tradition of using chains in order to block access to neighborhoods at nights or in moment of turmoil (Traugott 1995, 47).

However, the re-emergence of old forms of protest, which are considered as rather primitive by some, is per se an issue of contention. As Baroncini observed, fear was expressed in Italy by progressive commentators "that the use of these rowdy and pre-political methods might backfire on the progressive candidates. For this reason, party committees and local authorities close to the Left tried to conceal their involvement in actions, which to be effective, had to have a spontaneous flavour". Similarly, describing the Autumn Fair Riot in a Swedish city in 1937, Stefan Nyzell also stresses the uneasiness of the institutionalized socialist movement towards re-emerging forms of resistance, stigmatized as rough artisan culture and contrasted with the "culture of respectability" of the working class. The Autumn Far Riots are then interpreted as "popular protests against the disciplining project of creating a modern welfare society where traditional popular culture was seen as something to be uprooted in the process". Also in Ireland, Borgonovo stresses, while the use of old types of performance, typical of peasant struggles, "connected republicans to long-standing popular traditions of subversion against state and economic elites, sending clear messages to rural society about expected conduct and loyalties", the Republican leadership remained ambivalent towards them. And Favretto and Fincardi notice that "workers practiced tin banging and noise making during marches and enacted carnival-like street theatre such as mock funerals and effigy parading. Such a festive mood signalled a remarkable break with Unions' theatre of seriousness and traditional military and orderly marching style." While these forms of action resonated with the social base of the protest, they were feared by the more established unions.

Old and new repertoires are blended together, however. Diego Palacios Cerezales so addresses persistent repertoires of contention as "throughout nineteenth- and twentieth-century Portugal forms of popular direct action such as ransacking, siege and burning property were continually turned to different political needs and widely used in combination with modern tools of action in a diverse range of contexts, both rural and urban". Bogad studies tactical carnival in the Global Justice Movement, defining it as "a form of protest that evokes and invokes the mythos, imagery and attitude of medieval carnival". As he noted,

> Our movements drew some inspiration from Rabelaisian outrageousness, true; but they were also inspired by the disciplined, calculated, and beautiful troublemaking of ACT-UP; the wild effrontery and symbolic mindfucking of the Yippies and the Provos, the poetics of the Zapatistas, the grim subvertisements and detournements of the Situationists, and many other such powerful influences (we have even referred to ourselves as Harpo- or Groucho-Marxists in deference to the inspiration of those masters of slapstick and wordplay). If "carnival" was a major influence, we had certainly adjusted it into a more ideological, oppositional, mediagenic, tactically targeted and calculated form.

Tactical carnival is in fact presented as a reaction to more conventional and institutionalized forms of protest, opening public space for a freer and more festive direct action.

As in the broad and varied range of historical illustrations presented in this volume, in the most recent waves of protests we also find a blend of old and new repertoires, that can be read as instrumental but also normatively justified. While Tilly had insisted on the continuities of the modern repertoire of contention, what we observe even nowadays are changes that go beyond the modern one, but also go back to pre-modern one. First of all, if the nation-state is still the target of much contentious mobilization, in the emerging conflicts there is a growing transnationalization of protest. Even though most protests still take place at the local or national level, more and more often countersummits have contested international governmental organizations and world social forums and global days of action developed beyond national borders.

Moreover organizations seem to have reduced their role. Not only do contemporary forms of protest tend to be based on a campaign model structured as networks, including informal groupings, but they are also increasingly driven by the actions of single individuals. In addition to newspaper and television, computer-mediated communication has transformed, in fact, the ambitions and capacity for intervention of social movements. Communication is cheaper as a result of the Internet, but, more importantly, it is also relatively horizontal, allowing for a broader autonomy from the mass media. The social media of the Web 2.0 generation are even said to have worked upon an aggregated logic, giving more leverage to single individual and reducing the need for strong organizational structures (Juris 2012; Bennet and Segerberg 2013).

Moreover, the modern repertoire of protest had tended towards forms of action which reflect a particular logic of action. The attempt to influence decision-makers traditionally rested on a demonstration of strength, either in numbers (mass demonstrations, petitions and so on) or, to use a military analogy, by inflicting maximum damage on the enemy for minimum losses (strikes, barricades). This type of political logic had not been abandoned in recent movements, but another, more symbolic logic was also employed, the logic of bearing witness, designed to convince rather than to win (della Porta et al. 2006). Forms of ethical consumerism developed within this logic.

Finally, performances seems to adapt to different generational *tastes* (Jasper 1997, 250). So, for instance, the rituals of marches have changed from those oriented to show unity and organization to more theatrical ones, giving space to a colourful expression of diversity and subjectivity that reflect cultural changes. In the recent demonstrations of the global justice movements, the younger cohorts of activists have changed the images of marches, with their taste for a more playful and spontaneous outlook (della Porta 2009).

Within these innovations, there is also a return to pre-modern forms. Charivari reappeared in the protest against austerity in Spain—in part imported from anti-austerity protest in Argentina—when protestors used a logic of naming and shaming of specific actors, considered as having broken a moral economy, betraying citizens' rights. Students often played rough music, protesting against neoliberal reforms of education.

Transformations in the very characteristics held to be essential for the emergence of the modern repertoire can explain such changes. Capitalism developed from nation-state-based industries to multinational corporations, while neoliberalism brought about broad social, political and cultural changes. While the nation-state has certainly not disappeared, it is now flanked by sub- and supranational entities which possess increasing powers. New means of communications have developed. As had happened in the shift from the ancient to the modern repertoire of protest, social movements seems to adapt their protest tactics to these broad contextual changes. Some characteristics of the social movements active against austerity can explain their revisitation of what Tilly considered as pre-modern repertoires of contention.

First of all, Charles Tilly authoritatively located the modern repertoires of contention within the development of the nation-states that social movements themselves contributed to legitimate. Even if interactions

between social movements and the state were conflictual, movements were able to exploit the need of the state for expanding its competences and, to a certain extent, they legitimated it through their struggles. Social movements active against neoliberalism are embedded in a deep crisis of legitimacy that takes the particular form of a crisis of lack of responsibility towards citizens' demands. They stigmatize the power of big corporations and (unaccountable) international organizations, with the related loss of national governments' sovereignty. What is more, they hold responsible those governments and the political class at large for what they consider an abduction of democracy.

The anti-austerity protests are embedded in a strongly ethical vision. Rather than developing anti-democratic attitudes, they claim that representative democracy has been corrupted by the collusion of economic and political power, calling for participatory democracy and a general return to public concern with common goods. Given the extremely low trust in existing representative institutions, these movements have addressed requests to the state, but also experimented with alternative models of participatory and deliberative democracy. *Acampadas* became places to prefigure new forms of democracy that, to a certain extent, revisited forms of the so-called democracy of the ancients, direct and participatory. In fact, these movements propose a different vision of democracy that they prefigure in their own organizational forms. Deliberation through high-quality discourse rather than charismatic power is called for as a way to find solutions to common problems. In the presence of an institutional system felt as more and more distant, a direct commitment is promoted. This development reflects the perceived challenge in the crisis of neoliberalism: first, the singling out of a large and very critical potential basis of the movement in the heterogeneous social groups who have been hit by the crisis; and, second, the search for radically different forms of politics, which reflects deep disappointment not only with representative institutions and political parties, but also with unions and associations of various types, stigmatized as unwilling or unable to address the financial crisis. As neoliberalism attacked the corporatist actors that had driven the social pacts of Fordist capitalism, the unions first but also many civil society associations once integrated in the provision of social protection, the idea of a direct democracy of the citizens started to be cherished by the emerging movements.

The criticism of the political consequences of neoliberalism was also couched in highly ethical terms. The slogans at anti-austerity protests

pointed, in fact, at the collusion of business and politicians, as "Banks got bailed out, we got sold out". Institutional democracy, in particular, is seen as representative not of the people, but of banks and financial power. In fact, the blame for the situation is seen as lying in the corruption of representative institutions. In Spain, the slogan "We are not commodities in the hands of politicians and bankers" is linked to the denunciation of the corruption of representative democracy. The appeal to take the street on 15 May 2011, "Toma la calle", was completed with statements like: "because our politicians rule for the market and not for the citizenry" (toma la calle, 15.05.11). Similarly, in the USA the "greedy" top 1 per cent was targeted (Graeber 2012, xxi). Given the perceived corruption of representative democracy, there is in fact a persistent demand for accountability of public affairs and the prosecution of political corruption. Beyond the condemnation of corruption, the slogan "They don't represent us" also expresses a deeper criticism of the degeneration of liberal democracy, linked in turn to elected politicians' failure to "Do politics". The latter are, in fact, considered as united in spreading a narrative suggesting that no alternatives are available to cuts in budget and deregulation—a narrative that protestors do not accept. Stigmatized is also the abduction of democracy, not only by financial powers, but also by international organizations, above all, the International Monetary Fund and the European Union (EU). Pacts for the euro and stability, imposed in exchange for loans, are considered as anti-constitutional forms of blackmail, depriving citizens of their sovereignty. Criticism of representative democracy as degenerating into an elitist and secretive caste emerged very strongly in the discourse of the various groupings that mobilized against austerity policies. The EU, as it is now, is blamed as being dominated by the European Central Bank and other supranational economic and unelected institutions, aiming only at defending the European Monetary Union—a "Europe of the banks" responsible for cuts and austerity.

While institutions claim for (depoliticized) technical expertise, protest movements repoliticize the provision of common goods through an emphasis on the practical knowledge citizens hold. The commons are constructed as the decommodification of what is essential to life, with the self-management and self-government of these resources through the participation of the community. The idea of a re-establishment of the common, and of a "commonification" (rather than commodification) of public services is, in fact, bridged with a participatory approach. The commons are also "commoned" through the involvement of all stakeholders in their protection. So, protests and campaigns against welfare retrench-

ment have not just aimed at protecting the material conditions of users of social services and workers in social services, but also contributed to elaborating a different conception of public service as common good, opposing its neoliberal conception as merchandise.

A crisis of responsibility, driven by the choice of free market over social protection, had an effect in terms of sudden drops in trust, which punctuated a long-term decline (della Porta 2015). Mistrust spread as political authorities were considered unable to meet both the old promises of justice and the new assurances of growth. While the turns towards capitalism with social protection had been seen as compromises between capital and labour—legitimating the state as promoter of security and guarantor of that compromise—neoliberalism denied that need for political legitimacy, stripping public institutions of their competencies and sources of loyalty. If corruption, *strictu sensu*, spread with the increasingly convergence of politics and business, the perception also developed of a rampant corruption *latu sensu*, as betrayal of those very bases of legitimacy in the promises about justice and democracy. In turn, collusion between politics and business produced an array of laws and regulations that made political inequality all the more blatant.

The protest framing addresses indeed some of the general trends of abdicating responsibility singled out above, with a very high degree of stigmatization of the corruption of so-called representative institutions, which are claimed to be unable to represent the citizens. Around the world, *indignados* citizens have occupied squares, transforming them into public spheres made up of "normal citizens". It is an attempt to create high-quality discursive democracy, recognizing the equal rights of all (not only delegates and experts) to speak (and to respect) in a public and plural space, open to discussion and deliberation on themes that range from situations suffered to concrete solutions to specific problems, and from the elaboration of proposals on common goods to the formation of collective solidarity and emerging identities.

In sum, while, of course, there are many differences between the pre-modern repertoire of contention and the most recent protests, they do share a focus beyond the nation-state, often making a direct address to the people considered as responsible for a betrayal of a social pact. As in the pre-modern repertoire, the forms of protest express a moral claim against immoral authorities. Finally, the role of strong organization is reduced—not the least by the weakening of corporatist actors in the wave

of neoliberalism—and is replaced by an emphasis on the reconstruction of a community and of commons.

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